microsoft word document4 dear readers, it is with great pleasure that i announce the publication of issue xvi of consilience: the journal of sustainable development. in a time of great political turbulence, the importance of maintaining pluralistic debate increases and is further needed as an instrument of democracy and progress. with large-scale immigration escalated by war, conflict, and persecution, many countries will need to anticipate how to cope with fluctuating populations—not only in terms of the economic impact of such sudden migration but also the environmental consequences. the recent brexit referendum introduces another element of uncertainty into both migration patterns in the european region and into the future of environmental quality controls and legislation in the uk. given these recent events, the editing team atconsilience has curated a selection of papers for this issue that discuss sustainability in population-dense contexts that we hope will prove useful for future discourse. our mission remains to promote dialogue and understanding of issues in sustainable development that affect not only individual communities, but the greater collective well-being of our planet. our authors have worked diligently to provide innovative perspectives to perpetual challenges in sustainable development. we invite you to think critically about their arguments, further our understanding of their claims, and challenge their assumptions. through interaction between practitioners, scholars, and researchers, we hope the ensuing dialogue will offer fruitful solutions to the most pressing challenges facing our planet. as always, we welcome constructive feedback and hope that our work inspires you to engage with the issues. if you have any questions, comments, or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact us at contact@consiliencejournal.org. regards, nikita sivakumaran editor-in-chief microsoft word letter.docx dear readers, it is my pleasure to present the 18th issue of consilience: the journal of sustainable development. the editorial board has worked thoughtfully to assemble one of consilience’s most variegated and pertinent publications to date. the journal’s shortest issues yet, issue 18 highlights a diversity of subjects unified by a pressing uncertainty in the world of sustainable development—that of leadership. each piece takes for its author or subject a different agent responsible for advancing some aspect of sustainable policy and economy. together, the pieces form a patchwork of potential leaders, leaving the reader’s approbation free to identify the most convincing approach to the ever-complex task of sustainable development. only days before president trump announced his intention to withdraw from the paris agreement, pope francis gifted trump a copy of his ‘laudato si’, a 192-page encyclical that cites “scientific consensus” to rebuke environmentally and socially unsustainable action. the utter irony captured in the direction of this exchange crystalizes the dramatic shift in (global) sustainable leadership. the united states’ abdication of its role as a sustainable development champion—or at least, a disposed participant—exemplifies a broader shuffle in leadership roles throughout the world. beyond the international playing field, other polity levels and private entities increasingly assume responsibility for driving sustainable policy and practices. we hope that together the following pieces illuminate this fluctuating landscape and inspire dialogue that will ultimately prompt sustainably minded leadership and policy. in the first piece of the issue, arogyaswamy uses the pope’s encyclical letter to ultimately frame the growing role of corporations in driving clean energy investment. sutton, on the other hand, provides an illuminating view of how relevant stakeholders, including producers themselves, view oil production in alberta’s bituminous sands deposit. for a contrast in scope, we present the ucla analysis of wash (water, sanitation, and hygiene) programs in uganda and lempert’s critique on the un’s 2015 sustainable development goals. the former identifies a clearly positive outcome of targeted community investment. the latter exposes a flawed logic behind the far-reaching sdgs. iyalomhe calls on the nigerian government to do a better job equipping its higher education students with environmental management instruction. goldman invokes the support of the supranational european union to employ new immigrant populations constructively in a ‘new deal’ style. in his opinion piece, zambakari calls attention to land grabs in sudan being carried out by businesses and foreign sovereign capital. as always, we welcome constructive feedback and hope that our work inspires you to engage with the issues. if you have any questions, comments, or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact us at contact@consiliencejournal.org. i would also like to briefly announce our upcoming partnership with jstor, which will be including consilience in its open-access section. we look forward to sharing past and future work with an even broader audience. regards, david medoff editor-in-chief dear readers, it is my great pleasure to announce the official publication of our 10th issue. our editorial and managing boards have worked tirelessly over the past semester to compile a list of 13 articles we believe will contribute critically to the field of sustainable development. issue x is a milestone for consilience, which was founded in 2007. in just six years, we have published over 150 articles, including our features and briefings installments. we hope you will join us in celebrating this achievement by engaging with our most current edition. issue x features a variety of topics spanning different subjects and geographical regions. in africa, oyakhilomen oyinbo, abdulsalam zakari, and grace zibah rekwot discuss the “implications of agricultural transformation in nigeria,” rebecca smith examines malaria in madagascar, and edward anane illustrates the environmental challenges of the sunyani city in ghana. arash riasi and seyed fathollah amiri aghdaie assess iran’s accession to the wto through the lens of the flower industry. moving down to latin america, jorge shigematsu and sylvia sadowski depict “sustainable indigenous orchards” in the colombian amazon, while philipp altmann discusses the notion of “good life” in ecuador. the topics we are publishing are not limited to geographical scope alone; they exhibit global implications. authors patricia nilsson, george davies, and mark wilson all offer unique perspectives by discussing sustainable development in the context of gender, notions of weak and strong sustainability, and the green economy, respectively. andrew wu, jaaved singh, and peter tikasz also contribute a unique perspective by studying student behaviour as a means of increasing energy efficiency on a university campus. doctors seetharam chittoor jhansi and santosh kumar mishra evaluate sustainability options for wastewater treatment. lastly, our very own, hubert chang, and his colleagues present a solution for reducing the amount of energy required for concrete production. our mission remains to promote dialogue and understanding of issues in sustainable development that affect not only individual communities, but the greater collective wellbeing of our planet. our authors have worked diligently to provide innovative perspectives to perpetual challenges in sustainable development. we invite you to think critically about their arguments, further our understanding of their claims, and challenge their assumptions. through interaction between practitioners, scholars, and researchers, we hope the ensuing dialogue will offer fruitful solutions to the most pressing challenges facing our planet. i invite you to read issues x as well as our past publications and briefings articles. as always, please contact us with any questions, critiques, feedback or submissions at contact@consiliencejournal.org. regards, alexandra sing editor-in-chief http://www.consiliencejournal.org/index.php/consilience/author/submit/contact@consiliencejournal.org editor’s note: issue xix, january 2018 dear readers, the united states, formerly one of the key players in international sustainability, suffered major blows in 2017. an intention to withdraw from the paris agreement and the systematic undermining of the environmental protection agency have delegitimized, muted, or ignored many of the voices pushing for environmental progress. an international chorus including religious figures such as pope francis and the dalai lama, politicians from emmanuel macron to koichi yamamoto, and usbased independent businesses and corporations have all castigated the trump administration for their deviant policies. trust in politicians and political parties is falling and populism is reemerging, while natural disasters are increasing in destructive intensity and scarcity of food is growing. given these sobering realities, it is altogether too easy to ask, “what’s the point?” amid this discouragement, it is with great pleasure and optimism that i announce the publication of issue xix of consilience: the journal of sustainable development. this issue considers often overlooked or marginalized people, groups, and ideas. our authors bring to light their accomplishments and potential while critically questioning concepts generally regarded as ‘good’ or ‘normal’. in this geographically and intellectually diverse issue, our editing team has carefully compiled a set of articles that we hope can inspire a renewed belief in and dedication to a sustainable future as we move forward into 2018. we begin with a thoughtful critique of the often indiscriminately-lauded paris agreement by johanna caytas. her exploration of the legal limitations of the agreement is followed by a discussion of its importance as a driver of conceptual change, while challenging us with intriguing suggestions for future international collaboration. in a similar vein, jon schroeder confronts the often-willful environmental ignorance that accompanies meat-based food choices with an investigation into the sustainability of various diets that models the different amounts of phosphorus required to sustain them. lisa dale’s research into the un’s climate resilience initiative: anticipate, absorb, reshape is a structural text that painstakingly establishes key indicators and global baselines. in so doing, it provides a reference point for future analysis of this climate resiliency initiative. in an exploration of the development of sustainably-minded transportation infrastructure, carleigh ghent stresses the importance of a multi-faceted approach to development that values economic growth alongside public health and sustainable ecosystems. many of the articles in this issue focus on local or national implementation of sustainably-minded initiatives. anne steele’s field notes from research in bhutan establish an entirely different set of absolutely critical middlemen, those she dubs the ‘actors in-between’. belofsky and zemskova describe their resounding success in nepal with sustainable earthbag technology that enables accessible, ecological methods of residential construction. kevin fan and sang nam explore the huge potential for geothermal energy production in indonesia, currently severely underutilized. this resource could improve the well-being of millions while drastically reducing greenhouse emissions. nicasio espina jr. conducted an in-depth case study of resiliency in a neighborhood, or barangay, in the philippines. his findings identify useful alternatives that local stakeholders and authorities can implement to shore up resilience and adaptive capacity. in a foundational study of peace and sustainable development, maria fontecha-tiraldo explores the interactions of small colombian editor’s note: issue xix, january 2018 communities with the farc, the now-active national government and environmentally-focused goals. as always, issue xix of consilience continues to push the boundaries of sustainable development. our final piece confronts one of the most pervasive and often detrimental dichotomies in academia: the art-science schism. lauren butler’s introduction of a new framework with which to understand sustainable development is only fitting in our era in which upheaval, both global and personal, has become the norm. it is my sincere hope that the articles we’ve assembled in this volume will inspire innovative, transdisciplinary possibilities, shed light on new or overlooked concepts and populations, and above all renew a sense of creative optimism in our community. as always, we welcome and encourage constructive feedback and commentary. if you have any questions, comments, or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact us at consiliencejournal@gmail.com. ambria benesch editor-in-chief mailto:consiliencejournal@gmail.com microsoft word booth.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 13, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 327-335 variations in elephant (loxodanta africana) diet along a rainfall gradient: the effect of latitude, grass reserves, and proximity to water laura booth department of ecology, evolution and environmental biology columbia university, new york city, new york lsb2137@columbia.edu catherine breen department of ecology and evolutionary biology princeton university, princeton, new jersey kbreen@princeton.edu cricket gullickson department of ecology and evolutionary biology princeton university, princeton, new jersey cgullick@princeton.edu abstract global climate change is predicted to bring longer dry seasons and changing rainfall patterns to equatorial africa, causing range reductions for species such as elephants, whose diets are constrained by water availability. elephants are facultative grazers whose diets are seasonal, with woody proportion of diet increasing in the dry season. in this study, we sought to identify the factors that predict woody percentage of elephant diet along a rainfall gradient at the mpala research centre in central kenya. we used elephant dung as a means to analyze the woody content of elephant diet. we found that grass biomass and distance to the nearest river explained the most variability in elephant diet, while latitude was a less influential predictor. because these local factors were more important determinants of elephant diet differences than rainfall along a gradient, we conclude that climate change will likely affect elephant populations through elongated dry seasons, which may limit availability of nearby water sources. 1. introduction global climate change is predicted to bring longer dry seasons and changing rainfall patterns to equatorial africa, causing range reductions for many species whose diets are constrained by water availability (global biodiversity outlook 3, 2010). elephants (loxodonta africana) are one such species, as their diets are indirectly determined by rainfall and seasonality (laws 1970, barnes 1982, birkett and stevenswood 2005, loarie et al. 2009). elephants are facultative browsers that increase the woody proportion of their food intake when grass availability is low (napier and sheldrick 1963, laws 1970, barnes 1982, birkett and stevens-wood 2005). in turn, grass availability depends on a variety of biotic and abiotic factors, including rainfall, consilience booth et al.: variations in elephant diet soil nutrient content, and grazing pressure (sankaran et al. 2013, augustine 2003, and higgins et al. 2000). grass availability is expected to vary predictably along a rainfall gradient, with grass reserves accumulating where rainfall is relatively high (sankaran et al. 2013). however, soil nutrients and grazing pressure may vary along a gradient, interacting with rainfall to produce more complex patterns of grass availability (augustine 2003). previous work tracking elephant diet preferences along a rainfall gradient has indicated that elephants actively seek green forage throughout the year (loarie et al. 2009). because of the various factors controlling food availability, this green-seeking behavior results in heterogeneous feeding preferences: in the wet season, elephants increase grass consumption while its nutritional value is high and grass biomass is widely available (barnes 1982, loarie et al. 2009), whereas in the dry season, they increase consumption of woody species (barnes 1982). additionally, elephant family groups are limited by the minimized mobility of young individuals, who must also consume a greater proportion of grass than wood to meet metabolic requirements (laws 1970). although rainfall ultimately determines forage abundance on large scales, permanent water sources have also been demonstrated to influence elephant feeding habits on more local scales (laws 1970, ihwagi et al. 2009). elephants frequently migrate to and congregate near permanent water sources, especially in the dry season (laws 1970, leuthold and sale 1973). in contrast to the larger scale determinants discussed above, nearness to permanent water sources may prove more important in structuring elephant diet than rainfall along a gradient. additionally, if elephants’ ranges are restricted by proximity to water (laws 1970, leuthold and sale 1973), local grass reserve may become a more important predictor of elephant diet than gradual changes in biomass along a gradient. in this study, we explored whether elephant diet in the dry season changes along a rainfall gradient and, if so, what predictive variables governed these changes. we expected that at more northern latitudes, reduced rainfall would diminish grass reserves, causing the woody component of elephant diet to increase. likewise, we hypothesized that, because family groups with young individuals will be located nearer to a permanent water source (here, a river or rivers), the woody component of elephant diet would decrease with increased proximity to a river. finally, we expected that when we observed high grass biomass at a site, elephant diet at that site would exhibit a higher proportion of grassy components than woody components. 2. methods 2.1 study sites this study was conducted along a rainfall gradient at the mpala research centre (mrc) (0°17’n, 37°52’ e) in laikipia, kenya. the northernmost portion of mrc receives approximately 350mm of rainfall annually, while the southernmost portion receives between 550-600mm annually. we chose five sites approximately evenly spaced along this gradient: site 1, 0°30’52.1”n, 36°51’38.9” e, 1650m above sea level; site 2, 0°27’05.4”n, 36°51’55.3” e, 1684m above sea level; site 3, 0°24’49.7”n, 36°54’05.3” e, 1640m above sea level; site 4, 0°20’36.3”n, 36°54’41.7” consilience booth et al.: variations in elephant diet e, 1654m above sea level; site 5, 0°17’45.7”n, 36°54’17.1” e, 1672m above sea level (see figure 1). all sites were located on the red clay soil. 2.2 field methods at each site, we collected 10 samples of elephant dung within 75m of the road. as termite damage indicates greater than one year of decay and prevents analysis of dung content, we avoided samples showing signs of termite damage (surface of sample intact, but internal contents consisting of soil and pockmarked with holes). to speed the drying-out process for our samples, we chose dung that was mostly dried. in order to determine the amount of grass available for forage at the respective sites, we took grass biomass measurements using a disk pasture meter (dpm). we paced off approximately 25m from the road and then took dpm measurements every 2m along a 50m walking transect. when possible, we used one walking transect on either side of the road. in cases where our site abutted private property, we used two walking transects 20m apart on one side of the road. raw dpm measurements were converted to grass biomass values using the equation calibrated grass biomass value in kg/ha = -3019+2260 raw  dpm  measurement. figure 1: our study sites were areas located along a 200 mm rainfall gradient at the mrc. assuming a gradual gradient, site 1 receives approximately 350 mm rainfall annually, site 2 receives 390 mm, site 3 receives 430 mm, site 4 receives 470 mm, and site 5 receives 510 mm. site 1 site 2 site 3 site 4 site 5 consilience booth et al.: variations in elephant diet 2.3 analysis of dung for woody components after collection, we allowed our samples to dry in full sun for approximately six hours. we then weighed the samples for total dry mass. subsequently we sifted through each sample, identifying woody components by eye and collecting them. grass components were distinguished from woody components by their hollow structure, yellow color, and shiny cuticle. we then weighed the woody components and divided this mass by the total mass to obtain a percentage of dung that was woody. 2.4 statistical analyses all statistical analyses were performed using jmp pro 10. we conducted regression analyses comparing woody percentage of dung against three factors: latitude, grass biomass (kg/ha), and distance to nearest river (m). to assess which of these three factors explained the highest proportion of variance in elephant diet, we constructed a model using grass biomass and distance to river as the primary predictor variables. grass biomass and distance to the nearest river did not co-vary. we were therefore able to include them in a single model. 3. results we found that as latitude increased, the woody percentage of dung increased (r2 = 0.40, n=5, p=0.25; see figure 1). although this trend was not significant, latitude still explained 40% of the variance in elephant diet. this relationship supported our initial expectation that elephant diet would exhibit a higher proportion of wood at the northern end of the mrc, where annual rainfall is lowest. we also found that as grass biomass increased, the woody percentage of dung decreased (r2 = 0.28, n=5, p=0.36). as with latitude, the inverse relationship between grass biomass and the woody percentage of dung was not significant, but the trend explained 28% of the variance in elephant diet and supported our hypothesis that the proportion of wood in elephant diet would be negatively related to grass biomass (see figure 2). we found that as distance to the nearest river increased, the woody percentage of dung increased (r2=0.87, n=5, p=0.02). this significant relationship explained 87% of the variation in elephant diet and supported our expectation that there would be a positive correlation between distance to the nearest permanent water source and woody component of elephant diet (see figure 3). we constructed a model incorporating distance to a river and grass biomass as the two primary explanatory variables of elephant diet (r2 = 0.96, n=5, p=0.04). together, these variables explained 96% of the variation in elephant diet, indicating that local-scale determinants of water and food availability have greater impacts on elephant diet than do overall rainfall patterns. 3. discussion consilience booth et al.: variations in elephant diet we found that the percentage of woody content in elephant diet during the dry season at mpala was significantly correlated with collection-site grass biomass and proximity to a water source. based on these results, we conclude that food availability is not the sole predictor of elephant diet, and that social dynamics influencing elephant movement also play an important role in structuring elephant diet. while our model shows that distance from a river and collection-site grass biomass in an area are more predictive of woody content than latitude in explaining elephant diet at mpala, the effects of latitude may operate at a larger spatial scale than was examined in this study, especially given the large distances over which elephants are capable of migrating in short periods (leuthold and sale 1973, barnes 1982). additionally, because elephants may travel large distances between consumption and defecation, the contents of dung at a site may not be representative of what an elephant consumed at that site. furthermore, the mean annual precipitation between an elephant’s consumption point and the point of dung collection may differ substantially, resulting in potentially misleading associations with rainfall (barnes 1982). finally, because we did not control for dung age during this study, our samples represented elephant diet beyond the dry season. future work would benefit from considerations of elephant mobility and dung age. despite the confounding effects of elephant movement and dung age, the high predictive power of our model indicates that the relationship between elephant diet, collection-site grass biomass, and distance to the nearest river is robust. during the dry season, local water availability more accurately determines the percentage of woody content in elephant diet than regional mean annual rainfall. this relationship can be applied in assessing how interannual changes in rainfall, which controls available grass biomass, and distance from a river or rivers will affect the movement and behavior of elephant populations at the mrc and across east africa. more broadly, global climate change is predicted to bring longer dry seasons to equatorial africa, which may correspond to the drying up of rivers (global biodiversity outlook 3, 2010). given our findings on the significance of distance to the nearest river in elephant diet, these changes may prevent elephants from meeting grass intake needs, leading to range reductions and population decreases. consilience booth et al.: variations in elephant diet bibliography a. birkett and b. stevens-wood. 2005. effect of low rainfall and browsing by large herbivores on an enclosed savannah habitat in kenya. african journal of ecology. 43. 123-30. d.j., augustine. long-term, livestock-mediated redistribution of nitrogen and phosphorus in an east african savanna. journal of applied ecology. (2003) 40:137-149. f. w. ihwagi, f. vollrath, r. m. chira, i. douglas-hamilton, and g. kironchi. 2009. the impact of elephants, loxodonta africana, on woody vegetation through selective debarking in samburu and buffalo springs national reserves, kenya. african journal of ecology. 48. 87-95. higgins, s. i., w.j. bond, and w. s. w. trollope. fire, resprouting, and variability: a recipe for grass-tree coexistence in savanna. journal of ecology. (2000). 88:2. 213-229. r.f.w. barnes. elephant feeding behavior in ruaha national park, tanzania. african journal of ecology. (1982). 20: 123-136. r.m. laws. 1970. elephants as agents of habitat and landscape change in east africa. oikos. 21:1. 1-15. napier, p. and sheldrick, d.l. w. 1963. some preliminary observations on the food of elephant in the tsavo royal national park (east) of kenya. journal of african ecology. 40-51. sale, john b. & leuthold, walter. 1973. movements and patterns of habitat utilization of elephants in tsavo national park, kenya. east african wildlife journal. 11. 369-284 sankaran, m., d.j. augustine, and j. ratnam. native ungulates of diverse body sizes collectively regulate long-term woody plant demography and structure of a semi-arid savanna. journal of ecology. (2013) 101: 1389-1399. secretariat of the convention on biological diversity (2010) global biodiversity outlook 3.montréal, 94 pages. consilience booth et al.: variations in elephant diet figures figure 1: response of dung woody fraction to latitude. error bars represent one standard error from the mean percent woody dung in each site. r2 = 0.40, n=5, p=0.25. figure 2: response of dung woody fraction to grass biomass. error bars represent one standard error from the mean percent woody dung in each site. r2 = 0.28, n=5, p=0.36. 0   5   10   15   20   25   30   0.25000   0.35000   0.45000   0.55000   pe rc en t  o f  d un g   w oo dy   la2tude   0   5   10   15   20   25   30   35   0   1000   2000   3000   4000  pe rc en t o f d un g w oo dy average  grass  biomass  (kg/ha)   0   5   10   15   20   25   30   35   0   1000   2000   3000   4000   pe rc en t d un g w oo dy distance to nearest river (m) consilience booth et al.: variations in elephant diet figure 3: response of dung woody fraction to distance to the nearest river. error bars represent one standard error from the mean percent woody dung in each site. r2=0.87, n=5, p=0.02. note from editors note from editors https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i1.4455 how to cite board, e. (2008). note from editors. consilience, (1). https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i1.4455 abstract “however unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion may admit the possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved by the consideration that however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.” – john stuart mill consilience: the journal of sustainable development began as an idea: an idea that a group of ten students genuinely and passionately believed had the potential to make this world a better place. the realization of this idea – the inaugural issue of the journal we present before you – represents the space created to keep john stuart mill’s concept of a “living truth” alive. this first issue aims to serve as a stimulus for informed debate on some of the issues most pressing in our world today. widespread global poverty, hunger, environmental damage, and conflict are only some of the problems facing humanity today. as a bold collective of students intolerant of inertia, we push you to understand the urgency of forging solutions to these problems. mainly rooted in rigorous research, the seven scholarly articles in this first issue of consilience all begin to effectively analyze some of these problems from very different angles. aaron holdway advocates for policy change in international law while jisung park roots his review in economic theory. pedro sanchez et al. reveals the importance of science-based interventions for the millennium villages while thomas lee visually communicates the impact of literacy programs in afghanistan. the diversity of methodologies employed parallels the variety of academic disciplines in which this inaugural issue is rooted. the problems facing humanity are mired in complexity, and one challenge is often intricately connected to another. for instance, chikara onda argues that a steady decrease in freshwater availability correlates to civil war onset in africa. in this case, environmental science is intimately linked to regional politics. we firmly believe in a more integrated understanding of complex situations gained through an interdisciplinary approach. https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i1.4455 the concept of consilience, “the joining together of knowledge and information across disciplines to create a unified framework of understanding,” runs through each article. with this in mind, we urge you to be active readers, to not only think deeply about each specific article but also to consider the interaction between the individual pieces. e.o. wilson claims that “a balanced perspective cannot be acquired by studying disciplines in pieces but through pursuit of the consilience among them.” in his field note, matthew bonds observes that the questions that pit economists against ecologists inside the closed walls of academia quickly dissipate when considered in the field. bonds’ observation is a specific realization of wilson’s conceptual thread. we urge you to contrast theory against practice, one discipline against another, and your ideas against the authors’ ideas. the editorial board ofconsilience has high hopes that this exchange of ideas, sparked by the written and visual media contained in this online space, will contribute to the progress of sustainable development. – the editorial board, spring 2008 con·sil·i·ence (noun): the joining together of knowledge and information across disciplines to create a unified framework of understanding. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution 4.0 international license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ note from editors ​​​ abstract​​​​ dear readers, i am pleased to present issue xvii of consilience: the journal of sustainable development. this issue arrives at a time of broad uncertainty. the headwinds of challenged globalism, as demonstrated by ‘brexit’ and president trump’s first week in office, face equal opposition from an international community of alarmed stakeholders, from chinese leaders at cop 22 to american pro-refugee protestors. the optimism accompanying 2015’s sdgs and paris agreement encountered a sobering 2016, in which many sustainable development issues suffered significant momentum-checks. while western powers look inward in search of identity, new leaders look to lead the way for a sustainable future. in this issue, the editing team has curated an inclusive collection of articles that reflect the diversity of topics implicated by these changing circumstances. staying true to consilience’s interdisciplinary mission, we look in settings small and large, near and far as we analyze our way to a more sustainable future. issue xvii invites you to consider a range of topics across polity levels and engage with a diverse set of actors. at the national level, bakari offers a topical reflection of the ‘anthropocentric-ecocentric dualism’ of past u.s. presidencies and its resulting affect on environmental policy. jayawardhan provides poignant and timely discussion of the legal protection gaps of those displaced by climate change. no less relevant is palliam’s examination of a sustainable path forward for gulf countries facing the economic pressure of low oil prices. in his opinion piece, porter posits an environmentally inclusive economics needed to adjust growth along such a sustainable trajectory. we hope that together these pieces, as well as their equally insightful companions, inspire dialogue that will ultimately prompt sustainably minded leadership and policy. as always, we welcome constructive feedback and hope that our work inspires you to engage with the issues. if you have any questions, comments, or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact us at contact@consiliencejournal.org. regards, david medoff editor-in-chief microsoft word bernard.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 13, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 312-326 the effects of mega-herbivore extinctions on seed dispersal and community structure in an east african savanna miranda bernard department of ecology and evolutionary biology princeton university, princeton, new jersey mirandab@princeton.edu laura booth department of ecology, evolution and environmental biology columbia university, new york city, new york lsb2137@columbia.edu abraham kielar department of ecology and evolutionary biology princeton university, princeton, new jersey akielar@princeton.edu abstract herbivory is a prominent top-down force shaping the landscape of semiarid savannas in east africa. herbivores participate in seed dispersal both by ingesting and defecating the seeds of endozoochorously-dispersed plants and by translocating the seeds of exozoochorously-dispersed plants. in this study, we sought to determine how the extinction of large mammalian herbivores would affect the abundance of five focal species of plants that use fruiting as their primary dispersal mechanism. we also examined how the absence of large mammalian herbivores affected seed predation by small mammals. we counted the number of individual plants for each of the five species in three short-term (5 year old) exclusion blocks and one long-term (15 year old) exclusion block. we found that total abundance of fleshy-fruited species increased as successive levels of large mammalian herbivores were excluded and as the duration of herbivore exclusion increased. within species, we found that c. orthacantha and s. campylacanthum increased in the absence of herbivores, while o. stricta decreased in the absence of herbivores. b. aegyptiaca and b. albitrunca did not exhibit differences in abundance between different levels of herbivore exclosure. we found that small mammals demonstrated a preference for b. albitrunca and o. stricta seeds, which were consumed primarily by the fringe-tailed gerbil, gerbilliscus robustus. understanding the interactions between herbivores and vegetation is vital to conserving plant communities as well as understanding how they may change in the future. author’s note we thank and acknowledge r.m. pringle, t.c. coverdale, s. kurukura, mpala research centre, and the tropical biology and sustainability program of columbia and princeton universities for facilitating this research. consilience bernard et al.: effects of mega-herbivore extinctions keywords: seed dispersal mechanisms, herbivore exclusion, seed bank, seed predation pressure, cafeteria trial 1. introduction herbivory is a prominent top-down force that shapes the landscape of semiarid savannas in east africa by influencing seed dispersal and plant establishment, recruitment, and mortality (augustine and mcnaughton 2004, sankaran et. al 2013). large mammalian herbivores (> 5 kg) consume different components of the same plant; for example, mega-herbivores (e.g. elephants) typically consume plants of the understory and small woody plants whole, whereas meso-herbivores (e.g. impala) may consume only the fruits, thereby acting as seed dispersers (pringle et al. 2014). extinction of large mammalian herbivore species that selectively consume seeds and fruits may reduce the overall abundance of fleshy-fruited plant species by limiting the dispersal of seeds and, in turn, lowering rates of recruitment and establishment (pringle et al. 2014, janzen et al. 1984). reduction in the abundance of fleshy-fruited species could have impacts across trophic levels, since smaller herbivores forage on the leaves and seeds of fleshy-fruited plants (keesing 2000, goheen et al 2004). however, reductions in abundance may not be immediately apparent because of delayed plant responses to diminishing browsing pressure by large herbivores (pringle et al. 2014). in this study, we explored whether the abundance of five fleshy-fruited species decreases in the absence of large mammalian herbivores, the amount of time it takes for this effect to manifest, and whether the loss of large herbivores alters how smaller herbivores feed on the reproductive structures of fruited plant species by focusing on three primary questions: 1) does exclusion of large mammalian herbivores reduce the abundance of fleshy-fruited plant species? we hypothesize that the abundance of fleshy-fruiting plants experiencing reduced browsing pressure will either increase because the net effect of herbivore presence is negative (browsing pressure is more deleterious than animal dispersal is beneficial) or decrease because the net effect of herbivore presence is positive (browsing pressure is less deleterious than animal dispersal is beneficial). 2) do differences in the abundance of fleshyfruited species depend on the duration of the exclusion of large mammalian herbivores? we expect one of three scenarios to emerge over time: abundance will increase uniformly over time because the net effect of herbivore presence is negative, abundance will decrease uniformly over time because the net effect of herbivore presence is positive, or abundance will increase on short time scales (due to reduction in browsing pressure) and decrease on long time scales (due to diminished reproductive resources in the seed bank). we do not see a biologically viable explanation for the fourth scenario of an initial decrease in abundance followed by an increase on long time scales. 3) does seed predation pressure by small mammals increase when large mammalian herbivores are excluded from the study system? because rodent densities are known to increase in the absence of large mammalian herbivores and because rodents are known seed predators (keesing 2000, goheen et. al 2004), we expect the proportion of seeds taken by small mammals to be highest where all large mammalian herbivores are excluded. consilience bernard et al.: effects of mega-herbivore extinctions knowing the answers to these questions will increase our understanding of how herbivore diversity and foraging strategies structure plant communities. our findings can be applied to future management of plant communities in the context of widespread declines in the populations of large mammalian herbivores, both in east africa and in other tropical savanna ecosystems. (wiitemeyer 2011, craigie et al. 2010, parker et al. 1989, hoare et al. 1999, barnes 1996). 2. methods 2.1 study sites and system our study sites were located on red soil in the southern region of the mpala research center (mrc) (0°17’n, 37°52’e) which receives approximately 650700mm of rainfall annually. we used the three southernmost blocks of herbivore exclosures in the ungulate herbivory under rainfall uncertainty (uhuru) experiment, which was established in 2008 (for details on the experimental design of uhuru, see goheen et. al 2013), and exclosures established by d.j. augustine in 1999 (for details see augustine and mcnaughton 2004). in uhuru, each block of exclosures includes four 100m x 100m plots. these include one control (no herbivores excluded) and three treatment plots: one mega-herbivore exclusion (elephants and giraffes excluded), one meso-herbivore exclusion (elephants, giraffes, and impala excluded), and one total exclusion (elephants, giraffes, impala, and dikdiks excluded). all plots in uhuru are accessible to rodents and hares (pringle et al. 2014). in the augustine exclosures, each block includes one 70m x 70m herbivore exclusion treatment adjacent to a 70m x 70m control plot. the treatment in augustine is comparable to the meso-herbivore exclusion in uhuru because both exclude herbivores approximately the size of impala and above. our study focused on five species of fleshy-fruited plants: cyathula orthacantha, solanum campylacanthum, opuntia stricta, boscia albitrunca and balanites aegyptiaca. these species were chosen as representatives of several different categories of plants within the umbrella of fruiting species. c. orthacantha, s. campylacanthum, and o. stricta are understory species, whereas b. albitrunca and b. aegyptiaca are trees. c. orthacantha is a forb, s. campylacanthum is a woody shrub, and o. stricta is an invasive cactus originally from north america. finally, c. orthacantha is dispersed exo-zoochorously via its “burr” fruiting structure, whereas each of the other four focal species is dispersed endo-zoochorously. 2.2 data collection to assess the effects of large herbivore exclosure treatments on plant abundance, we sampled three blocks (three types of herbivore exclosure treatment and one control each) in the uhuru sites, yielding three replicates for each treatment and for the control. within each treatment, we performed plant surveys along two transects 60m long and spaced 20m apart. along each transect, we counted the number of c. orthacantha, s. campylacanthum, o. stricta, b. albitrunca, and b. aegyptiaca within 2m on either side of the transect. consilience bernard et al.: effects of mega-herbivore extinctions to assess effects of the duration of large herbivore exclusion on plant abundance, we sampled one of the augustine blocks containing the herbivore exclosure treatment and the control plot, yielding one data point each for the augustine treatment and control. in both the treatment and the control, we conducted transects using the same procedure as described for the uhuru plots. to assess seed predation pressure under different herbivore exclosure treatments, we conducted a cafeteria trial experiment in each of the four plot types in two blocks of uhuru. we placed 3, 3, 10, and 20 b. aegyptiaca, b. albitrunca, o. stricta, and s. campylacanthum seeds, respectively, and 3 whole fruits of each species in petri dishes at the center of each 100m x 100m plot. the number of seeds was chosen based on seed size, where s. campylacanthum seeds were ~1mm x 1mm, o. stricta were ~3mm x 3mm, and both b. aegyptiaca and b. albitrunca seeds were approximately the same size as their fruits (see table 1). we standardized the microhabitat of the cafeteria trial by choosing an area with open ground on which to place the seeds and fruits, shielded by moderate grassy cover nearby. we avoided densely wooded areas, which could obscure the trial from view, as well as large patches of bare ground, which could deter small mammals based on increased risk of predation. our trial ran for 48 hours total, and we checked each location after 24 hours. we collected data on the number of seeds removed over the course of each day. we collected video footage of seed predators using bushnell infrared camera traps placed on the ground in front of the seeds and fruits and used the videos to identify seed predator species. 2.3 statistical analyses we analyzed data using jmp pro 10 and r statistical software. we used an anova in jmp to test for effects of herbivore exclusion treatment on total abundance of fleshy-fruited species in the uhuru and augustine plots. we used post-hoc tukey hsd analyses to compare specific treatments. in r, we used negative binomial generalized linear models, which are appropriate for non-normally distributed data that is over-dispersed, to assess species-level differences in abundance across treatments in uhuru. we used single-sample tests in jmp to look for effects of duration of herbivore exclusion on species-level differences in abundance. in these tests, we specified the mean to be the value obtained by averaging the two transects in the augustine plot and the standard deviation to be the standard deviation obtained from that average. 3. results 3.1 total abundance we found that the abundance of fleshy-fruited species in uhuru varied across different levels of herbivore exclusion. to normalize the data, we used a square root transformation and found a general trend of increased plant abundance as additional species are excluded (one-way anova, f5,22=3.60, n=28, p=0.02). average abundance was significantly higher in the total exclosure than in the control (tukey hsd, p=0.04) and was higher in the mesoand mega-herbivore exclosures than in the control (see figure 1). consilience bernard et al.: effects of mega-herbivore extinctions 3.2 species-level abundance for species-level statistics, please refer to the respective panels in figure 2. as with total abundance, both c. orthacantha and s. campylacanthum were significantly more abundant in the total herbivore exclusion treatment than in the control plot and had higher abundance in the megaand meso-exclosures (see figures 2c and 2e, respectively). s. campylacanthum was also significantly more abundant in the megaherbivore and meso-herbivore exclosures than in the control (see figure 2e). o. stricta was significantly more abundant in the control than in the mega-, meso-, and total exclusion treatments (see figure 2d). we found no statistically significant differences in abundance across treatment types for either b. aegyptiaca or b. albitrunca (see figure 2a and 2b, respectively). we found significant effects of block for both c. orthacantha (negative binomial glm, n=3, df=2, p=0.01) and s. campylacanthum, (negative binomial glm, n=3, df=2, p=0.02), indicating that abundances of these species were not the same across the three blocks that we sampled. however, because we are interested in variance in abundance driven by the type of treatment rather than by sampling block, these differences did not prohibit analyses at the treatment level. 3.3 abundance over time we found that the duration of exclosures did not affect the overall abundance of fleshy-fruited plant species. there were no statistically significant differences between abundance in the augustine treatment and the uhuru mesoherbivore exclosure (see figure 1). at the species level, we found that overall abundances of o. stricta and s. campylacanthum were higher in the uhuru mesoherbivore exclosure than in the augustine treatment (single sample tests, n=3, df=2, po. stricta=0.02, ps. campylacanthum <0.0001; (see figure 3d and 3e, respectively). for o. stricta, this difference was likely driven by the complete absence of o. stricta in the augustine treatment. we found no statistically significant differences between the augustine and uhuru plots for b. aegyptiaca and b. albitrunca (see figure 3a, 3e). 3.4 seed predation b. albitrunca and o. stricta had the highest proportion of seeds taken (see figure 4). b. albitrunca seeds were removed in the control, mega-, and total exclusion treatments, and o. stricta seeds were removed in all four treatments. seeds taken. only in the total exclosure treatment were seeds of all five focal species removed. seed predators included yellow-necked spur fowl (francolinus leucoscepus), common bulbul (pycnonotus barbus), fringe-tailed gerbil (gerbilliscus robustus), spotted morning thrush (chichladusa g. guttata), and northern pouched mouse (saccostomus mearnsi) (see table 1). g. robustus was the only species sighted more than once (see table 1). 4. discussion consilience bernard et al.: effects of mega-herbivore extinctions we found that over the course of both five and fifteen years, plants producing fleshy fruits increase in overall abundance as successive levels of large mammalian herbivores are excluded (see figure 1). because this trend appears to remain constant over time, we find that these results support the hypothesis that consumption by herbivores is more detrimental to parent plants than animal dispersal is beneficial, implying that fleshy-fruiting plant species will increase in the absence of large herbivores. a major limitation to these conclusions was our inability to replicate the augustine treatments; our conclusions about abundance trends over time would be strengthened by additional samples in the 15-year old exclosures, and future studies should not only increase replicates but sample more than two different ages of plots to better understand the effects of duration of herbivore exclusion on fruiting plant abundance. at the species level, certain fruiting species were affected more by large mammalian herbivores than others. c. orthacantha and s. campylacanthum—both understory species—were significantly more abundant when all herbivores were excluded in comparison to the control. for c. orthacantha, this difference appears to be driven by the absence of browsing pressure by dik-diks, since a significant increase occurs only in the total herbivore exclusion. for s. campylacanthum, abundance was significantly increased at each level of treatment and does not appear to be related to the exclusion of a particular herbivore. conversely, b. albitrunca and b. aegyptiaca—the two tree species—showed no differences in abundance across the different treatments; it is possible that any differences driven by treatment were obscured by the generally low abundance of these species. future studies could index each species’ relative abundance against the background woody cover in each treatment to ameliorate this problem. the only species that had higher abundance in the control than in any of the uhuru treatments was o. stricta (see figure 2d), which suggests that o. stricta, unlike the other understory species, is benefitted more by endozoochorous dispersal than it is damaged by herbivore consumption. this result agrees with the observation that o. stricta is also the most heavily physically defended species in the subset of plants that we studied. it is worth noting that the behavior of o. stricta—an invasive species from north america—is opposite from our other focal species, which are all native to kenya. while o. stricta is extraordinarily well-adapted to the harsh abiotic conditions and intense herbivory of africa, its high investment in physical defense and fruiting structures may not prove advantageous in a future where large mammalian herbivores are scarce. we found that small mammals preferred b. albitrunca and o. stricta seeds over all other species (see figure 4, table 1). this suggests that, in a scenario where small mammal populations increase in the absence of large mammals, o. stricta populations may be further reduced due to heavy predation of seeds by increasing populations of small mammals (keesing 2000, goheen et. al 2004). b. albitrunca, which was not affected by the exclusion of large mammalian herbivores, represents a more stable seed source. because of the indirect effects of large mammalian herbivores on seed predation, the loss of large mammalian herbivores has implications for food stability across trophic levels. furthermore, extinction of large mammalian herbivores could cause permanent changes to the mosaic of plant and animal species characterizing savanna bushland by altering the species that consume and disperse the seeds. maintaining the current balance of c. orthacantha, s. campylacanthum, and o. stricta may consilience bernard et al.: effects of mega-herbivore extinctions be particularly difficult because their populations are driven in opposite directions by the removal of large mammalian herbivores. despite the various negative consequences of large mammalian herbivore extinctions, our study indicates that there may be one benefit: diminishing populations of the now-prolific invasive species, o. stricta. 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(1999). coexistence between people and elephants in african savannas. conservation biology. 13(3), 633-639. keesing, f. (2000). cryptic consumers and the ecology of an african savanna. bioscience, 50(3), 205-215. parker, i. s., & graham, a. d. (1989). elephant decline (part i) downward trends in african elephant distribution and numbers. international journal of environmental studies. 34(4), 287-305. parker, i. s., & graham, a. d. (1989). elephant decline: downward trends in african elephant distribution and numbers (part ii). international journal of environmental studies, 35(1-2), 13-26. pringle, r. m., j.r. goheen, t.m. palmer, g.k. charles, e. defranco, r. hohbein, a.t. ford, and c.e. tarnita. (2014). low functional redundancy among sympatric large herbivores in regulating an encroaching shrub (solanum campylacanthum) in african savanna. proceedings of the royal society b. in press. sankaran, m., augustine, d. j., & ratnam, j. (2013). native ungulates of diverse body sizes collectively regulate long-­‐‑term woody plant demography and structure of a semi-­‐‑arid savanna. journal of ecology, 101(6), 1389-1399. weltzin, j. f., archer, s., & heitschmidt, r. k. (1997). small-mammal regulation of vegetation structure in a temperate savanna. ecology. 78(3), 751-763. consilience bernard et al.: effects of mega-herbivore extinctions wittemyer, g. (2011). effects of economic downturns on mortality of wild african elephants. conservation biology, 25(5), 1002-1009. consilience bernard et al.: effects of mega-herbivore extinctions figures au gc on tro l co ntr ol me ga me so te tr ea tm en t0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 to tal ab un da nc e plots b b b b a a a a b figure 1: total abundance of all plant species in the augustine control and treatment plots (shown in purple) and the uhuru control, mega-, mesoand total exclusion plots (shown in gray). different letters indicate that the categories were significantly different. error bars represent one standard error from the mean. (n=28; p=0.0157). consilience bernard et al.: effects of mega-herbivore extinctions figure 2: abundance of plant species in the uhuru plots. different letters indicate that the categories were significantly different. error bars represent one standard error from the mean. * p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.0001. control mega meso te 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 a b u n d a n ce balanites plots control mega meso te 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 a b u n d a n ce boscia plots control mega meso te 0 5 10 15 20 a b u n d a n ce cyathula plots control mega meso te 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 a b u n d a n ce opuntia plots control mega meso te 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 a b u n d a n ce solanum plots a b c d e a a a a a a a a a a b a a b a b b a b b c * ** ** ** ** consilience bernard et al.: effects of mega-herbivore extinctions -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 av era ge abu nda nce augustine uhuru boscia 96 rows excluded each error bar is constructed using 1 standard error from the mean. chart y overall averages mean(overall averages) 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 av era ge abu nda nce augustine uhuru balanites 96 rows excluded each error bar is constructed using 1 standard error from the mean. chart y overall averages mean(overall averages) -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 av era ge abu nda nce augustine uhuru cyathula 96 rows excluded each error bar is constructed using 1 standard error from the mean. chart y overall averages mean(overall averages) -1 0 1 2 3 4 ave rag e a bun dan ce augustine uhuru opuntia 96 rows excluded each error bar is constructed using 1 standard error from the mean. chart y overall averages mean(overall averages) -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 ave rag e a bun dan ce augustine uhuru solanum 96 rows excluded each error bar is constructed using 1 standard error from the mean. chart y overall averages mean(overall averages) a c b d e figure 3: average abundance of (a) b. aegyptiaca, (b) s. campylacanthum, (c) c. orthacantha, (d) o. stricta and (e) b. albitrunca in the augustine treatment and uhuru meso-herbivore plot. the red circles represent the average of the two transects within each plot (uhuru) or the observed value for the plot (augustine), while the blue crosses represent the mean of the plots sampled. consilience bernard et al.: effects of mega-herbivore extinctions balanites boscia opuntia solanum 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 pr op or tio n of se ed s t ak en c m m t c m m t c m m t c m m tbalanites boscia opuntia solanum 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 pr op or tio n of se ed s t ak en c m m t c m m t c m m t c m m tbalanites boscia opuntia solanum 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 pr op or tio n of se ed s t ak en c m m t c m m t c m m t c m m t figure 4: proportion of b. aegyptiaca, s. campylacanthum, c. orthacantha, o. stricta and b. albitrunca seeds taken from the control (c), mega(m), meso(m), and total exclusion (t) plots. consilience bernard et al.: effects of mega-herbivore extinctions tables table 1: seed predation in uhuru by small mammals species of plant fruit description seed predator # of sightings common prickly pear, opuntia stricta roughly cone-shaped, purple ~ 25mm wide at base, 10mm wide at tip, and 55mm tall fringe-tailed gerbil, gerbilliscus robustus 2 yellow-necked spur fowl, francolinus leucoscepus 1 boscia albitrunca spherical, green ~ 12mm wide x 14mm tall northern pouched mouse, saccostomus mearnsi 1 fringe-tailed gerbil, gerbilliscus robustus 2 yellow-necked spur fowl, francolinus leucoscepus 1 common bulbul, pycnonotus barbatus 1 balanites aegyptiaca oblong, orange when ripe ~15mm wide, 20mm tall fringe-tailed gerbil, gerbilliscus robustus 1 solanum campylacanthum spherical, yellow, ~ 24mm wide x 22m tall spotted morning thrush, chichladusa g. guttata 1 microsoft word porter final.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 17, iss. 1 (2017), pp. 220-229 recasting economics as if the climate and global ecology really mattered john r porter department of plant and environmental sciences university of copenhagen, denmark jrp@plen.ku.dk mark howden climate change institute australian national university, canberra, act, 2601, australia mark.howden@anu.edu.au pete smith institute of biological and environmental sciences university of aberdeen, scotland pete.smith@abdn.ac.uk michaela schiller stokholm department of plant and environmental sciences university of copenhagen, denmark schiller@plen.ku.dk abstract the current paradigm of global economics with exponential and continuous economic growth is unsustainable as far as earth system ecology is concerned. to support the earth system and boost sustainable development, a functional and operational linkage between global ecology and economics should be established – which we term ‘carbonomics’. the simple basis of ‘carbonomics’ is that the more fossil and non-fossil carbon one has as stocks, and not flows, of carbon, the richer one is. this opinion piece makes some suggestions about how we might establish such a balanced relationship. author notes: john r porter is an internationally known agricultural scientist with an expertise in agronomy, crop ecology and physiology, simulation modelling and food systems. from 2011 to 2014 he led the writing of the critically important chapter for the ipcc 5th assessment in working group 2 on food production systems and food security. he has served or continues to serve on many national, regional and international public and private bodies concerned with agricultural research, education and development such as cgiar committees; ipcc; international crop science society; european society for agronomy; european joint research programme on food security, agriculture and climate; institut de la recherche agronomique (inra) in france; us agmip and eu macsur joint program on agricultural and economic modelling and, most recently, the barilla foundation for food and nutrition. consilience 221 mark howden is director of the climate change institute at the australian national university. his work has focused on climate impacts and adaptation for systems we value: agriculture and food security, the natural resource base, ecosystems and biodiversity, energy, water and urban systems. he helped develop the national and international greenhouse gas inventories and has assessed sustainable ways to reduce emissions. mark has partnered with many industry, community and policy groups via both research and science-policy roles and has over 400 publications. he has been a major contributor to the ipcc since 1991 now being a vice chair of ipcc working group 2. pete smith is the professor of soils and global change at the institute of biological and environmental sciences at the university of aberdeen (scotland, uk), science director of the scottish climate change centre of expertise (climatexchange) and director of food systems for the scottish food security alliance-crops. he leads the university of aberdeen multi-disciplinary theme on environment & food security. he is a fellow of the royal society of biology, a rothamsted research fellow, a fellow of the institute of soil scientists, a research fellow of the royal society (london; 2008-2013), and a fellow of the royal society of edinburgh. he has led the writing of many chapters for the ipcc on the topic of land-based mitigation. michaela schiller stokholm is a postdoctoral fellow, investigating microbial communities associated with crop plants in response to various environmental conditions, including fungal diseases and the potential for botanical seed treatments to improve plant health and productivity. she became highly interested in agriculture and biological sciences during her travels in latin america 20 years ago, where she realized how essential food security is for protection of the environment, in particular the tropical forests in poor developing countries. during her bsc and msc studies in agronomy and biotechnology she has investigated plant pathogens and biological control organisms, while her phd was about molecular plant nutrition in cereals. the plant microbiome and its importance for plant health and nutrient cycling in the soil, together with sequestration of carbon and how it could be linked to improving soil fertility and food security, as well as mitigation of climate change, is among her main interests and concerns. keywords: climate change, carbon standard, global economy, global ecology, carbon stocks, carbon sequestration consilience 222 introduction both economy and ecology share the same ancient greek language root or prefix: ‘oikos’, which means house or home. while economics is a purely human invention that has no objective existence beyond the minds of women and men, physics exists whether or not there are people to believe in its laws. the ‘laws’ of neo-liberal economics, based on the continued exploitation and use of natural resources and fossil energy, are being increasingly challenged by the physical laws of thermodynamics – which, amongst other things, state that adding net energy to a closed system increases the system’s temperature; an effect one can observe every time one makes a cup of tea. the system in question is the global atmospheric system. the extra net energy input comes from the effect of increasing trace gases in the atmosphere that leads to trapping of long-wave radiation and restricting its return to space, from which it came, thus increasing mean global temperature. although they share the same ‘oikos’ the main systemic difference between economics and ecology, and the main scientific reason for their conflict, is the fact that ecology is a zero-sum game, whilst economics in its current form is not. the ecological zero-sum game arises because of the finite amount of energy that enters the earth system, thus setting an upper limit to the productivity of the global ecosystem. economics being the creation of human minds has no such zero-sum game constraint and this is evidenced by the fact that the global economic growth rate is a positive relative rate – i.e. it is exponential. the question arises, for how long can the non-zero sum game of economics be based on the finite zero-sum game of global ecology? we suggest that we can reconcile these two ‘oikos’ by developing an economic system that values ecological carbon stocks higher than their flows and in which there are penalties for exploiting carbon and other stocks and rewards for not doing so. to transition to a non-fossil fuel based energy system, without wrecking the global economic system, requires that we must base our idea of economic value on the most valuable element on the planet that is carbon. concepts such as the low carbon economy, environmental economics and finance are however not new. in fact we are already deeply enrolled in the carbon economy with carbon pricing, regulations and taxes, including systems for carbon emissions trading of permits and credits (newell et al. 2012). the current carbon market uses various emissions trading systems, each representing the right to emit a certain amount of greenhouse gas (ghg), which is equivalent in radiative warming potential of one tonne of co2 (button 2008). the first carbon offset project was initiated in 1989 (newell et al. 2012) and the framework of the carbon market to create monetary incentives to reduce carbon emissions and thereby mitigate global warming was then adopted in 1997 by the international community under the kyoto protocol of the un framework convention on climate change (unfccc 1998). the kyoto protocol came first into force in 2005 and was then ratified by 191 states in 2010 (dalsgaard 2013). carbon has thus become a new type of commodity, although it already prior to climate change has been a fundamental part of the economy, particularly in terms of hydrocarbons such as coal, oil and gas (dalsgaard 2013; bridge 2010). even though there is a huge concern about reduction of co2 and other carbon and non-carbon ghgs emissions, such as consilience 223 hfcs (hydrofluorocarbons) and n2o, concern and noble intentions are insufficient to prevent further increases in atmospheric ghg concentrations, radiative forcing and global warming (stocker 2013). this requires us to consider the entire planetary carbon cycle and its link to the global economy. the carbon cycle comprises carbon stocks in ecological reservoirs such as soils, forests, oceans and the atmosphere together with fossil-based reserves (oil, coal, gas etc.) and the carbon flows between stocks. instead of trading the rights to emit carbon into the atmosphere as the primary focus of the current carbon markets, much stronger economic incentives to mitigate climate change should be implemented, to prevent the serious consequences we are facing, if we do not succeed in keeping global warming below 2oc above pre-industrial levels (ipcc 2014). the idea of creating a stronger link between carbon and the economy by using carbon as a standard of value and even potentially as a currency has previously been discussed by button (2008) and dalsgaard (2013). to avoid dangerous climate change, a new global economic system should be invented. this would embed strong economic incentives to maintain current carbon stocks (both fossil and non-fossil), as well as strong incentives to sequester and thus grow terrestrial and biological carbon stocks by an amount more than the amount of carbon emitted to the atmosphere, in order to shift the main direction of the carbon flow, leading to a net reduction of carbon in the atmosphere and thereby mitigate further climate changes. this is critical in order to reach a steady-state equilibrium of carbon and non-carbon ghgs in the atmosphere (ipcc 2013) that will not endanger life on earth. we term the discipline of making an explicit link between global ecology and economics to be ‘carbonomics’. maintaining carbon stocks maintaining carbon stocks requires a new ecosystem based valuation of economies developed deliberately to value the maintenance of carbon and other ecological stocks higher in monetary terms, than their flows and in which there are penalties for exploiting carbon and rewards for not doing so, as well as rewards for carbon sequestration. one way to do this is to link currency value to carbon stocks, such that a currency’s value falls if a country’s net carbon stocks fall – a so-called carbon standard for the valuation of currency. developing such a ‘savingvalue’ paradigm would maintain the economic viability of current fossil fuel industries by valuing their unexploited fossil energy reserves and give them a window of opportunity to transition to becoming non-fossil based energy industries and thus a bridge to a non-fossil fuel global energy system. the robustness of knowledge of carbon stocks and flows would be positively related to their value, thus also providing incentive for effective monitoring. we must change thinking from the conventional economically comfortable ideas of carbon taxation, or credits, which have had little effect to date on reducing emissions, or even the idea of ‘pricing’ nature, to assessing the value of economics in environmental terms rather than the converse. this means that the environment should be the dominant and decisive partner in this relationship and not the afterthought. such a redesign requires economists and ecologists who are prepared to think outside the conventional ‘box’, to create and analyse, consilience 224 economic and resource-use models to essentially move onto a ‘carbon standard’ as a basis of economic value. prior to the bretton woods agreement in 1944 that introduced a new regulation of the international monetary system, the value of a currency was measured in gold stocks – the so-called ‘gold standard’, although markets still retreat into gold when the financial system is turbulent. what would a carbon-based economic system look like and what would be the consequences for the global economy and environment of moving onto a ‘carbon standard’ – i.e., from one element in the periodic table (gold) to another (carbon)? these questions need a historical, a climate change and an environmentally focused analysis of the modus operandi of the bretton woods process – in terms of the intellectual processes, the instruments established, the modelling performed and the decision and governance process that gave it life and revolutionised the global economic system post-world war 2. we are at a time in our development as a species where we need to rethink the very foundations of the global economy, in the face of very serious consequences if we are neither brave nor inventive enough to rethink the relation between our global economic and ecological systems. a carbon-based economic system, would in addition to adding value to fossil fuel stocks, also add value to the preservation of non-fossil carbon stocks such as forests, perennial forms of farming and soil organic matter. another way to frame this would be that each country is committed to maintain a given net level of carbon stocks, which means that it could use carbon flows to the extent that the net carbon stock is not decreased over time, but rather increased. on the contrary, net losses in carbon stocks would affect the carbon currency value of the country. in short, the basis of ‘carbonomics’ is that the more fossil and non-fossil carbon stocks one has, the richer one is. adding to carbon stocks compared with the amount of carbon in the atmosphere, oceans account for about fifty times as much carbon, while terrestrial ecosystems store almost three times as much carbon, in which the largest carbon reservoirs are in soils (ciais et al. 2013). plants are the fundamental biological drivers of the conversion from atmospheric carbon into biomass and soils via photosynthesis. soil fauna together with microorganisms are then responsible for the turnover and decomposition of carbon-rich compounds in the soil, obtained from root exudates of living plants, as well as from dead plant and animal substances, which eventually leads to formation of stable soil organic matter (humus) (bot and benites, 2005). a significant amount of soil organic carbon has been lost during conversion from natural to agricultural ecosystems. restoring this lost carbon is a major challenge and requires agricultural practices that increase the stable fraction of the soil organic matter (kirkby et al. 2014). although agriculture significantly contributes to greenhouse gas emissions via carbon and non-carbon greenhouse gas emissions, there is a major potential to increase soil carbon through improvement of crop and grazing land management, restoration of degraded soils, as well as cultivation of cover crops (smith et al. 2008; peoplau and don 2015). rebuilding topsoils with organic matter would effectively translate into better soil fertility with improved soil structure, water infiltration and consilience 225 moisture holding-capacity, and availability of essential plant nutrients, including nitrogen, phosphorus and sulphur (berg and mcclaugherty 2014). there is thus a strong alignment between enhancing carbon stocks and meeting the major challenge of future food security (porter et al. 2013). a carbon-based transformation of the global economy in previous times the human trading system was largely a carbon transfer system (food, timber, fabric plus non-carbon or embodied carbon goods such as metals, gems etc.). people spent the vast majority of their income (or equivalent) on accessing these carbon forms either directly or indirectly. life was tough for many. however in the last 100 years this outlay has dropped dramatically in the developed world (wesley 2016), whilst it remains high in many developing countries where people/economies are much more strongly reliant on primary production. in developed countries, there is a close coupling of this decline in relative expenditure on carbon-based items such as food and the increasing reliance on fossil carbon for energy. addressing climate change will require a decoupling of these different carbon economic elements (e.g. keeping food prices manageable or transport effective whilst reducing ghg emissions). a fundamental issue is whether to view carbon as a commodity or as a currency (button 2008; porter and wratten 2015), if the aim is to reduce the atmospheric concentration of the gas. categorization as a commodity (like wheat or a metal) invites emission control methods such as carbon taxes or trading of the commodity – methods that have not generally yielded the desired outcomes of substantial reductions in carbon emissions. from an ecological viewpoint seeing carbon as a currency makes more sense in coupling global ecology to global economics. such a transformation in outlook would make forests and soils resemble deposit accounts in a bank, referred to as an international carbon bank, and carbon would gain recognition from governments as a currency as economic currencies do now. such a development would link tangibly the global economy to global ecology with parallels to existing global ‘bretton woods’ institutions such as the imf and the world bank. although the above idea of creating an ecosystem based global economy is not completely novel, there is still a long way to go since this idea directly challenges conventional economic thinking about the nature of value and the value of nature. the form of economics that humans have practiced over time has not been static; the initial bartering of goods and services gave way to the use of tokens of value, as a means of easing the exchanges of goods and services between humans, and hence the invention of money and subsequently banking, which introduced virtual transactions. historically, the form of economics has also been dictated by the social and political climate of the period. the birth of mercantilism and the european discovery of ‘new lands’ in the 17th and 18th centuries engendered the development of banks and insurance markets in a largely laissez-faire system; in the 20th century supply-side regulation of economies gave way to the demand-driven state-stimulated policies of keynes and the new deal – this being in response to the overriding issue consilience 226 of mass unemployment in the late-1920s and 1930s. so economics, at its core, has been mostly, and should be a conceptually flexible human animation that responds to the socio-political issues of the time, in a way that improves the human lot for as many people as possible. as keynes remarked in his general theory in economic terms, it is more important to be generally right than precisely wrong. more stable and long-term valuation of currencies could be expected if the value would be based on carbon stocks (which change only slowly) rather than flows, and might even prevent currency speculation that induces uncertainty for businesses and governments. instead of financial stock-markets there would be carbon stock-markets, of which fluctuations would depend on whether carbon is released to or captured from the atmosphere. of course this would require development of effective, unbiased, transparent and cheap monitoring and evaluation systems, as well as a way to deal with changes in carbon stocks that are not under management and policy influence (e.g. wildfires or warming that reduces soil carbon or a pathogen that wipes out a species – like the dutch elm disease). one consequence of linking carbon stocks to economic valuation is that it allows a link to be made between such a policy and the kaya identity (bennetzen et al., 2015), especially the first two elements that relate emissions to the type of fuel used to produce energy and the energy used per unit of gdp. economic theory and experience suggests that an incentive to maintain carbon stocks against an economic penalty for not doing so would of itself lead to lower emissions per unit energy used and to lower energy use per unit gdp – i.e. be a drive to higher energy efficiencies in the economic process. the picture of which are the rich and which are the poor countries of the world might also change radically under a carbon-stock valuation system of money and might additionally encourage competition among different countries, in order to boost their currency value by protecting carbon stocks and re-stocking carbon into their biological reservoirs. farmers who improve soil fertility and biodiversity by sequestrating carbon into their soils could be rewarded by earning carbon credits, which is already a possibility for farmers in australia (koch et al. 2015). based in part on these experiences from australia, the french minister of agriculture launched the ‘4 per 1000’ carbon sequestration initiative for agriculture at the climate conference cop 21 in 2015. the ‘4 per 1000’ initiative aims at increasing soil carbon by four parts per thousand per annum, to reconcile food security and climate change (koch et al. 2015). at a citizen level, reflecting the carbon footprint in food prices would have a huge impact on consumer choices. for instance, meat from animals that have been fed with fodder such as soya grown in areas that used to be rainforest, and then transported across the ocean, might be very expensive compared to meat from animals that have been used for nature conservation by grazing permanent grasslands, in a way that maximises the increase of soil organic matter. conclusions and perspectives sustainable development has many dimensions and these are reflected in the recently adopted sustainable development goals (undp, 2016). however, underpinning many of these goals is the need to link global ecology with global economics in a deliberate and operational way. these questions need, amongst other elements, a historical analysis of the consilience 227 modus operandi of the post-world war 2 bretton woods process. we are at a time in our development as humans, where we need to do this again – in the face of very serious consequences if we do not rethink the relation between our global economic and ecological system, to prevent global warming from reaching over 2oc above pre-industrial levels. in contrast to the above, conventional economics deals with carbon emissions by a variety of economic tools such as taxes, trading schemes, licences to emit, discounting methods of adaptation to impact mitigation of climate change. these methods assume that those approaches that have worked in the past, such as regulating the emissions of cfcs (chlorofluorocarbons) to the atmosphere because of their detrimental effects on ozone chemistry, can be replicated for carbon emissions. but such analogues do not exist for several reasons; the first is that there were readily available technical ‘fixes’ to the ozone issue – this is partly the case for carbon but to a much smaller degree. the second is that technical fixes work when the environmental problem is caused by a commodity and, in the case of cfcs, this is a useful denomination whereas carbon may be better treated as a currency (button 2008). the final reason is more fundamental, in that use of fossil carbon is inimically bound psychologically to our current model of economics – but as jm keynes wrote in the preface to his ‘general theory of employment, interest and money’ – ‘the difficulty [in novel economic thinking] lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our minds.’ similarly prior to the bretton woods conference, the us treasury official harry white, who was jm keynes’ opposite number, wrote the following to describe the political shortcomings of the us state department to the negotiations that were precursor to bretton woods: ‘where modern diplomacy calls for swift and bold action, we engage in cautious negotiation…where we should be dealing with all embracing economic, political and social problems, we discuss minor trade objectives and small national advantages… we must substitute, before it is too late, imagination for tradition, generosity for shrewdness, understanding for bargaining, toughness for caution and wisdom for prejudice’. these quotes are as relevant today, in setting the necessary radical agenda to deal with fossil carbon, as they were in setting the path from the misery of the 1930s to the relative peace and prosperity we have enjoyed since 1944. the macro-challenge of climate change requires the macro-response of rethinking our global economic system to incorporate carbon fully into the latter and mitigating climate change by an ecosystem based valuation of the global economy. consilience 228 references bennetzen, e. h., smith, p. & porter, j. r. 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(2016). 100 years of consumer spending. visual economics. creditloan.com: https://visualeconomics.creditloan.com/100-years-of-consumer-spending/. microsoft word booth final.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 17, iss. 1 (2017), pp. 33–45 identifying conservation strategies for group-spawning coral reef fish in the indo-pacific, using a case study of a protogynous giant wrasse laura booth laurasbooth@gmail.com abstract fish reproducing in group-spawning aggregations face intense fisheries during spawning events due to increased ease of capture. other traits often associated with group spawning, such as late sexual maturation and sequential hermaphroditism, cause group-spawning species to be especially vulnerable to population declines, either because fishermen target large, reproductively mature specimens or because they target juveniles that would otherwise have reached sexual maturity and contributed to reproduction. in group-spawning species that are protogynous hermaphrodites, including species of grouper, snapper, and the giant wrasse (cheilinus undulates) fishing large specimens skews sex ratios towards females, thereby interfering with reproduction through sperm limitation. unprecedented sex ratio skew could cause aggregations to disappear from their historical sites, with potential evolutionary implications. in this paper, i review the unique threats afflicting group-spawning species, as well as possible resolutions to these threats. i use the highly endangered humphead wrasse as a case study in the deleterious effects of overfishing on population dynamics, in the effectiveness of trade regulations and conservation strategies already in place, and in potential solutions not yet applied. using the conclusions of this analysis, i extrapolate trends likely to continue in the indo-pacific region, where aggregation spawning is unfamiliar to fisheries scientists but familiar to local fishermen, and where aggregation-forming species are apt to benefit most from the implementation of effective conservation strategies. keywords: giant wrasse, conservation, marine wildlife, coral reef, reef food fish trade, group spawning, indo-pacific author’s note: laura booth graduated from columbia university in 2015 with a b.a. in environmental biology. she currently works as assistant editor for the nature of cities, and has studied conservation issues in consilience booth: group-spawning conservation strategies birds of prey in california and in a remnant old-growth forest in new york city. consilience 35 group spawning: a reproductive pattern worthy of further study group spawning is a reproductive behavior in which fish of the same species aggregate at a particular site, in numbers or densities far greater than during non-reproductive activities, in order to spawn (domeier and colin 1997, nemeth 2005). usually, group-spawning aggregations are characterized by the release of gametes by a single female and multiple males (domeier and colin 1997), though fish may also spawn in pairs (colin 2010) or in a variety of other combinations on a spectrum of spawning techniques (domeier and colin 1997). group spawning is a prevalent reproductive system in relatively large coral reef fish that carry platonic eggs (domeier and colin 1997). within this broad group, the nassau grouper, epinephelus striatus, is perhaps the most famous (sala et al. 2001, sluka et al.1997, colin 1992). this mode of reproduction has also been observed in other groupers (sadovy and domeier 2005), snappers (sala et al. 2001, grüss et al. 2013, sadovy and domeier 2005), cheilinus undulatus, better known as the humphead, napolean, or maori wrasse (sadovy de mitcheson et al. 2010, sadovy et al. 2004), and some other wrasses (domeier and colin 1997, sadovy and domeier 2005). spawning typically occurs either residentially, with local fish taking no more than a few hours to migrate to the aggregation site, or transiently, with fish traveling beyond their home ranges for days or weeks in order to reach the site (domeier and colin 1997). finally, spawning can be correlated with lunar phases as well as the seasons (colin 1992, domeier and colin 1997); seasonality of spawning is likely a response to optimal water temperatures (colin 1992). group spawning and, more generally, spawning aggregations, are interesting phenomena worthy of scientific inquiry for a variety of reasons. these range from their lucrative fishing prospects for indigenous and commercial fisherman and the problems of sustainability inherent in this market value (domeier and colin 1997, beets and friedlander 1998, sadovy and domeier 2005, poh and fanning 2012), to the potential insight gained for implementation and evaluation of different protective strategies for their conservation (sala et al. 2001, beets and friedlander 1998, drew 2005, grüss et al. 2013), to the awe-inspiring visual impressions they can make on observers (domeier and colin 1997). although group aggregations have been the subject of many diverse studies (domeier and colin 1997, nemeth 2005, colin 1992, sala et al. 2001, sadovy et al. 2004), the knowledge we have amassed both about aggregations and about most species using this mode of reproduction remains limited (domeier 1997, sadovy et al. 2004), primarily because collecting data on aggregations and spawning is difficult. these events are shortlived, tend to occur in relatively inaccessible places, or if accessible, consilience booth: group-spawning conservation strategies tend to be already altered by fisheries pressure (domeier 1997). as a result of these and other factors, many species targeted by aggregation fisheries continue to be depleted without sufficient assurance that populations are not being fished to the point of collapse (conover and munch 2002, sadovy and domeier 2005). indeed, in the past two decades, many species exhibiting group spawning behavior—including the nassau grouper in belize, the red hind in the us virgin islands, and groupers in several indo-pacific locations—have faced local extirpations in the face of fisheries pressure (beets and friedlander 1998, johannes 1997, sala et al. 2001, nemeth 2005). why are spawning aggregations particularly at risk? while overfishing is hardly a unique problem among fish, spawning aggregations face even higher levels of susceptibility to overfishing because aggregation events are predictable based on lunar cycles (colin 1992, domeier and colin 1997) and site retention (sadovy and domeier 2005). based on knowledge of these ecological and biological factors, local fishermen are able to aggressively exploit aggregations, potentially removing large proportions of reproductively mature individuals in discrete fishing events (sala et al. 2001, nemeth 2005, yadovy and domeier 2005). furthermore, in protogynous hermaphroditic species—including most groupers (sala et al. 2001, domeier and colin 1997) and some other group spawners (colin 2010)—wherein the largest individuals are males, fishermen fishing out the largest specimens may unknowingly induce changes in population structure such as sex-ratio (beets and friedlander 1998, nemeth 2005, grüss et al. 2013, koenig 1996, sala et al. 2001, sadovy et al. 2004), size composition (longhurst 2002, sala et al. 2001), and age composition (longhurst 2002, sadovy et al. 2004). sex-ratio bias is a particularly concerning effect of targeting fish of a certain size and can have reproductive repercussions for the entire population. in protogynous hermaphrodites, removal of the largest individuals in the population could lead to sperm limitation, thereby reducing the overall reproductive success of the spawning aggregation, as has been suggested for the red hind (beets and friedlander 1998). if sex-ratio bias driven by fisheries pressure causes severe enough sperm limits so that females are unsuccessful in finding males with whom to spawn, aggregations could cease to form at all (sala et al. 2001). additionally, for sequential hermaphrodites, the take of large individuals can eliminate the oldest, most reproductively mature individuals from the gene pool, causing a selection effect in favor of slower growing genotypes; such preferential selection could reduce the population’s evolutionary fitness (conover and munch 2002). much of the fishing pressure that group spawners experience results from the life reef fish trade consilience 37 (lrft), in which demand for live reef fish, especially in southeast asia, incentivizes the removal of these species even when removal is restricted or prohibited by law (johannes 1997). in aggregations targeted by the lrfft, a different size-selection effect emerges: ideal fish are based on market demand for “plate-size” fish, such that the hardest hit age group is juveniles that would otherwise have reached reproductive maturation (sadovy et al. 2004, sadovy de mitcheson et al. 2010). such preferential selection of juveniles could have farreaching effects on future recruitment and future reproductive success (sadovy et al. 2004). prevailing conservation strategies & their effectiveness for group spawners current conservation strategies for group spawning aggregations can be sorted into three general groups: 1) closures— either permanent, temporary, or seasonal—of aggregation sites to fishing (nemeth 2005, grüss et al. 2013, sala et. al 2001), 2) the institution of marine protected areas (mpas), in which the fishery for the group-spawning species in question is closed beyond the aggregation site (nemeth 2005, grüss et al. 2013, sala et. al 2001), and 3) a general reduction in fisheries pressure, usually enforced via a quota system (sala et al. 2001). while participatory management by communities in the indo-pacific region has been on the rise, as of 2005, indo-pacific marine conservation policy did not incorporate spawning aggregations due to limited knowledge of aggregating species and their spawning sites (sadovy and domeier 2005). nevertheless, examples from locales with parallel ecological, social, and/or economic conditions are indicative of the challenges and opportunities offered by the common conservation strategies mentioned above. in a study modeling the effects of a permanent no-take reserve applied to the aggregation site of a protogynous grouper in the seychelles, grüss et al. found that aggregation reserves— measured in biomass-per-recruit—improved, and the sex-ratio bias was reduced for each of the scenarios they modeled (2013). however, these improvements were marginal and varied with stage of sexual maturity in individuals (grüss et al. 2013). furthermore, for each of the scenarios modeled, yields-per-recruit improved a negligible amount or did not improve at all (grüss et al. 2013). based on these results, the authors concluded that other conservation strategies involving broader geographical protection, such as seasonal closures of the entire fishery for the grouper (especially where spawning and non-spawning areas overlap), or reduced fishing overall, would likely be more successful (grüss et al. 2013). consilience booth: group-spawning conservation strategies a study of a red hind (epinephelus guttatus) aggregation in st. thomas examined possible effects of the strategies suggested by grüss et al. in this observational study, the average size of individuals, average density and biomass of spawners, and maximum spawning density were measured before and after the implementation of a permanent mpa designed to protect an important e. guttatus spawning aggregation (nemeth 2005). after permanent closure of the area to fishing, nemeth found each of the above indices to increase significantly: the maximum total length of male red hind increased by seven centimeters., the average density and biomass of spawners increased by >60%, and the maximum spawning density more than doubled (nemeth 2005). the author also suspected that the closure of the mpa contributed to the overall increase in the size of red hind caught in the extant commercial fishery beyond the boundaries of the mpa (nemeth 2005). in light of these results, policymakers should conclude that even permanent protection of spawning sites is not sufficient protection for species that group spawn in aggregations; rather, full protection of a geographical range broader than and encompassing the spawning aggregation must be instituted for successful recovery from overfishing (grüss et al. 2013, nemeth 2005). of course, suggesting the implementation of such strict conservation measures is relatively simple for waters in the jurisdiction of wealthy nations such as the united states, where the potential immediate profit of the fishery can be overlooked for the purposes of the inherent value of the species, or for the purposes of serving the long-sighted view that protecting the species now could facilitate a sustainable fishery in the future (sadovy and domeier 2005). some group-spawning species, however, do not have endemic ranges in such bureaucratically smooth-sailing regions, and their plight is representative of the many socioeconomic factors at play in achieving effective conservation (poh and fanning 2012). thus, in order to understand the unique challenges of conservation in one such ecologically vibrant region— the indo-pacific—i will now examine an emblematic protogynous group spawner native to that region: the humphead wrasse. a case study: the humphead wrasse, cheilinus undulatus (pisces: labridae) natural history the humphead wrasse, also known as the maori wrasse and as the napoleon wrasse, is a giant among labridae, measuring up to over two meters long and weighing up to 190 kg (sadovy et al. 2004). its range extends across most of the indo-pacific; it naturally occurs in low-densities except when aggregating to spawn, at which time groups of between tens to about 100 humpheads gather (sadovy et al. 2004). like most protogynous hermaphrodites, it is long-lived and consilience 39 late-maturing, living about thirty years and becoming sexually viable at approximately five years old (sadovy et al. 2004). humphead wrasses are residential spawners and may spawn as often as every day (colin 2010). the humphead wrasse is considered an endangered species by the international union for the conservation of nature (iucn) and is listed under appendix ii by the convention on international trade in endangered species (cites) of flora and fauna (poh and fanning 2012). cultural importance the humphead wrasse has long held significance for a variety of cultural groups in the indo-pacific, a fact that researchers speculate may account for the proliferation of names that exist to identify the species at different life stages and colorations (sadovy et al. 2004). in these cultures, consumption of humphead wrasse has typically been reserved for royalty, chiefs, elders, or other community members in positions of power in palau, the cook islands, fiji, pohnpei, and the carteret islands of papua new guinea (sadovy et al. 2004). in papua new guinea, access to the fish is gendered— women are not permitted to consume it—and it has had a role in defining gender roles in guam, where spearing a humphead wrasse was once a rite of passing into manhood (sadovy et al. 2004). today, however, the cultural role of the humphead wrasse has been superseded by its leading role in traditional peoples’ scramble to earn a fraction of the profits available in the burgeoning live reef fish food trade (lrfft) (barber and pratt 1997, sadovy et al. 2004, poh and fanning 2012). commercial importance and its accompanying threats although the humphead wrasse is also targeted in low volumes for the chilled fish trade and for the aquarium trade, it is most severely threatened by its very high relative value in the lrfft (sadovy et al. 2004, barber and pratt 1997, poh and fanning 2012). in 2004, the value of a humphead wrasse weighing 0.5-1.0 kg—a “plate-size” fish—ranged from us$3 to $60 per kg. (sadovy et al. 2004). profits from selling humphead wrasse are the primary cause of illegal, unregulated, and unreported (or iuu) trade in the fish in malaysia, where fisherman engaged in iuu activities can earn a salary between three times and ten times greater than the average nonparticipating artisanal fisherman (poh and fanning 2012). purveying humphead wrasse for the lrfft is not only associated with sizeable export profits in indonesia, malaysia, and the philippines (sadovy et al. 2004), it also underpins ecotourism in many indo-pacific nations. both local and international tourists—primarily from asia—have come to expect the rare species to be available live for immediate cooking and serving in exchange for competitive prices; “plate-size” consilience booth: group-spawning conservation strategies fish can earn up to us$ 300 per plate (barber and pratt 1997). in sabah, malaysia, for example, the high demand for c. undulatus has promoted the development of a smuggling hub from the philippines, where trade in the species is illegal (poh and fanning 2012). perhaps one of the most disturbing trends perpetuated by the demand for humphead wrasse in the lrfft is the use of destructive harvesting techniques such as cyanide poisoning and explosives (barber and pratt 1997). because humphead wrasse are naturally shy fish, they are difficult to catch by traditional methods such as hook and line (sadovy et al. 2004). as a result, the use of cyanide as a stunning agent has become widespread, driven by the high additional profits to be made by using such technique. indeed, the use of cyanide and explosives has been found to increase profits for an individual fisherman by up to ten times (poh and fanning 2012). cyanide use represents a potent threat not only to the fish captured—a high proportion of which die in transit—but also to non-target fish, to the coral reef itself, and to the fisherman using the method (barber and pratt 1997). when cyanide solutions are sprayed onto coral reefs, it induces bleaching, killing the corals. furthermore, implementing cyanide techniques with primitive diving apparatuses, as is done by local fishers, is often dangerous and can result in decompression sickness. on a larger scale, bleaching corals represents a significant threat to the long-term economic and food security of artisanal fishermen, who rely on the reefs for their livelihoods (barber and pratt 1997). for protogynous hermaphrodites such as humphead wrasse, a second trend related to commercial importance is worth noting: the explosion of the lrfft has been accompanied by a sharp increase in demand for “plate-size” fish, weighing in at about 0.5-1.0 kg (sadovy et al. 2004). in turn, this demand has caused preferential selection of juveniles that fall within this size range or slightly below because they can be grown out in floating cages until they are large enough to sell (sadovy et al. 2004). such preferential selection threatens the reproductive stability of the species because juveniles in this size range would otherwise have reached full reproductive maturity, but are instead lost to the lrfft (sadovy et al. 2004). the threats identified here, both at the ecosystem level for coral reefs and for the artisanal fishers exposed to cyanide, are representative of challenges experienced by the indo-pacific region (sadovy et al. 2004), where regulations are under-enforced due to lack of resources, commercial pressure, and low opportunity cost. together these factors encourage fishers to continue to harvest from populations they know to be declining, using techniques that are dangerous both to the corals and to themselves (poh and fanning 2012). furthermore, increased profits from lrfft primarily benefit industry middleman. although fishers do better economically than they might otherwise, the costs of meeting consumers’ demands–– including local extirpations of humphead wrasse, loss of coral reef consilience 41 based industry, and risk of bodily harm assumed in participating in illegal and dangerous harvesting techniques such as cyanide fishing— makes profits from the lrfft risky and unsustainable (poh and fanning 2012, barber and pratt 1997). while my discussion here has focused on c. undulatus and similar group spawning aggregations of fish in the indo-pacific, the perils of this particular species offer insight into the ecological complexities of conservation. in the case of fish that use group spawning as a reproductive strategy, for example, people are not the only predators that choose to increase their probability of a catch by honing in on aggregation sites. whale sharks and manta rays have been observed feeding on eggs and other materials released during spawning; were spawning aggregations to disappear due to overfishing, these megafauna would lose a resource, potentially causing widespread harm to the trophic balance (sadovy and domeier 2005). such disruptions to the food web can also proceed in the opposite direction, resulting in increased populations of lowertrophic-level organisms—such as smaller fish and invertebrates—that would otherwise be consumed as part of group spawners’ diets (sadovy et al. 2004). on a macroscopic scale, the removal of even one species from an ecosystem can reverberate throughout the food web, as has been widely documented in studies on the impact of sea otters on kelp forests’ carbon storage capacity (wilmers et al. 2012) and of the reintroduction of gray wolves to yellowstone national park (ripple and beschta 2012). extrapolating outward in this fashion can be useful for prioritizing the issues facing a single species, such as c. undulatus, during a policymaking process that must not only address ecological considerations, but must also acknowledge economic, political, cultural, and historical conditions to achieve sustainable, effective outcomes. why worry about spawning aggregations & artisanal fishers in the indo-pacific? having established that the problems of c. undulatus are symptomatic of problems that could face any group-spawning species in the indo-pacific, it is worth asking why the indo-pacific merits special consideration. first of all, the indo-pacific, often called the “amazon of the oceans,” is a biodiversity hotspot for marine life (barber and pratt 1997). however, preliminary and qualitative data related to the humphead wrasse suggest that the species is in decline (sadovy et al. 2004)—an ominous indicator for other sensitive species endemic to the region and for future species richness. additionally, the scientific infrastructure of nations in the indopacific is poor, and knowledge of spawning aggregations is limited among scientific communities (sadovy and domeier 2005) in consilience booth: group-spawning conservation strategies comparison to the cache of traditional economic knowledge stored within indigenous communities (drew 2005, barber and pratt 1997, sadovy et al. 2004, sala et al. 2001). furthermore, due to a lack of resources and incentives among officials to resist corruption, regulations that are in place both to curb trade in humphead wrasse and to limit such harmful harvesting techniques as cyanide application are either limited in scope or virtually unenforceable (poh and fanning 2012). finally, because other sources of income seldom exist, traditional fishers often find it economically necessary to systematically exploit known spawning aggregations in the region (sadovy and domeier 2005, poh and fanning 2012), especially when they are faced with competition from other fisherman using relatively modern—if dangerous and illegal—technologies, such as cyanide poison and scuba night fishing (sadovy et al. 2004) in short, the indo-pacific faces a host of challenges that would make traditional conservation strategies, such as marine protected areas or quota systems, impractical and difficult to enforce. in light of this reality, developing conservation plans that take advantage of intrinsic properties of the indo-pacific, such as high biodiversity and extensive traditional ecological knowledge (tek) (drew 2005, sala et al. 2001), must be the goal of conservation biologists and conservationally-minded citizens seeking to protect group-spawning coral reef fish. alternative conservation strategies for consideration in the indo-pacific while traditional techniques of conservation are likely to be ineffective in the indo-pacific, recently identified alternative strategies have optimistic outlooks for success based on preliminary studies (drew 2005) and modeling (sala et al. 2001). the two most applicable of these strategies for the indo-pacific are ecotourism and community-based strategies utilizing tek. ecotourism leverages a place’s innate ecological characteristics, such as high endemic biodiversity, for economic gain by offering recreational and/or educational experiences that rely on maintaining those ecological characteristics within the landscape, rather than removing them for other uses that generate income. conservationists prefer ecotourism to resource extraction as a method of generating income from nature because of the local economic benefits that carry minimal disturbance to ecosystem function. this is especially true if organizing parties endeavor to construct a sustainable ecotourism model (buckley 1994). in an economic modeling study that compared the value of an existing aggregation fishery of nassau groupers in belize versus a prospective ecotourism industry reliant upon the aggregation, researchers found that replacing the fishery with ecotourism would be significantly consilience 43 more profitable and long-lasting (sala et al. 2001). while ecotourism must be undertaken carefully to ensure that it causes minimal disruption of an aggregation, generating ecotourism in the indopacific is a logical conservation strategy. not only would it prevent culturally and commercially important group-spawning fish from local extirpations (sala et al. 2001), ecotourism would address many of the issues raised by the lrfft by reducing the need of fishermen to participate in illegal markets and harvesting techniques that put their overarching source of income—the coral reef—at risk. while ecotourism represents an immediately viable conservation alternative for fish that form spawning aggregations, the incorporation of tek into community-based conservation strategies is more abstract. in practice it requires researchers to shift their mindset and incorporate knowledge amassed by native peoples into modern conservation (drew 2005). this process, however, is already underway in the indo-pacific, where native people have recently provided scientists with invaluable knowledge of aggregation locations and temporal patterns of spawning, as well as in establishing mpas encompassing spawning aggregation sites at gladden spit in belize (drew 2005), ngerumekaol in palau (johannes 1997), the solomon islands (drew 2005), and in glover’s reef in belize (drew 2005, sala et al. 2001). beyond engaging in conservation in these capacities, tek could be further incorporated into future conservation efforts targeting group-spawning species through the development of customary ecological management practices, in which the native peoples of indo-pacific nations would have the final say in conservation plans for their region (drew 2005). given that spawning aggregations have yet to be thoroughly considered in the limited policy frameworks currently in play in the indo-pacific region (sadovy and domeier 2005), instituting the first such plans using baselines drawing on regional tek would be a step in the direction of participatory management that empowers local indigenous communities to steward these species for generations to come. consilience booth: group-spawning conservation strategies references barber, c.v., and v.r. pratt. 1997. policy reform and community-based programmes to combat cyanide fishing in philippines. spc live reef fish informational bulletin #3. december 1997. beets, j. and a. friedlander. 1998. evaluation of a conservation strategy: a spawning aggregation closure for red hind, epinephelus guttatus, in the u.s. virgin islands. environmental biology of fish. 55: 91-98. buckley, r. 1994. a framework for ecotourism. annals of tourism research. 21: 661-669. colin, p. 1992. reproduction of the nassau grouper, epinephelus striatus (pisces: serranidae) and its relationship to environmental conditions. environmental biology of fish. 34: 357-377. colin, p. 2010. aggregation and spawning of the humphead wrasse cheilinus undulatus (pisces: labridae): general aspects of spawning behaviour. journal of fish biology. 76: 987-1007. conover, d.o. and s.b. munch. 2002. sustaining fisheries yields over evolutionary time scales. science. 297, 94. doi: 10.1126/science.1074085. domeier, m. l. and p. l. colin. 1997. tropical reef fish spawning aggregations: defined and reviewed. bulletin of marine science. 60(3). 698-726. drew, j. 2005. use of traditional ecological knowledge in marine conservation. conservation biology. 1286-1293. doi: 10.111/j.1523-1739.2005.00158.x. grüss, a., d.m. kaplan, and j. robinson. 2013. evaluation of the effectiveness of marine reserves for transient spawning aggregations in data-limited situations. ices journal of marine science. doi:10.1093/icesjms/fst028. johannes, r.e. 1997. grouper spawning aggregations need protection. spc live reef fish informational bulletin #3. december 1997. koenig, c.c., f.c. coleman, l.a. collins, y. sadovy, and p.l. colin. 1996. reproduction in gag, (mycteroperca microlepis) (pisces: serranidae) in the eastern gulf of mexico and the consequences of fishing spawning aggregations. biology, fisheries, and culture of tropical groupers and snappers. international center for living aquatic resources management. campeche, mexico. longhurst, a. 2002. murphy’s law revisited: longevity as a factor in recruitment to fish populations. fisheries research. 56: 125-131. nemeth, r. 2005. population characteristics of a recovering us virgin islands red hind spawning aggregation following protection. marine ecology progress series. 286: 81-97. poh, t. and l. m. fanning. 2012. tackling illegal, unregulated, and unreported trade towards humphead wrasse (cheilinus undulatus) recovery in sabah, malaysia. marine policy. 36: 696-702. ripple, w. and r. beschta. 2012. trophic cascades in yellowstone: the first 15 years after wolf reintroduction. biological conservation. 145: 205-213. sadovy, y., m. kulbicki, p. labrosse, y. letourneur, p. lokani, and t.j. donaldson. 2004. the humphead wrasse, cheilinus undulatus: a synopsis of a threatened and poorly known giant coral reef fish. reviews in fish biology and fisheries. 13: 327-364. sadovy, y. and m. domeier. 2005. are aggregation-fisheries sustainable? reef fish fisheries as a case study. coral reefs. 24: 254-262. sadovy de mitcheson, y., m. liu, and s. suharti. 2010. gonadal development in a giant threatened reef fish, the humphead wrasse cheilinus undulatus, and its relationship to international trade. journal of fish biology. 77: 706-718. sala, e., e. ballesteros, r.m. starr. 2001. rapid decline of nassau grouper spawning aggregations in belize: fishery management and conservation needs. fisheries. october 2001. consilience 45 sluka, r., m. chiappone, k.m. sullivan, and r. wright. 1997. the benefits of a marine fishery reserve for nassau grouper epinephelus striatus in the central bahamas. proceedings of the 8th international coral reef symposium. 2: 1961-1964. wilmers, c., j. estes, m. edwards, k. laidre, and b. konar. 2012. do trophic cascades affect the storage and flux of atmospheric carbon? an analysis of sea otters and kelp forests. frontiers in ecology and the environment. 10: 409-415. dear readers, i am, as always, absolutely delighted to present to you volume xxi of consilience: the journal of sustainable development. in the face of current events – devastating fires in the amazon, dangerous heat waves in europe, the continued rollback of u.s. environmental policies – our journal has carefully curated an issue which will inspire hope and action. pushing interdisciplinary boundaries, critiquing unsustainable establishments and ideas, and bringing attention to overlooked places and communities are all explored in volume xxi. our featured new articles open with an exploration of the heart of consilience: interdisciplinary collaboration for sustainability. s. peyton ellis examines various case studies in urban centers around the united states, showing how community development and historic preservation can come together to create environmentally and socially sustainable buildings and neighborhoods. often, this new nexus helps marginalized places become thriving communities. dr. john choptiany et al. write about the creation of a mobile app which targets vulnerable farmers and agriculturists in midto low-income countries. the use of simple, easily accessible technology to promote resilience tactics for impending climate change impacts develops a key intersection for sustainability, particularly in developing countries. volume xxi then turns to the more well-known intersection between economics and environment. nicole marie karsch presents an in-depth and convincing critique of the debated environmental kuznets curve, showing that the model has very little empirical evidence. the irreversible and the unknown effects of uncheck, unsustainable economic growth are clear, contradicting the curve. a final scholarly article brings forth a critique of international healthcare investments. michikazu koshiba shows that an outdated understanding of established monolithic donors risks disincentivizing investment and innovation from other private sectors. he introduces a new framework for evaluating healthcare investment which addresses this gap, and advocates for national procurement mechanisms that encourage more private investment through public-private partnerships. sayan bhattacharya closes our featured new articles with an arresting photo essay portraying the beauty and the destruction of the eastern himalayas. this article showcases the effects of climate change, increasing tourism, government projects and policies, and rising populations on the ecosystems of the mountains and the people who have traditionally made their homes there. bhattacharya’s striking images call for sustainable action and preservation in the himalayas. we have in volume xxi continued the best of consilience series. this tradition began five years ago in volume xii. the best of consilience features articles from the journal’s rich history which we believe represent some of the most thoughtful, timely, or innovative works published on our site. we believe that consilience has always pushed the boundaries of sustainable development, and this section of highlighted articles embodies that fully. hopefully, it will inspire our readers to do their own exploration at the edges and corners of interdisciplinary sustainability. please enjoy volume xxi, with articles and ideas both old and new. this new era in the fight for a sustainable future seems to have inspired a sense of eco-citizenship. the consilience network is doubtless on the front lines of this fight, and we expect that our articles also act as an optimistic callto-arms to defend our common rights, resources, and planet. as always, we welcome and encourage constructive feedback and commentary. if you have any questions, comments, or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact us at consiliencejournal@gmail.com. ambria benesch editor-in-chief mailto:consiliencejournal@gmail.com consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 19, iss. 1 (2018), pp. 183–195 dance and mixed-media performance for building scientific understanding and environmental respect lauren m. butler lauren is a dancer, choreographer, and engineer who researches the impact of mining on water quality and runs a dance company that does scientific and environmental collaborations. she has degrees in dance and mechanical engineering from the university of minnesota and a master’s in environmental engineering from columbia university. lauren.butler@columbia.edu abstract art and science are essential for sustainable development, and art-science interactions can advance both fields and enhance their impact. this is supported by historical, personal, and contemporary examples. dance and performing arts are especially powerful when representing the physical world studied by environmental science, and for encouraging change in thoughts and actions related to the environment. the ways in which artistic approaches differ from the scientific are helpful in encouraging innovation and scientific discovery. obstacles to such collaborations are discussed, as well as potential solutions and best practices. one such practice is measuring impacts of interdisciplinary collaborations, and a methodology is proposed to do so. study of these interactions will enable strategic art-science partnerships and encourage wider acceptance of interdisciplinary innovation. mailto:lauren.butler@columbia.edu 184 consilience 1. introduction 1.1. a framework for sustainable development the advancement of humankind requires adoption of new technologies, solutions that are safe and appropriate, understanding long-term impacts, and commitment to protecting natural resources even as economies grow. all of these require a strong and effective scientific discipline. science is connected to all of the sustainable development goals in some form. here i consider that the aim of development is supporting healthy lives and thriving communities for as many generations as we can imagine. lives should be long and fulfilling; communities, including families, institutions, and countries, should be peaceful and supportive. and why do i use the word imagined? it is impossible to fully know what future generations require. some have used this observation to modify early definitions of development and have suggested we leave future generations with the resources we ourselves received. but i contend that we can do better. conducting thought experiments on what might be helpful to leave behind may be a more appropriate method than leaving exactly what we received or trying to “preserve” the environment. even nature doesn’t naturally preserve itself. it is dynamic. such thought experiments may also enable us to identify additional unintended consequences of current actions. it is this forward-thinking aspect of science, and the creative processes often found in art, that can enable us to approach this type of development. 1.2. awareness and transformation it is good to use art to raise awareness, but that is not enough. the arts are not a tool for other disciplines to contribute to development. the arts are part of sustainable development; thriving communities create art. even struggling communities create art; it is a part of human existence as old as records exist. art born of struggle is often an essential component of bringing about change. in fact, many artists believe that art should always change the way an observer feels, thinks, or acts in the future. in this paper i will focus mostly on this aspect of artits transformative potential. though they are valid ventures, i do not dwell here on aesthetics, art that makes us question what qualifies as art, or “art for art’s sake”. specifically, i consider art that can create change related to science and the environment and contend that science is better suited for raising awareness than art is. science informs and increases our body of knowledge about the world. art can both turn that information into transformation and help advance the scientific field by helping scientists discover in new ways. 2. art and science 2.1. the art-science schism italian artist lucio fontana said, “we refuse to think of science and art as two distinct phenomena… artists anticipate scientific deeds, scientific deeds always provoke artistic deeds” (hamilton 2001). the art-science split is theorized to have consilience butler: art-science interactions for sustainable development deepened both by the environs of the industrial revolution and when, in 1837, the scientific royal academy moved out of the london somerset house which it shared with the arts-focused royal society. scientists were then first called as such, and what was lost at the art-science split was “the colour, depth and shape of the interrelationships between artists and natural philosophers”, as they had been called before (hamilton 2001). rather than merging, it is possible that the two have continued diverging, and modern technology may play a role. for engineers, drawing used to be a more important skill than it is today. in the past, calculating trajectories, ideation and design, and creating plans were done by hand drawings. compare that with my mechanical engineering education in the 21st century. i spent two weeks of one class practicing hand drawing objects with appropriate perspective, shading, and clarity, versus six entire courses focused computer languages and modeling programs. the type of “art” an engineer is required to learn has changed. with that historical perspective, increasing technology could further divide art from science. but there are other ways in which technology is becoming a bridge between the two, some of which are discussed in this paper. a seminal and oft-quoted work discussing the division between art and science focuses mainly on the cultural difference between those who practice both fields (snow 1993). while the schism remains, many of the characteristics of the two groups have changed. some distinctions may have even flipped from one group to the other, such as political affiliations and level of optimism for the future. this paper discusses some of the past and current differences of outlook and approach. updated analyses have been done on the two cultures (nair 2005) and further quantitative data from surveys could shed additional light on the change. some have suggested a third culture that bridges both, and when that third culture failed to be truly mutual, even a more equitable fourth culture has been suggested (lehrer 2007). 2.2. art and feelings create change: science alone often does not humans generally retain information better through visual stimulus than auditory. why, then, are important scientific concepts so often communicated through words? the use of art, specifically visual or performing arts, can help people remember concepts and the importance of the natural environment. art has been successfully used for years to expose social science phenomenon, political motivations, and to build community. we must begin to use it more to bring attention to physical science discoveries and as environmental discourse that is more effective than other modes of communication. not only do we want audiences to remember our discoveries, but we also want to inspire transformation. environmental science has a goal: to protect natural resources and enable people to comfortably live for generations in their surroundings. having a purpose means the communicator desires to change actions or thoughts. change does not come easily, whether in the form of an individual reducing driving time or a politician prioritizing carbon emission policy over economic development opportunity. personally, i act primarily on what i feel even if i also rationalize. for example, i recently started eating less meat. my “reason” was environmental. i had known for years that methane produced by cows affects the atmosphere yet took no action. then i calculated my water footprint and related two 186 consilience bites of meat to a day of painstaking reduction in water use and experiences with water shortage. i felt those impacts deeply, related that to my environmental impact as i ate a burger, and changed. 2.3. unique opportunities of dance and live performance if people act on how they feel, how can we facilitate experiences of feeling? when an audience watches dance, their mirror neurons ignite, in a way as if they themselves are performing the movement. a dance piece called spill, choreographed by emilie plauché flink, is about a bird in the exxon valdez oil disaster. witnessing struggled movement, stuck and viscous, embodied by a human but portraying a bird, i imagined what such a confined and condemned existence would feel like. i also imagined how i would react differently to the news if an oil spill affected humans the way it was affecting marine life. in short, i placed the human experience inside of the bird's; this is a very different type of empathy than can most effectively be evoked by visual and performing art. 2.4. unique application for today: environmental communication here i focus on physical sciences, rather than social sciences. the importance of art in the creation of societal fabrics has been well studied. using art to increase understanding and advancement of the social sciences has also been successfully accomplished many times. for example, art in the form of sound or visuals provokes emotions, which can be studied from a psychological perspective or measured with biometrics. using a person’s art-making, such as dance or drawing, can expose their psychological states or anomalies. there are many more examples (arends and thakara 2003). the physical sciences, however, are much less integrated with the arts. i contend that they are especially fertile soil for dance and live performance collaborations, given the physical embodiment and movement in space. environmental science and related fields are disciplines that constantly struggle to communicate with a broader audience. political climate skeptics are deemed experts by many, and scientists are considered self-interested liars. there are many reasons for this. one key factor is the relatability of research results. many questions addressed by environmental studies are at scales that are unrelatable or even unimaginable to those who are not environmental scientists. there are studies of tiny ants in gabon and massive glaciers in greenland. how can a human relate? when i travel for research on water, i act diligently because i can relate to stories of people observing their land changed. i think of my rural homeland i visit every summer, and my sadness over even small anthropogenic changes. stories, feelings, and experiences of nature motivate action. yet the global population is moving to urban centers, where it is challenging to encourage reflection and feelings regarding the environment. for creatively communicating the physical world, i propose that dance is especially apt. in part, it brings a physical embodiment to physical realities; additionally, it invites an audience to place their human experience into a story. to achieve the major cultural shift needed to save our warming planet, every human must relate to and deeply care about the changing environment. consilience butler: art-science interactions for sustainable development 3. interactions between art and science there are endless ways that art and science overlap, dialogue, and oppose. those mentioned here are not suggested as an exhaustive classification or even a spectrum. most individual projects or collaborations would defy categorization of any one approach. between many of these types or approaches, there are connections and continuums. for the approaches below, i give examples from my work and that of others to instigate discussion. my intention is to highlight the complexity and wide range of opportunities to use art and science and create positive development. ways in which the two fields interact include: scientists hiring or using artists to effectively communicate their work to a wider audience; artists using advances in science and technology to facilitate their process and product; and the science of artmaking, including studying methods, materials, and developing diagnostic and performance technology. here i do not discuss in depth those interactions, though historical examples abound. instead, i focus on more contentious or challenging collaborations: scientists creating artful presentations, art about scientific topics, science learning from art, and mutual art-science collaboration. 3.1. scientists making art many scientists turn their research into art. much effort goes into making their work “pretty”; being able to do good data visualizations is a valued skill. it’s been argued that this is not art: “as unmediated science realism, this is abstract expressionism minus both the expressionism and the abstract, because not intentionally art, their function is the unambiguous communication of specific information” (ede 2005). however, many decisions inform even what topic to study, how to study it, and what things are of interest and important for the world. there is human judgement in the process, all the way through how to present it. a scientist may be as proud of a final product and presentation as an artist is of their creation. though none of my graphs about water quality i would call art, i hope that someday i master the presentation and complexity of analysis that will allow me to do so. i have been collecting references to other scientists’ work that i hope to see hung in a gallery. consider the additional curating process i am undergoing and scientists’ future decisions of size, printing methods, labeling, and a gallery owner’s decisions of what to hang where… all additional steps that bridge “science” and “abstract art”, or more appropriately for environmental art, “realism”. thus, if a fellow scientist wants to call their work art, even if seemingly “unmediated”, i shall accept it as such. 3.2. art about science further proposed by ede (2005) is that art cannot be directly about science. “lectures, books or discussions are more successful at presenting explanations or stimulating debate. if art is ‘about’ anything, it is a reflection of human experience in complexity... conveyed through hints and ambiguity. artist don’t ‘do’ prettification, product or propaganda for the public understanding of science. but they can engage with it and create images which suggest alternative ways of seeing”. artists can choose to take scientific information and make it more aesthetically pleasing if they are motivated to, and can also create propagandain fact this is a 188 consilience massive genre of art. much social action art is created to motivate a specific set of responses and reactions. the artist has something they want to communicate and a social change they want to instigate. this may be considered propaganda, but rather than being for the benefit of some higher person or institution, it is for a higher purpose which the artist values. however, art created very literally ‘about’ science is less artful than when it sheds new light. i have experimented with the level of literalness communicated to the audience. i choreographed a dance piece about the gendered influences of water shortage, inspired by statistics from research i had done. some people in the arts community gave feedback that their viewing experience was interrupted by the presence of the written statistics. the personal experience may be greater without the accompaniment of the literal scientific findings, but is that true for scientists and for people not as engaged in contemporary arts? i have since conducted other experiments to address this question. i gave different audience members different versions of the program notes; some knew the environmental phenomena, development statistics, and personal experiences that motivated the choreography in detail. others received a one-line description, and others nothing. one such piece was inspired by infant mortality in areas with water shortage. when children are not expected to live, they are sometimes not given names until the age of two or three. names help us remember and honor people; how can we honor those who never received a name? reverent dance became my method, because it can be felt without words. the audience members that had none of this information enjoyed the aesthetics of the piece, and reported noticing the peaceful, reverent, innocent, and meditative qualities. their possible interpretations and connections were far from the original inspiration. those who had a one-line description noticed similar things, but in addition reported being “moved” by the piece. the addition of a longer description did not seem to add much, at least in the interviews immediately following the performance. whether such information motivates longer-term memory and action is yet to be determined but is proposed in follow-up studies below. in this case, i felt that it was my role as the artist to portray my experience and interpretation of the reality through my art. over-describing my experience in a literal way prescribed the audience’s experience. stating the reality, even a simple statistic, and being artful about its presentation seemed to be the “sweet spot”. i hope that the next time those audience members hear a statistic about water scarcity or infant mortality, they react differently than they would have before, with a softer and more receptive heart. what i mean by that is that they listen more closely, are more attentive, and therefore are ready to act or react. they may not remember that my performance played a role, but that is fine; my art lived its moment and served its purpose. 3.3. science informed by art this type of interaction is rare, as i often notice a hierarchy in the relationship between science and art. art can be inspired by science, but few recognize that art has something to offer science, and even fewer practice it. in one such exploration, a malaria researcher partnered and travelled with a photographer and poet. he reflected that “perhaps making connections between different realities causes us to question our assumptions, examine with fresh eyes what we take for granted and consilience butler: art-science interactions for sustainable development encourage us to see things more inventively… at the end of the project i have a deeper, more holistic view of this complex subject” (holder 2003). because of detailed encounters with the artistic process, science “gains easier ways of understanding difficult ideas” (arnolds 2003). they also achieve innovative thinking, done by artists. finally, art can also remind scientist of the importance of their work, the motivation. the malaria researcher who saw the issue through the eyes of the photographer is an example of this. remembering the intention of the work helps direct most meaningfully, which is often the most straightforward method. my short breaks when i’m researching, which often involve music or movement, are a chance to ask, “where am i going”? if they are too long, i must ask “where was i?”, which is not as helpful; the same thing happens on a longer scale if i leave a topic on the backburner for days or weeks. however, a daily dance class or a weekend working on an artistic project provides a shift in perspective and environment, enough to remember to start research again with the long-term goals in mind. keeping an eye on the objective can help scientists avoid extraneous steps. 3.4. science and art work together even rarer than science informed by art is a true collaboration in which an artist and scientist are mutual learners. this is not just cross-disciplinary or interdisciplinary. transdisciplinary work is a “means of achieving new forms of knowledge” (arends and thakara 2003). an example of this is the dance company black label movement. director carl flink’s choreography interacts with subjects such as gravity, cell collision, and evolution. he regularly partners with scientists and offers a helpful explanation on the difference between collaboration and the other types of interactions mentioned previously. his work is “not so much about the science or subject as they are direct models to conduct research in the specific area of inquiry with the goal of obtaining useful information/data, subjective and objective, about the human condition and the subject itself" (personal communication, 2017). there are instances when art and science discover similar things, with parallel but separate processes. examples of when art’s understanding came before that of science is provided by lehrer (2007). i consider these fascinating but tragic examples of forgone opportunity. if there had been mutual learning and discovery, perhaps the arts could have understood more deeply, and the science advanced more efficiently. 4. addressing challenges 4.1. questions of usefulness as a researcher, i understand the struggle of desiring to focus solely on my project without distractions. my workplace hosts many workshops that would help a researcher, but it is hard to justify going to one even as relevant as data visualization, effective communication, or statistical reporting when i’m struggling with the first step of importing raw data correctly and need to do so by the end of the week. yet on a long-term scale, those seemingly “unnecessary” ventures are valuable. on a national scale, it is a good sign for the economy of a country when they invest in r&d. it indicates a shift from a survival mindset to one of long-term growth. in science, we need to move from a mindset of poverty to one of plenty, and trust that 190 consilience creating room for innovation will propel both the field and individual careers. just like a company must intentionally invest in r&d, time must be set aside for artistic and creative endeavors. i hope that it becomes common, for example, to include a “creative communication” line item on research grants, like it is standard to add a certain percentage for administrative or indirect costs. scientific researchers (or those in any other field) might also be encouraged to use a small percentage of their time towards inter-disciplinary collaborations that do not have immediate deliverables for their main projects. by intentionally releasing control over every minute’s “usefulness”, we see that creativity and open-minded endeavors are quite useful indeed. 4.2. being serious art, to scientists, can seem frivolous. that is a good thing. modern studies of neuroplasticity have reversed the previous convention: that we are born with all our neurons. that outdated view was determined mostly by studying animals in cages. however, once monkeys were put in a simulated natural environment with a rotating selection of toys and hidden food, they grew new neurons (coe et al. 2003). well before the term neuroplasticity was accepted in the scientific lexicon, this dynamic nature of the brain was understood by author george elliot. her novels exposed that “the most essential element of human nature was its malleability” (lehrer 2007). engaging scientists in transdisciplinary play and new types of challenges may increase neurogenesis and aid in scientific discovery. open-mindedness and creativity have a lot to do with innovation, which is essential for the advancement of science. “indeed, pioneering scientists have always challenged the status quo, operating through guesswork and intuition sometimes more than through deductive logic… think of evolution which has advanced at random and without any vision or goal” (ede 2005). perhaps random playful moments are like mutations (flink and odde 2012) – many of no consequence or failing, but every once in a while resulting in (r)evolutionary breakthrough. how can we take art seriously while appreciating its playful and exploratory nature? it is important that art’s role is respected in science, policy, development, and all fields. one first step is to refrain from quickly consigning artistic creation to artists and children. it is easy to hear about exploring science through movement and imagine the potential for early education. while this is a worthy pursuit, one i am also involved with, it is a mistake to ignore art’s potential to shift political views, reconcile communities, or spark discovery. exploring new ways of thinking is not only for children; adults can learn too. it is not only age that makes us less creative, it is our environment. recall the example of neuroplasticity in cages versus a playful and stimulating environment. raising children who think creatively is not sufficient if the environments in which they subsequently work is stifling. we must take seriously the need to shift “working” culture: coming out of our cages so that we may playfully innovate and progress in all fields. 4.3. differing viewpoints there are real differences between the approaches in art and science. one difference often addressed is that scientists try to be impartial, whereas for artists, “meaning consilience butler: art-science interactions for sustainable development depends on countless variables” (ede 2005). however, absolute truth does depend on infinite variables, to varying levels of importance. both disciplines search for essential components that are hidden. can science learn from art’s intuition of complexity, and can science’s quest for distilled truth challenge artists to allow a momentary landing on something true, even if they must recognize its momentary nature and the subjective process of discovery or presentation? a beautiful text about a photojournalistic exhibition of glacial change stated that “the anthropocene may not mark the end of the world, but it marks a point of no return” (horn 2017). what may mark the end of the world, however, is building walls around disciplinary fields. the field of art and the field of science must be in humble dialogue and playful co-experimentation. “for if we’re not prepared always to wonder what it’s like to see things from an entirely different point of view, to imagine impossible scenarios and adapt to unknown circumstances, it may spell the end of the human race. it is good to see the world from the point of view of many ‘others’” (ede 2005). i recognize that this analysis has been ethnocentric, with few examples outside of europe and the united states. even discussion of the original division between art and science was located in london (the separation of the royal academy and royal society) and broadly in the western world (the industrial revolution). perhaps other cultures that have not so strongly adopted culture exported from london, whether directly or indirectly via other european countries or the u.s., have maintained an integration between fields that the world can learn from. these countries and cultures can be instrumental in restoring/leading a much-needed perspective and practice. today, most of the easily discoverable books published on the combination of art and science have still been published in london, as evidenced by the references in this paper. future study must actively seek insight from those who may be able to more naturally lead this discussion. 5. best practices in the interaction in the above examples of art-science interactions, i have already introduced some collaborations that work well. i now share additional themes that emerged from my research and interviews on the topic. 5.1. exchange of perspectives the theoretical physicist dirac summarized his philosophy with “physical laws should have methodical beauty” (farmelo 2002), perhaps a surprising statement from such a methodical and unemotional person. can the practice of art help scientists and mathematicians develop their intuition for what is beautiful? on the other hand, perhaps it is the artists who have in the past century maintained the centrality of chaos and complexity. “the artist’s experience of life is uncoordinated, dislocated, contingent, incomplete” (ede 2005). in fact, modern physics and other scientific disciplines are discovering the importance of chaos. while they previously sought governing equations, many of the most fundamental have been found. left unknown is what governs the chaotic motion and complexity. the slow viscous flow is simple, laminar, predictable, but the turbulent waters remain troubled. can artists 192 consilience help us discover those regions? of the two fields, art has been the one digging in the dirt to expose the unknown, while science has been trying to order it. 5.2. partnership across disciplines this one is perhaps obvious, but i offer two particularly effective ways of transdisciplinary partnering. the first is defining each discipline very specifically, using sub-disciplines, and requires a willingness to collaborate with seemingly unrelated sub-disciplines. an example of this is found at the gowanus canal, an infamously contaminated waterway in new york city. a community organizer there, owen foote, often partners his canoeing organization with artists. how can art affect change? he engages new groups by connecting with what they already care about. for example, creatively exploring the connection between dog-loving neighborhood walkers and city-dwelling nature lovers. if owen’s canoeing organization pursued only canoers, it would never become the neighborhood-wide advocacy force for environmental cleanup for which he aims. for art to be effective, people need to be both challenged by it and connected to it. specificity in partnership provides the connection, and seemingly disparate partners can bring a newness or challenging perspective. i observe that this is more effective as a practice than as a one-time experiment. people who easily jump between and partner with varying disciplines seem to have a strong interdisciplinary background. as this kind of work becomes normal, the innovator focuses less on the “originality” that others perceive, and more on the outcomes. a second effective method of collaboration across disciplines is a deep, mutual exploration: true partnership, where neither can achieve the goal without the other. each discipline or innovator is involved throughout the process. carl flink, a choreographer mentioned above, has worked with a biomedical professor, dr. david odde, to create a process called bodystorming, a kinesthetic version of brainstorming (flink and odde 2012). “its purpose is to create a modeling tool using bodies in space and choreographic tools to conduct substantive research in areas where it can be an effective tool for the discovery of new knowledge" (personal communication, 2017). these collaborations have resulted in published scientific work and new choreographic forms and processes. 5.3. quantitative analysis and impact assessment a study funded by nasa found that a program called beautiful earth increased the value which audience members ascribed to understanding the environment. the number of participants who thought it was “very important” to learn more about earth’s condition doubled after seeing the presentation. the most highly rated parts of the program incorporated live music, projected visualizations, and interactive experiences: sections that had a “wow” factor (juffer 2003). interestingly, discussion groups were the most poorly rated, which is a common way to address the question, “how can we get people to engage with this topic?”. conferences and events purporting to advance a particular field (read: change and develop) should more often include arts than endless discussion. arts and interaction are effective, and more studies like the one on beautiful earth can guide the refinement of effective approaches. consilience butler: art-science interactions for sustainable development 6. proposed study about art about science i have personally experienced dance as an effective way to communicate, but i recognize that all people are different. how can we better understand how well dance engages with environmental science? i propose a study about a performance, with the following methodology. in it, audience members’ reactions will be filmed and the audience will complete a survey right after the performance and one month later. the performance will include dance, visual art, theater, poetry, live music, video, and mixed media (projected image behind dancers with live music also playing). each medium will be based on at least one fact related to environmental change, will draw inspiration from an aspect of the natural world that is wonderful or admirable, and each artist will identify possible actions that an audience member could take as a result of experiencing their performance. these, however, will not be communicated explicitly to the audience. the research questions addressed by the surveys and analysis of the video include: q1. which artistic medium produced greatest physical or emotional feeling? q2. which inspired the most personal reflection and thought? q3. for which medium was the knowledge or experience gained also retained over time? q4. which media motivated action or lifestyle change? q5. which inspired conversation related to the environment in the days following the performance? i recognize that the quality, style, and topic of individual pieces will affect the outcome. thus, we will look for themes that emerge so that in the future those themes can be incorporated across disciplines and add more control to follow-up experiments. the results of the study will enlighten how dance and other art mediums can not only raise awareness but also help achieve the sustainable development goals. answering the questions above will enable artists to take a more informed approach in the future as they interact with environmental topics and with scientists, policy makers, and environmental researchers. the proposed study facilitates the framework of this paper by enlightening select details of how to use dance and performing arts to encourage environmental respect and action. subsequent quantitative studies could tackle best practices in other types of artscience interactions, such as those listed above. though art can stand alone and need not always be subjected to quantitative analysis, demonstrated effects of art may make it more acceptable by those in other disciplines as an effective way of knowing, learning, and communicating. disseminating the lessons learned in this study will enable a larger audience to transform the way they think and act about art, research, and environmental communication. in order to effectively broadcast these results, we will of course include a line item in the budget for creative post-project communication. 7. conclusions achieving the sustainable development goals requires scientific advancement. the arts are an essential part of sustainable development; healthy communities create art and striving communities use art to bring about change. furthermore, science and art in dialogue can advance sustainable development more effectively than either can 194 consilience alone. scientists projecting and planning for the future can be supported by the creative processes often found in art. the chaos and complexity intuited by artists may help science understand the world more accurately. science describes the world as is, and art in turn can help translate that knowledge into action. to creatively communicate the physical world, dance is especially appropriate because it embodies physical realities and lets viewers connect in a personal way. the environmental sciences may especially benefit from such collaborations. environmental protection requires changes in the way people act, which requires altering what is prioritized and how people think. transformative art also has this goal of: to change the way people think and act. there are endless ways that art and science may interact. when scientists present their results artfully, the line may be blurred between science and art. scientific topics may inspire artists, and art may inspire scientists or even help them discover. the greatest potential is realized when art and science are mutual learners. while there are obstacles stemming from differing perspectives and approaches, these differences can actually increase the benefits of collaboration. examples abound of fruitful collaborations, but scientific studies of their impacts are rare. developing a theoretical framework about what makes art-science interactions work will support an integration of the concepts presented in this paper, and such a study is proposed here. innovation in the way we imagine the future, playfully discover, and assess transformation will support holistic sustainable development. consilience butler: art-science interactions for sustainable development references: arends, bergit, and davina thakara. 2003. experiment: conversations in art and science. london: the wellcome trust. arnolds, ken. 2003. "preface." in experiment: conversations in art and science, by bergit arends and davina thakara. london: the wellcome trust. coe, christopher l., marian kramer, boldizsár czéh, elizabeth gould, alison j. reeves, clemens kirschbaum, and eberhard fuchs. 2003. “prenatal stress diminishes neurogenesis in the dentate gyrus of juvenile rhesus monkeys.” biological psychiatry 54 (10): 1025–34. ede, siân. 2005. art & science. london: i.b. taurus. farmelo, graham. 2002. it must be beautiful: an anthology of the great equations of modern science. london: granta books. flink, carl, and david j. odde. 2012. “science + dance = bodystorming.” trends in cell biology. gamwell, lynn. 2002. exploring the invisible: art, science, and the spiritual. princeton: princeton university press. hamilton, james. 2001. fields of influence: conjunctions of artists and scientists 1815-1860. bodmin, cornwall: mpg books. holder, tony. 2003. "red and wet on the iron air." in experiment: conversations in art and science, by bergit arends and davina thackara, 98-131. london: the wellcome trust. horn, eva. 2017. "the anthroposcene sublime." after nature program . new york. juffer, kris. 2003. beautiful earth: experiencing and learning science in a new and engaging way. ellicott city: action research & associates. lehrer, jonah. 2007. proust was a neuroscientist. new york: first mariner books. nair, ranjit. 2005. “the two cultures revisited.” indian journal of physiology and pharmacology. nørretranders, tor. 2003. "science and art in collaborationthe mindship method." in art and complexity, by john casti and anders karlqvist, 69-74. amsterdam: elsevier. snow, c. p. (charles percy). 1993. the two cultures. nature. vol. 400. microsoft word kelbaugh.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 13, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1–15 the environmental paradox of the city, landscape urbanism, and new urbanism douglas kelbaugh taubman college of architecture and planning university of michigan, ann arbor, michigan kelbaugh@umich.edu abstract “the city council, as you can well imagine, swallowed this line whole. who wouldn’t? landscape is good; building is landscape; therefore building is good. one hears this three-car train of logic constantly in architectural discourse today…nothing sells like landscape. it’s our sex” (heymann, 2011). “if you love nature, live in the city” (glaeser, 2011). as the first quote above suggests, the proponents of landscape urbanism have been winning design competitions and commissions, as well as gaining professional and academic acclaim. closely associated with hallowed ecological values, it has been given a wide berth in the media and public process. however, it has received limited analysis and criticism in the professional and academic worlds. new urbanism, on the other hand, is an older and more organized movement whose agenda has been repeatedly dissected and critiqued. a critical comparison of the two is illuminating and timely in an era of increasing ecological degradation and climate disruption, as well as of rapid urbanization. before comparing the two, the environmental merits and demerits of urbanism in general will be discussed. 1. the environmental paradox of urbanism it’s obvious that cities consume enormous amounts of resources and produce prodigious amounts of pollution and waste – far more per acre than suburban sprawl. yet, cities are surprisingly greener than their more verdant suburbs. this paradox can be explained in a number of ways for different audiences: for the average citizen: the average urbanite’s carbon and other eco-footprints are smaller than the average suburbanite’s. leafy suburbs may look greener, but on a per capita basis they produce more pollution and waste than cities, and consume more energy, water and natural resources. for the economist: measuring carbon and other footprints on a per capita basis is the equitable way to measure environmental costs and level the playing field in a world of wildly uneven wealth (for instance, a large leed gold house isn’t very sustainable if only two people live there.). cities are also more efficient in terms of land consumption, infrastructure, and the mechanical heating and cooling of buildings, as well as transportation. placing people in the denominator of the metric is the key that unlocks this paradox, however narrowly or widely it is applied. for the climate scientist, the environmental paradox is more complex: on top of producing a higher amount of greenhouse gas (ghg) per acre, the city also tends to warm the local climate. its extensive dark rooftops and pavements absorb solar radiation and release heat into the atmosphere. there are fewer trees than in consilience kelbaugh: landscape urbanism and new urbanism suburbia to provide shade and evaporative cooling; there is more waste heat, i.e., hot gases spewing from tailpipes and chimneys that heat the air. this “anthropogenic heat” raises the temperature of the climate in the city higher than in its suburbs and countryside, producing the “urban heat island effect” (uhie or uhi). ghgs produced in the city contribute to global climate change (cc) as opposed to local warming. however, the city’s ghg production is smaller per capita than its suburbs, paradoxically making urbanization an environmentally beneficial trend. for the local government official: urbanism is a powerful and under-utilized strategy to mitigate global cc. and because mitigation strategies for global cc are complementary to uhi mitigation strategies, the more immediate impacts of local climate change can be used in already-hot cities to motivate people to simultaneously address both problems. urban deforestation is a major contributor to local warming. for instance, metro atlanta lost almost half its trees in the last quarter century; replanting these trees would cut its uhi in half, dropping average summer temperature about 3 degrees f and shaving up to 12 degrees f off the daily highs (stone, 2012). last, for the urban planner it would be no surprise that residents in a dense city have less impact on global climate change than automobile-dependent sprawl. what might surprise her is that a city of the same statistical density that does not have a wide mix of uses, a well-connected road grid, walkable streets, and good transit produces a per capita impact on cc much like suburbia. figure 1: cities like dubai with a superhighway supergrid can be “highrise sprawl,” a compromise that provides neither the space and privacy of suburbia nor the walkable and transit benefits of urbanity. this relentless overlay of the emirate-wide grid of consilience kelbaugh: landscape urbanism and new urbanism superhighways encourages making every trip by car. it is indifferent to natural topography and ecology, while encouraging the continuous, undifferentiated sprawl and monoculture of modernist development. in short, the ecological footprint and environmental impacts of cities are larger per acre but smaller per capita than suburban sprawl; and the footprint with a mixed use network of small blocks is even smaller than fragmented cities with cul-de-sacs, superblocks and limited access highways. 2. three relevant benefits of urbanization a. the environmental paradox is central to this comparative study, as well as a very relevant benefit to a rapidly urbanizing planet. the phenomenon is supported by current scientific research at the santa fe institute. (west, 2011) its work, which is based on big data, indicates that the metabolism of cities increases in a sub-linear manner — that is, due to the inherent efficiencies, their metabolic rate grows at a slower rate than their increase in size. similar to kleiber’s law for animal metabolism, doubling the size of a city with a commensurate increase in density has been shown to increase energy consumption by about 70%—not 100% as might be expected. bigger cities are more efficient at using and conserving energy—like the elephant, which has a slower heartbeat and metabolism than the beaver, whose heart in turn beats slower than a hummingbird. the increasing energy efficiency arises from higher rates of walking, biking and transit ridership, as well as fewer and shorter automobile trips. larger buildings are typically more efficient per square foot to mechanically heat and cool (although more difficult to naturally light and ventilate). to solarize, whiten, or vegetate their roofs and walls costs less per occupant to build and operate, as does urban infrastructure—from streets, bridges, tunnels, utilities and transit, to sanitary and solid waste systems. the metabolic benefits are less in new or expanding cities, where the energy and material flows resulting from construction are much higher than in mature cities. as aggressive interventions in the landscape, cities could be called ecological sacrifice zones. this may be inflammatory terminology, but even the greenest of cities inflict local environmental wounds that nature must heal; they leave scar tissue that must be compensated or justified with other trade-offs and benefits that outweigh the ecological costs. this compromise is illustrated in countless cities, vividly so in cities like venice, italy and charleston, south carolina. these virtuoso examples of compact, traditional urbanism were built on landfill in sensitive environments, ones where development would be highly regulated if not prohibited today. consilience kelbaugh: landscape urbanism and new urbanism figure 3: this map of metro chicago’s ghg production illustrates the environmental paradox of cities. while vehicular travel in the center city produces more emissions per acre, it produces less per person. the paradox would be even greater if the per-capita heating and cooling of buildings were also included, not to mention water consumption as well as the capital and maintenance costs of infrastructure (center for neighborhood technology). any visitor to or resident of these cities can attest to the many ways that the merits of these and other cities compensate for their intrusion into local ecological systems. this is not to say that new cities should be built in sensitive areas. we should select development sites as mindful of ecological constraints as possible, while also recognizing that humans need and want to be in proximate contact with “nature.” on the other, hand physical distance is no guarantee of protection; indeed, humans can disrupt ecologies without living in or near them. cities are better understood in a broader meta-ecological way, and seen not as metaphors for ecological systems but as actual ecological systems. they can be as or more negentropic than forests and estuaries. and as seats of human ecology – from muppets to mozart to metaphysics – their culture can be profound, even operatic in their complexity and intelligence. consilience kelbaugh: landscape urbanism and new urbanism figure 4: charleston as built (left), and as a hypothetical non-urban/anti-urban configuration that contemporary regulations might require it to be built today (right). cities unavoidably entail environmental trade-offs and sacrifices, but the myriad benefits of good cities seem well worth the deficits. (dpz) although not central to this study, the following two important benefits of cities are also relevant: b. cities are on average more productive and creative per capita than suburban and rural communities. kleiber’s law is inverted – doubling the density increases creativity roughly 2.8 times, as measured in metrics like patents and publications per capita. (west, 2011) per-capita productivity and income also enjoy a better-than-linear rise. jacobs (1961) has written about this phenomenon, as have florida (2004) and glaeser (2011). c. cities sponsor a positive social paradox: they can maintain socio-cultural diversity within a large population while simultaneously providing a sense of identity for neighborhoods, social groups and individuals. they can promote tolerance and absorb the social chafing and competition of everyday urban life without homogenizing the variety of a city or bleaching out difference. their public realms bring people closer together – while keeping them apart much like a dining or conference table simultaneously connects and separates people (arendt, 1958). social and demographic inclusiveness is essential to sustainability; without it, civilization will not endure. before discussing landscape urbanism (lu) and new urbanism (nu), some of the environmental downsides of cities should be mentioned. as suggested above, “cities are acts of violence” (krier, 2011). they are getting bigger and more environmentally disruptive, requiring more resources and land to support their appetites and absorb their voluminous wastes. cities are typically not as resilient or self-reliant in times of environmental crisis as more self-sufficient rural communities. urban living can disconnect our species from the wild nature that runs deep in our consilience kelbaugh: landscape urbanism and new urbanism genes, and it can be stressful with more concentrated crime, disease, pollution, noise and social friction, as well as impersonal and alienating to newcomers. despite these downsides, cities have become the primary habitat of, by, and for the human species, soon to surpass 60% of the world’s population and rising rapidly. can growing cities contribute to the ongoing success and happiness of our species, without compromising thousands of other species and fouling the ecological systems that we share with them and mutually depend on? if, as climatologists claim, the tenthousand years of near-perfect climatic conditions for humans to flourish are now giving way to a less stable and less hospitable climate, how can cities help our species continue to thrive? lu and nu offer answers that both coincide and differ. 3. landscape urbanism and new urbanism, their similarities and differences these two primarily american movements of academicians and professionals have a number of values and aspirations in common. in the broadest sense, both lu and nu are reactions to modernism and the impacts of its static, mechanistic view of the natural world. each purports to be empirical and pragmatic, claiming to be evidence-based and outcome-based, which is why there is the potential for rational discourse between. each considers environmental sustainability and resilience to be a very consequential design issue – and cares fervently about form – believing design has a basic agency in life and an indispensable role to play in addressing society’s problems. they feel that sustainability as an ongoing ethic and that practice isn’t sustainable if it doesn't result in aesthetically pleasing places, ones that are expressive of community sensibilities and tastes. a designed environment that is ugly and unpleasant isn’t beloved, and if people don’t love it, they aren’t motivated to care for and sustain it. to a varying degree, each rejects post-structuralism and the academy’s endless critiques of society’s flaws in favor of more “projective,” proactive theory and performative practice. both eschew the nihilism, subjective relativism, and “critical project” of the late 20th c., but in different ways, with lu deploying more imaginative solutions to problems and nu more proven solutions. lu has raised the ecological bar, or at least the conversation on urban infrastructure, just as nu has on suburban retrofit, transit-oriented development (tod), and, more recently, urban infill. each rejects the rational reductionism and the one-variable-at-a-time, one-sizefits-all engineering syndrome common to modernism. both seem to repudiate the human-nature dichotomy — whether the cartesian duality of mind and body, or the emersonian distinction of “rural strength and religion” vs. “city facility and polish.” essentially, they both believe cities are as “natural” as beehives, anthills, and coral reefs, albeit with more elaborate gizmos and props. both would no doubt agree with jane jacobs that people watching in cities is as much about “nature” as bird watching in the wilderness, or, for that matter, birds watching people in cities. both movements focus on public space and infrastructure, lu almost exclusively. lu seems to embrace the walkable neighborhood that is the bedrock of nu, although lu’s ideal neighborhood is typically more campus-like, with pedestrian routes through the park rather than along the street. nu rejects the modernist dendritic, tree-like network of streets, and unabashedly promotes the consilience kelbaugh: landscape urbanism and new urbanism connected grid/network. however, lu leader charles waldheim champions detroit’s lafayette park, a superblock urban renewal project by mies van der rohe and ludwig hilberseimer. its campus-like setting of townhouses and few high-rises may be a lush green sanctuary in a distressed city, but its suburban-like density and cul-de-sacs do not make for a repeatable building block of urbanism. each movement embraces a more regional approach to urban planning, preferring to coherently address the entire metropolitan area and bioregion. both are also putatively regionalist in design. for instance, lu believes in native plants and permaculture, just like nu aspires, if not always successfully, to traditional and passive solar architecture rooted in local climate and local building materials and practices. despite celebrating regionalist design, nu’s charter also advocates underlying if not universal patterns and structure in design, aiming to reject arbitrary or capricious form. here the similarities between the two movements end and the differences begin. lu is professionally and academically “hot”, with strongholds in several ivy league design schools, which generally avoid nu as nostalgic, retrogressive, and dismissive of their avant-garde tendencies.1 waldheim (2012) claims to disassociate the movement from most of the rarefied, relativistic literary and art theory that dominated the architectural academy for a generation and that openly criticized normative practice. this high theory has given way in the last decade to “a shift toward collaborative, practice-based research,” often focused on the environment and urbanism. (allen, 2012) but lu seems to be still enthralled with forms that look post-structuralist. the fractal geometries, in particular the flowing, interweaving stream forms may be ecologically inspired, but these large-scale landscapes seem to be as much about style. when formal audacity is obligatory in every project – as is usually the case with starchitecture – inventiveness has become more slavish than liberating. figure 4: james corner’s firm field operations designed these parks in santa monica, california, and seoul, south korea. the smooth, curvilinear mounds of land (left) and the sculpted towers in a park/superblock (right) are more elegant than nu, but will they be as empty of pedestrians and denuded of trees as depicted? despite rhetoric to the contrary, is lu still in the thrall of post-structuralist formalism? for 1 architecture programs at notre dame, u. of miami, andrews university, and u. of maryland, have included nu to varying degrees in their pedagogy, as well as the urban design degree program at u. of michigan for the decade while the author was dean. consilience kelbaugh: landscape urbanism and new urbanism formal clarity and contrast must it be embedded in the ordinary urban fabric that lu seems unable to deliver? lu is often accomplished, exquisite landscape architecture, but is it urban enough to be landscape urbanism? figure 5: two well known lu projects are the redevelopment and restoration of the lower don river in toronto (left), and the highly popular high line in new york city (right), in two of north america’s densest cities, despite lu’s alleged focus on decentralized cities. in toronto, the high-rise towers are set amidst parks more than streets. in manhattan, the elevated park cuts through the traditional, dense, streetbased urbanism that lu dismisses in theory but needs in practice for counterpoint. lu has direct roots in ian mcharg, downplayed as it has been since his view of nature has been shown to be too static. lu touts the fluidity and indeterminacy of natural systems more than their stability. it has embraced ecological theories and practices that emphasize more dynamic ecosystems with the rapid changes and oscillations that rattle longer periods of equilibrium (most significantly the increasing climate wobble that has not been seen for over ten thousand years). nu has also become very concerned about climate flux, but is much less fluid and continuous in its formal vocabulary, with its roots more in traditional urban syntax and figural urbanism. the original east coast contingent of nu grew out of a european formalism and has consistently promoted traditional architecture, traditional neighborhood development (tnd) and the nu transect. the original west coast contingent (including the author) arose from the environmental/passive solar movement and regionalism, and has been less insistent on traditional architecture. it has focused more on the regional scale and on (tod), and has tended to be more accepting of high-rise buildings. although nu has refrained from inventive or flamboyant form, it has been urbanistically skillful, even bold. george baird suggests that peter calthorpe’s consilience kelbaugh: landscape urbanism and new urbanism regionalism is arguably more radical and critical (in a positive sense) than the work of peter eisenman, the arch-champion of discomforting “critical design” that challenges convention and leaves issues like sustainability to others. (fishman, 2005) despite its too-frequent architectural mediocrity and pasty historicist tectonics, nu is in some senses more radical than avant-garde design, in which audacious urban form often cloaks the socio-economic status quo and even complicity with entrenched power and privilege. i agree with stan allen that lu stars – and their clients – are well “aware of the branding and marketing potential of the avant-garde mood that adheres to the work” (allen, 2012). there is a basic difference in the way that the two movements think about urbanism and nature. not surprisingly, landscape design comes first in lu and urban design comes first in nu. the latter doesn’t believe in maximizing the amount of “nature” per se in the city, but in balancing it with human priorities. it opts for less open space, streams, forest or grasslands than lu, which has criticized nu for promoting a “parks desert”. nu would rather concentrate development within the city than spread or dilute it with conventional suburbs. neither is lu in favor of conventional sprawl, but it prioritizes open space and parkland. since the great recession, nu has dramatically shifted its focus from large greenfield projects to smaller, greener and leaner urban infill (and to reform of policy and standards). although it has come to fully embrace environmental sustainability later in its trajectory than lu, it believes the first obligation and role of towns and cities is to provide livable, resilient human habitat that is compact enough to reap the inherent benefits of urbanism and leave intact as much of a region’s wilderness and natural habitat for other animal and plant species. this host-guest distinction can be seen as an ironic return to the compartmentalization of euclidean land-use zoning that nu has so roundly rejected—this time separating the built habitat of humans from the wild one of animals. the separation varies in intensity across the urban gradient or the transect, as explained below. nor is it exclusive; there is room for urban food growing, and a place for domesticated animals and wild species, some of which thrive better than in the wild (e.g., the peregrine falcon and the red-tailed hawk, and the more ubiquitous squirrel, rat, and pigeon.) habitat separation is like zoning land by species rather than by function, as an act of community building and of respect for other species. this interpretation may be stretching the zoning analogy, but compact human habitat intensifies the environmental paradox of cities: density not only shrinks per-capita eco-footprints but also human intrusion into animal and plant habitat. every contemporary urban theory seems to agree that the city is a network in some manner or form. however some think of the city as a network of flows, while others think of it as a network of places. typically, luists embrace and celebrate flows, especially water flows in the landscape, whereas nuists champion place, both streets and plazas/squares. indeed the most salient design difference between these two schools of thought may be their attitude toward the street, which nu sees as the most important public infrastructure – the city’s vascular system, commercial locus, social stage, and “the river of life for the city” (whyte, 1980). as one nuist says about this debate: "it is more than being about ‘two movements’. it is about the primacy of the ‘street’ as opposed to the primacy of the ‘park’ as the primary setting consilience kelbaugh: landscape urbanism and new urbanism for a civil society. the distinction is stark and nothing is more fundamental in urbanism."2 lu takes us back to the tower-in-the park urbanism and ciam’s early death warrant on “the street” written several generations ago. it is the apex of a long list of differing design tendencies: dendritic street hierarchy vs. highly connected networks; freestanding, object buildings vs. background, fabric buildings; high-rise vs. low-rise density; artistic license vs. norms and codes; artist vs. artisan; void-dominated vs. solid-dominated urban fabric; less consistent urban patterns vs. the transect; surface vs. mass; and abstract vs. figural form and composition—all of which reveal that lu has not left modernist urbanism or post-structuralist architecture as far behind as claimed. on the other hand, nu should incorporate more contemporary geometries, such as fractal and parametric form, on top of the euclidean/platonic circle, square, and ellipse. nor should it ignore technological breakthroughs such as digital fabrication; or the contemporary tectonics of glazed transparency that seamlessly connect interior and exterior space; or the apparent weightlessness of contemporary structures that visually defy gravity, an effect that can uplift the human spirit. each movement should embrace the full range of local/low/vernacular design to high design, remembering that an urban fabric of many modest background buildings is needed to set off the few iconic ones. indeed, what seems most promising going forward is street-oriented, walkable, mixed-use, socially diverse fabric that is realized with contemporary architecture and punctuated with iconic buildings that are of contemporary, sometimes avant-garde design. it’s the best of what the design professions have to offer. even new urban fabric realized in traditional architecture with contemporary/avantgarde foreground buildings – the original promise of seaside – is a fuller, more culturally and tectonically authentic urbanism. but formal audacity shouldn’t be obligatory in every foreground building – as is usually the case with starchitecture – or inventiveness and originality will be more slavish than liberating. it is easy for the neo-traditional new urbanists to blame their often mediocre, even banal, architecture on middle-class taste and the market economics that dominate speculative development (where, admittedly, one failed project can bankrupt a developer). however, they could fight for better design with the same fervor with which they’ve battled for mixed use, walkability, and transit. a loyal minority of nuists has been pushing since the movement’s birth over two decades ago for more contemporary architecture.3 a standard response has been that nu is beyond style, but very few cnu charter awards have been given to contemporary buildings. a more convincing response has been that you can move public taste and the market only so far so fast, and that urban reform is more important and impactful than architectural style—a tactical argument to use familiar styles as a trojan horse in which to hide less acceptable social and environmental programs. this argument is less compelling with wider public acceptance of nu principles. these aesthetic comparisons focus on more emotive, subjective and less discursive preferences that tend to run deeper and change slower than more rational 2 email from paul murrain, january 9, 2011. 3 a number of in-house nu activists, most notably cnu founder dan solomon, current cnu board chair ellen dunham-jones and the author, have long argued for both higher quality and more contemporary architectural design. consilience kelbaugh: landscape urbanism and new urbanism positions and constructs. formal sensibilities are no doubt at the crux of the friction between lu and nu; they often speak louder than words. the difficulty of verbally unpacking aesthetics notwithstanding, lu is more enthralled with surface and “thick”, continuous horizontal form, especially folded, abstracted ground planes or interweaving, curvilinear landscapes and feathery wetlands. the geometries are neither finite nor finitely composed – without borders or frames – and they are more inspired by fractals than, say, the proportions of the human body. however voluptuous and biomorphic, the palette can be as formulaic as nu’s formalistic master plans of grids, radials, and terminated axes (another criticism that is often deserved). nor do lu building designs define the outdoor rooms of plazas and streets, which people from all cultures seem to find spatially comfortable and sociable. and like suburbs, there tends to be too much open space devoted to grass and not enough to trees, with the universal sense of refuge and prospect that tree canopies provide. this lack of enclosure brings into question waldheim’s assertion that lu has “the ability to produce urban effects traditionally achieved through the construction of buildings simply through the organization of horizontal surfaces.” (2006) will the vast, open green spaces actually attract the many pedestrians photoshopped into the exquisite renderings, or will they become empty “border vacuums” (jacobs, 1961)? 4. learning from and moving beyond the differences the built habitat needs to function in a way that is beneficial to its host species. curvy biomorphic shapes and patterns may appear to be more natural than rectilinear ones, but they are not necessarily more biophilic, which is design that makes humans innately feel alive, comfortable, and secure. biophilic environments need not be biomorphic in shape or literally full of greenery (e.g., the alhambra in granada, which primarily consists of rectilinear forms and patterns). they are sustainable because they resonate with humans. both movements need biophilic design to achieve lasting cultural relevance. lu’s focus has been more on water in the city, whereas nu has paid more attention to fire, i.e., the inherent energy conservation of cities. nu can learn more about hydrology, as well as ecological infrastructure, habitat, and horticulture, from lu, which in turn could profit from nu’s detailed knowledge of street networks, tod, its higher walk scores, form-based codes, and the public/private declension of urban space. nuist principles are based on millennia of city design, updated and methodically refined over 25 years of frequent conferences, writings, debates, and built projects. it’s inspired by enduring precedents like nolli’s rome, which is held up as a quintessential setting for human ecology. like tod, the transect is basic to nu, with its gradient of density, use, and height that builds from wilderness to rural to suburban zones to three zones of urbanism, plus a special district zone for uses that don’t easily fit in neighborhoods (warehouse districts, industry, airports, etc.). this six-zone gradient works across both the metropolis and the individual neighborhood, which typically consists of two or three t-zones. it includes a sliding repertoire of habitat for plant and animal species, as noted earlier. the urban end of the transect promotes social diversity, in keeping with nu’s increased focus on urban redevelopment. lu’s large open spaces consilience kelbaugh: landscape urbanism and new urbanism promote ecological diversity, but its less granular urbanism is not as likely to induce socio-economic mixing. if sociocultural diversity increases with density while natural/ecological diversity decreases, a more sustainable urbanism would keep sociocultural diversity and natural/ecological diversity as high as possible in all zones. illustrated in the chart, this balance would take fuller advantage of both the environmental and the social paradox of cities. figure 6: the natural and socio-economic transects of the city. if nu learned more from lu about the ecology of the low-density transect zones, and vice versa at the urban end of the transect, it would produce a more ecologically and socially diverse city, as shown in chart d. (dpz) in short, there’s not enough urbanism in lu, and not enough ecology in nu. to be more specific, at the urban end of the transect there’s not enough human habitat, figural space, socio-economic diversity and street life in lu, and not enough natural diversity and hydrology in nu. because both social diversity and natural diversity are a. traditional urbanism — privileges socio-economic diversity b. landscape urbanism — privileges natural diversity c. new urbanism — values natural & socio-economic diversity d. sustainable urbanism — equalizes natural & socio-economic diversity at all t-zones rural zones ◄ r u r a l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l t r a n s e c t l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l u r b a n ► urban zones urban coresub-urban natural rural urban center general urbant1 t6t5t4t3t2 consilience kelbaugh: landscape urbanism and new urbanism weak in suburban sprawl, both movements should minimize its spread and aggressively retrofit it with urban interventions. even with these changes, both movements are transitional steps to a world that needs to be far less carbon based and consumptive than current versions of lu and nu, as well as much denser and leaner, more democratic and inclusive, and more racially and ethnically equitable. reducing carbon and consumption needs to be particularly dramatic in north america, where voracious consumption and rapacious lifestyles typically yield ecological footprints that exceed their planetary fair share by a factor greater than three, and where inequalities are expanding. lu and nu may both represent advances, but ultimately they are not transformative enough to mitigate and adapt to the ongoing, compounding impacts of cc, resource depletion, and world-wide cultural, economic and socio-political stresses. the deeper and more immediate the mitigation, adaptation and transformation, the less costly and disruptive they will be. 5. the global challenge the world can no longer afford the time or the resources to produce and insatiably consume endless novelty and needless change, for which industry needs ongoing avant-garde design. the need for variety and change, as well as for some fantasy and spectacle, may be in our dna, but frenetic, unquenchable love of the new – neophilia, if not neomania – is unsustainable. we don’t have enough time or wealth to address all our problems one at a time; we need to deal with multiple problems at the same time, synergistically and mindfully. designers are especially adept at elegantly integrated solutions, and can help show the way toward a more holistic urbanism. we are hardwired by evolution to respond to more immediate problems and less abstract threats than cc, as well as driven by our desire for immediate pleasures and attachments. it is genetically easier to focus on short-term gratification and on closer, more tangible crises, such as poverty, corruption, terrorism, extreme weather events, unemployment, pollution, or diminishing resources. 4 it’s socially and psychologically challenging to deal with the slow tragedy of the global environmental commons, the biosphere’s atmospheric blanket that now traps too much of the sun’s otherwise beneficent energy. market economies and electoral politics have trouble rallying to long-term problems. this is where uhi can help motivate behavior change. as a city’s hot season becomes more uncomfortable and unhealthy, there are ways to mitigate and adapt to local climate change more quickly than global cc. residents can focus on a fiveto 10-year local challenge with more direct, measurable feedback, rather than dither on a 50to 100-year global challenge that offers vague, indirect feedback. because the local adaptation and global mitigation strategies are typically complementary, these cities can focus on uhi while tackling global cc at the same time. although without air conditioning and being less 4 it is also more politically effective. for instance, the ozone hole and selected species decline and loss have been sufficiently mitigated or reversed in less than a lifetime through government intervention and behavior change. problems as big as global poverty, many diseases, and the universal provision of clean water could be solved in a lifetime with sufficient political will. (a popular example is universal clean water might cost less than the money spent globally on bottled water every year.) consilience kelbaugh: landscape urbanism and new urbanism acclimated/more vulnerable to heat waves, urbanites in cool climates may welcome warmer weather; so residents of stockholm and seattle will need to find other ways and reasons to motivate themselves to deal with cc and do their share of stewardship of the global commons. in all cases, a sense of planetary citizenship, fair play, and altruism are needed to help those unlucky areas of the planet most devastated by cc, especially in the countries that have contributed least to the problem. the built environment is the largest single contributor to both local and global climate change. billions of lights – powered by primeval hydrocarbons taken from the earth’s crust – keep the planet glowing in the night sky. this gossamer veil of urban lights visible from outer space is perhaps the grandest testimony to what glorious marvels and desperate challenges humans have wrought. figure 7: the diaphanous twinkling of our earth aglow at night – the picture of a planet intentionally on fire – closely maps cities that consume immense resources but paradoxically reduce per-capita ghg production for half of its human inhabitants. new green technologies and helpful scientific breakthroughs are sure to emerge, thanks to the intelligence and resourcefulness of our ingenious, adaptive species. they will bring benefits that hopefully will exceed their unintended but unavoidable negative consequences. our planet, which has been through far bigger changes, and its hardiest, most adaptive species, will survive if not thrive. the big question is whether the most advanced and powerful of its species will survive cc and live fulfilling lives in numbers anything like today’s seven billion inhabitants. paul hawken lost count when the tally approached a million organizations devoted to the environment and social, from tree planters to micro-loan programs to 350.org to the united farm workers. he describes their loose agglomeration as the largest social movement ever. (hawken 2007) the sooner lu, nu, and the multitude of other movements get their acts together – both within and between themselves – the better they can act together. it will take every bit of collaboration we can muster to sustain humankind and its civilization. consilience kelbaugh: landscape urbanism and new urbanism bibliography allen, s. 2012. architecture school. cambridge, ma: mit press (with acsa press). arendt, h. 1958. the human condition. chicago: university of chicago press. fishman, r. 2005. new urbanism & reurbanism. ann arbor, mi: taubman college of architecture and urban planning, university of michigan. florida, r. 2004. cities and the creative class. new york: routledge. glaeser, e. 2011. triumph of the city. new york: penguin press. hawken, p. 2007. blessed unrest. new york: penguin press. heymann, d. 2011. landscape is our sex. places. retrieved from places.designobserver.com/feature/landscape-is-our-sex/31228/ jacobs, j. 1961. the death and life of great american cities. new york: random house. krier, l. 2011. seaside at 30. south bend, in: university of notre dame. stone, b. 2012. cities and the coming climate. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. waldheim, c. 2006. the landscape urbanism reader. new york: princeton architectural press. west, g. 2011. www.ted.com/talks/geoffrey_west_the_surprising_math_of_cities_and_corporation s.html whyte, w. 1980. the social life of small urban spaces. washington, dc: the conservation foundationallen, s. 2012. architecture school. cambridge, ma: mit press (with acsa press). consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 5, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 125-140 the role of regional institutions in sustainable development: a review of the mekong river commission’s first 15 years mai-lan ha columbia school of international and public affairs columbia university in new york city email: lmh2127@columbia.edu abstract the implementation of sustainable development principles often comes into conflict with government driven needs for greater economic growth. the richly diverse mekong region–which comprises the six riparian nations of china, burma, laos, thailand, cambodia, and vietnam–is in the midst of a regional debate between development and ecological preservation. the mekong river commission (mrc), the sole organization in the region tasked with managing this delicate balance, is struggling to find a balance between utilizing the mekong’s waterways for economic growth without undermining the vitality of the river for use by future generations. in its 15 year history, the organization has never truly defined its basic principles on sustainability and has instead shifted positions as its leadership has changed. the mrc is also trapped in a difficult balance with its upstream neighbors; due to its limited authority, the mrc has been unable to effectively manage water usage and development along the mekong region. 1. introduction vision for the basin: an economically prosperous, socially just and environmentally sound mekong river basin. vision for the mekong river commission: a world class, financially secure, international river basin organization serving the mekong countries to achieve the basin vision. mission of the mrc: to promote and coordinate sustainable management and development of water and related resources for the countries’ mutual benefit and people’s well being (mrc). sustainable development reverberates in policy discussions around the world. in practice, the implementation of sustainable development principles often comes into conflict with government driven needs for greater economic growth. the mekong region, comprising the six riparian nations of china, burma, laos, thailand, cambodia, and vietnam, is in the midst of a regional debate between development and ecological preservation. the sole organization in the region tasked with managing this delicate balance, the mekong river commission (mrc), is 126 consilience struggling to find a balance between utilizing the mekong’s waterways for economic growth without undermining the vitality of the river for use by future generations. ensuring the viability, history, and character of the basin system represents an enormous task for all professionals in conservation, sustainable development, and water resource management. outside of china, the river basin in the lower mekong remains close to its natural state. however, plans are being made to construct dams for hydropower and irrigation, improve river navigation for trade, and other policies that will change the nature of the river across the region. all of these changes are made in the name of pro-poor development.1 yet, the poorest communities are often found on the banks of the mekong and rely on the river’s natural abundance for their livelihoods. the mrc must find a balance between developing the basin and not destroying the natural resources the poor rely on. since the founding of the mrc in 1995, the organization has faced many questions about its role and ability to adequately address development concerns. in many ways, the mrc has been insular, focusing mainly on answering the needs and requests of its member nations’ governments and select partnering agencies. its ability to absorb and respond to outside considerations (public requests) has been dependent on the character of the organization’s leadership. at the same time, the mrc has played a significant role in shaping the mekong basin as the greatest opportunity for sustainable development, trade facilitation, and navigation. the mrc’s greatest challenge has been how to include into development plans the much less quantifiable but equally important roles of culture, the ecological system, and social structures of basin residents. the question remains: how can the mrc use its knowledge and information base to facilitate dialogue between all parties (member governments, donors, and civil society), to coordinate and advise on sustainable development, and to manage water usage and resources of this rich ecological system for the benefit of the poorest, while maintaining the ecological integrity of the river system? thus far, the mrc has not been able to adequately answer this question. it has done a poor job in its fundamental tasks of water management and sustainable development and has struggled to maintain dialogue with all parties. this article will demonstrate how the mrc’s changing understanding of sustainable development, along with its inability to coordinate information transfer, include public input, and influence national agendas, has hampered its ability to meet its stated mission. beginning with a basic background of the mrc’s origins, this article will examine how the mrc has looked at sustainable development, water resource management, public participation, and role development. finally, it will give some thoughts of what the future holds for the organization. 2. the founding of the mekong river commission the mrc’s legacy can be traced back to geopolitics of the 1950s. led by the united nations development program (undp) and the united states army corp of engineers, a united nations economic commission for asia and the far east (unecafe) study viewed the mekong as one of the greatest “untamed” rivers whose waters must be controlled to limit flooding, produce electricity, and support development through a series of hydropower dams in the region. during a historical consilience ha: regional institutions period fraught with concern over the rise of communism in southeast asia, development in the region had little to do with actual local needs; instead, development was seen as a strategy to fight communism. hence, hydropower plans developed by the us corp of engineers gave the united states a clear advantage over others in the region. following the decision to build a cascade of dams throughout the region, an agreement was signed in 1957 that established the mrc’s forerunner, the mekong committee, and included thailand, laos, cambodia, and vietnam. the committee’s main task during the time was to implement hydropower development plans throughout the region. during its early years, the committee predominantly surveyed, researched, and collected data for the construction of a series of hydropower dams throughout the basin. however, the committee could only complete a limited amount of work as indochina (laos, cambodia, and vietnam) slipped into outright conflict in the 1960s and 1970s. meetings were suspended and little work was completed. in 1975, with the conclusion of the vietnam war, the grouping, without cambodia (who at that time was under the closed khmer rouge regime) signed a new interim agreement that allowed the 3 countries to continue implementing hydropower development studies and construction. in all, a very limited number of dams were built, none of which were on the mekong’s mainstream waterways. in 1992, conflict in cambodia ceased, and the country re-emerged from years of isolation. consideration had to be made about where cambodia fit into the existing 3 party mekong committee. however, since 1957, the economic make-up of the region had changed significantly. thailand in particular was in the midst of great industrial growth and had become reliant on the river’s water. several thai development plans required diversions on the mekong’s tributaries and mainstreams. however, the 1975 interim agreement contained specific clauses prohibiting the river water’s diversion without consent from other member countries. for the first time in over a decade, cambodia’s re-entry into the committee as the country most immediately downstream of thailand posed a potential threat to thailand’s own economic plans. thailand was fearful that cambodia would object to its water diversion plans and therefore, objected to cambodia’s re-entry. however, excluding a stable cambodia would undermine the regional legitimacy of the organization. this impasse threatened the existence of the mekong committee, something that the undp could not allow to happen. in this acrimonious atmosphere, negotiations led by the undp for a revitalized four member organization concluded in 1995 and established the current mekong river commission. the commission was tasked with ensuring sustainable development throughout the basin with explicit language to mitigate harm to the environment while protecting, preserving, and even enhancing its surroundings. the member countries’ governments heralded the agreement as a great achievement. within civil society, on the other hand, the 1995 agreement was met with less enthusiasm. although civil society applauded the agreement for establishing a mechanism for cooperation and discussion, the agreement failed to acknowledge the negative attributes of large scale industrial development and to explicitly discard hydropower plans for the mekong region.2 as a result, the mrc had to continue reassessing its role in the mekong region. over the next 15 years, the mrc’s role and focus shifted as it struggled to define its position vis-à-vis other intergovernmental organizations and regional 128 consilience bodies. its main strength continued to be its ability to increase its already significant knowledge base by amassing large quantities of macro level data and observations on the technical aspects of the river basin. however, it struggled to utilize this knowledge base for actual sustainable development and water governance. 3. sustainable development the 1995 agreement that created the mrc was explicit in its goal towards, “sustainable development, utilization, conservation and management of the mekong river basin water and related resources… consistent with the needs to protect, preserve, enhance, and manage the environmental and aquatic conditions and maintenance of the ecological balance” (“1995 agreement on the cooperation for the sustainable development of the mekong river basin”). within this framework, the mrc structure (council, joint committee, national committees, and secretariat) has been unable to present a coordinated work-plan meeting this objective. the mrc has found it particularly difficult to understand the implications of cross boundary programs in transportation, fisheries, hydropower, and irrigation. the very understanding of sustainable development and the degree of attention paid to environmental concerns and sustainability have been wholly dependent on the personalities of the mrc’s leadership. the mrc’s inability to institutionalize actual environmental and social considerations beyond the rhetoric undermines this element of the mrc’s core goals. during the first years of its existence, the mrc, under the direction of yanasabu matoba, a former japanese engineer, differed little from its predecessor, the mekong committee. its 1996 work program included a list of infrastructure programs for investment. many of these projects were recycled from lists constructed by the mekong committee focusing extensively on centralized infrastructure. other considerations, including its mandate for water utilization, environment, and social mitigation programs were considered with no progress made until the early 2000s. following matoba, joern christensen, was appointed the mrc’s chief executive officer. during his tenure, from 2000-2004, development became much less project-specific. instead, basin wide considerations were made with an emphasis on ecological conservation. under christensen, the basin development plan was completed in 1999, and implementation began soon thereafter. the basin development plan was one of the key projects stipulated by the 1995 agreement. its aim was to develop and coordinate development initiatives that would benefit all countries in the region by emphasizing cross border projects while also minimizing the possible negative impact associated with such projects. sustainable development became less reliant on rapid infrastructural development and instead included consideration for basin wide resource management combined with social and environmental impacts. this did not mean a cessation of infrastructure projects, but greater attention was paid to the projects’ ecological ramifications. the environment, fisheries, and water utilization programs became integral for determining how the development agenda could be reconciled with socio-economic growth, a stark departure from preceding years. consilience ha: regional institutions by the mid-2000s, the basic frameworks and procedures for the mrc had been concluded.3 while the early 2000s were marked by basin wide management and integration of environmental and social considerations into development plans, the second half of the decade saw an increase in concrete investment and development projects. under the mrc’s third ceo, olivier cogels, concrete action became the major concern. in 2005, he wrote, “the mrc is in an ideal position to act as a promoter and facilitator of well-coordinated investments in the water and water related sectors of the region, in close cooperation with the donor community and investment institutions” (cogels, 2005). in this model, greater cooperation with both the world bank (wb) and the asian development bank (adb) became integral. 4 “sustainable development” now meant concrete projects in hydropower, navigation, fisheries, irrigated agriculture, environmental management, watershed management, etc.5 during this period, project completion, with a nod to sustainable development was extremely popular among riparian governments. by 2008, under its current ceo, jeremy bird, the mrc once again shifted positions. greater consideration is now given to the social and environmental impacts related to project implementation. core practices now include determining mainstream acceptable practices for hydropower development. the mrc’s new project to develop a strategic environmental assessment is indicative of its current efforts to pay more attention to the environmental ramifications of development projects. over the past few years, greater attention has also been paid to impacts on one of the most diverse fisheries in the world, accounting for one quarter of global freshwater fishing and worth over 2.5 billion usd annually (mrc). the mrc’s latest two initiatives, basin wide development scenarios 2010 and its strategic environmental assessment (opportunities and risks) for proposed lower mekong basin mainstream dams, takes a much more critical view of the impacts that development will have on the make-up of the region. the basin wide development scenarios 2010 looks at three cases: the baseline situation, the definite future scenario, and foreseeable future scenario. in each of these scenarios, the mrc has assessed how development plans created throughout the region will impact livelihoods, fisheries, hydrology, etc. the strategic environmental assessment (sea) on the other hand, analyzes for the first time the impact of mainstream hydropower construction on the communities, fisheries, and hydrology of the region. the sea was recently released in october 2010 and actually found that hydropower plans should be halted for at least ten years because they could lead to irreparable harm (“dams spell doom,” 2010). with greater emphasis on the social and environmental impacts of project implementation, the mrc has made significant strides in recent years towards sustainable development. the mrc’s understanding of sustainable development has changed through the years, and its evolution has not followed a linear path. instead, the balance between how much environmental and social issues would be considered in the need for overall development depended predominantly on the personality of the mrc’s ceos. during its first years, the mrc was concerned with continuing with previous hydropower plans. during subsequent years, the mrc shifted back and forth between developing more comprehensive and balanced development agendas and completing large centralized infrastructure projects. recent years have seen a return to social and environmental considerations for project completion, though much progress remains. 130 consilience 4. water resource management the mrc’s second major task is to manage the water resources afforded by the mekong river for the betterment of the communities it serves. in this respect, the mrc has followed a step-wise approach by passing a series of procedures dictated by the 1995 agreement. the 1995 agreement explicitly spelled out the mrc’s role in facilitating water use, determining the causes of disruptions, and facilitating disputes if they were to occur. the mrc also sought to increase dialogue with upstream mekong countries, burma and china, as a key cornerstone for water resource management. yet this effort met only limited success in facilitating greater transparency in water use. in the end, the mrc’s effectiveness in water management was greatly hampered because the 1995 agreement set out procedures that were not rules based and lacked real enforcement mechanisms. in essence, the mrc was unable to influence the national policies of its member countries. although the mrc initiated its water utilization program in 1996, it was not until 2003-2006 that the majority of its stated mandates were completed, including procedures for water use monitoring, prior consultation and agreement, and maintenance on the flows on the mainstream. another mandate, known as procedures for water quality, is currently still awaiting approval. the delay in these procedures led to thailand’s 1995 diversion of water from the mekong mainstream for its own purposes and uncoordinated development along the river. as in the 1995 agreement, the procedures are not rules based and member states are not bound to act by the procedures. along with these procedures, the mrc has also developed a variety of modeling mechanisms and programs to focus its work. the current model is the integrated water resources management (iwrm) to complement its hydrological modeling under the decision support framework. the iwrm in theory, “promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems” (“mekong water resources assistance strategy,” 2007). by utilizing the iwrm, the mrc notionally acknowledges the need for both a bottom-up and top-down approach. nevertheless, the actual implementation of the program relies on the organization’s ability to influence riparian governments’ policies, something that has not yet happened. the individual national mekong committees are more concerned with national interests than the mrc’s regional role, thus straining relations among members. the mrc’s relations with its upstream countries, burma and china, have led to some agreements between the parties for greater information sharing. however, it still took over ten years for china to agree to provide 24 hour water level and 12 hour rainfall data for flood forecasts. only following this year’s major drought has china agreed to release limited data from two of its upstream dams. the fact that it took 15 years for china to agree to minimal data release is a testament to the relationship the mrc has with its upper riparian neighbor. these two aspects-the organization’s inability to affect real domestic policy changes in its riparian governments and insufficient information sharing with its upstream neighbors-limit any real affect the mrc can have on water use consilience ha: regional institutions management. without effective water use management, the second core objective of the mrc cannot be met, leading to disruptions in water flow and depletion of water resources. for the communities living along the river who are reliant on its natural water flows, massive changes in expected water flows (both unforeseen), droughts, and floods have led to diminishing livelihoods. 5. public participation one of the greatest challenges the mrc faces is its relationship with the public. more than any other issue, the mrc’s inconsistent policy and the original disregard for public participation led many to question its legitimacy and effectiveness. by not engaging with the public, the mrc severely limited its own ability to adequately assess the needs of the people living along the mekong. without public input in its projects, civil society protested against the opaque decision making process that they believed benefited large private developers over their own needs. this undermined the mrc’s objectives to effectively manage the resources of the mekong for residents in the area. the core problem is that the mrc is only directly accountable to the four riparian governments, not to the general public. during the 1990s, the mrc took a particularly aloof stance. its first ceo, yanasabu matoba, stated, “public participation is not the responsibility of the mrc but that of its member countries,” further noting that if the public needed information it must, “go to the embassies of the member countries or through the donors” (“letters,” 1996). the utter exclusion of public participation in the mrc secretariat’s planning process was an inauspicious beginning to relations between the mrc and the public. rather than seeing the public and civil society as key actors and allies, the dismissive nature of these first years fostered hostility and mistrust between the parties. given the extremely different stages of political freedom and participation of its member states, the mrc has been unable to sustain public participation in its programs. certain less contentious projects (environmental and basin development plans) include built-in mechanisms for dialogue and consultations with the public, while others (water utilization program) exclude the public completely. for example, the current basin development plan and the state of the basin report both hold a series of stakeholder sessions to share preliminary results, garner feedback, and make amendments throughout the process. in april 2010, a representative from the mrc even attended a civil society forum to share the latest developments of the basin development plan and to hear differing viewpoints. still a key avenue for public engagement, the national mekong committees have failed to implement a mechanism for open dialogue. the committees are established by each of the national governments. for cambodia, laos, and vietnam, where public participation is a new concept, there is little precedent for establishing arenas for public dialogue. instead, the national mekong committees are treated as merely another bureaucratic organization. it was not until 2009 that the mrc responded concretely to the problem by issuing a new communications strategy. this strategy explicitly declared the need for greater discussion, dissemination of information, publication of the mrc’s roles, and the need to establish avenues for public feedback on projects.6 by 2009, after nearly 132 consilience two decades of turmoil over the lack of information coming from the mrc, its new ceo, jeremy bird (who had previously been head of the world commission on dams) saw the vital need for a better communication strategy with the public. over the years, public participation was a repeated refrain from both civil society and the donor community. bird recognized donor demands as well as the importance of a coherent communications strategy from his previous position. being accustomed to dealing with controversial issues, he realized the mrc must address these concerns and improve its information sharing. over the past year, the mrc has released policy studies, posted meeting notes, and held stakeholder forums. hopefully this genuine approach and engagement with the public will continue. 6. its role: knowledge development, investment, regulation, and coordination most importantly perhaps is the image and overall role of the mrc. over the course of 15 years it has developed, accommodated, and changed itself depending on pressures from governments, donors, and civil society. striving to meet multiple objectivesincluding managing water resource information, coordinating activities, notifying members, and playing prominent advisory roles on sustainable development– these goals remain largely unmet. 6.1 knowledge development and consulting from its very inception, the mrc has been a knowledge organization. work since the 1950s resulted in a vast quantity of information on fishery levels, environmental surveys, water levels, etc. many of its programs today continue to fulfill this purpose, since the mrc sees itself as a repository for technological knowledge about the river’s resources and flows. yet, it still lacks a depth of knowledge on the cultures and histories of communities along its banks that were originally deemed unimportant in its work. stretching from china into vietnam, the mekong passes through villages and communities that are both among the poorest as well as most diverse. these include small fishing communities on the borders of laos and thailand, ethnic minority groups, and floating villages in cambodia and vietnam. historically, these communities have relied on the river’s natural ebb and flow for their livelihoods. most dependent are the floating villages on the tonle sap (great lake) in cambodia where the river naturally reverses its flow every year, yielding one of the largest fisheries in the world. recently, the mrc has tried to increase its knowledge by publishing the living mekong, a volume documenting the rich diversity of communities and fisheries along its banks, but more should be done to effectively engage with these communities. as a knowledge organization, the mrc has used its role to act as a consultant and advisor for projects with the world bank and adb as well as to advise member countries. this has manifested into a number of consultancies with international financial institutions on pre-feasibility reports for the mrc as well as environmental studies for local member organizations. recently, it has also begun to delve into developing recommendations for crossborder infrastructure projects across the consilience ha: regional institutions region, acknowledging the need for greater environmental and societal considerations. at the forefront of all infrastructure projects is a cascade of dams on the mainstream. the mrc’s “sustainable hydropower” program came about as laos, thailand, and cambodia looked to build 11 mainstream mekong dams. the mrc recognized that the completion of these 11 dams would change the very character of the mekong river basin, leading to potentially catastrophic environmental and social considerations due to collapsed fisheries, relocations of communities, and a complete change in the ecology of not just a single country, but the entire region. 6.2 private investment the mrc has also played a role in attracting investment for development projects. over time, this has moved from collaboration with international financial institutions towards projects with private investors. the shift became prominent particularly under olivier cogel’s administration. the importance of the private sector’s increasing role in the mekong basin is a significant challenge for the mrc. this is particularly true as private investors such as chinese, russian, and regional financiers and companies enter the market for hydropower development. as development organizations, such as the adb, promote public-private partnerships, private entities play an increasing role in determining development projects. in doing so, jeremy bird, notes, “the planning cycle for private sector projects tends to be much shorter than in the public sector, and less open” (“changing currents: navigating the mekong’s past, present, and future,” 2008). with the private sector playing a greater role, the mrc must reassess its position in development programs and determine its relationship with private entities. however, this shift from a basin management and a knowledge coordination organization towards an investment attraction organization does not fit donors’ conceptions of the organization. instead, donors believe it should play the role of a manager and facilitator amongst governments rather than a project oriented organization (donor group statement, 10th meeting of the mrc-donor consultative group). 6.3 regulation the mrc has also played a role in attracting investment for development projects. over time, this has moved from collaboration with international financial institutions towards projects with private investors. the shift became prominent particularly under olivier cogel’s administration. the importance of the private sector’s increasing role in the mekong basin is a significant challenge for the mrc. this is particularly true as private investors such as chinese, russian, and regional financiers and companies enter the market for hydropower development. as development organizations, such as the adb, promote public-private partnerships, private entities play an increasing role in determining development projects. in doing so, jeremy bird, notes, “the planning cycle for private sector projects tends to be much shorter than in the public sector, and less open” (“changing currents,” 2008). with the private sector playing a greater role, the mrc must reassess its position in 134 consilience development programs and determine its relationship with private entities. however, this shift from a basin management and a knowledge coordination organization towards an investment attraction organization does not fit donors’ conceptions of the organization. instead, donors believe it should play the role of a manager and facilitator amongst governments rather than a project oriented organization (“donor group statement, 10th meeting of the mrc-donor consultative group”). 6.4 knowledge management and coordination even without a true regulator’s role, the mrc as a knowledge base, advisor, and coordination center can do much more to highlight and regulate water flows. yet, it continues to fail to successfully investigate, monitor, and notify governments of impending disasters. one of the prime examples is the yali falls dam built 80 km upstream of the cambodia-vietnam border. between 1999 and 2001, when partial operation of the dam commenced, flash floods destroyed fields and vegetable gardens while also leading to a number of deaths in ratanikiri, cambodia. it was only when local reports from ratanikiri emerged that the mrc responded. even then, the mrc’s could only take undertake several field studies to meet with the vietnamese and cambodian mekong national committee members to set up better communication and cooperation mechanisms. it was clear that the mrc’s position was limited; it could merely bring sides together but not force changes (“cooperation for sustainable development,” 2000). in 2010, the mekong basin faced its most severe drought in close to 20 years. water flows and levels were considerably below average. the mrc claimed the low water levels were due to an unusually dry rainy season that ended in october, 2009. holding this knowledge internally, the mrc made no public statement until local media began reporting on drought conditions. this inability to coordinate and share information or make early warnings was indicative of its communications and systemic failures. even if seen solely as a knowledge organization, the mrc failed to meet its objectives. for the most part, the mrc has managed its large technical knowledge base to assist in member country and international financial institutional projects; however, it has struggled to adequately coordinate information transfer especially during times of crises. 7. the future of regional cooperation the mrc provides a good case study of the difficulties facing regional organizations tasked with managing water resources and sustainable development in a trans-boundary context. the commission’s complex agenda among its four member states combined with finding a way to engage with its two upstream nonmember neighbors make its mission particularly difficult. combined with regional and international interest in the mekong from the adb and wb, the mrc has struggled to find its niche in the development world. the mrc offers a number of lessons including the following: the importance of effective communications amongst governments and the public, true public engagement, the need for a mechanism to adequately enforce implementation of recommendations and consilience ha: regional institutions decisions, clearly defined understanding of development and real sustainability, and lessons in dealing with the geopolitics of upstream and downstream neighboring countries. although it has made mistakes in the past, the mrc is also shifting positions and reforming itself for the future. after years of foreign leadership, the mrc is shifting towards riparianization, meaning the riparian states (laos, thailand, cambodia, and vietnam) will have greater power in the decision-making process. in the upcoming years, the ceo and other key positions will be turned over to a riparian country national rather than expat leadership. decreased term limits for professional staff will also be amended to increase dedication and professionalization of the organization. this fundamental shift in the organization’s everyday working structure will further increase riparian governments’ ownership of the organization. these changes will, however, lead to more questions. most significant of these questions will be whether this latest attempt at inclusivity will be institutionalized and continued by later regimes. how the secretariat manages its relationship with national governments will also change as the organization moves ahead. time will tell whether increasing riparian ownership of the mrc will lead to greater cooperation or greater manipulation of the secretariat as a tool of national agendas. the mrc stands at a pivotal moment when it must take a more assertive stand in using its knowledge to promote sustainable development and equitable water use in the basin. as dialogue on global warming increases, the mrc will need to find a truly equitable strategy that will enable it to meet the changes brought by global warming. it should also endeavor to implement water resource management that does not destroy the ecological system and livelihoods of those in the basin, while simultaneously alleviating poverty for the very poorest. steadily over the past 15 years, the mrc has expanded its core strength as a knowledge institution in regards to technical and scientific data. at the same time, it has struggled to define its role in “sustainable development,” to effectively coordinate information transfer and to establish its public presence. in the past, much of this was due to a nonexistent communications strategy and shunning of public engagement. this is beginning to change, as the mrc recently passed a new communications strategy that establishes avenues for public input, responds to inquests, and utilizes the internet for information dissemination. it has also started taking more comprehensive steps to understand a dam’s impact on fisheries, sedimentation, and overall ecological impacts while issuing guidelines for further “sustainable hydropower” development. these are improvements, but they also signify the continued belief in the centrality of large scale infrastructure for development. the original question of how to use its knowledge base to increase environmental and social considerations and manage water resources has still not been adequately answered. at present, the mrc’s attempts have been inconsistent and dependent on the nature of its leadership. the true institutionalization of sustainability, environmental considerations, public participation and discourse has not yet occurred. consequently, the regional organization established to both coordinate and advise on basin wide development has had little impact on the decision making of its national members, nor has it been responsive to civil society and local societal needs. this has led to uneven development with potentially disastrous long term effects. 136 consilience the mrc has, thus far, failed to fulfill its vision for the mekong basin. sustainable development for the poorest mekong residents still has a long way to go. in addition, its inability to coordinate information transfer about water fluctuations impacting the entire basin has resulted in greater hardship for large swathes of communities. the struggles that were noted above have hampered the mrc from undertaking projects that are both sustainable and beneficial to the wellbeing of citizens living on the banks of the mekong. while large-scale infrastructure and agriculture projects have resulted in greater overall economic growth for the mekong countries, greater income inequalities have also emerged in the basin, exacerbating local challenges. as the basin’s nations continue down a path towards rapid economic growth, more pressure will be placed on the river system. currently, 11 mainstream hydropower projects are planned in laos and cambodia with potentially severe impacts on fish migration and the overall ecology of the basin. how the mrc navigates these projects will set precedence for the future and define its role in the basin. the mrc will need to confront and address its systemic failures in order to ensure that it may not only adequately manage the mekong’s development and water resources but also gain public legitimacy and trust. endnotes 1 pro-poor development: policies aimed specifically at benefitting the livelihoods of the poorest communities and individuals in the region. 2 please see “statement on cooperation for the sustainable development of the mekong river basin.” 4 april 1995, chiang rai, thailand. http://www.terraper.org/key_issues_view.php?id=14. the grouping of thai civil society organizations stressed, “an end to the era of environmental destruction and the beginning of an era of sustainability that does not damage the natural environment and which benefits all members of society … a holistic approach and the decentralization of authority to local communities must replace the concept of large scale water development centralized within the state.” 3 the different procedures included: procedures for data and information exchange and sharing, water use monitoring, and notification for prior consultation and agreement. 4 the iucn and wwf also became cooperation partners during this same period. today, twenty-seven organizations are amongst the mekong commission’s development partners. they encompass a wide array of organizations from ngos to intergovernmental organizations. 5 in fact, the cogel administration was notable for its control of information and was charged with withholding negative environmental reports. please see “13 years of http://www.terraper.org/key_issues_view.php?id=14 consilience ha: regional institutions bad luck: a relfection on the mrc and civil society in the mekong.” watershed. vol. 12, no. 3, november 2008 for further information. cogels also explicitly defended the building of hydropower dams, finding them critical for the region. http://www.mrcmekong.org/mrc_news/speeches/30-nov-06_open.htm. 6 please see new communications strategy, http://www.mrcmekong.org/download/free_download/mrc-communicationstrategy250110.pdf for more information. http://www.mrcmekong.org/mrc_news/speeches/30-nov-06_open.htm http://www.mrcmekong.org/download/free_download/mrc-communication-strategy-%20250110.pdf http://www.mrcmekong.org/download/free_download/mrc-communication-strategy-%20250110.pdf 138 consilience bibliography "changing currents: navigating the mekong's past, present, and future". 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(2000, july october). waterhsed , 6 (1), pp. 10-13. hirsch, p. (2008, november). 13 years of bad luck? a reflection on mrc and civil society in the mekong. watershed , 12 (3), pp. 38-43. hirsch, p. (2006 2007, july february). the mekong river commission and the question of national interest. watershed , 12 (1), pp. 20-25. lee, g., & natalia, s. (november 2008). the governance role of the mrc vis-a-vis mekong mainstream dams. australian mekong research center: mekong brief number 10 . lee, g., & scurrah, n. (2009). power and responsibility: the mekong river commission and lower mekong mainstream dams. australian mekong resource center, university of sydney and oxfam australia. sydney, australia: oxfam australia and university of sydney. mekong politics: "new era", same old plans. (1995, july). watershed , 1 (1), pp. 24 29. consilience ha: regional institutions mekong river commission. (2009). communications strategy. vientiane: mekong river commission. mekong river commission. (2003, april-june). mekong news: the newsletter of the mekong river commission. mekong river commission. (2004, august october). mekong news: the newsletter of the mekong river commission. mekong river commission. (2005, february april). mekong news: the newsletter of the mekong river commission. mekong river commission. (2005, may july). mekong news: the newsletter of the mekong river commission. mekong river commission. (1995, april 5). mekong river commission. retrieved march 12, 2010, from agreements, procedures and technical guidelines: http://www.mrcmekong.org/agreement_95/agreement_95.htm mekong river commission. (n.d.). public participation in the context of the mrc. retrieved march 15, 2010, from mekong river commission: http://www.mrcmekong.org/download/programmes/public_participation _mrc_context.pdf mekong water resources assistance strategy: justifying large water infrastructure with transboundary impacts. (2006-2007, july february). watershed , 12 (1), pp. 10-20. mekong, t. p. (2008, august 16). mekong flood, mrc's role, dams in china, and a failed alarm system. retrieved march 2, 2010, from http://www.prachatai3.info/english/node/755 nette, a. (1997, march-june). mekong river commission going with the money. watershed , 2 (3), pp. 31-34. ngos, t. (1995, april 4). statement on cooperation for the sustainable development of the mekong river basin. retrieved march 1, 2010, from foundation for ecological recovery: http://www.terraper.org/articles/thai%20ngo%20statement%20mrc%2 095.pdf philip, h., jensen, k. m., boer, b., carrard, n., fitzgerald, s., & lyster, r. (2006). national interests and transboundary water governance in the mekong. australian 140 consilience mekong resource center, danida, the university of sydney, sydney, australia. terra. (2008, march 27). mekong river commission. retrieved march 02, 2010, from foundation for ecological recovery: http://www.terraper.org/articles/regional%20letter%20to%20mrc.pdf terra. (2007, november 13). mekong river commission facing crisis of legitimacy. retrieved march 3, 2010, from foundation for ecological recovery: http://www.terraper.org/articles/press%20release%2013%20nov%20200. pdf woods, k. (2004-2005, november june). transboundary environmental governance in the greater mekong subregion: the politics of participation. watershed , 10 (2), pp. 10-23. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 21, iss. 1 (2019), pp. 1-16 historic preservation as a tool for sustainable community development s. peyton ellis s. peyton ellis is currently an intern for the international fund for agricultural development, having just completed her m.sc. in development practice from trinity college dublin and university college dublin. she received a b.a. in international relations, history, and philosophy from salem college in 2017. speytonellis@gmail.com abstract although the fields of community development and historic preservation are independently successful, there is an increasing need for professionals from each field to collaborate for efficient urban development. by combining the community building aspects of community development and the sustainable practices of historic preservation, urban development endeavors become more sustainable for both the environment and the people in urban communities. the growing pertinence of both community developers and historic preservationists in urban development is shown through analysis of the practices of each field and case studies involving their collaboration. author’s note my interest in this research topic is a combination of my studies in history, political science, and historic preservation practices. my focus throughout these areas has continuously been encompassed by my interest in international development. as i studied various techniques for development, i saw a growing need for historic preservation and regard to historical integrity. while many urban development projects have started using historic preservation practices, it has not yet become widespread criteria for community development agendas. my goal is to encourage the implementation of historic preservation practices in urban development nationwide. i hope to further my research from just the domestic use of historic preservation in community development to the potential of historic preservation in development practice internationally. keywords: community development, historic preservation technology, sustainability, economic development, leed certification mailto:speytonellis@gmail.com 2 consilience introduction the field of historic preservation offers many methods and ideologies that can foster success within other disciplines. one example of this is the collaborative efforts between historic preservationists and community developers. these professionals have used ideas from both disciplines to create projects throughout united states cities that not only employ sustainable practices, but also increase the overall well-being of communities. the objectives of historic preservation, including historical analysis, sustainability, and repurposing, provide a direct platform for these projects. community developers can repurpose these ideals to create city plans that revive historical cities and buildings. case studies involving the synthesis of historic preservation and community development show potential for sustainable advancements and the betterment of communities. the case studies included in this analysis provide examples of how historic preservation practices and community development ideology can be merged for the common causes of sustainability and community development. the importance of this collaboration is shown in each case study, as is the potential for the application of this relationship to future community development initiatives. before discussing case studies which exemplify the relationship between historic preservation and community development, this article will review background information on each discipline. the relationship between historic preservation and community development historic preservation focuses on the preservation of historically significant buildings, landscapes, and artifacts. experts in this field are called preservationists, and they possess a deep understanding of the theories and practices involved in conserving historic spaces. preservationists specialize in different subdivisions including research, consultations, and preservation technology1. the traditional ideals of historic preservation focus on saving materials and structures that would otherwise be thrown away or demolished and are easily adaptable to contemporary, environmentally aware endeavors. preservationists have noticed this connection and have begun implementing plans and technology that revolve around the philosophies of both historic preservation and environmental sustainability2. this connection has also attracted the attention of community developers, giving them an avenue to both practice historic preservation in order to save already existing infrastructure and to create an eco-friendly, often more affordable environment for communities. in this growing relationship between historic preservation and community development, those who study preservation technology play the largest role. this technology allows for the incorporation of sustainable 1 “historic preservation,” national trust for historic preservation, online, https://savingplaces.org/. 2 robert a. young, historic preservation technology: a primer. hoboken: john wiley & sons, (2008), 10-17. consilience ellis: historic preservation and community development ideology into refurbishment and conservation practices. recycled materials, energyefficient technologies, and tools to repair deteriorated buildings are all part of this process3. common materials used in sustainable historic preservation range from salvaged wooden or steel structural elements to refurbished carpeting to insulated window units that allow historic buildings to keep their original windows. these materials are eco-friendly as they are made without harmful chemicals and can support the effects of modern energy-saving technology such as insulated cork board flooring and solar panels. preservation technology has the important ability to balance historic elements with these modern amenities. structures can keep their foundation and historical integrity while appealing to contemporary design. as a result of stylistic and preservation trends, the demand for historically renovated houses has increased substantially in the last two decades. this interest has led to the greater use of preservation technology practices to properly maintain historical structures. these structures include office buildings, residential homes, apartment complexes, and retail spaces. with the growing popularity of renovated spaces, their value and the necessity of historic preservation has also increased. interior designers for these spaces have begun to combine the historical nature of the structure with contemporary design, and contractors are attracted to the reduced cost and improved sustainability associated with historic preservation. using refurbished materials decreases the cost of restoration and these materials are proven to result in a longer lifespan for the structures. historic preservation technology also has the potential to reduce energy costs. an example of such a product is geothermal technology, which uses in-ground receptors to store heat from the earth and convert this heat into a functioning energy source4. together, these positive externalities offer new methods of approaching community development through preservation technology. these incentives have led many community developers to incorporate historic preservation into their work. community development focuses on building community infrastructure and morale and is easily integrated with ideas of historic preservation. this is especially true when working with the homes, community centers, parks, and public facilities of a community. often in low-income communities, this collaboration plays a vital role; governments and not-for profits are typically the entities implementing development practices, meaning there is usually a tight budget constraint on community development5. in the past, such financial limitations have prevented these structures from being environmentally sustainable or long-lived. as a 3 ibid. 4 “how geothermal energy works,” union of concerned scientists, online, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/renewable-energy/howgeothermal-energy-works.html#.wef_zowchjw. 5 “community development,” united states department of housing and urban development, online, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/hud?src=/program_offices/comm_planning/communit ydevelopment. 4 consilience result, many eventually become inhabitable for the people for whom they were built6. this can be detrimental not only to the community’s aesthetic but to their morale as well. to address this, community developers have looked to historic preservation techniques. by using repurposed materials, buildings have been renovated with high quality construction at an affordable cost. historic preservation technology such as insulated cork board floors and geothermal heating has been used to cut energy costs for these structures, which also results in economic sustainability7. the application of historic preservation to community development also gives a community the opportunity to celebrate unique and historically important structures. without historic preservation these structures would likely be abandoned, creating more of an ‘eye-sore’ effect rather than one of pride and societal connection. thus, historic preservation allows community developers to use existing structures to create growth and better morale in developing areas. while there is significant potential for this collaboration, it is not free from criticism. the main disadvantages of historical preservation and community development projects are the high costs of some historic preservation and sustainability technologies, the negative effects of gentrification, and the economic competition caused by the introduction of large-scale businesses into local economies. as these projects often require large budgets, outside developers and businesses are typically the only ones able to afford the process. when previously deteriorating structures become expertly renovated and modernized, developers who are not community-minded tend to increase the price of those properties so much so that locals can no longer afford them. this leads to housing and small business displacement. these newer, more appealing structures also attract big businesses that have a level of capital and reach unattainable by local businesses. together, these can substantially harm a community, leaving many neighborhoods to reasonably hesitate at the thought of such development8. with these setbacks in mind, communities still support better, long-term infrastructure while also calling for such development to be done properly, with every aspect meeting the current and future needs of locals. the responsibility of proper community development, therefore, not only lies with community developers and preservationists, but with local organizations and governments who can facilitate community involvement and offer policies and grants that give preferential treatment to locals. working together, these actors can ensure that community development projects are executed in such a way that residents remain the principal beneficiaries. collaborating for sustainability 6 ted k. bradshaw, "theories of poverty and anti-poverty programs in community development," community development 38, no. 1 (2007): 7-25. 7 robert young, historic preservation technology, 21-24. 8 dan immergluck and tharunya balan, "sustainable for whom? green urban development, environmental gentrification, and the atlanta beltline," urban geography 39, no. 4 (2018): 546-562. consilience ellis: historic preservation and community development the benefits of combining historic preservation and community development are seen at the social and economic level, particularly through sustainability efforts. the sustainable development goals can be used to show the extent to which this collaboration encourages long-term sustainability. the sdgs were published by the united nations in 2015. there are seventeen goals, each tackling development issues on a broad spectrum. the collaboration between preservationists and community developers addresses five of these goals: goal 7 – affordable and clean energy; goal 8 – decent work and economic growth; goal 9 – industry, innovation, and infrastructure; goal 11 – sustainable cities and communities; and goal 12 – responsible consumption and production9. efforts aligning with these goals are present in each case study below as they show preservationists and community developers leading communities towards a sustainable future. while these projects were initiated prior to the establishment of the sdgs, their existence and consistent work towards sustainability set examples for similar projects worldwide. case studies with an understanding of each discipline, the intricate relationship between historic preservation and community development is apparent. community development benefits from the sustainable practices associated with historic preservation. when possible, community developers and historic preservationists reuse materials to increase morale, encourage economic growth, and create sustainability for communities10. historic preservationists use the historical value of an area as a main point in community development, highlighting unique characteristics of the neighborhood that attract outside interest, enhancing economic development11. the positive outcomes of this collaboration can be seen through case studies in which community developers and historic preservationists have worked together to better communities throughout the united states. pittsburgh, pennsylvania one such case study is the development of uptown pittsburgh, pennsylvania. this community was a frontier village which transformed into an industrial city. its easily navigable waterways made it ideal for transporting and manufacturing goods. by 1950, pittsburgh had become one of the nation’s largest cities as a result of its mass steel production and increased immigration rates. when steel production slowed down in the 1970s, pittsburgh evolved into a city for technical and medical innovation. some areas of pittsburgh, however, did not recover from the economic turmoil caused by 9 united nation, sustainable development goals, 2015, online, http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/. 10 marilyn e. swisher, sandra rezola, and james sterns, “sustainable community development,” university of florida cooperative extension service, institute of food and agricultural sciences, edis, 2003. 11 david listokin, barbara listokin, and michael lahr, "the contributions of historic preservation to housing and economic development." (1998): 431-478. 6 consilience the cessation of steel production12. uptown pittsburgh, located between the two commercial communities of downtown pittsburgh and oakland, is one of these areas. after steel production came to a halt, uptown pittsburgh experienced population decline and its infrastructure deteriorated. industrial buildings in the area made it seem unsafe, therefore limiting foot traffic and the use of store fronts. even with these impediments, uptown pittsburgh has remained a center for innovation and education, encouraging developers to invest in the revival of the community. in 2014, pittsburgh’s community development team created a plan for economic development, sustainable structures, and equal wealth distribution. though these tactics were heavily focused on community development ideals, each included some aspect of historic preservation. to integrate old apartment lots into the modernized city and connect them to businesses, preservationists placed sustainable heating and cooling features in existing structures and helped renovate their exterior complexes while maintaining their historical integrity. these features made the lots more desirable to community members while providing accommodation that was easily accessible from the city. they additionally surveyed the area for appropriate locations to build new structures that would not disturb historical sites but would act as a catalyst to connect the community to the greater pittsburgh area. preservationists also helped analyze historic buildings that were already part of the community, highlighting historically and culturally important architecture13. each of these endeavors relates closely to sdg 7 (affordable and clean energy) and sdg 9 (industry, innovation, and infrastructure) as they exemplify the use of green energy technology and sustainable infrastructure design. within the development of uptown pittsburgh there were many different methods of both community development and historic preservation. one of these methods was the inclusion of ecodistricts in the creation of sustainable designs for the area. ecodistricts is a company focused on creating diverse, equitable, and sustainable communities. they are often hired by city governments for their expertise in community development and their specialization in creating futurized urban communities14. ecodistricts’s ‘implementation model’ was used by pittsburgh’s city developers to construct innovative plans for uptown pittsburgh. they also formed a team of consultants to implement this plan15. of these consultants, several had backgrounds in historic preservation. uptown pittsburgh has many historical features relating both to its use as a frontier and an industrial sector. there were many structures in need of appropriate historical preservation. these structures served as a basis for designs regarding new 12 “pittsburgh history: introduction to pittsburgh,” visitpittsburgh.org, online, http://www.visitpittsburgh.com/about-pittsburgh/history/. 13 katy ricchiuto, “incubator success story: bringing up uptown in pittsburgh, pa,” ecodistricts. http://ecodistricts.org/incubator-success-story-bringing-up-uptown-inpittsburgh-pa/. 14 “about,” ecodistricts, https://ecodistricts.org/about/. 15 ricchiuto, “incubator success story: bringing up uptown in pittsburgh, pa.” consilience ellis: historic preservation and community development buildings in the area. after historic preservationists assessed each structure, new additions to the neighborhood were able match the historical buildings in both design and size. the new buildings allowed the community to incorporate modern amenities such as geothermal technology while still celebrating the characteristics that make their community unique. those same historic preservation techniques were also applied to parks and outdoor public spaces. park benches and tables were built from salvaged materials and gardens and public facilities were constructed using sustainable water usage techniques. the techniques used in these endeavors show how historic preservation can be used to reach sdg 12 (responsible consumption and production) within communities. these initiatives consciously provided green spaces for the community and small businesses, evading the problem of gentrification and eventually leading to the creation of uptown partners of pittsburgh, a community group dedicated to the sustainable development of uptown pittsburgh. this group currently runs multiple community-based programs, such as the sustainable small business designation, the sustainable pittsburgh restaurant program, the mlk community garden, and tree tenders. these programs are aimed at facilitating small-business growth and bringing members of the community together for environmental projects16. uptown partners of pittsburgh is just one example of how collaboration between preservationists and community developers resulted in community growth beyond physical infrastructure. this case study also exemplifies how this collaboration can lead to progress for sdg 8 (decent work and economic growth) and sdg 11 (sustainable cities and communities). st. louis, missouri another city undergoing the development process is st. louis, missouri. during mass migration, this city was known as the ‘gateway to the west’ and thousands of passersby traveled through it. after world war ii, st. louis became overcrowded, resulting in the construction of suburban neighborhoods on the outskirts of the city. these neighborhoods eventually resulted in urban population loss. unfortunately, this geographical separation also created racial and socioeconomic division within the city as affluent white residents were typically the only ones able to move to suburban divisions. in the late twentieth century, city planners developed strategies to combat tensions caused by the rigid division. these efforts were in vain, however, and several areas of st. louis remain racially and socioeconomically divided17. one such area is the new north side. this area is characterized by its historical features and the role it played in st. louis’ manufacturing and production past. the community has experienced many setbacks due to racial tensions but despite this adversity has evolved into an active community based on sustainability, cultural 16 uptown partners of pittsburgh, (2019), http://www.uptownpartners.org/. 17 “a brief history of st. louis,” st.louis-mo.gov, online, https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/visitplay/stlouis-history.cfm. 8 consilience exposure, and equity18. community developers have already made great progress in the area and have done so with respect for the community's rich history. not only do many of the original structures remain standing, but preservationists have also incorporated the wishes of residents by creating spaces highlighting local culture and serving specific needs. these included easily accessible outdoor spaces for community gatherings and innovative recreation facilities that can be used by area youth19. this development was made possible by taking advantage of the new north side’s location. the community, once defined by its low income and high unemployment, was able to transition because of its close proximity to a major highway, which allowed easy access to the neighborhood for both st. louis residents and out-of-town visitors. community developers received a grant from the united states department of housing and urban development to capitalize on this location by bringing in long-run investors. these investors secured outside funding for local businesses, increasing the use of existing structures and small business activity within the community. business owners who received these investments renovated using historic preservation tactics such as utilizing refurbished material and preserving historically significant characteristics. after city planners included ecodistricts in their planning process, the community grew substantially with an increase in career opportunities, youth engagement, and neighborhood resources such as free childcare and a fully operating food pantry20. the collaboration between historic preservationists and community developers to achieve this success shows the importance of such integration, with partnerships between small businesses and the community continuing to grow well after initial investments21. these achievements also show progress towards sdg 8 (decent work and economic growth) and sdg 11 (sustainable cities and communities). the many changes that occurred in the new north side necessitated precise city planning. this planning was ideologically focused on community development, infrastructure, and community morale. the infrastructure of the new north side included new buildings, sustainable technology, and the appropriate preservation of already standing structures, exemplifying work towards sdg 9 (industry, innovation, and infrastructure). by using the location of the community to gain funding, community developers succeeded in constructing well-rounded infrastructure22. they did so with the advice of historic preservationists and designers. preservationists were able to save historic storefronts by using preservation techniques and technology that guaranteed long-term sustainability, adhering to sdg 12 (responsible consumption and production). these storefronts were affordably transformed and supported local businesses, therefore improving the economy of the new north side. preservationists also created building plans to preserve existing structures and to create modern, 18 “historic north st. louis made all new,” northside regeneration, online, http://www.northstl.com/. 19 ibid. 20 katy ricchiuto, “making the near north side new in st. louis,” ecodistricts, online, http://ecodistricts.org/making-the-near-north-side-new-in-st-louis/. 21 the near north side, online, http://www.nearnorthsidestl.com/partners. 22 “making the near north side new in st. louis.” consilience ellis: historic preservation and community development affordable housing for the new north side community23. with these preserved structures the new north side city planners were able to create economic development strategies that included the internal monetary system of the community, instead of relying solely on outside aid. another endeavor preservationists contributed to was the addition of sustainable features to existing structures. one of the main goals of the developers was to increase sustainability and ensure affordable energy. this followed the ‘minority wealth creation strategy’ created by both developers and individuals within the community. together, historic preservationists and community developers were able to meet this goal with several strategies currently being implemented on the new north side including low-energy air circulation and cork board insulation for heat retention24. this collaboration is present in many of the success stories of the new north side, proving the importance of the relationship between historic preservationists and community developers and showing how this relationship can coincide with sdg 7 (affordable and clean energy). lansing, michigan although communities as a whole benefit from the collaboration of historic preservationists and community development, certain aspects of a community such as buildings, parks, and landmarks can also reap the benefits. one example of this is the christman building in lansing, michigan. from its original construction, the christman building has been a landmark in lansing. it has served as a hub for business and as an important part of the city’s overall aesthetic. even so, for some time the building was vacant and poorly maintained. since then the building has been added to the national register of historic places and is currently used as an office building for the christman company. the company specializes in real estate development and construction and rents out office space to over seventy tenants25. when the christman company purchased the building, they did so with the mindset of community developers. they wanted to revive the building using both historic preservation techniques and sustainable technology26. this restoration was completed in 2007, with the collaboration between community developers and preservationists evident in every decision made throughout the process. in particular, the christman company’s decision to follow leed criteria, a set of regulations meant to ensure sustainable construction and operation, shows both an interest in community development and historic preservation. the christman building became the first building to receive double-platinum leed certification, showing their dedication to both disciplines and progress towards sdg 7 (affordable and clean energy), sdg 9 23 michael r. allen, “’northside’: historic preservation,” preservation research office, http://preservationresearch.com/north-st-louis/northside-historic-preservation/. 24 “historic north st. louis made all new.” 25 “the christman building,” urban land institute: development case studies, online, http://casestudies.uli.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/98/2015/12/c039012.pdf. 26 ibid. 10 consilience (industry, innovation, and infrastructure), and sdg 1127 (sustainable cities and communities). the importance in renovation which draws on both development and preservation ideology is shown through an analysis of this certification. the christman building’s double-platinum leed certification means their sustainability efforts were beyond pristine. in order to reach this high level of certification the christman company had to maintain historical spaces, incorporate sustainable materials into secondary spaces, and use energy-saving devices and materials28. the christman company used technology to ensure sustainable siting, sustainable design and construction practices, energy efficiency, and water efficiency, which in turn represented progress towards sdg 12 (responsible consumption and production). example of these devices and materials include energy star appliances, efficient hvac systems, recycled materials, and insulated carpet tiling. the cost of these renovations was not significantly higher than unsustainable renovations, especially after the christman company earned incentives from both the state and federal governments, 'green tax cuts' that saved the company money in the long-term. along with the green tax cuts, the christman company profited from the media attention it received with a double-platinum leed certified building29. these financial incentives, along with the long-term environmental benefits of sustainability, make the christman building a success story of the collaboration between development and historic preservation. the christman company's success also aligned with economic community growth as the building brought job opportunities into the area, aligning with sdg 830 (decent work and economic growth). without tactics from both preservationists and community developers, the christman building would not be the sustainable landmark it is today, nor would it be a symbol of community growth through sustainability. shreveport, louisiana another building that was renovated through a partnership between community development and historic preservation is the ogilvie hardware company building in shreveport, louisiana. this building was originally constructed in 1929 and was added to the national register of historic places in 1999. its original purpose was to serve as a warehouse, but after sitting vacant for over a decade, developers made the decision to turn the building into affordable housing units. the property was subsequently turned into ninety lofts and five recreational spaces. community developers had to consult with historic preservationists to create the affordable housing units. renovation architects from bgo architects consulted with the shreveport historic commission to preserve the historical integrity of the 27 “the christman building,” united states green building council, online, http://www.usgbc.org/projects/christman-building. 28 “historic rehab became the first double platinum leed project,” national parks service, online, https://www.nps.gov/tps/sustainability/case-studies.htm#mutual-building. 29 “the christman building,” urban land institute: development case studies. 30 urban land institute: development case studies. consilience ellis: historic preservation and community development building31. many of the original historical characteristics of the building were maintained. the original industrial architecture is highlighted throughout renovated spaces and the authentic steel windows were repaired. throughout the renovations, features such as steel beams, exposed concrete, and concrete columns were kept and integrated into the modern interior design. the ogilvie hardware company building’s renovated exterior also adheres to its historical aesthetic. the original loading docks were kept and transformed into balconies32. original brick, large windows, and exposed concrete foundation all embody the period in which the building was constructed. they also highlight the original purpose of the building with modern additions representing its current use33. together, the additions to the building and the original characteristics show the careful thought processes of community developers and historic preservationists working on this project, while also exemplifying progress towards sdg 9 (industry, innovation, and infrastructure). one of the main reasons for the project was to create affordable housing for those in the community who needed a safe, reliable place to live. to residents, the ogilvie hardware company building is known as the ogilvie hardware lofts. the surrounding community suffers from socio-economic division, resulting in many individuals unable to afford decent housing, and the affordable lofts were a necessity. using sustainable methods, developers were able to make the apartment rents and their energy costs as low as possible, aligning with sdg 7 (affordable and clean energy) and sdg 11 (sustainable cities and communities). while ogilvie hardware lofts was born from this need for community development, they were not completed without the use of historic preservation34. preservationists helped developers obtain gold leed certification, with the criteria for the certification implemented in each step of renovation. for this certification, preservationists set certain restrictions for each loft based on how tall architects could make the ceiling and what historical elements could not be covered. the height restrictions influenced the square footage of each room and architects kept the original concrete floors, which can be seen in some of the lofts and recreational spaces. materials available to contractors were also limited as they had to meet the energy-efficient criteria from leed while being structurally sound. many refurbished materials were used to meet this requirement, demonstrating progress towards sdg 12 (responsible consumption and production). as the contractors were constructing a building within a building, leed criteria and structural soundness were critical during construction. some of the historic beams were even used for further structural 31 “leed gold national register listing, shreveport, la,” national park service, online, https://www.ncptt.nps.gov/resilience/case-study/warehouse-to-lofts-conversion/. 32 “leed-gold project converts hardware warehouse to apartments,” national park service, online, https://www.nps.gov/tps/sustainability/case-studies.htm#ogilvie-hardware 33 “leed gold national register listing, shreveport, la,” national park service. 34 “ogilvie hardwarean adaptive rebirth,” downtown shreveport, online, http://downtownshreveport.com/history/ogilvie-hardware/. 12 consilience support, and new walls were added around the beams35. overall, the architects and contractors successfully completed the puzzle of fulfilling the needs of both community developers and historic preservationists. san francisco, california the renovation of pier 15 in san francisco, california is another example of collaboration between community developers and historic preservationists. pier 15 is located on the san francisco bay, between two piers that are used for ferry boats and a fisherman’s wharf. in the early 2000s, the bay area was thriving while pier 15 was deteriorating in appearance and structure36. meanwhile, one of san francisco’s main attractions, the exploratorium, was looking for a new location as their current building was causing operational setbacks. these obstacles included low levels of natural light, a lack of space for expansion, and structural issues preventing them from conducting science experiments. while looking for a new location they came upon pier 15 and decided it fit their needs as it offered solutions to their current constraints. in 2013, the exploratorium made the move to pier 15. this was not an easy transfer; hundreds of exhibits and organism cultures had to be transported to the new location. the workers and scientists of the exploratorium worked for days to efficiently transport these items and display them properly within the new location37. pier 15 had space for triple the number of exhibits, double the number of classrooms, and quadruple the amount of meeting spaces38. these new features were important as they encouraged both economic growth and educational development in the san francisco community39. during its transition, pier 15 experienced many changes that were supervised by both community developers and preservationists. throughout the construction process, pier 15 was examined based on how its features influenced both the community and the historical setting of the san francisco bay. community developers had to ensure that the exploratorium complemented other public venues and the historical presence of nearby piers. historic preservationists were participants in this process so that any changes to pier 15 were structurally appropriate to the history of the community. they also had to keep in mind the environmental impact the exploratorium and its foot traffic would bring40. these problems were considered by both community developers and historic preservationists. the biggest adjustment that contractors for the exploratorium 35 “leed-gold project converts hardware warehouse to apartments,” national park service. 36 “exploratorium at pier 15,” the american institute of architects, online, http://www.aiatopten.org/node/472. 37 “the science of moving science across town,” the new york times, online, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/arts/artsspecial/how-the-exploratorium-in-sanfrancisco-moved-across-town.html. 38 “pier 15 facts of interest,” exploratorium, online, https://www.exploratorium.edu/pressoffice/press-releases/pier-15-facts-interest. 39 “exploratorium at pier 15,” the american institute of architects. 40 “new addition to the san francisco waterfront,” national parks service, online, https://www.nps.gov/tps/sustainability/case-studies.htm#pier-15. consilience ellis: historic preservation and community development endured was the addition of seventy new steel pilings. these steel pilings were added to ensure structural stability but threatened the historical integrity of the location. other additions included 5,874 high efficiency solar panels and water pumps that use the san francisco bay water to regulate the temperature inside the exploratorium, an innovative move representing sdg 7 (affordable and clean energy). these sustainable features allowed the exploratorium to become the largest net zero energy museum in the united states. in order to ensure that these additions did not disrupt the historical integrity of the building, historic preservationists had to analyze each change and its impact on the structure, exemplifying the objectives of sdg 9 (industry, innovation, and infrastructure) and sdg 12 (responsible consumption and production). in the end, they decided that these sustainable practices met the requirements of preservation and offered ideas on how to maintain both new technology and historical elements. these ideas included using natural light provided by the original storehouse windows and carefully placing large machinery so that it did not ruin irreplaceable characteristics of the property. the presence of the exploratorium has been a positive force in educating and entertaining the san francisco community while also increasing the economic growth of the bay area and the museum itself, showing progress on sdg 8 (decent work and economic growth) and sdg 11 (sustainable cities and communities). maintaining the original structure of the pier and remaining cognizant of its historical integrity followed the guidelines of historic preservation techniques, showing that this growth was a result of combined efforts from preservationists and developers41. the future of sustainable community development discussion as the world moves toward global sustainable initiatives such as the sdgs, there is a growing need for the collaboration between preservationists and community developers. before this relationship can reach its full potential, however, several questions must be answered. perhaps the most pressing challenge is how to incentivize sustainable community development while maintaining local integrity. based on the case studies above, the best method of doing this is to ensure community involvement with government programs and grants that offer preferential treatment to sustainable, community-led projects. one example of this is the green tax cuts offered to businesses who incorporate sustainability practices into their operations. these types of policies may be enforced nationally, with possible tariff cuts or trade pacts serving as incentive for the execution of domestic sustainable preservation, design, and development. the sdg framework offers an internationally recognized set of indicators that could be used for such programs, with many countries consistently collecting and reporting data pertinent to their overall sustainability. 41 “exploratorium at pier 15,” the american institute of architects. 14 consilience while this program would be an ideal start to incorporating both preservationists and community developers into global sustainable development, there are bound to be setbacks. the issues of gentrification and big business competition are just as prominent on the global stage as they are in local neighborhoods, meaning that large-scale tactics must first address these issues. other potential barriers to such programs include the formulation of set standards for projects, uniform monitoring and evaluation processes, and the policies of countries that may have differing social and economic agendas. together, these issues call for international actors who are willing to work together to create solutions and to properly implement preservation and community development projects on the global stage. other questions regarding the global collaboration between preservationists and community developers continue to require further research, such as how to approach communities that do not traditionally practice historic preservation or those who have had their historical landmarks demolished in times of conflict or natural disaster. another challenge searches for best practices when navigating this relationship within the foreign aid constraints that are present in many low income (lics) and middle income countries (mics). conclusion while many questions still remain about the future of collaboration between preservationists and community developers, the success this collaboration can have is undoubtedly present in the case studies examined above. these show not only potential but the need for further exploration of how this relationship could serve global development. by using the sdg framework, the projects completed through these disciplines are directly connected to the international goals of the united nations and worldwide communities. therefore, incorporating this collaboration into related programming could result in further progression towards the goals of the sdgs, specifically sdg 7, sdg 8, sdg 9, sdg 11, and sdg 12, and for an overall sustainable future. references “about.” ecodistricts. online. https://ecodistricts.org/about/. “a brief history of st. louis.” st.louis-mo.gov. online, https://www.stlouismo.gov/visit-play/stlouis-history.cfm. https://ecodistricts.org/about/ https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/visit-play/stlouis-history.cfm https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/visit-play/stlouis-history.cfm consilience ellis: historic preservation and community development allen, 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ecodistricts. http://ecodistricts.org/incubator-success-story-bringing-upuptown-in-pittsburgh-pa/. ricchiuto, katy. “making the near north side new in st. louis,” ecodistricts, online, http://ecodistricts.org/making-the-near-north-side-new-in-st-louis/. “sustainability case studies.” national parks service. https://www.nps.gov/tps/sustainability/case-studies.htm. online. “sustainable urban development case studies.” eco districts. http://incubator.ecodistricts.org/team-case-studies/. online. swisher, marilyn e., sandra rezola, and james sterns. sustainable community development. university of florida cooperative extension service, institute of food and agricultural sciences, edis, 2003. “the christman building.” urban land institute: development case studies, online, http://casestudies.uli.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/98/2015/12/c039012.pdf. “the christman building.” united states green building council, online, http://www.usgbc.org/projects/christman-building. “the science of moving science across town.” the new york times. online, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/arts/artsspecial/how-theexploratorium-in-san-francisco-moved-across-town.html. the near north sid. online. http://www.nearnorthsidestl.com/partners. united nations, sustainable development goals. 2015. online. http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-developmentgoals/. young, robert. historic preservation technology. john wiley & sons, 2008. http://ecodistricts.org/incubator-success-story-bringing-up-uptown-in-pittsburgh-pa/ http://ecodistricts.org/incubator-success-story-bringing-up-uptown-in-pittsburgh-pa/ http://ecodistricts.org/making-the-near-north-side-new-in-st-louis/ http://casestudies.uli.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/98/2015/12/c039012.pdf http://casestudies.uli.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/98/2015/12/c039012.pdf http://www.usgbc.org/projects/christman-building http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/arts/artsspecial/how-the-exploratorium-in-san-francisco-moved-across-town.html http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/arts/artsspecial/how-the-exploratorium-in-san-francisco-moved-across-town.html http://www.nearnorthsidestl.com/partners microsoft word palliam final.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 17, iss. 1 (2017), pp. 162–181 sustaining investment in innovation in oil rich gulf countries amidst falling oil prices “the jar of meal will not be emptied and the jug of oil will not fail” (the prophet’s psalm) meshaal jaber al-ahmad al-sabah phd director-general kuwait direct investment promotion authority bbougaiz@hotmail.com ralph palliam phd associate professor of business management, american university in kuwait rpalliam@auk.edu.kw abstract oil rich gulf countries have identified all forms of sustainability as key drivers of innovation. therefore innovating for sustainability is critical for an economy’s political legitimacy, socio-economic reputation, and ecological performance. sustaining investment in innovation requires an understanding of returns or payoffs accruing to an investment in innovation. sustainable development is fraught with challenges particularly when an economy’s growth is linked to a single resource. research and development together with productivity growth rates have become innovation indicators and continue to raise questions about their interpretation and implication. in resourceladen rich countries the challenge is further exacerbated by inflows accruing from benevolent government subsidies. this empirical study reviews the variables for policy formulation associated with innovation in the six resource-rich oil countries of the gulf and considers its determinants. negative relationships between resource abundance and poor economic performance have often been empirically established, providing support for the “resource curse” hypothesis. the culture of governance, norms and values that pervade oil-rich countries become key determinants of their economic success. the primary purpose of this study is to determine the factors associated with sustainable innovation in the gulf and to address the concerns related to the governance of resources that necessitate further innovation. keywords: innovation, resource curse, gulf countries, investment in innovation consilience sabah, palliam: innovation in oil rich gulf countries introduction the oil-rich gulf countries share a common vision for economic development. their national development plans highlight the need to innovate and to reduce dependence on the hydrocarbon sector. the creation of more decent and productive employment opportunities for their young and growing population is a milestone towards independence and self-reliance and an important step in completing the youth’s transition to adulthood. an extensive and exhaustive literature survey on innovation and its economically complex relation to diversification, modernization, industrialization and poverty reduction consistently conveys the phenomenology of innovation is ubiquitous. this finding aligns with the organization for economic co-operation and development (oecd) suggestion that innovation goes far beyond the confines of research laboratories, to users, suppliers and consumers everywhere, in government, business and non-profit organizations, across borders, across sectors, and across institutions. innovation has long been argued to be the engine of growth and the need to innovate has been identified by many notable authors, including auty and mikesell (1998), freeman (1982), porter (1990), lundvall (1992) and nelson (1993). moreover, these authors have linked innovation to economic growth models. the support and encouragement for innovation varies among stakeholders. innovation raises competition, presents lower pricing structures, and accords job creation opportunities. more importantly, innovation returns wealth for individuals, corporations and nations. innovating for sustainability could assume a fundamental and radical change that accrues social and environmental benefits as well as economic value. sustaining an investment in innovation within this context would include an examination of economic, political, social and environmental concerns in corporate operations and their interactions with stakeholders (van marrewijk, 2003). ultimately, innovation is stimulated when innovators receive the resulting payoffs. a scientist’s view of innovation payoffs may very well be very different from that of an accountant or even that of the corporate social responsibility department in the same organisation. accounting for an investment in innovation is problematic, in part because a single metric that reflects a return on this investment has not been identified. consequently, there has been a paucity of research in this regard. studies by auty and mikesell (1998) on sustainable development in mineral-rich economies merely focus on the accruing benefits of innovation. lundvall (1992) and nelson (1993) link innovation to competitive economic outcomes and their results have been widely adopted in the formulation of policy. however, the necessary preconditions in formulating and determining curse consilience 164 reductive measure for oil rich countries remains unexplored, particularly in oil rich gulf countries. this view is also consistent with that of van der panne and van beers (2006) who ask: “what favors regional innovation?” economies are inextricably linked to the type of governance and political policies that states have endured over time, with collier and hoeffler (2000) eloquently addressing these issues in terms of greed and governance. wilson (2011:5) in his seminal work, “is it possible to build sustainable innovation capacity in oil rich gulf countries?”, presents a pessimistic picture and suggests that there is very little scope currently for gulf states to become more internationally competitive with respect to innovation and knowledge fundamentals. to varying degrees, each gulf state is embarking upon an economic diversification strategy to move their respective economies away from hydrocarbon dependence. however, each gulf state is severely constrained in key areas, such as educational achievement, innovation, economic incentive regime, and lack of coherent science, technology and innovation policy. wilson (2011) goes on to add that the successful implementation of innovation in the gulf countries requires due consideration. any contribution to innovation as a resource curse reduction mechanism must be interdisciplinary, taking into consideration the politics of the region, socio-economic issues, history, and the nature of business conducted by of the private and the public sector. failure to address the issues from an interdisciplinary perspective may result in stakeholders being antagonized and the consequences could be disastrous. furthermore, an interdisciplinary approach better addresses the complexity of gulf countries’ resource curse with their concomitant plurality of causes and effects. a range of perspectives should ideally be considered providing a more comprehensive understanding of issues and challenges. the thought that innovation is vital for socio-economic growth and human development was long recognized by adam smith and even karl marx. as long as the global socio-economic and political environments are in a state of dynamic change, these have a major impact on economies. economies are in different stages of economic growth. according to the world economic forum’s (2013-2014) key performance indicators for global competitiveness, gulf countries have achieved a status of high mass consumption and at the same time, have faltered in terms of innovation. therefore sustaining an investment in innovation is crucial. over the years, gulf countries have established certain traditions in order to maintain and sustain social, political, and economic cohesiveness. an understanding of these traditions is imperative for corporations that are domiciled within the gulf. equating the changes that are taking place in the external environment with these traditions should go a long way in ensuring that innovation is not a curse. success for any corporation within the gulf comes from adopting appropriate changes that reflect the consilience sabah, palliam: innovation in oil rich gulf countries culture of the region. any change that is effectively and consistently managed within cultural parameters, presents the corporation with opportunities for sustained growth and ultimately human and social development. the capability to innovate is not only critical to an organization’s viability but also the country as a whole to improve its current competitive position. acknowledging that innovation in any organization requires a thorough understanding of an economy’s social fabric, geographical environment and political economy, an examination of the potential resultant changes accruing to an economy needs to be considered within a curse-blessing context. a haphazard approach in using innovation as a curse reduction tool may have disastrous consequences. revisiting innovation and positioning it within context sustainability of people, profit and planet is the sine qua non of organizational and technological innovations. corporations are therefore becoming aware of the social and environmental pressures that confront them. the literature findings suggest that these new demands offer phenomenal opportunities and within this context innovation becomes the primary means by which organizations achieve sustainable growth. in reality corporations are fraught with issues around innovation and sustainable development pressures. designing strategies that integrate the goals of innovation and sustainable development should ideally accommodate these complexities and uncertainties. although bakken (2002) identifies innovation as a fuzzy concept that evokes sharp political reactions, schumpeter’s (1934) more dominant ideas posit that radical innovations shape big changes in the world and incremental innovations fill in the process of change continuously. the term innovation certainly covers a vast range of ideas and policies relating to change. star (1988:1) considers innovation as going far beyond research and development. governments, private businesses, non-profit organizations and other institutions are beneficiaries of innovation. the oslo manual of 2005, the foremost international guide for the collection and use of data on innovation activities across the oecd countries, contends that the ability to determine the extent of innovation initiatives and the characteristics of innovators are prerequisites for the pursuit and analysis of policies aimed at fostering innovation. the manual investigates the field of non-technological innovation and the linkages between different innovation types. furthermore, it includes an annexure on the implementation of innovation surveys in developing countries. innovation is at the heart of economic change. schumpeter (1942) proposed a list of various types of innovations, including: the introduction of a new product or a qualitative change consilience 166 in an existing product; process innovation new to an industry; the opening of a new market; development of new sources of supply for raw materials or other inputs; and changes in industrial organization. the first issue, product innovation, involves a good or service that is new or significantly improved. this may include significant improvements in technical specifications, components and materials, software in the product, user friendliness or other functional characteristics. process innovation refers to new or significantly improved production or delivery methods. marketing innovation, the third form of innovation includes significant changes in product design or packaging, product placement, product promotion or pricing. finally, organisational innovation relates to a new organisational method in business practices, workplace organisation or external relations. firms care about their ability to innovate, on which their future allegedly depends (christensen and raynor, 2003). indeed, many management consultants are busy informing companies about how they can help them improve their innovation performance. designing policies that stimulate innovation has become a major issue for politicians at various levels of government. the european commission has made innovation policy a central element in its attempt to invigorate the european economy. a large body of knowledge has emerged, particularly in recent years, on various aspect of innovation and many new research units focusing on innovation have been formed (fagerberg and verspagen, 2009). there is a distinction between an innovation and a product. product is an output of innovation. this is consistent with what drucker (1992:38) posits: “in a knowledge economy knowledge is a product, in a knowledge-based economy, knowledge is a tool”. a brief analysis of economic history, especially in the united kingdom, will show that industrial technological innovation has led to substantial economic benefits for the innovating company and the innovating country. the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century was fuelled by technological innovations. nineteenth-century economic historians observed that the acceleration in economic growth was the result of technological progress. however, little effort was directed towards understanding how changes in technology contributed to this growth. schumpeter (1934, 1939, 1942) was among the first economists to emphasise the importance of new products as stimuli to economic growth. he argued that the competition posed by new products was far more important than marginal changes in the prices of existing products. this macro view of innovation as cyclical can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century. it was marx who first suggested that innovations could be associated with waves of economic growth. since then others such as schumpeter (1934, 1939), kondratieff (1935, 1951), and abernathy and utterback (1978) have argued the long-wave theory of innovation. marx suggested that capitalist consilience sabah, palliam: innovation in oil rich gulf countries economies would eventually decline, whereas kondratieff argued that they would experience waves of growth and decline. abernathy and utterback (1978) contended that at the birth of any industrial sector there is radical product innovation that is then followed by radical innovation in production processes, followed, in turn, by widespread incremental innovation. this view was once popular and seemed to reflect the life cycles of many industries. it has, however, failed to offer any understanding of how to achieve innovative success. the characteristics of innovation suggest that innovation is the result of numerous interactions between key organizations and groups in the economy including universities, government, firms and other institutions, which together form an innovation system (wilson, 2010). wilson (2010) goes on to add that innovation does not take place within a vacuum and that there is an interaction between numerous stakeholders. a national innovation system consists of flows and relations which exist among industry, government and educational institutions in the development of science and technology. an investment in market-driven innovation and sustainable development innovation should ideally consider the exogenous future generation’s economic, social and environmental pressures. diffusion of innovation—impact on sustainable development innovation is a solution to sustain competitive initiatives. effective programs of innovation in the economy involve many elements, both macro and micro in character. these programs include the introduction of new goods and new methods of production, the opening of new markets and the sourcing of new material, as well as managing and restructuring enterprises, establishing an appropriate business environment, building financial intermediaries and promoting competitive market conditions. innovation is affecting the technology of production and the organization of firms as well as triggering social and cultural changes. the accompanying figure 1 shows the diffusion of innovation in terms of a wider definition that encompasses: the improvement of social relations, the fostering of economic growth, financial development and independence; reducing political, social and financial volatility; fostering employment growth; fostering sustainable environment; restructuring social security; re-focus on food security, ensuring fiscal discipline; and re-energizing trade agreements. an investment in all forms of governance of innovation plays a pivotal role in the pursuit of country attractiveness. oil and gas-based economies have an opportunity to use the wealth derived from mineral assets to create societies capable of sustaining growth and diversity, with infrastructure and education taking priority, as consilience 168 illustrated in figure 1. infrastructure will provide the platform for linkages across the oil and gas community, fostering creativity and innovation. education will help to create an environment where innovation can take place, and will also provide the labor pool so desperately needed by an industry whose specialized knowledge and talent are currently dwindling. figure 1 diffusion of innovation – a broadened view source: the natural wealth of nations: transformation of oil and gas producing economies, cisco internet business solutions group (ibsg) (wood, 2007, p.5) connected cities become part of the innovation network, providing access to data and enabling collaboration and cooperation among communities, companies, institutions, and government. when the workforce becomes connected, even while mobile or in remote locations, and manufacturing and production are tightly tied to business analysis and decision-making, the benefits become tangible and quantifiable. country attractiveness is also a major issue in the diffusion of innovation. an identification of the key drivers of country attractiveness could ideally include a country’s economic growth and entrepreneurial potential; liberal conduct of financial institution; tax regime for business entry and exit; legal structures that protect property rights; the human and social environment of the country and the prevalence of an entrepreneurial culture. innovation resource curse hypothesis and blessings it is widely acknowledged that revenues resulting from natural resources should generate wealth for an economy, promote economic progress, and increase the wellbeing of each citizen. a large windfall of revenues accumulating from an abundance of natural resources should place that economy in pole position when compared to others. whether resource-rich countries have experienced better performance (in terms of economic progress and consilience sabah, palliam: innovation in oil rich gulf countries poverty reduction) than countries without such apparent “benefits” is an important issue. however, this paper concentrates on understanding innovation as a strategy that converts the blessings into a common good for all. much of this conversion process relies upon configuring governance structures that make innovation possible. the “resource curse” phenomenon is not an immutable law, but studies consider it a strong recurrent tendency. in their seminal work, berkhout et al. (2006) identify the changes that are taking place in the so-called innovation economy. besides capital, labor and knowledge, creativity is identified as the fourth principal factor of production. the authors go on to describe the activities in an innovation economy as creative enterprise with knowledge. creativity is an important aspect of human endeavor, particularly in distressing economic times. the assumption of the study is that together with creativity, innovation creates added value. this may be central to converting curse effects into blessings. innovation is an imperative for the survival of economies endowed with natural resources and it is a solution to their political, social and economic woes. for much of the contemporary period the economic system of the gcc countries entailed the provision of free housing and other welfare services to their nationals. security from public sector employment is a privilege that is also accorded. this has created a dependence syndrome resulting in a “financial duty” and the state’s obligation to fulfill this dependence syndrome. government benevolence in the form of generous subsidies is becoming untenable as a result of the increasing population and the fact that fiscal revenues remain limited to the revenues generated by oil. in this regard, the arab planning institute suggests that the continued welfare system will become unsustainable. oil price fluctuations make government revenues unstable and therefore innovative ideas in dealing with the rulers’ benevolence need to be considered. policy makers must consider a different effective economic mechanism for achieving greater efficiency, strengthening the role of the private sector, improving the public sector financial health, and freeing up resources for allocation to other important areas of government. generally gifts of nature are defined as natural resources. these range from inter alia, mineral deposits, water, arable land and vegetation, to natural forests, marine resources, animal life and oil. by definition natural resources are in fixed supply and are therefore inelastic in the case of oil, most oil reserves lie in developing economies where governance mechanisms tend to be weak. this predicates a high prevalence of the resource curse syndrome. the “paradox of plenty” relates to any country that is richly endowed in natural resources and at the same time presents itself with numerous conflicts. these conflicts could range from social and political disorders to economic woes of the majority of citizens. as a result, an abundance of natural resources presents curse effects and encourages consilience 170 conflict. nevertheless there are studies (ross, 2003) that suggest oilproducing developing countries that have very high levels of oil revenue are remarkably stable. an analysis of the ways in which governments spend oil revenues gives an indication of the extent of the paradox. auty (1998:9) reflects the view of numerous authors arguing that resource-rich and developing countries have not performed as well as countries that are resource deficient. at the fourteenth world congress of the international economic association in morocco (marrakech) held in 2005, nabli and silva-jauregui analyzed in the mena (middle east and north africa) region. they argue that there is no question that democracy has lagged behind in the mena region; a persistent democracy gap persists. contrary to what is observed in the rest of the world, there is no correlation in the mena region between the level of income and progress in democracy. the rich oil exporting countries in particular have among the lowest democracy scores. per capita income growth in the mena region has also been low, though not as low as sub-saharan africa. however, the general literature on the link between democracy and growth is not very conclusive and many of its results are either fragile or conditional. while there has been little democratic progress in mena countries there has been progress in human development, particularly in education and health. they discuss a battery of governance indicators and conditions for good governance under democracy. fragmented countries like iraq, lebanon and syria have worse initial conditions for good governance. oil producing countries usually have worse governance indicators. the authors are skeptical that good governance may come out of non-democratic regimes. on the other hand, obstacles to reform are numerous and political economy factors would tend to favor the status quo. this supports the idea that a resource-rich environment has an adverse effect on gdp growth. while this inverse correlation between growth and resource abundance has received widespread acceptance, recent research from gupta (2007) and karnick and fernandes (2009) suggests a positive association between growth and resource abundance. however, the strong inverse relationships in the findings of sachs and warner (2001) and auty (2001) are the basis for the principal premise of the resource curse hypothesis. models could be generated to determine whether countries are better or worse off with smaller or larger endowments of natural resources (and whether any econometric associations are subject to bias). however, the character of the resources themselves is more important to consider than the underlying reasons for any association. should countries fail to build upon their resource base productively and exert caution in its use, the result would be a failure in development that can be attributable to a country’s overt dependence on resources. moreover, cowen points out: consilience sabah, palliam: innovation in oil rich gulf countries ... it is unfortunate that economists have to debate whether natural resources are a blessing or a curse for a developing nation. minerals, diamonds or oil may appear to represent automatic wealth but resource-rich countries usually become mired in corruption. high oil revenues, for instance, allow a government to maintain power and reward political supporters without doing much for its people. (cowen 2007) yet wright and czelusta’s (2002) findings suggest that some nations with large extractive industries – like malaysia, botswana and chile – have overcome the resource curse and introduced sound development strategies that address poverty alleviation. norway has also been cited as a country that has surmounted “the curse”, along with indonesia (prior to 1997), australia and canada. auty (1998:46) questions if these exceptions exist, can it be true that “the problems of mineral economies are inherent to the production function of mining?” when one considers and addresses how a development strategy exploits a country’s abundance of resources, the argument is often reduced to a discussion of politics. arguably countries whose political and social institutions and structures have not succeeded in supporting sustained development tend to be those who suffer from civil discontent, corruption and conflict. one can well imagine that in an environment of fragile institutions and factional politics, resource abundance may be a mixed blessing. the problem, however, lies not with the resources themselves, but in how the resources are managed. whilst there may be strong evidence of the resource curse syndrome, there do remain compelling examples of economies that have converted the curse into a blessing. the resource curse appears in different ways and can manifest as political conflicts, social anomalies, or economic iniquities that stem from wealth based on natural resources. the poor governance of natural resource could be the major cause of conflicts. the characteristic of investment decisions in oil rich states effective investment decisions in oil-rich countries may be hampered by mismanagement. while irresponsible management may be attributable to poor governance structures, investment decisions can, at times, strongly support the growth and development of an unproductive economic base. sarraf and jiwanji, (2001) have outlined that poor investment decisions are evident in many countries. poor investment decisions include greater investment in non-tradable sectors (e.g. military, prestige projects). large oil revenues allow governments the luxury to borrow on the strength of these revenues, but this can also militate against sound decision-making. consilience 172 a government policy for industrialization and innovation should be directed towards fulfilling certain goals and objectives. these may include the following: what path should industrial development take? how can sustained growth in productivity be maintained? how can gainful employment, particularly for citizens, be expanded and optimal utilization of human resources achieved? how can social and economic disparities be reduced? how can poverty be eradicated and self-reliance attained? how can international competitiveness be attained? policies of oil-rich states must ideally reflect the realization of these goals. a policy of industrialization and innovation ought to answer these concerns, and should ideally propose initiatives towards employing revenues for national reconstruction and development. corden and neary (1982) raised the concern that in the case of numerous resource oil-rich countries, they have generally failed to promote competitive manufacturing sectors. however many economists, including wagenast (2007), ross (2006) and auty (2001), have since considered competitive manufacturing a primary source of technological progress and innovation. when an economy adopts an industrial policy based on greater state intervention for the import substituting sector, this can help oil-rich countries break out of the cycle of underdevelopment and develop markets that are powerful and efficient while serving the public interest. curse effects – political and social issues a commonly held view, and a prevalent thread throughout the reviewed literature, appears to suggest that countries which exhibit extreme dependence on natural resources, such as oil, are always vulnerable to various forms of conflict and civil war (ross, 2006). however, the impact of natural resources on social capital and institutional structures also needs to be addressed. ross (2006) suggests that resource rich countries accumulate social capital at a far slower rate than poor countries. an explanation that can be advanced for this is that limited natural resources promote early industrialization which triggers earlier urbanization. people who migrate from villages into an urban environment become more enterprising, and better functioning markets develop. savings are then repatriated into the poorer indigenous regions, thereby increasing the social capital of the region. an abundance of natural resources not only stimulates dysfunctional economic policy choices, but can also pervert political and social behaviour, leading to conflict over the distribution (and non distribution) of wealth. countries usually seek to avoid this by consilience sabah, palliam: innovation in oil rich gulf countries using state machinery to bring resources within seemingly rational political control, with auty (2001b) suggesting strong and transparent governmental involvement is needed in the production of oil. royalty or taxation policy should guarantee income to the state from oil production. the establishment of an oil fund investment should ideally be a primary requirement to convert a curse into a blessing. transparent and judicious involvement of the state in the oil sector strengthens one’s expectations of benefits one may receive. however, at times, dissatisfaction contributes to reduced political trust in leaders and results in weaker institutional capacities. governments and corporations need to co-operate in reducing economic and social costs in order to deliver economic and social benefits. to this end a strong private sector must communicate its integrity in a transparent way. corporations may seek innovative ways to increase the social and economic benefits that accrue to communities, thereby helping to raise the standards and capacity of public involvement in governance (an absence of which is often a causal mechanism behind conflicts). generally it is assumed that an abundance of oil revenue causes broad-based socio-economic and political problems (ross, 2006). other authors, including engeli and pieth (2000) and wegenast (2007), blame abundance directly for motivating rebellion and allowing the finance of large-scale armed violence. using a host of alternative measures of natural capital wealth (aggregated as renewable and non-renewable), soysa (2002) finds that an abundance of renewable resources — not their scarcity — leads to violence and to lower economic, human and institutional development. according to wagenast (2007), international sanctions for poor governance on all fronts are thus important in ensuring acceptable governmental performance levels in line with the expectations of the different parties. purpose of this study the primary purpose of this study is to determine the factors associated with innovation in the gulf. initially, this study reviewed the variables for policy formulation associated with innovation in the six resource-rich oil countries of the gulf and considered the determinants. since negative relationships between resource abundance and poor economic performance have often been empirically established that provide support for the “resource curse” hypothesis, the culture of governance, norms and values that pervade oil-rich countries become key determinants of their economic success. these determinants include: inefficient government bureaucracy, inadequate educated workforce, poor work ethic in the national labor force, government instability and coups, technological readiness and market efficiency. firms’ realization of technological consilience 174 innovations may critically depend on the degree of these determinants. the question is: why do oil-rich gulf countries with great potential gains from innovation fail to do so? the determinants are statistically tested and relationships are established. data and methodology within the context of innovation, this paper considers the existence of both long-run and short-run relationships affecting sustainable economic growth in oil-rich gulf countries. it also examines the challenges of innovation activities and political and socio-economic practices. in this regard, the model estimation and analysis rely heavily on both secondary data and various panel data techniques to establish any causal relationship between sustainable economic growth in oil-rich countries and the influencing factors and impact of innovative activities. the study uses data from six gcc countries. three sets of data sources were used: the world economic forum's global competitive reports over the period 2005-2014, the published financial statements of the ten top companies in each of the six gcc countries over the period 20042014, and the gdp per capita data of each of the six gcc countries. each year the world economic forum provides a list of at least 14 factors. respondents are required to select the five most problematic ones for doing business and to rank them between 1 (most problematic) to 5 (least problematic). at least 12 of the most problematic factors for each country are usually reported upon. nine common factors were originally selected as independent variables. the original regression output revealed that none of the variables were significantly related. this was the adverse effect of multicollinearity. using backward stepwise regression, three independent variables (crime and theft, access to financing, and foreign currency regulations) were removed from the original model. the variables and analysis employed in the study are reflected in table 1. the model to be tested is represented by: y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + β4x4 + β5x5 + β6x6 + ε table 1 summarizes the data as used in this study. y the dependent variable is the growth in research and development per capita gross domestic product. total research and development (a) of 10 top listed companies over nine periods in each of the six gulf states was determined and this value was divided by the country specific per capita gross domestic product for each of the nine periods. the computation is as follows: ii,j,t = !!,!,! !"#!,! where i is the company (10 companies), j is the country (six gulf countries), t is the time (nine years), a is the investment in research and development and gdp is the gdp per capita. the growth in consilience sabah, palliam: innovation in oil rich gulf countries research and development per capita gross gdp was the dependent variable representing the growth in innovation. the use of research and development is the proxy data for innovation. expressing research and development per capita gross domestic product provides the ratio of research and development to per capita gdp. a ratio of 3:1 suggests that there is an innovation investment of $3 for every $1 gdp per capita. for the purposes of this study, the change in this ratio reflecting the growth was used as the dependent variable. this measurement is consistent with the variation of the innovation index used by areppin (2012). table 1 data summary data source of data y dependent variable growth in research and development (as a proxy for innovation) per capita gross domestic product. ii,j,t = !!,!,! !"#!,! where i is the company (10 companies), j the country (6 gulf countries), t is the time (9 years), a is the investment in research and development and gdp is the gdp per capita. published company financial statements; published country specific data; and published world economic forum global competitive reports. x independent variables x1 inefficient government bureaucracy published world economic forum global competitive reports. x2 inadequate educated workforce x3 poor work ethic in national labor force x4 government instability/coups x5 technological readiness (“unreadiness”) x6 market efficiency results table 2 represents the findings of the study. the coefficient of determination (r2) is 0.54050292 suggesting that 54% of variation in the growth in investment in innovation per capita gdp is explained by the six independent variables. the model’s fit is moderately good as reflected by the adjusted r2 of 0.48184. the large f value resulting in p = almost zero further indicates that a significant proportion of the variations in a growth in investment in innovation per capita gdp is explained by the regression equation. the regression model is therefore estimated by: 𝑌 = 31.059897 – 2.5898 x1 – 0.325959 x2 + 3.4097865 x3 + 0.144290324 x4 – 2.91189571 x5 + 1.227428713 x6 consilience 176 the statistical findings are further summarized in table 3. the findings suggest that inefficient government bureaucracies together with technological readiness (“unreadiness”) of the country are major stumbling blocks to a growth in innovation in the gulf. bureaucracy exists both in private and public sectors. however, the notorious inefficiencies of public sector bureaucracy are a concerning factor against innovation. the question arises whether governments in gulf states can reinvent themselves as innovative forces? table 2 -statistical findings of the study in a several gulf states some progress has been made to address government bureaucracy. that said, gulf states continue to remain a highly paper driven society with archaic practices and have yet to incorporate modern bureaucracy into their political systems. gulf states with vast resources and oil wealth continue to have problems in properly administering benefits in a way that is fair and beneficial to their citizens. recurring themes can be readily be identified in the literature on bureaucracy relating to corruption, nepotism, and incompetence. coefficients standard error t stat p-value intercept 31.05989814 10.14747644 3.060849 0.003642 x1 -2.58946806 0.392480409 -6.5977 3.34e-08 x2 -0.32595931 0.332847004 -0.97931 0.332443 x3 3.409786544 0.769662277 4.430237 5.6e-05 x4 0.144290324 0.931403317 0.154917 0.87755 x5 -2.91189571 1.312349405 -2.21884 0.031363 x6 1.227428713 0.467853618 2.623532 0.011698 consilience sabah, palliam: innovation in oil rich gulf countries table 3 interpretation and summary of the findings independent variables p value x1 inefficient government bureaucracy β1 = -2.58946806 inefficient government bureaucracy has a negative impact on the growth in an investment in innovation. 3.34e-08 statistically significant. there is adequate evidence to infer that inefficient government bureaucracy and a growth in investment in innovation per gdp capita are linearly related. x2 inadequate educated workforce β2 = -0.32595931 0.332443 not statistically significant. there is not enough evidence to infer the existence of a linear relationship between inadequate educated workforce and a growth investment in innovation per gdp capita are linearly related. x3 poor work ethic in national labor force β3 = 3.409786544 5.6e-05 statistically significant. there is adequate evidence to infer that poor work ethic in national labor force and an investment in innovation per gdp capita are linearly related. x4 government instability/coups β4 = 0.144290324 0.87755 not statistically significant. there is not enough evidence to infer the existence of a linear relationship between government instability/coups and an investment in innovation per gdp capita are linearly related. x5 technological readiness (“unreadiness”) β5 = -2.91189571 0.031363 statistically significant. there is adequate evidence to infer that technological readiness (“unreadiness”) and an investment in innovation per gdp capita are linearly related. x6 market efficiency β6 = 1.227428713 0.011698 statistically significant. there is adequate evidence to infer that market efficiency and an investment in innovation per gdp capita are linearly related. bureaucratic institutions that adhere to strict rules, regulations and habitual ways of doing things, are devoid of innovation prerequisites, which include inter alia creative thinking, inventiveness and idea experimentation. there is adequate evidence to infer that technological readiness (“unreadiness”) and an investment in innovation per gdp capita are linearly related. the more ready an economy is, the greater is the propensity for an investment in innovation. in the information age, the gap between the ready and consilience 178 the “unready” gulf economies is decreasing but not at an alarmingly increasing rate. technology ready economies tend to have a higher innovation per gdp capita. the promotion of readiness is to ensure that the stakeholders are prepared to participate in the information age networked-world. there is adequate evidence to infer that poor work ethic in national labor force and an investment in innovation per gdp capita are linearly related. work among the national labor force is viewed as an obligation and not as a privilege. despite the image of the national labor force being inefficient and ineffective, successful innovations have flowed into the gulf economies. finally, there is adequate evidence to infer that market efficiency and an investment in innovation per gdp capita are linearly related. efficient markets promote investment in innovation. conclusion among the most critical issues in recent innovation literature is the lack of data adequate for the analysis of innovation and for policy-making. this would provide a suitable measurement framework to capture the substantial innovation activity within economies. an expansion of the innovation concept beyond technological product and process innovation and a more complete treatment of linkages and knowledge flows, provides greater coverage of innovation. however, while these changes are a significant step forward in innovation measurement, there are a number of areas in which a metric can be improved further: inter alia government bureaucracy and stability, workforce issues, technological readiness, and market efficiency. since negative relationships between resource abundance and poor economic performance are well established, leading to stylized “resource curse” hypothesis, the culture of governance, norms and values that pervade oil-rich countries become key determinants of innovation. embracing an all-encompassing concept of innovation, this paper established that innovation is a political and socio-economic issue that sustains an economy and improves productivity. the implementation of innovation becomes a critical component within this definition, particularly in getting economies into e-readiness. in ultra-conservative societies the inertia for change comes from certain policy initiatives created by the government. a mandate by the government to change its modus operandi is indeed an impetus for change. an investment in innovation becomes critical when one considers the broadened view of innovation in relation to gulf countries endowed with rich natural resources since negative growth and development outcomes resulting from natural resources have been established in these countries. moreover, the manner in which natural resources are exploited becomes a cause for concern. since the gifts of nature are not renewable and cannot be replenished, countries endowed with rich natural resources need to align themselves with economic, political, social, ethical and moral forms consilience sabah, palliam: innovation in oil rich gulf countries of governance that encourage innovation. should countries fail in this endeavor they may find themselves financing conflicts through natural resource exploitation and predatory institutions. investment in innovation advances important national and societal goals and prepares economies to conduct themselves in ways that does not undermine social, economic and political goals. gulf states have not been 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[online] available at: http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/extaboutus/extarchives/0,, contentmdk:20035653~menupk:56305~pagepk:36726~pipk:36092~thesitepk:29506,00 .html. world economic forum archives – reports http://www.weforum.org wright, g. and czelutsa, j. (2002) resource-based economic growth, past and present. stanford, usa: stanford university press, pp. 34-37. a note to consilience readers a note to consilience readers https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i1.4454 how to cite wilson, e. o. (2008). a note to consilience readers. consilience, (1). https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i1.4454 abstract the last decade of events around the world have brought into clearer focus than ever before this overarching principle: humanity’s many troubles will not abate, they will grow steadily worse, unless humanity can agree on the lodestar of sustainable development. we find ourselves in the early steep climb of exponential change: per capita consumption of materials and energy; the demand for shrinking natural resources, most critical of which is fresh water; climate change with an impact on virtually every aspect of human welfare; the cost of war; and the destruction of ecosystems and species, which have hitherto sustained us scot free. these trends are interlocked and mutually reinforcing. we must study and address them as a unity. success would ensure a future for humanitarian civilization. failure is unthinkable. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution 4.0 international license. https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i1.4454 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ a note to consilience readers abstract microsoft word goh final.docx consilience: the journal of sustaianble development vol. 17, iss. 1 (2017), pp. 46–74 carbon accounting in local-scale land use and land cover change jia chen judy goh columbia university school of international and public affairs jg3723@columbia.edu abstract complex land use and land cover change (lulcc) processes modify ecosystems' ability to store and sequester carbon and regulate the climate, resulting in thermally uncomfortable climates and even more carbon emissions in an unchecked cycle. the value of potential loss of such climate ecosystem services remains understudied in urbanization planning and development. using ecosystem modeling, this research quantifies potential changes of carbon storage and sequestration for a case of future lulcc in a tropical country by building an initial baseline carbon account of the existing forest. this study looked at a unique case of planned local-scale lulcc in singapore where a secondary forest, punggol forest, is slated for conversion into a mixed-use residential neighborhood, punggol eco-town. carbon accounting is conducted to determine the carbon footprint of the lulcc, specifically for carbon storage and rate of carbon sequestration, using a sampled tree inventory with primary data collection. the results suggest that considerations of urban tree species selection in urban forestry are important in planning in order to reduce climate ecosystem services loss as a result of development. it is also a first step in using urban forestry tools for carbon accounting in decision-making for urban planning. keywords: land use and land cover change (lulcc), carbon accounting, urban forestry, urban planning author’s note: this research is an adapted version of my undergraduate honors thesis at the national university of singapore, where i was advised by a/p winston chow. the original paper has an urban climatology focus that also considers microclimate change, as observed by components of the surface energy balance, and used a second model called localurban meteorological parameterization scheme (lumps) to generated projections for scenarios of urbanization. this component of carbon storage and sequestration was however the most fun, to me, of the entire process of primary data collection using forest sampling methods. i am fascinated by the application of this methodology in evidence-based decision-making for policy with quantitative values. i consilience goh: carbon accounting and lulcc believe that sustainable development in urbanization and urban planning must be accompanied with an awareness of ecosystem services that are lost, and further design to restore them in some way. while this paper takes a focused approach to modeling climate ecosystem services, the future must include integrated solutions for ecosystem services across definitions within the millennium ecosystem assessment. consilience 48 introduction extensive, accelerated land use and land cover change (lulcc) has dramatically altered our physical environment with unprecedented impacts on ecosystem functioning (lambin et al., 2001, turner et al., 1990). the ability of to support the needs of the human enterprise, also known as ecosystem services, (vitousek et al., 1997, bonan, 2008) is lost during lulcc processes of deforestation and urbanization. carbon storage and sequestration are crucial ecosystem services in a warming world where carbon sinks and stores are depleting rapidly. deforestation reduces the amount of carbon stored in forest biomass (lal, 2005) and removes the carbon sequestration service provided by trees (rowntree and nowak, 1991). quantifying the loss of ecosystem services in carbon sequestration and storage is hence important to city planners to design for mitigation against climate change. lulcc poses a challenge for policymakers aiming to balance human population needs with long-term environmental sustainability. although researchers have long called for change in the way ecosystems are managed to reduce detrimental impacts of lulcc, it is only until recently that ecosystem services and values are being considered in decision-making processes to inform urban planning and land management (lambin and geist, 2008). forests have positive effects on human well-being through ecosystem functions, one of which is carbon removal and storage from the atmosphere as climate change mitigation. one solution in urban areas to reducing the loss of carbon sequestration and storage is green infrastructure design, which incorporates vegetation into an urban matrix (tyrväinen et al., 2005, gill et al., 2007). the change in carbon stored and sequestered can be quantified by an existing model that uses primary data to build a sample tree inventories of forests given relevant biological data inputs. this research brings quantitative modelling lulcc research into the scope of policy with a specific local case study of considering climate ecosystem services in urban planning. the temporal element of ecosystem service loss is captured as a baseline snapshot prior to planned, projected change as the study area undergoes deforestation and subsequent urbanisation. this research generates values for carbon storage and sequestration loss for a specific future lulcc in singapore based on official plans for land management. singapore is a densely populated, highly urban city-state, with over 95% of the original vegetation cover cleared (corlett, 1992). the government extensively allocates land uses within the limited space to plan for sustainable urban growth (urban redevelopment authority, 2015a). this small-scale lulcc enables consilience goh: carbon accounting and lulcc the possibility of carbon accounting, which can inform urban planning options to compensate for the accompanying ecosystem service loss. literature review carbon storage and sequestration services modulate the climate through biogeochemical regulation (west et al., 2011). both are provided by carbon stocks, the carbon-carrying capacity of vegetative biomass and soil. forest ecosystems sequester carbon through photosynthesis and net growth, storing it as biomass. if carbon uptake exceeds the amount released through decay, respiration or burning, a forest is regarded as a ‘sink’, and the sum of carbon stocks increases (apps, 2003). globally, forests remove approximately 2.6gt of atmospheric carbon dioxide (co2) annually (vogt et al., 2006). deforestation and forest degradation, primarily of tropical forests, are the next most important contributors to climate change after fossil fuel use. during deforestation, above-ground carbon in vegetation and soil are lost as biomass is removed (lal, 2005), releasing existing carbon stocks and losing the carbon sequestration service that offsets co2. lulcc-related co2 emissions are attributed to deforestation by fires, timber exploitation and intensive cultivation of cropland soils (le quéré et al., 2009). these were previously known to account for up to 20% of global carbon emissions (houghton, 2005), a number revised to 12% recently (canadell et al., 2007; van der werf et al., 2009). no longitudinal data on the contribution of carbon emissions from lulcc by land conversion from forest to specific land uses is available. experts estimate that of the global urban expansion rate of 20,000 km2/year, 10% of this expansion intrudes on forests (holmgren, 2006). global deforestation for urban land expansion is likely to accelerate, with forecasts estimating a possible 185% increase in urban land extent from 2000 (seto et al., 2012). the relationship between carbon ecosystem services and lulcc at the local scale has been understudied due to complex urban dynamics; ‘urbanisation’ in the literature is defined as an expansion of both urban populations and areas (heilig, 2012). climate change is an important issue for cities as both home to majority of the world’s population and major carbon sources (hoornweg et al., 2010). an advantage of city-scale analysis is that it coincides closely with administrative decision-making boundaries (hunt and watkiss, 2011). there is increasing attention on the need for cities to quantify and manage their carbon footprint at the local scale (gurney et al., 2015). urban forestry is one way to restore carbon storage and sequestration ecosystem services (rowntree and nowak, 1991) and offset carbon emissions. forest management methods like reforestation and afforestation to reverse lulcc, increasing the carbon density of existing forests and reduction of deforestation and degradation are being explored (canadell and raupach, 2008). consilience 50 methodology this case study is of lulcc in singapore, specifically the northern part of punggol eco-town, where land is undergoing conversion from secondary forest to urban mixed-use residential land. it is a prime illustration of local climate change as a result of loss of climate ecosystem services due to anticipated urban development in response to projected demographic change within a local planning context. this study specifically focuses on an area of land occupied by punggol forest. at present, it consists of secondary regrowth forest on abandoned coconut, rubber and fruit plantation land and small patches of mangroves. this 2.14km2 area will be clear cut and deforested to make way for part of punggol eco-town. carbon accounting in this study is done with primary data collection followed by the i-tree eco software suite by the united states department of agriculture forest service as a modelling tool. a sample inventory of trees in plots within the study area forest is used as input data to accurately estimate urban forest structure, total carbon stored and net carbon annually sequestered. plot sampling was performed by a trained crew managed by the lead investigator who was present for all fieldwork sessions. pair review was conducted to ensure quality control. fieldwork took place over the course of seven days in early june 2015. figure 1 photograph showing lack of access due to construction work, taken at 1˚25’52”n, 103˚54’24”e source: author’s own consilience goh: carbon accounting and lulcc the study site of was first assessed for accessibility as an important limitation on the surveyable area since the survey had to be conducted on foot in a high density tropical forest with tall grasses. as construction and deforestation was already under way, access was restricted by construction fences (figure 1). through site visits, it was ascertained that a 303,251m2 area (shaded red in figure 2) could not be accessed within the study site. it was thus omitted from the vegetation survey area. figure 2 vegetation survey plots mapped out across stratified study site. source: google earth (updated 24 july 2015) a proportionate stratified accessibility sampling method was used in plot selection. the accessible area of punggol forest was divided into two strata by ground cover characteristics, forest (figure 3) or grass cover (figure 4), based on google earth satellite image observations for tree cover density. twenty non-overlapping plots were selected from either stratum based on proportion of area (see table 2). plots were preferentially but systematically selected to spread out across the study site with each plot at least 25m away from another. the bias in plot selection is influenced by access due to criteria for fieldwork crew safety and sampling feasibility, important considerations for fieldwork (woodward et al., 2009). plots sampled were limited to accessible regions and slopes lower than 35˚. dangerous crossings over man-made or natural waterbodies such as streams, wells and deep drains and other potential hazards such as wild dogs were avoided. thus, plots sampled were spatially biased consilience 52 towards the more southerly part of punggol forest. the location of all twenty plots can be seen in figure 10. table 1: study site according to ground cover characteristics. ground cover type area (m2) proportion of area number of plots sampled forest cover 1,108,792 0.771 16 grass cover 327,918 0.228 4 total extent 1,436,710 1 20 the standard error of this sampling method is approximately 35% as determined by a prior study on urban forests (nowak et al., 2008b). however, this is an estimate as punggol forest is smaller in size compared to the urban forests in the united states of that study. thus, together with practical constraints, the selection of twenty sample plots is justified and acceptable for this study. figure 3 photograph of a vegetation survey sample plot classified as 'forest cover' source: author’s own consilience goh: carbon accounting and lulcc figure 4 photograph of a vegetation survey sample plot classified as 'grass cover' source: author’s own each concentric 0.1acre plot with an 11.3m radius was assessed in a full vegetation cover survey. a garmin etrex 20x global positioning system (gps) unit was used to collect location and directional data oriented around a reference object, usually a tree, in the centre of each plot. other forestry equipment used include transect tapes, diameter at breast height (dbh) tapes and haglöf ecii electronic clinometers. plot characteristics recorded include tree cover, shrub cover and land use. ground cover was measured in terms of percentage of natural materials such as rock, bare soil, mulch, herbs, grass (maintained and unmaintained) and water, and urban materials including building, cement and tar. the herbaceous layer, consisting of non-woody stems, were considered as part of ground cover (i-tree, 2010). shrubs and saplings, defined as woody material with dbh at 1.37cm of less than 5cm, were excluded. the delphi method was used to aggregate the values estimated by the fieldwork crew in midpoints of 5% intervals (macmillan and marshall, 2006). trees were defined based on dbh of at least 5cm, a threshold selected over the i-tree eco’s value of 2.54cm to reduce misidentification of young trees. as a result, the extrapolation of plots consilience 54 in running i-tree eco would produce a conservative estimation. for this vegetation survey, palms were included in this category. figure 1 illustration of percentage canopy missing and tree height measurements source: i-tree eco v5.1.7. (n.d.) several tree characteristics on tree condition were also collected. tree height was measured using a clinometer for the height of the tree to live top, height to crown base and total tree height. crown width in the north-south and east-west directions were measured using transect tape. the percent of the crown volume that is missing was estimated in terms of percentage of foliage absent due to dieback, defoliation and uneven crowns, though this was at times difficult for tall trees in the densely intersecting canopy (see figure 5). crown light exposure, the number of sides (including the top) of the tree receiving sunlight, was encoded as a value from 0 to 5 according to i-tree eco protocol. for trees lying on their side, leaning or situated on sloping ground, an aboveground reference point was taken according to i-tree eco protocol. trees not identified during fieldwork were later identified with the assistance of a botanist from the department of biological sciences at the national university of singapore using leaf samples consilience goh: carbon accounting and lulcc and photographs. out of the 24 species of trees that were identified (appendix a), four were not found within the i-tree eco species code list inventory list, and were thus replaced with proxy species based on similar characteristics of leaf shape, leaf size, approximate range of tree height and crown shape (see appendix b). all vegetation survey data were entered manually into i-tree eco using the mobile data collection system. this international project on the forest inventory of punggol forest was processed by researchers at the united states forest service. no additional input data on runoff or pollutant values were included due to the lack of available information on singapore. thus, outputs excluded bioemissions and rainfall interception data. although i-tree eco is parameterised primarily for temperate urban forests, errors are minimised by using species or genus-specific values (i-tree eco v5.1.7., n.d.). i-tree eco estimates the forest structure and characteristics of vegetation, through the use of species-specific regression equations in converting empirical leaf-area estimates into leaf biomass, and subsequently scales it according to tree condition ratings. the values are further scaled proportionally by a crown competition factor to account for shading by overlapping tree crowns. species diversity indices and species richness are also calculated (nowak et al., 2008a). i-tree eco also estimates the carbon storage value as biomass through species-specific allometric equations derived from the literature (nowak and crane, 2002, nowak, 1994), and if unavailable, an average of equations from the same genus, failing which broadleaf equations are used (nowak et al., 2008a). aboveground biomass is converted to tree biomass assuming a globally averaged root-to-shoot ratio of 0.26, a slight overestimation compared to the tropical ratio of 0.24 (cairns et al., 1997), that may affect this study. fresh weight biomass equations are adjusted to dry weight with species-specific equations from the literature (nowak and crane, 2002). only wood biomass is considered for deciduous trees due to the annual shedding of leaves. the total dry weight biomass of trees is converted to total stored carbon by a factor of 0.5 (chow and rolfe, 1989). i-tree eco estimates carbon sequestration rates based on dbh and height growth rates year-round. individual tree growth is controlled by the estimated growing degree days, an accumulative value localised by latitude and related to collected crown light exposure values. these values are adjusted based on tree condition inferred from crown dieback data. carbon emissions from decomposition were calculated by combining the probability of tree death within the next year for live trees and the rate of natural decomposition of 20 years for existing dead trees (i-tree, 2010). thus, the calculated net carbon sequestration annual rate is the carbon storage difference between one year and the next, as aggregated by mortality probability, decomposition and growth. consilience 56 results tree inventory of punggol forest this tree inventory of punggol forest is a snapshot of current conditions in the study site prior to lulcc transformation. this establishes a baseline for anticipated changes to ecosystem services in terms of carbon storage and sequestration due to future deforestation. i-tree eco reports 47,957 trees within the 1.43km2 accessible region of punggol forest at a density of 33,380 per km2. of the 27 species, the most abundant is caryota mitis, or fishtail palm (17.6%), followed by the delonix regia, commonly known as the flame of the forest (15.7%). the majority of trees (42.3%) have a dbh of between 7.7 and 15.2cm. in terms of biodiversity value, punggol forest has low species richness of 10.93 (simpson’s reciprocal index) and low species evenness at 0.8172. by extrapolating the average of the 0.04046-hectare sampled plots according to equation (1), the approximate number of species per hectare is 33.75 per hectare. 𝑋! 0.04046 𝑛 ! !!! = 33.75 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠/ℎ𝑎 where 𝑋!= no. of species in plot i n = no. of plots = 20 (1) the diversity of punggol forest is high for a secondary regrowth forest, with a shannon-weiner index value of 2.69, compared to other regenerated sites in singapore (shono et al., 2006). the most dominant tree species found in punggol forest, based on number of individuals (percent population), relative frequency, density and basal area (importance value) and tree cover (percent leaf area) are shown in table 2. consilience goh: carbon accounting and lulcc table 2 tree species diversity species (replaced) percent population importance value percent leaf area delonix regia 15.7303 51.5182 35.7879 caryota mitis 17.6027 28.4278 10.8251 casuarina equisetifolia 8.9891 28.2086 19.2195 sapindus spp. (nephelium lappaceum) 11.9854 16.2809 4.2955 syzygium spp. 3.7448 10.0838 6.339 artocarpus heterophyllus (durio zibenthinus) 2.9964 8.6383 5.6419 claoxylon indicum 4.1203 8.5707 4.4504 cinnamomum iners 5.243 6.6014 1.3584 toona spp. (aphanamixis polystachya) 4.8688 6.0365 1.1677 terminalia catappa 2.2467 5.3328 3.0861 syzygium grande 3.3706 4.5264 1.1558 maprounea guianensis (heavea brasilensis) 4.1203 4.5075 0.3873 pipturus argentus 3.7448 3.9414 0.1966 leucaena leucocephala 2.6221 2.9796 0.3575 macaranga gigantea 0.7485 2.3213 1.5728 garcinia hombroniana 1.1239 2.1725 1.0486 eucommia ulmoides 1.1239 1.7793 0.6553 pterocarpus indicus 1.1239 1.4814 0.3575 acacia auriculiformis 1.1239 1.3086 0.1847 roystonea spp. 0.7485 0.9868 0.2383 albizia saman 0.3742 0.9819 0.6077 gordonia spp. 0.3742 0.9224 0.5481 bambusa multiplex 0.3742 0.833 0.4587 terminalia brassii 0.3742 0.416 0.0417 manihot spp. 0.3742 0.3921 0.0179 dillenia suffruticosa 0.3742 0.3742 0 andira inermis 0.3742 0.3742 0 source: i-tree eco consilience 58 while shrubs are excluded from this study, the ground cover of punggol forest is shown in figure 6. figure 6 modeled ground cover of punggol forest carbon storage and sequestration i-tree eco reports the annual rate of carbon sequestration in punggol forest to be 1637kg/year/ha. the carbon storage per area is 74421kg/hectare, which means a potential release of 18708mt of carbon into the atmosphere during deforestation. the forest provides an annual net carbon sequestration value of 262.5mt/year (table 3) and oxygen production at a rate of 2785kg/year/ha, or 400mt/year in total. 26.3 28.7 5.2 29.2 0.3 0.3 8.3 0.8 proportion of ground cover in punggol forest duff/mulch herbs maintained grass wild grass water cement bare soil rock consilience goh: carbon accounting and lulcc table 3 carbon sequestration values from i-tree eco species (replaced) carbon (mt) gross seq (mt/yr) net seq (mt/yr) value se value se value se total 18708.83 5663.84 411.44 79.93 262.5 91.79 delonix regia 8889.68 4601.65 120.14 41.13 83.06 36.99 syzygium spp. 1996.95 1693.08 41.01 32.27 34.98 28.53 artocarpus heterophyllus (durio zibenthinus) 1934.17 1225.1 48.67 29.4 44.3 26.65 casuarina equisetifolia 1169.04 686.97 29.79 18.1 26.93 16.57 sapindus spp. (nephelium lappaceum) 1048.58 699.16 40.24 28.82 29.03 29.38 cinnamomum iners 1022.8 1018.53 35.13 34.59 31.95 31.42 terminalia catappa 540.59 452.82 5.2 2.81 -68.99 74.18 macaranga gigantea 428.05 407.46 10.44 9.08 9.47 8.17 toona spp. (aphanamixis polystachya) 335.93 335.39 15.77 15.74 13.84 13.82 caryota mitis 283.19 144.22 2.8 1.34 2 0.92 syzygium grande 210.05 166.14 10.52 7.95 9.89 7.43 gordonia spp. 128.18 127.98 4.54 4.54 4.25 4.24 pterocarpus indicus 103.75 103.58 6.2 6.19 5.95 5.94 claoxylon indicum 103.51 103.35 8.37 8.36 8.12 8.11 garcinia hombroniana 102.25 102.09 5.72 5.71 5.48 5.47 maprounea guianensis (heavea brasilensis) 96.45 96.3 6.87 6.86 6.35 6.34 albizia saman 96.12 95.97 3.83 3.83 3.61 3.61 eucommia ulmoides 91.42 91.28 5.02 5.01 4.81 4.8 pipturus argentus 56.18 56.09 4.88 4.87 1.77 1.77 acacia auriculiformis 35.59 31.23 2.69 1.94 2.6 1.87 leucaena leucocephala 11.84 11.82 1.72 1.72 1.26 1.26 bambusa multiplex 8.39 8.38 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.04 terminalia brassii 6.26 6.25 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.76 roystonea spp. 5.72 5.71 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 dillenia suffruticosa 1.76 1.76 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37 manihot spp. 1.39 1.39 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 andira inermis 0.97 0.97 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 source: i-tree eco figures 7 and 8 show the gross and net annual carbon sequestration rates by each tree species, with a clear positive carbon sequestration rate by almost all species, led by delonix regia, artocarpus heterophyllus (replacing durio zibenthinus) and syzygium species. in contrast, the terminalia cattappa species has negative net sequestration, indicating an annual rate of carbon release into the environment. this consilience 60 is due to the preponderance of dead terminalia cattappa trees found within punggol forest, which release carbon as they decompose, and the higher likelihood of mortality for this species as modelled by itree eco. figure 7 annual carbon sequestration rate by tree species (i) -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 artocarpus heterophyllus (durio zibenthinus) cinnamomum iners sapindus spp. (nephelium lappaceum) terminalia catappa c ar bo n se qu es tr at io n (m t/y ea r) gross sequestration rate net sequestration rate consilience goh: carbon accounting and lulcc figure 8 annual carbon sequestration rate by tree species (ii) notably, the dominant tree species by number of individuals does not store the greatest carbon content (figure 9). the greatest amount of carbon is stored in the second most common species in punggol forest, delonix regia, while the most common species caryota mitis, ranks 10th out of the total of 27 species. this is possibly due to caroyta mitis’ higher green mass to solid dry mass proportion as a palm, compared to dipterocarp species such as delonix regia and syzygium spp. (brown, 1997). caryota mitis has a leaf biomass of 0.020594mt per individual, much higher than the all-species average leaf biomass of 0.017181mt per individual. 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 a ca ci a au ric ul ifo rm is a lb iz ia s am an a nd ira in er m is b am bu sa m ul tip le x c ar yo ta m iti s c la ox yl on in di cu m d ill en ia s uf fru tic os a e uc om m ia u lm oi de s g ar ci ni a ho m br on ia na g or do ni a sp p. le uc ae na le uc oc ep ha la m ac ar an ga g ig an te a m an ih ot s pp . m ap ro un ea g ui an en si s (h ea ve a p ip tu ru s ar ge nt us p te ro ca rp us in di cu s r oy st on ea s pp . s yz yg iu m g ra nd e te rm in al ia b ra ss ii to on a sp p. (a ph an am ix is c ar bo n se qu es tr at io n (m t/y ea r) gross sequestration rate net sequestration rate consilience 62 figure 9 tree species by abundance and carbon storage 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000 d el on ix re gi a s yz yg iu m s pp . a rto ca rp us h et er op hy llu s (d ur io z ib en th in us ) c as ua rin a eq ui se tif ol ia s ap in du s sp p. (n ep he liu m la pp ac eu m ) c in na m om um in er s te rm in al ia c at ap pa m ac ar an ga g ig an te a to on a sp p. (a ph an am ix is p ol ys ta ch ya ) c ar yo ta m iti s s yz yg iu m g ra nd e g or do ni a sp p. p te ro ca rp us in di cu s c la ox yl on in di cu m g ar ci ni a ho m br on ia na m ap ro un ea g ui an en si s (h ea ve a br as ile ns is ) a lb iz ia s am an e uc om m ia u lm oi de s p ip tu ru s ar ge nt us a ca ci a au ric ul ifo rm is le uc ae na le uc oc ep ha la b am bu sa m ul tip le x te rm in al ia b ra ss ii r oy st on ea s pp . d ill en ia s uf fru tic os a m an ih ot s pp . a nd ira in er m is c ar bo n st or ed (m t) n um be r o f t re es tree species number of trees carbon consilience goh: carbon accounting and lulcc discussion baseline values on carbon ecosystem services the modelled results from i-tree eco on punggol forest’s structure, composition and carbon services are specific to this case study and thus must not be extrapolated to characterize deforestation in singapore in other historical and spatial contexts. local-scale carbon stock assessments have been conducted for forests in cities (jim and chen, 2009) but are not comparable with this research for several reasons. tree cover, density and forest maturity affect carbon sequestration and storage rates. sequestration rates decrease as forests mature due to a higher proportion of dead trees and large diameter trees. natural forest stands typically have higher tree cover than urban forests and thus store and sequester more carbon annually, but the reverse is true on a per unit tree basis due to higher growth rates as a result of lower tree density (nowak and crane, 2002). the results of this study are baseline values necessary to quantify potential carbon services loss due to lulcc. punggol forest will be replaced with an urban matrix of street trees and parks as punggol eco-town. while i-tree eco is unable to model future urban forestry composition and structure, its on-site vegetation assessment methodology is applicable to both urban and natural forest inventories. thus, a longitudinal study of the same site after construction of punggol eco-town is required to calculate a net carbon ecosystem services loss. these quantified baseline values provide an opportunity for urban forestry management policies to minimize this loss and thus retain some of the original carbon storage and sequestration values. urban forestry management at present, urban forestry management in singapore prioritizes shade and aesthetics for roadside greening (national parkrs board, 2015) and more recently, biodiversity (khew, 2015). while climate cooling and biodiversity benefits are recognized, carbon ecosystem service benefits have been neglected. i-tree eco results suggest a mismatch between planning priorities of biodiversity and carbon ecosystem services. preserving the original biodiversity of punggol forest would not align with carbon services maximization. the importance value of each species found in punggol forest does not correspond to the carbon sequestration value per individual (figure 10), nor the carbon stored per individual (figure 11). however, the results of these figures cannot be taken at face value due to numerous factors that affect growth rate. to design the urban forest matrix in punggol ecotown, identifying tree species with significant carbon benefits, in addition to biodiversity value, are required to minimize the loss of ecosystem services and maximize benefits of urban forestry. consilience 64 figure 10 net carbon sequestration and importance value of tree species in punggol forest 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 a ca ci a au ric ul ifo rm is a lb iz ia s am an a nd ira in er m is a rto ca rp us h et er op hy llu s (d ur io z ib et hi nu s) b am bu sa m ul tip le x c ar yo ta m iti s c as ua rin a eq ui se tif ol ia c in na m om um in er s c la ox yl on in di cu m d el on ix re gi a d ill en ia s uf fru tic os a e uc om m ia u lm oi de s g ar ci ni a ho m br on ia na g or do ni a sp p. le uc ae na le uc oc ep ha la m ac ar an ga g ig an te a m an ih ot s pp . m ap ro un ea g ui an en si s (h ea ve a br as ile ns is ) p ip tu ru s ar ge nt us p te ro ca rp us in di cu s r oy st on ea s pp . s ap in du s sp p. (n ep he liu m la pp ac eu m ) s yz yg iu m g ra nd e s yz yg iu m s pp . te rm in al ia b ra ss ii te rm in al ia c at ap pa to on a sp p. (a ph an am ix is p ol ys ta ch ya ) importance value net sequestration per individual (mt/year) consilience goh: carbon accounting and lulcc figure 11 carbon storage per tree and importance value of tree species in punggol forest 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 a ca ci a au ric ul ifo rm is a lb iz ia s am an a nd ira in er m is a rto ca rp us h et er op hy llu s (d ur io z ib et hi nu s) b am bu sa m ul tip le x c ar yo ta m iti s c as ua rin a eq ui se tif ol ia c in na m om um in er s c la ox yl on in di cu m d el on ix re gi a d ill en ia s uf fru tic os a e uc om m ia u lm oi de s g ar ci ni a ho m br on ia na g or do ni a sp p. le uc ae na le uc oc ep ha la m ac ar an ga g ig an te a m an ih ot s pp . m ap ro un ea g ui an en si s (h ea ve a br as ile ns is ) p ip tu ru s ar ge nt us p te ro ca rp us in di cu s r oy st on ea s pp . s ap in du s sp p. (n ep he liu m la pp ac eu m ) s yz yg iu m g ra nd e s yz yg iu m s pp . te rm in al ia b ra ss ii te rm in al ia c at ap pa to on a sp p. (a ph an am ix is p ol ys ta ch ya ) importance value carbon per individual (mt) consilience 66 conclusion this study used a modeling tool, i-tree eco, to quantify ecosystem services that affect the climate – carbon storage and sequestration. it uses a case study of planned lulcc in the form of deforestation and urbanization, and uses the local-scale study site as a baseline of carbon accounting. it finds a potential loss in carbon storage and sequestration services as punggol forest is deforested to make way for punggol eco-town. calculations using i-tree eco indicate that up to 1637kg/year/ha of annual carbon sequestration and 18708mt of carbon storage could be potentially lost. extrapolating these insights from the case of punggol, several directions for informing climate ecosystem services management in planned cases of lulcc from forest to urban area can be considered. prioritizing tree species for their carbon service value is proposed as a planning priority in urban forestry. 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a., hutten, k. m., boetsch, j. r., acker, s. a., rochefort, r. m., bivin, m. m. & kurth, l. l. 2009. forest vegetation monitoring protocol for national parks in the north coast and cascades network, u.s. geological survey. techniques and methods, 2-a8, pp. 228 consilience 70 appendices appendix a: list of tree species in punggol forest identified from vegetation survey no. scientific name common name of species species code in itree 1 acacia auriculiformis acacia acau2 2 aphanamixis polystachya pithraj not found 3 bambusa multiplex bamboo ba2 4 caryota fishtail palm ca43 5 casuarina equisetifolia casuarina caeq 6 cinnamomum iners cinnamon ci4 7 claoxylon indicum claoxylon indicum cl2 8 delonix regia flame of the forest dere 9 dillenia suffruticosa simpoh air disu11 10 durio zibethinus durian not found 11 garcinia hombroniana mangosteen gama10 12 gordonia singaporeana gordonia go7 13 hevea brasiliensis rubber not found 14 leucaena leucocephala leucaena leucocephala lele 15 macaranga gigantea giant mahang ma4 16 manihot esculenta tapioca ma27 17 nephelium lappaceum rambutan not found 18 pipturus argenteus pipturus argenteus pi17 19 roystonea regia royal palm ro9 20 syzygium glaucum syzygium glaucum sy8 21 syzygium grande sea apple sygr2 22 syzygium zeylanicum syzygium zeylanicum sy8 23 terminalia brassii brown terminalia te4 24 terminalia catappa indian almond teca consilience goh: carbon accounting and lulcc appendix b: punggol forest tree species replacement justification charateristics original species replacement species tree 1 hevea brasilensis (rubber) maprounea guianensis (same family euphorbiaceae)1 source: wikimedia commons source: southeastgrowers.com source: flickr source: useful tropical plants leaf shape · alternate leaves · separate leaflets · 3 leaflets per leaf stalk (trifoliate) · elliptical leaflets · palmately compound (radiate from single point at distal end of petiole) · apically acute to mucronate to acuminate · abaxially often with basal glands leaf size varying lengths of up to 45cm tree shape bole straight or tapered without buttresses straight tree size rarely exceeding 25m in height in plantations but wild trees of over 40m recorded up to 25m tall replaced species è maprounea spp. charaoriginal species replacement species 1 esser, h.-j. 1999. taxonomic notes on neotropical maprounea aublet (euphorbiaceae). novon, 32-35. consilience 72 teristics tree 2 durio zibenthinus (durian)2 artocarpus heterophyllus (jackfruit)3 source: anthropogen sourc e: blogs pot archi ves source: growables.org source: flora italiana leaf shape · elliptic to oblong · apex acuminate · entire · alternate · petiolate · elliptic to oblong · alternate · entire · glossy · simple leaves leaf size 10–18cm up to 16cm tree shape bole straight or tapered without buttresses bole straight tree size large, 25–50m 8–25m replaced species in itree eco è artocarpus heterophyl lus 2 brown, m.j., 1997. durio, a bibliographic review. bioversity international. 3 prakash, o., kumar, r., mishra, a. and gupta, r., 2009. artocarpus heterophyllus (jackfruit): an overview. pharmacognosy reviews, 3(6), p.353. consilience goh: carbon accounting and lulcc charateristics original species replacement species tree 3 nephelium lappaceum (rambutan)4 sapindus spp. (of the lychee family spindaceae)5 source: varashree nursery source: usda agricultural research service source: anthropogen source: blogspot archives leaf shape · pinnately compound · alternate · no end-leaflet · pinnate · alternate · 14-30 leaflets · no end leaflet leaf size 10–18cm 15–40cm tree shape open crown of large branches straight tree size 10–12m up to 25m selected replacement è sapindus spp. 4 arenas, m.g.h., angel, d.n., damian, m.t.m., ortiz, d.t., díaz, c.n. and martinez, n.b., 2010. characterization of rambutan (nephelium lappaceum) fruits from outstanding mexican selections. revista brasileira de fruticultura,32(4), pp.1098-1104. 5 brummitt, r. k. 1999. report of the committee for spermatophyta: 48. (taxon) 48:369-370. consilience 74 charateristics original species replacement species tree 4 aphanamixis polystachya (pithraj)6 toona spp. (same family meliaceae)7 source: natureloveyou.sg source: natureloveyou.sg source: forest & kim starr source: green clean guide leaf shape · pinnately compound · alternate · rachis pulvinate · 4–8 pairs of leaflets · pinnate · 5–10 pairs of leaflets · no lobes or teeth on leaves leaf size >30cm 50–70cm tree shape 10–12m, open crown of large branches up to 25m tree size up to 20m tall up to 25m selected replacement è toona spp. 6 world conservation monitoring centre 1998. in: iucn 2006. 2006 iucn red list of threatened species. retrieved 12 december 2015.aphanamixis polystachya. 7 brummitt, r. k. 1999. report of the committee for spermatophyta: 48. (taxon) 48:369-370. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 5, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 141-150 toppling the tripod: sustainable development, constructive ambiguity, and the environmental challenge frances c. moore emmett interdisciplinary program in environment and resources stanford university palo alto, ca fcmoore@stanford.edu abstract discussions of global environmental governance seem to have gotten nowhere in the last thirty years despite environmental problems that continue to grow in scope and magnitude. here, the role of sustainable development in that failure is examined, particularly the constructively ambiguous nature of the paradigm. it is suggested that an emphasis on the shifting, contextualized and relative term ―needs‖ in the definition of sustainable development has led to paralysis at the international level in addressing environmental problems, particularly climate change. contradictions that emerge when sustainable development is formalized in economic models as weak and strong sustainability are discussed. finally, promising future pathways for environmental actions are explored. keywords: constructive ambiguity, environmental politics, climate change negotiations, global environmental governance. 1. introduction it is june 2009 in the small swiss town of glion overlooking the northern shore of lake geneva. in a beautiful hotel, some of the founding fathers of the environmental movement stare at a screen in quiet disbelief. they are gathered for the last day of a major conference on global environmental governance that has brought together three generations of environmental leaders: those that worked on the stockholm conference of 1972 and the rio conference of 1992, which established the environmental governance structure we know now, those leading the international environmental institutions today, and those emerging leaders who will be charged with solving the environmental problems of tomorrow. over the past two days, these luminaries have discussed the original vision of the founders, the successes and failures of the last forty years, and ways of strengthening environmental governance in order to address the problems of the twenty-first century. at this moment, we are watching a video projected onto a screen in the same room where most of these discussions have taken place. the black and white video is from 1982, and it shows a conference held in london to mark the tenth anniversary of the signing of the stockholm convention. in it, environmental leaders of the time — many of them household names, some of them now sitting in the conference room, older and grayer, watching their younger selves on screen — make 142 consilience impassioned speeches about the environmental crisis and the need for collective political action to stem the decline. for the forty minutes that the video runs, the room is eerily silent. the conference descends into none of the last-minute conversations or slow drifting away that usually marks the end of a high-level meeting. instead, the participants watch intently as, one-by-one, the speakers in the video stand up and repeat, almost word for word, the arguments of the last two days. the talking points are the same: the immediacy of the environmental crisis, the dire consequences if it is not addressed, the lack of an effective response so far, the overconsumption of the north, and the development aspirations of the south. ignoring the scratchiness of the 1980s recording, the speeches of 1982 and 2009 become indistinguishable. the questions that hang in the room are almost tangible: why have we been describing the same problems for over twenty-five years? have we made any progress? and how can we expect to make progress now if we have no new solutions? 2. the promise of sustainable development for many years, environmentalists believed that sustainable development offered the key to solving the most basic socio-environmental problem – how to encourage economic growth without destroying the natural environment. working for the past few years in environmental think tanks in washington, d.c., i too believed that sustainable development was a sound way of ensuring prosperity and environmental protection for all. i appealed to the framework described by the brundtland commission in 1987 in which environmental, social and economic values are given equal weight in decision-making. maybe most environmental problems had gotten worse, not better, over the twenty years since sustainable development was first popularized, but i felt confident that this was only because no one was truly practicing it. after enrolling in a graduate program in environmental science, however, i began studying the tense relationship between north and south on environmental issues, particularly the deadlock in the international climate negotiations. this work has led me to believe that sustainable development is not only un-implemented but is actually un-implementable. far from being the solution to our environmental problems, sustainable development actually stands in the way of a sober examination of what it will take to solve the environmental challenges posed by climate change, biodiversity loss, water shortages, overfishing, and desertification. as a young environmentalist, part of a generation charged with solving the environmental problems of the twenty-first century, i fear repeating the failures of the last twenty years. i fear the illusory promise of sustainable development, which projects a mirage of consensus that evaporates when confronted with real problems that require real solutions. i fear that we too, like the founding generation before us, will fall into the trap of casually relying on superficial agreement without engaging with the very real tradeoffs between consumption and conservation. i know that as environmentalists, we are often so focused on the future – on the next battle, the next crisis, the next generation – that we rarely take the time to look back and listen to the dusty recordings of twenty years ago. but a disinterested evaluation of our chances of success against the major environmental problems that consilience moore.: toppling the tripod confront us in the twenty-first century makes it clear that we are in pressing need of a new strategy. and maybe that new strategy should begin by looking back, by taking a dispassionate look at the performance of sustainable development in the last twenty years. what was its original promise and why has that promise gone unrealized? was sustainable development ever a real solution to the now decades-old questions posed by northern overconsumption, southern underdevelopment and global environmental constraints? perhaps by doing this we can start a new conversation, one that really engages with the underlying drivers of environmental decline. if we don‘t, can we have any confidence that a summit similar to the glion conference in twenty years time will not sound like a depressing repetition of the one in 2009? 3. constructive ambiguity a precise definition of sustainable development is tough to pin down; there are over one hundred published definitions by some counts and still no clear agreement. perhaps the most frequently cited is that of the brundtland commission. in its 1987 report our common future, the commission describes sustainable development as ―meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.‖ but what exactly does this mean? this seemingly simple question evokes many, frequently contradictory responses. ask an official from a developing country, as i have done many times at climate negotiations, and you will get a response that emphasizes alleviating poverty and meeting the needs of the poor through economic development. ask someone from a developed nation, and you will most likely hear about considering future generations in policymaking and extending the timehorizon of planning decisions. ask a typical representative of an environmental ngo, and he or she will tell you that sustainable development is about redefining development to include environmental, as well as economic, objectives. at first, i believed that these multiple definitions simply represented confusion over the true meaning of sustainable development. supporters will tell you that these different ideas are not fundamentally opposed but simply reflect complementary priorities in the implementation of sustainable development. but after seeing how the concept is used by governments and policy-makers, i have increasingly realized that this vagueness is not peripheral but is in fact central to sustainable development. politicians and diplomats will often build agreement between parties on sensitive issues by using deliberately ambiguous language in order to create superficial consensus. it is likely that this process has existed for as long as diplomacy itself, but in the 1970s henry kissinger dubbed it ―constructive ambiguity.‖ constructively ambiguous language can be helpful: it lets each party read its own interpretation while preventing a breakdown of talks. if the issue at hand is relatively minor or peripheral to the main agreement, then parties can still make progress while punting the controversy to later talks. in some cases, the passage of time, intervening events or improved relations makes the original disagreement simply disappear. but if the issue at hand is central to the dispute, then constructive ambiguity only serves to delay the tough political choices needed for a resolution. 144 consilience looking back at the political landscape of the 1970s and 80s that produced sustainable development, it is easy to see how an outcome that kissinger would recognize as constructive ambiguity might have arisen. ever since the inception of the environmental movement in the 1960s in the united states and europe, developing nations had been suspicious that environmental concerns would be used as a ploy to thwart their development aspirations. many threatened to boycott the stockholm conference in 1972 and afterwards remained concerned that this newfound obsession with the environment was just another way for rich nations to pull up the development ladder behind them. the west had gotten rich while polluting and consuming resources and, in a new-found fit of environmental consciousness, was now telling developing countries they could not do the same. the brundtland commission–whose official name was the world commission on environment and development–was a semi-political body selfconsciously made up of roughly equal numbers of representatives from each of the official un world regions. charged with squaring the circle of continued development for the poor and global environmental protection, the commission‘s formulation of sustainable development was able to forge agreement only through ambiguity. 4. two cases sustainable development according to the brundtland commission promises to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. this emphasis on needs constitutes the key ambiguity in the brundtland commission‘s definition. it seems like an intuitive concept, but is in fact a highly contextualized term. to see this, we simply need to compare two representative cases. let‘s take ismail, a kyrgyz herder i met on my travels in central asia. ismail lives in the pamir mountains in tajikistan. in the winter he teaches at the primary school in his village. in the summer he takes his son, his wife, his extended family and their flock of goats and yaks to the summer pastures higher up the valley. ismail needs many things: he needs electricity and piped water in his village; he needs economic opportunities in the region so his son doesn‘t have to migrate to russia to find work; he needs a motorbike so his family, two days ride from the nearest town, is not so isolated in their summer encampment. at the same time, he is better off than many others. with a diversified and relatively stable income and a large share of capital in the form of livestock, ismail is solidly middle-class for the region. now let‘s take jo, a housewife and mother of four living in the d.c. suburbs who is also solidly middle-income. jo needs, and in fact has, many of the things that ismail needs such as electricity, clean water, economic opportunities and transportation. but in addition, perhaps there are other things that jo needs: a car big enough to transport a large and active family; reliable heating for the winter and air conditioning for the summer; a telephone and internet connection to maintain a standard level of connectivity. perhaps jo doesn‘t really need these things, but only wants them. yet this highlights the ambiguity embodied in the brundtland commission‘s definition of sustainable development. beyond the most basic biological necessities, what we feel we need becomes inextricably tied up with what we want. our needs are constantly consilience moore.: toppling the tripod evolving and are defined relative to what those around us have and want. if jo truly feels that she needs an suv to accommodate and protect her family, who has the authority to tell her that she doesn‘t? and if she needs one, it becomes increasingly hard to tell ismail, and the other four billion inhabitants of the developing world, that they do not also need the same. in a constantly changing world of highly unequal consumption, distinguishing necessities from luxuries becomes not just difficult but highly politically charged. 5. international climate negotiations it is easy to see why environmentalists believed that the sustainable development paradigm held so much potential. it promised to elevate environmental values alongside economic values in policy-making and, with its emphasis on future generations, promised to push planning horizons out so that the long-lived effects of environmental decline would be considered and averted. but this is the precisely the point of constructive ambiguity – all parties, environmentalists included, can read their own meaning into the ambiguous term. the international climate negotiations where i have most experience offer a classic example of how the constructive ambiguity at the heart of sustainable development plays out in environmental policy-making. perhaps the only thing that all countries can agree on in these talks is the importance of sustainable development. but dig a little deeper and you find that this rhetoric disguises real and intractable differences, and these differences have made it extremely difficult to negotiate an effective climate change treaty. industrializing countries such as china and india refuse to commit to any absolute caps on emissions by citing the energy and transportation needs of their still relatively poor populations. developed countries such as the united states acknowledge the need to reduce emissions but argue that it shouldn‘t be done in a way that jeopardizes sustained economic development, a position that results in small emissions cuts and an emphasis on emissions offsets of questionable environmental validity. the combined result of these commitments to sustainable development has been continued growth in emissions with no prospect of reversing this trend in time to avert dangerous and irreparable climate change. working at the copenhagen climate talks as part of the maldives delegation, i saw first-hand how a seemingly theoretical concept such as constructive ambiguity has produced very real consequences for this vulnerable island nation. from the maldives‘ perspective, climate change has laid bare the inadequacy of the sustainable development paradigm: the needs of its future generations, the need for a homeland not sunk beneath the waves, are pitted directly against the needs of the current generation to maintain and increase an unsustainable standard of living. unfortunately for the maldives, this has always been, and will likely remain, an unfair and quite likely unwinnable contest. 6. weak sustainability, strong sustainability the ambiguity described above, which forms such a central element of sustainable development, means that the concept does not lend itself to easy application. attempts to practically apply sustainable development to policy analysis 146 consilience must involve confronting and resolving its inherent ambiguity. the risk is that this in turn will cause a breakdown of the political coalition supporting the idea, since this coalition only makes sense in the context of the multiple, conflicting interpretations permitted by constructive ambiguity. nowhere does this contradiction become clearer than in the work of economists attempting to apply sustainable development to economic analyses and their competing definitions of weak and strong sustainability. the notion of weak sustainability recognizes three kinds of capital, reflecting the three legs of the sustainable development tripod described by the brundtland commission. economic capital covers the traditional understanding of capital as goods or assets. social capital covers human resources such as an educated workforce or networks of relationships. natural capital consists of renewable and non-renewable resources such as forests, clean water, minerals and biodiversity. in the world of weak sustainability, all forms of capital are interchangeable and an economy is sustainable if the total stock of capital remains constant. this may sound arcane and just a little bit dull, but think for a minute about what counts as sustainable development under the weak definition. crucially, an economy is sustainable even if it uses up all of its natural capital, as long as a portion of that income is invested to ensure equally high income for future generations. in other words, overfishing a fishery until it collapses would be a sustainable development pathway if roads, schools, power plants and other infrastructural investments were built with the fishing income. in fact, if the price is high enough, complete destruction of a nation‘s natural resource base could be considered sustainable. if you think this scenario is farfetched, consider the nation of nauru. this tiny island in the central pacific would be just an insignificant dot in the ocean were it not for the fact that the island is composed entirely of one of the highest grades of phosphate rock ever discovered. since the beginning of the twentieth-century over 80% of the surface has been mined and shipped to australia and japan to produce fertilizer, turning the island‘s interior into a weird moonscape that is entirely unusable and largely inaccessible. the phosphate on nauru is a non-renewable resource. production peaked in the 1980s and will likely cease entirely within the next decade. nine in ten nauruans are now unemployed and the government employs 95% of those that do work. nevertheless, a fraction of phosphate revenue was diverted into a $1 billion trust fund that could provide continued income to citizens. according to the doctrine of weak sustainability, nauru once counted among the most sustainable economies in the world – even while it proceeded to render most of its terrain completely uninhabitable. weak sustainability departs so far from what we instinctively understand as sustainability that it seems as if logical contortions are needed to connect the two. a natural and instinctive reaction is to dismiss weak sustainability as a manipulation of the true spirit of sustainable development, but its counterpart, strong sustainability, also has serious problems. for the requirements of strong sustainability to be met, the stock of natural capital must remain constant. this formulation ensures environmental protection but at the expense of economic development, a ―morally repugnant‖ effect in the words of oxford welfare economist wilfred beckerman. beckerman argues that strong sustainability would require devoting huge resources consilience moore.: toppling the tripod to protecting every one of the million species of beetle for future generations, an inexcusable luxury in the face of acute poverty and real human needs today. taken together, where does this leave us? refreshingly, the formalism of economics leaves no room for ambiguity here. either natural capital is exchangeable with other forms of capital or it is not. the former, resulting in weak sustainability, produces outcomes that few would consider sustainable. the latter, strong sustainability, prevents trade-offs between the environment and economic growth but could halt development as we understand it today. sustainable development is constructively ambiguous because it holds out the promise of both environmental protection and economic growth, without engaging in the real exchanges that happen between the two. because of this, sustainable development has not only failed in implementation, but has fostered the dangerous illusion that there are no trade-offs, that we can consume and conserve at the same time – that we can have our fish and eat them too. 7. a voice of reason to understand exactly how sustainable development failed in the two decades since the brundtland commission, we need to go to the top – to those formulating environmental policy at the international level. the conference in switzerland on global environmental governance brought together the current and all the former executive directors of unep for the first time in history. cumulatively, this group represents almost four decades of experience at the helm of un‘s most important environmental institution, working to navigate the treacherous waters of international environmental politics and to advocate for the environment at the highest levels of government. if any single collection of people can be said to be eyewitnesses to the politics of sustainable development, it is these four men and one woman, who together have experienced all the successes and failures of global environmental governance since stockholm, as well as the back room political deals and horse trading that accompanied them. even in this company, mostafa tolba stands out, though it is hard to put a finger on exactly why. perhaps it is his venerable age, which at 86 makes him easily the oldest. perhaps it is because, as an egyptian native, he is the only representative of the global south. but i suspect that, most probably, it is the sheer length and depth of his leadership in the environmental field that singles him out and gives his remarks a special emphasis, as if his words are underlined in the minds of those listening. tolba headed unep for a remarkable seventeen years, between 1976 and 1992, steering it through some of the most important environmental landmarks, including the montreal protocol to protect the ozone layer, the cites treaty to prevent trade in endangered species, and the preparations for the earth summit. dr. tolba leans forward when he talks and speaks quietly but distinctly into the microphone. he fixes the person he is addressing with a stare, made larger by the thick glasses he usually wears, and emphasizes his points with sharp jabs of his index finger. his words are direct and challenging. ―look at all the work we have been doing for the last forty years, and human beings are still destroying the natural resources. where is the impact on human behavior?‖ tolba cites the ecological footprint indicator, a measure of the land area needed to support the average individual, to make his point. globally, the biological capacity of the earth can 148 consilience support 2.1 hectares per person. in 2005, the average global citizen used up 2.7 hectares. this means that we are now consuming over 128% of the earth‘s reproductive capacity every year, mining its natural resources to support our lifestyles. tolba‘s conclusions are characteristically to the point: ―this means that in 2005, thirty five years after the establishment of unep and after all the discussion of global environmental governance, people are not shifting from over-consumption and they are not shifting from environmental destruction.‖ ―let‘s remember that back in 1972 the slogan was ‗only one earth‘,‖ says tolba, reminding us of the first major political conference of the environment in stockholm, where he headed the egyptian delegation. if current consumption trends continue, then we will require the productive capacity equivalent to a second earth sometime within this century. ―we keep saying we borrowed the earth from our children, but we are doing absolutely nothing to return back what we borrowed, either intact or with interest.‖ tolba traces the failure to reverse environmental destruction directly back to the sustainable development paradigm. ―thirty-five years ago we realized that there is a problem of deterioration and we came up with the famous slogan ‗alternative patterns of development and lifestyle‘. and at the earth summit in 1992 we had the brundtland commission and sustainable development. but did we change the lifestyles that are deteriorating the planet? who of you changed his lifestyle over the last ten or fifteen years?‖ hearing this direct challenge brings home some painful truths. i care about the environment – i ride a bike, i eat very little meat, i recycle, i shop at the farmers market. but i also know that as a citizen of a developed country i am a member of a privileged global elite whose ecological footprint is unsustainable. if everybody on earth lived like me, we would face environmental catastrophe. ―you,‖ and here tolba is addressing you, me, and the other one billion inhabitants of the developed world, ―are pulling us in the developing countries into this same mischief of over-consumption and destruction of the natural resources that we have. there will never be sustainable development if we don‘t change our own way of life.‖ if tolba is right, then the core of the many environmental challenges is the huge per-capita resource use in the north that provides a massively unsustainable development model for the billions around the world seeking a route out of poverty. sustainable development has failed because it doesn‘t engage with this development model. instead it promises to meet the needs of the present generation when the needs and aspirations of developing countries will always be to become developed, to achieve the high levels or prosperity and accompanying resource consumption that prevail in wealthy countries – an outcome that can never be sustainable. 8. new ways forward after tolba‘s talk and the video screening, participants at the conference in switzerland begin packing up and heading home, some perhaps a little subdued at hearing their speeches echoed in a crackly, black and white recording from 1982. among the participants, there is general agreement that political momentum is building toward a major summit in 2012, a symbolic date, commemorating 20 years from rio and 40 years from stockholm. consilience moore.: toppling the tripod from my perspective, anticipating the environmental challenges that lie ahead, there is little to commemorate. the u.n. environment programme established in stockhholm is generally considered weak, marginalized and ineffective. the climate change, biodiversity and desertification conventions signed at rio have all failed to halt the environmental deterioration they were designed to address. many of the leaders that gathered in glion seem to truly believe a new summit will make a difference but, given the record of the past, can we hold out any hope that they are right? i cannot say i have the answers, but the shortcomings of sustainable development may point the way forward. if, as tolba suggests, sustainable development failed because it did not address the development model provided by wealthy countries, then this is the place to start. ironically, this would imply that there should be less global environmental problem-solving, not more. if the environmental challenges of the 21st century such as climate change and biodiversity loss can be ultimately traced to unsustainable lifestyles in the developed north, then this is where these problems will be solved. recognizing and acting on the longrange connections that link consumption with environmental degradation millions of miles away will allow us to treat the cause of environmental decline, not just its symptoms. certainly this will mean exposing and rejecting the economic assumptions that underlie so much of how we understand development today: that more is always better; that the invaluable has no value; and that governments exist only to help us satisfy our superficial wants. more importantly it will mean ceasing to use the developing world as an excuse to avoid examining our own over-consumption. fundamentally, climate change is not a problem of deforestation in indonesia but of patterns of energy use in developed countries. biodiversity loss is not caused by poor farmers trying to make a living, but by patterns of globalized commodity production that push ever outward into pristine wilderness areas. the real pressure on earth‘s resources comes not from population growth in the global south but from per-capita consumption in developed countries and growing per-capita consumption in those aspiring to be developed. these facts may be uncomfortable, but they should also be inspiring because they mean we can address these problems here and now, in our own communities, without waiting for the slow machinery of global environmental politics to grind into action. ultimately, and perhaps inevitably, this article will end on an unsatisfactory note. the goal is to point out the inadequacies of our current approach to environmental problem solving, not to replace it with a new ―big idea‖. and, in fact, i suspect that any new big idea will prove as illusory as sustainable development for the simple reason that we do not know what a prosperous society with very low percapita resource consumption looks like. instead, i believe that the next big idea may only be understood retrospectively. that, if we are successful at solving the environmental challenges of the twenty-first century, we will look back and see the actions of individuals and communities, which seemed at the time mundane, small, and perhaps hopeless, as part of a mighty normative shift that ultimately redefined how we understand the world and our place in it. the challenge now is therefore to resist the seductive glamour of the next big idea, but instead to see the potential in practical, local leadership and to foster that potential. in doing this, we can only hope that thirty years from now, 150 consilience environmentalists watching a crackly, color recording of the 2012 summit will not find the conversations so strangely familiar. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 20, iss. 1 (2018), pp. 1–22 an exploration of the gender-migration-development nexus: the impact of labor migration on women’s empowerment anna bachan anna bachan is a former fellow with princeton in africa at the african school of economics/institute for empirical research in the political economy (ireep). she received her b.a. in global liberal studies from new york university in 2017. avb308@nyu.edu abstract the feminization of labor migration is a 21st century phenomenon. though not often center stage of migration policy and debate, migrant women have become powerful agents of change as well key actors in influencing social and economic development in their countries of origin. this paper explores the complexities of a system in which labor migration is controlled, produced, and understood; its impacts on women and the society at large; and the sustainability of such change for future generations. through a case study on female migrant women from senegal, this article aims to demonstrate how the migration experience and subsequent return of women to their home countries leads to positive and sustainable social and economic changes at household, community, and national levels. however, in order for this occur, it argues that governments must play a key role in supporting and protecting women prior to, during, and after their migration experience while encouraging their return home. author’s note i would briefly like to thank my senior thesis advisor ascension mejorado for her continuous advice and support, and beth haymaker and the global liberal studies department at new york university for their generous support in awarding me two grants to pursue research in senegal. i also humbly thank the many individuals i interviewed in senegal, from experts to migrants themselves, for providing such useful insight for writing this paper. during my first trip to senegal in 2012, i became interested in the relationship between migration and development, especially i spent that summer living with a host family, in which the father worked abroad in france. coura niang, the mother, took care of three children, operated her own shop in town, managed household finances (including her husband’s remittances) and organized a community women’s savings group. she also gave loans to women to help them migrate independently to other countries for work. during this time, i began to realize the multiplicity effects migration can have on women’s empowerment in social and economic domains. i mailto:avb308@nyu.edu 2 consilience returned to senegal twice in the following years, during which i had the opportunity to interview wives of migrants, and many migrants themselves (both men and women) and representatives of ngo’s and government bodies. i even had the opportunity to contribute to migration related projects with local ngo’s, including in organizing an entrepreneurship workshop for returning migrant women. keywords: migration, development, women, senegal, empowerment, remittances. consilience bachan: gender-migration-development nexus introduction for the past decade, the number of women migrating independently for employment opportunities has increased dramatically, especially for low skilled labor in the service industry. however, much of the existing research on female labor migrants has focused on their economic impact and on top down approaches to development, namely through policies initiated to increase or decrease migratory flows1. the discussion has also tended to ignore the impact of gender on development outcomes. lastly, it has not thoroughly addressed the lasting impacts of labor migration as a channel for social and economic empowerment, especially for future generations of women in migrant-sending or origin countries. this article examines the relationship between migration and development (m&d) and the gender dimension, aiming to address these gaps and highlight the potential of female labor migration as a sustainable force for social and economic change in the developing world. instead of simply approaching the “female migrant” as a subject of study, this paper analyzes the complexities of the system in which migration is controlled, produced, and understood, and in which gender relations are both constructed and followed2. this article is divided into three sections: an exploration of the migrationdevelopment-gender nexus, the repercussions of labor migration on women and society in origin countries, and the role of government policy in addressing female labor migration, followed by a case study on migrant women in senegal. it aims to make sense of how programs and policies can be revised and remodeled to better empower migrant women while eliminating the negative implications of migration. finally, the research in this paper is not representative of all involved in m&d in senegal nor their attitudes towards migrant women; it aims to instead reflect the complexity and multi layered reality of women’s rights and international labor migration in the country and on a global scale. migration and development (m&d) international labor migration is a defining feature of the global economy. for instance, the migration of west africans to europe for employment purposes has long been at the forefront of political discourse and media debates3. however, the problem is that international migration is often simplified, the boundaries between voluntary and forced migration and their causes and implications blurred. debates have also largely ignored the gender dimension, omitting the nuances of female labor migration compared to that of men (or children)4. the continued simplification and lack of contextualization of labor migration by policy makers and other practitioners has resulted in problematic management of migratory flows5. in western countries, an overwhelming majority of policies aim to damper such flows due to fears of migrants as national security threats, as pollutants of well-established cultural and religious hegemonies, and of the economic implications of migrants flooding local labor markets and taking jobs away from local citizens6. on the other side of the spectrum, governments in migrant-sending countries have largely encouraged migration as a means for national development. seldom explored in research on m&d is the opposite side of the global transfer of work and the longstanding implications migratory flows have on the 4 consilience socioeconomic development of origin countries. origin or migrant-sending countries are doubly affected by labor migration as they both gain and lose valuable human, social, and financial capital7. while presumptuous to claim that labor migration is an end-all strategy to lift developing countries out of poverty, exploring both its positive and negative implications can shed light on how, and for how long, it could realistically lead to national socioeconomic development. the role of women in migration and development today, women account for over 50 % of international labor migrants8. the recent increase of women migrating internationally can be partially attributed to the growing demand for service work (among other low-skilled labor) in certain industrialized countries. the feminization of international labor migration is also characterized by women seeking jobs abroad independently of their families9. migrant women have become powerful and independent generators of income and unique agents of social change in their communities and countries of origin. globally, an overwhelming amount of evidence shows that investing in women, educating them, and allowing them to work increases a country’s standard of living and level of education while decreasing fertility rates, infant mortality rates, health concerns, and poverty levels10. to narrow down implications and make concrete resolutions, it is imperative to determine how migration affects the socioeconomic development of economies and women in particular. it is also important to assess the sustainability of labor migration as a long-term vehicle for socioeconomic development as well as its impact on the wellbeing and capabilities of future generations in terms of education, health, and employment as well as intergenerational equity. in addition, an exploration of the environmental effects of migration, such as the migrant’s acquisition of new norms regarding sustainable practices or capital to fund environmentally friendly products or services, has rarely been explored and merits further inquiry. the impact of labor migration on development can be measured by the commission of sustainable development (csd)’s indicators of sustainable development. two core indicators for evaluating living standards and intergenerational equity include ‘the proportion of the population living below the national poverty line’ and ‘the ratio of share in national income of highest to lowest quintile’11. in terms of basic economic growth, the gross national product (gnp) per capita measures the level and extent of total economic output and reflects changes in total production of goods and services12. as a population’s education is crucial in “promoting sustainable development and improving the capacity of people to address environment and development issues”, relevant indicators include ‘gross intake rate into last year of primary education’ and ‘adult literacy rate13. lastly, in this case, ‘remittances as percentage of gni’ is crucial as it indicates the extent to which remittances sent by migrants are a major and stable source of external financing14. when measuring how migration affects women, core csd indicators include ‘the share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector’, which indicates the extent to which women have access to paid employment and equal employment opportunities and in general the flexibility of the labor market and the consilience bachan: gender-migration-development nexus economy’s capacity to adapt to changes over time15. in addition, ‘the total fertility rate’, ‘under five mortality rate’, ‘nutritional status of children’, and ‘contraceptive prevalence rate’, are important as they indicate accessibility and quality maternal health services and mothers’ awareness and education of family planning, child nutrition and health, and fertility16. other indicators include the human development index (hdi), the gender development index (gdi) and the gender inequality index (gii). the united nations created the hdi in order to emphasize that people and their capabilities, rather than economic growth alone, are the ultimate criteria for assessing national development17. the hdi assesses life expectancy, literacy rate, number of years of schooling, and standard of living by gross national income per capita18. the gdi in turn assesses gender gaps by determining disparities between women and men in three dimensions of human development – knowledge, health, and living standards – by utilizing the same indicators as the hdi19. lastly, the gii reflects gender-based inequalities in reproductive health, measured by maternal mortality and birth rate; empowerment, measured by share of female parliamentary seats and attainment in secondary and higher education; and economic activity, measured by female labor market participation rate20. in addition to these indicators, when assessing development for women, considering only an economic perspective is problematic. the reciprocal relationship between migration and development aligns more comprehensively with the capabilities approach to human development, propagated by amartya sen. this approach views female development as a subset of human rights and focuses on women’s agency, expanding women’s decision-making power and her ability to choose freely without violence, retribution, or fear21. it also aims to increase women’s economic and social roles in influencing and informing society for future generations22. labor migration in origin countries: repercussions on women & society analyzing female labor migration and the various capitals it generates sheds light on ways in which mobility impacts the economies and societies of sending countries and women themselves. the un emphasizes, “migration is not in-itself a solution. it can also have negative impacts ranging from human trafficking and migrant exploitation, to dependence on remittances and brain drain”23. among the most researched economic effects of migration is remittances, or funds transferred from migrants abroad back to family members in their home countries24. remittances are understood to fuel cycles of dependency, in which economies become reliant on the labor force working abroad, and citizens increase their conspicuous consumption of everyday goods rather than investing in productive channels25. they have also been proven to increase inequality between migrant and non-migrant families and areas for generations26. despite these negative repercussions, world bank data indicates that a 10 percent increase in remittances directly decreases the number of those in poverty by 1.6 percent due to their multiplier effects on the economy27. various studies have also shown that remittances can narrow the gender inequality gap regarding employment and education, as female migrants generally send more remittances and at more frequent time intervals than male migrants28. female migrants have also been 6 consilience noted to remit to the caretakers of their children, which were often other women29. when sent and received by women, remittances increased household spending on children’s healthcare and education, especially for girls30. this extra income also serves as a safety net, allowing family members to engage in high-risk profitable opportunities such as investing in or starting their own businesses31. migrant remittances have also been shown to increase domestic savings and contribute to shared financial responsibility between parents32. by sending and receiving funds, women emerge as breadwinners, a role typically attributed to men in many societies, which ultimately enhances their social status and can improve gender equality over generations33. labor migration also results in a variety of long-term social implications. among the most cited negative impacts is brain drain, or the flight of highly skilled and educated citizens to work abroad, depriving home countries of their prized professional labor force34. other negative effects are thought to stem from social networks between migrants abroad and their compatriots at home35. social networks can create a “culture of migration”, or the accepted notion in society that equates migration with the only means to success in life, leading to higher rates of outmigration36. furthermore, membership in migrant networks or associations is thought to function along gender lines37. men’s associations regroup around ethnic ties and hometown affiliations, whereas women’s groups are multi-ethnic, multinational, and multi-lingual, anchored in their country of destination rather than of origin38. therefore, due to gender specified labor markets, it is more difficult for women to find job opportunities and they can be pressured to only migrate alongside their husbands or family members39. labor migration also results in the accumulation of human capital gained by working abroad, such as qualifications, interpersonal skills, and notions of independence40. as economic migration is ultimately a question of choice, a migrant woman’s potential impact on development relies in part on her awareness of her capabilities and rights41. evidence shows that the impact of human capital is mediated by gender relations, and returning migrant women face more challenges capitalizing on their skills and knowledge gained abroad than men. women who left their families behind face especially significant stigma in their communities upon return to their husbands and children42. migrant women may also face gender-biased government reintegration policies and microloan or grant programs, which makes it more difficult for them to start businesses43. lack of awareness can also make women targets for human trafficking, abuses in the workplace, harsh working and living conditions, and low wages44. they may also have more issues reintegrating upon their return home well as causing family and intergenerational tensions45. when reintegrating into the family without support from social services or solidarity groups, women might be expected to resume their traditional roles as household caretakers46. research also shows that migration negatively impacts children’s health and education, as strain from separated families can lead to psychological effects for children, and changes in parenting can be disruptive to a child’s development47. nonetheless, social networks have shown to create substantial ‘brain gains’ as they facilitate the flow of information, capital, ideas, and human resources back to home countries. despite promoting gendered labor markets, social networks have also reduced migratory risks and costs and greatly facilitated the journeys and consilience bachan: gender-migration-development nexus employment of women to similar regions48. in addition, they have allowed women to create solidarity groups through which they work together to advance their standard of living and advocate for more equitable gender relations in their communities49. through labor migration, women can increase their well-being by acquiring knowledge about gender equality and broader societal attitudes and practices regarding education, childcare, maternity health, family planning, and political participation50. subsequently, women can adopt new norms while living away from home, such as child rearing practices, or attribute more importance to key factors for child development such as nutrition, maternal health, and education. they can also learn to reject traditions or practices with harmful implications such as female genital mutilation (fgm)51. research from moldova, for example, showed that returning female migrants were less likely to accept and more likely to report domestic violence after being exposed to gender-based violence protection programs abroad52. similarly, in ghana, returning migrant women were more likely to use birth control and delay their own marriage and that of their children than non-migrant women53. many migrant women essentially return with a newfound sense of financial and economic independence, higher self-esteem, and specialized knowledge and skills, which are invaluable assets in the domestic labor market54. they can overcome challenges when informed about migratory risks prior to their journeys and often succeed in returning and capitalizing on their experiences with support from organizations and other women. in some countries, female-specific return and reintegration schemes organized by the government, ngos, or international organizations can combat the lack of opportunities for women and help manage difficult family situations. migrant women also have the potential to transform gender roles in a broader context by setting examples for younger generations. in senegal, for example, the international flow of senegalese businesswomen has inspired the next generation of young females to focus on entrepreneurship55. thinking critically about the migration-development nexus through a gender lens reinforces the fact that labor migration leads to positive impacts at the individual, familial, and societal levels. however, this cannot be categorized as simply an improvement or erosion of a woman’s position in society. rather, it is a catalyst for restructured power and social asymmetries related to gender in countries of origin56. in the same vein, the positive effects of female migration are not automatic or everlasting57. they can only be sustained in countries where adequate systems exist and are prepared to address and support this type of large-scale change58. the role for government policy the preceding analysis makes clear why migrant women require a great deal of social support before, during, and after migration in order to ensure retention of skills and a sense of empowerment upon their return home. social assistance, however, is not possible without institutional support. even when grassroots programs provide these services, they must be backed up by supporting national, regional, and local authorities. existing policies and programs dedicated to assisting migrant women range from migrant-friendly financial products to social assistance schemes. for example, some governments invest in the development of free banking applications to reduce 8 consilience the costs of remittance transfers and invest in financial literacy training programs to educate women about investment and financial management to promote saving of remittances and income59. other programs encourage networking and mentorship opportunities between female migrants abroad and women at home through portals, conferences and events60. pre-migration services spread awareness and encourage husbands to take over household and caretaking responsibilities while their wives are abroad. post-migration services, including mentorship programs and professional development workshops, help women retain and capitalize on knowledge and skills they have accrued abroad61. other programs encourage the return of women through job placement and recruitment schemes in countries of origin62. despite the diversity of such initiatives, most governments in developing countries fail to protect migrant women’s rights, create legal avenues for migration, or facilitate their full economic and social participation in both host and origin countries. a contributing factor is the lack of female representation at the government level. according to a un women study, women account for only 22.8% of national parliamentarians in the world, serving in eleven as heads of state and in nine as heads of government63. developing countries, especially those dominated by traditions of patriarchy, put women at risk of becoming the victims of discriminatory migration policies and programs64. country-wide gender dynamics represented at national levels by scholars, policy-makers, and media outlets can also result in discriminatory, gender-blind, or otherwise misleading news coverage and research65. at the 2010 global forum on migration and development, recommendations for government intervention in m&d included increased decentralization and cooperation between levels of government, shared responsibility between government and non-government actors, and a refocus on grassroots development programs66. the migration 4 development umbrella organization declared that governments around the world must give more ownership of m&d processes to migrants, ngos, and civil society actors67. examples of specific government strategies are be further discussed below in the senegal case study. governments and policymakers can enact a number of laws and regulations to simplify emigration procedures, create more avenues for safe and legal migration, ensure the portability and protection of migrant rights and their full participation in societies of origin and destination, and lower remittance transfer costs68. subsequently, they can support and recognize existing migrant associations, cooperate with regional and local authorities, and collaborate with ngos, multilateral institutions, and other stakeholders69. most importantly, governments can recognize migrants as inclusive actors in m&d processes, build their trust and leadership, and favor institutional change through decentralization70. the lack of women at top levels of government can be combatted through decentralization and bottom-up development strategies to empower female migrants. focusing on small-scale actors, including non-governmental organizations and civil society, can give women more of a voice in implementing development policies and programs. in order for the government to enact these measures, however, institutions must be ripe for change. only then can migration have the potential to be a long-term instrument for promoting development and equal gender roles in society. consilience bachan: gender-migration-development nexus case study: migrant women in senegal methodology the data in this paper was collected through an ethnographic methodological approach: a combination of participant observation, fieldwork, and semi structured interviews with representatives of organizations (directors and staff), government authorities, and migrant men and women. the organizations included national ngos, international ngos and multilateral institutions in several locations around senegal (see figure). additional information was also gathered during a summer internship with two senegalese ngos. additionally, the nyu institutional review board (irb) exempted this study from needing formal approval for international human subjects research. migration and development in senegal for the past two decades, senegal has been in the throes of a socioeconomic crisis. desertification has devastated the agricultural sector and 70% of the population it employs. the devaluation of the national currency (cfa) in 1994 resulted in an economic recession, and the population has quadrupled since 196071. currently, 61% of senegalese are under the age of 2472. a young population combined with a weak private sector has expanded the informal economy, which now employs one out of every two senegalese, the majority being women73. combined, these factors have resulted in high job instability, an unemployment rate of 14%, and a rising labor emigration rate74. increasing numbers of senegalese nationals are migrating abroad in search of employment75. these flows have brought a mass influx of capital in the form of remittances. in 2015, the estimated yearly total of migrant remittances surpassed 1.6 billion us dollars76. in addition, according to a 2011 world bank report, remittances were mainly used on daily consumption (58.5 percent), figure 1: map of senegal with areas visited. source: author’s own. 10 consilience health and education (13.2 percent together), and rent (12.6 percent)77. labor migration from senegal is categorized as low skilled and circular: migrating with the intention of finding any possible work and returning as soon as possible to rejoin their families78. as senegal is a community-oriented society, priorities of family and roots dominate. even abroad, migrant workers remain linked, whether informally between families or formally within migrant associations79. the culture of migration is also partially perpetuated by social factors that stem from polygamy. according to interviewees, households with multiple wives are pressured to have more children in order to increase the chance that one of them migrates and brings the family prosperity. migration has also become fully integrated into the fabric of culture and society80. the international migrant is often seen as an beacon of socioeconomic success and individual achievement81. emigration is also driven in part by a postcolonial sentiment that the senegalese must “go out and fight” to spread knowledge of their country and bring back success in terms of knowledge and capital82. the senegalese view their pride and social status as integral to their identities, especially if they are migrants83. commonly seen with migrant returnees is the tendency to share success stories of high paying jobs and good living standards in the “el dorados” they have found in europe and elsewhere84. migrants reported that disclosing the difficult realities of migration would be deemed culturally unacceptable and could be perceived as an effort to dissuade others from succeeding through migration. this is problematic as it contributes to perpetuating a vicious cycle – creating a glorified image of migration as an easy passage to wealth and higher social status85. in spite of these pressures, some organizations in senegal are actively combatting the culture of migration. one such organization is the project to support the promotion of youth and women’s employment (papejf), which aims to create employment for young men and women86. due to the decline of the agricultural sector, papejf focuses on training young senegalese to raise livestock, garden, fish, and manage commercial activities — which are made more attractive through the implementation of innovative technologies87. the director, monsieur diatta, emphasized the importance of retaining young people in agricultural work in rural areas to disincentivize their migration to urban centers. the feminization of migration women in senegal have also become more present in migratory flows. professor dembe fall from the university of dakar describes the “rebellion” of women who see migration as an “aspiration for emancipation”88. fall, along with other academics in the field, points out that female migration in senegal is, however, not new. for decades, women have migrated from rural to urban areas in the country. international migration to europe, the united states, and the middle east is a more recent phenomenon89. according to the 2010 un report, between 1997 and 2001 the percentage of labor migrants from senegal constituted 18.2% of the female population90. in 2002, the census showed a rise to 25 percent91. in 2008, the mafe (migration between africa and europe) survey data showed that 65 percent of females migrated internationally compared to 52 percent of males in their migrant sample pool92. these data also showed senegalese migrant women found consilience bachan: gender-migration-development nexus employment abroad in the low-skilled sector or temporary or seasonal jobs in the informal economy, such as import-export activities, cleaning, caretaking, tailoring, sewing, or hairdressing. in general, female migration from senegal has also become transnational as women travel between countries for employment. an association of wolof hair braiders in new york, for instance, uses their profits made in the us to migrate to france to buy goods, upon which they return to sell them in senegal93. despite the growing feminization of migration, women continue to face significant barriers to migration and return. women have the right to travel and apply for passports and visas, yet they face barriers due to gender divisions in social networks and labor markets, and differences between various social and cultural norms depending on their ethnic group and community of origin94. since membership to migrant networks is gendered, it can prevent many women from migrating95. in paris for example, migrant women from senegal, guinee, and mali congregate together despite their differences, while wolof men from the same village in senegal form a tightly knit affinity group. these gender divisions can partially impede migration, as it is not as easy for women to connect with others that desire to migrate outside their community or country. many interviewees claimed it was improbable that a woman would connect with a man working abroad to help facilitate her migration (this may be seen, though rarely, between family members)96. the social acceptance of and attitude towards migration varies by ethnic group. for the mandinke and hal pulaar, it is seen as an immoral activity largely associated with prostitution and fear of women abandoning their household roles97. conversely, the wolof group has begun to accept women’s labor migration as shown by their increasing presence in the import-export industry overseas98. historically, the jola group has promoted seasonal female rural-urban migration to dakar. around the country jola women are recognized as independent for “running the household”, and as such face less constraints as potential international labor migrants99. these attitudes also vary considerably from urban to rural areas. those in urban areas are more accepting and open to change100. in rural areas, tradition still reserves migration as a primarily masculine activity, though this attitude is changing101. for instance, the international ngo cartias published a recent report of household data which showed that husbands encouraged their wives to work abroad, claiming they were more “economically efficient” and sent home larger sums of money than men102. in addition to migrating, women face obstacles upon returning home, specifically with social and professional reinsertion. many can be expected to return to their pre-migratory social roles as some men see migration as a transitory period for their wives, especially in rural areas103. in his research, professor dembe fall found that when senegalese women migrate, they discover a new society, only to return and realize the one they came from hadn’t changed at all. he referred to this dichotomy as the struggle between “tradition and modernity” and claims that in order for migration to benefit women, it needs to be accepted by both women and men in their home society. in regard to professional reinsertion, women also face difficulties accessing capital to engage in entrepreneurial activities upon their return. according to the world bank, only 13 percent of women in senegal currently use a formal financial product or service104. data from the un capital development fund (uncdf) 12 consilience showed only 10 percent of women in senegal are considered financially included, and 67 percent of those rely solely on informal services105. lack of financial education and access to formal financial institutions greatly inhibits a woman’s ability to accrue credit106. therefore, even if given a loan, women are unlikely to be granted financial services such as savings accounts, digital payment methods, and insurance107. a vicious cycle begins where banks are unwilling to lend to women without credit or trust them with other forms of financial assistance. mafe data shows that only 34% of return migrants were female, suggesting that return migration is minimal108. this can partially be explained by a major lack of support for them upon return (i.e. social and financial assistance, psychological guidance). secondly, in migrant-receiving countries, ngos offer support and assistance for “vulnerable migrants” (which mainly target immigrant women and children). this assistance can take the form of assistance with finding employment, housing and childcare, and generally facilitating integration into the host country. such programs can strongly dissuade migrant women from returning home109. the role of government in migration and development macky sall, the current president of senegal, has pursued a number of immigration-related policies in areas of protection, security, migration and development, diaspora involvement, and migrant return and reintegration110. two government programs specifically that have targeted migrant women (at least to some extent) are faise and hom. the most publicized government project is faise or the “investment support fund for senegalese abroad.” this program focuses on the senegalese diaspora and funds their business projects abroad and upon their return111. since its creation, over 122 projects and 1 million usd has helped the senegalese develop businesses in sectors from livestock farming, fishing, handicrafts, and sanitation to information and communication technologies112. faise has also contributed around $9,000 yearly to help migrants return to senegal113. the majority of faise grants have been given to women in the senegalese diaspora. another program is hom or help of migrants. hom is an online platform developed by the regional agency of development in the town of sedhiou, senegal. the program is free, online, and aims to connect migrants abroad with migrant associations and development projects in their localities of origin to facilitate their productive investment at home114. hom also strives to support local and regional authorities with project management, promote decentralized development planning in coordination with migration flows, and connect the diaspora with entrepreneurs in senegal115. staff admitted that only about one in ten migrants assisted by hom was female, as “women in the diaspora are more interested in starting their own businesses abroad than returning to start businesses in senegal”116. the reasoning behind this can also stem from women’s insecurities and fears of returning and reintegrating both professionally and socially. the government implemented a new migration policy in april, 2019, with assistance from the international organization for migration (iom)117. the new policy prioritizes integrating gender differences in migration policy, particularly in assuring that migrant women do not face discrimination when seeking employment and receive adequate social protection and legal assistance both abroad and upon consilience bachan: gender-migration-development nexus their return118. despite these recent commitments, most government efforts have thus far focused on supporting female migrants’ investment in the country and assisting with voluntary return programs, rather than on supporting and protecting temporary migrant workers. subsequently, government management of migration is highly centralized and lacks coordination between national, local, and regional authorities119. authorities have also focused on spreading awareness to limit clandestine migration rather than promoting migrant rights abroad120. the superior council of senegalese abroad, which aimed to foster dialogue between the senegalese diaspora and migrants and the national government, was suspended in 2013. as a result, senegalese nationals working abroad have limited legal protections121. the positive potential of female migration in senegal despite the obstacles faced and lack of policies and programs to support female, evidence points out that female migration is positively affecting senegalese society well beyond the economic realm. case studies have shown that migration has helped women gain a higher level of self-esteem and an increased ability to influence gender norms and negotiate gender-related responsibilities122. senegalese researcher cheikh babou studies wolof women hair braiders in the united states and their impact on the gender norms of the traditional wolof household.123 his research shows that the majority of husbands were eventually employed by their wives’ hair salons and took over household and childcare tasks, so their wives could work longer hours. these women in turn contributed significantly to household expenses such as the rent, utilities, and groceries124. their increased monetary contribution shifted power relations, giving wolof women a larger voice in decisions about reproductive issues, investment priorities, childcare, and work schedules125. babou concludes with the claim: “money is gradually displacing nonmaterial sources of prestige and authority, such as blood and gender. while traditional social hierarchies continue to retain much symbolic significance, honor and self-worth are increasingly defined by people's ability to accumulate money and satisfy economic needs”126. in senegal, it is evident that gender power dynamics and roles are changing, at least at the household level. a number of wolof female interviewees insisted on having financial independence as a result of migration while also remaining faithful to traditional and muslim values of respect and loyalty to the husband in the household. to symbolize how senegalese women integrate their newfound social and economic position into existing gender roles, one woman referred to the wolof proverb “ñaariloxooy takk tubëy, ñaari loxooy takk sër” or “it takes two hands to tie pants, and it takes two hands to tie a wrap [skirt]”127. in another interview, madame v, a returned senegalese migrant woman from geneva, had returned to dakar after a 40-year career to run an ngo which supports and promotes women’s roles in the government roles and in peace building128. when i inquired about her decision to return, madame v claimed she felt a strong pull to return and join the struggle for gender equality in her home country: “we need to educate the women of tomorrow about the concept of gender and not fall back on the clichés of feminism. we cannot fight for gender parity by focusing only on the professional agenda, but must reconcile the professional with the domestic role of the woman in senegalese society”129. as madame v suggested, the 14 consilience feminist agenda in senegal seems to uphold that economic and social empowerment and domestic responsibilities (and traditional gender norms) go hand in hand. this more gradual approach is also seen as strategic in gaining acceptance from the male population. in senegal, men are increasingly more involved in the fight for women’s rights and accepting their migration as a path to success. several male interviewees noted that senegalese women are driven and have high goals. a young man in dakar noted, “one thing we’ve noticed is that women work better than men. in senegal, they are harder workers than men. men spend too much time partying, drinking, and wasting money. women are more family minded.”130 on a larger scale, migrant women are increasingly seen as role models, as they change perceptions about the role of women in the workplace131. interviews with caritas staff showed that migrant women who return to their communities of origin were viewed in a different light132. since they return wearing nicer clothing and more material possessions, they are associated with a higher social status. another staff member reported that returning migrant women have the power to change mentalities, particularly if they can reinsert themselves professionally and engage in productive activities upon return133. if these women successfully start their own businesses upon return, they exemplify success for other women in the community134. many interviewees emphasized that migrant women motivated younger generations to pursue entrepreneurship and dissuaded them from the idea that migration is the only path to success135. a migration specialist from the iom also agreed that migrant women were models of success for future generations due to their ability to travel independently and acquire resources136. through the iom, i connected with one woman who, after years of working in france, imported a large van to senegal and started her own transportation business in her village137. another woman i spoke to had imported sewing machines from france back to senegal to create jobs for women in her village138. these case studies illustrate how migrant women can bring positive change to their communities. while these economic and social changes are profitable for the individual woman and her family, they occur mostly at the micro-level. contributing to large scale social and economic development will require a critical change in mentalities to accept migration as a possibility for women’s empowerment139. in order to extract changes from the micro-level to benefit the society and economy at large, the government must take a crucial stance in empowering migrant women and translating their development potential onto a national scale140. conclusion will female labor migration continue to have positive implications on the socioeconomic development of women in countries of origin, and is this change sustainable? the answer depends on the country; as this study shows, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and historical differences determine how migration is perceived by the local population and managed by society. analyzing the gender-migrationdevelopment nexus also requires a micro-level and community-based approach with female members of society, who in some countries are ignored by policy makers and consilience bachan: gender-migration-development nexus researchers alike. while economic impact can be extracted from quantitative data, measuring social impacts is incredibly challenging. both do not occur overnight, yet social changes are subtler and thus more difficult to recognize and evaluate. for social change to diffuse from the individual to the family or household, to the community, and finally to the national level, can take decades. women have potential to be strong agents of change, but they need support from institutions and from other women. advancing their status in developing countries requires that they be at the center of program and policy creation. without implicating women from the start and giving them a productive role in society, governments will see social change rapidly evaporate into thin air. while focused on senegal, the outcomes of this research have global implications. labor migration has been recognized as a path to socioeconomic empowerment around the world. the key themes in this paper are transferrable. obstructing, devaluing, and restricting mobility for women is not limited to senegal or west africa. it exists around the world, even though migration is managed differently in every country. in order for labor migration to contribute to social and economic development in migrant sending countries, it must be addressed with grassroots policy and programs which start from the community-level and be recognized globally as a phenomenon with potential to catalyze gender equality. government practice and policy should address the social dynamics of female migration through ‘return migration’ schemes, legal protection of migrant women’s rights, facilitation of skill and knowledge transfer through exchange platforms, and promotion of entrepreneurship and solidarity in migrant women’s groups. through such policies and practices, countries can contribute to economic growth while simultaneously empowering women in their societies, both economically and socially. future research would undoubtedly benefit from an in-depth exploration of the environmental impacts of female labor migration in developing countries, and the sustainability of circular migration in particular. it would be particularly interesting to explore whether women have brought back sustainable practices from abroad, such as recycling or cooking with gas stoves instead of open fires. another potential subject of inquiry could be whether remittances or migrant businesses have contributed to addressing environmental degradation or pollution. 16 consilience end notes 1 bachan, 10 2 andersson, 12 3 bachan, 11 4 ibid. 5 ibid. 6 ibid. 7 ibid. 8 ibid. 9 piper, 4 10 bradshaw & castellino, 4. 11 united nations. “indicators of sustainable development: guidelines and methodologies third edition”, 48. 12 ibid, 75. 13 ibid, 57. 14 ibid, 85. 15 ibid, 80. 16 ibid, 53-54. 17 “human development index”. 18 ibid. 19 “gender development index”. 20 human development report 2016 undp. 21 ibid. 22 ibid. 23 “examining role of labour migration for sustainable development.” united nations department of economic and social affairs. 24 "the jmdi handbook migration for development: a bottom-up approach”, 24. 25 “migration and development: perspectives from the south”, 18. 26 ibid. 27 ibid. 28 “gender, migration and remittances”, 1-2. 29 ratha, 7. 30 ibid, 4. 31 “women and international migration, world survey”, 21-22. 32 ratha, 7. 33 sijapati, 8. 34 dehaas, 233. 35 “the migration-development nexus: a transnational perspective”, 16. 36 toma, 37. 37 stecklov, carletto, azzarri & davis, 9. 38 ibid, 91. 39 toma, 44. 40 "the jmdi handbook migration for development: a bottom-up approach”, 25. 41 ibid, 26. 42 fleury, 18. 43 ibid. 44 “women and international migration, world survey”, 20. 45 “gmg issues brief no.3”, 4. 46 sijapati, 5. 47 fleury, 19. 48 “women and international migration, world survey”, 29. consilience bachan: gender-migration-development nexus 49 ibid. 50 piper, 11. 51 toma, 86. 52 fleury, 17. 53 ibid. 54 hagan et al, 1. 55 toma, 86. 56 piper, 25. 57 taylor, 15. 58 ibid. 59 "the jmdi handbook migration for development: a bottom-up approach”, 54. 60 ibid, 36. 61 ibid, 87. 62 ibid, 78. 63 “facts and figures: leadership and political participation.” 64 ibid. 65 “migration and development: perspectives from the south”, 9. 66 "the jmdi handbook migration for development: a bottom-up approach”, 28. 67 ibid, 22. 68 ibid, 24. 69 “engaging diasporas as development partners for home and destination countries: challenges for policymakers”, 54. 70 ibid. 71 ibid, 77. 72 ibid, 33. 73 ibid, 77. 74 "senegal unemployment rate 1994-2017." 75 ibid, 80. 76 “enhancing financial capability and inclusion in senegal”, 27. 77 cisse, 4. 78 maggi, dame et al, 145. 79 ibid, 146. 80 ibid, 81. 81 ibid. 82 cisse, 22. 83 ibid. 84 toma, 81. 85 ibid. 86 ndiaga fall diatta, personal communication 87 ibid. 88 papa dembe fall, personal communication. 89 ibid. 90 “migration, remittances and gender-responsive local development”, 25 91 toma, 86. 92 ibid, 87. 93 ibid. 94 papa demba fall, personal communication. 95 ibid, 90. 96 coumba fall venn, personal communication. 97 ibid, 85. 98 lambert, 2. 18 consilience 99 ibid. 100 toma, 82. 101 ibid. 102 rose sagna, personal communication. 103 toma, 120. 104 “enhancing financial capability and inclusion in senegal”, 38 105 consumer behaviors in senegal: analysis and findings. 106 ibid. 107 ibid. 108 "mtm i-map migration and development layer senegal." 109 salla mbaye, personal communication. 110 workshop 2015 senegal chapter, 4. 111 ibid, 11. 112 "faise : 122 projets de sénégalais”. 113 ibid. 114 “le help office for migrants (hom) de sédhiou en deux mots”. 115 ibid. 116 lamine ba, personal communication. 117 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"women in senegal: breaking the chains of silence and inequality." women in senegal: breaking the chains of silence and inequality. united nations office of the high commissioner on human rights, 2015. web. 07 mar. 2017. workshop 2015 senegal chapter. n.p.: united nations, 2015. print. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 19, iss. 1 (2018), pp. 103–129 accelerating geothermal development in indonesia: a case study in the underutilization of geothermal energy kevin fan university of british columbia kevin.fan@alumni.ubc.ca sang nam mcgill university sang.h.nam@mail.mcgill.ca abstract geothermal energy is a clean, reliable, and domestic source of energy that offers constant electricity while emitting relatively few emissions of carbon dioxide and other pollutants. despite these benefits, its development globally has not been as rapid in recent years as that of other renewable energy sources. we examine indonesia as a case study— while home to over a third of the world’s geothermal resources, the country exploits only 5.8% of it. moreover, as a rapidly developing economy with projected electricity growth of 8.5% per year until 2025, indonesia must harness its geothermal potential if it is to meet electricity needs without requiring the fossil fuels upon which it has historically been reliant. however, significant roadblocks impede geothermal development in indonesia, primarily in the geoscientific, financial, and political spheres. firstly, there is a lack of geologic data crucial to preliminary geothermal potential assessment, rendering it difficult to locate available resources. financial issues also deter investment in geothermal development by private companies due to the high up-front cost of preliminary resource exploration. lastly, an uncertain political and regulatory environment create uncertainty for geothermal investors. cognizant of these problems, we examine solutions and policies effectively implemented by other countries and industries that can be applied to indonesian geothermal energy development. while specific to indonesia, our recommendations for collaborations amongst governments, development agencies, and private companies bear implications for accelerating the development of geothermal energy resources worldwide. mailto:kevin.fan@alumni.ubc.ca mailto:sang.h.nam@mail.mcgill.ca 104 consilience author’s note our team finds it startling that the country of indonesia, although estimated to possess about one-third of the world’s geothermal energy resources, utilizes only a negligible amount. in particular, we are motivated by the fact that this underutilization is more than an academic question: two years after the momentous international accord that arose out of the paris agreement of 2015, the question of how developing countries will sustainably lift their poor out of the trenches of poverty—without gravely endangering the stability of the global climate system—remains one of the most significant sources of uncertainty in assessing the geopolitical trajectory of the 21st century. in this light, the challenge of geothermal development in indonesia provides an exemplary case study—indonesia being a highly populous island and rapidly industrializing nation for which the problems of sustainable electrification, the mitigation of climate change and sea level rise, severe health risks owing from air pollution, and poverty alleviation and marginalization loom large. we are furthermore compelled by a sense of humanitarian urgency: indonesia’s failure to develop its geothermal resources would most likely result in the country’s burgeoning electricity demand being instead met by coal power, exacerbating all of these problems. as senior undergraduates and recent graduates interested in geophysics business and economics, we are also intrigued by the inherent interdisciplinary nature of the problem, which cuts across both the natural and social sciences: from geology, geophysics, and environmental science to renewable energy policy, politics, sustainable electrification and poverty alleviation, finance, and economics. emboldened by how our different but complementary interests provided us with a holistic perspective on the diversity of subjects constituting geothermal development, we set out to research and evaluate the problems hindering geothermal development in indonesia, the solutions that had already been researched and attempted, and how particular actors can better collaborate to take advantage of this abundant renewable energy source. we owe much to the experts we interviewed, ranging from geothermal scientists and consultants to renewable energy specialists and un sustainability advisors, who have generously shared their insights and experience with geothermal energy development practices, both in indonesia and around the world. . keywords: geothermal energy, renewable energy policy, indonesia, sustainable electrification. consilience fan and nam: indonesian geothermal development i. introduction a) the need for sustainable electrification in indonesia the world's fourth most populous country, indonesia has 255 million people and the largest economy in southeast asia. given that it is a nation consisting of 18,000 islands across its expansive archipelago, universal access to electricity—a key driver of poverty alleviation and income inequality reduction—has been a major challenge. indeed, indonesia faces an electricity crisis: over 80% of regional electricity systems are prone to frequent or sporadic power outages (pwc, 2016, p. 8). the situation could still worsen. considering indonesia's strong population growth, rapid urbanization, industrialization, and rising per capita income, future electricity consumption is projected to grow at the precipitous rate of 8.5% per year until 2025 (pwc, 2016, p. 7). the benefits of universal electrification are well-documented, as are their correlation with higher levels of human development (figure 1), providing water and irrigation for enhanced agricultural production, improving educational outcomes via lighting and communication tools, and reducing child/maternal mortality and disease incidence via refrigeration of medication (undp, 2013). as recently as 2000, the nationwide electrification ratio was 57%—and though it had increased to 84% by 2014 (adb, 2015), 50 million people still lack access to electricity. improvement in this sector therefore offers an opportunity to positively affect tens of millions of indonesians. yet the historical, near-exclusive reliance upon fossil fuels in indonesia has had substantial, deleterious consequences, disproportionately affecting its most marginalized populations. at present, fossil fuels are responsible for 88% of electricity generation in the country (eia, 2015). this presents significant health risks because of air pollution: according to greenpeace (2015), an estimated 6,500 people per year die prematurely due to coal plants, while the national bureau of research (2016) estimates that 58% of jakartans suffer from air pollution-related diseases. thus, reducing indonesia’s reliance on fossil fuels and strengthening its capacity to produce renewable energy is imperative to improve the health of indonesians. moreover, as an island nation, indonesia is vulnerable to future socioeconomic harm from climate change and coastal inundation, particularly because 60% of the population resides in coastal cities such as jakarta. likewise, agriculture and fisheries, two economic sectors upon which the poor in indonesia are heavily reliant, are anticipated to experience substantially lower yields in future decades due to increased extreme weather events such as floods and monsoons (measey, 2010). projected climate change therefore stands to exacerbate indonesia’s already large income inequality1 with a ‘perfect storm’ of adverse, coupled effects. 1a common statistical measure of the degree of wealth inequality in the distribution of family incomes in a country, indonesia’ gini index was 36.8 as of 2009, ranking 79th out of 145 countries (see cia, the world factbook, “country comparison | distribution of family income gini index”). for the gini index, a score of 0 represents maximum income equality, while a score of 100 represents maximum income inequality. 106 consilience climate change is also projected to adversely affect indonesia more directly via the effects of elevated temperatures throughout the 21st century. for instance, defining the signal-to-noise (s/n) ratio as the amplitude of climate change in units of existing climate variability, frame et al. (2017) expresses the effects of climate change statistically, in terms of the unfamiliarity of future projected climates for specific geographic areas with respect to present conditions. according to this conceptual framework, an s/n value of 3 indicates that a projected new climate is warmer than 99.9% of the base (present) years and is therefore designated with the highest risk moniker of “unknown”. the association of southeast asian nations (asean), including indonesia, is projected to experience an s/n value of up to approximately 25 by the end of the 21st century, resulting in an unprecedentedly warmer climate. furthermore, this presents significant potential for global spillover effects in economic, security, and political realms—particularly where climate impacts contribute to security and humanitarian issues in vulnerable countries2. given the magnitude of these challenges, there is thus urgent and substantial impetus for indonesia to reduce its unsustainable carbon emissions, and their attendant adverse effects on human health, economic longevity, social stability, and the environment. to this end, this paper shall focus on the contributions that renewable energy sources such as geothermal energy can make in terms of providing sustainable alternatives. 2 frame et al. 2017, page 1. according to this framework, s/n=1 denotes an “unusual” climate, s/n=2 denotes an “unfamiliar” climate, and s/n≥3 denotes an “unknown” climate. for the latter, an “unknown climate” is unknown in the sense that the overlap between coldest projected years and warmest base period years is only 13%, such that the new mean climate is warmer than 99.9% of base years, and the new climate state would be experienced on average only once every 740 years in the base climate far beyond what a single human could reasonably expect to experience in their own lifetime. a value of s/n=25, at the upper limits of what is projected for indonesia by the end of the 21st century, therefore represents extreme climate change in statistical terms. consilience fan and nam: indonesian geothermal development figure 1: relationship between electrification rate and human development index and gender inequality in 2009, with emphasis upon southeast asian countries. note that indonesia’s electrification ratio has increased significantly in recent years, to 84% as of 2014. source: undp. (2013). human development report. b) indonesia’s geothermal energy resources indonesia owes its abundant geothermal resources to its privileged position in the pacific ring of fire, at which the indo-australian plate and the pacific plate are subducted beneath the eurasian plate. once these plates reach depths of approximately 100km, temperatures are sufficient for rock to turn into magma, which subsequently rises to the surface at sites of volcanic eruption. this manifested in indonesia’s 76 historically active volcanoes—the largest number of any country (volcano discovery). more than 75% of indonesian residents live within 100km of a volcano that erupted within the last 11,700 years (smithsonian institution). since geologically young volcanoes are typically the areas with the highest underground temperatures (union of concerned scientists), indonesia possesses an enormous opportunity for energy production, having an abundance of such high-temperature hydrothermal systems. indeed, geothermal heat flow at the surface is up to 100% greater in some regions of indonesia than the average heat flow at the surface of earth’s continents (figure 2), up to 120 milliwatts per square meter (i.e. power per area) as opposed to the more typical value of 60 milliwatts per square meter. such high heat flow values in the country can be attributed to volcanic and magmatic heat as well as some non-volcanic sources, such as extinct magmatic systems at old subduction zones, tectonic extensional domains, and intra-cratonic basins (suryantini, 2017). 108 consilience it because of this favorable geological and thermal environment that indonesia possesses an abundance of geothermal energy: an estimated 35-40% of the world’s global geothermal energy potential (see appendix i for further discussion of the variability in this estimate). figure 2: geothermal heat flow in indonesia, in units of milliwatts per meter squared. data has been interpolated (owing from the relatively sparse data coverage in some regions) and smoothed. source: searg (southeast asia research group). heat flow | se asia heatflow database. compilation map by helen smyth. (http://searg.rhul.ac.uk/currentresearch/heat-flow/). furthermore, many geothermal resources in indonesia are situated in ideal locations, both near major population centers where electricity demand is high and still increasing, and near impoverished eastern parts of the country where electrification rates are low. for example, the geothermal energy upstream development project for indonesia, initiated in 2016, focuses upon the underdeveloped geothermal power market in eastern indonesia — where electrification rates are lowest and poverty rates highest. it is a joint initiative of pertamina sarana multi infrastruktur (pt smi), an infrastructure financing company, and the world bank (qadir, 2016, page 3). http://searg.rhul.ac.uk/current-research/heat-flow/ http://searg.rhul.ac.uk/current-research/heat-flow/ consilience fan and nam: indonesian geothermal development the indonesian federal government has repeatedly stated its intention to develop the country’s abundant geothermal resources, which are estimated to be 24 gw or 35% (fauzi, 2015) of the global geothermal potential of 70 gw, where the latter is defined as the total extractable geothermal energy estimated based on current technology (bertani, 2009). as of december 2012, the geological agency (badan geologi) of the ministry of energy and mineral resources has identified 299 geothermal working areas in indonesia (smillie, 2015, p. 1). however, installed capacity in 2014 was 1.4 gw, a mere 5.8% of total potential (fauzi, 2015). in addition, the federal government’s stated goal is to increase geothermal capacity more than fourfold by 2020 (ministry of energy and mineral resources, indonesia), which seems impractical3. overall, substantial scientific and technical, financial, and political problems keep the situation in stasis. the stakes loom large. any shortfall in installed capacity will most likely be met by construction of additional coal power plants (adb, 2015, p.1), rendering almost impossible indonesia’s cop21 pledge to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 29% by 20304. in light of the interconnected problems of climate change and sea-level rise, mortality and illness from fossil-fuel air pollution, and sustainable electrification, indonesia’s failure to utilize its geothermal resources has dire implications for the future welfare of its people. c) geothermal energy: scientific principles and environmental impact geothermal energy is derived from the flow of the earth’s internal thermal energy to the surface, which includes both thermal energy from the original formation of the planet and the heat-producing radioactive decay of elements in the earth’s mantle and crust (berrizbeitia, 2014, p. 1). the exploitation of hydrothermal geothermal systems is a mature technology. it consists of naturally convecting fluid circulation systems, in which hot water and steam are extracted from permeable reservoirs near the surface in areas with high heat flow. they are the most commonly exploited geological setting for geothermal energy production. figure 3 illustrates the principles relevant to a conventional flash steam geothermal plant in a hydrothermal system. the utilization of hydrothermal systems for electricity is distinct from that of enhanced geothermal systems (egs), a more recent innovation in which areas with high heat flow but insufficient natural permeability for natural fluid convection are artificially stimulated via the injection of water at high pressures, with the ultimate goal of producing a fracture network with high fluid permeability (dempsey & suckale, 2015, p. 2/5). however, the focus in indonesia thus far has been upon exploiting hydrothermal systems, which tend to be both cheaper and easier to establish. 3 private correspondence with huong mai nguyen, energy specialist with focus on geothermal and hydro power in indonesia, at the world bank. 4 this projected reduction is calculated with respect to a business-as-usual scenario in which 2.881 gigatons of co2 equivalent is emitted in 2030 (see republic of indonesia 2015, “intended nationally determined contribution”). 110 consilience figure 3: (top) schematic illustrating how a flash steam geothermal power plant (the most common kind) works. source: mcdowell, r. (2006). “indonesia sitting on geothermal power plant.” nbcnews.com. (bottom) dajarat iii power station, west java, possessing 290 mw in capacity, rendering it the world’s 10th largest geothermal plant as of 2013. with the ability to fulfill fast-growing electricity demand, alleviate health risks, and tackle climate change issues, geothermal energy is a continuous, baseload source of power (in contrast to wind and solar) that results in comparatively minimal environmental damage (in contrast to hydroelectric, which adversely impacts fluvial consilience fan and nam: indonesian geothermal development ecosystems) and improves energy security. geothermal is a relatively clean energy, with flash steam plants emitting 4% of the sulfur dioxide (0.16 kg/mwh), 0% of the nitrous oxide, and 3-5% (27-40 kg/mwh) of the carbon dioxide created by a coal power plant producing an equivalent amount of electricity. closed-loop binary plants emit zero or near-zero emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxide, and carbon dioxide (tester et. al., 2006, p. 8-6). geothermal plants also require less land (0.4 m^2/mwh) than other energy technologies, from three times less than wind power to nine times less than coal power, while using less than 5% of the water (38 l/mwh) of an equivalent coal power plant (gea, 2014, figures 16, 18). though potentially harmful environmental effects of geothermal energy have been documented, such impacts can be mitigated. for instance, it has been stated that geothermal waters pose a large potential risk to water quality, soil quality, and local vegetation if released into the environment, due to their high concentrations of toxic elements including antimony, arsenic, lead, and mercury. however, the risk of release can be virtually eliminated by proper design and engineering controls (clark, harto, sullivan, wang, 2011, p. 49). examples of such controls include the direction of fluids in surface runoff to impermeable holding ponds, and the injection of all wastewater streams deep underground. another control against fluid leakage into shallow fresh-water aquifers consists of designing well casings with multiple strings (long sections of pipe lowered into a well and subsequently cemented), in order to provide redundant barriers between the inside of the well and the adjacent formation (tester et. al., 2006, p. 8-6). ecosystem impacts such as wildlife/habitat loss or vegetation disturbance associated with geothermal energy are relatively minor at hydrothermal projects in the united states (tester et. al., 2006, p. 8-12). specifically, geothermal field development can involve the removal of trees and brush to facilitate the installation of necessary infrastructure such as the power house, substation, well pads, piping, emergency holding ponds, and otherwise. however, once a plant has been built, reforestation can restore the area to a semblance of its initial appearance, masking the presence of buildings and other structures. while such efforts do not preclude the possibility of long-term ecosystem damage, the small area required for geothermal plant operations relative to most other electricity sources (both non-renewable and renewable) minimizes this concern. finally, as with other types of power generation facilities, industrial accidents can occur. those involving well drilling and testing are unique to geothermal. in the early days of geothermal energy production, well blowouts were fairly common; however, at present, the use of fast-acting blowout preventers have essentially eliminated this possibility (tester et. al., 2006, p. 8-15). ii. why is geothermal underutilized in indonesia? a) technical challenges the two fundamental physical requirements for the generation of economicallyviable amounts of geothermal power are high geothermal heat flow and high permeability of the geothermal fluid as it migrates to the surface. indonesia, however, lacks the borehole heat flow data that would allow for the optimal 112 consilience characterization of its numerous hydrothermal geothermal systems. even where it does exist, such data is largely limited to areas with a high density of oil wells in which heat flow measurements can be easily taken (suryantini, ehara, and nishijima, 2006), as shown in figure 4. the absence of such data creates a high degree of uncertainty in any estimates of heat flow or fluid permeability. it should be noted that drilling boreholes is necessary in order to take accurate measurements of heat flow. moreover, test holes must be drilled sufficiently deep to reduce the effect of climate variations at the surface (guy masters, 2017, p. 84). while oil and gas companies often possess such data (collected from oil wells), it is often proprietary. to date, no central database exists for the agglomeration of indonesian heat flow measurements. figure 4: spatial distribution of geothermal heat flow measurements in indonesia, in units of power per area (milliwatts per meter squared). source: map created using south-east asia heat flow data from searg (southeast asia research group), heat flow | se asia heatflow database, with compilation map by helen smyth. (http://searg.rhul.ac.uk/current-research/heat-flow/). in addition to data quantity, geothermal data quality has also been of concern. many developers have complained about the poor quality of data offered during the geothermal resource tendering process (adb, 2015, p. 108). indeed, the 2004 revision of the indonesian geothermal reporting standard does not require explicit disclosure of the assumptions used to develop resource capacity and extraction estimates. this is a substantial impediment, as such assumptions necessarily include specification of the technology pathway, the basis for selecting values for resource parameters (e.g. area, temperature), land tenure, and environmental issues. without the explicit disclosure of such assumptions in indonesian reporting standards, it is impossible to perform a verification by an independent authority to replicate the http://searg.rhul.ac.uk/current-research/heat-flow/ consilience fan and nam: indonesian geothermal development resource estimate and assess its reliability (adb, 2015, p. 111). furthermore, the indonesian standard is not available in an official english version (only in bahasa indonesia, the national language) and does not address the use of probabilistic estimates, both of which reduce the international credibility of indonesian geothermal prospects for investors. it is also essentially one-dimensional, containing only provisions relating to geoscience (adb, 2015, p. 111-112), and excluding social and environmental considerations. in contrast, formal geothermal reporting codes now exist in at least two countries: australia and canada. these codes embody principles such as transparency and accountability regarding both the presentation of results from geothermal exploration, and the estimates of future geothermal power production (ifc, 2013, p. 3). furthermore, they have been extensively peer-reviewed, are endorsed by the international geothermal energy association (iga), and have built up a track record of use and validation (adb, 2015, p. 108-109). in particular, the australian code is multidimensional, incorporating not only geoscience concerns (as in the indonesian code) but also considering the myriad other aspects that affect ultimate project feasibility: economic, marketing, environmental, social, legal, and regulatory factors (adb, 2015, p. 111). while it may be questioned whether the australian/canadian codes are applicable to indonesia, the fact that they have already been employed in three geothermal feasibility studies at lumut balai, ulubelu, and tompaso supports the notion of their successful, widespread implementation in the future. overall, the lack of high-quality, accessible, country-wide data presents significant uncertainty for private developers and amplifies investor risk, rendering development prohibitively expensive for small companies. b) financial challenges high quality exploration work prior to drilling maximizes the probability of achieving the required rate of return for prospective financiers (ifc, 2013, p. 27). unfortunately, geothermal development projects generally suffer from high exploration costs, and thus high initial investment costs and risks (figure 5). for example, test drilling to confirm the existence of sufficiently large heat flow and geothermal resources costs between us$2-6m per well. since multiple wells need to be drilled, test drilling costs can total to tens of millions of dollars (esmap, 2016). moreover, after confirming the existence of a geothermal resource, the investment required to develop the power plant is substantial. according to a world bank geothermal specialist we interviewed5, the general rule of thumb for the total investment needed for the exploration and development stages in indonesia is us$8m per mw of capacity (1 mw powers 1,000 u.s. homes, or roughly 7,000 indonesian homes, according to brown). thus, approximately us$400m of investment is required for a mid-sized 50 mw plant. in comparison, only us$23m/mw is required for a coal plant, rendering geothermal investment relatively 5 private correspondence with thrainn fridriksson, geothermal specialist, world bank. 114 consilience expensive during the exploration and plant construction stages6, and often risky for the private sector due to the high likelihood of unsuccessful exploration. given this risk, banks are reluctant to lend to private developers. even if availability of the resource is confirmed, financial payoff is deferred, as development takes at least 7 years. given such constraints, financial challenges pose serious obstacles to geothermal development in indonesia. figure 5: visualization of the risks and costs at different stages of geothermal development. adapted from esmap (2012), geothermal handbook: planning and financing power generation, as cited in esmap (2016), comparative analysis of approaches to geothermal resource risk mitigation | a global survey, p. 2. however, once constructed, geothermal plants have competitive operating costs because they do not require purchase of fuels, unlike fossil fuel plants. as of 2015, most indonesian geothermal plants had operating costs of us¢8.5/kwh or below, while those for coal and gas plants varied from us¢4.2-19.3/kwh (adb, 2015, p. 8, 27). c) political challenges geothermal energy is heavily impacted by indonesian government policies. one challenge facing geothermal energy is uncertainty resulting from an ever-evolving legal and regulatory framework. the federal government has issued a proliferation of laws and regulations in the past several years. for instance, in the “regulation of 6 private correspondence with huong mai nguyen, energy specialist, world bank. consilience fan and nam: indonesian geothermal development minister of natural resources no. 17/2014”, the ceiling tariff for geothermal power projects was altered for the fourth time. it was revised from a scheme in which tariffs varied based on plant capacity to a geographically-based tariff regime. moreover, different federal government ministries, often with diverging interests, have overlapping responsibility for geothermal development. while the ministry of energy and mineral resources pushes for greater aid for geothermal development, the ministry of finance is reluctant to use government funds for such purposes. meanwhile, the ministry of state-owned-enterprises, which controls pertamina geothermal energy (national geothermal developer) as well as pln (national energy distributor), requires strong profits from its companies. with relatively high geothermal plant development costs, state-owned-enterprises (hereby abbreviated ‘soe’) are disincentivized to increase geothermal investment (adb, 2015, p. 83). given the indonesian federal government’s stated initiative to vastly increase the country’s geothermal energy utilization by 2025, future human capital in the geothermal industry has also been cited as a concern, particularly in the geoscientific disciplines of geology, geophysics, and geochemistry necessary to perform exploration. because geothermal energy has not been consistently developed in indonesia, conventional market forces to identify and satisfy the demand for technical staff have not been developed, resulting in a depleted human resource pool from which to draw staff for new geothermal plants (smillie, 2015, p. 1). iii. what solutions have been attempted locally and globally? a) what actions have already been undertaken in indonesia? in the early 1980s, the soe pertamina was appointed head of all indonesian geothermal energy development. in 2007, the federal government took steps to improve its geothermal data coverage by establishing governmental regulation no. 59/2007, under which it assumed legal ownership of all data acquired under the geothermal mining business license. in 2011, the federal government also set up a us$300m geothermal support fund (pwc, 2016); however, the funds, were not allocated until 2017. initially created to provide loans for exploration, the fund has now been restructured to facilitate government-led exploration and drilling7, and will include a contribution of us$55m from the world bank. pt smi, the infrastructure investment arm of the federal government, will be responsible for managing the fund, while the ministry of energy and mineral resources and the ministry of finance are working to establish a geothermal exploration committee consisting of officials from the ministry of energy and mineral resources, the ministry of finance, and the geological agency of indonesia (baden geologi) (jg, 2017). there was also a partnership coordinated in 2012 between private enterprises, soe, and academic institutions in order to build up human resources and expertise in the geothermal sector (smillie et. al, 2015). 7 private correspondence with huong mai nguyen, energy specialist at the world bank. 116 consilience in 2014, the maximum electricity paid to private geothermal operators (the ceiling tariff) was increased by the decree of the minister of energy and mineral resources via ministerial regulation no. 17/20148. this regulation reverted the tariff to a previously employed geographically-based regime and additionally considered the time required for a project to reach commercial operation, to account for inflation (hasan & wahjosoedibjo, 2016, p. 6). regions were classified principally by potential levels of electricity infrastructure development. for instance, region 1, in which geothermal would primarily replace large coal plants, includes sumatra, java, and bali. in 2017, this region was accorded the lowest geothermal ceiling tariff of us¢12.6/kwh. region 2, comprising sulawesi, west nusa tenggara, east nusa tenggara, and others, was accorded an intermediary ceiling tariff of us¢18.2/kwh. in these areas, geothermal would replace small coal power plants. region 3, covering other areas for which isolated diesel generation is the primary source of power, received the highest ceiling tariff of us¢26.2/kwh9 (hasan & wahjosoedibjo, 2016, p. 6). the breakthrough, however, was the “new geothermal law” of 2014 (no. 21/2014), under which geothermal activities became permissible in forests after obtaining a permit from the minister of forestry. this opened for development the 50% of geothermal resources located in protected forests or national parks (ifc, 2013, p.6). however, some forestry regulations that still classify geothermal development as a mining activity may require further amendment before the provisions of the new geothermal law can be effectively implemented within forested areas. the law also re-centralized authority over geothermal power generation, placing the distribution of geothermal licenses and working area tenders under the sole federal jurisdiction of the ministry of energy and mineral resources instead of under the authority of governors and regents/mayors as had previously been the case (hadiputranto, hadinoto & partners, 2014, p. 1). the law also stipulated a production bonus scheme: local governments near geothermal working areas would receive a portion of the revenues based on a percentage of the geothermal license holders’ gross income beginning from when the first unit operates commercially. this was important because the old law stated that geothermal license holders were to pay state income tax and non-state income tax but did not specify who the actual recipient of the bonus would be, nor how the bonus would be calculated (hasan & wahjosoedibjo, 2016, p. 4). despite the ostensible benefits of the new geothermal law, its tangible impact upon geothermal development is difficult to assess, in particular due to the nature of indonesia’s highly hierarchical legal system. for instance, despite the fact that the law removes the classification of geothermal as a mining activity, other subsidiary laws and regulations must also be implemented (within a span of two years of the initial one) in order for the initial law to have any effect. indeed, the relevant forestry 8 see baker & mckenzie (2014) for additional commentary regarding the subtleties of this revision to the geothermal ceiling tariff regime. 9 while all ceiling tariffs quoted are for 2017; note that the tariff for all regions increases by us¢18.2/kwh by 2025. consilience fan and nam: indonesian geothermal development regulations classifying geothermal as a mining activity need to be updated to reflect this change (hasan & wahjosoedibjo, 2016, p. 5). b) how can examples from other countries help us? many countries utilize government-led or sponsored programs (such as through the intermediary of soes) to map their geothermal reserves (adb, 2015, p.74). for instance, iceland’s federal government actively led geothermal mapping within the country until 2003 when it created iceland geosurvey, an entity which receives funding from private icelandic companies in the geothermal industry and carries out the same tasks as a non-profit organization (orkustofnun, 2010, p.33). however, to recoup the costs of preliminary geoscientific data surveys, the government can charge fees to private companies that use its information, as was the case for new zealand (esmap, 2016, p. 12). alternatively, countries such as japan employ costsharing, in which the government shares 40% of exploration drilling costs and 20% of production drilling costs with private developers; this scheme is said to have hastened the development of most of the 536 mw of geothermal power operating in japan today (esmap, 2016, p.7). another option produced the geothermal risk mitigation facility in east africa, which was set up in 2010 with €110m of funding from the eu for geothermal exploration and development (grmf). the common theme amongst all countries with significant geothermal development is a highly involved government that catalyzes strong funding initiatives. once the geothermal industry is built up by preliminary government-led initiatives to reduce exploration risk for the private sector, the geothermal industry can ultimately be privatized, as exemplified by iceland in 1986 and the philippines in 2007 (orkustofnun, 2010, p.19). iv. recommendations and opportunities: filling the gaps a) improved geothermal data standards, science, and technology firstly, indonesia needs to improve the quality and credibility of its geothermal data. to achieve this, the federal government should develop a more systematic and transparent estimation methodology of geothermal potential by adopting an established, peer-reviewed, internationally-recognized geothermal recording code such as those in australia and canada (ifc, 2013, p.3). while such an adoption may encounter resistance because of the effort required to change reporting codes, the inadequacies of the present code (highlighted in section iia) are sufficient to warrant this effort, and will continue to hamper international investment in indonesian geothermal development until they are resolved either by improving the code or by adopting another one that explicitly stipulates standards for resource estimation assumptions and uncertainty. moreover, the indonesian code does not appear to actually have been used (or if so, then not transparently) in resource capacity estimates on which current tendering and forward planning is based (adb, 2015, p. 110). nonetheless, either approach will necessarily require time and the overcoming of institutional resistance to a new/revised code. in addition, geothermal exploration practitioners in indonesia should adopt the geothermal play fairway analysis 118 consilience method, a research initiative developed by the united states department of energy to improve uncertainty quantification. the method evaluates a range of geologic, technical, and socio-economic factors, which are subsequently integrated in order to narrow a basin or regional-scale area down to smaller areas of interest for further study and prospecting (garchar, 2016). secondly, countries such as indonesia interested in geothermal development should encourage research into the application of geoscientific techniques to improve preliminary characterization of the subsurface, for example with grants to public universities. such techniques are important because they can guide and constrain the location of borehole drilling, which is essential given the high cost and inherently uncertain nature of drilling. used in conjunction, integrated geological, geophysical, and geochemical data deliver better estimates of geothermal potential than can be provided by surface geological data. surface manifestations of key geothermal parameters (heat flow and fluid permeability)—can be only be inferred (from hydrothermal springs and geologic fault density respectively, for instance) but not definitively known from surface investigations alone. conversely, it is only through the utilization of subsurface methods, such as geophysical/geochemical surveys and borehole drilling, that these key parameters can be constrained in order to construct accurate models of geothermal reservoir systems. geophysical methods can be employed to non-invasively acquire subsurface data and key indicators of geothermal potential, in order to increase the probability that expensive drilling wells discover high-productivity geothermal resources (gibson et. al., 2015). geophysical methods include gravity, magnetics, temperature gradient drilling, 2d and 3d seismic, and electromagnetic surveys (such as magnetotellurics). they attempt to identify anomalies in the subsurface physical properties of density, magnetic susceptibility, and electrical conductivity measurements, respectively. these methods have been deemed indispensable as they help constrain the understanding of geothermal heat flow as well as of the geologic structure of geothermal systems (ifc, 2013, p. 20). meanwhile, geochemical methods such as geothermometry, electrical conductivity, ph, flow rate determination of fluids from active features, and soil sampling can be used to determine the chemical characteristics of underground geothermal fluids at a prospective field site (juliarka & niasari, 2016). surface surveys can include gathering local knowledge, locating active surface manifestations of geothermal activity, and assessing surface geology (ifc, 2013, p. 8). for a comprehensive elaboration of the many and varied types of data that are relevant to exploration for geothermal resources, see “data checklist for project review and exploration risk insurance applications” (ifc, 2013, appendix a3, p. 64). generating such geoscientific data can be completed in numerous ways. first, the federal government (such as the ministry of energy and mineral resources) can collect the data, then charge geothermal companies for the usage of data—a model that has been implemented in new zealand (esmap, 2016, p. 12). second, the federal government could create a non-profit organization that conducts research and collects data and is funded by private companies, as is the case in iceland (orkustofnun, 2010, p.33). third, the federal government can provide grants to consilience fan and nam: indonesian geothermal development universities and research organizations to collect data. out of the three, the first option, government-driven data collection and cost recoupment (from fees charged to those using the data), is the most viable. this structure is easier to initially set up and facilitates centralized organization of data with standard methodologies. the second option requires cooperation from geothermal companies across indonesia with an agreement on who pays what. such a structure is much more difficult to form in indonesia than in small, homogenous countries such as iceland. the third option, on the other hand, may result in data with different methodologies and representations due to the fact that the data is collected by independent institutions. government-led data collection avoids the challenges faced by the second and third options, while enabling the federal government to recoup a large proportion, if not all, of the data collection cost by charging companies for the usage of the data. b) enhanced and alternative funding mechanisms there exist multiple channels through which geothermal energy resources can be developed. the federal government should first focus on promoting collaboration on rural geothermal exploration between the us$300m geothermal support fund (discussed in section iiia) and the tropical landscapes financing facility (tlff), a pioneering us$1b fund between the indonesian federal government and international partners that provides long-term, low-interest financing for social and environmentally beneficial projects in rural areas10. these funds should be used to prioritize the expansion of the soe pertamina’s geothermal energy upstream development project. in this venture, over half of the proposed sites for exploration drilling are in largely rural and poorly electrified eastern indonesia. this could potentially provide electrification to impoverished, marginalized areas that have historically been difficult to access (pt smi, 2016, p.10). secondly, the federal government should entice geothermal development by implementing tax incentives to make investment more attractive. such incentives could be modelled, for instance, upon the philippines’ 7-year tax holiday for geothermal developers, or upon canada’s flow-through shares tax provision for investors in the mining industry, through which investors claim tax deductions for exploration costs (nrc, 2017). in indonesia, inducing private sector investment is critical. the federal government alone cannot provide the estimated us$25b in investment required to increase geothermal power from the current 1,400 mw to their goal of 7,500mw by 2025 (pwc, 2016, p.103). thirdly, to offset the risk of exploration, a consortium consisting of the federal government, development banks, and/or the private sector could collectively contribute to an insurance scheme, in which a portion of exploration costs are paid out to private developers in the event that exploration is unsuccessful. the indonesian government can draw on the expertise from private insurers and development agencies to create its own insurance scheme or make a deal with private 10fan came to learn about this fund while attending a talk held by satya s. tripathi, who is the chief executive of the tlff, in addition to being the senior advisor to the 2030 agenda for sustainable development (un environment programme). 120 consilience insurers to ensure geothermal exploration by private developers. in such an arrangement, the government would share the cost of the premium with private developers, thus reducing risk. mexico, for example, is working with munich re and the inter-american development bank to provide insurance for private developers (munichre, 2015). finally, a public-private partnership should be considered in which the indonesian government conducts the exploration and then sells or leases out the site to private developers to build and operate the plant. such a model is used in turkey (ifc, 2013, p.29). they could also consider mandating utilities to derive a certain percentage of electricity provided from geothermal sources. this program might lead utilities to seek power supplies from geothermal sources, increasing private-sector investment in geothermal development (esmap, 2012, p.90). it is of course important to note that indonesia should leverage private over public investment for geothermal development to the greatest possible extent. the federal government has a multitude of priorities outside of geothermal development. large and consistent investments over the coming decades in infrastructure, education systems, health care, and a variety of industries (i.e. manufacturing and agriculture) are critical to develop indonesia’s economy, for which gdp per capita remains below us$4,000 as of 2016. 28 million people live with less than us$26.60 per month (indonesia investments, 2017). geothermal development should not distract the government from this extensive set of daunting challenges that will require innovative policies and government resources to tackle. hence, indonesia should focus on creating an environment in which private investors have confidence in the ability of geothermal energy to provide a sufficient financial return, thereby stimulating private investments. many of the recommendations listed here are focused on precisely this: the provision of tax incentives, introduction of insurance schemes, and creation of public-private partnerships are all policies that require limited government funding but provide strong incentives for companies to invest in geothermal development. c) government-driven political initiatives the enabling mechanisms for accelerated preliminary exploration have thus far been absent in indonesia. to address this inertia, the soe pertamina geothermal energy should be given authorization to be more extensively involved in drilling, potentially with federal funding. this would help alleviate resource development stasis, which is due to the aforementioned competing interests amongst the ministry of energy and mineral resources, the ministry of finance, and soes. governmental efforts should also be made to provide and disseminate updates to private developers regarding geothermal regulations and laws pertaining to environmental impact assessment, social license, and ceiling tariff schemes. while the new geothermal law (law nr. 21/2014) in theory opens up to development the 50% of indonesian geothermal resources located within protected forest areas and national parks, all government ministries must implement this change to their own regulations in order for it to have any impact. therefore, the consilience fan and nam: indonesian geothermal development ministry of forestry should prioritize the changing of its regulations to declassify geothermal as a mining activity, given the significantly reduced impact of geothermal energy development upon the environment (as outlined in section ic) relative to traditional mining activities. such regulatory changes should necessarily include the stipulation that award of geothermal licenses is conditional upon comprehensive environmental and social impact assessments, emphasizing any potential estimated impacts upon forest ecosystems and indigenous tribes. principles applying to international tendering processes should be applied to the indonesian geothermal project tendering practices. indeed, the aforementioned poor quality of geothermal data available during the tendering process can be attributed to a corresponding lack of standardization in this regard throughout the country. the indonesian government should establish a technically qualified central tender committee to conduct tenders on behalf of local governments. while such an entity would require significant technical assistance, it has been stated that bilateral donors would be highly interested to provide such assistance. meanwhile, a balance would be struck between the interests of the central federal government and local governments by appointing a local government representative to the committee (adb, 2015, p. 106). however, if the federal government wishes for pertamina and pertamina geothermal energy to play a meaningful role in national geothermal development, the demand that they compete with other soe’s in terms of equity returns alone should be removed. specifically, the ministry of soe’s should consider setting up a benchmark for the equity returns for geothermal projects separate from that of oil and gas projects so that the former does not compete with the latter, as geothermal cannot compete with oil and gas in such singular terms as soe equity returns. this would demonstrate the federal government’s recognition of the broader, positive socioeconomic returns to the country due to geothermal investment, which are not necessarily apparent in such a narrow measure of profitability (adb, 2015, p. 107). finally, it is crucial for the federal government to rectify the lack of human capital and build institutional expertise in the geothermal sector. one solution would be to renew the geothermal capacity building program (or implement a program of a similar nature in its place), which was terminated in 2015. a pioneering indonesiansupported program between indonesia and the us, the program trained geothermal scientists and engineers and was an international collaboration that strengthened networks amongst federal government agencies, academic institutions, soes, and private companies, including the ministry of energy and mineral resources, the bandung institute of technology (itb) and other indonesian universities, the university of southern california, the united states agency for international development (usaid), star energy, pertamina geothermal energy, and other private geothermal developers operating in indonesia (smillie et. al., 2015, p. 1). the program facilitated the establishment of an advisory board, a scholarship for the geothermal master’s program at itb, a geothermal seminar program consisting of 5 seminars in 5 indonesian cities (with a total of 1300 participants), and a “train the trainers” program, which built the capacity of indonesian university lecturers and local government officials (smillie et. al., 2015, p. 3-6). the program doubled in the 122 consilience average number of masters students enrolled per year in geothermal-related disciplines from 2012-2015, while the percentage of women increased from 14.0% to 26.4% in what is traditionally a highly male-dominated program and field. furthermore, improvements were made to the understanding amongst indonesian practitioners of geothermal systems, exploration, development, and utilization, in addition to resource assessment methodology, environmental analysis, and impact assessment (smillie et. al., 2015, p. 8). were the program to be reinstated, the collaboration could be strengthened by developing a research consortium with industry, improving teaching and curriculum guides, and increasing student support in the form of scholarships, industry networking, and employment opportunities (smillie et. al., 2015, p. 8). consilience fan and nam: indonesian geothermal development references: beesley, a. et al. 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(2011). is global warming mainly due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions? energy sources, part a: recovery, utilization, and environmental effects, 33(21), 1985. consilience fan and nam: indonesian geothermal development appendix i while indonesia is typically cited as possessing 40% of global geothermal potential, this estimate relies upon estimates from a 2013 study by the geological agency of indonesia, which arrived upon 29 gw from an assessment of approximately 300 sites (geological agency, 2013). this study, however relied upon a flawed methodology, in which estimates of some reserves (energy that can be exploitable given current economic conditions) were double-counted as resources (energy that may become exploitable, given future economic conditions and/or technological developments). this is problematic because sites were being classified as both reserves and resources, after which the total of the 2 categories were summed, resulting in an inflated estimate. fauzi applies a more realistic methodology and arrives upon the estimate of 24 gw. considering that the estimated global geothermal potential is 70gw (a conservative figure from bertani (2009), which precludes the possibility of technological development of enhanced geothermal systems, which could double this figure), indonesia’s estimated proportion of the global geothermal potential then becomes the slightly lower, albeit still substantial figure of 34.3%. microsoft word burr.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 16, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 106-131 wild bees in the city: reimagining urban spaces for native bee health andrea burr saint louis university, center for sustainability aburr1@slu.edu nicole schaeg saint louis university, center for sustainability schaegnl@slu.edu paige muñiz saint louis university, department of biology pmuniz@slu.edu gerardo r. camilo saint louis university, department of biology camilogr@slu.edu damon m. hall saint louis university, center for sustainability dmhall@slu.edu figure 1. st. louis, missouri north corridor urban community garden. consilience burr, et al.: reimagining urban spaces for native bee health abstract bees (hymenoptera: apoidea) are critical to crop production globally. in the last decade, significant declines in managed and native bee health have been documented, and it is now widely considered a “crisis.” the potential causes of reduced wild bee health (species richness and abundance) relate to land-use decisions, practices, and management including habitat fragmentation, lack of foraging resources, pesticides, pests, and disease. recent studies of native bees found diverse communities in cities around the world. this interdisciplinary pilot study investigates relationships between bee health and urban landuses. it joins ecological and social science field research to examine linkages between native bee health and socio-cultural drivers of urban land-use decision-making practices to understand (1) what explains findings of diverse bee species in cities and (2) how citizens can encourage the enhancement of habitat for native bee conservation. to establish a baseline for monitoring species’ diversity and abundance, wild bees were sampled weekly at designated urban farms, community gardens, and prairie pockets located in st. louis, missouri, usa from 2013 to 2015. to learn the social dynamics effecting management at the biologically sampled sites, ethnographic interviews were conducted in the summer of 2015 with 30 decision-makers. informants described bees’ role in crop yield, quality, and quantity; reported planting to attract them; and spoke of the city as viable for habitat, which is relevant to urban conservation and policy. this essay reflects on these conversations with images captured at the research sites to understand the rich urban social-ecological tapestry toward informing future research and development approaches. keywords: sustainability science, sustainable development, pollinator health, pollinator crisis, social-ecological systems, urban ecology consilience 108 introduction: urban bees bee health, a policy-friendly expression of bee species richness and abundance, is in decline globally and recognized as a crisis by governments, the scientific community, and the general public [1–9]. specifically, bees (hymenoptera: apoidea) are the most effective of animal pollinators and are critical both ecologically and economically to wild and managed crops worldwide [1–5]. in the united states, there are more than 4,000 species of native bees that work alongside the european honeybee in pollinating our fruits and vegetables [10]. declines in wild bee diversity and abundance, first noted in 2006, have been linked to increased urbanization and land-use intensification through habitat disturbance, fragmentation, and loss, resulting in reduced and sporadic availability of foraging resources and viable nesting locations [1, 3–5, 11]. for wild bees (figure 2), research in urban contexts is a recent phenomenon, and it is primarily being conducted in the young field of urban ecology. these studies find that cities can function as biological havens for community composition, richness, and abundance [1, 2, 4, 5, 12, 14]. researchers are finding surprisingly diverse communities of wild bees in cities around the world such as berlin, germany [14], cardiff and london in the uk [15–17], melbourne, australia [18], guanacaste province, costa rica [19], vancouver, canada [20], chicago, il [21], new york city, ny [22,23], phoenix, az [24], and san francisco, ca in the usa [25]. managed habitats on the urban to suburban gradient such as residential yards, community gardens, urban farms, public parks, and cemeteries provide much needed resources for nesting and foraging [22, 26–30]. for example, urban areas afford diverse nesting sites ranging from bare soils, plant stems, trees, and leaf piles to cavity-nest sites located in walls, fences, porches, and building crevices, which species, such as bumblebees, successfully colonize [13, 16, 20– 22, 31]. in cities, forage too is often abundant and as diverse as its people. studies reveal that the consistent driver of bee health is the presence and availability of flowers for foraging [4, 5, 17]. this suggests that conservation efforts aimed at increasing the floral resources in cities can have a positive impact on improving bee species richness and abundance [4, 5]. consilience burr, et al.: reimagining urban spaces for native bee health figure 2. agopostemon virescens, a native bee in st. louis, missouri. urban redevelopment efforts historically prioritize economic opportunities and outcomes. however, findings from urban ecology suggest planners reconsider the urban core as an interconnected social-ecological system that generates a myriad of ecosystem services offering possibilities for biodiversity conservation [4, 5, 12, 30–33]. fragmented and disturbed metropolitan environments serve as patchy yet vital resources, capable of supporting wild bee populations. as the amount of people living in cities globally grows to nearly 67% by 2050 [4, 5, 35], additional pressures on landscapes, infrastructure, and services will be realized in urban areas [35]. we argue for a reimagining of “the city.” both sustainability science and sustainable development play key roles in facilitating urban transitions toward sustainability [4]. sustainability science is a young field [4, 36–38], aspiring to research where scientists from different disciplines collaborate with decision-makers and key stakeholders for the co-production of knowledge for sustainability [37–41]. our pilot study investigates relationships between wild bee health and urban land-uses, as humans are the most dominant shapers of the urban landscape [4, 5, 42]. it conceives to inform sustainability science [36], with empirical case studies to further advance the relationship between knowledge and transitions toward sustainability [4, 5, 43, 44]. more broadly, our research contributes to understanding native bee population declines, by examining the bee health crises via integrated biophysical and social lenses, to view differently urbanization and policy. this is a necessary step for scientists to help society develop consilience 110 empirically-grounded policies and best practices for improving native bee health [4]. figure 3. st. louis, missouri north corridor urban prairie pocket. in the following sections, we summarize the literature on drivers of land-use decisionmaking, management, and practices; detail the interdisciplinary research methods we utilized; and discuss how informant insights shaped future approaches for both biophysical and social scientific research efforts. socio-cultural drivers of urban land-use: humannature connections with increasing population and urbanization, human interactions with nature are changed. as urban living comes to dominate the human-nature experience, pyle (1978) and miller (2005) categorize the progressive decoupling and decline of the human-nature exchange in the urban setting as the “extinction of experience,” characterized by a fragmented, wildlife ‘empty’ landscape which negatively impacts sense of place [12, 32]. this does not mean, however, that cities preclude positive interactions with nature. the post-industrial urban environment is now being recognized for its ecological functions, including cultural ecosystem services (educational, emotional, social) vital to human health and well-being, and biodiversity conservation [12, 47, 51, 52]. residential and community gardens have been depicted as key to facilitating a positive urban human-nature experience, providing the desired aesthetic, recreational, and spiritual connections while influencing behavior to be more ‘wildlife-friendly’ [51–54]. multiple studies reinforce the direct consilience burr, et al.: reimagining urban spaces for native bee health and substantial impacts cultural ecosystem services and the urban natural environment have on quality of life, physical health, and mental well-being; fostering deep connections with nature; increasing conservation awareness; and strengthening sense of place [22, 26, 51, 53–60]. figure 4. st. louis, missouri south corridor urban community garden. household income and the urban landscape the socioeconomic makeup of an urban environment influences land management and decision-making practices [61]. landscaping investments for yards, common grounds, and public spaces demonstrate social status and identity, correlating closely with investments in home and neighborhood values [51, 54, 62, 63]. financial resources can play an instrumental role influencing biodiversity in the urban environment. increases in plant, insect, and animal species’ richness and abundance have been linked to increases in personal and disposable income; this has been called the ‘luxury effect’ [61, 64]. for higher income households, as hierarchical and dietary needs are met, landscaping and gardening preferences shift to incorporate aesthetically-pleasing ornamental plantings and traditional garden varieties, which in turn affects maintenance activities and expenditures [51, 54, 57–59, 63, 64]. this extends to community gardens as well: as gardeners’ socioeconomic resources expand, their planting choices change, evolving plot composition from primarily food and medicinal staples to a mix of food, medicinal, and ornamental vegetation [58]. reference group behavior and urban spaces many western urban lands have inherited garden aesthetics exemplified by a structured, manicured landscape devoid of wildness [47, 51, 62, 65]. in western cultures, the desire to emulate and perpetuate this socially constructed residential yard consilience 112 ideal reflects the profound influence reference group behavior and social norms have on environmental management decisions and practices at the individual, neighborhood, and community scales [51, 53, 61, 62]. reference group behavior is an informal institution [66] of internalized beliefs, values, and shared norms which influence and shape behavior, manifesting as an ‘ecology of prestige’ in which those group beliefs, values, and norms are translated into value-laden public landscaping choices [61]. the physical indicators of active neighborhood norms, ‘cues to care,’ are signaled by neat, orderly fenced properties with mown turf grass, trimmed bushes, and well-maintained flower beds [67]. how the ecology of prestige influences perceptions of front lawns versus backyards varies, suggesting that public-facing front landscaping follows the local or neighborhood norms as a symbolic expression of respect, pride in membership, and as a preemptive measure against social exclusion (figure 5), whereas backyard spaces are private areas to express meaningful personal choices which may diverge from normative ideals (fig. 6) [51, 54, 62, 63]. backyard landscaping was subjected to much less scrutiny for adherence to the shared lawn paradigm, lending itself to the articulation of an individual’s vision for private outdoor spaces [51, 65]. figures 5 and 6. st. louis, missouri residential landscapes surrounding the pilot study sites. aesthetic concerns are dominant in molding property owner activities [63] as one study found 80% of surveyed respondents reported it was their ‘duty’ to uphold neighborhood landscape norms [54]. suburban residential front yards located near one another are strongly influenced by neighborhood norms first, resulting in a ‘mimicry’ effect (fig. 5), and by broader normative conventions second [62, 63, 68]. additionally, the motivations fueled by the ecology of prestige are evident in the widespread, intensive use of fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides as levers to manage collective landscape standards [69, 70]. people expect green, scenic, accessible surroundings restricted to consilience burr, et al.: reimagining urban spaces for native bee health the parameters of a human-dominated environment, resulting in a constrained vision of aesthetics consistently prioritized above ecological and conservation considerations [47, 54, 60, 62, 65, 71]. the role of informal and formal institutions the shapes of the urban land uses are codified and actualized through both formal and information institutions. crawford and ostrom (1995) define an institution as the system for structuring and reinforcing human action either informally or formally via rules, norms, and shared strategies. informal institutions are exemplified by ‘bottom up’ individual, neighborhood, and community customs and social norms, which drive decision-making activities and actions [51, 53,59]. in residential landscapes, informal collective approaches have been used successfully for conservation and demonstrate the valuable role such grassroots efforts can play in reducing habitat patch isolation and improving biodiversity in the urban matrix [72]. leveraging such institutions presents opportunities for engagement, knowledge generation, and wildlife conservation in urban residential contexts [26, 27, 53, 58]. formal institutions range from national to local agencies and organizations with the accompanying governance, policies, codes, and restrictions. all establish and enforce standards on a wide range of land-use and management criteria, such as vegetation composition and maximum permissible plant heights for residential landscapes, common grounds, and public spaces [51]. known as ‘top down’ mechanisms, these can improve biodiversity in metropolitan environments through ‘commandand-control’ restrictions [53, 59, 73]. in summary, the literature identifies how each of these sociocultural drivers may impact landuse and decision-making practices from fine to broad scales in the urban environment. as the world’s urban centers continue to grow, exploring and understanding how well these theories predict outcomes in the coupled human-nature environment is not only relevant but also critical for informing sustainable development, urban policy, and conservation initiatives. interdisciplinary research approaches utilizing social-ecological sampling this pilot research study examines the linkages between wild bee health and the sociocultural dimensions of urban land-use decision-making practices in post-industrial cities [4]. the methodology is designed to inform transformational sustainability science [4, 37], which has called for more consilience 114 empirical case studies to further advance the relationship between knowledge and transitions toward sustainability [4, 41, 44]. figures 7 and 8. saint louis university interdisciplinary researchers in the lab and field in 2015. because the city is a social-ecological system, we developed an interdisciplinary design for connecting social and biophysical data in a pilot project of st. louis, missouri [4]. to establish a baseline for long-term monitoring of species’ diversity and abundance, we began wild bee sampling at 15 sites weekly at a rate of one-person sampling per hour per 0.25 hectare. sample sites include urban farms, community gardens, and urban prairie pockets located within city boundaries with the exception of a farm in ferguson, missouri. research sites span the range of socioeconomic and cultural perspective across the city (figs. 9 and 10). all bees were collected via aerial netting, preserved, and identified to species. voucher specimens were deposited in the enns entomological museum, university of missouri, columbia. the results of the bee sampling are being analyzed (camilo et al. forthcoming). to initiate linking biophysical findings to land-use practices, we conducted 30 ethnographic semi-structured interviews with the land managers of each site. to provide a broader perspective on bee health in the region and to connect to other local actors, we interviewed local experts on insect pollinator health research and outreach programming. consilience burr, et al.: reimagining urban spaces for native bee health st. louis city corridor geo-demographic characterizations figure 9. arcgis map of st. louis, missouri with the 15 sampling sites located within north, central, and south corridors. source: n. schaeg, 2016. st. louis, missouri is the eighteenth largest metropolitan statistical area in the united states. it is representative of a postindustrial city whose urban core has experienced net population loss from its peak of 856,796 in 1950 to 319,365 in 2010 [74], with property and land vacancies standing at 19.4% [75]. st. louis is representative of 92 us shrinking cities. due to land availability, shrinking cities are likely to serve pilot roles for urban native bee conservation practices within the pollinator action plan [76]. this research seeks to inform urban planning by exploring how land-use decision-makers and stakeholders can be engaged for a national strategy for increasing and improving bee health in urban areas. as all urban ecosystems are embedded within cultural landscapes [42], historical socioeconomic norms consilience 116 and the politics of power account for today’s distribution of people and the landscapes they shape. the 15 sites are located within three designated geographic corridors of the city: north, central, and south (see figures 9 and 10). the three zones are administrative artifacts of the city, which delineate the significant land-use and population differences characterizing each area (fig. 10). according to the 2010 us census bureau data, st. louis has a total estimated population of 319,365, of which 43.9% are caucasian and 49.2% are africanamerican. in terms of education, 82.9% of the residents have obtained a high school diploma or the equivalent, while only 29.6% have achieved a bachelor’s degree or higher [75]. the median household income is $34,582, with a corresponding homeownership rate of 44.6% [75]. single-parent families make up 24.3% of the st. louis city households [75]. the poverty rate is estimated at 27.4% [75]. overall property and land vacancies stand at 19.4% [75]. these socioeconomic attributes are clustered throughout the corridors as the following characterizations will describe. figure 10. esri tapestry™ maps of st. louis, missouri north, central, and south corridors. consilience burr, et al.: reimagining urban spaces for native bee health to better see the demographic differences across the corridors, we used esri’s tapestry™ geodemographic market segmentation tool to characterize neighborhoods at the u.s. census block group level. geodemographic tools have been applied in a variety of fields, including community policing [77, 78], health screening [79, 80], education [81, 82], regional planning [83], and urban ecology [61], and use census and consumer market data to characterize spatiallyexplicit groups based on socioeconomic structures, consumption practices, and lifestyle factors [84]. esri’s tapestry™ system relies on census 2010, american community survey, experian’s consumerview database, and other consumer surveys to generate over 60 variables used to classify us neighborhoods into 67 market segments and 14 lifemode summary groups [85]. lifemode groups are based on traits such as median age, average education level, median annual household income, residential neighborhood/property age, homeownership rates, and levels of employment (fig. 2). characterizing residents into classification schemes infer that similar people live in similar places and behave similarly [86], this can be used as a general approach for designing communications about native bee conservation with residential audiences [84]. methods: naturalistic inquiry we conducted a total of 30 semi-structured interviews [cf. 45] with land-use decision-makers representing our 15 biophysical bee sampling sites to understand (1) local planting choices of land-use decision-makers; (2) how decision-makers communicate about bees; (3) how decisionmakers value urban wild bees; (4) what informants identify as best practices for increasing wild bee habitat; and (5) what decision-makers perceive as facilitators and barriers for implementing habitat protection measures on their properties and regionally. informants were recruited based on expertise and association with the sites as decisionmakers. during the interview each respondent was asked to characterize the site, detail its plantings and composition, describe the decision-making processes and timing, articulate potential formal and informal institutions impacting planting land-use decisions, provide their observations and interactions with urban pollinators, as well as respond to probes for understanding the scope and quality of the provisioning ecosystem services bees provide. informants were also asked to comment on the global pollinator health crisis, what potential solutions they envision at local and regional scales both individually and by others via government programs, ordinances, or land-use measures, and then to articulate possible barriers to the identified solutions. finally, at the conclusion of the interview, respondents were asked to reflect on the interview consilience 118 session and convey what was most important to them. many of the interviews were conducted at or adjacent to a garden site and often the informant provided a post-interview guided tour during which photographs were taken. all interviews were digitally audio recorded, transcribed by trained student transcriptionists following a standardized protocol [87–89], and stored in a password-protected qsr nvivo 10.0 qualitative analytic database software for analysis. additional informants were identified using snowball sampling with an effort to ensure the diversity of voices across the bee sampling sites [90]. participants were grouped into four categories: urban farms, community gardens, prairie pockets, and experts. after completion of the interviews, we conducted content analysis of data within the 14 recurring themes inductively developed [87, 91], which enabled a schema for identifying key points of correlation between reported land-use management practices and sampling observation data. figure 11. st. louis, missouri north corridor urban farm. results and discussion recasting the urban environment we analyzed interview transcripts to understand how the urban environment can be enhanced for bee conservation from the informants’ perspectives. 77% of the participants articulated visions of a reimagined urban environment viable for wildlife habitat and biodiversity conservation. the participants described the urban environment as viable for bees and their habitat while rejecting the dominant narratives of diminished post-industrial lands and absent wildlife as a foregone conclusion. the conversational evidence indicated the socio-cultural drivers of the urban human-nature experience, reference group behavior, and informal and formal institutions as factors that influence urban land-use and decision-making practices. consilience burr, et al.: reimagining urban spaces for native bee health the informants expressed both the tensions and conundrums experienced due to the interplay of these socio-cultural drivers as they seek to reconstruct urban notions of nature from wildlife ‘empty’ spaces to ecologically rich social systems. [what’s important is] individuals creating as healthy of an ecosystem as they possibly can. even if that means just a small, little, 10’ x 10’ lot in somebody’s front yard or not even a front yard just some lot down the street that nobody’s doing anything with. we live in a big city and a lot of times people think that it’s divided from the natural ecosystem--that it’s separate from the natural ecosystem and it’s not. we’re animals just like anything else; the city that we live in is an ecosystem. so individuals taking responsibility for that and trying to make it as healthy as possible for themselves and everything else that lives in it [is important]—‘cause it’s not just us (urban farmer). the participants’ ability to translate concepts of the reimagined urban landscape into tangible action, such as planting native flowers and plants, mowing lawns less frequently, and allowing “wildness” into their yards, community gardens, and public green spaces to support bees, provides not only concrete representation of those concepts but an opportunity to mediate the socio-cultural drivers in the public sphere. as the following quotes reveal, informants described how these efforts influenced common demonstrations of reference group behavior. you know, planting native plants, the focus is, ‘yes we’ve always wanted to make our community look more beautiful,’ but planting native plants helps us do that, it also helps provide benefits for beneficial wildlife, to birds and bees, pollinators (expert). we had some areas in our park, like, this very swampy area [where] all that was growing there was weeds. and so, it seemed like a nice place to put [the urban native prairie pocket] which was somewhat experimental for us because, as you’ll see, our park is very formal and very formally landscaped. a native plant garden is a little bit more wild, so it seemed like a good place to put something like that. people have been very receptive [of the native prairie pocket] … one thing is, because it’s a formal park with our native plant garden, the city actually has this granitelimestone used for curb—i think it’s the same stuff that they used to pave the street with—and that’s what we use for the border of the garden. so that makes it kind of a wild, but kind of a formal, and then we’re going to put up a sign that identifies all the plants (urban prairie pocket gardener). consilience 120 figure 12. st. louis, missouri south corridor prairie pocket. participants reported that the processes to develop and establish native habitat in a variety of forms and settings encouraged them to engage and advocate informally with neighbors and fellow gardeners, as well as more formally with homeowners’ associations and various local and state agencies. our conversations revealed the tensions between the participants’ initiatives to translate their visions into meaningful action; the prevalence of established reference group behavior symbolically represented in manicured residential landscapes and public green spaces; as well as the widespread informal and formal institutions, such as neighborhood planting norms and municipal ordinances, undergirding and reinforcing prevailing aesthetics. the resulting passages articulate the everyday challenges informants encountered. we could definitely have less stringent municipal codes about nuisance vegetation, which is considered to be anything taller than like seven inches that’s not a bush or a tree or something. that’s, i think, the code in a lot of places – i mean it would be wonderful if we had front yard prairies instead of just front yard turf grass (urban farmer). when we first were in the garden, weeds were like the complete enemy. but i think now maybe sometimes the weeds aren’t always such a bad thing, like the vines that grow on the side of the wall. whereas most people in buildings that are functioning don’t want vines growing on their walls, that is a natural thing that draws different pollinators perhaps and so the wildness, letting kind of the wild things grow a little bit in an area or a garden, while it may look a little wild, it may be consilience burr, et al.: reimagining urban spaces for native bee health important for this ecosystem of bugs to really function properly (urban community gardener). figures 13 and 14. examples of urban ‘wildness’ in the north corridor. when i look at a mowed park pond, it’s like this might be peaceful-looking but i don’t necessarily think, oh it’s beautiful. if i see a healthy, functioning wetland with a bunch of pickerelweed and arrowhead and i can hear frogs, i think, wow that is beautiful you know; and it’s because of what i know about that system and the value it has to me. and so i’d like to think that is where [it] is important for people to understand what the value is to them but also in a larger sense outside of themselves--and then that kind of directs their sense of aesthetics (expert). building on the socio-cultural driver of the urban humannature experience, which is the aesthetic, recreational, and spiritual connections people have with the environment, participants described personal satisfaction and positive feedback received from noticeable increases in bees’ presence as reinforcing connections with nature, sense of place, and additional motivation for their efforts. what i’ve noticed is that i have a lot of bees in the garden. it takes me awhile to get back there to weed, pull out the non-native stuff that i don’t want. but last summer when i was doing that, i could just hear all of these bees buzzing around me [laughter] (urban community gardener). consilience 122 figure 15. st. louis, missouri central corridor urban community garden. there’s something that’s very subjective about the impact that it has on the human condition for somebody that’s living in an urban environment to be able to go access a space that’s in the middle of a residential area and feel like you’re in nature. so i guess that could be a missing piece. it’s basically like, what does the presence of pollinators give back to someone’s spirit and sense of well-being, and how important is that when you decide what to plant and how (expert). conclusion this interdisciplinary pilot research study investigates the connections between wild bee health and the socio-cultural dimensions of urban land-use and decision-making practices in the post-industrial city. the biophysical sampling data (camilo et al., forthcoming) will serve to benchmark urban bee diversity and abundance in st. louis, missouri that we will use to guide our ongoing research efforts. the ethnographic data reveals participants’ unique knowledge of and aspirations for the urban environment, especially when considering its viability for wild bee habitat. the socio-cultural drivers of the urban human-nature experience, reference group behavior, and informal and formal institutions shape participants’ urban land-use and decision making practices, often functioning in aggregate to exert influence. examining these conversations develops our understanding of the informants’ collective conceptualizations of nature in the urban setting. recasting the urban landscape as a refuge for bee habitat and biodiversity conservation is captured by participants’ perceptions of future possibilities for nature integrated into the urban environment despite any impaired surroundings, challenges, or uncertainties of governance. by extension, it demonstrates the value of conducting research in the socialecological systems framework. it offers a route to inform urban sustainable development efforts via engaging landuse decisionmakers and key stakeholders around local and national policy consilience burr, et al.: reimagining urban spaces for native bee health (e.g., pollinator action plan’s national strategy) for increasing and improving bee health in urban areas. a more socially robust understanding of the city from the bee’s perspective can inform policy-specific research approaches involving urban privateproperty owners in facilitating insect pollinator habitat enhancement, using sustainability science approaches to cocreate knowledge and outcomes deemed salient, legitimate, and credible [37–40] that work for each unique setting. figures 16 and 17. examples of native planting spaces to support pollinator health in st. louis urban community gardens. figure 18. st. louis, missouri north corridor urban community garden. consilience 124 acknowledgements the authors wish to acknowledge our study participants and the work of angela myers, rebecca tonietto, and the billiken bee lab: chris banotai, rena black, rachel brandt, arjun chandra, collin edwards, ken fujita, matthew greg, james harris, ji-hye kim, durga kullkanda, tierra lillard, haley leatherbarrow, lauren merchant, gabrielle pouncil, amanda sebesta, daniel starvos, rebecca tipton, rebecca tonietto, alex vavra, david wilton, and paul winiecki. this research was supported by missouri department of conservation, saint louis university's presidents' research fund award #8867, the beaumont development award, saint louis university diversity fellowship, and the center for sustainability. consilience burr, et al.: reimagining urban spaces for native bee health references 1. cariveau, d. p., & winfree, r. 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(2002). asking, listening, and telling. qualitative communication research methods, 170-208 microsoft word 1 1-15 mishra final formatted.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 10, iss. 1 (2013), pp. 1 – 15 wastewater treatment and reuse: sustainability options dr. seetharam chittoor jhansi (ph. d.) gujarat research society’s pushpa navnit shah centre for lifelong learning dr. madhuri shah campus, mumbia, india email: drscjhansi@yahoo.co.in dr. santosh kumar mishra (ph. d.) department of continuing and adult education and extension work s. n. d. t. women's university, mumbai, india email: drskmishrain@yahoo.com abstract water is one of the world’s most valuable resources, yet it is under constant threat due to climate change and resulting drought, explosive population growth, and waste. one of the most promising efforts to stem the global water crisis is industrial and municipal water reclamation and reuse. the watereuse association defines reused, recycled, or reclaimed water as “water that is used more than one time before it passes back into the natural water cycle.” thus, water recycling is the reuse of treated wastewater for beneficial purposes such as agricultural and landscape irrigation, industrial processes, toilet flushing, or replenishing a groundwater basin (referred to as groundwater recharge). water reuse allows communities to become less dependent on groundwater and surface water sources and can decrease the diversion of water from sensitive ecosystems. additionally, water reuse may reduce the nutrient loads from wastewater discharges into waterways, thereby reducing and preventing pollution. this ‘new’ water source may also be used to replenish overdrawn water sources and rejuvenate or reestablish those previously destroyed. the objective of the present paper is to give insight into the appropriate technology for treatment of wastewater. the paper discusses sustainable wastewater treatment systems in the context of urban areas of the developing world. the paper concludes that, “since the urban areas of many developing countries are growing rapidly, ecological sanitation systems must be implemented that are sustainable and have the ability to adapt and grow with the community’s sanitation needs.” in order to determine the appropriate treatment system, the developer must consider the area’s climate, topography, and socioeconomic factors. keywords: developing countries, ecological engineering, high efficiency production, sustainable wastewater treatment & reuse, urban areas, and environmental quality. 1. introducion water scarcity and water pollution are crucial issues in today’s world. one of the ways to reduce the impact of water scarcity and pollution is to expand water and 2 consilience wastewater reuse. the increasing scarcity of water in the world along with rapid population increase in urban areas gives rise to concern about appropriate water management practices. in the context of trends in urban development, wastewater treatment deserves greater emphasis. currently, there is a growing awareness of the impact of sewage contamination on rivers and lakes. accordingly, wastewater treatment is now receiving greater attention from the world bank and government regulatory bodies. urban wastewater treatment has received less attention compared to ‘water supply & treatment.’ water scarcity coupled with the bursting seams of our cities and towns have taken a toll on our health and environment. the sewage contamination of our lakes, rivers, and domestic water bodies has reached dangerous levels and is being recognized by leading organizations like the world bank. the current urban wastewater management system is a linear treatment system that is based on disposal. the traditional system needs to be transformed into a sustainable, closed-loop urban wastewater management system that is based on the conservation of water and nutrient resources. a huge loss of life-supporting resources is the result of failed organic wastewater recovery. a wastewater management team is well equipped to create a wastewater management strategy that will result in the reduction of pathogens in surface and groundwater to improve public health. in a developing urban society, the wastewater generation usually averages 3070 cubic meters per person per year. in a city of one million people, the wastewater generated would be sufficient to irrigate approximately 1500-3500 hectare. this urban epidemic needs to be tackled ecologically because of so many pressing issues that are afflicting our waste management process: § new immigrants to cities have low incomes and cannot afford municipal amenities like waste disposal and sanitary functions; § in developing countries, approximately 300 million urban residents have no access to sanitation; § approximately two-thirds of the population in the developing world has no hygienic means of disposing excreta and an even greater number lack adequate means of disposing of total waste water; § it is often an acceptable practice to discharge untreated sewage directly into the bodies of water. according to the world bank, “the greatest challenge in the water and sanitation sector over the next two decades will be the implementation of low cost sewage treatment that will at the same time permit selective reuse of treated effluents for agricultural and industrial purposes” (green arth, 2012). it is crucial that sanitation systems have high levels of hygienic standards to prevent the spread of disease. other treatment goals include: o the recovery of nutrient and water resources for reuse in agricultural production; o reducing the overall user-demand for water resources. consilience jhansi & mishra: wastewater treatment in order to achieve ecological wastewater treatment, a “closed-loop treatment system” is recommended. many present day systems use a “disposal-based linear system.” the traditional linear treatment systems must be transformed into the cyclical treatment to promote the conservation of water and nutrient resources. using organic waste nutrient cycles, from “point-of-generation” to “point-ofproduction,” closes the resource loop and provides a better approach for the management of valuable wastewater resources. failing to recover organic wastewater from urban areas means a huge loss of life-supporting resources that, instead of being used in agriculture for food production, fill rivers with polluted water. the development of ecological wastewater management strategies will contribute to the reduction of pathogens in surface and groundwater to improve public health. the goal of ecological engineering, in this particular context, is to attain: § high environmental quality, § high yields in food and fiber, § good quality/high efficiency production, and § full utilization of wastes. in the growing number of conflicts between agricultural and domestic use of scarce water resources, an increased use of treated wastewater for irrigation purposes is vital. based on extensive successful experience in canada and elsewhere on cost effective and environmentally sound practices of sludge application on agricultural land, there is tremendous potential for the safe disposal of sewage sludge on agricultural land. the objective of the present paper is to consider the appropriate technology for treatment of wastewater. it also discusses sustainable wastewater treatment systems in the context of urban areas of the developing world. 2. problem statement problems concerning water sanitation stem from the rise in urban migration and the practice of discharging untreated wastewater. the uncontrolled growth in urban areas has made planning and expansion of water and sewage systems very difficult and expensive to carry out. in addition, many of those moving to the city have low incomes, making it difficult to pay for any water system upgrades. 4 consilience industrial development has always been afflicted with the issue of residue disposal, and it has become accepted by all bodies of knowledge that industrial effluents are one of the largest sources of water pollution and one with the most lethal composition of toxins. the most popular and widespread industrial pollutants include: o asbestos : it is carcinogenic and its fibres can be inhaled and cause illnesses such as asbestosis, mesothelioma, lung cancer, intestinal cancer, and liver cancer. o lead : it is non-biodegradable and is hard to get rid of once it has permeated our environment. lead is harmful as it can inhibit the action of bodily enzymes. o mercury : it is also non-biodegradable, and mercury poisoning is a serious health hazard for humans and livestock. o nitrates & phosphates : it is one of the most common components in fertilizers and is often washed from the soil and into rivers and lakes. this can cause eutrophication, which can be very problematic to marine environments. o sulphur : it is extremely harmful for algae and other marine life. o oils : oil does not dissolve in water; instead it forms a thick layer on the water surface. this can prevent marine plants form receiving enough light for photosynthesis. it is also harmful for fish and marine birds. o petrochemicals : these are formed from gas or petrol and can be toxic to marine life. industrial effluents are the major source of toxins for groundwater. mega industrial parks require an in-plant waste segregation and pretreatments in lieu of a traditional central treatment of the combined park’s wastewater. figure 1: industrial wastewater. source: green arth (2012) the problem with the current treatment technologies is that they are not sustainable. the conventional centralized system flushes pathogenic bacteria out of the residential area, using large amounts of water, and often combines the domestic wastewater with rainwater, causing the flow of large volumes of pathogenic wastewater. in fact, the conventional sanitary system simply transforms a concentrated domestic health problem into a diffuse health problem for the entire settlement and/or region. in turn, the wastewater must be treated where the cost of treatment increases as the flow increases. the abuse of water use for diluting human excreta and transporting them away from settled areas is increasingly questioned and being considered unsustainable. another reason many treatment systems in developing countries are unsustainable and unsuccessful is that they were simply copied from western treatment systems without considering the appropriateness of the technology for the culture, land, and climate. often, local engineers educated in western development programs supported the choice of the inappropriate systems. many of the implemented installations were later abandoned due to the high cost of running the consilience jhansi & mishra: wastewater treatment system and repairs. on the other hand, conventional systems may even be technologically inadequate to handle the locally produced sewage. for example, in comparison to the us and europe, domestic wastewater in arid areas such as the middle east is up to five times more concentrated in the amount of oxygen demand per volume of sewage. 3. sustainable treatment and reuse of wastewater the uncontrolled disposal to the environment of municipal, industrial and agricultural liquid, solid, and gaseous wastes constitutes one of the most serious threats to the sustainability of human civilization by contaminating the water, land, and air and by contributing to global warming. with increasing population and economic growth, treatment and safe disposal of wastewater is essential to preserve public health and reduce intolerable levels of environmental degradation. in addition, adequate wastewater management is also required for preventing contamination of water bodies for the purpose of preserving the sources of clean water. effective wastewater management is well established in developed countries but is still limited in developing countries. in most developing countries, many people lack access to water and sanitation services. collection and conveyance of wastewater out of urban neighborhoods is not yet a service provided to all the population, and adequate treatment is provided only to a small portion of the collected wastewater. in slums and peri-urban areas throughout the world, it is common to see raw wastewater flowing in the streets. the inadequate water and sanitation service is the main cause of diseases in developing countries. in the year 2011, the population of the planet was 7 billion. population growth forecasts indicate rapid global population growth that will reach 9 billion in 2030. the forecasts also indicate that: o most of the population growth will occur in developing countries, while the population of developed countries will remain constant at about 1 billion; and o a strong migration from rural to urban areas will take place. considering the expected population growth and the order of priorities in the development of the water and sanitation sector in developing countries—water supply and sewerage first, and only then wastewater treatment—as well as the financial difficulties in these countries, it cannot be assumed that the current low percentage of the coverage of wastewater treatment in these countries will increase in the future, unless a new, innovative strategy is adopted and affordable wastewater treatment options are used. a key component in any strategy aimed at increasing the coverage of wastewater treatment should be the application of appropriate wastewater treatment technologies that are effective, simple to operate, and low cost (in investment and especially in operation and maintenance). appropriate technology processes are also more environment-friendly since they consume less energy and thereby have a positive impact on efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change. also, with 6 consilience modern design, appropriate technology processes cause less environmental nuisance than conventional processes—for example they produce lower amounts of excess sludge and their odor problems can be more effectively controlled. appropriate technology unit processes include (but are not limited to) the following: § preliminary treatment by rotating micro screens; § vortex grit chambers; § lagoons treatment (anaerobic, facultative and polishing), including recent developments in improving lagoons performance; § anaerobic treatment processes of various types, mainly, anaerobic lagoons, upflow anaerobic sludge blanket (uasb) reactors, anaerobic filters and anerobic piston reactor (par); § physicochemical processes of various types such as chemically enhanced primary treatment (cept); (vi) constructed wetlands; § stabilization reservoirs for wastewater reuse and other purposes; § overland flow; § infiltration-percolation; § septic tanks; and § submarine and large rivers outfalls. out of these processes, various combinations can be set up. combinations can also include some other simple processes such as sand filtration and dissolved air floatation (daf), which are not considered appropriate processes per se but are in fact appropriate processes. one interesting combined process is the generation of effluents suited for reuse in irrigation based on pretreatment by one of the mentioned unit processes followed by a stabilization reservoir. 4. results 4.1 appropriate treatment technology based on experience from past mistakes in sewage treatment technology, the definition of what is sustainable is clearer. developers should base the selection of technology upon specific site conditions and financial resources of individual communities. one approach to sustainability is through decentralization of the wastewater management system. this system consists of several smaller units serving individual houses, clusters of houses, or small communities. black and gray water can be treated or reused separately from the hygienically more dangerous excreta. non-centralized systems are more flexible and can adapt easily to the local conditions of the urban area as well as grow with the community as its population increases. this approach leads to treatment and reuse of water, nutrients, and byproducts of the technology (i.e. energy, sludge, and mineralized nutrients) in the direct location of the settlement. consilience jhansi & mishra: wastewater treatment communities must take great care when reusing wastewater, since both chemical substances and biological pathogens threaten public health as well as accumulate in the food chain when used to irrigate crops or in aquaculture. in most cases, industrial pollution poses a greater risk to public health than pathogenic organisms. therefore, more emphasis is being placed on the need to separate domestic and industrial waste and to treat them individually to make recovery and reuse more sustainable. the system must be able to isolate industrial toxins, pathogens, carbon, and nutrients. 4.2 sustainable treatment types now that the requirements for a sustainable wastewater treatment system have been presented, there are several options one can choose from in order to find the most appropriate technology for a particular region. this paper will discuss sustainable wastewater treatment systems including: a) lagoons/wetlands, b) usab (anaerobic digesters), and c) sat technologies. § lagoons and wetlands: in wetland treatment, natural forces (chemical, physical, and solar) act together to purify the wastewater, thereby achieving wastewater treatment. a series of shallow ponds act as stabilization lagoons, while water hyacinth or duckweed act to accumulate heavy metals. multiple forms of bacteria, plankton, and algae act to further purify the water. wetland treatment technology in developing countries offers a comparative advantage over conventional, mechanized treatment systems because the level of self-sufficiency, ecological balance, and economic viability is greater. the system allows for total resource recovery (rose, 1999). lagoon systems may be considered a low-cost technology if sufficient, non-arable land is available. however, the requirement of available land is not generally met in big cities. the demand for flat land is high for the expanding urban developments and agricultural purposes. the decision to use wetlands must consider the climate. there are disadvantages to the system that in some locations may make it unsustainable. some mechanical problems may include clogging with sprinkler and drip irrigation systems, particularly with oxidation pond effluent. biological growth (slime) in the sprinkler head, emitter orifice, or supply line causes plugging, as do heavy concentrations of algae and suspended solids. § anaerobic digestion: another treatment option available, if there is little access to land, is anaerobic digestion. anaerobic bacteria degrade organic materials in the absence of oxygen and produce methane and carbon dioxide. the methane can be reused as an alternative energy source (biogas). other benefits include a reduction of total bio-solids volume of up to 50-80 percent, and a final waste sludge that is biologically stable can serve as rich humus for agriculture. so far, anaerobic treatment has been applied in 8 consilience colombia, brazil, and india, replacing the more costly activated sludge processes or diminishing the required pond areas. various cities in brazil have shown an interest in applying anaerobic treatment as a decentralized treatment system for poor, sub-urban districts. the beauty of the anaerobic treatment technology is that it can be applied on a very small and very large scale. this makes it a sustainable option for a growing community. § soil aquifer treatment: sat (soil aquifer treatment) is a geopurification system where partially treated sewage effluent artificially recharges the aquifers and is then withdrawn for future use. by recharging through unsaturated soil layers, the effluent achieves additional purification before it is mixed with the natural groundwater. in water scarce areas, treated effluent becomes a considerable resource for improved groundwater sources. the gaza coastal aquifer management program includes treated effluents to strengthen the groundwater, in terms of both quantity and quality. with nitrogen reduction in the wastewater treatment plants, the recharged effluent has a potential to reduce the concentration of nitrates in the aquifer. in water scarce areas such as in the middle east and parts of southern africa, wastewater has become a valuable resource that, after appropriate treatment, becomes a commercially realistic alternative for groundwater recharge, agriculture, and urban applications. sat systems are inexpensive, efficient for pathogen removal, and are not highly technical to operate. most of the cost associated with an sat is for pumping the water from the recovery wells, which is usually $20-50 usd per m3. in terms of reductions, sat systems typically remove all bod, tss, and pathogenic organisms from the waste and tend to treat wastewater to a standard that would generally allow unrestricted irrigation. the biggest advantage of sat is that it breaks the pipe-topipe connection of directly reusing treated wastewater from a treatment plant. this is a positive attribute for those cultures where water reuse is taboo. the pretreatment requirements for sat vary depending on the purpose of groundwater recharge, sources of reclaimed water, recharge methods, and location. some may only need primary treatment or treatment in a stabilization pond. however, pretreatment processes should be avoided if they leave high algae concentrations in the recharge water. algae can severely clog the soil of the infiltration basin. while the water recovered from the sat system has much better water quality than the influent, it could still be lower quality than the native groundwater. therefore, the system should be designed and managed to avoid intrusion into the native groundwater and use only a portion of the aquifer. the distance between infiltration basins and wells or drains should be as large as possible, usually at least 45 to 106 m to allow for adequate soil-aquifer treatment. all the systems described allow for the reuse of treated wastewater in order to have a cyclic, sustainable system. these treated wastewaters provide essential plant nutrients (nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium) as well as trace nutrients. phosphorus is an especially important nutrient to recycle, as the phosphorus in chemical fertilizer comes from limited fossil sources. consilience jhansi & mishra: wastewater treatment 5. discussion 5.1 treated wastewater reuse wastewater reuse must meet certain controls: § first, wastewater treatment to reduce pathogen concentrations must meet the who (1989) guidelines; § second, crop restrictions must be specified to prevent direct exposure to those consuming uncooked crops as well as defining application methods (irrigation) that reduce the contact of wastewater with edible crops, § finally, control of human exposure is needed for workers, crop-handlers, and final consumers. benefits of safely recovering and reusing human wastes include the reduction in effluents to bodies of water and the opportunity to re-build soil with valuable organic matter. the nitrogen in reclaimed water can replace equal amounts of commercial fertilizer during the early to midseason crop-growing period (table-1). excessive nitrogen in the latter part of the growing period may be detrimental to many crops, causing excessive vegetative growth, delayed or uneven maturity, or reduced crop quality. 10 consilience s. no. country nutrient equivalent in commercial fertilizer applied (%) (assumes 50% loss of nitrogen due to volatilization) 1. kenya 136 2. tunisia 25 3. indonesia 49 4. zimbabwe 38 5. columbia 31 6. mexico 31 7. south africa 29 8. egypt 28 9. india 26 figure 2: nutrients in human waste compared to commercial fertilizer. source: worldwatch institute, 1998 5.2 strategies for implementing new treatment technology many countries have the problem of a severe water imbalance. this imbalance in water demand versus supply is due mainly to the relatively uneven distribution of precipitation, high temperatures, increased demands for irrigation, and the impacts of tourism. to alleviate water shortages, serious consideration must be given to wastewater reclamation and reuse. reclaimed wastewater can be used for a number of options including agricultural irrigation. a wastewater treatment developer must perform an appropriate risk assessment before implementing the reuse of wastewater. proper consideration of the health risks and quality restrictions must be a part of the assessment. sourcepoint measures rather than end of pipe solutions are essential. source-point measures require extensive industrial pre-treatment interventions, monitoring and control programs, and incentives for the community to not dispose of any harmful matter into the sewers (world bank, 2010). for the implementation and promotion of new technology, strategies must include local participation as well as municipal action. local participation is a positive and important growing trend in government projects. the participation must fit with the local population to meet particular local needs. local communities can contribute valid indigenous ideas for cost savings in the project. agreement on key issues between design engineers and the local residents is necessary early on in the project, and if local participation is extensive, capital costs can ultimately be reduced. according to the inter-american development bank, “citizen participation, properly channeled, generates savings, mobilizes financial and human resources, promotes equity and makes a decisive contribution to the strengthening of society and the democratic system.” there is a strong sense of ownership by members of the community in their projects. this pride in the new development helps to ensure the sustainability of the water supply and sanitation systems. once the project is implemented, local consilience jhansi & mishra: wastewater treatment participation contributes to the community’s confidence in the new technology and allows them to take on other challenges such as accessing financial aid for other infrastructure projects. on the governmental level, institutional strengthening is usually needed to assist small to medium-sized cities in dealing with new administrative and financial management responsibilities. one program that has been developed to address the problems associated with decentralization is riadel (local development research and action network). it is a network for sharing information about local community development in latin america, including decentralization and the training of social leaders and civil servants. 6. case study of peru peru’s ministry of housing, construction and sanitation has approved a series of policy guidelines supporting the promotion of wastewater reuse in the country for urban irrigation purposes. the guidelines are an outcome of the switch project, coordinated globally by ihe-unesco, and carried out in peru by local organizations in collaboration with the ministry of housing. they build on existing small-scale private wastewater treatment initiatives in the lima area, and are intended to result in the scaling-up of wastewater treatment reuse at a city and country level in order to make it a sustainable economic option (fabiola, 2010). whilst the initial scope will focus on the irrigation of urban green spaces (which lies within the ministry of housing’s area of competence), it is expected that the next step could involve the reuse of treated effluent in agriculture with the potential to expand to other productive uses at a later date. the private sector will play an important role in seizing the economic benefits of reusing treated wastewater in other sectors beyond the irrigation of urban green spaces and agriculture. this will prove particularly important on the peruvian coast, where there is a severe scarcity of fresh water resources. the most significant evidence of peru’s commitment to adopting wastewater reuse on a large scale is the pair of wastewater treatment plants currently being established at taboada and la chira, which are designed to treat 100% of lima’s wastewater flows by 2015. together, the plants will create more than 2 million m3/d of new capacity and will involve significant capital commitments from the private sector. the policy guidelines focus on following five key elements: o the inclusion of the reuse of treated wastewater for the irrigation of green urban areas in national water resource management; o the use of operationally and economically efficient treatment technologies; o the facilitation of the participation of public and private sectors as well as of communities and international organizations in the investment and development of sustainable treatment and reuse systems; o the promotion of citizens’ participation and access to information to ensure the transparency, control, and efficiency of reuse systems management; and o the strengthening of the capacity of the water sector in general in terms of treatment and reuse. 12 consilience priority activities include the drafting of a specific national strategy promoting wastewater reuse as well as a suitable institutional and legal framework, including the harmonization of existing laws and responsibilities within the water sector. the incorporation of sanitation quality standards for treated wastewater to be reused in the irrigation of green urban areas is also a priority. peru is also considering ways to use the clean development mechanism (cdm) in wastewater treatment systems in order to obtain certificates for emissions reduction (cer) as a way of financing such systems. 7. concluding remarks water has a precious value and each drop must be accounted-for in water scarce regions such as the middle east and north africa. therefore, wastewater has to be reclassified as a renewable water resource rather than waste as it helps increase water availability and, at the same time, prevents environmental pollution. utilization of this resource requires collection, treatment, and use of all generated wastewater. although reuse of wastewater is recognized in most water-scarce countries, the reuse of wastewater is still very low. once freshwater has been used for an economic or beneficial purpose, it is generally discarded as waste. in many countries, these wastewaters are discharged, either as untreated waste or as treated effluent, into natural waterways from which they are abstracted for further use after undergoing "self-purification" within the stream. through this system of indirect reuse, wastewater may be reused up to a dozen times or more before being discharged. such indirect reuse is common in the larger river systems of latin america. however, more direct reuse is also possible. this paper discussed several options to achieve sustainability in wastewater treatment. the first was by decentralizing the treatment rather than installing expensive sewer systems that combine and increase the volume of the waste. the next part discussed choosing an appropriate treatment technology for the community. the common characteristic of all of the described types is that they involve “zero-discharge technology.” this cyclical, rather than linear, approach includes the reuse of the treated effluent for agricultural reuse. the reuse of the wastewater decreases the money spent on fertilizers, and the resulting water is considered safe, since it has been treated for pathogens. to come to this point, the urban areas of many developing countries are growing rapidly, and ecological sanitation systems that are sustainable and have the ability to adapt and grow with the community’s sanitation needs must be developed. in order to decide what the appropriate treatment system is, the developer must consider the area’s climate, topography, and socioeconomic factors. to successfully implement the strategies for wastewater reuse, it is vitally necessary for institutional and policymaking capacities to be improved, public awareness of related issues to be increased, and appropriate financial mechanisms to be created. to sum up: a) water scarcity and water pollution pose a critical challenge in many developing countries; consilience jhansi & mishra: wastewater treatment b) in urban areas, it is becoming difficult for the authorities to manage water supply and wastewater; c) strategies for wastewater reuse can successfully improve urban water management. 14 consilience bibliography cavallini j. m., young l. e. (2002). integrated systems for the treatment and recycling of wastewater in latin america: reality and potential. pan american center for sanitary engineering and environmental sciences, idrcpaho/ hep/ cepis agreement. lima. csdlac (1977). pomona virus study final report. county sanitation districts of los angeles county, whittier, ca. dunbar, professor, dr. (1908). principles of sewage treatment. charles griffen & company, ltd., london, england. fabiola, a. (november 2010). peru promotes treated wastewater reuse. global water intelligence. http://www.globalwaterintel.com/archive/11/11/general/ peru-promotes-treated-wastewater-reuse.html. green arth (2012). industrial wastewater. http://www.greenarth.com/industrialwastewater.html. green arth (2012). urban wastewater. http://greenarth.com/urbanwastewater.html. gu a. (2005). endocrine disruptors: what are we facing. waterscapes, technical publication of the water group of hdr, vol. 16., no. 1, pp. 8-9, omaha, ne. hach (1997). hach water analysis handbook, 3rd ed., hach company, loveland, co. kansal, rajeshwari, balakrishnan, lata, and kishore (2003). anaerobic digestion cooper r. c., salveson a. t., sakaji r., tchobanoglous g., requa d. a. and whitley r. (2000). comparison of the resistance of ms2 and poliovirus to uv and chlorine disinfection, presented at the california water reclamation meeting, santa rosa, ca. looker, n. (1998). municipal wastewater management in latin america and the caribbean. r. j. burnside international limited, published for roundtable on municipal water for the canadian environment industry association. masudi, mashauri, mayo, and mbwette (september 2001). constructed wetlands for wastewater treatment in tanzania. science in africaafrica’s first online science magazine, merck. metcalf l. and eddy h. p. (1930). sewerage and sewage disposal: a textbook, 2nd ed., mcgraw-hill book company, inc., new york. consilience jhansi & mishra: wastewater treatment noaa (2005). the beaufort wind scale, national oceanic and atmospheric administartion. available from: http://www.crh.noaa.gov/lot/webpage/beaufort. rose, g. d. (1999). community-based technologies for domestic wastewater treatment and reuse: options for urban agriculture. n. c. division of pollution prevention and environmental assistance, cfp report series: report 27. rugaard l. c. (2001). cmom++ improving collection system reliability to achieve a goal of no overflows, presented at 2001 collection systems odyssey: combining wet weather and o&m solutions, water environment federation, washington, d.c. schertenlieb and heinss (february 2000). keeping wastewater in sight and in minda new approach to environmental sanitation. department of water and sanitation in developing countries, swiss federal institute for environmental science and technology, city development strategies initiative, journal 6. snow j. (1855). on the mode of communication of cholera, 2nd ed., churchill, london, england. state of california (2000). code of regulations, title 22, division 4, chapter 3 water recycling criteria, sections 60301 et seq., december 2, 2000. technologies for energy recovery from industrial wastewatera study in indian context. teri information monitor on environmental science, new delhi, 3(2): 6775. u.s. epa (1994). water quality standards handbook, 2nd ed., epa-823-b-94-005a, u.s. environmental protection agency, washington, d.c. u.s. epa (2003). 2000 clean watershed needs survey report to congress. epa 832-r-03001. office of water, u.s. environmental protection agency, washington, d.c. http://www.iwawaterwiki.org/xwiki/bin/view/articles/test, accessed on january 14, 2013. van lier, pol, seeman, and lettinga (1998). decentralized urban sanitation concepts: perspectives for reduced water consumption and wastewater reclamation for reuse. ep & rc foundation, wageningen (the netherlands), sub-department of environmental technology, agricultural university. http://www.cee.mtu.edu/sustainable_engineering/resources/technical/wast ewater_treatment_and_reuse_final.pdf, accessed on september 08, 2011. microsoft word 5 72-84 chang final formatted.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 10, iss. 1 (2013), pp. 72 – 84   performance and implementation of low-quality recycled concrete aggregate hubert chang, project leader department of civil engineering and engineering mechanics columbia university, new york, ny email: mr.hubert.chang@gmail.com ryan morgan department of civil engineering and engineering mechanics columbia university, new york, ny email: rcm2140@columbia.edu umed aziz department of civil engineering and engineering mechanics columbia university, new york, ny simon herfellner university of applied sciences regensburg kenneth ho department of civil engineering and engineering mechanics columbia university, new york, ny abstract our project seeks to greatly reduce the energy required for concrete production by using mostly recycled concrete. the use of recycled concrete aggregate (rca) is not a new phenomenon, but has not been studied in the context of low-cost disaster reconstruction efforts, which was our focus—specifically, the 2010 earthquake in haiti. in our experiments, we sought to replicate the variability in concrete quality that is often found on poorly supervised construction sites. construction companies in developing nations often add water to cement, which decreases the concrete’s final structural strength. thus, our experiment produced several samples of concrete with a high water to concrete ratios, which we then crushed and turned into rca to produce new concrete. we tested both our initial concrete samples and the final concrete products for compression and tensile strengths. from our data, we were able to conclude that rca is a reasonable low-cost aggregate in the production of concrete structures. our experimental results suggest that some of the downsides of low quality rca can be offset by high water absorption in the process of making new concrete. finally, we discuss possible implementations of our findings and suggest avenues of future research. consilience chang et al.: performance of low-quality concrete as rca author’s note special thanks to prof. christian meyer for sponsoring and advising this project as part of his broader ultra-low-cost housing for haiti initiative. we are also greatly indebted to adrian brugger, manager of carleton lab, as well as the lab technicians of carleton lab, for maintaining testing equipment and supporting our experiments. this project also benefited greatly from the help of minh-thu ho and james jelinek, who helped with day-to-day lab procedures and specimen testing. keywords: recycled concrete aggregate, sustainable development, internal curing, disaster zone reconstruction 1. introduction in january 12, 2010, a 7.3 magnitude earthquake devastated the republic of haiti, fatally affecting over 300,000 people, displacing 1.3 million more, and causing over $8 billion in damages, or 120% of the country’s gdp only a year before. 55% of the monetary loss could be attributed to infrastructure damage, including an overwhelming 40% that belonged to the housing sector1. given haiti’s limited resources and available materials in the aftermath of the disaster, it follows that reusing the concrete debris might be the most economical and sustainable way to rebuild the cities of haiti. concrete is the most widely used material in construction – comprised of aggregate (usually coarse rocks and fine sand), cement, and water, it is produced through an essentially one-way chemical hydration reaction that causes the cement to bind the aggregate together. the production of concrete requires a vast amount of natural resources, especially for obtaining aggregate, which is the largest component (by volume, and usually by weight as well) of the final concrete mixture. in recent decades, driven by aspirations towards more sustainable construction, there has been a push to replace these traditional aggregate materials with recycled products, such as glass, fly ash, or processed concrete rubble. cement, another essential component of concrete, is also the most costly. in addition, it is a significant contributor to the world’s co2 production2. by using recycled concrete aggregate (rca)3, we reduce the environmental impact of construction by using less virgin aggregate and eliminating the need to dispose of the concrete debris resulting from earthquake damage and demolition. applied more broadly, usage of recycled aggregate has the potential to reduce the financial cost of many large-scale infrastructure projects.                                                                                                                           1 global facility for disaster reduction and recovery, haiti– 2010– pdna estimated the earthquake impacts equivalent to 120% of gdp, https://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/node/320 (oct. 15, 2012) 2 chemistry world, the concrete conundrum, http://www.rsc.org/images/construction_tcm18-114530.pdf (oct, 15, 2012) 3 recycled concrete aggregate (rca) is aggregate made from mechanically processed concrete rubble, where large chunks of rubble are pulverized into pebblesized pieces suitable for mixing into fresh concrete; no chemicals, additives, or other modifications are involved in this process. 74 consilience   despite the precision required to produce structurally sound concrete, some unscrupulous contractors will inevitably attempt to cut corners to save on costs. this is particular prevalent in third world countries, where construction sites can be poorly supervised. construction companies in developing nations often add water to cement, which decreases the concrete’s final structural strength. often, this is to make the concrete more workable and easier to pour, as companies lack access to chemical admixtures that aid the mixing process. or, cement can be deliberately left over, since companies can sell remaining portions on the black market for extra profit. the goal of our project was to quantify the effect of recycled aggregate on final concrete compressive strength; in other words, how practical it is to produce high-strength concrete from low-strength aggregate. 2. investigation our research spanned a total of eight months. phase i consisted of the manufacture of flawed concrete in order to mimic that of haitian buildings. by systematically replicating unfavorable site mixes, we produced several different samples of low-quality concrete. these samples were then tested for compressive and tensile strengths. in phase ii, these samples were crushed by a crushing machine and used as rca to create new concrete, which was in turn tested for its compressive strength. analyses were made to quantify the relationship between the quality of the final concrete product and that of its rca components. in the scope of our investigation, we narrowed experiments to structural concrete, since that is the type most vulnerable to earthquake and other forces of nature; non-structural concrete (for example, sidewalk or road surfacing) is less affected by natural disasters. 3. experiment design 3.1 mix design in producing our concrete samples, we chose to approach the reduction of cement content and increase of water content separately, since the combination of the two would too rapidly and drastically lower the concrete’s quality. deviating from the control sample, the variable samples each followed decreasing increments of 10% for cement and increasing increments of 5% for water. each sample would have either a decrease in cement or an increase in water—given one, all other mix parameters were held constant. our control mix was designed to be non-air-entrained concrete with a nominal maximum coarse aggregate size of ¾” and a slump4 of no more than 4                                                                                                                           4 slump is a measure of the workability of freshly mixed concrete; i.e. how easily it can be poured. consilience chang et al.: performance of low-quality concrete as rca inches5. mix design goals included a volume ratio of 63% aggregate, and a total density of 3960 lbs per cubic yard. our control mix was predicted to have a ultimate compressive strength of 4000psi.   figure 1: large cross-section showing the uniform distribution of coarse aggregate in simulated rca, approximately 3” by 6”. specimen has been wet slightly to make it easier to distinguish quartz aggregate pebbles.                                                                                                                           5 4 inches is the specified maximum slump for poured structural load-bearing concrete walls or columns. 76 consilience   3.2 mix procedure and consolidation our mix procedure emphasized a uniform dispersal of water, rather than a rigorously defined set of incremental mix proportions. early mixing observations noted that when following a rigid set of mix proportions, ingredients can cake up once the water is added, resulting in nonuniform dispersal of cement components that were partially segregated even after the full mixing cycle. therefore, our solution was to visually observe the mixing and add water (while still mixing) until the ingredients appeared uniformly wet before proceeding to add the next round of ingredients. by doing so, we resolved the issue of clumping and aggregate segregation in the mixing bowl.6 our specimens were also more uniform in crosssection appearance. 3.3 strength evaluation to evaluate the strength of samples we made, we chose to use a a simple compression test and a splitting tension test. these are the primary testing methods that are used in the commercial development of custom concrete mixes, particularly during the construction of high-rises where quality control of concrete pours is critical to ensuring the final stability of the structure. although 28-day tests are standard for those quality control tests, we chose to perform 7-day tests, due to our use of portland type iii cement instead of the portland type i cement usually used for structural concrete. the primary difference between the two is simply the rate of curing. portland i reaches 95% of its strength in 28 days, and portland iii reaches 95%of its final strength in 7 days. substituting portland iii for portland i to speed up experimental testing is an accepted lab practice, and does not significantly affect the conclusions we arrived at. 3.4 aggregate selection: granite vs. quartz for our coarse aggregate, we chose to use quartz pebbles instead of the standard granite, as quartz pebbles are more commonly found in beachfront areas such as haiti. quartz aggregate also generally differs from granite aggregate in nominal size (diameter); this is due to differences in quarrying method. granite comes in large boulders that have to be further fractured, whereas our selected quartz aggregate came in smaller particles the size of river pebbles. our original plan was to have granite chips of 3/8” to 3/4” in diameter. however, the quartz pebbles had a different particle size distribution, and for practical reasons we decided to use                                                                                                                           6 industry contacts informed us that uniform dispersal of concrete components is easily obtained in the commercial mixing process, due to differences in mixing mechanics that arise from economy of scale. large-scale commercial production can usually obtain uniform ingredient distribution without the high level of scrutiny that we performed in experimental circumstances. consilience chang et al.: performance of low-quality concrete as rca pebbles 3/16” to 1/2" in diameter. this change was slight, and was within the bounds of astm guidelines. average compressive strength average tensile strength quartz aggregate, .5 w/c 5209 psi 1774 psi granite aggregate, .5 w/c 5804 psi 1936 psi figure 2: control sample strength comparison our findings indicated that the mechanical properties of the two do not differ significantly. the average compressive and tensile strengths of the quartz control were only slightly lower than the granite control sample, and we determined that this was adequately explained by the pebble surface being smoother than that of granite gravel and differences in ambient humidity at the time of mixing. 4. phase i data summary figure 3: batch summary and compressive strength test results 0.00   1,000.00   2,000.00   3,000.00   4,000.00   5,000.00   6,000.00   0.45   0.55   0.65   0.75   0.85   0.95   1.05   m ax .  s tr en gt h   (p si )   w/c  ra6o   avg.  max.  compressive  strength  v.s.  w/c  ra6o   batch watercement ratio total density (lb/ft3) 7-day compressive strength (psi) 7-day tensile strength (psi) a 0.50 4356 5,209.44 443.54   b 0.56 4290 4,429.12 319.81   c 0.63 4224 4,477.66 311.60   d 0.71 4158 3,393.53 321.34   e 0.83 4092 2,779.24 265.05   f 1.00 4026 2,093.44 212.27   g 0.55 4389 4,827.25 292.49   h 0.60 4422 4,362.07 342.07   i 0.58 4405 4,638.06 353.80   j 0.53 4372 4,730.10 373.89   78 consilience   figure 4: compressive strength results, stress (psi) vs. w/c ratio figure 5: tensile strength results, stress (psi) vs. w/c ratio 5. phase i analysis the simulated rca performed largely as expected. as shown on the graphs, compressive and tensile strengths decreased steeply as the water to cement ratio increased, according to an exponential best-fit correlation. based on standard error analysis, the individual sample results all fell within 3 standard deviations of the mean. put simply, it means that our lab-simulated rca is an appropriate replication of concrete rubble found in real-world demolition sites. in processing the simulated rca, care was taken to ensure that the particle size distribution of the rca approximated the particle size distribution of the virgin aggregate used in phase i. 6. phase ii relationship between rca strength and final concrete strength 6.1 phase ii: mix design and observations for the phase ii test plan, we tested one primary variable: the quality of the recycled aggregate. the crushing machine is calibrated to replicate the sieve gradients of the original aggregate set as closely as possible. the phase i samples were crushed to this setting, with the processed rca comprising both coarse and fine aggregate. a secondary variable was the w/c ratio. it was observed that test batches of rca with .5 or .6 water to cement ratios resulted in mixes that were extremely dry and unworkable. test batches of .7 and .8 water to cement ratios resulted in mixes that were workable enough to be pursued for measurement and analysis. 0.00   100.00   200.00   300.00   400.00   500.00   0.45   0.55   0.65   0.75   0.85   0.95   1.05   m ax .  s tr en gt h   (p si )   w/c  ra6o   avg.  max.  tensile  strength  v.s.  w/c  ra6o   consilience chang et al.: performance of low-quality concrete as rca we also observed that slump was lowest for the lowest-quality rca. as detailed in the next section, this is probably due to the higher absorptive properties of lower-quality rca. 6.3 phase ii data analysis   figure 6: compressive strength vs. original w/c ratio of rca figure 7: tensile strength vs. original w/c ratio of rca there appears to be two separate peaks for the .7 and .8 w/c ratios. since the only variable different in the figures above, it seems that the w/c ratio has a balancing effect against the quality of the recycled aggregate. from to the two peaks, we can conclude that lower-quality aggregate will produce concrete of higher 0   1000   2000   3000   4000   5000   6000   0   0.2   0.4   0.6   0.8   1   1.2   co m pr es si on  s tr en gt h   (p si )   w/c  ra6o  of  rca   compression  strength   .7  compression   .8  compression   poly.  (.7  compression)   poly.  (.8  compression)   0   50   100   150   200   250   300   350   400   450   0   0.2   0.4   0.6   0.8   1   1.2   te ns ile  s tr en gt h   (p si )   w/c  ra6o  of  rca   tensile  strength   .7  tension   .8  tension   poly.  (.7  tension)   poly.  (.8  tension)   80 consilience   strength when the w/c ratio is increased accordingly. higher-quality rca performed better at lower w/c ratios than lower-quality rca. another noteworthy phenomenon is the indication that tensile strength of rca concrete suffers more detrimental effects than compressive strength. whereas most of the compression test specimens surpassed 4000 psi in compression and were comparable to the control sample, none of the tensile tests reached the threshold of virgin aggregate concrete strengths. because there was no strong positive or negative correlation, this implies that the strength of the rca itself is not a significant factor in contributing to tensile strength. 7. key conclusions and proposed explanations from our data, we conclude that the quality of the original aggregate is less important than the water to cement ratio. concrete with a lower water to cement ratio seemed to be more sensitive to the quality of recycled aggregate, indicating that the degree of water absorption was a significant factor in the final strength. this is supported by the absorption tests we performed separately. 7.1 internal curing in order to get a better understanding of the rca’s absorption capacity, we conducted water absorption tests for several recycled and virgin aggregate types, and found that the absorption rate of recycled aggregate is somewhere between 9 – 15 %, while the water absorption rate of quartz and granite aggregate is only between 3 – 4 % and 10%, respectively. this indicates that the absorption capacity of rca is large enough to produce internal curing7 within the sample. therefore, we conclude that the recycled aggregate absorption capacity is more than three times of normal aggregate, with most of the absorption taking place in the pores of the rca mortar surrounding the original aggregate. a quick estimate of the high water absorption of recycled aggregate is the significant loss of workability in early mixing of batches with rca, which became dry even when w/c ratio of 0.6 and 0.7 are used. this amount of water absorbed in early mixing is critical in preventing concrete shrinkage and self-desiccation, as well as being necessary for completion of the concrete hydration process. we posit that the lower-quality rca allowed for more water absorption during the mixing process, which meant that hydration of cement could take place internally for a longer period of time; this is confirmed by the higher strength of .8 water to cement ratios with lower-quality rca.                                                                                                                           7   “internal curing has been defined by the american concrete institute (aci) as "supplying water throughout a freshly placed cementitious mixture using reservoirs, via pre-wetted lightweight aggregates, that readily release water as needed for hydration or to replace moisture lost through evaporation or self-desiccation"” – weiss, bentz, schindler, and luna. internal curing: constructing more robust concrete. structure magazine, january 2012   consilience chang et al.: performance of low-quality concrete as rca furthermore, immediately after the tension and compression tests were completed, a color differential was noted in the specimen cross-sections; the interior of the cylinders were a darker gray, surrounded by a 1-cm perimeter of lightercolored concrete. this color differential was due directly to the presence of moisture, and dissipated quickly after the cross-section was exposed to air. this color differential was much greater in specimens containing lower-quality rca; this supports the notion that lower-quality rca results in more internal curing. figure 8 is a sample comparison of these color differentials. with this in mind, we conclude that internal curing takes place in concrete produced with rca, and that the degree of internal curing depends on the quality of the rca. we also conclude that the negative effects of low-quality rca can be significantly offset by a higher w/c ratio. figure 8: tensile fracture plane of .8 w/c ratio specimen made with rca; the sample on the left had a rca w/c ratio of about .6, whereas the sample on the right had a rca w/c ratio of .8 82 consilience   8. on-site implementation options and construction approaches developing a viable recycled aggregate concrete mix is only the first step towards an ultra-low-cost housing system for haiti and other disaster-stricken areas. a practical design for a dwelling using the novel material must also be derived. this process is twofold – any design must resist future seismic or hurricane damage, but must also be buildable by local craftsmen with minimal ngo support. one option calls for the fabrication of concrete masonry blocks using the recycled aggregate concrete. this design has the benefit of being relatively simple to construct without any new training – a distinct advantage in a nation where only 22% of students advance to education above the primary level and literacy is limited8. however, using unreinforced masonry units has the disadvantage of low resistance to any tensile loading. this will typically result in cracking and eventual failure at the middle of the wall where the maximum bending moment occurs9. thus, it is necessary to introduce significant reinforcements to the construction if it is to withstand seismic loading. this makes construction much more complicated and expensive, likely making the use of a concrete masonry design less than ideal. the development of a system consisting of prefabricated concrete wall panels and roof/floor slabs would be a more practical option. once a system of formworks is devised, the same design could be provided by a sponsoring ngo and used to mass produce dwelling components on-site or at a neighborhood staging location (essentially an open-air factory). given the small size and basic nature of the dwellings required by haitian villagers, the wall panels could easily be hoisted into place using a foundation with a specially designed channel by a team of local residents or volunteers. even lifting a roof slab would only require a hand-powered rudimentary crane. additionally, reinforcement (always necessary given the low tensile strength of concrete) would be added during the fabrication of the actual panels, making the construction process straight forward. in tropical regions without access to steel rebar, it is possible that bamboo could be substituted, with natural plant fibers adding to the tensile strength – in the end, the actual material used may vary, but reinforcement of some kind will be probably be necessary in seismic regions. however, the system is not without some challenges. the most critical is developing a structural configuration minimizing the number of connections required between adjoining panels or slabs and the panels and foundation. this is key to the success of the system because the metal or other types of components necessary to connect each element could quickly increase both the cost and complexity of construction. ideally, all materials would be readily available from local sources or could be fabricated from local materials with minimal skills or training. the ideal structural design could be built by villagers after rudimentary training by volunteer engineers from an ngo and could be summarized by “ikea”-style                                                                                                                           8 suzata, eriko. 2011. education in haiti: an overview of trends, issues, and plans. world innovative summit for education. 9 kelly, trevor e. 1996. earthquake resistance of unreinforced masonry buildings. paper no. 689. eleventh world congress on earthquake engineering. consilience chang et al.: performance of low-quality concrete as rca instructional pictures, circumventing the problems associated with widespread illiteracy. furthermore, mix procedures would differ from actual lab procedures due to changes in efficiency of scale. for residents in developing nations unfamiliar with mixing instructions, our lab procedure could be simplified to steps as straightforward as: mix coarse and fine aggregate, then add all the required water, then finally mix in all the cement, further mixing for a period of 5 minutes before pouring. 9. future directions 9.1 beyond haiti while there is still certainly need for an affordable and modular housing system on the island, the disaster did occur nearly three years ago. thus, it will be useful to consider expanding our technology to consider the needs of other disaster areas. examples to consider include the eastern united states (prone to hurricane damage, especially in the wake of sandy in october 2012), japan and the rest of the pacific “ring of fire,” and central china (specifically earthquake-prone sichuan province). as we saw, the type of aggregate used in concrete can affect its strength. thus, it is important to consider what resources different regions have access to as that will determine the composition of the existing mixes that will be found in rubble. haiti, for example, does not have large granite deposits; rather, the island features volcanic material, silica, and limestone10. in relation to the regions we proposed to investigate expansion to, we found that due to limited resources, japan has a major rca industry already and some of the rubble may include aggregate that has already been recycled11. additionally, while the us east coast has plentiful granite and other resources, central china offers limited granite and instead features sandstone, gravel, and shale12. because the team has limited knowledge of geology, it may be useful to consult with a geologist at the university for further assistance. although our experiment focused on minimal-cost materials and thus did not consider common concrete admixtures, another interesting avenue of research to consider is the possibility of adding a ceramic or glass admixture to the concrete. this admixture could be recycled from ceramic debris on site, and recent research found that adding such an admixture can improve the strength of concrete13. in relation to other debris on site, it is also important that we think about the way our aggregate is prepared to ensure an absence of contaminants. research has shown                                                                                                                           10 g.j. draper, j.f. lewis, g. gutiérrez, geologic map of hispaniola, 1995. http://www.fiu.edu/orgs/caribgeol/hispaniola.html. (16 december 2005). 11 japan concrete institute, 1996-2012, 3 december 2012, http://www.jcinet.or.jp/index-e.shtml. 12 r.t. ryder , d.r. dudley, z. sun, y. zhang, y. qiu, and z. guo, “petroleum geology of the sichuan basin/ china,” usgs, october 1991. 13 f. pacheco-torgal. “compressive strength and durability properties of ceramic wastes based concrete.” materials and structures 44, no. 1 (2011): 155-167. 84 consilience   that, while not necessarily a detriment to raw strength, brick contaminants can result in increased porosity14. this could be a concern in regions experiencing a freeze-thaw cycle. finally, especially for haiti, it is necessary to consider the negative effects of a tropical marine environment and the presence of salts in the air. this is especially vital if our materials are used with conventional steel reinforcement which can corrode if salts penetrate the surrounding concrete15. this could become a concern if the amount of aggregate is not adequate to prevent moisture penetration or if the concrete is porous, which might happen in the presence of some contaminants. beyond simply researching the qualities of our new material, we believe that we can develop a system that can foster economic development and social entrepreneurship. the rca industry can be profitable if proper care is taken to set up facilities and transport16. we believe that we can find a way to empower people long after an ngo or similar organization leaves the affected area. rather than simply providing housing, we could help to construct new businesses that process rubble and provide rca materials for reconstruction. this is precisely the sort of stimulus suffering regions need. with a strong local economy, the recovery process becomes much easier and more complete.                                                                                                                           14 jian yang, qiang du, yiwang bao. “concrete with recycled concrete aggregate and crushed clay bricks.” construction and building materials 25. no. 4 (2011): 1935-1945. 15 p. castro, l. maldonado, r. de coss. “study of chloride diffusion as a corrosive agent in reinforced concrete for a tropical marine environment.” corrosion science 35. no. 5-8 (1993): 1557-1562. 16 usgs, “recycled aggregates – profitable resource conservation,” 2000 microsoft word abate1.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 15, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 192-218 indigenous ecological knowledge and pastoralist perception on rangeland management and degradation in guji zone of south ethiopia teshome abate school of animal and range sciences, hawassa university of ethiopia teshome_abate@yahoo.com; fax: +2510463312674 abstract the study was conducted to explore range management practices, and pastoralists’ views on degradation and its impact on local livelihood in south ethiopia. the data was gathered from three pastoral and agro-pastoral districts of the guji zone using structure questionnaires, key respondents and direct observation. the study shows the use of enclosure and herd mobility in basic traditional practice as well as the effectiveness of community indigenous knowledge in assessing and monitoring rangeland degradation. communities used numerous indicators to explain local level degradation, finding drought to be a primary cause of the decline in household livestock assets, the expansion of aridity, and as a rising threat to food security. the study shows an alarming increase in degradation and the urgency of measures to halt this trend. keywords: indigenous knowledge, rangeland degradation, guji pastoralists, ethiopia consilience abate: rangeland management and degradation 1. introduction pastoralists have managed their production system for many centuries, accumulating detailed knowledge of the environment of their grazing landscape (oba and kotile, 2001; mapinduzi et al., 2003). turner et al., (2000) suggested that traditional knowledge of the indigenous people was fundamentally important in the management of local resources. other studies (e.g. fernandezgimenez, 2000; angassa and oba, 2008) documenting local ecological knowledge of rangeland resources have provided useful information for the development, sustainable utilization and conservation of natural resources. additionally, local ecological knowledge may provide new insights into improving existing scientific research, in addition to a basis for designing appropriate research and development policies. despite the availability of this valuable resource, researchers and development experts have previously overlooked indigenous knowledge in the evaluation of rangeland (abate et al., 2009). in arid and semi-arid african rangelands, pastoralists are blamed for contributing to range degradation, but rarely considered a critical authority on the rangeland (o’leary, 1984). many studies (roba and oba, 2008; dabasso et al., 2012) have suggested that integrating the knowledge of local communities would improve the current understanding of the mechanisms involved in range degradation. other studies (angassa and oba, 2008; roba and oba, 2009a) have indicated that a combination of pastoral indigenous knowledge and modern scientific information would help provide a better understanding of the environment from the perspective of resource utilization. generally, in arid and semi-arid rangeland of ethiopia and particularly in guji pastoral and agro-pastoral system, the indigenous ecological knowledge, views on the current rangeland conditions, and degradation and management strategies of pastoralists have not been documented. this study aims to explore whether local communities are able to use environmental indicators to describe local range degradation and its impact on environment and local livelihood. it focuses on the following three areas: (i) traditional grazing land management practice (ii), perception of local communities on range degradation, underlying cause and their impact (iii), assess the role of pastoralists’ indigenous ecological knowledge, challenge and system stability in southern ethiopia. consilience 194 2. materials and methods 2.1. description of the study area the study was conducted in three neighboring pastoral and agro-pastoral districts of the guji zone in oromia regional state of south ethiopia. the guji zone borders on the north with the gedeo zone and the sidama zone, on the south with the somali regional state, on the east with the bale zone, and on the west with borana zone. the total land area of the zone is 18,577 square kilometers. the gugi zone is estimated to have a human population of 1,590,225 (csa, 2005) and lies within the altitude range of 700-3500 meters above sea level (m.a.s.l). the zone has 13 districts, out of these five were categorized as pastoral and agro-pastoral districts. this study was conducted in three of these neighboring districts: wadera, gorodola and liben. the climate of the pastoral and agro-pastoral regions of the guji zone is mostly arid and semi-arid. the inter-annual rainfall was varied with an average annual rainfall of 526.75 mm. the rainfall pattern is bimodal the major season (ganna) which extend from march to may and received 60% of the annual rainfall, the minor season (hagayya), which extend from september and november received 40% of the annual rainfall. the mean annual temperature range is 24–300c (adi et al., 2003). drought is common in the study area every five to ten years. the guji oromo are the dominant ethnic group in the study area and borena, arsi, and somaile are ethnic groups living in peaceful coexistence. in the liban district, borena oromo are numerically the dominant ethnic group. the livelihoods of the community are predominantly dependent on livestock production and in some area's agriculture. they are predominantly pastoralists, agro pastoralists, and farmers. the guji and borana communities have a wellestablished indigenous system in the management of grazing lands and other natural resources as well as an organized social institution: the ‘gada’1 system. 2.2. methodological approach data was gathered using a multiple visit formal survey method (ilca, 1990). prior to the actual survey, visits were made to the districts to gather secondary information from all possible sources. group discussions were held with key informants, development agents and district agricultural officers. a structured questionnaire was designed to obtain data on household demography 1 the word “gada” is a system of social organization among the oromo society used to be regulated by the gada principles. in the borana region of southern ethiopia gada is a system of classes (luba) that succeed each other every 8 years in assuming military, economic, political and ritual responsibilities (legesse, 1973). each gada class remains in power during a specific term (gada), which begins and ends with a formal ceremony. the concept gada has three related meanings: it is a period of eight years during which elected officials take power from the previous ones; it is the grade during which a class of people are in power by having politicritual leadership; it is the institution of the oromo society. consilience abate: rangeland management and degradation characteristics, livestock holding, household income, rangeland management practice, mobility, current rangeland conditions, range degradation, local indicators, bush encroachment, and role of indigenous knowledge. the questionnaire included both closed (single response) and open (multiple responses) questions. a pre-test of the questionnaire was made before the actual data collection in order to later make appropriate modifications and corrections. in each district, representative pastoral associations (pas) were selected based on accessibility, representativeness of grazing land, and livestock potential. a total of 211 household (hh) consisting of 91 households from wadera district, 60 households from gorodola, and 60 households from liban district were randomly selected and interviewed. 2.3. statistical analysis the collected household data was analysed using statistical package for the social sciences (spss, version 19, 1996). descriptive statistics were used to present the results. 3. results 3.1. household demographic characteristics a guji/borena household consists of a man, his wife, their children and any others dependent on them for food. these additional members may include kin or non-kin members (hogg, 1992). the survey showed that the average household size of a family within the study areas is 10.4±7.0 (± sd) people (table 1). of the total respondents, 10.4% were female-headed households and the remaining were male—because males are often heads of the family and strong cultural practice prevented females from responding on its behalf. among the total respondents, 71.6% were of the guji ethnic group, followed by the borena (16.1%), while the remaining consisted of arsi, somali, and others. the mean age of respondents was 45.2+11.4 years with the age range of 26-88 years. among respondents 46.4% had no formal education with only 5.7% of respondents educated past the 8th grade. 3.2. evolution of agro-pastoralism forty years ago, livestock production was practiced by most respondents and all inhabitants were pastoralists. livestock and livestock products played a major role and the rangelands were used mainly for grazing. currently, most respondents (99.5%) practiced an agro-pastoral lifestyle, combining livestock and crop production. crop cultivation was reported to be higher in the wadera district than in the gorodola and liban districts. maize, haricot bean, wheat, teff, and barley were the major crops grown in the study area. consilience 196 table 1. household demographic characteristics in guji zone of south ethiopia, (n=211) parameters wadera gorodola liban mean age of respondent (years) 41.4+10 44.8+10 51.4+12 45.2+11 male headed household (%) 83.5 96.7 91.7 89.6 female headed household (%) 16.5 3.3 8.3 10.4 ethnic group (%) guji 100 85.0 15.0 71.6 borena 56.7 16.1 arsi 26.7 7.6 somali 1.7 0.5 others 15.0 4.3 age categories mean + sd (number) <15 6.6+4.3 6.4+0.5 5.9+3.3 6.3+3.9 age16-64 2.9+2.6 2.9+0.4 3.6+2.0 3.1+2.6 age>65 0.8+0.8 1.0+0.3 1.0+0.5 total family size 10.3+ 7.7 9.3+0.9 10.5+5.6 10.4+7.0 level of education (%) cannot read and write 37.4 50.0 56.7 46.4 read and write 19.8 25.0 6.7 17.5 basic education 16.5 11.7 30.0 19.0 primary education (5-8) 17.6 6.7 6.7 11.4 secondary education (9-10) 8.8 6.7 5.7 most of respondents (48.3%) started growing crops after 1991, the year of the socialist military derg regime’s downfall, although about 44.5% respondents were already doing so during the derg regime (table 2). the reasons for adopting an agro-pastoral lifestyle included: the need to diversify household income (29.1%), human population growth (19.6%), expansion of settlements and promotion of crop cultivation (19.0%), owing to drought (17.0%), and a decline in livestock numbers per household (15.0%). the derg regime implemented a settlement program in 1970’s. settlement in villages had brought social change among the guji-borena pastoralists: first, it influenced the people to adopt agro-pastoralism in favor of pastoralism, as well as a move from mobile and scattered residence to settled and confined villages. these changes were accompanied by new ways of life in which crop cultivation, formal education and division of labor at a household level were introduced. additionally, inappropriate development interventions during the derg regime (e.g. the construction of watering points in traditional rainy-season pastures, a ban on the use of fire, and the introduction of a peasant association), the weakening of local institutions, and repeated drought and massive loss of livestock exhausted the resources of many families. furthermore, there have been several government initiatives to provide extension services to promote crop cultivation into the most valuable grazing areas. currently, among respondents, 54% considered crop cultivation encouraging. however, 42.7% of respondents indicated discouragement and the remaining 3.3% of respondents failed to make suggestions (table 2). consilience abate: rangeland management and degradation 3.3. traditional grazing land management practice the traditional grazing land management practiced is presented in table 3 and 4. the majority of respondents (92.9%) had access to local enclosures called kaloo. forms of enclosure included the kaloo jabi (used mostly for calves), which are privately-owned, small, and relatively near the homestead. most respondents (46.4%) owned enclosures privately, 36.1% were owned communal, and the remaining 22.2% of respondents had both types of enclosures. table 2. major farming activities, time and reason for emergency of agro-pastoralism in guji zone of south ethiopia (n=211) parameters wadera gorodola liban mean have you started faming activities (%) yes 100 98.3 100 99.5 no 1.7 0.5 time of expansion (%) during haile sellassie regime* 5.5 8.3 8.3 7.1 during derg regime ** 48.5 55.1 28.3 44.5 after the down fall of derg regime*** 46.2 36.7 63.3 48.3 reason for cultivation (%) income diversification 34.2 27.2 22.6 29.1 human population pressure 21.8 18.4 18.5 19.6 expansion of settlement and promotion of crop cultivation 19.3 20.9 16.4 19.0 drought 13.2 15.8 24.7 17.0 death of livestock population and disease 11.5 17.7 17.8 15.0 perception of community toward cultivation (%) encouraging 49.5 43.3 71.7 54 discoursing 46.2 51.7 28.3 42.7 i don’t know 4.4 5.0 3.3 ***, before 1974 gc **between 1974 to 1991, *after 1991 communal enclosures were accessible to all members of the community and open to communities when feed resources were depleted in communal grazing areas during the long dry season. communal enclosures were controlled by abboti dedha (the elderly who were elected to mange grazing land) and these grazing lands were often unfenced. the private enclosures were owned by individual families and controlled to ensure conservation of forage for the animals. enclosures were usually located around the homestead and farmlands, mainly used for feeding of lactating cows, calves, and weak or sick animals during the dry season. among the total respondents, 52.6% responded that they owned enclosures for dry season use and drought mitigation strategies, consilience 198 6.2% for rehabilitation strategies, while the remaining 40.2% responded that enclosures were used for both purposes. most informants (88.7%) used different management strategies to improve their enclosures, including: fencing (56.6%), bush cleaning (36.0%) and burning (11.0%). despite efforts for improvement, bush encroachment (33.7%), shifts to cropland (21.2%), recurrent drought (20.6%), inadequate fencing (12.7%) and termite infestation (11.8%) posed as the main consequences of changes to enclosure (table 4). communities categorized the grazing landscapes into two main landscapes, such as the badaa and the gamojii, using a combination of climate (rainfall and temperature), soil, topography, and vegetation. the badaa landscapes were characterized by high amounts of rainfall, cool temperatures, highlands, and dense vegetation cover. these were used for dry season grazing and are found mainly in the wadera and gorodola districts. the gamoji landscapes had low rainfall, warm temperatures, lowlands, and sparser vegetation. these are mainly used for wet season grazing and can be found commonly at the three the study districts. furthermore, in the liban district, the grazing lands were also partitioned into wet and dry season grazing areas. the wet season lacked permanent water supplies, which can only be utilized when rainwater, surface water and traditional pond water are available. when water sources were exhausted, the grazing then returned to the dry season rangelands. generally, wet season areas were used for only a short period (mostly 2–3 months). in the liban district, the didi liban grazing land, a dry season grazing land which acted as a key resource of rich perennial grasslands, water sources and hayya soil crucial for livestock production and grazing land management. table 3. traditional rangeland utilization and management practices in guji zone of south ethiopia (n=211) management practice wadera % gorodola % liban % mean % use of enclosure 97.8 96.7 81.7 92.9 division of herd 69.2 55.0 93.3 72.0 moving animal during dry season 74.7 83.3 98.3 83.9 migration with olla for period of time 49.5 100% 86.7 74.4 moving animal to relative and clan member 59.3 75.0 56.7 63 burning 25.3 25.0 25 25.3 diversifying herd composition and division of herds based on the species and class of animal was found to be common practice. 72% percent of respondents split their herd into warra herds (village-based) and fora herds (satellite herds). in village-based herds, calves and small ruminants were kept around the homestead, as were animals under production (lactating cows), sick animals, and calves during the dry season. fora herds (bulls, heifers, dry cows and camels) utilized pasture and water remote from the homestead during wet season. of the respondents, 83.9% moved animals during dry season to water points and use forage resources that are found at the daily walking distances locally called meta tika. migration with olla for period of time (19.2%), moved animal to relative and clan member (63%) to exploit areas remote from permanent settlement sites and use of fire (25.3%) in traditional grazing land consilience abate: rangeland management and degradation practice (table 3). most respondents (74.4%) used seasonal herd mobility and moved livestock seasonally to exploit areas remote from permanent settlement sites. the extent and direction of movements depend on the availability of rainfall, water, feed, and security. in the dry season livestock, cows, bulls, heifers, goats, sheep, and camels were moved to remote sites where water and feed were abundant. household heads and boys above the age of 15 years were responsible for the migration of the animals. the majority of respondents (49.8%) indicated that the frequency of migration decreased over time, owing to settlement, declines in livestock ownership per household, human population, and government policy (e.g. the encouragement of settlement, education, crop farm and water points). the remaining 27.5% indicated that the intensity of migration has increased because of shortage of rainfall (i.e., drought condition), feed and water. respondents indicated feed shortage (49.8%), water shortage (49.3%), animal disease (44.5%), human disease (27.5%), wild animal attack (18%) and conflict (0.5%) posed as the main threats to migration. most respondents indicated the role of mobility as survival (58.8%) and risk management strategies (45.5%), while 19.9% of respondents suggested that mobility has culture value, and 1% of respondents considered it as bad practice. table 4. status of range enclosure in guji zone of south ethiopia (n=211) variables wadera gorodola liban mean do you have enclosure (%) yes 85 96.7 85 91.9 no 6 3.3 15 8.1 enclosure type (%) communal 30.6 31.0 45.1 36.1 private 51.8 41.4 43.1 46.4 both 17.6 27.6 21.6 22.2 do you use management to improve enclosure (%) yes 82.3 98.3 88.2 88.7 no 17.6 1.7 15.7 12.9 type of management used (%) fencing 57.1 51.0 55.6 56.6 bush clearing 29.4 38.0 39.7 36.0 burning 13.4 11.0 4.6 11.0 role of enclosure (%) dry season and drought mitigation 57.6 53.4 45.1 52.6 rehabilitation 4.7 13.8 1.9 6.2 both 37.6 32.8 52.9 40.2 challenge related to enclosure (%) bush encroachment 35.2 34.0 30.4 33.7 shift to cropland 23.6 13.5 28.4 21.2 recurrent drought 19.1 19.2 25.5 20.6 lack of fencing 12.1 20.5 2.0 12.7 termite infestation 10.1 12.8 13.7 11.8 consilience 200 3.4. livestock production system and household income livestock have been the main asset of local communities, with an average livestock holding per household of 12.7 tropical livestock units (tlu = 250 kg non-lactating animal; ilca, 1991) (table 5), of which 8 tlus were cattle. pastoralists in the liben district have the highest total livestock and camel population followed by those in the gorodola and wadera districts. most households indicated that livestock management was traditional with a freegrazing, extensive system. 95% percent of respondents derived income from livestock, sale of small ruminants and dairy products, sale of crops (77%), off farm (40%), petty trade (33.2%), sale of forest products (36.5%), employment (1.9%), sale of honey (61.6%), remittance (6.2%), food aid (9%) and causal labor (5.2%) to cover expenses. according to respondents, shortage of feed (68.2%) was the primary challenge to livestock production followed by drought (59.7%), health problems (60.3%), scarcity of water (60.2%), market problem (41.7%) and wild animal attack (33.2%). table 5. mean livestock holdings (tlu1 +sd) per household in guji zone of south ethiopia (n=211) livestock class wadera gorodola liban mean cattle 7.2+3.9 8+045 9.08+ 6.13 8.0 + 4.6 sheep 0.01+.03 0.09+0.03 0.4+ 0 0.06 + 0.18 goats 1.0+.0.04 1.71+ 1.3 1.8 + 0.93 1.43 + 0.95 camels 0.57+1.9 2.32+0.33 3.5 + 3 1.88 + 2.77 equines 1.1+0.58 0.80+0.04 0.98 + 0.58 0.96+ 0.52 total 9.9+5.3 13.02+0.77 15.23 + 8.92 12.3 + 7.03 3.5. feed resources natural pastures, woody plants and crop residues were the major feed resources for livestock in the study area. despite low availability of crop residues, straw from maize, sorghum, and teff were used during the dry season. as most of the lands were covered with woody vegetation, trees and shrubs were sources of livestock feed. grazing was the main form of feed utilization, and grazing lands were communal and grazed continuously throughout the year. natural pasture was available to animals mainly from march to may (main rainy season) and september to november (short rainy season). during the dry season, natural pasture, browse plants and standing hays were important. most respondents (97.8%) in wadera, (100%) in gorodola and (98.6%) in liben district has a critical feed shortage both in the short and in the long dry season. table 6. status, challenges, land tenure and perception of respondents to communal grazing land in guji zone of south ethiopia (n=211) variables wadera gorodola liban mean consilience abate: rangeland management and degradation the primary measure taken by communities to solve feed shortage was the use of enclosure (88.1%) followed by the use of browse trees (57.3%), migration (52.6%), and destocking (15.2%). communities rarely sell livestock as the main measure to alleviate feed shortages. the majority of households (97.6%) considered the current status of communal grazing land was decreased as compared with the past forty years ago (table 6). the main attributes of shrinking grazing lands included: shifts to cropland (40.0%), expansion of villages (33.4%) and bush encroachment (26.4%). the study assessed the community views on the type of land tenure they would prefer for future management of grazing lands. the majority of respondents (45.5%) would prefer a communal type of tenure, 28% preferred private, while 26.5% prefer both types. preference towards a communal type of land tenure incorporated several different reasons—31.3% of households suggested that privatelyowned land would reduce the size of land and 26.9% of respondents indicated that herd mobility and grazing would be restricted. about 25.7% of respondents reported that communal land would strengthen social relations among communities, while 16.1% of respondents reported that it was their culture to own communal land. the households indicated that enclosures (31.6%) and cleaning of bush (31.9%) were among the main strategies used to improve grazing lands (table 6). status of communal grazing land (%) increasing 2.2 1.7 3.3 2.4 decreasing 97.8 98.3 96.7 97.6 opinion for decreasing (%) shift to cropland 39.6 38.3 43.5 40.0 expansion of village 31.2 31.6 39.8 33.4 bush encroachment 29.2 30.1 16.7 26.4 preference of land tenure system (%) communal 28.6 58.3 65.0 45.0 private 42.9 11.7 25.7 28.0 both 28.6 30.0 13.3 26.5 reason for preference of communal grazing land tenure (%) if the land is privately owned, the size will be decline 22.4 34.0 33.0 31.3 if the land is privately owned, restrict mobility and grazing 18.4 26.8 31.1 26.9 if the land is communally owned, strengthens relations among people 22.4 27.8 25.2 25.7 our culture to use the land communally 16.7 11.3 10.7 16.1 opinion to improve communal grazing land (%) bush clearing 32.1 28.1 35.5 31.4 make enclosure 25.9 35.3 36.6 31.9 destocking 13.2 12.4 9.7 11.8 burring 15.1 16.3 8.6) 14.2 minimizing cultivation 13.7 7.8 9.7 10.9 consilience 202 3.6. natural minerals supplementation mineral supplement to livestock is an integral component of herd and grazing land management strategies of pastoralists. there were various types of natural minerals utilized by animals. locally they are called ‘haya’, ‘hora’, and ‘bojjii’. communities identified haya as grey, black and red colour soil from which the minerals are derived. haya is the most frequently used natural mineral as it can be found in dry and wet muddy form and is suitable for all kinds of animals. the majority of respondents (97.2%) supplement all classes of livestock, especially cattle in wet season, by leading them to the sources (47.9%), while 21.1% of respondents transport the mineral soil to homes to feed animals and the remaining 25.6% of respondents use both methods. hora is found in the diluted form and is consumed by drinking. bojjii’ has a dull whitish colour, fine salt grains and is mainly used by camel. the mineral supplement was considered to induce rapid weight gain in livestock, increase milk yield, and stimulate cows for reproduction, as well as having medicinal value. 3.7. local indictors, causes and impacts of rangeland degradation communities in the study areas are aware of the extent of degradation and the local indicators that have been used are depicted in table 7. communities used numerous indicators to describe degradation, encompassing: soil, vegetation, livestock, water, and termite infestation. guji communities describe overgrazed lands as barbadaa, which means few or no grass cover, as well as short in height. degraded areas described as kuunchaaye meant that even if there was enough rainfall in the area, these degraded lands did not produce any grass and had a high number of cattle trails and bare ground patchs. local communities often assessed the current condition of rangelands, either individually or on a local group basis known as aburu, using the following criteria: the availability of grass and water, the prevalence of animal and human disease, the suitability to different livestock species, and security for the herder. there were different opinions on the current conditions of the rangeland as compared with forty years ago. 95% of respondents rated the current range condition as poor and degraded (table 11). respondents indicated recurrent drought (45.5%), human population (23.3%), farmland expansion (26.5%), overgrazing (12.8%) and bush encroachment (34.1%) as the main forms of degradation (table 8). the impact of degradation is presented in table 9. respondents named soil degradation (94.8%), decline in household livestock holding and output (93.4%), expansion of aridity (85.8%), deforestation (82.9%), food insecurity and poverty (85.8%), the need for alternative livelihood income and diversification (88.1%) (e.g., promotion of cultivation, petty trade, sale of charcoal and fire wood), herd diversification (80.1%) (e.g. shifts to camel and goat herding), and increased migration (67.8%) to urban centers for labor, mineral mining area and herd mobility as the impacts (table 9). consilience abate: rangeland management and degradation table 7. indictors used to describe rangeland degradation in guji zone of south ethiopia (n=211) table 8. possible cause of rangeland degradation in guji zone of south ethiopia (n=211) causes wadera % gorodola % liban % mean % recurrent drought 47.3[1] 36.7[1] 35.0[3] 40.8[1] shift to crop land 23.1[2] 56.7[3] 41.7[1] 37.9[3] overgrazing 26.4[4] 46.7[6] 36.7[5] 12.8[4] settlement 23.0[6] 30.0[4] 46.7[2] 12.8[6] population pressure 25.3[3] 48.3[2] 53.3[4] 22.3[2] bush encroachment 38.5[5] 56.7[5] 41.7[6] 34.1[5] lack of burning 23.1[7] 36.7[7] 45.0[8] 19.0[8] poor soil status 3.3[8] 16.7[8] 46.7[7] 17.1[7] limited knowledge of rangeland management 14.3[9] 68.3[9] 43.3[9] 37.9[9] reduced livestock mobility 6.6[10] 13.3[10] 10[10] 9.5[10] number in bracket shows ranking order table 9. possible impact of rangeland degradation in guji zone of south ethiopia (n=211) impact of land degradation wadera % gorodola % liban % mean % poor livestock output and holding 88 81.7 100.0 93.4 soil deterioration 88 91.7 95.0 94.8 decline of biodiversity 82 80.0 81.7 84.8 deforestation 87.9 100.0 75.0 82.9 increase income diversification (petty trade, sale of charcoal an fire wood 96.7 81.7 83.3 88.6 introduce and use of camel 82.0 80.0 76.7 80. food insecurity, food aid and poverty 96.7 91.7 71.7 88.2 variables (%) wadera gorodola liban mean soil erosion, and high levels of dust in the air 98.9 81.8 95.0 89.6 bare ground cover, presence of rills and gullies 97.7 83.6 95.0 89.6 decline of forage biomass (stubble height) 78.4 98.2 95.0 85.3 decline of vegetation cover 89.8 88.9 88.5 85.3 decline of desirable grass species 96.6 78.4 85 83.4 increase of undesirable grass 94.3 93.9 83.3 84.8 increase of undesirable tree and bush 94.3 93.9 83.3 84.8 decline of livestock performance (rumen-fill, milk production, weight gain) 79.5 80.0 88.5 85.8 decline water availability(surface water and water flow diminish) 70.5 91.5 83.3 77.3 termite infestation 64.8 65.2 56.7 57.3 consilience 204 increase migration 73.6 66.7 58.3 67.3 change to more aridity 90.1 83.3 81.7 85.8 decline milk production per animal 97.8 96.7 100.0 98.1 3.8. herder perception on bush encroachment the majority of respondents (93.8%) suggested that, compared with forty years ago, grazing lands are now covered with bushes and shrubs. factors that triggered such bush encroachment, according to the respondents, include: uncontrolled livestock movement (55.0%), overgrazing (52.6%), drought (50.7%), and lack of the use of fire (40.3%). nevertheless, 4.78% of respondents failed to make suggestions. the abundance of trees and shrubs in the rangelands were considered to engender a decrease in the production of grass (43.5%), difficulty in herding (34.6%), increased animal wounds (21.4%), and increased wildlife attacks (0.5%). the boyyoo and acaia species in the gorodoloa and acacia bussei, acacia drepanolobium and commiphora species were the main encroaching species in the rangelands of liban district. additionally, most respondents, 93.4% in wadera, 88.3% in gorodola and 80.7% in liben districts, reported that the invasion of poisonous plants in the rangelands is now higher compared to the forty years ago. most of respondents (57.3%) indicated bush cleaning (42.4%) and burning (42.4%) as the main effort to control bush encroachment (table 10) table 10. reasons, consequence and management of bushes and shrubs in guji zone of south ethiopia (n=211) parameters wadera gorodola liban mean do you observe an increase in bush/shrubs (%) yes 94.5 96.7 90.0 93.8 no 5.5 3.3 10.0 6.2 opinion for cause (%) uncontrolled livestock movement 53.8 65.0 46.7 55.0 overgrazing 69.2 41.7 33.3 51.2 drought 67.0 40.0 33.3 59.8 lack of burn 39.6 40.0 36.7 38.9 i do not know 1.1 4.7 consequence of bush encroachment (%) shortage of grass 41.7 42.1 49.0 43.5 create difficulty to herd 34.3 34.2 35.7 34.6 wounding of animal 23.0 23.7 15.3 21.4 predator 1.0 0.5 bush control method (%) clear 60.7 51.1 58.4 57.3 burn 38.6 48.9 41.6 42.4 i do not know 0.7 0.3 consilience abate: rangeland management and degradation 3.9. role of traditional knowledge, system stability and sustainability the majority of respondents suggested that the primary role of the indigenous rangeland management system was to provide survival strategies (26.6%) followed by risk management strategies (21.0%). 20.6% of respondents considered the system primarily held a cultural role, while others reported conservation and rehabilitation (15.1%), flexibility to changing conditions (9.1%), and sustainability (7.3%) as the primary provision of the system (table 11). table 11. views and role of traditional knowledge of communities in the guji zone of south ethiopia, (n=211) attributes wadera (%) gorodola (%) liban (%) mean (%) survival strategy 24.2 24.4 35.9 26.6 risk management 24.9 22.1 11.7 21.0 cultural 23.5 17.9 19.3 20.6 conservation and rehabilitation strategies 14.6 15.7 15.2 15.1 sustainable 4.6 10.2 7.6 7.3 flexible to changing conditions 8.2 9.4 10.3 9.1 number of respondents.2 stability refers to the degree to which range productivity remains constant despite normal fluctuations in environmental variables.3 sustainability refers to the ability of the range to sustain its long-term productivity when subjected to particular environmental or management stresses. local communities viewed the pastoral production system as facing numerous challenges. 89% of respondents rated that rangelands were found in a downward trend of condition (table 12). most informants reported that the current condition of the rangeland (95.3%), grass cover (95.7%), and milk production per animal (98%) had declined. the majority of respondents (73%) indicated grazing land management was less sustainable than the forty years ago and the remaining 28% of respondents suggested that it has been sustainable and more sustainable than forty years ago. similarly, most of respondents (79.6%) indicated that the grazing land management system was less productive, while the remaining 20% reported it as having been productive and more productive than forty years ago. furthermore, most respondents (68.8%) replied that the trend of food security had decreased, whereas 28.9% of respondents reported this trend had increased. only, 3.8% of respondents failed to make suggestion. consilience 206 table 12. perception of communities toward range condition, trend, sustainability, productivity in guji zone of south ethiopia (n=211) variables wadera gorodol liban mean assessing rangeland (%) yes 84.6 78.3 60 87.2 no 13.2 21.7 0 11.8 condition of rangeland (%) good 2.2 8.3 5.0 4.7 poor 97.8 91.7 95.0 95.3 trend of rangeland (%) downward trend 90.1 78.3 98.3 89.1 upward trend 8.8 16.7 1(1.7) 9.0 the same as before 0 5.0 0 1.4 grass covers (%) increasing 1.1 1.7 1.4 decreasing 92.3 100.0 98.3 95.7 the same as before 0 0 0 2.8 milk production per animal (%) declining 97.8 96.7 100 98 increasing 2.2 3.3 0 2.2) sustainability of grazing land management (%) more sustainable 2.2 0 15.0 5.2 sustainable 19.8 11.7 31.7 20.9 less sustainable 78.0 88.3 53.3 73.0 productivity of grazing land management (%) more productive 0 0 25.0 7.1 productive 93.4 6.7 30.0 13.3 less productive 6.6 93.3 45.0 79.6 trend of food security over the past 40 years (%) increasing 29.7 1.7 55.0 28.9 decreasing 67.0 98.3 35.0 66.8 i don’t known 3.3 10.0 4.3 4. discussion 4.1. household demographic characteristics this study has provided a wealth of information on indigenous range management and pastoralists’ views on range degradation in the guji zone of southern ethiopia, which will be valuable for development and sustainable range management strategies. the average household family size in the study districts (10.4 people) were higher than that of the afar and kereyu pastoralists of eastern ethiopia (6.74 people) (abule et al., 2005) and comparable with the family size of 9 people for borena pastoralists of south-eastern ethiopia (eyasu and feyera, 2010). the higher family size might be linked with the cultural practice of polygamy by most pastoralists and agro-pastoralists of the area. the low-level of education noted in the survey is common to many pastoral areas consilience abate: rangeland management and degradation of ethiopia (abule et al., 2005) and might hinder efforts to achieve technology transfer to the communities. thus, this calls for the introduction of an education system that will accommodates pastoralist and agro-pastoralist lifestyles. the development of agro-pastoralist communities similar to that in other pastoral areas of ethiopia (angassa and oba, 2008), reflects a change from the traditional pastoral lifestyle. previous studies (beriso, 1995; beriso, 2002) in the guji zone of southern ethiopia have indicated that settlement programs implemented during derg regime in 1980’s in the guji communities brought substantial change, such as the adoption of agro-pastoralism, the promotion of crop cultivation, and implementation of formal education. this expansion of cultivation in the rangelands is most likely a result of an increased food demand for families in pastoral communities due to repeated droughts and large losses of livestock. another potential reason includes policy changes regarding land use and government interventions such as increased access to improved seed, fertilizer, farm implements and extensions. as elsewhere in ethiopian and east-african pastoral groups, households kept more than one species of livestock to secure their livelihood. holding two or more species with different feeding habits can make more effective use of vegetation, thereby increasing profitability. furthermore, different livestock species can serve different roles (solomon et al., 2007); as observed in this study, the sale of livestock and livestock products provided the main source of income (abate et al., 2010). as elsewhere in ethiopia and other pastoral areas in east africa, communal grazing is often the main land use management system in the study area. productivity of the rangelands was influenced by the availability of desirable plant species and adequate rainfall (oba et al., 2000), with drought causing feed shortages in terms of season of use (oba and kotile, 2001) and grazing capacity (abule et al., 2005). 4.2. traditional rangeland management practices like other east-africa pastoral communities in the guji pastoral system, grazing resources have been owned communally and administered by traditional institution where community leaders/elders formulate bylaws about their use in accordance to the spatial and temporal patterns of grazing and the types of animals to be allowed to graze (oba, 1998). the uses of range enclosure in the guji pastoralists were a common practice. oba (1998) explained that the boran recently adopted the enclosures from the settled agropastoralists of the guji communities during the gada of gobba bulle (19601968) and expanded the enclosures during the gada of jillo aga (1968-1976) and boru guyo (1984-1992) (oba, 1998). the decision to establish communal enclosures followed the proclamation of the assembly of gumi gayo in 1988 (tache, 2000). range enclosures are less developed in the arid lowlands including the liban district, where conditions are too dry and the population is more nomadic. the establishment of range enclosures was the community’s way of a responding to both the scarcity of feed for vulnerable herd classes (e.g. consilience 208 calves, milking cows and weak animals) and droughts. in the study area, enclosures provide an opportunity to develop a more intensive communal resource management system. additionally, the establishment and promotion of communal enclosures and drought season reserves in the study areas could help reduce grazing pressure on communal lands, thereby creating access to fodder banks and improving soil restoration for rangeland development. tache (2010) reported that in the liban and gorodola districts, currently 22 communal drought reserve enclosures, which cover about 8, 122.5 hectares, have been established and rehabilitated. thus, given the inherent uncertainties of arid and semi-arid environments and the current risk of climate change, enclosures and drought reserves can contribute to a local adaptation and mitigation strategies to climate change. however, the recent expansion of farming, settlement, and gradual privatization of the rangelands, are a threat for a mobility-based land use system. this threat arises from neighboring agriculturalists, farming by pastoralists themselves, and urban residents who have a desire to adopt private enclosures for large-scale investments. furthermore, the problems associated with enclosures in the study area were similar to those reported by oba (1998), gemedo-dalle et al., (2006) in borana, southern ethiopia. as observed in the present study rendille pastoralists in northern kenya (dabasso et al., 2012) and borana pastoralists in southern ethiopia (oba and kotile, 2001) classified landscapes based on vegetation, soil, and historic events. the eco-physiognomic classification of the grazing landscapes used by the communities in the guji pastoral area is comparable to the approach used in conventional range science. the local communities classify grazing landscape into badaa and gamojii—wet and dry season grazing—on the basis of climatic factors, topography, dominant plant species and soil type. this criterion is similar to that used by the ariaal of northern kenya (oba, 1994), who classify range into two main categories: the highlands and the lowlands. furthermore, based on these eco-physiognomic classes, the local communities make decisions pertaining to range suitability for a given livestock species. however, today in the guji pastoral area, the key dry season grazing areas has been declining due to the expansion of farming, and settlements in most grazing areas of the badaa landscape. as a result, livestock frequently graze on the gamoji landscape. additionally, respondents explained that continuous grazing has affected the vegetation of the gamoji landscape and desirable grasses species have declined. for example, the abundance of desirable grasses important for cattle such as sardoo (cynodon dactylon), mata gudeesa (cenchrus ciliaris), allaloo (chrysopogon spp), ilmogorii (leptothrium senegalense) have declined. whereas undesirable and invasive plant species have been increasing. local communities explained that human activities on the gamoji landscapes such as expansion of farming, settlement, timber and charcoal making, selling of wood for fuel, and deforestation has increased, thereby affecting the availability of forage plants. in the past, no individuals in the guji communities have used charcoal burning as a livelihood strategy. these types of livelihood activities lead to deforestation, the loss of other ecosystem services, and alter the local climate. the traditional rangeland and livestock management practices noted in this study split livestock herds based on species, type and productivity. herd diversification and free ranging of communal land were similar to those consilience abate: rangeland management and degradation reported from other east-african countries (oba and kotile, 2001). herd diversification in the study area was found to be pastoralists’ response to changing environmental conditions, which corresponded to responses by other pastoral areas. cattle is the dominant herd, and the guji and the borana pastoralists’ have cultural value for cattle herding. despite this culture surrounding cattle, today the guji and the borana communities have increasingly adopted camel and goat in order to adaptat to persistent drought and pasture decline. the diversification of herd composition is a response to changing environmental conditions and enhances climate resilience in the region. the adoption of camel and goat herding requires the acquisition of new knowledge regarding different patterns of grazing and water use and animal husbandry. herd mobility a key strategy in response to spatial and temporal variability of rangeland resources (oba, 2011). mobility is used for a wide range of purposes, and the practice relies on pastoralists’ knowledge and local institutions for making decisions (oba, 2011). according to informants, herd mobility was a community survival and risk mitigation strategy. despite the benefit of mobility for pastoralists and the environment, government policies to date have not promoted its sustainability. pastoral development policy in ethiopia emphasizes sedentarization as a way out of poverty, and this policy direction fails to recognize mobility as a means of production in the arid lands. the extent and direction of herd movement, trend of mobility and the problems facing pastoralists in the current study were similar to those reported by scoones (1995), and abule et al., (2005). in the study area, pastoralists linked the spatial diversity and abundance of bush and shrub vegetation with free movement of livestock in the communal grazing land, resulting in the dispersal of seeds of different plant species. 4.3. local level indictors for rangeland degradation pastoralists have been able to detect change and describe the status of their rangelands. the degraded sites in this study locally called kunchayee and barbadah, for overgrazed sites, is also common in rendille pastoralists in northern kenya (dabasso et al., 2012). guji and borana pastoralists used many indictors to explain range degradation. pastoralists described degradation on the basis of overall animal performance (e.g. rumen fill, milk production, weight gain, coat condition, mating frequency and health). the observations about the decline in livestock performance indicators were made at household level and views were shared at the elders’ meetings for appropriate decision making. furthermore, pastoralists depicted range deterioration from the point of protecting their household food (mainly milk), income, and other livelihood requirements. the condition of plant growth and grazing pressure were also inferred from the livestock performance. this implies that range condition can be inferred without directly measuring the indicators. this shows that links among pastoralist, livestock, and their grazing environment could be strong. as consilience 210 opposed to herder views, ecological assessment of degradation is not coupled with livestock production performance. range degradation can be described in terms of vegetation indicators (e.g. poor rangeland condition, vegetation cover, abundance of undesirable plant, presence and absence of valuable forage). the pastoralists associated the availability of desirable grasses with good rangeland conditions while undesirable grasses and forbs with degraded land. the presence and absence of key valuable forage species were used indicators of range degradation rather than using the diversity of entire species. as opposed to pastoral views, ecologists may monitor a few key species to reach decisions on land degradation, while herders used multiple indicators (e.g. fernandez-gimenez, 2000; oba and kotile, 2001). most often ecologists might assess degradation from a conservational point of view for the protection and conservation of landscape, which indicates lack of emphasis from a local-land use perspective. this study and others (e.g. oba, 2001; dabasso et al., 2012) have indicated that range degradation can be explained in terms of soil erosion. use of various indicators to describe rangeland degradation is more or less standard across subsaharan africa (herrmann and hutchinson, 2005; mortimore and turner, 2005), north africa (behnke and scoones, 1993), south africa (hoffman et al., 2007), northern kalahari of namibia (katjiua and ward, 2007), borana of southern ethiopia (gemedo-dalle et al., 2006; solomon et al., 2007) and eastern ethiopia (kassahun et al., 2008). the poor current range condition and range degradation documented in this study were similar to those found in the borana rangeland of southern ethiopia (solomon et al., 2007 ayana and fekadu, 2003), awash rift valley of ethiopia (abule et al., 2005). 4.3. underlying cause and impact for rangeland degradation understanding the driving forces behind rangeland degradation in the dry land ecosystems, however, can be complex. recurrent drought, expansion of crop cultivation, human population growth, settlement, overgrazing, bush encroachment, and bans on use of fire were the main factors attributed to degradation in this study, which corroborates findings of many other studies (gemedo-dalle et al., 2006; solomon et al., 2007). the impact of prolonged drought in the guji and the borana pastoralists has been widely documented (oba, 1998). periodic drought in the guji and the borana communities could induce chronic poverty and local food insecurity (tache and oba, 2010) and massive loss of livestock (cossins and upton, 1988); this view was supported in the present study. demographic factors related to human population growth resulting from an increase in the number of communities themselves, settlements, and immigrants from outside the pastoral area are the underlying causes for rangeland degradation. the human population of guji zone included the study area was about 1,412,972 in 1999 and increased to 1,590,225 in early 2000’s years (addisalem, 2006). furthermore, the annual human population growth rate in the borana rangelands including the study area was about 1-1.3% in the early 1970s (homann et al., 2005), but increased to 2.5% in the 1980s (coppock, 1994). in the late 1990s, the net population growth was estimated at 3% per year (helland, 1997). from this, it can be inferred that increases in consilience abate: rangeland management and degradation human population can aggravate pressure on the existing rangeland resources and lead to land degradation. government policies that were identified as the main causes of degradation include: the expansion of cultivation, settlement programs, and bans on use of fire (beriso, 1995; beriso, 2002). fire plays an ecological role in shaping the structure and composition of rangeland vegetation (e.g. angassa and oba 2008). pastoralists traditionally used fire to control the expansion of bush cover and ticks, to improve pasture quality, and to facilitate livestock movements. however, the use of fire was prohibited in the early 1970s (coppock, 1994). as a result, bush covers have significantly increased (oba, 1998). in the region, bush encroachment has increased within the last four decades, with negative effects on cattle production and community livelihood (angassa and oba, 2008), thereby accelerating the degradation of rangelands. this suggests that inappropriate government development interventions can be linked to rangeland degradation. rangeland degradation can be described in terms of soil erosion (oba, 1998; oba et al., 2000). soil erosion has become a serious problem in the study area with the formation of bare ground and gullies in many places. the change in pastoral land use has weakened the local traditional institution. as a result, the present condition of resource management practices is not as strong as 3-4 decades ago. rangeland degradation in the guji and the borana communities has resulted in a substantial change in livestock holding at the household level, while communities in general have lost their livestock asset and become destitute. another consequence of rangeland degradation is linked to food insecurity, poverty to the extent of food aid, expansion of aridity and the need for alternative livelihood income and diversification, as described by pastoralists in this study, which is in agreement to results found kassahun et al., (2008) in eastern ethiopia. in general, our analysis suggests that the problem of rangeland degradation can cause severe poverty for inhabitants of arid environments. 4.4. herder perception on bush encroachment bush encroachment and the expansion of invasive plant species represent significant problems as found elsewhere in the rangelands of ethiopia (oba et al., 2000; angassa and oba, 2008). smit (2002) suggested that the causal factors for bush encroachment are complex and have been a contentious issue in rangeland ecology. pastoralists considered that drought, overgrazing, livestock movement and absence of fire were the main factors causing woody encroachment, which is in agreement with reports by abule et al., (2005) for the awash rift valley of ethiopia, herrmann and hutchinson (2005) for the sahelian belt of africa, twine (2005) for south africa, gemedo-dalle et al., (2006) and angassa and oba (2008) for the borana zone of southern ethiopia. there is numerous evidence in the literature that bush encroachment causes a decline in rangeland conditions; the respondents in this study supported this view. the control of bush encroachment will require a proper understanding of consilience 212 invasive species, the extent of encroachment, the mechanisms leading to their increase, and the population dynamics of the invasive species, which could be used to develop a long-term community-based control program. 4.5. role of traditional management and system sustainability as noted in this study the indigenous knowledge of pastoralists is closely related to survival and risk management strategies and provides a basis for local-level decision-making pertinent to rangeland management and various other community-based activities (de guchteneire et al., 1999). indigenous knowledge was found to be versatile, and the pastoralists in the guji zone view rangeland resources in a holistic way. additionally, the traditional systems recognize and use several kinds of adaptive rangeland management and improvement techniques. for instance, the use of range enclosure as an adaptive response to scarcity of pasture and drought management, division of herds into home based (waara), and mobile (foora) herds managements system, partition of grazing land into wet and dry seasons, mixed-species herds to use of all ecological niches; mobility to disperse grazing pressure, classification of rangeland at macro landscapes level, rangeland monitoring and assessment knowledge (e.g. range condition, and range degradation), use of hayyaa soil for minerals supplementation, and the knowledge of plant-animal interactions. furthermore, pastoralists have developed well-established rules and regulations for resource uses (e.g. pasture and water resources). these are some of the examples that indicate the importance of indigenous ecological knowledge in sustainable resource management. indigenous knowledge enables pastoralists to survive and adapt in their unpredictable environments. currently, communities reported that the pastoral production system faced numerous challenges and has become increasingly unsustainable (e.g. rangeland degradation, recurrent drought, food insecurity, and poverty). this implies that the rangeland management system is becoming unstable, and pastoral livelihood is more insecure. furthermore, this study supported that the undermining indigenous knowledge, which was comparable to scientific knowledge (oba and kotile, 2001) was the main cause for rangeland degradation and a threat to the livelihood of pastoralists in the region. 5. conclusion and recommendations the results of this study can be relevant for the development and sustainable management of rangelands in arid environments. the finding shows communities have a well-developed and effective assessment and monitoring system. the study reveals communities recognize and use several kinds of traditional rangeland management practices including: range enclosures, seasonal herd mobility, herd diversification, partitioning of grazing lands into wet and dry season. these kinds of rangeland management practices can play a key role in sustainable management and conservation of range resources. the study shows that communities used numerous indicators to explain local level range degradation, encompassing: livestock, soil, vegetation, and water and consilience abate: rangeland management and degradation termite infestation. the causes for degradation were identified to be drought, expansion of crop cultivation, settlement, and human population growth. consequently, degradation may contribute to the decline in household livestock asset, the expansion of aridity, food insecurity and poverty, the weakening of local institutions, and increased community engagement in alternative livelihood income and diversification options. the study shows an alarming increase in degradation and the urgency of measures to halt this trend. additionally, the current condition of rangelands can be enhanced through rehabilitation, conservation, and management. this would involve the strengthening of seasonal herd mobility, herd diversification, strengthening of enclosures and drought reserve pastures in key sites. in these regard, enhancing traditional resource management systems and technological support to pastoralists is recommended. full participation from all stakeholders (public community, policy makers, development practitioners and researcher) who may be directly or indirectly involved in rangeland resource management and conservation is imperative. furthermore, to minimize the pressure on rangeland resources, various stakeholders should emphasize education regarding livestock market, the design of income generation, and livelihood diversification options. additionally from this study, the following points are also concluded: (i), community-based knowledge can be a key element for sustainable management and conservation of resources in arid and semi-arid environments, (ii) community knowledge can be vital to understanding environmental change at a local-level and effective in the development of an assessment and monitoring system (iii) local knowledge can provide a basis for making holistic decisions pertinent to rangeland management, enhance local institutions and encourage local communities to range rehabilitation, (iv), community based knowledge should be integrated into a scientific approach to understand the degradation and to develop tools for a monitoring system. acknowledgements the research work was financed by the office of research, dissemination, and community services of dilla university, ethiopia. i thank agriculture development workers specially samuel abomssa, birbissa, tutishe, samuel bekele, abiyot mesifin and enumerators. i also thank the guji elders for their time and kindness in willing to share their accumulated knowledge and experience on overall rangeland management and degradation in the study area. consilience 214 bibliography abate, t., ebro, a., & 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(2000). individualizing the commons: changing resource tenure among borana oromo of southern ethiopia. ma. thesis, addis ababa university. tache, b. (2010). participatory impacts assessment of drought reserve areas in guji and borana zones, oromia region .report prepared for save the children usa. pp 53 tache, b., & oba, g. (2010). is poverty driving borana herders in southern ethiopia to crop cultivation? human ecology, 38:639-649 turner, n.j., ignace, b., & ignace, r. (2000). traditional ecological knowledge and wisdom of aboriginal peoples in british columbia. ecological applications, 10, 1275–1287 twine, wc. (2005). socio-economic transitions influence vegetation change in the communal rangelands of the south african lowveld. africa journal range forage science, 22(2), 93–99. microsoft word evans.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 13, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 247-266 doing better than divestment will evans university of virginia, charlottesville, virginia wje2qf@virginia.edu abstract in the next several years we will see an increasing number of divestment campaigns spring up among student bodies nationwide. given this trend, i believe it would be helpful to those interested in divestment at u.va and other institutions to first examine the discussion that has followed the campaign so far. what is divestment? is it well argued? does it make economic sense? should we divest? if so, what steps should we take? frequent campaign failures indicate that the divestment argument needs some reworking. the ultimate objectives of this paper are 1) a new argument that elucidates more compelling incentives for u.va to take action against fossil fuels and 2) a financially responsible reinvestment strategy that reflects the greater values of our university. note to reader i have searched endlessly for papers that condense the divestment conversation down to one, digestible text. the best works i have found are long, dense and perhaps not written for students who are generally interested in the subject. so i have dedicated some time to creating one that is. “doing better than divestment” is broken up into six parts, or six articles presenting six different arguments that ultimately contribute to the whole. i hope it helps. 1. introduction this paper serves to help students better understand how they can encourage their institutions to take meaningful action to address the climate crisis. while smallscale sustainability initiatives foster environmental consciousness on our campuses, endowment responsibility shifts our focus back to the more pressing problem: an existential threat that could ultimately wipe out millions. our universities can help foster the immense leadership required to face this challenge by transforming our endowments into powerful educational tools. a collective call for socially responsible investment (sri) publically communicates the importance of defeating unsustainable, short-term profit-driven interests with sustainable, long-term value-driven objectives. students can lead the way by encouraging their administrators to act on this imperative. the divestment movement continues to gain momentum as new campaigns spring up across the country. given this trend, i believe it would be helpful for students interested in divestment to first examine the discussion that has followed the campaign so far. what is divestment? is it well argued? does it make economic sense? should we divest? if so, what steps should we take? frequent campaign failures indicate that the divestment argument needs some reworking. consilience evans: doing better than divestment the objectives of this paper include 1) a new argument that elucidates more compelling incentives for universities to take action against fossil fuels and 2) a socially responsible investment strategy that reflects the greater values of our institutions. i present the university of virginia as a specific case study; however, these arguments do not apply exclusively to any institution. all universities can be moral leaders in this challenge, but that leadership must begin with students. 1. what is divestment? our world faces a severe climate crisis due to a growing concentration of greenhouse gases in our atmosphere, a problem exacerbated by our increasing energy consumption linked to global industrialization and rapid population growth. storms, floods, droughts, and fires associated with climate change are already having their effect on the us economy, and the worst is still to come.1 as top scientists conclude: humanity is in for one pernicious, apocalyptic treat. all fatalism aside, however, there are solutions to be found. divestiture from behemoth fossil fuel companies such as bp and exxonmobil is a good place to start. most universities have endowments of invested capital, e.g. stocks or bonds scattered across a wide array of businesses and industries that, if invested prudently, produce sufficient returns to finance their operations. fossil fuel divestment calls for the removal of stocks from specific companies engaged in the extraction, production, and distribution of dirty energy resources such as coal, natural gas and petroleum, enumerated by the size of their proven reserves. the refinement and consumption of these substances contribute to global climate change by releasing dangerous quantities of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. bill mckibben – founder of 350.org, an organization centered on the objective of reducing atmospheric co2 levels back to a more sustainable 350 parts per million – eloquently puts, “if it is wrong to wreck the climate, then it is wrong to profit from that wreckage.”2 divestment is smart because it politically weakens the industry that pollutes our future. when private and public stocks are removed from those companies, their influence in the marketplace should in theory diminish due to the effects of stigmatization. this strategy, which has precedent in the form of divestment campaigns against tobacco, sudan, and south africa during apartheid – was adopted by a national student-driven campaign launched in 2012. the movement has since galvanized campus support around the objective of convincing colleges and universities to cleanse their endowments of fossil fuel investments. the divestment narrative is admirable, as well as a crucial component to the wider youth climate movement that has burgeoned internationally since the first power shift summit was held in washington d.c. in 2007. however, those who champion its vision have faced much resistance. in 2013, my brother helped organize the divestment campaign at davidson college (endowment size: $560 million). that same year, my cousin orchestrated the tulane campaign (endowment size: $1 billion). despite immense student support, 1 bloomberg, michael r., henry m. paulson, jr., thomas f. steyer, “risky business: the economic risks of climate change in the united states” 2 mckibben, bill, “turning colleges’ partners into pariahs” consilience evans: doing better than divestment neither one succeeded. in fact, among the 300+ student-driven divestment campaigns, only a handful have committed to full divestment from the top 200 fossil fuel companies.3 among those, only one can boast an endowment of over $100 million, the rest averaging at about $30 million or smaller. whether deterred by lower investment returns, commingled funds, or pure politics, the pattern is clear: bigger schools are more reluctant to join the march for environmentally conscious investment. unfortunately, it is these big schools that the movement needs the most. with u.va’s own endowment surpassing the $5 billion mark, it will be particularly challenging for divestment to take root here. by rethinking the divestment campaign, we can generate new incentives for our universities to become national leaders in this global challenge. we can do better than divestment. 2. rethinking divestment as the united nations framework convention on climate change continues to push for more stringent cutbacks on fossil fuel consumption, individuals, organizations, companies, governments, and municipalities around the globe will be driven to cease unsustainable energy practices and divest their fossil fuel assets. while students should recognize this inevitability, they should think carefully about how to encourage their schools to participate in the effort. for the purposes of a student campaign – particularly at this early stage in the market transition – students would do well to focus their efforts on spreading a moral message rather than targeting the industry directly. the rest of this paper argues why student divestment campaigns should recontextualize their arguments as part of a broader conversation on sri. in doing so, campus campaigns will be better positioned to mobilize their resources in order to propel the movement forward through public statements. failed campus divestment campaigns end up being taken down by similar arguments: on a small scale, divestment does little to negatively influence the fossil fuel market because fossil fuels abound. they are in everything from our shoes, roads and toys, to the fuel that ultimately powers the developed world in which we live. the prevalence of fossil fuels in our everyday lives demonstrates the enormity of the industry we are dealing with. we students can do very little to reshape this reality. if student campaigns view their success as a reduced subsidy to the fossil fuel industry tied to subsequent cutback on carbon emissions, then yes, divestment fails. if any university were to magically divest $2 million worth of dirty assets, those shares would likely soon be snatched back up by new investors, if not already engulfed by the $21 billion worth of subsidies the us government pumps into the fossil fuel industry every year.4 and that does not even account for the hundreds of billions wrapped up in hedge funds and private equity that our universities have no control over, despite being heavily vested in those firms.5 factor in the difficulty of 3 fossil free, “fossil free commitments” 4 makhijani, shakuntala, “cashing in on all of the above: u.s. fossil fuel production subsidies under obama” 5 bullard, nathaniel, “fossil fuel divestment: a $5 trillion challenge” consilience evans: doing better than divestment dealing with the major stocks that are pooled together with other institutions, and suddenly there seems to be little incentive for u.va to divest. campaigners must realize that divestment is not an economic argument; it is a social one. a harvard study showed that the south africa apartheid divestment movement in the late 1970s and 1980s had negligible financial impact, and yet still contributed to the dissolution of the south african regime.6 symbolized largely by acts of divestment, worldwide condemnation of human injustices carried out by the national party drove south african whites away from their government under fear of being stigmatized themselves. divestment steered domestic and international public discourse for the better in south africa, and it can have the same effect on our society today. however, unlike the historical movement, the moral question underlying the current campaign is somewhat murkier. it is an overstatement to argue that all fossil fuel companies directly finance the oppression of innocent people. in many ways, they have provided us with the very comforts of modern day living that enable us to organize and rally against such pressing issues. there are a billion people on the planet currently living without electricity, and while we privileged westerners demonize fossil fuels, a good majority of those without power pray that they may one day be plugged in with the rest of us. if our focus is human rights, then many would argue that fossil fuels are often the solution, not the problem. i am not advocating for fossil fuels, but rather offering a reality check to those who may need it. arguing against dirty energy is tricky. most of us do not question the moral merits of fossil fuel consumption because these resources are deeply entrenched in our quotidian existence. even fewer question the supply-side implications of their preferred fuel and power providers. however, by shifting focus from fossil fuels in general to specific cases of social injustice within the industry, campaigns might be more successful in delivering their message. the corporate fossil-complex is riddled with human rights violations.7 royal dutch shell has ravaged communities in the nigerian delta by destroying their natural resources and manipulating their government to violently suppress their cries of protest. chevron, while also accused of aiding and abetting in the injustices perpetrated by the nigerian government, faces human rights allegations (including rape, murder, and enslavement) surrounding hazardous and illicit resource extraction in burma and kazakhstan. 8 bp has deeply defiled the natural resources of colombian farmers, a mere misdemeanor compared to its countless federal criminal and civil charges due to deadly and environmentally devastating operational failures, the worst and most recent of which has amounted to $18 billion in civil penalties.9 10 while these egregious cases are of foremost concern, there are more subtle forms of social injustice that are often left unacknowledged. on top of financing operations linked to human rights abuses, fossil fuel companies fund pseudoscience campaigns intended to undermine the legitimate 6 hong teoh, siew, ivo welch and c. paul wazzan, “the effect of socially activist investment policies on the financial markets: evidence from . . .” 7 watts, michael j., “human rights, violence and the oil complex” 8 “the true cost of chevron: an alternative annual report” (may 2011) 9 verkaik, robert, “bp pays out millions to colombian farmers” 10 bbc, “bp found ‘grossly negligent’ in 2010 gulf oil spill” consilience evans: doing better than divestment science of climate change that threatens its future profits. as naomi oreskes and clara belitz of harvard university point out: “while giving money to support research, fossil-fuel companies also spend money to undermine its results, both directly through misleading advertising and indirectly by supporting think-tanks, trade organizations and other ‘third party allies’ who are continuing to promote disinformation and doubt [about climate change].” universities exist to foster the knowledge that compels revolutionary change in all fields of study, whether it is the r&d of renewable energies or the enhanced monitoring of global climate change. how can we fulfill this purpose if our institutions remain vested in an industry that spends millions to undermine that progress? in other words, any university that pumps money into the pockets of corporate backstabbers needs to rethink its investment portfolio. by now, it should be clear that fossil fuel corporations do not exist for the benefit of humanity, but rather to profit from society’s dependence on their dirty market. by focusing on an egregious corner of the industry, campaigners will be better positioned to make a case to their administrators. i argue that u.va students should start by centering their argument on the injustices felt by local coal mining communities. framing an sri resolution around coal would certainly be an effective first step towards developing a more powerful argument. 2.1 honing the argument in light of u.va’s divestment from apartheid in 1990 and its subsequent divestment from unocal – once a petroleum explorer – in 2001 and the sudanese government in 2006, the campaign will have little effect here unless targeting an industry that clearly deserves condemnation: coal. 11 12 for decades, appalachian communities in west virginia have faced corporate injustices comparable to those targeted by historical divestment campaigns. a royal sociological society study even argues that the coal industry in west virginia has exploited labor communities by means of “ideological manipulation,” manufacturing a local identity that essentially champions coal at the expense of human life.13 the social and environmental costs of coal are indisputable. given its proximity to the west virginia mining industry, u.va in particular should play a bigger role in educating the public on the devastating health effects of coaldependence along with the importance of helping neighboring communities transition over to healthier, more sustainable local economies. divestment is a powerful way to package this message. however, would our administration readily adopt such a proposal? stanford has demonstrated that major schools can work out reasonable divestment resolutions. on may 6 2014 stanford university (endowment size: $18.7 billion) committed to full divestment from coal mining companies, setting a promising precedent for a campaign here at virginia. big schools demand big incentives, and as stanford has demonstrated, coal compels. however, no major research institution 11 guniganti, pallavi, “praising student efforts for divestment” 12 cavalier daily, “divestment portfolio” 13 bell, shannon elizabeth, and richard york, “community economic identity: the coal industry and ideology construction in west virginia” consilience evans: doing better than divestment simply acts on moral imperative alone. a closer assessment of stanford’s motivation for sri reveals that practical incentives ultimately pushed its resolution through. it was a financially easy decision for stanford to remove all of its public holdings from the coal industry. public stocks are easily accessible and can be quickly removed. private stocks – likely accounting for the vast majority of stanford’s dirty assets, many of which may still include coal – are not. furthermore, divestment did not violate the school’s investment responsibility policy because coal shares were too meager to have any significant effect on its returns.14 while stanford’s divestment resolution did not reap financial gain, its losses were insignificant. this example provides ample evidence that the social benefits of sri greatly outweigh the financial hurdles of passing a resolution, which in stanford’s case appear quite minimal. despite stanford’s modest upfront commitment, its act of divestment represented a statement from one of the nation’s leading universities and was featured in the headlines of the new york times that very week. the announcement has since reinvigorated the movement, sparking a new wave of campaigns nationwide. u.va should learn from this example. although divestment would not financially benefit our institution, the moral message can be delivered in a financially feasible manner with little hassle involved. u.va campaigners should emphasize that the degree of initial divestiture is less important than the message that needs to be communicated. however, sri proposals should commit asset managers to working out long-term divestment solutions, a not so unreasonable goal given the unfavorable projections for future returns on fossil fuel investments (discussed in part iv). furthermore, reputable studies have shown that divestment does not necessarily translate to a breach in fiduciary duty. in other words, the university of virginia investment management company (uvimco) can ensure healthy returns on its investments that achieve budgetary demands and minimize risk. it is important to note, however, that greater and wider investment means less risk overall, so socially responsible reinvestment – i.e. in sustainable development and community-centered energy practices – would actually buffer our endowment from any residual risks of fossil fuel divestment. we might start by researching reinvestment models that would directly benefit those communities in west virginia and southwest virginia that have suffered the most under the coal mining industry. in conclusion, by placing divestment within the broader discussion on sri, we can generate more compelling incentives for administrators to join the effort. as stanford has demonstrated, a reasonable compromise can be achieved between students, administrators, and asset managers. however, the real question is whether our board of visitors will be willing to even acknowledge the moral imperative to act. given our university’s continued reliance on coal consumption, this could present a bit of a challenge. i turn now to a more holistic discussion on sri that should help clarify the broader message that needs to be communicated to the american public. these following arguments should help reinforce campaign strategy, and thus strengthen student standing before the board. 14 seiger, alicia, “inside stanford’s coal divestment decision” consilience evans: doing better than divestment 3. divestment, the path to reinvestment this section attempts to flesh out the conversation on sri to help u.va students recognize their overarching objective of publically denouncing unsustainable and socially irresponsible investment. if we want our university to speak strongly against unclean investment – against all fossil fuels – we have to shift the conversation from divestment to reinvestment. the 318 million (and growing) people living in this country will not bend an ear until solar and wind outcompete oil and gas, until zero-emission vehicles prove accessible along with the electrical grid to support them, and until enough capital has been reinvested in the sustainable infrastructures and technologies that must define our energy future. if student activists acknowledged this truth, then campaigns would not view divestment as the end goal but rather as a necessary step towards greener, smarter investment. under the purview of our school’s investment managers, divestment is not an economic solution; reinvestment is. recent economic trends indicate that clean energy technologies – whether in research, development, or manufacturing – are becoming increasingly wise investments. with high prospects in green-tech energies and climate finance, there are plenty of options to be explored. however, the solution is not that simple. the reinvestment message is meaningless unless it accounts for the perverse conflict of interest that ultimately impedes our transition to a greener economy. a recent study showed that 59% of americans support eliminating all subsidies to the fossil fuel industry and 72% advocate for reinvestment in renewables.15 nevertheless, while our demand is changing, supply isn’t listening. the energy market remains dictated by the ultra-wealthy, i.e. corporate executives and big-league lobbyists who profit from preserving our unsustainable, fossil-based economy. despite its highest approval rating in us history, clean energy represents only a small percentage of our energy supply because the fossil fuel lobby stifles its growth. a report in the washington post states, “the [fossil fuel] industry has among the biggest and most powerful contingents in washington,” revealing further that of its 600+ active lobbyists, three of every four once worked for federal government.16 so long as this “revolving door” permits big oil executives and congressmen to exchange salaries behind the backs of the american people, the unsustainable extraction of fossil fuels will continue to hamper growth in the renewable sector. the message is clear: the short-term self-interests of a select few should not overshadow the greater long-term interests of society. our collective academic community can play a larger role in defeating this perverse economic reality by sending a strong message to our public representatives and national leaders, demanding that decision makers adopt long-term planning horizons that span decades, if not centuries. most economic decisions currently operate within a timeframe of only a few years. the short-term thinking that governs most individual businesses and political cycles is simply not compatible with future climate stability. 15 leiserowitz et al., “public support for climate and energy policies in november 2013” 16 eggen, dan, and kimberly kindy, “three of every four oil and gas lobbyists worked for federal 16government” consilience evans: doing better than divestment the collective long-term interests of society – including public and private sectors – must govern our economic decisions. until the energy market reflects social conscience, our moral responsibility of protecting future generations will remain neglected. campaigners should perceive divestment as part of a broader conversation on reinvestment in clean energy and climate mitigation. whereas divestment can powerfully target instances of social harm occurring throughout the fossil fuel industry, reinvestment communicates the greater importance of acting prudently in response to climate change. in short, divestment and reinvestment deserve equal footing within the sri discussion. combined, they transform our endowment into a powerful educational tool forged by the core values of our academic community. our business is education. we should capitalize on this service by extending it beyond our university community to the broader american people. fulfilling our wider educational responsibilities would allow us to join stanford in steering the american people away from fossil fuels, and simultaneously, support a greener energy economy. ultimately, the goal is to capture the attention of our public representatives so that government can begin regulating the market in a way that facilitates our transition away from fossil fuels. until the market adjusts, i.e. demand shifts and supply follows, our petrochemical-based economy will continue to trudge forth unsustainably towards a dirty horizon. 4. why reinvestment makes economic sense in this section, i do not attempt to justify reinvestment as a means for reaping greater financial benefit. instead, i argue that the movement towards sri parallels an ongoing shift in our energy market. by recontextualizing the divestment discussion as part of a broader global energy narrative, students can generate more compelling incentives for their administrators to help facilitate this transition. 4.1 a new energy narrative as we’ve shifted over to the 21st century, the prospect for a fossil-based economy has diminished. total annual returns on fossil fuel investments are currently at their lowest since 1998, performing worse than any sub-sector in the standard & poor’s 500.17 the only shares in energy (not including renewables) that will reap any worthwhile returns are those staked in natural gas. however, advocating for increased investment in gas exploration merely locks the us further into another unsustainable fossil fuel reliance. investments translate directly to the development of concrete super structures including extraction wells, transmission lines, and processing plants – collectively impeding progress towards cleaner energy by absorbing the financial resources necessary to make this critical transition. while short-term profits from gas shares are guaranteed to be high, we must think long-term. we must view this resource as a necessary stepping-stone, not as the end all-be all. in other words, climate urgency should compel policy actors to recognize minimal thresholds for gas investment so that the further development of natural gas 17 morningstar stock market data through september 2014 consilience evans: doing better than divestment infrastructures does not hamper our much-needed shift to green energy. our board of visitors should honor this truth. there is no healthy future in fossil fuels. despite short-term positive projections by the energy information administration (eia), future fossil fuel investments will inevitably dwindle, with coal dropping out first.18 no asset manager will refute the fact that coal has become a poor stock choice.19 coal production in central appalachia has been declining for decades because the resource is becoming increasingly dangerous and expensive to extract. coal is no longer a viable option for many of these local economies.20 while the coal market is deteriorating, there has already been a decrease in production across the three major oil corporations: chevron, shell, and exxonmobil.21 as a result, their capital expenditure, i.e. the percentage of profits that gets channeled back into the industry, has decreased dramatically. point being, current long-term growth trajectories do not present favorable stock values to outside investors. remaining shares will be funneled towards more expensive extraction methods such as enhanced oil recovery and thermal intervention that target unconventional reserves including oil sands and shale oil in pristine (and often politically corrupt) regions of the middle east, canada, and south america. these techniques are already exacerbating environmental degradation by destroying habitat and tripling the amount of greenhouse gasses emitted during the refinery process. investing in such harmful practices is simply unjust, not to mention financially unsound. last, in response to climate threats, the internationally agreed upon goal of limiting global warming to 2 °c suggests a strengthening global consensus on ending fossil fuel reliance. a recent report reveals that if world governments are serious about meeting that goal, 80% of fossil reserves would have to remain underground – “stranded” – threatening to drain $28 trillion from the industry within the next couple decades. i believe i have made my point: any argument for continued fossil fuel investment is simply null. as sri gains momentum, more mechanisms are being put in place to help increase the transparency of investment portfolios, enabling institutional investors to align financial actions with values. blackrock, the world’s largest fund management company, has launched a new index series to help investors avoid companies wrapped up in the exploration, ownership, or extraction of fossil fuels. the wellrespected aperio group also offers feasible indexing for major investors such as u.va to screen against socially and environmental irresponsible finance while maintaining the integrity of their portfolios. the influx of sri solutions demonstrates the influence of the divestment movement on market behavior. more options will become available as the campaign gains momentum, transforming dirty black box endowments into clean and transparent financial flows. the financial argument for divestment certainly does not ring hollow. without reinvestment, however, the message will grow stale. rather than throwing money at technologies that will ultimately swallow up the profits from the hard oil 18 u.s. energy information administration, aeo 2014 report overview 19 goldman sachs, “the window for thermal coal investment is closing” 20 gardner, sarah, “in kentucky, who’s to blame for coal’s decline?” 21 sanati, cyrus, “chevron’s major gamble: baffling spending amid production declines” consilience evans: doing better than divestment they attempt to extract, why not pack up those operations altogether and reallocate the funds towards renewable energy where there is a future? not convinced? look overseas. the european union projects that member state shares in the renewable energy sector will hit 20.7% by 2020, paralleling an unprecedented 24.4% rate of total renewable energy production. 22 that is in four years, and the commission institutes new milestones every year. a report released by bloomberg new energy finance claims that cleaner energy will attract $5.5 trillion by 2030, a fast-paced shift away from the current fossil fuel-laden market amounting to an impressive $5 trillion challenge. prospects for a greener economy are beginning to shape up here in the us as well. the eia projects that our own market for wind and solar will double within the next twenty years. however our domestic transition will prove difficult without the cooperation of both private and public sectors. government will have to provide incentives for energy companies to concentrate efforts toward developing community-based clean energy infrastructures. renewable energy technologies are most effective when operating jointly under a decentralized model. ideally, different local energy inputs would collectively feed into a smart grid with the capacity for both storage and transferability between homes, ensuring a constant supply despite the volatility of wind and solar. germany and other eu states are already implementing a similar model. progress overseas begs the question of when the us will make strides to follow suit. as long as we continue to lock ourselves into a natural gas economy, our energy grid will remain incompatible with those new technologies that ultimately have to replace the old. the international energy agency has already announced that worldwide clean-tech energy production will surpass natural gas by 2016.23 this last year, total investment returns on solar have far surpassed those on fossil fuel exploration and production.24 no energy sector is growing faster than renewables. while the domestic market is not quite up to speed with the global energy trend, we would be unwise to ignore the inevitable. 4.2 exercising political prudence at the end of the day, fossil fuel investments contribute to a massive carbon emissions debt that will inevitably wreak financial havoc in the form of severe climate consequences, reducing the 2008 downturn to a mere historical hiccup. republican henry paulson, former us secretary of the treasury, puts it best: “we’re making the same mistake today with climate change. we’re staring down a climate bubble that poses enormous risks to both our environment and economy. the warning signs are clear and growing more urgent as the risks go unchecked.”25 does our university investment portfolio neglect fiduciary duty by failing to account for this colossal risk? 22 european commission, “energy roadmap 2050” 23 international energy agency, “renewable to surpass gas by 2016 in the global power mix” 24 morningstar 25 paulson jr., henry m., “the coming climate crash: lessons for climate change in the 2008 recession” consilience evans: doing better than divestment the renewable energy policy network for the 21st century eloquently states, “the future of renewable energy is fundamentally a choice, not a foregone conclusion given technology and economic trends.” 26 while economic trends provide incentives, they are ultimately the product of human will. a powerful statement from u.va can help foster that will by steering our nation’s citizens in the right direction. we should untether our beloved institution from any industry that pollutes this vision and, instead, harness the clean technologies that harmonize with it. societal demand for cleaner energy must not be overshadowed by the selfinterest of the corporate elite because climate stability depends on a greener energy economy now. financial decisions that reflect distance horizons guide us to prosperity. short-term thinking does just the opposite, forcing us deeper into a hole where we’ll find nothing but unscrupulous mortgage brokers and depleted oil deposits. by 2040, many of our administrators will have passed on, but we will be in our prime. we are the true stakeholders. we deserve attention. and we need all the help we can get. 5. working with the institution every campaign should strive to deliver the same moral message: we must unfetter ourselves from our dirty past and embrace a more just and cleaner future. however students should adopt campaign strategies that are appropriately tailored to their respective institutions. part v examines some of the lessons learned from other schools to help inform an effective campaign here at u.va. campaigns at different schools face different challenges. universities with smaller endowments (i.e. roughly under $100 million) should have an easier time working out divestment resolutions because their endowment portfolios are typically more accessible to private asset managers. that said, the stanford success story suggests that size alone is no excuse for inaction. so what prevents hundreds of other schools from responding similarly to student campaigns? we might begin by looking at several administrative statements regarding divestment proposals that have been released thus far. the administration at swarthmore (endowment size: $1.5 billion) that rejected divestment in 2012 responded rather defensively. swarthmore president chopp delivered an op-ed piece to the student body, in which she asserts, "…the time and circumstances are ripe for collaboration rather than divisive and adversarial uses of our combined energies." 27 why does the administration perceive the campaign as divisive and adversarial? this language is echoed in harvard president faust's rejection statement released in 2013, which reads that the tactic "pits concerned citizens and institutions against companies that have enormous capacity and responsibility to promote progress toward a more sustainable future." 28 indeed, divisive language turns administrators away, but for different reasons depending on the institution. for instance, administrators at powerful research centers such as harvard and mit argue that divestment threatens to disturb vital sources of funding crucial to the 26 taken from the ren21 global futures report for 2013 27 chopp, rebecca, “op-ed: chopp on divestment” 28 faust, drew, “fossil fuel divestment statement” consilience evans: doing better than divestment r&d of alternative energy technologies and climate science. obviously, small liberal arts colleges such as swarthmore have fewer vested interests in maintaining cooperative ties with major energy corporations. therefore, administrators at smaller schools may be reacting defensively because student demands are simply disagreeable. as i have already argued, most student divestment strategies lack the astuteness required of any institutional investment proposition. while few administrators actually dismiss the broader importance of ending fossil fuel reliance, many perceive “divestment” as a divisive term due to this persistent clash between impractical student ambition and practical administrative duty. for this reason students should be careful not to let campaign fervor clout thoughtful campaign strategy. a strictly student-driven campaign is most vulnerable to this risk. in stark contrast to swarthmore and harvard, middlebury president liebowitz (endowment size: $1 billion) delivered a rejection statement that offers prospects for strengthening efforts around the cause. according to liebowitz, the school intends to carry the campaign’s momentum forward through a variety of proactive joint student-faculty initiatives. students are working with the investment committee to develop principles of environment, social and governance (esg) for guiding investment decisions and institutional policy, while also working to redirect endowment funds towards esg investments. in other words, a proposal rejection does not necessarily translate to inaction on sri. middlebury president liebowitz not once criticizes the divestment movement, nor does he insinuate that students should abandon it altogether. instead, he encourages the conversation on responsible investment and even offers a divestment fact sheet enumerating various insights into the school's endowment portfolio. why does the middlebury administration appear more receptive than those of other administrations? the rest of this chapter explains how students can work more collaboratively with their universities to develop meaningful responsible investment resolutions against fossil fuels. 5.1 lessons learned the middlebury rejection resonates positively because students, faculty and administrators are working together towards a common investment strategy. an integrated and inclusive approach is crucial because it leaves meager room for “the naïve dissenter versus rational authority” scenario. campaigns at davidson and tulane proved ineffective because they relied almost entirely on action-oriented student power. let’s not let jeffersonian principles of self-governance get to our heads; we could use the help. an effective clean investment campaign at u.va and other research institutions will require enhanced focus on reinvestment and, most important, a greater diversity of support. because our university receives significant funding from major fossil-supporting energy corporations (i.e. dominion power), our language will have to be tailored appropriately. the language of reinvestment and responsible investment will prove far more productive than that of divestment, which has already been deemed divisive by u.va faculty. that said the middlebury lesson should not be given short shrift. consilience evans: doing better than divestment students should invite well-respected members of the university, spanning multiple disciplines and positions, into the discussion to ensure the legitimacy of their message. perhaps our most valuable asset includes the professors whose knowledge forms the very foundation of our institutions. advanced students in business and economics are also wise allies because they are well qualified to discuss finance at the administrative level. consulting experienced individuals within the institution ensures that investment resolutions are crafted carefully and made palatable to boards of trustees. every board is comprised of different individuals expressing different opinions and values, which are ultimately dictated by the financial status of the school. a university suffering from major financial cutbacks will be less willing to discuss opportunities for sri. therefore, the presentation of any resolution should be tailored accordingly. it is imperative that campaigners consider the perspectives of their administrators because thinking from the top exposes potential counterarguments that are crucial to informing and strengthening campaign strategy. while our investment decisions ultimately fall under the purview of uvimco, they should be guided by a policy that takes into account the greater values of our institutional body, encompassing students, faculty, and alumni. if the demand is there, our asset managers will have no choice but to work out a solution that accommodates a divestment resolution; otherwise, they lose our business. however, there will be no demand on grounds without conviction, and similarly, no conviction without cooperation. our board of visitors should be transparent, cooperative, and open to different investiture review models. ideally we would adopt an inclusive structure similar to the one that stanford has, i.e. an investment advisory panel that serves as a moral bearing to the board. stanford has set the precedent for schools such as mit and harvard. with one of the largest renewable energy research and development programs in the nation, its administration has realized that it cannot continue suckling from the very industry it purports to have outgrown; fossil fuels are an adolescent dependency. as stanford asserts, we need to grow up. by emboldening public discourse, we too can educate others to do the same. 5.2 adopting outside strategy i began by outlining certain precautions gleaned from rejected resolutions; i end by focusing on the positive. while student campaigners should strive to cooperate with experienced members within their institutions, they should also examine outside strategies that have contributed significantly to the movement thus far. with hundreds of ongoing campaigns, there are plenty of compelling lessons to be found. i offer three admirable outside strategies that might help guide student efforts here at u.va: • developing a narrative: swarthmore students have centered their divestment campaign on the devastating damages of mountain top removal felt by appalachian coal mining communities. a mountain justice narrative comprised of real testament from effected individuals would deliver a consilience evans: doing better than divestment powerful message to u.va, particularly given our proximity to these regions and continued reliance on coal. • exercising self-governance: columbia students have started a fund for responsible investment independent of their university endowment. the fund will generate revenue for sustainable development and student climate justice projects. furthermore, it demonstrates the credibility and rigor of student demand for clean investment, while sending a message to administrators that students will not let institutional inertia hamper meaningful progress on reinvestment. u.va students should work closely with net impact at darden to start a similar project. • working with the institution: empowered by student initiative, stanford’s advisory panel to the board, including twelve students, faculty and alumni, developed a divestment resolution demanding sri. this concerted effort drove stanford’s board of trustees to recognize the sheer importance of letting no industry overshadow the greater values of its institution. u.va could greatly benefit by implementing a similar structure. each example offers unique insight into effective campaign strategy. in summary, emphasis on mountain top removal ties university energy reliance directly to real injustices felt by local communities. the creation of an independent fund for responsible investment garners student credibility by demonstrating their determination to deliver meaningful sri results despite administrative reluctance. finally, the formation of a joint student-faculty advisory panel on responsible investment ensures that wider institutional values are represented in administrative financial decisions. in light of these examples, the u.va campaign should be able to work more strategically within its own institution towards promoting sri. driven by collective conviction, we can begin to explore options for cleansing our endowment of dirty assets, though responsibly so as to not to disrupt the flow of returns crucial to the integrity of our institution.29 that said, sri is first and foremost an opportunity for universities to align actions with values by rallying their communities around the objective of combating climate change through political action and wider education. i cannot emphasize this point enough. 6. why our generation will not tolerate unclean investment 29 working with the institution also opens up opportunity for parallel reinvestment solutions such as a green revolving fund (grf) an initiative that has already achieved student council support here at u.va. a grf is an internal fund made accessible to organizational bodies at the university aiming to implement green projects that would cut back on facility costs campus-wide, recouping any lost returns and offsetting carbon emissions in the long run. why revolving? because savings are pumped back into the fund creating a revolving, self-sufficient vehicle for further green investments on campus. if cutting back on greenhouse gas emissions is our ultimate objective then, unlike divestment, a grf is a real solution that directly benefits the institution. nonetheless, local solutions should serve to supportive our broader objective, not define it. consilience evans: doing better than divestment the turn of the 21st century has been accompanied by an unprecedented shift in economic and political philosophy, a shift that is felt most by the current generation. as the acclaimed economist jeremy rifkin puts it, “[our] politics are less about left versus right and more about centralized and authoritarian versus distributed and collaborative.”30 when one considers the noticeable transition in our communications infrastructure, i.e. from telephones to twitter, there is little surprise that we millennials have become more receptive to terms such as “transparent” and “distributive. this change in our generation’s attitude parallels a massive shift in our country’s energy economy. the centralized and fossil fuel-based industry that has dominated nearly all aspects of american society (including political office) for over a century is being supplanted by a more distributive and transparent green marketplace centered on renewable energy technologies. these two trends complement each other quite well. the decentralized and cooperative infrastructure that is required to optimize wind and solar supply across the grid calls for a citizenry that knows how to collaborate, share, and keep an open mind to progressive change. if this shift in values has become the flagship philosophy of our generation, then unresponsive schools such as u.va, harvard, swarthmore, davidson, tulane, and columbia continue to support an outdated energy regime that subsists on the suppression of our collective voice. students must demand cooperation and transparency, but more important, we must demand prudence. socially and environmentally responsible investment serves to educate society about the importance of keeping planet earth habitable for future generations. any educational institution that fails to act on this critical truth – largely voiced by the students of our generation – again undermines the principle role of its own existence: to educate. what better way to fulfill this purpose than by echoing one of the most powerful educational statements of the 21st century, to teach our citizens to live sustainably with the world, so that those very institutions we cherish the most can serve as beacons to society for centuries to come. while student concerns tend to reflect the broader political and societal landscape, administrative interests rarely exceed the institutional bubble. fortunately, there is ample room to reconcile short-term interests of our administrations with the long-term interests of society championed by students; they are one and the same. if our future energy economy is centered on a wind and solar infrastructure, then students and administrators alike have interest in liberating the “free market” from the grasp of the fossil fuel elite so that the outdated model can be replaced with one that is more sustainable. however, the message is not being communicated because boards of trustees are simply not listening. is the perverse conflict of interest reflected in the broader energy market being reenacted on our own college campuses? if rifkin is right, then perhaps it is the very authoritarian and centralized nature of our educational institutions – remnant of an era crafted by the hands of oil lobbyists and big-business bureaucrats – that undermines our distributive and collaborative efforts. for this reason, radical change at the institutional level demands more than a few “ayes” from student government. it demands a coming together of students and 30 rifkin, jeremy, “the third industrial revolution” consilience evans: doing better than divestment faculty under one powerful voice. as primary stakeholders in a future green economy, our generation would be unwise to remain idle. we must demand prudence, and we must act now. the standard for social and environmental responsibility has never been higher. 7. conclusions if the intellectual community exists to impel political and social progress, then so do our endowments. our endowments are in many ways the hearts of our institutions, enriching our academic communities with a vital stream of capital that ultimately keeps us alive and growing. if the heart is poisoned, then so is the body. therefore, endowments are inextricably linked to our campus communities and collective values—education above all. harvard’s president faust argues that our endowments must not be used to make political or social statements. i disagree. our investment portfolios exist to serve education, and therefore should be employed as powerful educational tools to honor this responsibility. our university investments should ultimately reflect our community values, which do not align with those of an industry that negligently endangers and destroys human life, freely pollutes our atmosphere and exacerbates our climate crisis, and undermines scientific progress. our university serves to educate and protect; the fossil fuel industry serves to brainwash and profit. if our students, faculty, and alumni value the future health and education of our society, then we will make a moral commitment to sever financial ties with the fossil fuel industry and encourage decisionmakers to adopt long-term economic plans to support a greener economy. combined, divestment and reinvestment form a powerful statement that will resonate with neighboring institutions and politicians. with social injustices and climate challenges escalating, we would be unwise to keep quiet. but first we need a voice. with enough collective will, bolstered by smart faculty and students, we can rethink the divestment campaign in a way that provides u.va with an opportunity to become a national leader in this global challenge. 8. resolution summary 1. we should create a coalition of students, faculty, and alumni to serve as a moral compass for socially responsible investment to our administration, ensuring that the values of the greater institution are reflected in our investment portfolio. 2. we should remove all public holdings from coal or from any fossil-target branded by evident civil abuse while pledging to adopt a long-term divestment timeline. divestment serves to educate society by publically communicating an emphatic no to fossil fuels. 3. we should reinvest in a more sustainable energy economy by promoting the development of community-based energy solutions. reinvestment serves to educate society by publically communicating an emphatic yes to renewables. consilience evans: doing better than divestment 4. climate change is ultimately a national security threat that could displace and wreck the lives of millions. needless to say, the issue demands the full attention of our institutional body—students and administrators alike. therefore, our chief objective should entrust our asset managers with exploring alternative, broader opportunities for reinvestment in climate change mitigation and adaptation; the stronger our commitment, the more powerful our statement. consilience evans: doing better than divestment bibliography ansar, a., ben caldecott, and james tilbury. stranded assets and the fossil fuel divestment campaign: what does divestment mean for the valuation of fossil fuel assets? accessed september 4, 2014. bbc. bp found ‘grossly negligent’ in 2010 gulf oil spill. september 4, 2014. accessed september 4, 2014. belitz, clara, and naomi oreskes. universities must end financial ties to climate denying fossil-fuel giants – now. the guardian, april 17, 2014. accessed september 4, 2014. bell, shannon elizabeth, and richard york. community economic identity: the coal industry and ideology construction in west virginia. rural sociology 75(1), 2010, pp. 111–143 bloomberg, michael r., henry m. paulson, jr., thomas f. steyer. risky business: the economic risks of climate change in the united states. 2014. accessed september 4, 2014. bullard, nathaniel. fossil fuel divestment: a $5 trillion challenge. bloomberg, new energy finance. august 25, 2014. accessed september 4, 2014. cavalier daily. divestment portfolio. october 3, 2006. accessed september 4, 2014. eggen, dan, and kimberly kindy. three of every four oil and gas lobbyists worked for federal government. washington post, july 22, 2010. accessed september 4, 2014. european commission. energy roadmap 2050: impact assessment and scenario analysis. december 15, 2011. accessed september 4, 2014. fossil free. fossil free commitments. accessed september 4, 2014. guniganti, pallavi. praising student efforts for divestment. april 5, 2001. accessed september 4, 2014. hong teoh, siew, ivo welch and c. paul consilience evans: doing better than divestment wazzan. the effect of socially activist investment policies on the financial markets: evidence from . . . 1999. accessed september 4, 2014. international energy agency. renewable to surpass gas by 2016 in the global power mix. june 26, 2013. accessed september 4, 2014. leiserowitz, a., maibach, e., roser-renouf, c., feinberg, g., & rosenthal, s. (2014) public support for climate and energy policies in november 2013. yale university and george mason university. new haven, ct: yale project on climate change communication. accessed september 4, 2014. lenferna, georges. betting on & investing in climate failure: the ethics and economics of fossil fuel divestment. accessed september 4, 2014. mckibben, bill. global warming’s terrifying new math. july 19, 2012. accessed september 4, 2014. mckibben, bill. turning colleges’ partners into pariahs. new york times, february 11, 2014. accessed september 4, 2014. makhijani, shakuntala. cashing in on all of the above: u.s. fossil fuel production subsidies under obama. oil change international, washington dc, usa july 2014. accessed september 4, 2014. paulson jr., henry m. the coming climate crash: lessons for climate change in the 2008 recession. june 21, 2014. accessed september 4, 2014. rifkin, jeremy. the third industrial revolution. new york, ny: palgrave macmillan, 2011. sanati, cyrus. chevron’s major gamble: baffling spending amid production declines. may 5, 2014. accessed september 4, 2014. seiger, alicia. inside stanford’s coal divestment decision. may 28, 2014. accessed september 4, 2014. verkaik, robert. bp pays out millions to colombian farmers. july 22, 2006. accessed september 4, 2014. watts, michael j. human rights, violence and the oil complex. niger delta: economies of violence working paper 2. 2004. accessed september 4, 2014. microsoft word winters.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 13, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 285-300 the botswana bushmen’s fight for water & land rights in the central kalahari game reserve olivia jane winters school of oriental and african studies university of london, london, united kingdom 607049@soas.ac.uk abstract the botswana bushmen live in the central kalahari game reserve in the centre of botswana. the area is known to be one of the most rugged, arid landscapes on the face of the planet. in recent years, due to claims from the botswana government that the bushmen needed to ‘develop’, extreme efforts have been made to force the bushmen from the reserve originally allotted to them in the 1960s. author’s note i chose to research the situation of the botswana bushmen in the ckgr after learning about them when working with the organization survival international. i since then have become a strong supporter of indigenous groups worldwide. the bushmen in particular are an incredible example of the endurance of mankind in the most trying of environments. it is my belief that through sustainable development we can not only learn a great deal from those people whose voices otherwise would not be heard, but we can also show future generations the importance of the ethical treatment of all human beings. 1. introduction the presence of water is essential to both human survival and human development. therefore, “for any sovereign nationstate government, the conquest and control of water resources is a paramount concern.” (workman: 2009, 128). this governmental drive to obtain and possess water, in order to progress human development, can be seen in botswana, one of the fastest growing economies in the world.1 since its independence in 1966, the government of botswana (gob) has sought to develop and advance through a series of progressive social policies and capital investment.2 through this development, certain groups of botswana have benefitted, while others, primarily smaller, undervalued groups, have been forced to assimilate with development plans, or risk being pushed out. one such group marginalised by the gob is the bushmen of the central kalahari game reserve. through aggressive measures such as prohibiting access to water and basic human 1 (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html, accessed december 9, 2013; taylor, 2007). 2 ibid. consilience winters: bushmen’s fight for water & land rights services, the gob has gradually diminished the freedoms and right to life of this indigenous group, at the cost of what they refer to as “development”.3 the british protectorate originally established the central kalahari game reserve, or ckgr, in 1961 with the intent to protect the territory of the indigenous hunter-gatherer communities of the area (bushmen), and the wildlife resources they subsist on (sarkin & cook: 2010-2011, 12). however, in more recent years, the reserve has been the hotbed of international attention following the gob’s decision to begin removing the indigenous tribes off of their traditional land. this decision came shortly after the country’s discovery in the late 1980s of one of the largest diamond deposits in the world (survival international, workman: 2009, sarkin & cook: 2010-2011, 17). the government then turned its back on its original declaration of the purpose of the reserve, and set out to relocate the thousands of bushmen to resettlement camps on the outskirts of the ckgr (sarkin & cook 2010-2011, survival international, morinville & rodina: 2013). what ensued was an ongoing legal battle between the government of botswana and the indigenous bushmen and their horde of supporters, both national and international human rights groups that were outraged. due to the extensive nature of this issue, it is unrealistic to cover all of the events which happened over such a long period of time. therefore the points discussed in the following argument are slightly narrow in scope so as to allow for a greater range of subjects to be mentioned. the following expose will discuss the realities of the government’s intentions in the alleged development agenda behind the relocation of the bushmen and the deeper connection it has to the human right to water. it will also discuss whether the gob’s development policies are, in fact, for the greater good of the people they are meant to be helping, and if they are benefitting the development of the country as a whole. 2. the bushmen & their history of marginalisation the bushmen, otherwise referred to as the san, bushpeople, basarwa, n/oakwe, or kwe, “refer to a heterogeneous group of peoples who have predominantly resided in the contemporary contexts of botswana, namibia, south africa, zimbabwe, lesotho, mozambique, swaziland, and angola” (morinville and rodina: 2013, 5). while they are known internationally under many terms, for the purposes of honouring their history, and in trying to best avoid the derogatory connotations behind many of their names, they will hereafter be referred to as bushmen (survival international, stephen corry: 2011, nthomang: 2002). these hunter-gatherers are believed to be one of oldest indigenous groups on earth, having lived in southern africa for tens of thousands of years (survival international, sarkin & cook: 2010-2011). findings by geneticists show that the bushmen and their neighbours, the khoekhoe, carry genetic material indicating their ancestors as the ancestors of all living people (sarkin & cook: 2010-2011). their deep knowledge of their land has enabled them to survive in sub-saharan africa, 3 the eviction of the bushmen. prod. carte blanche. survival international. carte blanche, n.d. web. 20 nov. 2013. <http://www.survivalinternational.org/films/carteblanche>. documentary consilience winters: bushmen’s fight for water & land rights “the most water-stressed region of the world”, for thousands of years (qiu, pulitzer center, 2013). the bushmen’s history of inequality is not recent and is attributed to the “evolution of the cattle industry” led by the local tswana peoples well before the independence of botswana. the tswana, “traditionally a cattle-herding culture…developed several major tswana kingdoms” headed by kgosi, or chiefs. (sarkin & cook: 2010-2011, 6-7) the power of the kgosi was often determined by the amount of cattle they possessed, thus leading to the large growth of cattle herds in the region, particularly between the 17th and 19th centuries (good: 2003; sarkin & cook: 2010-2011). during this pre-colonial era, the ruling tswana kingdoms forbade bushmen from participating in local politics and owning land, eventually reducing the group to slavery and serfdom (good, 1993, sarkin & cook, 2010-2011). in one description by siegfried passarge, the daily life and labour of the bushmen included “‘forced pillages of property, unjust requisitions for work, and most of all the daily rapes of the women and girls’…murder almost ‘constantly’ accompanied these ravages” (good, 2003, 14). during the british protectorate, things did not significantly change for the bushmen, for when the british arrived in botswana, it was the tswana who were viewed as the ruling party while all other groups were forgotten (sarkin & cook, 2010-2011). with the advent of the cattle industry in botswana in the 1930s, much of the open lands were seized by tswana and privatized, once again pushing the bushmen off the land and being given no rights. furthermore, the landowners, with the help of newer technology, began to construct private boreholes to maintain their livestock, tapping “water sources in bedrock aquifers, beneath the sand cover, allowing access to water previously inaccessible” (morinville & rodina: 2013, sarkin & cook: 20102011, 8). the bushmen, who relied mostly on surface water, occasional rain harvesting, and communal boreholes as their primary water sources, were now forced to travel greater distances in search of water (morinville & rodina: 2013). additionally, measures enacted by the british such as the chieftainship act and the tribal territories act of 1933 gave greater official power to the “eight principal tswana-descended ethnic groups”, which were later carried over into independence and to this day prohibit the “thirty eight other ethnic groups” in botswana from meaningfully participating in politics and having a voice in greater social decisions (cook & sarkin, 2010). this decades-long pattern of extending land for private cattle herders has increasingly reduced the availability of communal lands for the bushmen, and other small hunter-gatherer communities, to subsist on. the 1975 tribal grazing land policy is another example of how the formerly “communally owned land around the kalahari desert” was “[re-allocated] to the more economically powerful members…[of] botswana”, which happened to also be the majority ethnic groups of the tswana (nthomang, 2002, 110). this not only annexed the bushmen from their land, but left them landless, penniless, and forced into serfdom by the tswana elite (nthomang, 2002). this alleged economic development of cattle herding has not only stripped the bushmen of their rights and lifestyle, but it is also presently places immense strain on the environmental resources of the country, in particular water. (sarkin & cook: 2010-2011) furthermore, “the gob has used the [bushmen’s] perceived nomadic nature as an excuse to validate denying them ownership over any land or natural resources. in a 1978 legal opinion, the gob proclaimed that the consilience winters: bushmen’s fight for water & land rights [bushmen’s] ‘nomadic status’ indicates that, ‘they have ‘no rights of any kind’ deriving from customary practices, and in particular no land rights” (sarkin & cook: 2010-2011, 9). while the marginalisation of the bushmen began in the post-colonial period, its destructive pattern continues into the present day. even with the demarcation of the ckgr for the indigenous group in the 1960s, the gob continues to go to great lengths to ensure that the bushmen are unable to survive on their land (sarkin & cook: 2010-2011, survival international, nthomang: 2002, morinville & rodina: 2013). 3. the battle for the central kalahari game reserve when the central kalahari game reserve (ckgr) was created in 1961, the bushmen believed their ancestral lands had finally been returned to them. the reserve, which sits in the centre of the country, is the “second largest game reserve on the…continent” (sarkin & cook: 2010-2011,12). in the early 1980s, with the discovery of diamonds on the ckgr, the gob set out to relocate the bushmen to resettlement camps on the outskirts of the reserve (survival international). while the government maintains that there is no linkage between the mineral discovery and the bushmen’s forced removal, some bushmen and their representatives (e.g. human rights organisations such as survival international) do not agree. in three clearances spanning from 1997 to 2005, the bushmen were “encouraged” to leave the reserve. “the rationale behind the relocation project as presented by the government of botswana was threefold(1) it was cost prohibitive for the government to provide services to remote and dispersed populations; (2) people and wildlife were incompatible in the reserve; (3) [bushmen] would be better off in locations closer to developed infrastructure” (morinville and rodina: 2013). furthermore, the gob claimed the bushmen had to develop themselves by forgoing their traditional lifestyles, as they were “‘stone aged creatures’ who were doomed to ‘die out like the dodo’ if they failed to fall in with official plans for their development” (good: 2008, 124). the gob not only assumed the bushmen were a primitive and undeveloped peoples, but also that their lifestyle was greatly reducing the number of wildlife game in the ckgr, which in fact was the opposite.4 arthur albertson, an ecologist, developed a management plan approved by the botswana department of wildlife, which would allow for the inhabitants to stay on the reserve. in his research, he found that “the inhabitants on the reserve have always lived sustainably in their community areas and have never depleted the resources…[and] wildlife members have actually increased in the reserve in recent years.”5 6 these findings, if acknowledged by the gob, could have contributed much to the proposed management of the ckgr and provided insight in the arena of sustainable development and conservation. however, despite albertson’s best efforts, when he and lawyer glen williams met with margaret nasha to discuss the plan, the minister of local government admitted to having a copy of the plan but not having read it. additionally, in a press conference, the minister showed the 4 http://www.survivalinternational.org/films/carteblanche. 5 ibid. 6 http://www.ditshwanelo.org.bw/images/ckgr seminar.pdf. consilience winters: bushmen’s fight for water & land rights management proposal to all, claiming it as “a plan of how the resources of the central kalahari [would be] used, how and by whom.”7 as carte blanche points out, “if the minster had eventually read the plan, perhaps she missed the section which states that, ‘it acknowledges the presence of the people in the ckgr and empowers them to use their zones sustainably’.”8 in addition to this embarrassing lack of research on behalf of the government, they also continued to inaccurately maintain that the reserve was intended for the protection of the botswana wildlife, when it fact it had been designated for the bushmen (taylor: 2007, morinville & rodina: 2013, gall: 2003). when the british created the ckgr in 1961, it was meant as a permanent home for the tribe. however, the administrative officer george siberbauer used the title of “game reserve” as there was no proper legislation at the time which would allow for the establishment of a “peoples reserve” (sarkin & cook: 2010-2011, 12). thus, the ckgr “is unique in that it was created not only as a nature reserve but also to protect the rights of around 5000 people, mostly san, who wanted to maintain their hunting-gathering lifestyle” (taylor: 2007, 3). knowing the reserve was set aside for the bushmen and that arthur albertson’s ecological studies have shown that the bushmen are not negatively impacting the wildlife, what then could the botswana government claim was the reason behind the tribes relocation? minister margaret nasha in a personal interview with carte blanche claimed, “the issue of basarwa [(bushmen)], sometimes i equate it to the elephant. we once had the same problem with elephants. when we wanted to cull, and people said no. they are such nice cuddly animals. its not cuddliness, were talking about the environment and the destruction. the issue of basarwa here is a human rights issue. do you allow a section of the population to continue living in the manner they are doing? not accessing information, not accessing education for their children and health facilities and all those things that every other botswana has free access to. and as a government we had to take a stand and say, no that is not right.”9 disregarding the insolent analogy of the bushmen’s and elephant’s situations, if one were to make the argument for the gob’s decision that this was merely another attempt to increase botswana’s development in the most economically feasible way, while maintaining their “african miracle” image, the realities of the situation for the bushmen remain horrendous. (cook & sarkin: 2010) for a people whose identity is intrinsically attached to their land, their removal from this land and placement in settlements, and by extension a sedentary lifestyle, is incredibly damaging. as keitseope nthomang notes, visiting the bushmen’s settlements reveals the extent of their suffering, as they experience problems of poverty, drug and alcohol abuse, and poor nutrition (nthomang: 2002). not only did the government of botswana blatantly disobey the desire of the people to stay on their ancestral lands, which had been demarcated for them years before, and which they are entitled to, 7 http://www.survivalinternational.org/films/carteblanche. 8 ibid. 9 ibid. consilience winters: bushmen’s fight for water & land rights but they removed them in the name of “development”, only to place them in conditions which are leading to their demise. for the gob to claim the bushmen as destructive to the development of the country as a whole and then to actively participate in measures that only stunt development is seemingly contradictory. if the government truly had the best interests for the success of the tribe, surely they would work with them to ensure they were receiving the services they needed most and would contribute to their overall success. while fingers can be pointed at the government for their condescending behaviour toward the bushmen and their dubious policies towards human rights, one must also ask why the bushmen went along with the government’s plans and moved from their lands. in a 1996 report entitled, when will this moving stop? the botswana human rights advocacy group, ditshwanelo, did just that and asked residents of the ckgr why some of them had moved to the resettlement camps. in reply the residents remarked, “there were threats that water would be cut and they would have no water supply. there were a number of other threats that were used to lure people to move. essentially people didn’t move out of their willingness, people didn’t choose to move. they moved because there was fear that if they didn’t move, then what would happen?”10 in addition to the various threats placed on the bushmen to make them move, the government took extreme action to forcibly remove them from the ckgr. on january 31, 2002, in an effort to “expedite the removal of the remaining [bushmen]… the gob ceased provision of all basic services to the reserve, including drinking water, [all] borehole access [and] food rations” (sarkin & cook: 2010-2011, 14). john simpson, bbc world affairs editor, visited the abandoned villages in the ckgr, and in a documentary discovered the smashed wellheads the government officials had been sent in to destroy. peering into the water borehole, simpson remarked, “instead of the stuff of life, nothing but sand”. 11 along with the inability to access the water boreholes, the residents were restricted from bringing water into the reserve and from hunting for food. “the gob…removed water tanks…and then forbade the use of donkeys, which had become necessary to transport water from further away, claiming that livestock, as potential carriers of disease, threatened the wildlife” (sarkin & cook: 2010-2011, 14-15). due to these restrictions, two residents died after being severely beaten by wildlife scouts for hunting, and one woman, qoroxloo duxee, died of dehydration and starvation.12 this termination of water services by the gob came exactly two months after the un committee on economic, social and cultural rights declared water a “public good fundamental for life and health…indispensible for leading a life in human dignity… [and] a prerequisite for the realization of other human rights” (un cescr: 2002). the government of botswana, having never signed the un declaration, did not feel bound by it and therefore did not abide by it. therefore, the gob’s blatant disregard for international human rights spurred 243 relocated residents of the 10 http://www.ditshwanelo.org.bw/images/ckgr%20seminar.pdf. 11 http://www.survivalinternational.org/films/kalaharicourt. 12 http://www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/bushmen/diamonds. consilience winters: bushmen’s fight for water & land rights ckgr, under the leadership of bushman roy sesana, to bring a case to the high court of botswana in february 2002 (roy sesana and others vs. government of republic of botswana: 2006). the group sought justice for their forced relocation, and the government’s termination of various service provisions including access to their boreholes. unfortunately, the case was dismissed on technical grounds and was not brought back to the high courts until 2004. (morinville & rodina: 2013) the appeal in 2004 spanned two years and turned out to be the most expensive court case in the history of the country (cook and sarkin: spring 2010, bennett: 2013), “the original urgent application…over the four years…the case [ran], evolved into a full-scale trial, of a scale none of the parties, nor the two courts, for that matter, could have initially anticipated…it attracted a lot of interest, as well as a fair amount of bandwagon jumpers, both nationally and internationally…perhaps [more than] any other case has ever done.”13 the 243 applicants, all relocated residents of the ckgr sought justice not only for the wrongful dispossession of their land but also the termination of their basic and essential provisions without their prior consent, as well as the government’s decision not to issue hunting licenses to the residents.14 there were more than 19,000 pages of transcript, which reviewed whether the bushmen legally owned the land of the ckgr and were wrongfully removed (workman: 2009, sarkin & cook: 2010-2011). additionally, the court assessed “the legality of the gob’s decision to cease provision of basic services to the inhabitants…whether these service ought to be reinstated…[and] whether it was unconstitutional to also deny the bushmen special game licenses to hunt” (sarkin & cook: 2010-2011, 4). furthermore, the case brought up wider debates over development and the rights of indigenous populations to manage and decide their own futures. when the gob was confronted with hard evidence in court regarding their termination of services and their deliberate action to deny the bushmen water, the government’s attorney, sidney pilane denied the accusations (workman: 2009, 163). what pilane claims the government did was merely “‘move its water provision’ from one place to another” (workman: 2009, 163). if indeed the government was just moving the bushmen’s water resources to another location, it still remains unclear why they would deny the tribe the ability to bring in their own water resources to their homes in the reserve. 4. the diamond-bushmen paradox in an interview in 2003, survival international’s jonathan mazower asked botswana’s president festus mogae if he would let the bushmen return to their homes in the ckgr. in reply, mogae said, “where is home? home is in botswana where they live. the ckgr is for animals, not people. you don’t know. i am their countryman and not you. i know better.”15 mogae’s claims that the reserve was 13 http://www1.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/browse-by-country/botswana/1118.html. 14 ibid. 15 http://www.survivalinternational.org/films/kalaharicourt. consilience winters: bushmen’s fight for water & land rights intended for the protection of wildlife was an empty statement, perhaps intended to conceal the corrupt truth behind the situation. the gob throughout the entire ordeal has maintained one of two positions. firstly, they claim that removing the bushmen was necessary for protecting the wildlife in the ckgr, particularly because the tribes’ way of hunting “interferes with conservation” (sarkin & cook: 2010-2011, 15). secondly, the government believes that this is a developmental issue, wherein the bushmen are a primitive, backwards group that must ‘develop’ and rid themselves of their traditional lifestyle, accepting botswana’s ‘modern’ society as their own (sarkin & cook: 2010-2011, 15). yet, as the un committee on economic, social and cultural rights pointed out in a council in 2002, “water is required…to realize many of the covenant rights” of which include: food production, securing livelihoods, cultural practices, health and hygiene as well as personal and domestic issues (un cescr: 2002, 3). therefore, as margaret nasha and the gob have consistently claimed that they wanted to help the bushmen to ‘develop’, their actions, like cutting off their water supply, completely contradict their intended purpose. if one wishes for a populace to develop and expand, by denying them the essential tool for survival, and thus development, they are not only risking the bushmen’s lives, they are inhibiting them from moving forward in any direction. perhaps coincidentally, as the government has maintained these positions on the forced removal of the tribe, on the other hand they have simultaneously allowed companies such as debeers to occupy the reservation for diamond exploration and mining. what then is the government’s public position on these claims? and does the presence of these companies not create an impediment to the conservation of the reservation, something the gob has maintained as its original and present purpose? in november 2002, two months before the last evictions of the indigenous bushmen from their traditional lands in the central kalahari game reserve, president festus mogae proclaimed, "there is neither any actual mining nor any plan for future mining inside the reserve”.16 the connection between the forced removal of the bushmen and diamond prospecting on their land cannot be overlooked, as much of botswana’s success is due to its diamonds. even president mogae himself said, “the partnership between de beers and botswana has been likened to marriage…[and that] a better analogy might…be that of siamese twins” (good, 2003, 17). as jeremy sarkin and amelia cook point out in their research, “diamond mining is now the core of botswana’s economy…nearly all of botswana’s advancements in infrastructure, healthcare, and education are the result of diamond revenues” (20102011, 17). in 2001-2002, diamonds were recorded as contributing 33 per cent to the country’s gdp, and constituting “65 per cent of government revenue, and some 80 per cent of foreign exchange earnings.” (good, 2003, 18) it is worth noting at this point that the ckgr’s most lucrative resource is also diamonds, as it is “the richest diamond-producing area in the world.” 17 however, mogae has continually denied the presence of diamond exploration and mining on the reserve, failing to mention the four existing diamond mines which fuel botswana’s economy and that constitute more than a third of national gdp, in addition to the gem diamonds mine under 16 http://www.khoisanpeoples.org/indepth/exiles-kalahar.htm. 17 http://www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/bushmen. consilience winters: bushmen’s fight for water & land rights construction in the ckgr (pulitzer center: 2013). while mogae has continually denied the mining allegations, other representatives, including the local government minister, michael tshipinare have stated that “the country reserve[s] the right to mine any resource wherever it deem[s] feasible” (good, 2003, 18). the ghaghoo diamond mine, owned by gem diamonds, is located 45 km inside the eastern boarder of the ckgr.18 it is believed to have a carat resource of 20.53 million with an estimated worth of $4 billion us dollars.19 in 2011, after gem diamonds board approved an $85 million capital budget for the site, construction began. 20 while these figures undoubtedly are going to provide huge economic benefits for the country of botswana, is this economic development worth the major environmental and social impacts it will have on the ckgr? not only are these mines on land originally set aside for the hunter-gatherer groups and the wild game they hunt, they are exhausting precious water sources out of the country’s pocket. “mining companies are paying nothing for water now…because hydraulic costs are subsidized by the government (250 million pula or $2.9 million), companies like debswana have no incentive to use expensive technology that allows viable long-term use.”21 while some mining companies are relying on the government for their water sources, others are drilling deep boreholes, which is also extremely exhausting on the land. “it’s going fast”, says roman grynberg, a senior research fellow at the botswana institute for development policy analysis. “groundwater accumulates in geologic time and they’re certainly mining it a lot faster.”22 along with the impact these extractions will have on the already stressed water resources of the ckgr, gem diamonds has already negatively impacted the lives of the hunter-gatherers who both live on and own the land on which they are mining. not only has the gob forced the removal of the bushmen off their land, but they have also already begun construction of the mine on their land without the bushmen’s participation, agreement, or monetary inclusion in the matter. as survival international alleges, the company did not carry out significant consultation with the bushmen about the matter, and more companies, such as petra diamonds, are now prospecting in the area.23 most interestingly, a look at gem diamonds’ annual report for 2013 reveals that the company claims to have set up a “community water supply programme [which] has drilled and equipped four boreholes, giving four communities a sustainable water supply within the central kalahari game reserve”.24 not only have the communities been left anonymous, leading one to believe they could in fact be the established mining communities, but this also completely contradicts the gob’s argument that the reserve must remain as a habitat for wildlife and not for people. even if the communities were in fact not comprised of employed miners for gem diamonds, one must ask why these communities are 18 http://www.gemdiamonds.com/gem/en/operations/botswana/. 19 ibid. 20 ibid. 21 http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/africa-botswana-mochudi-water-boreholes-drills-diamondminerals-mine-poverty-unhealthy-untreated-government-cattle-gaborone-dam-thirst-hydrauliccommerical-farmers. 22 ibid. 23 http://www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/bushmen. 24 http://www.gemdiamonds.com/gem/uploads/reports/reports/gem-diamonds-ar.pdf. consilience winters: bushmen’s fight for water & land rights allowed to continue to inhabit an area that has been strictly forbidden for the bushmen. additionally, as the gob has continually expressed their concern that the bushmen are a threat to conservation initiatives on the reserve, how then are they blind to the disruption that is being brought upon the land, its flora, and fauna from mining companies? as with any extractive industry, there are environmental impacts that will affect wildlife. nevertheless, there seems to be little to no concern for this matter, despite the insistence of the gob for more than a decade that the ckgr must remain solely a habitat for animals. as for gem diamonds’ plans for addressing these matters, they claim “the highest environmental standards will be strictly adhered to, to ensure minimal environmental impact from the mine's development. independent advisors, marsh environmental services, a division of marsh (pty) ltd, were appointed to undertake an environmental impact assessment which included a stakeholder engagement process.”25 these ‘assessments’ are misleading to the public, as they are being done by a division of one of the worlds leading insurance broker/risk managements companies, which has, in recent years, been the centre of civil action cases for illegal misconduct. not only have their business intentions been questioned, but they publically state on their company website that their “guiding principle is to consider (its) clients' best interests in all placements”. 26 therefore, one could conclude that marsh environmental services would most likely have the best interests of their client, gem diamonds, a multi-billion dollar company that is likely paying them a considerable amount of money for their services, and not of the impoverished bushmen and the wildlife who live in the reserve. one therefore cannot be assured that the assessments taken are not biased and are not concerned primarily with the economic viability of this proposed venture, but the actual environmental impacts they will have on the ckgr. 5. the situation today and its possible global impacts following the bushmen’s appeal in 2004, the case carried on for two years. finally in december 2006, the court ruled that the actions taken by the gob were unlawful (morinville & rodina: 2013, 8, bennett, 2013). the land and subsistence rights were returned to the bushmen, and they were allowed to go back to the ckgr, though this only applied to the 189 original applicants who remained alive (morinville & rodina: 2013, 8). as the bushmen’s lawyer recounts, “one judge held that the forced relocation had abridged bushmen’s rights to ‘life, liberty and freedom of movement’, and that the root cause of these violations was a view of ‘development’ that ‘failed to take into consideration [their] knowledge, culture and ideologies.’”27 yet, while the denial of water provisions and other services remained a staple discussion in the case, the court ruled that the termination of these services on behalf of the government was not unconstitutional, and that they were not required to provide these services to the bushmen (morinville & rodina: 2013, 8). for years, the government has also continued to deny the bushmen use of a water borehole or the ability to sink their own boreholes on the reserve. instead, they 25 http://www.gemdiamonds.com/gem/en/operations/botswana/ operations. 26 http://www.sec.gov/archives/edgar/data/62709/000119312504171862/dex991.htm. 27 http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/1686. consilience winters: bushmen’s fight for water & land rights have been expected to carry in all of their own water resources, which fails to consider those who are old or physically impaired. 28 after further litigation in the court of appeal, it was ruled that the bushmen were allowed to use the existing boreholes and sink their own, and that government attempts to stop them were unconstitutional. 29 nevertheless, the government has continued to find means of restricting the bushmen’s rights and their ability to live on the reserve. through the strict issuing of permits to enter the reserve, many bushmen have been cut off from members of their families, and those who disobey these systems can be sent to prison for up to seven years.31 most importantly, due to the fact that the ruling only applied to the original plaintiffs, it is extremely important that the bushmen seek legal measures which will insure that their non-applicant family members will not only be able to visit the reserve, but live on it as well. the bushmen are currently hoping to challenge this court ruling and argue that roy sesana and the others sued not only for themselves, but also for the entirety of their tribe who were relocated in 2002.32 if the tribe is unable to do so, they risk losing their land after all of the original applicants have passed away, thereby giving the gob what they have been attempting to expropriate for decades. what remain as an even scarier threat are the possibilities this situation has left for the governments of other african countries to follow suit in human rights violations and water issues. if the rest of the world is able to look on as the “african miracle” blatantly ignores human rights, what precedent does this then provide for them to feel the need to govern responsibly? as james g. workman discusses in his book, heart of dryness, this disgraceful ‘development’ on behalf of the botswana government is not far from genocide (2009: 181). as workman points out, “the [gob’s] coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of [the bushmen]”, otherwise referred to as genocide, may in fact be due to resource scarcity. as seen in sudan, after a water became scarce, fighting broke out and more than 200,000 people died (workman: 2009, 182). as most of the interior of botswana consists of the arid landscape of the kalahari, and water resources already prove strained throughout periods of the year, it is inevitable that the extensive mining and resource extraction in the “most water stressed region of the world” will only further deplete the water table. 33 as roman grynberg, senior research fellow at the botswana institute for development policy analysis, notes, “we can afford to import so we don’t think twice about it. botswana is in the pariah state category here. we share water, import water, drill really deep for water. so how are we going to pump enough for everyone to drink, keep a large national herd, and expand mining?”34 as the bushmen are hardly capable of an uprising against the government due to a lack of resources and sheer numbers, and the legal framework has done little 28 ibid. 29 ibid. 31 http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/1686. 32 ibid. 33 http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/africa-botswana-mochudi-water-boreholes-drills-diamondminerals-mine-poverty-unhealthy-untreated-government-cattle-gaborone-dam-thirst-hydrauliccommerical-farmers. 34 ibid. consilience winters: bushmen’s fight for water & land rights thus far to help them, what will become of them as the fear of countrywide drought becomes realized? is one to assume that the ancestors of all humans on earth will just fade away like the water they so desperately have spent the past two decades fighting for? 6. conclusion the bushmen’s history of marginalization in botswana is not new. for hundreds of years, this culturally and historically rich tribe has been left to suffer at the hands of the prominent few. while certain measures have been taken to protect these people – such as the establishment of the ckgr and the 2006 court ruling entitling them to return to the reserve from which they had been forcibly removed – there still remain many aforementioned measures that have suppressed the lives and development of the bushmen. the un’s declaration on the human right to water was a giant step forward in the world of human rights and water issues, yet it still remains only as a declaration and not a binding mandate. as the gob continues to focus on its economic development through mineral extraction, the already stressed water table will only become more so. the current measures and actions being taken by the gob may not only destroy the lives and culture of the ancient bushmen, but leave the country in a worse environmental state, of which they may not be able to come back from. for now, it is up to the world community to question the actions of the gob and stand with the bushmen in the fight not only for their right to water and life, but the preservation of a culture from which we all ultimately derive. consilience winters: bushmen’s fight for water & land rights bibliography 2010 human rights report: botswana. rep. n.p.: bureau of democracy, human rights and labor, 2010. print. bennett, gordon. "how botswana runs roughshod over the rights of its bushmen minority." the south african civil society information service. sacsis, 7 june 2013. web. 16 nov. 2013. <http://www.alternet.org/world/botswana-violates-bushmen-rights>. cook, amelia, and jeremy sarkin. "is botswana the miracle of africa? democracy, the rule of law, and human rights versus economic development." transnational law and contemporary problems 19.453 (spring 2010): 454-89. print. economic and social council agenda item 3, committee on economic, social and cultural rights e/c.12/2002/11 (20 january 2003) from the kalahari to court. prod. survival international. survival international. survival international, n.d. web. 20 nov. 2013. <http://www.survivalinternational.org/films/kalaharicourt>. documentary gall, sandy. “the bushmen of the kalahari.” ecologist. sept. 2003. web. 4 dec. 2013. general assembly agenda item 3, human rights council a/hrc/12/24 (1 july 2009) good, kenneth. bushmen and diamonds: (un)civil society in botswana. uppsala: nordiska afrikainstitutet, 2003. print. in the high court of botswana held at gaborone. ithutseng & malefo v attorney general [2012] 3752. in the high court of appeal of the republic of botswana. mosetlhanyane & matsipane vs. attorney general [2011] no. caclb-074-10. kgomotso, phemo k., and larry s. swatuk. the challenges of supplying water to small, scattered communities in the lower okavango basin (l.o.b.), ngamiland, botswana: an evaluation of government policy and performance. paper prepared for presentation at the 7th annual meeting of waternet. n.p.: n.p., n.d. print. mogwe, alice (march 2002) ‘central kalahari game reserve seminar’. ditschwanelo the botswana centre for human rights. [online]. available at: http://www.ditshwanelo.org.bw/images/ckgr%20seminar.pdf (accessed: 19 november 2013). consilience winters: bushmen’s fight for water & land rights morinville, cynthia, and lucy rodina. "rethinking the human right to water: water access and dispossession in botswana's central kalahari game reserve." geoforum 49 (2013): 150-59. science direct. elsevier ltd., oct. 2013. web. 2 dec. 2013. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2013.06.012>. nthomang, keitseope. "exploring the indigenous minefield: social policy and the marginalization of the bushmen in southern africa." journal of social development in africa 17.1 (2002): 99-121. print. "operations: botswana." gem diamonds. gem diamondsdelivered by global3digital, 2013. web. 11 dec. 2013. <http://www.gemdiamonds.com/gem/en/operations/botswana/#operati ons>. qiu, linda. botswana: diamond hopes, diamond blues. rep. n.p.: huffington post, 2013. pulitzer center. web. 2 dec. 2013. <http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/africa-botswana-mochudi-waterboreholes-drills-diamond-minerals-mine-poverty-unhealthy-untreatedgovernment-cattle-gaborone-dam-thirst-hydraulic-commerical-farmers>. sarkin, jeremy, and amelia cook. "the human rights of the san (bushmen) of botswanathe clash of the rights of indigenous communities and their access to water with the rights of the state to environmental conservation and mineral resource exploitation." journal of transnational law & policy 20 (2010-2011): 1-40. print. "sesana and others v attorney-general (2006) ahrlr 183 (bwhc 2006)." centre for human rightsuniversity of pretoria. african human rights case law database, n.d. web. 23 nov. 2013. <http://www1.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/browse-bycountry/botswana/1118.html>. solway, jacqueline. "human rights and ngo 'wrongs': conflict diamonds, culture wars and the 'bushmen question'" africa 79.3 (august 2009): 321-46. 3 mar. 2011. web. 9 dec. 2013. "survival international the movement for tribal peoples." survival international the bushmen. survival international, n.d. web. 11 dec. 2013. <http://www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/bushmen>. swatuk, larry s., and dianne rahm. "academia.edu is a place to share and follow research." science directphysics and chemistry of the earth 29 (2004): 1357-364. academia.edu. elsevier ltd., 2004. web. 02 dec. 2013. taylor, julie j. "celebrating san victory too soon?" anthropology today 23.5 (2007): 3-5. print. consilience winters: bushmen’s fight for water & land rights the eviction of the bushmen. prod. carte blanche. survival international. carte blanche, n.d. web. 20 nov. 2013. <http://www.survivalinternational.org/films/carteblanche>. documentary workman, james g. heart of dryness: how the last bushmen can help us endure the coming age of permanent drought. new york: walker &, 2009. print. microsoft word zambakari_landgrabsudan.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 18, iss. 2 (2017), pp. 193–204 land grab and institutional legacy of colonialism: the case of sudan dr. christopher zambakari chairman of the board, the nile institute for peace and development (nipd), assistant editor, sudan studies association, and ceo of the zambakari advisory l.l.c. zambakari.c@husky.neu.edu abstract over last decade africa has experienced an unprecedented amounts of land being concessioned, leased or sold to business, corporations or foreign sovereign capital. the land question (who can acquire or have access to land) and the political question (who belongs in the political community) are connected to the citizenship question. these questions are among the most politicized in africa. this article answers the following questions: who benefits from the ‘land grabs’? what can a critical analysis of the ‘land grabs’ tell us about the contemporary politics of development? the first section of this article discusses and provides the intellectual background that informs today’s land rush. the second section discusses the competing actors involved in the land grab, winners and victims. here i will argue that the majority of victims of land dispossession in the african context are peasants, pastoralists, nomadic, and transboundary communities, whose land management system is based on customary land tenure. keywords: land grabbing, sudan, colonialism, accumulation/ dispossession, unregistered land act (1970)/civil transaction act (1984) author’s bio: dr. zambakari is a south sudanese-american, who emigrated to the united sates in 2001 as a refugee. he is a rotary paul harris fellow, founder and ceo of the zambakari advisory, llc, and the assistant editor for the bulletin of the sudan studies association (ssa). in 2013, he received the prestigious rotary international peace fellowship to study at the university of queensland in australia. he has prepared reports for the council for the development of social consilience zambakari: land grabs and colonialism in sudan science research in africa (codesria), berghof foundation, consulted and contributed to the united nations development programme (undp) commissioned reports on anti-corruption initiatives in east and southern africa as well as infrastructures for peace. his specialization is in international law and security, political reform and socio-economic development, governance and democracy, nation and state-building processes in africa and in the middle east. his work has been published in law, economic, and public policy journals. this article is developed based on a previous short manuscript published by the new african in zambakari, c. 2015. sudan: land grabbing and displacements. new african 34-35. that article forms the basis of this manuscript. consilience 195 i. introduction over last decade africa has experienced an unprecedented amounts of land being concessioned, leased or sold to business, corporations or foreign sovereign capital. the land question (who can acquire or have access to land) and the political question (who belongs in the political community) are connected to the citizenship question. these questions are among the most politicized in africa. this article answers the following questions: who benefits from the ‘land grabs’? what can a critical analysis of the ‘land grabs’ tell us about the contemporary politics of development? the first section of this article discusses and provides the intellectual background that informs today’s land rush. the second section discusses the competing actors involved in the land grab, winners and victims. here i will argue that the majority of victims of land dispossession in the african context are peasants, pastoralists, nomadic, and trans-boundary communities, whose land management system is based on customary land tenure. these groups constitute the vast majority of the population in many countries. they have been left landless in the face of an increasing marketization, commodification, and the privatization of land. the third section uses critical analysis to provide an insight into the case of sudan where modernization of agriculture, privatization of land, undertaken by the government has left a large segment of the population landless, evicted, and forcefully displaced. while there is a renewed scholarly interest in land grabbing, the phenomena itself, characterized by an acquisition of land through dispossession, is not new. the next section discusses the legacy of colonial governance, and its accumulation through dispossession. ii. legacy of colonialism and accumulation through dispossession over last decade we have witnessed unprecedented amounts of land being concessioned, leased or sold by countries in the global south. according to an oxfam report: “in developing countries, as many as 227 million hectares of land – an area the size of western europe – has been sold or leased since 2001, mostly to international investors.”1 from the americas to africa, more peasants are being 1 oxfam 2011. land and power: the growing scandal surrounding the new wave of investments in land. 151 oxfam briefing paper. oxford, uk oxfam. accessible consilience zambakari: land grabs and colonialism in sudan forcefully evicted from land. these dispossessions are justified in development terms, increased productivity, mechanized farming to feed more people, job creation, and attract foreign direct investment. the assumption is that leasing or selling land to investors who bring in foreign capital will create jobs and help the host country. in the african or latin/south central american context, there haven’t been many studies which have shown the benefits to society of land concessioned to investors. instead there have been many studies critical of land deals and the negative effect they cause to local communities. this justification, modernization of the economy, lies in the colonial discourse of conquest, which set in motion accumulation through dispossession few centuries back. the conquest of the americas went hand in hand with a discourse on the nature of those that lived on the continent.2 in a famous u.s. supreme court case, johnson v. m’intosh (1823),3 the future of american indians was sealed and their citizenship and access to land was locked in law. the court authorized the expropriation of land and extinguished the indian title of occupancy. the reasoning of the court was informed by debates and discussions driven by the salamanca school in spain.4 in justifying dispossession of land, justice marshall wrote: “to leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people, was impossible.”5 the logic informing the decision was framed in development discourse. according to this reasoning, leaving indians in possession of land was to render the land unproductive. there was only one way to deal with amerindians, land deprivation through forceful removal. given the resistance to this policy the inevitable outcome was genocide because the indian was ‘fierce’ and a ‘savage’ who could not cohabitate with the ‘civilized’ settler. in addressing the relationship between political power and the rights obtained through conquest, marshall wrote: “conquest gives a title which the courts of the conqueror cannot deny”6 and made his statement more clear when he explained how from <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp151land-power-rights-acquisitions-220911-en_4.pdf>. 2 pagden, a. 1982. the fall of natural man: the american indian and the origins of comparative ethnology, new york, cambridge university press. 3 1823. thomas johnson and graham's lessee v. william m'intosh. 21 u.s. 543. 4pagden, a. 1982. the fall of natural man: the american indian and the origins of comparative ethnology, new york, cambridge university press. 5 1823. thomas johnson and graham's lessee v. william m'intosh. 21 u.s. 543. 6ibid. consilience 197 this right was maintained when he noted: “title by conquest is acquired and maintained by force.”7 colonial governance in africa, with its civilizing and modernizing discourse, had a contradictory outcome on the ground. according to nyong’o, modernization combined constructive (wealth accumulation and increased productivity), with destruction, reducing labor to the state of a commodity sold on the market, often destroying the natural ecological basis needed for the reproduction of life and production – and polarizing the distribution of wealth on a global level.”8 the shift from the americas passing through india and later africa saw another shift in colonial governmentality.9 in the african context, martin chanock notes that “the colonial state brought immensely far reaching changes to colonised peoples which undermined their structures of authority; their relationships to land; their relationships to other peoples; gender and generational relationships in their communities; and usually completely changed the economic world within which they lived.”10 further south, general ian smuts, the ideological architect of apartheid, made the case for apartheid by framing his argument in civilizational and development discourse. he wrote that “what is urgently wanted is the settlement of a white population, able and competent to undertake the task of development, and finally to conquer and hold this continent for european civilization.” 11 one of the gravest crimes of apartheid was contained in several legal acts. this included the infamous pass laws and the group areas act. however, it was the land acts which led to the dispossession of land from black south 7 ibid. 8 peter anyang’ nyong’o, "the land question, land grabbing and agriculture in africa," codesria bulletin, no. 3 & 4, (2013): 26. 9 i used this term in its broadest sense as articulated by michel foucault to include a technology of rule, employed by a state to exercise control over territory, populace. this includes governance, the structure of power, and how a state governs. 10 martin chanock, "constitutionalism and the ‘customary’." university of pretoria, http://web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/15338/constitutionalism%20and%20the%20 %e2%80%98customary%e2%80%99%20chanock.pdf. 11 jan christiaan smuts, africa and some world problems: including the rhodes memorial lectures delivered in michaelmas term, 1929 (oxford, uk: the clarendon press, 1930). consilience zambakari: land grabs and colonialism in sudan africans. the combined force of these acts led to forceful removal and displacement of millions of south africans. mamdani notes that under the apartheid regime, an estimated “3.5 million people were forcibly removed from their communities” 12 between 1960 and 1982. the legacy of those removals and dispossession are still haunting south africa today. today, the land grab phenomenon is also presented as way to modernize agriculture, to develop a country’s industries, and framed in “a narrative of promoting foreign direct investment which will stimulate the modernization of the agricultural sector through large scale commercial farming, and thus ensure ‘development’ and food security.”13 expropriation then is rationalized through a development discourse. whereas land acquisition is a global phenomenon, it is particularly more acute in africa. of all reported land deals, a total of “948 land acquisitions totaling 134 million hectares are located in africa.”14 this is a significantly large acquisition when compared with other regions: “43 million hectares reported for asia, 19 million hectares in latin america, and 5.4 million hectares in other regions, particularly eastern europe and oceania.”15 this rapid land acquisition is driven by a number of factors: governments securing food and fuel exports, multinational corporations and financiers speculating on commodities16 as well as actors interested in natural resource explorations. the confluence of all these factors has generated increased interests in land. with all these factors, rooted in the colonial legacy of conquest, accumulation through dispossession, i will turn my attention to the losers of land grab in the african context, namely, peasants, nomad and pastoral communities, internally displaced population, and migrants who move around in search for a better living condition. 12 mamdani, mahmood. "a diminished truth." in after the trc : reflections on truth and reconciliation in south africa, edited by wilmot godfrey james and linda van de vijver. athens: ohio university press, 2001, page 39. 13 codesria. "accumulation by dispossession, climate change and natural resources governance in africa." council for the development of social science research in africa, http://www.codesria.org/spip.php?article1936. 14 anseeuw, w., l. alden wily, l. cotula, and m. taylor. "land rights and the rush for land: findings of the global commercial pressures on land research project." edited by tim bending and david wilson. rome, italy: the international land coalition, cirad, and iied. accessible from <http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/publication/1205/ilc%20gs r%20report_eng.pdf>, 2012. 15 ibid, page 23 16 philip, mcmichael. "the land grab and corporate food regime restructuring." the journal of peasant studies 39, no. 3-4 (2012): 681. consilience 199 iii. regimes of land tenure: the case of sudan in many countries around africa, land has more than economic values to its owners. people’s identity is linked to land and acts as a source of livelihood, wealth, social peace, and in some cases hold ceremonial and religious values. for pastoralists and sedentary/agriculturalist communities, and peasant societies, land is key to livelihood. without it they cannot farm. without grazing land, pastoral communities cannot feed their animals.17 the struggle over land is a struggle for a vital source of livelihood. in most countries in sub-saharan africa, two regimes of land tenure can be found, one based on private property rights and the second based on customary rights. the tension between these two regimes produces a minority of winners and a majority of victims (whose land is often dispossessed). advocates of land titling includes governments, international organizations like international monetary funds, world bank, and local non-governmental organizations (ngos) like the land and equality movement in uganda (lemu) and the uganda land alliance (ula)18 as well as investors and multinational corporation (mncs). according to codesria: “within customary tenure regimes, commons lands are even more vulnerable to expropriation as they are not physically possessed, are deemed to be under-utilized or unutilized, and thus can be expropriated in ‘national interest’ through government led interventions as part of the ‘national development’ process.”19 on the one hand, the state wants land to be titled to facilitate its commodification. on the other hand, we see the mass of peasantry who stand to lose from this very commodification. to lose one’s land is to lose one’s source of livelihood. to illustrate the dilemma of the african peasantry, the majority of losers of the land grab, i will analyze the case of sudan. as mamdani noted given that the rich whether native or non-native could purchase land anywhere, what then is the reality of the poor 17 christopher zambakari, "nation and state building in south sudan: violence, development, and democracy," business, peace and sustainable development 2014, no. 3 (2014): 164. 18 mamdani, mahmood. "the contemporary ugandan discourse on customary tenure: some theoretical considerations." in working paper no. 13. kampala, uganda: makerere institute of social research: accessible from 19 codesria. "accumulation by dispossession, climate change and natural resources governance in africa." council for the development of social science research in africa, http://www.codesria.org/spip.php?article1936. consilience zambakari: land grabs and colonialism in sudan peasant? if “you could not afford to buy land in the first place, you could still claim land ‘customarily’, in your ‘home’ area, from your ‘customary’ chief, as a ‘customary’ right, under ‘customary’ law”.20 security of tenure is built into customary law. a peasant doesn’t have to have a land title to make a living off the land. it is this security that is eroded by the marketization, privatization, and commodification of land. the outcome of which increasingly leaves peasants without land and livelihood. the increasing marketization of land, characterized by rapid titling of land is followed by eviction of producers who lose the right to work the land and in the case of sudan discussed next, forceful displacement and relocation of entire communities. in this case, the victims have been poor peasants, communities who use customary land system but do not have written titles, agro-pastoral communities, nomads and other trans-boundary communities who move around seasonally. the republic of sudan and south sudan were jointly ruled by great britain in the colonial period. in the north, the government passed a series of law governing land with profound implication for sudanese small farmers, peasants, and pastoral communities. two legislations are of particular interest: the unregistered land act (1970) and the civil transaction act (1984).21 both of this legislation strengthened the privileges of the state over land. by doing so, it also allowed elites to acquire rural land at low price. the most affected land was those that were held by customary authorities, accessed collectively by virtue of being a member of an ethnic group in the region. those who were not resident on the land could secure the right of passage through the land or grazing rights from communities who lived on the land. in the border region of abyei, the disputed border state between sudan and south sudan, the land was shared jointly by the ngok dinka and seasonally by missiriya – seasonal migrants who graze their cattle in abyei, in the dry season. the same system worked with the baggara pastoralists who moved from darfur (western sudan) through kordofan (state in central sudan) and into bahr ghazal (a region in western south sudan). the 1970 act was rationalized and justified as necessary for the expansion of the agricultural sector, specifically mechanized farming.22 the outcome of this legislation was that by 2005, 20 mamdani, mahmood. "when does a settler become a native? the colonial roots of citizenship." pretexts: studies in writing and culture 7, no. 2 (1998), page 2. 21 ayoub, mona. "land and conflict in sudan." accord, no. 18 (2006). 22ibid, pg 14 consilience 201 mechanized farming has fifteenfold.23 the legislation “entitled the government to use force in safeguarding “its” land and encouraging the accumulation of land by a minority of rich investors (both local and foreign).”24 the result was the displacement of communities, mostly agro-pastoralists, from land usually through violence. both legislations dismantled the defense the peasants, pastoral communities, and nomads had in traditional authorities whose mandate also included the management of land. lastly both legislation denied traditional authorities, “formal legitimacy or juridical status to traditional property rights, and implied the cancellation of all rights – and income – relating to water, land and grazing by pastoralists.”25 the forceful eviction and displacement of entire communities, initiated by the passage of these laws in sudan has created a large population who are landless and internally displaced, without jobs, and access to basic services. according to dr mona ayoub, from the university of khartoum “the displacement caused by mechanized farming remains a major source of grievance and conflict, reinforcing feelings of neglect, marginalization and social repression, as well as sealing off nomadic routes, water points and pastures, fostering a culture of land-grabbing and creating large landless groups who are forced to work as precarious wage labourers or to migrate”26 outside the traditional areas. the challenge faced by most communities is that communal land is not registered land. for centuries communities manage land for usage by all members and that land is accessed communally or through lineage. access to land use is often more important to peasants than titles. for pastoral and nomadic communities, this is more important given their seasonal movement. they need the right to use the land for grazing and water. traditionally they have shared the land without resorting to titling it with sedentary farmers and other pastoralist groups. under the unregistered land act, unused and unregistered land is deemed unoccupied and hence subject to government takeover or as frequently happens, sold to investors. using a development ideology, unoccupied lands are deemed to be underutilized or unutilized. these can then be expropriated in national 23 ibid, pg 14 24ibid, pg 14 25ibid, pg 14 26 ibid, pg 14 consilience zambakari: land grabs and colonialism in sudan interest. the sudanese case is furthermore complicated by the fact that the law prohibits any recourse to the legal system by peasants and those who have been forcefully evicted or displaced. the legislations confirm the government ownership over all unregistered land on the one hand and remove legal redress brought by victims against the state. this means that “no court is competent to deal with any suit, claim or procedures on land ownership against the government or any registered owner of investment land allocated to him.” in short, the interests of the regime and its supporters are beyond the law.”27 the displaced and victims of eviction and displacement have had to resort to violence in dealing with the state in sudan e.g. conflict in abyei, blue nile, and south kordofan, all border states. the issue raised by land grabbing touches on communities’ rights to use their land and also on issues of social democracy. the question and challenge for many states in africa is how to protect social democracy (right of the masses e.g. peasant/pastoral communities), and balance rights with social justice, market fundamentalism with social equity in the face of growing commodification of land and market forces. iv. conclusion this essay engaged with two questions: who benefits from the ‘land grabs’? what can a critical analysis of the ‘land grabs’ tell us about the contemporary politics of development? to answer these questions, i provided a historical background to the land-grabbing phenomenon by arguing that to understand the crisis requires we look back at the legacy of colonial conquest. colonial powers advanced two justifications for conquest, civilization and modernity. the latter often presented in development language of increased productivity, modernization of industries, and wealth accumulation. this left a violent legacy of forcefully evicting population from their areas. in the second section, i turned my attention to the case of sudan where two legislations, the unregistered land act (1970) and the civil transaction act (1984) have left many communities landless and/or displaced. these acts have provided a justification to the state to displace entire population under the guise of improving agriculture productivity. the victims of land grab or forceful eviction and 27 yoanes ajawin and alexander de waal, eds., when peace comes: civil society and development in sudan (red sea press: ewing township, nj, 2002), 134-5. consilience 203 dispossession of communal land has been peasants, pastoralists, nomadic and trans-boundary communities whose land management is based on customary land tenure. in conclusion, the biggest challenge in many african states is how to manage and protect social democracy while balancing rights with social justice and safeguarding against increasing market fundamentalism. consilience zambakari: land grabs and colonialism in sudan refrences 1823. thomas johnson and graham's lessee v. william m'intosh. 21 u.s. 543. ajawin, y. & de waal, a. (eds.) 2002. when peace comes : civil society and development in sudan, red sea press: ewing township, nj. anseeuw, w., l. alden wily, l. cotula & taylor, m. 2012. land rights and the rush for land: findings of the global commercial pressures on land research project. in: bending, t. & wilson, d. (eds.). rome, italy: the international land coalition, cirad, and iied. accessible from <http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/publication/1205/ilc%20gsr%20rep ort_eng.pdf>. ayoub, m. 2006. land and conflict in sudan. accord, 18, 14-15. chanock, m. n.d. constitutionalism and the ‘customary’. [online]. pretoria, south africa: university of pretoria. available: http://web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/15338/constitutionalism%20and%20the%20%e2%8 0%98customary%e2%80%99%20chanock.pdf [accessed may 29 2012]. codesria. 2014. accumulation by dispossession, climate change and natural resources governance in africa [online]. dakar, senegal: council for the development of social science research in africa. available: http://www.codesria.org/spip.php?article1936 [accessed february 01 2014]. mamdani, m. 1998. when does a settler become a native? the colonial roots of citizenship. pretexts: studies in writing and culture, 7, 249-258. mamdani, m. 2013. the contemporary ugandan discourse on customary tenure: some theoretical considerations. working paper no. 13. kampala, uganda: makerere institute of social research: accessible from <http://misr.mak.ac.ug/publications/working-paper-no13-contemporary-ugandan-discourse-customary-tenure-some-theoretical>. mcmichael, p. 2012. the land grab and corporate food regime restructuring. the journal of peasant studies, 39, 681-701. nyong’o, p. a. 2013 the land question, land grabbing and agriculture in africa. codesria bulletin. oxfam 2011. land and power: the growing scandal surrounding the new wave of investments in land. 151 oxfam briefing paper. oxford, uk oxfam. accessible from <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp151-land-powerrights-acquisitions-220911-en_4.pdf>. pagden, a. 1982. the fall of natural man: the american indian and the origins of comparative ethnology, new york, cambridge university press. smuts, j. c. 1930. africa and some world problems: including the rhodes memorial lectures delivered in michaelmas term, 1929, oxford, uk, the clarendon press. zambakari, c. 2014. nation and state building in south sudan: violence, development, and democracy. business, peace and sustainable development, 2014, 162-178. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 18, iss. 1 (2018), pp. 17–35 phosphorus impacts from meat-, dairy-, and plant-based diets jon schroeder rochester institute of technology, golisano institute for sustainability js9683@rit.edu abstract phosphorus (p) is a finite resource located within certain geologic reserves around the world. morocco and the western sahara together account for roughly 75% of reserves, raising questions of how to more sustainably use this precious resource. phosphorus is mined from rock and eventually converted into usable fertilizer, which is applied to croplands. this study aims to contribute to the literature on phosphorus sustainability by analyzing the yearly diet choices of an average american consumer using life cycle assessment (lca) software. when ascertaining dietary phosphorus use, meatand plant-based diets have traditionally been juxtaposed. using data from the united nations and a study by a consulting firm in boston, the lca queries through the food materials that meatbased, dairy-based, and plant-based diets contain, and yields a rough estimate of total p consumption in kilograms. findings show that as anticipated, a meat-based diet is higher in p consumption than a dairy-based or plant-based diet and gives credence to the notion that consumers in their everyday lives can affect the sustainable use of scarce resources such as phosphorus. concluding this report is a brief discussion summarizing literature findings on how to use p more sustainably in other sectors, such as wastewater treatment. author’s note my personal interest in this stemmed from a discussion with my capstone advisor in graduate school. she had mentioned that phosphorus is a hot topic in present research, and i wanted to continue working with lca. i am particularly interested in anything in the sustainability realm that deals with food or waste and being able to explore diet choices allowed me to better understand what is required to grow different foods. keywords: phosphorus, life cycle assessment, diet, meat, plant. mailto:js9683@rit.edu 18 consilience 1.0 introduction 1.1 phosphorus the food and agricultural organization (fao) of the united nations estimates that the number of individuals following meatand dairy-based diets will double by 2050, especially in developing countries (cordell and white, 2013). this presents a problem in sustainability because meatand dairy-based diets require up to three times the amount of phosphorus (p) as a vegetarian or plant-based diet (cordell and white, 2013), which reduces or eliminates the consumption of animal products and by-products. in the coming decades, p usage will increase due to surging interest in meat-based products in rapidly industrializing countries including india, china, and brazil. this is cause for concern, especially when the impact of climate change on precipitation patterns could mean that much of the phosphorus applied to agricultural lands runs off into waterways. thus, it is important to analyze the p intensity (raw kilogram p/raw kilogram of food item) of various products to see how consumers can use their diets to shift demand, ultimately affecting overall p consumption. 1.2 impact of diet diet plays a large part in phosphorus consumption. the more p-intense a food item is, the more p is required to produce it for human consumption. meat production has contributed tremendously to the increase in mining for phosphorus: according to one study, meat production causes 72% of the global average p footprint (metson et al., 2012). one of the main reasons meat is so p-intensive is because of the multistep process required to bring meat to market. cattle, chickens, pigs, and other animals from which we source meat require feed to grow, and this feed is often grain – which requires p. meat adds an extra step to the process: instead of the direct human consumption of p-nourished grain, it becomes feed and is eaten by livestock. additional losses occur in the feed production process (metson et al., 2012), and animals, depending on size, will need a substantial amount of p to grow and sustain themselves. this is where the p-intensity of meats, especially beef, is amplified. 2.0 methodology 2.1 development of representative diets a morningstar life cycle assessment (lca) report conducted by quantis and information from un food and agricultural organization statistics (fao-stat) were the data sources used to model two typical diets within the united states. the consilience schroeder: phosphorus impact from diet two specific libraries used within simapro to model food items included the ecoinvent version 3.3 database and the agri-footprint version 2.0 economic allocation database. both databases were used in a concerted effort to fully capture phosphorus fertilizer use regardless of the food item pulled through. the agrifootprint catalogue contains meat items including pork, chicken, and beef, and given that the comparison of meat-based with plant-based diets is inherent to this study, it was an obvious choice. table 1: quantis modeling methodology 20 consilience the quantis lca report contained self-reported amounts of food eaten within a 24hour period. participants surveyed within the 2011-2012 year were asked what they had eaten for breakfast, lunch, and dinner (in kilograms) (dettling et al., 2016). averages were found across responses for each meal type, and broken down further into certain food groups, or commodities, as shown in table 1. given that the reported amounts only spanned a 24-hour period, this study scaled those totals to an annual aggregate amount in simapro. if the entire self-reported totals for food consumption across a year were to be modeled in the quantis study, the amounts would have been 624 and 628 kilograms, for meat-based and meatless diets, respectively (meatless equates to plant-based for this study, which is defined as a diet with approximately 80% vegetables, fruits, and grains). however, as demonstrated in table 2, only 521.84 kilograms of meat-based and 522.23 kilograms of plant-based diets were originally modeled. this is because a screening tool was applied whereby the 10 and 17 largest food commodities (in kilograms) were selected for the plant-based and meat-based diets, respectively. this means that roughly 83% of the quantis food data was modeled. however, since simapro does not contain fish, this study did not model them. this reduced the meat-based diet modeled total from 521.84 kilograms to 503.07 kilograms. given the discrete food groups reported by consumers and my screening methodology, the plant-based diet total remained at 522.23 kilograms. this is a methodological choice on a functional unit basis, which i concede could slightly skew phosphorus totals higher than the true values for plant-based diets, but not by much. table 2: quantis diets modeled source: dettling et al., 2016 consilience schroeder: phosphorus impact from diet one key component that is absent from the quantis report is the loss of food items in the supply chain, from food leaving the factory gate up until delivery to the consumer. according to a report by the natural resources defense council (nrdc), there are five main stages during which food can be wasted. these stages include production, postharvest, handling and storage, processing and packaging, distribution and retail, and consumption, which includes out-of-home consumption (gunders, 2012). thus, the self-reported totals from the national health and nutrition examination survey (nhanes) are lower than what is necessary (accounting for losses in the supply chain) to provide adequate volumes of food to consumers. the quantis report does, however, account for post-consumer waste, assuming certain percentages across food groups as explained in buzby et al. (2014). to fully capture the phosphorus impacts of growing food for a diet, i used the united nations’ fao-stat data to examine the number of crops and commodities grown in year 2014 (most recent data available), as this would provide a closer approximation of real phosphorus impacts from growing the necessary amount of food. the fao-stat data is where pimentel and pimentel (2003) retrieved data for an average american’s diet, whether meat-based or lacto-ovo-based. lacto-ovo in this study is meant to also encapsulate the meatless foundation of a diet that still includes dairy items. against pimentel and pimentel’s totals, i compared my own query for the production totals of 2014, making certain assumptions which are delineated in the next section. table 3 shows this comparison between the pimentel and pimentel study and my own with food group totals for each diet. table 3: fao-stat diets modeled sources: pimentel and pimental, 2003; fao-stat 22 consilience 2.2 modeling assumptions appendix 1 shows the output from the fao-stat query. one key discovery is that for certain widely consumed crops, average kilogram consumption of p per capita is high, especially with maize, soybeans, wheat, sugar beet, sugar cane, and sorghum. thus, certain assumptions are made about these crops in order to to scale down the per capita consumption to a manageable size. the pared-down totals are then consolidated into the category totals seen in table 3. fresh whole cow’s milk, a food item output from the fao-stat query, was also high in per capita consumption, at 293.07 kilograms. however, i did not screen this or pare it down in any way, as i did not rationalize how it could be used for biofuels or go toward any other purpose, so the entirety of the food line item was modeled in simapro. this did have a discernible impact on phosphorus use, especially since milk is a dairy product (animal-based), but it did not have a large enough impact to offset the p counts associated with meat products (chicken, beef, pork, turkey). another assumption of the fao-stat data was that turkey was to be modeled as chicken in simapro. turkey has a sufficient associated kilogram count to be included in the model. however, simapro does not contain turkey and it was categorized as chicken or, more broadly, poultry. an additional postulation was that the procedure modeled meat items within the context of either netherlands or ireland. one significant problem in simapro is the integration of micro-spatial, or gis, data with food production. older versions of simapro do not contain this level of granularity, through which one is able to discern the different application rates of fertilizers (phosphorus included) on various hectares of land. because of this lack of granularity, a conscious choice was made to model global food items to the greatest extent possible where those items existed in simapro. the only place where this did not hold was in modeling meats and eggs. for meats, the goal was to show the general p impact of bringing meats to the factory gate, regardless of where those meats originated. broadly speaking, the numbers for p associated with meats should not be too different if modeled in another country, which quantis attempted to do with meat impacts in its lca for morningstar. that level of detail is beyond the scope of this study. certain crop or commodity yields were too large to warrant their full inclusion in either fao-stat diet, so further breakdown analysis was performed on soybeans, corn, sorghum, wheat, sugar cane, and sugar beets. soybean production, on a per capita basis, yielded 335.15 kilograms. 85% percent of soybeans are crushed, and of consilience schroeder: phosphorus impact from diet that, 80% become meal as opposed to oil or fiber (solecki; “soy facts”). to get the leguminous bean, two percent of the meal portion was calculated to arrive at 4.56 kilograms per capita, a reasonable estimate. for corn, a national corn growers association report delineated how much product is used in various applications, including high-fructose corn syrup (hfcs), sweeteners, starches, cereals, beverages/alcohol, and seeds (“world of corn”). using a bushel-to-ton converter, i then converted production of corn to bushels, and found percentages of corn used in the various product groups above based on overall production. 62.14 kilograms hfcs and sweetener, 19.97 kilograms of starch/grains, and 26.63 kilograms of cereal/beverage grains were calculated. while in simapro, these product groups had no bearing on how corn was modeled, breaking up these product groups allowed for allocation of certain portions of corn to different parts of the diet. seeds were excluded for modeling purposes. sorghum, used in food industry applications, was assumed at two percent of production totals in fao-stat (“all about”). 65% of the wheat crop was assumed for food applications, and the entirety of this percentage was modeled as wheat grain (“feeding the world”). for sugar cane and beets, an economic research service (ers) report by the usda showed that 8.1 million tons of sugar (beet and cane) is refined every year, with 55% coming from beet and 45% from cane (“u.s. sugar”). applying these calculations against the overall production totals seen in appendix 1 yielded roughly 11.43 kilograms of sugarcane and 13.97 kilograms of sugar beets, which were both were modeled in simapro. one final assumption was scaling the lacto-ovo diet with the fao-stat data to an equivalent functional unit to facilitate comparison with the meat-based diet. table 4 shows this scale-up. pimentel and pimentel (2003) followed this same scaling factor on a functional unit basis, but with calories. one detriment to scaling this diet and excluding meat is that many product categories were pushed above the production threshold. obviously, no one would eat what was not produced, but, for representative purposes, the scaling still shows the impact p use has in a meat-based vs. lacto-ovo diet. 3.0 results-raw p intensity one of the most surprising results of this analysis was the phosphorus intensity (raw kilograms p/kilograms of food item) associated with both data sets. figure 1 shows the p intensities for both quantis and fao-stat data sources. 24 consilience table 4: scaling diets consilience schroeder: phosphorus impact from diet figure 1: raw phosphorus usage in growing food for the fao-stat diet, the top 10 food items from table 4 were selected for the sake of brevity. it is not surprising that beef has the highest p intensity in either diet study. for quantis, most of the impact from p use comes from having some component of meat (pork, beef, or chicken) as part of the diet, followed by grains and milk. cheese and other meat products in the fao-stat study also have high p intensity, followed by various grains. 26 consilience table 5: fao-stat raw p intensities consilience schroeder: phosphorus impact from diet what is most surprising from this analysis is that in both studies, eggs registered the lowest overall p intensity, which is contrary to other findings in the literature. one study concluded that one kilogram of p can produce the most kilograms of starchy roots, followed by pulses, fruits, vegetables, cereals, milk, and then eggs, poultry, pork, and beef (“what to eat next”). thus, this study anticipated a much higher egg p intensity. while eggs were assumed to have originated in the netherlands (as mentioned above), the result should not change drastically when different countries are modeled. many data sources, including metson et al. (2012), state that the united states’ annual per capita consumption of phosphorus is between six and seven kilograms for a meat-based diet, and less than one kilogram for a plant-based diet. looking at the quantis totals, those phosphorus amounts are 2.69 and 0.59 kilograms for a meat-based and plant-based diet, respectively. the plant-based amount is in a similar range to that found by many other studies, but the meat-based p total is lower by roughly a factor of three. one of the key reasons this may have been lower is because of the sheer amount of total p in a diet (in kilograms) modeled in simapro. however, when studies such as those conducted by metson et al. (2012) state specific per capita p consumption rates by country, i approach those with skepticism. it is hard enough to model an average diet with relatively complete information from fao-stat and quantis. nonetheless, to deal with losses throughout the food supply chain and account for the total amount of food produced in the united states, i turned to the fao-stat totals, as the diets modeled from this data source were more than double the quantis amounts in total kilograms. the result was that the fao-stat phosphorus per capita consumption numbers deviated even further from those in other studies. as seen in table 5, total raw phosphorus usage was 2.23 kilograms for the lacto-ovo diet and 4.35 kilograms for the meat-based diet. considering these data encompassed end-to-end food production for consumption purposes (with any losses accounted for), it is no surprise that both numbers for total p use were higher than those associated with the quantis study. furthermore, in fao-stat, the raw p use in the meat-based study was double that used in the lacto-ovo diet. in the quantis analysis, p use was five times higher in the meat-based study, demonstrating an interesting divergence in the total p usage for growing food for human consumption, whether self-reported or taken from aggregate production totals. raw p intensities associated with the entire quantis meat-based and meatless diet were 0.0053 and 0.0011 kilograms respectively as shown in table 6. for the faostat diets, these intensities dropped from 0.0053 to 0.0038 kilograms p for a meatbased diet and increased from 0.0011 to 0.0019 kilograms p for a meatless diet. one 28 consilience item raw phosphorus (kg) modeled in simapro (kg) p intensity (kg p/kg food item) milk 0.058 42.22 0.0014 vegetables (+ potatoes) 0.10 98.6 0.0010 fruit 0.013 59.25 0.00021 grains 0.15 100.1 0.0015 eggs 0.00039 17.02 0.000023 meat/veggie mixture 0.78 89.44 0.0087 meat/veggie/grain mixture 0.17 26.24 0.0063 meat mixture 0.38 22.49 0.017 beef 0.81 17.78 0.046 chicken 0.23 29.93 0.0078 total 2.69 503.07 0.0053 item raw phosphorus (kg) modeled in simapro (kg) p intensity (kg p/kg food item) milk 0.15 109.23 same as meat-based vegetables 0.045 60.61 0.00074 fruit 0.018 83.07 same as meat-based grains 0.37 253.09 same as meat-based eggs 0.00037 16.23 same as meat-based total 0.59 522.23 0.0011 meatless diet meat-based diet possible explanation is the sheer amount of grains consumed in the fao-stat diets. grains are somewhat more intense in their use of p than items like vegetables and fruits (see figure 1). for the meat-based diet, this p intensity may have dropped when analysis was switched from quantis to fao-stat, because the meat totals modeled from both data sources were roughly equivalent. because meat accounts for the largest amount of phosphorus use, if that category of food stays roughly the same in a diet ratio and other, less p-intensive crops are added to the diet, the overall p intensity for that diet will drop, as evidenced below. table 6: quantis raw p intensities 3.1 scenario analysis the main purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of diet choice on phosphorus consumption, and figure 2 below is a concise summary. it shows the overall effect that choice in diet at a national level (all citizens accounted for) would have on the aggregate raw p usage in 2014. a population estimate for the united states was taken from the world bank. the u.s. population for 2014, when data was queried, was 318.6 million. consilience schroeder: phosphorus impact from diet figure 2: u.s. consumption of raw p as figure 2 shows, both meat-based diets from quantis and fao-stat were higher in p use than the plant-based and lacto-ovo diets. according to the usgs, the u.s. consumed roughly 29.1 million metric tons of phosphate rock in 2014. the meat-based diet, assuming all citizens followed it, would comprise three and five percent of that total for the quantis and fao-stat sources, respectively. 3.2 alternative routes to responsible p management there are many routes to responsible p management that go beyond shifting diet patterns. these are predominantly focused on the supply side of the p equation, with measures including more efficient recovery of p from mine waste, responsible sourcing of fertilizers from renewable pathways including food waste, human excrement, and manure, and increasing plant uptake efficiency of p through better crop and soil management (cordell and white, 2013). additionally, wastewater phosphorus must be contended with, as this growing problem will require innovative recovery technologies including chemically precipitated struvite, which aggregates phosphate, ammonia, and magnesium into crystals within the piping systems of a wastewater treatment plant (cordell and white, 2013). if managed correctly, struvite can be harvested to act as a slow-release fertilizer in croplands. of the three million tons of p in wastewater treatment plants, only ten percent is recovered and sent back to agricultural operations; the remaining 30 consilience 90% is wasted in waterways, causing major eutrophication (cordell and white, 2013). that means that a lot more can and should be done in this realm to affect sustainable p use in the coming decades. policy mechanisms should be leveraged to affect sustainable p use. these mechanisms include mandates from governments stipulating goals for certain percentage recoveries of phosphorus from various waste streams, such as municipal wastewaters and factory farms’ and feedlots’ cow manure. unfortunately, policy mandates cannot stipulate what people eat, but they can tax certain food products (i.e., soda taxes) if appropriate justification is given to demonstrate how much p is used in creating a product. finally, another place to affect change is in regions where farmers make meager earnings and thus have little purchasing power for fertilizers to sustain crops. these include sub-saharan africa, south east asia, and latin america (cordell and white, 2013). p is low in these agricultural lands; where soils are lacking, people are going hungry, and enough food cannot be grown to sustain farmer livelihoods. international agreements should strive for the proper trade of p using economic instruments to lower fertilizer prices, subsidize costs for poorer nations, or deploy recovery technologies in parts of the world where p-recovery efforts would greatly benefit farmers who need help growing and sustaining crop yields. there are myriad ways to affect sustainable phosphorus use in a growing world. shifting diet choices coupled with appropriate policy and economic measures may begin to result in less reliance on phosphate rock mining and more reliance on p flows already in the system. 3.3 implications of phosphorus use as this study has found, one of the primary reasons to switch to a plant-based diet is to alleviate the strain on our planet’s finite resources, such as phosphorus. phosphorus is non-substitutable, meaning it is essential and non-replaceable in its uses. moreover, western sahara sits on 73.5% of the world’s reserves of phosphate rock, according to the 2017 u.s. geological survey (jasinski, 2016). that presents tremendous geo-political risk if the world is ever in short supply of this precious commodity. this could certainly become reality in a burgeoning market, where the demand for agricultural crops would vastly exceed the fertilizers available. in such a situation, demand would outstrip supply, prices would skyrocket, and nations would have to dole out additional dollars. sustainable management of phosphorus (including curtailing its agricultural use), however, can prevent these potential consequences. thus, diet choice has extraordinary potential to ameliorate not only consilience schroeder: phosphorus impact from diet the way we use p, but other resources too, such as nitrogen, potassium, and fresh water. phosphorus overuse also has implications for the environment, primarily eutrophication. typically, over-saturated soils (those inundated with p) will have excess phosphorus, which is then washed off into waterways during precipitation events. this often is the case along the mississippi river, where large swathes of farmlands lose surplus nutrients. problems arise when p enters surface water and causes algal blooms. the algae will eventually die, and bacteria decompose the sinking algae, which sucks up available dissolved oxygen. fish in the proximate area are deprived of necessary oxygen, and the entire area becomes hypoxic (oxygendepleted). thus, life cannot be sustained. while “dead zones” are not necessarily permanently relegated to being deprived of oxygen (it is a cycle), it stands to reason that we need to be doing a better job with how we apply phosphorus and other nutrients to croplands. why should fish have to sacrifice their lives for irresponsible application of nutrients upstream? it is also important to mention the disparity in phosphorus use across the globe, and how dynamic behaviors in developing countries can be leverage points in the global fight for a sustainable future. in the u.s., a developed country, both diets modeled are well studied, and the total p use in either diet for both sources is a reasonably good approximation of how much raw p is actually used. however, in booming countries like brazil, russia, india, and china, diet choices may be much more varied, or the data for production may be less comprehensive. thus, the diet choices modeled for the u.s. would not necessarily hold for a country at present or in the near future; different nations consume different quantities of food groups for a variety of reasons (i.e., religious purposes, agricultural restraints). the purpose of this paper was to investigate what a diet looks like in the u.s., however, which is a majority meat-eating country. accordingly, these totals would over-estimate how much p other countries are consuming per capita, unless those countries consume even more meat (one would need to consult un data). this is because meat tends to be the most p-intensive. the key point, then, is that this study shows the course certain countries may be on in terms of annual per capita p consumption, especially if meat-eating trends continue to grow as the middle-class booms in countries such as china and india, increasing national demand for animal products. this study aims to help people in such countries think about diet choices in advance of a crisis to mine and produce the necessary agricultural p. 32 consilience 4.0 conclusion diet choice is one of the most sustainable lever points we have at our individual disposal. this study examined the sustainability of such a choice through the lens of a finite resource, phosphorus. overall, meat-based diets consume more phosphorus because the uptake efficiency of turning p into consumable food is much lower for meat-based products such as beef, pork, and chicken. a cow will only supply a certain amount of meat, and growing that meat requires a tremendous amount of grain. this efficiency is much lower than the p needed to grow a much smaller amount of grain to directly feed a consumer. we have the personal ability to affect how resources are used on a daily basis, and this study takes a systematic approach to examine how individuals can use data to inform their decisions. with this in hand, readers should consult other resources around what additional benefits plant-based diets confer over meat-based diets, and if plant-based diets are right for them in other ways. consilience schroeder: phosphorus impact from diet references all about sorghum. (n.d.). retrieved from united sorghum checkoff website: http://www.sorghumcheckoff.com/all-about-sorghum bushel/tonne converter. (n.d.). retrieved from alberta agriculture and forestry website: https://www.agric.gov.ab.ca/app19/calc/crop/bushel2tonne.jsp buzby, j., wells, h., & hyman, j. (2014, february). the estimated amount, value, and calories of postharvest food losses at the retail and consumer levels in the united states. retrieved from usda ers website: https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?id=40702602709410110009310 0029121013109116084085079093023074103117105026108117065071010048 0421160600450340001031161160030980820190000170910180920990890790 7710906801006802605008711011408211409710309512406507403010007510 6097002008079092102122025090072074&ext=pdf cordell, d., & white, s. (2013, january 31). sustainable phosphorus measures: strategies and technologies for achieving phosphorus security. agronomy, 3, 86-116. retrieved from http://www.mdpi.com/journal/agronomy cordell, d., white, s., & drangert, j.-o. (2009, may). the story of phosphorus: global food security and food for thought. global environmental change, 19(2), 292-305. retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.rit.edu/science/article/pii/s0959378 00800099x dettling, j., tu, q., faist, m., delduce, a., & mandlebaum, s. (2016, march). a comparative life cycle assessment of plant-based foods and meat foods. retrieved from quantis website: https://www.morningstarfarms.com/content/dam/morningstarfarms/pdf/ msfplantbasedlcareport_2016-04-10_final.pdf feeding the world. (n.d.). retrieved from fao.org website: http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3107e/i3107e03.pdf gunders, d. (2012, august). wasted: how america is losing up to 40 percent of its food from farm to fork to landfill. retrieved from nrdc.org website: https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/wasted-food-ip.pdf jasinski, s. m. (2016, january). phosphate rock. retrieved from minerals-usgs website: https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/phosphate_rock/mcs -2016-phosp.pdf metson, g., bennett, e., & elser, j. (2012, december 29). the role of diet in phosphorus demand. retrieved from iop science website: http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/7/4/044043 34 consilience myplate daily checklist. (2017, march 20). retrieved from choosemyplate.gov website: https://www.choosemyplate.gov/myplate-daily-checklist phosphorus. (n.d.). retrieved from oec website: http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/hs92/280470/ pimentel, d., & pimentel, m. (2003, september). sustainability of meat-based and plant-based diets and the environment. american journal of clinical nutrition, 78, 660-663. retrieved from http://ajcn.nutrition.org/content/78/3/660s.full.pdf+html solecki, m. (n.d.). soybeans for biodiesel. retrieved from fueling growth website: http://www.fuelinggrowth.org/soybeans-for-biodiesel/ soy facts. (n.d.). retrieved from soyatech website: http://www.soyatech.com/soy_facts.htm u.s. sugar production. (2017, april 28). retrieved from usda ers website: https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/sugarsweeteners/backilogramsround/ what to eat nexta phosphorus primer. (2013). headway, 7(1), 6. retrieved from https://www.mcgill.ca/research/files/research/mcgill_headway_71_spr13_web_opt1.pdf world of corn 2015. (2015). retrieved from ncga.com website: http://www.ncga.com/upload/files/documents/pdf/publications/woc2015.pdf consilience schroeder: phosphorus impact from diet appendix 1: fao-stat query output for united states domain item production in kg per capita consumption (kg) modeling category amount modeled maize 3.61091e+11 1132.30 grain/sweetener 108.75 soybeans 1.06878e+11 335.15 legume 4.56 wheat 55147120000 172.93 grain 112.40 sugar beet 28381270000 89.00 sugar/sweetener 13.97 sugar cane 27600190000 86.55 sugar/sweetener 11.43 potatoes 20056500000 62.89 veggie 62.89 tomatoes 14516060000 45.52 fruit 45.52 sorghum 10987910000 34.46 grain 0.69 rice, paddy 10079500000 31.61 grain 31.61 seed cotton 9791640000 30.70 cotton productionanimal feed grapes 7152063000 22.43 fruit 22.43 oranges 6139826000 19.25 fruit 19.25 apples 5185078000 16.26 fruit 16.26 cottonseed 4649320000 14.58 cotton productionanimal feed barley 3952610000 12.39 grain 12.39 lettuce and chicory 3791140000 11.89 veggie 11.89 cotton lint 3593000000 11.27 not modeled maize, green 3447520000 10.81 assume for animal feed onions, dry 3166740000 9.93 veggie 9.93 groundnuts, with shell 2353540000 7.38 nuts 7.38 almonds, with shell 1545500000 4.85 nuts 4.85 watermelons 1508780000 4.73 fruit (model as melons) 4.73 carrots and turnips 1443120000 4.53 veggie 4.53 strawberries 1371573000 4.30 fruit 4.30 sweet potatoes 1341910000 4.21 veggie (model as potato) 4.21 beans, dry 1311340000 4.11 legume 4.11 cauliflowers and broccoli 1222930000 3.83 veggie (split 50/50) 3.83 rapeseed 1140140000 3.58 not modeled oats 1019410000 3.20 grain 3.20 sunflower seed 1004630000 3.15 not modeled peaches and nectarines 959983000 3.01 fruit 3.01 cabbages and other brassicas 958930000 3.01 veggie (split 50/50-r&w) 3.01 grapefruit (inc. pomelos) 949822000 2.98 can't model-not in simapro chillies and peppers, green 914490000 2.87 veggie 2.87 pumpkins, squash and gourds 863460000 2.71 can't model-not in simapro vegetables, fresh nes 834292000 2.62 not modeled cucumbers and gherkins 799820000 2.51 veggie 2.51 melons, other (inc.cantaloupes) 787030000 2.47 fruit 2.47 string beans 786750000 2.47 can't model-not in simapro peas, dry 778140000 2.44 can't model-not in simapro pears 754415000 2.37 fruit 2.37 lemons and limes 747520000 2.34 fruit (lime is chemical) 2.34 tangerines, mandarins, clementines, satsumas 664059000 2.08 fruit 2.08 walnuts, with shell 518002000 1.62 can't model-not in simapro mushrooms and truffles 432100000 1.35 not modeled tobacco, unmanufactured 397535000 1.25 not modeled cranberries 381018000 1.19 can't model-not in simapro spinach 350410000 1.10 veggie 1.10 cherries 329852000 1.03 can't model-not in simapro peas, green 329180000 1.03 can't model-not in simapro beer of barley 22600000000 70.87 grain 70.87 oil, soybean 9706000000 30.44 soybean oil 30.44 milk, skimmed cow 15400000000 48.29 skim milk 48.29 cheese, whole cow milk 5221857000 16.37 cheese 16.37 milk, whole fresh cow 93460920000 293.07 whole milk 293.07 meat, chicken 17722312000 55.57 chicken 55.57 meat, cattle 11453253000 35.91 beef 35.91 meat, pig 10368214000 32.51 pork 32.51 eggs, hen, in shell 5973968000 18.73 eggs 18.73 meat, turkey 2610710000 8.19 chicken 8.19 *cutoff applied at 1 kg of food item per capita livestock primary livestock processed crops processed crops* microsoft word schipani.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 13, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 180–195 green talk: comparing the discourse on climate change and sustainable development between environmental ngos and the state in vietnam and bolivia samantha schipani earth institute columbia university, new york city, new york ss4121@columbia.edu abstract environmental non-government organizations (engos) and national governments are key players in the political sphere surrounding issues of climate change and sustainable development. the relationships between the discourse on “climate change” and “sustainable development” and engos and the state in both vietnam and bolivia provides a critical look into the ways in which these issues are approached in two highly-vulnerable countries with different political regimes. live & learn, the centre for marinelife and conservation, and pannature were interviewed as engo case studies in vietnam; and grupo de trabajo de cambio climático y justicia and proinpa were interviewed as engo case studies in bolivia. comparing the discourse from the engo interviews and websites depicting the socialist republic of vietnam’s law on the protection of the environment and bolivia’s 2009 political constitution of the state elucidates the gaps left by state policies with regards to the needs of civil society in the context of climate change and sustainable development. the analysis also demonstrates the ways in which different regimes shape the culture of engos and how this impacts climate change and sustainable development initiatives and action. author’s note i became interested in the relationship between environmental civil society organizations and government regimes while studying abroad through the school of international training’s international honors program on climate change. as a self-proclaimed politics geek, i feel that for any significant movement, the relationship between government and civil society is essential to understanding how the different facets of the policy itself are shaped. in areas where the impacts of climate change are immediate and salient, particularly in the developing world where regimes are different from the united states, this relationship will be critical in the coming years for the process of adapting and responding to a changing earth. keywords: ngos, environmental ngos, vietnam, bolivia, sustainable development, government. 1. background both the state and non-government organizations (ngos) are leading decision-influencing bodies in any given nation. however, the two groups have consilience schipani: green talk distinctive origins, agendas, and motivations that lead to each framing issues using different rhetoric. the relationship between active environmental non-government organizations (engos) and the state in terms of the discourse on “climate change” and “sustainable development” reveals the ways in which the needs of the populace with respect to these issues are being addressed. moreover, the varying discourse surrounding these ideas reveals how non-government groups behave within different regimes with regards to these issues. further comparing these discourses and their disparities between the countries of vietnam and bolivia elucidates not only the predominance of specific issues over others in the environmental discussions of each country, but also how the relationship between different governmental regimes and their civil society actors responds to the shifting ecological tides in some of the world’s most vulnerable areas. though the united nations (un) originally delineated the term “ngo” in 1945 for international bodies engaging within the context of the un itself, the modern connotation has evolved to encompass private groups united under a mutual objective whose members do not “include official members, such as governments, governmental representatives, or governmental institutions”, and are non-profit oriented and independent from the government because they operate primarily on private donations (martens, 2002). for the purpose of this research, an engo is considered to be a group of civil society members not funded or represented in part by government actors that pursues a common goal mainly related to issues of ecological protection, or issues related to natural resource management, such as agriculture, water, and energy. however, engos may have agendas that do not necessarily work towards a broad social benefit, and it is thus important to be critical of the motivations of engo actors. large, international engos do not necessarily encompass all of the grassroots social movements surrounding environmental issues, as the “radical ecology movement argues for a reorientation of economics, replacing competitive free trade and export led development with self-sufficiency and minimal energy and material throughput” (isla, 2009). engos have conflicted with social needs particularly in issues of forest conservation and carbon offset engos, which have been known to remove indigenous people from their lands for the sake of preserving “natural” areas (landell-mills & porras, 2002). therefore, it is essential to understand the origins, the sources of funding, and the motivations of engo actions in order to properly understand their role in the environmental discourse. the relationship between engos and the state reveals how civil society prioritizes environmental issues and how environmental civil society behaves comparatively across different political regimes. the discrepancies between the priorities emphasized by the government and those by engos often reveal areas in which the government has failed to sufficiently address the needs of its people. ngos are essential mechanisms for mobilizing civil society politically when “traditional mechanisms like voting are blocked or seen as ineffective” by providing resources that can be used for organizing or by facilitating interaction between members of a community (boulding, 2010). in many regimes, environmental movements can claim their roots in social movements from grassroots groups, dynamic environmental networks, and public pressure lobbies (ho, 2001). the comparison of the relationship between engos and the government across different states provides insight into the effects of different regimes on civil society consilience schipani: green talk actors with regards to environmental issues. in china, for example, the “altering politics of toleration and strict control of social organizations” largely shaped the government’s approach to environmentalism, marked by gradual development, a lack of immediate urgency to confront the environmental costs of development, and a general inability of engos to openly confront the government on environmental issues (ho, 2001). this deviates from the behavior of engos in western democracies, where the environmental movement rose as a specific crisis of quality of life in a post-industrial setting, initially recognizing the need to improve environmental efficiency in a free market economy, and to “enhance a pluralist, democratic political system if long-term economic growth is to be secured” (ho, 2001). the comparison between vietnam and bolivia are particularly informative considering the vulnerability, state regimes, and history of civil society in the two regions. vietnam and bolivia are the 6th and 35th, respectively, most vulnerable countries to climate change according to the global climate risk index (harmeling and eckstein, 2013). however, based on the varying geographies of the regions, each nation will be affected differently. vietnam will likely suffer most prominently from the effects of sea-level rise, such as saline intrusion and coastal erosion. as a landlocked country, bolivia will be less impacted by sea-rise than its coastal counterpart across the pacific. nevertheless, bolivia will be affected by glacial retreat in the mountainous areas, which affects domestic and agricultural water supply. both countries face agricultural challenges as the shifting climate transforms ecological conditions in their primary growing areas. vietnam and bolivia are also both currently led by socialist heads of state, though the structures of the two governments are dissimilar. vietnam is a singleparty socialist republic where the president of vietnam is the head of state, and the prime minister of vietnam is the head of government in a one-party system led by the communist party of vietnam. the executive branch is responsible for the implementation of the state’s political activities, but the legislature is, according to the constitution, the highest organ of the state (van & cooper, 1983, p. 56). the constitution of vietnam is largely based around marxism-leninism and ho chi minh thought, which are also considered to be the “official ideology” of the communist party of vietnam (the socialist party of vietnam government portal, 2013). though the government actors are by no means homogenous, this “official ideology” serves as a unifying factor within the government, and while the president himself is never held up as a figurehead in vietnamese culture, ho chi minh iconography is present in public spaces throughout the nation. in contrast to vietnam, the government of bolivia is a presidential representative democratic republic, whereby current president evo morales serves as head of state, head of government, and head of a pluriform multi-party system. evo morales is a member of the movement towards socialism (mas) party, as is current vice president álvaro garcía linera. with evo morales’s rise to power as the first democratically-elected president from an indigenous population, the government underwent a constitutional referendum in 2009 that granted more power to indigenous people, allowed president evo morales to stand for re-election, ensured state control over natural gas, and limited the size of land ownership (constituent assembly of bolivia, 2009). morales’ presence as a culture icon is prevalent on billboards across the country, though public opinions of his politics are by no means consilience schipani: green talk uniform. with similarly socialist-minded leaders in vastly different regime structure, there should be some similarities between the way governing bodes approach issues of climate change and sustainable development between vietnam and bolivia, but the differences in comparison will reveal how the different government structures perceive these ideas as well as how they respond to civil society. vietnam and bolivia also both have contentious histories of civil society with regards to their relationship to governing bodies. in vietnam, terms such as “civil society” and “ngo” are “not widely used in academic and official discourse in vietnam” (thayer, 2009). generally, the term “civil society” in vietnamese “has two distinct meanings” with complicated connotations in relation to the state. the first is “an economic meaning that views civil society in terms of service delivery by local development ngos,” which is viewed mostly negatively by the state as “being closely linked to international benefactors and their agendas…because in vietnam's mono-organizational system there is no domestic civil society sector that is independent or autonomous from the direct control of the state” (thayer, 2009). the second meaning, which emerged in the 1990s, is largely political, whereby “dissidents have appropriated the term civil society in order to promote liberal democracy” and create spaces “where vietnam's one-party state can be challenged by the non-violent political mobilization of ordinary citizens” (thayer, 2009). in a political context, “vietnamese ngos began to emerge to deliver services that were no longer provided by the state,” though increasingly, “this space has been occupied by ingos [international non-government organizations] at the expense of local development ngos” (thayer, 2009). civil society organizations have an equally contentious relationship with the state in bolivia. according to a study conducted by boulding regarding the role of ngos in bolivian political participation, “ngos facilitate collective action and political participation,” though “how that political participation is exercised…is contingent on the larger political context in which ngos are operating” (2010). as bolivia is considered a weak democratic setting “where institutions are viewed with deep distrust and skepticism, new political participation can also take more contentious forms, such as political protest and demonstrations” (boulding, 2010). boulding finds that, in bolivia especially, ngos are linked to protests in such political regimes, which is not only important for the political character of bolivia itself, but emphasizes “the importance of political context” to how civil society works in less democratic settings (boulding, 2010). 2. methodologies in order to compare the state and engo rhetoric within specific limitations, in-depth interviews were conducted with engo leaders as well as close readings of online resources from both engo and government webpages. the specific limitations of the research included language barriers and discrepancies in translation, particularly in vietnam; inability to speak candidly with government employees about their perceptions of state environmental discourse in relation to engos; and a relatively non-random sample of engos, all of which were selected to present for the ihp climate change program this semester. however, leaders of the engos were interviewed at length to gather qualitative research. interviews were constructed consilience schipani: green talk conversationally, centered around the main questions of “what does climate change mean for your organization and how has it impacted your projects?”, “how does your organization approach sustainable development? how is this similar or different from sustainable development as conducted by the state?”, and “what is the relationship between the state and your engo?” after the interviews and any follow-up emails, the engos’ websites were browsed for official mission statements, distributed literature, and other relevant information. finally, english translations of the vietnamese environmental policies and both english and spanish versions of the bolivian constitution were reviewed for relevant information as to the ways in which “climate change” and “sustainable development” were defined and used in the discourse. in order to attempt to factor issues of engo efficacy out of my research, eliminated ingos with primarily international leadership were eliminated from the case studies. the only ngo studied with an international headquarters was live & learn, headquartered in australia, because the group’s leaders were all native vietnamese and claimed veritably no connection to the live & learn headquarters aside from some funding and name recognition. the discourse analysis focuses on both climate change and sustainable development to not only highlight the tensions between economic development and the inevitable impacts of the changing environment in these decision-making and public action bodies, but also to emphasize the inherent variability associated with these phrases in environmental discourse. a study conducted by weingart, engels, and pansegrau (2000) on the discourses of climate change divides the discourses into three distinct spheres of science, politics, and mass media, with serious disparities between the three in the level of complexity, uncertainty, and alarm. according to the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc), the term “climate change” is defined as “any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity” (2007). however, this usage differs from that in the united nations framework convention on climate change (unfccc), which defines “climate change” as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods” (2014). similarly, “sustainable development,” first used by the brundtland commission in its 1987 report our common future, is defined at its most basic level as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” however, oil companies such as shell have co-opted terms like “sustainable development” in order to improve their public image, and its engagement with the sustainability discourse is linked to the “changing social practices of sustainable development” and is revealing to the “power-knowledge dynamics at play in this discursive field” (livesey, 2002). some scholars even argue that the phrase “sustainable development” itself is an oxymoron, as ecological and social sustainability is necessarily in conflict with the current paradigm of economic development (redclift, 2005). 3. vietnam consilience schipani: green talk the vietnamese engos interviewed as case studies include live & learn, the centre for marinelife and conservation, and pannature. live & learn is an international ngo headquartered in australia with branches all across southeast asia. live & learn aims for a “sustainable and equitable world free from poverty” through educating communities about climate change in “action-based, effective and creative learning models and teaching methodologies” (live & learn, 2013). the vietnamese branch of live & learn underwent two years of development to build a “passionate and enthusiastic human resources of full-time staff and collaborators with in-depth experience and knowledge in sustainability education and good governance” (live & learn, 2013). the live & learn branch in vietnam focuses mainly on educating the public by distributing climate change educational materials to classrooms, particularly the abc education book on climate change publically available on their website. the centre for marinelife and conservation (mcd) is a non-profit, nongovernment organization devoted to marine life conservation and sustainable development in vietnam’s coastal areas. mcd strives to become, “by 2015, a pioneering vietnamese civil society organization that harmonizes the effective management of coastal resources and improvement of coastal community livelihoods by localizing international knowledge and experience into practical adaptive models in vietnamese context” (mcd vietnam, 2014). mcd operates mainly in impoverished communities surrounding national parks and marine biosphere reserves, as well as wetland ecosystems in the red river delta, mekong delta, the central coast, and coastal islands. mcd provides technical consultancy about resource management and livelihood improvement as well as writes proposals to improve relevant policies. pannature is a vietnamese not-for-profit organization dedicated to protecting and conserving biodiversity and improving human wellbeing in vietnam by promoting the good governance of natural resources; raising public awareness; building a network for vietnamese environmental groups; and fostering participation and transparency of public policies (pannature, 2014). pannature implements environmental awareness and education activities in various sites throughout vietnam, as well as seeking feasible solutions for better governance of natural resources to balance the goals of nature conservation with improving rural livelihoods (pannature, 2014). the organization focuses on the role of community participation in sustainable development. pannature also conducts research about conservation and sustainable development (pannature, 2014). the vietnamese government largely views the environment as a means for development. the english translation of the laws on the protection of the environment, enacted in 1992, was used to discern state rhetoric surrounding sustainable development and climate change. the laws heavily emphasize the importance of environmental “protection”, requiring “any organization, family household or individual causing environmental pollution or degradation…to remedy it and to compensate for loss and damage” (socialist republic of vietnam, 1992). however, the government views “investing in protection of the environment as investment for development” (socialist republic of vietnam, 1992). such protection must, therefore, “must conform with the law, with natural, cultural and historical characteristics and with the level of socio-economic development of the country from time to time” (socialist republic of vietnam, 1992). references to “climate consilience schipani: green talk change” are absent from the constitution as a whole, though there is mention of rising temperatures and “greenhouse gases”, though only in direct reference to “selling of greenhouse gas emission quotas between vietnam and foreign countries” and encouraging “manufacturing, business and services establishments to minimize greenhouse gas emissions” (socialist republic of vietnam, 1992). though the engos in vietnam addressed climate change through many different avenues, there was a prevailing focus on adaptation and resilience across all three. unlike the state, all three engos refer directly to “climate change” throughout their environmental discourses, usually coupled with a “response” that involves adapting lifestyles or ecosystems to the inevitable impacts. the live & learn abc education book on climate change continually mentions the importance of “adaptation,” both with regards to the actions of the vietnamese government and in “what you can do” in “responding to climate change” (abc education book on climate change, 2012). the live & learn website describes its “child-centered climate change adaptation project” as “building the resilience of children, young people and their communities for future climatic risks and impacts…with skills and knowledge to identify disaster and climate change risks and initiate the solutions to cope and adapt with” (live & learn, 2013). the mcd leaders emphasized the need to build the “resilience” of marine ecosystems and coastal communities in the face of climate change, including projects such as the “community communication campaign promoting climate change adaptive livelihood models” and tools for “natural resources management and climate change adaptation in the coastal biosphere reserve in vietnam” (mcd, 2014). though pannature makes no specific reference to “adaptation” or “resilience,” its mission similarly emphasizes the importance of individuals and communities adapting more “sustainable livelihoods” in response to climate change (pannature, 2014). however, the rhetoric surrounding “sustainable development” by both the state and the engos emphasizes the role of environmental resources in the economic growth of vietnam. the laws define “sustainable development” as “development which satisfies the needs of the present generation without prejudicing the ability to satisfy the needs of future generations on the basis of tight and harmonious coordination between economic growth, guarantee of social progress, and protection of the environment” (socialist republic of vietnam, 1992). the emphasis on “social progress” and “economic growth” differs from the original brundtland report definition, emphasizing the vietnamese government’s commitment to economic growth in the context of managing environmental resources. furthermore, such rhetoric regarding “sustainable development” is echoed by the engos, who emphasize the “environmental sustainability of the development path” as an issue with regards to “economic growth” and “environmental planning as a part of socio-economic development” (live & learn, 2013; pannature, 2014). even mcd, which is focused on environmental conservation, strives primarily to “balance the needs of coastal communities with the needs of the marine environment to ensure a sustainable future for all” (mcd vietnam, 2014). though the mention of sustainability is less explicitly economical, there is still a prevailing sense of needing the environment primarily to support the development of the communities. furthermore, all three engos viewed their relationships to the state as specifically supplementing laws that were already put in place by the government. consilience schipani: green talk the leaders of live & learn described their relationship with the government as contingent on the topic – education on energy production and conservation, for example, is most heavily monitored – but generally cooperative. with specific regards to climate change, the government already has the policies in place for “promoting dissemination of information, education…to build awareness and discipline in environmental protection activities,” but the engos have more financial resources (the socialist republic of vietnam, 1992). according to their website, mcd strives to “manipulate multilevel policies of nature resources management in coastal areas” (mcd vietnam, 2014). the leaders of the mcd echoed this rhetoric in conversation, emphasizing the importance of engos in mobilizing existing conservation policies. pannature’s policy program aims to build the capacity of vietnamese civil society to “monitor law enforcement and implementation,” as it recognizes that vietnam has “a good system of environmental and conservation laws,” but “implementation and enforcement of these laws are still considered to be weak and inefficient” (pannature, 2014). pannature provides “government agencies with reference models and recommendations for better environmental management and planning for sustainable development” (pannature, 2014). vietnamese engos, therefore, serve to fill the gap between policy and action. nevertheless, all three vietnamese engos maintain rhetoric of seeking “transparency” from the government. though provinces and municipalities are centrally controlled and managed by the national government, towns are locally accountable through some degree through elected people’s councils (the socialist republic of vietnam, 1992). the local governments play an important role in vietnamese environmental laws, as article 112 of the laws on the protection of the environment outlines the “responsibilities of the people's committees at all levels for state administration of protection of environment” (1992). however, because of the varying levels of bureaucracy, the vietnamese government is prone to corruption, particularly at the local level (fritzen, 2006). subsequently, live & learn has a specific project related to pursuing a “transparent and sustainable society.” the project is designed in order to bring to light the issues of corruption in the daily lives of the nation’s youth (live & learn, 2014). one of pannature’s five main goals is “transparency of government policies” (pannature, 2014). the engos discourse on filling the gaps between government policies and action likely stems from the inefficiencies perpetuated by the decentralized local governing bodies, which are technically in charge of implementing the government’s environmental policies. 4. bolivia the bolivian engos used as case studies for the purpose of this research were the grupo de trabajo de cambio climático y justicia and fundación proinpa. grupo de trabajo de cambio climático y justicia (gtccj), or “working group for climate change and justice,” is a social group consisting of several bolivian nonprofit institutions “working on the issue of climate change from the perspective of ecological ethics and justice” (gtccj, 2014). the organization manages a climate fund for gtccj member institutions, which is “intended to perform actions and/or research, systematization on the implementation of micro-projects in consilience schipani: green talk rural and urban areas, related to the topics of prevention, adaptation and mitigation of climate change” (gtccj, 2014). the engo strives to act as a bridge between the people and the government on issues of climate change and environmental justice. fundación proinpa’s mission is to “promote the conservation and sustainable use of genetic resources” through researching and increasing agricultural biodiversity (fundación proinpa, 2014). the impact area of fundación proinpa spans across bolivia, from the altiplano to the valles sur, as the organization seeks “to strengthen community structures and protect the environment” (fundación proinpa, 2014). the engo views crop varieties and increasing agricultural biodiversity as one way to combat climate change, conducting research and experiments with different varieties of tubers, roots, grains, cereals, legumes, vegetables, and fruits able to grow in bolivia. the foundation also conducts research with regards to climate change adaptability and rural community vulnerability across the country. the 2009 bolivian constitution recognizes the rights of communities to environmental resources, but only insofar as they assist the development of the country as a whole. the 2009 bolivian constitution, like the vietnamese laws on the protection of the environment, makes no mention of climate change, but recognizes the right of people to have to environmental resources. section i of the social and economic rights section includes that, “everyone has the right to a healthy, protected, and balanced environment. the exercise of this right must be granted to individuals and collectives of present and future generations, as well as to other living things, so they may develop in a normal and permanent way” (constituent assembly of bolivia, 2009). however, the discourse of the constitution is rife with internal contradictions about the environment and development. article 9 with regards to the principles, values and purposes of the state includes promoting and guaranteeing “responsible and planned use of natural resources, and to stimulate their industrialization through the development and strengthening of the productive base in its different dimensions and levels, as well as to preserve the environment for the welfare of present and future generations” (constituent assembly of bolivia, 2009). therefore, though people have a right to the natural environment, environmental resources must be “planned” and industrialized for a “productive base.” bolivian engos are focused on “adaptation” to climate change, specifically with regards to vulnerable communities. the main goal of the gtccj network in the face of climate change focuses on “prevention, adaptation and/or mitigation” through “a number of initiatives through the support of micro projects that complement or help create knowledge which others can learn” (gtccj, 2014). the climate fund specifically targets vulnerable urban and rural areas, identifying “local initiatives being implemented to prevent and confront the effects of climate change adaptation, mitigation and prevention” (gtccj, 2014). fundación proinpa presents their projects as building socio-ecological resilience to climate change through agricultural biodiversity. the foundation prioritizes their focus in areas “in which its residents are affected by poverty but have natural or economic potential has not been tapped” (fundación proinpa, 2014). furthermore, fundación proinpa is currently working on a project to evaluate the vulnerability of communities to climate change alongside developing an adaptation program to improve the resilience of their agricultural biodiversity projects. consilience schipani: green talk amongst the bolivian engos, there is also a prevailing sense of associating climate change issues to social equity, both domestically and internationally. at a domestic level, gtccj demands that the bolivian government make “clear gesture of commitment to the environment and ecosystem”, which “should promote local, regional and national policies to promote the preservation of water resources, food security, health, particularly the most vulnerable” (gtccj, 2014). as one of the leaders of gtccj described, bolivian engos are less focused on mitigation because their impact is relatively little. one of the organization’s main principles is the “requirement to pay the ecological debt of the poorest developing countries, not as a form of compensation or exchange or market mechanisms, but as a real way to amend the irreversible damage that generated huge consumerist economies, opposed to a fair and balanced development” (gtccj, 2014). another includes “the commitment of developed countries to fulfill their responsibilities; while effective efforts are made to reduce deforestation in developing countries” (gtccj, 2014). gtccj thus coordinates “processes and actions on adaptation to climate change from the perspective of justice” (gtccj, 2014). fundación proinpa focuses less specifically on issues of justice and social inequality, but recognizes the impacts of climate change on the resilience of rural communities with limitedly distribution resources, thusly focusing the energies of the projects on the communities most in need. the state also focuses on inequalities, but little with regards to issues of climate change. in fact, the state only refers to inequality specifically with regards to the “reduction of inequality of access to productive resources” and “equitable distribution of wealth and of the economic resources of the country, for the purpose of preventing inequality” (constituent assembly of bolivia, 2009). sustainable development discourse in bolivian engos is holistic, but critical of implications of the phrase itself. fundación proinpa is committed to a “system of life” approach to development, whereby the ecosystem in its entirety is considered when making any changes for the benefit of economic gain. within their paradigm of agricultural systems, fundación proinpa also recognizes that “organization of science and technology with a flexible and agile structure, known in bolivia and abroad for its excellence…has also achieved its institutional and financial sustainability” (fundación proinpa, 2014) fundación proinpa integrates the “genetic heritage of bolivia and technological innovation within a concept of sustainable farming systems” (fundación proinpa, 2014). similarly, gtccj also recognizes that “the transfer and the development of clean technology without debt should be a key to enter and sustainable mitigation processes, real and concrete adaptation pillar” (gtccj, 2014). the leaders of the engo consider development to be a balance between living with and using nature without removing everything from it. however, the leaders of the group were also quick to point out the internal contradictions with the word “sustainable development” and question its efficacy at length. they claim we must either visualize or make visible alternative forms of lifestyles. with the incorporation of concepts like “vivir bien,” development in the eyes of gtccj should include education and access to opportunities without marginalization, not building economic markets. in contrast, the bolivian government’s discourse on sustainable development is focused on strategy, authority, and, ultimately, production, largely for the proclaimed benefit of the nation at large. according to the constitution, “natural assets are of public importance and of strategic character for the sustainable consilience schipani: green talk development of the country,” and, therefore, “their conservation and use for the benefit of the population shall be the responsibility and exclusive authority of the state, and sovereignty over natural resources may not be compromised” (constituent assembly of bolivia, 2009). the state emphasizes the “industrialization” of natural resources “to overcome dependence on the export of raw materials and to achieve an economy with a productive base, within the framework of sustainable development in harmony with nature” (constituent assembly of bolivia, 2009). similarly, protected environmental areas constitute a “common good” in that “they perform environmental, cultural, social and economic functions for sustainable development” (constituent assembly of bolivia, 2009). the bolivian state even goes as far as to stretch sustainable development beyond the bounds of environmental issues, discussing the “defense, security and control of the zones of border security” as essential duties of the armed forces to ensure “comprehensive and sustainable development of these zones, and shall guarantee their physical presence in them” (constituent assembly of bolivia, 2009). the discourse surrounding sustainable development by the bolivian state is largely focused on the capacity for natural resources to achieve power through production in the markets. the rationale behind such ideas is to benefit the people of the country as a whole, but such a vision contrasts with the holistic vision of development outlined by the bolivian engos. bolivian engos view their relationship to the government not as a supplement to existing policies, but as a vehicle through which new policies can be created. the leaders of the gtccj claim none of the topics on the government agenda are important to the people. subsequently, one of the gtccj’s main objectives is to “generate proposals concerted between actors from the information, awareness, training and advocacy processes and policies to adapt to climate change justice perspective” (gtccj, 2014). with regards to the government, fundación proinpa is currently participating in a program of bioculture that involves participants of both public and private entities. though the project itself is in part associated with government entities, the leaders of fundación proinpa hope their participation in creating a strategy for a unified image of climate change will be taken into consideration with policy changes. 5. comparison the similarities and differences between the environmental discourse of vietnam and bolivia elucidate the multi-faceted nature of engos in framing important environmental issues of climate change and sustainable development with respect to the regimes in which they operate. the primary difference between the vietnamese and bolivian regimes is that bolivia operates democratically with many parties while vietnam is a single-party socialist republic. though separate from the engos themselves, such ideas of democracy and pluralism permeate the discourse of the engos with regards to climate change issues. both the vietnamese and bolivian states are, perhaps unsurprisingly, more focused on promulgating economic development through means of so-called “sustainable development” than directly addressing issues of climate change, but the differences between the state discourse demonstrate how the two regimes approach individual responsibility versus individual rights with respect to the environment. furthermore, the differences consilience schipani: green talk between the engos in the different regimes with respect to the state demonstrate the way environment civil society is shaped by the political regime in which it occupies, and what role it subsequently plays in the political-ecological sphere. with regards to civil society in the two nations, there is a prevailing discourse about adaptability with regards to engos. such adaptation in bolivia, however, is focused primarily on the most susceptible rural populations, while adaptation in vietnam is generally broader. gtccj and fundación proinpa both emphasize their focus on “vulnerable” agricultural populations. live & learn’s educational programs are intended for use across vietnam, and while pannature and mcd both focus on a specific type of community in rural and coastal areas, respectively, the rhetoric of “vulnerability” is absent from the discourse, except with regards to specific species or ecological zones. the discourse of engos in bolivia is also more focused on social equity and environmental justice than that of engos in vietnam. the rhetorical differences with respect to climate change adaptability where no one population is considered more “vulnerable” speaks to the universality and prevalence of climate change effects in vietnam, as the southeast asian seaboard nation is ranked much more vulnerable to climate change than that of the landlocked south american state. on a political level, however, such a difference also speaks to the impacts that the presence of an officially democratic regime has on portraying climate change issues, specifically with a stronger focus on the impacts on people. with regards to environmental discourse, both the vietnamese and bolivian states are more focused on economic prosperity with regards to “sustainable development,” but also rhetorically construct different relationships with respect to humans and their environment. vietnam places a strong emphasis on individual action in mitigating and adapting to climate change. the 1992 laws encourage “all organizations, communities, family households and individuals to participate in environmental protection activities,” even going so far as to require “communities and people to bury their dead in already planned graveyards and cemeteries; to practice hygienic cremation; and to abandon burial practices which cause pollution” (the socialist republic of vietnam, 1992). such an approach permeates the engos, as live & learn’s educational program devotes an entire section of their handbook and whole projects to what individuals can do in response to climate change (live & learn, 2013). engos in bolivia, in contrast, are more focused on the structural changes regarding climate change. on the other hand, the bolivian state is more focused on individual rights with respect to the environment. chapter four of the 2009 constitution, entitled “rights of the nations and rural native indigenous people,” specifically designates the right to “live in a healthy environment, with appropriate management and exploitation of the ecosystems” for all peoples in the nation. this key differences perhaps point to an attitude within the socialist and democratic regimes, whereby the former is more focused on the wellbeing of the collective and thus the responsibilities of the individual thusly while the latter focuses on individual rights. the engo and state relationships in vietnam and bolivia solidify the role they have in the political system. with regards to issues with the government, vietnam is more focused on corruption and the transparency of existing political action while bolivia is more focused on changing the policies put in place. likewise, vietnamese engos see themselves as supplementing the state, reinforcing the idea of the socialist collective. bolivian engos, on the other hand, view civil society as a consilience schipani: green talk means by which the democratic voice can rise up with greater force to change government policies. though corruption is a prevailing issue in bolivia as well, the priorities of the engos with regards to what the state means for their actions is different based on the structure of the state. such differences could also speak to the legacies of civil society in the two nations, or the ways in which the government is handling climate change and sustainable development issues specifically. regardless, culture of engos is affected in part by the state regime that they occupy. 6. conclusion the dynamics between the state and engos with respect to issues of climate change and sustainable development create a steady give and take, not only with regards to the discourse put forth by the different entities, but also the implementation and actualization of environmental action. the disparities between the engos and the state reveal the ways in which the state falls short with respect to civil society with regards to environmental issues. likewise, the differences between engo and government discourse call to question not only the relationship of civil society entities to the state, but also the ways in which national political regimes permeate environmental decision-making, even at non-governmental levels. within vietnam, engos act to supplement existing policies in vietnam, which focus primarily on resilience and sustained development. in contrast, bolivian engos assume a more confrontational role to the state with grander policy-making goals emphasizing the social equity and vulnerability of certain disenfranchised populations. when comparing the two, the discourse on adaptation amongst engos and that of economic development between governments is prevailing, though the differences in the ways individuals are treated as either culpable actors or recipients of rights reveals how the nature of the political regime shapes the climate change and sustainable development discourse across both engos and the state. consilience schipani: green talk bibliography boulding, c. e. 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(2000). risks of communication: discourses on climate change in science, politics, and the mass media. public understanding of science, 9(3), 261-283. microsoft word boyd.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 15, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 146-180 the girl effect: a neoliberal instrumentalization of gender equality ginger ging-dwan boyd the new school boydg927@newschool.edu abstract over the past ten years, ‘the girl effect’–the discourse and practice of investing in third world girls’ education—has ascended to the top of the international development agenda as the ‘highest return investment strategy’ to end poverty. this paper interrogates the trend by investigating the genealogy of ‘the girl effect’ as the nike foundation’s flagship corporate social responsibility campaign and the theory of change it is based on. a literature analysis of the nike foundation’s most recent intervention projects—“the girl effect accelerator” and ‘girl hub’ pilot projects in ethiopia, nigeria, and rwanda—will elucidate the underlying investment logic and serve as a representative sample of the broader emerging practice. while claiming to advance “gender equality” and “women’s empowerment”, i argue that the girl effect accomplishes the opposite by reinforcing gender inequity on both the micro and macro levels. feminist grammars are instrumentalized as window dressing to exploit third world females as prospective (1) debtors in the expansion of credit markets, (2) exploits in the expansion of consumer markets, and (3) the ‘untapped resource’ for cheap labor. an epochal look at second wave feminism will show how ‘the girl effect paradigm’ is a second wave of neoliberal exploitation—a parallel of its first female-led development era (1980s-1990s). this paper warns that as this phenomenon grows in hegemony it is insidiously displacing feminism as a political project and neutralizing the need for a truly transformational agenda. without a counterbalance of vigilant public scrutiny and debate, we risk letting it crystallize westernpatriarchal-capitalism even more deeply in an unyielding global glass ceiling. keywords: nike, csr, women’s empowerment, education, public-private partnerships, corporate philanthropy, human capital theory consilience 147 introduction throughout the history of international development, varying camps of research have traced poverty to the source, proposed strategies of preventing poverty before it starts, and synthesized how to incorporate them sustainably in tandem with the natural environment. when identifying the most robust bodies of literature therein, investing in girls’ education is, by and large, the most universally convincing—and yet, it is also historically the most marginalized until now. according to rigillo (2011) alongside the dawn of the development industry (1950s) the university of chicago’s theodore schultz et al. linked new home economics theory with women’s human capital theory (2-3). they found that educated women were more likely to increase their own productivity by entering the workforce, lowering fertility, and (should they have children) increasing human capital “as measured through higher monetary investments in their nutrition, education, time spent with them and so on” (2-3). this logic has since also resonated with studies of women being better enabled to occupy positions of leadership at all levels of society, wherein they have been shown to increase the quality of democratic decision making, be less susceptible to corruption, and improve environmental management (rigillo 2011, 3). since the women in development’s movement (wid) in 1975, decades of empirical evidence has further (1) exposed how development primarily disadvantages women in relation to men; (2) identified an “observable decline in their access to productive social and material resources” over time; (3) disproved assumptions about gender power asymmetries as a ‘natural’ order inherent to the human condition1, (4) how the improvement of girls’ education, health, safety and income opportunities, transpires beyond girls and women, in the “ripple effects” it has on families, communities, environments, and eventually nations (goetz 1994, 29; the girl effect). in the most recent phenomenon, a surge of public-private partnerships, corporate social responsibility and corporate philanthropy initiatives have generated an unprecedented amount of investments in education for the third world adolescent girl (twag) over the past 1 in actuality, female responsibility of family survival was/is based on a particular set of historically produced, sociocultural, political, and economic conditions which force them to take on what moser (1989) calls, “the triple role” (1801). she states that in most low-income households in third world societies, the sexual division of labor assigns men as the “breadwinner” and women—subordinate to the man—as housewife and “homemaker”. this androcentricism “is seen to reflect the “natural” order, and is ideologically reinforced through such means as the legal and educational system, the media, and family planning programs” (moser 1989, 1800). women’s triple role thus includes: (1) the reproductive role of childbearing and rearing (2) the productive role as secondary income earners and (3) community managers who take responsibility for the allocation of limited resources. furthermore, as an extension of their domestic role, women frequently take primary responsibility for the formation, organization and success of local-level protest groups. because women’s triple role is seen as “natural”, the majority if not all the work that they do fails to be recognized as work and is therefore made invisible (1801). the triple role is therefore one the third world female does not occupy by choice let alone biological design. boyd: the girl effect consilience decade (roberts and soederberg 2012, 949-950; switzer 2013, 345). most popularly referred to as ‘the girl effect’ (tge), the trend has fast become the most prominent feature of international development discourse and practice of the 21st century (see appendix 1) (koffman and gill 2013, 83-84; hickel 2014, 1355). nike inc.’s flagship corporate social responsibility (csr) campaign, the girl effect campaign (tgec) itself was launched in 2008, and from there grew into such prominence that switzer (2013) characterizes it as “a representational regime” (345). the name alone now iconic, nike’s legendary branding prowess and strategic partnerships has indeed won it an unnaturally high profile in the international development discourse. but the movement at large is less of a coherent top-down project and more so the product of a confluence of forces (to be discussed) (roberts c2015, 109). koffman and gill (2013) thus characterize the girl effect as not just a singular entity, “but an assemblage of transnational policy discourses, novel corporate investment priorities, bio-political interventions, and branding and marketing campaigns” (84). because of its innumerable actors and unquantifiable scope, i will reference this greater constellation as ‘the girl effect paradigm’ (tgep). taken together, tgep has effectively brought the most historically marginalized group of the global south to the front and center of development. but this shift should not be confused as a cause for celebration just yet. i argue that because western 2 -patriarchalcapitalism has always controlled the discourse and subsequent implementation of mainstream development, the only scope for sustainable development in the face of this neoliberal3 trend is a selfserving one—perpetuating exploitation, and thereby poverty in an intergenerational feedback loop. looking at the pattern of promise versus reality from the first wave of female-led development to the current one will illuminate why. theoretical framework truong (1997) argues that, “the dominant discourse on human development so far is overtly patriarchal” (350). the nature of patriarchal 2 since the end of wwii, “the occidental enframing and deployment of modernization theory for the so-called developing countries provided a discursive legitimation” (slater 1993, 421). when that knowledge is deployed in practice over those who are known as the other, “those who are so known will be subject, or more exactly subjected, to it” (slater 1993, 422). thus, the west has been able to justify an industry of “practical interventions and penetrations that…subordinate, contain and assimilate the third world as other” (slater 1993, 421). 3 an offshoot of western-patriarchal-capitalism, neoliberalism is: viewed as both: (1) a project instituting marketbased norms of practice across the spheres of politics, economics, and culture, the boundaries between which have become almost indeterminate; and (2) a category of periodization of the latest phase of global capitalism; neoliberalism has become largely characterized by—if not considered almost synonymous with—the hegemonic ascent of the defining features, instruments, and operative logics of financialization and post-fordism (tadiar). since the 1980s, neoliberalism has shaped global and national economic policies in favor of “fiscal conservatism, open markets for capital and commodities, privatization,” and granted a bigger role to financial and corporate sectors (sen 2014, 195). consilience 149 power in the human development discourse resides in part to its “ability to maintain the social meanings attached to biological sex differences derived from male-centered conventions, the traces of which may be found in the conception of social power and the subject, and in the conception of the economy” (353). in capitalism, “bodies bear markers of difference that differentiate the value of their labour in which the human body can be put to use as the bearer of the capacity to labour” (114). roberts (c2015) cites david harvey: “the differentiation of bodies takes place as they are ‘marked by different physical productive capacities and qualities according to history, geography, culture, and tradition’, reducing the markers of race, ethnicity, age and gender to perceptions of what particular kind of labour people are able to do” (114). patriarchalcapitalism has thus rendered the bodies of women and girls as “potentialities”—passive subjectivities to be regulated in service of the market (banet-weiser b2015, 56). the first generation of female-led development did not gain traction as a political project to dismantle androcentricism. despite a tireless campaign to integrate feminism into development during the wid movement, the un remained a relatively weak implementation entity. women (not girls) were thus, only truly brought to mainstream visibility when noticed by the world bank—the historically more instrumental and influential agent of development. the third world woman’s “triple role” became undeniably salient under pressure of the financial crisis of 1979 and structrual adjustment programs (saps) of the 80s—only to be instrumentalized and doubly exploited under capitalism. moeller (c2014) cites christine ewig’s definition “of the ‘instrumental use of women’ in development programs and policies as ‘targeting particular groups of women for ends that do not necessarily benefit these women themselves.’ although proponents claim a win-win situation for girls and society, in reality the focus is on the returns on investment, and program content and policies are structured to generate these returns” (582-583). the world bank’s first flagship publication on gender issues appeared in 1995 entitled enhancing women’s participation in economic development. chant and sweetman (2012) highlight that “in a chapter unashamedly entitled ‘the pay-offs to investing in women’, the world bank professed that: investing in women is critical for poverty reduction. it speeds economic development by raising productivity and promoting the more efficient use of resources; it produces significant social returns, improving child survival and reducing fertility, and it has considerable intergenerational pay-offs” (519). in totality, shifting the onus to women meant that the ideology of the ‘self-sacrificing woman’ was expanded and the stereotypical ‘good mother’ perpetuated. their unpaid work as feeders, healers, and teachers of children to include the provision of basic services to the community meant increased hours and intensity of labour under the justifying veneer of ‘female altruism’ (goetz 1994, 30). furthermore, as a direct result of these neoliberal policies, inequality between and within countries has increased, labor market regulations have loosened, wages have been pushed down—especially female wages—in export-oriented sectors, reduced real incomes and job growth, and increased social conflict and boyd: the girl effect consilience exclusion from common resources. thus, the hegemony of the neoliberal economic agenda has threatened economic justice, particularly for girls in the global south, let alone in terms of global “gender equality" (sen 2014, 195). in parallel, leading up to 2015, the most ubiquitous rationale for these investments has followed the world bank’s (2006) rhetoric, ‘gender equality as smart economics’ (gese): “to promote economic development and attain the mdgs—especially the overarching poverty reduction mdg and the gender equality mdg—the global community must renew its attention to women’s economic empowerment and increase investments in women... women will benefit from their economic empowerment, but so too will men, children and society as a whole...in sum, the business case for expanding women’s economic opportunities is becoming increasingly evident; this is nothing more than smart economics”. 24 in a matryoshka doll of trojan horses, “gender equality” is being discursively instrumentalized as an expedient for development and together, re-instrumentalized as an alibi for economic growth. the nike foundation having been a primary leader of this movement in partnership with the world bank, it is the most salient case study to help us understand the emergent practice of investing in “the girl effect”. the interventions the nike foundation’s most recent csr interventions include girl hub (2010-2014) and “the girl effect accelerator” (tgea) (2014). a literature analysis of these projects’ investment logic and their respective interrelationship will serve as glimpses into the nike foundation’s broader agenda. the girl effect campaign being a representational regime, this analysis will further help expose the macro paradigm (612). my disclaimer aligns with moeller’s (b2014)— “while it is not expected that the experiences of nike, inc., the nike foundation, and their institutional partners in any specific geography will be exactly replicated by another set of actors focused on “the girl effect,” this study places these investments within a larger constellation of discourse and practice in order to understand the emergent practice of investing in “the girl effect” (612-613). for context, sdd (2013) reports that girl hub began on 1 december 2009 (2.) while icai (2012) reports that it began on 25 february of 2010. both report however that dfid granted girl hub a three-year grant of £12.8 million (£11.6 million in cash and £1.2 million in kind). its branches operated in ethiopia, rwanda, and nigeria (dfid offices), and supported work in kenya and drc, with a girl hub headquarters in london. dfid social development adviser, and an entry scheme social development adviser from the hq gender team (2013) reviewed girl hub ethiopia separately as it began in november of 2011 and was funded mainly by the secretary of state for £8.8 million for 2.5 years (additional funding of £1.4 million was provided by the nike foundation (2). icai (2012) also reports that dfid rwanda, dfid 4 chant and sweetman, 2012 consilience 151 nigeria, and dfid ethiopia allocated separate funding to their respective girl hub counterparts. girl hub states that their “mission [was] to empower the 250 million adolescent girls living in poverty to reach their full potential.”5 but according to icai’s (2012) report, the “girl hub aim[ed] to be a catalyst and convenor, so [it] d[id] not generally implement programmes” (1). the question then is, if nike is trumpeting the panacea effects of investing in third world girls’ education, but isn’t implementing programs, then what were they doing? tgec can be better understood as just one example of an onslaught of corporations redefining their corporate social responsibility (csr) agendas since the turn of the century. moeller (a2014) points out that corporations have long been principal architects and beneficiaries of development, but in the shame of global anti-sweatshop/antiglobalization movements, corporations have had to revise their “tarnished images” in order to secure their “social licenses to operate” and, correspondingly, their financial-bottom lines. she explains that, “csr is predicated on ‘doing well by doing good’…corporate investments in development, including the areas of education, health, finance, and the environment, suture them together” (76). but for “corporate executives and other proponents, csr is not merely an altruistic endeavor; rather it contributes to the corporation’s financial bottom line by fortifying existing market share, opening new markets, and producing potential new consumers and workers” (moeller a2014, 76). girl-hub was originally defined as “a strategic collaboration between the department for international development and the nike foundation, designed to bring together the expertise of both organisations to transform the lives of adolescent girls.” 6 while girl hub certainly has ‘transformed the lives of thousands of adolescent girls’, i argue that it has not been in the pursuit of “gender equality” or even ending poverty. it is my speculation that girl hubs ethiopia, rwanda, and nigeria were hubs more likely for market study/procurement of adolescent girls rather than hubs for adolescent girls—specifically for the expansion of credit markets, and consumer markets. the girl effect’s launch at the world economic forum alone forecasted their agenda. according to elias (2013) the wef has always had “power in constructing and promoting a particular global agenda in which the solutions to global problems are always found to lie with the market” (157-158). elias (2013) argues: “wef-produced gender and development discourse is profoundly compatible with the politics and practices of neoliberalism—not least in the way in which it aligns gender equality and women’s empowerment with national economic competitiveness” (152). during the girl effect session, the panel focused on the “potential multi-trillion-dollar impact of girls on national economies, the economic cost of not investing, and the impact of these investments on developed economies” (moeller a2014, 70). 5 http://www.girleffect.org/the-girl-effect-in-action/girl-hub/ 6 http://www.girleffect.org/the-girl-effect-in-action/girl-hub/ boyd: the girl effect consilience the wef’s business case is shown to have four main components: (i) explicitly linking aggregate measures of gender equality to measureable levels of economic competitiveness; (ii) constructing women as agents of the global financial recovery, especially in relation to how their everyday financial engagements embody riskaverse behaviors; (iii) viewing women and girls as a value for money investment—especially in relation to educational spending; and (iv) relating gender issues to a corporatized diversity management discourse. (elias 2013, 158) while items (i), (ii), and (iv) are important factors that are shaping the greater contours of the girl effect paradigm, for the sake of this paper it is most fitting to focus on point (iii): ‘viewing women and girls as a value for money investment—especially in relation to educational spending’. as gender inequality is framed as a problem which the market can solve, gender equality is reduced to women’s opportunities and empowerment, wherein women’s opportunities are limited to market opportunities and empowerment is constricted to economic empowerment in the form of individual human capital investment and job attainment (switzer 2013, 350). according to banet-weiser (a2015), empowerment in a neoliberal capitalist context means, among other things, that the individual girl is highlighted as empowering potential entrepreneurs (a2015, 9) and according to cruickshank, empowered consumers (elias 2013, 156). koffman and gill point out that the girl effect “portrays girls as ‘already entrepreneurial’ because they have had to be resourceful. [they astutely point out that] poverty, it seems, can be celebrated for the entrepreneurial capacities it stimulates’” (banet-weiser a2015, 7). according to elias (2013), “although the wef is not a development institution per se, its activities…make explicit assumptions about improving the economic growth of underdeveloped countries by opening up market opportunities to them” (153). in order to “unleash”7 the girl effect, roberts (b2012) accounts that much of the discourse “in relation to women and gender equality is focused on the need to improve women’s access to finance and credit. while this includes the need to extend credit to greater numbers of women in the us, the most profitable countries are predicted to be those where women have relatively lower levels of labour market participation and therefore remain a relatively untapped market” (96). taken together, it is therefore most likely that in presenting the girl effect at the wef, the ultimate goal was to lobby for scaled investment in girls’ entrepreneurial education—which would effectively rear the next score of credit consumers and deliver the 7 http://www.girleffect.org/about/ consilience 153 projected ‘multi-trillion-dollar[s].’ a survey of girl hub ethiopia, rwanda and nigeria literature will be discussed next as a testament. girl hub girl hub’s culpability as a trojan horse is evidenced by the switch from the nike foundation’s initial theory of change (ensuring girls are enrolled in formal schooling), to girl hub’s theory of change. item 76, but more specifically, item 153 in the sdd (2013) report, explicitly notes “[t]he theory [of change] had originally focused exclusively on the girl as a change agent. the revised theory of change recognises the importance of the enabling environment and establishes links between girl hub’s work to build demand for service and their work to influence the supply of services for girls through advocacy, brand development, research and evidence (153). the girl hub literature from all three sites emphasizes this concept of building an ‘enabling environment’, which i argue means creating what banet-wesier (a2015) has termed, a ‘market for girls’ empowerment’ (mge)8. the demand for girls’ empowerment (human capital) “finds purchase in education, self-esteem programs, confidence, […] leadership, health, and overall ‘agency’” (banet-weiser b2015, 55). girl hub prides itself on “unlocking insights”9. everything they do is built on what girls tell them they need and what they tell them will work for them 10 . gh’s ‘insights’ inform them of a ‘confidence gap’ and legitimize a demand for human capital. however legitimate the demand is, gh co-opts the data and is then able to justifiably position itself as the authority of the supply side i.e. intervene. girl hub’s enabling environment is based on two tiers of mges: 1. brand loyalty11; 2. entrepreneurial education; whereby the procurement of mge 2 first depends on procuring mge 1. according to the social development direct (sdd) annual review (2013), a key part of girl hub’s work would be to develop “brands that inspire, motivate and encourage girls to make the most of the new opportunities for girls provided by the policies and programmes of others” (10.). by fertilizing a legion of ‘confident’ and ‘inspired’ girls, it conveniently positions for themselves a crop of human capital that is ready and willing to embrace “new opportunities”–opportunities geared for them to become, not all together, but namely, future credit consumers. while gh nigeria was not able to activate and sustain a brand12, 8 basic economics can be understood as a market that is made up of buyers, sellers, or traders who constitute the demand and supply of a commodity, service, or good. since the 1990s “markets have expanded beyond conventional economic formations to encompass emotional or personal markets, where such things as self-esteem and empowerment can be branded and sold”—and around which new industries can be built (banet-wesier a2015, 2). 9 “its power and legitimacy are derived from the authentic desires and grassroots demands of marginalized girls and women” (moeller b 2014, 577) 10 http://www.girleffect.org/the-girl-effect-in-action/girl-hub/ 11 “our aim is that, in time, every adolescent girl in ethiopia will feel attachment to the brand and a sense of belonging within the yegna community” (crawford 2013, 25) 12 due to: 1) the deteriorating security situation in northern nigeria disrupted its work; 2) creative partners that had a good understanding of the environment that girl hub wanted to work with in northern nigeria could not boyd: the girl effect consilience ni nyampinga of rwanda and yegna of ethiopia became each (respective) country’s first teen girl brand. in rwanda, 90,000 copies of ni nyampinga magazine are distributed across each of rwanda’s 30 districts every three months and has become rwanda’s largest media publication. each copy is said to be shared with five others and the content and messages are reinforced by the ni nyampinga radio shows which are broadcasted nationwide through 8 radio stations (sdd 2013, 59). gh rwanda’s infographic: in numbers: day-today life for girls in rwanda, gives a snapshot of their brand loyalty-mge as, “[w]hen girls don’t get access to education and healthcare, they can grow up too quickly…their world is limited and many feel they have little control over their own lives…more than 50% of girls aged 15-19 think domestic violence is justified…but with effective policies, active partners, and dynamic programmes in place, the girl effect is happening in rwanda. ni nyampinga is at the heart of this movement. it’s created for girls, by girls, demonstrating a new version of girlhood they can all share and be inspired by.” the yegna brand platform is disseminated via a radio drama, talk show, & musical, and as of 2014, 39% of listeners tuned in to the radio drama every week (girl hub ethiopia a2014, 42). in girl hub ethiopia’s presentation of yegna (girl hub ethiopia a2014) they say: “right now, one in three girls don’t go to school, one in three girls can’t read, girls do an average of 28 hours of housework a week, two out of three women believe that wife beating is justified, and one in five girls describe themselves as having no friends. to change these statistics, we have to create behavior change at scale. we asked ourselves the question can we use the power of brands to change the game for girls? and can we give girls a set of friends to inspire and equip them to succeed?” the yegna presentation answers their own question by framing yegna as an essential part of their theory of change, “advocacy: ensuring policies and programmes are designed for girls + girls-centered research: making sure the data on girls exists + yegna: shifting attitudes and behaviors towards girls = a girl who is inspired and equipped to transform her world and her country” (26). beyond just inspiring confidence in the twag and gaining loyalty, the brand functions to manipulate the twag’s social capital and lubricate the supply side of the entrepreneurial education-mge. adolescent girls economic opportunities study in rwanda (calder et al. 2013), economic opportunities and obstacles for women and girls in northern nigeria (taylor et al. 2014) and girls and income growth in ethiopia (gable 2013) 13 illuminate the broader enabling environment. “shifting attitudes and behaviors towards girls” is referred to throughout the publications as removing “barrier”/“blockers”/“constraints” by curating conducive family relations, and changing boys’ and men’s perception of girls’ ‘value. meanwhile, ‘equipping girls with a set of friends’ and strengthening their “girlhood” (the bond between girls’ friend networks) be found; and 3) staff recruitment difficulty (sdd 2013). 13 a more detailed account of the other literature can be found in appendix 2. consilience 155 is most likely recommended as the foundation to foster future microfinance groups. while shifting patriarchal biases towards females and creating safe spaces for them to bond is a perfectly deserving cause, the twag is protected due to her merit as future human capital—not because of an altruistic endeavor to emancipate girls and women from second-class citizenship. girl hub rwanda calder and huda (2013) explicitly identify girl hub rwanda as the precursor for opening entrepreneurial credit markets. in its beginning chapter from july to december 2011, girl hub rwanda, partnered with population services international (psi), the ministry of health, and l’association du guides du rwanda, to pilot a ‘12+ programme’ which aimed to improve the self-esteem, leadership ability, social capital and life skills of girls aged 10 – 12 years. it was designed around the core concepts of mentorship, safe space and skills building, and reached over 600 girls in 4 districts (calder and huda 2013, 6). building on the 12+ programme and ni nyampinga, “girl hub rwanda [sought] to develop specific economic empowerment programming for girls from the age of 13 years. in order to develop this programme, nike foundation and girl hub rwanda commissioned development pathways to conduct in-depth research into girls’ economic opportunities in rwanda” (7). development pathways’ conceptual framework shows how constructing a demand for human capital enables girl hub to intervene and deliver economic capital (2013, 17): 1. livelihood assets (capital) and capabilities: the ability of adolescent girls to access skills, resources (actual and knowledge resources) and services, including economic capital (comprised of financial capital and services, physical assets and capabilities), social capital (alliances, groups, networks), and human capital (health and educational assets, services and capabilities). this corresponds to nike foundation’s “delivering resources to girls”. 2. personal empowerment and self-efficacy: the ability for adolescent girls to exercise voice, influence and agency in order to access livelihood assets, services and capabilities (above), as well as change the rules of the game in their favour (below). this corresponds to nike foundation’s mantra “inspiring girls to believe in themselves”. 3. “rules of the game”: this refers to the formal and informal social institutions (laws, values and norms) that mediate and regulate adolescent girls’ participation in the life of the family, community, state and market, and their access to livelihood opportunities. at its heart this domain is about power, and corresponds to the nike foundation’s “removing the barriers that hold girls back”. boyd: the girl effect consilience findings from the study showed that, insufficient social capital, lack of family support, broken families (including orphan-hood), lack of support from the community and jealousy of other [girls], were highly ranked “blockers” to achieving a good future for girls (calder and huda 2013, 53). concerning human capital, “without exception, adolescent boys and girls rank insufficient education as one of the most critical “blockers’ to achieving life aspirations” and the researchers noted that “girls’ lack of personal empowerment and self-efficacy makes them a high risk group for early sexual debut and pregnancy, maternal mortality and hiv infection” (2013, 42; 39). economic empowerment recommendations included needing “to increase a girls’ “value” or “potential value” in the households” but more broadly, granting “girls, particularly older girls and those out of school…entrepreneurial and business skills, as well as access to financial capital [with] enterprise training and micro-finance products tailored to adolescent girls” (calder and huda 2013, 53). a repeated notion was that, “given the dearth of formal employment opportunities, and limited access to government,” technical and vocational education and training (tvet), entrepreneurship was highlighted as an important opportunity for adolescent girls to “earn and learn” (2013, 53; 54). to underscore their argument, discussions with young people revealed that they had a “keen desire to ‘be their own boss,’ but generally lack[ed] the capital and the skills to make this a reality” (2013, 54). demand was further emboldened, as “girls aged 13-15 years ranked ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ as the biggest enabler to success. the fact that adolescent girls themselves are prioritising a lack of enterprise and employable skills, inadequate training, and a lack of capital, highlights the extent of the problem” (54). the researchers concluded that the period between 13 and 15 years old appeared to be a critical for girls “particularly in terms of building self-efficacy and livelihood capital: social, human and economic. most girls are still in school at the age of 12. many are not by the age of 16. this is a key period for intervention” (2013, 54).the opportunity recommendations advocated that training modules about savings and lending, mobile phone banking, and imparting employable skills could be built upon the 12+ programme approach for older adolescent girls. but more importantly noted that that “the formal barriers for adolescents to access financial institutions – having to be 18 years of age to join an mfi [(micro-finance institution)] or bank, and the high savings requirements for saccos – have created an opportunity for the private sector to intervene. village savings and loan associations (vslas) are tremendously popular in rwanda and, according to care, can be tailored to meet the needs of the 13-15 age cohort” (5814). girl hub nigeria although girl hub nigeria was never able to sustain a brand campaign, its casage (community spaces for adolescent girls empowerment) endeavor with the population council west africa 14 calder and huda 2013 consilience 157 office has also become a potential consumer/credit market. according to the girl hub nigeria site page, “csage supports adolescent girls by giving them access to social, economic and health assets.” 15 the economic opportunities and obstacles for women and girls in northern nigeria report (taylor et al. 2014) was meant to provide an “evidence base on economic participation of women and adolescent girls in northern nigeria including an analysis of the socio cultural and economic constraints adolescent girls face and an understanding of how these shape and constrain the livelihood and economic opportunities of adolescent girls” (2014 ,10) commissioned by dfid, it aimed to “…use the research to inform and to complement the gender analysis and pilot interventions being undertaken elsewhere in dfid northern nigeria, especially in relation to programmes such as the growth and employment in states (gems) programme and propcom mai-karfi, a rural market development programme focused on northern nigeria, and upcoming income generation projects. the information generated will provide programmes with insights to help them focus their activities in such a way as to maximize impact on women in northern nigeria” (10). the study looked “at the type of income earning activities that women and girls are involved in and the obstacles and opportunities they face across several levels” (2014 11). of the main findings, lack of capital and credit was the most commonly cited barrier by women. also, lack of education (illiteracy) and training, access to information (market prices, market opportunities, job opportunities), access to financial services—savings, saving in banks (53), and lack of support (but not attitude barriers) from husbands (55), were the biggest factors limiting women from formal wage employment. of women’s aspirations: “many of the women participants aspired to grow their current business; several women would like equipment such as sewing machines or food processing machines in order to grow their business; some women wish to expand into additional business areas or new products or services” (36). out of the three girl hubs, gh nigeria is by far the most extensive, but for the purposes of this argument, attention will be limited. like girl hub rwanda, the safe spaces activities were explicitly advised to be taken advantage of by linking with “a group of high profile business mentors and role models” wherein, three kano business women offered to support women entrepreneurs through the bank of industry (boi) funds application process (62). the report also recommends dfid find more ways of “improving women’s access to a whole range of reliable financial services –including savings, credit, insurance etc. develop tools and methods for women to be able to assess different savings and investment options (e.g. livestock versus putting funds in the bank). already, “savings and credit groups have been set up as part of the prinnmnch dfid (programme for reviving routine immunization in northern nigeria-maternal newborn and child health initiative) programme which provide small loans to women’s enterprises” (61). 15 http://www.girleffect.org/the-girl-effect-in-action/girl-hub/nigeria/ boyd: the girl effect consilience girl hub ethiopia the girls and income growth in ethiopia (gable 2013) opening note states “the purpose of this study is to identify and prioritize the country-specific constraints to higher return investments in adolescent girls, including obstacles for girls to contribute to and benefit from economic growth in ethiopia.” as this passage describes, the majority of the report goes into heavy detail about social, human, and economic capital constraints/enablers. the paper self-declares to “…support decision-making on options to reap the benefits of investing in girls as they transition to adulthood. although the report approaches its analysis from the perspective of the girl, it adopts a more holistic view that considers how the challenges of adolescent girls are connected to boys and men, as well as to their opportunities when they become women” (8). the report justifies the demand side by approaching their analysis ‘from the perspective of the girl’ and addresses the supply side by poetically ‘adopting a more holistic view’ which addresses challenges connected boys and men. gable (2013) outlines more explicitly that, “constraints and opportunities in this study will therefore be analyzed from the perspective of females as economic actors throughout their lifetime” (17). the purpose of the report is also, “to connect investments in adolescent girls to overall economic development, through productive income-generating employment, i.e. through contributing to and benefitting from economic growth” (2013, 97). importantly, gable makes the distinction: “the focus is productive employment opportunities, which entail decent returns rather than just employment opportunities. also note that employment can mean wages earned from selfemployment,” i.e. entrepreneurial businesses, firms, or ‘enterprises’ (2013, 17) (author’s italicization). surprisingly, gable (2013) uses this qualifier to breach the girl effect’s usual approach of staying loyal to insights. the reports findings conclude that “in ethiopia, public employment is the most attractive option for educated people, and that [people] would rather remain unemployed (the incidence of unemployment is higher among the most educated) than enter informal private-sector employment or selfemployment… [f]or an adolescent ethiopian girl, education has a substantial effect on job allocation, by reducing the probability for selfemployment and increasing the probability for public and private wage employment. however, there still seem to be gender-specific constraints for the most attractive form of employment — public wage employment” (58). after this passage, ‘public wage employment’ is not mentioned again. in totality, it is referenced 4 times (3 within that single paragraph), while entrepreneurship is mentioned 74 times. since the report is based upon an “inclusive growth” and “gender equality as smart economics” framework, it emphasizes “targeted interventions to support women’s economic empowerment and further catalyze economic development” by “improving the productive capacity of individuals and creating a conducive environment for productive employment,” —“productive” being the operative word, “rather than just employment opportunities” (2013, 15 ;18; author’s italicization). instead, consilience 159 gable advocates that due to globalization, “trade openness and the spread of icts [(information communication technology)] have increased female access to economic opportunities and, in some cases increased their wages relative to male earnings. growth in export and ict-enabled sectors, together with a decline in the importance of physical strength and a rise in the importance of cognitive skills, has increased the demand for female labor. icts have also increased access to markets among female farmers and entrepreneurs by easing time and mobility constraints” (2816). due to the pressure “globalization puts on competitiveness and the need for countries to use their human capital resources to the fullest” gable argues that, “increased globalization and a service-dominated economy open up new opportunities for female employment and, when combined with increased ict integration, result in higher-paying, higherproductivity employment” (gable 2013, 99). access to finance and access to land are the main constraints expressed by ethiopian (female and male) formal entrepreneurs, and the performance is very similar for femaleand male-headed formal firms. however, barriers to entry into wage employment and entrepreneurship present greater obstacles for women than for men (gable 2013, 93). the report specifically advises that: “access to finance through banks and/or mfis [(micro-finance institutions)] encourages entrepreneurship and the development of small and medium enterprises (smes), which are crucial for employment generation—especially for females” (gable 2013, 25). the girl effect accelerator the same year the girl hubs eclipsed17, on october 31, the nike foundation and unreasonable group—brought together 10 select entrepreneurs to san francisco to develop their businesses with “world class mentors” (and 3 entrepreneurs in residence) in “an intensive twoweek program”—so coined—the girl effect accelerator. the ventures together already operate in over 30 countries and averaged $2.2 million in revenue the previous year, from customers living on less than $2 a day. iconized as “black swan” startups “that are positioned to benefit millions of girls in poverty,” 18 the endeavor culminated in the entrepreneurs pitching their ventures at the palace of fine arts theatre on nov 11, 2014, followed by an investor gathering the next day. the day of the event, girleffect.org released an article with the headline: “these aren’t your average silicon valley startups,” and the sub-heading: “one year in the making, today is the capstone moment for the girl effect accelerator-the world’s first business accelerator that exists to unleash girls’ potential.”19 the article highlights how the “forprofit startups [are] working in some of the world’s fastest emerging 16 gable 2013 17 2014 18 http://girleffectaccelerator.com/ 19 http://www.girleffect.org/what-girls-need/articles/2014/11/these-arent-your-average-silicon-valley-startups/ boyd: the girl effect consilience markets,”20 but does not divulge how those markets are coming to be or why more energy is being spent capitalizing on the third world adolescent girls’ position of poverty rather than dismantling the structures of inequity that drove her there in the first place. indeed, “the girl effect accelerator” promotional video captures the unabashed exploitative nature of the enterprise when tayo ovioso, founder and ceo of paga says: “i actually came in here thinking, ‘what can we do to help girls? and that thinking has been completely refined and turned on its head, and the question should actually not be, ‘what can we do to help girls?’ but rather, ‘if girls were a target market for your business, how do you unlock that today?’ and i think that’s going to really help our business bring the girl effect to life.”21 although the girl effect accelerator is still in its preliminary stages, their methodology reveals that the venture stands to benefit more than the targeted girls. their measurements for success over time include: 1. the increase in the flow of investment dollars into the 10 participating ventures. 2. the growth (or decline) in revenue, costs, team size, customer base, and geographic expansion of each venture on a semi-annual basis. 3. each venture will identify the impact they are having for girls in poverty. we will track one metric around their impact on girls on a semiannual basis to gauge both the breadth and depth of their impact for girls in poverty. (note: because each venture is different, this core metric will be unique to each participating company). it seems that measurements one and two are as expected—profit driven. and measurement three is not only too one-dimensional, but also too infrequent in that they will only check on a ‘semi-annual basis’. as it stands, their 500k ‘working capital fund’ is designed to provide capital in the form of a short-term debt to the 10 ventures when ready. nike foundation and unreasonable group claim they are only supporting the ventures by paying their costs for taking part in the girl effect accelerator. they state: “nike foundation and unreasonable group are not taking an equity position in the ventures that are part of the girl effect accelerator as a condition or benefit of participation.” while a thorough assessment of the girl effect accelerator goes beyond the aims of this paper, it is important to take into account the context in which this takes place—“in the past two decades the notion of strategic philanthropy has shifted corporate agendas, where donations are no longer simply made without a strategic understanding of how such financial contributions affect a corporation’s bottom line, markets or employees. king uses the term ‘global strategic community relations programs’ (gscr) to describe the vast efforts of corporations to create transnational philanthropy and community relations interventions that pair community involvement with a particular ‘aspect of corporate social 20 http://www.girleffect.org/what-girls-need/articles/2014/11/these-arent-your-average-silicon-valley-startups/ 21 http://girleffectaccelerator.com/ consilience 161 responsibility’” (hayhurst 2011, 536). mc hayhurst (2011) offers her own set of ‘insights’ from seven semi-structured interviews with staff members who worked in the csr department of a multinational corporation (mnc) involved in funding sgd [(sport, gender and development)] interventions in multiple countries throughout the ‘two-thirds world’ (538). hayhurst’s “concern lies within the possibly colonizing tendencies that were used to gain access to grassroots ideas and activities that would, as the regional csr representative claimed, ‘feed the brand in terms of coming up with future initiatives’” (543). according to the representative, “by working with and locating [sport, gender, and development] entrepreneurs in new markets across the two-thirds world, mnc would be even able to increase its sales by accessing those four billion poor ‘customers’ (ie those who live on less than $2 a day) at the bottom of the pyramid. in fact, five of the interviewees spoke of harnessing the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ model” (543). and another csr manager explained that “the next billion consumers are not going to look like the first billion. [mnc] is a very, very strong market with the first billion consumers, but . . . people who can afford [mnc’s] stuff is not even at the very tip . . . so when we did the [sgd programme in an african refugee camp], it was great and altruistic but it also really gave designers a lot of insight” (2011, 543). at one point, girl hub claimed to be “smoothing the path for the revolution” (roberts a2015; icai 2012). although that statement now retracted 22 , other interviewees similarly “discussed how mnc’s increasing involvement in funding and promoting sgd initiatives was needed to ‘lay the groundwork’ for an amplified focus by mnc on girls’ and women’s sports” (2011, 543) conclusions although not all agents following the current girl effect paradigm are necessarily guilty of using gender equality or women’s empowerment as window dressing for economic expansion, the rhetoric among the bigger leaders in the development industry certainly sets a precedent (as shown in appendix 1). further, it is not as if females in the global south do not have anything to gain from decent education and job opportunities. the reality is however, “the best outcomes for economic growth are not necessarily the best outcomes for girls and women. [moreover] if investment in girls does not lead to growth in the short term, women and girls may then be pushed off the political agenda” (woodroffe and donaldson 2012). goetz (1994) cites jaquette in this regard: “linking equality demands to efficiency and merit claims is a powerful argument in development agencies, where the project of modernization puts a premium on increases in productivity. but while ideologically forceful, this strategy is analytically and politically dangerous. firstly, it does not put equality claims on a firm foundation. counterevidence can defeat quantitative arguments for women's efficiency and merit if women's productivity can be shown to be 22 they may have realized it shared more than they would have liked. boyd: the girl effect consilience consistently lower than men's, then, following the logic of the market, they deserve fewer resources.” overall, it is staggering how high the cost of opportunity has been for females of the global south. taking stock of the post sap era and now, these points in time marked where they have been given the most amount of attention they deserve23, however being backwards in quality of attention, the movements have largely been to their detriment. the danger lies in how the world bank has the “tendency to adopt the language of its critics in order to silence them” (bergeron 2003, 404). bergeron (2003) suggests that “the emergence of a postwashington consensus may represent just one more example of the power of the bank extending itself into new areas, thus blunting the possibility for change. policies based on these new economic approaches may recognize the need to integrate social and cultural concerns into development policy, but the analytical separation of the economic and non-economic may keep truly interdisciplinary, transformative approaches at bay” (404). goetz and sandler note that in feminist development, “so too often, we have the sense that we are going up a down escalator...while these positive changes represent upward momentum, the larger environment is pointing in the other direction” (cornwall et al. 2007, 168). the principal lesson is to be aware of the insidious experience of ‘plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’ (‘the more things change, the more they stay the same’) (chant and sweetman 2012, 518). while the first era of female-led development was dissolved under a critical mass of vigilant activists and civil society, hayhurst (2011) remarks that the girl effect paradigm is as much a quickly growing movement as it is understudied (531). a budding body of other authors agree that despite the increasingly hegemonic discourse of global girl power “scholarly analysis of the campaign is currently scant” (switzer 2013, 345; 347; eyben 2011; wilson 2011). thus, lacking a counterbalance of critical public debate and scholarly voices, my final argument is both a warning and a call to action: absent a collective interrogation of all parties in line with the girl effect paradigm, we risk allowing the political project of gender equity to be displaced and with it, the undergirding framework needed for truly sustainable development. 23 vertically from policy to practice and horizontally across institutions consilience 163 appendix 1 survey of the trend organization date campaign/publication title type mission/key quotes nike inc. n/a mark parker, nike inc. president and ceo direct quote “every global company should invest in the girl effect. economists have demonstrated that it is the best possible return on investment. with targeted investments linked to market demand, adolescent girls will reverse cycles of poverty with huge impact on our global economy” (murphy et al. 2009, 3). the nike foundation founded in 2004 fund “nike has always been a company focused on human potential. co-founder and track coach bill bowerman was a relentless innovator, obsessed with giving athletes the training and equipment they needed to maximize their performance. at the nike foundation, maria eitel took the bold decision to apply this philosophy to perhaps the world’s most isolated and marginalized people: the 250 million adolescent girls living in extreme poverty. when the nike foundation started in 2004, we sought the best investment to end global poverty with the highest returns. we traced poverty back to its roots. investing in adolescent girls was the unexpected solution to break the cycle of intergenerational poverty and unleash the unlimited potential of adolescent girls on the world” (nike inc. “community impact”) the coalition for adolescent girls founded in 2005 coalition founded by the united nations foundation and the nike foundation along with partners from the international women’s health coalition, international center for research on women, and population council to address adolescent girls’ need for support and their potential to change the world. since its inception, over 50 leading national and international organizations have collaborated together (“the coalition for adolescent girls”). the girl effect fund founded in 2008 fund founded by the nike foundation in partnership with the novo foundation, the united nations foundation and the coalition for adolescent girls. the girl hub founded in 2011 the girl hub is the project-arm of the girl effect fund the nike foundation and the department for international development. “girl hub’s work is concentrated on four areas: 1. advocacy: bringing girls’ voices to the forefront and involving them in the design and implementation of policies 2. brand and communication: developing social communications to inspire and engage girls 3. partnerships and policy: informing and influencing decision makers to invest overseas aid and development budgets in effective policies and programmes that benefit girls 4. insight & knowledge: creating robust data and evidence to track the impact of work for girls (“girl hub”). oecd dac december 2008 dac guiding principles for aid effectiveness, gender equality and women’s empowerment technical brief “recent reforms of aid delivery, most notably the paris declaration on aid effectiveness (2005), have provided new opportunities and mechanisms to translate donor and government commitments into improved practice, results and impacts. achieving internationally agreed development goals will however not be possible without progress on gender equality and women’s empowerment. at the same time, implementing the paris declaration’s overarching partnership commitments is a powerful way of accelerating progress on millennium development goal 3: gender equality and women’s empowerment...these [guiding principles] suggest approaches and entry points for policy advisors and programme managers in both donor and boyd: the girl effect consilience partner countries to increase the prospects for achieving development results and impacts through work on gender equality and women’s empowerment” (oecd/dac). oecd dac may 2013 unfinished business-women and girls front and centre beyond 2015 technical brief “it is time to put women and girls front and centre…these five priorities are interlinked and mutually reinforcing”: 1. keep girls in school; 2. improve reproductive health, including access to family planning 3. increase women’s control over and ownership of assets 4. support women’s leadership and influence 5. stop violence against women…women’s economic empowerment can improve women’s decision-making in the household and is one way of tackling domestic violence” (oecd/dac). oecd dac may 2014 from ambition to results: delivering on gender equality in donor institutions technical report “gender equality is a policy priority for all but one dac member agency, with 24 out of 29 agencies reporting increased policy focus on gender equality since 2006…eleven dac institutions report an increase in budget for gender equality since 2006 and just 4 report a decrease” (oecd/dac, 4). world bank group august 15, 2006 gender equality as smart economics: a world bank group gender action plan (fiscal years 2007-10) action plan “to promote economic development and attain the mdgs—especially the overarching poverty reduction mdg and the gender equality mdg—the global community must renew its attention to women’s economic empowerment and increase investments in women…women will benefit from their economic empowerment, but so too will men, children and society as a whole…in sum, the business case for expanding women’s economic opportunities is becoming increasingly evident; this is nothing more than smart economics” (2). world bank group 2008 girls’ education in the 21st century: gender equality, empowerment, and economic growth book “gender equality is not just a women’s issue, it is a development issue. women’s economic empowerment is essential for economic development, growth, and poverty reduction not only because of the income it generates, but also because it helps to break the vicious cycle of poverty. educating girls and women is critical to economic development. research conducted in a variety of countries and regions has established that educating girls is one of the most cost-effective ways of spurring development. female education creates powerful poverty-reducing synergies and yields enormous intergenerational gains. it is positively correlated with increased economic productivity, more robust labor markets, higher earnings, and improved societal health and well-being. for developing countries in particular, women represent a previously untapped source of human capital, and countries that have adopted aggressive policies to promote gender equality in education can be expected to reap higher social and economic benefits. greater investment in girls’ education is vital for increasing female participation and productivity in the labor market, especially in nonagricultural wage employment. greater productivity means higher economic growth and more effective reduction of poverty” (tembon 2008, xvii-xviii). world bank group 2012 gender equality and development world development report “…gender equality is a core development objective in its own right. but greater gender equality is also ‘smart economics’” (world bank 2012, xiii). consilience 165 imf september 2013 women, work, and the economy: macroeconomic gains from gender equity staff discussion note “…labor markets across the world remain divided along gender lines, and progress toward gender equality seems to have stalled…the challenges of growth, job creation, and inclusion are closely intertwined” (imf 2013, 4) imfdirect september 23, 2013 lagarde: women can help grow the world economy the international monetary fund’s global economy forum “hot off the press: a new study out today from our economists pointing to the striking economic benefits that could come from increased female participation in the work force. imf chief christine lagarde, calling attention to the findings of the paper, 'women, work, and the economy,’ made the case for policymakers to shift into high gear and give women equal opportunities to participate in the work force” (imfdirect 2013). usaid march 2012 gender equality and female empowerment policy report “in 2011, usaid significantly expanded efforts to support women’s leadership…a growing body of research demonstrates that societies with greater gender equality experience faster economic growth, and benefit from greater agricultural productivity…[g]ender equality not only benefits individual males and females but whole sectors and societies” (4; 4; 6). usaid june 2014 let girls learn initiative nearly 30 artists and athletes, as well as a host of global non-profits and businesses, announced $230 million to kick off the campaign to support girls’ education programs around the world (“broad coalition”). undp march 25, 2010 helen clark, undp administrator direct quote “i believe that investing in women and girls in itself constitutes a breakthrough strategy for achieving the mdgs, and that almost any investment we make in women and girls will have multiplier effects across the goals.” united nations conference on trade and development 2011 applying a gender lens to science, technology and innovation report “applying a gender lens to sti policy is not only an equality or rights issue; given the fundamental and crucial role played by women in development, it is also critical to ensuring the effectiveness of mobilizing s&t for development” (2011, 4). undp july 2013 powerful synergies: gender equality, economic development and environmental sustainability report “at the recent united nations conference on sustainable development (rio+20), the international community acknowledged that sustainable development requires pursuing economic, social and environmental objectives as interconnected development goals. it is critical that gender equality—a human right and a catalytic force for achieving all development goals—is central to this pursuit” (2012, vii). women deliver july 2014 invest in girls and women: everybody wins report “the action plan: invest in the cross-cutting issues of health, education, and equality for girls and women—and act now” (3). goldman sachs 2008 10,000 women: education, empowerment, economic opportunity report “gender equality fuels growth by bringing women into the labor force and by raising the overall level of human capital, productivity, and wages. it also fuels growth by paving the way to a “demographic transition” that is more conducive to long-term gains in gdp per capita” (2008, 16). goldman sachs 2008 10,000 women initiative a five-year campaign committing $100 million to 10,000 underserved women around the world with a business and management education. the initiative is coordinated in local markets by a network of more than 80 academic and ngo partners. it is funded by goldman sachs and the goldman sachs foundation. boyd: the girl effect consilience goldman sachs march 2008 lloyd blankfein, goldman sachs chairman and ceo direct quote “we not only chase gdp around the globe, we try to create it” (murphy et al. 2009,7). harvard kennedy school (murphy et al. 2009) september 2009 investing in girls’ education: an opportunity for corporate leadership corporate social responsibility report “multinational corporations, in particular, are well positioned for the transfer of responsible business practices and standards, technologies and infrastructure that facilitate knowledge creation and promote gender diversity and more equal access to economic opportunity and human capital development. as employers in tomorrow’s job market, they are best suited to help to create today’s educational curricula…companies are working to increase participation in the global market, for their (and their shareholder’s) own benefit” (6; 7). international fund for agricultural development september 2012 gender equality and women’s empowerment policy report “the policy will provide ifad with strategic guidance in systematizing, intensifying and scaling up its efforts to close gender gaps and improve the economic and social status of women in rapidly changing rural environments…the report argues that economic growth alone does not reduce gender inequalities; specific policies and programmes are needed to address those gaps, which persist even as countries become richer” (ifad 2012, 8; 10). international finance corporation; winvest initiative (investing in women initiative) 2013 investing in women’s employment: good for business, good for development report “…despite the persuasive evidence that gender equality has a transformative effect on productivity and growth, women’s full economic and productive potential remains unrealized in many parts of the world… [the report] draws on members’ experiences and encourages business to tap and manage female talent in emerging and developing markets…investing in women’s employment is key to unlocking growth in emerging and developing economies” (ifc 2013, 1; 1; 2). exxonmobile september 2013 a roadmap for promoting women’s economic empowerment research report “the roadmap for action was crafted primarily to guide actions and investments by the private sector and potential public-private sector partnerships. the roadmap favors actions that directly and in the short-term seek to empower women economically, and measures empowerment as increases in women’s productivity and earnings” (exxonmobile 2013, 2). center for global development 2008 girls count a global investment & action agenda “this report is about why and how to put girls at the center of development…the center for global development had an exciting opportunity to work with the international center for research on women and the population council and with the support of the nike foundation and the un foundation” (levine et al. 2008, vi). consilience 167 references “applying a gender lens to science, technology and innovation” switzerland: unctad/dtl/stict (2011) http://unctad.org/en/docs/dtlstict2011d5_en.pdf bamberger, michael and donna r. podems. 2002. “feminist evaluation in the international development context.” new directions for evaluation 96, 83-96. available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1002/ev.68/asset/68_ftp.pdf ;jsessionid=db4d6400af22aa0c499d695be194b466.f03t01?v =1&t=ia8rjku1&s=9acae5e45a0ddd997c5be231c65ec1e1f2582e8c banet-weiser, sarah. 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"the imf and gender: a long way to go." rev. of women, work and the economy. bretton woods project : n. pag. at issue. gender action. web. <http://genderaction.org/publications/at-issue-imf-gender.pdf>. microsoft word menz.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 13, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 130-164 a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis? the feasibility of establishing sustainable grasscutter farms in kenya alyssa menz earth institute columbia university, new york city, new york amm2358@columbia.edu abstract in africa, the unsustainable, illegal hunting of wild animals for food, commonly referred to as the bushmeat crisis, causes multiple problems for ecosystems and human health. given the lack of management of bushmeat hunting and rapidly expanding human population densities, the potential for overharvesting, driving populations of native species to local extinction, is of major concern unless effective and feasible alternatives can be developed. the farming of desirable native species offers one solution to reducing the demand for bushmeat, but farms must be economically viable, environmentally sustainable, and socially acceptable. this research uses geographic information systems to examine the feasibility of establishing large native rodent (thyronomys swinderianus) farms in kenya. given their high protein content, these rodents, commonly known as grasscutters, are a highly sought bushmeat species and have been successfully farmed in west and central africa. i performed an extensive literature review and consulted with grasscutter and sustainable livestock farm experts located in sub-saharan africa to determine physical and socio-political geographic factors most likely to constrain the development of sustainable grasscutter farms in kenya, before using arcgis to map these criteria and a weighted overlay analysis to identify potentially favorable locations for establishing future farms. these maps identified three suitable geographic locations: the western and nyanza provinces; the central province; and the southeastern tip of the coastal province. the majority of kenya reflects moderately suitable locations that are feasible for establishment as grasscutters are adaptive, low-intensity livestock, and previous studies have identified some of these moderately suitable locations as accepted livestock centers. these results are encouraging for the implementation of sustainable grasscutter farming in kenya and the diversification of protein sources and economic development opportunities for rural dwellers. while the maps created are specific to kenya, the methodology developed in this study is useful to global stakeholders attempting to alleviate the bushmeat crisis, combat food insecurity in a sustainable manner, and/or provide means of economic development to developing countries. acknowledgments i would like to thank my research mentor, skye naslund, for her instrumental assistance and endless support. i would also like to thank my senior thesis advisor jenna lawrence for her indispensable guidance and meticulous edits. thank you to jeremiah trinidad-christensen for his gis assistance and infinite patience. i would like to thank david reid for his thorough corrections and support throughout my entire thesis process even after moving back to australia. thank you to my research mentor mark becker, who passed away last spring; he was a charismatic, kind person, and his passing was a terrible loss for the columbia consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis community. lastly, i would like to thank my parents and friends for their love and support throughout my thesis adventures. keywords: bushmeat crisis, sustainable farming, grasscutter, gis, weighted overlay analysis, kenya. 1. introduction over the next fifty years, the world population is estimated to increase by up to 3 billion people and reach 10.6 billion people by 2050 (dorling & hennig, 2011). the countries that are projected to have the greatest population increase tend to have the highest poverty rates, the least amount of inhabitable land, severely limited natural resources, and the weakest economies (united nations, 2004). the united nations department of economic and social affairs’ population division projects that through 2050, eastern africa, middle africa, and western africa, will grow at a much faster rate compared to every other region in the world (united nations, 2004). this accelerating growth in human population will intensify demand for resources such as food and fresh water. these natural resources are already greatly stressed in many parts of africa, leading to concerns about the ability to maintain a sustainable food supply and future food security across the region (ulrich et al., 2012; weidinger, 2014). more than one quarter of sub-saharan africans, about 234 million people, currently suffer from under-nourishment at some time over the course of each year (carr, 2012). food security is often linked to economic security: poverty and deprivation can escalate conflict over scarce resources, which can lead to more restrictive laws, less personal freedom, and increased violence and warfare, further perpetuating the unsustainable use of natural resources and threatening the livelihoods of local people (ulrich et al., 2012; wilkie et al., 2002). the exhaustion of natural resources can be exacerbated through ineffective management, leading to deforestation and over-hunting (wilkie et al., 2002). current deforestation and overhunting in africa is linked to the expansion of road networks for commercial logging, which has increased access to once isolated forests (wilkie et al., 2002). a particular manifestation of this overpopulation in africa is the bushmeat crisis: the unsustainable hunting of wild animals for human consumption. biodiversity is part of the natural capital that underpins the livelihoods of many rural people; thus, the bushmeat crisis is a major concern (davies, 2002). bushmeat may comprise over 80% of the consumption of animal protein in some indigenous and rural african communities that consider bushmeat a staple or supplement to their diet (adu et al., 1999; wilkie & carpenter, 1999). bushmeat is essential to both local and national economies; however, much of the bushmeat trade is unregulated (davies, 2002). fifteen years ago, estimates of annual wild meat harvest in the congo basin alone ranged from 1 to 5 million tonnes, which is valued at millions of dollars (adu et al., 1999). in 2003, fa et al. determined that in less than 50 years, at current exploitation rates, bushmeat supply will drop by 81% in all subsaharan african countries, leaving only three countries able to maintain protein supply above the recommended daily requirement of 52 g/day. with as much as 70% of the impoverished in africa inhabiting rural areas, concerted efforts must be taken to foster economic growth based on the sustainable use of natural resources. consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis without a focus on sustainability, poverty reduction in sub-saharan africa is nearly impossible (davies, 2002). a rising demand for bushmeat often follows overpopulation and urbanization, which leads to further depletion of game in everdwindling hunting areas (jori et al., 1995). the unregulated and unsustainable commercial hunting of wild animal meat has become a significant threat to certain native animals, such as the golden-rumped elephant shrew (rhynchocyon chrysopygus), now found only in the coastal arabuko sokoke national park north of mombasa in kenya (fitzgibbon & rathbun, 2008)). bushmeat consumption is increasingly linked to deadly diseases such as hiv/aids, ebola, and foot-and-mouth disease (wilkie & carpenter, 1999). abela et al. (2002) discovered that more than 20% of the sooty mangabeys, chimpanzees, and other primates captured from the bush in western africa harbor siv, simian immunodeficiency virus, which is transmitted to humans via handling, consumption, bites, and contact with fecal matter and urine, and represents a simian precursor from which the hiv viruses may have originally been transmitted to humans. the increased hunting and trading of bushmeat increases the likelihood of human exposure to these deadly diseases and an emergence of new zoonotic infections (abela et al., 2002). the handling and consumption of infected bushmeat carcasses contributed to the 2003 congolese outbreak of ebola-zaire, the deadliest of the four strains of ebola virus, killing 114 out of the 128 individuals infected (rizkalla et al., 2007). the current ebola outbreak, which is the largest ebola epidemic in history, has caused over 4,950 deaths and 13,260 total cases as of 12 november 2014, and may be linked to the handling and consumption of bushmeat (centers for disease control and prevention, 2014). the hunting of bushmeat is so deeply embedded in rural african lifestyles that its complete elimination is unrealistic and would also represent a loss of cultural practice (davies, 2002). however, a balance between regulated bushmeat hunting and sustainable wild animal farms would reduce the stress on african natural resources and biodiversity. in order to know the full extent of the bushmeat crisis, the reliance on bushmeat to support rural livelihoods must be better documented, in the context of both community and household food budgets (davies, 2002). one solution to combat the bushmeat crisis and food security concerns is the development of sustainable animal farms (davies, 2002). sustainable farms using animals traditionally hunted as bushmeat may reduce the demand for wild-caught meat, where households have income to purchase this meat, and farmed animals can be managed and monitored to prevent those diseases associated with wild-caught meat. sustainable bushmeat farms may be a particularly useful intervention in kenya, owing to the country’s growing population and resultant increased demand for food, expanding economy and increasing development (as measured by the human development index), and a relatively stable political situation (international human development indicators, 2013; cia, 2013). currently, the most commonly farmed livestock in kenya include cattle, goats, and sheep (kenya national bureau of statistics, 2011). if demonstrated to be practically feasible, the farming of native animals could have several advantages over these traditionally farmed species. the native giant grasscutter, thrynonomys sinderianus, also known as the cane rat, is a bushmeat species that is a prime candidate for commercial farming in kenya given its size, habitat preferences, high market price, and current consumption in the region (jori et al., 1995; iucn, 2013). multiple sources have suggested that consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis grasscutter farming possesses environmental-related advantages, such as reduction in bushfires and poaching (jori et al., 1995; adedapo et al., 2013; weidinger, 2014). the commercial production of grasscutters can aid in conserving the species (and other bushmeat species) where it is overhunted, while simultaneously protecting savannah habitats that are threatened by bushfires organized during small bushmeat hunting operations (jori et al., 1995). this protection of local vegetation can occur because the captive propagation of grasscutters would provide a reliable, readily-available food source, in effect reducing the need to draw endangered species, in particular grasscutters, out of the bush through intentional fires, which often become uncontrollable. grasscutter farming would also lessen the bycatch of other target species through the poisoning of water sources and capture via snares, which do not discriminate between species (asibey, 1974; jori et al., 1995). grasscutters are the second largest african rodent (fig. 1), measuring up to 60 cm (85 cm including tail length), and weighing between 2 kg and 6 kg (jori et al., 1995). figure 1: the giant grasscutter, thrynonomys sinderianus, which inhabits southern kenya, and other regions of sub-saharan africa. source: harckynyehlay (2012) these rodents are monogastric herbivores, which means they have a simple single-chambered stomach with a wide nutritional intake, such that they do not need to be fed the same foods that could be used for human consumption, as do poultry and pigs. they are able to adapt to various diets, so they are relatively easy to feed (opara, 2010; jori et al., 1995). the gestation period is five months, which is similar to that of other farmed animals such as sheep and pigs, but shorter than for cows. they can breed throughout the year, annually producing two litters consisting of two consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis to six offspring (jori et al., 1995). grasscutter meat has a higher protein content than the meat of guinea pig, chicken, and rabbit, and a lower fat content than pork, beef, and lamb; thus, it can contribute a high protein source to the diet of undernourished rural populations (ajayi, 1974; jori et al., 1995). grasscutters inhabit reed beds or areas of tall, dense grass with thick cane-like stems, typical of riparian habitats; however, they can also survive and thrive in the limited space of small-scale farms in sub-saharan africa (fig. 2; weidinger, 2014; owen & dike, 2012, jori et al., 1995). figure 2: map of geographic location of kenya and distribution of grasscutters across southern and western kenya (shaded region) (iucn, 2013). grasscutters are abundant and are generally culturally accepted as a more favorable protein source than most domestic livestock. they are also one of the few species of bushmeat in sub-saharan africa that are not associated with any cultural taboos (ajayi, 1974; jori et al., 1995). adedapo et al. (2013) claim non-conventional livestock, such as grasscutters, make significant contributions to the nutritional wellbeing of marginal households in parts of africa, as some tribes in west africa use every part of the grasscutter: they eat the meat, burn the hair, use the resultant ash powder in a special lotion that is considered to have healing properties (weidinger, 2014), and use the feces in seasonal sauces for traditional dishes (jori et al., 1995). the meat is valued for its savory taste and tenderness and is in great demand not only in african urban centers, but also in major global markets for africans living in the united states and europe. in some african countries, grasscutter meat is three to four times more expensive than beef because of the savory taste (martin, 1985; steel, consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis 1994). in nigeria, a matured grasscutter sells for between $us18.50 and $us30.90 (adedapo et al. 2013). adedapo et al., (2013) also report that grasscutter meat is the preferred and perhaps most expensive meat in west africa. moreover, in baon, mali, wild grasscutter meat is sold at $us2.8/kg whereas farmed grasscutter meat is sold at $us5/kg (adedapo et al., 2013). this means that farmed grasscutter meat is twice as economically valuable, which is encouraging for this study. this difference in market price could be explained by the health and safety standards associated with domesticated animals, or by the killing technique: weidinger (2014) disclosed that the muslim community in ghana was willing to pay higher prices for domesticated grasscutter that were killed in accordance with islamic doctrine. the technical feasibility of grasscutter production has been demonstrated in numerous sub-saharan countries, such as benin, togo, ghana, the democratic republic of congo, cameroon, gabon, and nigeria (jori et al., 1995). benin initiated a major research program to select genetically improved grasscutter stocks adapted to life in captivity and to promote the rearing of grasscutters in suburban and rural environments (owen & dike, 2012). as a result, there is now a selected breed of grasscutters that is adapted to captivity (jori et al., 1995). in ghana, nongovernmental organizations and the government subsidized purchase of the domesticated grasscutters in exchange for the buyer’s participation in intensive training (weiginger, 2014). currently, there are about 5,000 successful grasscutter farms in ghana (weidinger, 2014). a world bank study reported small-scale grasscutter farming as the most profitable livestock system in ghana (adedapo et al., 2013). grasscutter farms in southwest nigeria have also shown large profit returns and serve as a major source of employment for rural and impoverished indvidiuals (adedapo et al., 2013). unsuccessful grasscutter farms result from exposure to weather, predators, insufficient shelter, inadequate water provisioning based on the inaccurate belief that the rats obtain necessary water solely from food sources, and/or general lack of background knowledge regarding the biology of grasscutters, all of which can be easily remedied with basic training and information (adu et al., 1999; jori et al., 1995). although there is no specific data on grasscutter farming in kenya, given kenya’s similar environment, bushmeat hunting practices, and economic conditions with ghana and nigeria, it is reasonable to believe that grasscutter farming could be successful in kenya as well. before sustainable grasscutter farms can be implemented in kenya, however, a strategic analysis of the efficacy of such a project is required. in this study, i assessed the factors that may limit the successful introduction of sustainable grasscutter farming in kenya and used geographic information systems (gis) to determine the most suitable locations for grasscutter farms. over the last decade, gis systems have increasingly been seen as tools for decision making, specifically involving cases of land-use suitability and modeling (malczewski, 2004). i used gis to describe the broad physical and socio-political factors in order to create visual maps that depict the efficacy of sustainable grasscutter farm establishment in kenya. the goal of this project was to create a series of maps in order to conduct a geographic analysis using geographic information systems (gis) to explore the locations likely to be most suitable for sustainable grasscutter farms in kenya. these maps identify physical and socio-political limiting factors and aid in determining the viability of establishing sustainable grasscutter farms in kenya. consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis 2. methods 2.1 study area kenya is located in eastern africa, bordering ethiopia, south sudan, uganda, tanzania, somalia, and the indian ocean (see figure 2). it has a total area of 580,367 km2 (cia, 2013). kenya’s climate varies from a tropical coastline to an arid interior (cia, 2013). the terrain consists of a fertile plateau in the west, with low plains that rise to form the central highlands, which comprise one of the most successful agricultural production regions in africa (cia, 2013). the highlands are bisected by the great rift valley, which is home to numerous glaciers and fresh water lakes (cia, 2013). 2.2 arcgis and the land suitability analysis geographic information systems (gis) combines cartography, statistical analysis, and computer science technology to reveal data relationships, patterns, and trends. gis is a highly valued analysis system that is unique in its capacity for integration and spatial analysis of multisource datasets such as data on climate, public infrastructure, land use, etc. (malczewski, 2004). in this study, i employed arcgis, a specific gis product distributed by the environmental systems research institute (esri, 2013). one of the most widely recognized uses of arcgis is the land-use suitability and analysis application (malczewski, 2004). land-use suitability analysis has been applied in studies determining suitability of land for agricultural activities (kalogirou, 2002; malczewski, 2004), ecological approaches for defining land suitability and habitat for animal and plant species (store & kangas, 2001), and selecting the best site for private and public sector facilities (eastman et al., 1993; malczewski, 2004), all of which i utilized in this study. site-selection analysis aims at identifying the most appropriate sites for a specific activity, in this case, the farming of grasscutters, given a set of specific physical and socio-political requirements that are important in grasscutter production, as determined through an extensive literature review and consultation with experts (malczewski, 2004). over the past forty years, the land-use suitability application has increasingly become an integral component of environmental, urban, and regional planning activities (brail and klosterman, 2001; collins et al., 2001; malczewski, 2004). gis land-use suitability analysis in africa has successfully been applied in a wide variety of situations such as for determining: warm water aquaculture in continental africa and madagascar (kapetsky, 1994), inland aquaculture potential across africa (aguilar-manjarrez & nath, 1998), land suitability for pyrethrum cultivation, a natural insecticide processed from chrysanthemum in west kenya (wandahwa & ranst 1996), and suitability for rice-growing sites in great mwea region, kenya (kihoro et al., 2013), to name just a few examples. this case study presents a gis-based land suitability analysis for identifying and measuring the suitability of potential sites for sustainable grasscutter farms in kenya. the analysis involved five major steps: (1) conducting a literature review and consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis consulting with experts to determine the limiting factors associated with both wild and domesticated grasscutter life and production, (2) collecting spatial data, (3) identifying preferences (weighting values), (4) integrating and analyzing gis data through overlay techniques, and (5) evaluating the output (see figure 3). although there is currently no information on grasscutter production in east africa, a limited literature examines grasscutter farms in west africa. my analysis relied primarily on this literature to establish relevant factors in grasscutter farm locations, and i consulted with experts in the field of sustainable grasscutter and livestock farming, including: dr. rita weidinger, project advisor for the german international corporation (giz) sedentary farming systems project in ghana; saani abdulai, ghanaian grasscutter farm manager and member of the brong ahafo grasscutter association; joshua ahiaba, advisor for the market-oriented agricultural programme (moap) in ghana; and dr. pedro sanchez, director of the agriculture and food security center and kenya sustainable livestock farming expert for columbia university’s earth institute. the limited quantity and quality of spatial data available on kenya further informed the factors mapped. within gis there are two types of data: vector, data that map particular points, lines and polygons onto an otherwise blank surface; and raster, data that offer a continuous surface of values over the study area. i used the raster data model as it has traditionally been recognized as the more compatible data model for land-use suitability applications because the raster structure is area-oriented (malczewski, 2004). raster data are better suited to this project because of its goal of establishing a continuous surface of grasscutter farm feasibility. i identified factors related to two subdivisions of data: physical geography and socio-political geography (see appendix). after determining which spatial data to use, i transformed all of the relevant spatial data, or each individual map layer, into the same coordinate and grid systems, so that the data layers could be accurately mapped on top of one another. i first assigned a specific weighting to each criterion or data layer based on available literature and/or consultation with experts (see appendix). i created a separate map for every criterion within each major subdivision of data, physical geography (see figures 4-8), and socio-political geography (see figures 9-11), to provide the reader with a visual understanding of individual data inputs. i then synthesized these individual data layers to create a synthesized-layers map for each major subdivision of data (fig. 12-14). to create these multiple conclusive maps, i followed the structure of previously successful gis-based multicriteria evaluation studies, such as m. shahadat hossain et al.’s 2009 study identifying suitable sites for carp farming development in urban water bodies of chittagong, bangladesh. this multicriteria evaluation method evaluated each pixel in the gis data layer by using a basic additive weighting formula. with this formula, an overall suitability score for each pixel, or specific location, was obtained by multiplying the weights assigned to a particular criterion (such as proximity to water) with the value of the particular pixel, and adding up the values of the products over all criteria. based on this method, the most suitable areas were represented by the highest values. consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis figure 3: flowchart of the methodology followed in this study. adapted from kihoro et al., 2013. in step 2, sedac stands for socioeconomic data and applications center and wri stands for world resources institute. 3. results the eight physical factors and their corresponding weightings are delineated in figures 4 and 5. precipitation is the only factor that produces unsuitable conditions, which are concentrated in the northeast, while the most suitable locations for precipitation, croplands, and rivers are concentrated in the western and central regions of kenya (see figure 5). consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis figure 4: eight physical geographic parameters (a) precipitation (b) bare areas (c) wetlands (d) rangelands (e) protected areas (f) rivers (g) lakes (h) cropland in kenya that have the potential to limit grasscutter farm location. spatial data is from the world resources institute. consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis figure 5: suitability levels of eight physical geographic parameters (a) precipitation (b) bare areas (c) wetlands (d) rangelands (e) protected areas (f) rivers (g) lakes (h) cropland in kenya that have the potential to limit sustainable grasscutter farm placement. weightings were determined based on literature review and consultation with grasscutter and sustainable livestock experts (appendix 1). unsuitable and less suitable locations based on physical data are prevalent in northern and eastern kenya: the majority of the rift valley, nairobi, eastern and northeastern provinces (see figures 6-8). consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis figure 6: land suitability analysis of the prime locations to create sustainable grasscutter farms in the eight provinces of kenya. suitability is based on eight physical geographic factors: precipitation, bare areas, wetlands, rangelands, protected areas, rivers, lakes, and cropland, and corresponding weightings were determined based on literature review and consultation with grasscutter and sustainable livestock experts (see appendix). consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis figure 7: land suitability analysis of the prime locations to build sustainable grasscutter farms at the district level in the western, nyanza, and rift valley administrative boundaries of kenya. consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis figure 8: land suitability analysis of the prime locations to build sustainable grasscutter farms at the district level in the central and coastal administrative boundaries of kenya. these areas were characterized by low precipitation, the presence of bare and protected areas, scattered rangelands and wetlands, fewer rivers and croplands, and the absence of major lakes (see figures 6-8). most suitable locations were found primarily in areas where there was high precipitation; the presence of rivers, croplands, wetlands, major lakes; and the absence of bare and protected areas (see figures 6-8). the three socio-political factors and their corresponding weightings are delineated in figures 9 and 10. the percentage of individuals living below poverty and urban areas both produce unacceptable locations, whereas proximity to roads consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis produces a mostly neutral outcome (see figure 9). this mostly neutral outcome could be a result of the data not being extensive enough and only showing major roads. unlike the physical data, the socio-political data produces mainly neutral locations, scattered with unsuitable clusters (see figure 10). the main cluster of unsuitable locations is concentrated in the nairobi province (see figure 10). figure 9: three socio-political parameters (a) poverty (b) roads (c) urban areas in kenya with their corresponding weightings (d-f) that have the potential to limit sustainable grasscutter farm location. weightings were determined based on literature review and consultation with grasscutter and sustainable livestock experts (see appendix). consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis figure 10: land suitability analysis of the prime locations to create sustainable grasscutter farms in the districts of kenya based on three socio-political geographic factors: poverty rate, roads, and urban areas. weightings were determined based on literature review and consultation with grasscutter and sustainable livestock experts (appendix 2). the most suitable locations to establish sustainable grasscutter farms based on the combined physical and socio-political data are concentrated in three main regions: the nyanza, western and western half of the rift valley provinces, hereafter referred to as the western cluster; the central province, hereafter referred to as the central cluster; and the south-eastern tip of the coastal province, hereafter referred to as the south-eastern cluster (see figure 11). consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis figure 11: land suitability analysis of the prime locations to create sustainable grasscutter farms in the eight provinces of kenya. weighted overlay map is based on eight physical geographic factors: precipitation, bare areas, wetlands, rangelands, protected areas, rivers, lakes, and cropland; and three socio-political geographic factors: poverty rate, roads, and urban areas. corresponding weightings were determined based on literature review and consultation with grasscutter and sustainable livestock experts (see appendix). within the nyanza, western, and western half of the rift valley administrative boundaries, 28 districts have at least 75% of landcover suitable for the creation of sustainable grasscutter farms (see figure 12). consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis figure 12: land suitability analysis of the prime locations to build sustainable grasscutter farms at the district level in the western, nyanza, and rift valley administrative boundaries of kenya. within the central province, 10 districts have at least 50% of landcover suitable for the creation of sustainable grasscutter farms, and within the southern tip of the coastal province, three districts have at least 20% of landcover suitable for the creation of sustainable grasscutter farms (see figure 13). consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis figure 13: land suitability analysis of the prime locations to build sustainable grasscutter farms at the district level in the central and coastal administrative boundaries of kenya. 4. discussion water scarcity is one of the main physical limiting factors in kenya, and thus it is not surprising that the three most suitable regions for building sustainable grasscutter farms are all areas with high concentrations of water: high precipitation, high density of croplands and associative infrastructure (such as irrigation), lack of bare areas, scattered wetlands, and proximity to lake victoria and many rivers (see figures 5-6). the expected increasing frequency of droughts, as a result of global climate change, further necessitates close proximity to water sources (ulrich et al., consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis 2012). bare areas and protected areas were both unsuitable locations because bare areas are devoid of vegetation and generally have limited water availability, necessitating costly infrastructure construction (weidinger, 2014); it is illegal to build farms on protected areas but they do not need a buffer, as domesticated grasscutters have an identical genetic makeup to wild grasscutters and would be diseasecontrolled (weidinger, 2014). access to roads and proximity to urban areas were the main socio-political limiting factors (see figure 9). if farms were located too close to roads and urban centers, there would be increased pollution, increased chance of theft, and decreased quality and availability of natural resources (weidinger, 2014; abdulai, 2014). alternately, if farms are too far away from roads and urban centers, it is difficult and costly to transport meat to slaughterhouses and markets. the main political factor that limited success of grasscutter farms in ghana was access to roads, as the transportation of grasscutter meat to markets is vital for financial gain (abdulai, 2014). in kenya, more extensive data on roads is necessary to determine whether or not access to roads would be a major limiting factor. the percentage of individuals living below the poverty rate, while not integral to the overall functionality of grasscutter infrastructure, was central to my research focus because one aim of this study was to provide a primary source of protein and income to impoverished kenyans. implementing grasscutter farms in such suitable locations has the potential to improve the lives of local residents. one study found that livestock-related strategies helped over one-third of kenyan households escape poverty (kristjanson et al., 2010). in the urban and agropastoral zones, livestock commercialization, meaning selling the majority of meat versus primarily consuming it for subsistence, was essential in the transition out of poverty (kristjanson et al., 2010). in the districts of kisumu, migori, and busia, kristjanson et al., (2010) discovered that livestock made up 30% of total income and that increased access to livestock was directly associated with significant poverty reduction. kisumu, migori, and busia, are three of the 28 districts located in the highly suitable physical geographic hotbed of the western cluster (see figure 12). if increased access to livestock was directly associated with significant poverty reduction in these three districts, it is reasonable to extrapolate that increased access to livestock would also directly help reduce poverty in the surrounding 25 districts, especially as those districts all have very similar physical conditions and present suitable locations for potential grasscutter farms. in the districts of makueni, kilifi, tharaka, marakwet and laikipia, kristjanson et al., (2010) found that over 50% of income derives from livestock activities. marakwet is located in the northern tip of the western cluster, makeuni, tharaka, and laikipia are located in the central cluster, and kilifi is located in the southeastern cluster (see figures 12 and 13). these areas are not as highly suitable as the cluster in western kenya, as there are protected areas in these regions which restrict grasscutter farm establishment (see figures 6 and 7), sprawling urban areas which increase both natural resource competition and theft potential (see figure 9), and lower percentages of kenyans living below poverty (see figure 9); however these five districts are located in areas of relatively high precipitation, high densities of cropland, prevalence of rivers, scattered grasslands, and high concentration of roads which facilitate grasscutter meat distribution to markets (see figures 5 and 9). kristjanson et al., (2010) reported that livestock diversification and commercialization consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis have potential in these areas; however, major livestock losses were due to drought (kristjanson et al., 2010). grasscutters are a more viable option than other conventional types of livestock as they are naturally drought-resistant; they obtain the vast majority of their water from grass and other types of vegetation (weidinger, 2014). proximity to water sources, such as rivers, lakes, and wetlands, and the establishment of farms on existent croplands or rangelands where irrigation infrastructure is already existent would further ensure the presence of grass and subsequently fulfill grasscutter nutritional requirements (weidinger, 2014; abdulai, 2014). despite the fact that about 20% of kenya presents highly suitable grasscutter farm locations (see figure 11), the establishment of sustainable grasscutter farms should not be restricted solely to these locations. ulrich et al., (2012) conducted a study on small-scale farming in semi-arid areas in laikipia kenya from 1997 to 2010. the authors discovered that many rural farmers identified livestock as their most important strategy against food deficit periods (ulrich et al., 2012). these results are encouraging as the majority of the land in kenya falls into the less suitable range, due mainly to physical limiting factors such as lower precipitation, further distance from rivers and lakes, and resultant lower densities of croplands and rangelands (see figures 4 and 6). socio-political limiting factors proved to restrict a much smaller amount of space (see figure 9). cows were the main source of livestock for the farmers in ulrich et al.’s 2012 study. grasscutters, in comparison, require much less food, water, and space than cows, and thus if cows could survive in these semi-arid conditions and serve as a vital food and security source to farmers, grasscutters would seem to be an even more reliable, resilient, and economically viable option. 5. conclusion 5.1 the conceptual framework with the creation of new, multi-layered maps, this project sheds light on a possible means to combat the bushmeat crisis at the local level and provide a framework for implementing similar ventures on a national, regional, or even continental scale. this study identifies potential sustainable grasscutter farm locations in kenya. from an applied standpoint, the maps developed for kenya can change and adapt based on user inputs, which will be beneficial as more current and detailed data from recent censuses and surveys are acquired. future work by myself and/or agriculture and development experts can use the conceptual framework presented in this study as a baseline, and incorporate additional layers, such as the effects of climate change on possible grasscutter-farm locations. understanding the relationship between climate change and future sustainable livestock farms in africa is paramount, as africa is projected to suffer the greatest health impacts from climate change (mcmanus, 2012). additionally, future iterations of the model presented in this study could be improved with more complex modeling techniques, such as genetic algorithm for rule-set prediction (garp), which describes environmental conditions in which a species can sustain populations (kolivras, 2006), and graduated maps, which effectively show high-risk and low-risk areas. the variation generated from graduated consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis maps would show a continuous range rather than separating areas into unsuitable, neutral, or suitable, essentially allowing for more local detail. 5.2 environmental standards, assessment procedures, and future laws the conceptual framework and methodology presented in this study could function as a universal means of determining prime locations for sustainable farms for a variety of species and at all levels of governance, and could be adapted to varying environmental conditions depending on each region. the creation and implementation of this accepted methodological standard might inspire implementation of similar environmental standards and assessment procedures on a local, regional, national, and global scale. a universal framework for establishing sustainable grasscutter farms could foster communication between actors involved in all junctures of the bushmeat trade, including local communities, private-sector interests, management regimes, government, and international logging companies, whose labor forces are often fed with bushmeat, and whose roads open new areas for commercial exploitation of bushmeat (davies, 2002). the maps created in this study could be useful to stakeholders not only in kenya, but also globally, that are attempting to alleviate the bushmeat crisis, combat food insecurity in a sustainable manner, and/or provide means of economic development to developing countries. specifically, in terms of the bushmeat trade, to resolve conflicts between varying stakeholders, conservation and development agencies should work together to address biodiversity loss and poverty, which are intricately interwoven (davies, 2002). my methodology could provide a platform for this cooperation. policy and field issues need to be addressed concurrently, as many of the underlying causes of the bushmeat crisis originate from poverty, food insecurity, weak local governance, and unfavorable terms of trade at the policy level (davies, 2002). with regard to poverty, sustainable bushmeat farms would provide a means of economic development to farmers, and all parties involved in the physical construction of the farms, production and care of the animals, as well as the marketing of the meat. local, regional, and international policies should enable commercial activities of small-scale farmers by increasing investment in agricultural infrastructure, research, improved access to animal health information and treatments, and support competitiveness of household producers (kristjanson et al., 2010). with respect to food security, which is established upon the three fundamentals of food availability, food access, and food use (fao, 2003), sustainable grasscutter farms would directly address the two pillars of food availability and food access. they would provide food availability by contributing sufficient quantities of food available on a consistent basis, both on the local level through mini-livestock farms, and at the regional level through larger-scale farms; and food access, by providing sufficient resources for obtaining vital nutrients (fao, 2003), specifically protein, which is particularly scarce in africa. the assertion of alary et al., (2011) that livestock represents social capital to reduce the vulnerability of households in times of food shortages and urgent health problems, can be consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis extended/applied to grasscutters, as grasscutter meat can be seen as an engine for both seasonal work and security. 6. recommendations beyond the conceptual model proposed in this study, educational programs are necessary to address issues in all areas of the spectrum. instituting educational programs would raise the awareness of the general public about the severity of the bushmeat crisis and its adverse affects on the environment, economic security, and health. grasscutter experts identified education as the greatest social limiting factor in creating successful, sustainable grasscutter farms (weidinger 2014; abdulai, 2014). it is thus crucial that the kenyan government and international development agencies ensure that any intervention has a capacity-building component (ulrich et al., 2012). intervention should center around environmental and ethnographic research, education about the bushmeat crisis, training on how to interact with grasscutters and maintain a successful farm, and the development of infrastructure. 6.1 future research to develop employment on these farms, future research could determine which specific groups of people could benefit the most from sustainable grasscutter farms. women are one example of a historically disenfranchised portion of the population who could greatly benefit from a sustainable means of economic security and highly nutritional food source to feed their families. alary et al., (2011) assert that livestock is one of the only livelihood options available for women, who represent 70% of the world’s poor. one way to map areas of the greatest female disadvantage in kenya would be to use female illiteracy and maternal mortality as proxies to measure female quality of life. thus, future research could explore the idea and feasibility of creating sustainable grasscutter farms that targeted the employment of women. future research could also incorporate the element of adventure or ecotourism. as eco-tourism is a rapidly expanding industry, future maps could integrate major locations in kenya that attract adventure or eco-tourists, so that sustainable grasscutter farms could be built nearby. adventure tourists tend to be interested in sustainable livelihoods (fennell, 2008), and thus would likely be interested in paying to visit, learn about, and even volunteer on, sustainable grasscutter farms. this additional element could add another means of economic benefit to be drawn from sustainable grasscutter farming. eradicating the bushmeat crisis and food insecurity is highly unlikely, yet 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(2007). kenya gis data. available from http://www.wri.org/resources/data-sets/kenya-gis-data. consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis tables table 1: within the context of physical geography – the datasets, description of the data, and the weighting and rationale for each data set. superscript 1 indicates data from the world resources institute (wri); superscript 2 indicates data from natural earth. map-able factors: physical geography data description weighting weighting rationale precipitation average annual rainfall in kenya. three main agroclimatic zones: • humidsubhumid (1000-2700 mm) = 3 • semi-humid-semi arid (700-1000) = 2 • semi-arid (550700) = 1 • arid-very arid (0550) = 0 water is one of the main limiting factors, as grasscutters need fresh grass and/or other vegetation in order to survive, (weidinger, 2014). precipitation was divided into the main agro-climatic zones of kenya: humidsub-humid as most suitable; semi-humidsemi-arid as suitable; semiarid as neutral; and arid-very arid as unsuitable as precipitation is sporadic and vegetation is sparse (abdulai, 2014). bare areas areas naturally devoid of vegetation. • bare areas present = 0 • not a bare area = 1 bare areas would be unacceptable locations because grasscutters need a constant, close supply of grass/vegetation and infrastructure construction would be too costly (weidinger, 2014). non-bare areas are neutral (1). wetlands areas of land that are permanently, seasonally, or • wetland present = 3 • within ½ km wetland = 2 wetlands have greater amounts of water and are generally more grassconsilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis occasionally waterlogged at a depth not exceeding six meters. these areas are key natural resources important for agriculture. • 0.5 km+=1 productive so grasscutters would have food throughout the seasons (abdulai, 2014). areas within ½ km of the wetland would reap a lesser degree of the benefits of a wetland, but would likely still be more productive areas (weidinger, 2014). all other areas are considered neutral. rangelands grasslands and savannas that support a wide range of livestock production systems. • rangelands present = 3 • rangelands not present = 1 rangelands have greater amounts of water and are generally more grassproductive so grasscutters would have food throughout the seasons (abdulai, 2014). if grasslands are not present the location is simply considered neutral. protected areas protected areas. • protected area= 0 • un-protected area= 1 protected areas are illegal to build farms on (0), and all nonprotected areas are neutral (1). no buffer was needed as domesticated grasscutters have the same genetic makeup as wild grasscutters, and there is no record of domesticated grasscutters escaping (weidinger, 2014). rivers derive from world data bank 2. • 0.5 kilometers = 3 • 1 kilometer = 2 proximity to rivers is important for production of grass, consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis • everything else = 1 which is the domesticated grasscutter’s main source of food (abdulai, 2014; sanchez, 2014). areas within 0.5 km of a river benefit from a year-round water source and are more agriculturally productive, and areas within 0.5 to 1 km of a river are still easily accessible by foot, bike, or other forms of transportation. lakes derive from world data bank 2. includes the three main water bodies in kenya: lake victoria; lake turkana; and the masinga reservoir, a human-made lake. • 0.5 kilometers = 3 • 1 kilometer = 2 • everything else = 1 • lake = 0 as with rivers, proximity to lakes is important for production of grass, which is the domesticated grasscutter’s main source of food (abdulai, 2014). the areas covered by lakes are impossible to build on (0). areas within 0.5 km are most suitable (3) because the lakes are a year-round water resource (abdulai, 2014). areas within 1km are suitable (2) because it would be feasible to move between the lake and the farm to gather fresh vegetation and/or water for the grasscutters without significant infrastructure construction or costly transportation. consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis cropland1 areas of cropland. • cropland present = 3 • cropland not present = 1 grasscutter farms can be located within or close to croplands in order to use some of the crops, such as maize and millet as grasscutter feed (abdulai, 2014; sanchez, 2014). it is important to note that grasscutter farms should not be located near croplands with heavy pesticide usage (weidinger, 2014). if cropland is not present the land is simply considered neutral. table 2: within the context of socio-political geography – the datasets, description of the data, and the weighting and rationale for each data set. global roads open access is from the socioeconomic data and applications center (sedac); poverty rate is from the world resources institute (wri); and urban areas is from natural earth. map-able factors: sociopolitical geography data description weighting weighting rationale poverty rate based on data from 1999; depicts the percentage of people living below poverty line per square kilometer in kenya. • 0-59.99% = 1 • 60-74.99% =2 • 75-100%=3 one aim of this study was to provide a primary source of protein and income to impoverished kenyans, thus areas with the highest percentages of people living below the poverty line (75100%) were most suitable. roads a combination of the best available roads data ranging from the 1980s to 2010. • 0-0.5km = 1 • 0.5-3km = 3 • 3+ km = 2 the main political factor that limited success of grasscutter farms in ghana was access to roads, as the transportation of consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis grasscutter meat to markets is vital for financial gain (abdulai, 2014). a 0.5 km buffer is necessary because air pollution from the road could be harmful to the grasscutters, and grass and other natural resources close to the roads are likely to be of lower quality, (abdulai, 2014; weidinger, 2014). areas within 0.5 to 3km of a road would be most suitable as they would ensure that meat could be transported easily without significant infrastructure construction (weidinger, 2014). urban areas represents both areas of dense human habituation and serves as a proxy for markets as gis market data for kenya were unavailable. derived from 2002-2003 modis satellite data at 1 km resolution. • 0-0.5 km = 1 • 0.5-3 km=3 • 3+ km= 2 the grasscutter markets should be located in highly populated areas, however the grasscutter farms should be located in less populated areas, as the most productive farm sites are in rural, vegetation-rich environments (weidinger, 2014). as with roads, a 0.5 km buffer is necessary because of potential pollution, lower quality food sources, increased consilience menz: a means to alleviate the bushmeat crisis competition for already limited natural resources, and increased livestock theft (ulrich et al., 2012). in kenya specifically, from 1997 to 2010, the decrease in household livestock units was directly linked to population increase (ulrich et al., 2012). areas within 0.5 to 3 km of urban centers would be most suitable as they would ensure that fresh meat could be transported easily to market centers without significant infrastructure construction (weidinger, 2014). microsoft word jayawardhan final.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 17, iss. 1 (2017), pp. 103–142 vulnerability and climate change induced human displacement shweta jayawardhan university of washington shweta93@uw.edu abstract this paper addresses the relationship between vulnerability and climate change induced human population displacement. anthropogenic climate change is increasingly altering the way people live. a significant consequence of the effects of climate change is human displacement due to climate effects such as hurricanes, sea level rise, and drought. people displaced by the effects of climate change suffer from a legal protection gap. increasing global attention is being addressed at closing this gap. this paper explores the relationship between vulnerability and climate change induced displacement by analyzing case studies of hurricane induced displacement in the u.s. gulf coast, cyclone induced displacement in bangladesh, and drought induced displacement in somalia. analysis of these case studies demonstrates that there is a relationship between socioeconomically vulnerable populations and displaced populations. both in developed and developing countries, environmental displacement affects vulnerable populations disproportionately. policy aimed at closing the legal protection gap for environmentally displaced persons should address the socioeconomic inequalities that make marginalized groups more vulnerable to climate change. keywords: climate change, displacement, vulnerability, climate risk, refugee, climate law author’s note: i pursued this research as an opportunity to combine my studies in law, societies, justice, and environmental studies in a culminating senior thesis. i first explored the topic of environmental displacement in a course on u.s. asylum and refugee law. after gaining an introduction into how migration and refugee law applies, or more accurately does not apply, to environmentally displaced persons, i decided to further research the problem and complete a senior thesis. consilience jayawardhan: climate change, vulnerability, and displacement introduction anthropogenic climate change is adversely affecting the earth’s environment and altering the ways in which people live. politicians and decision makers are addressing greater attention towards people displaced by the effects of climate change or who will be displaced in the future. this problem is a powerful example the human face of climate change in the international policy arena.1 the un high commissioner for refugees (unhcr) has acknowledged that the effects of climate change have forced people to leave their homes in search of new lives in new places, and states that the unhcr will work on human rights issues relating to climate change induced population displacement and adapt much of its environment-related planning and work to address the effects of climate change.2 the unhcr has expressed concern, however, because environmentally displaced persons (edps), are not covered by the 1951 refugee convention and are therefore not protected by the unhcr’s charter. the media and politicians often refer to edps as 'climate refugees,' however there is not a consensus among politicians, international institutions, or academics that edps necessarily refugees due to their legal ambiguity. this lack of consensus has created a legal protection gap. environmental displacement is not solely an ecological problem. it is a multicausal problem where ecological and socioeconomic vulnerability act together to displace marginalized people. professor of geography steve lonergan noted in 1998: there is too often an uncritical acceptance of a direct causal link between environmental degradation and population displacement. implicit in these writings is the belief that environmental degradation – as a possible cause of population displacementcan be separated from other social, economic or political causes. it must be recognized that the degradation of the environment is socially and spatially constructed; only through a structural understanding of the environment in the broader political and cultural context of a region or country can one begin to understand the ‘role’ it plays as a factor in population movement.3 the problem with relying on a refugee framework for addressing edps is that this method risks accepting an uncritical link between climate change and population displacement. climate change alone does not displace people, it exacerbates social vulnerability which contributes to displacement. while addressing environmental displacement as a refugee crisis creates a 1 koko warner, “climate change induced displacement: adaptation policy in the context of the unfccc climate 2 “climate change,” unhcr, accessed march 8, 2015,http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4a5096.html 3 steve lonergan, “the role of environmental degradation in population displacement,” environmental change and security project report 4 (1998): 8. consilience 105 sense of urgency, this framework will not adequately address the problem. climate change is not the sole source of persecution that leads people to environmental displacement. in fact it is not a source of persecution at all because it does not discriminate. the impacts of climate change may be the reason for why people evacuate, but they alone do not explain why people do not return to their places of origin. the problem results from the complex relationship between climate change, lack of agency, and governance. in this paper i argue that socioeconomic inequality and marginalization of vulnerable communities account for the disparity in who is displaced by the effects of climate change. i will first provide a review of current scholarship on the issue, and then examine case studies of environmental displacement in the u.s. gulf coast, bangladesh, and somalia. finally i will discuss the policy implications of my findings and argue that policies aimed at addressing the legal protection gap that exists for environmentally displaced people needs to address the underlying socioeconomic conditions of marginalization that create displacement by taking a human rights based approach. categories of climate change induced displacement environmental migration is either slow onset or rapid onset. in this paper i will look at slow onset environmental displacement and rapid onset environmental displacement from hydrometeorological disasters, disasters caused by water related events. climate change contributes to both rapid-onset and slow-onset environmental displacement. climate effects like increasing ocean temperatures, rising sea levels, and increasing global temperatures, alter the way people interact with water. climate change threatens aspects of life such as living near bodies of water and relying on bodies of water and groundwater for livelihoods. the threats to the way people interact with water influence rapid onset and slow onset migration. rapid onset environmental displacement is people displaced due to natural disasters such as hurricanes, cyclones, and landslides, which render places uninhabitable. it is associated with climate change because of the effect of rising ocean temperatures on ocean movements and storms. according to the internal displacement monitoring centre, “14.9 million people were displaced by suddenonset natural disasters in 2011” alone.4 in this paper, i will examine rapid-onset environmental displacement resulting from hurricane katrina in the u.s. gulf coast and cyclone aila in bangladesh. slow onset displacement involves peoples gradually forced out of their place of inhabitance due to factors such as drought, soil 4 vikram kolmannskog, “climate change, environmental displacement and international law,” journal of international development 24 (2012): 1071. consilience jayawardhan: climate change, vulnerability, and displacement erosion, and sea level rise, which make their way of life in that place impossible. droughts are expected to become more frequent and severe due to anthropogenic climate change.5 in particular, climate change is expected to decrease freshwater availability and affect between 75 and 250 million people in africa by 2020.6 slow-onset displacement due to drought is often temporary, such as is common in somalia. slow-onset displacement in somalia, which i will discuss later in this paper, is an extreme example of drought related migration. migration related to drought is often multicausal; due to the impacts of drought combined with resulting political or economic crises. slow-onset ecological events like droughts gradually deteriorate people’s livelihoods to the point where they cannot sustain an adequate standard of living in their places of origin. droughts alone do not necessarily render areas inhabitable or dangerous to continue residing in, but they affect many aspects of life including economies. for this reason there is greater inclination to categorize slow-onset edps as economic migrants than there is for rapid onset edps. in this case of somalia, and in other cases of drought related displacement, environmental displacement can be thought of as migration motivated by a tipping point.7 review of literature terminology the term ‘climate refugee’ is frequently used in politics and media, yet it is met with a degree of caution in scholarship because people displaced due to climate change are not covered by the 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees. according to the convention, a refugee is someone who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."8 edps do not have the rights that the convention and the unhcr, the u.n. agency mandated to safeguard the rights of refugees as guaranteed by the 1951 convention, awards to convention refugees. political scientists and environmental policy scholars biermann and boas use the term ‘climate refugee’ because it has strong moral connotations and gives the problem legitimacy and urgency.9 this understanding departs from the legal definition of a 5 robert a. mcleman, climate and human migration: past experiences, future challenges (new york: cambridge university press, 2014), 141. 6 cecilia tacoli, "crisis or adaptation? migration and climate change in a context of high mobility," in population dynamics and climate change, ed. jose miguel guzman et al. (new york: united nations population fund, 2009), 108. 7 jane mcadam, "the concept of crisis migration," forced migration review 45 (2014): 10. 8 frank biermann and ingrid boas, “preparing for a warmer world” towards global governance system to protect climate refugees,” global environmental politics 10 (2010): 67. 9 ibid. consilience 107 refugee. mcadam, a professor of refugee law, refers to the term ‘refugee’ as “a legal term of art” confined to the definition by international law, and does not consider edps as refugees.10 many scholars reject the term ‘environmental refugees’ because it assumes there is a direct causal link between environmental change and migration. the term creates an oversimplified view of the problem, which is based on ‘common sense’ rather than a complex understanding.11 subramanian and urpelainen use the term environmentally displaced persons “so as to not confuse their rights with conventional refugees.”12 kolmannskogg also uses this term, defining it as “those forcibly displaced at least partly because of a natural disaster.”13 edp is also the unhcr’s preferred term and i will be using it in this paper.14 though imperfect, the term ‘edp’ allows for considerations of climate change, human agency, and governance, when analyzing the multicausal nature of environmental displacement. relevance and role of international law people fleeing regions for environmental reasons do not meet the strict definition of refugee from the 1951 convention. the commonly used term ‘climate refugee’ is therefore flawed. however as mcadam notes, while the law defines ‘refugee’ in a particular way, this does not mean that displaced people who do not fit the definition are unworthy of refugee protection or even necessarily denied it.15 the 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees was a stop-gap measure implemented to address the refugees of wwii. the u.n. intended for it to be temporary and solve a temporary problem. however, the 1951 convention and the following 1967 protocol are used today to cover the world’s vast number of refugees fleeing persecution. the 1951 convention alone cannot address the plight of edps first because it was written to address a specific problem, and second because climate change was not understood when the 1951 convention and 1967 protocol were written. the principle of protection and non-refoulment – not forcing refugees to return to their countries of origin – should apply to edps on moral grounds. the reasons for their displacement are different than those of convention refugees, but their suffering is similar. 10 mcadam, climate change, forced migration, and international law, 97 11 tacoli, "crisis or adaptation? migration and climate change in a context of high mobility," 107. 12 narayan subramanian and johannes urpelainen, “addressing cross-border environmental displacement: when can international treaties help?,” international environmental agreements: politics, law and economics 14 (2013): 27. 13 kolmannskog, “climate change, environmental displacement and international law,” 1072. 14 unhcr, "environment and climate change." unhcr the u.n. refugee agency. accessed january 29, 2016. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c10a.html. 15 mcadam, climate change, forced migration, and international law, 97. consilience jayawardhan: climate change, vulnerability, and displacement expanding the 1951 refugee convention the case could be made for the refugee convention to be reinterpreted to include edps. a refugee is persecuted based on “reasons of race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” accordingly, edps experience climate disasters differently based on their demographics and memberships in certain social groups. politicians in ecologically vulnerable countries like the maldives and bangladesh have even called for the convention to be amended to include protections for edps.16 while edps do not meet the strict definition of a refugee, it is too soon to say that edps will never be covered by the refugee definition.17 the reason for this is that displacement is not random. marginalized populations that become environmentally displaced arguably constitute a ‘particular social group.’ marginalized groups such as ethnic minorities and members of oppressed castes are both more exposed to climate disaster before they occur and suffer from inequitable distribution of relief and assistance after the disaster. this distinction between the general population and marginalized groups’ experience of climate change, which i discuss through three case studies in this paper, could fulfill the requirement of “reasons of race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” lack of protection assistance in the aftermath of disasters is comparable to persecution if the assistance is unequally or inequitably distributed. in cases of politicized disaster relief, as was the case in the aftermath of hurricane katrina, particular social groups may be unable to avail themselves of state protection in the form of disaster relief. sources of persecution need not be a state actor, or even supported by state actors, to be considered persecution under the convention. deborah anker, professor of law and director of the harvard law school immigration and refugee clinical program, argues that persecution includes situations where the state is “simply unable to protect its citizens.”18 she further argues that “refugee law exists to provide surrogate… protection when the state has failed in fundamental duties it owes to its population and this failure has a discriminatory impact based on” convention categories.19 anker’s surrogacy principle is useful in analyzing the role of international refugee law for edps. discriminatory climate adaptation policies and failure to provide adequate disaster relief can be considered as persecutory because the state is failing in its fundamental duties it owes to its population, the protection of people’s lives. 16 jane mcadam, “swimming against the tide: why a climate change displacement treaty is not the answer,” international journal of refugee law 23 (2011): 6. 17 kolmannskog, “climate change, environmental displacement and international law,” 1075-1076. 18 deborah anker, “refugee status and violence against women in the ‘domestic’ sphere: the non-state actor question.” georgetown immigration law journal 15 (2001): 394. 19 ibid, 399. consilience 109 as discussed earlier, not all scholars reject using the term ‘climate refugee.’ biermann and boas support using the term, but they do not support expanding the 1951 convention to cover said climate refugees. they argue that the unhcr rejects the term ‘climate refugee’ because of the legal rights that it bestows upon ‘refugees.’ transboundary flight distinguishes refugees from internally displaced persons (idps). by law, refugees must be outside of their country of nationality. if their flight is internal, they are considered idps. biermann and boas disregard the transboundary flight requirement for refugees because climate change will cause transnational and internal flight. they choose to use the term refugee because it has “strong moral connotations of social protection... [and] by using this term, the protection of climate refugees will receive the legitimacy and urgency it deserves.”20 they define climate refugees as “people who have to leave their habitats, immediately or in the near future, because of sudden or gradual alterations in their natural environment related to at least one of three impacts of climate change: sea level rise, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity.”21 one argument against expanding the convention’s mandate to cover people under biermann and boas’ definition is that it would extend convention protections to a group 20 times larger than what is currently covered. this could produce a trade-off between the legal protection of climate refugees and the protective services currently awarded to convention refugees. another argument is that climate refugees require a different kind of protection than convention refugees because most will remain in their home countries. 22 rather than expanding the convention, biermann and boas propose establishing a new regime for governing climate refugees, with an emphasis on resettlement, collective rights, and international assistance and burden sharing.23 they suggest this regime could take the form of a protocol to the united nations framework convention on climate change.2425 the un development programme and the world bank could serve as implementing agencies.26 biermann and boas acknowledge that the proposed governance system would have to overcome practical and political hurdles. an obvious hurdle is the emphasis on international assistance and burden sharing based on grant funding, which creates 20 biermann and boas, “preparing for a warmer world” towards global governance system to protect climate refugees,” 66-67. 21 ibid. 22 ibid, 74. 23 ibid, 79. 24 ibid, 75-76. 25 united nations framework convention on climate change, paris agreement,( fccc/cp/2015/10/add.1) 2015. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf 26 biermann and boas, “preparing for a warmer world” towards global governance system to protect climate refugees,” 79. consilience jayawardhan: climate change, vulnerability, and displacement a financial burden for donor countries. however, they argue that attitudes of self-interest may, or may have to, change.27 in some cases, new contextual interpretations of the refugee convention could be useful in addressing the problem of environmentally displaced persons. however, as supported by both mcadam and biermann and boas, the convention alone cannot address the problem because it was not designed to address this issue. the majority of environmental displacement cases do not meet its criteria. limiting the understanding of edps as ‘refugees’ lessens the severity of the problem by limiting it to a framework with which it is not wholly compatible. internal displacement protocols another reason that the refugee convention is not the most appropriate legal mechanism for addressing edps is that they are predominantly internally displaced, meaning they are displaced within their countries of origin. kolmannskogg suggests that the 1998 guiding principles on internal displacement, which incorporate aspects of international refugee law, provide a useful framework for addressing environmental displacement. the guiding principles contain a broad definition of internally displaced persons (idps), “which includes those fleeing man-made or natural disasters.” the un special rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons has further clarified that the definition covers edps. the guiding principles are a soft law mechanism that are increasingly being incorporated into national laws and policies. soft law is legal agreements and understandings that are non-binding. its biggest advantage is its flexibility.28 soft law is often associated with international law, as most u.s. resolutions and declarations fall under it. states are not bound by soft law provisions, but there is a legal expectation that they abide by them and use them to guide domestic policy. soft law is especially relevant when discussing the impacts of climate change, as it is still a developing field of science and policy, and non-binding law may be temporarily more appropriate. however, because they are non-binding, there is also very limited enforceability and accountability with soft law mechanisms. regional regimes subramanian and urpelainen use a game theory analysis to study when regional collaboration in the form of environmental displacement treaties is feasible to address cross-border displacement caused by environmental degradation.29 game theory analyses allow 27 ibid, 83. 28 kolmannskog, “climate change, environmental displacement and international law,” 1072-1073. 29 subramanian and urpelainen, “addressing cross-border environmental displacement: when can international treaties help?,” 25. consilience 111 us to see under what quantifiable conditions two states will cooperate. the study finds that treaty formation is easier under conditions of mutual vulnerability.30 countries are more likely to agree to a cross-border displacement treaty with each other when each is somewhat equally vulnerable. this is because they have similar assets and securities to lose or gain from a treaty. subramanian and urpelainen analyze different variables to determine if two countries will agree on treaty participation. participation involves a commitment to assisting edps from other countries. the analysis shows that countries join displacement treaties only if they expect the benefits of assistance from participatory states to outweigh the costs of offering assistance to other states. for this reason, treaty formation is easier when countries are similarly situated in terms of vulnerability to climate change. subramanian and urpelainen support regional treaties because mutual vulnerability is more likely in geographic regions.31 global treaties are unlikely to get support from low vulnerability countries that would have to take on a greater financial burden. though environmental displacement is primarily internal, cross-border displacement can be expected in low-lying island nations and in border areas.32 cross-border environmental displacement is already happening in countries like somalia, where slow-onset environmental disasters are gradually driving people out of the country. researching theories on cross-border environmental displacement is important for governments to consider when cooperation can be in a state’s interests. subramanian and urpelainen cite the kampala convention as an example treaty that supports their model. the kampala convention is a treaty adopted by the african union that covers a wide range of cases for displacement including those “due to natural or human made disasters, including climate change.”33 the treaty includes measures to prevent internal displacement and mitigate its root causes. it also calls for assistance by humanitarian agencies and other relevant actors when a state is unable to provide sufficient protection. subramanian and urpelainen interpret ‘other relevant actors’ to include other state parties.34 the kampala convention supports their model as all 24 countries that have ratified the convention are above median vulnerability when country vulnerability is quantified.35 a regional treaty can therefore serve as collective insurance against the threat of environmental 30 subramanian and urpelainen, “addressing cross-border environmental displacement: when can international treaties help?,” 25. 31 ibid, 26-27. 32 ibid, 26. 33 ibid, 37. 34 ibid. 35 ibid, 38. consilience jayawardhan: climate change, vulnerability, and displacement displacement.36 while their model of mutual vulnerability can be useful in addressing edp treaties at a regional level, it does not account for the fact that there is significant asymmetry in climate vulnerability among countries of the global north and south. it also fails to consider regional political conflict in parts of the global south most vulnerable to climate change. in cases where states do not have the capacity to accept edps from neighboring states, or are equally affected by climate change, regional treaties may not help the countries that are most vulnerable to climate change. in the following section, i discuss the disparity in vulnerability between the global north and south, using the research of tracey skillington, a sociologist whose research focuses on climate justice. legal violence and environmental colonialism skillington considers the lack of legal protection for edps as a form of “legal violence.” she comes at the issue from a perspective of morality and human rights, and argues that the protection gap that exists for edps violates expectations of universal human rights law and the principles of cooperation upon which the human rights community is founded. in discussing the vulnerability differences between sending and receiving states, skillington argues that most receiving states hold a significant responsibility for causing displacement due to the global north’s history of carbon pollution. 37 the industrialization of the global north contributed immensely to global climate change, the results of which are most severely experienced by the global south. yet, global north states shape responses that deny safe haven to edps. this denial amounts to legal violence as in many ways global north states are denying protection to people harmed by their actions. due to the temporal separation between the global north’s industrialization and the effects of climate change experienced by the global south, culpability of the global north is lessened, and denying safe haven can be seen as a right of sovereignty instead of legal violence. in the following section i will discuss an example where the u.s. has maintained its sovereignty while offering some limited assistance to edps from the global south. domestic legal responses while there is still no legal obligation based in international law to offer assistance to edps, some countries have initiated legislative mechanisms to offer relief to people fleeing natural disasters. this relief is usually in the form of temporary protection. the united states immigration act of 1990 (immact) provides temporary protected status (tps) to people from a country where 36 ibid, 39. 37 tracey skillington, “climate justice without freedom: assessing legal and political responses to climate change and forced migration.” european journal of social theory 18 (2015): 290-291. consilience 113 conditions in that country prevent nationals from returning safely.38 conditions include earthquakes, floods, droughts, epidemics, or other environmental disasters that result in a substantial but temporary disruption of living conditions.39 immact reformed the immigration and nationality act of 1965 and greatly expanded and revised legal immigration to the u.s.40 u.s. citizenship and immigration services may grant tps to nationals of eligible countries who are already in the u.s. individuals protected under tps are not removable from the u.s., can obtain employment authorization, and may be granted travel authorization. they also cannot be detained for their immigration status.41 for example, the u.s. designated 18 month tps to haitians residing in the u.s. after the 2010 haitian earthquake and granted tps to almost 150,000 nicaraguan and honduran migrants who migrated after hurricane mitch. 42 43 the main benefit of temporary protection measures is that edps in the u.s. from eligible countries are protected by non-refoulment until their home countries are safe to return to. unfortunately, tps is not applicable for many edps because they are usually displaced within their countries of origin. two key factors of tps make it an unsuitable legal remedy for edps. first, tps in the u.s. is highly discretionary, and the secretary of homeland security must designate a country before its nationals are eligible for protection. second, tps only benefits people legally or illegally already in the u.s.44 the u.s. granted tps to migrants from honduras and nicaragua in 2003, five years after hurricane mitch in 1998. most of those migrants had entered the u.s. illegally.45 this second requirement makes tps a challenging and uncertain resource for edps. the theory behind temporary protection for individuals fleeing unsafe conditions, however, is promising in relation to environmental displacement. it is yet to be seen if tps measures will become an encouraged legal norm as the effects of anthropogenic climate change intensify. 38 "temporary protected status." u.s. citizenship and immigration services. accessed february 05, 2016. https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status. 39 subramanian and urpelainen, “addressing cross-border environmental displacement: when can international treaties help?,” 2728. 40 marianne grin and miguel lawson, "the immigration act of 1990" harvard international law journal 33 (1992): 255257. 41 "temporary protected status." u.s. citizenship and immigration services. accessed february 05, 2016. https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status. 42 mcadam, climate change, forced migration, and international law, 182. 43 robert a. mcleman and lori m. hunter, “migration in the context of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change: insights from analogues,” wiley interdisciplinary reviews: climate change 1 (2010): 451. 44 "temporary protected status." u.s. citizenship and immigration services. accessed february 05, 2016. https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status. 45 mcleman and hunter, “migration in the context of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change: insights from analogues,” 451. consilience jayawardhan: climate change, vulnerability, and displacement vulnerability and socioeconomic and political factors of environmental displacement edps are displaced due to the interplay of ecological and social vulnerability. the intergovernmental panel on climate change’s (ipcc) definition of vulnerability is “the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes.”46 the ipcc, a scientific intergovernmental body established by the u.n., provides an ecological definition of vulnerability based on a ‘system’s’ ability to cope. the united nations office for disaster risk reduction uses a human-based definition. their definition of vulnerability is “the characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard.”47 socioeconomic inequities exacerbate ecological vulnerability, and contribute to environmental displacement. an extreme environmental event becomes a disaster when it affects vulnerable communities.48 racial and class inequities can make certain groups more vulnerable to climate change than others due to differing levels of protection and resilience. resilience is “the ability of communities to absorb external changes and stresses while maintaining the sustainability of their livelihoods.”49 lower resilience means a lessened capacity to adapt. in my case studies, i find that marginalized groups are less resilient than dominant groups. the ipcc defines adaptive capacity as “the ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate variability and extremes) to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences.”50 for marginalized groups, a lessened capacity to adapt can lead to environmental displacement. i will use vulnerability indexes in my analysis of case studies to quantify different groups’ varying levels of vulnerability. vulnerability indexes a vulnerability index is a method of quantifying the vulnerability of groups, census tracts, countries, and other organizational units. the social vulnerability index (sovi) was developed by the hazards and vulnerability institute at the university of south carolina.51 the index uses 30 u.s. census tract 46 ipcc climate change. impacts,, adaptation and vulnerability. contribution of working group ii to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change 2007. cambridge university press, (2007): 883. 47 "terminology." the united nations office of disaster risk reduction. accessed february 07, 2016. https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology. 48 tacoli, "crisis or adaptation? migration and climate change in a context of high mobility," 109. 49 adger et al., "migration, remittances, livelihood trajectories, and social resilience," 358. 50 ipcc climate change. impacts,, adaptation and vulnerability. 869. 51 "social vulnerability index." hazards and vulnerability research institute. october 30, 2013. http://webra.cas.sc.edu/hvri/products/sovi_details_2006.aspx. consilience 115 variables, including race, age, median house value, immigrant population, and households without cars, to quantify vulnerability at the census tract level. the 30 variables contribute to a community’s ability to respond to and recover from hazards.52 the sovi does not include ecological variables such as temperatures, land level above sea level, and level at risk for hydro-meteorological events. this allows for the comparison of the sovi with individual ecological variables. geographic information system (gis) mapping of vulnerability indexes provide a useful tool for analyzing the overlap of ecological and social vulnerability. gis visually presents data in maps. a study by martinich et al., a climate scientist at the u.s. environmental protection agency, combined the sovi with a sea level rise coastal property model to determine if and where socially vulnerable population groups would experience disproportionate effects and burdens of adaptation to climate change induced sea level rise. they examined census tracts along the continuous u.s. coastline.53 the study found that 22 percent of the population at risk of sea level rise is in the highest and second highest social vulnerability categories. their analysis is that “socially vulnerable populations would be more likely to have fewer resources within their communities” to respond to the risk of sea level rise.54 i argue that marginalized populations are more vulnerable to climate change because of discriminatory zoning practices and property value based protection decisions. this holds true in the u.s. and in developing countries. because data is less available for population areas in developing nations, i use the wheeler vulnerability index (wvi), an index of the vulnerability of countries as a whole, to quantify vulnerability outside of the u.s. the wvi, created by environmental economist david wheeler, considers the three main impacts of climate change (extreme weather changes, sea level rise, and agricultural productivity loss) and relevant political and economic factors.55 country indexes are useful for analyzing which countries may contribute higher numbers of environmentally displaced persons. their main shortcoming, however, is that vulnerability can greatly vary for different populations and regions within a country. this is due to variance in geographic and social vulnerability of groups. for example in bangladesh, rural communities on the southern coast of the country are much more vulnerable than the capital city of dhaka. while indexes based on subnational population 52 ibid. 53 jeremy martinich et al., “risks of sea level rise to disadvantaged communities in the united states,” mitigation and adaptation strategies for global change 18 (2013): 171. 54 ibid, 177. 55 david wheeler, "quantifying vulnerability to climate change: implications for adaptation assistance working paper 240," 240 (2011). consilience jayawardhan: climate change, vulnerability, and displacement areas such as u.s. census tracts reveal these differences, this information is less available in developing countries. additionally even if it is available, census variables are not uniform across countries. without a uniform list of variables, one index could not be used for different countries. the wvi shows us that bangladesh and somalia are vulnerable to climate change. i use qualitative research of population shifts and demographics to analyze socioeconomic and ecological differences of social groups within each country. coastal vulnerability and disaster relief by examining the impact of hydro-meteorological disasters, i show that discrimination trends in spatial vulnerability manifest similarly in developed and developing countries. hydrometeorological disasters like hurricanes can cause mass destruction to homes and infrastructure. research shows that lower social classes often suffer disproportionate levels of population displacement. hurricane mitch struck central america in 1998 and displaced about 2 million people. decades of civil conflict in the region left large populations of people impoverished and occupying marginal and hazardous lands in the countryside and peripheral urban slums.”56 people occupying these areas were considered vulnerable communities because of land characteristics like steep slopes prone to landslides and low-lying flood prone areas. over a year after the storm, people continued to live in temporary dwellings around urban centers in honduras, and migration out of the country after the hurricane tripled.57 the underlying spatial inequities beforehand and population displacement after hurricane katrina in the u.s. gulf coast were very similar to the narrative of hurricane mitch. in new orleans, marginalized populations did not live in vulnerable areas because of a civil conflict, but rather because of a history of racial segregation and redlining. segregation laws in post-slavery new orleans forced african americans to live in low-lying areas like the lower ninth ward, which put them at higher risk of flooding. the areas of new orleans most at risk of flooding continued to be primarily inhabited by people of color in 2005 when hurricane katrina struck the gulf coast.58 the hurricane displaced over 378,000 people and its 2008 population was 72 percent of its prehurricane population. environmental justice scholars bob bullard and beverly wright note that the hurricane more severely affected african american households than it did white households.59 african 56 mcleman and hunter, “migration in the context of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change: insights from analogues,” 452. 57 ibid. 58 earthea nance, "making the case for community-based laboratories," in race, place and environmental justice after hurricane katrina, ed. robert bullard and beverly wright. (boulder: westerview press, 2009) 155. 59 robert d. bullard and beverly wright, "race, place, and the environment in post-katrina neworleans," in race, place and environmental justice after hurricane katrina, ed. robert bullard and beverly wright. (boulder: westerview press, 2009) 30. consilience 117 american and white populations were displaced at drastically different rates: “47 percent of african american households live someplace different, compared to only 19 percent of white households.”60 hurricanes mitch and katrina demonstrate the importance of underlying socioeconomic inequities on migration following natural disasters. the migration outcomes from these two disasters were not random, rather particular demographic groups that were economically disadvantaged or marginalized were more likely to permanently relocate.61 cost-benefit analysis based hazard protection decisions also perpetuate and exacerbate marginalized groups’ vulnerability to climate change. in a cost-benefit analysis based protection decision, agencies or developers award resources for protection or resilience based on local property values. protection in the form of beach nourishment or a levee would be awarded if the cost of installing the protective measure were less than the potential property loss without the measure in place.62 areas inhabited by marginalized communities often have lower property values. therefore these communities suffer when protection decisions are made using cost-benefit analyses. for example, martinich et al. find that highly socially vulnerable are more likely to be abandoned than protected in response to sea level rise.63 these communities are abandoned because the cost of making them resilient is greater than the monetary value of lost property if a disaster strikes. in the u.s., the army corps of engineers, a federal agency under the department of defense, plans and constructs most adaptive infrastructure. the responsibility for flood protection primarily falls with the corps. the corps requires cost benefit analyses to support or justify coastal infrastructure and nourishment projects. where the cost of protection exceeds the benefit, abandonment is the estimated response.64 this demonstrates how reliance on cost benefit analyses creates situations of environmentally displaced persons. people living in areas with lower property values, due to various inequities and historical injustices, are less likely to be protected in the face of a natural disaster. though cost-benefit analyses can be useful, they should not be the primary method for making protection decisions. the connection demonstrated above, between social and ecological vulnerability, reflects how a lack of social power influences population groups’ ability to adapt to climate change and the likelihood of them being forced to migrate. in governance systems reliant on cost-benefit analyses for protection decisions, marginalized 60 ibid, 30. 61 mcleman and hunter, “migration in the context of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change: insights from analogues,” 453. 62 martinich et al., “risks of sea level rise to disadvantaged communities in the united states,” 175. 63 ibid, 169. 64 ibid, 175-176. consilience jayawardhan: climate change, vulnerability, and displacement populations do not have the resources to protect their communities. social hierarchies and oppression also keep marginalized groups ecologically vulnerable. in the aftermath of cyclone aila in 2009, the location of support service in rural bangladesh depended on the rural power structure and the influence of rural leaders.”65 in rural villages in bangladesh, families voluntarily organized into mutual benefit associations. leaders of these associations, known as matabdars, settled village disputes between associations. the social position of these associations and matabdars, based on factors such as income, literacy, and housing, had a significant influence on the location of cyclone relief services.66 marginalized groups lower in the rural power structure – those most landless and impoverished – did not have the social capital to acquire adequate disaster relief assistance. a lack of fair governance allows government agencies to make inequitable protection. vulnerability and governance effective governance can make a difference in whether a situation results in forced displacement or adaptive migration. this is because the effectiveness and equity of governance can determine whether migrants will return to their places of origin, or whether they will migrate and not return. in the immediate aftermath of rapidonset events, people are able to return to their origins based on the effectiveness of governance to recover restore social, economic, and physical characteristics of the affected area.67 mcleman claims a key lesson from hurricane katrina is that damage to housing and competency of institutional authorities to provide relief and recovery are key determinants of whether people return or migrate elsewhere.68 both of these are associated with disproportionate levels of vulnerability and the role of government. i build off the ideas presented by mcleman, bullard, and mallick in my discussion of the relationship between environmental displacement and socioeconomic vulnerability. in the following section, i will discuss how local governance had weak efficacy in recovering social, economic, and physical characteristics in the aftermath of hurricane katrina in new orleans, cyclone aila in bangladesh, and the 2011 drought in somalia, causing environmental displacement. case studies 65 bishawjit mallick et al., "coastal livelihood and physical infrastructure in bangladesh after cyclone aila," mitigation and adaptation strategies for global change 16 (2011): 636 66 bishawjit mallick, and joachim vogt, "social supremacy and its role in local level disaster mitigation planning in bangladesh," disaster prevention and management 20 (2011): 548. 67 warner, koko. “assessing institutional and governance needs related to environmental change and human migration.” united nations university (2010): 2. 68 mcleman, climate and human migration: past experiences, future, 141. consilience 119 hurricane katrina in new orleans hurricane katrina hit the united states gulf coast in 2005 and resulted in the evacuation or displacement of approximately 1 million people.69 many have termed the disastrous situation in new orleans following the hurricane ‘unnatural’ or ‘man-made.’70 when new orleans’ levees failed, 80 percent of the city was flooded. although evacuation rates from new orleans do not vary greatly across demographic groups, the probability of returning varies significantly by demographic group. 71 more than a million people in the gulf coast were displaced, 600,000 of which remained displaced a month after the storm. a year after the hurricane, the city was at half its previous population. since then it has been rising; the 2014 population was 79 percent of the 2000 population.72 local vulnerability the city of new orleans is situated in the very ecologically vulnerable mississippi river delta. mcleman describes the city before the hurricane as “three shallow bowls holding a half million people at or below sea level.” a series of hurricanes in the twentieth century motivated the government to invest in protective levees to reduce the risk of storm flooding in the city.73 the u.s. army corps of engineers used a cost benefit analysis based on property values in the levee project plan. the environmental impact statement for the project issued in 1984 states that the corps 1974 and the final statement was issued and approved in 1984. the statement calculated annual benefits as the difference between the expected costs of damage caused by hurricanes without the proposed projects and the expected costs with the projects. 74 adaptation and investment decisions based on property values instead of population density resulted in inequitable levels of adaptation and increased ecological vulnerability for more socioeconomically disadvantaged neighborhoods. consistent with the corps’ method for adaptation decision-making in the u.s., martninch et al. found that when land value is higher than the cost of protection, the land will be protected through adaptive infrastructure. when the value of land is lower than the cost of protection, evacuation and abandonment will be the primary response to coastal threats. 75 the study’s use of gis 69 ibid, 95. 70 robert d. bullard and beverly wright, "introduction," in race, place and environmental justice after hurricane katrina, ed. robert bullard and beverly wright. (boulder: westerview press, 2009) 2. 71 jeffrey a. groen and anne e. polivka. “going home after hurricane katrina: determinants of return migration and changes in affected areas.” working paper 428. u.s. bureau of labor statistics. (2009). 15. 72 allison plyer, “facts for features: katrina impact.” last modified august 28, 2015, datacenterresearch.org 73 mcleman, climate and human migration: past experiences, future, 95. 74 detlof von winterfeldt, “using risk and decision analysis to protect new orleans against future hurricanes,” in on risk and disaster: lessons from hurricane katrina, ed. by ronald j. daniels et al. (philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press, 2006), 30. 75 martinich et al., "risks of sea level rise to disadvantaged communities in the united states," 175. consilience jayawardhan: climate change, vulnerability, and displacement highlights where land that is likely to be unprotected or abandoned overlaps with a high social vulnerability index. they find that the gulf coast is the region in the u.s. with greatest intersection of population tracts with high social vulnerability and sea level rise risk. new orleans’ hardest hit neighborhood was the predominantly african american lower ninth ward. the city has a racially discriminatory historical geography, which concentrates black populations in ecologically vulnerable zones. after the civil war, the rapidly growing numbers of african americans in new orleans were legally forced to live in low-lying areas such as the lower ninth ward, which put them at greater risk of flooding and contamination. african americans were redlined into low-lying land uninhabited by white people.76 the effect of this redlining remains in place into present day. at the time of hurricane katrina in 2005, the low-lying areas were most at risk of flooding; new orleans east, lower ninth ward, and gentilly, were primarily inhabited by people of color.77 a history of racial discrimination placed minority new orleans residents in a more ecologically vulnerable position than white residents. who did not return? analysis of racial differences in return rates suggests racially correlated ecological vulnerability and social capital. within three months of the hurricane, half of white residents who had evacuated had returned to the city. yet over a year after the hurricane less than half of black residents had returned.78 furthermore, only 38 percent of black evacuees from the entire affected gulf coast returned to their pre-katrina counties, compared with 76 percent of white evacuees.79 these racial differences in the pre and post katrina populations remain significant ten years after the storm. according to the u.s. census bureau, there are now 99,650 fewer african americans living in new orleans and 11,494 fewer whites. the predominantly african american lower ninth ward saw only 9.9 percent of its population return. comparatively, affluent and predominantly white neighborhoods repopulated back to their previous populations, and some grew more populated than previous levels for example, the predominantly white neighborhoods of 75 ibid., 169 76 nance, “making the case for community-based laboratories,” 155. 77 ibid. martinich et al., "risks of sea level rise to disadvantaged communities in the united states," 181. 78 mcleman, climate and human migration: past experiences, future, 95. 79 groen, and polivka. “going home after hurricane katrina: determinants of return migration and changes in affected areas,” 16. consilience 121 garden district, the french quarter, and faubourg marigny all had 2008 populations greater than before the hurricane.80 to be sure, return rates to different neighborhoods are related to levels of damage, but these too exhibit institutionallyreinforced racialized inequalities. damaged areas in the city “were populated by 46 percent african americans compared to 26 percent african americans in the rest of the city.”81 the disparity in damage is related to ecologically discriminatory redlining of african american populations described above, and to the lack of adequate investment and protection in ecologically vulnerable areas with low property values. another factor in why affluent residents returned at a higher rate than low-income residents is homeownership and flood insurance. groen and polivka consider homeownership as “locationspecific capital,” an indicator of likeliness to return. their analysis of the u.s. census bureau current population survey following hurricane katrina finds that returnees were disproportionately homeowners compared with non-returnees.82 however homeownership alone is not a strong indicator of whether people returned home. a comparison of the repopulation of two neighborhoods in orleans parish, the lower ninth ward and the garden district, reveals why homeownership is not a strong indicator. the lower ninth ward and the garden district repopulated at very different rates. based on u.s. census data, the neighborhoods had similar homeownership rates but very different demographics. in 2010, 59 percent of housing units in the lower ninth ward and 49.1 percent of housing units in the garden district were owner occupied. the lower ninth ward’s number of total occupied housing units in 2000 was 4,820 and in 2010 was 1,061. the garden district’s number of total occupied housing units in 2000 was 1,117 and in 2010 was 1,063. though the lower ninth ward had a higher rate of homeownership than the garden district, it repopulated at a much lower rate. the two neighborhoods had, and still have, contrasting race and income demographics. in 2000, the lower ninth ward had an average household income of $37,803 and was 98.3 percent african american. the garden district had an average household income of $124,688 and was 89.2 percent white. 80 robert d. bullard and beverly wright, "race, plane and the environment in postkatrina new orleans," in race, place and environmental justice after hurricane katrina, ed. robert bullard and beverly wright. (boulder: westerview press, 2009) 30-31. 81 sheila j. webb, "investing in human capital and healthy rebuilding," in race, place and environmental justice after hurricane katrina, ed. robert bullard and beverly wright. (boulder: westerview press, 2009) 145. 82 groen, and polivka. “going home after hurricane katrina: determinants of return migration and changes in affected areas,” 18-19. 82 webb, "investing in human capital and healthy rebuilding,” 149. consilience jayawardhan: climate change, vulnerability, and displacement owning flood insurance made it much easier for people to return to their homes in new orleans. homeowners with flood insurance could expect relatively quick and fair settlements to begin funding housing recovery. there is a positive correlation with household income and possessing flood insurance. the majority lower ninth ward residents were low income and did not have flood insurance. the louisiana recovery authority’s the road home program was a grant program intended to provide funds to rebuild uninsured and underinsured homeowners.83 though the program was intended to compensate for the socioeconomic differences in flood insurance protection, its implementation was slow and ineffective due to numerous administrative obstacles, and it ultimately failed in achieving its goal. 84 mcleman states two key lessons from hurricane katrina are that: damage to housing is a key determinant of whether people will return… or migrate elsewhere [and] the competency of institutional authorities to provide relief and recovery assistance is an important influence on how people adapt, especially the poor and marginalized.85 the relationship between lack of flood insurance with low-income people and low return rates demonstrates the importance of these takeaways. he also notes “strong social capital can overcome institutional inadequacy.” 86 low-income people also did have access to social capital to improve their situation and overcome inadequacies of the louisiana recovery authority and fema. bates and green argue that government program design and implementation have maintained the bias towards well-insured homeowners with private resources, to the detriment of african american homeowners in the lower ninth ward.87 a difference in access to resources and capital made a big difference in who was able to return home. overall, the data shows a slight positive correlation throughout the city of average household income of neighborhoods and rates of return in those neighborhoods. in graph 1, the repopulation percentage of neighborhoods is the change in number of houses receiving mail from june 2005 and june 2015. households receiving mail is a useful indicator for analyzing the number of occupied homes. 83 lisa k. bates and rebekah a. green, "housing recovery in the ninth ward,” in race, place and environmental justice after hurricane katrina, ed. robert bullard and beverly wright. (boulder: westerview press, 2009) 236-237. 84 ibid. 85 mcleman, climate and human migration: past experiences, future, 103. 86 ibid. 87 bates and green, "housing recovery in the ninth ward,” 243. consilience 123 88 there is also a slight relationship between the racial makeup of neighborhoods and their repopulation rates. graph 2 shows the relationship between the african american population of neighborhoods and neighborhood repopulation rates. though the relationship is not quite a correlation, the data still shows us a racial difference in repopulation rates. all the neighborhoods with repopulation rates lower than 80 percent are predominantly african american and neighborhoods with lower than 60 percent repopulation are all over 90 percent african american. racial disparities in flood insurance coverage are also relevant in analyzing race and repopulation. before hurricane katrina, african americans were the least likely racial group in new orleans to have flood insurance. this is due to insurance redlining of black neighborhoods. because of the disparity in insurance coverage, fewer settlement funds went to rebuilding homes in black neighborhoods. 88 data source: u.s. census 2000 summary file 1 (sf1) and u.s. census population estimates 2015 0.00% 20.00% 40.00% 60.00% 80.00% 100.00% 120.00% $0.00 $50,000.00 $100,000.00 $150,000.00 $200,000.00 re po pu la 4o n pe rc en ta ge ju ne 2 01 5 2000 average household income (in 2014 dollars) graph 1. household income and repopula4on rates of new orleans neighborhoods consilience jayawardhan: climate change, vulnerability, and displacement 89 while helpful, the data on household repopulation does not give us the full picture of who left and who returned to new orleans because it does not take into account gentrification after hurricane katrina. graph 3 shows the difference in new orleans’ racial makeup before and after the hurricane. in 2000, new orleans was 66.7 percent african american and 59.6 percent in 2010. additionally, adjusted for inflation in 2014 dollars, the 2000 average income of new orleans was $59,354 and 2014 average income was $62,880. for numerous reasons including the redlining of african americans into ecologically vulnerable areas, discriminatory insurance practices, and a reliance on the private insurance sector to facilitate recovery, african americans have returned to new orleans at a much lower rate than whites. 89 data source: u.s. census 2000 summary file 1 (sf1) and u.s. census population estimates 2015 0.00% 20.00% 40.00% 60.00% 80.00% 100.00% 120.00% -10.00% 10.00% 30.00% 50.00% 70.00% 90.00% 110.00% re po pu la 4o n pe rc en ta ge ju ne 2 01 5 percent african american 2000 graph 2. race and repopula4on consilience 125 hurricane katrina caused the evacuation of 70 percent of new orleans. evacuees were demographically representative of the city. hurricane katrina alone does not explain why return rates were so different along racial and income level lines. marginalized groups in new orleans had greater levels of exposure to the hurricane and lesser access to economic relief and social capital after the hurricane. the difference in access to resources plays a significant role in the disparity in return rates. though the city is repopulating, ten years after the hurricane, the population is still well below its previous population. the demographics of the city have also shifted toward a greater number of whites. who returned after evacuating and who did not demonstrates how marginalization causes environmental displacement and migration in response to climate disasters. cyclone aila in bangladesh cyclone aila was a category 1 climate change induced cyclonic storm that hit the bangladesh coast in 2009.90 the storm displaced 2 million people, most of who returned to their villages after the cyclone. bangladesh is one of the most, if not the most, 90 m. rezaul islam & mehedi hasan. “climate-induced human displacement: a case study of cyclone aila in the southwest coastal region of bangladesh.” natural hazards, 81 (2016): 1053. graph 3: comparison of 2000 and 2013 populations of african american, white, and hispanic populations of orleans parish. consilience jayawardhan: climate change, vulnerability, and displacement vulnerable country to climate change. it has a wheeler vulnerability index score of 53 out of 100. the country is in the world’s largest river delta, where the ganges, brahmaputra, and meghna rivers converge.91 ten percent of its land is only 1 meter above sea level, making it particularly vulnerable to sea level rise. the bangladeshi government constructed polders and embankments in the 1960s to protect against inundation from the sea.92 in the 1990s, the world bank funded the bangladesh coastal embankment rehabilitation project, which aimed to further fortify the coast with embankments. these embankments, however, did not withstand the region’s cyclonic storms.93 similarly to the levee breaches after hurricane katrina, cyclone aila toppled coastal embankments and flooded settlements. local vulnerability figure 1 demonstrates the increasing vulnerability of the southern coastal region of bangladesh where cyclone aila hit. islam et al. base their index of overall vulnerability on an aggregate of agricultural, climatic, demographic, occupational, and geographic vulnerability (vulnerability to hydro-meteorological disasters). they consider the southern districts of bangladesh as ‘very highly vulnerable.’ as per bangladesh’s 2001 census, the country’s 19 coastal districts had a population of 36 million people of which 52 percent were classified as ‘poor.’94 the region’s rural poor do not have access to adequate relief and rehabilitation resources after climactic disasters. the location of disaster relief support services in rural bangladesh depends on the rural power structure.95 as discussed previously, village associations gain power through their assets and income. poor populations in rural southern bangladesh are particularly vulnerable to being environmentally displaced because of their social vulnerability in the rural power structure and ecological vulnerability due to their location in the river delta. 91 katha kartiki, “climate change and migration: a case study from rural bangladesh,” gender & development 19 (2011) 24. 92mallick et al., "coastal livelihood and physical infrastructure in bangladesh after cyclone aila," 630. 93 kartiki, “climate change and migration: a case study from rural bangladesh,” 27. 94 islam et al., ”vulnerability to climate change: adaptation strategies and layers of resilience – quantifying vulnerability to climate change in bangladesh, " 24. 95 mallick et al., "coastal livelihood and physical infrastructure in bangladesh after cyclone aila," 636. consilience 127 figure 196 bangladeshis are socioeconomically vulnerable to climate change at a national level because a majority of the population relies on the land for a living. sixty-three percent of the population makes a living in the natural resource dependent sectors of agriculture, forestry, and fishing.97 though annual flooding in bangladesh delivers agricultural productivity to rural areas, the rural population distinguishes between good floods, which nourish the land, and bad floods, which damage crops, housing, and shrimp ponds.98 the cyclone severely damaged the economy of affected areas. the region’s agricultural production was completely decimated, shrimp farms were washed away, and even personal gardens were destroyed, depriving most people not only of their income source, but also of their non-market earnings used for subsistence.99 people in this region had lived off the land for generations. the effects of climate change and lack of government protection decimated their way of 96 islam et al., ”vulnerability to climate change: adaptation strategies and layers of resilience – quantifying vulnerability to climate change in bangladesh, " 28. 97 kartiki, “climate change and migration: a case study from rural bangladesh,” 25. 98 mcleman, climate and human migration: past experiences, future, 129. 99 mallick and vogt. “cyclone, coastal society and migration: empirical evidence from bangladesh.” 223-224. consilience jayawardhan: climate change, vulnerability, and displacement life. years after cyclone aila, the land remains ruined and unsuitable for farming or living. rural bangladesh also has ecological vulnerability trends similar to the redlined neighborhoods of new orleans. according to brouwer et al. the poorest and most socioeconomically marginalized populations in both urban and rural bangladesh tended to occupy the most ecologically vulnerable regions. they found that floodplain residents have lower income levels than village averages. their study determines that vulnerability can be determined by income inequality.100 101 this conclusion implies that equitable siting of homes can have similar levels of protecting people from climate disaster as physical infrastructure investments like embankments and levees. people in rural bangladesh are at environmental risk because of their income level. data on migration patterns after the cyclone shows that migration was both necessary and unavoidable for poorer farmers in the region.102 initial migration patterns reflect that usually men would leave their families in the rural areas and try to find work in the southern cities: khulna and satkhira.103 this left a greater population of women left in the region to maintain family land and attempt to make a livelihood with assistance from remittances. even before the cyclone, the region was very poor. the government did not devote resources to building climate mitigating infrastructure to protect people and agriculture in the region. due to lack of sufficient resources, it also did not devote resources to repairing embankments after the cyclone to make the region suitable for agriculture again.104 through this policy of resource allocation, the state has failed rural people by failing to protect minimum living standards. who did not return? demographic trends in return rates after cyclone aila also reflect the relationship between socioeconomic status and migration. a survey by mallick and vogt of 280 households in 12 villages affected by cyclone aila shows that migration decisions correlated with income levels. respondents with a pre-cyclone monthly income of less than $30 had an 86 percent migration rate; those earning between $30 and $75 had 58 percent migration rate; and those earning over $75 had a 19 percent migration rate.105 another study by islam and hasan finds that 53.8 percent of cyclone aila migrants they surveyed said they left because of “damage of home and 100 roy brouwer et al., "socioeconomic vulnerability and adaptation to environmental risk: a case study of climate change and flooding in bangladesh," risk analysis 27 (2007): 320. 101 mcleman, climate and human migration: past experiences, future, 131. 102 mallick and vogt. “cyclone, coastal society and migration: empirical evidence from bangladesh.” 234. 103 islam & hasan. “climate-induced human displacement: a case study of cyclone aila in the south-west coastal region of bangladesh,” 1057. 104 ibid, 227. 105 mallick and vogt. “cyclone, coastal society and migration: empirical evidence from bangladesh.” 226. consilience 129 cultivable lands.”106 both studies show there is a relationship between housing damage, income, and the decision to migrate. in the rural coastal areas surveyed, low-income households were likely homes made of clay, which did not withstand the cyclone. higher income groups lived in homes constructed of more resilient materials.107 as in the aftermath of hurricane katrina, housing damage was a significant factor that kept people from returning home after cyclone aila. the storm destroyed coastal embankments, which submerged thousands of homes. these areas remained flooded a year after the storm, and 200,000 displaced people continued to live in temporary shelters. around 250,000 houses were fully damaged, destroyed beyond repair, and about 400,000 houses were partially damaged. kartiki writes that destruction of livelihood and destruction of household were the major reasons for migration after cyclone aila.108 unlike in new orleans, the primary driver of migration from coastal bangladesh was loss of livelihood due to the ecologically vulnerable nature of the local economy. by damaging agriculture and shrimp farming, cyclone aila decimated the region’s source of income. after government and ngo relief efforts had concluded, there was no sustainable income generation. this motivated male rural to urban migration. kartiki, mallick and vogt use the term migration instead of displacement because the majority of migrants were males who moved to urban areas and sent money back to their families.109110 male heads of household moved to nearby urban centers to earn money for their families. the migration was environmentally caused not because the ecological destruction itself displaced people, but because the cyclone decimated the local income source, and relief efforts did not include social protection.111 in the aftermath of cyclone aila, international and regional ngos provided humanitarian aid such as food and water, however this was not sufficient protection and assistance. for edps of cyclone aila, there were no institutional supports from the government or from ngos. edps lacked the assistance necessary to rebuild their livelihoods, both in their places of origin and in the places they migrated to.112 temporary relief aid could not have prevented migration, but it could have facilitated supportive and sustainable internal migration. kartiki finds that the migration from coastal bangladesh was not a form of adaptation because it did not improve the overall 106 islam & hasan. “climate-induced human displacement: a case study of cyclone aila in the south-west coastal region of bangladesh,” 1062. 107 mallick and vogt. “cyclone, coastal society and migration: empirical evidence from bangladesh.” 229. 108 kartiki, “climate change and migration: a case study from rural bangladesh,” 32. 109 ibid, 34. 110 mallick and vogt. “cyclone, coastal society and migration: empirical evidence from bangladesh.” 230. 111 ibid, 234-235. 112 ibid, 237. consilience jayawardhan: climate change, vulnerability, and displacement resilience of households. she considers the economic migration as an instinctual reaction to a climate shock. resiliency was not improved for various reasons including that if migrants moved to nearby villages, then the local economies were not much different than their home economies. if they moved to urban centers, their living expenses substantially increased and their households did not receive a significant economic benefit through remittances. additionally in the majority of cases, the entire household did not migrate; only one or two primary wage earners migrated. this means that members of the household remained as ecologically vulnerable as they were before the disaster. kartiki attributes bangladesh’s environmental migration from rural coastal villages to a lack of choice and agency.113 migrants do not choose to migrate in order to improve their overall situation; rather they are forced because they believe there is not a feasible alternative in their places of origin. edps fleeing drought in somalia in 2011 faced a similar situation where they were forced to abandon their way of life because they found it no longer feasible. drought in somalia somali pastoralists are a population group considered at high risk of being displaced across borders by drought, and are therefore a relevant population to study in analyzing environmental displacement. similarly to disaster migration in bangladesh, most drought-related migration is temporary labor migration.114 like other forms of environmental displacement, it is also multicausal, influenced by human decisions, and not simply the economic phenomenon of drought from lack of rainfall.115 migration in somalia was influenced by a lack of rainfall and existing local political violence that exacerbated the effects of the drought experienced by poor pastoral communities. the majority of people in central somalia are nomadic pastoralists, making their livelihoods by rearing livestock.116 pastoralism as a livelihood has long been a way to sustain livelihoods in the unpredictable environments in the horn of africa.117 though droughts are regularly occurring natural phenomena, climate scientists believe droughts will intensify and increase in frequency due to anthropogenic climate change.118 because they are inherently nomadic, it does not seem intuitive that pastoralists can be 113 kartiki, “climate change and migration: a case study from rural bangladesh,” 34-35. 114 mcleman, climate and human migration: past experiences, future, 141. 115 justin ginnettii and travis franck, “assessing drought displacement risk for kenyan, ethiopian and somali pastoralists – technical paper.” internal displacement monitoring centre, last modified april 26, 2014. http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/2014/assessing-drought-displacement-risk-for-kenyan-ethiopianand-somali-pastoralists. 12. 116 anna lindley, “questioning ‘drought displacement’: environment, politics and migration in somalia,” forced migration review 45 (2014): 39. 117 tacoli, "crisis or adaptation? migration and climate change in a context of high mobility," 109. 118 mcleman, climate and human migration: past experiences, future, 146. consilience 131 environmentally displaced. however they can and are being displaced. according to a study by the internal displacement monitoring centre, pastoralists are displaced by drought when pastoral livelihoods reach “a critical threshold below which pastoralism is not sustainable.”119 somali pastoralists reached this critical threshold during their 2011 drought. in 2011, somalia simultaneously experienced severe drought, political violence, and governance failure, leading to displacement of a quarter of its population. the 2011 crisis in somalia has been described as the 'perfect storm' due to the confluence of drought and governance failure.120 accordingly, drought migration from the country cannot be analyzed without considering the state of political violence and turmoil. the drought exacerbated the turmoil and the turmoil exacerbated poorer pastoralists’ inability to make a livelihood. in response, pastoralists migrated to urban centers like mogadishu, and out of somalia to kenya and ethiopia.121 the case of environmental displacement in somalia is unique from the other two cases analyzed in this paper because many people were displaced cross-border to kenya and ethiopia.122 the multicausal nature of the crisis in 2011 influenced how the drought became an environmental displacement problem. a drought alone does not necessarily cause displacement. for example, regional droughts in kenya and ethiopia did not create famine and displacement, like the drought in somalia did. the political turmoil and violence in somalia left marginalized people vulnerable to famine and displacement.123 the case of environmental displacement in somalia is also unique from the previous two case studies because of the role of political violence and failed governance. the unhcr registers many somalis as displaced persons. according to the unhcr statistics, there were 2,059,977 displaced somalis in 2011. in unhcr records, people may only list one reason for displacement. the vast majority of displaced persons from this crisis do not list ‘drought’ as the reason for their displacement. graph 4 shows that from 2009-2012, the number of somalis displaced by drought is a small fraction of the overall number of displaced somalis.124 the number is at its highest during the 2011 drought, but even that is only 10.6 percent of the total number displaced. therefore despite frequent references to ‘drought displacement’ by politicians and the 119 ginnettii and franck, “assessing drought displacement risk for kenyan, ethiopian and somali pastoralists – technical paper,” 12. 120lindley, “questioning ‘drought displacement’: environment, politics and migration in somalia,”39. 121 ibid, 41. 122 ginnetti and franck, “assessing drought displacement risk for kenyan, ethiopian and somali pastoralists – technical paper,” 16. 123 lindley, “questioning ‘drought displacement’: environment, politics and migration in somalia,”41. 124 ginnetti and franck, “assessing drought displacement risk for kenyan, ethiopian and somali pastoralists – technical paper,” 16. consilience jayawardhan: climate change, vulnerability, and displacement media in the context of the 2011 humanitarian crisis, the displacement crisis had a much more nuanced cause.125 graph 4: number of somalis displaced annually (2009-2012) lindley, a migration professor at the university of london school of oriental and african studies, argues that the reason the kenyan government, the main receiver of displaced persons from somalia, explicitly distinguished between refugees displaced by conflict and people displaced by drought was to implicitly circumscribe its legal obligation under international law.126 her argument is similar to the argument against referring to edps as climate refugees because the term does not allow for the consideration of marginalization and socioeconomic vulnerability. rather, it places the blame solely on climate change. mcadam defines crisis migration as “a response to a complex combination of social, political, economic and environmental factors, which may be triggered by an extreme event but not caused by it.” this definition is an accurate term to apply to the displacement crisis in somalia.127 environmental displacement in somalia is important to study because of the highly vulnerable status of the country and because a number of refugees fleeing somalia have listed drought as the reason for their displacement. however, the unstable status of the state and presence of political violence make it challenging to collect data on environmental displacement that is not influenced by political 125 lindley, “questioning ‘drought displacement’: environment, politics and migration in somalia,”41. 126 ibid, 41-42. 127 mcadam, "the concept of crisis migration,"10. consilience 133 instability and violence. furthermore, some scholars suggest that climate change can exacerbate pre-existing violence and tensions in climate vulnerable countries because it puts a strain on resources. these factors can make it difficult to study environmental migration in somalia independently of forms of persecution already covered under the 1951 convention. discussion of case studies the environmental displacement problems in the u.s. gulf coast, coastal bangladesh, and somalia were all multicausal, resulting from a combination of climate change induced natural disasters, socioeconomic vulnerability, and ineffective governance. no movement of people can be attributed to an environmental event alone. it is interesting that this relationship holds true in developed and developing countries. there are similarities in vulnerability to climate change among marginalized groups in the u.s. gulf coast and in coastal bangladesh. in both places, government policies placed marginalized populations in ecologically vulnerable areas. poorer bangladeshis are more likely to live in floodplains. similarly, marginalized groups inhabited areas in new orleans particularly vulnerable to flooding, like the lower ninth ward. economic and political discrimination concentrated both marginalized groups in these vulnerable areas. another example demonstrating the many similar aspects of vulnerability to climate change is the structural vulnerability of homes. marginalized groups in new orleans and bangladesh had homes more vulnerable to climate change because of lack of access to insurance and to resilient construction materials, respectively. the evidence i present suggests that people in developed and developing countries had different primary reasons for migrating or not returning. in the developing countries of bangladesh and somalia, inability to maintain livelihoods motivated migration. people left their places of origin in order to support their families. cyclone aila decimated the local land dependent economy and livelihood, driving people to migrate for labor opportunities to maintain their livelihoods. in somalia, the drought made pastoralism, the predominant form of livelihood for most somalis, no longer feasible. coupled with political violence, this led to a situation of widespread hardship and famine in the country, forcing people to flee to internal displacement and refugee camps. this form of labor migration in developing countries is also likely to be temporary. this is not necessarily the case in developed countries. in this paper i do not consider evacuees who returned to new orleans after hurricane katrina as edps. i only consider those who left new orleans and had to resettle elsewhere as edps. inability to sustain livelihoods due to lack of labor opportunities, though somewhat relevant due to the temporary decline in fishing and tourism industries, was not a driver consilience jayawardhan: climate change, vulnerability, and displacement of migration in new orleans to the same extent that it was in bangladesh and somalia. i find that the lack of economic and labor opportunities is the main difference between environmental displacement in developing and developed countries. evidence from the cases suggests that environmental displacement will likely be domestic and not international. despite its proximity, there was very little migration to india from coastal bangladesh after cyclone aila. though somalis were displaced crossborder, this was likely owing to the political violence and the region’s history of cross-border pastoralist movement. people in new orleans and bangladesh responded to hydro-meteorological disasters with domestic migration. consequently, policy responses to environmental displacement should focus on domestic resettlement as that is the more common response. policy implications as the impact of anthropogenic climate change becomes increasingly visible, governments are addressing policy to adapt to the changing world. climate change mitigation cannot prevent the likely rise in frequency of environmental displacement. policy aimed at addressing environmental displacement should not attempt at an ‘environmental fix.’ seeing as the problem is multicausal, policies addressing it must target the different layers of the problem. these include disparate ecological vulnerability, socioeconomic vulnerability and marginalization, and disparities in adaptive capacities. this section will not attempt to provide specific policy solutions, as these are beyond the scope of the paper, but rather will provide important considerations in creating policy solutions. policy solutions should be guided by human rights not humanitarianism. policy makers should take this approach by considering climate change adaptation, economic vulnerability, and cross-border legal responses within a human rights framework. human rights approach edps are not victims of climate change in need of humanitarian aid. they need to be seen as humans and be treated with dignity. the u.n. charter recognizes the inherent dignity and worth of the human person.128 this principle is further recognized by the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights (icescr).129 humanitarianism address temporary problems with responsive solutions, human rights address permanent problems with permanent pro-active solutions and policies. anthropogenic climate 128 united nations, charter of the united nations, 24 october 1945, 1 unts xvi, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html 129 united nations, international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights, 16 december 1966, united nations, treaty series, vol 993, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html consilience 135 change has begun it course and no state or intergovernmental body can prevent its effects. climate change induced displacement is therefore a permanent problem and requires a permanent durable solution. there is a consensus among scholars and intergovernmental organizations that climate change will undermine the realization of internationally protected human rights such as the right to health, food, and shelter.130 131 furthermore, climate change will most severely impact those who already suffer from insufficient human rights protections. 132 policy makers should address climate change induced displacement by targeting the inequitable enjoyment of human rights. they must take a human rights approach to lessen vulnerability to climate change before disasters and establish requirements for permanent and sustainable resettlement of edps after disasters. a human rights approach to development and decisionmaking requires decision makers to focus on who has not benefitted from development and who has been excluded.133 my evidence demonstrates that edps are displaced due to the role of pre-existing conditions of inequality and vulnerability that were in place before natural disasters. policy must attempt to make people less vulnerable by protecting their economic, social and cultural rights. additionally, kolmannskog suggests that a human rights approach is better suited for addressing vulnerability than a policy focused on displacement itself. 134 policy that only addresses post-disaster displacement runs the risk of only protecting a narrowly defined group of people and excluding other vulnerable people.135 a human rights based is more valuable than narrowly defining environmental displacement or distributing relief aid to edps. states must address the underlying conditions of inequality and vulnerability before a natural disaster takes place. adaptation and resilience states can lower vulnerability by improving adaptation and resilience. migration in response to an environmental event is often considered an extreme form of adaptation or attempt at adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change. migration is a costly and 130 stephen humphreys, "introduction." in human rights and climate change, ed. stephen humphreys and mary robinson. (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2009) 1. 131 iom, “migration and climate change,” iom migration research series, 31 (2008). copyright © 2009. cambridge university press. all rights reserved. 132 humphreys, "introduction," 1. 133 robert archer. "linking rights and development: some critical challenges." in rights-based approaches to development : exploring the potential and pitfalls, ed. samuel hickey and diana mitlin. (sterling, va: kumarian press, 2009) 29. 134 kolmannskog, “climate change, environmental displacement and international law,” 1077-8. 135 ibid. consilience jayawardhan: climate change, vulnerability, and displacement unfavorable endeavor, and therefore is not usually an adaptation method of first resort except in the most extreme circumstances.136 research by the world bank finds that urban slum dwellers gain more from slum upgrading than from relocation. 137 this is an example of a particularly underserved population where costs of relocating are relatively low compared to costs of adaptive infrastructure. increased adaptive infrastructure is more sustainable than relying on evacuation as a response to environmental events. adaptive infrastructure creates resilience, “the ability of communities to absorb external changes and stresses while maintaining the sustainability of their livelihoods,” and is a worthy investment for countries most vulnerable to climate change. 138 in their discussion of post cyclone aila recovery, mallick et al. state that improving physical infrastructure is the most important means of preventing environmental displacement in bangladesh. 139 physical infrastructure is not the only area in which governments can make improvements in adaptation. proper informational networks are also an important part of adaptation, especially when evacuation continues to be the primary response to natural disasters. the dispersal of information is vital to disaster response and adaptation, and it is much less resource intensive than constructing adaptive infrastructure. economic vulnerability in both somalia and bangladesh, marginalized people were displaced because their livelihoods were dependent on ecology and highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. this is especially true in developing countries where household income and subsistence is often closely tied with productivity of land. in rural areas where the majority of people’s livelihoods are dependent on ecology, migration is often a household strategy to diversify risk. remittances that migrants send to their families in their places of origin play a key role in this.140 instead of relying on this as an adaptation strategy, governments should consider investing in diversifying local economies and making them less dependent on vulnerable ecology. as kartiki notes, labor migration in response to natural disaster does not improve the overall resilience of households. relief aid will not suffice to better livelihoods and foster economic opportunities. a diversified economy would improve communities’ overall resilience to climate change by making households less dependent on ecologically sensitive land for their livelihoods. 136 mcleman and hunter, “migration in the context of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change: insights from analogues,” 455. 137 judy l. baker, climate change, disaster risk, and the urban poor cities building resilience for a changing world (washington, d.c.: world bank, 2012), 77. 138 adger et al., "migration, remittances, livelihood trajectories, and social resilience," 358. 139 mallick et al., "coastal livelihood and physical infrastructure in bangladesh after cyclone aila," 646. 140 lori m. hunter et al., “environmental dimensions of migration,” annual review of sociology 41 (2015): 380. consilience 137 policies to make vulnerable communities less economically vulnerable should invest in and develop industries that are not ecologically sensitive. there are numerous examples of foreign investment in bangladesh’s shrimp farming industry because of the high global demand for shrimp. the u.s. agency for international development (usaid) funds a program called the bangladesh youth employment pilot project. this program trains youth for jobs or self-employment in the shrimp farming industry.141 in the context of environmental displacement, this is an unsustainable and inequitable allocation of development resources because of coastal bangladesh’s high risk of hydro-meteorological disasters. to build communities’ resilience, job training programs for rural communities should focus on industries resilient to cyclones and therefore not dependent on the land. cross-border responses though environmental displacement will remain primarily internal, states should take action to accept cross-border edps. i do not argue for expanding the 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees because the convention is not a well-suited legal solution for the problem. the convention is a humanitarian convention that addressed the temporary problem of refugees resulting from wwii. though refugees today invoke the convention today for reasons unrelated to wwii, they still invoke it for temporary problems like war and genocide. i do support other international legal remedies. seventy-one states have signed the icescr and its provisions are considered customary international law. article 11 of the icescr recognizes a right to an adequate standard of living, which includes food and housing.142 this right justifies the need for permanently resettling edps internally if possible, or internationally if the displacement is cross-border. a commitment to international human rights includes a commitment to resettling edps. regional treaties, as discussed by subramanian and urpelainen, are also well-suited ways of approaching cross-border displacement. countries within geographic regions often have similar levels of climate vulnerability, making them more likely to cooperate with each other and accept edps. cultural similarities and alliances may also strengthen regional edp treaties. tps is another good example of addressing displacement from natural disasters. states should build upon existing tps measures and consider programs that do not require tps beneficiaries to already be residing in host countries. international legal remedies are unable to address the underlying social inequities that cause displacement, but 141 “bangladesh youth employment pilot,” educational development center, inc. accessed february 07, 2016. http://idd.edc.org/sites/idd.edc.org/files/bangladeshpercent20byeppercent20resultspercent20edcpercent20web.pd f. 142 united nations, international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights. consilience jayawardhan: climate change, vulnerability, and displacement they can provide sustainable assistance options for those who have been displaced. conclusion ultimately for a policy addressing environmental displacement to be successful, it must address the preexisting conditions of inequality that make people vulnerable to the effects of climate change. bob bullard, known as the father of environmental justice, notes that in responding to natural disasters, “it is far easier for the army corps of engineers to retrofit and rebuild levees than it is for other government agencies to root out racial injustice, dismantle centuries of mistrust, and rebuild ‘community.’”143 while environmental infrastructure projects are important, they alone will not necessarily make people less vulnerable to environmental displacement. addressing inequality and housing discrimination are just as important, if not more important, as building levees. when looking at environmental displacement, it is clear that racial, economic, and social injustices are environmental problems as well. due to the multicausality of environmental displacement, policy solutions should be holistic rather than focused on particular drivers of movement.144 in planning for climate adaptation, decisions makers should consider the bigger questions of what makes people vulnerable and why particular groups of people are more vulnerable than others. they should be guided by the principles of ‘human rights’ and ‘dignity’ to raise the resilience of vulnerable communities. 143 bullard and wright, "introduction," 2. 144 mcadam, climate change, forced migration, and international law, 146. 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(3) the largest concentration of discussion about sustainability surrounded practices and values, with goals and indicators figuring much less prominently. this paper provides useful insight to both the areas where stakeholders are still struggling to agree upon and those places where there is in fact some overlap. areas for future research include exploration into one more key stakeholder: the indigenous voice. keywords: sustainability, sustainable development, oil sands, stakeholders consilience sutton: stakeholders and the alberta oil sands i. introduction the third largest oil reserve in the world after saudi arabia and venezuela, the alberta oil sands hold 170 out of canada’s 173 billion barrels of oil reserves, 168 billion of which are recoverable from bitumen (government of alberta, 2016). as well as supplying oil for canada and other countries around the world, these oil sands also provide jobs by the hundreds of thousands, predicting a growth of 5,170 operations workers by 2020, a 17% increase from 133,053 jobs in 2014 (government of alberta 2014; 2016). unfortunately, a healthy supply of oil and the economic benefits that come with it are not all the oil sands have to offer. producing 2.3 million barrels of oil per day, a number expected to rise to 4 million in the next ten years (government of alberta 2014), comes at a cost. environmental damage due to extreme extraction processes have been an increasing cause of concern and questions of sustainability are rising amongst many canadians and oil sands observers worldwide. national and international attention has been peaked with increasing mass media coverage on issues such as wildlife drowning in tailings ponds (ramsay, 2015; canadian press, 2012) efforts by industry to present the resource as ethical (de souza, 2012), and current pipeline concerns (bird, 2014). these arising questions about the sustainability of alberta’s oil sands have lead to further queries about exactly just what sustainability means. accordingly, this paper aims to explore the following research question: how do key stakeholders define sustainability as it relates to the alberta oil sands? to do so it asks those key players working in different areas of the field to comment on the topic. what follows is a review of existing literature on this topic. next, the methods of this project are explained. after which, key findings are presented. finally, this article offers concluding thoughts and considers implications of the study results for future discussions of sustainability. ii. literature review a google scholar search of the alberta oil sands, stakeholders and sustainability since 2012 yields approximately 300 articles on this topic. however, a careful review of abstracts indicates that very few of these discussions are on how sustainability is communicated. in fact many deal with rather technical dimensions that give very little clarity to what this concept means to those groups responsible for communicating about it. some samples of these articles include: consilience 177 foote (2012) who examines mining effects and wetland reclamation in alberta’s mineable oil sands to estimate thresholds of biophysical realities, time scales, economic allocations, and social tolerance; allen (2008) who explores process water treatment in the oil sands, and how continuous recycling of tailings pond water is contributing to a decline in water quality that has consequences to bitumen recovery, water consumption and reclamation efforts; and rooney, bayley & schindler (2012) who have quantified the wholesale transformation of the boreal landscape by open-pit oil sands mining in alberta, canada to evaluate its effect on carbon storage and sequestration. while such technical articles are constructive for providing some ideas about specific issues associated with the oil sands, they do problematize the concept of sustainability itself. there is, however, a small body of social science literature that attempts to explore some of these issues. for instance, slawinski & bansai (2015) conducted interviews with 60 respondents in five oil and gas companies in alberta in an attempt to appreciate how they approach the long-term and short-term pressures of climate change. they found that firms appreciated the complexity of this issue and looked for solutions both within and outside their organizations that would balance both societal and business needs which included long range planning, two way stakeholder engagement and cross sector collaboration. moreover, paskey, steward & williams (2013) set out to determine how the discourse in documents and news articles pertaining to the alberta oil sands that have been produced by government, industry, academia and non-governmental organizations, and the news media over the past 40 years has changed. upon exploration one of the most notable shifts is that since the 1970’s there has been a considerable decrease in evidence and facts provided by government funded research and an increase in promotion and marketing by stakeholders as industry, government and ngo’s began to attempt to push their own agendas into the public eye. in addition, murphy’s (2015) search into the media’s construction of climate change states that there is a lack of global responsibility perspective by media opinion leaders and that is part of why science, an institution usually assumed to be influential, is having little impact on societies like canada when it brings troubling news (specifically, environmental news in regards to harmful effects of the oil sands). this idea is also present in richards (2012) exploratory case study on green house gas emissions from the alberta oil sands. in a claim tracing document review, richards (2012) found several issues, which could be consilience sutton: stakeholders and the alberta oil sands accepted as reasons for compromising effective dialogue about ghg emissions, such as speaking different languages, unclear ultimate sources, vague assumptions and processes, lack of academic sources, potential magnification of misinformation, and poor direct engagement. as a solution, richards suggests a more central role for science in the processes of policy-making and related deliberation, also, that a physical institution may be required to facilitate social consensus-building and movement in positions instead of opposing sides becoming further entrenched in their initial stances. other findings in the reviewed articles include tran’s (2014) look into news content (2007-2009) about the oil sands and noted a concentrated level of media surrounding the economic aspects of the oil sands, with lesser on ecological, political, scientific and other dimensions. as well, nelson, krogman, johnston & st. claire (2015) analyzed 747 newspaper articles surrounding the issue of 1,600 ducks flying into an oil sands tailing pond and uncovered that most solutions to the issue presented in the media were short-term and depicted a zero-sumtrade-off between environmental and economic interests. they suggest that more sustained media attention with a greater diversity of voices and solutions could foster greater dialogue around environmental challenges. a preliminary look at the literature reveals that there are several common issues reiterated in the literature surrounding the alberta oil sands: [1] the media is having an effect on how the public is receiving information about the oil sands and moreover, affecting their interpretations on associated issues (murphy, 2015; nelson, krogman, johnston & st. claire, 2015; paskey, steward & williams, 2013; tran, 2014); [2] there has been a shift away from stakeholders sharing factual, evidence based information and towards a more marketing and promotional focused approach, with an emphasis at times on industry concerns, when it comes to oil sands information presented by industry, government and non-governmental organizations (paskey, steward & williams, 2013; tran, 2014); [3] there is a need for a larger scientific presence, and clearer ways to talk about complex issues, when it comes to sharing information about the environmental issues associated with the alberta oil sands (richards, 2012; tran, 2014); and [4] there is a need for better communication within and across at these sectors (nelson, krogman, johnston & st. claire, 2015; paskey, steward & williams, 2013; slawinski & bansai; 2015). consilience 179 it is also worth noting that not only are there some significant issues in how issues associated with the oil sands are communicated, the term ‘sustainability’ itself is a word that can be problematic. berry (2015) for instance, analyzed the industry perspective on sustainability and the alberta oil sands from a metaphorical perspective. her study showed that a vast portion of industry literature, about 10% of 26 documents analyzed, were metaphorical. common metaphors used by industry were, “sustainability as a journey”, or “sustainability as a scale/balance”. understanding these metaphors is important because it shows that industry is very vague in their communication about sustainability. she also reminds us that such “metaphors are so ingrained and common they become less and less meaningful for promoting a rich and varied discussion of oil sands sustainability” (berry, 2015, p.19). understanding sustainability through metaphor is not the only way to approach the topic. another way of talking about sustainability is to seek a concrete definition. kates, parris, & leiserowitz (2005) suggest that in its most basic form sustainability is “creatively ambiguous” and is often described as “meet[ing] the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (kates, parris, & leiserowitz, 2005, p.1). they argue that “this malleability allows programs of environment or development; places from local to global; and institutions of government, civil society, business, and industry to each project their interests, hopes and aspirations onto the banner of sustainable development” (kates, parris, & leiserowitz, 2005, p.2). they worry that “if anyone can redefine and reapply the term to fit their purposes, it becomes meaningless in practice, or worse, can be used to disguise or greenwash socially or environmentally destructive activities” (kates, parris, & leiserowitz, 2005, p. 20). what kates, parris, & leiserowitz (2005) and berry (2015) thus illustrate is that sustainability is a concept that can be appropriated by different groups in problematic ways. in sum, while it is apparent in this literature review that there is some discussion surrounding issues directly associated with sustainability and the oil sands; it still remains rather underdeveloped as a topic. existing discussions are often quite technical or explore views from simply one discourse community, which is often that of industry (berry, 2015. murphy, 2015.) consequently, a study on stakeholder views about sustainability promises important and meaningful results for appreciating how the notion of sustainability consilience sutton: stakeholders and the alberta oil sands and the alberta oil sands can be better understood as we move into the future. iii. methods when trying (as kates, parris, & leiserowitz (2005) above suggests) to map the “interests, hopes and aspirations” of government, industry, and civil society qualitative interviews are a useful method for assessing different views on sustainability as it relates to the oil sands. according to bryman, bell & teevan (2012) interviews in this form are advantageous because face-to-face interaction is the fullest condition of participating in the mind of another human being (p. 140). while this methodological approach does have some limitations such as being difficult to replicate, facing problems of generalization and being criticized for being too subjective (bryman, bell & teevan p. 143), qualitative interviews are still an important departure point for accessing specific and everyday understandings of complex topics like sustainability. in terms of researching the oil sands at least four groups have played an important role for determining the environment in which debates about this resources occur: the mass media, government, industry, and non-governmental organizations (paskey, steward & williams, 2013). consequently, the project’s target was between 10-12 participants (3-4 respondents from each sector). in the end, interviews were conducted with 4 industry respondents, 3 ngo respondents, 3 journalist and 3 government respondents (n=13). these interviews were conducted in person, unless geographical barriers were present in which case interviews were done via telephone. the interviews lasted from anywhere between twenty minutes to an hour, they were also recorded and transcribed in full. the same set of questions was used for each of the interviews and interviewees were provided with the list of questions prior to the interview. questions included how the interviewees organization defined sustainability, what the challenges and opportunities of creating a dialogue about sustainability were, if sustainability was specifically an environmental, social or economic issue, what success for sustainability looked like, and what the future holds for sustainability. the study uses a non-representative sample (bryman, bell & teevan p. 209). to create this sample, different methods were used: convenience and snowball. according to bryman, bell & teevan consilience 181 (2012), “a convenience sample is one that is used because the elements are readily available to the researcher” (p. 219). a convenience sample was used during the first round of interviewee selection as a fairly comprehensive list of stakeholders was available from a previous media analysis project (williams, 2015). once the first list was completed, interviewees were then contacted via phone or e-mail, this was when the second round of sampling began deploying a snowball approach. snowball sampling is “when a researcher makes initial contact with a small group of people who are relevant to the research project and then uses them to establish contact with others” (bryman, bell & teevan, 2012, p. 220). once the initial sources were contacted, further sources were requested and/or recommended and then contacted for interviews. in the end, 31 sources were contacted and offered an opportunity to participate. out of those 31,16 potential participants responded, and 13 agreed to participate in an interview. the sample was diverse and the professional positions of the interviewees varied. industry positions ranged from sustainability issues manager and senior sustainability advisor to development support and manager of oil sands communications from some of the leading companies in sustainable development practices such as suncor, syncrude, meg energy and canadian association of petroleum producers (capp). government positions included senior manager, senior advisor of integrated resource management and regional director from key government institutions like alberta energy regulator, alberta innovates energy & environmental solutions and sustainable development technologies canada. ngo positions included the vice president of research and director of strategic communications from organizations such as pembina institute, ecojustice and canadian energy research institute. the media section of the sample consisted of journalists currently working or who previously worked on stories surrounding sustainability and/or oil sands issues for publications including the edmonton journal and the toronto star. interviewees have all been assigned pseudonyms associated with the specific communities they represent in order to respect the ethical protocols of the project. once the interviews were conducted and transcribed they were uploaded to dedoose (a mixed methods computer assisted software) where they were then coded. the framework deployed for coding which was based on the categories discussed by kates, parris & leiserowitz (2005) in which they suggest sustainability can be consilience sutton: stakeholders and the alberta oil sands understood in four specific ways: (1) as a goal, (2) as an indicator, (3) as a value and/or (4) as a practice. goals are used to describe sustainability by talking about exactly what it seeks to achieve and is organized into three categories: long term (beyond 2050), medium term (up to 2050), short term (under 5 years), or no time frame given. indicators are a way to define sustainability through initiatives, policies, commissions etc. set out by industry or government stakeholders. values are a way to define sustainability through expressions, beliefs, the worth of objects, qualities, or behaviours and “they are typically expressed in terms of goodness or desirability, or, conversely, in terms of badness or avoidance” (kates, parris, & leiserowitz, 2005, p.16). specific values associated with sustainability historically have included freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility. finally, practice: includes the many efforts at defining the concept, establishing goals, creating indicators, and asserting values. but additionally, it includes developing social movements, organizing institutions, crafting sustainability science and technology, and negotiating the grand compromise among those who are principally concerned with nature and environment, those who value economic development, and those who are dedicated to improving the human condition (kates, parris & leiserowitz, 2005, p.16, 17). iv. findings in terms of the definitions of sustainability present in the data, several key findings emerge of note. firstly, in congruence with kates, parris & leiserowitz (2005) suggestion, the responses reveal that definitions of sustainability as it relates to the alberta oil sands were often “creatively ambiguous” (p.9). vague language pervaded many of the discussion including references ‘responsible development’, ‘corporate social responsibility’ or ‘triple bottom line.’ such terms were used (primarily by industry) to talk about sustainability without really using the word. a sample of what this looked like includes the following quote: you are going to hear phrases like ‘the triple bottom line’, but the way i like to think of it a bit more simply is you have got three different forces: you have social, you have environmental, you have economic, and really what we are trying to find is the optimal balance between those three forces. (industry 1) despite the tendency to generalize, the findings also indicated a continuum of comfort levels with the term. for example, there were the “optimists”, those who recognized the difficulty of the term consilience 183 but saw value in it as way to create a dialogue about the oil sands. they believed it was still an appropriate term in some contexts. this position was typically found in industry. a sampling of these sorts of comments in the data set include the following: terms like ‘sustainability’ have just naturally evolved and become much more widely used because of that awareness and interest of people to ensure that we do… we are on this earth for only a short period of time and we need to make a minimal impact, but at the same time ensuring that our actions today are able to provide… provide, you know, reward future generations and provide benefits for future generations. (industry 2) sustainably for us, as an oil sands producer is to ensure that we don’t do any – while making profit – we do not harm the environment, or we do not increase the impact on ghg emissions,” or whatever metric you want to appease society, right? so then you get to a second stage of it and you say, well, “how do you operate?” to make money, that is the main thing, and the second piece is we are going to use society’s definition or categorization of sustainability and now we have to talk about the environment. how we are impacting the environment while we are making money. (industry 4) there were also those who showed a little more caution with its deployment, and took on a sort of “fence sitting” or a “pragmatic” positionality. such respondents, typically found in the media and government interviews, tended to question the validity of the term but not the notion of sustainability in the context of the oil sands specifically. below are some illustrations of this: …i guess the term ‘sustainability’ it is kind of a trendy word, of course, but what does it actually mean when it comes to the oil sands? ... i am not too sure what it actually means except, i guess you could say it still is an issue of can the oil sands continue to grow? i think that the status quo we have got right now isn’t going to be enough, it looks like, so can the oil sands continue to grow? it is not an issue that i can say our organization looks at in any sort of formal level. it is not something we look at, of course, as environmental groups look at this, or government groups, or groups in the industry, they all look at this differently than what we look at it at, but we don’t actually sit down, to my knowledge, and discuss the sustainability of the oil sands. what we tend to look at is a more pragmatic sense of if the oil sands are in trouble from environmental attacks, can it continue to work even at the status quo? (media 1) consilience sutton: stakeholders and the alberta oil sands so the government sets the policy on energy development, the regulator enacts the policy on energy development. so with that we don’t actually define sustainability. the government uses sustainability, but if you check government documents you will find very few instances of the word ‘sustainability’. (government 1) finally, there were those who outright questioned it as a term, the “rejecters”, who not only problematized the term itself but also its use in the context of the oil sands specifically. this position, not surprisingly (given their strong environmental focus within the dataset), was typically found in the non-governmental responses. some examples of this include the following quotes: the technical, like, definition, as i am sure you know, of sustainability revolves around the idea of making sure that future generations have the same access to resources that ours had now. one thing about the oil sands is…. that the oil sands fundamentally can’t be sustainable, but development can be responsible. so no matter what there is going to be a certain amount of environmental issues that you can’t continue to develop indefinitely this way, but the push that we aim for is to strive for more responsible development, so basically development that keeps in mind what the environmental and social thresholds are for development to make sure that basically, eventually, that land can be reclaimed. (ngo 1) we do a bunch of work around energy development projects, meaning we really take a hard look at projects that we deem to be unsustainable, and currently the organization defines those as ones that depend on the extraction or the transport, or burning of fossil fuels. (ngo 3) in sum, it is clear that in this range of positions respondents within these different discursive groups appear to be having quite different conversations. while all interviewees tended to accept that sustainability can be a problematic term, whether it should be used at all is not something that is consistently agreed upon. this finding illustrates why when trying to talk about this issue it can be challenging to move forward in a collaborative and cooperative manner and provide the public with an understanding of what sustainability could or should look like in the context of future oil sands developments. a second finding of interest comes from a breakdown of the coding framework deployed (i.e. sustainability as a goal, indicator, value and/or practice). in total 90 excerpts were isolated within the dataset at a paragraph level, which were deemed explicit efforts to try and define sustainability. of these 90, it was discovered that the consilience 185 largest concentration of discussion surrounded practices (42) and values (32), with goals (10) and indicators (7) figuring much less prominently (one excerpt was dual coded hence the total of 91 codes). this finding is important as it shows that stakeholders were most prone to discussing sustainability in terms of either how they are going about being sustainable (i.e. an action), or why sustainability is important as a broader philosophical position (i.e. a normative value position). of the 4 stakeholder groups, industry and government were the largest presence under the practices category (n=31) while all discursive communities tended to invoke value statements. some examples of stakeholders speaking about sustainability through practices are the following: we are an innovation company that makes money through bitumen extraction, we use cogeneration, we reduce the steam to oil in our sagd process, we are one of the industry leaders in that and that reduces ghgs immensely. we have actually got another research project that we are working on to actually further reduce that, and then we are looking at partial upgrading which will reduce the environmental footprint, and also make money for the company. so that would be our take on it, and what we would say for sustainability, you need innovation to maintain sustainability. (industry 4) our role is to be an agency of the government of alberta that is funding projects in the province, and they can be in more industries than just oil sands, but when we talk about oil sands in particular we are funding the projects that intended to deliver on those [responsible development] targets. (government 2) often times these practices were also highlighted in an industry context as an act of balance and recognizing the needs of three “special” (industry 1) issues: social, economic and environmental. some example of this include the following: i think we have always kind of taken the origin of sustainability from the definition from the brundtland commission, which was 1987 or 1988. i would say the word ‘triple bottom line’ has sort of fallen out of favour and now we are talking more about balancing, sustainability is a balancing of those three forces. (industry 1) every decision that we make, you even look at our capital project analysis, you know, it does incorporate all three of those factors in it [environmental, social, economic], so it is engrained in every decision that we make. and now, with this consilience sutton: stakeholders and the alberta oil sands board committee on corporate sustainability, there is a much more strategic focus on ensuring and addressing each of those areas. (industry 2) while the ngo stakeholders spoke of their practices largely in terms of determining what is sustainable versus what is unsustainable, for example: we don’t view what is happening in the alberta oil sands as being sustainable in any form. and that is the position the organization has taken in its work. so when we look at, you know, tar sands mines or expansion, or extraction, we do not look at that as sustainable practice. (ngo 3) further, following the overview offered by kates, parris & leiserowitz (2005), once an excerpt was coded under the values category, values were split into six categories including freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility. out of those categories, the most commonly expressed views amongst interviewees were shared responsibility (13) and respect for nature (9). all discourse communities used both of these values when talking about the resource. this is important as it shows that sustainability is often times not just about how we act or behave, but also taps nicely into our “interests, hopes and aspirations” kates, parris & leiserowitz (2005, p.10). an example of shared responsibility includes the following statement: i do tend to think that sustainability kind of has a taken for granted quality as a term, sort of an understanding that it is the responsibility across the board of corporations and governments to have a sort of sustainability ethic, but i am not sure how often that is really analyzed in media. (media 2) the idea of balance also reappeared in the context of sustainability as shared responsibility between three areas in all of the interview responses. this was actually a more common way to express this value. a sample of this is shown below: separating them [environmental, social and economic issues] out as individual pieces, i think, is … it devalues that fact that environmental issues are economics and all of them have a capital expenditure attached to them. each environmental issue that you need to address has an economic cost attached to it that is put into a business case, so it is all – it is all three. it costs … there is still a costs attributed to addressing a social issue, or social justice issue, there is a cost with stakeholder engagement and putting in place the solution that will create harmony within a community to further develop an oil sands project. (government 3) examples of statements regarding the respect for nature category include the following: consilience 187 i think the oil sands are an important resource, for alberta and for the rest of canada, but in terms of sustainability i think there has to be, you know, if we are going to exploit that resource we also have to be really careful in terms of, obviously, environmental consequences. (media 3) the environmental piece is critical because it is an environmental activity; we are out there using land, using water, using the resources to do development work and to produce those resources. (government 3) the prevalence of these sorts of common values is an important finding as it provides valuable insight into the areas of conversations that stakeholders are beginning to see eye to eye on, and could provide a stable starting point for further discourse on the topic of sustainability. the framework deployed in this project, as well as showing what’s present in stakeholder discourse, is also beneficial in showing the areas of conversation that are absent. in this case very few of the definitions within the data set represented discussion of either indicators and/or goals. goals can be long, medium or short term (kates, parris & leiserowitz, 2005). what this data revealed when goals were identified rarely were they given a temporal dimension with only one respondent pinpointing a long-term goal: aside from the university, all the entities i have worked for, their main goal is to make money. that is the only reason they are in the business, right? to make money. so for them, sustainability means the ability to make long-term profit. (industry 4) indicators are a way to define sustainability through initiatives, policies, commissions etc. set out by industry or government stakeholders. in this case very few specific plans or programs were mentioned by any of the respondents except the following: our common future/also known as the brundtland report (government 1; industry 1). v. implications and conclusion in sum, 13 professionals from 4 different stakeholder groups (industry, government, media and ngo) were interviewed using the same set of questions focused around the opportunities and challenges of creating a dialogue about sustainability as it relates to the alberta oil sands. once interviews were completed, they were transcribed in full and then coded according to the framework adapted from kates, parris & leiserowitz (2005). these codes consilience sutton: stakeholders and the alberta oil sands revealed several important findings. firstly, vague language pervaded many of the discussion including references to ‘responsible development,’ ‘corporate social responsibility,’ or ‘triple bottom line.’ these were vague because very little detail was provided about what these looked like in practice. secondly, the sample illustrated a continuum of positions regarding both the notion of sustainability writ large and within the context of the oil sands specifically including: (a) optimists, those who challenged the term of sustainability but still believed it could be used in the context of the oil sands, this position was typically found in industry; (b) the pragmatists or fence sitters, mostly found in media and government, who questioned the notion of the term sustainability, but were not prepared to call the oil sands unsustainable; (c ) and, the nonbelievers/rejecters/or pessimists, who not only problematized the term itself but do not feel that the oil sands are sustainable at all (this was the typical ngo position). finally, the largest concentration of discussion about sustainability surrounded practices (42) and values (32), with goals (10) and indicators (7) figuring much less prominently. in terms of specific practices there were references in industry to balance and in terms of values those most often talked about included shared responsibility and respect for nature. these findings are important as they relate back to the observations made earlier on during the literature review conducted for this project. for example, the interviews did in fact reveal that there are some challenges with defining ‘sustainability’ (berry, 2015; kates, parris & leiserowitz, 2005; slawinski & bansai, 2015) and that different stakeholders are in fact struggling with both the term itself and its overall relevance to the extraction of this resource (paskey, steward & williams, 2013). there was also significant use of the metaphor “sustainability as a scale/balance” by industry as well as instances of the “sustainability as a journey metaphor” although no specific time frames were given for said journey as was noted by berry (2015). these interviews also revealed that stakeholders preferred to discuss sustainability in terms of values and practices more so than in terms of indicator or goal oriented perspectives. this desire to link sustainability to discussions of values could be connected to language that is more promotional in nature (paskey, steward & williams, 2013). while the media and its role as a communicator about these issues to the public has been analyzed before (murphy, 2015; nelson, krogman, johnston & st. claire, 2015; paskey, steward & williams, consilience 189 2013; tran, 2014), the data also showed that the stakeholders themselves difference in opinion when it came to the ways that the media influence public perceptions when it comes to sustainability and the alberta oil sands. industry stakeholders suggested that the media is primarily in opposition to their efforts in the oil sands: i think the term is, “if it bleeds, it leads,” right? so bad news sells papers; it gets you an audience. and maybe that is because it is kind of emotional, and bad news usually causes an emotional response, whereas good news, when it comes to the oil sands, say syncrude, for example, over the last few years we have invested three billion dollars in tailings technologies to better manage our tailings. we spent one point six million dollars to reduce air emissions, which are now the lowest in our history and we communicate that but it doesn’t seem to resonate. it is one of those questions, we spent all this money to address these environmental issues, and, you know, have we come up with the final solution? no, but this is a demonstration of our commitment, you know, four and a half, almost five million dollars of technologies and you hardly hear ‘boo’ about it. (industry 2) in contrast while media stakeholders maintained that the mass media, particularly in alberta, often favour the oil sands more than other outlets across the country: industry feels that they are being picked on all the time because of… from the environmental kind of point of view. you know, i guess i can understand why they might feel that way, but if you look at the way that the oil sands are covered in media and newspapers in canada, most of the information is coming out of industry and it is not coming out of environmental groups...really, the record just shows that for the most part media coverage is usually from the point of view of industry, or from the point of view of certainly government, which certainly in this province, have supported it. (media 3) this diversity of opinion illustrates why bringing together these different groups and hoping for a collaborative discussion on this issue can be challenging. clearly, as the aforementioned findings show there is still a large level of disagreement about whether the terms sustainability is useful, and if it can be applied to the oil sands at all. the stakeholders do not use it lightly and were aware of some its limitations. perhaps most importantly, the interviews showed us that despite the tension existing between stakeholder groups when it comes to outlining precisely what sustainability is and what we want from it, there are consilience sutton: stakeholders and the alberta oil sands some places of agreement. the values of respect for nature and shared responsibility (especially in terms of balancing economic, social and environmental needs) are perhaps a useful departure point for collaboration. in addition, some efforts could be made to think about how best to include indicators and goals in future partnerships and ensuring that these indicators and goals are shared, and if they are not, an attempt to determine where and how stakeholder groups differ in communicating these possibilities are identified. the limitations of this paper include lack of a key voice: indigenous voices. this is clearly an important gap and ought to be addressed in future research on this topic (paskey, steward & williams, 2013). moreover, the sample is small and is by no means a definitive representation of all the positions implicit within a particular discourse community. this paper nevertheless provides a useful platform for identifying both the areas where stakeholders are still struggling to agree and those places where there in fact some overlap. it is hoped it will thus inspire for thought into the specificities associated with the values of shared responsibility (for example, do all stakeholders play and equal role in this process and should they? can an equal balance between the economic, environmental, and social demands occur in the context of the oil sands? is this balance understood consistently?) and respect for nature (i.e. does this look the same for industry, the government, the public and non governmental organizations?). and in doing so it can make the dialogue about this controversial resource and its future more productive from the vantage point of those most invested with its development. references consilience 191 allen, e. w. 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(2015, june). understanding the politics of sustainability and the alberta oil sands: metaphors of practice, processes and things. paper presented at the canadian sociological association’s annual meeting, ottawa, canada. microsoft word iyalomhe_nigera ems_final.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 18, iss. 2 (2017), pp. 84-110 environmental management system for nigeria’s higher education: two-year pilot analysis felix o. iyalomhe polo centre of sustainability, imperia, italy department of biological and environmental science, kampala international university fo.iyalomhe@polocentre.org giuseppe t. cirella polo centre of sustainability, imperia, italy alessio russo blaboratory of urban and landscape design, school of arts, culture and sports, far eastern federal university, vladivostok, russia; anne jensen cdepartment of policy analysis, university of aarhus, roskilde, denmark philipa idogho department of office technology and management, auchi polytechnic, auchi, nigeria abstract hypothetical research into how the introduction and utilisation of environmental management systems (ems) could be instituted into nigeria’s higher education scheme, as a means to improve environmental awareness and sustainable development practices on university campuses, is explored. qualitative methodologies are utilised based on reviewed literature, semi-structured interviews, personal experiences and structured questionnaires. effective potential ems for nigeria’s higher education, demands policyoriented government directives and commitments in terms of strict regulatory legislation and coordination of related management support. reported two-year findings illustrate ems implementation blockage due to a lack of government initiative and managerial commitment accompaniment throughout nigeria’s overall education sector. this blockage includes inadequate salary structures, lack of funding, insufficient academic curriculum and disconnect between universities and society at large. the research posits a preliminary platform towards creating ems practices and processes, and its significant role in the definition of sustainable consilience iyalomhe: ems in nigerian higher education campuses and research via educative activities. it highlights the need for re-evaluation of nigeria’s higher education scheme and its academic curriculum to create room for improved environmental awareness and performance, and work toward sustainable development, especially, in an era where several universities in nigeria are housing dilapidated infrastructures and weak related institutional frameworks. keywords: environmental management systems; drivers; barriers; nigeria higher education; sustainable practices; environmental awareness acknowledgements: the authors gratefully appreciate the study participants, community and greater university conurbation of auchi polytechnic, edo state, nigeria. consilience 86 i. introduction the need for environmental management systems (ems) has become increasingly significant due to recent concerns of environmental problems becoming ever-so challenging, complex and expensive to manage. ems, as described by a number of studies, is a means to systematically address environmental problems while integrating sustainability into higher education (adomssent et al. 2008, cortese 2003, hansen and lehmann 2006, lozano 2006, 2010, 2011). higher education and universities worldwide are expected to play a vital role in building the skills and capacity to manage environmental problems at multiple scales and have been recognised as ideal environments for ems implementation (jain and pant 2010, barwise 2001). ems implementation, at the university level, has been steadily expanding globally. this momentum, however, has not reached nigerian universities that lack ems amalgamation into its strategic management plans. to date, there are no universities in nigeria with functioning ems. at best, there exist several contingent management initiatives being used to address prevalent environmental impacts. the implementation of ems in nigeria’s higher educational institutions would be a positive and real programchanging step for the progress and well-being of its educative and environmental systems; in particular, nigeria’s educational institutions lack focus in addressing environmentally-related programs amidst several growing environmental problems (e.g. massive natural resource and ecosystems degradation and occurrences of climatic events). this is, perhaps, due to a lack of awareness and concern among students, the general population and decision makers for the environment. nationally, there has been an intensification of unsustainable industry-related development and no serious attempt in employing appropriate sustainable management strategies. such practices and negligent policy continue to result in large-scale negative impacts on livelihoods dependent on natural resources and untold hardship on already vulnerable livelihoods, property and local investment (kola-lawal et al. 2014). the purpose of this study is to identify relevant means to promote ems in nigeria’s public sector via its higher education institutions in order to enhance environmental management performance of nigeria as a whole. this study will add knowledge base and somewhat parallel ems research in higher education similar to that of adomssent et al. (2008), cortese (2003), hansen and lehmann (2006), lozano (2006, 2010, 2011), consilience iyalomhe: ems in nigerian higher education sammalisto (2004, 2007) and sammalisto and lindhqvist (2008). this investigation improves upon this knowledge base by backing it up as a proven tool for greener campuses with more environmental aware students, staff and decision makers, and sustainable environmental-related development. this two-year analysis of ems, conducted at auchi polytechnic, auchi, edo state, nigeria, serves as a foundation for environmental awareness and indicative environmental performance from its higher academic institutions. it reviews ems already implemented in such institutions in the west and examines possible ems implementation in nigerian universities. it discusses auchi polytechnic’s environmental practices and its corresponding management strategies and, empirically, identifies why and how possible drivers, barriers and success factors for ems may be beneficial. this cause and effect process is in support of genuinely implementing ems nigeria-wide. as a pilot effort, geared toward reawakened consciousness for the environment and an educative step of enactment for actual ems implementation at auchi polytechnic, we are optimistic that this can be replicated in other universities throughout the country. in the long-term, this transmissive approach of academic training centres developing, not only future leaders but full-scale nation building, is key to environmental awareness and management in nigeria. ii. ems in universities since the 1990s, major environmental problems have been given a great deal of attention at the united nations arena. key united nations environmental conferences (un 2016, hens and nath 2003, pickering and owen 1997) have challenged governments at all levels to take real steps towards protection of natural resources and the human environment, management of environmental problems at varying societal levels and enhancement of environmental performances by formulating policies on environmental issues and sustainability (noeke 2000, bennett and james 1999). international standard organizations (iso) introduced regulatory standards, such as iso 14001 in 1996 and iso 9000 in 2000 to serve as guidelines for environmental performance and standardised management concepts and processes that have resulted in increased efficiency of operations, put focus on customer requirements and facilitated communication between the organisation and interested parties (sammalisto et al. 2015, sammalisto 2007, viebahn 2002, disterheft et al. 2012, jain and pant 2010, sayre 1996). the iso consilience 88 14001 standard for ems has been primarily implemented in private sectors like manufacturing and relating industrial practices, as a structured management framework for an organisation to manage its environmental related process and practices. the driving force for its implementation has been the requirement and longing of customer satisfaction, ensured legal compliance, improved impacts management (e.g. by reducing the risk of uncontrolled emissions), improved public image and increased cost-effectiveness of capital and natural resources (kincheloe and mclaren 2008, brorson and larsson 1999, banergee 1998). over the past two decades, a number of public sector universities have also implemented ems as mechanisms to improve their environmental performance and operational tasks in parallel to growing conservation, protection and sustainability of natural resources (jain and pant 2010, sammalisto et al. 2015, joseph and philip 1996). the university of gävle in sweden represents one example of the western world’s implementation of ems. this includes the indirect aspects of education and research in their ems, while working to certify iso 14001 in order to acquire international acceptance and recognition (disterhoft et al. 2012). ems implementation denotes the creation of a number of routines and novel approaches to work within an organisation in an environmentally-sound manner. within higher education institutions, this requires the training of staff, faculty and management for improved awareness and skills, and understanding of why they need to work within the ems framework. the ems framework elucidates how their tasks will contribute to an improved environmental performance and longterm sustainability on campuses and beyond. von malmborg (2003) and emilsson and hjelm (2002, 2009) examined the potentials of iso 14001 certified ems practices in the public sector of sweden. they revealed that in order to suit the public sector, iso 14001 certified ems must be simplified and integrated with other management systems to have one standardised management system. moreover, the ems scope has to be broadened and include aspects of caring and social administration, as it affects the overall goal of public sector entities. note, since public and private sectors function in a different manner, within two different spheres relative to differing institutional logics, these findings are not necessarily compatible with private sector requisites (lozano 2011, kirkland and thompson 1999, welford 1998, kuenen 1986). emilsson and hjelm (2009) stress the development and its likely contributions and constraints with extending ems into a sustainability consilience iyalomhe: ems in nigerian higher education management approach. they conclude it may point to a more comprehensive understanding of an organisation’s total impact on nature and society, and relating management needs. ems in universities has been gaining momentum and academic interest since about the beginning of the new millennium. for example, in 2003, a survey carried out in sweden showed 60% of swedish universities indicated government directives as a key ems external driver. internal drivers, such as the role of staff, faculty, students and top management, between 1999 and 2003, were found to have a variation in values as a result of contrasting university procedural implementation, while noteworthy, major ems barriers included lack of management support, resources and commitment (sammalisto 2004, 2007, sammalisto and lindhqvist 2008). further research, from the university of gävle, indicated that ems implementation from 1999 to 2003 showed that 60% were in favour of government directives as a major external driver (sammalisto and bororson 2006), while 70% favoured staff and faculty commitment, 36% indicated good image and credibility on the part of the university, whilst 28% specified student involvement as important (sammalisto and arvidsson 2005). moreover, thompson and van bakel (1995) stressed that the appointment of an environmental coordinator and active support from top management would serve as an extremely important driver. several ems barriers identified within the period of 1999 to 2003 showed approximately 54% favoured low priority and lack of resources, 34% weak management support and follow up and about 18% long turnover in showing results (sammalisto 2007). similar research and survey methods in the united kingdom’s higher education system indicated a problem with an overloaded curriculum (martin et al. 2006). this overload was shown to come at the expense of newer programs, including ems implementation – noted among academic staff as inappropriate, they themselves undertrained and under aware of the issues. moreover, price (2005) explained that ems implementation in canadian universities supported coordination with other universities, leadership roles for environmental programs and student initiatives as major ems drivers. in addition, a few studies showed iso 14001 certified ems typically warranted an environmental performance improvement of university campuses (ammenberg et al. 2001, alshuwaikat and abubakar 2008, omrcen et al. 2013, davey et al. 1999, joseph and philip 1996). hence, the basis of the literature indicates that emphasis should first be put on environmental impacts, and the ways in which consilience 90 reducing these will benefit higher education, before ems as a tool can be implemented. iii. auchi polytechnic environmental management initiative auchi polytechnic is one of the top technical universities in nigeria. it was founded in 1963 as a technical college and converted to a polytechnic in 1973. its national status is to produce well-trained, highly skilled graduates for nigeria’s economy and growing society. key disciplines taught include engineering, sciences, environmental management and art and design. auchi polytechnic is located in auchi, one of the most vibrant and cosmopolitan towns in the southern nigeria, where there is inordinate environmental degradation and pollution related activities from excessive oil and solid minerals explorations. auchi polytechnic has three campuses, jointly composed of approximately 58,000 students and a faculty of about 14,650. the activities of this institution have direct impact on the surrounding environment and have resulted in several environmental protection-based initiatives put into practice, including the use of waste baskets and noise reduction initiatives. positioned in strategic locations, throughout the institution’s grounds, waste baskets have helped to prevent solid waste littering campus-wide. contracted members of staff empty the waste baskets daily, with hazardous waste buried for decomposition. to combat noise pollution, university management passed a number of bylaws to prevent unauthorised vehicles, motorcycles and other motorised vehicles from entering campus grounds. apart from noise reduction, these bylaws help reduce campus-wide air pollution and carbon dioxide emission. at auchi polytechnic, indirect impacts on the environment have yet to be considered, even though there are several environmental courses and programs in landscape planning, estate management and urban and regional management. no core courses are taught on human interaction with the environment or the wellbeing of environment in terms of our responsibility as human beings. this has meant that there is no, or very little, research or trained students on sustainable development, let alone on indirect environmental impacts. correspondingly, direct environmental impacts at auchi polytechnic are carried out within five operations: (1) its power plant, (2) laboratory and workshop facilities, (3) staff and student consilience iyalomhe: ems in nigerian higher education activities on campus, (4) contractor and subcontractor activities and (5) teaching and collaboration with stakeholders and with the community at large. together, these activities have had a wide range of impacts on the environment. table 1 summarises the types of measures put forward by the polytechnic to control its direct environmental effect thus far (b. campbell, personal communication, 5 january 2016). table 1. auchi polytechnic environmental aspects. environmental area treatment or program quantity water no waste water treatment average 888,689,819 l/year solid waste no treatment in place average 61,680 ton/year hazardous waste no treatment in place not available emergency response system fire put-out program not available energy electricity diesel petrol no energy or alternative energy savings program in place electricity 45,761,343 kwh/year diesel 10,000,000 l/year petrol 917,922 l/year air pollution noise carbon dioxide sulphur oxide no air pollution treatments in place not available not available not available paper used on campus offices library no paper saving program in place 43,000,000 million sheets/year 3,368,000 million sheets/year buildings on campus ecological floor plan 80 buildings designed with ecological blueprint ems no system in place environmental regulations initiatives since 2004 to date education no compulsory environmental courses except the department of environmental studies according to table 1, environmental aspects at auchi polytechnic are regulated by informal environmental initiatives as opposed to an ideal ems approach shown in figure 1. this indicates that there is a level of environmental awareness at the polytechnic but staff and faculty do not deem its significance as job-related or see its relevance to their jobs. consilience 92 figure 1. ems policy cycle, adapted from cascio et al. (1996). based on the works of cascio et al (1996), figure 1 illustrates, in general, how an ems implementation cycle works from the prevention of pollution to a state of continual improvement. when implemented, its focus ideally is on bettering environmental impacts, improving efficiency, complying with legislation and demonstrating to stakeholders a commitment to environmental conservation and protection. (i) policy auchi polytechnic has over the last decade or so proven to have a valued history of environmental action. the department of environmental studies, in conjunction with top management, have assisted in establishing initiatives that monitor activities connected to environmental conservation and protection. as mentioned, auchi polytechnic put in place a waste control system throughout its campuses, to regulate generated waste by staff, faculty and students and to comply with national and state environmental regulations. auchi polytechnic also has adopted environmental practice to conduct its activities in an environmentally-friendly consilience iyalomhe: ems in nigerian higher education manner, in part because it recognises its own environmental impact and lack of leadership required to improve upon environmental performance and minimise any associated degradation. five specific areas are targeted include: (1) academic activities (2) research, (3) environmental and human health, (4) management of buildings and (5) grounds and operations management within campus workshops. (ii) planning auchi polytechnic has no formal ems or structured implementation scheme as shown in figure 1. according to top management personnel interviewed, “we [auchi polytechnic] do not currently have a strategic plan, audit or any of that, but we are lucky to have a lot of good people who do a lot of good things”. another top management staff notes that “the polytechnic is heavily decentralised, there is very little policy follow up or dissemination. nobody knows what policies there are and there is no system to inform them”. in 1981, auchi polytechnic hired an architecture and design firm to create its campus plan. this campus plan was not specific to environmental management; however, it did include aspects that relate to transportation and environmental planning and, if desired, could be upgraded to current standards (s. jimoh, personal communication, 22 september 2015). there has also been some unit or school level planning, in the form of student projects and committee forecasting initiatives to facilitate management sets and annual plans for waste and energy. the polytechnic’s medical centre has internal protocols that focus on public awareness, hazardous waste and other health and safety issues. in 2000, students in higher degree level programs held a public consultation on environmental management objecting to the impacts the polytechnic had on the affected landscape and nearby urbanised areas. this consultation focused on town planning, surveying and estate management. (iii) implementation actions have been taken toward environmental management at auchi polytechnic since the early 1980s. burning of solid waste (e.g. office paper) and burying of chemicals (k. osigbemhe, personal communication, 27 december 2015). between 1998 and 2003, 76,000 kilos of hazardous waste was buried. in energy terms, for example in 2003, the energy used at auchi polytechnic comprised 25,761,343 kwh of electricity, 687,922 litres of diesel consilience 94 and 6,000,000 litres of petrol (a. aleogho, personal communication, 10 march 2016). however, to date no alternative energy savings program has been put in place. throughout its campuses, power outages are supplemented via backup diesel and petrol generators. in the last decade, the polytechnic has witnessed a consistent annual rise in carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide emissions. implementation of newly installed technology (i.e. upgraded generators) has aimed to reduce these emission levels by consuming less fuel. facilities management has also done a large number of maintenance upgrades within campus workshop buildings. it automated energy management in some buildings, creating better control and regulation of ventilation systems and temperature. unfortunately, a huge problem is access to sufficient funds, and thus, a complete maintenance overhaul has not been possible, according to a. aleogho (personal communication, 10 march 2016). renovation and repair include leaky roofs, old windows and cracked foundations – all of which affect energy efficiency of indoor environments (balf and stuart 2001). little or no initiative to address operational environmental impacts of the daily operation of the polytechnic has been implemented. examples of potential actions include wastewater treatment, organic food purchasing, environmentally friendly transportation and ecologically-sound building designs. to date, one environmental action that has had little conservational attention is the purchasing and consumption of office paper (b. kabaka, personal communication, 30 june 2015). small efforts include photocopying material double-sided in print shops, especially within library and relating office areas, and reducing the use of hardcopy student calendars. still, in 2003, the polytechnic used 43,106,813 sheets of photocopied office paper, according to s. umar (personal communication, 5 january 2016) which translates into 3,657 trees, 327,612 litres of diesel, 16,726,563 litres of water, 1,366,654 kwh of electricity and 8,105 kg of air pollution (m. igbape, personal communication, 24 may 2015). this is exacerbated during the period of examinations where academic staff has to print their examinations due to a lack of digital implementation. since the early 1980s, many courses and research projects have contested these issues, with the majority of environmentally friendly initiatives and output limited to the school of environmental studies. consilience iyalomhe: ems in nigerian higher education (iv) checking and corrective action decentralised initiatives within the polytechnic board do not disseminate broadly and in effect lack capability for a systematic approach to establishing a university-wide ems. as a result, no staff is responsible for implementing environmental regulations or the necessary procedures, according to b. kabaka (personal communication, 12 february 2015). however, there are some levels of monitoring of air pollution, water use, energy use, hazardous waste disposal and solid waste disposal by a unit or school responsible – but it is by no means comprehensive. there have also been no audits in the areas of solid waste composition or office paper consumption, but there are some independent efforts from various stakeholders to monitor some of the institution’s environmental actions and to try to coordinate appropriate checks and balances. undoubtedly, ems is needed not only at auchi polytechnic but throughout nigeria’s higher education institutions. having researched this necessity and urgency it is evident that a vast educative platform is needed, perhaps in the form of a public or private forum for introductory planning and later corrective protocols. ems introduction and implementation via education would serve as a core training centre and focus on potential impacts, including: degraded air quality, resource and infrastructure depletion, conservation, pollution prevention and aspects of social and economic benefits. iv. methodology and material for the purpose of this study, a frequency distribution of 48 % was used as a benchmark to reduce self-reporting biasness of ems drivers and barriers, and to some degree, highlight the circumstantial reality in other case study-related analyses. the data collected originally was put together by iyalomhe (2009) and revisited in 2015 and 2016, respectively. the distribution for the questionnaire was divided by way of two methods: administered take-home questionnaires (na) and telephone interview questionnaires (nt). the questionnaires used in each method were identical. equation 1 illustrates the combinative total number of respondents (n) from both datasets. n = na + nt (1) the total number of respondents (n) equated to 101. our pilot analysis illustrates the combinative as well as singular results consilience 96 from the two datasets. the quality of the questionnaire was double checked for content and language editing with 12 environmental and 9 non-environmental experts, in five sister universities in the southern region of nigeria before they were administered. selected experts were asked if they had expertise and responsibilities in environmentally related programs or departments at auchi polytechnic. first, a total of 65 take-home questionnaires were administered to potential responding candidates between june and august 2015. to avoid any possible delay or non-receipt of questionnaires, they were directly delivered or mailed using the local postal service. a total of 50 respondents turned in the administered questionnaires (na), representing a pilot take-home survey response rate of 76.9 %, totalling 16.9 % students, 43 % faculty and 18.5 % management staff. the selected candidates were then distributed between environmental and non-environmental backing to reduce the possibility of inherent self-reporting and reverse causality biasness (kola-lawal et al. 2014). to further help reduce any bias, we ensured the questionnaires were understood by each respondent and administered in such a way that respondents would have plenty of time to fill out the questionnaires by taking and completing them on their own time and sending them back to us within a one-week time frame. second, a year later, we conducted two sets of follow-up telephone interviews in june and july 2016. these telephone interview questionnaires were conducted by the rector of auchi polytechnic. the first set of telephone interviews were conducted with senior administrators (sa), department heads (dh) and faculty members (fm), while the second set was done with heads of student affairs (hsa) and staff management (sm). for this purpose, a total of 79 calls (i.e. 15 for sa, 12 for dh, 23 for fm, 13 for hsa, and 16 for sm) were made, with 51 persons (nt) (i.e. 64.5 %) accepting to take the telephone interview (i.e., 10 for sa, 7 for dh, 18 for fm, 7 for has, and 9 for sm) – see figure 2 for an illustrative breakdown. consilience iyalomhe: ems in nigerian higher education figure 2. telephone interview calls made versus calls accepted. note: senior administrators (sa), department heads (dh) and faculty members (fm), heads of student affairs (hsa) and staff management (sm). all the interviews were confidential and anonymous, and have been integrated into our analysis and compared with the responses from the administered questionnaires. v. ems at auchi polytechnic: two-year pilot analysis the structured questionnaires were administered to elicit relevant information related to four key ems themes: (1) general awareness, (2) possible drivers, (3) possible barriers and (4) attitude to the environment and usefulness of ems. for the questionnaires, we estimated a response rate of 80 %, equating to 52 out of 65 administered questionnaires with a distributive spread of 20 % students, 50 % faculty and 10 % management staff. figure 3 illustrates the questionnaire actual responses versus estimated responses. the response rate was 3.1 % below our estimation with 50 respondents. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 total sa dh fm has sm calls made calls accepted consilience 98 figure 3. questionnaire actual responses versus estimated responses from a total of 65 potential responding administered questionnaires. for the purpose of the pilot study in 2015 the actual responses fell short of our estimations, however, the responses satisfied our curiosity to continue with the research a year later in 2016. table 2 to 5 illustrate the analysis of the two types of surveyed questionnaires. (i) general awareness first, the initial process spurred a general understanding of the amount of ems awareness at auchi polytechnic. a summary of questions and responses is shown in table 2. it illustrates, despite the fact there seems to be general environmental awareness, ems knowledge is very limited among staff, faculty and management. table 2. a summary of the total number of respondents (n) to the general awareness of ems; n = 101; na = 50 (a = administered); nt = 51 (t = telephone); y = yes; n = no. questions n na nt y n y n y n 1. is there any environmental awareness among staff, faculty and students at auchi polytechnic? 85 16 47 3 38 13 2. do you think activities at auchi polytechnic affect the environment? 75 26 41 9 34 17 3. are you aware of any global or national environmental regulations or standards? 43 58 24 26 19 32 4. are you aware of environmental management systems or ems? 21 80 11 39 10 41 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% total management staff faculty students actual responses esemated responses consilience iyalomhe: ems in nigerian higher education the general awareness of ems at auchi polytechnic is low, although there is increasing concern for environmental issues in the university, but still there is little or no consideration for a scientific approach needed for educative implementation of ems. this institutional lack of understanding and inaction should not be under evaluated as it can lead to an exacerbated ecological footprint and relating high-level costs. as noted earlier, these costs are directly or indirectly related to energy use, water use, solid waste generation, air emissions and green procurement (i.e. the process to conserve resources and prevent pollution). at auchi polytechnic, this lack of general awareness of ems may be consequential to the statistical augmentation of used resources and lack of solutions to such inquires. (ii) possible drivers a second core aspect of the process to understanding ems at auchi polytechnic is to familiarise the stance of possible ems drivers. the total respondents suggested factors they thought could encourage and support ems at the polytechnic – shown in table 3. positive responses are illustrated from the total number of respondents (n) from the questionnaires. table 3. positive responses from the total number of respondents (n) relative to possible ems drivers; na = 50 (a = administered); nt = 51 (t = telephone). drivers positive respondents n na nt strict legislative regulatory laws on ems implementation 94 46 48 government directives integration of environmental courses in all programs 87 78 44 39 43 39 government incentives for compliance and punishment for non-compliance 86 41 45 sources of revenue for the university 81 41 40 university management support 87 40 47 prevailing regional environmental pollution and contamination 80 38 42 environmental awareness campaign in the university 54 25 29 to improve standard and image of the university 64 34 30 dilapidated structures and infrastructure of the university 68 39 29 functional environmental departments in the university 78 39 39 engagement of environmental expertise 65 30 35 at auchi polytechnic strict legislative and regulatory policies, government directives as well as incentives for compliance and punishment for non-compliance are seen as the most frequently stated external drivers for ems implementation. these external drivers function at a national level and require consilience 100 political and jurisdictional provision. as a higher education institution, auchi polytechnic potentially can prompt discussion and influence for both of these provisions. however, for the polytechnic it is unclear how much weight is needed to acquire enough funding and support for full ems implementation. internal related drivers indicate auchi polytechnic views ems implementation as a source of revenue from the government, while at the institutional level, indicates best practices functionality via a top-down approach (i.e. from top management support). in addition, the dilapidated structures and infrastructure of the university, alongside a functional environmental department, where teaching and research work to incorporate both staff and students, indicate potential strong stimuli for an educative ems-based initiative. moreover, the inclusion of environmental courses within the country’s higher education curriculum core section, would hugely foster environmental awareness and consciousness among students, and thus facilitate ems practices and processes at the polytechnic. (iii) potential barriers the third aspect relates to possible barriers to ems at auchi polytechnic, which oppositely correlate with the possible drivers. this is understandable since, comparably, they are opposing forces weighting against one another for institutional knowledge and implementation. the identified possible barriers to systematic ems being introduced at auchi polytechnic are broken down in table 4. positive responses are illustrated from the total number of respondents (n) from the questionnaires. table 4. positive responses from the total number of respondents (n) relative to possible ems barriers; na = 50 (a = administered); nt = 51 (t = telephone). barriers positive respondents n na nt lack of commitment from government and university management 93 44 49 lack of funds and expertise 96 46 50 academic curriculum of the university 87 40 47 the disconnect between the university and society 67 38 29 top-down policy implementation in the university 67 30 37 lack of academic freedom in the university 56 25 31 inadequate power supply and internet facilities 63 29 34 the salary structures for academic and non-academic staff in the university 68 33 35 student apathy for environmental studies in the university 57 24 33 emphasis on traditional professional programs in the university 60 21 39 consilience iyalomhe: ems in nigerian higher education at the polytechnic, the majority of respondents believed that a lack of funding and commitment on the part of management and government will hinder ems implementation. the academic curriculum of the country’s universities will also not allow ems to be given consideration mostly due to pre-built, time-consuming and non-inclusive curriculums. it is evident that if an ems implementation team has limited expertise and resources, staff and faculty most likely will grant ems low priority. according to our findings, inadequate staff salary structures already overly impact on the performance of their duties, an elevated lack of professionbased ems expertise and consistent disconnect between universities and society. this disconnect further narrows the window of opportunities for relevant policy strategies needed to signify the importance of ems in the nigeria higher education. in addition, current barriers to ems implementation at auchi polytechnic also relate to the inherent apathy of students to take environmental courses due to the seemingly lack of prospect therein. (iv) attitude to the environment and usefulness of ems fourth, questions were asked concerning attitude to the environment and whether respondents thought ems perceptions would be useful to improve environmental awareness and concern at the institution. table 5 presents the three questions that were used to correlate these questions. the responses indicate 73.3% of respondents do not see the environment is properly taken into consideration, while 63.3% suggest ems can improve the standard of education and 78.2% of respondents suggest that an ems tool would bring positive role and responsibility to auchi polytechnic. table 5. a summary of the total number of respondents (n) on attitude and usefulness of ems; na = 50 (a = administered); nt = 51 (t = telephone); y = yes; n = no. questions regarding its usefulness n na nt y n y n y n 1. in regards to the general attitude of staff, students and faculty, is the environment taken into consideration at auchi polytechnic? 27 74 16 34 11 40 2. do you see ems improving the standards of education in nigeria? 64 37 38 12 26 25 3. do you see ems as a tool that will bring positive role and responsibility? 79 22 40 10 39 12 consilience 102 at an institutional level, attitude to the environment and the usefulness of ems are fundamental to better understanding its utility and potential. at auchi polytechnic, it is clear that a cleaner, healthier environment is desired by students, staff and management but attitudinal concerns indicate initial educative steps will be needed if ems is to be ensued. if one reflects on a fully implemented ems at auchi polytechnic – with the inclusion of measurable environmental goals, objectives and targets that are reviewed and updated annually – environmental considerations or requirements must be appropriately prioritised and managed. this study indicates that auchi polytechnic’s present educational system lacks basic knowhow and overall needs for ems implementation. vi. discussion we have shown that among the respondents there is awareness for the environment and impact on the environment from academic activities at auchi polytechnic. yet, this awareness is not fully embraced by-way-of attitudes and actions of staff, faculty and management. this may be due to a lack of formal environmental training, and what some may label as “environmental awareness”, as an over-riding boldness not to be sound environmental caretakers. moreover, the polytechnic does not reflect upon its own department of environmental studies, which primarily focuses on academic knowledge and theory-based instruction rather than on the implication or advocacy of such knowledge. this has resulted in a very low level of ems awareness and relating linkages to environmental standards. as a consequence, we identified relevant internal and external factors that would facilitate ems at auchi polytechnic. the drivers were divided according to their nature of origin and amount of impact rendered. we identified government directives and strict legislative regulatory, with incentive for compliance and punishment for non-compliance, as major external drivers, while the prevalent dilapidated structures and infrastructure can be considered a major internal factor for ems at auchi polytechnic. this result corresponds to a negligent attitude of nigerian citizens and their inability to accept and embrace relevant changes in day-to-day living, according to p. imonikhe (personal communication, 19 july 2016). moreover, ems at universities in europe, especially in sweden, indicates key parallel external drivers – including the role of government and personal commitment of staff, faculty and management. some european universities have stressed the role consilience iyalomhe: ems in nigerian higher education of an environmental coordinator as vital to institutional integrity and standardisation of rules (sammalisto and bororson 2006). furthermore, as sub-drivers for ems in europe good representation, credible delivery and optimised management have been seen as integrative, and to some degree, compulsory to institutional frameworks (mihyo 2003). conversely, internal ems drivers reflect one mode that auchi polytechnic can use to obtain increased sources of funding (as noted in the data analysis) by 80.2% of respondents. moreover, 64.4% of respondents said the involvement of environmental expertise in active research and teaching on environmental issues would enhance successful ems implementation, while 77.2% suggest the integration of environmental courses in all programs of study in the university could also foster its development. overall, it seems that if the identified drivers are to be effective as a means to a successful introduction of ems at auchi polytechnic, government directives in conjunction with legislative environmental awareness campaigning are to be enacted and obeyed. in contrast, possible ems barriers at auchi polytechnic are its lack of government and management support. these topdown perspectives have the ability to hinder ems at even its initial stages. in addition to these finding, the data analysis also showed lack of funding and inadequate academic curriculum as relevant factors to any ems application. this correlates with previous studies that government and top management personnel are central to any ems application and, in all likelihood, higher educational institutions nigeria-wide. additionally, an important aspect that should be emphasised is the comparative results from the two types of surveyed questionnaires; that is, an analytic breakdown of data between the administered take-home questionnaires (na = 50) from june to august 2015 and the telephone interview questionnaires (nt = 51) from june to july 2016. note, only the method of data collection differed, not the questionnaires used. figure 4 shows a compilation of positive responses pertaining to all of the questions asked, put into blocks relative to table 2 to 5. consilience 104 figure 4. positive responses from the total number of respondents (n) to each question from the questionnaire relative to table 2 to 5. table columns are coloured and labelled with its pertaining questions; table 2 refers to general awareness of ems; table 3 refers to possible ems drivers; table 4 refers to possible ems barriers; table 5 refers to attitude and usefulness of ems; na = 50 (a = administered); nt = 51 (t = telephone). the data from figure 4 indicates limited to low variability. analogous results point to a consistency over the two-year study and demonstrate no change in social response or standpoint from the polytechnic toward environmental responsibilities and ems implementation. this trend further verifies the urgent need to better look into and, potentially, exercise ems knowhow. moreover, a sound interpretation of the current economic situation and the lack of good governance within the country most likely hamper the application of ems. this notion is associated with current levels of nationwide poverty that does not permit citizens to participate in environmental matters due to survival needs and security. another suggested barrier to ems implementation is the academic curriculum of the country, which encourages high academic workloads, excludes environmental courses from general studies, and is often inflexible and does not credit any environmental consideration. in addition, professional attitudes within academia are not favourable in allowing current 0 10 20 30 40 50 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 n um be r o f r ep on de nt s table 2 table 3 table 4 table 5 nᵃ = left column nᵗ = right column consilience iyalomhe: ems in nigerian higher education systematic structures to change, due to culture-related impunity and non-policy implementation in the country. nigeria’s higher educational institutions are structured in such a way that they do not appear to be aware of their responsibilities to society at large, let alone the environment. this pilot analysis reveals that positive attitudes toward the environment would result in profound environmental performance if ems were implemented at auchi polytechnic. this somewhat correlate ems studies for universities in the western world (sammalisto et al. 2015, omrcen et al. 2013, noeke 2000, lozano 2011, davey et al. 1999, thompson and van bakel 1995). vii. conclusions this paper provides a two-year pilot analysis on how and why effective ems could be implemented in nigeria’s higher education. its scope is to encourage greener campuses and improve upon environmental performance throughout the country’s academic institutions. for this purpose, two main research questions associated to nigeria’s higher educational institutions were looked at: what are the possible drivers for ems implementation? using our pilot analysis of auchi polytechnic, possible ems drivers for its implementation include the need for a functional environmental department, and the integration of environmental courses in all programs of study, as well as the dilapidated structures and infrastructure of the university. in contrast, relevant external drivers for effective ems in western universities were also identified – government directives and commitment, university management support, funds and strict legislative regulations all play an important role. we postulate these key possible ems drivers as a primary step to ems implementation in auchi polytechnic and, potentially, to other higher educational institutions throughout nigeria. what are the likely barriers ems implementation faces? our pilot analysis highlights that inadequate academic curriculums would contribute to poor consideration of environmental issues in the nigerian universities. in addition, this circumstance is exacerbated by a poor salary structure for academics and nonacademics in the university. notable barriers also confronting ems implementation in the western world include: lack of funds and resources and lack of management and government commitment. unique to auchi polytechnic, but perceptible in other nigerian consilience 106 higher educational institutions, are the inadequate power supply and unreliable internet services, and the emphasis on traditional professional programs in nigerian universities. this focus on preprofessional curriculums, in our opinion, has fostered the apathy of students for environmental studies in both public and private universities in the southern region of nigeria. it has been a part of our premise that this study contributes to the discourse on ems in nigeria’s higher education scheme, especially in the southern region where environmental degradation and pollution are hugely prevalent. it has provided a preliminary and useful insight into how and why ems should be introduced into nigeria’s educative system. if properly implemented, it most likely will improve environmental awareness and performance, and work toward sustainable development, especially, in an era where several universities in nigeria are housing dilapidated infrastructure and weak institutions, and where humanity is confronting constant global change and concomitant challenges. it is imperative that policymakers at national, state and local levels provide support to university management if ems is to be fully introduced and implemented. considering the top-down policy implementation system in nigeria, if there are government directives that can feed into or from federal agencies – including public and private universities – the same directives via state and local governments may provide additional support and, thus, introduce and implement an ems application. it is our recommendation, the government should provide adequate funding and resources to universities and ensure proper implementation of policies by putting the responsibility on university management personnel. the academic curriculum should be reconsidered to include how staff, faculty and students can prioritise environmental matters, by possibly reducing academic workloads and allowing room for effective environmental consideration. both the nigerian federal and states’ ministry of education should assist with the establishment of proper linkages between industry, business and education sectors. this initiative should improve environmental considerations in a cohesive and practical manner through higher education, with filter effects nationwide. in conclusion, it would be beneficial to further analyse possible drivers and barriers in other universities throughout the regions of nigeria, both private and public universities, and comparatively show the differing challenges and incentives for implementing ems. moreover, further studies would be needed to explore how staff and faculty perceive consilience iyalomhe: ems in nigerian higher education sustainability within the context of their academic duties in order to boost internal support within ems 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(1998). corporate environmental management: system and strategies. earthscan publications, london. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 20, iss. 1 (2018), pp. 62–87 stepping sustainably: the potential partnership between dance and sustainable development sadi mosko sadi mosko recently graduated magna cum laude from columbia university where she received a b.a. in sustainable development and dance. now, she works as a freelance dancer, choreographer, writer, and sustainability practitioner in new york city. sadi.mosko@gmail.com abstract focusing specifically on dance, this study explores the relationship between the arts and sustainable development. very little academic work has been conducted about artists’ role in sustainability, a field that is characterized by intersectionality and crossdisciplinary work. this paper seeks to begin to fill that research gap. it determines two ways that dance artists can interact with sustainability: the operations approach and the artistic approach. highlighting four organizations — arts council england, kidd pivot, eiko & koma, and vertigo dance company — that have made strides in these two approaches, the study concludes that dance could be a tool for sustainability advocates to better communicate material to non-scientific audiences. introducing environmental material through dance or other artistic mediums is a way of reframing conversations so that they appeal to broader audiences and target different types of solutions. a true shift toward a sustainably minded society will come from many sources, including a shift in cultural values about consumption and humankind’s relationship to the natural world. art is a driver and creator of culture. if combined effectively, the arts and sustainable development could help to shift our society in a sustainable direction. acknowledgments special thanks to eric beauchesne, for his generosity and insight, and lynn garafola, for her guidance, edits, and unending support. mailto:sadi.mosko@gmail.com consilience mosko: dance & sustainable development introduction at its essence, dance can be defined as movement through space. accordingly, dance is inherently linked to space and requires an awareness of it. intriguingly, dance’s interaction with space is ephemeral (beauchesne, 2014). unlike other art forms that require instruments and canvases, dance leaves no tangible traces. in theory, it is the ultimate sustainable art form as it requires no extra resources besides the human body. in reality, this is not the case; dance does leave lasting footprints environmentally. land must be cleared to build large studios with sprung floors, and energy must be consumed to provide stable (and often high) temperatures that keep dancers’ bodies uninjured. theaters require extra space to accommodate audiences as well as immense amounts of electricity to power stage lights and sound systems. set and costume designs add to dance’s resource consumption, as do the vehicles and fossil fuels required for touring. theatrical dance as it is practiced in many parts of the world is not environmentally sustainable. bringing dance into contact with sustainable development could make the practices of dancers and dance companies more ecologically sound. it could also benefit the outreach strategies of sustainability practitioners. sustainable development struggles with communicating to people outside of its field. collaborating with dance could be one method to bridge that divide. if utilized correctly, dance could be a means of reframing the sustainability conversation so that it reaches a broader audience and targets more lasting, cultural solutions to environmental issues. however, potential collaborations between sustainability and dance (and the arts in general) have been, until this point, largely unexplored. sustainable development is an inherently cross-disciplinary field. it was established with a goal of uniting the “three pillars,” combining natural sciences with economics and the social sciences to develop the world in an economically profitable, socially conscious, and environmentally sustainable way. however, in this discussion about the cross-disciplinary nature of sustainable development, the arts are rarely, if ever, mentioned. thus, ample space exists for discussion and research on the topic of the arts and sustainability. the following pages will explore this gap. while all types of art have the potential for this collaboration, dance seems to be particularly appropriate because of its unique and inherent connection to space. hopefully, this study will create a foundational conversation about the relationship between the two fields and will encourage further research on the topic. 64 consilience background: environmental communications some geologists assert that the earth has entered a new geologic era called the anthropocene. this term comes from the greek roots anthropo meaning “manmade” and cene meaning “new” (sachs, 2015). it implies that human actions are altering earth’s physical processes on a scale equal to that of the ice ages, the meteor that killed the dinosaurs, and the advent of living organisms. consequently, an unprecedented period of earth history has begun. various steps can be taken to decrease humans’ immense environmental footprint. many sustainability advocates focus on technologic solutions that make our machines more efficient and our energy sources renewable. others consider directly withdrawing excess greenhouse gases from the atmosphere with carbon capture and sequestration technologies. an economic version of this is carbon offsetting, a growing phenomenon in which people invest money into environmental projects to compensate for their carbon emissions. however, these mostly technological solutions are not the only answers to sustainability issues nor are they necessarily the most lasting. much of our current sustainability problem results from our culture. culture, in this case, is defined as the values, beliefs, practices, and traditions that characterize a group of people and influence the choices and actions those people make. western culture, which has been seeking to control nature for centuries, now struggles to redefine its relationship to its environment. solving this cultural problem will only result from many societal changes. technology will play a role but so will changes in economic structures, political doctrines, educational standards, and cultural values. achieving changes in all of these areas will be challenging, but not impossible, especially if sustainability thinkers can improve how they communicate with the rest of the world. discussing environmental issues is difficult, especially when more complicated concerns like climate change are in question. environmental communications can be challenging due to the general public’s essential illiteracy regarding basic environmental science facts and theories. for example, a study conducted by the yale project on climate communications (2009) found that many participants were unclear about the difference between the hole in the ozone layer and climate change, two completely separate phenomena. furthermore, only 34% of participants agreed that the statement “climate means the average weather conditions in a region” (the definition of “climate”) was “definitely true” (yale project, 2009). this lack of basic knowledge on environmental scientific concepts makes it difficult for society to have meaningful discussions about environmental issues. in addition to this education problem is the reality that environmental threats are often hard to assess. climate change is a somewhat timeless threat (marshall, 2014). as climate psychologist george marshall describes, climate change “can be consilience mosko: dance & sustainable development here or there, in the present or the future, certain and uncertain” (marshall, 2014). it does not have a definite day of destruction. its impacts are dependent on many indeterminable factors, including future population levels and consumption rates as well as positive and negative feedbacks in the climate system and impact location. in an attempt to combat these difficulties and appeal to the general public, environmentalists often resort to two different rhetorical tactics: 1) overly technical language mixed with complicated statistics or 2) excessively dramatic emotional appeals that are dark, depressing, and not always accurate. frequently, these two communication strategies are used in tandem. with sea levels rising, biodiversity decreasing, and foundational ecological systems deteriorating, it is easy to turn facts about environmental change into a dystopian tale of sorrow and destruction. moreover, sensationalized interpretations of statistical results can add flavor to drier discussions about scientific technicalities and complex data, making them more digestible to non-scientific audiences. these communication strategies are not new to environmentalism. influential author and marine biologist rachel carson chose them for her famous book silent spring (1962), which explains the harmful effects of the chemical pesticide dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (ddt). in the opening chapter, “a fable for tomorrow,” carson paints a picture of a peaceful american town inflicted by an “evil spell” that brings illness and death to all living organisms (carson, 1962). it is a vivid and disheartening image that seems out of a grim fairy tale rather than scientific non-fiction. this dark rhetoric draws readers in and guides them into a more technical, fact-based discussion of ddt. alongside explanations of ddt’s chemical structure and potential impacts, carson continues her gloomy storytelling, describing an apocalyptic scene of environmental destruction caused by human actions (killingsworth & palmer, 2000). she calls chemical pesticides “elixirs of death” and speaks about “man’s assaults” on the environment (carson, 1962). carson is not incorrect in these explanations. pollution from toxic chemicals and the possible genocide of insect species would be an assault to life on earth. however, her dramatic language makes these dangers seem more terrifyingly imminent than they necessarily are. this fear-based mobilization tactic worked well for carson. silent spring sparked public concern about the implications of chemical pesticides and eventually led to the banning of ddt for agricultural purposes in the united states (griswold, 2012). this success is largely due to the fact that carson knew her audience and targeted them through her choice of language. as new york times reporter eliza griswold explains, “carson used the era’s hysteria about radiation to snap her readers to attention, drawing a parallel between nuclear fallout and a new, invisible chemical threat of pesticides” (griswold, 2012). in other words, carson used the fear and mistrust already brewing in cold war america to connect her readers to ddt. 66 consilience today, many sustainability advocates continue carson’s tradition by evoking apocalyptic messages to inspire action. however, this tactic is no longer as successful. in his documentary, the inconvenient truth (2006), former vice president al gore used a plethora of well-researched scientific information to explain the distressing dangers of anthropogenic climate change. yet, over 30% of americans continue to deny that it exists, and many american lawmakers are enacting policies that pull us further away from a climate-conscious future (“u.s. concern,” 2016). today’s world is very different than the one in which rachel carson lived during the 1960s. we have experienced increased globalization, changes in social and economic structures, and developments in digital and media technologies. moreover, the environmental movement is not new. significant amounts of environmental regulations are in place and environmental concerns are a mainstream topic. people have been hearing apocalyptic environmental rhetoric since carson published her book fifty years ago, but that destructive end has not come. as a result, for many, the reality of environmental wellbeing and the expected timeline of environmental fallout appears uncertain and confusing. environmental advocates who choose to continue this dramatic rhetoric often become didactic and irritating. they prescribe the right and wrong way to live and blame the general population for environmental problems that plague us. while effective in small doses, an overabundance of this type of language can be overbearing and off-putting. the human brain has a limited capacity for concern, what some experts call a “finite pool of worry” (center for research on environmental decisions (cred), 2009). as a result, there are a limited number of issues that a person can worry about and, usually, one struggles to worry about an issue over an extended period of time. consequently, an excess of negative or fearbased emotional appeals can invoke “emotional numbing” within an audience (cred, 2009). when people are repeatedly faced with a threat, fear of that threat eventually lessens. a similar phenomenon is occurring in some parts of the environmental movement. we have been hearing dark and depressing facts about environmental problems for decades. it is difficult for the human brain to continue processing that worrisome information and even more difficult for the brain to continue worrying about it. therefore, as a result of the continued fear-based rhetorical choices that many environmentalists make (as well as deficiencies in our education and media systems), the facts and theories that create the foundation of environmental scientific work are being politicized and distorted, making it even more difficult to have productive discussions about many important issues. one key strategy to combat this communication blockade is to reframe the environmental conversation so that it appeals to both the emotional and analytic processing centers of the human brain (cred, 2009). also, by reframing arguments, environmental issues can be molded to appeal to specific audiences and can be consilience mosko: dance & sustainable development linked to other issues and values that people may care about more deeply. this is exactly what rachel carson did in silent spring. she reframed the problems of ddt so that they were associated with an issue about which her audience was profoundly concerned: national security in the midst of the cold war. reusing her specific wording and storytelling strategies will not be as effective in the present because modern audiences are faced with an entirely different set of dangers but continuing her legacy of reframing environmental issues is critical for environmental communicators. this paper argues that the arts, specifically dance, are useful tools to reframe the environmental conversation. through dance, sustainability experts could refashion their argument and better communicate their material to general audiences. academic literature on this topic is limited. therefore, much of the argument derives from evidence found in primary sources such as reports, websites, articles, and interviews from organizations and individuals working in the intersection of dance and sustainability. although these sources come from around the world, this study focuses on artists within the western modern dance genre. however, the issues addressed are applicable to any dance style. there are two ways that a dancer, choreographer, or dance company can become more environmentally sustainable. one, called the operations approach, makes company operations sustainable by implementing energy efficient technologies, waste reduction practices, and other similar measures. the second infuses sustainability principles into art by creating work inspired by environmental themes. both strategies have the potential to promote sustainability to audiences and raise awareness about environmental issues but do so differently. the operations approach focuses on measurable and tangible solutions that have an immediate impact on the environment. the artistic approach does not have direct quantitative results. instead, the impact is conceptual and ideological, targeting the emotional, ethical, and cultural value systems that determine how humans interact with the environment around them. neither of these techniques is necessarily better than the other. sustainable development is a complex field that involves many elements. both approaches target different but equally important aspects of those elements. the operations approach arts council england 68 consilience arts council england, england’s governmental arts development and funding agency, is a world leader in the operations approach.1 in 2012, the arts council announced that it would embed environmental sustainability requirements into its funding agreements with artistic and cultural programs as part of its ten-year plan (“growing environmental,” 2012). this initiative focuses on bringing resilient and sustainable business practices to the organizations that the arts council funds in order to make those organizations “more adaptable to all elements of the external world” (arts council england (ace), 2013; “resilience,” n.d.). copenhagen’s “notoriously disappointing climate talks, cop15” of 2009 inspired the council to incorporate these concepts into its work (julie’s bicycle, 2015). as explained in the arts council’s 2015 environmental report, sustaining great art, the program “was designed to do what the talks had failed to achieve: to activate and inspire the arts community to make environmental sustainability a major priority” (julie’s bicycle, 2015). in establishing the resilience and sustainability program, arts council england became the world’s first major arts organization to incorporate environmental stipulations into its work (julie’s bicycle, 2015). the resilience and sustainability objective combines environmental and economic views equally into the council’s overall mission. environmental stipulations work in tandem with the plan’s economic goals of diversifying artists’ monetary support to include “a wider range of contributed or earned sources” such as private funders and supplementary incomes (ace, 2013). the arts council asserts that environmental sustainability increases financial sustainability by ensuring that a company does not run out of resources (ace, 2013). additionally, energy efficiency and waste-saving strategies often save money. in the first three years of the resilience and sustainability program, over half of the participating organizations saw financial benefits after implementing carbon-saving practices. between 2013 and 2015, arts council-funded organizations saved 12,673 tons of co2 equivalent, equaling a financial savings of £2.29 million (julie’s bicycle, 2015). moreover, implementing environmental sustainability standards could help arts organizations find new sources of income. widening the scope of an arts organization’s business plan beyond art diversifies the organization’s business model. a broadened financial base could make an artist or arts company more appealing to a wider array of supporters who may be interested in environmental causes, but not artistic ones. unfortunately, specific examples of this phenomenon in arts council funded organizations are difficult to locate. however, according to the council, 70% of participating organizations found that having environmental policies as part of their business model was “useful when applying for funding,” and that 69% of 1 the author has previously written about this subject in resilience and sustainability: an ethical assessment of environmentalism at arts council england (2016), an unpublished work written for the course ethics of sustainable development taught by adela gondek at columbia university. consilience mosko: dance & sustainable development organizations found these policies helped them “engage with stakeholders” (julie’s bicycle, 2015). to support the environmental element of the resilience and sustainability initiative, the arts council teams up with julie’s bicycle, a global charity that specializes in artistic environmental sustainability. the goal of this collaboration is to 1) track the energy and water use impacts of the arts community, and 2) inspire other artists to make their creative practices more environmentally friendly. to achieve these goals, julie’s bicycle provides technical training and tools that help arts organizations develop an understanding of their environmental footprint (julie’s bicycle, 2015). arts council-funded organizations are required to report information about their energy and water usages using creative industry green carbon calculators, a free environmental impact tool that collects and analyzes a company’s carbon footprint. these calculators can adapt to different arts sectors and measure five areas: energy, water, waste, transportation, and materials (“creative ig tools,” n.d.). this analysis provides arts organizations with data about their carbon footprint from energy, water, waste, and transport as well as information about energy mix, emission levels, water consumption, and waste generation. with this information, julie’s bicycle helps organizations make their operations more sustainable and sets benchmark indicators that allow them to compare their carbon output with others. julie’s bicycle also organizes events, networks, and seminars for people interested in sustainable art practices (julie’s bicycle, 2015). through their joint program, arts council england and julie’s bicycle have made strides in improving the sustainability of british arts and culture. between 2013 and 2015, the number of groups incorporating sustainability measures into their creative practices rose from 14% of arts council-supported organizations to 98%. today, 80% of the over 700 participating organizations not only follow environmental standards, but also consider themselves to be “engaged or very engaged with environmental sustainability” (julie’s bicycle, 2015). between 2012 and 2015, 51% of member organizations saw financial improvements as the result of sustainability measures, 67% saw morale improvements, and 43% saw reputation enhancements. most significantly, the arts council’s environmental measures have “reinforced a sustainability movement in culture with far-reaching potential” (julie’s bicycle, 2015). because of these successes, arts council england plans to continue its resilience and sustainability initiative, furthering its reach and instilling an environmental mindset in england’s arts and culture sector. while these statistics seem promising, the specifics of the program are unclear. it is difficult to find exact energy or waste standards that organizations are expected to meet. instead, it appears that organizations report their consumption statistics to julie’s bicycle, but any action afterward is dependent on the company’s willingness to continue the collaboration. moreover, it is difficult to 70 consilience pinpoint exactly what actions organizations took to improve their sustainability. it seems like most successes were achieved through small-scale efforts to improve the efficiency of buildings. this includes installing efficient lighting and water systems; improving insulation and heat infrastructure; reusing or recycling office supplies, building materials, sets, or costumes; and simply consuming less energy (i.e., turning off the lights more often). some groups incorporated these ideas into their tours. the most extreme example is the shakespeare theater company, handlebards (figure 1), which toured europe on bikes in its 2013-2014 season (julie’s bicycle, 2015). figure 1: the handlebards and the bicycles they use during tours. source: handlebards, n.d. kidd pivot one dance company that takes an operations approach to the dancesustainability partnership is kidd pivot, a vancouver, canada-based contemporary dance company under the direction of world-renowned choreographer crystal pite. kidd pivot’s sustainability efforts were initiated by the company’s rehearsal director, eric beauchesne. an active outdoorsman since childhood, beauchesne quickly noticed the environmental impact of kidd pivot’s touring practices. in a “lightning talk” given at velocity’s seattle festival of dance improvisation in 2014, beauchesne explains how he had an epiphany during a tour in which he traveled from canada to tokyo on a monday and returned that friday, “spending literally as much time in the air as on the ground.” he did this to give a single performance of a 13-minute duet. according to beauchesne’s calculations, the trip emitted seven tons of co2, more than double the co2 emitted annually by a person living in a developing country (beauchesne, 2014). consilience mosko: dance & sustainable development my tokyo epiphany was so strong that for a while i considered quitting my dream job in order to stop extensively pouring co2 in the atmosphere. i was rejecting more and more that the art form i had fallen in love with at 18 was creating dramatic and lasting effects… i thought: “this is going exactly against the very nature of dance, which is to be ephemeral” (beauchesne, 2014). instead of leaving his dance career, beauchesne decided to find a solution to his carbon emission problem. he determined that the main culprit of kidd pivot’s environmental footprint was touring. when the company tours, ten to fifteen people travel across the globe in a staggered and geographically inefficient schedule. for example, kidd pivot began its 2017 tour flying from its home in vancouver to australia (e. beauchesne, personal communication, 20 october 2016; “touring past,” n.d.). then, the company flew to the united states and traveled there for three weeks. after this, all company members traveled to their homes in various parts of canada and the united states for a one-week break before moving on to europe, where they visited serbia, england, spain, and france. one month later, the company returned to europe to perform in amsterdam before hopping back across the atlantic for a show in north carolina. this helter-skelter style of travel has major environmental impacts. worldwide, airplanes account for 2-3% of co2 emissions (federal aviation administration, 2015; international civil aviation organization, 2010). the contrails and cirrus clouds that airplanes emit have a warming effect eight times greater than co2 (borken-kleefeld, berntsen, & fuglestvedt, 2010). at shorter time frames, the per passenger per hour impacts of air travel are 6-47 times higher than car travel (borken-kleefeld et al., 2010). flying as kidd pivot does only worsens these effects. in 2011, each member of kidd pivot emitted about 26 tons of co2 from touring and transporting sets alone (beauchesne, 2014). this number does not the include dancers’ personal emissions. according to the international energy agency, that same year average total co2 emissions per capita in the united states were 17 tons (beauchesne, 2014). therefore, the carbon footprint of kidd pivot dancers solely from touring-related transportation was 65% higher than the total carbon footprint of the average american. in order to combat these challenges, beauchesne decided to offset kidd pivot’s touring-related carbon emissions. after extensive research, beauchesne chose to work with the canada-based carbon offsetting company offsetters (beauchesne, p.c., 2016). offsetters developed a portfolio of projects that is priced at $25 per ton of co2 removed from the atmosphere (beauchesne, p.c., 2016). this portfolio includes three projects. the great bear forest project protects a forest in british columbia, kidd pivot’s home (“great bear”, n.d.). lower zambezi redd+ aids 72 consilience conservation efforts of a wildlife corridor between zambia’s capital, lusaka, and the lower zambezi national park (“lower zambezi, n.d.). kidd pivot’s third project funds the dissemination of fuel-efficient wood burning stoves in uganda to replace the charcoal stoves used by many ugandans (“uganda efficient”, n.d.). the first phase of the kidd pivot-offsetters relationship began in 2014 during a tour of pite’s piece the tempest replica (figure 2). during this phase, offsetters sponsored kidd pivot (“kidd pivot will travel,” 2014). this means that offsetters offset the greenhouse gas emissions kidd pivot generated from touring in exchange for offsetter visibility in kidd pivot’s programs and website (beauchesne, p.c., 2016). the sponsorship allowed kidd pivot to travel carbon neutral that year by offsetting 206 tons of carbon (beauchesne, p.c., 2016). figure 2: kidd pivot performing the tempest replica by crystal pite. source: photo by jörg baumann. the tempest replica. kidd pivot. retrieved from http://www.kiddpivot.org/works/tempest-replica/ after 2014, offsetters stopped sponsoring kidd pivot, initiating the second phase of kidd pivot’s carbon offsetting program (beauchesne, p.c., 2016). in 2015, beauchesne started “1 day for the climate,” a company-collaborator voluntary partnership that dedicates one day of work per year to climate protection (e. beauchesne, personal communication, 10 october 2017). collaborators joining this initiative commit to donating one paycheck per year, an amount that kidd pivot matches and then directs toward climate protection projects chosen by its members. through the 1 day for the climate program, kidd pivot aims to support projects that “directly, effectively, and rigorously offset carbon emissions, support climate justice, or raise awareness on climate change issues” (beauchesne, p.c., 2017). this initiative has allowed kidd pivot to continue touring carbon neutral since 2014, offsetting over 400 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent and donating over $1000 to consilience mosko: dance & sustainable development environmental organizations that are fighting climate change (beauchesne, p.c., 2017; “1 for the climate”, n.d.). for beauchesne, “it was very important that [1 day for the climate] should be voluntary” (beauchesne, p.c., 2016). he did not want to “twist arms” or shame dancers into taking part. still, in retrospect, beauchesne is glad that offsetter’s original sponsorship turned into this new, client-based partnership. “it forces us to be more involved,” he asserts (beauchesne, p.c., 2016). because of 1 day for the climate, kidd pivot members are personally invested in the carbon offsetting process by choosing and partially funding projects that the company supports. consequently, they are thinking about their environmental footprint and are more involved in fixing it. however, carbon offsetting is not a perfect system. even the most responsible carbon offsetter risks donating to scamming organizations. moreover, many critics of carbon offsetting believe that it is merely a “license to pollute” and an excuse to continue an unsustainable lifestyle (palmer, 2016). one critic compared the sale of carbon offsets to the sale of indulgences by the catholic church during the 15th and 16th centuries, which traded money for an absolution of sin (monbiot, 2006). such a comparison implies that carbon offsets are ineffective at altering human behavior, just as indulgences did little to deter sin. if people can pay their way out of sin, what stops them from committing it? similarly, if people can pay away their carbon footprint, what will push them to alter their overly consumptive and polluting habits? these habits, enforced by a culture of heavy consumerism, are one of the main causes of current environmental problems. to many, carbon offsets seem like a cop-out, keeping us from solving a more complicated issue. beauchesne understands these complaints and agrees that carbon offsets are not the perfect solution (beauchesne, p.c., 2016). offsetting is only a small piece of the climate solutions puzzle, but beauchesne believes that it is beneficial in the long run, if only symbolically. calculating carbon footprints and researching offsetting possibilities forces people to have a conversation about their environmental impact. without the conversation, we will never reach the ultimate solution. excitingly, 1 day for the climate has done exactly this. after three years of the program, beauchesne reports that 1 day for the climate has sparked discussions within kidd pivot as well as with agents, presenters, and funders about environmental sustainability (beauchesne, p.c., 2017). kidd pivot is not the only company that struggles with unsustainable travel routines. touring is an essential part of any large dance company’s livelihood. it is how a company makes money and shows its work to larger audiences. unlike film or paintings, it is hard to transport dance. dancers cannot send a digital file or a canvas to a museum or presenter. instead, an entire company along with any necessary sets or costumes must travel. in a perfect world, dance companies could decrease their environmental impact by flying less and having longer home seasons. when 74 consilience traveling, they could organize more logical schedules so that they remain in one region for a longer period instead of hopping between continents every few weeks. in reality, this type of schedule is difficult to organize. agents and presenters, rarely the company, determine touring schedules. companies tour to a theater when the theater is available, not when the company happens to be nearby. beauchesne believes that there is a solution to this touring problem, but at the moment it is difficult to consider (beauchesne, p.c., 2016). discussion arts council england and kidd pivot focus on the operations-side potential for dance to interact with sustainable development. while both of these companies have achieved notable successes, they do have room for improvement. on the whole, the arts council’s resilience and sustainability program is an “empowering statement” on the role of the arts and cultural sector in societal development, implying, that regardless of a lack of political will to respond meaningfully to climate change and environmental degradation, the arts and culture are setting their own ethical and practical standards for environmental management, through voluntary compliance that's placing sustainability at the heart of their business models (“growing environmental”, 2012). however, the program is young and imperfect. some question its emphasis on private sector funding, wondering if increased commercialization will harm artistic quality (gardner, 2016). maintaining the integrity of art is absolutely necessary to any artistic sustainability endeavor. without innovative or legitimate art, the impact of the sustainability initiative will be much less powerful. considering the implications of a sustainability initiative on the quality of the art being presented is vital when assessing the potential for art-sustainability collaborations. another drawback of the arts council’s program is that it focuses almost entirely on energy consumption. it utilizes some information about water and waste, but does so through the lens of carbon footprints. while decreasing carbon emissions is crucial to sustainable development, it is not the only aspect of the field. a similar criticism could be made of kidd pivot’s carbon offsetting program. kidd pivot only assesses its carbon footprint from air transportation, not taking into account carbon emissions produced by the food dancers eat, the costumes they wear, or the electricity they use to power studios and theaters. beauchesne is aware of these limitations and hopes to expand the initiative in the future. specifically, he would like to better organize food consumption during tours to include restaurants and food sellers that provide sustainably grown and prepared foods (beauchesne, p.c., 2016). as these programs develop and the dance world becomes more involved consilience mosko: dance & sustainable development in sustainability, it would be beneficial for organizations to follow beauchesne’s lead and consider a wider array of environmental concerns beyond energy consumption. this raises questions about administrative and financial burdens of sustainability initiatives. arts organizations like kidd pivot do not generally have extra money to pay sustainability managers. groups like julie’s bicycle and offsetters do basic sustainability management for a low price, but if a company wants to expand its environmental program, much of the burden falls on the its own members. beauchesne does the work of arranging kidd pivot’s carbon offsets not because he is paid to do so, but because he cares about the cause. most people do not share his commitment to environmental sustainability, and few have the time or money to sustain a strong and unpaid commitment to such a project. that being said, as arts council england discovered, increased involvement in sustainability initiatives has the potential to expand a dance company’s income sources. thus, implementing sustainability measures could lead to new sources of support that would help to fund additional sustainability endeavors. the other drawback to these projects is that they focus only on the day-today operations of a dance company. consequently, they ignore a major asset available to these artists, namely the art they are creating. this is not necessarily a bad thing. improving the sustainability of a company’s operations is a valuable endeavor. however, art itself is another powerful tool that can be used to bolster the potential relationship between dance and sustainable development. the artistic approach art is a driver and creator of culture. as arts council england explains, “the creative community, the epicentre of culture, has a special contribution to make to the world: it shapes and builds culture, identity, communities, and values” (julie’s bicycle, 2015). art shapes and expresses ideas. it is what delves into the psyche of a culture, exposing and possibly transforming the social status quo and value system. therefore, the actual art that artists create could be an immensely useful tool for sustainability advocates. 76 consilience figure 3: eiko & koma performing river in the delaware river in 1995. eiko & koma dance artists eiko & koma are known for their stark, dramatic, and moving performances. their work reflects influences of japanese butoh and early twentiethcentury german expressionism but remains unique with characteristically slow and extreme movements (acocella, 2011). the environment around the dance (whether natural or manmade) is key to eiko & koma’s choreographic process (yamada, yamada, & yokobosky, 2000). the use of environmental factors in movement invention came early in the duo’s career and has remained throughout. since beginning to choreograph in the 1970s, they have danced with beach seals, on top of landfills, in lakes and streams, and in front of the world trade center (before and after the september 11th attacks) (yamada et al., 2000; kloetzel & pavlik, 2011). river (1995) (figure 3) is a powerful example of eiko & koma’s exploration into environmental subject matter.2 tired of working inside studios and theaters, eiko & koma moved their performance outdoors (yamada et al., 2000). premiering in the delaware river in easton, pennsylvania, this 70-minute dance is entirely dependent on the body of water in which it is performed. the performers start upstream and let the river’s current pull them downstream toward the audience. at the end, the river’s natural flow carries them off stage (yamada et al., 2000). in between that entrance and exit, as koma explains, “we dance and linger a little longer” (miller, 2009). wearing white draping fabrics and painted faces, eiko & koma drift in the river alongside a floating sculpture of wooden branches and accompanied by a gentle flute melody. the movement is slow, simple, and purposeful with few displays of technical brilliance. this simplicity reflects the tranquility of the river. as dance critic joan acocella (2011) explains, eiko & koma 2 the following analysis is not based on a live performance of river. instead, it comes from video excerpts of the piece, interviews with eiko & koma, and critical reviews of the work. source: photo by bruce r. feeley. river (outdoor work) (1995). eiko & koma. retrieved from http://eikoandkoma.org/aboutriver consilience mosko: dance & sustainable development become “part of nature—something bumping out of the tree, the leaves, as slowly as changes take place in those elements.” however, the dance is by no means peaceful. although slow and simple, the movement is full of tension. as acocella (2011) writes, “…they seemed to be in pain. think of those war stories one hears in which, after a massacre, the arriving troops find, under a pile of corpses, an arm or a leg feebly waving…” new york times dance critic jennifer dunning (1995) described how eiko, who appears at first like a “pre-raphaelite rendering of a water-bound, long-haired ophelia” is so transformed by her movement that by the end, she looks like a drowned soldier. river is an inherently sustainably-minded work. as dunning (1995) affirms, river is “quintessential outdoor art: something come upon unexpectedly, privately, an odd and unfathomable phenomenon of nature.” beginning at sunset, the dance makes use of the earth’s natural dimming (yamada et al., 2000). although stage lights do come on once the sky blackens, this use of natural light draws the audience’s attention to an important natural feature: the sun. also, it allows the production to use less electricity than if it were artificially lit. eiko & koma go beyond simply utilizing natural features in their pieces. at each new site, they collaborate with locals to learn about the science and history of the location (yamada et al., 2000; kloetzel & pavlik, 2011). frequently, they clean the river with local volunteers so that it is safe to perform in (kloetzel & pavlik, 2011). the cleaning process involves checking and improving water quality as well as removing debris from the riverbed (kloetzel & pavlik, 2011). while sustainability themes are apparent in eiko & koma’s work, they are not its main focus. rather, eiko & koma continually use natural features in their creations simply because it interests them. “we like to dance about something that is compelling to us, and so, often, that is the tree, it is the mountains, and it is seals” (yamada et al., 2000). the environment becomes a choreographic tool. “nature has an infinite vocabulary,” eiko explains (yamada et al., 2000). through the landscape and the resources it provides, the duo uses nature’s vocabulary to generate material. ultimately, the natural features become an integral part of the work. they determine where audiences view the work and how eiko & koma conduct their movement. as eiko asserts, “the leaves, water, etc., are all a part of our body extension, which provokes us to move in a certain way. they become both our house and our costume” (yamada et al., 2000). beyond choreographic tools, eiko & koma see nature as a means of better communicating with audiences. through their dance, they seek to “have a more universal exchange” (yamada et al., 2000). this exchange relies not on an appreciation or excellence of technique, but instead on an understanding of physicality and setting, concepts innate to life on earth. everyone experiences movement and everyone experiences space. through their work with natural materials, eiko & koma seek to reconnect their audiences with these two 78 consilience fundamental parts of life. “it’s not that we are only interested in animals or plants,” eiko explains, “but we’re interested in life as life, and sometimes it is not necessarily only about the human” (yamada et al., 2000). she goes on to say, our primary concern, though, is how to be part of something larger than who we are. in that sense, we are visitors to the river. during our visit, we share the time with the river and then we disappear and the river is left alone. people who live in the community have a sense of seeing the river in a very new, different way…this will hopefully stay with the audience. we hope that we are giving some kind of awareness to the environment as much as to the community (yamada et al., 2000). the fact that eiko & koma create environmental work from something other than an environmentalist perspective makes their work all the more powerful. enlisting the environment as a choreographic tool rather than a political statement seems to allow eiko & koma to avoid the trap of depressing and overbearing language that environmentalists often fall into. their work most definitely raises attention to issues about sustainability and environmental health, but it does so by drawing attention to the beauty and uses of nature. it does not preach the reasons that nature must be saved, but instead exposes the benefit and importance of it. vertigo dance company vertigo, an israeli contemporary dance company, incorporates both the operations and artistic approaches of dance sustainability into its work.3 based in the eco-arts village built by artistic directors noa wertheim and adi sha’al, vertigo is known for its social and environmental activism (“biographies,” n.d.). located at kibbutz netiv halamed-hey in the elah valley between jerusalem and tel aviv, this eco-arts village allows the company to operate sustainably. the studios are refurbished chicken coups that were renovated using recycled wood and local building materials (wertheim, 2010). the village utilizes renewable energy technologies, such as solar panels, and its gardens are run with sustainable agricultural practices (halon & lebor, 2011; israel, 2014; dorit talpaz, 2012). additionally, wertheim and sha’al organize workshops and artistic residencies at the village for people interested in green technologies, building techniques, and gardening. the sustainable principles that vertigo dance company practices in its operations inform the choreography that wertheim (the company’s main choreographer) creates. wertheim’s choreography derives from a characteristically 3 as with eiko & koma, the following discussion sources information from interviews, articles, and video excerpts of the discusses works, not viewings of live performances. consilience mosko: dance & sustainable development israeli lexicon of contemporary dance. it is extreme and physical with a low center of gravity, intricate joint articulations and extensions, and energetic dynamics. reflecting sha’al’s experience as a member of the batsheva ensemble, wertheim’s style has aesthetic similarities to the sensation-based movement of ohad naharin’s gaga technique. however, wertheim’s interest in social and environmental issues makes her work unique and distinctively “sinuous, organic and rooted to the earth” (kussell, 2016). figure 4: birth of the phoenix is performed under this geodesic dome. source: dekel, a. (2012, march 25). napoli teatro festival italia 2012: focus on israeli dance. midnight east. retrieved from http://www.midnighteast.com/mag/?p=18473 environmental themes are obvious in wertheim’s piece, birth of the phoenix (2004). inspired by soil and a desire to no longer perform indoors, wertheim choreographed a dance that “examines the human relation to and alienation from the earth” (kussell, 2016). like eiko & koma’s river, birth of the phoenix is performed outdoors, taking place within a bamboo geodesic dome (figure 4) and on top of a circular stage covered in dirt. the dirt is integral to the dance. as the dancers spin, leap, and roll, the soil flies into the air and sticks to the costumes. like the water in river, the dirt becomes a set, a prop, a costume, and another performer. although river and birth of the phoenix are performed outdoors, they are not necessarily site-specific. they require specific natural features, but those features exist in multiple places. as a result, the dances are transportable. river and birth of the phoenix have been performed in multiple outdoor locations. eiko & koma even adapted their work for indoor spaces at the american dance festival and lincoln center (“river (outdoor work)”, n.d.). 80 consilience both eiko & koma and vertigo dance company have created sustainablyminded work for indoor spaces as well. vertigo’s white noise (2008) (figure 5) takes place on a traditional proscenium stage and, like birth of the phoenix, explores human disconnect with the natural world (kussell, 2011). featuring costumes adorned with large bar codes and music that mixes urban and wilderness sounds, white noise questions modern society’s connection to material consumerism (rottenberg, 2008; kussell, 2011; kaye, 2017).4 figure 5: white noise, choreographed by noa wertheim source: white noise at the revolution orchestra. vertigo dance company. retrieved from http://vertigo.org.il/en/vertigo-company/white-noise/ during white noise performances, vertigo asks audience members to bring old items to barter and trade with other audience members. called “hand to hand,” this program makes audiences aware of their consumptive habits by encouraging them to recycle unwanted items (wertheim, 2008; kaye, 2017). it provides audiences with insight into the anti-consumerism message behind white noise, but also takes direct action to reduce waste. discussion the aesthetic differences between vertigo dance company and eiko & koma make the sustainability implications of their work different. eiko & koma’s intensely slow, intentional dancing that is intimately connected to the landscape puts more attention on the environment than on the humans. eiko & koma become features of the space, so their dancing draws the audience’s attention to the space. 4 wertheim is currently revisiting and reworking white noise in a collaboration with the revolution orchestra. the new version will premier in the spring of 2018. consilience mosko: dance & sustainable development alternatively, at vertigo dance company, wertheim’s physical and dynamic choreography highlights humans in contrast to the environment around them. rather than making the dancers a part of the surrounding space, wertheim focuses on the evolving relationship between humans and space. from a sustainability point of view, both of these messages are important and can be used in tandem to target separate topics and audiences. even with these differences, the way in which these dances impact sustainability is similar. the effect that they have in terms of increasing environmental appreciation is subtle, but impactful. the reason that art is poignant and provoking is that it can question and highlight concepts, arguments, and ideas outside the limits of rational, everyday language and thought. thus, dances about sustainability issues have the potential to delve into a much deeper form of environmental advocacy that imaginatively analyzes value systems, societal norms, and other concepts surrounding environmental problems. dances like river, birth of the phoenix, and white noise do not tell people what to do or overtly criticize their lifestyles. they do not rely on statistics or projections about future disaster to make a point. instead, these dances supplement scientific theory by reframing the conversation, bringing environmental concepts into a new context. this new context is potentially less politically polarizing and off-putting than sustainability’s usual setting because it is not coming from the usual sources, namely politicians, media outlets, and scientists who foster and receive prejudice based on their affiliations with certain environmental issues. that being said, even if the dance is political it can be a useful tool for sustainability. reshaping any argument (through dance or other mediums) makes that argument stronger. new versions of the argument will highlight different elements and draw attention to issues in diverse ways. a reframed argument has the potential to appeal to new audiences who may not receive or care about a message in its original setting. a climate skeptic may not be receptive to discussions about climate change from climatologists or journalists who they perceive as biased. however, they may be more receptive to the conversation if it comes in a new location from new agents who have new arguments. if, for instance, this person saw a dance that expressed the value of natural resources through abstraction and creativity, they may gain a more emotional and value-based connection to those resources and have a greater interest in preserving them. sustainably-informed dances, especially the outdoor works discussed above, reshape perceptions of the space around us (kloetzel & pavlik, 2011). dancing alters any space, transforming it into a place of action and human connection. when dance occurs in an everyday space, it transforms into a place with a unique story, memory, or emotion. after seeing river, one audience member commented, “all summer, i have been bringing my kids to this place, and i have never seen this river as a ‘river’” (kloetzel & pavlik, 2011). by watching dance in a familiar river, this woman saw the 82 consilience river differently. it gained its own intrinsic value. many philosophers dating back to the time of plato and aristotle have asserted that intrinsic valuing (seeing the good in something for its own sake) is more profound than utility valuing (seeing the good in something for the services it provides). appreciating a space for its own sake provides a deeper type of respect that will likely lead to greater compassion. environmentally motivated choreography like that of vertigo dance company and eiko & koma reveals a more profound solution to sustainability issues. it helps reconstruct our perception of the environment and instill a sustainable set of values that derive from a place of appreciation and understanding rather than one of rapprochement and fear. in the long run, this tactic is more lasting because it aims at the underbelly of culture, altering the way that we see and interact with the world around us. there are drawbacks to this dance-sustainability partnership. the main obstacle is visibility. dance does not have the pop cultural appeal of other art forms like music or film. dance’s lack of visibility among the general public in western, but especially american, culture is a complex issue with numerous and historic roots. the united states was founded on a set of puritan values that perceived dance as sin. certain aspects of western theatrical dance history only enhance this historical perception. for instance, there is a long history of prostitution and sexualization (especially of the female body) in ballet. although perceptions on morality and religion have changed drastically in past centuries, their legacy in regards to dance has not vanished completely. still, dance is often associated with promiscuity and is not always seen as a legitimate or intellectual art form. this perspective is only exacerbated by the fact that dance and dance history education (like environmental science education) is lacking. dance is not taught with the same frequency or depth as other art forms like painting, theater, music, or film, which most people come into contact with, in some form, during their formal education as well as in their daily lives. eiko & koma and vertigo dance company are well known in the modern dance community, but their work is not widely displayed to the general public. it is unlikely that many people without backgrounds in either dance or sustainability would seek out the opportunity to see these artists simply because most people are unaware that these artists exist. it is also possible that their work would be distasteful to certain audiences. with minimal and slow movement patterns, eiko & koma’s dances are highly experimental and lack the sensational overload of more popular performance styles (kloetzel & pavlik, 2011). wertheim’s choreography, which is dense with vigorous, sensation-based movement, would probably not face this issue, but it does incorporate other elements that non-dancers might find off-putting. this includes a liberal use of the pelvis and torso that may appear sexual to unaccustomed viewers. consilience mosko: dance & sustainable development appealing to a general audience is a problem throughout the dance world. kidd pivot discovered this during the first phase of its collaboration with offsetters. initially, offsetters agreed to sponsor kidd pivot in exchange for visibility in the company’s promotional materials. however, offsetters realized that kidd pivot does not offer much visibility, at least compared to other organizations that it sponsors such as the canadian olympic team (beauchesne, p.c., 2016). the work that offsetters put into the kidd pivot sponsorship did not equal the visibility that kidd pivot — an internationally renowned dance company — could offer. improving the visibility of dance will be crucial if it is used as a communication tool for sustainability. it is possible that collaborative work between the two fields could aid this endeavor. work about sustainable narratives could entice audiences and funders interested in sustainability but not necessarily dance, thus widening dances’ support network. this idea is central to arts council england’s resilience and sustainability campaign, but examples of it happening are so far limited. moreover, by interacting with a scientific field, dance could gain legitimacy among academics and society. unlike the visual arts, music, or theater, dance has a small academic wing and is less widely understood by the general public. interacting with scientists and scientific ideas could help dance appear more legitimate to less knowledgeable viewers. this aspect of the dance-sustainability collaboration is beyond the scope of this study, but has great potential for further research. conclusion dance is an inherently spatial and ephemeral art form. these qualities give dance the possibility of being a leader of sustainability, but dance is not living up to that potential. there is ample space for the dance community to become more sustainable by improving the inefficient and wasteful practices of many dancers and dance companies. programs originated by arts council england, kidd pivot, and vertigo dance company (with its eco-arts village) are excellent examples of the potential for this type of work. they are setting examples of sustainable business practices, funding requirements, and material consumption that all dance organizations should follow. these sustainability endeavors can start small. consider reusing or repurposing costumes. stay cognizant of sets or props and try to use them in the least wasteful way (is a prop that can only be used once and must be replaced for each performance a sustainable choice, environmentally or economically?). the more that dance artists and organizations research, test, and discuss sustainability endeavors, the more advances and innovations will be made. despite their successes, the projects discussed above are only starting points. they initiate the conversation, but also expose the inadequacies of the dance community’s current relationship to sustainability. improving this dance84 consilience sustainability partnership also requires that dancers and choreographers start incorporating their artistic voices into the sustainability conversation. if utilized correctly, dance could be an especially potent tool to communicate ideas and information about sustainability issues. it could reframe the environmental conversation so that it appeals to broader audiences and focuses on deeper cultural sources of unsustainability. this is not to say that dance is the only solution to our environmental problems. it is also not asserting that all dance should be about environmental themes. rather, it emphasizes a potential partnership between the dance and sustainable development communities that could improve the education and communication methods available to sustainability advocates and environmental scientists. a true shift toward a sustainably minded society will come from many sources. it will come from improvements in technology, changes to economic structures, and implementations of political tools. however, all of these changes point toward one main solution to our current environmental problem: culture. no matter how many renewable energy technologies we develop or environmental restrictions we put in place, a long-lasting change toward a sustainable society is ultimately going to result from a shift in our culture and the values that it creates. the arts, a driver and innovator of culture, are therefore an important asset to sustainability. they could help to shift the values of our society in a sustainably minded direction, creating much more lasting impacts on the future of dance, sustainable development, and the planet as a whole. consilience mosko: dance & sustainable development bibliography 1day for the climate. kidd pivot. retrieved from https://kiddpivot.org/1day-forthe-climate/. acocella, j. (2011, april 11). bare truths: eiko and koma in ‘naked.’” the new yorker. arts council england. (2013). great art and culture for everyone: 10-year strategic framework, 2010-2020. manchester, england. beauchesne, e. (2014, september 16). beyond the ephemerality of dance: the positive impact artists can have in the fight against climate change. stance. retrieved from http://velocitydancecenter.org/stance/beyondephemerality/ biographies: vertigo dance company. ecotopia dance productions. retrieved from http://www.ecotopiadance.com/37/index_en.htm borken-kleefeld, j., berntsen, t., & fuglestvedt, j. (2010). specific climate impact of passenger and freight transport. environmental science technology, 44(15), p. 5700–5706. doi: 10.1021/es903993 carson, r. (1962). silent spring. new york: houghton mifflin. center for research on environmental decisions (cred), columbia university. (2009). the psychology of climate change communication: a guide for scientists, journalists, educators, political aides, and the interested public. new york. creative ig tools / services. julie’s bicycle. retrieved from http://www.juliesbicycle.com/services/ig-tools/ [dorit talpaz]. (2012, march 29). vertigo dance company [video file]. retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a3iumzb1sgw dunning, j. (1995, september 11). dance review; a nuanced production with nature as co-star. new york times. federal aviation administration (faa), office of environment and energy. (2015). aviation emissions, impacts & mitigation: a primer. washington d.c. gardner, l. (2016, october 20). arts council releases report on state of english theatre. the guardian. great bear forest carbon project. offsetters. retrieved from https://www.offsetters.ca/project-services/offset-projects/bycountry/great-bear-forest-carbon-project griswold, e. (2012, 21 september). how ‘silent spring’ ignited the environmental movement. new york times magazine. growing environmental sustainability in the performing arts sector. (2012, september 28). dance uk. retrieved from http://www.danceuk.org/news/article/growing-environmentalsustainability-performing-arts-sector/ halon, s. & lebor, m. [21see]. (2011, july 18). an eco village beyond vertigo [video file]. retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ulmmy7xj4a 86 consilience international civil aviation organization (icao). (2010). aviation’s contribution to climate change. in icao environmental report 2010. montreal. [israel]. (2014, january 18). successful dancer trades in her jeep to start an eco-art village [video file]. retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cvvzhv39ce julie’s bicycle & arts council england. (2015) sustaining great art environmental report: 2012-2015 results and highlights. manchester, england. kaye, h. (2017, april 27). all the buzz about ‘noise.’ retrieved from http://vertigo.org.il/en/buzz-noise-helen-kaye/?lang=en kidd pivot will travel carbon neutral for the tempest replica tour thanks to a new partnership with offsetters. (2014, april 25). offsetters. retrieved from https://www.offsetters.ca/about-us/currentnews/2014/04/25/kidd_pivot_will_travel_carbon_neutral_for_the_temp est_ replica_tour_thanks_to_a_new_partnership_with_offsetters killingsworth, m. j. & palmer, j. s. (2000). silent spring and science fiction: an essay in the history and rhetoric of narrative. in c. waddell (ed.), and no birds sing: rhetorical analyses of rachel carson's silent spring. (p. 174-204). carbondale: southern illinois university press. kloetzel, m. & pavlik c. (eds.). (2011). eiko otake. in site dance: choreographers and the lure of alternative spaces. gainesville: university of south florida press. kussell, s. m. (2011, 13 october). bringing modern dance down to earth. the forward. retrieved september 15, 2017 from http://forward.com/culture/144228/bringing-modern-dance-down-toearth/ lower zambezi redd+. offsetters. retrieved from https://www.offsetters.ca/project-services/offset-projects/bycountry/lower-zambezi-redd marshall, g. (2014, september 23). why our brains are wired to ignore climate change and what to do about it. the guardian. miller, s. (producer) & eiko & koma (directors). (2009). dancing in the water: the making of river (film). retrieved from http://eikoandkoma.org/dancinginwater monbiot, g. (2006, october 18). paying for our sins. the guardian. palmer, b. (2016, april 28). should you buy carbon offsets? a practical and philosophical guide to neutralizing your carbon footprint. retrieved from https://www.nrdc.org/stories/should-you-buy-carbon-offsets resilience, sustainability and philanthropy. arts council england. retrieved from http://www.artscouncil.org.uk/how-we-make-impact/resilience-andsustainability river (outdoor work)*. eiko & koma. retrieved from http://eikoandkoma.org/index.php?p=ek&id=1857 consilience mosko: dance & sustainable development rottenberg, h. (2008, november 9). white noise: the power of protest. retrieved from http://www.dancevoices.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl e&id=42:white-noise-the-power-of-protest&catid=31&itemid=17&lang=en sachs, j. d. (2015). the age of sustainable development. new york: columbia university press. touring past. kidd pivot. retrieved from http://kiddpivot.org/touring/past/ uganda efficient wood cook stoves. offsetters. retrieved from https://www.offsetters.ca/project-services/offset-projects/bycountry/uganda-efficient-wood-cook-stoves u.s. concern about global warming at eight-year high. (2016, march 16). gallup news. retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/poll/190010/concern-globalwarming-eight-year-high.aspx wertheim, n. (2010, may 25). vertigo dance company: a conversation with choreographer noa wertheim (galili, d. f., interviewer) [audio file]. retrieved from https://www.danceinisrael.com/2010/05/vertigo-dance-company-aconversation-with-choreographer-noa-wertheim/ yale project on climate change. (2009). global warming’s six americas 2009: an audience segmentation analysis. yamada, e. o., yamada, t. k., and yokobosky, m. (2000). movement as installation: eiko & koma in conversation with matthew yokobosky. paj: a journal of performance and art, 22(1), p. 26-35. doi: 10.2307/3245908 microsoft word roy.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 16, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 74-90 a critique on current paradigms of economic ‘growth’ and ‘development’ in the context of environment and sustainability issues sayan roy ashoka trust for research in ecology and the environment (atree), bangalore, india sayan.roy@atree.org abstract this paper critically evaluates different models of economic progress and development using concepts based on the idea of the ‘political economy’. it explores the influence of globalization on these different models and explores the nexus between the international financial institutions, trade bodies, and agreements that continuously exert economic pressure on governments. this paper also attempts to understand the environment and society in the context of markets and valuation mechanisms, and questions the effectiveness of economic instruments used to tackle complex environmental issues such as climate change and deforestation. the rest of this paper focuses on the technology-market interface; technologically oriented economic solutions seem to have a limited understanding of the root causes of the issues they are created to remedy. they also fail to acknowledge the intricate relationship between humans and their environments. this paper expounds the perceived inability of conventional economic frameworks to capture the dynamism, complex interactions, and organic nature of life sustaining phenomena in the biosphere is emphasized. keywords: political economy, market instruments, international financial institutions consilience roy: economic growth and development paradigms author’s note: my core interest lies in bio-physical hydrologic modelling. currently, i am focused in general on hydrology and management of urban lakes and specifically on constructing a water and nutrient balance for the jakkur lake in bangalore. previously, i have also worked on modelling forest fire-hydrology interactions in the garhwal himalaya, and had two stints on the adapting to climate change in urbanizing watersheds project at atree. i have a strong affinity for ecological economics, political ecology and governance. consilience 76 overview of surveyed literature limited literature having been surveyed, a concise summary of the limited sources helps provide the reader with a greater context. this paper was inspired by ashish kothari and aseem shrivastava’s ‘churning the earth: the making of global india,’ which is essentially a critique of globalization in an indian context. using extensive, often government-supplied data, they analyse the consequences of rigorous economic reform across many aspects of life indicative of human well-being, including nutrition measures in a typical food basket, actual wages across economic strata, and job creation. throughout the book, it becomes painfully clear that traditional livelihoods and systems of sustenance have been uprooted and, unraveled, leaving a significant section of the populace to face dire economic consequences that are in stark contrast to the great fruits that a global economy promised with their integration. the book pays special attention to the structural adjustment policies instituted by international financial institutions like the world bank. similarly, ciem tisdell’s paper on transitional economies and globalization examines the relationship between integration into the world economy through institution of market based reforms and its subsequent social and environmental impacts, such as in the form of unemployment and ecological consequences. this paper focuses on the contradictory outcomes of globalization—simultaneously increasing access to commodities and creating new dilemmas for social welfare and employment. teresa encarnacion tadem’s paper on anti-globalization spaces in thailand helps foster an understanding of how popular grassroots movements have mobilized using their collective agency to voice their own concerns about globalization and take on the disparately larger and more powerful large international banks. through ‘radical ecological democracy,’ ashish kothari provides suggestions for alternative development pathways rooted in traditional livelihoods, local production and consumption, and other solutions based on actual experiments that have worked to some degree in different parts of india. this can also be regarded as active resistance against globalization and its detrimental effects. wing thye woo’s paper on the governance structures in china shows that a paradigm shift is underway, as greater concerns are raised about the integrity of chinese society and a harmonious existence. rebecca pearse’s work on markets and climate governance examines the market based instruments that have been aggressively touted as solutions to address anthropogenic climate change. she uses a gramscian analysis to show how political agency has been used by corporate lobbies to shift climate governance strategies towards market focused solutions as opposed to other alternatives. long, roberts and dehm have specifically looked at the unredd (the collaborative united nations program for reducing consilience roy: economic growth and development paradigms emissions from deforestations and forest degradation) framework and have shown that the program has seldom achieved its emissions reductions targets; furthermore, the authors note the program’s potential to uproot and devastate those who depend on the forest to survive. ariel saleh is even more critical in her climate strategy paper. she writes about the australian climate obstacles, where emissions initiatives are simply fallacies claiming to use certain technologies with no emissions but with invisible externalities that often more than offset the reductions. saleh’s paper also highlights the people’s conference on climate change in bolivia held in bolivia as a counter-narrative to the united nations framework convention on climate change (unfccc) and the conference of parties (cop), although they engage with the former and present their draft recommendations that closely resemble their protocol. analogous to the markets and technology oriented solutions in the climate governance framework, alistair iles’ ‘rethinking differential obligations...’ examines the international convention on biodiversity (cbd) through the lens of technology transfers. equity dimensions of the cbd are explored, and it is seen that on the ground, the convention cannot effectively preserve biodiversity in many parts of the world, leading to the assertion that certain aspects of the convention may be reworked to include a more pluralistic idea of how to engage with biodiversity based on local economies. a prelude energy demands, economics of scale: whose demand? at the 2014 annual delhi sustainable development summit (dsds) held by teri, the deputy chairman of the planning commission of india posited a dilemma: that we must choose between a perilous scenario of energy deficiency wherein electricity generation would be catastrophically less than our demand and another where this deficit is solved by opening northeastern india to hydroelectric projects involving the erection of large dams. this binary rhetoric of ‘develop or perish’ has been mooted by the indian state over the last two decades and the proposed ‘development’ solutions have far reaching ecological, socio-economic, and cultural consequences. both coveted engineering design and economic principles share a similar character scale. if things can be scaled, they make sense. therefore, hydroelectric power generation in this country is also myopically restricted to the idea of scale; it is not economically and energetically feasible to generate electricity from smaller dams and therefore we must construct mega-dams across all of our large rivers. when manufacturing dams, size is a considerably important factor. the size of a dam determines construction materials larger dams typically cannot be made from earthen materials such as soil and rock, and they necessitate the inundation of large areas to create reservoirs. the socio-economic dimension of energy demands is heavily disregarded. the northeastern rivers must generate hydroelectric power, otherwise consilience 78 india will fail to meet its energy demands. when we present a future demand of 65000 mw for the country, whose demand is considered? is this not essentially the routing of electricity principally to our concentrated urban centres? rationale, research questions & organization economics traditionally categorizes itself into macroeconomics, which concerns large-scale economic trends, and microeconomics, which involves household-level resources and decisions. however, with the exception of elinor ostrom’s framework of new institutional economics, mainstream economic theory seems to pay very little attention to the role of politics, power, and institutions in shaping a nation’s macroeconomic policies. this paper is essentially a critique of the development decisions made by the indian state. it also attempts to understand and analyse the performance of the economic tools and frameworks that are implemented to steer the nation towards economic growth. it is based on a literature survey and attempts to shed light on the following questions: how has globalization influenced economic policies in india and other developing nations, and what impact have market based economic reforms had on countries like india? how do international financial institutions influence the macroeconomic policies of developing nations? does the creation of market based economies and the implementation of market instruments based on technology genuinely address complex environmental issues like climate change? what assumptions does the current paradigm of indian economic development make and is this development socially inclusive? does everyone support current notions of economic growth or are there alternative ideas and concepts of ‘development’? the first section of this paper comments on capital in its different forms and how different elements of the environment and society are viewed through an ‘economic lens’. next is an exploration of what globalization has meant for economies, with special attention paid to china, in a global framework of obligations resting on international trade bodies and agreements. subsequently, the focus shifts to two key environmental issues climate governance and biodiversity conservation. examples from the unfccc framework and the convention on biodiversity (cbd) are highlighted. this paper then goes on to examine the crucial interface between technology and markets, and tries to ascertain the consilience roy: economic growth and development paradigms potential of technology to actually solve issues like climate change. finally, the environmental kuznets curve, a fundamental concept in resource economics, is mentioned. questions about social dimensions of equity and access to resources are posed, and the eco-sufficient low-carbon lifestyles of indigenous peoples in nations are brought to light. this paper has notable boundaries, the most significant being the limited amount of literature surveyed. another restriction is the scope of the paper, as it can only discuss broad economic perspectives. the presented arguments lack specific, concrete examples and case studies. the links and relationships between different concepts are not concrete causalities. capital, markets and growth central to all economic theory is the concept of ‘capital’. this seems a reasonable conceptualization to understand and empirically quantify things (albeit with its own problems) in terms of markets, finance, and capturing flows of money. economists, however, have gone further and applied the idea of ‘capital’ to human beings and the relationships that exist between them. the terms ‘social capital’ and ‘human capital’, which quantify and assess the trust, ties, and networks that people form, severely limit a coherent cognizance of human experiences. the word ‘capital’ automatically restricts the undeniably nuanced experiences of human life and consciousness with other people. the appropriation of human lives into the economic systems has always existed in the form of conceptualizing the ‘labour’ component of ‘land, labour and capital’ in order to address production, consumption, supply, demand and other economic needs. to achieve this, the transformation of human individuals into aggregate ‘labour’ forces was deemed necessary. social ‘capital' and human ‘capital’ have gained traction in economic circles as progressive ideas in spite of the limitations mentioned before. in addition, the paradigm based on neo-classical economics goes further and appropriates nature as a form of ‘capital’ as well. one is obliged to accept the idea that ‘natural capital’ is a sincere, sensible way of capturing the value of natural ‘resources’ and our environment in general. the economic discipline seems to construe many things as resources to be extracted, harvested and mobilised, and hence most things come to be regarded as ‘capital’ regardless of whether they are living, dead, observable or invisible. with this conceptualisation of the world comes the perception that nature is not central and vital to our existence, but simply a tool to be utilised. the present doctrine of economic thought brainwashes individuals into forgetting a crucial fact of existence human beings cannot survive without the basic processes that exist in natural systems such as the production of oxygen through photosynthesis, and the biotic regulation of climate phenomena. humans’ arrogance and self-centeredness has engendered the belief that humans are the evolutionary pinnacle of all life forms, consilience 80 and nature and all else exist to be subjugated. this is illustrated by the point made before, where nature and its vital life-supporting processes are demoted to a form of capital. in this sphere, there seems to be no understanding that none of the basic elements of commerce such as, stock exchanges, or manufacturing facilities, would survive or be sustained if these vital life-supporting mechanisms were to falter in any way. the liberalised free market doctrine of economic growth is fundamentally driven by increased consumption. there are constant references to the ‘engines of growth’ and the idea that regulations and processes must not hinder growth rates. even if someone sanely argued that there is some sort of inevitable human need to want to consume more indefinitely, from an ecological perspective, there are fundamental thermodynamic laws of energetics. these dictate that there are energetic limits to extraction, conversion of raw materials to products and waste and so on. therefore, an economic system that does not pay heed to basic energetics, possibly captured by measurement tools such as eroei’s (energy return on energy invested), for all its mathematical and modelling sophistication in the form of econometrics, cannot supersede the fundamental laws of energy and matter. the most relied-upon index for measurement of economic growth is still the gross domestic product (gdp). as the discipline of economics has matured there has been gradual recognition that gdp is not a very comprehensive measure of many crucial elements of a nation’s condition and therefore there has been a drive to create other indices. an alternative, the human development index (hdi), was inspired by amartya sen’s capability approach. the hdi attempts to capture other meaningful qualitative parameters such as access to education, health services etc. unfortunately, even alternative indices of a nation’s economic condition such as the hdi are still given little importance in framing economic policy, as the models of economic growth are obstinate in their use of gdp. in sum, in the realm of public discourse, the numbers matter and those numbers are all in reference to gdp. international financial institutions and the chinese economy international financial institutions have been encouraging the developing nations to follow the same growth-oriented model that is overtly focused on gross domestic product (gdp) as a measure of economic growth. one of the key justifications to entice the indian state to follow this model of development has been the story of china’s meteoric rise in the global economy. however, there is growing recognition that the chinese economy cannot keep ‘growing’ at this unprecedented rate and that this ‘growth’ has come at a significant ecological and social cost to the country (see woo, 2007). since india frequently looks to china as a country worth emulating (see drèze and sen, 2002), it is consilience roy: economic growth and development paradigms important to recognize the shifting dynamic in the political thought process of the chinese state. the priority of the chinese state has shifted from economic growth to ‘establishing a harmonious society by 2020’ (woo, 2007). the chinese government may soon recognize the considerable degree of social unrest among citizens who could not reap the benefits of economic growth and react by adjusting their economic policies to engender a more equitable distribution of wealth and resources in the future, even if it implies resisting some of the economic measures that the large multi-lateral banks would like china to implement, although this point is hugely speculative. since there are certain similarities between india and china in terms of demographics, it would be sensible for indian economic policy makers to understand and learn from the changes that are taking place in the chinese context. in the current economic context, each nation has its own internal market economy and also a global market economy that it is a part of. globalization, through economic pressures, has triggered a heavy interaction between domestic market economies and the global economic regime. india has been no exception to this phenomenon and the result is that domestic economic policy is increasingly influenced by the external global market economy. like many developing nations, the consequence has been that india has lost a degree of its economic sovereignty. the multilateral development banks have played a huge role in influencing this interaction and it becomes a pertinent issue in many contexts. india as a nation may want to enact certain environmental regulations or even social welfare initiatives but it may be discouraged from such initiatives and bullied onto a different path of development as dictated by the forces of the international market economy. (pearce, 2011) market creation and livelihoods an important feature that needs to be reckoned with respect to market creation is the timespan involved in the evolution of markets. the global north has had a considerably larger amount of time to evolve market structures as opposed to the nature of the current shifts taking place in the global south. a rapid enactment of economic reforms that are meant to swiftly liberalize an economy and generate markets is bound to have adverse effects on the social and cultural fabric of a population, not to mention, widespread ecological consequences. for instance, in the predominant mainstream economic rhetoric, one is used to the idea that displacement caused by rapid industrialization can be appeased and dealt with justly by rewarding compensation to those that are affected by such projects. however, communities themselves may not be ready or equipped to deal with such a dramatic shift and the compensation amount may have little meaning to them. in fact, injecting such amounts of money into rural economies in the form of compensation in order to acquire land for private enterprise may even wreck havoc among consilience 82 communities. this is well illustrated in the kind of situations evolving in the agrarian villages of the northern indian region such as that described by kothari in ‘churning the earth.’ farmers contest that their way of life is the most precious thing that they hold and giving up their practice of growing crops would amount to a shattered, directionless future in which context, the money received from the state would bear little relevance. (shrivastava and kothari, 2012) ifi’s & trade treaties the most powerful tools created by international financial institutions are international trade bodies and agreements. the world trade organization (wto) creates the rules of the game with respect to international trade and with the ratification of the general agreement on trade and tariffs (gatt) by developing nations, countries like india have certain obligations to fulfil with respect to their economic policies on trade and export. it is no surprise that these trade frameworks once again reflect the geopolitical struggle for dominance of capital flows which ends up being in favour of the developed world. ifi’s with their powerful trade agreement tools to influence national economic policy have been historically putting pressure on developing nations to institute ‘structural adjustment policies’ in the domestic structuring of their internal economies (see tisdell, 2001). this is facilitated in no small part by large banks lending vast amounts of capital such as to the indian state for various ‘development’ projects and assistance. when national governments take on these projects and agree to carry them out they are essentially locked into a ‘debt trap’ situation where the lending institutions increasingly influence monetary policy domestically, using the debt as a leveraging tool. these modes of influence are relevant in the current ‘foreign direct investment’ (fdi) debate, which india was thoroughly caught up in. fdi may adversely influence local employment prospects and local enterprise but if the indian state has been accumulating capital from the ifi’s, they would be in a weaker negotiating position to maintain their previously firm stance on restricting the amount of fdi allowed. interestingly, neo-liberal enthusiasts with a heavy interest in opening up the indian economy to foreign injection of capital have highlighted ‘policy paralysis’ as a problem with respect to the indian state. it has the caught the imagination of the public that there is too much ‘red tape’ and this ‘hinders’ financial interests. the implicit suggestion being that the state should reduce the degree of its intervention in economic affairs. however, this is ironic considering ‘policy paralysis’ could be the same term used to describe the effects of loss of economic autonomy in domestic decision making in the country as noted before. the international monetary fund (imf), the world bank and the chicago group have been very systematic in their declaration that developing nations and indeed the whole world, should all orient their economies towards generating market consilience roy: economic growth and development paradigms focused solutions and this should be in conjunction with the retreat of the state. this premise has some serious flaws, especially in a country like india where there has been a history of inequity of distribution of access to even basic needs. the first flaw that can be highlighted is that of rising unemployment with a shift to market economies based on increased privatization and mechanization of goods and services. for a long time, there has been serious concern that if china were to privatize all its state enterprises then there would be a significant spike in unemployment. india is a democratic country in principle and therefore such dramatic transitions may not be plausible but it is still important to consider impacts on employment with rising privatization of public sector enterprises. welfare & public-private partnerships in addition to the employment impacts, another consistent fallout of a rapid shift to laissez-faire market dominance in a domestic economy is the erosion of welfare. the indian state and constitution began with very serious commitments to ensuring that its citizens should be extended different forms of welfare and this should foster an equitable society. however, social welfare has steadily become a low priority endeavour of the indian nation-state and this is in congruence with what is observed in other developing nations that have encouraged radical shifts to market based economies. increased privatization and corporate control of basic resources and services leads to a widening gap between those that have access and those that do not have access to these resources. this has serious impacts on civil society as large numbers of people lose access to basic services such as healthcare, education and other public services simply by virtue of not being able to ‘afford’ them. the indian government has steadily oriented policies to favour more public-private-partnerships (ppp’s). this move involves giving more power to corporate interests through setting up large projects that involve a lot of resource extraction or use. issues such as land acquisition come to the forefront here, and there is an imminent and realized danger of there being state sanction for coercing indigenous communities on such issues to expedite the implementation of large projects such as dams, power plants, mines and other industrial setups. the nexus of the state with large corporations raises a multitude of ethical issues and economic policies such as those on taxation are being increasingly made to facilitate corporate interests. this manifestation can be no clearer than in the case of the multiple ‘special economic zones’ that the indian state has been zealous in setting up in order to tempt foreign investors to bring their capital into the country. sez’s essentially allow private enterprises to have ‘free reign’ in that bounded geographical extent whereby they can flout the regular labour, taxation, environmental and various regulations that would ordinarily apply to them in the rest of the country (see shrivastava and kothari, 2012). large banks and financial institutions actively consilience 84 finance ppp projects, and it is seen as a measure to ‘spur growth’ and make the economy ‘more competitive.’ it must be voiced though, at what socio-ecological costs is this growth at the expense of, and is this the kind of competition that is considered healthy for a society? climate governance: ‘cap and trade’, cdm & redd another case of misconstrued ideas is the advocacy for ‘cap-and-trade’ or emissions trading systems. creating a market from tradeable emissions credits simply redistributes the pollution. on the whole, these kinds of market mechanisms do very little to reduce overall emissions. this is a classic case of markets attempting to solve complex ecological issues without addressing the root causes. it is a telling commentary on mainstream economic thoughtthat, somehow, setting the right price for pollution will make pollution itself vanish. climate policy has not been immune to this thrust towards technology transfers, capital flow, and other market-based instruments that favour multilateral banks and the global north. international negotiations on climate change have tried to cajole governments into adopting flagship frameworks such as the clean development mechanism—which is embodied by world bank initiatives (including the ‘carbon prototype fund’) and supported by large financial institutions. climate change is a complex problem that is being thoroughly examined by a huge number of scientists and special interest groups. an appropriation of this domain by banking institutions that aim to foster market solutions is in itself a questionable trajectory. when combined with their influence on the economic, development and energy policies of entire nations, this becomes a serious case of conflicting interests (see salleh, 2011). in accordance with cdm, another unfccc mechanism is reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation of forests (redd). this framework, at first glance, seems to be address deforestation. a closer look, however, suggests that redd is more about preserving rainforest carbon sinks in order to enable the global north to continue emitting unacceptable levels of pollutants. these neo-colonial architectures subjugate developing countries to absorb or compensate for the atmospheric pollution generated by energy intensive economies in the developed world. they address neither the real issue of alarmingly rapid deforestation nor the inequity of such subjugation. for native forest-dwellers this translates to a loss of access to the forests upon which they have relied for generations (long et.al, 2011). there have been certain progressive movements by the indian judiciary to institute the forest rights act and other attempts to foster equality but there is a lot of contention around these issues. consilience roy: economic growth and development paradigms convention on biodiversity (cbd) and different ways of viewing biodiversity the international convention on biodiversity (cbd) seemed at first to be an extremely progressive multi-lateral treaty with serious intentions of addressing the alarming rates of global biodiversity loss however, with the forces of market-based mechanisms looming over the convention, it was reoriented towards viewing biodiversity as a commodity. the goals of the convention became more technologically oriented: for example, providing genetic material for industrial use in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. this mindset of ‘extracting’ materials from ecosystems for human use is deeply flawed and undermines basic principles of conservation. the intentions may have been to curb biopiracy and give nations sovereign rights over their regional biodiversity, but economic models based on extraction of resources reduced the concept of complex and respected habitats and ecosystems to available assets that can be ‘mined.’ this focus on bio-prospecting neglects the relationship that indigenous peoples have with nature, threatening their delicate equilibrium with forests, wildlife, and other troves of biodiversity. interestingly, the progressiveness of the convention lies in the fact that it is composed of asymmetric or differential obligations based on the differential conservation capabilities of nations. however, these asymmetric obligations often end up enforcing the policies and frameworks that result in species or habitat loss. the entire treaty is based on the assumption that it is possible to have economic growth, equitable access to resources, and technologically fuelled extraction and production, all simultaneously. in the end it is no surprise that none of these goals are met with great satisfaction, as some of them are clearly contradictory. (see iles, 2003) technology and efficiency paradigm the economic growth and development model is consistently dazzled by two elements: technology and efficiency. when it comes to serious problems like climate change the focus is on technical and energy efficient solutions. the resultant direction is that renewable energy technologies and zero emission initiatives will ‘solve the problem.’ once again this fallacy needs to be deconstructed; technologies do not get produced in an ecological vacuum. organisations such as ‘beyond zero emissions’ in australia heavily promote the idea that their renewable geoengineering products will alter the trajectory of emissions and subsequently, climate change. there seems to be a deliberate unwillingness to acknowledge that however ingenious the technological geo-engineered solution may be, in terms of energetics and material, it still has a fossil fuel basis for its creation. not only that, but for the facilitation and subsequent consilience 86 maintenance of some of these technologies, there are often other external ecological costs which are not accounted for and which are contradictory to what the technology itself might be trying to achieve (see salleh, 2011). therefore, the economics in such scenarios fails to capture the entire process of production and the negative externalities resulting from that particular technology. with regard to efficiency of resource use, jevon’s paradox clearly highlights the issue. greater efficiency does not result in lesser production—it results in the converse: a greater quantum of production of goods from the same quantum of resource. technology, socio-ecological fabric and indigenous lifestyles these economic directions that are focused on technological solutions to ecological issues must be categorized as initiatives of weak sustainability. they are essentially cursory attempts to deal with genuinely problematic issues with great consequences and that is why disciplines such as ecological economics focus on how to endeavour towards implementing measures of ‘strong sustainability.’ there is also a conscious reluctance by large institutions and nation states alike when framing economic policies to recognize the low-carbon lifestyles that indigenous communities have had for thousands of years in a country like india for instance. their ways of doing agriculture and every other activity that involves nature such as collection of water, are a testament to an existence based on eco-sufficiency. farmers themselves have seed and crop varieties that they have realized can grow better in new unpredictable conditions brought about by changes in climatic patterns and these revelations cannot be separated from the unique relationship and intricate understanding that they have with the soil, plants and their surrounding environment. yet there is practically no attempt to see these ways of living as sustainable alternatives. in the conceptualizations of economic growth that india has had for its populace, which is based on the never ending pursuit of growth perpetuated by large financial institutions, there is an assumption that people across all geographic contexts and lands are a homogeneous whole, and that inducing them to be part of market economies based on capital will have universal effects across the board. in other words, there is no ecological context and no cultural context to this mode of economic development and it assumes that everyone will react in the same manner and swim along with the tide. this is an area of the prevailing mainstream economic paradigm that cannot address a crucial issue; economics does not have an articulation on how to incorporate normative value systems of different peoples and how to take cognizance of the different human-nature relationships that exist. the other very significant aspect that cannot be captured by the current modes of valuation and pricing mechanisms are the consilience roy: economic growth and development paradigms dynamic and organic nature of natural phenomena, not to mention the interrelationships and intricate complexity of natural processes. this is where the mechanistic structure of markets, valuation, instruments and pricing falls painfully short of being able to see and capture crucial aspects. perhaps ecological economics has some answers to these questions in the way that it sees the metabolic processes of humans with nature and its socio-metabolic frameworks combined with material and energy flows. kuznet’s curve and trickle-down effect the environmental kuznets curve is a classic economic tool that has been used to explain how there would be increased pollution levels during the industrialization of a developing country and over time, as the gross domestic product would increase with ‘economic growth’, the per-capita income of the nation would simultaneously rise and eventually environmental degradation would plateau and fall to acceptable levels. unfortunately, or rather predictably, this has not been the case with many nations who have instituted economic reforms focused on industrial and manufacturing based economic growth over the past two-three decades. studies have shown that the rebound of the kuznets curve has not occurred and in fact there has been no fall in the rate of environmental degradation. in fact, there is a revelation that the kuznets curve has shown bi-modal character. in addition, the rise of per-capita incomes in no small part relies on the phenomenon of the ‘trickle down’ effect, implying that in a rapidly growing economy, benefits ‘trickle’ down to lesser economically privileged sections of society. the ‘trickle down’ effect is another dated argument (its origins disputed) that economists have stubbornly used as a political justification to relentlessly pursue gdp-based growth. the ideal creation of entrepreneurial revenue that flows down and stimulates growth for even the poorest in a society is is in stark contrast with the present reality observed in nations like india. there are very few signs of the ‘trickle’ down effect, and the result of attempts to create one is a deeply divided society, where a small elite class has overwhelming control of resources and capital. the large majority, conversely, has a greatly diminished capability to pursue traditional livelihoods and sustain their existence (see shrivastava and kothari, 2012). this economic situation is a recipe for disaster. such an inequitable distribution of capital and access to basic services fosters resentment and unrest. these voices may be temporarily subdued by the great ‘shining india’ stories, but eventually political grassroots movements will mobilise. if many feel that the state is not adequately addressing their concerns or excluding them from the new wave of development, then violence is also a real possibility. aspects of equity and fairness of distribution are not sufficiently dealt with by economic reforms premised on economic growth. the idea of a self-correcting market based on an idealized consilience 88 version of free trade fails to recognize power relations, in that different peoples have different negotiating and bargaining statuses. this clearly demonstrates a need for an institutionalized framework based on ethics and justice. unfortunately, neoclassical and neo-liberal economics seem to be very poorly equipped to deal with these issues, as their models are mechanistic and reductionist when representing economies, peoples, cultures and nature. concluding remarks throughout this paper, there is an emphasis on power relations, political structures, and methods of governance. when introduced to economics, often the illustrated etymology is of ‘household maintenance.’ however, the intermediate roots of economics lie in the phrase ‘political economy’ and this paper is a humble defence of the idea that power relations and economic theory cannot be separated. international financial institutions seem to exert a significant amount of influence over macroeconomic policy, and it becomes relevant to postulate whether state policies should be so affected by lobbying from financial bodies. rapid institution of economic reforms seems to have certain adverse socio-ecological effects. therefore, it is necessary to respect the timeframes required for market evolution and to realise that markets cannot rectify many societal issues. it is clear that globalisation and an industrial boom has accelerated the adoption of these economic policies. this necessitates a reevaluation of the elements and outcomes of globalization as well as a reconsideration of the ideas that india wants to promote. environmental issues such as deforestation and climate change are inherently complex. market instruments such as emissions cap-and-trade schemes and the clean development mechanism do not represent effective solutions. the overt focus on technological innovation ignores the root causes of this ecological destruction. in fact, when the entire production cycle is considered, these technological ‘solutions’ do not significantly reduce emissions at all. instead, the development techniques promoted by the indian state both ignore current low-carbon, eco-sufficient indigenous lifestyles and alienate large populations who are negatively impacted by these practices. mainstream neo-classical and neo-liberal economic paradigms have shown themselves to be ill-equipped to successfully incorporate and prioritize the dynamic life processes and systems of the biosphere. valuation and pricing mechanisms are also unable to recognise the vital and diverse elements of socio-metabolic human-nature relationships. acknowledging the limited scope of the surveyed literature, there seem to be few works that concretely qualify or establish the extent of influence that international financial institutions have over economic frameworks. this may be simply due to the difficulty of isolating and quantifying the role of financial consilience roy: economic growth and development paradigms institutions given the interdependence and inter-connectedness of the global economic system. the reviewed research also generally fails to present specific scenarios involving the various economic market based mechanisms outlined throughout the paper, such as public-private partnerships and clean development mechanisms. it is, of course, entirely possible that these gaps have been addressed in works that were not considered in this paper. consilience 90 references drèze, j., sen, a., 2002. ‘india: development and participation, oxford scholarship online: economics and finance module.’ oxford university press. p.113 encarnacion tadem, t.s. 2012, 'creating spaces for asian interaction through the antiglobalization campaigns in the region', modern asian studies, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 453481. iles, a. 2003, ‘rethinking differential obligations: equity under the biodiversity convention’, leiden journal of international law, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 217-251. kothari, a. 2009, ‘radical ecological democracy: escaping india's globalization trap’, development, vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 401-409. long, s., roberts, e. & dehm, j. 2011, 'climate justice inside and outside the unfccc: the example of redd', the journal of australian political economy, no. 66, pp. 222-246. pearse, r. 2011, 'making a market? contestation and climate change', the journal of australian political economy, no. 66, pp. 166-198. salleh, a. 2011, 'climate strategy: making the choice between ecological modernisation or living well', the journal of australian political economy, no. 66, pp. 118-143. shrivastava, a and kothari, a. 2012, churning the earth: the making of global india, new delhi: penguin books india tisdell, c. 2001, 'transitional economies and economic globalization', international journal of social economics, vol. 28, no. 5-7, pp. 577-590. woo, w.t. 2007, 'the challenges of governance structure, trade disputes and natural environment to china's growth', comparative economic studies, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 572602. note from the editor-in-chief note from the editor-in-chief https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i13.3947 how to cite elivo, r. (2015). note from the editor-in-chief. consilience, (13). https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i13.3947 abstract dear readers, it is my absolute pleasure to present the 13th issue of consilience: the journal of sustainable development. our editorial and managing boards have worked assiduously to bring you our longest and most ambitious issue yet, at 16 articles comprised of a cumulative 346 pages. this upsurge in submissions is a reflection of the rising prominence of the global conversation on sustainable development, with the year 2015 ushering in the rollout of the sustainable development goals and the 21st conference of parties, with the goal of realizing a legally binding treaty to lower greenhouse gas emissions. issue 13 features a variety of topics spanning myriad subjects and geographical regions, all unified around three questions that have implications for the future of sustainable development: (1) how have the economic and technocratic rationalities that have thus far defined development changed, and how must they continue changing to reflect the realities of our world? (2) have the frameworks, solutions, and priorities that have been implemented thus far been inadequate, and how can they be addressed? (3) have those in positions of power done their best to incorporate the communities – human and ecological – that have traditionally been marginalized and excluded from the discourse? douglas kelbaugh opens up the issue and the first question by discussing the changing paradigms of urban planning and architecture in light of the challenges of climate change. mohamed el-kamel bakari examines the conflict between the man-nature relationship that the sustainability discourse seeks to engender and the predominant neo-liberal perception of the environment. savannah kuper also discusses this relationship, though in the context of anthropocentrism using past philosophical works on the natural world as a framework. will evans offers a nuanced critique of the burgeoning fossil fuel divestment movement and challenges the status quo of investment management, which has thus far not been leveraged enough to effect change vis-à-vis damaging corporate activities. miranda bernard et al. https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i13.3947 conducted a study to ascertain how the extinction of mammalian herbivores affected the abundance of five plant species, bringing further light to the profound interconnectivity of natural systems that has undermined elementarist rationality in favor of systems thinking. finally, samantha schipani compares the public and third sectors of vietnam and bolivia to consider how they intersect and to challenge the typical roles and priorities of non-governmental organizations. with the second question, we have tal cantor et al. assessing the energy efficiency of the kitchen operations of a university to determine opportunities for improvement, while monica carty does the same for teaching programs in two developing countries to determine which were most conducive to the long-term success of water projects. msafiri daudi mbaga and alyssa menz consider creative solutions to the failings of modern food production, discussing the potential for sustainable desert agriculture in amman and grasscutter farming in kenya, respectively. zachary davis provides an extensive analysis on the benefits and defects of nuclear power before recommending a course of action for energy; anthony ojonimi onoja conducts a survey on the profitability and issues inherent in contemporary oil palm products’ processing and marketing in kogi state, nigeria. finally, with regards to the third question, zahra ahmed et al. discuss the maasai ethnic group of kenya and tanzania and how their culture has transformed with the pressures of climate change, westernization, and civil institutionalization. laura booth et al. attempt to identify the variables that signify changes in elephant diets to determine how climate change will affect elephant populations. finally, olivia winters chronicles the struggles botswana’s bushmen to preserve their way of life in the face of an antagonistic motswana government. with all of these subjects and their implications, we at consilience are excited for the year 2015 and the changes that it will bring. we encourage you to continue interacting with the journal through your readership, submissions, and contributions to our briefings column. as always, we welcome all feedback and hope that our work inspires you to engage with issues trending across the discipline of sustainable development. if you have any questions, comments, or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact us at contact@consiliencejournal.org. we hope you enjoy issue 13. ryan elivo editor-in-chief consilience: the journal of sustainable development january 15, 2015 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution 4.0 international license. http://www.consiliencejournal.org/index.php/consilience/editor/viewmetadata/contact@consiliencejournal.org https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ note from the editor-in-chief ​​​ abstract consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 19, iss. 1 (2018), pp. 36–57 anticipate, absorb, reshape (a2r): a baseline study of climate resilience in developing countries dr. lisa dale earth institute, columbia university lisa dale is a lecturer at columbia university’s earth institute, where she teaches classes in the undergraduate sustainable development program. she has a phd in environmental policy from colorado state university (2003). lad2189@columbia.edu research support: jonathan held, stephanie ratte, and farrukh zaman school of forestry & environmental studies yale university abstract the united nations climate resilience initiative: anticipate, absorb, reshape (a2r) is a global, un-led, multi-stakeholder initiative that strengthens climate resilience for vulnerable countries and people. a2r addresses the urgent needs of least developed countries (ldcs), small island developing states (sids), africa and other vulnerable regions. the initiative accelerates action on key aspects of climate resilience under its three pillars: 1) anticipate – increased capacity to better anticipate and act on climate hazards and stresses through early warning and early action; 2) absorb – increased capacity to absorb shocks by increasing access to climate risk insurance and social protection systems; and 3) reshape – increased capacity to reshape development pathways by transforming economies to reduce risks and root causes of vulnerabilities and support the sound management of physical infrastructure and ecosystems to foster climate resilience. this report outlines the current status of key indicators relevant to the three pillars. it also identifies some of the challenges faced in this analysis and suggests ways of overcoming them, so that we may, in the future, be able to provide a fuller picture of progress on these three key capacities for climate resilience. mailto:lad2189@columbia.edu consilience dale: a2r: climate resiliency baseline i. introduction & project overview the united nations climate resilience initiative: anticipate, absorb, reshape (a2r) is a global, un-led, multi-stakeholder initiative that strengthens climate resilience for vulnerable countries and people. launched in november 2015 during the 21st conference of parties of the un framework convention on climate change in paris, this initiative brings together governments, international agencies, regional initiatives, the private sector, civil society, and academia. a2r addresses the urgent needs of least developed countries (ldcs), small island developing states (sids), african nations, and other vulnerable regions. the initiative accelerates action on key aspects of climate resilience according to three pillars: • anticipate – increased capacity to better anticipate and act on climate hazards and stresses through early warning and early action. • absorb – increased capacity to absorb shocks by increasing access to climate risk insurance and social protection systems. • reshape – increased capacity to reshape development pathways by transforming economies to reduce risks and root causes of vulnerabilities and support the sound management of physical infrastructure and ecosystems to foster climate resilience. one of the a2r initiative’s functions is to analyze progress in these three areas in light of previously stipulated global goals and targets, including those set out in the 2030 sustainable development agenda, the united nations framework convention for climate change (unfccc), and the sendai framework for disaster risk reduction. this report is a first attempt to establish baseline data that provide a brief glimpse into contemporary national resiliency efforts. a2r is expected to periodically reassess progress, thereby identifying both where gains have been significant and where additional support might be focused. the article outlines the current conditions of key indicators relevant to the three pillars. it also identifies some of the challenges faced in this analysis and suggests ways of overcoming them so that we may, in the future, conduct a more comprehensive study of progress on climate resilience. this study will also inform the a2r initiative in bringing partners together to fill vital gaps in climate resilience action. the report begins with an explanation of our methodology and is organized by the three pillars of a2r. in each section, an overview provides a framework for analysis and a research summary highlights specific challenges encountered during the investigation. we then present our findings and a discussion of data gaps. appendix a charts our complete findings. ii. methods drawing heavily from research and reporting of intergovernmental processes, this research focused on data sources relevant to climate resilience policy. with guidance 38 consilience from the a2r leadership group, we identified existing datasets that were available for at least two-thirds of the 114 countries studied. the countries selected for analysis were chosen specifically to cover ldcs, sids, and african countries (see appendix b). given our objective of quantifying information across 114 countries, we chose indicators that provided binary or multiple-choice responses. thus, the scope of this research was limited to data that provided a snapshot of baseline conditions and does not paint a fuller, more nuanced portrait. overwhelmingly, available data was found in the disaster risk reduction literature, and while this information offers important insights into climate resilience it does not adequately capture slow-onset elements such as drought and sea-level rise. criteria and indicators were developed to combine datasets from varied sources and present a more complete representation (see appendix a). each pillar contains two to four criteria, selected both to highlight essential components of desired actions toward improved resilience and to reflect existing international efforts. to assess progress, we identified two to five indicators; see appendix a for summary of criteria and indicators used. where possible, indicators draw on data from disparate sources or from different sections within a given source. three fundamental methodological challenges were apparent throughout the research process. first, key terms like “early warning – early action systems” and “climate resilient development pathways” are used widely but without a clear, shared definition. in the absence of agreed parameters, organizations have interpreted the terms differently. consequently, data that appears similar but comes from different sources may offer conflicting results. we have attempted to combine data from different sources for each criterion to minimize this effect. second, data is not available for many of our desired indicators. even where data has been gathered on a metric of interest, we find persistent gaps. for example, of the countries studied, the 14 that are not independent sovereign nations1 often lack data. we have included them in our total because the united nations (un) system recognizes them in its disaster risk reduction programs. third, much of the existing data is self-reported. countries are accountable to a range of international organizations for a myriad of tracking requests, but response rates vary widely, and independent verification of the data is uneven. an additional challenge arises from the lack of sex and age disaggregated data (sadd). practitioners note that any effort made to enhance climate resilience must address existing gender inequities before, during, and after a climate-related disaster. with an overwhelming majority of male expert disaster management staff, women are likely at a disadvantage even in the planning stage. these asymmetries continue through the disaster phase and into recovery (fordham, 2011). when a hazardous event occurs, women are more likely to suffer, slower to recover, and less likely to build long-term resilience. with such a significant proportion of populations thus at a disadvantage, these patterns will be reflected in the crisis impact, rate of recovery, and level of resilience of the whole community. integrating a gender perspective into all disaster management policies, plans, and decision-making processes is essential consilience dale: a2r: climate resiliency baseline (unisdr, 2011). we have been unable to provide disaggregated data for the indicators used here and understand that to be a weakness in our conclusions. during each stage of research, we have been cognizant of separating inputs, outputs, and outcomes. inputs generally refer to resources such as human capital, funding, and equipment. in the policy sphere, some consider frameworks like enabling legislation to be an input, as the collection of these resources sets the stage for action to occur. for example, inputs may include funding to develop an early warning system and the assignment of staff. outputs are the direct and immediate deliverables associated with the implementation of policy or the deployment of resources toward a concrete aim. continuing the previous example, outputs might include new technology that is designed to facilitate improved outreach to vulnerable communities. outcomes refer to the relative success of results. if new early warning technology fails to operate prior to a climate event or does not succeed in reaching more individuals, then those outcomes indicate low effectiveness and are critical factors to consider when assessing a country’s progress. throughout the research conducted, we have sought to include data for all three dimensions. unsurprisingly, measuring effectiveness – outcomes – is consistently the most challenging to quantify. part of the difficulty in capturing effectiveness is related to mis-matched time frames. short-term inputs and outputs may contribute to longer-term processrelated outcomes, but those connections are not always apparent. this research therefore has identified the existence (or lack) of various elements relevant to climate resilience across countries of interest, but much less can definitively be said about the relative effectiveness of those elements. iii. pillar 1: anticipate a. overview the anticipate pillar centers on accelerating action that establishes and strengthens early warning-early action systems that address climate risks, such as floods and storms. with a focus on enhanced preparedness and early response to the increased vulnerabilities and risks associated with climate change, this pillar reflects the fundamental need to safeguard vulnerable communities and ensure that countries have the capacity to implement effective multi-hazard early warning and early action programs. analysis of this pillar aims to capture the baseline scope and comprehensiveness of early warning and early action systems, along with their potential effectiveness at reducing the impact of climate-related disasters. b. research research on early warning-early action systems faces several challenges. first and most generally, there is little global information on scope, implementation, and effectiveness of national early warning systems, apart from what is self-reported by countries under the hyogo framework for action (hfa). second, there is also a diversity of early warning system approaches, which can limit comparability. the term early action is complex, spanning a range of activities and approaches at different timescales. for example, the international federation of red cross and red 40 consilience crescent societies considers early action to encompass wide-ranging strategies including addressing systemic vulnerabilities like poverty, improving building codes to reduce disaster risks, and providing near-term responses to impending cyclones and floods (ifrc, 2009). in this report, we have not assessed all of these elements in this pillar; some are captured in assessments of the other two pillars, and some are difficult to track using existing sources. lastly, assessing the effectiveness of early warning-early action systems can be complicated by the reality that a reduction in climate-related impacts does not necessarily indicate system effectiveness. it may, for example, indicate fewer flooding events in a given timeframe, or storm surges that hit relatively unpopulated areas. c. findings results suggest that countries face challenges when implementing comprehensive early warning systems. the first criterion captures indicators for one critical input: whether countries have a comprehensive early warning system. at the national level, only 2 out of 81 countries with available data report that integrated early warning systems are in place for all major hazards, although 77 suggest they have made some progress toward that goal. more countries (45) report a multi-hazard risk assessment with common methodology to inform planning and development decisions. with all 114 countries reporting on the third indicator, we found only 31 having declared a national platform for disaster risk reduction. however, 57 out of 81 countries report participating in regional or sub-regional early warning programs, suggesting that engagement and coordination across countries is a promising development. the second criteria – assessing whether early warning systems are people-centered – relies on information from the hfa reports and therefore only has data for 81 nations. many of those countries (58) report that their early warning programs account for the most vulnerable populations, and an additional 11 descibe some limited progress toward that aim. similarly, 57 countries have systems in place that consider local or traditional knowledge, with an additional 5 showing progress. 51 countries, nearly half of the total included as part of this study, report either that “gender concerns inform policy and program conceptualization and implementation in a meaningful and appropriate way” or that, for the 2007–2009 and 2009–2011 reporting periods, gender perspectives on risk reduction and recovery have been adopted and institutionalized. however, narrative descriptions of progress around gender integration provided by countries vary widely, suggesting that there are still significant gaps which binary “yes/no” self-reporting may fail to capture. finally, 52 countries report that disaster information is disseminated through multiple, appropriate channels. these elements reflect progress on inputs and outputs but reveal little about longer-term outcomes. data collected for the third criteria show that many countries do not yet operate comprehensive early action systems. communication and education about disaster risks are an essential part of ensuring that communities and individuals are made aware of hazards and can respond effectively. 65 countries report that public education campaigns for risk-prone communities and local authorities include disaster risk, or that (in the case of 2007–2009 reports) countrywide public awareness strategies exist to stimulate a culture of disaster resilience with outreach to urban and consilience dale: a2r: climate resiliency baseline rural communities. while this suggests a relatively high level of communication, public education targeted at risk-prone communities represents a somewhat basic early action threshold, indicating that greater efforts should be made. regarding the incorporation of climate risks into disaster management, which may signal the inclusion of proactive early action systems alongside traditional disaster management, only 30 countries report that potential risk scenarios consider climate change projections. relatively low affirmative responses suggest that climate risk is still underrepresented in disaster management. the final criteria for this pillar seeks to capture outcomes by measuring the effectiveness of early warning – early action systems. 57countries report that their warnings are timely and reach at-risk populations. beyond self-reporting, three additional indicators assess changes in damage and deaths for climate related disasters from 1995-2004. with data for only 75 countries, 42 saw decreased damage during that span. of the 95 countries with data, 50 show fewer people killed and 40 saw fewer people reported affected by those disasters. these data are far from conclusive and do not provide insight into the frequency of disasters during these years, a factor that would influence results. d. data gaps there are a number of critical data gaps that limit this baseline assessment. of particular importance is that data sources on early warning-early action with specific attention to climate hazards are extremely limited. as the hfa national reports focus on disaster risk reduction generally, distinguishing between actions specific to climate-related hazards and those related to other general (and non-climate) hazards is problematic. moreover, responsiveness is a limiting factor. out of a total of 114 countries, 81 submitted reports under the hfa, leaving 33 countries with no available data. given the importance of the information collected in these reports to the conclusions we present here, it is important to note that more complete information may lead to different findings. furthermore, although the hfa reports provide helpful data, they are self-reported, and questions in the reporting template are often open to interpretation. data is similarly limited for evaluating the effectiveness of early warning-early action systems. while disaster impact sources such as the em-dat database are often thorough and accessible, causally linking impacts to the scope and comprehensiveness of early warning-early action systems is problematic. a decrease in mortality, affected populations, or financial costs may indicate that systems are improving and effective at reducing risks, or simply that the period saw fewer or less damaging natural events. improved data may come from upcoming renditions of reporting under the sendai framework for disaster risk reduction, although those will not resolve the challenges of self-reporting. as more countries participate in regional efforts, aggregated third party data may also improve. despite these limitations, preliminary data gathered in this baseline study illustrates opportunities for countries to build resilience through improved early warning-early action systems. 42 consilience iv. pillar 2: absorb a. overview climate change impacts have resulted in significant financial losses to countries, adversely impacting lives and productive assets. swiss re (2013), a leading international insurance entity, has estimated that global disasters caused approximately usd 126 billion in insured losses in 2011 and usd 186 billion in 2012. it is important to note that these totals do not distinguish natural catastrophes from man-made disasters and do not identify how much of that amount is attributable to climate change. still, the costs to the insurance industry are significant and rising, and those increases are at least in part related to climate change. the relative ability of a country to absorb these shocks is an essential component of overall climate resilience. two dimensions of this pillar inform the data collected in this section: climate risk transfer pools and broader social protection mechanisms. risk transfer as understood here is a process through which the burden of financial loss or responsibility for risk financing is shifted to another entity given an extreme climate event. by aggregating individual country processes into risk transfer pools, those countries can spread their risks geographically and access insurance on better terms from a larger pool. climate risk insurance is broadly divisible into direct and indirect insurance. direct insurance schemes help vulnerable people reduce disasterrelated setbacks, such as using savings and taking children out of school, in the face of unexpected climate extremes. indirect insurance schemes provide country payouts after an event, often in addition to providing technical support that identifies and prices risks, building risk management into national planning, and contributing to contingency plans that protect the poor (mcii, 2015). climate risk transfer tools assist vulnerable countries and communities by providing them with financial leverage to cope with losses from climate change. while these tools play an important role for susceptible communities in the event of a specific, time-limited, and localized loss, there are important limits. risk pooled insurance schemes are not appropriate or feasible for insuring against high frequency or slow onset risks like sea-level rise or desertification since these processes occur with high certainty and impact large areas. on-going work suggests that risk transfer tools could be expanded to include a wider range of impacts. for example, the african risk capacity insurance company has expanded its scope to apply to long-term droughts (durand, 2016). while insurance schemes can go a long way toward improving community, there is also widespread agreement among practitioners that social protection mechanisms more broadly are also critical for building capacity to absorb shocks. beyond traditional safety nets, social protection mechanisms encompass initiatives that protect the vulnerable against risks to their livelihood. these might include wealth transfer mechanisms and enhanced legal rights for marginalized groups (world bank, 2011). for example, some countries provide support for families in the case of maternity, disability, or injury. others have tax-supported programs that ensure a fundamental level of income security for all residents. so intertwined are these tools with climate resilience that many international aid organizations now frame their consilience dale: a2r: climate resiliency baseline work as the integration of social protection, climate change adaptation, and disaster risk reduction efforts. addressing only one in isolation is not likely to be as effective as a synergistic approach. b. research information on climate risk insurance availability, coverage, and reach is relatively accessible, although effectiveness is more difficult to assess since it is challenging to monitor how indirect climate related insurance payouts are utilized. according to insuresilience, a g7 climate risk insurance initiative, market research and expert opinion on global insurance penetration suggest that only about 100 million people of the poor and vulnerable in africa, asia, and latin america are covered by direct (55 million) or indirect (45 million) insurance schemes against climate risks (giz & kfw development bank, 2015). as this information could not be accessed in a format that disaggregates by country, it could not be included as a data source for analysis. it does, however, provide contextual information for establishing a baseline of climate risk insurance coverage. the world bank financial inclusion database (world bank, 2011) provides a further data source. according to this data, only 6.2% of farming, fishing or forestry workers worldwide have purchased crop, rainfall, or livestock insurance. in sub-saharan africa the coverage is 6.5%, while in developing east asian and pacific countries it is 6.4% and in south asia 5.7%. social protection programs include a wide range of national efforts to improve health, broaden access to education, reduce poverty, protect residents from losses, enhance food security, address inequalities, and implement other such policies. in the context of the a2r initiative, it is challenging to definitively connect the entirety of these programs with climate resilience. instead, we looked at two variables from the world bank aspire portal, which uses officially recognized national household surveys from 120 countries to better understand levels of participation (inputs) and measure effectiveness (outcomes): (1) do at least 50% of the country’s most vulnerable population participate in social protection programs? and (2) what is the percentage reduction in poverty levels as a result of targeted social protection programs? these data were selected to assess both the reach and impact of social protection schemes as a proxy for better understanding adaptive capacity. c. findings results show that insurance markets to reduce climate change risks are still nascent. the first criterion is whether climate insurance schemes cover a wide range of assets, and data suggests there is only limited progress. only 40 countries report the option to insure crop and property against climate impacts. micro-insurance schemes exist but are not prevalent, with only 34 countries reporting access. catastrophe bond options are even less common, in part because they are often only available to institutional investors. only 11 countries report their use. the scarcity of these bonds is likely due in part to their higher fixed costs and institutional complexity. only countries with strong financial market structures and stable policy frameworks can offer them. the second measure explores whether climate insurance schemes are accessible at multiple levels. data show that reinsurance facilities are in place in only 32 countries, 44 consilience highlighting a relatively weak link between local, national, and international climate insurance pools. africa and the caribbean appear to be the only two regions in this study that have a large-scale regional insurance pool in place. the africa risk capacity initiative (arc) and the caribbean catastrophic risk insurance facility (ccrif) are the two most prominent examples. of 54 total african nations, 32 have signed the establishment agreement for participation in arc. 17 caribbean countries have joined the ccrif. a pilot project through the smaller pacific catastrophe risk assessment and financing initiative has provided risk-pooling support to five pacific island countries (pcrafi, 2013). through these various institutions, 48 of our countries of interest are part of a regional pool. one advantage of regional insurance pools is that they allow individual countries to access collective reserves in addition to their own; however, these examples demonstrate that even in areas with growing institutional attention to risk reduction through insurance, not all countries have benefited. arrangements between some of the countries of interest and multilateral development banks have also begun and may help address these gaps as they continue to mature. social protection mechanisms are found to have limited reach in the countries of interest. only 12 report that more than 50% of their most vulnerable population participates in social protection mechanisms. it is worth noting that countries report a wide range of participation, from botswana with 91.6% of the most vulnerable participating in social protection programs, to laos reporting only 0.3%. one explanation for this might be that different countries have varying participation terms for their social protection programs. similarly, countries offer variable estimates of the percent reduction in poverty levels that can be attributed to social protection programs. see appendix a for more detailed data. d. data gaps as with the first pillar, research in this section was hampered by data gaps in hfa reporting. similarly, the world bank’s aspire platform also has a widespread pattern of non-reporting, with only between 47-60 countries reporting on data of interest. multilateral development banks have not released comprehensive summary data on participation in their insurance programs to date, and private institutions may be unlikely to do so. if the role of private insurance mechanisms increases over time, there may be new opportunities to incentivize the publication of datasets. data on social protection efforts are more available but not directly tied to climate resilience. for the purposes of this study, we chose to access only macro-scale data to capture participation levels and poverty reduction. future research might dig more deeply into the connections between individual indicators of social protection and broader climate resilience capacity. v. pillar 3: reshape a. overview the third pillar of a2r, reshape, focuses on national efforts to adopt climateresilient development pathways. the creation of a climate-resilient pathway is a consilience dale: a2r: climate resiliency baseline process that often includes reforming institutions to better manage change within complex socio-economic systems. these changes may be incremental or transformational and should align with broader efforts to integrate sustainable development into national priorities. with both planning and financial dimensions, reshaping development here means integrating climate resilience into building and zoning codes, shifting funding priorities, updating national planning strategies, and building partnerships with the private sector. for this pillar, it is especially important to separate inputs, such as new funding, from outputs, such as the implementation of stated funding priorities. even more critical is moving beyond outputs to outcomes, where the effectiveness of those measures can be assessed. given the significant data gaps encountered, we have primarily focused our analysis on inputs and policy outputs. national planning for climate resilience varies widely in reach and scope. the existence of a national climate resiliency development plan or the inclusion of climate change as part of an existing national development plan may reveal little about a country’s progress toward implementation but does indicate that it has begun to incorporate climate resilience into its planning process. scope and effectiveness is especially difficult to quantify. in certain cases, even detailed plans may not be well implemented due to limitations in capacity. evaluating national budget allocations to climate resilience is similarly challenging, in part because climate finance reporting can vary significantly based on key methodological questions including how to count, weigh, analyze, and differentiate line items. additionally, because many resilience measures are implemented locally, reports on national budget allocations may be limited in their ability to assess impacts on individual communities and residents. ultimately, reshaping development pathways means investing in adaptive capacity on multiple scales. b. research under the unfccc’s 2015 paris agreement, of the 114 countries of interest, 59 submitted nationally determined contributions (ndc) by january 2017, and 95% of those ndcs included an adaptation component (unfccc, 2016). designed as a complement to the broader ndcs, the national adaptation plan (nap) process was created by the unfccc to enable developing countries to identify mediumand long-term adaptation needs and generate related strategies. naps are intended as national documents, endorsed and approved by an appropriate national body. to date, naps have only been submitted by three countries of interest; therefore, individual country development plans were found through internet searches. c. findings the first criterion is whether climate resilience is incorporated into national development and contains both finance and planning indicators. of the 66 countries with accessible national development plans, 49 have incorporated climate change, although the implementation and effectiveness of these measures remains unknown. an additional 7 countries’ plans incorporate climate change to a limited extent, and 10 do not include it at all. some development plans dedicate entire chapters to climate, and others only note the need for climate change to be considered in future 46 consilience planning efforts. despite this range, the widespread inclusion of climate change in national development plans indicates a positive trend as countries begin to normalize planning for global warming. we were able to locate reports detailing climate-related public-sector expenditures for only 12 countries. with such limited data, no analysis of overarching trends was conducted. research on policy development was more fruitful, and the second criterion relied on data from hfa reports to indicate whether national policies and regulations contribute to furthering climate resilience. data revealed that of 76 countries with available data, 58 report the use of integrated planning in which elements of climate resilience capacity are included. half of the 66 countries with available data point to their use of risk sensitive regulation in land zoning and private real estate development. even more – 60 out of 76 – report that that impacts of disaster risk are taken into account in environmental impact assessments. 56 nations report that impacts of disaster risk created by major development projects are assessed, while 39 of 65 countries report that costs and benefits of disaster risk are considered in the design and operation of major development projects. indicators encompass all forms of disaster risk, including non-climate disasters. these data capture baseline inputs and outputs, but do not reveal outcomes. for example, a country that has high marks on all four indicators profiled here may still find that despite thoughtful planning and zoning, their infrastructure does not survive a catastrophic climate-related disaster. more research is needed to assess whether existing tools are effective in promoting climate resilience. d. data gaps without detailed climate change expenditure data for the majority of countries, it is impossible to know to what extent countries are funding inputs that might then become meaningful outputs and outcomes. but new research is underway. the united nations development program is facilitating detailed climate public expenditure and institutional review (cpeir) studies, and those have been completed in 17 countries so far. a consortium of non-governmental organizations including the overseas development institute, oxfam, and the world resources institute have partnered with civil society groups in four pilot countries – nepal, uganda, zambia, and the philippines – to launch the adaptation finance accountability initiative (afai). afai aims to create frameworks for tracking national climate finance in developing countries. vi. conclusions capacity limitations may result from insufficient public funds, weak institutions, and dispersed populations. these factors among others have rendered many countries unable to tackle the urgent tasks they face at the necessary pace and scale. at the same time, data limitations create research challenges and result in an incomplete picture of current situations in many at-risk nations. evolving metrics and a focus on improved reporting will significantly improve the data landscape. still, and despite the information gaps described in the analysis here, we can make preliminary observations. the majority of vulnerable countries do not yet have a comprehensive, consilience dale: a2r: climate resiliency baseline multi-hazard, inclusive, people-centered early warning – early action system in place. components of this, however, are in place in certain areas, and regional partnerships offer a promising strategy for strengthening infrastructure. climate risk insurance pools have been established in two critical at-risk regions: africa and the caribbean. they are also beginning to appear elsewhere. as data emerges that enables an assessment of effectiveness, these new systems may provide replicable lessons for other vulnerable regions, enabling them to better absorb climate-related costs. finally, consideration for climate-resilient development pathways is increasingly integrated into national budgets and planning documents, although the implementation of policies remains inconsistent. vulnerable countries will experience the brunt of climate-related shocks as impacts intensify (unfccc, 2015). within those vulnerable countries are sections of the population – particularly women and girls – whose needs must be specifically identified and addressed to ensure balanced, inclusive, rights-based strategic planning that serves the entire population. building resilience to climate-related hazards is vital, not only to protect communities and individuals but also to facilitate broader sustainable development goals. cross-cutting synergies with the unfccc and the sendai framework for disaster risk reduction offer a platform to catalyze global action. small island developing states, least developed states, and african nations face an arduous task as they work to remap their development pathways to promote climate resilience. research presented here to determine baseline levels for the united nations secretary-general’s climate resilience initiative (a2r) suggests that there is significant opportunity for further action. 48 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(2012). climate early warning system feasibility report: early warning systems and hazard protection. retrieved from http://www.unep.org/science/chiefscientist/portals/76/docs/ews_report_final_version1.pdf 52 consilience appendix a anticipate criteria indicators source total # countries with data findings criteria 1: country has a comprehensive national early warning system indicator 1: country has a multi-hazard and integrated early warning system. hfa report, priority for action 2, core indicator 3 81 yes: 2 limited: 77 no: 2 indicator 2: country has national multi-hazard risk assessment with a common methodology to inform planning and development decisions. hfa report, priority for action 2, core indicator 1 81 yes: 45 limited: 3 no: 33 indicator 3: country has declared a national platform for disaster risk reduction prevention web, national platforms 114 yes: 31 no: 83 indicator 4: country is part of a regional or sub-regional early warning system. hfa report, priority for action 2, core indicator 4 81 yes: 57 no: 20 other*: 4 criteria 2: early warning system is peoplecentered. indicator 1: programs account for the most vulnerable populations. hfa report, drivers of progress d 81 yes: 58 limited: 11 no: 12 indicator 2: programs take into account local or traditional knowledge. hfa report, section 8e 81 yes: 57 no: 5 other: 19 indicator 3: programs are gender-responsive / sensitive. hfa report, section 8b 81 yes: 51 no: 21 other: 10 consilience dale: a2r: climate resiliency baseline indicator 4: disaster information is disseminated through multiple, appropriate channels. hfa report, established mechanisms for action 81 yes: 52 no: 16 other: 13 criteria 3: country has comprehensive early action approach. indicator 1: communication and education on disaster risk is emphasized. hfa report, priority for action 3, core indicator 4 81 yes: 65 no: 12 other: 4 indicator 2: ratio of national budget allocation for risk reduction vs disaster relief / reconstruction reflects investment in early action. hfa report, priority for action 1, core indicator 2 81 ratios vary indicator 3: climate risks are incorporated in disaster management. hfa report, priority for action 5, core indicator 1 81 yes: 30 no: 29 other: 13 criteria 4: country has effective early warning – early action system. indicator 1: early warnings are timely and reach at-risk populations. hfa report, priority for action 2, core indicator 3 81 yes: 59 no: 16 other: 5 indicator 2: total damage from climate-related disasters decreases from period 19952004 to period 2005-2014. em-dat, international disaster database 75 yes: 42 no: 33 indicator 3: total number of people reported killed by disasters decreases from period 1995-2004 to period 2005-2014. em-dat, international disaster database 95 yes: 50 no: 45 indicator 4: total number of people reported affected by disasters decreases from period 1995-2004 to period 2005-2014. em-dat, international disaster database 95 yes: 40 no: 55 54 consilience *note: a response categorized as “other” can mean one of several things: the question may have been left off the questionnaire for some countries, or the country may have responded with “in progress” or “incomplete. absorb criteria indicators source total # countries with data findings criteria 1: climate insurance schemes cover a wide range of assets. indicator 1: option to insure crop and property against climate impacts exist. hfa report, priority action 4, core indicator 2. 76 yes: 40 no: 37 indicator 2: micro insurance schemes for climate risk are offered to at-risk communities. hfa report, priority action 4, core indicator 2. 81 yes: 34 no: 43 indicator 3: government and/or non-government actors offer catastrophic bonds and other market mechanisms. hfa report, priority action 5, core indicator 3. 81 yes: 11 no: 66 criteria 2: climate insurance schemes are accessible at multiple levels. indicator 1: insurance and reinsurance facilities are in place at local and/or national levels to deal with major climate disasters. hfa report, priority action 5, core indicator 3. 80 yes: 32 no: 41 indicator 2: country is part of a regional or international climate risk insurance pool. 1) oxfam america; 2) african risk capacity; 3) caribbean catastrophic risk insurance facility 114 yes: 48 no: 66 consilience dale: a2r: climate resiliency baseline criteria 3: social protection programs are well targeted. indicator 1: high proportion (>50%) of most vulnerable population participates in social protection programs. world bank atlas of social protection 60 yes: 12 no: 49 indicator 2: percentage reduction in poverty gap levels as a result of targeted social protection programs. world bank atlas of social protection 47 answers range from 0.02%38.66% reshape criteria indicators source total # countries with data findings criteria 1: climate resilience is incorporated into national development. indicator 1: national publicsector climate-related expenditures have been calculated and data is publicly available. 1) governance of climate change finance to benefit the poor and vulnerable in asia pacific; 2) overseas development institute 12 yes: 12 unavailable: 102 indicator 2: climate change is incorporated into the most recently available national development plan. country-specific sources. 66 yes: 49 limited: 7 no: 10 criteria 2: national policies and regulations contribute to furthering climate resilience. indicator 1: integrated planning is used. hfa report, priority for action 4, core indicator 1. 76 yes: 58 no: 18 56 consilience indicator 2: risk sensitive regulation in land zoning and private real estate development is in place. hfa report, priority for action 4, core indicator 4. 66 yes: 33 no: 33 indicator 3: impacts of disaster risk are taken into account in environmental impact assessments. hfa report, priority for action 4, core indicator 6. 76 yes: 60 no: 16 indicator 4: impacts of disaster risk created by major development projects are assessed. hfa report, priority for action 4, core indicator 6. 76 yes: 56 no: 20 indicator 5: cost/benefits of disaster risk are taken into account in the design and operation of major development projects. hfa report: priority for action 4, core indicator 6. 65 yes: 39 no: 26 consilience dale: a2r: climate resiliency baseline appendix b: countries selected afghanistan algeria american samoa angola anguilla antigua and barbuda aruba bahamas bangladesh barbados belize benin bermuda bhutan botswana british virgin islands burkina faso burundi cambodia cameroon cape verde cayman islands central african republic chad u.s. commonwealth of the northern mariana islands comoros cook islands cote d'ivoire cuba curacao democratic republic of the congo djibouti dominica dominican republic egypt equatorial guinea eritrea ethiopia fiji french polynesia gabon gambia ghana grenada guadeloupe guam guinea guinea-bissau guyana haiti jamaica kenya kiribati lao people's democratic republic lesotho liberia libya madagascar malawi maldives mali marshall islands martinique mauritania mauritius micronesia, federated states of montserrat morocco mozambique myanmar namibia nauru nepal new caledonia niger nigeria niue palau papua new guinea puerto rico congo, republic of the rwanda saint kitts and nevis saint lucia saint vincent and the grenadines samoa sao tome and principe senegal seychelles sierra leone singapore st maarten solomon islands somalia south africa south sudan sudan suriname swaziland timor-leste togo tokelau tonga trinidad and tobago tunisia turks and caicos islands tuvalu united states virgin islands uganda tanzania vanuatu yemen zambia zimbabwe microsoft word microedit changes_jenna tyler.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 15, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 134-145 sustainable hazard mitigation: exploring the importance of green infrastructure in building disaster resilient communities jenna tyler school of public and environmental affairs indiana university-purdue university indianapolis jentyler@iupui.edu abstract natural disasters continue to plague the united states, undermining the nation’s ability to build disaster resilient communities. although structural and non-structural mitigation measures are currently in place to lessen the impact natural disasters have on society, little attention has been given to the construction of green infrastructure as a sustainable hazard mitigation strategy. the purpose of this article is to explore the benefits of green infrastructure as a sustainable hazard mitigation strategy and offer recommendations to public sector entities to build disaster resilient communities. keywords: natural disaster, green infrastructure, sustainable hazard mitigation consilience 135 introduction natural disasters pose significant threats to the physical, social, and economic wellbeing of communities on a national and international scale. this was evidenced when hurricane katrina in august of 2005 killed over 2,000 individuals, destroyed or damaged nearly 300,000 homes, and caused roughly $96 billion in damages (townsend, 2006). likewise, hurricane sandy in october of 2012 wreaked havoc along the east coast killing 147 individuals and damaging or destroying over 650,000 homes (sullivan & uccellini, 2013). at the international level, the earthquake turned tsunami in december of 2004 affected a combination of thirteen asian and african countries and resulted in over 200,000 deaths (kathiresan & rajendran, 2005). in light of the devastation caused by these events and others, there is a need for communities to adopt sustainable hazard mitigation measures to build disaster resilient communities. sustainable hazard mitigation is “a concept that links the wise management of natural resources with local economic and social resiliency" (mileti & gailus, 2005). examples of sustainable hazard mitigation measures include the construction of green infrastructure such as green streets, bioswales, and wetlands (environmental protection agency (epa), 2015). green infrastructure is a viable hazard mitigation strategy as it helps to manage storm water, reduces flooding risks, and improves water quality (jaffe et al., 2010). although local, state, and federal governments across the united states are slowly recognizing the importance of investing in such sustainable hazard mitigation measures (burby, deyle, godschalk, & olshansky, 2000), additional scholarship is needed to address how communities can mitigate the effects of natural disasters by investing in green infrastructure. the purpose of this article is to explore how the construction and protection of green infrastructure can serve as a sustainable hazard mitigation measure. the article commences with a discussion of the root problem that causes much of the disaster losses as well as a discussion of current mitigation strategies. next, the author discusses the concept of green infrastructure as a sustainable hazard mitigation approach. then, the article focuses on building disaster resilient communities and the current funding for mitigation in the united states. finally, the article concludes with a set of recommendations for public sector entities. tyler: green infrastructure consilience the root problem natural disasters continue to devastate communities year after year. in fact, from 1980 to 2014, the united states experienced 3,400 disaster events, which resulted in roughly 20,600 deaths and $1,300,000,000,000 in total losses (munich re, 2015). a majority of these losses are a direct result of the interaction of three major systems: the physical environment, the built environment, and the human environment (mileti & peek, 2001). the physical environment consists of the natural elements such as water, wind, and earth and their corresponding hazardous event (e.g., hurricane, flood, tornado and earthquake). the built environment includes transportation networks as well as buildings and essential utilities (handy, boarnet, ewing, & killinhsworth, 2002). finally, the human environment refers to the way individuals live within society including social demographics and cultural norms (mileti & gailus, 2005). these interactions together have resulted in lives lost, homes and businesses destroyed, and economies shattered. these three systems are not static, but are constantly changing every year. first, the physical environment has seen a shift towards the potential cascading effects climate change may have on the frequency and magnitude of natural disasters (mileti & gailus, 2005). the built environment continues to expand and the protection of critical infrastructures (e.g., water and wastewater management, commercial facilities sector, nuclear plants, etc.) becomes an even greater challenge. for example, as a result of the tsunami that devastated much of japan in 2011, a nuclear meltdown occurred at the fukushima nuclear power plant, causing the largest nuclear disaster since chernobyl in 1986 (haddow, bullock, & coppola, 2013). lastly, the human environment continues to subject itself to the effects of natural disasters by living in hazardous areas such as along earthquake fault lines or on the coastline. according to the national oceanic and atmospheric association (noaa ) (2013) in 2010, 39% of the us population resided in a coastal county and projections show the percentage to increase with each coming year. in addition, scholars have found that the lower an individual’s socioeconomic status is the more vulnerable they are to the effects of natural disasters due to a lack of financial resources to mitigate and prepare for such events (cutter & finch, 2008). current mitigation strategies consilience 137 mitigation measures are classified dichotomously as structural, whereby engineering methods are employed, and nonstructural, whereby administrative methods are employed (brody, khang, & bernhardt, 2010). structural mitigation commonly refers to modifications of the built environment by using engineering designs to limit damages such as constructing dams, levees, and seawalls (brody, kang, & bernhardt, 2010). historically, structural mitigation measures have dominated communities throughout the united states to lessen the impact disasters have on people and property (godschalk, 2003). the investment in such practices has not only limited physical losses, but also economic losses. the us army corps of engineers (2006), found that while flood damages from 1991 to 2001 totaled nearly $45 billion dollars, the structural mitigation measures in place saved over $200 billion dollars in losses. however, scholars have expressed the limitations of implementing structural mitigation measures. first, the forces of the physical environment can exceed the design capacity of the structural mitigation measure causing more damage to occur than if no measure was in place at all (larson & pasencia, 2001). this is evident in the analysis of hurricane katrina where much of the city of new orleans was destroyed when the levees did not hold due to poor maintenance and major design failures (brody, kang, & bernhardt, 2010). second, structural mitigation measures can lead to a false sense of security (burby & dalton, 1994). in fact, an estimated 20% of the city of new orleans did not evacuate for hurricane katrina in part because of their reliance upon the levees as the primary flood protection measure (brinkley, 2006; montz & tobin, 2008). finally, structural mitigation measures can create adverse environmental impacts such as decreases in wildlife habitats and water quality (birkland et al., 2003). on the other hand, non-structural mitigation measures are in place, which focus on the physical and human environment. examples of non-structural mitigation measures include land use regulations, revitalizing wetlands, public education, and insurance programs. the most widely implemented non-structural mitigation measure is the national flood insurance program. (brody, khang, & bernhardt, 2010). established in 1968, the national flood insurance program provides insurance to property owners living in flood hazard areas so long as the local jurisdiction continues to enact and enforce flood protection measures (brody, khang, & bernhardt, 2010). the implementation of non-structural mitigation strategies are often more sustainable than engineering designs, using avoidance strategies to deviate from the development in hazard-prone areas. even though both structural and non-structural mitigation measures have proven to be effective in reducing tyler: green infrastructure consilience disaster losses, additional attention is needed to the investment of more sustainable hazard mitigation measures. green infrastructure green infrastructure refers to the “interconnected network of green space that conserves natural ecosystems values and functions and provides associated benefits to human populations” (benedict & mcmahon, 2012). the adoption of green infrastructure strategies have been employed to address the risk of water hazards such as flooding, hurricanes, tsunamis and can take a number of forms, such as the construction of wetlands, green roofs, and buffer zones (see table 1). due to the multi-disciplinary approach of disaster management, scholars from a wide variety of disciplines such as climatology, meteorology, engineering, emergency management, and others have attempted to understand the effect green infrastructure has on the physical, built, and human environment (mileti & peek, 2001). scholars have studied the impact of green infrastructure on reducing flood and storm waters and sewer overflows. kloss (2008) argues that the implementation of green infrastructure measures to manage storm waters reaps notable economic and environmental benefits. this is because green infrastructure uses vegetation, soil, and other natural resources to improve air quality reduce urban temperatures, and save on energy costs. similarly, rajan et al. (2011) explored the benefits of green infrastructure to manage storm water in the city of philadelphia. the results of this study indicated a significant reduction of storm water volume could be achieved through the adoption of various green infrastructure measures. jawdy, reese, and parker (2010) studied the effectiveness of green infrastructure and more specifically the use of bioretention cells, pervious pavements, green roofs, and tree planters to reduce the runoff volume of sewer systems in nashville, tennessee. the results suggest that green infrastructure measures significantly reduced the runoff volume of sewer systems. finally, guo and correa (2013) conducted a study on behalf of the united states department of homeland security and found that adopting green infrastructure as a flood mitigation strategy can save approximately $6.1 million dollars annually in flood-prone areas. based on these studies, public sector organizations should further invest in green infrastructure to build disaster resilient communities. table 1. examples of green infrastructure consilience 139 green infrastructure description benefits green roofs roofs of buildings that are covered with vegetation and soil. reduces runoff by absorbing rainwater bioswales vegetated conduits that are an alternative to conventional storm water sewers by absorbing and redirecting storm water. reduces storm water runoff and enhances local water quality. rain gardens vegetated areas that collect and absorb storm water runoff from buildings and sidewalks. reduces storm water runoff and irrigation demands. green streets streets and alleys that are designed with natural resources to store, infiltrate, and move storm water. reduces storm water runoff by creating a network of connected streets to improve drainage. buffer zones protected area of land that runs adjacent to waterway. reduces storms water runoff and restricts development in hazardous areas. pervious pavement paved surfaces that infiltrate, treat, and store rainwater. reduces impervious areas and storm water runoff. wetlands a land area that is filled with water either permanently or seasonally. trap floodwaters and reduce flooding. * source: (epa, 2015) the costs incurred from implementing green infrastructure can be divided into direct financial costs and opportunity costs. the financial costs of implementing green infrastructure projects can vary depending on the size and scope of the project as well as the resources necessary to complete the project. and opportunity costs refer to the potential monetary loss from deciding to implement green infrastructure rather than adopting more common mitigation measures such as dams and levees. however, despite these costs, the adoption of green infrastructure measures can reap environmental, social, and economic benefits (epa, 2013). environmentally, green infrastructure improves air quality, reduces carbon emissions, intercepts stormwater, and saves energy (benedict & mcmahon, 2010). socially, green infrastructure can tyler: green infrastructure consilience also serve as recreational amenities and improve aesthetics. economically, green infrastructure can reduce construction costs incurred from implementing structural mitigation techniques as well as increase property values (epa, 2013). in sum, adopting green infrastructure as a sustainable hazard mitigation strategy can have a lasting and positive economic and environmental impact. building disaster resilient communities researchers and policymakers have widely used the concept of resilience to describe the way society reduces the threats posed by natural, man-made, and technological hazards (haigh & amaratunga, 2010). much of the ecological literature focuses on the physical environment and defines resilience as “the amount of disturbance an ecosystem can withstand without changing self-organized processes and structures" (haigh & amaratunga, 2010). however, the engineering sciences view disaster resilience quite differently and perceive the concept as the ability of buildings and critical infrastructure to withstand the shock of a disaster (cutter, burton, & emrich, 2010). for example, bruneau et al. (2003) defines resilience with an emphasis on the robustness and redundancy of the built environment. in other words, infrastructures are deemed resilient if they are able to withstand a great shock without suffering significant damage and if the infrastructure has substitutable components ensuring operability. finally, the application of resilience in emergency and disaster management discourse emphasizes the human environment’s role and suggests the concept is the ability for a community to withstand the shock of the disaster and “bounce back” from adversity (mileti, 1999). despite the variations in terminology, building disaster resilient communities requires the coordination, collaboration, and financial support of various government entities. the united states federal government has become increasingly interested in investing in the construction of disaster resilient communities (cutter, burton, & emrich, 2010). the flood mitigation assistance program, for instance, was created as part of the national flood insurance reform act of 1968 as a predisaster mitigation strategy. specifically, the flood mitigation assistance program provides funds to state and local communities for mitigation measures that reduce or eliminate the long-term risk of flood damage (rose et al., 2007). in addition, the hazard mitigation grant program was created in 1988 under the stafford act as a post-disaster mitigation strategy in which the amount of funding given to the affected community is dependent upon the amount of damages (rose et al., 2007). this is the largest source consilience 141 for hazard mitigation funding and allows states to identify feasible hazard mitigation projects that are cost-effective, environmentally sound, and sustainable (fema, 2015). to assess the benefits of such hazard mitigation programs, rose et al. (2007) conducted a cost-benefit analysis of fema-funded hazard mitigation activities. the results of this study determined that the cost-benefit analysis for flood, wind, and earthquake hazard mitigation is $3.5 billion to $14 billion, respectively. this implies that americans greatly benefit from fema’s continued investment in mitigation. however, despite fema's large investment in the aforementioned hazard mitigation programs, little emphasis has been placed on investing in green infrastructure. it was not until president obama placed a greater focus on climate change, preparedness, and resilience, that environmental sustainability and the investment of green infrastructure obtained a higher stance on the political agenda. however, in the summer of 2014, the epa launched the green infrastructure collaborative in conjunction with six other governmental agencies to include the department of transportation, department of housing and urban development, department of defense, department of interior, department of agriculture, and department of energy as well as nongovernmental and private sector entities to assist communities in implementing green infrastructure (epa, 2015). the creation of the green infrastructure collaborative is a starting point for underscoring the importance of sustainable hazard mitigation measures. however, even further actions can emphasize the importance of green infrastructure in building disaster resilient communities. recommendations implementing sustainable hazard mitigation measures presents significant challenges to the public sector. first, disaster issues are not salient and building disaster resilient communities is often a low priority until a disaster strikes. for example, following the release of nuclear agents at the three-mile island nuclear plant in pennsylvania in 1979, president jimmy carter signed executive order 12127 creating fema to coordinate all federal disaster responses (haddow, bullock, & coppola, 2013). prior to the establishment of fema, disaster management in the united states followed an ad hoc system (haddow, bullock, & coppola, 2013). in addition, it is often difficult to persuade organizations to adopt sustainable hazard mitigation measures when money has already been invested in current development. lastly, federal funding is both unstable and unpredictable due to changes in federal budgets, tyler: green infrastructure consilience which in turn effects state and local entities’ ability to invest in sustainable hazard mitigation measures. despite these challenges, there are a variety of steps the public sector can take to implement sustainable hazard mitigation measures. first, public organizations must begin preparing and planning for recovery purposes. recovery plans should be written and should address the potential of using green infrastructure as a sustainable hazard mitigation strategy. also, the public sector should network with political advocates to mobilize support for disaster issues. these individuals might be elected or appointed officials, educators, business owners, and interested citizens. in addition, the public sector must use the “window of opportunity” to emphasize the importance of investing in sustainable hazard mitigation measures. furthermore, the public sector should tie disaster issues with more salient issues such as environmental or health issues. also, public funding should be increased for communities to invest in green infrastructure projects. lastly, public-private partnerships are necessary to obtain additional funding and resources to invest in sustainable hazard mitigation measures. public-private partnerships are a unique funding mechanism whereby a project or program is funded jointly by a public and private organization. specifically, communities should utilize the epa’s community-based pubic-private partnership (cbp3) program as it is designed to help local communities identify and establish private partners when developing green infrastructure. conclusion the purpose of this article was to explore how the construction and protection of green infrastructure can serve as a sustainable hazard mitigation strategy. based on extant literature, it is clear there are benefits to using green infrastructure as a sustainable hazard mitigation measure, and the adoption of such measures is needed to address the dynamic nature of disasters in the twenty-first century. although this paper focuses on the adoption of green infrastructure as a sustainable hazard mitigation measure in regions devastated by flooding, hurricanes, and other water disasters, additional studies are needed to address other modes of sustainable hazard mitigation strategies in regions largely affected by land disasters (e.g., tornados and earthquakes). the author is hopeful that adoption of sustainable hazard mitigation measures will minimize disaster losses and that disaster resilient communities will prevail. consilience 143 bibliography benedict, m. 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(2006). the federal response to hurricane katrina: lessons learned. retrieved from http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessonslearned/chapter1.html u.s. army corps of engineers (2006) services for the publics. retrieved from http://www.usace.army.mil/public.html consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 5, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 190-200 the art of development images promoting dialogue and alternatives to poverty and violence in local communities of colombia natali rojas development and international cooperation-faculty of social sciences university of jyvaskyla, finland natalirojas07@gmail.com abstract sueños films colombia is a grassroots organization based in ciudad bolivar, southern bogotá-colombia. for over ten years, this community-based project has offered diverse art activities including audiovisual training, documentary production workshops, forums on cinema and an international film festival. this innovative community organization promotes the active participation of local people, enabling them to use the arts to express themselves, to interact with others and to find collective solutions for their community. ‘the art of development’ collects material from the time that i have spent in ciudad bolivar and other marginalized barrios/neighborhoods of bogotá and manizales. since may 2010, i have been assisting several projects that sueños films colombia has organized, including filmmaking seminars and workshops, while producing ethnographic material for my masters thesis. through the following images, i hope to share the power of the arts in promoting alternatives to poverty and violence, along with, even more importantly, the strength of the local colombian people. i have been inspired by children taking their first photos, elderly learning video editing from their grandsons or neighbors, and the energy moving groups of people from different generations to develop projects collectively. author’s note natali rojas is a colombian who is completing a masters in development and international cooperation at the university of jyväskylä, finland. she has a background in sociology and art history, and her areas of research include community development, art and media studies, communication and culture. she has practice using video, documentary films and photography together with communities to document her work. she aims to contribute to the recognition of the people she works with through her pictures, videos and articles. keywords: community, arts, films, video, cinema, grassroots, development, ciudad bolivar, bogotá, colombia. consilience natali rojas: the art of development 1. ciudad bolivar, bogotá-colombia ciudad bolívar is located in the south of bogotá. although this locality is mostly rural, its urban area concentrates the poorest population (between 800,000 and 2 million estimated habitants) of the colombian capital city. ciudad bolivar is a young and diverse community of immigrants and displaced people who come from all over the country. poor urban infrastructure, informal and illegal settlements, stigmatization, and lack of communal spaces are problems ciudad bolívar has faced for years. 192 consilience 2. ciudad bolivar’s audiovisual revolution sueños films colombia is a grassroots organization that has led an audiovisual ‘revolution’ in ciudad bolivar, bogotá for over ten years. through different art activities, including community audiovisual schools, video clubs, and its international community video and film festival ojo al sancocho, the organization promotes dialogue and alternatives to conflict and violence. the participants form creative groups that are generally diverse both in terms of backgrounds and ages. consilience natali rojas: the art of development in ciudad bolivar and other vulnerable communities like usme or soacha (located in southern bogotá as well), families, children often spend a long time alone due to the long working days of their parents who generally work in construction, cleaning and security. in 2010, sueños films colombia started a program in partnership with community culture houses of different barrios /neighborhoods of ciudad bolivar to offer children free audiovisual education before and after their school times. similar night activities began this year and are becoming popular among adults and the elderly. unfortunately, engagement to the activities has not been consistent. job changes, relatives’ illnesses, residential movements and familial problems all result in students missing sueños films colombia’s education programs. 194 consilience 3. ciudad bolivar’s ekoaudiovisual school through support fromby international cooperation and development agencies such as iom and war child holland, escuela ekoaudiovisual in ciudad bolivar was born in 2005. the project offers poor children education via films and encourages them to express themselves and tell their own stories. for five years now, the community’s children, along with their families and neighbors, have collaborated together in documenting community problems such as the poor street quality, the all-too familiar violence and high rates of drug consumption. sebastian lives in bella vista-ciudad bolivar and has been attending the audiovisual school for just couple of months. in this video he shows what he likes doing in his free time and invite others children to join his school, his favorite activity: http://www.youtube.com/user/ekomunicacion#p/u/1/imzbpsqpafg http://www.youtube.com/user/ekomunicacion#p/u/1/imzbpsqpafg consilience natali rojas: the art of development 3. international community video and film festival ojo al sancocho is the name of the international community film and video festival that sueños films colombia has been organizing in ciudad bolivar since 2008. every year, the festival welcomes more than 5,000 participants who visit from different parts of bogotá, colombia and the world. during one week, the festival screens audiovisual productions and runs diverse workshops that are open and free for anyone interested. video, film, photography, performance and other visual arts are used to promote community engagement and dialogue. three months before the 2010 festival, the children who are part of the ekoaudiovisual school helped design the festival’s poster. they were asked to draw their own ideas about what meaning the festival has for them. their drawings were later combined into one piece. 196 consilience ojo al sancocho is the only film and video festival in bogotá promoting activities with the people of the barrios/neighborhoods. with knowledge about and experience in making videos, children and young people use the festival week to produce more videos that are often screened before the end of the festival and published later on the web. this year, the students from semillas creativas (a public library in one of the most dangerous barrios of ciudad bolivar, juan pablo ii) and a visiting southern colombia audiovisual children school produced a short video clip together. the group of youth used stop motion techniques to tell their own story through rap lyrics. consilience natali rojas: the art of development 4. local stories documented via film in 2010, sueños films colombia started a video project in socaha, located nearby ciudad bolivar legalizando un sueño (making a dream legal) (http://www.vimeo.com/17083711) is the result of collective effort of children and the women who live altos de la florida, one of the poorest neighborhoods of soacha. rubi. in the film, women document their life during the years that they have been living in this illegal settlement, explaining how they survive and raise their children despite the social and economical difficulties. in the video, they bring up issues like the lack of water access, high erosion levels and pollution. http://www.vimeo.com/17083711 198 consilience ojo al sancocho participates in other art and film festivals around colombia and the world. the official selection of its films is usually shown in other barrios/neighborhoods similar to ciudad bolivar. last november, ojo al sancoho participated in manizales’s short film festival, running a community film workshop at barrio el nevado. after five days of intensive training, fifteen youth finished a nine minute documentary that they called casa de sueños e ilusiones (house of dreams and hope). in the video, they refer to the culture house of barrio el nevado where they meet everyday for diverse cultural activities including circus activities, traditional music and dances. the film has been widely screen in alternative festivals and recently won an award in ojo al cine festival. consilience natali rojas: the art of development alaska is a neighborhood located in usme, southern bogotá. as in many barrios/neighborhoods of ciudad bolivar, alaska has poor urban infrastructure. there is no potable water and the little community spaces are mostly abandoned. as a member of sueños films colombia, i documented an architectural intervention that a group of national and international non-profits made (http://vimeo.com/17564310). with the help of community members, the organizations renewed the only existing park in alaska. during the shooting process children spontaneously used my camera to interview their friends. they were really happy to see themselves on the screen during the video premiere after the park was completed. http://vimeo.com/17564310 200 consilience list of videos and links: la historia de sebastian/ sebastian story: http://www.youtube.com/user/ekomunicacion#p/u/1/imzbpsqpafg legalizando un sueño/making legal a dream http://www.vimeo.com/17083711 alaska, parque comunal/ alaska community park http://www.vimeo.com/17564310 websites of interest: http://ecoaudiovisual.blogspot.com/ http://www.youtube.com/user/ekomunicacion http://festivalojoalsancocho.wordpress.com/english/ http://www.youtube.com/user/ojoalsancocho http://www.urbanology.org/bogota/ http://www.ciudadbolivar.gov.co http://www.youtube.com/user/ekomunicacion#p/u/1/imzbpsqpafg http://www.vimeo.com/17083711 http://www.vimeo.com/17083711 http://ecoaudiovisual.blogspot.com/ http://www.youtube.com/user/ekomunicacion http://www.urbanology.org/bogota/ http://www.ciudadbolivar.gov.co/ microsoft word williams.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 16, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 64-73 a systematic evaluation of environmental discrimination with regard to sustainability initiatives in india how community based natural resource management theory could offer a practical solution to promoting equitable access to sustainability jonah m. williams 1school of engineering, rutgers university jonah.m.williams@rutgers.edu abstract in the past fifty years, india has undeniably become one of the world’s economic and industrial superpowers, dominating the geopolitical climate of south asia. india’s road to industrialization has been accompanied by extreme environmental devastation that is encapsulated by population growth, pollution, and loss of biodiversity; additionally, many of these factors have had crippling effects on certain areas of india’s environment. to combat these problems, certain groups within the government and nation, such as the ministry of new and renewable energy, have been implementing sustainable solutions to combat the adverse effects of man-made environmental degradation. oftentimes, however, the implementation of these conservation tactics is done at a state-wide or national level in what is masked as “soft-authoritarianism” and fail to consider the interests and accessibility of programs for all peoples, especially communities which are labeled as minority, indigenous, slum, or lower caste (dalit) leading to the rise of environmental prejudices. although india has come a long way in the past decade regarding action against environmental problems through new sustainable solutions, it has failed to consider the accessibility of these programs to all peoples and the alleviation of environmental discrimination. this paper considers the convoluted nature of the past and aims to propose solutions that will a) allow india to continue its commitment to a sustainable future and b) combat socio-political issues of environmental biases, which adhere to the paradigm of community-based natural resource management (cbnrm). keywords: environmental discrimination, south asia, india, environmental sustainability, equal access, community based natural resource management (cbnrm) consilience williams: sustainability initiatives in india author’s note: the work contained in this paper stems from research that i conducted under the direction of priti narayan, a scholar of south asian studies at rutgers university. she encouraged me to combine my passions for both geographic topics as well as environmental conservation and explore a new region of the world which i knew little about. understanding the political, social, and environmental climate of south asia, and in particular, india, was both extremely interesting and eye-opening. oftentimes learning about another people’s culture and the struggles they face is the best way to re-evaluate our own lives and perhaps better comprehend how we can solve global problems, as they apply to all peoples in all parts of our world. i hope you enjoy my work and that it teaches you something new about a topic that is of urgency to us all. consilience 66 as society presses further into the 21st century there is no doubt that issues regarding the extreme degradation of the environment will become of increasing urgency and importance. humanity’s interaction with the environment and global biosphere has led to problems such as various forms of pollution, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, climate change, and shifting weather patterns [26]. recent research conducted by solomon et al. (2009) discovered that, as a society, we are currently approaching a point of “no return” in regards to our treatment of the global environment; they predicted that irreversible changes in terms of the world’s climate, forests, animals, and humans will soon commence [7, 24, 26]. thus, this current nature of degradation has warranted the growth and development of environmental conservation tactics that are aimed at curbing and mitigating the destruction that is being caused to our planet. many of these solutions constitute increased attention to alternative energy, sustainable resource conservation, and improved wastewater management. however, implementation of these tactics is easier said than done, as it not only requires adequate attention to the scientific nature of the problem and economics of construction, but also geopolitics and socio-cultural considerations in the area of establishment. oftentimes, the logistical aspects of implementing sustainability programs are extremely sound. however, geopolitical disconnects, socioeconomic inequality, and cultural phenomena can operate to prevent the implementation and equal access to these programs for all peoples [6]. this notion of environmental prejudice has received new attention by politicians, activists, and community leaders in recent years due to the disconnect that exists in certain nations between sustainability initiatives and socio-economically disadvantaged peoples. in india, the issue of disproportionate access to environmental sustainability has become an extreme problem. as one of the world’s most industrialized countries, poor treatment of the environment has become a large issue through pollution, overpopulation, and deforestation. environmental sustainability is now of utmost importance to india, and the country has invested a significant amount into the development and promotion of these new technologies. however, going forward, india must now understand that the long untreated sociopolitical issues of the discrimination and infrastructure will begin to impact its ability to reach new sustainability goals, conserve resources, and become south asia’s flagship of conservationism – thus considering sustainable solutions which allow disadvantaged people increased environmental justice are of great concern to the well-being of india’s biosphere and its people. consilience williams: sustainability initiatives in india like many other industrially developing nations, india has faced a long history of struggles with issues of environmental degradation. india is currently the second most populated nation in the world due to its extremely high birth rate [11]. this expanded growth is a multifaceted result of both cultural and socioeconomic issues, as well as the green revolution agricultural movement of the 1960s [21]. india’s large population has placed extreme pressure on its environment, further exacerbating issues such as air pollution, water contamination, and deforestation. in heavily populated cities, large volumes of traffic, idling, and the use of high-sulfur diesel has resulted in disastrous levels of smog, such as in the capital city of new delhi, forcing people to stay inside. in the countryside, air pollution comes mainly from biomass burning in stoves called challahs, found in rural villages due to lack of access to electricity and other fuel sources [20]. crop burning has become prominent after monsoons in order to easily remove overharvests, dead crops, and illegitimate crops that did not yield enough produce. these habits have led to the growth of the “asian brown cloud,” a massive weather system of pollutants which lingers in the air and delays the monsoons causing a vicious cycle of inadequately grown crops and burning, accentuating problems [16]. high volumes of particulate air pollution are extremely harmful to humans, causing elevated rates of cancers, asthma, and childhood diseases [15]. water contamination has been a large part of environmental degradation in india and is mainly due to agricultural runoff and solid wastewater pollution in drinking water. these problems are a direct result of inadequate infrastructure such as non-functional wastewater treatment plants and a lack closed-sewage systems [19]. this contamination pollutes groundwater and top-water leading to hazardous health effects, increased droughts due to lack of clean drinking water, as well as decreased agricultural potential and loss of biodiversity, especially in wetlands and rivers, such as the ganges – a major source of food, water, and income for many indians [23]. due to the detrimental effects of these problems, india has begun to implement sustainable solutions which, for the most part, have been successful in combatting environmental degradation overall. in terms of alternative energy, the national ministry of new and renewable energy, under the current direction of piyush goyal, is responsible for proliferating and developing these new energies. each province in india has a smaller sub-group of the national ministry, which allows a more direct approach to implementation of sustainability on a per-state basis [1]. although the indian government has historically been known for its “strong consilience 68 center” and soft-authoritarianism, this is an interesting example of what appears to be a quasi-federalist power development. india began wind power initiatives in the 1990s and now has the fifth largest wind power capacity in the world, with its largest energy generation facility located in rajasthan [10]. india also has an ideal solar climate, with remote areas such as the thar desert that have allowed the nation to become a hub for solar power initiatives [17]. biofuels and biogases are also gaining popularity, due to the fact that they can be implemented easily with the existing infrastructure. . of extreme interest is the jatropha plant, which can easily be grown with low nutrient soils and less water to produce a crop that can be turned into biodiesel for automobiles and generators alike [2]. the indian government is now providing incentives in the form of tax subsidies to certain groups of farms to cultivate various biofuel crops. this policy has served to both promote bioenergy sources and to aid farmers struggling with high-requirement food crops that yield little-to-no income. while it seems as though india is heading in the right direction regarding the implementation of conservation technologies, these practices are extremely selective in terms of who gets to reap their benefits. to a certain extent, there exists a degree of environmental prejudice through the employment of these alternative solutions, which favor those of higher economic status, location, caste, and “citizenship” status through the eyes of society – e.g. majority versus minority communities. oftentimes, these minority communities are also located in areas with higher levels of environmental contamination, pollution, and poor infrastructure [3]. although one might think that this would warrant these disadvantaged communities to be the main target of sustainability initiatives, this is not the case due to the presence of both explicit logistical and ideological barriers. a historic example of this bias can be seen through the 1984 union carbide (uc) chemical plant disaster in bhopal, india. this incident occurred at the american company union carbide’s fertilizer plant in the central region of madhya pradesh. the chemical that was leaked, methyl isocyanate (mic), killed almost 8,000 instantly, wounded 520,000 total, causing blindness, deafness, cancer, and major childhood illness; in fact, bhopal now has one of the highest rates of birth defects in india as a result of the contamination [4]. the cause of the leak was due to the fact that the uc plant had cut corners in safety, containment, and remediation of chemicals, as safety officers in both the indian government and union carbide overlooked systemic management problems. the plant in bhopal was entirely surrounded by slum communities, and many activists and researchers speculate that consilience williams: sustainability initiatives in india such an incident would not have happened had the plant been located in an area that was of higher class and caste status. today, much of the bhopal site has been left untouched. the mic gas still lingers in the groundwater, soil, and flora, exposing those who live in the area with still hazardous conditions. activists have been petitioning the indian government to begin sustainable remediation of the site’s hazardous toxins, but little work is being done to help those surrounding the site, further contributing to the overall problem of environmental discrimination. one of the most persistent problems of this discrimination lies in the consideration of urban slums in sustainability programs. slum communities in india are groups of people who live in extreme poverty and lack basic amenities. most often, these communities are composed of people whom society identifies as dalit (untouchable caste) or minorities. city campaigns for wind and solar power, as well as biodiesel and improved wastewater treatment, often do not apply to these slum communities as they do not lie on the electric grid, cannot afford cars, and have no sewage systems. in fact, slum communities are frequently constructed out of refuse from local landfills. slum communities often cannot benefit from these initiatives due to infrastructure inefficiencies, and thus continue to pollute waterways, burn biomass, and cause the “degradation of communities” (in the eyes of the elites) [9, 22]. however, they cannot change their ways because these programs do not apply to them. this hypocrisy has unfortunately led a radical anti-slum rhetoric and the codification of the notion that “slums should be removed because they are an aesthetic and environmental nuisance” [14]. in rural areas, conservation of biodiversity and alternative energy are issues which also promote a bias towards native adivasis (“scheduled tribe” caste) and rural farmers living in these areas. india has begun to employ the use of hydroelectric, wind, and solar energy in rural areas as well as the enforcement of stricter resource usage laws and forest protection legislation. overall, these programs have been highly effective in advancing india’s commitment to a sustainable future. however, they fail to consider the environmental accessibility of groups affected by these projects. perhaps the most notable case in this area was the creation of the sardar sarovar hydroelectric dam in gujarat as a part of the narmada valley project [13]. here, instead of expanding energy access to millions of indians, the benefits of this initiative went primarily to those already with access to electricity (most likely those who are not adivasi, dalits, etc.). furthermore, the initiative has largely served only the state of gujarat, instead of madhya pradesh. the planning of the dam did not consider any of consilience 70 the adivasi people, farmers, or people living on land and forests near the river who would be greatly impacted by the dam through flooding, loss of business, resources, and possible displacement. this prompted the formation of the narmada bachao andolan (nba) adivasi social movement to stop the dam project and raise awareness about the discrimination and prejudices that they face both on a national and statewide level [3]. through its vast corporate and non-governmental partnerships, the nba successfully prompted the supreme court to halt the dam project. however, after several years of deliberation, the court decided to let the dam project proceed under stricter conditions and a greater attention to inclusiveness; yet, this was not well enforced, and the mechanism to monitor the progress and effects of the dam was lackluster. nonetheless, adivasis, dalits, and other minorities in rural areas continue to advocate for their rights to the land and its resources, as well as their right to participate democratically in deciding local matters that concern their communities and way of life. evidently, the lack of access to sustainability and conservation programs stems from an overall lack of infrastructure and implicit/explicit biases based on culture, income, and caste. thus, it is imperative to consider alternative methods of promoting sustainability which are a) easily implementable without drastically requiring altercation to the existing physical infrastructure and technology, and b) provide access and benefits for all people, especially those disadvantaged groups. a novel global paradigm that is gaining popularity for providing solutions to these problems, especially in africa, is the theory of community based natural resource management (cbnrm) [8]. this notion is primarily based on kuznets’ theory that the status of environmental degradation within a nation is not dependent on the population size, the nature of the government, or public and private sector affairs, but rather the relative income and sociopolitical involvement of that nation’s people [12]. cbnrm programs operate to promote sustainability from the ground up, educating disadvantaged, rural, and poorer residents in resource conservation and enabling them to take ownership and become inspired to conserve and develop their communities. certain programs include the installation of biogas plants in slums that generate fuel and electricity from waste, compact waste-water treatment through cheap microorganisms, slum-based garbage recycling plants, and subsidies for sustainable biofuel-crop farming. additionally, these initiatives stimulate the creation of jobs and revenue in disadvantaged areas by allowing members to get involved in activities that are not only economically favorable, but also mentally, socially, and spiritually engaging as well. consilience williams: sustainability initiatives in india cbnrm-oriented programs have been most notably implemented in nairobi, where the kenyan government has worked closely with nairobi slums to create jobs, sustainability, and improve health conditions through establishing a biogas plant that turns human waste and garbage into fuel [5]. in india, cbnrm-oriented initiatives have only recently begun to arrive, with mumbai as one of the first cities to implement such programs. there, the global alliance for incinerator alternatives (gaia) has installed biogas plant that has had great success in the city’s slum community by improving living conditions through recycling, generating clean energy, and offering employment to locals as well [18]. if correctly implemented, cbnrm programs can have a profound effect on the overall sustainability of an area’s environment and the access that all people have to local resources, especially those who face environmental prejudices. they can also help mitigate the effects of both environmental degradation and the systematic oppression of “backwards” peoples through solutions that are extremely realistic, affordable, and readily implemented without any major changes to the geographical infrastructure. india should begin to look toward constructing similar biogas programs, similar to the ones in nairobi and mumbai, in other national cities to aid with the development and conditions of slums. additionally, enabling adivasis and other tribes with greater autonomy and rights can ensure an equality of sustainability measures in rural and urban indian communities. by pursuing these solutions, india will become a leader in the promotion of new conservation tactics, reaffirming its position in the global community as a nation dedicated to improving humanity’s interaction with the environment. furthermore, the use of cbnrm will help the nation facilitate aid to its disadvantaged citizens and take a strong stance against economic, caste, and cultural discrimination, 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(2011). retrieved november 1, 2015, from http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/our_products/noddy/union/report_21_12.pdf solomon, s., plattner, g., knutti, r., & friedlingstein, p. (2009). irreversible climate change due to carbon dioxide emissions. pnas, 106(6), 1704-1709. doi:10.1073/pnas.0812721106 somanathan, e. (n.d.). biodiversity in india. retrieved november 1, 2015, from http://www.isid.ac.in/~som/papers/biodiversityinindia_rev.pdf the hidden cost of fossil fuels. (n.d.). retrieved october 16, 2015, from http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/coal-and-other-fossil-fuels/the-hiddencost-of-fossil.html#.vjfu27ersm8 consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 19, iss. 1 (2018), pp. 130–162 planning for climate resilient barangays in the philippines: the case of barangay tumana in marikina city, metro manila nicasio b. espina, jr* mr. nick espina is an architect, urban planner and a senior lecturer from the university of the philippines open university (upou) faculty of management and development studies and the university of the philippines – diliman (upd) school of urban and regional planning. nbespina@gmail.com abstract the philippines is among the countries most threatened by climate change. this combined with other human and developmental factors compounds the challenge that barangays, the smallest political and administrative units in the country, face: to build and scale-up local resilience. this paper presents the case of barangay tumana in marikina city, philippines, the second most populated barangay in the city and the most devastated when typhoon ondoy (international name: ketsana) hit the country in 2009. the study examines key hazards and elements of the communities in barangay tumana that contribute to its susceptibility to climate-related impacts, using the definition of the united nations framework convention on climate change (unfccc) to frame the process of analysis. in particular, it characterizes the biophysical/environmental risks and socioeconomic/demographic vulnerabilities of the communities (exposure and sensitivity elements) in barangay tumana that can be addressed through planning in order to further community resilience and enhance long-term quality of life (ensor, and berger, 2009). these risks and vulnerabilities are established through various quantitative and qualitative methods of data gathering and analysis, including questionnaire surveys, key informant interviews, geographic information system (gis) analysis, reviews of key local documents and related literature, and a multistakeholder validation and consultation. policy options to build barangay resilience in the context of climate change are then recommended. mailto:nbespina@gmail.com consilience espina: barangay resilience and adaptive capacity 1. introduction the philippines is one of the countries most at risk from the impacts of climate change. it ranks fifth on the global climate risk index 2017 in terms of extreme weather events (kreft, eckstein, and melchior, 2016). this exacerbates the developmental challenges faced by the nation and thus necessitates sound and urgent measures to build and maximize local resilience. marikina city has long been plagued by numerous environmental hazards, especially flooding. the swelling of the marikina river is an old problem: incidents of largescale flooding have been documented as far back as 1937, when marikina was still a largely agricultural town. a huge flood in 1988 saw the marikina river rise to 19 meters. from the early 90s to the first decade of 2000, the city faced intermittent flooding with floods reaching as high as 18 meters. tropical storm ketsana (locally known as ondoy) brought about flashfloods that inundated 80% of metropolitan manila on september 26, 2009. the waters of the marikina river reached a record high of 22.8 meters and severely affected marikina city. tropical storm meari (locally named falcon) brought heavy rains to the country in june 2011, and the marikina river again reached a critical level. in november of the same year, typhoon nesat (locally named pedring) dumped heavy rains comparable to typhoon ondoy. water levels reached as high as 20.1 meters, submerging several barangays in the process. in august 2012, the monsoon rains or habagat caused the river to swell to 20.6 meters, just a few meters below the record level set by typhoon ondoy. the rains affected the rest of metropolitan manila, with some areas submerged in flood waters up to 3 meters high. the destruction caused by these flood incidents was driven by topographic and anthropogenic factors, and resulted in the displacement of hundreds of households, particularly in the informal settlement areas by the riverbanks in marikina (delos reyes, and espina, 2016). these informal settlements are “residential areas where 1) inhabitants have no security of tenure vis-à-vis the land or dwellings they inhabit, with modalities ranging from squatting to informal rental housing, 2) the neighbourhoods usually lack, or are cut off from, basic services and city infrastructure and 3) the housing may not comply with current planning and building regulations, and is often situated in geographically and environmentally hazardous areas” (un-habitat, 2015). extreme weather events in the region are projected to increase in the coming years (pagasa, 2011) and, if left unaddressed, will lead to greater impacts. cities, especially those that have been repeatedly affected by typhoons and monsoon rains, are thus encouraged to conduct socioeconomic profiling of disaster risk areas to determine their level of exposure and to inform planning and disaster response operations (adb, 2013). the paper is a case study of the barangay tumana. this is the second most populated barangay in marikina city, with 41,809 residents as of 2010 (psa 2016), and the most severely affected by the onslaught of typhoon ondoy and the recent monsoon rains. 132 consilience 2. study context 2.1. research questions the project aims to answer the main research question: what are the exposure and sensitivity factors of the communities in barangay tumana that contribute to its vulnerability to climate-related hazards? in particular, the study seeks to determine the biophysical/environmental risks and socioeconomic/demographic vulnerabilities of the geographic site and its communities, and how these can be addressed through barangay planning in order to improve resilience. 2.2. objectives to answer the questions above, the research intends to accomplish the following objectives: a. to determine climate-related exposure and risks faced by barangay tumana; b. to characterize and analyze barangay tumana’s sensitivity to climate-related risks, particularly its socioeconomic and demographic profile; and c. to formulate policy and strategy options to improve barangay resilience. 2.3. research methodology the study uses various methods of data gathering and analysis. among them are the following: a. administration of survey. a survey was conducted from november to december 2013 in the barangay with 384 households. the sample size was determined through stratified random sampling, applying slovin’s formula1 to the total number of households; b. geographic information system (gis) processing and analysis. gis was used to process primary and secondary data. results are presented graphically as maps; c. interviews. interviews and consultation meetings were likewise conducted for assessment and triangulation of data. 2.4. scope of the research a. spatial coverage: analysis of the socioeconomic profile and exposure data of marikina city is focused on tumana, a barangay with high flood risk. b. time frame: the study examines the events that happened during typhoon ondoy in september 2009, typhoon falcon in june 2011, and the monsoon rains/ habagat in august 2012. environmental/biophysical and climate 1 slovin’s formula is used to calculate the sample size (n) given the population size (n) and a margin of error (e). it is computed as n = n / (1 + ne2) (ariola, 2016) consilience espina: barangay resilience and adaptive capacity related exposures are analyzed and projected for the medium term (year 2020) and for the long term (year 2050). the survey focusing on the socioeconomic condition of the population was conducted from november to december 2013. c. target population: the study focuses on the population affected by flooding during typhoon ondoy in 2009 and habagat in august 2012. the unit of analysis is a household. d. planning and policy focus: the study focuses on the assessment of exposure and sensitivity of the site to inform planning and policy options for the following areas: ● database formulation and local government decision making. knowledge of the exposed elements and their sensitivity is a basic requirement for disaster and resilience-related decisions. knowing the what, who, where, and why’s of the barangay’s vulnerability shall influence the soundness of the decisions of the local government. the study exposes the significance of this database and conducts preliminary stocktaking that can guide immediate decisions. it can also serve as a template for future assessments and strategies, and as a model for other sites. ● development planning and barangay resilience. vulnerability information (e.g. high-risk areas, area with the most number of residents exposed, households most sensitive to impacts) reveals the areas or sectors where resources are most necessary. this is crucial for the identification of plans, programs and projects that need to be prioritized by the barangay in order to foster development and simultaneously increase its resilience to disasters. the study includes this information and derives recommendations that are deemed useful for the formulation of development plans (e.g. physical, economic and social plans and programs) of the barangay, and for city planning (e.g. land use plans and development plans). 3. framework of analysis the definition of the united nations framework convention on climate change (unfccc) on climate change vulnerability (figure 3.1.) is used to frame the analysis. the exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity level of the households in tumana, marikina are assessed in this study. these are determined using existing government data, available research, personal accounts, and other official studies on relevant indicators and factors. 134 consilience ● exposure is what is at risk from climate change (e.g. population, resources, property), the change in climate itself, and its implications (e.g. sea level rise, temperature, precipitation, extreme events, etc.). ● sensitivity is the degree to which a system is affected by the biophysical impact of climate change. it also considers the socioeconomic context ● adaptive capacity is the ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate variability and extremes) and limit potential damage, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences. the general analysis of the exposure criterion consists of examining what is at risk in the locality and identifying climate-induced hazards and stresses. sensitivity analysis is done by examining and characterizing the socioeconomic profile of the community affected by climate change impacts. adaptive capacity is also determined by examining the socioeconomic conditions, as well as institutional capacity, availability of resources, and disaster-preparedness among others. consilience espina: barangay resilience and adaptive capacity 4. results and discussion the following results are presented according to the unfccc framework. the first part highlights the exposure information, while the second part examines the socioeconomic, or sensitivity, aspect of barangay tumana. 4.1. exposure information 4.1.1. spatial and geographic context: what is at risk? tumana is one of the 16 barangays that constitute marikina city. it is part of the second district of marikina and is situated in the northwest portion of the city. it is bounded by barangay nangka on the northeastern side, by barangay concepcion uno on the eastern side, and barangay malanday in the south. tumana has a land area of approximately 181.97 hectares (marikina city 2010b) and a total population of 41,809 as of 2010 (psa 2016). the barangay has been identified as one of the lowlying barangays with flood risk. spatial data was processed through geographic information system (gis) and confirmed through consultations. these analyses are presented below. 136 consilience consilience espina: barangay resilience and adaptive capacity the lowest areas of the barangay, and therefore the first areas to be flooded at 16 meters above sea level, are those by the creek side of angel santos and amplaya, the portion of palay street near the creek, the streets of pipino, singkamas, mais (at tumana proper), iwahig and ilaw (at doña petra). higher ground is found along the streets of upo, okra, patola, and portions of palay and farmers ii in the central part of tumana proper. certain portions of doña petra are the same level as the central level of tumana proper. adding to tumana’s susceptibility to flooding is the river system traversing the barangay as shown in figure 4.1.1.4. the eastern side of the barangay is subjected to intermittent flooding brought about by the overflowing of the marikina during the rainy season, as illustrated in figure 4.1.1.5. this is particularly noteworthy – this area is home to clusters of families in approximately 8,000 households (marikina city 2010a), who live in shanties on the outskirts of the river and its surrounding esteros. during the 2013 monsoons, data from the local government show that the eastern barangay was subjected to greater than 2 meters of flood inundation (figure 4.1.1.6). 138 consilience consilience espina: barangay resilience and adaptive capacity during the onslaught of typhoon ondoy in 2009, the whole area on the eastern portion of the marikina river was inundated by floodwater of more than 2.5 meters. according to the zoning map of marikina city (figure 4.1.1.8), barangay tumana is assigned five main land uses. the land uses affected by intermittent flooding are the designated socialized settlement zone, low density residential zone, high density industrial zone, and parks/open space/ recreation zone. the residents in these zones, except those in the upscale loyola grand villas in the western part of the barangay, are considered informal settlers. 140 consilience 4.1.2. climate change projections data from the philippine atmospheric geophysical and astronomical services administration (pagasa) under the department of science and technology (dost) reveal the mediumand long-term climate projections for tumana, marikina, which will greatly affect the population and units operating within the barangay. the projected climate change scenarios in average emission scenarios are shown as bases for the indicative macro-level climate assessment. these scenarios are then used to deduce changes in climate parameters: precipitation, temperature, and extreme events. a. projected changes in average temperature in marikina city the projections made by pagasa illustrate significant warming in the philippines by the middle of the century. average annual mean temperature is projected to increase by 0.9°c-1.1°c by 2020 and by 1.7°c-3.0°c by 2050. higher temperatures are generally expected in all regions of the country by 2050, with the rates doubling from 2020 levels. adopting these projections, the estimated changes in seasonal mean temperature in marikina city in 2020 and 2050 under the medium-range emission scenario are shown in figures 4.1.2.1 and 4.1.2.2. consilience espina: barangay resilience and adaptive capacity b. projected changes in seasonal rainfall in marikina city pagasa projects a change in annual precipitation of -0.5% to 17.4% in 2020 and 2.4% to 16.4% in 2050. increases in rainfall are particularly evident in most areas of luzon and visayas, while mindanao is projected to undergo a drying trend. average annual rainfall increases over most parts of luzon. change in the visayas is estimated at 2% to 17% by 2020 and 1% to 16% by 2050. projected changes in seasonal rainfall in marikina in 2020 and 2050 under the medium-range emission scenario are presented in figures 4.1.2.3 and 4.1.2.4. 142 consilience c. projections on extreme climate events in marikina city hot days are expected to increase by 81% and 185% from observed conditions by 2020 and 2050, respectively, while dry days are seen to decline by 16-17% in those years. days with precipitation are also projected to increase by 44% in 2020 and by 89% in 2050. consilience espina: barangay resilience and adaptive capacity d. summary and implications of climate projections in marikina city marikina city is expected to have a 1°c incremental change in temperature by 2020. this implies that upcoming storms will be more intense, with longer dry spells between them. precipitation will become more sporadic. increasing temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, sea level rise, and extreme weather events form the backdrop upon which the philippines, particularly tumana in marikina city, endeavors to pursue its development goals. such factors affect key geographic and spatial contexts where at-risk population and systems operate. the ability of a unit to address such impacts affects the facility by which sustainable development and resiliency are pursued. 4.2. sensitivity information 4.2.1. socioeconomic profile of the informal settler families in tumana, marikina the following data on the socioeconomic profile of informal settler families in barangay tumana was generated from a survey conducted in 384 households from november to december in 2013. they form part of the sensitivity data and some adaptive capacity data for analysis. a. household size the household sizes were stratified into the following number of people per household: 1 to 3; 4 to 6; 7 to 9; and 10 and above. 144 consilience the majority (60.4%) of the households reported having four to six members, and only 4.2% have ten or more members. the average number of people per household is five. b. sex distribution of about 2,045 surveyed household members, the gender distribution is nearly equal, with the males numbering 1,036 (50.7%), and the females 1,009 (49.7%). data gathered also reveals that there are more females (79%) taking on the role of household heads than males (21%). c. age distribution residents aged 25 to 54 make up the largest population (37.6%) in the barangay. they are followed by those aged 6 to 14 years of age (21.0%), and those aged 15 to 24 (20.5%). the group aged 55 and above only comprises 2.4% of the population. consilience espina: barangay resilience and adaptive capacity with residents aged 0 to 14 and 65 and above considered dependents, dependency rate in the area is about 47%. d. educational attainment out of the households surveyed, 32.03% have at least one high school graduate. 26.04% have at least one member who attended college, and only 19.27% have a college graduate. as for the educational attainment of household heads, 17.45% attended college but only 4.69% graduated. 38.02% finished high school, while 17.97% attended high school but did not graduate. around 4.95% finished vocational schooling and a very small percentage (1.04%) have a ph.d./master’s degree. 146 consilience e. employment status about 63% of the surveyed population is in the labor force (i.e. ages 15-64). of the population, 41.7% reported having full-time jobs and 14.6% are self-employed. those working part time and on-call make up 8.6% and 11.5%, respectively. the non-working population is 23.4%. f. engagement in business only a third of the households are engaged in businesses. most (43.27%) are employed in retail/wholesale, while a third (32.69%) are vendors (neighborhood variety stores, recyclables collectors, and the like). around 11.24% are engaged in home/small scale industries, 8.65% in personal services, and 2.88% in transport. consilience espina: barangay resilience and adaptive capacity g. income and savings as of 2009, the average annual income and expenditure of families in metro manila amounted to php 356,000 and php 309,000, respectively (psa, n.d.). this translates to an average monthly income of php 29,667 and expenditure of php 25,750. survey results show that household heads’ earnings average php 9,307.12, and the monthly household income average is php 15,838.33 – 46.61% below the regional average. almost half (49.16%) of the household heads earn php 5,001 to php 10,000, 23.41% earn php 5,000 or lower, and less than 1% receive php 30,000 or more. at the household level, 29.60% earn php 20,001 to php 30,000 a month. 20% earn php 15,001 to php 20,000 while 18.67% make above php 30,000. only 2.93% earn php 5,000 or less. findings are detailed in table 4.2.1.5 and figure 4.2.1.4. 148 consilience given that the typical household income is below regional averages, it is not surprising that around three-fourths of the surveyed families do not have monthly savings. of those with savings, only 2.1% set aside php 10,000 or more. h. land ownership only 15.1% of households own property; 84.9% do not own any land. locations of lands are shown in table 4.2.1.7. consilience espina: barangay resilience and adaptive capacity i. medical/health insurance medical/ health insurance is uncommon in the community. only 5.29% of the population has household members with health/ medical insurance. j. social programs/services provided by the government results show that almost half of the households surveyed have not utilized of any of the programs/services available to them. these programs range from education to housing, health, security, and financial assistance. as for the recipients, the most popular program (with 34.4% taking part it) is the pantawid pamilyang pilipino program (4ps), the government’s conditional cash transfer (cct) program. next is the family planning program used by 13.8%, and then scholarships that benefited 11.7% of the barangay. 150 consilience k. age of houses based on the survey, 26.8% of the houses were constructed 16 to 20 years ago while 17.4% were built less than 5 years ago. only 8.9% of the structures are more than 30 years old. consilience espina: barangay resilience and adaptive capacity l. structural types the average floor area per household in tumana is 42 square meters, with a minimum of 5 square meters and a maximum of 300 square meters. five structural types of houses (based on appearance) were identified: salvaged (type 1), light (type 2), semi-concrete (type 3), concrete (type 4), and mixed materials (type 5). ‘salvaged’ refers to discarded wood and wood-based products. ‘light’ describes wood construction with structural elements made from any materials permitted by the philippine national building code. ‘semi-concrete’ construction is made up of masonry and wood. concrete consists of steel, iron, concrete, or masonry. finally, ‘mixed materials’ are four-hour fire-resistant supplies, with buildings including permanent partitions made from incombustible fire-resistant construction. most of the houses studied were semi-concrete, followed by mixed materials and then concrete. less than 1% are salvaged. 152 consilience m. accounts of calamity ● exposure to geophysical hazards the whole barangay is affected by typhoons. almost all (99.2%) of them are affected by flooding. 31.3% have been affected by earthquakes, and 10.2% by fires. consilience espina: barangay resilience and adaptive capacity ● experience during typhoon ondoy and the habagat the onslaught of typhoon ondoy and the monsoon rains or habagat affected 98.70% of the population. flood height averaged 17.3 meters, with 70.7% of the households affected by 11 to 20 feet of floodwater. 92.6% reported that it usually took at least a day for the water to subside. the average duration was 1.2 days, while the shortest and longest durations were one and seven days. during ondoy and habagat, 54.4% of the houses emerged in need of repairs. out of these, 33.5% needed php 10,000 or more to cover repair costs. 154 consilience n. calamity preparedness when asked about the implementation of disaster drills in barangay tumana, 46.1% confirmed their awareness of these procedures while 53.9% responded that there have been no drills. of those aware, 33.3% know of the flood drills, 16.4% of fire drills, and 17.7% are aware of earthquake drills. o. perceived safety of houses 19% feel that their houses are safe from flooding while 20.3% feel that their residences can withstand earthquakes based on the physical condition of their houses. regarding location, 8.3% said that their houses are spared from flooding while 9.1% believe they are safe from earthquakes. consilience espina: barangay resilience and adaptive capacity p. willingness to relocate almost half (47.9%) of the households affirmed that they have plans to relocate but not within the next five years. 36.2% plan to immediately transfer while 15.9% do not have plans of transferring at all. unwillingness to transfer stems from various reasons such as distance from school or place of employment, attachment or length of stay in the area, and lack of financial capability to rent or buy a new house. 10.7% of the surveyed households have been recipients to a relocation program. of these, 7.3% were recipients of the city’s relocation program, 2.9% were beneficiaries of the national housing authority (nha) program, and less than 1% received assistance from other organizations. 156 consilience the rest of the population (89.3%) did not receive any form of relocation program. 92.4% of those would consider relocating if a program on housing for people in risk areas is to be implemented, while 7.6% still would not. q. housing preferences ● location 44.1% of the respondents who consider relocation prefer to be relocated within metropolitan manila, except marikina. 31.9% favor relocation within marikina, while 12% prefer another part of the barangay. another 12% do not mind being relocated to other provinces or municipalities outside of manila. ● type of housing 59.3% prefer a single-detached housing, 23.2% prefer medium rise, and 10% favor a duplex. among those who prefer medium rise residences, 77.7% favor a 2-story building, while 16.2% prefer 3 stories. only 6.1% prefer 4 floors or higher. consilience espina: barangay resilience and adaptive capacity r. relationship between plan to relocate due to flooding viz. gender and age of house it was observed through quantitative analysis that the tendency of male household heads in tumana to have a plan to transfer is higher by a factor of 2.29 when compared to females. results also show that the age of infrastructure is directly correlated to the decision to transfer due to flooding. specifically, the odds show that for every year added to the age of the infrastructure, there is a 106% decline in the propensity to transfer due to flooding. thus, the older the house is, the less likely it is that residents will transfer. 5. summary of results the following is a summary of the study results. these are categorized based on the factors that affect the vulnerability of tumana, following the unfcc framework that defines vulnerability as a function of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity. 5.1. summary and analysis of exposure information barangay tumana has high exposure to the impacts of climate change. below is a summary of its exposure information. ● barangay tumana houses 41,809 residents as of 2010. 158 consilience ● half of the barangay (i.e. the eastern portion, about 100 hectares) is intermittently flooded due to biophysical and anthropogenic factors. flood heights reach a maximum of 40 feet. ● marikina is projected to have fewer but stronger typhoons (comparable to typhoon ondoy) and sporadic precipitations/monsoon rains (habagat). projections point to a hotter summer season, particularly during march, april, and may, and heavier rains during the rainy season, particularly during june, july, and august. ● the socialized settlement zone is situated in an environmentally critical area. parks & open space and low density residential land uses are also affected by intermittent flooding. 5.2. summary of sensitivity and adaptive capacity information barangay tumana has a high degree of sensitivity to hydrometeorological risks, particularly to impacts of global warming, given its socioeconomic condition. this necessitates a proactive approach through mitigation and adaptation strategies towards building resiliency and reducing vulnerability. the following is a summary of the degree of sensitivity and adaptive capacity for the barangay. ● there are 47 dependents (6 old and 41 young) for every 100 people. ● approximately 1 out of 4 of the surveyed population is unemployed. ● approximately 50% are high school graduates, or have attended high school level but did not graduate. ● about a third of the population has lived in tumana for 10-20 years. ● about 50% of the household heads earn only php 5,000 php 10,000. ● 4 out of 5 households do not have medical insurance/health cards. ● 4 out of 5 households do not have savings. ● 9 out of 10 households do not own land. ● all have experienced the effects of typhoon and flooding when flood height is “lagpas-tao", or well above people’s heads. ● 4 out of 5 do not feel safe due to typhoon and flooding in marikina and/or within metropolitan manila. ● half of the respondents have experienced disaster drills led by the city government. ● 4 out of 5 respondents have plans to relocate. 9 out of 10 are willing to transfer if given a relocation program. they prefer to be relocated within marikina and/or within metropolitan manila 6. policy options and recommendations consilience espina: barangay resilience and adaptive capacity the following recommendations to further barangay resilience were formulated: build resilience through barangay development planning such high exposure and degree of sensitivity to climate change affect key geographic and spatial contexts where at-risk population and systems operate. in addition, the ability of a unit to address and cope with such impacts affect the facility by which sustainable development and resiliency are pursued. in order to achieve them, it is important to ensure policies and strategies are in place at the onset of barangay development planning, and to promote barangay programs that increase socioeconomic standards. specifically, the following strategies and policy options are recommended: decrease exposure of vulnerable communities to climate related risks the enactment and enforcement of local legislative measures to manage and protect the environmentally critical and hazard-prone areas in barangay tumana can decrease the number of exposed units. locally institutionalizing these measures with an up-todate zoning ordinance, as well as other complementary regulatory directives (e.g. incentives, sanctions, etc.), can protect high-risk and flood-prone areas. the socialized settlement and the low density residential zones must be moved away from this area while the parks, open spaces, and recreation zone should be maintained and delineated. the national and local easement policies (i.e. maintaining a distance 96 meters on both sides of the river) should be effectively enforced and monitored. exploring safer areas for a comprehensive resettlement program can fundamentally decrease the vulnerabilities of the barangay population. designating relocation areas in safer grounds (i.e. low to zero risk of flooding) in marikina city or within metropolitan manila, as preferred by the community can enhance community resilience. the possibility of families in older homes located in high flood zones being preferentially targeted for relocation efforts can be explored in addition to further research about appropriate tenurial instruments and housing size and typologies. most of the building types surveyed in the barangay are type 3, 4, and 5 which resemble permanent housing typologies in high flood zone areas. these areas shall be identified as appicable in the comprehensive land use plan of marikina city and of other cities in manila and enforced through a local zoning ordinance. partnership with the national housing authority, non-government organizations, and other private entities may be established to create a comprehensive and effective resettlement program. further study on determinants and barriers to community relocation, e.g. distance from school and employment, capacity, and willingness to pay for housing, should also be conducted. decrease sensitivity through socioeconomic development programs a comprehensive development program that addresses sustainability should be commenced by the local government. the socioeconomic situation of the 160 consilience communities in tumana exacerbates the sensitivity of the population to climate related risks. the high total dependency ratio, high unemployment rate, low labor participation, low education, and low income make the barangay communities in tumana more sensitive to the impacts of climate change. programs that will address key socioeconomic issues among the barangay population can be pursued through the provision of social support facility. the importance of gender mainstreaming and the role of women in the development programs should be prioritized: most of the community has female heads-of-household. labor market programs and community-based enterprises can be explored to give jobs to the unemployed 23.4%. child and elderly care projects and support facilities can created. disaster unemployment programs can also be explored in addition to the institutionalization of academic scholarships and technical/vocational education programs to increase the level of education and income among the barangay population. the promotion of government social programs and services is of primary importance to increase access and awareness among community members. increase adaptive capacity of barangay communities barangay tumana’s adaptive capacity be increased through the provision of skills trainings and seminars on disaster risk reduction and management (drrm) and climate change adaptation (cca). this should include flood, fire, and earthquake drills and trainings for calamity preparedness, which at present only 50% of the community have accessed. funds for climate and disaster losses can be raised with better access to finance and insurance policies. the local government could establish local financing programs and credit facilities, especially for healthcare and medical insurance. with the aid of the national government and private entities, residents can be educated on the national and private financing and insurance programs available. livelihood programs, financial literacy programs, and other initiatives that boost community capacity may be implemented as well to aid residents in increasing their financial capacity and repairing their credit. barangay communication and public awareness campaigns that increase awareness on local environmental management must be prioritized and must consider possible adaptation mechanisms and technological interventions for disaster resiliency. 7. conclusion barangay tumana in marikina city, philippines is a highly populous locality that has historically been severely affected by flooding due to natural and anthropogenic factors. primarily affected are residential areas inhabited by households with low socioeconomic status. high population exposure is heightened by the city zoning which places the socialized settlement zone in a high-risk area. basic societal issues of the barangay such as financial capacity, health, and education contribute to the sensitivity of the community. the gravity of disasters in the highly vulnerable barangay is set to escalate given the projected increase in extreme weather events in the absence of proper and immediate intervention. consilience espina: barangay resilience and adaptive capacity flooding and its resulting disasters have persisted for years in tumana. many may have survived and continue to live in the area, but this cycle of losing and rebuilding physical, economic, and social assets should be put to an end. resiliency must be strengthened. various strategies should be employed by the local government to decrease exposure and sensitivity and to and increase the adaptive capacity. risk and exposure databases must be put in place to provide significant input to the development planning process of the barangay. the city must begin to consider resiliency in these plans. legislative measures that protect critical areas should be enacted and enforced, and a comprehensive resettlement program for those residing in high-risk areas should be established. adaptive capacity might also be ameliorated with various initiatives such as providing drrm and cca trainings, improving access to financial and insurance policies, implementing livelihood, education, and health programs, and promoting awareness of local environmental management. these are just a few of the policy options that the local government can consider to substantially diminish the vulnerability of barangay tumana. all these options require the active participation of all stakeholders. this includes residents, local officials, the national government, and the private sector, which can offer technical and financial support. acknowledgement the author would like to thank the city government of marikina for its assistance with this study. in particular, he extends his gratitude to then-marikina mayor del de guzman, barangay captain of tumana ziffred a. ancheta, and tumana councilor jimmy m. ceguerra, who shared with him their extensive knowledge of barangay tumana, marikina. likewise, special thanks are given to dr. mario r. delos reyes, team leader of the program: environmental planning and governance on disaster risk prevention, mitigation and management at selected pilot priority areas in laguna de bay and manila bay regions, where this research is a subcomponent project under his tutelage through the up center for integrative and development studies. in addition, the author extends his thanks to ms. annlouise genevieve castro, ms. angelina caluag, ms. michelle yu, and mr. bhen aguihon for formatting, facilitating and documenting the survey and workshops for this research. lastly, the author thanks chancellor melinda dp. bandalaria and dean primo g. garcia of the up open university for funding the dissemination of this research which made possible the presentation of the findings in the fifth international conference on sustainable development in new york city. 162 consilience references: adb (asian development bank). 2013. moving from risk to resilience: sustainable urban development in the pacific. mandaluyong: adb. ariola, mariano m. 2006. principles and methods of research. manila: rex book store, inc. delos reyes, mario r., and nicasio b. espina, jr. 2016. “analysis on decentralization and its implications to land use and local environmental planning and management: the case of 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melchior. 2016. global climate risk index 2017. edited by joanne chapman-rose and daniela baum. berlin: germanwatch e.v. www.germanwatch.org/en/cri marikina city. 2010a. marikina city comprehensive land use plan. marikina: n.p. marikina city. 2010b. marikina city ecological profile. marikina: n.p. pagasa (philippine atmospheric, geophysical and astronomical services administration). 2011. climate change in the philippines. quezon: pagasa. psa (philippine statistics authority). 2016. “philippine standard geographic code: city of marikina.” psa. http://nap.psa.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/municipality.asp? muncode=137402000& regcode=13&provcode=74 un-habitat. 2015. habitat iii issue paper no. 22: informal settlements. new york: un. n.d. “family income.” psa. http://www.nap.psa.gov.ph/secstat/d_income. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 20, iss. 1 (2018), pp. 88–103 engaging college students in the transition to sustainability through design-based approaches najla mouchrek najla mouchrek is a designer with a phd in interdisciplinary studies, human centered design from virginia tech in 2019. she also received an m.f.a. in design, innovation, and sustainability from the state university of minas gerais, brazil in 2014. she completed a b.a. in communication from the federal university of minas gerais, brazil in 1996. najlamk@vt.edu abstract to achieve social change towards sustainable ways of living, it is essential to promote a culture of sustainability among young people. universities have a very important role, as sustainable education on college campuses has the potential to achieve long-term results by promoting the development of awareness and skills for youth engagement in order to face complex challenges, now and in the future. this study investigates the application of design-based thinking and participatory design to support a culture of sustainability among youth. it aims to bridge the value-action gap and to develop sustainable competencies. design-based strategies integrated within educational experiences promote dealing with change and complexity, as well as offering a range of potentialities and interfaces for innovative action in the transition to sustainability. this research used a qualitative multi-method approach which consisted of a literature review, context analysis, ethnographic observation, and application of participatory design in educational settings in brazil and the united states. this paper summarizes preliminary findings, including guidelines for engagement strategies. these reinforce the importance of understanding values and challenges of youth development, exploring dimensions of sustainability connected to student realities, building contexts for transformation, stimulating empowerment and autonomy, and using mediation to facilitate change processes conducted by young people. these findings also demonstrate that design-based participatory approaches in educational settings offer excellent opportunities for intervention to both engage youth in sustainability and support their positive development. keywords: culture of sustainability, youth, universities, college students, bridging the value-action gap, engagement, design for sustainability, participatory design mailto:najlamk@vt.edu consilience mouchrek: design-based education for sustainability introduction the transition to sustainability is a long-term goal for human society and will necessarily take place over time, as we are faced with a tremendous challenge of unprecedented scope, scale, and complexity (unesco 1997). shifting towards sustainable living constitutes a process of social learning, hence the social responsibility of all institutions to promote a culture of sustainability, beginning with the local contexts and challenges. it is especially important to promote healthier, sustainable, and integrated lifestyles for newer generations. fostering a culture of sustainability among young people is a key strategy, allowing them to develop processes and interaction strategies to create ‘contexts for change’. the initial motivation for this research came from difficulties found in sustainable education projects developed in brazil, especially on how to spark interest and engagement among young people. traditional speech tools and models seemed to be ineffective in terms of mobilization, as they did not relate to students’ imaginary and lived experiences. although the ecological impacts and the need for change are understood, they remain general and abstract ideals (and are often generators of anguish) because it is difficult for young people to connect them to their everyday lives. in this context, the field of design offers a range of potentialities and interfaces for innovative action. design principles and practices may contribute to creative innovation and support promising initiatives on sustainability, offering skills, abilities, methodologies, and a unique viewpoint (mouchrek, 2014). this study aims to investigate the process of change and engagement in sustainability among youth. furthermore, this article explores the potential of design to support interventions to bridge the value-action gap in sustainable behavior and develop sustainable competencies, especially in the context of higher education. the paper summarizes results from the first part of the research project, developed for a master's degree (brazil, 2012-2014), and shares preliminary results of the second part, currently in development for an interdisciplinary phd (united states, 2015-present). the main content presented in this paper includes: 1) interdisciplinary literature review on themes such as the culture of sustainability, design as an agent of sustainable change, and the role of universities in the transition. 2) analysis of key aspects and proposition of a set of guidelines for strategies to promote the culture of sustainability among young people – developed in search of priority areas and possible approaches for intervention in the field 3) investigation of the potential of design-based approaches to promote engagement in sustainability among students. promoting a cultural shift regarding sustainability the concept of sustainability encompasses several dimensions, as it regards living conditions and organization of society as a whole. sachs (2004) identifies eight 90 consilience dimensions of sustainability: social, cultural, ecological, environmental, territorial, economic, and political. in this research, the focus is on socio-cultural and educational dimensions. culture is an inextricable part of the complex notion of sustainability, being a very practical, concrete determinant in this process (unesco 1997). the transition towards sustainability constitutes a widely diffuse process of social learning through a systemic transformation (manzini 2008). it is a complex process requiring society-wide shifts in priorities and perspectives (stephen et al. 2008). it is imperative to implement a cultural shift in how individuals and society address economic, social, and environmental issues, developing a culture of sustainability (duxbury and gillette 2007). the idea of promoting a culture of sustainability encompasses all the factors of sustainability, since culture embodies the meaning people give to their lives, the values they share, and how they express their vision for the future, to be conveyed to future generations (hawkes 2001). this cultural change necessarily encompasses a radical re-evaluation of the hierarchy of values that give meaning to life and determine society’s priorities (brown 1981). behavior shifts come from a process of awareness, collective responsibility, and strengthening autonomy. lifestyle changes will need to be accompanied by a new ethical awareness (unesco 1997). to this end, it is important to develop innovative approaches to evolve into more sustainable and conscious lifestyles, particularly among young people. it is especially regarding the new generations that the changes towards healthier, integrated and sustainable lifestyles are fundamental. young people are the core of our present and the key to determining if there will be a future (canclini 2007). the young person carries in him/herself, in an intensified way, the problems of our civilization: youth is simultaneously the weak link (for its weak sociological presence) and the strong link (for its energy) of our society (morin 2012). in the near future, this generation will need leaders and citizens who think ecologically, understand the interconnectedness of human and natural systems, and have the will, the ability, and the courage to act (stone 2009). as autio and heinonen (2004, p. 150) emphasize: "young people need to reflect on the future of the world and what is the meaning of ‘good life’ for them. they are the future consumers, producers and agents of change. " engaging young people in cultural and social sustainability generates positive outcomes for both youth development and community change (browne et al. 2011), allowing them to develop an optimistic and proactive outlook for the future (duxbury and gillette 2007). the ability to understand and seek meaning in their experiences and choices will be a key attribute for young people in this process. developing competencies such as critical thinking, autonomy, the ability to make choices, and the ability to envision new scenarios will also be important. this study is built around the idea that it is essential to invest in and promote a culture of sustainability among youth. this includes developing tools and innovative strategies of interaction, embracing diversity, promoting skills to deal with the complexity and challenges of the near future, and preparing them to participate fully and actively in sustainable transformations in our society. consilience mouchrek: design-based education for sustainability behavioral change towards sustainability authors observe a value-action gap regarding sustainable behaviors and social engagement, which may be attributed to a lack of appropriate information (blake 1999). it is possible to observe other barriers to sustainable behavior, such as personal, structural, practical, and social matters (jackson 2005; blake 1999). several authors state that expanding ecological information by itself will not be enough to overcome this gap (sammer and wüstenhagen 2006; roizman 2001; mouchrek 2014; leitner et al. 2011; autio and heinonen 2004). kollmuss and agyeman (2002) propose a strategy including, among others, internal factors such as environmental awareness, responsibility, emotional involvement and motivation, and locus of control. to bridge the value-action gap and encourage youth engagement in sustainability, it is fundamental to promote the key competencies (barth et al. 2007) that enable reflection, participation, awareness, and engagement on sustainable development goals. this study aims to investigate key factors and potential strategies to bridge the value-action gap and promote engagement in sustainability and social change among young people, particularly college students. design as an agent of change for sustainability among alternative methodologies to promote a culture of sustainability among youth, the field of design emerges with promising strategies to deal with transitional change and complexity. design evolved from a specialized profession to an area of knowledge, through reflection on its practice and through the opening of new niches and levels. in addition to traditional areas of expertise, nowadays we can find great development in new interdisciplinary areas such as human centered design, design for sustainability, and design for social innovation. design is a dynamic process, comprising of the act of thinking, planning, and devising courses of action with a particular purpose (friedman 2000). design can be approached in various dimensions, among them: (a) a process and a set of projects and creative activities; (b) an active agent for problem solving, through the planning and implementation of actions to change existing situations into preferred ones (simon 1982); (c) as an agent of mediation between diverse actors, to facilitate and support innovation (krucken, 2008). there is a growing focus on design as a process and an alternate mode of inquiry within contemporary decision-making contexts. the design process is being applied as a tool to understand reality, formulate problems in new ways, and develop solutions that emerge from a collaborative process. within this general trend of change of perspective, the field of design is expanding and there is a growing focus on design as a process and a strategic tool (cassim 2013). design can be a powerful catalyst for sustainable change: acting in networks of multidisciplinary action, contributing to plural solutions and new scenarios (krucken 2008), shaping conditions for the creative context (landry, 2000), providing tools, equipment and infrastructure for innovative practices (malaguti 2009), and leading convergence towards shared ideas and potential solutions 92 consilience (manzini 2008). this study focuses on participatory design: an approach to design which develops solutions that actively involve all stakeholders in the design process (harder, burford and hoover 2013). the origins of participatory design date back to movements toward democratization at work in scandinavian countries in the 1970s, starting from the political conviction that those affected by a design should have a say in the design process (ehn 2008). at the core of the participatory approaches, there are a range of activities of co-creation. co-design (or co-creation) describes a process that involves designers and those not trained in design working together to develop solutions (sanders and stappers 2008). it is a way of progressing through a problem or design scenario used as a means of, for example, attending to behavioral change (kingsley 2009). typical features of participatory design include collective construction of knowledge, mutual learning, prototyping, and iteration. particularly regarding the promotion of the culture of sustainability among youth, it is relevant to investigate design's potential and interfaces of action in order to propose and support creative paths for innovative practices in the field. role of higher education in building a sustainable society the changes required in the process of social learning in the transition to sustainability will be performed via active participation of competent citizens (barth et al., 2007). awareness and competences in sustainability are increasingly necessary in the constitution of citizenship and social engagement. thus, it is vital that all institutions (especially those of higher education) recognize their responsibility to promote a culture of sustainability. with the potential to model sustainable practices for society and to promote awareness and engagement among students and extended communities, universities are at the forefront of the transition to sustainability. sustainable education on college campuses has the potential to achieve long-term results by promoting the development of awareness and skills for youth engagement in order to face complex challenges, now and in the future. strategically positioned to encourage synthesis and integration of different types of knowledge and to enhance the application of knowledge to social change, universities may facilitate social changes toward more deliberate societal engagement and to advance sustainable practices (stephen et al. 2008). higher education can offer unique experiences for students to develop skills of integration, synthesis, systems-thinking, complex problem solving, and awareness of social responsibilities that are associated with professional practice, self-efficacy, and capacity for advocacy and interdisciplinary collaboration (sibbel 2009, stephen et al. 2008). key competencies for sustainability include foresighted thinking, interdisciplinary work, cosmopolitan perception, transcultural understanding, participatory skills, planning and implementation, empathy, compassion and solidarity, self-motivation and motivating others, and objective reflection on individual and cultural models (barth et al. 2007). the education for a sustainable living is also fundamental in the “whole person” education. therefore, the opportunities to experience social engagement and mobilization in the context of consilience mouchrek: design-based education for sustainability higher education show excellent potential to support personal and collective development. by investing in strategies to bring social and cultural sustainability aspects to day-by-day practices and academic settings, universities will be fulfilling their fundamental role in: (a) educating the next generations with the complex competences required; (b) being a privileged space for discussion and evolution of knowledge and practice (preferably through an open debate and not under a universal approach), and; (c) giving back to local communities and society with collective efforts towards sustainable systems and practices. the strategies and activities to promote the culture of sustainability implemented within the present study were developed in the context of higher education both in brazil and the united states. methodology this research uses a qualitative multi-method approach, using concepts and tools from the field of design research and interdisciplinary knowledge to find patterns to understand and map contemporary and changing issues and to outline opportunities for intervention. we elaborated a composite of traditional procedures and research techniques (literature review, documentary research and content analysis, open and semi-structured interviews, and case studies) and other innovative procedures and tools of design research (rapid ethnographical research, participant observation, visual mapping, co-creation and collective construction of knowledge, and collaborative maps). these research activities were implemented in three different educational contexts, as follows. 1. youth sustainability management group the first semester-long project was implemented in the youth sustainability management group at oikabum! school of art and technology (belo horizonte, brazil). based on a model of democratic management, the school had student-led management groups, including the sustainability group. the group consisted of 8-10 students and was finding it difficult to communicate and mobilize their peers regarding sustainability in the school environment. the co-creation process was developed in four stages: (a) discussion of concepts of sustainability and aspects of communication and mobilization; (b) creation of context for transformation, discussion of motivation and objectives; (c) proposal for intervention in which a communication campaign was elaborated and published, and; (d) validation, feedback from the community, and concrete change in behavior. the initiative yielded very interesting results about youth engagement and authorship, strengthening of team spirit, and student relationships to public space. along the way, an expanded vision of sustainability and innovative and interesting languages to communicate it were developed. 94 consilience figure 1 – sustainability group at oikabum! school source: mouchrek, 2014. 2. laboratory of design, co-creation, and sustainability next, a semester-long design laboratory focusing on open innovation in sustainability (uemg-brazil) was developed as an undergraduate course for 2025 design students at the state university of minas gerais, brazil. following an experimental approach, the primary goal was promoting experimentation of strategies of co-creation and sustainability projects targeting youth, promoting competences for future intervention in contexts of transition towards sustainability. the co-creation activities during the semester were meant to encourage students to interact collaboratively to develop, facilitate, and implement innovative solutions. in the beginning, a co-design activity focused on students’ perception of youth and their context of development (what does it mean to be young? what is the spirit of our time?). using design tools such as ideation, affinity diagramming, and visual maps, student groups created collective image boards (figure 2). the whole group engaged in structured reflection and produced a synthesis map. the visual maps drawn up at the beginning of the process led to the emergence of an active debate among the students. they showed interest and a willingness to express their views, and produced a collaborative, complex profile of issues related to young people’s realities and how potential design-based interventions could work to promote the culture of sustainability in a meaningful way for them. the experience with the laboratory is described in detail by mouchrek & krucken, 2018. figure 2 laboratory of design, co-creation, and sustainability consilience mouchrek: design-based education for sustainability source: mouchrek & krucken, 2018 3. workshops in intro to sustainability courses in the scope of an interdisciplinary introductory course on sustainability at virginia tech in the united states, two co-creation activities were developed (figure 3). the first activity included approximately 60 students and prompted them to reflect on their values and create projections for the future (what inspires me? who is my future self, 5 years from now?). using ideation, group discussion, scenarios, and video, students revealed interesting intrinsic motivations and proposed diverse future trajectories, both personal and professional. the group shared insights about the relevance of starting to pursue strategies in the present in order to create conditions for the future contexts they designed for themselves. the second activity was implemented in the second iteration of the course and asked a group of 20-25 students about their visions and potential strategies on sustainability (how can we bridge the value-action gap in sustainability?). using affinity diagramming and synthesis maps, students vocalized their perceptions and criticism while envisioning solutions. the activity was considered an efficient way to summarize the content knowledge constructed in the class during the semester and to exercise students’ critical thinking on the subject. figure 3 – in-class discussions in the introductory course on sustainability. source: vt archive preliminary results and discussion in this section, we present part of the findings of the research project, consisting of 1) an analysis of key aspects and proposition of a set of guidelines for strategies to promote the culture of sustainability among young people – developed in search for priority areas and possible approaches for intervention in the field 2) an investigation of the potential of design-based approaches to promote engagement in sustainability among students. 96 consilience key aspects and guidelines for strategies to promote the culture of sustainability among youth1 youth development happens through learning in the course of action and experimentation. in this stage of life, this generation explores different values and positions in order to find and establish the values and principles that will underpin their adult life. therefore, young people integrate sustainability as it relates to their personal situations in real life, with choices, decisions, school and professional orientations, balancing risk behaviors, and significant experiences. the process of behavior change toward sustainability and social engagement is complex and does not correspond to a linear model in which the ecological knowledge would lead to awareness and thus directly to action. the overall picture is complicated, and notions of citizenship and active social participation are diluted. thus, it can be difficult for young people to devise for themselves an active role in the transformation towards sustainable ways of living. there is much evidence that highlights the need to provide new frameworks and foster the development of new skills to create a culture of sustainability. the following is a set of guidelines for strategies to promote the culture of sustainability among youth, developed as a result of this research: 1 this section present findings reported on the author’s master thesis (mouchrek 2014, in portuguese). consilience mouchrek: design-based education for sustainability figure 4 – guidelines for strategies to promote the culture of sustainability among youth. source: author’s own. • explore dimensions of sustainability directly connected to youth realities. it is recommended to develop more open and integrated sustainability approaches, preferably proposed by young people themselves, starting from reflection and discussions. these might involve contextualizing the issues into personal context and promoting ways to help them solve their own questions. another approach might stimulate experiences through which they may constitute their own principles and motivations for action, individually and collectively. • extend the frames of possibilities and references and create new contexts for action. it is important to analyze the current contexts, frames of reference, and spaces for action available to young people. is it possible to extend/develop/strengthen/redirect these contexts? it is necessary to open spaces and opportunities for experimentation, create new fields of action, find points of opportunity, and create innovative strategies from them. proposing new policies and concrete actions allows young people to experience new possible identities and to reinvent social practices and social interactions. • facilitate convergence and social cohesion around innovative alternatives. young people present positive and promising interests and characteristics that may be stimulated, supported, and strengthened in order to promote sustainable change. among them we highlight: the interest and motivation to create innovative and original discourse and practices; a desire to participate, to belong to identity groups and shared initiatives; the will to exercise freedom 98 consilience of choice; and a desire for autonomy and to create a significant professional and personal life. therefore, it is necessary to facilitate convergence processes to foster social cohesion so that their choices and aspirations for change can become real and concrete alternatives. • promote empowerment and autonomy and develop competences related to sustainability. empowerment is fundamental in the development of citizenship, because young people feel they can be agents of change and active subjects in problem-solving, developing autonomy and self-esteem. it is important to create pathways to stimulate their latent intention to act; reinforce their personal power; deepen the understanding of the impact of choices; and propose practical initiatives, allowing concrete experimentation and the feedback of peers. these strategies can generate relevant changes in youth participation and engagement while they promote the development of innovative attitudes, methods of action, and participation. • seek points of connection between groups and identify drivers of change. each group has its own agents and drivers of change. ‘agents of change’ are young people with the potential to build a 'bridge' between those of different orientations and act as opinion formers. interventions focused on young people should include a process for identifying and strengthening these motivations as they are key factors that guide, nurture, and ensure mobilization and resilience and provide a living and active meaning to transformative processes. • apply mediation strategies to facilitate understanding and the search for solutions. through discussion and interaction dynamics, invite young people to reflect on values, motivations, and objectives in context. mediation encourages awareness in a practical context and hones their ability to cope with the challenging issues from their own understanding and willingness to participate. interventions that emphasize co-creation processes and collective management are especially promising. • develop languages and communication approaches to promote dialogue and mobilization. communication strategies in this field must provide opportunities to hear what young people have to say. in a dynamic and open communication approach, it is possible to create contexts to transform perceptions, views, demands, and desires of young people in practical factors of mobilization and expression. the communication created ‘by the young, for the young’ is a highly creative factor, given the impact that can generate in terms of stimulus, participation, and representativeness. this is a key factor to the success of sustainable initiatives in this field. the potential of design-based approaches to promote a culture of sustainability2 preliminary findings also show that design-based participatory approaches integrated 2 this section presents preliminary findings on the in-progress phd research, reported on mouchrek (2017). consilience mouchrek: design-based education for sustainability in educational settings offer excellent opportunities to both engage youth in sustainability and support their positive development. participatory design emphasizes design as a social process founded on the democratic philosophy of mass participation in decision-making processes (luck 2003). this approach is therefore well-suited to support social change and engagement in sustainability. participatory design engages participants through strategies of collective construction of knowledge, prototyping, iteration and cocreation activities, among others. co-design activities stimulate systemic thinking, encourage people to participate, reveal possibilities of doing things, empower people to act as active citizens providing self-sustaining and self-regenerating solutions, and build trust, an essential ingredient for bringing about any real change (fuad-luke, 2010). participatory approaches in design use activity-based co-design engagements (martin & hanington 2012), which might help capture students’ visions about the transition to sustainability, by integrating their tacit knowledge, intrinsic motivations, and embedded perspectives. it also offers opportunities for students to collaboratively reflect and work to envision possible futures in multiparty collaboration processes. this research also shows that co-creation activities are suited to develop a culture of sustainability among youth (mouchrek 2014), since they contribute to: • developing critical thinking to analyze complex problems and find innovative solutions; • providing fields of experimentation for students to create solutions from their own resources and motivations; • by offering a range of tools and forms of intervention, students learn collaboratively how to select and apply; • developing concrete and action-oriented projects; • and establishing a dynamic system in which feedback and confirmation stimulate new cycles of project and applied action. considering potential design-based strategies for engaging youth in sustainability, our research (mouchrek 2017) shows that: • participatory design processes can provide spaces for experimentation, inviting youth to enact and reflect on their choices in a non-serious, playful environment. • from the perspective of development, participatory design processes can offer opportunities for peer interaction, equal participation with adults, exploration of diverse identities, and elaboration of possible futures. • participatory processes can improve youth’s ability to understand and contribute to (trans)forming their life contexts and exercising skills for protagonism and positive intervention (youth as co-creators of public space). 100 consilience • open, participatory environments are ideal to enable young people to exercise their critical and creative thinking skills and help them reflect on values and choices while creating and confirming their own principles. • the integration of design-based thinking in the classroom opens opportunities to develop structured reflection and critical consciousness, both precursors of an intentional and active engagement with sustainability. • if design competencies are combined with a discussion focused on sustainability, the impact in the learning process is expanded, allowing students to articulate their values and discuss potential strategies for application. • introducing tools and strategies from design-based thinking in the classroom allows students to learn practical skills that will be useful in their engagement in sustainability and social change in the community (such as graphic design, multimedia, verbal and visual expression, teamwork, etc). final considerations design proved to be a good methodology for intervention for youth engagement in sustainability, both as a way to understand the problem (as a way of knowing and inquiring) and to attain goals (participatory approaches). design-based activities are opportunities for experimentation that can both engage youth in sustainability and support their integral development. the proposed guidelines for strategies in this field reinforce the importance of understanding the values and challenges of youth development. these can broaden and deepen the concept of sustainability, bringing it closer to student realities, building contexts for transformation, stimulating empowerment and the development of autonomy, seeking possible languages and communication approaches, and using mediation strategies to 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overbeek.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 13, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 165-179 examining the efficacy of fair trade and alternative consumption on environmental sustainability and human rights in developing countries ashley overbeek stanford university, stanford, california ashleyov@stanford.edu abstract through the lens of political ecology, the idea of alternative consumption, as defined by bryant et al, is the consumption of more sustainable products with eco-labels alerting consumers about the benefits of purchasing said product instead of traditional products. here, i examine the efficacy of fair trade certification on environmental sustainability and human rights in developing countries. benefits accrued to fair trade, namely that certification informs consumers about environmental and social issues occurring in developing countries, provides consumers an option for “alternative”, more sustainable consumption, encourages businesses to develop in a more sustainable manner, and also may provide premiums that support environmental conservation and human well-being in developing countries or traditionally rentier-states. however, several drawbacks of fair trade certification and alternative consumption also have been noted, namely the concerns about corporate greenwashing, as well as the potential for creating a moral hazard for consumers who feel as though they are making a difference by simply perpetuating a neo-liberal capitalistic culture that oppresses those in developing countries in the first place. in addition, the definite edenization of the rainforest can have arguably positive and negative benefits on the environmental and social aspects of developing countries. this paper will also examine the long-term effects of green marketing in the global north on the perceptions of the south as a place of unaltered wilderness and pristine ecosystems separate from the social struggles of human society. this paper argues that fair trade and alternative consumption has its benefits and constraints/limitations, but overall has greatly improved the plight of developing countries. inherently, alternative consumption subscribes to neoliberal systems and capitalistic culture, yet given we all must consume and alternative consumption captures a large audience and corporations with considerable purchasing power, fair trade certification and alternative consumption may be an effective means of consumptive change within the system. keywords: political ecology, alternative consumption, fair trade, edenization, certification, producer-consumer networks 1. introduction the notion of alternative consumption seeks to respond to consumer pressures to create a means whereby consumers are able to influence moral issues through the markets and purchasing decisions. this idea stems from two different consilience overbeek: efficacy of fair trade in developing countries factors: one, the disenchantment of consumers in the global north with the efficacy and transparency of direct aid, and two, the desire to create a reliable emotional and ethical network linking consumers in the global north, those in developed countries, to producers in the global south, those in developing countries. goodman 2004 references this idea of eco-labeling functioning as a type of bridge between the somewhat conventionally opaque supply chain from production to consumption by stating: “fair trade attempts to re-connect producers and consumers economically, politically, and psychologically through the creation of a transnational moral economy. this re-connection is accomplished through material and semiotic commoditization processes that produce fair trade commodities. the semiotic production of these commodities and their traffic in particular ‘political ecological imaginaries’ is essential to the formation of ethical production-consumption links, acting to also politicize consumption and fair trade eaters” (goodman, 2004:891). alternative consumption, viewed from the perspective of political ecology, is not traditionally seen as a viable, long-term solution to resource extraction and laborrelated company practices in developing countries. in their book, eco-business: a bigbrand takeover of sustainability, researchers dauvergne and lister argue from the political ecologist lens, stating that the system for enacting change through consumption is inherently flawed, simply because capitalistic consumption fundamentally leads to the depletion of natural resources and the oppression of the working class. byrant et al, (2004: 344) continues to support this idea, claiming that alternative consumption is a form of “social and political ‘caring at a distance’ due to an uncritical acceptance of consumption as the primary basis of action.” though alternative consumption still subscribes to the capitalistic consumer model, it effectively creates a link between the north and the south, and the increased funds from fair trade certified premiums have measurable positive effects on community development in the global south, as well as the increased environmental regulations resulting from farms that are rainforest alliance certified. raynolds (2002:410) supports this claim by acknowledging that the “fair trade movement destabilizes neo-liberal knowledge claims regarding the normalcy of commercial conventions” and pushes a shift in corporate mentality from exploitation of both human and natural resources in developing countries to a more harmonious, mutualistic balance with much more transparency. it is important to note, however, that even the term “fair trade” is decidedly a northern term, and succumbs the southern producers to the definition of fair as generated by the ideals of the northern consumers. this consequently creates a group of qualifications based on a northern standard of “fairness” centered around “collective responsibility and evaluations of societal benefits” (raynolds 2002). it is perhaps myopic to assume, however, that eco-labeling is merely a product of the viewpoints of consumers in the global north. rather, the processes of both fair trade and rainforest alliance eco-labeling can be partially explained through the “actor network theory” (whatmore 2008) in which the producers, consumers, and processors throughout the supply chain all contribute to the final definition of ‘sustainability’. the actor network theory, as defined by whatmore consilience overbeek: efficacy of fair trade in developing countries (2008), emphasizes the plurality of definitions that are shaped by the multiplicity of stakeholders in the capitalist system as a “social composite of the actions and competences of many actants; an attribute not of a single person or organization but of the number of actants involved in its composition.” 2. the edenization of the rainforest and its effect on the focus of eco-labeling currently, the portrayal of the rainforest through eco-labeling and “green” advertising perpetuates the ideal of a biblically pristine ecosystem, a modern garden of eden completely separate from the pollution of human industry. this idea uses spiritual rhetoric to spur consumers to want to “save the rainforest” and raises public support about ecological conservation efforts. on the other hand, this portrayal can also be extremely problematic at a fundamental level, heightening the importance of environmental sustainability to the complete eclipse of the need for social reform or human rights accountability at the governmental level. though fair trade does a good job of bringing social issues in developing countries into the agenda of northern consumers, it does perpetuate a different type of what bryant (2004) article references as “edenic myth-making” in regard to how businesses portray the rainforest to consumers in the north. fair trade’s edenization involves the “creation of a ‘third world’ ambiance, including music and decor, and the telling of producer stories, through producer store visits, photo and video images, and written narratives on the lives of individual producers” (raynolds, 410) as well as the creation of a pristine natural rainforest completely separate from civilization, ripe with the western notions of ‘wilderness’. as seen on the fair trade certified website, personal stories from smiling farmers speaking about how fair trade has impacted their lives and communities at an individual level abound, in addition to excerpts stating how the certification has created standards for environmental preservation. this storytelling aspect has been critical to the development of alternative consumption, and has shaped a more emotional, personal bond between consumers in the global north and producers in the global south. figure 1 creates a personal anecdote that appeals to the pathos of consumers by showing a personable, smiling farmer picking fruit who is looking directly at the camera and, consequently, directly at the viewer/consumer. a quote on fair trade’s impact report, which is also shown in figure 1, mentions “before, my son never used gloves while he worked. but through the program he learned to protect himself while applying agricultural inputs. for that i am so glad.” consumers reading this are shown the personal level of impact that their donation has in a relatable, multigenerational manner. consilience overbeek: efficacy of fair trade in developing countries figure 1: “fair trade: importing lives producer profile” fairtrade usa, 2012 <http://fairtradeusa.org/what-is-fair-trade/impact> along the same vein of the biblical, garden of eden portrayal of tropical forests in developing countries, in his book “uncommon ground: rethinking the human place in nature”, environmental historian william cronon explores humanity’s schizoid relationship with nature, a topic that has been exacerbated by green marketing and alternative consumption. this theory states that wilderness has been elevated to a spiritual experience that consumers feel frees them from the mundane confines of human civilization and traditional societal roles. this viewpoint can be problematic in how northern consumers view the natural resources of developing countries, and therefore through alternative consumption, these viewpoints can directly shape the agendas of ngos or the specifications for the certification processes for eco-labeling. for example, when the rainforest is portrayed as an untouched, pristine landscape, consumers in the global north tend to overlook the need to support the indigenous peoples who call the rainforest home. this in turn can create an apathy towards the plight of indigenous tribes or smallholder farmers, who can be viewed as “outsiders” to the forest ecosystem. in other words, because of edenization, consumers from the global north are less sympathetic to farmers and smallholders that are cultivating small parts of the rainforest for sustenance because they are not viewed within the idealized, “trees, animals, and nature” rainforest landscape. fair trade certification, paradoxically, both seeks to change this point of view and yet continues to perpetuate it. fair trade highlights the plight of humans in consilience overbeek: efficacy of fair trade in developing countries a natural setting, thus weaning perceptions away from untouched wilderness and bringing social turmoil and class conflict into the forefront of the western consciousness. however, in its approach for community-based funding that gives premiums to co-operative farmers, fair trade continues to ignore the existing class issues that are perpetuated by government corruption and the exploitative, wealthy elite. in this way, fair trade serves as more of a band-aid, albeit a relatively successful band-aid, instead of a cure. in its own way, fair trade exemplifies the edenization of developing countries, implying that hard-working small farmers are inhibited only by their meager wages through the exploitation of labor by large, multi-natural agribusiness corporations, and fails to address the system of institutionalized oppression and both geographic and socioeconomic discrimination by the arguably corrupt governments of the developing countries. in this way, fair trade certification smartly avoids becoming a politicized matter, and it is still important to note the successes of improving the quality of life for farmers on a more localized, case-by-case level. figure 2: james rodriguez for fair trade usa, “gender equality supported by fair trade”, fair trade usa, 2013, <https://photos.fairtradeusa.org/preview/391> the photo in figure 2 was meant to be used by fair trade partners, and included the description, “luz marleni mendoza (center), married to segundo cuevas villalobos, coffee grower affiliated to cecanor since 2000 from agua azul, tends the family's coffee seedbeds with her two daughters.” even though luz marleni is not affiliated with cecanor, she participates and receives many benefits from the fair trade prize. she comments, "i am not a member of the co-op because my husband is the one involved, but i help out a lot on the field. and the fair trade benefits are great for our children, particularly with regards to education. we have also been to gender equality workshops [paid for with fair trade prize consilience overbeek: efficacy of fair trade in developing countries money] that have dramatically changed our village. before men would drink too much, some were violent. now, many of us feel equal to men." cecanor: agua azul, la florida, san miguel, cajamarca, peru. february 26, 2013.” the photo, with its emotionally appealing, anecdotal rhetoric, also subscribes to the traditional northern perception of producers in the global south, including tight familial bonds, and smiling community members working together picking and harvesting produce in the green, edenic rural forest. to move away from the visual and begin analyzing the caption, the quote exalting the “spillover effect” of fair trade certification on the community and extended family of farmers does nothing to reference the underlying political turmoil or institutionalized gender inequality in peru. while fair trade continues to provide direct alleviation on a local level by funding and providing gender equality workshops that are described to be quantitatively and qualitatively successful, fair trade does not attack existing systems of gender oppression that perpetuate discrimination against females in peru on a national, or governmental, level. 3. defining fair trade certification: in principle and in practice the history of fair trade began in around the 1960s as a niche, alternative market. fair trade products were sold in “world shops”, or specialty stores that only carry fair trade goods. however, as the years progressed, fair trade moved into the mainstream market and into larger scale processing and distribution networks that were accessible to a larger slice of northern society and popular culture (fair trade resource network, 2010) and has been growing ever since. fair trade spends a large amount of revenue funding extensive, international marketing programs in order to gain brand recognition for the fair trade label and incentivize alternative consumption. indeed, the current focus of fair trade has been coined a ‘‘mainstreaming strategy’’ by taylor (2004), which seeks to “achieve rapid growth in market share by encouraging corporations, governments, major retailers, and other large economic actors to support fair trade.” in many ways, this approach has allowed for a large expansion of the fair trade market, as sales had reached over us$700 million by the end of 2003 according to murray et al. (2006). fair trade reported over us$5 billion in sales revenue in 2013 (bbc news). as defined by murray et al 2003, “the fair trade movement is an effort to link socially and environmentally conscious consumers in the north with producers engaged in socially progressive and environmentally sound farming in the south. it is an attempt to build more direct links between consumers and producers that provide the latter with greater benefits from the marketing of their products than conventional production and trade have allowed, while breaking down the traditional alienation of consumers from the products they purchase” (murray, 179). currently, the fair trade certification abides by five major tenets, as indicated from the fair trade usa website: (1) access to credit; (2) guaranteed prices; (3), environmental sustainability; (4) labor right; and (5) community development. the posited requirements and their effectiveness in practice are discussed in detail below. through the access to credit requirement, buyers are required to offer a line of credit to farmers, allowing them to invest in farm improvements and sustainable consilience overbeek: efficacy of fair trade in developing countries infrastructure. however it is unclear how much money is actually loaned and utilized by producers in the global south. taylor (2004) reports “participants’ access to credit has improved, largely due to flo’s pre-financing requirements” while lyon (2007:108) critiques the failure of the access to credit in practice because “many cooperative members find it difficult to repay their loans to the cooperative, in turn making it difficult for the group to repay its bank loans.” the guaranteed price is applied through an economic price floor that represents the cost of sustainable production. the international community, not fair trade itself, sets this objective cost. this price floor guarantees that farmers will be paid the cost of sustainable production, regardless of market volatility. in the case of coffee, prices have fluctuated so much in 2002 that the guaranteed price represented “as much as double the conventional market price” (taylor 2004). some argue, however, that a price floor incentivizes overproduction, flooding the market and even lowering the market price. in addition, the guaranteed price could potentially trap producers in the fair trade certification, offering the only means for producers to turn a profit or maintain afloat in an inflated and inefficient market. in regard to environmental sustainability, for its criteria and/or conditions, fair trade prohibits the use of genetically modified organisms, most toxic agrochemicals, and promotes the active conservation of soil, forest, and water resources. these standards are enforced through an audit system, where an independent third-party auditor surveys participating farms for compliance. though still somewhat nebulous of requirements, measurable results are seen as “small producers are now adopting more environmentally friendly farming techniques to improve the quality of their coffee beans” (utting-chamarro, 2005). fair trade also demands that no certified farms use child labor, forced labor, or allow workplace discrimination. if child labor or forced labor is discovered during the auditing process, the child or forced laborer will be immediately removed and taken to a safe location. as for workplace discrimination, fair trade’s most measurable effect has been to improve gender equality at a local level, allowing “some women producers to take greater control of their lives, and not be afraid to participate in decision making both within their cooperative and household” (utting-chamarro, 2005). consilience overbeek: efficacy of fair trade in developing countries figure 3: “premium payments to fair trade producer organizations by product, 1998-2012”, fair trade usa, 2012 <http://fairtradeusa.org/what-is-fairtrade/impact> perhaps one of the most unique aspects of the fair trade policy is its commitment to community development by providing a premium given directly to the farming co-operatives. according to fair trade usa’s website: “since 1998, fair trade usa and its partners have enabled fair trade farmers to earn more than $114 million in community development premiums,” also depicted in figure 3. this money is put toward a nebulous description of “community development.” a representative of fair trade elaborated that there is no specific suite of guidelines established by fair trade for community development. rather, the community and the farming co-operative work together to address the specific needs of the community, whether it be paying for the medical treatment of an elderly resident or building a well to bring more accessible water to a village. this flexibility allows individuals in the community to use the money to enact change identified at a local level, which is a much more pragmatic approach than the traditional philanthropic remote instruction, or top-down external oversight. in this way, fair trade addresses the complaint raised by bryant (2004), who stated that alternative consumption is a mechanism for “caring at a distance” (bryant, 344). true, consumers are still not directly affecting the communities when they pay the price premium, but this type of spending autonomy to the producers is a much more successful and revolutionary method of exchange. though the price premium is technically absorbed by the processors, the prices of fair trade products are typically higher than traditional non-fair trade products, though “consumers are willing to pay higher premiums for coffee labeled as fair trade” (loureiro, 2005). indeed, it is because of the way that fair trade is marketed, and the anecdotal advertising strategy which builds a network of transparency from individual producer to individual consumer, that consumers in the global north are willing to pay a higher premium for a product that they feel directly impacts producers in the global south. taylor (2004) elaborates on the emotional rhetoric that induces alternative consumption: “this willingness to pay is supported by the building of direct personal ties between northern consumers and southern producers” (taylor 2004: 132). allowing the community to exercise localized control over how the premium money is spent has had definite success in poverty alleviation, being spent largely “by producer organizations to be invested in crop quality and infrastructure improvements or community projects such as schools and health services” (raynolds, 2002). 4. fair trade certification as a product of a capitalist culture that represents northern capitalistic interests fair trade has been criticized for perpetuating a north-knows-best type of attitude vis-à-vis the certification criteria. because the standards appeal to the consumer consciousness in the global north, they reflect the values and ideals of a society that does not typically have direct interaction with the global south. this has been a key critique in “that governance of the fair trade coffee movement has been consilience overbeek: efficacy of fair trade in developing countries dominated by northern interests” (taylor, 2004). various shareholders influence the decision-making process, and as multi-national corporations such as walmart begin to sell fair trade products, the danger of the original intention of fair trade – to provide an emotional network between producers and consumers while fighting against environmental degradation and social exploitation traditionally perpetuated in the neo-liberal capitalistic global marketplace – stands at risk of being altered by profit-motivated business interests. there are also issues posed by the equity of the distribution of benefits, especially in regard to the hands-off approach of fair trade’s community development premium. because there is no authority on how the premium can be spent, “benefits may not be distributed equally among cooperative members or among members of producer households” (raynolds, 2002). on a more macro scale, fair trade as an organization is inherently biased toward more developed cooperative farms instead of extremely small shareholders operating in more rural areas. simply because fair trade requires compliance to many standards, including environmental standards, co-operatives with sustainable infrastructure or available funding, which by default tend to be bigger, have an easier time adhering to the fair trade tenets. indeed, in anonymous interviews, “interviewees in several wellestablished fair trade cooperatives expressed concern that the initiative may be serving the strongest and most established producer organizations rather than addressing the most marginalized” (taylor 2004). in addition, the network linking the southern producers and the northern consumers is arguably extremely one-sided, and portrayed through a veil of feel-good marketing. while consumers are shown the stereotypically northern viewpoint of culturally unique producers and their rural environments, the producers themselves still know very little on a personal, individual level about their consumers. because there is little to no proximate, physical interaction between producers and consumers, the ethical networking link is warped through the lens of fair trade and is only really shown to the consumers in the global north, as “the modes of connectivity linking producers and consumers are largely symbolic ones formed in the north through marketing” (lyon, 2006). in other words, migrant workers in peru are not shown full color leaflets with professional photography depicting a middle-class american housewife who is purchasing their coffee beans. 5. fair trade certification as a tool for positive social change and environmental regulation conversely, fair trade has been seen as an important step in poverty alleviation and environmental protection in developing countries, especially from an economic perspective. it has been documented extensively that producers in the global south have received additional income from participating in fair trade certification. indeed, as shown in figure 4, “the incomes of most small coffee producers had doubled since their entry into the fair trade market” (utting-chamoro, 2005). consilience overbeek: efficacy of fair trade in developing countries figure 4: karla utting-chamorro, “changes in a small producer’s income over two years” development in practice, 2005. consequentially, this increased revenue has dramatically increased the quality of life for the co-operatives and their surrounding communities, as “many small producers illustrated changes in their lives by referring to greater economic stability and security, in addition to identifying material changes. some significant improvements they reported included the following: the use of electricity instead of fuel wood, better nutrition, physical improvements to their home, the ability to pay for their children’s education and to buy uniforms, shoes, and books, the ability to purchase a vehicle and install a telephone in their home, and the ability to improve the condition of their farm, including purchasing inputs such as organic fertilizer, machinery, and other equipment, and hiring help” (utting-chamoro, 2005). there has also been a noticeable “spillover-effect”, as mentioned previously, where not only the farming co-operatives that are in direct contact with fair trade benefit, but also their extended families and outlying communities through their interactions with the members of the farming co-operative. as a case study in coffee production confirms, “fair trade has provided increased economic and social stability to participants, and greater access to technical training. this in turn has led to improvements in the quality of small-producer coffee and higher productivity. farmers’ families have also benefited, for instance through greater access to education for their children” (raynolds, 2002). as means of production, location, and culture among co-operatives can vary slightly at a case-by-case basis, levels of success for fair trade can also vary. however, on the whole, “all the cooperatives participating in fair trade have clearly reaped significant benefits from the experience, which has improved the well-being of thousands of small-scale farmers in mexico and central america” (loureiro, 2004). 6. moving forward: the future of alternative consumption and fair trade certification consilience overbeek: efficacy of fair trade in developing countries as fair trade continues to grow as a presence in the farming communities of developing countries, it has several areas of improvement. to revisit the drawbacks of fair trade, one of its weakest areas appears to be its lack of ability to address the needs voiced by the southern producers themselves, or to even provide a reliable medium for producers to provide feedback or provide input on certification standards. this is especially tenuous as fair trade becomes more mainstream in the global north, and must increasingly balance the needs of their profit-driven capitalistic corporations and the requirements of philanthropic environmental and social justice through alternative consumption. steps that can be taken to improve alternative consumption and fair trade certification’s sustainability include industry changes as well as political changes. fair trade as an organization can invest in creating more reciprocal channels of communication, allowing for open or even direct exchange of thoughts and ideas from the global south producers to the global north consumers. in addition, fair trade can focus on creating a system that relies on more producer input to create the certification standards, perhaps even varying the standards based on country or region. on the policy end, both the governments in the global north and those in the global south can work together to promote sustainability. the fair trade model that has been discussed previously in this paper is fairly straightforward. in this way, this structure can be adopted by governments in both producing and consuming countries, creating national or international legislation to promote price floors on food staples, as well as adding a government tax on certain food products which would fund community development in rural farms and plantations. 7. conclusion the most difficult aspect surrounding the efficacy of fair trade certification on environmental sustainability and human rights in developing countries is the variability between different countries, sizes and locations of farming co-operatives, and the crops being produced. generalizing the successes or drawbacks of fair trade as a whole fails to examine the specific traits unique to these extremely diverse areas. however, in certain aspects, fair trade as a governing principle can be analyzed critically and applied to the concept of alternative consumption as a whole. although it is true that inherently alternative consumption perpetuates the flaws within the market system by subscribing, and therefore conforming to a degree, to the neo-liberal capitalistic culture it is fighting against, alternative consumption also provides a necessary bridge between traditional capitalistic culture and a radically outside-of-market-based solution. alternative consumption commits to “operating both ‘in and against the market’, aiming to use the market to transform the market” (taylor 2004). specifically with fair trade, murray et al (2006) deems fair trade a mechanism that has become “a dynamic and successful dimension of an emerging counter-tendency to the neo-liberal globalization regime.” alternative consumption and fair trade create a link between the producers in the global south and consumers in the global north, allowing a personal, albeit consilience overbeek: efficacy of fair trade in developing countries sometimes one-sided, relationship to develop, shortening the supply chain and creating more transparency in the traditionally opaque and oppressive global market system. the willingness of consumers to pay the fair trade premium, which has made significant documented effects on poverty alleviation and environmental conservation in developing countries, has been ushered in by the personal, anecdotal marketing that is used to promote alternative consumption, but can also shape certification requirements to a northern ideal. taylor (2004) elaborates, stating, “fair trade objects to the abstraction of the market as a depersonalized mechanism operating outside of social institutions and cultural values. it recognizes that economic activity is a social activity invested by humans with social and cultural meaning.” one of the biggest concerns for fair trade is the need to include producers in the decision-making processes while the expansion of the organization creates the potential 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"the meaning of alternative consumption practices." cities 20.5 (2003): 311-319. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 19, iss. 1 (2018), pp. 69–81 investigating the global and local in wangchuck centennial national park: a case for the bhutanese conservation actors in-between anne lee steele ba, columbia university in the city of new york aleesteele@gmail.com abstract bhutan is world famous for its approach to both environmental conservation and development, despite being classified as “least developed” by the world bank as recently as 2016. as bhutan continues to develop, it has increasingly encountered the colloquially known, but statistically unproven phenomena: that development standards and conservation goals are often in conflict with the needs of rural communities. in the case of such ideological, cultural and economic clashes, this article argues for the necessity of “middle-actors” such as native bhutanese civil servants, as they are able to navigate the cultural and economic zone “in-between” the international and the local in ways that others cannot. author’s note this article was produced from a larger research project done in bhutan during the spring of 2017. i came to bhutan during the last semester of my last year at columbia university, after years of studying anthropology and sociology (with an environmental focus). my desire to come to bhutan was split twofold, the first being my desire to tread away from theory and towards immersing myself in more tangible field research experience. the second was because it was bhutan, widely known to be one of the most closed countries in the world, and i just wanted to learn more about terms that i had heard for years, ‘gnh’ and ‘net-carbon-sink’ among them. while my research project that spring was ultimately an analysis of the mobility of civil servants in wangchuck centennial national park (the largest protected area in the country) and beyond, combing through the data has revealed other conclusions that i believe are of particular value for sustainable development. those in the development sphere, especially large-scale organizations, tend to be criticized for their lack of attention to the specificities of the cultures they work with. of course, larger international organizations deal with bigger problems that require solutions of equal measure. however, i also observed that there is very little attention paid to the actualizers of such programs, the middle actors that appeared to have mailto:aleesteele@gmail.com 70 consilience the flexibility and knowledge needed to operate effectively. this paper was an attempt to further tease out that relationship: between those implementing and enforcing rules and regulations, as juxtaposed with those impacted. i gratefully acknowledge the financial and logistical support provided by the school for field studies (sfs) at the ugyen wangchuck institute for conservation and environmental research (uwicer), as well as my primary investigator and professor, dr. riamsara kuyakanon, for providing guidance and structure to not only my research but general experiences in bhutan. i am also grateful for my team members erick adrian, natasha baranow, annabel li and matthew bleich who contributed to our collective data bank, as well as kencho tshering and rinchin singye for managing our research team. last but certainly not least, thank you to the staff of wangchuck centennial national park, the villagers of naspel and our team of translators for their boundless generosity, hospitality and engagement throughout the research process and beyond. keywords: development, bhutan, environment, networks, conservation, civil servants, forestry note: narrative ethnography and/or inserted field notes are italicized. consilience steele: bhutanese actors in-between i. introduction it was the beginning of cordyceps season in wangchuck centennial national park (wcnp) when we arrived in nasphel, the village closest to its central entrance. we were still in bumthang, one of bhutan’s middle districts, but driving here on the new roads required snaking up the valley, along rain-slicked and pothole-laden roads. the mountains surrounding nasphel felt higher and rockier than those of our field station at the ugyen wangchuck institute for conservation and environmental research (uwicer). from naphel, the snowy peaks of the high himalayas were just on the horizon. there were 10 of us on the research team, including the lead investigator, coordinators, fellow student researchers, and translators. i had come to interview park staff and villagers, to learn more about the people behind and affected by conservation policy, so to speak. but we were approaching cordyceps season. it was possible that the staff quarters – let alone the entire village – could be completely empty. cordyceps sinensis, or “yarsegumba” as it’s called locally, are a type of fungi found in the mountainous regions of the himalayas. prices for cordyceps, traditionally used in chinese medicine, have skyrocketed over the past 5-10 years, leading to a kind of gold rush in the region. cordycepscollecting season meant that most of the park staff would be patrolling in those snowy peaks sooner than i had realized. in bhutan, collecting requires the right permit, as well as residency in a proximal district. the permits are given for a maximum of one month between may and june, but the number of illegal collectors from other districts or abroad, as well as local yak herders whose livestock conveniently keep them in the region for the entire summer, meant that park staff must stay on as well. most of the park staff remain in the mountains for all three months of growing season. we would be long gone by then. ii. bhutan: a conservation and development frontier bhutan is most famously known for its concept of gross national happiness, or gnh. the former king of the world’s last himalayan kingdom, jigme singye wangchuck, popularized the idea when he proclaimed that "gross national happiness is more important than gross national product" in 1972. it is gnh, upon which their current development policy is based, that has given bhutan a platform on the world stage despite an inconvenient location between china and india. environmental conservation, sustainable and equitable socio-economic development, preservation and promotion of culture, and good governance make up the four pillars of bhutanese governance. bhutan also has the numbers to back them up: the country’s second national ghg (greenhouse gas) inventory, generated by the unfcc, reports that bhutan’s per capita emissions total only 0.8 annual metric tons (unfccc, 2011). according to the ‘carbon comparator’ tool generated by the energy and climate intelligence (eciu), a uk-based non-profit, bhutan absorbs more than three times more co2 emissions than its population emits through industrial activities, agriculture and hydropower (eciu, 2015). in other words, bhutan produces less carbon-emissions 72 consilience than its forests remove via carbon sequestration. this is the “net carbon sink” that current prime minister tshering tobgay spoke about at a ted conference in 2016. this trend is due to a few reasons, the first and most obvious being that bhutan is not a developed nation, and thus has less carbon-emitting industries in-situ. but as the country inevitably develops, it has been building upon (and diverging from) a legacy of total state-control. unlike its neighbors, natural resource management (particularly forestry) is completely nationalized in bhutan. while the bhutanese government is notorious for having been closed to the outside world, the previous king jigme singye wangchuck’s voluntary abdication [for his son] as well as his codified steps towards decentralization and parliamentary-democracy demonstrate a clear shift away from this traditional stance. foundational to bhutan’s development are the country’s five year plans (fyps), national economic development plans created by the royal government of bhutan (rgob) that have spearheaded growth in the country since 1961. as the government has decentralized, the process has become more bureaucratic but remains top-heavy. forest conservation is a substantial component of the royal government’s approach to conservation, in part due to the numbers identified above. according to the first national forest inventory of bhutan, approximately 71% of bhutan is under forest cover, 60% of that being required by law (bbs, 2017, department of forests and park services). consilience steele: bhutanese actors in-between figure 1: protected areas of bhutan, including national parks, nature reserves, wildlife sanctuaries and biological corridors. (department of forests and park services, ministry of agriculture and forests, royal government of bhutan.) protected areas constitute the major impact of such conservation policies. wangchuck centennial national park (wcnp) is one of five national parks, four wildlife sanctuaries, and one nature reserve. a network of biological corridors links all nine of these areas. thus, 53% of bhutan’s total land is under official government protection (national forest inventory, rgob, 2017). these numbers that make bhutan popularly known as one of the richest biodiversity hotspots in the world. it was this seemingly-unparalleled political will for environmental conservation that brought me to bhutan in the first place. especially when compared to neighbors such as nepal (from 33.7% to 25% forest cover from 1990 to 2015, respectively), or even newly-opened myanmar (60% to 44.5%), bhutan’s increase from 53.7% to 72.3% is undoubtedly impressive (world bank, 2017). but it is only by peeling back such jargon and numbers that the complicated network of development and conservation actors reveal themselves. internationally, bhutan has received most of its aid and development funds from india, in part because its historical trading and religious ties to tibet closed during china’s cultural revolution. the japanese have also invested heavily in bhutanese infrastructure and agricultural projects (japan oda, 2011). swiss cows were introduced for greater milk production. the world wildlife fund (wwf) is bhutan’s biggest conservation partner and has helped to fund protected areas for decades (wwf, 2017). the united nations development programme (undp) has been involved in bhutan since 1973 (undp 2017). the list goes on. but peel back a little more. on the ground, bhutan remains poor and classified as “least-developed” by the world bank. thimphu, the capital city, contains about 100,000 of the country’s roughly 700,000 people (would population review, 2017). bhutan also has the highest rate of rural to urban migration in south asia (world bank 2015). food insecurity remains a problem: the world food programme reports that one third of primary school children are physically stunted due to malutrition (wfp 2017). too many educated young people have too few opportunities in the still primarily agricultural economy (kuensel, 2017). cultural and historical traditions and languages are also at risk of extinction as development takes hold. at least 19 languages are spoken in bhutan, which is divided between four broad (but by no means exclusive) ethnic groups. shifting cultivation, a traditional practice that was widely used across bhutan due to the impotence of mountain soil, has given way to more stationary livestock grazing and the modern intensive agricultural production that is enabled by pesticides (fao, bhutan). given these facts, there were more questions, but less confusion. on the ground, it was clear that conservation policies struggled to both protect resources as well as 74 consilience provide for the poor rural communities that rely on them for their livelihood, especially given bhutan’s hunger for development. gnh, i soon realized, seemed to be a meaningless phrase to most of the everyday bhutanese people: an idea that was projected outwards, but less evident within. according to the bbc, this was one reason behind the downfall of the incumbent government (which utilized a platform heavily reliant on gnh) in the last elections (2013). what became increasingly clear during my time in bhutan was not that there was a disconnect between the global and local, but rather that they were intimately linked in a kind of network. ultimately, it was those in the middle that proved to be some of the most important elements for the implementation of development and conservation projects. that is, these bhutanese actors who had regional and/or international experience as well as local connections could uniquely communicate across all parties and manage the inevitable cultural, linguistic and educational gaps that must be bridged for change to be felt on both sides. across the board, their exclusive positions between the local villages and multi-national organizations were integral to ensuring that larger conservation-development goals were achieved while simultaneously addressing the concerns and needs of the surrounding community. these linking figures, especially in the conservation-development sphere i was exposed to, first revealed themselves during the informal conversations we had before arriving in nasphel. they represented the entire employment and economic spectrum: from bhutanese civil servants in charge of distributing permits and controlling resource distribution to international development workers. they were remote villagers, whose crop production or livestock remained dependent on said permits, or eco-tourism operators. they were the bhutanese scientists we were based with and learning from, to a member of the royal family and local high school students, to employees of bhutan’s first major foreign investment venture, mountain hazelnut. the global merged with the local in all of these interactions, and in many forms. the cordyceps market was one – their skyrocketing international value has introduced entirely new economies to remote villages such as nasphel. one villager we talked to (a cordyceps-collector), had a daughter attending university in australia, despite the fact that her village had only received electricity three years prior. another woman had traveled to japan for training in organic farming, funded by the japanese government. eco-tourism ventures appeared to bring in an overlap of equally international clientele, coupled with development and/or aid funding. mountain hazelnut, bhutan’s first direct foreign investment (dfi) project, was founded by a stanford graduate. the civil servants we talked to, specifically in forestry, were reoccurring elements in these observations, and from the scientists at uwice to foresters in protected areas, certain narratives emerged. they were all native bhutanese and from different districts and languages across bhutan’s varied geography. as employees of the royal government of bhutan (rgob), they are required to regularly change post locations around bhutan in order to prevent corruption. consilience steele: bhutanese actors in-between these civil servants have also had the rare opportunity to pursue degrees, training, assignments, and research at regional and international levels. the extent to which they may do so depends on position as well as previous educational attainment. however, their everyday tasks, especially those of lower ranks, is occupied entirely by the local: actually implementing development projects as set out by the rgob or conservation partners, preventing illegal logging or extraction of other resources, or on rare occasions, attending local ceremonies such as the purifying labsang or puja. it is for these reasons that learning more about wangchuck centennial national park and the village of naphel was the optimal jumping-off and homing-in point for a deeper understanding of these connections. iii. wcnp & nasphel: networks of interaction the wcnp headquarters and village of nasphel are only about a 10-minute walk away from each other, yet they seem worlds away. the former is equipped with a wireless network, which we were told is occasionally used by intrepid villagers who can catch the signal from outside the building’s walls (4g has yet to enter the valley). the gnh center, a meditation and retreat hall that remains unused for the majority of the year, was built next to the headquarters. all, however, are built in the traditional bhutanese style that is required by law: rigidly-boxed structures, painted white and decorated with auspicious symbols and patterns. there are 39 permanent staff total at wcnp, including the administrator, accountant and receptionist. all are civil servants with green department of forests and park services (dofps) uniforms. all except for the hq’s driver and receptionist reside in chamkar, the town further down bumthang valley and closest to uwicer, the government research center at which we were based. between them, the staff represented eight of bhutan’s twenty districts in origin, and the group spoke at least five languages including english and dzongkha, the national language. four of the nine staff permanently based at headquarters speak bumthap, the local tongue. of the 39 staff in total that are distributed across the three satellite range offices, that number rises to 17. nasphel village, on the other hand, is composed of 32 households built in a main cluster formation with offshoots and outliers nearby. most homes, if not all, are multi-generational. they are varied in age, from the young attending school, to the old who still remember the time when the valley cultivated not potatoes but buckwheat, when the herders owned primarily yaks and not cattle. perhaps most importantly, cordyceps were not as important to local livelihood then as they are now. income is higher here than in most remote, rural villages because of it. under the overarching theme of mobility, our team of student researchers (all with different foci in mind – from knowledge-transfer of traditional practices to gaging rural life-satisfaction in a gnh context) composed sets of semi-structured interview questions that were tailored to our respective topics and applicable audiences. we conducted most of our field research collectively and over a total of 10 days at wcnp. the first two days of interviews were conducted in april 2017, with the following sets of two and six consecutively completed in may of the same year. during all three excursions, our team was based in two locally-operated homestays, both of which were begun by a wcnp integrated conservation and development 76 consilience program (icdp). for further context, a few other interviews were conducted at uwicer and in jakar, the town closest to the former. upon first impression, the staff of wcnp and the villagers of nasphel seemed to operate on entirely different levels. the in-situ diversity of the former is not to be overlooked – the mere fact that bhutan is composed of numerous valleys (that were essentially isolated until the advent of modern roads) has produced a wealth of unique indigenous languages besides dzongkha, the national language. nasphel did initially appear to be both the inverse and product of that. this gap between the civil servants and the villagers was most apparent when interacting with older generations. most of the older residents especially struggled with dzongkha and instead preferred to use their native tongue of bumthap. multiple generations of the same households had been yak herders or pursued other traditional practices. most, however now rely on cordyceps for the majority of their income. all told us of dramatic changes in their lifetimes. the first five year plan, implemented in 1961, focused on infrastructure, health care, and educational development, and eventually expanded in scope to include the environment. environmental sustainability is also codified in bhutan’s 2008 national constitution, with protected areas acting as restricting measures to developmental encroachment. because of this fragile relationship, any possible impediments are heavily regulated and monitored. such implementation is not universal, however. the royal government of bhutan acknowledges that the varied geographies (both physical and geopolitical) of the country affect the issues encountered. where we were, in the north, cordyceps-collecting is highly visible, along with poaching of “charismatic” species (as they’re called in the conservation world) such as the black bear, tiger, and snow leopard (100-200). from 2006-2015, bhutan’s tiger action plan (tap) was initiated in order to reduce transboundary poaching. in 2013, bhutan rolled out smart (spatial monitoring and reporting tool), a capacity-building tool to monitor poaching in parks across the country (wwf, 2016). southern parks are known to face greater instances of poaching as well, due to their proximity and shared park-lands with india, and their exponentially more accessible borders. unlike public areas, parks also implement integrated conservation development programs (icdps), in wcnp’s case, for water purification or traditional cultural practices such as weaving. this is in part due to the conservation and development objectives of the organizations that fund them. all projects were along the lines of key wwf initiatives. however, the interviews we conducted in nasphel revealed a fundamental disconnect between the conservation and development projects implemented by wcnp and wwf more largely and how they were recognized by the community. case in point: a recent study of human-asiatic black bear interaction in and around wcnp reported that the human-wildlife conflict has not only destroyed crops and livestock, but even humans as well. between 1960 and 2010, 40 people were reported consilience steele: bhutanese actors in-between to have been mauled by the asiatic black bear, with that number growing exponentially to 19 cases between 2013 and 2015. 52% of respondents believed that the killing of bears would reduce the conflict, despite the “stringent conservation rules [that restrict] killing it” (jamtsho 2016). while it cannot be denied that these organizations have greater access to both political and economic capital, and that projects were being implemented in the park, the communities themselves did not seem to be aware of the respective sources or purpose. when asked if she felt that living in the park had any impact upon her livelihood, an elderly woman we talked to simply shrugged. yes, partnering with the wwf has availed these protected areas of resources and exposure that they would not have had otherwise. but something seems to be lost in translation after the fact – villagers didn’t appear to be aware of who exactly implemented the projects, or their international worth. it is colloquially acknowledged that resource regulation seems to lie in fundamental conflict with the immediate needs of most rural peoples, but substantiating numbers seem to be difficult to find. this may be in part due to the overlapping factors at play (“global and national… individual and households”), and the difficulty of accurately tracing them because of variability (fao 1994). in their 1994 report, “rural households and sustainability: integrating environmental and gender concerns into home economics curricula,” the fao acknowledged that “past economic development policies, international lending, and development assistance programs have contributed in some cases to environmental mismanagement”. the report noted that “there may also be difficult environmental trade-offs in balancing industrial and urban growth with sustaining the natural resource endowments available to households in rural areas” (1994). globally, the contradiction between such limitations for growth has been called a kind of “ecoimperialism” (the guardian, 2010). the international statistics of forest conservation that make their way to un meetings and ted talks are perceived differently by locals themselves. but again, presentation usually varies from actuality: at wangchuck centennial national park, a project was recently initiated and supported by international donors to install electric fences for villagers in nasphel, as human-wildlife conflict is responsible for a sizable amount of crop loss annually according to the park’s internal reports. we observed the implementation to be uneven at first, but realized later how multifaceted the issues were. while the park supplied certain materials, villagers provided others – and available land & labor needed for installation was a different story entirely. in many ways, the electric fencing project was an example of how complicated implementing development initiatives are in the first place. more largely, protected areas such as wcnp are in a unique situation because they are not only subject to the conservation laws of the royal government of bhutan, but also the requirements and agenda of their supporters. such development projects were varied. examples included the local homestays we resided in during the research period, a weaving co-op (dorjibi weaving center) for 78 consilience women, and a nomads cultural festival (that ceased in 2016). as recently as november 2017, the wwf, rgob and various donors announced the creation of a usd $43 million fund – asia’s first – for a new initiative called “bhutan for life” that would work towards permanently conserving bhutan’s protected areas. on the ground, implementation is completed by bhutanese forestry civil servants who are employed by wcnp. their aforementioned diversity, composed of eight districts and five local languages, is in part a preventative measure for corruption. this is further reinforced by the government stipulation that forestry civil servants must be moved to a different station after a set number of years (royal civil service commission, 2002). stations can range from postings in public lands to protected areas such as wcnp. the idea is that the less involved these civil servants are in the communities that they serve, the less opportunity there is for an extra log distributed here or a blind eye turned there (anti-corruption commission, 2016). these civil servants, however, also received opportunities for education, trainings, conferences and other experiences that the general population was not exposed to. the same applied to uwicer researchers. depending on rank, lower officials had the ability to pursue degrees, trainings or programs in neighboring countries such as nepal or india – even as far away as australia or austria. despite this, lower-ranked officials reported education (or lack thereof) as the biggest inhibitor for promotions, not the training they had access to on the job. bhutanese civil servants such as the wcnp staff and the researchers at uwicer were shown to occupy unique positions in the conservation-development schema: they were not exactly villagers, but neither were they foreign interlocutors. a villager commented to me that students in the village were sometimes allowed to use the wcnp park office wireless network. another said that a couple of foresters had rented rooms in homes within the village for their daily living. ultimately, these middle actors emerged to be the most effective in the actualization of conservation and development goals for wangchuck centennial national park. unlike foreign counterparts, for example, they had an immediate ability to both interact and integrate with the communities they were placed in due to shared language and culture. some foresters had previously been invited to ceremonies in village homes. while we were in nasphel, we had the opportunity to observe a religious ceremony at an important lhakhang (temple) nearby. we saw villagers, foresters and even army men (given the proximity of the tibetan border) interact in an overlapping of worlds, backgrounds and languages. we were told that the high himalayas during cordyceps season was a similar ordeal. that is not to say that this sentiment is universal: we found that some of the educated bhutanese staff did not fraternize with the community in nasphel due to perceived differences in lifestyle preferences or education. villagers noted that many staff lived in jakar (a larger town) further down the valley. to explain this, the foresters cited educational opportunities for family members (nasphel has no secondary school education). consilience steele: bhutanese actors in-between this contradictory yet varied spectrum of interaction seemed to enable their duel outsider-insider status, as mobile enforcers of the law that were still bhutanese. some villagers, even, occupied similar positions between the global and local. in either case, this dual status allows them to navigate the space in between. iv. looking forward: the impact of “middle-actors” in bhutan and beyond to further understand these networks of interaction, additional comparisons and studies must be organized outside of those conducted at wangchuck centennial national park. while these clearly actors play an important role in the implementation of development and conservation projects, their effects are generally underestimated and understudied. in cases such as the aforementioned anti-poaching and sustainable development initiatives, the importance of these middle actors as nodes within the larger conservation-framework is demonstrated. indeed, sustainable development is often conceived of on the macro scale, in forms such as the un’s millennium or sustainable development goals, but usually without concrete methods of execution. conservation of the environment for future generations is often implicated in “bourgeoisie” or “industrialized-nation-centric” viewpoints of environmental conservation, and in contrast with needs of the “global south”, who are thought to sideline environmental repercussions in lieu of the need for resources for industrialization and improving their standard of living. upon deconstruction, however, the complicated factors at play reveal a kind of symbiotic relationship between these macro and micro elements: one being a larger skeleton of interaction, dominated by the political-economic space, and the other being the “fleshing out” or actualization that is only possible with local interactions and commitments. for bhutan, this means approaching development with the local in mind, not only in terms of enacting projects but post-implementation communication as well. the royal government already understands the importance of understanding the local: the national gnh survey of 2015 was conducted with 7,153 bhutanese people aged 15 years and above and conducted entirely in interviews. this desire to keep in mind the perspective of a bhutanese villager will, of course, diverge from an organization such as the wwf’s previously established standards, especially those that have been applied across the world. of course, the latter has the political and economic capital required to influence governments and international governing bodies that the public may not. these constraints and confirmations of power are understood. however, given the rgob’s clear desire to understand and integrate local perspectives and priorities, the potential for optimizing implementation, integration, and public communication is high. efforts at doing so have already been made: for example, community meetings are held to gage the reactions and desires. however, our research seemed to imply that a number of the park’s development projects produced uncertain responses from constituents. when asked about the effectiveness of those meetings, local reaction was even more difficult to gage. 80 consilience such uncertainty might be mitigated with greater specialization in local outreach, such as further employing local bumthap dialect with villagers in surveys or approaching community consultation in alternative ways that would align with both local and wwf/rgob interests. this could be done with larger outreach and education efforts that would empower locals to trace projects from prototype to implementation. expanded to a larger scale, greater attention should be paid to those in equivalent “middle” positions in the development-conservation space, with the ability to oscillate between the local and global. couple greater understanding of these integral but often overlooked middle actors with community outreach and communication, and the substantial improvements may occur. it is the local communities that will greatly improve not only the effectiveness, but perhaps more importantly, the local perception of the effectiveness of such programs. consilience steele: bhutanese actors in-between references: annual report 2016,” anti-corruption commission. royal government of bhutan. 2016. “bhutan: bringing swiss cheese to the himalayas,” new zealand herald. 2007. “bhutan civil service rules & regulations 2002,” royal civil service commission of bhutan. royal government of bhutan. 2002. “bhutan pdp opposition party wins election,” bbc news. 13 july 2013. chambers, andrew. “the fight against eco-imperialism,” the guardian. 11 april 2010. energy & climate intelligence unit (eciu). comparator tool. 2015. jamtsho, yonten. “assessing patterns of human-asiatic black bear interaction in and around wangchuck centennial national park, bhutan,” 2016. global ecology and conservation, vol 8. october 2016. “japan official development assistance (oda): rolling plan for the kingdom of bhutan”. ministry of foreign affairs of bhutan. 2011. “leveraging urbanization in bhutan”. world bank, 2015. web. national forest inventory report, “stocktaking nation’s forest resources. volume 1.” department of forests and park services, royal government of bhutan. 2017. national landscape information system (nlis). world health organization. 2016. rinzin, yangchen c. “job plan designed to address youth unemployment,” kuensel. 11 july 2017. “second national communication to the unfcc (united nations framework convention on climate change)”. national environment commission. royal government of bhutan. 2011. “shifting cultivation in bhutan: a gradual approach to modifying land use patterns”. food and agricultural organization, united nations. 1995. united nationals development programme, bhutan. 2017. web. world bank open data. 2017. web. world food programme, bhutan. 2017. web. world population review. 2017. web. world wildlife fund bhutan. 2017. web. microsoft word 02112008 onda effect of spatial resolution of conflict.doc consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 1 the effect of the spatial resolution of conflict data on the analysis of drought as a determinant of civil war onset: africa, 1980-2001 chikara onda1 abstract: with the steady decrease in freshwater availability and the growth of world population, freshwater distribution is likely to become an increasingly prominent source of conflict. given that civil wars by definition occur within national boundaries and therefore involve factors that vary within the country in which they occur, past studies examining the determinants of civil conflict using the state as the unit of observation are inherently flawed. improvements in the accuracy of the delineations of such conflict should increase the ability to determine the local determinants of civil war. this analysis focuses on africa between 1980 and 2001, utilizing a refined version of the international peace research institute, oslo (prio) armed conflict dataset at the 0.25-degree resolution, and juxtaposing this data on rainfall data using gis analysis. using socioeconomic factors as control variables, we perform a logistic regression analysis, comparing the correlation coefficients from this analysis to those of a previous study using conflict centroids with radii as the units of observation. thus, this study aims to explore the effect a change in the spatial level of resolution of conflict data has on our ability to analyze geographic determinants of war outbreak. we find that, despite the altered delineation of conflict data, the statistical analysis produces similar results that confirm the causal relationship between drought and civil war outbreak. this calls to attention the need for further international cooperation in assisting developing nations to develop infrastructure for the sustainable management of water resources. 1 chikara onda is a second-year undergraduate studying environmental science at columbia university, with academic interests in the relationship between environment and development. during the summer following his first year in college, he worked under marc levy at the earth institute’s center for international earth science information network (ciesin). he can be contacted at co2177@columbia.edu. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 2 introduction: in the last several decades, civil war has become the predominant form of conflict, as 27 of 32 instances of armed conflict ongoing in 2007 are occurring on the intrastate level2. accompanying this trend, we have observed a steady increase in the number and magnitude of quantitative studies on the causes of civil war3,4. recently, studies have confirmed the effect of environmental factors upon conflict. for instance, in a report released in 2007, the united nations environment programme ties conflict in sudan to key environmental factors, including freshwater availability, within the country5. however, it is only very recently that researchers have begun to examine the effects of the environment and natural resource availability upon internal war outbreak. past studies that concern the links between conflict and environmental scarcity, more specifically on resources such as freshwater, forests, and arable land, tend to use the nation as the unit of analysis, and therefore lack the spatial analysis of internally variant factors6,7,8,9. however, since internal conflict would presumably depend on internal factors (i.e. those that vary by region), if studies on civil war are to isolate specific factors, these must incorporate higher degrees of spatial resolution than those offered by nationally aggregated statistics. sambanis at yale university has already compiled an extensive review of the recently voluminous quantitative literature on civil war10. therefore, the aim of this study is not to introduce a new theory on the determinants of internal conflict. rather, it aims to explore the effect an improvement in the level of spatial resolution of civil war data through clearer delineations of conflict zones has on our ability to analyze geographic determinants of war outbreak. namely, we examine the effect of freshwater scarcity, determined through rainfall variation, on the outbreak of internal war in africa. recent studies find significant correlations between rainfall and conflict. a team led by miguel from university of california at berkeley utilizes rainfall variation as an instrumental variable to assess the impact of economic growth (or lack thereof) on civil conflict in africa between 1981 and 1999, using the nation as the unit of observation11. a later study by levy et al.12 at the center for international earth science information network (ciesin) at columbia university employs data from the international peace research institute, oslo (prio) 2 buhaug, h. (2007). “ucdp/prio intrastate conflict onset dataset, 1946-2006”. international peace research institute, oslo. retrieved december 25, 2007 from http://new.prio.no/cscw-datasets/data-on-armed-conflict/uppsalaprio-armedconflicts-dataset/armed-conflicts-version-4-2007. 3 fearon, j.d. and d.d. laitin. (2003). “ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war”. the american political science review, 97 (1): 75-90. 4 collier, p. and a. hoeffler. (2004). “greed and grievance in civil war”. oxford economic papers, 56 (4): 563-595. 5 united nations environment programme. (2007) “sudan: post-conflict environmental assessment”. retrieved on december 25, 2007 from http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/ unep_sudan_synthesis_e.pdf. 6 homer-dixon, t.f. (1994). “environmental scarcities and violent conflict: evidence from cases”. international security, 19 (1): 5-40. 7 hauge, w. and ellingsen, t. (1998). “beyond environmental scarcity: causal pathways to conflict”. journal of peace research, 35 (3): 299-317. 8 homer-dixon, t.f. (1999). environment, scarcity, and violence. princeton, nj: princeton university press. 9 de soysa, i. (2002). “ecoviolence: shrinking pie, or honey pot?”. global environmental politics, 2 (4): 1-34. 10 sambanis, n. (2002). “a review of recent advances and future directions in the quantitative literature on civil war”. defence and peace economics, 13 (3): 215-243. 11 miguel, e., s. satyanath, and e. sergenti. (2004). “economic shocks and civil conflict: an instrumental variables approach”. journal of political economy, 112 (4): 723-753. 12 levy, m.a., c. thorkelson, c. vörösmarty, e. douglas, and m. humphreys. (2005). “freshwater availability anomalies and outbreak of internal war: results from a global spatial time series analysis”. human security and climate change: an international workshop, oslo, norway, june 21-23. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 3 conflict database13; this study maps each instance of internal conflict between 1979 and 2002 as a centroid of a determined latitude and longitude with a buffer of given radius to perform a similar analysis. this later study not only incorporates a higher degree of resolution in terms of conflict data, but also brings together a monthly timeseries of water availability produced by the international research institute for climate and society (iri) at columbia university14 alongside spatially explicit demographic data from ciesin, in order to gain further insight into the local determinants of civil war outbreak. although a number of measures are used to assess the relationship between water availability and conflict outbreak, analysis using instances of high intensity (level 3) conflict15 produced the strongest results. we undertake a similar method; this time, however, we use the relevant data for africa from a more “refined version of the conflict location data… [b]ased on descriptive information on the location of various battles” generated by buhaug and rød at the centre for the study of civil war (cscw) at prio, which delineates past conflicts into irregular polygons16. as the delineation of conflict zones is of a higher spatial resolution than in previous studies, directly comparing the coefficients resulting from the two statistical analyses should yield noteworthy results; this should shed light upon the effect, and ultimately the necessity, of higher levels of resolution in conflict data in the study of armed conflict. such improvements in the understanding of the determinants of internal war may bear a good deal of predictive value, which would in turn aid in shaping policy in the realm of conflict prevention. hypotheses: as discussed above, decreases in rainfall levels are generally thought to increase the chances of civil war onset. because freshwater availability affects the distribution of wealth, collier and hoeffler at the centre for the study of african economics at the university of oxford argue that water scarcity decreases the opportunity cost of rebellion; that is, water scarcity decreases the return from peaceful economic activities due to minimal wages and high unemployment, thereby increasing the relative rates of return from rebellion17. also, as drought may affect one region more adversely than another, disparities in freshwater distribution may increase the likelihood of civil conflict over these limited resources. although the above correlation between water scarcity and conflict outbreak has been manifested in the aforementioned studies on the effect of freshwater scarcity on internal conflict18 ,19, more distinct delineations of the 13 gleditsch, n.p., p. wallensteen, m. eriksson, m. sollenberg, and h. strand. (2002). “armed conflict 1946-2001: a new dataset”. journal of peace research, 39 (5): 615-637. 14 lyon, b. and a.g. barnston. (2005). “enso and the spatial extent of interannual precipitation extremes in tropical land areas”. journal of climate, 18 (23): 5095-5109. 15 the prio armed conflict dataset defines “war” (level 3) as any armed conflict that exceeds 1000 battle-related deaths per year. 16 buhaug, h. and j.k. rød. (2006). “local determinants of african civil wars, 1970-2001”. political geography, 25 (3): 315-335. 17 collier, p. and a. hoeffler. (2004). “greed and grievance in civil war”. oxford economic papers, 56 (4): 563-595. 18 miguel, e., s. satyanath, and e. sergenti. (2004). “economic shocks and civil conflict: an instrumental variables approach”. journal of political economy, 112 (4): 723-753. 19 levy, m.a., c. thorkelson, c. vörösmarty, e. douglas, and m. humphreys. (2005). “freshwater availability anomalies and outbreak of internal war: results from a global spatial time series analysis”. human security and climate change: an international workshop, oslo, norway, june 21-23. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 4 geospatial extent of conflict should reduce the likelihood of the erroneous inclusion of non-conflict regions with those in conflict. such an improvement in accuracy would further clarify the spatial variation within countries, increasing the precision with which the effect of determinants, or, in our case, of freshwater availability, on civil war onset can be examined. this brings us to our hypotheses: h1: increasing the level of spatial resolution of the geographic delineation of conflict data should produce stronger correlations in the analysis of freshwater availability as a determinant of civil war onset; h2: there should remain a strong correlation between rainfall deviations below baseline levels and the likelihood of falling into high-intensity conflict despite this change in resolution. data: for comparison with the previous quantitative analysis using circular conflict zones, this study similarly involves the geospatial statistics developed from spatially and temporally harmonized datasets. we utilize the aforementioned water and climate archives from the iri in order to produce spatial indicators of water stress. data is available in monthly increments for the period covering 1979 onwards. since the likelihood of conflict is expected to increase during the year following instances of water scarcity, the rainfall data is lagged by one year. therefore, our analysis on the effect of rainfall anomalies on internal war onset includes instances of internal armed conflict from 1980 onwards. conflict data: the analysis uses the prio database to identify the internal wars in africa for the period studied. however, we utilize the spatially explicit dataset developed by buhaug and rød, which delineates conflicts into irregular polygons (see figure 1, below), instead of the circular, centroid-radius conflict zones. we mapped these onto a 0.25-degree resolution raster grid version of esri’s digital chart of the world using gis. we then applied a 0.25degree fishnet over the conflict data and merged the two: this process allows us to organize the continent of africa by grid-year and assign each an outbreak variable, set to 1 in the grid cells corresponding to conflict zones and 0 to those without conflict. since this study focuses on instances of conflict outbreak, grid-years applying an ongoing conflict in years subsequent to the outbreak year were censored out of the analysis and thus set to missing in the database. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 5 figure 1: instances of high-intensity internal conflict, africa, 1980-2002 figure 2: converting the 1980-1983 south africa (namibia) conflict polygons to conflict grids, using a 0.25-degree fishnet consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 6 since the analysis of level-3 conflicts listed in the prio database produced the most noteworthy results in the previous study by levy et al., we have limited analysis to these: percent of territory coded as outbreak grid location start year end year circles polygons south africa (namibia) 1980 1988 74.5 60.2 uganda 1981 1991 93.7 100.0 sudan 1983 1992 58.1 31.3 somalia 1989 1992 98.9 100.0 angola 1990 1994 3.3 26.5 chad 1990 1990 26.0 16.4 liberia 1990 1990 100.0 100.0 rwanda 1991 1992 66.7 48.5 algeria 1993 2001 29.4 31.2 zaire (congo) 1997 1997 98.1 76.1 angola 1998 1998 58.0 60.9 burundi 1998 1998 83.3 100.0 guinea-bissau 1998 1998 27.9 28.6 rwanda 1998 1998 100.0 100.0 sierra leone 1998 1999 82.7 100.0 figure 3: conflicts included in the analysis20 demographic data: demographic data is often unreliable due to the lack of resources, quality control, and the referencing of spatial and temporal resolution. however, processed datasets such as ciesin’s gridded population of the world (gpw) allow for the overcoming of such shortcomings in data. currently in its third version, the dataset is comprised of explicitly georeferenced population estimates for over 350,000 subnational units. the data is based upon standard gis gridding algorithms that produce population estimates at a resolution of 2.5 minutes in both latitude and longitude21. 20 note that the uganda (1979), mozambique (1981-1992), chad − libya (1987), south africa (1989-1993), congo-brazzaville (1997), and ethiopia − eritrea (1998-2000) conflicts included in the previous study were omitted from the analysis, as these were not present in the buhaug and rød dataset. 21 balk, d., f. pozzi, g. yetman, a. nelson, and u. deichmann. (2004). “methodologies to improve global population estimates in urban and rural areas”. annual meetings of the population association of america, boston, ma, march-april. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 7 rainfall data: we assess rainfall variation using the weighted anomaly standardized precipitation (wasp) index22. the wasp index measures the monthly difference between observed rainfall and average values over the period 19802002, weighing monthly anomalies to the average monthly rainfall’s fraction of annual rainfall: ! wasp n = 1 " wasp n • p i # p i " i $ % & ' ( ) i=1 n * p i p a ! where p a = avg. total annual percipitation p i = observed monthly precipitation in the i th month in the sum p i = climatological avg. value for the i th month p i p a = avg. monthly fraction of annual precipitation " i = standard deviation of anomalies of monthly precipitation we utilized yearly totals of the monthly wasp indices so as to render the measures of rainfall variation compatible with the annual conflict data. methodology: in order to facilitate the comparison with the previous study using by levy et al., we apply the scripts for the logistic regression model used in this previous study upon both the circular and polygonal conflict zones. we used the grid cell as the unit of analysis and conflict outbreak as the dependent variable. as mentioned earlier, gridyears for ongoing conflict were censored from the analysis. as in the previous study, we implement a simplified version of the political instability task force model, which encompasses measures of infant mortality rates, trade openness, and perceived levels of democracy (also known as polity)23. in accordance with the model, values for infant mortality rates and trade openness are relative to the world means, while the polity measure is a binary variable set to 1 for polity scores in the intermediate range between -5 and 7. each variable uses the country as the unit of measurement but is implemented at the grid-cell for the purposes of the statistical analysis. the analysis also uses grid-cell population as a control variable. previous studies, such as that performed by fearon and laitin, have confirmed that population has a direct causal relationship to the probability of civil war24. this is particularly important when dealing with sub-national units of analysis, because population varies drastically within a given country, and conflict is largely unlikely in relatively uninhabited areas. ciesin’s gpw dataset was used for these purposes. however, since time series data was not available, we use the dataset’s population count for the year 2000 throughout the analysis. 22 lyon, b. and a.g. barnston. (2005). “enso and the spatial extent of interannual precipitation extremes in tropical land areas”. journal of climate, 18 (23): 5095-5109. 23 esty, d.c., j.a. goldstone, t.r. gurr, p.t. surko, a.n. unger, and r.s. chen. (1998). “the state failure project: early warning research for us foreign policy planning”. j.l. davies and t.r. gurr (eds). preventive measures: building risk assessment and crisis early warning systems. boulder, co: rowman and littlefield. 24 fearon, j.d. and d.d. laitin. (2003). “ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war”. the american political science review, 97 (1): 75-90. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 8 results: centroid-radius irregular polygon variables coefficient s.e. significance coefficient s.e. significance infant mortality 0.154 0.011 0.000 0.429 0.012 0.000 trade openness -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.260 polity -5 to 7 0.509 0.022 0.000 0.331 0.027 0.000 rainfall deviations -0.053 0.001 0.000 -0.037 0.001 0.000 population (natural log) 1.84 0.050 0.000 2.252 0.076 0.000 population (squared) -0.099 0.003 0.000 -0.127 0.004 0.000 constant -12.892 0.211 0.000 -15.622 0.316 0.000 figure 4: logistic regression results for varying conflict data resolutions, with the outbreak of high-intensity conflict as the dependent variable and all independent variables lagged one year the results of the logistic regression show no drastic difference in correlation coefficient between highintensity conflict and the independent variables, as seen in figure 4 above. both analyses show a strong relationship between rainfall deviations below baseline levels and the likelihood of high-intensity conflict outbreak the following year. the other variables assessed under the political instability task force model show similarly strong correlations, with significances at the 0.001 level, with the exception of trade openness when using irregular polygons as the conflict zones. however, a difference is seen in the magnitude of the coefficients. apart from the similar natures of the correlations (positive or negative), there seems to be no pattern that determines which level of data resolution produces the coefficient of a higher magnitude. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 9 figure 5: conflict polygons juxtaposed over total weighted anomaly standardized precipitation (wasp) indices for preceding year uganda (1981-1991) sudan (1983-1992) somalia (1989-1992) angola (1990-1994) chad (1990) liberia (1990) consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 10 rwanda (1991-1992) algeria (1993-2001) zaire (1997) angola (1998) burundi (1998) guinea-bissau (1998) consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 11 rwanda (1998) sierra leone (1998-1999) discussion: looking at figure 4, it is apparent that the difference in conflict data resolution has some effect on the outcome of the logistic regression analysis, though the nature of this effect remains unclear. this raises the question of whether it is worth obtaining more precise conflict data when studying civil war. however, the lack of a clear pattern may be due to the fact that, while the conflict data is indeed more precise, much of the other data remains coarse. for example, the wasp data remains at a lower resolution of 2.5 degrees, the population data was not part of a time series, and factors under the political instability task force model were measured only to a national level. moreover, since sparsely populated areas are highly unlikely to reach the 1000 battle-related deaths required for a region to be classified as being in high intensity conflict, these regions would not be marked as conflict zones in the analysis, virtually by default. thus, the inclusion of population measures within the regression analysis may have distorted the results. finally, when examining the spatial differences between the two datasets, there seems to be less of a difference than would be expected. this is particularly true for uganda (1981-1991), somalia (1989-1992), liberia (1990), burundi (1998), rwanda (1998-1999), and sierra leone (1998-1999), a group that amount to a third of the conflicts in the dataset, where the presumably higher-resolution conflict polygons essentially occupy the entire country. when taking these cases into account, we are left to question the ability, and perhaps the need, to create such clear-cut boundaries of conflict beyond the precision of the general areas of conflict indicated by the centroids and approximate buffer zones, since the economic impacts of drought would clearly be felt in geographically disparate regions due to the nature of trade. conclusion: despite a lack of significant difference between the coefficients produced by the logistic regression analyses using irregular polygon and centroid-radius geospatial delineations of the instances of internal conflict in question, we find a consistently strong correlation between rainfall deviations below baseline levels and the likelihood of falling into high-intensity conflict; we therefore reject h1 and accept h2. although the effect of an improvement in spatial consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 12 resolution of conflict data may not be apparent, further progress will require the use of data of equally improved resolutions, not only in conflict data, but also in the other variables included in the regression analysis, most notably in freshwater availability. further insight may be gained by examining the regional factors of the areas included in the centroid-radius delineations but not in the polygons, and, in particular, what these regions excluded in the higher resolution conflict data have in common. one possibility is that these regions are sparsely populated, which could, as mentioned earlier, alter the outcome of the analysis. finally, one major hindrance to the breadth of this study was the availability of wasp data, which limited the study to a mere 15 conflicts. if more data were available, a more robust statistical analysis could be performed, not only increasing the statistical strength of the study, but also raising the interesting question of regional differences in the various causal factors surrounding civil war onset. thus, this study highlights the need for further rigorous studies employing the latest statistical and geospatial tools available, in order to identify the determinants of the outbreak of armed conflict with increased confidence. such work would have implications on policy, potentially prompting individuals and organizations on both the international and domestic levels to prioritize threats and to take measures in order to avert conflict outbreak. as previously elucidated, poverty can decrease the opportunity costs of rebellion by reducing the return from peaceful economic activities; this increases the relative rates of return from rebellion, which would, in turn, threaten the region’s security. given that limited freshwater availability aggravates poverty, global climate change, and the consequent changes in rainfall distribution pose a threat to developing nations’ security. since many of these nations do not have the economic nor technological means by which to withstand the effects of climate change, it is necessary for developed nations to begin assisting developing nations to develop infrastructure for the sustainable management of water resources. for such action to be taken, studies using data of higher resolution are therefore vital, so that the determinants of conflict outbreak can be further isolated, and so that regions facing the largest threats can be identified. acknowledgements i would like to express my sincere gratitude for my mentor marc levy, without whom i would not have been able to undertake this project; i would also like to thank malanding jaiteh, maria muñiz, catherine thorkelson, and gregory yetman for their invaluable advice throughout. references: balk, d., f. pozzi, g. yetman, a. nelson, and u. deichmann. (2004). “methodologies to improve global population estimates in urban and rural areas”. annual meetings of the population association of america, boston, ma, march-april. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 13 buhaug, h. (2007). “ucdp/prio intrastate conflict onset dataset, 1946-2006”. international peace research institute, oslo. retrieved december 25, 2007 from http://new.prio.no/cscw-datasets/data-on-armedconflict/uppsalaprio-armed-conflicts-dataset/armed-conflicts-version-4-2007. buhaug, h. and j.k. rød. (2006). “local determinants of african civil wars, 1970-2001”. political geography, 25 (3): 315-335. collier, p. and a. hoeffler. (2004). “greed and grievance in civil war”. oxford economic papers, 56 (4): 563-595. de soysa, i. (2002). “ecoviolence: shrinking pie, or honey pot?”. global environmental politics, 2 (4): 1-34. esty, d.c., j.a. goldstone, t.r. gurr, p.t. surko, a.n. unger, and r.s. chen. (1998). “the state failure project: early warning research for us foreign policy planning”. j.l. davies and t.r. gurr (eds). preventive measures: building risk assessment and crisis early warning systems. boulder, co: rowman and littlefield. fearon, j.d. and d.d. laitin. (2003). “ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war”. the american political science review, 97 (1): 75-90. gleditsch, n.p., p. wallensteen, m. eriksson, m. sollenberg, and h. strand. (2002). “armed conflict 1946-2001: a new dataset”. journal of peace research, 39 (5): 615-637. hauge, w. and ellingsen, t. (1998). “beyond environmental scarcity: causal pathways to conflict”. journal of peace research, 35 (3): 299-317. homer-dixon, t.f. (1994). “environmental scarcities and violent conflict: evidence from cases”. international security, 19 (1): 5-40. ________________. (1999). environment, scarcity, and violence. princeton, nj: princeton university press. levy, m.a., c. thorkelson, c. vörösmarty, e. douglas, and m. humphreys. (2005). “freshwater availability anomalies and outbreak of internal war: results from a global spatial time series analysis”. human security and climate change: an international workshop, oslo, norway, june 21-23. lyon, b. and a.g. barnston. (2005). “enso and the spatial extent of interannual precipitation extremes in tropical land areas”. journal of climate, 18 (23): 5095-5109. miguel, e., s. satyanath, and e. sergenti. (2004). “economic shocks and civil conflict: an instrumental variables approach”. journal of political economy, 112 (4): 723-753. sambanis, n. (2002). “a review of recent advances and future directions in the quantitative literature on civil war”. defence and peace economics, 13 (3): 215-243. united nations environment programme. (2007) “sudan: post-conflict environmental assessment”. retrieved on december 25, 2007 from http:// postconflict.unep.ch/ publications/unep_sudan_synthesis_e.pdf. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 18, iss. 1 (2018), pp. 58–68 mitigating the effects of transport infrastructure development on ecosystems carleigh ghent carleigh ghent graduated from the global field program at miami university with her ma in biology in december 2017. throughout her time in the program, she studied the intersection of public health and conservation. ghentcc@miamioh.edu abstract transport infrastructure is one of the most important ways to help a country drive economic growth and alleviate poverty, but it can also have devastating effects on the surrounding ecosystems and wildlife. habitat fragmentation and degradation, vehicle-wildlife collisions, population and genetic isolation, and loss of ecosystem services are just some of the effects roads can have on ecosystems and wildlife. this synthesis paper seeks to explore these effects and look at different ways to mitigate them to help restore ecosystems and the services they provide. some ways to mitigate these effects include green infrastructure, corridors, and wildlife crossings. green infrastructure provides more natural or semi-natural space for various ecosystem services, wildlife, and humans. corridors connect the natural spaces created by green infrastructure and protected areas and allow movement of wildlife between these areas. wildlife crossings can be overpasses or underpasses that lessen the barrier effects of transport infrastructure. collaboration between multiple sectors, including governments, policy makers, transport infrastructure planners, ecologists, and geographers, is needed to create successful and both sustainable transportation networks and green infrastructure that support ecosystem services and functions. keywords: transport infrastructure, development, ecosystem services, green infrastructure, corridors, wildlife crossings. mailto:ghentcc@miamioh.edu consilience ghent: mitigating transport infrastructure mitigating the effects of transport infrastructure development on ecosystems infrastructure provides the basic framework for moving goods and providing services such as energy, housing, healthcare, and education—essential components for the economic and societal health of a nation (skorobogatova & kuzminamerlino, 2017). transport infrastructure, such as road and rail, is a key element that stimulates the growth of modern economies, can ameliorate the health of citizens (mandle et al, 2015), and reinforces social and cultural relations within and between nations (gornig, michelsen, & van deuverden, 2015, skorobogatova & kuzminamerlino, 2017). however, these benefits to development often come at a cost to the environment (reid & sousa, 2005, beben, 2012), as interaction between transport infrastructure and the surrounding landscape is inevitable, and most likely negative (coffin, 2007). roads can have adverse effects on biodiversity (polak, 2014) by increasing wildlife mortality from collisions (coffin, 2007), fragmenting and degrading habitat (karlson, mortberg, & balfors, 2014), and creating barriers to wildlife movement and migration (van der grift et al, 2013). this can have long-term effects, including evolutionary changes in wildlife populations (brady & richardson, 2017), the introduction of invasive species (angelstam et al, 2017), and the loss of ecosystem services to surrounding communities (mandle et al, 2015). ecosystem services are “the capacity of natural processes and components to provide goods and services that satisfy human needs, directly or indirectly” (de groots, wilson, & boumans, 2002). as the human population continues to increase, more transportation infrastructure will become necessary, increasing the negative impact on ecosystems unless informed action is taken (polak, rhodes, jones, & possingham, 2014). to ameliorate this, infrastructure construction must evaluate impacts from many different angles. one example is this is road ecology, which investigates through ecological, geographical, engineering, and planning lenses the impact of roads upon the surrounding ecosystems (coffin, 2007). this paper seeks to present ways in which the negative effects of transport infrastructure, mainly roads, on ecosystems can be lessened. the paper first looks at why transport infrastructure is important to the development of countries. the next section lays out the effects of transport infrastructure on the surrounding ecosystems. we then explore how these effects can be mitigated through green infrastructure, corridors, and wildlife crossings. finally, this paper emphasizes that collaboration between multiple sectors is the key to successful mitigation of the effects of transport infrastructure on ecosystems. need for infrastructure in development often considered a prerequisite for economic growth in developing countries (arima 2016), advancing transport infrastructure can facilitate the growth of urban centers, agricultural and industrial sectors (skorobogatova & kuzmina-merlino, 60 consilience 2017), and international trade (hopcraft, bigurube, lembeli, & borner, 2015). by 2050, while much of the world’s population will inhibit urban areas, anywhere from 45-50% of populations will still reside in rural homes, especially in poorer nations (chinowsky, schweikert, strzepek, & strzepek, 2015). often, a lack of connection to urban areas is a driver of poverty. reliable transport infrastructure can help alleviate rural poverty by offering access to services such as healthcare, education, and food and water supply networks (chinowsky et al, 2015). in 2008, only 25% of roads in sub-saharan africa were paved, compared to 67% of north american roads (chinowsky et al, 2015). while more research is necessary, the drastic difference in average life expectancy between the two regions (world health organization, 2016) indicates a relationship between paved roads and public health. the improvement of transport infrastructure such as useable roads can help ease poverty, increase citizen well-being, and act as a catalyst for economic development (hopcraft et al., 2015). impact of infrastructure on ecological systems while public well-being and economic growth are important, maintaining healthy ecosystems is a vital factor to potential development and growth. these can reduce risk of flooding and landslides (mandle et al, 2015) and provide ecosystem services, such as clean water, food, and income from tourist economies (hopcraft et al, 2015). ecosystem services (es) as defined by coutts and hahn (2015) “are the benefits that humans obtain from ecosystems.” it can be broken down into four categories: 1. regulation functions, such as water and soil regulation; 2. habitat functions, such as suitable living spaces for animals and plants; 3. production functions, such as providing food and raw materials; and 4. information functions, such as aesthetics and recreation (de groot et al, 2002). ignoring ecosystem services during the development of infrastructure can lead to more negative impacts than anticipated, and the benefits may not live up to estimated standards (mandle et al, 2015). roads can be very important to national development, especially in poorer nations, but they also contribute to ecosystem degradation and habitat fragmentation, which can reduce or even eliminate the populations of certain species in the area (mandle et al, 2015, snȁll, lehtomaki, arponen, elith, & moilanen, 2016). the construction and maintenance of transport infrastructure is one of the most significant drivers of deforestation, which in turn negatively impacts biodiversity and carbon sequestration (particularly tropical forests) (arima, 2016). additionally, developing new roads that interfere with existing ecosystems could have a devastating impact on the economy of a country through loss of tourism (hopcraft consilience ghent: mitigating transport infrastructure et al, 2015). for example, tourist revenue from the serengeti-ngorongoro ecosystem in tanzania, a protected area famous for its annual wildebeest migration, brings in over 100 million usd each year (hopcraft et al, 2015). a road such as the proposed serengeti route would bisect the area of wildebeest migration and disrupt the ecosystem. degradation of this area would reduce tourist economies and foreign capital which, in turn, would have huge repercussions for tanzania’s economy and those who rely on the ecosystem resources (hopcraft et al, 2015). globally, road network length is expected to increase 60% by 2050 (mandle et al, 2015). of all types of infrastructure, roads inflict the most damage on surrounding ecosystems (reid & sousa, 2005). this ranges from the fragmentation, degradation, and loss of habitat (clauzel, xiqing, gongsheng, giraudoux, & li, 2015) to increased mortality rates due to vehicle-wildlife collisions (coffin, 2007) to noise disturbances, pollution, chemical contamination (ogden, 2012), and runoff contamination (brady & richardson, 2017) to barriers to wildlife movement and migration (van der grift et al, 2013) and the spread of invasive species (herzog, 2016) to an increased human carbon footprint (angelstam et al, 2017) to population and genetic isolation (beben, 2012) and loss of biodiversity (karlson et al, 2014). habitat fragmentation, generally caused by the construction process and the resulting physical barriers to movement, is a major threat to species, leading to isolation of populations and gene flow restrictions (clauzel et al, 2015). these effects persist even after the infrastructure is in place (karlson et al, 2014). paved roads become a predictor of deforestation in the peruvian amazon, one of the most biodiverse areas in the world, by making surrounding zones more accessible; proposed transportation projects could cause an anticipated 1.8 million hectares of deforestation (arima, 2016, reid & sousa, 2005). this damage should be considered while planning such projects in order to minimize these effects (beben, 2012). one example of this is the national environmental policy act in the united states, which currently mandates that agencies develop environmental impact statements during project proposals. in its 1990 environmental policy statement, the u.s. federal highway administration also recognized the importance of ecological assessment (southerland, 1994). while this is a good step forward, it is one of only a few exceptions. more commonly, the failure to consider ecosystem services and the effects of infrastructure on surrounding ecosystems creates disastrous results: eliminating native ecosystems, contributing to floods and landslides, increasing pollution, and creating urban heat islands (herzog, 2016). when a coastal road, the clenagabarranquilla highway, was built in columbia, the importance of mangroves was not considered. this resulted in a highway being exposed to erosion, a decline in certain fish populations, and increased poverty among villagers reliant upon fishing (mandle et al, 2015). both society and nature can benefit from infrastructure that is developed with an understanding of the services that ecosystems provide to the affected region. 62 consilience balancing infrastructure and ecosystems green infrastructure green infrastructure (gi) refers to natural or semi-natural areas that are strategically planned to lessen the environmental burden of development (capotorti, del vico, anzellotti, & celesti-grapow, 2017) and provide ecosystem services, such as new habitats, flood management, temperature reduction, and cleaner air and water (tayouga & gagne, 2016). urban areas use gi, such as public parks and green spaces, to counteract the loss of intact natural habitats, reduce urban heat islands, and promote biodiversity and species movement (garmendia, apostolopoulou, adams, & bormpoudakis, 2016, kasada et al, 2017). gi can also help maintain and restore ecosystems by giving land developers the tools to balance infrastructure and wildlife habitat conservation (snȁll et al., 2016, garmendia et al., 2016). other gi benefits include water management and regulation (herzog, 2016), climate change mitigation, and improvements in public health and well-being (garmendia et al, 2016). the main goal of gi in the united states is to improve watershed quality, which provides many ecosystem services. one of the most common barriers to implementing gi policy is the difficulty of convincing private landowners to comply (dhakal & chevalier, 2017). to counter this, the gi website of the environmental protection agency (epa) has information on implementing policy for and overcoming barriers to green infrastructure (united states environmental protection agency, 2017). some u.s. cities have already started using it on public land to help restore ecosystem services that have been depleted by urban density and infrastructure (snȁll et al, 2016). in portland, oregon, gi was implemented to help divert storm-water and to improve watershed functions (shandas, 2015). this has been realized extensively through the tabor to river program, which includes planting 3500 trees and creating an extensive network of 500 vegetated storm-water facilities to ameliorate the impermeability of roads and subsequent runoff (shandas, 2015). gi initiatives in u.s. urban centers such as portland have improved watershed stability, increased biodiversity, and provided various ecosystem services such as improvement in air quality and noise reduction (herzog, 2016). green infrastructure, which can be as small as an isolated tree or as large as a forest (capotorti et al, 2017), is only effective if properly planned and maintained (snȁll et al, 2016). its aim is to reestablish socio-ecological services and functions (herzog, 2016); therefore, when planning for green infrastructure, data on distribution of species, habitat types, ecosystem services, and land-use patterns must be taken into account. an analysis of the trade-offs should also be considered (snȁll et al, 2016). gi deterioration, caused by increased land use or ineffective management, negates its initial benefits (angelstam et al, 2017). new transport infrastructure should try not to interfere with current green infrastructure initiatives consilience ghent: mitigating transport infrastructure that allow for increased ecosystem services to humans as well as benefits to wildlife (angelstam et al, 2017). corridors one of the most common ways to implement green infrastructure is with corridors (snȁll et al, 2016). as defined by van de perre, adriaensen, songorwa, and leirs (2014), a wildlife corridor is “an unprotected area between two or more protected areas either (i) through which animals are known or believed to move, (ii) that are connected by (or can potentially be reconnected by) natural vegetation, or (iii) both (i) and (ii) together.” wildlife corridors are frequently used to connect green infrastructure and protected areas (snȁll et al, 2016) to help mitigate the effects of habitat fragmentation from transport infrastructure (coffin, 2007). increasing functional movement between protected areas mitigates the effects of climate change on vulnerable species, helps conserve biodiversity, and maintains ecosystem services (karlson et al, 2014). corridors should be planned to overcome the barrier effect of nearby transport infrastructure (karlson et al, 2014), to be useful for a majority of local species (garmendia et al, 2016), and to account for range distribution changes due to climate change (snȁll et al, 2016). corridors can maintain or expand gene pool flow, help facilitate movement, and provide habitat for range shifts, as well as enable other processes that require large spaces (snȁll et al, 2016). unfortunately, new roads are breaking up wildlife corridors worldwide, creating ecological islands of isolated populations in protected areas and affecting genetic diversity (van de perre et al, 2014, beben, 2012). to counter this problematic trend, u.s. representative don beyer, jr (dva) introduced the wildlife corridors conservation act of in december 2016 (hr6448), which would promote the creation of corridors with a national wildlife corridors system to protect and restore native wildlife and plants (wildlands network, 2017). as of december 2017, the bill is still in the subcommittee on conservation and forestry (library of congress, 2016). similarly, in ukraine there is a plan in place to increase forest coverage, but the rate of habitat gain has been deemed far too low to have a discernable effect (angelstam et al, 2017). while the creation of corridors after the building of infrastructure is beneficial, natural corridors that are kept intact while building infrastructure seem to have a bigger and more positive effect on species movement (snȁll et al, 2016). 64 consilience corridors allow development to occur while addressing conservation needs (rovero & jones, 2012). however, the relative success of corridors should not blind governments or policy makers into thinking we no longer need to protect larger reserves or that we should move our attention away from managing ecosystems as a whole (snȁll et al, 2016). wildlife crossings and fences wildlife crossings are another way to mitigate the effects of new roads on local species, and they are particularly good at aiding efforts to reduce habitat fragmentation. these crossing structures can be either underpasses – including tunnels, pipes, or even drainage culverts (karlson et al, 2014) – or overpasses – such as land or rope bridges (van der grift et al, 2013). they are being globally developed and utilized, including underpasses for various populations in the roztocze hills in poland (angelstam et al, 2017) and canadian overpasses for grizzlies in banff national park (ogden, 2012). well-designed overand under-passes can be used by many species (karlson et al, 2014), although it is not always a one size fits all scenario (ogden, 2012). there are key factors to the design of the wildlife crossing that can improve its viability. these include location, size, openness, habitat cover, and fencing (ogden, 2012). smaller animals may need more frequent crossings than larger animals, and it may take some time for the crossings to be used, as in banff national park, where it took grizzlies five to six years to start using the overpasses (ogden, 2012). polak et al. (2014), van der grift et al. (2013), and beben (2012) all agree that wildlife crossings are most effective when they are paired with fences, although it can be difficult due to the cost of fences, the impact on landscape aesthetics, and the potential for it to cross onto private land (huijser et al, 2016). it is the combination of wildlife crossings and fences that helps create protected and connected habitats which allow the migration of species over long distances (beben, 2012). fences along the road help keep wildlife from trying to cross, therefore reducing mortality, and can also help guide animals to use the wildlife crossings, which can encourage movement of populations and gene flow (polak et al, 2014). wildlife crossings and fences also help maintain a steady traffic flow, which is beneficial for humans by making the roadway safer, reducing vehicle-wildlife collisions, and decreasing property damage caused by these collisions (van der grift et al, 2013). working together mitigating the effects of transport infrastructure on ecosystems must be a collaborative effort. many different sectors, including governments, transport infrastructure planners, policy makers, ecologists, geographers, must come together to ensure that all the needs of both ecosystems and human communities are met. road ecology, for example, is the investigation of the impact of roads upon the consilience ghent: mitigating transport infrastructure surrounding ecosystems. to understand the multifaceted and complex issues, this discipline uses multiple lenses including ecological, geographical, engineering, and planning, among others (coffin, 2007). one of the main problems that prevents the effective implementation of green infrastructure is the knowledge gap regarding ecosystem services and biodiversity. this can be clearly observed in many transport infrastructure planning situations (angelstam et al, 2017). data showing the benefits of green infrastructure to humans and ecosystems, however, can provide key knowledge and can bolster support from other parties, including community members and decision makers (lovell & taylor, 2013). to be sustainable in the long term, transport infrastructure and gi planning should be collaborative, strategic, dynamic, and adaptive (herzog, 2016). conclusion while building infrastructure is vital to economic development and poverty alleviation, the benefits of natural ecosystems to both the economy of a country and the well-being of its citizens should not be forgotten. using green infrastructure during development can maintain and support the services provided by a specific ecosystem (coutts & hahn, 2015). wildlife corridors are necessary to connect protected land areas, and wildlife crossings and fences can help connect fragmented habitats. while there are ways to mitigate the negative effects of roads on ecosystems after they are built, a proactive approach that preserves natural corridors will help with long-term sustainability of the transport infrastructure and the ecosystem services of an ecosystem. successful and sustainable projects require collaboration between governments, policy makers, infrastructure planners, ecologists, and the community. there are ways to balance human needs and ecosystem needs when it comes to building infrastructure, especially roads. it may not be easy, but unless we want to continue to be affected the negative impacts of roads on ecosystems and wildlife, we need to take informed action now. acknowledgements i would like to thank amanda bentley brymer, amy owens, kelsey stone, and all of my colleagues in the profession media workshop course who took time to read and give feedback on my paper. this work was conducted as part of graduate work through project dragonfly at miami university in oxford, ohio. this research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. 66 consilience references angelstam, p., khaulyak, o., yamelynets, t., mozgeris, g., naumov, v., chmielewski, t.j., elbakidze, m., manton, m., prots, b., & valasiuk, s. 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(2016). life expectancy at birth. retrieved may 31, 2016, from http://gamapserver.who.int/gho/interactive_charts/mbd/life_expectancy/a tlas.html http://gamapserver.who.int/gho/interactive_charts/mbd/life_expectancy/atlas.html http://gamapserver.who.int/gho/interactive_charts/mbd/life_expectancy/atlas.html consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 5, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 168-175 development for tibetans, but by whom? diana jue department of urban studies and planning, international development group massachusetts institute of technology, cambridge, ma dmjue@mit.edu keywords: tibet, china, development, design. 1. introduction: tibetans in china in addition to the han majority, the people‟s republic of china officially recognizes 55 ethnic minority groups within its borders. the degree to which minorities have been incorporated into the national mainstream community varies widely from group to group, with some demonstrating considerable resentment against the ethnic majority. most notable are the turkic muslim uyghurs, who made international headlines in july 2009 for the urumqi riots; the hui in hunan province, where unrest broke out in 2004; and, of course, the tibetans, whose high-profile protests were in to the spotlight in the months preceding the 2008 olympic games in beijing. the tibet-china conflict is one of the most polarized disputes in which china is currently embroiled. at the core of this debate is tibet‟s status as either an autonomous region of the people‟s republic of china or an independent country. the chinese leadership is staunchly against the “legitimate and meaningful autonomy” demanded by the dalai lama (bbc news, 2009); the dalai lama has also been labeled as a “separatist” by china‟s president hu jintao but maintains that he does not want to separate tibet from china (mazumdar 2010). additionally, discontent among tibetans is not limited to those residing in the tibet autonomous region (tar). a majority of the 6.5 million ethnic tibetans live in the neighboring provinces of sichuan, gansu, yunnan, and qinghai, where discontent among tibetans is also pervasive. dissatisfaction dates back 50 years to the failed 1959 lhasa uprising against the invading chinese army. the violent demonstration resulted in the dalai lama‟s escape to dharamsala, india, where the tibetan government in exile is now based. the most recent large-scale tibetan uprising began as a commemoration of this flight. the tibetan unrest in 2008 (also known as the 3•14 riots) started in the lhasa but spread to tibetan buddhist monasteries outside the tar. the tibetans‟ struggle extends beyond political and ethnic tensions. according to census data from 2000, tibetans have the highest illiteracy rate of any ethnic group in china with a population of over 500,000. the illiteracy rate among tibetans, 47.55%, is five times greater than china‟s national average illiteracy rate, 9.08%(congressional-executive commission on china, 2005). this is partly due to consilience jue: development for tibetans, but by whom? lack of access to a bilingual tibetan-mandarin chinese education system. primary school is the only educational level for which tibetans are comparable with the national average. han migrants in culturally tibetan areas graduate from universities at more than three times the tibetan rate and from senior middle school at five times the tibetan rate (congressional-executive commission on china, 2005). this makes competing for employment and economic benefits vastly more arduous for tibetans. tibetans‟ low levels of education contribute significantly to their slow economic and social progress. in 2004, the annual per-capita income of tibetan farmers and herdsmen was 1,861 chinese renminbi ($225 us dollars), and the disposable income of urban tibetans was 8,200 chinese renminbi ($991 us dollars). according to the chinese national bureau of statistics, the tibetan autonomous region‟s 2009 gdp ranked 31st out of 31 province-level divisions and 28th in gdp per capita (national bureau of statistics, 2010). it also ranked lowest on the human development index in the same year (undp china, and renmin university of china, 2010). while both numbers are exceptionally low for national averages, the chinese government emphasizes that they are increasing at an accelerating rate (congressional-executive commission on china. 2005). due to tibet‟s suboptimal economic, social, and political situations, the chinese government, interested foreigners, and tibetans themselves have all put effort toward sustainable development. in this article i focus on both top-down policies instated by the national government and a number of grassroots efforts implemented by foreigners and tibetans. i learned about these citizens‟ organizations when i was in qinghai province, china in january 2009 with a mit team of undergraduate and graduate students. we attempted to implement villagelevel development projects, including water testing, air quality monitoring, energy usage surveying, and development worker training. our team operated in collaboration with nongovernmental organizations operating out of xining, the capital of qinghai province. i keep specific names and locations undisclosed to secure the privacy of tibetan friends and colleagues. 2. for tibetans, by china there have been a number of national policies implemented to benefit tibetans, including the great western development (gwd) program and the qinghai-tibet railroad. the gwd program was instated by china to increase the income of its less developed western regions, which have traditionally lagged behind since deng xiaoping‟s reform policies. major components of the gwd program include developing infrastructure, attracting foreign investment, increasing ecological protection (e.g. reforestation projects), promoting education, and retaining talent to prevent brain drain. the qinghai-tibet railroad is a high-altitude railway connecting xining, the capital of qinghai province to lhasa, the capital of the tibet autonomous region. one motivation for its construction was to increase the flow of industrial products and goods into tibet from more developed regions, thus benefiting the tar population. many tibetans believe that these policies and others exert additional pressure on tibetan culture and heritage because they attract han migrants to tibetan areas. in 2000, state ethnic affairs commission minister li dezhu wrote that a westward 170 consilience flow of ethnic han would be “in keeping with the execution of large-scale western development” (congressional-executive commission on china. 2005). tibetans‟ suspicions are exacerbated by the persecution of prominent tibetan religious leaders who are believed to have links to the dalai lama (congressional-executive commission on china. 2005). another policy that i had the opportunity to see the effects of in person is the resettlement of nomadic tibetans in the tar and adjacent ethnic tibetan areas of sichuan, gansu, and qinghai provinces. according to a june 2007 human rights watch report, “the chinese government has been implementing resettling, land confiscation, and fencing policies in pastoral areas inhabited primarily by tibetans, drastically curtailing their livelihood.” these efforts began in 2000 and have intensified considerably since 2003. required to move into newly built housing settlements or nearby towns, many tibetan herders have been forced to kill most of their livestock and abandon their traditional way of living. after moving to the resettlements, they are frequently unable to find jobs other than temporary or menial labor. this results from their inability to speak mandarin chinese, the lack of capital to start small businesses, the lack of skills training available on resettlements, and the inappropriateness of the newly resettled areas to their existing skill sets. additionally, while the state purports to act as an indefinite caretaker, promising shelter, food, and fuel, resettled populations need to get food and fuel from elsewhere (often relatives), the provided shelter is of poor quality, and healthcare and education are mostly difficult to access (shenk, 2009). the chinese government has justified the relocations of tibetan herders as necessary actions to protect the environment and to “develop,” “civilize,” and “modernize” china‟s western provinces. by concentrating tibetans closer to towns, they arguably would have better access to jobs, education, and medical services. however, authorities failed to consider what tibetans wanted and have not responded favorably to complaints. tibetans had no opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, and the reasons they are given for resettling were unclear. i visited a resettlement after spending time in a nomadic village near rebgong in qinghai province. with its rows of identical brick houses and small, fenced yards, the cramped resettlement area starkly contrasted with the pastoral village. per the government‟s demands, nomadic families had begun moving into their houses by sending family members to live in them. the resettlement was mostly empty and physically generic, providing little to no room for individual preference. it was difficult to imagine its becoming a livable community. considering these unlivable conditions, the policies of the chinese government are often thought to have indistinct motives. many tibetans are still suspicious of the tens of billions of dollars spent by the state in the name of development. according to tibetologist parvez dewan, coauthor of tibet: fifty years after with siddharth srivastava, “even the most massive infusions of funds have never been able to buy the affection of the people. you can‟t get rid of the alienation of a people through development” (mazumdar, 2010). 3. for tibetans, by foreigners consilience jue: development for tibetans, but by whom? global interest in tibetans is considerable, and the international media readily picks up tibet-china issues. events like the dalai lama‟s 1989 nobel peace prize, the tibetan uprising of 2008, and repeated reports of china‟s accelerating economic growth that is occurring at the cost of curtailed human rights have motivated the establishment of tibetan-aiding social development organizations. during my team‟s visit to qinghai province, one of the nation‟s poorest and most ethnically diverse provinces, we met with many foreigners working for the development of tibetans. in 2009, the province‟s gdp was only 108.1 billion chinese renminbi, ranking 30th out of 31 province-level administrative areas. its gdp per capita was 19,407 chinese renminbi, ranking 22nd (national bureau of statistics, 2010). the population is approximately 5.5 million, among which the han majority accounts for 54 percent. other ethnic groups include the tibetans (21 percent), tu, hui, salar, and mongols (national bureau of statistics, 2010). 3.1 the english training program groups working on development issues for qinghai‟s lowest income populations, usually ethnic minorities living in rural areas, include the sanchuan development association and the snowland service group. my team‟s main contacts in qinghai were directly associated with the english training program (etp), and four students served as our trilingual translators. etp was specifically designed to address the lack of high-level educational opportunities for tibetans by offering “innovative school practices that provide [minorities] with improved access to education and mainstream chinese society” (english training program, 2009). founded by americans in 1991, the program operates out of the nationalities department at qinghai normal university in xining, the capital of qinghai. etp‟s original goal was to use foreign teachers to train young tibetans to become english teachers in rural tibetan areas, thus addressing the lack of bilingual education. the program also teaches tibetan youth “to expose and mentor students in small-scale rural community development, to train students to be community activists, [and] to encourage students in the importance of cultural development work” (english training program, 2009). etp has accomplished the goal of offering a high-quality education to students who otherwise would have likely remained in low-quality middle schools and vocational training schools. nearly all of the students are from low-income rural households. for these students, one of etp‟s strongest draws is a full tuition scholarship, which make it possible for them to attend. most graduates are working in rural areas and others are working for or have worked for nonprofit development organizations, environmental protection agencies, and cultural preservation groups (english training program, 2009). students have traveled abroad and have returned to china to teach english at higher levels of education (yi, 2008). 3.2 one earth designs part of my team included members of one earth designs (oed), a nonprofit organization co-founded by a mit graduate. oed “serves as a catalyst for socially and environmentally minded innovation among himalayan…communities. 172 consilience acting as a conduit through which communities can access technical and business support, [it] unleash[es] the potential of modern design.” (one earth designs, 2010). current projects include solsource, a lightweight solar energy device that provides users with a low-cost a portable means of cooking, heating, and electricity generation, and heatsource, a product that captures and redistributes excess body heat. both products were made with the input from partners in the himalayan region. oed attempts to fill in the gaps existing in the development-oriented nongovernmental organization network by providing scientific analysis and designbased support, hosting web tools to connect communities with policy makers, and training for capacity building through workshops, school construction, and scientific and engineering curricula. it also plans to offer technical and financial support for developing sustainable businesses among local entrepreneurs–a method of development that few nonprofit organizations in the region have attempted. during our visit, oed members were engaged in a number of projects, including creating a water testing training video with local tibetan students, demonstrating and testing a solsource prototype, and surveying villagers about energy usage. the goal was to apply and transfer mit students‟ engineering and scientific know-how to local tibetan development workers so that projects can be carried out in the absence of oed members. 4. for tibetans, by tibetans an interesting consequence of etp is spin-off development work that begins as extracurricular activities. as part of their coursework, students are first exposed to development through a popular sustainable development class, which teaches students theories of development and practical steps for implementing smallscale projects. such projects include collecting tibetan handicrafts from a village to sell or delivering books to a village to make a library. there are also workshops for students to learn how to write project proposals that solicit donor funding. every small-scale development project is completely voluntary and student-initiated. according to the teacher, there are three main reasons for why students do projects. first, they want to follow in the footsteps of prior students, many of whom have established their own nongovernmental organizations. second, by reading case studies in the sustainable development class, they understand issues of poverty and are made aware of their own villages‟ needs. additionally, they can see the need for change, can envision a direction for change, and have been shown examples of how other people have helped. third, exceptional english speakers have goals to study abroad, and in order to earn scholarships they first need to demonstrate their societal contributions. spin-off organizations are another result of etp. one organization, imaging tibet, began as an extracurricular workshop that provided etp students with practical skills and technology to visually document their home villages. imaging tibet began in march 2007 by an etp teacher, but plans have been made to entrust it to etp graduates. program members have created a digital archive of hundreds of photographs that are divided into three broad fields: small-scale development (visual documentation of students‟ development projects), cultural preservation (using consilience jue: development for tibetans, but by whom? photography to preserve elements of tibetan communities‟ intangible heritage), and social documentary (small bodies of work describing life in rural tibetan communities). shem women‟s group helped set up our village visits. it describes itself as a group “dedicated to empowering tibetan women and their communities through grassroots development” and began in 2003 as an etp extracurricular course on gender studies (shem women‟s group, 2007). female etp students wanted to become involved with development projects, so a teacher began to meet with a group of women to teach a small-scale development course. now, members consist of female etp graduates and typically come from communities where they are the only females with more than a middle-school education. the shem women see themselves as strong female role models, which they hope will raise villager confidence in women‟s abilities and encourage villagers to value women‟s education. the organization offers sustainable development-related discussion groups, workshops, and training to female etp students. many of the development issues in communities are gender-related. women shoulder much of the burden caused by limited access to clean water, electricity, basic health care, and basic education. female etp students not only have first-hand knowledge of this life, but also can talk one-on-one with women in their communities, which is why their leadership is so crucial. etp graduates also return to their villages to advance their home community. my team had the opportunity to stay in one nomadic village where an etp graduate had recently reinvigorated the local primary school as the new principal. even at a young age, the young man had gained the respect of community elders and the local government. this etp graduate‟s desire to see improvement in his community and his connections to people who could help were invaluable resources. another etp graduate was on the brink of establishing his own nonprofit organization, with which he hoped to start small handicrafts businesses for people in his village. 5. conclusion: who should do the work? my trip to qinghai revealed the various layers of who is doing work to help the tibetan community. from talking to villagers and from accounts of development workers‟ experiences, i was able to gauge tibetans‟ receptivity toward different sources of development. most villagers i met continued to distrust the chinese government and welcomed foreigners with open arms, but often to the point of dependency. etp students i talked with told me that gaining respect was sometimes difficult, but if they could carry one project out successfully, they could gain their villagers‟ trust. compared to other development organizations run by foreigners, i have great respect for the english training program because it trains tibetans to help tibetans. this is unique in that foreigners themselves do not carry out development work in the tibetan villages, but rather encourage villagers to do so on their own through education. there are many advantages to this, with knowledge of the local culture and language being key. as natives, tibetans are more sensitive to what could be considered “good” changes and “bad” changes. these are cultural issues that 174 consilience foreign development workers most likely do not consider when implementing projects. the viewpoints held by etp graduates, who have straddled the worlds of their tibetan background and a western-style education, are beneficial in setting an appropriate mindset for development work. however, there are still some obstacles confronting the development workers trained by the english training program. they are well-trained in english, but they lack technical skills in engineering and business. it is in these areas where a lot of potentially beneficial work could be done for tibetans in an economically, environmentally, and socially sustainable fashion. for now, many of the etp student projects and the shem women‟s group are one-time ordeals that are donor-funded and require immense effort on behalf of the implementing development worker. it is in these gaps where organizations like one earth designs can play an important role by building the capacity of local tibetan development workers and introducing new technologies that are co-created with local users. this goes to show that any development work requires larger-scale collaboration across sectors, across skill-sets, and also, perhaps, across boundaries and cultures. consilience jue: development for tibetans, but by whom? bibliography bbc news. (2009, march 10). tibetan people „put through hell‟. bbc news. retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7933207.stm congressional-executive commission on china. (2005). 2005 annual report. retrieved from http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualrpt/annualrpt05/2005_6_tibet.php human rights watch. (2007). “no one has the liberty to refuse” – tibetan herders forcibly relocated in gansu, qinghai, sichuan, and the tibet autonomous region. retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/06/10/no-one-hasliberty-refuse english training program. (2009, january 9). school profile. unpublished internal document, nationalities department, qinghai normal university. mazumdar, sudip. (2010, january 27). course correction. newsweek. retrieved from http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/26/course-correction.html national bureau of statistics. (2000). 2000 population census of china. retrieved from http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/ one earth designs. (2010). about one earth designs. retrieved from http://www.oneearthdesigns.org/oedabout.html schenk, t.e.w. (2009). finding the higher ground: assessing contrasting approaches to planning for climate change induced resettlement. (masters thesis). retrieved from dspace@mit. (463621783) shem women‟s group. (2007). welcome to shem women’s group. retrieved from http://shemgroup.org/ undp chin and renmin university of china (2010). china human development report 2009/2010: china and a sustainable future – towards a low carbon economy & society. retrieved from http://www.undp.org.cn/pubs/nhdr/nhdr2010e.pdf yi, l. (2008). cultural exclusion in china: state education, social mobility, and cultural difference. new york: routledge. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7933207.stm http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualrpt/annualrpt05/2005_6_tibet.php http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/06/10/no-one-has-liberty-refuse http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/06/10/no-one-has-liberty-refuse http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/26/course-correction.html http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/ http://www.oneearthdesigns.org/oedabout.html http://shemgroup.org/ http://www.undp.org.cn/pubs/nhdr/nhdr2010e.pdf note from the editor in chief note from the editor in chief https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i5.4529 how to cite varman, m. (2011). note from the editor in chief. consilience, (5). https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i5.4529 abstract it is with great pleasure that i invite you to read the fifth issue of consilience: the journal of sustainable development. this issue marks another step in our endeavor to provide a platform for interdisciplinary dialogue among diverse, global actors on the topic of sustainable development. i would like to thank the editorial and managing boards of consilience, and lead senior editor vighnesh subramanyan in particular, for the dedication and passion with which they worked on selecting and editing pieces for the journal. this issue preserves and furthers the journal’s mission to further solutions-oriented, open access discourse through a balance of scholarly articles, opinion pieces, field notes, and photo essays. each piece in this issue challenges the reader to think more broadly, thoroughly, and analytically about sustainable development. as in our previous issues, we have pushed the boundaries of this incredibly complex concept, even going so far as to challenge the very paradigm itself, as author frances moore does in the opinion piece “toppling the tripod: sustainable development, constructive ambiguity, and the environmental challenge.” this issue features pieces by students, professors, practitioners, and researchers at highly prestigious research institutions across four continents. the content is incredibly diverse, with topics that include access to health care in india, the carbon footprint of google searches, procurement of clean burning stoves, community based nutrition procurement in kenya, and the centrality of the democratic process to the pursuit of development. i invite you to engage with the complex questions and challenges raised by our authors, and to bring your own, unique perspective and voice to the conversation. please feel free to comment on pieces online, attend our events, and explore our other content. consilience maintains a biweekly editorial column, and will be launching a blog shortly. the blog will act as a platform for more dynamic, time-sensitive coverage of news, events, and opinions in the sustainable development community. we invite you to contribute your reactions to the pieces in our journal to our blog. https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i5.4529 i am also excited to announce the launch of sense and sustainability, a podcast featuring interdisciplinary dialogue on research and policy in the field of sustainable development. it is hosted by jisung park, a graduate student studying economics and environmental policy as a rhodes scholar at oxford university. jisung is a former member of the editorial board of consilience, and graduated from columbia university in 2009. the podcast is a collaborative effort with consilience, and can be accessed from our website. in our ongoing effort to facilitate the exchange of information and perspectives, we have partnered with field actions science reports (facts), an open-access, peer reviewed journal of field actions at institut veolia environnement, to share content and scholarship. our partnerships and collaborations enable our authors and readers to share best practices and ideas with a wider audience. if you particularly enjoyed the field notes in this issue, i invite you to explore the case studies and field actions examined by facts. i hope you enjoy this issue of our journal, and invite you to contribute to the journal through comments, critique, feedback, or submissions at contact@consiliencejournal.org. yours sincerely, monica varman editor in chief consilience: the journal of sustainable development this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution 4.0 international license. http://factsreports.revues.org/index.html https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ note from the editor in chief ​​​ abstract consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 20, iss. 1 (2018), pp. 104–114 entrusting the future of rural society through nurturing civic pride: endeavors in gojome town, akita prefecture of japan dr. yasuko kusakari, dominique chiu, lillian muasa, kyoko takahashi, and dr. shogo kudo the authors of this work are involved in the graduate program in sustainability science global leadership initiative (gpss-gli) at the university of tokyo. yasuko.k@sustainability.k.u-tokyo.ac.jp; dominique.chiu@s.k.u-tokyo.ac.jp; muasa@s.k.u-tokyo.ac.jp; takahashikyoko@s.k.u-tokyo.ac.jp; kudo@edu.k.utokyo.ac.jp abstract this photo essay illustrates a study on endeavors in a rural japanese town with a declining population and discusses the future of rural society from a perspective of civic pride as well as sustainability. the population of the town of gojome, located in akita prefecture of northern japan, has halved from 20,025 in 1960 to 9,481 in 2015. depopulation is often perceived as a half-empty glass, but we approached our study with the view that it is half-full. we discuss the issue through appreciative approaches by adopting the concept of “civic pride” as an alternative lens based on our empirical survey. the methodology adopted for this field survey include individual interviews with 126 respondents (consisting of 79 residents of gojome and 47 individuals who were visiting the town) across different generations, 15 key informant interviews, drawings of their pride about the town by 34 sixthgraders of gojome elementary school, and observations. it was found that various generations of proud gojome locals and non-locals have started to proactively participate in the process of bettering the town through various social, cultural, economic, and environmental activities. based on our learning in gojome town we conclude that, in the wake of rural depopulation, nurturing “civic pride” could potentially contribute to rural sustainability through entrusting the future of rural society to next generations. author’s note rural depopulation, often perceived as a negative phenomenon, is believed to increase in the near future in various countries worldwide, with japan currently in the lead. as a group of graduate students from the university of tokyo’s graduate mailto:yasuko.k@sustainability.k.u-tokyo.ac.jp mailto:dominique.chiu@s.k.u-tokyo.ac.jp mailto:muasa@s.k.u-tokyo.ac.jp mailto:takahashikyoko@s.k.u-tokyo.ac.jp mailto:kudo@edu.k.u-tokyo.ac.jp mailto:kudo@edu.k.u-tokyo.ac.jp consilience kusakari et. al: rural sustainability and civic pride program in sustainability science global leadership initiative (gpss-gli), we traveled to akita prefecture in search of possible approaches to the challenges facing rural sustainability in aging societies. upon arrival in the town of gojome, we conducted our fieldwork from the 23rd to 30th of january 2016. presented in this article is a discussion of our research into the ongoing challenges to the sustainability of this aging japanese rural town and the potential of civic pride to address such challenges. inspired by the endeavors of gojome locals, we hope our findings will further support the future of rural sustainability in various regions around the world. keywords: rural depopulation, civic pride, sustainable development, rural sustainability, akita, japan 106 consilience context: gojome, depopulation and civic pride from washoku traditional japanese cuisine to shinkansen bullet trains, japan has been a world leader in culinary delights and advanced technology; yet, it is also a world leader in declining rural populations. as graduate students of sustainability science at the university of tokyo, we ventured into the rural town of gojome in early 2016 to learn more about rural depopulation. we conducted field research comprised of individual interviews with 126 respondents. these consisted of 79 residents of gojome and 47 individuals who were visiting gojome, each across different generations. this study also interviewed 15 key informants, analyzed drawings by 34 sixth graders of gojome elementary school which described their pride about the town, and drew on observations. figure 1: share village covered in a blanket of fresh snow during the winter source: author’s own. located in akita prefecture of northern japan, the town of gojome has been shrinking in population for decades. according to national censuses, the population reached its peak in 1960 and has halved in the past 55 years—from 20,025 in 1960 to consilience kusakari et. al: rural sustainability and civic pride 9,481 in 2015 (statistic bureau, ministry of internal affairs and communications of japan, 1961 and 2016). the national institute of population and social security research (2013) foresees that it will further drop to 4,991 by the year 2040. in recent decades, rural depopulation has become common in japan mainly due to declining birthrates and out-migration from rural to urban areas, particularly among the young generation seeking education or employment opportunities, which has consequently resulted in the era of an aging society. today japan has the highest proportion of population over 65 years old in the world, with the national average at 26.7% and that of akita prefecture at 33.9%, the highest among all 47 prefectures (statistic bureau, ministry of internal affairs and communications of japan, 2016). such a trend is significant in gojome, as the elderly proportion of the population has reached 42.8% (akita prefecture, 2015). evident in japan’s rural communities today are critical issues including a declining labor force, reduced tax revenue, increase in abandoned houses, diminishing traditional cultures, and lower community vitality. these issues have also contributed to accelerating the decline of the rural japanese population. according to the united nations (2018), the trend of rural depopulation reflects globally as the urban population of the world has grown rapidly from 751 million in 1950 to 4.2 billion in 2018 and it is expected that the proportion of the world’s population living in urban areas will increase from 55% in 2018 to 68% by 2050. furthermore, the percentage of persons aged 65 years and over is projected to increase from 8.5% in 2015 to 17% in 2050 worldwide (he et al., 2016). due to the anticipated decline in the population of future generations with their increased personal and social burdens, rural depopulation is commonly considered to have significant negative implications for sustainable development, where critical emphasis is on the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. not surprisingly, depopulation therefore poses a serious challenge to key concepts of sustainable development, especially in the creation of intergenerational ties. as a consequence, passing down cultural values and local knowledge related to environmental practices such as agricultural practices and forest resource management are becoming ever more difficult, particularly in rural communities. moreover, out-migration from rural to urban areas potentially increases the adverse environmental effects of urbanization, which include but are not limited to air pollution, increased hazards such as flash flooding, and other climate impacts (world meteorological organization, 2018). from the perspective of promoting sustainable rural development and mitigating possible adverse effects in urban areas, rural depopulation is a fundamental matter that needs to be addressed. the government of japan has recognized and started addressing the issues of depopulation on a national scale as early as the 1950s through the enactment of various relevant laws (kakiuchi & hasegawa, 1979). following some specific laws 108 consilience focused on particular dimensions of depopulation, the emergency act for the improvement of depopulated areas (kaso chiiki taisaku kinkyu sochi-ho) was passed in 1970 as the first comprehensive legislation to address the issues of depopulation directly through substantial funds (ibid.). another example is the unique government-led grassroots initiative called “supporters of regional revitalization” (chiiki-okoshi kyouryoku-tai) where “supporters”, mostly in their 20s or 30s, have been recruited and dispatched to rural communities for promoting local products and facilitating other regional revitalization activities since 2009. furthermore, the regional revitalization act (chiho sosei-ho) was launched in 2014 to promote revitalization processes at the personal, community, and corporate levels. while there have been some concrete outcomes through various legal measures with human and financial resources, the population in rural japan has continued to decline in the last half century. rural depopulation could be perceived as a half-empty glass, but we decided to view it as a glass half-full — full of strengths and possibilities that could contribute to community vitality. bearing this in mind, we consider the role of “pride” as a potential actor to reveal these strengths and possibilities which can take shape in the forms of perspectives and endeavors. after our survey, we revisited a wide range of literature and eventually the concept of “civic pride” emerged as a key word (e.g., wood 2006, ito & shimuta 2008, ihnen 2013, collins 2016). originating in 19th century england, this concept includes elements of a) pride about a community; b) proactive participation in endeavors towards the betterment of the community; and c) a sense of attachment to the community held by anyone, either local or non-local (ito & shimuta 2008). in the case of gojome, their charter, launched in 1985, suggests that residents be proud of their town, entrust their traditions to future generations, and contribute to a creative and affluent community. the mission statement of the comprehensive development plan of gojome 20122021 (2012) also addresses the significance of having new “vitality” and “pride” for promoting sustainable development through a set of specific measures. during our visit, we witnessed various concrete initiatives which are deeply connected with civic pride. through stories generously shared by locals, young and old, we grew to understand how nurturing civic pride can be a key factor contributing to the sustainability of gojome. local specialties and unique initiatives of gojome via our intergenerational surveys during our one-week stay in gojome, we discovered that this rural town is endowed with local specialties and unique initiatives that serve as sources of civic pride. when asked, “what are you proud of in gojome?”, locals and visitors from neighboring towns frequently mentioned consilience kusakari et. al: rural sustainability and civic pride gojome’s beautiful natural landscapes and the local sake rice wine and damako nabe hotpot, both of which are made from locally sourced rice. during our visit to gojome elementary school, 6th grade students presented their wide range of answers to our question in the form of drawings; surprisingly — or not — many of them drew bottles of sake. many students also drew pictures of gojome morning market, a traditional platform for local commercial activities that was established over 520 years ago. the uniqueness of the gojome morning market lies not only in its history, but also in its value as a place for social interactions among and between both customers and shop owners. thus, both gojome locals and non-locals have a strong sense of attachment to this morning market. similarly, gojome’s “share village” is a new initiative where members can become a “villager” wherever they may live through paid membership. the number of “villagers” has reached 1,215 as of january 2016—within less than five years after it was launched. membership enables villagers to stay at a historically preserved 135-year-old traditional japanese house in gojome and to participate in social interactions such as get-togethers and meetings to discuss topics like the future of rural societies (share village 2017). these activities have been forging a sense of belonging in this “village” and gojome, although they do not necessarily live there physically, in order to promote a “community” of likeminded people who are connected to gojome. figure 2: some of drawings by gojome elementary school students: “what i am proud of about our town gojome”. 110 consilience source: author’s own. perspectives and endeavors by an entrepreneur in gojome in an interview with mr. yozaemon hatazawa, the then-68-year-old founder of a local agriculture and forestry corporation named “agri”, he said, “my generation created the issue of depopulation in rural japan.” according to him, his generation known as baby-boomers born between 1947 and 1949 lived through japan’s rapid economic growth, which created a high demand for workforce in urban areas. this resulted in a shift to academic meritocracy, where people believed that higher education and subsequent employment in urban areas was preferable. this meant, in his words, “a better life with higher and stable salaries” compared to rural areas. mr. hatazawa explained that many parents, including himself, fostered this belief by encouraging their children to migrate from rural to urban areas, particularly tokyo. despite ongoing rapid depopulation, mr. hatazawa maintains his pride in gojome’s beautifully rich natural landscape. however, he believes such scenic beauty and natural assets have not been fully appreciated by the local people; and such apathy, coupled with a lack of economic opportunities, has accelerated the depopulation of gojome. determined to change this, he has been making vigorous efforts through his corporation by promoting agriculture, preserving beautiful sceneries of paddy fields, and creating employment opportunities for various generations ranging from the youth to the elders (agri 2018). furthermore, he believes that the much younger generation of kindergarten and elementary school students are key to sustaining the future of gojome. with this belief, mr. hatazawa organizes numerous environmental education activities for children to get hands-on experience to foster nature connectedness through harvesting agricultural produce and by touching and feeling the soil, water, and snow. he believes that civic pride can be nurtured from positive memories developed at a tender age, which could greatly impact the long-term formulation of local people’s perceptions about their hometown. this may help inspire a deeper and longer-lasting relationship with gojome, which could be a key determinant in how they decide to contribute to their hometown in the future. consilience kusakari et. al: rural sustainability and civic pride figure 3: mr. hatazawa teaching children how to plant rice source: cosaque gojome facebook page. transforming perspectives through learning and endeavors by senior high school students in an effort to learn more about gojome, the “gojome social lab” was established in 2015 at the only high school in town with support from their teachers, in addition to advisors from both the gojome town council and the university of tokyo. the gojome social lab provides local students with opportunities to learn about the history and geography of gojome through fieldwork, mainly by conducting interviews with local residents about certain topics. we had a chance to meet six of the seven high school student members, four of whom are locals and two from a neighboring city. the members explained that they had selected two particular research topics about gojome, “traditional festivals” and “energy”. many of them admitted that they were not interested in gojome much before starting their research projects. some members even used to think that gojome would cease to exist in the future. however, the more they learned, the more they developed an interest in gojome. 112 consilience through proactive participation in various local festivals, the students gained deeper insight into the spirit of gojome, nurturing a desire to preserve the town and its traditions. one female member further asserted that although she had thought about leaving the prefecture after graduating from high school, she had begun to consider remaining in akita. other members plan to study outside of akita but wish to return home for work. as they regard the “gojome social lab” as a good learning opportunity for deepening their understanding of and nurturing their pride for gojome, they now wish to engage other fellow students in the same quest. one member even said, “i want to hand over all the wonderful things in town to future high school students”. the potential of civic pride in contributing to rural sustainability various generations of proud gojome locals and non-locals have started to proactively participate in the process of bettering the town. these efforts include providing educational opportunities such as the gojome social lab and mr. hatazawa’s environmental activities for kids, supporting local festivals, or joining share village, all of which support the creation of intergenerational ties and the teachings of local cultural values. gojome locals like mr. hatazawa and the gojome social lab members have decided to entrust their beloved town to “future generations” through nurturing civic pride. while it may be difficult to halt the trend of rapid depopulation in rural societies, endeavors in gojome exemplify the potential of civic pride to contribute to enhancing community vitality, one of many key issues in rural sustainability. in time, the outcomes of the endeavors in gojome will demonstrate the type of contributions that civic pride can produce. the issue of rural depopulation may be a result of various social changes at local, national, and global levels, but examples such as gojome serve as a reminder that vibrant communities can still be achieved through determination, interaction among people, and connections with social, economic, and environmental potentials. civic pride has certainly unveiled its potential in the numerous efforts for promoting sustainable rural development in gojome and could potentially be applied in other communities. whether or not civic pride will yield sustainable results, it has undeniably inspired the people of gojome to work hard for the betterment of the town they know and love so that future generations may have an inheritance worth protecting themselves. fostering civic pride may just be that first step towards creating a sustainable rural society. consilience kusakari et. al: rural sustainability and civic pride references agri. 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(2006). measuring the social impacts of local authority events: a pilot study for a civic pride scale. international journal of nonprofit and voluntary sector marketing, 11(3), 165-179. world meteorological organization. (2018). urban development – megacities. https://public.wmo.int/en/our-mandate/focus-areas/urban-developmentmegacities http://sharevillage.jp/about/ https://public.wmo.int/en/our-mandate/focus-areas/urban-development-megacities https://public.wmo.int/en/our-mandate/focus-areas/urban-development-megacities microsoft word williams_jonah_african_ivory_trade_edited_12_10_2015.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 15, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 181-192 the convoluted nature of the african ivory trade possible solutions for curbing the destructive nature of poaching and promoting elephant conservation jonah m. williams rutgers, the state university of new jersey email: jonah.m.williams@rutgers.edu abstract the current nature of ivory and elephant conservation within africa is extremely ambiguous and filled with much uncertainty. the purpose of this work is to investigate objectively the sources for this convoluted complexion, which stem from a wide variety of issues including (but not limited to) geopolitics, imperialism, governmental legitimacy, foreign policies, and present-day western influences. in addition, this work also considers certain ecological ramifications of the current illicit african ivory trade and sheds light on not only the problems relating to direct poaching, but also extraneous pressures, both internal and external, which are causing a high demand for ivory. through such analyses, this paper investigates possible solutions to lower poaching and stimulates conservation on the african elephant, promotes community-based conservation, and relieves african nations of post-imperialistic stress, granting them increased autonomy on the matter. keywords: african elephant, conservation biology, ivory trade, post-imperialism, westernized conservation, community based natural resource management consilience 182 author’s note as a student and scholar, i am personally very interested in ecological and geographical issues revolving around the conservation of diverse flora and fauna. in our day and age, many scholars have labeled the twenty-first century as the beginning of the “sixth age of extinction,” which is undeniably being caused by humanity’s interaction with the environment. it is imperative that as a society we understand that our actions are causing an extreme loss of biodiversity and that we come together to try and understand the complexity of ecosystem destruction, educate others, and help preserve species that are on the brink of extinction. i became interested in environmental conservation at a young age through the numerous amounts of hours i would spend outside and various camping/hiking trips that my family would take. upon entering college, i built upon this passion by immersing myself in courses such as “conservation,” taught by dr. richard schroeder (who specializes in geopolitics and african studies). through this class, i was introduced to the topic of elephant conservation, as well as the troubling issue of poaching and the destructive nature of the illegal demand for ivory. i hope this work will allow you to gain a better understanding of the “convoluted” nature of this issue, and why it is important for policy-makers, researchers, and conservationists to consider all parts of the picture before going forward with decision-making. going forward, i hope to continue researching this very interesting issue, and at the least, that my piece will be able to inspire you to get involved in the worldwide conservation movement. williams: african ivory trade consilience the illegal wildlife trade is currently one of the largest "black-market" industries in today’s world, falling fourth behind drug, gun, and human trafficking trades. an 8 billion dollar industry, illicit wildlife trading is currently devastating the world's biodiversity and ecosystems, shifting the natural balance, and forcing animals toward extinction. one of the most popular commodities within the illegal wildlife trade is ivory, which comes mainly from illegally poached african elephants. years of unregulated poaching and culling in the 1970s into the 1980s decimated the african elephant populations until they were on the brink of extinction. a ban on the legal sale of ivory in 1989 was put into effect by worldwide conservation organizations, such as the convention on international trade in endangered species (cites), the african wildlife fund (awf), and the world wildlife fund (wwf) to try to save the elephant populations which had dropped extensively in numbers. this ban was very effective overall, and population rebound was extremely high in mozambique, zimbabwe, south africa, kenya, and tanzania (duffy, 2010). the international conservation organizations, however, failed to recognize the voice of the sub-saharan african nations who, for the most part, argued for legal ivory trade as a mechanism to generate revenue for conservation efforts which would support parks and their anti-poaching campaigns. this has caused a stark division within the global conservation community, with the western world arguing for total protection of elephants and the subsaharan african nations pressing for regulated small legal sales, or at most, the ability to sell ivory from animals that have died of natural causes. with the transition from an era filled with plumage and imperialism to the ivory wars, it is only ethical that the rest of the world now let africa begin to make some of their own decisions on the matter of ivory trade, while still adhering to the precedents set forward by cites and other regulatory groups. in such a system, community-based conservation is highly supported, and autonomy is granted to sub-saharan african nations giving them the power to sell stockpiles of naturally harvested ivory so that revenue can be generated for the conservation effort, park management, and new scientific and technological tools, hopefully reducing the tendency to poach overall. although widely unknown, the african ivory trade has existed for centuries; since the early days of civilization, the ivory trade routes that ran through africa and into the middle east helped bring wealth and prosperity and built empires all across its trail. labeled the "land of punt" by the ancient egyptians, the horn of africa has long remained the basin for the fruitful ivory trade that helped build modern trade routes that were used in the late 15th and consilience 184 16th centuries, all the way up to the 19th and 20th centuries as well (duffy, 2010). as time passed, the uses of ivory seldom changed. in fact, ivory is still mainly used in ornamental practice around the world, generally stemming from cultural and religious influences. in the philippines, a largely catholic nation, many people believe that getting ivory trinkets of saints or of jesus christ will help them obtain salvation, and the finer the material one uses, the greater his or her chance of achieving salvation (of course ivory being the finest material available) (christy, 2012). additionally in asia, rapid economic growth has increased the amount of disposable income within the lower classes, allowing them to splurge on certain exotic items. although rhino horn, bear bile, and shark-fin soup are choice favorites, ivory ornaments and carvings are also a popular item bought by many buddhists living in asia. purchasing a statue of buddha or christ is relatively easy, and priests will further bless them for you and instruct you on how to discreetly ship them back home (christy, 2012). as bryan christy from national geographic explains, "because this is about faith, and because faith requires suspension of disbelief, ivory traded for religious purposes doesn't garner the aggressive scrutiny it might if it were carved into, say, chess pieces. god's ivory has its own loophole." (christy, 2012) the fact of the matter is ivory is purely used for ornamental purposes it doesn't feed people, help them live, or affect their lives for the better. this extraneous nature has warranted ivory as a commodity that humanity could easily do without, and thus it could theoretically be removed from the wildlife trade. despite the strong stance in defense of the sale of ivory for religious uses, its role in cultural or religious ceremonies is not pivotal at their core. as beth allgood, campaigns director for the international fund for animal welfare, states, "ivory isn't used for anything but art and ornaments...in fact there's no good reason why anyone needs ivory...except elephants." (russo, 2014) yet, such a statement is easier said than done; the power to change an entire culture’s beliefs and use of a product, regardless of whether or not that product is used to sustain life, is near impossible. thus, there will likely always be a black market to support those who choose to purchase ivory for religious, ceremonial, and cultural reasons, regardless of the status of the international regulations and restrictions on ivory itself. the complicated past of illegal ivory trade and the ban of legal sales in 1989 has left a true scar on the conservation world; in fact, the nature of the ban is partly responsible for why the current degraded conservation conditions exist today. the slaughter of elephants during the ruthless ivory wars warranted international action against the previously unregulated trade. organizations like williams: african ivory trade consilience wwf, awf, and cites gathered to discuss the nature of the industry, and finally, in 1989, a ban was placed on the international trade of ivory. additionally, international conservation organizations and large non-governmental organizations (ngos) conducted massive merchandise campaigns and used “sloganengineering” as advertisements to raise awareness and money for the butchering of the elephant (duffy, 2010). although this measure was extremely effective in reducing poaching and elevating elephant population numbers, the resolve failed to consider the opinions and beliefs of the african nations on the matter, many of which were in support of a legal ivory trade. the “crass” decision-making of groups like cites and awf was perceived as ignorant and “narrow-minded,” heightening tensions between conservationists and creating a very clear-cut divide in the movement – those who supported the western authority versus those who vouched for the autonomy of african nations to deal with matters themselves. more generally speaking, this was a battle between strict protectionism and sustainable use, with geopolitics mixed in between (duffy, 2010). although it is important to acknowledge the ban and its immediate benefit on elephant populations, the resolves failed to address issues such as uncontrolled elephant population growth, african governmental authority, and certain cultural aspects of the situation, namely, the fact that westerners came to a conclusion on a matter that truly does not concern them. currently, african nations dealing with elephants are struggling with growing numbers within natural reserves, problem animals, and how to raise political legitimacy and increase economic revenue for conservation. many african nations have approached cites with the resolve that a regulated ivory trade, or at least, the permission to carefully sell the ivory from confiscated stock piles, problem animals, and natural elephant deaths, could be beneficial (duffy, 2010). nations such as tanzania and kenya have enormous ivory stockpiles, with tanzania’s most recent pile of 101,005 kg being worth about 60 million dollars on the international market (mande et al., 2012). in the past, ivory stockpiles were typically burned to send a message to poachers and the international community. this was championed by the past president of kenya, daniel arap moi in the early 1990’s, and is still used to a certain extent in some parts of africa. however, instead of burning the ivory, which is a waste of a valuable commodity, certain groups of africans are now advocating for the right to sell their stockpiles or have the right to a small, legalized, and regulated trade (perlez, 1989). david stiles, an economist and conservationist who studies the ivory trade, explained that a successful raw ivory trade is possible it encompasses tusks from monitored stockpiles, which consilience 186 come from elephants that died naturally or were identified as “problem animals” as well as a closely monitored system as they ship to asia (russo, 2014). he stated, “if 50 tons of legal ivory could be supplied to china annually, the poaching rates would crash" (russo, 2014), additionally, this trade could generate an enormous amount of revenue that could be put toward elephant conservation, creating more jobs at national parks, increasing ecotourism, and actually spurring increased concern for elephants’ wellbeing within these nations. if revenue is generated via these stockpile sales, people will most likely not take kindly to poaching, which would severely hurt people’s jobs, and therefore their livelihoods, creating a social pressure among africans to avoid poaching themselves. one of the most important benefits of this modified ivory trade is that it has the potential to ameliorate conditions on both the donor and recipient sides of the trade. in the case of the african nations, direct revenue associated with isolated sales could have the potential to bring in money for conservation that would be handled directly by the economies of the respective nations, not ngos or “umbrella” organizations. earnings will be able to go to park management, animal care, grounds-keeping jobs, and most importantly, education efforts regarding sustainable use. a significant effort is placed on external conservation efforts in africa, which does not allow ordinary africans to get involved and excited about conserving their ecosystem’s animals. as bhaskar nath (2008) posed regarding funding for conservation efforts in africa, “should it be to maintain and reinforce the status quo, or should it be to incorporate and create [a] more effective management paradigm that seek the consent of the affected local stakeholders?” changing the paradigm of what many call “western conservation” is no easy task, yet a modified legal trade could have the potential to do just that, putting the conservation of the african elephant back in the hands and hearts of africans who live together side-by-side. additionally, the creation of a sustainable use trade also has the potential to benefit the receivers of the legal ivory, mainly in asia. china is one of the world’s hubs for the illegal wildlife trade, with ivory being a highly valued commodity among the chinese. the uses of these ivory products are strongly tied to chinese culture, and there exists a long valued tradition of ivory carving rooted in the far east. as john frederick walker (2014) explains, “it’s highly unlikely the second biggest economy in the world will undergo a sudden mass conversion to the view that it should immediately ban all ivory trade… it places great value on the cultural significance of its traditional ivory carving industry.” poaching in africa is directly related to the demand of illegal trade in the east, and thus a small, steady flow of regulated ivory to asia could conceivably lead to a williams: african ivory trade consilience drastic decline in poaching rates. this could be due to the fact that chinese people who go out of their way to purchase illegal ivory undertake a huge opportunity cost of being involved in illicit activities and must also pay for costs associated with those activities. as stated earlier by russo (2014), flooding the asian markets with controlled legal ivory will likely encourage people to consider the legal option when purchasing this rare commodity. this gives china the opportunity to launch a massive crackdown on its illegal ivory trade, something that it has not really pushed in the past. thus, “with no way to sell contraband tusks to the chinese, there’d be diminishing payoffs for african poachers, smugglers, and corrupt officials” (walker, 2014). still, there are those who oppose this notion of a “modified” legal ivory trade and their arguments start from different premises; the majority stem from animal rights while others from a strict protectionist standpoint. many people believe that any sort of legal trade will not solve the problem of poaching and an illicit trade will always exist, regardless of illegality or legality of sales. mary rice (2014) argues, “just because it is difficult to enforce something does not mean the solution is to legalize it…traders themselves agree that no amount of legal trade can satisfy the current demand for ivory.” this notion is undeniably true – wherever there exists a route for illicit activities, there will surely be an illegal trade regarding that commodity. thus, in order to prevent poaching outside the system of legal ivory sales, increased attention to elephant protection and conservation efforts, local education, and novel scientific and technological efforts to curb illegal activities must be employed regardless. this idea of strict protectionism, however, does not consider the multitude of geopolitical issues that riddle african nations struggling with elephant conservation. strict protectionism is sometimes labeled as “western conservation” due to the fact that decisions regarding the fate of the elephant are entirely decided upon by western entities and ngos. this “classical approach” to conservation, championed by groups such as cites, “traditionally emphasizes the formation of ‘off-limits’ protected areas, nationalization of ownership of wildlife, and institution of bans on the hunting or utilization of the protected species” (carpenter, 2011). there exists a certain degree of exclusion in the enactment of these policies, which can and has either explicitly or implicitly removed not only african governments, but also local communities from the conservation effort. the cooperative-use solution offers an alternative that is rooted in the principles of protectionism as well— the goal of such a modified ivory trade is not to dismiss the ideas and demands of protectionism, but rather to merge them with the ideas of sustainable, cooperative use as well. consilience 188 from a geopolitical perspective, the sub-saharan african region has been riddled with political corruption for many years, with politicians taking bribes from poachers and gangs and personally involving themselves in the illegal trade. political instability and a certain degree of stagnancy in areas of africa have shaped the world’s skepticism about a legal ivory trade, especially in tanzania (duffy, 2010; burnett, 2012b). additionally, many believe that the creation of a legalized or modified trade will result in a greater rate of poaching as people turn to the black market for even lower prices, or may coerce those who may not have thought about buying before into purchasing. allgood explained that when it comes to the black market and corruption, “[illegal] trafficking cannot be stopped in a corrupt world, and buying cannot be stopped in a corrupt world” (russo, 2014). poaching, as is, is a ruthless and destructive industry, as illustrated by john burnett in his piece, “in a tanzanian village, elephant poachers thrive.” in an interview between burnett and a local poacher, the poacher explained, “sometimes when [elephants] have a funeral, it’s like a party for me…i kill another one, and kill another…the game reserve is my shop…let me go to the shop and kill.” (burnett, 2012b) the extremely methodological killing that accompanies poaching, through the use of advanced weaponry, organized crime, and bribery, is something that plagues the world, but becomes even more detrimental when mixed with the current state of the geopolitical nature of governments along the horn of africa. ngo involvement in the conservation of the african elephant has also been widely disputed as to whether or not the current “status quo” is both the correct and most effective way of promoting the sustenance of these animals. cites and other large umbrella groups predominantly use “strict legislation and the designation of protected areas for conservation” (carpenter, 2011). this method, however, is rather inefficient in developing nations, such as certain sub-saharan african countries, as they often lack the resources and capabilities to adhere to these strict guidelines. they also may not be able to devote the necessary funds to promoting park protection and the very nature of this legislative approach is that it, according to stefan carpenter (2011), “remove(s) the ability of local communities to benefit from the utilization of species…which can actually have the perverse effect of incentivizing local communities to over-exploit protected species.” if conservation were instead focused on a communityand nation-based paradigm, it would provide groups with a sense of ownership over elephants, and in turn a responsibility to conserve the species as well. this communitybased conservation approach has already proved to be very effective in post-colonial namibia, and it has potential to revolutionize efforts elsewhere in africa. through a modified ivory trade, african williams: african ivory trade consilience nations will be able to better equip and educate their communities to conserve at the local level through revenue generated by selling small stockpiles of ivory from natural deaths or problem animals, promoting self-sufficient sustainability and enabling the proper development of modern-day africa. the current political conditions within these nations are strengthening as more legitimate and focused governments take charge of their nations and recognize the problems they face. specifically, within tanzania, the new minister of the wildlife department, khamis kagasheki, has a strict agenda concerning the regulation of parks (such as selous national park, which houses over 80,000 elephants – 25% of all of africa’s elephants), fighting corruption, and collaborating with border nations to ensure that the latest technologies and measures are utilized against poachers (burnett, 2012a). in an excerpt from an interview between john burnett and kagasheki on the nature of poaching, he replied, “what i'm saying is we have to be stringent. we have absolutely no choice. these people are killing innocent animals with impunity. and when you look at these elephants, beautiful beasts. harmless.” (burnett, 2012a) even in an ideal system, poaching will still exist, and thus the utilization of new technological and scientific methods for tracing poachers, in combination with harsher punishment for poaching, could effectively result in a drop of poaching rates should a modified legal ivory trade be opened. techniques such as dna sequencing, gene mapping, and fluorescent proteins to make ivory glow under airport screening devices could allow prosecutors to efficiently track and locate poaching operations and individuals (wasser et al., 2008). mary rice (2014), an advocate of strict protectionism in elephant conservation, stated, “how [would] enforcement authorities distinguish between legal and illegal ivory?” bioinformatics databases, fluorescent labeling, and new biotechnological assays could easily be employed to label both illegal and legal ivory stocks so that authorities may easily distinguish between the two. utilizing these methods on legally sold ivory could also allow the tracking and monitoring of where the legal ivory goes and could potentially lead investigators to stolen stockpiles. additionally, advancements in unmanned drone technology could allow african parks to readily track and survey vast tracks of land to combat poachers and monitor elephant herds. with a close-eye from cites and other international groups monitoring sub-saharan african governmental actions, this hybrid, legalized trade system could prove to be very effective. the possibility of an ethical sustainable-use ivory trade is very plausible if all parties in the trade work together well and back a zero-tolerance policy for violation of any agreements. the overall consilience 190 policy which maps these changes stems from community-based natural resource management (cbnrm), a theory applied to a novel conservation approach which aims to empower local african communities and governments to get more involved in and excited about sustaining their elephants (carpenter, 2011). at its base, this modified legal ivory trade incorporates principles of both strict protectionism and sustainable use, enabling this hybrid model to be highly desirable. a general layout of the necessary steps to implement such a modified trade is as follows. firstly, the cites regulated sales regarding problem animals and natural deaths should be made out in the “open,” and the group will serve as a mediator in discussions between african nations and asia. secondly, the implementation of harsher punishments for poachers, smugglers, and sellers of illegal ivory both in africa and asia is necessary to provide a strong foundation for a “zero” tolerance toward these crimes. additionally, sales made from legal ivory stockpiles will go directly to funding cbnrm as well as elephant conservatories across africa, giving them access to novel scientific technologies, such as drones, tusk protein labeling, and genetic classification of elephants. finally, reports should frequently be filed from both africa and asia regarding progress, poaching prevention, and the relative successes and failures of various methods for future optimization of the program. if strictly adhered to, these principles can lay the solid foundation for such a trade, which could extremely benefit the subsaharan african nations socially, politically, and economically. it could also drastically reduce poaching and the motivation to poach, thereby liberating southern africa from some of its postimperialistic oppression, returning conservation to the hands of the people, and sustaining the african elephant for millennia to come. williams: african ivory trade consilience references burnett, j. (2012a). poachers decimate tanzania’s elephant herds. transcript of national public radio broadcast, oct. 25. retrieved october 12, 2014. burnett, j. (2012b). in a tanzanian village, elephant poachers thrive. transcript of national public radio broadcast, oct. 25. retrieved october 12, 2014. carpenter, s. (2011). the devolution of conservation: why cites must embrace community-based resource management. the arizona journal of environmental law & policy. retrieved october 4, 2015. christy, b. (2012). ivory worship. national geographic, vol. 222, no. 4, pp. 28-61. retrieved november 12, 2014. duffy, r. (2010). nature crime: how we’re getting conservation wrong. new haven: yale university press. “rhino horn, ivory and the trade ban controversy,” pp. 113-154. retrieved november 3, 2014. mande, m and ihucha, a. (2012). tanzania in fresh bid to sell ivory stockpile. the east african, oct. 20. retrieved october 15, 2015. nath, b. (2008). ngos for the conservation of africa’s wildlife and their habitats. environmental education and awareness. retrieved november 3, 2015, from http://www.eolss.net/samplechapters/c11/e4-16-07-08.pdf perlez, j (1989). kenya, in gesture, burns ivory tusks. the new york times (archival). retrieved august 18, 2015, from http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/19/world/kenya-in-gestureburns-ivory-tusks.html rice, m. (2014, october 13). the case against a legal ivory trade: it will lead to more killing of elephants. retrieved july 15, 2015, from http://e360.yale.edu/feature/counterpoint_the_case_against_a_legal _ivory_trade_it_will_lead_to_more_killing_of_elephants/2815/ russo, c (2014). can elephants survive a legal ivory trade? debate is shifting against it. national geographic. retrieved consilience 192 october 29, 2014, from http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/08/140829elephants-trophy-hunting-poaching-ivory-ban-cities/ walker, j. (2014, october 13). the case for a legal ivory trade: it could help stop the slaughter. retrieved july 15, 2015, from http://e360.yale.edu/feature/point_the_case_for_a_legal_ivory_trad e_it_could_help_stop_the_slaughter/2814/ wasser, s., clark, w. j., drori, o., kisamo, e. s., mailand, c., mutayoba, b., stephens, m (2008). combating the illegal trade in african elephant ivory with dna forensics. conservation biology. retrieved november 7, 2015, from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.15231739.2008.01012.x/full microsoft word davis.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 13, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 217-246 the need for a new, clear option: an in-depth analysis of nuclear energy zachary evan davis virginia commonwealth university, richmond, virginia davisze@vcu.edu abstract the goal of the research presented here will be to provide a comprehensive view of the nuclear industry today. upon analyzing data from the last 40 years, a pattern of irresponsible, financially untenable policymaking begins to emerge, highlighting the growing disconnect between the general populace, which is most vulnerable to the benefits and pitfalls of the nuclear industry, and the elected officials who make the final decision in many countries regarding nuclear adoption. the primary context of this article will be concerned with analyzing opposing views of how nuclear power normally stands to benefit mankind versus the impacts of a worst case nuclear disaster, as occurred at the fukushima daiichi nuclear plant. the author provides a brief, general overview of the theory behind nuclear power and its impacts before moving on to the benefits and drawbacks faced by adoptive communities. next, an analysis of the financial viability of the nuclear industry will be offered, as well as a brief introduction of several means of generating electricity, and their general benefits and drawbacks. the author then offers an opinion on which of these options would offer the best alternative to nuclear power in both the short and long term. finally, government patterns of dealing with nuclear power will be examined; it very quickly becomes evident that even in the most transparent societies, nuclear adoption encourages dishonesty from policy makers. in closing, the author will leave the reader with a troubling question: “do we really have a say in our own future?” author’s note it is my firm belief that by examining the problems we face today from a holistic point of view, one where the interconnectedness of the world around us is fully understood and considered, we can create a better future for ourselves. i speak not only of the interconnectedness of the biological world, but that of the artificial world we have created for ourselves, that which we call “society”. through the exploration and examination of how these two seemingly disparate fields are able to influence one another, the world can be made a much better place. it is a curious fact of the world that i have noted: when the world is looked at in a manner which truly captures the “big picture” of the moment, what we as a human race desire and need seems closely tied to the needs and desires of the world as a whole. failure to see this tendency of the world is a failure born not out of ignorance, but out of society’s deception by examining the real truth of the nuclear industry from many points of view, it is my hope that you, the reader, will discover in yourself a desire to help the world at large, not just because it is the right thing to do for the world, but the right thing to do for yourself. the goal of a truly sustainable future is not one that serves all of humanity; there will always be those individuals in this world whose future is built upon the foundations of the past. for them, a sustainable future is one where they no longer hold the power. for the rest of the world, however, sustainability is freedom. it is with this belief in my heart that i thank you for your time, and submit to you the following, with the hope that you will gain some benefit from it. consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option keywords: nuclear power, fukushima, sustainability, policy, economics, health. 1. overview for as long as nuclear power has existed, it has been a hotly debated topic, one whose problems are both multi-faceted and complex. while there are many respected individuals who have spoken out over the years as proponents or detractors of the nuclear industry, nuclear power has, by and large, maintained a steady pattern of expansion and growth over the past five decades, seemingly without regard for the debate which surrounds it. however, in recent years new information and events have brought nuclear power into the mainstream consciousness with renewed vigor. with the information being presented, it is hard to understand how nuclear power has remained at the forefront of energy production for so long. on march 11th, 2011, a 9.0 earthquake off the coast of japan triggered a massive tsunami which struck the main island of honshu. the 15-meter high wave disabled power to the fukushima daiichi nuclear plant (fdnp), which in turn caused a “loss of cooling accident” in three of the plant’s reactors. the resulting criticality that occurred has continued to have numerous deleterious effects on both japan and much of the pacific ocean region. since the fukushima daiichi nuclear disaster (fdnd) occurred, there have been mass evacuations, commercial fishing bans, and numerous health concerns in japan. in addition, growing concerns over contaminated wildlife caught along the american west coast and rising rates of thyroid cancer on both sides of the pacific ocean have led to an increased global awareness of the effects that nuclear power plants can have on regions remote from them. in addition to the numerous deleterious effects on humans and other living creatures across much of the planet, we must also acknowledge the financial difficulties faced by the nuclear industry at large. one of the most important factors to consider with any form of energy production is its long-term sustainability. at first glance, a comparative analysis of the costs and benefits of nuclear power when compared to other major forms of energy production shows nuclear as a strong leader; however, when looking at the problem from a “worst-case scenario” viewpoint, a very different picture emerges. even in the case of a minor incident (relatively speaking), cleanup costs can soar, such as in the 1979 meltdown at three mile island, for example. despite the fact that there were no reported injuries or deaths, and a long-term evaluation of more than 30,000 people from the surrounding area showed no appreciable impact, it was reported by the world nuclear association that cleanup still took over 12 years, at the cost of approximately us$973 million. while some may point out that the three mile island incident was rated as a 5 out of 7 on the international nuclear event scale, it should be noted that a category 5 incident is the lowest rating which is likely to result in the implementation of planned countermeasures; incidents rated 4 and below are generally reserved for events which affect only plant personnel and/or a very limited area around the plant site. even more disturbing is the overwhelming likelihood that any new nuclear consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option construction project would ultimately fail, with any money invested in the project being lost. while it can be argued that nuclear power is a strong contender for being the “best” form of energy production we have available today, there are many alternative forms of renewable energy which have grown in popularity in recent years. “green” technologies such as wind and solar power, as well as the newly forming field of artificial photosynthesis, offer strong alternatives to nuclear power’s production capabilities while completely avoiding the dangers inherent with nuclear adoption. with so many reasons not to accept nuclear power, it is perfectly normal for an individual to question the methods by which nuclear adoption takes place. when analyzing the deciding factors for nuclear adoption, three major interest groups stand out: public citizens, elected officials, and private interests (primarily those individuals directly associated with the nuclear industry). however, there is more to the problem than that; it has been seen time and again throughout the history of nuclear power that the government has shown a tendency to mask or hide the truth entirely when it does not serve the best interests of the nuclear industry. by studying nuclear power from this consumer driven viewpoint, with voice given to both sides of the nuclear power debate, the reader will hopefully gain a greater understanding of the inner workings of the nuclear industry and discover how nuclear power has managed to survive in the wake of the fukushima daiichi nuclear disaster. it should be noted that while it may seem as though greater weight is given to the arguments against nuclear energy, an equal amount of data for each section was pulled from resources in support of and against nuclear power; quantitative data in particular was pulled almost exclusively from sources such as the world nuclear association and energy policy archives, both of which have traditionally taken an either unbiased or slightly pro-nuclear stance in their articles. therefore, if the majority of the information presented seems to skew in one direction, then that should be taken into consideration when formulating a final opinion based on the facts presented. 2. a basic understanding of nuclear power 2.1 introduction one of the key arguments that has sustained the nuclear industry for so long is the claim that it is an “eco-friendly” alternative to the much harsher and oft-vilified coal, oil, and natural gas which humanity has relied on for much of modern history. the reader will be given a brief overview of how nuclear energy actually “works”, along with an impact analysis of normal operations as well as worst-case scenarios, in order to determine whether this is actually so. 2.2 how does nuclear power actually work? due to the radioactive nature of the fuel rods, once damage has been sustained it is exceedingly difficult to repair, and poses a serious hazard to both the on-site workers and the greater region where the plant is located. as seen in figure 1, below, the nuclear power production cycle is essentially a large loop which utilizes consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option steam to turn a turbine. by splitting apart the individual atoms in the fuel rods (usually composed of uranium-235), massive amounts of heat are generated. water is constantly pumped into the reactor and transformed into steam, which then moves into a turbine assembly; the steam turns the turbines, generating electricity. the steam then moves into a “condenser” where it passes over pipes which are kept cool by a constant flow of water pulled from nearby lakes, rivers, or other bodies of water. this condensation is then discharged back into the main body of water, or circulated through cooling towers, before the cycle begins again. failure of any part of the system generally results in a rapid build-up of heat and pressure which results in either an explosion, damage to the fuel rods’ containment structure, or both. figure 1: general design of a boiling water reactor (bwr) 2.3 when things go right? nuclear power is often hailed as the solution to our current climate change woes. however, this is simply not true; not only is nuclear power not carbon-free, it is actually more harmful to the environment than traditional coal or natural gas means of production. how could this be, you may ask? mary olson, of the nuclear information and resource service, tells us that, “a number of recent studies have found that when mining, processing, and extensive transportation of uranium in order to make nuclear fuel is considered, the release of carbon dioxide (co2) as the result of making electricity from uranium is comparable to burning natural gas to make electric power. additional energy required for the decommissioning and disposition of the wastes generated increases this co2 output substantially (olson, 2006). even more disturbing, a 2003 study at mit revealed that “expanding nuclear generating capacity worldwide to 1000 billion watts would be required to address the climate problem to any meaningful degree. this would roughly mean adding one new reactor every two weeks until 2050” (olson, 2006). as you will see in the coming sections, such a solution is unequivocally impossible, both from a scientific and economic standpoint. consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option 2.4 when disaster strikes now let us take a look at the other end of the “impact spectrum”: the fukushima daiichi nuclear disaster. as stated in the introduction, a 9.0 earthquake off the coast of honshu, japan triggered a massive tsunami on march 11th, 2011. the resulting wave disabled power to the fukushima daiichi nuclear plant (fdnp), which in turn caused a “loss of cooling accident” (loca) in three of the fdnp’s reactors. for those not familiar with the term, “loca [involves] the safety of the emergency core cooling system (eccs), a fail-safe mechanism to prevent core meltdown in the event of abrupt loss of primary coolant. the dramatic increase in reactor size in the late 1960s increased uncertainty about the integrity of the containment shield in the event of a meltdown” (surrey & hugget, 1976). basically, in the event of a power outage, emergency systems (usually powered by diesel fuel) are designed to kick in and allow for continued cooling of the reactor in order to prevent an explosion. it therefore stands to reason that, “since the core of a reactor continues to generate heat for years, even ‘off-line’, it is vital that emergency cooling equipment be operable around the clock” (olson, 2006). for reasons which remain unclear, the eccs at fukushima daiichi either failed or was manually shutdown, resulting in a massive explosion which led to the largest release of radioactive contaminants ever recorded. later sections will go into greater detail about the exact nature of the fdnd’s negative impacts worldwide, so for now we will leave the reader with steven starr’s words on the continuing difficulties faced by cleanup crews: “meanwhile, the destroyed fukushima reactors and spent fuel ponds, which hold huge quantities of radioactive waste, are far from being stabilized. reactors #1, #2 and #3 every day discharge radioactive gases that emit a billion becquerels of radiation. the uranium cores of reactors 1, 2 and 3, which completely melted down and then melted through the bottom of the steel reactor vessel, will continue to produce enormous amounts of radiation and heat for many years. every day, ten tons of seawater is poured upon each of the melted cores; the water becomes intensely radioactive and then rapidly leaks out of the containment into the adjacent turbine building. it is then pumped trough an expensive cooling system that traps the radioactivity in filters the size of small cars, which become highly radioactive and are being placed in a nearby field. fifty million gallons of intensely radioactive water have already been collected and stored on site. thousands of additional radioactive gallons continue to accumulate daily, and the jury-rigged pipe system connecting the storage tanks remains at risk, should another large quake strike the area” (starr, 2012). 2.5 conclusion – nuclear power is not safe at the end of the day, behind all the fancy verbiage and technological jargon, the goal of nuclear power as a means of energy production is to boil water, creating steam which then generates electricity by turning turbines. after reading the excerpt in section 2.4, consider this: “there are 23 nuclear reactors of the same design as those at fukushima now operating in the us, [and] us spent fuel pools contain many times more spent fuel than the spent fuel pool at reactor building 4 in fukushima daiichi” (starr, 2012). these facts alone should be enough to convince consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option an objective reader that nuclear power is not the safe, reliable, or logical choice to make for providing electricity for our communities. 3. happiness vs. health – a human perspective 3.1 introduction when examining the positives and negatives of the adoption of nuclear energy as a mainstream industry, it is best to first examine the impacts that the adoption of nuclear power has on individuals and communities, without considering any financial, ecological, or ethical arguments. if the goal of nuclear power is to benefit mankind, then it must be shown that it possesses the potential to improve human quality of life. for the purpose of this article "quality of life" benefits can be broken into two primary forms: 1) lifestyle benefits – lifestyle benefits are primarily assumed to mean better access to or affordability of basic utilities, such as running water and electricity. however, secondary lifestyle benefits could also include an improvement to either the infrastructure or job sectors of a given area, assuming such improvements are a direct impact of the adoption of nuclear power. 2) health benefits – one of the most studied and discussed aspects of nuclear power. it must be acknowledged that any attempt to quantify the health "benefits" of nuclear power will by necessity be an analysis primarily of the negative effects which can result in an area following the adoption and proliferation of nuclear power. it will be the goal of this section to empower the reader to weigh the positives and negatives of nuclear power as they pertain to both individual lifestyle and health; and to determine which of the two carries a greater weight in society. 3.2 the benefits of nuclear power on day-to-day life the adoption of nuclear power can lead to a plethora of lifestyle benefits in the communities where it occurs. in many cases, it has been found that the incentives and subsidies which accompany nuclear adoption can both revitalize and revolutionize an area. building a nuclear power plant requires a certain amount of basic infrastructure, manpower, and materials; and this need can drive the vitalization of a community as jobs become more readily available, utility grids are overhauled, and roads are built (or improved) to handle new traffic to the area. any local businesses which are able to supply these needs may see a great deal of growth as a result of commercial ordering, which in turn can lead to even more jobs. in addition, as mentioned above, certain areas have also seen added benefits (such as the construction of new community spaces) which are offered as incentives for nuclear adoption. 3.3 the drawbacks of nuclear power on day-to-day life while it has been argued that the adoption of nuclear power creates many positive benefits for the community, this is simply not so. the local benefits are no consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option greater than those associated with any other large public works project despite the economic incentives linked. the amount of development which is needed to construct a nuclear power plant calls for huge amounts of traffic, manpower, and materials to enter a community very suddenly and often without regard for the surrounding areas. this sudden influx has the potential to create a great deal of economic strain on an area, as prices are driven up by increased demand for certain goods, and can lead to an area’s citizens becoming victims of a localized economic depression as their own incomes are no longer able to keep up with the changes in their community. even more concerning is the cost faced by the surrounding ecosystems, as clear cutting for the construction zone, waste runoff, and noise/air pollution strangle the surrounding flora and fauna. when you calculate the effects of the operations of said plant, including the fact that “[t]he waste from mining, enrichment and spent fuel rods will be present for thousands of years, much of it where it was produced or utilized” (mccally, 2007), things begin to look very bleak for nuclear power’s new home. the adoption of nuclear energy poses serious health risks not just for the home community, but for areas and people far removed as well. when the fdnd occurred, not only was the immediate area instantly rendered useless to everyone who lived nearby, but in truth nearly the entire population of japan suffered. this may seem to be a wild claim, but let us examine the numbers. it was reported by the japanese science ministry that “long-lived radioactive cesium had contaminated 11,580 square miles (30,000 sq km) of the land surface of japan” (starr, 2012). this is equivalent to ~13% of the total landmass of honshu, the main island of japan and the one directly affected by the fdnd. 13% may not seem like a lot, but consider this: according to census data from 2012, honshu is home to roughly 103 million people, approximately 81% of japan’s total population. assuming a relatively even distribution of people on the island (with areas of large population cancelling out areas with few residents), we can see that as many as 13.3 million people were exposed to radioactive cesium following the event. however, when we analyze fig 2, below, we see that the amount of land exposed to this highly dangerous, radioactive element was essentially “all of it”, to say nothing of the millions of gallons of ocean water contaminated every day. this becomes even more disturbing when the reader stops to consider that this was just 38 days after the fdnd; we are now at 1322 days (as this is being written) and cesium is still leaking into the environment daily. 3.4 conclusion – no appreciable benefits to nuclear adoption in closing, it would seem that nuclear energy has a long way to go before it can make the claim that it offers any true health benefits, whether of a physiological or psychological nature. it is important to note that, although it may seem as though undue focus has been placed on the effects of a “worst-case scenario”, this is by necessity rather than a desire to paint nuclear energy in an unfair light. as is stated in other sections of this work, the international nuclear event scale (ines) does not consider an event below a category 5 (the rating ascribed to the reactor meltdown at three mile island) to have any “significant” effects beyond the range of the employees and locale of the plant site itself. for category 4 incidents and below there is no expectation of a planned emergency response other than an analysis of local consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option food crops for contamination. therefore, any analysis of the negative effects of nuclear energy on a community at large must be based on data from large-scale incidents such as three mile island, chernobyl, or indeed fukushima daiichi. the argument that there is no danger to the populace so long as everything goes according to plan should not be enough of a “health benefit”, per se, to support the adoption of nuclear energy in a community. though proponents of nuclear power will claim that the benefits of construction of a plant alone should make the option attractive to many struggling communities, this is simply not the case. when considering the lifestyle benefits of nuclear expansion, the initial benefits and drawbacks during the construction phase are similar to those of any other large construction project. the difference is that once construction has been completed, the nuclear plant offers little when compared to, say, a shopping mall, which creates just as many jobs while also providing a niche for economic growth and variation. even the claim that there is no change in an adoptive community seems tenuous at best, and trying to justify an industry which profits off the ability of others to break even (in an optimal scenario) is somewhat nebulous when weighed against the risk of catastrophe. for this reason, i must conclude that there are no appreciable health or lifestyle benefits to nuclear adoption. figure 2: estimated total amount of cesium-137 deposited from march 11 – april 19, 2011 (yasunari et al.) 4. economic advantages and drawbacks of the nuclear industry 4.1 introduction the lack of financial viability (whether perceived or real) has haunted the nuclear industry for over 40 years now, and though proponents of nuclear energy consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option champion the nuclear plant as a “money-making machine”, there are many experts who say that the numbers just don’t add up. when analyzing the pros and cons of nuclear economics, it is important to tackle the problem from several angles: a) capital costs – these are the initial costs of any nuclear plant; the amount of time, money, and manpower required for such a project to reach operational status. b) costs to the consumer – the cost of electricity generated by any plant is directly related to the presence or lack of competing interests, the overall economy of an area, and the amount of money which must be recouped by the plant to pay for capital costs. c) c) local economic impact – what effect, if any, such a project would have on the economy of the area where it is being built. this could include, but not be limited to, the creation of new jobs in the area for the construction and/or continued operation of the site as well as the depreciation of surrounding properties. d) d) incidental costs – incidental expenses could be the cost of insurance, repairs, and the general maintenance of a nuclear plant, as well as the secondary costs which occur in the event of a major incident, such as the one which occurred at fukushima daiichi. these secondary costs could take the form of cleanup costs, property loss, contamination of agricultural production zones, and psychological or health impacts related to the disaster. the goal of this section will be to help the reader gain a better understanding of the arguments for and against the economic viability of nuclear power. 4.2 economic advantages of nuclear energy the capital costs associated with the construction of a new nuclear plant are the same as those of any other major public works project, such as a mall, school, or hospital. the seemingly high costs associated with nuclear energy are primarily due to the high costs of concrete and steel, which are both needed in enormous quantities for a building project of this magnitude. the construction costs associated with nuclear power plants increased worldwide after the fukushima accident, driven by the public’s demand for additional safety measures (hayashi and hughes, 2013). what sets the nuclear industry apart, however, is the number of highly beneficial subsidy programs (such as the energy policy act of 2005 in the united states) evident in many parts of the world which help to offset these costs in a way that many other forms of electricity cannot match. while it is true that competing interests in an area can have an impact on the costs of electricity, this is rarely an issue for nuclear power plants. it has been shown time and again that the monthly savings produced by the introduction of nuclear power to an area can have a huge effect on the average family. what’s more, the sheer amount of electricity produced via nuclear fission generators means that nuclear plants can very quickly recoup the costs associated with construction, which in turn can lead to a noticeable decline in energy prices after a period of years. as can consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option be seen in table 1, the prices of electricity generated by nuclear energy are consistently lower than those from other major sources. as stated above, the impacts of a nuclear plant on the economy of the surrounding area cannot be denied. due to the huge need for manpower, an area selected for such a site would see an enormous influx of jobs available for both skilled and unskilled labor until the completion of the project. furthermore, it is a known fact that, once established, the costs associated with the ongoing operation of a nuclear plant are very low when compared to other similar works. finally, it should be noted that, while the depreciation of properties can occur, it rarely does so due to the fact that areas which embrace nuclear power plants are often subject to additional subsidies and incentives which can have a secondary effect on the values of properties and the quality of overall infrastructure in the surrounding area. while some adversaries of nuclear power have labeled such incentives as “bribes” kato et al. (2013) point out that in a social survey of the kanto region in japan, “perceived risk, not perceived benefit, [was found] to be the most important factor influencing the acceptance of [nuclear power plants]”. table 1 actual costs of electricity (us cents/kwh) (wna, 2014) technology region or country at 10% discount rate at 5% discount rate nuclear oecd europe 8.3-13.7 5.0-8.2 china 4.4-5.5 3.0-3.6 black coal with ccs oecd europe 11.0 8.5 brown coal with ccs oecd europe 9.5-14.3 6.8-9.3 ccgt with ccs oecd europe 11.8 9.8 large hydroelectric oecd europe 14.0-45.9 7.4-23.1 china: 3 gorges 5.2 2.9 china: other 2.3-3.3 1.2-1.7 onshore wind oecd europe 12.2-23.0 9.0-14.6 china 7.2-12.6 5.1-8.9 offshore wind oecd europe 18.7-26.1 13.8-18.8 solar photovoltaic oecd europe 38.8-61.6 28.7-41.0 china 18.7-28.3 12.3-18.6 consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option table 2 : economic incentives (kato, takabara, nishikawa & homma, 2013) category financial source major examples local tax utility property tax, local corporation tax, nuclear fuel tax, spent fuel tax subsidy national government subsidies based on the three laws for power source development donation utility construction of public facility, money local economy utility and government expenditure job opportunities, propagation effect incidental expenses associated with nuclear energy have grown over the years, but this is mainly due to more stringent safety requirements and the push to reformat, streamline, and update older existing plants in favor of constructing new ones. for the most part, the growth of the nuclear industry has been a direct result of the desire to reduce pollution; the japanese government announced in 2002 that “it would rely heavily on nuclear energy to achieve greenhouse gas emission reduction goals set by the kyoto protocol” (wna, nuclear power in japan). in cases such as the fukushima incident, it must be acknowledged that the reactors which failed had just recently passed their 40-year expiration date, and the fact that they were approved to run for 10 additional years shows a failure on the side of human error rather than being indicative of safety flaws in the reactor itself. in fact, there were previous issues in japan involving nuclear plants, such as when scandal broke out in 2002 in connection with equipment inspections at nuclear power plants (wna, nuclear power in japan). cleanup costs associated with a major incident can be high, but are effectively combated by better safety training, more skilled operators, and a quick response time in the early stages of any such an incident. compared with other industries, the safety record of the nuclear industry is high; the precautions against mishaps and theft of dangerous materials are stringent, and the risk of major accident is less than that of natural disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes, and accidents associated with coal mining, aircraft and cars (surrey & hugget, 1976). as further proof of the commitment to safety and rapid emergency response, which is a major hallmark of the nuclear industry today, it must be noted that while “the fukushima accident was rated level 7 (the highest level) on the international nuclear and radiological event scale—as serious as the chernobyl accident in 1986” (hosoe & tanaka, 2012) not a single death was reported as a direct result of the accident. from these facts, it should be obvious that the image of rampant costs in the nuclear industry is a false one, and that the costs associated with nuclear power are more than reasonable in the face of the industry’s commitment to safety and reliability. while it may be possible for some countries to get by using their own natural resources, this is not always the case; japan, for example, needs to import ~84% of its yearly energy needs (wna, nuclear power in japan). faced with such numbers and a world characterized by massive oil crises, nuclear energy is simply the best option available to meet that demand. though there have been minor setbacks for nuclear energy, the fact remains that the industry will remain strong, as senator james inhofe [r-ok] asserted in his 2007 piece nuclear power use must be expanded: consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option “once it has revitalized, [nuclear energy] will financially sustain itself”(inhofe, 2007). what’s more, the growing nuclear presence around the world is one that will lead to lower costs for consumers and higher profit margins for plant operators and, in turn, the countries where they are based. in short, nuclear power will continue to be seen as “an essential way of improving energy security in many countries and, despite what its critics may say, will probably continue to be used as a significant source of low-carbon electricity” (hayashi and hughes, 2013), both due to the overwhelming positive benefits as well as the absence of any other widely available low-carbon options. 4.3 economic drawbacks of nuclear energy the primary issue with the capital costs associated with nuclear power is simply this: they are far too high. as early as the 1970s, it was observed that “the reduction of nuclear ordering has been aggravated by cost escalation and financing problems. like many other types of capital equipment, nuclear plants have sustained cost escalation well in excess of the general rate of inflation” (surrey & hugget, 1976), and this trend has not abated with time. in fact, many construction projects have a final cost which is many times higher than its initial projected budget, with the difference being made up using taxpayer dollars. “wall street is not putting a penny of private capital into the industry, despite 100-plus percent subsidies” (lovins, 2008). while many individuals claim that the generation costs of electricity using conventional power versus nuclear are much higher, the fact is that this is only true in areas where additional taxes are levied from producers based on annual carbon emissions. it is also important to mention that the savings associated with nuclear energy are only significant in regions where there is little to no competition, or where the demand for electricity is much higher than normal. as seen in table 1, the average cost/kwh (cost per kilowatt hour) of electricity from a nuclear plant tends to be ~2-4 cents us lower than other forms of electricity generation, which is less than 10% of the total cost/kwh in most countries. while the amount of electricity generated by nuclear reactors is high, the lower utility cost in areas where nuclear power has been introduced can actually have a deleterious effect on consumers, as they tend to be more “energy wasteful” because of the lower cost/kwh. this in turn can lead to a higher-than-average bill for many families, even though the costs are technically lower. the economic advantage of integrating nuclear power into an area is generally negligible, and never last more than a few years. while the initial stages of construction for such a site do require large amounts of manpower, the workers needed are generally unskilled, and the presence of such work invariably leads to an influx of new residents to the area. when the jobs go away at the end of the construction period, the new residents often do not, and this in turn can have a disastrous effect on local economies as unemployment rates quickly skyrocket, leading to a greater demand for government welfare in the area. furthermore, the jobs that do remain are generally those which require a highly specialized degree of training and knowledge, and as such the workers employed to fill such positions are statistically unlikely to be from the surrounding area, at least for the first generation consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option or so of workers employed by the plant. the most pressing issue, however, is the fact that “the huge economic incentives during the construction phase result in the creation of many public facilities and the expansion of public welfare programs. however, the expense incurred in maintaining these facilities and services often cause financial problems later” (kato, takahara, nishikawa & homma, 2013). as time goes on and the economic benefits go away, host cities have been forced to request that more reactors be installed on their lands, as “the social changes caused by the economic incentives made it difficult to manage the local communities in a sustainable way” (kato, takahara, nishikawa & homma, 2013). perhaps the greatest economic drawback of all is the staggering incidental costs associated with a nuclear disaster; in the case of fukushima alone, “[e]stimates of the total economic loss range from $250-$500 billion us” (starr, 2012). what’s more, not only does the financial impact totally eclipse the possible gains (it should be noted when referring to figure 5 below, that us$58 billion was an estimate only of the “cost of cleaning up the radiation contamination from fukushima around farms and towns […and] does not include other costs, such as compensation and dealing with reactors” (mckeating, 2013)) the area affected by the disaster usually extends far beyond the region that could have ever benefitted from the existence of the plant in the first place. following the destruction of the fukushima daiichi plant in march 2011, it was reported that “all of the land within 12 miles (20 km) of the destroyed nuclear power plant, encompassing an area of about 230 square miles (600 sq km), and an additional 80 square miles (200 sq km) located northwest of the plant, were declared too radioactive for human habitation. all persons living in these areas were evacuated and the regions were declared to be permanent “exclusion” zones” (starr, 2012). in addition, some “4,500 square miles […] was found to have radiation levels that exceeded japan’s allowable exposure rate of 1 msv (millisievert) per year” (starr, 2012). the total loss of property and livelihoods as a direct result of this disaster may never be known. fukushima officials stated in september of 2012 that a total of 159,128 people had been evicted from their homes (starr, 2012), and many of them are even being forced to pay mortgages on homes and property they can never return to. depending on peculiarities in meteorological patterns at ground zero, individuals many hundreds of miles away can face significant health risks which have a direct impact on both their lives and the economy of an entire region far removed from the nuclear plant. the impacts on an ecosystem can be even more astounding. it has already been stated that “[o]nce a large amount of radioactive cesium enters an ecosystem, it quickly becomes ubiquitous, contaminating water, soil, plants and animals” (starr, 2012) and in the case of fukushima, contamination has been reported in crops and fish more than 200 miles away. while supporters of nuclear power will quickly make the claim that better safety training and more skilled operators are needed to combat this, it must be acknowledged that “it can be argued that nuclear risks cannot satisfactorily be compared with natural disasters, nor with accidents from other technologies” (surrey & hugget, 1976) in which a reasonable level of preparation is possible. consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option figure 3: a comparative analysis of the cost of the fukushima cleanup efforts (mckeating, 2013). in closing, any claim made in support of nuclear power as an economically viable endeavor is either the result of faulty information or is an outright fabrication. the ever-growing costs of construction alone should be enough to put the issue to rest, but there is far more to the problem than that. the money saved when switching to nuclear electricity is neither commonplace nor appreciable, and while some incentive projects have been both well received and communally beneficial, they are short-lived at best and often leave the areas in worse shape than they were before in the long-term. most importantly, the incidental expenses of nuclear energy are too high to be reconciled regardless of its benefits, not just in terms of financial and human costs, but environmental costs as well. 4.4 conclusion – nuclear energy not economically sound the evidence speaks for itself: in order for utilities to develop new nuclear plants, they must have access to adequate financing at a reasonable cost. before wall street will provide that financing, there must be confidence that the project will be successful, that the business risks are manageable and new plants can meet schedule commitments to begin delivering power (inhofe, 2007). the truth, however, is that skyrocketing costs in construction materials leave the taxpayers holding the bag; since “wall street […] will not finance these facilities because future plants are likely to cost more than $5 billion, making them marginally profitable at best. and, a recent congressional budget office report predicts that more than 50 percent of proposed plants would default on loan guarantees” (mccally, 2007). if nuclear energy is so profitable, then why is it so hard to find someone willing to invest money in its future? supporters of nuclear energy have been quick to say that their detractors tend to exaggerate the financial risks of nuclear energy, but the fact remains that 36 years ago, when the final report of the rasmussen group appeared in october 1975, it contained revised estimates of the consequences of the worst imaginable reactor consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option accident, which for property damage was raised from $6.2 billion to $14 billion (surrey & hugget, 1976). accounting for inflation, this would be about us$60.8 billion today (this number should be familiar to readers; as shown in figure 5 above, current cleanup costs for fukushima are estimated at $58 billion dollars). meanwhile, the projects themselves offer only temporary employment to most and can leave an area in a worse economic state than before. supporters of nuclear energy may tout the benefits of “savings” and “incentives” but these terms are really just part of a concerted effort to distract the average citizen from the fact that they are being bribed to allow nuclear power a place in their communities. consider this: it took over 20 years to for the korean government to receive approval for a low-level waste site; and jun et al. (2010) acknowledge that this approval was only granted by the public after “[the] korean government promised to pay a 300 million dollar subsidy and move korea hydro and nuclear power (khnp)’s headquarters to the area as the price for constructing low level waste site in the region”. subsidy based policy-making risks not just the homes and families of ourselves and our neighbors, but a huge area surrounding the site which gains no benefit at all from the introduction of the plant. simply put, there is no way to make a plan for mother nature, and any claim made to the contrary is false. the idea that a consumer should offer support to a project which may save him or her a little bit of money every month is fine. but if those savings have the potential to destroy entire ecosystems, contaminate hundreds of square miles of populated land, and expose people thousands of miles away to increased risks of cancer as well as other serious health risks, then it is not worth it. it has been estimated that ~733,000 curies of radioactive cesium were pumped into the pacific ocean in just fifteen months after the fukushima disaster (starr, 2012). since then, there have been reports of contaminated fish and foods as far away as california, and many areas bordering the pacific have reported rising rates of thyroid cancer in young children. the idea that nuclear power can simultaneously cost less and yet generate more cash flow is a compelling one; however there is no amount of money that can be saved which could ever outweigh such dire risks, which is why i must conclude that the argument for nuclear power as being economically sound is a faulty one. having considered both the drawbacks and benefits of nuclear power from a variety of standpoints, it now remains to consider alternate forms of energy production available in the world today. 5. sound alternatives to our growing energy needs 5.1 introduction while it may seem easy to simply bombard the nuclear industry with complaints and charges designed to show that it is a flawed means of production, all this evidence is useless if there are no better alternatives ready to take the place of nuclear power. any search for an appropriate alternative means of energy production must, therefore, be based on three main principles: a) any positive and negative effects on the local and global communities, b) the ecological impact of such a production method, and c) the financial viability of the production method. in addition, as mary olson points out, “nuclear power is […] dependent upon a grid consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option that is powered by other sources of energy, typically coal. this is due to the simple fact that nuclear reactors cannot “black start” – in other words, they depend on electric power from the external power grid to be able to come on-line” (olson, 2006). therefore, it must be said that the most ideal alternative must either be able to utilize current power grids with little to no restructuring, or to be able to operate independently of existing grids. thus, it will be the goal of this section to analyze several of the leading forms of energy production in the world today, as well as new technologies that are beginning to see expanded use, and determine which would be the best alternative option in lieu of nuclear power. 5.2 oil as a well-understood and time-honored mainstay of the energy industry, the main problem with oil is simply that it is an extremely limited commodity. even the most conservative estimates tell us that oil resources on the planet will be completely depleted before the end of this century, and even more alarming is the impact that increased oil usage can have on other facets of life around the world. plastics, asphalt and most lubricants, as well as many organic chemicals, are made using oil, so any strain on the world’s dwindling oil supply would have cascading effects on nearly all manufacturing industries. the only part of the world where any sizable reserves of oil have yet to be tapped are in the arctic refuge, separated from the rest of the world by hundreds of miles of trans-alaska pipeline. this poses a massive security risk; indeed, while testifying against arctic drilling, former cia director jim woolsey is quoted as calling the pipeline, “uncle sam’s ‘kick me’ sign” (lovins, 2008). as troubling as the economics of oil can be, the main issue is the political vulnerability of oil. bernard cohen warned in 1990 that rising oil prices could one day lead to us involvement in wars overseas; we will leave that statement to be taken on its own merit. due to both the dangers presented here, and the many stronger alternatives outlined below, i must agree with bernard cohen “that measures which increase our use of oil must be avoided as much as possible” (cohen, 1990). 5.3 coal as with oil, coal burning has historically been a widely used, reliable source of electricity. however, despite its high level of affordability and accessibility, it is also the most ecologically unsound form of energy production available today (except perhaps nuclear energy). for these reasons alone, coal fails to serve as a viable alternative to nuclear power. 5.4 natural gas the drawbacks to natural gas are virtually identical to those faced by oil. supply is largely limited, and natural gas is only cost-effective in areas close to where it is gathered. additionally, natural gas is far more efficient when put to use heating homes than generating electricity. for most of the world, natural gas resources are highly limited and prohibitively expensive, and thus are better used for other consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option purposes. subsequently, natural gas offers no benefits as an alternative to nuclear power. 5.5 hydropower one of the most significant and historically reliable forms of energy production comes in the form of hydroelectric power. hydroelectric power operates on the principle of water moving through a series of turbines, generating electricity as it does so. hydroelectric dams have powered much of norway and the united states’ power grid, as well as parts of quebec in canada. norway derives a great deal of its total electricity from hydroelectric power as well. however, as professor bernard cohen of the university of pittsburgh points out, there is a major hurdle to face: “[s]ites for generating hydroelectric power must be provided by nature, and in the united states nearly all of the more favorable sites nature has provided are already being used. there have been new projects for harnessing the energy in the flow of rivers, but these give relatively little electric power and cause serious fish kills, which lead to well-justified objections by environmental groups” (cohen, 1990). this problem holds true in many other parts of the world as well. hydroelectric power is such an excellent means of energy production that in most developed countries, it is already being utilized to the full extent. furthermore, the local ecological impacts of creating new dams, lakes, and rivers to power hydroelectric plants can be disastrous for local wildlife. thus, while hydroelectric is a strong method of energy production in and of itself, it cannot be said to be a strong alternative to nuclear power for meeting future energy demand. 5.6 wind power the fastest growing sector of energy production in the world today is wind power. in fact, according to amory lovins of the rocky mountain institute, “[nuclear power] added 1.4 billion watts […] it was a tenth what wind power added” (lovins, 2008). while older wind farms were known to create many noise complaints and posed a serious danger to local bird populations, newer, more efficient ecofriendly designs have minimized or eliminated these worries. in addition, many experts have cited wind power as being of exceptional economic quality; as mary olson states, “life cycle costs for nuclear power generation (in the usa) have been estimated at 12 cents a kilowatt hour, whereas life cycle costs for wind power in the same analysis is estimated at 4 cents a kilowatt hour” (olson, 2006). for further data on the cost comparisons of nuclear energy versus wind power, refer back to table 1, above. the main problem with wind power, if there is one, is the fact that “there is the very sticky question of what to do when the wind isn't blowing [since] using batteries to store the electricity is far too expensive (cohen, 1990). however, putting that aside, it would seem that wind power is a strong contender for “best alternative”, an opinion which seems to be reinforced by solid, openly available industry data and the shifting energy climate in many eu countries. 5.7 solar power consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option at first glance, solar power would seem to be the most ideal option available. what could be more natural, clean, and harmless than using the sun’s rays to generate our power? however, traditional photovoltaic generators face a number of problems. while the cost of operating a solar plant is very low, so too is the efficiency of these plants; the rate at which most current generation solar panels work is far too slow to meet demand. though it is true that in recent years there has been a great deal of technological advancement in the field of photovoltaics, most of these advances are far more economical when used to upgrade existing plants rather than build new ones. this issue is one faced by the nuclear industry as well; amory lovins tells us that most of the new electricity generated in 2006 (the last year in which data is available) was “from upgrading old plants, because the new ones they built were smaller than the retirements of old plants” (lovins, 2008). while there is a great deal that can be said for traditional solar power, the main difficulty faced by photovoltaic plants is similar to that of wind plants; the sheer amount of power generated during operation cannot be stored for later use at an economical rate, and peak generation periods do not coincide with peak demand periods. 5.8 artificial photosynthesis last on our list is the newly emerging field of artificial photosynthesis (ap). not satisfied with the rate at which plants naturally photosynthesize light, scientists at the joint center for artificial photosynthesis (jcap) have been exploring new methods to determine whether it is actually possible to improve on the efficiency rates of natural photosynthesis. by using a multi-layered design very similar to that of a plant cell in nature, minus all the other components required for life, it is believed that they can “streamline” the process of photosynthesis and enhance it, providing actual liquid fuel made from sunlight. this puts ap in a whole different category of energy production; one which goes beyond simple electricity generation and allows us to make a combustible fuel which is totally renewable that, when burned, does not harm the environment. as caltech professor nate lewis puts it, “forty percent of global transportation – heavy duty trucks, ships, and aircraft – cannot be electrified […] you’ve got to find a high-energy-density, carbon neutral liquid fuel for global commerce” (silberg, 2013). meanwhile, berkeley labs researchers are also exploring the applications of ap through the development of a nano-engineered micro fluidic electrolyzer. this technology generates hydrogen and oxygen via the use of a chemically inert wall which separates anodes and cathodes. essentially, water (h20), is broken down into potential energy (h2) and oxygen (o2) on a cellular scale. the greatest advantage of this technology, however, is its flexibility. virtually any part of the structure can be swapped out for optimization with no loss in basic function. “proof of concept” designs for ap technology are expected to be completed sometime in 2015. even more encouraging is the recent discovery of examples of photosynthesis in places devoid of visible light. through manipulation of the spectrum of light that the subject organisms were exposed to, it was found that some plants are able to photosynthesize lights along the infrared wavelength, though the general consensus is that the process is far from efficient. what this means is that as ap technology advances, new generators will be able to utilize not just the visible consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option spectrum of light, but low energy wavelengths as well; allowing for greater overall energy output from the same level of input. 5.9 conclusion – wind power, and an eye towards future technologies while there may not be a clear leader in alternative energy, the fact remains that there are several strong alternatives to be had, none of which can come close to the negative effects caused by nuclear power. however, it must be acknowledged that none of these options are perfect. oil, coal, and natural gas all face the issues when it comes to availability, ecological impact, and overall cost factors, though they do have an advantage over nuclear power when considering construction and operational costs. hydropower is an extremely efficient energy producer, but as stated in section 5.5, there are few suitable locations left which have not already been utilized, and the construction of hydroelectric dams has been shown in the past to have incredibly deleterious effects on surrounding regions, including the destruction of low-lying communities, and wide-scale impacts on local wildlife which are unable to adjust to the changing landscape. wind power has already been proven to be cleaner, more cost efficient and far more environmentally friendly than nuclear power, with new wind turbine designs having next to no impact on the surrounding area. while solar power is an incredibly clean and readily available source of energy when compared to nuclear, it lacks the ability to act as a standalone energy provider for mass consumption, and would be better relegated to a secondary support role in areas where demands on the local power grid are unusually high. the final option presented, artificial photosynthesis, has a great deal of potential, but even the most optimistic projections indicate that we are still several decades away from being able to utilize it effectively on a large scale. overall, wind power serves as far and away the best option we have available today, due to its reliability, flexibility, and low risk when compared to nuclear power. one of the major claims of nuclear power proponents is that nuclear energy possesses long-term sustainability with a high rate of efficiency at a relatively low cost; therefore this should be a major selling point for consideration of alternatives to nuclear power. wind power more than meets this goal, with the added advantage of having little to no negative ecological impact. it is this researcher’s opinion that given the overall adaptability and potential that we have seen thus far, wind power offers us an excellent current generation solution to the energy crisis we now face; however, a great deal of the capital currently being used to expand nuclear power in developed countries should be diverted to the research and expansion of artificial photosynthesis as a means of mass energy production in the future. 6. decision-making policy in regards to nuclear adoption 6.1 introduction consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option whenever nuclear power is adopted (or expanded, as the case may be) in an area, the decision to do so is generally a result of a long period of analysis and public hearings on the factors discussed in the preceding sections. while it would seem from the facts presented up to this point that nuclear adoption would rarely make it past these proposal stages, this is not the case. therefore, it is the primary goal of this final section to revisit the main points which are brought up in relation to nuclear power. it is my hope that by analyzing these points from a decision-making perspective, the reader will be able to determine who makes the final call regarding nuclear adoption in a given region: the public majority, elected lawmakers, and private industrial interests. figure 4 experimental design: “nano-engineered micro fluidic electrolyzer” 6.2 public stances on nuclear adoption since the mid 1960s, japan has been among the countries most willing to embrace the potential of nuclear power. the world nuclear association, however, reported that “following the tsunami which killed 19,000 people and which triggered the fukushima nuclear accident (which killed no-one), public sentiment shifted markedly so that there were wide public protests calling for nuclear power to be abandoned” (wna, nuclear power in japan). it is important to note here that a 2009 survey showed that support for nuclear power is far stronger in countries where it has already been introduced (see figure 5). kovacs and gordelier attribute this trend to the idea that “people living in countries with nuclear power plants are more supportive of nuclear energy because they are more familiar with it, better informed about it, and more aware of its benefits”. they believe that, through further education of the public, social acceptance of nuclear power will rapidly increase in many countries. without being informed, there is no way that the public can ever make an informed decision about nuclear power. that is why when charlie smith of russia today reported on february 14th, 2014 that “a commentator [toru nakakita, an economics professor at the university of toyo in tokyo] on japan's radio 1 resigned after he was instructed not to discuss the nuclear accident until after a gubernatorial election”, a dire picture for how nuclear policy is made and reported on within the country is painted. representatives of the radio station claimed that the reason for the censorship was due to a desire to offer an opposing viewpoint on the topic, but that they were unable to find anyone to do so. this failure to communicate openly with the public seems endemic at every level in japan; in the nature piece consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option “nationalize the fukushima daiichi atomic plant”, japanese house of representatives members tomoyuki taira and yukio hatoyama reported that while trying to research the exact cause and nature of the fdnd, the tokyo electric power company (tepco) “refused to supply” any information about the plant. when they finally did hand over a copy of the plant’s operating manual, key passages had been blacked out due to “intellectual property rights and security concerns”. all in all, it was more than six months before investigators were able to obtain full disclosure (as far as they know) about the plant and what transpired there. this speaks to a key concern of many citizens of countries around the world: the idea that “administrative responsibility only works satisfactorily with restraint and reasonableness on all sides, and where the governed have confidence in their elected representatives and the officials serving them” (surrey & hugget, 1976). however, given the climate of distrust and secrecy seen today, it would seem that ‘administrative responsibility’ is nowhere to be found. figure 5: “percentage of people supporting the use of nuclear power in each of the 25 eu countries, after dividing them into countries with and without nuclear power plants” (kovacs and gordelier, 2009). 6.3 elected officials’ stances on nuclear adoption the government stance on nuclear power varies from region to region and, as is to be expected, is affected in large part by public opinion. however, there is also evidence to suggest that, in cases such as that of the fukushima daiichi disaster, the ruling body also goes to great lengths to avoid controversy, often at the expense of the health and livelihood of the citizens whose interests it professes to serve. a prime example of this occurred roughly a month after the fdnd, on april 19th, 2011, when “japan chose to drastically increase its official “safe” radiation exposure levels from 1 msv to 20 msv per year – 20 times higher than the us exposure limit” (starr, 2012). it did not escape the notice of this researcher that april 19th was the exact day that yasunari et al. (2011) finished gathering data for their report, “cesium137 deposition and contamination of japanese soils due to the fukushima nuclear accident”, the findings for which were not published until fall of that year. in the report, it was stated that large amounts of cesium had saturated not just the majority of the island of honshu, but had been carried far out into the pacific ocean as well. based on this consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option information, it seems somewhat unlikely that the japanese government’s choosing the exact day that yasunari’s team finished gathering data to increase their safe exposure levels by an incredible 2000% was purely coincidental. note the gradual shrinkage of the zones deemed too hazardous for human health in figure 6 despite cesium-137’s marked tendency to “…quickly become ubiquitous, contaminating water, soil, plants and animals [as it] bioaccumulates, bioconcentrates, and biomagnifies [while moving] up the food chain” (starr, 2012). given this information, it would seem that the hazardous zone would increase, not grow smaller, as time went by. figure 6: “the evolution of evacuation areas around fukushima daiichi” (starr) japan’s stance on nuclear energy has for a long time been well established. as is stated in the opening paragraphs of nuclear power in japan, published by the world nuclear association, “japan’s first commercial nuclear reactors were brought online in 1966” and, due to its historical reliance on imports (~84% by the wna’s latest numbers), “nuclear power has been a national strategic priority since 1973” (wna, nuclear power in japan). as stated above in section 6.2, public opinion shifted drastically away from nuclear power following the fdnd, with an "innovative energy and environment strategy" [being] released in september 2012 recommending a phase-out of nuclear power by 2040. in the short term, reactors currently operable but shut down would be allowed to restart once they gained permission from the incoming nuclear regulation authority (nra), but a 40-year operating limit would be imposed” (wna, nuclear power in japan). however, just four days later, officials switched from a general approval of the plan to one which stated that “flexibility was important in considering energy policy” (wna, nuclear power in japan). while it may be easy for some to dismiss this as the government’s way of recovering from a brief period of “crisis-driven, ad hoc energy policy” (hayashi & hughes, 2013), the fact remains that in other countries, such as germany and italy, the sudden shift in public opinion, as well as the serious long term effects which continue to unfold as a result of the fdnd, led to the decision “to immediately shut down some of the nuclear reactors or abandon plans to build new ones” (hayashi & hughes, 2013). in fact, as mentioned in section 5, above, it was noted that the push for denuclearization and a greater focus on “green energy” now seen in many consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option european nations has not only proceeded without incident, but has resulted in a better standard of living for many citizens. why then, have japan and the united states, arguably the only two nations to suffer any major difficulties as a result of nuclear adoption, insisted on a continued expansion of nuclear power within their borders? in japan at least, the reasons could be largely based on their “almost total lack of natural resources (in 2010, japan imported 99.6%, 96.3%, and 100% of its petroleum, natural gas, and coal, respectively)” (hayashi & hughes, 2013). in the united states, however, the answer does not seem so simple. over forty years ago, surrey & hugget (1976) stated the very rational concern that “[t]he government may side too easily with the 'atomic industrial establishment' – the community of interest between electric utilities, agencies promoting nuclear power, and the manufacturers of nuclear plant and may use its party majority to steamroller objections in parliament”. it seems today that their fears have come to fruition. 6.4 private interests’ stances on nuclear power the impact of private interests on policy making in regards to nuclear power cannot be understated. “nuclear power has been written off many times since three mile island yet, despite the crushing blows it has suffered – serious accidents and continuing real increases in costs – it has retained, and even strengthened its support, particularly at the highest political levels” (thomas, 2012). to some extent, the introduction of benefits and subsidies for nuclear adoption has helped to spur the growth of nuclear power in some countries, but as kato et al. (2013) note, “after the accident, benefit recognition of utility bill refunds clearly declined, while that of public facilities did not, suggesting the influence of a bribery effect”. but where exactly do the “bribes” come from? it can’t be from private investors, since as pointed out in section 4.3, renowned scholar amory lovins has stated that wall street is not investing capital into the industry, despite the considerable tax benefits and subsidies associated with nuclear power. since the benefits are given out by the government, and government dollars are tax dollars, we are in effect being bribed with our own money to accept nuclear power. 6.5 conclusion – policy is affected by personal interests when responding to questions involving the continued construction of a nuclear waste storage facility against the wishes of locals, senator james inhofe [rok] is quoted as saying, “our generation has a legal obligation to build yucca mountain; we’ve collected the money to pay for it, and we are 20 years overdue in getting it done” (inhofe, 2007). let us break down and examine this (seemingly) innocuous statement from an american lawmaker. “our generation has a legal obligation…” at any given time in america, there could be five or maybe even six generations represented to some degree in an area, each with their own needs and wants. and what of future generations? shouldn’t they be taken into consideration as well? given the fact that “cesium-137 has a half-life of 30 years, and since it takes about 10 half-lives for any radionuclide to disappear” (starr, 2012), it would seem so. and while we are on the topic, to consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option whom exactly do we hold a legal obligation? the citizens who stand to gain (or lose) the most from nuclear adoption, or the nuclear industry itself? either way, the nuclear industry is (presumably) made up of us voters, so wouldn’t they be held at the same level as any other voting member of the community; and as such be subject to the whims of the majority? sen. inhofe doesn’t seem to think so. “…we’ve collected the money to pay for it…”, this is true; the tax dollars to pay for this were collected long ago. if this is truly a determining factor in the decision to continue the expansion of nuclear energy in the united states, then it would seem that the funds in question could be either refunded as an economic stimulus package or diverted for use as subsidies and benefits meant to reinforce struggling communities through public works and infrastructure projects. indeed, as has been stated in other sections, such works are some of the strongest supports offered in favor of nuclear expansion. “…and we are 20 years overdue in getting it done.” claiming that you should be allowed to finish a job simply because you are 20 years behind schedule is like a heart surgeon saying he should be allowed to continue an operation “because the patient is dead already”. in the professional world, failing to complete a job in a timely manner does not mean you get infinitely more time to complete it; it means you are fired. they even have a term for it: lack of productivity. the american government is not “producing” anything by its continued sponsorship of nuclear energy; why should they be allowed to throw hard-earned tax dollars away “on principle”? referring back to figure 5 above, while it is true that information and education seem to have a strong effect on the likelihood of nuclear adoption, there is not a single country out of the 25 presented where nuclear power was favored by a majority of the population. in fact, out of the 13 countries where nuclear acceptance was highest, the average rate of approval was only ~25% of the total population. thus, i conclude based on the evidence presented that the final decision to adopt nuclear power rests with the elected officials of a region rather than with the citizens who put them in office. 7. closing thoughts the question we must ask ourselves is, given that the nuclear industry has proven itself time and again to be both a financially and ecologically untenable one, why has it continued to flourish, largely against the will of the public? while there may be no easy answer, the data presented here today seems to support two arguments: (1) that nuclear energy is far less safe and economically sound than we have been led to believe, and (2) there has been an organized effort over the last 40+ years to hide that truth from the general populace. as seen in the preceding sections, nuclear power has few advantages over alternative forms of energy production when put to scrutiny and indeed manages to outclass every alternative in terms of inherent danger. even when a majority of the data presented is taken from pro-nuclear or unbiased sources, the information presented here has the appearance of bias simply because an overwhelming majority of the data, including virtually all quantitative data on the topic, undermines the argument for growth of the nuclear industry. we humans as a race have advanced to consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option a level of technological sophistication where scientists are using water to turn sunlight into combustible fuel, and yet we generate electricity using a medium with the potential to cause irreparable damage to our worldwide economy and, more importantly, to the environment. think back to steven starr’s words in section 2.4; three years after the fact billions of dollars are being invested into fixing a mistake that never should have occurred, and the best solution we have is to spend the next several years permanently removing ten tons (~2,641.72 gallons) of seawater every day from our water cycle to prevent a meltdown, a process resulting in millions of barrels of highly irradiated seawater, each essentially a dirty bomb waiting to go off. nuclear power is, at its core, a very complex, expensive, and hazardous solution to what might seem to be a simple problem. the nuclear industry thrives on an environment of public ignorance, blind faith, and incentives designed to buy our acquiescence while better alternatives are consistently passed over by policy-makers with questionable motives. when j. barnie beasley jr., president of southern nuclear operating company, spoke before the energy and natural resources committee in 2006, he said, “the administration and congress demonstrated strong leadership by enacting the energy policy act of 2005, which encourages diversity of energy sources, including emission-free sources of electricity, such as nuclear energy” (beasley, 2006). however, the truth is that when the entire cradle-to-grave cycle is considered, nuclear power is actually one of the worst forms of energy production for a country aiming to lower emissions. that he could speak such a blatant mistruth and keep a straight face speaks volumes more about his own character than it does about the fundamentally flawed behemoth that is the nuclear industry. i can only assume that his success lay in part with the fact that so many of the committee members were “in on the joke”, as it were. based on the data gathered here, it is obvious that nuclear power is a means of energy production that should have been done away with long ago. there is little to no documented evidence that nuclear adoption has any appreciable beneficial impact in the long-term for adopting communities, yet it continues to be pushed at the behest of politicians and nuclear lobbyists. it has been proven both in theory and in practice that there are better energy alternatives, both in terms of overall cost and efficiency, yet in certain countries it is still claimed by many to be the answer to all the world’s energy needs. what’s more, every nuclear plant currently in operation has the potential to devastate huge portions of our world ecology. yet when things do go wrong, data is manipulated or downplayed in order to minimize cleanup costs and public disapproval, often at the cost of the general public’s health and safety. it is only through a concerted effort demanding change that policy will ever shift appropriately. such change must begin with a greater level of public education and awareness about the costs, both monetary and otherwise, of nuclear power. consilience davis: the need for a new, clear option bibliography (2012). three mile island accident. world nuclear association, retrieved from http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/safety-and-security/safety-ofplants/three-mile-island-accident/ (2014). the economics of nuclear power. world nuclear association, retrieved from http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/economic-aspects/economicsof-nuclear-power/ beasley, j. b. energy and natural resources committee, united states senate. 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(2011). cesium-137 deposition and contamination of japanese soils due to the fukushima nuclear accident. proceedings of the national academy of sciences of the united states of america, 108(49), 19530-19534. retrieved from http://www.pnas.org.proxy.library.vcu.edu/content/108/49/19530 consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 5, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 201-216 the winding ways of development: a historical journey of a road in the putumayo region of colombia simón uribe martínez department of geography and environment the london school of economics and political science s.uribe1@lse.ac.uk abstract roads are by nature a contested subject. although they represent vital infrastructure to enable the flow of people, goods and ideas, their potential detrimental effects for humans and the environment have been a constant source of debate and criticism. this is particularly true for natural resource-rich regions such as the amazon, where the development of roads has been directly associated with rampant deforestation and resource extraction, uncontrolled colonization and dispossession of indigenous lands. yet the impact of roads goes far beyond their direct social and environmental costs and benefits. in many places of the world, roads have a strong evocative power, as they represent spaces that materially and symbolically embody ideas such as „modernity,‟ „progress,‟ „backwardness‟ and „development.‟ combining multi-sited ethnography and historical analysis, this photo essay attempts to document the past, present, and likely future of a road in putumayo, a region of southwest colombia that has been traditionally considered a marginal frontier, and which has also become internationally known for the production of cocaine and the violence that has come with it. the road, as i will try to show, invites reflection about the complexities inherent to the different meanings and realities of development. author’s note this paper is part of an ongoing doctoral research project supported by the wenner-gren foundation phd fieldwork grants, the lse phd scholarship and the university of london central research fund. the author would like to thank gustavo torres in putumayo and the capuchin provincial archive in catalonia, for allowing me to digitally print some of the photographs included in the essay. the author would also like to thank maría elisa balén, nicolás cárdenas, catalina holguín and thomas martois for their useful comments and suggestions. keywords: roads, development, putumayo. mailto:s.uribe1@lse.ac.uk 202 consilience 1. first capuchin friars established in putumayo, teaching the gospel to indigenous children. santiago, 1903. capuchin provincial archive of catalonia (cpac) the capuchin missionaries arrived to putumayo in 1899, invited by the colombian government to „civilize‟ the indigenous tribes scattered across the region. since the state was practically absent and did not have the financial means nor the interest to expand its territorial control to a region of the country deemed remote and inhospitable, capuchins were given free rein to impose „sovereignty‟ on the land and its „savage‟ inhabitants. thus, along with spiritual jurisdiction over the whole territory, they were given civil, judiciary and police powers over the indigenous peoples, who at the time did not qualify as citizens since most of them, the government judged, had not yet been „reduced to civilized life.‟ consilience uribe: winding ways of development 2. sibundoy valley, c.1910 (cpac) the missionaries embraced the assignment with religious fervor and military severity. they established the mission‟s headquarters in the valley of sibundoy, a plateau located 2000 meters above the sea level in the heart of the andes, inhabited by the kamsá and ingano indians. soon, however, they found what they thought would be the major obstacle to achieve their long-term goal. father montclar, mission chief and a very enthusiastic friar, wrote a letter to the ministry of government in 1909 summarizing the problem: “those territories,” wrote the friar in reference to the putumayo lowlands, “are destined to be one of the richest and most peopled places of colombia, if only the government would pay some attention. these lands are completely isolated from the republic, and only some bold caucheros have penetrated this rich new world, a world like the one columbus dreamed about, by breaching abysses and crossing marshes, climbing rocks and defying wild rivers.”1 father montclar thus envisioned what he would later declare as the major accomplishment of the mission in the country: the construction of a road linking the andes mountains with the amazon forests. 204 consilience 3. the capuchins supervising the indians and peasants working on the road, 1909-1930 (cpac) fearing that the peruvians, engaged in the rubber trade and excited by the friars‟ accounts of inconmesurable riches, would invade the territory, the central government provided the mission with the financial means required for the titanic enterprise. the mission devoted all its energy to the bridge-building project. employing more than 1,500 indian and peasant workers, the road advanced slowly but relentlessly through the abrupt topography of the cordillera. it took nearly three years to complete the 50 km strech descending the eastern slopes of the andes, which separated the sibundoy valley from the vast lowlands of putumayo. consilience uribe: winding ways of development 4. inauguration of the pasto-mocoa road. march 10, 1912 (cpac). father monctlar (on horse, second left) and members of a national government commission welcomed by the indigenous music band of san andrés (sibundoy valley) altough it took another 20 years to cut through the damp terrain of the plains to finally reach the port city of puerto asis on the putumayo river, the completion of the first section of the road in 1912 was received with numerous celebrations and adulations for the capuchin mission. the government published a booklet for the inauguration filled with flamboyant phrases and manifestos such as this one, written by the general inspector of the road, which emphatically reads: “wounded by the strokes of relentless athletes, the unsurmountable wall, which like a sentinel placed by mighty nature blocked the way to the most beautiful and rich part of our territory as if it wanted to guard a potentate anxious to give happiness to all men and generously share its infinite bounty, was finally defeated” (informe, 1912, p. 6). 206 consilience 5. alluvial gold mining, n.d. (top left, gt); colono from puerto asis with jaguar, 1930 (right, cpac); capuchin cattle farm, sibundoy, 1912 (bottom left, cpac) the indians were to pay a big toll. as part of their compulsory duties to the church they were frequently forced to work on the road without remuneration. the road also attracted thousands of new settlers in search of those „empty‟ and „rich‟ lands. since the capuchins thought the best way to christianize and „civilize‟ the indians was to expose them to white and mestizo settlers, they encouraged the establishment of the newcomers by dispossessing the natives of their ancestral lands. the most radical experiment was carried out in sibundoy: most of the valley was officially declared vacant in 1911, and its land assigned to the mission‟s sustenance farms and the founding of mestizo towns. the drastic demographic change during the first three decades of the past century epitomizes the dramatic social and cultural conflict in the valley: from 1906 to 1933, the indigenous population of putumayo decreased from 32,600 to 13,997, while the number of settlers grew in the same period from 2,200 to 21,587 (bonilla, 1972, p. 186). consilience uribe: winding ways of development 6. embarkation of troops in puerto asis, 1932 (cpac); first trucks arriving in putumayo, c.1955 (gt) pressed by the growing tensions with peru in the late 1920s and foreseeing a potential armed confrontation, the colombian government decided to widen the capuchin road to allow the transport of heavy artillery and military vehicles. it took almost 30 years to complete the 220 km dirt road connecting the andean city of pasto with puerto asis. the road—classified as a „national defense road‟—not only allowed the migration of thousands of poor settlers fleeing the political violence that had taken over most of the country‟s rural areas since early 1940; more importantly, it directed the way colonization and settlement unfolded across the whole region. 208 consilience 7. town born along the road. villa garzón, 1952 (gt), and 2010 (author) rolf wesche (1974), a german geographer who came to putumayo in the early 1960s to research colonial development in the region, noted that at least 90 percent of the population lived at a maximum distance of one km off the road or main rivers. those traffic arteries were not only synonymous with access to markets and mobility but were “a place of excursion, the route through which news travelled, and the primary means of social contact” (p.2). a distance of just one hundred meters off the road or river, he added, “could represent the difference between taking active part of daily life or total isolation” (p.2). asking people what issues they considered a major obstacle for the region‟s development, the great majority answered transport problems as the most important. consilience uribe: winding ways of development 8. oil pipes and land cleared for cattle pastures and coca crops along the road. august, 2010 (author) the „development‟ and „progress‟ the road promised decades earlier, however, did not materialize. instead, it assisted a process of chaotic colonization and deforestation, and consolidated the extractive character of the region, which traces back from the rubber boom in the early 1900s, to the discovery of oil in the 1960s, to the explosion of coca growing and cocaine production since the early 1980s. 210 consilience 9. truck accident, c.1960 (gt); crosses and commemorative plaques by the side of the road in the sector of murallas, july 2010 (author) the road, moreover, had an additional issue. the engineer commissioned by the government to enhance the capuchin road made what many deemed an irrational and catastrophic decision. on the most critical section of the road—the steep descent from the eastern slopes of the cordillera—the engineer avoided the trail that the capuchins had forged. instead, he designed a new road following a longer and more abrupt route. those who travel along this hazardous unpaved road now pay the price for his decision. eventually, this road came to be infamously known as „el trampolín de la muerte’—the springboard of death—due to the dozens of people who die in car accidents each year. the most tragic event took place in july 1991, when in the sector known as „murallas‟ (walls), a huge land slide buried several buses and cars, killing more than a hundred people. only 50 bodies were recovered. consilience uribe: winding ways of development 10. the springboard of death, july, 2010 (author) the springboard of death has caused countless tragedies, many of them echoing nationally, ironically reinforcing the image of putumayo as a remote and treacherous territory. its fame has even reached foreign tourists, who through internet forums and blogs tout the road as a daring experience for those who like to avoid the „beaten track‟ and taste something wild.2 putumayenses, however, have invested this road with a moral content in which enduring feelings and memories of isolation, marginality, and abandonment from the state converge. from public demonstrations to facebook groups,3 generations of putumayenses have fiercely campaigned for the replacement of the road. 212 consilience 11. national forest reserve of the upper mocoa river basin, june 2010 (author) although for decades the government remained reluctant to listen to the claims of putumayenses, the construction of an alternate road—which, ironically, will follow the same route chosen by the capuchins one hundred years ago—seems to be a certainty. recently, the government finally signed a loan with the international development bank (idb) to finance the project, promoted as a pioneering model of sustainable development, as it promises to foster economic growth and regional integration without compromising the environment. yet the passage of the new road through the middle of a national forest reservoir has been a point of contention on environmental and social grounds. ngos such as ilsa4 and socivil putumayo5 are sceptical of the assumed benefits and have emphatically highlighted that it could expose a vast area of forest to natural resource extraction, causing more deforestation, poaching and large-scale mining. consilience uribe: winding ways of development 12. indigenous communities’ demonstrations. june-july, 2010 (author) concerns regarding the environmental and social costs of the future road are only one part of the picture. another issue, which is likely to be more complex and difficult to settle, is current indigenous claims to their ancestral territory. with the imminent construction of the road and the project‟s plan to enlarge the actual national forest reservoir as a measure of environmental compensation, the tension between the government and the indigenous communities has risen sharply. in june 2010, about 5,000 kamsá and ingano indians blocked the road into the sibundoy valley (top left and right) to protest the measure and assert themselves as the legitimate owners of the road territory. d3ays later, in a more symbolic demonstration, around three hundred walked for two days across the 50 km abrupt trail father montclar considered his magnum opus (bottom left). 214 consilience 13. peasant settlers growing coffee and staple crops in the vicinity of the future road. august, 2010 (author) the demonstrations and protests of the indigenous communities have not been in vain. they have persuaded the government to start a negotiation process. however, the problem is not confined to the disagreements between the government and indigenous communities. another relevant, though not as visible, party, is the dozens of mestizo peasant families living within the area that the future road will affect. although they are aware of the indigenous claims over the territories, the mestizos also consider themselves the land‟s legitimate owners. referring to indigenous rights, a peasant told me recently, “what is the meaning of ancestral anyway? we were born and grew up here. our grandparents arrived here many decades ago; they came walking through the capuchin road and settled here to work the land. so this land is ancestral for us, too” (peasant settler from putumayo, personal communication, june 20th, 2010). consilience uribe: winding ways of development 14. the road ahead will the future road be an opportunity to change a long history of dispossession and environmental destruction to one where development does not clash with nature and the welfare? according the government and the idb, the road project is designed to be an examplar of sustainable development for the country. but, and regardless of the road‟s assumed benefits, it is clear that the road itself will not be a panacea for the region and its people, especially when these kinds of projects cannot be isolated from broader political and economic dynamics. the biggest challenge will then not be for the government but for the people of putumayo: they must build a shared view of the region they want and fight for it. the recent indigenous demonstrations and the increasing participation of local ngos and social movements represent a huge step forward. still, as has been true literally and metaphorically for decades, the road is long and the obstacles many. endnotes 1 archivo general de la nación, bogotá. fondo ministerio de obras públicas, tomo 1407, folio 194-195. 2 see: vivalatinamerica (2010, january 28). the best (and most dangerous) way to get to pasto [blog entry]. retrieved from 216 consilience http://www.lonelyplanet.com/travelblogs/508/33196/the+best+%28and+most+ dangerous%29+way+to+get+to+pasto?destid=363333 (2010, september 15). gauchito gil (2010, march 28). san agustin and the death road to pasto, colombia [blog entry]. retrieved from http://www.lonelyplanet.com/travelblogs/967/46035/san+agustin+and+the+dea th+road+to+pasto,+colombia?destid=363333 (2010, september 15). 3 see: por el cierre definitivo de la vía pasto-mocoa [facebook group]. http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=672819922&v=wall&story_fbid=463293 399922#!/group.php?gid=24417331812&ref=ts 4 latin american institute for an alternative society. non-profit organization which offers alternative legal services for social organizations and has been involved in the debate regarding the impacts of infrastructure integration megaprojects in south america. for more information visit: http://ilsa.org.co:81/node/141 5 a regional platform of leaders and social movements committed to the promotion of participatory citizenship and the environmental conservation of the andean and amazon regions. socivil has been actively involved in the consultation process for the alternate road. for more information visit: http://socivilputumayo.org/ bibliography bonilla, victor daniel (1972). servants of god or masters of men? the story of a capuchin mission in amazonia. london: penguin. informe sobre la terminación del camino a mocoa (1912). pasto: imprenta del departamento. wesche, rolf (1974). el desarrollo del poblamiento en el alto valle del río putumayo. bogotá: igag. bibliographic note photographs listed under the abbreviations cpac (capuchin provincial archive of catalonia, putumayo mission photographic archive) and gt (gustavo torres, private collection) are permitted to be digitally printed in this essay. http://www.lonelyplanet.com/travelblogs/508/33196/the+best+%28and+most+dangerous%29+way+to+get+to+pasto?destid=363333 http://www.lonelyplanet.com/travelblogs/508/33196/the+best+%28and+most+dangerous%29+way+to+get+to+pasto?destid=363333 http://www.lonelyplanet.com/travelblogs/967/46035/san+agustin+and+the+death+road+to+pasto,+colombia?destid=363333 http://www.lonelyplanet.com/travelblogs/967/46035/san+agustin+and+the+death+road+to+pasto,+colombia?destid=363333 http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=672819922&v=wall&story_fbid=463293399922#!/group.php?gid=24417331812&ref=ts http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=672819922&v=wall&story_fbid=463293399922#!/group.php?gid=24417331812&ref=ts http://ilsa.org.co:81/node/141 http://socivilputumayo.org/ consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 20, iss. 1 (2018), pp. 43–61 the solar and wind economy in ohio: industry analysis and policy implications colton smith voinovich school of leadership and public affairs, ohio university. cs029613@ohio.edu david driver voinovich school of leadership and public affairs, ohio university. dd058713@ohio.edu gilbert michaud ph.d., assistant professor of practice, voinovich school of leadership and public affairs, ohio university. michaudg@ohio.edu abstract after historically being driven by coal and, in more recent years, natural gas, ohio’s energy industry has experienced notable growth in installed solar and wind capacity. due to changes in consumer tastes and preferences, an overall decline in expenses, and environmental concerns about coal mining and hydraulic fracturing, among others, both public and industry support for renewables has grown. however, ohio’s renewable energy policies have not consistently aligned with this support. this paper synthesizes reports and analyzes energy industry employment and capacity data in order to summarize the trends within ohio’s present-day energy industry. after a brief surge, wind activity has stagnated, in part due to expansion of the turbine property line setbacks law. wind employment has also been relatively erratic, seeing spikes and rapid declines that average to a growth of 13.6% per year from 2013–2016. conversely, solar energy capacity has grown a bit more steadily due to fewer regulatory restrictions as well as supportive state net metering policies. correspondingly, solar employment has grown more consistently at a rate of 11.3% per year during our study years. this paper highlights these trends, discusses policy implications moving forward, and makes recommendations for ohio to stimulate the deployment of additional renewable energy capacity in future years. to accomplish this task, and to enhance sustainable development via renewable energy, we suggest mailto:cs029613@ohio.edu mailto:dd058713@ohio.edu mailto:michaudg@ohio.edu 44 consilience that ohio ease its wind setbacks and continues to protect the state’s renewable portfolio standard and net metering laws. keywords: renewable energy, solar, wind, public policy, economic impact, ohio consilience smith, driver, & michaud: ohio solar & wind introduction over the past couple of decades, both solar and wind energy have experienced substantial growth in the united states (u.s.). for instance, in 2015, 26% and 41% of the nation’s added power generation capacity came from solar and wind respectively (united states energy information administration 2018), outpacing many traditional resources. this development has come as part of a nationwide trend away from coal and toward other energy sources such as natural gas, solar, and wind. this trend is particularly pronounced in the state of ohio, where the coal industry has consistently declined since the 1990s. the utica and marcellus shale plays are creating fuel booms in the natural gas industry, and reduced development costs have spurred growth in the solar and wind sectors. in particular, power generation capacity in ohio from natural gas has grown by more than 8 gigawatts (gw), from 1,251 megawatts (mw) in 1996 to 9,660 mw in 2016 (untied states energy information administration 2018) – one of the largest gas growth spurts in the country. while the majority of ohio’s energy generation growth has been in natural gas, solar and wind have also experienced rapid growth in the last decade. from an environmental sustainability perspective, these two sectors have numerous advantages when compared to coal and natural gas. for example, in 2016 the ohio power sector produced 144,210 short tons of sulfur dioxide (so2) and 81,618,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide (co2), largely due to the burning of fossil fuels (united states energy information association 2018). in turn, this has resulted in the state being ranked second and fifth in the country in overall emissions of each gas, respectively (united states energy information association 2018). these pollutants have added to the growing concentration of greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions in the state, which is one of the most influential contributors to harmful climate change impacts (wubbles and jain 2001). since electricity generation is one of the largest contributors to ghg emissions and given the fact that energy demand and consumption continues to rise, developing sustainable energy solutions remains a critical issue. solar and wind generation expansion has been shown, both in literature and in practice, to reduce these pollution figures. a national study by the national renewable energy laboratory (nrel) found that, on average, producing one megawatt hour (mwh) of electricity with solar photovoltaic (pv) energy reduces emissions by eight pounds of so2 and 1,400 pounds of co2 (nrel 2004). similarly, according to estimates by the american wind energy association (awea), producing 1 mwh of wind energy reduces emission by 1.5 pounds of so2 and 1,550 pounds of co2 (awea 2016). this is important given the fact that these emissions (such as co2) have been shown to have eminent negative effects on health (e.g., lung 46 consilience damage from inhalation) and climate change (more severe weather, changes in food growth patterns, etc.). on top of the pollution caused by the burning of fuel for electricity, coal and natural gas also rely on extensive by-product disposal and resource gathering techniques, such as hydraulic fracturing (i.e., ‘fracking’) and coal mining, which result in damages to forested areas and pollution in the water supply. while renewables such as solar and wind do create problems such as land and habitat losses, high water use, and the use of potentially hazardous materials in the manufacturing process, the benefits of sustainable electricity generation, acid rain declines, emissions reductions, and climate change mitigation still outweigh these costs, especially when compared to the alternatives. moreover, the costs of solar and wind energy development continue to decline every year. estimates by the international renewable energy agency (2016) show that solar pv could see up to a 57% cost decline by 2025 and that wind could see declines of up to 15%, positioning these industries as a viable supplement to the ohio energy portfolio in the future. nevertheless, coal and natural gas continue to dominate ohio’s electricity generation, with 86.6% of total power capability (defined as the production output of a system at peak conditions) consisting of either natural gas or coal-fired power plants (united states energy information administration 2018). ohio’s first core policy that helped pave the path for renewable energy development, especially of the distributed variety, was its net metering policy. originally passed in 1999 as senate bill (sb) 3, this program enabled customers to generate electricity (from sources including solar, landfill gas, wind, biomass, and hydroelectric) and supply excess generation back onto the grid, providing credit toward future bills through the production of net excess generations credits (dsire 2016). furthermore, unlike many other states, ohio’s net metering program has no capacity limits. in essence, this policy allows for customers to pay only the net amount of energy consumed from the grid per month. ohio’s net metering policy received positive remarks from national reviews. freeing the grid, an annual report which examines each u.s. state’s net metering policies, grades ohio’s policy as an a on an a–f scale (freeing the grid 2016). additionally, in 2008, ohio adopted a renewable portfolio standard (rps) which requires the state’s investor-owned electric utilities to generate or procure a select amount of energy generation portfolio from renewable sources by a specific date (dsire 2017a). initially, this requirement was set to 12.5% by 2024, with 0.5% (the ‘carve-out’ or ‘set-aside’) required to be solar energy specifically (dsire 2017a). this solar carve-out included a solar renewable energy credit (srec) mechanism, which allows owners of solar pv energy systems to sell credits to electric utilities for every mwh of energy generated in order to help the utilities meet the mandated carve-out (dsire 2017a). despite passing these policies aimed to enhance renewable energy deployment from 1999 to the late 2000s, more recent policy developments have been consilience smith, driver, & michaud: ohio solar & wind less supportive. for instance, with sb 310, the state actually froze these rps mandates from 2014 to 2016, pushing the final requirements back two years (dsire 2017a). in 2017, the ohio house of representatives passed a bill that would have continued the freeze for another two years, but governor john kasich vetoed it (dsire 2017a). another relevant bill, house bill (hb) 483, was passed in 2014, which particularly impacted ohio’s wind energy industry. this bill increased the minimum distance required between the blades of a wind turbine to the nearest property line from 550 to 1,125 feet (runnerstone 2016). moreover, it mandated that the turbines be measured starting from the nearest property line rather than the nearest habitable structure, which further limited turbine zoning and resulted in over 1,400 megawatts (mw) in planned wind projects to be put on hold (runnerstone 2016). one of the nation’s most stringent setback laws, this policy was passed without public testimony or written justification (dvorak, 2017). there have been several efforts to partially revert the property line setbacks, though none have passed through the ohio house of representatives. additional policy-related efforts that have adversely affected the solar and wind industries include a 2002 ruling by the ohio supreme court that limited the credit of net excess generation to the utility’s generation cost rather than the full retail rate, which greatly reduced the overall value of excess generation via net metering mechanisms (dsire 2016). in 2015, in response to proposals from utilities, the public utilities commission of ohio (puco, the state’s regulatory agency for electric utilities) placed ohio’s net metering standards under further review, debating whether to classify the credit as a subsidy (upgrade ohio 2017). in november 2017, the puco passed new net metering rules, which included the explicit declaration that customers may now have systems sized large enough to produce 120% of their annual electric usage, which is a favorable percentage compared to other states. however, as a policy compromise, additional changes included adding several different fees to these distributed energy system investors (mostly solar energy) in order to cover costs associated with system maintenance as well as overhead costs for generating power, such as the transportation of natural gas and coal (upgrade ohio 2017). overall, while these recent policy alterations have seemingly made the state’s net metering policy more straightforward, it remains unclear whether the modified fee structure will encourage or discourage net-metered, distributed generation investment. some environmental groups and solar industry representatives have claimed that the new rules will slow growth, as they “would not credit customers with the ‘capacity’ portion of their overall rate. instead, customers would get just the energy-only portion, which comes to only about 85 percent of the bundled rate” (kowalski 2017b, para. 7). such an alteration may change the economics and return on investment calculations for prospective investors. 48 consilience amidst these complex renewable energy policy developments in ohio, this paper’s primary goal is to provide a measure of the economic contributions of solar and wind to the state, with the purpose of adding perspective to these recent policy decisions. to accomplish this, recent trends including installed capacity (or capability), generation, job growth, and the overall economic impact of the wind and solar industries were analyzed. we focus on ohio as an exemplary ‘swing state’ with convoluted politics and interesting geographic foci, such as tech and data centers in many of its large cities, and a history of coal and resource extraction in the southeastern part of the state. ohio has been a traditional laggard state, especially regarding renewable energy policies, so this analysis can also be used by other, similar states with complex policies and less progressive legislatures. overall, understanding the trends and projections for ohio energy jobs and capacities has numerous implications for policymakers and economic development practitioners alike, which are highlighted in our conclusions. methods and materials to analyze the overall growth, impact, and infrastructure of the solar and wind industries in ohio, as well as the evolution of these industries over time, we first collected and analyzed capacity data from 2009–2016. furthermore, by differentiating between distributed (e.g., small, residential and commercial pv and turbines) and utility-scale1 (e.g., large, utility owned and operated centralized pv and turbines) capacity, the impact of ohio’s net metering laws (which more pointedly impact the former deployment category) on the solar industry could be evaluated. these data were derived from the united states energy information administration’s (2018) ohio energy profile. secondary employment data from 2013 to 2016 was then used to evaluate the impact of the solar and wind industries on ohio’s economy. annual state reports from the solar foundation (tsf) provided the solar employment data for our analysis (the solar foundation 2015; the solar foundation 2017). these reports surveyed hundreds of thousands of known and potential energy establishments, resulting in more than 2,000 completed surveys (the solar foundation 2016). our wind employment figures came from reports from two different organizations: environmental entrepreneurs and the american wind energy association (awea). environmental entrepreneurs sponsors two surveys, clean jobs ohio and clean jobs midwest, which detail the economic potential of the renewable and sustainable energy economy in the locations described. the specific data used in this paper came from the 2014 clean jobs ohio report and the 2015 clean jobs midwest report (clean jobs ohio 2015; clean jobs midwest 2016). both the 2013 and 2016 data 1 utility-scale energy refers to large-scale power plants, such as 1 mw and larger for solar pv, typically owned and operated by electric utilities or independent power producers. consilience smith, driver, & michaud: ohio solar & wind came from awea, which produces annual reports on the current status of the wind industry in each state, based on data tracked by windiq (green energy ohio 2014; awea 2018). this is a comprehensive online database that tracks all operational, under construction, and advanced development wind projects, as well as windrelated manufacturing facilities. however, their data has the limitation of being a range of values (e.g. 2,001–3,000), so for the sake of comparison with the solar data, we averaged the range of values for each year. in addition, we used nrel’s jobs and economic development impact (jedi) model to forecast the impact of american electric power (aep), ohio’s plan to install 400 mw of solar and 500 mw of wind generation capacity in the state in the near future (matyi 2017). the jedi model uses input-output multipliers based on data from the u.s. bureau of economic analysis (bea) to compute output impacts associated with power generation capacity development. due to its various limitations, such as the use of default (i.e., industry average) values for various model parameters, the results of the model should be taken as rough approximations of the actual employment, wage, and economic impact metrics. aep ohio is the largest investor-owned electric utility in the state, with more than 1.5 million customers (aep ohio 2015). in october 2017, aep ohio issued a request for proposals regarding development of solar energy in the state, with the appalachian region as a site preference for these installations, as well as a preference for projects committed to hiring ohio military veterans. this effort is, in fact, part of a larger puco settlement through 2024 that focuses on clean energy investments through three core strategies: 1) maintaining current fixed monthly charges for residential utility customers; 2) strengthening grid reliability and resiliency through microgrid development; and 3) investments in electric vehicle infrastructure, such as charging stations. taken as a whole, these initiatives seek to enhance the clean and renewable energy industry in ohio as part of aep ohio’s recent electric security plan. finally, we used implan (impact analysis for planning) version 3.1 to estimate the economic impact of the 2015 wind and solar activity in ohio by inputting the employment estimations for each respective industry. we used 2015 data due to data limitations at the time of modeling. like jedi, implan uses input-output multipliers based on data from the bea and u.s. bureau of labor statistics (bls) to model direct and indirect output based on employment. the average wage and value of production, which we refer to as ‘economic impact,’ of each industry were approximated from the results of the model. as with jedi, these results should be understood as informed approximations due to the various limitations and assumptions introduced by the specifications of the model. for instance, both jedi and implan suffer from limitations around variable or figure alteration capabilities, as well as not accounting for potential behavioral changes from exogenous shocks. nevertheless, these tools still offered a sound platform for 50 consilience analysis given their state-level modeling capabilities and ability to review income and tax data results. results this section analyzes data regarding the generation capacity (i.e., capability), employment, and economic impacts of the solar and wind industries in ohio. specifically, this includes each industry’s generation capability from 2009 to 2016, along with analyses of their respective utility-scale and distributed deployment. additionally, we display employment data of each industry from 2013 to 2016. lastly, as noted, the jedi model was used to estimate the impact of aep ohio’s proposal to install 400 mw of solar and 500 mw of wind in the state, and the economic impact of the wind and solar industries was calculated with the implan model given employment figures from 2015. overall, the purpose of this study was to quantify the direct job impacts of the solar and wind industries in ohio, as a key contributor to more favorable forms of sustainable energy development. as illustrated in figure 1, both the solar and wind industries showed nearly zero production in 2009, with almost all growth occurring in 2010 and beyond. most notably, wind spiked from 13 mw in 2010 to 473.5 mw in 2012, which largely corresponded with the construction of the 350 mw blue creek wind farm near van wert, ohio (green energy ohio 2012). however, from 2013 to 2015, wind experienced almost no growth, coinciding temporally with the aforementioned rps freeze and ohio’s wind setback law. in fact, capability actually dropped from 2012 to 2013 due to some retirements of existing turbines. however, the industry did recover some growth in 2016, jumping 111 mw, the only substantial growth since 2012. this growth can be attributed to the end of the rps freeze, continued expense declines, and an increasing consumer appetite for renewable energy, especially in a deregulated state. similarly, solar capacity experienced a dramatic jump from 23 mw in 2010 to 74.5 mw in 2012. overall, however, solar has grown much more consistently, with an 85.1% average annual growth rate and an average annual addition of 19.7 mw during the years of study. consilience smith, driver, & michaud: ohio solar & wind figure 1: ohio aggregate solar and wind energy capability, 2009–2016 source: author’s own. we then examined the development trends of ohio’s utility-scale and distributed solar capability from 2009 to 2016. we did not analyze utility vs. distributed wind energy capability; generally, most wind development is comprised of large-scale turbines built by developers or utilities. in 2009 and 2010, utility and distributed solar grew roughly in parallel (fig. 2). however, from 2011 to 2013, distributed solar became the main means of solar pv growth in the state, a trend that continued in a less pronounced way from 2013 to 2016. overall, utility solar annually grew on average 6.9 mw per year, while distributed capability grew 12.8 mw every year. the increasing gap between distributed and utility-scale generation emphasizes the positive impact of ohio’s relatively strong net metering laws, which are geared specifically towards distributed investment, as well as factors such as cost reductions and the increased knowledge of pv installers. 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 m w year solar (total) wind (total) 52 consilience figure 2: ohio utility and distributed solar capability, 2009–2016 source: author’s own after establishing this baseline of solar and wind energy deployment in ohio, we then focused on the employment within these industries. a secondary data analysis of the solar industry showed 3,800 jobs in 2013; 4,300 jobs in 2014; 4,811 jobs in 2015; and 5,831 jobs in 2016 (fig. 3). this resulted in an average annual growth rate of 11.3% over the analyzed period. the state’s expanding solar manufacturing sector, based primarily in northwest ohio and headed by companies such as first solar, one of the largest pv manufacturers in the midwest, will most likely fuel additional employment growth in the future. in fact, in april 2018, first solar announced plans to build a 1.2 gw capacity factory in lake township, ohio. the plant will be used to manufacture first solar’s series 6 pv modules, bringing the company’s u.s. manufacturing capacity total to 1.8 gw annually, all of which is located in ohio. the continuation of the state’s rps may also encourage investment in utility-scale solar, while ohio’s strong net metering policy will continue to incentivize consumer investment in small-scale residential and commercial pv (e.g., rooftop solar), all prospectively contributing to positive employment growth. a similar analysis of the wind industry in ohio showed 1,500 jobs in 2013; 2,589 in 2014; 1,138 jobs in 2015; and 2,500 in 2016 (fig. 3). the employment shifts in this industry are remarkable, as marked by the growth from 2013 to 2014 and 2015 to 2016 and the decline from 2014 to 2015. these shifts amounted to an annual growth of 13.6%, although careful attention should be paid to the inconsistency of 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 m w year solar (utility) solar (distributed) consilience smith, driver, & michaud: ohio solar & wind growth, figures, and data sources. however, with the revival of ohio’s rps and improvements in wind turbine technology (and other factors), a reversal of this downward trend can perhaps be predicted for the future, despite growth being hindered by the zoning restrictions of hb 483. figure 3: solar and wind industry employment, 2013–2016 source: author’s own next, we focused on aep ohio’s recent announcement of its plans to install 400 mw and 500 mw of solar and wind capacity respectively by the end of 2021 (editors of power engineering 2017). while at the time of writing these developments are still undergoing a hearing and approval process, we sought to model their potential impacts as a particular case study of a sizeable enhancement of state capability figures, and to better comprehend what the economic implications may be. these installed capacity estimates (400 and 500 mw) were used as inputs to the jedi model, with the limiting assumption that these capacities would roughly be evenly installed over a five-year period resulting in 80 mw per year for solar and 100 mw per year for wind. we also assumed the size of each solar farm to be 10 mw, which is not only the current size of the largest solar farm in ohio, but also the minimum size project proposal that aep ohio was willing to accept per their 2016 request for proposals. the wind farm size was assumed to be 100 mw with a 2 mw wind turbine size, the same size of the turbines at the state’s largest wind farm (krouse 2016). we assumed construction costs to be $1,540 per kilowatt (kw) for solar and $1,590 per kw for wind, based on secondary 2016 costs of construction data (awea 2016; nrel 2017). finally, a 2017-dollar value was assumed, as this was the year of our initial analysis. note that the construction figures are one-time 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 2013 2014 2015 2016 em p lo ym e n t year wind solar 54 consilience impacts, while the operations and maintenance (o&m) figures represent annually recurring impacts associated with the daily operation (e.g., monitoring, cleaning, etc.) of the solar and wind energy facilities. table 1: jedi model results, 2016 jobs annual salary net impact solar construction 2,220 $88,724 $406,317,278 o&m 1,271 $65,452 $139,346,377 total/average 3,491 $80,250 $545,663,655 wind construction 2,002 $57,410 $289,649,179 o&m 126 $57,066 $29,194,259 total/average 2,128 $57,389 $318,843,438 source: author’s own according to the model, large-scale solar energy investment results in many more o&m jobs and overall economic impact than wind (table 1). solar construction and o&m jobs are also higher-paying than corresponding wind jobs. finally, it should be noted that all jobs pay much higher than the state’s 2016 mean salary of $45,930 (bureau of labor statistics 2016). table 2: implan model results, 2015 jobs annual salary net impact capability (mw) impact/ mw solar 4,811 $74,635 $900,777,216 119.6 $7,534,039 wind 1,138 $68,336 $4,336,450,048 455.1 $9,528,502 source: author’s own we then used the implan software to cross-compare data and estimate the economic impact of ohio’s energy industry in its current state using the 2015 consilience smith, driver, & michaud: ohio solar & wind employment data as a baseline for the solar and wind industries. the implan model was customized so that each industry produced 100% of its primary commodity and trade flows (i.e., the buying and selling of goods between various industries) were reduced to zero. this was done to limit the impact of ancillary industries through unrelated purchases and to more accurately estimate the direct effect of solar and wind. moreover, while the metrics that they model are similar, the implan and jedi models make different assumptions and carry different caveats and thus their results are not directly comparable. bae and dall’erba (2016) made these differences explicit in their investigation of the economic impact results of solar energy projects in arizona. the wind industry, despite employing fewer people, actually provides a higher installed capability due to the greater generation ability of wind turbines compared to solar pv, depending, of course, on their size/scale (table 2). the model shows that wind industry’s net impact far surpasses that of solar, perhaps attributable to the inherent distributed nature of solar compared to wind’s reliance on larger-scale, more expensive projects. however, the solar industry generally provides better-paying work, such as for pv installers. nevertheless, the two industries have a similar overall economic impact per currently installed mw (to provide a homogenous comparison), of around $8,000,000–9,000,000. despite these comparative differences, there remains a need to invest in both solar and wind energy resources. ohio has high pollution metrics from electricity generation, especially with its legacy in coal and other extractive industrial activity in appalachian ohio, a region that has seen its ups and downs of boom and bust cycles. with core environmental benefits of transitioning fossil fuel generation to renewable sources, such as ghg reductions and important public health advantages, energy transitions to both solar and wind can reduce fossil fuel-related pollution and provide positive benefits for sustainability. certainly, more jobs could be created in alternative sectors altogether, yet as environmental regulations and the lack of cost competitiveness continue to push utilities to decommission their large, baseload plants (e.g., coal-fired power), there is an obvious energy generation gap that will need to be met by alternative energy sources. many of these occupations do not require advanced degrees, and thus match well with declining jobs in many sectors (e.g., former coal economy workers in southeast ohio). this can create opportunities for occupational transitions that do not require additional education or advanced-level certifications. discussion though this research is unique in its focused analysis of ohio’s contemporary energy economy, others have modeled subsets of the state’s energy industry. one such prior report is the greenlink group’s models for three scenarios of development in ohio’s renewable energy and energy efficiency industries: one 56 consilience where ohio focuses on energy efficiency, one focused on renewables, and one intermediate scenario that balances between the two strategies. these models suggest that efficiency-focused development is actually the most beneficial to ohio’s economy. this model projected that by 2030, ohio’s efficiency and renewables industries combined would employ 82,300 – 136,000 individuals (cox et al 2016). this would create a $4.6 billion – $7.6 billion payroll boost in the state, as well as contribute $6.7 billion – $10.7 billion to ohio’s gross domestic product (gdp) (cox et al 2016). these estimates are substantially greater than those presented in our analysis, as the scope of the greenlink analysis also included energy efficiency defined quite broadly (e.g., green homebuilding), reflecting a much larger portion of the state’s economy. additionally, the national solar energy industries association (seia), in a study with greentech media research, found that $467.13 million has been invested in ohio’s solar industry as of 2016 and predicted that the state will go on to install 607 mw of solar capacity by 2021 (solar energy industries association 2016). in comparison, our models show an even more optimistic estimation, with nearly twice the estimated economic impact given projected investments from large electric utilities as well as with more refined models and newer data. it is clear that ohio’s energy economy is rapidly evolving, driven primarily by continued improvements in technology, changes in state policy, an appetite for sustainability, and increased citizen and business awareness of environmental impacts. both solar and wind module and equipment costs continue to decrease every year, making them economically competitive alternatives to traditional sources of energy generation. specifically, residential solar pv installation costs in the state have dropped from $8 per watt in 2009 to well under $4 per watt in 2016 (our years of analysis), with even cheaper prices (around $1 per watt of installed capacity) at the utility-scale level (michaud 2016). further research by nrel has shown that the average installed costs of wind projects built in the u.s. in 2014 were $1.71 per watt (weiner 2015). the recent puco settlement and aep ohio’s plans for additional renewable energy development in the state will also contribute to sustainability initiatives such as mitigating pollution impacts, maintaining competitive electricity prices, and providing residential and commercial customers alike with more clean energy options. this is an important effort and direction by aep ohio, as it represents a wider strategy to adapt to emerging clean energy market demands for customers of the future. subsequently, this effort will further stimulate jobs and general economic growth potential. aep ohio’s parent company, american electric power, also reports that they have recently adopted a carbon reduction strategy that aims to reduce power plant emissions by 60% by 2030 and 80% by 2050 (american electric power 2018). aep has been working to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels for more than a decade, as evidenced by a decrease in coal-fired generation capacity from 70% consilience smith, driver, & michaud: ohio solar & wind to 40% since 2005, coinciding with an increase in renewable capacity from 4% to 13% during the same timeframe (american electric power 2018). also, as noted, ohio’s puco adopted new rules updating which types and sizes of electric generation facilities qualify for net metering in november 2017, defining the limit for the generation capability of a net-metered facility to be 120% of the user’s average electricity consumption. this positive development has been complicated by the negative increased fee structure, which is projected to reduce the net metering credit rate by roughly 30% for ohio customers (walton 2017). at this time, the impact these new rules will have on the growth of net-metered renewable energy development remains relatively uncertain. however, consumers may be less inclined to invest in distributed generation (e.g., rooftop solar pv) via net metering due to the reduced credit rate. this research adds perspective to the recent developments, especially those in policy, of ohio’s energy industry. the continued strong growth of installed solar capability and employment helps show a consistent rise of the industry despite some policy restrictions. wind energy has shown to be more stagnant in response to more aggressive negative policy such as the setback law. it is certain that future state policy will continue to greatly impact these industry trends and will largely decide whether they reverse or continue. the strict setbacks placed on wind farms in ohio in 2014 have limited the wind industry’s development. both the recent employment and capability data have shown that the industry has stagnated despite large initial growth. as this has greatly limited the number of new wind farms, revamping the requirements (e.g., reducing footage or eliminating altogether) for future wind development could lead to growth in the capacity and employment of the industry. maintaining or expanding these wind setback requirements, which are among the most stringent in the country, will likely lead to continued stagnation, and maybe even contraction, due to lowered investment production, causing more midwest wind developers to look to other states such as michigan and minnesota. conversely, solar energy has thus far relied more heavily on distributed, individual investment for expansion, as shown in the large disparity between distributed and utility-scale solar capacities. as such, legislators’ continued revision in ohio’s net metering policies will directly influence new consumer investment. at the utility-scale level, ohio’s rps heavily influences growth in both the solar and wind industries by requiring utilities to invest in these technologies or face steep financial penalties. the expansions or reductions in the carve-out totals, or changes in what type of generation is considered ‘renewable,’ will also determine future utility investment. in addition to these core, highlighted policy mechanisms, other state renewable energy strategies may also have an impact on the future of the solar and wind industries, such as low-interest loan programs, tax credits, tax exemptions, and 58 consilience grants. ohio already provides some of these, including loans and property tax exemptions (dsire 2017b; dsire 2017c). many of these policies have been shown in prior research to advance investment in renewables. policymakers can use those policy evaluation studies to better understand the most cost-effective use of public dollars when it comes to implementation of energy generation strategies. advanced strategies such as community renewables, which is a mechanism by which off-site customers can invest in a remote energy generation asset instead of on their own property, may also be a viable path forward. however, knowledge of these alternatives remains relatively low, and legislation may be difficult to pass depending on legislative demographics and anti-renewable lobbying efforts. thus, other potential paths forward may come directly from electric utilities, or even grassroots programs which provide workarounds to policy deficiencies. for instance, solar energy cooperatives have been forming around the country to achieve economies of scale and lessen risk by reducing costs through bulk purchasing strategies. various stakeholder study groups, coalitions, and others have been pushing for more favorable renewable energy policymaking, but alternative crowdfunding and alternative billing arrangement options will interplay with paths forward, as well as non-policy factors such as technological advancements and improved energy storage technologies. moving forward from this paper, there is considerable room for future research. employment data limitations (often due to data suppression) were a noteworthy caveat to this research, requiring employment estimations from various sources to be trusted as accurate representations for the years analyzed. future work could perhaps develop methodologies to overcome these limitations, such as using north american industry classification system (naics) codes and bls employment data to give more direct estimations that are continuous from year to year, and to expand the years covered. further, marrying employment figures with wage estimate data could give a more detailed perspective to the annual growth or shrinkage of wages, especially in comparison to the median state wage, and would also provide greater context to the estimations provided by the implan and jedi models. regardless, it remains clear that state politicians will have to continue to navigate this complex policy environment when considering future energy decisions around renewables such as solar and wind. consilience smith, driver, & michaud: ohio solar & wind works cited american electric power (aep) ohio. 2015. facts, figures & bios. available from: https://www.aepohio.com/info/facts/ american electric power. 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http://newscenter.lbl.gov/2015/08/10/study-finds-that-the-price-of-wind-energy-in-the-united-states-is-at-an-all-time-low-averaging-under-2-5%c2%a2kwh/ consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 5, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 176-189 an exploration into community health charlotte eloise stancioff university of north carolina – chapel hill cestancioff@gmail.com 1. introduction billowing white clouds begin to form over the horizon as the usual afternoon heavy rain shower, indicative of the rainy season in bahia, will soon arrive. the air, heavy with moisture, is filled with the smells of fresh earth and sweet overripe fruit. the wind has begun to pick up, clattering the metal tools hanging outside foringo’s house. we are under the shade of a giant palm, by his coffee plant in the back. he points out quedra-pedra, “good for urinary tract infections.” pushing aside the coffee bush, he swiftly walks to the quiou plant, “and this here, good for high blood pressure.” continuing on, he quickly points out countless plants lost under the lush growth of his garden. i struggle to note each plant with their correct medicinal use as he zips through his garden, pointing out plants hidden beneath the bushes of beans and stalks of corn. he turns to me suddenly, “how can i go to the doctor when god gave us all these plants? i don’t need to. i have everything here.” looking into his sun worn face, i see a man with years of experience and accumulated knowledge. he weaves in and out of the immense tropical plants. each plant that he identifies for me, he touches, rubbing the leaf between his fingers. “but, the power of plants does not work if people do not believe.” when we finally reach the back fence of his garden, i thank him, explaining that i had no idea how many plants could be used to heal sicknesses, from the common cold to arthritis and paralysis. the sky has now become dark with the inescapable late afternoon rain. as i turn to go with a mango in each hand, a gift from his wife, i know it will be a wet walk home. i hear my name. “wait, wait, have you already seen fedegozo? it is good for antiinflammation.” i often visited foringo to learn of medicinal plant uses in the month that i spent living in the nova suiça settlement, a rural farming community 90 minutes outside of salvador, brazil. while studying the brazilian public health system, sistema único de saúde (sus), for the previous three months in salvador, professors, doctors and ministry of health officials constantly reminded me that sus brings primary healthcare to isolated and historically forgotten populations. to assess the accessibility of sus health programs for remote populations, i lived in the nova suiça settlement, a part of the larger social movement, the movimento sem terra (mst), or the landless workers movement. there, i studied the mst’s use of medicinal plants in conjunction with the sus community health programs found at the nearby health clinic. throughout my stay, i lived with rosa, a member of the mst in her home on the nova suiça settlement. as both a member of the mst and a community health agent for the sus health clinic, rosa served as an ideal guide, allowing me to shadow her visits to the sus health clinic and the settlers’ homes. by interviewing consilience stanicoff: community health settlers and health professionals, administering mst community surveys, and conducting fieldwork on the use of medicinal plants, i gained a more complete understanding of both the sus public health programs and traditional mst medicine. 2. background on movimento de trabaledores sem terra (mst) and expansion in the northeast of brazil the darkness of the red brick house and the coolness of the simple cement floor are refreshing as i come in from the heat of the afternoon sun. she welcomes me warmly, offering me a chair and sugary coffee. the noise of chirping birds mingles with her grandchildren’s playful yells from outside. sitting in a worn wooden chair, she says, “now i want peace. i was a militant. i went to our marches, i fought for my land.” as one of the original campenheiros to come to nova suiça from terra nova, a provincial city south of salvador, rita remembers the days of black tarp tents during the occupation. in 1995, mst settlers and new members came to an unused area of an old fazenda, or plantation, laying claim to the land. after attending an mst meeting in her own town that explained the movement and beliefs, rita packed all that she owned, leaving behind a meager plot of land to become a part of something bigger. without access to land or loans, rural farmers like rita have lived a difficult life, as their small fields of manioc remain at the mercy of of cruel weather and they have seen flight to the cities lead to increased poverty. finding few other options, rita joined mst. for the next three years, the seventy-three families that first laid claim to land constituting the nova suiça mst settlement struggled against horrible rains, extreme droughts and food and water shortages. yet, they were determined to finally reclaim the land that they felt was unfairly taken away. in 1998, the brazilian government’s instituto nacional e colonizacao e reforma agraria (incra), formally recognized the claim in nova suiça, granting the seventy-three families twenty-five acres each. the settlement received funds from the government for the construction of seventy-three concrete brick houses situated in a large circle around communal land, a school and a health post. like rita, each settler uses the land however he or she desires. the most popular crops are corn, beans, and manioc, which is then made into flour at the casa de farina, also located on the settlement. according to rita, life on the settlement is what she has always wanted. she finally has no obligation to anyone, she does not worry about how she will feed her children, and she has peace of mind. according to carneiro,“49 thousand landowners, representing only 1 percent of all landowners in brazil, own 45 percent of all agricultural land in brazil” (carneiro, 2007). from centuries of discrimination came the outpouring of frustration in the early 1980’s through the form a new movement in the south of brazil, where pre-existing peasant activism was strong. unlike past land redistribution movements, the mst settlers saw themselves as a new type of exploited worker, one that lost land through the industrialization of agriculture and neo-liberal economic policies. now, one of the most successful agrarian reform movements, the mst currently has 1.14 million members and 2,000 agricultural settlements. 3. background on the sistema único de saúde (sus) according to gesler, “health is, to a large extent, constructed by the health care systems prevailing at any particular place and time” (gesler, 1991). in brazil, 178 consilience health is described in the 1988 brazilian constitution as “the right of all persons and the duty of the state,” which is why health “is guaranteed by means of social and economic policies aimed at reducing the risk of illness and other hazards and at universal and equal access to all actions and services for the promotion, protection and recovery of health.” described as state and society synergy, the subsequently created national health program, sistema único de saúde (sus), provides any person in brazil free medical attention and treatment from the most minor treatment to the most complicated operation. despite the two grounding principles of sus, universality and equity, health care delivery and access still remain divided along economic lines. juxtaposed against the rural highway, the unidade de saúde da família walter de figuerêdo strikes a stark contrast. clean, white and gated, it looks out of place in the middle of outstretching green fields. constructed only two years ago as part of the fifteen-year-old programma saúde da família (psf), the family health clinic is equipped with a team consisting of one doctor, two nurses, one dentist and twenty community health agents. in the brazilian health system, the psf is a relatively new development in community health. following reforms initiated by the 1988 constitution and subsequent additions to the sus, the ideology behind healthcare was explicitly restructured. to combat top down inefficiencies and the inability of large urban hospitals to reach isolated populations, the psf provides primary care to remote communities while recognizing local culture and beliefs that can be overseen in crowded hospitals. before psf, settlers of nova suiça had to travel the thirty minutes by public bus to santo amaro, the nearest municipality. the psf has grown tremendously since 1994, becoming one of the world’s largest primary health care systems, serving more than 85 million people. intending to bring medical access to places previously disregarded with the psf model, doctor arinaldo josé monteiro of the unidade de saúde da família walter de figuerêdo, notes that there is still much work to be done. according to the doctor, political corruption in brazil still continues to strip health infrastructure, and sus fails to overcome historic disparities in wealth and status that continue to plague brazil. despite the shortcomings of the psf clinic, dr. monteiro is adamant that the changing nature of diseases that he encounters at the psf health clinic indicates that brazil’s health experience is in transition. he encounters fewer tropical diseases, traditionally found in the countryside of the harsh northeast environment, and more chronic diseases common in aging populations. he states that the benefits of psf are found in its attention to ninety five percent of all sicknesses, providing health on three levels: promotion, prevention and treatment. the program is especially effective in rural areas because it provides health to residents rather than forcing a trip to the hospitals of large urban cities, dr, monteiro states. 4. walking with rosa: community health door by door we enter joão’s home and the brick of his walls and cement floor are refreshingly cool after spending the day in the afternoon sun. rosa and i have spent the day administering blood pressure checkups as part of her monthly checkups for the settlement through the psf program of sus. joão gives each of us a stool to sit on and offers coffee. having lived in the same settlement as joão for the past ten years now, rosa asks him how his family is doing. joão discusses how life has been hard consilience stanicoff: community health because there has been little rain, causing his family to worry about the prospect of an unsuccessful crop this year. with a livelihood so dependent on a dry landscape and unforgiving weather, joão’s worries are similar to many of the families who live on the settlement. the settlers work hard to grow enough manioc or corn to sell in the market in santo amaro. she takes his blood pressure, asks him if he is taking captopril, the drug of choice for high blood pressure, and how he has been feeling. joão responds in a long sigh as he reaches for all the pills that he has been given by doctor monteiro at the psf clinic. he empties the multicolored pills into his hand and tries to remember when he takes each one, morning or night, after dinner or before, once a day or twice. with a clipboard and blood pressure monitor, we continue the walk from home to home to speak with settlers who have high blood pressure. this checkup shows how the psf program attempts to bring health care to remote areas or populations that may be unable to visit the psf clinic. occurring monthly, the visits are intended to reach aged populations, track those with high blood pressure, provide prenatal care and administer vaccines. during these visits, rosa liaises between the psf health post and the families. walking back to her home after a long day of health door-to-door visits, rosa and i often discussed the problems encountered throughout the day. we were often invited into the homes of settlers, and offered coffee or water. discussions of health were usually short, as the conversation mainly covered news, weather and neighborhood gossip. many times, settlers were unaware of the health care options available at the clinic, or unwilling to go the clinic for a follow-up procedure. rosa explained that many settlers feel uncomfortable and judged in the presence of the doctor, especially when treated for the most common diseases on the settlement, hypertension and high cholesterol. in the heat of the afternoon sun, i find ovo sweeping her front walk. after giving me a tour of her garden, she invites me into her home for tea. according to ovo, the heavy afternoon sun is an indication that it is time for an afternoon tea, believed to combat high blood pressure. she creates an infusion of chu chu leaves and hot water and sips delicately in the cool of her home. we continue chatting about the varying strengths of herbal remedies the needed cautions, and the possible cures. she explains that her knowledge of the healing properties of each plant was passed to her from her mother, who in turn learned them from ovo’s grandmother. she doesn’t believe that the pills dr. monteiro gave her are working. she understands that she has high blood pressure, but is not bothered by it as she is still capable of living her life as she did before. besides, she adds, a life spent consuming pills each day is not her opinion of health. any symptoms she may experience, such as dizziness or shortness of breath, can all be cured by drinking her own tea, trading allopathic medicine for her family’s own practice of traditional medicine. rosa explained that ovo is not alone in her misuse of the captopril pills provided by the doctor. settlers may take it for a day or two, but soon they revert back to treatments from medicinal plants that lower blood pressure (table 1). although rosa always advises settlers to follow what the doctor’s prescription, out of the eighteen people on the settlement diagnosed with high blood pressure, only one, josé, is currently taking his medicine properly. according to dr. monteiro, his first step in treatment is providing information and education. for example, he says that for hypertension and high cholesterol, the only changes that need to be made are in some of the habits of the affected populations, including smoking, alcohol consumption, and diet. despite his efforts, he explained that no one changes their habits, referring to the rich feiojada, a meal of black beans and meat commonly eaten in the northeast countryside of brazil with strong cultural links to african, portuguese and indigenous influences. he 180 consilience suggests that his rural patients should realize that their own lifestyle choices are the causes of some ill health, such as hypertension and high blood pressure. while dr. monteiro claims that health education programs, such as workshops and outreach on hypertension, are present at the clinic, he had only a few pamphlets listing risk factors of hypertension to express the programs’ offerings. what he did have available was a chart outlining dosages of captopril, the drug of choice for hypertension. i discussed the doctor’s opinion that the lack of education and willingness to change lifestyle habits result in the poor health of rural residents who live with rosa. according to rosa, many rural families, including mst settlers, lack traditional schooling, but possess a rich knowledge of health that the doctor fails to understand. rosa was quick to note that a diet of cachaça, beans and manioc flour is not a new development, but results from century old traditions of the northeast. while diet is not the first example of misunderstandings between doctor and patient, i found that these misinterpretations had strong impacts with the rural settlers. such rural traditions have been ingrained in a community long before the psf clinic ever arrived outside the settlement, and they continue to serve as important manifestations of identity. 5. discussion when i asked settlers to describe a common illness and how they would treat it, the clinic was never mentioned as a primary option for care. from my interviews, only people who needed vaccines, re-filled prescriptions or pre-natal exams went to the health clinic. this was not due to maltreatment, as only two people mentioned clear examples of being treated poorly at the clinic. despite acknowledgement of the usefulness of the biomedical practices found at the health clinic, many settlers did not believe their health would be affected negatively or positively if they chose to use the health clinic. when asked why they did not use the psf clinic, thirty-five households reported that the doctor lacked understanding. many believed it was unnecessary to visit a medical clinic where their own knowledge regarding health and illness, such as the use of medicinal plants, was not appreciated. one settler mentioned that he did not visit the doctor because the doctor thought he was ignorant. to most settlers, the doctor represented the elite and city life, making him incapable of understanding life in the brazilian countryside. health, whether actual or perceived, is actively defined as better because of fewer environmental and social stressors. according to other thirty-four heads of households, life on the settlement is healthier without pollution, violence, and stress; furthermore, all food is naturally grown, without chemicals or pesticides, and all residents enjoyed leisure time. rather than the absence of disease, the settlers attributed their health to the freedoms provided by their life on the settlement. an influx to nova suiça of previously urban residents suggests a growing upheaval in the surrounding cities. as economic policies further concentrated the geography of wealth, remaining unbalanced but influential to cut across local boundaries, a global agricultural modernization that severely disrupted the social structure and existence of the traditional family agriculturalist. the population of nova suiça created a different consilience stanicoff: community health definition of health than what could be found at the psf clinic. the mental freedom gained from controlling the place in which they live brings awareness of other environmental and built factors that previously impacted a negative health experience in the city. after historically being socially excluded, settlers define health by improved social and mental well-being, instead of actual illnesses experienced. appendix table 1. commonly mentioned medicinal plants uses at mst and known uses plant (scientific name) use from interviews observed use known uses from studies abacate (persea americana) -cited once leafurinary tract infections (used with folha de cana and cabelo de milho); rheumistism (used with inhame do brejo) tinturagrated avacodo heart and rubbed on the area diuretic, used for muscle pains, including arthritis. must use dry leaves because fresh ones can cause taquicardia alcerim (lippia sidoides c.) -cited twice leafanti-inflamatory and diuretic, in high doses is toxic and abortive anti-inflamatory and anti-spasmodic calmant and heart tonic alfavaca(ocimums gratissimum l.) -cited five leafanti inflamatory and gastric ulcers -studies are being done on hiv drugs xarope for gripe used for digestion and coughing alho (hippeastrum psittacinum) -cited twice leaf/clove/oilused for rheumatism, ashtma and respiratory problems, stops the formation of gases and stomach ulcers anti-vermin, natural bug replent,antibactarial • reduz o colesterol e diminui a formação de placas. diabetes. throat pains-gargling. aroeira (myracrodruon urundeuva -cited three used to make soap, antimicrobial soap anti-infection, diuretic, hypertension inflammations of ovaries and ulcers. ass (verbesina macrophylla) -cited once leaflower fevers berinjela (solanum melongena l) -cited once fruitjuice for high cholesterol 182 consilience calendula (calendula officinalis) -cited once leafmade into a pomade topic use of cuts, bruises, contusions, acne, mosquito bites figure 1. map of bahia, brazil http://www.v-brazil.com/tourism/bahia/map-bahia.html http://www.v-brazil.com/tourism/bahia/map-bahia.html consilience stanicoff: community health figure 2. photo of community health visit. figure 3. photo of community garden with medicinal plants 184 consilience figure 4. photo of rosa’s home in the nova suiça settlement. figure 5. photo of rosa conducting monthly checkups. consilience stanicoff: community health bibliography agrovila, v. acocap. itaberá. airhihenbuwa, c. 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(2005). prevention and promotion in decentralized rural health systems: a comparative study from northeast brazil. health policy and planning 20.2, 69. baer, h. (2004). toward an integrative medicine. oxford: altamira press. baer, h., singer, m., & susser, i. (2003). medical anthropology and the world system. second ed. westport: praeger publishers. baer, w. (1964). regional inequality and economic growth in brazil. economic development and cultural change, 12.3, 268-85. bertoldi, a.d., et al. (2009). medicine access and utilization in a population covered by primary health care in brazil. health policy, 89.3, 295-302. biehl, joao. (2009). the brazilian response to aids and the pharmaceuticialization of global health. anthropology and public healthbridging differences in culture and society. ed. marcia c. inhorn robert a. hahn. second ed. oxford: oxford university press, 480-511. bodeker, g. & kronenberg, f. (2002). a public health agenda for traditional, complementary, and alternative medicine. american journal of public health 92.10, 1582. 186 consilience branford, s., & rocha, j. (2002). cutting the wire: the story of the landless movement in brazil. london: latin american bureau. calixto, j. b. (2000). efficacy, safety, quality control, marketing and regulatory guidelines for herbal medicines (phytotherapeutic agents). brazilian journal of medical and biological research, 33, 179-89. carneiro, f. f. (2007). a saúde no campo: das políticas oficiais à experiência do mst e de famílias de “bóias frias” em unaí, minas gerais. universidade federal de minas gerais, escola de veterinária. carter, m. (2009). a luta na terra: fonte de crescimento, inovacao, e defsafio constante ao mst. combatendo a desigualdade social: o mst e a reforma agraria no brasil. ed. unesp. sao paulo. carter, m. 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"is health education good for you? rethinking health education through the concept of bio-power." foucault, health and medicine. ed. alan petersen robin bunton. london: routledge,113-33. gerard, b., kroneberg, f., & burford, g. (2007). policy and public health perspectives on traditional complementary and alternative medicine: an overview. traditional complementary and alternative medicine. ed. gemma burford gerard bodeker. oxford: imperial college press, 9-38. http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/constitution.html consilience stanicoff: community health gesler, w. m. (1991). the cultural geography of health care. pittsburgh: university of pittsburgh press. gold, j. (1985). cartesian dualism and the current crisis in medicine--a plea for a philosophical approach: discussion paper. journal of the royal society of medicine, 78.8, 663. gulliford, m., figueroa-munoz, j, & morgan, m. 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(2008). hospital performance in brazilthe search for excellence. washington, dc: the world bank. leibing, a. (2007). brazilmuch more than medical anthropology: the healthy body and brazilian identity. medical anthropologyregional perspectives and shared concerns. ed. serge genest francine saillant. oxford: blackwell publishing, 58-70. luna, e. (2008). introduction to the brazilian national public health system . 2008. retrieved march 13, 2010. http://www.drclas.harvard.edu/files/lecture_1_sus_intro_jan2008.ppt. lupton, d. (1994). medicine as cultureillness, disease and the body in western societies. london: sage publications. luzia. personal interview. macinko, j., et al. 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(2001). transnationalism, neo-liberalism, and the rise of the shadow state. economy and society, 30.2, 165-89. navarro, v. (2002). the political economy of social inequalities. amityville, new york: baywood publishing comapny, inc. ngokwey, n. (1988). pluralistic etiological systems in their social context: a brazilian case study. social science medicine, 26.8, 793-802. oliven, r. g. of culture in brazil. latin american perspectives. ovo. personal interview. petras, j. (1998). the political and social basis of regional variation in land occupations in brazil. journal of peasant studies, 25.4, 124-33. quitéria. personal interview. rita. personal interview. rodrìguez, e. b. (2006). the role of the state in land reform processes: the case of brazil. haol, 10, 47-57. alves, r., & rosa, l. (2007). zootherapy goes to town: the use of animal-based remedies in urban areas of ne and n brazil. journal of ethnopharmacology, 113, 541-55. sartori, m. s. (2002). saude, doenca, e representacao: um estudo com mulheres rurais. santa cruz do sol: universidade de santa cruz do sol. saude da familia . (2009). departamento de atencao basica. retrieved february 8th, 2010. http://dtr2004.saude.gov.br/dab/atencaobasica.php. http://dtr2004.saude.gov.br/dab/atencaobasica.php consilience stanicoff: community health saúde pública (2009). (march 6th, 2010). retrieved march 12th, 2010. http://www.mst.org.br/node/7713. scheper-hughes, n. (1992). death without weepingthe violence of everday life in brazil. berkley: university of california press. stein, a. t., & harzheim, e. (2006). effectiveness of primary health care evaluated by a longitudinal ecological approach. british medical journal, 60.1, 3. thomas, v. (2006). from inside brazil development in a land of contrasts. palo alto: stanford university press. to, a. (2003). health for all beyond 2000: the demise of the alma-ata declaration and primary health care in developing countries. the medical journal of australia, 178.1, 17-20. weston, a. (1992). on the body in medical self-care and holistic medicine. the body in medical thought and practice. ed. drew leder. boston: kluwer academic publishers, 69-84. wolford, w. (2003). families, fields, and fighting for land: the spatial dynamics of contention in rural brazil. mobilization: an international quarterly, 8.2, 15772. wolford, w. (2004). this land is ours now: spatial imaginaries and the struggle for land in brazil. annals of the association of american geographers, 94.2, 40924. http://www.mst.org.br/node/7713 consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 5, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 119-124 carbon footprinting the internet joel gombiner department of earth and environmental sciences columbia university joelhg@gmail.com abstract recent analysis suggests that global it, a rapidly expanding sector, is responsible for two to four percent of global greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions. how is the use of computers and networks affecting our planet‟s atmosphere? through the example of google, the world‟s most visited website, this article explores the ways in which the internet generates ghgs, the difficulties in quantifying these emissions, and the possible mitigation of negative planetary impacts. author’s note keywords: carbon footprint, climate change, global it, 1. sizing up the problem of the internet’s carbon footprint 1.1 the magnitude of the internet’s ghg emissions according to saul griffith, a leading innovator in green technology, “the internet's energy and carbon footprints now probably exceed those of air travel... perhaps by as much as a factor of two” (owen). this statement is surprising in at least two ways: firstly, that the internet‟s carbon footprint has exceeded that of such a notorious greenhouse gas emitter like air travel and, secondly, that the estimated magnitude of the internet‟s carbon footprint is so uncertain. though online activities may seem benign, they are, in fact, a major contributor to global warming. so what is the extent of the problem, and what can we do to fix it? 1.2 what is a carbon footprint? before exploring the energy use and carbon footprint of the internet, it is important to understand what is meant by the term „carbon footprint‟ and why it is so hard to calculate it accurately. the word is somewhat of a misnomer, since a carbon footprint refers to “total greenhouse gas emissions caused directly and indirectly by a person, organization, event or product,” gases that include noncarbon compounds. the greenhouse gases (ghgs) are carbon dioxide (co2), methane (ch4), nitrous oxide (n2o), sulfur hexafluoride (sf6) and a class of compounds known as fluorocarbons.1 to calculate a carbon footprint, the amount of 1 water is also an important ghg, but its residence time in the atmosphere is too short to be included in this list. 120 consilience ghg emissions that a certain process causes is converted to a carbon dioxide equivalent. in other words, the carbon footprint is the amount of carbon dioxide that would cause the same amount of warming as all of the greenhouse gases actually emitted. there are a number of different databases used to calculate carbon footprints, and they often spit out drastically different values for the same process or product. these differences occur for two main reasons. one is that each database includes a unique set of greenhouse gases. the class of greenhouse gases known as fluorocarbons contains over a hundred compounds, some of which are included in certain carbon foot-printing databases and not in others. in this way, there is actually some disagreement about what is and what is not a greenhouse gas. the other difference between databases relates to how far upstream or downstream a calculation extends. for example, if you are carbon footprinting a bottle of soda, do you include the ghg emissions of the fertilizer used in the making of the corn syrup? do you include the ghg emissions of the construction of the factory, which produced the bulldozer, which transported the fertilizer? do you include the impact of the employees at that factory driving to work? (do you include the carbon footprint of the bottle of soda those workers drank at lunch?) the complexity of these decisions explains why carbon footprinting is such a difficult process and why achieving consistent results across databases is nearly impossible. many companies exploit this inter-database variation by simply choosing the database that calculates the lowest carbon footprint. 2. global networks: the internet and the atmosphere 2.1 how the internet is responsible for ghg emissions with these inherent complications in mind, let‟s try to understand how the use of the internet is impacting the world‟s atmosphere. the internet consumes a huge amount of ghg-emitting energy, which can be divided into two pieces. technology companies must manufacture (by extracting raw materials and assembling in factories) and ship (using airplanes, trucks, etc…) the internet‟s hardware: servers, personal computers, iphones, et cetera. then, those devices must be powered and cooled, drawing electricity from their local grids, energy that is generated in different ways with varying ghg emissions. for example, in china, where google maintains vast arrays of servers, coal power plants produce most electricity. coal is plentiful and cheap, but the least efficient of the fossil fuels. in comparison with fossil fuels like natural gas and petroleum, coal emits the greatest amount of ghgs per calorie of energy produced. gartner inc., an international consulting firm, recently tried to quantify all of the components of global information technology, calculating that the information and communications technology (ict) industry is responsible for two percent of global co2 emissions, the same as aviation (remember that griffith thinks it may be twice that of the aviation industry). gartner‟s definition of ict includes “in-use phase of pcs, servers, cooling, fixed and mobile telephony, local area network (lan), office telecommunications and printers, all commercial and governmental it and telecommunications infrastructure worldwide, and the embodied (that used in consilience gombiner: carbon footprinting figure 1: the ipcc‟s 2007 sector-by-sector breakdown of ghg emissions does not include global ict. design, manufacture and distribution) energy in large-volume devices.” calculating the global ghg emissions of the internet is unprecedented, and it is interesting to observe that the international panel on climate change's (ipcc‟s) 2007 fourth assessment does not include the it industry in its sector-by-sector breakdown of ghg emissions (fig. 1). given that global it makes up a substantial percentage of global ghg emissions (two percent according to gartner, maybe more according to griffith), perhaps it is worth including in future ipcc reports. 2.2 a closer look at google and youtube a good model for understanding the energy usage and carbon footprint of the internet is google, the world‟s largest search engine. this multi-national corporation operates over one million servers around the world and processes one billion search requests each day (pandia). at its current rate of expansion, google is installing 100,000 servers per quarter (kuhn). the production and distribution of these servers requires a huge output of ghg-producing energy. in addition to server production, there is also an output of ghg gases each time one searches google. every unique search requires multiple servers. google works by indexing the internet, creating a virtual copy of the web. to maximize the speed of each search, google combs through multiple servers, on which these copies of the internet are stored. by querying multiple servers there is a greater chance that one of those servers will respond quickly. this approach gives fast results, but is also power-hungry, using more energy than is truly necessary (leake). google could reduce energy usage (but compromise the speed of its searches) by querying one server instead of many. how much ghgs does an individual google search generate? this question, one that has only been addressed in the last few years, recently generated buzz among prominent scientists and google‟s public relations branch. the debate was 122 consilience sparked by a statistic from harvard physicist alex wissner-gross, who claimed that a google search accounts for seven grams of carbon dioxide emissions. seven grams of co2 emissions is equivalent to boiling a pot of tea or driving a car 52 feet. the figure prompted google to respond by publishing a counter-statistic of .2 grams of carbon dioxide per search (hölzle). the wide-ranging disparity (over an order of magnitude difference) can be partially accounted for by the differing way each study interpreted a „search.‟ google's statistic refers to one individual search, while wissner-gross's figure includes the multiple attempts it may take to find a desired result. however, for this explanation to make the two results compatible would require an average of 35 tries to complete a search, a number which is clearly too high. therefore, these two statistics indicate an underlying uncertainty about how much co2 a google search truly emits into the atmosphere. if we adopt the middle ground between wissner-gross and google and assume a google search creates one gram of co2 emissions, it is possible to calculate the total impact of google searching on the earth‟s atmosphere. with one billion google searches occurring every day, there are one billion grams of co2 being emitted into the atmosphere due to google searches alone. this is the same as driving a car 2,375,000 miles (or 80,000 people commuting to work 15 miles each way). of course, google searches are only a single component of internet activity. wissner-gross estimates that looking at a webpage with pictures or video emits .2 grams of co2 per second. youtube users watch two billion videos every day and upload hundreds of thousands more (youtube factsheet). if the average time a user watches a video is ten seconds (a random guess), then watching of videos on youtube accounts for another four billion grams of co2 emissions, or an additional 320,000 car commuters. given that the two examples of youtube and google only represent a portion of online content, it is easy to see how the internet as a whole is a major contributor to global co2 emissions. however, it may be some time before we can precisely quantify the impact of the internet and global it on our planet‟s atmosphere. 3. powering the internet with clean energy? the issue of energy consumption and carbon output is one that google appears to be taking seriously. its philanthropic subsidiary, google.org, recently invested 15 million dollars in makani, a wind-energy corporation. (makani has a somewhat unconventional plan for creating renewable energy. they take advantage of the powerful and consistent winds at high altitudes by flying airplane-mounted turbines around in circles, thousands of feet above the earth‟s surface (owen)). while fifteen million dollars is an impressive investment, griffith points out that for any alternative energy company to actually join the grid requires about 100 million dollars and five to ten years of time (owen). that sobering reality makes google's 15 million look a lot smaller. as the internet continues to expand its high-bandwidth content, there will be further demand for production of new servers, servers that require ghg-emitting energy to produce, distribute, power and cool. google may be interested in lassoing consilience gombiner: carbon footprinting the high winds, but like most other websites, the majority of its servers currently derive their energy from coal, the cheapest and most abundant fossil fuel. a transition to an internet powered by renewable energy is remote and may be a cool and breezy dream. 124 consilience bibliography gartner, inc (april 26, 2007). gartner estimates ict industry accounts for 2 percent of global co2 emissions. http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=503867 hölzle, urs (january 11, 2009). “powering a google search.” the official google blog. ipcc (2007). climate change 2007: synthesis report. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf kuhn, eric (december 18, 2009) “cnn politics — political ticker...google unveils top political searches of 2009.” cnn. leake, jonathan and richard woods (january 11, 2009). “revealed: the environmental impact of google searches.” the sunday times. owen, david (may 17, 2010). “the inventor's dilemma: a eco-minded engineer discusses the limits of innovation.” p. 42-50. the new yorker. pandia search engine news (july 2, 2007). “pandia search engine news — google: one million servers and counting.” youtube factsheet. http://www.youtube.com/t/fact_sheet. http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=503867 http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf http://www.youtube.com/t/fact_sheet dear readers, it is with great pleasure that i announce issue xx of consilience: the journal of sustainable development. over the course of 2018, we have seen the united states withdraw from the global environmental arena, and china and india have begun rhetorically jockeying to fill this power vacuum. sustainable development, no longer an elite buzzword, has become a common issue and the focus of marches, protests, and much national legislation, even as an urgent ipccc report called for immediate and decisive action to combat the looming effects of climate change. despite some rising international tensions and internal political strife, there must be cohesive multilateral cooperation on sustainability and the environment. in issue xx, the editing board of consilience has chosen six carefully curated articles, which come together to deliver a truly global and interdisciplinary look at contemporary problems and solutions in sustainable development. anna bachan opens this issue with an expansive article focusing on gender and international labor migration. her exploration of the social and economic development spurred by female senegalese migrants exemplifies both the local and global impacts of the genderdevelopment-migration nexus. she reminds us that overarching governmental policies must consider each individual in order to make sustainable, cultural change. cultural change is also the focus of najla mouchrek’s research in brazil and the united states. she applies design-based approaches to educational settings in order to better facilitate sustainable thinking and living in students. bridging the “value-action” gap to encourage concrete action based on environmental values can serve as a jumping-off point for a gradual cultural shift to a sustainably minded society. an exemplary article from hillary brown engages successful implementations of circular energy economies in brazil and india. renewable energy in a closed-loop system utilizes energy otherwise wasted from a landfill site and agricultural waste in two brazilian case studies, and cross-sectoral integration helped electrify rural villages with solar power in india. brown explores these examples to show how circular energy produces not only environmental but economic and social benefits. colton smith, david driver, and gilbert michaud also delve deeply into the possibilities of renewable energy, focusing on solar and wind potential in ohio. their article synthesizes a vast collection of employment and capacity data to show how both solar and wind production has changed, and how ohio policymakers have directly and indirectly affected the renewables sector. consilience breaks away from traditional academic writing with a powerful photo essay from a study in gojome, a rural japanese town. dr. yasuko kusakari, dominique chiu, lillian muasa, kyoko takahashi, and dr. shogo kudo show with images and from interviews how civic pride and a sense of belonging can facilitate rural sustainability and can encourage population stability to preserve culture, tradition, and the environment. in our previous publication, consilience presented a theoretical exploration of the relationship between art and science. in issue xx, sadi mosko grounds this theory with an investigation into contemporary dancers and dance companies that integrate sustainability and environmental values into both practical carbon costs as well as into their choreography and scenery. this article shows how dance can bring sustainability to everyday people and can help formulate that cultural shift which is so important to a livable future. in this turbulent era, it is vital that we continue to assemble interdisciplinary solutions that explore every horizon. yes, we must “push the boundaries” of sustainable development – but more importantly, we must do away with boundaries of all kinds and instead focus on integration and amalgamation. it is time for a global cultural shift towards a world where sustainability is natural, normal, and ubiquitous. thank you to our readers and authors for your patience as we worked on issue xx. as always, we welcome and encourage constructive feedback and commentary. if you have any questions, comments, or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact us at consiliencejournal@gmail.com. ambria benesch editor-in-chief mailto:consiliencejournal@gmail.com microsoft word 02112008 holdway reducing uncertainty.doc reducing uncertainty: the need to clarify the key elements of the precautionary principle aaron holdway1 abstract: in the past two decades, the precautionary principle has appeared ever more widely in national and international law and policy concerned with the environment and public health. a general lack of clarity in these policy instruments about how the precautionary principle should be operationalized, however, has undermined the principle’s potential as a valuable tool for public policy-makers and decision-makers. this paper builds on the existing literature on the precautionary principle by identifying four key elements that require particular attention if the precautionary principle is to be effectively operationalized. key considerations for policy-makers are outlined for each of these elements. the paper situates these ideas in the context of the overlapping spheres of science and politics, addressing common misunderstandings about the relationship between expert knowledge and public value choices. 1 aaron holdway graduated from queen’s university in 2003 with a degree in chemistry and is currently studying at the oxford university centre for the environment. he can be contacted at aaron.holdway@ouce.ox.ac.uk introduction: western society in the last century has seen extraordinary gains in health and standard of living, but these advances have not come without a price. technological innovations such as ddt, cfcs, pcbs, and asbestos, to name just a few, have caused disastrous consequences for the environment and human health, yet all were given a clean bill of health by the best science of the day. uncertainty about the magnitude or possible causes of such harm has frequently been used as a reason to postpone decisions to protect against it. the precautionary principle – broadly stated, the idea that where possible risks to the environment and public health have been identified, action should be taken instead of waiting for conclusive evidence of a causal relationship – emerged from a recognition that clear evidence of threats cannot always be obtained before damage occurs. it is often necessary to make decisions in the face of persistent uncertainty and ignorance. although the precautionary princple has been endorsed in a wide variety of international treaties and increasingly incorporated in health and environmental legislation in many countries, there is a lack of common understanding of what precisely the precautionary principle means in practice. numerous definitions exist, many of them differing substantively in key elements such as the level of threat required to invoke the principle, the level of evidence required to avoid the invocation of the principle (and who bears the burden of proof), the range of precautionary actions that should be considered, and with what force precautionary measures should be applied. clarifying and elaborating these elements also requires a clear understanding of the roles of science and politics in policy-making and decision-making in instances of scientific uncertainty and ignorance. with the precautionary principle becoming an increasingly important part of national and international environmental law and policy, it is important that future formulations of the precautionary principle provide the above content. origin and increasing importance of the precautionary principle: the precautionary principle has its conceptual origins in a rejection of the assumptions of the “assimilative capacity approach” to environmental policy2 – that is, it represents a shift of focus away from trying to determine the level of pollution that the environment can assimilate to a policy of reducing or eliminating the input of pollutants. failures of this approach, where scientific proof of the harmful effects of activities or substances was inadequate or untimely, led to a shift in emphasis in favour of caution and environmental protection.3 the precautionary principle thus counters the traditional presumption that activities should proceed unless and until they are proven to be harmful, recognizing that delaying action until this point will often mean that it is too expensive, and perhaps impossible, to avert the threat. the precautionary principle also comes from a recognition that while in the past human actions could generally only have effects over small areas and timescales, new technologies make it possible to harm vast areas and humanity as a whole, including future generations.4 the principle is not a substitute for a scientific approach but is instead a supplement to aid in policyand decision-making when scientific knowledge is lacking. 2 mcintyre & mosedale 3 cameron & abouchar 4 andorno 3 in law and policy, the origin of the precautionary principle is generally traced to the concept of vorsorgeprinzip – literally “principle of advance caring”5 – in german environmental law in the early 1970s.6 vorsorgeprinzip states that environmental policy requires a cautionary approach7 and was introduced to provide a decision-making tool for environmental risk managers.8 the principle “implied a reversal of the burden of proof from the proponents of the hypothesis of a causal link between a particular activity and harmful effects, to the promoters of the said activity.”9 the precautionary principle was then adopted by other european countries such as denmark, sweden, and france, and was extended from environmental matters to also cover issues of public health.10 the precautionary principle also began to be enshrined in a number of international treaties and policy documents. the first of these was the 1982 un world charter for nature,11 which stated that “activities which are likely to pose a significant risk to nature shall be preceded by an exhaustive examination . . . and where potential adverse effects are not fully understood, the activities should not proceed.” the first appearance of the precautionary principle in international law was as a result of german proposals made at the second international conference on the protection of the north sea, in 1987.12 the ministerial declaration from this conference (the london declaration) stated that “in order to protect the north sea from possibly damaging effects of the most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may require action to control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence.” it was at the un conference on environment and development in rio de janeiro in 1992, however, that the precautionary principle achieved universal recognition. the two treaties signed at the summit – the convention on biological diversity (cbd) and the un framework convention on climate change (unfccc) – both included the precautionary principle (though in the cbd, not by name). principle 15 of the rio declaration on environment and development (rio declaration) declared that “where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” mention of the precautionary principle has also occurred in international agreements related to human health, such as the 1994 world trade organization agreement on the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures (sps agreement), which deals with food safety and animal and plant health measures, and the cbd’s cartagena protocol on biosafety (2000), which regulates the international movement of genetically-modified organisms. in some cases, parties to agreements that were enacted prior to the establishment of the precautionary principle have endorsed a version of the principle, as was the case with the convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora (cites) in 1994.13 in total, trouwborst reports that references have been made to the precautionary principle in more than fifty legally-binding 5 petrini & vecchia 6 sunstein 7 kheifets, hester, & banerjee 8 hathcock 9 henry & henry 10 andorno 11 commission of the european communities (cec), p. 11 12 freestone & hey, 1996a, p. 4 13 dickson, p. 276 4 international instruments14 – that is, in virtually every recently adopted treaty in environmental and public health protection 15 ,16 – and has thus become a norm of international law.17 ,18 the precautionary principle has also been important at the national level in a number of countries and in the european union. the founding documents of the eu, the treaties of maastricht (1992) and amsterdam (1997), both make the precautionary principle one of the main criteria for environmental and health policies. the former treaty states that eu environmental policy “shall be based on the precautionary principle.” at the national level, the precautionary principle has been included either explicitly or implicitly in the national environmental legislation of a number of countries in addition to those mentioned above, including argentina, australia, canada, costa rica, the netherlands, new zealand, norway, south africa, switzerland, and the united kingdom.19 ,20 ,21 the problematic lack of clarity: despite its widespread use, most present formulations of the precautionary principle require a considerable degree of interpretation by decision-makers. as adams notes, “the precautionary principle is often invoked as if there is common understanding of the term.”22 the treaties of maastricht and amsterdam, for example, cite the precautionary principle as a cornerstone of european environmental policy but do not define the term or provide any guidelines on its application. those documents that do define the precautionary principle use widely differing formulations. the lack of a clear, widely agreed-upon, operational definition of the precautionary principle undermines the principle’s intended purpose, allowing, for example, the adoption of disguised trade restriction practices meant to protect a country’s commercial interests rather than its environmental or public health interests. newton and oldfield conclude that, under the status quo, “users of the precautionary principle appear to interpret it to further their own aims.”23 some commentators have made suggestions on how formulations of the precautionary principle can be improved, including hickey and walker;24 stirling;25 raffensperger and barrett;26 harremoës, gee, macgarvin, stirling, keys, wynne, et al.;27 and cooney and dickson.28 common items in such guidance include: transparency and accountability in the decision-making process; fairness in considering the distributional impacts of the social and economic costs and benefits; proportionality to the potential threats and the desired level of protection; involving a 14 trouwborst, pp. 303-327 15 andorno 16 freestone & hey, 1996a, p. 3 17 mcintyre & mosedale 18 cec, p. 11 19 cooney & dickson 20 cameron & abouchar 21 kheifets, et al. 22 adams 23 newton & oldfield, p. 36 24 hickey & walker 25 stirling 26 raffensperger & barrett 27 harremoës, gee, macgarvin, stirling, keys, wynne, et al. 28 cooney & dickson 5 wide range of stakeholders; and subjecting decisions to monitoring and regular review to assess the understanding of the threat and the effectiveness of the precautionary measures employed. such statements of guidance often recommend the use of tools like risk assessment (to the extent possible), cost-benefit analysis, and multi-criteria analysis, and the employment of clean production methods, best available technology, and best environmental practices. these examples cite important principles for policy-making and decision-making in general, but they largely overlook the need for guidance on the key elements outlined in this paper: level of threat, level of evidence, range of actions, and level of force. such guidance rarely appears to be taken up in subsequent formulations of the precautionary principle. nonetheless, some policy instruments have begun to take steps in this direction, providing more comprehensive outlines of the intentions of the precautionary principle and guidance on how to implement it. the 1995 un fish stocks agreement, for example, lists specific steps that states should take to ensure precautionary fisheries policies are applied.29 similarly, the un food and agriculture organization’s 1995 “guidelines on the precautionary approach to capture fisheries and species introductions” provide guidance on a broad range of issues related to monitoring, research, and evaluation of new technologies.30 in a broader policy context, the european commission’s 2000 communication on the precautionary principle outlines five principles to guide implementation of the precautionary principle, including consistency and examination of scientific developments.31 like the guidance suggested by commentators above, however, these policy instruments still do not address most of the key elements required for effective implementation of the precautionary principle and could be significantly improved by explicitly addressing the four key elements outlined in this paper. clarifying the main elements: the difficulties of applying the precautionary principle in complex situations are heightened in many ways by a lack of agreement on the meanings of key elements and terms. this has meant that in practice, “there is considerable lack of clarity about what it actually means to apply the precautionary principle or take precautionary measures.”32 tucker and treweek have shown, for example, how different understandings of the principle can lead decision-makers to different conclusions about how to respond to particular development proposals.33 sant points out that a lack of shared understanding of what the precautionary principle means in the context of australian fisheries has contributed to the lack of impact of despite the presence of longstanding precautionary obligations.34 as underwood notes, “given that decision-making must always be done in a context of poor information, conflicting goals, uncertain consequences and political pressure,” it needs to be made clear “what makes it appropriate to use a precautionary principle.”35 to begin the analysis, it is important to define a few key terms. 29 as cited in freestone & hey, 1996a 30 as cited in cooney 31 cec 32 cooney, p. 6 33 as cited in cooney & dickson, p. 289 34 as cited in cooney & dickson, p. 289 35 underwood 6 the precautionary principle is often said to be a tool for dealing with uncertainty in scientific knowledge, but “uncertainty” should properly be differentiated into three different epistemic situations: risk, uncertainty, and ignorance. risk, as formally defined in probability theory, is where all possible outcomes are known in advance and can be assigned probabilistic values. uncertainty is where outcomes are relatively clear but adequate evidence for assigning probabilities does not exist. ignorance is where not only the likelihoods of various outcomes are unknown, but where some of the possible outcomes themselves are unknown.36 ,37 in cases where risk prevails, decision-makers can use risk assessment to prevent environmental damage and protect human health. in cases of uncertainty and ignorance, however, conventional risk assessment is too narrow in scope to provide adequate guidance to decisionmakers and the precautionary principle is needed. much of the misunderstanding surrounding the precautionary principle concerns the distinction between prevention and precaution.38 prevention is used in cases of risk; precaution is used in cases of potential risk – that is, uncertainty and ignorance. for example, a 1991 study by the organisation for economic co-operation and development (oecd) on the precautionary principle notes that “some would like to see [the principle] applied to any substance liable to cause pollution, while others consider that it should be applied only to substances that have adverse effects, or to substances whose emissions actually do create a pollution risk.”39 in cases where a substance is likely to cause pollution or is known to have adverse effects, however, purely preventive measures can be taken, as the situation is one of risk. the precautionary principle is a framework for managing situations of uncertainty and ignorance. it goes beyond prevention by urging policy-makers and decision-makers to anticipate problems before they occur and to act instead of waiting for scientific proof of harm. these distinctions are not always acknowledged, rarely defined, and sometimes not even properly understood in formulations of the precautionary principle. with a proper understanding of the above terms, we then need to discern the key elements of the precautionary principle and determine what they mean. from the wide variety of existing statements of the precautionary principle, we can identify four key elements that will require elaboration: the level of threat that warrants action, the level of evidence required to avoid taking precautionary action, the range of actions that are to be taken, and the level of force required of the actions. using these four elements, we can demonstrate the shortcomings of existing definitions and the need for more clarity and specific criteria for putting the precautionary principle into action. let us consider the four elements in turn. 1. level of threat virtually every new development in technology creates some risk in the pursuit of benefits. decisionmakers, then, need to know what constitutes a threat requiring action under the precautionary principle. some statements of the precautionary principle may appear to give some guidance on what constitutes an “actionable” threat. the rio declaration and australia’s intergovernmental agreement on the environment (igae) of 1992, for 36 gardiner 37 wynne 38 andorno 39 as cited in cameron, p. 37 7 example, both refer to “threats of serious or irreversible damage” – but what does this mean? the notion of “seriousness” is clearly subjective: “one person’s ‘unacceptable consequence’ is another person’s ‘regrettable necessity.’”40 is irreversibility to be understood in the physicist’s sense, such that “all change (and hence all damage) is irreversible in the strict sense that the precise structure of the world that pertained before cannot once again come into being”?41 it may seem pedantic to make such a point, but the interpretation of irreversibility has practical implications. for example, decision-makers considering whether to approve the construction of a dam that would kill a river’s trout may legitimately wonder whether this situation would be considered irreversible if the dam could later be removed and the river restocked with non-native trout. other statements of the precautionary principle are even less specific about what level of threat requires precautionary action. for instance, the widely-publicized wingspread statement from a 1998 conference sponsored by the us-based science and environmental health network refers simply to “threats of harm,” and the sps agreement does not specify a threat at all: “in cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures . . .” in addition, it should be made clear whether a certain level of scientific evidence of possible harm is required before decision-makers can order that precautionary measures be taken. stated another way, what level of scientific uncertainty must be demonstrated in order to trigger the principle? a number of possible “levels of proof” can be imagined, ranging from the “reasonable grounds for concern” in the 1992 convention for the protection of the marine environment of the north east atlantic (ospar convention) and the european commission’s communication, to the “beyond reasonable doubt” of criminal law. in short, for the precautionary principle to be effectively operationalized, the vagueness surrounding what constitutes a threat requiring action, as well as what level of evidence must be provided before action is taken, must be clarified. without these clarifications, the precautionary principle is susceptible to abuse, to being used as a cover for making decisions based on other factors, such as using it as a pretext for the adoption of protectionist measures. 2. level of evidence required to prove safety clarification and elaboration is also required on the level of evidence required to avoid the invocation of the precautionary principle. many definitions are vague about how much certainty must be demonstrated regarding a product or activity’s safety. for example, the un world charter for nature refers to cases where threats are “not fully understood,” and the sps agreement refers to cases where scientific evidence is “insufficient.” does this mean that industrialists or potential polluters must show that their product or process is safe with complete certainty (“zero risk”), or beyond a shadow of a doubt, or beyond a reasonable doubt, or beyond the balance of probabilities, or some other measure? definitions like the rio declaration, which refer to “lack of full scientific certainty” (emphasis added), overlook the fact that it is impossible to prove the “absence of harm.”42 if it is acknowledged that the 40 freestone & hey, 1996b, p. 250 41 manson 42 turvey & mojduszka 8 standard should be “one of weight of evidence rather than of absolute proof,”43 it should be made clear which of the above degrees of evidence is required. equally important is the lack of clarity in many statements of the precautionary principle on who bears the burden of proof. (turvey & mojduszka, in fact, say that “the principle is about the burden of proof.”44) traditional legal standards require that public regulators provide scientific evidence of harm before restricting the sale of a product or use of a technology. formulations such as the wingspread statement and the earth charter, however, explicitly propose to reverse the burden of proof between society and technological innovators, asserting, respectively, that “the proponent of the activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof” and “place the burden of proof on those who argue that a proposed activity will not cause significant harm.” the european commission’s communication also endorses shifting the burden of proof in certain cases, such as approval of products like drugs, food additives, and pesticides before they are placed on the market, and substances “deemed ‘a priori’ hazardous.”45 reversing the burden of proof redresses the situation where “the ‘perpetrators’ of adverse impacts from new technologies often escape accountability, because such impacts are hard to prove and the burden of proof is on those who suffer.”46 but the requirement to establish safety with complete certainty, besides being technically impossible, as already noted, will dramatically increase costs for proponents of new technologies and could indefinitely delay, or indeed make impossible, advances that could be of great benefit to society. yet it is possible to divide the burden of proof – even if this still rests much more heavily with the innovator than with society. this may reduce the “impossible burden”47 placed on proponents of technology while at the same time still making them play a more active role in assessing the potential risks of their proposed products or actions.48 statements of the precautionary principle should thus include guidance on how the burden of proof is to be distributed and what in particular those with the burden of proof must demonstrate. 3. actions to be taken similarly vague in most statements of the precautionary principle are the types of actions that constitute precautionary measures and guidance on which actions should be taken if the evidentiary threshold is met. one can imagine a wide variety of possible actions that could (or should) be taken to address the possible harmful effects of a given product or activity. in approximate increasing order of severity, these include: doing nothing; merely considering action; performing further research to improve understanding; in the case of a product, performing premarket testing; warning people of the possible harm caused by the product or activity (in the case of products, this could include labelling); monitoring the product or activity to look for evidence of the possible harm; taking measures to reduce the impact of the possible harm (for example, by preventing exposure to it); placing strict regulation on the product or activity; placing a moratorium on the product or activity; phasing out the product or 43 kheifets, et al. 44 turvey & mojduszka 45 cec, p. 21 46 van den belt & gremmen 47 hathcock 48 andorno 9 activity; and placing an outright ban on the product or activity. (of course, more than one of these actions may be employed in a given situation, either simultaneously or in succession.) yet most statements of the precautionary principle do not help decision-makers understand which range of options to employ. for example, we see references to “preventive measures” (for instance, in the convention on the protection of the marine environment of the baltic sea area) and “cost-effective measures” (rio declaration) but are not given any guidance on what exactly these phrases mean in practice. few versions of the precautionary principle explicitly mention cost-effectiveness (the rio declaration and the unfccc are two examples). if this is to be included, further guidance would be helpful. if the employment of “cost-effective actions” is taken to mean “adoption of the least costly action among alternatives that are equally effective at reducing harm,”49 it remains unclear what should be done in cases where effectiveness differs. for example, what if one option is highly effective at reducing harm but is also very expensive and another option is less effective but also less expensive? should highly effective options be preferred over less effective ones, regardless of the difference in cost? if not, it should be made clear how effective actions must be in order to be considered. other versions of the precautionary principle are slightly more specific, saying that if a threat of harm is sufficiently uncertain, “the activities should not proceed” (un world charter for nature) or one should “stop it [here, the worst case scenario, from] taking place” (first european seas at risk conference). yet even here, it is not clear whether decision-makers should adopt a permanent ban on the given product or activity or instead a moratorium, whether such measures could be overturned in the future, and what criteria would need to be met to bring about such a change. 4. level of force the final element of the precautionary principle that requires clarification is with what force precautionary measures should be applied. one can imagine a range of possibilities, from making action mandatory to merely making it permissible. some formulations of the precautionary principle give some guidance on this. the sps agreement, for example, makes some action mandatory by saying that “members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time” (emphasis added). the un world charter for nature makes a strong suggestion in saying that “activities should not proceed,” while the wingspread statement makes a softer suggestion in saying that “precautionary measures should be taken” (emphasis added in each case). weaker still, the london declaration says that certain threats “may require action” − that is, that action should merely be considered. the final declaration of the first european “seas at risk” conference says that if the possible harm of an activity is great, “even a small amount of doubt as to the safety of that activity is sufficient to stop it taking place” (emphasis added). so we see a variety of levels of force, from making action mandatory, to strongly suggesting action, to merely suggesting action, to merely considering action, to merely permitting action. many versions of the precautionary principle provide even less guidance. the bamako convention (1991) on hazardous waste, for example, only urges parties to “strive to adopt and implement the preventive, precautionary approach.” as mentioned above, the level of obligation may be clouded by making references to “economic considerations” 49 kheifets, et al. 10 (montreal protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer, 1987), “cost-effective measures” (rio declaration), “different socio-economic contexts” (second world climate conference, 1990), and application by states “according to their capabilities” (rio declaration). it would be helpful, then, if formulations of the precautionary principle made it clear whether action under specific circumstances is mandatory, merely permitted, or something in between. * * * it is no longer acceptable simply to express a vague desire to avoid pollution; further platitudinal statements of the precautionary principle will not protect the environment. now that it has become widely accepted to include the precautionary principle in international agreements, the next step must be to strengthen and clarify the key elements and key terms according to the considerations outlined above. the roles of science and politics: if the precautionary principle is to be effectively implemented, it is also important that its proper place in the overlapping spheres of science and politics be understood, particularly the extent to which science can and should drive decision-making and the roles of public officials in considering how to act based on the best science available to them. indeed, the relationship between the expert knowledge of scientists and the value choices of public officials is at the very heart of the precautionary principle. it is thus important to address a few key points on the roles of science and politics in applying the precautionary principle – points that some definitions and commentators overlook or seem to misunderstand. first, recognizing the limitations of scientific knowledge, particularly regarding “certainty” and ignorance, is crucial in understanding and effectively implementing the precautionary principle. society’s increasing inclusion of the precautionary principle in national and international law and policy is a response to a recognition that science’s “growing innovative powers were increasingly outrunning its capacity to anticipate the consequences.”50 this was coupled with a reluctance of the scientific community to acknowledge this waning ability to predict the impact of its actions. harremoës et al. note that within the scientific community, it is accepted that scientific “proof” is always provisional.51 yet externally it has sometimes been the case that science has been asked to provide the policy process with straight-forward answers and certainty. as mentioned above, however, science cannot provide certainty. definitions that point to a “lack of full scientific certainty” (for example, the rio declaration and the igae definition) imply that there are environmental issues for which full scientific certainty exists. as karl popper has argued, ultimate truth is unknowable; uncertainty is always with us,52 and perhaps nowhere more so than the environment. scientists, policy-makers, and decision-makers must recognize that uncertainty will always be part of environmental policy-making and decision-making and must therefore ensure, via the precautionary principle, that it receives due consideration in these processes. another acknowledgement that needs to be made is the importance of ignorance. balzano and sheppard, for instance, state that “acting on speculative ideas about the existence of risk 50 harremoës et al., p. 209 51 harremoës et al. 52 as cited in macgarvin, 1999a, p. 36 11 divorced from risk assessment is only guessing and likely to be in error.”53 this overlooks that the greatest contamination problems in the past half century – for example, ddt, pcbs, and cfcs – were created out of ignorance, not uncertainty.54 originally declared safe by the science of the day, these chemicals had already created significant damage by the time uncertainties began to emerge. in cases of ignorance, when so many variables cannot be identified let alone quantified, it is irrational to argue for a quantitative risk assessment. to try to overcome these difficulties, the scientific community needs more humility and less hubris, and must focus on ignorance as well as uncertainty. second, the nature of the contribution of science to policy-making and decision-making must also be properly understood. a number of commentators in the scientific community have criticized existing definitions of the precautionary principle for marginalizing the role of science (for example, gray & bewers55). the perception is that the precautionary principle “fails to pay enough respect to science”56 and even threatens57 the role of science in policy-making and decision-making by “invoking unsubstantiated perceptions as a basis for action instead of scientific methods.”58 gray even says that use of the precautionary principle is “entirely an administrative and legislative matter and has nothing to do with science.”59 on the contrary, the precautionary principle is not “antiscience”; it depends very much on science. yet, it has to do with “the rejection of reductionist, closed, arbitrarily narrow science in favour of sounder, more rigorous and more robust science,”60 incorporating uncertainty and ignorance into the decision-making framework. the controversy arises because science cannot always provide the insights needed to effectively protect the environment, leaving decisions on environmental management to public officials. science is thus a tool for policy-makers and decision-makers. it is an essential, but not sufficient, condition for the management of potential environmental risks.61 science only provides one part of the basis for employing precautionary measures. in this way, “science should be on tap, not on top.”62 furthermore, science is not as objective as is sometimes supposed. as thomas kuhn, another important thinker on the nature of science, has argued, “facts” are influenced greatly by our worldview and the observations we choose to make, and the questions we ask (and do not ask) and the theories we construct reflect our prior experiences and the values we hold.63 science, in short, is a social construct. it makes an important contribution to policy-making and decision-making, but it cannot be the only basis. third, following from the above, the decision whether or not to adopt the precautionary principle is a value judgement, to be made by public officials. it is politicians who must decide what level of risk is “acceptable” to society, what trade-offs society is willing to make, and how different interests should be balanced. (the european 53 balzano & sheppard 54 macgarvin, 1999b, p. 229 55 gray & bewers 56 sandin, peterson, hansson, rudén, & juthe 57 santillo, stringer, johnston, & tickner 58 gray & bewers 59 gray 60 harremoës et al., p. 210 61 stirling, p. 92 62 stirling, p. 92, quoting winston churchill 63 as cited in macgarvin, 1999a, p. 37 12 commission communication refers to this as “an eminently political responsibility.”64) one commentator misses the point: “unless amended, the precautionary principle leads to a subjective form of risk assessment . . .”65 in situations of uncertainty and ignorance, where the level of information that science can provide is limited and a clear technical resolution is thus not to be found, decisions about how to act are particularly laden with value judgements and subjective assumptions. decisions about which risks to assess and which to ignore, how to assess harm, and even what constitutes a harmful impact are all value-based judgments. if society has to share the potential burden of harmful impacts, then policy-makers and decision-makers need to consider the possible social and ethical implications of their actions. formulations of the precautionary principle should provide more guidance, according to the four key elements described above, to help policy-makers and decision-makers implement the principle effectively. * * * with the precautionary principle appearing ever more widely in national and international law and policy, it is increasingly important that a shared understanding of the principle be developed and that practical guidance is added to future formulations of the principle to aid decision-makers in its implementation. the inclusion of the precautionary principle in so many national and international policy contexts affirms the need for a framework to address uncertainty and ignorance in scientific knowledge. yet, the wide variety of existing definitions is attended by an even greater variety of interpretations. this has made application of the principle largely an ad hoc affair and undermines its effectiveness as a tool for protecting the environment and public health. yet despite the problems with existing articulations, this paper has demonstrated that a truly useful elaboration of the precautionary principle is within reach, and its attainment should be a priority of decision-makers and the citizens they serve. those who draft future agreements that cite the precautionary principle should ensure that their formulations clearly address the four key elements outlined in this paper: the level of threat that triggers precautionary action, the level of evidence required to avoid invocation of the precautionary principle, the range of possible precautionary measures, and the level of force with which precautionary measures should be applied. likewise, parties to existing agreements should call for current formulations of the precautionary principle to be amended accordingly. international agreements often reach the lowest common denominator and end up with imprecise formulations of the principle. but if it is agreed, as has generally been the case, that the precautionary principle is an important tool in protecting the environment and public health, the principle should be allowed to be truly effective by ensuring that formulations clearly state how the principle is to be implemented. the precise form each articulation of the principle takes will depend on the context of the respective agreement, but formulations that explicitly address the level of threat, level of evidence, range of actions, and level of force as described herein offer a better prospect of effective operationalization. as technology moves us continually faster from the realm of human experience, the challenge remains to implement the precautionary principle with the strength of its original vision. 64 cec, p. 4 65 balzano & sheppard 13 doing so will require a continual re-examination of the most basic concepts of environmental management policy and the relationships between science, technology, politics, law, and moral norms. references n.b. textual references to the precautionary principle in all international agreements cited above are listed in trouwborst, 2002. the agreements, therefore, are not individually listed below. adams, m. d. 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(1992). uncertainty and environmental learning: reconceiving science and policy in the preventive paradigm. global environmental change, 2(2), 111-127. microsoft word flores_wash_final.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 18, iss. 2 (2017), pp. 29–59 evaluation of wash implementation in nama sub-county caroline fernandes, claudia flores, gabrielle montalbano, harveen sekhon advisor: dr. gregory pierce, ph.d. globemed at ucla university of california, los angeles email: csfernandes@ucla.edu cpflores@ucla.edu gabriellem2097@gmail.com harveens@ucla.edu abstract villages that had underwent globemed and mchi water access, sanitation, and hygiene (wash) interventions tended to exhibit better sanitation and hygiene practices compared to control villages. survey participants were directly recruited from households in eight rural villages that had previously received community-based wash interventions in nama sub-county, uganda. all participants were adults (above eighteen) of varying ages and genders. the other participants were directly recruited from two rural villages who had not received any wash intervention within nama sub-county and served as our control groups. participants were surveyed on various topics including water source quality and distance, prevalence of sickness, latrine management, and sanitation and hygiene practices. the effectiveness of wash programs in globemed and mchi sponsored villages compared to control villages was measured using t-tests and pearson correlation coefficients (r). improved safe water and hygiene practices is fundamental to improving quality of life. improved wash related practices not only correlate with health, they ameliorate other frequently encountered inequities—like low school attendance—as education is a major factor in economic growth and alleviating poverty. addressing wash related problems can be challenging as they affect people from diverse communities and demographics. however, the most promising solutions arise when collaboration emerges between ngos, governments, communities, and individuals. consilience wash in nama sub-county keywords: wash, wuc, uganda, water, infrastructure, health, hygiene, ngo, latrine authors’ note: globemed and mchi’s vision of success is to not only improve wash in the community, but to have our efforts continued by community members long after the implementation. the purpose of our study was to evaluate the progress we have made thus far, but also look for weaknesses in this particular aid model. only with the knowledge of our initiative’s strengths and weaknesses, can the efficacy of our wash efforts substantially be improved. we strive for a day when water user committees can effectively function to manage their respective village’s water source and promote sanitation and hygiene without the support of globemed. we would like to acknowledge dr. gregory pierce for his assistance throughout this study. we would also like to appreciate the members of the mpoma community hiv/aids initiative for their support throughout the project. we would especially like to thank wandera peter (mchi manager), frieda, betty, dennis, kenneth, and lydia for their participation in the outreaches. we also acknowledge the dedication of the members of globemed at ucla in their relentless efforts to raise money and support the wash project. consilience 31 introduction the goal of water access, sanitation, and hygiene (wash) interventions is to improve access to water as well as educate people on the importance of sanitation and hygiene. these projects also aim to reduce the incidence of waterborne and water-related diseases throughout the region that it is implemented. one such water-borne disease is diarrhea, which persists as a leading cause of mortality amongst children under five in developing countries. this type of project also focuses on sustainability for improved water security for future years. ideally, this is done in part through the formation of water user committees (wucs) for each water source. these committees are elected by the community in which the water source has been funded. the role of the wuc is to collect a household water user fee, as determined by the community, and to create an emergency fund in a bank. they are also responsible for tracking community usage of water, identifying problems, and brainstorming solutions. the wuc is responsible for allocating funds appropriately in repair and upkeep of the water source. another part of the wuc are the two health promoters, who are responsible for conducting trainings and outreaches to educate the community about safe sanitary and hygiene practices. these water user committees, in essence, mimic the duties of the water user groups that are supposed to be formed under the water statute of 1995, specifically in uganda. this enactment was the beginning of water access laws in the largely rural country of uganda. studies have shown that improved water access, sanitation, and hygiene result in lower diarrheal rates, lower mortality, and better quality of life. a 2004 study by world health organization found lower mortality and diarrhea rates after the implementation of wash. formation of wucs, which mirrors elinor ostrom’s theory of common pool resource institutes, shows beneficial contributions to community empowerment. however, studies such as the analysis of water user committees in uganda have also shown the ineffectiveness of wucs. this is usually the result from improper or lack of training. nonprofit organizations (ngo) have played a vital role in providing access to potable water. however, a study conducted in ghana showed potential challenges that could arise from a ngo funded water source. overall, the long term benefits of wash projects have shown to balance the inequality that exists in communities from economic statuses to empowering women. consilience wash in nama sub-county in the summer of 2016, we conducted a survey based on sanitation and hygiene practices for 209 households in ten different villages in uganda with mpoma community hiv/aids initiative (mchi). in the results section of this report, we focus on analyzing the most interesting or significant topics from the survey. we found that in general wash villages tend to perform better than control villages in water access and sanitation practices. wash villages tend to have less problems with their source in terms of water quality and source upkeep. moreover, there were significantly less reports of illness in wash villages than in control villages. a similar trend was found when analyzing the relationship between handwashing stations and diarrhea—the two variables had a stronger positive correlation for wash villages than control villages. however, when comparing the wash villages to the control village kyampisi no significant results were found based on latrine management criteria. this suggests that these topics should be more emphasized in wash curriculum. additionally, within wash villages there was variation in wuc performance, with waluga having the most effective committee and buyuki having arguably the worst. after reviewing the results and comparing qualitative data received from the surveys, we considered the future steps for wucs in villages that already have wash interventions. wucs should be further trained on borehole maintenance and be connected with resources to repair these waters sources. also, a greater emphasis should be placed on the importance of latrine sanitation and the use of a permanent handwashing station near the latrine. we also propose expanding mchi’s partnership to the two control villages, kyampisi and namwajollo, in the coming months to implement a wash intervention there as well. the goal of this research was to evaluate the effectiveness of globemed and mchi’s wash interventions and then seek ways to improve our efforts to achieve maximum impact. while our data provided evidence which suggested that most villages with mchi interventions performed significantly better in wash related areas, it is evident that there is still room for improvement. first, data collection must be altered by conducting a baseline assessment prior to villages receiving a wash intervention. additionally, in moving forward with mchi and globemed wash projects, wucs must be the primary area of focus for improvement. it is imperative to increase villagers’ awareness and understanding of the importance of wucs. in addition to connecting wucs with each other, mchi consilience 33 must engage the local government to gain support for their projects and potentially inspire wash-related policy. while wash issues in developing countries are far from being completely resolved, the best chance at significant advancement is through collaboration between ngos, governments, communities, and individuals. literature review water access, sanitation, and hygiene (wash) projects have been implemented by both governments and non-governmental organizations in many developing countries--especially in uganda. unfortunately, improper water, sanitation, and hygiene practices and facilities in the developing world are extremely prevalent and cause major hardship. poor water, sanitation, and hygiene account for roughly ten percent of all deaths annually as 1 in 6 people do not have access to clean water (prüss-üstün, 2008). currently, diarrheal diseases are one of the main causes of high mortality rates in developing countries (boschi-pinto, et al., 2008). specifically in uganda, a 2004 study from the world health organization stated that the rate of mortality from diarrheal diseases was at thirty percent. furthermore, the united nations millennium development goal states that sub-saharan african countries have the highest rate of the disease compared to other countries. with such a large amount of people experiencing wash related hardship, it is important to understand the effects of such issues to appreciate the importance of wash improvement initiatives. unsafe water sources coupled with poor sanitation practices serve as a vector for disease transmission. in fact, two million deaths per year are attributed to waterborne illnesses. the role of nonprofit organizations (ngo) in expanding the proportion of populations that have access to water has shown to be tremendously successful (alexander and et al., 2015). due to population growth and limited funding, governments have shown the inability to provide this access. a study conducted in ghana studied seven villages where ngos had built water sources. questionnaires were then conducted in each village to evaluate the effect each source had on the community’s access to water. the study also looked at four villages who acted as controls. the health levels and sanitary practices of the controls were compared to the ngo intervene villages. the addition of basic infrastructure to the communities resulted in a reduction of thirty minutes for water collection consilience wash in nama sub-county (alexander and et al., 2015). earlier attendance in schools were also noted. because children are regularly held responsible for the retrieval of water, higher attendance in schools could have resulted. in the study, residents proclaimed a lesser concern for acquiring water borne diseases. yet, the addition of a safe water source in the community did not lower diarrheal rates. this could have been caused because of wrong assumptions from the community or lack of sensitization. the intervention of ngo built water sources has benefited many communities. however, the study conducted showed that challenges from ngo funded water sources can easily arise (alexander and et al., 2015). proper training for borehole or water source maintenance must be conducted. the dependency on ngos from these villages could potentially result in nonfunctional sources. that is where water user committees (wuc), as stated before, could intervene and take on the role of dependency. this brings in the sustainable factor, which is what the study suggests in in its discussion. ngos efforts could also be redundant, in the sense where lack of communication between local officials or government could provide boreholes for already served communities (alexander and et al., 2015). not only do wash interventions have remarkable direct impacts on people’s daily lives, but the indirect, long term benefits of these interventions are as well extraordinary. wash interventions have the potential to make serious advancements in combatting inequality. first, wash efforts have significant economic benefits. the world health organization reports that in high income countries most people die of conditions like heart disease, stroke, cancer, alzheimer’s, and diabetes. whereas, in low income countries people are more commonly affected or even die from preventable diseases that are virtually nonexistent in developed countries like diarrheal disease, malaria, tuberculosis and waterborne illnesses (weissman, 2003). thus, productive members of society who have the capacity to contribute to the nation’s economy are no longer able to because they are burdened by illness. in fact, a harvard study reveals that with wash interventions, occurrence of minor, adolescent intestinal infections decreased and the time adults in the community studied usually would have spent caring for children was reallocated to farming or work. (meeks, 2015). with more time for work, a greater consilience 35 opportunity exists for economic development. in addition, the healthier children contribute to the economy as well. children in developing countries miss an estimated three days of school per each episode of diarrhea they experience (chatterley, 2013). thus if access to sanitation and clean water were improved, school attendance can logically be expected to increase, improving the economy as education is commonly considered a major factor responsible for fiscal growth. lastly, not only do wash efforts improve low income nations’ economies relative to other countries, these interventions reduce economic disparity within developing countries. higher income families can often afford to pay for clean water, whereas poor families are forced to drink inconvenient and unsafe water (weissman, 2003). this disparity only widens the economic gap between the rich and poor in developing nations as the poor will continue to be burdened by time intensive water collection and water related illnesses, while the higher income citizens continue to avoid these issues. furthermore, in addition to aiding the economies of developing nations, wash interventions can improve aspects of these countries’ social environments. wash projects empower women in societies where they are often traditionally oppressed. in rural areas the responsibility of water collection typically falls on women (meeks, 2013). with long pumping times or distant water sources, women naturally have less time to earn their own income or attend school. a study in ghana conducted by the world bank concluded that reducing girls’ water collection time expense by fifteen minutes a day would raise girls’ school attendance by eight to twelve percent (weissman, 2003). in addition, wash in school programs also promotes gender equality through relieving girls of the burden of enduring menstruation without proper sanitation and hygiene facilities (weissman, 2003). allowing women the opportunity for education through reducing water collection times and providing infrastructure for menstrual management creates an environment where women can be financially independent, empowering them by giving them more ownership over their lives. additionally, educating women means that the other fifty percent of the population is now able to contribute to the economic productivity of the country. as well as changing a developing country’s social environment in terms of gender equality, wash interventions, consilience wash in nama sub-county especially in schools, have been known to change the broader culture of household sanitary practices. a study examining wash education in kenyan schools found that after the intervention, there was an increase in consumption of treated drinking water, latrine construction, and handwashing in the students’ households (weissman, 2003). these families adopting hygiene conventions is clear evidence that wash interventions are not only working but sustainable. the children passing the information they have learned on to their parents, which changes the social habits of the families, ensures that the wash education does not end in the school and is truly sustainable. methods demographics survey participants were directly recruited from households in eight rural villages that had previously received community-based wash interventions in nama sub-county, uganda. all participants were adults (above eighteen) of varying ages and genders (figure 1). the other participants were directly recruited from two rural villages who had not received any wash intervention within nama subcounty. we thus had two groups, one was a control group of villages that did not receive a wash intervention. the second group consisted of the eight communities that received wash interventions through the globemed-mpoma community hiv/aids initiative (mchi) partnership. using secondary data, a report compiled by the local country district report and information from the manager of mchi, we were able to make estimates of the population size of each village that we surveyed. according to local government reports and verbal responses from local leaders, the total population of the entire nama subcounty has 16,513 males and 16,491 females. there are approximately 143 springs and dug wells, but there is a problem with a lack of funding for those water sources and some have problems with functioning. table a (see appendix) represents estimates that we obtained through conversations with local leaders and leaders of mchi. through mchi’s wash program, there are an estimated 6,022 direct beneficiaries and 1,500 estimated indirect beneficiaries in all villages. ethics and dissemination consilience 37 our survey protocols have been reviewed and approved by the institutional review board of the university of california, los angeles (irb#-16-000773). consent for this study was obtained from the local ugandan government and also from each participant. before beginning the interviews the participants were told the purpose of the study, that the results are confidential, and that they do not have to answer anything they do not wish to respond to. participants were informed that we would be conducting an in-depth qualitative interview about their village water source, current sanitation practices, and latrine quality. also, they were informed that the gps coordinate of their household would be recorded. consent was indicated by signing their name and in the case of illiteracy using their thumb print. the consent form is attached to the end of this report (appendix c). how the survey or interview was conducted (translation methods included) in summer 2016, we conducted 209 interviews in ten villages: eight communities that had wash interventions and in two communities that served as control villages. a minimum of twenty surveys were taken in each village. these interviews were conducted by grow interns in the luganda language with the presence of a mpoma team member who served as the translator. the translator had a physical copy of the translated survey and the interns recorded the responses on a paper. gps coordinates were taken at every household and globemed funded water source. the researchers collected data through the survey on household demographics, sanitation and hygiene practices, and water source availability and quality. researchers also directly observed household latrines, water sources, and handwashing stations. part one of the survey asked questions about the water source that was funded by mchi in the specific village. these were questions pertaining to water clarity, taste, accessibility, and more. there were a total of five questions, each with several parts (a-e) for a total of twenty-two questions. part two of the survey focused on sanitation and hygiene practices within the household. these questions were focused on handwashing practices, latrine conditions, soap usage, cleaning of utensils, sickness in the family, and training on wash. there were seven questions with several parts for a total of twenty-five questions. consilience wash in nama sub-county part three assessed households’ current behavioral practices in four areas: disposal of feces, disposal of children’s feces, latrines and handwashing stations, and safe water handling. the participants ranked themselves from pictures one through three (disposal of children’s feces and latrine practice) or pictures one through four (disposal of feces and safe water handling), with picture one ranked as the least sanitary behavior and picture three or four ranked ranked as the most sanitary. for example, in latrine practices, picture one had no handwashing station near the latrine and picture three had a tippy tap (a “no hands” handwashing station made from local materials) near the latrine. this survey lasted approximately fifteen to twenty minutes per household and a minimum of twenty households were surveyed in each of the ten villages. although most participants completed the full survey, there were three villagers that either refused to finish the survey or to even begin the survey. the mchi and globemed team conducted the outreaches (and surveys) over a six week period. approximately two survey rounds were conducted each week (one in the first week and three in the last). these outreaches lasted approximately four to five hours, including travel time. statistical analysis this report draws on several aspects of a larger survey that was conducted in these villages. all tests of statistical significance were measured using conventional standards and a p-value less than .05 was considered significant. using weighted averages, we obtained the combined averages for the control villages and the combined averages for wash villages. results although the entire wash survey encompassed many topics, we focus on the most interesting and significant findings in this report. we explore first, a summary of the results found about the water sources themselves (figure 1). we further analyze the time that it takes to walk to a water source (figure 2) and the immediate implications of building basic infrastructure. we then discuss study latrine sanitation practices (figure 4) and handwashing stations (figure 3). throughout the results, there is a general trend that wash villages tend to perform better than control villages in both waters access and sanitation practices. this is the biggest takeaway from this section. consilience 39 figure 1: water source survey across control and wash villages in figure 1, we explore some of the basic issues associated with the water source that were surveyed. the horizontal axis shows questions that were asked in the survey such as "do you think the water is clear?" and "does the water taste ok?" the vertical axis shows the average percentage of "yes" replies to each question. the control group includes namawajollo and kyampisi's responses as weighted averages. the other group represents a weighted average of "yes" replies from the eight wash villages, incorporating the population surveyed in each village. in order to explore the data fully, the entire wash group was often compared to each control village. the graph shows that villages with wash interventions had fewer problems with their water source than the control villages. the difference was significant between namawajollo and all wash villages (p<.05) and between kyampisi and all wash villages (p<.05). some common problems that were mentioned in the villages included: dirty water (kyampisi), rain water mixing with the ground water (waluga), problems with the drainage system (takkajjunge), water scarcity in the dry season (lukalu 2), problems with animal contamination (kyampisi), crowding (several), and the rusting of pipes (buyuki). it can be seen from the graph that villages that received consilience wash in nama sub-county funding from globemed and mchi had more satisfaction with water clarity in comparison to control villages, where the water came from an unprotected water source. for namawajollo, seven of the eight wash villages had significantly more responses of "yes" (p<.05) the only wash intervention that was not significant was buyuki (p=0.3972), which also had a low response of "yes" to "do you think the water is clear?." in comparison to kyampisi, each wash village was considered statistically different (p<.05). wash intervention villages generally had clearer water than the unprotected sources in control villages. as water taste is concerned, it is again easily observable that wash villages had fewer problems with the taste than control villages. namawajollo did not show a significant difference between wash villages lukalu 2 and buyuki. buyuki actually had a lower responses of "yes" to "does the water taste ok?" than namawajollo (buyuki mean=25%, namawajollo mean= 55%). kyampisi had a significant difference with all of the wash villages (p<.05) except buyuki. kyampisi had a lower average response of "yes" than buyuki (buyuki mean= 25%, kyampisi mean= 20%). some of the problems with kyampisi's water clarity and taste were due to mud mixing with the unprotected water source and animal's drinking and defecating near the source. both control and wash villages agreed that the water sources were used by too many people. this is true in many wash villages as well, because the new borehole often becomes the main water source for the households surrounding it, as many other sources remain unprotected. however, as can be seen from figure 1, wash villages were still able to retrieve water on a more regular basis than control villages, even though both say that the sources were crowded. explanations for this could include faster pumping time with a borehole and the water levels remaining consistently high in wash villages. the graph also shows that the unprotected water sources in the control villages had been dry more so than those in wash villages. namawajollo has an average of 65% of those surveyed that said that the water source had indeed been dry. this was significantly different from the other wash villages. kyampisi had an average of 20%, which was not significantly different from busaale (average=10%), katoogo (average=5%), and lukalu 1 and 2 (average=5%). this could imply that even some of the villages that received wash interventions had some trouble with water scarcity consilience 41 in the boreholes. at the same time, this water scarcity may have affected the control villages more, as more people had difficulty retrieving water in those villages. the control villages, on average, had more villagers that were unable to retrieve water, for various reasons. many of these reasons are included on the chart as well, such as problems with overcrowding, water clarity, and a dry source. an average of 90% of those surveyed in namawajollo had been unable to retrieve water at some point. this was significantly higher than any of the wash villages (p<.05). an average of 50% of those surveyed in kyampisi had been unable to retrieve water. this was significantly higher than all of the wash villages except katoogo (average=27%). the most common reason stated in katoogo for being unable to retrieve water was because the source was overcrowded. figure 2: time to walk to water source in control and wash villages figure 2 shows the average time to walk to the water source in wash villages (12 minutes) and in control villages (17 minutes). it is important to consider that this walking time only includes going to the water source and not the way back, nor does it include pumping and waiting times at the water source. it also important to consider that the data for the wash villages is a bit skewed towards a higher average due to the average time to walk to the source found consilience wash in nama sub-county in lukalu 1 (21 minutes). however, it can still be seen that providing basic infrastructure such as a borehole can decrease the time spent walking to the water source. next, we explore the sanitation and hygiene aspect of wash. figure 3 demonstrates the possibility of a correlation between wash training and the prevalence of sickness amongst the villagers. figure 3 includes both the control and wash villages, for a total of ten villages. of the total individuals surveyed, we combined the data for all individuals who said that they or a family member had been sick in the past three months. then, we totaled those within that group who had training on wash and those who had not had any training. it is important to consider that this training did not always come from mpoma. only 52% of all training was conducted by mchi. other trainings came from the government, other nonprofits, and schools. it is also important to consider that these illnesses ranged from a simple cough to a water-borne disease. therefore, it is difficult to conclude that wash training directly impacted how often an individual became sick. however, as can be seen from the graph, a larger percentage (67%) of those who had been sick had not received wash training of any kind. most interviewees who had wash training not conducted by wucs noted that it was typically from the government. out of the figure 3: wash training and prevalence of illness amongst participants seven households which said they had wash training, four said the consilience 43 training came from the government, one said an ngo, another received training via radio, and one household could not remember who conducted the training. for these villages, the topics covered ranged from personal hygiene to boiling water plus keeping utensils and water vessels clean. by comparison, all globemed sponsored households said their training came from village water user committees which were trained by mpoma. although these households mentioned the same topics, interviewees usually stated that they learned about the importance of topics like hand washing and boiling water; this may suggest that the prevention aspect to wash training was emphasized to them unlike control households where they may have vaguely been told that hand washing and boiling water were important with the focus being on the steps to do both actions. a discussion about prevention of waterborne illnesses to elucidate why such precautions are so imperative could have made wuc trainings more effective than government trainings. however, the findings may not be accurate as we were only able to survey two control villages. perhaps the difference between control and wash villages would have been stronger if more non-wash villages had been interviewed. in order to further explore sanitation and hygiene practices, it is important to consider the state of the hand washing stations present in each household, and their proximity to the latrine to promote handwashing. the pictures in figure 5 of the survey, which can be found in appendix d, correspond to the labels on figure 4. as can be seen, the first picture represents no type of hand washing station near the latrine. the second picture shows a permanent handwashing station, not a tippy tap. the third picture shows a tippy tap near the latrine. this chart shows that a large percentage of households in the control villages do not have permanent handwashing stations near the latrine (83%) as compared to (54%) in wash villages. using this data, we can consider the impact that implementing a wash program has on actual behavior change. however, it is also important to consider each individual wash consilience wash in nama sub-county figure 4: types of handwashing stations amongst wash and control villages village and how long the program has been implemented in it. for example, the village with the highest percentage of no handwashing stations was busaale (75%). busaale is the newest village in which wash has been implemented, and the water user committee there has yet to be elected. representatives from this village attended their first wuc biannual training in july 2016. if we do not include busaale, the average for wash villages with no handwashing station is 45%. moreover, no households in the control villages had tippy taps, the preferred method of handwashing stations. this could be due to a lack of training and education about the usefulness and low cost of tippy taps. the wash program aims to emphasize the importance of handwashing stations and also teaches wucs about the use of tippy taps. the horizontal axis in figure 5 shows questions that were asked in the survey such as "do you have a handwashing station?." a handwashing station was considered to be any permanent fixture only used for hand washing. the vertical axis shows the average percentage of "yes" replies to each question. the blue bars represent the weighted averages of "yes" replies from the eight wash villages. the control group in blue includes two villages, namawajollo and kyampisi, that did not have mchi wash programs. the responses are displayed in the graph as weighted averages. figure 5 demonstrates that wash villages tended to exercise better latrine management based on the criteria surveyed. there was a significant difference between all wash villages and control villages (p <.05) for "there is a handwashing station" and "the handwashing station is near the latrine" but not "the latrine is covered" (p>.05). furthermore, there was no significant difference between all wash villages and kyampisi or namawojjolo for having a latrine cover consilience 45 figure 5: latrine management criteria across wash and control villages (p >.05). there was almost a significant difference between all wash villages and kyampisi (p=0.071) and a significant difference (p <.05) between all wash villages and namawojollo for whether a household had a handwashing station. there was a significant difference between all wash villages and kyampisi (p <.05) plus all wash villages and namawojjolo (p<.05) for whether households placed handwashing stations near the latrine. interestingly enough, when each wash village was separately compared to each control village, not many significant results were found when comparing them to kyampisi. for "is your latrine covered?" takkajjunge was the only village out of the eight total wash villages with a significant comparison (p=0.0432). the question "do you have a handwashing station" only yielded two significant comparisons: katoogo (p=0.0209) and waluga (p=0.0402). the last question, "is the handwashing station near the latrine" had three significant comparisons: katoogo (p=0.0012), namatogonya (p=0.0089), and buyuki (p=0.0381). however, across all villages surveyed there was a low percentage of interviewees that used latrine covers and had permanent handwashing stations. for the wash villages and control villages, 54% and 83% respectively did not have a permanent handwashing station. similarly, not many interviewees used latrine consilience wash in nama sub-county covers: only 27% of wash villages and 20% of control villages used them. figure 6: handwashing stations, boiling water and prevalence of sickness across wash and control villages the importance of latrine covers and handwashing stations as well as how to build them was not a topic that was emphasized during wash village trainings last year. in addition to their significance, village members may not know how to build a latrine cover or permanent handwashing station like a tippy-tap with low cost, local materials that fit within their budgets. during the interviews, some village members also expressed concern about building tippy taps outside as jerry cans are sometimes stolen. these challenges may explain why so few interviewees had such fixtures in their households. the horizontal axis in figure 6 shows questions that were asked in the survey such as "do you boil your water before you drink it." the vertical axis shows the average percentage of "yes" replies to each question. the group in blue represents a weighted average of "yes" replies from the eight wash villages. the control group in blue includes two villages, namawajollo and kyampisi, that did not have mchi wash programs. the responses displayed are weighted averages. a pearson correlation coefficient (r) was calculated for both wash villages and control villages. this test determined the consilience 47 presence and type of a relationship between boiling water and sickness within families. based on these two variables for wash villages r= 0.3029. in the control villages the same relationship was analyzed with r= 0.913. out of the wash households surveyed that were sick or had a family member that was ill within three months, 8.45% had diarrhea as a symptom. for the control households, 54% said diarrhea was a symptom that accompanied a recent illness. for the relationship between handwashing station and sickness for all wash villages, the r= 0.898. in the control villages the same relationship was analyzed with, the r= 0.429. although there is a positive relationship between boiling water and sickness for wash villages, the results suggest the correlation was stronger for control villages. additionally, diarrhea was a symptom for over half of the illness in the control villages. this information is important as diarrhea is considered a waterborne illness and thus may be more directly related to the practice of boiling drinking water as opposed to general sickness. for example many respondents said they or a family member had a “cough” or “flu” recently. respondents used the term “flu” and “cough” to describe having a mild sickness or “cold.” these illnesses may not have originated via water before transmission between people. the lower correlation between the two variables for wash villages suggests that other factors apart from the practice of boiling water were more influential in the sicknesses present in village members. however, it’s important to note that other sanitation practices, like frequently washing water vessels and hand washing with soap, are also influential in the prevention or presence of illnesses. across all globemed sponsored villages and control villages the majority of households interviewed boiled their water before drinking it--89% of wash villages and 70% of control villages. additionally, interviewees responded that they ‘always’ used soap and that they thought it was important to use soap (93% of wash villages and 98% of control villages). these points were heavily emphasized by the wucs and mpoma during wash trainings held throughout the year. in order to aid the discussion, last year’s grow team designed several posters with information about different water borne diseases like schistosomiasis, typhoid, and cholera. daily habits like hand washing and boiling water were discussed as simple but important tactics to prevent the contraction of such illnesses. consilience wash in nama sub-county these changes in the educational materials provided as well as further discussion of prevention techniques may explain why there was a higher positive response rate for the above mentioned questions regarding globemed sponsored villages. however, the control villages also had a high response rate, although slightly lower compared to the other villages. both variables for sickness and handwashing station also appeared to positively correlate, although we expected the relationship between the variables to be stronger for the control villages. there appears to be an inverse relationship between handwashing stations and diarrhea as a symptom—as the presence of handwashing stations in households increases the prevalence of diarrhea decreases. this may suggest that handwashing stations help decrease sickness and diarrhea. however, as these households may carry out other favorable sanitation and hygiene practices, we cannot solely attribute the outcome to having a handwashing stations. for the households that stated that they did have a handwashing station, most said that they were located near the latrine. handwashing stations, ideally a tippy-tap, are vital in the prevention of illnesses as they promote hand washing immediately after using the latrine or even before meals. thus, the sensitization of latrine management can result in lower diarrheal rates across villages. policy and practical considerations using indicators of water source issues such as clarity, taste, dryness, and inability to retrieve water, it is apparent that wash interventions have had a positive impact on the communities in which they are enacted. at the same time, by looking at specific villages, we are able to see problems within both wash intervention villages, and control villages. for example, in the consideration of buyuki, under figure 1, it is observed that several villagers are requesting a replacement of the pipes in the borehole to prevent rusting. this weakness of the wuc may be caused by a lack of proper training of wash information, as was determined in the study of sixty different wucs in uganda (mcparlton, 2016). it is therefore suggested that wucs are trained further in the repair and management of boreholes, and connected to resources that will help the wucs find professionals to repair the source. observing figure 5, we can see that latrine sanitation practices need improvement even in wash villages, although wash villages still fare better than the control villages combined. consilience 49 however it can be noted that no significant results were found when comparing the wash villages to kyampisi based on the latrine management criteria previously discussed. these results are counterintuitive because kyampisi seemed less rural compared to namawojjolo. it is therefore suggested that latrine sanitation practices are further emphasized in wash trainings, especially the use of latrine covers. after speaking to members of the mchi team, we realized that the lack of the use of latrine covers are more due to a lack of education than a lack of resources. collaborating with the mchi team, we have decided to make latrine sanitation practices, including latrine covers, more of a priority in training meetings. next, we explore water user committees in depth. as can be seen from figure 8, takkajjunge has a low rate of village members who generally pay the water user fee. in this case, it is important to communicate with the village members and the wuc members. in this specific case, many villagers responded that there was not yet an established water user fee, and that the committee only has two members. it is very important that these wucs are well established and functioning. in this case, it is important that mchi re-partners with this specific committee in order to re-establish a water user fee that can be used to repair the borehole in the future. more generally, using the feedback from villagers, we have compiled a list of suggestions for improvements to water user committees. first, it is important that wucs collect fees on a monthly basis, so that it is less of a financial burden on villagers. it was also suggested by a few villagers that an income based water user fee be enacted, as some villagers are able to contribute more than others. this is a suggestion that can be contemplated by the respective wucs. many water sources also lack a fence, which should be a priority use of the water user fees. another important finding in this study was the decrease in water retrieval time in wash villages (figure 1). this is important as it allows both women and children more time to attend to chores or to attend school. an interesting opportunity for a future wash study, or improvement to this study, would be to observe the change in school attendance patterns amongst children before and after the installation of a water source and the sensitization of wash in the community. because children are often given the chore of retrieving water, it could be inferred that providing safe water nearby may have an effect on attendance, and thus would be interesting to study. consilience wash in nama sub-county it may be proposed that wash is not a truly sustainable program. for example, if the borehole undergoes a major functional problem, it is very possible to drain the entire water user committee collected fund. since the fee collected is so small, the money in the fund can be depleted very quickly, leaving behind a broken water source and failed intervention. moreover, it may be difficult to incentivize wucs to collect this fee if they do not believe that their fund will be capable of sustaining the water source. however, it is to be noted that our wash program has created a matching model to both incentivize wucs and create a sufficient fund for repairs. for the first three years, globemed matches the amount of money collected by the wuc for a village nine times the amount raised by each village for the first year, three times, and one time for the following years. thus, a larger fund is created within the first few years of wash implementation to strengthen its resilience. although an expensive repair may still diminish a village’s fund, it is impossible to guarantee sustainability for such a project. overall, it is suggested that a wash intervention include a matching model that gradually lowers the wuc’s dependency on the partner, but which also bolsters the repair fund. conclusion the intent and the outcome of wash interventions do not always match up. as explored in the literature review, there have been diverse interventions with varying success. our study aimed to assess the effectiveness of mchi and globemed’s wash efforts. generally, villages with globemed and mchi implemented programs tended to exhibit better sanitation and hygiene practices. these villages had better water quality, such as improved clarity and taste, as well as lower incidences of water scarcity, overcrowdedness and shorter walking distances to reach the water source. furthermore, control villages had higher rates of sickness in the last three months than villagers that received wash training. while not all training came from mchi-so the difference cannot entirely be attributed to their efforts-it can be reasonably assumed that wash training led to a decreased rate of illness. however, due to a broad definition of an illness, we may not have garnered an accurate representation of sickness within villages. moreover, there was a behavior change observed in terms of sanitation and hygiene. between the control and non-control villages, results implied that non-control villages had better latrine management, measured by the consilience 51 possession of latrine covers, a handwashing station, and the handwashing station’s proximity to the latrine. additionally, an increased practice of sanitary efforts including boiling water and handwashing were also noted in control villages and correlated to decreased rates of diarrheal disease. for a better understanding of wash interventions’ impact, potential villages should be surveyed before any intervention to obtain baseline data. this would complement control village surveys, providing a more accurate depiction of wash related problems most villages face than the data from the two control villages could provide. as aforementioned, reported “illness” should be clearly defined in order to gather more accurate data. with more precise data, globemed and mchi will better understand the impact of our wash interventions and potential improvements. while the results emphasized the importance of globemed and mchi wash intervention, the data also provides invaluable insight into how the initiatives can be improved. strengthening the water user committees, the actors who in theory implement wash themes, would substantially improve wash efforts. many villages do not know about their water user committee or do not pay their water user fee every month. thus the importance of active participation of water user committees must be emphasized. with more people aware of their water user committees’ importance and responsibilities in maintaining the municipal water source, more people are likely to consistently pay their water user fee, which would provide an ongoing reserve of funds, allowing the water sources to be sustained. furthermore, water user committees have the potential to improve each other. our data showed that some water user committees are actually functioning quite well like in waluga village, while others are not like in buyuki village. water user committees could gather more frequently than twice a year or have small support networks of villages where they could discuss problems they had been facing and other villages could offer solutions that had worked in their respective villages. lastly, the weaknesses found on outreaches in villagers’ sanitation and hygiene practice, such as a lack of latrine covers and permanent handwashing stations near the latrines, should be emphasized in future mchi conducted trainings. in addition to strengthening water user committees, mchi and globemed must maximize its resources for the greatest possible impact. this mchi has begun to engage the local government in its consilience wash in nama sub-county initiatives. this has drawn more attention to the severity of wash issues and could have an impact on influencing policy to improve wash conditions. governments, local or national, can use wash interventions to help build basic infrastructure more effectively. wash uses a community based approach that works from a bottom up design and seeks to modify behavioral patterns. this design can be more effective than a top down approach where much information can be lost in transit from the government to the community. this is due to the fact that each community faces different challenges in water access, sanitation, and hygiene. wash tailors the approach for each specific community to improve their general sanitation and hygiene, which contributes to an overall improved community health. wash related problems continue to be neglected by the international health community. while it is daunting to tackle an issue of this magnitude, it is possible, but not by one individual or government or organization. the most promising solutions arise when collaboration emerges between ngos, governments, communities, and individuals. consilience 53 references alexander, d., n. wilson, r. giesker, e. bartlett, n. rosseau, e. amuzu, d. ansonia, o. olopade, and c. olopade. 2015. "drinking water infrastructure in the ashanti region of ghana: developing a model for sustainable interventions by non-governmental organizations." journal of water sanitation and hygiene for development. boschi-pinto, cynthia, lana velebit, and kenji shibuya. 2008. "estimating child mortality due to diarrhoea in developing countries." world health organization. n.p., n.d. chatterley, c. 2013. “identifying pathways to well-managed school sanitation services in low-income countries.” proquest dissertations & theses global. meeks, r. c. 2012. “essays on the economics of household water access in developing countries.” proquest dissertations & theses global. ostrom, elinor. 1990. governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. n.p.: n.d. print. prüss-üstün a, bos r, gore f, bartram j. 2008. “safer water, better health: costs, benefits and sustainability of interventions to protect and promote health.” world health organization, geneva. weissman, r. 2003. “grotesque inequality: corporate globalization and the global gap between rich and poor.” multinational monitor. consilience wash in nama sub-county appendix appendix a: vil lage stat is t i c s village (water source) population: 2002 census or (estimate population served by water source) years since wash implemented population surveyed namawajollo 900 0 20 kyampisi 250 0 20 busaale 330 3 months 20 lukalu 1 (bernado) 200 2 20 buyuki(kiwana) 670 2 20 waluga (nabirye) 755 2 24 takkajjunge 872 1 23 namatagonya 500 2 20 lukalu 2 150 6 months 20 katoogo health center 675 1 22 lukojjo (johnson nkosi) not surveyed 3 0 lwanyonyl not surveyed 1 0 lutengo not surveyed (720) 2 0 katoogo (st. ponsion) not surveyed 1 0 the first two rows contain information about the villages namawojollo and kyampisi that did not have wash programs and served as our control villages in the study. we surveyed a sample of all wash villages except the last four mentioned in the table: lukojjo, lqanyonyl lutengo, katoogo (st. ponsion) due to time constraints. consilience 55 appendix b: nama sub-county map (uganda) consilience wash in nama sub-county appendix c: consent form consilience 57 appendix d: survey location (village): date: sex: m f age: _______ part 1: water source 1. what’s the name of your closest water source? a. is the water source more than 1 km yes no b. how many minutes does it take you to walk to the source? c. are there problems with this water source? yes no i. if yes, what are the problems with the source (no fence, long pumping time, crowded, broken)? 2. for your water source: i. do you think that the water is clear? ii. do you think that the water tastes ok? a. are too many people using it? yes no b. has the source ever been dry? yes no c. have you ever been unable to retrieve water? yes no i. why? 3. do you know about your water user committee? yes no a. do you generally pay your water user fee? yes no i. if no, why not? ii. in the last 6 months, how many times have you paid your water user fee? _____ b. do you think the water user fee is: too low just right too high c. do you have any complaints with the water user committee? d. do you have any suggestions for changes to the water user committee? 4. how many sources of water are within the village? _____ a. do all of the water sources work? yes no i. if no, what are the problems with the source? 5. do you have any more comments? consilience wash in nama sub-county part 2: hygiene and sanitation condition 1. family information a. adults_____ children_____ girls______ boys_____ 2. is there a fence around your water source? yes no a. in the last 6 months, are there any problems with animals near the water source (waste, animals drinking, etc.)? yes no 3. do you boil your water before you drink it? yes no a. how many times a month do you clean your jerry cans? ______ b. how many times a month do you clean the containers you store your drinking water in?______ c. how many times a month do you clean the cup you use to drink water?_________ d. how do you clean these items?________ 4. is your latrine more than 10 m from your home? yes no a. is it more than 30 m from the water source? yes no b. is your latrine covered? yes no 5. how do you clean your hands? a. do you have a handwashing station? yes no b. if no, where do you clean your hands regularly? _______________ c. is the hand washing station/ other method used to clean hands near the latrines? yes no d. do you think it is important to use soap? yes no e. how often do you use soap? never sometimes always 6. have you or a family member been sick in the last 3 months? yes no a. if yes, do you know the illness? yes no i. if, yes: _____________ b. was diarrhea a symptom? yes no 7. have you had training on water/sanitation? yes no a. if yes, what did you learn? b. where did this training come from? gov’t wuc health promoters ngos consilience 59 consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 20, iss. 1 (2018), pp. 23–42 towards a circular energy economy: cross-sector successes in brazil and india hillary brown hillary brown, faia, is professor and director of the urban sustainability masters program at the city college of new york, cuny. a 1974 graduate of yale university school of architecture, she has authored several books, most recently: infrastructural ecologies: alternative development models for emerging economies, (mit press 2017). hbrown2@ccny.cuny.edu abstract a new paradigm for energy production is one that emulates the closed-loop circular systems of natural ecosystems. at once holistic, economical, and equitable, energy production based upon reciprocities with other sectors (e.g. telecommunications, water, sanitation, and waste management) can leverage synergies and provide multiple co-benefits. with avoidance of fossil fuels, less pollution, and reduced throughput of matter and energy, such a circular energy economy offers a model for critical electricity provision for the next 2 billion people in emerging economies—both those moving to cities and particularly those who remain in rural poverty. three exemplary cases, one in india and two in brazil, reveal the efficacy of renewable power created through cooperative, cross-sector initiatives that also yield economic and social benefits. the first, methane recovery in belo horizonte, brazil, illustrates the potential for closed-loop use of an otherwise wasted energy source in rapidly urbanizing settlements. in the second case, omnigrid micropower company leveraged affordable electricity for some of india’s poorest rural citizens by combining the electricity demand from the telecommunications sector to support the economical construction of smallto mid-size solar power plants. lastly, brazil and paraguay’s itaipu binacional, developer of the world’s largest generator of renewable power, addressed the pollution of its reservoir from agricultural waste by establishing a rural waste-to-energy program that electrified 2,200 households. moving beyond conventional, mono-sectoral approaches to energy delivery, these alternative, circular strategies for power production are solving energy poverty. as blended, multi-functional systems, they have also fostered job creation, allowing for economic growth while suppressing carbon emissions. keywords: biogas, landfill, hydropower, infrastructure, microgrid, photovoltaics, solar energy, waste mailto:hbrown2@ccny.cuny.edu 24 consilience defining the circular economy the notion of a “circular economy” is modeled on self-sustaining ecosystems and grounded in their complex, self-organizing, and circular flows of energy and matter. by cascading (passing along) waste energy and processing waste nutrients for reuse in the cycle, such a closed-loop, complex system reduces new resource inputs while eliminating waste, pollution, and emission outputs.1 optimized by design this way, a human-engineered system of goods and services may be considered restorative or regenerative. the circular economy stands in contrast to the extractive, once-through, or linear economy upon which our open-ended economic system — and industrialized consumption of resources — has been predicated. derived in principle from the discipline of industrial ecology — industrial strategies for resource efficiency, dematerialization, and waste prevention — a circular economy lowers the externalized risks and costs associated with waste and energy leakage.2 increasingly, through governmental initiatives and corporate social responsibility programs, these strategies are being embedded in corporate culture, benefiting business and yielding improved social and environmental benefits. the concept of a circular economy has been gaining momentum since its introduction in the late 1970s. most recently attributable in part to theoretical influences such as “cradle-to-cradle”3 and the proactive work of the ellen macarthur foundation,4 it has gained traction through implementation in china, where it is centrally promoted as a key strategy.5 in europe, policymakers have issued a comprehensive european circular economy package.6 as a replacement for the dominant economic modes of the industrialized world, the circular economy is espoused by environmentalists and increasingly by decision-makers as a crucial means of steering human society in general, and the business sector in particular, toward operating within the ecological limits of the planet. in contrast to our growth-oriented, waste-producing, business-as-usual means, a circular economy may not only safeguard the integrity of ecosystem services essential for humanity’s survival but also help rebuild natural capital. 1 geissdoerfer, martin, savaget, paulo, bocken nancy m.p and hultink, erik jan, “the circular economy – a new sustainability paradigm,” journal of cleaner production 143 (2017) 757-768. 2 nakajima, nina, “a vision of industrial ecology: state-of-the-art practices for a circular and service-based economy,” bulletin of science technology society, 20, no.1 (2000):154-169. 3 mcdonough, william, and braungart, michael, cradle to cradle: remaking the way we make things, first ed. new york: (north point press 2000).
 4 ellen macarthur foundation (emf), 2013b. towards the circular economy, vols. 1 &2, isle of wight: (emf 2013). 5 liu, qian, hui-ming li, xiao-li zuo, fei-fei zhang, and lei wang. "a survey and analysis on public awareness and performance for promoting circular economy in china: a case study from tianjin." journal of cleaner production 17, no. 2 (2009): 265-270. 6 european commission. "towards a circular economy: a zero waste programme for europe." brussels, com (2014) final. http://www.eukn.eu/fileadmin/files/news/2014/towards_a_circular_economy.pdf consilience brown: circular energy economy integrated infrastructural services as a mode of the circular economy assuming that the transition towards a global circular economy has just begun, a track record of its successes built on economic returns on investment for the business community will be imperative for motivating such a paradigm shift. as society’s political, economic, and environmental actors foresee the circular economy as a crucial pathway for decoupling finite resource consumption (and concomitant negative externalities) from economic growth, how, we might ask, would we apply the circular economy’s high-level operating principles to the critical infrastructural services that underpin economic growth — the resourceand energy-intensive provision of energy, sanitation, water, waste management, communications, transport, etc.? would a circular economy approach to planning and operating these assets deliver more sustainable and resilient services? how might we recover waste to support renewable energy production? how might critical systems be reconceived collectively as more interconnected to reduce dependency on non-renewable resources and energy? the following successful precedents, along with the case studies that follow begin to suggest some answers to these questions. modelled according to the tenets of industrial ecology, with facilities clustered facilities to capitalize on the efficiencies, the first eco-industrial park in kalundborg, denmark exemplifies such beneficial energy and material flows. developed around a central coal-fired power plant, waste steam and hot water feeds an oil refinery and pharmaceutical company while warming greenhouses, a fish farm, and nearby homes. kalundborg also recovers fly ash from its stacks to substitute for virgin gypsum in its sheetrock manufacturing plant. these are some of 22 separate exchanges in the park (as of 2011). the eco-industrial park’s initial $60 million investment has returned $15 million in annual savings and eliminated 64,000 tons of co2 while reducing air, water and soil pollution.7 in a newly completed neighborhood of stockholm called hammarby sjöstad, officials used a similarly circular archetype which linked its infrastructural services to reduce metabolic urban flows.8 in this “hammarby model” (fig. 1), connections were fostered across heat and power, sewage, and waste handling utilities. waste heat recovered from the sewage treatment plant is combined with heat issued from a local woodchip-fired combined heat and power (chp) plant to provide new district heating. methane gas from wastewater is processed into cooking and vehicular fuel while the residual sludge is reused to fertilize the forest.9 7 domenech, teresa and davies, michael. “structure and morphology of industrial symbiosis networks: the case of kalundborg,” procedia social and behavioral sciences 10 (2011): 79–89. 8 iveroth, sofie pandis, anne-lorène vernay, karel f. mulder, and nils brandt. "implications of systems integration at the urban level: the case of hammarby sjöstad, stockholm." journal of cleaner production 48 (2013): 220-231. 9 iveroth, sofie p. "the potential of the infrastructural system of hammarby sjöstad in stockholm,sweden." energy policy 59 (2013): 716-726. 26 consilience figure 1: the “hammarby model,” integrated urban systems for hammarby sjöstad, sweden. redrawn by logman arja from the original by lena wettrén, bumling ab. source: hillary brown and logman arja. (reprinted courtesy of the mit press from infrastructural ecologies: alternative development models for emerging economies, by hillary brown and byron stigge). as unique industrialized world examples, these closed-loop, circular arrangements among infrastructural — often including some commercial — assets demonstrate how to leverage multiple synergies from networked energy, water, and waste services to bolster both economic and environmental performance. the exceptionality of hammarby sjöstad reminds us that the uptake of these models for infrastructural development has been slow. instead, industrial era models mostly hold sway. the convention for developed nations’ “legacy systems” has been to disaggregate water, waste, energy etc. into separate sectors, physically and jurisdictionally, isolating them as single purpose and linear instead of multivalent and closed-loop. therefore, one opportunity for humanity would be to foster the embrace of circular planning in the provision of new and extended infrastructural services in both the rural and urban developing world where growth of and demand for infrastructural services are rapidly escalating. the following three case studies consilience brown: circular energy economy demonstrate how new actors, employing innovative and relational thinking, are positioned to unlock the value of the circular energy economy, one that can support economic growth while avoiding resource depletion and ecosystem degradation. resource loop-closings and beyond: belo horizonte, brazil typically located near urban areas, landfill sites are the most visible indicator of today’s linear, once-through economy. conventionally filled with municipal solid waste (msw) — a mix of inorganic and organic material (46 percent global average)10 — these sites release harmful methane into the atmosphere. landfill gas alone leads to the worldwide release of between 19.99 million and 59.99 million metric tons (approximately 22 million to 66 million tons) of methane annually.11 recovering and utilizing gas from the decomposing organic matter in sanitary landfills for energy generation represents a closed-loop bio-cycle and is a considered a transitional, carbon-neutral energy solution. understanding and replicating this approach is extremely relevant for low income countries that can only spend a fraction of their solid waste management budgets on waste disposal, with most msw going simply to waste collection and not to appropriate treatment.12 background to the initiative the local government of belo horizonte established and operated its first sanitary landfill in a highly urbanized region northwest of the city in 1972. the site, which occupied 114 hectares (282 acres), received some 4,200 tons of msw daily until its closure in 2007. it was just the prior year that belo horizonte had established its municipal committee on climate change and eco-efficiency. under this umbrella, it was undertaking major projects for ghg mitigation, including solar hot water heating and a rapid-transit bus program.13 an early adapter (1993) of integrated solid waste management (iswm), a comprehensive waste reduction, collection, composting, recycling, and disposal system, the city’s waste scavengers — sweepers, pickers, collectors, packers, and sellers — had formally partnered with the municipal administration. together they created an effective urban waste management 10 walker, dale, “urban biocycles,” ellen macarthur foundation, 28 march 2017, 1-34 at 13, https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/publications/urban-biocyles (accessed 20 july, 2017.) 11 a. robinson, g. sewell, n. damdaran, e. david, and n. kalas-adams, “landfills in developing countries and global warming,” in proceedings sardinia 2003, ninth international waste management and landfill symposium, cagliari, italy, cisa, environmental sanitary engineering centre, october 6–10, 2003, 2. 12 iclei-irena case study, 2013, belo horizonte, brazil, waste to energy for more effective landfill site management: https://www.irena.org/publications/re_policy_cities_casestudies/irena%20cities%20case %203%20belo%20horizonte.pdf (accessed 20 july, 2017). 13 world wildlife fund, “belo horizonte sustainability,” http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do /footprint/cities/urban_solutions/themes/governance/?228952. https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/publications/urban-biocyles https://www.irena.org/publications/re_policy_cities_casestudies/irena%20cities%20case%203%20belo%20horizonte.pdf https://www.irena.org/publications/re_policy_cities_casestudies/irena%20cities%20case%203%20belo%20horizonte.pdf 28 consilience system that professionalized their positions, systematized their processes, and improved working conditions (fig. 2).14 creating a circular recovery system of solid waste byproduct was the next step. figure 2: a member of the waste picker cooperative, belo horizonte, brazil. source: courtesy of sonia dias. previously the biggest single source of ghg emissions in belo horizonte (2014 population 2.5 million), the landfill site was transformed in 2007 into a municipal waste treatment center, the centro de tratamento de residuos sólidos (ctrs). when the landfill shut down, it held 17.4 million m3 (22.75 million yd3) of waste that had accumulated since 1972 and covered a land area of 65 ha (161 acres) (fig. 3). while an initial goal had been to address odor at the landfill, which 14 ana paula bortoleto and keisuke hanaki, “analysis of waste prevention policies applied at the solid waste management in belo horizonte, brazil,” international solid waste association, 1–8 at 4, http://www.iswa.org/uploads/tx_iswaknowledgebase/543801_paper.pdf. accessed on: 15, july 2017. consilience brown: circular energy economy continued to be a problem, the city also moved to add another option to its renewable energy choices. figure 3: aerial view of the centro de tratamento de residuos sólidos in belo horizonte, brazil. source: google imagery copyright 2017. closing the bio-cycle loop whereas in most of brazil landfill sites had open biomethane drainage systems where gas is wasted by simply flaring it, belo horizonte contracted with the bid-winning asja ambiente italia spa (asja) company in 2007 to recover and treat the gas for use in electricity generation. by 2010, the site operated a 4.5 mw capacity energy plant.15 this was in part thanks to an innovative funding and financing mechanism: the sale of carbon reduction credits under the clean development mechanism (cdm). under this program, established in 2006, developed nations — those that have made emission-reduction commitments under the kyoto protocol — can help finance emission-reducing project implementation in developing countries. this is accomplished through their purchase of certified emission reduction credits (cers) from these emerging nations, thereby helping to finance such projects. here, as is typical in this significant program, asja was required to 15 iclei-irena, ibid 30 consilience comply with specific requirements of the cer credits. at the site, asja today operates the biogas processing and utilization center. its gas production process involves purification to remove sulfuric gasses and decrease water volume. once combusted in general electric gas engines, it generates enough grid energy to support electricity consumption of approximately 30,000-35,000 people. between 2009 and 2010, it reduced the city’s ghg emission by 237,473 tco2e/y, which by 2016 had fallen to 91,475 tco2e as the continued extraction depletes the methane accumulation.16 expanding the circular system today, under the jurisdiction of its department of urban cleaning (superintendência de limpeza urbana (slu)), belo horizonte has expanded the complex web of its circular economy at the site, embracing recovery and regenerative processes from complementary sectors. the ctrs operates several co-located facilities (fig.4). these include the following enterprises: 1) a composting plant, which processes selected organic waste collected from markets for the schools’ vegetable gardens, parks, and squares of the city 2) a recycling facility for construction waste, which yields synthetic gravel used for roadway paving 3) a “seedling station,” which grows plants used to support the environmental restoration of the landfill site 4) a hazardous medical waste plant 5) a plant that recovers tire rubber for offsite recycling 6) an environmental center offering tours to as many as 144,000 students annually to learn about the circular economy.17 16 ibid. 17 ibid. consilience brown: circular energy economy figure 4: landfill gas to energy and solid waste management, belo horizonte, brazil. source: hillary brown and logman arja. (reprinted courtesy of the mit press from infrastructural ecologies: alternative development models for emerging economies, by hillary brown and byron stigge). in recognition of its co-located and integrated solutions to waste management, mitigation of the environmental impacts of the landfill, and reductions of ghg emissions, belo horizonte receives 6 percent of the value of the electricity sold. this is in addition to what the municipality receives as revenue from the sale of approximately 1.3 million cers sold in the international market during its ten-year cdm crediting period.18 the program falls within the brazilian government’s initiative to increase the production of electricity from renewable sources and reduce the country's greenhouse gas 18 world wildlife fund, “belo horizonte sustainability,” http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do /footprint/cities/urban_solutions/themes/governance/?228952. 32 consilience emissions by between 36.1 and 38.9 percent from projected amounts by 2020.19 by harvesting its myriad waste sources and integrating them in this fashion, this public/private entrepreneurship has not only made major strides towards this goal, but it has also gained profitable returns. as other emerging economies see their consumption and thus their waste production mount and begin to shift from open dumps to sanitary landfills, they should seriously consider adopting this comprehensive and integrated solid waste management and energy production model. they too could at once cascade their resources, turning waste to energy and recovering both biological and technical nutrients while providing educational programs that advance the circular economy in their metropolitan area. omnigrid’s solar asset-sharing strategy: an enabling framework for value creation another aspect of the circular energy economy illustrated in the following case study is the optimization of asset usage through sharing. we are mostly familiar with how peer-to-peer sharing (e.g. uber, zipcar, airbnb) is revolutionizing the transport and hospitality sectors by extending the deployment of a particular asset. similarly, the combined use of a single infrastructure facility through co-location means fewer resources consumed and less waste produced.20 omnigrid micropower company’s achievement in india sets it apart from other power providers. it serves two very different kinds of clients via a single solar power plant, a shared-use arrangement that makes the business model financially viable – selling electricity to the rural poor – without necessitating government subsidies. background to the innovation the potential of such an eco-innovative and effective approach is enormous. there are approximately 237 million citizens in india who lack access to reliable electricity.21 consequently, economic development is stalled for those beyond the reach of the electric grid. some are already technically “wired” but still receive quite an irregular power supply. while ownership and management of india’s electrical distribution networks is shared between both public and private distribution companies (discoms), the latter, which typically serve large urbanized areas, can neither spare the power nor afford the cost of extending transmission and distribution lines to remote locales. nonetheless, because sunlight is a key resource in india – greater than 60 percent of the country receives annual average global insolation of 5kwh/m2/day22 — the government has embraced the strategy 19 general electric website, “ge’s landfill gas technology powers new brazil landfill gas-toenergy project,” press release, october 31, 2011, http://www.genewsroom.com/pressreleases/ges-landfill-gas-technology-powers-new-brazil-landfill-gas-to-energy-project220762 20 arup 22 21 world energy outlook, weo database, 2015, http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/weo2015/ accessed on: 16 july, 2017. 
 22 t. v. ramachandra, t.v., jain, r. & krishnadas, g., hotspots of solar potential in india, renewable and sustainable energy reviews. 15 (3178‒3186), 2011. 
 http://www.genewsroom.com/press-releases/ges-landfill-gas-technology-powers-new-brazil-landfill-gas-to-energy-project-220762 http://www.genewsroom.com/press-releases/ges-landfill-gas-technology-powers-new-brazil-landfill-gas-to-energy-project-220762 http://www.genewsroom.com/press-releases/ges-landfill-gas-technology-powers-new-brazil-landfill-gas-to-energy-project-220762 consilience brown: circular energy economy of serving its rural populations with distributed, renewable solar power.23 despite the ubiquity of solar energy and regulatory support of rural power provision, the remote installation of photovoltaic power plants has been traditionally perceived as financially risky. this is due to the low density of customers as well as the higher cost of distributed vs. grid-served electricity. additionally, rural communities have experienced faulty or substandard products and overall often unreliable services despite the higher cost they pay.24 therefore the installers themselves are concerned about both the inclination and the ability of indigent rural populations to pay, guaranteeing a reasonable return. despite these deterrents, omnigrid micropower co., pvt., ltd. (omc) saw a unique opportunity for solar-powered generation in uttar pradesh, one of india’s most populous (200 million) and poorest states. the company envisioned a business model that capitalized on the large energy demand of the dynamic telecommunications industry. with india’s base of in excess of a billion subscribers,25 a near majority of india’s 400,000 off-grid cell phone tower base stations were running on diesel generators as recently as 2013. these generators are costly from both an operational and maintenance perspective; they also pollute the air and contribute significantly to india’s carbon footprint. beginning in 2012, tower operators were mandated by the government to transition 50 percent of their power system to renewables by 2015.26 circular thinking fosters a sharing economy founded in 2011, omc is a gurgaon, india-based renewable energy service company (resco) which finances, builds, maintains, and operates solar and wind-powered micro power plants. in 2012, omc partnered with bharti infratel (india’s leading telecom tower infrastructure service provider) to furnish electricity to cellular towers with micro-solar power plants, typically producing less than 50kw.27 despite the aforementioned drawbacks to powering off-grid populations, omc recognized the market potential for providing solar-powered electricity in uttar pradesh. they realized that the renewable powering of remote cell phone towers under a long-term supply contract would comprise an “anchor” demand, thereby 23 gnsed. renewable energy-based rural electrification: the mini-grid experience from india. new delhi: prepared by the energy and resources institute (teri) for the global network on energy for sustainable development (gnesd), pp.1-31. 24 liu, c., renewable energy, once a dream, lights up some of india’s slums, climatewire. december 20, 2013, http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059992166. accessed on: 11 july, 2017. 25 rai, s., india just crossed the 1 billion mobile subscribers milestone and the excitement’s just beginning, forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/saritharai/2016/01/06/india-justcrossed-1billion-mobile-subscribers-milestone-and-the-excitements-justbeginning/#73753be17db0 accessed on: 18 july, 2017. 26 tweed, k., why cellular towers in developing nations are making the move to solar 
 power, scientific america january 15, 2013, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/cellulartowers-moving-to-solar-power/. accessed on: 17 july, 2017. 27 krishna, r.j., renewable energy powers up rural india, july 29, 2015. the wall street journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/renewable-energy-powers-up-rural-india1438193488. accessed on 19 july, 2017. 
 34 consilience guaranteeing a revenue stream that could subsidize the service to nearby rural communities. based on this combined service arrangement, omc could piggy-back the delivery of electricity to adjacent villages via microgrids, making this otherwise dicey investment more “bankable” from the perspective of their partnering financial institutions. under this community power program, by 2013, omc had constructed eleven 9 to 18kw micro solar power plants, costing about 50 lakh (us$75,385) each.28 this stands in contrast to the high capital costs of a coal-fired plant and its long construction timeline—typically 5 to 7 years versus 3 months for the implementation of an omc solar plant. additionally, according to one estimate, powering a single mobile base station with an omc pv-power plant reduces carbon emissions between 40 and 50 metric tons annually while eliminating the energy losses typical of long-distance power transmission.29 augmenting a low resource-consuming, high efficiency energy economy another significant feature of the program capitalizes on a closed-loop biocycle: these power plants may be supplemented by biogas-generated electricity, utilizing biomethane produced by local anaerobic biodigesters which feed on agricultural, animal, and human waste. the micro power plants can also readily be supplemented by wind energy. the power plants can even be equipped with battery banks and/or diesel-fired backup generators to guard against low solar insolation levels during monsoon seasons (see fig. 5).30 28 ibid. 29 tweed, ibid. 30 almqvist, p., cutting the cord for a better energy future,” the solutions journal 4(2) june 2013, 
http://www.thesolutionsjournal.org/node/22511?page=31%2c0%2c0%2nc0%2c. 
accessed on: 17 july, 2017. consilience brown: circular energy economy figure 5: diagram of omc power plant and microgrid, uttar pradesh, india. source: hillary brown and logman arja. (reprinted courtesy of the mit press from infrastructural ecologies: alternative development models for emerging economies, by hillary brown and byron stigge). another aspect of the circular energy economy is its innovative use of advanced technology, saving energy and resources. supplied through local distributors, villagers are using affordable and technically appropriate microgridadapted power equipment. these include portable and rechargeable led (lowemitting diode) lanterns that completely eliminate the need for household wiring. based on a prepayment business model, these lanterns costs about 100 rupees ($1.50) each month, versus 180 ($2.70) for kerosene. the lanterns are collected each morning by “light wallahs,” recharged, and returned to customers later the same day (see fig. 6). to further support elimination of wiring, for 350 rupees ($5.45) a month customers can lease a bijli box (powerbox), a battery capable of powering two lanterns, a fan or t.v., and a cellphone charger.31 since 2012, mini-refrigerators and high-efficiency irrigation pumps have further diversified omc electrical services. 31 dubey, a., microgrids lift villages out of dark age, nikkei asian review. april 1, 2015. 
http://www.omcpower.com/blog/p/nikkei-asian-review-microgrids-lift-villages-darkage. accessed on: 19 may, 2017. 36 consilience critical to omc’s inventive and circular thinking is understanding the needs and limitations of their remote rural customers. figure 6: omc’s light wallahs carrying recharged lanterns, uttar pradesh, india. source: courtesy of omc power. photo credit: pär almqvist. the game-changing nature of the bharti/omc partnership is based on linking the telecom industry’s needs to community power provision. it is significant that more than half of omc’s revenue stream comes from local residents, disproving the belief that indigent rural citizens may not gain electricity access economically. where the cost recovery for comparable (non-renewable) power plants might take 7 or more years, omc breaks even within a half year. a co-benefit of the program to the community is direct job creation: omc employs between 10 and 15 rural workers per cell tower complex.32 scaling up circular innovation in 2014, the world economic forum named omc power a 2014 technology pioneer as the first renewable start-up company to create commercially 32 guay, j. meet uttah pradesh, india’s next distributed solar hotbed. sierra club blogs, compass: pointing the way to a clean energy future. 19 november, 2012. http://blogs.sierraclub.org/compass/2012/11/meet-uttar-pradesh-indias-nextdistributed-solarhotbed.html. accessed on: 17 july, 2017 
 consilience brown: circular energy economy viable and sustainable grid-less rural power plants. omc has gone on to enter further agreements with sunedison (a global us-based renewable energy company) as well as the rockefeller foundation to scale up distributed power in rural india. the foundation recognizes that energizing these millions of remote citizens can help unleash india’s entrepreneurial potential.33 workers can enhance their incomes by working after dark, students study, and women prepare meals post-sundown, avoiding the cost and health damaging effects of kerosene. such transformational accomplishments, effectuated by omc’s “disruptive innovation”, are testimony to the power of relational and circular thinking. itaipu binacional’s full circle solution: rural agro-energy and hydropower protection the prospects for successful “circular infrastructure economies” are further validated in a third case study. here, with intelligent caretaking of its assets and deliberate integration across economic sectors, an organization yielded results greater than sum of its parts. in solving one of its operational predicaments, this bi-national energy company created a collaborative platform that yielded “circular-by-design” services, new jobs, and new manufacturing. three years after its inaugural operation in 1991, the 8km (5 mile) wide itaipu hydroelectric dam across the paraná river bordering paraguay and brazil was recognized by the american society of civil engineers as one of the seven modern “wonders of the world.”34 itaipu binacional (ib) is the bi-national entity that successfully completed and operates this large generator of renewable power. with its 14 gw installed capacity, it supplies 17 percent of brazil’s energy demand and 75 percent of paraguay’s. it could be argued that its contentious and transgressive construction — which displaced nearly 60,000 occupants,35 reduced biodiversity, degraded land and water, and eliminated of a national park — has been partially compensated by ib’s community engagement activities over the last two decades that embrace sustainable development and promote rural energy access, environmental conservation, and local employment. while today its name reflects its locale on the paraná river watershed separating brazil and paraguay, many of the system’s infrastructural assets belong to ande, paraguay’s public utility, and eletrobrás, among the largest of brazil’s power utilities. it was funded, however, by the brazilian government. in 2002, despite the fact that approximately 88 percent of brazil’s electricity is renewably sourced by hydroelectric generation, the nation established an incentive program to promote 33 omc power press release, march 8, 2016, the rockefeller foundation and omc power reach a u.s. $4.5 m deal to finance 100 minigrids in rural india, http://www.omcpower.com/blog/p/press-release-rockefeller-foundation-omc-ink-us45mdeal. accessed on: 19, july 2017. 
 34 gregory t. pope, “the seven wonders of the modern world,” popular mechanics 172, no. 12 (december 1995): 48–56. 35 terminski, b., development-induced displacement and resettlement: theoretical frameworks and current challenges. development, 10, pp. 101–134, 2013. 
 38 consilience other renewable infrastructure, from small hydropower to biomass and wind turbines.36 in december 2009, brazil set a target of reducing countrywide greenhouse gas emissions by between 36.1 and 38.9 percent below business-as-usual projections by 2020. this was to be achieved through a combination of efficiencies in the building and industrial sectors, additional renewables, and improvements to agricultural and animal husbandry practices. precipitating concerns and itaipu binacional’s response the paraná 3 watershed (8,000 km2) which comprises the power plant reservoir’s main area of influence is home to more than 35,000 local farms that produce mostly soy-beans and maize. it is also home to more than 1.5 million pigs, 30 million poultry, and the agro-industries based on these plant and animal production practices.37 the combination of intense agriculture and meat production in this basin created problems at the itaipu dam. the reservoir’s water quality became degraded by deforestation, run-off from soil tilling, and the inflow of phosphorus from agricultural fertilizers and pesticides. the reservoir began to experience both premature filling with sediment and eutrophication, both threats to hydropower production.38 recognizing the linkages between the reservoir’s altered hydrology, the region’s poverty, and the overall ecological impairments due to agriculture, ib enlarged its mission to embrace environmental and social stewardship in the watershed basin. it instigated the cultivando agua boa (cab) or cultivating good water program: 63 initiatives including conservation of water, protection of farmland and forests, and reduction of agricultural land and water pollution. strategies introduced included no-till farming; new rural sanitation and wastewater treatment; elimination of pesticides; and forest and stream restoration.39 through the cab program, which emphasized civic society’s participation in the farming settlements, ib built an exemplary, multidimensional framework for local stewardship. in 2015, ib received the best water management practices award from the united nations water for life program. agro-energy closes the loop established by ib in 2009 in the paraná river watershed, the agroenergy condominium for family agriculture sanga ajuricaba was a key outcome of a sustainability-oriented partnership between ib’s office of renewable energy, the 36 mathias, m.c. & mathias, j.f., biogas in brazil: a governmental agenda. editorial board members, 2015. 37 wwap (united nationals world water assessment program), facing the challenges: case studies and indicators, paris: unesco, pp. 1–62, 8–9, 2015. 
 38 coimbra-araújo, c.h., mariane, l., júnior, c.b., frigo, e.p., frigo, m.s., araújo, i.r. & alves, h.j., brazilian case study for biogas energy: production of electric power, heat and automotive energy in condominiums of agroenergy. renewable and sustainable energy reviews, 40, pp. 826–39, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2014.07.024 
 39 wwap ibid. consilience brown: circular energy economy institute of technical assistance and rural extension, the paraná state electricity company, the international center for renewable energies, and other entities. consisting of 33 small-scale family farms, this cooperative became the focus of ib’s effort to reduce pollution by supporting the production of biogas and biofertilizers from area waste. it also aimed to help eliminate energy poverty in the region. ib’s program installed individual anaerobic biodigesters at each farmstead that could process the corn production waste with manure from the farmers’ herds (approximately 1,000 head of cattle and 3,000 swine). the farmers in the condominium collectively have produced 15,800 cubic meters (4.2 million gallons) of agricultural residue and manure annually – organic waste that yields 266,600 m3 (348,699 cubic meters) of biogas. sent through a 22 km (13.7 mile) pipeline to a central power plant, the biogas collectively generates electricity, heat, and – after upgrading – a biogas-based vehicular fuel.40 electricity generation of 445,000 kwh/year serves approximately 2,200 local households, with farmers receiving revenue from surplus sold back to the state’s energy distributor. 41 notably, the residual slurry is also an excellent organic fertilizer for the farms. finally, a centralized grain dryer, which runs on the thermal energy produced by the power plant, dries products such as corn, beans, and soy beans, reducing farmers’ drying costs by as much as 90 percent (fig.7). figure 7: diagram of itaipu binacionale’s agroenergy condominium for family agriculture, paraná river basin, brazil. 40 iea energy technology network, iea bioenergy, bio-energy in family farming: a new 
sustainable perspective for the rural sector in brazil, 2013, available at: http://task37.ieabioenergy.com/casestudies.html. (accessed 17 july, 2017). 
 41 osava, m., brazilian hydroelectricity giant promotes biogas, inter press service news 
agency, tierramamerica, available at: http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/09/brazilian-hydroelectricity-giantpromotes-biogas/. accessed on: 18 july, 2017. 40 consilience source: hillary brown and logman arja. (reprinted courtesy of the mit press from infrastructural ecologies: alternative development models for emerging economies, by hillary brown and byron stigge). given the fact that much of the nation’s agricultural wastes accumulates across its territories — with 77 percent of brazil’s population still employed in farming as of 2015 — distributed power generation from waste biomass and manure, produced through anaerobic bio-digestion, is an obvious means to rural electrification. circular logic therefore underscores how agro-energy eco-effectively transforms the environmental liabilities of brazil’s farming sector – the methane derived from animal manure and the watershed-polluting organic chemicals from fertilizer – into electricity and bio-fertilizer. both provide a useful source of additional income for rural settlements while helping to foster decentralized renewable generation and diversification of energy resources.42 the reciprocities between hydro dam water quality protection and rural energy access have also produced a range of co-benefits and employment. these include water quality improvement in 206 micro-basins; restoration of riverine buffer zones with 40 million trees; and the creation of two biological sanctuaries. the condominium biogas initiative, with assistance from ib, has also fostered a small local industry, bio-kohler, which manufactures the fiberglass biodigesters, storage tanks, and cooking stoves designed for biogas use.43 at the same time, cab has delivered educational services geared towards improved nutrition, organic farming practices, cultivation of medicinal plants, and the introduction of aquaculture. cab has established five local waste cooperatives and 25 regional waste associations that improve the livelihoods of solid waste handlers.44 ib has scaled up its circular stewardship well beyond its own customer base. the agroenergy condominium model initiated in paraná has been since introduced in uruguay, especially in the state of san jose, which produces the highest carbon emissions nationally due to its dairy-heavy agricultural economy. led by eletrobrás with funding from a group of the world’s thirteen leading energy companies and with ib as the project consultant, 22 farms will be connected to a central micro 42 waap, ibid. 43 mario osava, “brazilian hydroelectricity giant promotes biogas,” terramerica: environment and development, september 2013, 2, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/09/brazilian-hydroelectricity giant-promotes-biogas/. accessed on: 24, july 2017. 44 itaipu binacional, cultivating good water overview, available at: https://www.itaipu.gov.br/en/the-environment/cultivating-good-water. (accessed 20 july 2017). 
 consilience brown: circular energy economy thermoelectric plant which will produce 764 m3 (1,020 cubic yards) of biogas daily, with an expected energy production of 1.53 mwh/day.45 surmounting barriers to circular thinking in the infrastructure sector certainly, circular thinking (infrastructure integration) is not the only pathway to reducing the global carbon footprint. as renewable technologies become increasingly cost-competitive with conventional generation, nations are already forging ahead, installing new distributed renewable installations at a meaningful pace. in fact, according to one report, in 2016, total global capacity increased by 9 percent over 2015, to nearly 2,017 gw globally.46 nonetheless, the three examples detailed above show that a complementary and multidimensional approach to decarbonization can result from circular thinking. these cases reveal how one system’s waste or surplus can be useful to another, producing socio-economic cobenefits. belo horizonte extended its initial investment in landfill gas recovery into a diversified job-generating practice of waste recovery. in linking telecommunication infrastructure’s demand to its solar power plant, omnigrid micropower was able to electrify rural communities and spur new employment. in resolving its own critical hydropower problems, itaipu binacional simultaneously promoted rural community agro-energy and economic development.
 given the wide diversity of actors in the infrastructure space — governments, multilateral financial institutions, nonprofits, and private enterprises — who is best posed to implement new models based on the principles of infrastructural ecology? the answer, to a great extent, is all of them. however, entrepreneurial thinking on behalf of omc aside, government, as in the cases above, has a special lead role to play through policies, regulation, and incentives. governments at all levels are often most able to create progressive policies which coordinate the many entities involved in creating circular energy systems. many low-latitude countries have abundant potential for renewable energy production, aside from hydroelectricity. national governments there can and should retire carbon-based subsidies. eliminating or reducing importation of “cheap” gas or oil and gas would incentivize the use of indigenous energy sources, at the same time improving the balance of trade. federal governments can establish joint water, energy, and agriculture commissions. in nepal, for example, the national creation of the biogas support program opened up opportunities for private biogas companies to scale up rapidly.47 governments can encourage pursuit of the clean development 45 itaipu binacional, biogas production model from paraná will be replicated in uruguay, press release, 27 august, 2013, available at: https://www.itaipu.gov.br/en/press-office/ news/biogas-productionmodel-parana-will-be-replicated-uruguay. accessed on: 21 july, 2017. 46 ren21 secretariat, un environment news release, june 7 2017. http://www.ren21.net/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/press-release_english.pdf accessed on: march 2, 2018. 47 united nations asian and pacific centre for agricultural engineering and machinery (unap caem), “recent development in biogas technology for poverty reduction and sustainable development” (beijing: united nations economic and social commission for asia and the pacific [unescap], 2007), 55, http://www.un-csam.org/publication/f-biogas.pdf. accessed on may 12, 2017. http://www.ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/press-release_english.pdf http://www.ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/press-release_english.pdf 42 consilience mechanism (cdm) as a supplementary revenue source to support infrastructural ecologies for energy production. national investment in coordinated geospatial mapping and databases can illuminate potential synergies across diverse sectors. finally, at the national level, governments can incentivize infrastructure integration through their access to international development funds.48 at the state or local level, strong leadership can align objectives and activities and engage staff across ministries and departments in new approaches to crosssector infrastructural development. interagency collaboration can, however, be extraordinarily challenging. to that end, mayors or governors can set up separate authorities or commissions empowered to lead integrated resource planning for the inter-reliant sectors of water, energy, waste, sanitation, and agriculture, easing negotiations or resolving disputes. such entities would assess a number of projects for potential complementarity and synergies, with an emphasis on piloting those with a potential to be widely replicated. from a financial perspective, delivering a single, combined project instead of several diverse ones might reduce transaction and overhead costs. merging capital budget lines from two or three agencies in order to capitalize a single project may create some bureaucratic complexity, but it is a great mechanism to raise sufficient funding to get a project off the ground. it also offers the prospect of aggregating user fees that would provide quicker return on investment. local governments can also consider instruments such as expedited approvals or tax breaks to reward multisector project development by private or nongovernmental entities.49 conclusions driven by private entrepreneurship or public leadership and coupled with the use of strategic policy levers that spur other combinations of investment, infrastructural ecology has the potential to help redress environmental degradation as well as the economic and political instability that plagues many emerging economies. on their road to low-carbon infrastructure, infrastructural service providers in emerging economies — both public and private gas and electrical utilities — can work closely together to find synergistic opportunities to build closed-loop, circular energy systems. they must be attentive to opportunities inherent in untapped or underused local resources. in particular, these can include waste streams from agriculture, sanitation, domestic cooking, and even municipal solid waste. infrastructural services economically provided through circular assemblages can create sustainable energy access for remote and impoverished populations with multiple benefits. 48 brown, hillary and stigge, byron. infrastructural ecologies: alternative development models for emerging economies, (cambridge, ma: mit press, 2017), 193-212. 49 brown, hillary and stigge, byron. infrastructural ecologies: alternative development models for emerging economies, (cambridge, ma: mit press, 2017). 175-192. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 19, iss. 1 (2018), pp. 82–102 bringing earthbags to the people – a new, democratic approach to sustainable building nathan belofsky nathan belofsky is co-founder of good earth nepal, the author of two published books and a practicing attorney. he graduated from brandeis university in 1981 and cardozo school of law in 1984. nathan@goodearthnepal.org kateryna zemskova kateryna zemskova is the ceo & co-founder of good earth nepal. she has a degree in computer science from university of santa cruz and has a background in software development, business and real estate. kateryna@goodearthnepal.org abstract earthbag technology builds safe, appealing, and cost-effective structures out of ordinary soil. stronger, cheaper, and less harmful to the environment than conventional building techniques like brick and cement, earthbag technology is generally considered the most promising of sustainable building techniques. but despite widespread support among environmental groups and eco-builders, this method is shunned by governments and remains virtually unknown to everyday building professionals and the public. this paradigm, however, is changing in nepal, where a catastrophic 2015 earthquake flattened much of the housing stock. good earth nepal, a non-profit organization, has pioneered a three-pronged approach designed to overcome resistance to sustainable building and to, for the first time, make earthbag technology accessible to the masses. keywords: earthbag technology, sustainable, natural building, pollution, earthquake, nepal, india, government acceptance, earthbag training mailto:nathan@goodearthnepal.org mailto:kateryna@goodearthnepal.org consilience belofsky & zemskova: earthbag building introduction in developing countries, the prevailing building scheme is economically unsustainable and environmentally destructive. rural villagers build with locallysourced but flimsy stone, mud, and clay or factory-processed cement, bricks, steel, and timber, which are costly to produce and process. manufacture and transport of the latter also consumes precious fuel and natural resources and pollutes the air and water. both sides of this coin have taken their toll in nepal, a south asian country of almost 30,000,000. in april 2015 a 7.8 magnitude earthquake destroyed residences and communities, killing thousands and displacing millions. structures of all types suffered catastrophic failure, whether constructed of traditional or more “modern” materials. meanwhile, nepali citizens are subject to some of the most polluted air on earth. much of this pollution, including water contamination and deforestation, is caused by factories processing bricks, cement, and timber, and the thousands of trucks required for transport. earthbag technology, using ordinary soil gathered from the worksite itself, offers nepal and other developing regions a sustainable, affordable, and disaster-resistant building technique superior to conventional construction methods. until recently, however, this eco-friendly building practice has failed to meet its initial promise. good earth nepal, a non-profit organization, employs a three-tiered approach: securing government acceptance and support; training educated professionals and village builders; and building grassroots support. its goal is to establish earthbag technology as an everyday construction option for ordinary families, and as a critical tool in nepal’s push towards a more sustainable future. a country in need nepal, tragically, is now ground zero for sustainable building, and an ideal testing lab for earthbag technology. no other region is better suited to building with earthbags, or more in need of them. a 7.8 magnitude earthquake killed 9000, displaced 2.8 million, and destroyed approximately 600,000 structures, most made of conventional brick, cement, stone, or mud.1 almost three years later earthquake victims still live in temporary makeshift structures, and children still attend school in crude tin shacks open to the elements. nepal, home to verdant valleys and the mighty himalayas, is also among the most polluted countries in the world, ranking 177th out of 180 countries for air quality as per the environmental performance index (epi). kathmandu is the seventh most polluted major city in the world, with pollution levels 20 times higher than recommended.2,3 a three-kilometer thick “atmospheric brown cloud” (abc) 84 consilience composed of toxic ash, black carbon, sulphate, nitrates, and aerosols hangs over the indo-gangetic plain of southern nepal, according to the united nations environment programme.4 this toxic miasma blocks the sun. according to nepal’s department of health, respiratory diseases are the leading reason for outpatient consultations, with obstructive pulmonary disease the top cause of death among inpatients.5 dust from local cement factories even interferes with the chlorophyll content of plants, reducing their growth rate.6 brick and cement factories in suburban areas around major cities are a chief contributor to nepal’s pollution problem, with a majority of structures in the country employing mud-bonded bricks (44.21%), cement bonded construction (17.57%) or reinforced concrete (9.94%).7 figure 1: distribution of housing systems as per types of structures in nepal source: dipendra gautam, jyoti prajapati, kuh valencia paterno, krishna kumar, bhetwal and pramod neupane, “disaster resilient vernacular housing technology in nepal,” geoenvironmental disasters (2016): 6, doi: 10.1186/s40677-016-0036-y. according to a 1996 study by the world bank, 36% of the total suspend particles (tsp) in the kathmandu valley were caused by local cement factories and 31% by brick kilns. brick kilns are the biggest source of the most dangerous particles, those under 10 microns. a household environmental survey revealed that 95% of respondents in the kathmandu valley suffered from some degree of respiratory illness.8 vehicle exhaust, including trucks transporting building materials, is also a significant contributor to air pollution in the kathmandu valley, and throughout nepal. much of nepal also lacks access to safe water. liquid effluent from factories and kilns is a major source of pollution and runoff into lakes and over 6,000 rivers. consequently, 10 nepali children die each day from diarrhea and other water-borne diseases.9 the terai region in particular is vulnerable to arsenic contamination, and deep-water aquifers are at risk for being depleted.10, 11 smokestack emissions find their way into the water supply as acid rain, as do emissions from the multitude of trucks and vehicles used to transport building materials. consilience belofsky & zemskova: earthbag building timber used for building is a major cause of nepal’s crippling deforestation; between 1990 and 2005 the country lost almost 25% of its forest cover.12 fewer trees have resulted in a loss of topsoil, causing flooding and erosion. loss of jungle cover has led to decreased biodiversity and reduced leaf litter, depriving the soil of needed nutrients. beyond the well-documented costs in sickness and death, overtaxing nepal’s ecosystems also creates daily hardships for impoverished and vulnerable families. pots of water lugged home from a well by daya laxmi, a villager displaced by the earthquake, are so dirty that when she washes rice the grains turn black. jwala devi sahi receives clean water from a government-installed tap in her building but only once every eight days, for an hour. “sometimes i wait and wait. sometimes we are deprived of sleep while waiting and it affects our work, but there is still no sign of water”, she says.13 fewer forests mean less hunting and a diet with less protein. nepali woman are forced to walk long distances to gather firewood. topsoil loss and erosion (along with overpopulation) force farming families to move to less desirable and more mountainous land, further exposing them to landslides and extreme weather.14 air pollution also takes a toll on nepal’s tourist industry, which is estimated to create one sixth of the jobs in the country. “we got one hazy glimpse of a snow-topped mountains in pokhara on one afternoon. we never saw the mountains again”, reported one frustrated traveler on a lonely planet website. in sum, the engines of nepal’s massive industrialization, and now its rebuilding effort, risk further degrading the country’s already tenuous quality of life. earthbag technology earthbag technology is a sustainable and cost-effective method for using ordinary soil to erect disaster-resistant structures of superior strength and durability. some call earthbag technology “rammed earth in a bag”.15 though the technique currently in use is relatively “new”, its true origin dates back thousands of years. ancient structures built with similar rammed earth methods still stand, from the alhambra palace in spain to the great wall of china. to build an earthbag structure one first creates a rubble trench foundation filled with coarse gravel, an innovation first popularized by frank lloyd wright. 86 consilience figure 2: rubble trench foundation source: geiger, o. (2013). natural building blog earthbag building & other natural building methods. retrieved january 10, 2016, from: http:// www.earthbagbuilding.com/ workers then stuff ordinary soil gathered from the construction site into polypropylene bags. staggered like masonry and tamped down, the bags become hard as brick in a month or two. figure 3: earthbag construction, makwanpur, nepal consilience belofsky & zemskova: earthbag building figure 4: earthbag wall. source: geiger, o. (2015, september). earthbag building guide (abridged and adapted for builders) – special edition by osho tapoban publications. barbed wire laid between the layers of the bags serves as mortar instead of cement. in seismically active zones, reinforcing buttresses, rebar, and bond beams are added as needed. as the walls go up, workers add doors and windows. when the building nears completion, a lightweight roof is installed and the building is plastered and painted. inside and out, earthbag homes and schools look and perform just like "normal" homes and schools. figure 5: barbed wire layour. source: geiger, o. (2015, september). earthbag building guide (abridged and adapted for builders). special edition by osho tapoban publications. 88 consilience figure 7: shree jana primary school, nuwakot, nepal. built by good earth nepal advantages of earthbag building while earthbag technology is stronger and less expensive than conventional building (as described below), the technique is best known for its role in promoting sustainable development, defined as “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (world commission on environment and development, 1987, p.43). requiring no bricks or blocks and little to no cement, steel, or wood, earthbag homes, schools, and clinics substantially reduce reliance on manufactured materials and the environmentally damaging factories, smokestacks, and kilns needed to process them. while no large-scale comparisons of the environmental impact of earthbag technology versus conventional construction have been done to date, rigorous studies have evaluated the environmental benefits of individual earthbag structures. a 2006 study, for example, evaluated the sustainable characteristics of an earthbag home built in crestone, colorado.16 underwritten by the u.s. environmental protection agency (epa) and using criteria set forth by the u.s. green building council’s (usgbg) leadership in energy and design (leed) home program, the study evaluated the sustainable characteristics of an earthbag home based on engineering inspections of the site, interviews, and design evaluation. the study found that earthbag technology, in comparison to conventional construction, reduced waste generation, lessened demand for non-renewable energy sources, increased use of environmentally-friendly products and locally-supplied materials, minimized environmental impact on the building lot itself, and required less energy consumption due to superior thermal and insulation qualities. building with ordinary soil from the worksite also reduces the need to transport building materials which is of critical importance to developing countries like nepal. this lessens fuel consumption, reduces emissions, and requires fewer transport figure 6: completed earthbag house, gorkha, nepal built by good earth nepal consilience belofsky & zemskova: earthbag building vehicles, a significant boon for regions lacking good infrastructure and a strong highway system. in developing countries, earthbag construction has proven stronger and safer than conventional construction. it is noted for the ability to endure earthquake, fire, flood, wind, vermin, and even bombs and bullets. in fact, earthbag technology first came to prominence in nepal when all 55 of its earthbag structures survived a 7.8 magnitude earthquake with no structural damage, some standing beside the ruins of conventionally built homes and schools. figure 8: earthbag school in basa, nepal (edge of seven, small world) next to a damaged stone building figure 9: earthbag school construction, nepal 90 consilience figure 11: house in turkey that has withstood three earthquakes key components that make earthbag technology earthquake-resistant include: • rubble trench foundation: an earthbag building “floats” on a rubble trench foundation, minimizing shock transfer to the walls. • resiliency of earthbags: an experimental study performed by three chinese universities (hohai university, the business school of hohai university, and hefei university of technology) confirmed that earthbags absorb vibration due to their high damping ratio • tensile strength of barbed wire: during an earthquake, the barbed wire between bags resists possible outward expansion of the walls • thick walls: earthbag walls are generally 16-19 inches thick • bond beam: a thick bond beam wraps around the top of the walls, further strengthening the structure • use of polypropylene (pp) bags: pp bags have a tensile strength higher than steel • reinforcements: in nepal and other regions with high seismic activity vertical rebars, buttresses and corner reinforcements are added to increase strength outside of nepal, earthbag buildings have weathered all sorts of trauma, surviving various natural disasters that doomed structures built of brick, cement, wood, and other conventional materials. although it has held up in real-world situations, earthbag technology has only undergone controlled testing in the past decade. patti stouter, a leading earthbag builder and researcher, recently conducted a review of the literature and compiled a summary of studies authored by leading authorities in the field. these include figure 10: the ‘sun house’ in haiti. survived most recent earthquake. consilience belofsky & zemskova: earthbag building laboratory analyses of earthbag strength and durability, tensile strength of barbed wire, and projected performance of earthbag structures during earthquakes.17 largescale shake table tests, vital to a broader acceptance of the technology, are still required. tests completed in accordance with international building code (ibc) standards have also confirmed that earthbag construction far exceeds zone 4 standards, devised to protect against the very highest level of seismic activity. numerous earthbag structures have passed inspection in the united states, with earthbag structures permitted by the california building code which is – due to extreme seismic activity – the most stringent code in the nation. due to reduced material and transportation costs, earthbag structures are also less expensive than comparable conventional methods. in the table below, we compare the total cost of materials and labor for 3 different building methods: stone-masonry with cement mortar, brick-masonry with cement mortar, and earthbag. the house design, material list, material quantities, and labor required to build with stone and brick masonry are taken from the nepal government’s “design catalog for reconstruction of earthquake resistant houses, volume 1”18, with material rates and labor rates from nepal’s department of urban development published rate catalog19. total earthbag cost was calculated by good earth nepal engineers based on an identical house design and using identical material rates. table 1: comparing costs of building technology technology main materials cost stone masonry with cement mortar stone, cement, sand, aggregate, wood, rebar and cgi 8559 usd brick masonry with cement mortar brick, cement, sand, aggregate, wood, cgi and rebar 7663 usd earthbag with wooden truss earth, pp bag, barbed wire, rebar, cgi, gi wire, wood 6437 usd exchange rate of 1 usd = 102.707 npr as per xe.com as of jan 22, 2018 92 consilience total cost does not include site management, administrative fees, or transportation costs. because earthbag structures use predominantly local materials and thus require less transportation, the cost benefits of earthbag construction might be even greater than indicated in the table above. earthbag construction is also simpler than more conventional building techniques, and well suited to impoverished regions suffering from limited infrastructure and low literacy. building with earthbags requires minimal expertise and relies almost entirely on unskilled labor. thus, a typical earthbag structure is easily built by a pool of unskilled workers and a single carpenter (for doors and windows), all supervised by a single construction manager. more conventional building techniques, in contrast, require skilled workers, often imported, to build a safe structure. figure 12: good earth nepal construction of an earthbag school, makwanpur, nepal brick construction, for example, requires the services of a trained bricklayer or mason, with the skill to reinforce a structure with cement bands wrapping around the walls, a necessity in a seismic zone like nepal. the failure of untrained builders to employ these bands, and shoddy workmanship in general, substantially contributed to the high failure rates of nepal’s brick buildings, especially in rural areas. cement construction requires a person skilled in the highly specialized art of cement mixing and laying. as noted by kishore thapa, president of the society of nepalese architects: “rcc (reinforced cement concrete) structures… require strict quality control… it requires high quality workmanship in formwork, bar bending, mixing, transporting, pouring and curing of concrete. failure to maintain quality may reduce the strength of the concrete, which makes the building structurally weak.20 consilience belofsky & zemskova: earthbag building therefore, we should be very careful while adopting rcc technology, particularly in rural areas of nepal… “ earthbag construction also requires only the simplest of tools – buckets, shovels, hoes and other similar materials. this makes earthbag building ideal for rural villagers who wish to build for themselves but don’t have the means to buy specialized tools and equipment, and sometimes even lack electricity. this simplicity of methods and materials is perfectly suited to overcoming the economic and cultural obstacles most responsible for the catastrophic failure of rural nepal’s housing stock: a tendency to skimp on quality building materials in favor of cheaper, shoddier ones, and untrained villagers doing specialized building tasks for themselves, poorly. figure 13: earthbag materials and tools earthbag construction also has a beneficial impact on the community, far exceeding that of conventional construction. since it relies almost entirely on local unskilled labor, it provides much needed employment to those without transferable skills. almost all building materials are bought locally as well, a boon to local merchants and commerce. unlike the skilled trades, earthbag construction is also easily taught, even to nonbuilders. many earthbag trainees without a formal building background but eager to learn have, with experience on a few sites, gone on to supervise their own earthbag projects. 94 consilience figure 14: chart showing breakdown of earthbag budget. community building in bolgaun a case study in central nepal in the rural village of bolgaun, families displaced by the 2015 earthquake are helping construct their own earthbag homes in partnership with the nimbin health and welfare association and good earth nepal. after closely examining various building options, nimbin ultimately opted for earthbag construction based on considerations of safety, cost, practicality, ease, and benefits to the community and local economy. reproducibility, ease of transference, and the ability to scale up given a successful project were also given attention. of particular concern to nimbin was the remoteness of the worksite, which requires 10 hours of travel by bus. moreover, the road is impassable much of the year due to landslides and floods. when the road is unusable, bricks and cement must be carried up steep slopes on the backs of porters. homes were to be small, strongly reinforced against earthquakes, and modular so that homeowners could later construct additions as desired. designs were squareshaped and without curves, reflecting traditional nepali values. projected costs were $2,500-3,000 a unit. suitable families were chosen, many living in open-air shacks or lean-tos since the earthquake. supplies were then purchased – almost all from local merchants – with a single small truck used to deliver outside materials. prospective homeowners received training in earthbag protocols from good earth nepal construction managers, who lived in a tent near the worksite and closely supervised all subsequent work. working in such an environment was fraught with challenges. construction, as is always the case in nepal, required a flexible schedule: slowing down or stopping for monsoon season, landslides and floods, and for lengthy holidays, elections, weddings, or funerals. subsistence farmers, barely eking out a living from the terraced mountainsides, sometimes spent construction time working instead of consilience belofsky & zemskova: earthbag building building. erecting the houses was physically arduous, because of the digging, stuffing and lifting required by earthbag construction. as with most earthbag technology, the houses could not exceed one story due to the tremendous mass of the walls, limiting design choices. still, the bolgaun community-based project has been a notable success, and bodes well for the future of earthbag construction in nepal. participating families have validated the viability of the community building model. costs have adhered to projections, and the construction quality is shown to be consistently excellent. with routine maintenance the structures should last for generations, if not centuries. families traumatized after seeing their village razed by an earthquake have also come to embrace this technology and trust in its strength and structural integrity, which is critical to the spread of earthbag technology. already, some owners are adding adjoining cooking areas to their homes, and neighbors and passersby now express interest in building their own earthbag homes. to date, 9 structures have been completed and two more begun, with more to come. figure 14: villagers build their own earthbag houses under good earth nepal supervision in bolgaun, sindhupalchok. 96 consilience a failure to launch despite its benefits and successes, earthbag technology has failed to capture the imagination of mainstream builders and the public and has been actively rejected by local and federal governments suspicious of such a radically different building method. earthbags and other sustainable building techniques remain mostly confined to ecoand design enthusiasts, first adopters, and natural builders and the relatively affluent owners they serve, mostly in the west. rarely do sustainable building methods like earthbag technology filter down to those who need them most: the rural poor. a review of earthbag building reveals that the technology has failed to establish a foothold due to government permit and licensing issues, the limitation of training opportunities to a relatively sophisticated few in the west, and a failure to adapt earthbag designs to the local traditions and cultures of people they supposedly serve. as a result, the initial promise of earthbag technology has largely remained unfulfilled, with correspondingly limited benefits to the community and the environment. it is our belief that only the construction of thousands of simple earthbag homes and schools for those in need, not eco-showcases for the relatively privileged, will make a true difference. earthbags for the people – a three-tiered approach 1. government acceptance good earth nepal has developed a three-tiered approach designed to bring the promise of earthbag building to ordinary families and communities. the first tier addresses the traditionally uneasy relationship between sustainable builders and government officials. for decades, official hostility to earthbag technology has led to the rejection of building licenses and permits, resulting in a dearth of earthbag structures worldwide. it is so prevalent that when discussing potential projects, aspiring earthbag builders tend to focus not on the advantages of earthbag technology but rather on whether they can obtain a building permit in the first place. typical is the recent query of an aspiring builder published by the well-known earthbag builders group.21 “hello all…i am looking for suggestions on places to buy reasonably priced acreage…where zoning and building codes will not be an issue…”. another sustainable building blog suggests building in delta county, colorado because it has no building codes. other recommendations include constructing “off-road” in the jungles of puna, hawaii, or in chile because enforcement is lax.22 in his blog “earthbagbuilding.com”, earthbag proponent kelly hart discusses this issue at length.23 in “a sad story of what can happen without a permit”, dr. owen geiger, head of the geiger institute for sustainable building and widely considered the world’s consilience belofsky & zemskova: earthbag building leading earthbag builder, describes the tragic plight of a licensed contractor who built an earthbag cabin deep in the woods and was then forced by authorities to tear it down.24 in nepal, however, this is changing. a year and a half of lobbying and dozens of meetings between good earth nepal representatives and nepali government officials and engineers have resulted in nepal’s federal approval and acceptance of earthbags. for the first time, a sovereign country (population 30,000,000) has adopted this technology as a standard and recommended construction technique, suitable for large-scale building. formal approval by the nepali government means that good earth nepal designs for a one-story earthbag house have been published in the design catalogue for reconstruction of earthquake resistant houses, vol 2, printed by nepal’s ministry of urban development, and that earthbag designs are now being distributed to 3,000 nepal reconstruction authority engineers. critically, earthbag building is also an official option for rural villagers receiving government reconstruction aid after the earthquake. figure 15: government-approved earthbag house design. source: government of nepal, ministry of urban development, department of urban development and building construction, “design catalogue for reconstruction of earthquake resistant houses, vol 2”, (2017): 123. 98 consilience developments in nepal could spawn similar outcomes elsewhere. for example, in india good earth nepal is now meeting with government officials and has built an earthbag structure on the campus of anna university, a large governmentsponsored technical school. good earth nepal has also built earthbag toilets as a part of prime minister modi’s swachh bharat (“clean india”) health and sanitation campaign. 2. training a rising professional class and rural village builders the training of everyday building professionals, in both the cities and rural villages, constitutes the second tier of good earth nepal’s strategy. recent decades have seen the rise of a passionate earthbag building community. judging from available literature, however, earthbag training within this community is largely confined to a small and homogenous cohort of college students, design and architecture buffs, first adopters, and building part-timers. a few organizations sponsor training opportunities abroad, but generally only as an adjunct to foreign aid “projects” conducted by outsiders. to remedy this, good earth nepal is sponsoring training programs that specifically target a growing pool of young engineers, architects, and licensed builders from developing regions and nations. it is this platoon of everyday working professionals, not western devotees, who will ultimately make earthbag construction a viable building option for those areas most in need. good earth nepal’s current training program consists of a standardized seven-day earthbag workshop. the first day is taught in the classroom, using written curricula developed in conjunction with dr. owen geiger. the next six days highlight practical, hands-on training, taught at active earthbag worksites. at the end of the program successful trainees receive a certificate of completion. many graduates go on to work at other earthbag worksites, and some have even supervised their own earthbag project figure 16: earthbag training at good earth nepal office in kathmandu figure 17: earthbag workshop for villagers in phulping village, sidhupalchok, nepal consilience belofsky & zemskova: earthbag building good earth nepal complements these workshops with shorter conferences and lectures. just a few months after nepal’s earthquake, it co-sponsored an earthbag summit in kathmandu that drew over 300 attendees and featured staggered, smallgroup training sessions. in october 2016, good earth nepal in conjunction with anna university conducted a two-day international earthbag conference in madurai, india, attended by over 350 people. the group also lectures before professional universities and societies and publishes in peer-reviewed technical journals. a more recent effort aims to install earthbag technology into the standardized curricula at leading engineering colleges and universities, thus giving it parity with more conventional building methods. good earth nepal also teaches the technology to those living in nepal’s most remote, under-served regions. rural villagers constituted a substantial portion of the trainees at the earthbag summit and have attended training sessions at good earth nepal’s kathmandu headquarters. presently, most rural training is conducted on-site, with hands-on instruction by construction managers. good earth nepal also sponsors workshops for junior and senior high students, and for young people in general. at a typical workshop, students might build a public toilet in a rural area, and then turn their handiwork over to local villagers. 3. building grassroots support creating grassroots, indigenous demand for earthbag technology in developing countries constitutes the third prong of good earth’s approach. historically, earthbag initiatives in developing regions have been limited to foreignrun aid projects. many have featured dome-shaped designs first developed by nader khallili, the noted architect and founding father of earthbag technology. though strong, the resulting structures have disregarded local building and cultural norms and have often been regarded as cutting-edge curiosities, not everyday structures to be used or lived in. to cite one example of cultural dissonance, many stupas (buddhist temples) in nepal are dome-shaped, as are some tombs. few, understandably, want to live in such structures. perversely, these culture-blind designs, however well-intentioned, have stifled the spread of earthbag building worldwide. good earth nepal takes an entirely different approach, striving to create simple, replicable designs that honor longstanding cultural traditions. 100 consilience conclusion this three-tiered approach has succeeded in nepal and made sustainable earthbag technology accessible to a large population that desperately needed it. lobbying and working with governments, the training of everyday building professionals, and creating grassroots demand seem to be an effective blend of strategies that together create indigenous demand for earthbag construction and can bring its many benefits to a world in need of sustainable building solutions. figure 18: earthbag house built by good earth nepal, kathmandu, nepal figure 19: earthbag meeting center built by good earth nepal, anna university campus, madurai, india consilience belofsky & zemskova: earthbag building references: 1. john p. rafferty, “nepal earthquake of 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(2016, september 4). building strong [editorial]. kathmandu post. retrieved january 9, 2018, from http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2016-09-04/buildingstrong.html 21. adam, posted on march 11, 2017, earthbag builders public group, accessed july 14, 2017, https://www.facebook.com/groups/39495056171/ 22. anonymous, posted in 2011, “areas that allow earthbag construction?,” permies, accessed july 14, 2017, https://permies.com/t/6363/areasearthbag-construction 23. kelly hart, “permits and codes for earthbag buildings,” earthbagbuilding.com, undated, accessed june 20, 2017, http://www.earthbagbuilding.com/faqs/codes.htm 24. owen geiger, “a sad story of what can happen without a permit,” natural building blog, may 10, 2011, accessed june 20, 2017, http://www.naturalbuildingblog.com/a-sad-story-of-what-can-happenwithout-a-permit/ https://rainforests.mongabay.com/ https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/impact-deforestation-life-nepal https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/impact-deforestation-life-nepal http://www.earthbagbuilding.com/testing.htm http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2016-09-04/building-strong.html http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2016-09-04/building-strong.html https://www.facebook.com/groups/39495056171/ https://permies.com/t/6363/areas-earthbag-construction https://permies.com/t/6363/areas-earthbag-construction http://www.earthbagbuilding.com/faqs/codes.htm http://www.naturalbuildingblog.com/a-sad-story-of-what-can-happen-without-a-permit/ http://www.naturalbuildingblog.com/a-sad-story-of-what-can-happen-without-a-permit/ microsoft word 2 16-27 oyinbo final formatted.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 10, iss. 1 (2013), pp. 16 – 27 agricultural budgetary allocation and economic growth in nigeria: implications for agricultural transformation in nigeria oyakhilomen oyinbo department of agricultural economics and rural sociology ahmadu bello university, zaria, nigeria email: ooyinbo@abu.edu.ng abdulsalam zakari department of agricultural economics and rural sociology ahmadu bello university, zaria, nigeria grace zibah rekwot department of agricultural economics and rural sociology ahmadu bello university, zaria, nigeria. abstract the objective of this paper is to investigate the link between agricultural budgetary allocation and economic growth in nigeria from an econometric perspective. the results of the analysis show that the relationship between agricultural budgetary allocation and economic growth in nigeria is positive but not significant in the long run, while the relationship is positive and significant only for the two-year lagged value of agricultural budgetary allocation. this observed relationship is not unrelated to the low budgetary allocations to agriculture over the years in nigeria. this implies that there is a need for a significant increase in budgetary allocations to agriculture in order to ensure that the agricultural sector plays a pivotal role in the national transformation of nigeria. author’s note author’s note text (half-inch from either margin; first line indented an additional quarter-inch). oyakhilomen oyinbo is a lecturer in the department of agricultural economics and rural sociology, ahmadu bello university, nigeria. he is interested in the economics of climate change vis-à-vis agriculture, poverty and agriculture linkages, food consumption and gender issues. abdulsalam zakari is an associate professor of agricultural economics and head of the department of agricultural economics and rural sociology, ahmadu bello university, nigeria. grace zibah rekwot is a postgraduate student in the department of agricultural economics and rural sociology, ahmadu bello university, nigeria. keywords: budgetary allocation, economic growth, transformation consilience oyinbo et al.: agriculture and economic growth in nigeria 1. introduction the food and agricultural organisation (fao) recommends that 25 per cent of government capital budget be allocated to agricultural development. this has not been achieved by the various administrations of nigeria, thereby affecting government programmes and policies for the sector (iganiga and unemhili, 2011). nigeria has also consistently failed to reach the 10 per cent agriculture budget standard of the maputo declaration, which has led to negative implications for food security (ochigbo, 2012). total expenditure on agriculture, as a percentage of overall expenditure, fluctuated from 4.57 per cent between1986-1993, to an average of 4.51 per cent per annum between 1994-1998, to 3.53 per cent between 1999-2005; this reflects intensified efforts by the government to reduce its size (udoh, 2011). this incessant reduction in agricultural expenditure over the years relative to the overall expenditure of nigeria has led to inadequate funds for the sector. in this light, (ujah and okoro, 2009) emphasized that the inadequate funding of the agricultural sector could never make the sector sustainable. while agricultural spending expressed as a share of total spending is generally low in african countries compared to other developing countries, nigeria fares unfavourably even within the african context. when public spending in agriculture in nigeria is benchmarked relative to public spending in other sectors, the value of the indicator for agriculture is lower than the values of all other sectors, such as industry, construction, trade, and services (mogues et al., 2008). nigeria has embarked on an agricultural transformation agenda that, as spelt out by tijani (2011), involves value chains of prioritized commodities that would provide more income to farmers, processors, and marketers; and provide opportunities for both local and foreign direct investment into the agricultural sector; thereby ensuring food security, poverty reduction, and job and wealth creation. therefore, the agricultural agenda is invariably aimed at enhancing economic growth in nigeria, and this call for the assessment of the relationship between government expenditure in financing agriculture and economic growth and its implication for the transformation agenda of nigeria. despite myriad studies that have been undertaken to understand the relationship between government expenditure and economic growth in nigeria, it is worth noting that most of these studies disaggregate the sectors of the economy from the few sector-specific studies, with none of the sectorspecific studies solely addressing agricultural expenditure – i.e. economic growth linkage without recourse to the other sectors of the economy. in view of the foregoing, this study was designed to carry out a sector-specific study on the relationship between expenditure in the agricultural sector and economic growth in nigeria. 2. review of empirical studies on government expenditure and economic growth several cross-country (ghura, 1995., devarajan et al., 1996., guseh, 1997., kelly, 1997., alexious, 2009) and country-specific (knoop, 1999., alexiou, 2007, irmen and kuehnel, 2008., hussain, 2011, dandan, 2011) studies have been carried out across the globe to examine the relationship between government expenditure 18 consilience and economic growth, but their data periods, methodologies and findings differ from some studies indicating that government expenditure has a negative impact on economic growth and others positing that government expenditure has a positive impact on economic growth. the incongruent findings of the studies could be attributed to the short data periods of some of the studies, which must have affected the reliability of the inferences drawn from the studies. the inconsistencies between the methodologies and time series analyses of most of the studies must have also accounted for the variations in the findings of the studies. in nigeria, nasiru (2012) employed the granger causality test to examine the relationship between government spending and economic growth, and the results showed that while government capital expenditure causes economic growth, there was no observable causal relationship between recurrent government expenditure and economic growth. the policy implication of this findings is that any reduction in capital expenditure would have negative repercussions on economic growth in nigeria. through an augmented solow model, usman et al. (2011) posited that expenditure on administration, education, transportation and communication has a negative impact on economic growth in the short run, while fdi and expenditure on health and other services have a positive impact on economic growth. maku (2009) discovered that both government expenditure and private investment have no significant influence on economic growth in nigeria, and that the rate of government expenditure to real gdp has been rising since the enactment of the structural adjustment programme (sap) without contributing significantly to economic growth in nigeria. nurudeen and usman (2010) used the data period of 1970 to 2008 in their study, and the estimation results showed that total capital expenditure (tcap), total recurrent expenditure (trec), expenditures on transport and communication (traco), education (edu), and health (hea), including inflation (ifn) and overall fiscal balance (fisba), are statistically significant in explaining changes in economic growth. however, expenditures on defence (def) and agriculture (agr) are not significant in explaining economic growth. loto (2011) investigated the growth effect of sectoral expenditures on economic growth and discovered that expenditures on national security, transportation, and communication were positively related to economic growth, but were not statistically significant. meanwhile, expenditure on education, though negative, was not significant; expenditure on agriculture was negatively related to economic growth; and expenditure on health was positively related to economic growth. 3. methodology this study utilized a secondary dataset of 30 years (1980-2010) that was obtained from the annual reports and statistical bulletins of various issues of the central bank of nigeria and the national bureau of statistics. the dataset includes budgetary allocation to agriculture, real gross domestic product, the inflation rate, and the exchange and interest rates of nigeria. keynesian and wagnerian macroeconomic theories are two major divergent theories in economics concerning the relationship between government expenditure and economic growth (dandan, 2011). this study adopts the keynesian macroeconomic approach in specifying economic growth as a function of agricultural expenditure. keynesian consilience oyinbo et al.: agriculture and economic growth in nigeria macroeconomic theory generally assumes that increased government expenditure can lead to high aggregate demand and in turn rapid economic growth; wagnerian theory, meanwhile, contends that an increase in national income causes more government expenditure. the augmented dickey fuller (adf) test was used to examine the stationarity of the dataset in order to overcome the problem of spurious regression that is common in the time series analysis of non-stationary variables. the model of the adf test with the constant term and trend is as follows: ∆𝒀𝒕 =  𝝋𝟏 +  𝝋𝟐𝒕+  𝜹𝒀𝒕!𝟏   𝜸𝒊 𝒏 𝒊!𝟏 ∆𝒀𝒕!𝟏 +  𝜺𝒕……………………………………………… (𝟏) the dependent variable, 𝒀𝒕, is regressed with its own lags,  𝒏. � is defined as the first different operator, and 𝜺𝒕 is a gaussian white noise error term. the null hypothesis (𝐻!:  𝛿 = 0) implies that the series has a unit root (non-stationary or integrated of order zero) and the alternative hypothesis (𝐻!:  𝛿 < 0) indicates that the series is stationary. the decision rule is to accept the null hypothesis assuming the calculated adf statistic is less than the mackinnon critical values, with the null hypothesis being rejected otherwise. the johansen cointegration test was employed to examine the long-term relationship between the variables under study after establishing the stationarity of the variables. a linear combination of two or more i(1) series may be stationary or i(0), in which case the series are cointegrated. the null hypothesis for the johansen cointegration test (𝐻!:  𝑟 = 0) implies that cointegration does not exist, while the alternative hypothesis (𝐻!:  𝑟 > 0) implies that it does. if the null for non-cointegration is rejected, the lagged residual from the cointegrating regression is imposed as the error correction term in a vector error correction model (vecm) given below as: ∆𝒚𝒕 =  ∏  𝒚𝒕!𝟏 +   𝚪𝒊 𝒌!𝟏 𝒊!𝟏 𝚫𝒚𝒕!𝒊 +  𝝁 +  𝜺𝒕……………………………………………………… (𝟐) where: ∆𝑦! = first difference of an (n x 1) vector of the n variables of interest π = (n x n) coefficient matrix 𝑦!!! = lagged values of 𝑌! γ= (n x (k-1)) matrix of short-term coefficients µ = (n x 1) vector of constant tε = (n x 1) vector of white noise residuals the underlying principle of the johansen cointegration test is that if the coefficient matrix ( ∏ ) has been reduced in rank (𝑟 < 𝑛  ), it can be decomposed into a matrix (𝑛  𝑥  𝑟) of loading coefficients (�) and a matrix (𝑛  𝑥  𝑟) of cointegrating vectors (�) such that ∏ = ��'. 𝑟 is the number of cointegrating relations (the cointegrating rank). the loading coefficients (�) indicate the cointegration relationships in the individual equations of the system and of the speed 20 consilience of adjustment to disequilibrium. this represents the causality in the system and the direction of the causality flows, while the cointegrating vectors (�) represent the long-term equilibrium relationship. johansen (1988) considered two likelihood ratio tests, namely the trace and the maximum eigen value statistic tests, which are used to determine the number of cointegrating equations given by the co-integration rank  (𝑟). the trace statistic tests the null hypothesis of 𝑟-cointegrating relations against the alternative of 𝑘-cointegrating relations, where 𝑘 is the number of endogenous variables for 𝑟 = 0, 1,..., 𝑘 – 1. the maximum eigen value statistic tests the null hypothesis of r-cointegrating vectors against the alternative of (r + 1)cointegrating vectors. 3.1 model specification a keynesian-macroeconomic viewpoint of the relationship between government expenditure and economic growth was adopted in this study; therefore, economic growth (eg) was modelled to be a function of budgetary allocation to agriculture (bba). however, to avoid the omission of relevant variables and the misspecification of the model, inflation rate (ifr), exchange rate (ecr) and interest rate (itr) were included in the model as other components of macroeconomic variables that influence economic growth. the model for the long-term relationship between the variables was given explicitly as: 𝒍𝒏𝑬𝑮𝒕 =  𝒂𝟎 +  𝒂𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑩𝑩𝑨𝒕 + 𝒂𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝒕 + 𝒂𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑬𝑪𝑹𝒕 +  𝒂𝟒𝒍𝒏𝑰𝑻𝑹𝒕 +  𝒖𝒕……………… (𝟑) in order to estimate the short-term relationship between the variables, the corresponding error-correction equation was estimated as: ∆𝒍𝒏𝑬𝑮𝒕 = 𝒂𝟎 +   𝒂𝟏∆𝒍𝒏𝑩𝑩𝑨𝒕!𝟏 𝒑 𝒊!𝟏 + 𝒂𝟐∆𝒍𝒏𝑰𝑭𝑹𝒕!𝟏 𝒑 𝒊!𝟏 + 𝒂𝟑∆𝒍𝒏𝑬𝑪𝑹𝒕!𝟏           𝒑 𝒊!𝟏 +   𝒂𝟒∆𝒍𝒏𝑰𝑻𝑹𝒕!𝟏 𝒑 𝒊!𝟏 +  𝝍𝑬𝑪𝑴𝒕!𝟏            +  𝒖𝒕………………………………… (𝟒) 𝐸𝐺 =   economic growth proxied by real gdp (n million). 𝐴𝐵𝐴 = agricultural budgetary sllocation (n million) 𝐼𝐹𝑅 =   inflation rate (%) 𝐸𝐶𝑅 = exchange rate (n/us dollar) 𝐼𝑇𝑅 = interest rate (%) 𝐸𝐶𝑀 = error correction term  𝑙𝑛 =  natural logarithm δ = difference operator the a priori expectations are 𝒂𝟏 > 0, 𝒂𝟐 < 0,𝒂𝟑 < 0, 𝒂𝟒   < 0 consilience oyinbo et al.: agriculture and economic growth in nigeria 4. results and discussion 4.1 augmented dickey fuller unit root test the results of the adf test as reported in table 1 show that eg, aba, ecr and itr were non stationary (integrated of order one) at their respective level forms, which substantiates the null hypothesis. however, the first difference of the variables was established to be stationary. ifr was found to be stationary (integrated of order zero) at level form, which invalidates the null hypothesis and substantiates the alternative. it was necessary that the properties of the time series variables under study be explored in order to overcome the problem of spurious regression – i.e. regression that tends to accept a false relationship or reject a true relation by flawed regression schemes. variables adf statistic lag length remark level lneg -1.661097 1 lnaba -3.339909 0 lnifr -3.587055 1 lnecr -1.049483 0 lnitr -2.406661 0 first difference nonstationary nonstationary stationary nonstationary nonstationary ∆lneg -38.37279 0 ∆lnaba -7.402476 1 ∆lnecr -4.923490 0 ∆lnitr -6.987179 0 stationary stationary stationary stationary nb: test critical value at 5 % significant level(-3.574244) lag selection is automatic based on schwartz bayesian criterion (sbc) figure 1: augmented dickey fuller (adf) test result 4.2 johansen cointegration test the results of the johansen cointegration test (trace and max-eigen) as shown in tables 3 and 4 respectively indicate that there is one cointegrating equation at the 5% level, which rejects the null hypothesis of not having a cointegrating equation (r = 0) and accepts the alternative hypothesis of having one co-integrating equation (r = 1). this result indicates that there is a long-term relationship between eg, aba, ecr, ifr and itr; therefore, a vector error correction estimation can be carried out to examine the short-term relationship between the variables under study. 22 consilience ce(s) eigenvalue trace statistic 0.05 critical value prob. none * 0.802783 86.89961 at most 1 0.512962 39.81959 at most 2 0.347679 18.95663 at most 3 0.190476 6.567275 at most 4 0.015035 0.439326 69.81889 0.0012 47.85613 0.2290 29.79707 0.4960 15.49471 0.6284 3.841466 0.5074 figure 2: johansen cointegration test result (trace test) ce(s) eigenvalue max-eigen statistic 0.05 critical value prob. none * 0.802783 47.08002 at most 1 0.512962 20.86296 at most 2 0.347679 12.38936 at most 3 0.190476 6.127947 at most 4 0.015035 0.439327 33.87687 0.0008 27.58434 0.2846 21.13162 0.5097 14.26460 0.5968 3.841466 0.5074 figure 3: johansen cointegration test result(max-eigen test) 4.3 vector error correction estimates the existence of a cointegrating relationship between the dependent and independent variables as indicated by the johansen cointegration test necessitated examining the short-term dynamics between the variables in the cointegrating equation by estimating the error correction model. the results of the vector error correction as shown in table 5 contain long-term estimates, short-term estimates and diagnostic statistics. the r square value of 0.62 implies that 62% of the variation in economic growth was due to the influence of explanatory variables (eg, aba, ecr, ifr and itr) that were included in the model. the f statistic value was significant at the 5% probability level, indicating the joint significance of the explanatory variables of the model (goodness of fit of the model). consilience oyinbo et al.: agriculture and economic growth in nigeria variable coefficient standard error t t t t-statistic long run constant -14.00684 lneg(-1) 1.000000 lnaba(-1) 0.037814 0.09805 lnifr(-1) -0.560845 0.14652 lnecr(-1) -0.084827 0.11849 lnitr(-1) -0.800698 0.34787 short run constant 0.036422 0.01692 ∆lneg(-1) 0.544936 0.18308 ∆lneg(-2) -0.040227 0.02830 ∆lnaba(-1) -0.006259 0.01001 ∆lnaba(-2) 0.980467 0.49798 ∆lnifr(-1) -0.035436 0.01656 ∆lnifr(-2) 0.024057 0.01638 ∆lnecr(-1) 0.001159 0.03807 0.38566 -3.82783*** -0.71589 -2.30171** 2.15217** 2.97656** -1.42126 -0.62517 1.96887** -2.13925** 1.46889 0.03045 ∆lnecr(-2) -0.015521 0.03445 ∆lnitr(-1) -0.050215 0.05056 ∆lnitr(-2) -0.056687 0.04561 ecm(-1) -0.284820 0.14034 diagnostic statistics r-squared 0.616216 log likelihood adj. r-squared 0.352365 akaike aic sum sq. resids 0.026845 schwarz sc s.e. equation 0.040961 mean dependent f-statistic 2.335469 s.d. dependent -0.45052 -0.99321 -1.24288 -2.02949** 57.56807 -3.254862 -2.683918 0.048457 0.050899 nb: * denotes p< 0.1 ** denotes p< 0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01 figure 4: vector error correction estimates of economic growth in nigeria the long-term estimates show that aba is positively related to eg in the long run and is therefore consistent with a priori expectation. however, aba is not significant in influencing economic growth in the long run. in the short run, the first lagged value of aba is negative and insignificant in influencing economic growth, but the second lagged value of aba is positively related to economic growth and significant at the 5% probability level. aba should have been positive and highly significant owing to the integral role of finance in agriculture, which is known to be the major contributor of gross domestic product in nigeria. the observed shortand long-term relationships between aba and eg can be attributed to poor budgetary allocation to agriculture relative to other sectors of the economy; and the poor implementation of the budget, as recent monitoring and evaluation reports indicate that the implementation of the 2007 and 2008 agricultural budget was below 25% (ujah and okoro, 2009). the error correction coefficient (-0.284820) of the model had the expected negative sign and was significant at the 5% probability level, confirming the existence of a long-term relationship between eg, aba, ecr, ifr 24 consilience and itr. the error correction coefficient indicates a feedback of about 28% of the previous year’s disequilibrium from the long-term values of the independent variables. itf and itr are in conformity with a priori expectation in the long run and significant at 1 and 5% respectively. this implies that a reduction in the inflationary trend of the economy would likely increase economic growth. there is also a tendency for economic growth to increase with a reduction in lending rate. ecr, meanwhile, is also consistent with a priori expectation but was found to be insignificant in influencing economic growth over the data period (1980-2010) of the study. 5. conclusion this study has been able to establish that agricultural budgetary allocation is positively related to economic growth in the long run but not significant in the short run. it was also found to be negative and significant for a one-year lagged period, but positive and significant for a two years lagged period at a 5% probability level. this disparity is linked to the poor budgetary allocation to the agricultural sector, which is far below the 25% and 10% recommendation from the fao and au, respectively. it is therefore recommended that budgetary allocation to the agricultural sector should be increased significantly so that adequate funds can be available for driving the activities of the sector. budgetary implementation in the agricultural sector should also be pursued for the latter so as to foster a higher level of budget implementation in other areas, such as for capital projects. this will ultimately ensure that the agricultural transformation action plan (atap), which is geared towards achieving food security, poverty reduction, employment generation and wealth creation, is realized in nigeria. consilience oyinbo et al.: agriculture and economic growth in nigeria bibliography alexiou, c. 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(2012) government expenditure and economic growth in nigeria: cointegration analysis and causality testing. academic research international, vol. 2, no.3, pp. 718 – 723. national bureau of statistics, (2010) social statistics in nigeria. nurudeen, a. and usman, a.(2010). government expenditure and economic growth in nigeria, 1970-2008: a disaggregated analysis. business and economics journal, vol. 4, pp. 1 – 11. ochigbo, f.(2012) ‘nigeria’s agriculture budget under 10%’. the nation newspaper, nigeria. http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/business/60002%e2%80%98nigeria%e2%80%99s-agric-budget-under10%25%e2%80%99.html accessed 1st september, 2012. okoro, d. & ujah, o.c.(2009) agricultural policy and budget analysis in nigeria (1999-2007): perspectives and implications for slissfan project states. report submitted to oxfam gb nigeria. consilience oyinbo et al.: agriculture and economic growth in nigeria tijani, b.(2011) federal ministry of agriculture and rural development action plan towards the attainment of a sustainable agricultural transformation in nigeria. being a lead paper delivered at the world food day seminar, agricultural show ground keffi road, abuja, nigeria. pp. 1 – 10. usman, a., mobolaji, h. i., kilishi, a. a., yaru, m. a. & yakubu, t. a.(2011) public expenditure and economic growth in nigeria. asian economic and financial review, vol. 1, no.3, pp. 104 – 113. microsoft word editor's note.docx dear readers, it is my great pleasure to announce the official publication of issue xv of consilience: the journal of sustainable development. 2015 has been a pivotal year in sustainable development, with the global adoption of 17 sustainable development goals (sdgs) marking a new path for international discourse. over the past few months, the team at consilience has been working to curate the diverse selection of articles in this issue. we hope this new issue will further an interdisciplinary examination and understanding of key target areas within the sdgs. issue xv features a variety of topics across different geographical regions that together seek to confront inefficiencies that arise from a changing world. adewumi and oguntuase examine best practices of wastewater management across the world in order to provide recommendations for the nigerian system. ndubueze-ogaraku, onoja, and monsi analyse the effects of an oil spill on the productivities of local livelihoods such as shellfish collection. continuing the discussion of oil, sabah, palliam, and al salem consider how oil price volatility has affected the lives of those who live in oil-rich countries. these two articles together offer differing implications of a shift to alternative energy sources and how it will affect standards of living across the world. while all articles are country-specific in nature, they carry significant policy implications that can be widely adopted. for instance, lie focuses on the theoretical foundations of the asymmetrical relationship between donor and recipient institutions that decrease the effectiveness of development aid. mubazi’s article complements lie’s piece with an examination of the challenges to aid effectiveness in the african subcontinent. tyler considers the natural disaster environment of the united states and provides examples of green infrastructure that can aid in hazard mitigation. hollender offers a case-study of bolivia’s political climate and the presidency of evo morales in order to guide efforts of building sustainable alternatives to capitalist development. the opinion pieces in this issue provide insight into current efforts to fight gender inequality and the illegal ivory trade in africa. boyd reviews nike’s corporate responsibility program, the girl effect, and describes an inherently capitalist design that seeks to enter a thus far untapped market segment. williams discusses the attitudes of various stakeholders towards ivory trade and the potential for a legal system that would empower local communities. finally, the articles in this issue’s field notes deliver primary data for issues of pastoral livelihoods and the economic and environmental impacts of private conservation efforts. in particular, abate reviews range management practices used in southern ethopia and the effects of agricultural policies. similarly, oyinbo determines, through quantitative analysis, the effects of livelihood diversification in farm households to the reduction of poverty. with the current movement towards private eco-system conservation efforts around the world, hounshell’s article provides a cost-benefit analysis of the economic impacts arising from such measures in a study of the sai sanctuary located in the western ghats of india. our mission remains to promote dialogue and understanding of issues in sustainable development that affect not only individual communities, but the greater collective wellbeing of our planet. our authors have worked diligently to provide innovative perspectives to perpetual challenges in sustainable development. we invite you to think critically about their arguments, further our understanding of their claims, and challenge their assumptions. through interaction between practitioners, scholars, and researchers, we hope the ensuing dialogue will offer fruitful solutions to the most pressing challenges facing our planet. we encourage you to continue engaging with the journal through your readership, submissions, and contributions to our briefings column. as always, we welcome constructive feedback and hope that our work inspires you to engage with the issues. if you have any questions, comments, or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact us at contact@consiliencejournal.org. we hope you enjoy issue xv. regards, nikita sivakumaran editor-in-chief consilience: the journal of sustainable development consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 19, iss. 1 (2018), pp. 163–183 building trust and collaborating with others: challenges for a sustainable peace in caquetá, colombia maria m. fontecha-tirado ms. fontecha, a journalist with a minor in history (2012), is currently a master’s candidate at the university of florida. her graduate work has focused on communicating science and sustainable development and advancing thinking regarding collaboration in post-conflict scenarios. she writes for international and colombian media. mfontecha@ufl.edu abstract in the amazonian department of caquetá (colombia), considered a revolutionary armed forces of colombia (farc) stronghold, 300 families are currently challenged with implementing the peace agreement in their territory while also navigating the road to sustainable development. this process entails trusting others, collaborating, and making decisions about health and education services, environmental problems, economic issues, and even aspects of everyday life. the paisajes conectados program is focused on reducing deforestation and promoting sustainable development in two municipalities of caquetá. its mission is to build new skills and share knowledge within local communities in order to strengthen governance and participation. this paper presents the findings of a field practicum, developed with the objective of determining community perceptions of the capacity building and governance strategy implemented under the paisajes conectados program in the context of a transition from conflict to peace. author’s note what is at the heart of peace-building after five decades of violence and civil war in colombia? a peace agreement signed between the colombian government and the revolutionary armed forces of colombia (farc) guerillas is shifting the power balance in many regions of the country. through demobilization and disarmament, farc has abandoned its long-standing role as a powerful referee of economic, social and political affairs in certain regions. simultaneously, the colombian state intends to enter regions where distrust is prevalent due to decades of federal neglect. in the amazonian department of caquetá, considered a farc stronghold, 300 families are currently faced with implementing the peace agreement in their territory while also forging the road to sustainable mailto:mfontecha@ufl.edu 164 consilience development. this process entails trusting others, collaborating, and making long-term decisions about health and education services, environmental problems, and economic issues alongside daily complications. the paisajes conectados (connected landscapes) program, implemented by the colombian ngo fondo acción in 2013, focuses on reducing deforestation and promoting sustainable development in two municipalities of caquetá. the program aims to build new skills and share knowledge within the local communities in order to strengthen governance and participation. this paper presents the findings of a field practicum, developed with the objective of determining community perceptions of the capacity building and governance strategy implemented under the paisajes conectados program in the context of a transition from conflict to peace. governance refers to the set of rules that communities require and utilize in order to make their own decisions. among other results, the practicum revealed that communities in caquetá identify the need to develop skills for conflict resolution, cooperation and teamwork, and the need to strengthen mechanisms for participation in the agreements that are relevant to their lives and territory. these results might help the national government implement the peace agreement in the region and achieve goal 16 of the sustainable development goals (sdg) peace, justice and strong institutions. consilience fontecha-tirado: sustainable peace in colombia introduction colombia and conflict have historically gone hand in hand. even though the country elected the first democratic government in south america, 150 of the 200 years since simon bolivar and his army gained independence from spain have been scarred by civil strife (killcullen and milles 2015). in 1819, when colombia gained independence, the new nation was politically divided between centralists and federalists, led by bolívar and fellow patriot santander respectively. these factions gradually evolved into the conservative and liberal parties by the 1840s. both blocs spent most of the 19th and half of the 20th centuries struggling for political power (killcullen and milles 2015). the confrontation reached a critical point in 1948 when jorge eliecer gaitán, a populist politician running as liberal presidential candidate, was murdered. the magnicide sparked a dark period called “la violencia” (killcullen and milles 2015) that took the lives of some 300,000 people and displaced thousands from rural areas to the main cities (killcullen and milles 2015). in an attempt to end the conflict, liberals and conservatives signed a covenant in 1956 where both parties agreed to share power (killcullen and milles 2015). though the period dubbed the national front (1958-1974) quelled violence, it also blocked political pluralism, failed to deliver equity, and generated widespread discontent. “colombia’s temperate, urbanized, populated, developed center contrasted with its tropical, rural, sparsely inhabited, neglected periphery. structural inequality and lack of opportunity created a fertile ground for revolutionaries seeking to overthrow the system.” (killcullen and milles 2015, 118). by 1964, in the middle of the political truce, colombia had two major guerrilla groups: the marxist-leninist revolutionary armed forces of colombia (farc) and the maoist national liberation army (eln). moreover, under the claim of electoral fraud in the 1970 elections (the last held under the national front), a new urban guerilla group, the m-19, entered the scene. according to these groups, armed struggle to achieve social justice was their only recourse. they financed subversion through kidnapping, extortion, and bank assaults, and by the 1980s began “taxing” coca crops (killcullen and milles 2015). it didn’t take long for farc and the paramilitary armies to connect with the complex network that produced and exported cocaine to the us and europe (killcullen and milles 2015).1 participation in the drug trade meant growth for the illegal armies and a significant escalation of the armed conflict. by the last decade of the 20th century, violence, drugs, and social injustice painted colombia as a failed state (killcullen and milles 2015). farc controlled large swaths of the country including two of the biggest regions, meta and caquetá. in 2002, following a failed peace negotiation process with farc, president andrés pastrana negotiated “plan colombia”, a us-backed 1 some of the first paramilitary forces were created during the 1960s by the colombian military as part of its counterinsurgency efforts. subsequently, many paramilitary forces trace their development to wealthy landowners, drug traffickers, multinational corporations, members of the security forces, and politicians. 166 consilience military and intelligence strategy aimed at strengthening the rule of law and combating farc and other illegal groups. president álvaro uribe vélez continued the plan for eight more years, delivering accurate blows and debilitating farc and other sources of violence and destabilization (killcullen and milles 2015). however, the conflict was not over and the military, social, and economic costs were becoming unsustainable. when president juan manuel santos took office in 2010, he focused on finding a “third way” out of a conflict that had given the country a shameful record (santos 2014). “after syria, colombia has the world’s largest number of internally displaced people. this has bred food insecurity and loss of livelihoods; it is associated with child labor, school desertion and sexual exploitation – as well as the recruitment by armed groups of thousands of mostly indigenous children” (world food programme 2016). the peace process “the word is “opportunity”. we must not limit peace to the silence of the rifles. the most remarkable issue is that today there are new opportunities to believe in, create, and re–construct ourselves through dialogue and respect.” humberto de la calle, head of the colombian negotiation team, 2016 the colombian government negotiated a peace accord with farc, a process that took four years beginning in march 2011. “initial contacts [were] kept confidential to protect [the] process’s early viability” (de la calle 2016). with a defined agenda, the negotiations went public in october 2012. they would address five topics: rural reform, political participation, illicit drugs, victims, and the end of conflict. the agenda also involved the design of a transitional justice to deal with war crimes, as well as measures to implement, verify, and endorse the process (peace goverment team colombia 2016). negotiations ended successfully in august 2016, and the peace agreement was presented to colombian citizens and international authorities (peace goverment team colombia 2016). for the first time in 52 years of continuous war against farc, an opportunity to believe in peace was possible. however, a majority of the citizens voted against the subsequent referendum to ratify and implement the agreement, due to concerns about the treatment of the rebels (reiter 2016). according to opponents of the peace agreement, “the justice components of the peace agreement, which centered on truth, reconciliation and reintegration, rather than solely on trials, were tantamount to allowing rebels to get away with murder” (reiter 2016). after a month of re-negotiation, farc, the government, and some opponents of the initial agreement reached a “new final accord” that improved legal provisions, defined crimes that would be dealt with by special judges, and provided clarity on how farc would transform into a political party (peace goverment team colombia 2016). the department of caquetá consilience fontecha-tirado: sustainable peace in colombia caquetá has a total area of 88,965 square kilometers (four times the state of new jersey), and a population of 465,477, 46% of whom are between the ages of 15–44, and of which 80% live in rural areas (caqueta goverment 2014). the life expectancy is 69.6 years for men and 64.9 years for women, and the population growth rate is 12.93% (caqueta goverment 2014). less than half of caqueteños (46.2%) have finished elementary school, and only 35.8% have graduated from high school. barely 30% of those living in rural areas have full access to public services like sanitation, electricity, and potable water (caqueta goverment 2014). as of 2015, 41.3% of the population was living in poverty – 117,315 more than reported in 2014 (valencia 2016). the department’s heterogeneous population is composed mostly of colonos: displaced families from nearby andean departments (huila and tolima, for example) who traveled during the la violencia years to the sparsely populated and “open lands” of caquetá in search of opportunity (arcila, et al. 2000). this involuntary migratory process was complemented by state-sponsored colonization. by 1964 the central government, promising land and loans to those who moved to caquetá, managed to attract large numbers of dispossessed families from other regions. but given the poor quality of the soils, agriculture was not an option for most of those who relocated to caquetá, and so the colonization attempts were economic failures (arcila, et al. 2000). caquetá has always been in the periphery. the region has historically represented an opportunity to secure property (arcila, et al. 2000), yet land tenure is uncertain. moreover, poor soil quality makes producing adequate yields difficult. most of the region is isolated, as road infrastructure is deficient, and rivers are the main communication routes (arcila, et al. 2000). the region’s long history of war and pervasive neglect by the central state created a power vacuum that was readily filled by farc. the rebels took over some of the sixteen municipalities in caquetá by the late 1970’s. they did not face much opposition from locals; instead, they found that most believed in the ideal of an equitable society and blamed the government for their poverty. farc had an identical speech and used marketing to discredit the government (arcila, et al. 2000). the rebel army soon became a parallel authority (arcila, et al. 2000). nevertheless, over the years some active local civil groups of farmers and ranchers emerged. rafael orjuela, a community leader from cartagena del chairá, recalls that “in the times of the guerilla, we had the initiative of creating a manual that contained sixteen environmental provisions ranging from prohibiting logging on river banks to barring entry to the reserve zones that we the communities had created” (semana sostenible 2017). during the 1980s and 1990s, the insurgent illegal army built up its presence in the region. they recruited adults and children from rural areas, cultivated and protected coca crops, charged coca paste “taxes”, opened and controlled cocaine trade routes, and established connections with drug kingpins (arcila, et al. 2000). farc also made alliances with local politicians in order to protect their interests. in several elections, the armed group coerced civilians into voting for their candidates (nunez and 168 consilience moreno n.d.) while also kidnapping, threatening, or murdering political rivals (arcila, et al. 2000). according to official data, internal conflict victims in caquetá total 372,661 (ciro 2016). these include victims of homicide, forced displacement and kidnapping. the graph below shows how, at the end of the 20th century and in the early 21st century, both displacement (purple) and kidnapping (green) ravaged the department. implementation of the peace agreement, however, promises to turn over a new leaf for this region. the government has announced investments in public goods and local development. implementation requires unprecedented levels of participation and consultation with local communities, as decisions over economic, environmental, and social development will have to originate from the bottom up. these new rules will affect the way stakeholders interact, implement changes, and measure impacts on communities. one of the most significant changes will be farc’s promise to disarm, demobilize, and instead act politically. “farc reiterates its disposition to use only words as a weapon to build the future. count on us, peace will triumph,” declared farc’s top commander rodrigo londoño last october (citation). if the bells toll for peace, there must be new institutions to direct collaboration, participation, and decision-making in caquetá and other parts of the country where, until recently, weapons and intimidation have previously prevailed in the absence of the rule of law. graphic 1. kidnappings and displacement in caquetá. source: misión de observación electoral, 2008. consilience fontecha-tirado: sustainable peace in colombia field practicum approach: collaborative planning and community capacity building the peace agreement effectively changes the institutions influencing decisionmaking, as farc is no longer the authority in the region. these changes render the traditional decision-making model obsolete, as it assumes the world is rather like a machine which can be designed to produce particular outputs, when in reality our contemporary society is complex, dynamic and evolving (innes and booher 2003, 6). in contrast, the bottom-up collaborative planning process required under the peace agreement is grounded in the belief that local communities know best the multifaceted and fluctuating realities they face (chambers 1995). the collaborative planning approach is an effective strategy for dealing with conflict where other practices have failed (innes and booher 1999). collaborative planning is a social response to changing conditions in increasingly networked societies, where differences between communities and individuals are growing, and where accomplishing anything significant requires creating flexible, innovative linkages among many players (innes and booher 1999). in this approach, outcome and process are valued in the same way (innes and booher 1999), and pluralism is an opportunity for innovation and creativity. collaborative planning is based on the idea that solutions can be achieved through dialogue that engages different interests surrounding a task or problem. it requires that every stakeholder is equally informed, willing to listen to the concerns and expectations of others, and respectful of differences (innes and booher 1999). this produces two different types of outcomes: tangible and intangible. tangible results comprise agreements, policies, decisions, strategies, or new ideas for approaching a problem. intangible outcomes include social and political capital formation, stronger relationships, enhanced trust, a mutual understanding of diverse interests, and thus genuine communication and joint problem solving (innes and booher 1999). often, these intangible results become the foundations for future collaboration. community capacity building (ccb) is the increase in the ability of community groups to define, assess, analyze, and act on any important matter (gibbon, labonte and laverack 2002). the capacity of a group depends on resource opportunities or constraints (political, ecological, and environmental), and the conditions in which people live (gibbon, labonte and laverack 2002). it is important to understand that “community capacity is neither seen as means or as end, rather it is viewed as both. it is not a substitute for program goals or objectives but it creates a separate set of objectives that run parallel to those of specific programs. this is called a ‘parallel track’ approach in which community capacity is strengthened at each stage of the project.” (laverack 2005). building community capacity is a central and shared concern for funding agencies, implementing organizations and communities because it enables the development, implementation, and maintenance of effective community-based projects (goodman, et al. 1998). according to marion gibbon, ronald labonte, and glenn laverack (2002), there are nine dimensions that ascertain capacity building in a community 170 consilience (table 1). these dimensions allow for analysis of community skills, resources and knowledge, and all are equally relevant. table 1. dimensions of community capacity building. adapted from gibbon, labonte and laverack, 2002 the paisajes conectados program: an alternative for conservation and sustainability in caquetá in 2013, closely following the official launch of peace talks with farc, fondo acción, a colombian ngo, began implementing the paisajes conectados program in caquetá. the program is based on the assumption that “if provided with alternative sources of income and the appropiate tools for governance, local populations can actively reduce forest clearing and natural habitat degradation.” (fondo acción 2015, 3) to achieve this change, the program has three strategies: (i) reduce deforestation by promoting alternative, profitable, environmentally sound, low-carbon economic options for food sovereignty and sustainable livelihoods in rural communities; consilience fontecha-tirado: sustainable peace in colombia (ii) strengthen and empower local civil society and local/regional governments; (iii) create conditions to enable payments for environmental services (pes). pes is an economic mechanism that compensates ecosystem managers for the conservation of the ecosystems that provide environmental services such as clean water, biodiversity, clean air (fondo acción 2015). fondo acción works with fifteen local community-based organizations and external decision makers such as public officials in rural areas of the solano and cartagena del chairá municipalities in caquetá. the ngo provides support (financial, technical, strategic communications) and stimulates a collaborative planning approach backed by a community capacity building and governance strategy (cbgs). the cbgs process involves: • determining the need for capacity-building and strengthening in the intervention areas • conducting capacity-building activities with individuals and organizations from local communities, ngos and governments, using the following instruments: o coaching: the leadership school (escuela de líderes) is a coaching program to help community leaders and local teams improve their individual and social communication and organizational skills, build leadership, and create high performance teams o training: field schools (escuelas de campo), learning routes (giras de intercambio) and workshops facilitate sharing best practices on issues related to natural resource management, associativity, management, information systems and communal voluntary action o formal education: community members have access to the certificate in rural development in the amazon, offered in partnership with amazonia university • creating platforms for civil society participation to facilitate agreements on guidelines and regulations for sustainable management of natural resources between local governments and the community. • designing or strengthening mechanisms for sustainable planning and development (communal development plans, land management municipal plans, local community council action plans, municipal environmental agendas and municipal development plans.) (fondo acción 2015) “for over thirty years, farc rebels taught us that all things coming from outside were a threat to our land and rights. they said that outsiders only wanted information, and that nothing good would come from them (…) fondo acción is the first ngo that has challenged the idea that all caquetá communities are rebels and terrorists; they wanted to work with us, to help us understand how valuable and important we are, through the forest conservation program. they have earned our trust, and they proved that outsiders are not always the bad guys,” said victor, a participant in paisajes conectados. 172 consilience methodology the field practicum intended to determine community perceptions about the capacity building and governance strategy (ccbgs) implemented under paisajes in the midst of a transition to peace. this qualitative and participatory assessment also identifies strengths and weaknesses of the capacity-building strategy, which can direct fine-tuning by fondo acción. the approach uses semi-structured interviews and workshops with a sample of program participants from both localities. study members have participated in paisajes conectados for at least six months through capacity building and governance activities and/or as beneficiaries of small grants and other program investments. the approach assumes that people are able to relate to and recognize the nine dimensions if they have enough information about the program and if the questions and instruments are clear and culturally appropriate. i applied these filters to select interviewees and workshop participants. university of florida professors, fondo acción team members, and community members revised and tested the questions and workshop activities before field implementation. i conducted the following activities: 1. documentary review of ten relevant publications by fondo acción under the ccbgs. 2. semi-structured interviews with five fondo staff members from the paisajes conectados team. 3. twenty-two semi-structured interviews with program participants (men and women between 21 and 65 years old; 65% were men) in solano and cartagena (annex 1). nine interviews in cartagena were conducted during the leadership school (may 17-19, 2017). eleven interviews were conducted in solano during the delivery of small grants (may 17-21, 2017). i had two additional interviews with the director of the caquetá women’s platform and with a professor from amazonía university. both have been closely involved with the ccbgs since 2014. 4. one workshop with twenty participants (evenly distributed between men and women, ages 18 to 65) in solano (annex 2). 5. one workshop with eleven program participants (evenly distributed between men and women, ages 18 to 65) in cartagena del chairá (annex 2). data analysis included transcribing all interviews and workshop outcomes. i treated all nine community capacity dimensions as categories of analysis and classified all answers and information in these dimensions. this is the first assessment that has been carried out with the information. further analyses will take place during late 2018 using n-vivo software under the advice of university of florida professors. therefore, the following results are preliminary and were shared with fondo acción before leaving colombia in july 2017. results consilience fontecha-tirado: sustainable peace in colombia in 2015, fondo acción implemented a community capacity-building and governance strategy that focused on strengthening skills and abilities relevant to sustainable natural resource management. it also trained individuals to lead and participate in public policy debates on topics such as food security, sustainable rural development, sustainable cattle ranching, gender, and conservation. the assessment has revealed that program participants from both localities recognize the importance and usefulness of this strategy and value the skills and capacities acquired in the field schools (ecas), learning routes, leadership school, and workshops. participants report that they have learned practical skills, technical abilities, and knowledge to improve farm planning, productivity, natural resource management, project design, and communication, among other things. the leadership school has helped them take on active roles in their communities and to realize how these roles differ from farc-style leadership. indeed, participants highlight the importance of building new local leadership in caquetá. communities are facing a two-fold challenge: managing a territory without farc’s traditional authority structures and learning to negotiate with public organizations that are knocking at the door. practicum interviews and workshops reveal that leaders, community members, and the fondo acción team are aware that new skills are necessary in the post-conflict context. communities identify the need to develop the capacity for conflict resolution, cooperation, and teamwork, as well as the need to improve mechanisms of participation. the following graphics represent contributors’ perceptions regarding community capacity. participants were divided by village, or vereda, and were asked to score from 1 to 5 how much they agreed with the statements i read. spiderweb representations, shown below, revealed perceptions regarding the nine community capacity domains (solano includes three nodes: herichá (1), mononguete (2) and las mercedes (3); cartagena includes three local groups). spider web representation of solano. 174 consilience spider web representation of cartagena del chairá. participation and leadership are strong attributes of both communities. the conflict has forced communities to build local leadership and empowered citizens to negotiate with legal and illegal armed actors. in fact, the decision to let fondo acción into their communities resulted from a long negotiation between community leaders and farc. solano participants identified strengths in participation, leadership, program management, and resource mobilization. the weakest dimensions were the ability to work with others (external and internal actors) and the capacity to formulate questions (‘asking why’). the testimonies and workshop revealed two possible reasons for the first finding. for years, farc played several roles: that of an environmental authority, an administer of justice, and a referee for everyday issues (divorces, thefts, homicides, etc.). as farc served as the authority on social and economic matters, little space was left for autonomy or collaboration. participants also noted that a culture of mistrust has prevented them from working with others. regarding the ‘asking why’ dimension, participants recognized that though they inquired about benefits and subsidies offered by projects, they never delved into the political, social, or environmental consequences of these projects. however, some of the participants acknowledged their independence in deciding whether to participate in the program. “those of us who decided to participate in the program were called naïve. they said fondo acción was going to take our farms from us, that they were lying, and they encouraged people to abandon the program. we told them that before this program, nothing had come to solano so we had little consilience fontecha-tirado: sustainable peace in colombia to lose. three years later, several families are asking to be part of it. fondo acción did not let us down,” said alirio, one of the first participants in solano. in cartagena del chairá, the results were different. the strongest dimensions identified included organizational structures, problem assessment capacities, leadership skills, and the ability to collaborate with others. participants argued that these are the result of farc's political and social work with the juntas de acción comunal (jac)2, the main local authority. “the movement (farc) gave us health, education, technical assistance, and dedicated time and resources to help us create strong civil organizations. but we were the ones who decided to let them (paisajes conectados) come to cartagena, not farc,” said ricardo, a member of the cartagena community. after the peace agreement was signed in 2016, cartagena del chairá communities decided to keep the organizational structure in place because they considered it an effective mechanism to deal with the central government’s programs and institutions. the cartagena participants report that their capacity to work with others is a core value of their community and that it has resulted from the foundation laid by farc. thus, collaborating with other jacs and organizations is common practice. another finding from the interviews and workshops was the role of women. according to program data, most of the participants in paisajes conectados are women. this is uncommon in caquetá’s male-dominated society and culture, according to the women’s platform. women were more willing to join the program, motivated their male partners to participate, and encouraged other women and local organizations to trust fondo acción. most of the male interviewees acknowledged that they did not believe in the program and its activities; this perception changed when their wives began receiving materials, small grants, and training in sustainable agriculture, and when they witnessed how women readily participated in programrelated design and decision-making. conclusions before the peace agreement was signed, many observers asserted that the biggest obstacle to peace would be assuring the implementation of various provisions of the agreement. while the uncertainties related to post-conflict implementation of the peace agreement are important, even more significant for achieving a lasting, durable peace in colombia is progress towards sustainable development goals. initiatives like the paisajes conectados program provide important lessons concerning best practices for sustainable development, which can in turn inform similar development initiatives in other former conflict territories. the field practicum conducted in caquetá is one of the first efforts to carry out academic research on communities in former farc-controlled areas. how have these communities fared after years of war and isolating conditions? how can they deploy the social capital developed during the conflict to ensure that they will be able to more effectively manage their 2 jac is a mechanism of participation that enables people from villages and neighborhoods to organize themselves to promote development projects (interior minister, 2017). 176 consilience natural resources in an era of peace? the field practicum report provides important information that helps decision makers better understand the local context and craft development interventions. the field practicum findings also show that changes in solano and cartagena del chairá’s systems have been mainly influenced by outsiders. however, the social capital, mindset transformations, and knowledge produced by the communities through the paisajes conectados program can provide them with pathways to communicate their history and future vision for caquetá with outsiders. their vision is one of peacebuilding and forest protection, to leave future generations with the possibility of sustainable livelihoods. to implement the peace agreement and sustainable development goals, the colombian government must listen to communities that were deeply affected by the armed conflict and take full advantage of environmental project outcomes. the government must acknowledge the social capital developed by these communities during the conflict, represented in the community capacity domains. finally, it is important to build bridges and synergy among communities, ngos, and local governments to produce policies and programs that will help strengthen community capacity and conservation efforts going forward. acknowledgments this work was made possible thanks to the communities in caquetá (colombia), fondo accion, the master of sustainable development practice program at the university of florida, and my advisors: dr. philip williams, director of the center for latin american studies at the university of florida, professor jonathan dain, and dr. grenville barnes. consilience fontecha-tirado: sustainable peace in colombia references: arcila, oscar, gloria gonzales, franz gutierrez, adriana rodriguez, and carlos ariel salazar. 2000. caqueta, construccion de un territorio amazonico en el siglo xx. bogota: instituto sinchi. caqueta goverment. 2014. indicators our region. accessed september 24, 2016. http://www.caqueta.gov.co/indicadores_anuales.shtml?apc=bexx-1&x=1370988. caracol, radio. 2006. caracol. may 28. accessed september 17, 2016. http://caracol.com.co/radio/2006/05/28/nacional/1148829840_291596.ht ml. chambers, robert. 1995. "poverty and livelihood:whose reality counts?" environment and urbanization 173-203. ciro, alejandra. 2016. ¿qué debe esperar el caquetá con los acuerdos de la habana? september 1. accessed september 24, 2016. http://alaorilladelrio.com/2016/09/01/que-debe-esperar-el-caqueta-con-losacuerdos-de-la-habana/. de la calle, humberto. 2016. ending colombia’s guerrilla war, securing the peace. june 6. accessed september 23, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/endingcolombias-guerrilla-war-securing-the-peace-1465254474. fondo acción. 2015. “the epic – fondo acción colombia program: enhancing community-based conservation stewardship in caquetá and the pacific”. bogotá: fondo acción, august. gibbon, marion, ronald labonte, and glenn laverack. 2002. "evaluating community capacity." health and social care in the community 485-491. innes, judith e, and david e booher. 1999. "consensus building and complex adaptative systems. a framework for evaluating collaborative planning." journal of the american association 412-423. killcullen, david, and greg milles. 2015. "colombia: a political economy of war to an inclusive peace." prism: a journal of the center for complex operations 116-121. laverack, glenn. 2005. "evaluating community capacity: visual representation and interpretation." community development journal 266-276. nunez, magda paola, and patricia moreno. n.d. "monografía político electoral." mision de observacion electoral (moe). accessed september 23, 2016. http://moe.org.co/home/doc/moe_mre/cd/pdf/caqueta.pdf. 178 consilience peace goverment team colombia. 2016. peace agreement. accessed september 23, 2016. http://equipopazgobierno.presidencia.gov.co/especiales/abc-delproceso-de-paz/phone/por-que-este-proceso-de-paz-es-diferente.html. piccolli, guido. 2004. "el sistema del pájaro: colombia, laboratorio de barbarie." by guido piccolli. tallafa : editorial txalaparta. reiter, andrew. 2016. "the wrong choice in colombia." u.s. news. october 4. accessed october 4, 2016. http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/201610-04/colombia-no-vote-on-farc-peace-referendum-was-the-wrong-choice. santos, juan manuel. 2014. "palabras del presidente juan manuel santos en el conversatorio ‘la tercera vía: el camino a la prosperidad económica y social’." presidencia de la republica. accessed novemeber 15, 2016. http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/prensa/2014/julio/paginas/20140701_05palabras-presidente-juan-manuel-santos-conversatorio-la-tercera-viacamino-prosperidad-economica-y-social.aspx. semana sostenible. 2017. medio ambiente. may 01. accessed july 20, 2017. http://sostenibilidad.semana.com/medio-ambiente/articulo/deforestacionen-caqueta-asi-es-la-lucha-para-combatirla/37681. vasquez, teofilo. 2014. "caquetá, análisis de conflictividades y construcción de paz." united nations development program. abril. accessed september 27, 2016. http://www.co.undp.org/content/colombia/es/home/library/crisis_preven tion_and_recovery/caqueta--analisis-de-conflictividades-y-construccion-depaz.html. world food programme. 2016. colombia. accessed september 17, 2016. https://www.wfp.org/countries/colombia. consilience fontecha-tirado: sustainable peace in colombia annex 1 interviews with people of the community 1. can you please give me your full name? 2. how long do you live in caquetá? 3. were you born in the region? if you don't how did you arrive to caquetá? 4. what the thing that you like the most about the region? 5. what attributes have the people of your community? 6. what do you cultivate in your farm, what animals do you have? 7. how do you find out about paisajes conectados and fondo acción? 8. what is the purpose of the program? 9. what kind of vinculation do you have with paisajes conectados (employee, beneficiary)? 10. how long do you work in the program's activities? 11. how was this place before paisjes conectados started? 12. regarding the activities, you have worked, is there anyone that you remember the most? why? 13. where do you traditionally gather for the meetings and activities? 14. who participate in these activities? do you remember somebody in particular? 15. if you can tell me the three things that the program has taught you, what would it be? 16. how have your life changed since you are in the program? 17. who makes the decision about what is going to be made in the community? 18. can you please describe how was and how is the process to implement a project in the community? 19. how would you describe the work that the community is doing with with fondo acción 20. what do you like about the work with this organization? 21. what do you want to be different? why? 22. which are the most important resources that the community give to participate in the programs or projects (time, logistics, food)? 23. do you work with other organizations? if yes how is the relationship with them? 24. how have your life changed since your are in the program? 25. how do you imagine the region in a couple of years? 26. what should happen in order to make the think you imagine real? 27. any final comment that you want to add 180 consilience annex 2 community workshop objective: to identify what dimensions from the community capacity approach have materialized in the communities of caquetá that have been beneficiaries of fondo accion's interventions. target population: men and women between 18 and 70 years-old. time: 4 hours • the activity will be recorded all the time workshop guide 1. greetings (10 min): when people arrive, the facilitator gives each person a name tag to write his/her name. 2. icebreaker name and throw (20 min): to help learn another’s name in an enjoyable and non-threatening manner. participants make a circle, and the facilitator says her name and throws a ball to another person. the second person says his name and throws the ball. this process continues until everyone has said their names and threw the ball. after two rounds, facilitator throws the second ball in the same order she did the first time. participants must be aware of saying their name and throwing the ball in the order they did the first time. in the end, the circle will have three balls and will force that participants be aware to say their name and throw the ball in a specific order. materials: 3 balls 3. meeting objectives and establishing rules of participation (15 min):the facilitator takes the objectives written on flip chart paper to the meeting, and puts them in a visible location after participants sit after the first activity. to establish the rules for participating, the facilitator asks the people to write what they think the rules should be on a piece of colored paper, and then to tape the paper onto the wall. when everyone has finished his/her paper, the facilitator asks which is the most important paper on the wall, and on another piece of flip chart paper writes down what people say. at the end, the facilitator will ask them if they are comfortable following the rules of participation written on the flip chart. 4. exercise #1 (60 min): spider web representation: the objective of the activity: to identify what dimensions of the ccb are acknowledged by the beneficiaries of fondo acción's projects and the why they acknowledged them. the facilitator asks each participant to fill in the matrix individually (below). after 15 minutes the facilitator divides the group into three smaller groups and provides instructions to fill in the matrix again together in a flip chart. after 30 minutes, the facilitator asks the small groups to make a round table and present the form. meanwhile, the facilitator takes notes. once small groups finish the presentations of their matrices, the moderator closes with consilience fontecha-tirado: sustainable peace in colombia the ideas that come up from the activity. materials: matrix prints, markers, stickers, pens, tape, note-taking poster, 3 big spider webs. 5. transition between activities (5 min): moderator goes around the circle and asks participants which of the dimensions are more important for them to make better community decisions. 6. exercise #2 (80 min): social mapping and timeline: objective of the activity: to identify what places have been used and what activities have occurred in the projects that are acknowledged by the community. 6.1 participants sit around a table and the facilitator gives them a flip chart. then, she asks the group to organize themselves into a line from the earliest (january) birthday to the latest (december). once they have formed a line, the moderator asks them to take a marker and draw on the paper when the program starts, what activities they remember and when did the meet the last time. when they finish, the facilitator ask participant to discuss the timeline. 6.2 energizer: “all move who…”: stand or sit on chairs, in a circle, with one person (facilitator first) in the middle. say ‘all move who…’ and then add, for example: are wearing something blue; traveled more than a day to get there; got up this morning before 4 am. 6.3 the facilitator divides the groups again two groups: men and women. moderatos gives a map of solano and ask each group to draw the places (church, school, community center) where they have had activities of the projects and identify what activities they have developed in those places. after 30 minutes, the facilitator asks them to present their work and comment on them. meanwhile, facilitator takes notes. once small groups finish the presentation, facilitator makes a closing with the ideas that came up from the activity. materials: 2 big copies of solano's map, markers, note taking poster 7. break (15 min): ngo will provide the snacks for the break. 8. final reflection (30 min): objective of the activity: to summarize and clarify ideas that have come up from the activities. considering the activities that were made, the facilitator asks some clarifying questions about the activities and ask the participants to give a conclusion about the results of the activities, community’s characteristics, and the skills they have honed through the project's. (dimension) (statement) (grade) (what are the reasons for this grade?) participación (participation) (participation is mandatory for the empowerment of the community. participating in large 182 consilience or small spaces, people from the community can reflect, analyze and act in the issues that are important for the community) (leadership) (leadership in the community is exerted by different people in the community such as women, men, young, elders, indigenous, and it allows the development of the community) (people who are acknowledged as leaders enable community to have more support from other organizations, access to resources (economic, material) and better understanding among the people who belong to it) (organizational structures) (community involves different actors as the church, school teachers, young people, women organizations to analyze the problems of the community and propose solutions) (problem assesment) (community is able to identify the causes and solutions to the problems it has) (resource mobilization) (community is able to mobilize resources (human, financial, materials) inside and outside of the community to manage solutions to the problems that affect it) (asking why) (before making a decision, the community is able to inquiry about the political, economic and social consilience fontecha-tirado: sustainable peace in colombia consequences that could arise from the decision it makes) (links with others) (community is able to manage alliances with other communities or organizations to develop or implement their projects) (role of the outside agents) (community is able to work with external organizations like the local government, non-profit organizations, private companies to mobilize resources and technical support for developing their own projects and activities) (programe management) community has the control, independence and power to decide over the design, implementation and evaluation of the programs and projects that are implemented in their territories) (community has roles in its organization to manage the projects and the decision-making process) *adapted from (gibbon, labonte and laverack, evaluating community capacity 2002) microsoft word bakari final.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 17, iss. 1 (2017), pp. 1–32 mapping the ‘anthropocentric-ecocentric’ dualism in the history of american presidency: the good, the bad, and the ambivalent mohamed el-kamel bakari kau university kamel3_2000@yahoo.com abstract this article examines the way that ‘anthropocentric-ecocentric’ dualism has affected the history of the american presidency since the turn of the century, with special focus on three presidents: theodore roosevelt, ronald reagan, and barack obama. with their contradictory environmental records, theodore roosevelt and ronald reagan are believed to stand for the two extremes on an ‘anthropocentrism-ecocentrism’ spectrum, while barack obama ambivalently oscillates between them. coming to power with different agendas, presidents roosevelt, reagan, and obama each used the presidency as a bully pulpit to implement their ideological visions of nature, the environment, and economic growth in line with either ‘ecocentrism’ or ‘anthropocentrism.’ focusing on their rhetoric and policies, this article highlights the three presidencies’ differences along the ‘anthropocentric-ecocentric’ continuum and discusses the divergence of their respective political and philosophical beliefs as well as implementation strategies. ultimately, mapping the anthropocentric-ecocentric dualism in the history of american presidency provides a valuable insight into how this divide has been transferred from the philosophical realm to the political. keywords: american presidency, anthropocentrism, ecocentrism, roosevelt, reagan, obama, environment, sustainability author’s note: mohamed el-kamel bakari holds a phd in american studies from the university of manouba in tunis, tunisia. he is a published researcher in american environmentalism, sustainability, and globalization studies. consilience bakari: anthropocentrism-ecocentrism in u.s. presidency introduction it is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the various attempts over recent years to initiate new approaches to development that reverse environmental degradation while catering to people’s social and cultural needs worldwide. the 1960s and 1970s, in particular, witnessed a surge in public awareness of the negative environmental consequences of exponential economic growth and the high rates of consumption associated with the prevailing lifestyles in industrial countries. in addition, the last few decades of the 20th and the early 21st centuries have witnessed a steadily growing presence of the environmental issue on the global agenda. this follows important post-wwii geo-political changes, such as the end of the cold war and the collapse of the communist bloc, which meant more room for cooperation between the two superpowers. while these transformations have been perceived as a promising inception and evolution of environmental politics based on international cooperation (connelly & smith, 1999; rollin, 1988; petesh, 1992), some observers believe that these geo-political changes have also meant some hard choices for the nation, as it struggles to keep its sovereignty intact (e.g., sakamoto, 1994). with the maturation and growth of the american environmental movement by the turn of the century, the concept of sustainability has gradually become the backbone of this movement’s approach to ecological and developmental concerns. when conceptualizing sustainable development, however, i believe it is essential to point out that different disciplines and conflicting perspectives have resulted in diverse interpretations and many definitions of this concept. in economics, an important part of environment-development studies, for instance, human beings are seen as rational, self-interested individuals working to ensure their material well-being, and nature is considered an instrument to achieve this well-being. definitions from this discipline, therefore, tend to place human beings as the core and nature as the periphery. by contrast, in ecology, which is also an integral part of sustainability studies, human beings are regarded simply as one species among many. in recent literature, this dualism has been referred to as the ‘anthropocentrism-ecocentrism’ divide (elliott, 2000; carter, 2007). as such, i believe that this dualism has significantly marked not only american political history, but also the perception of the environmental issue and sustainability in the american presidency. however, before discussing the evolution and effects of this divide in the presidency, i believe a brief survey of the growth of the concept of sustainability in american history is essential to thoroughly understand the intricacies of the ‘anthropocentrism-ecocentrism’ divide. 3 consilience the inception and evolution of the sustainability discourse before discussing the different definitions of sustainable development, i would like to first examine the particular social, political and environmental circumstances in which the concept of sustainable development was forged, along with the array of issues that this concept addresses. researchers (e.g., dresner, 2002) point out that the beginning of the discourse on sustainable development dates back to 1974 when the concept of a ‘sustainable society’ was discussed at the conference on science and technology for human development convened by the world council of churches1 in bucharest, from june 24th to july 2nd. at this conference, scientists, environmentalists, and politicians highlighted the importance of many factors deemed vital for a sound model of development such as the equitable distribution of resources, an opportunity for all to participate in social policies, the need for limiting the emission of pollutants, and the sound use of technological innovation in order to conserve non-renewable resources. the first mention of the concept of sustainability at this conference gave priority to social needs for equity, democracy, and the alleviation of poverty before even addressing environmental issues (dresner, 2002). a few years later, the term ‘sustainable development’ started to spread in public debates as early as 1980 when it was mentioned in a document entitled world conservation strategy published by the international union for the conservation of nature and natural resources (iucn)2. this document stressed the necessity of achieving a new model of development through the conservation of natural resources and the promotion of ecological sustainability. critics (e.g., baker, 2006), however, point out that the focus of this report was largely limited to ecological concerns without linking sustainability to wider social and economic issues. seven years later, the concept of ‘sustainable development’ gained momentum as the world commission on environment and development (wced) accentuated the links between the social, economic, and ecological dimensions of development in its famous report, our common future, which gained widespread popularity. taking its label from wced 1 in their website, this organization defines itself as “a worldwide fellowship of 349 churches seeking unity, a common witness and christian service” (world council of churches, 2012). 2 established in 1948 in france, the iucn (union internationale pour la conservation de la nature) is the world’s oldest global environmental network which has more than 1,000 member organizations including more than 80 states, more than 110 government agencies, and more than 800 non-governmental organizations (ngos). consilience bakari: anthropocentrism-ecocentrism in u.s. presidency chairman gro harlem brundtland, then norwegian prime minister, this report is widely referred to as the brundtland report. at this conference, the participants stated their vision of the new model of development as follows: “we came to see it [i.e. development] not in its restricted context of economic growth in developing countries. we came to see that a new development path was required, one that sustained human progress not just in a few places for a few years, but for the entire planet into the distant future” (wced, 1987, p. 8). combining the two concepts of ‘development’ and ‘environment’ that had been studied and examined separately for decades, the brundtland report signaled the beginning of sustainable development discourse in the last few decades of the 20th century. in this report, sustainable development is defined as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (wced, 1987, p. 43). according to many critics (e.g., baker, 2006; mcneill, 2000; schrijver, 2008), this definition of sustainable development has become the most widely accepted. it has gained authoritative status as it was adopted by many un organizations, igos, ngos, and international financial organizations such as the world bank. nico schrijver (2008) further asserts that this concept of sustainable development has become a prominent issue in international law concerning global ecological problems, natural resources, energy, health, international trade, and security. other critics (e.g., dresner, 2002) contend, however, that the vision underpinning this definition of sustainable development echoes much of what was advocated by the world council of churches, especially regarding the combination of the developmental and environmental. according to the brundtland report, sustainable development stands for a “new development path […] that sustain[s] human progress not just in a few places for a few years, but for the entire planet into the distant future” (wced, 1987, p. 4). this concept seems to have encapsulated some of the values and ethics that have been popularized by the new social movements (nsms)3 since the 1970s. however, sustainability soon became an extremely controversial concept at the end of the 20th century. jennifer a. elliot (2000) argues that there are more than seventy definitions of sustainable development currently in circulation. these different definitions are certainly the outcome of different interpretations and perceptions of how economic growth and the protection of the environment can be combined in one model of development. 3 in the literature, a new social movement (nsm) is defined as “a loose-knit organization that seeks to influence public policy on an issue such as the environment, nuclear energy or peace, and which may use unconventional forms of political participation, including direct action, to achieve its aims” (carter, 2007, p. 84). 5 consilience by the late 1990s, the term sustainable development had gained currency in many political and academic arenas in america, engendering endless debates among scholars and politicians who tried to conceptualize this new mode of human growth. as a new idea, sustainable development exposes and tackles weaknesses of the current political, economic and social systems, especially in industrialized countries. politically, it aims at securing effective citizen participation in decision-making, and it tries at the same time to build an economic system that avoids tensions arising from unbalanced modes of growth at the expense of the environment and social issues (wced 1987, p. 65). socially, it aims at achieving both ‘intergenerational’ and ‘intra-generational’ social equity4 by securing a decent and environment-friendly way of life for different segments of society such as different generations, ethnic minorities, and races. the discourse on sustainable development has also generated a paradigm shift from what are usually considered “nationally demarcated environmental problems” over which the state would usually have control, to the idea of a global environmental and developmental crisis that can be managed only on an international scale (hettne, 2008, p. xvi). though regarded by some scholars such as ann dale (2001) and neil carter (2007) as a sign of the richness of literature on sustainable development, the proliferation of definitions of such a recent concept is considered by many other critics (e.g., blewitt, 2008; robinson, 2004) as an indication of the prevailing vagueness of this project. this vagueness has indeed rendered sustainable development one of the most contested concepts over recent years. while asserting that “the idea of sustainable development is fraught with contradictions,” michael redclift admits that “like motherhood, and god, it is difficult not to approve of it” (1993, p. 3). still, other critics such as desmond mcneill contend that “the term sustainable development is only two-thirds complete, for the social dimension is not explicitly included” (2000, p. 117). one of the most fertile sources of reflection for researchers today is the question of how far the objectives of sustainable development can be achieved within the prevailing socio-economic paradigm of development. despite its worldwide popularity, the concept of sustainable development has been received with a lot of scepticism and suspicion ever since its inception. this scepticism has come from environmentalists, politicians, and economists alike. suspicions have intensified even more in the last few decades, as the concept has become widely accepted and popularized among politicians and has been taken up 4 according to the world commission on environment and development (wced), “intra-generational equity refers to equity within our own generation” whereas “inter-generational equity refers to equity between generations” (1987, pp. 5-6). consilience bakari: anthropocentrism-ecocentrism in u.s. presidency as a slogan by many governments and ngos. many criticisms point out a hidden agenda behind the project of sustainable development. allan holland points out, for instance, that “development and growth, which are creatures of the market economy, are being offered, under the banner of sustainable development, as a cure for the very ecological crisis that they have served to bring about” (2000, p. 3). sharing the same view, susan baker argues that “the discourse on sustainable development is seen to share characteristics of colonizing discourse, becoming another example of a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the third world” (2006, p. 160). many scholars (e.g., carter, 2007; baker, 2006; connelly & smith, 1999) voice their suspicions that while sustainable development appears to be imposing constraints on businesses and the industrial sector, it, in fact, covers for and even supports industrial growth. as a theory, sustainable development creates an unmistakable notion of fairness of access to basic natural resources and an equal right to decent living standards not only for all segments of society, but also for those generations yet to come. despite its wide popularity among scholars, economists, and environmentalists, the concept of sustainable development seems to be excessively open to various, sometimes conflicting, interpretations. more broadly, this concept has become part and parcel of a bigger debate about development and growth which is laden with numerous controversies. ultimately, the vagueness of the concept of sustainable development is in part a reflection of the controversy over the meaning of the broad notion of development and the best way to achieve it. the ‘anthropocentrism-ecocentrism’ dualism marks the american presidency for over more than a century, american presidential rhetoric and policies have drawn upon various strategies to deal with the rising environmentalism across america and to accommodate the concomitant political, economic, national security, and social concerns. from theodore roosevelt to barack obama, american environmentalism has witnessed profound transformations, ranging from rise to regress, on presidential agendas. throughout this, the philosophical and intellectual perception of man and nature has been at the heart of public policy and presidential decisions. in many respects, the concept of sustainability itself evolved as an outcome of a lingering philosophical and ethical tension between conflicting visions of the man-nature relationship. in fact, this tension is often echoed in american art, literature, and social theories as well as in the political and economic choices of the nation. for the most part, this tension persists between what is referred to as ‘immanence’ and 7 consilience ‘transcendence’ – a tension between the desire to live as an integral part of nature and the drive to rise above being a part of nature to being its absolute master, thus representing two frameworks of thought, namely ‘ecocentrism’ and ‘anthropocentrism’ (martin & huckle, 2001; fox, 1990). american political history seems to be significantly marked by an unrelenting clash between ‘ecocentrism,’ which “reflects immanence by basing ethics and politics on a friendly ‘nature’ that may be assumed to have value in its own right (intrinsic value)”, and ‘anthropocentrism’ or ‘technocentrism,’ which “reflects transcendence by basing ethics and politics on the virtues of exploiting ‘nature’ as a resource” (martin & huckle, 2001, p. 19). put differently, ‘ecocentrics’ tend to regard humans as subject to the ecological laws of nature because they constitute an integral component with the same degree of importance as other components such as animals, insects, rivers, mountains, and so on. on the other hand, regarding man as the master of nature, advocates of ‘anthropocentrism’ are fully committed to use nature instrumentally to achieve more human well-being. elaborating on this concept, neil carter writes: anthropocentrism regards only humans as having intrinsic value, a claim usually based on their capacity either to experience pleasure and pain or to reason, and, furthermore, that only humans have interests. the rest of nature is of instrumental value; it has value and deserves moral consideration only in so far as it enhances human well-being (2007, p.15) theoretically, ‘ecocentrism’, also referred to as ‘ecologism,’5 is an ideology that is based on two main tenets that differentiate it from other traditional ideologies: first, the need for a complete reconceptualization of the human-nature relationship to place man as an integral part of nature rather than its master; and secondly, the need to set ‘limits to growth’ as a prerequisite to any growth strategy. according to ecologists (e.g., dobson, 2000; devall & sessions, 2001; fox, 1990; orton; 1994), the contemporary environmental crisis has, for the most part, been caused by human arrogance towards the 5 this term is often used in the literature to refer to “a distinctive green political ideology encompassing those perspectives that hold that a sustainable society requires radical change in our relationship with the non-human natural world and our mode of economic, social and political life” (carter, 2007, p. 6). it should be also noted that there exist a lot of divergences of approaches among the ‘ecologists’ family along a spectrum comprising two extremes, i.e., ‘deep’ and ‘shallow’ ecologists, but with various variations in the middle. consilience bakari: anthropocentrism-ecocentrism in u.s. presidency natural world, which has resulted in abusing nature to satisfy human interests. central to ‘ecologism,’ therefore, is the principle that man is not necessarily placed at the top of an ethical hierarchy (fox, 1990). above all, this principle radically opposes ‘anthropocentrism,’ also referred to as ‘technocentrism,’ which only attaches intrinsic value to humans who are placed at the center of the universe whereas nonhuman entities are of mere instrumental value. according to ‘anthropocentric’ principles, therefore, nature has value only in so far as it serves human needs and enhances human well-being (carter, 2007). counterbalancing the ‘anthropocentric’ or ‘technocentric’ approach is an ‘ecocentric’ (also referred to as ‘non-anthropocentric’) approach that opposes what ecologists see as the ‘human chauvinism’ of ‘anthropocentrism’ and stresses the intrinsic value of non-human entities (dobson, 2000; devall & sessions, 2001, 1985; fox, 1990; orton; 1994). according to this approach, non-human entities like animals, trees, plants and other species, and even inanimate objects like rivers and mountains have their own intrinsic value. ecologists such as the norwegian philosopher arne næss (1995, 1989), bill devall and george sessions (2001, 1985) reject the enlightenment view that man and nature are separate entities. instead of being its master, man is considered as an integral part of nature. the concept of ‘ecological consciousness’ that aims at altering people’s current view of nature is highly celebrated in these writings. david pepper (1998), for example, emphasizes the holistic aspect of ‘ecologism’ and highlights the close interdependence of ecosystems as an important tool to reappraise the human-nature relationship and man’s ethical duties towards nature. historically, ‘ecocentrism’ has always posed an ideological challenge to the american political system at the levels of ideas, policies, and implementation despite the far-reaching effects of seminal writings by important ecologists such as john muir, gifford pinchot, and adlo leopold in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. despite this divergence, the modern sustainability discourse (e.g. in the wced, 1987; earth charter) claims that it draws upon familiar concepts such as participatory democracy and social justice, which are borrowed from other ideologies, to serve sustainability. “green politics has drawn on other political traditions, notably socialism, for its critique of capitalism, and from anarchism for its suspicion of the state,” maintains neil carter (2007, p. 354). these principles now seem to play a crucial role in raising ecological consciousness and fostering greener political and economic policies. according to some (e.g., carter, 2007; elliott, 2000; baker, 2006), the discourse of sustainability has been significantly informed by both ‘ecocentrism’ and ‘anthropocentrism.’ advocates of sustainable development claim that this new project strikes the right balance between economic growth and environmental protection, between using natural resources and preserving nature, and ultimately between 9 consilience ‘anthropocentrism’ and ‘ecocentrism’ (wced, 1987). jennifer elliott (2000) notes that the ‘ecocentrics,’ who have little faith in technology and progress associated with modern societies, tend to accentuate spirituality and advocate environment-friendly self-sufficiency, whereas ‘anthropocentrics’ have a strong belief in modern science’s ability to solve social and environmental problems and are fully committed to ongoing economic growth and the exploitation of natural resources. by and large, i believe that these two trends have always had a bearing on american presidential policies and the tension between them underlies much of divergence between different american presidents’ approaches to nature, the environment, and sustainability. in current development debates, scholars from both schools of thought fiercely defend their viewpoints. according to the ‘ecocentric’ approach, the predominant capitalist model of development is considered a major threat to the natural base for future development. observers (e.g., moghadam, 2007; kütting, 2004; shiva, 2008) note that the capitalist commitment to economic growth and material advancement is no longer an asset in the new paradigm. on the contrary, making economic growth a nation’s paramount priority is, to environmentalists, a serious flaw, and even more so if this priority is maintained at the expense of social equity and environmental protection. other critics (e.g., lubchenco, 2003; thomas, 1992) cite problems such as biodiversity loss, climate change, ozone layer depletion, deforestation, and soil desertification as global threats caused mainly by the untrammelled economic growth in the second half of the 20th century and onwards. in fact, the sustainability discourse not only opposes certain practices of mass production and consumption in capitalism, but it constitutes the absolute antithesis of this model of development. spotlighting this contradiction, james connelly and graham smith write: “contemporary capitalism primarily requires governments to protect private capital and to ensure continued economic growth. under such conditions, environmental considerations will never be given priority where they conflict with capital accumulation. sustainable development is at odds with the logic of capitalism” (1999, p. 60). from a social point of view, the sustainability discourse deems it futile to think of development in isolation from its ecological and social consequences, given that deteriorating environmental conditions often result in serious social dislocations. in fact, this new discourse rejects the idea of equating human progress with the domination of nature, and decries its instrumental use for the sake of creating more wealth and material well-being for humans. according to this new discourse, consumption is no longer the most important aspect of human welfare, and unfettered economic growth is no longer the backbone of development (carter, 2007). ultimately, there is a whole new lifestyle and a sustainable model of development being advocated as an alternative: “by consilience bakari: anthropocentrism-ecocentrism in u.s. presidency showing that the model of development pursued by the western industrial societies cannot be carried into the future, either in its present forms or at its present pace,” argues susan baker, “environmentalism makes it imperative for society to construct a new development model” (2006, p. 212). this new discourse is unorthodox by nature. the divergence of individualistic or collective approaches to america’s welfare and human well-being has also been part of the ‘ecocentric-anthropocentric’ duality. advocates of sustainability (e.g., edwards, 2008; speth, 2008; kütting, 2004) point out that the current socio-economic paradigm of growth overtly celebrates the individualistic drive for more consumption and the ethics of achieving more material well-being mostly at the expense of the environment. accordingly, the ‘ecocentric’ discourse deplores the culture of mass consumption and the individualistic ethics of material self-realization. it aims rather at achieving social solidarity by including all segments of society in the process of development and by attaching great importance to the protection of the environment which is the shared wealth of the whole community (wced, 1987). structurally, it is clearly underscored in the earth charter6 that sustainable development adopts a bottom-up process of building a partnership between different sectors such as industry, education, services, and governmental environmental management. this seems revolutionary: “the sustainable development model thus challenges conceptions of development that prioritize individual selfadvancement” and “holds that the promotion of the common good takes precedence over the encroachment on the commons by the few” (baker, 2006, p. 213). significantly marking modern american history, the ecocentric-anthropocentric dualism has so far impacted presidents’ approaches toward the economy, nature, and society. a very important part of the american political system, the presidency has been used in different ways to serve different ends. while some american ‘ecocentric’ presidents strove to harness the presidential powers to protect nature, safeguard the environment, and ultimately boost sustainability, ‘anthropocentric’ presidents tried to give ultimate priority to economic growth even at the expense of the environment, used the executive power to curb or reverse the environmental 6 “the earth charter was created by the independent earth charter commission, which was convened as a follow-up to the 1992 earth summit in order to produce a global consensus statement of values and principles for a sustainable future. the document was developed over nearly a decade through an extensive process of international consultation, to which over five thousand people contributed. the charter has been formally endorsed by thousands of organizations, including unesco and the iucn (world conservation union)” (earth charter commission). for more information, visit www.earthcharter.org 11 consilience regulations, and ultimately obstructed efforts to boost sustainability in america. in the american presidency, the ‘anthropocentrismecocentrism’ divide constitutes not only a philosophical divergence of views, but also a determinant factor that has guided the beliefs, options, and policies of american presidents for over more than a century. because the scope of this paper does not allow examination of all american presidents’ records, only three presidents who stand for unique landmarks in the ‘anthropocentrism-ecocentrism’ continuum are chosen as case-studies. theodore roosevelt’s presidency: sowing the early seeds of sustainability as a president, theodore roosevelt put it in no equivocal terms that “there can be no greater issue than that of conservation in this country” (as cited in theodore roosevelt association). most historians believe that president theodore roosevelt was exceptional in boosting conservationism by developing and strengthening the executive authority, independent of external pressure (sheffield 2010; daynes & sussman, 2001; miller, 1992). above all, roosevelt’s love for nature and the american wilderness was unmistakable, which ultimately led him to actively pursue an agenda of conservation and to set a precedent for presidential endorsement of the environmental issue. historically, observers note that “conservation was largely unknown to the presidents before roosevelt, but it became pertinent to the presidential agendas that followed” (izatt, 2004, p. 83). president theodore roosevelt was a very good example of an ‘ecocentric’ president who can, in fact, be termed the ‘father’ of modern sustainability. it is not my intention here to rehash theodore roosevelt’s efforts, decisions, and accomplishments that boosted american environmentalism because they have already been documented, analyzed, and discussed thoroughly elsewhere. instead, it is my aim to focus on the challenging commitments that theodore roosevelt had undertaken, and how these dramatically shaped the american presidency by setting an example of an ‘ecocentrist’ president who constitutes a great source of inspiration. before analyzing the various aspects of ‘ecocentrism’ in theodore’s approach, i believe it is vital to mention that for a few ‘deep ecologists’7 like eckersley (1992) and 7 ‘deep ecologists’ are staunch defenders of ‘deep ecology,’ which is one of the most radical approaches to nature, based on a few claims such as attaching purely intrinsic value to nature independently of human purposes or uses, denying humans any right to use nature instrumentally in a way that affects its diversity and richness, and condemning the present excessive human interference with the non-human world which should be protected and kept intact (devall & sessions, 1985; naess, 1989; devall, 1990). consilience bakari: anthropocentrism-ecocentrism in u.s. presidency oeslschaeger (1991), both the ‘preservationism’ and ‘conservationism’ that marked theodore’s era remain essentially ‘anthropocentric’ as they do not protect nature from human interference and abuse. even within the environmental family, there were some criticisms of roosevelt’s unmistakable endorsement of conservation at the expense of preservation. despite his great admiration of john muir’s environmental vision following roosevelt's western tour, which included yosemite, yellowstone, and the grand canyon, roosevelt still favoured conservatism over ‘conservationism’ in most of his policies (sheffield, 2010; oravec, 1984; nash, 1967). however, i still believe that ‘preservationism’ and ‘conservationism’ significantly overlap with ‘ecocentrism,’ which makes of activists on both parts (such as theodore roosevelt) rather ‘ecocentrist,’ especially as they held fast to their ‘ecocentric’ beliefs despite an overwhelming ‘anthropocentric’ drive brought to early 20th century america by intensifying waves of urbanization, industrialization, and exponential economic growth. one of the most distinctive features of roosevelt as an ‘ecocentrist,’ in my view, was his sagacious and efficient use of the executive role to boost the environmentalist agenda despite some bureaucratic impediments and political challenges at the turn of the century. as a president, roosevelt was no doubt a staunch ‘ecocentrist,’ who strongly believed in the need to preserve nature from human abuses. right from the beginning, he relied on strong executive powers to expand the presidential role in defending the environment and boosting a conservationist agenda. when roosevelt took office, for instance, he unabashedly devoted a significant part of his inaugural address to talking about the environment, asserting that: “they [the american founders] did their work; they left us the splendid heritage we now enjoy. we in our turn have an assured confidence that we shall be able to leave this heritage unwasted and enlarged to our children and our children's children” (theodore roosevelt, 1905, para. 5). to further back up his ‘conservationist’ agenda, roosevelt’s first tactic was a very effective use of the appointment power in the american presidency. roosevelt’s appointment of his long-time friend and leading conservationist gifford pinchot as chief of the division of forestry was one of the biggest steps he took to ensure wider support for his agenda (theodore roosevelt association, the conservationist). sharing the same ideas of conservation and sustainability with the president, pinchot shared roosevelt’s conviction that conservation was a politically pertinent issue. unsurprisingly, pinchot’s appointment began a strong commitment to policies defending the conservation of the environment as both roosevelt and pinchot exerted all their influence to pass legislation that would transfer the nation’s forest reserves to the department of agriculture in 1905 (izatt, 2004). 13 consilience as ‘ecocentrism’ started to colour the american presidency, president roosevelt used pinchot’s experience in, and commitment to, conservation issues to sow the seeds of what is referred to today as sustainability. in fact, “pinchot was a significant force in roosevelt’s organization and instigation of numerous additional commissions and conferences such as the conference of governors, at which roosevelt, acting on pinchot’s advice, sought to provide a ‘catalyst’ for the compilation of various state laws and viewpoints into a single unified structure” (izatt, 2004, p. 86). significantly, the guests at this conference included members of congress, members of the supreme court, representatives of major conservation and scientific groups, along with prominent figures in the u.s. industry and commerce (redekop, 2012). the 1908 conference of governors holds special importance in the history of environmentalism, for it not only dealt with a wide range of environmental issues, but also signalled roosevelt’s ‘expansionary nature’ by including more than simply governors. another important sign of roosevelt’s early vision of sustainability was his declared policy that conservation efforts should not only be endorsed at the federal level, but they should also be embraced at all governmental levels for them to be soundly accomplished (roosevelt, 1908). as a matter of fact, roosevelt’s ‘ecocentric’ vision exceeded even the federal level with his unrelenting efforts to organize the north american conservation conference whose main object was to address the issue of conservation on a larger international scale (redekop, 2012). after he realized that congressional cooperation could not be obtained, roosevelt used his executive powers to independently convene the north american conservation conference in 1909 without congressional support, in an act revealing his staunch ‘ecocentric’ commitment to serve the environment. in addition to his effective use of the presidency as a bully pulpit, roosevelt was also adamant in boosting a robust legislative agenda to serve the environment. historians note, for instance, that one of the most significant pieces of legislation that roosevelt passed through congress was the newlands reclamation act of 1902, which granted the federal government huge control of irrigation of arid lands, thus founding a solid federal irrigation project. this act allowed 100,000,000 acres of arid lands to be reclaimed for storage purposes and “marked the beginning of governmental concern with the environment in terms of legislation” (izatt, 2004, p. 90). one more example of roosevelt’s success as a legislative leader was the american antiquities act of 1906, granting the president unparalleled power for the preservation of historic and scientific sites. unequivocally following his commitment to disseminating conservation and sowing the early seeds of sustainability, president roosevelt succeeded in doubling the number of national parks and preserving the ones already in existence (redekop, 2012). consilience bakari: anthropocentrism-ecocentrism in u.s. presidency roosevelt’s visionary awareness of the most salient tenets of sustainability started to surface as early as his seventh state of the union address in 1907. in this speech, he stated that “optimism is a good characteristic, but if carried to an excess, it becomes foolishness. we are prone to speak of the resources of this country as inexhaustible; this is not so” (as cited in theodore roosevelt association, quotations). one equally important foresight was roosevelt’s insistence on keeping environmental conservation out of the private sector, using an executive veto to block any initiative to do so. on several occasions, roosevelt declared his distrust of private sector’s greedy entrepreneurs who could wreak havoc on america’s natural resources with their selfishness in seeking benefits (roosevelt, 1910). a clear example of this will was roosevelt’s veto in 1903 to a bill that would have allowed a private power firm to build a largescale dam on the tennessee river in muscle shoals, alabama. likewise, roosevelt showed unabashed sympathy to other pieces of legislation preventing the private sector from controlling the environment such as his endorsement of the general dam act of 1906, which specified the regulations for hydroelectric dam construction on a federal level. as a politician, roosevelt took the presidency upon president mckinley’s assassination, which meant he was not bound by any specific election promises as most presidents would normally be during their first term. as a consequence, roosevelt’s conservationist agenda was mostly independent of the republican party’s official platform. despite its undesired political consequences, roosevelt’s dissent from his party’s platform proved beyond any doubt that a president’s strong commitment to a cause could lead to success even without party support. roosevelt’s dissent from his party on a few occasions to uphold his ‘ecocentric’ beliefs has unmistakably differentiated him from his successors and predecessors, thus setting him as the epitome of ‘ecocentrism’ in the history of american presidency thus far. for roosevelt, his ‘ecocentric’ vision was certainly so prioritized that it permeated all facets of his presidency – a feature which is lacking in many other presidents’ profiles who claim to hold an environmental agenda without genuinely showing the kind of the ‘ecocentric’ commitment that roosevelt did. holding fast to ‘ecocentrism,’ roosevelt expanded the presidential power to include everything not explicitly limited by the constitution. historians note, for instance, that not until president franklin d. roosevelt – theodore roosevelt’s distant cousin – did the environment become an important issue in the american presidency (izatt, 2004). historically, president theodore roosevelt has constituted a very rich source of inspiration for environmentalists in general, and for some of his successors in particular (bricker, 2010). in a visionary statement that set the stage for today’s tenets of sustainability such as intra-generational and inter-generational equity, roosevelt asserted as early as 1916 that: 15 consilience our duty to the whole, including the unborn generations, bids us restrain an unprincipled presentday minority from wasting the heritage of these unborn generations. the movements for the conservation of wild life and the larger movement for the conservation of all our natural resources are essentially democratic in spirit, purpose, and method (as cited in theodore roosevelt association, quotations). stirred by a staunch ‘ecocentrist’ drive, theodore roosevelt’s instigation of the conservation cause blossomed into recurrent presidential interests in conservation, the environment, and ultimately modern sustainability as it stands today. without the seeds theodore roosevelt had sown more than a century ago, the issue of environmental sustainability might not be nearly as significant in modern politics as it is today. however, the history of american presidency has also been marked by other presidents from across the ‘anthropocentrism-ecocentrism’ spectrum, coming to power with a vision of society, nature, and the environment that is very different from roosevelt’s. ronald reagan is one of the american presidents who stood at the other end of this spectrum. ronald reagan’s presidency: the turbulent years of environmentalism by the summer of 1980, most americans were deeply concerned about the sluggish economy. with intensifying stagflation, unemployment rates reaching 8 percent, a growing energy crisis, and persistent budget deficits, many americans believed that the growing conservative movement could bring hope and boost the nation’s economy again (rossinow, 2015). upheld by the new right8 and defended by presidential candidate ronald reagan, the economic conservative agenda was based on new measures such as reducing the size of the federal government, decreasing taxes and spending on social welfare programmes, and restoring the nation’s economic 8 politically this term is defined as a “grassroots coalition of american conservatives that collectively led what scholars often refer to as the ‘conservative ascendancy’ or ‘republican ascendancy’ of the late 20th century. dubbed the new right partly in contrast to the new left counterculture of the 1960s, the new right consisted of conservative activists who voiced opposition on a variety of issues, including abortion,homosexuality, the equal rights amendment (era), the panama canal treaty, affirmative action, and most forms of taxation” (encyclopedia britannica, accessed on 10 june 2015 at http://www.britannica.com/topic/new-right). consilience bakari: anthropocentrism-ecocentrism in u.s. presidency strength and global prestige (rossinow, 2015; kaye, 1987 mcgarity, 1986). michael e. kraft and norman j. vig write that: the reagan presidency brought to the federal government a markedly different environmental policy agenda. virtually all environmental protection and resource policies enacted during the 1970s were reevaluated in light of the president’s desire to reduce the scope of government regulation, shift responsibilities to the states, and rely more on the private sector. (2010, p. 13). domestically, ronald reagan was one of the few presidents who not only did not boost the environmental agenda, but fiercely opposed the environmental movement. his administration’s ‘antienvironmental’ deregulation policies were mainly driven by marketbased incentives to reinvigorate the economy. right from the beginning of his presidential campaign, candidate ronald reagan used the term “albatross” to describe the burden of environmental regulations on american industry. with “deregulation” the reduction of the number and scope of federal rules affecting the private economy as his major goal, president reagan launched a fierce attack on new environmental initiatives as well as old laws and regulations (national wildlife federation, 1982). just like theodore roosevelt, president ronald reagan drew heavily on the presidency appointment power, but only to implement his ‘anthropocentric’ policies. in fact, president reagan appointed two contentious figures, james watt and anne gorsuch, as the head to the department of the interior and the director of the environmental protection agency (epa), respectively. they fought to curtail environmental regulations and funding along the same lines as reagan’s ‘anthropocentrism.’ anne gorsuch even urged for a direct reduction in the agency budget from $1.4 billion to $950 million for fiscal year 1983. “never has america seen two more intensely controversial and blatantly antienvironmental political appointees than watt and gorsuch,” commented greg wetstone, director of advocacy at the natural resources defense council (as cited in staff, 2004, para. 10). led by anti-environmental figures like james watt and anne gorsuch, the reagan administration succeeded in reducing the epa’s budgets for water quality and air quality enforcement by 59 percent and 31 percent, respectively, between 1981 and 1984 (rossinow, 2015, p. 44). given the evident hostility to environmentalism that marked reagan’s policies, many critics disapproved of an infamous ‘list of [environmental] rollbacks’ that this administration tried to implement at every level, including attempts to “gut the clean air act with proposals to weaken pollution standards on everything from automobiles to furniture manufacturers — efforts which took congress two years to defeat” (staff, 2004, para. 11). other 17 consilience observers (e.g., rosenbaum, 1998) equally condemn the fact that anne gorsuch precipitated many of president carter’s appointees into resignation, thus reducing the size of the epa’s staff. this move made available key administrative roles for lawyers and lobbyists from big corporations such as general motors, exxon, and the american paper institute. walter a rosenbaum described this atmosphere: the environmental movement regarded the reagan administration as the most environmentally hostile in a half century and the president’s regulatory reforms as the cutting edge of a massive administrative assault on the institutional foundations of federal environmental law. (1998, pp. 11-12). despite its hostility to the environment, president reagan’s campaign based on deregulation and regulatory reform struck a chord with many american voters who were promised a stronger economy, free of the growing ‘burden’ of social and environmental programmes that had crippled economic growth during the previous decades (kaye, 1987). in essence, governmental regulatory policies under the reagan administration were significantly different from those preceding; they focused on ‘deregulation’ in two specific areas – the environmental and civil-rights issues (mcgarity, 1986; lovell, 1983). more alarming than these anti-environmental policies, in my view, were reagan’s administration’s relentless efforts to break the blue-green alliance9 and his systematic refusal to enforce occupational safety and health laws for american workers. ironically, as the election of ronald reagan steadily “pushed unions back toward their erstwhile allies [i.e., environmentalists],” many workers’ loyalty and anti-environmental cooperation was only rewarded with further layoffs and job outsourcing in developing countries where environmental regulations were usually lax or non-existent (dewey, 1998, p. 59.) 9 the term ‘blue-green’ refers mainly to the alliance between labour unions and the environmental movement groups in the united states which has evolved into a coalition since the late 1990s when it orchestrated strong protests against the policies of the wto during its meetings in seattle in november 1999, and against imf and world bank policies in 2000. this alliance was declared by the united nations global impact, which is a document signed in 2000 by 50 multinational corporations and 12 environmental and labour groups. globally, this alliance established a network of almost 2000 companies such as bayer, daimlerchrysler, nike, and the royal dutch shell in over 70 countries, all working in partnership to better address human rights, labour rights, and environmental issues (edwards, 2008, pp. 137-138). consilience bakari: anthropocentrism-ecocentrism in u.s. presidency just like president theodore roosevelt, president ronald reagan sought to expand the executive power of the presidency, but for opposite reasons. while teddy roosevelt expanded the president’s executive power to boost the conservationist agenda and sow the early seeds of modern sustainability, president ronald reagan capitalized on expanding the role of the chief executive’s omb 10 to curb environmental programmes. “by executive order,” observers note, “the president placed unprecedented coordination and implementation authority in the omb, which now works in tandem with the president’s task force on regulatory relief. the omb approval mechanism is one important way through which the administration exerts its ideological influence over the functional agencies” (lovell, 1983, p. 275). embodying reagan’s ‘anthropocentric’ vision of sound economic growth, deregulation policies were based on strengthening the executive control of the government’s functional agencies to implement its policies. the reagan administration used the omb’s rule-review process, for instance, to cast an executive hegemony over rule-making in the different agencies working on environmental and civil-rights issues. this role was backed by the task force on regulatory relief,11 chaired by vice president george bush, which during its first two years of operation, claimed that over 100 existing regulations needed to be changed (lovell, 1983). although regulations and laws in both the civil-rights and environmental policy arenas remained the same under the reagan administration as they were in the previous administrations, their implementation changed 10 the omb is defined as an executive agency under the federal government that works closely with the president to provide recommendations with regards to budgetary matters such as the preparation of the budget that will be reviewed by the congress. the development of fiscal programs is also undertaken by the omb in close partnership with other federal agencies (the law dictionary, accessed on 12 july 2015 at http://thelawdictionary.org/office-of-management-and-budgetomb/). 11 the task force on regulatory relief is a regulatory body established by president ronald reagan on 22 january 1981. chaired by the vice president, this body includes also other members such as the secretary of treasury, the attorney general, the secretary of commerce, the secretary of labor, the director of the office of management and budget, the assistant to the president for policy development, and the chairman of the council of economic advisers. the job of this task force is basically to review major regulatory proposals by executive branch agencies, assess executive branch regulations, oversee the development of legislative proposals, and make recommendations to the president on regulatory personnel and legislative changes (the white house office of the press secretary, 1981, pp.1-2). 19 consilience dramatically (rossinow, 2015). thus, for the most part, reagan’s administration did not aim at affecting fundamental changes in environmental laws, but planned to focus on what they considered as “the mistaken interpretations of environmental laws” which resulted in “unwarranted extension of authority, rigidity in administration, and costly delays” (lovell, 1983, p. 276). thus, with a fast-expanding scope of responsibilities, the environmental protection agency (epa) was one of the reagan’s administration’s top targets in its ‘regulatory reform’ agenda (mosher, 1981; cohen, 1986). responsible for interpreting and enforcing twelve different environmental regulations about air, water, pesticides, and waste, the reagan administration’s became concerned about the epa’s alleged negative impact on the economy and on individual businesses. contrary to roosevelt’s efforts to strengthen the federal powers to serve conservationism, the reagan administration was driven by one major objective, namely to launch a profound shift of power from washington to the states. supposedly, this shift of power would lead to a more efficient system of environmental protection at a much lower cost (mosher, 1982). however, this shift would also mean the weakening or destruction of the epa, “with no guarantees that the states can or will pick up the pieces or that the states will meet what should have been federal standards” (lovell, 1983, p. 279). while the reagan administration saw it as a success to have reduced the ‘burdens’ of environmental protection on the economy, environmentalists argued that the administrative agencies were seriously hindered from doing the job that the environmental protection laws require. this stalemate came as a result of the alteration in scope and content of new environmental regulations and the weakening enforcement of existing legislature. studies show, for example, that during the first two years of the reagan administration, existing clean air requirements were relaxed and new regulations in a number of other areas were obstructed. in fact, the epa itself withdrew power from the states over the clean air act program to meet health standards in polluted areas which had previously depended on state review (lovell, 1983, p. 277). disapproving of this ‘raid’ on american environmentalism, major american environmental organizations such as friends of the earth, natural resources defense council, the wilderness society, sierra club, national audubon society, and the environmental defense fund, among others, condemned the policies that exempted most new polluting industrial installations from state reviews (friends of the earth, et al., 1982). the epa weakened, for instance, heavy truck emission standards, automobile emission standards for hydrocarbons, particulate emission standards for diesel automobiles, and announced a two-year delay for the development of standards for dangerous fine particulates from diesel trucks, and industrial boilers. the epa also issued rules which allowed increased use of lead in gasoline (lovell, 1983). taming the epa to work in line with consilience bakari: anthropocentrism-ecocentrism in u.s. presidency reagan’s pro-corporate and anti-environmental policies is a clear sign that reagan's presidency went even beyond the conventional limits of ‘anthropocentrism’ to embrace a whole new era of ‘corporatism.’ financially, the reagan administration cut the budget for monitoring air programs by 40 percent, while the budget for grants and technical assistance to states to assist with monitoring and enforcement was cut by 30 percent (lovell, 1983, p. 278). this wave of deregulation also impacted water quality regulations: when the epa proposed passing more responsibility for water quality to the states, regulations were adopted to relax water treatment requirements for municipalities. in addition, the national pretreatment program to curtail toxic discharges by industries into municipal treatment plans was suspended at the same time as the secondary treatment requirements for municipalities were relaxed. as a result, statistics show that following this series of sharp budget cuts and agency reorganizations with further reduction and weakening of the enforcement units in the epa, the cases filed in federal court against supposed polluters declined by 75 percent while certain key cases were dropped altogether (national wildlife federation, 1982). at the budgetary level, statistics show that in the 1983 fiscal year , budget states received about 20 percent less money for environmental protection programmes from the federal government than in 1982 (jubak, 1982). describing the side effects of the reaganomics’ wave of deregulation, michael e. kraft and norman j. vig wrote: budget cuts and loss of capacity in environmental institutions took a serious toll during the 1980s, […] the determined efforts of a popular president (namely ronald reagan) could not halt the advance of environmental policy. public support for environmental improvement, the driving force for policy development in the 1970s, increased markedly during reagan’s presidency and represented the public’s stunning rejection of the president’s agenda. (2010, p. 14). ironically, reagan’s extreme ‘anthropocentrism,’ which gradually mounted up to anti-environmental ‘corporatism,’ did actually strengthen environmentalism in the usa. in many respects, reagan’s administration’s lax enforcement of pollution regulations and pro-business resource policies seemed to have strengthened even further the environmentalist raison d’être, boosting environmentalism throughout the nation. “these (environmental) groups,” argue michael e. kraft and norman j. vig, “appealed successfully to a public that was increasingly disturbed by the health and environmental risks of industrial society and by threats to ecological 21 consilience stability” (2010, p. 14). as a result, membership in national environmental groups soared and new grassroots organizations appeared, creating further political incentives for environmental activism at all levels of government (kraft &vig, 2010, p. 14). thus, despite the turbulent years of reaganomics, the american environmental movement successfully outlived president reagan’s presidency. ultimately, if president theodore roosevelt is the epitome of ‘ecocentrism,’ president ronald reagan would certainly be the embodiment of ‘anthropocentrism’ in the history of the american presidency. between these two extremes of the ‘anthropocentric-ecocentric’ continuum, however, a few other presidencies are certainly worth studying. barack obama’s presidency: the age of ambivalence on november 4th, 2008 barack obama was elected mainly on ‘a mandate of change.’ as a presidential candidate, he was widely thought of as the hope for a significant transformation from the previous eight years of the second george w. bush presidency (bomberg & super, 2009). soon, president obama’s inauguration filled environmentalists with the “hope of new beginnings” as “the environmental community [became] especially excited about a new path” (chameides, 2009, para. 1). observers (e.g., smith, 2013) note that this change was particularly promising to ‘green groups’ and ngos defending environmental sustainability. the day following the election, for instance, sierra club issued a statement proclaiming that the environmental future of the country is in “very capable hands” while the president of environmental defense asserted that “this election offers us the greatest opportunity we have ever had to change course on global warming” (as cited in bricker, 2010, p. 3). before coming to power, barack obama started sending positive messages to environmentalists when he stated in his book that his environmental policy would “signal to the world the u.s. commitment to climate change leadership by implementing an aggressive domestic cap-and-trade program” (2008, p. 74). this message was duly consolidated on other occasions by mr. obama when he used the presidency as a bully pulpit to reiterate his commitment to the environmental agenda from his address on clean energy development at southern illinois – carbondale’s first agricultural industry day in april 2005, to his oval office address on the deepwater horizon oil spill (bp oil spill) in june 2010. obama’s electoral pledges led environmentalists to great expectations about the upcoming changes and the future of sustainability in america (smith, 2013; bomberg & super, 2009; chameides, 2009). as a president, however, obama encountered different challenges and obstacles brought about by the various political and economic exigencies. in the face of a deep ideological polarization on how the government should respond to environmental problems, consilience bakari: anthropocentrism-ecocentrism in u.s. presidency obama’s environmental policy was hard to define and his ambivalence towards whether to adopt an ‘ecocentric’ or an ‘anthropocentric’ environmental agenda started to surface. criticism from the media that “there [was] no visible sign of a coherent strategy” was directed at obama’s environmental policies even before he completed his first term (the new york times, 2013, para. 4). as early as 2010, critics also pointedly argued that “not only is there a political divide about the role of government in protecting the environment, there is also a clear lack of consensus as to whether there is an environmental problem at all – especially in the case of global warming” (bricker, 2010, p. 8). perhaps one of the fiercest environmental debates in obama’s first term was the one about global warming. despite compelling scientific evidence asserting that global warming is a real, human-induced threat (inslee & hendricks, 2010), most republican leaders still questioned these scientific findings and dismissed their urgency. faced with these challenges and his advisors’ recommendations, president obama resorted to appealing to economic and security concerns to defend his environmental policies. one of the most salient signs of obama’s ambivalence towards the environmental issue and sustainability is his main focus on appealing primarily to ‘economic competitiveness’ and ‘job creation’ rather than to safeguarding the environment per se in his rhetorical strategy, in an attempt to win over the large segment of the american public who were concerned about the rising rates of unemployment and the consequences of the economic recession. while he did address the benefits of sustainability, such as creating green jobs, economic prosperity, and boosting green energy, concerns for national security through the appeals to the war on terrorism, weaning the united states off oil dependence, and promoting effective military readiness were paramount in obama’s speeches. in an address to the department of energy on february 5th 2009, for instance, obama’s focus on economic prosperity and competitiveness was unmistakable while his concerns for sustainability were almost non-existent (obama, 2009). in the face of rising unemployment in the united states, on another occasion, president obama capitalized mainly on job creation as a benefit to gain from clean energy policy, and even when the bp spill offered a chance to tie his environmental agenda to a visible environmental cause, “obama instead chose to frame the issue in the same manner as the fifteen months of his presidency,” stressing economic competitiveness as a major cause in his suggested policies (bricker, 2010, p. 69). obama’s ambivalence towards a genuine commitment to sustainability can also be traced through recurrent words and expressions in his speeches. statistics show, for example, that in the eighteen months of his first mandate, he gave forty speeches with over 63,000 words without once using the phrase ‘global warming’ in 23 consilience public address, despite it being a matter of urgency (bricker, 2010, p. 69). this ambivalence was further displayed when president obama (2010) avoided the discussion of the almost worldwide scientific consensus on the human-induced causes of global warming in his 2010 state of the union address. similarly, obama did not discuss harms to the environment, biodiversity, or species posed by the current model of economic growth. further unveiling obama’s ‘anthropocentrism’ was his huge focus on economic and national security benefits as independent benefits, instead of as associated with environmental policies, when using the presidential bully pulpit. at the policy level, obama’s ambivalence towards sustainability and environmentalism is evidenced by his hesitation to adopt new major environmental regulations in his first term despite the promises he made to the american public before and during his presidential campaign. “after pushing through some of the most sweeping and contentious environmental measures in years,” contends the washington post journalist juliet eliperin, “the obama administration has slowed action on several policies as it calculates what it should undertake before the end of the term” (2012, para. 1). reneging on most of the president’s promises, obama’s administration put on hold some important rules aimed at curbing emissions from cars and light trucks by not giving the green light to the office of management and budget (omb) to review them. critics also point out that obama’s administration was hesitant mainly because these environmental regulations “could impose new costs on consumers and certain sectors of the economy, which has sparked opposition and complicated the administration’s political calculus” (eilperin, 2012, para. 3). head of government relations unit at the law firm hunton & williams, joe stanko, put it succinctly: “behind the scenes, [the environmental protection agency] is pressing to get rules out before the administration pulls up the drawbridge and goes into campaign mode” (as cited in eilperin, 2012, para. 4). implementing strong environmental policies and maximizing his chances of winning a second term in the forthcoming elections seem to have constituted two irreconcilable variables in obama’s political calculations in the closing years of his first term. as the 2012 presidential election drew nearer, obama’s ‘anthropocentrism’ grew all the more evident as his administration systematically delayed or blocked enacting a series of rules on the environment, worker safety, and health care for fear of raising contention before going to the polls. in fact, obama’s administration was even accused of instructing some environmental agencies to refrain from submitting any proposals to the white house for up to a year so that they would not be issued before elections, which meant that these rules were either postponed or never issued (eilperin, 2013). some of these stalled regulations included important provisions of the affordable care act, pollution controls for industrial boilers, and limits on consilience bakari: anthropocentrism-ecocentrism in u.s. presidency dangerous silica exposure in the workplace. although obama’s administration insisted that the delays of these rules until after the election were ‘coincidental’ and were not motivated by any political cause, a few administration officials disclosed to the press “that the motives behind many of the delays were clearly political, as obama’s top aides focused on avoiding controversy before his reelection” (as cited in eilperin, 2013, para. 4). later, a report from the administrative conference of the united states (acus), an independent agency that advises the federal government on regulatory issues, further substantiated the claims that the obama administration had deliberately postponed or obstructed those regulations (copeland, 2013). one more example reflecting obama’s administration’s ambivalence towards sustainability is the way his administration dealt with attempts to curb emissions from cars and light trucks within a federal programme, widely known as “tier 3.” aiming at slashing the amount of sulfur in u.s. gasoline by two thirds and imposing nationwide pollution limits on new vehicles, this initiative was zealously defended by the epa. however, ‘tier 3’ was obstructed by obama’s administration and the whole initiative was put on hold. as a matter of fact, the battle to enact these rules began well before the obama administration came to power when a federal court invalidated regulations proposed under president george w. bush. mounting criticism came from different activists such as earth justice attorney paul cort, who voiced his frustration about the obstruction of these rules, which could prevent at least 10,500 premature deaths each year (eilperin, 2012). attorneys general from 11 states, led by new york, also sued the epa in an effort to compel it to update the standard, proclaiming that “[they] are trying to get epa off the dime here to do something,” in paul cort’s words (as cited in eilperin, 2012, para. 15). as the end of obama’s presidency draws near, the debate about his environmental record has intensified. some observers such as richard revesz, dean emeritus at new york university school of law, point out, for instance, that obama’s record on environmental issues has been marked with courageous steps towards sustainability such as “the clean power plan, cafe standards, methane regulation, and other actions, [which] has created the first-ever framework for the united states to achieve long-term emissions reductions” (as cited in peak, 2015, para. 12). likewise, others (e.g., chait, 2013; bomberg & super, 2009; peak, 2015) regard obama’s record on the environment and sustainability as a success and point to the lack of congressional support as a major obstacle for further achievements. however, a lot of evidence suggests otherwise, as president obama’s ambivalence towards sustainability has become more evident. this ambivalence could, in my view, explain the growing dissatisfaction with obama’s environmental policies among a large segment of the american society so far. commenting on this ambivalence, former 25 consilience vice-president al gore asserted that “if he [i.e., obama]‘s serious about it [i.e., protecting the environment], he needs to get a team in place and he needs to present a plan, he needs to use the bully pulpit, he needs to be a vigorous advocate” (as cited in guillén & goode, 2013). obama’s ambivalence towards the environment and sustainability has also been criticized by many environmental ngo leaders, like the director of greenpeace, annie leonard, who put it as follows: while president obama has taken significant steps to address climate change — establishing the first-ever carbon emissions limits for power plants and new fuel economy standards for cars — his administration continues to lease massive amounts of publicly-owned fossil fuels…it’s clear that president obama is serious about cementing his climate legacy, but until he takes steps to ensure the vast majority of fossil fuels remain in the ground, his legacy is as vulnerable as an arctic ice sheet. (as cited in peak, 2015, para. 4). all in all, notwithstanding his zealous environmental rhetoric, president obama’s recurrent focus on economic growth, national security, and job creation reveals his ambivalent oscillation over the ‘anthropocentrism-ecocentrism’ spectrum. in fact, a closer look at his policies reveals that despite his rhetorical capitalization on a ‘mandate of change,’ his overall policies were quite conservative when it came to defending the environment and sustainability. the unmistakable primacy his administration has given to economic competitiveness, job creation, and national security justifications for environmental policy shows clearly the conservatism of obama’s policies. by dodging any firm commitment to sustainability and shrouding most of his environmental policies with economic and national security, obama can hardly be termed an environmental president in the way theodore roosevelt was. he can at best be regarded as an ambivalent president. with congress once again dominated by notvery-environmentally-friendly republicans and the surprising victory of donald trump in the 2016 presidential election, obama’s presidency will be remembered as a rather wasted opportunity to boost sustainability in the us and abroad – an opportunity that was very much marred by presidential ambivalence and indecision. conclusion by tracing the bearing of the ‘anthropocentrism-ecocentrism’ dualism on the american presidency over more than one century, a consilience bakari: anthropocentrism-ecocentrism in u.s. presidency whole spectrum – where on the one side roosevelt stands for the ‘good,’ and on the opposite side, reagan stands for the ‘bad,’ while obama stands in between as the ‘ambivalent’ – is adequately substantiated. far from being a ‘moral’ judgement, this spectrum unveils different techniques, policies, and tactics that american president have used to defend and implement either their ‘anthropocentric’ or ‘ecocentric’ approach to the environment. ultimately, such mapping of the anthropocentric-ecocentric dualism in the history of american presidency provides an insight into how this divide has been transferred from the philosophical realm to the political one. theodore roosevelt’s ‘ecocentrism’ is anchored in his pioneering of the american environmental movement with its two broad branches of ‘conservationism’ and ‘preservationism’. not only did he introduce these concepts to american politics, but he also defied congress and his own party to implement policies and strategies serving environmental conservation. as a president, roosevelt’s decisions and policies seem to have been guided by his ‘ecocentrist’ vision despite the various political challenges he faced. in addition to an effective use of the presidency as a bully pulpit, roosevelt harnessed almost all presidential authority such as appointment power as well executive prerogativesto implement his agenda. when compared to both his predecessors and successors, it is evident that roosevelt chose ‘ecocentrism’ not only as a philosophical and political concept, but as a way of life. while president theodore roosevelt harnessed the presidency to disseminate ‘ecocentrism’ and sow the early seeds of sustainability as we know it today, president ronald reagan made use of the american presidency to serve opposite causes, namely deregulation, open market, and the obstruction of environmentalism in america. accordingly, reagan was so committed to a combination of ‘neo-liberal capitalism’ and ‘anthropocentrism’ that he used his executive power to implement this agenda. like roosevelt, president reagan made good use of his appointment power, but only to obstruct and reverse major federal environmental policies in america, thus going beyond the conventional principles of ‘anthropocentrism’ to represent the early stages of ‘corporatism.’ at this extreme of the ‘anthropocentric-ecocentric’ spectrum, reagan was also a source of inspiration for like-minded presidents such as presidents george bush and george w. bush. amid the two opposite ends of the ‘anthropocentrismecocentrism’ spectrum stands president obama, whose major environmental policies unveil a great deal of ambivalence towards a genuine commitment to sustainability despite proclaiming himself an environmentalist president. with a highly contentious environmental record, obama’s rhetoric and policies as a president seem to belie most of the zealous promises he made during his presidential campaign. now that donald trump has won the 2016 presidential 27 consilience election and the republicans have the majority in the congress, obama’s ambivalence acquires even worse connotation, for his presidency was certainly a valuable opportunity to boost sustainability that was not adequately seized. while presidents theodore roosevelt and ronald reagan stand uniquely at the opposite ends of the ‘anthropocentrism-ecocentrism’ spectrum, barack obama is certainly not the only ‘ambivalent’ president in the history of american presidency, but his ambivalence happens to be more conspicuous than others. consilience bakari: anthropocentrism-ecocentrism in u.s. presidency references baker, s. 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(2010). theodore roosevelt, ‘conservation as a national duty’ (13 may 1908). voices of democracy 5, 89-108. shiva, v. (2008). soil not oil: environmental justice in a time of climate crisis. new york: south end press. consilience bakari: anthropocentrism-ecocentrism in u.s. presidency silveira, s. j. (2000). the american environmental movement: surviving through diversity. boston college environmental affairs law review, 28(2), 497-532. smith, h. (december 20, 2013). obama’s green record: some small victories, one gaping flop. grist. retrieved on 24 july 2015 from http://grist.org/climateenergy/obamas-green-record-some-small-victories-one-gaping-flop/ speth, j. (2008). the bridge at the edge of the world: capitalism, the environment, and crossing from crisis to sustainability. new haven: yale university press. staff, g. (june 11, 2013). a look back at reagan’s environmental record. grist. retrieved on 3 july 2015 from http://grist.org/article/griscom-reagan/ the editorial board. (may 18, 2013). climate warnings, growing louder. the new york times. retrieved on 10 june 2014 from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/opinion/sunday/climate-warningsgrowing-louder.html?_r=0 the white house office of the press secretary. (february 18, 1981). fact sheet: president reagan’s initiatives to reduce regulatory burdens. retrieved on 17 march 2015 from http://www.thecre.com/pdf/reagan_regaininitiatives.pdf theodore roosevelt association (tra). quotations. theodore roosevelt association. accessed on 10 may 2015 at http://www.theodoreroosevelt.org/site/c.elksidowiij8h/b.9297493/k.37 c4/quotations.htm. thomas, c. (1992). the environment in international relations. london: the royal institute of international affairs. world commission on environment and development (wced). (1987). our common future. oxford: oup. note from the editor-in-chief note from the editor-in-chief https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i7.4586 how to cite subramanyan, v. (2012). note from the editor-in-chief. consilience, (7). https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i7.4586 abstract dear readers, it is my pleasure to present you issue 7 of consilience, which our team has been diligently compiling and editing through the fall of 2011. the wide range of topics and perspectives that this issue brings to the table, now more than expected of a consilience publication, stretch from microfinance credit-scoring models in west africa to the viability of hydropower in the mekong basin to algal blooms in guatemala. we have endeavoured to form more and deeper connections with academic institutions and networks around the world dealing with sustainable development issues. for example, liana ricci, from the sapienza university of rome, writes a thought-provoking article on peri-urban development in tanzania, the submission a result of the collaboration between consilience and the international phd workshop in sustainable development, hosted at columbia university. critically, liana’s article points to the fact that more than ever we need to be concerned with institutional capacity building in developing countries. aspects of this challenge are explored by several of our authors, including esohe odaro in her piece on service delivery in sub-saharan africa. yet it is important to note that sustainable development is not just a concept to be applied to developing countries by those in developed countries, but should be used to critically analyze the current situation and trajectory of the developed world as well. to this aim i am pleased to recommend frank hemmes et al’s scholarly article regarding energy use monitoring in the netherlands, as well as julia and robert fredenburg’s incredibly evocative photo essay regarding river deltas in california. https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i7.4586 as always, i encourage you to contact me at vs2299@columbia.edu orcontact@consiliencejournal.org with any comments or queries, and i encourage you to continue engaging with us. enjoy the issue! vighnesh subramanyan editor-in-chief consilience: the journal of sustainable development january 17th, 2012 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution 4.0 international license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ note from the editor-in-chief ​​​ how to cite ​​​​​​​​​​​​​ abstract microsoft word schott final.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 17, iss. 1 (2017), pp. 182–195 promotion vs. education in choosing “real food” willem schott university of wisconsin school of medicine and public health wschott@wisc.edu adrienne cachelin ph.d university of utah adrienne.cachelin@health.utah.edu abstract the global agro-industrial system contributes to an abundance of human and ecological health problems from social injustices and public health issues to global warming and ecological degradation. in response to these problems, universities across the country are joining the real food challenge (rfc). the rfc is a national student-driven organization that describes “real food” as possessing at least one of the following four attributes: local, fair, ecologicallysound, and/or humane. by mobilizing the power of students on college campuses, the rfc aspires to shift one billion dollars in dining purchasing towards “real food” by the year 2020 while engaging students in change-making leadership roles. one key element for the continued success of the rfc is a better understanding of factors affecting college student food choice. our research explores these factors as well as the types of interventions that will most effectively impact them. both educational and social marketing strategies were found to effectively increase the importance of real food factors affecting college student food choice decisions. in addition, the overwhelming majority of student participants believe that their personal food choices can have an impact on moving the larger industrial food system towards sustainability. identifying strategies that encourage students to choose more “real food” can provide administrations with the necessary support to increase sustainable food purchasing while fueling the rfc on its industry-shifting path towards a more sustainable food system overall. keywords: real food, agriculture, sustainable food. agro-industrial, food education authors’ notes: willem schott received his undergraduate degree in health consilience schott, cachelin: real food promotion and education from the university of utah where he completed the real food calculator and championed his university’s signing of the real food campus commitment. he’s now in his second year of medical school at the university of wisconsin school of medicine and public health where he continues to pursue behavior-level interventions for improving health. adrienne cachelin serves as the sustainability education director for the university of utah and an associate professor for the environmental and sustainability studies program. her research interests include critical sustainability education and food justice. consilience 184 introduction the production, transport, and consumption of our food contributes to critical issues from global warming and social injustices to public health concerns. while advances have been made in organic production and labeling, much work remains to address more complex food-based aspects of sustainability and justice including humane food processing, fair working conditions and fair trade (alkon &agyeman, 2011; tanner & kast, 2003). in response, the real food challenge (rfc) has created a framework to analyze and quantify real food purchases on college campuses. anim steel (2014) describes real food as food that “nourishes communities, producers, consumers, and the earth.” from this perspective, local foods nourish communities by keeping food dollars in tight-knit economies, while fair foods provide just working conditions for producers. in addition, consumers can take solace in humane treatment of food-producing animals, while ecologically sound foods contribute to planetary health by avoiding fossil fuel-intensive fertilizers and pesticides. while this description is broad, rfc has developed a calculator based on both third party certifications and location-based criteria-driven research such that students from 240 institutions have researched 566,570 products (real food calculator, 2016). beyond certifications and local research, real food guidelines disqualify products with ingredients causing serious health problems e.g., acesulfame potassium, rgbh/rbst, and sodium nitrate (real food standards, 2016). generating awareness of real food attributes advances the broader goal of shifting $1 billion of university food budgets away from deleterious agro-industrial practices by the year 2020 (real food challenge, 2007). as such, this more expansive approach to nourishment offers a tool for affecting both individual food-related behavior (pursehouse, 2012; riebel & robbins, 2011), and university and national purchasing practices. food choice research recent research investigating university students’ food choices has focused on two main areas. the first area focuses on perceptions and attitudinal determinants that shape the behavior (boek et al., 2012; lockie et al., 2004; smith & paldino, 2010; wilkins et al., 2000). the second examines the deeper conceptual understandings of sustainability and the curricular changes needed to influence student behaviors (cachelin et al., 2009; sherman, 2008). going forward, hekler, gardner & robinson (2010) have identified the need for further study of social marketing interventions, while brown (2013) and boek et al. (2012) have identified the need for more research into the impacts of university coursework in actually influencing food-related behavior changes on college campuses. consilience schott, cachelin: real food research investigating sustainable eating behaviors is on the rise in a variety of disciplines illustrating that scholars and students alike are becoming concerned with the consequences of their food choices. as more scholars develop instruments for assessing environmentally-conscious eating interventions for college students (i.e., weller et al., 2014; yeh et al., 2010) researchers are bound to better understand food choice factors. pelletier's (2013) research links dietary quality and attitudes towards organic, local, and sustainable foods to suggest that nutrition education may have an important role to play for young adults interested in sustainability. for example, he found that young adults who place high importance on alternative production practices consume 1.3 more servings of fruits and vegetables daily, more dietary fiber, fewer added sugars, and less fat than students placing low importance on these sustainable practices. these contributions strengthen the research base, yet a gap persists as not much is known about how personal characteristics motivate food choices (boek et al., 2012). our project addresses this gap by analyzing how social marketing and educational interventions influence students’ food choices while also examining primary food choice factors. community-based social marketing community-based social marketing (cbsm) is a promotional technique based in behavior change models (mckenzie-mohr, 2011). developed in response to ineffective information-intensive campaigns, cbsm includes the following steps: 1) identify barriers and benefits, 2) develop a strategy with effective “tools” for behavior change, 3) pilot it, and 4) evaluate it. more specifically, the cbsm strategy, developed by mckenzie-mohr (2011), describes commitments, prompts, norms, communication, incentives, and barrier-removal as critical tools of changing behavior. university campuses have been the stage for many behavior change interventions including work to reduce energy consumption through elimination of barriers and the provision of tools to facilitate positive behaviors (aronofff et al., 2013). a study conducted at pacific university oregon found an “increase in campus-wide purchasing of recycled content paper and [environmentally preferred products, and also that] 74 percent of staff and faculty changed their behavior because of the cbsm campaign.” (cole & fieselman, 2013, p. 176) the cbsm strategy is clearly an effective tool to promote environmentally conscious behavior in higher education institutions. our research begins with the question: will social marketing strategies or educational interventions prove most effective in promoting real food choices? to address this question, we collected data regarding the factors that motivate student food choice, and students’ perceived self-effiacacy toward systemic change. given the consilience 186 increasing interest in real food on college campuses, and the importance of student food choice in the food movement overall, this data may have a significant impact on the real food movement and beyond. methods study design our study used a parallel group experimental design to assess self-reported student behavior change data. the study aim was to enroll approximately 200 student participants, recruited from the 389 available seats in three separate courses; each of the three courses had at least one food-related curricular component. the three courses selected were scientific foundations of human nutrition and health, environmental justice, and community health issues. scale-based survey questions provided quantitative data analyzed using paired and independent t-tests. students were randomly selected to experience either an educational (ed) or social marketing (sm) intervention and took pre and post-test surveys administered through canvas learning management system software. food selection factors food selection factors were assessed in asking students which of six factors affected their food choice. students were able to select all factors that applied when asked about the importance of these factors when choosing food. participants were then asked to identify the most important factor. each question listed the following as possible responses: cost, cook/wait-time, fairly-produced, local and/or organic, nutrition/calories, taste. in order to gauge the effect of label reading on food selection, participants were asked “when choosing packaged foods, how often do you read labels?” with likert-type scale answers: never, rarely, sometimes, often, always. additional questions were developed to assess other factors related to self-efficacy and real food, beginning with how students believed food labeling would impact their choices. students were asked “which of the following food labels would impact how you choose your food? choose all that apply”, and given four options: local, fair, ecologically sound, and humane. it’s important to note that these food attributes are taken directly from the real food challenge organization’s standards (real food calculator, 2016). another food labeling question asked at post-test was “if qualifying food products on campus carried a "real food" label, do you believe that the number of meals you purchase and eat on campus would increase?” with regards to sustainability, participants were asked, “do you believe there is a relationship between food choices and sustainability?” and then, “how important is the relationship between consilience schott, cachelin: real food food and sustainability?” with likert-type scale answers of: not at all, somewhat important, important, very important, and critical. to measure self-efficacy in making food decisions with impacts on sustainability practices, students were asked, “do you believe that your personal food choices can have an impact on moving towards more sustainable food systems?” finally, in regard to the rfc, students were asked “can you describe the real food challenge program?” to which they could simply respond yes or no, and at post-test they were asked “where would you like to see real food information incorporated? choose all that apply.” while 133 students completed the pre-test survey, and 95 students completed the post-test survey, only 55 participants could be traced for repeated measures analysis and these 55 students comprise our participant pool. the discrepancy between those who completed both pre and post-test, and the ultimate 55-participant sample was due to unanticipated issues regarding anonymous survey implementation through canvas course software. additionally, the educational intervention distribution was flawed such that all study participants had the option to complete this intervention regardless of group assignment. ultimately three groups participated in the study: ed, sm, ed+sm. the ed group consisted of students (n=24) who completed the “unwrapping real food” educational module with its 45-minute video lecture and online worksheet. the sm (n=14) group received a series of three separate e-mails designed to increase understanding of real food choices. the ed+sm group (n=18) received e-mails and completed the educational module (figure 1). consilience 188 figure 1: flowchart of the final implemented study design data analysis all study data was exported either from adobe forms or canvas before organization and analysis in the numbers for mac computer program. as the data were determined to be normally distributed, independent sample t-tests were used to examine pairwise differences between sm ed, and sm+ed groups. a probability value of p<0.05 was utilized to determine statistical significance. results all study participants were students enrolled in courses with at least one food-related component: envst 3365, nutr 1020, and h edu 3050. the most common major for the study sample was health education. of the participants, almost three-quarters (74.5%) reported no dietary restrictions, and 18.2% of participants reported being vegetarian. food selection behaviors across all participants, there were significant pre to post-test changes in response to food choice factors when asked to choose all that apply. both real food factor responses rose in frequency from consilience schott, cachelin: real food pre to post-test, 38.2% to 43.6% for fairly produced, and 43.6% to 63.6% for local and/or organic (figure 2). nutrition/calories, not explicitly targeted in education or social marketing strategies, decreased. as in previous studies, (boek et al., 2012) taste and cost were the most frequently selected factor in both pre and post surveys. fairly produced (p=0.04) and local and/or organic (p=0.0003) factors saw significant changes. participant responses to the question “when making food choices, which of the following factors are important to you? choose all that apply”. figure 2: food choice factor graphs compared pre vs. post-test consilience 190 educational vs. social marketing interventions to answer questions related to the effects of social marketing vs. educational interventions, pre and post-test surveys were traced to 55 participants, all of whom received an intervention (figure 3). the sm group showed no change in the number of participants choosing at least one “real food” factor, while 66.7% of participants in the ed group selected at least one “real food” factor at post-test compared to 50% pre-test (p=0.02). the sm+ed group revealed an even more substantial increase with a 33.3% (p=0.01) jump from pre to post-test. figure 3: “real food” factor choice compared across intervention groups including sm (social marketing), ed (education) and sm+ed (social marketing and education) consilience schott, cachelin: real food additional measures: labeling, the real food challenge and self-efficacy 80% of post-test participants said that labeling indicating local food origin would impact their food choices while just 47.2% said the same for “ecologically sound” labeling. over half (58.2%) said that real food labeling would increase the amount of meals they eat on campus. nearly all (98.2%) students believe that there is a relationship between food choices and sustainability, with almost one quarter (23.6%) categorizing it as critical. in terms of the rfc, 76.4% of participants could describe the campaign, and 87.3% of participants would like to see its information displayed around campus. finally, 96.4% reported self-efficacy in the creation of a sustainable food system (figure 4). figure 4: personal impact on food systems, measured responses to the question “do you believe that your personal food choices can have an impact on moving towards more sustainable food systems?”. discussion this study offers interesting insights into how education and social marketing can affect college student food choice factors, and calls for an exploration of the gap between self-efficacy and intended behavior. despite issues with sample, our results support the notion that interventions can be successful in influencing food choice factors and label-reading habits, both of which can lead to nutritional and sustainability outcomes. these data also suggest that students are confident in their ability to make a difference and are overwhelmingly supportive of the rfc program. this is important information for nutrition and sustainability educators as well as the rfc program itself, and, has several implications not only for work at the intersection of sustainability and nutrition, but also for sustainable consilience 192 development as a whole. these data show significant differences in the frequency at which real food factors were selected from pre to post-test after educational interventions, providing evidence that students will more frequently select real food factors as important after educational programming, and even more frequently when cbsm and education are combined. the increase in label reading shown also speaks to the efficacy of these interventions (figure 4.) while this is in keeping with the arguments of sherman (2008) and cachelin et al. (2009) who suggest that conceptual understanding is an important element of change making, our results cannot be generalized to suggest that education is more effective than cbsm given the specific population selected, and the use of only four of six cbsm-recommended behavior change tools. some of the most interesting findings suggest that an overwhelming majority of study participants believe that not only is there a relationship between food choices and sustainability, but that their personal behaviors have an impact. these data are particularly curious given that even after the interventions less than 64% of participants selected local/organic food as an important food choice factor and less than 44% selected fairness as an important food choice factor. this gap between self-efficacy and behavior is certainly worthy of further investigation. it is possible that not all students associate “local/organic” and “fair” with sustainable food systems. it is also possible that various barriers exist between high self-efficacy and enacting influential behavior. understanding these barriers may help us eliminate them and consider the importance of approaches beyond personal choice, investing our efforts more heavily in policies and practices that support local, fair, humane, and ecologically sound food systems. given that the overwhelming majority of participants named nutrition/calories as one of the most important food choice factors, we suggest the rfc explicitly include health and nutrition into real food discourse. the vast majority (over 70%) of study participants could describe the rfc at study completion and supported the incorporation of real food information everywhere from on-campus dining locations, to their courses and freshman orientation. as such, inviting nutrition educators to collaborate with sustainability and justice scholars around food advocacy on campus would undoubtedly expand the reach of all groups while acknowledging the complexity of food choices for personal, social, and environmental health. conclusion while this study is preliminary and small in scope, students predisposed to health promotion help us better understand how to connect the dots between seemingly disparate branches of food consilience schott, cachelin: real food studies and consider the benefits and barriers of individual level behavior change in sustainable development. given the role of education and social marketing in moving students towards more sustainable food choices, and that an overwhelming majority of students feel able to change food systems via personal choice, there is tremendous potential for collaboration between campus sustainability efforts and nutrition educators. future research should explore the apparent disconnect between students reported self efficacy and their reported food choice as this has broader implications for sustainable development. when sustainable behavior is promoted as an individual act for those with choice, rather than a set of system-wide policies and practices, a variety of barriers may prevent desired outcomes. exploring the synergies between real food and nutrition may be key to rfc’s industry-shifting path, and to creating a healthier and more nutritious college food environment. consilience 194 references alkon, a., & agyeman, j. (2011). cultivating food justice: race, class, and sustainability, cambridge, ma: the mit press. aronoff, j., champion, b., lauer, c., & pahwa, a. (2013). teaching old dogs new tricks: the effectiveness of community-based social marketing on energy conservation for sustainable university campuses. power and energy magazine, ieee. 11(1), 30-38. boek, s., bianco-simeral, s., chan, k., & keiko go. (2012), gender and race are significant determinants of students’ food choices on a college campus, journal of nutrition, education, & behavior, 44, 372-378. brown, g. (2013). green eating and dietary quality in university students. open access master’s theses. paper 26. cachelin, a., paisley, k., & dustin, d. (2009). opportunity and obligation: a role for outdoor educators in the sustainability revolution. journal of outdoor recreation, education, and leadership, 1(2), 141-150. cole, e., fieselman, l., (2013). a community-based social marketing campaign at pacific university oregon. international journal of sustainability in higher education,14(2), 176 – 195. hekler, e., gardner, c., & robinson, t. (2010). effects of a college course about food and society on students’ eating behaviors. american journal of preventative medicine, 38(5), 543-547. henderson, k. a. (1991). dimensions of choice: a qualitative approach to research in recreation, parks and leisure. state college, pa: venture. janesick, v. j. (2003) the choreography of qualitative research design: minuets, improvisations, and crystallization. in n. k. denzin y. s. lincoln (eds.), strategies of qualitative inquiry (pp. 46-79). thousand oaks, ca: sage. lockie, s., lyons, k., lawrence, g., & grice, j. 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(2010). eating clean and green? investigating consumer motivations consilience schott, cachelin: real food towards the purchase of organic food. australasian marketing journal, 18, 93-104. steel, anim. (2014). anim steel bioneers part 2. retrieved december 6, 2016, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxzy5vds8uy tanner, c., & wölfing kast, s. (2003). promoting sustainable consumption: determinants of green purchases by swiss consumers. psychology & marketing, 20(10), 883-902. weller, k., greene, g., redding, c., paiva, a., lofgren, i., nash, j., & kobayashi, h. (2014). development and validation of green eating behaviors, stage of change, decisional balance, and self-efficacy scales in college students. journal of nutrition education and behavior, 46 (5), 324-333. wilkins, j., bowdish, e., & sobal, j. (2000). university student perceptions of seasonal and local foods. journal of nutrition education, 32(5), 261-268. yeh, m., matsumori, b., obenchain, j., viladrich, a., das, d., & navder, k. (2010). validity of a competing food choice construct regarding fruit and vegetable consumption among urban college freshmen. journal of nutrition, education, & behavior, 42(5), 321-327. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 6, iss. 1 (2010), pp. 280–290 sustainable trade in the ixil triangle, guatemalan highlands angela radulescu department of psychology columbia university, new york ny ar2651@columbia.edu abstract guatemala has among the largest numbers of indigenous people living within its borders in central america. with wealth coming from tourism and exports concentrated mainly around guatemala city, descendants of the ancient maya live in small, ethnically distinct villages where locals struggle to preserve their heritage. isolated in the valleys between the cuchumatanes mountains, the ixil triangle is home to a unique community of ixil people who have retained their ancient way of life. men tend to be farmers, women weave using technologies passed down from generation to generation, and few have a strong grasp of spanish as a second language. yet despite the isolation, tensions and instability in modern-day guatemala have struck this community hard. a startling number of the indigenous citizens of guatemala, who make up 40% of the population, have no access to education, and many have no voice in the political process, as they lack the financial means to pay to become registered citizens. the ixil also face economic pressures, as well as the repercussions of a bloody civil war that ended in 1996, taking an entire generation of men as casualties. faced with the prospect of their disappearing culture, a small group of widows in the village of san juan cotzal have welcomed the help of european volunteers, and formed a weaving co-op. they take orders from distributors in more established tourist stops like guatemala city and antigua, utilizing age-old technologies to make carpets, bags, shawls, and other products that volunteers then deliver to stores around the country. building upon the business skills they gain by maintaining the co-op, the widows are both politically and economically active, taking initiative on behalf of their community. future projects include organizing fundraisers to equip each widow’s home with proper stoves and developing an improved outreach strategy to goods distributors in the larger cities. defying heavy odds, the empowered women of ixil are finding local ways to integrate their heritage into the global landscape. keywords: trade, guatemala, maya heritage, co-op, women empowerment consilience radulescu: sustainable trade figure 1: two traditionally clad ixil women walk down the street, passing the main church in santa maria nebaj, the largest municipality in the ixil triangle. as many men of all ages were killed during the civil war, one is very likely to encounter a disproportionate number of women walking down the streets of nebaj. taken in may 2010. 282 consilience figure 2: a woman in the marketplace looks on as passers-by browse goods for sale in santa maria nebaj. may 2010. figure 3: local ixil trade their goods in the marketplace in san juan cotzal. women are wearing traditional maya blouses and skirts, while men tend to wear more modern clothes often imported from the united states. may 2010. consilience radulescu: sustainable trade figure 4: a young girl walks down an alley in san juan cotzal. may 2010. figure 5: doña teresa demonstrates an age old rug weaving technique that she has learned from her mother. after marrying and divorcing an abusive first husband, her second was killed during the guatemalan civil war. she has made a living traveling like many other ixil women to work on the coffee plantations near the coast, but the harsh conditions affected her health and she was forced to return to san juan cotzal. now she is part of tejidos cotzal, a cooperative that aims to commercialize the 284 consilience hand-woven products and raise money for a number of local projects that could improve the lives of the 30 or so women who have joined the co-op. doña teresa does not know her real age. may 2010. figure 6: doña catrina prepares coffee beans for roasting. she welcomes tourists to her home as part of the eco-tours tejidos cotzal offers, always enjoying an opportunity to practice her spanish. consilience radulescu: sustainable trade figure 7: the kitchen in doña catrina’s home. many of the women live and cook in houses that do not benefit from proper stoves, developing conditions of the respiratory system because of the smoke they inhale. one of the biggest priorities of women that have joined the co-op is to raise funds for equipping every widow’s home with an eco-friendly stove. may 2010. 286 consilience figure 8: pedro is one of the local volunteers with tejidos cotzal. he studied in university in order to improve his english, and would like to continue to work in the local tourism industry. pedro coordinates the eco-tours with the widows via indispensable cell phones that many of the women carry. may 2010. consilience radulescu: sustainable trade figure 9: doña catrina sipping a cup of coffee prepared according to an ancient maya recipe. may 2010. 288 consilience figure 10: typical maya altar in the house of doña petronila, the founder of tejidos cotzal. religious habits of the ixil have been heavily influenced by the catholic faith. at the top are pictures of doña petronila’s husband and brother, both of whom perished during the guatemalan civil war. may 2010. consilience radulescu: sustainable trade figure 11: doña petronila, the founder of the weaving coop tejidos cotzal, stands for a portrait outside of her house. although she lost much of her family during the war, she adopted a girl named juana after finding her lost and crying in the woods. may 2010. 290 consilience figure 12: doña juana, the adoptive daughter of coop founder doña petronila, makes wax candles based on an ancient maya technique. she sells the candles in church or at the market, for people to use at altars in their homes. may 2010. consilience radulescu: sustainable trade figure 13: an ixil family whose income depends on the revenue from hand-woven products sold through tejidos cotzal stands outside their home for a portrait. a handmade carpet can take up to a few months to complete, and as they design new products, the widows incorporate symbols and motifs pertaining to their traditional culture. may 2010. bachhuber 1 india, water and sustainable development daniel bachhuber danielbachhuber@gmail.com daniel bachhuber is a junior environmental sciences and journalism student at the university of oregon currently taking a break from school to journey around peru. bachhuber 2 author’s note india faces tremendous developmental challenges, both in water and other sectors, in the next couple of decades. my three-month journey in spring 2008 was, at its core, an exploration of the myriad of complexities to providing safe and sustainable water access. i hope the images will lend an insightful introduction to the challenges of the subcontinent and inspire a desire to learn more. keywords: india, ganges, water supply bachhuber 3 india, water and sustainable development introduction in february 2008, i took a break from academic studies for three months of real-life study: trying to understand india's cultural, social and religious constraints to clean water access. the subcontinent has the second largest population in the world, and nearly a quarter of its peoples are lacking access to safe and reliable water. i set out to discover and document this issue. after landing in delhi, i traveled to kanpu, allahabad and varanasi, all sites along india's most famous and—arguably—most toxic river because of heavy domestic and industrial pollution. from there, i went south to the western ghats and then northeast to the kolwan valley, where stories of complex political dynamics lived in every village. traveling onward to mumbai, it was a story of socio-economic inequalities. finally i ended up in rajasthan, where the biggest issue is also the most basic: there simply is not nearly enough water. overall, the journey was an eye-opening exploration of india's biggest challenge in the coming decade: clean and sustainable water access for all of its citizens. bachhuber 4 01 cricket: kanpur, india, february 2008 kids play cricket, india's most popular sport, on the banks of the ganges river in kanpur. although significantly polluted, it is still the life-source for those who live along the river. the ganges, according to rakesh jaiswal of eco friends, is forecast to "die" in 30 to 50 years, meaning all available water flow will be allocated to different agricultural and industrial uses. this analysis does not factor in the potentially negative effects of climate change on water sources in the himalaya. bachhuber 5 02 tumblers: kanpur, india, february 2008 workers at one of kanpur's four hundred tanneries, the city's primary industry, load hides into well-used tumblers. treating leather in this manner is a multi-step process requiring chemicals such as chronium and copious amounts of water. after the water is used, rendered highly polluted in the process, it is genenrally piped back to the ganges without any treatment. bachhuber 6 03 waste to the river: kanpur, india, february 2008 just below the dapka ghat in kanpur, a nhala, or drainage ditch, pours raw sewage into the ganges river. the pollution is 80% domestic and 20% industrial. waste treatment should have been addressed by the ganga action plan of 1986 but, like many of india's environmental programs, it did not bear fruit because of the size of the issue and complexity of the political action required to solve it. in the meantime, the number of leather factories has jumped from one hundred and seventy-five to over four hundred, substantially increasing the amount of waste disposed in the river. bachhuber 7 04 diversion: kanpur, india, february 2008 fishermen drop their nets below the kanpur barrage, built as a part of the ganga action plan to provide irrigation water for farmers. the project has since chiefly benefited the agricultural-industrial giants, while at the same time drastically reducing the flow of the river. mohit, a local journalist, says that many stories get written about the ganges but most kanpurians think the situation is chalta hai, or alright. bachhuber 8 05 offering: varanasi, india, february 2008 a floral diya to the gods as the sun rises over a new day. for hindus, the "ganga" is the holiest river in the world, offering cleansing and salvation. at the same time, this belief of piety can conflict with the scientific hard truth that the river is one of the most polluted in the world. while on an eight hour bus ride from kanpur to allahabad, the man next to me said, "you should not think the ganga is polluted; many people bathe in it and are not harmed." bachhuber 9 06 cleaning: varanasi, india, february 2008 children clean the ghats of varanasi free of religious offerings by washing them into the ganges. with up to 50,000 visitors per day to worship at varanasi, the toll on the river from the sheer amount of material goods left is significant. bachhuber 10 07 conservation: south of kodaikanal, india, february 2008 south of kodaikanal in the western ghats, a young boy on his way to school turns off the tap the mother has left on as it fills an already overflowing jug. children are taught conservation and environmental stewardship in school, but the uncertainty remains about what state their natural resources will be in fifteen years from now. bachhuber 11 08 where the lines diverge: south of kodaikanal, india, february 2008 water access is also an obvious political issue. in the same village south of kodaikanal, enough influence in the village can get you a public tap close to your door or, in this case, a private connection off the public water line. bachhuber 12 09 down the hill: western ghats, india, february 2008 on terraced fields in the western ghats, artificial fertilizers and pesticides used to improve crop yields can get back into the water supply. unfortunately, these contaminants then flow into the water supply of the villages lower on the hillside. bachhuber 13 10 silent killer: nanegaon, kolwan valley, india, march 2008 a woman from nanegaon in the kolwan valley west of pune carries water home past the heavily-fertilized sugarcane fields near her community's open well. sugarcane requires copious amounts of water and heavy fertilization, most commonly with a nitrate-based urea. although not fully understood, excess amounts of nitrates have been associated with methaemoglobinaemia, a potentially life-threatening condition of depleted blood-oxygen levels, especially serious in bottle-fed infants. according to mr. shyam divan, a senior advocate for the supreme court of india, there are no legal frameworks in india with which to prosecute those releasing industrial contaminants to a public water supply. bachhuber 14 11 negotiation: nanegaon, kolwan valley, india, march 2008 a meeting between the elders of nanegaon stretches on for hours as everyone voices their opinion on what decision should be made. this discussion, initiated by a local non-governmental organization (ngo) called gomukh environmental trust for sustainable development (gomukh), was intended to reach a consensus about installing a biogas digester and generator to provide additional power for the village's water pump. the men deliberated for hours on who will pay for it. when the representative of gomukh proposed the women of the village, those who would benefit the most, should be a part of the conversation, the meeting stalled completely. bachhuber 15 12 broken connection: savurgaon, kolwan valley, india, march 2008 in savurgaon, another village in the kolwan valley, a broken pipeline means there has been no water supply for the past five days. the community shares its local government with two other villages, a unique situation to the area which means issues are not often addressed as quickly as they should be. in the interim, many of the families are dependent on the generosity of a wealthier farmer with his own private borewell. when water does come again, though, the ways in which the pots are ordered will signify who receives their water first. bachhuber 16 13 from the slums: mumbai, india, march 2008 in mumbai, the poorest of the poor pay disproportionately more for their water. in this case, the tariff is about nine times more. men from the non-institutionalized slums around the suburbs wake at 4:00am every morning to buy water from those who have formal tap connections, paying between two rupees and six rupees per jerry can (for eight to ten cans each morning) from those who pay just one hundred and twenty-five rupees per month. things might change if those selling the water did not make upwards of 2,000 rupees per day. to make matters worse, the bombay municipal corporation (bmc), is considering privatizing water in the future, arguing they "lose too much money in the business" (joshi). bachhuber 17 14 globalization: paud, kolwan valley, india, march 2008 india's economic growth has been driven by foreign investment, but the coca-cola company and other multinationals have received much criticism in the recent years for their alleged involvement in draining india's groundwater supply. it requires thirty to forty liters of clean water to make one liter of coke. bachhuber 18 15 summer harvest: thar desert, india, april 2008 in the thar desert, day laborers pull a summer crop of mustard seed which will bring high prices for the landowner at the market. many farmers cannot afford the costs associated with drilling a borewell. however, without the assistance of one, many rajasthanis depend on limited rainfall that usually only support one season of growing. according to anurag gupta, who works for a rajasthanis ngo called gravis, "groundwater is increasing the divide between the rich and the poor." bachhuber 19 16 walking home again: thar desert, rajasthan, india, april 2008 women and girls of all ages share the responsibility of bringing home the family's water. when water is plentiful, the walk might only be a kilometer or less. a dry year, however, can easily double or triple the distance required to find a useful source of water. bachhuber 20 17 water for the family: thar desert, rajasthan, india, april 2008 a rajasthani man fills his cart to take back home after first watering his donkey. only 10% of rajasthan has access to government schemes, as most water has to be transported down from punjab via the indira gandhi canal. bachhuber 21 24 thirst: thar desert, rajasthan, india, april 2008 parched, india consumes its most precious resource: water. bachhuber 22 works cited gupta, anurag, ngo employee. interview by author. 4 april 2008. joshi, leena. interview by author. 27 march 2008. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 13, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 336-346 economic survey of oil palm products’ processing and marketing in kogi state, nigeria anthony ojonimi onoja department of agricultural economics and extension university of port-harcourt, port-harcourt, nigeria tonyojonimi@gmail.com t. u. ogali department of agricultural economics and extension university of port-harcourt, port-harcourt, nigeria abstract this study was designed to ascertain the level of profitability and inherent problems derivable from oil palm products’ processing and marketing in kogi state of nigeria. primary data used for the study was obtained through the use of structured questionnaire and oral interviews. from the six agricultural zones in kogi state a total sample size of 60 was finally drawn to form the sampling frame from 3 agricultural zones. descriptive statistics were used to attain objectives 1 and 3; while objective 2 was attained by the use of gross margin analysis. majority of the farmers obtained their fresh fruit bunches for processing from the village or open market (50%); oil palm processing and marketing is profitable business in the area with a gross margin of n603,320.00k (usd 4,695.10) and gross margin ratio of 2.72 from an average enterprise; problems identified in the enterprises included fluctuating prices, lack of basic infrastructure and inputs such as capital and processing machines. the study recommended the need for government to hasten the supply of rural infrastructure, reduce taxes and let processors/marketers be encouraged to form cooperatives so as to access credit. keywords: oil palm, gross margin, oil palm processing and marketing. 1. introduction oil palm is a common name for an ornamental and economically valuable palm tree, elaeis guineensis, native of the west coast of africa and widespread throughout the tropics. the oil palm grows up to 9 m (30 ft) in height. it has a crown of feathery leaves that are can be up to 5 m (15 ft) long. the flower cluster is on a short thick spike at the base of the leaves. flowering is followed by the development of a cluster of egg-shaped, red, orange, or yellowish fruits. each fruit is approximately 3 cm (1 in) long and contains from one to three seeds embedded in a reddish pulp. palm oil is extracted from the fruit pulp (encarta, 2008). palm oil is extracted from the mesocarp of fruits of oil palm tree (elaeis guineensis jacq). the fruit, a drupe that is ,prolate spheroid in shape varies between 20 to 50 mm in length and could be as large as 25 mm in diameter, is found in bunches that are attached to the crown of the tree through a stalk (orji & mbata, 2008). extraction of palm oil from fruits involves field operations and factory/house mailto:tonyojonimi@gmail.com consilience onoja: economic survey of oil palm products operations. the field processes include cutting ripe fruit bunches from the palm tree and carrying the fresh fruit bunches (ffbs) and fallen loose fruits to the factory/house by field workers while the factory/house processes involves sterilization, stripping, milling, pressing, clarification, and storage (nigerian institute of forestry research, nifor, 1975; badmus, 1990;. opeke 1997). palm oil is used in the manufacture of soap, liniments, and ointments, and in west african and brazilian cooking. its chief chemical constituent is palmitic acid. oil is also obtained from the kernel of the palm fruit. known as palm -kernel oil, this is lighter oil, resembling coconut oil. fao (2008) noted that the development of agriculture can play a direct role in rural poverty alleviation. fao (2009) held that for many farmers in the west african region, processing forest and farm tree products provides an essential source of off-farm income. notable products from oil palm trees in nigeria apart from fresh fruits bunches of palm fruits includes palm kernel, palm -wine, brooms, palm kernel oil, storage baskets, and climbing ropes. the stems can be cut as wood for building tooas well. fao (2009) noted that activities which are common throughout the west african region include palm oil processing and other forest food processing, alcohol distilling, fish smoking, raphia and rattan basketry, woodworking, charcoal production, cloth dyeing and soap production. cashman (1987) in fao (2009) also found that palm oil processing was one of the most lucrative activities for women in southeastern nigeria but the labour required in palm oil processing was great. according to national open university of nigeria (noun) (2004) by the beginning of the 20th century, nigeria was the largest exporter of palm oil in the world. the relative contributions of palm produce to the country’s exports continued to decline (to 36.4% in 1969 and 13.2% in 1974). recent data by central bank of nigeria (cbn, 2007), which showed the trend of oil palm production in nigeria (from 1970 to 2006), indicated that the output of palm oil rose from 88,000 tonnes in 1970 to 949,000 tonnes in 2003, then decreasedbefore decreasing to 187,000 tonnes in 2004; while that of palm kernel rose from 315,000 tonnes in 1970 to 745,500 tonnes in 2004. one of the major problems of nigerian palm oil in the local and international market is the issue of poor quality product. according to noun (2004), poor harvesting methods and poor processing methods were largely responsible for this. nevertheless, noun (2004) reported that the introduction of pioneer oil mills was gradually raising the quality of palm oil among some producers. to what extent this has helped reduce the market quality of palm oil at the macro level in nigeria is a subject for anotherof further research. besides the issue of poor quality outputs, lack of capital or inadequate finance is one of the major problems facing the oil palm products marketers and processors in nigeria. orji (2006) corroborated this assertion in his report where he noted that “mechanized palm oil mills is capital intensive and this may be one of the reasons why very few mechanized palm oil mills exist in nigeria”. it is noteworthy that most of the palm oil in nigeria was obtained from selfowned plants in imo, anambra, enugu, abia, cross river, akwa ibom, delta, and edo states. some parts of kogi state also fall within the oil palm belt. noun (2004) observed that establishment of plantations growing improved high-yielding oil palms bred at nifor in benin had some positive impacts on the output of oil palm in nigeria. despite the potentials of nifor extolled by noun above, reports of consilience onoja: economic survey of oil palm products nifor’s performance in kogi state is demoralizing. egwu (2008) observed that at the breeding center, acharu-egume, dekina local government area of kogi state, the experimental station of national institute for oil research, (nifor), the plantation which was there since 1961 failed to drive the trend of palm oil production in the area. nifor operation secured an estimated 385 hectares of land in the area, but only 90 hectares has so far been put to use by the institute. he further observed that within within this arrangement, there have been 10 trials, but 5 units have been completed and put on observation, while the remaining five are still on trials, he further observed. experts assured that the result of the experiment was something that should gladden the minds of the people. the aim of nifor in intensifying the experiment on palm oil produce, according to mr samuel omoreghe, the representative in acharu-egume, site of the palm plantation, mr samuel omoreghe, was to evolve a "robust, practical and sustainable palm oil production for the country”. unfortunately, the acharu oil mill in egume, kogi state today is a shadow of its old self. it was last talked about in 1996 when the then governor of kogi state, col paul umeruo, reactivated it. since then, this gigantic engine had been abandoned by successive governments in the state. this scenario is not restricted to kogi state alone. a voice of america (voa) english-to-africa service reporter, ntaryike (2008) noted that oil palms were grown throughout west and central africa, but the development of the palm oil industry has been slow, despite a thriving market. the report raised the hope that a project sponsored by the united nations industrial development organization was about to change the palm oil industry in cameroon and nigeria. the reported reasons for the low output included obsolete production equipment, aging plantations, and little access to technology and financing. the above scenario is prevailing at a time when local demand for palm oil and palm kernel oil are increasing in nigeria, owing partly to its importance as food for the teeming population and as industrial raw materials for the manufacture of margarine and soap. as a result of these, nigeria is now a net importer of palm oil. incidentally, the imports are from malaysia, a country which obtained its first oil palm seeds from nigeria (noun, 2004). this scenario, which poses a serious concern, informed this study. 1.1 purposes of the study this paper was designed to, among other things, ascertain the level of profitability and inherent income/problems derivable from oil palm products’ processing and marketing in kogi state of nigeria, especially the parts of kogi state which fall within the oil palm belt. the study specifically, objects at: (1.) identifying the sources of fresh fruit bunches (ffbs) and other economic palm products in the study area. (2.) determining the costs and returns of oil palm products among processors in the study area; and (3.) describing the problems encountered by the processors and marketers in the zones being studied. the results from this study will expectedly provide evidence for policy making in sustainable development of oil palm marketing and value addition in a consilience onoja: economic survey of oil palm products major oil palm producing zone of nigeria. lessons will also be learnt by other countries producing oil palm in other parts of the world. 2. methodology of research kogi state lies between longitudes 5o40‘e and 7o49‘e; and latitudes 6o 33‘n and 8o44‘n. it is bounded to the south by anambra and edo states; and to the north by niger, nassarawa and federal capital territory; to the east by benue and enugu states. on the western flank it shares a common border with ondo, ekiti and kwara states (kogi a.d. p, 1993). the state which is structured into 21 lga’s comprises is comprised of three major ethnic groups: i.e. igala, ebira and okun (yoruba); other minor groups include –: bassa komo, bassa nge, kakanda, kupa, ogori-magongo, nupe, oworo, gwari, etc. (kogi state government, 2008). going by the 2006 population census, the state pooled a population of 3,278,487, representing 2.34% of the nigerian population. the population of farmers in the three agricultural zones selected (based on the list obtained from kogi agricultural development project) is 159,671. a purposive random sampling was used to select the respondent for this survey. out of the six agricultural zones delineated by kogi agricultural development project in the state, only three were selected. the selection was based on the presence of oil palm tree belt in the zone. the two zones selected are zones a, b and d, which are called aiyetoro gbede, anyigba, and alloma zones, respectively. three local government areas named aiyetoro gbede ,dekina and olam aboro lgas were selected with twenty (20) oil palm processors and marketers sampled randomly from each local government of the respective zones above, giving a total sample size of 60 to form the sampling frame. primary data used for the study was obtained through the use of structured questionnaire and oral interviews. the secondary sources of data used came from published texts, journals, periodicals and offline computer resources as digital video discs. descriptive analysis such as mean and percentages were used to attain objectives 1 and 2; while objective 2 was attained by the use of gross margin analysis. gross margin(gm) is the difference between the gross farm income (gfi) and the total variable costs (tvc). thus the model is given by: gm = gfi – tvc 3. results and discussion table 1: frequency distribution of sources of ffbs in the study area s/no. sources frequency by agricultural zones ankpa zone dekina zone idah zone total percentage(%) 1. personal farm 10 9 6 25 42 2. gifts from friends 2 1 2 5 8 3. bought from market 8 10 12 30 50 consilience onoja: economic survey of oil palm products source: field survey, 2006 (a) sources of fresh fruits bunches (ffbs): table 1 above shows the frequency distribution of the sources of ffbs in the study area. the table indicated that majority of the farmers obtained their ffbs for processing from the village or open market (50%). this source is closely followed by farmers’ own farms, which pooled a 42% response. the source which may be the least reliable of the ffbs as indicated in the table is in the form of gifts and royalties from farms operated by other farmers in the area to relations and land lords (8%). table 2: gross margin analysis of oil palm production in the zones a, b, and c agricultural zones of kogi state a. operations of palm oil marketers amount in nigerian naira *amount in us dollars harvesting 59,600.00 463.81 transportation 61,400.00 477.82 sterilization 7,670.00 59.69 stripping/milling 26,500.00 206.23 pressing/clarification 16,300.00 126.85 water used for processing 35,330.00 274.94 fuel wood used up (as energy source) 26,730.00 208.02 tax on revenue/rates 6,620.00 51.52 packaging cost 85,250.00 663.42 handling cost (loading/offloading) 25,040.00 194.86 total variable cost 350,440.00 2727.16 b oil palm products sold income (n) palm oil 533,780.00 4153.93 palm kernel 279,420.00 2174.47 palm wine 279,420.00 2174.47 brooms 29,860.00 232.37 storage baskets 16,850.00 131.13 climbing ropes 10,500.00 81.71 gross farm income = 953,760.00 7422.26 gross margin = b – a 603,320.00 4695.10 source: field survey, 2006. *the researchers used the 2005 usd/ngn rate of $1: n128.5 (b) costs and returns of oil palm processing enterprises in the selected agricultural zones: a gross margin approach table 2 itemized the costs and returns of oil palm products’ processing enterprises in the selected agricultural zones of the state. from the table it can be observed that the gross farm income was n 953,760 (usd$7,422.26) while the total variable cost was n 350,440.00 (usd$2,727.16). this difference gave a gross margin of n 603,320.00 (usd$ 4,695.10). this value represents the profit made from the oil palm consilience onoja: economic survey of oil palm products processing enterprise for an average farm in the three agricultural zones. the figure showed that oil palm products’ processing and marketing is a very profitable business. table 3: frequency distribution of response to problems constraining effective processing and marketing of oil palm products in the agricultural zones studied s/ no. item frequency "yes" % "yes" frequency "no" % "no" total frequency total % 1 low level of education 23 38 37 62 60 100 2 lack of capital to start up the business 52 87 95 13 60 100 3 lack of inputs 38 63 22 37 60 100 4 govt. taxes/rates are too overbearing or high 44 73 16 27 60 100 5 unstable exchange rate discourages export 13 22 47 78 60 100 6 high risk in processing and marketing 28 47 32 53 60 100 7 poor knowledge of farm accounting 19 32 41 68 60 100 8 family & friends take products as gifts 23 38 37 62 60 100 9 unstable prices of oil palm products 35 58 25 42 60 100 10 high cost of processing machines 56 93 4 7 60 100 11. lack of storage facilities 13 22 47 78 60 100 12. high cost of transport due to poor transport facilities in the area 48 80 12 20 60 100 13. lack of electricity to reduce dependency on 47 78 13 22 60 100 consilience onoja: economic survey of oil palm products fuel wood source: field survey, 2006 this point is buttressed by the gross margin ratio of the enterprise, which gave a figure of 2.72, a value greater than 1. this implies that returns from oil palm products processing, and marketing in kogi state could pay off the cost of processing and marketing and even leave some extra income which can improve the household’s welfare. hence, we can infer from the gross margin ratio found here that for every n 1 (usd$ 0.01 cents) spent on processing and marketing of oil palm products in this agricultural zone, two naira seventy two kobo (n2.72k) i.e. usd$ 0.02 cents profit, is made. (c) problems constraining effective processing and marketing of oil palm products in the agricultural zones studied table 1.3 showed that lack of capital (87%); %), lack of inputs (63%); %), overbearing or high taxes and rates (73%); %), lack of electricity supply to reduce dependency on fuel-wood (78%), and fluctuating prices of oil palm products (58%), with their respective percentage acceptances (in parenthesis), were identified as the major problems constraining the effective and profitable processing as well as marketing of oil palm products in the study area. other major problems identified included the high cost of processing machines (93%) and the high cost of transport arising from bad roads (80%) in the area. regular dependence on processors of oil palm on fuelwood as a major energy source means portend serious environmental hazards such as desertification. the problem of high cost of processing machines received a wider acceptance by the respondents followed by the problem of high cost of transport. most vehicles charge the farmers very high amounts since they ply bad roads in the area as they haul the palm products from the processing centres to the markets. in fact, the dominant form of transport as a result of these bad roads is by motorcycles, popularly called “okada”. these cannot carry enough palm products at a time. 4. conclusion this study has been able to describe some aspects of the sustainable marketing of oil palm production looking at the potentials or viability of the business as well as the challenges hindering sustainable processing and marketing of oil palm it in a nigerian state. it was found that the business is viable but sti ll faced some challenges against itswith sustainability. the major findings of the study is are that oil palm processing and marketing portends a very useful and reliable means of making profits and raising household incomes in the study area. this implies that encouraging farmers who are in these business to solve their problems will go a long way in solving the problem of poverty and looming food crisis crises in nigeria. the study revealed some of these major problems being faced by oil palm processors and marketers in the area. an attempt at solving these problems at the national and state levels will actually be a way forward in the drive for food security and poverty formatted: indent: first l ine: 0.5" formatted: indent: first l ine: 0.5" consilience onoja: economic survey of oil palm products alleviation. hence, the need to follow the recommendations above is hereby reiterated. based on the findings of this research, it is recommended that the state state and federal federal government government should gear up efforts to provide basic infrastructure such as electricity and good, motorable roads in the oil palm belts so that the efficiency of production or processing and marketing of oil palm products can be guaranteed. the issue of electricity supply will reduce dependency on fuel wood, and thus stemming environmental degradation in the area. the state state and federal federal government government should use their agencies and parastatals to subsidize inputs, especially processing machines in the oil palm processing zone of the state. this will boost their output and reduce the cost of production or processing and marketing. farmers should be encouraged by banks and agricultural agricultural extension extension agents in the state to form oil palm processing and marketing cooperatives so that they may benefit from the banks’ loan facilities or government agencies’ loans. this can solve the problem of lack of capital. the state state and federal federal governments should reform the tax policies with a view of making the taxes and rates paid by farmers more realistic and friendly. consilience onoja: economic survey of oil palm products bibliography badmus ga (1990). factors affecting the design of a fruit bunch harvesting system of tall oil palm trees in plantations. nigerian journal of palms and seeds 11:1: 102-1114. central bank of nigeria (2007). statistical bulletin. cbn: abuja. egwu, sam (2008). nigeria: agriculture palm oil the country's untapped potential. in the daily trust. 28th april. food and agricultural organization, fao (2008). world agriculture: towards 2010: an fao study. alexandratos, n (ed). retrieved on 22/07/08 from http://www.fao.org/docrep/v4200e/v4200e00.htm fao (2009). the major significance of ‘minor forest products’. retrieved on 23rd march, 2009 from http://www.fao.org/docrep/t9450e/t9450e00.htm kogi a. d. p. (1993). village listing survey. occasional report. kogi state agricultural development project: lokoja. kogi state government (2008). kogi state. retrieved 21/07/08 from www.kogistateofnigeria.org/kogistate_history.html microsoft (2008). encarta map. in microsoft student dvd, 2008. microsoft corporation, usa. nigerian institute of forestry research, nifor (1975). a manual on oil palm production. nigeria institute f or oil palm research (nifor) 3rd (ed). pp. 39-41. nigerian institute of forestry research, (nifor) (1989). history, activities and achievement. nifor bulletin; 2nd edition, benin city. pp.26-27. national open university of nigeria (noun) (2004). export crop agriculture. in geography of nigeria. heinemann educational books: lagos. ntaryike, divine (2008). new project to increase palm oil production in cameroun and nigeria. a news report on voice of america (voa) english-to-africa service. 23rd august. retrieved on 23rd march, 2009 from http://www.voanews.com/mediaassets/english/2008_08/audio/mp3/cop y%20of%20divine%20ntaryike%20%20cameroon%20palm%20oil %20%20for%208-21-08.mp3 opeke, r.c. (1986). the role of adult education in rural development: a conceptual model for nigeria. nigerian journalof agricultual extension. 2:182 http://www.fao.org/docrep/v4200e/v4200e00.htm http://www.kogistateofnigeria.org/kogistate_history.html consilience onoja: economic survey of oil palm products orji, m. u. (2006). microbiological and chemical studies on nigerian palm oil with particular reference to the effect of extraction methods on oil quality. phd dissertation, nnamdi azikiwe university, awka, nigeria. orji, m. u. and mbata, t. i. (2008). effect of extraction methods on the quality and spoilage of nigerian palm oil . african journal of biochemistry research. 2:9: 192196. retrieved on 23rd march, 2008 from http://www.academicjournals.org/ajbr. purseglove j.w. (1995). tropical crops monocotyledons: 1: 2, longman group ltd. : 479509. http://www.academicjournals.org/ajbr microsoft word oyedepo.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 16, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 91-105 performance analysis of off-street parking around the central business district of akure southwest nigeria joseph o. oyedepo department of civil and environmental engineering, federal university of technology akure, nigeria. oyedepoo@yahoo.co.uk abstract central business districts (cbd) are areas of dense traffic which result in parking problems. four parks were selected for detailed study in akure, the capital of ondo state, nigeria. parking surveys were conducted to evaluate their parking index (efficiency) using both close and open-ended questionnaires. parking index (efficiency) for ofp1, ofp2, ofp3 and ofp4 were obtained as 42.5%, 69.52%, 74.88% and 26.66% respectively. the study shows that ofp1 and ofp4 operated below the maximum capacity at parking index lower than 50%, while ofp2 and ofp3 operated above the maximum capacity when compared with policy 7 of the parking space requirements in parking code guidance 2012 of san francisco department of transportation. furthermore,50%, 36% and 14% of the respondents affirmed that the facilities are not adequate, adequate and very adequate respectively. inadequacy in parking signage and deficiency in enforcement by management was observed. however, effective communication, parking enforcement, operational efficiency and provision of parking signage should be adopted in the study area. keywords: traffic, parking index, central business district, enforcement, operational efficiency consilience 92 introduction parking, an integral component of the transport system, is a serious problem that confronts the urban planner and traffic engineer, as it plays a crucial role in the management of traffic and congestion mitigation. any vehicles traveling on highways will at one time or another be parked at some point for either a relatively short time or a much longer time, depending on the reason for parking. the provision of parking facilities is therefore an essential element of the highway mode of transportation. the growing use of the automobile as a personal feeder service to transit systems (“park-and-ride”) has also increased the demand for parking spaces at transit stations. in areas of high density, where space is very expensive, the space provided for automobiles usually has to be divided between that allocated for their movement and that allocated for parking them. providing adequate parking space to meet the demand for parking in the central business district (cbd) may necessitate the provision of parking bays along curbs which reduces the capacity of the streets and may affect the level of service (los). before any measure for the betterment of the conditions can be formulated, basic data pertaining to the availability of parking space, extent of its usage and parking demand are essential. if it is proposed to implement a system of parking charges, it will also be necessary to know how much to charge and what will be the effect of the pricing policy on parking. parking is one of the major problems created by increasing road traffic; it has an impact on transport development. the availability of less space in urban areas has increased the demand for parking space, especially in cbd affects the mode choice and has a great economical impact. however, the minimum parking requirements for all new development and land use changes is not normally considered. these requirements are meant to ensure that there will be sufficient parking to avoid shortages and prevent spillover at adjacent properties. with the increasing growth in vehicle population on road, the problem of parking has assumed serious proportions in the study area. as a result, a systematic study of parking characteristic, demand, and regulatory measures that are possible for the control of vehicle is very important. this research, aim in analyzing the performance of off street parking at cbd in akure, nigeria, with a view to identify the various factors influencing the supply of parking facilities and formulate strategies for better management. consilience oyedepo: off-street parking in nigeria literature review transportation is a process that involves the movement of commuters, goods and services from a given point of origin to a specific destination (okoko, 2006). it is a means to access business activities, education, employment and recreational opportunities (world bank, 2002). also, talvitie (1997) opined that urban transport is very crucial because it facilitates the movement of people and goods, which marks the backbone of economic growth and sustainable development of a country. however, urbanization is increasing at an alarming rate with 50% of the world population expected to be living in urban areas by 2025 and more transformation is expected in developing countries (world bank report, 2003). with rapid urbanization and economic growth, motorization has been accelerating in cities in developing countries. this rapid urbanization with its increase in both vehicular and human population is foreseen to affect sustainable development through its negative consequences such as traffic congestion, traffic accidents, global warming through air pollution and traffic noise pollution, among others. transport is described as the ‘maker and breaker of the cities. ’ogunsanya (2002) confirmed how transport has built cities over the year in some urban areas in nigeria and how it has gradually destroyed them. filani (2002) and ikporukpo (1994) stated that inadequate and poorly maintained infrastructure facilities, accidents, the relative immobility of the disadvantaged, waiting for a long period at the bus-stop, pollution from transportation, traffic congestion and parking problems are becoming acute in the city.in another study by brierley (1962), traffic congestion is described like a disease which if not treated, will bring death to the heart of the city. unhabitat (2006) also emphasized the effects of traffic on environmental pollution in cities and towns, which is a health hazard to human beings and animals. knoflacher (2006) affirms that cities in the third world countries face traffic congestion, which is mainly caused by the following factors: a) the urban setup is not compatible with the traffic demands; b) the rate of car usage is high rather than using a car at some point, and then one has to walk or use public transport; c) little budget is put on car maintenance by owners resulting in slow-moving vehicles due to inefficiency; d) inadequate traffic management measures; e) flouting of traffic rules by motorists; and f) inadequate public transport. the significant role of transport in the movement of people, good and services from origin to destination which thus consilience 94 improves the socio-economic status and the general development of the nation cannot be over-emphasized. transport problems are very common in the cbd of nigerian cities as a result of the growing concentration of population, rapid urbanization and economic activities. according to ogundare and ogunbodede (2014), the city is an engine of economic development and centre of industry, commerce and administration, which functions only with an efficient system of transportation. traffic congestion is therefore one of the most predominant problems encountered in such environment, and the case of nigeria is no exemption. in the study of ogundare and ogunbodede (2014) on traffic congestion and parking difficulties in akure metropolis, nigeria, they observed that parking problem in the cbd of akure is a major cause of traffic congestion. on-street parking constitutes one major problem that makes the traffic situation chaotic in nigerian cities. because most of the roads in nigerian cities are narrow and lack pedestrian lanes; parking along these narrow roads therefore causes traffic congestion. this is due to the unavailability of offstreet parking facilities along the transportation routes coupled with inadequate traffic management (asiyanbola and akinpelu 2012; olorunfemi, 2013). however, in western countries, standards for parking requirements have been reoriented towards limiting the use of private car in congested central areas but maintaining minimum levels to preserve city center activities. this is most feasible in cbds, where activities are interrelated because of the mix of land uses and efficient public transportation system that would decrease reliance on private cars. cities are characterized by different various land uses activities, and patterns of circulation is partly a functions of the land use activities and their spatial distribution. the efficiency of this circulation depends upon existing transportation systems, of which parking facilities are major component. according to obot et al, (2009), in situations of lack of provision and poor planning in respect to other urban land use activities, the economic activities of the city may be affected. increase in numbers of vehicles without adequate infrastructure has accentuated the problems of traffic congestion, traffic delays, parking problems, accidents, and urban land use severance (raji and wasiri, 2008). in nigeria, like elsewhere, where cars are one of the dominant modes of transportation, urban circulation is one of the most obvious problems and parking seems to be an overlooked element in transportation development (obot and umoh, 2007). tanimowo and atolagba (2006) affirmed that improvement in the living standards of people as a result of wage increases contributes almost as much as the growth of cities to contemporary urban traffic condition in nigeria. however, for a consilience oyedepo: off-street parking in nigeria city to function as a system, transportation must be efficient and reliable to facilitate, not only intercity movement of people and their activities, but encourage intra-city movements within the city. these movements are from point of origin to the point of destination. they also recommended the use of benefit districts, where parking areas are shared within neighbourhoods, not only for maximizing the use of parking, but also in improving the efficiency of land use. overview of parking policy parking policy, as a regulating tool for the use of cars in urban areas, plays a vital role in defining urban planning and transport policy. by setting appropriate standards for parking requirements, the urban transport and land use systems are supported. the amount of parking supplied influences such systems and even the characteristics of the market. generally, parking spaces are related to some quantitative measure of land use. the institute for transportation engineers (lte) identifies the number of dwelling units as the variable determining the number of parking slots. from parking occupancy studies, the ite developed parking generation rates, defined as the number of parking spaces per unit of independent variable. other foreign studies suggest using building floor area and number of bedrooms as qualitative measures. notably, these studies stress the need to undertake localized parking studies from which to base such requirements. the study area akure with the provisional census figure of 387,087 people according to 2006 national population census, is located on latitude 70 20”n and longitude 50”e, while the natural pattern of development is linear along its main roads viz oyemekun-oba adesida road and arakale-oda road. the existing land use is characterized by a medium density of structure within the inner core areas. akure is mostly residential areas forming over 90% of the developed area but additional activities such as warehousing, manufacturing, workshops and other commercial uses are commonly located within the residential neighborhoods. at present the traffic composition of akure is dominated by taxis, okadas and minibuses. methodology following the reconnaissance survey of the study area, four parks around the central business district shown in figure 1.0 were selected for detailed study. the parks were as coded and shown in table 1 while plates 1 to 4 shows typical scene at consilience 96 the parks. the primary data were obtained from well-structured questionnaires and personal interview while the parking surveys were conducted between 8a.m and 5p.m. license plate method of survey was adopted, so in this case of survey, every parking stall was monitored at a continuous interval of 15 minutes or so and the license plate number was noted. this gave the data regarding the duration for which a particular vehicle was using the parking bay. both close-ended and open-ended questionnaires were administered to 800 users representing 75% of the total population. the calculation for sample size was based on the consideration to examine at least half (50%) of the total parking bay; 680 questionnaires were retrieved for data analysis, which represent 85% of the total population. table 1: selected parks around the central business district note: ofp is the off-street parking s/no . park capacity (no. of bays) cross sectional areas (m2) park use characteristics’ 1. democracy park(ofp 1) 400 15,744 behind akure central mosque in oja-oba commercial, truck parks, and residential. 2. arakale park 1 (ofp 2) 250 4,014.36 along arakale road commercial and residential. 3. arakale park 2(ofp 3) 120 1,926.72 along arakale road commercial and residential. 4. arakale park 3(ofp 4) 300 5,790.00 along arakale road commercial, truck parks, residential consilience oyedepo: off-street parking in nigeria figure 1.0: existing land-use structures showing the study location source: department of urban and regional planning, futa. (2015) consilience 98 plate 1: typical scene at democracy park (ofp1) plate 2: typical scene at arakale park (ofp2) consilience oyedepo: off-street parking in nigeria plate 3: typical scene at arakale park (ofp3) plate 4: typical scene at arakale park (ofp3) results and discussion table 2 and table 3 show the summary of parking accumulation and arrival departure survey for ofp1 respectively; figure 2 shows the parking accumulation curve, while equations 1, 2 and 3 were used to evaluate the parking statistics. consilience 100 table 2: summary of parking accumulation for ofp1 time of day number of stalls available number of vehicles parked inside the parking lot percentage (%) before 8a.m 400 22 5.42 8-10a.m 400 88 22.00 10-12a.m 400 197 49.33 1-3p.m 400 219 54.67 3-5p.m 400 69 17.33 table 3: arrival departure survey for ofp1 time interval (min) (i) arrival (ii) departure (iii) accumulati on (iv) occupancy (%) (v) parking load (vi) 5 8 7 138 34.50 690 10 13 6 145 36.25 725 15 11 6 150 37.50 750 20 16 7 159 39.75 795 25 11 4 166 41.50 830 30 9 7 168 42.00 840 35 10 3 175 43.75 875 40 10 5 180 45.00 900 45 15 8 187 46.75 935 50 8 8 187 46.75 935 55 13 7 193 48.25 965 60 9 9 193 48.25 965 510.25 10,235 parking duration = parking load parking volume (1) parking turnover = parking volume no. of bays available (2) parking index efficiecy = parking load parking capacity x 100 (3) accumulation = initial count + no. of entering vehicles − minus the no. of exit vehicles. = 137 + 8 − 7 = 138 parking index = 138 400 × 100 = 34.5% consilience oyedepo: off-street parking in nigeria average parking index = 510.25 12 = 42.5% average parking index = 510.25 12 = 690 vehicle minutes the analysis of surveys at other parks was carried out in a similar manner. figures 3 to 5 is the parking accumulation curve for ofp2, ofp3, and ofp4. figure 2: parking accumulation curve for democracy park (ofp1). figure 3: parking accumulation curve for ofp2 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 nu m be rs o f v eh icl es (a cc um ul at io n) time interval (seconds) 110 112 114 116 118 120 122 124 126 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 nu m be rs o f v eh icl es (a cc um ul at io n) time interval (seconds) consilience 102 figure 4: parking accumulation curve for ofp3 figure 5: parking accumulation curve for arakale park 3 remarks the parking index (efficiency) of 42.5%, 69.52%, 74.88% and 26.66% respectively were obtained for ofp1, ofp2, ofp3 and ofp4. the study shows that ofp1 and ofp4 operate below their maximum capacity, while ofp2 and ofp3operate above the maximum capacity when compared with policy 7 of the parking space requirements in parking code guidance 2012. also, 50%, 36% and 14% of the respondents affirm that the facilities are not adequate, adequate and very adequate respectively. analysis from users’ perspectives figure 6 shows the schematic representation of the user perspective of the parks. figure 6 shows that 50% of the respondents affirmed that the facilities are not adequate, while 36% are of the opinion that it is adequate, and 14% believed it is very adequate. 44 49 54 59 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60n um be rs o f v eh ic le s (a cc um ul at io n) time interval (seconds) 62 64 66 68 70 72 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60n um be rs o f v eh ic le s (a cc um ul at io n) time interval (seconds) consilience oyedepo: off-street parking in nigeria figure 6: adequacy of the parking spaces conclusion the growing concentration of population, rapid urbanization and economic activities at the cbd has resulted in aforementioned transport problems around it. in akure, the development of all transport modes served as a useful catalyst in the economic development of the town. the provision of the existing parks reduces the traffic problems arising from on street parking; however, at ofp 2 and ofp3, the demand exceeds the supply. parking plays a vital role in promoting the efficiency of road network and accessibility of commercial land for customers especially at the cbd. however, inadequate or improper management of parking spaces, as well as ineffective law enforcement has compelled many to park along the road including the public transport operators. this act contributed immensely to traffic congestion around the cbd; thus, it causes delays in traffic movement, increase in travel time, noise pollution, air pollution, and accidents. strategies such as effective communication, parking enforcement, operational efficiency and provision of parking signage for better and efficient management of off-street parking should be adopted in the study area. 14% 36% 50% very adequate adequate not adequate consilience 104 references asiyanbola and akinpelu (2012): the challenges of on-street parking in nigerian cities’ transportation routes; international journal of development and sustainability, vol. 1 no. 2, pp 476-489; 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(1997): things planners believe in, and things they deny. transportation vol. 24, no. 1, pp 1-31; tanimowo, n. b. and atolagbe, a. m. (2006): land use and intra-urban travels in ogbomosho, nigeria, in eds (j.a.fadamiro et al,) urban environmental sustainability; interventions and responses; urban design research team, school of environmental technology, akure. pp 91-99; un-habitat, (2006): meeting development goals in small urban centres: water and sanitation in the world cities, earthscan publications, london, uk; world bank, (2003): urban development: facts and figures. microsoft word puaschunder.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 16, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 38-63 on the emergence, current state, and future perspectives of socially responsible investment (sri) julia m. puaschunder1∗ the new school, department of economics, schwartz center for economic policy analysis, julia.puaschunder@newschool.edu abstract in recent decades socially responsible investment (sri) emerged into an en vogue investment philosophy. originating from religious and moral considerations, sri evolved in the wake of socio-political deficiencies and corporate social conduct. in the global rise of financial social conscientiousness, differing national legislations and regulatory traditions have led to various sri practices, which are harmonized by the united nations (un). building on the historic advancement of financial social responsibility in the wake of socio-ethical deficiencies, this paper highlights the future potential of sri in the aftermath of the 2008/09 world financial crisis as a means to avert economic market downfalls. during the current financial market reform, additional microand macro-research on financial social conduct could foster the idea of financial social responsibility and aid a successful implementation of sri. keywords: economic crisis, financial social responsibility, socially responsible investment (sri), 2008/09 world financial crisis. 1∗ financial support of the austrian academy of sciences, austrian american education commission – fulbright commission, eugene lang liberal arts college of the new school, fritz thyssen foundation, the maxwell school of citizenship and public affairs at syracuse university, the max kade foundation new york, new school for social research, tishman environment and design center, and the university of vienna is gratefully acknowledged. the author declares no conflict of interest. the author thanks professor rainer maderthaner and professor uwe schubert for helpful comments on the presented ideas and/or earlier versions of the paper. all omissions, errors and misunderstandings in the following article are solely the author’s. consilience puaschunder: trends in sri introduction as part of human nature, social responsibility guides corporate activities and financial considerations. the societal demand for imbuing social responsibility in economic markets has risen steadily in recent decades due to globalization and socio-political trends. in the current aftermath of the 2008/09 world financial crisis, the call for social responsibility in financial markets climaxed. the announcement of the recapitalization of the banking system in october 2008 created a need for reconsideration of social responsibility in a newly defined finance world. heralding the “age of responsibility,” the crisis led us president barack obama to call for a new spirit of responsibility that serves the greater goals of society (washington post, january 21, 2009). world bank president robert zoellick describes the “new era of responsibility” featuring responsible corporate conduct and socially conscientious investments as means of societal progress (financial times, january 25, 2009). the crisis’ outbreak let mainstream economic theories’ assumptions of unregulated markets being largely efficient appear in a new light. classic finance theories’ estimation of the collective outcomes of aggregated economic market actors’ cognition blatantly underlined the importance of widening the interdisciplinary lens in the investigation of financial decision-making. given the impetus of the 2008/09 world financial crisis and the renewed attention to social responsibility in economic markets, the interest in understanding ethicality in the finance world and advancing the idea of financial social responsibility reached unprecedented momentum. financial social responsibility attributes the consideration of csr in investment decisions (puaschunder, 2010). financial social responsibility bridges the financial world with society in socially responsible investment (sri). in this asset allocation style, socially conscientious investors select securities not only for their expected yield and volatility, but foremost for social, environmental, and institutional ethicality aspects (beltratti, 2003; mohr, webb & harris, 2001; williams, 2005). in the current climate of socio-economic crisis, the idea of financial social responsibility appears as a means to reestablish trust in financial markets and potential panacea to avert future financial market downfalls. in this light, understanding financial social conscientiousness in financial markets appears more important than ever before to advance the idea of financial social responsibility. while the time is ripe to tackle the whole-rounded investigation of financial social responsibility, we face sri as a relatively novel and heterodox market option comprising multiple stakeholders around the globe. in the international arena, various sri practices emerged concurrently. national rules and legal jurisdictions have shaped consilience 40 multiple corporate and financial social expressions as legal boundaries guide financial considerations and institutional frameworks predestine sri conduct (reinhardt, vietor & stavins, 2008; steurer, 2010). regional settings and economic customs have contributed to the culture-dependence of sri. as a first step toward resolving societal losses imbued in the complexity of this novel phenomenon but also to innovatively explore new opportunities to ingrain social responsibility within globalized market economies, this paper will present the history of sri and international practice of financial social responsibility in order to draw conclusions about the future potential of sri in the aftermath of the 2008/09 world financial crisis. the historic emergence of financial social responsibility shows social conscientiousness to peak in the wake of socio-economic deficiencies, humanitarian downfalls, and legislative compulsion, which provides a convincing case for the appreciation of the current crisis’ role to ingraining ethicality in economic markets. studying the emergence of sri in economic markets and taking a snapshot of where we stand with sri during a time of financial turmoil will also inform circumstances under which social responsibility is likely to prosper. reflecting financial social conscientiousness through a historic lens will in addition help in deriving natural financial social responsibility triggers and sri success factors in order to aid the ongoing adoption of sri around the globe. in the international arena, external influences have shaped the practice of financial social responsibility. national legislations, policy frameworks, and cultural landscapes have brought out differing sri forms as governmental forces and institutional incentives either curb or perpetuate specific financial social considerations. with no stringent legal international basis, in some parts of the world, sri activities are mandated by national, federal, state, or local laws and regulations. in others, the judicial record leaves room for investors to allocate resources in a socially conscientious way. until today our insights on external forces shaping sri customs, however, remain rudimentary. sri practices are still inconclusive in the global arena leading to disparate sri notions throughout the world. capturing the current state of sri around the world will give a more conclusive picture of financial social responsibility. analyzing financial social considerations on a global scale through a prism of legal setting and institutional customs will help in finding mutually shared contents of financial social investment. paying attention to international differences of sri options will also serve as a first step to harmonize differing financial social responsibility practices in the ongoing sri adaptation around the globe. enabling a more harmonious discourse on sri will reduce the complexity of sri and diminish socio-economic losses imbued in the ambiguity of this multi-stakeholder phenomenon. consilience puaschunder: trends in sri studying the manifold sri expressions resulting from the various interplays of governmental, corporate, and financial market forces will also allow drawing inferences about positive framework and boundary conditions of financial social conscientiousness. international sri descriptions will thus offer insights on financial social responsibility triggers and repeatable patterns as a basis for successful sri policies within financial markets. advancing financial social responsibility technically and aiding to mainstream financial social endeavors but also fostering the sri acceptance throughout the investment community promises to strengthen sri’s global governance contribution (bruyn, 1987). following this goal, international organizations have started to align differing sri practices. the united nations (un) leads the institutional harmonization of financial social responsibility in capturing diverse sri actions. in the pursuit of finding an overarching sri framework, the un unifies disparate financial social responsibility approaches and promotes consensus finding on sri as a multi-stakeholder means for attributing societal global governance goals. only by understanding our past can we excel in the future. outlining the historic root of financial social responsibility and the current state-of-the-art international sri practice will help drawing inferences about the future potential of financial social responsibility. as we may conclude, recent developments in the aftermath of the 2008/09 world financial crisis promise to hold favorable conditions for the advancement of sri. in the aftermath of economic downturns, more than ever sri opens a prospective avenue to ingrain financial social considerations in globalizing economies. sri appears as an already existing means to re-establish trust in financial markets and aid financial market stability. in this vibrant field, however, more research on financial social responsibility is needed to predict sri as a panacea to avert future economic crises and successfully contribute to future financial social global governance. socially responsible investment (sri) socially responsible investment (sri) is an investment philosophy that combines profit maximization with social endeavors (livesey, 2002; matten & crane, 2005; wolff, 2002). by integrating social, environmental and financial aspects in investments, socially conscientious investors pursue economic and social value maximization alike (renneboog, horst & zhang, 2007; schueth, 2003). financial goals can be coupled with catalyzing socio-political change in various forms (mohr et al., 2001). socially responsible screenings are ‘double bottom line analyses’ of corporate economic performance and social responsibility, in which socially conscientious investors incorporate corporate social consilience 42 responsibility (csr) in financial decision-making and allocate financial resources based on the societal impacts of the funded entities. screenings evaluate options on economic fundamentals as well as qualitative intra(e.g., corporate policies and practices, employee relations) and extra-organizational (e.g., externalities on current and future constituents) corporate social conduct (schueth, 2003). screenings watch corporate track records of societal impacts, environmental performance, human rights attribution, fair workplace policies, and health and safety standards. positive screenings select corporations with sound social and environmental records that pay attention to human rights and labor standards, equal opportunities, environmental protection, consumer safety, community concerns, and stakeholder relations. negative screenings exclude corporations that contribute to socially irresponsible activities such as addictive products and services (e.g., liquor, tobacco, gambling), defense (e.g., weapons, firearms, landmines), environmentally hazardous production (e.g., pollution, nuclear power), and humanitarian deficiencies (e.g., discrimination, human rights violations). specialty screenings target extraordinary executive compensation, abortion, and animal testing (dupré, girerd-potin & kassoua, 2008). post-hoc negative screenings lead to the removal of investment capital from markets to attribute global governance goals (broadhurst, watson & marshall, 2003; harvey, 2008; mcwilliams & siegel, 2000). in political divestiture, socially responsible investors use their market power to pressure politically incorrect governments counterparting from international peace laws steering war, social conflict, terrorism, and human rights violations (schueth, 2003; starr, 2008). prominent public divestiture cases are the capital flight from south africa during apartheid, investor responses to the human rights violations in burma and the capital drain during the humanitarian crises in sudan’s darfur region. screenings are often complemented with shareholder advocacy and activism – the active engagement of shareholders in corporate policy and managerial decision-making (little, 2008; schueth, 2003; sparkes & cowton, 2004). resolutions allow shareholders to request corporate board information and vote on corporate issues in shareholder meetings. the vast majority of shareholders exercise their voting rights by proxy, which grants third parties voting rights on matters before the corporation (little, 2008). current trends of mutual fund proxy disclosure regulations target the public availability of corporate records. related active endowments establish procedures for integrating social responsibility in university endowments through proxy voting. informal shareholder dialogues influence corporate policies and practices without formal resolutions and investment withdrawals. shareholder activism also comprises pro-social political lobbying, consumer boycotts, and corporate confrontations drawing public attention to corporate social conduct (sparkes & cowton, 2004). consilience puaschunder: trends in sri community investing started in the 1970s with direct investments and investor set-asides for underserved low-income groups (schueth, 2003). community development banks provide at-risk communities access to financial services – including credits, equity, and banking products – to support housing, education, childcare, and healthcare. community development venture capital funds startups in underdeveloped regions (schueth, 2003). related social venture capital supports social entrepreneurs to vitalize communities and foster positive societal change. supplementary financial empowerment targets financial education, mentoring, and assistance. today’s financial social responsibility expressions are manifold, and forecasts predict a growth in diversity (little, 2008; social investment forum report, 2006). sri already embraces a variety of stakeholders comprising economic (e.g., institutional and private investors), organizational (e.g., labor union members, banking executives, fiduciaries), and societal constituents (e.g., representatives of international organizations and non-governmental organizations, governmental officials, public policy specialists, nonprofits, media spokesperson, academics). consequently, sri touches on diverse interests. the multitude of ideas and parties involved leads to a disparity of financial social responsibility endeavors that may cause multi-stakeholder deficiencies. to reduce the complexity of the phenomenon and overcome socio-economic losses implied by various financial social responsibility approaches, the various sri phenomena must be scrutinized. as a first step in this direction, we may start by shedding light on the history of human ethical considerations entering financial markets. historical emergence social and ethical considerations in financial markets have a long tradition stemming from religious roots. already in medieval times, christianity imposed financial restrictions based on the old testament. the catholic church prohibited usury as early as 1139. judaist writings praised ethical monetary conduct. methodism urged to avoid ‘sinful’ trade and profit maximizing exploitation (cuesta & valor, 2007). since the 17th century, the quaker society of friends refrained from military and slave trade. the uk methodist church advocated for ethical corporate conduct. the christian pioneer fund was first to officially exclude ‘sin stocks.’ until today, islamic banking has restricted adult entertainment and gambling (renneboog et al., 2007). the early beginnings of modern sri are attributed to social responsibility concerns in the face of social, environmental, and political deficiencies and humanitarian crises (williams, 2005). in the post-world war ii era, first financial social considerations ideas sparked in the wake of legislative compulsion, information disclosure, consilience 44 and governmental policies encouraging trustees’ social responsibility (solomon, solomon & norton, 2002; sparkes & cowton, 2004). during the 1960s stakeholder pressure and anti-vietnam war movements alerted institutional investors to sell napalm-producing dow chemical shares (biller, 2007). civil rights campaigns and social justice initiatives opposed college endowments funding warfare. minority empowerment, consumer rights activism, and environmentalism sensitized for financial social conscientiousness (renneboog et al., 2007; sparkes, 2002). since 1969 the council on economic priorities rated corporate social and environmental performance. after a yale conference introduced financial social responsibility, many universities established committees to advise trustees on social investment. subsequently methodist clergy created the pax world fund aimed at divestiture from vietnam war supporters (broadhurst et al., 2003; renneboog et al., 2007). the dreyfus third century fund opened the following year to avoid ‘sin stocks’ and improve social labor standards. by the mid-1970s, a significant number of governments had enacted shareholder rights to address corporate activities that caused ‘social injury,’ and many universities established committees to advise trustees on sri and shareholder rights. the investor responsibility research center (irrc) and the interfaith center on corporate responsibility (iccr) were launched to promote shareholder advocacy and proxy resolutions around the same time (social investment forum report, 2006). in 1972 activists criticized harvard university for owning shares in petroleum corporations. political divestiture became firstly discussed in the case of the angolan repressive government (alperson, tepper-marlin, schorsch & wil, 1991). in 1976 reverend leon sullivan – a civil rights activist and director of general motors – developed the sullivan principles to foster equal remuneration and workplace opportunities to empower minorities (voorhes, 1999). during the 1980s, political divestiture was practiced by us universities, investors, churches, city governments, and state governments as a means to dismantle the south african apartheid regime featuring racial segregation and economic discrimination against non-european groups (schueth, 2003; soros, 2008). environmental catastrophes in chernobyl, bhopal, and the exxon valdez oil spill perpetuated shareholder activism. with the desire to set standards for corporate social engagement and environmentally conscientious conduct, social investors started positive screenings in the beginning of the 1990s. the domini 400 social index institutionalized ratings of standard & poor’s 500 (s&p) corporations. the micro-finance revolution and the co-operative banking system further galvanized the idea of sri (brenner, 2001). within recent decades financial social responsibility boomed in the wake of globalization and political trends. an unprecedented interconnectivity of globalized financial markets strengthened the consilience puaschunder: trends in sri societal role of financial institutions. political libertarianism implicitly shifted social responsibility onto the private sector. deregulated liberalization attributed a rising share of global governance onto financial markets. financial social considerations leveraged an implicit fiduciary responsibility (solomon et al., 2002; sparkes & cowton, 2004). as social global governance has increasingly entered financial markets since the turn of the millennium, a growing proportion of investment firms and governmental agencies around the world adopted a more socially conscientious investment philosophy (knoll, 2008; mccann, solomon & solomon, 2003; sparkes, 2002). information disclosure on corporate social conduct in combination with benchmarking of corporate social engagement and governmental encouragement of trustees’ social conscientiousness propelled sri. institutional investors concurrently used their clout to influence corporate conduct and actively demanded corporate governance reforms to act on societal concerns. the advanced consideration of financial social responsibility by major institutional investors matured sri from a niche market option that was offered by specialist retailers to a more mainstream asset allocation style (mathieu, 2000; sparkes & cowton, 2004). sri reached unprecedented diversity featuring a wide range of social engagement possibilities (rosen, sandler & shani, 1991). as sri gained in prominence and broadened in size, scale, and scope, practitioners and academics started documenting state-of-the-art financial social responsibility practices. business professionals reported and analysts monitored social, ethical, and environmental corporate performance. social and environmental stock exchange rating agencies and certifications measured sri impacts. today business leaders tend to contribute to the creation of economic and societal progress in a globally responsible and sustainable way by means as never before experienced. corporations that join the united nations principles of responsible investment (pri) report concomitant tangible (profit gain, efficiency, product innovations, market segmentation) and intangible (reputation, employee morale) benefits. the united nations environment programme finance initiative (unepfi), the equator principles, the green bond principles, and the various corporate reporting lead initiatives such as global reporting initiative (gri) and integrating reporting (ir) are additional un responsible investment activities. the key constituents are stock exchange and financial analyst communities as future sri drivers to support the ungc goals. in addition, ngos are invited to advance financial market transparency and accountability (puaschunder, 2016b). in light of the rising climate change awareness and demand for an economically efficient transitioning into renewable energy, the unled earth league most recently incepted the climate risk and the consilience 46 finance sector working group in partnership with united nations environment programme finance initiative (unep fi), the world resources institute (wri), and the global challenges foundation. the unep fi is a global partnership between unep and the financial sector. over 200 institutions, including banks, insurers, and fund managers, work together with unep to capture the mutual impacts of environmental and social considerations on financial performance (puaschunder, 2016b). at the 3rd conference on financing for development in july 2015 in addis ababa, and at the global summit on the sustainable development goals in new york city in september 2015, external financing for development was proven as key driver of developing economies. in the wake of the 2015 inception of the un sustainable development goals, a report was published by unep fi in cooperation with the pri, unep inquire, and the ungc that aims at elucidating debates surrounding environmental, social, and governance issues in the light of fiduciary duty. the report is meant to foster investors’ understanding and consideration of environmental, social and governance (esg) issues in their investment decision-making. the research stresses the point that a failure to consider long-term investment value drivers including esg issues in investment practices is a failure of fiduciary duty. the report also touches on the implementation of sustainable finance and impact investment in order to propose practical action for institutional investors, financial professionals, and policy-makers to embrace sustainable development (puaschunder, 2016b). one of the most novel trends is the acknowledgement of the role of political divestiture for sustainable development (puaschunder, 2016b). with political divestiture having increasingly become an element of fiduciary duty, particularly for investors with long-term horizons that oversee international portfolios, this financial social responsibility means has also come closer to serving sustainable development. sustainable investment is needed in global economic growth and development, especially in light of financing the sdgs and developing countries being highly dependent on corporate contributions. there are massive worldwide financing needs for sustainable development, and fdi plays a crucial role in bridging the investment gap, especially in developing countries. due to stability and diverse development impact compared with other sources of finance, fdi is the most important component of external development finance to fragile economies. over the past decade, fdi stock tripled in least developed countries and small-island developing economies and quadrupled in landlocked developing countries. at the same time, inward fdi to the developing economics reached their highest level at usd 681 billion with a 2 percent rise in 2015 (puaschunder, 2016b; world investment report, 2015). according to the world investment consilience puaschunder: trends in sri report 2015, investment community trends will still be geared toward investment liberalization, promotion, and facilitation in the future. global fdi flows are expected to reach $1.4 trillion in 2015, an 11 percent rise. flows are expected to increase further to $1.5 trillion and $1.7 trillion in 2016 and 2017 (world investment report, 2015). with a concerted effort by the international investment development community, fdi in weak economics could quadruple by 2030. in the future, economic diversification should target fostering greater sustainability in these most vulnerable countries (puaschunder, 2016b; world investment report, 2015). for the future the world’s leading stock exchange commissions seek to further support the pri and consider innovative ways of how to partner with the ungc. sustainable development impact reporting can thereby highlight sustainable development criteria such as environmental and social standards. for instance, the united states’ overseas private investment corporation (opic) uses about 30 development indicators to evaluate job creation and human capacity building, sustainability effects, as well as impacts on environmental and community benefits (world investment report, 2015). in addition, specific sustainable development outcomes could be screened for industrial development and regional economic cooperation. future monitoring could comprise of an ombudsperson and facilitator to help ensure a vital sustainability climate. this qualitative and quantitative emergence of financial social market options and the rising attention to sri for global governance, however, also caused a disparity of sri practices. in the quickly changing, unregulated market systems of today, we face a lack of indepth analysis of financial social responsibility phenomena. lately weakened market economies caused by an inadequate understanding of financial social conscientiousness underline the urgency and importance of a whole-rounded investigation of sri. while diversity of sri practices is welcome to reach out to various constituents and clients, a classification of the differing financial social responsibility practices throughout the world may serve as a prerequisite for a pinpointed sri support on a grand scale. as a first step in this direction, shedding light on international differences of sri may hold the potential to draw conclusions about positive framework and boundary conditions for a successful implementation of sri. analytic investigations will also help to shed light on the efficiency and unknown potentials as well as possible downturns of sri. in a cost and benefit analysis, sri implies short-term expenditures, but grants long-term sustainable investment streams. in the short run, screened funds have a higher expense ratio in comparison to unscreened ones – that is, social responsibility imposes an instantaneous ‘ethical penalty’ of decreased immediate shareholder revenue (mohr & webb, 2005; tippet, 2001). in addition, for investors consilience 48 the search for information and learning about csr is associated with cognitive costs. screening requires an extra analytical step in decisionmaking, whereby positive screens are believed to be more cognitively intensive than negative ones (little, 2008). screening out financial options lowers the degrees of freedom of a full-choice market spectrum and risk diversification possibilities (biller, 2007; mohr & webb, 2005; williams, 2005). in the long run, sri options offer higher stability, lower turnover and failure rates compared to general assets (dhrymes, 1998; geczy, stambaugh & levin, 2003; guenster, derwall, bauer & koedijk, 2005; schroeder, 2003; stone, guerard, gületkin & adams, 2001). based on more elaborate decision-making processes, once investors have made their socially responsible decision, they are more likely to stay with their choice (little, 2008). as a matter of fact, sri options are less volatile and more robust during cyclical changes (bollen & cohen, 2004). sri measurement deficiencies stem from intangible and time-inconsistent pay-offs as well as measurement errors. sri studies are methodologically limited for small sample sizes due to the relative novelty of financial social responsibility, inconsistencies in the short time frames under scrutiny, and differing modelling techniques used to estimate investment returns (jones, van der laan, frost & loftus, 2008; mcwilliams & siegel, 1996; mohr et al., 2001; ngassam, 1992; teoh, welch & wazzan, 1999). most sri studies do not take externalities on the wider constituency group into consideration, which lowers the external validity of the results and calls for a more whole-rounded examination of sri with a global perspective (mcwilliams et al., 1999). international differences sri bridges the finance world with society (schueth, 2003). in the international arena, various sri practices emerged concurrently as national rules and legal jurisdictions shape corporate and financial social conduct (steurer, 2010). legal boundaries guide financial considerations and institutional frameworks predestine financial social responsibility practices (reinhardt et al., 2008). regional settings and economic customs add to the culture-dependence of sri. financial social responsibility booms in the western world and has primarily been adopted in central europe and anglo-saxon markets. whilst anglo-saxon countries (such as the us and uk) are prominent for private investments; european financial systems are renowned for governmental and institutional banking. common law anglo-saxon countries (e.g., us, canada, australia, uk) are more liberal in institutionalizing sri (matten & moon, 2004). anglo-saxon fiduciary responsibility focuses stronger on return on investments, while western european roman law-dominated countries legally consilience puaschunder: trends in sri grant fiduciaries more leeway in considering the overall societal impact of the asset-issuing entities. civil law countries (e.g., central european countries) tend to place greater emphasis on stakeholder participation in corporate governance (reinhardt et al., 2008). north america despite drawbacks during the 2008/09 financial crisis, the us is home to half of the world’s capital and publicly-traded corporations. hosting 7,000 self-made millionaires and 170 billionaires, the us political and legal systems disproportionately reward capital allocation talent. featuring a liberal market economy, the us benefits from a comprehensive set of market transparency rules, a vigorous, free media, and highly educated market actors. the us constitutional law endows with substantive rights of freedom of speech, assembly or association, press, religious exercise, as well as property securitization. the us is renowned for explicit csr expression combined with a competitive market and relatively low governmental social welfare (roberts, 2006). having grown out of niche market options for value-led investors, sri prospered in the us due to disclosure of corporate social externalities and shareholder activism in the wake of socio-political concerns. the 1981-enacted american social investment forum – as a professional body for individual and institutional sri constituents – introduced sri to the american market (broadhurst et al., 2003). the 1986 us comprehensive anti-apartheid act legally backed billions of divested dollars from south africa to weaken a discriminatory government. since 2004 various corporate scandals led to legislations addressing disclosure of proxy votes, which leveraged shareholder resolutions to become the mainstream track record for socially responsible corporate conduct (little, 2008). in numeric terms, 348 resolutions on social and environmental issues were proposed in the us, of which more than 50 percent reached a proxy vote in 2005 (social investment forum, 2006). the same year us $ 2.5 trillion assets were attributed as socially responsible funds, which accounted for 20.7 percent of all us investments (williams, 2005). today the us features – in a landscape of highly dispersed share ownership – by far the broadest variety of sri options and socially responsible performance measurement indices. in canada, legal obligations require corporate directors and officers to act in the best interest of the entity without ignoring stakeholders (borok, 2003). sri was officially introduced in canada by the ethical growth fund in 1986 (williams, 2005). based on the us model, the 2001 canadian institute of chartered accountants established disclosure guidelines backed by mandatory obligations (sparkes & cowton, 2004). since 2006 the canadian securities consilience 50 administrators mandated mutual funds to publicly disclose their proxy voting policies and records. sri is organized by the social investment organization (sio) renowned for surveys and conferences (williams, 2005). community investing recently boomed in canada (social investment forum report, 2006). europe europe has a long history of incorporating corporate social conduct in institutional investments (reinhardt et al., 2008; sutton, 2004). as european legislations emphasize stakeholder participation in corporate governance, european corporate boards often include employee representatives. civil law countries tend to codify profitsacrificing corporate behavior as cultural traditions value corporate social conscientiousness. while the more liberal uk permits corporate managers to engage in socially beneficial activities as long as this is in the shareholders’ greater interests, social democracies – such as france and german-speaking countries – legally back stakeholder interests (lynch-fannon, 2007; reinhardt et al., 2008; roe, 2000). the german corporate law does not even explicitly oblige the management to maximize shareholder value (corfield, 1998; marinov & heiman, 1998). while sri booms in northern and central europe, the movement is slower to take off in southern europe. community investing is prominent in latin countries like italy, france, and spain.2 quantitatively, the growing european sri market (excluding the nordic region) recently comprised around 400 green, social, and ethical funds worth €1.138 billion in 2008, accounting for 18 percent of the market share.3 the uk leads the sri movement with €8.0 billion in total assets, followed by germany (with €6.7 billion), austria (€5.3 billion), france (€3.1 billion), switzerland (€2.9 billion), italy (€2.7 billion), and sweden (€2.5 billion) in 2006. in the uk – the european sri leader – first uk victorian concerns about employment conditions sparked corporate social conduct (sparkes, 2002). ethical finance was established by the mercury provident in 1974 and introduced to retail banking in 1992. in 1997 a group of university affiliates launched a campaign for ethical and environmental pension funds. since 2000 sustainable and responsible investment policies require all occupational pension funds to formally consult adopting social, ethical, and environmental policies (sparkes & cowton, 2004; williams, 2005). the uk government regulations reassured pension funds to declare the extent to which environmental, social, or ethical considerations are taken into consideration in the selection, retention, and realization of investments 2 european social investment forum report retrieved from the internet in january 2009 at http://www.eurosif.org/ 3 european social investment forum report retrieved from the internet in january 2009 at http://www.eurosif.org/ consilience puaschunder: trends in sri (sparkes, 2002). similar regulations have been passed in germany and sweden and are currently considered by the european parliament (steurer, 2010). the nordic european countries are renowned for a scandinavian law framework. political divestiture was enacted by the belgian government in 2007 by restricting belgian investors to finance warfare (steurer, 2010). sweden’s 2000 public pension fund act required all swedish national pension funds to report investments’ environmental and social externalities (steurer, 2010). while the law gives leeway to what extent funds have to comply, it helped in granting access to information and raising awareness for sri. in addition, joint ethical council offers investment recommendations for stakeholders (steurer, 2010). the dutch green funds scheme provides information on sri tax exemptions (steurer, 2010). in continental europe, the french pension research fund offers insurance plans in line with sri principles. in german-speaking roman law countries, sri was propelled in the wake of peace movements and the 1970s green wave promoting environmental protection. the gemeinschaftsand ökobank were first sri traders. major influences are attributed to green parties, the 1991 renewable energy act, information campaigns, and tax exemptions (williams, 2005). the pacific rim australian corporate law requires corporate managers to make decisions in the best interest of the corporation, yet a statutory business judgment rule grants considerable discretion (reinhardt et al., 1998). australian direct share ownership led to higher levels of individual investors’ sri screenings. the first australian ethical investment movement began in the early 1980s leading to the australian ethical investment trust in 1989 (cummings, 2000). the ethical investment association (eia) emerged throughout the 1990s to launch sri benchmarking reports and a sri symbol to approve socially responsible products (williams, 2005). the financial service reform act 2002 introduced financial disclosure statements. in 2003 the australian securities and investment commission (asic) issued sri disclosure guidelines (williams, 2005). from 2001 to 2004, sri rose by over 100 percent from aus $10.5 to $21.5 billion – making sri the fastest growing investment segment in australia (jones et al., 2008). emerging markets sri drives international development in emerging markets foremost through community investing, microfinance, and enterprise consilience 52 development for social entrepreneurs (social investment forum report, 2006). newly emerging and rapidly growing sri markets are latin america (foremost brazil) and south africa. asia is a potential future ripe market for sri – reaching us $2.7 billion in total sri assets (sparkes & cowton, 2004). japan accounted for asia’s leading sri market with more than 100 billion yen spread over ten sri funds. the 2011 crisis followed by a financial investment drain from japan, however, may slow or even halt this trend. hong kong as asia’s additional sri expansion market may take over the lead in asia. more than twelve screened funds are available in the islamic banking territories of malaysia, taiwan, and singapore. in the developing world, sri practices vary across countries as laws and regulations are often not well-enforced (reinhardt et al., 2008). missing financial social responsibility standardization hampers the adoption of sri. oversea oversight is challenged by a lack of accountability of sri practices and non-transferable customs. standardized sri policies could help regulatory enforcement and monitoring to overcome principal-agency discrepancies, conflicts of interest, and corruption. to diminish the likelihood of these downfalls but foremost to foster the idea of financial social responsibility through a harmonious understanding of sri on a grand scale, international organizations have set out to harmonize financial social responsibility practices in the global arena. institutional harmonization of sri in the eye of globalized markets and international societal challenges (e.g., in the environmental domain such as climate change), international organizations currently harmonize differing sri practices throughout the international arena. international organizations define sri standards and guideline the financial social responsibility implementation from a global governance perspective. a more harmonious picture of concerted financial social responsibility is meant to foster financial markets’ global governance impetus in the pursuit of societal goals. transnational entities play a pivotal role in institutionally supporting financial social responsibility and streamlining disparate sri practices throughout the world. the united nations (un) leads the international public administration of financial social responsibility. in january 2004, the un invited a group of leading financial institutions to form a joint financial sector initiative under the guidance of the united nations global compact’s (ungc) board to discuss financial investment banks and fiduciaries’ social responsibility implementation. in associated research units, the initiative developed guidelines on how to integrate environmental, social, and corporate governance in asset management and securities brokerage services. consilience puaschunder: trends in sri subsequently responding to rising sri trends all over the world, the ungc division and the un environment programme finance initiative launched the ‘principles for responsible investment’ in collaboration with the new york stock exchange (nyse) in 2006. the pri are supported by the ungc conference board, the chief executive officers of global corporations, the international finance corporation of the world bank group, the swiss government, and columbia university. the principles are designed to place financial social responsibility into the core of investment decision-making of financial managers, asset owners, and institutional endowment holders. the pri support socially responsible investors and harmonize financial social conscientiousness to create repeatable models for positive societal change within the investment community. under the auspice of the ungc and the unep finance initiative, the pri invite institutional investors to consider sri and mobilize chief executive officers of the world’s largest pension funds to advance financial social considerations at the international level. at the one-year anniversary of the pri, more than 170 institutions – representing approximately usd 8 trillion in assets – had committed to the pri.4 corporations joining the pri have been reporting profits, efficiency, product innovation, and market segmentation advantages but also intangible reputational gains, improved employee morale, and consumer satisfaction. in february 2008 the un conference on trade and development (unctad) launched the ‘responsible investment in emerging markets’ initiative at the geneva pri office. this publicprivate partnership fosters transparency and disclosure for the integration of environmental, social, and corporate governance in emerging markets. the key constituents are stock exchange and financial analyst communities. ngos are invited to advance accountability. investment banks and fiduciaries are assisted to implement social responsibility as a risk management tool. the 2008/09 world financial crisis has put a novel perspective on the promotion of financial social responsibility. above the advancement of global governance goals through the engagement of financial markets, the idea of sri began to offer the prospect of market stability as the 2008/09 financial turmoil had proved financial social responsibility as an essential well functioning of financial markets. sri in the light of the 2008/09 world financial crisis starting in the 1970s, financial markets increasingly became interweaved with socio-politics. the diminishing power of nation states 4 who cares wins: connecting financial markets to a changing world: recommendations by the financial industry to better integrate environmental, social and governance issues in analysis, asset management and securities brokerage. the united nations global compact office. retrieved from the internet at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/whocareswins.pdf consilience 54 in a globalizing world shifted social responsibility attribution onto the private sector (ahmad, 2008; puaschunder, 2010). since the 1990s, capitalism has grown into the triumphant market system and upcoming financial market dominance was forecasted. financial social responsibility increasingly leveraged a global governance means in the wake of financial markets’ outreach into socio-political affairs. rising levels of social venture capital for international development led to predictions about the increasing influence of financial markets in public affairs and social welfare provision. the 2008/09 world financial crisis, however, put new perspectives on financial markets’ global hegemony and redefined the impetus of the investment world in global affairs. the 2008/09 world financial crisis’ impact on economic markets, international financial policy frameworks, and society is indubitable. caused by the neglect of social responsibility of fallible market actors coupled with absent accountability in liberal markets, the world economy weakened beginning around august 2008. the crisis caused what alan greenspan called a ‘once in a century credit tsunami’ featuring governmental takeovers and corporate bailouts, a lock-up of credit markets and inter-bank lending, a 25 percent drop in financial market indices, bailed-out european countries, and a hampered us economy (duchac, 2008). after the steady rise of sri in recent decades, stakeholder concerns for financial social responsibility climaxed in the eye of the 2008 financial meltdown. since the outbreak of the crisis, the societal call for social responsibility in corporate and financial markets has reached unprecedented momentum. the revelation of corporate social misconduct and financial fraud steered consumers and investors to increasingly pay attention to social responsibility within market systems (roberts, 2010). media coverage of corporate scandals, fiduciary breaches, and astronomic ceo remuneration fostered the need for financial social conscientiousness. financial managers’ exuberance fueled the demand for transparent and accountable corporate conduct. stakeholder pressure addressed information disclosure of corporate activities. market actors were confronted with growing societal expectations of disciplined corporate conduct under conditions of heightened levels of public scrutiny. corporate scandals also drove the wish for restoring public trust in financial markets. the announcement of the recapitalization of the finance sector in october 2008 perpetuated skepticism in the performance of unregulated markets and halted liberalization trends. stakeholders demanded governmental control of corporate social conduct and pushed for financial market regulations. a redefined interplay of public and private sector forces was meant to ensure social responsibility and strengthen confidence in financial markets (deegan & blomquist, 2006; kotler & lee, 2005). governmental bailouts renewed public claims in financial market consilience puaschunder: trends in sri control to lower agency default risks. in his historic inauguration speech, us president barack obama drew attention to the importance of social responsibility for economic prosperity, voicing the collective demand for a well-balanced interplay of public and private forces: “regained regulatory power should ensure social responsibility in the corporate and finance world as a prerequisite for sustainable markets. legislative reforms and governmental regulations set out to institutionalize social responsibility in financial markets. technocrats’ “watchful eye over the market place” should oversee socially responsible financial conduct and ingrain long-term societal considerations in shortsighted market actors” (obama, in speech, january 21, 2009). newly installed financial market disclosure regulations set out to prevent financial fraud steering economic turmoil. transparency of private sector activities and accountability of financial market operations should naturally lower principal-agent default risks. public and private leaders as well as academics followed these trends by searching for financial social conscientiousness-enhancing market structures, while investors aimed at restoring general public trust in financial markets – e.g., the theme of the 2011 bretton woods institute for new economic thinking conference (nowotny, in speech, 2009; tumpel-gugerell, 2009). the renewed acknowledgement of financial social conscientiousness as well as the regulatory renaissance in the finance world are believed to make sri prosper (duchac, 2008; roberts, 2010). ever since its existence, financial social responsibility has been perpetuated by socially and environmentally problematic situations and flourished in the eye of socio-political deficiencies. as for being less volatile during cyclical changes and more robust for whimsical market movements during economic turmoil, socially responsible funds are proven as crisis-stable market options. especially negative screenings are extremely robust in times of heightened uncertainty – as socially conscientious investors remain loyal to core values even during uncertainty. given this track record of growth and stability in times of societal and economic downturns, nowadays sri appears as a favorable market strategy. research-based transparency campaigns could aid this trend by promoting sri as a crisis-stable market option. concurrent executive education may also nurture social conscientiousness in financial leaders as role models who motivate others to follow their paths. in the aftermath of the 2008/09 financial meltdown, sri appears as a powerful means to implement financial social conduct and thereby opens a window of opportunity for re-establishing stakeholders’ trust in financial markets. ingraining social conscientiousness in financial markets promises to positively echo in the industry and thereby bring positive socio-economic change. if the majority of investors are socially responsible and social consilience 56 conscientiousness becomes a standard feature of financial decisionmaking, this will also reflect positively on corporate social performance. if more and more investors are willing to pay for socially responsible assets, firms in general will be incentivized to adopt more socially responsible practices. in this scenario, all investors will have to accept some degree of socially responsible contributions in response to rising socially conscientious market options. sri thus holds the potential to lift entire market industries to a more socially favorable level in the future. while financial social responsibility appears as the optimum means to avert future socially irresponsible corporate conduct and an after-crisis catharsis may have opened a window of opportunity for a prospected rise of sri, little is actually known about the socioeconomic impact of the financial crisis on sri in the interplay of financial markets and real economies. in the currently newly restructured economic markets that more than ever are attentive to the idea of financial social responsibility of disciplined market actors, future studies may innovatively capture sri trends during this unprecedented time of economic change. future perspectives in the aftermath of the 2008/09 world financial crisis, the demand for ingraining ethicality in financial decision-making has reached unprecedented momentum. if sri is not further investigated at this unique moment in time, the enormous potential of sri as an emergent risk prevention and means to imbue trust in the post-2008/09 world financial crisis economy would be missed (puaschunder, 2016a). as a window of opportunity for change, the world’s most severe financial meltdown since the great depression underlined the fact that classic financial and economic theories do not accurately model the full realm of financial social responsibility decision making outcomes. in newly restructuring economic markets demanding social responsibility of disciplined market actors, future studies may capture novel sri trends. when investigating the impact of the 2008/09 world financial crisis on sri, a holistic viewpoint on financial social responsibility must be taken. innovatively coupling individual decision-making research findings’ with insights on external influences on social responsibility promises to help in managing financial market social responsibility risks for society. while micro-behavioral economists may in particular unravel human socially responsible cognition in the search for human-imbued ethicality nudges, macroeconomists may explain how individual social responsibility can shape collective market outcomes. general investigations of the perception of sri in the aftermath of the 2008/09 financial downturn could determine in what way the consilience puaschunder: trends in sri financial crisis has changed the financial community’s view of economic markets’ social responsibility obligations. once-in-a-century available information on the social representations of financial social conscientiousness in post-crisis markets should be reaped as a unique source on societal perceptions of financial market reforms. studying investors’ cognition on sri in this unique point in time also provides an innovative snapshot of the current crises’ potentials to ingrain ethicality in competitive market systems. concurrent multi-stakeholder analyses may attribute the newly defined role of public and private constituents in social contributions and search for the optimum balance of deregulated market systems and governmental control in providing financial social responsibility. capturing real-market social responsibility phenomena could thereby not only help in finding well-tempered public-private partnership networks to support modern market economies. oversight accountability could also present information on corporate and financial social conduct that will lead academics, technocrats, and practitioners to reflect deeper about responsibility within market systems and rethink their roles in backing socially favorable market structures. while ingraining social conscientiousness in financial market appears as a panacea to avert future economic crisis, behavioral economists may contribute their insights on the human natural laws of social responsibility (puaschunder, 2011). behavioral ethics specialists may inform the role of bounded rationality for financial-social cognition and investigate accidental ethicality mishaps in financial markets in laboratory experiments (bazerman & tenbrunsel, 2011; shu, gino & bazerman, 2011). becoming aware of the bounds of human ethicality will help in reducing cognitive barriers on moral dilemmas and alleviate potential financial-social decision-making predicaments (bazerman & moore, 2009). evolutionary psychologists may explore the emergence of ethicality in human beings by investigating which aspects of social responsibility are ingrained in human traits and the constitution of mind and which ones are nurtured by external factors. organizational behavior scholars may add by attributing how goals can stipulate ethicality. unpacking social responsibility incentives but also goal setting with accidental negative externalities appear as interesting research avenues. in the case of financial markets, short-term goals can lead to critically trade-off from long-term societal endeavors (shilon, 2011; tsay, shu & bazerman, 2011). extensions of current sri could focus on curbing shortsightedness in financial market decisions with implicit negative societal externalities. for instance, as a fortification of political divestiture advocating for conscientiousness of financial market transactions, socially harmful, shortsighted day-trading in externally-shocked crises markets could be considered for ethical consilience 58 scrutiny. as the most recent example, divestiture from japan in the aftermath of the 2011 nuclear crisis underlined how investment withdrawals during times of external shocks can add additional frictions to already weakened economies. in the case of japan, it took several days until shortsighted arbitrage trades unethically pressuring the already-fragile japanese market with additional financial unrest were stopped. respective international financial market regulations would have been a quicker-to-hand solution to curb unintended socially harmful negative externalities caused by the collective impact of shortsighted day-traders going short on japan. the case of japan outlines our understanding of what a globalized world implies, remaining limited in the domain of collective social responsibility. regulations appear to be lagging behind when considering novel challenges in the eye of interdependent economic, institutional, and political networks determining financial market moves. new risks are imposed onto corporate and financial actors by fast-paced information flows that increase the complexity of decision-making contexts and the cognitive overload of fallible financial leaders. wading through these newly created multi-complex environments has become a formidable task for public technocrats and private practitioners. science may attribute how a globalizing world moderates individuals’ decision making on social responsibility in order to avert predictable surprises of future global crises. future research on the fallibility of human decision-makers and external, global influences on social responsibility may help in deriving recommendations on how to steer socially conscientious behavioral patterns in modern economic markets. all these endeavors are aimed at fostering financial social responsibility as a future guarantor of economic stability and sustainable social progress throughout the world. as an overarching goal, helping to leverage sri into a more mainstream economic trend by fostering financial social conscientiousness as an implicit financial crises mitigation means can aid financial market stability. this piece will hopefully contribute to a future rise of social responsibility in our currently globalizing, economically transforming, and environmentallyfragile world, in which we should certainly feel responsible. consilience puaschunder: trends in sri references ahmad, m. 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(2002). response to “confronting the critics.” new academy review, 1, 230-237. microsoft word bakari.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 13, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 195-216 sustainability and contemporary man-nature divide: aspects of conflict, alienation, and beyond mohamed el-kamel bakari department of english language university of mannouba, tunis, tunisia kamel3_2000@yahoo.com abstract the rise of modern capitalism, which is based largely on enlightenment thinking and the primacy of exponential economic growth, has usually been considered the starting point of environmental degradation and the abuse of nature. post-industrial societies, therefore, have been characterized by a disturbed environment-society relationship manifesting itself as ecological disasters as well as the prevailing instrumental view of nature under the current neoliberal capitalist paradigm of development. using this framework, this article aims to discuss whether or not the current environment-society relationship is wholly at odds with the holistic view of nature within the sustainability discourse. some important features of globalization, such as ‘time-space distanciation,’ rising ‘corporatism,’ and ‘global consumerism’, are also relevant to this discussion. special emphasis is placed on the increasingly conspicuous aspects of human alienation from nature within modern societies as well as the concomitant social and cultural dislocations that the lingering man-nature divide has engendered. ultimately, the potential of new initiatives to bridge this divide and promote sustainability is highlighted and research questions are thrown up for further scholarly investigation. author’s note mohamed el-kamel bakari, phd in american studies, is a published researcher in globalization and sustainable development studies. keywords: sustainability, sustainable development, consumerism, mannature divide, alienation, ecologism. 1. introduction engendering a radically different vision of development, nature, and society, sustainable development emerged as a real challenge to the current socio-economic paradigm of growth based mainly on neoliberal capitalism. the new sustainability discourse preaches a new approach to the accommodation of different political, economic, and social variables in light of new ecological challenges such as ozone layer depletion, global warming, and climate change. in doing so, sustainable development departs significantly from the 1970s environmental movement’s narrow focus on single issues such as pollution, diversity loss, and other expressions of the abuse of nature. the most distinctive feature of this new paradigm, therefore, is that it not only questions the current trade-offs between the environment and economic growth, but it also places environmental issues in broader social, economic, and consilience bakari: sustainability and contemporary man-nature divide political contexts. launched within the rather hostile context of neoliberal capitalism, sustainable development has unveiled a deep man-nature divide with an intensifying sense of alienation from mother nature in contemporary post-industrial societies. 2. contemporary society-environment relationship over the decades, capitalism has been upheld by theorists, economists, and politicians who assert that free trade, capital flow, and state non-intervention policies lead to economic growth, wealth creation, and, ultimately, well-being for the whole of society. neoliberal economists (e.g., bhagwati, 2007; norberg, 2003/2007; sagoff, 2000) argue, for instance, that more consumption means more growth whereas less consumption means less growth and well-being for society. however, throughout this process of wealth creation, nature, as an independent entity, has been largely excluded from this equation and has existed only as a source of raw materials or a recipient of industrial and chemical waste. more and more critics (e.g., brown, 2002; speth, 2008; carter, 2007; jahiel, 2009), therefore, consider the rise of modern capitalism as the main cause of human society’s alienation from nature, which has been conducive to a disturbed society-environment relationship. although some forms of environmental degradation with limited regional impact did exist in pre-industrial society, some scholars (e.g., goldemberg, 2003; altvater, 1998; dresner, 2002; kütting, 2004) assert that the global features of contemporary environmental degradation are generally associated with the industrial revolution and the subsequent economic growth of industrialized countries. against this backdrop, the relationship between environmental degradation and today’s socio-economic model of development was often regarded as part of ‘the modernity project.’ for neoliberal economists, “environmental problems, rather than being caused by economic growth as measured by gdp, can be solved by growth” (robbins, 2009 p. 5). conversely, for critics like ann dale (2001), stuart hart (2009), and andres r. edwards (2008), the subordination of the environment to economic growth marked a turning point in the society-environment relationship, ushering in a new phase of alienation between man and nature. this growing divide between man and nature constitutes one of the main obstacles of sustainable development, which advocates a new conception of the society-environment relationship. one of the milestones in the ongoing debate on the society-environment relationship was the publication of the limits to growth by donella h. meadows, dennis l. meadows, jørgen randers, and william w. behrens in 1972. as the environmental movement gained momentum in the 1970s, this document triggered a heated debate about the existence of ecological limits to economic and population growth. using state-of-the-art computer modeling techniques, the authors came to the conclusion that if existing growth rates continued, “the limits to growth on this planet [would] be reached sometimes within the next one hundred years” (meadows, d. h., meadows, d.l., randers, j., & behrens, w. w., 1974, p. 23). with all its alarming findings, this report was significant in advancing the environmental movement in the 1970s and 1980s and in drawing public attention to environmental concerns. consilience bakari: sustainability and contemporary man-nature divide in addition to making the environment a high-profile issue on the political agenda of the time, the limits to growth informed ‘green ideology’ or ‘ecologism’1 in various other ways. as a matter of fact, this report gave sustainable development a solid raison d’être that thoroughly informed its discourse and articulated its approach to economy, society, and nature. scholar neil carter pointedly argues, for instance, that “the concept of finitude underpinning the ‘limits to growth’ thesis is unique to ecologism; it implies that any future sustainable world will be characterised by material scarcity rather than abundance” (2007, p. 43). this document has also been an important eye-opener for the american public regarding the different dimensions of the society-environment relationship. thus, in the wake of the ‘limits to growth’ thesis, this prevailing environment-society relationship characterizing the current socio-economic paradigm of growth has been widely called into question, hence the growing literature on the necessity of alternative paradigms of development. the contemporary society-environment relationship constitutes but one main feature of the incompatibility between the current socio-economic paradigm of growth and sustainable development. while the overall message of the limits to growth is that environmental degradation is inextricably linked to neoliberal capitalist economic, social, and political systems, neoliberal economists (e.g., bhagwati, 2007; norberg, 2003/2007) still insist that the solutions for environmental problems necessitate more economic growth. therefore, a real shift in the society-environment relationship is still not on their agenda, and radical changes to the neoliberal capitalist modes of production and consumption continue to be dismissed. from an environmentalist point of view, the neoliberal capitalist drive for continuous exponential economic growth contradicts the idea of ‘limits to growth’ and the need to live within the ecological carrying capacity of the earth. neoliberal capitalism has also caused society to become more alienated from its physical environment. in fact, critics like ann dale (2001) and stuart hart (2009) believe that the more societies industrialize, the more this alienation intensifies. armed with modern science and technology, most citizens of industrialized societies developed a solid conviction that they have become the absolute masters of nature rather than being an integral part of it. hence, “by controlling public awareness of environmental issues, the media, corporations, and governments, and often religious institutions help foster the ideology that human beings were put on earth to dominate nature,” upholding a “patriarchal capitalism that equates the domination of nature with the domination of women” (robbins, 2009, p. 14). at this very juncture, the different features of the man-nature divide come to the fore and manifest themselves in the form of further estrangement from the natural environment. historically, this dichotomy between man’s mastery of nature and man’s subservience to nature dates back long before the inception of sustainable 1 this term is often used in the literature to refer to “a distinctive green political ideology encompassing those perspectives that hold that a sustainable society requires radical change in our relationship with the non-human natural world and our mode of economic, social and political life” (carter, 2007, p. 6). the father of ‘ecologism,’ philosopher arne naess, stresses the new vision in what he refers to as ‘deep ecology’ or ‘ecologism,’ putting it as follows: “i believe that multifaceted, high-level self-realization is more easily reached through a lifestyle which is ‘simple in means but rich in ends’ rather than through the material standard of living of the average citizens of industrial states” (1995, p. 82). consilience bakari: sustainability and contemporary man-nature divide development in the late 20th century. in the literature, this notion has been referred to as the ‘mechanism-organism’ dichotomy—between a ‘machine-based’ approach to development that usually encompasses an instrumental view of nature and a holistic view of development that views humans as an integral part of nature (kütting, 2004). overall, this ‘instrumental’ approach to nature seems to perpetuate a disturbed society-environment relationship in modern societies, for it downplays the seriousness and urgency of the ecological problems caused by the prevalent unsustainable patterns of economic growth. it does so by trying to fix environmental problems individually while claiming they have little connection with other social and ecological issues. this approach is often embodied in the ‘fragmented’ policies of modern governments vis-à-vis environmental issues. by thwarting the holistic view of nature, modern capitalism reduces nature to simple compartmentalized parts that are dealt with independently. this approach corrodes the main cause of sustainable development based totally on a different kind of society-environment relationship. undoubtedly, the society-environment relationship varies according to the degree of industrialization and the wealth of nations, the predominant culture in a given society, and the type of livelihood that citizens have within that society. in modern, industrialized societies, however, the alienation that characterizes man’s relationship with nature is exacerbated by higher rates of mass production and consumption nurtured by the principles of neoliberal capitalism. indeed, the current socio-economic paradigm of growth systematically weakens efforts to raise citizens’ awareness of ecological problems and reverse the estrangement of society from the environment. the instrumental approach to nature in contemporary neoliberal capitalism jeopardizes strategies for realizing a sustainable mode of development as it places man as the master of his environment and downplays the intrinsic value of nature. as this top-down society-environment relationship prevails, people’s estrangement from nature deepens, limiting their consciousness of their harmful abuses of the environment. this alienation intensifies even more when the process of globalization further obscures current environmental degradation by constantly nourishing a growing ‘global consumer culture’ that systematically reduces nature to a mere source of bounties. 3. ‘global consumer culture’ and the ‘limits to growth’ with the rise of neoliberal capitalism and the onset of globalization, human production and consumption volumes have increased exponentially over the past century.2 this explosion in production and consumption patterns has had profound economic, political, and cultural ramifications worldwide. the fervent quest for material well-being, the voracious accumulation of wealth, and the insatiable desire for further consumption in industrialized societies have all grown into a fast-growing phenomenon dubbed ‘global consumer culture’ (mooij, 2011; bakari, 2013). the global economic changes of the last quarter of the 20th century and the early 21st 2 recent statistics show, for example, that over the 20th century (from 1890s to 1990s): the overall world economy doubled up to 14 fold; world population doubled up to 4 fold; overall energy use doubled up to 16 fold; carbon dioxide emissions doubled up to 35 fold; water use doubled up to 16 fold; and marine fish catch doubled up to 35 fold (speth, 2008, p. 50). consilience bakari: sustainability and contemporary man-nature divide century have also brought about numerous fundamental changes to consumer ethic prevalent in these post-industrial societies. due to globalization, ‘consumer culture’ – also referred to as ‘global consumerism’ – has been widely exported through mass media to the rest of the world where societies have, to different degrees, adopted and identified with the prevalent western lifestyle (sydee & beder, 2009; kütting, 2004). this section will focus on the negative effects that ‘global consumer culture’ has had on the emerging project of sustainable development and the resultant intensification of the mannature divide in light of the aforementioned processes. more it will spotlight the dramatic societal and cultural changes that hinder the progress of sustainability in the context of neoliberal capitalism. understanding the far-reaching effects of these economic and cultural changes is essential to discerning the nature and scope of the clash between the current paradigm of growth and sustainable development. although ‘culture’ is an elusive concept to define, this article will consider the sum of the predominant social practices and beliefs underpinning the prevailing economic, political, and religious systems as the culture of post-industrial societies. over the last few decades, the society-environment relationship of industrialized societies has become both blurred and unrealistic mainly because it does not reflect the real magnitude of environmental degradation, thus engendering a concomitant sense of alienation between society and nature. this estrangement from nature has both contributed to and been nourished by the surge of mass consumption habits, especially in wealthy, industrialized societies. observers assert, for example, that consumerism nowadays is not only a “pillar of modern capitalism,” but also “an approach to life and social well-being that elevates the material conditions of life over the spiritual and social dimensions” (speth, 2008, p. 147). globally, transnational corporations (tncs) have played an important role in popularizing consumer culture in order to open new markets and sustain economy growth (hart, 2009; speth, 2008). scholar stuart l. hart also contends that “such corporate dominance is leading to a worldwide commercial monoculture based upon the values of western consumerism and bringing with it the decline of local cultures, products, and traditions” (2009, p. xxxvii). this ‘cultural globalization,’ also referred to as ‘westernization,’ has contributed to the spread of standardized mass consumption patterns that have, in turn, led to the creation of what came to be known as ‘global consumerism.’ the phenomenon of ‘cultural globalization’ has been criticized for failing to produce a new form of a ‘global’ culture, instead “artificially creating a transnational cultural type that is predominantly characterized by the consumption of global brand names and a particular form of news and entertainment” (kütting, 2004, p. 45). what is heralded as a global culture, other critics note, is but the spread of western consumption patterns, which is closer to an economic phenomenon than to a new form of culture (sydee & beder, 2009). more important than these definitional problems is the damage that this ‘consumer culture’ or ‘global consumerism’ inflicts on efforts to bridge the man-nature divide and implement the sustainability agenda. the argument that the excessive consumption of earth’s natural resources results in environmental degradation is not new, for it dates back to the beginning of the environmental movement in the early 1970s. reports such as the limits to growth by the club of rome has had a far-reaching influence on environmentalists and other activists who questioned the prevailing culture of consumerism that led to consilience bakari: sustainability and contemporary man-nature divide unprecedented rates of environmental abuse. being another distinctive feature of neoliberal capitalism, the issue of overconsumption represents one of the biggest obstacles to sustainable development today. the challenge facing this new paradigm is twofold: first, most attempts to implement sustainable development strategies take place in a very unpropitious context dominated by unsustainable fossil fuel-based modes of economic growth with little consideration for ecological limits. secondly, this new paradigm aims at establishing a broad type of ‘ecological consciousness’ in post-industrial societies where consumer ethics are still deeply entrenched. for the most part, many of the obstacles facing sustainable development are closely related to contemporary developmental options. many studies (e.g., goldemberg, 2003; venetoulis & talberth, 2009; radermacher, 2004; wwf, 2012), for example, show that the excessive consumption of the planet’s renewable and non-renewable resources has caused increasingly irreversible environmental degradation that transformed from local to global by the turn of the 21st century. nevertheless, the neoliberal capitalist approach that prevails in global economic, trade, and developmental institutions is based on the assumption that the high standards of living currently enjoyed by the richest 20 per cent of the world’s population can be extended to the rest of the world if they follow the same path of economic growth (rostow, 1991). moreover, the powerful tncs, through their relentless worldwide media propaganda popularizing ‘global consumer culture’ and exporting consumer ethics, are dwarfing efforts to popularize sustainability both locally and globally. as with production, consumption reflects another feature of the dichotomy between sustainable development and neoliberal capitalism. given their conflicting theoretical underpinnings, neoliberal capitalist and sustainable development discourses have two contradictory visions of consumption. neoliberal economists (e.g., sagoff, 2000; krugman & venables, 1995; bhagwati, 2007), for example, consider growth and consumption to be essential tenet of modern development that can be extended indefinitely. in fact, consumption is thought of as the very engine of growth in a society “that considers trade and consumption the source of all wellbeing […] built on the foundation of perpetual economic growth, in which we are required to produce and buy more this year than last year and more next year than this year in perpetuity” (robbins, 2009, p. 1). in other words, the neoliberal capitalist approach considers consumption the last stage in the production-consumption cycle, which means that once a product is consumed, more products must be manufactured to satisfy growing consumer demand and make more profits. counterbalancing this zeal for global consumption comes sustainable development’s rallying cry for sagacious patterns of consumption within the carrying capacities of the planet. from an environmentalist point of view, consumption remains but one stage that has to be interconnected with other stages such as environmentally-friendly production, the preservation of the common good, and the process of recycling to alleviate the pressure on renewable and non-renewable resources (kütting, 2004, pp. 55-60). the ‘limits to growth’ principle, therefore, plays a vital role in sensitizing the public to the required rates and scopes of consumption within the project of sustainable development. “a green economy [that] would be based on production primarily for use rather than profit, and would thereby rule out such frivolous consumption” has, therefore, become one of the major objectives of this project, argues scholar neil carter (2007, p. 48). however, this new concept is consilience bakari: sustainability and contemporary man-nature divide still evidently incongruous in the context of neoliberal capitalism, which prioritizes economic growth and ever-increasing consumption at the expense of sustainability. another important feature of this dichotomy is also revealed by the issue of waste and recycling after consumption. by and large, the neoliberal capitalist approach considers consumption to be the last stage in the production-consumption process, and thus hardly takes into account the way the consumer disposes of the goods consumed. this neglect of the recycling process, critics argue, further alienates society from its environment, and disconnects these consumers from their social and environmental responsibilities (kütting, 2004, p. 58). environmentalists, on the other hand, consider waste disposal to be the last stage in the ‘production-consumptiondisposal cycle.’ scholars pamela chasek, david downie, and janet brown note, for instance, that only under huge pressure from environmentalists did governments in industrialized countries, international economic organizations, and tncs start to pay attention to the issue of waste disposal (2010, pp.141-145). still, other critics argue that the way these governments and organizations dealt with this issue has raised a lot of apprehension mainly because “corporations only take account of costs that are integral to their own functioning” and “wherever possible, the consequences of production are externalized, from waste products to the need to care for old or sick workers” (mellor, 2000, p. 157). unlike the current socio-economic paradigm of development, sustainable development discourse does not consider consumption to be the last stage of production and attaches great importance to recycling, the use of environmentallyfriendly ‘green’ technologies, and less energy-efficient growth.3 this divergence in the conception of consumption and consumerism lays bare another fundamental feature of the incompatibility between neoliberal capitalism and sustainable development. the perception of the consumer in the neoliberal capitalist paradigm of development is, for instance, radically different from the one held in the sustainability paradigm, hence the discrepancy in the consumer ethic of the discourses. while consumers are often portrayed as passive elements targeted by the huge power of advertisement and the allure of modern lifestyle in neoliberal capitalism, they are held accountable for their choices and patterns of consumption in the sustainable development discourse. this juxtaposition provides insight into the extent to which the two paradigms diverge and the difficulty in establishing a new consumer ethic in this context. on the whole, the current socio-economic model of growth thwarts efforts to raise ‘ecological’ consciousness when it absolves consumers of their responsibility on the grounds that they are constrained in their actions and choices by supply and demand. critics (e.g., kütting, 2004) point to the huge pressure from advertising to ‘keep up with the joneses’ and the prevalent ethic of the consumer society as a major impediment to effecting social change with regards to consumption. on the contrary, the sustainable development discourse places emphasis on the will of consumers as conscious citizens despite the presence of the materialistic ethic and seeks to 3 a great emphasis is placed, for example, on recycling, the efficient use of ‘green technology,’ and environmentally-friendly waste disposal in wced, 1987; earth charter, 2010; wwf, 2012; and unced, 1992. consilience bakari: sustainability and contemporary man-nature divide maximize their awareness regarding the need to consume sustainably in documents such as the bruntland report, the earth charter, and agenda 21.4 the discrepancy between the two paradigms is also reinforced by the unequal distribution of wealth5 and its concomitant consequences on both society and the environment. though consumption itself is one of the integral pillars of capitalism, the scale and nature of consumption advocated by neoliberal capitalism goes far beyond the human needs for food and shelter. given this overwhelming drive for exponential economic growth, observers point out that “the most characteristic feature of modern capitalism is its insatiability” (campbell, 1987, p. 37). what is more alarming, in my view, is that not only do modern societies insatiably consume more than what they actually need, but they also expect that increasing consumption rates will guarantee more welfare, in an illogical defiance of the finiteness of earth’s natural resources. environmentalists and thinkers such as speth (2008), hart (2009), edwards (2008), dale (2001) hawken, lovins and lovins (2008), among others, argue that if contemporary industrialized society is to survive this ecological crisis, it has to change from a consumer society to a conserver society. in such a ‘conserver’ society, explains neil carter, “any quantitative reduction in the overall material standard of life in the sustainable economy will be more than compensated for by the resulting benefits; both material, such as improved craftsmanship, healthier food, and safer communities; and ‘spiritual,’ such as happiness, individual fulfillment, and a more cooperative society” (2007, p. 49). to put it in a nutshell, the emphasis on production-consumption processes, the dissemination of materialist ethics, and the neglect of environmental exigencies have all contributed to the yawning man-nature divide by perpetuating patterns of environmental degradation. looking at the big picture, this linear vision of progress advocated by neoliberal capitalism is one of the major obstacles to the project of sustainable development, which strives to awaken consumers to the drawbacks of consumer culture. the resultant man-nature divide grows even more conspicuous as the process of globalization intensifies, ushering in the new phenomenon of ‘timespace distanciation.’ this will be discussed in the following section. 4. globalization and the phenomenon of ‘time-space distanciation’ closely linked to the disturbed environment-society relationship that has marked contemporary post-industrial societies, ‘time-space distanciation’ is another feature of the current socio-economic paradigm of growth as a whole, and particularly of the intensifying process of globalization. one important aspect of this feature is that mass production and consumption typical of industrialized societies 4 agenda 21 is one of the main documents that were drafted at the 1992 united nations conference on environment and development. it spells out a blueprint of action to be taken by the different un organizations, governments, ngos and other organizations at the global, national, and local levels in areas where there have been negative human effects on the environment. 5 recent statistics of the global wealth report 2010, published by the credit suisse research institute, show, for instance, that 0.5 percent of global population (adults) share 35.6 percent of global wealth whereas 68.4 percent of global population (adults) share only 4.2 percent of global wealth (pizzigati, 2010). consilience bakari: sustainability and contemporary man-nature divide usually take place far away from resource extraction process, thus obscuring the concomitant environmental abuse and further degrading the environment-society relationship. the concept of ‘time-space distanciation’ is defined by scholar gabriela kütting as follows: the basic idea behind this concept is that under globalization social relations are spatially removed, creating global-local linkages through economic and cultural practices. at the same time social relations are also temporally removed in two ways: first of all, events can be experienced simultaneously in different places through sophisticated technology and, second, the consequences of an action or policy may not be felt in a different place until sometime after actual events (temporal distanciation). so, time-space distanciation is mostly about global-local linkages. (2004, p. 33) before delving into the effects of ‘time-space distanciation’ on sustainability, it must be pointed out that globalization itself is a very contentious concept (bakari, 2013). despite widespread criticism, proponents of globalization argue that the whole world has benefited from it and particularly from the resulting increase in global trade and capital flow. neoliberal theorists and economists such as jagdish bhagwati (2007), johan norberg (2007), paul krugman, and anthony venables (1995), among many others, defend globalization as the ‘engine of wealth creation’ that will ultimately benefit all segments of society in both developed and developing countries thanks to what is commonly referred to as ‘trickle-down economics.’ 6 boosting the growth agenda, reducing trade tariffs, disseminating modern telecommunication technologies, and promoting more freedom of movement and communication are some of the principal concepts the advocates of globalization share and defend. in his book, in defense of global capitalism, economist johan norberg, for example, argues that capitalism and economic globalization offer unlimited opportunities for the development and well-being of humankind: at its core, belief in capitalism is belief in mankind [….] in the cultural arena, that means freedom of expression and the freedom of the press. in politics, it means democracy and the rule of law. in social life, it means the right to live according to one’s own values and to choose one’s own company. and in the economy, it means capitalism and free markets. (2007, pp. 266-267) one major argument set forth by defenders of globalization such as johan norberg (2007, pp. 266-67), paul krugman and anthony venables (1995, pp. 875-76) is that globalization empowers poor and rich nations alike to transcend geographical, political, ideological, and cultural barriers and open up to a world full of opportunities to improve living standards and achieve sound development. according to its advocates, globalization has numerous benefits such as promoting freedom and allowing the working class to pursue alternative opportunities and throw off local constraints. they also claim that these opportunities will ultimately 6 according to economists, the trickle-down theory (aka trickle-down economics) is fundamentally based on the belief that “the accumulation of wealth by the rich is good for the poor since some of the increased wealth of the rich trickles down to the poor” (aghion & bolton, 1997, p. 151). consilience bakari: sustainability and contemporary man-nature divide lead to the ‘liberation’ of human thinking as borders vanish and the world becomes more interconnected (norberg 2007, p. 263). proponents of globalization also dispute many anti-globalization arguments, pointing out that critics’ attacks on ‘hypercapitalism’ originate from elements that have traditionally opposed free markets and free trade, such as ‘third world regimes,’ conservative intellectuals, new left movements, and environmental movement, which are all afraid of globalization’s empowerment of the people at the expense of their political institutions (norberg 2007, pp. 263-64). according to this view, having a globally interconnected economic system with a free flow of capital and liberalized trade is not a curse, but a blessing. scholar johan norberg concludes that globalization is portrayed as an unfettered monster only because politicians cannot subject it to their authorities (2007, pp. 263-64). notwithstanding this celebration of the benefits of globalization and capitalism, the prominence of environmental issues since the 1970s onwards has cast a shadow on the validity of this model of growth. with the advent of sustainable development by the turn of the century, many of the benefits of neoliberal capitalism in general, and of globalization in particular, have been called into question. the effects of new phenomena brought about by globalization such as ‘time-space distanciation’ have gradually become the focal points of many scholarly debates and academic studies. before probing its far-reaching implications, however, it is essential to spotlight the historical context in which ‘time-space distanciation’ came to the fore. there is now a widely-held belief that globalization, with all its overwhelming and unrelenting economic, social, technological, and cultural processes, has made of the world a ‘global village.’ thanks to technological telecommunication breakthroughs, remote parts of the world have become unprecedentedly interconnected. indeed, many observers (e.g., blewitt, 2008; chasek, downie, & brown, 2010; choudary, 2004) talk about how the ‘local’ has become closely connected to the ‘global’ not only economically, but also politically and culturally. as such, the benefits that globalization has brought about in different fields such as telecommunication, global transport, education, arts, social activism, and global intellectual and scientific debates are beyond any doubt. in fact, the modes and scopes of environmental activism have been revolutionized by the intensifying interconnectedness of different green ngos (non-governmental organizations) with the onset of globalization. in recent years, however, more and more observers (e.g., dale, 2001; kütting, 2004; speth, 2008) have pointed out that as a result of this ‘distanciation,’ citizens of post-industrial societies have become gradually estranged from the environment and almost blinded by a false sense of well-being to the actual degree of environmental degradation. by and large, despite the multiple benefits of globalization, the phenomenon of ‘time-space distanciations’ still reflects the magnitude of the yawning man-nature divide and underlies much of the prevalent sense of alienation from the natural environment. to begin, the phenomenon of ‘time-space distanciation’ seems to gradually disconnect societies’ economic activities from their concomitant social and environmental consequences, resulting in difficulties in establishing causal links between exponential economic growth and its negative effects on nature and society. scholars pamela s. chasek, david l. downie, and janet welsh brown further explain that ‘time-space distanciation’ “stretches the chains of production and consilience bakari: sustainability and contemporary man-nature divide consumption over great distances and across many locations, which increases the separation between sources of environmental problems and their impact” (2010, p. 367). as such, this ‘distanciation’ poses a huge challenge for sustainable development in making people conscious of the environmental damage caused by their consumption patterns as they do not witness this damage in their daily lives. with regards to the effects of this phenomenon on sustainability, they are best exemplified by two particular phenomena, namely ozone layer depletion and the growth of ‘cash crops’7 in developing countries. recent scientific studies (e.g., in chasek, downie, & brown 2010, pp.163-171) have adequately demonstrated that the ozone hole over antarctica, latin america, and australia was caused primarily by chlorofluorocarbons (cfcs) and other ozone depleting substances (ods) released into the atmosphere during decades of mass production, mass consumption, and relentless fossil fuel-based economic growth, mainly in the industrialized countries. other recent studies (e.g., in leichenko & o’brien, 2008, pp. 6-7) also show that the dire consequences of this global environmental problem strike first in small islands and developing countries, which are poorly equipped to deal with such predicaments. because citizens of industrialized societies can hardly feel the consequences of their daily abuses of nature in their daily lives, their consciousness of these abuses grows weaker over time. looking at the big picture, this type of ‘time-space distanciation’ clearly works against efforts to forge a consensus on sustainability. the second example of ‘time-space distanciation’ is ‘cash crops,’ which are grown in developing countries to satisfy global consumer demand, usually at the expense of local food shortages in developing countries. according to john blewitt, “poor nations are forced to grow cash crops and export raw materials to the affluent developed nations, who then ‘add value’ through production processes and refinement, while externalizing any environmental costs to the country of origin” (2008, pp. 12-13). other critics (e.g., kütting, 2003; maxwell & fernando, 1998) point out that because these ‘cash crops’ are grown in regions so remote from developed countries, the citizens of these countries usually have a shallow idea about what environmental damages these ‘cash crops’ cause. this type of ‘time-space distanciation’, nurtured by intensifying economic globalization, systematically creates obstacles to building a worldwide ecological consciousness upon which the paradigm of sustainable development is based. this, in turn, has exacerbated the man-nature divide over time. the consequences of this phenomenon are, therefore, detrimental to the strategies of sustainable development, for they insidiously corrode one of the chief foundations of this project—public consciousness of environmental exigencies and sustainable growth. 5. beyond the man-nature divide: bridging the gap between society and the environment despite the predominance of the current socio-economic paradigm of development and the yawning of the man-nature divide, the first decades of the 21st 7 the term ‘cash crop’ is defined differently in the literature, but the most commonly used definition refers to a crop exported and “grown specifically for sale or [that] might be sold because production was surplus to ‘domestic’ demand” (maxwell & fernando, 1989, p. 1678). consilience bakari: sustainability and contemporary man-nature divide century have witnessed a surge in scholarly rethinking of sustainable development and of development in general. people’s conspicuous estrangement from nature has been a strong eye-opener, sensitizing many contemporary thinkers, economists, and activists to the need for a reconsideration of the meaning and implementation of sustainable development. many of these thinkers aim at initiating a new holistic approach to sustainability that would be the antithesis of the traditional paradigm of development that deals with environmental issues individually. there has also been a growing conviction among thinkers and activists that tackling ecological issues separately would only result in more confusion and an incomplete understanding of what development means. professor ann dale explains the new holistic vision in the following terms: sustainable development can be regarded as a process involving the reconciliation of three imperatives: (1) the ecological imperative to live within global biophysical carrying capacity and to maintain biodiversity; (2) the social imperative to ensure the development of democratic systems of governance that can effectively propagate and sustain the values by which people wish to live, and (3) the economic imperative to ensure that basic needs are met worldwide. and equitable access to resources – ecological, social, and economic – is fundamental to its implementation. (2001, p. x) many critics (e.g., kemp kemp, parto, & gibson, 2005; hart, 2009: ikerd, 2005; strange & bayley, 2008; edwards, 2008) regard the fundamental integration of ecological, social, and economic imperatives in one comprehensive model of development to be an alternative to the current unsustainable approach to development. thanks to this integration, the economic, social, and ecological imperatives can change from competing interests to reconcilable, complementary issues. the potential of these initiatives to bridge the gap between the post-industrial societies and their natural environment should constitute an important starting point to effectively tackling the man-nature divide. as bureaucratic inefficiencies and short-sighted developmental policies have made governments part of the problem rather than the solution in the implementation of sustainable development (ashford, 2004 p. 2; dale, 2001, p. 146; kütting, 2004, p. 67), rethinking the role of government has become an essential step in overcoming today’s sustainability challenges. some scholars (e.g., kemp, parto, & gibson, 2005; strange & bayley, 2008; stahel, 2004) note that the interrelatedness of ecological, social, and economic issues in sustainable development requires more efficient collaboration among different governmental sectors than currently occurs. according to the new sustainability approach, the concept of social and economic collaboration has to replace the concepts of competition and material acquisition, which are highly valued in consumer culture. this paradigm shift in the current links between the ecological, the social, and the economic is central to any effort to reconceptualize sustainability, which would ultimately ease the man-nature divide in modern societies. above all, bridging the man-nature divide requires that institutions of modern governance develop a strong sense of relatedness and commitment to sustainability in order to implement sustainability. this transition from a top-down to a bottom-up approach to decision-making will require a fundamental redesign of consilience bakari: sustainability and contemporary man-nature divide governmental bureaucracies to institute a new type of collective decision-making that takes into account the different participants of civil society.8 thus, establishing common ground between different stakeholders such as governmental institutions, corporations, and ngos would have several benefits for the implementation of sustainable development and bridging the man-nature divide. in a similar vein, civil society can also play a vital role in reducing the alienation between humans and nature by transforming the current disturbed societyenvironment relationship to serve the purposes of sustainability. more to the point, transforming the rather blurred society-environment relationship requires the active, effective involvement of citizens and ngos in both planning and decision-making. researchers (e.g., ashford, 2004, pp. 9-10; dale, 2001, p. 160; kemp, parto, & gibson 2005, p. 18) note, for instance, that different stakeholders’ commitments are vital to revolutionizing the governance system through higher degrees of interaction between decision-makers and civil society groups. in a holistic paradigm of sustainable development, civic engagement helps harmonize ecological concerns with other social and political imperatives in society. it does so by spreading public consciousness, not only of these ecological exigencies, but most importantly of the interdependence of ecological, economic, and social issues. on the social and political levels, civic engagement cannot be effective without a propitious context that encourages bottom-up participation and establishes a solid basis for interaction between decision-makers and the citizens. plagued by an excess of bureaucracy and hierarchy, however, most contemporary governments, fail to take on board the imminent exigencies of sustainability. scholar neil carter argues, for example, that “liberal democracy nurtures an atomised individualistic focus on the private sphere, which makes it a poor breeding ground for the ecological consciousness and responsible citizenship needed to bring about a sustainable society” (2007, p. 55). according to scholar gabriela kütting, this failure has resulted in many of today’s governments turning a blind eye to social dislocations and environmental abuse in modern society, exacerbating the already disturbed man-nature relationship (2004, p. 67). for other critics (e.g., carter 55), today’s social and economic inequalities indicate clearly that the current structures of liberal-democratic governments offer limited opportunities for mainstream participation in public matters. building up on this view, bridging the current man-nature divide necessitates rethinking the cult of individualism in light of the common responsibility of safeguarding nature and establishing a balanced development in accordance with sustainability tenets. drawing on tools such social inclusion, consciousness raising, and education, the idea of participatory democracy has the potential to effect positive change on the disturbed society-environment relationship. rather than forcing the required change solely through laws and regulations, this new form of governance could progressively change citizens from being ‘self-regarding’ to becoming ‘other-regarding’ in society (carter, 2007, p. 56). on the economic level, fighting corporate economic policies that are accelerating the exhaustion of earth’s finite resources and the exploitation of 8 the term civil society is used in this thesis to stand for “the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values,” which is the definition given to this term by the london school of economics’ centre for civil society (as cited in strange & bayley, 2008, p. 118). consilience bakari: sustainability and contemporary man-nature divide workers has always been one of the top priorities of sustainability activists. with the intensification of economic globalization, however, opposing corporate hegemony has proved extremely difficult. daunting as this task might be, harnessing today’s global economic powers to work for, rather than against, sustainability may still be possible. in the literature, many scholars such as john ikerd (2005), james speth (2008), stuart hart (2009), ann dale (2001), and andreas edwards (2008) pointedly argue that what we need today is an economy that efficiently serves the collective interests of humankind as a whole rather than those of corporate elites and suggest new approaches to green business. as more and more economists and theoreticians contend that business and sustainability are not necessarily mutually exclusive, a new business ethic of achieving economic growth within the ecological carrying capacity of the earth is being preached as a basis for the ‘next industrial revolution’ (hawken, a. lovins, and l. lovins, 2008, pp. 1-4 ). according to this view (e.g., in ikerd, 2005; hart, 2009; knowles, twomey, davis, & abdul-ali, 2009; earth charter), an acceptance by business leaders of their responsibilities in fostering sustainable development and implementing its strategies is deemed crucial today. this shift will not be possible, however, without a willingness among corporate managers to adopt a new approach to making business and expanding profits. the success of this shift to green business hinges, therefore, on how efficient the paradigm of sustainable development would be in accommodating different business interests and harnessing them to achieve sustainability. hence, sustainable development is far more likely to succeed if it wins over, rather than opposes, business. still, the challenge, remains how to work with business without being overwhelmed by it. being the most prominent actors in today’s free market economy, tncs have the potential to marry sustainability and capitalism to generate a new form of environment-friendly capitalism. given the omnipresence of corporate power worldwide, these tncs can uphold the sustainability agenda9 and ensure much of its success locally, regionally, and globally (möller, 2004, pp. 23-24). stuart hart (2009, p. xl) maintains that, “by creating a new, more inclusive brand of capitalism, one that incorporates previously excluded voices, concerns, and interests, the corporate sector could become the catalyst for a truly sustainable form of global development – and prosper in the process.” many environmentalists such as speth (2008), hart (2009), edwards (2008), and dale (2001), among many others, argue that this paradigm-shift from an environment-unfriendly economy to an environment-friendly one can be achieved by mimicking the processes in ecosystems, in which by-products are recycled and reused indefinitely. other researchers (e.g., herman, ardekani, & ausubel, 1990) believe that this shift can also be achieved through what is referred to as the ‘dematerialization of the economy’, in which material and energy inputs are replaced with lighter sources of energy such as solar and wind sources. ultimately, this shift should also focus on services and technological innovations to combat the excessive consumption of energy and materials in industry, thus narrowing more and more the man-nature divide as sustainability becomes a global lifestyle. 9 for a thorough analysis and specific cases of tncs‘ endorsement of the sustainability agenda (such as the case with interface inc., unilever, philips electronics, general electric, and wal-mart), see harmon et al., 2009, pp. 101-105. consilience bakari: sustainability and contemporary man-nature divide 6. conclusions despite the prevalent rhetoric of caring for the environment in contemporary post-industrial societies, the neoliberal discourse is still holding to market efficiency and exponential economic growth as the predominant gauge for every issue related to human development. however, this approach starkly fails to take on board other equally important issues such as social equity, sustainable consumption, and equal distribution of wealth. above all, this neoliberal capitalist approach to development has resulted in the widening of the man-nature divide, which marks modern societies today. consequences range from the intensifying alienation of citizens from nature, to the governmental separation of environmental policy from other social and economic policies, which is the ultimate cause of the marginalization of environmental concerns. this chain of policies and the consequences thereof are but another impediment to sustainability strategies, which denounce the notion of gauging environmental, social, and cultural issues solely in terms of economic efficiency. by and large, this discrepancy also embodies many of the conflicting sets of values and priorities in neoliberal capitalism and sustainable development. globally, this contradiction is also echoed in other wider areas such as the global governance system, the global trade system, and north-south politics. the man-nature divide is exacerbated by one characteristic feature of globalization, namely the phenomenon of ‘time-space distanciation.’ revolutionary as it may be in other fields such as telecommunications, this feature has proved alarmingly detrimental to efforts to bridge the gap between man and nature and implement the strategies for a sustainable model of development. by creating and popularizing an unrealistic society-environment relationship, the phenomenon of ‘time-space distanciation’ makes it difficult for society to spot the direct link between the accumulation of wealth and the resultant environmental degradation, hence the growing estrangement of contemporary post-industrial societies from nature. endorsed by an intensifying process of an economic globalization, ‘time-space distanciation’ has also weakened strategies for raising public consciousness. ideologically, the supremacy of individual property rights and the intense pursuit of materialistic lifestyles prevalent in the post-industrial consumer society stand in stark contradiction with the priority of preserving nature and collective efforts to safeguard the environment in ‘ecologism.’ this further reduces the chances of survival of sustainable development in a hostile environment created by neoliberal capitalism and perpetuated by a worldwide zeal for global consumerism. on the social level, many aspects of the current socio-economic paradigm of development such as contemporary economic growth, energy consumption, and environmental degradation further exacerbate the man-nature divide. the manipulation of global trade regulations on the part of the industrialized countries has had a negative impact not only on the national economies of developing countries, but more importantly on the daily livelihoods of the millions of poor citizens in these countries. for example, it weakens their purchasing power and makes their lives ever more difficult, thus leaving them with no other option but to abuse their natural environment and become more estranged from nature. some of the root causes of this situation, therefore, can be directly attributed to the whole consilience bakari: sustainability and contemporary man-nature divide global economic system that turns the developing countries into sources of cheap raw material and underpaid labor. despite the daunting challenges facing sustainability today, green industry constitutes one of the most suitable, if not only ways, to overcome the impasse that has obstructed sustainable development. new ideas such as the ‘dematerialization of the economy’ and ‘industrial ecology’ have revolutionized business and have the potential to bridge the man-nature divide, especially through a reconceptualization of the role of government in this process. hence, new ‘green’ economic gauges, procedures, and policies, along with a new environment-friendly corporate creed, are needed to put these values into practice and make the structure of industry more compatible with sustainable development. with a new holistic environment-friendly approach to development, modern government could become part of the solution rather than part of the problem in narrowing the man-nature divide in modern societies. once it overcomes the bureaucratic fragmentation that plagues their policy-making processes, governments could become a catalyst for the revival of sustainability. with more civic engagement from local communities and ngos, governments could also become more open to bottom-up policy-making that would guarantee wider public participation and social equity. the transition from liberal democracy to participatory democracy is key to broadening the public consensus about sustainability. widening political alliances with unions, ngos, and interest groups is another effective way of gaining more ground for this new paradigm of growth. however, due to sustainable development’s holistic nature, forging green political alliances is just one step in the battle against the predominant socio-economic paradigm. hence, other economic, social, and intellectual alliances are also important tools in winning this battle. in light of these conclusions, this paper throws up some important questions in need of further investigation. if the current debate about sustainable development is to be pushed forward, a better understanding of the role of educational institutions in the dissemination of sustainability ethics needs to be developed. in-depth research is also needed to examine possible ways to revolutionize academic and scientific research in these institutions so as to better capture the multi-dimensionality of the current man-nature divide. this paper might also serve as a starting point for future studies about the possibility of marrying sustainable development with new trends in global politics and examining how faithful they are to the basic tenets of sustainability. further research of the corporate role in promoting a green economy could also be based on some of the ideas in this article. further research on the type and potential of alliances and partnerships between environmentalists and other political and civil society groups is also highly recommended. consilience bakari: sustainability and contemporary man-nature divide bibliography aghion, p., & bolton p. 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(1987). our common future. oxford: oup. microsoft word arogyaswamy_papal_final.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 18, iss. 2 (2017), pp. 1–28 energy sustainability and pope francis’ encyclical on care for our common home: national policies and corporations as change agents bernard arogyaswamy professor, madden school of business lemoyne college, arogyas@lemoyne.edu abstract it has been widely accepted by policy makers, corporate executives, and citizens alike that economic growth is the measure of a nation’s prosperity and well-being. the almost single-minded focus on growth, however, is achieved at high ecological and social cost, which has become a source of great concern. one of the driving forces behind unbridled growth has been the unquenchable thirst for energy worldwide. this paper investigates the challenges posed by the growth-energy nexus. while renewables are making giant strides, they account for a mere fraction of the world’s energy demand. the papal encyclical laudato si’ offers a detailed analysis of the harm humanity has inflicted on its common home, and the arguments developed in this paper are evaluated through the prism of the encyclical. the underlying mindset preventing more sustainable ways of generating and using energy is explored, and the need to articulate human spirituality while accepting scientific consensus is emphasized. the recent international accord addressing climate change, already facing the threat of withdrawal by the united states after the recent election, can only work if the “technocratic” paradigm is radically modified. the paper provides evidence that national and local policies mirror public attitudes to tackle deteriorating environmental and social conditions. it concludes that corporations, mentioned in passing in the encyclical, are beginning to play a central role in finding sustainable solutions, regardless of whether the international consensus holds. key words: economic growth, energy needs, papal encyclical, mindsets, government policies, corporate sustainability author’s note: consilience arogyaswamy: sustainability and the pope’s encyclical as a professor of business, my research focus has generally been on ways in which business firms can achieve greater success, particularly through innovative practices. i decided to change the direction of my enquiries, and perhaps my life, when a student of mine asked me, “but with all this innovation going on, and new products coming out all the time, aren’t we using up more and more resources and throwing away so much we have made?” not only did this set me on the path to looking at sustainable development more carefully, and why it has become such a contentious issue, i have started teaching sustainability in business and infused the concept into all my courses. after reading and studying the papal encyclical, laudato si’, i felt compelled to view it from the perspective of technical and social dimensions of energy generation and usage in a sustainable world. i think the pontiff pope has not acknowledged the contributions business firms are making to sustainable development, and will continue to do so, regardless of whether the political will to act exists or not. consilience 3 economic growth and its discontents economic growth worldwide has averaged 3% or more per year over the past twenty years, even considering the financial crisis of 2007-’08 (tani, 2016). rapid economic growth has not come without a cost. inequalities both among and within countries have been exacerbated, creating a crisis from capitalism’s unremitting and almost single-minded focus on economic growth (alderson, 2001; izaak, 2005; stiglitz, 2006). stagnating incomes have spurred a rising tide of nationalism in parts of the developed world, which appears to be driven in large part by the perception that free trade has helped millions in less developed nations at the expense of the middle class in wealthy countries (collins, 2015). the pursuit of rapid economic growth has not only contributed to rising disparities in economic outcomes and hostility to the other (across and within countries); it has also accelerated ecological damage. as rees (2012) shows, rising incomes stimulate increased consumption, thus exerting greater pressure on resources, and furthering environmental deterioration. though ignored or denied for almost two centuries after the start of the industrial revolution, environmental damage and resource shortages (costs of which are borne by society, resulting in what hardin (1968) referred to as the tragedy of the commons) have accelerated, especially over the past two decades. the question of carrying capacity (resource availability and waste/emission absorption in a specified region) has been debated for almost half a century and is now beginning to acquire ever-growing urgency (ophuls and boyan, 1992). in this paper, we focus on the challenges posed by the world’s seemingly insatiable demand for energy and natural resources. we discuss why urgent action is needed, and what forms the solutions might take. in making the case for action, we draw on the literature and on the wisdom of pope francis, as exhaustively explicated in his recent encyclical laudato si’ (2015a), and address some of the criticisms leveled against the pontiff’s assertions. we concur with the pope that a radical transformation of people’s mindsets and the development of a spiritual, reflective perspective on our relationship with nature and with one another is imperative. the paper contends that governmental policies, working in tandem with public concern over deteriorating (local) environmental and social conditions, are beginning to address the complex challenge posed by climate change. paradoxically, business firms, which have been widely consilience arogyaswamy: sustainability and the pope’s encyclical viewed as being culpable of contributing in large part to the world’s ecological and social problems, could play a leading role in finding solutions to the crisis. energy usage and carbon emissions since the industrial revolution, the predominant sources of energy have been fossil fuels, chiefly derived from oil, gas, and coal. the burning of these fuels has resulted in an increase in greenhouse gases (ghgs), most importantly carbon dioxide and methane (according to a large body of scientific evidence), which have contributed significantly to the rise in atmospheric carbon. by the first decade of this century, the carbon content in the atmosphere had gone up from 280 parts per million (ppm)in the early 19th century to over 400 ppm, an increase of over 40%. experts note that if the carbon level were to rise to the 450-500 ppm range (which is expected by 2050, if carbon generation continues at the present rate), the accumulation of carbon and its cumulative effect may become irreversible (jackson, 2009; imster, 2015). in fact, recent reports suggest that despite a brief dip in carbon emissions in 2009, carbon pumped into the atmosphere exceeded 40 gigatonnes in 2013 with co2 added at a rate of almost 2ppm per year (plait, 2014), a tonnage and rate which makes a damaging temperature increase of over two degrees celsius all but inevitable (harvey, 2011). though the united states has recently achieved a partial decoupling of emissions from growth, the substitution of gas for coal has been a contributing factor (davenport, 2016). pope francis, in his encyclical laudato si’ (2015b), cites his predecessors when arguing that an economic system whose success derives from ever-rising levels of consumption coupled with the perception that resources (including sources of energy) are limitless has had a tremendously deleterious effect on all creation. it is imperative, in his view, that we take care of our common home. echoing patriarch bartholomew, the pope posits that causing harm to any part of creation is a sin against all of creation. he calls on us, in the words of st. francis of assissi, to feel “…intimately united with all that exists…” (laudato si’, 2015c). montgomery (2015) takes issue with the encyclical on the grounds that tinkering with the market economy would hurt both the rich and the poor. he argues that, as incomes rise in developing nations, emissions and pollution will decline. as evidence, the author cites the reductions in sulphur dioxide, particulate pollution, and consilience 5 carbon emissions per capita in the united states over the past two decades. however, montgomery does not mention that a combination of many factorsgdp growth slowing down in the us, energy efficiency going up, gas substituting for coal, more stringent regulations (rather than a simple inverse relationship between income growth and emissions), and a ramping up of outsourcing of manufacturing (as well as services)contributed to the decline in ghg emissions. moreover, capitalism varies in terms of regulation, industrial policy emphasis, state ownership of firms, political freedoms, and intervention, and levels of foreign investment change from country to country (the economist, 2012). generalizing from the experience of the united states to highly dissimilar societies does not seem to be grounded in reality. the promise and limitations of renewable energy the world’s appetite for energy is so voracious that generation capacity has to be added in large chunks measured in gigawatts (gw) or billions of watts. the world’s electrical energy capacity grows by about 500 billion kwh per year (the equivalent of 30 million american households’ energy needs) and is expected to reach 26 trillion kwh in 2020 (eia, 2016), even accounting for capacity that becomes obsolete. china alone will add almost half that amount. the additions will probably be more efficient at reducing both coal consumption and co2 emissions per unit of output. however, the net carbon being added to the atmosphere is far from insignificant. the world is nowhere near the ideal of absolute decoupling or delinking energy generated and used from carbon produced. for low-carbon energy to become a reality, drastically different methods of generation, transmission, distribution, and consumption of electricity are needed. solar power generation has been growing at an extraordinary pace over the past decade, particularly in countries which are the leading carbon emitters. in the united states, for instance, a total of 7.3 gw solar photovoltaic (pv) capacity was added in 2015, with around 9gw likely in 2016. the total installed capacity of solar pv is of the order of 28gw (an approximation, since accurate data on rooftop installations is hard to come by; seia, 2016). the cost of solar cells has dropped by an order of 10 in the last 15 years, making solar even more attractive as a power source (solarcell, 2015).wind power has grown by leaps and bounds and reached a total of over 50 gw installed capacity in 2012 (eia, 2016). coal generated power installed capacity has decreased over the past few years due to consilience arogyaswamy: sustainability and the pope’s encyclical increases racked up by renewables and natural gas. just in 2015, coalfired power declined by almost 13 gw. however, considering that the country’s installed capacity for electricity generation stands at about 1100 gw, renewables constitute only around 2% of power generation added every year. the picture was, till recently,even less promising in the developing world, as noted later in the paper. the impact of fossil-fuel based power generation (and, it may be added, transportation) is made even more harmful when one considers that emissions also contain particulate aerosols. larger particles trap heat and act like ghgs, while smaller aerosols reflect light back into space, reducing warming effects. unfortunately, when inhaled, the latter (in particular, those known as pm2.5) are dangerous to health; the most widespread and immediate effects include pulmonary and cardiac illnesses. (hicks, et.al., 2012) while solar and wind power are clean, albeit non-continuous, sources of energy (unless high capacity storage systems, such as batteries become available), they are often dependent on subsidies and incentives. battery technology is indeed advancing at a rapid rate. indications, however, imply that affordable large-scale batteries may not emerge till 2020 or later. it has been noted that if renewables were installed at sufficient scale in diverse locations, this energy “portfolio” might provide a steady supply of electricity when connected to the grid (marcus, 2015). on the other hand, nuclear energy—a relatively carbon-free source of electric power—is capable of substituting for coal at a gigawatt scale. however, the risks inherent in operating huge nuclear plants and in disposing of radioactive waste have policy makers and sections of public opinion opposed to installation. large developing nations like china and india plan to install scores of nuclear plants in the coming decade, while simultaneously expanding solar and wind capacity in large chunks. it might be worthwhile for other countries with massive energy needs to explore making nuclear power safer and speedier to install in terms of product and process technology, location, and so on. the encyclical makes the case for ramping up the availability of renewable energies, and for redoubling efforts to develop better battery storage. pope francis emphasizes the importance of carbon emission mitigation efforts, such as cutting down on consumption in rich nations while substituting fossil fuels with renewable energy sources (laudato si’, 2015d). the “ecological debt” owed by early industrializers to the developing world (arising from carbon consilience 7 emissions, pollution, resource depletion) should, the pope argues, be repaid by helping poor countries ameliorate the abject conditions in which the poor live and subsidizing the use of advanced technologies (including renewables). the encyclical makes the case for systemic solutions, arguing that piecemeal efforts (e.g. renewables alone) in which one technology seeks to ameliorate the impacts of another can only make the situation worse. efforts to reduce energy usage in production and transportation as well as in living and working spaces must complement the moderation of demand and consumerist tendencies. though the encyclical does not specify the amount or modality of settling the “debt”, the fact that the concept of a debt owed by one set of nations to another has been incorporated into the paris accord ( unfccc, 2016) is an achievement in itself. equity today and in the future sustainability is often framed in terms of brundtland’s formulation of present actions not limiting future actions or harming future generations (wced, 1987). when the harm caused by carbon emissions and increased pollutants is projected to make itself felt as soon as 2050, policy makers and the general public tend to favor postponing action until definitive proof of the costs of inaction is available. however, some of the repercussions of industrial growth without restraints can be seen in the present, though climate change skeptics either deny the evidence or attribute the undeniable to natural causes. for instance, parts of the world are facing increasingly arid conditions, while other regions are being deluged with far-aboveaverage rainfall. some are experiencing rising sea levels and/or temperatures, loss of fish populations, and a variety of other persistent near-catastrophic phenomena (mckibben, 2007). all this is happening right now, and are not events which might occur sometime in the future. in nearly all these instances, the ecological burden has fallen disproportionately on the less privileged and the poor, which could be one reason why powerful actors are so slow to take action. large scale malnutrition, diseases exacerbated by warming climates, shooting wars, and floods of refugees are already posing a major challenge for countries which are not equitable societies to begin with, as well as for entire regions (such as europe) which have seen a surge in people fleeing areas of conflict engendered, in part, by the nexus of ecological damage and social inequity. the armed struggles which have broken out in parts of the middle east (e.g. consilience arogyaswamy: sustainability and the pope’s encyclical syria and iraq) and africa have been attributed to a succession of burning hot summers in regions suffering from acute poverty and wide disparities (biello, 2009). the environmental justice foundation views climate change as a “threat multiplier”, exacerbating simmering tensions in already vulnerable communities (ejf, 2017). according to the center for climate and security, agriculture-dependent areas marked by poor governance or active repression are places where climate change could be the tipping point leading to rebellion and violence (ccs, 2017). pope francis concurs, observing that “…once certain resources have been depleted, the scene will be set for new wars” (laudato si’, 2015 e). with much of the rich world preoccupied with growth and consumption, the result is “…the globalization of indifference” (laudato si, 2015f). a focus on the individual and a lack of caring for others, an obsession with technology to the detriment of a sense of community, sacrificing future generations on the altar of today’s wants, and a sense of futility when confronted by the gradual damage being done to all of creation only help institutionalize this indifference. furthermore, when tackling increasing inequality, the pontiff’s focus is on the poor of the world, particularly in less developed countries, and not so much on the middle-class in the rich world, who appear most exercised over the perceived harm caused to them by globalization. in fact, pope francis explicitly mentions decision-makers and opinion leaders living in rich urban areas as being responsible for ecological deterioration (in fishery depletion, water pollution, sea-level rising, floods, etc) which disproportionately affect the poor of the world. (laudato si’, 2015g). with rapidly increasing urbanization, the energy demands of large cities worldwide are exacerbated by the fact that city dwellers often have tenuous connections to nature in all its wonder and beauty. the work being done in some of the world’s largest cities to reduce the use of fossil fuels, conserve water, facilitate mass transport, and lower harmful emissions in partnership with firms like siemens constitutes an admission of the inadequacy of, and a direct intervention into, the workings of the market to reduce and even reverse environmental damage (portney, 2013). in gregg’s (2015) view, the encyclical has been strongly influenced by the pope’s latin american background (the use of the terms ‘global north’ and ‘global south’ seem to particularly irk the researcher), and glosses over the social and ecological damage done by left-leaning regimes (though he avows that the pontiff is no consilience 9 marxist). the author argues, like montgomery (2015) earlier, that growth is the best remedy for poverty. he finds it paradoxical that those who seem to be highly exercised over the impact of climate change on future generations do not appear as concerned about mounting debt levels. in his defense, pope francis does not exonerate leftist regimes of the past or present; he merely points out where the human race stands now, and what factors today constitute the greatest threats to our continued existence. admittedly, the pope takes a ‘subaltern’ (guha, 1983) perspective; that is, events as seen from ordinary citizens’, as opposed to the elites’, point of view. given how markets can be distorted by elites (even in countries with stable institutions), the encyclical’s intent and tone seem apropos to the state of the world. while debt and deficits are indeed worrying factors, neither are existential threats, and from the developing nations’ standpoint, ecological debt must be part of the conversation. sustainability: institutional and cultural tensions it is worth noting that concerns over anthropogenic climate change and its worsening repercussions are far from universal. climate change skeptics and deniers abound, including politicians (who label climate-change findings and scenarios, even when studies are conducted by reputable institutions, as “junk science”), corporations, think tanks, anti-un activists, and lobbying groups (mooney, 2005; muller, 2012). it is clear that there is an essential, deep-rooted tension between sustainability and the dominant market/technocratic paradigm. one way to understand the contradiction is to examine our prevalent mental models. based on empirical research, adams et. al. (2009) observed that respondents (middle managers) in a variety of countries seemed to adopt a position best characterized as: short term (immediate priorities) vs. long term (vision and potentialdriven) reactive (responding to external demands) vs. creative (novel solutions, internally driven) local (concern for self or narrow needs) vs. global (larger collectiveorganization/nation/world) separation (specialized) vs. systemic (holistic) accountability (clear responsibility) vs. learning (improvement oriented), and consilience arogyaswamy: sustainability and the pope’s encyclical possession (ownership, materialism) vs. being (reflective, value of intangibles). the results indicate that while one-third of the respondents occupied the middle ground, the overwhelming majority of the remaining two-thirds expressed a preference for the constructs on the left (short-term, reactive, etc). four of the five countries from which respondents were drawn are developed nations, and the fifth (india) is an emerging economy. though the survey reflects corporate perceptions, it is a microcosm of societies in these nations. citizens in some countries, however, (e.g. the netherlands) might lean more toward the right side of the above scale. while questions concerning sustainability call for the ability to think expansively in both time and space (i.e. beyond the immediate present, and in a global sense) and pursue greater equity, participation, and transparency, the dominant mental models held by people in a variety of countries do not support either the ends or the means proposed to achieve them. ehrenfeld (2008) contends that a newtonian, baconian worldview still dominates our thinking. it remains focused on the individual, is atomized, and values human needs above all else. in the author’s view, a “sustainability culture” is characterized by holism, a sense of belonging to a community, and flexibility in adapting to emerging challenges. ehrenfeld provides a taxonomy of caring and discusses the importance of caring for oneself, for others, and the world as a whole, with self-actualization and spirituality forming foundational elements. pope francis’ encyclical laudato si—which, as we noted earlier, makes the critical connection between ecological damage and the worsening plight of the poor living at the margins of all societies, particularly in the developing world—sees the natural environment as a “…collective good…” to be nurtured. rather than view creation as being at the service of humanity, he calls on us to recognize that human beings and the rest of the natural world are equal partners in creation and the divine plan (laudato si’, 2015h). the pope zeroes in on individualism as the root of humanity’s socio-ecological deterioration. when we value self over community, possessions over being and caring, and seek external affirmation rather than inner peace, we are, in effect, diminishing the sacred in all of god’s creation. while francis exhorts us to solve social problems through community networks, he does not expect individualistic societies to switch to a collective or communitarian mind-set (hofstede, 1980). consilience 11 instead, he proposes spirituality and a search for inner peace as the means to attain a sense of oneness with creation. rather than focusing on what we lack, we should fully appreciate and enjoy what we do have. the pontiff commends to us the ignatian ideal of seeing god in all things to help us break the individualism-consumptiongrowth cycle that has held us in thrall for about two centuries. francis confronts a shibboleth of the market economy head on: that customer needs and demand are paramount. he appeals directly to consumers to moderate their needs, do with less, and to attach less importance to possession and more to community, sharing, and reflection. he also appeals to citizens to make small sacrifices, even ones as minor as turning down the heating or cooling. a recent report exemplifies what the pope has in mind. in the english town of ashby. a bottom-up campaign is underway to reduce energy usage at home, use bicycles for transportation, substitute fossil fuels with renewables, and so on in order to achieve energy-neutrality (schlossberg, 2016). this is exactly the type of grass-roots action the pontiff would like to see on a large scale (as we note in a later section,this sort of bottom-up activism is spreading, arising often from serious, even catastrophic, events experienced by people in different parts of the world). materialistic, consumption-driven, wealth-creating, individualistic societies are not likely to turn spiritual overnight. however, faced with tragedies and disastrous occurrences of our own making, a mindset change could develop over time. as we begin to perceive the dangers in pursuing the economic, “technocratic” paradigm deeply embedded in the psyches of modernizing societies, it is necessary, according to walker (2013), for our thinking to shift from designing products, services, and processes to designing social systems to foster reflectiveness, contemplation, and caring for others. the author argues that striving to attain what maslow referred to as ‘self-transcendence’ is critical to the shift from a material, time-driven, possession-oriented society to one based in spirituality. though the pope accords high priority to heeding scientific studies and conclusions, he by no means cedes the moral high ground to science. on the contrary, he takes the position that science is our handmaiden in creating a better world, one characterized by community, caring, and contemplation. eiseley (1958) and other spiritual scientists have called on us to extend our thinking beyond science and the values of the modern world, and to find personal meaning by understanding, respecting, and identifying with nature. as eiseley observes in a later work, nature, rather than consilience arogyaswamy: sustainability and the pope’s encyclical being in emerson’s words, “…the immense shadow of man…”, is, to quote thoreau, “…a civilization other than our own.” changing the paradigm: national and international cohesion an obstacle to achieving international agreement on a common approach to minimize human impacts on the planet may be found in the residual effects of the colonial era. in addition to a reluctance to apply the brakes on growth, countries like china, india, brazil, and indonesia, with their large populations and rising incomes, are unlikely to deviate from the path to industrial growth, in part because that would mean submitting to the will of their colonial masters all over again. globalization has set off a race for economic growth. however, it has not erased memories of domination by european powers (and by the us in its sphere of influence), in part because the rules of the game were framed by developed nations whose multinationals (and their shareholders) benefited greatly from the low cost production, marketing expansion, and knowledgesharing (izaak, 2005; steyngart, 2008; stiglitz, 2006). in fact, klein (2014) argues that globalization is merely an extension of colonialism— or, to put it in current terminology, colonialism 2.0. if any progress is to be achieved in sustainable development, the first move has to come from the advanced nations which, rightly or wrongly, have the tag of colonialism attached to them. one might imagine that, with more than half a century having elapsed since many of the large developing nations achieved independence, memories of foreign aggression or oppression would have faded. however, while many countries have adopted capitalist growth models of the former colonial powers (coyle, 2014), feelings of suspicion and distrust linger. this contributes to the glacial pace at which agreement on and implementation of strategies to moderate resource depletion, atmospheric and water pollution, carbon emissions, and so on, is being reached. the irony of the situation is that, having persuaded poorer nations to adopt free market economics (or variations thereof) and having espoused globalization as a means to achieving more rapid growth, many people in the rich world are disenchanted with free trade (due to jobs lost, decline in middle class incomes, investment flows to emerging countries). reversing the process of globalization and asking developing countries to undertake “planet-saving” measures to restore an consilience 13 ecological balance , both of which are western initiatives, is proving to be a difficult undertaking as noted by porter (2015) and may even be viewed as colonialism 3.0. the paris climate change conference, signed late 2015, appears to have achieved a breakthrough in that respect (unfccc, 2016). to some extent, we might argue that pope francis’ voice built momentum for the agreement to be struck, and in fact may have marked the tipping point. with 195 countries signing off on it, the agreement to limit temperature rise to two degrees celsius relative to pre-industrial age levels broke a series of infructuous attempts from rio to copenhagen to find a common platform that countries at varying stages of economic development, with diverse political systems, and facing a multitude of social and cultural issues could agree upon. approaches to mitigation include ramping up renewable energies, preserving forests, and transferring technologies, funding, and capacity building methods from developed to developing nations. a fund providing $100 billion per year beginning in 2020 has been proposed for this purpose. recognizing that much damage has already occurred and will continue to, adaptation mechanisms have also been proposed. risk forecasting and management, dealing with economic losses, early warning systems, emergency preparedness, and building ecosystem resilience are among the adaptation initiatives listed. as the pope’s contends, a radical mindset shift, a heightened sense of spirituality, and a sense of oneness with all of creation are central to changing the course that nations have set for themselves. international resolutions and national policies can provide guidelines, set priorities, reallocate resources, and so on, but changing mindsets needs help from as many quarters as possible. national and local policies as initiators and reflectors of change given the accumulating, almost overwhelming scientific evidence that human-induced climate change is occurring, public opinion in many countries in most countries has not changed accordingly. the complexities associated with understanding various projected scenarios and the probabilities of each, taken in conjunction with the perceived trade-off between addressing rising carbon emissions and economic growth are among the contributing consilience arogyaswamy: sustainability and the pope’s encyclical factors, accentuated by the political forces discussed earlier. one strategy to convice citizens and consumers that the science behind the climate issue is sound is to employ spokespeople who can effectively connect with non-academics. while “celebrities” such as alan alda, mark ruffalo, matt damon and others have done notable work to spread the word, experts with the ability to use everyday language might also be successful in countering the powerful economic interests vested in the status quo. for instance, television programs such as along the lines of carl sagan’s or neil degrasse tyson’s cosmos could complement the work of scientists, activists, ngos, and others. in addition to attempting to achieve a shift in attitudes through a direct appeal to individuals, tools are also available to governments through the adoption of appropriate policies. there are a variety of initiatives accessible to policy-makers at the national and local levels to enable more effective mitigation. among the more commonly used tools are the carbon tax, cap-and-trade, incentives/subsidies tied to conservation, and generation of lowcarbon energy. a tax on carbon is one of the simplest ways to reduce co2 emissions. the levy is imposed on carbon as near to the source as possible (e.g. coal received at a power station). the rate is determined by the energy produced (or btu), thus allowing for variations in emissions from different types of fuel (carbon tax, 2016). ideally, the tax should be imposed nationwide (in countries with many regions) to prevent the flight of carbon-intensive processes across state lines. in the case of imported goods, a border (adjustment) tax would be in order if the country of origin did not have a corresponding carbon penalty. energy users, such as manufacturing firms, may choose to raise prices to pass on the increased cost to customers. however, if competitors were to opt for renewable energy sources, it would create an incentive to switch to clean energies. in any case, a rise in product prices would reflect the true cost of production, inclusive of future costs to society. (the corporate average fuel economy, or cafe, standards set an average fleet mileage for major automakers; this is, in effect, a carbon tax with penalties imposed for non-compliance.) like the carbon tax, a cap-and-trade (cat) regimen sets a price on carbon. however, the tax only kicks in when a preset limit on carbon emission (which differs by industry and type of firm) has been reached. firms which exceed the cap may pay the penalty or trade with firms which come in under the cap (edf(a), 2016). the consilience 15 trading often takes place through intermediaries or by auction as in california, which has operated a cat system since 2013 (cap and trade, 2016). its emissions have fallen by about 4% since that time. the advantage of a cat system vis-à-vis the carbon tax is that it allows businesses a certain “quota” of co2 emissions, which means costs do not have to rise as long as firms take steps to control emissions. another plus is that regulators can progressively lower the cap, thus reducing total emissions (roberts, 2011). problems arise when the cap or price (initial or trading) of carbon are set too low. under such conditions, it might become less expensive to pay the penalty or the auction/trading price. despite potential flaws in the system, china is also about to launch a cap-and-trade policy nationwide in an effort to combat the deadly effects of climate change and pollution (edf(b), 2016) (it may be noted that china’s emissions have already declined due to a transformation in energy production and consumption, as well as an economic slowdown). complementing policy initiatives are approaches aimed at rewarding the generation and use of zero-carbon energy. subsidies given to r&d, engineering, and manufacturing activities in wind, solar, geothermal, and battery technology are in place in many countries including germany, spain, the united states, china, and india. the use of renewables is fostered by offering incentives such as tax credits for rooftop solar (often combined with feed-in tariffs, i.e. selling electricity back to the grid at a favorable price), subsidies and tax credits offered to large-scale installations such as solar arrays and wind farms, certification of energy-efficient appliances (“energy star”), and so on. while countries in the european union and the united states have been actively pursing policies to stimulate the generation and utilization of carbon-free electricity, china and india are now stepping up their efforts. china, the world’s largest emitter of ghgs, has announced that it will invest at least $360 billion by 2020 in renewable energy installations (new york times, 2017). the intent is both to gradually replace coal-fired power with clean energy, and to assume leadership in solar and wind technologies while creating employment for millions in these fields. it is indeed ironic that china (together with india, to some degree) who had resisted efforts by european nations and the united states to tackle its rapidly spiking emissions, appears to be assuming the mantle of leadership in the worldwide race to combat climate change (the economist, 2017). in 2015, china outspent the united states two to one by investing $100 consilience arogyaswamy: sustainability and the pope’s encyclical billion in renewables. the country is also extending its push in clean energy beyond its borders, pouring $30 billion into establishing projects abroad (renewable energy world, 2017). the latest chinese five-year plan calls for raising the share of renewables in the energy mix to 15% by 2020, with wind power contributing 30 gw by that time. (jiang, et al., 2013). india, also a late “convert” to the cause of ameliorating climate change, intends to quadruple its renewable capacity in five years to 175 gw. though reaching this target would entail a mammoth financial commitment by a country which lacks the resource pool of china (forbes, 2017), india has little choice. people in major indian cities are faced with almost the highest global levels of co2, nitrous oxides (nox), and particulate matter are demanding immediate action. similarly to china, a potent combination of bottom-up activism (caused by climate-related factors, deteriorating social conditions, dangers to public health) and governmental concern about future economic uncertainty have spurred action. private corporations, public agencies, infrastructure investment trusts, foreign governments (such as the united arab emirates), and multinationals such as japan’s softbank are collaborating in the burgeoning renewable energy efforts (the national, 2017). as a result of this multi-pronged strategy, the indian government expects to generate 50% of its electricity needs from carbon-free sources by 2027 (the guardian, 2016). the world’s population is becoming increasingly urban, reaching 23% in 2016 ( un, 2016). the energy needs of major cities comprise around 70 % of world emissions (zdnet, 2016), and leaders of such cities have been engaged in efforts to tackle emission problems by reconfiguring services and activities. collaboration and competition among cities have yielded positive results. efforts have typically focused on traffic congestion, electricity used at home and in the workplace, the location of recreational, shopping, and educational centers, urban agriculture, recycling, transit hubs, and more (portney, 2013). munich, for instance, meets 40% of its energy needs through renewables. bogota transports 70% of its seven million population through public transport. copenhagen aims to be carbon-neutral by 2025. san francisco leads in waste management (fast company, 2016). chinese cities are becoming more involved in the sustainable cities effort, which could have a significant impact on emissions since the equivalent of a megacity (around 20 million) is added to china’s urban population each year (world bank, 2012). consilience 17 when discussing policy formation, pope francis warns us against the “…myopia of power politics…” and argues strongly in favor of actions to conserve energy and resources as a centerpiece of public policy (laudato si’, 2015i). while making the case for better transportation, leisure spaces, and improved living conditions in mega cities, the encyclical observes that “.. respect for our dignity as human beings often jars with the chaotic realities…” of urban life. in fact, enabling greater social interaction is a key factor in ensuring urban harmony and environmental health (laudato si, 2015j). corporations: merchants of doom or cavalry to the rescue? klein (2014) attributes our climate-related problems to corporations’ unbridled greed (and clearly there is much truth to this assertion, though consumers, employees, and governments have been at least passively complicit in the excesses of capitalist economies). however, the unremitting anti-capitalist, multinationals-as-villains strain that marks the author’s work leads her to dismiss the corporation as a possible partner in undoing the impacts of industrialization. we contend that corporate actions, paradoxically, could prove to be a vital building block in the edifice of sustainability. how can an institution which is almost universally reviled for having played a leading role in creating the resource and emission crisis be counted on to ameliorate the existential problems that face us ecologically, socially, and spiritually? though business firms must, indeed, share much of the guilt, there are other segments of society which have been passively or actively complicit in the damage done to all of creation, present and future. as consumers, people all over the world eagerly await the release of new products, which appear to give us greater control over our own lives, over others, and over nature itself. appliances, cars, planes, weapons, building materials, heating and cooling systems, and apparel, among other products, have inculcated in us a desire to indefinitely increase consumption. if demand decreases, policymakers step in to stimulate it. politicians assure us that growth will pick up soon and may even urge us to go shopping. how can the cycle of resource squandering and indifference to social and ecological damage be broken? while governments could enact effective policies (cap and trade, carbon tax, incentives for renewables, and so on), and people may gradually alter their mindsets, companies can play an active role in helping us consilience arogyaswamy: sustainability and the pope’s encyclical reverse course (olson, 2010). culture as a collective indoctrination programming of the mind arises when actions help instil values and beliefs. corporate actions can go a long way to replace a culture of waste and destruction with one of responsibility and revival. as lampikowski et. al. (2014) note, a vision and culture of sustainability are more likely to come to fruition if corporations are woven into the fabric of action. numerous firms are beginning to view sustainability as a possible approach to attract customers, enhance their reputation with diverse stakeholders, gain the allegiance of communities in which they operate, and increase profits (if nothing else, by cutting costs). they treat sustainability as an opportunity to gain anedge over their competitors, align sustainable strategies with core competences, and stay ahead of (and perhaps even enhance) the regulatory arc. for instance, starbucks forms binding partnerships with coffee growers, ensuring they are provided with the necessary knowledge to deal with pests in a way that does not harm the local ecosystem, to handle fluctuations in weather and world prices of coffee beans, etc. the direct financial and reputational benefit to starbucks along with the reduced uncertainty facing growers makes for a combination of risk reduction, increased profits, environmental citizenship, and social responsibility. interface, the largest carpet manufacturer in the united states, has,over the past two decades embarked on a course of environmentally-friendly strategies. the “missions zero” program has set a goal of powering its operations fully using renewable energy by 2020 (as of 2015, renewables provided over 80% of their energy needs). the firm has reduced waste sent to landfills by 90%, water use has gone down by 70%, and its carbon emissions are about 30% of what they were in 1994. the company has also helped design modular carpets. these require replacement only in high-traffic areas, thus reducing waste for the customer despite the fact that it cuts sales. interface has also worked towards socially-oriented goals regarding employees, suppliers, customers, and the local community in an attempt to optimize its triple-bottom line (tbl) performance (interface, 2016). the tbl, proposed by elkington (slaper and hall, 2011), suggests that business performance should be assessed in terms of how well they firms nurture the physical environment and care for social needs (including those of employees, customers, suppliers, local community, etc.) in addition to the financial yardsticks (profit, market share, etc.). while the tbl does not offer a single composite measure, firms which use it typically formulate goals for all consilience 19 three dimensions (e.g carbon emissions, stock prices, and employee development). other firms with a triple-bottom line include unilever, 3m, and procter and gamble (slaper&hale, 2011; the economist, 2005). walker (2013), whose work on spirituality was cited earlier, suggests a quadruple bottom line, where the fourth is the reflective dimension, in which one discovers a sense of personal meaning, and the economic dimension is the least important. while this may be viewed as an ideal end state, with the potential to undo the ecological and social damage wrought by the unmitigated pursuit of economic growth, firms need to first work on recalibrating the relative emphases placed on economic, ecological and social issues before embarking on the quest for spiritual design. laszlo and zhexembateva (2011) delineate seven strategies to achieve this, which range from ensuring corporate survival to embedding sustainability into the firm’s culture. the strategies are risk mitigation (e.g. abide by regulations, reduce mitigation costs); cost reduction (e.g. in energy, resources used); differentiation (by offering products that use less energy, food grown locally); developing new markets (conserving local resources, ways to minimize damage due to flooding); enhancing reputation (publicizing achievements in sustainability); raising industry standards ( e.g dupont’s efforts to establish a cap-and-trade system); and radical innovation ( e.g. carbon fiber bodies for airplanes, electric cars with extended ranges). some firms may position themselves on different sustainability levels at the same time when dealing with various stakeholders. for instance, herman miller, a furniture manufacturer, uses primarily recycled inputs, requires suppliers to adhere to its own high standards, refurbishes/recycles products when customers are done with them, designs customer workspaces to save energy, recycles products when their useful life is over, and powers its factories with renewable energy. renault, in addition to designing cars to use less fuel, also refurbishes used vehicles for sale at lower prices, fostering sustainability values among its suppliers and maximizing its “cradle-to-cradle” potential (nguyen, stuchtey, and zils, 2014). ge’s increasing focus on the “internet of things” is in large part positioned to develop smart strategies to reduce energy wastage. 3m, a firm whose competitive advantage has been rooted in product innovation centered around certain core technologies, has now begun to view its core competence as sustainability, directing its innovations toward the various facets discussed above. consilience arogyaswamy: sustainability and the pope’s encyclical while incorporating sustainability into the strategy process, firms can use techniques commonly used in the field of strategy. as epstein (2008) notes, sustainability needs to be framed in measurable terms such as a specified reduction in carbon emissions, water usage, the use of harmful materials, etc; crafting an appeal to customers and other stakeholders using sustainability as a distinctive feature; motivating employees to think innovatively about socio-ecological aspects of the firm’s mission; enhancing sustainability of supply chains; or measuring performance in sustainability as a function of goal attainment as well as in relation to long-term competitive advantage. the balanced scorecardwhich links stakeholder needs, internal processes, learning and improvement, and financial outcomesmay also be adapted for this purpose. the value chain could also be modified so that activities (inputs, operation, technology development, and so on) are tailored to the firm’s emphasis on sustainability. it is clear that corporate sustainability efforts are in their infancy, with some firms resisting even the concept while others have developed long term plans to embed sustainability into their strategies. however, as more firms join the sustainability “bandwagon”, whatever the reasons might be, the impact on customers, suppliers, financial institutions, and other stakeholders could be significant. in fact, in a recent report, ernest and young (2015) conducted a survey among 272 executives in large firms competing in a range of industries and concluded that ghg reporting is quite common and water-related reports are increasing, despite that measures are still under discussion. the chief financial officer is becoming a key player in sustainability strategies, and involving employees seems critical to successful sustainability outcomes in corporations, a finding corroborated by mckinsey (2014). it is possible that sustainability strategies might increase short-term costs, not appeal to customers, require supply chain coordination or reconfiguration, or call for the development of new designs or production methods. any of these could affect performance and the careers of top executives. the temptation for businesses is to pick low-hanging fruit, in a way harking back to techniques such as value analysis, a forerunner of the total quality management (tqm) revolution. just as value analysis focused on eliminating components and substituting more expensive materials, thus lowering total cost, an ongoing emphasis on “cost-driven” consilience 21 sustainability strategies might constitute a low-level trap from which firms and industries find it difficult to escape. for corporate sustainability initiatives to have a noticeable impact, top executives will have to take risks by redesigning products and processes, pushing for stricter industry standards, assessing energy usage during their products’ life cycles, enlisting the support of their entire supply chains, reconfiguring the value chain to make sustainability a distinctive feature, and involving employees in the effort to ensure a better future for all. companies need to move beyond short-term and self-serving outlooks on sustainability. corporate leaders, who assert that they are convinced that urgent action is needed to prevent climate change, acute resource shortages, and social collapse, must act decisively by investing in products and services which mitigate the damage already done. these actions would extend beyond resource usage and emission curtailment to consume fewer resources during their useful lives, educate customers, suppliers, and shareholders on the challenges facing the world, or working with ngos, governments and other actors. it may take a while, but corporate actions to heal the planet could influence public opinion and our responsibility to our “common home”. it should be noted that, according to a global survey conducted by mckinsey (2014), sustainability was among the top three strategic priorities for nearly 50% of the ceos surveyed worldwide. the percentage of respondents who viewed the alignment of sustainability with corporate strategy as imperative doubled to over 40%, while the percentage emphasizing cost reduction actually declined from 2012 to 2014 by 25%. in the encyclical, business is viewed as a “…noble profession…” which can create wealth and make our world a better place, especially if it creates more jobs (laudato si’, 2015k). while this appears to be a less than enthusiastic endorsement of business, the pope calls to adopt a “…circular model of production…” which would reduce resource usage, energy waste, lower demand for new products through reuse and refurbishment, and other stratigies. as noted earlier, companies are engaged in a range of efforts to innovate in sustainability, including the ways the pontiff makes special note of. however, given that the consumption-growth model has been in place for over a century, weaning people, firms, and nations off it is still a work in progress. corporations have played a significant role in wealth creation and poverty reduction over the past century, while at the same time contributing to ecological damage and social consilience arogyaswamy: sustainability and the pope’s encyclical disparities. this vital institution has both the obligation and the ability to address the cumulative negative impacts of economic growth. even more, corporate actions could play a vital role in changing mindsets, attitudes, and behaviors. an indicator of corporate reaction to potential us withdrawal from the paris accord (now, apparently, a reality) was a statement issued by around three hundred and fifty large firms soon after the american elections. meeting in morocco, these corporate titans asserted that they had committed themselves too deeply and invested too much time, energy, and resources in sustainability to reverse course. top business leaders in the united states have come out strongly in favor the paris accord (shultz and halstead, 2017). it is quite possible that, despite the insistance of national leaders on placing economic growth over the future of the planet, corporations might offer us a way out of the ongoing crisis. sisyphean endeavor? a few years ago one could have claimed, with justification, that attempting to curtail carbon emissions, resource depletion, and the increasing immiseration of the poor worldwide was a futile endeavor, equal to that of sisyphus (condemned to rolling a rock up a hill only to find it roll all the way down just when he was near the peak). with china, india, brazil and other developing countries joining in the race to industrialize and reluctant to act on low-carbon solutions and resource conservation, it appeared the world was headed for an inevitable climate catastrophe. however, due to circumstances outlined earlier, china and indiatwo of the largest polluters in the worldhave both embarked on a path to grow their economies while moderating environmental and social impacts. both countries have formulated national policies to reach sizeable renewable energy goals and the significant reduction of carbon emissions by 2020 (the year was perhaps chosen since it has a certain ring to it). realistically, one might expect that china, india, brazil, indonesia, and other developing nations will be able to curb the growth in emissions by 2025. absolute reductions could take longer, even up to 2030. however, a combination of national policy changes, coordinated urban initiatives, corporate strategies aimed at gaining a competitive advantage through sustainability, and moral suasion by thought leaders (such as pope francis) are altering values and mindsets in diverse societies which have witnessed the outcomes of unchecked industrial growth. 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importance of local knowledge, partnerships, and indigenous leadership. this story chronicles a two-year process of considering, rejecting, and finally developing the most workable solution for safe water: solar water purification. unlike boiling and chlorination, this method was acceptable to the kuna because it does not conflict with cultural practices on the island. it is likely that this method of water purification can be sustained over time. 1 michael halperin worked as a water and sanitation health promoter in the peace corps from 2003 to 2005. he is a first year mph student studying epidemiology in the global health track at the mailman school of public health at columbia university. he can be contacted at mh2453@columbia.edu. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 2 starting in early 2003, i worked for two years as a peace corps volunteer in the indigenous kuna island community of ustupu, just off the northeastern coast of panama. my work focused on the issue of potable water and diarrheal disease. my training prior to moving to ustupu consisted of three months of linguistic, cultural, and technical classes. my peace corps training group sitting atop a newly constructed composting latrine in the town of villa carmen, panama this training, however, was not site-specific, so there was much to be learned once i moved to the village. in february of 2003, i arrived in ustupu, after a 45-minute flight by twin-propeller plane to the airstrip on the mainland, and then to the island by canoe. for the next two years, i called ustupu home. the island rises just a few feet above sea level. almost 5,000 people live there without paved roads or electricity. ustupu is one of 49 inhabited island and coastal communities in the 350-island archipelago of panama called kuna yala. the kuna gained their autonomy from panama after a 1925 revolution. in the last century, the island the size of three football fields saw its population grow from one-hundred to nearly five-thousand. a maze of thatched-roof homes are narrowly separated by zigzagging pathways, and towering three stories above this labyrinth is a large blue concrete water tank, the most conspicuous feature of ustupu’s aqueduct system. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 3 main street: ustupu, kuna yala i worked with melvin, or more accurately, i worked for melvin. as a salaried employee of the community, melvin was in charge of maintaining the aqueduct system that feeds this towering blue water tank on the island from a mountain stream a few miles away. to get acquainted with the system, i nervously scaled the three-story ladder up the blue walls to the top of the tank. melvin led the way. he explained how the entire system worked by gravity. pointing up towards the hills on the mainland, he told me how the water enters the piping way up the hill in a stream, and then flows in the pipe down the slope of the hillside to where the water pours into a sand filtration tank. the water seeps from top to bottom in the tank, filters through the sand, and exits the tank in piping. this water then makes its way down through plantain and coconut groves to the coast, across the bay, onto the island, and up into the towering blue holding tank where melvin and i were perched. from the holding tank, gravity again propels the water down to community spickets, distributing it in a web of half-inch plastic piping that covers the entire island. melvin’s description of the system sounded much like the aqueduct systems i had seen as a peace corps trainee, so i wondered why the community was having problems with diarrheal disease. the next step was a visit to the headwaters. melvin and i paddled his dugout canoe across the bay to see the water source and the sand filtration system. we climbed uphill for about an hour to the water source. a white plastic pipe was encased in a concrete dam with the open end pointing upriver. mesh wiring covered the intake and prevented large debris from entering the pipe and clogging the system. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 4 the water source for ustupu’s aqueduct system melvin and i then followed the piping downhill from the headwaters to the sand filtration tank, where melvin told me we would find the source of the problem. a well-designed sand filtration tank should be filled with an even layer of sand. figure 1: ideal sand filtration tank2 as we peered over the walls of the tank, however, i immediately understood melvin’s worry. the force of the incoming water had burrowed a tunnel through the sand, essentially eliminating all filtration. 2thanks to sam halperin, my brother, for help with the two sand filtration computer renderings. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 5 figure 2: ustupu’s sand filtration tank melvin was fully aware of the problem and explained that if he collapsed the tunnel created by the rushing water, it would take too long for the water to seep down through all the sand. the increased resistance of the sand filtration would create a bottleneck and the water would spill over the walls of the sand filtration tank and be lost. melvin’s explanation for the engineering failure seemed reasonable. i felt that it took courage for melvin to conclude that the city engineers from the capital who designed the system may have been at fault. the aqueduct dated back to the 1970s, and melvin reasoned that it was probably built during the dry season, when the flow of the river was at its lowest. once the rains came, the system, specifically the sand filtration tank next to where we were standing, was not large enough to handle the flow of water. during these early days on ustupu, i offered melvin moral support, but did not contribute much technologically. over months and years i later learned from melvin that i was indeed serving a function. having me as a coworker, un licenciado (a college graduate), made it easier for melvin to critique the system and voice his concerns with community leaders, who might otherwise have given the benefit of the doubt to the city engineers. on this first of many trips to view the inadequate sand filtration tank, melvin reasoned aloud to me that unfiltered water was better than none at all. so the system was left in place, delivering what was surely contaminated water to ustupu. melvin and i agreed that a larger sand filtration tank was needed, and worked with community religious and political leaders, and the sailah (chief), to create a plan. the initial goal was to build a bigger sand filtration tank, one that would not overflow given the flow rate and quantity of water entering the system. we then approached engineers from both the peace corps and the panamanian health ministry, and found that the cost was estimated to be nearly $300,000. a cost that was financially impossible. we needed a more realistic solution. an official from the panamanian ministry of health proposed a solution: chlorinating the water once it reached the blue holding tank on the island. if added one drop for every liter (four drops a gallon), chlorination would be a very effective purification method. practically, however, the kuna woman’s groups were fervently opposed to chlorination because they considered chlorine a powerful bleaching agent capable of making the kids clothes sparkling white. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 6 ida, an important member of a woman’s group on ustupu melvin and the aqueduct committee were hesitant too because of the practice of using chlorine to dislodge octopuses from surrounding reefs. harvesting octopus is dramatically easier if a small amount of the chemical is added to the sea-water surrounding an octopus. on ustupu, men are commonly seen with a spear full of octopus in one hand, and a little bottle of chlorine in the other. as a result of these cultural practices, the idea of drinking anything with chlorine in it was met with great opposition. the next alternative focused on water purification at the household rather than at the municipal level. most kuna were well aware of boiling but rarely adopted it. while boiling would purify the water, there was no reasonable economical source of fuel. the kuna live on the island but travel daily to the mainland to farm. bringing firewood to the island meant bringing home less food. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 7 harvesting plantain from the mainland no rational woman would trade food for safe water. we were left with no practical solution for decontaminating the water. months later melvin and i learned of the possibility of solar water purification. we first heard of this technique at a sustainable technologies seminar in another region of panama. the dissemination of crucial information is very slow on ustupu because there is neither access to a library, internet, or experts. the limited flow of information to ustupu was in many ways as problematic as the flow of water. peace corps volunteers can be useful information brokers by bridging information gaps and communicating new technologies, even very rudimentary ones. solar purification is a really simple process; a transparent two-liter soda bottle is filled with water, the top is closed, and the bottle is placed in the sun for 6 hours. the heat and uv radiation kill the contaminating organisms and make the water safe to drink. regardless of melvin’s stature in the community and my supporting role, there was an intellectual resistance to the idea that the existing system needed fixing. people were often perplexed by the idea that the current system, built for them by government engineers from panama city, could make them sick. although i could not see the biological organisms in the water, i knew they existed. i came to realize that my knowledge of these organisms was not intuitive, but really dated back to when i was a child experimenting with a microscope in science class. i recalled from biology classes in high school the story of leeuwenhoek’s surprise in the 17th century when he first looked at water with a microscope. during our peace corps training, we were taught about techniques used to purify contaminated water and the sources of biological contamination; but, it was assumed by our instructors that we would not question the fact that the organisms were there in the first place. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 8 explaining solar water purification to a group of water technicians at a seminar in the neighboring community of ucupseni, kuna yala as i went from house to house excitedly talking about this new solar technique, i noticed a familiar look on the faces of the kuna. for people in the village, the existence of the organisms was not intuitive, just like it had not been for me until i saw them under the microscope. without a microscope to be found on the island, few people had ever seen anything on the microscopic level. i knew that many people believed there were harmful organisms even in water that appeared clear, but without having seen them for themselves, there was a definite lack of enthusiasm for solar disinfection. on my next trip out of ustupu, i was able to get an old microscope and returned with it to the village. the response was unbelievable! one look at a sample of river water, especially after a heavy rain, and the villagers now had a visual image when melvin and i spoke of microscopic organisms and “dirty” water. the glass of water that i would hold up had the same clear, clean looking appearance as before, but after looking through the microscope there was increased validity and understanding that the “dirtiness” existed beyond what the eye could see. mothers took ownership of the project, making sure that they had sufficient supplies of plastic bottles laid out on their thatchroofs for everyone in the family. unlike boiling and chlorination, the solar water purification method was acceptable to the kuna community because it did not conflict with cultural practices on the island. men were not being asked to expend time and energy to bring back additional wood for fuel to boil water, and women did not need to set aside their objections to chlorination, both obstacles to the sustainability of these techniques. all three methods are technically feasible, but only solar purification was culturally acceptable. while i was helping on the plantain field, melvin once commented on why he thought the solar purification method was viewed positively. the kuna, well acquainted with the powerful tropical sun, seek shade during midday consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 9 hours, when the suns rays are most powerful. therefore, especially with the visual provided by the microscope, it made sense that the sun could kill the microorganisms in the water. making solar purification increasingly workable for the kuna was the fact that plastic bottles, the only equipment needed, were cheap and available from passing merchant ships. passing merchant ship in a subsistence agricultural community like ustupu, where the monetary unit is often still the coconut (worth 5 cents each), solar purification demonstrates that appropriate health interventions and the health of the community can be attained at low cost. ideally, melvin and other community leaders eventually want a functioning aqueduct system; however in the meantime, they view solar purification as a viable substitute. living in the community of ustupu as a peace corps volunteer for two years revealed the complex problems surrounding contaminated drinking water. however, appropriate solutions can be found. it is likely that this method of water purification can be sustained over time. as we have seen here, understanding local knowledge and practices is essential. indigenous leaders like melvin apply local knowledge to specific problems, in this case water purification. in addition, grass roots health education is also very important as a means to make information available in the community. it is possible to prevent water-borne diseases given the right combination of infrastructure, cultural sensitivity, and local leadership. microsoft word nhapi final.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 17, iss. 1 (2017), pp. 143–161 business and society: determinants and experiences of corporate social responsibility practices in zimbabwean extractive industries from 2000-2015 takudzwa leonard mathende tmathende@yahoo.co.uk tatenda goodman nhapi nhapaz@yahoo.com abstract this article notes that although a considerable corporate social responsibility (csr) knowledge base exists in zimbabwe, there have been no comprehensive studies on csr determinants and community csr in zimbabwe since 2000. “the nature of socio-political change within the southern african context is such that, of late, the issue of the impact of projects on communities has become a sensitive one’’ (bews, 2003: 2). csr is “problematic for corporations because they are increasingly being required to align with societal norms while generating financial returns” (smith, 2011: 1). this article explores the dominant narratives in csr literature that have contributed to continuous debates in related academia, businesses, and society. zimbabwe is resource rich, but the majority of the population is still living in abject poverty. some have questioned whether this is indicative of a zimbabwean resource curse. many zimbabweans believe that the companies benefitting from these resources should finance social programs in the country (newsday, 2012). this belief is a result of fiscal challenges that the government of zimbabwe (goz) is grappling with. finally, this article recommends pathways for sustainable csr implantation. keywords: corporate social responsibility, zimbabwe, extractive industries, minerals, resource curse authors’ notes: takudzwa mathende holds a bachelor of science social work honours degree from the university of zimbabwe and an ma in social impact assessment from the university of johannesburg, south africa. he is currently practicing as a social worker with a uk local authority. previously, he worked in the child protection sector both in zimbabwe and city of johannesburg, south africa. tatenda nhapi holds a bachelor of science social work honours degree from the university of zimbabwe in 2015 he was awarded an erasmus mundus masters in advanced development social work, a five european universities study consortium programme. consilience mathende, nhapi: csr in zimbabwe introduction and background this article strives to contribute to the knowledge base through the conceptualisation and understanding of determinants of csr and exploring the experiences of communities about csr in zimbabwe. this article is largely reflective in its approach, referring to zimbabwean studies and survey reports of surveys by a variety of institutions. data has been gathered largely by documentary search and content analysis, facilitating specific conclusions to illustrate certain arguments. in the current sustainable development goals and african union agenda 2063, trans-national corporations (tnc)’s responsibility is to manage the impact of their activities on and to enhance the socio-economic well-being of the people in africa by improving the environment for capital accumulation. viewed from this perspective, any improvement in local people’s lives is incidental. while improved quality of goods and services is by no means less important in africa, csr has to engage with sustainable development (matunhu 2012). the mining and extractive sector constitutes a major share of exports and tax revenues for countries in the global south, and holds enormous potential to finance rapid economic development and poverty reduction (besada, lisk and martin, 2015) since the year 2000, a number of studies (mostly in in the extractive sector) have investigated the nature and impact of csr programs in relation to corporate size and profitability. the global south — the developing regions of africa, asia, and latin america — is richly endowed with mineral assets that are essential for modern production and consumption worldwide (besada, lisk et.al, 2015). this article seeks to expand the knowledge of the relationship between a number of financial and non-financial determinants of social responsibility based on a cross sectional sample of resilient corporate sectors. this article attempts to offer new insights into the current debate about zimbabwean csr efficacy and is grounded in appreciating impacts of poverty, inequality, unemployment and the poor living conditions of employees and communities where local and multinational corporations have reneged on their development agendas . background and historical overview of zimbabwe analysis of post-independence structural changes shows the economy’s three distinct policy swings – from interventionism (19801990) to structural adjustment (1991-1995) to reactive management (1997 to 2008) (chimhou, 2010). corporations have also transformed and been affected in different ways. historically, the major highlights fall into three periods: the pre-economic structural adjustment programme (esap) era (1980-1989), the esap era (1990-1999), and the new millennium era (post esap) (2000-present). schematically, the pre-esap phase was characterized by relative economic stability, growth, and sustained foreign direct investment (fdi). the esap era marked the beginnings of an economic downturn, characterized by company closures, mass retrenchments, drought (1991-92), and labour unrest. finally, the new millennium/post-esap era was marked by both economic and consilience 145 political crisis. this is when the contested fast track land reform (ftlrp) commenced (scoones et al. 2010:8). political turbulence escalated and the failure of the agricultural and manufacturing sector created artificial food shortages. relief and development strategies were led by non-governmental organizations (ngos). the zimbabwe democracy and economic recovery act (zidera) restrictive measures imposed by the western countries, caused company closures and downsizing. in response to economic sanctions by the european union (eu) and united states of america (usa), the government of zimbabwe adopted the look east policy that led asian countries, particularly china, to invest in the country. in 2005, the goz implemented operation murambatsvina (‘clean up the filth’), which caused widespread urban displacement and led to a humanitarian crisis. during this period, many skilled and unskilled zimbabweans migrated to countries like the united kingdom (uk), the usa, australia, canada, south africa, namibia, and botswana. the post-esap era was also marked by hyperinflation and economic stagnation, which accelerated in 2006. these challenges were partially solved by the ephemeral government of national unity (gnu) between the zimbabwe african national union patriotic front (zanu pf) and the two formations of the movement for democratic change (mdc) between 2009 and 2013. the gnu introduced dollarization and the use of multiple currency regimes, which resulted in short-lived economic stability. the 2013 elections marked the end of the gnu, and the economy once again began to deteriorate. post-2013, the zanu pf-led government adopted the zimbabwe agenda for sustainable socio-economic transformation (zim-asset) as its macro-economic blueprint to achieve sustainable development and social equity anchored on indigenization, empowerment, and job creation. the objectives of the zim-asset are aligned with the millennium development goals (mdgs) and fit very well into the sustainable development goals. this program addresses underlying structural rigidities and bottlenecks that inhibit the rehabilitation of infrastructure, energy, and clean water supply. unfortunately, zim-asset suffered misfeasance, which led to an fdi freeze, the closure of many companies, mass retrenchments, capital flight, corruption associated with the mismanagement of allocated empowerment funds, and intraparty dissent. in his 2016 midterm fiscal policy statement, finance minister honorable patrick chinamasa identified low production levels, the attendant trade gap, insufficient fdis, and lack of access to international finance as main causes of the economic malaise. table 1: economy, employment and poverty challenges and opportunities consilience mathende, nhapi: csr in zimbabwe challenges opportunities liquidity constraints. provisions in the constitution. low average incomes, savings and investment zim-asset operationalization. high and increasing unemployment and poverty price stability in the multicurrency system industrial infrastructure decay prospects from zim-asset declining average industrial capacity utilisation enabling migration policy and governance environment company closures and scaling down of operations. human resource capital and the youth demographic dividend shrinking formal sector and tax revenue base harnessing the informal and rural economy power and water challenges. growth in ict use and application large government external debt burden re-engagement with key players in the international community weak corporate governance in public and private sector. infrastructure rehabilitation and upgrading limited engagement with international community. green economy. source: united nations country team (unct), 2014 zimbabwe lacks an economy that provides social solidarity throughout the country. blame has been directed towards chinese investors, who have been accused of ‘reaping without sowing’ and causing ‘wanton environmental destruction’ in their pursuit of the ‘primitive accumulation of capital’. the notion of irresponsible capitalism by foreign investors in africa, and zimbabwe in particular, has widely been reported. specifically, in chiadzwa, chinese companies have failed to protect and improve the lives of local communities and environmental protection, instead adopting ‘militarized capitalism’ (chinguno et al. 2015: 1). this problem is not limited to zimbabwe; it is a phenomenon experienced by the rest of africa and the world at large. global businesses have been struggling with new ethical requirements. corporations are expected to “to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of the next generations to meet their own needs” (d’amato et al. 2009). this is basically the principle of sustainability. in this modern world, where human rights are emphasized, it is no longer acceptable for a corporation to experience economic prosperity in isolation from those impacted by its actions. to help remedy this problem, this article analyses csr determinants and selected empirical studies of communities in zimbabwe, drawing insights from the extractive, retailing, telecommunications, and banking industries since 2000. given this background, it is imperative and also interesting to examine the determinants, experiences, and practices of csr in an unstable and unpredictable economy like that of zimbabwe. in order to have a clear and general understanding of the field, the article focuses on the four resilient key sectors of the zimbabwean economy: extraction, retail, telecommunications, and banking. it will further examine at least two communities in which each sector/company is implementing csr programs. with traceable csr strategies, these companies should have been successful despite the floundering economy. this article seeks to provide a theoretical and practical consilience 147 foundation for the relationship between business and society with the following objectives: i. to give a historical analysis (critical trends, issues and opportunities) of csr in zimbabwe ii. to investigate the push and pull factors that influence csr in zimbabwe iii. to assess the experiences of communities with csr programs iv. to recommend csr best practices that would enable corporates to conduct ethical business in the communities in which they operate. firstly, csr literature development has been well advanced in global north (weber 2001: 251). a number of studies in western and eastern countries over the past decades have investigated csr disclosures; specifically, the nature, frequency, patterns, and trends in relation to corporate size and profitability. there is a clear absence of such scholarly studies in zimbabwe. the bulk of the literature on csr from the state, private media, and ngos is largely relative and often biased. this article proposes a framework of csr index with the objective of advancing professionalism in the csr field. csr implementation dynamics this section synthesizes relevant literature about csr, with particular attention paid to the legislative and policy frameworks that regulate csr in zimbabwe. theoretical approaches and the global, regional, and zimbabwe csr practices will be discussed alongside the social, cultural, economic, environmental, and political issues and impacts of csr in zimbabwe. one challenge is the varying definitions of csr; each company interprets it as they want it to be. the resonating element is that of business practice that promotes ‘social good’. companies ‘do good’ to meeting legislative requirements, for public relations/brand marketing, and to meet social expectations. csr is defined by smith (2011: 1) as a “business system that enables the production and distribution of wealth for the betterment of its stakeholders through the implementation and integration of ethical systems and sustainable management practices”. the problem is that csr is not grounded on solid universal principles. though there remain contradictions and contestations, this paper will adopt the united nations industrial development organization (unido, 2015) definition: csr is “a management concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and interactions with their stakeholders,...a way through which a company achieves a balance of economic, environmental and social imperatives (triple-bottom-line approach, tbl), while at the same time addressing the expectations of shareholders and stakeholders”. this definition coalesces all dimensions of csr. however, the problem with this definition is that it does not explicitly differentiate between csr and charity, sponsorships, or philanthropy. consilience mathende, nhapi: csr in zimbabwe business’ key stakeholders include its employees, customers, investors, suppliers, public and governmental officials, activists, and communities (as highlighted in fig. 1). corporations are expected to develop sustainable strategies aimed at dealing with the intersection between societal needs, the natural environment, and corresponding business imperatives, or taking responsibility of what d’amato et al. (2009) calls the ‘three angles of the tbl’. mutisi (2009:37) argues that csr should not be viewed as philanthropy work or hand-outs, but rather as the implementation of projects that go beyond philanthropy, projects that change and develop communities. often words and phrases such as social investment, corporate citizenship, corporate conscience, and responsible business are used interchangeably with csr. in zimbabwe, csr has in most cases been confused with charity. charity is normally sporadic and lacks sustainability, whereas csr is specifically created for sustainable development. it is important to note that the definitions of csr are contextual and influenced by ideological and political aspirations. perspectives of csr this section will outline the historical, political, and legislative framework of csr globally and in zimbabwe. matunhu (2012) sought to discover the nexus between csr and poverty in africa in relation to the giant tncs on the continent. he observes that corporate social responsibility/investment is generally treated as a charitable activity by companies in zimbabwe. poverty eradication in africa would result in a healthier population, reducing social welfare costs to governments and the donor community. this may compel governments to reduce taxes on businesses for giant tncs operating in africa. however, there is no comprehensive legislative and policy framework that guides csr; instead they differ from company to company. there are some fragmented laws and policies that existfor example, the environmental management act 13 of 2002, the indigenization and economic empowerment act 14 of 2007, the mines and minerals act chapter 21; 5 of 1996, and various statutory instruments addressing specific areas of the environment. the environmental management act requires environmental impact assessments for companies conducting development programs. it criminalizes companies that alter the environment without proper social and environmental mitigation measures. in the spirit of this legislation, the environmental impact assessment policy (eiap) of 1994 was crafted. this policy emphasizes that all socioand economic impacts of development should be properly accounted for. however, this policy is not mandatory. the united nations country team (unct) notes that zimbabwe has access to abundant and diversified natural resources. these consist of land, water, and mineral resources. forests cover approximately 66% of the total land area but have been threatened due to socioeconomic and political factors. in 2010, total forested area in zimbabwe was 15.6 million hectares with a reduction rate of 327,000 hectares per year (united nations country team (unct), 2014:55). zimbabwe’s population continues to grapple with poverty, living at less than us$1 per day despite the plethora of natural consilience 149 resources. poverty is increasing at an alarming rate in africa and is mainly caused by regimes neglecting the welfare of their citizens (chitereka, 2009). but there is no major analytical debate over land and agrarian reform in zimbabwe. foreign-owned businesses are not questioned about their non-local development promotion as they harness commodities, and simultaneously deny the country of the benefits. companies have in the past invested in csr programs, but they seem to be insignificant compared to the profits earned and externalized. this may have led to the indigenization and economic empowerment act no. 14 of 2007, which introduced community share ownership schemes/trust (csot) to compel corporations to invest into the community from which natural resources are exploited. this economic indigenization legislation is aimed at empowering local zimbabweans and enabling local communities and labour to benefit from natural resources through shareholding and management in various foreign owned companies. this legislation makes it mandatory for all foreign-owned companies worth us$500,000 and above to reinvest their profits into the society. the confusion around these community trusts, however, raises the question of who is really benefitting from this scheme. the primary role of the state has mainly been the development and enforcement of various legislation, as highlighted above. one of the major statutory instruments currently guiding csr in zimbabwe is the iso 26000: 2010 which is administered by the standard association of zimbabwe (saz). the government of zimbabwe endorsed the 2009 initiative by the institute of directors, the saz, and the zimbabwean leadership forum to establish a corporate governance code which focuses on the development and promotion of csr as a guiding concept for business operations. there have also been non-state initiatives, primarily through the private sector. ncube provides a chronological breakdown: in 1992, private companies established the environmental forum of zimbabwe to express their concern for the environment. four years later, the country’s telecommunications giant, econet, formed the capernaum trust as its csr branch. this was followed by the creation of the zimbabwe business council on hiv/aids in 2003 with the intention of promoting workplace wellness programs. in 2004, the country’s business umbrella body, the confederation of zimbabwe industries (czi), developed a business ethics charter that guided its members to ethical business practices. in 2010, the us embassy in zimbabwe and the american business association of zimbabwe launched the “investing in zimbabwe’s future” csr awards. it has been difficult for other sectors of the economy to implement csr programs. the extractive industries, though minimal, have been on the forefront of initiating csr initiatives, probably due to stronger legislation and the extractive industries transparency initiative (eiti), which has great potential to drive social investment. internationally, the united nations developed the guiding principles for business and human rights. this framework encourages corporates to adopt rights-based csr programs. in addition, the monrovia principles are applied, which include entrepreneurship, consilience mathende, nhapi: csr in zimbabwe growth partnership, and inclusive ownership. csr in developed countries is well-regulated and the implementation of csr projects practically adds value to communities. according to kerr (2009: 31), canada has played a major role in shaping the development and implementation of csr. in february 2009, the canadian institute of mining metallurgy and petroleum officially launched the csr centre for excellency. they also enacted a private member’s bill c-300 to regulate corporate accountability in mining, oil and gas corporations. in europe, cynthia and ruth (2006: 34) write that the uk takes a leading role in encouraging csr with high rates of stakeholder engagement and social reporting. according to moon (2004: 23), the uk government promulgated regulations guiding accountability, political stability, social and environmental information, and issues of poverty. singhapakdi and karande (2001: 135) note that countries like belgium, france, germany, and the netherlands followed the uk in prioritizing valueaddition csr. in the usa, aguilera & jackson (2003: 451) argue that the government promotes csr projects which address specific issues based on the socio-economic circumstances where the company is operating. the companies should be accountable to ensure that they add value to the communities impacted by their operations. it is, however, important to note that even in global north, csr is still mostly a voluntary activity, though when it occurs, the execution is better than africa’s. this is supported by jenkins (2004: 25), who argues that in developing countries, where environmental regulatory controls and associated governance processes may be weak, there is greater concern about csr implementation. in africa, south africa is taking a leading role in promoting csr. madeleine (2013: 41) states that the south african government has played a crucial role in defining and motivating csr initiatives. in zambia, konkola copper mines corporation abandoned a mine and was not held accountable because csr is largely considered voluntary (scoones, 1998: 13). hilson & potter (2005:19) state that in ghana, there have been high environmental and social costs of the gold mines. the mining sector has adversely affected community livelihoods and human rights. in some cases, entire villages in ghana have been relocated with paltry compensation. in zimbabwe, it is not clearly understood why companies engage in csr. moreover, literature review shows that there are no standardized csr strategies. mpofu (2012) writes that there is a lack of well-substantiated study on csr in zimbabwe. because it is considered voluntary (iso 26000: 2010, saz) and charitable, csr initiatives and data are not formally reported and recorded centrally. despite the fact that csr is central to sustainable development, data has not been captured even in the mdg status reports. zimbabwe does not have a csr index. this means there are no measurable indicators of csr, which makes it difficult to measure the short-term contribution of such initiatives to sustainable development. the first organization that deals with this was only launched in 2011, the regional centre for csr, which is modeled on south africa’s bench marks foundation. consilience 151 conceptual framework the concept of corporate social responsibility is based on the argument that business is sanctioned and promoted by society. society legitimates business by allowing it to function and use scarce resources (maphosa 1997). csr is a social practice which tends to be embedded in a particular economic, social cultural, historical, and institutional structure (midttun et al., 2006). different theories attempt to explain csr. mcwilliams and siegel’s (2001: 8) write about management theory, which is where a firm goes beyond compliance and engages in actions that appear to further some social good. the stakeholder theory explains that corporations must satisfy a variety of constituents e.g. workers, customers, suppliers, and local community organizations who can influence the firm’s outcomes. additionally, the stewardship theory by donaldson (1991: 12) is based on the idea that there is a moral imperative for corporations to do the right thing without financial consideration. finally, the liberal theory regards businesses as part of the solution to african poverty. this is rooted in the assumption that business and society have a symbiotic relationship (matunhu 2012). for matunhu, this theory treats businesses as global community citizens with the moral responsibility of championing poverty reduction through corporate transparency and accountability, restructuring the education system, and rectifying the financial exclusion of african states. barriers to government of zimbabwe csr enforcement maphosa (1997) contends that the primacy of profit maximization remains unchallenged in zimbabwe and that it will remain so for the foreseeable future. only a few organizations will make social information an important element of their information systems. zimbabwe’s companies act, the dominant legal framework binding legal operations of companies, has not sufficiently enforced social reporting. however, the indigenization & economic empowerment act is meant for organizations that are worth $500,000 or more. the law requires these organizations to give back to the communities. the general notice 459 of 2011 stipulates that organizations in the manufacturing sector must comply with indigenization regulation of zimbabwe. other csr corporate governance codes have not been officially enunciated. zimbabwean csr experiences—some critical perspectives this section explores selected topical incidents or controversies contributing to public concern about irresponsible and unethical business in zimbabwe. it will also look at some factors that have influenced corporations to carry out csr programs. mining has been consilience mathende, nhapi: csr in zimbabwe instrumental in the development of communities in rural areas. the many towns that have developed around mining in zimbabwe, for instance, include hwange, kadoma, shurugwi, zvishavane, bindura, and bulawayo these are clear examples of what is achievable if mines are encouraged and incentivized to take more corporate responsibility. the development of these centers took place thanks to responsible entities willing to cooperate with communities (dziro 2014). chiadzwa the eastern zimbabwe chiadzwa diamond mine is one of the most contested issues in zimbabwe’s mineral exploitation history. chiadzwa diamonds have been central to zimbabwe’s economy. from march 2006, chiadzwa – located some 80 kilometres from the eastern town of mutare – literally and metaphorically became an area of conflict following the ‘discovery’ of diamonds. numerous entities sought to exploit the mines, systematically displacing the interests and hegemony of the original, mostly apostolic, inhabitants of marange (nyamunda and mukwambo 2012). when driving to chiadzwa, down the winding and tarred 80km stretch from mutare up to hotsprings, which for all intents and purposes should be a memorable drive for any first-timer to the area, one will be excused for conjuring images of kimberley, south africa’s diamond nerve centre (mazara and mushaveto 2016). both the goz and the private companies involved in the extraction of diamonds were blamed for disregarding human rights in the diamond fields. the first contentious issue was the crack police sting operation, operation hakudzokwi (no return) and chikorokoza chapera (the end of artisanal mining), which was aimed at driving away artisanal miners in the area. much violence and death was recorded, resulting in another controversy surrounding the meeting of the kimberly certification process. formal commercial mining in chiadzwa began without the required environmental and social impact assessments, which led to environmental degradation and human displacement. these displacements made obvious the lack of resettlement action plans and social management plans. the resentment amongst community members meant that the companies were operating without a “social licence”. kamhungira, mugove and kachembere (2014: 1) state that no significant csr projects were being implemented in chiadzwa. they highlighted that mbada diamonds has surpassed us$ 1 billion in profits since they began operations in 2010. the company has only invested a little over us$1 million into the surrounding communities. it is not out of the ordinary to see young males, some in their early teens, breaking barricades and sprinting with rubble-filled 50kg sacks on their back in the searing weather. they then sift through this ore in search of the famed “ngoda”. after risking life and limb, many of these panners squander their illegally acquired gains on alcohol and sex (mazara and mushavetu 2016). the centre for natural resources governance (cnrg, 2013: 1) reported that mbada diamonds only managed to complete 100 housing units for relocation of families affected by their operations. the cnrg (2013:1) further states that mbada diamonds refused to compensate families forcibly relocated to arda transau, a governmentowned farm. it has not fulfilled its promise of drilling boreholes for all consilience 153 relocated families. gumbo (2014: 5) and mugabe and gumbo (2014: 3) write that chiadzwa villagers are still languishing in poverty in front of billions of dollars of diamond mines. according to katsaura (2010: 21), infrastructure is nonexistent in chiadzwa; roads are still in gravel (gumbo, 2014: 5) and schools are dilapidated (katsaura, 2010). the schools built by mbada have few classrooms and lack adequate furniture. the firms marange resources, mbada diamonds, diamond mining company, and anjin and jinan, pledged initial seed money of $1.5 million when the zimuto/marange community share ownership trust (csot) was launched in mid-2012 (the source newspaper, 2014). the companies were supposed to contribute $50 million, at $10 million each, to the trust. the zimuto/marange csot is one of the 16 community trusts launched countrywide as part of the government’s contentious empowerment programme. its goal was to have foreignowned firms give 51 percent of their shares to locals. chief gilbert marange, who chairs the zimuto/marange trust, told the parliamentary portfolio committee on indigenization that only mbada and marange had so far deposited a combined $400 000 into the trust’s account by 2014: when the trust was launched, we were given a cheque of $1.5 million but the money never came,…it looks like the companies mining diamonds in marange lied to the president (marange, 2014). out of the $417,598 (which includes interest earned from the deposit), the six-member leadership of the zimunya/marange csot has spent over $45,000, $31,000 of which has gone towards transport, allowances, and board fees (the source newspaper 2014). the portfolio committee urged the trust to use the funds for their intended purpose. according to mazarire and mushawetu (2016), headman mukwada, who has oversight over 18 villages, has no kind words for the diamond companies that have been involved in chiadzwa. companies that were ordered to cease operations by the government in march of 2016: when these companies came, they promised us a lot of things. they said we will have tarred roads within two years, have electricity, schools and clinics – but all that has just been talk. i think you have seen for yourself the road that you used from hotsprings. if you go the other way, it is even worse. and yet diamonds were leaving this area almost every week – the plane would leave at least twice a week. where is the money? where is the development that they promised us…the move by the government, to consolidate the companies into one company might be welcome. maybe if it is the government that is to be involved, they might have a different take to our welfare. as for these private companies, we have already seen that consilience mathende, nhapi: csr in zimbabwe they didn’t live up to their promise. hopefully the government will not let us down, as did the diamond companies (mukwada, 2016). this is further evidence that csr in zimbabwe lags behind other regional countries. though there are csr initiatives by some of the corporate sector, zimbabwe’s lack of csr legislation does not encourage businesses to participate. mutoko granite mining granite-mining communities are accusing companies of exploiting natural resources without giving back (mazararire and mushaweto 2016). villagers allege that, as the mining companies reap huge profits from granite, local communities remain poor. one villager, john kowo of the kowo village in mutoko, noted: granite miners have adopted a hit-and-run approach. they are only concerned with making profits and never bother to care about the environment and the welfare of the communities in which they operate (kowo, 2015). black granite, which is used to make in construction and to make tiles and tombstone, is mostly mined in murehwa, mutoko, and mount darwin. local granite is exported to south america, europe, and the united states, among other markets. it has been mined in some parts of the mutoko district since 1972, and more than 10 companies are mining black granite in this area alone. according to the zimbabwe mining development corporation, the mutoko district produces 75 percent of the country’s total black granite output. it is also mined in uzumba and mt darwin. on the international market, black granite, classified by the zimbabwe government as a mineral, can cost up to us$800 per square metre. villagers in mutoko are accusing the mining companies of ruining the environment, causing noise pollution, and destroying houses with blasting that causes cracks. despite that motoko is one of the country’s biggest producers of black granite, the roads linking the quarries to the main harare – nyamapanda highway are in a bad state. headman mbudzi (mr benhura katsande), of the kowo village, is unhappy with the conduct of both the local political leadership and the mining companies. according to mbudzi, we are aware of the fact that a number of community ownership schemes were set up in such mining communities as chiadzwa and ngezi. we do not have such a thing here and the community has not benefited from the exploitation of the stone. we are being taken for granted,”…we have had several meetings with representatives of the mining companies but nothing has materialised. there has been talk of a constituency ownership trust but again nothing came out of the several meetings that we had (mbudzi, 2015). consilience 155 most rivers in mutoko are heavily silted and there has been serious land degradation due to the industry. people and cattle have drowned in open pits left by the mining companies. the local leadership alleges that since 2008, more than six people have drowned in unprotected pits. mbudzi also said: the companies have very few permanent workers and those that are injured in blasting accidents are not compensated. we have had instances in which the family of a worker who was killed in a blasting accident was only given us$100. this is exploitation at its worst (mbudzi, 2015). on average, mining companies produce more than 120,000 metric tons of black granite worth more than us$12 million. on the local market, a tombstone costs over us$400. prices, however, depend on quality and size. as a community, we are calling upon the government to issue a directive that will compel mining companies to release some of the claims that they are holding on to. the community, in partnership with partners, is capable of running a mining venture. we cannot be beggars forever,” a clearly agitated headman mbudzi said. pathways for sustainable csr implementation social re-engineering csr is embedded in the social dimensions of economic development that are expressed in a variety of interventions, which range from household-based microenterprises to community-based livelihood projects, these can also include national programs that act as economic redistributive justice. zimbabwe faces a real and significant crisis of social development, whose roots are can be traced to the process of decolonization, the economic liberalization programme, and governmental economic mismanagement (murisa 2014). it is critical that grassroots communities participate in csr initiatives through incrementally cascading programs using bottom up approaches. as maphosa (1997) observes, the government's role in economic and social issues is curtailed with economic turbulence. society expects the private sector to increase its sensitivity and responsiveness to social needs. mounting public criticism of business, however, is indicative of society's disillusionment about the willingness of the private sector to live up to these expectations. it is essential to create autonomous and independent monitoring agencies within resource-rich states with the legal authority to identify undervaluation of mineral concessions and track extractive resource revenue (besada et al 2015). the blue chip businesses that remain afloat in zimbabwe decrease csr programs as economic contraction continues. this is further evidenced by zimbabwe’s finance minister’s mid-term fiscal policy statement of september 2016. he proposed civil service trimming, which he says stands at 298,000 currently, to 273,000 by the end of 2017 further consilience mathende, nhapi: csr in zimbabwe worsening the current unstable employment rates (financial gazette newspaper 2016). additionally, nnazodie (2016) suggests that african public institutions grapple with challenges relating to shortages of qualified personnel, inabilities to formulate and implement policies, unmotivated staff, and the slow diffusion of technology in order to improve productivity and competitiveness. these problems result in inefficient business procedures, weak intergovernmental relations, policy inconsistencies, weak interaction between public institutions and the private sector (which has partly stalled policy implementation), and high levels of bureaucracy. for csr effectiveness, this paralysis needs to be deconstructed and fixed. csr as an industrial growth catalyst sachikonye (2005) suggests that a structural evolution of the economy requires an increasing percentage of employment and contribution towards the gross domestic product (gdp), which should come from industry rather than agriculture. only as the engine of industrial growth gathers momentum will people migrate from the countryside to urban centres, reducing the pressure on natural resources and freeing land for farmers who wish to expand their operations and income. this requires robust community action for csr initiative implementation from csr duty bears. as dziro (2014) suggests, a community engages in a process aimed at improving the social, economic, and environmental situation of the community’s development. it is both the means and the end of development. it is through this action that the community becomes stronger, not just economically and socially but as a functioning society. expanded csr buy in from zimbabwean business entities despite economic challenges, some blue chip companies (the extractive sector included) have continued to publicize impressive unaudited results. it should be noted that csr is a business process beyond a company’s legal obligations. this is a commitment to contribute to sustainable economic development, working with employees, their families, the local community, and society at large to improve their quality of life in ways that are good for business and for community development (murisa 2010). csr and social workers zimbabwean social workers with vibrant frontline advocacy skills provide an opportunity for social work fraternity groups such as the national social workers association of zimbabwe. these groupings can enforce csr by forming alliances with other organizations, such as the zimbabwe environmental lawyers association or institute of directors zimbabwe, to form broad-base csr enforcement working groups. pragmatist social workers, policy makers, and researchers who are realistic about their profession’s place in the developmental scope need to unleash their power, and advocacy and lobbying have propelled social work to a pivotal niche in social and economic development (kangethe 2014). one example of where social workers can play a role is in investigating if corporations are doing consilience 157 environmentally sound business when resources are harnessed and extracted from grassroots communities, such as in chiadzwa and mutoko. social workers have the oversight necessary to ensure that duty bearers conform to government-initiated community development and community share ownership trusts. community share ownership trusts were established in terms of section 14b of the economic empowerment (general) regulations of 2010, which provides that local communities whose natural resources are being exploited by any "qualifying business" must be guaranteed shareholding in such business. non-state actors different lobby groups have been active in advocacy programs for livelihood transformation in communities like chiadzwa and manicaland in zimbabwe. one example is the centre for research and development. knowledge management through commissioned empirical studies examines the challenges faced by ngos and other groups when engaging with csr in developing countries. research is also needed to examines how ngos develop their conceptions of the social needs and expectations of the individuals they purport to represent (lauwo and otusanya (sa)). social justice and human rights are mutually reinforcing concepts, since one cannot enjoy human rights in an unjust society (masuka, 2014, p. 82). recommendations the role of the legislature the mines and energy parliamentary portfolio committee of parliament of zimbabwe should push for legislation enforcing taxes for mining entities, which should be used exclusively as a revolving fund for rehabilitating the environment. the zimbabwe environmental law association has exhorted the government of zimbabwe to develop comprehensive policies which govern the mining industry and compel companies to give back to the mining communities. (www.miningwatch.com). role of public institutions public institutions in zimbabwe like the environmental management agency, the zimbabwe human rights commission, and the office of the ombudsman are the duty bearers for environmental management, social justice, and human rights. they can robustly craft policies and action plans. the implementation of these policies and plans should ensure the deconstruction of csr implementation paralysis. these institutions are trusted by the zimbabwean public to be duty bearers, guaranteeing citizens that social justice is embedded in every socio-economic domain. corporates should connect to grassroots through these institutions and be held accountable for their csr initiatives. as un country team(unct), (2014:51) notes …other challenges in environmental sustainability are mainly due to highly sectoral and compartmentalized understanding of development consilience mathende, nhapi: csr in zimbabwe issues, competing demands of economic and industrial development and resource conservation, pollution control and, capacity of government departments to integrate environmental concerns in their plans and strategies which are severely constrained by poor management and a lack of information… the joint work of public institutions to tackle csr implementation and outcomes gaps in order to unlock value for enhanced social functioning is vital. sustainable development implications of past, current, and future csr models mandina, maravire, and masere (2014) investigated corporate social responsibility (csr) effectiveness in enhancing a company's image using the unki mine (um), in midlands province, zimbabwe as a case study. their finding indicate that corporate philanthropy activities, a phenomenon which connects the business sector to the social sector, play a crucial role in fostering relations between a company and the community. from mandina, maravire, and masere’s 2014 study, 83% of respondents agreed that corporate philanthropy activities have fostered relations between um and the communities of chironde and tongogara. it can be concluded, then, that businesses that take an active interest in a community’s well-being can generate support, loyalty, and goodwill from the community. conclusion this article has described the trajectory taken by, and the limitations of, csr in zimbabwe. csr implementation is vital for enhancing the well-being of beneficiary communities if pursued objectively with transparency. the article also examined dominant csr narratives in zimbabwe which, although noble, have been contested due to implementation complexities. consilience 159 references besada, h et al 2015 regulating extraction in africa: towards a framework for accountability in the global south. governance in africa, 2(1): 2, pp. 1–12, bews, n. 2003. “social impact assessments, theory and practice juxtaposes: experience from a south african rapid rail project’’. paper presented at the new directions impact assessment. 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[accessed 12 may 2016]. consilience 161 zimbabwe investment authority (nd) doing business in zimbabwe – mining, [online].available from: http://www.abaz.co.zw/pdf/government%20of%20zimbabwe/investment/mining.pdf (accessed on: 30/11/16) microsoft word hounshell.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 15, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 233255 disaggregated cost-benefit analysis incorporating ecosystem services and disservices: a case from sai sanctuary tyler hounshell college scholars program university of tennessee, knoxville thounshe@vols.utk.edu abstract under private management and ownership, privately protected areas provide opportunities for in situ environmental conservation. these areas also provide ecosystem services and disservices for various stakeholders, but their impact on various stakeholders has not been comprehensively studied. to evaluate the economic impact of a privately protected area, a disaggregated cost-benefit analysis was conducted on sai sanctuary incorporating its ecosystem services and disservices on private, local, and global stakeholders over a 10-year period from 2010 to 2020. sai sanctuary is a privately protected area located in southern kodagu, a district in the western ghats forests of karnataka, india. to valuate costs and benefits, interviews were conducted with private and local stakeholders. a literature review integrating other valuation techniques was performed as well. discount rates of 0% and 6% were selected, and sensitivity analysis yielded various tradeoffs born by each stakeholder group. results indicate private stakeholders bear the greatest net costs, and local stakeholders gain the greatest net benefits largely due to pollination, a regulating service valued between $546,210 and $774,810 in the year 2020. global stakeholders remained the least affected by sai sanctuary with net benefits ranging from $27,900 to $39,570 in 2020. still, the results validate stakeholder predictions that sai sanctuary not only sequesters carbon dioxide, it provides a range of ecosystem services while harboring biodiversity and producing natural capital. the results also indicate that environmental conservation occasionally yields unintended tradeoffs with disproportionate costs and benefits. in sum, environmental conservation can have a multiplicity of outcomes, but it is vital to measure these outcomes and bring privately protected areas into strategies for global conservation. keywords: ecosystem services, western ghats, disaggregated cost-benefit analysis, environmental conservation, privately protected areas, biodiversity consilience 234 author’s note in the summer of 2015, i had the opportunity to conduct research in the western ghats of india through columbia university’s summer ecosystem experiences for undergraduates (see-u) program. i also collaborated with researchers from the ashoka trust for research in ecology and the environment (atree), an environmental conservation ngo, to help plan this project. while studying in bangalore, i was introduced to the concept of ecosystem services and their irreplaceable economic, social, and environmental values in promoting sustainable development. to aid policymakers in fostering good governance and environmentally conscious policies, economists have begun to monetize these services creating implications for local microeconomies and the macroeconomy. sharing our understanding of the interactions between the economy (as a subset of our environment), and ecosystems can aid individuals and governments in constructing strategies to achieve the sustainable development goals, specifically target 15.9, which calls on countries to integrate ecosystem and biodiversity values into national and local planning, development processes, poverty reduction strategies and accounts by 2020. in the future, i would like to continue researching sustainable development in south asia along the intersections of development and environmental economics. 1. introduction hounshell: ecosystem services and disservices consilience in order to assign values to biodiversity and ecosystem services, environmental economists have used cost-benefit analysis (cba) to evaluate their importance and impact. “ecosystem services are the ecosystem functions of value to humans generated as emergent phenomena by the interacting elements of ecosystem structure” (daly and farley, 2004). generally, ecosystem services can be categorized into four main groups: provisioning, supporting, regulating, and cultural services (millennium ecosystem assessment, 2005). humans utilize these services both directly and indirectly, but there are also option values and non-use values of services that affect ecosystem productivity and future generations (pagiola et al., 2004). some examples of these services include fresh water, climate regulation, nutrient cycling, and aesthetic values. the sum of all values of ecosystem services indicates the total economic value (tev) of the ecosystem (pagiola et al., 2004). at the heart of all ecosystem structures is biodiversity. biodiversity is inherently linked to all elements of ecosystem structure and ecosystem services. this means that biodiversity loss can be considered as both a decline of species and a decline of ecosystems and their services (european chemical industry council, 2013). ultimately, preserving biodiversity and sustaining ecosystems and their services are closely associated, especially in species-rich areas such as tropical evergreen forests and biodiversity hotspots. an example of these ecosystems is sai sanctuary, a 300acre privately owned and protected evergreen forest in the kodagu district of the western ghats of india. since the region is home to more than 325 globally threatened species and moderates “unique biophysical and ecological processes”, the western ghats are recognized as a unesco world heritage site and one of the world’s eight “hottest hotspots” of biodiversity (western ghats, 2012). situated between brahmagiri wildlife reserve and nagarhole national park, sai sanctuary forms a major wildlife corridor that allows organisms to move between both areas of high biodiversity concentration (ricklefs, 2001). in sum, this area represents a critical eco-sensitive zone where wildlife and humans interact. sai sanctuary, as an ecosystem, provides services in the surrounding areas for various stakeholders; however, the impact of ecosystem services from privately protected areas has not been thoroughly evaluated even though many cost-benefit analyses and ecosystem valuations have been conducted on federally protected areas. moreover, disservices from ecosystems are hardly ever taken into account in the majority of valuation studies even though ecosystems can incur costs on stakeholders in the forms of wildlife damages, pest damages, and protection costs, among others (lele consilience 236 and srinivasan, 2013). therefore, cba incorporating ecosystem services and disservices from sai sanctuary communicates values and implications of these services to various stakeholders and policymakers. in order to analyze the impact of sai sanctuary, i determined the costs and benefits of its ecosystem services incurred on private, local, and global stakeholders over a 10-year period (2010-2020). i also questioned whether there was a relationship between the number of stakeholders at each stakeholder level and cost-benefit ratio. i hypothesized h0: the amount of stakeholders at each stakeholder level will have no effect on the cost-benefit ratio, and h1: the cost-benefit ratio will decrease as the amount of stakeholders at each stakeholder level increases (in other words, private stakeholders will have the highest cost-benefit ratio, and global stakeholders will have the lowest cost-benefit ratio). many of the methods presented in this article are based on a previous study, “disaggregated economic impact analysis incorporating ecological and social trade-offs and techno-institutional context: a case from the western ghats of india” by lele and srinivasan (2013). i begin this article by describing the study site, stakeholders, methods (section 2), and the results (section 3). i then discuss the major findings and their implications on various stakeholders, public policy, and future research in the context of privately protected areas and conservation in the western ghats (section 4). finally, i provide a summary and concluding remarks (section 5). 2. methodology hounshell: ecosystem services and disservices consilience 2.1. study site figure 1: maps of india, karnataka, kodagu (coorg) district, and sai sanctuary with a 5 kilometer radius in red (karnataka state, 2000; kodgu district, 2015; map of coorg, 2015; google earth, 2015) note: the yellow pins in the map of sai sanctuary (bottom right) represent the various plantations that were evaluated. the blue circle represents the 300-acre plot of sai sanctuary. maps not drawn to scale. private landowners purchased sai sanctuary in 1991 with the intention of restoring native forests that were previously used for agroforestry. the sanctuary is now managed by sai sanctuary trust, an independently registered nonprofit organization (sai sanctuary trust, 2008). “the sanctuary’s rich variety of flora includes hundreds of different indigenous trees and plants—many of medicinal value—as well as numerous rare and threatened consilience 238 species of animals… with over 300 different kinds of birds frequenting its forest canopy” (sai sanctuary trust, 2008). currently, the sanctuary is undergoing secondary succession and remnant forests dominate the landscape. fragmented coffee-agroforestry mosaics characterize the area around sai sanctuary. coffee agro-forests were first established in the 1850s, but since the 1970s there has been a dramatic expansion of these landscapes along with the intensified cultivation of non-native shade trees such as grevillea robusta (silver oak) (krishnan et al., 2012). although coffee (coffeea canephora, the robusta variety) is the main crop grown in kodgau, pepper, tea, rice, banana, cardamom, and others are also grown usually in agroforestry systems. a 5 kilometer radius from sai sanctuary’s coordinates (11°59'50.30"n, 75°53'9.48"e) was established as the area that represented local stakeholders that were influenced by sai sanctuary’s ecosystem services. a total of 20 farms and 213 acres were evaluated representing 4.34% of the surrounding area under forest cover from spatial analysis using google earth (google earth, 2015). 2.2. stakeholders in order to assign disaggregate costs and benefits, the various levels of stakeholders had to be defined. private stakeholders were defined as the owners and trustees of sai sanctuary. local farmers and their households within a 5 kilometer radius from sai sanctuary were ascribed as local stakeholders. global stakeholders were also considered and defined as the total world population. the various stakeholders were assigned costs and benefits in fig. 2. sai sanctuary also affects regional stakeholders downstream, but they were not included in this analysis due to time constraints. 2.3. valuating costs and benefits 2.3.1. private stakeholders in order to valuate costs and benefits of private stakeholders, an interview was conducted with the owners of sai sanctuary on june 21, 2015. from the interview, the benefits from ecotourism and costs of operation from the past 5 years were determined. data including the number of tourists per year, revenues from ecotourism, and trends for the future were obtained. the operational costs of sai sanctuary were broken into the categories of maintenance costs, protection costs, and labor costs. opportunity costs were also included in the cba because the hounshell: ecosystem services and disservices consilience owners could convert sai sanctuary and its remnant forests to coffee-agroforests like the majority of other households in the surrounding area. to monetize private stakeholders’ opportunity costs, data on local farmers’ average profits per acre was extrapolated from section 2.3.2. 2.3.2. local stakeholders the first step in valuating costs and benefits for local stakeholders was to select households to interview. the area limited to coffee-agroforests was predetermined using google earth. the area north of sai sanctuary was chosen for sampling since i did not want to factor ecosystem services from brahmagiri wildlife reserve and nagarhole national park into the analysis. the twenty households were randomly selected from dispersed communities that were scattered around roadways encompassing sai sanctuary (see figure 1). the selected farms represented variation in distance from 0.84 km to 4.90 km from sai sanctuary with an average distance of 2.53 km. the households also varied in acreage from 2 acres to 40 acres with an average farm size of 10.65 acres. interviews were conducted with the farmers over a three-day period from june 22-24, 2015. data collection was required in order to monetize pollination benefits from native pollinators, which are estimated to produce 8.826 million metric tons of coffee around the world annually (faostat, 2014). in fact, “pollination by animals is an important ecosystem service because crop plants accounting for 35% of global crop-based food production benefit from animalmediated pollination” (klein et al., 2007). interviews were conducted at the households of the farmers to determine their annual profits from agriculture. a method called benefit transfer was also employed to estimate the production value of native pollinators since the production value of pollinators from sai sanctuary has not been evaluated. the benefit transfer method involves estimating “the values for biodiversity or ecosystem services being transferred from studies carried out elsewhere” (biological diversity advisory committee (australia) & land & water australia, 2005). the study selected for benefit transfer was conducted by researchers who determined the status and efficiency of pollinators in a similar fragmented agroforest landscape in northern kodagu (12°12'0.00"n, 75°48'0.00"e) located 24.3 kilometers northwest of sai sanctuary (krishnan et al., 2012) according to krishnan et al., native pollinators were responsible for 50% more coffee fruit set than by wind pollination alone in 2012. moreover, 95.7% of all pollinators observed were bees with apis dorsata (the giant honey consilience 240 bee) making up for 57.37% of all native pollinator fruit set (krishnan et al., 2012). bee populations were estimated to be declining annually at 2.5% from 2010-2015, and the rate was predicted to remain constant through 2020 (setty, 2015). the quantification of pollination benefits could be determined using the proportion of coffee produced by pollinators and comparing it to each farmer’s annual profit from coffee sales. pest damages and wildlife damages also had to be considered to determine the costs of wildlife disservices. the interview with the farmers included questions pertaining to crop damages from pests and crop damages from wildlife were also incorporated. the forestry department of india operates a compensation scheme that reimburses households for crop damages from wildlife, so the interview also included questions pertaining to compensation. wildlife was defined as any medium or large-sized animals. the most widely cited were elephas maximus (the asian elephant) and bos gaurus (the indian bison/gaur). these disservices make human-wildlife conflict more likely (distefano, 2005). driven by india’s population growth, land-use transformation, and habitat fragmentation, human-wildlife conflict is increasingly becoming a hazard to many endangered species and creates economic and social costs by undermining “human welfare, health, and safety” (distefano, 2005). according to ninan and sathyaplan, the intensity of wildlife damages is more severe “near or within forest boundaries” (2005). accordingly, i wanted to determine if any relationship existed between severity of pest and wildlife damages and distance from sai sanctuary. a garmin etrex 10 gps was used to plot farm locations and distances were measured using tools on google earth. simple linear regressions were performed with data from both pest and wildlife damages using jmp pro 10 statistical software. 2.3.3. global stakeholders valuating the benefits for global stakeholders included determining the price of carbon sequestration benefits and biodiversity conservation. zero costs born by global stakeholders could be determined in the study conducted by lele and srninivasan (2013). in a similar manner, no costs generated by sai sanctuary could be determined for global stakeholders and were subsequently excluded from the valuation. hounshell: ecosystem services and disservices consilience table 1: identified costs, benefits, and stakeholders with assigned ecosystem services private stakeholders local stakeholders global stakeholders 1. (+) ecotourism: cultural service 1. (+) pollination: regulating service 1. (+) carbon sequestration: regulating service 2. (−) operational costs 2. (−) wildlife damages 2. (+) biodiversity conservation: supporting service 3. (−) costs of foregone land usage 3. (−) pest damages note: benefits are denoted with “+”, and costs are denoted with “−“. no costs could be determined for global stakeholders. in order to determine the annual amount of carbon sequestered in sai sanctuary, the benefit transfer method (see section 2.3.2.) was utilized from a global carbon sequestration study that measured annual sequestration rates of tropical forests based on the age of the forest in secondary succession. (silver, ostertag, and lugo, 2000). the following algorithms from the study were used to estimate the amount of aboveground (agc) and belowground (bgc) carbon sequestered in mg/ha in sai sanctuary for the years 2010-2020 (silver, ostertag, and lugo, 2000): agc = e^ln(0.96*forest age) + 1.56 bgc = e^0.16*ln(forest age) + 3.65 note: the age of the forest in 2010 was calculated to be 19 assuming the forests in sai sanctuary began undergoing succession in 1991. the values obtained from the amount of carbon sequestered per hectare were converted to annual amount of carbon dioxide sequestered in metric tons (tonnes/megagrams) over the 300-acre study site for 2010-2020. prices for sequestered carbon dioxide were calculated and predicted based on market values in us$/tco2 from global voluntary and mandatory markets (diaz, hamilton, and johnson, 2011; goldstein and gonzales, 2014; hamrick and goldstein, 2015; peters-stanley, gonzalez, and yin, 2013; petersstanley, hamilton, and yin, 2012). to monetize biodiversity conservation, i utilized a metaanalysis study that aggregated the results from previous studies from 1979-2005 that gauged people’s willingness to pay for the biodiversity conservation of terrestrial and marine habitats (within national jurisdictions) through the contingent valuation method consilience 242 (jacobsen and hanley, 2008). contingent valuation method estimates economic values by “ask[ing] people to directly state their willingness to pay (wtp) for specific environmental services, based on a hypothetical scenario” (daly and farley, 2004). the study found that people’s wtp for biodiversity conservation is linked to income, and on average people are willing to pay 1.1257825% (based l45 wtp responses) of their income for biodiversity conservation (jacobsen and hanley, 2008). given this percentage, i calculated global stakeholders’ wtp for biodiversity conservation by multiplying 1.1257825% by global gross national income (gni) for the years 2010-2020 using the “gni, atlas method (current us$)” dataset (world bank, 2015). gni was predicted for the years 2015-2020 using the “inflation, consumer prices (annual)” dataset (world bank, 2015). to determine global stakeholders’ wtp for biodiversity conservation solely for sai sanctuary, i divided 300 acres by the total number of acres of protected terrestrial and marine area in the years 2010-2020 according to values published by protected planet report 2014 (juffe-bignoli et al., 2014). multiplying each of these values by global stakeholders’ wtp for biodiversity conservation for each year yielded global stakeholders’ wtp for biodiversity conservation of sai sanctuary. 2.4. sensitivity analysis for sensitivity analysis, a nominal rate of 12%, recommended by the planning commission of india, would be equivalent to a real rate between 3% and 6%, given current interest rates and expected inflation in india. moreover, environmental cba should consist of lower discount rates than monetary cba (lele and srinivasan, 2013) in order to discount future generations more proportionately to present generations. i selected discount rates of 0% and 6% based on recommendations published in a review by dasgupta (2008). additionally, various scenarios were analyzed to account for uncertainty. i calculated the net costs born by private stakeholders without opportunity costs (scenario 1). i also reevaluated net benefits for local stakeholders with bee populations declining annually at 5% and 0% (scenario 2). social costs of carbon dioxide, as determined by the white house office of management and budget, were considered in calculating the net benefits for global stakeholders (scenario 3) (interagency working group on the social cost of carbon, united states government, 2015). sensitivity analysis showed that various results change substantively depending on the modification of independent variables. hounshell: ecosystem services and disservices consilience 3. results the estimated changes in present value of the economic costs and benefits are given in tables 2 and 3. only the costs and benefits of the individual stakeholder groups are aggregated in accordance with the methods of disaggregated cba, so economic impact can be analyzed for each stakeholder group. all values discussed will be in 2014 us$. i focus initially on analyzing the impact of ecosystem services and disservices. i then analyze the effects of discount rates of 0% and 6% and the time horizon of 10 years. finally, i explain the results of sensitivity analysis and the effect of various scenarios proposed in section 2.4. 3.1. impact of ecosystem services and disservices on stakeholders of all stakeholder groups, private stakeholders maintain the highest cost-benefit ratio from 2010-2020. the majority of costs incurred result from opportunity costs of foregone land usage. since coffee plantation owners gain large profit margins, the transferred surplus creates a considerable cost that is born by the owners and trustees of sai sanctuary. this cost is decreasing since the profit margin for local stakeholders is thinning (adjusted for inflation) due to bee population declines, stagnant wholesale coffee prices, and rising inflation in india (office of the economic adviser govt. of india, 2015) table 2: present value of changes in economic costs and benefits of stakeholders with a 0% discount rate over 10 years (2010-2020) private stakeholders local stakeholders global stakeholders ecotourism + 6.35 (+ 64%) operational costs − 15.90 (0%) costs of foregone land usage − 143.47 (− 13%) pollination + 774.81 (− 28%) wildlife damages − 210.32 (0%) pest damages − 278.38 (0%) carbon sequestration + 8.33 (− 40%) biodiversity conservation + 31.24 (− 1%) consilience 244 net economic impact − 153.02 (−14%) + 286.11 (− 51%) +39.57 (− 13%) cost-benefit ratio 25.10 0.63 <0.0001 note: units are thousand us$ in 2014 prices, i.e. 1$ = 61inr (board of governors of the federal reserve system (us), 2015). the figures that are not in brackets reflect the value added in the year 2020. the figures in brackets reflect percent change from 2010 to 2020. wildlife damages are adjusted for compensation. however, ecotourism benefits are increasing substantively, but the benefits are marginal when compared to net loss. operational costs are expected to stay constant when adjusted for inflation. the observed percent change in net economic impact remains negative even though there is an increase in benefits and decrease in costs from 2010-2020 since the net economic impact was − $176,940 in 2010 for private stakeholders. due to pollinators’, and particularly apis dorsata’s ability to fertilize between 27% and 35% of coffee flowers, local stakeholders receive the greatest net benefit (krishnan et al., 2012). pollination services are estimated to be valued between $546,710 and $774,810. but as expected, local stakeholders bear the highest ecosystem disservices from sai sanctuary. contrasting local stakeholders’ assumptions, when compensation was disregarded, pest damages still outweighed wildlife damages by 10%. when wildlife damages and pest damages were correlated with distance from sai sanctuary, no relationship could be determined, and linear regression yielded r2 values of 0.000141 and 0.050234 respectively. global stakeholders are least affected by sai sanctuary’s ecosystem services, and bear no ecosystem disservices. biodiversity conservation benefits are consistently greater than the benefit from carbon sequestration. both carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation benefits decrease from 2010 to 2020. although young succession forests (like the forests of sai sanctuary) sequester greater amounts of carbon dioxide than oldgrowth forests, sequestration rates still decrease annually since biomass accumulation is assumed to level off over time (lal and singh, 2000). likewise, the market price of carbon remains unstable with prices currently on the decline due to recent unproductive markets predominantly in the european union’s emission trading scheme (world bank, 2014). biodiversity conservation benefits declined from 2010 because increasingly more terrestrial lands and marine bodies are becoming protected (juffe-bignoli et al., 2014). while the effectiveness of conservation management in these new protected areas can be debated, the globe is on track to meet and even surpass (by 3%) target 11 of the convention on biological diversity’s aichi hounshell: ecosystem services and disservices consilience biodiversity targets and sustainable development goal 14.3 by 2020, which call for “the effective and equitable management of at least 17% of the world’s terrestrial areas and 10% of marine areas” (juffe-bignoli et al., 2014; united nations, general assembly, 2014). 3.2. impact of time discounting the use of a real discount rate of 6%, in keeping with the established cba framework, proved to significantly impact distribution of costs and benefits on all stakeholders (see table 3). and although absolute values change, there is no significant difference in who are net gainers and losers. this discount rate is inherently biased towards current generations, but may serve as rate revealed by the preferences of current stakeholders based on market conditions in india. alternatively, the results in table 2 do not discount future generations and thereby reflect equitable allocation of natural resources and capital to all generations, but this social discount rate is viewed by some economists as misrepresenting society’s option values. even so, the question of appropriately discounting future generations and continuous flows from ecosystems remains to be answered. table 3: present value of changes in economic costs and benefits of stakeholders with a 6% discount rate over 10 years (2010-2020) private stakeholders local stakeholders global stakeholders ecotourism + 4.48 (+ 16%) operational costs − 11.21 (− 30%) costs of foregone land usage − 101.14 (− 38%) pollination + 546.21 (− 49%) wildlife damages − 148.27 (− 30%) pest damages − 196.25 (− 30%) carbon sequestration + 5.88 (− 58%) biodiversity conservation + 22.02 (− 30%) net economic impact − 107.87 (−39%) + 201.69 (− 66%) + 27.90 (− 39%) cost-benefit ratio 25.10 0.63 <0.0001 consilience 246 note: units are thousand us$ in 2014 prices, i.e. 1$ = 61inr (board of governors of the federal reserve system (us), 2015). the figures that are not in brackets reflect the value added in the year 2020. the figures in brackets reflect percent change from 2010 to 2020. wildlife damages are adjusted for compensation. 3.3. impact of various scenarios further sensitivity analysis revealed net costs decrease when costs of foregone land usage are excluded from analysis for private stakeholders as shown in figure 2. figure 2: present value of net costs for private stakeholders with a 0% discount rate from 20102020 note: the light gray line (below) reflects net costs without opportunity costs (scenario 1). since bee populations were only estimated to decrease at 2.5% annually, i designated this rate as the middle ground and chose a higher and lower rate to serve as boundaries for the actual rate of population decline. sensitivity analysis revealed net benefits over time for local stakeholders when bee populations were estimated to be annually decreasing at 5% and when they were estimated to remain constant as shown in figure 3. 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 thousand us$ in 2014 prices hounshell: ecosystem services and disservices consilience figure 3: present value of net benefits for local stakeholders with a 0% discount rate from 20102020 note: the black line reflects net benefits when bee populations remain constant. the medium gray line reflects net benefits when bee populations decline at 2.5% annually, and the light gray line reflects net benefits when bee populations decline at 5% annually (scenario 2). 2012 was the known base year for bee populations (krishnan et al., 2012). the social cost of carbon “is meant to be a comprehensive estimate of climate change damages” (environmental protection agency, united states, 2015). in figure 4, the social cost of carbon represents a high estimate of the price of carbon, and net benefits are greater when the social cost of carbon is taken into account as shown below. figure 4: present value of net benefits for global stakeholders with a 0% discount rate from 2010-2020 note: the black line reflects net benefits incorporating the social costs of carbon (scenario 3). the gray line reflects net benefits incorporating the market prices of carbon. 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 thousand us$ in 2014 prices 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 thousand us$ in 2014 prices consilience 248 4. discussion 4.1. trade offs from environmental conservation in the year 2020, private stakeholders are expected to bear net costs between $107,170 and $153,020. reaping large profits from coffee farming would not be difficult even if bee populations decreased drastically due to native tree felling to make room for coffee plants. although bee populations would likely lose their most suitable habitat, some pollinators will be able to locate to remnant forest mosaics surrounding the sanctuary and wind pollination will still occur (krishnan et al., 2012; lele and srinivasan 2013). fortunately, the owners and trustees of sai sanctuary are not seeking to profit from coffee-agroforestry. actually, their ability to persist in maintaining sai sanctuary, even while bearing a net loss and minimal benefits from ecotourism, reveals non-monetizable ecosystem services that private stakeholders value from the sanctuary. these could include cultural services such as aesthetic, spiritual, recreational, or even psychological benefits (millennium ecosystem assessment, 2005). private stakeholders may even gain a personal sense of well-being in knowing that they are safeguarding the transfer of valuable ecosystem services like evapotranspiration and biodiversity conservation to others. ultimately, private stakeholders choose to maintain sai sanctuary even when a more profitable tradeoff is available. like private stakeholders, local stakeholders stand to lose and gain from sai sanctuary through wildlife and pest damages and pollination benefits. increasing conservation efforts and sustaining populations in sai sanctuary would increase costs and benefits incurred on local stakeholders since bees, pests, elephants, and guar all call sai sanctuary home. but as previously stated, wildlife damages and pest damages may be resulting from other ecosystems even though literature suggests otherwise (ninan and sathyaplan, 2005). part of the difficulty in linking wildlife and pest damages with sai sanctuary may result from a small sample size or the fact that the landscape consists of a mosaic of contiguous remnant forests that serves as a habitat for some species and a “highway” for species maneuvering the wildlife corridor (ricklefs, r. e., 2001). however, pollination benefits would likely outweigh wildlife disservices because of bees’ instrumental role in coffee fruit set and, consequently, the profits gained from coffee cultivation (krishnan et al., 2012). still, bee populations need to be closely monitored due to local population declines and declines around the world (setty, 2015; potts et al., 2010). higher bee hounshell: ecosystem services and disservices consilience populations from increased conservation efforts would cause a greater net loss born by private stakeholders because opportunity costs of foregone land usage would increase due to higher pollination benefits and larger profit margins in coffee cultivation. lastly, global stakeholders can benefit from increased conservation efforts if sai sanctuary expanded its 300-acre site to encompass a larger area. global stakeholders could gain in the long term from increased carbon sequestration benefits. but minimal benefits would only be accrued in the short term from increased biodiversity conservation since the amount of protected areas worldwide is expected to steadily increase through 2020 and beyond (juffe-bignoli et al., 2014). 4.2. importance of privately protected areas privately held land is valuable for conservation in providing ecosystem services, regulating resource productivity, and curbing the effects of climate change. for example, in 2015, sai sanctuary stored an aggregated 77,404.69477 metric tons of carbon dioxide in total as estimated by devagiri et al. (2012). additionally, the net economic impact from its ecosystem services and disservices is estimated between $274,070 and $332,030 for 2020. as indicated, sai sanctuary not only acts as carbon sink, it provides a range of ecosystem services while harboring biodiversity and producing natural capital. privately protected areas like sai sanctuary “can be effective in expanding protection into under-represented or where most land is private hands” (stolton, redford, and dudley, 2014). these areas can also link other large publicly protected areas functioning as wildlife corridors and habitats when the surrounding area is fragmented. but unlike publicly protected areas, these areas face different obstacles. often privately protected areas face problems of increasing management capacity, measuring biodiversity, monitoring ecotourism impacts, acquiring funding, and poaching. current estimates of the total amount of privately protected areas range in the tens of thousands (stolton, redford, and dudley, 2014). “millions of hectares of privately owned forest, farmland, grazing lands, and water bodies are vital for broader biodiversity conservation, not only because of their extent but because they can be located in areas in high resource productivity” like biodiversity hotspots (stolton, redford, and dudley, 2014). ultimately, privately protected areas play an irreplaceable role in conserving biodiversity and provisioning ecosystem services. acknowledging that environmental conservation can have unintended tradeoffs (see section 4.1) for various stakeholders, consilience 250 bringing these privately protected areas into the conservation conversation is vital. 4.3. future policy and research implications as of 2015, payments for ecosystem services (pes) for carbon credits and biodiversity conservation are already under development and should be implemented in kodagu. in particular, “[stakeholders] whose livelihoods are largely dependent on the natural forest or biodiversity need to be identified and suitably rewarded [with pes] for protecting or practicing natural farming activities that do not lead to destruction of natural ecosystem” (devagiri et al., 2012). a revised system of compensation for wildlife disservices is also needed since damages are not fully compensated (35% of those interviewed reported losing more than 50% of their crops to pest and wildlife damages). the current system disincentivizes local stakeholders to conserve biodiversity. local stakeholders should be instructed about the impact of pollinators, specifically apis dorsata on coffee fruit set. maintaining stable bee populations is critical for their livelihood. for future analysis, researchers need to evaluate a larger variety and diversity of privately protected areas and their ecosystem services. by comparing the impact of these areas on different stakeholders, researchers can assemble a framework over time. additionally, the correlation between wildlife disservices and distance from private forests needs to be evaluated with a much larger sample size and scale in order to assess the notion that these disservices increase with proximity to protected areas. moreover, an in-depth analysis of appropriate discount rates is necessary in order to valuate ecosystem services flowing from privately protected areas over time. depending on time, disaggregated cba can be used to account for additional ecosystem services (reflecting a more accurate tev) and stakeholders. certainly, with appropriate discount rates, predictions about future ecosystem services can be carried out for to account for multiple generations. 5. conclusion over time, ecological economists popularized the idea of ecosystem services with the intention of helping decision-makers assign economic values to environmental flows, but ecosystem services were hardly ever viewed as bearing costs or disservices on various stakeholders. one would presume that increased conservation efforts would improve the benefits from ecosystem services across all stakeholders; however, this is not the case in all situations as various stakeholders may face unintended tradeoffs. hounshell: ecosystem services and disservices consilience furthermore, disaggregated cba allows one to distinguish between ecosystem services and disservices and determine the net impact on each group of stakeholders since ecosystems affect different stakeholders disproportionately. analyzing the economic impact of sai sanctuary has shown the following; a) that the cost-benefit ratio increases as the amount of stakeholders at each stakeholder level increases, thus affirming my initial hypothesis (h1) for this study. b) that private stakeholders bear the greatest net costs (significantly due to costs of foregone land usage), and local stakeholders gain the greatest net benefits (significantly due to pollination). c) that environmental conservation can occasionally have unintended tradeoffs that come with costs and benefits. some stakeholders are not beneficiaries. d) that economic impacts from ecosystem services change significantly with various scenarios, tradeoffs, discount rates, and ecological dynamics of the evaluated system. e) that privately protected areas should be further researched and incorporated into global conservation strategies. in short, ecosystem service valuation has left an impactful influence on the way humans understand natural capital and the methods of monetizing ecological flows. ultimately, a disaggregated cba of sai sanctuary benefits the biologist just as much as the decision-maker in shaping conservation strategies in the western ghats since both should be more economically and ecologically informed about various options and tradeoffs. acknowledgements i am enormously grateful to meghna agarwala for her contributions and encouragement at all stages of research. i also wish to thank urvashi bhosle for her insightful critiques. for support and sponsorship, i would like to thank the center for environmental sustainability at the earth institute of columbia university and all the researchers, faculty, and staff at the ashoka trust for research in ecology and the environment (atree) especially sidappa setty, r. ganesan, n. a. arawind, arshiya bose, and harisha r. p. and finally for their friendship, i thank lorenzo gibson, matthew coughlin, nellie leddy, jonathon smith, and elias liakos. consilience 252 bibliography biological diversity advisory committee (australia) and land & water australia. 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(2015). gni, atlas method (current us$), world development indicators [data file]. washington dc: world bank. retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gnp.atls.cd world bank, 2015. inflation, consumer prices (annual), world development indicators [data file]. washington, dc: world bank. retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/fp.cpi.totl.zg note from the editors-in-chief note from the editors-in-chief https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i8.4617 how to cite sing, a., & subramanyan, v. (2012). note from the editors-in-chief. consilience, (8). https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i8.4617 abstract dear reader, it is our pleasure to present you issue 8 of consilience: the journal of sustainable development. this past year has been filled with many milestones for us, as we have launched new opportunities for readers to engage with consilience. our new ipad app is now available for download from itunes here. we believe that this is a major step forward in making consilience accessible to our readers across a range of media. we are also pleased to announce the launch of our upgraded website, which may be viewed at www.consiliencejournal.org. changes include an expansion of our briefings column, featuring short articles by undergraduate and graduate students at columbia university and other institutions, as well as a more vibrant and engaging photo essay section. we strongly encourage our readers to engage with these new facets of our website and contribute to the continuing dialogue on sustainable development. specifically in regards to this issue, we are proud to present our special feature on urban development, which occupies the first 70 pages of this issue. in an era where more than half the world’s 7 billion people live in cities, the challenges involved in creating livable, healthy cities are very pressing. however, the special feature, seeking to provide glimpses into the concerns of this field, is in no way a holistic treatment of every issue in this domain. rather, we give readers a taste of the scope of pressing matters in this area, in the hope that they will be motivated to delve further into this in other issues of consilience, as well as in other reputed publications. our three photo essays concerning urban development capture the essence of this section, approaching the urban from different, yet complementary, perspectives. simon fique’s concern for the influence of urban planning and architecture on community building in the developed world, by his exploration of santiago de compostela in spain, contrasts to the rather more gritty concerns of leandro lima, in his discussion of a program to introduce media education into the favelas of brazil. yet they, as well as laura penaranda currie, in her photo essay on planning https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i8.4617 http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/consilence-journal/id477051123?mt=8 http://www.consiliencejournal.org/ and construction in havana, cuba, recognize the importance of the habitat that we construct for ourselves in determining our development and fulfillment as human beings. in a time when it may appear that the thinking on urban development is haphazard and disconnected, in both the developed and developing worlds, these essays serve as a heartening reminder of the true human scale and impact of these issues. we are excited about the coming year and encourage you to continue interacting with consilience through readership, submissions, and through our briefings column. as always, we look forward to receiving your feedback and hope that our work will in some way inspire engagement with the issues trending across the discipline of sustainable development. if you have any questions or comments, please do not hesitate to contact us atcontact@consiliencejournal.org. enjoy the issue! alexandra sing editor-in-chief, ay 2012-2013 consilience: the journal of sustainable development vighnesh subramanyan editor-in-chief, ay 2011-2012 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution 4.0 international license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ note from the editors-in-chief ​​​ microsoft word ahmed.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 13, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 300-311 the warrior’s dilemma: can maasai culture persist in a changing world? zahra ahmed department of ecology and evolutionary biology princeton university, princeton, new jersey zahraa@princeton.edu laura booth department of ecology, evolution and environmental biology columbia university, new york city, new york lsb2137@columbia.edu loise njagi gibson institute for land, food, and environment queen’s university, northern ireland loisenjagi@yahoo.com elleni stephanou university of east anglia, norwich, united kingdom elleni.stephanou@gmail.com abstract the maasai people have acted as the historical stewards of the land and wildlife of the amboseli ecosystem for centuries. maasai culture and its accompanying traditions compose one of the most well-studied anthropological systems in the world. currently, maasai culture and tradition face more challenges than ever before. through a series of interviews with various constituents of the amboseli community, we sought to discover which traditions the maasai continued to find important, what were the most formidable threads to those traditions, and how the maasai were responding to those threats. community members identified four primary traditions that continue to be important: social connectedness, dress and ornaments, connection with wildlife and nature, and the practice of moranism. threats to these traditions include increased the presence of westerners, tourists, and conservationists; climate change and increased incidence of drought; changing land tenure systems; and the introduction of formal education among younger generations. maasai community members have responded to these threats by keeping, discarding, or evolving the tradition based on its importance to them. based on these findings, we detail potential strategies for the maintenance of those traditions which are currently evolving: moranism and pastoralism. these recommendations will inform maasai community members about the scope of solutions they currently face, as well as providing insight into more innovative solutions that could be implemented in the future. 2 consilience 1. introduction the maasai tribe of kenya and tanzania has acted as the historical stewards of the land and wildlife of the amboseli ecosystem for centuries (fitzgerald 2013). the traditional maasai lifestyle is seminomadic; as it is for other pastoralists; the movement of herds of livestock over vast areas of land in search of areas with better resources is central to the maasai way of life. maasai measure their wealth by the number of cattle they own and the number of children they have (briggs 2006). among the maasai, such symbols of status lead to high population growth—a trend reflected by rapid population growth across kenya since the 1980s (kenya open data). livestock numbers must increase to sustain an increasing population of maasai, leading to competition for land. due to land privatization through subdivision, the maasai are now unable to travel over the vast distances they once covered. these factors have led to considerable changes in their traditional way of nomadism (goodman 2002). two such traditions that are undergoing change include pastoralism and moranism. among the maasai, the morans, or warriors, are an age class of men tasked with protecting their communities from external aggressors, both human and animal. morani initiation is a complex affair that traditionally involved the killing of a lion and other displays of bravery. these events served to prove one’s manhood to the fellow men and eligible women of the group. with the recent outcry against lion-killing, moranism, like pastoralism, has come under threat from the encroaching modern world. in light of the aforementioned challenges, the maasai tradition and cultural practices are changing. the effect of these changes on the tradition and culture will ultimately affect the conservation efforts of the surrounding wildlife moving forward. through surveys and interviews of maasai people in local communities, ifaw, kws, and big life representatives, we gathered information on which cultural practices seemed to be evolving with the current changes. we examined the possible results these two cases would have on the future preservation of maasai tradition and culture and, in turn, the effects this would have on the conservation of wildlife in the amboseli ecosystem. 2. methods we collected information about the evolving culture and traditions of the maasai by conducting a series of ten interviews over the course of five days. we spoke with three maasai communities in the area surrounding amboseli national park: women at enkangu narok, women at mbirikani group ranch, and men from the community of satao elerai. we collected supporting information from employees of several ngos, the kenya wildlife service, and other entities that are closely tied to these maasai communities at the local level. these included the big life foundation, the international fund for animal welfare, the kenya wildlife service, the amboseli/tsavo game scout association, the deputy headteacher at the primary school at enkangu narok, members of the african wildlife foundation, nora njiraini of the amboseli elephant research project, and david sorimpan and consilience ahmed et al.: the warrior’s dilemma isack marembo of wildlife direct. we supplemented the information we collected via interviews by using observations taken at each site, including noting the dress and any piercings of our interview subjects. additionally, we augmented our conclusions by consulting the literature on maasai culture. 3. results we have divided the results of our study into several components. first, we report the traditions that were specified by maasai interviewees to be most important to their culture. next, we identify the primary challenges threatening these traditions, including a risk assessment of their potential hazardousness to maasai culture. we then identify strategies currently used by the maasai for dealing with these challenges, including examples. 3.1 vital traditions maasai interviewees verbally identified four tenets of maasai culture (listed in order of importance): their social connectedness, their dress and ornaments, their connection with wildlife and nature, and their practice of moranism (see figure 1). 3.2 challenges to traditions we identify the primary challenges to maasais’ social connectedness to include shifting land ownership practices, education, and westernization (see figure 2). the cultural tenet of social connectedness among the maasai arose through their pastoral way of life. when land is privatized, communal management of cattle by men and the development of emotional bonds between women and children living in close quarters in temporary manyattas ends, thus reducing social connectedness. additionally, increasing rates of primary school enrollment provide younger generations of maasai access to secondary school, university education, and employment opportunities outside of pastoralism. economic incentives, as well as the opportunity to secure a higher standard of living, may draw younger generations away from their parents and their communities, thus reducing social connectedness. finally, implicit in kenyan education is a degree of westernization; students are expected to wear uniforms rather than traditional dress to school, are required to learn english, and are not taught about maasai culture in typical curriculums. each of these factors serves to alienate younger generations from their parents’ culture and to stifle connectedness between children, their parents, and community elders. for a summary of the risks posed by shifting land ownership practices, education, and westernization, see table 1. we identify the primary challenges to maasais’ dress and ornaments to include conservation, education, and westernization (see figure 2). by providing maasai men and women with job opportunities as game scouts, community rangers, administrators, and researchers, conservation increases the probability that maasais will discard traditional dress for uniforms or western-style office attire. there is one notable caveat to this trend: conservation efforts maintain wildlife, which attract eco4 consilience tourists who may also be interested in visiting one of the several cultural bomas in operation around amboseli and purchasing souvenirs from their markets. in this way, conservation indirectly encourages maasais to maintain their traditional dress and ornaments as a strategy for supplementing their income from livestock. the ways in which education and westernization discourage traditional dress and ornaments have been provided above. for a summary of the risks posed by education and westernization, see table 1. we identify the primary challenges to maasais’ connection with wildlife and nature to be shifting land ownership practices, climate change and drought, and conservation (see figure 2). when maasai communities shift from group ownership of land to private ownership of subdivided plots, new owners often erect fences to denote their property. this not only reduces potentially beneficial interactions of wildlife with cattle, such as the facilitation of grass communities by native ungulates (augustine et al. 2010), but prevents these traditional pastoralists from moving their cattle according to where they can find high quality forage. furthermore, increasing incidence of permanent settlements leads to reductions in wildlife around those settlements; thus, in the event that properties are not predator-secure, any remaining predators may be turned to livestock to reduce energy expended in seeking out prey (western et al. 2009), thereby increasing human-wildlife conflict. by reducing the predictability of rains and decreasing the resilience of semi-arid ecosystems, climate change and higher incidence of drought will reduce the land area suitable for traditional pastoralist lifestyles. in these ways, drought and climate change erode the relationship between the maasai and their historical territories. conservation primarily threatens the ability of maasais to continue such practices as ritual lionkilling, which have long been a part of their relationship with wildlife and with nature. however, it is worth noting that conservation can also bolster the alreadystrong relationship between the maasai and wildlife: for example, conservationists have supported maintaining pastoralist lands because they enable wildlife to pass through them. additionally, conservation organizations have emphasized that traditional maasai skills, such as tracking wildlife and adaptability to harsh conditions in the bush, make them excellent employees in the business of poaching prevention. thus, of all the factors threatening the relationship between the maasai and wildlife and nature, conservation has the fewest net negative effects. for a summary of the risks posed by shifting land ownership practices and climate change and drought, see table 1. we identify the primary challenges to maasais’ practice of moranism to be declining wildlife populations, conservation, and shifting land ownership practices (see figure 2). because one of the defining trademarks of moranism is the killing of a lion to symbolize strength and warrior status, declining wildlife populations, in conjunction with conservation efforts, are a major threat to this tradition. in the context of increasing membership in the age-class of boys about to become morans (the most recent class was approximately 4,000, compared to between 70 and 121 lions by big life foundation’s last census), there simply are not enough lions to support ritual killings by every eligible group. furthermore, conservationists have been campaigning to end the tradition of lion-killing through a variety of initiatives that will be discussed further under responses to challenges. beyond the end of lionkilling as a tradition, morans’ responsibility to protect communities from aggressors, both human and animal, is challenged by the shifting of maasai from community consilience ahmed et al.: the warrior’s dilemma living to private land ownership. for a summary of the risks posed by shifting land ownership practices and declining wildlife populations, see table 1. 3.3 responses to challenges over the course of our interviews, we identified three primary ways in which maasai have responded to challenges to their traditions. in some cases, they have been able to keep their traditions mostly intact without alteration. for example, because it does not interfere with the interests of other groups, maasai dress and ornaments are still worn by a high proportion of maasai—as we were told on more than one occasion, “even maasais in downtown nairobi can be seen wearing their shukas” (pers. comm. paula kahumbu, david sorimpan). additionally, because dress and ornaments have come to symbolize the maasai outside of kenya, maintaining this particular tradition has economic incentives—there is profit to be made off the maasai image, even if the maasai are not currently the ones collecting that profit (see figure 3). a second response strategy is to phase out the tradition altogether. this was the case for both female genital mutilation (fgm) and lion-killing among morans. we found that excising a tradition does not happen all at once—according to david sorimpan and phillip (awf), fgm still occurs, though it is no longer celebrated. additionally, we heard from the women of enkangu narok that, as they have learned about the potential negative consequences of the practice, younger women are no longer choosing to have their daughters circumcised. similarly, lionkilling has been phased out gradually, though it is now completely extinct according to all of our interviewees. a third and final strategy that the maasai have used in response to challenges to their traditions is modification. this strategy emerges in the case of both moranism and pastoralism, two of the most aggressively threatened of the maasai traditions. indeed, the elimination of lion-killing has prompted some maasai to assert that “moranism is dying” (peter, chairman of elerai conservancy). in order to maintain the tradition of moranism in the absence of lion-killing and some other aspects of traditional life, non-governmental organizations (ngos) such as the big life foundation and lion guardians have begun initiatives such as the lion guardian program for young maasai men as well as the maasai olympics. lion guardians attempts to position prospective morans as protectors of lions by drawing on the skill set that traditionally marked morans as warriors: strength, courage, bravery, and skill in the bush. similarly, the maasai olympics seeks to provide an outlet for young maasai men to demonstrate the skills they would otherwise have proved by killing a lion through athletic contests. as an additional benefit, these initiatives promote benefit sharing with the local communities: lion guardians offers employment, and participants at the maasai olympics win prizes such as pedigree bulls (for the winning manyatta), scholarships (one participant in 2012 received a full scholarship to moy university), and invitations to international events (one participant in 2012 was invited to compete in the ny marathon) (pers. comm. daniel ole shambu, big life foundation). the case of pastoralism is a more complex one because it involves many more stakeholders than the maasai alone. one way in which the maasai of the amboseli ecosystem have maintained their practice of pastoralism is by entering 6 consilience land-lease agreements with such organizations as the international fund for animal welfare (ifaw), the african wildlife foundation (awf), and kenya wildlife service (kws). in a land-lease from the olgulului people, for example, ifaw, awf, and kws pay the olgulului stakeholders 600ksh per acre per annum in order to keep the kitenden corridor, a vital passageway for wildlife traveling between amboseli and tanzania, open (evan, ifaw). through land-leases, both maasai interests and the interests of conservationists are met to some degree. however, this land-lease was difficult for the ngos and kws to negotiate because some maasai are adapting from pure pastoralism to partial agriculture. in land nearby the kitenden corridor, maasai are making between 5,000-6,000ksh every three months farming maize, tomatoes, beans, potatoes, and some other crops (evan, ifaw). while this land is especially fertile in the context of the surrounding semi-arid regions, it offers a potent reason for maasai to turn to agriculture where possible and, where impossible, to lobby strongly for comparable compensation. indeed, according to the ifaw officials we interviewed, this particular land lease was settled only because ifaw, awf, and kws have agreed to add other incentives, such as funding for a game scout training program, to their original offer. thus, through savvy agreements and diversification of sources of income, the maasai have been able to maintain their pastoralist lifestyle in new, modern forms. 4. discussion over several days of conducting interviews and observations, we obtained a comprehensive view of how maasai culture is changing in the face of challenges such as drought, westernization, and conservation efforts. however, it is important that we also acknowledge the limitations of our study. our sample size was small; we interviewed three communities (enkangu narok, elerai and mbirikani), several ngos, kws, and several individuals. the interview process consisted of talking to a group in which either the elder woman or head of the respective organization responded to questions, with minimal input from others. this likely introduced some bias into our study. however, the information we compiled was sufficient to preliminarily assess how and why maasai culture is evolving. as many community members and ngo officials articulated, maasai culture has had to change in the context of modernization and conservation efforts. while some traditions, such as fgm and lion killing, are being phased out, other traditions, such as dress, are able to be maintained in most areas of life. still, other traditions – including moranism and pastoralism, which embody important values to the maasai are being modified and preserved by the maasai. for example, pastoralism is considered to be one of the most fundamental elements of maasai culture. the maasai are seminomadic pastoralists, who value cattle as a form a currency and subsist mainly on their domestic stock. however, pastoralism has come under threat for a variety of reasons, including those outlined in this study. as we have shown, these pressures are forcing the maasai to partially abandon their nomadic way of life. in the face of these issues, can – and should – pastoralism survive? pastoralism has survived for over 30,000 years; therefore, it must be a viable life strategy in many respects. several studies support the benefits of traditional pastoralism: the seasonal movement of cattle has been shown to maintain milk yields consilience ahmed et al.: the warrior’s dilemma and to enable drought avoidance additionally, the maasai’s breed of cow, the boran, is well adapted to semi-arid and dry environments (western, 1982; ellis and swift, 1988). traditional pastoralism is also economically productive; the international livestock research institute (ilri) estimates that the commercial meat industry in kenya is worth over 800 million us dollars. in addition, the mobility and scale of pastoralism has traditionally allowed overgrazed areas to recuperate while herders graze their cattle elsewhere. furthermore, wildlife numbers and production have also been shown to decrease in areas that have been subdivided when compared to areas where mobile pastoralism has been maintained (western et al. 2009). these many benefits of traditional pastoralism explain why the maasai initially resisted government efforts to subdivide and privatize land (western and manzolillonightingale, 2004). however, the challenges to pastoralist development are increasing. one of the biggest issues the maasai, as well as other pastoralists in africa, face is recurring droughts and other climatic disasters. while weather and climate are never completely predictable, droughts are expected to become more frequent and more severe as climate change worsens (ipcc 2013). these changes render maasai pastoralists more dependent on national parks and areas with permanent water sources, such as amboseli, for refuge from drought. in addition, in many parts of the country, pastoralists are involved in a slow process of settlement and integrating into agricultural economies (sandford 2006). agriculture and other business ventures pose another, perhaps more profitable, challenge to the pastoral way of life. nevertheless, pastoralism is a key part of maasai culture that many are reluctant to completely relinquish. while some aspects of pastoralism will inevitably change, many options exist that will allow partial maintenance of traditional pastoralism. one such option is expanding education on rangeland management practices, which emphasize keeping herd size at or below carrying capacity and prioritize the productivity of each cow rather than the sheer number of cows. changing the perception that quantity, rather than quality, of livestock is a better indicator of social status will go a long way towards preserving pastoralism while reducing overstocking and land degradation. while expanding education can improve current practices, a more innovative strategy would be to diversify and supplement sources of income. we have seen such diversification achieved through the zoning of specified areas for particular purposes, as in the amboseli ecosystem management plan, 2008-2018, wherein some areas are to be used for wildlife tourism, others for livestock production, and others for arable agriculture. private owners could set aside a part of their plot for agriculture, mining or wind farming, while continuing to practice pastoralism on the remaining area. finally, kenya could adopt systems that have worked for other countries with large populations of pastoralists; in spain, for example, the government maintains cattle migratory routes. though the threats to the maasai way of life are greater today than ever before, we are optimistic about the future. while maasai culture and tradition will inevitably change in the coming years, our study demonstrates that the most valued maasai traditions and values have manifested in new ways that are harmonious with conservation efforts and a changing world. the maasai are a resilient people, and their presence will still be surely felt in kenya for years to come. 8 consilience bibliography augustine, d.j., k.e. veblen, j.r. goheen, c. riginos, and t.p. young. pathways for positive cattle-wildlife interactions in semi-arid rangelands. 2010. smithsonian contributions to zoology. 632: 55-71. briggs, p. 2006. northern tanzania: the bradt safari guide with kilimanjaro and zanzibar. brandt publishers. 1: 1-304. ellis, j.e., swift, d.m., 1988. stability of african pastoral ecosystems: alternate paradigms and implications for development. journal of range management 41, 450–459. goodman, r. 2002. pastoral livelihoods in tanzania: can the maasai benefit from conservation? current issues in tourism. 5:3-4. kenya open data. 2014. retrieved from https://opendata.go.ke. apr. 6, 2014. sandford, s. (2006) “too many people, too few livestock: pastoralism in crisis?” western, d., 1982. the environment and ecology of pastoralists in arid savannas.development and change 13, 183–211. western, d., et al. the impact of subdivision and sedentarization of pastoral lands on wildlife in an african savanna ecosystem. biol. conserv. (2009), doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2009.05.025 western, d., manzolillo-nightingale, d.l., 2004. environmental change and the vulnerability of pastoralists to drought: a case study of the maasai in amboseli, kenya. africa environment outlook case studies: human vulnerability to environmental change. unep, nairobi. pp. 35–50. working group i contribution to the ipcc fifth assessment report climate change 2013: the physical science basis summary for policymakers. 2013. 1-36. consilience ahmed et al.: the warrior’s dilemma tables table 1. risk assessment of threats to maasai culture and tradition based on trends up to april 2014. threats were identified based on interviews conducted from mar 31, 2014 to apr 5, 2014. probability of occurrence was assessed based on how often the threat in question could be expected to occur based on information collected from our interviews as well as additional literature. mitigation strategies were also identified based on information collected from our interviews and additional literature. hazard scale was assigned by taking into account the expected frequency of threat, as well as how many and which of the four key cultural tenets (see results) the threat challenged. note that some of the broader challenges mentioned in the text are excluded due to difficulty in assessing probability of occurrence, whereas some additional underlying threats have been added for completeness. risk assessment threat risk posed probability of occurrence mitigation strategies hazard scale drought loss of livestock; human health implications ~every 5 years construction of grass banks and water reserves; scholarships to gain alternative employment high climate change unpredictability of rainfall; reduced ecosystem resilience increasing into the future (ipcc wgi ar5 2013) improved rangeland management techniques; diversification of income resources medium/high declining wildlife populations reduced tourism; loss of game scout & community ranger employment; threat to traditions pertaining to wildlife increasing based on current demographic trends, especially of megafauna (craigie 2010) cooperation with conservation organizations; ending ritual killings and/or retaliation killings medium land subdivision/ shifting land ownership practices loss of pastoralism and social connectedness; loss of opportunity to collaborate with conservationists on the rise since the 1990s (fitzgerald 2013) land use policies that accommodate pastoralism; land lease programs to improve benefit sharing high political instability/ violence reduced tourism; exclusion of maasai interests; corruption increasing in recent months (e.g. grenade attacks in nairobi, mombasa, and at the international airport in january 2014) local participation in government/devolution; community accountability medium westernization loss of social connectedness; loss of traditional dress and ornaments declining with recent cultural revival (pers. comm. daniel of big life maintenance of traditional ceremonies and dress low 10 consilience foundation) education reduced investment of youth in traditional practices/lifestyles; increases ability of girls reject traditional roles increasing as maasai attitudes towards school become more positive (pers. comm. nora njiraini) including cultural history in school curriculums low/medium population growth increasing livestock beyond carrying capacity of land; reduced availability of property increasing rapidly to 2030 (kenya open data) diversification of sources of income high consilience ahmed et al.: the warrior’s dilemma figures figure 1. primary challenges to four central maasai traditions. land ownership and conservation were the most often occurring challenges, and threatened three out of four traditions. westernization and education were the next most often occurring, threatening two out of four traditions. climate change and drought and declining wildlife populations were the least often occurring, threatening one out of four traditions. figure 2. a louis-vuitton ad featuring traditional maasai shuka cloths. maasai cloth has been used in a variety of branding schemes by western clothing companies; although the profits from these endeavors likely do not reach communities on the ground in kenya, shukas are sold in most curio shops in southern kenya and represent potential economic returns that have not yet been realized by the maasai. microsoft word cummingsfinalconsilience.doc cummings 1 communicable disease surveillance and response in uganda matthew cummings mj24cumm@siena.edu matthew cummings is a senior at siena college where he is studying biology and history. he spent the fall of 2007 at makerere university in uganda and worked with the epidemiology and surveillance division at the uganda ministry of health throughout the summer of 2008. during this time he participated in field investigations and control activities related to outbreaks of cholera, hepatitis e, typhoid, and marburg hemorrhagic fever. acknowledgements: the author would like to thank mr. luswa lukwago, dr. joseph wamala, and the entire staff of the epidemiology and surveillance division at the uganda ministry of health for their encouragement and support during the activities described in this article. cummings 2 scholarly abstract while outbreaks of communicable diseases have long presented an ongoing challenge in the developing world, within recent years the frequency of such outbreaks has risen sharply. accordingly, it is clear that strong epidemiological surveillance and response is needed to improve the health of disadvantaged populations in developing nations such as uganda. such populations face the greatest threat from communicable diseases and are more likely to fall victim to illness due to their poverty. in uganda, the implementation of village health teams (vhts) has laid the groundwork for establishing community-based surveillance and response systems that can provide early notification of outbreaks and prevent the unnecessary suffering that accompanies unrecognized epidemics. local response programs can also help to identify opportunities for the implementation of sustainable preventive measures and health education activities that will be able to improve the overall welfare of those living in settings of poverty. cummings 3 author’s note my experiences in uganda have reinforced my belief that access to health care is a fundamental human right. after learning about the concept of village health teams and their ability to improve healthcare in impoverished and isolated communities, i immediately knew that i wanted to convey their importance to others. empowering village health teams provides an opportunity to work with the poor to reclaim their right to health. while in uganda, the high levels of poverty and disease that i witnessed confirmed my desire to pursue a career in medicine and to volunteer my time to work with the underserved. keywords: epidemiology, communicable disease control, medicine, equity cummings 4 communicable disease surveillance and response in uganda community-based disease surveillance, prevention, and response as an essential tool for improving health in the developing world in reflecting upon my first trip to uganda in the fall of 2007 and my subsequent stay throughout the summer of 2008, i have become acutely aware of the need for communicable disease surveillance, prevention, and response in regions that are at-risk for outbreaks of epidemic-prone illnesses. epidemiological surveillance and response is an integral tool for improving the health of disadvantaged populations, as they are more likely to fall victim to communicable illnesses due to their poverty. providing routine surveillance in these locations can help prevent unrecognized outbreaks. additionally, the increase in communicable disease outbreaks demands amplified surveillance of these pathogens in order to prevent large-scale epidemics. such epidemics undoubtedly have the potential to threaten the livelihoods of those living in at-risk areas and may hamper the development of the communities in which they reside. while studying at kampala’s makerere university in the fall of 2007, my academic program allowed for a practicum period during which i researched the medical, social, and economic factors preventing more effective anti-retroviral therapy for hiv/aids in a rural area of uganda. during my time at makerere’s school of public health i met mr. luswa lukwago, an epidemiologist from the uganda ministry of health (moh). mr. luswa grew up in a rural village similar to many of those he visits as part of his fieldwork today. he has a master’s degree in public health with a specialization in communicable disease outbreak response, and is currently earning his doctorate in public health. as a member of the makerere/moh integrated disease surveillance and response program, mr. luswa fulfills his duties as a field epidemiologist and helps train the next generation of ugandan public health workers. throughout the semester i regularly stopped by mr. luswa’s office to discuss the epidemic control efforts that he was helping to coordinate throughout the country. while my work at this time focused on hiv/aids treatment, my meetings with mr. luswa at the moh provided me with a window into the epidemiology and surveillance activities of uganda. my interest in these fields had been sparked and i knew that if i was able to return to uganda, working with mr. luswa and his fellow epidemiologists would be at the top of my agenda. cummings 5 cholera when i returned to uganda in may 2008, i worked with mr. luswa at the epidemiology and surveillance division at the moh. mr. luswa and his colleague dr. joseph wamala were coordinators of communicable disease outbreak response throughout the country. at the time of my arrival, one of their primary concerns was the increasing intensity of an outbreak of cholera in eastern uganda. cholera is a disease caused by infection with the bacterium vibrio cholerae. among humans, the infection frequently presents mildly or asymptomatically and only develops as severe illness in a small percentage of the population. however, in this symptomatic group, infection results in massive diarrheal discharge of a “rice-water” stool as well as intense vomiting. the v. cholerae bacteria exit the human body in this stool and can typically be found in bodies of freshwater. in many parts of the developing world, contaminated water sources provide the drinking water supplies for countless communities and therefore provide the link in the bacteria’s fecal-oral route of transmission. following consumption of infected water, untreated cholera can cause death within hours of its onset. this rapid death is caused by massive fluid loss and the ensuing dehydration from the diarrhea and vomiting described above. typically, well-handled epidemics of cholera result in a case fatality rate (the proportion of recorded deaths among those presenting with the disease) of about two percent. however, the outbreak in eastern uganda had a reported case fatality rate of about seven percent. in order to address the high number of deaths, the moh sent dr. wamala to the east to evaluate the response capacity of the cholera-affected districts. he planned to assess the control effort and offer education and guidance to the local area health teams if needed. i was privileged to travel with him. it must be noted that in many cholera outbreaks, inadequate treatment is frequently found to be the basis behind an unusually high amount of fatalities. however, before our departure, members of the humanitarian organization médecins sans frontières/doctors without borders (msf) informed us that poor case management and treatment did not cause the high fatality rates in the eastern uganda outbreak. msf often handles much of the clinic duties of an epidemic response and they confirmed that their staff had been treating cases appropriately and were successfully training local health workers. eventually, health officials and community leaders in the east revealed that many of the early cholera deaths occurred among people who had not been cummings 6 able to make it to a treatment center in time. often the illness was not recognized as life threatening by the affected individuals, their families, or their peers. eventually, they became too ill to travel to treatment centers to seek care. to fully determine the specific factors that had discouraged local residents from seeking care, further investigation was needed at the community level. due to the fecal-oral method of transmission of cholera, dr. wamala and our group from moh conducted an assessment of sanitation and hygiene practices in the region. once the team identified these factors, a corrective plan could be put in place to address them. village health teams and cholera in order to fully understand the importance of local engagement in an outbreak response, the concept and role of the village health team (vht) must be explained. vhts are the “eyes and ears” of the control effort in any potential or confirmed outbreak. they are members of the local population who are elected by their peers and trained to recognize suspected cases of epidemic-prone diseases and to provide basic health education to their communities. while local healers have been mainstays in these communities for generations, the moh only recently began an official program to organize and train vhts in uganda, beginning in 2000. with training assistance provided by organizations such as the world health organization (who) and unicef, vhts were established in 40 districts (50% of the nation) by 2008. vhts, or “village doctors,” as they are sometimes referred to locally, are trained to identify individuals who present the standard case definition of a serious illness and require the attention of health facility staff. additionally, they are trained to disseminate “information, education, and communication (iec)” materials, which alert the community to epidemic threats and promote healthy living. they are also trained in contact tracing, which entails following up on contacts of infected individuals during an outbreak of a communicable disease to help halt transmission chains. lastly, the local knowledge and trust that vhts possess is invaluable when outside investigators are navigating unknown terrain or attempting to gain insight on areaspecific customs and practices that may be affecting disease patterns. as they are local residents themselves, vhts understand the needs of their communities and can relay this information to others. cummings 7 “information, education, communication” (iec) materials in an eastern uganda health center during the response to the cholera outbreak. in response to an outbreak of a disease like cholera, vhts can dispense initial oral rehydration solution to affected individuals before their arrival at a treatment center. vhts also provide instruction on maintaining healthy hygiene and sanitation within their communities, such as the need for consistent hand washing and the installation and use of proper latrines. cummings 8 training of vhts on proper hand washing techniques. during our meetings with the vhts in the eastern, cholera-afflicted district of pallisa, dr. wamala assessed the vht members’ general knowledge of epidemic-prone diseases such as meningitis, measles, and viral hemorrhagic fevers like ebola and marburg. he placed a special emphasis on the hygienic standards necessary to prevent and control cholera. several of the vht members were impressively conversant concerning the symptoms of cholera and the appropriate steps to take after recognizing a suspected case. there were, however, inconsistencies in the knowledge base of other members concerning these issues. some members of the community were unaware of the symptoms of the disease and others did not know how it can spread. during some outbreaks, elements of sorcery may be blamed for the transmission of the disease and such beliefs can impede necessary interventions. therefore, education about the fecal-oral route is an important aspect of social mobilization during a cholera outbreak as it helps prevent the spreading of inaccurate and dangerous misinformation. another issue that dr. wamala and i encountered in pallisa was the reluctance of some members of the community to purify their water using chlorine tablets and construct new pit latrines in areas sufficiently isolated from communal water sources. through conversations with the vhts, we found out that the bitter taste that chlorine tablets produced when combined with cummings 9 drinking water led to resistance to the use of these tablets among community members. dr. wamala explained to the vhts that while we understood their concerns with the unpleasant taste, the crisis at hand required a compromise. many of the vhts then agreed to increase their water purification efforts. later, dr. wamala and i learned that new latrines were not being built due to a shortage of the concrete slabs needed for their surfaces. there was also a lack of understanding in the community concerning the immediate need to build new latrines. in addition to realizing the need to increase the availability of the slabs, dr. wamala urged the vhts, many of whom had improper latrines themselves, to construct new, isolated ones and to encourage their neighbors to do the same. the importance of sanitation and hygiene during a cholera outbreak cannot be overstated, and failing to prevent infected latrine waste from contaminating water sources and neglecting to purify drinking water are two main vehicles by which cholera spreads. based on the information gained in our meetings, dr. wamala and i realized that additional sensitization training of these community health leaders regarding sanitation and hygiene was imperative in order to completely end the epidemic. after our departure, the pallisa district implemented an unusual policy in an attempt to boost latrine construction. it mandated that residents of cholera-stricken areas who had latrines located too close to water sources would be penalized with the seizure of livestock until they constructed a proper latrine. while many local residents were clearly upset upon hearing this threat, the policy did succeed in encouraging proper latrine construction, and the number of latrines in the cholera-affected areas increased. this increase undoubtedly contributed to the decrease in new cholera infections. in addition to knowledge-enhancing trainings, there were also tangible items necessary to stop the epidemic, such as water purification tablets, soap, and supplies for constructing pit latrines. the sub-counties of pallisa district where the outbreaks were centered were very rural and populated primarily by poor subsistence farmers residing in mudor brick-walled and thatchor tin-roofed huts. these huts were organized into small homesteads and villages. latrine shortages were already rampant and clean water sources were far from ubiquitous. during our time in pallisa, communities needed hand soap, water purification chlorine tablets, and concrete slabs for pit latrine surfaces in order for local interventions to be effective. these logistical and supply problems are not unusual in other resource-limited districts of uganda.1 cummings 10 the work of vhts is challenging in itself and nearly impossible to complete if they do not possess the necessary supplies. following the assessment, dr. wamala met with the national task force on cholera and hepatitis e and recommended that vht training be enhanced. he also recommended increasing the availability of the supplies mentioned above in an effort to improve community levels of sanitation and hygiene. by increasing the capability of vhts to recognize suspected cases of cholera, in addition to affording them the materials necessary to prevent the spread of the disease, the chain of transmission could be stopped. ultimately, the eastern cholera epidemic came to an end in early fall 2008. after my departure, smaller epidemics arose in sections of kampala and more recently, in the central district of kayunga. as discussed previously, many causes contribute to an outbreak of cholera. therefore, it is difficult to identify one factor in particular that leads to its resolution. the crux of the response is often found at the grassroots level. education and sensitization efforts, proper case management and surveillance, the availability of adequate supplies, and maintaining local involvement all contributed to the halting of the epidemic. vhts understand and respect the local culture. as a result, they are an integral aspect of all of these interventions. cummings 11 meeting with members of vhts during response to the cholera outbreak in pallisa district, eastern uganda. (standing in foreground: dr. joseph wamala.) conclusion: vhts and community-based control of communicable diseases while communicable disease outbreaks have long presented an ongoing challenge in the developing world, within recent years the frequency of such outbreaks has risen sharply. among others, outbreaks of ebola and marburg fevers, cholera, meningococcal meningitis, bubonic plague, hepatitis e, and measles occurred during my collective time in uganda. in addition to the three pandemics of hiv/aids, tuberculosis, and malaria (which demand their own reviews and will not be covered here), other communicable diseases continue to take a devastating toll on those living in settings of poverty. despite the unrelenting nature of such outbreaks, the good news is that many of these diseases are preventable. in situations where prevention fails, timely recognition and response can substantially decrease the mortality rates of epidemic-prone diseases. early recognition of the signs and symptoms of the illnesses may help to prevent the negative social and economic consequences that accompany unrecognized outbreaks. as illustrated previously, vhts and a community-based approach towards implementation of these practices is essential. after dr. wamala and i visited the cholera-affected communities in eastern uganda, it was clear that the creation and maintenance of adequate village-level surveillance systems was a key factor in ensuring that afflicted individuals were being recognized and initially treated by vhts. early detection of the illness by the villagers themselves enabled them to recommend that their neighbors seek care earlier. the epicenters of the outbreak were in remote corners of pallisa district and were isolated from advanced health centers, and early identification and care were essential in providing symptomatic individuals enough time to reach a treatment unit before they became severely dehydrated. the early reporting of cases by vhts to other health workers, along with the transportation of affected individuals to treatment centers, will most likely decrease the fatality rate of epidemics of cholera and similar diseases in remote areas. to effectively contain outbreaks when prevention falls short, a support structure from the ground-up is needed to ensure that reports of “strange,” or suspected epidemic-prone diseases, are given timely attention and adequate resource allocation. reports of what people refer to as “strange diseases” are not uncommon in uganda. in many instances, reported cases of the diseases are promptly contained; sometimes they are actually determined to be unfounded. cummings 12 there is, however, the possibility for an explosive and difficult-to-contain outbreak as seen in eastern uganda. vhts are usually the first to encounter reports of “strange” illnesses and have the power to notify those within the extended health care system or those at even higher levels of care. well-trained and experienced vhts possess the knowledge of warning signs and symptoms of various diseases. this should certainly be the case for diseases with hallmark indicators such as “rice-water” stool in cholera or a stiff neck in meningitis. rapidly identifying these diseases can lead to enhanced containment measures and interventions. as mentioned earlier, vhts can also provide invaluable assistance during an outbreak by teaching outside investigators how to address local traditions and customs that may play a role in controlling the epidemic. an awareness and respect of local cultures works to gain the trust of the population. this trust is indispensable during contact tracing activities, one of the most important aspects of epidemic control. it is important that vhts are in positions to lead by example. if they cannot, it may prove impossible to relay health information to entire populations. as emphasized earlier, village teams can provide instruction on proper hand washing, appropriate sanitation, and hygiene promotion activities. additional education on topics ranging from hiv/aids prevention to safe child-delivery and nutrition can be carried out by vhts in their communities as well. the village doctors can provide local leadership and set ideal examples for their peers. vht programs possess the unique ability to empower the impoverished and provide a bridge to health for the sick. cummings 13 with community and vht members (standing second from left: mr. luswa lukwago). cummings 14 notes 1 innocent komakech, “village health team strategy is a most innovative community practice award winner: the experience of a village volunteer programme in yumbe district, uganda,” health policy and development 5.1 (2007): 21-27. cummings 15 works cited komakech, innocent. “village health team strategy is a most innovative community practice award winner: the experience of a village volunteer programme in yumbe district, uganda.” health policy and development 5.1 (2007): 21-27. microsoft word cantor.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 13, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 16-59 a technical and behavioural energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria operations at bishop mountain hall and royal victoria college tal cantor school of environment mcgill university, montreal, canada tal.cantor@mail.mcgill.ca maida hadziosmanovic school of environment mcgill university, montreal, canada maida.hadziosmanovic@mail.mcgill.ca harriet kim school of environment mcgill university, montreal, canada harriet.kim@mail.mcgill.ca elizabeth marsh school of environment mcgill university, montreal, canada elizabeth.marsh@mail.mcgill.ca chiara secules school of environment mcgill university, montreal, canada chiara.secules@mail.mcgill.ca kirk wright school of environment mcgill university, montreal, canada kirk.wright@mail.mcgill.ca carol zastavniouk school of environment mcgill university, montreal, canada carol.zastavniouk@mail.mcgill.ca abstract mcgill food and dining services (mfds) have, over the past three years, progressed as a leader in sustainable practices at mcgill university. increased expectations for sustainable management have pushed executive chef oliver devolpi to assess energy efficiency at the bishop mountain hall (bmh) and royal consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria victoria college (rvc) cafeterias. this project aims to determine which technical and behavioural modifications should be made in the royal victoria college (rvc) and bishop mountain hall (bmh) cafeterias in order to increase energy efficiency. two key aspects determining energy consumption were addressed: the required energy input of the appliances and the frequency and manner of appliance usage. the technical approach assessed the sustainability of energy sources, including natural gas, electricity, and steam. the behavioural approach identified necessary improvements in mealtimes, the operation and availability of appliances, and staff practices. using this data and appliance specification data, priority lists of suggested appliance replacements were made. author’s note the authors of this study were all part of an undergraduate research class focusing on creating a culture of sustainability among students, staff, and administration at mcgill university. one larger goal of this project in our final year at mcgill was to provide a stepping-stone towards a more robust and cooperative culture of sustainability on our campus. keywords: energy efficiency, sustainable building, energy efficient appliances, school cafeterias, energy analysis, university dining. 1. executive summary mcgill food and dining services (mfds) have, over the past three years, progressed as a leader in sustainable practices at mcgill university. increased expectations for sustainable management have pushed executive chef oliver devolpi to assess energy efficiency at the bishop mountain hall (bmh) and royal victoria college (rvc) cafeterias. this project aims to determine which technical and behavioural modifications should be made in the royal victoria college (rvc) and bishop mountain hall (bmh) cafeterias in order to increase energy efficiency. two key aspects determining energy consumption were addressed: the required energy input of the appliances and the frequency and manner of appliance usage. the latter aspect reflects the technical approach of the project, which is comprised of investigating the operations of the appliances, their efficiency, and options for alternate, more energy efficient appliances. the former reflects the behavioural approach, which is comprised of conducting observations and interviews to assess staff appliance usage and food preparation. the extensive research we conducted allowed us to provide costs and benefits of installing energy-efficient alternatives, as well as suggest alternative staff practices. recommendations were made for each type of appliance analysed. the technical approach assessed the sustainability of energy sources, including natural gas, electricity, and steam. data on energy and cost savings of replacing particular appliances with high-efficiency units (energy star rated models) were provided. using this data and appliance specification data, priority lists of suggested appliance replacements were made. the behavioural approach identified necessary improvements in staff practices, which depended on factors such as the type of food being prepared, mealtimes, and the operation and availability of the appliances. broad recommendations included completely turning off appliances (ones which are not in use for long periods of the day), and reducing preheat times for appliances such as consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria grills, griddles, and fryers. the most significant finding was the need to develop an atmosphere promoting energy efficiency through staff team support. we hope that our recommendations facilitate the commitment of mfds to sustainability. 2. introduction: project issues in broader context the focus of this report is to determine ways to increase energy efficiency in the mcgill university cafeterias of royal victoria hall and bishop mountain hall. our client, executive chef oliver devolpi from mcgill food and dining services (mfds), has put forth this initiative. mfds is a sector of mcgill student life and learning, which operates under a self-financing, mixed business model that includes self-operated locations which contract food providers (rhodes 2011, mfds 2012). we realize there are greater consequences of this task and its implementation. the concept of energy efficiency goes far beyond the borders of the campus; environmental factors, national and provincial regulations, as well as university policies have all contributed to shaping our initiative. the findings in this report may be applied to the greater knowledge base of energy efficiency best practices in cafeteria and kitchen facilities. in an era of rapid globalization and economic development, resource depletion and rising costs of energy have begun to limit our actions and behaviours. these limitations have made it essential for industries to operate under higher levels of efficiency. an industry that increases its energy efficiency will produce more outputs per unit of energy input (bergstrom & randall 2010), thus optimizing resource use and cutting down on operation costs. this sort of increase in energy efficiency can reduce negative impacts on the environment, particularly greenhouse gas (ghg) production and the destruction of ecosystems through resource exploitation. taking a more local perspective, the commercial food service industry in canada accounts for 4% of commercial and institutional energy consumption (natural resources canada 2010). though this may be a small percentage on a national scale, the proportion of this industry’s energy consumption in certain smaller environments, such as university campuses, is greater. with the exception of some medical facilities, dining facilities generally have the largest environmental footprint on university campuses (elbaum 2010). in fact, commercial kitchens are typically found to use about five times more energy than any other part of a university campus (conrad 2007). thus, technical and behavioural modifications made to the operations of university cafeterias can have significant impacts on the overall energy consumption of the campus. because these cafeterias are central hubs of student and staff activity, improvements in efficiency can optimize resource and energy use. (elbaum 2010). governmental ministries have been quick to recognize the necessity for energy efficiency efforts in educational institutions. in 2006, le ministère de l’éducation du loisir et des sport (mels) of quebec mandated the reduction of consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria energy intensity1 consumption of post-secondary institutions in quebec by 14% below 2002-03 figures by the 2010-11 academic year (mcgill university 2010). mcgill responded to this mandate by setting its own goal of achieving 12% reductions below 2002-03 levels by the 2010-11 year. however, by 2010, mcgill had only achieved a 5.66% reduction (mcgill university 2010). this failure to meet the targets outlined by mcgill and the mels was due to a few different factors. mcgill’s building areas, as well as student and staff populations, have been on the rise; square footage requiring heating and cooling had grown 13.2% since 2002 and most of this space is research-intensive facilities (mcgill university 2010). the population at mcgill had grown 10% since 2002 and is expected to grow another 3.7% in the next five years (mcgill university 2010). furthermore, the unit cost of energy has also been increasing, thus compounding the adverse effects of space and population growth on total university energy costs. for the past ten years, energy spending at mcgill has been increasing at a rate of 2.8% per year (appendix a: figure 1) (mcgill university 2010). this pattern of growth is unsustainable, and will drain the mcgill’s budget and resources if allowed to continue. in response to increasing energy intensity on campus, mcgill decided in 2010 to implement a five-year energy management plan, which outlined five key areas for improvement. the plan aimed to achieve a 14% energy intensity reduction by 2012-2013 (relative to 2002-03 figures) (mcgill university 2010). the five areas of focus were the implementation of an energy management information system program (emis), a lighting and retrofit program, a building energy audit program, a building recommissioning program, and various energy conservation projects (mcgill university 2010). the emis program was implemented to input metering, allowing for more accurate quantifying of the energy consumption of steam, electricity, and condensate (mcgill university 2010). (as it had not been implemented yet, our project was not able to use any data from metering). the lighting and retrofit program was implemented to replace incandescent lighting with more technologically advanced fluorescent lighting, in the hopes of allowing for greater flexibility in illumination at different times during the day (mcgill university 2010). the building energy audit program, which has already covered buildings such as bronfman, burnside hall, and rutherford physics, aims to identify and “provide information on the most significant sources of energy consumption in [the] building, thereby ensuring that energy reduction investments are appropriately prioritized and planned” (mcgill university 2010). however, the costs of audits for mcgill run from $33,926 to $75,417 annually (mcgill university 2010). our project, though it does not depict itself as formal audit, is a zero-cost way to assess energy efficiency. the building recommissioning program aims to optimize the current automated control systems in mcgill buildings. mcgill currently has an energy footprint of around $25.00/m2, due to the intense use of many spaces and the inefficiency of some of the current ventilation systems (mcgill university 2010). the fifth section of the plan included energy conservation projects. some examples of completed projects are the otto-maass retrofit, the burnside hall heat recovery project, and the new steam boiler for summer steam production (mcgill university 2010). other action plans for sustainability, such as mfds’s ‘an appetite 1 energy intensity can be defined by the formula: gj/$ of floor space (mcgill energy project: mels 2012). consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria for sustainability’, deal specifically with sustainable food purchasing (rhodes 2011). this initiative takes into account changes that can be made in the amount of energy input used to provide food to students by changing the parameters of the life cycle of food procurement (rhodes 2011). for example, by buying local foods, mfds is able to cut down on transport costs, thus reducing energy consumed by the transport vehicles and total ghgs emitted. it is also important to note that in economics, demand drives supply, and the larger purchases made by an entity are, the greater the influence it has on what is demanded (bergstrom and randall 2010). mfds can set an example for other university dining facilities since they are bulk food purchasers, and thus have purchasing power that can influence the decisions of suppliers. our project satisfies the goals of mfds’s strategic plan because it will add to the research and knowledge base needed to run more sustainable operations. it will also address the goal of making food service operations more sustainable by creating prioritized energy-savings suggestions, including appliance replacements and more time-appropriate use of appliances. the project will also assist in achieving financial sustainability so that the “premiums paid on local and sustainable food purchases are absorbed” (rhodes 2011). cost savings from increased efficiency will provide funds for more local and sustainable food purchases. 2.2 bmh and rvc: historical and current conditions the two cafeterias examined in this project are bishop mountain hall (bmh) and royal victoria college (rvc) (appendix c: figures 1,2,3). the rvc cafeteria is connected to the rvc residence hall, so there is no distinction between the two areas in terms of energy billing. within the last five years, the cafeteria in rvc was recently renovated and retrofitted with many new energy efficient appliances. the kitchen in rvc now has a new sensor-run heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (hvac) system, which accounted for a significant amount of energy savings at rvc (devolpi 2012). this is an especially important addition to a commercial kitchen because of the large discharges of heat and vapour from cooking activities. the appliances in rvc now all run on either electricity or gas, with the majority running on electricity (appendix a: figure 2). the rvc cafeteria was also retrofitted with a new lighting system, as well as a dishwasher (devolpi 2012). bmh is an independent dining hall, which serves the upper residence halls of molson, mcconnell, and gardiner. the majority of the building is a kitchen and dining space; there are also a few small offices in it. thus, the energy billing for bmh is a fairly accurate representation of the energy consumption of its cafeteria operations. the cafeteria in bmh occupies two floors: the basement, where most of the food preparation occurs, and the second floor, where the food is served. bmh services around the same number of students as rvc (devolpi 2012). however, the floor space at bmh is around twice the size of rvc’s. it should be noted that increased floor space means an increase in area, which would need to be serviced by hvac systems. bmh is older and less efficient than rvc (devolpi 2012). most of the appliances in bmh have not been updated in decades (devolpi 2012). though there are gas and electricity powered appliances in bmh, there are also many that run directly on steam. while there have been recent installations, most notably consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria energy efficient models of a walk-in fridge and walk-in freezer, appliance replacements in bmh will be a key focus of our analysis. 3. research question our project aims to determine which technical and behavioural modifications should be made in the royal victoria college (rvc) and bishop mountain hall (bmh) cafeterias in order to increase energy efficiency. within the context of this project, energy efficiency is defined as the ‘optimal performance of food preparation with minimal use of energy, lowest possible costs of operational modifications and installations, and most effective procedure implementation’.2 in the context of our project, ‘lowest possible costs of installation’ is represented in terms of cost savings from modifications and replacements of appliances. ‘most effective procedure implementation’ is represented in our behavioural analysis and suggested best practices which can be implemented to streamline the food preparation process. finally, ‘optimal performance of food preparation with minimal use of energy’ is represented in the integration of the technical and behavioural data, and the recommendations and prioritization of appliance replacements provided. 3.1 working definitions best practices: a set of guidelines, ethics or ideas that represent the most efficient or prudent courses of action (campus erc 2007). within the context of kitchen energy efficiency, they are cooking practices that prompt food to be cooked well and in a timely manner, using the lowest possible amount of energy. cooking energy efficiency (cee): the ratio of energy absorbed by the food product to the total energy used by the appliance during cooking (energy star 2012). idle energy rate (ier): the rate of energy consumption while the appliance is maintaining or holding at a stabilized operating condition or temperature (energy star 2012). energy input: the energy demand [of an appliance] of a particular energy source (i.e. electricity, natural gas, or steam) (radovic). energy input is used as one of the parameters for determining appliance energy efficiency. 4. methodology in our efforts to provide staff best practices and appliance modification or replacement recommendations, we looked to develop solutions using a methodology that is inclusive of all stakeholders and is holistic in nature. this has prompted us to use two distinct but complementary approaches, which we deemed were appropriate for a comprehensive analysis: a technical approach and a behavioural approach. 2 definition was developed with the help of indian bureau of energy efficiency 2010. consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria 4.1 technical approach the technical aspects of energy efficiency were investigated by collecting and analysing data on existing cafeteria appliances, their sources of energy, and their energy consumption. the technical data collection methods are as follows: i. a purposeful sampling method was used to collect data on existing cafeteria appliances in both bmh and rvc. the samples included all appliances that consumed significant amounts of energy, which were determined using researched literature. from the research, it was deducted that the sample should include ovens, steamers, griddles, grills, fryers, fridges, and freezers (navigant 2009). purposeful sampling allowed the focus to be on the appliances contributing the most to cafeteria energy consumption. ii. data from appliance labels was recorded wherever available. for unreadable or non-existent appliance labels, a description and image of the appliance were used to match the appliance as closely as possible to a model by the same manufacturer. data of models were found using online publications of appliance specifications. iii. data or figures collected included number and type of doors (fridges only), energy source, location, manufacturer, model number, voltage, watts, amps, hertz, ounces of refrigerant, temperature or pressure setting, high and low pressure specifications, and status as an energy-star model, among others (appendix b: tables 2 & 3). iv. data was recorded in two separate spreadsheets: one for bmh, and one for rvc. v. floor plans of both cafeterias were created, and included all relevant appliances. appliances were labelled according to the labels used in the spreadsheets. vi. energy-star appliances, steam-run appliances, and fridges and freezers were subsequently excluded from comparative analysis.3 all other appliances were analysed based on data collected from the behavioural research; information from staff interviews and observations of staff practices allowed us to determine the frequency of use of appliances. hours of use were estimated and were recorded on a scale ranging from rarely used to very often used. vii. each category was as follows: a. rarely: <5 hrs/week b. sometimes: 5-20 hrs/week c. often: >2035 hrs/week d. very often: >35 hrs/week viii. energy input data was converted to a single unit (for comparison consistency), kilowatts (kw). data often converted were british thermal units (btus) or joules (j), often used for natural gas measurements. ix. the frequency of use and energy input data for each appliance were then compiled as data points and plotted on a biaxial graph. 3 justifications for these exclusions may be found in sections 4.3.8 and 4.3.9. consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria x. to determine priority of replacement, high-energy input and frequently-used appliances were noted as top priorities for replacement. rarely-used appliances were examined for redundancies and possible removal. xi. benefits and drawbacks of replacement of high-energy input and frequentlyused appliances were charted based on factors including: cooking energy efficiency, improved idle energy rates and annual cost savings. xii. finally, research and analysis of the energy sources of the appliances were completed along with the collection of data on building-specific and campuswide energy usage. 4.2 behavioural approach the behavioural aspects of energy efficiency were investigated by observing and analysing staff behaviour regarding the use of cafeteria appliances at rvc and bmh. data on hourly usage of appliances were collected through formal interviews and later incorporated into the technical methodology. furthermore, information on how staff operates the appliances was obtained by conducting numerous cafeteria observations and interviews at both cafeterias (appendix d: figure 1). the behavioural methodology is as follows: i. observations of the kitchen were conducted during four periods of the day: opening, peak, non-peak, and closing hours, as appliance use differs throughout the working day. it is important to note that peak and non-peak hours vary between the cafeterias. both cafeteria schedules assisted in determining these periods. the following types of observations were noted: a. when and how often particular appliances are used b. at which settings (e.g. temperature) the appliances are programmed/set to c. whether an appliance is turned on when it is not in use d. whether the use of the appliance suits its purpose well ii. informal questions were posed to the staff during some of the observations in order to better understand their practices, and the rationale behind these practices. iii. formal one-on-one interviews with staff members were conducted by members of our team. the aim was to conduct a more in-depth study of staff practices in the cafeterias. we interviewed 13 kitchen staff in total: six from bmh and seven from rvc. the staff interviewed included general helpers, counter staff, bakers, first cooks, second cooks, sous-chefs, and other kitchen staff who work on weekdays. the interview was completed using a series of 14 questions. four were closed-ended questions, and 10 were open-ended questions. closed-ended questions are easier to respond to and analyse, while still providing important data. open-ended questions require the interviewee to answer a question in detail, which is beneficial as it provides clarification and further understanding of their reasoning. the interviews were conducted on friday, november 16 at bmh from 10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. by carol, then 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. by tal and harriet. interviews at rvc were conducted the following monday, november 19 by harriet from 9:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m., liz from 9:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m., tal and carol from 11:30 a.m. consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria to 2:00 p.m., and harriet from 3:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. each of the interviews lasted approximately 20 to 40 minutes. the full interview form can be found in appendix d: figure 1. examples of question topics include: a. staff satisfaction with the performance of appliances b. detailed accounts of the time, length, and frequency of use of specific appliances c. suggestions for what could make their workspace more energy efficient d. previous knowledge (if any) about energy efficiency subsequently, the data gathered from observations and interviews were studied in order to develop recommendations and suggestions of which best practices the staff at both cafeterias should implement. data and information collected were compared to best practices found in the literature. both observations and interviews were conducted to compensate for possible bias in the information collected in the interviews. 5. analysis 5.1 behavioural results & recommendations recommendations have been made for each type of appliance by comparing current staff practices to researched literature. a list of best practices for each type of appliance can be found in appendix b: table 4. 5.1.1 grills staff that were informally spoken to said that the grill in rvc is on for over nine hours a day, from around 11:30 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. one interviewee explained that while the grill is not used for breakfast, it is turned on at 9:30 a.m. to prepare for the lunch-time peak, which begins at 11:00 a.m. this was clarified to be necessary due to the uncertainty of when a student may request a food item that must be cooked on the grill. the interviewee said it usually preheats for over an hour, and that the grill is always used at a high temperature setting despite the existence of a medium setting option. this statement was confirmed through observations. the interviewee also noted that the grill is cleaned about every hour to remove food scraps. based on these findings, we recommend that the grill be turned on no earlier than 10:30 a.m. at the medium setting because it was mentioned by the staff that it takes 10 to 15 minutes to preheat. the grill is then turned up to the high setting at 11:00 a.m., just before the lunchtime rush. because of the uncertainty of when students will order food off the grill, it is understood that the grill cannot be turned down to a medium setting throughout the entire day. in accordance with best practices, the grill is cleaned an adequate number of times. 5.1.2 griddles consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria there were four staff members interviewed that used the griddles—one from rvc and three from bmh. the griddles were observed at both cafeterias at various times of the day. staff suggested that the griddles require preheating of 10 to 15 minutes at bmh, and 45 minutes at rvc. in bmh, there is a griddle in the upstairs serving area, and one in the basement kitchen. these griddles varied between being turned off, being left on occasionally, and always being left on, depending on the staff member. two staff members indicated that both are cleaned after every use. however, another staff member said that the downstairs griddle is cleaned according to how busy the staff there is, while the upstairs griddle is cleaned after every use. there is one griddle in rvc, which is always on, and it is cleaned twice a day in bmh, the temperature setting of the griddles ranged from 350 °f to 450 °f, but were observed to be improperly calibrated. in rvc, the temperature of the griddle ranged from 300 °f to 350 °f depending on the food being cooked. rvc staff explained that when a lot of appliances that run on gas are being used at the same time, less gas will reach the griddle, so the griddle must consequently be turned up to a very high setting in order to effectively cook food. this may indicate the need for a future study of gas distribution. . we recommend that the griddles be turned on only when needed, as they may use up a substantial amount of energy, especially depending on the size of the griddle. we also recommend preheating the griddles only as early as necessary. for the bmh griddles, we suggest calibrating the temperature setting more accurately in order to assure that energy is not wasted from unnecessarily high temperatures. we recommend cleaning the griddles at the end of every main mealtime at a minimum in order to maximize heat transfer (campus erc 2007). 5.1.3 fridges & freezers there were five staff members interviewed from bmh and two from rvc who used the fridges and/or freezers. observations confirmed that those who dealt with stocking the fridges and freezers opened them constantly during their shifts. all foods were covered or packaged in some way, although late food arrivals are occasionally left uncovered until the next day. three out of five staff at bmh and all staff at rvc who used the fridges said they place warm and hot foods in the fridges and freezers very often. the fridges and freezers are usually packed to capacity in both cafeterias. all fridges use a defrost cycle system that is not regulated by staff. all interviewed staff mentioned they close the doors upon finishing using the fridge/freezer, but some mentioned that they occasionally notice others not closing the doors all the time. according to one interviewee, the gaskets are in bad condition at bmh. these faulty gaskets and poorly sealed doors contribute to the leaking of cool air from inside (natural resources canada 2012). in rvc there is a beeping system installed in the walk-in fridges and freezers, which reminds staff if the door is open. interviewees said that food items are usually thawed in fridges overnight, but if they are in a rush, food is defrosted in the sink with lukewarm running water. we recommend planning the stocking of fridges and freezers beforehand to minimize the number of times that they are opened. one effective method is to stock the foods that will be used in the front so that the length of time a door is kept open is reduced. this issue could also be addressed by stocking foods in a more consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria organized manner so that it does not take long to find particular foods. items should always be covered before being placed in the fridge or freezer in order to increase cooling efficiency (campus erc 2007). this should either be arranged with the food delivery companies or faster packaging techniques should be developed. the gaskets in bad condition on the fridge and freezer doors in bmh should be replaced to make it easier to close the doors.. as the rvc staff indicated, there is an alarm system as a reminder that doors are left opened. we recommend that an alarm system be installed in more of the fridges and freezers in both cafeterias. staff should always plan ahead and consider thawing food items in the fridges, rather than thawing them last minute using running water. thawing more food in the fridge overnight will also aid in keeping the fridge cool (food safety and inspection service 2010). 5.1.4 steam kettles we interviewed three staff members from bmh and one from rvc who dealt with steam kettles. according to staff, the steam kettles are never left operating while not in use. this was confirmed through observation. in bmh, only one steam kettle has a cover, but it is generally not used. in rvc, the covers are used only while the water is set to boil. none of the interviewed staff were aware of how often the kettles are flushed. the steam kettles are cleaned after every use at both cafeterias. the kettles at bmh undergo a full cleaning (including the removal of mineral deposits) once a year, and rvc staff were not aware of how often this was done for their steam kettles. we recommend that the covers be used to speed up cooking times (association for the education of young children). covers should be installed as additional parts on those steam kettles that do not already have them, and staff should be trained to use them in both cafeterias. 5.1.5 fryers there are three fryers at bmh and three at rvc. two people from bmh and one from rvc were interviewed about these appliances. one interviewee said that fryers are left on between orders as they are uncertain about when students will request food from them. furthermore, it takes about eight minutes to warm up the fryers. another interviewee said that fryers are never on when they are not in use. the heat settings of the fryers are never adjusted. the oil in the fryers is replaced about once every ten to fourteen days. the baskets of the deep fryers are not often filled to capacity. we recommend that meters for polar content, which measures oil quality, be installed in the fryers at bmh to make sure that the polar content does not go above 24% (replacing the oil every 10 to 14 days may not be as often as is necessary) (gromicko and london 2012). the baskets of the deep fryer should be at capacity as often as possible. fryers should be turned off when not in use, but otherwise adjusted to a lower temperature in between peak hours. 5.1.6 warmers & holders consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria there are two holders in bmh and four in rvc. at bmh, one of the holders is a steam bath that is set between 160 °f and 180 °f. the other one is a standard upright holder. rvc has an enclosed upright holder, which is set between 160 °f and 170 °f. the holders are on all day from opening to closing in both cafeterias, but are only actually filled and ‘in use’ for about three hours per day in bmh and rvc. as there are several holders in either cafeteria, we recommend that only one or two holders be used until filled to capacity. once the first holders are filled to capacity, others can be turned on for use. we also recommend that covers (where applicable) be used for all holders to reduce heat loss (association for the education of young children). 5.1.7 ovens four out of the six staff members interviewed from bmh, and four out of seven staff at rvc use ovens. all of the staff interviewed that used ovens at bmh used the combination ovens very often, which is more than 35 hours for a five-day week. this indicates that the ovens are one of the most frequently-used appliances in the cafeteria. staff said the convection oven was used occasionally as well. in rvc, two of the four staff interviewed use the combination ovens very often. of the other two interviewed, one used the pizza oven and the other used the convection oven rarely (less than five hours per week). even though using convection ovens or the combination ovens on the convection setting is more energy efficient, the cafeteria staff prefer using the combination ovens on the combination setting (combining steam and convection) over the previous options (natural resources canada 2012). staff said that the combination ovens were set at temperatures between 225 °f to 465 °f with a median temperature of 375 °f, which was supported by our group observations. the combination setting was used an estimated 90% of the time, while the convectional heat setting was used the other 10%. the staff found that the third setting, the steam setting, was not preferable for the type of food being cooked in these ovens. the ovens are filled to capacity depending on the menu and time of day, which was also confirmed through observation one cook explained that one type of entrée served for dinner cannot be cooked at the same time as the dinner period spans several hours; it would not be fresh for those who eat later. thus, the cooking of some entrée meals in ovens is staggered. however, all interviewees said they tried to fill them to capacity if the menu and timing allowed for it. all the cooks interviewed said they would open the oven doors multiple times, at least twice during a 20-minute cooking session. cooks in rvc noted that with the new ovens, they did not have to open the doors as often because they have glass doors that allowed them to observe the food more easily. this decreases cooking time because less heat is lost to the surroundings, and more heat is available for the system to prepare the food (natural resources canada 2012). oven cleaning is important because a clean oven can transfer heat more efficiently than one with excess food scraps left inside it (natural resources canada 2012). three of four bmh staff members interviewed believed that the ovens were cleaned two to three times a year. however, the rvc staff members interviewed did consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria not have uniform knowledge of the frequency of oven cleaning. two out of four staff could not answer, while the other two guessed that cleaning happened twice a year. the staff members noted that their usage varied. three out of four staff from bmh use the ovens for about two hours at different times before 2:00 p.m. the fourth staff member said oven use varies based on the menu. at rvc, two cooks use the combination oven very often; one cook uses it for at least three hours in the morning, and the second cook uses it from 2:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. two other staff members said they use the convection oven for two hours, and the pizza oven for at least one hour, depending on demand. at bmh, two of four of the staff interviewed said that the oven is never left on when not in use. one staff member said that it is sometimes left on while not in use, and another said that the combination oven was left on for most of the day. at rvc, three of four staff said that the oven is often left on when not in use, while one staff member disagreed. at bmh, no staff members said that they used the ovens to keep food warm. at rvc, one staff member said that the ovens were sometimes used to keep food warm. again, the rest of the staff rvc staff interviewed disagreed with this point. no one was found to put food in the oven while the oven was in preheating mode. we recommend using convection ovens (or the convection setting on the combination ovens) more often than the combination ovens (set on the combination setting). this shift would save energy and water (campus erc 2007). we recommend that the interior of the ovens be cleaned at least once a month and up to once a day in order to reduce food debris that could contribute to the reduction of heat transfer (food service warehouse 2012). we also recommend loading the ovens to capacity, and even combining the various foods cooked into one oven, while maintaining a two-inch clearance space. turning off an oven for several hours can save energy, but is not beneficial if turned off for less than an hour (campus erc 2007). we recommend that any new ovens purchased should have glass windows, which will help to reduce the number of times the oven door is opened and will reduce the amount of heat loss. 5.1.8 stoves out of all the staff members interviewed, one from bmh and one from rvc interviewed used the stoves. during staff interviews and observations, it was noted that stoves are used mostly for vegetarian meals, sauces, and soups. the number of burners used ranged from one to three for about two hours a day. the stoves did not seem to be left on longer than necessary. food is not left to steam after turning off the stove. for the most part, pot size is matched to the type or amount of food being prepared. it was not specified whether the pot size always matches burner size. pressure cookers are not used in either cafeteria. some pots are warped in shape and may not have full bottom-contact with the burners to achieve maximal heat transfer. when gas burners are set on high, the flames go much higher than just the bottom of the pans or pots. the gas burners are checked periodically, and the colour of the flames are checked. the flames are mostly blue, and occasionally white or orange. consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria we recommend ensuring the flames are not yellow or uneven in colour, as this indicates an unsatisfactory temperature of the flame. burners should be cleaned regularly with a wire brush (natural resources canada 2012). the cafeteria should consider purchasing a pressure cooker if the kitchen is not stocked with one already because pressure cookers use 50-75% less energy than standard pots (natural resources canada 2012). we recommend reducing cooking times, especially with grains, lentils, and split peas, which can be cooked for three-quarters of the recommended cooking time. additionally, a lid should be placed on the pot so that the food can continue to cook under the existing heat pressure, as food may need to sit and steam slightly longer past the recommended cooking time (campus erc 2007). we also recommend that when gas elements are set on high, flame tips should just touch the bottom of pots or pans rather than reaching higher than them. any new pans purchased should be flat-bottomed and should match the burner size for maximum heat transfer. (natural resources canada 2012). 5.1.9 dishwasher a staff member who works with the dishwasher was interviewed from each of bmh and rvc. at bmh, the dishwasher was said to be usually full to capacity. at rvc, the dishwasher was believed to be around 90% full when in operation. the dishwashers at both cafeterias run for approximately 12 hours, making us aware that their maintenance and use should be carefully watched in order to minimize energy losses. the dish-washing staff were not sure which settings the dishwashers were set to, and were unaware of whether a water softener was installed. dishes were prerinsed before put in the dishwasher. the wash tank of the dishwasher at bmh was set to a temperature of 180 °f – 190 °f. however, the temperature of the hot water heater at bmh was observed to be at 140 °f and the shine wash was observed to be at 180 °f. staff at rvc were not certain of the temperature settings. additionally, staff at both bmh and rvc were unsure of whether the dishwasher has a booster heater. the dishwasher is cleaned twice every day at rvc; once after the lunch peak and once at the end of the night. the dishwasher at bmh is cleaned once every day. we recommend that the wash tank of the dishwasher be set at a lower temperature: around 160 °f, in order to conserve heat (campus erc 2007). if the dishwasher has a "sanitizer" setting or booster heater, we advise that the temperature of the hot water tank be reduced to about 120 °f. this will significantly reduce water heating costs (campus erc 2007). we recommend scraping food off plates instead of pre-rinsing dishes before putting them in the dishwasher to save energy and water consumption. soaking is generally suggested in cases of burnt or dried-on food. if dishes must be pre-rinsed, we advise the staff to use cold water instead of hot water (campus erc 2007). the rvc cleaning schedule fits the suggested frequency of cleaning. we recommend that the staff at bmh clean just as frequently to keep the appliance running more efficiently, and only run the dishwasher at full capacity. from our observations, we noted that rotating rack toasters were using excessive energy, so we recommend that they be replaced with regular electric toasters, which consume less energy (natural resources canada 2012). furthermore, as a general rule, staff should know to unplug any small appliances that are not in use. consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria we recommend that staff refer to best practices guides and increase communication in order to avoid waste during food preparation activities. these best practices guidelines should be on display in the cafeteria to help guide the staff during their food preparation activities. 5.2 creating a culture of sustainability within mfds in addition to suggesting technical and behavioural recommendations to increase energy efficiency, we conducted research on how to create a culture that promotes sustainability. this research will provide our client with the tools to create such an atmosphere to change the interactions between the cafeteria staff and students. in the past few years, mcgill university has taken many steps towards developing a sustainable future (vision 2020 mcgill). through student and staff collaboration, mcgill now has an office of sustainability, a sustainability policy, and a sustainability projects fund (vision 2020 mcgill). this cooperation between students and staff members has created noticeable changes on campus (vision 2020 mcgill). to further such a collaborative and sustainable community within the rvc and bmh cafeterias, community-based social marketing techniques can be used. community-based social marketing aims for behavioural change through direct communication and community level initiatives (kennedy 2010). social marketing is the application of traditional marketing techniques to inform the public about issues while aiming for particular behavioural changes (kennedy 2010). to promote a more sustainable future, it is critical to understand how to encourage both individuals and organizations to adopt activities that promote sustainability. this type of marketing initiative emphasizes direct personal contact among community members and the removal of barriers (natural resources canada 2009). once the barriers are identified, marketers may then develop programs that address each of them (natural resources canada 2009). consequently, individuals and organizations will adopt more sustainable activities, creating more sustainable communities (natural resources canada 2009). based on community-based social marketing and the expertise of jonathan glencross, co-founder of the mcgill food systems project, we recommend designing training sessions for the mfds staff in community engagement and energy efficient cooking practices. we found that 85% of staff interviewed was interested in attending a training session about energy efficiency. we have decided to focus on an example of staff training that could be used to evoke behavioural changes. the following will outline an experimental model in the form of an energy reduction competition between staff-student teams at rvc and bmh. our goal through this competition is to build a culture of engagement between the staff and students while teaching energy reduction strategies. to begin this process, envr 401 student researchers would identify staff and students interested in acting as team leaders through the residential life office who would act as co-leaders of the team. the role of the team leaders is threefold: to recruit other staff and students to be part of teams in each cafeteria, to motivate the staff-student teams during the competition, and to provide feedback to the envr 401 team during the competition. consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria once the teams are formed, the envr 401 group would facilitate training sessions on energy efficiency and best practices for the team leaders. the training would focus first on the greatest inefficiencies in the cafeterias or the tasks that are most easily modified. a specific methodology for evaluating behavioural change would be developed using information from this report and further input gathered from staff and students. we could potentially work with the mcgill energy project to effectively meter electricity and gas consumption of appliances before, during, and after the competition. to maximize accountability and continuity, feedback to teams should be provided as often and in as much detail as possible during and after the competition. at the end of each competition, successful strategies and failed ones would be analysed by the participants. for many of the suggested best practices to work, motivation coming from a level beyond the individual will also be necessary in order for the staff to feel that they are integral parts in a team that influences the mcgill community. we therefore recommend integrating individual-level changes with a community initiative that promotes a culture of responsibility and sustainability. 5.3 technical analysis & recommendations 5.3.1 assessing energy sources: electricity, natural gas, & steam both cafeterias have three types of energy sources available to them: electricity, steam, and natural gas. however, bmh is the only cafeteria that relies on all three sources, while rvc relies only on electricity and gas (appendix a: figures 2, 3). this section will first compare the energy consumption of each type of electrical and gas appliances. secondly, the rates for each energy source will show the costs of running different appliances on both sources. lastly, the environmental impacts of each source will be compared in terms of carbon dioxide (co2) gases produced. these evaluations will allow us to identify the energy source which best fits the appliance. it should be noted that most appliances on the market, excluding fridges, freezers, and warmers, are available as gas or electricity-run models. 5.3.2 electricity & natural gas: energy efficiency all types of appliances were found to have higher energy consumption as gas-run models compared to the energy consumption of electricity-run models. this is partially due to the fact that gas-run models tend to have higher idle energy consumption rates (fisher 2002). however, in terms of the efficiency of basic energy transfer, natural gas is more efficient (cps energy 2012). this is because the gas itself releases heat quicker than electric heating elements and no energy is lost during conversion and transmission of the energy (cps energy 2012). to view the differences between the natural gas and electricity consumption for running various appliances (energy star 2012), see appendix b: table 5. 5.3.3 electricity & natural gas: costs consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria it is also important to compare price differences between natural gas and electricity, as this will inevitably affect the client’s decisions when choosing a new appliance. even though a particular appliance may be less energy efficient, differing operating costs can determine which one is more cost efficient. mcgill is charged a rate of 0.0295$/kwh for electricity (mcgill energy project: mels 2012) and a rate of approximately 10.0463 $/gj for natural gas (gaz métro 2012). these rates and the projected annual energy consumption from appendix: table 5 were used to estimate the annual cost. to view the differences between the costs of running appliances on natural gas and on electricity, see appendix b: table 6. 5.3.4 electricity & natural gas: impacts mcgill’s electricity is provided by hydro-québec. although considered a renewable resource, energy generated through water still impacts the environment. hydroelectric reservoirs, many of which produce most of quebec’s electricity, cause the decomposition of flooded biomass, resulting in ecosystem damage and increases in ghg emissions (hydro-québec 2012). hydro-québec releases the equivalent of 2.04 g of co2 for every gj of energy consumed (mcgill energy project: mels 2012). mcgill’s natural gas is supplied by gaz métro, which receives its supply of gas from alberta. the emissions related to the process of natural gas extraction contribute to the formation of acid rain and ground level ozone, both of which are linked to many health issues (environment canada 2007). moreover, it is estimated that using a gj of energy is equivalent to emitting 49,864.34 g of co2 (mcgill energy project: mels 2012). though natural gas is more efficient with energy transfer, in this specific case, electricity may be the more sustainable source of energy because it comes from hydroelectric sources. see appendix b: table 7 for the different projected co2 emissions for appliances running on natural gas and electricity. 5.3.5 electricity & natural gas: results & recommendations we analysed the energy consumption, costs, and environmental impacts of running appliances on natural gas versus electricity in order to recommend the bestsuited energy source for kitchen appliances. considering the environmental impacts and projected ghg emissions of natural gas, we recommend appliances that operate with electricity. electricity production by hydroquébec has been deduced to have the least negative impacts on the environment and considerably reduced emissions of ghgs compared to natural gas (appendix b: table 7). so, using electricity-run appliances contributes to the greater goal of protecting our natural resources and reducing our dependence on fossil fuels. for all appliances, natural gas models consumed a higher amount of energy than the equivalent electricity-run model (appendix b: table 5). also, the annual cost to run gas models was always higher than running electrical models (appendix b: table 6). as we realize that replacing all gas and steam-run appliances with electricity-run ones is not feasible in the short-term, we suggest that this become a long-term goal for the cafeterias. we also suggest that when the steam-run appliances consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria are eventually replaced, that electricity-run appliances are most heavily considered. the following sections show some of the findings of our research. 5.3.5.1 fryers all fryers in both bmh and rvc are open deep-fat fryers and run on natural gas, though electrical models exist on the market. a gas fryer consumes the equivalent of 47,774.98 kwh (172 gj) annually, compared to 18,189 kwh for an electrical fryer, a 29,586 kwh difference. it costs $1191.40 more annually to run a fryer off natural gas than electricity. 5.3.5.2 griddles it was found that all of the griddles in bmh and rvc run on natural gas, with the exception of one electrical griddle in bmh. a gas griddle consumes the equivalent of 35,553.47 kwh (128 gj) annually compared to 17,056 kwh for an electrical fryer, an 18,497 kwh difference. it costs $782.78 more annually to run a griddle natural gas than electricity. 5.3.5.3 ovens the majority of the ovens in both cafeterias were dependent on natural gas. a gas oven consumes the equivalent of 30,831.53 kwh (111 gj) annually compared to 12,193 kwh for an electrical fryer, an 18,639 kwh difference. it costs $755.45 more annually to run an oven on natural gas than electricity. 5.3.5.4 steam kettles all relevant steam kettles found in both cafeterias were dependent on natural gas. a gas-run steam kettle consumes an equivalence of 18,276.71 kwh (66 gj) annually compared to 9,980 kwh for an electrical kettle, an 8,297 kwh difference. it costs $366.64 more annually to run a steam kettle on natural gas than electricity. 5.3.5.5 steamers all steamers found in the two cafeterias were dependent on natural gas. a gas steamer consumes an equivalence of 24,720.77 kwh (89 gj) annually compared to 9,241 kwh consumed by an electrical steamer, a 15,480 kwh difference. it costs $366.64 more annually to run a steamer on natural gas than electricity. 5.3.6 steam-run appliances several appliances in bmh currently run on steam, and the hot water that is provided to the building also comes from the steam lines. the demand for steam in the summer is much lower than during the school year, as the campus population is smaller and the residence halls are mostly not in operation. this requires an output of only 8,000-15,000 lbs/hour. however, as the minimal operating output of one consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria large boiler is 20,000-23,000 lbs/hour, all the extra steam produced is emitted into the air and wasted. by installing a smaller boiler, it is possible to tailor the amount of steam produced more closely to the actual demand, thus reducing wasted energy (mep: powerhouse 2012). however, this new boiler does not solve the problem of steam’s inherent inefficiency. the mcgill powerhouse is one of the largest steam power plants in downtown montreal and is located in the ferrier building. it provides steam for many of the buildings in the downtown campus (mep: powerhouse 2012). bmh, in particular, relies on this steam network for energy to run many of the kitchen appliances. before entering the powerhouse, the water must go through a purification process that includes water softening, gas removal, and sulfide treatments (mep: powerhouse 2012). this process is inherently inefficient; the intensive water purification steps, which would otherwise go toward purifying drinking water, are instead used during the production of steam. furthermore, energy is lost as the three main boilers and the tunnel network that transports the steam around campus has an estimated leakage of 15-20% of total steam supply (mep: powerhouse 2012). steam production is also unsustainable because of the natural gas required. most of the consumption of mcgill’s natural gas goes to running the boilers in the steam powerhouse, with smaller amounts contributing to gas appliances, activities in laboratories, and heating for several campus buildings (mep: natural gas 2012). due to the massive amounts of input necessary to create steam and the large amounts of wasted energy emitted in the form of steam arising from imprecise calculations of demand versus capacity, steam energy is very inefficient and environmentally unfriendly. as a result of these findings, we believe cafeterias should minimize their dependence on steam as an energy source. we recognize that this is a difficult and complex task, especially as the steam network is already in place. replacing steam with another source of energy could prove to be costly. in the long run, however, replacement of the steam network at mcgill will be necessary. steam-run technology, which dates back to the industrial revolution, is simply out-dated and inefficient. steam must be maintained at very high temperatures, and many old steam pipes are poorly insulated, again, allowing for huge amounts of heat loss (ubc sustainability 2012). when these steam pipes occasionally break down, there is no readily available hot water. this can potentially cause major problems in the bmh cafeteria, which serves hundreds of students. therefore, due to the evident inefficiency of steam-run technology, there will be no further analyses of steam-run appliances in bmh. 5.3.7 energy input versus frequency of use analysis figures and results of appliance energy input vs. frequency of use are shown in appendix a: figures 4, 5 and appendix b: tables 1, 8, 9. energy star-rated appliances were left out of this analysis as they already meet the energy standards of the government of canada (natural resources canada 2011). energy star-rated models are government approved and recognized as energyefficient appliances. they are defined by meeting minimum cee, as well as maximum ier (natural resources canada 2011). consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria steam-run appliances are also excluded from this analysis.4 all of the following recommendations were formulated using the collected specification data and behavioural data as well as the costs and savings of various appliances from natural resources canada (energy star 2012). natural resources canada makes assumptions of $9.02/gj for natural gas and $0.12/kwh for electricity (energy star 2012). these figures were adjusted to reflect, as closely as possible, the rates applied to mcgill. because mcgill is under the d1 general distribution service in the southern zone (gaz métro 2009), figures of the natural gas supply price ($3.48/gj or 13.186¢/m3) and compressor fuel price (0.462¢/m3) from december 1, 2012 were used to calculate estimated natural gas prices per unit energy (gaz métro 2009). this calculation was done by adding these figures to gaz métro transportation (6.927 ¢/m3), load-balancing (4.652 ¢/m3), distribution (11.924 ¢/m3), and inventoryrelated adjustment (0.915 ¢/m3) prices (gaz métro 2009). the calculated natural gas rate was 38.066 ¢/m3 or $10.046/gj. the electricity rate paid by mcgill to hydro quebec (as a large user) is 0.0295$/kwh. calculations were made as follows: i. gas-run appliances: estimated operating cost x (($10.046/gj) / ($9.02/gj)) = adjusted estimated operating cost ii. electricity-run appliances: estimated operating cost / (($0.12/kwh) / ($0.0295/kwh)) = adjusted estimated operating cost appliances not included in the appliance savings figures include full ranges and steam kettles. ranges vary widely in type, and steam kettles are not presently made for energy-star standards. alternate sources were used to make replacement cost-benefit analyses. using the priority appliances tables (appendix b: tables 8, 9) and the appliance savings figures (appendix b: table 12), we examined the high-energy input and very often-used appliances to determine the costs and benefits of their replacement. our recommendations for replacements are based on the energy and cost benefits of installing energy star-rated appliances. the particular factors that are examined are energy savings, cost savings, and costs of replacement. 5.3.7.1 bmh appliance analysis & recommendations i. fy123 (gas fryers) have the highest energy input, 58.57 kw, and are used sometimes (~15hrs/wk). replacement with an energy star model is about $2,944, with annual cost savings of $535.69 and annual energy savings of 53 gj/yr (14,722 kwh/yr). ii. gd1 (gas griddle) has an energy input of 43.34 kw and are used often (~25hrs/wk). replacement with an energy star model is about $1,560, with annual cost savings of $158.15 and annual energy savings of 16 gj/yr (4,444 kwh/yr). 4 see section 4.3.6. for justification for the exclusion of steam consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria iii. r1 (range with 1 griddle, 2 burners, and oven) has an energy input 45.1 kw of and is used rarely (2-3 hrs/wk). energy star data is not available for ranges. iv. o6 (gas combination oven) has an energy input of 33.68 kw and is used very often (>35hrs/wk). as combination ovens are excluded from energy star products, exact figures are not available (energy star 2011). however, figures for gas ovens will be used for comparison. replacement with an energy star model is about $1,550, with annual cost savings of $324.09 and annual energy savings of 32 gj/yr (8,888 kwh/yr). v. gd2 (electric flat griddle) has an energy input of 14.3 kw and is used very often (>35hrs/wk). replacement with an energy star model is about $850, with annual cost savings of $80.88 and annual energy savings of 2,595 kwh/yr. vi. w1 (electric warmer) has an energy input of 1.1 kw and is used very often (>35hrs/wk). replacement with an energy star model is about $3,569, with annual cost savings of $261.32 and annual energy savings of 8,382 kwh/yr. appliances ordered from the greatest to lowest energy savings: fy123, o6, w1, gd1, gd2. it is clear that the costs of replacement may affect the followthrough of these recommendations. appliances ordered from greatest to lowest replacement cost: w1, fy123, gd1, o6, gd2. for bmh, we recommend prioritizing according to energy savings and frequency of use. we recommend, in order of priority, the replacements of o6, w1, fy123, gd2, and gd1. recommendations for r1 will be continued in section 4.3.8 (rarely-used appliances). 5.3.7.2 rvc appliance analysis & recommendations i. r1 (gas range with 4 burners) has an energy input of 49.78 kw, and is used sometimes (10-15hrs/wk). as ranges are excluded from energy star standards, exact figures are not available (energy star 2011). ii. sk1 (gas steam kettle) has an energy input of 49.78 kw, and is used often (20-25hrs/wk). energy star data is not available for steam kettles. iii. gd1 (gas griddle) has an energy input of 43.34 kw, and is used very often (>35 hrs/wk). replacement with an energy star model is about $1,560, with annual cost savings of $158.15 and annual energy savings of 16 gj/yr (4,444 kwh/yr). iv. sk2 (gas steam kettle) has an energy input of 49.78 kw, and is used sometimes (~10 hrs/wk). energy star data is not available for steam kettles. v. s1 (gas steamer) has an energy input of 36.61 kw, and is used very often (>35 hrs/wk). replacement with an energy star model is about $7,256, with annual cost savings of $209.58 and annual energy savings of 50 gj/yr (13,889 kwh/yr). vi. o3 (gas combination oven) has an energy input of 33.68 kw and is used very often (~45hrs/wk). as combination ovens are excluded from energy star products, exact figures are not available (energy star 2011). however, figures for gas ovens will be used for comparison. replacement with an energy star model is about $1,550, with annual cost savings of $324.09 and annual energy savings of 32 gj/yr (8,888 kwh/yr). consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria vii. g1 (gas grill) has an energy input of 26.35 kw and is used very often (>35hrs/wk). replacement with an energy star model is about $1,560, with annual cost savings of $158.15 and annual energy savings of 16 gj/yr (4,444 kwh/yr). viii. w2 (electric warmer) has an energy input of 2.8kw and is used very often (>35hrs/wk). replacement with an energy star model is about $3,569, with annual cost savings of $261.32 and annual energy savings of 8,382 kwh/yr. ix. w1 (electric warmer) has an energy input of 1.1kw and is used very often (>35hrs/wk). replacement with an energy star model is about $3,569, with annual cost savings of $261.32 and annual energy savings of 8,382 kwh/yr. appliances ordered from the greatest to lowest energy savings: s1, w2/w1, o3, g1/gd1. it is clear that the costs of replacement may affect the follow through of these recommendations. appliances ordered from greatest to lowest replacement cost: s1, w2/w1, gd1/g1, o3. for bmh, we recommend prioritizing according to energy savings and frequency of use. we recommend, in order of priority, the replacements of s1, w2/w1, o3, and g1/gd1. though data is not available for sk1 and sk2, as they require high energy inputs and are used often and sometimes respectively, modified behavioural changes should be made to increase use efficiency (see section 4.1.4.). furthermore, modification changes such as adding lids, which can reduce simmer energy use by 60%, should be made (fisher 2002). also, as figures for r1 are not available, we recommend modified behavioural changes to increase use efficiency (see section 4.1.8.). 5.3.8 rarely-used appliances rarely-used appliances are examined individually. as they are used so infrequently, it is important to assess their necessity in the cafeterias. energy savings can be made if operations carried out on these appliances can be done using other already available appliances in the cafeterias. rarely-used appliances in bmh include: r1, o4, o5. r1 is a high-energy input and rarely-used appliance. it has a griddle, two burners, and an oven. bmh is already equipped with a functioning griddle, which is used significantly more often than the small surface area provided by the r1 griddle. furthermore, the r1 oven is rarely used as there are many other available ovens, including both convection and combination ovens in bmh. though the burners have been found to be rarely used as well, it is possible that their functions are specific to cooking particular foods, oatmeal for example. while we suggest the removal of r1 due to its high energy input and low frequency of use, we recognize the role of a burner. further assessment by the client is necessary to make conclusive judgments. o4 and o5 are currently part of a range which includes gd1. the removal of o4 and o5 would thus require the removal of gd1 one as well. because r1 was recommend for removal, this leaves gd1 as the only griddle in the basement kitchen of bmh. what we recommend is the installation of an energy-star rated griddle in place of the current range which includes o4, o5, and gd1. this would be beneficial because other existing ovens, such as the combination oven, o6, may replace the functions of o4 and o5. consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria rarely-used appliances in rvc included: fy3, o5, o6, o7. fy3 is one of 3 fryers in rvc, and is used the least. it is recommended that it be removed, and that its functions be replaced by the existing fryers, fy1 and fy2. with management of cooking times and estimations of food loads for a particular period of the day, fy1 and fy2 may be used efficiently and successfully even without fy3. o5 and o6 are also part of a range which includes gd1. because gd1 is used frequently and has been installed recently, we recognize that the removal of o5 and o6 would be unreasoned. we therefore strongly urge that the use of these ovens be regulated and that best practices be followed closely (appendix b: table 4). o7 is a salamander, which is primarily used for browning large dishes. it would be beneficial to remove it and use existing ovens to perform this function instead. moreover, the browning of dishes contributes primarily to the visual appeal of food, and not necessarily to improvement in its taste. after considering existing appliances in the cafeterias ones that may replace some of the functions of these rarely-used appliances we gather that they may be removed without much impact on overall food preparation. 5.3.9 fridges & freezers our recommendations for fridges and freezers are not based on energy consumption rates, but on observations only. estimates of energy consumption of these appliances depend on how often their compressors operate. the role of a compressor is to maintain a constant temperature in the fridge or freezer. as compressor operation is highly variable, depending on how often and for how long the fridge or freezer is opened, only rudimentary estimates can be made. furthermore, as fridges contribute to only about 6% of electricity consumption in a kitchen (energy star 2009), mass replacements of non-energy star fridges may not improve energy efficiency significantly in comparison to other options for appliance replacements presented in this report. we do suggest, however, that particular modifications to the walk-in fridges and freezers be made. it is beneficial to add strip curtains to the walk-ins, as they can save about $784.59/yr of operational costs (based on mcgill’s rate of $0.0295/kwh) (energy star 2009). it is also noted that wf2, wf3, wfr2, and wf4 in bmh have not been updated in over 30 years. 6. conclusion 6.1 key findings two key aspects determining energy consumption were addressed: the required energy input of the appliances, and the frequency and staff usage of the appliances. the technical approach investigated the operations of the appliances, their efficiency, and options for alternate, more energy-efficient appliances. the behavioural approach conducted observations and interviews to assess staff practices of the use of appliances and the preparation of food. extensive research conducted consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria allowed us to provide the costs and benefits of installing energy-efficient alternatives, as well as suggest alternative staff practices. the most significant finding was the need to develop a culture of sustainability, encompassing education, participation, and energy efficiency through staff team support. although the student staff undergoes the same turnover rate as the students using the cafeterias every three to four years, the permanent staff play a key role in maintaining the techniques and practices used in the cafeterias. interviews with these employees provided insight on energy-efficient practices that could be incorporated into the cafeteria operations. in working with staff and including them in research and the decision-making process, a greater sense of participation and transparency was felt. it was found that employees were open to having training sessions on how to operate in more energy-efficient manners. this is a promising finding, as it may instigate a community of acceptance for the implementation of best practices, and potentially even a development in sustainable norms and values followed in the cafeterias. the technical approach assessed the sustainability of energy sources including natural gas, electricity, and steam. using this data and appliance specification data, priority lists of suggested appliance replacements were made. our key findings were the need to switch from reliance on steam to reliance on gas and electricity. furthermore, where the options are feasible, we see it fit to invest in electricity-run models rather than natural gas-run models. we found that most appliances that needed high energy inputs and were very frequently used were not energy star-rated models, and that many were very out-dated models. our prioritized recommendations for replacements may be found in appendix b: tables 8, 9. 6.2 limitations during the first month of our project, we met with various stakeholders working on the sustainability movement on campus in order to design the scope and feasibility of our project. this included addressing which aspects of the life-cycle of energy we should focus on. we first met with our client, chef devolpi, and stakeholder david balcombe (see appendix b: table 10). after dealing with many projects that focus on food systems (which are continually being assessed by mcgill food systems project and mcgill’s office of sustainability), the clients preferred to focus on the aspect of energy use within the constraints of the cafeteria setting. this was further emphasized in our meetings with maria mazzotta and elana evans (see appendix b: table 10). subsequently, it was decided that addressing the full life-cycle analysis of the food served in the cafeterias was not feasible due to the time constraints of the project. instead, we decided to focus on aspects of energy use in the cafeterias that could be reduced with technical and behavioural modifications. after meeting with stakeholders jerome conraud (energy and utilities management team), and marc-etienne brunet (see appendix b: table 10), it was determined that an extensive energy audit of all appliances would not be possible. professional firms may have advantages in completing comprehensive energyefficiency assessments or audits within shorter time periods. as students who are not trained as professionals in the field, we carry only fundamental knowledge in the consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria execution and format of formal energy assessments and audits. furthermore, energyefficiency assessments often require metering instruments (for example, temporary energy meters on appliances) in order to measure energy consumption. these apparatuses are quite costly (powershift 2012). as this project is not supported financially, purchases of such equipment were not possible. this led us to our decision to approach this project using a user-interface perspective. jerome conraud also informed us of mcgill residences facilities and buildings operations’ plan to complete a full energy audit of mcgill cafeterias within the next two years. our group had discussed including the water usage in the cafeterias as part of our scope, and this was brought up with jerome conraud as well. he informed us that there are no water meters used within mcgill, and that access to billing data is very difficult to obtain. additionally, our client wanted us to focus on energy consumption over water usage. one of the main criticisms of our project was that energy consumption in the cafeterias is highly dependent upon the menu. we understand that due to differences in the weekly menus, there will be differences in the amount of energy used per day in order to prepare dishes. however, due to time constraints and lack of influence over food purchasing, we did not investigate this aspect of energy efficiency. our team also met with david gray-donald (see appendix b: table 10) to determine whether an analysis of the food waste produced by the cafeterias would be feasible. we were informed that big hannah, the industrial composter on campus, is already running at full capacity, and the only way that composting capacity could increase was if macerators were successfully installed in the cafeterias. he further informed us that this had already been attempted last year, but that the macerators did not end up being suitable. we therefore concluded that it was not practical to include food waste in our scope. the technical analysis relied on energy data for old appliances, which was in some cases not available. these appliances are expected to have labels that state various energy figures. however, some of these labels are physically inaccessible, missing, or illegible. there is no equipment list available for either cafeteria, which hindered our ability to verify all existing appliances. we compiled a list of all the relevant appliances in the cafeterias, concentrating on appliances chosen according to energy consumption. this appliance list was a useful asset to us, particularly for the technical analysis, and may be found in appendix b: tables 2 and 3. another limitation was the inability to use energy bills for electricity and gas as a measurement of energy usage. electricity bills for mcgill are based on the energy usage of entire buildings and are not broken down by areas within the buildings. furthermore, gas bills are not available for public viewing (conraud sept. 27th, 2012). thus, we were unable to use billing as an analytical tool in our procedure. a large component of our behavioural analysis relied on interviews with the cafeteria staff. we interviewed thirteen staff in total from both of the cafeterias. without a full census of all staff, it was difficult to make definite conclusions of each staff member’s use of appliances. staff observation, completed several times by each member of the project group in both cafeterias, supplemented the interviews as a method of estimating the frequency of the use of the appliances. 6.3 future studies & research consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria there is constantly room for improvement, especially for projects focusing on sustainability. in determining the scope of our project, we realized early on that there were many aspects of energy efficiency within mfds that we were not able to assess. it is therefore important to look at potential projects that may be conducted in order to address other energy efficiency and sustainability matters. jerome conraud is already working on an energy audit to be completed by an external agency, in addition to implementing meters for both energy and water consumption at mcgill. for the future it is important to be able to monitor energy use within the institutional setting. the maps of the cafeterias and the appliance lists (see appendix b: table 2, 3) may be helpful in the implementation of meters. furthermore, these documents may be accessible to students interested in doing applied student research through the mcgill energy project. future envr 401 projects, or even prospective internship positions with mfds or spf projects, can look at the life-cycle of food within the cafeterias. in the past, mfds has worked with envr 401 groups to look at sustainable seafood options and sourcing options for poultry and tomatoes in quebec. however, addressing all of the food served has not been carried out yet. mfds has also collaborated with students in research groups through the office of sustainability, resulting in significant developments in sustainability like the creation of the mcgill food systems project. food waste and composting at mcgill cafeterias is also a potential undertaking. as previously discussed, the compost facilities are already filled to capacity from pre-consumer food waste alone, leaving no room for post-consumer food waste. once proper macerators are installed, post-consumer food waste may also be added to the composting process. an exciting feature of food waste and composting initiatives is that there are many ways to get involved. according to our client, informative eco-stations are to be installed. in these stations, students, staff, faculty, and the administration can learn about and take part in composting. furthermore, these stations will always be in constant need of enhancement and personalization. other project ideas include competitions between campus cafeterias to determine which cafeteria produces the least amount of waste (see section 4.2: creating a culture of sustainability within mfds). continuing to build a connection between staff, supervisors, and students is important when working towards a culture of sustainability at mcgill. communitybuilding initiatives of this kind are in constant progress. the results of this report will add to the knowledge base of best practices and energy efficiency at mcgill university. we hope it contributes to the greater awareness of sustainability in mcgill dining facilities and that it provides a platform from which future projects on different aspects of energy efficiency can be conducted. 6.4 final statements in light of expectations for improvements in overall sustainable management, we have conducted this project with the hopes that our technical and behavioural recommendations will properly address the matter of energy efficiency in the bmh and rvc cafeterias. consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria we believe that, in following through with many of these recommendations, the prospective cost savings and premiums will allow mfds to purchase even more local and sustainable foods. most importantly, in the way that both approaches in the methodology were necessary for a comprehensive study, it is important to continue to take on the same holistic approach towards sustainability while taking into consideration social and economic aspects. we hope this report adds to the knowledge base of best practices and energy efficiency at mcgill university. we hope it contributes to the greater awareness of sustainability in mcgill dining facilities and that it provides a platform from which future projects on different aspects energy efficiency can be conducted. we would like to thank our client, executive chef oliver devolpi, for providing us with the means to carry out this project. consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria 7. works cited bergstrom, john c., and alan randall. resource economics. northhampton, ma: edward elgar publishing inc. , 2010. “cafeteria/dining best practices.” campus erc. last modified 2007. http://campuserc.org. 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(2008). adapted from: greening your business: the hands-on guide to creating a successful and sustainable business: us first. retrieved from http://www3.usfirst.org/uploadedfiles/robotics_programs/mentors_and_coache s/assets/green_team_manual.pdf. thurmann, a., & younger, w. j. (2008). the handbook of energy audits retrieved from: http://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d3lnprza7dmc&oi=fnd&pg=pr 7&dq=energy+audit+restaurants&ots=xa9x5lerb&sig=um3ghmjyjh9cg0qof qyfn6iazuk#v=onepage&q=energy%20audit%20restaurants&f=false. young, d. (2008). when do energy-efficient appliances generate energy savings? some evidence from canada. energy policy 36(1), 34-46. consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria appendix a: graphs figure 1: energy conservation at mcgill and corresponding costs and investments from 2002-2009 (mcgill 2010). figure 2: pie-chart: distribution of energy input by source: rvc 72%   28%   0%   energy  sources  of  appliances:  rvc   electricity   natural  gas   steam   consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria figure 3: graph of energy input vs. frequency of use: bmh figure 4: pie chart: distribution of energy input by source: bmh 78%   13%   9%   0%   energy  sources  of  appliances:  bmh     electricity   natural  gas   steam   consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria figure 5: graph of energy input vs. frequency of use: rvc consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria appendix b: tables tables and additional data can be provided upon request. table 1: frequency of use: bmh and rvc table 2: appliance list with specifications: rvc table 3: appliance list with specifications: bmh table 4: best practices table 5: appliance energy consumption: natural gas vs. electricity table 6: cost ($) of running appliances: natural gas vs. electricity table 7: carbon dioxide emissions: natural gas vs. electricity table 8: prioritized list of replacements: bmh table 9: prioritized list of replacements: rvc table 10: list of stakeholders table 11: annual energy savings calculations table 12: appliance savings figures (energy star 2012) assumptions: natural gas at $10.046/gj; electricity at $0.0295/kwh; water at $2.20/m3; 45.4 kg (100 lb.) daily food load (where applicable). consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria appendix c: tables figure 1: map of rvc consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria figure 2: map of bmh: basement kitchen consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria figure 3: map of bmh: main cafeteria & kitchen consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria appendix d: other documentation mfds staff interview 1. where do you work? ! bmh ! rvc ! both ! other 2. what is your position? ! general helpers ! counter kitchen staff ! baker ! first cook ! 2nd cook ! cook’s helpers ! casual kitchen student ! counter ! dish ! driver ! other 3. average weekly hours (including weekends) ! <10 ! 10-20 ! 20-30 ! 30-40 ! >40 4. which time of day do you usually work at? (specify peak hours for each cafeteria) ! opening hours ! peak times ! non-peak times ! closing hours 5. what station(s) do you work at? what are your main tasks? consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria 6. according to your estimations, how often and how long do you use the main equipment (specified by technical analysis) in your area? 7. what do you know about energy efficiency? 8. which changes (if any) can be made in relation to your practices and use of appliances to save energy? 9. during the time of a normal work period, would you be interested in attending a staff training session about energy efficiency? ! yes ! no why or why not? 10. do you work with or use any appliances that are broken or/and inefficient? 11. what are you satisfied and not satisfied with in relation to the equipment that you work with? 12. are you satisfied with the current location of your equipment in relation to your working space? 13. do you think there are kitchen practices (related to staff behavior) that could be changed to be more efficient? 14. do you have any other questions or concerns about the energy efficiency project conducted by students from the environmental research course? figure 1: interview form for mfds staff consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria figure 2: ethics approval consilience cantor et al.: energy efficiency assessment of mcgill cafeteria figure 3: gantt chart microsoft word 02112008 ruben-salama water privitization.doc 1 thirsty for change: considering water privatization in developing nations corresponding author: celine ruben-salama1 abstract: access, maintenance, and distribution of clean water are daunting tasks for developing nations. efforts to provide clean drinking water have often fallen short, which has prompted the world bank to advocate for privatization. from a theoretical perspective, privatization blends the advantages of corporate efficiency with responsible management on behalf of the national government. analysis of attempts to privatize water in the philippines, with the establishment of the metropolitan waterworks sewerage system (mwss), shows mixed results. between 1997 and 2003, citizens with access to water increased from 58 percent to 84 percent, yet water became five times costlier due to privatization. advocates may applaud the efficiency of the model, but developing nations must emphasize accessibility and affordability of the resource. privatization, as a model for water distribution, remains contentious. 1 the following authors include mpa candidates at columbia university’s school of international and public affairs and a researcher at the earth institute. the authors would like to thank casey brown, from the international research institute for climate and society. he provided precise commentary and motivation that aided in writing this report. jack foshee, an mpa candidate, has a research focuses on renewable resource systems and sustainability issues. he can be reached at jf2425@columbia.edu. anirban ghosh, an mpa candidate, has a primary research interests in the maintenance of large water systems and urban energy use. he can be reached at ag2638@columbia.edu. christopher graham, an mpa candidate, can be reached at cjg2131@columbia.edu. william thomas murray, an mpa candidate, has a primary interest in the development and implementation of a comprehensive emissions-reducing bill in the united states. he can be reached at wtm2102@columbia.edu. celine ruben-salama is a swedish american living and working in new york city pursuing her mpa. her main focus is private sector solutions to environmental issues and private-public partnerships. she can be reached at csr2109@columbia.edu. dr. tobias siegfried is currently working at the earth institute, columbia university. he studies a broad range of issues related to the management of scarce freshwater resources and its improvement. he can be reached at ts2392@columbia.edu. 2 introduction: based on current population trends, 3.3 billion people, or more than half of the human population, will be living in urban areas by next year. this number is expected to increase to almost five billion by 2030 (unfpa, 2007). given the increasing constraints on scarce natural resources such as fresh water, challenges surrounding the future development of large urban agglomerates are indeed great. this is especially true in developing countries. only about one percent of the water on earth is suitable for human consumption, and most of that water is inaccessible to humans because it is frozen in the polar ice caps. sustainable supply and distribution of water is key to successful development and will play an increasingly vital role in urbanization globally. all people need clean water to survive; access to fresh water is thus essential for development. today’s developed nations made significant investments in water infrastructure, institutions, and management capacities early on. these strategic investments led to improvements in public health, which laid the foundation for steady economic growth and stable societal conditions1. unfortunately, in developing countries, development of clean water and sanitation infrastructure has not kept pace. global water consumption is at an all time high and yet 1.1 billion people – around one out of six of the current population – lack access to safe drinking water, and 2.6 billion people lack adequate sanitation. as a result, 1.8 million people die annually from curable diseases such as diarrhea and cholera and countless more fall victim to other waterborne diseases. children in developing countries are the main casualties2. unsurprisingly, developing countries and regions that lack adequate water and sanitation services are generally also hindered economically and/or suffer from political instability. the conflict in modern darfur is cited as an illustration of this problem3. providing clean drinking water and sanitation services is extremely costly. massive infrastructure investments in piping, pumps, water purification and wastewater treatment plants are necessary. generally, revenues from tap water sales do not cover such costs for treatment. often, these countries have difficulties in recovering costs and fall far short of full cost-recovery. additionally, water systems in the developing world are particularly inefficient. water loss due to the combination of system leakage and theft range from 40 percent to 60 percent for many developing countries compared with 10 percent to 20 percent for systems in the developed world4. in order to achieve stability and economic progress, it is vital that developing countries address these water provision and sanitation challenges by making proper infrastructural investments, implementing solid operational principles, establishing regulatory frameworks and fine-tuning economic instruments. unable, or in some cases unwilling, to finance these investments, governments in the developing world have fallen short of meeting the public’s need for 1 sierra, k. (march 14, 2006). making water available for all. taipei times. retrieved january 11, 2008, from http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/editorials/archives/2006/03/14/2003297311. 2 world health organization/unicef joint monitoring program for water supply and sanitation. (2005). water for life, making it happen. retrieved january 11, 2008, from www.unicef.org/wes/files/jmp_2005.pdf. 3 siegfried, t., & pizarro, g. (2007). options for water resources management in darfur, sudan. submitted to the united nations development programme (undp), august 2007. 4 haarmeyer, d., & mody, a. (1997). private capital in water sanitization. retrieved january 11, 2008, from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1997/03/pdf/haarmeye.pdf. 3 adequate and affordable water and sanitation services. privatization of public water works has emerged as a possible alternative. proponents of water privatization believe these challenges can in fact become lucrative business opportunities. since the late 1980’s the world bank has actively advocated for private sector participation in public water works, reasoning that private entities are better equipped than government-run bureaucracies to deliver clean water and sanitation services to the public5. this notion proved popular and spurred water works privatization projects throughout the developed and developing world. although levels of public-private involvement differ by project, fundamental goals of privatization efforts are fairly standard across the board. these aims include improving the efficiency of water and sanitation services to the public, expanding coverage area and meeting or exceeding the water quality standards set forth by the world health organization. the main difference between private and public water projects is the corporate profit motives which, in some cases, conflicts with the idea of equal distribution of water to all citizens. results of privatization projects have varied. in some cases privatization resulted in increased rates of corruption, deteriorating service, and loss of local operational control. other projects successfully improved both service coverage and reliability. it is important to note here that rate increases are not necessarily a negative result. reasonable rate increases reflect the true cost of water and are the result of removing artificially low tariff requirements specified by the government and subsidized by tax dollars. of course, inferior water delivery should not accompany these price hikes. nor should prices increase astronomically over a short period of time. given this mixed record, it is not apparent that privatization is the correct prescription to cure the developing world’s water woes. is it reasonable to assume that private companies will be able to generate sufficient profits to cover operating costs and provide a feasible revenue base to finance system expansion? what opportunities do water privatization projects actually present? who benefits? this paper examines the overall viability of water privatization schemes in terms of their ability to provide for the critical water and sanitation needs of citizens in the developing world. roles of and the interplay between government entities, private companies, the world bank and the public are explored in the ongoing privatization of public water works. the privatization of water in the philippines is used to illustrate the many salient issues that emerge in the process. we conclude with general observations and policy recommendations. the case for or against privatization: in the face of growing population and an aging water infrastructure, the prospect of privatizing the water system is increasingly attractive from a government’s perspective. possible incentives include improvement, development, and expansion of infrastructure, increasing efficiency of water supply and distribution, development of technical expertise, securing funds to finance investments and securing income to service debts. at first glance, it seems safe to assume that a private entity will consistently trump a public entity in terms of efficient delivery of services for the benefit of all. under closer scrutiny however, the validity of this assumption becomes less obvious. 5 spronk, s., & webber, j. (2007). contention struggles against accumulation by dispossession in bolivia: the political economy of natural resource contention. latin american perspectives, 34.2. retrieved january 11, 2008, from http://lap.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/34/2/31. 4 while the benefits of a robust water system – increased public health and long-term economic development – are clear on a macro scale, the externalities do not translate well to the corporate bottom line. this fact can potentially cause corporations to make operational and strategic decisions that oppose the appropriate provision of this good. in addition, the market for water services differs from the typical free market scenario found in other sectors such as telecommunications and power in several important ways. because of the immense infrastructure investments required to provide these services, direct competition among piped water systems is practically nonexistent6. next, this market does not follow normal fluctuation patterns. particularly in developing nations where urban populations are constantly increasing, aggregate demand for water is constantly on the rise. because of the monopolistic nature of the sector, prices are not determined based on supply and demand but rather, tariffs are set by governments. additionally, demand is price inelastic in the traditional sense as services provided are basic necessities. this does not necessarily mean that demand is totally unresponsive to price. some evidence suggests that demand decreases somewhat with dramatic price increases. however, low tariffs on water make this phenomenon difficult to gauge accurately. equality of access is often cited as the rationale for the public provision of water and wastewater systems at subsidized prices. however, this rationale is no longer valid given findings that the lack of cost recovery by commercial pricing prevented public utilities from serving the poor at all. due to the reliance on private vendors, the latter often pay up to 10 times more for water than the wealthier that have access to subsidized piped water 4. the world bank believes that industrializing nations do not have the necessary funds to close the gap between the rich and poor in terms of water delivery. privatization can potentially place financial power for water delivery into the hands of a more objective third party. the world bank states that private investment can boost efficiency if two requirements are met. first, the projects must generate enough profit to cover operating costs and provide a feasible revenue base. second, prior to implementation, risks must be identified and allocated to the parties that are best organized for dealing with them4. international organizations play an instrumental role in water privatization design. a bad economic or social track record can derail governmental negotiations with potential investors. often, these organizations serve as intermediaries facilitating contract negotiations and providing legitimacy to the process. as an example, the world bank has used its leverage as an international lender to negotiate contracts between government agencies and specialized utility firms like suez, veolia environment, and rwe, a subsidiary of kemble water, which are currently the largest multinationals in the sector7. currently there is no best-practice model for the privatization of water and sanitation services. feasibility of arrangements is location dependent. contractual arrangements range from simple management and lease contracts with utilities to complete divestiture. the former defines the provision of specialized, narrow services and thus does not assign full commercial risk to the operator. the latter characterizes situations where the private sector holds 6 wallsten, s., & kosec, k. (2005). public or private drinking water? the effects of ownership and benchmark competition on u.s. water system regulatory compliance and household water expenditures. retrieved january 11, 2008, from http://aeibrookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/php0a.pdf. 7 pinsent masons. (2006). pinsent masons water yearbook 2006-2007. retrieved january 11, 2008, from http://www.nedwater.eu/documents/pinsent%20masons%20water%20yearbook%202006%20%202007.pdf. 5 ownership of infrastructural assets and complete control over the process of water distribution and thus bears full commercial risk of private capital investments8. privatization has not proven to be the panacea for domestic water supply and sanitation, and one must be circumspect in the identification of the underlying causes. while we are aware of the intrinsic problems associated with a case study approach, such as a lack of generalization and other factors, we believe that the rather generic philosophic discussion of access to water as a natural right is less relevant than implications for best policies and institutional settings. therefore, we now focus our discussion on the privatization of manila’s urban water supply, a project that, at the time of its inception in 1998, was considered to be the largest water privatization project in the world. this privatization project was marked by relative success in one half of the city and absolute failure in another part during the same time period. as such, it provides an interesting historical lesson. case study: prior to privatization in 1997, the philippine capital of manila had one of the oldest water distribution systems in asia. the system dated back to the 1870s, and was designed to provide water for a population of 300,000 with 16 million liters of water each day9. by the end of the 20th century, the population dependent on this system of distribution increased to nearly 12 million10. the publicly owned and operated metropolitan waterworks sewerage system (mwss) was unable to satisfy these growing requirements satisfactorily. in 1995, the mwss provided 8.25 million of metro manila’s residents with water connections, while 3.6 million residents had no such water source10. in addition, the system’s dilapidated pipes were blamed for periodic outbreaks of bacterial diseases, and large percentages of delivered water were lost via leakages and illegal connections9. functional failures of the corruption riddled mwss and lack of financial resources available for the system’s maintenance and development projects made privatization an attractive alternative in manila. given the dismal state of urban water supply, public support for private-public partnerships in the water sector was on the rise13. between 1995 and 1996 a consortium of engineers, lawyers, economists, accountants, and government administrators designed a plan which delineated the privatization process. the plan provided that 25-year concession contracts would be awarded in a competitive bidding process. at the same time, mwss would concede its position as manila’s water distributor and instead assume a regulatory role monitoring and enforcing service standards, conducting financial audits, handling customer complaints, and guaranteeing provision of raw water to the operators. furthermore, the plan separated manila into two divisions – the east zone and the west zone – that 8 the world bank. (2006). approaches to private participation in water services: a toolkit. retrieved january 11, 2008, from http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/toolkits/water/water_full.pdf. 9 orwin, a. (1999). the privatization of water and wastewater utilities: an international survey. retrieved january 11, 2008, from http://environmentprobe.org/enviroprobe/pubs/ev542.html#asia. 10 montemayor, c. (2003). the manila water privatization fiasco and the role of suez lyonnaise/ondeo: brief history of water privatization in metro manila. retrieved january 11, 2008, from http://www.tni.org/altreg-docs/manila.pdf. 6 were to be serviced separately. the west zone comprised about 60 percent, the majority of manila’s population, and yet little of the city’s wealth. the east zone was more sparsely populated but wealthier overall. this duopolistic arrangement sought to encourage competition between concessionaires, provide performance benchmarking, and to ensure that a backup system would be available in case of one concession’s failure. finally, the system of distribution expected to expand in both wealthy and poorer areas indiscriminately13. bids submitted by the various potential concessionaires were evaluated based on cost. despite the fact that one concessionaire underbid all others by more than 50 percent, the consortium of decision-makers proceeded with its initial plan to employ two separate private water providers. in 1997 a conglomerate named manyilad-ondeo won the bid for the west zone, and the manila water company won the east zone. the terms of the contract mandated expansion of water supply and sewerage coverage, water quality and pressure standards, tariff structure, and labor transition packages to be met by the concessionaires9. before transfer of concession, manyilad-ondeo and manila water pledged the following: 1) lower water rates, 2) 24 hour availability of water by the year 2000, 3) increased water pressure, 4) compliance with world health organization standards, 5) provision of $7.5 billion in investments for infrastructure, 6) provision of an additional $4 billion in income tax revenues over the course of the contracted years, and 7) service to the mwss’s $800 million debt through payment of concession fees14. within one year manyilad-ondeo, the holder of the west zone concession, began renegotiating its contract to allow for rate increases. in the next three years, manyilad-ondeo renegotiated its contract six more times with a seventh being denied due to poor performance. as rates increased service provided to metropolitan manila remained unsatisfactory. daily water availability and water pressure targets were consistently missed, expansion goals were deferred by as much as five years, and nearly 600,000 of the west zone’s poorest residents were still without water as of 2003. those lacking service were mainly in the urban poor areas and forced to spend a considerable amount of their income on overpriced water sold by private vendors10. the ensuing years were mired in dispute as manyilad-ondeo and mwss clashed over contract negotiations and concessions fees. despite contractual amendments and relaxed requirements, relations had gone completely amiss between manyilad-ondeo and mwss by mid-2002. manyilad-ondeo, while failing to pay concession fees for over a year, still sought additional rate hikes and the government’s guarantee on loans. mwss rejected these demands and manyilad-ondeo terminated its contract. consequently, responsibility for water services reverted to mwss on february 7, 200311. manyilad-ondeo then filed for arbitration before the international appeals panel. the private water conglomerate cited mwss’s refusal to implement rate adjustments, the effects of the 1997 asian financial crisis, delays in the completion of a river basin project, and drought caused by el niño as primary reasons for their course of action. the arbiter ruled that manyilad-ondeo should pay $150 million in 11 llorito, d., & marcon, m. (march 26, 2003). maynilad: a model in water privatization springs leaks. the manila times. retrieved january 11, 2008, from www.manilatimes.net/others/special/2003/mar/26/20030326spe1.html. 7 withheld concession fees, but that mwss must allow the conglomerate to raise their rates to meet financial obligations12. interestingly, manila water, the concessionaire of the east zone, managed control of operations in a satisfactory manner and as of today still provides water under its long-term concession in a profitable manner. based on these facts, proponents of privatization highlight the overall positive aspects of the manila water privatization project. their claim is that privatization has generally improved the infrastructure and level of service in metropolitan manila. even in the problem-stricken west zone, residential service coverage has expanded from 58 percent prior to privatization to 84 percent afterwards12. certainly no easy conclusions can be drawn and ready made recommendations cannot be provided based on the manila case study. neither of the two private water companies saw the level of profits they expected at the outset of their venture until today. the lack of hedging for currency fluctuations exposed this multi-national project to serious foreign exchange risk. between local revenue generation, international borrowing and the asian financial crisis of the late 1990’s these risks were realized. however, both companies were confronted with different operational environments at the micro-level. the managerial approach changes with the switch to privatization and perhaps the profit outlook was not properly assessed in supplying the west zone. operational efficiency decreased with increasing household coverage in the west zone. in other words, more water was wasted as more connections were established and hence more money lost for manyilad-ondeo relative to the increasing operational expenses. however, not all of the unaccounted water was seeping into the ground. ironically, this inefficiency was the result of an emerging cottage industry. as it turned out, a thriving multimillion-peso black market of water directly stolen from pipes emerged in response to continued lack of ubiquitous service coverage11. conclusions: theoretically, privatization presents an opportunity to improve domestic water supply and wastewater systems in the absence of powerful local governments. private firms offer resources and expertise. these partnerships can be successful; the manila water company in the philippines case study is a good example. there are also copious examples of failed partnerships. successful fusion of public and private entities requires careful arrangement of responsibilities, clear goals and expectations for government and private organizations, and transparency of operations. privatization of water resources is a very delicate endeavor that requires a purposeful, careful balancing of interests. it is delicate from the get-go because it exposes both consumer and providers to market forces that are largely out of their control. in developing countries where consumers are particularly, sensitive to rate hikes, it 12 slattery, k. (2003). what went wrong? lessons from cochabamba, manila, buenos aires, and atlanta. retrieved august 10, 2007, from http://www.rppi.org/apr2003/whatwentwrong.html. 13 rosenthal, s. (2001). the manila water concessions and their impact on the poor. retrieved january 11, 2008, from http://www.yale.edu/hixon/research/pdf/srosenthal_manila.pdf. 14 asia pacific movement on debt and development (apmdd) and the freedom from debt coalition (fdc). (2006). profiting from people’s lives: metro manila’s water privatization saga. retrieved january 11, 2008, from jubileesouth.org/upload1/fdc_low.pdf. 8 becomes important to develop resilience by sound management and to be acutely aware of the specific economic, political and cultural operational environment. in developed countries, where consumers are able to pay the true price of water, privatization and the accompanying rate hikes may be a suitable method for encouraging water conservation. governments and private firms must maintain the notion of mutual benefit. private firms that are unregulated, lack proper enforcement, or possess unfairly profitable contract rights, will inevitably erode public and governmental support through price hikes. governments can also maintain overly high standards for private firms, stifling their profits. however, the root of an unhealthy partnership is often the profit motive of private firms. this motive, when pursued above all other interests, can inevitably undercut government and public support. owing to the eclectic nature of water issues worldwide, many different arrangements and terms of contracts can be appropriate. successful partnerships need to be applicable to local conditions; this implies the necessity of uniquely suitable contracts. nevertheless, there are features common to all successful privatization agreements. in order for poor areas to be served successfully, differential pricing with free quotas for basic requirements can enable better acceptability and cost recovery since a relative deprivation in the exchange entitlements of lesseroff households will be avoided. differential pricing would also address the inherent problem of public sector utilities that prevented them from serving the poor. specific profit margins for private groups and committal returns on water infrastructure for local governments should be clearly outlined within contracts. furthermore, contracts must provide contingencies for a number of risks that should be carefully identified ahead of time. once an agreeable and fair arrangement has been decided upon, both government and firm must participate to protect their interests and overcome unforeseen obstacles effectively. as in the case of manila, the largely unseen nature of underground assets and the state they are in should allow for constant renegotiation of contractual arrangements. successful partnerships exhibit continued involvement of both parties in the contract. at the end of the day, the outcome of a successful agreement results in equitable gains by all parties — the government, the private operator and the citizens — both rich and poor. these equitable gains must emerge from substantial technical improvements related to the efficiency of provision and the ubiquitous metering of consumption. any agreement that fails to improve a region’s water quality and efficiency of distribution, reward concessionaires appropriately, and provide affordable service to the public represents, will inevitably be an unsuccessful contract. focus must remain on driving mechanisms of agreement, and government and private groups must work closely to achieve each other’s ends. this is especially true for developing nations where the pressure from population growth and the increasing scarcity of water have to be reconciled so as to meet public health and environmental goals. 9 references asia pacific movement on debt and development (apmdd) and the freedom from debt coalition (fdc). (2006). profiting from people’s lives: metro manila’s water privatization saga. retrieved january 11, 2008, from jubileesouth.org/upload1/fdc_low.pdf. haarmeyer, d., & mody, a. (1997). private capital in water sanitization. retrieved january 11, 2008, from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1997/03/pdf/haarmeye.pdf. llorito, d., & marcon, m. (march 26, 2003). maynilad: a model in water privatization springs leaks. the manila times. retrieved january 11, 2008, from www.manilatimes.net/others/special/2003/mar/26/20030326spe1.html. montemayor, c. (2003). the manila water privatization fiasco and the role of suez lyonnaise/ondeo: brief history of water privatization in metro manila. retrieved january 11, 2008, from http://www.tni.org/altreg-docs/manila.pdf. orwin, a. (1999). the privatization of water and wastewater utilities: an international survey. retrieved january 11, 2008, from http://environmentprobe.org/enviroprobe/pubs/ev542.html#asia. pinsent masons. (2006). pinsent masons water yearbook 2006-2007. retrieved january 11, 2008, from http://www.nedwater.eu/documents/pinsent%20masons%20water%20yearbook%202006%20%20200 7.pdf. rosenthal, s. (2001). the manila water concessions and their impact on the poor. retrieved january 11, 2008, from http://www.yale.edu/hixon/research/pdf/srosenthal_manila.pdf. siegfried, t., & pizarro, g. (2007). options for water resources management in darfur, sudan. submitted to the united nations development programme (undp), august 2007. sierra, k. (march 14, 2006). making water available for all. taipei times. retrieved january 11, 2008, from http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/editorials/archives/2006/03/14/2003297311. slattery, k. (2003). what went wrong? lessons from cochabamba, manila, buenos aires, and atlanta. retrieved august 10, 2007, from http://www.rppi.org/apr2003/whatwentwrong.html. spronk, s., & webber, j. (2007). contention struggles against accumulation by dispossession in bolivia: the political economy of natural resource contention. latin american perspectives, 34.2. retrieved january 11, 2008, from http://lap.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/34/2/31. wallsten, s., & kosec, k. (2005). public or private drinking water? the effects of ownership and benchmark competition on u.s. water system regulatory compliance and household water expenditures. retrieved january 11, 2008, from http://aeibrookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/php0a.pdf. world health organization/unicef joint monitoring program for water supply and sanitation. (2005). water for life, making it happen. retrieved january 11, 2008, from www.unicef.org/wes/files/jmp_2005.pdf. the world bank. (2006). approaches to private participation in water services: a toolkit. retrieved january 11, 2008, from http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/toolkits/water/water_full.pdf. united nations fund for population activities (unfpa). (2007). unleashing the potential of urban growth. retrieved january 11, 2008, from www.unfpa.org/swp/2007/presskit/pdf/sowp2007_eng.pdf. senior editors’ notes senior editors’ notes https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i2.4483 how to cite daniel greenberg, chikara onda, a. a. w. c.-b. m. d.-c. (2009). senior editors’ notes. consilience, (2). https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i2.4483 abstract dear readers, i welcome you to meet the leading editorial board of consilience: the journal of sustainable development. each senior editor is an inspiring leader and world citizen. i invite you to peruse, below, in addition to the editor-in-chief’s note, the notes of each senior editor on the written work they advised. -hannah lee editor-in-chief scholarly articles towards sustainable wastewater reuse in the mena region dr. maher abu-madi, assistant professor, birzeit university dr. rashed al-sa’ed, associate professor, birzeit university > note by chikara onda when discussing resource management with regards to the middle east and north africa (mena) region, oil is generally the first commodity that comes to mind. yet, with human populations growing alongside a dwindling base of freshwater resources, the global water crisis is of great salience, especially to areas of low precipitation. in order to bridge the gap in water availability and demand, abu-madi and al-sa’ed advocate for the reuse of wastewater, which also has the added benefit of mitigating environmental degradation. in this piece, the authors develop a parsimonious water reuse index (wri). the calculation of this index, they argue, will allow the policy makers to identify the “juncture” in wastewater treatment at which its use as a resource is being limited, be it collection, treatment, or reuse. this piece is therefore not only https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i2.4483 http://consiliencejournal.readux.org/2009/03/editor-in-chief-note/ highly relevant in its subject matter, but also in the way in which it brings policy and academia together. gad and gender mainstreaming: a pathway to sustainable development? alleta brenner, london school of economics > note by winston christie-blick over three decades have passed since the 1975 world conference of the international women’s year in mexico city drew widespread attention to issues of economic, social and political gender inequity in the developing world. since then, the goals and approaches of those seeking to ensure that members of each sex enjoy equal benefits from development have been varied and constantly evolving. aims of such development practitioners have spanned from a focus on women’s productive roles and their integration into the economy as valuable agents of economic growth, to increased concern over gender-driven social relations, the social construction of gender identity and the redistribution of power between sexes. this final objective of inter-sex power transfer is a fundamental and provocative element of the gender and development (gad) paradigm presented here in alletta brenner’s piece, which discusses the viability of top-down approaches towards greater gender equality in afghanistan following the u.s. invasion in 2001. specifically, the initiative of “gender mainstreaming” is analyzed as a manifestation of the gad paradigm—described as an effort to raise awareness of gender inequality while increasing women’s participation in the public sphere. in spite of the convincing case made for a top-down gender-based development effort, brenner acknowledges and discusses setbacks to the success of gender mainstreaming due to both practical problems of implementation in afghanistan and those more fundamental to the mainstreaming initiative in general. from brenner’s account at least two points are clear: if gad denies men a role in its agenda it will be seen as an overtly threatening force that redistributes power at the expense of males and arbitrarily hurls women into a sphere in which they have not traditionally played (and may not be prepared to play) a role; secondly, it must be recognized that gender mainstreaming, and any top-down gad initiative, is bound to fail if viewed as a pet project of paternalistic outsiders, not rooted in the country of interest’s culture and traditions. at a time when the u.s. and its allies continue to struggle with reconstruction and concomitant development efforts in the middle east, brenner’s warning that the numerous shortcomings of gender mainstreaming may lead to regress in the effort for gender equality is of extreme relevance. insofar as gender mainstreaming in afghanistan could be seen as just one experiment in gender-based development that could be instantiated elsewhere in the future, learning from these deficiencies bears significant implications for the livelihoods of millions of women across the developing world, which would be greatly augmented by increased agency in both the public and private spheres. evaluation of the nzaid project scarlett lopez freeman, columbia university seung bok lee, columbia university veena vasudevan, columbia university diana wu, columbia university the political economy of the resource curse in gabon: lessons for ghana richard king, london school of economics > note by daniel greenberg the “resource curse” theory has lost none of its potency or popularity since it was first formulated. it has been applied to explain situations ranging from violent civil conflict in africa to resistance to democracy in the middle east and latin america. richard king provides a provocative and thoroughly researched argument, stressing the need for reliable institutions to manage ghana’s oil. norway provides perhaps the best case showing that people can design mechanisms and take control of their natural surroundings to avert the pitfalls of the resource curse. encouragingly, people, and not nature, are the deciders of fate. the ghanaian government would do well to tighten their political institutions in order to direct their newfound wealth to development rather than to political patronage and possibly war. the stakes could not be higher. situating local knowledge within development agenda: some reflections dr. toyin kolawole, university of sussex > note by daniel greenberg the scene is paradoxical: well-educated, well-dressed european and american technocrats discussing how to “solve” the problems of africa, asia, latin america, in the absence of any africans, asians or latin americans. the concept of “development” has certainly come under public debate in the recent past. toyin kolawole provides a provocative argument for the incorporation of “local knowledge” into the development agenda. what he proposes, essentially, is development from the ground up, assisting the needs of local populations rather than imposing “modernization.” while modern science has yielded tremendous advantages, it can often be reductive, and has not been a panacea in many parts of the developing world. with growing calls for “bottom-up” rather than “top-down” development, kolawole provides a systematic argument not only for the importance of local knowledge, but for its formalization and reproduction in schools and universities. agree or disagree, this issue is has the potential to transform the practice of development. social responses to environmental degradation in northwest rural china scott moore, princeton university a. leung, university of chicago e. o’donnell, michigan state university h. travis, central washington university > note by chikara onda china’s policies constantly seem to be the object of international criticism, be it with regards to its environmental policy or its human rights record. yet, these “problems” are generally considered as separate entities; seldom is the relation between them considered. in “social responses to environmental degradation in northwest rural china”, moore et al. consider the incentive structures underlying environmental consciousness in the shanxi province of china, which is affected by desertification and groundwater depletion. this paper is a prime example of interdisciplinary research in that it brings together two issues that are often brought up with regards to china, environmental degradation and gender equality, making connections between the two, of which many may not have even thought. more specifically, it asks whether the lack of female participation in daily activities affects their ability to act upon their higher environmental awareness, if any. in answering this question, the paper ends up spanning the fields of, environment, anthropology, gender studies, agriculture, policy, and linguistics, among others. how to get beyond the zero-sum game mentality between state and non-state actors in international environmental governance dr. franz perrez, international affairs division, federal office for the environment, switzerland > note by winston christie-blick the potentially far-reaching, if not global, effects of nations’ environmental policymaking offer immediate justification for developing and maintaining effective systems of environmental governance that extend across national borders. but on the international scale, environmental policymaking can suffer in quality and legitimacy due to constraints placed on state representatives, who are necessarily disconnected from the multitude of local environmental issues on which their policies are based. moreover, the inherent pressure on state actors to protect national rather than international interests and their hesitance to sacrifice national development prospects by implementing costly environmental policies—which threaten to diminish short run economic growth in exchange for long run economic and environmental sustainability—further hinders effective international governance. such obstacles may lead to a failure of national governments to appropriately prioritize pressing environmental concerns over other matters of national importance. acknowledging this lack of political will to address critical environmental issues on the international scale, dr. franz perrez offers a unique and illuminating glimpse into the inner workings of international environmental governance, stressing the valuable role that non-state actors like non government organizations can play in international governance despite the limitations often put on their involvement. his insights into the state of today’s institutions of environmental governance culminate in an insider’s look at the unproductive, semi-competitive mentality of state and non-state representatives in certain governance processes. as dr. perrez asserts, institutions of international governance have much to gain from liberalizing the restrictive, overly formalized format of non-state actor participation and fostering authentic interaction between state and non-state actors. given the capacity of non-state actors to supply expert knowledge on localized issues, assist in implementation of policies, increase the quality of environmental governance by influencing agenda-setting, and galvanize political will as public advocates for environmental reforms, dr. perrez is surely justified in claiming that ngos ought not be overlooked as key allies in addressing critical and time-sensitive issues of global environmental degradation. field notes communicable disease surveillance and response in uganda matthew cummings, siena college > note by adriana akers matthew cummings’s field note, “communicable disease surveillance and response in uganda,” recounts the author’s work with the epidemiology and surveillance division of the uganda ministry of health in the summer of 2008. the note focuses on his travels in the eastern district of pallisa, where a cholera outbreak had occurred previous to his arrival in the country. cummings’s team found that various conditions had contributed to the outbreak and made several recommendations to control the disease. pit latrines needed to be constructed farther from water sources; communities required more supplies like soap and water purification tablets; local doctors needed further cholera-specific training. the field note also touches on unexpected resistance to already available prevention measures: cummings’s team found that the bitter taste produced by water-purifying tablets caused many to neglect to use them. cummings focuses on the role of village health teams (vhts), local residents who are trained to recognize signals of a disease outbreak as well as treat initial symptoms. his field note brings to life our academic knowledge about vhts and reminds us that supplies and access to medication are not the only important factors in communicable disease prevention and control; local knowledge and local participation are also vital. from the global to the local: how international child rights in bangladesh reach the grass roots’ level andrea schapper, university of bremen > note by adriana akers in her piece, “from the global to the local: how international children’s rights in bangladesh reach the grassroots level,” andrea schapper investigates how international and national legislation regarding child labor can be transported to local communities. the field note connects global and national legislation with two projects being conducted on the ground in bangladesh. while schapper determines that both projects are largely successful in transplanting global and national legislation to the grassroots level, she also recounts the programs’ flaws, providing us with a realistic, fleshed-out account the initiatives. the first case study is the food for education program, which provides qualifying families with a free monthly food ration if their primary-school-aged child attends school on a regular basis. schapper met with officials involved in the program as well as program participants who attend the gorad government primary school in savar upazila. the second program, prevention and elimination of selected worst forms of child labour in the informal economy in dhaka city, works to reduce the number of children who work in hazardous environments in bangladesh (the number is currently estimated to be 1.3 million). the program re-introduces younger children to the formal education system and provides a skills-based, vocational training program for older children. the initiative also provides mothers of participants with a micro credit and training to start a business. schapper met with a technical advisor for the program and mothers who received micro credits through the program. the women that she met with are now all small business owners. opinion pieces illusions of grandeur: the role of the psychosocial in a sennian approach to escaping urban poverty rochelle burgess, london school of economics > note by adriana akers in “supporting capabilities: using psychosocial concepts to guide a sennian approach to escaping urban poverty,” rochelle burgess takes a psychological approach to understanding poverty in brazil’s favelas, or informal urban slums. the piece is notable because it considers a psychosocial approach—an angle not often used in the field of sustainable development—and because it examines the phenomena of informal urban slum communities. the appearance of such communities around city peripheries has rapidly increased in recent years, most notably in the developing regions of africa, asia, and latin america. burgess’s opinion piece considers concepts developed in renowned economist amartya sen’s work development as freedom and argues that psychosocial theory can combine with sennian ideas to build and inform development programs. in particular, burgess writes that psychosocial theory can help us understand how favela residents can achieve the (political) freedoms that sen suggests can help individuals escape poverty. burgess argues that psychosocial barriers like negative social identity, negative social representations, and stigmatization toward favela residents can hinder these individuals from achieving sennian freedoms on a day-to-day basis. by considering the fields of psychology, economics, and urban studies, the piece takes an interdisciplinary approach toward understanding the case study of brazilian favelas. photo essays india’s clean water access constraints daniel bachhuber, university of oregon sustainable living by the nomads: is there development? dulguun batkhsihig, university of london’s school of oriental and african studies images and voices of change: engaging local community in assessing impact of millennium villages project in their lives in sauri village, western kenya dr. mary nyasimi, columbia university dr. joseph okang’a, cefored institute, nairobi, kenyachallenges to the conservation of river turtles (spp. podocnemis) in the peruvian amazon francisco laso, columbia university > note by madeline dangerfield-cha i’m very proud to present this collection of photo essays. the depth and insight that these four authors convey through their artistic vision and compassion is truly humbling. dr. mary nyasimi and joseph okang deepened their work at the millennium village in western kenya by turning the camera over to the villagers and asking for their stories first hand. what results is touching, surprising, and familiar. franscisco laso took his camera into the peruvian amazon in an attempt to bring largely ignored species decline to light. daniel bachhuber brings together loosely-related stories of the ganges river in india through lively images of life on its banks. dulguun batkhishig catalogues the impact of tourism on a small nomadic community by showing intimate, intricate images of their lives as they’ve been lived for hundreds of years, and the threats facing them now. this collection touches three continents. it covers city, forest, field, and river. it assesses the impact of industrial societies on natural resources, of foreign cultures on native ones, on lifestyles in danger, and on lives flourishing. it speaks to sustainable development across the world, and i am honored to present it to you today. this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution 4.0 international license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ how to cite ​​​​​​​​​​​ abstract microsoft word mbaga.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 13, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 114-129 the prospects of sustainable desert agriculture to improve food security in oman msafiri daudi mbaga department of natural resource economics, college of agricultural and marine sciences sultan qaboos university, muscat, oman msafiri@squ.edu.om abstract food security will continue to be one of the important issues occupying policy makers in the middle east and oman in particular. desert countries such as oman depend significantly on imported food commodities for food security because the desert environment is harsh in such a way that only very little food can be produced locally. as a result, oman produces only a fraction of the food it consumes, and most of the food, especially grains and red meat is imported. land and water scarcity are among the leading constraints to agricultural production such that by 2050, oman is expected to depend solely on imports to meet food security needs. this paper proposes alternative technologies and approaches that can be employed by oman under desert agriculture to help improve domestic food production and thus food security in the country. keywords: food security, desert agriculture, hydroponics, land and water saving technologies, biosalinity. 1. introduction in 2050, there will be about 9.3 billion people sharing the planet (sahara forest project, 2012), and thus the challenge of producing enough food to feed these people will be enormous. we therefore need to critically think of innovative ways to increase our food production capacity for the future. food production challenges are and will continue to be daunting especially for desert countries such as oman. even though these countries have oil and gas deposits and by extension enough financial resources to import the foods they need, it is a fact that oil and gas deposits will not be there in perpetuity—these resources will be depleted sooner or later. the food crisis of 2008/2009 also taught many countries in the gulf region a lesson that having the financial means to import food does not necessarily mean that they will to obtain it. this is because during the last food crisis, countries such as india and pakistan imposed an export embargo for rice. it is therefore important to start thinking of innovative ways to produce whatever food locally as much as possible in order to reduce food import burden (mbaga, 2013). consilience mbaga: desert agriculture in oman desert agriculture, which is the farming of crops that are well suited for arid conditions such as wild plants that are agronomically adapted to the weather in the area, is one potential solution. desert farming approaches are principally water and land saving and, as a result, have the potential to promote food production in oman. experiences from other countries such as israel and egypt shows that it is promising and possible. in egypt, for example, desert farmland is expected to grow about 40% until 2017 (reuters, 2007). the objective of this paper is to explore and present the various possibilities that are available to oman to engage in desert agriculture (economizing on water and land) so as to increase food production locally and reduce food import dependency. it is important to emphasize and make it clear at this point that desert agriculture is not easy and will not completely address food security, as water is not the only limiting factor, but also land. however, with technology we do not need plenty of naturally occurring underground water and vast tracts of fertile land to produce. desalinated water and the hydroponics technology could be used to reduce water consumption by 40-60%. this paper is organized into five sections as follows: section two looks at the current and future prospects of oman to expand domestic production without employing desert agriculture. section three highlights prospective land and water saving technologies that could be employed by oman for desert agriculture to improve food security. section four presents a case for oman to invest in desert aquaculture to improve food security. section five is the conclusion of this paper. 2. current and future prospect for oman to expand domestic production without employing desert agriculture the current and future prospects of oman to expand domestic production without employing desert agriculture are limited by land and water scarcity. with respect to water availability, which is critical to increasing local production, oman is among the countries that will face water deficits by 2050, as shown in figure 1 below. figure 1 illustrates in green the number of countries in 2050 that will face freshwater surpluses (> 1,300 cubic meter (m3) per capita per year in water for food availability over current agricultural land). in orange and red are countries facing freshwater deficits (< 1,300 cubic meter per capita per year). according to fao (2003), developing countries such as oman will require an average production of 3,000 kcal/capita/day by 2030. assuming that 20% of this is animal protein, an estimated 1,300 cubic meter per capita per year of freshwater would be needed (rockström et al., 2007). as indicated in figure 1, by 2050 oman will have between 0 and 500 cubic meters per capita per year of freshwater available, which is a serious water deficit since the amount required is 1,300 cubic meter per capita per year (fao, 2003). consilience mbaga: desert agriculture in oman figure 1: the number of countries in 2050 facing freshwater surpluses and deficits. source: falkenmark et al, (2009) from a water availability perspective therefore, oman is expected to continue being a food-importing country, as indicated in figure 2 below, unless innovative strategies are identified and harnessed to increase local production with less water. aside from water scarcity, land suitable for agriculture is also scarce in oman. arable land in oman is about 2.2 million hectares (moa, 2010) which is equivalent to 7% of the total area of oman (31.4 million hectares). the actual cropped area in the sultanate was 62,000 hectares or 2.8% of the total arable land1 and 0.2% of the total area of the country. this indicates that irrigated land in the sultanate of oman is below 1%. in this backdrop, the oman self-sufficiency ratio for important food groups as of 2008 is presented in table 1. table 1: oman self-sufficiency ratio for important food groups for 2008 food groups domestic production imports exports available for consumption selfsufficiency ratio --------------------------in thousands of tons---------------------------- cereal / grain 4.6 630.6 64.9 570.3 0.8 vegetables 141.1 163.6 27.6 277.1 50.9 fruits 327.6 155.0 18.8 463.8 70.6 red meat 13.0 92.6 2.7 102.9 12.6 chicken meat 20.9 75.6 9.2 87.3 23.9 1 due to irrigation water shortage source: falkenmark et al. (2009) and rockström et al. (2008) consilience mbaga: desert agriculture in oman eggs 10.2 13.9 4.5 19.6 52.0 milk 48.6 112.6 77.2 84.0 57.9 source: ministry of agriculture (moa), department of statistics; royal oman police, directorate general of customs table 1 show that oman is less than 1% self-sufficient in grain production. to achieve self-sufficiency from local production, oman will have to increase local grain production by 99%, which is impossible given that only 2.8% (or 62,000 ha) of total arable land is cropped. in addition, producing a ton of wheat would require 1,000 tons of water (1,000 cubic meters (m3)), and a ton of rice would require 3,400 cubic meters (tony allan, 2001), which is an amount that oman does not have. table 1 also shows that oman is 12.6% self-sufficient in red meat. to achieve full self-sufficiency from domestic production, oman needs to increase production by 82%, which is next to impossible given that 16, 000 cubic meters of water are needed to produce a ton of red meat. as highlighted herein in relation to land and water availability in oman, it is clear that the prospects of oman achieve self-sufficiency from local production are not good. land and water availability are the limiting factors. therefore investing in desert farming seems to be the way forward for oman. desert farming or desert agriculture entails among other things the use of a combination of traditional and modern waterand land-saving technologies. next, this paper attempts to highlight some of these traditional and modern waterand land saving technologies that could be adopted in oman. 3. landand water-saving technologies for the purpose of this paper, landand water-saving technologies (both traditional and modern) are those technologies that are geared towards reducing the need for land and water to produce the same amount of food. these are the key technologies that have potential to help oman increase agricultural output with the same amount of cropped land that, as we saw earlier, currently stands at 0.2% of the total area of the country. these land saving technologies include: 3.1 promoting traditional crops in order to improve food security, oman needs to promote traditional crops that are suited to arid conditions. these include traditional crops that have been growing in oman for many years such as tree crops, including dates and lime, which have both nutritional and export value (fao, 2008). oman is also endowed with traditional grain crops like wheat, barley, and chickpea for local consumption. dates have been growing in oman desert oasis for many years and therefore can be said to be very well adapted to arid weather conditions. what is needed is more research to find ways to increase food security and export potential for the benefit of the country (mbaga et al., 2011). oman farmers have been growing wheat (locally-adapted varieties) using traditional methods in areas such as the hajar mountains in rustaq for many years. table 2 and figure 3 present data on wheat production in oman between 1961 and 2009. consilience mbaga: desert agriculture in oman table 2: production quantity of wheat in oman year amount year amount year amount 1961 1,400 1977 500 1993 1,300 1962 1,400 1978 275 1994 1,325 1963 1,500 1979 150 1995 1,350 1964 1,500 1980 359 1996 1,380 1965 1,500 1981 359 1997 1,250 1966 1,700 1982 1,141 1998 770 1967 1,700 1983 1,141 1999 1,050 1968 1,850 1984 1,141 2000 1,413 1969 1,850 1985 251 2001 1,429 1970 2,000 1986 289 2002 1,421 1971 2,000 1987 369 2003 1,210 1972 2,000 1988 700 2004 1,200 1973 3,000 1989 900 2005 865 1974 3,000 1990 1,190 2006 775 1975 3,000 1991 1,200 2007 947 1976 2,000 1992 1,250 2008 1,070 2009 1,200 source: http://data.mongabay.com/commodities/category/1-pr/1-crops/15wheat/51-production+quantity/221-oman. the table data comes from the faostat database produced by the food and agriculture organization of the united nations (fao). the data is displayed with the express written permission of un/fao and was downloaded from faostat on 07/17/2011. as indicated in table 2 and figure 3, wheat production in oman reached the highest level ever recorded of 3,000 tonnes between 1973 and 1975. wheat production has since been going up and down; the most recent data available show that production was around 1,200 tonnes in 2009. consilience mbaga: desert agriculture in oman figure 3: production quantity of wheat in oman, 1961-2009. source: faostat database produced by the food and agriculture organization of the united nations (fao). the data is displayed with the express written permission of un/fao and was downloaded from faostat on 07/17/2011. wheat is one of the food commodities that oman spends a lot of financial resources on for import. the government therefore needs to put more effort towards research and extension in order to increase production and thus reduce the import burden. 3.2 hydroponic and greenhouse farming hydroponics is the agricultural technology that utilizes nutrient-laden water rather than soil for plant nourishment (bridgewood, 2003). hydroponics, combined with a controlled environment, allows farmers and growers to produce large quantities of high-quality fruits and vegetables year round. in combination with greenhouses and high technology with capital intensive inputs, hydroponics systems can be highly productive, water and land conserving, and environmentally safe. a hydroponics system is therefore both land and water saving. consilience mbaga: desert agriculture in oman for a country like oman, flooding irrigation combined with rapid evaporation from the soil surface has led to salinity problems. under such conditions, hydroponics offers a way of improving waterand land-use efficiency. therefore, the countrywide adoption of hydroponics in combination with greenhouses in oman would go a long way towards increasing agricultural output with less land and water. the ministry of agriculture (moa) has introduced a hydroponics research on different agricultural crops at the agriculture research center in rumais. the adoption of hydroponics farming in oman has already registered some promising success. for example, there is a private farm in samail, al-dakhelia region that in 2008 produced around 20,000 tons of cucumber, which was three times higher than the recorded output from the same area of land for conventional agriculture. however, more needs to be done especially with respect to the possibility of combining hydroponics and greenhouses technologies with solar energy technology. solar energy is needed during the summer season to run the air conditioning system for cooling purpose. the hydroponics and greenhouse technologies have been adopted in other countries in the region. in qatar, a half-hour drive from the centre of doha, the qatari capital, you will find the al sulaiteen agricultural and industrial complex, a luscious farm set in the middle of a dusty expanse of desert. the farm grows among other things: cherry tomato, cucumbers, capsicums, green beans, and many other fruits and vegetables. in the united arab emirates, a number of hydroponics farms have been set up in recent years, and are now starting to play a more important role in the market. similarly, saudi arabia has seen new agricultural companies emerge. emirates hydroponics farms, which in 2005 was one of the early entrants to the region’s advanced technology farming market, has now started to deliver for free for its customers in abu dhabi and the surrounding area. the company sells its produce, such as cucumbers, capsicums, strawberries and lettuces, online and at similar prices to the supermarket. emirates mushrooms is another private hydroponic farm. it is the only fully organic mushroom grower in the market so far, with a farm of 10 specially designed growing rooms that can produce 8,000 kg of mushrooms a week. last year, abu dhabi announced it was set to launch baniyas, the largest aquaponics centre in the world, a project that started with lettuces, but that was set to expand to other vegetables. aquaponics uses water that fish live in, beneath the plants, offering extra nutrients to the lettuces. it is therefore clear from the discussion above that the opportunities presented by hydroponics and greenhouse technologies to save land while increasing agricultural production are unlimited. 3.3 seawater greenhouses the seawater greenhouse technology is a low-energy means of growing food in desert regions using nearby abundant saltwater. such greenhouses built near coasts (see figure 4 below) turn plentiful seawater into fresh water for crops, without expensive desalinization plants. consilience mbaga: desert agriculture in oman figure 4: seawater greenhouse evaporates seawater into humid air for plants and then condenses it into freshwater for watering. source: http://www.popsci.com/environment/article/2009-07/8-farming-solution-helpstop-world-hunger three pilot greenhouses in tenerife, canary islands; abu dhabi, united arab emirates; and oman use prevailing winds, fans and simple evaporators to convert seawater into fresh water, and in the process create a humid environment in which just about any plant can grow. the seawater greenhouses, which cost as little as ro 2 or $5 a square foot to build, get water from the sea, either by gravity or a pump. the water trickles down honeycomb-shaped lattices on the front wall and evaporates, cooling and humidifying the air inside. the air warms as it travels across the greenhouse – hotter air can hold more moisture – before reaching a second evaporator, which supersaturates it. from there, the air moves immediately into a condenser, which pulls out freshwater and sends it to an underground storage tank for watering the plants. this is a very promising technology for oman insofar as the issue of water scarcity is concerned. more research needs to be directed towards this technology. 3.4 rainwater harvesting no matter how low the rainfall experienced in a given area, rainwater harvesting can go a long way towards relieving water needs (bruins et al., 1986). in the arid regions of tunisia for example, considerable investments have been made to capturing the scarce amount of rainwater (100–230 mm/year) for agricultural, domestic, and environmental purposes. for rainwater-harvesting to be possible, three basic landscape elements must be present: the landscape surface or soil conditions must be able to produce runoff; the landscape surface must include variations in elevation so that runoff water created during rains will flow into and be collected; and the collection areas must have adequately deep soil horizon of a suitable structure to store sufficient runoff. consilience mbaga: desert agriculture in oman harvesting rainwater can be traced back to the 9th and 10th century (grdc, 2008). perrier and salkini (1991) defined water harvesting as a watermanagement technique for growing crops in arid (desert) and semi-arid areas where rainfall is inadequate for rainfed production and where irrigation water is lacking. rainfall is collected from a modified or treated area to maximize runoff for use in a specific site such as a cultivated field, for storage in a cistern or a reservoir, or for aquifer recharge. water harvesting has been and is being practiced in many countries in the region and beyond, such as in the edom mountains in southern jordan (oweis, 1996; nasr, 1999), southern tunisia (prinz and wolfer, 1998), sudan (unep 2000), and iran (siadat (1991). in recent years, oman has experienced increased rainfall, especially in the interior, jabal akhdar, and the dhofar mountain areas. this presents an opportunity for rainwater harvesting. water harvesting is one of the desert agriculture strategies, and therefore needs to be researched and exploited for the benefit of agriculture in oman. 3.5 investing in biosalinity research approximately 97.5% of global water resources is salt water (taha and ismail, 2011). investing in biosalinity research therefore makes a lot of sense. biosalinity is the study and practice of using saline (salty) water for irrigating agricultural crops. in oman, the water available in abundant quantities is either brackish (0.5-5g/l salt) or saline (30-50g/l salt). with traditional farming practices (e.g., what is happening in batinah region) saline water results in soil salinization, rendering it unfit for raising most crop plants. the soils of batinah region have traditionally been very productive, but agricultural practices there have slowly rendered it saline and hence unproductive. currently, oman is estimated to have 320 million m3/year of usable brackish water resources. in addition to this, oman has around 25,200 hectares of potential land for biosaline agriculture (taha and ismail, 2011). biosalinity research includes studies of the biochemical and physiological mechanisms of salt tolerance in plants, and breeding and selection for salt tolerance (halotolerance). it also includes the investigation of the use of saline irrigation water to increase desirable traits (such as sugar concentration in a fruit) or to control the ripening process. furthermore, biosalinity research deals with issue related to the interaction between salinity and soil properties, and the development of naturally salt-tolerant plant species (halophytes) into useful agricultural crops. this kind of research is what we need in oman, as it will help to provide answers on how we could use the saline water that is abundantly available to us in order to increase agricultural output. some biosalinity-oriented research has already been done in oman (see for example, s.a. al-rawahy, 2010) but more needs to be done. 3.6 pink led technology—grow future food with less water consilience mbaga: desert agriculture in oman figure 5: pink led technology building with plants inside. source: http://www.greenprophet.com/2012/02/pink-leds-grow-future-food-with-90-lesswater/plantlab-purple-future-food/ pink led technology is still in the early stages of development but presents hope for the future in particular to desert countries facing water scarcity like oman. what is pink led technology? a netherlands-based company called plantlab has devised a method for growing plants indoors using an unearthly pink-purple light made by the combination of red and blue led lights instead of sunlight. plants convert light from the sun into energy through the process of photosynthesis, but plants only need some parts of the sun’s colour spectrum. blue and red leds (see figure 5) can provide just the light a plant needs, making the process more efficient while resulting in a stronger, healthier plant. the usefulness of this technology is that all the water used within the indoor environment is recycled for reuse. as a result, water is efficiently economized. furthermore, because plants are grown indoors, away from their pests, there is no need for pesticides, further reducing the costs of production. therefore, the leds technology’s climate-controlled indoor farms not only use less energy, water, and space than traditional agriculture, they also reduce the unpredictability of our food supply. nowhere is this need for carrying out agriculture with less water and land more crucial than in oman and other desert countries in the region. this pink led technology is therefore worth exploring for oman. 4. investing in desert aquaculture in oman oman has a very long coastline and active fishery sector with approximately 40,000 fishermen distributed in more than 90 fishing villages along the omani coast (al-jufaili et al., 2010). fish prices in oman have, however, been high to the point of rendering this important commodity inaccessible to low-income households. investing in desert aquaculture in oman is one possible solution for addressing the problem of fish shortage, and thus fish prices and food security. consilience mbaga: desert agriculture in oman broadly, aquaculture refers to the breeding, raising, and harvesting of plants and animals in all types of water environments, including tanks, ponds, rivers, lakes, and the ocean. therefore desert aquaculture can be defined as aquaculture activities practised in desert and arid lands characterized by low precipitation (<250 mm/year), high solar radiation, and high rates of evaporation, and subsurface and surface water. aquaculture in desert and arid lands has been growing steadily over the last decade thanks to the modern technologies and alternative energy sources that have allowed water in these places of extreme weather conditions to be exploited more effectively and more efficiently (fao, 2010). developing aquaculture in harsh environmental physical conditions, typical of deserts requires the adoption of production strategies focused on good water management, including the use of water conservation, recycling practices, and protection against strong solar radiations. aquaculture can also be integrated with agriculture and, in doing so, reduce the water requirement for the production of quality fish protein and fresh vegetable products relative to both culture systems being operated independently (mcmurtry et al., 1997). furthermore, innovative fish/vegetable co-culture systems could be developed; such systems use the nutrient by-products of fish culture as direct inputs for vegetable production, constantly recycling the same water (e.g. aquaponics). a large variety of fish species can be cultured in arid (desert) conditions like that of oman, if the technology used is conductive to species proliferation. in the selection of species to be reared in desert environments, it is recommended that they: • tolerate hyper-saline waters • have high tolerance to large temperature fluctuations • be relatively fast-growing species to face off water-limited conditions typical of these desert environments. the choice is also influenced by other factors such as the availability of farm inputs, market value and volume, local consumption and preferences, and dietary habits. currently, the most suitable fish species for water-limited aquaculture systems include the tilapias (oreochromis spp.), the barramundi or asian sea bass (lates calcarifer), carps and mullets (mugil cephalus and liza ramada), and several catfish species (clarias gariepinus and bagrus spp.). other fish species include the small brine shrimp (artemia sp.) and the unicellular green algae (dunaliella sp.). currently, australia farms and supplies over 60% of the world’s natural ß-carotene extracted from dunaliella salina, which is mainly produced in large saline evaporation ponds in south and western australia (benemann, 2008). the fao desert aquaculture production statistics shows that in 2009, egypt produced approximately 600,000 tonnes of fish in brackish water, and saudi arabia produced 17,500 tonnes of shrimp. other countries such as israel and algeria are producing substantial amounts of fish in marine and brackish waters. the reviewed information above suggests that it is worth it for oman to explore investing in research to establish desert aquaculture. such an undertaking will go a long way towards solving food security problems, as well as, creating jobs for oman’s people. 5. conclusion consilience mbaga: desert agriculture in oman with land and water scarcity seriously limiting agricultural production in oman, as well as in other gcc countries, increasing agricultural production through expansion is not feasible. a sustainable marginal increase in agricultural production might be achievable through improvements in land and water productivity. this paper looks at the prospects of desert agriculture to improve food security in oman. landand water-saving approaches and technologies have been proposed. these include: hydroponics and greenhouse farming powered by solar power, traditional crops adapted to oman’s weather and the environment, seawater greenhouses that turns seawater into fresh water for crops, rainwater harvesting to recharge aquifers, investments in biosalinity research, pink led technology to grow food with less water and land, and lastly investments in desert aquaculture. consilience mbaga: desert agriculture in oman bibliography al–jufaili, s. m., hermosa g., al–shuaily s. s. & al–mujaini, a., 2010. oman fish biodiversity. journal of king ardul aziz university, marine science, 21: 3–51 benemann, j.r. 2008. opportunities and challenges in algae biofuels production. 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(2011). case studies of successful applications of biosaline agriculture in mena region. international center for biosaline agriculture, dubai, uae. available at: http://www.arabwatercouncil.org/awf/downloads/sessions/topic2/p2-1faisal_case-studies.pdf tony allan. 2001. virtual water—economically invisible and politically silent—a way to solve strategic water problems. international water and irrigation, vol. 21, no. 4 consilience mbaga: desert agriculture in oman unep. 2000. sourcebook of alternative technologies for freshwater augmentation in west asia (available at http://www.unep.or.jp). consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 6, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 113–132 the two-sector economic problem of persistent organic pollution and baltic sea salmon fisheries barbara hutniczak department of environmental and business economics university of southern denmark, esbjerg, denmark bashia@op.pl lone grønbæk kronbak department of environmental and business economics university of southern denmark, esbjerg, denmark lg@sam.sdu.dk abstract the paper describes the general nature of two-sector environmental and natural resource problems and highlights the issue of two sector models where one sector imposes a one-sided negative externality on the other sector, e.g. the polluting sector causes changes in the economic value of the fishery sector. the paper sets up a general social planner model and demonstrates it in simple functional form, using the problem of persistent organic pollution in the baltic sea and its effects on the regulation and economic value of the baltic salmon. the paper illustrates how a modified golden rule can be used to describe the optimal link between the two sectors. lay-person’s abstract the problem of persistent organic pollution (pops) in the baltic sea has been widely studied by biologists and chemists, however the economic impacts of the pollution have not been sufficiently examined. this paper explores possibilities for sustainable development which accommodate both the fishery and industrial sectors. it focuses on the baltic sea salmon fishery and the effects on its value resulting from different pollution levels. the paper aims to find balance and an optimal link between sectors. author’s note barbara hutniczak is a student in the masters programme in environmental and resource management at the university of southern denmark, esbjerg, graduating in june 2011. she is working as a research assistant department of environmental and business economics at the university of southern denmark. her research interest is bioeconomic modelling of fish resources. lone grønbæk kronbak is associate professor at the department of environmental and business economics at the university of southern denmark. she earned a ph.d. in economics from the university of southern denmark in 2004 and a postgraduate certificate program in agricultural and resource economics from the department of agricultural and resource economics, university of california, usa, 2001. keywords: two-sector model, baltic salmon, persistent pollution, integrated modelling 114 consilience 1. introduction problems in the management of marine resources are often treated in a one-dimensional way, while they are actually affected by other economic sectors. one example is agriculture, where run-off causes eutrophication, and thereby a decrease in stocks and changes in fishery conditions. a similar problem occurs with persistent organic pollution (pop) where industrial emissions lead to the presence of pollutants in water. to handle externalities linking different economic sectors, a social planner must adapt a broader modelling tool which considers both sectors at once. this paper focuses on the application of a two-sector model to pollution problems in fisheries, as there is a common agreement that fisheries should not be analysed in isolation from other economic sectors (neiland and béné, 2004). presented here is a dynamic two-sector bio-economic model which incorporates both fisheries and the dioxin polluting sector. following lane and stephenson’s (1995) suggestion of an integrated approach in fisheries management, this model shows the complexity of marine environmental systems and the interconnections between various factors. the aim is to use a dynamic maximisation approach for reaching the maximised present value of net benefits, which in this case is the sum of utilities from both sectors. the model uses the fundamental equation of renewable resource management, called the 'golden rule', which describes the balance between the benefits of current exploitation and future profits from unharvested stock growth. the results suggest an efficient management policy under open-access conditions in this case, where integrated modelling of two sectors allows a broader and more realistic view which may be more useful in practical applications. the paper with the closest link to the model presented here is a study by murillas-muza (2003). the author introduces two separate economic sectors, which exploit the sea either as a fish source or a sink for contaminants. the joint bioeconomic model shows that it is possible to reach a steady state by applying a modified golden rule designed to consider fisheries influenced by other sectors. the bioeconomic model developed in this paper offers an extended illustration by introducing a time delay in the model and in the functional forms applied. another difference is that while the base model assumes that there is only a stationary state while pollution is eliminated, the model in this paper includes pollution in the function of price continuously. the results differ as well, as murillas-muza predict exhaustion of the fish resource together with pollution increase, while this study predicts an increase in fish stocks, but a degradation of value. the focus in this model is on the population of salmon (salmo salar,) in the baltic sea within the danish fishery area. the aim is to explore the linkages between pollution release into the sea and the dynamics of the fishery, as well as economic damages triggered by it. the specific focus is dioxin contamination, which is negatively affecting the environment for a substantial period of time. in general, this project will focus on two major issues in environmental economics, the regulation of pollution activities and the valuation of environmental amenities and services (cropper and oates, 1992). consilience hutniczak: baltic sea salmon following an introduction on the baltic sea and its contamination with pops, a general two-sector bioeconomic model is introduced and discussed. the consequences are then illustrated by applying the model to an example with offset in the baltic sea. the paper ends with a summary and conclusions. 116 consilience 2. background of pops existence in the baltic sea the baltic sea covers an area of 374 000 km,2 with a drainage area about four times greater (glasby and szefer, 1998). this is a catchment area inhabited by 85 million people,1 with well-developed industry and agriculture (glasby and szefer, 1998). pollution comes from three main sources: river inflow, direct discharge from the land and atmospheric input. overall pollution levels are high, causing effects like eutrophication (szlinder-richert et al., 2009a). the late 1960s brought deep concern about the deterioration of water quality and biota and resulted in the convention on the protection of the marine environment of the baltic sea in helsinki in 1974. all the baltic countries signed, starting a monitoring programme and periodic assessments of environmental conditions (sheppard, 2000). a narrow connection to the north sea via kattegat and an inlet of the belt sea and sound (sheppard, 2000) with a slow water exchange rate of 22 years (mackenzie et al., 2004) makes the baltic sea water reservoir very vulnerable to pollutant accumulation. the rapid growth of this problem can be used as an indicator of what may happen to other seas in the near future. this study focuses on substances with dioxin-like toxicity, including polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins (pcdds), polychlorinated dibenzofurans (pcdfs) and dioxin-like polichlorinated biphenyls (dl-pcbs). there are 75 possible pcdd congeners with 7 toxic, 135 possible pcdfs with 10 toxic and 209 pcbs with 12 toxic (nora, 2003). in total there are 29 substances which are here referred to as dioxins. high levels of dioxin contamination are present in the baltic sea (karl et al., 2010). they are by-products of various processes, originating from chemical, paper and metal industries, incineration of waste (both municipal and hazardous), burning fossil fuels and transportation. the high current concentrations are largely a result of emissions from the pulp and paper industry, which used chlorine for bleaching until the early 1990s (helcom, 2004). the main release route is emission into the air, which makes it difficult to trace the exact source and allows pollutants to be transported over great distances and spread all over the baltic sea. these emissions are called non-point pollution, (npp) because of their diffuse nature with no specific discharge point, hampering source localisation, following segerson (1988). dioxins, because of their very low solubility in water, settle in sediments. sediments are the major aggregation of dioxins in the aquatic environment (kitamura et al., 2009). concentration in the baltic sea is around 500-1500 ng/kg dry weight, which corresponds to 10-30 ng who-teq/kg dry weight (dioxin toxicity equivalence) (helcom, 2004). disintegration of dioxins in the baltic sea is very slow and uncertain, and half-life is estimated to be between 20 and 275 years (helcom, 2004). dioxins, re-suspended in the sediment, can re-enter the aquatic environment when natural disturbances occur, such as waves or water 1 countries bordering with the sea: denmark, estonia, finland, germany, latvia, lithuania, poland, russia, sweden; and in the drainage basin: belarus, czech republic, norway, slovakia, ukraine consilience hutniczak: baltic sea salmon flow (kitamura et al., 2009). as a fat-soluble substance, these also have a tendency to accumulate in the food chain when they are suspended in the water column. this leads to high dioxin concentrations in commercially important fatty fish species like herring, sprat and salmon (karl et al., 2010). the main management tool of baltic sea fisheries is the total allowable catch (tac) assigned for each fish stock under ices auspices. the quotas are divided between member countries. apart from that, other regulatory policies apply, including pollution concentration level control (sheppard, 2000). because of potential harmful impact caused by exposure to dioxins, the european commission (ec) has indicated a maximum acceptable level of these substances in food products. recent regulations from november 2006 allow concentration in muscle meat of fish and fishery products of 4 pg who-pcdd/pcdf-teq /g fresh weight (fw) and to 8 pg who-teq /g fw for the sum of whopcdd/pcdf-teq and whopcb-teq (who-teq) (european commission, 2006). salmon (salmo salar) is an diadromous fish, living in the sea and breeding in fresh waters. in the sea it usually lives a migratory, solitary life in pelagic waters. spawning migration into fresh, native waters occurs between june and november. that is the time when fat resources are converted into energy and sexual products. spawning takes place in late autumn in clean, cool streams with gravelly and stony bottoms at a depth of 0.5-3m. due to this process salmon lose 60-70% of their weight, and mostly don't survive the spawning (european commission, 2009). eggs hatch into larvae between april and may and stay in fresh waters for 1 to 6 years, reaching the stadium smolt. after migration to the sea, a rapid growth is documented, reaching 1.5-3.5 kg in the first year, 4-8 kg in the second and 8-13 kg in the third (muus et al., 1999). because of positive correlation between dioxin concentration and size (sea age) of salmon (larsson et al., 1996; persson et al., 2007), the maximum allowable pollution level is exceed by salmon with sea age of 2-3 years (ices, 2009). furthermore, the baltic sea salmon shows a significant overlap in pop content compared with european fishing waters (karl and ruoff, 2008). 118 consilience 3. methods and methodology in this section a dynamic two-sector bio-economic model of the baltic sea salmon fishery in discrete time is developed. the theoretical background is based on conrad (1999) who describes fishery and polluting sectors separately. the constrained optimisation problem is solved using a mean of lagrange multipliers. 3.1. benefit functions the model aims to maximise the sum of benefits originating from both sectors jointly. the benefits from the fishery sector can be described by the following equation (1), which is the function of stock, harvest rate and pollution. ( )tttt phx ,,ππ = (1) π: benefits from the fishery x: fish resource stock ht: harvest rate at time t, where ];0[ maxhh ∈ , hmax is maximum harvest capacity p: pollution (here dioxin) level the benefit function first derivatives are: 0/ <tt pδδ π , 0/ >tt hδδ π , 0/ >tt xδδ π . here, the typical fishery benefit function is extended with the pollution externality, whose ambient level is treated as a non-point pollution (npp) (segerson, 1988). defining it this way is indicating the observable combined effect of all individual polluters from other economic activities (description below). the value is the stock of dioxins stored ahead of time t. the benefits from the other economic activities are defined as the utility function: ( )tt yuu = (2) where u'>0 and u''<0. utility is an argument of social welfare which is increasing with consumption of good y. here consumption is associated with production in other economic activities, which is the sum of individual utilities gained by each production activity. those, however, produce pollution, affecting the profit from the fishery sector. this is the link interconnecting both sectors. 3.2. salmon fishery sector the evolution of the salmon stock in the steady state variable is described by the equation (3). ( ) tttt hxfxx −=−+ 1 (3) consilience hutniczak: baltic sea salmon f (x): biomass growth function here, the biomass net growth function is assumed to follow the commonly accepted schaefer's logistic function. in this type of growth curve, the growth is at first slow, but then accelerates, slowing down afterwards due to environmental constraints (carrying capacity). it presents evolution from period to period of the stock and depends on the stock of the resource and the harvest function. 3.3. polluting sector the polluting sector is represented by other economic activities. other economic activities in this context are defined as all actions contributing to the overall stock of dioxins stored in the sediments. the change in the stock is (yt-τ) reduced by g(pt), which is a decay function describing the self-cleaning effect of the ecosystem. compared to other models in the literature (conrad, 1999; murillas-maza, 2003), the contribution to the equation is τ, which is the lag from the pollution occurrence until it is problematic for the fishery, assumed to be constant. the evolution of the pollution stock originating from other economic activities is described by equation (4). ( )tttt pgypp −=− −+ τ1 (4) y – pollution production by other economic activities g self-cleaning effect of the ecosystem, where g’≥0 and g''≤0 3.4. social planner optimisation the social planner (4) maximizes the present value of net benefits from both sector over a fixed time horizon t, where β is the weight on the fishery sector and (1β) is the weight on the other economic activities sector determined by the social planner. this is a two sector model, with two state variable, xt, pt and two control variables, the pollution from the other economic activities (pollution flow), yt, and the harvest in the fishery, ht. the full optimisation problem is described in (5) with the resource constraints in (5a) and (5b). ( ) ( ) ( )( )∑ −+ t tttt t yh yuphxmax tt 0, 1,, ββ πρ (5) subject to: ( ) tttt hxfxx −=−+ 1 (5a) ( )tttt pgypp −=− −+ τ1 (5b) 0x given 0p given 120 consilience in order to find the steady state and describe the properties of the system, the lagrangian is defined (6). ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ }∑ = +−+++ −−++−−++−+= t t tttttttttttttt t ppgypxhxfxyuphxl 0 11111,, τρ µρ λββ πρ (6) the costate variables λ and μ are shadow prices; λ indicating the marginal value of an incremental increase in xt in period t and μ indicating the shadow price on the pollution in pt in period t. here ρ is a discount factor (ρ=1/(1+δ)) with discount rate denoted by δ. the rate of discount is assumed to be constant. 3.5. dynamic efficiency and steady state solving the lagrangian for steady state ensures all the variables reaching constant value. this requires resource growth equal to harvest, as well as polluting level equal to environmental self-cleaning rate. lastly, the implicit equations imply the modified version of golden rule for both sectors separately (7a) and (7b) and integrated one (8). the time subscript is omitted in the steadystate. therefore, time lag included in the first-order partial derivatives disappears further on. salmon fishery sector polluting sector (7a) )/)(( )/)(()(' h xxf ∂•∂ ∂•∂+= π πβδ (7b) )/)()(1( )/)(()(' yu ppg ∂•∂− ∂•∂−−= β πβδ )/)()(1( )/)(()(' )/)(( )/)(()(' yu ppg h xxf ∂•∂− ∂•∂−−= ∂•∂ ∂•∂+= β πβ π πβδ (8) the right side of equation (7a) is defined as “resource internal rate of return” (conrad, 1999) where the sum of the marginal net growth rate and marginal value of the stock with weight of the sector in relation to marginal value of harvest is equal to the discount rate. in case where β is approaching 1, the equation is traditional golden rule. on the other hand, when β is close to zero, the discount rate equals internal growth rate. in (7b), the right side of the equation is the sum of marginal rate of environmental self-cleaning (where the minus in front indicates that the function is describing the reduction of state variable p) and marginal loss in fishery sector due to pollution stock (with weight of matching sector) in relation to marginal value of pollution flow with weight of other economic activities sector. it is equal to the discount rate as well. the fishery sectors appear here as the polluting sector is affecting the benefits from the fishery (as described in (1)). both (7a) and (7b) lead to the integrated equation (8). according to conrad (1999) the discount rate here can be interpreted as an alternative use or a return from the investment in the economy elsewhere. therefore, in the steady state, the investments in both sectors should be equal as is confirmed in (8). consilience hutniczak: baltic sea salmon 4. the example of pops and the baltic salmon 4.1. danish salmon fishery the danish salmon fleet is a typical open sea fishery. the harvest takes place in the cold months, in water below 10ºc, and when garfish is not active. danish catches mostly cover the area surrounding bornholm island because of the small size of vessels which cannot operate in the open sea. the commercial fishing fleet’s dominant method is longline fishing, especially after a ban was enforced on driftnet fisheries in 2007 (fg&fri, 2009). there are regulations on the maximum weight, and salmon with a weight below 2 kg (gutted weight) can be marketed without restrictions, between 2 and 5.5 kg after deep skinning and trimming, and above 5.5 kg can be sold only outside the european union. regulations concerning the dioxin levels which increase with weight have caused a significant drop in the number of fish caught in recent years. furthermore, they have led to the targeting of specific marketable sizes, and the available data shows that most (99.5% in 2007, 98% in 2008) of danish catches are in a weight range indicating a maximum sea age of two years (ices, 2009). this paper aims to evaluate the economic perspectives of food quality when persistent pollution is present, as fish consumption is a commonly known source of human dioxin intake. an average intake in the european union is estimated to be 13.3-14.7 pg who-teq/kg bodyweight (bw) (danish ministry of food, agriculture and fisheries, 2003), where the tolerable weekly intake (twi) is 14 pg who-teq/kg bw (helcom, 2004). exceeding the twi may result in carcinogenic risk, hormone disturbance or congenital malformation (helcom, 2004). according to surveys from previous years concerning dioxin levels (szlinder-richert et al., 2009b; isosaari et al., 2006), the ec limits in fatty tissues of salmon were exceeded in the years 2003-2005. this extremely high content of dioxin caused a closure of the salmon fishery (danish ministry of food, agriculture and fisheries, 2004). 4.2. a simulation example of the model applied to the case of pops in the baltic salmon this section sets up an example of how the fishery affected by a stock pollutant originating from another economic sector can be modelled. the example simulates the dioxin pollution in the baltic sea and how it affects the price of salmon from the area. as described in the methods section, a full bio-economic model of the selected case is extremely complex (see also ices (2009)) and beyond the scope of this paper. therefore, the following paragraph demonstrates a simple, illustrative example, where functional forms of functions based on conrad (1999) are employed. the model uses steady-state calculations adjusted to this particular example and chooses coefficients to draw the graphs. the biological growth function is based on traditional logistic growth and a schaefer production function. costs of harvesting are assumed constant marginally. thus, the fishery sector functional forms are (9-11). 122 consilience ( )      −= k xrxxf t tt 1 (9) ( ) ttttt eqxexh =, (10) ( ) ttttttt cehpmphx −= )(,,π (11) where: r – intrinsic growth rate, where r > 0 k – environmental carrying capacity, where k > 0 q – catchability coefficient, where q > 0 e effort input to the fishery m – price per unit, where m > 0 m(pt)=m0(1-pt), where >∈ < 1;0p c – cost per unit, where c > 0 what distinguishes the model from the traditional gordon-schaefer model is the price of the harvest, which is linked to the other economic sector. the price (m) is given exogenously and is a relative measure of pollution assumed to decrease linearly together with increasing pollution levels measured as a fraction, starting from the maximum price indicated by m0. the price reaches zero when p=1, when the fish is not tradable due to dioxin restrictions. to relate to the actual example the price can be determined by the average price. more pollution likely results in more fish exceeding the threshold and therefore the average price decreases with pollution. the functions above allow us to rewrite the benefit function: ( )     −=−=−= t tt t t ttttttttt qx cpmh qx chhpmcehpmphx )()()(,,π (12) for the steady-state calculations the 'golden rule', modified for this particular two-sector example, is required (8). the time subscript is therefore omitted, as the variables in steady-state adopt the constant values. the only variable remains the pollution. derivatives from equations (12) and (9) substituted to the modified version of golden rule for salmon fishery sector (7a) yields (13). ( )cqxpmx ch k xr t − +     −= )( 21 βδ (13) by solving (13) for harvest, (14) is obtained. consilience hutniczak: baltic sea salmon ( ) c cqxpmx k xr xh t β δ φ −           −− == )(21 )( (14) )(xφ depends on the entire set of bio-economic parameters, as well as the share of the fishing sector. thus, changes imply shifts in stock-harvest space. the optimum can be achieved when harvest is equal to growth. that is why h in (14) is substituted with (9). it yields (15) and when solving for x, (16). c cmqxx k xr k xrx β δ )(21 1 −         −− =     − (15)              +− − +    −+ − −+−+ − −= βδδβδβ 1 )1( 81 )1( )2(1 )1( )2( 4 )( 0 2 00 rqrpkm c rqrpkm rc rqrpkm rckpx ttt t (16) this equation shows changes in the stock with any change in all bioeconomic parameters and is as such a reaction function of the optimal biomass level to different levels of pollution. polluting sector functional forms are (17-18). tt ppg γ=)( (17) )ln()( yyu = (18) γ – degradation coefficient, where γ > 0 derivatives from the rewritten benefit function (12) and decay function (17) substituted to the modified version of golden rule for polluting sector (7b) yields (19). β βγ β βγ β πβδ − +−= − −−= ∂•∂− ∂•∂−−= 11)1( )(' )/)()(1( )/)(()(' 0yhm y phm yu ppg (19) by solving (19) for y, (20) is obtained. 0 )1)(( hm y β βγδ −+= (20) this is the reaction function of the economic activities to a different level of harvest. the level of economic activity decreases with the relative importance of the fishing sector. the activities in this sector decrease with increasing β-values and the activities of the other economic sector decrease with increase in the maximum revenue (hm0) in the fishing sector. the polluting sector optimum can be achieved when the polluting process is equal to self-cleaning of the environment. that is why y in (20) is substituted with (17). it yields (21) and when solving for p, (22). 124 consilience 0 )1)(( hm p β βγδγ −+= (21) γβ βγδ 0 * )1)(( hm p −+= (22) in order to identify trends in solved equations, numbers for coefficients were selected. those are presented in table 1. k c m0 r δ 1 0,001 1 0,01 0,03 table 1: numbers for coefficients. 4.3. results the results of the model highlight the effects of two-sector profit maximisation on the fishery sector. as presented in fig. 1, the steady state stock level is increasing exponentially with the increasing amount of pollution. for lower levels of pollution, the importance of the fishing sector relative to other economic activity, e.g. the β-parameter, is of greater importance. for a large importance of this fishing sector, e.g. βparameter close to 1, the stock level is higher. the differences between the stock levels for different β-values become smaller with higher pollution level. furthermore, when there is more pollution, the stock gets closer to the threshold, where it is reaching carrying capacity (x* = 1 = k) and is no longer harvested. the calculated threshold value for assumed coefficients is p=0.874. the threshold is illustrated with the dotted line in figure 1. thus, high pollution implies closure of the fishing sector. investigating the harvest rate in steady-state for different pollution levels (fig. 2), the initial slight increase is noticeable. this is associated with increasing stock size. however, the subsequent rise of contamination reduces the harvest due to the fall in the catch value, making harvest less profitable. to prove this, the profit was calculated for different β levels according to pollution level (fig. 3). profits from the fishery sector demonstrate a falling trend with pollution increase. the significant differences in harvest rates and consequential profits between different β levels are connected with the degree of polluting sector importance. its bigger share implies a lower incentive to preserve the stock as the potential future benefits are decreasing and it is economically more viable to harvest at faster pace. values of pollution, where profit reaches 0.001, which is equal to the fishing cost, are presented in table 2. below it, there is no positive revenue from fishery sector. β 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 p 0.930 0.940 0.944 0.947 table 2: pollution levels for different fishery sector share where profit π = 0.001 = c. consilience hutniczak: baltic sea salmon the exact shape of the figure is dependent on the chosen parameter values. changing coefficients creates differences in model results, of which the most interesting ones are described. increasing the cost of fishing (c) causes an increase in fish stock, and carrying capacity is reached within lower level of pollution, thus the pollution threshold becomes lower. increase in the catchability coefficient (q) makes stock level lower. further, this lack of efficiency in the sector will imply straightforward impact of pollution, as the increase in stock effect would not make significant impact in general. increase in intrinsic growth rate (r) decrease stock level and changes of r to around 0.1 provides the set of numbers not reaching carrying capacity. it also implies lower profits from the sector. furthermore, rise of discount factor (δ) causes an increase of the profits from fishing sector for each β level. figure 1: steady state stock rate in function of pollution for different β levels. 0,000 0,100 0,200 0,300 0,400 0,500 0,600 0,700 0,800 0,900 1,000 0,000 0,100 0,200 0,300 0,400 0,500 0,600 0,700 0,800 0,900 1,000 x* /β=0 x* /β=0,25 x* /β=0,5 x* /β=0,75 x* /β=1 threshold p x* 126 consilience figure 2: steady-state harvest rate as a function of pollution. figure 3: profit from fishery for different pollution level and fishery sector share. 0,000 0,100 0,200 0,300 0,400 0,500 0,600 0,700 0,800 0,900 1,000 0,00 0,50 1,00 1,50 2,00 2,50 profit β=0,25 profit β=0,5 profit β=0,75 profit β=1 p pr of it 0,000 0,100 0,200 0,300 0,400 0,500 0,600 0,700 0,800 0,900 1,000 0,00 0,50 1,00 1,50 2,00 2,50 3,00 h β=0,25 h β=0,5 h β=0,75 h β=1 p h= f( x* ) consilience hutniczak: baltic sea salmon 5. conclusion this study aims to highlight the importance of combined models for pollution and fisheries. dioxins, as persistent substances, once released into the water affect the environment for a prolonged period of time. the underlined consequences for the fishery sector show high complexity concerning the stock level and its value, with the possibility of reaching the state where it is not worth fishing. the model shows that the value decrease may reach the state where it is lower than fishing costs. undoubtedly, progress in other industry sectors is necessary as well, and development must continue. however, development must be conducted in a sustainable fashion. in order to sustain the fishery, it must be managed so that current and future needs are balanced. the optimal rate of emission would have to be kept on a level where the benefit from marginal discharge is equal to forgone benefits from the fishery sector. furthermore, in a competitive market where sector switches are possible, it would be expected that contamination and falling fishery value would lead to a noticeable transition between sectors. a bigger share of other economic activities could cause an even faster pace of pollution, a self-triggering process leading to environmental degradation and preventing environmental self-cleaning adequate to maintain the health of the ecosystem. therefore, it becomes probable that the pollution threshold causing total closure of the fishery sector may be reached. identification and mapping of the dioxin in the baltic sea has been conducted (jensen, 2003), but the work covered a geographical, chemical and biological approach. the economic angle, including the challenge of fisheries regulation, is a new area for research (lindebo, 2004) which adds a significant contribution to the literature. the analysis has important policy implications and suggests some critical directions for future research. it shows that no intervention may lead to degradation of the environment and that proper action should be taken. however, there are also some areas in the research to be extended. this paper only seeks to find the social planner optimum. the analysis is also constrained in several areas. there are numerous simplifying assumptions made to allow the model to serve its purpose. the social planner findings are based on the steady state analysis only. the paths forward, and therefore the time lag implications, are omitted. also, there is a big assumption concerning the chosen coefficients, whose values may vary greatly from reality. in the future, it might be necessary to look for consequences in different management regimes (suboptimal outcomes), comparing competition or open access among the exploiters of the fish resource, competition among different countries in polluting economic activities or perhaps linking fisheries to a broader ecosystem management approach. 128 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(1999). resource economics. cambridge university press, new york. cropper, m.l., w.e. oates. (1992). environmental economics; a survey. journal of economic literature. 30 (2): 675-740. danish ministry of food, agriculture and fisheries. (2003). statusredegørelse for indsatsen mod dioxiner. ministeriet for fødevarer, landbrug og fiskeri, miljøministeriet. [document available in danish] danish ministry of food, agriculture and fisheries. (2004). bekendtgørelse mod forbud om fiskeri og fangst af laks i østersøen og forbud mod salg af laks, der er fisket eller fanget i østersøen. bekendtgørelse nr. 0 af 6 april 2004. [document available in danish] european commission. (2006). commission regulation (ec) no 199/2006 of 3. february 2006 amending regulation (ec) no 466/2001 setting maximum levels for certain contaminants in foodstuffs as regards dioxins and dioxin-like pcbs. official journal of the european union l32: 34– 38. european commission. (2009). consultation paper to support development of a baltic salmon management plan. brussels, 13.02.2009. fg&fri. (2009). data analysis to support the development of a baltic sea salmon action plan; annex 1: baltic sea salmon fisheries and results of the socio-economic impact assessment. finnish game and fisheries research institute, helsinki. glasby, g. p., p. szefer. (1998). marine pollution in gdansk bay, puck bay and the vistula lagoon, poland: an overview. sci. total environ. 212: 49–57. helcom. (2004). dioxins in the baltic sea. helsinki commission, helsinki. ices. (2008). assessment and advice. ices advice 2008, book 8. ices. (2009). ices wgbast report 2009: report of the baltic salmon and trout. assessment working group (wgbast). 24–31 march 2009, oulu, finland. isosaari, p., a. hallikainen, h. kiviranta, p.j. vuorinen, r. parmanne, j. koistinen, t. vartiainen. 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(1999). sea fish. scandinavian fishing year book. hedehusene, isbn 87090787-00-5. neiland, a.e., c. béné. (2004). poverty and small-scale fisheries in west africa. kluwer academic publisher, fao, rome. nora. (2003). dioxin and pcbs in four commercially important pelagic fish stocks in the north east atlantic. nordisk atlantsamarbejde, <www.hfs.fo>, (accessed march 31, 2011). persson, m.e., p. larsson, n. holmqvist, p. stenroth. (2007). large variation in lipid content, sigma pcb and delta c-13 within individual atlantic salmon (salmo salar). environmental pollution. 145: 131–137. segerson, k. (1988). uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control. journal of environmental economics and management. 15: 87-98. sheppard, c.r.c. (2000). seas of the millennium: an environmental evaluation; volume i regional chapters: europe, the americas and west africa. pergamon, oxford: 99-120. szlinder-richter, j., i. barska, j. mazerski, z. usydus. (2009a). pcbs in fish from the southern baltic sea: levels, bioaccumulation features and temporal trends during the period from 1997 to 2006. marine polllution bulletin. 58: 85-92. 130 consilience szlinder-richter, j., i.barska,z. usydus, w. ruczyńska, r. grabic. (2009b). investigation of pcdd/fs and dl-pcbs in fish from the southern baltic sea during the 2002-2006 period. chemosphere. 74: 1509-1515. 1. introduction 2. background of pops existence in the baltic sea 3. methods and methodology 3.1. benefit functions 3.2. salmon fishery sector 3.3. polluting sector 3.4. social planner optimisation 3.5. dynamic efficiency and steady state 4. the example of pops and the baltic salmon 4.1. danish salmon fishery 4.2. a simulation example of the model applied to the case of pops in the baltic salmon 5. conclusion bibliography consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 6, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 291-319 her hands: images of craftswomen in uganda, bolivia and india shaina shealy elliott school of international affairs george washington university, washington d.c. shainashealy@gmail.com abstract throughout the world, women employ their craft skills to contribute to their economies and gain financial independence. this photo essay exhibits craftswomen in bolivia, uganda and india, and reflects on the economic and social benefits they reap as a consequence of the art they produce. the featured photos examine art production by women as a catalyst of economic development, women's social and financial empowerment and independence, and positive social change within economically lesser-developed communities. author’s note shaina graduated from george washington university in 2010 with a degree in fine arts and international affairs. after graduation, shaina moved to kutch, india to work for one year at a grassroots women’s empowerment ngo as a world partners fellows, through the american jewish world service. she is working on expanding promotional materials for the organization’s handicraft initiative. she is from birmingham, al. keywords: women’s empowerment, handicrafts, uganda, bolivia, india, kutch. 1. introduction these photos exhibit women who contribute to social change within their country’s developing economies through art production. working with craftswomen in bolivia, uganda and india, i witnessed the powerful impact of art on both the support of cultural traditions and the promotion of new industry in developing countries. i saw the economic and social benefits the artists reaped as a consequence of the art they produced. they found their voices in their art. but the ultimate gift of self-sufficiency was obtained as a result of being a part of a supporting organization that offered skills training, design consultancy, support groups, and/or basic security for its participants, in addition to a forum for the production of art. the featured photos examine art production by women as a catalyst of economic development, women's social and financial empowerment and independence, and positive social change within economically lesser-developed communities. 292 consilience 2. photos 2.1 kampala, uganda photo 1. women stand hip-to-hip on the grass lawn in front of the beadforlife center in kampala, uganda. they are learning how to make school chalk with simple, cheap ingredients during a skills-training session sponsored by beadforlife. hands begin to shoot up as the lesson shifts into a discussion about marketing strategies. as they focus their attention to lessons about entrepreneurship, some women eagerly take notes while others keep their hands busy rolling beads. consilience shealy: her hands photo 2 and 3. beadforlife is poverty eradication program in kampala, uganda. leaders recruit vulnerable women and train them to make beads from recycled paper. the women join the beadforlife program for two years during which they create and sell beads to initiate income generation. as participants, women learn how to manage money, open savings accounts and develop entrepreneurial skills. 294 consilience photo 4 and 5. cissy, a woman in her mid forties, smiles widely and talks fast, “i had no hope in life, but when i came to beadforlife, now i have hope. ever since i was born, i had never opened up any account in any bank, but when i came to bead for life i have opened an account and after 6 months i am sure i am getting my own house. and my children are going to school and even the feeding is good. i have future plans and i have living hope.” cissy’s beads are distinguished from the others by her unusual blend of colored paper and tightly rolled pieces. consilience shealy: her hands 296 consilience photo 6, 7 and 8. “when we want to go somewhere and we don’t have a boat, beadforlife is like a boat. we are stuck somewhere and i know some of us, if it is not the grace of god, some of us we would have died, because so many of us are living positive [with hiv/aids]. and positive living means money. and how can you gain money? when we are working, they separate us by ignoring us. when you become sick once, they send you away” – sophie, beadforlife participant, 37 years old. consilience shealy: her hands 298 consilience photo 9, 10 and 11. “ in uganda, many women, when they fail to make money, they go and smoke the wind pipe to charm men to give them money. but, i tell them that you can roll such a single paper and get money out of it.” -– cissy , bfl photo 12. consilience shealy: her hands 2.2 gulu, uganda photo 13. in 2008, one mango tree consisted of a handful of women pumping manual sewing machines in a stall hidden deep within the crowded market of gulu’s center. the tailors sat among heaps of fabric, giggling as they transformed bold east african prints into lunch bags and clutches. 300 consilience photo 14. now, one mango tree has its own building in the outskirts of gulu and the tailors sew on updated machines. it has impacted over 65 women tailors, most of whom have been displaced from the 20 years of civil war northern uganda faced with the lords resistance army. consilience shealy: her hands photo 15 and 16. the tailoring tradition of northern uganda is apparent by the manual sewing machines and bright east african textiles that clutter gulu’s central market. with one mango tree’s influence, these tailors have shifted their traditional designs as yards of bold prints are stitched into skinny yoga bags. 302 consilience “the war in northern uganda has spoiled everything… all the people are frustrated. people can plan to do bad things instead of good things. that is why i have the interest. i have the skill, though i’m not highly educated, but i have also the interest of helping others.” -lucy, head-tailor at one mango tree photo 17. lucy recognizes the importance of employing vulnerable women in northern uganda. she told me that “in this area of uganda, if a woman does not have an income, she is not far from dying.” lucy works to help women gain skills to generate an independent income. consilience shealy: her hands 2.3 tiquipaya, bolivia photo 18. two jet-black braids fall against carlota’s back as she sits on the floor, grasping bright colors of yarn with her big toes. carlota weaves with her whole body, each tendon part of a unified machine that makes it look easy. when i asked carlota what she would do if she could do anything, she casually responded, “i am always going to make weavings.” carlota is the care-taker and weaving instructor at kusi kuma – a montessori style school situated among the eucalyptus trees of tiquipaya, outside of cochabamba, bolivia. 304 consilience photo 19. by the time she was 12, carlota was a master weaver. due to poverty and homelessness, carlota was forced to leave her village and relocate in cochabamba. she prides herself on making beautiful pieces and avoiding synthetic materials (“only pure llama wool!”) and fears that the art of hand-made weavings is disappearing. photo 20. “i weave because things that are made by hand are beautiful!” carlota consilience shealy: her hands photo 21. carlota partners with her friend and neighbor, leticia to create weavings and instruct courses. meters away from carlota and leticia, their children throw balls of yarn back and forth and get tangled in the strands that unravel. the two are almost always together laughing about which of them is the better skilled, confiding in the trials of motherhood, and conversing about which colors will sell best in the coming months. “when i sell weavings i can buy sugar, rice, oil… it has really helped us a lot.” carlota’s craft skill has allowed her to generate income to provide basic necessities for her family. 306 consilience consilience shealy: her hands photo 22 and 23. when carlota left her village, she was without a stable source of income. her weaving practice that she learned as a child in her village was a skill that she was unsure she could rely on. she remembered, “i had nothing. only two children. how can i live? how are we going to live? with food, without food. little by little i understood. now it is much calmer. we are better. but before we suffered a lot.” eventually, she capitalized on her traditional skills and kusi kuma offered her the market that she needed to support herself with her craft. 308 consilience 2.4 el alto, bolivia photo 24. in a workshop of 12 women, bertha smiles as she looks at each woman’s muñeca (doll). the women laugh as they pass the dolls around and admire the quality work, bright colors, and details that the dolls illustrate. bertha leads doll-making workshops at an organization (centro de investigaciones de energía y población (ciep)), which employs vulnerable women in el alto, la paz. as the room calms, bertha hands each woman a certificate with an arbitrary name on it. each woman presents a certificate to a receiver coupled with brief comments about artistic strengths and potential improvements. consilience shealy: her hands photo 25. bertha leads doll-making workshops at the ngo centro de investigaciones de energía y población (ciep). she came to ciep as a dolls maker and, now, at age 26, bertha leads doll-making workshops for women in el alto, a lesser developed area of la paz. she incorporates local materials into the making of the dolls and teaches the women how to make quality products. ciep facilitates the selling of the products, mostly to foreign markets. 310 consilience photo 26 (previous page). the women chat as they pass around bottles of glue to decorate their dolls. one woman stops to stretch her hands and others tell her how they’ve dealt with sore hands. the women giggle as they piece together dolls from a mound of colored fabrics. photo 27. “since joining ciep, my mind has been broadened. now, i learned to highly value my culture, my customs, the place where i am, todos… this is what artisan work can do – teach you how to value your culture.” -bertha consilience shealy: her hands photo 28 and 29. bertha spoke to me about crafts’ place in bolivia’s economy, “some people say bolivia is a sleeping mine, but everyone knows that it’s a very rich place, with many resources. but there’s so much poverty! and this poverty is because we don’t have the creativity to use what we have. bolivia has natural fibers, wool, seeds, land… bolivia has a lot!” the crafts of bolivia are embedded into its culture and economy. 312 consilience photo 30 and 31. working in a craft collective has challenged bertha to reframe her own perceptions of development and her country. “from working with ciep, i have learned that development isn’t individual. it’s social. it’s to think in a group.” consilience shealy: her hands photo 32. 2.5 kutch, india photo 33. women of a small village in kutch gather on a colorful dhadki (quilt). they have come to get feedback from other artisans and to exchange their embroideries for rupee notes. kutch is a drought prone district in northwest gujarat 314 consilience freckled with small villages that mostly rely on cattle breeding and farming for income. income generation remains unsteady as kutch suffers the consequences of climate change, and many of the women have begun to rely on embroidery for income. consilience shealy: her hands photo 34 and 35 (previous page). qasab, meaning craft skill in kutchhi, is a collective of kutchhi craftswomen. qasab enables a secondary source of income to kutchi craftswomen, creates a forum for craftswomen to express their creativity through embroidery and helps to preserve the craft of kutch by giving value to high quality embroidery. 316 consilience photo 36 and 37 (previous page). there are over 1,200 craftswomen affiliated with qasab. qasab promotes embroidery activity in over 42 villages throughout kutch, where eight distinct ethnic communities each have their own embroidery heritage and style. photo 38. above, a woman from the sodha rajput community shows her work to an artisan. the sodha rajput community is a hindu community that migrated to kutch from sindh. this embroidery was done in the neran style, meaning eyebrow, a style often used by sodha rajput craftswomen. if you look closely, you can see the tiny motifs resembling the shapes of eyebrows. each community of kutch has its own embroidery style and heritage. when worn as part of traditional dress, embroidery styles act to identify the marital, social, religious and age status of women. consilience shealy: her hands photo 39 and 40. kutchi embroidery is labor intensive. most of the embroideries contain hundreds of cracked pieces of glass, which are sewn into the cloth as small mirrors. the final pieces dazzle in the light. 318 consilience photo 41. 3. conclusion women’s income generation leads to a multiplier effect in their respective communities. art production is a feasible income generating opportunity for women who lack mobility, often due to their lack of land rights and many household responsibilities. employment opportunities are crucial for women in developing regions, but not all employment opportunities are accessible to them. craft production is notable for its accessibility to women: it does not require access to land or literacy, and isn’t physically demanding labor. it is available to the disabled, it allows women to work in their homes, offers flexibility in hours, and often incorporates traditional skills that women already possess. the most obvious advantage of art production is income generation, yet art production yields more. art production increases women’s sense of self-worth and independence, it allows opportunities for creative autonomy and expression, and it heightens the roles and status of women within their communities. furthermore, as women are more likely to invest their money in their children than men, art production allows women to promote positive social change within their communities. at its best, women’s art production may contribute to a revitalization of local design and the sustainability of traditional livelihoods. for women in lesser-developed communities, art production often leads to income generation and improved quality of life. yet, the role of art production within economic development has created much debate: some argue that using art for development sparks a loss of tradition as artisans alter their products for foreign markets. yet, in order to sustain income generation, artisans must make designs informed by market demand. consilience shealy: her hands the women featured in this essay have maximized economic success through product design and cooperative structures. with the help of intermediaries, within their respective artisan cooperatives and group structures, they have achieved a balance between traditional autonomy and relevant design and function. the women at bead for life in kampala, uganda have abandoned yellow beads (“they look horrible on white skin!”) and have started making pink ones (“can you believe how many american women love the color pink?”) in gulu, uganda at one mango tree, lucy learns about yoga bags and lunch boxes. while bertha in el alto, bolivia thinks of more innovative ways to build her dolls, carlota in tiquipaya, bolivia adds new colors of wool to her collection. women in rural villages of kutch embroider their traditional stitches onto cloth that will be used for clutch bags. the global connection and interaction that the artists participate in enrich us all. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 7, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 130-143 the mysterious bloom rachel boehr department of economics columbia university, new york ny rb2805@columbia.edu abstract central america’s deepest lake, lake atitlán, is located in the department of sololá, just 50 miles from the famous old city of antigua. residents depend on the lake for daily life and commerce. each year, thousands of tourists visit the region to experience the local mayan culture, learn spanish, and holiday amidst the picturesque surroundings. unfortunately, in late 2009 a combination of factors including poor waste treatment, climate change, and inorganic fertilizers caused the lake to be contaminated with mysterious algae that left the local tourism industry devastated and residents scrambling for answers. localized efforts to cleanup the lake by straining the bacteria out of the water were thwarted by continuous regrowth of the bloom. while the threat of climate change and its heightened impact on impoverished communities increases, government plans to deal with the major contamination issues in the region remain stalled, leading tourists, residents, and businesspeople left to wonder about the murky future of one of central america’s most beautiful natural wonders. author’s note rachel boehr is a third-year student of economics in columbia university’s school of general studies. having first studied at syracuse university’s school of drama, she went on to work in non-profit advocacy and political campaigns. her work in social justice over the last ten years has spanned issues related to health, human rights, and the environment. she has traveled independently in central america, europe, and australasia and has always taken her camera. various photos were contributed by tanya o'carroll. tanya recently graduated with an ma in human rights studies from columbia. she spent 6 weeks volunteering with the council of development in san pedro, lake atitlan, december 2009-january 2010. keywords: eutrophication, guatemala, water safety consilience boehr: mysterious bloom photo by tanya o’carroll 1. lake atitlán situated among the extensive coffee plantations and cornfields of the guatemalan highlands, lake atitlán and sololá, a city which overlooks the lake, serve as the majestic home to 116 species of reptiles and amphibians, 12 of which are endemic to the region, and more than 236 species of birds, including the national bird of guatemala, the resplendent quetzal. at an estimated depth of 324 meters, atitlán is the deepest lake in central america. 132 consilience despite having suffered systematic violence during the country’s bloody thirty-six year civil war ending in 1996, the indigenous culture remains vibrant and strong. approximately 90% percent of the more than 200,000 people in the area belong to mayan ethnic subgroups, namely tz'utujil, kichee, and kaqchikel, and their reliance on the lake permeates all facets of daily life. residents and businesses use the lake for fishing, bathing, drinking water, transport, and tourism. consilience boehr: mysterious bloom each year, thousands of visitors flock to the region to sample fresh coffee and engage in numerous other tourist activities that help sustain the economy. indigenous reeds, tul, grow on the banks of the lake and serve as raw material for baskets and other handicrafts. 134 consilience photo by tanya o’carroll still, ―poverty indicators suggest that [sololá] is one of the poorest departments in the country,‖ where the entire population is considered either poor (74.6% of residents) or extremely poor (25.4%) (marn 2009). in 2005, hurricane stan made matters worse, bringing devastation to the area, claiming 1,400 lives and leaving another 5,000 homeless. one of the hurricane’s most lasting effects was the massive runoff it caused from the surrounding hills and towns down into the lake, nearly destroying the nearby waste treatment plant in panajachel in the process. repairs to this plant have yet to be made, which has led to further contamination of the lake. 2. algae bloom consilience boehr: mysterious bloom in october and november 2009, the communities surrounding the majestic lake atitlán in guatemala were devastated by growing bloom known as lyngbya, a cyanobacteria more commonly known as blue-green algae. 136 consilience photo courtesy of nasa according to a government report, the presence of the bacteria was caused by ―the loss of the food chain through the introduction of black bass, the excessive influx of nutrients and waste to the lake and the temperature rise induced by climate change‖ (marn 2009). aerial photos from nasa (above) portray the startling extent of the contamination, which may have been at least partly caused by the increased use of inorganic fertilizers, which were widely distributed over the last 50 years. however, the problem was exacerbated by changing weather patterns and natural disasters like stan in 2005 and agatha in 2009, which destroyed infrastructure and expedited the flow of these contaminants into the lake. one of the biggest concerns of this particular alga was that it fed off nitrogen and phosphorous from the human pollution and agricultural runoff. as the bacteria died, it released toxins which in small amounts could be harmless, but in large amounts could cause liver damage, diarrhea, skin problems and hepatic encephalopathy. consilience boehr: mysterious bloom 3. effects on tourism not only were residents placed at a great health risk, their entire livelihoods were undermined. due to reports of the cyanobacteria, ―more than 60% of the reservations for the year-end holidays were cancelled [in panajachel], the municipality with the largest number of hotels on lake atitlán‖(valladares 2011). tourism in the area – and all related economic activity – effectively slowed to a halt. 138 consilience 4. community response news of the contamination seemed to spread as fast as the bloom itself. in markets, businesses, and homes around the lake, people conversed about the effect of the algae on day-to-day life and cleanup efforts. photo by tanya o’carroll over time, a concerted effort arose. whenever algae appeared, communities around the lake began manual cleanup efforts. from dawn until dusk, villagers went to the lake with any apparatuses they could find to drain the lake of contamination. in particular, the san pedro municipal council of development helped coordinate community volunteers and delegations to clean the lake. photo by tanya o’carroll consilience boehr: mysterious bloom “algae and seaweed were the declared enemies of the village! the idea was to remove the algae from the lake. people showed up with plastic baskets, screens, bedsheets for sifting and nets to remove the algae. people were plunging into the water and removing algae with their bare hands. they were diving under water and coming back to the surface with piles of seaweed and algae. people were removing rocks covered in algae from the water. there were people in boats, canoes, and on the docs. they were using rakes, sticks, and paddles. basically, people were trying to remove the algae any way possible! it was a surreal site to see. it went on for the entire day” (busenius). local resident, october 26th, 2009 santa catarina palopó, sololá guatemala 140 consilience photo by tanya o’carroll visits from government environmental department brought officials to local businesses to consult about drainage into the lakes. yet with little funding, frustration and mistrust of the government’s promises persisted. ultimately, it seemed that actions proved futile on the part of the villagers as well. the more local residents cleaned their precious lake, the more the algae grew. and yet, encouraged by community leaders, the resilient and determined citizens worked to protect their lake from the growing problem in the absence of any systemic policy change. consilience boehr: mysterious bloom each morning at dawn, it appeared that local efforts had been successful. the lake appeared clear, reminiscent of the clean and breathtaking natural wonder it was once known as. but throughout the day, the bloom would resurface without fail. 142 consilience 5. conclusion soon after the algae appeared, the government of guatemala released an action plan detailing the problem and setting out a public education campaign (including broadcasting public information in five languages), which encouraged residents to stay away from the water. in the long term, the government warned people against using chemical detergents and agro-chemicals. yet the waters ahead for the people of lake atitlán and their precious resource remain clouded with uncertainty. climate change lurks around the corner, and policymakers acknowledge that poor countries will be hit the hardest. for local advocates, the work only continues to protect their source of tourism and livelihood in the wake of natural disasters, climate change, and changing agricultural practices. while the cyanobacteria lyngbya is likely to return each year, the extent of the problem hinges on many factors that humans can control. further, as the field of sustainable development grows, the intersection between cross-cultural education, agriculture, tourism, and resource management continues to be a critical conversation for policymakers, advocates, and researchers. consilience boehr: mysterious bloom bibliography busenius. (n.d.). lake atitlan ecological crisis in santa catarina palopó. p. 2009. ―cianobacteria reaparece en área norte de atitlán.‖ prensa libre noticias, información y servicios del periódico lider en guatemala. the contamination of lake atitlan. coop, dwight wayne. ―the blooming of lake atitlan.‖ revue. web. fieser, ezra. "how guatemala's most beautiful lake turned ugly time." time. 29 nov. 2011. giron, nancy. "the complexity of protecting lake atitlan's water quality." lecture. guatemala. ministerio de ambiente y recursos naturales. plan de accion integral para la recuperacion del lago de atitlan y su enterno. nov. 2009. "guatemala: reviving lake atitlán — global geopolitics & political economy." global geopolitics net (gg net) global political economy net (gpe net). "guatemalas lake atitlan disaster, the explanation." guatemala news. 29 nov. 2011. "harmful bloom in lake atitlán, guatemala : image of the day." nasa earth observatory : home.web. 29 nov. 2011. "lake atitlan is in crisis." lake atitlan health cyanobacteria resource. 29 nov. 2011. "pollution threatens guatemala's lake atitlán." americas quarterly. web. 29 nov. 2011. 144 consilience "sustainable living december 2009." caribbean property & lifestyles magazine real estate in the caribbean vacation rental in the caribbean living & investing in the caribbean. web. 29 nov. 2011. valladares, d. (2011, july 19). reviving lake atitlán. tierraamerica . consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 5, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 71-95 sustaining culture with sustainable stoves: the role of tradition in providing clean-burning stoves to developing countries britta victor department of anthropology princeton university, princeton, nj brittavictor@gmail.com abstract the focus of climate change mitigation is on greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, but there is another form of carbon that contributes greatly to climate change and that, if cleaned up, seems to be a quick and easy way to slow climate change. this is black carbon, or soot, and the majority of the world's black carbon comes from the basic cooking stoves of poor people in developing countries. these same stoves also pose significant health risks to their users, and many researchers and philanthropists are working to put cleaner stoves in their kitchens. this quick fix is not so easy, though. in the quest for the perfect stove, a key detail is left out: the cooks do not want to give up their old stoves. this study juxtaposes the research of stove engineers with ethnographies of rural communities, writings on women's rights, and theories of imperialism, to explore the complex cultural obstacles to the success of clean stove programs in developing countries. author’s note britta graduated in 2010 from princeton university‟s anthropology and environmental studies departments, for which a version of this piece was written as her senior thesis. she currently works for the international waters cluster of the united nations office for project services in copenhagen, denmark, protecting the world‟s oceans and missing the water back home in st. croix, u.s. virgin islands. keywords: climate change, stoves, culture, gender, development, health. 1. black carbon “how to slow climate change for just $15 billion” boasts the title of an article in wired science. it sounds tempting: the solution is to donate stoves to the poor. they cannot use the stoves they already have, say the stove engineers, because they emit incredible amounts of black carbon into the atmosphere. while all of the climate change talk has centered on greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide, there is another kind of carbon in our atmosphere that deserves attention. black carbon, commonly known as soot, also contributes to climate change and may be much easier to control. scientists are calling it a “low-hanging fruit,” a cheap and easy solution that will not provide a permanent solution to climate change but can, if addressed, have an immediate and significant effect on global temperatures. 72 consilience “we know how to cook without smoke,” explains v. ramanathan, a leading stove expert from the university of san diego. “a clean stove costs $30. multiply that by 500 million households, and it‟s only $15 billion. this is a solvable problem” (keim 2009:1). in comparison with other tactics for climate change abatement, stoves represent relatively basic, affordable technology. and the best part, enthusiasts claim, is that they represent a solution to a serious global health problem—they can save the world in two ways at once. it is not that these promising new stoves represent any groundbreaking technological developments. in fact, they are simple, cheap versions of the stoves we use every day in developed countries. but for approximately half the world‟s population, almost all from developing countries, these modern stoves can be lifechanging, even life-saving. “i am unable to breathe properly whenever i use the chula,” a rural housewife in abdalpur, india, says of her traditional stove. “but i have been using it for over 20 years. it is the only thing i have with which to cook” (bhattasali 2005:1). difficulty breathing is just one of the consequences of working over traditional stoves, such as the chula, or open fires. it may also be a sign of a serious illness. traditional stoves such as the chula spew black carbon (better known as soot) into the air in the home, producing indoor air pollution. the world health organization (who) has named indoor air pollution one of the top ten health risks facing our world today, “responsible for an estimated 2.7 percent of the global burden of disease” (jetter and kariher 2009:1). while carbon dioxide, or co2, is still the leading cause of climate change, black carbon has surprisingly emerged in second place. methane and nitrous oxide receive much attention, yet black carbon poses a much more serious threat than these gases. as much as 20 percent of the earth‟s current warming can be attributed to black carbon, even though it is not a greenhouse gas. black carbon consists of tiny airborne particles emitted when fossil fuels, biofuels and biomass are burned. once in the atmosphere, these particles convert the sun‟s rays into infrared or heat radiation and warm the air around them, explains dr. mark jacobson, co-founder and director of the atmospheric energy program at stanford university. he adds that greenhouse gases, in contrast, trap this infrared radiation while still allowing sunlight to pass through (h.r. rep 2007:12). thus, jacobson says, while black carbon may only cause up to 20 percent of the earth‟s warming, controlling black carbon may actually reduce 40 percent of current warming. removing black carbon from the atmosphere will produce less infrared radiation to be absorbed by steady levels of greenhouse gases (h.r. rep 2007:12-13). when the particles of black carbon age in the atmosphere, they grow in size, which allows them to absorb and convert even more sunlight, but also allows them to form clouds. while these clouds block sunlight, cooling the earth to an extent, they can also contribute considerably to climate change, jacobson explains. when the clouds of black carbon, which only remain in the atmosphere for a few weeks, settle on snow or sea ice, they darken the white surfaces. this inhibits the ability of the snow and sea ice to reflect sunlight, a process called albedo. the light is instead absorbed by the dark ice and snow, which then warms and melts, raising sea levels (h.r. rep 2007:12). ramanathan describes the extent of black carbon‟s effect: it may have as much as 60 percent the warming effect as that of co2 and the particles originally consilience victor: sustainable stoves produce a haze around the area in which they were emitted travel fast, covering an entire ocean or subcontinent in as little as a week. (h.r. rep 2007:49). one of the most exciting characteristics of black carbon, as compared with greenhouse gases, is this short lifetime: one to four weeks. carbon dioxide, on the other hand, has a lifetime of 30 to 43 years and methane 8 to 12 years. because of this short lifetime, reductions in black carbon emissions can have immediate results in combating climate change. “yet,” representative waxman warns, “controlling black carbon has not been seriously examined at the federal level as a way of possibly mitigating climate change” (h.r. rep 2007: 2). this is unsurprising, though, as the united states is only responsible for 6.1 percent of black carbon emissions (h.r. rep 2009:7). it is actually the developing countries—especially india and china—that emit the most black carbon into the atmosphere (h.r. rep 2007:7). this is because black carbon, unlike other gases contributing to climate change, is not a byproduct of modern industry. open fires and basic stoves in developing countries, especially within rural communities with limited access to newer technology, are to blame for the majority of the black carbon in our atmosphere. better stoves are the solution. 2. sustainable stoves cooks in developing countries use one of three different methods for cooking their food: the open fire, an upgrade to the open fire, and a basic stove. open fires usually consist of three stones, and this method of cooking can be found in at least some communities of every country, according to gerald foley, author of “improved cooking stoves in developing countries” (1983). foley describes the upgraded open fire as one in which shielding has been provided for the fire or a platform has been built for convenience. the third cooking system in developing countries is the actual stove—though the form of stove that, like open fires, is still responsible for black carbon emissions—and these stoves vary in their design. some designs are thousands of years old and range in materials from mud or pottery in asia, metal “jikos” and “forneaux” in east and west africa, and other brick and mud varieties (foley 1983:12). the brightly-painted, shiny metal of the envirofit stove looks nothing like these stoves found in these poor rural homes. yet a lot of people are putting a lot of time and money into getting more envirofit stoves, or other clean-burning and fuelefficient stoves, into those same homes. these stoves are often sold commercially but the engineers, government agencies, non-governmental organizations and charities that work to get these stoves into their target kitchens have only the best of intentions. their work reflects their concern for the stoves‟ users and a concern for the environment as they endlessly strive to design and disseminate the perfect stove—one that will be safe and sustainable, one welcomed into the kitchens of the developing world. these modern stoves, according to tests of their efficiency, perform better “than even the most carefully operated fire” (bryden et al. 2005:5). their focus is on transferring heat from the burning fuel to the food as efficiently as possible. they use the same fuels that these cooks have available to them—wood, charcoal, coal, crop residues, animal dung, and other forms of biomass and waste—but they burn 74 consilience these fuels more efficiently. the stoves are also safer, especially for children, as they are not as hot to the touch as traditional stoves tend to be. a major benefit of these efficient stoves is their ability to cook the same amount of food with much less fuel. in areas where fuel is scarce, this saves time spent collecting firewood or other fuels. the new stoves also save time cooking, as they can heat food much faster. in areas where cooking fuel must be purchased, the stoves are an investment that will save their users an unbelievable amount of money in fuel costs. the reduction in indoor air pollution and its effects on human health, are the most valuable benefits of the stoves. more than 1.5 million people die prematurely each year from inhaling indoor air pollution (bhattasali 2005:1). the smoke from traditional cooking methods has been shown to cause a long list of health problems, including acute respiratory infections, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease such as bronchitis or emphysema, cancer of the nose, throat, and lungs, asthma, cataracts, tuberculosis, heart disease, birth problems such as low birth weight, stinging eyes, chronic headaches, and coughing (thakuri 2009:2, bhattasali 2005:1). these health concerns affect women and children in particular, as they spend much more time in the home and over the stove (jetter and kariher 2009:1). manas ranjan roy of the chittaranjan cancer research institute in india asserts, “these women are actually inhaling pollutants equivalent to as many as 20 cigarettes every day” (bhattasali 2005:1). there is a strong campaign against cigarette smoking throughout the world, yet there is little awareness of the greater threat of indoor air pollution to these rural cooks. efficient stoves may also help to cook food more nutritionally—a major concern in developing countries where malnutrition is prevalent. a study of “balady bread,” a flat bread popular throughout the middle east, has shown that cooking the bread at high temperatures or for long periods of time may reduce the bread‟s protein content. it is likely that these results would be similar with similar breads, and thus it is important to ensure that temperature and cooking time are carefully controlled. modern stove technology allows food to be cooked at lower temperatures and in less time; thus, the new stoves may produce bread higher in protein than traditional stoves do. 3. the challenge it is clear that modern stoves have significant economic, environmental and health advantages over traditional stoves. they seem an obvious solution to climate change and indoor air pollution. but they are not. there have been several challenges in the global initiative to swap cooking systems in the developing world to clean stoves. as brandon keim points out in his wired science article, it would only cost $15 billion to slow climate change with these stoves. but who is going to pay that $15 billion? there is little awareness about the importance and effectiveness of clean stoves and thus little funding. that funding is necessary, since the populations that cook with the culprit stoves are the populations that cannot afford new stoves. if we want residents of developing nations to switch to cleaner stoves, we must provide those stoves, because they simply do not have the resources to naturally create a market for them. consilience victor: sustainable stoves “people at the absolute bottom of the pyramid—those living on less than $1 or $2 per day—will not be able to afford a stove even with financing. in such cases, subsidies are necessary,” explain xander slaski and mark thurber, of stanford university‟s program on energy and sustainable development. it is crucial that stoves and the threat of black carbon are brought to the world‟s attention in order to obtain this funding to subsidize stoves for those who need them. “on the other hand,” they continue, “various studies have shown that subsidized stoves turn into little more than scrap if target customers do not value the product to begin with.” this cultural disinterest in new stoves is the greatest obstacle in the development and dissemination of sustainable stoves. the focus in the search for the perfect stove needs to shift from efficiency to the stove‟s resemblance to its original counterpart—in ease of use and in ability to cook food in just the same way. stoves designed for use in developing countries are constantly compared in terms of efficiency. those that are just slightly more efficient are chosen for mass-production and mass-distribution. but distributing these stoves only represents the environmental disaster of unnecessary production if the stoves are not used. douglas f. barnes, keith openshaw, kirk r. smith, and robert van der plas state an important message that should be heeded by all: no matter how efficient or cheap the stove, individual households have proved reluctant to adopt it if it is difficult to install and maintain or less convenient and less adaptable to local preferences than its traditional counterpart. on the other hand, households have been most receptive when the dissemination process takes full account of the capacities and needs of local stove producers and consumers (1994:v). 4. the role of the stove in rural life aside from the countless environmental and health benefits of sustainable stoves, there are many ways in which these stoves may improve the daily lives of their users. as a result of their increased efficiency in transferring heat from the fuel to the food, the stoves can save cooking time, giving women more time in their day. additionally, decreased soot emissions means that walls and clothing will no longer be discolored, a small but noteworthy benefit. the stoves themselves are also more attractive, often with handles to make them easier to carry, and can become symbols of modernity and higher status for their users (barnes et al. 1994:10). yet even when these stoves are made, and made affordable, cooks do not use them. in a review of past stove programs—both successful and unsuccessful— douglas f. barnes, keith openshaw, kirk r. smith and robert van der plas write: the work on stoves continually refers to „stove dissemination,‟ which seems to imply that the improved stove need only be distributed to be adopted and that it is intrinsically and obviously superior to the traditional stove just because it has greater energy efficiency. as a consequence of this perhaps naïve thinking— 76 consilience oblivious to the influence of custom, setting, and circumstance— many programs failed (1994:13). as they argue, it is naïve to think that all of those benefits will necessarily lead to the stoves being readily accepted in the developing world. the perfect stove has yet to be created, because the new stoves are different and often cannot perform the same vital tasks that traditional stoves performed. while many stove designers may view the benefits from improved stoves as much greater than the forgone benefits of traditional stoves, it is important to take note of these shortcomings of the improved stoves. to many who still cook with traditional stoves, these are important details, and a truly ideal stove would fix the ways in which these new stoves fail to live up to the old ones. a major complaint of the improved stoves is their complexity and difficulty of use. in reducing heat loss, engineers have decreased the size of the hole in which to add firewood, and this makes the stoves harder to light and to control. it also means women have an added burden of cutting firewood down to smaller sizes (barnes et al. 1994:10). as an added measure to increase efficiency, the stoves often have adjustable power outputs, which can be very difficult to control (barnes et al. 1994:14). other stoves, meanwhile, can focus too much on health and not enough on efficiency. adding a chimney, for example, prevents indoor air pollution but may actually reduce the efficiency of the stove (barnes et al. 1994:10). the fire in rural homes also serves an important social function, as families traditionally sit around the fire, and it is the only source of light for many families who cannot afford lamps, electricity or even candles. more significantly, a major benefit of fires or traditional stoves is their secondary role as space heaters, and stove designers who focus on increasing efficiency often overlook this role. that usually means increasing the efficiency with which heat transfers from the fuel to the food, losing no heat to the surroundings. this heat lost to the surroundings should not be considered a loss for stoves to be used in many parts of the world, though. foley argues that “using more fuel than is strictly needed for cooking is not wasteful if it is meeting an essential family need for heating” (1983:13), and argues that this is a widespread necessity. even some homes in tropical climates have a need for heating in winter mornings and evenings. smoke‟s food preservation capacity is another sometimes crucial aspect of traditional stoves that is lost with healthier, more sustainable stoves. the smoke causes sickness and death among cooks, and the black carbon in the smoke contributes to climate change, but many households use the smoke to preserve and dry food hung above the fireplace. most homes cannot afford refrigerators, and smoking food is essential to prolonging the life of the food, keeping insects and rodents away, and preventing molds and fungi during the wet seasons. chomcharn describes that, despite women‟s complaints that the smoke causes eye irritation, they still like to allow the fire to smolder long after they are finished cooking (1991:1). keeping insects away from people can be even more important than keeping them away from just the food, and the smoke from fires and traditional stoves often fills this role, too. disease-carrying mosquitoes and other poisonous insects are a serious concern in many environments, but these insects are repelled by a home filled with smoke. while mosquito nets and repellents work, they are less effective than smoke and often too expensive to be practical (chomcharn 1991:1). as a result, consilience victor: sustainable stoves stove designers have been surprised to see that, while asthma rates may drop after the introduction of cleaner stoves to a community, malaria rates may spike—an unforeseen and worrisome tradeoff. with these considerable benefits of fires and traditional stoves, it is clear that designing the perfect stove is a challenge. cooks need to love the stoves. there is a large focus on the need for more affordable stoves, with the underlying assumption that the success of a stove program depends upon the stove‟s price. there is a considerable amount of literature and press surrounding sustainable stoves, but in much of this writing there is that assumption that if people in rural communities can afford the stove, they will definitely buy it and use it. further, there is a sense that a stove is clearly superior to its user if it prevents pneumonia or other health concerns and reduces fuel use (saving its user time and money). and there is a sense that it is simply a “better stove” if it accomplishes these goals and also has a reduced impact on the environment and the atmosphere. therefore, there are many arguments for engineers to design a stove that can be assembled at a low cost and for government agencies and charities to subsidize the stoves so that the world‟s poor will switch from fires and inefficient stoves to cleaner stoves. the race for more efficient, cheaper stoves is in fact the race for the perfect stove. it seems there cannot, however, be one perfect stove. not all cooks will love the same stove, because members of each culture have different needs from a stove—from space heating and food preservation to the stove‟s ability to cook the perfect injera. and cooking the perfect injera—a flat bread that is a staple in ethiopia—is a necessity to many ethiopians. peter scott of the aprovecho research center, tells burkhard bilger of the new yorker, “the ethiopians are unbelievably particular. if the injera doesn‟t have the exact size of bubble in the batter, they‟ll say it‟s garbage” (bilger 2009:88). it is particular requirements like these, which abound among rural cooks, that constitute the “custom, setting, and circumstance” that barnes et al. describe as so crucial to a stove program‟s success (1994:13). engineers can design cheap, clean stoves, and philanthropists can make them even more affordable, but if they are not designed for the cooks who will use them, the cooks will probably not love them and probably not use them. cooks like their traditional stoves because of tradition, and as bilger writes, “the trouble with tradition…is that it can be remarkably thickheaded” (2009:94). it seems that no one stove can emit less black carbon into the atmosphere, repel mosquitoes, and cook everybody‟s meal just the way they like it. and while traditions may be very important to cooks, they may be detrimental to the community. this raises the question: should cooks change their traditions in favor of more sustainable stoves? is sacrificing tradition necessary to the development of poor communities? 5. cooking and culture the film “the gods must be crazy” depicts the tragic scenario of one product of western development (a coca-cola bottle) completely destroying the culture and the harmony in which a tribe of african bushmen lived. while the film itself may represent an offensive attempt at anthropology, it asked the world this 78 consilience same question: does western development lead to the disintegration of a culture so beautiful as that of the bushmen? there may be huge cultural significance stored in something so simple as a traditional stove, or even a fire pit. “cooking tools, as the durable objects that we take with us from place to place, or hand down in a family (usually maternal) line, come to be storehouses of memories which help tell stories of people‟s lives,” write david sutton and michael hernandez of this certain kind of magic connected with cooking tools (2007:1). stoves can be easily compared to tools in the sense that in rural communities, many generations have used the same stoves and many women have spent a large portion of their lives over these stoves cooking food for their families—a vital part of their lives. we must be careful to acknowledge that cooks in developing countries place much more value on their stoves and other cooking tools than we might understand. “in western capitalist modernity such objects are often discarded in the name of progress,” sutton and hernandez write (2007:1). in other parts of the world, though, the connections people have with their cooking tools may be more important to them than progress. food is not just a part of the culture in these communities; food is the culture. “the emergence of national cuisines is part of a process of assembling a national culture…food is an important, if not crucial, contributor to both an individual‟s and to a group‟s collective sense of identity,” writes igor cusack, a scholar of cuisine, culture, and identity (2003:278). like most valuable traditions, this means food must be cooked just right to truly represent and preserve that identity. food may be an important aspect of identity in its ability to tell a community‟s history. in many parts of the world, textbooks and classes do not exist, literacy rates are low, and there are few ways for a people to remember their history. food can tell this story in a language that takes no formal training other than the education a mother provides to her daughters. “cuisines are not just innocent concoctions, but reflect the dominant ideologies of the societies in which they emerge so that, for instance, imperialism and colonialism have been crucial contributors to african cuisines,” cusack writes (2003:278). a meal can illustrate the ways in which a community is unique as well as its connections with other cultures around the world through this combination of influences, representing that community‟s place in space and time. a meal can paint a personal history just as it can paint a national history. signe arnfred, author of “sex, food, and female power: discussion of data material from northern mozambique” writes of a dish in mozambique called “makeya,” which is said to have “a touch of the holy.” the locals say, “when you want to communicate with the government you take a pencil and write a letter. when you want to communicate with the ancestors, you pour makeya” (arnfred 2007:148). the act of pouring the makeya is given significance here—not just eating it. food preparation is in itself an art form, a form of expression, and a form of communication with one‟s ancestors, with one‟s community, and with the rest of the world. cusack presents social psychologist michael billig‟s theory of food as “banal nationalism,” or “everyday, unnoticed nationalism” (2003:279). just as food represents a people‟s national identify, cooking and eating that food is a way in which consilience victor: sustainable stoves any citizen can show their national pride, strengthening the nation and, through the sense of community, reinforcing the value of tradition. 6. the other side of tradition there are plenty of practices aside from the customs of food preparation that accompany fires and basic stoves and which residents of developed countries would view as unnecessary or even harmful to some of these communities. these include not only the aforementioned use of a tool which is harmful to the health of its users and contributes to climate change, but also acts of deforestation and unjust treatment of women. increasing stove efficiency decreases fuel requirements. in many areas, such as honduras, fuel is firewood from nearby forests. the strain on the forests can cause deforestation, a concern in almost all developing countries. deforestation is in itself a serious environmental problem, causing loss of biodiversity (including the loss of crops used for food), floods, and desertification, all serious threats throughout the world, especially in developing countries (allen and barnes 2010:164). beyond this, though, the loss of forests causes fuel shortages, increasing the need for more efficient stoves. and the decrease in global forest cover affects carbon cycles since there is less vegetation to absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, accelerating climate change. even if connections are not made between the collection of firewood for cooking and floods, desertification, or climate change, it is clear that forests, the major fuel source for many communities, are growing scarce. it seems that it should be in the best interest of these communities to preserve the limited firewood resources. arun agrawal and clark gibson warn against this assumption, though: claims on behalf of community-based conservation often retain a rather simple quality. one such form such claims assume is that „communities‟ have a long term need for the renewable resources near which they live, and they possess more knowledge about these resources than other potential actors. they are, therefore, the best managers of resources…but such representations of community ignore the critical interests and processes within communities, and between communities and other social actors (2001:7). these “critical interests and processes within communities” may include traditional cooking practices and the community‟s willingness to change them, and the authors may argue that these interests take a higher priority in decision-making than concerns for the sustainability of local resources. in this way, these traditional cooking practices seem detrimental to the community‟s sustainability and should perhaps be sacrificed. another tradition that may prevent the communities from using more efficient stoves, another one that westerners would be quick to put an end to, regardless of its influence on the success of stove programs, is the treatment of women in many developing countries. women perform more than 90 percent of the 80 consilience cooking duties in developing countries (kammen), so the health risks of inefficient stoves disproportionately affect women. yet men have historically been the decisionmakers in the developing world. while it may be impossible to prove that women‟s lack of decision-making power is to blame for the resistance to cleaner, safer stoves, it seems possible that men will choose how women cook their food and women, along with the children by their sides, will bear the burden of that decision. 7. accepted oppression of women what is best for women and children is not necessarily best for the whole family. health benefits for women and children do not directly affect the men of the family, nor does an extra hour in a woman‟s day. but most of traditional stoves‟ benefits—heating, food preservation, protection from insects and the cultural importance of dishes—are appreciated by the whole family. the decision whether to use sustainable stoves then becomes one that pits the interest of the family against the interests of the mother, and the family, led by the husband, often wins. women may even prefer to cook on newer stoves—they may be willing to sacrifice the perfect injera in favor of healthier conditions for themselves or their children—but their husbands, removed from the health risks, may prefer their bread cooked just right. igor cusack says of cooks in mexico, “women were perhaps less concerned than men with the social stigma associated with the pre-columbian dishes like tamales made of corn” (288). he extends these gender-based attitudes on food preparation to other cultures with a strong sense of tradition, arguing that women are more open than men to branching out to new recipes outside of their own ethnicity. if the men are more concerned with the preservation of culture through cooking, it is even more likely that the men will choose the stoves that their wives use. clean stoves may be a threat to culture, but it is important to note that every aspect of a culture may not be worth protecting. giving women, rather than the family, the choice in how to cook the family‟s meal will complicate the power structure ingrained in that culture. ruth meinzen-dick and margreet zwarteveen write about water resource management in south asia with an argument generally applicable to resource management in poor, rural areas. they say this power structure should be upset and women‟s rights brought to these areas, especially if women have a greater concern for environmental sustainability. “romanticizing views of „communities‟ as homogeneous groups that have a strong common commitment to maintaining their local resource base, and ignoring the effects of power differences within the community on who can participate in decisions regarding management and the share of benefits, risks reinforcing inequality,” write meinzen-dick and zwarteveen (2001:64). while the focus is on resource use rather than the design and use of clean stoves, clean stoves deal heavily with the use of fuel resources and represent a difference between men‟s and women‟s “needs”—health needs, fuel needs, and perceptions of sustainability as a “need.” this can be read as a call to all those involved in stove programs to recognize men‟s and women‟s decisions as separate, and to be sure to include women in the decision-making process. they should not assume that when a community rejects a stove, it is the choice of the entire community. when this consilience victor: sustainable stoves assumption is made, they warn, inequality may be reinforced as a feature of the culture. efficient stoves heat up more quickly and cook food more quickly, so these stoves would save women huge amounts of time—a benefit that would only concern the woman herself or a very sympathetic husband. but most husbands are not sympathetic. “studies have consistently shown that women in rural areas of developing countries work longer hours than men,” writes sustainable stove scholar peter watts, “and that much, if not most, of their time is taken up by the essential „survival activities‟ of food preparation, water hauling and fuel collection” (2008:1). he says a survey of five villages in india shows that women work an average of nine hours per day, while men work only five, the amount of time, coincidentally, women spend on food preparation alone. meinzen-dick and zwarteveen refer to the view of the male perspective as that of the entire community as the “unitary model” (2001:64). even with the focus on the risks stoves pose to women and women‟s cooking practices, it is likely the research and writing on stove programs which refers to a community‟s preferences is guilty of viewing the community as this unitary model. “gender differences in power and influence are a recurring pattern,” meinzen-dick and zwarteveen argue. “women‟s participation has received considerable rhetoric, but less careful attention has been paid to the differences between women‟s and men‟s needs and priorities with regards to resource use, and to the barriers women face in achieving control over resources” (2001:64). one of these barriers, in fact, is their reluctance to voice their concerns—one reason that, despite the huge focus on women‟s participation, their needs and priorities are still not heard. many women living in oppressive cultures stay quiet because they “often seem to acquiesce in their own noninvolvement,” not because of lack of interest but because they are aware of “the social costs and risks involved in contesting the masculine rules and norms” (meinzen-dick and zwarteveen 2001:83-84). this power struggle occurs at both the household and community levels. as meinzen-dick and zwarteveen explain, “leaving this analysis at the household level is incomplete, because it does not take into account the effects of the community on gender relations in the household, or vice-versa” (2001:65). the community dictates this power distribution within the household because it is ingrained in the culture, and when men have more power in the household, they have more power in the community. as such, they are the ones who represent the desires of the entire community to researchers. it is the household that rejects the stove, but rejection of stoves can be a trend within the communities because the culture of that community plays a key role in the stove‟s acceptance. just as ignoring women‟s cooking needs risks widening the gender gap, if women are given the power within the household to purchase a clean stove, they can improve their societal status. “strengthening women‟s claims over common property can strengthen their position in the household and community,” meinzen-dick and zwarteveen explain (2001:82). stove programs, then, should focus on breaking down these barriers rather than reemphasizing the health benefits of clean stoves for women. it does not matter whether women want to reap these benefits, if their culture prevents them from saying so. as a result, the concern for sustainability of 82 consilience the “community” (which will transform from the unitary model to a more accurate depiction of the entire population) may change. currently, women are not the only members of the household whose health is at risk due to soot-emitting stoves. children often sit by their mothers while they cook, suffering from the same ailments as their mothers. in fact, children under the age of five are at a higher risk of respiratory infections. these infections often lead to pneumonia, the cause of 19 percent of deaths in children under five. many children are even born underweight or with health defects such as asthma due to pregnant mothers inhaling soot while cooking (williams 2005:1). as with women, children have no decision making power, though this is not as much a concern of justice as is women‟s status. however, fathers tend not to consider children in family decisions as heavily as they perhaps should. meinzendick and zwarteveen describe this lesser concern of the fathers, writing “a number of studies have found that women and men spend income under their control in systematically different ways, with women more likely to devote a high proportion of their income on food and health care for children” (2001:65). unfortunately, the income is usually under the control of the men, and therefore less money is spent on their well-being. money is a form of power, and if men are less willing to spend money on healthcare for children, they are also probably less likely to use their power to protect children‟s health from threats such as stove smoke. women‟s greater concern for their children is linked with their domestic responsibilities, which include childcare (meinzen-dick and zwarteveen 2001:82). these responsibilities, in turn, are both the result of “rule-setting by men only” (meinzen-dick and zwarteveen 2001:82) and the reason for women‟s continued subordination: with their role limited to household duties, their power within the community is limited. but as women are better representatives of children‟s needs, it is even more important to work to hear women‟s true opinions. even after growing up with such exposure to the health risks of indoor air pollution, and even with women as the primary influence in children‟s lives, each generation continues to value tradition over the health of women and children and the sustainability of resources. liesbeth van der hoogte and koos kingma, scholars in gender and development, explain: women play a central role in socializing children to continue cultural practices, but if these cultural practices have a harmful impact on women and girls, they have very limited scope to question or change them. if women rebel against tradition, they run the risk of being excluded from the community. exclusion carries a very high price, if you are also discriminated against in the wider society based on your membership of a marginalized group (2004:51). again, women‟s lack of power actually ensures their continued oppression even as new generations, having suffered in the home alongside their mothers, grow up and make their own decisions. some organizations are already taking note of this crucial step of recognizing women‟s perspectives. the “global assessment for gender and energy,” or gage, project was proposed at the world renewable energy conference v on the consilience victor: sustainable stoves premise that “better understanding is needed about how renewable energy solutions affect men and women differently so that organizational responsibilities and resources can be accurately targeted (farhar 2000:2). the project is aimed at increasing the role gender plays in the energy discourse and increasing women‟s power in making energy-related decisions. analysts and development experts from several countries agreed at the village power ‟98 conference on sustainable energy development (sed) that recognition of women was a priority. their consensus was: that access to sustainable energy in rural areas is particularly difficult for women; that participation of local people, including women, is essential for successful sed; that international financing agencies should integrate energy into their gender policies; that electricity access can be increased by matching resources to women‟s energy needs; and that financing should be actively extended to women to acquire sustainable energy systems (farhar 2000:3). farhar details many more instances of organizations realizing the importance of women. this provides hope that, in the future, the views of the community truly will represent the views of everyone within the community. perhaps, at least where stoves are concerned, women‟s voices may even hold more weight than men‟s, as women are more directly involved in cooking than are men. unfortunately, though, van der hoogte and kingma present a less optimistic view of organizations working with developing countries. they argue that often employees do not value women‟s perspectives, that they falsely assume they understand women‟s conditions without actually listening to the women, and even that, in an attempt to be sensitive to a culture which oppresses women, they purposely do not hire local women while still attempting to appear as though women‟s needs were taken into account. “it was reported that ngo staff attempted to solve the problem of traditional leaders opposing women‟s equal participation in the organization, by excluding women from responsible roles or on committees, or by including women only in limited areas of a project, to solve the problem of participation,” they write (2004:54). this has two effects: women within a community who are trying to change that element of culture which is so detrimental—their own oppression—are not supported by the outside organizations which are trying to help them (such as stove programs, for which success may depend on giving women the right to choose their cooking methods), and the staff of the organizations may dismiss an entire culture as backwards and fail to offer it the respect it deserves. possibly as a result of dismissing the cultures as backwards, the organizations sometimes “accept gender inequality in a culture as unchangeable, and consider criticism of inequality as an offence against the culture in general” (van der hoogte and kingma 2004:54). this increases the likelihood that the community‟s perspective that is presented to stove programs the rest of the world may be simply the perspective of the men within the community. striking a balance between respecting tradition and promoting development is thus incredibly difficult. 84 consilience nevertheless, stove programs aimed at providing developing countries with clean, efficient, safe stoves may be overly intrusive if they were to interfere with gender relations, attitudes towards the environment and natural resources, or other aspects of culture which the communities themselves may view as important aspects of their lifestyles and parts of their collective cultural identities. this is especially true if the programs attempt to break down gender barriers not to increase the acceptance of stoves within a culture, but purely to help women gain power. and where do stove programs draw the line between believing that women within a culture truly want to use their traditional stoves and interpreting such a claim as women‟s forced acceptance of their husband‟s desires? should a stove program simply give up if women truly do not want to cook with sustainable stoves? 8. ethics of adapting cultures to stoves it cannot be easily assumed that, simply because of the risks and burdens that women face in cooking with traditional stoves, women would prefer to use sustainable stoves. there is also a certain level of fulfillment many women feel when cooking the dishes that are important to their culture: the same dishes their mothers and grandmothers cooked and taught them to cook, and the same dishes their mothers‟ families and grandmothers‟ families ate and enjoyed. cooking can be empowering for women. signe arnfred contrasts the conceptions westerners have of the work of a housewife with those of developing countries. “cooking in general is a female capacity and domain,” she writes, but warns that we should not interpret this as a form of oppression: “in a western context this seems a trivial statement and may be equated with the burdensome household chores of a western „housewife,” suggesting that this is not how the role of the housewife is viewed outside of the western world (2007:148). in societies which are based on subsistence production—the majority of poor, rural communities around the world—“cooking and distribution of food has a different status. food is a female domain and a basis for female authority” (arnfred 2007:149). arnfred gives an example from mozambique to represent the power associated with food production in all economies of subsistence production: men and women are both involved in the production (they both work in the fields), but at harvest time the products from the field are stored in the granaries of the older women, the grandmothers. they are the ones who control the granaries, deciding what to take out, when, and for what purpose. a man who wants to control the granary of his wife gets a nickname, which is translated to avarento in portuguese to mean “the one who wants to have it all for himself”—as opposed to the women who are supposed to administer the granary for the benefits of all (2007:149). this brings a new perspective to what appears to be the oppression of women in these communities—though they work longer hours and lack political power within the family and community, it seems they do have power over food production. to attempt to “free” women from the shackles of domestic work, or to dictate how they ought to cook, may improve their health and slow climate change, but it would come at a cost: removing the one source of power, and of pride, in these women‟s lives. and to call the housewife‟s role a form of “oppression” now consilience victor: sustainable stoves seems erroneous when, in fact, men are seen as selfish if they attempt to perform any tasks conventionally reserved for women. through this compelling relationship between women and food, whether or not it is the result of oppression, ecofeminists argue that women may have a connection with nature and, by extension, they may be more likely to have strong feelings about sustainability. in this way, their traditional roles as cooks may actually increase the likelihood that they will embrace sustainable stoves. meinzen-dick and zwarteveen describe this connection: ecofeminists maintain that traditional communities lived in close harmony with nature, according to feminine principles. colonialism and markets have broken up this harmony, often resulting in men engaging in life-destroying activities or having to migrate. the women meanwhile continued to be linked to life and nature through their role as providers of sustenance, food, and water. hence, for ecofeminisits, in terms of environmental sustainability it is a fortunate scheme of events that women have been left out of development, because this has made it possible for them to retain their unity with nature (2001:68). the advent of technology that promotes sustainability, especially when this technology is sold in a capitalist market system, complicates this theory. according to the claim of ecofeminists that meinzen-dick and zwarteveen present, women have retained their unity with nature as a result of their exclusion from markets and development. thus, allowing women to make decisions about technology, and giving them purchasing power, would allow them to make the transition to sustainable stoves. but to introduce women to these markets would break them from their alleged harmony with nature, just as has occurred among the men in their community, and they may no longer have strong feelings about sustainability. if the western world is to work to increase women‟s decision-making power in the developing world, we must be sensitive in how we do so. their cooking practices extend far beyond simply the final result: the food on the plate. for women, cooking is a social activity and has several other rewards. a major argument for clean stoves is these speedy stoves will shorten women‟s time spent cooking. they already work so many hours more than men and deserve free time, many advocates state. and women can devote this extra time to economic activities, increasing their familial or, more progressively, their personal incomes. peter watts writes that this is an idealistic assumption, though: because time is a limited commodity, women are required to make rational decisions concerning its use. the basis of those decisions is the contribution that a particular use of time will make towards sustaining the household. if the time required for one activity increases, then women must make a trade-off with time spent on another. any development program which aims to increase women‟s productivity or improve women‟s welfare must first consider the activities which the women will have to forgo as a result (2008:1). 86 consilience the concept of spare time for these poor, rural women may in itself be a fantasy, negating the argument that clean stoves will help women. it may even have adverse effects: if women find high levels of satisfaction in cooking, time spent doing other activities may feel less rewarding and more suggestive of chores. 9. technological imposition stove programs, especially those that developed countries initiate, do not always know what is best for the communities they are trying to help. this is no fault of their own; they simply do not understand the individual needs of each community, and perhaps they cannot. local members of the community know best which stoves the community will embrace. it seems that, instead of designing a stove such as that pretty, shining, and mass-produced envirostove to all of these communities, the best thing the developed world can do is to fund local stove projects. kirk smith contends that, while larger, government-funded stove projects are capable of producing stoves much quicker, at a lower cost, and of more uniform quality, they cannot beat local stove programs. he writes that such programs “suffer from high rejection rats and lack of integration into local social and economic development programs” (1989:521), implying that local stove programs will be much enthusiastically accepted by local communities. “unfortunately, the local stoves currently available do not always represent the best designs that modern engineering can offer,” according to mark bryden, dean still, peter scott, geoff hoffa, damon ogle, rob bailis, and ken goyer of the aprovecho research center (bryden et al. 2005:5). while their argument is no different from that of smith: the most efficient stoves are probably not going to be made by the designers who call rural villages in developing countries home, their definition of a successful stove is different. smith‟s primary source of success is the acceptance of a stove by a community, while the researchers at aprovecho define success as optimal energy efficiency. jacob moss of the u.s. environmental protection agency elaborates on this point while at aprovecho‟s stove camp in oregon: when we first got into this, we had this utopian vision of working with local communities to build locally grown stoves. we‟ve moved away from that—i won‟t say a hundred and eighty degrees, but maybe a hundred and sixty. i don‟t really listen to small stove projects anymore. when i hear dean say that one millimeter can make a nontrivial difference, it‟s inconceivable to me that all these local stovemakers can make all these stoves efficiently. you have to work in a different way (bilger 2009:96). however, if moss is correct in saying that local stovemakers cannot make an efficient stove—perhaps they can make a stove that is “better” in some ways but still doesn‟t meet a certain standard—then the community‟s acceptance of that stove is irrelevant. if we are to agree with these representatives of the aprovecho research center—leaders in sustainable stove design—and the environmental protection consilience victor: sustainable stoves agency, then we agree that stoves for the developing world should be designed in the developed world and subsequently distributed to a variety of diverse communities. this does not mean that stovemakers from outside the communities should not take local preferences into very serious account. and the researchers at aprovecho are aware of this. “the campers in cottage grove spent half their time agonizing over cultural sensitivity,” bilger writes. “‟we‟re highly dominated by elderly white engineering types,‟ a stovemaker who‟d worked in uganda told me. „so you get a lot of preposterous ideas that‟ll never fly in the kitchen‟” (2009:94). these expert stovemakers, advocating for stoves designed far from their future homes, are conscious of this drawback of their own method. the compromise, it seems, is stove design should be done by outside experts, with considerable input by the community members who will be using the stoves. douglas f. barnes, keith openshaw, kirk r. smith, and robert van der plas advise that engineers must build the stoves, with heavy local influence on their design, rather than the other way around. stove programs often fail, they explain, when outside engineers dictate to community artisans how the stove should be built (1994:14). local cooks should instead dictate how outside engineers should build the stoves. the stoves will be technically better when western engineers have control over those critical millimeters, but they will be more successful (even if a bit less efficient) if they take local preferences into account. there is, of course, a balance between too little local input and too much. stoves must be custom-designed for communities, but they will fail if “critical stove components are custom built” (barnes et. al 1994:14). these critical components, such as the combustion chamber, should be mass-produced, while the body of the stove should be adapted to local needs. unfortunately, this push for local input may have developed into a basis for false advertisement. stove programs that claim to welcome local input may not actually take that expertise into account. as smith argues, “you can have it in any color, as long as it‟s black,” he says of this false sense of choice consumers are offered (1989:521). the companies that design the stoves are so much larger and more powerful than the consumers, he explains, that the designers have no need to truly listen to their customers, and he suggests that in this way the designers are taking advantage of their customers‟ lack of power. “even if legislation or policy boasts a „participatory‟ or „community‟ label, it is rare that individuals from the community have had any say at all in the policy. further, many of these centrally imposed „community‟ programs are based on a naïve view of community,” seconds elinor ostrom (2001:ix). but programs using deception in this way, she writes, benefits nobody, as the programs are likely to fail. she is referring to any community resource legislation or policy, demonstrating that stoves fit in with other environmental initiatives—best understood by communities but often overtaken by outsiders. this idea is important to keep in mind: stovemakers are marketing their stoves. a quick internet search of “sustainable stoves” will produce countless testimonies by local cooks detailing the ways in which the stoves have improved their lives. most cooks in the developing world still cook with their traditional stoves and fires, though. there is a huge resistance to these stoves that the articles and youtube videos carefully ignore. but because of this resistance, in order to sell the stoves, for 88 consilience profit or for a genuine concern for human health and the environment, the stove programs must market them. this raises new ethical dilemmas. 10. marketing strategies sustainable stoves are not immediately successful because, for a variety of reasons, they do not immediately appeal to consumers. “they are expensive, imply a significant change in user habits, and, worst of all, are usually not highly valued by potential users at the offset” (slaski and thurber 2009:6). many westerners are surprised; we expect stove users to be as impressed by the long list of health benefits, if not environmental benefits, as we are. but even after consumers are told of these benefits, they still tend to value their traditional cooking methods over these stoves. there are two options for stovemakers in this case: give up, or find other ways to convince people to buy the stoves. slaski and thurber write to educate stovemakers on strategies for this latter option. they present a chart depicting products that are marketed to populations in developing countries. one branch of the chart shows why consumers promptly adopt products. the example is one that has initial perceived value and is affordable with disposable income, though it has a low magnitude of change: coca-cola. several branches in the middle show different combinations of factors, and the bottom branch represents the complete opposite of coca-cola. this product has no initial perceived value but instead may be valued after education and social marketing. it is not affordable with disposable income (nor financing, so subsidies are necessary) but has a high magnitude of change (higher than vaccines): stoves (slaski and thurber 2009:5). in order to create perceived value, slaski and thurber explain inherent motivation must be manipulated. fortunately, motivation to purchase sustainable stoves is actually quite high in urban areas where fuel is usually purchased, often at a high cost. but the majority of black carbon is emitted into the atmosphere by rural stoves, and these communities do not always feel strained by resources. their inherent motivation is low, and designers must target their strategies towards creating perceived value for stoves among these potential consumers: what have worked better are efforts that actually create and market new perceived value associated with the stove. a stove could be seen, for example, as contributing to a cleaner kitchen, adding new cooking functionality, or providing a status symbol associated with modernity. . .the commercial players who will be most successful in the cookstove space are those who are most innovative in creating these kinds of observable value for their customers (slaski and thurber 2009:6). it is a bit disconcerting that these stoves are now being marketed for selling points other than the humanitarian principles of improved health and climate change mitigation. envirofit takes the marketing to another level. in these target communities, devoid of televisions and radios, the company has begun holding live demonstrations of the stoves. in order to capture the community members‟ consilience victor: sustainable stoves attention, though, they have developed a few tactics: providing entertainment with games, song, and drama (rehman 2009). entertainment levels and social status are suddenly prioritized above the traditional cooking methods, which previously seemed so indispensable, that are still valued above the health of the cooks. the stoves also suddenly resemble commercial merchandise much more closely, risking some loss of their character as charitable contributions to their consumers. the problem with marketing and capitalistic methods, agrawal and gibson explain, is that they deconstruct community. for marx and engels, spencer and comte, and even for weber and durkheim, society moved along an evolutionary path. status, tradition, charisma, and religion would increasingly give way to equality, modernity, rationality, and a scientific temper. this theorization of social change automatically pits community against the market, since marketization and urbanization erode community (2001:3). modernization theorists, they add, agree with this concept of a linear evolutionary path in which culture and tradition are primitive ideals that are replaced through development by “equality, modernity, rationality, and a scientific temper.” these theorists view the culture and tradition, which forms such a strong identity for citizens of developing countries, as the “idiocy of rural life” (agrawal and gibson 2001:3). the entire concept of community, in fact, embodies this “idiocy of rural life.” in their opinion, the loss of tradition through development is not only acceptable, but a favorable consequence. and development is clearly a priority. this is evident, they say, in categorization of the world under the words “underdeveloped,” “developing,” and “developed.” these words are descriptive of the nations‟ actual circumstances, but by creating such a clear hierarchy, the words also reflect the desirability of development (agrawal and gibson 2001:3). to fulfill what many residents of developed countries and sustainable stove activists see as our responsibility to help the developing countries reach the status of “developed,” then, we must help them see that their culture and their traditions are holding them back, and convince them to purchase and use these stoves that will bring them one step closer to “developed.” we must teach them to cook in new ways and, according to slaski and thurber, encourage them to change their entire lifestyles to adapt to this new piece of technology, the basic stove: cooking touches on an entire lifestyle, which can include gathering wood (an activity with a strong social component) as well as cooking (an activity heavily influenced by tradition). changes in lifestyle may bring significant benefits—the ability to replace wood gathering with productive economic activities, for example—but they are not undertaken lightly. in addition, products like improved cookstoves that are more complicated than traditional technologies may require training and ongoing correct use to reap their benefits (slaski and thurber 2009:7-9). 90 consilience 11. accidental imperialism “what does loss mean to whole cultures, whole peoples of the global south who have seen their societies penetrated, worked over, restructured, modernized and made more „civilized‟?” asks development scholar david slater (2006:1372-1373). this connection between the civilizing of an entire people and the society‟s penetration raises concerns of imperialistic tendencies, and it seems to be exactly what stove programs that the western world initiates are doing in developing countries. the willingness of engineers to sacrifice tradition in favor of modernity is closely aligned with slater‟s definition of imperialism. he points out a key characteristic of imperialistic tendencies as the failure to recognize another community‟s culture and its inherent differences: it is important to emphasize that the imperial relation carries within it a lack of respect and recognition for the colonized or, expressed more broadly, imperialized society. hence, processes of penetration and imposition are viewed as being beneficial to the societies that are being brought into the orbit of imperial power. the posited superiorities of western „progress‟, „modernization‟, „democracy‟, „development‟ and „civilization‟, and so on are deployed to legitimize projects of enduring invasiveness that are characterized by a lack of recognition for the autonomy, dignity, sovereignty and cultural value of the imperialized society. overall, there is a mission to westernize the non-western world (2006:1372). slater also calls imperialism a “violation of the sovereignty of a third world society” which “negates the autonomous right of peripheral societies to decide for themselves their own trajectories of political and cultural being” (slater 2006:1371). by searching for any way to convince customers in developing countries to purchase new stoves (and consequently make significant lifestyle changes), developing nations are doing just this. they justify their means—manipulative marketing strategies—by claiming that the end result will be a more developed country with a better standard of living. the developed world thinks our stoves, our cooking practices, our household division of labor, and our concepts of women‟s rights are correct and desired by all. stove programs also need re-evaluating in their ability to create a risky case of short-term stability. it may be ambitious to compare a stove program to a puppet regime, but both can seem beneficial in the short term but can have detrimental effects in the long run: “the semblance of short-term stability achieved by the installation of a puppet regime often evolves into long-term instability, creating the need for further intervention, as demonstrated by the repeated u.s. intrusions in several latin american countries,” slater writes (2006:1371). in the style of a puppet regime, a stove program simply provides a quick fix by sending stoves from the developed world to the developed world. by consciously excluding local stovemakers from the process, we are accidentally preventing these communities from developing their own technology. the stoves they buy now will not last forever, and if we stop consilience victor: sustainable stoves sending them subsidized stoves, they will never learn to make their own stoves or have control over the technological evolution of these stoves. this creates a dependency that is characteristic of imperial relations. finally, the developed world is exploiting the developing world in this push for the transition to sustainable stoves. this may seem counterintuitive, as we are providing the communities with goods rather than taking them away. in fact, slater describes this exploitation as “appropriating resources and raw materials” (206:1371), but climate change forces us to redefine the goods that fuel a nation. with global climate change conferences and cap-and-trade systems controlling the amount of damage any one country can do to the planet, carbon credits have become a new currency. a quantity of carbon not emitted into the atmosphere by one party can be sold to another like a commodity. while black carbon is not officially regulated, efforts to mitigate climate change abroad may satisfy the guilt of developed nations enough that they may continue spewing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere at the same alarming rates. this method of removing guilt is like a figurative system of carbon trading: by removing dangerous emissions from the developing nations through our kind, charitable acts, the developing world earns the credit to continue emitting greenhouse gases from our own side of the world. this exploitation is especially striking when remembering the huge cultural sacrifice stove programs demand of the developing world. residents of developed countries have been incredibly resistant to give up driving or using excessive amounts of electricity in order to combat climate change, so the expectation that these communities give up the cooking methods that are so important to them is quite bold. if we will not change our culture, it is unfair to ask them to change theirs. by doing so, we are immorally shifting the burden of climate change. that burden is ours. black carbon may pose a serious threat to the atmosphere, but it is only the second most significant warming pollutant after carbon dioxide. these rural communities contribute very little to the carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere. the united states alone contributes 21 percent of the global carbon dioxide emissions. “reductions in black carbon emissions could buy us significant time to reduce co2 emissions,” stated tom davis, representative from virginia, at a house of representatives hearing before the committee on oversight and government reform. “that would be a welcome respite to allow the world to develop consensus solutions that don‟t stall growth or give some nations competitive advantages over others” (h.r. rep 2007:7). davis demonstrates this desire to reduce black carbon abroad in order to continue our carbon-intensive behavior at home with minimal interruption. the fear of stalling growth shows this attitude of rich nations that growth is more important than culture. his desire to not give any country a competitive advantage is an amusing one, as he then proceeded to explain that “the developing world is the major source of black carbon emissions,” and therefore the united states must be sure to include developing nations in climate talks, as “failure to do so would forfeit a prime opportunity to bring about meaningful changes in behavior that both include quality of life and reduce the immediate impact of climate change on the planet” (h.r. rep 2007:7). his insincerity is evident, as nobody is excited for the “prime opportunity to bring about meaningful changes in behavior” 92 consilience to combat climate change; it is seen as a burden by all, though some communities are more willing to make such changes than others. as an example, after deciding that the developing nations deserve the opportunity to change their lifestyles in an effort to slow climate change, davis describes the necessity of energy in the united states: “as we look for ways to mitigate harmful greenhouse gases, we must do so while acknowledging that energy is essential to the economic activity that sustains and improves our quality of life” (h.r. rep 2007:7). eileen claussen, president of the pew center on global climate change, feels differently about this burden. “equity demands that developed countries—the source of most past and current emissions of greenhouse gases—act first to reduce emissions” (chandler et al. 2002:1). unfortunately, the majority of the developed world does not share this view. it is actually much more likely that clean stove advocates would agree with claussen‟s argument, as they share a concern for the environment and human rights, yet they are responsible, at least in part, for this exploitation of developing countries through their approach to stove dissemination. they are not consciously attempting to exploit the communities with which they are working, though. the imperialistic tendencies of the stove programs are accidental. 12. a message to stove programs to avoid this accidental imperialism, stove programs should be careful not to manipulate the marketing of their products. if the stoves are not selling, it is not because customers should be convinced in a different way of the stove‟s value. rather, it is because the stove is not well adapted to the customer‟s needs. if the cooks that are exposed to the health threats accompanying traditional stoves are unwilling to switch to cleaner stoves, it is probably because there is something intrinsically unappealing about those stoves. “my number one piece of advice of doing successful work in the stove business is first listen to your clients. you cannot change your clients out there, it‟s much easier to change your technology, so if you‟re not selling your stoves you‟ve got the wrong product,” advises christa roth of the gtz program for biomass energy conservation in southern africa (toward clean cooking). stovemakers may be unable to design stoves that appeal to the cooks because of their relentless quest for optimal efficiency. perhaps a small degree of efficiency must be sacrificed in order to create the greatest magnitude of change, by shifting the emphasis from near-perfect efficiency to performance that can match that of traditional stoves when cooking traditional meals (barnes et al. 1994:13). this performance standard has been ignored in most stove tests. in fact, the efficiency of the stove when cooking the traditional foods of one‟s community may be completely different from the efficiency measured in the laboratory. the most common test for measuring stoves‟ efficiencies is the water boiling test (wbt). the models that boil water the quickest with the minimal amount of fuel and ambient heat loss are chosen to be mass produced and distributed to the rural communities. this test is preferred as it is an easy way to standardize between stoves when choosing the best model, but standardization is exactly what stovemakers should consilience victor: sustainable stoves avoid. stoves should be custom-designed for each community, not used to perform a function that the stove may never actually perform in its lifetime. an example of a stove which may be preferred by many cooks enough that they may actually purchase it and use it, so that it may make a more significant impact on climate change and human health than those stoves which are never adopted, is the ecostove. jetter and kariher describe this stove, just one of many they tested: this stove has a steel griddle top that is useful for making tortillas and frying foods, but it is not well suited for boiling water or cooking with a pot. . .the ecostove could be more fairly compared to other griddle stoves used for tortilla making and frying foods using a test protocol different from the wbt, such as the controlled cooking test (cct) (2009:7). for cooks who want to make tortillas (some variety of which is popular in communities in many developing countries throughout the world), this ecostove may function similarly enough to their traditional stoves that they would be willing to make the switch. they will never make that switch, though, if the stove is rejected because its efficiency is slightly lower than that of another stove. in fact, kariher and jetter explain that the stove performs poorly in the wbt because the heat transfer from the griddle top to the pot is inefficient. “some stoves are designed in the laboratory and then manufactured without prior field testing to verify that they actually perform the necessary tasks for persons who prepare meals,” douglas f. barnes, keith openshaw, kirk r. smith, and robert van der plas explain (1994:15). the use of the phrase “necessary tasks” is noteworthy—these are not tasks that cooks should hope their stoves might be able to do—they are the tasks which these cooks demand from a stove, and it is the responsibility of the stovemakers to design stoves which can perform these tasks. nevertheless, the marketing of stoves does have its advantages. the market competition leads to the development of better stoves, and the cost may actually increase their perceived value to consumers. the subsidies are important, too, as they make the stoves affordable to those who need them, and reflect their role in contributing to the public good (smith 1989:521). “clearly a balance must be sought among the perceived and real social benefits, which depend both on the stove and on the cooking customs of the people who use it. in some areas, there just may not be a balance between these factors that will permit the production of affordable stoves,” write douglas f. barnes, keith openshaw, kirk r. smith, and robert van der plas (1994:10). the authors seem too quick to give up, though. the quest for the perfect stove is of serious concern, and this balance should be taken as a challenge, not a point of surrender. the failure of a stove program is just that—the failure of the program, not of the stove or of the community. stove programs must do background research into the community‟s food preferences, cooking methods, and fuel sources, and run trials in the community, before attempting to simply “disseminate” a large quantity of stoves. barnes et al. later explain, “differences among programs have proved even more important than differences in local conditions in explaining the relative successes of stove disseminations” (1994:16). 94 consilience stove programs have the opportunity to save lives from premature death that indoor air pollution causes, to help protect the world from climate change, and to create social change. they should always be conscious of all of these opportunities. while it is easy to put a chimney on a stove and prevent indoor air pollution, the soot will still be released into the atmosphere and warm the earth. and while some women may find fulfillment cooking traditional foods on traditional stoves, others may be afraid to express their desire to change their traditional cooking methods or their roles as housewives. kanchan sinha, a women‟s rights activist in india, proclaims that changes in culture can be necessary. “changes in culture do occur, even if over long periods of time, and there are famous and heroic examples in history when such changes have been brought about through conscious and planned interventions,” she writes (2003:25). she explains that the development sector has the power and the responsibility to create this change, through working with local social movements. “this is of crucial importance if conditions are to be created whereby the right to equal citizenship is realized by women in societies like india” (2003:25). this is not to say that stove programs should always strive to fix all three of these challenges. just as stoves must be custom-designed for the communities in which they will be used, stove programs should also be custom-designed to fit the needs of each community. always, though, we must remember that providing sustainable stoves to developing countries is no substitute for changing our own behavior at home to live more sustainably. bibliography agrawal, arun, & clark c. gibson. (2001). communities and the environment: ethnicity, gender, and the state in community-based conservation. new brunswick, n.j.: rutgers university press. allen, julia c., & douglas f. barnes. (2010). the causes of deforestation in developing countries. annals of the association of american geographers 75, no. 2 arnfred, signe. (2007). sex, food and female power: discussions of data material from northern mozambique. sexualities 10, no. 2. barnes, douglas f., keith openshaw, kirk r. smith, & robert van der plas. (1994). what makes people cook with improved biomass stoves? report no. 242. energy. washington, dc: world bank. bhattasali, amitabha. (2005). a silent killer of rural women. calcutta: bbc news. bikram malla thakuri, min. (2009). revisiting the need of improved stoves: estimating health, time and carbon benefits. kathmandu: south asian network for development and environmental economics. bilger, burkhard. (2009). hearth surgery. new york: the new yorker. consilience victor: sustainable stoves bryden, mark, dean still, peter scott, geoff hoffa, damon ogle, rob bailis, & ken goyer. (2005). design principles for wood burning cook stoves. eugene, or: aprovecho research center. chandler, william, roberto schaeffer, zhou dadi, p. r. shukla, fernando tudela, ogunlade davidson, & sema alpen-atamer. (2002). climate change mitigation in developing countries. arlington, va: pew center on global climate change. chomcharn, aroon. (1991). cookstove smoke the other side of the coin. hedon household energy network. cusack, igor. (2003). pots, pens and 'eating out the body': cuisine and the gendering of african nations. nations and nationalism 9, no. 2. farhar, barbara c. (2000). technical report. report no. nrel/tp-550-27999. golden, co: national renewable energy laboratory. foley, gerald, & patricia moss. (1983). improved cooking stoves in developing countries. london: earthscan. h.r. rep. no. 110th-110-86 at 4 (2007). kammen, daniel m. cookstoves for the developing world. berkeley: daniel m. kammen. keim, brandon. (2009). how to slow climate change for just $15 billion. wired science. meinzen-dick, ruth, & margreet zwarteveen. (2001). “gender dimensions of community resource management." in communities and the environment: ethnicity, gender, and the state in community-based conservation, by arun agrawal and clark c. gibson. new brunswick, n.j.: rutgers university press. ostrom, elinor. (2001)."foreword." in communities and the environment: ethnicity, gender, and the state in community-based conservation, by arun agrawal and clark c. gibson. new brunswick. n.j.: rutgers university press. rehman, hafeezur. (2009). in india, battling global warming one stove at a time. interview by fred de sam lazaro. pbs newshour. rosenthal, elisabeth. (2009). third-world stove soot is target in climate fight. the new york times. sinha, kanchan. (2003). citizenship degraded: indian women in a modern state and a premodern society. gender & development 11, no. 3. slaski, xander, and mark thurber. (2009). research note: cookstoves and obstacles to technology adoption by the poor. publication no. 89. stanford, ca: program on energy and sustainable development,. 96 consilience slater, david. (2006). imperial powers and democratic imaginations. third world quarterly 27, no. 8 smith, kirk r. (1989). dialectics of improved stoves. economic and political weekly 24, no. 10. sutton, david, & michael hernandez. (2007). voices in the kitchen: cooking tools as inalienable possessions. oral history 35, no. 2, conflicts and continuity. toward clean cooking. the partnership for clean indoor air. http://www.pciaonline.org/. tsen, cho c. (2008). baking practices affect protein quality of flat breads. editorial. hedon household energy network. james, jetter j. & peter kariher. (2009). biomass and bioenergy. research triangle park, nc: united states. environmental protection agency. office of research and development. biomass and bioenergy. van der hoogte, liesbeth, & koos kingma. (2004). promoting cultural diversity and the rights of women: the dilemmas of 'intersectionality' for development organisations. gender & development 12, no. 1. watts, peter. (2008). the value of women's time. hedon household energy network. williams, susan p. (2005). in africa, lifting the pall of smoke from cooking. the washington post. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 6, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 222–239 sustainable development indicators: the tyranny of methodology revisited dr simon bell communication and systems department open university, uk s.g.bell@open.ac.uk professor stephen morse centre for environmental strategy university of surrey, uk s.morse@surrey.ac.uk abstract indicators are increasingly dominating our lives; whether we are aware of it or not. they have been popular tools for sustainable development policy makers, planners and managers, largely because they do the hard work of condensing complexity into single values that can be more easily digested and acted upon. but much power rests with those who select the indicators deemed to be important. this paper explores some of these issues at what is now regarded by some as the new frontier in „indicatorology‟; their use and influence. the authors argue that a new tyranny of methodology may be at play. author’s note dr. simon bell is a senior lecturer in information systems at the open university. his background is multidisciplinary, with a strong emphasis on research methods development, information systems design and monitoring and evaluation. simon co-developed and refined the information systems analysis and design methodology „multiview‟ and developed various project planning methods. working with the european union and unep he worked across the mediterranean on a series of coastal area management projects refining and adapting participatory methods in information collection and presentation from a diverse variety of stakeholder groups. more recently, with professor stephen morse, he has co-developed the triple task method for the european union fp7 programme. the method innovates in the area of engaging with and exploring group dynamics in a range of stakeholder participatory engagements. dr. bell has written and published widely in the areas of participatory methods, information systems and methodology development. stephen morse is chair in systems analysis for sustainability at the centre for environmental strategy, university of surrey. his background is in the biological sciences, with a specialism in the theory and practice of sustainability. steve has been involved in sustainable development projects and research for nearly 30 years, and his research interests are broad spanning both the natural and social sciences. research projects have included work on the socioeconomic impacts of genetically modified crops, the analysis of partnership within faith-based aid chains and the influence of indicators on policy (with simon bell). steve is an author of more than 80 research papers and 15 books including „sustainability; a biological perspective‟ consilience morse and bell: sustainable development indicators (cambridge university press) and various joint publications with simon bell on sustainability indicators (earthscan). he is a fellow of the royal geographical society (frgs), the higher education academy (fhea) and the institute of biology (fibiol cbiol). keywords: indicators, methods, gdp, gpi, beyond gdp 1. background: tyranny from 1994-2010 the raison d‟etre for this article is to return to a paper from 1994 and explore our current state with regards to what was then described as a „tyranny of methodology‟ and which has been referred to variously in the journal public administration and development (juma and clark 1995; bell 1997; cook 1997; bell 1999; bell 2000; stout 2010) and elsewhere as tyrannic approaches (for example see: blunt 1997; parkinson 2009). the 1994 paper (bell 1994) observed that, in much the same way as conventional empires are often experienced as tyrannical, projecting dominant mindsets and approaches onto subjugated (powerless) populations, so the products of western intellectualism can also be seen in terms of tyranny (see: ronzoni 2009), oppressing local population and enforcing subtle forms of domination. other journals have recently explored a similar area – that of multiple knowledge and the potential role for certain forms of technocratic dominance in development discourses (leach, sumner and waldman 2008; reynolds 2008; wilson 2008). ironically, forms of intended or unintended dominance are seen as being evident even for methods which are regarded by their proponents as „participatory‟ and intended to be „liberating‟ and „empowering‟ for peoples of the developing world (cleaver 1999; cooke and kothari 2001; sangiovanni 2007). a key element of the 1994 paper was contained in the definition of the tyranny of methodology: “ tyranny 'exercise of power over subjects and others with a rigour not authorised by law or justice” (websters new international dictionary) in the 1994 paper this definition was extended to the area of applied intellect in method: “tyranny defies both law and justice in its impact upon its subject. the key factor here is the idea that methods ..... are often not justified by context (without adaptation). they are imposed in an arbitrary fashion without regard to what would be just or lawful. they are exercised with immense power over a population who have little capacity to either reject or modify them.” 224 consilience table 1: the piaget kopolowitz. model source: mcarthur, 1990. figure 1: the western mindset. source: bell, 1994 this was linked to the „western tradition‟: “and its effect on methodology transfer. the key feature of this section is the linkage made between the western culture, its use of a certain type of scientific tradition (related to reductionism) and the way in which science provides methodologies in its own image” (bell 1994 page 325) consilience morse and bell: sustainable development indicators the self-fulfilling power of the reductionistic mindset was presented in a diagram (figure 1). figure 1 sets out the hypothesis behind the original article – an intellectual self-fulfilling prophecy, where the mindset determines the approach which in turn justifies and legitimises the nature of enquiry. in the original paper examples of tyranny were drawn from development practice in projects, participatory engagement and ict. in this article, we see the extension of this trend into the domain of indicators and is specificallyillustrated by the dominance of one economic indicator in particular – the gross domestic product (gdp). for the non-economists amongst the readership, gdp is a measure of the monetary flow in an economy, and managers try to maintain a steady increase in that flow with time as a indicator that the economy is growing and by implication that at least some people are „better off‟ than they were. tyranic mindsets are expressive of the idea that we know by means which we accept we know and ways of knowing which do not conform to our way of knowing are not legitimate (an issue also alluded to by reynolds: reynolds 2008). in this sense, ideas at variance to the tyranny do not count because they do not obey the underlying rules and laws. thus, for example, we might have what we call the „gdp worldview‟ where nation-states are „managed‟ to enhance gdp ahead of almost all other concerns. our argument is that gdp worldview is itself an expression of the reductionist mindset whereby a complex set of potential concerns is in reality reduced to a focus on but one. recently, we have been engaged in a series of participatory engagements with professionals from malta, finland and slovakia working in the field of sustainable development indicators and were struck by correspondences and resonances between two „realities‟. on the one hand, the apparent contemporary „invisibility‟ of concepts of methodological tyranny and, on the other, the dominance of certain methodological artifacts – such as international indicators of many kinds – on these groups. they raised various concerns, some of which are well known such as the dominance of economic indicators in framing policy instruments and other ideas such as the notion of a „natural selection‟ process amongst indicators where fitness for survival is not necessarily related to technical excellence of the indicator but to its „appeal.‟ an example of one of the outputs from the workshops is provided as figure 2. this is a rich picture produced by one of the groups from slovakia. the imagery is rich indeed; the see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil symbols were used to describe the tyranny which indicators can help impose. gdp is off the scale in the middle of the picture and looked over by politicians who themselves are puppets of major international funders. in the bottom right hand corner, purposely cut off from the rest of the picture, are the more „quality of life‟ type of indices such as the genuine progress indicator (gpi), but more of that later in the paper. while there are positives in this picture it has to be said that the overwhelming message is negative and it is not hard to see why this had an impact on us. indeed for many of the groups involved in the workshops „poor‟ indicators could be successful if they met certain demands, such as allowing politicians to use them to advocate an already established policy. thus it seems that indicators in general – and the methodologies which they are derived from and not only those that portray economic factors, may be used to enforce intellectual and cultural positions rather than help in any positivist sense of facilitating evidence-based policy. in this paper we explore these correspondences and what they might mean for sustainable development. 226 consilience figure 2: one of the rich pictures which emerged from the slovakian workshop on sustainable development. source: obtained from the slovakian workshop on sustainable development 2. the indicator story it is a truism to suggest that society is surrounded by and, to some extent governed by, indicators (morse, 2004). an indicator can be defined from the latin as consilience morse and bell: sustainable development indicators indicare: to proclaim or to say – “to point out or to direct to knowledge” (webster dictionary). this definition provides enormous room for interpretation and development and, over the last 100 years many agencies and powerful groups have made good use of this room. an indicator can be a quantitative signal, as with the social development indicators promulgated by the world bank, the human development index created by the undp or the index of multiple deprivation used in the uk, or as qualitative as the outcome of a focus group exploring the use of a new kind of olive oil. indicators „direct us to knowledge‟ and this direction can be conscious and planned (as in the case of career defining exam results or university league tables) or unconsciously absorbed (for example the tacit adoption of information about how well a football team may be playing, traffic congestion or indeed the weather). these are interchangeable of course as it is possible to give a number to anything. thus a perception („gut feel‟) as to how dirty the streets may seem can be translated into a numerical „score‟. thus indicator development and interpretation is more art than science and the room for subjectivity in all stages of their application is large. the indicator world is vast and constantly changing. to add to this complexity, indicators are not „fixed‟ or „true‟. a recent study (ichoku 2010) reiterates the importance of variations in context in indicator application. this is an issue we will expand upon in terms of certain dominant forms of international indicator, notably gdp. anecdotally it would seem that economics is still the main concern for the indicator business and, in the research we describe in this article it was interesting to see how the dominance of economic indicators in policy continued to be highlighted by those taking part. possibly this is more remarkable if we note the efforts made for some years now to broaden out the notion of how we envisage and define „development‟ by including social concerns (as in human development) and indeed the environment (sustainable development). for example, the hdi was created by undp in part because it wanted a counter to what it saw as the dominance of economic indicators in international development (morse, 2004). the very first human development report which published a league table of countries ranked by their hdi was published in 1990; 20 years ago! a question emerging from this observation is to consider why, despite all this effort, economic indicators persisted in their dominance to this day? 3. themes and issues for methodological tyranny: gdp as the prime offender? there are various ways in which the amount of money flowing in an economy can be measured. for example, one could measure income or expenditure, and in a closed economy where there are no outflows or where money is not hidden away under mattresses then these would be the same. taking the expenditure approach to gdp, one measures the flow of money when it changes hands to pay for goods and services and the following is a simple equation: 228 consilience where: gdp = gross domestic product c = consumers‟ expenditure on goods and services g = government expenditure on goods and services i = investment ex = exports im = imports components „c‟ and „g‟ are the expenditures (c is often much larger then g) and the (ex – im) component adjusts for flows across the border. „investment‟ (i) refers to private domestic investment and is a somewhat complex component to assess in practice. economists often measure the year on year or 3 month (quarterly) change in gdp. if the change in gdp is negative over two quarters (economy has shown a decline for a period of 6 successive months) then this is technically defined as a recession. the debate about use of indicators in the contemporary world was kicked into life in 2007 with the high-level conference hosted by the european commission, european parliament, club of rome, oecd and wwf entitled „beyond gdp‟ (www.beyond-gdp.eu). arising from this conference emerged the report (commission_of_the_european_communities 2009). the report underlined the vital importance of gdp but also its limitations: “gdp has also come to be regarded as a proxy indicator for overall societal development and progress in general. however, by design and purpose, it cannot be relied upon to inform policy debates on all issues. critically, gdp does not measure environmental sustainability or social inclusion and these limitations need to be taken into account when using it in policy analysis and debates.” (commission of the european communities 2009 page 2). this quote from the commission highlights the way in which gdp has been used as a bellwether for society as a whole. or, to put it another way, a knowledge technology imposed on the world explicitly promoting a certain kind of vision. it is applied as a means to tell not just policy makers, but citizens in general, how well a society is functioning. however, gdp does nothing more than measure the size of an economy, or more accurately how much money is being circulated in an economy. indeed gdp is related to population size; the more people there are in a nation state then the greater the flow of money. that is why economists prefer to use gdp/capita as a measure of national wealth. for example, in terms of national gdp the usa ranks 1st amongst nation-states according to the international monetary fund in 2010 with luxembourg coming in at a lowly 70th position. yet in terms of gdp/capita the usa is only 9th while luxembourg is 1st. even so, the use of this indicator is a salutary reminder of how powerful and even potentially tyrannic an indicator can be. of course it is not right to „shoot the messenger‟ and gdp is primarily a means to provide important information for those meant to manage an economy, but the use consilience morse and bell: sustainable development indicators of the message, its political importance and the way in which this imposes social orders on the rest of us is important to understand. the fact that gdp tells us nothing wider, deeper and more holistic about the systemic nature of combined aspects of society, for example about physical or emotional health, environmental health, human happiness or moral and emotional balance (all features which people regard as being central to balanced development and which find echo in the piaget model of cognitive development) seems lost in focus on an apparent economic imperative. in order to address the perceived weakness and potential for tyranny of gdp the european commission suggested five changes to help take us „beyond‟ that indicator: 1. complementing gdp with environmental and social indicators 2. provision of near real-time information for decision makers 3. more accurate reporting on distribution and inequalities 4. developing a european sustainable development scorecard 5. extending national accounts to environmental and social issues the fact that this kind of activity is being undertaken by such a major agency as the european commission adds weight to the impression that indicators, even the most important indicators, are not fulfilling the task expected of them – primarily to guide policy. alternatively, of course, we could see the flip side of the argument; that we have become fixated on indicators that we have created but which only reflect narrow aspects of our well-being. indeed it is noteworthy how one of the counters to the dominance of gdp in the above list is to complement it with other indicators (morse, 2004). either way, indicators might be argued to be the symptom of the state involving itself in the lives of citizens, yet at the same time, the means for the state to be monitored and assessed on evidence by active citizen participation. in short, indicators represent a paradox. they would appear to be constructs of our time with lengthy antecedence. they are everywhere and used by all of us but most of the use is unconscious or invisible. the human brain and our senses are „hard wired‟ to look for such indicators routinely as we try to make sense of a complex world, even if for the most part we are unaware that it is happening. at the same time, we may think that indicators are strange and perhaps rather inhuman in that they are clinical algorithms. they do not comprehend nuance or discretion in their expression. as already suggested, they can intrude into parts of our life that are implicitly value-laden. measuring immeasurable human qualities such as „development‟ and thus making generalisations about key concerns such as health, wealth, education and even happiness. trying to measure something which is not universally constant in terms of meaning would seem to be an exercise doomed to failure. yet we now have indicators that assess „quality of life‟ and „wellbeing‟. it is hard to identify filaments of human activity into which indicators have not intruded (for a general discussion see: verbruggen and kuik 1991). in an era of evidence based policy these issues often go hand-in-hand with a need to know whether the resources being used to improve something are effectively achieving impact. given all of this, with objectivity being key, indicators and their related algorithms have emerged as an important way for „us‟ to know „it‟, but the key here is: who is „us‟, 230 consilience what is „it‟, and how do we „know‟? these three terms bring out the nexus of the issues around indicators and the methods for their collection. it can be argued that the growth of indicator use is itself a proxy indicator for a move away from the local and „knowable‟ to bigger and less personal scales where „knowing‟ has to take on a different form. we argue that this „shift‟ is (ironically at a time when localism is gaining political support) an indicator of the demise of the importance of localized, human understanding. instead the indicator generalises and provides anonymity. there can be little disagreement that post-industrial society needs to understand itself in order to govern itself. localized and intimate understandings are not enough,. big society needs big tools, and the key tool used to date is gdp. but, and this is an important but, even with the best tools, the way they are applied – in short our understanding of who needs to know what in order to do something – is far from perfectly understood (eloquently argued in: chambers 1997). indicators are a cultural artifact of our times. ralph lee may have intimated it in „the wired nation‟ in 1972 (lee 1972). michael traber assessed myths and realities in „the myth of the information revolution‟ in 1986 (traber 1986) and pointed to the need for localized communication to be the prize of post-industrial society rather than technological fizz in the northern economies. but there are ethical dimensions to indiscriminate indicator hegemony. as the experts of indicator making and the related policy makers evolve the matrix of indicators which measure most aspects of contemporary life there are inevitable mistakes. a significant problem is that indicators are a reflection of what a particular context (set in a time and space) deems to be important. they are intellectual constructs derived from a cultural milieu, not laws of nature. thus the indicators which measure oil spillage, volcanic ash density and fish stocks can all be contested. this means that the application of an indicator is the beginning and not the end of a process. the indicator tells us something about it. we then do something about it. these are easy words which have manifold consequences. thinking back to the definition of stages of development, the indicator world certainly conforms to the first four levels in the piaget koplowitz model – from sense making to logical and rational analysis .. relevance to the higher, more systemic levels is much more debatable. 4. indicators: a tyranny of methodology? given the limitations of the gdp outlined above it is perhaps not that surprising that people have tried to improve upon it, and the „beyond gdp‟ debate already alluded to is in fact just a recent manifestation of what many have already tried to achieve and indeed continue to strive for (bartelmus 1987; fleurbaey 2009). indeed the statement give earlier that “gdp has also come to be regarded as a proxy indicator for overall societal development and progress in general” can hardly be regarded as a new discovery for 2009. it is in fact a clarion call with significant antecedence. some have tried to put forward counter-indicators to the gdp such as the hdi, although ironically the hdi since birth has had gdp/capita as one of its components (it is intended as a proxy for income). there have also been many attempts to re-design gdp from its foundations to include social and environmental concerns and thereby take it „beyond‟ a narrow measure of monetary flow, and an example is the genuine consilience morse and bell: sustainable development indicators progress indicator (gpi) created by the organization „redefining progress‟ (lawn 2003). the gpi is in fact the latest manifestation of the „index of sustainable economic welfare‟ (daly, cobb and cobb 1994)from the late 1980s and before that the measure of economic welfare developed by william nordhaus and james tobin in the early 1970s. the gpi keeps the fundamental emphasis on monetary flow as discussed above but attempts to incorporate components which are deemed important in terms of quality of life and the environment but which are far less easy to measure and often don‟t appear in the estimation of gdp; especially in the „c‟ component. the value of c is reduced as the degree of unevenness in income increases (i.e. the higher the value of idi). once this adjustment is made the value of the gpi is found as follows: gpi = cw + social benefits social costs environmental costs ± nci ± nfb nci and nfb are net capital investment and net foreign borrowing respectively. note the absence of a „g‟ (government expenditure) component as was set out for gdp. exactly what comprises „social benefits,‟ „social costs‟ and „environmental costs‟ is set by redefining progress and varies depending upon the version of the gpi. for example, it may include the economic value of household work, parenting and volunteer work as „benefits‟ and crime and commuting to work as „costs‟ (please see talbeth, cobb and slattery 2007 or more detail). in basic terms the „social benefits‟ category increases gdp as it includes „expenditure‟ not usually included within c (such as volunteer and house work). the two „costs‟ categories exert a negative pressure on the gdp. these adjustments to gdp can be significant. for example, the us economy in 2004 had an „environmental cost‟ adjustment of nearly $4,000 per capita. a plot of real gdp from 1960 to 2004 is shown as figure 2. gdp has shown a steady increase from 1950 to 2004 while gpi has been more or less level since the mid 1970s. this difference suggests that while the economy may have expanded over those 44 years it can be argued that the net benefits to society (once negative impacts have been taken into account) have grown at a much slower rate. other examples of the gpi based upon different sets of assumptions for the calculation over spatial and time scales can be found in hamilton (hamilton 1999) and costanza et al. (2004). 232 consilience figure 3: comparison of the gdp and gpi for the us economy 1960-2004source: talberth, 2007. thus while gpi and gdp offer two differing perspectives for an economy, they do share an emphasis on economic measures (as one might expect) and thus have much in common. indeed clarke (clarke 2007) has argued that they would benefit by having more in common than they do. however, the adjustments made in the gpi are not immune from criticism precisely because they are so value laden (neumayer 2000; lawn 2003; clarke 2007). all the adjustments in table 3 can be critiqued for one reason or another. indeed is there any evidence that the gpi, for all its appeal and logic, is succeeding in replacing the gdp? to be frank, the answer has to be a resounding no! figure 3 is a plot of the number of newspaper articles that mention the „gross domestic product‟ from january 1992 till the end of december 2009. these are articles that have appeared in uk national newspapers and the numbers in each year from the late 1990s are in the thousands with an overall total of 39,300 articles. over this same period the number of articles mentioning the gpi is only nine! the gdp is clearly way ahead of the gpi in terms of its reporting, and it should be noted that those responsible for writing the vast majority of the articles are journalists, albeit that many of them may well have training in economics. the advantages of the gpi and the problems with gdp that it seeks to address are not lost to this group; the nine articles set out much the same arguments as have been summarised here albeit in more colourful form. the following quote provides a flavour (with emphases provided by us). “a big part of the problem is the obsession with economic growth. many people, including most politicians, seem to regard economic growth as the universal panacea. once we have more growth, they claim, we will be able to solve our problems and we will 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 8 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 b ill io n s u s$ year gpi gdp consilience morse and bell: sustainable development indicators all feel better. in fact, the opposite is true. there is a lot of evidence that indicates that, after a certain stage of economic development has been reached, economic growth makes things worse, not better.” the herald (glasgow); may 17, 2004; page 13 figure 4: trend in the number of articles (uk national newspapers) mentioning the “gross domestic product” at least once and the annual growht rate of gdp (%) for the uk. source: talberth, 2007. given that there is awareness as to what gpi attempts to achieve, why has it not had a much higher profile?? why does gdp continue to be so dominant over all these years when its problems are so apparent?. in effect the gdp is arguably so ingrained as a measure of the economy that it would be difficult indeed for any other measure, even if founded on clear logic, to make inroads. interestingly, in figure 3 the reporting of the gdp does have a relationship with the annual growth rate of gdp; as the latter declines then reporting increases. the pervasiveness of that indicator seems to be so strong that it goes hand-in-hand with economic performance. bad news does appear to have „legs‟. is it any better for any of those indicators that attempt to introduce balance to the dominance of gdp? after all, the hdi has a major international organisation behind it (undp) with offices all of the world and far more resource than „redefining progress‟ has with its gpi. over the same period (january 1992 till the end of december 2009) the number of articles that mentioned the hdi in the national press of the uk was 356. admittedly this is a more impressive showing than the nine articles of the gpi but it still pails into insignificance relative to gdp. thus it would appear that the „beyond gdp‟ ethos has a long hard road to travel in terms of breaking the dominance of the tyranny of gdp. after all, it is not 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 8 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 b ill io n s u s$ year gpi gdp 234 consilience a tyranny coming from any one individual or group of individuals, but a whole structure of policy, management, reporting, conveyers of information and indeed the public – based on a reductive view of the values of human life. it is we who give life and „legs‟ to indicators; not the other way around. it is we who opt to give gdp its longevity. 5. discussion indicators are arguably another manifestation of tyranny of method. the gdp example illustrates how an indicator can become so dominant that it is almost impossible for it to be dethroned, even if apparently sensible (at least to some) alternatives are created and promoted. however, the importance of gdp as a cultural artifact is also a symbol of the dominant value system of our time. the study of history can be argued to be the perusal of changing cultural artifacts. we cannot literally commune with past society, but we can observe and interpret the artifacts which it created. a historian looking at the intellectual artifacts of the 20th and 21st centuries might conclude that s/he was observing:  the beginnings of a sense of global awareness  supported by global monitoring and evaluation systems  aimed at supporting rounded human livelihoods  expressed against rising crises in terms of resources and environment  but based upon highly restrictive (i.e. monetary) measures of value by this we mean, if the visual spectrum is a small percentage of the entire electro magnetic spectrum (about 10%), then the gdp spectrum can be argued to be a similarly tiny percentage of the true measurement of human lives and experience. the 1994 paper inferred that narrow mindsets and restricted methods were limiting and yet directing development. we suggest that this tyranny is continuing and expanding, although the form of expression may have changed. the indicators which govern our lives are still largely based upon narrow conceptions of value, they are imposed for significant and undemocratic policy formulation upon populations which have not been consulted (such as in greece and the republic of ireland) and, their authors are largely anonymous and removed from any form of accountability. following this argument, both the definition of tyranny taken from webster‟s and the characteristics of the early stages in the piaget /koplowitz model are satisfied – 2011 is not very different from 1994. in fact, we could go so far as to suggest that the developmental curve has progressed without surprise or change. what held true in the mindset for the method builders of development practice in 1994 holds true in exactly the same way for the indicator manufacturers of 2011. so what is the future of „beyond gdp‟? well it has to be stressed again that there is nothing new in the „beyond gdp‟ message promoted in recent years by major international agencies such as the european commission and world wide fund for nature. at one level it was no more than a repeat call for society to move beyond purely monetary-based measures of development. in other words, we have been here before and even the „answers‟ put forward by the „beyond gdp‟ supporters have a very familiar ring, a fact that in itself is a little disturbing. as to whether the promotion of „beyond gdp‟ will make a difference this time around it consilience morse and bell: sustainable development indicators is hard to say. since the financial crisis of 2007/08 there is little so far to suggest that the rhetoric has shifted, as born out in microcosm by the rise of gdp within the uk national press and the emphasis of governments on driving down deficits irrespective of the social consequences in the short term. it is indeed hard to see at present how „beyond gdp‟ has made a tangible difference to this mindset. the recent (2010) calls from david cameron (the british prime minister), for a measure of „happiness‟ to be developed for the uk may indeed sound „new‟ but is only an echo of similar calls that have resonated through the decades. bhutan developed its index of „gross national happiness‟ (gnh) in the 1970s, again as a response to a perceived dominance of gdp but which was aided by a deep rooting of the concept in buddhism. but this only brings us back to the use of such indices as devices to aid policy instrumentation; the implied need to manage to maximise the index. will gnh really provide as good or indeed better target for maximisation than gdp? will happiness be a new form of tyranny? while the literature is growing there is still much space for exploration. it should also be mentioned, in fairness, that there has been growing support for a new system of integrated environmental and economic accounting (seea), or what can be called „green accounting‟, to include changes in the stock of environmental assets at the scale of the nation state (auty 2007; bartelmus 2007; dietz and neumayer 2007; lange 2007; lawn 2007) but while this may be a step in the right direction does it go far enough? indeed maybe it can be argued that it is not gdp per se that is the problem so why should we try and go „beyond‟ it? after all, it is arguably the dominant thinking of what the world should be that creates the demand in the first place which gdp fulfils. thus, and perhaps ironically, even the term „beyond gdp‟ is misleading as it misses the very essence of what indicators are and why we made them. gdp is a cultural artifact and a symptom of our mindset, not its creator. maybe the very phrase „beyond gdp‟ employed by the eu and others is itself symptomatic and unintentionally supportive of the very tyranny of indicators which it tries to question? the reification of a single indicator as the centerpiece of a movement that seeks to question the damaging oversimplification of one of the most prominent indicators can only be the source of rich irony – and a sharp intake of breath. 6. conclusion an important additional factor, imminent in 1994 and now rampant, is what castells has called the rise of the network society (castells 1996). indicators, universal in scope and easily accessible via google and other search engines, are a significant manifestation of the products of the network, holding social order together by amplifying the tyranny, mirroring the order and simplifying (dumbing down or even distorting?) the message. as castells puts it: “it is the beginning of a new existence, and indeed the beginning of a new age, the information age, marked by the autonomy of culture vis-à-vis the material bases of our existence. but this is not necessarily an exhilarating moment. because, alone at last in our human world, we shall have to look at ourselves in the mirror of historical reality. and we may not like the vision.” (castells 1996 page 478) 236 consilience for those interested in hearing more about indicators and their uses and influence within sustainable development there is an open university podcast available at http://itunes.open.ac.uk/r/cptcj9. http://itunes.open.ac.uk/r/cptcj9 consilience morse and bell: sustainable development indicators bibliography auty, r. 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"our knowledge ourselves: engineers (re)thinking technology in development." journal of international development 20(6): 739 750. microsoft word 02112008 sanchez millennium villages.doc the african millennium villages pedro sanchez1,†, cheryl palm1,†, jeffrey sachs1,†,, glenn denning1, rafael flor1, rebbie harawa1, bashir jama2, tsegazeab kiflemariam1, bronwen konecky1, raffaela kozar1, eliud lelerai1, alia malik1, patrick mutuo1, amadou niang1, herine okoth1, frank place3, sonia ehrlich sachs1, amir said1, david siriri 1, awash teklehaimanot1, karen wang1, justine wangila1 and colleen zamba2 abstract: we describe the concept, strategy and initial results of the millennium villages project (mvp) and implications regarding sustainability and scalability. our underlying hypothesis is that the interacting crises of agriculture, health, and infrastructure in rural africa can be overcome through targeted public-sector investments to raise rural productivity, and thereby to increased private-sector saving and investments. this is carried out by empowering impoverished communities with science-based interventions. 78 millennium villages have been initiated in 12 sites in 10 african countries, each representing a major agroecological zone in early results, the research villages in kenya, ethiopia and malawi have reduced malaria prevalence, met caloric requirements, generated crop surpluses, enabled school feeding programs, and provided cash earnings for farm families. 1 the earth institute at columbia university, 405 low library, mc 4335, 535 west 116th street new york, ny 10027 2 united nations development programme, 1 un plaza new york, ny, 10017 3 world agroforestry centre, un avenue, po box 30677-00100 gpo nairobi, kenya. *corresponding author. sanchez@iri.columbia.edu; 1-845-365-8330 † sanchez, palm and sachs are primary authors of this work. other co-authors have collected and analyzed the data or provided crucial contributions to the concepts. this work is copyrighted by the proceedings of the national academy of sciences consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 2 introduction: at the millennium summit in september 2000, world leaders set forth quantified and time bound goals---the millennium development goals (mdgs)---to cut extreme poverty, hunger, disease, gender inequality, environmental degradation, and lack of access to safe drinking water and sanitation. in january 2005 the un millennium project released a series of reports identifying practical ways to achieve the mdgs2. while the mdgs have been generally accepted as the world’s goals, there are questions and controversies about how to attain them. sub-saharan africa is the only region still severely off-track to reach the mdgs by 20152. several biophysical and economic constraints impede sub-saharan africa’s escape from extreme poverty including extremely low productivity of food production3, heavy burden of infectious disease4,5, and insufficient core infrastructure in water, roads, power and telecommunications6,7. rationale: the poverty trap in africa results from the extreme shortage of productive capital in the rural areas where over 70% of the population lives. a sub-subsistence living standard means that survival is dependent on low or zero financial saving, and the depletion of natural capital, a form of dis-saving. poverty prohibits african households from self-financing farm inputs on the open market, and the lack of collateral and high transactions costs prohibit the finance of inputs through market-based credits. risk of drought add to the barrier of market-based financing of the poor. the result is that a high proportion of households plant their crops without improved inputs (seeds, fertilizers), and soils become depleted of nutrients after repeated crop cycles without sufficient nutrient replenishment7. there is little scope for net positive saving or environmental sustainability. just as africa’s food crisis is a reflection of the interaction of biophysical and economic factors, so too is the health crisis. disease burdens reflect an interaction of tropical climates, disease vectors unique to africa, and the lack of basic public health services 1, 3, 4. malaria and aids stand out as uniquely high burdens in africa, and both have run rampant in recent decades because of a lack of adequate public health response, which in turn has been hampered by the lack of adequate financing of public health measures. hunger and disease also interact with low food intake and nutritional deficiencies leading to reduced immune response. high disease burdens (such as infection with soil-transmitted parasites) result in reduced nutritional intake 2. high child mortality blocks the demographic transition to low fertility rates, and rapid population growth and large families exacerbate poverty. finally, poverty also contributes to poor governance which in turn exacerbates poverty. the result is a poverty trap in which poverty, hunger, 2 un millennium project, investing in development. a practical plan to achieve the millennium development goals (earthscan, 2005). 3 un millennium project, halving hunger it can be done. task force on hunger (earthscan, 2005). pa sanchez, ms swaminathan, science 307:357 (2005); lancet 365: 442 (2005). 4 un millennium project, combating aids in the developing world (earthscan, 2005), 5 un millennium project, coming to grips with malaria in the new millennium (earthscan, 2005). 6 un millennium project, health, dignity and development: what will it take? task force on water and sanitation (earthscan, 2005). 7un millennium project, energy services for the millennium development goals. (world bank, 2005). consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 3 disease, rapid population growth, environmental degradation, and poor governance are all mutually reinforcing. the “washington consensus” imposed by the breton woods institutions during the 1980’s and 1990’s did not address these underlying factors, and did not enable tropical sub saharan africa to escape from the poverty trap 1. approach: the underlying hypothesis of the un millennium project is that the multifaceted nature of poverty in rural africa can be overcome through targeted public-sector investments to raise rural productivity, leading to increased private-sector savings and investments. by significantly augmenting the capital stock of households and the community in several dimensions, the poverty trap can be escaped. several kinds of capital need to be increased: natural (soil nutrients), infrastructure (roads, power, telecoms), human (skills and health), and financial (household assets, collateral, microfinance). the key is to raise the capital stock above a threshold level, above which the village can move towards self-sustaining economic growth8. ideally this would be carried out on a large scale, involving an entire region or nation in capital accumulation along these lines. the un millennium project recommended that such capital investments be made at an appropriate magnitude and time scale, tackling all sectors with costs shared by communities, governments and donors 1. this approach contrasts with projects that emphasize macroeconomic stability or incremental steps in a single sector. such public investments at scale initiate a positive dynamic of saving and growth which supports private sector investments in two ways. first, household incomes rise above subsistence, so that householdbased capital accumulation and microfinance become feasible. second, the existence of good roads, power and telecoms encourages the inflow of capital from outside investors. the initial economic takeoff usually occurs in agriculture with the transformation of sub-subsistence communities into commercial farming communities which are able to save, invest, and diversify into productive non-farm work the public-sector investments are designed to stimulate, rather than replace, private-sector investments. in this sense, the project is consistent with a market-based and mixed-economy strategy of economic development. these investments are underpinned by 3 major science-based initiatives: africa’s green revolution9, the worldwide advances in treating malaria, hiv-aids and neglected tropical diseases 3, 4, and improvements in information technology. 8 jd sachs et al., brookings pap. econ. act. 1, 117 (2004). jd sachs, the end of poverty (penguin, 2005). cb barrett, bm swallow, world dev. 34: 1 (2006). mr carter, cb barrett, j. dev. stud. 42:178 (2006). 9 africa’s green revolution: a call to action (mdg centre, nairobi, 2004). secretary-general calls for “uniquely african green revolution in 21st century to end the continent’s plague of hunger” addis ababa. un press release, july 6, 2004. www.unmilleniumproject.org/html/addis/documents/shtm. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 4 in march 2004, the mvp was developed as a proof of concept that the poverty trap can be overcome and the mdgs achieved by 2015 at the village-scale in rural africa by applying the un millennium project’s recommended interventions in multiple sectors1 at the investment level of $110 per capita per year sustained over a period of 5 to 10 years (table 1). the main principles of the mvp are: • scienceand evidence-based, implementing technologies and practices that have already been proven. • community-based, with a participatory approach to planning, implementation and monitoring that contextualizes the specific set of interventions for each village,. • enhanced by local capacity-development in technical, managerial, and participatory skills. • based on multi-sectoral and integrated interventions. • geared toward gender equality and environmental sustainability • linked to district, national, and global strategies. • supported by partnerships with other development groups. • cost-shared by the community, government and donors. • supported by increased national-scale financing of public goods in line with increased official development assistance (oda) made available to african governments. strategy: the strategy focuses on four interconnected challenges: agricultural productivity, public health, education and infrastructure. the interventions are undertaken as a single integrated project; the synergies and tradeoffs are assessed and highlighted before decisions are made. for example, higher food production consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 5 has positive impacts on health and education, but might also result in children missing school by working on farms. impacts of interventions on gender and the environment are sometime less obvious but critical for long term sustainability. where adverse cross-sector tradeoffs are possible there must be guidelines and incentives or disincentives to minimize them. not all interventions can start at the same time and are phased according to local conditions and priorities. the first phase (usually 12 – 18 months) involves the basics---food, health, water and community empowerment. a generic list of interventions, which are localized for each site, follows: • increased food production. subsidized provision of improved seeds of high-yielding crop varieties or hybrids, the necessary amounts of mineral and organic fertilizers, and training on best agronomic practices, to eliminate hunger months and generate crop surpluses. • malaria control. free distribution of long-lasting insecticide-impregnated bednets (llin’s) for all sleeping sites, preceded by training and followed by monitoring of use, combined with access to anti-malaria medicines, to drastically reduce the disease burden of malaria. • a functional clinic at the village level, staffed by government and community health workers, to provide basic clinical services for infectious diseases, nutritional deficiencies, antenatal care, and attended normal delivery. • safe drinking water points constructed with the eventual aim of having access within 1 km of each household. • community capacity-building, to empower villagers to manage their own development more effectively; and to enhance the sustainability of interventions. another set of interventions follows, building on the first set, and others from additional sectors. • more robust and diversified agriculture using nitrogen-fixing trees and cover crops, organic manures, crop rotations, soil conservation practices, livestock, small-scale water management, improved crop storage, and crop insurance. • expanded health systems, including further malaria control through indoor residual spraying, particularly in epidemic areas; family planning; micronutrient supplementation for vulnerable groups; treatment and prevention of hiv/aids and tb; and improvements in the nearby referral hospital, including emergency obstetrical care. • functioning primary schools: universal enrolment in primary school , with adequate buildings, teachers, materials, separate latrines for girls and boys, drinking water, and a nutritious mid-day meal from locally produced food. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 6 • improved clean water, sanitation and personal hygiene. access to sufficient clean water for domestic consumption, pit latrines at home, and sanitary napkins for adolescent schoolgirls. • infrastructure: upgrading local roads and improving access roads, connecting to the electrical grid and the internet; transportation to and from markets. • expanded links with government and other development partners: steering groups that coordinate local and district-level activities, planning and cost-sharing. • commercial farming and business development: diversifying farm enterprise toward high-value products and linking producer groups to markets. enterprise development through capacity building, access to microfinance and micro-enterprise institutions. • environmental rehabilitation: increasing tree cover, soil conservation structures, agrobiodiversity and carbon sequestration. the first millennium villages were established in sauri, kenya in december 2004, and in koraro, ethiopia in february 2005, with additional villages in 2006, for a total of 12 located in ethiopia, ghana, kenya, malawi, mali, nigeria, rwanda, senegal, tanzania and uganda (see supporting information). each site is in a major agro-ecological zone that together represent the farming systems used by 90% of the agricultural population and 93% of the agricultural land area of sub-saharan africa 10. the sites range from slash-and-burn in rainforest margins to pastoralism in deserts and represent different situations of population density, soils, climate, water access, disease complexes and burdens, environmental degradation, market access, education levels, cultures, religions and gender issues. together the 12 research villages provide a robust framework for proof of concept. 10 calculated from j dixon, a gulliver, d gibbon, farming systems and poverty (fao, 2001). consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 7 initial results: this section includes results from the sauri baseline survey11, annual reports from sauri12 and koraro13 and crop harvest data from malawi14. in 2004, almost 80% of the population of sauri lived below the one-dollar-a-day poverty line 11. land holdings were less than 0.6 ha for 75% of the households with 0.22 to 0.27 ha planted to maize, the staple food crop in 2004. maize grain yields were under 2 t ha-1 with a 0.3 t difference between the lowest and highest income quartile (table 2). over half of the blood smears from the sample population in sauri tested positive for malaria parasites, with the highest prevalence found in the lowest income quartile. only 13% of the households reported having malaria bednets 11. the high levels of anemia, almost 50% of the three lowest income quartiles, are another indication of the high levels of malaria, undernutrition, and intestinal parasites. health: before the project, the nearest health services were provided at the yala sub-district hospital (no electricity, water or doctors) at a distance of around 5 km. the sauri community dispensary was opened in july 2005, with the ministry of health providing a clinical officer, the mvp funding 2 nurses and a laboratory technician, and the community providing community health workers. in the first year, 35,476 patient cases were seen, of whom 72% were sauri residents 12, the others came from surrounding, nonproject villages. the most common diseases treated were malaria, respiratory tract infections, skin conditions, intestinal worms and diarrhea. there was no marked difference in malaria prevalence among residents from sauri that had received bednets and those from outside sauri until october 2005 (fig. 1). after that date, malaria prevalence among sauri residents tested at the clinic fell to one-third of that of non-sauri residents who did not receive bednets. in koraro, ethiopia a clinic did exist, but had essentially no staff or medicines. in 2005, the ministry of health assigned a medical officer, three nurses and a laboratory technician and 5780 patients were treated as compared with 260 patients the previous year 13. prior to bednet distribution in september and october (the two months of peak malaria transmission) of 2005, there were 281 diagnostically confirmed malaria cases seen in the clinic. during the same period of 2006, there were only 143, a 51% reduction 13. agriculture: the results of the initial harvests in 3 research villages are shown in table 3 in comparison with estimates from the pre-project year. in sauri, 2005 maize yields increased 2.6-fold from 2004, averaging 5.0 t ha-1 at the village scale (325 ha).given the availability of inputs for each field they chose to plant, sauri 11 p mutuo, e lelerai, h okoth, j oule, ba ouma, j wangila, ca palm, k wang, b konecky et al, baseline report sauri millennium research village. earth institute at columbia university (new york, 2006). 12 p mutuo, h okoth, c makomere, j oule, g oduong, w ombai, j wariero, b akinyi (2006) annual report for sauri, kenya millennium research village july 2005-june 2006. earth institute at columbia university (new york, 2006) 13 t kiflemariam, a gebretsadik, g kebede, g mehari, t habtetsion, y ye-ebiyo, a. said, h desta, annual report for koraro, ethiopia millennium research village july 2005june 2006 earth institute at columbia university (new york, 2006). 14 r. harawa et al., mwandama millennium villages 2006 annual report, earth institute at columbia university (new york, 2007). consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 8 farmers increased their area planted to maize by almost 50%, all from fields that had been abandoned because of low soil fertility and related weed infestation. the combined effect was a village-wide 3.9-fold increase in maize production and a shift from 43 to 166% of the basic caloric requirements (table 3). all income groups of farmers increased their yields by a similar amount and yields were similar among income quartiles 12. on average families in the lowest income quartile produced 1.8 t of maize, surpassing the 1.1 t requirement for basic food security for a family of 5.7 people. a minimum land area of 0.21 ha is needed to produce that amount of maize for food security and one-third of the households had insufficient area. the fact that pre-intervention yields were similar across income groups and that yields increased similarly across income groups suggests two important points. first, even the relatively wealthy households ($2.6 per day) were not using fertilizer and high-yield seeds before the project; and second, even the poorest households ($0.11 per day) can effectively utilize subsidized agricultural inputs and training. in 2006, yields were even higher, with an average yield of 6.2 t ha-1 (table 3) the area planted increased by about 10% above the 2005 area. in 2006 the village surplus was almost 1300 t and the minimum area needed to produce 1.1 t was reduced to 0.18 ha, meaning that only 27% of the households had insufficient area to reach basic food security. the cost of this upfront investment in fertilizer and seeds supplied by the project was $50 per household planting an average of 0.25 ha to maize in 2005. approximately 11% was paid back through contributions of surplus maize to the school meals program, representing a net subsidy of 89%. for the 2006 maize crop, the subsidy for fertilizer and seed was reduced to $37. some farmers did buy fertilizer and improved seed from the market. in the third year seed and fertilizer subsidies were eliminated for the households in the top three income quartiles, while still fully subsidizing those very small and vulnerable ones. farmers either purchased inputs or obtained loans from a microfinance provider. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 9 koraro, ethiopia is a degraded highland semiarid area with highly variable rainfall. the 2004 year was a severe drought year, yields of the four main cereal grain crops were 0.13 t ha-1, producing only 418 t of grain which met 13% of the village’s caloric food requirement. in 2005, with inputs and good rainfall, average yields quadrupled but still a low level of 0.58 t ha-1 (table 3). koraro farmers also increased their area planted 1.8-fold, resulting in an 8.3-fold increase in total production over 2004. basic food requirements for the village were met. a partition of the yield increases in teff, the main cereal crop, indicates that the effect of a good rainy season without inputs resulted in a yield increase from 0.08 to 0.41 t ha-1. the use of fertilizer without improved seeds, increased teff yields further to 0.59 t ha-1, but the full consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 10 intervention package of fertilizer plus improved seeds combined with good rains resulted in an average yield of 1.20 t ha-1, a 15-fold increase 13. mwandama, malawi suffered from a drought in the year preceding the start of the project. even in good rainy seasons, however, the perennial nitrogen “drought” (i.e. shortage of nitrogen in the soils) result in low maize yields. in the first planting season maize yields increased from 0.8 to 6.5 t ha-1, and the area planted almost doubled, the total maize production increased 15-fold (table 3). maize yields from farms not using improved seeds and fertilizers averaged 2.2 t ha-1, showing that good rains alone accounted for less that half of the yield increase14. no one expects that these village average yields to be replicated at the country scale. malawi did institute a voucher-based 75% subsidy on fertilizers and improved maize seed for the 2005/6 season and as a result national maize production doubled and average maize yields doubled from 0.73 to 1.61 t ha-1.15 crop surpluses minimize risks of food shortages in subsequent years but also serve as the entry point for entering the cash economy. bumper crops also can result in drastic reductions in crop prices, leaving farmers with their surpluses unsold 2. in sauri, farmers were offered only $10 per 90-kg bag of dry maize in august 2005 by local middlemen, less than the official price of about $20. in need of cash to buy essentials farmers normally sell at these prices only later to run out of food and buy back maize for as high as $25 a bag. to buffer such price fluctuations, a cereal bank was established by renting storage space and using project funds to pay farmers the equivalent of $17 per bag. the cereal bank sold the crop at $21 per bag in april 2006, farmers were paid the difference, minus storage and management fees, effectively doubling the price they would have received selling to middlemen 12. in ethiopia a 5-ton truck provided by the project allowed farmers to transport their surplus crop of 84 tons of teff and finger millet which was sold at $39,528 13. following increased food production, diversification to higher-value crops is being promoted. sauri farmers have organized producer groups for onion, tomato, banana, dairy, and mushrooms. many farmers are now shifting about one third of their maize land to these high-value products. microfinance mechanisms, including but not limited to micro-credit are being established, including training in record keeping and accounting. crop insurance schemes are being developed to reduce risks of future crop failures caused by drought. discussion: the mvp aims to demonstrate the feasibility of practical economic transformation in rural tropical africa through targeted multisectoral investments. this approach has similarities and differences with the integrated rural development (ird) approach of the 1970’s and 80’s. the main similarities are simultaneous, complementary interventions, which create synergies and a major initial focus on agricultural productivity, including agro-processing1617. 15 gl denning et al., investing in smallholder agriculture to achieve national and household food security: malawi’s contribution to an african green revolution (mdg centre, nairobi, 2007). 16 da rondinelli, world politics, 31, 389 (1979). 17 j sallinger-mcbride, la picard, comparative politics, 22:1 (1989). consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 11 ird projects were developed by a range of donors and governments with different priorities, resource allocations, designs, execution and duration. in contrast, the mvp model is focused on achieving time-bound and quantitative goals, and promotes a more comprehensive set of sectoral interventions. many ird projects focused on more prosperous areas; world bank programs, for example, were often based in high growth areas 18. also, within chosen areas, ird projects often failed to be pro-poor19. in contrast, the millennium villages are situated in hunger hotspots where at least 20% of children under 5 are underweight 2. ird projects were often based on insufficient experience with local agricultural systems20 and the new farming interventions had seldom been tested with smallholders21. mvp interventions are drawn from technologies and practices that have been proven under similar ecological and socioeconomic conditions. while ird projects were typically top-down, government and community participation is a major feature of the mvp. ownership can be generated by communal efforts and in-cash, in-kind contributions22, a feature of mvp. the 5–10 year commitment of the mvp is longer than the 2-3 year duration of ird projects. although the scale of investment of ird projects is unclear they were probably funded at much lower levels than mvp. beyond these differences, the mvp approach can benefit from three key developments since the ird era: (i) decentralization and devolution of authority to local government; (ii) internationally agreed financial commitments to double oda in africa by 2010, and then further increases to 2015, and (iii) major advances in environmentally-sound agriculture, health and information technology. there have been many attempts to bring a green revolution to africa23. the asian green revolution benefited from high yielding crop varieties, fertile alluvial soils, and irrigation, with crop improvement accounting for 66 to 88% of the yield increases24, the green revolution in africa has not benefited similarly from improved crop varieties 24 but must also redress nutrient depleted soils 7 and little to no irrigation. there is abundant evidence throughout africa on crop yield response to fertilizers, both organic and mineral25. the mvp promotes overcoming nutrient limitations by sufficient rates of both 18 t mkandawire, the world bank and integrated rural development in malawi, working paper no. 1. (council for the development of economics and social research in africa, dakar, 1980). 19 ja binns, dc funnell, geografiska annaler b 65,57 (1983). 20 williams, g., “the world bank and the peasant problem,” chapter 2, in j heyer et al. (eds.), rural development in tropical africa.(macmillan, 1981). 21 dfid, “synthesis of integrated rural development projects,” evaluation summary 438, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev438s.pdf .“rural development in africa: a synthesis of project experience,” evaluation summary 400. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev400s.pdf. (dfid, 2004). 22 ew bresnyan, ma bouquet, f russo, “mbops and the case of ne brazil: the rural poverty eradication program,” (world bank, 2003). 23 g conway, the doubly green revolution; food for all in the 21st century (penguin, 1997). g conway, g. toenniessen, science 299: 1187 (2003). g djurfeldt, h, holmen, m jistro, r. larsson, the african food crisis. lessons from the asian green revolution (cabi, wallingford, uk 2005). 24 re evenson, d. gollin (eds.), crop variety improvement and its effect on productivity: the impact of international agricultural research (cabi, wallingford, uk, 2001). 25 rj buresh, pa sanchez, fj calhoun, (eds.), soil fertility replenishment in africa, spec. pub. 51, soil science society of america (madison, wisconsin, 1997). pa sanchez, rj buresh, rrb leakey, philosophical transactions of the royal society, consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 12 mineral and organic sources of nutrients26. mineral fertilizers are distributed the first year and legume cover crops and trees and composts are promoted the second year. some programs have advocated small quantities of nutrients to get farmers used to fertilizers but at rates insufficient for high yields27. others promoted full rates of plant nutrients and improved seed that have usually produced bumper crops28, but in some cases this resulted in collapsing prices so farmers lost money and were unable to pay back their loans (2). to address this challenge the mvp interventions include a cereal storage and marketing strategy to buffer price fluctuations in anticipation of the bumper harvests. results are still early, though the initial agriculture revolution has began in most sites with high yields and crop surpluses. crop surpluses were used to initiate school meals programs. positive interaction between improved labor productivity (less malaria) and land productivity allow agricultural activities to intensify. the subsequent phases of crop diversification and linking farmers to markets are challenges that have escaped most ird projects but are essential to overcome the poverty trap and achieve the mdgs at the village level. targeted input subsidies are necessary to jump-start increased food production and to sustain yields of both food crops and high-value agricultural products 2. the strategy is to subsidize fertilizers, improved seeds of maize, vegetables, grain legumes, nitrogen-fixing trees, treadle pumps and other inputs through local dealers and provide them with technical training —making a network of agrodealers in rural africa 16. one approach is to use vouchers with information on the farmer’s eligibility for subsidized inputs, limiting them to 1 or 2 bags of fertilizer and 10 kg of improved seed, magnitudes of inputs that are too small to interest large-sale commercial farmers. the vouchers are redeemed for inputs at agrodealers, who get paid by the banks where the subsidies are deposited by governments or donors. such smart subsidy systems overcome many of the mistakes of the past and empower the private sector. partnerships are being developed with companies working across the food chain to ensure quantity, quality, and timely delivery of products. limitations of project design b 352: 949 (1997). kd shepherd, mj soule, agriculture ecosystems and environment 71: 131 (1998). g. nziguheba, ca palm, rj buresh, pc smithson, plant soil 198:159 (1998). rj buresh, pjm cooper (eds.), the science and practice of shortterm improved fallows. agroforestry systems 47 (1999). b vanlauwe, j diels, n sanginga, r. merckx, (eds.), integrated nutrient management in sub-saharan africa: from concept to practice (cabi, wallingford, uk, 2002). m gichuru, a bationo, ma bekunda, hc goma et al (eds.) soil fertility management in africa: a regional perspective (tsbf, nairobi, 2003). a bationo, b waswa, j kihara, j kimetu (eds.), advances in integrated soil fertility management in sub saharan africa, special issue, nutr. cycl. agroecosyst. 76: 2/3 (2006) 26 pa sanchez, changing tropical soil fertility paradigms: from brazil to africa and back. in: a. c. monis et al., (eds.): plant-soil interactions at low ph, pp. 19-28.(brazilian society of soil science, piracicaba, 1997). 27 c mann, higher yields for all smallholders through “best bet” technology: the surest way to restart economic growth in malawi, cimmyt network research results working paper no. 3 (cimmyt, harare 1998). pd seward, d okello, methods to develop an infrastructure for the supply of appropriate fertilizer for use by small-scale farmers in sub saharan africa (sustainable community-oriented development program, ukwala, kenya 1998). j harrigan, food insecurity, poverty and the malawian starter pack: fresh start or false start? institute for development policy and management, university of manchester uk. 28 ma quiñones, ne borlaug, cr dowswell, a fertilizerbased green revolution in africa, soil sci. soc. amer. spec. pub. 51: 81 (1997). consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 13 the mvp is a highly complex project, and as such, faces several limitations recognized at the outset. here we mention scale and controls. first, the scale of each project site (a cluster of a several villages totaling 5,000 – 55,000 people) is determined by available project financing and implementation capacity, but poses several limitations. the sites are not large enough to justify large-scale infrastructure (e.g. a new water-treatment facility) or to justify inflows of foreign buyers for sourcing agricultural-based primary commodities, or to promote foreign investments in processing facilities. they are vulnerable to inflows of people from surrounding areas and might generate resentment in surrounding communities. finally, the project remains vulnerable to political upheaval and to drought which could be better cushioned with national-scale interventions. for these reasons, we should expect that a larger-scale effort than mvp would benefit from important economies of scale that will not be evident in the mvp alone. the scaling up of the key interventions to district and national level is discussed below. for ethical and practical reasons, there are no formal “control” villages, though there is monitoring of district-based indicators to obtain quantitative and qualitative comparisons with the project sites. measurements are based on before-and-after comparisons, and detailed studies by sector, rather than control-vs.-non-control villages. the ethical reasons relate to the fact that many core interventions (e.g. malaria control, access to safe water) are life saving, and would be ethically inappropriate to deny in a control village. moreover, it would not be practically and politically feasible to be deeply involved in monitoring a control village without also offering a substantial package of beneficial interventions, especially in light of the intervention package offered in the intervention villages. nor are individual interventions randomized across or within villages to try to get interventionspecific impacts. in some cases (e.g. the impact of fertilizers and seed varieties on crop yields) the data will allow us to assess the impact of specific interventions. in other cases (e.g. anemia), the outcome will result from several interventions (de-worming, food intake, nutritional supplements, malaria control) and factorspecific responses will be less clear. the fact that key outcomes have multiple and synergistic causes is even more true for more complex outcomes such as school attendance and school performance. sustainability one of the complex issues regarding the mvp is the exit strategy for external donors. the project commits to five years of funding, and anticipates that the community will become economically selfsustaining in commercial farming and non-farm activities within that period. we hypothesize that farmers will be able to procure inputs and sell outputs on a normal market basis at the completion of the first five years of the project, based on higher productivity and greater product diversity. subsidies of farm inputs may continue as part of national policy, but should no longer be necessary from the project itself. the community, however, will not be able to bear the financing for the interventions in health, education, and infrastructure. rather, the national governments should, by the fifth year of the project, have national financing of such interventions out of an expanded budget for such priority investments. all governments in the world are committed to achieving the mdg’s and the rich countries are committed to a significant increase of oda to support the mdgs in the poorest countries. thus, by 2011 (the sixth year of the project for the current millennium villages), the aid received by africa should be more than double consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 14 the 2005 levels, reaching at least $50 billion per year (a per-recipient equivalent of $75-100). this increased aid will be directed in part to expanding government support for critical services in health, education, infrastructure, and that expanded national budget should substitute for financing provided by the mvp in the years to 2011. scalability chances for success of the mvp depend, naturally, on whether the increased government budgets or oda for public goods actually materializes, and whether the types of interventions pioneered by the mvp are thereby expanded to other rural areas in the host countries. if the villages remain islands of prosperity in a sea of unrelenting poverty, then they are more likely to be over-run by in-migration and undermined by neighborhood jealousy. if instead the millennium villages are part of an expanded national-scale effort to achieve the mdgs, then they will benefit from an expanding national market, increased social and political stability, improved national-scale infrastructure, and success in attracting private investments that connect the villages with regional and international markets. as part of the overall millennium project, a senior country advisor based in the capital of each of the 10 countries works with government to assist in bringing the mdgs into the budget and policy process, as well as providing a link to the millennium villages. to encourage that expanded scale, two additional initiatives are being launched. the millennium cities initiative works with the major regional city closest to the millennium villages, in order to improve the urban business environment, to attract foreign investments into the city, and in part to create a market for the increased outputs of the villages and surrounding areas. after the first year of the project several countries in which millennium villages are located are working with the donor community and using their own resources to establish additional villages and also to scale up from the village scale (5,000 people) and “cluster” scale (30,000 -50,000 people) to a millennium district scale (300,000 500,000 people). with interventions applied at a district scale, not only will there be a greater scope of the market, and improved chances for a productive division of labor, but also improved chances for attracting inflows of foreign investment, and for undertaking public investments in roads, power, telecoms, and other sectors, where the scale of investments exceeds what can be accomplished at the village scale. methods: the following methods are described for the first research village in sauri, kenya, but apply as standard protocols and generic intervention strategies for all villages. see supporting information for site selection. baseline assessments: before intervention activities begin, comprehensive baseline assessments are conducted through household surveys, anthropometric and biophysical measurements (see supporting information). these surveys are used to determine baseline mdg initial conditions and targets to meet the mdgs and to monitoring impact of interventions. repeat surveys will be administered in year 3 and 5 (and 10). the content of the survey modules is summarized in supporting information. health baseline data also include consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 15 blood samples to determine nutritional status, levels of anemia, malaria parasite types and infection levels; weights and heights of children less than 5 years, and stool samples for determining parasite loads. an initial demographic survey provides information to stratify the population according to geographic representation and wealth categories. the wealth categories are determined by identifying assets considered important by each of the communities. a comprehensive socioeconomic survey is administered to all households, while the remaining surveys are administered to a stratified sub sample of 300 households –determined by geographic and wealth criteria. malaria control---first phase: in sauri from may to july 2005, 3000 olyset long lasting insecticide-impregnated bednets were distributed free to all households to cover all sleeping sights, roughly 3 nets for every 5 people. nets were distributed after training sessions on malaria prevention, treatment and bednet use by community health workers. the bednets were distributed free of charge because they constitute a public good like immunizations due to their “mass effect” on malaria control at the community level (30). the impact of the llin bednets was determined by comparing malaria incidence of the patients that came to the clinic in sauri between those that had received bednets (sauri residents) and those that had not received bednets (nonresidents). malaria was diagnosed by clinical symptoms and for the questionable cases was confirmed by examination of blood smears for presence of malaria parasites. agriculture – first phase: sauri farmers were provided with 96 kg n ha-1 and 50 kg p ha-1, as diammonium phosphate and urea for topdressing, the full recommended rate of mineral fertilizers for these nitrogen depleted and high phosphorus-fixing oxisols and oxic alfisols. in addition they received high-yielding hybrid maize seed (ws 502 and ws 505) from a local seed company. farmers also requested training on the best agronomic practices, which was done by agricultural extension agents prior to planting. upon receiving the agricultural inputs each farmer signed a document agreeing to use them in their fields and return 10% of their crop surplus to the village schools for the feeding program. similar arrangements took place in the other villages. crop yields were estimated 2-4 weeks prior to harvest from 30-90 farms which have used fertilizer, improved seed and training. this sample is again stratified according to wealth and geographic criteria. in addition, crop yields are estimated from a minimum of 30 farms that did not use improved agricultural inputs. crop estimates per farm are obtained by taking two to three samples from 5 x 5 m quadrants randomly placed within the maize field. sub-samples of the cobs and grain are taken and dried to determine grain yields at 14% moisture content. basic food security for the maize–based villages of sauri and mwandama was estimated as the difference between the amount of maize produced and the caloric requirements for the 5,000 people, consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 16 assuming 2500 calories per person per day29, and that 75% of the caloric requirement is met through consumption of maize, as reported for western kenya30, and that 1 kg of maize provides 3500 calories31. references: aa adesina (2004) making markets work for the poor in africa. in: africa’s green revolution: a call to action, proceedings of the high-level seminar on innovative approaches to meet the hunger millennium development goal in africa, addis ababa, 5 july. (mdg centre, nairobi, 2004). africa’s green revolution: a call to action (mdg centre, nairobi, 2004). secretary-general calls for “uniquely african green revolution in 21st century to end the continent’s plague of hunger” addis ababa. un press release, july 6, 2004. www.unmilleniumproject.org/html/addis/documents/shtm. a bationo, b waswa, j kihara, j kimetu (eds.), advances in integrated soil fertility management in sub saharan africa, special issue, nutr. cycl. agroecosyst. 76: 2/3 (2006) ja binns, dc funnell, geografiska annaler b 65,57 (1983). ew bresnyan, ma bouquet, f russo, “mbops and the case of ne brazil: the rural poverty eradication program,” (world bank, 2003). rj buresh, pa sanchez, fj calhoun, (eds.), soil fertility replenishment in africa, spec. pub. 51, soil science society of america (madison, wisconsin, 1997). pa sanchez, rj buresh, rrb leakey, philosophical transactions of the royal society, b 352: 949 (1997). kd shepherd, mj soule, agriculture ecosystems and environment 71: 131 (1998). g. nziguheba, ca palm, rj buresh, pc smithson, plant soil 198:159 (1998). rj buresh, pjm cooper (eds.), the science and practice of short-term improved fallows. agroforestry systems 47 (1999). g conway, the doubly green revolution; food for all in the 21st century (penguin, 1997). g conway, g. toenniessen, science 299: 1187 (2003). g djurfeldt, h, holmen, m jistro, r. larsson, the african food crisis. lessons from the asian green revolution (cabi, wallingford, uk 2005). gl denning et al., investing in smallholder agriculture to achieve national and household food security: malawi’s contribution to an african green revolution (mdg centre, nairobi, 2007). dfid, “synthesis of integrated rural development projects,” evaluation summary 438, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev438s.pdf .“rural development in africa: a synthesis of project experience,” evaluation summary 400. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev400s.pdf. (dfid, 2004). re evenson, d. gollin (eds.), crop variety improvement and its effect on productivity: the impact of international agricultural research (cabi, wallingford, uk, 2001). fao, food and nutrition technical report series 1. (fao, rome, 2004). 29 fao, food and nutrition technical report series 1. (fao, rome, 2004). 30 r rommelse, natural resources problems, priorities and policies working paper 2001-2. (icraf, nairobi, 2001). 31 ae okoruwa, jg kling, iita research guide 33 (iita, ibadan, nigeria, 1996). consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 17 r. harawa et al., mwandama millennium villages 2006 annual report, earth institute at columbia university (new york, 2007). t kiflemariam, a gebretsadik, g kebede, g mehari, t habtetsion, y ye-ebiyo, a. said, h desta, annual report for koraro, ethiopia millennium research village july 2005june 2006 earth institute at columbia university (new york, 2006). c mann, higher yields for all smallholders through “best bet” technology: the surest way to restart economic growth in malawi, cimmyt network research results working paper no. 3 (cimmyt, harare 1998). j harrigan, food insecurity, poverty and the malawian starter pack: fresh start or false start? institute for development policy and management, university of manchester uk. t mkandawire, the world bank and integrated rural development in malawi, working paper no. 1. (council for the development of economics and social research in africa, dakar, 1980). p mutuo, e lelerai, h okoth, j oule, ba ouma, j wangila, ca palm, k wang, b konecky et al, baseline report sauri millennium research village. earth institute at columbia university (new york, 2006). p mutuo, h okoth, c makomere, j oule, g oduong, w ombai, j wariero, b akinyi (2006) annual report for sauri, kenya millennium research village july 2005-june 2006. earth institute at columbia university (new york, 2006) ae okoruwa, jg kling, iita research guide 33 (iita, ibadan, nigeria, 1996). r rommelse, natural resources problems, priorities and policies working paper 2001-2. (icraf, nairobi, 2001). da rondinelli, world politics, 31, 389 (1979). jd sachs et al., brookings pap. econ. act. 1, 117 (2004). jd sachs, the end of poverty (penguin, 2005). cb barrett, bm swallow, world dev. 34: 1 (2006). mr carter, cb barrett, j. dev. stud. 42:178 (2006). j sallinger-mcbride, la picard, comparative politics, 22:1 (1989). pa sanchez, science 295:2019 (2002).. pa sanchez, changing tropical soil fertility paradigms: from brazil to africa and back. in: a. c. monis et al., (eds.): plant-soil interactions at low ph, pp. 19-28.(brazilian society of soil science, piracicaba, 1997). pd seward, d okello, methods to develop an infrastructure for the supply of appropriate fertilizer for use by small-scale farmers in sub saharan africa (sustainable community-oriented development program, ukwala, kenya 1998). a teklehaimanot, jd sachs, c. curtis, controlling malaria through the mass distribution of insecticidal bed nets the lancet (in press, 2007). un millennium project, investing in development. a practical plan to achieve the millennium development goals (earthscan, 2005). un millennium project, halving hunger it can be done. task force on hunger (earthscan, 2005). pa sanchez, ms swaminathan, science 307:357 (2005); lancet 365: 442 (2005). un millennium project, combating aids in the developing world (earthscan, 2005), un millennium project, coming to grips with malaria in the new millennium (earthscan, 2005). consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 18 un millennium project, health, dignity and development: what will it take? task force on water and sanitation (earthscan, 2005). un millennium project, energy services for the millennium development goals. (world bank, 2005). b vanlauwe, j diels, n sanginga, r. merckx, (eds.), integrated nutrient management in sub-saharan africa: from concept to practice (cabi, wallingford, uk, 2002). m gichuru, a bationo, ma bekunda, hc goma et al (eds.) soil fertility management in africa: a regional perspective (tsbf, nairobi, 2003). williams, g., “the world bank and the peasant problem,” chapter 2, in j heyer et al. (eds.), rural development in tropical africa.(macmillan, 1981). ma quiñones, ne borlaug, cr dowswell, a fertilizerbased green revolution in africa, soil sci. soc. amer. spec. pub. 51: 81 (1997). microsoft word 02112008 singh sea of darkness.doc 1 in india’s sea of darkness: an unsustainable island of decentralized energy production kartikeya singh1 abstract approximately 500 million people in india's countryside are still without access to electricity. the government has launched an ambitious project to electrify the entire nation by 2012. unfortunately, the term "village electrification" defines electricity distribution for only 10% of households. an equally ambitious plan by the ministry of new and renewable energy states a goal to electrify about 25,000 of the remotest villages in india. in these villages, it is inefficient to extend the grid with decentralized, renewable energy systems. the economic development of a large portion of india's population depends on the success of decentralized energy distribution. this development will help provide the means to eradicate poverty. ensuring the success of these systems requires a closer look at the rural energy ladder. one must go beyond just lighting in order to establish a paradigm for integrated sustainable energy independence for india's rural villages. whether india decides to power its villages through grid-fed coal power or through decentralized renewable energy systems, this decision has major implications for global climate change. this study assesses the benefits and drawbacks of one such distributive power system: solar home lighting. 1 kartikeya singh is a 2007 graduate of furman university. kartikeya designed his own major titled, ecology & sustainable development. currently a compton mentor fellow, he is working under the guidance of sunita narain, director of the center for science & environment in new delhi, addressing the barriers of decentralized renewable energy systems for rural india. he can be contacted at kartikeya.singh07@gmail.com. 2 one and half years ago, grameen surya bijlee (a mumbai based non-profit), distributed led (light emitting diode)-based solar home lighting systems to 52 homes in the remote village of dabkan, in the tribal area of the alwar district of northeastern rajasthan. the home lighting systems in dabkan consist of one 10-watt solar photovoltaic panel, one 12-volt battery, and two 21 or 33-light led bulbs which provide four to six hours of light. “there was nothing here ten years ago except jungle, and we were only connected to the outside world when the road was built" explains babu lal, the only shop owner in the village. because of the road, one of the men running grameen surya bijlee stumbled across the remote village with a truck full of supplies that they were unable to install in another village. as independent analysts, dave madan and i traveled to this village to assess the impacts of the solar home lighting systems on the families: the problems, benefits and the barriers to successful continuation of such a lighting scheme in this part of rajasthan or any other part of india. this assessment was for the benefit of not only surya bijlee but also the renewable energy corporation of rajasthan, which has to date installed approximately 90,000 solar home lighting systems throughout the state. rural india’s dilemma: approximately 500 million people in india’s rural areas have yet to see the light of “india rising” as the media has literally described the recent economic growth. 700 million people in rural india are still dependent on biomass fuel for their energy needs and as many has 500 million people still have no access to electricity. the government's ambitious plan to electrify the entire nation by 2012 is in large part based on providing these homes (particularly some 25,000 of the remotest villages) with decentralized renewable energy systems. decentralized renewable energy systems consist of local energy generation and dissemination systems unlike a large national or regional grid. it is important to add that when the government says “rural electrification,” it means providing electricity to a mere 10% of the households in a village. thus, decentralized renewable energy systems (as opposed to just the extension of the national grid) offer the best hope for a more complete electrification of india’s villages. there are many types of such systems depending on local availability of resources (micro-hydel, solar, biogas, biomass gasification, etc.). however, for this part of the country, solar energy is the best option because of year round availability of high solar radiation. also, led – the next revolution in energy efficient lighting – is helping people in the dark leapfrog into a new era of home lighting. this new led revolution has helped the poor by reducing their dependency on dirty kerosene, which consumed much of their meager income and was injurious to their health. system drawbacks: unfortunately, after five to six months of use, approximately 60% of the bulbs that were distributed have had some level of damage. most importantly, the bulb holders have broken and individual leds have fused within the bulb (some reporting 10-15 fused leds in a bulb). this could perhaps be due to the poor quality of manufacturing of the bulbs. the various parts of the system were sourced from china and distributed as surya bijlee’s products. the occasional solar panel is also damaged due to incidents involving monkeys, peacocks, and even rats eating the wires. these are all important factors to consider when designing future home lighting systems for rural areas. all of the recipients were adequately trained in the maintenance of the system. the villagers essentially only needed to keep one foot by one foot thin-film solar panel clear of dust, because the dust can affect the efficiency of the system, particularly in a desert environment. one of the other questions is of brightness of the 3 system. “when we provide light, our [compact fluorescent] bulbs give off 600 lumens whereas [surya bijlee] provides only 100 lumens of light” exclaims sudir mohan, head of rural electrification at india’s ministry of new2 & renewable energy sources, the only government agency dedicated entirely to such a cause anywhere in the world. at first sight, it appears that this really isn’t enough light. when asked about the amount light the bulbs emitted, approximately 70% of the respondents claimed it was adequate lighting but most agreed it could be brighter. at night, the effect was clear. in a sea of darkness, the small led bulbs made a large difference. we could see the light created by the bulbs from far off and the light seemed adequate to extend work hours, keep the bugs out of the food while eating, and even keep the scorpions and snakes at bay. it perhaps was not the best lighting for reading, but the led bulbs still made a difference by alleviating some of the major concerns of the villagers. benefits: “we are very happy with the system and we would like more installations,” said one of the villagers. indeed, the lighting systems benefit the villagers immensely in terms of general lighting needs. the majority of the respondents of the survey said they used the led-based lighting system to extend their work hours at night or early in the morning. the system was used specifically for their children’s studying needs as well as necessary kitchen lighting for cooking. the occasional person even used the system to charge mobile phones (there are only two in the entire village) and flashlights. the villagers dream of a day when they would be able to power fans, televisions, and even water pumps. there are approximately 52 homes in this village with joint families having seven to eight children in each home. formal surveys were conducted in 18 households, or 35% of all households in dabkan, with the assistance of the village schoolteacher, deendayal sharma. the large majority of respondents were decision-makers within their households, and 89% fell within the labor-contributing age range of 18 to 49. 28% of respondents were women. in addition, an informal survey was conducted of several homes during the night to assess the effectiveness of the home lighting systems. one hundred percent of the respondents claimed that they had seen their children’s study habits improve after the installation of the solar home lighting system. “when i first started teaching here five years ago, most of the children couldn’t even write their names properly, and they would fail tests even when only 50-60 percent marks were required for passing,” stated the village school teacher. “it took me one and half years to just get them to memorize the prayer we do in the morning before starting school.” thanks to the extended hours of study provided by the lighting system, there has been a 70% improvement in retention of knowledge and on average students are studying one to three hours longer than they did before. “our kids can study until late even after we have all gone to bed,” said choti devi. this is particularly important in rural areas where children often have chores until sundown which allows them to be free to study only in the dark. “would you prefer electricity from the grid or from such solar installations?” i asked every interviewee. “this led-based system, of course, because there are no bills!” bluntly stated pal brindiyal. the dependability of the grid was also often questioned, and rightly so in a nation which struggles to provide reliable electricity for even its urban centers. then there is also an issue of safety: “if i get in a fight with my wife, she may go outside and put her 2 the standard incandescent bulb in the us produces 10-17 lumens/watt of light while a standard cfl produces 50-70 lumens/watt. source: us department of energy 4 hands on the live wires,” joked lalu ram, who received the lighting system just in time for the birth of his first child. the truth is that in rural areas many of the wires are uncoated so they do present a threat to people, particularly curious children. but the national grid has no prospect of ever reaching this village, because it falls within the national forest lands. by indian law, infrastructural development is kept at a minimum within designated national forest land areas. this is in large part to minimize deforestation and human-wildlife conflict which would happen with human habitations being situated close by. because this particular village is near a famous project tiger reserve, siriska (now devoid of tigers), it falls within the forest land area which provides a buffer to this wildlife sanctuary. in an effort to continue to move people away from forest areas and make it easier for the government to provide them services, people living in designated forest areas have no choice but to move out (if they want services) and advance the process of urbanization in india. the led bulbs reduced the village’s dependency on kerosene. according to the villagers, the light emitted by the led bulbs was brighter than their kerosene lanterns. of the people we interviewed (approximately 40% of the households with the installations), there was a 50% or greater reduction in consumption of kerosene on average. a few households, including madav ram’s, saw their consumption of kerosene drop from 11 liters a month to absolutely none. this has major implications for climate change as well. according to surya bijlee, of the 87 million homes still burning kerosene in rural areas in india and consuming 100-150 liters per annum at the expense of 2.6 kg of co2 emitted per liter, there is immense potential to reduce the total 22 million tons of pollution being generated currently. though this may seem meager compared to co2 emissions coming out of developed countries, it is vital in helping rural india leapfrog past a carbon based economy. also, all of the interviewed villagers claimed that the home solar lighting system saved them money, because they no longer needed to purchase kerosene. this is important for households in this village where incomes are typically 10-12,000 rupees a year before expenses, and the cost of kerosene can be as high as rs. 1800 anually, proving to be a significant dent (up to 20 percent) in the household budget. since almost all the homes are dependent on some level of animal husbandry, madav singh’s response was particularly interesting: “the light provided by the system has helped me save money because it has made the calving process easier for my animals which earlier suffered greater mortality rates during delivery.” at the end of the visit, the lingering question of financial feasibility remained. a single home lighting system consisting of one solar plate and two bulbs costs rs. 3,250 (approximately $80) and these poor villagers had received them for free. with no nearby outlet for repairs and purchasing of more led bulbs, essentially an unsustainable island of decentralized energy production had been created. there were no clear pathways for progress. surya bijlee hoped that the pilot project would spur the villagers to want to purchase the next system out of their own pocket money (which many do not have) or take a bank loan to finance the purchase. seeing the benefits, approximately 80% of respondents said that they were willing to take a bank loan to finance the purchase of more home lighting systems. but who would provide these villagers with loans? it is known that interest rates for loans to villagers are very high and even the villagers themselves joked that they would take the loan “but paying it all back was an afterthought.” the future: perhaps a micro-finance scheme is required for the dissemination of such technology throughout rural 5 india. the recent formalization of a policy by the indian government on micro-finance might help expedite such schemes. already certain private banks are beginning to take an interest in funding small scale projects. “you see, people don’t want to pay for things,” stated mr. mathur, a project officer of alwar district for renewable energy corporation of rajasthan. “in the past, we provided free solar home lighting systems and people refused to pay the monthly rs. 100-200 for the new battery their system would require within two years.” currently, a 35 kilovolt solar home lighting system, provided by rajasthan electronics and instruments ltd. which powers three cfl bulbs and has a bigger solar panel, costs approximately rs. 10,000 base price and rs. 6,500 after the government subsidy. one of the villagers in dabkan had such a system and it was significantly brighter and more durable than the supposedly long-lasting led bulbs. when asked about consumption of wood before and after the solar home lighting system, all respondents reported no change. according to the ministry of new and renewable energy, in a nation where 84% of the rural household’s energy is needed for cooking, this may be an interesting point to consider. some villagers in dabkan are also dependent on diesel powered pumps to bring water to their fields. “it would be nice if we could use the light from the sun to power other things,” stated the shopkeeper babu lal, “for instance, the village mill.” clearly in terms of the overall energy ladder of the rural home, home lighting is filling only part of the gap. the important question is whether this offers only a "half-leap" in terms of providing for the energy needs of those in india's countryside. “solar is the only viable option that works across the country,” according to mohan. “but solar is not true electrification as it can only provide lighting.” i noticed a lot of animal dung readily available in the village because nearly everyone is dependent on animal husbandry for part of their income. perhaps it is time to consider the utility of biogas as a possible energy source used by the villagers. solar cannot be the only answer. instead, integrated renewable energy systems, a method of development which employs various renewable energy technologies in combination to provide for the various energy needs of a community, might not only pave the way for sustainable development, but rather represent the entire leap into sustainable energy independence for remote areas in india and other parts of the world. in the case of dabkan village, biogas, which could be harnessed through effective use of already available household biogas digester technology in india, could go a long way in making their lives more sustainable. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 6, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 240–250 towards improving sustainability in nags head, north carolina through increasing social capital nathalie prescott institute for the environment university of north carolina – chapel hill, nc prescott.nathalie@gmail.com abstract maintaining bodies of knowledge specific to coastal towns can be crucial to maintaining environmental sustainability. it can build relationships of trust while generating social norms and rules about how to interact with the surrounding environment. this report explores the disintegration of social capital in nags head, north carolina over time and how improving the transfer of local knowledge in the town can help to generate sustainable growth in the future. the researchers interviewed past residents of the town to gather information about how people used to interact with the environment in order to compare it to the present. nine resources were explored; this report focuses on the resource of knowledge and its transfer. author’s note nathalie prescott is a graduate of the university of north carolina at chapel hill, where she majored in environmental studies. this research was conducted at nags head during a semester program at outer banks, nc. she is from durham, north carolina. keywords: social capital, knowledge, coastal towns, north carolina, nags head.. the ability of a community to develop and sustain itself in a healthy and resilient way is closely tied to the formation and promulgation of diverse bodies of local knowledge. historically, traditional systems, those based on ―inherited patterns‖ of thought or action (wordnet 2010), ―rely on the accumulation of knowledge over many generations, and [that] knowledge is transmitted culturally‖ (hollings, berke, & folke, 1998, p. 358). transfers of this accumulated knowledge can maintain and build on cultural traditions while reducing and even ending cycles of ignorance. for example, the cree indians, in subarctic canada, were able to use information about caribou populations based on long-term learning transmitted by the cree culture from one generation to the next to maintain a stable and constant source of food (berkes, 1998, p. 120). ranging from formal schooling to informal conversation between people, transfers of such information are crucial to the continuity and expansion of local information bases especially in the context of social norms and ―common‖ knowledge and contribute substantially to a community‘s long-term social and environmental well-being. consilience prescott: social capital at nags heads figure 1: map indicating the location of nags head on the outer banks, north carolina. source: http://www.visitob.com/outer_banks/trip/outer_ banks_map.htm in order to consider knowledge as a resource, it may be defined as the ―common understandings related to knowledge of community, personal, individual and collective information… from sources internal and external to the community‖ (falk & kilpatrick, 2000, p. 99). the body of information that makes up an area‘s common knowledge is tied deeply to that community. it informs social norms, values and rules, and constitutes the fundamental culture and traditions of a place. the town of nags head, which is located on the outer banks barrier islands of north carolina, has had, nearly since its founding, two relatively divided spheres of knowledge: that of the long-term residents, and that of visiting summer residents. this division between two groups makes the study of knowledge in nags head somewhat unique in comparison to many mainland communities. the town has been shaped in large part by the historical loss of a once widely maintained and substantial body of traditional knowledge, as well as a recent deterioration in knowledge transfer within and between the two groups. i maintain that transfer and accumulation of knowledge specific to nags head should be fostered and maintained, and must continue to evolve in order for the town to be able to adapt to changing coastal conditions and to move forward in an environmentally sustainable manner. originally, nags head was characterized by its remoteness and small population. according to one year-round resident, much of the knowledge was originally spread informally, primarily through family and friendships. ―no schools down there. you could count on [permanent residents] either fishing or going 242 consilience figure 2: boat arriving in nags head with summer residents (date unknown). source: outer banks history center into the [military] service‖ (interview, 2010). the north carolina compulsory school law was not enacted until 1914, when all nags head children were required to commute to the nearby school established in manteo. because of its early isolation, nags head‘s body of knowledge was very specific to the town and its immediate maritime environment. most outer bankers knew how to fish, hunt, grow food, cook, raise animals, brew home remedies, and generally sustain themselves with minimal outside assistance, except for the rare visit to a doctor in manteo, located across the roanoke sound. knowledge about these basic and general practices was passed orally within and among households with relative ease (jones & glass, 1987). by the early 19th century, summer residents began arriving regularly. as these early tourists trickled in, marked divisions began to form between the permanent and summer residents. interviews with members of both groups underscore the existence of that divide. according to one summer resident, ―[the year-rounders] were friends. but they weren‘t social friends…we were very careful to stay on the right side of ‗em‖ (interview, 2010). trust was already in a form of breakdown at this early stage. one element that served to bring the two populations together, however, was manual labor, as when more manpower was needed to accomplish certain tasks, such as hauling in fish nets. another summer resident remembers having only her parents around to talk to when her family first visited nags head, because interactions with permanent residents rarely occurred. eventually, however, she was able to get to know local fishermen by helping to pull nets in on the beach (interview, 2010). for most people, these minimal interactions were insufficient to foster a real connection. instead, because of their long stays, summer residents formed strong bonds among one another and were able to reestablish those relationships each summer. the first paved road between the northern outer banks and the more southerly region where nags head was located was completed in the early 1930s. the paved road from manteo to nags head was finished a few decades later. one consilience prescott: social capital at nags heads resident remembers ―in the late 40s, early 50s, when you came across the bridge from point harbor to kitty hawk…it was a wood plank bridge, it had been built by private funds…you couldn‘t drive 5 mph over that bridge because the planks were all loose…that‘s what started [the development].‖ increasing infrastructure fostered parallel increases in population and visitors, as well as the arrival of a larger and more diverse, but less local and immediately relevant, pool of information. originally, local knowledge kept residents directly tied to their environment. they depended on it for produce, game, fish, and a clean water supply. the repercussions when harm was done to it could be seen and felt almost immediately. however, today, this is no longer the case. people buy food from supermarkets which import products from all over the globe. if an ecosystem is degraded in one area, consequences are almost never felt by the average american; food continues to remain available in the exact same way. the only area where coastal towns may feel immediate consequences is the supply of local seafood. since this can be a draw for tourists to coastal areas, less local seafood may have a marginal impact on summer tourist numbers. however, restaurants can still use seafood from other areas without much difficulty; the strain may only be felt by those whose businesses rely on fresh and local food. additionally, local norms—living much farther from the ocean beach to avoid damage from hurricanes, building houses to take advantage of summer breezes running through homes, etc. (interview, 2010)—were gradually lost with major shifts in the knowledge base, impacting the environmental sustainability and resilience of nags head. older summer residents still remember the reasons for the way houses were built: ―i think that‘s why they built ‗em up high on pilings, so the water could rush underneath. at that time there were no structures in back of you, and no grass, so the water could go back and forth like it‘s supposed to.‖ another talked about the first person to move from the much more protected sound side of the island to the atlantic beach side: ―mr. e.r. outlaw was the first brave soul to move his house to the beach. and he wrote a memoir about it, and i have one if you‘d like to see it. his friends said he was crazy‖ (interview, 2010). the late 1960s saw the beginnings of additional infrastructure development to accommodate increasing numbers of tourists, who arrived on the wings of social and economic trends; americans had more cars, disposable income, and direct access to the beach. the creation of the national flood insurance program in 1968 allowed property owners to build larger, more expensive homes closer to the oceanfront beach (wilson & parker, 2010). these trends continued into the 1970s, bringing rapid commercial and residential development along with the expanding infrastructure. new beach home rentals, strip malls, and fast food restaurants sprang up throughout nags head (land development, 1972; rountree, 2002, p. 85). the town‘s 1972 land development plan acknowledged these changes and noted with some foresight that ―it is believed that this building boom is just beginning‖ (land development, 1972, p. 10). nags head, and the outer banks in general, were increasingly marketed as a tourist‘s paradise and were soon flooded with summer vacationers (rountree, 2002, p. 84). the percentage of people who knew and understood nags head‘s environment with any degree of intimacy plummeted. today, most of the beach houses are owned or rented by people from outside of the area. the formerly held understandings about the safety and security offered by the sound side are well undercut by the romantic ideas of living right on top of the beach. orrin pilkey, a recognized advocate against coastal development, 244 consilience pointed out that ―the [coastal] geologist‘s voice is a lonely one amidst the clamor of realtors, homeowners, mayors, and engineers with vested interests in coastal property development‖ (pilkey, 2009). storms and hurricanes that cause damage to properties near the beach, instead of discouraging living in such a high-risk area, push people to invest in subsidized national flood insurance. this essentially shunts the payment for such risky behavior onto others, and further minimizes the amount that immediate consequences are felt. the idea of buying homes and businesses so close to the shoreline, a practice seen as unthinkable in the days of e.r. outlaw, is now the norm and provides an example of how much common knowledge has shifted. the influx of outside ideas, about living on the beach, overwhelmed the local knowledge base. furthermore, because coastal towns often rely on tourism as their main source of income, they may feel the need to accommodate mainland ideas about beach living in order to attract more industry. the transient nature of tourism hindered the transfer of local knowledge. older, more local and community-based bodies of knowledge possessed by yearround residents have gradually become specialized (e.g. medicine, agriculture) or institutionalized in museums, libraries, and historical centers. knowledge transfer now continues in formal contexts such as in schools, in organizations (e.g. the nags head beach road committee), and at a few regularly attended gatherings at local restaurants. however, such gatherings are only popular among permanent residents. the number of temporary visitors greatly outweighs year-round residents during the summer, which compounds difficulties associated with cultivating the transfer of local cultural and environmental knowledge both between and among the two groups in nags head. for example, the impacts of summer visitors on nags head‘s environment clearly cannot be directly felt by those visitors, as they leave a few days later. instead, the burden of impact falls on the year round residents. developing a more effective transfer of local information between year-round residents and summer tourists will increase social capital, which can help to foster more sustainable practices and social norms that are appropriate given the local maritime environment. the greatest difficulty with increasing local information transfer involves creating incentives. there is no obvious reason why tourists might want to learn about the area and adjust the often careless way they vacation. the best way to do this may be to emphasize yearly returns. many visitors come back to the same house each year, even if just for a few days, and would not want to see their vacation spot being degraded a little more each time. in reality, however, even an aggressive and well-planned campaign to spread information and understanding about the area‘s limits will probably not result in the highest possible return on effort at the beginning. a better start-off incentive scheme would be financial. those renting for a certain amount of time could be given deals if they agree to abide by ―green‖ standards during their stay. these might include shorter showers, more moderate thermostat settings, and the like. plastic bags at the local grocery store should cost money, to encourage use of reusable bags and to minimize shopping waste. once information specific to the nags head location, and its past practices, becomes common knowledge, a new, more sustainable way of vacationing could become the norm. a more refined understanding of the situation can be achieved if we recognize that social capital can further be broken down into two components: consilience prescott: social capital at nags heads bonding and bridging. bonding occurs between people with similar outlooks, usually within the same community, while bridging occurs between those with differing outlooks, and often between communities (pretty & smith, 2004). enhancing relationships that bond and bridge fosters knowledge transfer and trust, which are crucial to cooperation and connectedness. essentially, the more social capital there is in a given locale, the greater the amount of available information, and the better equipped that community‘s citizens are to create an environmentally, socially, and economically viable town. nags head‘s huge annual influx of tourists swells the permanent resident population of 3,125 (bortz & welsh, 2010) to more than 40,000 in the summer (nagsheadguide, 2010). in part because of this, the town is challenged in its ability to encourage lasting ―relations of trust [to] lubricate cooperation‖ (pretty & smith, 2004, 633). the historic labeling of ‗year-round residents‘ and ‗tourists‘ continues today; one interviewee described summer beach cottage owners as ―clannish‖ and ―not looking for somebody new to take in… they don‘t want anything different‖ (interview, 2010). the impediments to local knowledge transfer in towns with a heavy dependence on tourism are substantial. it may seem as though there is an innate conflict between economic viability and the preservation of local knowledge. this does not need to be the case, however, as cases such as dewees island (discussed below, pg. 8) can demonstrate. however, the high volume of people moving in and out of the area brings to and takes away from the place an enormous diversity of useful information. this largely untapped knowledge base can be considered a ―library from which a new science of sustainable resource management can borrow‖ (berkes & folke, 1994, p.139). finding ways to redistribute the social capital between and within both tourists and year-round residents can create a wealth of information pertinent to advancing a community‘s sustainability. according to a study on ecotourism, [social capital] can improve a community‘s ability to sustainably manage natural resources through generating appropriate norms and rules and enhancing trust and reciprocity. trust and reciprocity lubricate cooperation through reducing transactions costs, as people no longer have to invest in monitoring the behavior of others, thus building confidence to invest in collective or group activities. the assumption is, then, that higher social capital affords better environmental protection. (jones, 2005, p.307) better environmental protection affords greater visitation, local health, and cleaner, more abundant natural resources. alex pasquini, a co-researcher in this study on sustainability in nags head, looked at dewees island, a town which has demonstrated an extremely high level of unity with its natural surroundings. he explains his research and findings: ―john knott‘s (dewees island ceo and managing director) idea for the dewees island development was not based on the typical social amenities present in most beach developments. ‗we have to get back to building communities rather than commodity housing,‘ he said (lurz, 1999). knott‘s plan promotes personal engagement and participation in community affairs, which are readily available.‖ 246 consilience figure 3: aggie gray ferry. source: dewees island rentals figure 4: huyler house surrounded by old house lagoon and alligator pond. source: carolina coastal properties figure 5: the town of snow hill, like other towns in worcester county, has a rich heritage. the county strives to retain its historic and cultural character. source: joseph e. moore consilience prescott: social capital at nags heads ―dewees possesses a strong community that is ‗triggered by a series of accidental meeting places that are carefully planned‘ (lurz, 1999). this idea begins with the ferry ride that residents and visitors must take to get to the island, and where interaction is very personal. this mode of transportation is different from the ‗bubble‘ experienced by typical vacationers when they travel via car to their destination. cars are not allowed on the island, so slower modes of transportation are utilized. golf carts, bikes, and walking are the main modes of transportation, and these ‗slower, quieter‘ methods also permit social interactions to take place. everyone knows everyone else; this communal interaction has been lost in most social communities. the huyler house, the community building, has two tennis courts, a pool, a game room, and a community meeting place. it serves as a summer ‗hot spot‘ where social gatherings and childrens‘ activities regularly take place. the nature center and wet-lab, located next to the public landings dock, are also frequented places where a naturalist is on staff to answer questions and lead nature trips when requested. free nature-oriented camps for children of owners are available during the summer, and these children get a chance to see and interact with the natural world as well as with other children staying on the island.‖ there is a huge difference, however, between a town that has been planned from the beginning to be sustainable, as with dewees island, and a town that has grown unsustainably and must redevelop itself to achieve that same status. huge steps would need to be taken at nags head to replicate the same kind of community found at dewees—even, realistically, on the order of complete destruction through hurricane or other natural disaster. further, the much lower density of dewees island combined with the desirability of living near the beach results in a skyrocketing of housing prices for the area. nags head, though much less aesthetically pleasing and much more ecologically disrupted than dewees, still invites middle class america to come and vacation. a county more similar to nags head, but less sustainable than dewees is worcester county, maryland. another coresearcher, jamie berger, studied this area: ―worcester county could serve to inspire the town of nags head regarding sustainable practices. likewise, ocean city [in worcester county], though larger than nags head, is geographically and economically similar, and has also taken some laudably proactive steps to increase its environmental, social, and economic resilience. from the 1990s to today, worcester county‘s planning philosophy ‗evolved from a development emphasis to a priority on resource conservation and protecting its rural and coastal character. realizing that air, water, and land could be overused and despoiled, the plans increasingly moved toward resource protection. if such damage occurred, local residents‘ quality of life and tourism, the economic linchpin, would suffer. preserving the county‘s natural resources and character will therefore, continue to be this plan‘s main purpose.‘ (worcester, 2006) ―the county acknowledges that ‗critical to the county‘s quality of life and economy has been its rich natural resource base. our unspoiled rural and coastal assets are becoming increasingly valuable as these qualities decline and disappear in other areas. stewardship is critical.‘‖ ―through its land use goals, worcester county has established itself as forward-thinking and sustainably minded. it seeks to not only preserve resources and 248 consilience provide a more sustainable built environment, but also to engender a unique ‗sense of place‘ among its residents and visitors. it has identified several mixed-use, pedestrian scale, and sustainable ‗best practices‘ for growth that ‗will create communities rather than standard tract housing subdivisions.‘ (worcester, 2006)‖ in nags head, the development of community-centered organizations such as the beach road committee (a group working to guide development of a major beach road in nags head) and the efforts of gallery row (an association of art galleries) are already helping to facilitate crucial interactions. moreover, local museums and history centers can, through their historical knowledge, ―enable new knowledge to be contextualized and applied‖ (falk & kilpatrick, 2000, p.100). knowledge transfer efforts, such as those demonstrated by these groups and institutions, need to be encouraged -particularly if permanent residents are to benefit -because these lasting and trusted relationships will likely have a ―ripple‖ effect that also benefits tourists. policymakers must ―continue to seek ways to provide support for the processes that both help groups to form, and help them mature along the lines that local people desire and need, and from which natural environments will benefit‖ (pretty & ward, 2001, p.221). focusing on building physical community areas and relationships will tie people to nags head while they are visiting. dewees island has been able to use free programs and children‘s camps to further information transfer, and the same could be used here. concepts like worcester county‘s emphasis on sustainable planning philosophy can also be applied. physical common areas and free programs like these can bridge interactions and facilitate increased communication among year-round residents. an important point to note is that building social capital and reaping its benefits takes time. it is nearly impossible to immediately re-establish weak or lost patterns of knowledge transfer, but it can be encouraged through specific community development efforts. once it begins to take root, social capital becomes ―selfreinforcing when reciprocity increases connectedness between people, leading to greater trust, confidence and capacity to innovate‖ (pretty & ward, 2001, p.221). nags head should begin taking steps towards rediscovering and expanding its knowledge base, and nurturing a culture of information transfer both between and among year-round residents and the tourist population. consilience prescott: social capital at nags heads bibliography berkes, f. (1998). indigenous knowledge and resource management systems in the canadian subarctic. in f. berkes & c. folke (eds.), linking social and ecological systems: management practices and social mechanisms for building resilience (pp. 98128). cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. berkes, f. & folke, c. (1994). investing in cultural capital for sustainable use of natural capital. in a. jansson, m. hammer, & c. folke (eds.), investing in natural capital: the ecological economics approach to sustainability [electronic version] (pp. 128-149). washington, dc: island press. bortz, b. & welsh, a., conversation with the author, november 2010 falk, i. & kilpatrick, s. (2000). what is social capital? a study of interaction in a rural community. [electronic version] sociologia ruralis, 40(1), 87-110 fall 2010 interview with a nags head resident holling, c. s., berkes, f., & folke, c. (1998). science, sustainability and resource management. in f. berkes & c. folke (eds.), linking social and ecological systems: management practices and social mechanisms for building resilience (pp. 342362). cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. p 358 jones, l. & glass, a. (1987). “everyone helped his neighbor” : memories of nags head woods. kill devil hills, nc: the nature conservancy. jones, s. (2005). community based ecotourism: the significance of social capital. [electronic version] annals of tourism research, 32(2), 303-324. lurz, bill. (1999). greenest of all.(design)(unique, environmentally-friendly housing development in dewees island, sc). professional builder 64 (11). print. nags head planning board. (1972). land development plan. nags head, north carolina. nagsheadguide.com: information. retrieved dec. 6, 2010, from nags head guide, nags head, nc. web site: http://www.nagsheadguide.com/information/ . pilkey, o., kelley, j. t., & cooper, j. g. (2009). america's most vulnerable coastal communities. geological society of america. pretty, j., & smith, d. (2004). social capital in biodiversity conservation and management. [electronic version] conservation biology, 18(3), 631-638. http://www.nagsheadguide.com/information/ 250 consilience pretty, j., & ward, h. (2001). social capital and the environment. [electronic version] world development, 29(2), 209-227. rountree, s. b. (2002). nags headers (2nd ed.). winston-salem: john f. blair publisher. falk, i., & kilpatrick, s. (2000). what is social capital? a study of interaction in a rural community. [electronic version] sociologia ruralis, 40(1), 87-110. wilson, j. & parker, b., conversation with the author, november 2010 worcester county, md. (2006, march 14). retrieved december 05, 2010, from the comprehensive development plan, worcester county, md: http://www.mdp.state.md.us/pdf/ourwork/compplans/worcester/06_ cmp_worcester.pdf wordnet: a lexical database for english. retrieved nov. 30, 2010, from princeton university wordnet, princeton, nj. web site: http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=tradition. http://www.mdp.state.md.us/pdf/ourwork/compplans/worcester/06_cmp_worcester.pdf http://www.mdp.state.md.us/pdf/ourwork/compplans/worcester/06_cmp_worcester.pdf http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=tradition why taiwan’s sustainable energy policy matters consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 6, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 210-221 why taiwan‘s sustainable energy policy matters benjamin fox united states fulbright program benjamin.trfox@gmail.com about the author benjamin fox is a fulbright scholar studying sustainable urban development and energy policy in taiwan. benjamin has worked for the u.s. department of energy in beijing and holds a b.a. in history from the university of michigan, ann arbor. scholarly abstract by establishing a series of similarities to the u.s., this study demonstrates the potential for taiwan‘s recent progress on sustainable energy policy to influence american policymakers. an assessment of taiwan‘s current energy situation is contextualized within its economic development and political institutions. taiwan‘s energy legislation has already leveraged significant financial investment to reshape an economy increasingly focused on clean energy technology. in the future, taiwan will continue to pursue aggressive energy legislation and the u.s. may draw inspiration from taiwan‘s sustainable energy reforms. keywords: renewable energy, clean technology, carbon emissions, government policy i. introduction the argument has been made in the united states and elsewhere, that individual national action on energy policy and climate change is irrelevant due to the rapidly growing carbon footprints of the world‘s large developing nations, such as china. indeed, china continues to simultaneously concern and invigorate the world as its carbon dioxide (co2) emissions and clean energy investments grow exponentially. but the path taken by small nations to establish and achieve energy and climate change goals should not be overlooked as a guide to larger nations. although china‘s recent government policies targeting energy and climate change are often utilized as a benchmark for american inaction, a direct comparison between the two nations is inappropriate. china‘s massive economies of scale and authoritarian top-down planning are unique amongst the countries of the world and its government operates with a fundamentally different set of powers and constraints than the u.s. in contrast, the small island nation of taiwan has a minimal absolute impact on global co2 emissions and energy use. however, energy policy reform occurring in taiwan may serve as a desirable model for the u.s. taiwan‘s economic, and political structures are similar to those of the u.s. and other developed western nations. compared to america, taiwan is confronted by equal or greater challenges in terms of energy security, fossil fuel dependence, co2 emissions, and energy pricing reforms. operating within similar constraints, taiwan has recently enacted legislation to transition to sustainable energy sources, increase energy efficiency, and lower co2 emissions. thus, taiwan can exert influence on global climate change by offering american policymakers guidance on sustainable energy reform. mailto:benjamin.trfox@gmail.com consilience fox: taiwan energy policy ii. taiwan’s key similarities to the u.s. unlike china, taiwan is considered a stable nation that has already completed a meteoric period of economic growth and development. taiwan‘s population shares a similar demographic structure with many western nations and its nascent democratic political system contains many of the same advantages and disadvantages as the united states. taiwan developed in the image and partly due to the assistance of the u.s. the ―taiwan miracle‖ witnessed incredible economic growth spurred by land reform, industrial output, and $1.5 billion in usaid funding (toledano, 1983). over a thirty-year period from 1960-1989, taiwan‘s economy averaged 9.5 percent annual growth (tien, 1996). regarding taiwan‘s capitalist success, an effusive 1983 national review article stated that, ―the republic of china (roc) has the distinction of being the only country in the far east that has fully adopted a lockean, anti-mercantilist philosophy--the philosophy that made america great…the united states may ignore it officially, but the republic of china on taiwan is a symbol and a fulfillment‖ (toledano, 1983). over the past fifty years, taiwan‘s breakneck growth has allowed it to move up the economic value chain. an economy once reliant primarily on agriculture gave way to manufacturing, and eventually the services sector. today, taiwan‘s economic breakdown resembles that of the u.s. (central intelligence agency [cia], 2010). 2010 economic sector breakdown u.s. taiwan services 77% 59% industry 22% 36% agriculture 1% 5% as a developed nation taiwan‘s demographics largely reflect those of the u.s.: increasingly urbanized and wealthy. seventy eight percent of taiwanese live in urban areas, as do 82 percent of americans (cia, 2010). the taiwan miracle also made taiwan one of the world‘s wealthiest nations. at $35,800, taiwan‘s 2010 per capita gdp (on a ppp basis) ranked just slightly below germany and 33rd worldwide (cia, 2010). taiwan‘s similar trajectory of economic development and subsequent rates of wealth and urbanization lend themselves to high per capita consumption of energy. thus, like the u.s., taiwan is forced to address issues of energy efficiency and co2 emissions without compromising the luxurious, perhaps wasteful, amount of energy to which individual taiwanese consumers are accustomed. the striking similarity of its political structure and overall political climate to that of the u.s. reinforces the relevance of taiwan‘s progress on energy policy. taiwan‘s young and vibrant democracy has evolved rapidly in just 25 years of non-authoritarian rule and clearly drawn inspiration from the u.s. political system. taiwan boasts free elections, implements its laws through a well-defined legislative process, and has an independent judiciary (pascual & bush, 2007). taiwanese media is highly engaged with civil society, and freedoms of speech are generally protected. although the country is governed by a semi-presidential system (a la france), the executive branch is still quite powerful. like the u.s., a taiwanese president is the nation‘s most powerful political figure, the head of state, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. taiwan‘s presidents are selected by popular vote, serve four-year terms, and remain limited by a two-term limit. perhaps most similarly to the u.s., taiwan‘s political 212 consilience system functions primarily as a two-party system with highly partisan regional base of support. the kuomintang party (kmt) has held the north while the democratic progressive party (dpp) has drawn support from the south. while democratic reforms have encouraged the development of a just and stable society, taiwan has also undergone a period of political polarization affecting its ability to strategically plan for the future. in their article, ―the four faces of taiwan democracy‖ pascual and bush (2007) highlight the systematic issues afflicting taiwan‘s political system. the authors note that: formal democratic institutions may exist but they don't work well. the transition to democracy was successful but it has not been followed by a full consolidation of democracy. regrettably, taiwan's institutions—semipresidentialism, the legislature, the party system, the electoral system, and the mass media—work together in a perverse way that rewards political gamesmanship over good policy. they reduce accountability, foster a zerosum political psychology, promote policy deadlock, ensure suboptimal policy performance, and defer consensus on the rules of the game. taiwan‘s sclerotic policy-making process results from a gulf of distrust and animosity that exists between the kmt and dpp parties. taiwan‘s politicians make the vitriol found in u.s. politics seem tame; in the past decade alone there have been several well-publicized physical altercations on the floor of the taiwanese legislature (wang & yan-chih, 2010). additionally, taiwanese politicians engender similar criticism as their u.s. counterparts in regards to an election-cycle mentality hindering long-term strategic planning. the taiwanese media adds fuel to the fire of taiwan‘s partisan political environment. though tightly controlled by the kmt during authoritarian rule, taiwan‘s media has undergone a rapid change during a period of intense commercialization and competition for viewership. however, as huang ching-lung of the brookings institute argues, the liberalization of press freedoms has not translated into improved media quality. huang (2007) observes that ―the ensuing super competition resulted in the media moving toward extremes, satisfying popular whims, and getting deeply involved in the political battles between the two sides. thus the media in general became an accomplice in the polarization of society.‖ taiwan‘s newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts, and 24-hour news stations often overtly support the kmt or dpp. the marked uptick in taiwanese media polarization and coziness with political parties has led freedom house, which once assessed taiwan‘s media as the freest in asia, to downgrade its assessment for a second consecutive year (baum, 2011). moreover, polarization of media outlets has increased over the past decade and eroded any semblance of public trust in their journalistic credibility. in light of taiwan‘s political-media polarization, pascual and bush (2007) assess taiwan‘s political future. the authors assert: we believe the problems here are mainly structural and systemic. one political camp or the other can be blamed for mistakes that each has made over the last decade to contribute to the current state of affairs. but political actors are acting within a structure that encourages these unfortunate types of behavior. consilience fox: taiwan energy policy the current status as well as future prognosis for taiwan‘s political atmosphere closely resembles that of the u.s. advocates of legislative reforms often bemoan america‘s hyper-partisan political posturing and never-ending election cycles as roadblocks to pragmatic policymaking. in the u.s. media, networks have become more polemic in a similar quest for higher ratings. together, u.s. politics and media have served to further divide american society and defer responsibility for planning its future. an acrimonious atmosphere has led both u.s. and taiwanese pundits to proclaim their political systems broken and fundamentally at odds with the interests of their citizens. yet, in a political climate often more caustic than that of the u.s., taiwan‘s warring political parties have still managed to enact multiple progressive energy policies. the kmt party, currently in control of taiwan‘s presidency and legislature, has seldom been cited as an environmental activist. yet the party is composed of industrialist technocrats able to see the strategic value of clean energy for taiwan‘s continued economic growth and energy security. on the other side of the aisle, the dpp is supports sustainable energy legislation based on increased environmental protection and social justice. with unified economic, national security, and environmental concerns, taiwan‘s political figures have temporarily surmounted political differences to act in the best interest of their constituents. it remains to be seen whether republican and democratic legislators in the u.s. will be able to do the same. iii. the energy situations in taiwan and the u.s. the challenges that taiwan faces related to energy use and co2 emissions are as serious or perhaps even more so than those of the u.s. taiwan continues to rely on a higher proportion of fossil fuel than the u.s. as a result, it lacks any semblance of energy security and ranks amongst the world‘s highest per capita co2 emitters. like the u.s., a strong political lobby representing organizations with significant business interests in energy policy influences taiwan. taiwan‘s barriers to energy policy reform are also compounded by a model of artificially low electricity-pricing that interferes with transitioning to cleaner energy sources. taiwan, like most industrialized nations, promoted economic development at the expense of the environment. by the late 1980s, industrialization and high rates of car ownership led to tremendous levels of air, water and soil pollution. as it began its cleanup, taiwan was roughly twenty years behind the u.s. in terms of environmental protections (allen, 1990). created in 1987, taiwan‘s environmental protection administration (epa) has done an admirable job in reversing some of the worst effects of industrialization. yet, taiwan still relies on a higher percentage of fossil fuels than the u.s. coal and oil comprise 81 percent of taiwan‘s primary energy supply (ministry of economic affairs [moea], 2010), compared with 58 percent in the u.s. (u.s. energy information administration [eia], 2009a). compounding the problem of reliance on fossil fuels is taiwan‘s lack of natural resources and tenuous energy security. while u.s. politicians have emphasized the importance of energy independence for decades, america still produces approximately three quarters of its primary energy and its largest oil importer is canada, hardly a hostile or unstable nation (eia, 2009a). in contrast, taiwan‘s 2010 share of its domestic energy supply fell to an all-time low of 0.6 percent (moea, 2010). taiwan has largely exhausted its minimal sources of domestic petroleum, natural gas, and coal, leaving it dependent on 214 consilience foreign imports for over 99 percent of its energy demand. approximately half of taiwan‘s primary energy comes from oil, the majority of which is shipped from the persian gulf and western africa. as a result, taiwan‘s oil supply is exposed to dual vulnerabilities: regional instability in the middle east and africa and military conflict in the taiwan strait. although cross-strait relations have enjoyed a recent thaw with the signing of the economic cooperation framework agreement (ecfa), china‘s growing naval presence is a constant reminder about taiwan‘s diminishing energy security. despite its status as the 50th largest country in the world, taiwan‘s overall energy consumption is 21st worldwide (eia, 2010). taiwan also ranks among the top twenty five nations for total and per capita co2 emissions (carbon dioxide information analysis center [cdiac], 2007). in a 2010 climate change performance index conducted by the germanbased climate action network, taiwan ranked 47 out of 60 compared with its fellow highemission nations and finished third worst out of all asian nations surveyed (burke, bals, & lindsay, 2010). when discussing potential changes to the energy status quo, it is also important to mention the impact of lobbyists. upon initial examination, it would seem that taiwan and the u.s. differ greatly in terms of lobbying interests. the u.s. energy lobby, comprised of major oil companies and electric utilities, is consistently one of america‘s largest lobbying groups. since 2000, the u.s. energy lobby has spent over u.s. $2.5 billion to influence congressional politics (lacey, 2010). in contrast, taiwan‘s lobbying environment is fundamentally different due to nationalization of the oil and electricity generation industries. despite some recent privatization reforms, taiwan‘s energy and oil sectors are still dominated by state-run monopolies (taiwan power co. and cpc co., respectively). however, taiwan does have a robust, private sector heavy-industry lobby that is greatly impacted by energy policy. industry is the largest energy consumer in taiwan; its share of total domestic energy consumption has grown from 44.5 percent in 1994 to 52.5 percent in 2009 (bureau of energy, 2011). thus, taiwan‘s heavy industry lobby ostensibly serves the same role as the u.s. energy lobby in opposition to progressive energy legislation on the grounds of reduced business profitability. there is also a significant element of both the u.s. and taiwanese lobbies that seek stronger legislation on co2 emissions and renewable energy sources. in 2005, u.s.-based duke energy publicly supported a tax on co2 emissions on the grounds of greater longterm certainty in the utilities‘ cost-analysis (osborne, 2005). in 2009, several other large u.s. utilities including exelon and pacific gas & electric withdrew from the u.s. chamber of commerce due to the organization‘s strong opposition to global warming legislation (sheppard, 2009). in taiwan, certain organizations oppose taiwan‘s proposed energy policy reforms because they do not go far enough. taiwan‘s business council for sustainable development (bcsd), which includes most of taiwan‘s largest industrial companies as members, noted opposition against the proposed ghg reduction act due to its limited scope and solely punitive nature (huang, 2011). taiwan bcsd secretary general niven huang (2011) believes the legislation is hampered by its unclear ability to regulate the heavy industry and power generation sectors and an ambiguous time frame for a cap-and-trade system to emerge. huang (2011) contends that taiwan‘s ghg legislation should not exclusively utilize co2 legislation as a means of pollution control, but rather adopt a more holistic approach including pathways to invest in taiwan‘s low-carbon economy and future global competitiveness. perhaps the most significant barrier preventing taiwan from reducing its energy consumption and co2 emissions is its artificially low electricity price. taiwan boasts one of consilience fox: taiwan energy policy the cheapest electricity rates in the world (low, 2009). from 1987-2007, the average electricity price in taiwan decreased by seven percent (liao & lee). over the same time period, electricity rates in the u.s. increased by forty percent (eia, 2009b). in 2008, the state-run taipower company reported an average cost of nt $2.3 (u.s. $.076) per kilowatthour (low, 2009), nearly three times cheaper than the average electricity price of the e.u. (europe‘s energy portal, 2010). cheap electricity discourages investment in energy efficiency and stunts the competitiveness of electricity generated by more expensive alternative energy sources. as a result, several overseas investors have declared their renewable energy projects in taiwan unprofitable and some have withdrawn from the island altogether (ferry, 2010). even as taipower faces deficits due to low electricity costs, reform does not remain an option (―no electricity price hikes,‖ 2011). just as raising the gasoline tax is anathema to any u.s. political campaign, hiking electricity bills in taiwan remains politically poisonous and unfeasible. iv. taiwan’s sustainable energy policy progress though it shares similar structural constraints with the u.s., taiwan has made encouraging progress in enacting sustainable energy policy reforms. in recent years, taiwan has taken several steps to identify short-term and mid-term strategic goals supported by legislation and financing. in 2008, taiwan‘s ministry of economic affairs (moea) released the ―framework of taiwan‘s sustainable energy policy,‖ a document outlining several measures that commit to modest short-term and mid-term goals in energy efficiency and co2 emissions reductions. the government has pledged to decrease energy intensity twenty percent from 2005 levels by 2015 and fifty percent by 2025 (moea, 2008). furthermore, taiwan aims to return co2 emissions to 2008 levels between 2016-2020 and to 2000 levels by 2025 (moea, 2008). taiwan has also pledged double its share of renewable energy as a proportion of total installed capacity from eight percent to sixteen percent by 2025 (sun, 2010). taiwan has already developed most of its suitable hydropower sites (hu, 2010), so the vast majority of renewable energy growth will come from the wind and solar energy sectors. in order to achieve these goals, the government has unleashed several new policies. the most heralded has been the renewable energy development act (reda). passed in july 2009, reda calls for a 6.5 gigawatt (gw) increase in renewable energy installed capacity, bringing taiwan‘s total to ten gw within twenty years (kuo, 2009). reda importantly establishes a system of feed-in tariffs for electricity generated by renewable energy and compels taiwanese utilities to purchase it. the act also created a renewable energy development fund bankrolled in part by utilities that use fossil fuel and nuclear power generation. in addition to reda, the legislature has passed a series of measures intended to transform taiwan into a low-carbon country by 2020 (shih, 2009). the government has called for the creation of two low-carbon pilot communities per city or county over the next two years with fifty percent of energy supplied by renewable sources. in five years, taiwan aims to achieve six low-carbon counties or cities. to support its nascent legislation, taiwan has demonstrated its commitment through financial support for several initiatives. from 2010-2015, the government is preparing to invest u.s. $1.47 billion to promote renewable energy and energy research and development. the government‘s plan is expected to leverage an additional u.s. $200 billion in private investment while saving the country billions in energy costs and creating thousands of jobs 216 consilience (gates, 2010). over the same period, the ministry of the interior has announced a u.s. $100 million investment in green architecture. the plan is estimated to create 243,000 jobs in related sectors while reducing 3.82 million tons of co2 (―government to promote,‖ 2010). the government has also invested u.s. $260 million to develop penghu island into taiwan‘s first low-carbon pilot region. by 2015, over half of penghu‘s primary energy will be generated by renewable sources, cutting its co2 emissions fifty percent from 2005 levels (yang, 2010). taiwan‘s government legislation and investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency are routinely projected to create thousands of jobs and leverage private investment by a factor of ten. the passage of the reda was predicted to spark a u.s. $1 billion investment in renewable energy technology alone (kuo, 2009). strategic taiwanese government investment in sectors such as solar, led, and electric vehicles are part of a larger economic strategy to expand low-carbon industrial production from $5 billion to $35 billion in five years and create 110,000 jobs (chan, 2009b). thus, moderate energy goals have spurred the investment, innovation, and job creation that will drive taiwan‘s future economic competitiveness. while the steps taken so far are impressive, two pieces of legislation currently under debate could amplify the impact of existing measures and elevate taiwan to the status of a world leader in sustainable energy policy. taiwan‘s legislature is currently debating the passage of a domestic greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions act. under current parameters, taiwan‘s epa will manage ghg emissions permits and create performance standards. ultimately, the law would implement an overall ghg emissions target and cap-and-trade system. successful passage of the bill would bestow upon taiwan the distinction of being the first country in asia to enact a national cap-and-trade program. there has also been recent discussion surrounding a tax on co2 and fossil fuels. a lowering of both the corporate and income tax rates would offset the additional tax burden on fossil fuel consumers and proceeds would subsidize public transportation, low-income families, and energy efficiency research (chan, 2009a). annual revenues of asia‘s first potential carbon tax could reach u.s. $12.4 billion by 2021 (chan, 2009a). when evaluating taiwan‘s legislation and investment in clean technology and low carbon projects, it is important to address scale and proportionality with the u.s. in terms of overall investment, taiwan pales in comparison with its american counterpart. in 2009, the american recovery and investment act, or ―the stimulus bill,‖ allocated roughly u.s. $50 billion to clean energy and another $17 billion in energy efficient transportation (wang, 2009). in 2010, the u.s. annual investment in clean technology increased 51% to $34 billion, ranking it third in the world (pew environment group, 2011). the u.s. also remains a powerhouse in sales of clean technology, coming in second place in the world (van den berg & van der slot, 2009). however, given the fact that the american economy is roughly 35 times the size of taiwan‘s, both nations‘ clean technology investments and sales are more aptly compared when considered as a percentage of gdp. taiwan‘s $1.47 billion investment plan is approximately 0.35 percent of its 2010 gdp while the u.s.‘ $67 billion dollar green stimulus investment is slightly higher at 0.45 percent. weighted by percentage of gdp, taiwan‘s clean technology sales rank fifteenth worldwide, outpacing the u.s. in nineteenth place (van den berg & van der slot, 2009). in a 2009 report published by the world wildlife fund, taiwan also claimed first place of all nations studied in solar pv sales as a proportion of gdp while the u.s. did not place in the top five for any of the clean technology industries surveyed (solar, wind, biofuels, and insulation) (van den berg & van der slot, 2009). consilience fox: taiwan energy policy in regards to clean energy policy and investment, taiwan and the u.s. seem to be moving in opposite directions. due to recent legislation and investment priority, taiwan has seized an opportunity to reorient its economy towards clean technology while the u.s. has stalled and lost a once commanding lead. in terms of five-year growth in clean technology investment, the u.s. came in eleventh place out of the g-20 nations (pew environment group, 2011). despite a surge in funding from the u.s. stimulus, an uncertain national policy environment persists to discourage investment. the u.s. federal government has not been successful in passing a national renewable energy standard, carbon tax, cap-and-trade or feed-in-tariff system, nor is any such legislation likely to pass under a divided government. taiwan has successfully implemented some of these policies (renewable standard and feedin-tariff), deliberated on others (carbon tax, cap-and-trade) and shifted its economy with strategic government investment towards a greater dependence clean energy for growth. v. conclusion due to it‘s small population and murky political status, taiwan is often overlooked in the realm of global affairs. but a rash of similarities with the u.s. in terms of economic, demographic, and political structure warrant its consideration in the field of sustainable energy policy. taiwan‘s interrelated issues of unsustainable energy imports, fossil fuel dependence, energy consumption, and co2 emissions are compounded by obstacles such as the government‘s refusal to correct artificially low electricity rates. in spite of these negative factors, taiwan has passed multiple progressive policies that address energy efficiency, renewable energy installation, and the promotion of its domestic clean technology industry. the modest success of taiwan‘s sustainable energy policy demonstrates the importance of setting short-term and mid-term goals, even if they initially generate suboptimal outcomes. indeed, taiwan‘s short-term and mid-term co2 emissions and renewable energy targets are relatively conservative and fall well short of proposals pushed forth by the e.u. and other world leaders. however, taiwan‘s modest goals have fostered important legislation and financial investment that provide important price signals to its burgeoning clean technology industry. thus, taiwan‘s sustainable energy policy is the beginning of a process of reorienting taiwan‘s economy towards the energy technology sector, enhancing its economic competitiveness, environmental health, and contribution to global climate change initiatives. the u.s. and taiwan have a special relationship. over the past 50 years, taiwan has learned and benefited from the u.s.-style of economic, political, and cultural development. perhaps it is time for america to learn something about energy policy from its ally off the coast of fujian. 218 consilience bibliography allen, c. 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(2009). clean economy, living planet – building strong clean technology industries. world wildlife fund netherlands. retrieved may 11, 2011 from assets.panda.org/.../rapport_wwf_cleaneconomy_international_def.pdf wang, a. (2009, mar. 13). comparing green stimulus – china and u.s. natural resources defense council. retrieved may 3, 2011, from http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/awang/comparing_green_stimulus_china.html wang, f. & yan-chih, m. (2010, july 9). legislators brawl over efca review. taipei times. retrieved on march 29, 2011, from http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/front/archives/2010/07/09/2003477482 yang, t. (2010, nov. 16). ―penghu to be green energy testing ground‖ the china post. retrieved on march 24, 2011, from http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/biz/archives/2010/11/16/2003488611 http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/front/archives/2010/07/09/2003477482 consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 7, iss. 1 (2012), pp.144–154 striving towards a sustainable solution: water and community in veron, dominican republic erica bower columbia university, new york ny erb2157@columbia.edu abstract access to clean and sanitized water is one of the most fundamental of human rights. however, in many communities around the world, water remains contaminated and a danger to human health. this photo essay seeks to outline an example of such circumstances in domingo maiz, shed light on the potential for a sustainable solution, and embody the cultural beauty of the local community. author’s note erica bower is an undergraduate student at columbia university studying sustainable development, human rights and economics. her interest resides in exploring the ways in which these fields intersect, both academically and in fieldwork, and is inspired by the role that photography can play in capturing this multifaceted nexus. this photo essay documents research conducted during the summer of 2011 in domingo maiz, veron, dominican republic. keywords: dominican republic, water access 1. introduction among many other factors, development of the tourism industry in the dominican republic has made the dichotomy between wealthy and poor increasingly stark (weiner, 2010). nowhere is this disparity more evident than in domingo maiz, veron, a neighborhood community just 9 miles inland from punta cana resort area. over the past 25 years, veron has become a settlement of migrant labor, both dominican and haitian, who work at hotels during tourist seasons. this seasonal variation in population density, compounded with the lack of official governmental structure, makes obtaining census data extremely difficult. in addition, the population of this informal community is in constant flux and lacks uniform awareness about proper water cleanliness and sanitation concerns (reiff, 1996). this mindset therefore exacerbates improper waste disposal, unofficial well construction, and bacteria-infected water in veron. in fact, data from recent studies demonstrates that an overwhelming number of wells, specifically in the barrio domingo maiz, are contaminated at levels with drastic impact on public health in the community (novack, 2011). this past summer, with the help of peace corps volunteer sabine bergmann, colgate student alexis apostol, columbia ph.d. student natalia rossi, and numerous volunteers from the local community, i was a part of the efforts to explore these consilience bower: water and community photo 1: a typical housing structure in the “barrio” of domingo maiz, veron. circumstances further. after conducting a household assessment of water circumstances and a demographic census of domingo maiz, we collected startling sociological data. in particular, the extent of parasitic infections, specifically with regard to concentration of children per household, was truly overwhelming. on a more optimistic note, the study also calculated that a wastewater treatment plant to serve the neighborhood could be implemented on land located within domingo maiz. with incorporation of the perspective and help of local community organizers to ensure long term sustainability, volunteers from peace corps, save the children, grupo punta cana and various universities hope to make this project a reality in the upcoming months. access to clean and sanitized water is a fundamental human right, and every community, including domingo maiz, veron, deserves a sustainable solution to such existing problems (ishay, 2010). this photo essay seeks to outline the need for a sustainable solution, illustrate the prospects for the future of the water treatment plant, and embody the rich cultural fabric of the community in domingo maiz. 146 consilience photo 3: a narrow path between houses, empty now but ordinarily crowded with children playing and animals roaming around. photo 2: a man sits under a sign that translates ―do not throw trash‖, while garbage ironically litters the foreground. a ―tinaco‖ water carrier sits above the building. consilience bower: water and community photo 4: trash and discarded materials line the boundaries of the community and thereby contribute to the contamination of the water supply. photo 5: fecal matter from animals, both domesticated and non-domesticated, also leads to contamination of wells in the vicinity. 148 consilience photo 6: a typical ―tinaco‖ water storage container sits atop a house; these devices often hold contaminated water. photo 7: pipes for water transport line the walls of houses. photo 8: the community organizer of domingo maiz, chelo, explains the potential contamination of this particular well. consilience bower: water and community photo 9: a reflection peering into a well during inspection; notice the peeling blue paint on the sides, another potentially contaminating factor. photo 10: a young boy glances over his shoulder at the mound of cement that covers the top of an informal and poorly constructed septic tank in his yard. 150 consilience photos 11-15: a series on the intimate relationship between a mother and daughter—the delicate placement of her footwear is the embodiment of both maternal care and of empowerment of future generations. consilience bower: water and community photo 16: a young boy walks through the street with a stray dog. photo 17: an optimistic girl helps to care for her younger sibling. 152 consilience photo 18: a haitian woman sews clothes for a sale below; her efforts contribute to creating the intangible fabric of the community in domingo maiz. photo 19: an array of cloth and clothing for sale; despite the fact that a large portion was donated from abroad, this sale both generated income and strengthened the fabric of the community. consilience bower: water and community photo 21: this is ―el solar‖, the plot of land where the wastewater treatment plant for the domingo maiz community will be constructed in the upcoming months. however, this is merely a pilot program—if the project proves successful, this type of sustainable solution can be replicated and escalated to larger regions, in the dominican republic and across the globe. photo 20: volunteers from the local community, peace corps, and columbia and colgate university collaborated to work on this water and sanitation study. by incorporating the perspective and ideas of community members, they are empowered to take the project into their own hands and ensure its completion and sustainability in the long term. 154 consilience bibliography ishay, m. "the universal declaration of human rights at 60: a bridge to which future?" perspectives on global development and technology 9.1 (2010): 11-27. novack, j and m. widdowson. ―report on threats to water quality‖, virginia polytechnic institute and state university. july 2011. reiff, fred m., mirta roses, linda venczel, robert quick and vicente m. witt. ―low-cost safe water for the world: a practical interim solution,‖ journal of public health policy , vol. 17, no. 4 (1996), pp. 389-408 article stable url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3343099 weiner, angelica. the tourism industry and its link to poverty alleviation in the dominican republic. thesis. massachusetts institute of technology, dept. of urban studies and planning, 2010. mit. print. retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/58275 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/58275 microsoft word nzaid.doc evaluation of the nzaid project* a project of the international institute of rural reconstruction’s bicol program final evaluation report: may 27, 2008 *institutionalizing community-based integrated watershed management within local government units in the bicol region, philippines: scaling up and sustaining capacitybuilding outcomes at local level sipa evaluation team scarlett lopez freeman seung bok lee katrina ngo veena vasudevan diana wu evaluation of the iirr bicol program: final evaluation report evaluation of “institutionalizing community-based integrated watershed management within local government units in the bicol region, philippines: scaling up and sustaining capacity-building outcomes at local level” for the iirr bicol program 27 may 2008 economic and political development workshop project school of international and public affairs columbia university in the city of new york 420 west 118th street new york, ny 10027 usa report prepared by: scarlett lopez freeman seung bok lee katrina ngo veena vasudevan diana wu acknowledgements this evaluation report was prepared by a team of graduate students at columbia university’s school of international and public affairs (sipa) participating in the economic and political development concentration’s workshop in applied development. katrina ngo and veena vasudevan led the team as project managers. seung bok lee managed budgetary matters, and scarlett lopez freeman and diana wu served as client and advisor liaisons, respectively. the evaluation was conducted under the guidance of miguel pinedo-vasquez, serving as faculty advisor; eugenia mcgill, the director of the workshop in applied development; and jackie klopp, director of the economic and political development concentration. in addition, the evaluation team greatly benefited from consultations with pratima kale, former president of iirr and current adjunct professor of international and public affairs at sipa, and michael pinches, who served as a visiting professor at columbia university in fall 2007. the sipa team also acknowledges the support and cooperation of its client, the international institute of rural reconstruction (iirr), specifically from iirr’s regional center for asia in silang, cavite: hallivin arevalo, orlando buenviaje, francisca namia, sammy operio, philip penaflor, nhing reyes, arnold sabio, jitendra singh, and charles zulu; from the u.s. office: leslie enright, director, anthony gooch, chair of the board of trustees, and susan grove, former u.s. office director; and juan miguel “mike” luz, president of iirr. finally, this evaluation could not have been possible without participation from the bicol communities in the lagonoy and masaraga-quinale a watersheds, particularly barangays cagaycay, genorangan, minoro, mampirao, herrera, balinad, and napo in addition to the cities and municipalities of goa, lagonoy, ligao, oas, polangui and san jose. abbreviations and acronyms bicol building initiatives for community opportunities and livelihood bucaf bicol university college of agriculture and forestry cbo community-based organization cmdrr community-managed disaster risk reduction cmhn community-managed health and nutrition cml/re community-managed livelihood/rural enterprise cmnrm community-managed natural resource management cssac camarines sur state agricultural college dar department of agrarian reform denr department of environment and natural resources drr disaster risk reduction gdp gross domestic product iec information, education, and communication iirr international institute of rural reconstruction lagosan wasa lagonoy-goa-san jose watershed stakeholders’ association ldc local development council lgu local government unit lmo lingkod masa organization m&e monitoring & evaluation maquiwasa mt. masaraga-quinale watershed stakeholders’ association nga national government agency ngo non-governmental organization nzaid new zealand international aid and development agency pm&e planning, monitoring and evaluation po people’s organization ppmel participatory planning, monitoring and evaluation and learning ppp purchasing price parity pra participatory rural appraisal psu partido state university rca regional center for asia rhw rural health worker sec securities and exchange commission sipa school of international and public affairs undesa united nations department of economic and social affairs executive summary since 2001, the international institute of rural reconstruction (iirr) has been implementing its building initiatives for community opportunities and livelihood (bicol) program in the bicol region of the philippines. through this program, iirr utilizes a participatory community-based integrated watershed management (cbiwm) approach to combat poverty and environmental degradation. between november 2007 and april 2008, a team of five graduate students of columbia university’s school of international and public affairs (sipa) conducted a participatory and consultative evaluation of the bicol program’s activities in two of the three watersheds where iirr works. located in mt. masaragaquinale a and lagonoy watersheds, the specific project evaluated is entitled “institutionalizing communitybased integrated watershed management within local government units in the bicol region, philippines: scaling up and sustaining capacity-building outcomes at local level.” through two field visits to the bicol region, documentation review, and extensive analysis of the data collected, the sipa team assessed progress, lessons learned, and achievements of iirr’s efforts to institutionalize cbiwm in mt. masaraga-quinale a and lagonoy watersheds. key findings have been organized into three topical areas. 1. organizational development of watershed networks: a key component of institutionalizing cbiwm has been the formation of watershed networks—multi-stakeholder groups representing diverse interests within a watershed area. although networks actively engage local government units (lgus), civil society, and the academe, they remain dependent on iirr for financial and technical support. moreover, the three-year term of local government officials presents a challenge to maintaining partnerships between networks and lgus. 2. community-managed projects: with iirr’s guidance, watershed networks have initiated a number of community projects. while these projects actively target community-identified priorities and involve multiple stakeholders, there is still low community ownership, high dependence on iirr, and low financial sustainability. 3. iirr management of the bicol program: iirr has extensive international experience in community mobilization but has underutilized the opportunity to transfer relevant institutional knowledge to the bicol program. the evaluation team observed that iirr’s activities are documented, and the budget and allocation process is transparent. however, the program’s information management is in need of improvement. other limitations of iirr’s management of the program include high staff turnover, an underdeveloped monitoring and evaluation system, and a field office that is not easily accessible by all field staff. in light of key findings and phase ii plans to scale-up the bicol program, the evaluation team proposes a series of actions to strengthen iirr’s ability to guide the institutionalization of cbiwm in the bicol region. to this end, the evaluation team recommends that iirr strengthen existing watershed networks prior to expansion of the program. six key areas the team identified for improvement are as follows: • staff structure and support • knowledge-sharing opportunities • information management • financial independence of the watershed networks • monitoring and evaluation • alternative funding sources for the bicol program finally, the evaluation team recommends that iirr revisit the original watershed concept in order to reinforce its program goals. table of contents acknowledgements abbreviations and acronyms executive summary i. introduction.............................................................................................................................. 1 ii. context .................................................................................................................................. 1 iii. program background .............................................................................................................. 3 iv. evaluation methodology .......................................................................................................... 7 v. summary of findings ................................................................................................................ 9 vi. recommendations................................................................................................................. 19 notes ........................................................................................................................................ 26 appendix i. introduction about the international institute of rural reconstruction (iirr) iirr is an international training and development ngo focused on participatory and peoplecentered rural development. founded in 1960, its mission is to build capacity among rural communities by supporting partnerships at the grassroots level to implement development projects according to local needs and demands. iirr currently works with communities across asia and africa.1 sipa team objectives in november 2007, a team of five graduate students from the school of international and public affairs (sipa) at columbia university paired with iirr. the objective of this partnership was to conduct a participatory and consultative evaluation of the nzaid-funded project that is part of iirr’s building initiatives for community opportunities and livelihood program (bicol program), located in mt. masaraga-quinale a and lagonoy watersheds in the bicol region, philippines. the evaluation team’s objectives were to: • assess progress towards achieving the project’s goals, objectives, associated outputs and intended impact; • document lessons learned about what worked and what did not work; • assess how the achievements of the project contribute to the accomplishment of the bicol program objectives; and • draft an action plan for achieving program outcomes detailed in the second phase program document. jj. context the philippines situated in southeast asia, the republic of the philippines is comprised of 7,107 islands in the western pacific ocean. a mountainous, tropical country, the philippines is highly susceptible to destruction from calamities such as volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, landslides, and typhoons. typically, the dry season is from december to may and the wet (monsoon) season is from june to november. its population of over 92 million mainly resides in the interior plains of the islands and along the country’s extensive coastlines.2 the philippines is comprised of 17 regions, 81 provinces, 118 cities, 1,510 municipalities, and 41,995 barangays.3 1 in july of 1946, the philippines gained independence from 48 years of u.s. colonial rule.4 with the second-highest ratio in the world of university students to population, english widely spoken throughout the country, a democratic political system, and access to overseas trade routes, many were hopeful about the future prospects of the young republic of the philippines.5 however, a stagnant economy, coupled by years of political turmoil, has perpetuated a rise in poverty there. in 2003, the world bank reported that 43 percent of the filipino population was living under $2 a day.6 national figures show that over 38 percent of the population live in rural areas, of which 50.7 percent live below the national poverty line.7 in 2006, the gross domestic product (gdp) per capita (ppp) was estimated at $3,330.8 in order to reduce this widespread poverty, both governmental and non-governmental sectors focus on fostering growth and development in the philippines. (for more information on development initiatives in the philippines, see section 1.1 of the appendix.) the bicol region located in the southeastern tip of luzon island, the bicol region comprises four mainland provinces— camarines norte, camarines sur, albay, and sorsogon—and two island provinces—cantanduanes and masbate (see map, right). the region is comprised of 7 cities, 107 municipalities, and 3,471 barangays. 9 bicol is largely dependent on the agricultural sector. approximately 68 percent of its 4.6 million residents live in rural areas, and farming employs nearly half of the region’s workforce.10 the chief crops of bicol are coconut, banana, rice, abaca, and corn, with commercial fishing and mining also contributing to the region’s economy.11 the bicol region is particularly vulnerable to destructive natural disasters due to its location along a typhoon path. moreover, the volcanic range dominated by mount mayon, mount masaraga, mount iriga, and mount isarog puts bicol at high risk for earthquakes and volcanic activity. rural poverty remains a major obstacle to the development of the bicol region. in 2000, all six provinces in the region were named among the “poorest 44 provinces” in the philippines.12 the latest poverty data indicates that more than 48 percent of the population, or 2.2 million people, live below the poverty threshold. 13 bicol’s per capita gdp in 2006 was the second lowest in the nation—less than half of the national average and about one fifth that of metro manila.14 nearly 80 percent of the population in bicol is dependent on natural resources for food and income.15 rapid environmental degradation combined with insufficient livelihood opportunities in rural areas has trapped many bicolanos in a perpetual cycle of poverty. 16 iirr has indicated that “[poor households] exploit the natural resource to survive (marginally); the depletion of the natural 2 resource, however, further impoverishes them, making their survival more difficult.”17 (for more information on natural resource management in the philippines, see section 1.2 of the appendix.) mt. masaraga-quinale a and lagonoy watersheds the mt. masaraga-quinale a and lagonoy watersheds are the main areas of focus of this evaluation. both locations are characterized by high prevalence of poverty, high degree of natural resource degradation, and a severe shortage of social services.18 current challenges facing these areas include “forest decay, heavy soil erosion leading to reduction in agricultural activity, and a lack of non-farm activities.”19 in the lagonoy watershed, lack of employment opportunities has led to increased levels of out-migration.20 table i (below) provides a brief profile of mt. masaraga-quinale a and lagonoy watersheds. table i. summary profile of project areas21 mt. masaraga-quinale a lagonoy watershed watershed provinces albay and camarines sur camarines sur no. of municipalities 4 3 no. of barangays 293 37 eco-zones covered upland and lowland upland and lowland no coastal zone – river systems drain into lake bato iirr presence in 8 barangays 4 barangays watersheds iii. program background iirr’s bicol program in 2000, motivated by the extent of poverty in bicol, iirr initiated a watershed management program by reaching out to local stakeholders in the region. through a series of participatory community assessment activities employing pra techniques, iirr worked with barangay officials, community leaders, and existing civil society groups to identify root causes of poverty in bicol. the outcome was a common understanding that community problems, ranging from seasonal flooding to child malnutrition, were linked to environmental degradation. moreover, iirr and the network of stakeholders determined that water management and water quality were central to poverty reduction interventions in the region.22 the watershed was defined by iirr as follows: …the natural boundaries of a diverse yet logically-connected eco-system [that serves] as a unit for development…the watershed approach is based on the understanding that 3 communities in three broad ecosystems—the uplands, the lowlands and the coastal areas— share natural resources formed by watersheds, irrespective of their affiliation to administrative or political units like province or municipality.23 following the initial workshop, iirr initiated its building initiatives for community opportunities and livelihood program (bicol program), which aims, through the context of the watershed unit, to combat poverty within participating communities. the established aims of the bicol program are: 1. to strengthen capacities of community groups and people’s organizations, local government agencies and partner ngos in the watershed; 2. to strengthen the regional network of local government agencies, ngos and peoples’ organizations in the region to better link rural poor communities with regional and national policies, plans and programs; 3. to learn from working with communities and partner agencies about what works and why, in watershed development programs; and 4. to use field-based lessons for promoting community-based, people-centered, participatory and integrated approaches among development practitioners through iirr’s training courses, study programs, workshops and writeshops.24 in 2001, the bicol program began in the diwata watershed area of masbate province. in 2005, iirr secured funding from new zealand’s international aid & development agency (nzaid) to widen the reach of the bicol program into mt.masaraga-quinale a and lagonoy watersheds. drawing from its experience in diwata watershed, iirr focused its new efforts on the institutionalization of community-based watershed management through increased involvement of local government officials. thus, the “institutionalizing community-based integrated watershed management within the local government units in the bicol region, philippines: scaling-up and sustaining capacity-building outcomes at the local level” project was launched.25 this project is the subject of this evaluation. the objectives of the nzaid project within the bicol program are: 1. to improve coordination and institutional arrangements at the local level for effective and sustainable management of watershed resources; 2. to educate communities about their watersheds and their importance to long-term water quality, quantity, ecological biodiversity, and poverty alleviation/reduction; 3. to enable communities and local stakeholders (government and private sectors) to form partnerships and take collective action to protect and enhance the integrity of their local watershed as a source of quality water, economic resources, recreation, and employment opportunities; and 4. to demonstrate the application of community-based integrated watershed management for addressing ecological and socio-economic problems at the local government level.26 4 project theory model27 the overall goal of the program is to empower and benefit local households and communities. the mechanism used to implement the program is through the mobilization of stakeholders situated within a given watershed area to form multi-stakeholder groups, referred to as watershed networks. for this project, iirr assisted in mobilizing the masaraga-quinale watershed stakeholders’ association (maquiwasa) in mt. masaragaquinale a watershed, as well as the lagonoy-goa-san jose watershed stakeholders’ association (lagosan wasa) in lagonoy watershed. iirr works through these watershed networks to address community needs related to health, livelihoods, environment, and education. diagram i (below) outlines the way in which iirr works to achieve the objectives of the nzaid project. diagram i. institutionalizing community-based integrated watershed management: project theory model in this model, key stakeholder groups include: • local households and communities • watershed networks (comprised of members from people’s organizations (pos), community-based organizations (cbos), universities, other ngos, and local government) • iirr staff • external parties (i.e., donors, policy makers, etc.). iirr’s role is to interact with both watershed networks and external entities. iirr not only facilitates the formation of watershed networks, but also provides resources and trainings to strengthen the networks’ skills in program development, management, monitoring and evaluation (m&e), and proposal writing. in addition, based on the needs expressed by network participants, iirr provides thematic trainings to watershed networks on environmental conservation and 5 vocational skills.28 iirr leverages these trainings by enabling watershed networks to coordinate community-managed projects and information, education and communication (iec) campaigns in local communities and households (objectives 2 and 3). by including multiple stakeholders within watershed networks, iirr aims to strengthen the relationships between the different institutions that network members represent. moreover, iirr and networks engage in advocacy with key policymakers and funding sources in order to secure formal relationships as well as financial support from lgus (objective 1). in achieving the previous objectives, iirr will be able to demonstrate how community-based integrated watershed management can be implemented at the local government level in partnership with civil society and local communities (objective 4). the formation and trainings of multi-stakeholder watershed networks toward the nzaid project goals feed directly into the main aims of the broader bicol program. (for bicol program goals, see p. 4). bicol program management structure as mentioned, the “institutionalizing integrated community-based watershed management” project is managed as part of the broader iirr bicol program. bicol program management links iirr’s regional center for asia (rca) to local communities through its core team. the core team is envisioned to be composed of the following staff members: • three (3) field coordinators, who are each responsible for all watershed network and community-level activities in the watershed where he/she is based;29 • one (1) program coordinator, who is based in the field office in bicol and oversees reporting and coordination across watersheds; and • one (1) rca bicol program focal point, who is based in iirr’s rca campus, supports the overall bicol program, and liaises between bicol program staff and rca.30 the core team is responsible for the bicol program’s operational management and development. apart from the core team, various members of rca are also involved in supporting the bicol program. the rca director oversees the program’s long-term strategic planning. program specialists within rca facilitate trainings and workshops and provide m&e support to the bicol program. at each level of the program—from the community to the core team to rca staff—all bicol activities are guided by the participatory planning, monitoring, evaluation and learning (ppmel) framework.31 6 the ppmel framework the ppmel framework is rooted in the participation of diverse stakeholders from program conceptualization and planning to monitoring and evaluation. in planning activities, the ppmel framework engages multiple stakeholders to identify objectives and strategies to meet community needs. the framework also outlines expected timeframe, resources, budget, roles, and responsibilities for each activity. for project m&e, the ppmel framework outlines indicators and allows for the identification of evaluation tools, procedures, and target audience. all aspects of the ppmel framework are viewed as learning opportunities for those involved, assessing progress and extracting lessons learned from program activities.32 field coordinators: at the community level, it is the role of the field coordinators to organize trainings for communities (barangay officials and community members) on the use of ppmel to develop a community-based planning, monitoring and evaluation system. the field coordinator advocates for the linkage of this community-based m&e in the barangay development plan, which is a three-year plan drafted by the barangay-level government outlining its aims for development. the field coordinator’s role is also to empower communities to contribute annually to the barangay development plan and its implementation.33 watershed-level ppmel should also be facilitated by the field coordinator. the aim is to conduct quarterly, mid-year, and annual ppmel assessments with key partners and stakeholders at the community and watershed levels. out of these meetings, the field coordinators develop monthly, quarterly, and annual reports from watershed network meetings. as needed, the field coordinator must also draft reports to inform donor agencies on program progress.34 (for ppmel forms used by watershed networks, see section 2 of the appendix.) program coordinator: the bicol program coordinator should manage the overall ppmel activities. the coordinator is expected to consolidate and disseminate watershed-level reports, assessments, and lessons learned to both donor agencies and rca. bicol focal point and rca: charged with overall program oversight, rca—through the bicol program focal point—should use reports and assessments to work with donors and potential partners in order to support the work of the bicol program.35 iv. evaluation methodology the evaluation team employed a participatory and consultative methodology, engaging iirr and numerous key stakeholders of the nzaid project. following extensive context and program analyses, the team selected performance indicators based on iirr-identified key result areas and interviews with relevant stakeholders. with these indicators, the team identified key informants and developed and validated evaluation guides. (for a full list of interviewees during the march evaluation and the evaluation guides, refer to sections 3 and 4 of the appendix, respectively.) these guides were used to assess program relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact. during data collection in the field in march 2008, the team applied the following tools: 7 focus group discussions: the evaluation team facilitated focus group discussions with watershed network members and cbos in order to: • assess the relevance of iirr-initiated trainings and activities through list and ranking activities about key community needs; • identify key mitigating and supporting factors influencing social problems through force-field analysis (a modified swot analysis); • assess watershed networks’ interpretation and understanding of community-based integrated watershed management; and • analyze program sustainability in terms of technical and financial support in addition to watershed networks’ organizational development. site visits: the team observed the watershed networks’ project activities in order to: • understand local community context and conditions; • identify outputs and progress of community-managed projects; • identify roles of various stakeholders in project management; and • analyze project sustainability in terms of financial support. in-depth interviews with government and university stakeholders: the team met with a number of municipal government officials, barangay council members and area university professors in order to: • identify government and academic initiatives related to iirr work; • assess lgu and university knowledge of and relationships with iirr and its watershed networks; and • explore potential opportunities for collaboration. in-depth interviews with iirr staff: the evaluation team conducted interviews with iirr’s bicol program core team. these interviews were conducted in order to: • understand the informational and financial management of the program; • assess staff interpretation and understanding of community-based integrated watershed management; • gauge the roles of various staff and their level of coordination with one another; and • understand the efficiency and effectiveness of program management, particularly in regard to staff coordination, monitoring and reporting. limitations given the participatory approach and logistical realities of this evaluation, the sipa team faced a number of limitations. one key issue was a reliance on the client given that all field work was conducted in the presence of iirr staff, who also served as translators for many of the evaluation activities. while this was in many ways beneficial for the team to gain access to key stakeholders and better understand the program in-depth, this may have impacted participant feedback. in addition, the team struggled with access to key information and time constraints. due to the short length of the field visits in january and in march (less than two weeks), the team could only meet with a 8 limited number of stakeholders. as a result, the data sample size was both narrow and nonrepresentative. moreover, some documentation regarding the bicol program could not be gathered in time for analysis. despite these limitations, sufficient information was obtained to proceed with the evaluation of the nzaid project. the following section details the team’s findings from research gathered during the context analysis, program analysis, and data collection phases of the evaluation. v. summary of findings this section presents the three main areas of the evaluation: 1. organizational development of the watershed networks (maquiwasa and lagosan wasa) 2. community-managed projects 3. management of the bicol program by iirr within these three areas, the progress-to-date of each topic will be discussed followed by an analysis of its strengths and limitations. 1. watershed network organizational development progress to date of watershed network organizational development table ii (below) outlines the progress to date of the institutionalization of the two watershed networks. the sections below elaborate on this progress. table ii. progress to date of watershed network organizational development maquiwasa lagosan wasa sec registered since 2007 revising bylaws to expedite decisionmaking process identified and pursued partnerships with local government, civil society and academe sec registration in process initiated community-managed activities successfully engaged three municipalities to secure financial commitments identified and pursued partnerships with local government, civil society and academe 9 sec registration with iirr’s facilitation, maquiwasa was registered with the philippine securities and exchange committee (sec) in january 2007. this means that the network is now officially recognized by the government as an independent legal entity. this registration also gives the network the ability to receive government and private funding. iirr also has helped lagosan wasa to submit their application for sec registration. as of march 2008, they were still waiting for sec approval. membership representation maquiwasa has 35 listed members who have been with the group since it was established more than two years ago. the network is comprised of lgu officials at the municipal and barangay levels and local po members from farmers’ associations. lagosan wasa has 33 members that represent lgus at the municipal and barangay levels, rural health unit midwives, and representatives from six cbos (farmers’ associations, women’s groups, and youth groups). trainings disseminated maquiwasa members have participated in several trainings, such as sloping agricultural land technology (salt) and bio-intensive garden (big) training. lagosan wasa members have also participated in several trainings, including the rural enterprise development workshop and kalinga food processing training. (for a list of iirr trainings by date and location, see section 5 of the appendix.) members of both watershed networks expressed interest in receiving training on information, education, and communication (iec) campaigns, organizational management, and fundraising. the members interviewed felt that access to training on fundraising would help them to become more financially independent from iirr. bylaw reorganization maquiwasa recognizes that the strength of their organization is tied to the effectiveness of their sub-committees, which are the mechanism by which community projects are implemented. however, during the course of the evaluation, members of maquiwasa explained that not all of the 35 listed members participate in the organization’s activities and this makes it challenging for the group to maintain steady progress. for instance, their existing bylaws require that quorum be met in order to conduct votes. however, truant members have impeded the network’s decision-making process. as a result, maquiwasa is currently updating its bylaws to do the following: • establish guidelines to give members status of ‘non-active’ or ‘active’; • require 2/3 of active members to be present in order to meet quorum; and • modify the bylaws to encourage more members of pos and cbos of targeted barangays to join the watershed network. 10 strengthening partnerships with lgus both maquiwasa and lagosan wasa are making efforts toward developing strong partnerships with lgus. the networks are trying to leverage their members’ relationships to lgus, especially those who work for the municipalor barangay-level governments, to collaborate on projects that achieve the goals of the bicol program. during the evaluation trip in march, the team found several opportunities for both watershed networks to continue to strengthen their relationships with lgus and also to work in conjunction with lgu development plans. some examples include: • in ligao city, mayor linda p. gonzalez explained how the city’s major initiatives include providing relief to families who have been displaced by natural disasters, improving livelihood opportunities, increasing investment opportunities, and addressing the multi-dimensions of poverty. many of the mayor’s initiatives are in line with priorities identified by iirr and the watershed networks. • through municipal funding, maquiwasa members and university students plan to gather baseline environmental data of the mt. masaraga-quinale a watershed. this baseline data would include environmental, social, and economic indicators. • members of maquiwasa presented their watershed-level development plan to representatives of three municipalities in order to advocate for the inclusion of community issues into the barangay development plan. • lagosan wasa brought lgu awareness to their programs, resulting in the coordination of both government and non-governmental members on important watershed issues. one of the most significant examples of this collaboration is in a child feeding program that spans a wide range of stakeholders, including lgus, cbos, pos, and other members of lagosan wasa. • three municipalities have agreed to give lagosan wasa a one-time payment of 150,000 pesos (approximately $3700) each to support watershed network activities. the members explained that this was a way for the municipalities to demonstrate support for the work that the network is doing and also to facilitate additional community-managed projects in environmental conservation and alternative income generation. income-generating activities iirr has helped maquiwasa to establish two income-generating projects. they are the following: • mung bean production – with iirr’s financial support, maquiwasa was able to partner with members of lingkod masa organization (lmo), a people’s organization in barangay napo, to grow mung beans on a half hectare of land. maquiwasa and lmo plan to market and sell processed mung beans to the local government for a school feeding program. maquiwasa’s partnership with lmo will provide maquiwasa with 60 percent of profits from this venture. however, the land where the mung bean farm is located will eventually be used for housing and, therefore, this project will generate revenue only as long as the land is available. 11 • satellite plant nursery – this project was also started with iirr’s financial assistance and is another partnership with lmo. with the help of iirr, the two organizations were able to secure a small plot of land in napo. lmo members have agreed to maintain the nursery. jatropha saplings, grown in the nursery, are being sold to a lgu biofuel project. maquiwasa also receives 60 percent of the profits from the plant nursery. iirr has helped lagosan wasa to establish the following three revenue generation projects: • insumix project – iirr and lagosan wasa have given members of women’s groups access to training on how to make insumix, a nutritional supplement made from rice, sesame, and mung beans. the women’s groups have produced small amounts of insumix for lagosan wasa’s pilot feeding program. the women’s groups plan to sell the insumix in local markets, to generate additional income for the organization and its members. • mallard duck raising – with iirr support, the women’s group in minoro has purchased 120 mallard ducks. for a minimal fee, the ducks will be in leased to one member, or caretaker, for one year. the ducks will provide two major benefits for the caretaker: (1) profits from the sale of salted duck eggs in the market and (2) the elimination of snails that destroy rice crops. the women’s group also plans to conduct trainings for the production of salted eggs. • trees nurseries – the tree nursery project aims to provide additional income generation for the members of cbos in genorangan. the project will train eleven tree seedling caretakers while other community members will collect “wild-lings” and contribute labor. these seedlings will be sold to the lagonoy municipality for reforestation projects. strengths and limitations of watershed network organizational development table iii. strengths and limitations of watershed network organizational development strengths limitations actively engaging local government, civil society and academe for partnerships highly motivated and dedicated watershed network members sec registration networks dependent on iirr support challenge to maintain lgu partnerships due to three-year term of office little knowledge sharing between watershed networks 12 strengths both watershed networks have begun to leverage their relationships with lgus and local pos/ cbos to form partnerships within their watersheds. an aim of the watershed networks is to promote education and awareness of watershed management, especially to the communities’ youth. both watershed networks have achieved this by directly involving youth in their activities. also, the team observed that network members join on a voluntary basis. their willingness to make time for network activities demonstrates a genuine commitment to the mission of the organization. this motivation is a key driving force for the current success of the networks and will be critical for their future success as well. in addition, the watershed networks have diverse memberships that span across different groups within the philippine civil society. members of both watershed networks include pos, cbos, lgu officials (barangay and municipal levels), rural health workers, municipal health workers, and members of local universities such as bicol university’s college of agriculture and forestry (bucaf) and camarines sur state agricultural college (cssac). maquiwasa’s registration with the sec in january 2007 is a step towards the institutionalization of cbiwm and achieving financial independence. however, sec registration potentially compromises the multi-stakeholder nature of the watershed networks. this may occur if no formal mechanism exists to link member organization interests to their network representatives, who may increasingly associate with networks rather than their original organizations. limitations financial dependence on iirr activities of watershed networks ranging from meetings and awareness campaigns to communitymanaged projects are largely supported by outside donors. prior to april 2008, both maquiwasa and lagosan wasa activities were primarily funded by a nzaid grant obtained through iirr. according to the project budget for year 3 (1 april 2007 to 31 march 2008), nzaid bore 69.9 percent of the budget, iirr provided 13.5 percent, other funders covered 15.3 percent, and the communities contributed 1.3 percent of financial costs.36 thus, the termination of nzaid’s funding to this program in april 2008 may impact the sustainability of both watershed networks if no other funding is secured.37 maquiwasa generates a small amount of revenue from membership fees and a handful of community projects on which they collaborate with other organizations. because iirr is its main source of funding, this fledging network becomes vulnerable to fluctuations in iirr’s own funding capabilities. while members of maquiwasa recognize that the network must become financially self-sufficient, they have not succeeded in determining how they will reach this point. some members mentioned that they would benefit from having workshops or trainings on fundraising. similarly, lagosan wasa generates a small amount of revenue through membership fees and a handful of community projects. although the three municipalities in the lagonoy watershed have recently offered a one-time contribution of 450,000 pesos (around $11,100) to lagosan wasa, the 13 majority of the network’s funding continues to come from iirr. as a result, lagosan wasa is similarly vulnerable to fluctuations in iirr’s funding capability. informal government partnerships while the members of the watershed networks represent both the barangay and municipal levels of local government and do have some recognition within the lgus in the two watersheds, they have not succeeded in developing contractual partnerships with the different lgus. another concern related to government relationships is the three-year election cycle for government officials, which makes it difficult for the networks to maintain partnerships with governments, especially if the political party or government official changes. both iirr and the watershed network members in both watersheds have been unsuccessful in deciphering how best to institutionalize their efforts while working within the constraints of the political culture in the philippines. minimal knowledge sharing between networks though iirr strongly supports learning as a pillar of community development, there is little learning exchange between maquiwasa and lagosan wasa. only once during the networks’ formation did iirr facilitate a joint meeting between maquiwasa and lagosan wasa. moreover, both watershed networks could greatly benefit from information exchange between their organizations, given their unique experiences and shared challenges. 2. community-managed projects since iirr engaged in a reengineering process in the summer of 2007, community-managed projects have become a new focal point of the first phase of the bicol program. the community projects serve to address the needs of communities in a number of sectors to build their program management capabilities toward institutionalization. these projects are still in their nascent stages; only six had been started when the evaluation team visited in march 2008. the four sectors of intervention for community-managed projects are as follows: • community-managed natural resource management (cmnrm), • community-managed livelihood/rural enterprise (cml/re), • community-managed health and nutrition (cmhn), and • community-managed disaster risk reduction (cmdrr) progress to date of community-managed projects the evaluation team observed community projects in both watersheds. an example of a project that embodies the coordination between the three program components is the child feeding program briefly discussed earlier. this program falls under both the health and nutrition and livelihoods sectors. 14 the child feeding program is a pilot program initiated in march 2008 where malnourished children come for feedings of insumix.38 the program is a coordinated effort between local barangay council members, rural health workers, women’s groups and cbos, municipalities, lagosan wasa, and iirr. the following table illustrates the contributions each stakeholder has made towards achieving success with the child feeding program. table iv. stakeholder contributions in child feeding program stakeholder group contribution to child feeding program local barangay councils provide barangay hall or other local community space for feedings rural health workers feed and weigh the children women’s groups / cbo’s in the barangay s prepare the insumix local municipal governments provide space for the insumix preparation watershed network – lagosan wasa bring stakeholders together, provide forum for groups to share best practices iirr financial support, training on insumix production, and help watershed network facilitate the project. the women’s groups and cbos who engaged in the production of the insumix hope to use the training they received with iirr’s support as an income generation activity. during this pilot phase, the feeding program offers the nutrient mix free of charge to needy families. however, the women’s groups involved in the program aim to eventually produce the mix to sell in the local markets. the evaluation team has prepared a detailed analysis of all the existing community projects that have been identified in the detailed implementation plan and other iirr programmatic documents. (for further analysis, see section 6 of the appendix.) strengths and limitations of community-managed projects the following table describes the major strengths and limitations that were observed by the evaluation team with respect to the community-managed projects that iirr has helped the watershed networks to implement. table v. strengths and limitations of community-managed projects strengths limitations network projects actively target priority issues low community ownership, high identified by the community dependence on iirr 15 trainings responsive and appropriate to project low financial sustainability of projects needs projects involve multiple stakeholders following a number of community workshops and interviews, the evaluation team found that the community-managed projects work to address community-identified needs. the top priority issues identified by community members in both lagosan wasa and maquiwasa were the following: • lack of livelihood diversification opportunities; • high costs of agricultural inputs; • malnutrition and related health issues; and • vulnerability to natural disasters and lack of risk reduction tools/mechanisms (for priority issues identified by stakeholder groups, see section 7 of the appendix.) therefore, the trainings and community-managed projects were aligned with the needs of the community, especially in the areas of assisting communities to access livelihood diversification opportunities. in addition, the community projects involve a diverse set of stakeholders often including lgu officials, members of the watershed networks, and other community members such as health workers and local families. the most significant issue facing the community-managed projects is that they are reliant on iirr funding and that they have required a high level of involvement from iirr staff to move forward. since only the child feeding pilot project has been completed within the lagosan wasa network, it is difficult to determine whether the same issue will arise within maquiwasa. 3. iirr’s management of the bicol program program management of the “institutionalizing community-based integrated watershed management” program, as previously described, encompasses program planning, implementation, and m&e. this section will describe the work of iirr in the overall planning, m&e, and coordination of this program. this section will also highlight some strengths and challenges facing program management based on sipa team observations. progress to date of iirr’s management of the bicol program bicol program planning the bicol program core team facilitated a number of activities in preparation for program planning. in 2005, iirr established an office in ligao city and hired additional staff. it consulted with lgus in lagonoy and mt. masaraga-quinale a watershed areas in order to identify barangays for participation. iirr then used participatory rural appraisal (pra) methods to assess the needs of all participating communities.39 however, the data from these pra activities were largely qualitative with little gathering of quantitative information. moreover, to date, there has been no consolidation 16 of the baseline data that resulted from these assessments. also, since these initial pra activities, there has been no further collection of community indicators. bicol program monitoring and evaluation in monitoring the progress of the overall bicol program, iirr has been fairly consistent. program staff thoroughly has documented their work with the watershed networks. however, the monitoring reports and assessments of the bicol program have been limited in scope. originally, the bicol program’s m&e system was conceptualized to assess three program components: 1. project objective achievement; 2. activity implementation; and 3. relevance of bicol program activities to rca’s goal.40 from a review of iirr progress reports, along with discussions with iirr staff, it was determined that iirr’s m&e of the bicol program only discusses the first two components.41 field level coordination in regard to coordination of program management, there have been a number of unexpected shifts in program staffing at the field level. the result of staffing inconsistency has been a negative impact on program progress. when the bicol program expanded to include lagonoy and mt. masaragaquinale a watershed areas in fall of 2005, the bicol program coordinator covered overall coordination as well as field coordination for the mt. masaraga-quinale a watershed area. for three months in 2007, with the sudden departure of the field coordinator for the lagonoy watershed area, the bicol program operated in three watershed areas with one program coordinator, an administrative assistant, and only one field coordinator. by december 2007, the bicol program operated with all positions filled, but this quickly ended when the program coordinator resigned in february 2008, followed by a field coordinator in the following month. at the time of writing, the bicol program field staff is limited to one full-time field coordinator, one administrative assistant and one program coordinator who is also acting as field coordinator for the diwata watershed area. strengths and limitations of iirr program management table vi. strengths and limitations of iirr program management strengths limitations iirr institutional experience (especially with high staff turnover community mobilization) weak institutional knowledge sharing within clear roles and responsibilities for staff organization thorough documentation of meetings and limited opportunities for professional development activities underdeveloped monitoring and evaluation system transparency and accountability in budget of program 17 allocation process inconsistent information management field coordinator effective in mobilizing community field office not easily accessed by lagosan wasa watershed staff iirr management of the “institutionalizing community-based integrated watershed management” project has demonstrated both strengths and limitations in regard to the sharing of institutional knowledge, field-level operations and overall m&e. iirr possesses a wealth of institutional experience in regard to community mobilization, which is reflected in the commitment and enthusiasm of its watershed network participants. the use of this knowledge, however, has been limited by weak institutional knowledge sharing within the organization. for example, in each focus group discussion during the sipa team’s march field visit, the team asked the groups to identify the priority issues of their communities. two issues frequently identified by the interviewees were the need for post-harvest technology and methods for disaster risk reduction. through various discussions with the rca staff, the sipa team discovered that iirr has experience in both these areas. within the program, information management is not always consistent, limiting the usability of its documents. many documents that the evaluation team reviewed were not marked with dates or authorship, making them difficult to analyze. furthermore, without an information back-up system and limited internet access, program staff also reported losing some program documents. operationally, field coordinators and the administrative assistant maintain thorough records of watershed activities. the system of financial accountability and budget allocation is well organized and transparent. while staff roles and responsibilities were clearly defined, they were not consistently followed. this was particularly due to the high staff turnover and consistent understaffing of the program. due to this situation, bicol program staff had limited opportunities for professional development. moreover, while the mt. masaraga-quinale a watershed coordinator benefited from the field office and administrative assistant, the lagonoy watershed coordinator could not easily access the office and, instead, uses the facilities of municipal offices and internet cafes in order to complete her work. in terms of planning and m&e, iirr’s work remains driven by local community needs. moreover, its detailed implementation plans are clearly written, outlining project goals, steps, and timeframe. however, the overall monitoring and reporting system reflects some weaknesses. first of all, since there are no baseline indicators and most available data is qualitative, it is difficult to measure the impact of iirr activities in participating communities. as a result, the m&e system has been constrained. furthermore, the m&e system for this project is limited in scope. in only measuring progress in terms of project objectives and implementation, the bicol program could lose sight of the greater goals of enabling households and communities to affect meaningful change. 18 vi. recommendations phase ii of the bicol program with the end of the program’s first phase in april 2008, iirr looks forward to phase ii of the bicol program. a main component of iirr’s current plans is to expand the program. the table below represents this anticipated scale-up. table vii. number of barangay s involved in bicol program at phase i and targeted for phase ii phase i (2005 – 2008) phase ii (2008 – 2012) watershed # of barangays # of barangays mt. masaraga-quinale a 8 3042 lagonoy 4 1243 total barangays 12 42 the numbers targeted in each watershed were established by the watershed networks themselves and represent a critical mass the networks believe is needed for full implementation of the institutionalization of an integrated community-based watershed management program within their respective watersheds. while reaching a critical mass is an important goal, in light of the sipa team’s evaluation of the first phase of the bicol program, it is strongly recommended that iirr first strengthen its existing networks before launching into expansion. to meet this task, the following actions are recommended: 1. enhance staff structure 1.1 establish second field office and hire administrative assistant in lagonoy watershed while the bicol program design envisioned a field office and administrative assistant to support both watershed areas, in reality, it mainly serves the mt. masaraga-quinale a watershed. such inconveniences create inefficiencies in the program’s operations. for the field coordinator in lagonoy, her administrative work detracts time from her primary role and responsibility to promote community activities. 1.2 provide managerial and technical training for the bicol field team another area to address is staff trainings. in interviews with the field coordinators, both cited a desire to further their professional development. two specific areas mentioned were in communitymanaged disaster risk reduction (cmdrr) and in information management. in providing such trainings, iirr will be transferring skills that will both enhance performance and provide field staff with an opportunity to further their professional management skills. in addition, the skills that field coordinators build will also help enhance the activities of the watershed networks. with years of 19 experience in training ngos in community-based management, iirr has the ability to provide its bicol staff with such expertise. ultimately, by establishing another field office and administrative assistant position in lagonoy as well as providing more training opportunities for bicol’s staff, iirr will allow the core team to operate more effectively. also, these changes may address the issue of high turnover by incentivizing staff to remain at iirr for a longer period of time. lastly, fostering a good work environment and an effective field team will move the bicol program closer to its end goal—the phase-out of iirr facilitation in the program and independence of the watershed networks. 2. improve information management 2.1 standardize documentation while the evaluation team was able to review a myriad of documents, key information was often missing (i.e. authorship, date, location) making it difficult to analyze iirr’s recorded information. without having data that is properly labeled, iirr runs the risk of losing important institutional knowledge as these documents become irrelevant or unusable. therefore, iirr should establish documentation standards on the recording and reporting of bicol program activities and progress. moreover, it is suggested that all documents contain the following elements: • title of document (version number, if necessary) • title of activity/event • date of activity/event • location of activity/event • name of preparer • date of preparation 2.3 install data back-up mechanism the evaluation team also strongly recommends that iirr install a proper information management back-up system in order to prevent the loss of data due to computer failures—a problem the field staff has encountered in the past. a data back-up mechanism could include regular updates on virus protection software and periodic saving of documents on properly labeled cds, zip disks, or flash drives. the standardization of documentation and establishment of a data back-up mechanism provides iirr with important benefits. one critical outcome will be the ability to harness accurate information while monitoring and evaluating the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability of the bicol program. 3. systemize monitoring and evaluation a proper information management system is only one component of an effective monitoring and evaluation system. in terms of m&e, the following additional recommendations are made: 20 3.1 collect baseline indicators though iirr has facilitated the collection of a large amount of qualitative information from the participating watershed communities, this data has not been used to establish baseline indicators. moreover, quantitative data is greatly lacking in the bicol program. the evaluation team recommends that iirr immediately begin collection of this data. 3.2 establish socio/economic-environmental indicators program indicators can come from a variety of sources. examples include information from watershed network members, watershed communities, local academic institutions, rca’s program specialists, and philippine census data from the municipal and national government. in addition, bicol watershed networks could identify appropriate indicators from watershed management projects developed in other areas and incorporate those indicators into the bicol program’s m&e system. currently, bucaf is already planning to collect environmental and socio-economic data related to the mt. masaraga-quinale a watershed. in this regard, maquiwasa has the opportunity to collaborate with bucaf in this baseline collection project and utilize the information gathered in the network’s own activities. section 8 of the appendix provides examples of baseline indicators identified from three sources: 1) “bicol program document” written by iirr’s rca; 2) sipa team interview with bucaf staff; and 3) other natural resource management projects. 3.3 assess relevance of activities to broader program goals a second recommendation for the bicol program’s m&e practices is for iirr to assess project activity not only by degree of implementation but also by the relevance of the projects to the greater bicol program and rca goals. this would enable iirr to consistently target key issues of the communities. in addition, it is recommended that these assessments take place at regular intervals. 3.4 conduct regular assessment of community-managed projects at the community-project level, m&e of each community-managed activity should also include baseline indicators and regular assessment of the activities progress as well as relevance to its overarching objectives. applying all the recommended improvements will offer iirr more robust and timely information on its programmatic work. this information can be used to identify key challenges, successes, and lessons learned to guide the bicol program’s work. moreover, being able to accurately demonstrate progress also leverages iirr’s ability to seek funding. ultimately, both of these outcomes will contribute to the success of the bicol program’s phase ii. 21 4. leverage knowledge-sharing opportunities the evaluation team observed many information-sharing opportunities at several levels of the program that could be leveraged to enhance the bicol program. this includes un-tapped opportunities between watershed networks, within iirr, and with external partners such as local universities, government, and ngos. 4.1 facilitate learning between watershed networks in terms of the watershed networks, it is recommended that iirr organize periodic meetings between the networks to enable the exchange of information and ideas. differing both in their organizational development as well as in project activity, each network has much to learn from the other. for example, maquiwasa received sec registration in january 2007 and is currently working towards streamlining its membership and decision-making processes while lagosan wasa has not. on the other hand, lagosan wasa has successfully implemented several pilots for community-managed projects by bringing together several different stakeholders in the lagonoy watershed and could share these experiences with maquiwasa. accordingly, maquiwasa and lagosan wasa would greatly benefit from more periodic meetings to discuss their challenges, successes, and lessons learned. 4.2 utilize iirr’s past experience to meet bicol community needs due to iirr’s wealth of institutional experience and expertise in community-based management through the developing world, it also is recommended that iirr utilize its past experiences and apply them to the context of the bicol program. two such areas identified for this action include post-harvest technology and community-managed disaster disk reduction. in vietnam, iirr has gained recognition for its work with farmers on post-harvest technologies. also, iirr in conjunction with cordaid has produced a manual on community-based disaster risk reduction. 4.3 improve communication and exchange with local government, universities, and ngos the last area that the sipa team saw as a knowledge-sharing opportunity is with bicol’s local government and universities. in terms of the local government, the city councilor from ligao city, within the mt. masaraga quinale a watershed, discussed plans to launch an educational campaign on environmental conservation. if the watershed network were able to work with ligao’s municipal workers in this campaign, both parties would benefit. maquiwasa could gain information, education, and communication (iec) campaign skills while the city could utilize the network’s ties to the community to expand the depth and reach of the campaign’s impact. these iec campaigns should also engage various political parties in the region in anticipation of potential political transitions. in doing so, networks may be able to immediately establish relationships with lgus, thereby decreasing possible lag time in network-lgu partnerships during the transition phase from one administration to another. in terms of knowledge-sharing opportunities with universities, bucaf plans to educate youth about environmental issues. this initiative is scheduled to take place summer 2008 and consists of a series of traveling plays to be performed in barangay communities. in partnering with maquiwasa, bucaf could benefit from the networks ties to the communities while maquiwasa could 22 benefit from gaining a creative way to raise environmental awareness in the community. there are similar opportunities for lagosan wasa with cssac and partido state university (psu). 5. strengthen financial independence of watershed networks it was observed that watershed networks are heavily dependent on iirr for financial support. in order to move these networks away from this dependence, the sipa team recommends a series of actions. 5.1 enhance current financial management training iirr has already provided trainings on proposal writing to the networks. however, in focus group interviews with maquiwasa and lagosan wasa members, proposal writing was cited as a needed training. therefore, the sipa team recommends that iirr revisit the impact of its past proposal writing workshops in order to identify ways to improve its reach. 5.2 link to public and private funding opportunities the evaluation team also recommends that iirr couple proposal writing trainings with linkages to potential public and private funding opportunities so that the watershed networks can apply the trainings in proposal writing. 5.3 promote income-generating projects the evaluation team recommends that iirr give special attention to the promotion of incomegenerating projects and work toward these projects’ sustainability. this has begun to happen at a limited degree but should be increased within both watershed networks. in trying to ensure the sustainability of income-generation projects, iirr should facilitate demanddriven activities. for example, in the child-feeding pilot program, the women’s groups and cbos are interested in selling the insumix on a larger scale. however, they have not determined a buyer for the insumix. the team recommends that iirr facilitate ties between the women’s groups and cbos and government procurement projects, as it has in napo with the watershed network’s efforts in mung bean production and the jatropha saplings nursery. doing so would provide projects with a reliable source of funding and decrease risks associated with project expansion.44 by increasing the watershed networks’ abilities to independently seek grant funds as well as to establish more income-generating projects, iirr will promote an increased sense of community ownership within the networks as well as a more diversified funding base for the networks. this would further establish the networks’ independence from iirr support. 6. explore alternative funding opportunities for iirr’s bicol program it is also worth mentioning that iirr is currently in discussion with potential donors to fund the second phase of the bicol program. if these discussions prove unsuccessful or result in partial 23 funding of the second phase, the evaluation team recommends that iirr explore the use of climate change and disaster risk reduction as platforms for funding. 6.1 explore climate adaptation opportunities one such opportunity may lie with climate adaptation financing opportunities, such as the united nations clean development mechanism. the kyoto protocol adopted in february 2005 established the clean development mechanism (cdm), which allows industrialized countries to offset their greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions by investing in carbon projects in developing countries. currently, the cdm website lists 19 carbon projects in the philippines.45 unfortunately, reforestation—one main initiative of the bicol program—is not listed as an approved cdm project. however, review of the kyoto protocol will occur at the end of april 2008 and a force of 300 high-level endorsers is campaigning for the inclusion of reforestation in approved cdm projects.46 the sipa evaluation team recommends that iirr explore possible opportunities related to the clean development mechanism in addition to other sources of financing related to climate adaptation projects. 6.2 explore disaster risk reduction (drr) opportunities following the 2004 indian ocean tsunami, there was a heightened global awareness for natural disasters and to develop methods to mitigate their devastating effects. though the philippines has had a “national plan on community disaster preparedness” (presidential decree no. 1566) since 1978, the national government has continued to adapt its disaster management policies over the past few decades. the most recent of drr initiatives implemented by philippine government began in 2005 and is known as the “four point action plan for disaster preparedness.” the points include 1) enhancing early warning mechanism; 2) information education campaigns; 3) capacity building of lgus; and 4) building private-public partnerships for post-disaster relief and rehabilitation.47 the points 2 and 3 of the national government’s “four point action plan” relate directly to the objectives of the bicol program. moreover, as mentioned above, iirr has produced a manual on community-managed disaster risk reduction (cmdrr). this could be an opportunity to collaborate with the national government. iirr can leverage its institutional knowledge on cmdrr as well as its links to bicol communities through the watershed networks in exchange for financial and/or technical support in information education campaigns and capacity-building of lgus. 7. re-strengthen the watershed concept though the immediate recommendations by the sipa team calls for a strengthening of the existing watershed networks before expansion, the evaluation team recognizes that iirr aims to scale-up its program nearly four-fold (from 12 targeted barangays to 42). in light of this objective, the evaluation team recommends that iirr re-strengthen the watershed concept. 7.1 incorporate equal representation of all parts of the watershed eco-system as the program expands, it is highly recommended that iirr work to incorporate equal representation from the watershed eco-systems, namely, upland, lowland and coastal regions. 24 specifically, because most targeted communities are lowland areas and thus far, no coastal communities are involved in the program. therefore, the sipa team recommends that iirr facilitate partnerships with additional upland barangays and try to initiate interest in coastal communities to ensure that the networks are truly representative organizations. 7.2 return to the original concept of a watershed as a unit for development the program was originally conceptualized around the idea of a watershed as a unit for development. by reinforcing this concept, the credibility of the program will be strengthened. in turn, this legitimacy will foster more partnerships within the community among the local government, cbos, and universities as well as with external parties, such as donors and international ngos. in re-strengthening the watershed concept, iirr will bring the bicol program closer to its ultimate goal—to institutionalize community-based integrated watershed management. 25 notes 1 international institute of rural reconstruction (iirr), http://www.iirr.org/publications.htm. 2 central intelligence agency (cia), “philippines,” world factbook 2008, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/rp.html. 3 a barangay is defined as “the smallest political unit in which cities and municipalities in the philippines are divided. it is the basic unit of the philippine political system. it consists of less than 1000 inhabitants residing within the territorial limit of a city or municipality and administered by a set of elective officials, headed by a barangay chairman. for more information, see republic of the philippines: the official website, “general information,” http://www.gov.ph/ aboutphil/general.asp. 4 the philippines officially recognizes its independence on 12 june 1898, the day the philippines declared itself free from over 300 years of spanish rule. 5 b. m. villegas, the filipino phenomenon (manila: belgosa publishing, 1998), 1. 6 world bank, world development report 2008: agriculture for development (washington, d.c., 2007), 337. 7 ibid., 321, 337. 8 cia (2008). 9 national statistical coordination board (ncsb) region 5 division, “number of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays,” http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ru5/updates/npcmb.html. 10 eastern visayas information sharing network, “region 5: bicol region,” http://www.evis.net.ph/ subregions/subregion5.htm (data for 1990); regional development council v, “socio economic profile,” http://www.rdc5.gov.ph/bikol/sep.htm (data for may 2000); and regional development council v, “region v history/profile,” http://www.rdc5.gov.ph/bikol/bickol_history.htm. 11 ibid. 12 ncsb, “poverty statistics: poorest 44 provinces,” http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2000/44_ poorestprov.asp. 13 national statistical coordination board region 5 division, “the bicol region millennium development goals,” http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ru5/mdg/stats/goal1.htm (data for 2003). 14 nscb, “2006 gross regional domestic product,” http://www.nscb.gov.ph/grdp/2006/2006concap.asp. per capita gdp figures are for 2006 (given at constant 1985 prices): bicol 6,685 pesos. national average: 14,676 pesos. metro manila: 37,855. 15 iirr, “integrated watershed management approaches to alleviation to alleviating poverty in the bicol region, philippines: learning from past experience” (y.c. james yen center, silang, cavite: 2003), 1. 16 iirr, “a proposal: institutionalizing community-based integrated watershed management within the lgus in the bicol region, philippines,” 13. 17 iirr, “program document, 4th draft: building initiatives for community opportunities and livelihood (bicol) program” (regional center for asia, silang, cavite), 3. 18 iirr, “program document, 4th draft: building initiatives for community opportunities and livelihood (bicol) program” (regional center for asia, silang, cavite), 3. 19 ibid., 5. 20 iirr, “a proposal: institutionalizing community-based integrated watershed management within the lgus in the bicol region, philippines,” 15. 21 iirr, “program document, 4th draft: building initiatives for community opportunities and livelihood (bicol) program” (iirr regional center for asia, silang, cavite), 3. 22 pratima kale, personal communication, 21 november 2007, columbia university, new york, n.y. 23 iirr’s regional center for asia. bicol program: program document. (cavite: dr. y.c. james yen center, 2007), 7. 24 writeshops are participatory workshops that bring together community leaders, government officials, ngos and scholars to share experiences and document best practices on a given development issue. iirr, preliminary terms of reference, october 2007. 25 for the remainder of the report, this project will be referred to as the “institutionalizing community-based integrated watershed management project” or the “nzaid project.” 26 ibid. 27 this model was developed through consultations of the sipa team with its faculty adviser, professor miguel pinedo-vasquez. 28 international institute of rural reconstruction. list of skills conducted in bicol. 29 there is one field coordinator in each watershed area. 26 30 international institute of rural reconstruction (iirr), “participatory planning, monitoring, evaluation and learning (ppmel) framework for the bicol program”(cavite: y.c. james yen center, draft for discussion only). 31 ibid. 32 ibid. 33 ibid. 34 ibid. 35 ibid. 36 international institute of rural reconstruction silang, cavite. “institutionalizing community-based integrated watershed management within the local government units in the bicol region, philippines: year 3 budget (april 1, 2007 to march 31, 2008).” the remaining 15.3% of the year 3 budget was provided by a source labeled “other funder.” 37 reference section on nzaid change in support… 38 insumix is a nutritional mix comprised of mung beans, rice, and sesame. 39 international institute of rural reconstruction (iirr), “institutionalizing community-based integrated watershed management within the lgus in the bicol region, philippines: scaling-up and sustaining capactiybuilding outcomes at local level – progress report as of october 31, 2005”(cavite: y.c. james yen center, 14 november 2005), 3-5. 40 rca goal: to enable people and their communities in asia to effect meaningful change in their lives through action research and learning processes, and to generate and acquire knowledge and participatory human development derived from practical experience and learning. international institute of rural reconstruction (iirr), “participatory planning, monitoring, evaluation and learning (ppmel) framework for the bicol program”(cavite: y.c. james yen center, draft for discussion only) 41 philip penaflor, personal communication, 11 april 2008. 42 this represents 10% of all the barangays in mt. masaraga-quinale watershed. 43 this represents 30% of all the barangays in lagonoy watershed. 44 judith tendler. good governance in the tropics. (baltimore: the john hopkins university press), pp.113. 45 for a complete description of the 19 cdm projects located in the philippines, see http://cdm.unfccc.int/projects/projsearch.html. 46 visit the website of forest now declaration at http://www.forestsnow.org for a comprehensive list of supporters. 47 emilia tadeo, “the philippine disaster management system,” (presentation for adb’s small-group workshop on preparing for large scale disasters, 5-6 july 2007), http://www.adb.org/documents/events/2007/small-group-workshop/ppt-tadeo.pdf, 14-17. 27 appendix 1. additional context 1.1 governmental and non-government development initiatives in the philippines one of the most significant governmental changes that have had major implications for the growth and development of rural areas is through the empowerment of local government units (lgus).i this policy shift came through a provision to the 1987 constitution known as the local government code of the philippines. the purpose of the policy, declared in 1991, was to “enable [lgus] to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.”ii in the devolution process, lgus have been “given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources” in carrying out the following functions: to provide efficient service delivery, manage the environment, promote economic development and reduce poverty.iii the local government code encourages the participation of civil society in local governance. chapter iv of the code, entitled “relations with people’s and non-governmental organizations,” lists the following provisions: local government units shall promote the establishment and operation of pos and ngos to become active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy. local government units may enter into joint ventures and such other cooperative arrangements with pos and ngos to engage in the delivery of certain basic services, capability-building and livelihood projects and to develop local enterprises designed to improve productivity and income, diversify agriculture, spur rural industrialization, promote ecological balance and enhance the economic and social well-being of the people. a local government unit may, through its local chief executive and with the concurrence of the sanggunian concerned, provide assistance, financial or otherwise to such pos and ngos for economic, socially-oriented, environmental or cultural projects to be implemented within its territorial jurisdiction.iv one specific development strategy written into the code is the establishment of local development councils (ldcs) within each local government unit. the aim of the ldcs is to establish a “comprehensive multi-sectoral development plan” and to “assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development.”v an interesting feature of the ldcs is that members of civil society are represented alongside local politicians. the local government code requires that members of pos and ngos make up at least 25 percent of the total membership in these councils.vi the local government code has also altered the role of civil society in the philippines. with the devolution of powers from the central government to the lgus, “ngo efforts in advocacy and activities have shifted from the national to the local, and networking mechanisms are becoming increasingly area-based rather than sector-based.”vii this “localization” of ngos has been positive for enhancing community participation: “their knowledge of local conditions, sensitivity to local cultures, and participatory approaches in dealing with communities makes them ideal for community organizing and resolving conflicts.”viii 28 the philippine strategy for sustainable development, ratified in 1989, also acknowledges the importance of civil society actors in the development process: in promoting the active participation of the citizenry for sustainable development, nongovernment organizations (ngos) can be the central vehicle in mobilizing people to participate. ngos have certain advantages. they have less bureaucratic red tape and can thus move fast. they have already established strong direct links with the grassroots. their members are the very citizens whose participation is needed and who see their ngo membership as a citizen’s responsibility. they are thus imbued with the needed commitment and drive to deal with difficult sustainable development issues.ix 1.2 natural resource management in philippines several provisions of the local government code outline the functions of lgus in environmental conservation and natural resource management. for the municipal governments, these responsibilities include the implementation of water community-based forestry projects and soil resource utilization and conservation projects as well as the establishment of solid waste disposal and environmental management systems.x the decentralization of the department of environment and natural resources (denr), however, has been less effective. as the “primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources,” denr has been reluctant to fully devolve its functions and personnel to the local governments. xi another impediment to lgu leadership in natural resource management has been a local government code clause stating that “all environmental activities are subject to the supervision and control of denr.” xii the result has been the disengagement of some lgus from local resource management.xiii despite the challenges, the field of natural resource management in the philippines has made significant progress in recent years. one such example is the adoption and implementation of the united nations’ mandate known as agenda 21. the program sets out a plan for the universal adoption of sustainable development as the means for the “fulfillment of basic needs, improved living standards for all, better protected and managed ecosystems and a safer, more prosperous future.”xiv within this framework, the philippines has also established national and local versions of agenda 21 to promote and institutionalize sustainable development at all levels of government. memorandum order no. 47, issued by the office of the president in 1999, directs lgus to “coordinate closely with non-governmental organizations and people’s organizations in the formulation of local agenda 21.” xv iirr has reported that “[s]everal development agencies implementing projects in the [bicol] region such as the academe, non-governmental organizations, and national government agencies have…forged partnerships with lgus to implement agenda 21.”xvi 29 2. ppmel forms 2.1 ppmel expected results time responsible resources objectives activities frame persons/agencies needed outputs outcomes 2.2 ppmel assessment facilitating hindering lessons activities status/progress factors factors learned 3. march field trip schedules, 3 – 8 march 2008 3.1 march field trip schedule for lagonoy watershed date/ time activity participants location part 1: networks meeting march 3, 2008 8:00amwith mayors and mayor , mpdc, mao mayor’s office, goa o 10:00am respective lgu officials who have been involved municipal administrador, during the mpdc, 3 mao, 2 rhu, mayor’s office, 10:30am implementation of the menro lagonoy 1:30pm program municipal administrador, mayor’s office, san 2 mao, mpdc, 1 sb, 2 rhu, jose 2:00pm-5:00pm dilg-lgoo march 4, 2008 8:00-9:30am psu extension coordinator psu, san jose o municipal agricultural officers 10:00amdenr-cenro cenro office, o 1:00nn phone conversation with goa cssac director of extension o 3:00pm-4:30pm cssac, pili 30 date/ time activity participants location part 2: watershed & field levels meeting march 5, 2008 9:00am-4:30pm general evaluation (22) lagosan wasa mao, lagonoy o through lagosan wasa meeting march 6, 2008 fgd with: 8:00am women’s health and (4)barangay council minoro o 10:00nn environment association (10) members of cbos cagaycay rural (5)barangay council cagaycay o 1:30pm -4:30pm development association (15) members of cbos (crda) march 7, 2008 fgd with: 8:00 – 12:00nn green and health (2)barangay council mampirao, san jose o movers’ association (19) members of cbos (gahma) barangay mampirao o farmers’ association (bmfa) mampirao youth o 1:30pm-4:30pm development and (8)barangay council genorangan, productivity (mydap) (14) members of cbos lagonoy genorangan o environment and economic development association (geeda) march 8, 2008 10:00am cssac professor cssac, pili o 3.2 march field trip schedule for mt. masaraga-quinale a watershed date/time activity participants location march 3, 2008 meeting with maquiwasa (8) maquiwasa officers iirr field office, 10:00am – officers ligao city 2.00pm 31 march 4, 2008 informal meeting with ligao municipal agricultural ligao city 1:00 – 2:00pm municipal agricultural officer/maquiwasa officer/maquiwasa member, member, field coordinator, (3) iirr staff administrative assistant, and rca m&e specialist 2.30 – 3.00pm meeting with polangui mayor mayor lgu office, polangui 3.30 – 4.00pm meeting with municipal health municipal health worker municipal health worker office, polangui 4.00 – 5.00pm trip to napo (3) iirr staff nursery and mung bean projects, napo march 5, 2008 community focus group (2) barangay representatives, private home, balinad 9:00 – 11:00am discussion (1) sari-sari owner, (1) maquiwasa officer 2.00 – 4:30pm community focus group (2) maquiwasa members community hall, discussion (11) residents* of herrera herrera barangay march 6, 2008 meeting with municipal municipal health officers, municipal office, oas 9.30 – 10.30am officers secretary to the mayor, member of municipal development council, (2) agricultural technicians 11.00 – 2:00pm community focus group (6) residents* of san ramon restaurant, libon discussion barangay 2.30 – 3.00pm meeting with ligao mayor mayor municipal office, ligao 3.00 – 5.00pm meeting with municipal city planning officer, municipal office, officers (2) city councilors ligao (1) agricultural technician/maquiwasa member march 7, 2008 meeting with bucaf professor/maquiwasa bucaf, guinobatan 9:00 – 12:00pm professors president, associate professor 1.30 – 4:00pm meeting with field staff field coordinator, field office, ligao administrative assistant city debrief with maquiwasa (4) maquiwasa officers officers march 8, 2008 trip to balogo n/a landslide sites, 3.00 – 5:00pm balogo 32 *residents may include youth, farmers, barangay council members, sari-sari owners and health workers 4. evaluation guides 4.1 evaluation guide for the watershed networks set up administrative and logistical support on-site kras questions onsite office established in appropriate do you use the field office? to what extent? how far is it from your location. community? to establish trust and partnership with communities & local stakeholders in the watershed (as well as create awareness on water resources issues & problems) kras questions does baseline watershed data exists? identify, review, and analyze existing how was it obtained? local watershed data do you have a resource map? can we see it? how many transect walks have been conducted? were the pras/problem tree analysis conducted and with whom? when? identify, review, and analyze existing what was the purpose of these analyses? local issues can you describe the process of the problem tree, stakeholder analysis and pras? were swot/solution(s) tree conducted and with whom? when? identify, review, and analyze existing what was the purpose of these analyses? local opportunities can you describe the process of these analyses? were institutional analyses conducted and with whom? when? identify, review, and analyze existing what was the purpose of these analyses? local institutional arrangements can you describe the process of these analyses? what types of conflicts exist between stakeholders? identify potential conflicts & prevention how are these conflicts mitigated (i.e. at the barangay level, wn level, mechanism lgu-level)? validate information as basis for what are the main issues/opportunities/potential conflicts of your planning, partnership building & community? continuing dialogue w lgus & can you rank them? community groups 33 did you participate in an iirr workshop? how did you find out about it? conduct community watershed what did you do there? planning workshop (wn and why was the workshop held? community) what was your first interaction with iirr (how did you get involved)? what came out of the workshop? who are the cbiwm stakeholders? which are involved in current bicol program? why? how can you involve them in the process? why did you join maquiwasa / lagosan? define stakeholder roles, responsibilities how do you become a member of maquiwasa / lagosan? & actions are there other stakeholders that are not involved that you feel should be? what are the responsibilities and roles/actions of each stakeholder (ask stakeholder)? have they changed at all since the beginning of the bicol program? to create awareness about water resources kras questions where are the micro-watershed sites? how were they identified? (who identify start-up micro-watershed sites, involved? what process?) what are the key research and learning research and learning questions questions? how were research and learning questions developed? is there a joint proposal on cbiw? what was the role of the lgu in its development? develop joint proposal by community what was the role of the community in its development? and lgu on cbiw who within the lgu was involved in the proposal development? who within the community was involved in the proposal development? is there a guideline for conducting cbiw resources assessment, planning develop guideline for conducting and monitoring? how was it developed? when was it developed? who cbiw resources assessment, planning developed the guideline? and monitoring, has the guideline been used? how? how frequently? develop consolidated watershed action 5ws and h plans setting up watershed education and how many watershed education programs were conducted? how were outreach program within the topics decided? when was it? who participated? how did they get structure/mechanism for watershed involved? who is in charge of managing these programs? … management (for iirr and wn) 34 setting up watershed education and outreach program within the how important is…? some questions about education program structure/mechanism for watershed contents… management. (for to develop a community-based watershed action plan w/ participation of various stakeholders including initial capacity development for planning, monitoring, and evaluation (for napo and balinad) kras questions what are the current advocacy campaigns being undertaken? conduct watershed awareness and what were the baseline advocacy campaigns prior to iirr involvement? stakeholder responsibility dialogue when and where were these meetings conducted? workshops, tna, community and local what was the purpose of these meetings? government dialogue meetings what were the outcomes of these meetings? how successful has iec program been? to facilitate the process for community and lgu participation and partnership in implementing watershed resource development and management actions kras questions how did initial participants become involved with wn? how are new members, if any, recruited? involvement of all (or as many as when and where do your meetings take place? possible) stakeholders why do / don't people participate in the wns? what many hours per month do you commit to wn-related activities? what are some of the administrative challenges your wn faces (i.e. resource needs, participation,)? define your organizational structure. (social network mapping) administrative systems in place how are budgets allocated? is this process efficient? is there a mechanism to report issues/concerns/problems in your organization? how is information recorded? how do you (iirr, wn) disseminate management information system in information to stakeholders? who keeps track of wn records of place meetings? how are these documents usually used? how long have you participated in the wn? how did you initially become involved in the wn? active and sustained membership what was your role? how did you assume this role? (i.e. election?) 35 how are your officers elected? what is their length of term? distribution of power how are your wn's decisions made? how many women/youth are in officer positions? does the wn have a m&e system in place? where? please define guidelines of m&e. (ppmel) (wn) institutionalize of a community how often is m&e conducted? based monitoring and evaluation system who conducts m&e (ppmel at wn committee level and barangay level)? how many youth volunteers are involved in wn activities? what are these youth volunteer program to assist in activities watershed education and outreach what is their role? activities established how long have they been involved? what is the role of iirr in your community? what programs has iirr (iirr) support to relevant and supported? appropriate activities currently how many iirr trainings have been done in your community? what has implemented in selected barangays of participation been like? watershed areas how are these projects funded? describe other development projects in your community? (wn) support to relevant and what is the role of the wn in your community? what programs has wn appropriate activities currently implemented? what has the participation been like? implemented in selected barangays of how are these projects funded? watershed areas what problem did these projects address? (i.e. were they relevant?) what is the lgu presence in wn meetings? improve (wn) coordination and what is the wn relationship like with lgu officials/leaders? institutional arrangements for how does the barangay development council operate and implement partnership-building with lgu at development plan? what is the wns involved in this activity? barangay and municipal level has wn been able to secure funding from development plan? improve (wn) coordination and institutional arrangements for partnership-building with nonwhat other cbos and ngos operate in your community/region? government bodies (i.e. private and to what extent, if any, do you work with these organizations? other local ngos) at barangay and municipal level 36 4.2 evaluation guide for the communities to establish trust and partnership with communities & local stakeholders in the watershed (as well as create awareness on water resources issues & problems) kras questions does baseline watershed data exists? identify, review, and analyze existing how was it obtained? local watershed data do you have a resource map? can we see it? how many transect walks have been conducted? were the pras/problem tree analysis conducted and with whom? when? identify, review, and analyze existing what was the purpose of these analyses? local issues can you describe the process of the problem tree, stakeholder analysis and pras? were swot/solution(s) tree conducted and with whom? when? identify, review, and analyze existing what was the purpose of these analyses? local opportunities can you describe the process of these analyses? were institutional analyses conducted and with whom? when? identify, review, and analyze existing what was the purpose of these analyses? local institutional arrangements can you describe the process of these analyses? what types of conflicts exist between stakeholders? identify potential conflicts & how are these conflicts mitigated (i.e. at the barangay level, pn level, lgu prevention mechanism level)? validate information as basis for what are the main issues/opportunities/potential conflicts of your planning, partnership building & community? continuing dialogue w lgus & can you rank them? community groups disseminate lessons from entry point "trust building" activities & the have you met with iirr to discuss their work within community? how often? "dialogue" workshop to community what type of work do they do with communities? what information do you leaders and local policymakers (for gain from iirr? community and lgu) did you participate in an iirr workshop? how did you find out about it? conduct community watershed what did you do there? planning workshop (pn and why was the workshop held? community) what was your first interaction with iirr (how did you get involved)? what came out of the workshop? 37 who are the cbiwm stakeholders? which are involved in current bicol program? why? how can you involve them in the process? why did you join maquiwasa / lagosan? define stakeholder roles, how do you become a member of maquiwasa / lagosan? responsibilities & actions are there other stakeholders that are not involved that you feel should be? what are the responsibilities and roles/actions of each stakeholder (ask stakeholder)? have they changed at all since the beginning of the bicol program? to create awareness about water resources kras questions is there a joint proposal on cbiw? what was the role of the lgu in its development? develop joint proposal by community what was the role of the community in its development? and lgu on cbiw who within the lgu was involved in the proposal development? who within the community was involved in the proposal development? develop consolidated watershed 5ws and h action plans setting up watershed education and outreach program within the how important is…? some questions about education program contents… structure/mechanism for watershed management. (for to develop a community-based watershed action plan w/ participation of various stakeholders including initial capacity development for planning, monitoring, and evaluation (for napo and balinad) kras questions what are the current advocacy campaigns being undertaken? conduct watershed awareness and what were the baseline advocacy campaigns prior to iirr involvement? stakeholder responsibility dialogue when and where were these meetings conducted? workshops, tna, community and what was the purpose of these meetings? local government dialogue meetings what were the outcomes of these meetings? how successful has iec program been? to facilitate the process for community and lgu participation and partnership in implementing watershed resource development and management actions kras questions 38 how did initial participants become involved with pn? how are new members, if any, recruited? involvement of all (or as many as when and where do your meetings take place? possible) stakeholders why do / don't people participate in the pns? what many hours per month do you commit to pn-related activities? does the pn have an m&e system in place? where? please define (pn) institutionalize of a community guidelines of m&e. (ppmel) based monitoring and evaluation system how often is m&e conducted? who conducts m&e (ppmel at pn committee level and barangay level)? what is the role of iirr in your community? what programs has iirr (iirr) support to relevant and supported? appropriate activities currently how many iirr trainings have been done in your community? what has implemented in selected barangays of participation been like? watershed areas how are these projects funded? describe other development projects in your community? (pn) support to relevant and what is the role of the pn in your community? what programs has pn appropriate activities currently implemented? what has the participation been like? implemented in selected barangays of how are these projects funded? watershed areas what problem did these projects address? (i.e. were they relevant?) improve (pn) coordination and institutional arrangements for partnership-building with nonwhat other cbos and ngos operate in your community/region? government bodies (i.e. private and to what extent, if any, do you work with these organizations? other local ngos) at barangay and municipal level 5. list of iirr trainings conducted in bicol (received from bicol administrative assistant on 20 february 2008) masaraga watershed area # title of the training date and venue 1 soil and water conservation training 9-11 august 2006 brgy. herrera, ligao city 2 soil and water conservation training 8-10 march 2006 39 brgy. san ramon, libon, albay 3 joint proposal making workshop 26-30 june 2006 mayon spring resort sto. domingo, albay 4 soil and water conservation training 24-26 july 2006 sitio garayon, balinad polangui, albay 5 inter-watershed cbiwm youth training 26-27 october 2006 mayon spring resort, sto. domingo, albay 6 masaraga watershed cbiwm youth training 13-14 january 2007 kuyang’s function hall dunao, ligao city 7 nursery establishment and management training 25-26 january 2007 barangay hall napo, polangui, albay 8 insumix preparation training 30 january 2007 iirr field office policarpo, tinago, ligao city 9 workshop on facilitating participatory risk assessment and 6-9 february 2007 action planning kuyang’s function hall dunao, ligao city 10 livestock production training 15-16 february 2007 barangay hall mahaba, ligao city 40 111 participatory development communications training 20-22 february 2007 kuyang’s function hall dunao, ligao city 12 organizational development assessment workshop 27-29 march 2007 twin peaks farm resort batang, ligao city 13 bio-intensive gardening training 13-15 june 2007 barangay hall bagsa, oas, albay 14 rural enterprise development training 29 august 2007 twin peaks farm resort batang, ligao city 15 maquiwasa organizational assessment workshop 29-30 january 2008 iirr field office policarpo st., tinago ligao city lagonoy watershed area 1 nursery establishment and management training march 2006 cagaycay, goa, camarines sur 2 joint proposal making workshop 26-30 june 2006 mayon spring resort sto. domingo, albay 3 youth cbiwm training 5-6 january 2007 peñafrancia resort sabang, san jose 41 camarines sur 4 rural enterprise development workshop 30 august 2007 sb hall lagonoy, camarines sur 5 bio-intensive gardening training 28-29 september 2007 goa, camarines sur 6 kalinga food processing training 4 october 2007 goa, camarines sur 6. list of community-managed projects to date 6.1 community-managed natural resource management act ivi ty expecte d ou tput expecte d ou tcome sta tus collect baseline data on baseline data collected for monitoring of environmental planning the status of forest cover forest cover and vegetation indicators and vegetation establish central and three nurseries established functional nurseries to in progress satellite nurseries that include fruit-bearing support reforestation and timber seedlings establish financial seeds/seedlings purchased systems to monitor not started resources for seed, and disseminated. seeds/seedling dispersion fertilizer and other monitoring plan utilized. developed and implemented planting materials establish and maintain seedlings are planted and functional nursery to in progress pilot nursery as seedling nursery is being monitored. support reforestation source for reforestation 6.2 community-managed livelihood/rural enterprise act ivi ty expecte d ou tput expecte d ou tcome sta tus 42 trainings on livelihood networks and cbos trained increased family income; in progress and rural enterprise in alternative income generate funds for future (two trainings generation techniques projects of networks and conducted in cbos 2007) livestock raising (goat, distribution of livestock to increase farming production in progress mallard duck, carabao) low income households and income of farmer households by at least 10% insumix food processing production of insumix as an improve nutritional status of planning income generating activity community; for women’s groups generate funds for future projects 6.3 community-managed health and nutrition act ivi ty expecte d ou tput expecte d ou tcome sta tus assessing baseline and baseline data on monitoring of in progress monitoring of malnourished children nutritional/health status of malnourished children collected; monitoring of children children’s weight planning and malnourished children reach decrease in malnutrition in in progress implementation of normal height/weight ratio community by at least 10% (lagonoy feeding program watershed) establishment of biobig established in 20% of increased availability of in progress intensive gardens (bigs) households (20 square nutritious vegetables for meters plots per household) household consumption 6.4 community-managed disaster risk reduction act ivi ty expecte d ou tput expecte d ou tcome sta tus facilitate review, cmdrr implemented in increased awareness of the not started re-planning, and two barangays communities on disaster risk implementation of reduction; ability to mitigate cmdrr in bagsa and negative impact of disasters herrera 43 facilitate / support tree one central and two satellite functional nurseries with in progress nursery plan tree nurseries established to available seedlings for support 200 ha area for reforestation, woodlot, and reforestation orchard farming salt (sloping agricultural farmers learn salt improve fertility and stability in progress land technology) training techniques of agricultural soils soil and water conservation farmers learn soil and control soil erosion and in progress training water conservation improve soil fertility (three trainings techniques conducted in 2006) 7. priority issues identified by stakeholder groups mt. masaraga-quinale lagonoy environmental issues lack of livelihood opportunities lack of livelihood opportunities environmental degradation and lack of watershed sanitation health problems health networks lack of education about participation of stakeholders watershed issues poverty poverty lack of livelihood opportunities lack of livelihood opportunities malnutrition irrigation farm to market roads access to markets lack of flnancial capital (for lack of financial capital (for agricultural community agricultural inputs) inputs) floods and landslides flooding soil erosion lack of cooperation of barangay officials illegal logging illegal logging overpopulation politics farm to market roads lack of livelihood opportunities lgus electrification malnutrition increasing access to filtered water water resource management need for reforestation environment education campaigns sanitation high cost of farmer inputs illegal logging 44 malnutrition natural disasters climate change politics applicability/appropriateness of poverty technologies academe systemization/synchronization of insurgency barangay level demographic and lack of leadership at provincial level environmental data 8. examples of baseline indicators 8.1 example indicators adapted from “appendix 2: outcome indicators” from “bicol program fourth draft program document: second phase (jan 2008 – dec 2011)” written by rca: • average annual income of targeted households in three watersheds • morbidity rate of population in general and women and children in particular • incidence of water-borne and preventive diseases in the three watersheds • forest cover in three watersheds • number of drinking water facilities • area of agriculture land with irrigation facilities • area of eroded land • number of micro-enterprises as main occupation of residents • division of responsibilities between male and females • number of female cbo members actively involved in community activities • number of conflicts over resources within communities 8.2 example indicators from interview with julieta gonzales, associate professor, bucaf [march 7, 2008]: • type and area of vegetative cover • types of existing ecological niches • types and number of endemic and indigenous species • number of economic, ecological, and social services available to community members • mapping of farming systems / land use • type of farm practices utilized • mapping of vulnerabilities / hot spots (i.e. landslide locations/flood locations) • measurements of poverty • income sources from community-based forest enterprises • type and number of ordinances at local level and the extent of implementation 8.3 example indicators other source: 8.3.1 source: stormwater manager’s resource centerxvii � water quality (pollutant concentration) 45 • sediment contamination • number of aquatic species • number and type of public involvement groups • quantity of volunteer monitoring performed 8.3.2 source: participatory evaluation of collaborative and integrated water management: insights from the field. journal of environmental planning and managementxviii indicators measuring increased capacity (technical, collaborative & financial) • increased confidence of individuals to analyze watershed issues • increased ability of individuals to reach agreements • increased support for organizations to access funding • increased ability of local organizations to understand provincial and federal level initiatives indicators measuring building alliances • development of new long-term work relationships among individuals • development of new links among organizations appendix notes i local government units (lgus) are the provincial, city/municipal, and barangay governments. ii republic of the philippines: department of interior and local government, http://www.dilg.gov.ph/aboutus.htm. iii ibid; and unescap, country reports on local government systems: philippines, 4. iv a sanggunian is a government council. republic of the philippines: department of interior and local government, “the local government code of 1991,” book 1, sec.34-36. v ibid., sec. 106. vi unescap, country reports on local government systems: philippines, 15. vii asian development bank, “a study of ngos: philippines” (manila, 1999), 17. viii ibid., 6. ix philippine council for sustainable development, “philippine strategy for sustainable development,” http://pcsd.neda.gov.ph/pssd.htm. x republic of the philippines: department of interior and local government, “the local government code of 1991,” book 1, sec. 17. xi republic of the philippines: department of environment and natural resources, http://www.denr.gov.ph/about. the world bank estimates that only 4 percent of the denr’s 23,000 staff has been devolved to local governments. xii kenneth ellison, local governance and participatory natural resources management: usaid’s gold project in the philippines, 10. xiii world bank, “governance of natural resources in the philippines: lessons from the past, directions for the future”(2003), x. xiv united nations department of economic and social affairs (undesa) division for sustainable development, agenda 21 (undesa 1992), chap. 1.3. xv office of the president, memorandum order no.47, “strengthening the operationalization and localization of philippine agenda 21 and monitoring its implementation.” http://pcsd.neda.gov.ph/mo47.htm. xvi international institute of rural reconstruction (iirr), “integrated watershed management approaches to alleviation to alleviating poverty in the bicol region, philippines: learning from past experience” (cavite: y.c. james yen center, 2003), 12. xvii http://www.stormwatercenter.net/intro_monitor.htm. xviii c. ferreyra and p. beard, participatory evaluation of collaborative and integrated water management: insights from the field. journal of environmental planning and management, march 2007, 50(2):271-296. 46 microsoft word abumadi_revised 29jan2009.doc abu-madi and al-sa’ed 1 towards sustainable wastewater reuse in the middle east and north africa maher abu-madi * and rashed al-sa’ed ** * institute of environmental and water studies, birzeit university, p.o. box 14, birzeit, west bank, palestine. tel/fax: +972-2-2982120. e-mail: abumadi@birzeit.edu brief biography: dr. maher abu-madi received his phd in water and environmental engineering from technical university of delft in 2004. he is an assistant professor at the institute of environmental and water studies, birzeit university, and he is the research coordinator of unesco-ihe partnership for water education and research (power). ** institute of environmental and water studies, birzeit university, p.o. box 14, birzeit, west bank, palestine. tel/fax: +972-2-2982120. e-mail: rsaed@birzeit.edu brief biography: dr. rashed al-sa’ed is an associate professor in water and sanitation at the institute of environmental and water studies, birzeit university. he has worked with a number of wastewater consultancy firms in germany. abu-madi and al-sa’ed 2 scholarly abstract water has a precious value and each drop must be accounted-for in water scarce regions such as the middle east and north africa. therefore, wastewater has to be reclassified as a renewable water resource rather than waste. this helps in augmenting water availability, and at the same time in preventing environmental pollution. utilization of this resource requires collection, treatment, and use of all generated wastewater. although reuse of wastewater is recognized in most water-scarce countries, the reuse of wastewater is still very low. this paper analyzes the major components of a sustainable wastewater reuse scheme. it also reviews the different methods that are frequently used to quantify and report progress and achievements in wastewater reuse. the paper also introduces an alternative yardstick named by the author as the wastewater reuse index (wri) that has a value between 0-100; wri is calculated by dividing the amounts of wastewater being actually reused by the total amounts of wastewater generated at country level. wri enables water resource managers and policy-makers to put a figure on the gap between achievements at different junctures. moreover, wri recognizes water saving efforts such as low water consumption and reducing losses; thus, highlights the way forward for improving the reuse efficiency as an integral part of water resources management. the paper highlights the major barriers to extensive reuse of the reclaimed wastewater in the mnea countries. keywords: mena region; wastewater; sustainable reuse; utilization abu-madi and al-sa’ed 3 authors’ note wastewater reclamation and reuse is well recognized for its ability to mitigate water shortage which is a major threat to sustainable development and political stability in the middle east and north africa region. substantial efforts have been made to make better utilization of wastewater as a non-conventional water resource. these efforts have been undermined by the lack of vision towards integration of wastewater reuse within water resources management. this paper helps policy-makers and experts in efficient planning of national water resources, especially wastewater management and extensive reuse. keywords: mena; wastewater; sustainable development; utilization. abu-madi and al-sa’ed 4 towards sustainable wastewater reuse in the middle east and north africa introduction water has a precious value and each drop must be accounted-for in water scarce regions such as the middle east and north africa region (mena). the region dwells five percent of the world population and has less than one percent world’s available water. water scarcity is a major threat for food security and political stability in the region. much of the water crisis is caused by the way water is used. more than 89% of mena’s withdrawn water is allocated to agriculture and only 11% to municipal and industrial uses. alleviation of the water scarcity implies reallocation of freshwater from agricultural to domestic and industrial uses. according to the world bank1, a reduction in agricultural water use by 15% would double the water available to households and industry in the region. this would reduce irrigated agriculture at the time many countries aim to expand it due to food security reasons. besides, the mena countries avoid inter-sector water transfer, mainly due to internal political considerations2; for example, farmers in the jordan valley have strong influence on the jordanian policy makers due to the clan-type of social structure. in search for additional water supplies, the regional water experts and aid agencies have recognized reclaimed wastewater as a valuable non-conventional water resource. nevertheless, substantial amounts of water that originate from different human activities used to be considered as waste due to the deterioration of water quality and due to psychological considerations. in addition to water scarcity, the wide enough range of technologies that now exist to purify this wastewater to acceptable levels3 increased the chances for wastewater to be reclassified as a renewable water resource rather than waste4, 5, 6. in many countries such as 1 world bank. (2000). wastewater treatment and reuse in the middle east and north africa region (mena). world bank, washington, dc. 2 saghir, j., schiffler, m., and woldu, m. (2000). urban water and sanitation in the middle east and north africa region: the way forward. the world bank, mena, infrastructure development group. 3 kalbermatten associates, inc. (1999). study to identify gaps, issues and constraints in urban environmental sanitation. report no. 1: preliminary identification of gaps. a study funded by the department for international development, united kingdom, and executed by the undp/world bank water and sanitation program washington, d.c., u.s.a. 4 asano, t. and levine, a. (1996). wastewater reclamation, recycling and reuse: past, present and future. wat. sci. tech., 33(10-11): 1-14. 5 eden, r. (1996). wastewater reuse limitations and possibilities. desalination, 106: 335-338. abu-madi and al-sa’ed 5 israel, jordan, and tunisia, wastewater is becoming a preferred unconventional source of water7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, whose supply is increasing, because of population growth, and its costs are relatively low13, 14, 15. yet in the mena countries, substantial proportions of wastewater are discharged without or poorly treated. in other words, wastewater utilization in the mena region is very low despite water scarcity and strong demand for water supply augmentation. oron et al.16 identified two basic requirements for utilization of wastewater as a solution for water shortage problems whilst minimizing the health and environmental risks: (i) the need for comprehensive wastewater collection systems, and (ii) the need for well-operated wastewater treatment facilities. mills and asano17 rightly emphasized a third requirement, namely securing users for the treated effluents. thus, to maximize the contribution of wastewater reuse to the total water availability, the generated wastewater needs to be collected, treated, and used: three “pillars” of wastewater utilization. in order to better understand why reuse is still limited in the mena countries, reclaimed wastewater is recognized as a commodity whose market comprises: (i) a supply side, which refers to the production, collection, and treatment of wastewater, (ii) a demand side, which refers to the use of the reclaimed wastewater, and (iii) market control and monitoring, which refers to the regulatory and institutional framework. in the mena countries, the reclaimed-wastewater market is unbalanced; i.e., growing supply – which is demonstrated by 6 asano, t., maeda, m., and takaki, m. (1996). wastewater reclamation and reuse in japan: overview and implementation examples. wat. sci. tech., 34(11): 219-226. 7 otterphol, r., albold, a. and oldenburg, m. (1999). source control in urban sanitation and waste management: ten systems with reuse of resources. wat. sci. tech., 39(5): 153-160. 8 mubarak, j. (1998). middle east and north africa: development policy in view of a narrow agricultural natural resource base. world development, 26(5): 877-895. 9 angelakis, a., marecos, m., bontoux, l. and asano, t. (1999). the status of wastewater reuse practice in the mediterranean basin: need for guidelines. wat. res., 33(10): 2201-2217. 10 bahri, a. (1999). agricultural reuse of wastewater and global water management. wat.sci.tech., 40(4-5):339-346. 11 hussain, g. and al-saati, a. (1999). wastewater quality and its reuse in agriculture in saudi arabia. desalination, 123: 241-251. 12 faruqui, n. (2000). wastewater treatment and reuse for food and water security. idrc. ottawa, canada. www.idrc.ca/waterdemand/specialpapers_e.html. 13 asano, t. and levine, a. (1995). wastewater reuse: a valuable link in water resources management. water reuse, wqi, no. 4. 14 haruvy, n. (1997). agricultural reuse of wastewater: nation-wide cost benefit analysis. agricultural, ecosystem and environment, 66: 113-119. 15 haruvy, n. (1998). wastewater reuse regional and economic considerations. resources, conservation and recycling, 23: 57–66. 16 oron, g., campos, c., gillerman, l., and salgot, m. (1999). wastewater treatment and reuse for agricultural irrigation in small communities. agricultural water management, 38: 223-234. 17 mills, r. and asano, t. (1996). a retrospective assessment of water reclamation projects. wat. sci. tech., 33(1011): 59-70. abu-madi and al-sa’ed 6 the increasing sewerage coverage and number of wastewater treatment plants – and stagnant demand – which is demonstrated by the substantial proportions of treated effluents that are not used but discharged into the receiving water bodies. balancing the reclaimed-wastewater market (i.e., reducing the gap between supply and demand) implies increasing the rates of collection, treatment, and reuse close to the rate of wastewater generation. water scarcity has made wastewater reuse more prominent in technical and policy literature as well as in national and international professional meetings. several indicators are being used to quantify achievements and progress in wastewater reuse. however, until now no standard yardstick exists to measure overall reuse efficiency at a country’s level that meets the following criteria: (i) considers all wastewater production (collected and uncollected), (ii) recognizes the importance of each of these subsequent steps of production, collection, treatment, and use of the wastewater, (iii) allows comparisons within and among countries, and (iv) accounts for wastewater that is utilized through on-site and low cost means. the currently used yardsticks are based only on the amounts of urban wastewater and omit to take account of the wastewater that does not pass through conventional collection and treatment. to quantify achievements in wastewater reuse, the commonly used indicators are: (i) flow rate (million cubic meters per year), (ii) as percentage of wastewater treated, (iii) as percentage of municipal sewage produced, (iv) as percentage of total tap water supplied, (v) as percentage of urban water supply, (vi) as percentage of agricultural water supply, (vii) as percentage of total area irrigated, and (viii) as area of land irrigated with reclaimed wastewater. for example, reuse efficiency in israel is assessed in freidler18 as 65% of the municipal sewage production, in freidler19 as 80% of all irrigation water in the jeezrael valley, in shelef and azov20 as 24.4% of the total water supply, in idelovitch21 as 250 million cubic meter per year, as 60% of the total urban water supply, as 83% of the treated effluent, and as 20% of the irrigated 18 freidler, e. (2001). water reuse – an integral part of water resources management: israel as a case study. water policy, 3: 29-39. 19 freidler, e. (1999). the jeezrael valley project for wastewater reclamation and reuse, israel. wat. sci. tech., 40(4-5): 347-354. 20 shelef, g. and azov, a. (1996). the coming era of intensive wastewater reuse in the mediterranean region. wat. sci. tech., 33(10-11): 115-125. 21 idelovitch, e. (2001). wastewater reclamation for irrigation: the dan region project in israel. prepared for the world bank, washington dc. abu-madi and al-sa’ed 7 area. bahri and brissaud 22 assessed reuse efficiency in tunisia as 6,500 ha of irrigated land and as 15% of the available treated wastewater. other country examples are shown in table 1. these indicators are useful but inadequate to capture the potential for and achievements in efficiency improvement. table 1: wastewater reuse rates for agricultural irrigation23, 24. in the above cases also, the “potential” for reuse refers to the amounts of urban wastewater that is being collected and treated through conventional means and possibly would be added to the national water balance 9, 11, 25. the author defines the “potential” for reuse as the actual hydraulic capacity of the wastewater resource – i.e., total amount of wastewater production (urban and rural) – combined with the existing enabling environment – i.e., technical, financial, regulatory, institutional, and socio-cultural capacity – to utilize this resource. this paper aims at: (i) identifying the components of sustainable wastewater utilization, (ii) analyzing the indicators frequently used for quantifying achievements in wastewater reuse, and (iii) introducing a yardstick called wastewater reuse index (wri). wastewater utilization wastewater generation the total amount of wastewater generation is the hydraulic capacity of the wastewater resource, which can be quantified in three different ways: • measuring water supply. the generated amounts of wastewater can be derived from the total water supply for domestic, industrial, and commercial uses. this method is not favored since it is difficult to make countrywide estimates for the amounts of water supplied from 22 bahri, a. and brissaud, f. (1996). wastewater reuse in tunisia: assessing a national policy. wat. sci. tech., 33(10-11): 87-94. 23 khouri, n., kalbermatten j., and bartone, c. (1994). the reuse of wastewater in agriculture: a guide for planners. undp world bank water and sanitation program. washington, dc., the world bank. 24 al-hamdi, m. (2000). competition for scarce groundwater in sana’a plain, yemen: a study on the incentives system for urban and agricultural water use. phd thesis, ihe-delft, the netherlands. 25 angelakis, a. and bontoux, l. (2001). wastewater reclamation and reuse in eureau countries. water policy, 3: 47-59. location volume reused (million m3/y) as of total sewage (%) as of total irrigation (%) germany 100 3 10 china 10,000 27 mexico 1,500 100 80 santiago, chili 190 100 70 abu-madi and al-sa’ed 8 alternative non-public sources such as private water vendors, rainwater harvesting, and springs. moreover, the unaccounted-for water in the supply systems adds uncertainty. • measuring wastewater flows. this method measures only the metered wastewater flows from sewered communities. the amounts of wastewater generated from communities using cesspits and septic tanks must to be estimated and accounted. • measuring water consumption. this method quantifies the amount of wastewater generated from domestic, commercial, and industrial water uses based on the average per capita water consumption, taking into consideration that not all the consumed water enters the sanitation system. this technique is most recommended since it allows easy calculation and takes into consideration the water saving efforts. water saving means less per capita water consumption, less wastewater generation, and therefore lower costs. table 2 shows estimates for domestic wastewater production and collection in some mena countries. table 2: domestic wastewater production and collection rates in some mena countries. wastewater collection population (thousands) water consumption * (million m3/yr) (% of population) ** ( million m3/yr) *** country urban rural total urban rural total urban rural total urban rural total algeria 18,969 12,502 31,471 831 319 1,150 90 47 73 598 120 718 egypt 30,954 37,515 68,469 1,356 959 2,314 98 91 94 1,063 698 1,761 iraq 17,756 5,359 23,115 778 137 915 93 31 79 579 34 613 jordan 4,948 1,721 6,669 217 44 261 100 98 99 173 35 208 lebanon 2,945 337 3,282 129 9 138 100 87 99 103 6 109 libya 4,911 693 5,604 215 18 233 97 96 97 167 14 181 oman 2,135 407 2,542 94 10 104 98 61 92 73 5 78 saudi arabia 18,526 3,081 21,607 811 79 890 100 100 100 649 63 712 syria 8,783 7,342 16,125 385 188 572 98 81 90 302 122 423 tunisia 6,281 3,305 9,586 275 84 360 97 48 80 214 32 246 yemen 4,476 13,636 18,112 196 348 544 87 31 45 136 86 223 * estimated based on 120 l/c/d for urban and 70 l/c/d for rural; it does not include commercial and industrial water. ** sewerage and on-site collection systems. *** assumed that 80% of the water consumption is collected as wastewater. wastewater collection collection here refers to the wastewater produced across the country that enters the sewerage system or the on-site disposal systems; to a large extent, it is approximated by figures of sanitation coverage. in most mena countries, there is a continuing increase in the collection rate of wastewater, especially through sewerage networks that are gradually expanding. this is driven mainly because wastewater collection is considered an urban necessity that serves health and abu-madi and al-sa’ed 9 environmental purposes26, 27. the estimates for total collection rates of wastewater are very high in many mena countries (table 2); this includes conventional sewerage and on-site disposal such as cesspits and septic tanks. thus, it can be assumed that sanitation coverage and wastewater collection are not the limiting factors for wastewater utilization in most of the region. wastewater treatment wastewater collected from communities and industries ultimately returns to receiving water bodies or to the land. wastewater contains organic materials whose decomposition can lead to the production of large quantities of malodorous gases. in addition, untreated wastewater usually contains numerous disease-causing microorganisms that dwell in the human intestinal tract. wastewater also contains nutrients, which can stimulate excessive growth of aquatic plants and algae (eutrophication), and it may contain toxic compounds28. these contaminants have to be removed or reduced to a safe and environmentally sound level for environmental protection purposes in order that the water course can retain its utility (for fishing, bathing, etc.) downstream. in addition, if the wastewater can be treated to a high enough quality standard, it also provides for a badly needed non-conventional water resource. the level of required wastewater treatment is case-specific and directly related to the quality requirements associated with the end-use4. the typical wastewater end-uses are: (i) discharge into the sea (with minimum disturbance of the existing ecosystem), (ii) discharge into surface water, (iii) discharge into groundwater aquifers, (iv) restricted agricultural irrigation, (v) unrestricted agricultural irrigation, (vi) aquaculture, (vii) non-potable domestic use, (viii) potable water use, and (ix) industrial use. in all these cases, wastewater treatment is a requisite. conventional wastewater treatment, typically, consists of a combination of physical, chemical, and biological processes and operations to remove solids, organic matter and, sometimes, nutrients from wastewater. general terms used to describe different degrees of treatment, in order of increasing treatment level, are preliminary, primary, secondary, and tertiary and/or advanced wastewater treatment. the conventional treatment systems tend to be 26 bakir, h. (2000). guiding principles and options for accelerated extension of wastewater management services to small communities in emr countries. world health organization. regional office for the eastern mediterranean. regional center for environmental health activities (ceha). december 2000, amman, jordan. 27 who. (2000). global water and sanitation assessment 2000. report. 28 metcalf and eddy inc. (1991). wastewater engineering: treatment, disposal, and reuse. mcgraw-hill international, third edition. abu-madi and al-sa’ed 10 expensive at small scale. therefore, in rural and peri-urban environments, wastewater can be treated in alternative, low-cost treatment systems such as septic tanks with attached sub-drainage irrigation pipes, up-flow anaerobic tanks and ponds followed by furrow or pumped irrigation, etc. however, these systems are beyond the scope of this study. the frequently used systems for urban wastewater treatment in the mena are activated sludge systems, trickling filters, and lagoons29, 30. in some countries, disinfection to remove pathogens sometimes follows the last treatment step. wastewater reuse the collected wastewater must be treated to adjust its quality to any of the following end-uses uses: (i) irrigation, (ii) artificial recharge, (iii) potable water supply, (iv) toilet flushing, and (v) industrial water supply. reuse of wastewater has been practiced in many areas worldwide for thousands of years31. there are two strong economic incentives to reuse reclaimed wastewater: (i) augmentation in regions with water scarcity, and/or (ii) avoiding the cost of the deterioration of the water resources and the environment that would be polluted when receiving unor partly treated wastewater. as far as possible, the wastewater from rural and small communities should be reused as well. in those cases, on-site and low cost systems can provide for decentralized collection and treatment of the wastewater. however, in practice in most cases, cesspits and permeable septic tanks are used whose effluents infiltrate into the surrounding soil indiscriminately polluting groundwater, thus jeopardizing public health27. although their effluent is often indirectly partially “reused”, this flow must not be accounted for as this practice is not sound. likewise, direct or indirect irrigation with raw wastewater must not be accounted for as this practice is not in accordance with national and international sound reuse standards32, 33, 34. 29 bahri, a. (1998). fertilizing value and pollution load of reclaimed water in tunisia. wat. res., 32(11): 3484-3489. 30 jamrah, a. (1999). assessment of characteristics and biological treatment technologies of jordanian wastewater. bioprocess engineering, 21: 331-340. 31 mara, d. and cairncross, s. (1989). guidelines for the safe use of wastewater and excreta in agriculture and aquaculture: measures for public health protection. who, geneva. 32 who. (1989). health guidelines for use of wastewater in agriculture and aquaculture. report of a who scientific group. technical report series, no. 778. who, geneva. 33 rowe, d. and abdel-magid, m. (1995). handbook of wastewater reclamation and reuse. lewis publishers, usa. 34 epa. (1991). alternative wastewater collection systems: manual. us environmental protection agency, u.s. agency for international development, washington, dc. usa. abu-madi and al-sa’ed 11 reuse for agricultural irrigation: since the beginning of the 1980s many countries have been using untreated or partially treated wastewater for agricultural irrigation25, 35. treated wastewater is used for agricultural irrigation directly and indirectly. in direct reuse, the treated effluent is taken from the wastewater treatment plants (wwtps) to the irrigation site. for example, part of the treated effluents in tunisia is used to irrigate about 6,750 ha of orchards (citrus, grapes, olives, peaches, pears, apples, and pomegranate), fodder, cotton, cereals, golf courses and lawns. in indirect reuse, the treated effluent is discharged into surface water or groundwater aquifers. the effluents, thus, are deliberately blended with freshwater available in the wadis, dams, rivers, and aquifers and used, on purpose or not, by downstream farmers. in most cases it is used for unrestricted irrigation; reclaimed wastewater can be used for all crops even those consumed raw or uncooked. for example, most of the treated wastewater in jordan is blended with freshwater from the king talal reservoir and used downstream in the jordan valley for unrestricted irrigation12, 36. in the dan region project of israel, more than 100 million cubic meters of treated wastewater are leached annually to the groundwater aquifer. water is then pumped by production wells to the main conveyance system and to the distribution network to be used for unrestricted irrigation12, 20. reuse for municipal uses: municipal wastewater reuse can be divided into three categories: i) direct potable reuse. wastewater is treated to a level that is acceptable for human consumption. wastewater for direct potable use usually goes through two subsequent treatment processes, conventional and advanced. despite the viability of the treatment technology to produce an acceptable drinking water quality from wastewater, it is unlikely that it will be widely adapted because of the high cost and low public acceptance. ii) indirect potable reuse. it is very common and applied through the disposal of treated wastewater into surface or groundwater, which is used downstream as a potable water supply source. many of the large cities and towns that are located along the major rivers and lakes depend on water from those water bodies for their domestic water supply. 35 pescod, m. b. (1992). wastewater treatment and use in agriculture. fao irrigation and drainage paper no. 47. food and agriculture organization of the united nations, rome, italy. 36 shatanawi, m. and fayyad, m. (1996). effect of khirbet as-samra treated effluent on quality of irrigation water in the central jordan valley. wat. res., 30(12): 2915-2920. abu-madi and al-sa’ed 12 these water bodies at the same time receive treated and raw sewage from upstream cities and industries24, 29. iii) non-potable reuse. this includes reuse of reclaimed wastewater for irrigation of landscape, greenbelts, golf courses, public parks, sport fields, in addition to fire fighting, and toilet flushing. the use of reclaimed wastewater for irrigation of landscape, public parks, sport fields, and recreational sites has become a widespread practice in kuwait, united arab emirates, and tunisia6, 37, 38,39. reuse for industrial and environmental uses: the availability of well-treated wastewater at comparatively low cost and the scarcity of good-quality natural water are strong incentives for innovative reclamation projects. reclaimed wastewater is ideal for many industries where processes do not require water of potable quality. also, industries are often located near populated areas where centralized wwtps already generate an available source of reclaimed wastewater. wastewater reuse for industrial purposes is widely practiced in the world 6, 35, 38. reuse of reclaimed wastewater for environmental purposes is becoming a common practice in arid and semi-arid areas, especially in the form of artificial recharge in order to protect groundwater from seawater intrusion39, 40. wastewater reuse index (wri) despite the existence of the aforementioned indicators measuring wastewater reuse, an indicator with more potential is the wastewater reuse index (wri) which quantifies the total amount of wastewater being reused as percentage of the total hydraulic capacity of the total wastewater production. the wri calculation depends on the following realities: (i) wastewater collection is subsequent to wastewater production, (ii) wastewater treatment is subsequent to wastewater collection, and (iii) wastewater reuse is subsequent to appropriate wastewater treatment. accordingly, the wri derivation steps are represented as follows: 37 arar, a. (1991). wastewater reuse for irrigation in near east region. wat. sci. tech., 23: 2127-2134. 38 maeda, m., nakada, k., kawamoto k., and ikeda, m. (1996). area-wide use of reclaimed water in tokyo, japan. wat. sci. tech., 33(10-11): 51-57. 39 pettygrove, s. and asano, t., eds. (1985). irrigation with reclaimed municipal wastewater: a guidance manual. chelsae, mich., lewis publishers. abu-madi and al-sa’ed 13 • total amount of wastewater produced (g) from urban, rural, commercial, and industrial water users in the country depends on the population size, specific water consumption (l/c/d), and water losses, as in eqn. 1: g = f (domestic, commercial, and industrial water consumption, water losses) (1) • total amount of wastewater collected (c) through sewerage and onsite systems is represented as percentage (x) of produced wastewater (g), as in eqn. 2: 100 0 , 10 . . 100 . 10 . . 10 . ) . .( . . 100 ) . .( . 100 . . 100 . , 6 2 100 . ) , ( 100 . 100 . 100 . ) , , ( 4 4 4 ! ! = = = = = = = " = = = = = = wri z y x g r wri z y x g g x z y g c y z g t z g t z wri equations combining g r wri g r f wri t z r c y t g x c leakage n consumptio specific population f g (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) • total amount of wastewater treated (t) through appropriate offsite and onsite systems is represented as percentage (y) of collected wastewater (c), as in eqn. 3: 100 0 , 10 . . 100 . 10 . . 10 . ) . .( . . 100 ) . .( . 100 . . 100 . , 6 2 100 . ) , ( 100 . 100 . 100 . ) , , ( 4 4 4 ! ! = = = = = = = " = = = = = = wri z y x g r wri z y x g g x z y g c y z g t z g t z wri equations combining g r wri g r f wri t z r c y t g x c leakage n consumptio specific population f g (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) • total amount of wastewater reused (r) through irrigation, groundwater recharge, industrial use, potable use, toilet flushing, and acceptable onsite reuse is represented as percentage (z) of treated wastewater (t), as in eqn. 4: 100 0 , 10 . . 100 . 10 . . 10 . ) . .( . . 100 ) . .( . 100 . . 100 . , 6 2 100 . ) , ( 100 . 100 . 100 . ) , , ( 4 4 4 ! ! = = = = = = = " = = = = = = wri z y x g r wri z y x g g x z y g c y z g t z g t z wri equations combining g r wri g r f wri t z r c y t g x c leakage n consumptio specific population f g (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) • the wastewater reuse index (wri) is the percent ratio of total amount of wastewater reused (r) to total amount of wastewater produced (g), as in eqns. 5 and 6: 100 0 , 10 . . 100 . 10 . . 10 . ) . .( . . 100 ) . .( . 100 . . 100 . , 6 2 100 . ) , ( 100 . 100 . 100 . ) , , ( 4 4 4 ! ! = = = = = = = " = = = = = = wri z y x g r wri z y x g g x z y g c y z g t z g t z wri equations combining g r wri g r f wri t z r c y t g x c leakage n consumptio specific population f g (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) • substituting eqn. 4 instead of r in eqn. 6 gives wri in terms of z, t, and g. substituting eqn. 3 instead of t gives wri in terms of y, z, c, and g. substituting eqn. 2 instead of c gives wri in terms of x, y, and z. these are shown in eqns. 7 and 8: 100 0 , 10 . . 100 . 10 . . 10 . ) . .( . . 100 ) . .( . 100 . . 100 . , 6 2 100 . ) , ( 100 . 100 . 100 . ) , , ( 4 4 4 ! ! = = = = = = = " = = = = = = wri z y x g r wri z y x g g x z y g c y z g t z g t z wri equations combining g r wri g r f wri t z r c y t g x c leakage n consumptio specific population f g (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) where wri = wastewater reuse index (0-100) x = wastewater collection as percentage of total production, y = wastewater treatment as percentage of total collection, z = wastewater reuse as percentage of total treatment. abu-madi and al-sa’ed 14 wri can be used by water resource managers and policy makers to put a figure on the gap between achievements at different junctures. moreover, wri recognizes water saving efforts such as low water consumption and reducing losses; thus, highlights the way forward for improving the reuse efficiency. figure 3 provides wri for all possible collection and treatment percentages at four different hypothetical reuse rates (z = 10, 40, 70 and 100%). low values can be reached with an unlimited number of combinations of x, y, and z (collection, treatment, and reuse rates, respectively). higher values of wri can be reached only through higher rates of collection, treatment, and reuse, as these three factors are of equal importance in equation 8. in many mena countries, the total collection rate through sewerage networks and onsite systems exceeds 90%, except in a few where it is around half this rate (table 2). table 3 compares the wri in some selected mena countries. israel has reached a high collection rate of about 95% with 68% treatment of the collected wastewater and 83% reuse of the treated flow21, thus, with a wri of 53.7%. potentially, israel can increase its wri to 95% by increasing the treatment from 68% to 100% and reuse from 83% to 100%, assuming that the production and collection rates are unchanged. if israel reuses all of its currently treated wastewater, its wri will reach about 65%. high wri values can be reached if the treatment and reuse rates are increased to a level closer to that of collection. for example, jordan, tunisia, and saudi arabia, respectively, could reach a wri of 99%, 80%, and 100% if all their collected wastewater is treated and reused; saudi arabia currently is lagging behind whereas tunisia and jordan take a middle position, and israel is achieving slightly above half of its potential (table 3). all these countries have high collection rates but need to increase their treatment and reuse efficiencies in order to reach such high wri values. this can be achieved by constructing treatment plants and by encouraging on-site management of wastewater at household and community levels in periurban and rural areas. as mentioned previously, most countries of the region have reasonably high rates of wastewater collection, which is driven by urbanization, public health, and environmental incentives. thus, the low wri values and the imbalance (failure) in the reclaimed-wastewater market are mainly due to low rates of wastewater treatment and/or reuse. for reuse, however, disincentives tend to be stronger than incentives because reuse offers direct benefit to a lower number of groups only, i.e., farmers and water resource managers. abu-madi and al-sa’ed 15 figure 3: graphical representation of the wri at reuse rates of 10, 40, 70, and 100%, respectively. table 3: wri in selected mena countries (flow rates per annum). 21, 40, 41, 42 country g (million m3) c (million m3) t (million m3) r (million m3) x = c/g (%) y = t/c (%) z = r/t (%) wri (%) israel 464 440 300 249 95 68.2 83.0 53.7 jordan 241 239 80 67 99 33.5 83.8 27.8 tunisia 395 316 148 50 80 46.8 33.8 12.7 saudi arabia 1,347 1,347 292 92 100 21.7 31.5 6.8 g: generation; c: collection; t: treatment; r: reuse; wri: wastewater reuse index. a large number of factors have to be analyzed for each component of the wri in order to ensure better utilization of wastewater as a non-conventional resource of water. increasing wri in the 40 onas. (2001). annual report of the national agency for sewerage. tunisia. 41 mwi. (1999). annual report of the ministry of water and irrigation. amman. 42 abu rizaiza, o. (1999). modification of the standards of wastewater reuse in saudi arabia. wat. res., 33(11): 2601-2608. abu-madi and al-sa’ed 16 mena region requires increasing the reuse rates. extensive reuse of reclaimed wastewater in the region is constrained by a number of barriers. based on authors’ experience, the most important barriers and foreseen solutions are explained as follows: (i) the mena countries adopt supply-driven approach in which the concern for reuse of reclaimed wastewater is often subsequent to design and implementation of treatment plants. for example, tunisia started to explore wastewater reuse after the implementation of many treatment plants for environmental considerations along the sea coast that is faraway from agricultural lands. the mena countries are recommended to adopt a demand-driven approach when implementing new wastewater treatment plants. in other words, the end use of reclaimed wastewater should decide the effluent quality, technology, and location of treatment plants. (ii) the freshwater tariffs for agricultural irrigation are very low compared to the domestic water tariffs. therefore, farmers are not attracted to replace freshwater with reclaimed wastewater. the mena countries are recommended to restructure their water and wastewater pricing strategies with increasing the gap between freshwater and reclaimed wastewater tariffs. this, on one hand, would reduce agricultural water demand, and on the other hand, it would make irrigation with reclaimed wastewater more economically attractive than that with freshwater. (iii) framers and common public of the mena countries have limited knowledge and unclear perceptions towards wastewater reuse and the prevailing water shortage. many people believe that islamic religion prohibits reuse of treated wastewater. on the contrary, islamic religion supports water demand initiatives as well as reuse of treated wastewater that does not have negative impacts on public health. joint efforts are needed from governmental, non-governmental, academic, and aid institutions on developing appropriate educational and awareness programs and initiatives that improve public knowledge and perceptions. (iv) all countries adopt stringent guidelines and standards for wastewater treatment and reuse with over concern for public health and environmental protection. complying with such standards implies construction of sophisticated and costly wastewater treatment plants. the mena countries are recommended to adopt more flexible standards without compromising public health and environmental protection. for example, irrigation of abu-madi and al-sa’ed 17 fodder crops and trees does not require high quality water which can be produced by modest wastewater treatment systems. (v) most countries lack for adequate storage facilities to cope with continuous production of treated wastewater and seasonal variations in irrigation water demand. without large storage reservoirs, substantial amounts of treated wastewater will have to be discharged into the environment without utilization during off-irrigation periods. at the same time, the amounts of treated wastewater available to farmers will not satisfy the irrigation water needs. therefore, success of any wastewater reuse scheme necessitates having storage facilities for the treated effluent. conclusions and recommendations the middle east and north africa region suffers from a chronic water shortage that threatens its political stability and sustainable development. the reuse of reclaimed wastewater is recognized by all experts and policy-makers of the region as an important non-conventional water resource. this paper considers reclaimed wastewater as a commodity whose market is unbalanced; growing supply -demonstrated by high rates of wastewater generation and collection, and medium rates of treatmentagainst a stagnant demand -demonstrated by low rates of wastewater reuse and the large proportions of treated wastewater that are discharged into the water bodies. the high rates of collection are driven by urbanization, health, and environmental incentives. thus, augmenting freshwater availability in region implies improving wastewater utilization and balancing the reclaimed-wastewater market through maximizing the rates of wastewater treatment and reuse. the currently-used indicators to semi-quantify achievements in wastewater reuse are misleading as they account for only the reused amounts of wastewater from urban treatment plants and omit to include that from rural communities. they do not enable valid comparisons between and within countries. this paper suggests a yardstick indictor that is more inclusive and takes into account the contribution of each component in a wastewater utilization scheme: collection, treatment, and reuse. this indicator is called wastewater reuse index (wri) which quantifies reuse as a percentage of the total generation of wastewater. in the mena region, saudi arabia has a low wri, while tunisia and jordan have a medium wri. although israel has the highest wri, it is still only half of its potential. abu-madi and al-sa’ed 18 increasing wri in the mena region requires extensive reuse of reclaimed wastewater, which is constrained by a number of barriers. based on authors’ experience, the most important barriers and foreseen solutions are summarized as follows: 1. the reuse of reclaimed wastewater is often recognized after the design and implementation of treatment plants. the mena countries are recommended to adopt a demand-driven approach in which the end use of reclaimed wastewater decides the effluent quality, technology, and location of treatment plants. 2. due to low tariffs of irrigation water, farmers are not attracted to replace freshwater with reclaimed wastewater. the mena countries are recommended to increase the gap between freshwater and reclaimed wastewater tariffs in order to make irrigation with reclaimed wastewater more economically attractive than that with freshwater. 3. framers and common public of the mena countries have limited knowledge and unclear perceptions towards wastewater reuse and the prevailing water shortage. extensive efforts are needed on developing appropriate educational and awareness programs and initiatives that improve public knowledge and perceptions. 4. the mena countries adopt stringent guidelines and standards for wastewater treatment and reuse with over concern for public health and environmental protection. complying with such standards implies construction of sophisticated and costly wastewater treatment plants. the mena countries are recommended to adopt more flexible standards without compromising public health and environmental protection. 5. most countries lack for adequate storage facilities to cope with continuous production of treated wastewater and seasonal variations in irrigation water demand. therefore, success of any wastewater reuse scheme necessitates having storage facilities for the treated effluent. references 1. world bank. 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(1999). modification of the standards of wastewater reuse in saudi arabia. wat. res., 33(11): 2601-2608. microsoft word 7 99-110 riasi final formatted.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 10, iss. 1 (2013), pp. 99 – 110 effects of a hypothetical iranian accession to the world trade organization on iran’s flower industry arash riasi department of management university of isfahan, isfahan, iran email: arash_91@rocketmail.com seyed fathollah amiri aghdaie department of management university of isfahan, isfahan, iran email: s.aghdaie@ace.ui.ac.ir abstract this is a hypothetical case study, based on survey responses, that outlines how an iranian accession to the world trade organization (wto) would affect iran’s flower industry. four different groups are examined: flower producers, flower exporters, flower importers, and flower distributors. the results of the research indicate that iran’s accession to the wto would increase the performance of several industry factors, including direct foreign investment, the competitive strength of flower exporters, related job opportunities, and the number of international flower distribution companies in iran. results also show that iran’s accession to the wto would have no impact on iran’s annual flower imports, the cost of raw materials for flower production, and the size of iran’s domestic flower market. author’s note arash riasi is a b.sc. candidate at the university of isfahan. he has been studying business administration since 2010. seyed fathollah amiri aghdaie is an assistant professor of marketing at the university of isfahan. keywords: globalization, flower industry development, iran’s flower industry, competitiveness 1. introduction the flower industry is a major presence in both developed and underdeveloped countries, with an annual global trade value of more than us$100 billion. the netherlands is the world’s largest exporter with more than 50 percent of the world’s flower export; other major flower exporters include colombia, ecuador, kenya, israel, italy, and spain (institute of business research 1997). cut flowers are one of the most globally produced commercial mass production items (kendirli & 100 consilience cakmak 2007). given that iran has a comparative advantage in flower production in the middle east, the flower industry is currently one of the country’s fastest growing markets, with the potential to turn into one of the country’s most prosperous nonpetroleum exporters (asgari & rooshandel arbatani 2001). the world trade organization’s founding in 1995 affected all international markets and industries around the world. in today’s competitive global market, it can be hugely beneficial for countries to join the wto and access a huge global market. thus, we seek to evaluate the effects of a hypothetical iranian accession to the wto on iran’s flower industry. all the data used in this article are based on survey responses of senior managers of companies active in iran’s flower industry. for this reason, this article can be classified as a hypothetical case study. 2. the world trade organization the world trade organization came into force on january 1, 1995, fully replacing the previous gatt secretariat as the organization responsible for administering the international trade regime (international institute for sustainable development 2000). the goal of the world trade organization is to facilitate and supervise international trade. as of today, the wto has 157 members and 27 observer governments (world trade organization 2012). it forms part of a complex system of multilayered governance, both horizontally and vertically (cottier 2007).1 according to the cia world factbook (2012), iran is the world’s 24th largest economy by gdp, and currently the largest outside the wto. iran applied to join the wto on july 19, 1996. a high-level governmental committee, chaired by the deputy foreign minister, was given the responsibility of drafting a final report on iranian accession for the council of ministers. the committee’s recommendation clearly supported iran’s application (alavi 2010). the united states, however, vetoed iran’s application 22 times between 1996 and 2005, due to the political tensions between the two countries. but on may 26, 2005, wto members unanimously approved iran’s application, and iran became an observer member of the wto. it is still several stages removed, however, from permanent membership, though it is probable that iran will become a permanent member of the wto in the near future. the country’s recent economic reforms, including subsidy cuts, tax reforms, tariff reductions, and changes to its copyright laws, clearly indicate that the country is eager to become a permanent member. but, undoubtedly, iran’s accession to wto 1 the wto, however, does have its critics. khor (2000) believes that the wto has not helped developing countries to overcome the challenges of exporting their products to world markets. those who criticize the wto also believe that wealthy countries use their negotiation power in the wto to gain outsize benefits for themselves. many wealthy countries are able to maintain high import duties on certain products or even block their import, particularly in the agricultural sector. another major criticism of the wto is that it ignores the importance of environmental issues caused by large increases in international trade and the mass production and distribution of commercial goods. consilience riasi & amiri aghdaie: iran’s flower industry is largely reliant on the country’s political relations with major western powers, particularly the united states (mahdavi 2012). 3. iran’s flower industry development iran’s agricultural export from 2001 to 2011 made up roughly 40% of its non-oil exports. one of the most profitable industries within this sector is the flower industry. iran exports more than 87,000 metric tons of fresh flowers and 200 million cut flowers each year (khojaste nejad 2011). altogether, the country’s flower industry employs an estimated 50,000 people. the total area under flower cultivation in iran is 3,119 hectares—82 hectares of glass greenhouses, 1112 hectares of wooden and plastic greenhouses, and 1925 hectares of flower fields. major cut flowers include chrysanthemums, rose, gladiolus, carnation, gerbera, anthorium, narcissus, tuberose, china aster, and lilium (khojaste nejad 2011). during winter months, iran’s flower export is at its highest level (khojaste nejad 2011). the biggest foreign customers of iranian flowers are the united arab emirates, the netherlands, iraq, azerbaijan, saudi arabia, kuwait, turkmenistan, china, japan, and vietnam. figure 1 shows iran’s yearly revenue from flower exports in the last 10 years. it can be seen that iran’s revenue from flower exports has increased greatly in recent years, suggesting that the flower industry could potentially play a major role in the future of iran’s sustainable development (razaeii 2012). 102 consilience 4. methodology 4.1 sampling and data collection our research was conducted in october 2012. questionnaires were given to managers of various greenhouses and flower companies located in isfahan, tehran, nowshahr, chalus, varamin, and ramsar. the questionnaire contained 30 questions on a wide range of topics relating to iran’s flower industry, each to be scored on a 5point likert scale ranging from 1 to 5. we were looking for data on ten specific topics, with three questions devoted to each. the ten specific questions our questionnaire was designed to examine included: 1) impact on direct foreign investment 2) impact on competitive strength 3) impact on the number of international flower distribution companies in iran 4) impact on job opportunities in iran’s flower industry 5) impact on the size of iranian domestic flower market 6) impact on the number of modern greenhouses in iran 7) impact on the total area under flower cultivation in iran 8) impact on the amount of flowers imported to iran 9) impact on the cost of raw materials (95% confidence level). 10) impact on iran’s foreign exchange earnings the total sample size of our research was 206. this includes 99 green house managers, 53 managers of flower export companies, 37 managers of flower import companies, and 17 managers of domestic flower distributor companies. all were senior managers. the questionnaires were given to the managers in person and answers were collected by email. three respondents refused to answer. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 $ m m figure 1. iran’s annual revenue from flower exports in the last 10 years consilience riasi & amiri aghdaie: iran’s flower industry in order to choose a sample of 50 managers, we used stratified random sampling. the reason that we used stratified sampling was that subpopulations within the overall population varied. the sample includes 24 green house managers, 13 managers of flower export companies, 9 managers of flower import companies, and 4 managers of domestic flower distributor companies. we, therefore, replaced them with other managers from the statistical society. 4.2 validity and reliability of the research questionnaire in order to confirm the validity of our research questionnaire, we examined its content validity. content validity is a non-statistical type of validity that involves "the systematic examination of the test content to determine whether it covers a representative sample of the behavior domain to be measured" (anastasi & urbina 1997). the content validity of our questionnaire was evaluated by a group of five experts, including three international marketing managers and two flower export specialists. it was accepted unanimously. to check the reliability of the research questionnaire, we used two separate methods: the internal consistency method and the split-half method. using spss software, we calculated that the questionnaire’s cronbach's alpha was 0.82, indicating suitable reliability. in our split-half analysis, results showed that cornbach’s alpha was 0.79 for the first 15 questions of the questionnaire, and 0.83 for the remaining 15. because the difference between the two is not significant, we can accept the reliability of the questionnaire. 5. results questionnaire results: 1) respondents believed that iran’s accession to the wto would increase direct foreign investment 2) respondents believed that iran’s accession to the wto would increase competitive strength (95% confidence level). 3) respondents believed that iran’s accession to the wto would increase the number of international flower distribution companies in iran (95% confidence level). 4) respondents believed that iran’s accession to the wto would increase job opportunities in iran’s flower industry (95% confidence level). 5) respondents believed that iran’s accession to the wto would have no effect on the size of iranian domestic flower market (95% confidence level). 6) respondents believed that iran’s accession to the wto would increase the number of modern greenhouses in iran (95% confidence level). 7) respondents believed that iran’s accession to the wto would increase the total area under flower cultivation in iran (95% confidence level). 8) respondents believed that iran’s accession to the wto would have no effect on the amount of flowers imported to iran (95% confidence level). 9) respondents believed that iran’s accession to the wto would have no effect on the cost of raw materials (95% confidence level). 104 consilience 10) respondents believed that iran’s accession to the wto would increase iran’s foreign exchange earnings (95% confidence level). 6. discussion our results indicate that those employed in the flower industry believe that iran’s accession to the wto would help iran’s flower production become more globalized and have positive long term benefits on iran’s flower export. the responses indicate a belief that iran’s accession to the wto would increase direct foreign investment and increase job opportunities in iran’s flower industry. from this, we can extrapolate that respondents believe low-priced labor in iran will encourage international investment. this would only happen if iran becomes a member of the wto, as right now high tariffs and customs rules are not conducive to foreign investment. the responses also indicate a belief that iran’s accession to the wto would have no effect on the amount of flowers imported to iran and the size of the iranian domestic flower market. this suggests that though entering the wto would enable other countries to export their flowers to iran, iranian consumers would still largely choose iranian flowers over imported ones. right now, the most pressing problems in the iranian flower industry are the high price of raw materials and the weak flower distribution system. the results of this research suggest that iran’s accession to the wto might help alleviate such problems. respondents believed that the country’s accession to the wto would increase the number of international flower distributor companies in iran, which would ostensibly enable flower producers to export their products faster and with higher quality. overall, our findings also show that those in the flower industry believe that iranian accession to the wto would help globalize the industry and facilitate higher competitiveness. higher demand for flower exports would encourage companies to replace traditional methods of flower cultivation with more modern, efficient, and sustainable methods. our results can be compared with previous research of valibeigi (2003), which suggested that iran’s accession to the wto would increase the competitive strength of many of the country’s industries. 6.1. sustainable development and the iranian flower industry sustainable development can be divided into three main parts including economic sustainability, environmental sustainability, and sociopolitical sustainability. the development of the iranian flower industry has both sustainable and unsustainable aspects in each of these three sections. there are many avenues for sustainable development in regards to iran’s flower industry. much of these are economic. currently, many areas in western and southern iran have suitable climate conditions for producing cut flowers, but local citizens lack the resources to produce cut flowers in large quantities. iranian accession to the wto would make it easier for foreign investors to finance flower production projects in these areas and speed up economic growth. this could help consilience riasi & amiri aghdaie: iran’s flower industry the country overcome its current unemployment crisis and improve the living standards of its citizens. cut flowers exports also have the potential to turn into one of the country’s main sources of foreign exchange earnings. benefits extend, however, to environmental sustainability. by reducing iran’s dependence on petroleum exports as a source of foreign exchange earnings, a larger flower export business would help the economy shift from an industry that produces toxic pollutants to one that is much more environmentally friendly. increased demand for exports would also help producers use modern flower cultivation techniques, such as hydroponics, at much lower costs. this would decrease the amount of water consumption and energy usage in greenhouses. finally, the increase in cultivation of indigenous flower species would help the country overcome deforestation problems in its central region. not all effects of the flower industry, however, are positive. the chief unsustainable aspect of this industry involves the large quantity of pesticides and other toxic chemicals that can be used in flower production. also, an area that might be better served for food production could be used for more profitable flower production, leading to a possible food shortage. finally, globalization brought on by increased demand would harm producers who currently used traditional methods of flower production. these producers are mainly in rural areas, and would suffer severe economic and cultural difficulties as a result of large-scale development in the flower industry. 6.2. managerial implications the findings of this study have important practical implications for managerial practice. first, iranian flower exporters should pay more attention to international marketing of their products in order to increase their competitive strength and to access global markets. a powerful marketing function can make a significant contribution to business performance (auh & merlo 2012). it is important to advertise iranian flowers to other countries in order to introduce high quality iranian flowers to the world. second, foreign investment rules must be made easier. foreign investors are always ready to enter countries with low cost labor (mohamadi 2001). the benefits of investing in iran’s flower industry must be adequately conveyed to foreign investors. third, iranian flower distribution companies should expand their services and improve the speed of distribution. as the results show, after an iranian accession to the wto, many believe that the number of international flower distributors will likely increase; therefore, it is important for domestic distributors to expand their business so as to not lose their current market. fourth, flower producers should find new sources of raw materials. as the results show, iran’s accession to wto may not decrease the price of raw materials. this can become a big problem for flower producers facing an increased demand for their product. 106 consilience 6.3 research limitations and future research this study has two main limitations. first, the small sample size of our study (206) has limited statistical power (auh & merlo 2012). second, because we collected our data through a questionnaire, our results are predictions based on the current industry conditions rather than hard observational data. for future research we have three suggestions. first, it would be better to have a sample of managers from both domestic and foreign companies. this will help to have a more complete picture of the effects of this issue. second, we suggest conducting similar studies in other industries. having more information about the effects an iranian accession to the wto would have on different industries would allow for more fruitful comparative analysis. third, we suggest studying other countries that are permanent wto members in order to examine the impact of their membership on domestic flower production. 7. conclusion our findings suggest that industry leaders believe that an iranian accession to the wto would help further develop iran’s flower industry, giving the country the potential to eventually become one of the world’s largest flower exporters. the results also 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(2010). analysis of production and export marketing of flower and plants in iran and providing effective strategies using marketing mix model: a case study of mazandaran province. commercial surveys journal, (39), 32-48. exploring the source of green gold consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 7, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 97–102 exploring the source of green gold ida dokk smith school of international and public affairs columbia university lds2110@columbia.edu abstract the global value chain has provided opportunities for artisanal gold mining communities in colombia to build a mining model based on ecological principles. in the region of el chocó, colombia corporación oro verde was established in 1999. the program established a certificate scheme, which is now integrated into the newly developed fairmined and fairtrade standard. the label guarantees that the gold is extracted and processed in compliance with social and environmental standards, and without the use of chemicals. in return the miners are offered favorable market access and a 15% premium on top of a guaranteed price. oro verde serves as an example of local development from the bottom up, while also illustrating that this development is achieved only when a set of actors works together – from the local to the international level. the challenge ahead is to balance the need for revenue generation activities and increasing production, with environmental considerations. keywords: gold mining, flo fairtrade and fairmined certification, sustainable development, environment. 1. introduction the market for gold jewelry is one of the world’s largest markets of consumer goods. in 2010 we spent 137.5bn usd on gold jewelry (fairtrade, 2011). however, the 15 million artisanal and small-scale gold miners involved in low-tech and low-mechanized mining seldom benefit. they account for 10% of the global gold supply, but the profit is made higher up in the value chain. even more so, the mining activities impose environmental threats on personal health and mining communities, in particular due to the use of mercury for extraction. two mining communities in el chocó, the pacific region of colombia demonstrate another story. in this region the corporación oro verde was initiated to maintain the traditional way of small scale, non-chemical gold mining operations. the initiative addressed the challenge of market access, unfair supply chains and environmental concerns. this has been achieved by bringing transparency into a value chain that has traditionally lacked such assets, strengthening the position of often selfemployed, individual miners in an unfavorable international market, and teaching miners how their mining activities affect the environment and their communities. oro verde serves as an example of local development from the bottom up, while also illustrating that this development is achieved only when a set of actors work together – from the local to the international level. the challenge ahead is to balance the need for revenue generation activities and increasing production with 98 consilience environmental considerations. this is the story of a visit from one of the funders of oro verde, the environmental non-profit amigos del chocó foundation (amichocó), to fermin palomino’s mine in el chocó. 2. creating a certification scheme fermin palomino’s mine is in el chocó, a region rich in biodiversity and abundant with gold and platinum. however, weak legislation and control of land use have resulted in uncontrolled exploitation of the region’s natural resources. this has caused the loss of biodiversity and the impoverishment of the region’s mainly afrocolombian population. corporación oro verde was established in 1999, initiated by amichocó, the community councils of condoto and tadó, and the las mojarras foundation (corporación, 2011). together they created a market mechanism in which the social and environmental value of the traditional responsible mining practice was reflected in the final price of the buyer. their aim was to encourage the communities to build sustainable mining models. their approach required the development and implementation of both an ecological mining standard and a transparent supply chain. one of the key elements to this model was biodiversa. this institution is responsible for buying the gold from the miners, the refining process, and eventually selling the gold on the international market. the miners are paid directly 3% above the market price, while the 12% remaining is transferred to a fund owned by the miners. this structure addresses one of the main challenges for artisanal, small-scale mining; its weak position in the market. when the miners are unorganized and work in remote places, they often end up being dependent on middlemen. through oro verde the miners in each community have organized themselves into member based producer groups, and made a direct link to the international market through biodiversa. the final piece of the puzzle was put in place this year. oro verde served as an inspiration for the development of the fairtrade and fairmined standard. the fairtrade labelling organisations international (flo) used the principles for ecological mining when developing the standard. in addition, standards for labor conditions, social and economic development, and requirements for trading were added. today, oro verde is the brand while the producer groups of condoto and tadó will have access to a larger market using the internationally recognized flo logo. as a part of an amichocó team, i am on my way to el chocó. amichocó’s roles during these ten years have been to organize and build capacity within the producer groups and to manage funding and marketing. now they are organizing an evaluation meeting in collaboration with the miners in condoto and tadó. my role is to assess the distribution of the premium generated from the certificate. 3. what is green gold? from the national road going through tadó, a small trail takes off. just 100 meters on and i arrive at the mine of fermin palomino. nine people, men and consilience dokk smith: green gold women, are currently working to remove stones from a pit. together they form a family producing unit, a traditional way to operationalize the mining activities. one unit is made up of about five to ten people. their role depends on the capabilities and tools they bring to the unit. i am standing on a huge pile of rocks, leftovers from years of mining. fermin palomino´s mine stretches from the river further down and slopes up before it meets a steep wall of clay. the miners have followed the ore and are now working closer to the clay wall. gold found in these kinds of river terraces can usually be harvested from the surface with basic tools, after vegetation has been removed and pits dug to reach the gold bearing beds (fairtrade, 2011). next to the mine a simple shed has been set up to protect the few tools that are being used: a couple of pans and bars. the only mechanized devices are two water pumps used to separate the dirt from the larger rocks. the landscape bears witness of where the ore once started. in compliance with the responsible mining standard, an area from the river up to where i am standing has been rebuilt with stones and dirt that were initially removed while searching for gold. any intervention must be small enough that the area can be brought back to its initial state. on average an oro verde family producing unit owns 42-hectares of land. they work on about 1-hectare each year. so this is where the green gold is. whatever associations green gold might bring to a consumer in europe or the u.s it is most likely not what i see here. i am watching the miners lifting stones from the bottom of the pit, up and out. their work is coordinated and routine, each stone going from hand to hand. in the back the engines pumping water to remove sediments are running loudly. this is work based on water and pure manpower. the technique is called hoyadero, which literally means the “hole” technique. depending on the ore, the miners can spend weeks moving stones before they can start extracting the gold using panning trays. other mines under oro verde use different techniques; however, common for them all is the use of manpower and water. importantly, none of the other mines use chemicals. extracting gold without chemicals is unfortunately not the general case. conventional artisanal mining is one of the largest sources of mercury pollution in the world. mercury is the easiest and cheapest way to extract the gold. in colombia about 50% of the country’s gold is produced by 200,000 artisanal and small-scale miners, turning colombia into one of the world’s top mercury polluters (soos, 2011). the problem increases with the price of gold, attracting more people into the sector. in addition to the use of chemicals, artisanal and small-scale mining causes environmental problems such as dumping and leakage of mine waste into water systems, sedimentation, and deforestation (fairtrade, 2011). creating awareness and knowledge about environmental impacts of the mining activities has been one important task for amichocó. as a part of their capacity building program, they provide education in environmental management. in addition, they have developed an educational program for children who one day might become responsible miners themselves. thus, green gold means that the exploration is in compliance with ecological principles while being backbreaking work under a burning sun or pouring rain. while i am in el chocó the humidity is about 75%, making the 34 degree celsius appear even warmer. “the work is hard, and days are long” one of the female miners tells me, but as a member of oro verde her living condition has improved. 100 consilience she feels relieved knowing that she can give her children clothes and food, and support their education by buying notebooks, pens and uniforms. this feeling of certainty is a result of the oro verde program. as certified oro verde miners the palomino family producing unit is secured a minimum price and a buyer through biodiversa. 4. oro verde and its long-term impacts it is a short walk from fermin palomino’s mine to estación ambiental, an environmental station owned by the institute of environmental research of the pacific and a partner of the community council of tadó. the station offers lodging facilities for researchers and students from the university of antioquia who do environmental assessments in the area. 45 miners have come together for a half day evaluation meeting of the oro verde program. its location is impeccable. estación ambiental is a two floor wooden house surrounded by tropical vegetation. there is also a small lake here for fish farming. the meeting is taking place on a garden terrace covered by leaves from palm trees. the miners from tadó are divided into groups and representatives from amichocó provide cardboard and pens for the next activity. each group is asked to describe what differences they have experienced after they joined oro verde. one of the groups says their security situation has improved. before they could not leave their house because paramilitary and guerilla groups were fighting in the area. so, i wonder, is this progress due to oro verde? no, not really. the security issue has been determined by the presence of the army and more support from the government. other miners are not as fortunate. one miner, reuben, tells me that his family is being forced to move because they are not safe. oro verde is operating in an area where security is still urgent, thus making the working conditions highly challenging. the formation of producer groups is a prerequisite for making a program such as oro verde work. this might also be one of the program’s main long-term impacts in the mining communities. while some of the miners are fulltime workers and others combine mining with agriculture, forestry and fishing, they all have an interest in making the exploitation of the resources on their territory into a sustainable activity. they are all stakeholders in oro verde, and if one miner does not comply with the standard every miner will lose the certificate. the recent process to become fairtrade and fairmined certified has provided additional incentives to strengthen the producer group as an organization, and continue building management capacity. watching the next group presenting, i realize that this is a valuable arena for sharing knowledge and developing leadership skills. one of the topics that creates the most debate during the meeting is the distribution of the premium. this is the miners’ collective profit, and together they have to decide how to manage it. since the commercialization of oro verde in 2003, the premium has been saved in a fund. now both communities are working on establishing processes and procedures on how to use the money. as with any natural resource, it is not only how the resource is extracted, but also how the generated money is spent which determines the long-term impacts on the society. both communities identified health as a main concern and have set aside funds to address consilience dokk smith: green gold this. however, the producer groups still need support to structure the process before it becomes operative. “silla eléctrica” (electric chair) is cried out from behind. we all laugh. yes, the day has been long and we all want to stretch. 5. expansion and sustainable development sustainable development is about balancing the aspiration for economic progress with social and environmental concerns. extraction of green gold, just as any other economic activity, has environmental impacts. in particular, the necessity of using water during the mining process results in changes to the water flow and potential siltation of rivers. looking out over fermin palomino´s mine, it is clear that it will take time to bring nature back to its original state, but within five to ten years vegetation should have started to grow again. under oro verde the effects are small and controlled. thus, the main challenge for oro verde is how to expand and bring more revenue into the model without encouraging large-scale operations. today, approximately six kilos of oro verde gold reaches the market. in the long run, production must double to make the program financially sustainable. the demand for green gold is currently higher than the supply. in theory, this should imply an increasing price followed by more production of green gold. however, the pace at which this is done must be in compliance with the reality in which many miners still sign documents using their fingerprint and others might go to sleep with the sound of guerilla gunfire. patience and resources are needed to develop a legal, transparent and democratic organization in an area that lacks human capital and infrastructure. nevertheless it is possible. my filled visit to el chocó fermin and palomino’s mine has taught me that the global market does not automatically establish the link between producers and consumers, between el chocó and hollywood. this relationship is built through education and the making of institutions and finally symbolized with a fairtrade and fairmined mark. a fokker 50 brings me out of el chocó. the flight takes about 45 minutes from medellín, where green mountain areas unfold underneath. after the plane takes off i see huge wounds in the surface. these are mines that are not a part of oro verde and run on a larger scale. mechanization results in large areas being left like open scars. in el chocó, oro verde is still the exception. with record high prices for gold, individuals desperately in need of income are attracted to the mining sector. gold mining will take place in el chocó, legal and illegal, but hopefully many more communities will follow condoto and tadó in turning their natural resources into long term assets. 102 consilience bibliography corporación oro verde (2011) who we are? history. http://www.greengoldoroverde.org/ingles/historia_ing.html last accessed: june 27 2011 fairtrade and fairmined gold – empowering responsible artisanal and small-scale miners (2011). a fairtrade foundation and alliance for responsible mining report soos, andy (2011) gold mining boom increasing mercury pollution risk, oilprice.com jan 6th 2011 http://oilprice.com/metals/gold/gold-miningboom-increasing-mercury-pollution-risk.html last accessed june 30th 2011 http://www.greengold-oroverde.org/ingles/historia_ing.html http://www.greengold-oroverde.org/ingles/historia_ing.html http://oilprice.com/metals/gold/gold-mining-boom-increasing-mercury-pollution-risk.html http://oilprice.com/metals/gold/gold-mining-boom-increasing-mercury-pollution-risk.html microsoft word goldman_refugee_final.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 18, iss. 2 (2017), pp. 60–83 a new deal for refugees: how land restoration and infrastructure modernization can help solve the refugee crisis jonas philip goldman dalhousie university jonas@dal.ca abstract the migrant crisis in europe is the largest since wwii. millions of refugees are without a source of income and devoid of hope. however, this tragedy could present an opportunity for europe. the eu currently faces two problems: firstly, decaying, outdated european infrastructure and construction; and secondly, the abandonment of european farmland. a large influx of labor has the potential to solve these issues. during the 1930s, the civilian conservation corps (ccc), a u.s. government program from the great depression, employed large numbers of men in land management fields. just as the ccc addressed the environmental and social problems of its day, a modern program modeled after the ccc could address the issues currently facing the eu. this paper outlines how the eu could employ refugees to tackle environmental issues in europe. the paper also explores potential uses for abandoned farmland, such as re-utilization for agriculture, agroforestry, and re-wilding as well as the management, funding, and potential issues by such a program. keywords: work-relief, refugee, agricultural-abandonment, co2 emissions, agroforestry, re-wilding, infrastructure-modernization. author’s note: my profound desire to contribute something beneficial to the field of sustainable development (more than just liking a feel-good video on facebook) was the motivation behind this paper. however, my motivation for entering the fields of environmental science and political science as a whole is due to the fact that i had a fairly privileged upbringing. therefore, my desire to participate in the field of sustainable development traces back to my wish to try to give others the chance i had by increasing intergenerational equity. i have always had an interest in history and as such see many similarities between the current european refugee crisis and the american consilience goldman: a new deal for refugees depression of the 1930’s. under fdr, the disaster was turned into an opportunity to improve the american landscape via the civilian conservation corps. in turn, the ccc helped spawn the american environmentalist movement. my thesis is that a government work program modeled after the ccc can give refugees in europe livelihoods while also addressing a multitude of environmental issues. currently, it helps address multiple issues facing the eu (and world), and as a result, increases equity for current and future generations. it advocates for such sustainable development solutions as agroforestry, re-wilding, and modernization of existing buildings and infrastructure. future avenues of research could consist of analyzing the feasibility of other forms of refugee work relief that address sustainability issues. in an era of projected mass displacement and climate refugees, programs such as this may become frighteningly useful and necessary. consilience 62 introduction today’s refugee crisis represents the largest movement of displaced people in europe since wwii. the great depression saw some 13 to 15 million americans without livelihoods. to rectify this, franklin delano roosevelt’s administration implemented the new deal to revitalize the economy and curb unemployment. one of his most successful programs was the civilian conservation corps (ccc), a program that put millions of men to work. this paper proposes a new-deal-style scheme modeled after the ccc to take advantage of the influx of unemployed refugees by hiring them to work in fields that support the eu’s local economies and facilitate the implementation of eu-wide sustainability goals. these might include maintaining local agriculture, reducing carbon emissions, and re-wilding, as well as conserving wild lands. the program would also help integrate refugee populations into european societies. potential fields of employment include agriculture, forestry, and ecology/conservation in response to european farmland abandonment, as well as updating energy-inefficient buildings and outdated power grids. what is the ccc? during the great depression, american president franklin delano roosevelt created the ccc, a work program, as part of his new deal. the program gave livelihood to unemployed men with the goal as stated by roosevelt; of having them work on “forestry, the prevention of soil erosion, flood control, and similar projects” (as cited in bass, 2013). the program was a tremendous success. within three months of introducing the civilian conservation corps, 275,000 men were working on conservation projects (bass, 2013)(or for comparison one-fifth of the 1.3 million applicants who applied for asylum to the eu in 2015) (connor, 2016). at its peak, the ccc enrolled 500,000 men each year, with a total of three million men working to conserve the environment and create infrastructure from 1933-1942. in 1937 alone, the ccc “planted 365,233,500 trees, built 1,081,931 dams, and laid 9,960 miles of telephone lines” (bass, 2013). additionally, the ccc “slowed erosion on forty million acres of farm land, developed eight hundred new state parks, constructed 10,000 small reservoirs, and stocked america's rivers with 1 million fish” consilience goldman: a new deal for refugees (bass, 2013). conservative estimates are that the ccc worked more than 118,000,000 acres of land (maher, 2002)– an area larger than poland. parallels can be drawn between the great depression and the current european refugee crisis, as both involve millions of people in poor circumstances seeking work and opportunity. thus, a european agency modeled after the ccc would be a salient solution today. important differences between this proposal and the ccc are the socioeconomic as well as environmental circumstances that each program was designed around. the eu is in much a preferable socioeconomic (and in regards to agricultural land) environmental position then america was during the 1930’s. while the ccc was founded as a way to relieve the pressure that millions of out of work young men were applying to the fabric of american society. clearly the eu and its populace are not in anywhere near as dire condition. additionally, the ccc was also deployed in part to counter the effects of the dustbowl (anonymous, 2010). a set of climatic and man made conditions that rendered vast tracts of farmland in the great plains region agriculturally untenable, due to high levels of erosion (pbs, n.d.). however, while the eu is in state of greater stability then the society that created the original ccc. the same pressures exist in the from of at risk populations (refugees) and declining agricultural productivity (the projected abandonment of european farmland). as such, a society does not need to be in a state as degraded as america was in during the great depression to reap the benefits from a program designed and implemented during that time. despite the historical parallels between the current refugee crisis and the great depression, it is reasonable to doubt whether an american government program implemented in the 1930s is suitable for the economic environment of modern europe. the ccc could employ people in great numbers because there was readily available land to improve and a high domestic demand for new infrastructure. however, it is not only the nature of population movements into europe that mirrors the economic migrations of the 1930s. the current economic viability of european agricultural land and the need for public sector intervention in infrastructure development also mirrors america in the 1930s. in america, agriculture in the great plains region became commercially untenable due to high rates of erosion caused by a combination of unsustainable farming practices and decreased rainfall (pbs, n.d.). this in turn caused a marked consilience 64 decrease in commercial viability of agricultural land, and a collapse in the agricultural economy of the region (pbs, n.d.). part of the ccc’s mandate was to address this worsening economic situation via land restoration specifically in the field of soil erosion (bass, 2013). the state of eu agriculture mirrors that of the great depression, as future large-scale farmland abandonment is projected to cause a loss in agricultural production throughout the eu (terres, nisini scacchiafichi, & anguiano, 2013). another aspect of the ccc’s mandate was to build infrastructure in areas that needed repair or lacked the relevant infrastructure to begin with (bass, 2013). currently in the eu, there are discrepancies between the quality of infrastructure in various regions. additionally, there is the requirement to modernize infrastructure across the region in order to reduce the eu’s carbon footprint. thus, although the modern eu is far more developed then the us in the 1930’s, there is copious demand for expenditures and labor in the renovation and construction of infrastructure and farmland. who would this program benefit? much like the ccc, the proposed program outlined in this paper would seek to address the needs of at-risk populations by providing work relief. an important point is to address specifically which populations would be eligible to participate. thus it is important to differentiate between refugees and migrants when defining this program. on its website, the unhcr defines refugees as those for whom “it is too dangerous … to return home” and for “whom denial of asylum has potentially deadly consequences” (edwards, 2016). migrants “choose to move not because of direct threat of persecution or death, but mainly to improve their lives by finding work or in some cases for education, family reunion or other reasons” (edwards, 2016). in europe, we currently see a mix of both, some fleeing from areas where there is a real mortal risk, while others arrive seeking economic opportunity (edwards, 2016). the program proposed here would initially seek to hire refugees already in europe. if it proves viable and is a success, it could be extended to migrants seeking economic opportunity. however, as there were more than 1.3 million applications for asylum in 2015 (conner, 2016), for the foreseeable future it would be best to focus on refugees rather than migrants, as the former are most in need. consilience goldman: a new deal for refugees farmland abandonment and arising opportunities according to estimates by the institute for european environmental policy, by 2030 between 126,000km2 and 168,000km2 of farmland will be abandoned (keenleyside & tucker, 2010). reasons include: "low economic viability (farm income per work unit being lower than regional average), inappropriate farm structuring (size of parcels, remoteness, and fragmentation of holding), unfavorable social factors (greying farming populations), a weak land market, and unsuitable environmental factors (climate, soil, terrain)” (terres et al., 2013). (terres et al., 2013) this means that, even by conservative estimates, an area larger than hungary will fall out of agricultural use within the next 14 years. history has shown, however, that new land means new opportunity. a stream of able bodies and minds entering europe and seeking employment creates new options. a work program modeled after the ccc, updated for the modern era, would have tremendous potential to successfully pair unemployed refugees with consilience 66 jobs that arise out of the current trend in land abandonment. this section of the paper examines job opportunities which would emerge for refugees if the conservative figure of 126,000km2 of land is abandoned by 2030, and if that land, for example, was utilized for afforestation, agriculture, and rewilding /ecological restoration. afforestation timber production via afforestation (adding forest to previously unforested land) is a common instrument in the environmentalist toolkit. by conservative estimates, 126,000km2 (31,135,278 acres) of land will open up in the next 14 years (keenleyside and tucker, 2010). in canada, a country with a prodigious afforestation program, typically 2,500 seedlings per hectare are planted (1,012 seedlings per acre) (duinker, personal communication, 2016). a well-trained tree planter can plant 2,500 seedlings per hectare every 10-hour workday (duinker, personal communication, 2016). if one third of the future abandoned 126,000km2 of land were devoted to afforestation, 4,200,000 hectares would need to be planted. this implies that between now and 2030, 42,000,000 paying work hours could be created for refugee workers seeking a start in europe. tree planting would be beneficial for refugees in the short term; however, it could be problematic in the long run. workers are paid for each tree planted. while it takes experience to learn how to efficiently plant trees, the concept of tree planting is fundamentally simple, and would be classified as unskilled labor. it would not be difficult for a physically fit new arrival to pick up the concept, but it is unlikely that it could support a long-term career. additionally, tree planting is extremely physically demanding, and would be suitable only for refugees able to safely handle the workload. that said, the journey to europe is arduous; many refugees able to make the trip are likely fit enough to engage in this work. further, planting is seasonal work, as seedlings must be planted at a certain time of the year (elias, 2009). but while the work is physically demanding and temporary, it can be financially lucrative. in canada, during a traditional tree planting season of two months, a novice tree planter typically earns between 1,373 and 4,806 euros (elias, 2009). experienced employees generally earn between 3,089 and 6,179 euros during the same period (elias, 2009). so, tree planting could provide physically fit refugees with an opportunity to earn significant money within a short two-month span, better consilience goldman: a new deal for refugees equipping them to start a life in europe and pay for critical expenses such as housing and education, while giving them work they can take pride in. a ccc-styled program that employs refugees for timber production could do so in two different ways. one is the traditional socialist new deal method of the ccc, in which the government pays workers directly from its budget. with this approach, the eu funds refugees to start their lives in europe while obtaining multidimensional services in return. one example is carbon sequestration, as one mature tree sequesters an average of 48 pounds of carbon each year. if one-third of the minimum of projected abandoned farmland is forested, it could remove 504 billion pounds of carbon per year (american forests, n.d.). that is more than 5 times the amount of c02 that hungary produced in 2011 (united nations statistics division, 2015). growing timber resources would also allow the eu to reduce foreign timber imports, lowering its carbon footprint. another way of funding an afforestation program would be to partner with private industry. while this is not a traditional strategy, there is no reason why a modern land work and restoration program should be mired in the past. companies could be encouraged to pay for a planter’s wages by being given rights to harvest timber resources when the trees reach maturity. the program in this case would function as a brokerage house, pairing refugees seeking work with companies looking to invest in natural capital. the eu could ensure that these trees are harvested sustainably, perhaps training some longer-term refugee employees for the job, as well as training native eu citizens. scalability is another benefit of this strategy. trees need not be planted millions at a time. work could start with small test groups of a few thousand working hours of tree planting, in parts of europe where the demand for forests and timber resources is the highest. if successful, the process could be augmented to encompass more hectares and working hours, while modifying the program based on feedback from the smaller initial trials. agriculture agriculture is another option that could be incorporated into a program to improve land. while it may seem counterintuitive to refarm land that is being abandoned due to economic globalization of consilience 68 the farming industry, it is important to remember that the motivations behind abandonment are not just economic and environmental. inappropriate farm structuring (size of parcels, remoteness, and fragmentation of holding) and unfavorable social factors (greying farming populations) are both non-economic factors contributing to farm abandonment (terres et al., 2013). at least 30% of the farming populations of spain, romania, portugal, lithuania, bulgaria, italy, and greece are aged older than 65 (terres et al., 2013). in portugal, romania, lithuania, and most of bulgaria and italy, that number is 40% (terres et al., 2013). the eu states that one of the goals of its common agricultural program (cap) is to “maintain its agricultural production potential in all areas to avoid becoming overdependent on food imports” (european commission, 2016). additionally, according to the eu’s own estimates, global food demand will increase by 50% by 2030, bringing its own complications (european commission, 2016). if the eu wants to maintain its agricultural production and import less food, it will need more farmers. refugees could fill this void. before the current conflict, syria was the only country in the region that was self-sufficient in food production, and was a net exporter of many food crops to the gulf region (carnegie endowment for interational peace, 2015). forty percent of syrian livelihoods were connected to agriculture (carnegie endowment for interational peace, 2015). the eu, with its ageing farming population, should view this as an opportunity. a ccc-styled program could work to place refugees with farming experience in areas of europe currently experiencing farm abandonment and with greying agricultural populations. this would both give skilled refugees a familiar livelihood and boost local economies. over time, refugees might buy farms and fully integrate themselves into european society. agriculture also presents an opportunity for carbon sequestration through biochar, a technique that stores as charcoal the organic carbon collected via photosynthesis that would otherwise decompose back into the atmosphere (tenebaum, 2009). storing roughly 40% of the original carbon in the soil, biochar “helps promote the growth of beneficial microbes, and helps retain phosphorus and potassium in soils”(tenebaum, 2009). in fact, “[b]iochar paired with traditional chemical fertilizers increased the growth of winter wheat and several vegetables by 25%-50%” (tenebaum, 2009). through a ccc-style program, the eu could pay refugees to collect european biowaste and convert it to biochar. consilience goldman: a new deal for refugees such a program would help the eu meet the paris accords climate goals by offsetting fossil fuel emissions, in addition to employing refugees and helping the eu deal with food waste (this technique is best used with agricultural waste), all while increasing crop yields. beyond biochar, domestic european agriculture offers other opportunities to mitigate co2 emissions. for instance, 30% of cap payments are utilized by farmers to practice environmental sustainable methods of farming (european commission, 2017). european agriculture has also seen a 24% decrease in carbon emissions since 1990 (european commission, 2017). by promoting and sourcing local agriculture via a ccc-style program, and relying less on outsourced agriculture the eu may be able to lower its total co2 output. the low carbon efficiency of eu production is supported by data showing that non-eu states, “use more carbonintensive production technologies” (eurostat, 2016a), because they may not have as many environmental protections, or use less sustainable practices. further benefits include increased quality assurance of both agricultural methods and the final product (blanke & burdick, 2005). by keeping agriculture within eu boundaries, the entire agricultural supply chain is accessible to european quality assurance standards such as eurepgap, increasing product traceability (blanke & burdick, 2005). proximity to domestic agriculture also increases the value of property and fosters a sense of community empowerment (mok et al., 2014). rewilding rewilding and ecological restoration is another area that could benefit from a boom in refugee labor. rewilding is the promotion of wild species and natural systems, or the development of wilderness, in a region (rewilding europe, 2015). here, the ccc model could be applied without much modification. allowing abandoned agricultural land to revert to wilderness would create hiring opportunities for refugees. tree planting work might be offered. additional jobs created by a rewilding program would include trail creation, restocking rivers and lakes with fish, restocking forests with game, and connecting areas of new wilderness via wildlife corridors (spaces that act as a connection between two separated areas of wildlife habitat, allowing for the movement of species, and a subsequent reduction of negative isolation caused effects on species and ecosystems) (bond, 2003). however, these are just primary jobs. economic opportunities created by new consilience 70 wilderness areas include businesses that cater to hunting, fishing, hiking, conservation, and ecotourism “environmentally responsible travel to natural areas, in order to enjoy and appreciate nature” (the nature conservancy, n.d.). secondary industries generated from the labor of a ccc-styled program would need employees, and who better to hire than those who recreated the wilderness? additionally, the eu will need skilled rangers and ecologists to monitor the health of these new wildernesses. again, refugees who worked on rewilding would be an obvious choice. employing refugees through updating infrastructure the eu has set goals to have 27% of its energy powered by renewables by 2030, and to cut greenhouse gases by at least 40% (european commission, 2010). as part of this ccc-structured program, crews of refugees with appropriate experience (or suitable training) could work on updating europe’s infrastructure to meet these goals. ‘greening’ buildings and applying insulation might be a potential area of work for these crews. currently, more than 40% of residential buildings in the eu were built before the 1960s (marina economidou et al., 2011). additionally, 24.8% of the eu’s energy consumption is from household use (eurostat, 2016b). the extent of the problem becomes clearer when one examines what energy these homes consume: southern europe derives 32% of its residential heating energy from oil and 23% from gas, central and eastern europe produce 41% of their residential heating energy from coal, and western europe generates 30% of its residential heating energy from oil and 39% from gas. consilience goldman: a new deal for refugees (marina economidou et al., 2011) with the eu aiming to decrease energy usage by 27%, this area needs to be addressed (european commission, 2010). this program could identify refugees with construction skills and train them in energy-efficient methods, and then pay these refugees to update the buildings of europe. this could be accomplished in a few ways. for those in a higher income bracket, regulations might require that a home be brought up to a more efficient standard; these residents could pay to have their homes updated, perhaps in installments. in the long run, this would benefit the residents, as they would save money on energy costs. a different strategy would be to have the eu cover the initial cost of the renovation, and have the client pay back the cost over time, with money saved through reduced energy expenses. this method could potentially create accounting jobs to calculate how much energy would be saved and to work out payment plans. finally, a third way this could be implemented would be to partner with private industry and utilize the program as a brokering house for labor. tax incentives and subsidies could encourage consumers to hire private firms employing refugees to renovate old houses and improve the eu’s energy efficiency. updating buildings would require a wide range of skills and experience, including plumbers, roofers, electricians, carpenters, accountants, and city planners, offering opportunity to refugees of various backgrounds. starting with government and public buildings that are out of date could test the feasibility of this program. consilience 72 a potential argument opposing the proposed program is that it would take jobs from native eu citizens. however, the vast and varied labor necessary can accommodate both refugees and native eu citizens. residential housing is one example of a sector requiring labor-intensive retrofits to increase sustainability. while residential housing does not fall within the textbook definition of infrastructure, there is no question that suitable housing is required in order for a society to function. currently, the estimated rate of residential energy efficiency renovations is 250million m2 annually, or 1% of all eu residential floor space (artola, rademaekers, williams, & yearwood, 2016). while 40% of eu residential buildings predate the 1960’s (marina economidou et al., 2011). if, for instance, all buildings from before 1960 must be renovated within 10 years to lower their carbon footprints, 10 billion m2 of floor space will need to be renovated. to meet this goal, a four-fold increase in the number of yearly renovations would be required. to meet this increased renovation rate, it follows that a four-fold increase in individuals employed in residential renovations would be required. furthermore, commercial and industrial infrastructures will require energy efficiency retrofits. thus, building renovations can provide ample employment opportunities for both eu citizens and refugees. electrical grids are another sector that could employ refugees towards lowering the eu’s carbon footprint. transitioning europe’s electrical system to a smart grid, an electrical system incorporating digital monitoring technology as well as integrated storage capacity, would increase efficiency and compensate for the intermittent nature of renewables (anonymous, 2009). refugees could be employed to install necessary hardware, such as advanced electrical metering devices, smart appliances, decentralized electrical storage capacity in buildings, and larger community scale electrical storage (romer, reichhart, kranz, & picot, 2012). this potential industry is a very promising opportunity to employ refugees, as it is estimated that it would require 51 billion euros to make the transition to a smart grid (faruqui, harris, & hledik, 2010). thus potential funding for refugee employment would be available. other areas of interest include the power grids of countries bordering eastern germany, which need upgrading; not necessarily to a smart grid, but merely to keep up with current demands. with the surge in germany’s wind capacity, germany has been forced to dump excess consilience goldman: a new deal for refugees electricity from extremely windy days into neighboring countries, as it lacks the capacity to absorb and utilize it (czech power transmission system čeps, 2015). countries such as the czech republic and poland claim that that spillover from germany overtaxes their power systems and risks infrastructure damage. poland partly blames difficulties caused by excess power surges from wind for a brownout (a brownout is a period of reduced voltage and electricity availability in a grid) (merriam-webster, n.d.) that it experienced in 2015. surplus power flow having overtaxed the system so that emergency power could not flow to alleviate increased power requirements during a heat wave that year (polskie sieci elektroenergetyczne s.a., 2015). refugees with appropriate skills could be hired and trained to modernize the power grids of these countries, not only providing refugees with a viable source of income, but also helping to lessen the inequalities between european regions. scalability and flexibility additional benefits of a ccc-styled program include flexibility and scalability. this paper splits abandoned farmland into equal thirds for agriculture, afforestation, and rewilding, but this arbitrary division is solely for the purpose of argument. in reality, a more accurate model for land utilization will depend on local demand by eu member states. perhaps, due to a greying farming populace, lithuania will want the program's local branch devoted to agriculture. germany may want to embark on forest growth in order to soak up as much carbon as possible and create timber for new housing projects. sweden may seek to expand its already extensive ecotourism industry by returning more land to a natural state (visit sweden, n.d.). what is best in one area may not (and likely will not) be best in another; a ccc-styled program can adapt to local needs. consilience 74 (navarro & pereira, 2015) a graphic showing the various benefits and downsides to different usages of land flexibility is not only an asset in relation to the differing geographic requirements. it also serves as an important attribute to employ as many refugees as possible from differing backgrounds. infrastructure and land improvement jobs, which require skilled workers (e.g. architecture, civil planning, accounting, conservation, ecology) would find a large labor market; a majority of the syrian refugees currently in europe are from urban, educated backgrounds, as they had the funds and resources to escape syria (tharoor, 2016). blue-collar work (construction, plumbing, electrical work, carpentry, environmentally sustainable farming) could employ those refugees who have the necessary skills or can be trained quickly. unskilled work (from tree planting, biochar collection or trail construction) could provide transitionary relief for those who do not fall into the previous categories. scalability is another virtue of a ccc-style plan. the work need not start with millions-strong armies of tree-planters and infrastructure retrofitters. minor projects could test the validity and viability of various programs, and work out issues. initially, small crews can be trained to revitalize infrastructure in the most problematic areas. small groups of refugees with agricultural backgrounds could be settled in eu areas that are most at risk of losing their farming populations. test initiatives could be run with consilience goldman: a new deal for refugees private industry investment in timber resources planted by refugees. these projects can be expanded as they prove to be viable. in fact, because the plots of land being abandoned are both geographically and temporally dispersed, flexibility and scalability must be inherent in the methodology of the proposed program. integration be it agriculture, forestry, or rewilding, one of the greatest benefits to a program that involves close work with the land would be integrationhaving new arrivals out in the country improving land, building, and growing the future with their own hands. this work would invest new arrivals in the land and thus in the eu and its member states. historical precedent can again be found in the original ccc. testimonials from former ccc members such as harry dallas show the effect that the work of land restoration can have: “there was pride in the work. we built something, and i knew i helped, and saw the result. it was something you could take pride in, and there wasn’t lot of pride available in those days” (as cited in bass, 2013). enrollee virgil mcclanahan echoes this sentiment: “it was in this country my health was renewed” (as citied in maher, 2002). this spirit of renewal would be immensely beneficial to those fleeing war-ravaged areas. after so much destruction, helping a country grow before one's eyes would be good for the psyche and soul (depending on your preference or personal belief). while the proposed program would help foster an attachment to and invested interest in the lands of the eu, a potential critique is that working in a rural environment is a double-edged sword. while the work would foster attachment to the landscape, a lack of population density and the potentially conservative mindset of the rural populace could make refugee integration problematic. a counter-argument to this is that the proposed program is very versatile; one obstacle will not affect all components of the program similarly. first, not all the work available to refugees will be in rural areas. much work on infrastructure improvement and modernization will be done in urban areas, where refugees will be able to live and interact with the general populace on a more regular basis. another factor is time; work such as tree planting is seasonal and would only see refugees working in rural environments for two months of the year. as it is short-term, concerns about lack of integration should be minimal. consilience 76 for refugees working long-term in rural communities (whether as a supplement to ageing agricultural populations or to improve the infrastructure of rural communities), additional steps should be taken to promote integration. perhaps a combination of employees running the program, and veterans of the program could address issues with integration into local communities. in meetings, employees could work with local communities to highlight the benefits that refugees can bring to the community, as well as find ways to integrate refugees into the communities during their working time and beyond. this could involve, for example, promoting participation in local societies and clubs. engagement with local communities could also be fostered in urban environments to address the issue of refugee labor segregation. branches of the program could partner with civil society groups and local governments to promote the socialization of refugees within the local populace. this could be an added benefit for refugees working with the program. another way that the proposed initiative could facilitate integration would be to have classes on eu society. precedent for this approach exists in the original ccc, which had as part of its mission an educational goal of fostering “employability and citizenship” in its members (bass, 2013). the effectiveness of this education is reflected in the testimonial of a former ccc member, kenneth stephans: “above all, i know what the word americanism means” (as cited in maher, 2002). to emulate this success, a component of the proposed refugee work program might include education on language and eu society/culture (e.g. “what the word europeanism means”). this could provide an added incentive for refugees to participate, as it would allow them to learn more about the eu and be able to integrate with greater ease. additionally, it is crucial that any eu educational components of the program be supported by the socialization efforts of local citizens (perhaps via civil society initiatives), as well as efforts to encourage sensitivity to the cultures and situations of refugees. there are other integration problems this program may face. economically, it makes sense to offer refugees work in areas in need of labor. it also makes sense to minimize budget impact by utilizing funds already available for multiple purposes. however, there is a belief among many in europe that refugees will be a drain on host countries. this program can address these concerns by scaling to work with local economies and being flexible in the type of work done. the program can engage with local communities and show consilience goldman: a new deal for refugees how employing refugees will grow, rather than drain, their economies, perhaps in a town hall with government and public attendance. additionally, much of the works would entail unskilled labor, a stop-gap to allow refugees to save funds to jumpstart a new life in europework that many europeans might not want or, in some cases, lack the numbers for (e.g. agriculture). thus it is not only preparing refugees for european society that the integration component should focus on, but also helping european society acclimatize to syrian refugees. an issue that could be raised in regards to integrating large numbers of refugees would be a potential increase in environmental demands, and the subsequent enlarged ecological footprint of the eu. however, any increase in resource consumption of the eu due to the refugee population would be negligible, in comparison to the current resource consumption of the total eu population. together the combined population of all eu member states is approximately 510 million (eurostat, 2016), while the number of documented asylum applicants within the eu in 2015 was 1.3 million (connor, 2016). this number remained relatively constant in 2016, with 1.2 million applications registering for asylum in the eu (eurostat press office, 2016). assuming an addition of 1.3 million applicants every year for 5 years to the eu population, the projected increase in population will be 1.3%. it is logical to assume the requisite increase in the ecological footprint would follow a similar projection. however, an influx of refugees could become ecologically problematic on a state-by-state basis if the population of refugees is not distributed more evenly. when processing asylum applications, the eu follows protocols laid out in the dublin regulation (unhcr, 2008). the guiding principle is that individual states must address asylum claims, usually the state in which the asylum seeker first entered (unhcr, 2008). however, this has created inequity, putting exceptional strain on border countries and countries of high interest for refugees (moriconi & bordignon, 2017). this has resulted in border controls in some member states that put at risk the free travel aspect of the schengen accords, a central tenet of the eu (moriconi & bordignon, 2017). due to this issue, support has been voiced for a paneuropean refugee system, and some progress has been made in the form of the ebcga (european border & coast guard agency) (moriconi & bordignon, 2017). the proposal in this paper would build upon this support with a pan-european refugee work relief consilience 78 agency, which will create a more equitable distribution of refugees. it would seek to share the burden of care for refugees more equitably amongst member states, and beyond that seek to gain tangible benefits from hosting refugees. the literature and expert opinion the focus on integration is an additional boon to this proposal, as it corrects for mistakes which have happened in past refugee aid and development schemes. the literature points out that these tend to have limited and conflicting achievements. “[a]s barry stein (1994) asked in a paper prepared for unhcr, was its purpose to promote the settlement and eventual integration of refugee populations in countries of asylum? or was its aim to ameliorate the situation of refugees, the host community and state, pending the day when those refugees returned to their country of origin?” (as cited in crisp, 2001). the project proposed in this paper sets as a clear goal that education/integration is an essential part of the work program, with systems in place to facilitate refugee assimilation. additionally, a program that the literature calls a success (despite its critique of tandem refugee aid and development schemes) bears a striking resemblance to the one proposed in this paper. the income generating project for afghan refugees (igpar) “provided 21 million person-days of employment between 1984 and 1994, more than three-quarters of which benefitted the refugee population” (crisp, 2001). this was mainly reforestation, watershed management, irrigation, flood protection, road repair, and construction work (crisp, 2001). the opportunities offered to refugees in the igpar bears a striking resemblance to that offered by this paper’s proposal (i.e. timber production, agriculture, re-wilding, and infrastructure repair). both programs offer labor-intensive work in fields of environmental management and infrastructure maintenance/construction. finally, the fact that this program is being proposed in the eu and not in a developing nation effectively rebuts the potential critique that refugee aid and development programs fail when target nations lack the resources to handle projects of this magnitude (crisp, 2001). the literature notes a concern of donors: “that the refugee aid and development concept was being used as a means of mobilizing additional funds for some hard-pressed (and in many cases badly governed) states” (crisp, 2001). having the consilience goldman: a new deal for refugees governments of the eu run this program addresses both of these concerns, as the eu definitely has the resources and administrative framework necessary to handle such a project, as well as the credibility to address concerns that the funds might be squandered. specifics resources include multiple budgetary allotments that the eu has already earmarked for related causes and issues. currently, for 2015 to 2016, the eu has budgeted close to 10 billion eur for the refugee crisis (european commission, 2015). between 2014 and 2020, the eu has pledged to spend upwards of 180 billion eur to battle climate change and create green infrastructure (european commission, 2013). in 2013, as part of the cap, “direct aid to farmers and market-related expenditure amounted to just 30% of the budget” (european commission, 2016). between 2014-2020, 450 billion eur was set aside to fund the eu cohesion policy; which addresses “regional disparities in economic performance and living standards” promotes growth in less developed regions of the eu” (european commission, 2014). while there is funding available for these purposes, this paper proposes a more cost-effective method. the program would find refugees with the relevant skill sets (electricians, plumbers, construction workers, urban planners) and, after the appropriate language training, pay a wage above the level of current welfare payments to build green infrastructure in underdeveloped parts of the eu from the cohesion policy budget. such development would lower the eu’s carbon emissions while allowing refugees to become more self-sufficient, providing for themselves and their families. it would foster a sense of pride while integrating them into the fabric of the eu. the same approach could be employed with the cap budget for a subset that would hire refugees with an agricultural background in order to maintain a viable domestic farming industry. the climate change budget could fund tree planting, and various environmental budgets might cover rewilding. this approach would address multiple issues with funds already allocated from budgets meant to address only a single issue, streamlining allotments and potentially creating a budgetary surplus. consultations with refugee aid experts give further credence to this approach. in an interview, paul spiegel, former deputy director of the division of program support and management at unhcr, identified another benefit of the program: “refugees who are already in europe should be profiled economically and paired with work that best suits their skills and the needs of the local economies of europe. this would allow refugees to become less consilience 80 dependent on welfare and would allow the local economies to grow. this would be especially helpful in areas experiencing ageing populations”(spiegel, personal communication, 2016). this paper adopts this approach by offering a range of work that can be tailored to suit local environmental and economic needs. conclusion this paper proposes the creation of a new-deal-style work program to take advantage of the influx of refugees in need of employment by paying them to work and support the eu’s local economies. this would facilitate the implementation of such eu goals as maintaining agricultural market share, limiting inequality between regions of the eu, and cutting carbon emissions. potential fields of employment include updating energy-inefficient buildings and outdated power grids, agriculture, forestry, and ecology/conservation in response to european farmland abandonment. this program would be implemented by hiring refugees in scalable crews, working closely with local communities to best address their needs. the program would also include an education component to integrate refugees into european society. 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(n.d.). ecotourism. retrieved july 31, 2016, from http://www.visitsweden.com/sweden/things-to-%0ddo/nature--outdoors/ecotourism/.%0d microsoft word shumba final.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 17, iss. 1 (2017), pp. 196-219 risk, resilience, and sustainability: how governance in zimbabwe countervails this nexus dorcas shumba massey university dorkashumba@gmail.com abstract this paper concedes to the view that there is a strong correlation between risk, resilience, and sustainability and that governance has a bearing on the outcome of each of these processes. this suggests that, when the nexus is unstable, there is a greater chance that poor governance will be at play. to demonstrate this premise using zimbabwe as a case study, the paper draws on the trajectory of crisis from independence till the present day highlighting how issues of governance have played a big role towards heightening situations of risk, decreasing the resilience of the people, subsequently stalling sustainability. keywords: risk, resilience, sustainability, governance, zimbabwe author’s note: dorcas shumba has just completed her doctor of philosophy degree in development studies at massey university, new zealand. her professional background is in environmental management; hence she enjoys doing research on issues related to sustainable development, environmental change and vulnerability particularly as they relate to the african context. consilience shumba: risk, resilience, and sustaianbility introduction since humans are by nature constrained to observable phenomena, they are limited in their ability to see far into the future. thus, modern societies have resorted to the notion of risk in order to make sense of their uncertain world (becker, 2014). in so doing, modern societies ascribe risk to anthropogenic influences alongside natural variability.1 essentially, risk is the probability of an undesirable outcome combined with the magnitude of the losses and gains that it will entail (douglas, 1992, p. 40). taking this definition into account, vulnerability, then, is the propensity to be harmed by undesirable outcomes, while resilience is the capacity to cope with and recover quickly from these undesirable outcomes. simply put, resilience is a loose antonym for vulnerability (adger, 2000). this perhaps explains why resilience is sometimes referred to as invulnerability in studies of psychology. nonetheless, from a sustainability perspective, risk is said to present a safety element which highlights the need to be protected from unsafe conditions, or to prevent hazardous practices which present unsafe conditions from being carried out (becker, 2014). being cognizant of the fact that sustainability denotes a system’s capacity to endure, coupled with its potential for the long term maintenance of well-being, sustainability asserts the need to recognize present risk while learning from past risk, concurrently planning for future risk (ibid). through integrating this range of temporal scales, sustainability is believed to create risk resilient communities. this is why, becker (2014) states, we need to define risk in relation to some preferred expected outcome, as in this way, we endeavour to reduce such risk in order to safeguard our development objectives. the crucial question, however, is how sustainable societies which are risk resilient can be created. this has been a question that has been explored by several academic scholars and human response agencies since the wced conference on sustainable development in 1987 (see becker, 2014; cannon & müller-mahn, 2010; paton & johnston, 2001; walker et al., 2004). subsequently, insofar as it has existed as a development paradigm, the notion of sustainability has come under criticism for several shortfalls. first, it was criticized for failing to facilitate changes to the global political economic structure in order to engender the possibility of equality (redclift, 2005). second, the notion was criticized for being biased in its efforts to maintain only ecological resources and economic growth, veiling social equality under an ‘intra and intergenerational’ rhetoric (deutz, 2012). in both instances, 1 rockstrom et al. (2009) make a distinction between the holocene era (where natural variability was mostly responsible for environmental changes) and the anthropocene era (where anthropogenic activities have taken over from natural variability in influencing environmental changes). the scholars also suggest that, humanity may have already transgressed its boundaries in terms of interference with earth-system processes such as climate change, rate of biodiversity loss and interference with the nitrogen cycle. consilience 198 sustainability overlooked the underlying patterns of everyday life by everyday people, as well as the possibility that some segments of society were benefiting more from development than others; social aspects received insufficient attention in the sustainability discourse. in turn, issues of risk and resilience were not fully incorporated into the paradigm. this changed with the rolling out of the sustainable development goals in 2015. the sdgs encompass 17 aspirational goals and 169 targets which are comprehensive in their purpose to foster economic growth, promote environmental protection, end extreme poverty, and fight inequality and social injustice. to enhance the implementationality of the sdgs, governance was appended to the economic, social, and ecological dimensions of sustainable development, but only in a functional sense. according to the undp (2014), over a decade’s worth of experience with developmental progress and challenges showed that governance should play a stronger role in the post-2015 development agenda. in essence, there has been a call for a fundamental shift in which governance is taken as a core element in the achievement of sdgs, bearing in mind that good governance enables transformative change which is inclusive and people-centered, allowing for the achievement of a range of critical development objectives such as boosting community resilience and improving risk management. the call to bring governance to the fore had been passed as a resolution under the rio+20 declaration charter, ‘the future we want’ earlier on in 2012. annex 10 of the charter affirms that member states: acknowledge that democracy, good governance and the rule of law …. are essential for sustainable development, including sustained and inclusive economic growth, social development, environmental protection and the eradication of poverty and hunger … [and] reaffirm that, to achieve our sustainable development goals, we need institutions at all levels that are effective, transparent, accountable and democratic.2 while the three dimensions of sustainable development remain firm, figure 1 below encapsulates what the appendage of governance’s functional role to the triptych pillars would look like. 2 see: (un, 2012a, 2012b) consilience shumba: risk, resilience, and sustaianbility figure 1: governance and sustainability source: author in regards to the four pillars cited above, the environmental pillar affirms that we do not just live within the environment but that the environment constitutes the conditions necessary for human existence. hence we are part of the environment in as much as the environment is an integral part of our development. predicated on the irreversible role of anthropogenic activities on the environment, the pillar stresses the need for humanity to preserve the environment to ensure the continuity of humankind. equally, the economic pillar is focused on economic growth that meets human needs while preserving the environment for present and future generations. the social pillar further raises an awareness of intraand intergenerational equity, thus encompassing the interests of all social groups at present and in the future. while governance has been discussed before now, it faces the risk of being conflated with good governance (accountability, transparency, and enhanced participation), overshadowing effective governance (rule of law, capacity building, foresight and long-term planning) and equitable governance (social justice and fairness) (biermann et al., 2014). similar to the mdgs, there is an added risk of placing disproportionate emphasis on global governance3 and the problems of earth system governance under the banner of 3 the notion of governance as it is conceived by the un post-2015 development agenda encompasses more than local governance. the un (2012b) report stresses that recent global trends in food, fuel, and financial crises including climate change, migration (and perhaps terrorism) have only proven that the world is very interconnected, yet there are global governance deficits to face these global challenges. the report thus called for stronger global governance and accountability at this level. environmental protec/on inclusive social development governance inclusive economic development sustainability consilience 200 “planetary stewardship” and the notion that “we are in this together” vis-à-vis local governance and local problems (see gray, 2015). these are some weakness of the sdgs. a critical test for good governance is nonetheless how countries respond to risk in the form of extreme and unpredictable conditions of natural hazards. for the progress australia has made in its drought policy, the worldbank and imf (2014) regard it as an example of a country with good governance (see p. 132). the australian drought policy stresses risk management and preparedness rather than disaster response. it does so through focusing primarily on capacity building so as to minimize the need for government intervention (un/isdr, 2007, p. 18). through forging proactive rather than reactive solutions to drought, risk such as that exemplified by food insecurity and famine is prevented, drought resilient societies are generated, and sustainability is ensured. the example of australia ties in with the belief that when governance provides an enabling environment for sustainability, the end result should be a risk resilient society as demonstrated further by the risk model presented below. figure 2: resilience model adapted from: paton and johnston (2001) accordingly, from the perspective of rugalema (2000), a risk resilient society should be able to deal successfully with risk. this implies that when communities encounter shocks, they should be able to ‘rebound from the nadir of the disaster’ (p. 538) after the hardship has elapsed, where the assets disposed of during hardship are recovered and food production is restored. thus, the implication is that under conditions of bad governance, risk increases, resilience decreases, and sustainability stalls whereas under conditions of good governance, resilience increases, risk decreases, and sustainability becomes more achievable (see figures 3, 4). government enabling environment (economic growth, rule of law, equality) human freedoms safety nets community collective efficacy participation information exchange social support individual capacity to aspire substantive freedoms (capability) entitlements livelihood assets consilience shumba: risk, resilience, and sustaianbility figure 3: bad governance figure 4: good governance source: author the fact that governance as a formal institution affects the performance of the economy is hardly controversial; nor is the fact that the performance of the economy over time reflects the institutional policies (north, 1990, p. 3). in fact, as north goes on to add, institutions reduce uncertainty by providing structures which foster stability. the problem with many governance structures however, as motter (2015) asserts, is that institutional processes tend to be dominated by ‘particular interests’ – usually political, that overlook the common good, ultimately foiling the prospects of achieving inclusive growth and equitable social development. in addition, motter submits that there is an inherent tendency for politicians to sacrifice the long-term perspective that sustainable development requires to the short-term pressure of the electoral cycle. lastly, he also posits that in many countries the often thin divide between executive and legislative powers remains feeble, thus politicians often snub and or supplant the rule of law to preserve their own interests versus the common good. the paper will now go on to relay governance issues in zimbabwe, drawing particularly on effects on the poorer citizens, in terms of risk, resilience, and sustainability. the zimbabwean situation is far too complex to be downgraded to a single plot. however for the role that governance plays, cain (2016) highlights that under the rule of the incumbent government, “zimbabweans have been subject to gross violations of property rights, including state-sponsored expropriation and vandalism, corrupt politicians, restrictive business regulations, and an abysmal monetary policy”(p. 1). as cain points out, any one of these factors would have been detrimental to any economy, which explains why all of them combined have caused untold devastation for a country that once beamed as the bread basket of africa. cain concludes that poor governance is at the core of zimbabwe’s problems. quoting sustainability resilience risk risk resilience sustainability consilience 202 the first inaugural address of the former american president ronald reagan, he thus writes, “government is not the solution to the problem; government is the problem.” journeying from colonialism to welfarism, then on to neoliberalism according to chikwanha-dzenga et al. (2001, p. 3), zimbabwe, formerly known as rhodesia is in large part a prisoner of its history, and as moore (2005, p. 1) concurs, a spectre haunts zimbabwe a spectre of its brutal colonial past. despite the native government’s rhetoric of redressing colonially inherited imbalances, the onset of independence from british colonial rule remained blemished by the control of 70% of the best farming land by the white minority who made up 1% of the population (zamponi, 2005). the white minority had taken the bulk of the prime land and relegated the native majority onto marginal and agro-ecologically poor land under the provisions of the land apportionment act of 1930 (kanyenze et al., 2011). the irony of this is that the rural areas with an estimated carrying capacity of 275,000 families had carried a number of about 700,000 families by independence in 1980 (friis-hansen, 1995). in contrast, at least 60% of the white farming areas lay idle or underutilized with each farm ranging between 500 and 2000 hectares (harold-barry, 2004). as part of its commitment to redressing the imbalances, the incumbent government pledged to resettle at least 162,000 rural families within the first five years of independence (mlambo, 2014). in line with the lancaster house agreement, the british government under thatcher would meet part of the cost for the market-based instrument of land reform allowing for land to be bought back from the white minority using the fair market value (fmv) principle of ‘willing seller willing buyer’ (chung, 2006). but by 1984, only 34,000 families had been resettled (jacobs, 1991), by 1989, 52,000 families had been resettled, and by 1990, 71,000 families had been resettled (mlambo, 2014). there are claims that during this period, the government had misappropriated some of the land reclamation funds by securing land for the ruling elite as opposed to the landless rural people (goebel, 2005). this is argued to be part of the reason why the british government under blair later went on to cease funding for the resettlement program (chung, 2006). coupled with the slow-paced land redistributions, the pitiful living conditions in the rural areas led to rural discontent in the 1980s (mlambo, 2014). mlambo reports that during this period there were various attempted farm invasions on white minority land. the response from the government was to forcibly evict the illegal settlers. the government criticized the occupiers as unruly elements bent on disrupting the country’s economy (p. 225). further, the government told the ‘unruly elements’ that it preferred to resettle people who waited patiently rather than those who preferred to be squatters (chiviya, 1982, p. 165). it is no consilience shumba: risk, resilience, and sustaianbility wonder then that the white minority praised the native government in the first decade of independence (mlambo, 2014, p. 224). against the pitiful living conditions of rural people, a white citizen was cited in mandaza (1986) as saying, “we have a house, a swimming pool, a tennis court, three servants … we’re not living in rhodesia. we’re living in zimbabwe” (p. 58). taking into consideration their excessive affluence in comparison to the native poor, mumbengegwi (1986) comments that the native government had, on top of a dual enclave society, also inherited a spoilt white bourgeoisie.4 however, to address the colonially inherited imbalances, the growth with equity strategy of 1981 paved the way for the improvement of several aspects of rural infrastructure (kadhani, 1986). the government aimed for rural electrification, the construction of roads, schools, clinics, boreholes, sanitation, and the development of rural growth points as business centers (mangiza & helmsing, 1991). paying particular attention to the latter, these settlements had been earmarked for development through the integrated rural development plan of 1978,5 and would serve as the sphere of influence for rural areas (wekwete, 1988). according to manyanhaire et al. (2011), the set targets were too ambitious, because in the end, not all districts managed to get business centers. for those that did, the growth points soon became characterized by stagnation and decay. chirisa et al. (2013) essentially classify most growth points as downward transition regions. the government also initiated health and education reforms in both rural and urban areas, the benefits of which were mostly felt in the first decade of independence (muzondidya, 2008). for example, at independence, rural health care was so bad that for every 1000 babies born in mufakose (a high density suburb in harare) 21 would die before they reached age 1, whereas, for every 1000 babies born in binga (a district in rural zimbabwe) 300 would die before they reached age 1 (agere, 1986). amidst the progress, the amended public health service sector could only cater to a small population, mostly in urban areas (chimhowu, 2009), with only about 10% of the rural population covered by health care (kanyenze et al., 2011). most of the rural areas continued to receive health care and treatment from churches and missionaries (chimhowu, 2009).6 while positive pricing systems, credit and input supplies, and subsidies were also made available to the rural people, and further outcomes of development were promised (raftopoulos & mlambo, 2008), not much development progress ended up being achieved in the rural areas (moyo, 2007). muzondidya (2008) thus concludes that 4 the expression “dual enclave” refers to the coexistence of a ‘sophisticated’ urban economy and ‘rustic’ rural economy, including modern versus traditional farming institutions. in essence, the sophisticated economy operates as a narrow enclave in a largely traditional society (mamdani, 1996). 5 this is a development plan that had been initiated by the colonial government, but was later inherited by the native government. 6 the situation did however improve due to the ‘health for all by 2000’ development plan, but soon deteriorated again due to the ongoing economic crisis. consilience 204 government policy did not efficiently renew rural economies or revive rural conditions of poverty. notwithstanding this, the first decade after independence was marked by other notable socioeconomic improvements. real economic growth had been averaging 4.6% during the 1986-1990 period (mazingi & kamidza, 2011). yet still, the growth had been highly disproportionate as the doors to economic growth had been open to only a few (lopes, 1996) the elites, who muzondidya (2008) states comprised just 3% of the population made up of the white minority and a small black bourgeoisie.7 on top of being highly disproportionate, the growth was been ephemeral in nature. after the boom period in the first decade after independence, zimbabwe had succumbed to a bag of mixed fortune, ranging from the global economic recession in the 1980s, to weakening terms of trade, and high interest rates and oil prices (mlambo, 2014; muzondidya, 2008). the impacts of the state’s welfarist policies were also starting to be felt. as gordon (1984) points out, the policies gave rise to heavy investment in welfare expenditure, loss of control over fiscal spending, and a repeatedly overburdened budget. for instance, the education allocation budget between 1982 and 1983 was 22% of the national budget (zvobvo, 1986). as a result, the bretton woods institutions with their preconditions and concomitants came to the rescue with a structural adjustment program (sap), widely referred to in zimbabwe as esap. saps are economic reform packages that comprise loans provided by the international monetary fund (imf) and the world bank (wb) to third world countries dealing with critical economic hardship (see wamala, 2012). in dire need of economic rescue, the government took to the western neoliberal sap. this was to lead to the accumulation of foreign debt and renewed lease of dependency on the west.8 moreover, the sap saw inter alia, a 40% devaluation of the zimbabwe dollar; price controls, income controls, and labour relations controls; the removal of consumer subsidies, producer subsidies, educational subsidies (tuition support), healthcare subsidies, and transport subsidies; and investment controls, import restrictions, and a reduction in welfare spending (kanyenze et al., 2011). then education minister fay chung also pointed out that: tens of thousands of black workers lost their jobs … fees were introduced for hospital and clinic services: as a result the poorer half of the population could no longer enjoy even the most rudimentary of medical services … in the education sector, i managed as minister to stop the introduction of primary school fees in rural areas where 70 per cent of the population lived, 7 as compared to 4,500 white commercial farmers, as few as 300 natives owned commercial farms at independence (moyo, 1986). 8 the zimbabwean government had inherited little external debt from the colonial government but its debt started accumulating through money borrowed for welfare programs (see goebel (2005). consilience shumba: risk, resilience, and sustaianbility but they were introduced in the urban areas. (chung, 2006, p. 266) the outcomes of the sap contradicted the initial government claims that the zimbabwean sap was tailored to suit native needs (see maya, 1988). quite the contrary: where the rich would readily respond to structural changes, the poor were constrained by a lack of assets and stable incomes and the loss of state welfare (lopes, 1996). in addition to cutbacks in social services and a concomitant decline in general welfare, there was spiralling inflation (ibid). as such, esap was a washout that undermined the government’s efforts of the first decade after independence. it heightened poverty and created further inequalities (jauch, 2007). the impacts of the esap were felt deeply by the rural poor because it intensified existing poverty issues (marquette, 1997): user fees for education and health among other welfare subsidies had been removed; many jobs had been lost due to workforce restructuring; and workers that survived retrenchment suffered a real minimum wage decline. the effects of esap thus increased the residual effects of the historical colonial imbalances while at the same time heightening another problem of that day and age the major drought of 1992.9 overall, the early 1990s were dramatic years which i believe constitute a crucial chapter in the crafting and coalescence of crises in zimbabwe. with two droughts (one astronomical), the early 1990s marked the spiralling of natural risk and risk that is socioeconomic and political in nature. abandoning failed welfarism and neoliberalism for nationalism having flirted with the welfarist policies of nominal socialism and the structural adjustment policies of neoliberal capitalism and failed, the government moved on to an authoritarian nationalist ideology leading to more spiralling of risk. in the early years of this ideological shift, the ex-liberation war heroes’ coercive requests for war gratuities in 1997 were answered with financial disbursements amounting to zwd$50,000 per genuine war veteran, and an added zwd$5,000 lifetime gratuity paid monthly. the total cost of this would amount to about zwd$4 billion of the national funds (chitiyo, 2000). though warranted to an extent, the expenditure was impromptu and unbudgeted. despite this the reserve bank of the country printed money for the unbudgeted exercise. but before the end of the year, the country had plunged into an economic ditch. on november 14, 1997, for the first time in zimbabwean history, the currency dropped 72% against the us dollar. this day is remembered in zimbabwean history as black friday. a related 9 1992 was a critical year in the history of zimbabwe, where alongside the socioeconomic effects of the esap there was a serious drought. another drought ensued in 1994/95. consilience 206 defining moment in the history of zimbabwe, is that of the despatchment of 3,000 zimbabwean troops, later amounting to 11,000, sent to fight a sadc cause in the democratic republic of congo war against ugandan and rwandan backed rebels in 1998 (mbeki, 2009). this move was again unpremeditated, and in following the previous pattern, more bank notes were printed for the unbudgeted assignment, resulting in a furthered snowballing inflationary situation. with a full-blown economic collapse looming over the horizon, 1999 saw the birth of a formidable opposition party the movement for democratic change (mdc) which was birthed out of the zimbabwe congress of trade unions (zctu). the zctu had been established by the ruling party after independence in 1981 to represent the black majority workforce. by the late 1990s however, the union had become disillusioned by the ruling party’s oppressive rule and unresponsive policies. thus the mdc sought to restore the rule of law as well as to enact sound economic policies. the birth of the mdc marked the materialization of political tensions that had been escalating but held back by civic fear. this period was characterized by extensive civic protests that were met with active resistance from the armed forces. surely everything in the country had become politicized, including the land reform operation. while the market-based instruments of land reform had been suspended a few years back, land grievances by rural farmers who were now supported by ex-liberation war fighters had re-emerged. faced with the possibility of losing electoral votes to the opposition party, the government made the populist decision of revisiting the land question. however, because the british government had withdrawn the fund to carry out the ‘willing-seller, willing-buyer’ transactions, the only alternative to land redistribution was by forceful accumulation or primitive accumulation. the year 2000 was therefore characterized by a level of political violence not seen since the 1980s. the third chimurenga war10 had started under the guise of land reform. aside from the targeted white farmers, the land invasions affected close to 350,000 native farm laborers (richardson, 2005), who together with their families amounted to over a million people (phr, 2009). this on its own resulted in one of the country’s major internal population displacements (idmc, 2008). the land invasions are said to have also dismantled the commercial farming sector, which had been a crucial sector, contributing 15-19% of the country’s gdp and 60% of its foreign exchange revenue (uneca, 2002). as mbeki (2009) also points out, the commercial farming sector was the key driver in generating 60% of raw materials for secondary industries, export goods for foreign markets, and fertilizers, pesticides, and other agro-equipment for the local market, thus bringing in revenue. therefore the collapse of the commercial farming sector 10 the first chimurenga and second chimurenga wars were anti-colonial rule struggles. the third chimurenga war was a racialized post-colonial land struggle (see mlambo, 2014). consilience shumba: risk, resilience, and sustaianbility contributed to food insecurity, mass unemployment, increased hyperinflation, political turbulence, and the general weakening of the economy. following the chaotic situation and apparent human rights violations, economic sanctions were imposed on zimbabwe by the west, first by the eu in 2002 and then america in 2003. the reserve bank governor at the time, dr. gideon gono (2006) summed up some of the effects of the sanctions as: negative impacts on the financial sector; the decline in balance of payment support; sustained decline in offshore financing; sustained decline in long-term capital; socio-economic repercussions with grave development impacts on the health sector, agricultural and rural sector, education sector, as well as on investment and growth. despite this very familiar list of consequences broadcasted endlessly by the government, the fact remains that the economic sanctions were largely targeted (mlambo, 2014). the zimbabwe democracy and economic recovery act of 2001, which is often the reference point for us sanctions, was merely an intervention policy set to pressure the government into restoring order in zimbabwe. section 4 of zdera states: through economic mismanagement, undemocratic practices, and the costly deployment of troops to the democratic republic of congo, the government of zimbabwe has rendered itself ineligible to participate in international bank for reconstruction and development and international monetary fund programs which would otherwise be providing substantial resources to assist in the recovery and modernization of zimbabwe’s economy.11 although zdera directs the us representatives at major international financial institutions (ifis) to oppose any new credits or debt relief for zimbabwe, it has had no distinct impact in that regard. the imf (2001) claims that prior to 2000, zimbabwe had defaulted its debt payment plans and was already on those grounds ineligible for further funding. as already implied, the actual sanctions by the us (i.e. executive order 13288) were issued in 2003 and were targeted at specific individuals12 (leo & moss, 2009). the eu had earlier issued its own sanctions in 2002. similarly, these were smart sanctions aimed at specific government officials. unlike the us, the eu included an arms embargo and a curb on certain trade items. also unlike the us, the eu lifted its sanctions on zimbabwe in 2014. in all this, what is constantly discounted by progovernment commentators is that it is zimbabwe’s debt burden 11 zimbabwe democracy and economic recovery act of 2001 us public law 107-99, december 21, 2001. 12 in this case, us-based assets of 137 members of zimbabwe’s ruling party were frozen, including 36 companies and 28 farms. also under executive order 13288, us entities and persons are prohibited from conducting business transactions with these people, and travel sanctions against these people are also in place. consilience 208 (in the range of $7 billion) and not the sanctions that is what presently hinders the country from accessing funds from ifis to alleviate the economic strain. zimbabwe, faced with utmost isolation in the 1960s-70s had ironically survived economic sanctions under the unilateral declaration of independence (udi) as rhodesia. during this isolation period there had been an economic boom between 1965 and 1972 evidenced by an annual gdp growth of 6% (sachikonye, 2011), leading to the conclusion that: “rhodesia’s survival, years later, was ipso facto proof, for popular opinion as well as for many scholars, that ‘sanctions don’t work.” (minter & schmidt, 1988, p. 207) embittered by the current sanctions however, the government perceived a western conspiracy against zimbabwe. determined to challenge the west, the government continued with its firm rule, now even more determined to be anti-western imperialist in every sense. however this did not help the economy that had already nose-dived into the abyss of doom. at the end of 2000, per capita incomes were lower than in 1960 (ndlela, 2009), and by 2004, exports were a third of what they had been in 1977 (mlambo, 2014). by the end of 2005, the loss of the country’s wealth from land seizures alone was estimated to be around zwd$5.3billion. this amount is believed to be more than all the foreign aid zimbabwe had received since independence (richardson, 2013). other studies also claim that the income zimbabwe lost between 1999 and 2004 alone exceeds losses suffered by countries like cote d’ivoire, democratic republic of congo, and sierra leone in their individual conflicts (clemence & moss, 2005). by now, it seemed that everything that could possibly go wrong in zimbabwe had gone wrong, including the weather (mbeki, 2009). conditions of frequent drought spelled out uncertainty in a country where over half the population is rural, needing food aid to supplement its yield deficits (richardson, 2013). due to the escalating interlocking crises, the inflation rate hit a record 231 million percent in 2008, making zimbabwe the first country to hyper inflate in the 21st century.13 richardson (2013) states that by 2008, zimbabwe was 36% poorer than it was in 1998. although things had been progressively souring for zimbabwe between 1996 and 1998, it had remained among some of the fastest growing african economies. the remarkable u-turn took place between 1999 and 2008 when it became one of the fastest shrinking african economies (kaminski & ng, 2013). hence with empty shelves in the supermarkets, unprecedented fuel shortages, yet another drought, food insecurity, and a valueless currency, the year 2008 marked the peak of the zimbabwean crises. the economic crisis also led to water shortages, waste accumulation, and sanitation problems. these in turn culminated into a countrywide cholera epidemic. the epidemic erupted in august 2008 and lasted until june 2009, 13 zimbabwe’s inflation record comes second to hungary in world history. consilience shumba: risk, resilience, and sustaianbility killing at least 4,000 people, with over 100,000 reported cases of illness (mcsweeny, 2011). it was the worst cholera case in africa in about 15 years (mukandavire et al., 2011). an unforgettable headline from a 2008 newspaper article read: “zimbabwe’s cholera victims ten times more likely to die.”14 the reasoning behind the headline was that the high fatalities were being compounded by other factors such as poverty, hunger, hiv/aids, and a poor public health system. by november 2008, newspaper reports revealed that three out of zimbabwe’s four major public hospitals had shut down, along with the country’s only medical school. the fourth major hospital was functioning only with two wards, no operating rooms, minimal medical staff, and a shortage of basic drugs (hungwe, 2008). this information was corroborated by studies done by the physicians for human rights, which identified two of the closed hospitals as parirenyatwa and harare central hospital. these are harare’s two largest hospitals, and both had shut their doors in november 2008. at that time it is said that harare central hospital had not had running water since august 2008 (phr, 2009). the timing for the closure of the health centers was untimely as this was about four months into the cholera epidemic and was the time when people needed health facilities the most (ibid). some notable quotes in response to the health situation during this period include the following: hospital wards in one of zimbabwe’s main hospitals bear a resemblance to deserted, poor rural classrooms and the country’s empty supermarkets.15 the neglect of the health sector by the government is genocide … to me nothing can explain this better, it’s genocide, simple.16 right now i have no anti-hypertensives, no antiasthmatics, no analgesics, nothing for pain … i have a woman in labour, i have no way of monitoring blood pressure … and i have no suture material to do a repair if she tears.17 i have no pain medication, i have some antibiotics, but no nurses … if i don’t operate the child will die, but if i operate the child will also die.18 according to national science foundation’s president rita colwell (2013) the cholera outbreak should never have gotten this far out of hand; zimbabwe had been previously renowned for its fairly good health system and should have managed the outbreak well. but due to the economic crisis, what started off as a 14 berger and thornycroft (2008). 15 doctor representing the zimbabwe junior doctor association cited in hungwe (2008). 16 ibid. 17 nurse in a rural clinic in zimbabwe cited in phr (2009). 18 pediatric surgeon in a major hospital in zimbabwe cited in hungwe (2008). consilience 210 sanitation problem spiralled into an alarming extermination of people by a manageable disease. food insecurity during the peak economic crisis also increased the incidence of tuberculosis, which to some extent is linked to the hiv/aids virus (burke et al., 2014). improved tb management since the climax of the crises suggests that the tb epidemic at first mirrored the socioeconomic collapse and then the subsequent recovery of the country (ibid). given the above, in 2008, zimbabwe had a record low life expectancy of 34 years for women. the life expectancy for men was 37, and for both sexes these figures were down from 62 years in 1990 (phr, 2009). the economic situation also spiralled into a ‘mass exodus,’ which as one newspaper article noted: a [south african] border official called it a human tsunami of people fleeing the nation.19 explaining the mass exodus, a government physician disclosed his monthly gross income in zwd which at the time (november 2008) was worth usd $0.32 (phr, 2009). yet due to the inflationary situation, prices were said to be doubling every 24.7 hours (richardson, 2013). inevitably, the country suffered an enormous brain drain (mbeki, 2009). on december 4, 2008, the president declared a state of national emergency. but, this was only in response to the cholera situation. as far as all else was concerned, the country was considered to be running business as usual. reflections on failed nationalism fast forwarding to the present day, set within a context of a liquidity crunch, weak financial institutions, poor public sector delivery, closure of companies, a shrunken labor market, high unemployment rate, informalization of the economy, high decent work deficits, low industry productivity, and reduced foreign direct investments, zimbabwe’s economy remains compromised (imf, 2014). commendable economic progress has however taken place since 2008. for as richardson (2013) states, “…to be fair, the country is better off than it was…” in 2008 (p. 2). to ameliorate the hyperinflation, an appointed government of national unity (gnu)20 had discontinued the local currency in 2009, introducing a multicurrency system which is chiefly dollarized.21 irrespective of the marked progress, the economy is still relatively fragile, as was demonstrated by a deceleration in real gdp growth from 10.6% in 2011 to an estimated 4.4% in 2012, (aeo, 2013) and 3.3% in 2013 (imf, 2014), but with a predicted rise of 5.7% in 2014 (aeo, 2013). the growth was debated by article iv of the imf consultation which showed that the ‘economic rebound’ experienced by zimbabwe since 2009 was ephemeral (imf, 2014). the debate was justified by a further 19 thetrumpet (2007). 20 government of national unity consisting of ruling party zanu pf and opposition parties mdc t and mdc m. the gnu was dissolved after the 2013 presidential elections. 21 the us dollar is the official currency for government trade. consilience shumba: risk, resilience, and sustaianbility deceleration of real gdp growth to 1.5% in 2015 (uneca, 2016). in support of the downward spiral in gdp growth, richardson (2013) argued that the economic growth rates seen in zimbabwe after 2009 did not reflect zimbabwe’s long-term economic prospects. instead they drew attention away from the enduring economic problems such as the ones already mentioned. now nearly seven years since the temporary restoration of the economy in 2009, industrial capacity has decreased from 57% to 34% (pilling & england, 2016). the capacity utilization levels in the manufacturing sector have dropped due to a slowdown in business activity. in addition, consumer prices have fallen by between 2-4% (ibid). this means that there is a shortage of money (the us dollar) in circulation which has impacted consumer spending. as a result, supply of goods is high, demand is low, and in turn, consumer prices are falling. in short, inflation has been replaced by deflation. pilling and england (2016) note the significance of this, citing a zimbabwean banker who stated: for the man on the street deflation looks good, but to an economist, the economy is going through stagnation and the country, deindustrialisation. subsequently, as long as there is no production in the economy, it does not matter what currency is in use, or in local street language, ‘it is impossible to rig the economy.’22 zimbabwe’s sick economy is also characterized by the high informalization of the economy. one study revealed that the informal sector functions as the second economy of the country and had escalated from 10% at independence in 1980 to 70% in 2008 (makochekanwa, 2012). more recently, theeconomist (2015) claimed that the zimbabwe national statistics agency (zimstat) disclosed that 94.5% of the 6.3 million people defined as employed were working in the informal economy. while some critics had questioned the broad definition used of informality, using a stricter definition of the term only reduced the number down to 86%. the loss of formal employment, informalization also leads to unemployment another symptom of the sick economy. actual figures for unemployment are disputed among major organizations such as zimstat, national social security authority (nssa) and the zimbabwe congress of trade union (zctu), with the government parastatal zimstat giving the lowest figures of unemployment rate of 11%. the more realistic, albeit speculative, figures of unemployment in zimbabwe range between 94% and 80% for the 2008 to 2014 period. makochekanwa (2012), maintains that the unemployment rate went up from 70% in 2003 to 94% at the peak of the crises in 2008. a local newspaper however revealed an unemployment rate of 80% based on figures sourced from a zctu survey in 2014.23 nonetheless, aside from already noted undulant real gdp, the gdp per capita has also dramatically shifted from 9.2% in 2011 to an estimated 3.1% in 2012, with a further 3% decline in 22 figure of speech used typically by disenfranchised citizens who mockingly say that while it may be possible for the government to rig electoral votes, it will be impossible for it to rig the failing economy. 23 mtomba (2014). consilience 212 2014 (aeo, 2013). this suggests new forms of vulnerability which will be extensive, possibly exceeding the usual vulnerability that is considered as possessing either the face of a peasant or that of a woman. to highlight the policy environment presiding over the economic crises, the situation is said to be one of “ … the persistence of macroeconomic instabilities combined with policy responses only aggravating rather than remedying economic problems” (kaminski & ng, 2013, p. 2). these two scholars reason that the economic crisis in zimbabwe is a result of a combination of factors, a mixture of which defies economic logic. what is less baffling according to their argument is that the demise is entirely home-brewed. a vicious cycle of bad policies has played an instrumental role in the deterioration of the business environment, causing negative implications for industry growth, foreign direct investment, employment, and so forth. in further explaining the policies that lead to the crises, munemo (2012) reasoned that in contexts where policy making is personalized rather than institutionalized, people perish at the whim of the personal ruler. and so to borrow from the usage of a shakespearean expression by mkandawire and soludo (2003), the zimbabwean situation, ‘is not in its unlucky stars’ but is a result of the many acts of omission and commission that have resulted in an interlocked crisis. conclusion: weighing in the countervailing effect of governance in zimbabwe in simple terms, to countervail is to offset something through countering it with equal force. used in its denotative sense, the word countervailing thus entails the idea of ‘counter forces.’ in this paper, i presented three concepts within a nexus (risk, resilience, and sustainability) which i coupled with governance a concept having equal force but an opposite effect. in essence, governance serves as the confounder24 countervailing outcomes under each of the concepts within the nexus (risk, resilience, and sustainability). in the opening sections of the paper, i highlighted the impact that governance has toward increasing risk, decreasing resilience, and stalling sustainability. as i showed further, the significance of governance in propelling transformative change in the direction of inclusive and peoplecentered sustainable development is supported by reports from the undp (2014), un (2012a) and un (2012b). however, i also went on to highlight some of the challenges which threaten governance by citing motter (2015) who asserted three main points: 24 the term confounder used here is borrowed from statistics where it is defined as a variable related to variables of interest that either obscures or accentuates the relation between them (see meinert, 1986, p. 285). in this instance, bad governance is argued to be the variable that lessens resilience and sustainability, accentuating conditions of risk, while good governance is said to have the opposite (positive) effect. consilience shumba: risk, resilience, and sustaianbility (1) political processes tend to be dominated by ‘particular interests’ – usually political, that overlook the common good ultimately foiling the prospects of achieving inclusive growth and equitable social development (2) there is an inherent tendency for politicians to sacrifice the longterm perspective that sustainable development requires to the short-term pressure of the electoral cycle; (3) in many countries the often thin divide between executive and legislative powers remains feeble, thus politicians often snub and or supplant the rule of law to preserve their own interests versus the common good. the challenges put forward by motter very much reflect the zimbabwean situation. the retrospective analysis of the crisis situation in the country paints a clear picture of how governance issues countervail the risk, resilience, and sustainability nexus. through the narrative of the crisis, we see the manifestation of ribot’s25 claim that, ‘vulnerability just does not fall from the sky.’ crucially, we directly see how political instability can lead to an economic crisis and how an economic crisis can in turn lead to implications on the health, education, and agriculture sectors and the welfare of an entire population found within the crisis region. in such a fragile environment, the cases of poverty feed into the perpetuation and escalation of natural risk, health risk, political risk, and economic risk – problems which overlap, impinging more directly on people’s adaptive capacities. mcgregor et al. (2011) confirm that more and more, the zimbabwean people are finding themselves having to adapt to multiple stressors. in the desperate case of zimbabwe, vulnerability to concurrent shocks has translated directly into poverty, sickness or death (coltart, 2008). upon consulting other sources to see how bad the governance problem looks in zimbabwe, i came across the indicators and rankings seen in table 1 below. table 1: zimbabwe governance and sustainable development indicators and ranking concept (attribute) variables indicators of variable zimbabwe global ranking governance corruption freedom corruption perception index as given by transparency international 2013 human freedom index as given by the cato 150/168 countries 149/152 countries 25 ribot (2009). consilience 214 institute 2015 inclusive economic development (sustainable development economic dimension) economic capacity of the state economic output per person gdp growth as given by index mundi 2014 gdp per capita (ppp) given by index mundi 156/228 countries 227/228 countries inclusive social development (sustainable development social dimension) standard of living human development index as given by undp 2015 155/188 countries environmental protection (sustainable development environment dimension) air quality co2 emissions per capita as given by index mundi 2011 142/190 **ranking from highest to lowest, so zimbabwe is a low emitter source: author taking everything into account, all hopes of sustainability which in zimbabwe is often conflated with environmental sustainability26 seem to be futile at present. this picture presents a sharp contrast to the conditions in regions where good governance is practiced as seen through outcomes such as peaceful, stable, resilient societies which are sustainable. we must be mindful however of the fact that sustainability is more a journey than a destination (esty, 2009, p. 179), and that sustainability asserts the need to recognise present risk, while learning from past risk, concurrently planning for future risk. the important thing as esty says is to know where on the path of sustainability you are. thus there is still hope for zimbabwe if the government commits to improving the justice delivery system and rule of law; mechanisms for peace-building and for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict; accountability in the management of public resources and service delivery; and people’s participation in democratic governance structures and processes. 26 refer to the pillars of sustainability in figure 1. the three pillars of sustainability suggest that for sustainability to be possible, the pillars must be given equal consideration; the three pillars being social sustainability, environmental sustainability, and economic sustainability. in the case of zimbabwe, the country boasts of being a low carbon emitter or a net carbon sink yet, the country trails behind in other environmental indicators, let alone social and economic ones. consilience shumba: risk, resilience, and sustaianbility references adger, w. n. 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(1986). education and the challenge of independence. in i. mandaza (ed.), zimbabwe: the political economy of transition 1980-1986. dakar: codesria. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 8, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 200-218 between discourses of extreme pressure and modernization: small farmers’ diverse perceptions of vulnerability to soy in santarém, pará sophie theis school of earth sciences stanford university, california sophietheis@gmail.com briana swette school of earth sciences stanford university, california bswette@gmail.com abstract the socio-ecological implications of the soybean agricultural expansion in the brazilian amazon cannot be fully understood without examining the interactions between soy and small farmers. the expansion of soy in santarém following the construction of the cargill port in 2001 has affected local smallholders, but how and to what degree is the subject of significant controversy. discourse has emerged describing the impact of soybean agricultural expansion on the small farmers of the region. one discourse, which we term the modernization discourse, depicts effects on smallholders like migration as natural and welfare-improving. in opposition, a second discourse, which we term the extreme pressure discourse, portrays smallholders as struggling to survive under social, economic, and biological pressures associated with rapid land-use change due to soy. however, characterizing smallholders’ livelihoods as vulnerable too often assumes that smallholders have a single, homogenous experience of the expansion of soy agriculture and that they are unable to adapt to changes. interviews with smallholders who remain farming in 20 communities of rural santarém reveal heterogeneity in farmers’ perceptions to the soybean-smallholder conflict. understanding of vulnerability must expand to encapsulate farmers’ adaptive capacity. smallholders do express a desire and capacity to maintain a rural livelihood and their farming identity amidst the land-use change. smallholders’ perceptions of the impacts of the soy frontier complicate both extremes of public discourse vis-à-vis the soy conflict. author’s note sophie theis is a masters of sciences candidate at the school of earth sciences at stanford university. briana swette graduated from the school of earth sciences at stanford university in 2011. the authors would like to thank rachael garrett, jose and michela mauro, miyuki mitsuya, diego carneiro, roz naylor, nickie irvine, and all the respondents who were so generous with their time for making this project possible. keywords: smallholder agriculture, soy frontier, vulnerability, adaptive capacity consilience theis and swette: small soy farmers 1. introduction santarém, pará is the site of a new frontier and, as such, a locus of contested changes. at the end of the 1990s, the industrial soybean agricultural frontier began to reach santarém, bringing new social actors, economic relations, and land-use change to the region. we designate the expansion of soy in santarém a “frontier,” a term with a diverse history of use in amazonia, to suggest an “uneasy boundary between alternative definitions of what resources are to be appropriated how and by whom” (schmink and wood, 1992). while the state just to the south, mato grosso, is the site of substantial soy production, santarém is the only region in the state of pará with soy agriculture. never before has such a concentration of commercial agricultural production been mushroomed in the middle of the amazon basin. upon the arrival of the soy frontier in santarém, distinct discourses have emerged to describe the influence of the soybean industry on a region previously managed almost exclusively by smallholders. debate over the influence of soy has broadened from a strictly environmental focus emphasizing soy-driven deforestation (see: fearnside, 2001; nepstad et al., 2006) to, more recently, an awareness of the local social impacts of soy (steward, 2006; greenpeace, 2007; baletti, 2011). the influence of the soy industry on smallholders has had a social impact that has provoked significant conflict. two dominant discourses have emerged describing the impact of soybean agricultural expansion on small farmers of the region. while both sides agree that small farmers are selling their land to soy farmers and migrating to other farmsteads or to urban santarém, there is disagreement over the extent of this displacement and the degree of smallholder volition. the modernization discourse promoted by cargill, the multinational agricultural commodity-distributing corporation which built the port in sanatrem, depicts the effects on smallholders, like migration out of farming, as minimal, natural, and welfare-improving. the opposing, extreme pressures discourse, developed by recent academic research, greenpeace, and other local political organizations, portrays forced smallholder migration out of farming when extreme social, economic, and biological pressures associated with soy-driven land-use change deteriorate their quality of life and farming conditions beyond the point of livelihood viability. when pressures become too great, the discourse argues, farmers sell their land, abandon their community, and sometimes leave farming altogether. previous research linked to this discourse has intended to communicate the aggregate impacts of soy on smallholders as a social group, and in so doing, forgoes an exploration of the diversity of impacts and responses within this group. the migration of small farmers has been one of the most tangible effects, yet also one of the most difficult to quantify, for it remains unclear why some farmers migrate while others do not. previous researchers have investigated why smallholders sell their land, but none have asked why those that remain have not sold their land. by analyzing the social, economic, and ecological influences of soy on smallholders as smallholders themselves report, we sought to understand how smallholders who remain farming perceive and respond to the soy frontier. we compared farmers’ actual perceptions and behaviors to these two dominant discourses. perceptions of smallholders about their own vulnerability and capacities will influence how they shape their livelihood: “the response to any change will 202 consilience depend on the reasons farmers use to explain to themselves their own ability and power, or their vulnerability” (trujillo, 2008). we sought to uncover the discourses that farmers themselves produce to explain their experience of being affected by soy in relation to their capacity to adapt. 2. invisible smallholders and inevitable soy smallholder agriculturalists in the amazon have long been marginalized, antagonized, or simply neglected by government policy, non-governmental projects, and the public imagination. this trend of neglect towards the caboclo smallholders has led nugent (1993) to describe them as invisible in amazonia. caboclo producers fall through the cracks between the dichotomies that characterize thinking and policy in the amazon: pristine versus destroyed ecosystems, indigenous versus invading colonizers, economically efficient versus inefficient. culturally, caboclos’ diverse mixed ethnic heritage involving indigenous, portuguese, and, more recently, northeasterners drawn in on state-sponsored colonization projects, distinguish caboclos from the “truly indigenous” and deny them some of the privileges of being imagined as noble savages. while indigenous forest management and traditional ecological knowledge are appreciated for their conservation and cultural value, caboclos, producing for the market and subsistence on diverse, intensely cultivated plots, have more often been antagonized by conservationists for the use of fire and higher impact management. however, conservationists have recently begun to argue that smallholders can serve as key allies in conservation (campos and nepstad, 2006). their management regimes, especially in comparison with industrial agriculture, more closely mimic native nutrient cycling, soil conservation, and biodiversity. on plots less than 100 hectares, amazonian smallholders tend to use minimal machinery and chemical inputs, leave large swaths of land fallow or under forest cover, and make ample use of agroforestry techniques. smallholders have also been ignored in economic growth planning since they are perceived as inefficient because of their small-scale operations and limited access to capital, technology, and inputs. furthermore, smallholders mostly produce noncommodity crops for local markets, and their output is hard to quantify and thus goes untaxed. however, a national family agriculture movement spearheaded by the creation of the national program for strengthening family agriculture (pronaf) in 1996, and the creation of the secretary of family agriculture within the ministry of agrarian development, shifted the dialogue to recognize smallholder economic contribution, viewing them as “multifunctional,” and offering a combination of social, economic, and ecosystem benefits. research that laid the foundation for pronaf argued that family agriculture accounts for almost 40% of the gross value of agricultural production and produces more value per hectare (guanziroli, 2010). while pronaf has leveraged subsidized credit lines, technical assistance, and rural extension for smallholders categorized as family farmers all over the country, the northern region of brazil remains one of the least serviced regions of the country. in the amazon, the value of smallholder agriculture in development strategies remains particularly contested. santarém, with a population of 294,580, is the third largest city in the legal amazon. roughly a quarter of the populace (78,790) resides in rural santarém (ibge, 2010). almost 9,200 agricultural properties cover consilience theis and swette: small soy farmers approximately 275,000 hectares (ibge censo agropecuário, 2006). an average plot size of 30 hectares indicates that smallholder agriculture dominates in santarém despite the expansion of soybean cultivation, which requires upwards of 100 hectares to reach economies of scale. smallholders produce manioc, fruits, corn, and vegetables (horticultura) in patchwork forests and fields and, now, soy plantations as well. of more than 9,000 farmers in the region, 400 are soy farmers, planting in 2010 an estimated 27,000 hectares – only 10% of total area in agriculture in santarém (ibge, 2010; personal communication, cargill). in the 1990s, the state and municipal government of santarém elected to pursue a developmental strategy with soy agribusiness at its center. the municipality of santarém lies in a strategic position as a deepwater port at the confluence of the tapajós and amazonas rivers, the last point of connection in the amazon to a global market. the municipal council on rural development, an institution convened by pronaf, deemed soy a more profitable use of land than small-scale agriculture. the municipal government opted to expand its existing port, and cargill, the multinational agricultural commodity-distributing corporation won the contract. with neighboring state mato grosso rapidly expanding, soy production from a new varietal suited to the region developed by the brazilian agricultural research organization embrapa, santarém thought to capitalize on an opportunity. indeed, soy has been a major contributor to the brazilian economy. the food and agricultural economy constituted 30% of brazil’s gdp and comprised 40% of all exports in 2004 (chaddad and jank, 2004). brazil is both the second largest producer and exporter of soy, producing in 2011 75 million tons of soy and exporting 29.1 million tons behind. total exports of soy are valued at usd$11 billion (embrapa, 2011). the focus on soy as a development strategy in santarém led to infrastructural and institutional changes that brought the cargill soy processing and export port as well as a wave of soy farmers into the region. with cheap land and cargill as a guaranteed buyer and creditor, capitalized soy farmers from southern states of mato grosso, paraná, or rio grande do sul migrated into the santarém region, mostly between 2001 and 2005 (the nature conservancy, 2005). these farmers usually had previous experience growing soy and thus settled in santarém with machinery, workers, and their families. by 2010, 46,170 metric tons of soy were harvested annually, an increase from just 107 tons in 1997 (ibge, 2010). the santarém region represents the only site of soy production in the state of pará and its production is less than 1% of the national total (embrapa, 2011). the arrival of the soy frontier forced a dialogue in santarém to compare the value of smallholder versus industrial agriculture, and as soy expanded into the region, perceptions of the relative value of each evolved. this division gave birth to the two polarized discourses we return to throughout the paper. one discourse is supportive of soy cultivation and sees it as contributing to national economic growth and potentially yielding trickle-down effects at the regional level. this discourse propelled soy into santarém in the first place, and as soy expanded, the opposing discourse emerged to criticize soy agriculture’s environmental and social impacts. we elaborate upon both discourses in the subsequent section. 204 consilience 3. “modernization” and “extreme pressure” discourses on soy in santarém with the cargill port built and in operation by 2002, farmers from southern brazil purchasing land, and soybean production expanding, the soy frontier brought a period of rapid change to santarém. a dissonant chorus of responses from local and international organizations emerged in the wake of this upheaval. debate crystallized over how soy impacts santarém and what should be done about it, whether collaborating with cargill and the soy industry or opposing it. as local social movements like frente da defesa amazônica and greenpeace spearheaded protest against cargill and soy production in general, the nature conservancy and the world wildlife fund independently developed certification schemes for soy. tnc currently certifies “legal soy” for cargill, and wwf supports the round table on responsible soy to certify “responsible soy.” both collaborations seek to preserve soy while mitigating environmental externalities. social concerns associated with soy expansion are seen as an issue resolved through management and governance. in 2004, cargill sought out a partnership with tnc to ensure that it only purchases “legal soy” that is grown by farmers in compliance with the brazilian forest code, which states that farmers must leave a certain portion of their property in forest reserve and clear no forest. since the initiation of the tnc certification in 2006, there are 331 farms in the santarém region participating in the program. tnc revels in the fact that there has been no deforestation on any farm since july 2006, although there is just one employee responsible for administering this program, and monitoring for compliance with the forest code is outsourced to a third party. the rtrs draws together representatives of the soy supply chain and civil society to collectively define “responsible soy” nationwide in brazil. the rtrs certification extends beyond the tnc-cargill collaboration by requiring that soy expand only onto government-designated ecological-economic zones (zee). unlike with “legal soy,” the rtrs encourages consensus-building processes with local stakeholders and requires dispute resolution mechanisms and the establishment of “channels of communication” with locals (rtrs, 2011). yet for many, deforestation is merely a starting point of the catalogue of concerns with soy. in contrast with the collaborative efforts of tnc and the rtrs, other groups do not trust negotiation as a way to contain the expansion of soy nor make it accountable to local demands. the local pastor, padre edilberto senna, articulated a common sentiment: if cargill is not removed, eventually all of santarém will turn to soy. his grassroots organization, frente da defesa amazônia (amazonian defense front), is highly critical of both certification schemes that rationalize soy production on “already anthropogenically modified lands,” arguing that the biodiverse agricultural land of smallholders and soy monoculture represent two very distinct anthropogenic modifications and that the two forms of production are socially and economically very different (caminha barros, 2010). there is deep skepticism about whether or not soy expansion has truly benefited santarém or brought the promised economic growth, given that the vast majority of soy farmers have migrated into santarém from outside the state. many feel that santarém has donated land and sacrificed its local production in exchange for export-oriented commodity agriculture whose benefits are never seen. consilience theis and swette: small soy farmers image 1: barren, tilled soy fields carved out in santarém. image 2: a typical smallholder plot with a diversity of annual and perennial crops. local polarization was exemplified when the cargill public audience convened in july 2010 to discuss the environmental impact assessment for the port’s expansion. a half hour before the event began, the 400 seats of the auditorium of the yacht club were filled by cargill supporters who had been encouraged to arrive early and wear white shirts to distinguish their support. uniform signs hung around the walls of the auditorium read, “the community associations of liberdade and salé are with cargill in search of development and a better life for residents” and “a small friend can be an important partner.” only the back of the room and aisles remained for those who arrived on time, all of whom were forced to stand under the scrutiny of the audience seated in white. the few voices critical of cargill that were allowed to speak publicly were scheduled hours later into the daylong event. the seated mass of white cheered for pro-cargill sentiment and nearly drowned out dissidents with booing. with some protests agitating outside the auditorium, a group of students eventually snuck in and stood in the back of the room with banners that read, “out cargill!” and, “after a crime, a prize?” in reference to the pardoning of cargill after their failure to complete an eia for the initial construction of the port. 206 consilience image 3: the student activists behind the audience wearing white shirts in support of cargill. 4. debate over soy’s impacts on santarém smallholders these two dominant discourses resulted in two polarized accounts of soy’s pressure on smallholders. in cargill’s own publication of the impact assessment of the santarém port, cargill identifies just two social impacts: “social conflicts triggered by land issues” and “farm property concentration and migration of smallholders” (cargill, 2010). cargill promotes discourse along with tnc and rtrs that declares that social conflict related to the soy frontier is minimal and manageable, and that other changes are evidence of modernization and welfare improvement. other research associated with the alternate discourse that emphasizes smallholder vulnerability has highlighted a slough of direct and indirect pressures that smallholders experience as a result of their interaction with the soy frontier, and argue that smallholders cannot easily coexist alongside soy farmers. 4.1 “social conflicts triggered by land issues” in its impact report, cargill mentions that violent conflicts between soy farmers and smallholders have been reported, but depicts these reports as unverified accusations, emphasizing that there are “no official records available.” the rural worker’s union (sindicato dos trabalhadores rurais, str) argues that there have been significant social conflicts due to the influx of soy. the president of str consilience theis and swette: small soy farmers figure 1: this figure was taken from the cargill eia brochure to the general public (english version available online) offers optimistic prospects for smallholders who sell their land. related that they have received numerous reports from their constituents that they were facing aggressive purchasing tactics and intimidation by land buyers, including a report about four houses of small farmers that were burnt down in a land dispute in 2004 (pers. comm., 2010). the catholic pastoral land commission (cpt) has also documented violence, criminality, and disputes in the land sales between soy farmers and smallholders, including cases of grilhagem, land title falsification and illegal sales (cpt, 2008). 4.2 “farm property concentration and migration of smallholders” beginning around 1998 and peaking roughly from 2001 to 2006 during the highest market price of soy, soy farmers and speculators purchased land in the region from 500 families (cpt, 2008). cargill provides a flowchart (figure 1) to explain the outcomes of people who sell their land to soy farmers. the report downplays the rural emigration as “on a scale similar or smaller than seen in other regions of brazil’s north.” cargill implies that economic development empowers smallholders and prompts them to leave farming, which “is a sign of people yearning for better conditions of life associated with the ‘benefits’ available in urban areas” (cargill, 2010). 208 consilience in contrast to cargill’s estimation of the process, the extreme pressures discourse argues that the migration is often involuntary, either because of the conditions of the sale or because changes in living and farming conditions provoked by the expansion of soy has made a farming livelihood unviable. projeto saúde e alegría estimated that 26 communities completely disappeared between 1998 and 2007 (baletti, 2011). steward calls this rural exodus and baletti “land grabbing.” smallholders who sell their land either move into the city or buy new, smaller plots in the only areas where land is cheap enough and available: in more remote locations, often in primary forest (steward, 2006; baletti, 2009). for example, new incra settlements (e.g. bom sossego, founded in 2002) have been created out of primary forest to house some of these farmers. baletti found that all relocations lead to a reduction in farming by dislocated smallholders (baletti, 2011). 4.3 “pressure” on smallholders from indirect impacts the disjuncture between the two discourses is largest on the subject of indirect impacts of soy on smallholders. cargill does not touch upon the idea that the impacts of soy may extend beyond the land transaction. the extreme pressures discourse’s principal criticism is that the indirect effects of soy reduce the viability of the remaining farmers in santarém. the discourse depicts farmers as experiencing great pressures in the form of cultural friction with soy farmers, social disintegration due to smallholder out-migration, and ecological pressure from soy cultivation. str officials argue that the arrival of industrial soy production threatens smallholders’ rural identity. one official pointed out that smallholders want to leave their farm to future generations, but their children are not interested in traditional farming because of exposure to mechanized agriculture on nearby soy fields (personal communication, str). ethnic divisions (soy farmers tend to be called “gauchos,” as brazilian southerners of european ancestry) exacerbate differences between smallholders and soy farmers. steward (2006) quotes a small farmer who laments that while the smallholders have nothing, “the new soy farmer can come and have everything.” the emigration of small farmers is argued to fracture social networks and dissipate the support needed to maintain local infrastructure like schools, churches, water tanks, soccer fields, manioc processing houses, and bus routes. those that remain are described as living in the aftermath of deteriorating infrastructure and rural community networks. the environmental externalities of soy production include dangerous farming systems and the health of farmers, as well as what farmers are able to grow. baletti (2009) writes that smallholders reported an “extreme reduction in their ability to grow” crops due to agrotoxins used in nearby soy fields that had forced them to purchase food that they usually grew themselves. in 2007, greenpeace, local ngo saúde e alegria, and str created a community map to identify local impacts of soy. the first and only map of the municipality’s 121 rural communities highlights contaminated water sources, 55 sites of deforestation, blocked access to communities, and 29 “threatened” communities with severely reduced populations (greenpeace, 2007). steward (2006) writes that smallholders “wondered how long they or their neighbors could live under these exacerbated socioeconomic conditions and deteriorated environmental conditions.” baletti reports that a common consilience theis and swette: small soy farmers sentiment expressed in her study was, “life is difficult, but it wasn’t always this way,” which dominant perceptions of pressure of soy on smallholders the nature conservancy 2004 “legal” soy; must comply with brazilian forest code steward 2006 loss of hard-earned community infrastructure (e.g. schools, drinking water) increasing pressure to sell their land as soy farms surround colonos’ homes and agricultural fields agricultural product loss and children sick from pesticide spraying diminished or completely destroyed water sources, a result of erosion and sedimentation caused by agricultural machinery greenpeace-str-saúde e alegria community map 2006 impacted igarapés (water sources) blocked access threatened communities deforestation cargill 2010 farm property concentration and migration of smallholders social conflicts triggered by land issues roundtable on responsible soy 2011 “responsible” soy; only in eez designated zones representation of civil society to define sustainable soy appropriate communication with community baletti 2011 deterioration of infrastructure destruction of communities families split in process of selling land extreme reduction in ability to grow forced to purchase food that they had formerly grown figure 2. indicates that those who remain never received offers to sell, implying that they have not necessarily elected to stay. the normative premise of this discourse, embedded within an environmental justice argument that soy brings no benefit to the local community, does not suggest ways in which smallholders are managing to adapt or cope with the soy frontier. their rhetoric is necessarily polarized to question cargill and the value of soy. at the same time, the image of pressure deprives smallholders of agency, which implies homogeneity within this group, and presumes that farmers have no employable assets to contest and cope with the changes above (figure 4). 5. methods the two authors conducted field research june through august 2010 in the municipality of santarém. fieldwork involved semi-structured interviews and surveys 210 consilience with 21 smallholder families in 20 communities as well as site visits to farmers’ markets, the cargill soy processing and export port, and soybean farms. expert interviews were also conducted with community leaders and public agencies, including the rural laborers’ union (str), the rural producers’ union (sirsan), the rural producers’ union (aprusan), the state agricultural extension agency (emater), state agricultural research agency (sagri), the municipal agency for the small farmer (sempaf), the bank of the amazon (basa), ngo saúde e alegría, and cargill. the “principle of opportunity” as established by the literature (aldrich et al. 2006) guided us to maximize the number of communities visited and capture the broadest range of experiences across the municipality, instead of concentrating on any one community. formal semi-structured interviews and surveys were conducted with twenty-one households in the peri-urban area along each of the major paved roads through rural santarém: br-163, curuá-una, and pa-445. the farthest community contacted was located on br-163 about 70 km from urban santarém. 6. results smallholders’ own accounts of their vulnerability complicate the polarized discourses of extreme pressure and modernization. political ecology perspectives emphasize that vulnerability is not an outcome but a dynamic state (eakin and luers, 2006). smallholders can move in and out of vulnerable states, and movement is directed by their adaptive capacity (smith and wandal, 2006). while the modernization discourse discounts smallholder vulnerability altogether, the extreme pressure discourse characterizes smallholder vulnerability as a homogenous response under a fixed set of pressures due to soy. however, interviews with farmers revealed a diversity of smallholder experiences with soy. we observed that vulnerability amongst smallholders involves (i) exposure to the impacts of soy and (ii) adaptive capacity to cope with these impacts. both exposure and adaptive capacity vary between smallholder households, and the results can even be positive. while neglected in the extreme pressures discourse, smallholders’ adaptive capacity is an integral component of their vulnerability to soy. adaptive capacity is also diverse among smallholders and depends on factors such as proximity to santarem or the degree of community involvement. it is with knowledge of this adaptive capacity that smallholders perceive themselves as having both the choice and capacity to remain rural. 6.1 diverse experiences of vulnerability to soy smallholders we interviewed have a range of perceptions of soy farmers ranging from antagonistic, neutral, or friendly. most smallholders describe limited interaction with soy farmers. in the communities designated by local organizations as most impacted by soy expansion, residents tended to be more aware of the political aspects of the conflict but frequently referred to other communities as worse off. no farmer in our study described themselves as suffering or their community as “destroyed.” however, the fact that smallholders point to other communities shows their empathy with the struggle of smallholders everywhere. consilience theis and swette: small soy farmers several farmers defended soy farmers from criticism, arguing that they have been used as scapegoats for santarém’s deforestation or the problems of small farmers. often, small farmers know the local soy farmers by name and sell produce to them. while rare, there were a few reports of temporary employment for smallholders and the recent ability to rent machinery from soy farms. in a few cases, smallholders report that a soy farmer had contributed to the local community, bringing better roads or building churches. farmers’ understanding of those who sold their land illustrates a very different understanding of migration than the extreme pressure discourse. they frequently explained that small farmers sold voluntarily but irresponsibly, accepting unfair offers because they were unable to work the land as a consequence of sickness, old age, or laziness. when asked how the farmers who sold their land fare, farmers in our sample suspect that they are worse off, but that they did not keep contact with them. in certain communities, small farmers describe their relationship with soy farmers as interdependent. these communities tend to be more isolated and thus garner less support from the city or str. often, these relationships form in the wake of extreme rural abandonment. a family that was one of seven remaining households in prata, where between 40 and 70 families sold their properties, talked about continuing business as usual. three soy farms were established in their community, the closest just 300 meters from their house. they were some of the few remaining people in that community, and they had no available social network. they lost a number of services from emigration and spoke about veneno–the effects of pesticides on their crops–causing them to switch out of beans and rice to grow primarily manioc. despite these circumstances, they did not emphasize vulnerability to soy and instead said that soy farmers support small farmers. the effect of industrial soy agriculture on smallholder production is in itself controversial among smallholders. many say that the small-scale cultivation of beans, rice, and corn are directly impacted by large-scale soy production. the production of these staples is reportedly decreasing in the region and we saw no one selling these products at the market (personal communication, str). farmers frequently explain that production suffers as a result of pesticide use in nearby soy farms, which drives pests to their plots. however, while a third of the farmers independently mentioned this type of pest transfer, a quarter independently said that this story was not true. while the effect of veneno is an ecologically sound explanation for increasing pest challenges, it was difficult for farmers to give specific evidence from their own farm fields or exact timelines of when they moved away from the annual crops. we did notice a strong consistency in the radical language used to describe the effect of soy by the most politically active of smallholders and the story described by str. a strong indication that the expansion of soy indeed encouraged a transition out of annual crops is the sharp rise in manioc production, as it is solely a smallholder crop in the region (ibge, 2010). the driving force of this crop transition cannot be explained in our study, but it is a good example of tension between perceptions and experience. 212 consilience 6.2 adaptive capacity in addition to the more nuanced discourse on their own vulnerability, our research revealed a rich context that supports small farmers’ capacity to remain rural. rural identity, land security, urban-rural linkages, government cash transfers, and community networks all support the farmers’ adaptive capacity in the face of the pressures of soy. given varied experience with soy, the smallholders in our study were not excluded from the wave of land sales that sent many of their fellow farmers out of their homes. over half of the subjects interviewed received one or more offers from someone interested in purchasing their land, and all declined. the fact that they were offered an opportunity to leave farming and declined signifies that these smallholders value a farming livelihood over the perceived alternative. these farmers were not looking for an exit route to leave their current livelihood, nor were the pressures of soy so great that they were forced out of farming. a strong rural identity among the small farmers plays a large part in their resistance to sell. smallholders focused on farming as an identity for reasons why they did not sell when they received an offer. farmers speak about family connection to the land where they have lived on for many years. one farmer responded, “the land is where we draw sustenance” (de onde retira o sustento). others responded, “where would food come from?” and “nowhere to go.” all reported that they plan to pass their farm on to their children rather than sell it. selling is virtually unthinkable. while land tenure insecurity is widespread amongst small farmers in the amazon, all farmers of this study reported feeling secure in their land ownership. incra estimates that less than 30% of smallholders in santarém have formal title to their land (steward, 2001), and ludewig and brondízio (2009) found that most smallholders in the municipality have no title. however, in our study, a clear majority (72%) of respondents report possession of title, and most of the remaining (16%) report possessing a receipt of sale (posse) or (.05%) protocol to demonstrate ownership of the land. all three property regimes (private property with title, protocol, or posse) establish the owner’s perception of land security. this is an asset that equips smallholders to decline the sale of their land, and that also increases the value of their rural livelihood and willingness to invest in their properties. santarém also has unique characteristics that support informal land security. rural santarém’s proximity to a significant urban center adds value to their land. the communities close to urban santarém tend to have a 100+ year, multi-generation settlement history, with communities like tabocal, about 20 km from the city periphery, founded in 1906. these communities have some of the highest property values in rural santarém due to established infrastructure (schools, electricity, microsistemas for water) and easy access (frequent public transportation, good roads) to urban santarém. these communities are also denser than communities farther from santarém, since families often locate their homes in a community and station their farm property further away. such multi-sited households–a family may have a house on the main road, near bus lines, schools, and health services, and have their crop field a few kilometers from the road–is a common strategy to help families benefit from urban services while practicing a rural livelihood (padoch et al., 2008). the density, high property value, and strong sense of history and community of the consilience theis and swette: small soy farmers neighborhoods close to the urban periphery make them less attractive to land speculators and capitalized farmers seeking to buy and consolidate properties for rural production. these qualities lend them passive protection from land buyers, and contrast to the case of prata, where a community far from the city found had less resistance to selling. as the third largest city in the legal amazon, santarém provides an important urban resource to all the rural communities in our study. santarém is recognized for particularly strong rural-urban linkages, social networks that extend into the city, and multi-sited households (padoch et al., 2008). rural farmers rely on the urban population for an accessible consumer market for their products. city residents actively use the three thriving farmers markets, while extensive transportation infrastructure through the peri-urban region, including public bus transportation and three major paved roads, bring farmers to the market. farmers can also reliably access the goods and services of the city, like bulk food purchases or medicine. smallholders must also come into santarém to collect their welfare payments. almost all farmers rely substantially on federal conditional cash transfers, a trend documented elsewhere in the brazilian amazon (brondízio, 2011). families receive monthly stipends from several sources: government cash transfers (bolsa familia), retirement, and disability pensions. bolsa familia pays families about r$20 per month per child as long as the child attends school. retirement pensions (r$510 per month) are available for women over 55 and men over 60, or those with mental health and physical impairments, including depression (ilo, 2009). these transfers buffer smallholders from making economic decisions at the margin but also motivate farmers to assume more entrepreneurial risk (ilo, 2009; soares et al., 2008). two families, however, stopped selling at the market and subsist entirely off government payments. community organization is high in santarém, with community associations and str representatives in almost all communities. community associations serve as a collective governing body for the community, organizing water distribution systems, communal bus transport to the city market, and social events. with 20,000 members and 250 delegates, str represents an organizing voice for the rural population, and connects communities to government services. the union states that its main role is to maintain the land for the people who live there, help smallholders understand their rights, and verify their ownership of the land (personal communication, president of str). rural farmers interact to a high degree with str because it administers a number of federal and state government social pension programs and helps communities receive credit. the str delegates organize monthly meetings in their representative community, and are well known and identified as leaders. new emerging networks show a degree of adaptation behind the emphasis on community fracturing (steward, 2006; baletti, 2011). for some small farmers, capitalized soy agriculture can offer opportunities to intensify production via increased access to machinery (tractors, chainsaws), synthetic inputs (now sometimes cheaper than organic fertilizers), and large areas of cleared and tilled land. clearing regrowth was the most commonly cited challenge in farming for smallholders, and it was eased by expanded access to machinery brought by capitalized soy agriculture operations. two families actually moved onto former soy farms: one family purchased land from a soy farmer and was able to move off their family’s property to 214 consilience begin intensive fruit cultivation, and another rented land from a soy farmer that they otherwise would not have been able to purchase. these examples are rare and cases of adaptation do not imply that the impacts of soy are minimal. they do, however show how smallholders are not dwelling on their own vulnerability, and are instead taking advantage of opportunities for empowerment. pressures and changes reported by farmers factors of adaptive capacity observed adaptations  immigration of soy farmers  establishment of soy fields nearby  emigration of neighboring small farmers  pest transfer from pesticides used on soy fields  natural capital: pest transfer, pesticide externalities  economic capital: conditional cash transfers  social capital: community organizations, relatively long settlement histories, community infrastructure  political mobilization in support of smallholders (str, cpt, greenpeace, etc.)  informal land security  migration to urban santarém, manaus, or new farmstead  no perceived adaption necessary  greater dependence on welfare  stop selling or producing certain crops (corn, rice, beans)  intensify agriculture (borrow machinery from soy farmer, cheaper synthetic inputs)  sell part of land  stronger rural farming identity and membership in group figure 3. summary of smallholder adaption 7. conclusions: encounters and critical consciousness small farmers of santarém are aware of the changes brought about by the soy frontier, but they do not have a uniform experience of these changes and pressures. by examining their perceptions of the personal impacts of soy, we see that smallholders in santarém have meaning invested in their rural livelihoods. to a certain extent, they exercise a choice to remain rural. smallholders’ experiences of the soy frontier lie between the two polarized extremes of discourse demonstrated in the fraught atmosphere at the cargill public audience. while the modernization discourse disregards the value of smallholder agriculture, the extreme pressure discourse sees soy as a direct threat, capable of erasing smallholder agriculture and its related social and ecological benefits to the region. however, rather than being a space of dominance and subservience, the soy frontier is an encounter, a contested space of distinct understandings (vivanco, 2006). it appears that for many smallholders, coexistence is more feasible than originally described by the extreme pressures discourse. parsing apart the consilience theis and swette: small soy farmers heterogeneous experiences of smallholders points to opportunities for strengthening local coping strategies and assets that could lead to empowerment. both modernization and extreme pressure discourses paint vulnerability as a linear, uniform process. we see that the process of vulnerability often involves diverse feedback between impacts and responses. exposur to pressures may reduce farmer viability in many cases, but it can also stimulates and gives birth to new adaptations. perhaps what is most distinctive is that the soy frontier crystallizes a critical consciousness, a political awareness of the boundaries, identity, and power of small farmers’ social group. for the first time, the soy farmer presents the santarém small farmer with an “other” against which to define the small farmer. the story of soy expansion in santarém is not over. processing 1 million tons of soy per year, cargill’s port currently runs significantly under its total capacity of 5 million tons (personal communication, cargill). plans to pave the last stretch of the br-163 will make truck transportation of soy from mato grosso to the santarém port feasible. this infrastructure improvement will bring the continued establishment of soy agriculture along the road that will presumably fill the port’s capacity. understanding how smallholders interact with soy and their dynamic and diverse adaptive strategies should be a critical component of any future development or conservation strategy in the region. 216 consilience bibliography adams, c. et al. 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(eds.), confronting the coffee crisis, mit press: cambridge, 2008. vivanco, luis a. green encounters: shaping and contesting environmentalism in rural costa rica. berghahn books: new york, 2006. microsoft word carty.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 13, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 60–113 the role of training programs in the sustainability of potable water projects monica carty earth institute columbia university, new york city, new york mkc2145@columbia.edu abstract in rural regions around the world, 1.7 billion people rely on public taps, hand-pumps, protected wells, protected springs, and rainwater for clean drinking water. up to the present, there has been little focus on how training programs in communities receiving the water points fit into the overall picture of sustainability. many factors of sustainability such as financial management and operation, and governance of the water point are dependent on human skill, which are often first exposed to a community through training programs. to understand better how trainings affect the sustainability of water points, i sent surveys to personnel from ngos who have worked as trainers in water development projects in senegal, malawi, honduras, and india. i also conducted surveys and focus groups with ngo personnel and the community members who went through their trainings in three villages in senegal. i then compared perspectives of trainers and community members using grounded theory, facilitated by using nvivo 10. the results of all four countries’ results from ngo personnel showed that the central themes found in responses were management, community, knowledge, ngo and community relations, and the trainer-learner relationship. comparing the central themes of the trainers and learners in senegal, the two groups’ responses showed that mutually tied themes were knowledge, management, mechanical, and profits/finances. in order to improve training to make water points more sustainable, i recommend that ngos consider how people trained will relate to the rest of the community and, furthermore, see how the trainings and information learned will function in the community after the ngo leaves the community. acknowledgments i would like to thank my research advisors at columbia university, elisa bone and jenna lawrence, for working with me on this project. i would also like to thank my research mentors jeff walters and sabrina aggarwal for reading over countless drafts, looking over survey question, and making the time to work with me during their busy lives. i would also like to thank all the people in senegal who made my field research possible: waly faye at the west african research center, mamoud diop, director of radi in meckhé, astou; sow at radi; and abdullaye diallo, my translator. i would also like to thank my friend cordelia long for translating my survey responses from french to english. alyssa menz also deserves so many thanks for reading my thesis drafts from when it was just bullet points to an almost complete thesis. finally, i would like to thank all of the ngos and the people in senegal who answered my survey questions. all of the ngos who participated in the surveys will be receiving an electronic copy of this research. consilience carty: the role of training programs 1. introduction 1.1 the need for potable water in rural regions around the world, 1.7 billion people rely on public taps, hand-pumps, protected wells, protected springs, and rainwater to attain potable water (world health organization and unicef 2013). these technologies are often called water points, or, generally, any sort of system that brings drinking water to a geographical location that communities can access. safe drinking water is defined by the united nations (un) and, generally, by other organizations, as water that is clean for drinking purposes and also available in large enough quantities for hygienic purposes (stockholm international water institute 2005). the creation of water points in rural communities is not just a project, but also a service that should function over an extended period of time (wash sustainability charter 2011). because these technologies can be vital sources of drinking water that people need throughout their lifetime, it is important to understand how these water sources function over time after they are installed. in recent years, the issue of potable water access has garnered more attention from large international organizations such as the un and the world health organization (who), along with smaller non-governmental organizations (ngos). the un addressed one of the millennium development goals (mdgs) to be specifically about potable water access. in 2002 the united nations’ secretarygeneral, kofi annan, introduced the millennium development goals (mdgs). a task force, the un millennium project, brought together by annan, developed these targets of development for worldwide use to address issues, including: extreme poverty, gender equality, education, and environmental sustainability. the tenth mdg is to halve the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation by 2015 (relative to 1990 levels) (un millenium project 2005). there has been great improvement in the area of drinking water access around the world, especially since the creation of this goal. as of 2011, the coverage of improved water sources has exceeded target levels worldwide at 89%, 1% above the target (world health organization and unicef 2013). the need for clean drinking water is clear, especially in terms of human health. worldwide, diseases transmitted through water or human excrement are the second-leading cause of death among children (stockholm international water institute 2005). for example, lack of access to clean drinking water is frequently cited as a primary reason for malnutrition and stunting in young children. potable water also effects the achievement of other mdgs. for example, access to clean drinking water helps reduce child mortality, and clean water for use during childbirth reduces maternal mortality risks (stockholm international water institute 2005). the effect that water has on human health makes it imperative that there be continued work to expand sustained access to clean water. although wide coverage of the number of people who have access to potable water is important, the creation of water points in rural communities is not just a project, but also a service that should function over an extended period of time (wash sustainability charter 2011). the mdg target for potable water access includes the word “sustainable”, and the importance of this word is being consilience carty: the role of training programs recognized. the un rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation has recently released a report declaring that sustainability is an essential and fundamental human rights principle for realizing human rights to water (de albuquerque 2014). 1.2 defining sustainability and its relationship to potable water projects sustainability itself is a difficult term to define as it has many variations. the most significant issue with defining sustainability is that its definition varies widely amongst experts and organizations. moreover, the definition is also dependent on what the goals of an organization are and how they value specific goals (hodgkin 1994). with this in mind, it is important to understand that organizations installing a water source can approach sustainability in different ways, depending on what aspects of the definition they want to emphasize most and what value they attach to those aspects (lockwood, wakeman and bakalian 2007). another significant issue of the definition of sustainability is the disjunction between the perception of the goals and value of a water source by those implementing a project versus the community that is getting the water source. for example, an organization implementing an intervention may be concerned with the health benefits for a community with the creation of a water source. but the community may be most concerned most with convenience (lockwood, wakeman, & bakalian 2007; hodgkin 1994). thus, for simplicity and to recognize the variability of the definition of sustainability across people and places, in this research i will use what has been considered a foundational quality of the overall definition of sustainability: whether a water source supplies the benefits it was set out to provide over an extensive period of time, even after all significant forms of external support have been withdrawn (lockwood, wakeman and bakalian 2007). the sustainability of potable water sources so that water points can be effective as well as long-term technologies of change are a challenge for water services in the developing world. a wateraid study conducted of water points throughout tanzania revealed that 46% were non-functional (wateraid tanzania 2009). this percentage represents approximately 30,000 water points nationwide that, had they worked, would have served 7.5 million rural tanzanians (wateraid tanzania 2009). although tanzania is only one country out of many that have water access issues, it is a good example of how simply installing a water point is not enough to ensure an ongoing service of water. a review by the rural water network supply in 2009 estimated the statuses of water points (see table 1). countries with notable high percentage of hand-pumps that are not working include côte d’ivoire, the democratic republic of the congo, nigeria, and sierra leone. consilience carty: the role of training programs table 1: hand-pump data from select sub-saharan african countries country estimated rural population (millions) estimated rural coverage hand pumps not functioning angola 8.6 40% 30% benin 3.7 60% 22% burkina faso 10.5 44% 25% cote d'ivoire 9.2 74% 65% democratic republic of the congo 35.3 29% 67% guinea 5.5 38% 20% liberia 1.7 52% 31% malawi 10.0 62% 40% mali 8.6 35% 34% mozambique 12.6 24% 25% niger 9.0 36% 35% nigeria 65.3 49% 50% sierra leone 3.0 46% 65% uganda 22.0 52% 20% zambia 7.0 36% 32% source: all statistics were compiled from unicef and national government statistics (rural water supply network) 1.3 water projects and technology there are many kinds of technology that can be used to create a water point. although this research emphasizes social and communal aspects of water point implementation, the technology used to build a water point does matter (harvey and reed 2004). the kind of technology used to create a water point is an important choice and including communities in this decision process is an essential part of making the water point sustainable (breslin 2003). thus, there are a variety of technologies that are used for the creation of a water point (see table 2). because there are many ways to find water around the world, various methods have been developed either to tap into already collected water or to collect water for human use. different water technologies will be used depending on the environments that people live in. communities located in rainier climates may benefit more from collecting rainwater than communities in drier climates who may not be able to consilience carty: the role of training programs collect rainwater. these communities, however, may be able to tap into a nearby aquifer or aboveground water source. table 1: list of water technologies used around the world and in different environmental contexts water point technology description illustration borehole a tube is drilled down to the water table. boreholes can be either hand-dug or machine drilled, depending on the depth of the water table. water can be pumped up by a machine or another mechanical device (harvey and reed 2004). (skipton, hygnstrom and woldt 2012) hand-dug well this technology is also used when groundwater is the potable water source; the operation and maintenance costs are low. this is a less expensive option than a drilled borehole. water is brought to surface using a bucket (harvey and reed 2004) (gromicko 2013) hand-pump a water-lifting device, operated by human power, usually using the hands, arms or feet. a lever and fulcrum act as the mechanism for pumping water to the surface (harvey and reed 2004). (save the children) consilience carty: the role of training programs gravity-fed water schemes water is collected from a naturally occurring water source such as a spring. pipes bring the water down from a higher elevation, and then it is collected in a central container, ready for community use (niskanen 2003). (united nations environment programme) rainwater catchments rainwater is collected from a catchment area, usually a roof of a home, and then funneled into a storage container such as a cistern or tank (texas a&m agrilife n.d.). (meena 2003) biosand filters there is a layer of sand or gravel in a concrete or plastic container. a shallow amount of water is kept inside in order to let the bioactive layer grow, which contributes to reducing the presence of disease-causing organisms in the water (centers for disease control and prevention 2014) (centers for disease control and prevention 2014) although it is essential to include the community in deciding which technology will be used to create a water source, it is also important that the community know how to maintain and finance the water source so that it continues to function over a long period of time. thus, technology that requires specialist skills is not likely to be as sustainable as technology that requires general mechanical skills. furthermore, local innovations that have already been used should be considered in the interest of sustainability (harvey and reed 2004). 1.4 training and potable water projects consilience carty: the role of training programs examining how the mechanical and financial maintenance by the community for their water projects is part of a broader understanding of how human behavior affects the sustainability of a water point. this emphasis on the need to understand human behavior also comes with the general understanding that community participation is an integral part of determining if water installations will be successful and sustainable over time (narayan 1995). after evaluating 121 water points created by various development agencies throughout the world, researchers concluded that, overall, community participation allowed for the advancement of water management and organizational skills and allowed for local organizations to take newly learned skills and apply them to their own development programs (narayan 1995). if there is a significant foundational issue that underlies many sustainability indicators, it is human behavior and skills. many indicators of sustainability for water points that have been developed include an emphasis on the availability of funds to maintain the water point, accounting transparency, and the ability to repair a broken water point (sugden 2003; schweitzer & mihelcic 2012; hodgkin,1994). although never explicitly stated, what may underlie the success of these aspects of sustainability is the ability for those in the community after an external organization has left to execute these activities in a way that will allow for the water point to function. thus, a significant tension of building a sustainable water point in a community is that communities need to participate in the decision-making of the project in order to for the project to be successful. good decisions, however, can be difficult to make in communities where there may be limited knowledge of the technical and management skills necessary to make the good decisions that will allow the water point to be sustainable. thus, there can be a tension between community participation and making the right decisions necessary to make the project successful and sustainable (wateraid tanzania 2009). a way that this tension can be resolved, however, is through the educational and training components that come with installing a water system in a community. it is already evident that training is a part of many potable water projects (wateraid 2011). training can encompass things essential for sustainability, such as understanding the management of technical and financial aspects of maintaining the water point (adank and kumasi 2013). this kind of training is fundamental to ensuring that water points continue to provide services after their initial installation. how trainings are conducted can range widely from program to program. some trainings emphasize participatory methods that have been suggested to allow learners to develop skills that would be considered essential to maintaining water points, such as problem solving and resource management (srinivasan 1990). from this point of view, trainings could be used as a chance to broaden the narrow sectorspecific perspectives of individuals and also to encourage teamwork (srinivasan 1990). trainings are also meant to be a time of “meaningful practice”, which allows the participants to connect what they are learning to what they already know (center for affordable water and sanitation technology 2011, 63). this can be done with group discussions, case-problem studies, and hands-on activities (center for affordable water and sanitation technology 2011). trainings for water projects can vary by topic. some emphasize the operations and maintenance of the technology that manages the potable water, such as the pump or water kiosk. other trainings can be about how to set up and sustain a consilience carty: the role of training programs water committee, or a group of people from the community that oversees and manages the water system. other topics of trainings can include community health promotion, project planning, monitoring and evaluation, and drinking water quality testing (center for affordable water and sanitation technology 2011). furthermore, the role that trainers and participants play within the training project and the water development project overall can be especially essential. trainers are people who “help people to learn to do certain things” (center for affordable water and sanitation technology 2011, 23). unlike a facilitator, a trainer knows the content (s)he is teaching well and can use facilitation skills and teaching methods to promote effective learning (center for affordable water and sanitation technology 2011). in recent methods for training, there has been an increased emphasis on breaking down the power relationships that can inherently exist in a trainer and trainee relationship. thus, some manuals now call those who participate in trainings “learners” (center for affordable water and sanitation technology 2011). 1.5 countries of focus to narrow the scope of this wide-reaching topic, i chose four countries substantial for studying the relationship between training and water point sustainability: senegal, india, honduras, and malawi (see figure 1). these countries were chosen because all have relatively high percentages of rural populations: 47% of the total population in honduras, 57% in senegal, 84% in malawi, and 68% in india live in rural areas (the world bank 2013). my research focuses on rural water access since rural regions are areas where the populations are generally poorer than their urban counterparts, and also because it is more difficult to bring services like potable water to more comparatively remote regions of the world (stockholm international water institute 2005). figure 1 : locations where surveys were conducted. green markers are the countries of the ngos that completed the survey (google maps) consilience carty: the role of training programs although bringing water to rural populations is on the whole more difficult than in other regions of the world, all four countries have very high success in bringing improved water sources to their populations (see figure 2). some such as malawi have made significant progress in expanding access to improved water sources (from 42% in 1990 to 83% in 2011). other countries like honduras already has high percentages of access in 1990, and have continued to expand access even further. figure 2 : the countries of focus for my research have increased percentages of coverage for improved water sources (the world bank, 2013) at the same time, there are differences between these countries, especially in terms of water resources. water withdrawal and freshwater reserves in these countries varies significantly. the country that has the most serious freshwater access issues is india, where the total freshwater withdrawal as a percent of actual renewable water resources (arwr) was approximately 34.9% in 2010. for the other countries of focus, arwr in senegal was 5.7% in 2002, 7.9% in malawi in 2005, and 2.7% in honduras in 2003 (food and agriculture organization of the united nations n.d.). in order to better compare the opinions and perspectives of the ngo personnel and the community members on trainings and sustainability, i focused on senegal because i studied abroad there in the spring of 2014. i asked questions about trainings that were conducted by an ngo in the region of thiès, senegal (see figure 3). this ngo, réseau africain pour le développement intégré (radi), is a panafrican organization that has an office in the region of thiès, where it works on many development projects, including water access projects. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1990 1995 2000 2005 2011 % o f p op ul at io n w ith a cc es s improved water sources in countries of focus malawi india senegal honduras consilience carty: the role of training programs figure 3 : the orange region is thiès, senegal, where i conducted my field research (académie des sciences luventicus, 2005) 2. methods 2.1 surveys i created two surveys to examine the perspectives of those involved in community trainings: one for trainers and one for community members who have been trained. the questions for trainers (irb-aaan1168) were intended to gauge how they viewed their role as part of sustaining water point projects as well as gauge their relationship with the community members. these questions were sent to educators via email or hard copy to fill out. in each email, there was a consent form attached that was addressed to the subjects of the survey, and the survey itself was attached as well (see appendix 1 and 2). the respondents were asked to complete the survey by themselves on their own time. surveys completed in honduras, malawi, and india were completed between march 2014 and july 2014. from these countries, i received two surveys, each representing one ngo working in each country. for the recipients of the survey in senegal, all questions were asked in french and completed in french. to translate the survey from english into french, i was assisted by the personnel at the réseau africain pour le développement intégré (radi), as well as by personnel from the west african research center in dakar, senegal. for all recipients of the survey in the other three countries, the surveys were in english and filled out in english. the trainers in senegal were contacted through radi because radi has previously worked with education and consilience carty: the role of training programs potable water development. in an email, i sent the consent form as well as the survey (see appendix 3 and 4). four ngo-personnel surveys were completed in french in senegal, three from radi personnel and one from another local ngo. all the senegal surveys were completed between april and may 2014. i designed the trainer survey to examine how trainings were structured for communities. i used this question to examine the amount of time allocated, the size of training groups, and how often training sessions occur. then i asked more openended questions to better understand what role the trainers saw themselves playing, what they believed the goals of the trainings to be, and how these trainings contribute to the sustainability of the water points built for communities. in some cases, respondents added outside documents to elaborate on their responses. i also created surveys for the community members in the three villages in senegal that i visited who had completed trainings for potable water management during different times (irb-aaan4711). these questions were first developed in english, translated into french by myself, and then reviewed by bilingual speakers at the west african research center in dakar, senegal, and by radi. then, a bilingual speaker of french and wolof (a national language of senegal) who works at radi translated the french questions into wolof. both the consent form and the survey itself were translated in this manner (see appendix 5 and 6). these questions were very similar to the questions posed to the ngo personnel. i did this in order to make comparisons of opinions on similar subjects easier. furthermore, i wanted to examine how community members felt about the utility of their trainings and how what they learned contributed to the sustainability of the water points. 2.2 field work the questions for the community members were asked verbally in wolof with the help of a translator. abdulaye diallo, a former teacher in senegal, was my translator who translated from wolof to french. i recorded all responses by hand in french and english. all the surveys were given to groups of people who were asked to do the survey because they were members of the comités de hydraulique (hydraulic committees) or comités de l’eau (water committees). the strategy that i used to have people respond to my questions was a kind of convenience sampling where i was put in contact with a community leader in the village with the help of radi, and then the community leader would help me gather the people who would be able to answer my questions. focus group sessions were held either in public village centers, or in someone’s home, and they often lasted no more than an hour, often less. after filling out responses to the survey questions, i asked the members of the committees to show me the mechanical pumps that pump water and explain to me how they worked. i would ask the community members general questions about how they maintained the water systems and how they found the water systems to work for them. along with the machines, i was often shown the fields used for market gardening, orchards, as well as the watering trough for the animals. 2.3 data management and analysis consilience carty: the role of training programs survey responses for all but one survey were sent and collected via email. all these surveys were saved on my laptop and my backup drive in their original form. since i received one survey in hand-written form, i took the survey, typed up the responses, and saved it on my laptop and my backup drive. all the community member surveys were conducted by hand, then later scanned to pdfs and saved on my laptop. a bilingual speaker of french and english translated the surveys that were completed in french. for my analysis, i used grounded-theory method in order to identify themes from the data i collected versus imposing them a priori. grounded theory is a method of looking at qualitative data and analyzing it by letting the data determine their own theoretical framework. thus, in order to discover this theoretical framework, the researcher reads through the data and assigns themes to sections of the text. (glaser and strauss n.d.). in the case of my research, themes can range from “sustainability” to “community” to “capacity building”. using qsr nvivo 10, i coded the data with themes that emerged from my survey responses as i read them. sections of text can have multiple themes, as long as the user assigns it to that specific section of text. to start off my analysis, i first ran a word query of the data to see which words appeared most frequently in the responses. i furthered my search for themes by simply reading the text and as i was reading, assigning sections of texts to a theme. this technique is called constant comparative method, in which the researcher is constantly comparing the current coding done to the coding of the same theme that has already been done previously. because this technique requires a study of all coded texts, the researcher relies on memory to make comparisons. it is from this reading and assigning of themes that the researcher begins to see the theoretical properties of the themes and understand better how they connect to other themes (glaser and strauss n.d.). from the initial coding process, i used an nvivo feature to determine where themes overlapped, and nvivo was able to record the number of instances where each of the themes that i had designated overlapped. from here, i further narrowed down themes and combined themes under larger ones when they were related or when i considered the themes to be overarching themes (see figure 4). figure 4: nvivo framework and process of analysis consilience carty: the role of training programs in order to find the themes that were most connected and pervasive throughout the responses, i found themes that were the most connected to other themes. i did this by determining whether two overlapping themes had a strong connection. a connection was considered strong by counting the number of times one theme overlapped or was co-coded with other themes. a strong theme was considered such because compared to other themes, it had more overlaps with other themes. for example, sustainability can overlap with three other themes where the instances of overlap between sustainability and each theme is four textual overlaps or more. i would have chosen four overlaps to be the threshold for a strong connection because four overlaps was relatively higher than overlaps. because the theme “sustainability” had three themes where it had a strong connection with the other theme, it can be considered a central theme, or a theme that is strongly connected to other themes. the number of instances one theme needs to be strongly connected to other themes in order to be considered a central theme depends on its greater relative number of times that theme is strongly connected to other theme (see figure 5). figure 5: flowchart explaining how i found strong themes and central themes 3. results 3.1 ngo personnel and trainers 3.1.1 all responses from the various ngos to which i sent my survey and filled it out, i used a total of nine responses (see table 3). one ngo that participated was able to provide me a survey from its home office, and this was used twice to represent the ngos training methods in malawi and honduras. count the number of textual overlaps between all themes determine how many thematic overlaps are considered strong count the number of strong thematic overlaps to determine central themes consilience carty: the role of training programs table 3: the number of ngos that responded to my survey. note that one survey was used twice to represent the trainings in malawi and honduras. country total number of ngos represented number of survey responses senegal 2 4 malawi 2 2 india 2 2 honduras 2 2 with one of my questions, i asked respondents to explain how their organization structured its trainings in general. i asked them about how often they conducted trainings, how long trainings usually last, and how many people would be in trainings, and they responded by explaining the structure of trainings (see appendix 7). in the trainers’ survey, there were instances where themes fell under very similar categories, or could be categorized as sub-themes of larger themes. themes like finances, governance, maintenance, management, mechanical, and problem solving all can be considered capacity building of some sort of skill set. when assigning themes to text, i aimed to be as specific as possible with my assignment of theme. for example, i assigned capacity building to text when the response was vague on what kinds of skills they wanted to address in trainings. other themes that were grouped together based on similarity or sub-theme relationship were: community and trained people to rest of community relationship. knowledge and application were also grouped because application is often a demonstration of knowledge. motivation, health, and quality of life are grouped together since health and quality of life are considered in these responses as motivations for doing trainings. role of ngo and relationship between ngo and community members are grouped together as well. so are the themes participatory learning and trainer-learner relationship (see figure 6) capacity building finances governance maintenance management mechanical problem solving change community trained people to community relationship environment gender government/politics knowledge application measure of effectiveness consilience carty: the role of training programs motivation health quality of life profit role of ngo relationship between ngo and community members sustainability trainer-learner relationship participatory learning figure 6: grouping of themes that were used to code the ngo personnel responses using nvivo to track the number of thematic overlaps for all the ngo responses together, the central themes were management (seven strong overlaps), community (eight strong overlaps), knowledge (10 strong overlaps), ngo and community relations (six strong overlaps), and trainer-learner relationship (eight strong overlaps) (see figure 7). the number of textual overlaps for all intersecting themes was considered greater than the rest of the results when the two intersecting themes had 10 textual overlaps or more. this does not mean, however, that all intersecting themes had greater than 10 textual overlaps (see appendix 8). figure 7: the strong theme connections are tallied for each theme for ngo responses from all ngo responses and supporting documents. 3.1.2 honduras responses the central themes in the honduras responses and supporting documents were: community (five strong overlaps), knowledge (five strong overlaps), health (four 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 ca pa ci ty b ui ld in g fin an ce s go ve rn an ce m ai nt en an ce m an ag em en t m ec ha ni ca l pr ob le m s ol vi ng ch an ge co m m un ity tra in ed p pl to c om m un ity e nv iro nm en t ge nd er go ve rn m en t/p ol iti cs k no w le dg e ap pl ic at io n m ea su re o f e ffe ct iv en es s m ot iv at io n he al th qu al ity o f l ife pr of it ro le o f n g o re la tio ns hi p n g o a nd s us ta in ab ili ty tra in er le ar ne r r el at io ns hi p pa rti ci pa to ry le ar ni ng to ta l s tro ng o ve rla ps total strong themes connections of >10 texual overlaps: all ngo responses consilience carty: the role of training programs strong overlaps), trainer-learner relationship (five strong overlaps), and participatory learning (five strong overlaps) (see figure 8). central themes were themes that had more strong overlaps than other themes. the total number of textual overlaps for all intersecting themes was considered greater than the rest of the results when the two intersecting themes had five textual overlaps or more. this does not mean, however, that all intersecting themes had greater than five textual overlaps (see appendix 9). the threshold of five textual overlaps was interpreted to be to a strong connection between two themes because there was more textual data to analyze in this set of data compared to other responses from other countries. figure 8: the strong theme connections are tallied for each theme for ngo responses from honduras and supporting documents community was a theme that had significant overlaps to other themes as well. one theme that overlapped often with other themes was management (nine instances of overlap). this theme is best exemplified by a need to emphasize community buyin to pay for a water service. one of the training modules states, “instructor answers questions and emphasizes how important it is to promote that people have to pay for water to keep the project going” tying together financial management and the significant impact the entire community has on making that successful. community is also connected to how the people trained by the ngo relate to the rest of the community (11 instances of overlap). this concept is best exemplified by this excerpt from a training manual: emphasize the importance of being a wash promoter. people and children look up to them. they will be the role models for changed behavior. calls on their good spirits and endurance as well a commitment and courage for change and healthy people. community is also strongly connected to health (seven instances of overlap). messages about health are communicated to the entire community than just individuals. this is best seen in one ngos desire to message their goals to a widespread audience: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 ca pa ci ty b ui ld in g fin an ce s go ve rn an ce m ai nt en an ce m an ag em en t m ec ha ni ca l pr ob le m s ol vi ng ch an ge co m m un ity tra in ed p pl to e nv iro nm en t ge nd er go ve rn m en t/p ol iti cs k no w le dg e ap pl ic at io n m ea su re o f m ot iv at io n he al th qu al ity o f l ife pr of it ro le o f n g o re la tio ns hi p n g o a nd s us ta in ab ili ty tra in er le ar ne r pa rti ci pa to ry le ar ni ng to ta l s tro ng o ve rla ps total strong theme connections of ≥5 instances of overlap: honduras responses consilience carty: the role of training programs health situation: if there is a health facility it is always good to be in touch with local health agent. health representatives will confirm health messages that will be communicated to the community. another strong theme that was connected to other themes was knowledge. knowledge was especially connected to health (six instances of overlap) and recognizing what is clean and healthy water to drink. this is best illustrated by this excerpt from a training manual: class discussion: emphasizes weaknesses of the methods in the pictures. clear water is not necessarily safe unless it is treated with chlorine. using sun for disinfection is not enough to kill microbes in large amount of water. knowledge was also connected to mechanical skill (18 instances of overlap) or how one works the physical machinery of a water pump. this is best exemplified by one ngo’s “operator training checklist” where a ngo representative evaluates if the operator of the water point knows how to work the machine. example questions are “before sending water to the distribution tank what should you do?”, and “what do you do if the water at the tap does not have a chlorine level of at least 0.2 ppm?” in a survey response, one ngo stated that: “the key objective is to get the participants to a level where they can install a bios and filter by themselves, know the rules of use and maintenance of the filter in depth.” participatory learning was also strongly connected to knowledge (19 instances of overlap). often during trainings, knowledge is imparted by using participatory methods as exemplified with this excerpt from a training manual: “participants stand around the containers and explain what they see. sort out clean, covered containers and clean, covered containers with tap.” all the themes previously discussed are interconnected to create a web of themes (see figure 9). figure 9: theme map of the central theme (purple circles) and strong supporting themes (black circles) for honduras responses consilience carty: the role of training programs 3.1.3 malawi responses the central themes in the malawi responses and supporting documents were: management (12 strong overlaps), knowledge (nine strong overlaps), measure of effectiveness (four strong overlaps), ngo and community relationship (eight strong overlaps), trainerlearner relationship (13 strong overlaps), and participatory learning (12 strong overlaps) (see figure 10). central themes were themes that had more strong overlaps than other themes. the total number of textual overlaps for all intersecting themes was considered greater than the rest of the results when one theme was strongly connected to five textual overlaps or more. this does not mean, however, that all overlapping themes had greater than five textual overlaps (see appendix 10). the threshold of five textual overlaps was used to correspond to a strong connection between two themes since there was more textual data to analyze in this set of data. figure 10: the strong theme connections are tallied for each theme for ngo responses from malawi and supporting documents management was a theme that had significant overlaps with other themes. one theme that it often overlapped with was measure of effectiveness (10 instances of overlap). this is best exemplified by an excerpt from one of the survey responses: with respect to water committee trainings, we can gauge how much water committee members have learned by observing if they are able to manage finances, keep accurate records, and follow their constitutions. management is also strongly tied to trainer-learner relationship (11 instances of overlap). this is best exemplified by a training module from one ngo specifically about governance: • give each participant a cardboard to write in their names and position • let them put the names in a cup/cap. • tell them that with immediate effect their titles ceases until the sessions end 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 ca pa ci ty b ui ld in g fin an ce s go ve rn an ce m ai nt en an ce m an ag em en t m ec ha ni ca l pr ob le m s ol vi ng ch an ge co m m un ity tra in ed p pl to c om m un ity e nv iro nm en t ge nd er go ve rn m en t/p ol iti cs k no w le dg e ap pl ic at io n m ea su re o f e ffe ct iv en es s m ot iv at io n he al th qu al ity o f l ife pr of it ro le o f n g o re la tio ns hi p n g o a nd s us ta in ab ili ty tra in er le ar ne r pa rti ci pa to ry le ar ni ng to ta l s tro ng o ve rla ps total strong theme connections of ≥5 instances of overlap: malawi responses consilience carty: the role of training programs • ask them about their honest feelings about being ‘dethroned’ and whether the dethroning that has taken place can have effect. • bring them to their groups to discuss the terms leadership and governance • let them brief in plenary trainer-learner relationship was also a theme that had strong connections to other themes. one theme that it had a strong connection with was relationship between ngo and community members (13 instances of overlap). this overlap is best exemplified by a response from an ngo: after the water treatment and supply system is commissioned for use, we then make semi-regular follow-up visits (which are also additional trainings in financial management, administration, and conflict resolution). the trainer-learner relationship theme also overlaps with the theme, application (14 instances of overlap). the relationship between these two themes is best exemplified by this excerpt: with respect to water committee trainings, we can gauge how much water committee members have learned by observing if they are able to manage finances, keep accurate records, and follow their constitutions. another theme that had strong connections to other themes was participatory learning. one theme to which it had strong connection was governance (10 instances of overlap). this can be seen in an excerpt from a governance-training manual: • let participants write on the cards (one idea per card) of where they want to take associations • put these cards on board • let them prioritize from these cards • take 3-5 cards and let them in groups state things they want to do after the workshop on these cards all the themes previously discussed are interconnected to create a web of themes (see figure 11). consilience carty: the role of training programs figure 11: theme map of the central themes (purple circles) and supporting themes (black circles) for malawi responses 3.1.4 india responses the central themes in the india responses and supporting documents were: community (four strong overlaps), knowledge (five strong overlaps), role of ngo (four strong overlaps), and trainer-learner relationship (six strong overlaps) (see figure 12). central themes were themes that had more strong overlaps than other themes. the total number of textual overlaps for all intersecting themes was considered greater than the rest of the results when the two intersecting themes had three textual overlaps or more. this does not mean, however, that all overlapping themes had greater than three textual overlaps (see appendix 16). the threshold of three textual overlaps was used to correspond to a strong connection between two themes since there was less textual data to analyze comparatively in this set of data. consilience carty: the role of training programs figure 12: the strong themes connections are tallied for each theme for ngo responses from india and supporting documents in the india responses, community was a strong theme. one other theme that it was strongly connected to was role of ngo (nine instances of overlap). this can be exemplified in a response to the survey saying that: “people are also encouraged to nominate women for the training sessions.” and furthermore, “for encouraging women to attend we provide facilities for stay and women with small children are allowed to bring their child for the trainings.” community was also strongly connected to trainer-learner relationship (four instances of overlap). an example of how they overlap can be seen in the following quote from the survey responses: “each project team plans the annual training in discussion with the community members.” knowledge was also a theme that had strong overlaps to other themes. one theme that it was strongly connected to was trainer-learner relationship (10 instances of overlap). the following excerpt from one survey response best represents this overlap: during the training, the trainer is mandated to make an assessment of the learning that the trainees had. this is done through a review of the main points/ important points by asking trainees to speak about what they learnt. knowledge is also strongly connected to trainer-learner relationship. this overlap is best seen in the excerpt below from the survey responses: at the end of each training programs we collect feedback from each participants that reflects their understanding and the scope of improvements. the role of the ngo was another theme that had strong connections to other themes. one theme that it was strongly connected to was trainer-learner relationship (eight instances of overlap). this overlap can be best understood through the goals that one ngo sees its trainings in achieving: the overall goals of the trainings are: 1. to enhance skills and capacities of community members/ leaders 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ca pa ci ty b ui ld in g fin an ce s go ve rn an ce m ai nt en an ce m an ag em en t m ec ha ni ca l pr ob le m s ol vi ng ch an ge co m m un ity tra in ed p pl to e nv iro nm en t ge nd er go ve rn m en t/ k no w le dg e ap pl ic at io n m ea su re o f m ot iv at io n he al th qu al ity o f l ife pr of it ro le o f n g o re la tio ns hi p n g o s us ta in ab ili ty tra in er le ar ne r pa rti ci pa to ry to ta l s tro ng o ve rla ps total strong themes connections of ≥3 instances of overlap: india responses consilience carty: the role of training programs 2. to inform and educate them on polices, laws, relevant subject 3. to empower them by the process of trainings all the themes previously discussed are interconnected and support one another (see figure 13). figure 13: theme map of the central themes (purple circles) and supporting themes (black circles) for india responses 3.1.5 senegal responses the central themes in the senegal responses and supporting documents were capacity building (four strong overlaps), finances (four strong overlaps), management (four strong overlaps), mechanical (five strong overlaps), change (five strong overlaps), community (eight strong overlaps), knowledge (four strong overlaps), and trainer-learner relationship (four strong overlaps) (see figure 14). central themes were themes that had more strong overlaps than other themes. the total number of textual overlaps for all intersecting themes was considered greater than the rest of the results when the two intersecting themes had three textual overlaps or more. this does not mean, however, that all overlapping themes had greater than three textual overlaps (see appendix 12). the threshold of three textual overlaps was used to correspond to a strong connection between two themes since there was less textual data to analyze comparatively in this set of data. consilience carty: the role of training programs figure 14: the strong themes connections are tallied for each theme for ngo responses from senegal and supporting documents one theme that had strong connections to other themes was change. change overlapped often with mechanical (four instances of overlap). this best illustrated with the quote below from the survey responses: the most desired aim of these programs is to succeed in changing the behavior of people and their management of hydraulic work and the economy of water through the acquisition of new knowledge. change is also connected to the theme community (three instances of overlap). this is best exemplified by this quote from the survey responses: “the efficacy of a program is determined by the changes in behavior of the population.” community was another theme that had strong connections. community was strongly connected to knowledge (five instances of overlap). this overlap is best exemplified by the following quote: “our programs are successful if our participants can answer every question they are asked and if they spread the information they have learned to their communities.” community is also connected strongly to the role of ngo theme (five instances of overlap). this overlap is best exemplified by this quote from the survey: “we encourage people to participate in our program by telling them about the importance of water for society.” trainer-learner relationship was also another theme that had many strong connections to other themes. measure of effectiveness was one theme to which trainerlearner relationship had a strong connection (five instances of overlap). this overlap is best exemplified by the following quote: “we evaluate our programs by looking at the responses of our participants to questionnaires.” trainer-learner relationship is also connected strongly to knowledge (five instances of overlap). this relationship can be best understood with the excerpt from the survey responses: 0 2 4 6 8 10 ca pa ci ty b ui ld in g fin an ce s go ve rn an ce m ai nt en an ce m an ag em en t m ec ha ni ca l pr ob le m s ol vi ng ch an ge co m m un ity tra in ed p pl to c om m un ity e nv iro nm en t ge nd er go ve rn m en t/p ol iti cs k no w le dg e ap pl ic at io n m ea su re o f e ffe ct iv en es s m ot iv at io n he al th qu al ity o f l ife pr of it ro le o f n g o re la tio ns hi p n g o a nd s us ta in ab ili ty tra in er le ar ne r pa rti ci pa to ry le ar ni ng to ta l s tro ng o ve rla ps total strong themes connections of ≥3 instances of overlap: senegal responses consilience carty: the role of training programs i develop the tools of the program, as well as prepare the program with all interested parties (the population, service technicians, local collectives as well as technical and financial partners) all the themes previously discussed are interconnected and support one another (see figure 15). figure 15: theme map of the central themes (purple circles) and supporting themes (black circles) for senegal ngo responses 3.2 community members in senegal the three villages that i visited in senegal all had built and managed their water technologies for varying periods of time and therefore had gone through trainings during different times (see table 4). the most recently built water technology was built in 2011 and the oldest was in 1993, making the technology 21 years old. table 4: descriptions of the villages visited in the thiès region of senegal. names of the villages have been replaced with letters to account for irb (diop, 2014) village age of water system technology population (estimated) a built in 2011 machine and water tower 600 b built in 1998 machine and water tank 800 c built in 1993 machine and water tank 400 the central themes in the senegal community members responses were: knowledge (five), management (four strong overlaps), mechanical (three strong overlaps), problems encountered (three strong overlaps), profits (three strong overlaps), and consilience carty: the role of training programs sustainability (three strong overlaps) (see figure 16). the total number of textual overlaps for all intersecting themes was considered greater than the rest of the results when the two intersecting themes had three textual overlaps or more. this does not mean, however, that all overlapping themes had greater than two textual overlaps (see appendix 13). the threshold of two textual overlaps was used to correspond to a strong connection between two themes since there was less textual data to analyze comparatively in this set of data. figure 16: the strong themes connected are tallied for each theme for senegal community member responses one theme that had strong connections to other themes was knowledge. knowledge was strongly tied to the theme of management (five instances of overlap). examples of this overlap was that community members explained how much fuel they used to power their water pumping machines on a daily basis and that one focus group said that the trainings allowed the community to have knowledge to manage other projects in the future. knowledge was also connected to sustainability (four instances of overlap). this overlap of the two themes is best displayed when one focus group said that the knowledge that they learned allowed them to keep the machine that pumps the water in good condition. another example of this thematic overlap was when one focus group said that they hoped to pass down the knowledge they learned during trainings to younger people in the village. another theme was connected strongly to other themes was problems encountered. this theme has strong connections to the theme technology (two instances of overlap). this is best exemplified when during two different focus group sessions, communities explained that the current technology that they had did not have the ability to pump as much water as they wanted, or the water tank was too small to serve the community well. furthermore, this is related to the strong connection between problems encountered and role of ngo since in both of the same focus groups, 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 to ta l s tro ng o ve rla ps total strong theme connections of ≥ 2 textual overlaps senegal community members consilience carty: the role of training programs community members asked for the help of the ngo to replace or update the old technology. another focus group, however, explained to me how they fixed their machine when it broke down and told me the prices of the parts for replacement. there was also an instance of a community running into problems of trying to hook their machine-pump to electricity in order to not use gasoline, since it would be cheaper, but they had yet to make it work. management was also another theme that had strong connections to other themes. management is strongly connected to sustainability (three instances of overlap). this theme is best exemplified by the age of some of the water pump machines that the communities had (the oldest being 21 years old) and still functioning to pump water from the borehole. also, one focus group explained that they clean the entire water pump machine every three months. all the themes previously discussed are interconnected to create a web of themes (see figure 17). figure 17: theme map of the central theme (purple circles) and supporting themes (black circles) for senegal community member responses 3.3 comparing trainers and learners senegal when comparing which of the trainers’ and the learners’ responses share strongly tied themes, there were four themes that both groups emphasized in their responses: knowledge, management, mechanical, and profits/finances (see table 5). consilience carty: the role of training programs table 5: comparison of the strong themes of both trainer and learner responses in senegal. green highlighted themes are strong themes for both trainers’ and learners’ responses st ro ng ly t ie d t he m es k no w le dg e m an ag em en t m ec ha ni ca l pr ob le m s e nc ou nt er ed pr of its /f in an ce s su st ai na bi lit y c ap ac ity b ui ld in g ch an ge co m m un ity t ra in er -le ar ne r re la tio ns hi p community members x x x x x x trainers x x x x x x x x 4. discussion 4.1 ngos’ responses if there is anything that these responses reveal, it is that trainings cover a wide variety of topics. while trainings generally cover subjects meant to build the capacity of learners, capacity building, as is evident from the six sub-themes that are under it, entails many different kinds of knowledge. furthermore, different organizations, based on the teaching curriculum, can emphasize different kinds of skills that are taught and explained in trainings. for one ngo in honduras, their trainings revolved around the installation of bio-filters and, therefore, the management and mechanical themes heavily defined the honduras data. another ngo from malawi focused one of their trainings on governance, and this made the malawi data more representative of the thematic connection between governance and participatory learning. knowledge was a significant theme, though out all responses from ngo from all four countries as well responses from the senegal community members, this is more or less an obvious theme to come across while reading about trainings. to build on this, knowledge intersects with other themes to bring out interesting overlaps. when knowledge overlaps with mechanical skill, the most evident take-away is that acquiring knowledge about such skills in necessary, especially if the technology is new. from one of the responses of an ngo in honduras, the operation and maintenance of a bio-filter by learners in the training, when done independently, can be seen as an indication of general independence that the training wants to create and pass onto the learners. knowledge also intersected with health in the honduras responses. in this case, the ngo conducting this training wanted to explain how to identify clean water, and to explain that some methods (for example, sunlight to disinfect water) does not actually kill microbes. the intersection of knowledge and health ties to motivations consilience carty: the role of training programs behind why this training exists: to bring and sustain the service of clean water to a community. knowledge, trainer-learner relationship, and participatory learning were all themes throughout the responses from all four countries, and often overlapped with one another. the overlap of participatory learning and trainer-learner relationship is an indication of trainings constructed as times of “meaningful practice”. throughout the responses, the participatory methods of training that were mentioned were: group discussion, participant demonstrations, hands-on activities, and case study problem. it is this kind of learning that allows learners to connect what they already know with the new information they are processing (center for affordable water and sanitation technology 2011). furthermore, when learning, “people remember 20% of what they hear, 40% of what they hear and see, and 80% of what they discover by themselves” (brikké 2000, 6). with participatory learning methods, the likelihood that participants will remember the information presented is much greater and therefore the trainings overall are more effective. a specific instance where trainings demonstrated how the trainer-learner relationship interacted with a specific skill being taught during trainings was the governance training created by one of the malawi ngos. this training asks that the learners be honest about their feelings on being “dethroned”. governance can be a topic that brings out sensitive topics of power in a community. but it is through this kind of discussion and role-playing that the learners can simulate the inherent risks in real life (in this case, being honest with other people) while maintaining other parts of the interaction that are relevant. furthermore, role-playing “permits testing out different ways of behavior in a given situation” (brikké 2000, 12). especially since governance is a difficult concept to teach, having a trainer to guide the learners through the training in a way that addresses the issue at hand without falling into the dangers that can occur in real-life makes it more likely that the learners will pull information from the training that they can use in the future. an aspect of training structure that came to light while reading the ngo responses was the difference between the ngos addressing the community-at-large and the people who go through trainings as learners. the community members who go through trainings are the main form of communication between the ngo and the larger community. this is emphasized in one honduras ngo response stating that wash promoters are role models for the community and the kids in the community, especially for changed behavior. this sentiment is echoed in one senegal ngo response saying that trainings are considered successful if the participants spread what they have learned to their communities. thus, while many ngo trainers emphasized the entity of the community (and implying the whole community) in the responses, others did not explicitly talk about this difference. it is unlikely that training sessions will be available to all the people who live in a community. furthermore, it is not necessarily the goal for trainings to include all members of the community. this is based on the idea that the best trainings for operations and management of water points are small group sessions; even large lecture sessions are encouraged to break up into small group work (brikké 2000). because of the emphasis on small groups leading to effective learning, it is logistically not likely that all people in a community can participate in training. thus, this connection and need for learners in trainings to then become spreaders of consilience carty: the role of training programs information to their communities is a facet of the trainings that should be recognized and emphasized. community also overlapped with role of ngo in the indian ngo responses to reveal interesting ideas about how the ngo helps effect change in a community. one of the indian ngos explained that it encourages communities to nominate women for their training sessions, and it makes it possible for women to attend by allowing women to bring their children with them. in order to make trainings more inclusive, outside groups sometimes need to include groups that may not be included otherwise—in this case, it would be women (center for affordable water and sanitation technology 2011). by including women in trainings, the “social sustainability” of the water point is addressed by focusing on gender inequities that can exist in communities (water and sanitation program 2000, 3). social sustainability includes equity aspects of the water project, which “include looking at how fairly the burdens and benefits from the services are shared across different socio-economic, gender, ethnic, and caste groups” (water and sanitation program 2000, 3). furthermore, the intervention of an ngo may be necessary in order to include often-excluded groups in the process of building and using water resource since community-based approaches may reproduce existing inequalities of wealth and power in the community, unless there is an external intervention (cleaver and toner 2006). 4.2 senegal community members’ responses the tie of knowledge and sustainability examples in the community members’ response is extremely interesting when discussing the passing down of knowledge to younger generations. since this kind of action is out of the purview of the immediate project and trainings, this shows the importance of the non-project aspects of people’s lives to the sustainability of a water point. it is “the complex livelihood inter-linkages that make an impact in one area likely to be felt in others and the potential for unintended consequences arising from any intended interventions or acts” (f. cleaver 1999, 599). thus, these kinds of behaviors are not necessarily intended by trainings, but they affect how trainings and the information learned function in a community. the intersection of the themes of technology and problems encountered revealed some conflicting results. while one focus group discussed how they were able to fix their broken down water-pumping machine (see figure 18), there were other instances in the other two focus groups where the community members could not overcome the problems that they had with the water supply, specifically referring to the capacity of their water tanks to serve the various needs of the community. this is likely an issue of what is more easily fixed and what takes less amounts of capital up-front to fix or change, bringing up the issue of resource constraints (f. cleaver 1999). in the case of the water-pumping machine breaking down from need of a new part, it is relatively easy to replace. to build or expand a water tank (see figure 18), however, is a significantly different issue as well as it would take much more money. consilience carty: the role of training programs figure 18: water tower (left) and water pumping machine (right) in one of the villages where i conducted focus groups there were other focus groups where problems that were occurring with the water-pumping machine were discussed, such as one focus group trying to get their machine to run on electricity and not gasoline because electricity would be cheaper. getting the machine to work on electricity, however, was a different matter. this kind of issue is indicative of the limitations of a community’s resourcefulness when addressing the problems at hand. while the people working on this issue were completely aware of the costs of running the machine on electricity versus gasoline, there seemed to be structural problems that made it difficult to achieve their goals. these structural and resource constraints can have a sever impact on projects (f. cleaver 1999). the times at which these community members went through trainings (based upon the age of the water tanks and machines) shows the different stages of time that these technologies are functioning in. the ages of the technologies were from three years to 21 years old. while there were issues with capacity and other technological issues, the technologies were functioning overall and bringing water to the community. it is important to note, however, that when communities do have some issues with the technology, they still keep the technology functioning as well as it possibly can so that users will still want to use the service and therefore pay for it. with collected funds, improvements could be made to water points, which could attract more revenue and allow for further upgrades (bhandari and grant 2007). furthermore, while no situation was perfect or perfectly functioning (and in reality, this is impossible), the fact that multiple communities were able to sustain their water services since their installation reflects the overall effectiveness of the training programs that community members went through. 4.3 comparing responses from senegal ngo and community members the central themes, which both the senegal trainers and the community members discussed, were knowledge, management, mechanical, and profits/finances. the themes that the community members discussed which trainers did not discuss were problems encountered and sustainability. the differences of what was emphasized in surveys and focus groups can most likely be attributed to the experiences of time that trainers versus community members experience in terms of the project. trainers, for the most part, are involved in the project for the community for a relatively short period of time while community members are involved in the project consilience carty: the role of training programs indefinitely. thus, the likelihood that community members will be seeing problems with the water point and will talk about the sustainability of the water point (or how it has functioned and maintained over a period of time) is much more likely. 4.4 limitations one of the main limitations of this research is that all responses to my surveys and focus group questions were based on convenience sampling. all of my responders were volunteers who wanted to participate in this survey, which could have skewed the kind of responses i received. in the case of the community members, i may not have gotten a crosscutting representation of the community since it is likely that community leaders were chosen or volunteered to participate in my research. the area of this research is also expansive geographically. because i wanted to use as many responses that i had received from the survey for this research, i decided to focus on multiple countries in order to make this possible. in the case of the senegal community member focus groups, three focus groups is not a lot of data. but due to time constraints, those were the focus groups i was able to conduct while doing field research. depending on the extent to which ngos responded to my survey, i had more textual information to analyze for some responses versus others. some ngos included many supporting documents while others gave no supporting documents. this makes it difficult to numerically compare the number of theme overlaps with different responses from different ngos. finally, when conducting focus groups in multiple languages, there is the issue of translation. especially during focus groups, it was difficult for everything that was said to be translated into french for me to understand. thus, my translator often would summarize the discussion about one question, and then translate the summary for me to understand. this likely took out some details from the responses. additionally, one question was either mistranslated into wolof or was misinterpreted by the community members. this was the third question of the community member survey, which asked “how did you find out about trainings?”. the community members responded to this question in a way which implied that the question was meant to ask “how did you find the training?” or, “did you like the training”; i kept in the responses to this question because they revealed overall if the community members had liked the trainings or not. 5. conclusions trainings cover a wide variety of overlapping topics and thus cover many of the tenants of sustainability, which are required for making a water point work for a long time in a community (see figure 19). while participatory methods are considered to be the best by ngos at training community members, there is a difference between those who participate in the trainings and those who do not because it is unlikely that all community members will be trained. furthermore, it is possible that participatory methods will not solve all problems facing communities since community-based approaches can leave in place existing power structures, consilience carty: the role of training programs which keep marginalized groups from being included in decision-making and trainings. figure 19: the various factors of sustainability, which are also addressed by trainings (brikké, 2000) looking at the responses from senegalese community members, there are key aspects of sustainability that are out of the scope of trainings, such as leaders in the community passing down information about the trainings they went through to younger people. also, it was inconclusive how the community addressed issues with technology. while there were instances where communities were able to fix smaller problems with their water-pump machines, there were other examples where issues of lack of resources limited the communities’ abilities to fix problems of the tanks’ capacity. overall however, the villages were good examples of sustainable water points since they had all kept their water points functioning since their construction. differences between the senegal ngo responses and the senegal community members’ responses revealed that sustainability was a central theme for the community members but not the ngo personnel responses. this is likely due to the community members seeing the water point function over a long period of time as well as being invested in the water point even after the water project ends for the ngo. in the case for the ngo personnel, they would likely not see the water point functioning on such a daily basis as the community members. from the various responses and approaches by ngos, it is evident that water point development is moving away from “vaccine thinking”, or a solution that can be mass-produced anywhere and will work in all parts of the world (shah 2011). in order to address “the water challenge we need to use a different lens—one that allows us to structure the problem differently, to examine many diverse and consilience carty: the role of training programs partial answers and processes, and to set up new expectations of results” (shah 2011). 6. recommendations ngo personnel should consider expanding their evaluations of the trainings to cover not only the opinions of learners, but the trainers as well. a comparison of perspectives could reveal gaps in content that would improve trainings and make them more attuned to the issues facing communities. this participatory approach to evaluation is difficult for large programs or groups to execute since comparing across geographies becomes difficult with qualitative data (water and sanitation program 2000). the surveys created for this research can be applied to various ngos across the world, and this is also true for the community member surveys, which can be applicable to all kinds of communities. groups working with communities should also consider whom they are training in their programs. the likelihood that all people in the community will be directly addressed or participate in trainings is low and, therefore, trainers should emphasize the greater role that people trained by the ngos play in their communities. these kinds of social connections that work outside of trainings should also be researched more, and it should be better understood how they contribute to the sustainability of water points. furthermore, additional research can be conducted to better understand how information gets passed on in a community. techniques like network mapping and additional focus groups and interviews could reveal how specific communities keep the information 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(2007). assessing sustainability in rural water supply: the role of follow-up suport to communities. meena, s. (2003). chennai a success story: rainwater harvesting. retrieved from auick (asia urban information center of kobe): http://www.auick.org/database/apc/apc044/apc04403.html narayan, d. (1995). the contribution of people's participation. washington, d.c. : the international bank for reconstruction and development/ the world bank. niskanen, m. (2003). the design, construction, and mantenance of a gravity-fed water system in the dominican republic . rural water supply network. (2009). handpump data, selected countries in sub-saharan africa. save the children. (n.d.). young lives. retrieved from save the children: http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/about-us/what-we-do/young-lives shah, r. (2011, fall). water thinking. stanford innovation review . skipton, s., hygnstrom, j., & woldt, w. 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(2013). progress on sanitation and drinkingwater 2013 update. world health organization and unicef. consilience carty: the role of training programs appendix 1 columbia university monica carty 1897 lerner hall new york, ny 10027 973-747-4191 mkc2145@columbia.edu [insert date] dear_________, thank you for agreeing to have personnel from [ngo name here] participate in my research about potable water development and training programs. please find attached the survey that either you and/or your colleagues can fill out if they desire to participate in this survey. please try to send me the completed survey after 3 weeks of receiving the survey. i would like to have an apt amount of time to analyze the results of this survey, and thus i would greatly appreciate your cooperation to return this survey as promptly as possible. i also would like to emphasize again to the participants of this survey: do not sign your name anywhere on the document. in order to keep answers anonymous, as desired by my institutional review board (irb), i do not need that information. again, thank you for your help in contributing to my research. best, monica carty irb-aaan1168 irb exemption date: 03/10/2014 consilience carty: the role of training programs appendix 2 survey'to'ngo'personnel'discussing'training'programs'and'potable'water' !!!!!! ! thank&you&for&taking&the&time&to&fill&out&this&survey&for&my&senior&thesis&on&the&effect&of& training&programs&on&the&sustainability&of&potable&water&access.&this&information&will& help&me&to&better&understand&and&analyze&best&practices&for&potable&water& development.&when&my&senior&thesis&is&completed,&i&will&be&happy&to&provide&your& organization&with&my&results&and&findings&to&be&used&for&future&reference.&& & please&type&in&your&answers&below&the&questions.&do&not&give&your&name&in&this&survey!&& ! 1. what!organization!do!you!work!for?!and!in!what!country!or!countries!do!you!work?! ! ! 2. ! a. how!often!do!you!conduct!trainings?!(bi=annually,!every!month,!ect.!?)! ! b. how!long!do!trainings!last?! ! c. how!many!people!participate!in!a!training!session!on!average!(this!can!be!an! estimate)?! ! ! ! for'the'questions'below,'please'answer'in'one'paragraph'(~10'sentences)'or'less.'' 3. what!is!your!role!within!the!training?! ! ! ! 4. how!do!people!find!out!about!trainings?! ! ! ! 5. how!do!you!encourage!people!to!attend!trainings?!! ! ! ! 6. how!is!this!training!conducted?!(this!can!be!supplemented!with!a!manual!or! framework!that!is!used!as!a!guide!to!trainings).! ! ! ! 7. what!would!you!say!are!the!overall!goals!of!the!trainings?! ! ! ! 8. how!do!you!evaluate!the!effectiveness!of!a!training!program!in!a!community?! ! irb-aaan1168 irb exemption date: 03/10/2014 consilience carty: the role of training programs survey'to'ngo'personnel'discussing'training'programs'and'potable'water' !!!!!! ! 9. do!you!measure!how!well!people!have!learned!during!the!training?!if!so,!how?! ! ! ! 10. what!metrics!does!your!organization!use!to!measure!the!sustainability!(i.e.!long= term!effectiveness)!of!water!points!that!have!been!built?! ! ! ! irb-aaan1168 irb exemption date: 03/10/2014 consilience carty: the role of training programs appendix 3 columbia university monica carty 1897 lerner hall new york, ny 10027 973-747-4191 mkc2145@columbia.edu [insert date] cher _________, merci d’avoir accepté que des personnels de [le nom de l’ong ici] participer à ma recherche sur l’eau potable et les programmes de formation. trouvez l’enquête en pièce jointe que vous pouvez faire ainsi que vos collègues s’ils veulent participer à l’enquête. veuillez bien m’envoyer les enquêtes complètes trois semaines après la réception, s’il vous plaît. je voudrais avoir le temps nécessaire pour analyser les résultats de l’enquête et donc, je vous serais reconnaissante de votre aide, indispensable pour que l’enquête soit possible. je voudrais insister auprès des participants à cette enquête : ne mettez votre nom nullement part sur le document. afin que les réponses soient anonymes, comme le veut la institutional review board (irb), je n’ai pas besoin de cette information. merci encore une fois de votre contribution à cette recherche. cordialement, monica carty irb-aaan1168 irb exemption date: 03/10/2014 consilience carty: the role of training programs appendix 4 !"#$%&"'()#$*!+$'+%,!-#$.#%$/0&)0(11#%$'#$2&01(-+&"$#-$.#%$.3#(!$/&-(4.#$ !!!!!! ! !"#$%&'"()$*)+&+*)#&+#",-#"&."/&0"1+/&-"&2(%#"&$"00"&",3)40"&+*)#&1(&056/"&/)#&."/& .%",/&",0#"&.(&-)#('%.%07&"0&-"/&+#*8#(11"/&-"&2*#1(0%*,&-"&.9"()&+*#0('.":&;"00"& %,2*#1(0%*,&<(&19(%-"#&=&$*1+#",-#"&1%")>&"0&=&(,(.?/"#&1%")>&-"/&1"%..")#"/& +#(0%3)"/&+*)#&."&-7<".*++"1",0&-"&.9"()&+*0('.":&@+#6/&3)"&a9($56<"&1(&056/"b&a"&/"#(%& 5")#")/"&-"&+(#0(8"#&(<"$&<*0#"&*#8(,%/(0%*,&."/&#7/).0(0/:&c*)/&+*)<"d&."/&)0%.%/"#& +*)#&.9%,2*:&& & e(+"d&<*/&#7+*,/"/&/*)/&-"/&3)"/0%*,/:&f"&-*,,"d&+(/&<*0#"&,*1&+",-(,0&$"00"& ",3)40":&& ! "# $%&''&!()*+,-.+/-(,!/)+0+-''&120(%.!3!4/!5+,.!6%&'.!7+8.!/)+0+-''&120(%.!3!! ! ! 9# ! +# :(;<-&,!5&!=(-.!!0(%.!!5-)-*&1!5&.!=();+/-(,.!>.&;&./)-&''&;&,/?!@a+6%&! ;(-.?!&@/#b!3!! ! ! <# :(;<-&,!5&!/&;7.!7)&,,&,/2-'.!'&.!=();+/-(,.!3! ! ! +# 4,!;(8&,,&?!@(;<-&,!5&!7&).(,,&.!7+)/-@-7&!5+,.!%,&!=();+/-(,!!>4./-;&1! .-!0(%.!0(%'&1b!3! ! ! /567$89:$;69:<=5>:$;6=$:6=?79@$7ab5>89c$d$efg;69$;69:<=5>:$8g>:$6>$bg7gh7gbf9$ij$ kl$bf7g:9:m$56$n5=>:o$$ c# $%d&./2@&!6%&!0(/)&!)e'&!5+,.!5&.!=();+/-(,.!3!! ! ! ! f# :(;;&,/!5&.!*&,.!+77)&,5!5&.!=();+/-(,.!3!! ! ! ! g# :(;;&,/!0(%.!&,@(%)+*&!5&.!*&,.!5&!h!.%-0)&!5&.!=();+/-(,.!3!! ! ! ! i# :(;;&,/!0(%.!5-)-*&1!5&.!=();+/-(,.!>j-!0(%.!+0&1!%,!;+,%&'!(%!%,!@+5)&?!!+k(%/&1! @&//&!)l7(,.&!+0&@!'%-?!.d-'!0(%.!7'+m/b!3! ! ! ! n# $%&!5-)-&120(%.!'&.!;&-''&%).!<%/.!5&.!=();+/-(,.?!&,!*l,l)+'!3! irb-aaan1168 irb exemption date: 03/10/2014 consilience carty: the role of training programs une$sondage$qui$discute$les$programmes$de$formation$et$les$l’eau$potable$ !!!!!! ! ! ! ! 8. comment!évaluez2vous!la!efficacité!d’une!formation!dans!une!population!?!!! ! ! ! 9. mesurez2vous!comment!des!gens!ont!appris!pendant!la!formation!?!si!oui,! comment!?!! ! ! ! 10. quelles!sont!les!mesures!que!votre!organisation!utilise!pour!mesurer!la!durabilité! (c'est!à!dire!:!l'efficacité!à!long!terme)!de!points!de!l’eau!qui!ont!été!construits?! ! ! ! irb-aaan1168 irb exemption date: 03/10/2014 consilience carty: the role of training programs appendix 5 columbia)university)) ! ! ! ! ! ! monica!carty! 1897!lerner!hall! new!york,!ny!10027! 973<747<4191! mkc2145@columbia.edu! ! statement!for!informed!consent:! hello.!i!would!like!to!ask!you!a!few!questions!about!your!experience!in!educational!programs!for!water! development.!i!have!prepared!a!questionnaire!of!9!questions!that!should!not!take!very!long!to!answer.!i!will! not!write!down!any!personal!information!regarding!your!name!or!where!you!live.!i!will!only!write!down!the! responses!you!give!to!the!questions!i!will!ask.!knowing!this!information,!would!you!like!to!do!this! questionnaire?! bonjour.!je!voudrais!vous!poser!quelques!questions!au!sujet!de!votre!expérience!sur!les!formations! concernant!l'eau.!j'ai!préparé!un!questionnaire!de!neuf!questions!qui!ne!devrait!pas!prendre!beaucoup!de! temps!pour!être!renseigné.!ce!questionnaire!est!anonyme,!c'est<à<dire!que!je!ne!vais!écrire!aucune! information!personnalisée!sur!votre!identité!telle!que!votre!nom!et!votre!adresse.!je!noterai!seulement!vos! réponses!aux!questions!que!je!vais!poser.!sachant!cette!information,!souhaitez<vous!remplir!la!fiche! (questionnaire)!s'il!vous!plait!?!! salaamalikum.!!dama!leen!bëgoon!na!laac!!ci!xam<xam!bi!ngeen!am!ci!wàllu!ndox.!damaa!waajal!!juróom! ñeenti!!!laaj!tënk!ko!ci!këyit,!waaye!!laaj!yi!du!jël!lu!bari!ci!seen!jot.!ci!këyitu!laaj!bi,!duma!ci!!def!tur!mbaa! santu!nit!ki,!duma!ci!bind!yit!fi!mu!dëkk.!damay!bind!rek!tontu!yi!nit!ñi!joxe!ci!lu!jëm!ci!laaj!yi.!bi!ngeen!xamee! loolu,!ndax!!bëgg!!ngeen!!ma!!laaj!leen!!laaj!yii!ci!këyit!!gi!?! ! irb-aaan4711 irb exemption date: 05/01/2014 consilience carty: the role of training programs appendix 6 !"#$%&'()!*"!!)+,'-#.)+)+,'/#0,#.1!'.+('/0-.23%'4.-%#' !!!!!! ! !"#$%&'()(( *'+",(-./(0.1(2+,%"#(2'3(2%43(2.(2+,3(2'%&(&/153-(0.1(4-(&3"%.1(2'3&%&(."( &/&2+%"+6%$%2-(+"7(21+%"%"#(81.#1+4&(0.1(8.2+6$3(9+231(7353$.843"2:(*'%&( %"0.14+2%."(9%$$('3$8(43(2.(632231(/"731&2+"7(+"7(+"+$-;3(63&2(81+<2%<3&(0.1( 8.2+6$3(9+231(7353$.843"2:(=(#13+2$-(+8813<%+23(-./1('3$8(0.1(8+12%<%8+2%"#(%"( 2'%&(13&3+1<':( ( >13"<'()( ?31<%(63+/<./8(8./1(813"713($3&(2348&(73(0+%13(<3223(3"@/a23(8./1(4+(2'b&3(&/1( $3&($%3"&(3"213($+(7/1+6%$%2c(32(73&(81.#1+443&(73(0.14+2%."(73($d3+/(8.12+6$3:( e3223(%"0.14+2%."(5+(4d+%731(f(<.4813"713(4%3/g(32(f(+"+$-&31(4%3/g(73&( 43%$$3/13&(81+2%@/3&(8./1($3(7c53$.88343"2(73($d3+/(8.2+6$3:(( ( h.$.0()(( ij1jkj0((<%(&33"(k.2(#%("#33"(730(<%($++<(-%%((kj4(&%(#j&2/(((6/(-%233$(&+4+("kf"#(4/( ,+93(kj4(<%(&/,+$%,/((+,(&+-2/("7.g/4("++":((l%6++1(-%%(4+(0%-((kj$3m(7%("+(4+( k+88+$3(("#%1(4+(4j"+((g+4(83g3(-%(#j"((kj4((&%(&+-2/("7.g:( ( n/3&2%."&(+13($%&237(%"(2'3(0.$$.9%"#(.1731()(!"#$%&'m(>13"<'m(h.$.0( ( "# $%&'!()*&+,-&',(+!*&./!0(1!')&,+,+*23!! !"#$%"&&"#'()*+,-*.,'+#/'%-#*/"0#("1%#2".."#3'(4*.,'+# 5*+#6%(""&##4''#&""+##,+7,&##+89+)##4,#2,#:*&&%#-*;.%#+7';<# # # # # ! 4# 5(6!7&+0!')&,+,+*!2/22,(+2!%&./!0(1!*(+/!'(!,+!'('&835(6!8(+*!9,9!'%/0!8&2'3! ='4>,"+#7"#-"--,'+-#7"#3'(4*.,'+#*/"0?/'%-#>@+@3,2,@#"+#.'%.#<#a%"&&"#*#@.@#&"%(# 7%(@"#<# b**.*##&c&##2,#+89+)#4''4%#+)""+#7"3#<###>"++#>%#+"66#d**.*#3*+#&*#<# ! ! ! ! ! :# 5(6!9,9!0(1!;,+9!(1'!&<(1'!')&,+,+*23! ='44"+.#*/"0?/'%-#7@2'%/"(.#2"#.ef"#7"#3'(4*.,'+<# #g''#&""+##),-"#+89+)#4,#<# # # # # irb-aaan4711 irb exemption date: 05/01/2014 consilience carty: the role of training programs survey'discussing'training'programs'and'potable'water' !!!!!! ! 4. how!many!people!participated!the!training!sessions!you!went!to!(this!can!be!an! estimate)?! combien#de#personnes#ont#participé#à#ces#sessions#de#formation#(une#estimation#est# permise#pour#cette#question)#?# ñaata#nit#ñoo#bokkoon#ci#njàng##moomu#?#(mënees#na#xayma#ci#laaj#boobou)# # # # # # # # 5. what!were!the!three!most!important!things!that!you!learned!from!the!trainings?! quelle#sont#les##trois#aspects#de#ces#formations#qui#vous#paraissent#les#plus# importants#?# limal##ñatti#fanna#yu#la##ëppal##njariñ#ci#ngàng#moomu?# # # # # # # # # 6. will!you!continue!to!use!the!skills!you!learned!for!a!long!time?! envisagez#vous#de#faire#usage#des#compétences#acquises#de#ces#formations#dans#le# future#?# ndax#fasyeene#ngaa##jëfe#li#nga#jële#si#xam?xam##ci##njàng##moomu#?# ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 7. what!does!your!organization!do!to!keep!potable!water!programs!long!lasting?! que#fait#votre#organisation#pour#pérenniser#les#acquis#du#programme#hydraulique#?# seen#kureel##gui###yan#pexe##lay#def#ngir#gëna#dëgëral##li#ñu#am#ci#wallu#ndox#?## ! ! ! ! ! ! ! irb-aaan4711 irb exemption date: 05/01/2014 consilience carty: the role of training programs survey'discussing'training'programs'and'potable'water' !!!!!! ! 8. how!do!you!hope!to!help!with!the!water!supply!in!your!community?! comment#souhaiteriez?vous#continuer#à#faciliter#l’accès#à#l’eau#dans#la#communauté#?# nan#ngeen##di#def#ngir##gënë#yombal#aminu#ndox#mu#sell##ci#gox#bi#?### ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 9. what!did!the!organization!want!you!to!learn!from!the!trainings?! qu’est?ce#que#votre#organisation#voudrait#tirer#comme#leçon#de#ces#formations#?# yan#njàngat##la#seen#kureel##gi#jële#ci#njàng#moonu#?# ! ! ! irb-aaan4711 irb exemption date: 05/01/2014 consilience carty: the role of training programs appendix 7 organization and location how often do you conduct trainings? how long to trainings last? how many people participate in a training of average? honduras a (on average) on a bi-weekly basis, depending on how many communities we intervene at a time theoretical part7 hours; practical parton average 2 days (7 hrs each day) around 15 b* initial implementation period: 15-20 meetings over a 2-3 month period. after water treatment and supply system is commissioned, semiregular follow-up visits (financial management, administration, and conflict resolution). these meetings are 10-15 over a period of 1-2 years. (see wiki flowchart for timeline details). depending on audience and content, last anywhere between 1-5 hours. 5 (water committee training) to hundreds of people (community mobilization). senegal c the number of programs depends on the needs expressed by the beneficiaries or identified by the technicians. on average, we conduct one program per semester. the sessions last between four to five days. there are approximately 20 to 25 participants. d1 every semester depending on programs, from 3 to 6 days 20 to 30 people d2 we lead programs every year the programs last at most a week we have approximately 15 to 20 participants d3 the amount of training programs we run depends on the our water projects our training programs usually last 3 to 5 days 10-15 people take part in the programs india e monthly education/personality trainings 1-3 days; skill building up to 60 days around 25 g • orientation training for the staff of partner organization:once in a year • training to strengthen the user committees at schools and community:every month • training for the government officials: thrice a year • training for the school management committees and teachers:biyearly • training for the hand pump mechanics:as per need • training for the saab entrepreneurs:once in a year • training for internal staff capacity building:once in a year • hygiene training for partner staff – once in a year • orientation training for the staff of partner organization:last for 2 days • training to strengthen the user committees at schools and community: two hours • training for the government officials: whole day ( 5 hours) • training for the school management committees and teachers:two hours • training for the hand pump mechanics: two/three days • training for the saab entrepreneurs:whole day • training for the masons:one week • training for internal staff capacity building:3 days • hygiene training for partner staff – 2 days 10 to 50 malawi b* initial implementation period: 15-20 meetings over a 2-3 month period. after water treatment and supply system is commissioned, semiregular follow-up visits (financial management, administration, and conflict resolution). these meetings are 10-15 over a period of 1-2 years. (see wiki flowchart for timeline details). depending on audience and content, last anywhere between 1-5 hours. 5 (water committee training) to hundreds of people (community mobilization). g can change based on the kind of project being implemented. on average, every 3 months varies on type of training and content, but average 1 week average 20 consilience carty: the role of training programs appendix 8 cap acit y  bu ildin g fina nce s gov ern anc e mai nte nan ce man age me nt me cha nica l pro blem  sol ving cha nge com mu nity trai ned  ppl  to   com mu nity  rel atio nsh ip env iron men t gen der gov ern me nt/p olit ics kno wle dge app lica tion me asu re  o f  ef fect iven ess mo tiva tion hea lth qua lity   of  l ife pro fit role  of  n go rela tion ship    ng o  a nd  c om mu nity  me mb ers sus tain abil ity trai ner  lea rne r  re latio nsh ip par ticip ato ry  le arn ing ca pa ci ty  b ui ld in g 1 5 2 6 4 6 4 8 5 0 0 1 12 0 7 1 1 0 0 5 4 1 12 10 fin an ce s 1 4 6 12 6 2 3 6 1 0 0 0 4 1 7 0 1 0 3 3 6 1 6 1 go ve rn an ce 5 4 1 7 0 2 2 4 2 0 0 0 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 6 10 m ai nt en an ce 2 6 1 9 7 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 7 3 5 0 2 0 1 3 8 1 6 2 m an ag em en t 6 12 7 9 12 6 3 24 10 0 0 0 15 3 14 3 3 1 8 8 13 7 14 8 m ec ha ni ca l 4 6 0 7 12 3 5 5 1 1 0 1 25 3 4 1 1 0 1 4 4 6 16 10 pr ob le m  s ol vi ng 6 2 2 1 6 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 5 0 2 0 0 0 1 2 5 2 8 9 ch an ge 4 3 2 0 3 5 1 9 1 0 0 0 3 1 3 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 2 3 co m m un ity 8 6 4 2 24 5 3 9 19 0 2 3 17 1 8 19 11 3 5 25 36 6 13 7 tra in ed  p pl  to  c om m un ity  re la tio ns hi p 5 1 2 2 10 1 0 1 19 0 0 0 8 0 2 1 3 0 3 1 5 0 3 5 en vi ro nm en t 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 ge nd er 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 go ve rn m en t/ po lit ic s 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 2 1 kn ow le dg e 12 4 2 7 15 25 5 3 17 8 1 0 0 4 15 8 13 1 1 13 13 5 53 37 ap pl ic at io n 0 1 2 3 3 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 16 14 m ea su re  o f  e ffe ct iv en es s 7 7 4 5 14 4 2 3 8 2 0 0 0 15 3 0 2 1 1 7 7 5 16 9 m ot iv at io n 1 0 0 0 3 1 0 2 19 1 0 1 0 8 0 0 8 3 2 5 12 2 5 3 he al th 1 1 0 2 3 1 0 3 11 3 1 0 0 13 0 2 8 1 0 0 2 2 6 12 qu al ity  o f  l ife 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 pr of it 0 3 0 1 8 1 1 1 5 3 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 ro le  o f  n go 5 3 1 3 8 4 2 1 25 1 0 2 3 13 2 7 5 0 2 0 48 6 24 7 re la tio ns hi p   ng o  a nd  c om m un ity  m em be rs 4 6 2 8 13 4 5 1 36 5 0 2 2 13 2 7 12 2 1 1 48 5 22 8 su st ai na bi lit y 1 1 1 1 7 6 2 1 6 0 1 0 0 5 1 5 2 2 1 2 6 5 1 2 tra in er  le ar ne r  r el at io ns hi p 12 6 6 6 14 16 8 2 13 3 0 0 2 53 16 16 5 6 0 0 24 22 1 34 pa rti ci pa to ry  le ar ni ng 10 1 10 2 8 10 9 3 7 5 0 0 1 37 14 9 3 12 0 0 7 8 2 34 to ta l  o f  o ve rla ps  n um be rin g   >1 0 2 1 0 0 7 3 0 0 8 1 0 0 0 10 2 3 2 3 0 0 4 6 0 10 4 consilience carty: the role of training programs appendix 9 cap acit y  bu ildin g fina nce s gov ern anc e ma inte nan ce ma nag em ent me cha nica l pro blem  sol ving cha nge com mu nity trai ned  ppl  to   com mu nity  rel atio nsh ip env iron men t gen der gov ern me nt/ poli tics kno wle dge app lica tion me asu re  o f  ef fect iven ess mo tiva tion hea lth qua lity   of  l ife pro fit role  of  n go rela tion ship    ng o  a nd  c om mu nity  me mb ers sus tain abil ity trai ner  lea rne r  re latio nsh ip par ticip ato ry  le arn ing ca pa ci ty  b ui ld in g 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 fin an ce s 0 2 1 2 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 go ve rn an ce 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 m ai nt en an ce 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 m an ag em en t 0 2 0 2 5 4 0 9 6 0 0 0 8 1 5 2 1 0 7 2 3 5 3 3 m ec ha ni ca l 0 1 0 2 5 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 18 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 4 9 8 pr ob le m  s ol vi ng 0 1 0 0 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 4 4 ch an ge 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 co m m un ity 0 2 1 0 9 2 1 1 9 0 0 0 3 0 2 12 7 0 5 3 11 2 1 2 tr ai ne d   pp l  t o   co m m un ity  re la tio ns hi p 0 1 0 0 6 1 0 0 9 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 2 0 0 1 en vi ro nm en t 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ge nd er 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 go ve rn m en t/ po lit ic s 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 kn ow le dg e 0 0 0 1 8 18 3 0 3 2 0 0 0 1 1 4 6 0 1 0 1 4 22 19 ap pl ic at io n 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 13 m ea su re  o f  e ff ec tiv en es s 0 1 0 1 5 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 2 0 0 m ot iv at io n 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 12 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 6 0 1 1 8 2 4 3 he al th 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 7 1 0 0 0 6 0 2 6 0 0 0 1 0 6 9 qu al ity  o f  l ife 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 pr of it 0 2 0 1 7 1 1 0 5 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 ro le  o f  n g o 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 10 4 1 1 re la tio ns hi p   n g o  a nd  c om m un ity  m em be rs 0 1 0 0 3 0 1 0 11 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 8 1 0 0 10 3 2 1 su st ai na bi lit y 0 1 0 0 5 4 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 4 0 2 2 0 1 2 4 3 1 2 tr ai ne r  l ea rn er  re la tio ns hi p 0 1 0 0 3 9 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 22 13 0 4 6 0 0 1 2 1 11 pa rt ic ip at or y   le ar ni ng 0 1 0 0 3 8 4 0 2 1 0 0 0 19 13 0 3 9 0 0 1 1 2 11 to ta l  o f  o ve rl ap s   nu m be ri ng  ≥ 5 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 5 2 0 0 0 5 2 0 3 4 0 1 1 3 0 5 5 consilience carty: the role of training programs appendix 10 cap acit y  bu ildin g fina nce s gov ern anc e mai nte nan ce man age me nt me cha nica l pro blem  sol ving cha nge com mu nity trai ned  ppl  to   com mu nity  rel atio nsh ip env iron men t gen der gov ern me nt/p olit ics kno wle dge app lica tion me asu re  o f  ef fect iven ess mo tiva tion hea lth qua lity   of  l ife pro fit role  of  n go rela tion ship  ng o  a nd   com mu nity  me mb ers sus tain abil ity trai ner  lea rne r  re latio nsh ip par ticip ato ry  le arn ing ca pa ci ty  b ui ld in g 0 5 1 5 1 3 1 4 3 0 0 0 4 0 5 1 0 0 0 4 2 0 6 7 fin an ce s 0 2 3 8 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 6 0 0 0 1 2 4 0 4 0 go ve rn an ce 5 2 1 5 0 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 6 10 m ai nt en an ce 1 3 1 6 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 2 4 0 1 0 0 1 5 0 5 2 m an ag em en t 5 8 5 6 5 3 0 9 3 0 0 0 8 1 10 0 2 0 1 7 9 2 11 8 m ec ha ni ca l 1 1 0 3 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 10 8 pr ob le m  s ol vi ng 3 1 2 0 3 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 5 6 ch an ge 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 co m m un ity 4 1 2 1 9 0 2 2 6 0 0 2 6 0 4 2 5 0 0 8 10 2 5 4 tra in ed  p pl  to  c om m un ity  re la tio ns hi p 3 0 1 1 3 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 1 3 en vi ro nm en t 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ge nd er 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 go ve rn m en t/ po lit ic s 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 kn ow le dg e 4 2 1 4 8 12 3 0 6 3 0 0 0 1 8 3 6 0 0 8 10 1 30 27 ap pl ic at io n 0 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 14 14 m ea su re  o f  e ffe ct iv en es s 5 6 3 4 10 2 1 2 4 1 0 0 0 8 1 0 2 1 1 4 5 2 9 7 m ot iv at io n 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 he al th 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 5 2 0 0 0 6 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 5 qu al ity  o f  l ife 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 pr of it 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ro le  o f  n go 4 2 1 1 7 1 2 0 8 1 0 0 2 8 0 4 1 0 1 0 18 2 14 5 re la tio ns hi p   ng o  a nd  c om m un ity  m em be rs 2 4 2 5 9 2 2 0 10 2 0 0 1 10 1 5 1 1 0 0 18 1 13 6 su st ai na bi lit y 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 tra in er  le ar ne r  r el at io ns hi p 6 4 6 5 11 10 5 0 5 1 0 0 2 30 14 9 2 2 0 0 14 13 1 15 pa rti ci pa to ry  le ar ni ng 7 0 10 2 8 8 6 2 4 3 0 0 1 27 14 7 1 5 0 0 5 6 1 15 to ta l  o f  o ve rla ps  n um be rin g   ≥5 5 2 4 3 12 4 2 0 6 1 0 0 0 9 2 8 0 3 0 0 6 8 0 13 12 consilience carty: the role of training programs appendix 11 consilience carty: the role of training programs appendix 12 cap acit y  bu ildin g fina nce s gov ern anc e mai nte nan ce man age me nt me cha nica l pro blem  sol ving cha nge com mu nity trai ned  ppl  to   com mu nity  rel atio nsh ip env iron men t gen der gov ern me nt/p olit ics kno wle dge app lica tion me asu re  o f  ef fect iven ess mo tiva tion hea lth qua lity   of  l ife pro fit role  of  n go rela tion ship  ng o  a nd   com mu nity  me mb ers sus tain abil ity trai ner  lea rne r  re latio nsh ip par ticip ato ry  le arn ing ca pa ci ty  b ui ld in g 1 0 1 1 3 2 3 2 1 0 0 1 4 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 2 fin an ce s 1 0 2 3 4 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 go ve rn an ce 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 m ai nt en an ce 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 1 1 0 m an ag em en t 1 3 2 1 3 0 3 4 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 m ec ha ni ca l 3 4 0 1 3 1 4 3 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 0 pr ob le m  s ol vi ng 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 ch an ge 3 3 0 0 3 4 1 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 2 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 co m m un ity 2 3 1 1 4 3 0 3 1 0 0 0 5 1 2 3 1 2 0 5 4 1 2 1 tr ai ne d   pp l  t o   co m m un ity  re la tio ns hi p 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 en vi ro nm en t 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 ge nd er 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 go ve rn m en t/ po lit ic s 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 kn ow le dg e 4 2 1 2 2 2 0 2 5 2 0 0 0 1 4 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 5 1 ap pl ic at io n 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 m ea su re  o f  e ff ec tiv en es s 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 2 m ot iv at io n 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 he al th 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 qu al ity  o f  l ife 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 pr of it 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 ro le  o f  n g o 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 7 0 1 0 re la tio ns hi p   n g o  a nd  c om m un ity  m em be rs 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 7 0 2 1 su st ai na bi lit y 1 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 tr ai ne r  l ea rn er  re la tio ns hi p 3 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 4 pa rt ic ip at or y   le ar ni ng 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 to ta l  o f  o ve rla ps  n um be rin g   ≥3 4 4 0 0 4 5 0 5 8 0 0 0 0 4 0 2 2 0 1 0 2 2 0 4 1 consilience carty: the role of training programs appendix 13 co m m un ity en vi ro nm en t ge nd er kn ow le dg e m an ag em en t m ec ha ni ca l po lit ics pr ob le m s  e nc ou nt er ed pr of its ro le  o f  n go  p er so nn el su st ai na bi lit y te ch no lo gy us ef ul ne ss community 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 environment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 gender 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 knowledge 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 1 1 4 0 2 management 1 0 0 5 2 0 1 2 0 3 0 1 mechanical 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 3 1 1 politics 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 problems  encountered 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 2 0 2 1 profits 0 1 0 1 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 role  of  ngo  personnel 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 sustainability 0 0 0 4 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 technology 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 usefulness 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 overlaps  that  numbered   ≥  2 1 0 0 5 4 3 0 3 3 1 3 1 1 microsoft word 02112008 chin biotechnology for global health.doc consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 1 biotechnology for global health: solutions for the developing world curtis d. chin1 abstract: identifying and developing emerging biotechnologies is important in improving health in the poorest nations because current health products and practices are generally not suited for their developing economies, their inadequate transport and power infrastructures, their largely rural populace, and their rugged and often tropical environments. advances in biotechnology will more likely be valued and adopted as innovations in developing countries if they are suited to these challenging conditions. these innovations in health will favor a shift away from a centralized, curative-based framework towards a decentralized, prevention-based paradigm. in this article, advances in microfluidics and in vaccine delivery and storage are highlighted within the context of disease diagnosis and prevention in the developing world. 1 curtis chin is a phd student in the department of biomedical engineering at columbia university. his research interests include microtechnologies for global health diagnostics and tissue engineering. he obtained his bs in chemical engineering from the massachusetts institute of technology. he can be contacted at cdc2129@columbia.edu. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 2 introduction: what is the link between scientific discovery, biotechnology, and innovation? why is biotechnology particularly important for improving health in the world’s poorest nations? one can think of scientific discovery and innovation as being on two opposite sides of a continuum. scientific discovery deals with acquiring new knowledge by correcting and integrating previous knowledge through the formulation of testable hypotheses, conducting experiments, collecting data, and interpreting results in order to form conclusions; it is largely carried out in universities and is often characterized by academic freedom and intellectualism. on the other end of that continuum lies innovation, which introduces a new product or process that is both valuable to adopters and disruptive to the status quo. unlike scientific discovery, innovation is driven by economic and social pressures, which creates wealth or social welfare to a group of people, an organization, or a society by improving quality, efficiency, and productivity. in the middle of the continuum lies translational research, where discoveries with potential value are identified and pursued; this is largely conducted by the private sector. in the context of health products and practices, this middle ground is the domain of biotechnology. innovations in products such as vaccines, medical devices, and equipment start from scientific discoveries in genomics-related sciences and in applied sciences or engineering. advances in biotechnology become innovations if they are considered valuable in demonstrating clinical efficacy, ease of administration and use, reducing costs, and so on; these are adopted by health workers, health ministries, companies, and organizations. unlike scientific discovery, which is a long-term investment associated with high-risks, advances in biotechnology may directly lead to innovation and therefore contribute value to health sooner rather than later. more importantly, however, developing countries cannot sustain the adoption of medical products that are conventional in developed countries. these products and practices are incompatible with their weak economies, their underdeveloped transport and power infrastructures, their largely poor and rural populations, and their rugged and often tropical environments. despite these challenges, developing countries are perhaps best positioned to adopt innovations in biotechnology. not only do their circumstances pose significant challenges that demand creative and valuable solutions, but the significant gains over health products and practices currently inadequate or nonexistent in developing countries may also accentuate the value of an innovation. specifically, this value can range from reducing early mortality and burden of disease with more effective recombinant vaccines, to preventing degradation of vaccines by creating and optimizing techniques for stable formulations that withstand large fluctuations in heat and humidity, to increasing portability and capability of diagnostic devices with miniaturized lab-on-a-chip technology. in short, the impetus for innovation in health is vast. in fields other than those associated with healthcare, there has already been widespread adoption of relevant innovations. for example, the adoption of cell phones and wireless internet in sub-saharan africa has replaced the historical precedent of developing landlines, thereby allowing for quick communication to places in rugged and remote regions, consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 3 without the need to develop significant infrastructure2. however, the mere adoption of technology may not be enough to develop appropriate health products; perfecting promising biotechnologies and even developing new ones may be necessary. in doing so, developing countries may be able to bypass medical technologies conventional to centralized health systems, such as hospitals for healthcare and labs for diagnostic results, and instead be able to develop innovative technology better-suited for decentralized health networks, such as point-of-care diagnosis and at-home healthcare, which emphasize cost-effective public health strategies such as disease prevention and epidemiological surveillance3. in identifying and developing promising biotechnologies, it is important to first understand the limitations of conventional health products in meeting the unique challenges in the developing world. these limitations can be divided into several major categories: (1) power (e.g. lack of ground electricity, lack of refrigeration), (2) ease of use/administration (e.g. lack of skilled workers), (3) efficacy (e.g. sensitivity and specificity for diagnostics, development of immunity for vaccines), (4) portability (e.g. potential for use at rural villages or at point-of-care), (5) cost (e.g. costs associated with the product itself versus those for peripherals), and (6) safety. this paper focuses on identifying two active areas of biotechnology research relevant to health in developing countries: vaccines for building immunity against infectious diseases and microfluidics for pointof-care diagnostics. each section highlights the limitations of current products in the settings of developing countries, and discusses the advantages and possible disadvantages emerging biotechnologies have in this setting. vaccines: novel storage and delivery strategies vaccines for childhood illnesseswidely considered as essential in any strategy for disease prevention in developing and developed countries alikehave benefited greatly from recombinant dna technologies. not only are recombinant vaccines4 already proving to be cheaper in testing and scale-up of production, as well as safer (particularly in immunocompromised individuals) than inactivated or attenuated vaccines5, they may also address problems with vaccine storage and delivery. normally, vaccines require refrigeration, needles, and multiple administrations to fortify or refresh immunity. in much of the developing world, however, refrigeration is unavailable, and when available, refrigeration can constitute up to 80 percent of the total cost of vaccine delivery5. needles are often misused by inexperienced personnel in 2 undp, human development report 2001: making new technologies work for human development. 2001, united nations development programme: new york. and chin, c.d., v. linder, and s.k. sia, lab-on-a-chip devices for global health: past studies and future opportunities. lab chip, 2007. 7(1): p. 41-57. 3 alwan, a. and b. modell, recommendations for introducing genetics services in developing countries. nat rev genet, 2003. 4(1): p. 61-8. 4 recombinant vaccines are created by genetically modifying microorganisms such as bacteria and yeast and stimulating them to produce large quantities of immunogenic proteins. 5 daar, a.s., et al., top ten biotechnologies for improving health in developing countries. nat genet, 2002. 32(2): p. 229-32. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 4 unsanitary conditions, leading to transmission of blood-borne pathogens such as hiv, hbv, and hcv6. patient noncompliance is commonplace with poor rates of return visits, thereby making multiple vaccine administrations difficult. these issues can be partially addressed by developing novel storage techniques or by optimizing established processes with new formulations in order to increase vaccine viability, and by researching different methods of vaccine administration to reduce the need for intravenous immunizations. for example, the bacillus calmette-guérin vaccine7 (bcg) is currently prepared commercially by freezedrying8, which is known to significantly reduce bcg viability after freezing. researchers at harvard university hypothesize that the presence of nonvolatile salts and cryoprotectants during the normal drying of droplets raised osmotic pressures high enough to damage bacterial membranes, which yield low vaccine viability and stability at room temperature9. they discovered that spray drying with a special protein matrix without salts and cryprotectants yielded improved viability and stability9. this is promising, given the potential of spray-dried vaccines to be inhaled rather than administered intravenously, and scaled-up in sterile conditions with lower operating costs as compared to freeze-drying methods10 ,11. already, medicine in need12 plans to develop stable cell dry powder vaccine formulations for efficient and noninvasive inhaled delivery. furthermore, recent studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of porous particles and nanoparticles in efficiently delivering therapeutic aerosols, with the potential for larger dose delivery13 ,14 ,15. besides pulmonary vaccine delivery, other needle-free methods of immunization in the developing world such as liquid-jet injection, epidermal powder immunization, topical application (through cutaneous routes), and oral and nasal immunizations (through mucosal routes) have been proposed as alternatives to intravenous immunizations6. liquid-jet injections use the kinetic energy from a high velocity vaccine jet (typically up to 100 m/s, with a microneedle tip) to penetrate the skin and deliver the vaccine intradermally, subcutaneously, or intramuscularly. targeting the skin promotes its contact with langerhans cells, which initiate specific immune responses by processing and presenting antigen fragments to naïve t-cells in the lymph nodes. vaccines delivered by liquid-jet usually spread over a larger tissue area than vaccines 6 mitragotri, s., immunization without needles. nat rev immunol, 2005. 5(12): p. 905-16. 7 bcg vaccine is against tuberculosis which is prepared from a strain of the attenuated live bovine tuberculosis bacillus. 8 freeze-drying (also known as lyophilization) is a common dehydration process used to preserve a sensitive material and make transport convenient. freeze-drying involves a two-step process: 1) freezing below the lowest temperature at which solid and liquid phases can coexist (eutectic point), and 2) sublimination of ice crystals to water vapor. 9 wong, y.l., et al., drying a tuberculosis vaccine without freezing. proc natl acad sci u s a, 2007. 104(8): p. 2591-5. 10 millqvist-fureby, a., m. malmsten, and b. bergenstahl, an aqueous polymer two-phase system as carrier in the spray-drying of biological material. journal of colloid and interface science, 2000. 225(1): p. 54-61. 11 vanbever, r., et al., formulation and physical characterization of large porous particles for inhalation. pharm res, 1999. 16(11): p. 1735-42. 12 medicine in need is a non-governmental organization founded by david edwards, the principal investigator of the aforementioned study. 13 edwards, d.a., et al., large porous particles for pulmonary drug delivery. science, 1997. 276(5320): p. 1868-71. 14 pulliam, b., j.c. sung, and d.a. edwards, design of nanoparticle-based dry powder pulmonary vaccines. expert opin drug deliv, 2007. 4(6): p. 651-663. 15 tsapis, n., et al., trojan particles: large porous carriers of nanoparticles for drug delivery. proc natl acad sci u s a, 2002. 99(19): p. 12001-5. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 5 administered with needles, and may allow more contact with antigen-presenting cells before being degraded. while many vaccines (e.g. influenza and hepatitis b) have been successfully delivered using liquid-jets, cross-contamination and cost are major limitations. the development of disposable-cartridge jet injectors and single-use, pre-filled disposable devices have sought to alleviate concerns about contamination. epidermal powder immunizations facilitate storage of vaccine powders and there is strong clinical evidence for its applicability in dna vaccines; however, non-dna vaccines have enjoyed little commercial success. topical vaccine application, like liquid-jet and epidermal powder immunizations, naturally target langerhans cells and are cheaper and easier to use. however, simple topical delivery yields an inadequate immune response due to the low permeability of the stratum corenum, the outer layer of the skin. current research includes using topically applied adjuvants16, colloidal carriers17, and physical methods such as microneedles, ultrasound, and electroporation with topical application6,18. oral vaccine delivery has been used for live attenuated pathogens such as polio and typhoid, and is attractive because of its simplicity and ease of administration. however, vaccines are degraded and deactivated in the acidic gastrointestinal environment and high doses are required for adequate immune responses; improving response variability is an active area of research. nasal delivery allows easier access to mucosal membranes than does oral delivery, but the short contact time and enzymatic activity, while less relative to that in gastrointestinal tract, poses considerable challenges which have yet to be overcome6. a subset of oral vaccine delivery is temperature-stable formulations of vaccines expressed in transgenic organisms such as plants or crops19 ,20. edible vaccines are attractive because they are easy to administer; they are also theoretically cheap to produce because no protein purification steps are needed. studies on edible plant vaccines have shown to stimulate immunogenic responses against the hepatitis b virus and norwalk virus, which causes diarrhea. they also have protective capacity against pathogens causing bacterial diarrhea, such as cholera and enterotoxigenic escherichia coli21,22 , and tetanus toxin produced by bacterium clostridium tetani23. the latter is a common childhood vaccination target along with diptheria and pertussis. ongoing research aims to (1) understand variations in vaccine stability and immunogenicity in mucosal delivery, (2) express higher levels of antigen, (3) guard against degradation of protein components in the stomach and gut before they can elicit an immune response22, and (4) understand the risks of genetic contamination of foodstuffs and the threats to biodiversity. 16 an adjuvant is an agent that is mixed with an antigen and increases the immune response to that antigen following immunization6 17 a colloidal carrier is a stable system of small particles of lipds, polymers or any other material that encapsulate a vaccine6 18 guy, b., the perfect mix: recent progress in adjuvant research. nat rev microbiol, 2007. 5(7): p. 505 19 acharya, t., a.s. daar, and p.a. singer, biotechnology and the un's millennium development goals. nat biotechnol, 2003. 21(12): p. 1434-6. 20 acharya, t., et al., strengthening the role of genomics in global health. plos med, 2004. 1(3): p. e40. 21 mason, h.s., et al., edible plant vaccines: applications for prophylactic and therapeutic molecular medicine. trends mol med, 2002. 8(7): p. 324-9. 22 daniell, h., s.j. streatfield, and k. wycoff, medical molecular farming: production of antibodies, biopharmaceuticals and edible vaccines in plants. trends plant sci, 2001. 6(5): p. 219-26. 23 tregoning, j.s., et al., protection against tetanus toxin using a plant-based vaccine. eur j immunol, 2005. 35(4): p. 1320-6. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 6 diagnostics: microfluidic devices another promising biotechnology is microfluidics for development of portable and cheap health diagnostics2,24. microfluidics deals with the behavior and precise manipulation of small volumes of liquids and gases moving through microchannels embedded in a chip. also known as “lab-on-a-chip”, microfluidic devices have the potential to automate complex laboratory tasks such as sample preparation, preconcentration, and analyte detection (i.e. detection of desired biomarkers, such as antibodies against hepatitis b, conserved nucleic acid sequences in malaria parasites, t-cells for monitoring hiv/aids, etc.) on a chip. usually, these laboratory tasks require bulky, mechanically complex, expensive, power-draining instruments, such as centrifuges (e.g. for sample preconcentration), vortexes and spinners (e.g. for mixing liquids), liquid-handling robots (e.g. for quantifying protein in benchtop immunoassays), thermocyclers (e.g. for amplifying nucleic acids), flow cytometers (e.g. for counting and sorting cells), and high-powered microscopes (e.g. for visualizing cells). a true “lab-on-a-chip” would allow health workers in developing countries to run common lab tests with greater accuracy and throughput without significant prior training (figure 1). furthermore, miniaturizing onto a battery-powered or even solar-powered handheld device would allow health workers to diagnose at point-of-care, reducing time spent waiting for results and the number of patient visits to the clinic (figure 1a). the time saved is on the order of days in situations where samples need to be sent to national and/or regional testing centers25 for processing. clinics with poor patient compliance in follow-up visits may particularly benefit because diagnosis and treatment prescriptions can be done on a single visit. additionally, microfluidic diagnostic devices could be employed in a decentralized health care system where health workers travel to the village or rural home to deliver care. even in situations where the testing center has the capacity to run the desired assay, microfluidic diagnostics still save time by integrating multiple tasks and by processing microliter to nanoliter volumes. at these small volumes, reactions are rarely diffusion-limited, allowing for faster kinetics particularly when catalysts are involved, and thermal mass is minimized, allowing quicker responses to heat changes e.g. in thermocycling for pcr26. the ability to process small volumes also allows for less invasive patient sampling procedures such as fingerpricks as compared to more invasive techniques such as intravenous blood draws (figure 1a). most studies to date have focused on particular microfluidic procedures such as fluid actuation, mixing, sample preparation, analyte detection, because each poses tremendous scientific and technical 24 yager, p., et al., microfluidic diagnostic technologies for global public health. nature, 2006. 442(7101): p. 412-8. 25 the quality, conditions, and types of tests performed at health centers usually correlates with degree of urban development2. 26 pcr, or polymerase chain reaction, is a technique used for detection of nucleic acids (pcr for dna, rt-pcr for rna), typically for determining infection and pathogen strain or subtype identification. a section of target dna is marked off with flanking dna primers and amplified exponentially with repeated heating and cooling patterns (thermocycles). consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 7 challenges and depends on the physical, chemical, and biological makeup of the analyte2. with extensive work on new strategies and characterization, researchers are looking to integrate multiple procedures in order to be able to detect multiple analytes on a single chip (as illustrated in figure 1b). analytes are divided roughly into four classes: (1) cells, (2) metabolites, (3) nucleic acids, and (4) metabolites27. each class of biomarker is described in terms of its importance in diagnosing infections and health conditions, and significant research advances relevant to the advancement of global health are identified. figure 1: microfluidics: an emerging technology in portable, low-cost diagnostics. a: proposed intervention of device in workflow. b: ability of microfluidics to carry out multiple tests rapidly; cells, metabolites, nucleic acids, and proteins can all be analyzed for a complete diagnosis. cells: cell counts are important measures in addressing anemia and hematology via red blood cell and complete blood counts, as well as in monitoring hiv-infected patients for structuring antiretroviral treatment regimens via cd4+ t-cells. one study suggests that differential shear flows on antibodyfunctionalized surfaces can selectively capture cd4+ t-cells without labeling in a simple microfluidic 27 for a more detailed discussion on microfluidic diagnostic technologies for global health, see references 8 and 21. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 8 format28. cell analysis via microscopic examination is important for parasitology (e.g. blood smears for malaria). additionally, microbiological culture is important for determining drug-resistant strains of bacteria (e.g. tuberculosis, staph a), because culture is still considered the “gold standard” relative to newer molecular-based techniques detecting nucleic acids. small molecules: detection of small molecules is important for monitoring blood chemistries. common targets include bicarbonate for regulating ph, sodium and potassium for maintaining specific electrolyte levels in nerve and muscle function, oxygen and carbon dioxide for determining respiratory and/or metabolic problems, and glucose for metabolic disorders such as diabetes. vitamins and minerals are also relevant targets for detection, as they allow for the diagnosis and monitoring of nutritional deficiencies. popular techniques include electrochemical detection using thin-film patterned electrodes. istat, a current commercial product produced by abbot diagnostics, employs this specific technique. nucleic acids: conserved dna or viral rna sequences are often targets for detecting specific infectious diseases and for determining the stage of a disease (e.g. hiv rna viral load). genotyping is also common for distinguishing between pathogen strains (e.g. hepatitis c). the most popular techniques are pcr and rtpcr, due to their intrinsic specificity and signal amplification. certain technical challenges include the need for sample pre-treatment of lysed cells and low-cost methods for portable signal amplification and detection. one study demonstrates that oligonucleotide-conjugated nanoparticle probes coupled with silver reduction amplification can yield a low-cost and sensitive system29. proteins: antibody and antigen markers can indicate infections predominant in developing countries (such as anti-hiv antibodies, gp41 and gp120 antigens for hiv). one study uses a gold-silver sandwich immunoassay for detecting αhiv-1 antibodies in a microfluidic setup. the opacity of the solution due to silver reduction correlated with the amount of antibody in patient serum and was read by a simple, low-cost absorbance reader30. cost-reduction is perhaps the most attractive quality of microfluidic diagnostic devices. typically, one-time purchases of fixed instruments range from tens to hundreds of thousands of us dollars. for example, the cost of reagents is $5 for immunoassays and $50-300 for nucleic acid tests in a typical in-house hospital laboratory in the developed world2. in contrast, microfluidic devices in the developing world would need fixed instrument31 costs at tens of dollars, and per-assay32 costs on the order of pennies, which 28 cheng, x., et al., a microfluidic device for practical label-free cd4(+) t cell counting of hiv-infected subjects. lab chip, 2007. 7(2): p. 170-8. 29 taton, t.a., c.a. mirkin, and r.l. letsinger, scanometric dna array detection with nanoparticle probes. science, 2000. 289(5485): p. 1757-1760. 30 sia, s.k., et al., an integrated approach to a portable and low-cost immunoassay for resource-poor settings. angew chem int ed engl, 2004. 43(4): p. 498-502. 31 fixed instrument consists of hardware components for analyte detection, fluid actuation, power, and electronics for signal enhancement, user interfacing, and data tranmission. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 9 would include both chips and reagents. by scaling down reagent volumes hundredto thousand-fold and by using cheaper materials, such as injection-moulded plastics instead of glass, quartz, and silicon, and electrical components2 (figure 1a), the costs associated to fixed instrument and assay are reasonable for device deployment in limited-resource settings. implementing an appropriate intervention of microfluidic diagnostics, or of any new technology, in the health networks of developing countries is far from trivial. figure 1a illustrates some of the considerations for a lab-on-a-chip both in and out of the clinic. for instance, it is necessary to minimize the number of moving parts needed on the chip and in the reader in order to design an easily operated device. also, a minimal user interface consisting of a few buttons for powering and operation, and signal lights for showing status of test, on the reader itself may make the device easier for an untrained health worker to operate. considerations downstream of the microfluidic assay include recording, storing, and communicating results (figure 1a). typically, most centralized testing sites and practically all rural testing sites rely solely on written records, but digital records could improve quality of care (by assuring evidencebased medicine) and expedite communication, particularly in disease surveillance, where communication of results between clinics is vital33. results that are typed, synced via usb storage key, or uploaded via wireless transmission to a computer can then be collected and stored locally on a clinic-level network database. periodically, local networks of electronic records can communicate periodically with other clinics through syncing or internet upload. d-tree international, a non-governmental organization dedicated to improving medical records management in developing countries, plans to train and equip frontline providers with personal digital assistants, smart cards, and back up systems for sending data in real-time. this non-profit organization also develops evidence-based, standardized diagnostic and treatment protocols customized for local cultural conditions such as language, epidemiological patterns, and drug lists, also taking into account resources by calculating drug dosage based on patient statistics. technology is one part of the solution and must be designed appropriately to its settings (figure 2). for example, backup batteries and dust covers (figure 2a) are common in many regional and rural testing centers. this highlights performance and design considerations in alternative power, using backup batteries which may be rechargeable or even solar-powered, and dusty environments. bench-top units are fine in centralized testing centers but cannot be transported to rural sites. flow cytometers (figure 2b) are bulky and expensive, complicated to use, and are often in english instead of native languages. it is also clear that many diagnostic tests require significant training and are inadequate due to their lack of specificity. for instance, malaria blood smears are widely performed, and yet are difficult to read due to the subtle differences in phenotype between erythrocytes infected with different plasmodium species. one alternative to 32 assay components include chips (which can be reused depending on the material and application) and reagents. 33 initiatives such as one laptop per child (headed by john negroponte, head of mit’s media lab) may also help close the digital divide. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 10 microscopes and blood smears may be detecting differences in cell deformability, or electrical properties by using microfluidic setups34 ,35. figure 2: design constraints depend on circumstances in the developing world (pictures of labs). a: lab at kicukiro (outside kigali, rwanda) relies on backup batteries and dust covers. b: flow cytometer at gisenyi (regional test center in rwanda) is 34 shelby, j.p., et al., a microfluidic model for single-cell capillary obstruction by plasmodium falciparum-infected erythrocytes. proc natl acad sci u s a, 2003. 100(25): p. 14618-22. 35 gascoyne, p., j. satayavivad, and m. ruchirawat, microfluidic approaches to malaria detection. acta tropica, 2004. 89(3): p. 357-369. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 11 bulky, expensive, difficult to use, and uses english instead of the local french or kinyarwanda. c: malaria blood smears are commonplace yet difficult to read, requiring trained personnel. conclusions: there is a need for scientific innovation in global health, and the identification of key emerging technologies in diagnosis and prevention are the first steps. technologies need to be relevant to local conditions, and developing countries have a unique set of challenges that advances in biotechnology need to address before they become valuable as innovations. the need for biotechnologies that can be compatible to a decentralized, prevention-based health paradigm is evident because a conventional health system is unsustainable and incompatible with a developing nation’s budget, environment, and demographics. beyond identifying key biotechnologies, their development goes hand in hand with other efforts for improving health infrastructures. training programs are critical for improving skills of health workers, particularly in rural areas, and new technologies intended to work in these circumstances need to be introduced and involved at an early stage. faster and reliable communication and data storage systems will improve epidemiological surveillance and allow health workers to better customize diagnoses and treatments based on statistics pertinent to specific patients, as well as the local population as a whole. health education and awareness programs are important cost-effective interventions for stressing disease prevention and healthy lifestyles, and new technologies need to be understood by the populations they serve, in terms of access, changes in healthcare, and the potential positive and negative health side effects. a multidisciplinary approach with biotechnology is important for sustained and comprehensive improvements in health infrastructures and quality of care in developing countries. acknowledgements: i thank samuel sia for his research mentorship, eileen sun for helpful comments on manuscript, and the frank h. buck foundation for financial support in graduate studies. references: acharya, t., et al., strengthening the role of genomics in global health. plos med, 2004. 1(3): p. e40. acharya, t., a.s. daar, and p.a. singer, biotechnology and the un's millennium development goals. nat biotechnol, 2003. 21(12): p. 1434-6. alwan, a. and b. modell, recommendations for introducing genetics services in developing countries. nat rev genet, 2003. 4(1): p. 61-8. cheng, x., et al., a microfluidic device for practical label-free cd4(+) t cell counting of hiv-infected subjects. lab chip, 2007. 7(2): p. 170-8. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 12 chin, c.d., v. linder, and s.k. sia, lab-on-a-chip devices for global health: past studies and future opportunities. lab chip, 2007. 7(1): p. 41-57. daniell, h., s.j. streatfield, and k. wycoff, medical molecular farming: production of antibodies, biopharmaceuticals and edible vaccines in plants. trends plant sci, 2001. 6(5): p. 219-26. daar, a.s., et al., top ten biotechnologies for improving health in developing countries. nat genet, 2002. 32(2): p. 22932. edwards, d.a., et al., large porous particles for pulmonary drug delivery. science, 1997. 276(5320): p. 1868-71. gascoyne, p., j. satayavivad, and m. ruchirawat, microfluidic approaches to malaria detection. acta tropica, 2004. 89(3): p. 357-369. guy, b., the perfect mix: recent progress in adjuvant research. nat rev microbiol, 2007. 5(7): p. 505 mason, h.s., et al., edible plant vaccines: applications for prophylactic and therapeutic molecular medicine. trends mol med, 2002. 8(7): p. 324-9. millqvist-fureby, a., m. malmsten, and b. bergenstahl, an aqueous polymer two-phase system as carrier in the spray-drying of biological material. journal of colloid and interface science, 2000. 225(1): p. 54-61. mitragotri, s., immunization without needles. nat rev immunol, 2005. 5(12): p. 905-16. pulliam, b., j.c. sung, and d.a. edwards, design of nanoparticle-based dry powder pulmonary vaccines. expert opin drug deliv, 2007. 4(6): p. 651-663. shelby, j.p., et al., a microfluidic model for single-cell capillary obstruction by plasmodium falciparum-infected erythrocytes. proc natl acad sci u s a, 2003. 100(25): p. 14618-22. sia, s.k., et al., an integrated approach to a portable and low-cost immunoassay for resource-poor settings. angew chem int ed engl, 2004. 43(4): p. 498-502. taton, t.a., c.a. mirkin, and r.l. letsinger, scanometric dna array detection with nanoparticle probes. science, 2000. 289(5485): p. 1757-1760. tregoning, j.s., et al., protection against tetanus toxin using a plant-based vaccine. eur j immunol, 2005. 35(4): p. 1320-6. tsapis, n., et al., trojan particles: large porous carriers of nanoparticles for drug delivery. proc natl acad sci u s a, 2002. 99(19): p. 12001-5. undp, human development report 2001: making new technologies work for human development. 2001, united nations development programme: new york. vanbever, r., et al., formulation and physical characterization of large porous particles for inhalation. pharm res, 1999. 16(11): p. 1735-42. wong, y.l., et al., drying a tuberculosis vaccine without freezing. proc natl acad sci u s a, 2007. 104(8): p. 2591-5. yager, p., et al., microfluidic diagnostic technologies for global public health. nature, 2006. 442(7101): p. 412-8. microsoft word lempert_sdgs_final.doc consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 18, iss. 2 (2017), pp. 111–174 testing the global community’s sustainable development goals (sdgs) against professional standards and international law david lempert, ph.d., j.d., m.b.a., e.d. (hon) superlemp@yahoo.com southeast asia cultural and environmental heritage project, director vientiane, laos abstract this article examines the global community’s sustainable development goals (sdgs) agenda for 2016 to 2030 by applying several previously published professional and legal indicators, peer reviewed in a variety of fields, for measuring compliance with international law and professional standards in the social and management sciences for sustainable development, poverty reduction, and development to see how the sdgs do. overall, the sdgs show little change in substantive, ideological or implementation approach from the previous millennium development goals (mdgs). they are largely a reassertion of 19th and early 20th century european colonial approaches to weaker nations and cultures in violation of many of the principles established under international law for global peace, security and rights following the end of world war ii. the implications of this approach, despite the claims, are that the sdgs are likely to further threaten international law objectives for protecting cultural diversity, sovereignty, sustainability and survival in a way that undermines not just international law but also global security. keywords: sustainable development goals (sdgs); millennium development goals (mdgs); united nations; sustainable development; development biographical note: david lempert, ph.d., j.d., m.b.a., e.d. (hon.), social anthropologist and attorney, has pioneered approaches in comparative studies of development while also building the infrastructure for practical application and for interdisciplinary social science. he has worked in more than 30 countries and has founded ngos or projects in democratic experiential education, heritage protection, and sustainable development. this article is among a consilience lempert: testing the sdgs series of applied indicator and professional codes that he has published as part of an effort to protect professionalism and create accountability in the “development” sector/international interventions while promoting civilization and “progress”. author’s note: most of the discussions about “the future” when i was growing up were about expanding human potential and civilization in every field of activity from the sciences to the arts to social justice. the focus was not so much on materialism but on values, quality of life, discovery, diversity, democracy and participation, and creativity. these were all parts of the post-world war ii goals in international law and “development”, with a focus on social justice and peace and law, starting with the aspirations of individuals, communities and society as a whole. i focused my career on those visions, with skills of a lawyer, an anthropologist, and a manager, with experience in the arts and humanities and also experimentation in the sciences. most of that discussion seems to have now disappeared, with the focus now only on “survival” and economics as if we have been reduced to the state of animals and little more. we seem to live in an orwellian world where things are now the opposite of what they claim to be and there is little discussion of any kinds of possibilities or visions. “development” and “sustainable development” and measures of “progress” and “justice” seem to now be only shadows of their original meanings. we seem to have reversed the earlier goals of the international community that were enshrined and heralded in international laws, in the professional definitions and measures of “development”, and the ways we think about being human and civilized. in my career and this article, i have tried to make sure that we have real measures and standards to keep us on track so that we can move forwards rather than backwards and avoid making the same mistakes of the past. in this article, i apply these legal and professional measures and standards to the united nations’ sustainable development goals (sdgs) to show how the sdgs are erasing the actual universal development goals of humanity and imposing an agenda that has little to do with real “sustainability” or progress despite its claims. consilience 113 i. introduction on september 28, 2015, political leaders of the globe’s nation states gathered at the united nations to announce their agreement on a joint set of goals for which they called for commitments of some 1% of the gross world product (some $800 billion or more) per year for the next 15 years (using world bank gwp estimates: world bank, 2015). they called them the “sustainable development goals” (sdgs) or “agenda 2030”. u.n. secretary general ban ki moon described them as a kind of panacea, telling the 70th session of the u.n.’s general assembly that, “our destination is in our sights: an end to extreme poverty by 2030; a life of peace and dignity for all” (ban ki moon, 2015). most of the press simply reported moon’s rhetoric, calling the 17 sdgs and the 169 mostly non-quantified sub-goals a “towering achievement” and “inspiring” (ban ki moon, 2015), without presenting more substantive or opposing views. if the treatment of the sdgs in academic journals and in the press is similar to that for the millennium development goals (mdgs) that preceded them (u.n. millennium declaration, 2000; u.n., 2013), from 2001 to 2015 (and this seems to be the case in the author’s searches of the literature, to date), most publications are likely to refrain from criticism in the initial years and offer only a spirit of “optimism” and report on “implementation and progress” rather than “criticism and reflection” (fehling, nelson and vekatapuram, 2013). nevertheless, even during the several months leading up to the announcement, criticisms of what the sdgs needed to be doing and appeared not to be doing, slowly began to surface based on experiences with the mdgs. one critic, for example, describing the “impending failure of the sdgs” based on its initial draft, claimed it would likely be no more than a “rhetorical tool” calling for “homage” from “every government official and international aid worker” while “failing to hold accountable the appropriate actors in international development” (wisor, 2014). the same critic called it a “long and entirely unattainable wish list” as the result of “political lobbying by every interest group that wants their issue represented” in ways that “replay many of the flaws of the original mdgs.” consilience lempert: testing the sdgs russia’s foreign minister sergei lavrov, in addressing the u.n. general assembly at the time of adoption of the sdgs in late 2015, hinted that perhaps international development aid and the sdgs were little more than attempts at hegemony and propaganda. in his veiled criticism that did not identify exactly what agenda he believed was being promoted in the sdgs or what made russian assistance better, he noted that, by contrast, “russian development assistance is invariably aimed at solving the most pressing challenges faced by the countries in need. in these efforts, we are neither trying to lecture our partners on how they should build their lives, nor imposing political models and values” (south-south news, 2015). if the proposed global spending on the sdgs is to be an investment in assuring the sustainability of humans, the survival of the globe’s 6,000 remaining cultures in their eco-systems (krauss, 1992), and a reduction in the costs of conflict, environmental disasters, and of human suffering, it would be well worth it. an insurance cost of anywhere from 1-5% of global gdp, including a reduction in outputs in order to protect resources, would certainly be worth the investment to achieve these goals given the costs already spent in the global economy for insuring health, property, and security, that are now collectively much more than that. such an approach would be a major achievement and marked change, if not a reversal, from the international community’s spending on the mdgs that largely avoided any mention of sustainable development (other than in mdg 7 that was entitled merely “environmental sustainability”) during the previous 15 years. this author, like many others, welcomes serious international efforts on resolving global problems. yet, this author and many others have questioned whether the agenda of major nations and their leaders has accelerated these problems or, alternatively, has addressed them through strategies that adhere to international law and agreements and to protect humanity and the planet (lempert, 2017b; lempert and nguyen, 2009). indeed, the world’s cultures continue to be at risk (unesco, 2003; lempert, 2010). global impacts on poverty elimination are questionable (lempert, 2015a). the planet’s environment is in danger (worldwatch institute, 2015). the costs of crises continue. is the new 2030 agenda of sustainable development goals part of a solution recognized by u.n. representatives for performing their stewardship role and meeting the requirements agreed to under international law for “development” (lempert, 2014a, 2014b) or is it consilience 115 just the ineffective medicine, public relations, or perhaps something else, in new bottles? given public criticisms about global environmental treaties as unenforceable and lacking political will, the sdgs confront skepticism among many of those who focus on sustainable development, in regards to real commitments to the environment, indeed, international treaties and the united nations climate change conferences to discuss efforts related to those treaties year after year, such as the 21 annual conference of the parties (cop) to the u.n.’s framework on cimate change (unfccc, 1992) and the 11th conference of the parties to the 1997 kyoto protocol, led to mass public demonstrations worldwide in 2016 and continual criticism and disillusionment if not claims of “fraud” (milman, 2015). are the sdgs just another set of unenforceable “goals” talking the talk of “sustainability” but not taking the needed actions? even if there is commitment, what will they actually achieve? there are standards in public administration, law and managerial accounting that specify what makes plans and “action plans” actionable and enforceable (emmanuel, merchant and otley, 1990; garrison, noreen and brewer, 2005; seidman and seidman, 2000). there are ways to test international agreements and interventions like the sdgs and to hold them directly accountable to specific measures of effectiveness for public policy. these measures can answer the first question, about whether they are even enforceable and “actionable”, before getting to the question of whether they meet specific social science definitions and needs in “sustainable development”, “development” and other related goals like “poverty alleviation”. according to descriptions of the sdgs offered on the u.n.’s website, the process of formulating the sdgs was one that occurred with wide participation of non-governmental organizations (ngos) that are claimed to be in praise of the results (though certainly acknowledging that they all have self-interest in funding to implement it) (u.n., 2013b, 2015). this is praise offered by the participants in the process, many of whom will benefit directly in the sdgs and will share in the implementation of specific projects as “stakeholders”. while such praise carries some weight, it is not a systematic and scientific examination of the sdgs as a whole. given the numbers of sdgs and sub-goals as well as the lack of any real measurements or baselines, priorities, or even clarity of consilience lempert: testing the sdgs basic definitions in terms of professional measures (such as a basic definition of “sustainable” or “development” that references either bedrock international law or professionalism), making sense of the sdgs seems like a difficult task. the 17 target goals are double the previous 9 mdgs. the 169 sub-goals cover a wide range of issues and fields. neither the u.n., nor member states, nor any other professional body appears to have applied any procedure for screening the sdgs against international law or professional standards of sustainable development. nor does there seem to have been any references to professional measures and international legal definitions for development, sustainable development, progress, or long-term poverty reduction.. what makes this article different from other approaches to examining the u.n. system’s international goals, is that the author applies an integrated and systematic approach to the sdgs using the best available peer-reviewed scientific and professional measures of “sustainable development”, “development”, and “poverty reduction” as well as professional measures of consistency with international law, public administration effectiveness, and cultural change. most previous discussions have been ad hoc and focusing on single issues or particular impacts on development (fehling, nelson, and venkhatapuram, 2013), often by specific stakeholder beneficiaries in implementation with potential conflicts of interest. recent approaches to sustainability have also begun to take a technological or engineering focus in the belief that certain innovations that are being adapted in industrialized urban countries and cultures are also appropriate in the diverse cultures of the third world. the approach of this author, by contrast, is to recognize the different perspectives, choices, and needs of different cultures in their own environments and to apply systems thinking and measures from a variety of disciplines to test the actual workings of initiatives like the mdgs and sdgs. in examining the sdgs, one might also reasonably ask why the u.n. systems development goals are not coming directly out of the existing international laws and declarations that define “sustainability” and “development” and why they are not working from these directly. why is it that the u.n. system generated the sdgs through a process that did not directly systematize or reference the clear existing categories that were already established for international development in a body of laws over 70 years? indeed, consilience 117 this body of laws already sets a clear framework of long-term target goals for the international community that this author presented in several peer-reviewed journals as the recognized “universal development goals” of the international system (lempert, 2014b; 2014b; 2015a; lempert and nguyen, 2008). since other authors have also asked why the u.n. has refused to follow its own basis of international law and its universal goals in development in regards to the mdgs (saith, 2006; hill, mansour and claudio, 2010; waage, banerji, campbell, chirwa, collender, dieltiens and unterhalter, 2010), one might legitimately ask the discomforting question, why restate and redefine what already exists unless the purpose is to replace and divert attention from what already exists? in fact, there are methods for analyzing the sdgs against both international law and professional standards from social science and managerial science in the area of international development interventions and coming to reliable conclusions on their likely impacts. in the past, such analysis has been cumbersome, but there are now ways to streamline it. while there is a great deal of scientific and professional literature defining “sustainable development” as well as defining what makes international agreements effective, there have, up until recently, been few measurement tools that apply these definitions in ways that are comprehensive and represent a consensus in the scientific and professional community. in order to meet this gap, this author has been working with colleagues in sustainability and development and in various related disciplines such as law, public administration, social anthropology, and economics, to try to systematize development measures and to make them easier to use. the goal has not been to invent new standards, since standards already exist. it has been to take established standards in specific areas like “sustainable development” and international legal consensus in established treaties and international laws in areas like “development” as well as combinations of standards and laws in areas like “poverty reduction”, to identify the key elements that meet the definitions, and to place them in comprehensive but easy-to-use indicators to measure (and “score”) interventions to see how effective they are in meeting the required elements. in previous articles, this author has presented these measures (accountability indicators) in peer reviewed journals that have affirmed that the author’s indicators do, indeed, comprehensively consilience lempert: testing the sdgs represent the consensus science and legal agreements for those fields. the author has then measured the effectiveness of the mdgs in ways that have yielded scores for the legal accountability and effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the mdgs. these indicators show where the mdgs were meeting or failing to meet their goals, establishing a baseline for what the sdgs needed to do. indeed, recent articles by others criticizing the mdgs and calling for improvements in the sdgs have largely confirmed and reinforced what these measures highlight as the various aspects of weaknesses of the mdgs and needs for the sdgs (wisor, 2014; fehling, nelsonand vekatapuram, 2013; kabeer, 2010; fukuda-parr, 2010; hills, mansoor and claudio, 2010; saith, 2006; waage, banerji, campbell, collender, dieltiens, and unterhalter, 2010). this article examines the global community’s sustainable development goals (sdgs) agenda for 2016 to 2030 by applying three of these previously published professional and legal indicators for measuring compliance with international law and professional social and managerial science standards for sustainable development, poverty reduction, and development to see how the sdgs do and whether they actually reflect improvements on the mdgs. overall, the sdgs show little change in substantive, ideological or implementation approach from the previous millennium development goals (mdgs) that would reverse the legal accountability failures and professional shortcomings of the mdgs. they fail to meet professional and international legal standards in any of the three categories. this failure suggests that while they continue to make claims for attracting enormous amounts of global funds to be administered by a small group of officials and implementing organizations, they are in fact promoting an agenda of globalization, urbanization and assimilation that does not appear to be sustainable or in line with international law or with social science and management science standards. a fourth measurement test, using professional standards from anthropology to identify culture change, offers a simple comparison of the sdgs (and mdgs) with the pre-world war ii “civilizing missions” of european colonialism. it shows that both are largely a reassertion of 19th and early 20th century european colonial approaches to weaker nations and cultures. they are not only in violation of many of the principles established under international law for global peace, security and rights following the end of world war ii. despite the claims to the contrary by the u.n. system, the consilience 119 implications of this approach are that the sdgs are likely to further threaten cultural diversity, sovereignty, sustainability and survival in a way that undermines global security, the fundamental mission of the u.n. this article begins with a description of the sdgs and comparison to the mdgs that preceded them in a way that places the sdgs in the political context as a continuation from the mdgs, highlighting continuities and changes in a way that makes it easier to then use the comprehensive indicators to “score” the sdgs and to see whether or not, and by how much, they improve on the mdgs. it then describes the methodological basis of the four different tests that can be used to analyze the sdgs and that are used professionally to examine international (and domestic) development interventions. the piece then sequentially applies the four different tests to the sdgs and compares the results to those for the mdgs, using the scoring from the mdgs as a baseline and noting some slight but relatively inconsequential differences. ii. contextualizing the sdgs with the mdgs: both the mdgs and sdgs are part of an international political process of countries and organizations that provide inputs internationally and domestically in “development”. in trying to understand what the sdgs mean and what they may do, as well as how they might be used, one needs to see them in as a follow-up to the mdgs and to try to understand them in that context. this section presents descriptions and interpretive analyses of the sdgs in terms of form as a prelude to analysis of the sdgs as a policy tool in specific areas of development through measurement tests. the form of the sdgs as a policy document: • interpretive analysis of the sdgs as a policy document and an attempt at an “actionable” plan for readers who want to understand the content of the sdgs and their relationship to the mdgs, this description and analysis is presented in the annex: the content of the sdgs and a comparison to the mdgs: • interpretive content analysis of the comparative emphases of the sdgs and mdgs consilience lempert: testing the sdgs (i) the form of the sdgs as a policy document the international agreement presenting the sdgs is long and unusual for a policy document that purports to be a guide to action and spending. that raises questions about what kind of document it actually is and what its intentions are. perhaps the best way to describe it is as a very long list; but a list of what, to be used by whom to do exactly what? although the basic mission of the u.n. system is referenced, there are no clear links of the sdgs to that mission to explain how they further the key elements of global peace, security, and rights (including community/cultural protections and individual protections) that are the essential mission for the u.n. and the basis for its policies and interventions. there is a mission statement. it is to “free the human race from the tyranny of poverty” and to “heal and secure our planet” in a way such that “no one is left behind” (un, 2015, p. 2). the 35 page document introducing the sdgs offers only two overall measurable targets for the collective set of 17 sdgs: one for promoting income growth of weaker countries (7% gdp per year), using the measure of income and not assets/wealth or per capita wealth that is the standard professional measure of economic improvement (samuelson, 1961; nordhaus and tobin, 1972; stiglitz, 2009), and a second measure (in multiple parts) for how much money countries should provide to the u.n. and their implementing partners to spend on these goals (un, 2015, p. 26). although the 169 sub-goals are defined as “targets”, they are not, in fact, targets, because they offer few or no measures to aim at, and are mostly only categories. the identification of categories as goals makes sense if the goals were understandable within the context of overall objectives. if the overall purpose of the sdgs were actually to promote “sustainable development” to achieve the objectives of specific treaties or declarations under international law, such as the rio declaration on environment and development (u.n. conference on environment and development, 1992), they could potentially be written so as to target the systematic process or balance of sustainability (e.g., the scientific definition of “sustainability”, following the “ipat” equation for balancing consumption and production). similarly, if the overall purpose were to achieve longterm poverty alleviation in furtherance of specific goals that are also consilience 121 in international treaties, like the convention on the rights of the child (1989) or the u.n. international covenant on economic and social rights (1966), targets would need to identify root causes of poverty and behaviors that need to be changed. the “targeting” would be scientific selection and prioritization of the recognized approaches for changing behaviors so as to assure that poverty would not arise. the targets would also explain how to work within the political and cultural processes for institutionalizing these goals within cultures, communities, and national systems across the globe. where reducing poverty might require population control or social solidarity and redistribution (political changes), the target would be on the underlying human behaviors that prevent social solidarity and political equality. appropriate targets for long-term solutions would include explanations on how to balance competing short and longterm objectives, in ways that fulfill the different treaty obligations and are consistent with recognized principles. the sdgs, however, do not offer these types of “targets” and “measures”. the difficulty in determining what actual word applies to these “goals” is not the lack of “detail” of the list but the appropriateness or fit of the list within the context of these international treaty obligations and the scientifically and professionally measurable goals in an integrated, logical and systematic way in each national, cultural and community context, and with an appropriate process (the professionalism of public administration and measured goal setting and law). since all are entirely absent here even though they are also recognized as the key essential elements to any public policy, the form of the document can best be described as an aggregated list of disparate types of interventions from different constituencies that have been assembled together under 17 main categories and then 169 subordinate categories. iii. critique of the sdgs as a policy document and an attempt at an implementation plan of activities within the u.n. mandate and international law it is easy to be confused about what the sustainable development goals (sdgs) are and intend to do that goes beyond what was already happening internationally in “development” interventions because they are nothing more than a list of some 169 consilience lempert: testing the sdgs potential interventions, not integrated into the established and comprehensive approaches for achieving sustainability (ehrlich and holdren, 1971) or cultural survival. there are no priorities based on root causes of problems, categories, or strategies that would indicate they follow the basic prerequisites of public administration for effective and implementable policy (barry, 1984; bryson, 1988) and for accountability. nor are there ways of addressing potential conflicting objectives or competing priorities of “sustainability” and “poverty alleviation”, “growth” versus “sustainability”, or short-term versus long-term objectives. while some of these choices are to be left to local actors, one might ask what the actual value-added of the sdgs is over current political choices. how does it actually work to challenge current failed priorities that are leading to unsustainability and poverty given that they offer few clear measures that can be flexibly applied in different circumstances in ways that are consistent with principles of public management and achieving results (emmanuel, merchant, and otley, 1990)1? if its goal is to inform and direct country-specific goal setting in line with international treaties and in ways that overcomes previous failures, how does it why does it not it follow the standard principles of public policy in order to do that? rather than analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the sdgs as an “action plan”, this section tries to determine if there is an actual logic of the sdgs, that could be actionable, and attempts to decipher what it is and on what assumptions it is based, to see if there is a clear policy objective that could be actionable. a very quick way to analyze the sdgs and to decode or “deconstruct” its strategy, if a clear strategy exists, to see if its meets this requirement for effectiveness is to see if the 17 goals can be divided into some standard categories of goals that are used in any kind of planning document: end goals (results/output/outcome goals), intermediate goals (inputs/implementation goals), and professional, moral, and legal standards goals (protections/requirements and constraints). if so, these goals could then be placed into a sequence that would reveal the underlying logic of the document. 1 part of the confusion is that rather than start with the name “sustainable development” and then define it clearly, the u.n. secretary general and associated documents seem to describe the sdgs as geared to the same goal as the mdgs, to “end extreme poverty” (ban ki moon, 2015; u.n., 2015) rather than to achieve the purpose for which they are named, “sustainable development”. consilience 123 the un documents on the sdgs point to several main outcome goals even though they do not present a clear set of problems, root causes, or logic to try to solve them, which standard public management requires for effectiveness. the sdgs can be presented in full in three long sentences, dividing the goals into end goals, intermediate/implementing goals, and standards. here is what the sdgs seek to do and how: 1) the ultimate or end goal of the 2030 agenda is to “end hunger” (sdg 2) and “end poverty” (sdg 1) by goals that could be considered end goals (and partly intermediate goals) of increasing incomes, increasing global consumption of “modern energy” (sdg 7) and improving sanitation (sdg 6) and health (sdg 3). (these are the outputs/results goals) 2) international actors seek to achieve the above end goals by promoting economic growth of at least 7% per year in lesser developed countries and by creating employment (sdg 8) through technology transfer and globalization (sdg 17), industrialization (sdg 9), industrial agriculture (sdg 2 in combination with sdg 17), urbanization (sdg 11) and homogenization (reducing inequality by standardizing consumption and incomes) (sdg 10). this includes mechanisms of state education (sdg 4) and gender equality (sdg 5) in ways that provide more efficiency and participation at the local level (sdg 16) (these are the means/input goals but note that one might raise questions about some of them as to whether they are actually means/input goals or ends, like industrialization (sdg 9) and perhaps others)) 3) international actors promise to achieve this increased consumption by taking unstated actions that are either inputs or additional activities to combat climate change (sdg 13) while “sustainably using” the world’s marine resources (sdg 14), and terrestrial ecosystems and forests (sdg 15). additionally, signatories agree to halt biodiversity loss, land degradation and desertification (sdg 15), and ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns (sdg 12), recognizing that developing countries do not have to follow any of these protections and can focus on consumption and exploitation of resources (sdg 12), and noting that these goals for protection have no priority since the goals of consilience lempert: testing the sdgs resource exploitation are to be treated “as of equal weight” (sdg 17) and that all country governments can pick and choose from the sdgs in response to whatever pressures and financial incentives they receive, without any obligations. (these are the unbinding conditions for achieving the overall list of goals) in looking at the above list, one might also ask why all of the goals relating to sustainability in the sdgs seem to be relegated to unrelated inputs (e.g., sdgs 12, 14 and 15) rather than placed as end goals. the answer is that the sdg document does not prioritize sustainable balances of consumption and production or survival of cultures in their environments as the ultimate ends or as the means to achieving poverty reduction. although all of the goals are to be considered as “equal”, the document seems to highlight “growth”. so, if there could be said to be an underlying “priority” of the equal goals, it seems to be “growth”. the basic assumption of the sdg agenda, stated at the beginning of the document, is that “eradicating poverty ... is an indispensible requirement for sustainable development” (un, 2015, p. 2) and not the other way around (i.e., sustainable use of resources is the only way to protect against poverty). it is possible that this statement is simply being used as a way to try to explain a link with the mdgs and the naming of the sdgs. there is no description of where this assumption comes from, how it fits within the u.n. mission and established u.n. laws (if they do), or on what evidence it is based. note that there is no explanation or justification in the document as to the choice for highlighting or the validity of gross domestic product (gdp) as only one of a relatively small number of specific measures in the document. nor is there an explanation of how it is consistent with either “sustainable development” or “poverty alleviation” (un, 2015, p. 26) given that many economists believe that at least for many communities in fragile environments, the only way to achieve sustainability is through a “steady state” or “de-growth” (daly, and farley, 2003; daly, 2011). it is increasing the consumption of peoples in vulnerable eco-systems to levels of global mass culture that threatens sustainability (lempert, 2015a). moreover, the use of gdp as a target measure is also widely discredited both within environmental economics and within public and private accounting since it violates the professional measurement standard of economics (samuelson, 1961; nordhaus and tobin, 1972; stiglitz, 2009). gdp measures only short-term income, often at the expense consilience 125 of long-term wealth (e.g., through rapid sale of assets) and of percapita increases in wealth (even if higher incomes increase wealth, per capita wealth may decline as population grows, making people poorer even though gdp rises) (mishan, 1967; dasgupta and maler, 2000; van den bergh, 2009). indeed, almost all sustainable development experts understand the logic of sustainability to be the reverse of the assumption offered in the sdgs; “growth” is only part of sustainability when cultures choose to continually increase their consumption within their environments and where “growth” is possible and practical in those environments. “sustainability” requires a balance of levels of consumption (and population) appropriate to those environments. it is also this balance that achieves “poverty alleviation”. notwithstanding this conundrum in the basic logic of the sdgs, it is also important to note that there is no clear fit of this document with other activities of the international community in regard to sustainability and the failures of those agreements in terms of setting priorities and enforcing them also is likely to occur here as with the mdgs (amir, 2005; hains and cassells, 2004). since the various competing goals and indicators are to be treated as of equal weight (sdg 17), countries and donors financing country agendas can claim that by achieving all 9 sdgs that promote growth and none of the 8 for sustainability, that they are “in fulfillment of the sdgs” even if they are actually putting countries on paths that they know to be unsustainable and that accelerate climate change. what the sdgs do, similar to the mdgs, is allow recipient countries, donors, and implementing ngos to cherry pick items from the list that they favor, without having to consider either the overall balance or any kinds of side effects. since the goals are themselves inconsistent with the agenda of “sustainability” or with any kind of overall balance, this “freedom” of selection is actually an invitation for chaotic and ineffective policy. the un’s goal of trade and globalization that is enshrined in sdg 17 and expands on mdg 8, notes that, “the means of implementation targets under goal 17 and under each sustainable development goal are key to realizing our agenda and are of equal importance with the other goals and targets” (un, 2015, p 10). as with the mdgs, under the sdgs there are no challenges or changes to government planning processes that today are largely consilience lempert: testing the sdgs influenced by agendas of international banks financing “development”. that means that the selection of goals will be subject to the same political pressures and decisions as under the mdgs. if the same political processes continue, without change, one can assume that the sustainable consumption goals will be de-emphasized or discarded as they were in the application of the mdgs. as the sdg document makes clear, “each government will also decide how these aspirational and global targets should be incorporated into national planning processes, policies and strategies” with the recognition that the priority can continue to be on increased production and consumption (un, 2015, p. 13). although the u.n. made it clear that the sdgs were to be accomplished at the national and regional level to pay attention to different “national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting national policies and priorities”, the only measure they have offered for the science and logic of sustainability is in fact the goal of the international financial system (gdp) that has nothing to do with sustainability. the problem of the sdg agenda in a nutshell is that it offers no “strategic” advice or integrated, systematic set of measures and goals, nor even guidance as to the level of application (country, community, or cultures) or beneficiaries. even though the sdgs are described as “indivisible and interlinked” (un, 2015, p. 32), there is no strategy of integrated development and no benchmark of human or global progress, nor reference to specific international treaties and objectives. 2 in the area of sustainable development, sustainability experts recognize the need to approach ecosystems and human systems in an integrated way. here, however, in the sdgs, the list of measures is more akin to the identification of specific species in a forest. rather than offer approaches to protect the forest, its list is one geared to the protection of individual trees. by analogy, if one were trying to help a group of families to recognize and prepare healthy, balanced and nutritious meals over the 2 as a document for government spending and for international intervention, sdgs lacks almost all of the professional requirements required by development agencies or governments for clear problem solving mission and strategy (edwards and hulme, 2002; emmanuel, merchant and otley, 1990; unterman and davis, 1984). there is no problem statement other than a list of all of the realities of human history (inequality, violence, natural disasters, resource degradation) (un, 2015, p. 5), no root cause analysis of problems, no analysis of previous actions and lessons learned or corrections, and no logical framework of inputs, outputs and priorities. consilience 127 long-term and on their budgets, for their families, one would focus on strategies, processes, and priorities, with some clear measures. one would not simply list every potential nutritious food in a list that looked like a buffet. the sdg list is akin to this kind of a buffet. in summary, the danger with the sdgs is that the same short-term pressures and individualist agendas that currently guide international interventions and that have exacerbated climate change and led to unsustainability, will not be addressed because there is no attempt to identify the current failures and to offer a strategic approach to confront them either at the country level or the international level. where country governments and communities are often too weak to stand up to international pressures that undermine appropriate development and sustainability, and where communities and cultures lack the authority to hold their own governments, international development organizations, and private international actors (international investors) accountable, the sdgs does not attempt to offer any support to change this dynamic (lempert, 2008). many current u.n. and other international “action plans” are little more than symbolism or, more cynically, fundraising tools for self-interested bureaucrats and organizations, to attract resources for the short-term treatment of symptoms rather than solving problems, and it appears that the sdgs also falls into this category (lempert, 2014c). a standard political science analysis based on “political interests” would suggest that the organizations selected to participate in the processes designing the sdgs each had potential conflicts of interest in funding their implementation. iv. methodology: fundamental principles behind the indicators the main body of this article applies four different peer reviewed scientific measures to the sdgs, comparing the sdgs in four different areas to the mdgs to see how both do and to see the amount of change between the sdgs and the mdgs. three of these tests measure compliance with the specific agreed elements of international law and the scientific elements of professionalism in the areas of intervention where both the mdgs and sdgs claim to offer solutions – sustainable development, poverty alleviation, and development, itself. a fourth, test, directly from the social science of consilience lempert: testing the sdgs cultural change, tests whether the sdgs and mdgs reflect a continuation of pre-world war ii colonial “development” (missionizing) policies. each of these measures (or “indicators”) are those published by this author -for sustainable development (lempert and nguyen, 2008), for poverty alleviation (lempert, 2015a), and for development (lempert, 2014a) as well as for social change comparisons between the mdg agenda and french colonial “civilizing mission” policies (lempert, 2014b) – the first three indicators are nothing more than the identification, compilation, and systematization of the key international legal elements agreed to under international law in each of the indicator areas along with accepted definitions in the scientific communities for the key concepts in the treaties in areas like sustainability science, social sciences, and management sciences (policy science, public administration, and public and private management). the first three indicators do nothing more than identify the key elements and aggregate them so that international interventions can be “scored” or “scaled” to see how many of the key, required elements, they fulfill. to assure that these indicators are consistent with the professional consensus in their fields, they have undergone careful peer review. they have also each been tested on several different interventions to demonstrate that they reveal a range of scores and to also create a baseline calibration for scoring. each of the cited articles demonstrates this process in detail. the final indicator, measuring social change, takes a historical example of interventions from a century ago, applies a version of the indicator for “development” that is consistent with the post-world war ii international treaty definitions and scientific and professional definitions for “development” and establishes the two as comparative historical baselines. these baselines can then be used to see whether contemporary interventions like the mdgs and sdgs are closer to the interventions during the era of french colonialism or to the contemporary requirements, and to score the differences. to create indicators, i used a procedure that is well recognized both in legal analysis, for the creation of standards of proof and in “codification” of law, and in sciences and social sciences. in courts, legal determinations rest on meeting specific “elements” of proof. similarly, scientific tests also rely on meeting specific elements of definitions. in the areas of “sustainable development”, “poverty alleviation” and “development”, there are international treaties that use these terms and that mention their consilience 129 elements, but in ways that are often additive and unsystematic. the treaties also use terms from areas like sustainability science, social science, and management science but do not include the scientific definitions. what i have done is to look systematically at each of these areas and to compile the specific elements in international laws while enumerating the specific elements of sustainability science, social science and management science. the result is a set of systematic measures where before there were only ad hoc judgments. in place of competing, idiosyncratic, and often subjective critiques, i have developed more generalized, objective, consensus measures. the methodology for extracting basic principles from laws (here, from the body of international treaties, including basic international law starting with the u.n. charter, 1945; u.n. genocide convention, 1948; rome statute, 1998; u.n. international declaration of human rights, 1948; u.n. convention on the rights of the child, 1989; u.n. conference on environment and development, 1992; other u.n. rights treaties, 1966 and 1966; and the u.n. declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, 2007) is used regularly by lawyers and judges when trying to find the precepts underlying laws and is referred to as “statutory analysis”. though bodies drafting laws do not always fully define the theories and principles that they use when they reach a consensus and draft a law or a group of laws, legal scholars and judges routinely use laws and legal documents to reconstruct the underlying principles in order to apply them (cross, 1995; beninion, 2009; sutherland, 2010). in sustainability science, social science, and management sciences, the extraction of the basic principles and scientific elements is generally easier. these fields already have standardized textbooks defining terms and most of these terms have been in use for decades. for example, the basic definition of “sustainability” as a balance between production and consumption and represented by the “ipat equation” is a long-agreed scientific standard, just as managerial accounting and strategic management principles have long been standardized. in putting these definitions into measurement indicators, i simply draw from the recognized textbooks and then confirm that they are appropriately applied through article peer review. note that in applying these tests to the sdgs, there is no way of knowing at this point how the sdgs will actually be implemented, if at all. however, the scoring comparisons with the mdgs are valid consilience lempert: testing the sdgs because the implementation process for the sdgs is the same as that for the mdgs, and is also similar for many other contemporary international development interventions. the approach that i have used in scoring them using indicators is simply to look on paper at whether the key dimensions (the key elements used for scoring in the indicator) are referenced in the document. that says nothing about whether they are actually implementable or whether they can or will be overridden. however, since the existence of certain management procedures is also part of the scoring, the absence of specific procedures is a good proxy for the likelihood of effectiveness since successful management systems would have these procedures. what these tests do is offer a set of basic elements and considerations that must be found in an intervention document in specific categories in order to be consistent with international law and established professional goals in that category. since there is an assumption that use of certain terms and intent means familiarity and application of the professional standards and existing law, the sdgs likely would be scored even higher in this article than they might later be scored in practice, simply on the basis of mentioning certain intent. this means that any low scores of the sdgs should immediately raise red flags since the actual scoring of the sdgs in practice are likely to be even lower than those revealed using this methodology. this also explains why the sdgs may appear to score higher in some categories than the mdgs, even where there may be no difference in application (or where the sdgs may be worse in application). that is because the scoring of the mdgs now includes a history of how previous “goals” that were also initially just a written list, were actually implemented or not implemented, in practice. the scores, themselves, are not “weighted” and do not offer a quantitative measure of the impacts of spending that could be used for “cost-benefit” or other spending efficiency, though it is possible that they could be used in this way in the future if “sustainability” or “sustainable poverty alleviation” or “development” could actually be quantified. the scores are just the sums of all of the required elements for each indicator. the scoring system for most of the indicators is “yes” (one point) or “no” (no points) with a “debatable” (half point) where there is insufficient information or professional agreement. in testing this scoring, i have used a wide variety of cases to assure that the scores result in a full spectrum of low to high scores to differentiate various interventions. in thinking about these tests, readers should think about them in the same way that they consilience 131 think of their scores on standardized tests or on final exams in their courses. the scores, themselves, are not real or “absolute” measures. they are simply ways of differentiating various levels of achievement or aptitude for, or compliance with, whatever is being tested. the processes are not perfect and sometimes there is some variation between scorers. with more cases and more discussion, there is more consistency. v. sustainable development test (i) methodology the scoring indicator used for the mdgs and sdgs in the area of sustainable development is based on the scientific standard for sustainability that can be found in every basic textbook on sustainability; the “ipat” equation that balances production and consumption over the long-term (ehrlich and holdren, 1971). it also adds other related legal and procedural elements for sustainability planning that are found in international laws and treaties like the u.n. genocide convention (1948) and the rio declaration on sustainable development (1992). note that the standard in “sustainability science”, the ipat equation, requiring balances of consumption and production within specific environments, can be applied at both the levels of cultures and of complex societies, and this is also something found in the international treaties. the science, itself, is substantiated now with multi-disciplinary studies of historic “collapses” and adaptations where there was a failure or a recognition of these principles (tainter, 1988; diamond, 2005; rankin, bargun and kokko, 2007). overall, the indicator recognizes nine elements that are part of an integrated, systematic approach to “sustainable development” policy in ways that are required for accountability to the international framework and to scientific principles. optimal and effective approaches include all nine elements (lempert and nguyen, 2008). the analysis is presented directly in table 1, with lines on the table representing each element in the test and with explanations of whether the mdgs and sdgs satisfy the conditions of these elements. for readers not familiar with that indicator or who have forgotten the basic, bedrock principles defining sustainability and the consilience lempert: testing the sdgs basic international agreements, there is some attempt in the left-hand column of the table to clarify that what is being scored with capsule summaries of these scientifically established and internationally agreed basics. on this nine point scale, with a score of seven points denoting a sustainable or partly sustainable solution and under 1.5 points an unsustainable quick fix, the best the sdgs can do with generous scoring is 5.5 points. consilience 133 table 1. scoring of sdgs and on sustainability indicator indicator quest ion ”optimist i c outcome” scor ing o f sdgs i planning framework: implementing the commitments that countries have already made to “sustainability” and cultural protections in a systematic way: while issues are raised, there is no call for government planning frameworks at the level of national assemblies, parliaments, and lead ministries (rather than line ministries) and their counterparts in local governments, communities, and cultures, to assure that “sustainable development” is part of the longterm economic and social planning frameworks, fully integrated with and not subordinate to plans only focusing on the economic productivity or other short-term goals. question 1. the project uses the sustainability equation and tries to make predictions for balances of consumption and production to assure cultural/community/national sustainability for the next 50 years (two generations, the minimum period for projecting human cultural sustainability)? 0 points question 2. in implementing core international agreements on sustainability, the project builds a continuing government process to insure that some local governmental body uses the sustainability equation and enforces sustainable planning in public policy in a way that projects into the future and measures the four key factors in the equation? 0 points or 0.5 points. even though sdg 12 calls for “sustainable consumption and production patterns”, it does not call for planning or for balance, or for a government process to assure this. though sdg 15 calls for “sustainable use of terrestrial eco-systems”, the indicators are really geared at industrial sustainability, with no population plan or government process other than individual family planning services for sexual health (sdg 3.7). there is no asset accounting. ii consumption patterns: no focus on consumption but possible impacts question 3. the project manages consumption so that per capita wealth (or increases in per capita wealth) is not eaten up by increased population or by wasteful spending that does not improve long-term per capita wellbeing (health, safety and lifespan)? 1 point, given the benefit of the doubt that industrialization with health and education improvements along with focus on gender equality (sdg 5) will slow population growth and there is a focus on “healthy lives” (sdg 3). there is some consumption planning in sdg 12, but no measure of population or type of consumption, only on recycling and minimizing waste. the lack of recognition of the strategic goal of balancing production and consumption and protecting resources in this way, however, essentially raises doubt about the real long-term consilience lempert: testing the sdgs population and consumption planning that is required for sustainability. iii productivity impact (economics): no actual focus on asset balance but possible impact question 4. the project results in no total loss of value of per capita assets (wealth) in the system? 1 point, given the benefit of the doubt of sdg’s calling for social investments such as sdg 4 (quality education) and concerns for health in sdgs 3 and 6. question 5. the project results in long-term continuing productivity increases (not just a one-time technology transfer or investment) or stable per capita productivity consistent with the “ipat equation” for sustainability in societies/cultures with growing populations and consumption? 1 point, given the benefit of the doubt of sdg 8 calling for “sustainable economic growth”, sdg 9 for sustainable industrialization and foster innovation iv overall impact on global environment (the quality of assets that are protected): some calls for protection question 6. the project ‘internalises’ the costs of any changes (of productivity and consumption) so that any harms to the global environment are paid for and fixed with money from any benefits generated by the project? 1 point given the benefit of the doubt that sdgs calling for “sustainable use” of ecosystems will protect quality (sdg 15 to protect biodiversity and sustainable use of ecosystems; sdg 14 to protect oceans; sdg 13 action on climate change) question 7. the project has no negative impact on the ecosystem integrity or survival? 1 point given the benefit of the doubt of the multiple sdgs with discrete environmental measures such as sdg 17 on global implementation of non-implemented agreements, sdg 15 to protect biodiversity and sustainable use of eco-systems; sdg 14 to protect oceans; sdg 13 action on climate change. v impact on global cultural diversity (human aspects of development): no protections. question 8. the project reflects the cultural integrity and special characteristics of each separate cultural group it affects (including positive system preserving changes)? 0 points. question 9. the project helps reverse any legacy of colonialism and builds new self-sufficient communities rather than reinforcing dependency? 0 points. total partial solution: 5.5 points (with generous scoring) consilience 135 (ii) analysis of results for sustainable development test although the sdgs now give lip service to production and consumption planning, for example, there are no calls for long-term measurements and projections to effectively carry out this planning, no calls for changing consumption patterns, no calls for population planning or for any introduction of sustainability into long-term government planning. in other words, the sdgs are not including the simple, basic, recognized measures for sustainable development, even though they are certainly well-known to the international community. a second part of sustainable development, that is enshrined in international law but has disappeared from the sdgs, is the right of indigenous peoples and other cultures to cultural protection of their production and consumption choices, within their resource bases. the protection of peoples is key to sustainable development in several ways; particularly the ability to maintain sustainability within specific eco-systems. by promoting all of the factors that would actually assimilate and destroy cultures and that are known to uproot peoples (international trade, urbanization, and growth at the national and international level), the sdgs appear to be promoting an agenda that will erase the historical knowledge of sustainability at the local level while in fact ratcheting up population and consumption in ways that are likely to destabilize societies and undermine the potential for sustainability. again, since the fundamentals are well known to the international community, the choice not to recognize these principles in the sdgs seems to reflect a conscious agenda in the sdgs. by putting an emphasis on homogenization of standards, on assimilation and on raising incomes rather than on protecting resources as wealth and on achieving sustainable balances within diverse cultures and choices, the sdgs actually appear to undermine many of the long recognized keys to sustainable development in the name of sustainable development. even without expertise in the area of sustainable development, it is easy for anyone looking at the sdgs and the scoring to understand why the sdgs do not meet either professional or internationally agreed standards for sustainable development. the real key to a sustainable development solution is to follow a simple equation that balances consumption and production within specific resource bases and to make sure that the equation is part of a government planning system so that the balance is maintained for the long-term projected future (at least two generations or 50 years), with tailoring to specific cultural groups and environments, which is also recognized in international law. the key components of consumption include population and per capita consumption choices, not just the technologies to minimize waste or increase efficiency, though these consilience lempert: testing the sdgs are certainly important choices, particularly in urban, industrial cultures. the key components of production include the available resources and the technologies of production, including the long-term measures for those resources and technology. if societies choose paths of technological growth and increased consumption, they must also consider and plan their real long-term potential for new technologies and increased productivity, given that technological change for societies that are already industrial, is speculative and dependent on continuing investments and ability to create and apply new technologies. overall, neither the mdgs nor the sdgs appear to be doing anything more than offering very basic attention to sustainable development, with the sdgs doing only marginally better than the mdgs. neither achieves a solution that is in line with international agreements such as the rio declaration (un, 1992) or international rights conventions or professional measures. consilience 137 vi. poverty alleviation test the technology of poverty alleviation draws from both management science and social science. effective, long-term, poverty alleviation requires addressing root causes and achieving social changes that go well beyond the treating of the symptoms of poverty or inequality by simply transferring existing resources and technology (lewis, 1969; gunder frank, cochroft, and johnson, 1972; wallerstein, 1979; cloward and piven, 1993; rank, yoon, hirschl, 2003; picketty, 2014). the measurement indicator used here draws from the consensus in international law on definitions of “poverty alleviation” as something different from “development” and not a substitute for it (u.n. convention on the rights of the child, 1989, articles 6, 27; u.n. declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, article 2 and 8). it also recognizes the use of management science principles in addition to social science (barry, 1984; bryson, 1988; edwards and hulme, 2002; garrison, noreen and brewer, 2005). given some of the technical complexities of assuring real long-term poverty alleviation, addressing root causes rather than treating symptoms, the measurement indicator used here to test the sdgs relative to the mdgs includes some 12 elements (lempert, 2015a). they are divided into three categories, with six elements for reducing “absolute” poverty in order to meet basic needs (streeten, et. al., 1981), two elements for reducing “relative” poverty and inequality through efforts to assure equal opportunity and redistribution consistent with international rights treaties, and four elements to recognize many of the pitfalls that occur in anti-poverty programs such as forced relocations, forced urbanization, enforced economic choices and trade regimes on local communities, and other activities that are in violation of international laws like the genocide convention (1948) and rome statutes (1998), as well as international declarations and treaties for respecting cultural choices and protecting cultural integrity such as the u.n. declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (2007) and the u.n. convention on the rights of the child (1989) as well as basic rights treaties following the u.n. declaration of human rights (1948). although there are only these 12 elements, the reality in international development interventions is that many communities and peoples are now harmed by “development” policies that force them off of their lands and disrupt their lifestyles. that means that the international community not only recognizes these essential elements in “poverty alleviation” but also recognizes that there is an affirmative duty, under international law, to protect against the harms. this means that four elements there is both a positive value in poverty alleviation for the inclusion of the element as well as a duty to assure that rights are protected and that harms do not occur. so these elements can be scored twice, once for their inclusion consilience lempert: testing the sdgs (a positive score) and once on whether they take protective precautions (no score if they do, since this is a duty in the international system, but loss of a point if they don’t). this means that the full range of potential scoring in this category is 16 total points, or a spectrum ranging from (-4) points to 12 points. the scoring of the mdgs and sdgs in the area of poverty alleviation is presented on table 2. for readers not familiar with the principles of poverty reduction, there is some attempt in the left-hand column to clarify what is being scored using capsule summaries. for this indicator, an absence of professionalism in the first four of the categories is scored as negligence creating harm and one point can be subtracted (a score of (-1) in calculating the scoring. the full scale ranges from (-4) points to 12 points. on this 16 point scale, with a score of 10-12 points denoting true poverty reduction, 6.5-9.5 points as strong approaches that may lack attention to sustainability or cultural protection, 0-6 points as partial solutions that may endanger individuals or cultures in the name of equity, and (-4) to 0 points as failed approaches to poverty reduction with a conflicting agenda that promotes harms in violation of established rights under international law. consilience 139 table 2. scoring of sdgs compared to mdgs on poverty alleviation indicator indicator scor ing o f mdgs scor ing o f sdgs i. explor ingthe choice o f agenda: the ideology of the un system remains one of promoting globalization and industrialization in which quick generation of income is to be partly diverted to the poor, who are turned into workers for the global system even as their cultures and environments are destroyed. there is lip service to sustainable production and consumption and to rights concerns, which marginally raises the scoring on the mdgs (-4) points, to (-3) points for the sdgs. 1. protection of sustainable cultures? no. although the un treaties on genocide and the rio declaration explicitly recognize cultures as the basic unit for sustainable development and while they recognize “sovereignty”, all of their measures are at the country level with governments, and even at that level there is no focus on sustainability. (-1) points. same or worse. there is not a single mention of “culture”, “cultural survival” or “community” in the sdgs and the goal seems to be to promote a single national and global industrial plan and approach (sdg 17, 12, 8). (-1) points. 2. sovereignty of cultures in their ecosystems without foreign conflicts of interest? the un system’s agenda based on the mdgs is intertwined with trade and with growth, in promoting the agenda of globalism and working directly with “development” banks as well as in “partnerships” with business. it does not challenge government agendas to disrupt cultures and push peoples into the global economy as the approach to “poverty reduction”. (-1) points. same or worse. the agenda of globalization and standardization is now enshrined in sdg 17. (-1) points. 3. root causes (political and social) of absolute and relative poverty are addressed? the un system’s project documents no longer require problem tree analysis and examination of root causes but simply offer “situation analyses” that usually report on gdp and “growth” in line with international bank agendas. there is a reluctance to address political inequality and oppression since the un system essentially sees government elites that may cause the inequalities as its “partners”. same. there is no mention at all of root causes of poverty and inequality. on the positive side are suggestions that participation and transparency would help (sdg 16), but the sdgs that specifically target inequality (sdg 10, 1, 2) make no mention of the need for income redistribution, social solidarity, or reduced consumption of the rich, loss of lands and eco-systems and cultural practices and rights of consilience lempert: testing the sdgs (-1) points. minority cultures, or of the problems of the power and nontransparency of international economic and political institutions that are further empowered and that are the real source of power in lesser developed countries (sdg 17). (-1) points 4. protection of human dignity (assuring protections of human rights, land rights, and community integrity in accordance with the rome statutes,, 1998)? in implementing the mdgs, the un defines its measures as income and growth without commitment to diversity and full rights protections. (-1) points. while the approach does not consider cultures, consumption choices, or population, sdg proponents would argue that they will deal with resource protections and sustainability (sdg 12), that they have introduced political concerns (sdg 16) and that they do not directly conduct genocide through extermination. (0) points ii . achiev ing sustainable , long-term (absolute) poverty reduct ion (total) though the un treaties and statements may give lip service to sustainable poverty reduction, the un system (undp) itself admits that poverty reduction is coming at the expense of the environment, that it requires continued “growth” (that is likely unsustainable) and that it does no long term sustainability planning. people remain vulnerable and poverty may simply be postponed, with a quick attention to symptoms and perhaps simply “regulating the poor” as a form of short term political control. the sdgs actually encourage “poor” countries to opt out of sustainability concerns and to focus on short-term poverty reduction as they urbanize and assimilate into the global economy. 0 points 5. the focus is on long-term per capita wealth, not on short term incomes? no. the undp, for example, makes clear that “per capita gdp”, a measure of short term income, fueled by “growth” is its goal. though the environment is to be protected as one of the mdgs, there is no accounting for the value of environmental assets as wealth. 0 points. same or worse. there is not a single per capita measure of assets or call for asset accounting, while attention continues to be on incomes (sdg 8). 0 points. 6. culturally appropriate consumption is promoted? no. the undp uses the human development index, that focuses on a single standard of consumption, and it addresses poverty not through changed consumption but through “growth” in productivity. same. despite the many mentions of “sustainable consumption” (sdg 12), the goal is a single industrialized economy (sdg 17) that continues to “grow” (sdg 1, 8) and industrialize (sdg 9) with no one “left behind” consilience 141 0 points. (unassimilated) (sdg 10). 0 points 7. culturally appropriate production is promoted? no. there is no protection of traditional economic activities and the un system often includes funding specifically to change attitudes in order to promote production for globalization. 0 points. same or worse. the sdgs call for replacing traditional production with a single industrial standard (sdg 17) including industrial agriculture (sdg 2). 0 points. 8. culturally appropriate and sustainable population policies are part of the approach? no. although the un system includes the unfpa, its arm for population, and may offer family planning as part of women’s health, there is no demographic sustainability planning. 0 points. same or worse. population is not mentioned anywhere in the sdgs. nor is per capita protection of assets mentioned, despite all of the mentions of “sustainable consumption”. the focus is on “growth” (sdg 8). 0 points. 9. equitable (political rights) protections for cultures are promoted? no. the un system takes a narrow view of genocide and intervenes only in civil wars when deaths are occurring, not to protect cultures in other respects. 0 points. same or worse. the only political protections mentioned (sdg 16) are for individuals for “inclusive” societies, not cultural protection and survival. 0 points. 10. equitable (promotion of identity) protections for cultures are highlighted? no. while unesco has the mandate to protect culture and sometimes does now protect local languages, it seems to see language protection as a key to promoting globalization, and heritage protection as a way to promote tourism, rather than to protect identity and pride of cultures. 0 points. same or worse. there is a mention of global cultural heritage protection (sdg goal 11.4) but not a single mention of cultural protection. the sdgs seek to urbanize (sdg 9) and assimilate (sdg 17). 0 points. iii . eliminat ing relat ive poverty by promoting equity : the un system rarely considers political and institutional or social changes to promote equity, given that it works directly with government elites, but some of its impacts do create a partial leveling effect. there is little new under the sdgs. 1 point 11. impact on opportunity and equity for individuals? debatable. although the gini coefficient is not used, some un system interventions do look at tax structures and at distributions, even though undp projects may actually be subsidizing the wealthy and cementing or skewing inequalities. same. although sdg 10 now calls for reducing inequality, it is through employment for the poor and technology transfer/homogenization of cultures, not through taxation, social justice or protections. 0.5 points. consilience lempert: testing the sdgs 0.5 points. 12. reliance on human rights based approaches to promote opportunity and equity for individuals? debatable. the un system, including un women and unicef, does promote opportunities for women in an urban, industrial system and sometimes pushes for more educational opportunity and legal access, though it has never called for equal education or equal access to lawyers anywhere and simply seems to create a floor with some basics for the poor rather than real equity. 0.5 points. same. although sdg 4 calls for equitable education and sdg 16 calls for equal justice, the specific indicators do not show clear human rights based approaches in institutional changes in law and politics to ensure enforcement. 0.5 points total: the indicator reveals the un system as essentially treating some short term symptoms of poverty while covering up larger systemic problems, in a way that destroys cultural diversity and promotes globalization. the approach to poverty reduction is unsustainable. (-3) points. there is almost no difference in the short term approach to poverty with the mdgs, and the ideologies of urbanization and short-term treatment of symptoms are even stronger. sdg proponents say that the recognition of the environment is, itself, a marginal improvement but symbolism, alone, without the guidance and infrastructure for results, in what is an action document, is a sign, itself, of failure. (-2) points (i) analysis of results for poverty alleviation test almost everything in the mdg and sdg approach to poverty reduction fails to meet international legal and professional standards. there is no attention to root causes of poverty or to institutional (political system) or cultural changes. without attention to the recognized elements of poverty reduction, the long-term result of the mdgs and sdgs is likely to generate poverty by promoting increases in population and by destabilizing environments and cultures. the focus is on quick, short-term transfers and growth that experts see as a postponement of poverty through quick and temporary solutions. although this was one of the major critiques of the mdgs (maxwell, 2003; van norren, 2012), it remains unaddressed in the sdgs. consilience 143 neither the sdgs nor the mdgs promote any kind of income distribution or political power distribution, nor do they offer any targets of income inequality. concerns of relative poverty and inequality are not even on the agenda of the sdgs, although these were also among key critiques of the mdgs (bond, 2006; fukudaparr, 2010; saith, 2007; kabeer, 2010). the approach of both the sdgs and the mdgs to poverty reduction is not to balance populations in their resource bases, nor to measure assets and seek to increase per capita wealth. nor is it to help cultures maintain balances with their resources, which one might expect would be highlighted in the sdgs. the approach, as underlined by sdgs 1 and 17, to promote trade and uniform consumption standards of urban, industrial societies, as well as to rely on gdp as its basic measure, appears to be to promote globalization, inviting foreign investors to offer technological “growth” and provide “jobs” for globally selected work for the poor, so that their incomes rise. rather than focus on helping to maintain these incomes and wealth, the lack of population planning risks that expanded population of the poor will lead to rapid depletion of resources and a return to poverty, with continued dependency on outsiders to provide additional technology and solutions. in reality, much of the rise of gdp in developed countries has come with increased resource exploitation and inequality (lempert, 2015a). two key assumptions underlying the sdgs, in violation of international human rights treaties that protect the rights of indigenous peoples to protect their cultures and offering unconfirmed social science, are that developing countries will industrialize their indigenous peoples and undergo a demographic transition that will slow population growth to levels that are sustainable (or that something else will naturally reduce fertility). even if these changes were not in violation of international law, demographic transitions are gradual and just slowing population growth does not assure sustainability without some kind of planning. though (absolute) poverty and hunger appear to be the key goals of the sdgs as they were the main focus of the mdgs, the short-term approaches to treating symptoms reflect an approach that sociologists have long called “regulating the poor” (cloward and piven, 1973) and that many of the critics of the mdgs, cited above, suggested reflected a globalist or “neo-liberal” (or, perhaps, “neocolonial” agenda) in the mdgs. although the u.n. system and the world bank make claims that they are eradicating global poverty, other data, including that within the u.n. itself, from the food and agricultural organization, suggest that growing populations and stress on global resources are actually leading to increased undernourishment and to greater vulnerability of larger numbers of peoples whose transition “out of poverty” is short-term and consilience lempert: testing the sdgs precarious (fao, 2012). indeed, this was the very reason why there were pressures to focus on “sustainable development” as the replacement for the mdg agenda. the result of testing the mdgs and sdgs through this indicator suggests that the international community is substituting a globalization agenda in the name of poverty reduction; resurrecting the claims of classic political economists that are using the developing world as an opportunity to expand markets (hobson, 1902) and/or take advantage of increasing populations and poverty for cheap labor (marx, 1867). in short, neither the mdgs or sdgs focus on either longterm solutions to absolute poverty nor to any changes in relative inequality that are in line with international rights conventions or professional measures. consilience 145 vii. development law accountability test the measurement indicator for “development” comes entirely out of the body of international treaties almost universally adopted by member states of the u.n. it compiles all of the different statements on the goals and purposes of “development” that are found in these documents, dating from the u.n. declaration (1948) and then reappearing in international laws, fundamental rights declarations and later conventions and declarations such as the convention on the rights of the child (1989) and more recently in the declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (2007). this indicator simply organizes and systematizes the elements of human development on which the international community has continually agreed. overall, international law and treaties have recognized 13 different elements that compromise human development, in four different levels: the individual level (6), the level of society (3), the community and cultural level (1) and the global level (3). they include everything from moral, spiritual, and mental health development at the individual level, to promotion of peace and cultural and community protections, as well as political equality, at the higher levels. it is easy to list them in the categories and to use these 13 elements in an indicator that tests whether any comprehensive strategy for “development” actually incorporates the full spectrum in which the international community defines “development”. the list of these 13 elements and the scoring of the mdgs and sdgs in the area of development is presented on table 3, using this 13 element test for development interventions (lempert, 2014a). although most development organizations only target one or two areas of development, this scoring indicator can be used on those agencies or agendas that claim to offer a full and comprehensive approach to development, as the u.n. claims with the sdgs and claimed with the mdgs. for readers not familiar with that indicator, there is some attempt in the left-hand column to present capsule summaries of these different areas of development to clarify what is being scored. the method used for scoring using this table is not just whether an organization mentions an area of development, since that would simply be a score on rhetoric but whether there are specific contemplated actions in the form of active steps that go beyond mere platitudes and are not contradicted by other actions. where there is doubt, a half point can be offered as the score for a category, rather than a full point or no point. in interpreting this measurement indicator, a total score of 13 fully fulfills the international community’s various treaty goals for development, one of more than 6.5 points is a strong attempt to meet aspirations of humanity, 3-6 consilience lempert: testing the sdgs points is a partial solution that may endanger individuals or cultures in some way, and less than 3 points represents a focus on goals that do not meet the u.n.’s mandate defining “development”. table 3. universally recognized aspirations for development and the international community’s recognition of them through the millennium development goals 1. indiv idual deve lopment objec t ives : elements response o f the internat ional community through the mdgs changes in the sdgs 1. physical (body) development: limited in recipients and in applications. current mdg 1 (on poverty and hunger) partly addresses basic animal needs as do mdgs 4, 5 and 6 that focus on basic health (infant and child health, maternal health, and hiv/aids) but the approach of the mdgs is just to support minimal physical development of “the poor” and then to stop. 0.5 points . partly expanded but only partly fulfilled. the focus is still on hunger and poverty in sdgs 1 and 2 and basic animal health needs through sdg 3, though sdg 3 now expands the idea of health to that of “healthy lives” and “well-being” for all ages. the focus is on disease, toxins, accidents, and access to health care and partly on addictions, but not on exercise, diet, recreation and preventative health. 0.5 points . 2. mental development: dubious. current mdg 2 (primary education) promotes top-down universal primary state schooling (with curriculum set by national authorities and with international goals) for those not yet subject to it or excluded from it, but such schooling often destroys cultures and traditional education, skills, and respect for local environments, language, history and values. it is not responsive to individual desires and does not seek to improve mental development of the vast majority. 0.5 points . slight improvement but only partly fulfilled. the approach is still one of state schooling and productivity, though there is now an expansion of education for “lifelong learning” (sdg 4) and fostering of innovation but apparently just for economic production and not for any other human abilities and desires (sdg 9). there is still no protection of culture, traditional education and skills. there is now some concern for environmental education but not geared to protecting cultures in ecosystems (sdg 12). there is the first mention of mental health in target sdg 3.4. 0.5 points . 3. spiritual (appreciation of natural world) development: abandoned. current mdg 7 (on the environment) promotes green space (land devoted to forest and parks) and lowering of pollutants but does not change the attitudes or policies that have led to environmental damage because of the loss of spiritual dubious. one of the 169 targets (in sdg 12) now includes environmental awareness education, but awareness is different from creating a love of nature and appreciation of human integration with it. the focus is still on exploiting nature for “growth” (sdg 8) and “sustainable use” (sdgs 14 and 15). consilience 147 appreciation for nature. 0 points. 0.5 points . 4. moral (appreciation of others as individuals) development: abandoned. 0 points. same: abandoned. there is now lip service to this in sdg 16, for “inclusive societies” but there is no target for empathy, social solidarity, empowerment or ethical and moral action. 0 points. 5. social (appreciation of community) development: abandoned. 0 points. same: abandoned. 0 points. 6. cultural (appreciation of one’s identity) development: abandoned and contradicted by mdg 2 (primary schooling) that generally works to assimilate cultures and substitute traditional education with state directed classroom education promoting the history, language, culture and goals of the dominant national groups. 0 points. same: abandoned and contradicted by state schooling (sdg 4), global industrialization (sdg 9), and globalization and technology transfer (sdg 17) to assimilate and homogenize cultures under the slogan of “no one left behind” (i.e., “no one left unassimilated”). there is only lip service to “appreciation of cultural diversity” in sdg 4.7. 0 points. 2. socie tal leve l deve lopment objec t ives : : elements response o f the internat ional community through the mdgs changes in the sdgs 7. social equity/ social progress/ equal opportunity for individuals dubious. current mdg 1 (poverty and hunger) focuses on the lower 25% but tries to resolve inequity through productivity and cultural destruction to generate shortterm income increases for the “poor”, rather than through empowerment or distributional equity policies (e.g., higher taxation on the rich and legal protection of merit-based systems and choice) without any social solidarity and changes in distribution of opportunity; current mdg 3 (gender equality) tries to achieve equality in the area of gender, only, and in ways that do not protect traditional cultures and do not deal with any inequities to males same: dubious. the rhetoric again calls for various forms of equality for competition in industrial societies (sdg 4 for inclusive and equitable education but without any means of assuring it; sdg 5 for gender equality) and some increase in calls for political rights and oversight of government (sdg 10 and 16), but no calls for oversight of the real actors who are creating global inequalities (multinationals, major military powers, international banks, donors and development organizations), or for taxation of the rich and solidarity. the ideology is equality through growth and jobs, working for the wealthy (sdg 8) rather than empowerment and redistribution. 0.5 points . consilience lempert: testing the sdgs or underlying causes of gender inequity (e.g., militarization and violence). 0.5 points . 8. political equity/ equal rights for individuals: abandoned other than for women through mdg 3 (gender equality) and without addressing underlying causes of gender inequity or inequities faced by men. 0 points. some expanded mention but not likely to have impact. gender equality is still mentioned under sdg 5 and sdg 16 mentions “access to justice”, transparency and accountability, but only of local actors, and with no clear targets or approaches. the hint is that it may be intended just to open the door to international business and topdown enforcement rather than citizen rights and empowerment. 0.5 points . 9. peace/ tolerance/ demilitarization for individuals: abandoned. 0 points. same: abandoned. there is a goal of decreasing violence against women but this is a call for policing, not for demilitarization (sdg 16). sdg 4.7 mentions education for “promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence” as in all u.n. documents, with no specifics. 0 points. 3. cultural/ community leve l deve lopment objec t ives : elements response o f the internat ional community through the mdgs changes in the sdgs 10. sustainability/ (sovereignty) of cultures: abandoned and contradicted by mdg 8 (promoting global partnerships) that promotes trade and technology transfer to the detriment of resource protections and sustainability. 0 points. same: abandoned and contradicted by sdg 17 to promote globalization and sdg 9 to promote global industrialization and homogenization. 0 points. 4. global deve lopment objec t ives : elements response o f the internat ional community through the mdgs changes in the sdgs 11. social equity/ social progress/ equal opportunity of cultures: abandoned and contradicted by mdg 8 (promoting global partnerships) and mdg 2 same: abandoned and contradicted by sdg 17. the goal of reducing inequality “within and among consilience 149 (primary education) that work to industrialize, urbanize and homogenize cultures in their production and consumption rather than to promote diversity and equity between them. 0 points. countries” (sdg 10) is focused only on individuals through “employment and decent work for all” and “growth” (sdg 8), technology transfer and urbanization (sdg 9) to undermine cultures. 0 points. 12. political equity/ equal rights for cultures: abandoned and contradicted by mdg 8 (promoting global partnerships) and mdg 2 (primary education) that work to urbanize and homogenize cultures rather than to promote diversity and equity between them. 0 points. same: abandoned and contradicted by sdg 17. the mentions of government accountability and justice in sdg 16 make no mention of federalism, cultural autonomy, indigenous peoples or community rights and appear geared only to individual and business rights. 0 points. 13. peace/ tolerance/ demilitarization for protection of cultures: undermined. current mdg 8 (promoting global partnerships) tries to do this through homogenization and a single, top-down approach to globalization in ways that actually destabilize cultures and long term prospects for peace (lempert and nguyen, 2011). 0 points. same as mdgs: undermined by sdgs 17 and 9 to create a global urban mono-culture with a single technology. 0 points. overal l scor ing o f the mdgs and sdgs response o f the internat ional community through the mdgs changes in the sdgs total scoring on 13 elements 0 (if strict scoring) – 1.5 (if lenient scoring for physical and mental development and equality). the first and third goals do promote development in industrial countries but that is not the target for these interventions. this does not meet the international legal definition of development 1 (if strict scoring) – 2.5 (if lenient scoring as with mdgs). this is slightly better than the mdgs, with partial (0.5) points for spiritual development and political equality but not the full score (1.0) for each. this does not meet the international legal definition of development. consilience lempert: testing the sdgs (i) analysis of results for development law accountability test despite their universal recognition, almost none of the international community’s 13 recognized “universal” goals for development appear in any meaningful ways in either the mdgs or sdgs. although the international community essentially seeks to define development and set its targets through the sdgs, neither the mdgs nor the sdgs actually meet these already existing definitions of development that are established in the very bedrock laws and rights treaties of the u.n. system or that are recognized by people now alive on our planet. several critics noted the failures of the mdgs to follow the universal development agenda (kabeer, 2010; denoulin and shahani, 2009; saith, 2006; hill, mansour and claudio, 2010; waage, banerji, campbell, chirwa, collender, dieltiens and unterhalter, 2010). the focus of the mdgs and sdgs is a very narrow one that seems to view human beings only on the level of animals with physical and economic needs (streeten, et. al, 1981) but without any other attributes of culture, society, morality of spirituality. there is no concern at all for human cultures, for global peace, for social solidarity, or for real equality and equity, other than lip service. this is a narrow and cynical view of humanity. the score of the mdgs and sdgs on this indicator suggests that something has gone seriously wrong in procedures in the u.n. system for linking its mandate and its international treaties to actionable goals. it suggests that a small group of leaders has redefined “development” for some other agenda outside of the u.n. system’s legal mandate for development and human progress. it suggests that they have substituted a narrow economic and animalistic vision focusing on production and things for the rich vision of development goals that is actually the international consensus under international laws and treaties. consilience 151 viii. cultural change test: comparison with colonial policy social scientists continually search for ways of measuring social and cultural change. this measurement indicator, on cultural change in development approaches, offers a way to compare current approaches to development intervention, like the mdgs and sdgs, with approaches that are recognized as “colonial policy” of the late 19th and early 20th century. the test used here takes the previous measurement indicator, for “development”, using the post-world war ii consensus in international treaties defining the elements of “development”, and generates an historical measure using historical information on french colonialism in southeast asia and scoring it using this same indicator. it then compares the two approaches to see if there are commonalities. placing the mdgs and sdgs alongside the comprehensive measure of “development” using the elements in the treaties, and alongside the historical measure for french colonialism, allows for inferences on whether the mdgs and sdgs represent “progress” or “regress”. since a previous article by this author then took the next step, of examining the mdgs and looking for direct corollaries in colonial interventions in a specific case, using historical data from the french colonial era in southeast asia, this baseline can be used again here to see if there have been any changes in approach in the sdgs. the same table can be used from the previous study, this time incorporating information from the sdgs (lempert, 2015a). table 4 presents the eight mdgs and 17 sdgs together, by categories (similar to those used in table a1 in the annex) in the left hand column. the right hand column looks to see if there is a direct parallel to them in the religious missionization and “civilizing mission” of french colonialism in the late 19th and early 20th century, using and expanding the test presented in a previous article (lempert, 2015a). the data on the french period comes from the author’s research on french colonialism in the countries of southeast asia over a 15 year period and draws both on ethnographic historical data and historic materials that define the system of french colonialism (e.g., logan and askew, 1994; jamieson, 1993). while history is too often forgotten or distorted (or demonized) beyond recognition so as to make it difficult to compare with the present day, the logic of human cultures is to protect continuity over time. during the french colonial era, colonial administrators did use their power to commercial advantage in extracting resources, manipulating economies, destroying cultures, and exploiting markets and labor, but they also looked for ways to assure “sustainable use” (using the words now in the sdgs) of their colonies. such “sustainable use” required making investments in consilience lempert: testing the sdgs public health, education and economic infrastructure. indeed, during the colonial period, the french built hospitals, schools, and urban infrastructure in southeast asia. french colonial administrators promoted clean water (to treat epidemics), transferred technology, brought modern forms of energy (electricity), and created jobs (that served their interest) to raise the levels of the poor. they also brought in concepts of local democracy (participatory councils), built parks and museums, and announced several political rights including an end to enslavement of minorities. table 4. colonial origins of the millennium development goals: french colonial interventions millennium development goals (mdgs), sustainable development goals (sdgs) and measures analys is o f french colonial “civi l izing miss ion” activ i t i es on the basis o f whether the ir approach is continued in the mdgs/sdgs and the ir implementat ion (“yes”) or a break with colonial i sm (“no”) (using indochina, 1860 – 1945) mdg 1. end poverty and hunger, including increasing the share of the lowest 25% sdg 1. end poverty in all its forms everywhere (guaranteed minimum incomes) sdg 2. end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture yes, the mdgs and sdgs continue the french colonial approach to poverty reduction as part of their “civilizing mission”: promoting small business and export crops to serve european needs and building sanitation systems, irrigation systems and roads along with schools, and using community labor for investment to combat “poverty”. treatment of minorities imposed the same leveling effect as today, including abolition of slavery to protect the lowest 25%. the focus was on production without concern for sustainability or wealth protection. mdg 2. offer universal education (at the primary school level) sdg 4. ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all yes, the mdgs and sdgs continue the french colonial approach of top-down state education to train the lower classes for service and to break their traditional customs and economies. the french introduced community schools (same as the state schools of today for nation building and symbol manipulating skills) to promote french literacy and to unify the areas under their control and replace local autonomy. mdg 3. gender equality sdg 5. achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls partly, yes, the mdgs and sdgs continue the french goal of creating the same gender relations in the colonies as in france, which at that time was moving towards equality in order to place women in factories. the french created schools for girls as well as for boys. though the concepts of equality were different from today, the idea was to create the same gender relations in the colonies as in europe, including protections of women through french legal codes. mdg 4. child health (reduce infant yes, the mdgs and sdgs continue the french consilience 153 mortality) sdg 3. ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages approach to health in their colonies. health care was a key goal of french missionary activities and associated hospitals as well as of specific health institutes like the pasteur institutes. the french promoted vaccines and sanitation campaigns much like the mdgs and sdgs. mdg 5. maternal health sdg 3. ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages the mother and child hospitals were a key to the hospital and health systems introduced by the french in their colonies. the french symbol was that of mary and baby jesus. mdg 6. combat hiv/aids sdg 3. ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages though there was no hiv/aids in french times, there was venereal disease and the french established special clinics (e.g., hanoi) for soldiers and local prostitutes to receive treatment. mdg 7. environmental sustainability: species protection, lowering of ozone and co2 levels. sdg 13. take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts sdg 6. ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all sdg 14. conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development sdg 15. protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss sdg 12. ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns, “taking into account the development and capabilities of developing countries” partly, yes, the current approach to the environment in the mdgs and sdgs had its roots in french colonialism, though there was no concept then of “sustainability”. the idea of clean water and sanitation was one of the central development interventions in french colonialism. the french colonial approach to “sustainability” and the environment was almost exactly that of the mdgs and sdgs in that there was no valuation of assets, no attention to population growth (which french “development” caused to skyrocket as a major fuel of poverty and dissent), and no planning. the focus was on water sanitation and parks, efficient waste disposal and recycling systems. the french environmental consciousness was limited to aesthetics (landscaping and gardens) and efficiency in a way that is analogous to the mdg and sdg approach to symptoms rather than root causes of overuse of resources and environmental damage. mdg 8. global partnership: rule based trade and finance, sustainable debts; technology transfer, good governance, debt relief sdg 17. strengthen the means of implementation through technology transfer and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development, treating all the goals and indicators as of equal weight. yes, the french colonial idea of technology transfer (building technical schools and institutes, offering scholarship and work permits to france, to turn colonies into models of contemporary french production and consumption) and “civilizing” the locals was all based on a concept of globalization/ french “civilizing” mission that promoted trade and assimilation, as do the mdgs and sdgs. increased resource exploitation and consumption to “reduce poverty” sdg 7. ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all yes, the sdg goal of access to “modern energy” was exactly what french colonialism did in introducing electrification to its colonies, building roads for cars, consilience lempert: testing the sdgs rail lines and steam ships. sdg 8. promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth (of at least 7%/year in lesser developed countries), full and productive employment and decent work for all yes, the sdg goal of “growth” and employment directly follows the french approach of mobilizing “corvee” labor for public works, creating “employment” in colonial industries, and growing productivity and extractive industries to serve foreign markets with local labor placed in the formal, export sector to “grow” production and exports with no concern for local culture, asset protection, or per capita wealth. sdg 9. build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation yes, the sdg approach to innovation and urbanization reflects the french colonial model of urbanizing their colonies and building technical and vocational schools and universities as well as institutes. in many cases, the french went beyond what countries do today under the new world order in promoting local innovation. sdg 10. reduce inequality within and among countries (through increased income and consumption of the poor) yes, the sdg approach to “equality” through wage labor jobs and laws to eliminate slavery without any taxation or solidarity with french and local elites supported by the french, is a direct continuation of french colonialism. sdg 11. make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable with more housing, transportation yes, the french created replicas of paris in their colonies, with urban cities that had parks, french style houses for different classes, trains, steamboats and street cars, and electric lights and this is continued directly in the sdgs. in many cases, the french went beyond what countries do today under the new world order, to beautify their colonial cities. security, policing, law, and democracy (?) sdg 16. promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels yes, the sdg concept of “peace” and “justice” are exactly those of imposed hierarchical pacification and local participatory government under international control that were the hallmark of french colonialism. the french eliminated slavery under the banner of rights, trained local militias to maintain order, and created local self-governing parliaments. however, they did not allow any challenge to their hegemony: military, financial and cultural or any real empowerment, cultural autonomy, or challenge to their single order, which is reflected exactly in the sdgs. total 5 or 6 of the 8 mdgs and 12 of the 17 sdgs appear to be taken directly from the french colonial model while the remaining 2 or 3 of the mdgs and 5 of the sdgs, that are more time specific concepts of gender and environmental protection, seem entirely consistent with the french colonial ideology for “civilizing” the natives. in some cases, the attention the french spent on restoring cultural monuments, building libraries and museums, establishing universities and offering scholarships, and teaching the ideals of the french revolution (equality and liberty/democratic self-rule consilience 155 and human rights) may have actually been closer to the broad goals of development in international treaties than the sdgs are today. (i) analysis of results for cultural change test indeed, french colonialism included everything that is now in the sdgs and calling it a “civilizing mission” while at the same time overseeing policies that were exploitative, destructive, unsustainable and leading the world on the path to colonial revolts and to world war. what t able 6 shows is that the mdgs and now the sdgs are in almost exact parallel to the model of european colonialism in every significant way, though with some changes to reflect new technological conditions. the ideology of european colonialism seems to have fully asserted itself in the sdgs, though now in the form of globalization and what some term “neo-colonialism”. comparing both the mdgs and sdgs to the “civilizing mission” of european imperialism in the early 20th century helps to suggest what the agendas are that have replaced the international consensus on “development”, the legal and professional requirements of “sustainable development” and of “poverty reduction” even while claiming to meet all of these, and from where these agendas apparently stem. the mdgs and sdgs appear to be a reassertion of colonialism and the policies that led to world war ii, even though the international community established its treaties and laws specifically to try to avert this in the early post-world war ii period. this seems to confirm what has been one of the major critiques of international development for decades (baran and sweezy, 1968; gunder frank, cochroft and johnson, 1972; prebisch, 1949; wallerstein, 1979; klein, 2007) using what may be one of the first recognized measures to test the critique. even major economists have expressed dismay at how the agenda of international banks has seemed to be to promote inequalities and dependency rather than to promote independence and sustainability (stiglitz, 2002). this also appears to confirm one of the major critiques of the mdgs; that it was top-down and in the interests of stakeholders in the developed countries (international banks, governments and implementing organizations) but not the stakeholder beneficiaries (fukuda-parr, 2010; saith, 2007; bond, 2006; international planning committee for food sovereignty, 2015; haines and cassells, 2004). consilience lempert: testing the sdgs ix. conclusion all of the tests of the sdgs offered in this article suggest that the international community has veered sharply from its international legal consensus and scientific standards on “development”, “poverty reduction” and “international development” and that the u.n. system, itself has failed to follow its own legal mandate. instead, the sdgs are promoting an agenda similar to that of european colonialism, more than a century ago. the question is, why? development experts, including the former head of the undp, gustave speth, have been warning the international community to immediately reject the approach that is being taken (speth, 2008; korten, 2007). critics of the mdgs warned the international community to avoid carrying them over into the sdgs but apparently with no success (bond, 2006; fukuda-parr, 2010; meadows, meadows, randors and behrens, 2013). while many wish to remain hopeful that the sdgs will still awaken consciousness towards “sustainable development” by giving countries the “flexibility” to choose their own course, it is indeed the failure of such flexibility that led critics to call for a strategic, systematic approach. it is the “flexibility” of the mdgs that has allowed agendas of overuse of resources, cultural extinction, and inequalities to grow. the failure of the sdgs to challenge this means that donors are likely to continue to use development funds as they are recognized to be used today, as a form of “soft power” through financial incentives (transfers of money and benefits to specific countries and their leaders) (nye, 2004) to promote economic and political interests of the donors rather than long-term goals of sustainability and poverty reduction for beneficiaries. given that the international community already had a set of goals, directly in its basis of international treaties (with seven of the basic ones in the reference list, immediately following the citation of the united nations charter). these included approaches to sustainability, to equality and to long-term, integrated development, the question as to why there was a need for the creation of a new set of international development goals in a long political process can cynically be answered that it may have been specifically to replace what already existed in the international system and to distract attention from it. international laws had long established the goals of the international community for development (lempert, 2014a) and it is not difficult to provide measures for the 13 internationally recognized areas of development (such as using the professionally recognized “gini coefficient” for wealth or income distribution and equality) and establishing them as “universal development goal” targets (lempert, 2014b). if the process of formulating the sdgs was truly based on community participation and inclusiveness with global non consilience 157 governmental organizations (ngos), including those of the environmental community, how is it that the ideology, as in the mdgs, is essentially that of bankers and economists claiming that growth can somehow ultimately reverse the harms that it has caused? why have so many participants accepted the religious belief that a single urban technological monoculture will be able to find a way for technologies to infinitely expand productivity, urbanization, and human population? how is it that the only vision is of “growth” with no mention of the messages of several environmental economists who recognize community options for “de-growth” or “no growth” and other alternative consumption patterns?3 what we have in the sdgs appears to this author to be both an ideological tract and a fundraising document, to promote the private sector, possibly written by the international development banks in the interests of multi-national corporations, and financial elites in donor and recipient countries, by and for those implementing their agenda and reliant on their funding. the un document on the sdgs seems to acknowledge this directly. we recognize that [the sdgs] will include the mobilization of financial resources as well as capacity-building and the transfer of environmentally sound technologies to developing countries.... public finance, both domestic and international, will play a vital role in providing essential services and public goods and in catalyzing other sources of finance. we acknowledge the role of the diverse private sector, ranging from micro-enterprises to cooperatives to multinationals, and that of civil society organizations and philanthropic organizations in the implementation of the new agenda. (un, 2015, p. 11) the ideological assumptions that appear to be unchallenged and unsubstantiated, and that are at the basis of this approach seem to be that sustainability can be promoted by u.n. spending and creating a wish list rather than through any mechanisms of accountability and that sustainability can be promoted through urbanization, homogenization and some panacea of technological 3 in the view of this author, the answer appears to be that: the process was really driven by urban office workers who do not actually live with, understand, or value nature, or the relationship between humans and nature; participating ngos were co-opted by the agenda of globalization. a recent article examining international ngos, their funding sources and their missions, suggests that many have simply abandoned their missions and have been transformed into for-profit businesses simply implementing the agenda of the global banks and major powers (lempert, 2017a); the un appears to have manipulated the agenda and used its resources to influence the outside discussions as well. this was clearly evident in the 2012 conference on the environment, “rio plus 20” (lempert and nguyen, 2013). consilience lempert: testing the sdgs quick fixes. there is a magical belief that industrial systems are sustainable or can be made sustainable through technological innovations, without major social reorganization that many scholars openly refute (nguyen, 2008; daly, 2011; dietz and o’neill, 2013; roszak, 1978; yablonsky, 1972) but that goes unchallenged in the sdgs. the mantra also seems to be that trade and “growth” can promote sustainability and reduce poverty even though this view has long been contested by economists and is, in fact, in violation of basic international treaties for protecting cultural autonomy including the sanctity of their resources and economic and political systems (gallagher and robinson, 1953; baran and sweezy, 1968; lemkin, 1944; lindblom, 1977; perry, 1996; sponsel, 2000). these beliefs also conflict with the view of many experts, including some existing u.n. studies, demonstrating that trade and short-term growth do the opposite of what the sdgs claim; they uproot peoples from their resources, their lands, their traditional education and skills and cultures (krauss, 1992; cultural survival, 1993; unesco, 2003; lempert, 2015a; 2010). the sdgs appear to have been misnamed. they not only fail to target the problem of unsustainability but seem likely to make it worse. in apparently resurrecting the european colonial “civilizing mission” through the sdgs, the international community appears to be putting the planet on the path to the same instabilities and fights over resources that led to the horror of world war ii. it is as if all of these lessons have been forgotten. in short, what has happened is that the sdgs are being used to override established international laws and professional standards of sustainable development and to replace them with the mythical and dangerous dogma of sustainable globalization-homogenization-industrialization-urbanization. as a lawyer, sworn to uphold the rule of law, as a social scientist sworn to protect professional ethics, and as a development profession and humanitarian concerned for the future of the planet and the survival of its cultures, this author can only express shock mixed with some outrage at what seems to have happened in the sdgs. since the actual goals of the sdgs seem to be to further globalization and consumption in a way that urbanizes and assimilates peoples and cultures, this author suggests that they be referred to as the global assimilation goals, with the appropriate acronym (gags). while the international community in adopting the sdgs appears to have historically regressed to the period of european colonialism, it would be well advised to go back farther in european and world history and to reread the story of the biblical noah, in genesis, the impacts of extreme climate changes and then the story of the world that followed. consilience 159 in the bible, the great historical flood (possibly around 1500 b.c.e.) is described as an attempt by “god” to eliminate the corruption and greed of humanity and to restart humanity only with those who have the foresight to plan ahead and to protect nature by placing nature as its first priority and accepting the necessary sacrifices. in rebuilding the world, however, the story tells of an ancient empire that had become a mono-culture. its focus was on glorification and consumption and the building of a huge tower, in “babel”. this early globalization and mono-culture was unsustainable and on a path to collapse. it disappeared, only to be replaced by a world of diverse languages and cultures either investing appropriately for continued productivity for urban, technological societies or fitting within their eco-systems for rural cultures, but with the problem of needing to find a way to protect these differences and work together, rather than concentrating, again and again, in a single system that assured they would fall. stability, sustainability, poverty reduction and human progress occur through promoting and protecting diversity and standards. these were enshrined in international laws after world war ii to prevent a recurrence. now, 70 years later, that infrastructure is forgotten and eliminated in agreements like the sdgs. in the views of this author, it will have dire consequences for the planet and humanity. consilience lempert: testing the sdgs references ban ki moon, (2015). opening speech at 70th general assembly, september 28. on the web at: http://www.voltairenet.org/article188865.html baran, paul a. and sweezy, paul m. 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these [mdgs] did not achieve, particularly in reaching the most vulnerable” but without any explanation of why the mdgs failed and why the new goals can be expected to do better (un, 2015, p. 6). in the table, the mdgs are presented along the left hand column and the sdgs that address similar issues are placed in the right hand column. for all of the 8 mdgs, there are successor sdgs, though three of the mdgs in the area of health are essentially now combined into one sdg on universal health. the one mdg on the environment is now expanded into 6 sdgs, but some of them just take previous mdg sub-goals and turn them into individual mdgs. the new sdgs that correlate with the previous mdgs can be seen as creating moving targets so that the call for funding in those areas (and for certain implementers) will not run out. for example, the call for universal primary education that was an mdg is still part of the sdgs but there is now a call for continuous education and vocational education. note also that for all of these goals, there is no benchmark and no explanation of the problem that the goals seek to solve. there is no explanation, for example, why there is a need for expanding global trade. there are some 6 sdgs out of the total 17 that can be described as new and not a continuation from the mdgs. interestingly, 5 of them are not in the area of sustainability, rights protections or in recognized areas of human development (!). on the table, these 5 are presented under the category, “increased resource exploitation and consumption to reduce poverty” in an attempt to fit into the overall logic of the sdgs as described in the section above. the goal of increasing gross domestic products and supplying peoples with “modern energy”, housing and transportation can all be described as promoting increased consumption on a single, homogenizing, urban industrial model of standardized consumption and production that are part of the sdg agenda (sdg 10 and sdg 17). the other new sdg, 16, is a grab bag of goals that uses rhetoric on rights and security. however, the sub-indicators for this sdg actually promote a narrow and questionable view of this agenda that do not seem to match the goal of the title. the applications of rights have consilience 169 no targets and are limited to some very specific circumstances. in this author’s view, they appear to be very vague and weak restatements of what already exists under several international rights treaties without enforcement. overall, the continuity from the mdgs is both interesting and also perplexing. the one mdg subgoals that countries never reached and rarely even targeted was mdg 7 and its sub-goals of environmental sustainability (pinter, almassy, offerdahl, and szunyi, 2015). in application, mdg 7 was largely transformed into what is now sdg 6, for expanding access to sanitation and fresh water. the goals of promoting bio-diversity, combating climate change, and promoting sustainable development that were in mdg 7 were largely abandoned during the period of the mdgs in order to increase short-term consumption for the poor at the expense of resources, the environment, and cultures. while most countries were able to show that their poor increased consumption, as a result of selling their resources, increasing foreign aid, and allowing foreign businesses to exploit their labor as populations rose and people were desperate for short-term income, there was little attention to sustainability. environmentalists were critical of the mdgs because this one, single mdg devoted to the environment, mdg 7, was largely undermined by competition with the rest of the mdgs. the international institute for sustainable development called it “a symbolic rather than systematic treatment of the environment” (pinter, almassy, offerdahl, and szunyi, 2015). what is perplexing is that the sdgs that can be considered additions to the mdg agenda do not appear to address the key criticisms of the mdgs that appear in the development literature. although there was little initial criticism when the mdgs were launched, practitioners and development scholars increasingly noted and began to write on failures in the mdgs, noting the attempt to seek “quick fix” solutions based on quick technology transfers and targeting of symptoms with money or short-term unsustainable growth rather than any long-term, sustainable and structural solutions (fehling, nelson, venkhatapuram, 2013; bond, 2006; van norren, 2012). some likened the strategy to the picking of “low hanging fruit” (maxwell, 2003). in terms of “sustainability”, the mdg agenda failed because it focused on increasing consumption, eliminating cultures and their sustainability in their environments, sought no controls on population to assure balance with environments, and did little to ameliorate global insecurities that were at the basis of smaller and poor countries selling their assets and increasing consumption (and defense spending) in order to protect themselves from the pressures on their resources and political and cultural systems by major powers (lempert and nguyen, 2011; lempert, 2015a). these concerns are not addressed in any of the new sdgs. consilience lempert: testing the sdgs table a1: the evolution of the sdgs from the mdgs millennium development goals (mdgs) sustainable development goals (sdgs) 1. end poverty and hunger, including increasing the share of the lowest 25% 1. end poverty in all its forms everywhere (guaranteed minimum incomes) 2. end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture 2. offer universal education (at the primary school level) 4. ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all 3. gender equality 5. achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls 4. child health (reduce infant mortality) 3. ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages 5. maternal health 6. combat hiv/aids 7. environmental sustainability: species protection, lowering of ozone and co2 levels. 13. take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts 6. ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all 14. conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development 15. protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss 12. ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns, “taking into account the development and capabilities of developing countries” 17. strengthen the means of implementation through technology transfer and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development, treating all the goals and indicators as of equal weight. 8. global partnership: rule based trade and finance, sustainable debts [some sub-components of 17 on debts, global trade and finance and promoting globalization of the world economy.] new goals increased resource exploitation and consumption to “reduce poverty” 7. ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all 8. promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth (of at least 7%/year in lesser developed countries), full and productive employment and decent work for all 9. build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation 10. reduce inequality within and among countries (through increased income and consumption of the poor) 11. make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable with more housing, transportation security, policing, law, and democracy (?) 16. promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all (domestic) levels interpretive content analysis of the comparative emphases of the sdgs and mdgs: consilience 171 a slightly longer way to analyze the sdgs is to take some of the different functional area categories for development and to look at the emphasis placed on them in the sdgs as well as to note categories where the sdgs do nothing at all. this approach simply takes the sdgs on their face, without analyzing whether they are likely (or even designed) to have any impact or not, and puts the words into categories to see what is emphasized and what isn’t. this is the same kind of semantic analysis that one would apply to an advertisement, which may be all that the sdgs are. while table a1 just presents a list of the sdgs and mdgs, the goal of this section is to try to analyze both the sdgs and mdgs in terms of relative emphasis. since there are 8 mdgs, each mdg represents 12.5% of the mdg agenda, and since there are 17 sdgs, each sdg represents about 5.9% of the sdg agenda. by identifying categories and then adding up the number of mdgs and sdgs, it is possible to see the percentage emphasis in each category. table a2 presents both the mdgs and sdgs by category areas of interventions using established development categories and the percentages of mdgs and sdgs found in each category. the assigning of sdgs to a specific category is not always clear cut since some of the sdgs have multiple objectives that fit more than one category and some of the sub-goals could also fit in multiple categories. the assignations are not perfect but are attempts to try to code the sdgs for analysis. there is a lot going on in this one table and the table could potentially be several different tables using different frameworks for examining development and/or international interventions. rather than offer several different tables, i have started with the mdgs and sdgs themselves to see if they fit into any standard categories in the development literature that could constitute lines in the table. since most of the mdgs and sdgs are actually framed in terms of sectors of activity (and human consumption) like education, and health, i created aggregates for these sector categories (in regular print) and for areas of environment and “sustainability” as another sector cluster. the water sector overlaps categories since the concern for clean drinking water and sanitation relates to human health and consumption directly, as opposed to water as a part of the environment and eco-systems, so i have created percentages that do not include water and then those that do (using an asterix (*)). the development community largely refers to these as basic “economic rights”, so i have used that title for this category to distinguish it from other areas that are more clearly found as rights in international treaties. since so many of the mdgs were in the health sector, i also created a subcategory for this specific sector that i put in brackets ([]) and italicize. i also listed individually some of the categories of development that are found in the international human rights treaties and in the basic un documents including political rights (from the iccpr, 1966), social rights (icescr, 1966), cultural rights (undrip, 2007; un genocide convention, 1948), and the basic goals of the u.n. for demilitarization and peace (un charter, 1948; idhr, 1948), as well as the goals for individual development contained in the international convention on the rights of the child (crc, 1989). for the area of environment and sustainability, that can be considered a sector, i also created a sub-category to highlight whether or not the appropriate economic measures of asset protection and wealth were being calculated in any mdg and sdg categories, given that gdp (a short-term income measure) is included in the sdgs. i also included a sector for trade promotion (“globalization”). consilience lempert: testing the sdgs to contrast the amount of emphasis in the sdgs and mdgs on sustainability as well as to contrast the emphasis on categories that come out of the basis of international treaties and declarations, i created two categories to denote those goals with specific ideological components that are not found at all in international treaties but that do, specifically, appear in the sdgs and mdgs without any reference to basis in international legal agreements. these are the calls for “economic growth” and “use” or exploitation of resources, in one category, and the call for homogeneous consumption and production patterns as a form of “equalization” or assimilation into a common urban, industrial culture and standard. in the summaries at the bottom of the table, i have used the logic of the international community in distinguishing “basic needs” for human survival (streeten, et. al., 1981) from economic benefits that go beyond “basic needs”, and for noting other areas of human development that are found in international treaties like the crc (1992) and the full body of human rights treaties and declarations that call for promoting rights, developing human spirituality and intellectual abilities and mental health, as well as promoting peace, tolerance, and diversity, among others. i also created a category adding in “sustainability concerns”. the highlights of the table are presented as follows. in both the mdgs and sdgs, the focus is on the categories of economic “rights” or consumption, including health, education, housing, and energy, accounting for more than half the totals. depending on how the mdg 7 on sanitation and water is classified (as consumption or protection of water), more than half of both the mdgs and sdgs focus on increased consumption, though health concerns are now a smaller portion in the sdgs than they were in the mdgs. the major change between the sdgs and mdgs is not the inclusion of additional goals on sustainability, though these rise from 1 of 8 mdgs to 5 of 17 of the sdgs, but in fact, the opposite; the emphasis on the ideological category of economic growth and resource exploitation! these were a bit more than one third of the sdgs (3 of 8) but now more than half of the sdgs (9 of 17). indeed, if there is an agenda that is inconsistent with “sustainability” in the sdgs, it is this agenda of accelerated “growth” that precludes “de-growth” or “no growth” (steady state” alternatives (daly, 2011; daly and farly, 2003; dietz and o’neill, 2013) that would allow communities and countries to choose alternate paths for protection and survival rather than copying the consumption patterns of urbanized, industrial (“developed”) countries. a similar way of categorizing the ideology of the mdgs and sdgs and analyzing the changing emphasis is to ask how many of them promote the idea of moving towards a single standard of consumption in which the “under-developed countries” copy the lifestyles of urban, industrial societies rather than accept different choices and balances. the ideological category of “urbanization and assimilation” has also risen from about one third of the mdgs to more than half of the sdgs (!). by establishing international targets or goals that replicate the consumption patterns of “developed” urban societies, what these goals actually appear to be doing is to assimilate all cultures and societies into a uniform urban culture, rather than to allow a diverse set of choices consistent with cultural diversity and “sustainability”. putting all children into state public schools, for example, is a form of standardization that calls for indigenous cultures to eliminate their traditional forms of education and socialization (with parents, grandparents and community, directly in their natural environments) with mass industrial institutionalized practices that force cultural consilience 173 assimilation. it is easy to examine the goals and to come up with a count of goals that call for uniform standards following those of industrial countries rather than allow for diverse cultural choices for balancing sustainability. while only one third of the mdgs explicitly sought this goal, more than half of the sdgs now explicitly set these consumption standards (and the approaches to industrial production, institutional assimilation, and “growth” that come with them) as those for all cultures and countries to emulate! although there are now two sdgs that mention political rights (gender and “justice”), the percentage emphasis is actually now less than under the mdgs (1 of 8). there is no mention at all in the document about the global distribution of political power, the power and (un)accountability of international banks, of international economic actors, of major military organizations, and of international organizations like the u.n., itself even though these were among some of the sharpest criticisms of the failures of the mdgs, particularly in the area of distributional inequalities and the spectrum of political inequality (kabeer, 2010; denoulin and shahani, 2009; saith, 2006). in mention of economic inequality, the only political solution is at local levels, but there is no mention of redistributive taxation of the wealthy or of any social solidarity between rich and poor or of reducing lavish consumption of the rich; only of making it more efficient. another way to see what is happening is to look at those categories that do not even register in the mdgs and sdgs that one would expect, given international laws and treaties as well as the naming of the sdgs as “sustainable development” goals. for example, there is not a single mention of asset measures or per capita asset protections, which are the key to protecting the environment (by measuring it, first) and of increasing wealth and well-being (the per capita endowment of resources). this is trumped by the goal of rapid exploitation to generate income. as with the mdgs, there is not a single mention of cultural rights, of communities, indigenous peoples or their protections, though these are at the bedrock of both international law and sustainability (harmony of peoples within their environments and cultural diversity as the key to human innovation and survival). there is a single sdg sub-goal on heritage protection (11.4) but not on culture. nor is there a mention of any social rights to protect family, community, religion, non-state education or traditions. these disappear. the goal of the sdgs is to assure that no one is “left behind”, which appears from the lack of mention of culture and community protections, to signal an agenda of assimilation and cultural destruction. while a number of critics of the mdgs noted the failure of the mdgs to incorporate most of the key “universal” development goals, such as peace (including demilitarization and disarmament), security, and political equality (democracy and human rights) at various levels (saith, 2006; hill, mansour and claudio, 2010; waage, banerji, campbell, chirwa, collender, dieltiens and unterhalter, 2010), little if any of this global consensus agenda found in international treaties found its way into the sdgs. though there is a focus on education, it is on state education for economic productivity, with no goals for any kind of individual education and development other than productivity. schools can continue to be boxes or cages without gardens or libraries or sports fields or laboratories. the goals of de-militarization (to put an end to one of the largest categories of wasteful consumption) and peace are also nowhere to be found in the sdgs or mdgs, though these are consilience lempert: testing the sdgs claimed to be the mission of the sdgs, in the sdg document, and they are the bedrock goal and reason for being of the u.n. in directly examining the portion of the sdgs that do focus on sustainability, it is also interesting to note what else is emphasized and not emphasized, though this is not shown in the table. while there are several sdg goals for “sustainable use” of resources, there are few goals focusing on pollution/toxins and the major concerns of the “brown environment”. there is little mention of toxins that threaten the human species and all species, of radiation from atomic energy use and military use, of threats to human endocrine and reproductive systems, or genetic modification and its risks. these would not only fit the logic of sustainability but are also likely within the u.n. mandate, and could be presented strategically in an integrated and systematic way within the sdgs. their absence seems to highlight that the sdgs were actually designed to serve other interests and stakeholders. the ideology embedded in the mdgs and sdgs can also be quickly tested by categorizing them in terms of their focus on basic needs (streeten, et. al., 1981), on improved well-being beyond survival, on improved well-being including sustainability concerns, and on higher, non-animal needs that are part of being human and of human development (maslow, 1943). while half of the mdgs focused on basic survival needs and only third on improved economic well-being including sustainability concerns, half of the sdgs now focus on improved well-being beyond survival and almost all of them on this with sustainability concerns added (14 of 17). yet, there is zero recognition of any non-economic human needs in the mdgs and only one of the sdgs (on “justice”) seems to see human beings as anything other than animals and consumers. this is in direct defiance of international rights treaties that require all rights to be treated equally and integrated without prioritization that strips non-economic concerns from government agendas. this “progression” of the mdgs to the sdgs, moving from basic needs to industrializing and urbanizing humanity in the belief that this growth will “buy” a cleaner and sustainable planet, reflects an ideology of colonialism and growth that dates to the 1950s (rostow, 1960). it was longago discarded as unsubstantiated in some of the early environmental literature (carson, 1962; meadows, meadows, randers and behrens, 1972; schumacher, 1973; brown, 1981; hardin, 1993) and many environmentalists today refer to these earlier beliefs as “growth fetishism” (hamilton, 2010). yet, for some reason, this view seems to have returned in the sdgs. overall, the continuities and contradictions between the naming of the sdgs and its contents, suggest that the renaming of the mdgs as sdgs may be little more than a marketing strategy and that the goals themselves may simply be a fundraising document for an agenda of a small group of stakeholders rather than any kind of action plan for the benefits of humanity. consilience 175 table a2. changes in emphasis from mdgs to sdgs: category o f goals percentage o f 8 mdgs percentage o f 17 sdgs sector analys is economic rights/consumption policy (education, health, water*, energy, housing, etc.) 62.5 (75.0*) 52.9 (58.8*) [health protections] 37.5 5.9] political rights (gender and other individual) 12.5 11.8 social rights (family, community, religion, non-state education, etc.) 0 0 cultural rights and protection 0 0 de-militarization and peace 0 0 individual development/education other than economic productivity 0 0 environment and “sustainability” (not counting water) 12.5 29.4 [natural and other asset/wealth measures and per capita asset/wealth protection] 0 0] globalization (trade promotion and linkages) 12.5 5.9 ideolog i cal groupings economic growth and resource exploitation (not including “sustainable use” goals) 37.5 58.8 urbanization and assimilation (state education, gender equality, common technology and consumption, trade) 37.5 52.9 summary: basic physical survival needs 50.0 11.8 improved economic well being beyond survival 25.0 (education, gender eq.) 52.9 improved economic well being including sustainability concerns 37.5 82.3 non-animal, higher/human development 0 5.9 microsoft word 229-1056-2-sp (1). 20150122docx.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 7, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 17–32   building a credit scoring model for the savings and credit mutual of the potou zone (meczop)/senegal ousséni kinda cheikh anta diop university ousconnect@gmail.com audrey achonu columbia university aia2110@columbia.edu abstract this article explores the management of risk credit in a savings and credit mutual in a rural community in senegal. using a logit model, we built a credit scoring model for this mutual. there are three main models of scoring. the principal advantage of the regression model is that it clearly shows the link between credit risk and its characteristics, and hence, has a strong predictive power. our findings show that the variables age, age-squared, gender reimbursement history, guarantee and frequency of reimbursement are all statistically significant in regards to their relationship with the probability of repayment in the logit model. this informative credit scoring model developed for meczop allows for an assessment of variables that influence significantly late reimbursement; however, it needs to be tested on old clients and new borrowers. author’s note ousséni kinda holds a master’s degree in economics and is currently pursuing a master of public administration in development practice at cheikh anta diop university. he has participated in field work at the millennium villages project in potou, senegal addressing issues of microinsurance and microcredit. he is interested in further conducting research on economic diversification and more generally on issues of sustainable development. audrey achonu is currently pursuing a master of public administration in development practice at columbia university. she recently interned at the millennium village project in potou, senegal where the study was conducted. she holds a bachelor’s degree in economics with a minor in political science, audrey hopes to continue working on how to foster economic growth at the macro and micro-level, ensuring that growth occurs at all levels of development. keywords: credit scoring model, late reimbursement, savings, credit mutual. 1. introduction sustainable growth in africa requires facilitating the poor’s access to financial resources. although microfinance in west africa continues to grow, it makes up only 7-8% of the financial system comprised of loans and savings (cgap, 2011). there remain considerable hurdles that affect and prevent the sector from growing, namely poor governance, weak internal control, low capitalization, poor performance and insufficient management of credit risk. consilience kinda: credit scoring model 18     there are many ways to tackle the problem of credit risk, such as through the development of a credit scoring model that will allow for forecasting of the probability that a loan is not reimbursed. in the context of this study we examine the case of the microfinance institution meczop1 in potou, senegal and develop a credit scoring model that can be used to limit credit risk. figure 1: credit scoring process source: adapted from liu yang, new issues in credit scoring application, 2001   2. credit-scoring model scoring can be defined as the use of the knowledge about the performance and characteristics of past loans to predict the performance of future loans (schreiner, 2004, p.2). it uses a technique that awards scores to borrowers as a means of evaluating the performance of their future loans. the scoring follows the framework presented in figure 1. by using a borrower’s credit history, credit scoring is a tool that supports the decision making process, with a final goal of predicting the probability that a particular borrower defaults. the implementation of a credit-scoring project follows the following process (caire et al., 2006): 1. the definition of the segments of scoring: identifying the type of customers and products for which the scoring model will be used; 2. selection of the type of scorecard: there are three basic methods (schreiner, 2003; caire, 2004; caire et al., 2006; sur, 2008), the statistical method which is empirically derived from data on past loans; judgmental approach which is structured from expert judgment and institutional experience; and finally the hybrid which combines both judgmental and statistical; 3. the design of the credit scorecard: the 3 d (definition, discovery and development) terminology will define the framework used in this phase.                                                                                                                           1savings and credit mutual of the potou zone. credit   history  of   past   debtors     scoring   model   new   customers     building   prediction   consilience kinda: credit scoring model 19     the financial institution must define itself what it considers a “bad” credit behavior (bad client). bad credit behavior is when the borrower registers delinquency failing to meet his obligations with respect to the owed principle and interest. this is typically a client that if the mfi had perfect hindsight would have avoided (caire et al., 2006). in the case of the meczop a bad borrower is a borrower that has been late in debt repayments by at least 5 days one or more times. the meczop starts to calculate penalties after 52 late days (credit policy, 2010). a borrower is considered a good borrower when he repays his loan on time. discovery is the process of identifying the characteristics that are to be variables in the model. the financial institution must identify the variables that are likely to influence the risk of repayment. development involves weighing the selected model factors and creating a scorecard3; 4. testing, implementing and managing of scoring: back testing4 is a key tool in setting scoring policy. after back testing, a pilot test is conducted on new loans, to train the users of the scoring system, notably the loan officer to ensure viability and that the model works. moreover, the use of adequate technologies and the availability of data are tributary of the success of the credit-scoring model. there are three credit-scoring models (schreiner, 2003): the tree shaped scorecards (statistical tree)5 is made up of leaves6 that correspond to different segments. the segments are ordered from least to most risk. the statistical tree essentially links the past characteristics with past arrears and supposes that the future will reflect past behavior, hence allowing for the prediction of the probability of defaulting. the expert system7 also called judgmental scoring is based on the judgment and experience of the loan officers and branch managers. loan officers and branch managers identify the client characteristics and their relevance to client behavior. the expert system differs from the trees in that the trees use quantitative experience while expert systems rely on qualitative experience. comparing the two, expert systems have less predictive power. the third model is the notation by the principle of regression. it uses mathematical formulas to establish the influence of each client characteristics on the delinquency risk (schreiner, 2003).                                                                                                                           2the averages depend on the general policy of each mfi. 3 the weight for a statistical model comes from the statistical outputs, for a judgmental model weights are assigned manually based on the perceived importance of individual factors, their interactions and the implications, hybrid scorecards combine the statistical and judgmental techniques (caire et al., 2006). 4 back testing is a procedure that tests the performance of a credit-scoring model on the previous loans. 5  the functioning principle of the tree in the prediction of risk assumes the risk history associated with a segment presents the expected risk for that segment, so all loan applications that present certain characteristics identical to the risk history of past loans present the same characteristics of that segment. 6 there are two types of trees, the four-leaf tree and the 19-leaf tree. they differ only in the number of leaves but the process is the same. 7 there are two types of expert systems, regression and trees. the expert systems uses trees however their trees splits are based on the experience and judgment of the loan officers or branch manager, they are not based on statistical analysis. the expert system regressions use mathematical formulae like the statistical regression but the characteristics and their weights are chosen by the managers instead of derived from the data. consilience kinda: credit scoring model 20     of the three models, regression has the greatest predictive power and reveals the links between the risk and characteristics better than both the tree and expert system. the notation by the principal of regression assigns the weights such that they show whether the characteristics increases or decreases risk when other characteristics are held constant and by how much (schreiner, 2003). taking into account its predictive nature, its efficacy, and its operational capability in assessing the probability that a potential borrower defaults contrary to the previous models presented, the regression would be the model used to predict the probability of non-repayment in the case of the meczop. there are several advantages to the use of credit-scoring for the meczop. these advantages can be regrouped into three levels: the decision making level, the administrative level and at the cost level, by reducing transaction costs. at the administrative level, credit scoring offers privileges such as improved efficient analysis of credit applications, homogenizing the decision making process, increasing the sense of security for loan officers, a better allocation of funds and a flexible credit pricing policy. the quantitative model allows for the adoption of a common evaluation criterion that increases the consistency of lending policies (vigano, 1993). since credit scoring analyzes each customer using a similar set of rules, there is consistency in the evaluation process by the entire staff, increasing the efficient analysis of credit application. the loan officers as a result are secure because they know that the decision to allocate credit was objective. another important advantage of scoring is how it affects the allocation of funds by allowing the meczop to optimize its classification and selection of members to whom credit would be allocated. credit-scoring model facilitates the treatment of high and low risk borrowers, vis-à-vis the denial of or disbursement of credit. this allows the mfi to focus its energy on further analyzing the applications of average risk borrowers, which easily translates into increased efficient treatment of credit demand. a flexible pricing policy can also be developed based on the envisaged level of risk. low risk borrowers8 can be compensated and encouraged to continue to borrow by being offered lower prices (interest rates or lower guarantee). consequently higher risk borrowers can face greater interest rates or be subject to a higher required guarantee. at the decision making level, the credit scoring has the advantage of reducing human error taking into account many determinants of reimbursement. as for the reduction in transaction costs, the use of credit scoring will allow for the reduction of unpaid loans as well as the time invested in recovering. even if credit scoring presents many advantages, there are nonetheless some inconveniences. credit scoring can reduce access for new borrowers, as those without credit history are likely to score poorly and highly likely to be declined access to credit9. it can affect the pricing of credit by making it more expensive for borrowers to borrow – increasing the stringency of credit disbursement. having a low credit score makes it difficult to get a loan at a reasonable interest rate, while those who have a good score benefit from better interest rates. this could result in the exclusion of certain groups.                                                                                                                           8  borrowers below the tolerated risk limit. 9the statistical model of credit scoring can become “uncompromising” because it is based uniquely on mathematical formulas that segregate certain clients who may have a low score but whose project ideas may have potential. consilience kinda: credit scoring model 21     in addition to addressing both the advantages and disadvantages of this approach, it is important to elaborate on the course of action that will give rise to a credit scoring model that is adapted to the specific needs of meczop. 3. credit scoring: theoretical framework the goal of credit scoring for microfinance and other financial purposes is to discriminate between bad and good loans (gool et al., 2009). as such, it can allow a given mfi to manage the risks of non-repayment of loans. adverse selection and moral hazard, the dual problems of asymmetric information, justify the management of risk for mfis. adverse selection designates a situation in which clients know more about their risk level than their lender. in the microfinance context, borrowers hiding information to benefit from loans is an example of adverse selection. the outcome of this phenomenon is an increase in the interest rate by the mfi to protect itself against defaults. this could result in the selection of high-risk clients, because good clients will fear being able to reimburse the credit. moral hazard takes place after the credit application and approval. it is the inability of the mfi to control the behavior of the borrower as it pertains to the purpose and objective of the loan without incurring additional costs. borrowers can at any time adopt opportunistic behavior that could compromise their capacity to reimburse the loans. credit scoring alleviates these problems by increasing the ability of lenders to predict the risk of different borrowers and pricing accordingly. 4. description of the selected variables the selection of the variables is from evaluation of the socioeconomic and demographic environment of potou. it was also based on an assessment of the information available. a key determinant of variable selection was the information provided by the loan officer as well as a thorough review of meczop’s loan application. dependent variable the dependent variable in this model is late repayment, labeled in the data as “empr-retard”. it is a dummy variable coded one if a repayment was late and zero if the loan payments were on time. the independent variables after a review of the literature (schreiner10, 2004; gool and al., 2009), the independent variables are arranged in three categories according to the determinants of repayment: socio–economic characteristics of the borrower, characteristics of the loan and those related to the experience of the loan officer. the characteristics of the borrower provide insight into the likelihood of repayment.                                                                                                                           10schreiner classified the explanatory determinants of reimbursement into three categories: the socio-economic characteristics of the borrower, the characteristics of the borrower, and the loan characteristics.   consilience kinda: credit scoring model 22     knowing about the borrowers’ external conditions (social and economic) is an important way of knowing what factors could reduce their willingness to repay. the characteristic of the loan is an important factor because of how the demanding contractual conditions of the mfi can induce or discourage borrowers to respect their obligations. the loan officer plays an important role in identifying a bad borrower, by evaluating their credibility prior to credit disbursement. for socio-economic characteristics of the borrower, the variables are as follows: • the age of the borrower • sex (gender) • the number of dependents • the number of loans already obtained • the reimbursement of past loans • the number of years spent practicing an economic activity the variables for the characteristics of the loan are as follows: • the purpose of the loan • the guarantee provided • the frequency of repayment • the loan amount • the duration of the loan • the time between the demand and the loan disbursement the final category is the experience of the loan officer. 5. description of the sample the sample size is made up of 30 borrowers for whom the loans were disbursed and or reimbursed during the period from january 1st 2007 to the 31st december 2010. in the sample we have 15 good borrowers and 1511 bad borrowers. the sampling was based on the total number of customers who applied for a credit in order to avoid the reject inference bias12. a sample was randomly drawn that only constituted retail loans. however, the meczop’s database only gathers data on clients to whom a credit has been given. so the problem of reject inference bias does not occur.                                                                                                                           11  the bad borrowers were selected using meczop’s criteria. 12it is the process of deducing how a rejected applicant case would have behaved had it been granted the credit: the performance classification will be assigned to rejected cases. the data is then included in the scoring model development process. the accounts with known classification are to be augmented, in order to obtain a  complete  picture of the population applying for credit. the scoring model that inferred the information of the rejected applicants should theoretically be better than one built only on those accepted credit (liu, 2001, p.27). however the effectiveness of this approach is still being disputed. consilience kinda: credit scoring model 23     6. model specification the variable that the regression seeks to explain is coded y = 1 or y = 0. the independent variables that can affect the dependent variable are noted with x. the relationship between these explanatory variables and the dependent variable is explained by the discrete probability model displayed below: )()1pr( βxfy == )(1)0pr( βxfy −== where f is a function defined by the interval [0,1]; and � denotes the coefficients that are associated to the vector x. empr-retard, the variable defining reimbursement, is equal to zero if the borrower repays without delay and equal to one if the borrower is late in repaying the loan. the empirical econometric model has the following form: =dempr_retar ikiki xx εβββ ++++ ...110 p(.) is the probability that the event “late reimbursement” occurs. this is the probability that the event is observed and not the likelihood that the event itself takes place. consequently, it is possible to create a model for the probability that an individual reimburses the loan late (empr_retard =1). this model using the logistic function is presented as follows. ∑ = += = = k k kk x 1 ] )0dempr_retarpr( )1dempr_retarpr(log[ βα equivalently, pi = !!! !!!!! defines the probability that a potential borrower will be late in reimbursing, where 𝑌! represents the score function defined by the model. given the assumptions and the conditions of estimation, some of the variables defined above where not used in the final model. the whole equation is: )1dempr_retar( =p = 0β + 1β age i + 2β age2 i + 3β sexe i + 4β antcd_crd i + 5β nb_credit +i 6β garantie i + 7β exp_agt i + 8β montant_credit i + 9β freq_remb i + 10β annee_exp i + iε where empr_retard is the dependent variable. the explanatory variables are the following: • age (age) • age2(age2) • sexe (sex) consilience kinda: credit scoring model 24     • reimbursement history (antcd_crd) • the number of credit (nb_credit) • guarantee (garantie) • the experience of loan officer (exp_agt) • the loan amount (montant_credit) • the frequency of reimbursement / repayment (freq_remb) • years practicing an economic activity (annee_exp) the table 1 below is a summary of the different variables used in the model with their anticipated signs. table 1: variables, anticipated sign and description variable type anticipated sign description dependent variable late repayment/ reimbursement binary whether the borrower repaid his loan late independent variables age quantitative (-) age of the borrower sex binary (-) sex of the borrower reimbursement history binary (+) reimbursement of previous loans number of credit binary (-) number of loans obtained guarantee binary (-) nature of the guarantee experience of the loan officer quantitative (-) number of years the loan officer has been working in the field loan amount quantitative (-) loan amount frequency of reimbursement binary (-) frequency of loan reimbursement years practicing an economic activity quantitative (-) the number of years spent practicing an economic activity source: from the study, 2011 the significance of the individual coefficients as well as the percentage of variation in the dependent variable explained by the independent variables will be the basis upon which the strength of the model will be determined. consilience kinda: credit scoring model 25     7. results of the regression the estimation of the model has given the following results. table 2: estimation results logistic regression number of observations = 30 wald chi2(10) = 16.57 prob> chi(2) = 0.0845 pseudo r 2=0.6057 tardiness (empr_retard) coefficients robust standard error z p>|z| age 2.443829 0.9512724 2.57 0.010*** age2 -0.0255646 0.009814 -2.60 0.009*** sexe -2.443102 1.209673 -2.02 0.043** antcd_crd 9.251004 3.879988 2.38 0.017** nb_credit -0.3984008 1.853168 -0.21 0.830 garantie -7.183442 3.178908 -2.26 0.024** exp_agt -0.3516837 0.3161463 -1.11 0.266 montant_credit 3.79e-06 2.47e-06 1.53 0.126 freq_remb 9.149246 3.380873 2.71 0.007*** annee_exp -0.1810599 0.1125361 -1.61 0.108 �0 -53.52892 21.45759 -2.49 0.013 variables significance : ***=1%., **=5% ,*=10% source: from the study, stata, 2011 using y to refer to the dependent variable and the score function (tardiness (empr_retard)), the equation is as presented below: y =-53.52+2.44age-0.025age2-2.44sexe+9.25antcd_crd0.39nb_credit-7.18garantie0.35exp_agt+3.79𝑒!!montant_credit+9.14freq_remb0.18annee_exp the probability that a borrower is late with reimbursing is given by: 1 y y ep e = + this probability corresponds to the credit scoring model of the meczop. as an example, assume there is a borrower with the following characteristics: age = 45, gender (sex) = masculine, reimbursement history = not late, number of credit obtained = less than three, guarantee = yes, experience of the loan officer = 10 years, amount of loan = 275,000 fcfa, frequency of reimbursement = many, years practicing an economic activity = 30 years. the score function of this borrower is then calculated to equal -0.24, and the probability that the borrower is late in repaying is 44.02%. consilience kinda: credit scoring model 26     8. validity of the model and the significance of the individual coefficients the probability (> chi (2)) tests null hypothesis (h0) that all the estimated parameters are null, against the alternative hypothesis (h1) that at least one of the parameters is not null. this test allows us to measure the contribution of the variables in the model to explaining the variation in the dependent variable. the value of the probability (>chi (2)) = (0.0845) indicates that all the retained variables in the model jointly contribute to explaining the probability of repayment. robust standard errors were estimated correcting for heteroscedasticity. from an econometric point of view, an analysis of the table indicated that six (06) out of the (10) explanatory variables are significant. age, age2 and frequency of reimbursement have a significance of 1%. the analysis of the estimated coefficients of age and age2 indicates that age has a concave shape and impact on late reimbursement, age has a positive influence on late reimbursement, whilst age2 has a negative impact on it, setting then the turning point (vertex of the parabola) at 47.8 years13. this means that younger borrowers have a tendency to be late with reimbursing while older don’t. the significance of frequency of reimbursement (freq_remb) shows that multiple repayments option has a positive effect on late reimbursement. this result does not match the predictions that were made on this variable. this could be because the loans disbursed are mostly for a short duration and thus applying a high frequency of due repayments can affect the capacity of the borrower to repay his/her loan on time. gender (sex), reimbursement history (antcd_crd) and guarantee (garantie) are significant at 5% level. the relationship between sex and late repayment identified in the regression results is similar to conclusions drawn in numerous studies (bert et al., 2011; ausaid, 2008; armendariz et al., 2008). it indicates that a woman is more likely to repay her loan on time. the significance of the reimbursement history confirms that the credit history of a borrower is a good indicator of the likelihood of timely reimbursement. the variable guarantee is significant such that it enables the risk to be shared between the meczop and the borrower. the borrower that guarantees his/her loan is expected to repay loan on time. as for the remaining variables, they are not significant but however nonetheless contribute to explaining late reimbursement. the problem of normalizing the variance makes it such that the numeric values (estimated coefficients) of the variables cannot be interpreted directly (hurlin, 2002). the sign of the parameters only indicates the direction that the explanatory variables associated with the different parameters influences the probability of late reimbursement. consequently, computing the marginal effects will measure the sensibility of the probability of reimbursement with respect to the variations in the exogenous variables.                                                                                                                           13  this is calculated using the formula of the vertex point. in the estimated equation, the variables other than age and age^2 are held constant. the result is obtained by differentiating the equation relatively to age. 47.8 years is therefore the turning point from which the effect of age on the variable reimbursement changes sign. hence, the probability that a borrower is late with reimbursing increases with age until 47.8 years after which each additional year reduces the probability of tardiness. consilience kinda: credit scoring model 27     9. analyzing the marginal effects/discrete changes only the marginal effects of the significant variables will be analyzed. these effects are presented in the table 3 below. table 3: marginal effects variables marginal effects (dy/dx) age 0.2050036 age2 -0.0021445 sex -0.2049425 reimbursement history 0.7760315 guarantee -0.6025916 frequency of reimbursement 0.7674955 source: from the study, stata, 2011 the marginal effect indicates that when a borrower is below 47.8 years, the probability that he is late with reimbursing increases by 0.2, while when a borrower is above 47.8 years, the probability of lateness decreases by 0.002, ceteris paribus. for example, taking the example presented above and holding all else equal, the probability of late reimbursement changes from 44.02% to 30.15% when the age of the borrower increases from 45 to 55. this corroborates the fact that older borrowers have better credit risk than younger borrowers. the marginal effect of gender (sex) indicates that if the borrower is a woman, the probability that she is late giving the reimbursement decreases by 0.20. where reimbursement history indicates tardiness, the probability that the borrower is late giving the reimbursement increases approximately by 0.77. in addition, when the loan includes a guarantee14, the probability that the borrower is late decreases by 0.60. when the frequency of reimbursement is high, requiring multiple payments, the probability of default increases by 0.76. to evaluate the quality of the prediction, it was necessary to generate a prediction table from the model to evaluate its ability to predict the realization of the events associated with the dependent variable.                                                                                                                           14  the guarantee in this case is all other forms of guarantee other than the mandatory 20% of the loan amount deposited when the loan amount is below 250,000 fcfa. as a result the guarantee variable is coded 0 when 20% of the loan amount is required and 1 when it is not but another form of guarantee (material or other is required). consilience kinda: credit scoring model 28     10. quality of the prediction: table of classification and the receiver operating characteristic (roc) curve the quality of the prediction is presented on the table 4 below. table 4: classification table threshold 0.5 sensitivity 86.67% specificity 93.33% positive predicted value (late reimbursement) 92.86% negative predicted value(reimbursing loan on time) 87.50% correctly classified 90% source: from the study, stata, 2011 the table shows that at a threshold of 0.5, the overall accuracy of the model to predict a delay in reimbursement (with a probability of 0.5 or greater) is 90 %15. a sensitivity of 86.67 shows that among the 15 events “delay in reimbursement”, 13 will test with delay and 2 will test without delay. a specificity of 93.33% means that of the 15 events “reimbursement on time” 14 will test without delay and 1 will test with a delay. the probability (92.86%) that a borrower is in arrears for reimbursement when the “delay in reimbursement” is observed represents the positive predictive value. the negative predicted value (87.50) is the probability that a borrower is not in arrears for repayment when the event “reimbursement on time” is observed. another good way to assess the fitness of the model is to plot the proportion of observations classified as “tardiness in repayment” (sensitivity) against the proportion of observations misclassified as “tardiness in repayment” (1-specificity) to give a roc curve as shown in figure 2. figure 2: roc curve source: from the study, stata, 2011                                                                                                                           15this rate is equal to the sum of the cases correctly predicted divided by the total number of observations. 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 se ns iti vit y 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1  -­‐  specificity area  under  roc  curve  =  0.9556 consilience kinda: credit scoring model 29     our model has an area16 of 0.9556. as a result, this shows that in almost 96% of cases, if a positive event (delay in reimbursement) and a negative event (non-delay in reimbursement) are randomly selected, the model will assign a higher probability to the event “delay in reimbursement” which denotes its accuracy prediction. as a result, this shows that in almost 96% of cases, if a positive event (delay in reimbursement) and a negative event (non-delay in reimbursement) are randomly selected, the model will assign a higher probability to the event “delay in reimbursement” which denotes its accuracy prediction. 11. conclusion in the context of senegal, credit risk has been identified as a threat to the sustainability of credit access in the rural context. the implications of poor credit risk management are severe. the meczop’s operation is funded primarily by external borrowing and its own capital. repayment constitutes a serious risk for the meczop’s source of funds because it may not be in a position to meet its own financial obligation. additionally, the economic development opportunities of the rural community of leona, where the meczop operates is linked to the mfi’s capacity to provide loans and secure savings. the meczop’s credit scoring model allows for a greater grasp of relevant variables that influence significantly late reimbursement. age explains the late reimbursement and the meczop would have to keep an eye on borrowers that are under 47.8 years of age. given that women are good borrowers, the credit portfolio allotted to women should be increase to allow them to better develop their income generating activities. additionally, such a policy acknowledges the important role women play in the economy. meczop also has to focus on loans that can be repaid with multiple payments. collateral minimizes the risk of non-reimbursement, it is important that the meczop in addition to the forced–savings demands collateral for loans that are high. the meczop would benefit from being reluctant to issue credit to borrowers that have previously being late in repaying their loans. in addition to the addressed variables above, the meczop should take into consideration the other determinants of the model to better address credit risk. once the predictive power of the model has been confirmed, the meczop will be able to use it to select its borrowers more judiciously. to do so meczop would have to define scoring thresholds that correspond to the acceptance, rejection or re-evaluation of an application based on the borrower’s credit score.                                                                                                                           16  an appraisal of the predictive power of the model is the area under the roc line which varies between 0.5 and 1. each point on the roc plot represents a sensitivity/specificity pair corresponding to a particular decision threshold. a test with perfect discrimination (no overlap in the two distributions of results) has an roc plot that passes through the upper left corner, where the true-positive fraction is 1 (perfect sensitivity), and the false-positive fraction is 0 (perfect specificity). the theoretical plot for a test with no discrimination is a 45° diagonal line from the lower left corner to the upper right corner. qualitatively, the closer the plot is to the upper left corner, the higher the overall accuracy of the test (zweig&campbell, 1993, p.565). consilience kinda: credit scoring model 30     references armendariz et al., (2008). gender empowerment in microfinance. june 2008. ausaid, (2008).microfinance, gender and aid effectiveness. ausaid office of development. october 2008. bert et al., (2011). women and repayment in microfinance: a global analysis. world development journal. elsevier may 2011. caire et al., (2006). a handbook for developing credit scoring systems in microfinance context. usaid, february 2006. caire, d., (2004). building credit scorecards for small business lending in developing markets, bannock consulting, november 2004. gool, j. v. et al., (2009). an analysis of the applicability of credit scoring for microfinance, university of southampton, may 2009. hurlin, c., (2002). econométrie des variables qualitatives. cours de maîtrise d’économétrie. université d’orléans. meczop, (2010). credit policy paper schreiner, m., (2003). scoring: the next breakthrough in microcredit? cgap occasional paper n°7. schreiner, m., (2004). benefits and pitfalls of statistical credit scoring for microfinance, center for social development, washington university in st. louis, usa. sur, k., (2008). credit risk analytics: a cornerstone for effective risk management, an oracle white paper, oracle financial services, october 2008. vigano, l., (1993). a credit scoring model for development banks: an african case study. savings and development. quarterly review. vol 17.n°4. yang liu, (2001). new issues in credit scoring application, work report no 16, institut für wirtschaftsinformatik, 2001. www.cgap.org zweig, m. h., campbell, g. (1993). receiver-operating characteristic (roc) plots: a fundamental evaluation tool in clinical medicine. clinical chemistry 39 (review), 561-577. consilience kinda: credit scoring model 31     annexes logit regression results logistic regression number of obs = 30 wald chi2(10) = 16.57 prob > chi2 = 0.0845 log pseudolikelihood = -8.1992591 pseudo r2 = 0.6057 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | robust empr_retard | coef. std. err. z p>|z| [95% conf. interval] -------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- age | 2.443829 .9512772 2.57 0.010 .5793603 4.308298 age2 | -.0255646 .009814 -2.60 0.009 -.0447997 -.0063295 sexe | -2.443102 1.209675 -2.02 0.043 -4.81402 -.072183 antcd_crd | 9.251004 3.880015 2.38 0.017 1.646315 16.85569 nb_credit | -.3984008 1.853171 -0.21 0.830 -4.030548 3.233747 garantie | -7.183442 3.178927 -2.26 0.024 -13.41402 -.9528599 exp_agt | -.3516837 .3161474 -1.11 0.266 -.9713213 .2679538 montant_cr~t | 3.79e-06 2.47e-06 1.53 0.126 -1.06e-06 8.64e-06 fréq_remb | 9.149246 3.380901 2.71 0.007 2.522803 15.77569 année_exp | -.1810599 .1125368 -1.61 0.108 -.4016279 .0395081 _cons | -53.52892 21.45769 -2.49 0.013 -95.58521 -11.47263 --------------------------------------------------------------------- marginal effects/discrete changes ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | delta-method | dy/dx std. err. z p>|z| [95% conf. interval] -------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- age | .2050036 .0259957 7.89 0.000 .1540529 .2559542 age2 | -.0021445 .0002753 -7.79 0.000 -.0026842 -.0016048 sexe | -.2049425 .1061814 -1.93 0.054 -.4130542 .0031692 antcd_crd | .7760315 .1436279 5.40 0.000 .494526 1.057537 nb_credit | -.0334203 .1610299 -0.21 0.836 -.3490332 .2821926 garantie | -.6025916 .1997236 -3.02 0.003 -.9940426 -.2111406 exp_agt | -.0295014 .0219555 -1.34 0.179 -.0725334 .0135306 montant_cr~t | 3.18e-07 2.02e-07 1.57 0.116 -7.88e-08 7.15e-07 fréq_remb | .7674955 .1424011 5.39 0.000 .4883945 1.046596 année_exp | -.0151884 .0064859 -2.34 0.019 -.0279005 -.0024763 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- classification table for late in reimbursement -------true ------- classified | d ~d | total -----------+--------------------------+---------- + | 13 1 | 14 | 2 14 | 16 -----------+--------------------------+---------- total | 15 15 | 30 classified + if predicted pr(d) >= .5 true d defined as empr_retard != 0 ------------------------------------------------- sensitivity pr( +| d) 86.67% specificity pr( -|~d) 93.33% positive predictive value pr( d| +) 92.86% negative predictive value pr(~d| -) 87.50% ------------------------------------------------- false + rate for true ~d pr( +|~d) 6.67% false rate for true d pr( -| d) 13.33% false + rate for classified + pr(~d| +) 7.14% false rate for classified pr( d| -) 12.50% ------------------------------------------------- correctly classified 90.00% consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 6, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 133–155 why the rural rich remain energy poor bilal mirza united nations university merit maastricht university, netherlands mirza@merit.unu.edu rené kemp united nations university merit maastricht university, netherlands abstract the paper explores the rationale behind the complexities of energy poverty among different income groups in rural communities. we attempted to explain why rural rich, despite their relatively high purchasing power use energy sources which tend to categorize them as energy poor. using the energy poverty survey (eps) a dataset of more than 600 rural households from 27 different rural communities of punjab, pakistan, we presented the energy access situation in rural households among different income groups. subsequently, we used binary logit regressions to assess the influence of access factors on energy source choices among different income groups. the influence of occupation and household income, membership and size is also assessed. the limited significance of household income for traditional biomass use and high significance of community remoteness indicators imply that households give high importance on the proximity of energy sources available to them and, in many cases, will prefer to be in the state of energy poverty, than to use a modern energy source like liquefied petroleum gas (lpg). author’s note this paper originally appeared in the working paper series (issn 1871-9872) of unu-merit (united nations university – maastricht economic and social research and training centre on innovation and technology). unu-merit working papers intend to disseminate preliminary results of research carried out at the centre, to stimulate discussion on the issues raised. keywords: energy poverty, rural rich, rural poor, rural communities, punjab, pakistan, fuelwood, animal waste, plant waste, kerosene, liquid petroleum gas. 1. introduction in pakistan, and other developing countries, rural communities are often without access to modern energy sources like electricity and natural gas. in recent years, the expansion in electricity access has increased manifolds, however the inaccessibility to natural gas still remain as the major impediment for socio-economic development of these rural communities, due to high inconveniences experienced in collection and buying traditional biomass and other energy sources. based on the access to electricity and natural gas, 4 types of rural communities have emerged, in countries like pakistan, i.e., a) communities without electricity and natural gas, b) communities with electricity but without natural gas, c) communities without electricity but with natural gas, d) and communities with electricity and natural gas. 134 consilience the types, a and b are the ones, where rural households, either poor or rich, use variety of energy sources, particularly, for cooking and heating purposes. in a very limited manner, people move up the energy ladder when household income increases in these communities (davis, 1995; leach, 1987, 1988, 1992; campbell at al., 2003). we often observe that higher income groups may continue to rely on traditional biomass (firewood, animal waste, plant waste) or use kerosene in addition to using modern and convenient energy source like lpg1 (aburas & fromme, 1991; alberts et al., 1997; haas et al., 2008; joyeux and ripple, 2007; horst and hovorka, 2008). the issue of energy source choices in rural communities is examined in many studies. in most of the earlier studies, household income and consumption is used as the common determinants for explaining the energy poverty, followed by the pioneering research of leach (1987, 1988). leach, based on the national surveys, found that the consumption of biomass was related to income, household and settlement size and fuel prices in india, pakistan and bangladesh. subsequently, other similar studies show that due to non-availability of modern energy sources like ongrid electricity and natural gas, rural households, including richer one, adopt traditional biomass as a substitute for meeting household energy needs (wuyan et al., 2007; xiaohua and zhenming, 1996, 1997; masera and navia, 1997; tonooka et al., 2006). we also observed that there is a clear distinction between the energy source choices and the energy source switching – also referred as fuel switching, in energy poor households. energy source choices refer to the energy options available to rural households, which they choose or can choose to meet their household energy needs. once a specific energy source is chosen by a particular household, three different scenarios are possible, a) household starts using it as a main energy source, b) household starts using it, but only occasionally, hence combining it with other energy source(s), also called as fuel stacking (wuyan et al., 2007) and c) household stop using it and switch to other possible energy source(s)2. the first two scenarios clearly depend on available energy choices and number of related factors like income, price, household proximity etc, whereby households expands their types of energy sources to meet their energy needs, whereas the third scenario involves the discontinuation of previous energy source used by household and switch to available substitute(s) which could best provide them optimal combination of related factors (davis, 1995; campbell et al., 2003; alberts et al., 1997; horst and hovorka, 2008; wuyan et al., 2007; xiaohua and zhenming, 1996, 1997; masera and navia, 1997; masera et al., 2000; bhattacharyya, 2006; gupta and köhlin, 2006). in this paper, we studied the factors responsible for different energy choices, that people living in rural communities (type a and b only) choose to meet their domestic energy needs. we used the binary logit models for 5 different energy sources 1 lpg, also known as liquefied petroleum gas or liquid petroleum gas is compressed form of flammable gases used in many parts of the world. lpg is usually sold in cylinders and is becoming common form of alternative energy source where access to piped natural gas is limited or absent. apart from its domestic usage, it is also used in transportation across many countries. 2 this further leads to „fuel switching‟ phenomenon in rural households. for more information on fuel switching (campbell et al., 2003; alberts el al., 1997; horst and hovorka, 2008; masera and navia, 1997; masera et al., 2000; karekazi et al., 2008; viswanathan and kavi, 2005; nautiyal and kaechele, 2008). consilience mirza & kemp: rural rich, energy poor figure 1: hierarchy of different energy source choices available to rural households (firewood, animal waste, plant waste, kerosene and lpg) included in our survey. the structure of the paper is as following. section 2 offers an overview of energy sources and their respective use across the different income groups in rural punjab. section 3 discusses the dependent and independent variables used in our analysis. section 4 discusses the model results for 5 different energy sources and their sub-categories. and finally section 5 states our conclusions with special attention to the question why rural rich3 remain energy poor. 2. energy choices in rural communities of punjab households in the rural punjab of pakistan use different types of energy sources in the absence of natural gas and electricity. in the absence of natural gas, rural households are left with different energy sources like firewood, animal and plant wastes etc to meet their domestic energy needs. similarly, in the case where electricity is not accessible, kerosene is the most common alternative used in kerosene lanterns. figure 1 represents an overview of energy sources available to households in rural communities. based on the frequency of usage, the „frequent users‟ represent household using a particular energy source as one of the main energy sources in their energy mix. on the other side, occasional users are households using a particular energy source intermittently, due to different reasons (access, price, supply, availability etc.). figure 2 shows that more than 52% households are frequent users and rely on buying the firewood from the nearby market, whereas nearly 40% households collect firewood and are frequent users. 5.5% of households are those which, at the same time, collect and buy firewood from the market, whereas only 2.9% of firewood users have reported that they use firewood occasionally. in our sample of 640 households in punjab, 90.9% of rural households reported that firewood is one of the energy sources among others. firewood may be collected, bought or both collected and bought. both activities require effort for buying firewood as people 3 in our study, the term rural rich refers to those households that fall in upper middle and upper income households with income between rs. 8001 – 12000 and rs. 12001 – and above respectively. 136 consilience may have to go to nearby town or city. figure 2 (next page) shows different income groups and their respective proportions (in %) using energy sources (listed on x-axis). when these income groups are compared, we can see that consumption levels are surprisingly equal across income groups. these consumption levels point to our main problem statement for the paper, which inquire the causes for such consumption consistency in different income groups, particularly for the traditional energy sources like firewood and animal waste. in other words, we aim to specifically analyse why rural rich remain energy poor despite of higher incomes? apart from the infrastructural unavailability, what are the main factors in shaping energy choices available to rural households with different income levels? why are certain energy sources given more priority than others in different income groups? during the data collection using the eps, we found that many households, particularly with higher incomes, consider many factors in deciding for particular energy source. for such households, these factors are equally important as energy source price. figure 3 shows the average time per week that different income groups are spending for collection and/or buying different energy sources on average. the amount of time (per week) that people spend on buying and collecting energy sources is considerable and differs per energy source across different income groups. collecting animal waste takes most time (more than 6 hours or more on average per week) in upper income group, due to relatively high livestock ownership in rich households. data shows that the average time spent for collecting firewood decreases as the household income increases. in the case of lpg, there is a slight increase in average time spent at higher incomes (upper middle and upper income groups) as compared to lower income groups. this is certainly due to the increased usage of lpg in higher income groups. figure 4 shows that kerosene expense in all income groups is rather equal, whereas there is gradual increase in biomass expense from the lowest income to the upper income group. traditional biomass expense represents the combined expenses for firewood, animal and plant waste bought. we can see that people in the upper income group are spending twice as much as the lowest income group on biomass. this shows that instead of gradual decline of biomass expenditure in the upper income group, which is normally expected, it increases actually. due to its natural availability in rural setup, biomass still remains one of the preferred sources of energy in upper income groups, even when used in combination with lpg. in the case of lpg, an interesting u-shaped curve corresponds to the bars representing lpg expenses in figure 4. on average, more than rs. 1100 are spend on lpg in the lowest income group. most households in this group do not use lpg. out of 66 households categorized as the lowest income households, only 8 households reported that they are lpg users, representing 12.12% of entire group. the lpg expenses went down in the lower and the middle income group, whereas it started increasing in upper middle and upper income group. on average, energy expenses in the lowest income group are more than the lower and middle income group. these expenses tend to increase in the upper middle income and upper income groups, probably due to convenient energy sources like firewood bought (compared to firewood collected) and lpg. consilience mirza & kemp: rural rich, energy poor figure 2: proportion of energy sources in different income groups. source: energy poverty survey conducted by author. 138 consilience figure 3: average time spent (in hours) per week in buying and collecting different energy sources. source: energy poverty survey conducted by author. figure 4: average monthly expenses by different income groups for different energy sources. source: energy poverty survey conducted by author consilience mirza & kemp: rural rich, energy poor province punjab household members 169 districts 11 2 to 5 (26%) 388 rural communities (households) 27 (640) 6 to 10 (60%) communities with electricity but no natural gas 19 11 to 15 66 (10%) communities without electricity and natural gas 6 16 to 20 12 (2%) solar communities without electricity and natural gas 2 20 + 5 (1%) community prosperity gender level 599 male (93.6%) very poor 11 female 41 (6.4%) poor 11 age groups neither poor nor rich 2 below 18 years 4 (0.6%) rich 0 135 18yrs to 30yrs (21.1%) very rich 0 268 30yrs to 45yrs (41.9%) un-known 3 164 45yrs to 60yrs (25.6%) 60+ 69 (10.8%) table 1: sample profile: some facts and figures. source: energy poverty survey conducted by author. 3. data and research method we used our own survey, called the energy poverty survey (eps) to study the energy choices among rural households. the eps was conducted during september 2008 and january 2009 in 11 different districts of punjab province in pakistan. in total, 640 households from 27 rural communities in 11 different districts of punjab province were included using stratified random sampling. in the eps, 19 rural communities were without any natural gas supply but with on-grid electricity, 6 rural communities were without any access to natural gas or electricity, whereas 2 of them were solar villages, but without any access to natural gas and on-grid electricity. table 1 shows that almost all the rural communities in our sample are classified either as poor or very poor. around 88% respondents belong to age group between 18 years and 60 years. the ratio of male to female is heavily biased towards the male respondents, due to the fact that the local culture does not allow females to interact with males other than their family members. using the binary variables for energy source choices, we used the binary logistic regression to study the effect of different factors on energy source choices made by rural households. in our logistic regression model, we included the community remoteness indicators (td and cd), type of occupations (farmer, shop), household size (hs), number of household members working (nhmw), constant income (cons_income) and most importantly, the income groups as the explanatory variables. the dependent and independent variables are discusses separately in the following sub-sections. 140 consilience variable code variable name description firewooduser household using firewood 1 if yes, 0 otherwise firealways frequent firewood user 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. 0 also implies that household is occasional user. buy_firewood whether household buys firewood 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. 0 also implies that household collects firewood or collect and buy (both) collect_firewood whether household collects firewood 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. 0 also implies that household buy firewood or collect and buy (both) a_waste_user household using animal waste 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. awaste_always frequent animal waste user 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. 0 also implies that household is occasional user. p_waste_user household using plant waste 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. p_waste_always frequent plant waste user 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. 0 also implies that household is occasional user. k_user household using kerosene 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. k_always frequent kerosene user 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. 0 also implies that household is occasional user. lpg_user household using kerosene 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. table 2: dependent variables and their descriptions. source: energy poverty survey conducted by author 3.1 dependent variables the logistic regression model takes into account 11 different binary or dichotomous variables for 5 different energy sources, including firewood, animal waste, plant waste, kerosene and lpg. the first question asked to the respondents for each energy source is whether they are using the particular energy source or not, which is represented by 1 as a user and 0 otherwise. we made a further distinction in the next question by asking the usage frequency to all energy source users except lpg, which is coded as 1 if household is a frequent user and 0 if an occasional user (see table 2). specifically in the case of firewood, rural households collect, buy or do both to access firewood. in the case when households collect firewood, they bear relatively high physical inconveniences without any costs for the firewood. 3.2 independent variables 3.2.1 occupations eight different categories of occupations were identified, namely, unemployed (individuals), farming, (construction) labour4, shopkeeper, government employees, private employees, retired individuals, and others including drivers, barbers, etc. construction labour is found to be the most common profession among the rural households in all the districts, with 32% households associated 4 in the eps, the term labourer is used for the construction workers only as it is the most common profession among rural households. whereas all other labour intensive professions common are included in others category. consilience mirza & kemp: rural rich, energy poor variable code variable name description td town distance village distance in kilometres from nearby town cd city distance village distance in kilometres from nearby city hs household size total number of household members within one dwelling nhmw number of household members total number of households working (including working farming) const_income constant income dummy 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. whether the income remains constant during the year or not farmer occupation = farming dummy 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. main occupation of the respondent or household head shop occupation = shop keeping dummy 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. as per above lwstincome lowest income class dummy 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. group with income between rs.1 and rs. 3000 lwrincome lower income class dummy 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. group with income between rs. 3001 and rs 5000 midincome middle income class dummy 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. group with income between rs. 5001 and rs. 8000 upmidincome upper middle income class dummy 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. group with income between rs. 8001 and rs. 12000 upincome upper income class dummy 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. group with income between rs. 12001 and above [reference category]. table 3: independent variables and their description. source: energy poverty survey conducted by author. with it. the second most common occupation is farming which includes almost 31% of households, followed by shop keeping (15.7%). remaining 4 occupational categories were less than 7% separately. for that reason, initially we selected only three occupations for our model on different energy sources. however, a high collinearity between labourer and other two variables (occupations) was found, which led us to drop labourer from the econometric analysis, and thus only include farmer and shop as occupational variables. 3.2.2 income income of rural households is classified into 5 different groups, namely the lowest income group, lower income group, middle income group, upper middle income group, and the upper income group, based on the different income ranges. the lowest income group includes all the households, which has monthly household income (total household income) ranging from 1 rupee to 3000 rupees. similarly, the lower income group includes all the households which have monthly household income ranging from rs. 3001 to rs. 5000, followed by the middle income group ranging from rs. 5001 to rs. 8000, the upper middle income group ranging from rs. 8001 to rs. 12000 and the upper income group to incomes above rs. 12000. the explanatory variables corresponding to each income group are dichotomous variables that equals to 1 if the total household monthly income falls into that range category, otherwise zero. 142 consilience figure 5: proportion of income groups in different districts. source: energy poverty survey conducted by author figure 6: occupations and their proportions in different districts. source: energy poverty survey conducted by author. figure 5 shows the geographical distribution of different income groups in different districts of punjab province. muzaffargarh (25.9%) and rawalpindi (24%) districts are the ones with highest proportion of poor people falling into the lowest income group. sialkot and gujrat districts are those with highest proportion of rich people representing upper income group, i.e., 36% and 33% respectively. it is also worth mentioning here that according to the set income criteria, none of the households sampled in gujrat district belong to the lowest income group, hence the sialkot sheikhupura rawalpindi muzaffargarh multan layyah lahore jhelum gujrat faisalabad chakwal 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% unemployed farming labour shopkeeper govt. employee private employee retired others consilience mirza & kemp: rural rich, energy poor table 4: income group representation in all districts source: energy poverty survey conducted by author minimum maximum mean town distance 1 18 5.64 city distance 3 50 20.64 table 5: distance (in kilometres) of town and city from sampled rural community. source: energy poverty survey conducted by author. district only represents the remaining four income groups. to further analyse the source of such income patterns in different districts, figure 6 shows the break-up of occupations adopted by rural households. we can see that in the communities (muzaffargarh and rawalpindi) where poor income groups are in majority, farming is one of the major occupations, whereas in communities (sialkot and gujrat) with the majority of people belonging to upper income group, households have mostly reported as (construction) labourer, government and private employee households. using a random sampling of rural households in our sampled rural communities, we can see that more than 10% rural households belong to the lowest income category (see table 4). similarly, more than 17% households sampled in the eps are categorized as the lower income households, whereas 26% are the middle income households. according to the set income criteria, we found that nearly 30% of rural households can be categorized as the upper middle income households, whereas remaining 17% can be classified as the upper income households. as income in rural household is seasonal, a specific question was also asked to know whether the household income remains constant throughout the year or not. as a result, a dichotomous variable const_income is used in the model, which equals one if the household has constant income throughout the year, and zero otherwise. 3.2.3 community remoteness three different variables are used to measure the community remoteness, namely distance from nearest village (vd), distance from nearest town (td) and distance from nearest city (cd). to avoid the repetition of distance from village to village, we avoided to include adjacent villages in our sample. also, due to relatively similar market situations in all adjacent villages, rural people tend to visit nearest town or city for their energy needs. this gave us a reason to exclude village distance variable from our analysis, leaving us with two important variables for analysing the effect of community remoteness on energy source variables. table 5 provides a snapshot of community remoteness that shows minimum, maximum and average distances in kilometres from rural community to most nearby town and city. on average, rural people travel more than 5 and 20 kilometres to reach town and city respectively. in the case where city is very far (more than 10 kilometres) from rural community, we assume that nearby town shall be preferred by lowest income lower income middle income upper middle income upper income sample mean 10.28% 17.32% 26.07% 29.42% 16.92% 144 consilience rural people. another important aspect is mode of transportation to access in such far-flung towns and cities. particularly in lower income classes, rural people normally travel by foot. however, in some cases, they also use bicycles and animal carts, which make their access to town and city much more convenient. in upper income classes (upper middle and upper income group), use of motor bike and tractor is more common. 3.2.4 household size and number of household members working household size5 (hs) represents the total number of household members, including all men, women and children living together in one dwelling. in our sample, we found that the average number of household members (hs) is more than 7, with minimum of two and maximum of 30 household members. in the case of number of household members working (nhmw), more than 48% household reported that at least 1 household member is working, either employed or self-employed and earning income corresponding to one of the income groups. similarly, 20.4% and 15.2% reported 2 and 3 working members respectively. for the binomial logistic regression, we consider both, hs and nhmw as the important variables with possible impact on the energy access for households. our priori is that household with higher hs might have convenient access by engaging more households members in collecting and buying traditional and non-traditional energy sources. on the other hand, households with higher nhmw might have lower access to traditional energy sources, as they might not be available due to their employment. apart from independent variables discussed earlier, we also included education variables, for respondent, other male and female members (separately) and other occupations like labourer. however, surprisingly, both types of variables turned out to be highly insignificant with high standard errors. also, both of them were having co-linearity problems, which eventually forced us to exclude them from our final models and their sub-models. 4. results: different energy choices, different reasons household opt for different energy choices based on different factors relevant to that particular energy source. in this section, we discuss the factors relevant to each energy source based on the binomial logit regression results, as presented in table 6. 4.1 factors effecting household using firewood firewood is considered to be the most readily available and preferred energy source for rural households (davis, 1995; alberts et al., 1997; pachauri and jiang, 2008; permana et al., 2008). this also holds true for the rural communities studied in punjab where 90.9% of the households use firewood (bought or collected). in our analysis, we investigate the determinants of firewood use, both for occasional users and frequent users. 5 in the eps, we only had data on household size, and not on household composition. consilience mirza & kemp: rural rich, energy poor 4.1.1 households using firewood in the first step, we took firewood user as a dependent variable, representing the dummy which equals to 1 if household uses firewood and zero otherwise. using the independent variables listed in table 3, we found that the community remoteness indicators (town [p-value ≤ 0.10] and city distance [p-value ≤ 0.01]), household size (p-value ≤ 0.01), farmer (p-value≤0.01), lower (p-value ≤ 0.05), middle (p-value v 0.05) and the upper middle income (p-value ≤0.10) group turned out to be significant for choosing firewood as an energy choice in our sample of 640 households. the estimated coefficient, which represent the log of odds ratio suggest that the odds of using firewood (collected or bought) are highest in the middle income group [exp (midincome) = 2.74] than other income groups. similarly, in occupation related variables, the dummy variable for farmer tells us that the odds [exp (-0.862) = 0.422] of using firewood in farming households are 42% higher than households with other occupations (shop keeping). the nagelkerke r 2 shows that our model is able to explain just 15% of the variation based on the given variables. 4.1.2 frequent vs. occasional firewood using households rural households tend to make choices on usage frequency of energy source based on different factors. during our informal discussion with rural people, we found that for poor households time is less important than it is for rich households. on the other hand, rich households tend to choose energy sources with greater convenience and energy efficiency than its price. interestingly, we found that they still use firewood and animal waste in combination with lpg to meet their domestic energy needs. we created a dichotomous dependent variable, representing the frequency of firewood usage in rural households, where 1 representing a frequent firewood usage and 0 representing an occasional firewood usage. the results in column 2 of table 6 shows that town distance (p-value ≤0.05), household size (pvalue ≤ 0.10) and the upper middle income group variables are significant for the choice of using firewood frequently or occasionally. our results suggest that the increase in town distance negatively affects the frequency of firewood usage, as rural households are highly dependent on firewood sellers in the nearby town. household size (hs) is positively significant, as expected, implying more household involvement in firewood buying and collecting activities. in the income related explanatory variables, only the upper middle income group variable turned out to be the significant one (p-value ≤ 0.05) with negative coefficient value, suggesting very low odds [exp (-1.825) = 0.16] for using firewood frequently when households fall in the upper middle income group. 4.1.3 households buying firewood the results for households buying firewood are given in the column 3 of table 6. the independent variable buy firewood is a dichotomous variable that equals to 1 if households buy firewood, and 0 if not. if the rural households do not buy firewood, this also implies that they are either collect firewood, or combine buying and collection. the results shows that the community remoteness variables (td and cd) are highly significant (p-value ≤0.01), along with the dummy variables for the lowest income group (p-value ≤0.10) and lower income group (p-value ≤0.05). the 146 consilience negative sign in the coefficients of td (town distance) and cd (city distance) suggests that with the increase in the community remoteness (in kilometres), the log odds to buy firewood decreases. this might be due to the market inter-linkages between the rural community and the nearby town and city, specifically for buying and selling firewood. this is true in many cases, as most of the firewood or wooden log stall6 is only available in nearby town or city. the negative sign may also imply that with the increase of each unit of distance (kilometre), the probability to buy firewood among rural households decrease by the log odds of -0.06 for town and -0.057 for city. we may also transform the significant coefficient for the lowest income group (-0.827), which suggests that there is around 30% probability of buying firewood in the lowest income group, as compared to 70% probability of not buying it. similarly, the probability computed from the log of odds ratio for the lower income group suggest the probability of buying firewood in the lowest income group is more than 31%, slightly higher than the lowest income group. 4.1.4 households collecting firewood for households collecting firewood and not buying it, distance of nearby town and city are found to be highly significant (both with p-value ≤ 0.01) and have positive influence on the dependent variable (collecting firewood). this implies that with the increase in distance from town and city, the odds of using collected firewood increases among rural households. the model also suggests that the tendency of using collected firewood among the lower income group is significant (p-value ≤ 0.10). the influence of farmer for firewood collection is as per our expectations. the model suggests that the probability of using collected firewood is 40.4% in farmer households as compared to 0% in non-farmer household. in our dataset, farmers were usually not having access to „free‟ firewood. in such cases, they also have to buy firewood to meet their domestic energy needs. though, they have natural access to plant waste, due to its seasonal availability, they have to buy firewood and use it in addition to plant and animal wastes. 4.2 factors explaining households use of animal waste more than 63% rural households are using animal waste as one of their energy source. among the sample districts in the eps, around 91% households in the sialkot district reported to be using animal waste, followed by the lahore district with 88%. similarly, rawalpindi and layyah district turned out to have the lowest number of animal waste users, i.e., 86% and 75% rural households reported that they are not using the animal waste as an energy source. there are two main reasons for this. first, the rural communities in these districts are comparatively much poorer than rural communities in other districts. secondly, their high dependence on agriculture results in much lower household income than other types of occupations. as a result, almost all of the animal waste produced domestically at a household level is used as a fertilizer in their agricultural land, allowing them to save their expenses on fertilizers. moreover, it was also observed that due to comparatively high livestock ownership in rich households, animal waste becomes one of their natural 6 stalls where wooden logs are sold that can be used in furniture and firewood. this is very common practice in developing countries of south asia (india, pakistan, bangladesh, nepal, sri lanka) and sub-saharan africa. consilience mirza & kemp: rural rich, energy poor energy choices, which is often considered as an exclusive source of energy for poor households the ratio of rural household buying animal waste as an energy source is lower than the share of households buying firewood. we also found that if household owns livestock which produces waste usable as an energy source, household utilize it more often as an energy source than using it as a fertilizer. moreover, in many cases, rural households use animal waste produced from their own livestock. apart from buying animal waste, households also reported that in some cases, animal waste is earned as income in kind by female members of poor households who assist richer households with livestock ownership in cleaning the cattle shed and processing animal wastes to eventually make it combustible7. in our dataset, around 38% reported to buy it from the local sources like neighbour or households within their community, whereas only 1.2% reported using both ways, buying and collecting the animal waste from the community. 4.2.1 households using animal waste in the case of households using animal waste, city distance and town distance appeared to be significant at 10% and 1% significance level respectively (see column 5 in table 6). the results imply that lower the community remoteness, higher the chances of using energy source other than animal waste, as that increases the availability of other energy sources like firewood, kerosene, and liquid petroleum gas. in the estimates, we can also see that household income is without significant influence for the use of animal waste. in other words, this also implies that decision to use animal waste as an energy source is independent of the household social status, specifically in the case of rural communities. 4.2.2 frequent vs. occasional animal waste using households the column 6 in table 6 shows the logit regression results for the frequency of using the animal waste, in households which have already reported animal waste as one of their energy sources. apart from the community remoteness indicators (both significant at 1%), number of household members working in a specific household also turned out to be significant at 5% significance level with a negative coefficient value, implying the frequent use of animal waste as an energy source decreases with an increase in employed household members. this might be due to the fact that animal waste requires relatively higher degree of household efforts to make the animal dung usable for burning. therefore as the number of household members working in a household increases, the use of animal waste decreases but still remains as one of the energy source. 7 in rural communities of pakistan, there is no formal selling of animal waste which can be later used as animal waste. usually, animal waste is processed and dried by the females in rural households. if a rural household with livestock ownership has surplus amount of animal waste, the females use their personal contacts with other female household members to sell or „give away‟ animal waste. the practice in rich households (upper middle and upper income group) is slightly different, as the females from those households contact the females from household from low income groups (lowest and lower income group) and „give away‟ the animal waste for free, if female members from low income household agree to process and clean the cattle shed. 148 consilience 4.3 factors explaining plant wastes usage contrary to our hypothesis, the use of plant waste among rural households is independent of land ownership. instead, it has been observed that the relationship between the land ownership and the use of plant waste as an energy source turned out to be highly insignificant (χ 2 =0.872, df=1, p-value = 0.350). among 109 rural households using plant waste, 47% reported that they do not own any agricultural land. in general, less than 18% rural households use plant waste for energy purposes, as more effort and time is required to collect it. also, plant waste is not considered as an efficient energy source in terms of energy produced by it for the cooking purposes, as compared to firewood and animal waste. within different districts, 83% and 72% rural households in muzaffargarh and layyah district respectively were using plant waste in addition to other energy sources. on the other side, rural households in 4 districts, namely rawalpindi, gujrat, lahore and multan, were not using it at all. 4.3.1 households using plant waste in column 7 of table 6, a binary variable is used for plant waste using household, which equals to 1 if households are using plant waste and 0 otherwise. the result of logit regression shows that the all explanatory variables turned out to be significant except community remoteness indicators, number of household members working and the upper middle income group. the results clearly show that the households with farming have higher odds of using plant waste as an energy source. moreover, households with income having no seasonal impacts also reported higher log of odds ratio of using plant waste than those who are not. due to high colinearity of shop (shop keepers) variable with other occupations, it was dropped from the model. the lowest (p-value ≤ 0.01), lower (p-value ≤ 0.01) and the middle income group (p-value = 0.05), household size (p-value = 0.01), constant income (p-value ≤ 0.05), farmer (p-value ≤ 0.01) and number of household members working (p-value ≤ 0.10) turned out to be significant. one of the reasons for significance of hs could be the possibility of household members to engage themselves in plant waste collection, especially females and children. similarly, income groups with low income have higher log odds ratio of using plant waste than households with higher income. similarly, the high significance of farmer implies that due to easy access of plant waste, log of odds ratio of using plant waste are relatively high among farming households than those who are not. with r 2 of 0.14, the model is still able to explain only 14% variation, implying that still there are many unknown factors for remaining 86% variation responsible for plant waste collection. 4.3.2 frequent vs. occasional plant waste using households the results from 110 plant waste using households show that most of the variables were unable to explain the variation in dependent variable, except the constant income variable (p-value ≤ 0.05), shop variable (p-value ≤ 0.10) and the lower income group variable (p-value ≤ 0.10). consilience mirza & kemp: rural rich, energy poor 4.4 factors explaining kerosene usage households normally consume kerosene in lanterns or for igniting traditional biomass (alberts et al., 1997; rijal et al., 1990; karekazi et al., 2008; mirza, 2008). figure 2 shows that more than 50% of households in the lowest income group and around 60% of households in the lower income group use kerosene as one of their energy sources. there is a negative correlation between income and kerosene use due to the inconveniences involved. such inconveniences involved travelling to nearby town or city due unavailability of kerosene within the rural community, and thus also requires more time and efforts. we also observed that higher income groups tend to buy more convenient energy source like liquid petroleum gas, than kerosene for cooking purposes due to its relatively higher efficiency. the regression results in the column 9 of table 6 confirm that the odds of using kerosene is highly influenced by the city distance, and whether household is classified as the lowest or the lower income group household (p-value ≤ 0.01 for each). the transformation of log of odds ratio into probability shows that the probability of using kerosene in the lowest income group is nearly 80%, whereas for the lower income group it falls to 78%. the estimates for the middle income group also turned out to be significant at 10%, suggesting that the probability of using the kerosene in the middle income group is nearly 61%. this gradual decline in the probability of using kerosene can be attributed to the physical efforts and travelling involved for rural households. the column 10 in table 6 shows that the decision for using kerosene frequently or occasionally in rural households depends on the community remoteness and the household status. the negative estimate for town distance, represented as the log of odds suggests that with the increase of town distance, the odds for frequent use of kerosene declines. however in the case of city distance, the positive sign of log of odds might suggest that with the increase of distance between city and rural community, households might prefer to use kerosene more frequently than compared to a situation when city is close by. one possible explanation for this could be that when rural communities are distant, kerosene might become available within community market through shops and small grocery stores. the relative high value for nagelkerke r 2 for frequent vs. occasional kerosene user (column 10 of table 6) shows the model is far better in prediction than all other models for energy sources. 4.5 factors explaining lpg usage the liquid petroleum gas or more commonly referred as the lpg, is one of the most common substitutes for natural gas in relatively affluent households, as it involves relatively higher initial costs for stove, gas cylinder and some accessories (xiaohua and zhenming, 1996; heltberg, 2004; hosier and kipyonda, 1993; karekazi, 1994). in 2000 and 2008, masera et al. and horst and hovorka respectively, found that albeit the upper income households use lpg as a substitute energy source in the absence of natural gas, still it is not a complete substitute as they continue using traditional biomass in combination to lpg. the descriptive results from our dataset also confirm this fact. we found that more than 32 % households reported to be using the lpg in absence of natural gas, in combination with other energy sources, like firewood, animal and plant waste. as shown in the figure 2, the 150 consilience use of lpg tends to increase with the increase in household income. the column 11 in table 6 shows the logit results for the lpg usage in 640 rural households. except household size variable, all explanatory variables turned out to be highly significant, however most of them with negative signs. the community remoteness variables (town distance and city distance) suggest that with the increase of city distance, the odds for using the lpg decreases, but in the case when town distance increases, the odds for using the lpg increases, which is somehow unexplainable. similarly, coefficients for constant income and farmer also suggest that lpg usage is probably not common when households have constant incomes and are associated with farming profession. we observe negative values for the first income groups. the negative coefficients decline with household income. for the highest income group the coefficient is positive, which is evidence of the positive relationship of kerosene use with household income. consilience mirza & kemp: rural rich, energy poor table 6: binomial logit regression results for different energy sources dependent firewood animal waste plant waste kerosene lpg variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) user frequent vs. buy collect user frequent vs. user frequent vs. user frequent vs. user occasional occasional occasional occasional user user user users td -0.063* -0.126** -0.06*** 0.055*** -0.048** -0.098*** -0.043 0.167 -0.031 -0.312*** 0.086*** (0.033) (0.049) (0.021) (0.021) (0.02) (0.034) (0.029) (0.15) (0.021) (0.055) (0.021) cd 0.052*** 0.029 -0.057*** 0.059*** -0.053*** -0.04*** 0.008 0.03 0.062*** 0.072*** -0.035*** (0.015) (0.022) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.015) (0.009) (0.041) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008) hs 0.184*** 0.215* -0.003 0.033 0.088** 0.087 -0.022 0.05 -0.013 (0.063) (0.113) (0.031) 0.004 (0.031) 0.038 (0.032) (0.057) (0.036) (0.108) (0.032) (0.065) (0.031) nhmw -0.113 -0.235 -0.086 -0.244** -0.16 -0.184 -0.229 -0.148** (0.12) (0.183) (0.074) 0.055 (0.075) 0.094 (0.074) (0.12) (0.103) (0.355) 0.028 (0.073) (0.148) (0.075) const_income 0.968 -0.059 -0.2 -0.279 0.908** 2.024** 0.149 -0.346 -0.731*** 0.395 (0.36) (0.593) (0.26) 0.313 (0.273) (0.257) (0.512) (0.377) (0.972) (0.25) (0.565) (0.244) farmer -0.862*** 0.67 0.394* -0.389* 0.746 0.676*** -0.365 0.283 -0.679*** (0.321) (0.676) (0.219) (0.225) 0.179 (0.211) (0.526) (0.234) (0.969) 0.289 (0.206) (0.493) (0.226) shop -0.213 -0.301 -0.473 -0.619 -0.574 3.122* -0.615 0.209 0.867* (0.69) (1.121) 0.695 (0.524) (0.524) (0.449) (0.87) (1.705) (0.557) (1.175) (0.473) income groups lwstincome -0.17 -1.613 -0.827* -0.02 0.929 1.389*** 1.529 1.38*** 2.409** -2.688*** (0.503) (1.128) (0.427) 0.375 (0.422) (0.384) (1.106) (0.458) (1.384) (0.383) (1.178) (0.57) lwrincome 0.998** -0.071 -0.779** 0.323 1.084*** 2.479* 1.276*** 1.151* -1.753*** (0.5) (1.297) (0.33) 0.61* (0.332) 0.261 (0.315) (0.66) (0.412) (1.412) (0.313) (0.679) (0.342) midincome 1.009** -0.858 -0.209 0.32 -0.018 0.885** 0.569 0.468* 1.081* -1.511*** (0.443) (0.936) (0.28) 0.173 (0.284) (0.269) (0.483) (0.384) (1.216) (0.275) (0.62) (0.275) upmidincome 0.723* -1.825** 0.211 -0.266 0.231 0.566 -2.493 0.147 -0.666*** (0.427) (0.839) (0.28) (0.288) 0.124 (0.268) (0.513) (0.395) (2.102) 0.309 (0.275) (0.583) (0.253) constant 0.236 2.904** 1.995*** -2.377*** 1.478*** 3.967*** -3.614*** 0.167 -2.24*** 1.402 1.592*** (0.713) (1.321) (0.459) (0.471) (0.451) (0.862) (0.621) (0.15) (0.454) (0.962) (0.455) obs. 640 581 581 581 640 406 640 110 640 251 640 nagelkerke r 2 .15 .13 .28 .28 .23 .22 .14 .29 .24 .42 .25 reference category in income groups = upper income group; robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10% consilience mirza & kemp: rural rich, energy poor 5. conclusions in this paper, we have attempted to analyse the rationale of energy choices among different income groups in rural communities of punjab. to better understand the energy access in rural households, we differentiated the energy source usage into different sub-categories. the approach of distinguishing households on the base of usage (frequent vs. occasional user) and the type of energy access (buy or collect) has helped us to understand the degree of energy mixes that households with different incomes use to meet their domestic energy needs. the study is subject to its limitations. due to limitations of the eps, we are not able to explain fuel or energy switching phenomenon which is highly interconnected with energy choices available to rural households. also, due to scope of our research objectives, we are not able to include previous energy usage history of rural households, which might be critical to further understand the energy choices and subsequent fuel switching phenomenon in rural households. from our results we can infer the following conclusions. firstly, we conclude that the choice of energy sources among different households are not only affected by the household income, but depends importantly on other determinants such as community remoteness and household‟s major occupation. our results suggest that the role of income becomes more important when household decide to include expensive and advance energy source like lpg in their energy mix. in our dataset, we also find that traditional energy sources are preferred by all households, regardless of their household income. nevertheless, as the price of energy source increases, income starts playing its influential role in deciding for a particular energy source. this finding questions the linear and unidirectional approach adopted by the energy ladder, where it is assumed that households tend to shift towards modern energy sources with the increase in their income (wuyan et al., 2007; xiaohua and zhenming, 1996; karekazi, 2002; reddy, 1995). secondly, we also conclude that community remoteness is an important determinant for energy source choice in rural households. the high significance of the community remoteness indicators in almost all energy sources (except plant waste) suggests that rural households tend to avoid the inconveniences associated in energy access as it may not only involve transporting specific energy source (lpg cylinders, fuel wood bundles or wood logs) but also incur financial costs, involve strenuous physical efforts, engage household members and their time. thirdly, other variables like household size (hs), number of household members working (nhmw) and constant income (cons_income) also turned out to be significant in some cases. particularly in the case of firewood and plant waste usage, household size is revealed as an important factor for deciding whether to choose these energy sources in energy mix or not. finally, our results also suggest that use of each energy source can be attributed not only to household and community related factors, but also to peculiar access factors relevant to a particular energy source. in the case where households decide for animal waste and plant waste, different factors turned out to be significant in either case. based on our results, we conclude that the use of animal waste by a rural household is dependent on community remoteness, whereas using plant waste consilience mirza & kemp: rural rich, energy poor can be attributed to income group of a household, household major occupation and household size. in general, our results also correspond with those of earlier studies, especially the results of horst and hovorka (2008), masera et al (2000) and rao and reddy (2007) from two perspectives. firstly, rural households in general, do not follow the unidirectional approach of using energy sources, i.e., a shift from traditional biomass towards modern energy source like lpg, with the increase in household income. instead, a mix of energy sources is used, even by richer households who can even afford lpg as the only energy source. secondly, household income and size, along with community remoteness indicators turned out to be significant factors for determining the energy choices among rural households. from energy policy perspective, we believe that developing countries need to improve the energy access factors for rural communities, particularly to develop rural energy markets, which can result in energy access improvement in remote villages. as the developing countries have poor energy infrastructure for rural communities, local governments need to play their role in developing rural energy markets, so as to accommodate the needs of rural communities. this can be achieved by promoting channels of distribution, particularly for kerosene and lpg, without undermining the importance of traditional biomass. moreover, the local governments also need to promote modern 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in other words, their ecological footprints per capita are smaller than in both low-density sprawl and cities of similar density with coarser, less permeable networks. dubai, a modernist city of superhighways, superblocks and superhighrises, rapidly developed a disconnected pattern of homogenous enclaves that has served to limit physical accessibility, especially on public transit and foot, as well as to undermine the inherent vibrancy and sustainability of the compact, complex, connected, and complete urbanism of gridded manhattan. author’s note douglas kelbaugh faia, professor of architecture and urban planning, university of michigan, usa, worked in dubai for two years as the executive director of design and planning at limitless llc, a government owned international real estate development company with a portfolio of mixed use, walkable, transit-oriented projects in asia, europe and the middle east. he worked in manhattan during summers while in college, and has since visited countless times. 1. the environmental paradox of cities dense, gridded cities are better for the environment than sprawling, disconnected suburbs. this can be expressed in a number of ways to different audiences. for the regional planner, it is no surprise that dense urban space that is mixed use, walkable, bikable and transit-served has less impact on global climate change than low-density sprawl oriented to motorized vehicles. more surprising is that it has less impact than urbanism of equal density that is not gridded. however, dense urbanism of any layout typically has greater impact than sprawl on local climate change, because of the “local heat island effect” caused by higher absorption and retention of solar energy and by waste heat from energy usage. despite being hotter than surrounding suburban and rural areas (especially during the night), cities decrease their impact on global climate more than they increase their impact on the local climate. for the environmental scientist: the darker albedo/solar reflectivity of urban surfaces and materials, greater water and air pollution, lower level of consilience kelbaugh: paradox of cities evapotranspiration from vegetation, and higher ambient air temperatures of the typical city are typically higher per acre than low-density urbanism or sprawl, but its average ecological footprint per capita of ghg/carbon, water and solid waste is smaller. or, for the economist: measuring all of these factors per person rather than per acre is the more equitable metric in a global society with widely varying levels of land, wealth and population. based on that metric, cities are more efficient in terms of land consumption, the construction and maintenance of infrastructure, and the mechanical heating and cooling of buildings, as well as transportation and communication. they also deliver higher personal and collective productivity and creativity with fewer externalities than less dense settlement patterns. last, for the average citizen, the paradox can be expressed: suburbs may be “greener” per acre, but not per capita. in short, the ecological footprint and environmental impacts of cities are larger than suburban sprawl per acre but smaller per capita; and the margin of benefit for gridded cities is even larger than non-gridded city. this paradox is among the best news for a rapidly urbanizing humanity that is simultaneously facing some of the most severe and unprecedented challenges in its history. increasing the size, density and mix of uses has related salutary effects, such as promoting walking, biking and transit, which often enhance the public realm and sense of community in today’s increasingly diverse cities. and it offers more convenience, with fewer and shorter trips, especially by automobile. productivity, wages and innovation (as measured in inventions and patents per capita) also rise, as does economic, cultural and social opportunity. also, a compact city keeps the surrounding countryside more intact, whether it’s agrarian or wild. in short, compact cities are good for nature – human nature and mother nature. urbanism of course has its negatives: increased pollution, ambient noise, congestion, social friction, and communicable disease, as well as crime, overcrowding and mental illness if the urbanism is of low quality. 1.1 dubai vs. manhattan, a tale of urban growth in its lighting-fast and audacious development, dubai had a 60-year build-out of its footprint with a pace of development – adding about a million people similar to that of manhattan during its peak growth. both booms were kick-started by big government action that triggered an immense amount of real estate development by the private sector, as well as the accumulation of great local wealth. both cities were national centers of financial, academic, and cultural activity and were boosted by highly successful maritime ports and airports. the rivers’ edges and the beaches played large recreational and natural roles in their respective cities, as did tourism. much to its credit, dubai has got half the equation right: it’s dense enough to begin to partake of the paradox. its next challenge – not a small transformation is to embrace the other half of the equation mixed use with lots of worthwhile destinations in walking distance of lots of people, supported by transit and a wellconnected grid of streets and roads. its low-rise residential areas are typically singleuse and separated by an array of gates, walls, cul-de-sacs, and open land. and the 86 consilience high-rise clusters are also often single-use and difficult to access by car, unlike the sidewalk-oriented tall buildings of new york. the chorus line of high-rises along sheik zayed road, like fanciful perfume bottles competing with each other for attention, is stunning at night. (fig. 1) but these trophy towers often ignore their context on the ground, making urban space that can be alienating and scaleless. there are some wonderful exceptions, like the new development ironically called old town, with the elegant burj khalifa shimmering in the sky after the sun has set on the rest of the city. its spreading triangular base anchors the half-mile-high silver spire to the ground and provides an awesome backdrop to a world-class public space. a plaza surrounding a powerful, spectacular fountain and a gigantic mall make it a latter-day arab combination of rockefeller plaza and times square. both “the walk” at dubai marina and the dubai financial center are also delightful on foot, the latter during the day and the former evenings and weekends. as an architect, i could rant about the architectural excesses and superficialities, but i want to wear my other hat as an urban designer and planner and to focus on moving around in the city. despite the new and impressive metro system – a momentous step in the right direction – the city is still mired in the superblock/superhighway/supergrid transportation model. like all such systems, it privileges mobility over accessibility, i.e., it’s designed to move as many vehicles as fast as possible, rather than enabling as many people as possible to get to where they want or need to be. and the vaunted mobility is compromised by frequent traffic jams and pervasive 24/7-construction traffic, although both have slackened since the recession. it goes without saying that the roads and streets are inhospitable to pedestrians and bicyclists. consilience kelbaugh: paradox of cities figure 1: stylized high-rises rise and shine on sheik zayed road, dubai’s ultra-wide, ultra-long high street. unlike manhattan, there is little if any functional or bulk zoning and the towers – many over 70 stories neither taper with height nor space themselves for daylight and air. in this photo, nestling up to the skyscraper wall on the right is a low-rise subdivision of condos and villas on cul-de-sacs. 1.2 no left turn – the paradox of intersections and interruptions the superblock pattern is a result of vast tracts of land granted by the ruler (much like the english crown sponsored development of london) to public or private developers to promote growth. with the relentless drive for fast build-out and no comprehensive regional plan, these large parcels have been typically developed as self-contained (if not gated) communities, creating an archipelago of independent neighborhoods and districts. most of them act like large lakes that must be driven around, because, unlike olmsted’s central park, there are no cross connectors. the makes for a less permeable network of public roads, resulting in longer, less-direct trips, more traffic, increased gas consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. there simply aren’t enough intersections; especially ones that allow left turns, which are the point of greatest friction and conflict the achilles heel of any vehicular network. a finer grid offers more places to turn left. these intersections allow vehicles to turn left by finding relatively frequent and sufficiently long gaps in the oncoming traffic to make the turn, without having to stop all the traffic with multi-phase traffic signals and dedicated left-turn lanes that require most traffic to stop in their tracks while a string of cars turns left (or while only one or two cars turn 88 consilience left –the bane of suburban driving). this means that the red lights not only seem longer, but actually are longer in places like dubai than in manhattan. (near our neighborhood there was one 5-minute red light twice as long as the longest in my hometown that often drove me to the brink of road rage.) the fine-grained new york city grid also allows motorists to take alternate routes when they run into or are warned on the radio about heavy traffic or construction delays. this geometric advantage applies to pedestrian movement as well, and here manhattan is not much better than dubai. so much of the island is gridded with very long blocks, often 800 feet. these elongated blocks fortunately run east-west, which is preferable to north-south for solar access, but they are too long for good walkability. a city like portland, oregon, is more walkable (and drivable), where the square blocks are only 200 feet on a side. it’s very easy and pleasant to walk (and to drive), as the number of possible itineraries is exponentially larger than manhattan. it adds to the variety and richness of moving around the city on foot. in jane jacobs’ the death and life of great american cities, one of the very few drawings she includes is this diagram: figure 2: the advantage of small blocks – they allow more travel routes for both pedestrians and vehicles, which not only makes for a more varied array of itineraries but also allows easier changes to a route should there be any friction such as congestion, construction or an interest in variety. manhattan’s blocks are too long (and they lack services alleys common in other cities). traffic roundabouts – much more common in dubai than manhattan have reduced the friction inherent in the left turn. however, widening them to three or four lanes has proved very dangerous for drivers, and impossible for pedestrians. the lack of intersections that allowed left turns extended my daily commute home – 5 km as the crow flies – to 18 km! (fig. 2) fortunately, for cars other than many porsches or ferraris, this ridiculous route could be cut in half by illegally cutting across several hundred meters of sand. the paradox here is that more intersections increase accessibility by shortening routes and travel times, even though turning vehicles slow the speed of traffic. network connectivity and its fraternal twin proximity, are usually of greater value in driving around cities than high travel speeds on the road. as exemplified in new york, a network is better than a tree; accessibility trumps mobility; continuity beats interruption. consilience kelbaugh: paradox of cities figure 3: the lack of places to turn left tripled the distance of my evening commute home. the morning commute was 1/3 as long, because of more opportunities to turn right. with a grid many times coarser than manhattan, everyone lives, works and shops on large islands surrounded by a ring of asphalt and sea of sand. although this google photo depicts a largely low-rise area, there are in fact a number of 40-70 story buildings along the gulf’s edge in dubai marina. and then there’s the superhighway supergrid, the american model on hormones, not unlike robert moses’ realized and unrealized dreams in new york city. with up to six or even seven lanes in either direction and the world’s largest and most baroque interchanges, it can be hair-raising to drive and hair-pulling to navigate. if you miss your exit, you might well miss your meeting. it can take 15 – 30 minutes to recover, and that’s only if you have a co-pilot or gps; and neither map nor electronics can quite keep up with the changing roads and construction detours. 1.3 more roads, not wider ones with more lanes and bigger interchanges let’s hope the roads and transport authority’s (rta) plan to carpet the entire emirate with this supergrid is no longer on the table. (fig. 3) the hubris and absurdity of this vision is enough to make los angeles or houston, maybe even robert moses, blush. and the automatic policy of adding more lanes to decongest roads needs to give way to adding more roads, especially the missing links in a grid that is too coarse and too incomplete. and those empty 12 lane bypass roads, which feel like a future whose time has passed, should give way to investment in the uae’s proposed national rail system, like new york did a century or more ago. 90 consilience fig. 4 – an official plan to carpet the entire emirate with a supergrid of superhighways is over-the-top and hopefully over its shelf-life. a supergrid is not an urban grid: less a corbusian “machine for living” and more a machine for moving machines that move. there are other smaller discontinuities in the road network, most notably the cul-de-sac, which contribute traffic to the network without providing additional capacity to it. people living on these dead ends may enjoy their quiet privacy, but they are transportation parasites within the larger network. low traffic on cul-de-sacs means more traffic elsewhere. a city has two basic options: like new york, to spread out its traffic across a close-grained, distributed network of many streets to equitably share the traffic burden, or to channel it on a more hierarchical network of cul-desacs, collector, arterials and highways (which typically spares the wealthy neighborhoods). (fig. 4) the former strategy favors accessibility and the latter mobility (as long as the major roads are not overloaded with traffic). in fact, the connected grid has greater capacity per lane mile, because, as noted above, the many intersections allow turning left by slipping between oncoming cars. consilience kelbaugh: paradox of cities figure 5: a dense network of roads/streets (on left) has greater capacity than the tree-like hierarchy of the superhighway and superblock arterials with collectors and cul-de-sacs (on right). travel distances and times are shorter with a network, while moving more vehicles on an equivalent amount of roadway, which also means less pavement to install and maintain, plus less land use, less storm water run-off, and less heat gain for the same capacity and travel time). (this doesn’t mean grids can’t be very congested and slow; they will back up if their capacity is overloaded.) manhattan has a more rectilinear grid than shown, as well as being far more complete than the dubai pattern, which is more accurately portrayed by the left diagram, although some of its superblocks are larger. in manhattan, speeding is more or less kept in check by the short distances between intersections and traffic signals, as well as congestion. in dubai, the preferred traffic-calming device is the speed bump. they are more than a constant pest – they shorten the life of your vehicle’s suspension system and the length of your cervical spine, and can be a literal pain in the neck. (there were several dozen speed bumps on my daily commute.) sometimes they are placed sensibly on neighborhood streets, to warn the driver of an upcoming pedestrian crosswalk or intersection. but too often they are used on arterials and even highways, to simply slow down drivers, who are all assumed to be speeders if unchecked. this assumption may be true for many of us, but there are less tyrannical ways to put the brakes on fast drivers. research has shown that driving speed is determined more by street and lane width than by posted speed limits. narrower roads not only slow traffic, they cut the consumption of land, asphalt and energy, as well as reduce runoff, road maintenance, and the flooding and erosion that often follows rainstorms. why build wide roads that are engineered for high speed, and then impede that 92 consilience speed with jarring bumps? it’s like putting one foot on the gas pedal and the other on the brake pedal at the same time. 1.3 the transit grid – public and private, steel and asphalt a network of steel also connects manhattan and much of the rest of new york city: it has one of the first and largest rail grids, including subway, passenger rail and freight rail. like many large cities, it has this parallel transportation system, which is untethered from the surface grid when it tunnels underground and relatively aligned when on or above grade. the intermodal connections usually are strategically located and often anchor intensified real estate development and/or commercial, institutional and government centers, which tend to congregate in nodes. the term tod is pretty useless in manhattan, where so much of the population is so well served by public transit. the island is one mega-tod, and the city’s huge fleet of taxis and vans, plus public buses, tends to distribute themselves everywhere, although they often ply the same arterials and connect at the same nodes and intersections. and at a few key landings, water-borne ferries, tourist boats and ships link into the grid. the airports, by nature, tend to be huge and irregular superblocks that defy subjugation to the surface grid, and their aircraft fly independently above it all. dubai has made surprisingly significant progress in public transit in city and culture so enamored of and devoted to the automobile. for several years now, it has been operating the first line of the world’s largest automated metro. the elevated line runs along the spine of the linear city stretching along the coast, more or less paralleling sheik zayed road until it weaves around and dives under the older, tighter parts of the city near dubai creek. (fig. 5) it connects the very busy airport with the historic center of the city, which started as a creek side pearling and fishing village and trading port, and now runs over ten miles to the world’s largest manmade port at jebel ali at the western end of the city, near the border with neighboring emirate, abu dhabi. the aerial guideway slowly dances up and down, sometimes flying over cross streets, sometimes ducking under highway overpasses. all in all, it reflects and respects the broken, coarse grid of the city. dubai also operates a growing fleet of modern single and double-decker buses. there are even gleaming air-conditioned bus shelters, energy hogs that are nonetheless welcome for the half of the year that is intensely hot and humid. the seldom-discussed transportation backstory, however, is private transit. i mean some 20,000 private vans, mini-buses, and buses that ferry workers to and from their workplaces (mainly construction sites but also commercial and institutional employment centers) and their often remote, segregated, sometimes unair-conditioned, and very crowded living quarters (8 men or 8 women to a room!). they are everywhere, mostly vans, but over 10,000 light and heavy buses – 10 times the number of public buses. it’s rarely acknowledged, but it’s this private transit that is doing the lion’s share of moving workers around the city. this system results in much lower vehicle miles traveled (vmt) and tailpipe emissions (although some of these buses are old and polluting) than if the workers were commuting in private cars, or even in public buses, which are not usually as packed as the company buses. the poorly-paid, over-worked armies of construction laborers are the unsung consilience kelbaugh: paradox of cities transportation heroes of dubai. there is no subaltern transportation mode of this size or complexity in manhattan, which has a far smaller proportion of underclass, non-native residents and international workers and servants (who are not eligible for citizenship in dubai). figure 6: cars, taxis, vans, buses, trucks and metro stream and sometimes scream by the world’s tallest building, which stands higher than the empire state and chrysler buildings stacked one atop the other. it’s no secret that dubai’s traffic fatality rate, especially for pedestrians, is among the highest in the world. it’s often blamed on poor drivers who hail from many different countries and cultures. but surely, the excessive width of the local roads and number of high-speed roadways contribute. other fallouts of dubai’s automobile-dependent lifestyles are the lack of physical exercise and the fast-food culture of roadside eateries. both factors contribute to the native emeratis’ exorbitant rate of obesity and diabetes, probably the highest in the world. but dubai’s worst stigma is the planet’s highest per capita ecological footprint, pumped up by the high vehicle usage (as well as by a diesel-driven “construction economy,” which continues despite the economic downturn, albeit at much slower pace). as david owen so eloquently and definitively showed in his now famous article in the new yorker, manhattanites have a smaller ecological footprint than not only the emiratis, but also the suburbanites in surrounding counties and states. this margin primarily results from greater use of transit, greater walkability (and recently bikability), more compact and efficient infrastructure and buildings, the latter being more efficient to heat, cool and sometimes to maintain. 94 consilience 1.4 other grids, from bicycle paths to diagonals to underground truck lines the most conspicuous new grid in manhattan is the growing network for bicyclists, along with roller-bladers, runners, golf-carters and strollers. it is both a system for utilitarian mobility as well as a recreational venue. it tends to follow the street grid, with distinctive diversions into pools of public spaces and sometimes spectacular eddies into the larger parks with hills to climb and descend. and like all the rights-of-way that hug the islands’ shoreline, the path or carriageway can become sinuous and even romantically landscaped to provide leafy sanctuary and shade. the city is to be lauded for its aggressive addition of bike lanes, paths and street closings and plazas, and for its extensive, soon-to-be-opened bike sharing system. the geometric, pixellated grid meeting the more natural and curvilinear water’s edge is an old urban delight, going back to the one of the first ever urban gridirons, in the ancient greek city of miletus in anatolia, where the grid was even more contrapuntal because of more dramatic terrain. indeed, regular gridirons are subject to the relief of the exception, especially the diagonal. no diagonal is more famous and more enriching than broadway, which, to its credit, is not an urban planning trope, but is based on a genuine historical circumstance. it’s not just that it was a native american trail, but that it was so completely surrounded by consistently gridded streets for most of its length. unlike most cites, which have numerous radials and diagonals, midand up-town manhattan plays a relentlessly cardinal and cadastral field to broadway’s figure. speaking of cardinal directions, the fact that manhattan’s grid is typically on the four points of the compass is beneficial. unlike the random web of lower part of the island, or the rotated grid of the law of the indies, this regularity lends itself to good and equitable access to sunlight. no grid can increase the total amount of direct or diffuse solar radiation on a given piece of land, but it can facilitate more equitable access to whatever light and heat that is available by avoiding the black holes in the center of large, fat blocks. it is true, on the other hand, that the highrises of both manhattan and dubai, tend to skew the distribution of light, as well as of air, with tall buildings that grab more than their share of each, while blocking others to the north or downwind. they can also hog the good views. here’s where manhattan’s early and sophisticated zoning codes beat dubai’s free-for-all, although there is far more sun to go around in the desert, where shade from neighbors is usually welcome. regarding cadastral advantages, there is no doubt that a gridded city like manhattan and parts of other boroughs, is more efficient for land division and ownership than more randomly and irregularly laid-out dubai. the euclidean geometry allows for easier real estate surveying, assessing and sales, as well as for more consistent spatial packing of buildings. rectangular lots are easier to build on, as most construction systems like or even demand square corners. there tends to be less leftover, unbuildable land, and therefore higher densities, on top of clearer circulation. this physical consistency enables more effective urban design and planning, because there’s more predictability to future development than in dubai, where it’s more a matter of the ruler’s fancy or the government’s dictation, especially from the alpha regional transportation agency. consilience kelbaugh: paradox of cities there are less obvious urban grids, some intentionally hidden to the eye, ear and nose by being underground and some so sparse as to be invisible to the eye. electric utility, telecommunication, water and sewer lines often follow the grid of the streets above, for easier installation and repair. like the streets, they ultimately connect to and/or cross the rivers, not unlike the much more famous bridges and tunnels. the sparse grids are the pixels of schools, libraries, fire houses, police stations, medical facilities, community centers, and places of worship, all of which tend to space themselves out more or less evenly with the residential communities and neighborhoods (with some exceptional civic and cultural centers). the grid connects the dots in nyc better than in dubai, where these land uses tend to be more randomly located. 1.5 the missing fabric and links dubai, having built an extensive infrastructure and many high-density areas, is now in a position to get the second half of the urban paradox right. it can infill existing development, and build more mixed use, walkable urbanism on the open urban land that it has vaulted over, as well as add the missing links in the transportation network. just as important as connecting the dots, the existing single use areas need to be transformed into more complete and complex districts and neighborhoods. new and retrofit development is best located near metro stations, with the highest densities within a quarter mile radius. to be fair, this type of infill is exactly what many u.s. cities also need to do, if they are to overcome the equally unsustainable imprint of single use zoning and the leapfrog development of endless suburbs. in many cases, they are currently re-densifying in this welcome and timetested pattern. if these mixed use places are well designed, interesting, humane environments, people will live, work, shop and recreate there not only because of proximity, but because they want to be there. they will enjoy being footloose pedestrians on pleasant days and evenings, just as they now flock to the walk in dubai marina or mob the dancing fountain at dubai mall. walking is the healthiest, greenest, safest, cheapest, friendliest and most enjoyable way to move around a city, with biking a close second. walking is also a primary mode of mobility in manhattan, with its incredibly rich mix of uses that is well served by a highly interconnected circulatory network for vehicles and pedestrians, including a safe, pedestrian-scaled environment with wide sidewalks. as jane jacobs, new york’s patron saint of sidewalks and mixed use, presciently illuminated over four decades ago, walking will flourish 24/7, even in less-than-perfect weather. it is also essential that there be destinations worth walking to, as well as a high concentration of people to frequent and support them. and transit, which always starts and ends with a walking leg, enables the pedestrian to get around the whole city. a city without mixed use and a connected grid or network is simply dense, high-rise sprawl, which is typically the worst of both worlds: it offers neither the stimulating life of cities nor the quiet privacy and greenery of suburbs. if suburban sprawl is boring to gen-xers and gen-yers, dense sprawl is not only boring but noisy and crowded to boot. monocultures, like over-specialized species and ecosystems, are inherently less sustainable. in social, economic and environmental 96 consilience terms, they are less resilient, less able to adapt and co-evolve with changing conditions. nor are they as culturally vibrant, architecturally rich, or spatially interesting. in the end, it may even be more basic than physical urbanism. the grid is arguably the natural and inevitable pattern for a democracy, especially one connected to market economics. in a very basic, almost subliminal way, it makes everyone and every place equal. and it encourages and facilitates commerce, both economic and social, in its ongoing, extensive, multi-valent possibilities and its flexible routes, adaptable itineraries and easy wayfinding. the relentlessness occasionally opens up into the marketplace, the civic center, the institutional campus or the park that so wonderfully and clearly declare themselves to be the exception to the rule. (and, importantly for a democratic polis like new york city, it’s the rule of law, not people, whereas in dubai it’s essentially a monarchy, which tends toward more monumental layouts.) the grid is ideologically and operationally american in its egalitarian, pragmatic accessibility, rid of the hierarchical space of imperial capitals or the royal precincts of dubai. that’s our founding proposition one worth preserving, even fighting for as it is continually threatened. the grid makes that vigilance easier, both physically and culturally. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 9, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 181 – 191 sustainable development in rural ghana mira armstrong columbia university new york city email: mira.e.armstrong@gmail.com author’s note mira armstrong is a junior undergraduate student studying civil engineering at the fu foundation school of engineering and applied sciences at columbia university. she is currently co-program manager of the ghana program of columbia’s engineers without borders student chapter. abstract since 2004, columbia students have been partnering with obodan, a rural farming village in western ghana, to develop and implement engineering solutions to problems like water distribution and sanitation. the overarching organization, engineers without borders usa (ewb), has been supervising both the technical details of the projects as well as the community development and adoption thereof, as it does for hundreds of similar projects around the world. working in obodan with my classmates and ewb has been the defining experience of my time as an undergraduate, as we learn the possibilities and limitations of engineering, the joys and pitfalls of development work, and how we can carry these lessons throughout our personal and professional lives. this photo essay aims to describe the activities of a typical ewb trip and reflect on the role our work plays in sustainable development. introduction in 2002 an american civil engineering professor from the university of colorado, boulder and a landscaper from belize met by chance, teamed up, and built a much-needed water distribution system in the landscaper’s home village of san pablo, belize. the success of the project and its immediate improvement of the villagers’ daily lives inspired the creation of engineers without borders usa (ewb). ewb set out to bring together the skills and resources of engineers with the needs of developing communities to produce sustainable engineering solutions and lasting transnational ties. engineering students and professionals across the country took interest in the program, which has since spread to over 350 small-scale engineering projects in 45 countries. partnering with local ngos and community leaders, ewb chapters work on projects like footbridges, rainwater harvesting systems, and agricultural processing machines. the projects ensure sustainability not just through eco-friendly design but also through securing community adoption and developing long-term maintenance plans. the columbia university ewb student chapter was founded in 2004 when the community of obodan, ghana, with the help of the ngo sudex (sustainable development extension services), reached out for help with its sanitation and water infrastructure. obodan is a rural farming village an hour northeast of the capital accra. at the time of columbia’s first encounter with obodan, the villagers were using hand-dug pit latrines for human waste. these pits posed a serious hazard to 182 consilience human health, especially during the rainy seasons when they were prone to flooding. for household water, the villagers were spending hours waiting to collect water from hand-pumped boreholes and then carrying heavy buckets home. the columbia ewb team focused first on sanitation and built a ventilated pit latrine in 2005 and proceeded to construct six source-separated composting latrines in 2011. currently, the team is focusing on designing a water distribution system to relieve the community members, particularly women and children, of the tedious walks, long waits, and heavy burdens associated with the hand-pumped boreholes. figure 1: a midday scene from the center of obodan this past may, i traveled as part of the ewb columbia ghana team to obodan, ghana. in this midday scene, the village center is hot and quiet. villagers take refuge under a canopied bus stop along the road. this road bisects the town and is obodan’s lifeline to the rest of ghana. it is the road along which agricultural products grown in the hills are transported to nearby towns and commuters can take buses to their places of work. consilience armstrong: rural ghana figure 2: a columbia student and an obodan woman inspect one of the composting latrines. on this trip, the ewb columbia team completed some composting latrines that were started last year. most of the outer structures had already been built but lacked important details, such as doors and plumbing. these sturdy, concrete huts, like the one pictured above, provide privacy for the users and protection from runoff waste, vastly improving upon the existing hand-dug pit latrine system. by keeping the waste contained, these latrines prevent groundwater contamination and spread of disease. moreover, the composting process renders the waste safe to handle and useable as a soil substrate, so that unlike with conventional latrines, the villagers do not have to pay an outside service to pump out the waste, but can safely dig it out themselves. 184 consilience figure 3: a columbia student stabilizes a ladder while an obodan man prepares the latrine roof for ventilation installation. consilience armstrong: rural ghana figure 4: columbia students take surveying data along a proposed pipeline for the water distribution system. the design phase of an engineering project requires extensive data collection, and the ewb columbia water distribution project is no different. here, columbia students measure elevations using a tripod, a scope, and a stadia rod, which is a large measuring stick. since the water distribution system is designed to be gravity-fed, it is important that there is enough head (elevation difference) along the piping path line. 186 consilience figure 5: columbia students perform a slug test on one of the boreholes in obodan. the ewb columbia team also collected data on the capacity of the boreholes. the boreholes draw water from an underground aquifer, which is finite in capacity in terms of number of liters that can be withdrawn per day. since the water distribution system would ease the collection of water, ewb columbia predicted that the water consumption per household would also increase. thus, ewb columbia needed to test the capacity of the aquifer to ensure that the design would not lead to the overconsumption of water and subsequent diminishing of the groundwater source. here, the students and their mentor perform a slug test, a simple field method for determining the capacity of the aquifer. the activity drew a lot of attention from curious local children. consilience armstrong: rural ghana figure 6: columbia students and obodan schoolchildren spend a lunch break horsing around. ewb columbia has been coming to obodan for over seven years, and the community members especially the children continue to be friendly and welcoming. one surprise for the ewb columbia travel team was that once school let out for the day, children swarmed the project sites and bombarded the columbia students with questions, suggestions, and demands. 188 consilience figure 7: the ewb columbia team returns on foot to obodan after an afternoon of working on a latrine in a nearby satellite village. upon returning from a worksite one village away, the columbia students noted that a year ago, the road above was unpaved and there were neither the electricity lines nor the sign for obodan. a lot has changed in obodan since ewb columbia’s first project in 2005. however, much of the change is not due to the direct efforts of ewb columbia, but to the motivated and compassionate community leaders who want to raise the standard of living in the village. consilience armstrong: rural ghana figure 8: community leader samuel gamson (left) converses with fellow development worker and old friend steve forbes (right). the ewb columbia team could not have done any work without constant cooperation from sammy and steve. samuel gamson, left, is the assemblyman for obodan. much of his ambitious vision for the village (such as a police station and electricity) has already been implemented, without ewb involvement. he is the key community contact for ewb columbia. steve forbes, right, has been working in obodan with his ngo sudex (sustainable development extension services) and as a mentor for ewb columbia students. the community has rewarded his efforts by making him a chief. the project was group effort. obodan would have more difficulty addressing their sanitation needs without the skills and resources of ewb columbia engineers, and ewb columbia engineers could not have built any latrines without the guidance and local knowledge of sammy and steve. 190 consilience figure 9: high school girls wait on line to fill their water buckets from the borehole. one afternoon, the ewb columbia students noticed an unusually large crowd of young women surrounding the borehole. the young women informed us that the electricity had gone out at their nearby girls’ high school, so the pump at their borehole was not working. the students had to carry their buckets to one of obodan’s hand-pumped boreholes in order to fetch water for dinnertime cooking and washing. they also said that this was not an infrequent occurrence since the electricity lines were unreliable. the continued need in obodan can be upsetting. these girls served as a reminder that reliance on a shoddy electrical grid and a handpumped water source was an inconvenience that took away from time better spent in school, and that the water distribution system project undertaken by ewb columbia would vastly improve the quality of life in obodan. consilience armstrong: rural ghana figure 10: while waiting for their turn to collect water, high school girls made friends with the ewb columbia students. communication, whether through attending chiefs’ meetings or holding casual conversations as pictured above, is the best way to determine community needs, measure project success, and strengthen the bond between obodan and ewb columbia. asking the villagers what they wanted yielded straightforward answers. a private bathroom. access to water in their own homes. a semblance of a wealthier, more urban life. we can’t deliver everything, but we will continue to collaborate and develop meaningful infrastructure that will last as long as the transatlantic friendships and memories. ewb is much more than just the projects it completes. it is both a model for development and a method of teaching the next generation of engineers about how we can use our skills to address the needs of communities everywhere. ewb is not a perfect model of development.. but ewb is a way for us, a team of budding engineers, to learn hands-on the joys and failures of engineering development work so we can continue to seek a better, more sustainable future. 3 odaro final 34-45 consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 7, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 34-45 causes of poor service delivery in africa and their impact on development esohe denise odaro school of oriental and african studies (soas) university of london abstract service delivery remains a pressing issue throughout sub-saharan africa (ssa). recently, the focus of government policies on meeting the millennium development goals has increased attention on better provision of services. at present, however, services in africa lag significantly behind those of other developing countries and are considerably more expensive than elsewhere (foster & briceno; 2010). this paper explores the factors affecting service delivery in ssa and compares public services provision to private sector service delivery, as well as the impact of both on development. the paper unfolds in three steps: after a brief review of the current condition of services, i will examine the shortlist of identified factors contributing to the current state of services and conclude with brief recommendations. i have excluded south africa in my analysis because it is more developed than other countries in the region. this is by no means intended to be an exhaustive list of causal factors and capacity constraints allow for only partial considerations of primarily, water, and to a lesser extent, sanitation and electricity. author’s note denise is an underwriter in the oil, gas, chemicals, mining, and energy sector at the multilateral investment guarantee agency (miga), the foreign direct investment guarantee arm of the world bank group. denise joined miga in 2011 through the miga professionals program. before joining miga, denise received a master’s in business administration from cornell university. she received her llb (hons), law from the university of bedfordshire and subsequently qualified as a barrister having been called to the english bar at lincoln’s inn. denise completed a masters in development studies at soas in 2004 and then had a brief stint running a pro-bono outfit offering legal assistance to the refugee council and ngos. subsequently she spent her career in the private sector, working for goldman sachs and ge. in 2008, denise spent some time working in nigeria, carrying out voluntary work in her spare time. she was appointed a justice of the peace for her efforts in mentoring disadvantaged children. this paper is one of a series of various independent research studies denise is currently undertaking regarding development in sub-saharan africa. keywords: sub-saharan africa, service delivery, development, private sector. 1. introduction on almost all measures of infrastructure coverage, african countries lag behind other countries in the developing world (yepes, pierce, and foster 2008). the gap is particularly large for coverage of paved roads, telephone main lines, and power generation. in these three areas, african nations have been expanding services consilience odaro: service delivery in sub-saharan africa much more slowly than other developing nations, setting the stage for an everincreasing gap unless changes are initiated. power poses the biggest challenge, as thirty countries face regular power cuts and premiums for emergency power are high. according to the undp’s human development report, in 2000 only 44% of the population had access to safe water. in contrast, 67% of the population in east asia and the pacific had access to safe water, and 65% had access in latin america and the caribbean (undp; 2003). from 2003 to 2006, barely any progress had been made; almost half of the ssa population still had no access to an improved water source and two thirds had no access to sanitation. in fact, coverage of household services has hardly improved since 1990. in 2000, the member states of the united nations agreed to a set of eight development goals aimed at eradicating poverty, to be achieved by 2015. not only is africa unlikely to meet the millennium development goals (mdgs) for water and sanitation, but universal access to these and other household services is more than 50 years away in most african countries based on current trends (banerjee, wodon, and others 2008). while the perception exists that service delivery is higher in urban areas compared to rural areas because rural areas are inaccessible, cross-country statistical regressions of the determinants of access to water and sanitation do not support this (mamba; 2008). recently, the focus of government policies on meeting the mdgs has increased attention on better provision of services (undp; 2006). improved service delivery through investment in water and sanitation is necessary to achieve the mdg of halving the number of people without sustainable access to clean water and sanitation. privatisation is being promoted as a solution to the current dire state of services; evidence shows, however, that this is not a panacea, especially where expectations of african governments and the private sector incentives do not align. in order for the continent to achieve its economic potential, increase growth, and progress from being an exporter of raw materials to a producer of finished goods, service delivery must improve. this paper considers the lack of both funding and accountability as causes of poor service provision. the status quo in one african city, lagos, is then examined as an illustrative example of the relationship between public and private sector service delivery. the current state of public sector services and the push towards privatisation through public-private partnerships will then be evaluated, prior to briefly touching on other factors affecting delivery and my conclusions. 2. the funding shortfall the key sources of funding for the provision of water, sanitation and electricity services include government tax revenues, usage fee revenues and aid, but the funding allocated to these services is not adequate. public spending in subsaharan africa for water and sanitation services typically equals less than 0.5% of gdp and is as low as 0.1% in some countries, such as zambia (wolf; eca research 2007). average sanitation investments amount to 12–15% of total water and sanitation expenditure (afdb and oecd, 2007; undp, 2006). compounding the problems raised by low budgets, inefficiency and bottlenecks often lead to actual spending of only about two-thirds of the budget allocated to infrastructure. some governments have allocated more resources to certain areas of infrastructure than 36 consilience would appear to be warranted (briceño-garmendia, smits, and foster; 2008). the result is an overall funding shortfall for meeting africa’s service needs; there is a gap between the estimated infrastructure spending needs and the available resources. cuts in the percentage of aid allocated to water and sanitation, from 7.2% to 3.3% of total oda1 between 1996 and 2002 but up to 4.5% in 2005, have exacerbated funding shortfalls (oecd, 2007b). high aid volatility negatively affects countries that depend heavily on aid (bul´ıˇr and hamann; 2003). the instability of aid disbursements may alter fiscal behaviour, possibly causing a decrease in public investment (lensink and morrissey; 2000). in principle, aid makes more money available for public spending, which in turn should improve service delivery; high volatility, however, creates significant challenges for recipient countries with respect to the management of resources (briceno-garmendia et al; 2004). also, most project aid and donor funding stipulates some form of privatisation, which is not always warranted despite the problems with public sector delivery in most countries. in burkina faso, for example, the existing public services were efficient, making privatisation unwarranted, but privatisation was still imposed as a condition of aid. corruption has been a problem in privatised service delivery that is funded by aid money as well. even when a private company, lahmeyer, was found guilty of corruption related to a water project in rwanda, the world bank allowed it to be linked to contracts financed by the bank (hall and lobina; 2006). further, where privatisation has been resisted by a government, the donor or development bank funding gets cut, as it was in guinea.2 we must also consider that higher spending might also not lead to a proportional increase in the quality of service delivery where corruption exists (briceno-garmendia et al; 2004). 3. lack of accountability empirical studies show a strong correlation between service availability and the extent to which citizens select their own governments. the availability of services is also strongly correlated with the quality of government regulations (mamba; 2008). this suggests that the failure to provide public services can be attributed, at least in part, to low accountability environments, in which politicians are able to misallocate public funds; division among voters on social and ideological grounds could also be a contributing factor. corruption results in input shortages, price increases, decreased spending on maintenance, and reduced government revenue (wolf; 2007). greater political accountability has been shown to improve public services and reduce corruption in uganda, where transparency about government transfers to local spending units has reduced misappropriation of funds by as much as 90% (world bank; 2003). one recent trend aimed at increasing participation and transparency in public service delivery is decentralization. decentralization is associated with better access to water and sanitation in rural areas, which might reflect both better targeting and accountability at the local level and the availability of small-scale technical solutions. however, obstacles to decentralization are numerous because the tax base in rural 1 updated figures unavailable. 2 in 1999, the word bank suspended funding for guinea until privatisation consilience odaro: service delivery in sub-saharan africa areas is weak and vertical imbalances in technical and administrative capacities are large (bardhan; 2002). 4. public and private sector delivery 4.1 the status quo in lagos, nigeria in many places in the developing world, a large share of service activity comes from private sector and community participation; sometimes this kind of participation accounts for more output than the public sector, as is the case in nigeria’s commercial capital of lagos. limited investment in water and sanitation infrastructure has resulted in a situation in which only a minority of households in lagos are directly connected to the water board system, while the rest of the city relies on private connections or shared, community-funded access. at that time, williams and walsh reported that the city’s arrangements had produced huge disparities in both the cost and availability of drinking water – there was a plentiful supply to public and commercial buildings and high-income residential areas, but low-income areas were “served by sparse standpipes, and some sections are not served at all” (williams and walsh, 1968). today, the situation appears to have deteriorated. even highbrow areas have little access to public services. lagos has become a self-service city in which little is expected from government, and many social and everyday services are obtained through unstructured local and private negotiations and sourcing within the private community. deficiencies in water and sanitation provision continue to provide some of the most striking manifestations of the city’s worsening infrastructure crisis (gandy; 2006). gandy asserts that less than 5% of lagos households have piped water connections, a fall from around 10% in the 1960s) and less than 1% are linked to a closed sewer system. for those lucky enough to have piped connections, the bane of their daily lives is the frequent power shortages. most of the city depends on wells, boreholes, water tankers, illegal connections and street vendors (expunobi, 2001; sulaimon, 2000). besides providing one’s own water source, one must also obtain one’s own power source to access that water, since power is needed to pump water from boreholes and wells. inhabitants of slum settlements must choose between polluted wells or tanker water distributed by intermediaries at high, volatile prices (gandy; 2006). this state of affairs is not idiosyncratic to lagos, as public services enterprises in many ssa cities still face importunate financial and organisational problems including gross inconsistency in access, ineffective collection of rates and limited investment in new facilities. 4.2 public service provision most public service enterprises in ssa have been unsuccessful in providing reliable water supply and sanitation services. government monopoly in service provision has resulted in lack of accountability and community ownership in the planning and implementation of infrastructure projects, poor management and sustainability, low quality and limited options. a major challenge for the provision of 38 consilience water and sanitation is capacity constraints with respect to planning, management and implementation, especially at the local level. measures including the restructuring of ministries, matching of resource allocations with policy commitments and establishing national monitoring and evaluation frameworks are needed to improve access to water and sanitation (amcow et al., 2006). additionally, the service sector’s low revenue collection leaves it heavily dependent on aid funding with multiple fragmented donor projects, which makes planning at the sector level very difficult (slaymaker and newborne, 2004). as discussed above, poor service delivery in nigerian cities is largely attributed to poor planning, but in some cases good urban planning policies are undermined by poor implementation, as seen in abuja. these problems are compounded by population growth and the increasing rate of rural urban migration without a corresponding expansion of basic social infrastructure. a common sight in most nigerian urban centres is the indiscriminate dumping of refuse in open spaces because waste is seldom collected from the depots, in part because of the lack of sufficient equipment. the situation is also aggravated by a lack of concern over industrial waste (omar, 2009). the dominance of public enterprises has led to a monopolistic market environment, and the ensuing dearth of competition has been blamed for inefficiency and the dreadful state of these services. moreover, these enterprises often price services below cost, but these prices are still beyond the reach of lowincome households. for utilities, only 70%–90% of billed revenues are typically collected, and distribution losses can be twice that. according to household surveys, about 40% of those connected to utility services do not appear to be paying for them, a share that rises to 65% for a significant minority of countries (world bank; 2010). these losses are material at the national level, absorbing 0.5% of gdp on the sub-saharan african average, or $3.4 billion annually (briceño-garmendia et al., 2008). indeed, provision of services at below cost prices contributes to the lack of capital and low levels of investment in infrastructure (world bank report, 2010). low payment recovery and subsidies granted to large industrial customers hurt the poor masses, which have to pay higher prices and a higher percentage of their income towards services. it is unrealistic to expect the urban poor to pay sufficient charges to make needed infrastructure extensions viable, let alone profitable. in 2009 in uganda, water payments accounted for 22% of the average income of urban households in the poorest 20% of the income distribution (wolf, 2009). in nairobi and accra, the prices paid in low-income settlements with little access to the public provision are around 8 times higher than those paid by high-income residents (wolf, 2007). in general, the poor pay higher prices for water because they tend not to be connected to public services and thus must rely on expensive private alternatives. as highlighted above, a major impediment to the provision of basic water and sanitation is the lack of new infrastructure coupled with insufficient maintenance of existing services. governments have been encouraged to consider the commercialization of public services through privatisation in order to lead expansion schemes. however, many challenges are faced in attracting investments from the international private sector. in comparison to other continents, africa has a low overall population density (36 people per sq. km), low rates of urbanization (35%), relatively rapid rates of urban growth (3.6% annually), a relatively large number of landlocked countries (15), and numerous small economies (world bank, 2010). population densities in african cities are relatively low by global standards and do consilience odaro: service delivery in sub-saharan africa not benefit from large economies of agglomeration in the provision of infrastructure services. as a result, the costs of providing a basic infrastructure package can be twice as much as in other developing cities (dorosh and others; 2008). the explanation for africa’s higher prices sometimes lies in genuinely higher costs and sometimes in high profits. 4.3 private sector service provision while aid donors have encouraged the involvement of the private sector, especially in the water sector, they have also cut their own contributions to the sector to a point far greater than the actual investments made by the private sector (hall and lobina; 2010). development banks and the donor community have pushed for forms of privatisation owing to the school of thought that through partnering with the private sector, the potential political issues of full privatization could be evaded, access to new technology and expertise could be gained and, imperatively, access to capital needed for vital infrastructure expansion would materialise. generally, the use of the term ‘privatisation’ is avoided and the term ‘public private partnership’ (ppp) is used to connote the partnership between private and public sector. the most common forms of ppp globally are: (1) management contracts offered to private firms to manage the operations of service delivery for a fee over a short term period, (2) concessions contracts granted to private enterprises to fully run, invest in and expand services for a profit over a long term period, typically between 20 to 30 years, and (3) lease contracts by which a private company is brought in to run and maintain an existing service system but with no responsibility for expansion or new investments. thus far, ppps in the water sector in africa have not produced the desired results. several schemes have had a “negative impact on the poorest of the poor by restricting their access to clean supplies due to high tariffs” (ogunbiyi, 2004). in ssa, there have been mainly lease contract ppps and only a handful of concessions granted; three for water and electricity services in cape verde, gabon and mali, and two others covering water and sanitation in south africa. none of these cases have seen their expected success. mali terminated a 20year concession prematurely in 2005, and cape verde proposed renationalisation, both following their private partners’ under-investments (world market analysis, 2005). in gabon, there were problems with the concessioner veolia3, also owing to underinvestment, consequent power shortages and poor water quality, which resulted in the country’s first typhoid epidemic in 2004 (africa news, 2005). in 2005, the ifc stepped in to provide financing and guarantees needed for investments over the next five-year period. subsequently in 2010, the ppp has proposed a 512 million euro investment plan to be realised before 2017,4 mostly from government and development funding. the two mildly successful ppp stories are lease contracts in senegal and cote d’ivoire. their success is due in part to the long duration of their contracts, but also to the fact that, in both cases, the government has financed investments and new connections. in senegal, the contract led to an impressive 35% increase in water 3 in 1997, societe d’electricite et d’eaux de gabon gave a 20-yr. contract to veolia. 4 oxford business group, 2010. 40 consilience connections (hall and lobina, 2010). in general, other leases throughout the subcontinent have been much less successful, as evidenced by the veolia leases in gambia, guinea and niger. with the exception of niger,5 where the contract continues to be in place despite water shortages alongside price increases, the other two leases have been terminated because of poor performance, contractual omissions and disputes over investment responsibilities. similarly, a fundingconditionality-imposed lease contract in tanzania was terminated by the government after only two years due to the private partner’s failure to meet its investment commitments (action aid, 2005). 5. other factors there are many other factors that are not discussed in this paper; this does not imply, however, that they are any less important. some of these factors include a lack of skilled and professional manpower in government to handle service issues and inadequate related services. better roads, for example, could make it cheaper to build and maintain water and sanitation facilities in rural areas (gwilliam et al., 2008). there is some evidence that asymmetric information plays an important role in public service delivery; research in uganda by the world bank found that countries with better media coverage could have more efficient public service provision (svensson and reinikka, 2004). another contributory factor could be a lack of political will or political pull amongst the public: because most citizens have never experienced functional public services, the impetus for political mobilisation to effect change is hardly existent. unfortunately, the long-standing state of woeful service delivery has given rise to a local mafia class that provides water, fuel, and other services. these lords protect their market and high profits by sabotaging new government-sponsored infrastructure. 6. conclusion in conclusion, weaknesses in service-delivery can be attributed to a number of issues. optimistic expectations for investments by private companies have been dashed. these expectations led to reductions in development financing and aid, which has now exacerbated the poor state of infrastructure in ssa. imperatively, the manner in which provision of basic infrastructure services is dispensed to meet demands will determine the level of economic activity and, in turn, the overall development of a nation. delivery of public services is also essential in order to meet the mdgs. in particular, improved health and environmental sustainability as well as widespread access to clean water, sanitation and other basic public services are proving to be fundamental preconditions (oecd, 2004). the current needs necessitate crucial investments in expanding delivery and improving infrastructure. it is recommended that in partnering with private sector operators, governments should enter apt contractual arrangements that are compatible with socioeconomic criteria and objectives, with an emphasis on the specific needs of poor consumers. in 5 africa research bulletin. 2004. consilience odaro: service delivery in 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(2008). making sense of sub-saharan africa’s infrastructure endowment: a benchmarking approach. working paper 1, africa infrastructure country. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 8, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 188-199 strengthening local governance through effective waste management: the “sustainable environmental practices and policies” program in south lebanon and the bekaa valley andrew mccornack school of international and public affairs columbia university new york, ny ams3705@columbia.edu abstract in response to the critical lack of solid waste and wastewater management facilities in towns and cities around lebanon, the ymca of lebanon implemented the sustainable environmental practices and policies (sepp) program from 2003 to 2009. the overall goal of the sepp program was to improve environmental practices and policies for the management of both solid waste and wastewater in rural lebanon. this included the ain baal solid waste treatment plant (swtp) serving the city of tyre and nine wastewater treatment plants in municipalities in southern and central areas of the nation. the project built the capacity of local governments, and it ensured the use of reliable, low cost, low maintenance technologies that improve long-term sustainability. the project attests to the hard work of national civil society organizations to improve environmental practices and increase the accountability of local governments. this project has helped reduce tensions between communities and foster more democratic participation at the local level. author’s note currently completing his mpa in environmental science and policy at columbia university’s school of international and public affairs, andrew worked for two years in beirut, lebanon as a project development consultant to nonprofit organizations and authored freelance articles for multiple lebanese publications. he is interested in sustainable development policy and the importance of smallscale democratic governance in meeting basic community needs. keywords: waste management, south lebanon, wastewater treatment, tyre, local democratic participation. 1. introduction in the preparation for the united nations’ conference on sustainable development in rio de janeiro this summer, world leaders are focusing their attention on the possible outcomes of the negotiations, specifically in regard to green governance, sustainable development goals, and the green economy. while these are noble pursuits, the terminology is ambiguously defined and too often overused. within this context, it is important to identify successful projects and “best principles”1 that provide concrete examples of what should be meant by sustainable consilience mccornack: waste management in s. lebanon development. the sustainable environmental practices and policies (sepp) program was implemented in southern and eastern lebanon from 2003 to 2009 during a tumultuous period of post-war reconstruction and international conflict. lebanon had emerged from more than 15 years of civil war (1975-1990) with no meaningful resolution to the country’s pressing political questions and deep internal divisions. an already unstable lebanon broke down in 2005 when prime minister rafik al hariri was assassinated, and again in 2006 when israel invaded southern lebanon and bombed national infrastructure (bridges, oil refineries, beirut airport) in response to a hezbollah attack on its soldiers. although lebanon is a small country, it possesses an incredible diversity of ecosystems and climatic zones, ranging from sea level to 3,000m. the rapid changes in topography present a challenge for infrastructural development; when coupled with a weak central government, this results in many regions lacking basic services such as regular grid electricity supply and solid waste and wastewater management systems. lebanon is classified as an upper middle-income country. while most of the wealth is centralized in beirut, there are pockets of poverty in rural areas and smaller towns. the past four decades of instability have hindered environmental protection. this has led to crisis in some areas where inadequate waste management practices, deforestation, and soil erosion present major long-term challenges. specifically, the absence of proper solid and wastewater treatment and disposal methods has exacerbated the waste problem. increasing production of waste, minimal available land for storage and disposal in rural areas, and the limited development of appropriate strategies and legislation for waste management has led to a state of severe environmental degradation in many parts of the country. 190 consilience 2. the wastewater management context in many areas of lebanon, solid waste is discarded in open dumps. one infamous example is “the makab” on the outskirts of the southern city of sidon. “the makab” started as a dumping ground for building rubble, but slowly became a 40m high pile of trash on the mediterranean sea, visible on the bottom right of the photo. a new composting facility for organic waste was completed in 2010, but has not opened due to political disagreements and the tipping fees that the private company requested in order to accept city waste.2 in the case of wastewater, household sewage connection rates in some towns are as low as 4%3. in many villages and small towns, there are no wastewater facilities. this lack of infrastructure poses a significant danger to public health and the environment. moreover, government responses at the national level fail to address communities away from large cities. therefore a locally initiated, managed, and sustained solution presents a viable alternative to many of the existing waste management strategies. the ymca identified three priorities that were to frame the project: dissemination of knowledge on environmental management practices: the ymca was to conduct a comprehensive environmental education program to strengthen the capacity of municipalities and local communities in environmental management. the program targeted children because a new generation of environmentally conscious citizens can contribute to social change in the medium and long term. another key target were women, who often run the household and are responsible for managing the disposal of residential waste. physical infrastructure for solid waste and wastewater management: the ymca would build wastewater treatment systems that require low operational costs and minimal inputs, like electricity, which are often unstable in these regions. the open air dump on the mediterranean sea, outside the city of sidon (source: google maps) consilience mccornack: waste management in s. lebanon project would also develop a solid waste treatment facility capable of accepting a large portion of waste from the southern city of tyre. this technology must be financially sustainable and must minimize the need for land fills. engaging in dialogue and influencing policy on environmental management: the ymca would implement an ambitious high-visibility policy dialogue to re-direct national policies on waste management from centralized approaches to locally appropriate and cost-effective technologies. this required engaging the ministry of environment, the principle national body responsible for managing municipal solid waste, as well as the ministry of public health and other political leaders at the local and national level. these three priorities were essential to the broader goal of increasing the capacity of municipalities in managing their own waste and increasing the accountability to constituents. any intervention on waste would also require an educational aspect to ensure an understanding of the risks of trash and raw sewage. 3. mobilization of resources there have been instances of international nonprofit organizations receiving funding from major donors, such as the us and eu governments, to build wastewater facilities that are never completed or operate below capacity due to financial constraints. mercycorps, a us-based organization, built eight plants in rural lebanon, four of which are not operating due to a lack of local commitment and capacity to provide funding for operational costs4. even though the ymca received $3.7 million dollars in grant funds from usaid for the project, it also designed the project to ensure long-term sustainability and local ownership of waste facilities from the beginning. therefore, it spent a significant amount of time working with the municipalities to gather local contributions greater than 50% of the total development cost. the ymca also selected technologies that required minimal maintenance and inputs, which are in short supply in the implementation areas. the municipalities provided land and services, such as the excavation of sewage networks and installation of pipes, concrete work. in the table below, the different inputs of the municipalities are listed. 192 consilience figure 1: local contribution to wastewater treatment plants facility capacity local contribution (m3 / day) acquired private /secured public land covered cost of building and maintaining new access road covered cost of new sewer system installation (length) wadi jezzine 150 acquired n/a 4,100 m haitoura 100 secured yes 500 m snayyah 60 secured yes 2,743 m al aaychieh 150 secured yes 4,416 m ghobbatieh 250 secured n/a 5,500 m bakka 1 100 secured yes 4,370 m bakka 2 60 secured yes 2,000 m rashaya 600 secured n/a 13,452 m al hosh 100 secured yes 4.098 m to meet the operating and maintenance costs, municipalities used different approaches. one municipality initiated eco-tourism projects to raise funds, while others used direct taxation. other municipalities received funding from other aid agencies such as the hariri foundation for rural development. in the case of the al hosh wwtp, the ministry of energy and water committed to provide funding, but due to broader national political turmoil, its budget was frozen and the municipality had to raise funds to cover the ministry’s share. in total, these municipalities raised $959,977 and many exceeded the 50% requirement. consilience mccornack: waste management in s. lebanon in the case of the solid waste treatment facility, the union of tyre municipalities (utm) initially agreed to assume all costs associated with land leveling, the construction of the buildings and even some of the facility’s equipment while the ymca was responsible for purchasing the waste processing equipment. in february 2006, utm signed a contract with the office of the minister of state for administrative reform (omsar) agreeing to cover the cost of the concrete foundation, large-scale truck weighing equipment, bio-filter unit, and large hangars for composting waste. it also agreed to assume all outstanding costs associated with the purchase of the remaining equipment and the infrastructure networks. in total utm provided over 75% of the total funds. what makes this especially significant is that it all took place during the july 2006 conflict, during which there were delays of more than 6 months to the bidding and contracting processes. there were genuine concerns that the facilities would be bombed and some of the equipment was moved off-site to avoid destruction. the compost curing bays at ain baal before opening in 2009 2,000 meters of new sewers in the town of bakka 194 consilience 4. participatory planning process the ymca held public meetings in individual communities prior to the start of work. in those meetings, plans were described in detail and the program directors fielded questions and concerns. this discussion improved the plan for ain baal solid waste treatment plant. the organization worked with community leaders and arranged outreach programs for communities to voice their concerns and receive answers for their questions. one repeated worry was the proposed location of a given treatment plant, which was sometimes changed to meet local concerns. in several instances, communities simply refused the project idea for political or economic reasons. when this happened, the ymca was forced to find alternate locations and/or municipalities. the municipal officials were deeply involved in the activities, and they developed a clear sense of ownership for the wastewater treatment plants. they identified sources for covering the annual expenses of these facilities. some decided to collect additional taxes from the households, while in the case of one project, leaders contacted relatives in canada and elsewhere for donations. in the towns of al-hosh and ghobbatiyeh, the mayors gave much of their time to the supervision of the facilities: in the town of rashaya, which had the largest wwtp, the municipality required that all households connect their wastewater to the newly established sewers and pay connection and annual maintenance fees. small municipalities, such as snayyah, aychiyeh and al-hosh, planned to establish eco-tourism activities to cover the operating costs. in summary, the local governments adopted the responsibilities of the projects and met the operating standards established in specifically written operational manuals. in the case of the solid waste treatment plant, the ymca had originally intended to build three facilities; however, two could not be built because these municipalities relied on financing from the council of the south. this was problematic because the lebanese government’s budget for 2005-2006 was not officially approved. in fact, 2005 was the last year a national budget was approved5. furthermore, in one of the towns, political tensions and polarization between two factions led to an impasse and the project had to be stopped. at the national level, there were several major obstacles unrelated to the project. this included: (1) the municipal elections of 2004, because officials did not have the mandate to make decisions three months prior to elections, and several newly elected members changed the agreements that were signed with previous councils; (2) the assassination of prime minister rafic al-hariri in february 2005 paralyzed the country for months; and (3) the july 2006 war with israel affected all parts of lebanon and stopped all activities for more than 2 months. consilience mccornack: waste management in s. lebanon 5. context appropriate technology as described above, long-term sustainability in the rural lebanese context mandated that any technical solution be affordable, lowmaintenance, and durable. in response to this obstacle, the ymca identified three simple wastewater treatment processes implemented by local lebanese companies. the team was able to take advantage of the hilly landscapes in most of the villages by using gravity as the primary driving force for moving water in lieu of electric pumps. for example, wadi jezzine used the polytech bio-process for wastewater treatment that involved aerobic digestion of wastewater by using ecological products extracted from plants. the bio-process eliminates diseases and reduces the level of bod, nitrogen, phosphorus, toxic substances and other pollutants. it also treats the water to a secondary level, defined by the ministry of public health as suitable for discharge into nature. the sludge is recycled multiple times such that no sludge disposal is required. in haitoura and rashaya, they used the grossimex company’s two-stage trickling filter technology, which incorporated a mix of anaerobic and aerobic processes. each of the two wwtps contain two trickling filters, a primary separation tank, a secondary clarifier (anaerobic pond), and a sludge drying bed. the wastewater flows gravitationally through the system without any specific maintenance or electric power and is treated by aerobic bacteria and partly by anaerobic bacteria found in the wastewater stream. the process significantly reduces the coliform bacteria, bod, nitrogen, phosphorous, toxic substances and other pollutants found in the wastewater, thus allowing for safe discharge into nature (as above). the wastewater treatment technology used in snayyah, bakka, aichiyeh, al housh and ghobbatieh villages was the international business consultant’s (ibc) advanced integrated wastewater pond systems (aiwps) technology. this uses gravitational pressure without mechanical maintenance necessary to treat wastewater by natural processes in anaerobic and aerobic ponds. the anaerobic reactor forms the key stage in the process. in this phase, the water is kept for 20 days to reduce the low-cost gravity fed wwtp in snayyah 196 consilience coliform bacteria, bod, nitrogen, phosphorus, toxic substances and other pollutants to a secondary level, like the other two processes. the solid waste treatment facility in ain ball utilizes a siemens/ ips composting system as the primary in-vessel composting technology. the system affords immense flexibility for long-term management of the region’s solid waste and produces a quality range of compost products that can be beneficially used by lower end projects, such as daily landfill cover to higher end projects like landscaping and soils blending. comprised of ten parallel bays, the composting facility can dedicate each individual bay to specific organic recycling materials for breaking down organic waste by using forced air, mechanical agitation (stirring) and aerobic bacteria. each bay acts as an independent composting vessel so that yard-waste, source-separated and/or pre-consumer food residuals can be segregated and processed from the remaining mixed solid waste. the higher quality organics can bypass the preprocessing operation and go directly into the designated bays. the organic material is mixed daily to accelerate the composting process by providing an optimal movement of air to create aerobic conditions and a more uniform distribution of temperature in the compost mass. after the mixture has been conveyed through the system, it is discharged for further refining and curing. 6. public awareness and policy dialogue to increase the visibility and long-term success of the project, a 3-year environmental awareness campaign on sustainable waste management was conducted targeting women, youth, and students. the effort benefited 10,000 students and teachers in 94 schools, as well as more than 50 ngos, women’s groups, and local institutions 88 communities. the ymca targeted the areas of implementation and focused on basic information about waste treatment and its links to environmental and public health. in many cases, this involved creating games that encouraged the youth to think about the problems associated with waste and how to reduce their environmental impact. an emphasis was placed on sorting waste, but because the swtp was far from completion, additional sessions would have been useful at the completion of the project. ain baal swtp serving over 300,000 people in the union of tyre municipalities, south lebanon consilience mccornack: waste management in s. lebanon furthermore, the ymca organized several activities related to policy dialogue on waste management, including two tours to waste treatment plants sites and a roundtable workshop on policy issues. in each of the tours, representatives from the ministries of environment, agriculture, education and planning participated along with mayors from the concerned towns. a member of the ministry of environment emphasized that the ymca’s activities should comply with the council for development and reconstruction’s broader plan and that the wwtps should meet the treatment standards set by the ministry. the concern was that municipalities might not have the capabilities and resources for maintaining the facilities. in the spring of 2006, following the site visits, the ymca organized a roundtable discussion at the meridian/commodore hotel in beirut. the objectives of the roundtable were to discuss key planning, construction, operations and management issues that related to solid waste and wastewater management in lebanon, and to develop a draft memorandum of understanding (mou) outlining the guiding policy principles for running and managing the plants and facilities. the mou was completed in july 2006 and was distributed by mail to all participants, as the war with israel prevented the team from hosting a press conference as originally planned. 7. short and long-term project impacts the creation of the treatment centers are currently enabling communities to save money and reuse resources. for example, residents in the villages of bakka and el-hosh had been forced to drink bottled water until the project enabled them to once again drink from their natural springs. in the village of aychiyeh, treated wastewater is being used to irrigate olive trees. social problems, such as disputes among neighbors in the towns of bakka, rashaya and el-hosh, have stopped since the operation of their treatment plants. in aychiyeh, children were often ill because of the over-flowing septic tanks on the streets of the town; this also has dramatically decreased since the opening of the wwtp. these impacts fall into three main categories. first, in terms of social impacts, there have been health improvements, reductions in insects, elimination of smell from over-flown septic tanks, elimination of disputes among neighbors due to waste problems, and development of sense of participation in problem solving. secondly, the economic impacts include the development of ecotourism and other enterprises in towns, as well as increased incomes through the leasing of summer homes (which had not been possible earlier due to the level of pollution). finally, the environmental impacts included the elimination of the principal sources of fresh water contamination, forest rehabilitation, and increased awareness on environmental issues across all layers of society. the municipalities became owners of the plants and therefore ensured their long-term support and interest in the project. the projects boosted their annual budgets and brought increased credibility and capacity to their local governing bodies. in addition, the facilities are signs of environmental achievement. 198 consilience 8. “best principles” the sepp project demonstrates how foreign aid and locally implemented development can overcome political and social challenges and contribute to longterm environmental and economic sustainability. the emphasis on low cost, simple and reliable technologies allowed the project to succeed where others have failed. using gravity instead of expensive and unstable electricity has made a big difference. secondly, the financial and human resources needed to operate a treatment center should be secured at the start of the project. this ensured that the municipalities took ownership of the facilities and actively contributed to all phases of planning, construction, and operation. thirdly, an effective awareness-raising campaign should have actions at all levels in order to develop environmental sensibilities on a broad scale. finally, international and national development plans should integrate with localized waste management plans and develop with input from key stakeholders, so that these groups can clearly understand the project goals and provide additional support. in recognition of its accomplishment, the ymca was awarded the 2010 dubai international prize for best practices for the living environment by un habitat and the municipality of dubai. it out-scored competing projects from 22 arab states and received the award and $30,000 cash prize. it is not currently working on any new waste management projects, but is focusing on waste and climate change awareness among youth around the country. consilience mccornack: waste management in s. lebanon bibliography republic of lebanon ministry of environment, undp, and ecodit. 2011. state and trends of the lebanese environment 2010. page 68 republic of lebanon ministry of environment, undp, and ecodit. 2011. state and trends of the lebanese environment 2010. page 279 sikimic, s. (2010, september 08). water waste treatment plants sit idle as pollution problems mount. the daily star. 1 professor elliott sclar, director of the center for sustainable urban development (csud) at columbia university's earth institute, often makes the distinction between “best practices” and “best principles”; he argues that the former cannot often be applied to different county contexts, and thus it is more important to focus on the principles (an example would be pro-poor bias in the design of a project). 2 republic of lebanon ministry of environment, undp, and ecodit. 2011. state and trends of the lebanese environment 2010. page 279 3 republic of lebanon ministry of environment, undp, and ecodit. 2011. state and trends of the lebanese environment 2010. page 68 4 http://www.dailystar.com.lb/news/local-news/sep/08/water-waste-treatementplants-sit-idle-as-pollution-problems-mount.ashx#axzz1qhpnqgr5 5 http://www.dailystar.com.lb/business/lebanon/2012/feb-09/162698-cabinetcrisis-complicates-budget-bid.ashx#axzz1qq94szpg http://www.dailystar.com.lb/news/local-news/sep/08/water-waste-treatement-plants-sit-idle-as-pollution-problems-mount.ashx#axzz1qhpnqgr5 http://www.dailystar.com.lb/news/local-news/sep/08/water-waste-treatement-plants-sit-idle-as-pollution-problems-mount.ashx#axzz1qhpnqgr5 http://www.dailystar.com.lb/business/lebanon/2012/feb-09/162698-cabinet-crisis-complicates-budget-bid.ashx#axzz1qq94szpg http://www.dailystar.com.lb/business/lebanon/2012/feb-09/162698-cabinet-crisis-complicates-budget-bid.ashx#axzz1qq94szpg consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 5, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 53-70 health or agricultural development: boundary objects and organizations in a soya project in western kenya jennifer lamb agricultural and applied economics virginia tech jenilamb@vt.edu abstract improving global health and agricultural development have been identified as two of the most important objectives in fighting global poverty. however, the two approaches come at development from different perspectives and can actually undermine each other in practice. successful management of the competing demands of health and agriculture through organizations and technologies is crucial to advancing sustainable development. the turn toward local procurement of agricultural products in the administration of global food aid is evidence of attempts to bring these approaches together at the global scale, but has not delivered the promised benefits at the local level. this article presents a case study of a small kenyan community based organization (cbo), community action for rural development (card), as it has attempted to negotiate between nutrition and agricultural development in global and local networks. specifically, the case study addresses card’s experience with a small scale soya beans project as a part of a world food program (wfp) local procurement program and a transition toward developing a local soya bean project. keywords: soybeans, appropriate technology, agricultural development, food aid, boundary objects, boundary organizations 1. introduction health and agricultural development are consistently raised as key priorities in improving the livelihoods of smallholdersi and the rural poor. however, an analysis of the respective development discourses of health and agriculture reveals that the two more often compete, rather than complement each other in development practice (escobar, 1995). successfully managing the boundary between health and agriculture through organizations and technologies is crucial to advancing sustainable development. as one of the few crops to simultaneously answer to the demands of both fields, an analysis of soybeans (commonly known in the development context as soya beans) and their use in aid and development projects provides an interesting entry point into this boundary management discussion. the initial literature review situates soya beans within the framework of competing agricultural development and health and nutrition discourses to address food security. as a result of shifting prioritization of funding for health and nutrition from the late 1980s, the administration of global food aid is a primary mechanism for 54 consilience managing demands of nutrition and agriculture, especially through the turn toward local procurement policies. the core of the article presents a case study of a small kenyan community based organization (cbo), community action for rural development (card), as it has attempted to negotiate between nutrition and agricultural development in global and local networks. specifically, the case study addresses card’s experience with a small scale soya beans project as a part of a world food program (wfp) local procurement program and a transition toward developing a local soya bean project. the case study draws upon e-mail exchanges from november 2007-may 2009 and survey work and field notes collected during semi-structured interviews from juneaugust 2009. utilizing theory from the science and technology studies, nutrition, and agricultural economics literature, the concepts of boundary organizations, dietary diversity, appropriate technology and agricultural marketing are applied in an active interdisciplinary research framework for the development of successful local soya bean project. 2. boundary management in health, nutrition and agriculture: conceptualizations of hunger and famine in development policy and practice, the boundary between health, nutrition and agricultural development has proved to be one of the most difficult to manage. health hinges upon adequate nutrition as a state of being which individuals accessed through consumption of sufficient quality and quantity of food in harmony with the local landscape. by contrast, agriculture is the process through which that quality and quantity of food are produced. subsequently, health perspectives and their embodied nutrition development discourse have focused on the documentation of biophysical manifestations of malnutritionii and the delivery of food as aid to ameliorate these effects. historically, the primary role of agricultural development has been to raise the supply of foodstuffs through technology transfer. more recently, development thinking in agriculture has shifted toward system based approaches (barrett, 2001; moore, 2009). the key moment in which these discourses come together is in the conceptualization of famine and hunger. historic notions of famine capture the conflict between the symmetry of human nutritional need and the asymmetric distribution of resources to meet that need through agricultural production. in his path-breaking work in 1981, nobel prize winning economist amartya sen reworked the conception of famine and hunger to create a common denominator between nutrition and agriculture. sen describes starvation as “the characteristic of some people not having enough food to eat…not the characteristic of there not being enough food to eat”. sen argues that individual exchange entitlement, (ability to labor and earn an income) dictates the ability to obtain food. this recasts the problem of hunger as the need to increase access as well as availability of food (sen, 1981). today, the most common definition of food security is “access by all people at all times to enough and appropriate food to provide energy and nutrients needed to maintain an active and healthy life”(barrett, 2001). barrett (2002) describes three main phases of food security measurement: 1) supply based measures 2) household access and biometric measures 3) measures which assess constraints on individual consilience lamb: health or agricultural development choice, risk exposure, and lack of ability to cope with economic shocks. evolving definitions which capture the increasing depth and complexity of the food security problem have translated to a rapid emergence of revised techniques through which food security may be measured(coates, et al., 2006). scales which measure behavioral coping mechanisms have been developed in the united states and adapted for application internationally. additional access based indicators of food security include measures of dietary diversity and the recording of 24-hour dietary recallsiii. 3. the food aid and agricultural development trap the proliferation of measurement tools to address the complex nature of food security has not been matched by equally comprehensive development frameworks. conversely, when nutrition and agricultural development projects operate at scale they tend to assume that improving either consumptive or productive practice will result in a food security benefit and can end up working in opposing directions. as evidence of this, agricultural development paradigms remain entrenched in the rhetoric of improving yields through technology transfer and systems based approaches, continuously hypothesizing that closing the yield gap between developing and developed nations will enhance food security for smallholders (schreinemachers, 2006). in particular, scientists have recently identified declining soil fertility as a key barrier to obtaining and sustaining food security in sub-saharan africa (ssa). soil fertility decline is caused by a cycle of population growth and reduction in farm size which leads to limited the opportunities for fallowing and increasing pressure on the land for food production. examples of popular policies and programs to address soil fertility decline include national fertilizer subsidy programs, attempts to develop conservation agriculture production systems and experimentation with local soil fertility improvement technologies. productivity growth must benefit farmers so that they are producing above a subsistence level. in particular, farmers must be able to link to input and output markets in at least semi-commercialized production processes for sustainable productivity growth. despite the promise of agricultural development, the primary mechanism to address food insecurity in ssa has been through the delivery of food aid. most often food aid is manufactured from developed country agricultural products and with food aid and public private partnerships food aid consists of the provision of supplements and fortified food products. fortification refers to the processing of staple foods so that they also include nutrients which may be deficient in the targeted population. supplementation involves the provision of powders and/or pills to be blended or taken with meals to provide “missing” nutrients 1 . generally, these fortified products or supplements are produced on a commercial scale and often distributed as convenience style foods to targeted populations in an immediate, short term timeline. the wfp commonly refers to these programs as public private partnerships, wherein the wfp supplies of basic grains are processed by large food manufacturers at a reduced cost for distribution to developing countries. 56 consilience developed country processing equipment. the introduction of food aid has short and long term implications for agricultural development. in the short term, ill-timed deliveries of food lower agricultural prices for developing country smallholders. in the long term, bypassing local structures undermines the development of agroindustry in developing nations and has the potential to increase food dependency. unfortunately, with increased concentration on health and nutrition relative to agriculture in development programming since the late 1980s, the delivery of food aid has been the primary mechanism for boundary management between nutrition and agriculture (ashley and maxwell, 2001). 4. the interpretive flexibility of soya in agriculture and nutrition discourse and application to sub-saharan africa a global agricultural commodity commonly caught in the midst of this trap is soya or soybeans. soya presents a diverse set of characteristics which allow it to be highly valued by both nutrition and agricultural development approaches. agriculturally, soya beans have the ability to fix atmospheric nitrogen in the soiliv, for use by the growing plant and crops to be grown after soya in rotation (chianu, et al., 2009; misiko, et al, 2008). moreover, soya is relatively easy to grow and has a low incidence of pest and disease. further advantages include the structure of the crop itself. as a relatively low plant, most soya varieties are about 14 inches tall and once established fan out into a broad canopy that blocks out light for weed competition. nutritionally, soya is the only “complete” plant based source of protein, meaning that it provides ample quantities of all eight amino acids that the body cannot make on its own. soya protein qualityv also outranks all other protein sources with the exception of egg-whites. thus, in areas where high quality protein sources such as eggs, meats and dairy are not available or affordable, soya provides a nutritious substitute that is lower in both fats and cholesterol. soya also provides a number of additional vitamins and minerals and is a source of omega 3 and omega 6 fatty acids, all of which combine for it to be considered a highly nutritious food (american soybean association, 2004). this combination of agronomic and nutritional properties has led soya to be a key aspect of systems based soil fertility agricultural development programs, while the affordability and nutritional value of soya (and its abundance in the united states) have made it a popular choice for food aid. in the social construction of technology literature the appeal of a technology or technological process to different sets of stakeholders is referred to as interpretive flexibility. innovations with interpretive flexibility possess a broader range of appeal to stakeholders of different value systems and priorities, and when harnessed effectively can be developed and scaled more rapidly to societal benefit. the interpretive flexibility of soya beans has made it one of the most widely transferred and adapted crops around the worldvi(chainu, et al., 2009). the soil fertility and nutritional opportunities of soya have not been fully explored in ssa. despite its favorable agronomic and nutritional properties, soya is much more difficult to process and prepare than other legumes. soya contains the enzyme trypsin, which prevents the body from actually being able to absorb any consilience lamb: health or agricultural development protein. a number of techniques such as boiling the beans for thirty minutes in preparation for further processing and roasting can inhibit the enzyme’s activity. however, utilization of soya is constrained by the fact that it must undergo some form of value added processing before human consumption (american soybean association, 2004). as will be demonstrated, the technologies developed to process soya have confined the use of soya to largely nutrition-based and even undermined agricultural applications in the development context. 5. the primacy of processing and the turn toward local purchase programs with modern processing technology, soya beans have one of the most diverse ranges of use of any processed commodity. in developed countries, the majority of soya is processed in large scale oil and meal processing facilities. the meal is mostly fed to livestock but also commonly blended with maize meal for delivery as food aid (american soybean association, 2004). soya is also commonly processed into soy milk, tofu, and soy nuts. however, few developing economies have such extensive large scale processing facilities. in the development context, the lack of large scale processing has typically confined the application of soya beans to roasting, boiling, frying, and milling in local cereal grain millsvii. for conventional home preparation, boiling the soya beans, a process used to prepare most other legumes, requires as much as 3-4 hours until the beans are soft and consumable. as availability of energy and cooking fuel are often constrained in ssa, this additional preparatory burden, combined with the distinctive flavor of soya beans has been a major barrier to adoption. the necessity of more intensive value added processing in working with soya beans through nutritional and agricultural paradigms brings to light an important micro and macro disconnect in hunger and malnutrition approaches in ssa. projects which have attempted to scale up agricultural production and use of soya beans in africa have often had to overcome the use of soya in food aid programs. for example, nigeria and zimbabwe conducted outreach campaigns to promote soy as a nutritious food crop and as a soil friendly nitrogen fixing legume throughout the 1990s. these efforts involved education on soya’s nutritional, agricultural, and preparation applications at the household level. specifically, both countries refused to import soya beans as food aid, in hopes of developing their own local production and processing capacity (chianu, et al, 2009). as an alternative to this kind of tension between agricultural development and nutritional food aid programming, critics have argued that donors should purchase food aid as close to the region where food aid is needed as possible (lappe and collins, 1998). representative of this, the wfp has held what it refers to as a “local procurement policy” since 1996viii. however, it must be understood that local procurement does not necessarily imply procurement from developing countries. wfp financial regulations stipulate that only “when conditions are equal, preference will be given to purchasing from developing countries”(world food program, 1996). in the development context where conditions will clearly not be equal, the statement discredits the notion that local purchase will assist the rural poor in developing agricultural economiesix. the assertion reflects a desire to make legible the needs of 58 consilience nutrition sourcing as a higher priority than working with farmers toward longer term development goals (scott, 1998). in 2006, the wfp recognized that it has been unsuccessful in sourcing food from developing countries, and that greater effort needs to be made in order to make local procurement programs “more friendly” to developing country producers(world food program, 1996). the latter half of this paper explores the experience of card as a part of a wfp soya beans local procurement contract and eventually the development of a community soya project in western kenya. 6. local procurement in the card soya beans project in western kenya: card as a boundary organization in local and global networks the concept of developing country cbos and local non-governmental organizations (ngos) as boundary organizations in agricultural development projects is not new, especially in kenya (golderberger, 2008; schrum, 2001). like many developing countries, kenya has seen a massive surge in the number of registered non-governmental organization over the course of the 1990s. many have diagnosed this as a function of the fact that international donors have utilized these organizations to avoid corruption and misuse of funds encountered when development projects are channeled through the state. such ngos have been given credibility (only sometimes deserved) as representations of local communities capable of translating the wishes of donors into actual change at the field level. in kenya, goldberger (1999) points out that such organizations have been crucial in the promotion and rise of alternative agriculture, while shrum demonstrates how ngo’s have further been able to become an integral element of the agricultural development research apparatus (goldberger 2008). card is a small cbo that was founded in 1998. based in the provincial town of kakamega, the card strategy has focused on creating opportunities for rural income generation as a way to reduce pressures on the kakamega forest to harvest wood for fuel and conversion to charcoal. the organization’s founding projects in beekeeping and soya beans represented its desire to be viewed as an organization capable of facilitating rural development through global and local networks. card contracted with the wfp to supply soya beans for food aid just as the wfp began to experiment with local procurement programs in 1998. initially, the interpretive flexibility of soya was capable of meeting card objectives to promote income generating activities through rural development and increase environmental sustainability. however, the structure of the wfp local procurement contract was largely incompatible to work with smallholder production calendars. the wfp required quarterly quotas from its suppliers, consistent with its objective to provide a steady nutritional supply but not with the seasonal nature of agriculture or smallholder production volatility. while farmers could double crop soya beans in the long and short rains for a july and november harvest, smallholders had to pool their production to meet the wfp quota. the role of card was to organize 40 farmers to gather their current stocks of soya shortly before the quarterly deadlines. as such, card positioned itself as a boundary organization between the consilience lamb: health or agricultural development global nutrition network of the wfp and a local agricultural production network of soya farmers. the type of negotiation card was asked to perform as the contracting agent for the wfp local procurement program was dramatically different than the boundary management activities encountered in the works of either goldberger or shrum. in addition to translating between global to local scales, card was also caught in a more difficult mediation between the scaled discourses of nutrition and agriculture. card staff members still with the organization in 2009 from the first soya project recalled how they had felt inadequate to communicate to either side. speaking with the wfp procurement officer, it was obvious that the project needed soy on a quarterly basis, but to the farmer this externalized the undue burden of storing and saving seed and losing the opportunity to sell soy at appropriate times in the local market. when a drought in 2005 prevented the double cropping of soya beans during the short rains, card missed two sequential production quotas. by the time the wfp dropped the card managed cooperative as a supplier, the farmers already had a crop of soya planted for the long rains. frustration with the inability to either sell or process the beans at harvest because local markets were underdeveloped caused many farmers to abandon soya production all together. with a full-time staff of only eight people and in the face of the collapse of the project, card began to focus its efforts elsewhere. card’s decision to concentrate its efforts on its projects in beekeeping, biogas, and hiv/aids sustainable living reflected a shift in three primary areas: 1) the decision to engage in local versus global networks 2) to devolve control and ownership of the project back to stakeholders 3) to meet people where they are in recognizing the significant impact of hiv positive status on pursuing a livelihood. when i pressed members of the card staff on this last issue, they pointedly told me that community development simply could not go forward without working with hiv/aids. as hiv/aids affected nearly one of every five people in the community, literally everyone knew someone who was hiv positive and many households faced labor and income constraints as a direct result of the epidemic. in making a transition and moving out of its role as a boundary organization between the wfp and soya farmers, card actually strengthened its capacity to act as an effective boundary organization between the discourses of health and agricultural development. for one, it gave card a chance to work within the context of a social system where hiv/aids is a major factor in day to day livelihood choices, instead of attempting to operate in spite of those constraints. in devolving control to its stakeholders, card shifted toward a mindset of partnering rather than directing or leading development processes. increased stakeholder control also freed up limited card human and financial resources, the staff also had increased opportunities to pursue adequate training to make themselves accountable to members of the health and agricultural communities in kakamega. as evidence of its success in reorganizing itself as a boundary organization, by summer 2009 card had helped to install over 10,000 farmer managed beehives in the area and 15 biogas digesters to make use of animal feces for energy. card had also become increasingly well known as a major proponent of hiv/aids education and sustainable living. 60 consilience 7. a participatory action research agenda: measuring nutrition and agricultural development with smallholders when i contacted card in the fall of 2007 the organization had just begun to consider the possibility of a local soya project. first, fitting with its reorientation as a boundary organization in the kakamega community, card emphasized the need to incorporate both producer and consumer perspectives. in march of 2008, the project was given a grant for $1,000 from the jimmy and rossalyn carter partnership foundation to explore soya value added processing technologies for smallholders. during the summer of 2008, card held meetings with remaining soya project farmers and with some members of persons living with hiv (plwhiv) sustainable living network to gauge interest levels from different groups. in april 2009 i was granted a research fellowship from the fralin life sciences institute to explore consumption patterns and potential nutritional benefits of soya by persons in card’s network of plwhiv over summer 2009. this positioning as a researcher, intern and project coordinator at card offered the opportunity to approach development reflexively in simultaneously striving to study and catalyze change processes at the intersection of nutrition and agriculture (parfitt 2002). the participatory action research program wished to document and analyze the tradeoffs between health, nutrition, and agricultural decision making processes of agricultural smallholders. upon arriving in kakamega, an initial priority was to assess the opportunities and constraints of the soya project working with local persons living with hiv support groups, and a local farmer group composed of several previous soya farmers and a few additional farmers interested in transitioning some of their land to soya cultivation. given the local orientation of the project, the sample size is small, including 15 farmers, 15 town-based tujengane support group members, and 19 jiinue rural support group members. initially, surveys were distributed at the farmer and support group meetings. however, it quickly became clear in the support groups that literacy would be a major constraint in accurate reporting. subsequently, a member of the card staff fluent in kiluhya and kiswahili and i followed up individually with members whose surveys appeared incomplete. while responses remained low amongst support group members even after this process, we felt that we could have relative confidence in the quality of the data. consilience lamb: health or agricultural development figure 1: share of experience in soya figure 2: comparison of farmer, tujengane and junue support group consumption from an agricultural development perspective, project stakeholders were surveyed about their farming activities, including their experience, crops planted, lands and crop utilization. all the farmers surveyed had less than 5 hectares in production, and commonly produced products for home consumption and sale. this extended to a strong interest in cultivating soya for home consumption and processing for sale in the market. while all of the farmers had experience cultivating maize, figure 1 provides a sense of the mixed experience with growing soya. 62 consilience figure 3: vitagoat pressure cooker and stove in bukura, kenya. figure 4: soya mill used to process soya flour and soya beverage purchased by card in july 2009 consistent with nutrition literature, weekly dietary recalls (where an individual reports on the number of servings consumed per day from a local consumption basket) were administered to the participating groups. these surveys were used to examine dietary diversity (hoddinott & yohannes 2002). in figure 2, the project identified several interesting and relevant dietary patterns to the soya project. meat and fish consumption were universally low across groups, and pulses consumption considerably high relative to other products in the rural plwhiv support group. this suggested an opportunity to expand consumption of higher quality protein amongst this most vulnerable group by substituting soya beans for lower nutritional value pulses. moreover, the chart suggests considerable differences in access to different types of foods, even within 10 kilometers of kakamega. not surprisingly, the plwhiv rural support group members appear to be less food secure than the farmer or town based group members. other significant findings include the fact that all of the participants surveyed reported that they consumed chai and ugalix regularly, the only two food commodities for which this was the casexi. based on the results of the surveys, the card staff and i felt comfortable making several conclusions before moving forward: consilience lamb: health or agricultural development figure 5: chart reflecting preferences for mandazi made with 25% soya flour as compared to regular mandazi prepared from only wheat flour soya had major potential to improve protein consumption and income generation for plwhiv who regularly face employment discrimination and have elevated protein needs. continuing to work with the rural and town based support group would ensure that the project benefited those most likely to be food insecurexii. farmers and support group members had extensive agricultural experience and knowledge, as well as enthusiasm for experimenting with soya as an additional crop. ugali and chai were the most universally and commonly consumed foods. subsequently, efforts for value added processing should seek to take advantage and not displace these socially and culturally important foods. card could utilize its existing networks to expand and the project to beekeeping participants and throughout its plwhiv network. 7. appropriate technology for managing the boundary between nutrition and agriculture exploring options for value added processing of soya beans to meet these recommendations, it was frustrating to discover that available technologies had been developed largely from a nutrition intervention rather than agricultural development perspective. malnutrition matters, the ngo most well-known for soy processing in developing countries, has been successful in creating two machines for soymilk production: the vitacow and the vitagoat (figure 3). the earlier technology, the vitacow, was designed for large scale soya production and required the use of electricity and fuel to grind the soya beans and run the pressure cooker for soyamilk. in an attempt to adapt the technology to rural settings for use by farmers and development ngos, the vitagoat was designed to operate using manpower and locally available fuels (american soybean association 2004). yet the “appropriateness” of the vitagoat technology to the kenyan context remained constrained despite its adaptations (hazeltine, barrett, & bull 1999). the vitagoat still could only be manufactured and serviced in india due to sophisticated design of its pressure cooker and low availability of high quality steel. the vitagoat 64 consilience also required an input of 8kg of soy per batch, greater than the yield of most of the part-time soya farmers surveyed, suggesting that the scale of the machines capability was also not suitable for smallholder processing. as a food product, soyamilk was forced to compete with dairy milk. as dairy milk is already accepted and integrated into the culture, even optimistic soymilk pricing scenarios estimate that soymilk would only command two thirds of the price of dairy milk in kenya (chianu, ohiokpeai, vanlauwe, adesina, de groote & sanginga 2009). furthermore, unlike dairy milk, soymilk cannot be high temperature processed and therefore must be marketed, delivered, and sold under refrigerated conditions. the lack of availability of a refrigerated distribution chain largely confined the optimal utilization of vitagoat technologies to a feeding program rather than a mechanism for soya farmers to begin to capture higher returns for their agricultural products in western kenya. the low functionality of the vitagoat system as a tool for smallholders was demonstrated on a field visit to the agricultural technology center in bukura. while the ministry of agriculture in kakamega had reported the bukura project to be an example of significant success in soya bean processing in western kenya, a field visit revealed that the nearly year-old vitagoat system was operated at a quarter of its daily capacity and was utilized actively by a sole soya farmer, who operated a mildly successful soya yoghurt business by selling door to door in the surrounding area. in the wake of these disappointing findings, card leveraged its horizontal ties in the community in order to discover additional options for value added processing. from a reference of a posho millxiii owner, card learned that there were mills designed to process soya beans available in nairobi. the decision to purchase one of these machines (see figure 4) was the result of a culmination of factors. first, the machines themselves were much simpler in their design, using a sieve and grinder to produce fine flour from the oil seed. therefore, the machine could be serviced by most posho mill operators. from a product standpoint, the mill allowed for the resource and labor saving production of soya flour and soya beverage, both shelf stable products that a farmer could store and market for a period of up to six months. further, soya flour and soya beverage do not face the same constraints as soya milk in terms of having to compete with existing products. rather, soya flour can be marketed as a nutritional extender of both maize and wheat flour. the acceptability of both products was measured through anonymous taste tests, in which 15 participants from the tujengane town based support group were asked to compare the soya products to their non-soy or commercially scaled counterparts. soya beverage is a local product made by roasting soya and then grinding it to a fine powder. the soya beverage is then added to tea or served with warm milk or water and sugar. while soya beverage was considered a luxury product by most of the project stakeholders, most reported that they would consume the product if they could produce it easily themselves. above, figure 5 highlights the results of the taste survey for soya mandazi. card’s search for the appropriate technology for value added processing was not only crucial to transforming the form utility of soya, but also opened the opportunity the nutritional and agronomic benefits of soya beans to be realized by producers. moving forward, this rapid consilience lamb: health or agricultural development assessment had demonstrated that the experience with soya production (figure 1), the need for protein resources (especially for rural plwhiv as in figure 2), and the commitment to a project to improve home consumption and income generation to serve as the foundation for designing a successful local soya project. 8. discussion: horizontal networks in designing a successful local soya project with the value added processing system in place and its previous experience in working with community members in health and agriculture, card was in a position to further leverage its ability to work in horizontal networks within the kakamega community to capture the interest of a diverse set of stakeholders. using its previous work with hiv/aids and sustainable living, card was able to link to a rural and town-based support group who agreed to volunteer and work a common plot of soya beans as a substitute for double cropping maize. card also hosted a training for soya farmers on how to use the processing machine and enlisted the support of several of the hold-over soya growers from its previous project as well as a small group of farmers interested in transitioning some of their land to soya. working locally allowed card to appeal to the multi-dimensional nature of rural livelihoods. as one staff member put it “no one understands the need for good nutrition like an hiv positive mother working in the field”. relationships with agricultural and nutritional stakeholders were solidified through programmatic integration of larger scale organizations as well. from a nutritional perspective, the figure 6: card project design 66 consilience card staff met with officials from the voluntary counseling and testing center in kakamega and mukumu hospital, who coordinated support group activities. regarding agricultural development, an additional major outcome of the project was the development of a memorandum of understanding (mou) with the kakamega branch of kari. through the mou, kari-kakamega and card agreed to partner to establish plots for the growth of certified seed by card project farmers and to allow the kari staff to provide training in card projects as an aspect of the kari extension responsibility. in the longer term, card’s increased ability to use the soya processing system has also allowed card to reach additional stakeholders to benefit from the nutritional value of soy. amidst a surplus of soya flour and soya beverage, card began contracting with local schools and orphanages to provide ingredients for the lunchtime meal. through the process of developing its local soya project, card experimented first hand with many of the practical obstacles and considerations addressed by boundary management organizations. specifically, cash et al identify three common organizing themes for successful boundary management and articulating knowledge into action (2003). first, it is emphasized that boundary management should be treated seriously. secondly, considerable effort should be dedicated to demonstrating dual accountability. finally, effective systems utilize boundary objects (cash et al 2003). as presented by cash, these are projects or items in which individuals with diverse expertise may come together to develop a project and/or set of recommendations to improve the current situation. while cash et al extrapolate these themes to broader knowledge systems, the card experience as a boundary organization, and with its soya bean project, demonstrate that the interpretive flexibility of soya beans can improve both agricultural and nutrition outcomes at the local level. first, card identified that soya could serve stakeholders with multiple interests in improving nutrition, farm sustainability, and increasing their incomes by successfully identifying a processing technology (boundary object) that could meet these needs within the cultural framework. the card experience also raises issues of dual accountability. in a society where no one has enough, card constructed a project design to attempt to make benefits flow to those most in need of assistance. the organization also leveraged its previous experience in both fields to make itself equally accountable to its agricultural and health stakeholders. card’s success comes at an interesting juncture as advocacy of the use of soya beans in africa has become an increasingly high profile issue, especially in kenya (misiko et al 2008). while soybeans remain a prominent component of food aid programs in kenya, as captured in the opening quote, increasing levels of soil degradation and food insecurity in western kenya have been recognized by agronomists and nutritionists as an opportunity to introduce soya beans as a supplement to the maize dominated cropping system and diet (chianu et al 2009). in the works of one kari agronomist "i often tell kenyans they have to supplement ugali with soybean blended foods because when there is no maize, they starve” (njuguna 2009). however, as the card experience demonstrates, efforts to address food insecurity through soya production in local purchase programs have yet to be flexible enough to work with smallholders effectively. nevertheless, a concern with current efforts to scale up soya production through localized value added processing is that they seem to still be focused toward a food aid rather than agricultural development approach by continuing to promote the installation of vitagoat consilience lamb: health or agricultural development technologies. how soya beans will integrate or fail to integrate into local knowledge systems in kenya remains to be seen. what is clear is that local level soybean processing increases opportunities for production to be more profitable and sustainable while simultaneously meeting the protein needs of smallholders. the card experience emphasizes that the boundary between health and agricultural development can be effectively managed at the local level by bringing together stakeholders over their common interest to improve community well-being. 68 consilience bibliography american soybean association. (2004). improving health through soy: a basic training manual. ashley, c. and s. maxwell. (2001). development policy review. 19(4): 395-425 barrett, c. b.. (2001). food security and food assistance programs. in: handbook of agricultural economics vol. 2b agricultural and food policy. bijker, w. e.. (1995). of bicycles, bakelites and bulbs: towards a theory of sociotechnical change. cambridge, mass.: mit press. cash, d.w., w.c. clark, f. alcock, n.m. dickson, n. eckley, d.h guston, j. jager and r.b. mitchell. (2003). knowledge systems for sustainable development. proceedings of the national academy of sciences, 100(14). chianu, j.n., o. ohiokpeai, b. vanlauwe, a. adesina, h. de groote and n. sanginga. (2009). promoting a versatile but yet minor crop: soybean in the farming systems of kenya. journal of sustainable development in africa, 10(4). coates, j., e.a. frongillo, b.l. rogers, p.webb, p. wilde and r. houser. (2006). commonalities in the experience of household food insecurity across cultures: what are measures missing? american society for nutrition. supplement: advances in developing country food insecurity measurement. goldberger, j.r. (2008). non-governmental organizations, strategic bridge building, and the"scientization" of organic agriculture in kenya. agriculture and human values 25(2). hoddinott, j. and y. yohannes. (2002). dietary diversity as a measure of food insecurity. international food policy research institute, food consumption and nutrition division discussion paper no. 136. hazeltine, barrett and c. bull. (1999). appropriate technology: tools, choices, and implications. san diego: academic press. lappe, f. and j. collins. (1998). world hunger: twelve myths. second ed. new york: grove press. misiko, m., p.j tittonell, j.j. ramisch,p. richards and k.e. giller. (2008). integrating new soyabean varieties for soil fertility management in smallholder systems through participatory research: lessons from western kenya. agricultural systems. 7(1). njuguna, c. (2009) kenya: soybean the seed for wealth, health, and soil fertility. allafrica.com available at:http://allafrica.com/stories/200909240168.html http://en.scientificcommons.org/m_misiko http://allafrica.com/kenya/ consilience lamb: health or agricultural development parfitt, t. (2002). the end of development: modernity, postmodernity, and development. sterling, va: pluto press. pieterse, j. (2001). development as reflexive practice in pietierse, j. (ed) deveolpment theory: deconstructions/ reconstructions. london: sage. ruel, m.t. (2003). is dietary diversity an indicator of dietary quality or food insecurity? food consumption and nutrition division discussion paper no. 140. schreinemachers, p. (2006) the (ir)relevance of the crop yield gap to food security in developing countries: with an application to multi agent modeling of farming systems in uganda. doctoral dissertation, the university of bonn, netherlands. scott, j.c. (1998). seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed. new haven: yale university press. shrum, w. (2001). science and story in development: the emergence of non-governmental organizations in agricultural research. social studies of science 30(1). world food program. (2006). food procurement in developing countries. policy issues for consideration: agenda item 5. available at: www.wfp.org/eb ---. (1996). food procurement policy, executive director circular ed96/009, 11 april 1996 available at: www.wfp.org/eb endnotes i throughout this text smallholders will be used to refer to small, semicommercialized farmers who hold back some of their production for subsistence. ii common metrics to address macronutrient malnutrition include body mass index, upper arm circumference and height and weight measurements. measures of micronutrient malnutrition often look for physical manifestations of micronutrient deficiency, such as vitamin a related blindness or goiter. iii for triangulation, access based measures are also often paired with biometric measures of food security such as the presence of a stunted child in the household, upper arm circumference, body mass index, and weight to height ratios. iv like all legumes, soya bean leaves take nitrogen out of the atmosphere and draw it down to the root structure to be used as energy for plant growth. v in terms of protein availability for digestion. http://www.wfp.org/eb http://www.wfp.org/eb 70 consilience vi while soya beans originated in mainland china, today they are grown on all six inhabited continents and are available in a broad range of varieties bred to meet particularized climatic, nutritional, and agricultural needs. vii these mills are ill adapted to oil processing, and the oil can break down the blades over time. moreover, many mill owners do not want to take the time to clean the machine, allow for soya processing, and then re-clean the machine before moving back to grinding another grain. viiia headline program of the food aid reauthorization in the 2008 farm bill is the inclusion of a 60 million dollar local purchase program (title iii, farm bill). the local purchase program is a pilot designed to build the case for a larger restructuring of us food aid. in an idealized sense, the turn to local purchase seems a key opportunity for the potential complementary nature of nutrition and agriculture to be realized in the development context. functioning local purchase programs may have the opportunity to raise the exchange entitlement for participating farmers, providing them the opportunity to pursue a more sustainable livelihood. ix not surprisingly the largest supplier of food through local procurement programs is south africa. x ugali is commonly considered the staple of the kenyan diet. it is a pan-baked, mostly solid corn meal usually paired with vegetables such as kale or with boiled meat xi spss was used to conduct basic statistical analyses on the various surveys. xii this goal uses the phrasing of most likely to be food insecure as insufficient data was collected to obtain a more confident estimate of individual food security. xiii posho mills are kenyan corn mills, and are often managed by successful smallscale entrepreneurs. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 7, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 155–166 looking at a new strategy to save the sacramento-san joaquin delta julia fredenburg school of international and public affairs columbia university, new york julia.fredenburg@gmail.com robert fredenburg bob.fredenburg@sbcglobal.net abstract water supply, flood control, and environmental management are fundamental challenges for the western united states. california’s unique development patterns, with nearly 20 million of its residents living in water starved southern california, has resulted in a system of water transfers and aqueduct systems that rely on water being pumped, collected and transferred from northern california through an extensive and damaging pumping and aqueduct system. the sacramento – san joaquin delta (the delta) is the heart of california’s water source and the center of the transfer system. the delta is an 837,594 acres area where the sacramento and san joaquin river join before entering the san francisco bay and then the pacific ocean. water is pumped from the delta through a system of aqueducts to agricultural users in the san joaquin valley and urban centers of the san francisco bay, los angeles and other communities throughout southern california. unsustainable pumping of vast amounts of water yearly from the delta has caused the collapse of several fish populations and has forced a rethinking of the federal and state water policies. united states federal and state river and water policies for the past 150 years have relied on maximizing conversions of wetlands for agricultural uses while placing a high priority on flood control on major rivers like the mississippi, missouri and sacramento. as we move well into the 21st century the historic water policies of flood control and water exports have left the delta facing an imminent collapse that threatens the massive california water transfers and the delta fisheries if immediate action is not taken. the effect of the collapse is potentially the loss of water to the 20 million california residences and the agricultural economy of the california san joaquin valley. fortunately, the delta provides a new laboratory for water policies and improved habitat and water quality while addressing the need for flood control. images of the delta will help to illustrate the multiplicity of interests that form the heart of the debate over california’s water future. author’s note julia fredenburg is a student in the masters program in public administration at columbia university’s school of international and public affairs. previously, she worked for the city council of kansas city, missouri and worked as a photojournalist throughout rural missouri. she received a b.a. in mathematics and fine arts from the university of california, santa cruz in 2008. robert fredenburg is a consultant to the california state assembly committee on environmental safety and toxic materials. he has worked for more than thirty years for the california state assembly to improve the state of california's environment. keywords: sacramento – san joaquin river delta, flood control, sustainable water management; california; yolo bypass, salmon; delta smelt. 156 consilience 1. exploring the sacramento – san joaquin delta system the sacramento – san joaquin delta is the heart of california’s water source, an 837,594-acre area where the sacramento and san joaquin rivers join before entering the san francisco bay and then the pacific ocean at the golden gate bridge. it is a region where two of california's largest rivers meet to create a vast mazelike system of islands, marshes, and small farming communities. freshwater from the rivers combine with saltwater from the pacific ocean, creating the west coast’s largest estuary. composed of 57-leveed island tracts and 700 miles of sloughs and winding channels, the delta is an impressive and intricate water system. photographs, clockwise from top left: crawdad, sacramento – san joaquin delta waterway, fishing in delta, tule grass. consilience fredenburg: san joaquin delta california department of water resources, map of sacramento – san joaquin delta waterway 158 consilience 2. development of the delta the development of today’s delta was shaped in the late 1850’s when the federal swamp and overflow land act gave the state of california ownership of all swamp and overflow land, including delta marshes. the public support for land reclamation encouraged the drying of wetlands for agricultural purposes. when flood control efforts later relied on channelized flood control systems, the structure of the delta was set. later initiatives to deliver water to the drier southern california from the delta, worked further to alter the structure of the waterway. photographs, clockwise from top left: sacramento – san joaquin delta waterway, historic ryde hotel in the delta, concrete scale model of delta, antioch bridge over delta. consilience fredenburg: san joaquin delta 3. water’s journey the demand for water from the southern reaches of the state has left the delta with a system that relies on pumped, collected, and transferred water through an extensive and damaging transfer system. water is pumped and delivered through a series of channels from the delta to agricultural users in the san joaquin valley and cities in the san francisco bay area and southern california. the risk to long-term sustainability for the delta is tied to the likely failure of the complex physical infrastructure with land subsidence, sea level rise, and credible earthquake effects. beyond infrastructure risk, the effects of increased water pumping have left the salmon, delta smelt, and sacramento splittail in precipitous declines. without new policies and corrective actions, the water pumping will stop and nearly 6 million acre-feet of water per year to urban and agricultural users will end. photograph: antioch bridge and pier in big break inlet, delta 160 consilience 4. water pumping the delta is the major collection point for water that serves more than 25 million people, two-thirds of california's population. during an average rainfall year, 6.3 million acre-feet of water is exported from the delta. this export of water represents an ever-increasing diversion of water from the historic river flows to residential, industrial and agricultural uses. due to water exports from the delta, outflows to the ocean have decreased from 81% to 48% of total delta flows since 1930. photograph: agricultural canal, williams, ca consilience fredenburg: san joaquin delta 5. delta resources and fish populations the reduction in water flowing from the delta to the ocean causes many problems for current fish populations. the pumping of an estimated 6 million acre feet of water yearly from the delta has been linked to the collapse of the fish populations with the near complete loss of delta smelt. additionally, alterations to annual salmon migrations have forced a rethinking of the federal and state water policies. sustainable practices will require state and federal water managers to no longer rely on heavily engineered levee systems for flood control and maximizing the flow of water destined for pumping facilities. photographs, clockwise from top left: agricultural canal in grimes ca, new housing development near yolo bypass, agricultural area in delta, water pollution in delta. 162 consilience 6. damaging results the natural operation of the delta is in jeopardy of collapse as a result of the state's increasing population, demand for water, changing environmental conditions, and historic use patterns. water pumping causes many problems throughout the delta, but is not the only source of concern. housing demands propel the use of inflexible solutions, like levees, to create more developable land. property that was once flood-prone has been made profitable through waterway engineering which channels water in order to reduce the threat of floods. rigid water channels are not the singular tool being implemented in the delta. through the yolo bypass, we can see a more sustainable solution to flood management. photograph: new housing in delta, raised in the case of flooding consilience fredenburg: san joaquin delta 7. positive management: yolo bypass fortunately, the yolo bypass, one of the seasonal floodplains in california, offers an example of sustainable management and flood control within the delta. the unique systems of weirs and bypasses allow the american and sacramento rivers to flow into 59,000 acres of low lying agricultural land when there is danger of flooding. this encourages responsible flood control that allows for natural migrations of fish species. the bypass provides a unique habitat to native fish species, agricultural production and flood protection to the city of sacramento. increased flows provide critical habitat to native fish species, in particular chinook salmon and sacramento splittail. this longstanding flood control measure has been linked to restoring delta fisheries and reducing damage done by increased water diversions. photographs, clockwise from top left: agricultural canal in yolo bypass, field in yolo bypass, agricultural canal in yolo bypass, dry field in yolo bypass. 164 consilience the yolo bypass has received increasing attention as a potential solution to fishery failures in the delta. appropriately managed floodplains provide multiple benefits to society in a synergistic way. more flooding of the yolo bypass increases benefits to native fish species, in particular juvenile chinook salmon that use the floodplain as a nursery habitat. the yolo bypass is a successful example of a flood risk management strategy that achieves multiple benefits for the delta. there are opportunities to expand this type of scenario and increase the benefits to provide a more sustainable delta system. photographs, clockwise from top left: sacramento weir, yolo bypass, water storage, sacramento river. consilience fredenburg: san joaquin delta 8. california and the delta’s future the future of the delta and all of california, will be linked to its water supply. emerging environmental science is fundamental to a future water system that protects and improves the delta. a new delta system will need to recognize the multiple uses and users of the delta. urban areas in northern and southern california, west coast iconic salmons, in-delta agriculture and tourism activities are all being placed in jeopardy by historic practices and policies. finding new habitat, restoring past damaged wetlands and allowing rivers more room to spread in response to flooding are all new management tools that hold promise for the delta. photograph: sacramento river 166 consilience bibliography all photographs by julia fredenburg, 2006-2011 american rivers. (2010). putting green to work: economic recovery investments for clean and reliable water. retrieved from http://www.americanrivers.org/library/reports-publications/putting-green-to-workreport.html american rivers. (2011). flood bypasses in california. retrieved from http://www.americanrivers.org/ourwork/restoring-rivers/floods-floodplains/flood-bypasses-in-california.html california department of water resources. (2011). map of sacramento san joaquin delta waterway. division of flood managment. (2010). fact sheet sacramento river flood control project, weirs and flood relief structures: california department of water resources. opperman, j. j., galloway, g. e., fargione, j., mount, j. f., richter, b. d., & secchi, s. (2009). sustainable floodplains through large-scale reconnection to rivers. science. the governor's delta vision blue ribbon task force. (2008). our vision for the california delta. sacramento, ca: california resources agency. http://www.americanrivers.org/library/reports-publications/putting-green-to-work-report.html http://www.americanrivers.org/library/reports-publications/putting-green-to-work-report.html http://www.americanrivers.org/our-work/restoring-rivers/floods-floodplains/flood-bypasses-in-california.html http://www.americanrivers.org/our-work/restoring-rivers/floods-floodplains/flood-bypasses-in-california.html microsoft word perrez-feb22.doc perrez 1 how to get beyond the zero-sum game mentality between state and non-state actors in international environmental governance full name: franz xaver perrez e-mail address: franz.perrez@bafu.admin.ch acknowledgement: this article is a shortened version of the presentation “the pareto optimum of stakeholder participation in environmental governance” made at the conference on environmental governance and democracy – institutions, public participation and environmental sustainability: bridging research and capacity development, which was organized by yale university center for environmental law & policy in conjunction with the united nations institute for training and research, unitar, on may 10-11 2008 at the yale university in new haven. see generally: http://www.yale.edu/envirocenter/envdem/index.htm. the ideas expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the view of the swiss government. the author would like to thank the comments on a previous draft of this article received from dr. jürg schneider; stephan michel and alexander kopp. brief biography: dr. franz xaver perrez, head of global affairs section in the international affairs division of switzerland’s federal office for the environment; j.s.d. 1998 (nyu school of law); ll.m. 1996 (nyu school of law); additional studies at university of bern school of law and université de paris ii. dr. perrez teaches international environmental law at the university of bern school of law. perrez 2 scholarly abstract this paper examines the participation of stakeholders in environmental policy formulation and implementation. after a short discussion of the main functions and challenges of environmental governance the paper addresses the issue of stakeholder participation and the claim of “democratic deficits” in international environmental governance. it stresses that while non-state actor involvement does not necessarily increase democratic legitimacy, it may nevertheless increase the quality of the environmental policy processes. it will then argue that certain international processes such as the un commission on sustainable development (csd) have led to an unsatisfactory situation of non-state actor involvement where excessive formalization and proceduralization impede active interaction and input of expertise from non-state actors. it seems that the interaction between state and non-state actors in some of today’s international processes, such as the csd, has led to a zero-sum game1 where no party is really benefiting from the contributions of the other. this paper will suggest several changes to get beyond this zero-sum game mentality, including de-formalization of participation, replacement of generalist nongovernmental organizations with those that specialize in specific fields, and reformation of the relationship between state and non-state actors so that each might come to see the other as a partner, not as a competitor. it will conclude by arguing that neither the alleged lack of an authoritative, effective central institution addressing the main environmental problems, nor the so-called “democratic deficit” is the main challenge to today’s international environmental governance, but the lack of political will. political will, however, is not an absolute; it can and has to be stimulated. and this may be one of the most productive contributions that non-state actors can make. perrez 3 author’s note the international environmental policy processes are often criticized for inadequate involvement of non-state actors such as ngos or international organizations. this is often referred to as a ‘democratic deficit’. yet my experiences as head of delegation or lead negotiator for the swiss government in the un commission on sustainable development (csd) or in international chemicals negotiations such as the development of the strategic approach to international chemicals management (saicm) have revealed that not all ngo participation is as fruitful as often claimed. in some international processes such as the csd, ngo participation has become an overly formalized procedure that prevents rather than stimulates interaction and exchange within the ngo community and commission participants. today’s interaction between state and non-state actors in the csd can be described as a zero-sum game where no party is benefiting from the contributions of the other. the expertise and perspectives of non-state actors, however, is invaluable to consensus decision-making, policy-formulation and eventual impact through international governance like the csd. this article proposes the following steps to increase the effectiveness of non-state actors in environmental policy processes: a de-formalization of nonstate actor involvement, a replacement of generalist ngos with those that specialize in specific fields, a reformation of the relationship between state and non-state actors so that each might come to see the other as a partner, not as a competitor, and finally a strategic change whereby ngos re-focus their energy towards raising public awareness, influencing nations’ negotiation positions, and triggering the political will and commitment that is needed to effectively formulate and implement the policies of environmental governance. keywords: international environmental governance, non-governmental actors, ngos, stakeholder participation, legitimacy, democratic deficit perrez 4 perrez 5 how to get beyond the zero-sum game mentality between state and non-state actors in international environmental governance++ by franz xaver perrez* ++ this article is a shortened version of the presentation “the pareto optimum of stakeholder participation in environmental governance” made at the conference on environmental governance and democracy – institutions, public participation and environmental sustainability: bridging research and capacity development, which was organized by yale university center for environmental law & policy in conjunction with the united nations institute for training and research, unitar, on may 10-11 2008 at the yale university in new haven. see generally: http://www.yale.edu/envirocenter/envdem/index.htm. the ideas expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the view of the swiss government. the author would like to thank the comments on a previous draft of this article received from dr. jürg schneider; stephan michel and alexander kopp. * dr. franz xaver perrez, head of global affairs section in the international affairs division of switzerland’s federal office for the environment; j.s.d. 1998 (nyu school of law); ll.m. 1996 (nyu school of law); additional studies at university of bern school of law and université de paris ii. dr. perrez teaches international environmental law at the university of bern school of law. perrez 6 1. introduction today, it is well recognized that threats to the environment undermine the resource base of human development and well-being. as un secretary-general kofi annan (2005) has held, “[o]ur efforts to defeat poverty and pursue sustainable development will be in vain if environmental degradation and natural resource depletion continue unabated.” in order to address the challenge of global environmental degradation and natural resource depletion, a complex and multi-layered international environmental governance structure has materialized over the past few decades with an abundance of institutions, organizations and processes emerging—sometimes overlapping, sometimes cooperating, oftentimes conflicting. several factors contribute to the lack of effectiveness and efficiency of today’s system of international environmental governance, namely its fragmentation, the dilution of the authority of its coreinstitutions such as the un environment programme unep, the imbalance between the environmental regime and other regimes, the lack of institutional leadership within the international environmental regime, the inefficient use of already limited resources, and the lack of political will and commitment. 2 to further complicate the situation, this governmental environmental structure is complemented by an intricate network of thousands of active nongovernment organizations, initiatives and action groups. environmental governance has become so complex, that even specialists have lost oversight. this paper examines the participation of stakeholders (i.e. all actors that have an interest at stake, thus both states as well as non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations and international organizations3) in forming and implementing international environmental policy. one body of stakeholders commonly discussed is that of “nongovernmental organizations” (ngos), which is understood as including both, so-called "public interests ngos" and industry and business representatives. the paper will focus on the international level of environmental governance and will draw from experiences of international processes, such as those of the united nations commission on sustainable development (csd) and international chemicals negotiations, namely the development of the strategic approach to international chemicals management (saicm). perrez 7 after a short discussion of environmental governance, its actors and institutions, and its main functions and challenges (section 2), the paper will address the issue of ngo participation and the claim of a “democratic deficit”4 in international environmental governance. it will stress that while ngo involvement does not directly increase the democratic legitimacy as such (section 3), it may nevertheless increase the quality of environmental policy processes (section 4). it will then argue that over time, ngo participation has become an overly formalized procedure that prevents rather than stimulates interaction between conference participants. this is especially the case in processes like the united nations commission on sustainable development (csd), where stakeholder participation is confined to a portion of any given meeting known as the “multi-stakeholder segment.” today, interaction in the csd could be said to represent a zerosum game where the contributions of one party are seen as hindrances by the other. on the other hand, there are processes such as the development of the strategic approach to international chemicals management that do not limit stakeholder participation to specific segments and which are characterized by abundant, interactive and direct stakeholder involvement throughout negotiations and the decision making process. the paper will suggest that a de-formalization of non-state actor involvement is imperative to allow for valuable active stakeholder participation. a proposed method for how such reforms can be made will be detailed in this paper. it will conclude that non-state actor involvement may be less effective in general environmental governance processes addressing broad issues. similarly, ngos with a very general background may have less impact on specialised political processes. on the other hand, in processes where the issue in question is more specific, ngos and stakeholders with greater expertise in specific fields will be vital as active participants in policy making (section 5). finally, it will argue that neither the alleged lack of an authoritative, effective central institution addressing the main environmental problems, nor the so called “democratic deficit” are the main challenge to today’s international environmental governance, but the lack of political will, i.e. the continued political prioritization of other issues over the environment. non-state actors such as ngos, however, can be crucial in addressing this lack of political will. 2. functions, actors and institutions of environmental governance a) functions and actors perrez 8 environmental governance is the political and administrative system established to address environmental problems. it embraces institutions, principles, rules, procedures and instruments that regulate, manage, and implement the processes of environmental protection.5 the function of environmental governance is to provide a comprehensive, coherent, effective and efficient framework for the protection and sustainable use of natural resources.6 traditionally, it is argued that the main pillars of an environmental institutional framework are government authorities, appointed and authorised by elected officials to carry out tasks at the national (federal) and sub-national (regional and lower) levels. this traditional model has been changing rapidly non-state actors are no longer seen only as an “object” of environmental policy, they have also become a “subject” of environmental policy making. today, non-state actors are fulfilling increasingly important roles as engines of international environmental policy-making, setting agendas for international policy processes and development, providing knowledge and scientific information, monitoring implementation of international policies and lobbying state actors. they are also involved in partnership initiatives with governments, as well as the development of voluntary standards, and implementation of environmental protection programs.7 the establishment of private label schemes such as that from the forest stewardship council, a not-for-profit organization established to promote the responsible management of the world’s forests, is a prominent example of international environmental governance conducted without national government involvement.8 today more than ever there is a growing corpus of rules, principles and decisions with a direct impact on private actors that has not been negotiated in a traditional inter-state context. rules such as technical guidelines for best available technologies and best environmental practices are often made by international organizations with strong support from non-state expertises and the direct participation of non-state actors; international partnerships are being formed between public and private entities; international codes of conduct are being developed by private actors or private initiatives such as the forest stewardship council. all of the above have become important elements of international environmental governance. thus, international governmental organisations and non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations, corporations, other collectives and even individuals have become important actors of both national and international environmental governance.9 perrez 9 b) institutions and challenges governance can generally be seen as the system how actors, through institutions and processes, identify, address and solve common problems.10 it addresses not only how decisions are being made, who is responsible for making decisions, how decision makers carry out their mandate and how they are held accountable,11 but also how decisions are implemented and reviewed. international environmental governance is thus the international regime that has been developed to identify, address and solve environmental problems.12 international environmental governance is relatively young and dynamic. over time, a multi-layered regime has emerged, and a proliferation of instruments, processes, institutions and actors has evolved that bears the risk of duplication and even of conflict.13 today’s multi-layered international environment regime and its numerous institutions and processes demand an increased level of international cooperation; it might even be argued that cooperation is increasingly an obligation or necessary duty of state actors.14 non-state actors, however, seem not to bear such a responsibility to cooperate. the united nations’ environment programme unep is one of the main institutions of today’s international environmental governance. however, unep is lacking resources, authority and support to fulfil its role as central pillar of the international environmental regime. in addition to unep, over 500 international environmental treaties and multilateral environmental agreements (meas) such as the united nations framework convention on climate change, the convention on biodiversity or the montreal protocol for the protection of the ozone layer have addressed specific environmental concerns. each treaty establishes specific rules and obligations and creates its own mini-institutional machinery that includes annual meetings and an administrative structure to serve these meetings and to oversee the implementation of the conventions’ directives.15 in addition, while the unep and the international environmental treaties and meas have the primary political-normative functions of international environmental governance, their work is complemented by specialized organizations and institutions such as the food and agriculture organization, the international maritime organization, or the un commission on sustainable development. today, many of the most important decisions affecting the environment stem from perrez 10 institutions and processes outside of the complex web of the core global environmental governance system like the wto, multilateral development banks or bilateral investment and free-trade agreements.16 additionally, implementation and financing of environmental activities is often tasked to other institutions such as the united nations development programme undp, the world bank, the global environment facility, the united nations institute for training and research unitar, or united nations industrial development organization unido. this proliferation of meas, international environmental rule-setting bodies, and organizations and institutions engaged in environmental activities, often with overlapping or conflicting goals and strategies has lead to a fragmentation within the sphere of international environmental governance.17 due to the weak position of the unep, there is a lack of cooperation and coordination among the different relevant international institutions and a lack of implementation and enforcement, and the limited financial resources are not always used efficiently.18 these challenges or shortcomings of the international environmental regime can be structured into four groups or clusters: i) insufficient commitment to and prioritization of environmental considerations by states, ii) fragmentation of the regime, iii) limited authority and limited resources of unep, and iv) a structural and institutional imbalance between the environmental regime and other regimes.19 this proliferation of international environmental institutions and processes also makes it difficult for state and non-state actors to follow the work of all the relevant institutions and processes in international environmental governance. in response to its weaknesses, several propositions have been made to strengthen international environmental governance over the past several years.20 the most recent initiative was taken at the 2005 un world summit, which recognized the need for more efficient international environmental governance with enhanced coordination, improved policy advice and guidance, strengthened scientific knowledge and assessment, better treaty compliance, as well as better integration of environmental activities in the broader sustainable development framework; at the operational level, the heads of state and government agreed to explore the possibility of a more coherent institutional framework to address this need.21 it is interesting to note that all these propositions refer to institutional aspects of international environmental governance and politics and that they make no specific reference to the involvement and the general role of non-state perrez 11 actors. however, non-state actors can significantly contribute to addressing several of the identified needs. 3. stakeholder involvement and the claim of a “democratic deficit” the involvement of non-governmental actors in the international environmental policy regime is a typical characteristic of environmental governance. the un commission on sustainable development (csd) is said to have been a pioneer in engaging non-governmental actors in its work by including in its annual meetings “multi-stakeholder dialogues” where representatives from diverse sectors convene and share their experience and forge common grounds. this has led to a significant increase in ngo representatives from around the world attending csd meetings.22 today, non-governmental organizations regularly participate as observers at meetings of international environmental institutions and processes and make effective use of their right to intervene and submit their views and proposals. nevertheless, the involvement of non-state actors is often said to be insufficient and international institutions and processes are frequently criticized for suffering from a “democratic deficit.” the increased involvement of these non-state actors is said to be crucial, as they are typically deemed representatives of the global civil society and of the public interest worldwide; enhancing their role in international decision-making would enhance the democratic legitimacy of international institutions and processes. the claim that ngo participation can enhance the democratic legitimacy of international governance relies on the assumption that the concept of democracy can as such be directly applied to international governance.23 “democracy” is generally understood as a form of government in which the supreme power is held by the people, i.e. all individual subjects of the government live under a free electoral and participatory system.24 democracy is thus a form of self-governance by the people of a political entity. since there is no global government (a single government responsible for the political functioning and decision-making of the whole globe) and no global “people” (demos), international governance is difficult to associate with the act of perrez 12 democratic governing. and, it is argued that because of the fundamental absence of the premise of majority rule on a global scale, the concept of democracy seems hardly applicable to international governance, and any attempt to bring international governance “into the laboratory of democracy will result in a reductionist and impoverished understanding of international law, of democracy and of the actual and potential relationship between the two.”25 however, even if the applicability of democratic principles to international governance were to be accepted, the claim that ngo participation could correct a so-called democratic deficit of international governance seems to be superficial and short-sighted. in fact, ngos represent the views of specific interest groups – this does by no means imply that ngos represent the general public or a “global civil society.” therefore, ngos do not have greater democratic legitimacy than governments and cannot justify playing an activist role through arguing that they better represent the public than government representatives.26 while it could be argued that the aggregation of ngos as agents of special interests could theoretically holistically represent the views of the global community in the same way that democracies incorporate the special interests held by their constituents, this is not the case. for such democratic aggregation to occur, all views and interests would have to be represented by specific ngos, each with equal access to the international decision making processes. since this is not the case, this counter-argument may is not convincing. in fact, the involvement of stakeholders in international governance may even pose democratic challenges: while it’s assumed that governments defend the interests of the states they represent, and while government authorities are typically appointed and authorised by elected officials to carry out their tasks, ngos and stakeholders exert their influence without such control by and accountability to the general public. thus, the active ngo and stakeholder involvement in international environmental governance could raise concerns with respect to their accountability and democratic legitimacy. this concern of accountability and democratic legitimacy becomes even more pressing if the existence of a “new world order” is accepted, as is proposed by anne-marie slaughter:27 building on examples where international institutions function effectively when drawing significantly upon the existence of informal policy networks, slaughter presents a world that is largely run by networks of elites with close personal ties to one another. in her model, the perrez 13 individuals who make up these networks are public servants such as regulators, bureaucrats, diplomats and judges—personalities with explicit mandates under public law, formally held accountable to the people through elected governments and representative institutions. while slaughter’s “network” conception seems to depend on the continuing viability of a clear boundary between public and private, there is a real risk that these networks operate in a way “whereby network ‘insiders,’ both governmental and non-governmental, cooperate in a manner that defies formal boundaries between public and private”.28 but if global governance is run by networks that include both governmental and non-governmental actors, then the selection of who should be a member of the decision-making body becomes complex and raises important questions of accountability and legitimacy, as the general public is excluded from the selection of the members of the network and the non-governmental members of the network are not accountable to the general public but to special interests. 4. the benefits of ngo and stakeholder participation although the claim that ngos would enhance the democratic legitimacy of international environmental governance must be rejected, there are nevertheless other important benefits of non-state actor involvement in international environmental policy making and implementation. ngos, as compared to state actors, have the benefit of being able to focus on one specific interest and can express themselves more freely on that issue, being less constrained by the general interest of a specific nation at large. moreover, ngos often have specific expertise and knowledge. they enhance public support and assist in the domestic internalization and implementation of internationally agreed norms and commitments. additionally, “[i]n being entrepreneurial, ngos compete with other actors in a dynamic marketplace of ideas” and can be more creative in constructing and encouraging new norms, and new models of governance.29 non-state actors can play vital, supportive roles in each step of the process of developing, implementing, and monitoring international environmental policies within international environmental governance:30 perrez 14 i) by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating relevant information, drawing attention to new and emerging issues that need international attention and by mobilizing public opinion through information campaigns and broad outreach activities, they can influence the agendasetting of international environmental governance. ii) they can inspire and shape the development of international norms and policies by providing expert advice to state-centered international negotiations, formulating views and expressing interests that might otherwise be ignored by state actors, by mobilizing public opinion at the national level to influence the position of representatives, and by lobbying and monitoring governmental delegations during negotiations. several forms or channels for non-state actors involvement exist to influence the development of norms and policies by international governmental institutions: the most common form of this type of influence is non-state actor participation as observers in international meetings, negotiations and national delegations. moreover, some international institutions directly seek the expertise and the advice of ngos on specific issues or include ngos in technical committees or advisory groups. finally, nonstate actors can strongly influence international policy development by formulating and applying norms, standards, codes of conduct, or practices that influence governmental policy formulation. iii) they can contribute to the understanding of international norms and policies through dissemination of information to the public, engaging in interpretation of international rules and norms, and by contributing to international adjudication by making amicus curiae (friends-of-the-court) submissions. iv) they can support the implementation of international environmental policies by advising state actors, supporting state implementation and by performing operational functions themselves. v) finally, they can support compliance with commitments and policies by monitoring state action, by drawing the public attention to implementation problems, sue institutions at the national level for non-action, and, in specific environmental regimes, by triggering compliance procedures, i.e. initiate the procedure established by any given international environmental agreement to assess the compliance of its parties with the obligations under the agreement.31 these contributions of non-state actors to the process of developing, implementing, and monitoring international environmental policies undoubtedly increase the quality of international regulations and policies and improve the outcomes associated with them. thus, it is not the misleading claim of a higher democratic legitimacy that makes ngo participation desirable, but the fact that ngo participation may provide additional views and proficiency and that they promote transparency and accountability. clearly, ngo and stakeholder involvement does perrez 15 generally increase the legitimacy of international decision-making even if ngos are unable to address the “democratic deficit” of environmental governance. however, in order to ensure that such benefits of stakeholder and ngo participation are possible, it is crucial that non-state actors do have specific expertise and actively accompany, monitor and support the governmental negotiations. and, it is important that the processes are organized in a manner which allows for real interaction between non-state and state actors. experience shows that this is not always the case. 5. getting beyond the zero-sum game mentality between state and nonstate actors with respect to stakeholder participation the united nations commission on sustainable development (csd) has been praised in the past for having been a pioneer in engaging non-governmental actors, for organizing rich and stimulating multi-stakeholder dialogues at each of its meetings, and for including ngo representatives in many of its official government delegations. however, a critical analysis of the stakeholder and ngo participation of the csd would come to less positive conclusions. most of the time, the multi-stakeholder segment does not provide for active interaction between state and non-state actors but rather, is a platform for repeating already-known positions instead of a forum for collective brain-storming that provides new insights, expertise and stimulates new ideas that would be relevant for the issues under debate. a more provocative description would even argue that the csd stakeholder dialogues—which, in the interest of political correctness, are openly lauded as enlightening, thought provoking and crucial for quality and success of the csd deliberations—have evolved into formalized rituals that restrict the non-state actors’ impact. as a result, each year non-state representatives repeat more or less the same mantras, which too often fail to provide useful insights or tangible approaches to addressing the issues under consideration. the fact that a representative of the indigenous people is wearing a marvellous dress does not guarantee that his or her intervention is enlightening; the fact that the presence of a youth delegate is refreshing does not add value to the substance of his or her contributions; and the fact that a representative of the environmental community is deeply concerned about the issues under discussion does not guarantee a constructive analysis of the perrez 16 problem at hand. additionally, as a time specifically demarcated for non-state actor involvement, the introduction of multi-stakeholder segments has provided an excuse for excluding non-state actors from other parts of the csd sessions. given the fact that the multi-stakeholder segments do not provide additional or new insights in the issue under debate, the governmental delegations often use the multi-stakeholder segment to work on their position or to consult and coordinate informally. however, as it would be considered as political incorrect if a national delegation did not attend the multi-stakeholder segment, leaving its seat in the meeting room empty during this time, an intern, a junior member of the delegation or the ngo-representative in the government delegation is often sent to attend the multi-stakeholder segment so as to mark governmental presence and interest. later in the process, as delegations exchange non-non papers32 and begin to negotiate in small informalinformal contact groups33, which perhaps due to their unofficial nature are absolutely vital to the negotiation process, ngos and non-state representatives are excluded. and in the final negotiation phase when delegates are overwhelmed with work and responsibilities, they no longer have the time to respond to questions or contemplate potentially important proposals that ngos attempt to introduce to the state representatives. although a simplified—and thus, potentially controversial—picture of the dynamics within the csd, the above description highlights important shortcomings of the current system that are too often overlooked.34 thus, the once-commended ngo and stakeholder participation at the csd is not an adequate example of the positive impact of proactive involvement of non-state actors. csd multistakeholder segments fail to ensure that non-state actors provide useful forms of expertise that could be usefully employed by delegates. additionally, these segments do not provide sufficient in-depth interaction between non-state actors and other delegates. despite the shortcomings of multi-stakeholder segments, non-state representatives have greatly appreciated their inclusion in the formal agenda; as non-state actors have come to increasingly enjoy their new formal role, they have consequently begun to behave more formally. however, it seems that the formalization35 and proceduralization36 of stakeholder participation has not furthered its impact and value. while some thought that formalizing the stakeholder participation would not only secure a prominent time-slot for interaction with non-state actors but also give more weight and perrez 17 importance to the non-state actors as such, the reality seems to be that by allocating specific time segments to ngos and by formalizing their participation in the deliberations of governmental representatives, flexibility and dynamic have been lost. additionally, the formal multistakeholder segment has legitimized the exclusion of non-state actors from the other parts of the process, namely the less formal part where concrete results are negotiated. in order to change the current procedure, non-state actors would have to be ready to renounce the time, procedural certainty, and formality that is allocated to them in the formal multi-stakeholder segment; delegates would have to invest real interest to exchange with non-state actors; or time that is reserved for governmental-only deliberations would have to be opened for non-state participation. however, non-state actors do not seem to be ready to give up what they have gained—namely, the special segment formally allocated to them as well as the semi-official status they have earned through this formalization; on the other hand, government delegates are not ready to sacrifice any more of “their time” during csd meetings to ngos. it seems that the formalization and proceduralization of ngo participation in the csd—and in many other processes—have lead to a zero-sum game where no party is benefiting from the contributions of the other. this suboptimal result cannot be rectified without reforming the zero-sum game mentality held by each of the parties at hand. the benefits of expunging this zero-sum game mentality from environmental governance are clear. for example, there are other cases marked by more dynamic, direct and active non-state actor participation where a more fruitful non-state actor involvement has been reached due to a cooperative approach taken by state and non-state actors. one such example is the process to develop the strategic approach to international chemicals management (saicm).37 the decision to develop saicm was taken in 2004. in light of the desire to bring in the specific knowledge and expertise of the non-state actors involved in chemicals management issues, the need for a strong and direct involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the process was accepted from the beginning of the process. thus, ngos were allowed to participate fully in all of the work of the saicm preparatory committee and to attend as equal partners both the formal sessions and the informal negotiations. over sixty ngos from the agriculture, development, environment, health, industry, and labour sectors participated actively in the negotiations of perrez 18 saicm with the full right to take the floor, express their views and make constructive proposals. throughout the saicm process, ngos brought valuable expertise and knowledge and in the end, many of their ideas and proposals were taken up.38 the adoption of saicm was attended by over 140 governments, 60 specialized ngos and 20 intergovernmental organizations from the agriculture, development, environment, health, industry and labour sector, a magnitude and diversity of attendees that lent the revolutionary stress on stakeholder participation even greater significance. several reasons made this participatory approach so productive: ngo participation at saicm was not restricted by formalized procedures or a constrained stakeholder segment; ngo’s greatly invested in their saicm participation, coming well-prepared with specific, concrete proposals; ngos coordinated effectively among themselves and with governments throughout the process and they were clearly not perceived as competitors to the states but as active and competent partners. one could even argue that within the saicm-setting, it has been possible to leave the traditional interstate paradigm and to move towards a collective concern or community interest approach.39 in this case, extensive ngo participation was not sought in order to achieve greater democratic legitimacy but rather in order to tap stakeholders’ practical expertise and competency. thus, there seem to be at least six fundamental differences between a csd-like zero-sum game mentality case and the more dynamic saicm model: (i) while the participation of non-state actors within the csd is focused on a formalized stakeholder dialogue, this is not the case in the saicm process; ii) while the csd is perceived as a process dealing with the broad, overarching theme of sustainable development, saicm addresses a more specific issue; iii) while the csd seems to have attracted non-state representatives with a less focused background, less specialized expertise and little commitment to focus on the very details of the ongoing discussions between the government delegates, saicm has attracted ngos with specific expertise and knowledge in chemicals management; iv) while the non-state actors often formulate general and broad views not directly linked to the issues under debate at the csd, they have provided specific comments and proposals during the saicm process; v) while in the csd-process the formalized multistakeholder segments are sometimes perceived as non-productive, so non-state actors are too perrez 19 often viewed as obstacles, stakeholders have been seen as competent partners bringing in needed expertise and information in the saicm-process; and vi) while governments often primarily focus on the defence of their personal interests within the csd, they have tended to search for solutions to pressing common challenges in the saicm context. for the csd and other environmental governance structures, a move beyond the zero-sum game mentality towards a more flexible system that allows for direct interaction between state and non-state actors throughout the process would probably require several changes: • de-formalization of participation: formalization and proceduralization by allocating preset and thus limited segments to stakeholders excludes them from other parts of the debate. it makes it easy for government representatives to escape interaction with non-state actors. formalization and proceduralization also seem to attract non-state actors with less specific expertise and those that are inclined to focus on the form of participation and not the substance of contribution. formalization and proceduralization should be replaced with more flexible meeting structure that allows for direct and spontaneous interaction between state and non-state actors. at the same time, non-state actors should not internalize form and procedure, but remain innovative and thought-provoking participants. • generality of expertise and input should be exchanged for specificity: a key benefit of non-state involvement in policy deliberation is the specific expertise and information that they can provide and the fact that they may formulate interests and views that otherwise might have been lost in a state-centric process. by broadening the information base, they can contribute to an improvement in the quality of decisionmaking. therefore, ngos must not repeat generalities but focus on making specific comments and proposals on issues under debate. • non-state and state actors as partners not as competitors: state actors should perceive the non-state actors not as competitors for time or influence but as partners who provide for the specific insights and information needed. at the same time, it is crucial that these partners, focusing on their role to broaden the information base for good decision making, do not perceive government representatives as enemies of the public interest who defend a short-term interest of a small privileged elite whenever government representatives take a different view than the one promoted by non-state actors. they must go beyond simple accusation and try to understand the concerns and challenges that the government actors face and contribute actively to a common search for the best solution to solve the specific challenge under debate. 6. conclusions perrez 20 this paper has argued that formalization and proceduralization of stakeholder participation may lead—and has led in certain processes such as the csd—to a non-productive zero-sum game situation. stakeholder participation, when excessively formalized and proceduralized, risks becoming an inefficient, crude ritual in which stakeholder influence is limited and the process of interaction between state and non-state contributors fails to be interactive and dynamic. moreover, such a system is conducive to a less-than-desirable situation where the non-state actors most familiar with the system and its procedures will have their voices heard, while those non-state actors with the most needed expertise on a specific issue under debate will remain silenced. this will lead to zero-sum game situation where neither ngos nor governments are willing to change their allocation of time and resources, and any gains in time allotted to one party are seen as direct setbacks by the other. although all sides are not entirely satisfied with the situation, each side fears losing more than they might gain if the arrangement were to be changed; ngos would not be ready to lose their formal (but nonetheless limited) platform of influence and governments would not want to lose what they have been able to maintain as a “government only” sphere of policy making; both sides are afraid of “unknown territories” of state and non-state interaction. comparing the un commission for sustainable development—an example illustrating the zerosum game situation of stakeholder participation—with the strategic approach to international chemicals management—an example with active and dynamic stakeholder involvement—it seems that ngo and stakeholder involvement is less effective in processes which address broad issues at a general level and where ngo and stakeholder involvement is strongly formalized and institutionalized. such processes will attract ngos with a less focused background, less specialized expertise and little commitment to focus on the very details of the ongoing discussions between the government delegates. however, because of the zero-sum game situation, it is difficult to move from such a formalized and static situation towards a more dynamic and interactive process. a move beyond this suboptimal situation, such as the one in the csd, would require several changes: (i) de-formalization of participation: limited segments allowed to stakeholders and excluding them from other parts of the debate should be replaced with interaction throughout the whole process; (ii) generality with respect to ngo backgrounds perrez 21 should exchanged for specificity: ngos should bring in specific expertise and they should make specific comments and concrete proposals on issues under debate; (iii) non-state actors as partners not as competitors: state actors should perceive the non-state actors not as competitors for time or influence but as partners bringing insights needed in the common search for the best solutions for environmental issues. it seems as though the key challenge to today’s international environmental governance is not the lack of a strong and authoritative central institution addressing the main existing and emerging issues and providing overarching policy guidance, nor is it a “democratic deficit” or insufficient ngo and stakeholder involvement. rather, the main challenge is the lack of political will, political commitment and prioritization of environmental interests. this lack of political will and commitment and lack of political prioritization of environmental concerns, however, cannot be an excuse for inadequate environmental policy. while the strength of a certain regime and the effectiveness of policies are a reflection of political will and political prioritization, political will and prioritization are not a given fact that cannot be influenced. by raising public awareness of challenges and problems and by monitoring policy development and implementation ngos can become a strong force in addressing this exact fundamental failing of today’s system of environmental governance. as long as today's overly formalized systems of non-state actor participation in processes of international environmental governance are maintained, ngos and other non-state bodies will remain sub-optimally limited in their functionality. until reform on this front is enacted, ngos ought to devote their energies to raising awareness and lobbying at the national level when outside of the formalized processes of negotiation, and focus on their role as governance watchdogs when within. specializing in these roles while shying away from certain international governance processes that constrain non-state actors through overformalization of their involvement will serve to maximize non-state actors' impact. perrez 22 works cited annan, k. 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(2006). nongovernmental organizations and international law. american journal of international law. 1000: 348-372 el-ashry, m. 2007, introduction to the recommendations from the high-level panel on system-wide coherence on strengthening international environmental governance. in global environmental governance: perspectives on the current debate, eds. cydia swart and estelle perry. new york: center for un reform education esty, d. c. (1998). non-governmental organizations at the world trade organization: cooperation, competition, or exclusion. journal of international economic law 1(1): 123148 esty, d. c. (2006). good governance and the supranational scale: globalizing administrative law. yale law journal 115: 1490-1562 esty, d. c., and m. h. ivanova, (2002). revitalizing global environmental governance: a function-driven approach. in global enviornmental governance – options & perrez 23 opportunities, eds. daniel c. esty and maria h. ivanova. 181 – 204. new haven: yale school of forestry & environmental studies french, h. (2002). reshaping global governance. in state of the world 2002, 174-206. new york: norton gemmill, b, and a. bamidele-izu (2002). the role of ngos and civil society in global. in global enviornmental governance – options & opportunities, eds. daniel c. esty and maria h. ivanova, 77 – 100. new haven: yale school of forestry & environmental studies gubb m. and m. younes (2006). saicm – a new global strategy for chemicals. environment house news, 14: 6, available at <http://www.environmenthouse.ch/docspublications/newsletters/6a7b1dcbfde.pdf> howse, r. (2007). review of a new world order. american journal of international law 101: 231-234. ivanova, m. (2005). can the anchor hold? rethinking the united nations environment programme for the 21st century. new haven: yale school of forestry & environmental studies keohane, r. o., and j. s. nye (2001). the club model of multilateral cooperation and problems of democratic legitimacy. in efficiency, equity, and legitimacy: the multilateral trading system at the millennium, eds. roger b. porter et al., 264-294. washington dc: brookings institution press kingsbury, b., n. krisch, and r. b. stewart (2005). the emergence of global administrative law. law and contemporary problems, 68: 15-62 matz, n. 2005. wege zur koordinierung völkerrechtlicher verträge. berlin: springer meidinger, e. (2006). the administrative law of global private-public regulation: the case of forestry. european journal of international law, 17: 47-87 perrez 24 moravcsik, e. (2004). is there a `democratic deficit' in world politics? a framework for analysis. government and opposition, volume 39/2: 336-363 najam, a., m. papa, and n. taiyab (2006). global environmental governance: a reform agenda, winnipeg: international institute for sustainable development (2006) neusüss, ermenhild (1984). demokratie: theorien und politische praxis, in handbuch politischer theorien und ideologien, ed. franz neumann, 106-177. reinbek: rowohlt taschenbuch verlag nye jr., joseph s (2001). globalization's democratic deficit: how to make international institutions more accountable. foreign affairs 80/4: 2-6 obregón, l. (2006). the geological strada of international law – response to professor weiler’s ‘geology of international law’. asil proceedings, 100: 103-107 perrez, f.x. (2000). cooperative sovereignty: from independence to interdependence in the structure of international environmental law. the hague: kluwer law international perrez, f.x. (2001). country-report: switzerland’s international environmental policy in 2001. yearbook of international environmental law 12: 451-459 perrez, f.x. (2006). the strategic approach to international chemicals management: lost opportunity or foundation for a brave new world?. review of european community and international environmental law 15: 245-257 perrez, f.x., and d. ziegerer (2008). a non-institutional proposal to strengthen international environmental governance. environmental policy and law 38/5: 253-261. roch, ph, and f.x. perrez (2005). international environmental governance: the strive towards a comprehensive, coherent, effective and efficient international environmental regime. colorado journal of international environmental law and policy 16: 1-25. sands, ph. (2003). principles of international environmental law. cambridge: cambridge university press perrez 25 slaughter, a.-m. (2004). a new world order. princeton: princeton university press unep (2001). international environmental governance. http://www.unep.rog/ieg/workingdocuments.asp. weiler, j. h.h. (2004). the geology of international law – governance, democracy and legitimacy. germ. y.b. int’l l.: 547 perrez 26 endnotes 1 zero-sum game represents the case where any gain experienced by one individual in a system is associated with losses elsewhere in the system of equal sum magnitude to that of the gain. all gains in such a system are cancelled out by losses and no aggregate, or social, gain is possible for the system as a whole. 2 perrez and ziegerer 2008, 254-255 3 throughout this article, the term “stakeholders” is used as including all actors that have an interest at stake, thus stateand non-state actors; non-state actors include non-governmental organizations (ngos) and international (intergovernmental) organizations; ngos include both, so-called "public interests ngos" and industry and business representatives; private actors would include ngos and individuals. 4 concerning the criticism that the international regime suffers from a “democratic deficit”, see generally: nye jr., joseph s (2001), moravcsik 2004. 5 esty 2006, 1497-1499; najam, papa, and taiyab 2006, 3. 6 esty and ivanova 2002, 191-192; perrez 2001; roch and perrez 2005. 7 najam, papa, and taiyab 2006, 62 and 65-73; gemmill and bamidele-izu 2002, 89-95. 8 meidinger 2006. 9 kingsbury, krisch, and stewart 2005, 23-25; sands 2003, 70-122. 10 matz 2005, 342. 11 el-ashry 2007, 7. 12 perrez 2001; roch and perrez 2005. 13 roch and perrez 2005, 3–6; sands 2003, 25-69. 14 perrez 2000, 271-297. 15 french 2002, 176-177. 16 najam, papa, and taiyab 2006, 57-62. 17 perrez and ziegerer 2008, 254. 18 ivanova 2005; najam, papa, and taiyab 2006, 14-16 and 36-56; unep 2001. perrez 27 19 perrez 2001, 452-453; roch and perrez 2005, 15-17. see also: perrez and ziegerer 2008, 25355. 20 perrez and ziegerer 2008, 255-258. 21 2005 world summit outcome, § 169. 22 french 2002, 195. 23 obregón 2006, 103-104. 24 neusüss 1984. 25 weiler 2004, 549 and 552. 26 charnovitz 2006, 365. 27 slaughter 2004. 28 howse 2007, 232-233. 29 charnovitz 2006, 361-363. 30 charnovitz 1997, 271-274; charnovitz 2006, 352-355; esty 1998, 129; gemmill and bamidele-izu 2002, 83-95. 31 see e.g. paragraph 18 of the compliance procedures of the aarhus convention, available at <http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/mop1/ece.mp.pp.2.add.8.e.pdf>. 32 “non-non papers” are used to preliminarily test ideas or propositions, off the official record of a given conference. a “non-non paper” is one degree of informality higher than a “non-paper,” which is an unofficial document circulated during negotiations when one party seeks feedback on a certain proposition without being held officially responsible for the proposition in question. 33 “informal-informal” groups are meetings of delegates even less formal than “informal” contact groups. an example of an informal-informal group is when delegates discuss an idea off of the record in the corner of a meeting room. 34 in fact, this author has several times benefited during the csd negotiations from the exchange and discussion with ngo representatives and from the concrete proposals and suggestions on specific issues they were sharing with the author. however, these positive interactions have not perrez 28 taken place in the formalize setting of the multi stakeholder dialogue but informally in the corridors. and, they have always involved ngo representatives with specific knowledge and expertise addressing very concrete issues under debate. 35 “formalization” refers to a process by which the form or the formality of certain activities becomes increasingly important, such as when statements must be made in certain prescribed ways: i.e. “the distinguished delegate from country x”. 36 “proceduralization” is understood as a process by which activities are increasingly bound to follow strict procedures, such as when a participants cannot directly react to each other but have to ask questions through the chair, or when non-state actors are forced to speak once all the state actors have already spoken. as such, proceduraliziation can also include an element of formalization but is not limited to that. 37 perrez 2006. 38 gubb and younes 2006; perrez 2006, 247-249. 39 brunnée 2006, 307. microsoft word 02112008 bonds and fraden notes from millennium village.doc consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 1 notes from the millennium villages project: breaking the disease-driven poverty trap matt bonds1 & expanding access to healthcare in rwanda max fraden2 1 matt bonds is a second year earth institute post doctoral fellow at columbia university. he holds ph.d.s in ecology and economics. his research focuses on disease ecology and poverty traps. at the rwandan millennium village, he has analyzed how point of service payments and insurance coverage affect primary health utilization. he can be contacted at mbonds@ei.columbia.edu. 2 max fraden (columbia college, 2009) is a pre-medical student majoring in economics. over the last three years he has worked for the earth institute in india, rwanda, and ghana. he has focused on structuring and implementing subsidization schemes for primary health insurance. he can be contacted at mf2239@columbia.edu. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 2 introduction to the millennium villages: millennium villages sites across sub-saharan africa. the millennium villages project aims to achieve the eight millennium development goals. these goals outline a global partnership to reduce extreme poverty with a specific focus on hunger, education, gender equality, health, and environmental sustainability. mayange sector, one of the poorest regions in rwanda (with an average annual income of under 150 us dollars), is home to 4,600 households and approximately 25,000 people. the government of rwanda (gor) selected mayange in 2005 as a millennium village, making it the third such site in africa. unlike most of rural rwanda where individual homesteads are scattered across the hilly landscape, mayange has several umudugudus – also known as settlements – of closely spaced dwellings. the government built these settlements after the 1994 genocide in order to house returnees. within the sector are five primary schools, one secondary school, one health center, and over 2,300 hectares of farmland cultivated during the 2007 long rains. aerial map of rwanda: the red x indicates the rwandan millennium village. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 3 breaking the disease-driven poverty trap by matt bonds one out of six people in the world today suffers from extreme poverty (un millennium project, 2005). this kind of poverty means barely enough economic productivity to survive, leaving little or nothing to invest for the future. such a dearth of savings and investment has translated to one of the most puzzling realizations of our time: significant portions of the globe have never experienced meaningful economic growth and are roughly as poor today as they were tens of thousands of years ago. that the developed world has largely ignored these problems should put a blemish on our collective conscience. perhaps the issues have been too abstract and confusing to seem real or soluble. but the ever-growing rift between the rich and poor is something that more and more people of the rich world are finding unacceptable. the millennium villages project (mvp) serves to provide something of a remedy to this. through a suite of basic interventions in agriculture and land management, health, education, infrastructure, family planning, and business development, the mvp works with local communities and national governments to offer a comprehensive economic development package which strives to eliminate extreme poverty in rural africa. it also offers an opportunity for people of the rich world to work in solidarity with those of the poor world, helping to dismantle not just the economic issues at play, but also a sense of social disconnection between the two worlds. as an economist and disease ecologist trained in the u.s., my introduction to the practical side of international development has come formally through my position as an earth institute postdoctoral fellow working with the mvp in rwanda, and informally through my friendships with rwandans on the mvp staff and from the villages themselves. if there is a single lesson i’ve learned from working on the ground with the mvp, it is that the problems addressed by the sustainable development community (disease, conflict, population growth, land and water scarcity, etc.) take a lot of intellectual work to comprehend in the west, but are often devastatingly obvious in much of the poor world. certain debates (like those over trade-offs between economic growth and environmental conservation that pit economists against ecologists in the u.s., for example, or those over whether population growth is economically good or bad) can be highly misguided and often falsely dichotomous when applied to underdeveloped countries. in areas of extreme poverty, like parts of rwanda, where nearly the entire population subsists directly off of its finite land holdings, economics is clearly driven by the relationships between people and their environment. people rely on fertile soils and reliable sources of water, while human population growth necessarily increases per capita consumption of resources. aside from resource conservation and management, a critical part of the solution is a more diverse set of inputs (facilitated by free markets and trade), which is a paradigm too often decried as neo-liberal ideology. the most fundamentally important resource of all that social, political, and natural scientists of many stripes can agree on is healthy labor. this makes basic healthcare a particularly high priority for sustainable economic development. in describing my experience with the rwanda mvp, i want to emphasize two points: 1) the leading killer in rwanda is not violence, it is disease; and 2) violence and disease are both products of the same problem: poverty. a small landlocked country of approximately 9 million people, rwanda is the most densely-populated country in africa, and over 50 percent of its population suffers from extreme consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 4 poverty. most people now know of rwanda from the genocide of 1994, when approximately 800,000 tutsis and tutsi-sympathizers were systematically massacred by the rwandan army and the civilian hutu population over the course of three and a half months. the signature of the genocide remains everywhere in the country, as in the weekly local tribunals for genocide or the many genocide resettlement communities. it is especially significant in the nyamata and mayange sectors where the mvp operates; each sector lost 60 percent of its population in 1994. when the project began in december of 2005, the life-expectancy at birth in nyamata was 39 years, and the under-five mortality rate was 23.3 percent. many people are especially concerned by the effects on the community of the genocide as well as its underlying causes, along with how that concern affects our work. when i first arrived in nyamata in february of 2007, a year after the project was off the ground, i began working with max fraden on determining health insurance subsidies for every household in nyamata. of all the mvp interventions, basic universal healthcare is the most fundamental and least expensive, and therefore has the greatest “return on investment.” the leading cause of death for rwandans, and indeed throughout africa, is not conflict, but highly preventable and treatable infectious diseases. therefore, the mvp specifically focuses on healthcare access. for example, the mvp improved quality of healthcare in a clinic by increasing the nursing staff, building an inventory of drugs, and expanding health services. before the mvp arrived in mayange, the area health clinic was often out of service due to the circular problems of a lack of resources for treating illness and a lack of faith in the hypothetical service itself; the staff was indeed often known to “work from home” because residents rarely used the clinic, while the residents rarely used the clinic because it was often closed. increasing healthcare access therefore requires a process of building faith in the health system in addition to adequately efficient health services. given that early treatment of disease is critical not only for preventing the development of complications, but also for preventing further transmission, the community and the country have an interest in ensuring that each individual is treated quickly when symptoms arise. the government of rwanda has accordingly required rwandans to buy into the health insurance program called mutuelle. to encourage participation in the health system, and to complement the positive impacts of greater food production, the mvp requires residents to purchase mutuelle in order to qualify for seed and fertilizer loans. mutuelle is priced at about 2 u.s. dollars per person per year, which can be prohibitively expensive in an area where subsistence farmers with little or no cash income comprise 90 percent of the population. therefore, the mvp subsidizes the program based on need. our task was to determine appropriate mutuelle subsidies based on a socioeconomic index of the population by creating a cheap, easy, and scalable method. in practice, this meant that we needed to determine key household indicators of economic status that were measurable with a quick survey and that we could analyze with packaged statistical techniques to which others in rwanda would have access. after preliminary research, we began with a series of informal household interviews with residents from across income strata to inform our survey design. our translator was delphin muhizi, an mvp community mobilizer and now a good friend of mine. like many of our staff, delphin is around 30 years old and spent his early years outside of the country. he went to primary and secondary school in the democratic consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 5 republic of the congo before returning to rwanda after the war in 1994. he recently completed his bachelor’s degree on demography and land policy, and has a particular passion for improving food production. english is his fourth language, and he has a gift for approaching community members, putting them at ease, and asking questions respectfully. delphin first took us to a “typical” representative of the poorest residents. she was a 50 year old woman sitting barefoot and topless behind her one-room, mud-brick, thatched-roof house that sat upon a small hill that overlooked a breathtaking mountainous landscape. we sat on a bench outside her home in the mid afternoon and conversed as her family and many grandchildren soon convened around us, very curious about the white visitors, “umuzungus.” our questions focused on how they survived, how they generated income, what their priorities were, what they owned, and what they felt they lacked. they owned almost nothing, and even rented land for cultivation. an increase in income to them, they said, would mean owning land, and obtaining goats, a cow, a mattress, and improved mortar for the frame of their door, which wouldn’t close. i remember being struck by how relaxed, pleasant, and positive this encounter was, given that we were there to explore understand the needs of the poorest of the poor. delphin then took us to a “middle income” home. on mvp motorcycles, we drove to a small village neighborhood, “umudugudu,” via a short main street lined with a row of houses, and approached a young woman in her mid-twenties. her home was mud-brick with a concrete façade that from the outside, looked to be a clear improvement from the previous house. the song of a solo female vocalist emanated from a radio in her dark living room, as we all sat on a single bench, observing the bare walls and dirt floor of the bare room. she explained that she was orphaned during the genocide, that she inherited two hectares (five acres) of land that were more than she could manage alone, that she had two children, and that her relatively nice home was provided by an ngo that worked for genocide survivors. in contrast to the first interviewee, who was older, vital, and warm, this second woman was much more subdued. we then talked to a nearby couple, who appeared to be a bit wealthier, as indicated by the cow in their front yard. they were an older pair who had lost their children during the genocide and adopted an orphan since. they were extremely warm and gentle and seemed happy to talk. they explained that the cow was actually owned by their adopted child. they wanted bank credit, so they could buy some more land to farm and another cow for milk. over time, our informal conversations led to a short household survey on ownership of a collection of household assets (i.e., table, bench, mattress, radio, etc.) that we used to determine eligibility for health insurance. through help from mvp staff and the community, we eventually surveyed all households (~4500) in nyamata. we analyzed the data with a pattern recognition technique called principle components analysis, and correlated the results with previous ownership of health insurance. we then were able to determine how these assets indicated ability to pay for coverage, and determined subsidies designed to achieve universal coverage based on our index. other major health research questions focused on the impact of mvp policies, such as expanding mutuelle coverage, distributing malaria bed nets, removing clinic fees, expanding health satellite posts, and hiring community health workers. the necessary data is collected through other surveys or through health clinic records, and we are currently synthesizing these analyses for further publication. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 6 for the mvp in rwanda, my role has been unique in that i am one of the only people whose primary role has been to observe policy rather than execute it. how strange and relieving it was to arrive in rwanda, after being saturated with scientific literature, sensing that, at the outset, just about everybody knew more about the issues than i did. the single most important economic variable on the minds of our staff and of the residents of nyamata and mayange was something one did not need a ph.d. to understand. it was whether the rains would be generous that season. every week after i returned to the u.s. last spring, max or delphin would send notice on the status of the rains, which failed. poor rains combined with a virus that thrives under drought conditions meant wide-scale crop failure in mayange. consequently, the mvp had to forgive many of the seed and fertilizer loans, a frustrating reminder of the difficulties of working in these environments. fortunately, through improved seed, fertilizer and training in planting techniques, the previous season witnessed a quadrupling of typical harvests, which offered some buffer against future crop failure. further, because of near-universal healthcare access and bed net coverage, there were no funerals in mayange that season. to the typical (western) lay-reader, rwanda’s conflict, poverty, and disease may seem like a depressing version of a familiar african story. in the midst of an unpredictable and unforgiving environment, where the stakes of failed policy are so high, one would expect the working environment of the mvp to be correspondingly unforgiving. in a sense, it is. but what i found is that such destitution and utterly serious humanitarian challenges are in the context of a very rich and vibrant social network. as one who has explored these problems indoors through academic lenses an ocean away, what i have felt from these experiences is a kind of moral or visceral release. working on these kinds of problems in collaboration with the community, the rwandan staff, our director, josh ruxin, and others like max and our health coordinator, ranu dhillon, feels like a privilege even under the worst circumstances. seeing such work and sacrifice not for each other, but for a common critically important purpose, is inspiring. it is also a privilege to understand extreme poverty outside of the contexts of sympathy and guilt. i admire those like delphin and the community at large for their focused orientation towards progress. last july, i returned with delphin to one of the first houses we visited, that of the 20-something who had been orphaned, to drop off a photograph. the woman remembered us immediately and greeted us warmly. delphin did not hesitate to question her about the progress of her kitchen garden. afterwards, he looked at me with a bit of frustration, but with a truly inspiring sense of determination, and said, “this is my goal matt. every rwandan must have a productive kitchen garden.” references: un millennium project. (2005). investing in development: a practical plan to achieve the millennium development goals. un millennium project, new york, ny, consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 7 expanding access to healthcare in rwanda by max fraden it was on a flight home from iran in the summer of 1998 that i was first introduced to the field of sustainable international development. at the time, i was an eighth grade student doing my best to learn zulu before an upcoming trip to southern africa. i noticed the south african passport of the woman seated next to me on the plane, and struck up a conversation in zulu. although my vocabulary ran dry almost immediately, i soon realized that i had stumbled across a person with whom i would never exhaust conversation. our exchange continued for the next year while she lived in my home in boston pursuing a masters degree in sustainable international development. our talks in the late afternoons became my first introduction to concepts of microfinance, public health, and gender equity. since our first encounter, i’ve visited mapule at her home in naledi, soweto several times. during my last stay, she invited me to her workplace, a micro credit bank called the women’s development bank. after the fall of apartheid she began to work there with the bank’s founder, first lady mbeki, who had befriended mapule during their two decades together in exile. walking through the bank’s johannesburg headquarters and seeing the dozen or so employees struggling to create an economy that could accommodate the millions of uneducated poor, i was presented with the vision that soweto, given decades, could be transformed. since arriving at columbia, i have been lucky enough to get involved in two development projects with vastly different aims. the first project, originally a small start-up venture composed of a molecular biologist, a business student, a doctor, and another undergraduate and myself, is now months away from delivering a prototype low cost, highly sensitive multi-drug resistant tuberculosis diagnostic. the second, the millennium villages project, works to eliminate extreme poverty in rwanda’s bugesera district. both projects hold several core beliefs. first, access to health, education, and infrastructure are human rights not to be denied. the economic costs of treatable disease, when aggregated, amounts to hundreds of billions of u.s. dollars annually. second, these services should be decentralized wherever possible and efficient. decentralization increases and facilitates local solutions for local problems and access to these solutions. third, social safety nets are necessary for promoting equity. safety nets in the form of universal health insurance or business development for the landless poor ensure that growth is not divisive and does not leave marginalized groups behind. social services, such as housing for victims of domestic violence or broken families plagued by rural alcoholism, protect individuals from estrangement. lastly, achieving best practice is possible even in resource constrained settings. beyond interventions, social attitudes must evolve as well. i’ve found that in certain situations communities mired in deep poverty expect less and the mediocre is accepted as a status quo. i distinctly remember one incident when a battered woman came to the health center for treatment. after wound care, nurses were prepared to send her home because no other alternatives were available; abuse of women is not considered a major problem in rwanda. ranu dhillon, our health coordinator, made sure she was not simply consulted but also given proper social support. working alongside the nursing team, he found her a job at the health center and a place to stay. i realized that strong community led networks can form and ingrained attitudes towards domestic violence can be transformed. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 8 at the national level, policy makers sometimes argue that the impoverished are ignorant and unprepared for advancement. in ministries of health in delhi or kigali, i’ve heard officials claim that free, high quality services will be over-utilized. these leaders are legitimately concerned about their populations’ expectations and reliance on historically fickle foreign aid. however, this concern is unfounded and only applies to a small portion of the population. at the two millennium village sites where i’ve worked, our health facilities see roughly 1.5 patient visits per year (on average four times more than neighboring clinics). still, this is below ideal utilization given the population’s disease burden. furthermore, i have heard people say that extreme poverty persists because people are either unwilling to support themselves or too uneducated to manage complex systems. i remember being profoundly discouraged after a meeting with a group of doctors at india’s ministry of health during which they wrote off the use of rapid, molecular tests as too complicated for the developing world. the next day i arrived in bangalore with my advisor, dr. yanis ben amor, to meet dr. kumar, a creative engineer interested in the manufacture of a new tb diagnostic. a few months later we formed a partnership to develop a low cost, rapid test. dr. ben amor’s group has since demonstrated that in rwanda – where technicians had never worked with pcr3 technology – 95 percent homology can be achieved with blinded samples run at the prestigious institute of tropical medicine in antwerp, belgium (ben amor et al). now, encouraged by the results of many doctors who have not sacrificed best practice for lower standards, the policy environment is changing. the world health organization and foundation for innovative new diagnostics have partnered with biotech companies looking to develop a test that can replace an ineffective 130 year old method. millennium project: my work with the millennium project has taken several unexpected turns. freshman year i was hired by professor josh ruxin to help edit grants for a potential new site in rwanda. by junior year i had lived in rwanda for a year during which a national scale-up was announced by the president’s office. i have learned to think of development holistically and to believe that a comprehensive development agenda is entirely feasible. i also, however, remain skeptical and concerned that the field is losing focus. top-end hotels from kigali to accra are filled with “summits on gender equity” and “sessions on community mobilization.” it seems that more money is spent on supporting expensive u.s. consultants than on actual in-country work. for funds on the order of 100 billion dollars per year to be allocated properly, they must be apportioned to people on the ground, implementers and practitioners. development must be infused with realism. development projects alone will not end poverty in a five-year window. true working relationships with communities, governments, and other donors must be forged over years. remote villages will not be able to export surplus crops if the government does not pave roads. project staff will not learn the inner-workings of a community overnight. it takes time to understand which local leaders are supportive of change, which leaders to approach when dealing with issues of broken homes, and which to approach when trying to distribute improved seeds. 3 polymerase chain reaction, a molecular tool for dna amplification used by a wide array of diagnostics. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 9 many have proposed algorithms, flow charts, and methods for development. at the end of the day, however, we need to focus more on the intricacies of implementation and on making policy a reality. clearing 23,000 bednets through customs and off-loading them at night with no electricity is a challenge. getting these same bed nets to three districts 40 kilometers apart takes time to plan. mobilizing communities to use the nets and access healthcare requires more than effort. it takes deep, long lasting local connections. access: this all takes me back to freshman year at columbia. i learned that tuberculosis a perfectly curable bacterial infection kills 2 million people a year. in regions of the world with high hiv burdens, the prevalence of tuberculosis is only increasing. why are patients not getting treated, especially when a sixmonth regimen costs only 10 u.s. dollars? the answer is complex; bottlenecks occur long before a patient presents for consultation. user fees and health insurance are prohibitive to many. in september, as i was preparing to leave rwanda for school, i realized that a friend suspected that her child was infected with active tb. she could not afford the two u.s. dollar health insurance package to treat her baby. she was denied a basic human right because the primary health care system failed. it operates on a meager budget (12 u.s. dollars per capita), too small to support the population’s disease burden. more funding is desperately needed. dr. ruxin’s team has brought some solutions to the ground. dr. joseph nkurunziza, theo ndebereye, ranu dhillon, matt bonds and i attempted to understand where the health system was failing. working in the community every day for over a year, we learned through both informal conversations and formal statistical analysis who could pay for health insurance and how much they could afford. we evaluated the cost of all necessary interventions from bed sheets to incubators and aspirators, from penicillin to ceftriaxone. we proposed financing mechanisms to get all the nation’s health centers on board. along with structural and financial reform, came another critical component, increased staffing. about half of our 17 u.s. dollars per capita recurrent annual costs go to pay for nurses’ salaries. people must be paid decently to do good work to achieve best practice. matt bonds then returned four months later and we began to carry out regression analysis. the results were striking. removal of co-payments and universal coverage (provided through subsidized health insurance connected to fertilizer loans) led to an additional 36,000 outpatient visits per year (at a health center serving 25,000 people). an expanded pharmacy, increased staffing, electrification, improved equipment, an ambulance, and the opening of satellite health centers did even more. unfortunately, my friend lived outside the project’s 25,000-person catchments area. even if this overhaul of the health system reached her home, would her child be diagnosed properly? pediatric tb is often smear-negative, which means that the 130 year old sputum test would not detect the bacteria. access must come with trained implementers, equipped with modern tools to provide best practice and adequate diagnosis. extreme poverty keeps the poor poor. the poverty trap will persist as long as we continue to treat this crisis with ambivalence, denying its massive human toll. there are no silver bullets and there have and consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 10 always will be failures. this, of course, is no excuse. it is up to our generation to solve the greatest problem of today’s world. loans for fertilizer were connected to loans for subsidized health insurance. through this scheme over 12,000 individuals were insured. credit l. margulies. kibirizi, mayange during health insurance registration and fertilizer distribution. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 11 community meeting in kibenga, mayange. credit: j. mukabalisa. household visits to discuss health insurance in kanazi, nyamata. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 12 the millennium project staff outside our office in nyamata, rwanda. crop estimates in nyamata. richard mundere, center. aloys hakizimana, left. max fraden, right. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 13 references: ben amor, yanis. implementation validation performed in rwanda to determine whether the inno-lipa rif. tb line probe assay can be used for detection of multi drug resistant mycobacterium tuberculosis in low resource countries. journal of clinical microbiology (sept. 2007). consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 9, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 69 – 84 determinants of market participation in nigerian smallscale fishery sector: evidence from niger delta region anthony o. onoja department of agricultural economics and extension, university of port harcourt, nigeria email: tonyojonimi@gmail.com b. b. usoroh department of agricultural economics, university of nigeria, nsukka d. t. adieme department of marketing, university of port harcourt, nigeria n.j. deedam department of food science and technology, rivers state university of science and technology, port harcourt, nigeria abstract this study was designed to determine the factors that influence fisher farmers to participate in the marketing of their produce in the niger delta region of nigeria. a total of 120 fish farmers were randomly selected for the study. the data gathered through the use of a structured questionnaire were analyzed using the logistic regression model. the probability of participating in fish marketing was significantly determined by household size, distant to the nearest marketing channel, price of the commodity and sex of the fish farmer/marketer. market infrastructure development, provision of marketing incentives to women and development of an institutionalized marketing information service are recommended. keywords: market participation, fish marketing, rural livelihood, logistic regression, niger delta, nigeria. 1. introduction 1.1 introduction commodity production and trade have significant bearing on sustainable livelihoods of the poor, as well as on the exports and growth of a number of commodity-dependent developing countries (developing countries in international trade, 2005). fish marketing is one of the few livelihood activities that hold great 70 consilience potential for income generation and poverty reduction especially among communities or households living near water resources. it has been estimated that about 200 million africans eat fish regularly. fao estimates that fish provides 22 percent of the protein intake in sub-saharan africa; this figure increases to 40% in nigeria and to as high as 80% in coastal and riverine communities. (areola, 2007). in fact, fishing provides 6 and 9 million fulland parttime jobs, respectively, the income from which supports 30.45 million people. many involved in fish processing and trade are women who lead single-headed households (hall, 2005). for them, fish is the primary and sometimes the only source of income to support their livelihood and their children. world fish center (2005) maintained that the contributions of fisheries to the millennium development goals (mdg’s) of reducing hunger and poverty by half come 2015 are of two kinds: direct contribution to specific goals and indirect support to all the goals through enhanced livelihoods. for example, fao (2007) indicated that fish marketing was providing increased income to the many nigerians who distribute fresh and processed fish throughout the country. it is not uncommon to find markets for smoked fish products along inter-city highways and in onitsha, lokoja, jebba, makurdi, aba, port harcourt, etc. at such locations, there are back-up facilities to maintain the quality of unsold product day in, day out. for the consumers, fish is an important part of their nutrition, accounting for a large percentage of their animal protein, since it is often the most affordable source. thus, the fish market contributes to the food security drive of the country. fisheries can therefore play a role in eradicating extreme poverty and hunger especially in the niger delta region where most households in states such as bayelsa, akwa ibom delta, rivers and cross river states depend heavily on fishing and fish marketing (kingdom & alfred-ockiya, 2009). recent poverty analysis confirmed that households that produce fish for the market are generally better off than those producing for self-consumption (international fund for agricultural development, ifad, 2010). in a more explicit form ifad noted that the potential benefits of higher product prices and lower input prices due to commercialization are effectively transmitted to poor households when market access is guaranteed (ifad, 2001). unfortunately, not much research has been conducted to verify the major factors responsible for dismal market participation by farmers, especially those in developing economies such as nigeria. this work is an attempt to fill this research gap and contribute to the generation of evidence for policy makers to realize informed decisions on poverty alleviation. it is necessary to do this research especially as fish farming has been shown to be a predominant agricultural activity in the coastal states of nigeria where there is a currently observed increase in the population of fish farms and farmers in the face of rising poverty (ogboma, 2010). ogboma noted that fishing is no longer restricted to the wild alone in this region; fish farms can be found around towns and villages, and even behind homes. to sustain this development, they recommended that information on and for them be provided; hence the need for this study. the broad objective of this research therefore is to provide empirical information on likely causes of households’ involvement in the commercialization of fish in the niger delta area of nigeria using an appropriate econometric approach. specifically, the study determined the factors influencing market participation in fishing households and markets. consilience onoja et al.: market participation in nigerian fishery sector 1.2 literature review new partnership for african development, nepad (nepad, 2002) noted that africa faced trade challenges at many levels: the farmer faces non-remunerative markets and loses the incentive to produce; the nation-state fails to find rewarding markets both within the region and globally. africa as a region is often marginalized as uncompetitive in the international marketplace. furthermore, africa continues to offer mostly unprocessed produce, for which prices are static or falling. responses to these issues pose challenges that nepad would need to address at the appropriate level. in terms of trade and market access, the importance of domestic markets should not be neglected, warned nepad. a strong domestic market is a building block for export markets and there should be broad participation in domestic markets by farmers, women, etc. but to tap their potential requires strong institutional capacities and the implementation of relevant policies (e.g. competition, tariff policy, financing, market development, etc.). until a decade or so ago, for smallholder farmers, major markets were organized by governments, and exchanges were not critically influenced by farmer knowledge and organization. nearly everywhere the situation has changed radically. smallholder farmers no longer face an assured market for their produce at fixed, pan-territorial prices that often represent a large tax on the value of their produce. similarly, they no longer face a predictable supply situation for inputs and, in today's world, they may not be able to afford to buy what becomes available. a market environment offered farmers some degree of security, though far from perfect, has been replaced by a new one that is highly uncertain with regards to prices. new commercial relations must be struck with a myriad of suppliers and buyers (nepad, 2002). market access is a critical determinant of farmers' production habits: those who live close to better roads and have more frequent and direct contacts with the market appeared more willing to produce more systematically for the market, while those with poor market access have little incentive to produce crops other than those required for domestic consumption. in other words, improved market access is a prerequisite to increased farmer incomes. according to nepad, smallholder farmers are ill equipped to tackle the challenges they face in the market; farmers operate in an uncertain production environment and also have trouble accessing the markets because they live far away and transportation costs are high. in many cases, there are few buyers of their produce. poor farmers in africa are also constrained by the lack of market information, business and negotiation experience, and collective bargaining power. the result is poor terms of exchange and little influence over what they are offered. remunerative markets are an essential element in progressively making african agriculture more entrepreneurial; income from well-functioning markets, when combined with credit, can offer the real prospect of sustainable farmer investments needed for productive agriculture in future. the situation is often no better on the other side of the market equation that is, for the wholesalers who purchase farm surplus and those who sell technical inputs and provide finance to smallholders. some other empirical studies attempt to determine the factors influencing market participation and intensities among agricultural enterprises. for instance, 72 consilience kenya, omiti, otieno, nyanamba and mc cullough (2009) found that farmers in peri-urban areas sold higher proportions of their output than those in rural areas. they found that distance from farm to point of sale was a major constraint to the intensity of market participation while better output price and market information were key incentives for increased sales. they therefore concluded that there was urgent need for kenyan authorities to strengthen market information delivery systems, upgrade roads in both rural and peri-urban areas, encourage market integration initiatives, and establish more retail outlets with improved market facilities in the remote rural villages in order to promote production and trade in high value commodities by rural farmers. other variables that were attempted but did not result in significant slope coefficients were household size, age of the household head, education level of the household head, proportion of non-farm income in total monthly income, and total quantity of output produced per season. komarek (2010) found that sub-county prices in uganda had stronger influence on initial market entry decisions while quantities had a larger impact on volumes traded. it was also indicated that market information significantly influenced market participation in the survey. bartha and bauer (2007) observed that factors which proved to have a significant impact on small-scale south african livestock farmers’ decision to participate in market were: (i) market information, (ii) distance to the preferred marketing channel, (iii) the level of training (iv) extension visits, and (v) births (or prolificacy). the niger delta region is rated as one of the largest wetlands in the world (nigerian national petroleum corporation, nnpc, 2005). the minorities of southern nigeria primarily occupy the geopolitical zone. it covers an area of 70,000 square kilometers, with sandy coastal ridge barriers, brackish or saline mangroves, permanent and seasonal swamp forests as well as low land rain forests. the entire area is crossed by a large number of rivers, rivulets, streams, canals and creeks (nnpc, 2005). ogboma (2010) noted that four of the states of this region sampled in this study (akwa ibom, bayelsa, rivers and delta states) are endowed with many rivers and waterways. one other feature common to fish farmers in the region is the fish storage technology adopted by the fish farmers and marketers. davies r. m., davies o. a. and abowei (2009) noted that in niger delta, the most common fish processing and preservation methods was smoke-drying they indicated that the costs of maintaining modern technologies were very high compared to traditional storage technologies. their study further found that the majority of the traditional fish storage operators used thatched houses (61%). however, other storage facilities recorded were hanging of processed fish on roofs of huts (3%), eaves of houses (1.5%), kitchen roofs (3%), smoke houses (8%) and racks (5%). fish products were generally packaged in woven bags, jute bags, wooden trays, raffia baskets, plastic bags, sturdy boxes, wooden crates and boxes. 1.3 theoretical framework the theory of market participation has developed many different perspectives, including asset-based approaches and agricultural developmental theory approaches. boughton et al (2007) viewed market participation as both a cause and a consilience onoja et al.: market participation in nigerian fishery sector consequence of economic development. markets offer households the opportunity to specialize according to comparative advantage and thereby enjoy welfare gains from trade. recognition of the potential of markets as engines of economic development and structural transformation gave rise to a market-led paradigm of agricultural development during the 1980’s (reardon and timmer, 2006) in which market liberalization policy agendas were widely promoted in sub-saharan africa (ssa) and other low-income regions. furthermore, as households’ disposable income increases, so does demand for variety in goods and services, thereby increasing demand-side market participation, which further increased the demand for cash and thus supply-side market participation. the standard process of agrarian and rural transformation therefore involves households’ transition from a model of subsistence, in which most inputs are provided for and most outputs consumed internally, to a market engagement mode, with inputs and products increasingly purchased and sold off the farm (timmer, 1988; staatz, 1994). the asset-based theory was summarized by omiti et al (2009), who held that as the market share of agricultural output increases, input utilization decisions and output combinations are progressively guided by profit maximization objectives. this process leads to the systematic substitution of non-traded inputs with purchased inputs, the gradual decline of integrated farming systems, and the emergence of specialized high-value farm enterprises. several models have been proposed to explain why limited market participation may exist. in short, allen and gale (1994), williamson (1994), vissingjorgensen (1999), and yaron and zhang (2000) have focused on how entry costs and/or liquidity needs have created limited market participation. 1.4 analytical framework haddad & bouis (1990) indicated that agricultural commercialization involves the transition from subsistence farming to increased market-oriented production or participation. this is commonly measured as the ratio of percentage value of marketed output to total farm production. this present study will rely on this approach in deriving the rate of commercialization or market participation by fish farmers. the determinants of participation is a qualitative decision that is based on probabilities of either choosing to participate or not (in this case in commercialization of fishery produce). one qualitative choice model of interest in this type of decision is the logistic regression model. several econometric and statistics literature explains the processes and theory behind this model (see wuensch, 2006, gujarati and sangeetha, 2007 and greene, 2008). logistic regression is a very powerful, convenient and flexible tool used in predicting a categorical (usually dichotomous) variable from a set of predictor variables. it is often chosen if the predictor variables are a mix of continuous and categorical variables and/or if they are not normally distributed. with a categorical dependent variable, discriminant function analysis is usually employed if all of the predictors are continuous and normally distributed and logit analysis is usually employed if all of the predictors are categorical. by using the logistic regression the probability of a result being in one of two response groups (binary response) is modeled as a function of the level of one or more explanatory variables. thus, the probability whether or not the farmer sells 74 consilience fish may be modeled as a function of the level of one or more independent variables. for this study, the response variable is 1 when the farmer sold fish in the past twelve months and 0 when the farmer did not sell. the functional form is denoted in equation (1). where: j is the response category (1 or 0), i conditional probability, βo is the coefficient of the constant term, βj is the coefficient of the independent variable, xij is the matrix of observed values, εi is the matrix of unobserved random effects, is .odd., and ln is the logarithm of .odds. equation (1) can be manipulated to give the odds ratio using equation (2): (2) the probability that farm households sell livestock can be calculated using equation (3): (3) equation (3) is intrinsically linear since the logit is linear in xi (gujarati and sangeetha, 2007); it indicates that probability lies between zero and one and vary non-linearly with xi. the equation for calculating partial effects1 of continuous variable is denoted by: (4) the partial effects of the discrete variables will be calculated by taking the difference of the mean probabilities estimated for the respective discrete variable, xi = 0 and xi = 1. consilience onoja et al.: market participation in nigerian fishery sector 2. research methods 2.1 study area figure 1: map of niger delta shaded in the nigerian map, which is inset in african map. (source: macmilan, 2007) the research was carried out in the niger delta region of nigeria (see map of niger delta in figure 1). the niger delta region constitutes a significant proportion of southern nigeria, comprising six of the thirty-six states of the country and politically delineated as the south-south. it lies within latitude 4.50 7.50 n and longitude 50 – 9.50 e and occupies a shoreline of about 580km, 72.5 percent of the 853 national coastlines, and a landmass of 84,616 km2. delta, bayelsa, rivers, akwa ibom, cross river, and edo states constitute the niger delta (macmillan 2007). nigerian oil production takes place in this region. the major livelihood of the indigenes however is fishing and crop farming. according to the federal ministry of agriculture and rural development (2005), fish production from the niger delta states constitutes 43 percent of national production. 2.2 design, sampling and data collection method the study relied on primary sources (responses from small-scale fish farmers/fisher folks) and secondary data such as textbooks, and books of readings, journal articles and online materials for this research. the study was a survey design covering one production year (2011). primary data was obtained by the use of a structured questionnaire which elicited responses on their levels of participation in fish marketing in addition to socio-economic data such as age, education status, occupation, access to market information, distance to the nearest market, number of dependents in the household, sex etc. a multi-stage random sampling was used in 76 consilience selecting the respondents of this research. first, four out of the nine states in the niger delta were randomly selected (see figure 1). these include: akwa ibom, bayelsa, rivers and delta states. then, in each state, one agricultural zone each was purposively selected based on availability of fisheries and fish markets in the area. the average number of agricultural zones is four in each state. in each agricultural zone, three markets (in communities where fishing is a major source of livelihood) were identified and selected, making a total of 12 markets in the four states of the niger delta sampled. from each market, 10 fish farmers/fish marketers were randomly selected from list of registered members of fish marketers association in the agricultural zone. thus, the total sample size of study was 120. 2.3 empirical data estimation method the primary objective, which is to find out the determinants of level of fish farmers participation in marketing, was completed using logistic regression model. the implicit form of the model which was used to find out the rate of change in level of participation in fish marketing by the fisher folks in the survey was given by ppt = f (age + hhsz + incm + educstat + distmkt + crdtacs + mktinf + price + mktexp + sex + u). in explicit form the model is given by ppti = β0 + β1age + β2hhsz + β3incm + β4educstat + β5distmkt + β6crdtacs + β7mktinf + β8price + β9mktexp + β10sex + u, where ppti are probabilities of market participation ranging from 0 to 1; ppti = probability of not selling fish produced; ppti = probability of selling fish produce (or participating in selling activity); age = age of respondent in years; hhsz = household size of the respondent (categorical = 1 = 1-3, 2 = 46, 3 = 7 – 9, 4 = 10 and above); incm = monthly income in naira (discrete variable where 1 = n0 – n5000; 2 = >n5000 – n10,000, 3 = >n10000 – n15,000; 4 = above n15,000 – n20,000, 5 = .>n20000 – n100,000, 6 = above n100000); educstat = educational status (categorical variable where 0 = no formal education, 1 = primary education, 2 = secondary education and 3 = tertiary education and above); crdtacs = access to credit (dummy, 0 = no access, 1 = access to credit); mktinf = access to market information (dummy, 1= “yes”, 0= “no access”); price = market price of fish per kilogramme in the farmer’s area; mktexp = years of marketing experience, sex = dummy (0=male, 1 = female); and distmkt = distance to the nearest market (in kms); while u is the stochastic error term. the model was estimated using maximum likelihood method in spss software. 3. results and discussions 3.1 characteristics of the logistic regression model the results of assessment of the estimated logistic regression model are presented in table 1. consilience onoja et al.: market participation in nigerian fishery sector lr (likelihood ratio) chi2(10) = 119.83 prob chi2 = 0.000 log likelihood = -14.2175 pseudo r2 = 0.8082 number of observations = 120 table 1. logistic regression model fitness attributes as a measure of goodness of fit, the model chi-square was used and therefore, there should be no statistically significant difference between observed and predicted values if the model is a good one (field, 2005). the model chi-square statistic, which is the difference of the values of the two log likelihood functions (i.e. the null model -2 log likelihood and the full model -2 log likelihood), is 119.83. if the p-value for the overall model fit statistic is less than the conventional 0.05 (p<0.01) indicating an evidence to show that that at least one of the independent variables contributes to the prediction of the outcome. the latter is true for the fitted model, i.e. the overall model fit statistic is less than 0.05 and highly significant at (p<0.001) with ten degrees of freedom, indicating that at least one of the parameters in the equation is nonzero. the pseudo r2 is also very high, approximately 0.81, indicating that variations in probabilities of participating in fish marketing in the sample surveyed was explained by about 81 percent of the covariates in the logistic model. the result shows that, among the ten covariates (age, household size, education, income, distant to the nearest market, market information, price of the commodity, credit access, marketing experience and household head sex) considered for the model, participation in fish market is influenced to a great extent by the following four covariates: household size, distant to the nearest marketing channel, price of the commodity and sex of the fish farmer/marketer. consequently, the other six (6) covariates were eliminated from the equation through the iterative backward variable selection process. as it is shown in table 2, all the variables showed signs that are in tandem with theoretical expectations. however, only four variables were significant determinants of market participation in the study. the value of coefficients or βj indicates the change in the predicted logged odds associated with a unit change in independent variables (equation 1). it should be noticed that the interpretation of logit coefficients differ from typical linear regressions (field, 2005), and hence requires more manipulation in order to calculate the impact of the independent variables on the probability to sell fish. the partial effects of the statistically significant variables on conditional probabilities can be used to determine the effect of changes in the respective variables on the probability to sell fish. besides, the partial effects calculated from the logistic model show the effect of a change in an individual variable on the probability to sell fish when all other exogenous variables are held constant. table 3 shows partial effects of the continuous variables (see appendix 1 also). 78 consilience ppt odds ratio std. error z p>|z| age 0.05 -0.30 0.05ns 0.76 hhsz 0.54 2.01 0.54** 0.04 educstat 0.26 1.37 0.26ns 0.17 distmkt 0.13 -2.70 0.13** 0.01 incm 1.51 1.03 1.51ns 0.30 crdtacs 2.54 0.46 2.54ns 0.65 mktinf 1.23 -0.14 1.23ns 0.89 price 0.01 1.62 0.01* 0.10 mktexp 0.52 0.18 0.52ns 0.86 sex 138.26 2.23 138.26** 0.03 table 2. results of the logistic regression model nb: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 determinants partial effects household size 0.599 distance to the nearest marketing channel -1.23 mean market price of fish 0.009 table 3: partial effects for the significant continuous variables 3.2 distance to the preferred marketing channel from table 3, distance to the preferred marketing channel is negatively and significantly correlated to the probability of selling fish. hence, the partial effect of a unit increase in distance on the conditional probability of selling livestock is 0.02488. this means that with each unit increase (1km) in distance, the probability to sell will reduce by 1.23. thus, this finding suggests that households which are closer to market outlets are more likely to sell their fish than those households living further away. it is interesting to mention that commercial farmers that are at the same distances from markets do sell their fish on a regular basis. thus, this issue requires further investigation by incorporating the differences in transaction costs to sell fish over long distances. the findings about the significant effect of distance to market in this study is in tandem with empirical findings of bartha and bauer (2007), 3.3 price of fish furthermore, the price of fish is positively and significantly related to the probability of selling fish. hence, the partial effect of a unit increase in household size in the conditional probability of selling fish is 0.009. this means that with each unit increase (naira increase) in the price of fish, the probability to sell fish will increase by 0.01, approximately. thus, this finding suggests that households which have higher expectations of making higher profits from price signals are more likely to engage in or participate in fish marketing in the area. this is in line with earlier consilience onoja et al.: market participation in nigerian fishery sector findings of komarek (2010) in uganda where it was indicated that sub-county prices had a stronger influence on initial market entry decisions of some agricultural marketers. it is also related to the earlier assertion by the asset-based theory was summarized by omiti et al (2009) who held that gain in market share of agricultural produce could be motivated by profit maximization motive (and this can be expected to come from a better price offer by consumers. 3.4 sex as a determinant of fish market participation sex is a categorical variable but was found to be significant and contributed positively (sex was coded as “1” for females and “0” for males) towards fish market participation in the study. the result thus implies that there is a higher probability of fish commercialization if the head of the household is female. in other words, it seems women have more of a tendency to engage in fish marketing in the niger delta than men. many studies in niger delta agricultural activities have confirmed that women do most of the value addition activities in farming and related industries. likewise, women’s roles as fish processors and marketers have also been reported in nigeria by adewale and ikeola (2005) and verstralen and isebor (1997). the gendered nature of the fish trade arises from the fact that skills and tasks training for the acquisition of local knowledge is normally age and gender specific, and taught by members of the appropriate sex (ruddle, 2000). these also suggest the ‘gendered’ nature of local knowledge and its systems because men and women usually have different and often complementary economically productive roles, different resource bases, and face different sets of social constraints (omoto 2004). 4. conclusion the paper examined the factors influencing fish market participation. factors that prove to have a significant impact on the ability of small-scale fish farmers’ decisions to participate in market are the following: distance to the preferred marketing channel, household size, local market price of fish, and sex of the farmer. the fact that distance to the preferred marketing channel influenced the farmers’ decision to participate in marketing of their produce underlies the need to develop the market infrastructure as recommended by nepad. nigerian government can achieve this by encouraging niger delta development commission (nddc) to build markets and good roads in rural areas, especially in fish markets of the niger delta region. nepad recognized the existence of poor quality or inadequate infrastructure as an inhibiting factor on the competitiveness of african agriculture. by increasing internal transport costs, reducing levels of value-added at origin and lowering transaction efficiencies in the marketing chains, african agriculture can compete nationally and internationally. hence, we recommend the government provide adequate and cost-effective rural infrastructure in the niger delta region so as to enhance sustainable development of fisheries and fish marketing. women appear to participate more in the marketing of fish in the niger delta region, so there will be a need to provide incentives to them such as training, supporting them 80 consilience with credit, and 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(2000). fixed costs and asset market participation, revista de analisis economico 15: 89-109. 84 consilience appendix 1 results of logistic regression analysis on determinants of fish marketing participation showing coefficients (note that the results in table 12 shows the odd ratios) ppt coef. std. err. z p>|z| age -0.02 0.05 -0.30 0.76ns hhsz 0.60 0.30 2.01 0.04** educstat 0.27 0.20 1.37 0.17ns distmkt -1.23 0.46 -2.70 0.01*** incm 0.74 0.72 1.03 0.30ns crdtacs 0.63 1.36 0.46 0.65ns mktinf -0.22 1.53 -0.14 0.89ns price 0.01 0.01 1.62 0.10* mktexp 0.09 0.48 0.18 0.86ns sex 4.28 1.92 2.23 0.03** intercept -13.62 7.80 -1.75 0.08* nb: ***p<0.01 or figures significant at 1 percent statistical level; , **p<0.05, or or figures significant at 5 percent statistical level; , *p<0.10 or or figures significant at 10 percent statistical level. the tough realities small ngos face when evaluating their efforts: observations from guatemala and mexico consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 6, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 251-263 the tough realities small ngos face when evaluating their efforts: observations from guatemala and mexico jeffrey swindle brigham young university jeffswin@gmail.com abstract evaluation improves the quality of work completed by international non-governmental organizations (ngos) to fight poverty and develop communities (liebenthal et al. 2004). even so, many ngos do not conduct evaluations (ferguson 1990). to the extent that ngos evaluate their efforts, the evaluation results often do not affect the planning of future projects, making evaluation a static event instead of a learning process (mebrahtu 2002). thus, the relevant problem is how to make evaluation more useful. mulwa (2008) argues that participatory evaluation bridges the disconnect between evaluation results and future development projects. based on my experience, i emphasize the need for development evaluation to be practical; evaluations informed by all stakeholders create a climate of learning. evaluations lead to improved development when the evaluation responsibilities and measurements are shared between all parties involved. author’s note jeffrey graduated from byu in april 2011, spending time doing internships and on study abroad programs in mexico, guatemala, england, and washington d.c. he has volunteered as a project evaluator for small ngos in central america for the past three years. acknowledgments it was been my privilege to work under the supervision of dr. tim heaton on this project. in addition, i am thankful for my opportunity to work with leaders of ngo1. not only have they supported my research, they opened every door of opportunity they could for me. also, i enjoyed wonderful experiences living and working with ngo1 employees in both guatemala and mexico. keywords: evaluation, mulwa, ngos, guatemala, mexico 1. purpose of study in order to explain some of the realities that confront small ngos in implementing evaluations of their projects, i draw upon various personal experiences in guatemala and mexico as a project evaluator for a small ngo. by looking at my experiences in the field, i highlight some of the barriers facing small ngos when they implement evaluations, as well as what may prevent them from utilizing and applying evaluation results. in addition to identifying these barriers, i outline potential solutions, which point towards a need for evaluation to be practical. though this study is particular to the ngo for which i worked (hereafter referred to as ngo1), its implications can apply to other small international ngos, and appropriately to larger development organizations. the common barriers to evaluation for ngo1 are not exclusive, but principle-based. drawing from my personal experience as an evaluator, i examine francis mulwa’s 252 consilience theory of participatory evaluation (2008) in context of actual evaluation practices of ngo1. through a close investigation of ngo1’s evaluation rhetoric, practices, and application of results, i outline the need for all development evaluations to be informed by all parties and stakeholders involved. while mulwa’s repeated call for local people to be involved in evaluation is justified, he overlooks the importance involving outsiders—primarily ngo headquarters staff and project donors—in evaluation. the nature of the relationship between donors and local people creates a need to share evaluation responsibilities. in order for evaluations to be practical—so that the results can be applied and contribute to a greater learning process—they must be a shared responsibility between all parties involved. 2. the evaluation debate evaluations enable development agencies to improve their efforts and increase their impact. as world bank researchers have observed: “the intent [of evaluation] is to give partners enough feedback to allow them to learn, and if necessary, to modify their initial plans” (liebenthal et al., 2004, p. 37). the initiatives and projects of large development agencies, such as the world bank, are evaluated on a consistent basis; as a result, some are canceled and others are modified. evaluation helps the world bank to learn from its mistakes and practice better development. for ngos, evaluation is equally if not more beneficial to their improvement as an organization. one ngo, the american indian higher education consortium, explained: “evaluation, when properly understood, developed and applied, can provide powerful knowledge throughout indian country…[leading to] stronger, healthier, and more prosperous tribal communities and increased participation in the u.s. workforce” (2008, p. 2). when ngos apply the information gleaned from an evaluation, adjusting their efforts to overcome the weaknesses identified in evaluations, they increase their potential to make a significant impact and meet their goals (mulwa, 2008). nevertheless, many ngos face difficulties in conducting evaluations as well as in utilizing the lessons learned from the evaluation reports to change their practices. meaningful evaluation requires a significant educational investment that some ngos cannot make due to financial difficulties, a lack of staff, or pressure from donors. moreover, those ngos that can perform accurate and meaningful evaluations still struggle to incorporate the lessons learned from the evaluations into their actual practices. evaluation presents the organization with problems; correcting those problems requires the ngo to undergo the “painful process of change” that includes theoretical, methodological, and practical challenges (mulwa, 2008, p. 14). additionally, evaluations uncover weaknesses with the practices of ngos, information that could potentially be harmful to an organization’s ability to attract and maintain donors. despite these challenges, evaluation is necessary for ngos to promote development and decrease poverty in all its forms; however, it is only a worthwhile activity when the knowledge obtained is applied. effective evaluations are not discrete, static events, but part of a larger process. the process of organizational progression for an ngo involves a continuous conversation between theory, practice, and evaluation (rossi, 2008). this process is not merely deductive or inductive, but is a cycle, with each step leading to the next. without evaluation, or the application of evaluation results and lessons learned, progression halts. a good visual representation of organizational progression is a mechanical spring. each ring in the spring features a theory, an action, and an evaluation, which in turn lead to a higher understanding, consilience swindle: realities of small ngos a new theory, a new action, and another evaluation; it is a process of continual progression. accordingly, evaluation is productive when it foments new or modified theories that lead to new or modified practices. unfortunately, organizational progression is often only rhetorical. ngos commonly implement the same development projects over and over again, regardless of the data obtained in project evaluations, if such evaluations are conducted at all (ferguson, 1990). even if ngos religiously evaluate their projects, these measurements are only valuable if they influence the actions of ngos. why, then, do some ngos invest the resources to conduct evaluations of their projects, but fail to apply the lessons learned? what are the social conditions that stop ngos from applying the knowledge acquired by evaluations? on the other hand, why are some ngos innovative, consistently updating their projects based on the data and conclusions of their evaluations? these are difficult questions with complex answers. mulwa contends that placing evaluation equally in the hands of all stakeholders (all parties associated with a development program), as opposed to solely in the hands of ngo leaders or evaluators (all of whom are community outsiders), increases meaning and ownership (2008). liebenthal et al. at the world bank state that “the more perspectives on a situation that are considered, the better informed will be any conclusions drawn about that situation… i strongly recommend that stakeholders be encouraged to participate in the evaluation process” (2004, pp. 195-196). additionally, mulwa asserts that involving representatives from all stakeholding groups throughout the development process solves the common disconnect between evaluation results and their application to future projects. based on my personal experiences as an evaluator in guatemala and mexico for ngo1, i argue that the participatory approach to development evaluation, as explicated in the passage just mentioned, is ideal. unfortunately, certain barriers—geographic, linguistic, cultural, and financial—complicate the complete involvement of all stakeholders to equally participate. donors are rarely in the same geographic location as project beneficiaries, stifling communication between the two groups. furthermore, even when they are in the same place, language barriers and cultural differences make basic communication extremely difficult, limiting agreement on project planning, implementation, and evaluation. the root of these difficulties is the difference in values in each stakeholding group. in fact, empirical evidence shows that perceptions regarding evaluation “vary considerably among hierarchical levels” (mebrahtu, 2002, p. 501). if local people were to evaluate a project they would base their evaluation on their own values, which, in many instances, the donors or ngo staff would not understand. the same would be true if donors did the evaluation completely themselves. if, for example, the project was to provide transportation from the village to the hospital in the nearest city, the donors might consider how many people rode in the ambulance the past month. the local people, however, would point out that those people were actually the driver and his 10 children going for a joyride. clearly, then, involving all participants in the evaluation process is crucial in order to formulate a full picture; allowing one party full judgment is not productive. in sum, mulwa is right to place power in the hands of local people—local ownership increases the potential for evaluation results to be applied—but there are additional indicators to take into account. in particular, the variables that influenced ngo1’s tendency to apply the lessons learned from evaluations were: (1) shared goals and (2) ways of knowing. the effectiveness of evaluation, at least for ngo1 and potentially for many other ngos, rests on these variables. 254 consilience 3. background of ngo1 ngo1 was founded in 1982. over time, the organization expanded, working in fifteen different nations, including mexico and guatemala. its mission is to connect communities to the necessary resources that advance local capacity and leadership, allowing the community members to bring themselves out of poverty. essentially, ngo1 hopes to teach villagers skills with which they can better their lives. arming villagers with skills, as opposed to filling their cabinets with donations, ngo1 shows a commitment to the practice of sustainable village development. ngo1 identifies five dimensions of development: leadership and self development, access to education, access to living environment, access to healthcare, and access to markets. accordingly, ngo1 supports villagers in projects that align with at least one of the five dimensions of development. though projects are not stated in ngo1’s mission statement, they are the means by which ngo1 attempts to accomplish its goals. 3.1 ngo1 evaluation methodology ngo1’s founders and later leaders experimented with various evaluation models over the course of the past thirty years, eventually settling on their current methodology, which focuses on the five dimensions of development mentioned previously. to measure progress in the five dimensions, ngo1 methodology includes a qualitative ranking system. within each dimension are 7-12 subcategories; each is ranked on a scale of 1-5 (see appendix, section 1). a ranking of one indicates the lowest level of development and a ranking of five represents modern society. a ranking guideline sheet helps evaluators determine what characteristics merit which numerical rankings (see appendix, section 2). once a community reaches rankings of three, it is considered to be on its way to selfdevelopment and ngo1 withdraws. all rankings are averaged, though the leadership development dimension is weighted 400%. ideally, all of this information is gathered in each village and then posted on ngo1’s online database on a semi-annual basis. the ngo1 evaluation methodology appears well-designed and functional. however, evaluations have been conducted inconsistently, if at all, and there is a lack of harmony within the organization regarding evaluation, dependency, and ngo1’s mission in general. consequently, there is room for improvement both in conducting evaluations and in applying the results. 4. methods in this case study, i examine the contributing factors in ngo1’s evaluation methodology and its application of evaluation results. i draw my conclusions from participant observation as an independent evaluator for ngo1 in both guatemala and mexico. my particular role as an independent evaluator in guatemala and mexico granted me access to all aspects of ngo1’s hierarchy, including personal conversations between project beneficiaries and the ceo, as well as the middlemen between them. participant observation, drawing particularly upon mulwa’s use of the term, includes close contact between the researcher and the population under study, in this case with all ngo1 employees. the goal is to familiarize the researcher with the population’s practices and consilience swindle: realities of small ngos values (mulwa, 2008). as an evaluator, i had private meetings and conversations with all ngo1 employees and participated in many ngo1 leadership meetings, including the annual ngo1 world conference for all staff. i also draw upon my experience living with local staff in guatemala and mexico, traveling with headquarters staff throughout guatemala, numerous international phone calls, and a myriad of email exchanges. throughout all of these endeavors i recorded field notes; they provide the basis upon which i formulate my experiences into cohesive conclusions. in guatemala, my primary method of data collection was focus groups. accompanied by two ngo1 employees, local villagers themselves, i visited eight villages and held focus groups with village leadership. in each meeting, i asked the villagers pertinent questions about the state of their villages in order to accurately rank the villages’ level of development according to the ngo1 evaluation methodology. table 1 shows a sample of the ngo1 evaluation methodology for the leadership indicator; table 2 shows the portion of the ngo1 ranking guideline sheet associated with the leadership indicator. table 1: ngo1 evaluation rankings for leadership indicator 256 consilience ranking 1 ranking 2 ranking 3 indicator village organization minimal to no village organization. if elected officials exist, they are not well respected and may not represent the interests of the whole. elected officials carry some respect. natural leadership immerging to assist elected officials. committees are formed around special needs or initiatives. village development committee (vdc) formed and active. sub-committees formed as needed in health, education, water etc. natural and elected leaders in cooperation leadership skills no clear leadership in the village. village leaders are guiding villagers to have a common vision. leaders are sharing the leadership role with the ngo1 staff in community mobilization and project management. leadership has a clear understanding of how to use available resources in development. they can manage projects without ngo1 staff and keep the village motivated. networking there is no understanding of available resources either inside or outside the village. ngo1 allocates up to 80% of the resources in the development partnership. leaders are learning how to find and negotiate support from ngos, local government and other sources through ngo1 guidance. ngo1 investment is still more than 50% in the development partnership. ngo1 is no longer a major development partner. it contributes less that 20%. village leadership generates the rest of the resources through local contribution and new development partnerships. table 2: ngo1 evaluation ranking guideline for leadership indicator in mexico, i worked with two other evaluators. together, we began our research with semi-structured interviews administered to one representative of each home in the two communities being studied, tamuala and huaricho (mulwa, 2008). we interviewed program participants using a set of questions addressing aspects of leadership, business, and culture, as well as questions regarding ngo1’s implementation of the program. finally, we analyzed our notes from two sets of interviews to ascertain the social impact of the project (in this case, goat cheese factories) in each village. 5. findings as previously stated, the key for ngo1 in terms of practical evaluation, connecting evaluation results with future development plans, involves three main indicators: (1) shared goals, (2) practicality of evaluation results, and (3) ways of knowing. before discussing these indicators, however, i briefly discuss the findings of my evaluations in guatemala and mexico. the following table outlines the context that led to an evaluation initiative, the type of evaluation utilized, the findings, and how ngo1 used the findings (see table 3). consilience swindle: realities of small ngos context type of evaluation/assessment model evaluation findings how has ngo1 used the findings? the guatemala staff was not evaluating the communities where staff members worked. i trained them to conduct evaluations as designed by ngo1 headquarters. we held focus group meetings in each village and utilized the villagers’ responses to rank each community’s development. the evaluation was primarily topdown, but had participatory elements. ngo1 headquarters designed the evaluation strategy, but data were based on villagers’ input in community meetings. ultimately, ngo1 staff, not the villagers, ranked the level of the communities’ development. the guatemala staff now consistently conducts bi-annual evaluations in this fashion. the communities are developing slowly, according to the measurements designed by ngo1 headquarters. it is not clear whether headquarters staff consults evaluation results when planning new projects. the projects chosen since the evaluations began have all been based on community wants (such as the recent schools built in two communities) or tied donations (such as the medical clinic in one community). the evaluation data is used in ngo1’s annual reports for donors. the mexico staff was not evaluating the development of the communities where staff members worked. ngo1 headquarters sent a team of evaluators, including myself, for a period of two months, to mexico with hopes of finding out why evaluations were not occurring. the evaluators acted as participant observers of ngo1’s projects, conducting their own evaluation of the project while also conducting informal interview to accumulate important information about the mexico staff’s resistance toward evaluating. the evaluators found that ngo1 mexico staff had different goals than headquarters. they focused on “building people, not projects,” while headquarters focused on creating self-developing communities. consequently, the mexico staff did not find the evaluation method designed by headquarters to be an accurate tool for measuring development. mexico has been under major deadlines to complete the project (implementing goat cheese factories) funded by the umbrella ngo and the idb. as a result, no major meetings to reconcile the difference in goals between mexico and headquarters have occurred. however, headquarters staff has discussed redesigning their evaluations. ngo1 mexico received funding from an umbrella ngo and the idb to create small goat cheese factories to stimulate local economic opportunities for villagers. under pressure by hip to evaluate their efforts, ngo1 mexico asked a team of evaluators to evaluate the impacts of the businesses. the evaluation design was topdown; outsiders, not the villagers, had primary control of the evaluations methods. however, the data were gathered through in-depth interviews with local villagers, giving voice to beneficiaries. the evaluators also facilitated community meetings. these meetings were an effort to involve the locals, making the design somewhat participatory. the villagers were not appropriately trained in business practices. simply stated, the inputs outweighed the potential outcomes; the businesses would lose money. there were positive social benefits of the project, however, including increased educational expectations and decreased gender discrimination in the participating families. as recommended in the evaluation, ngo1 mexico staff began facilitating community meetings in order to train the villagers in business practices. at this point, the businesses are still financially dependent on ngo1 for business connections, but the villagers are learning ways to make their own business connections and to monitor their bottom line. table 4: evaluation results and applications 258 consilience 5.1 shared goals “shared goals” refers to the level of commonality between the goals of headquarters and those of local staff. for evaluations to be applied, headquarters and local staff must share development aims (mebrahtu, 2002). in guatemala, there was a lack of shared goals due to the hiring of new local staff. however, the new staff was humble and moldable, leading to moderate success in implementing evaluation results. in mexico, local staff and headquarters staff operated under different development goals; as a result, evaluations generally served the interests of either local staff or headquarters staff, but not both. in guatemala, the former country director passed away in august 2008. his passing slowed ngo1’s work immensely, and the new country director had not learned ngo1’s evaluation methodology before i arrived in august 2009. also, given his lack of experience in development, the new country director did not have strong opinions respecting evaluation theory or methodology. fortunately, he was teachable and energetic; in fact he asked headquarters staff to allow me to come and teach the local staff, including himself, ngo1’s evaluation methodology. he wanted more training, and his desire to learn was reflected in the rest of the local staff in guatemala as well. however, the new country director’s inexperience was problematic with respect to the goals and vision of the organization. he was only beginning to comprehend that ngo1 was focused on building on self-developing communities and he had yet to correlate this focus with related policy. the ngo1 evaluation methodology, then, which i taught to local staff and which they regularly use to evaluate the progress of villages every six months, is only useful to the extent that local staff understands the goals upon which the evaluation data is based. more generally, it is therefore apparent that evaluation results must be meaningful to those who are engaged in the creation of the evaluation methodology. in contrast to the guatemala country director, the ngo1 country director for mexico was extremely experienced; he had advanced degrees in development, had worked in the field for over 20 years and had worked for ngo1 for over a decade. he had strong opinions about what development should be and the goals of ngo1. he strongly supported the ngo1 motto: “building people, not projects.” development, according to the mexico country director, was primarily focused on the individual, and not necessarily on community development. the projects in mexico reflected his goals, as opposed to the goals of headquarters for community-based development. because of these differences in goals, there was a disagreement about evaluation methodology and neither party respected the evaluations that the other had completed in the past. the lack of shared goals stripped any current evaluation practices of both meaning and purpose. hoping to solve the disaccord between headquarters and local staff regarding evaluation, ngo1 headquarters sent me and two other evaluators to mexico with specific instructions to work with the country director on the selection of a project to be evaluated and the evaluation methodology. after meeting with him and the rest of the ngo1 mexico staff, we found that they had previously been evaluating the progress of the communities with whom they worked, but had stopped monitoring them within the past year. the country director and other staff members became extremely discouraged with evaluation due to a variety of factors and experiences. with respect to the ngo1 evaluation methodology, the country director reported that ngo1 headquarters handed him a new booklet on the ngo1 evaluation methods and told him to use it to evaluate his consilience swindle: realities of small ngos communities, but never trained him on how to use the booklet. when the country director asked his three rural development facilitators (villagers who serve as his liaisons in the communities) to use the booklet, two of them promptly quit. they felt that they could train people on how to complete projects, but felt uncomfortable calling and leading focus group meetings to collect data for the evaluations. if this negative situation were not enough, the mexico country director had a negative experience with the independent financial auditor hired by the umbrella ngo that had granted ngo1 funding for the goat cheese project. the auditor spent a single day with the country director, wrote a report, and then charged an excessive amount. most recently, the computer servers at ngo1 headquarters in utah crashed and a variety of information that the country director had uploaded to the ngo1 online database was lost. (though headquarters staff reports that they have restored the lost information, the country director insists that much of the information he uploaded is still lost.) all of these experiences contributed to ngo1 mexico avoiding evaluation. nevertheless, ngo1 mexico was still open to working with my team of evaluators given our independent position. in addition, they were happy to delegate this responsibility—that they felt pressure to perform—to us. the country director asked us to evaluate the social implications of the goat cheese project, which was designed to create local jobs and decrease the necessity of forced migration to the united states for employment opportunities. “does the project develop individuals?” he consistently asked. after conducting in-depth interviews, we concluded that the project would probably fail to create a sustainable goat cheese business, but that unexpected social benefits resulted (see table 4). not only did the country director appreciate the evaluation results, but he also initiated the retraining plans as recommended by the evaluation. local staff that participated somewhat in evaluation design were more likely to respect and apply the results. despite the success of our evaluation at affecting future development efforts and modifying project design, headquarters staff had less use for our evaluation results. since other countries where ngo1 worked, such as guatemala, collected evaluation data in a more systematic and homogenous manner, headquarters staff wanted mexico to do the same. it was most useful for headquarters to be able to compare and contrast the development of communities across countries in order to demonstrate to donors the progress and effectiveness of their efforts. communities in mexico, however, could not be compared due to the lack of consistent evaluation collection or comparable data. shared goals between local and headquarters staff, then, are imperative to maintain a sustainable balance between the demands of donors and the local people’s perception of their own needs across multiple projects and locations. 5.2 ways of knowing another factor influencing the likelihood that evaluation results are applied is the accepted “ways of knowing” ngos utilize. based on core sociological principles, it is accepted that reality is a social construction and relative to the particular culture in which it is created (berger and luckmann, 1966; ferguson, 1990; aihec, 2008). the “ways of knowing” for ngo1 are particular to its organization and its construction of reality and knowledge, and evaluation results are interpreted through a particular lens of reality. what forms of knowledge does ngo1 celebrate and how is crucial information, such as 260 consilience evaluation results, communicated so that it is applied? can different stakeholders learn other ways of knowing? there is not significant evidence that ngo1 regularly consults and utilizes the evaluation data it collects in guatemala and store on its online database. in actual practice, when an employee at ngo1 headquarters has a question, he/she calls the country director. when the country director has a question, he/she calls the local villager employees. when they have a question, they ask the villager associated with the subject under question. this process is equally true in the reverse direction, functioning up the organizational hierarchy as well as down. at times, steps in the ladder can be jumped. most importantly, knowledge is disseminated on a personal level, face-to-face or by telephone or email. the mexico country director expressed his doubt in collecting evaluation data according to the methodology of ngo1 headquarters. not only did he not agree with the method of measurements, but he also questioned the purpose: “the next time they have a question about the development of one of the communities do you think they will log on to the database and check out the stats? no! they will just give me a phone call, whether i do the evaluations and collect and post the data or not.” in the ngo1 work atmosphere face-to-face information is most highly valued and respected. evaluation results for ngo1 should be communicated face-to-face; it is most likely to have a lasting impact. though this method of communication can be highly informal and can leave later interpretation of evaluation results vulnerable to change depending on the contextual understanding and memory of ngo1 employees, it is nevertheless the practiced form of communication at ngo1. more formalized reports are less effective at changing actual organizational practices. 6. practicality in evaluation ngos should be flexible in their evaluation methods. as outlined throughout this paper, practicality in evaluation recognizes that the paramount purpose of evaluation is to improve development. often the most functional, workable, and plausible evaluation method does not include fully equal participation of stakeholders, rather, it reflects the interests of those who proposed and implemented the development project. as seen in mexico, if local staff is not committed to the evaluation framework designed by headquarters, then evaluations will not change development initiatives. as shown by my experiences in guatemala, a willing staff is not enough; staff members must then use the evaluation results to plan future projects. ultimately, sustainable long-term change can only occur in communities when local peoples are empowered to the degree that they hold full responsibility for their own development. realistically, however, ngos often find it more efficient to help communities achieve self-actualization by proposing and implementing projects for the villagers rather than guiding villagers through the entire process. though they are top-down, these projects generally meet the basic physical needs of local people. in these cases, evaluations may be designed by and primarily for donors and ngo staff, but must include the project beneficiaries, the local people, in order for the results to be applied. practicality, then, includes the rational judgment of what degree all stakeholders can reasonably be involved so that ownership for the project is shared. regardless of the balance of their respective contributions, the fundamental factors determining the implementation and use of ngo consilience swindle: realities of small ngos evaluations is the substantive involvement of all stakeholders, and a basic measure of congruity between each party’s values and goals. 262 consilience bibliography american indian higher education consortium (2008). indigenous evaluation framework workbook. washington, dc: national science foundation. banerjee, a. v., et al. 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(1999). development as freedom. new york, ny: anchor books. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 6, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 156–172 resistance to artemisinin-based combination therapies in uganda: an impending threat elana joelle siegel brown university, ri elana.j.siegel@gmail.com abstract plasmodium falciparum malaria is one of the most significant causes of morbidity and mortality in tropical africa. chloroquine phosphate emerged as the revolutionary drug of choice for the prevention and treatment of malaria, pushing the previously administered quinine to the sidelines. however, since the 1970s, sensitivity to chloroquine has been on the decline. in response to this, health professionals began to turn to a different drug: artemisinin-based combination therapies (act). act is now accepted by the world health organisation (who) as the most effective strategy to treat plasmodium falciparum malaria, despite some initial misgivings (their long-term usefulness has yet to be determined). in this light, based on a few tentative studies conducted since 2003, the who has established an emerging, yet noticeable, trend in growing resistance to act drugs. although, at this moment, there is no hard evidence of any act resistance within the ugandan population, this paper will explore, through published and unpublished sources, and a baseline survey conducted in july 2008 by amref (african medical and research foundation, an international medical organisation based in kenya), how this resistance will soon emerge in uganda, what the precipitating factors are, and through a careful evaluation of these causes, offer courses of action so as avoid the devastating consequences of act resistance. author’s note elana siegel graduated from brown university as a pre-medical candidate with a major in slavic studies (with admission to the national slavic honor society). in july and august of 2008 she worked as a research assistant for col. (ret) robert leitch, m.b.e., in uganda, for the african medical research foundation (amref), in a project regarding a baseline study of the malaria, aids and tb (mat) integrated model. she is a native of london, uk. keywords: malaria, resistance, artemisinin-based combination therapy, antimalarial drugs, tropical medicine, disaster planning. 1. introduction plasmodium falciparum malaria is one of the most significant causes of morbidity and mortality in tropical africa. the discovery of chloroquine phosphate was revolutionary for the prevention and treatment of malaria, pushing the previously administered quinine to the sidelines. it has been the drug of choice for several decades, thanks to its inhibition of parasite development in the blood. however, since the 1970s, sensitivity to the chloroquine has been on the decline, and resistance to anti-malaria drugs is now proving a major and challenging problem in most affected parts of the world. this emergence of chloroquine resistance has been consilience siegel: act resistance associated with recent surges in malaria mortality in several regions of the world; in fact, now, almost every malaria-susceptible country is reporting partial to full chloroquine resistance, with huge implications for its susceptible populace (world hwalth organization (who), 2006). in response to this, health professionals began to turn to a different drug: artemisinin-based combination therapies (act). the world health organisation (who) now recommends act as the most effective strategy to treat plasmodium falciparum malaria, despite some initial misgivings (their long-term usefulness has yet to be determined). in this light, based on a few tentative studies conducted since 2003, the who has established an emerging, yet noticeable, trend in growing resistance to act drugs. this worrying claim could have many implications for the vulnerable population in tropical africa, and uganda specifically, where the incidence remains high, the infrastructure lacking, and the manpower small. although, at this moment, there is no hard evidence of any act resistance within the ugandan population, this paper will explore, through published and unpublished sources, and a baseline survey conducted in july 2008 by amref (african medical and research foundation, an international medical organisation based in kenya), how this resistance will soon emerge in uganda, what the precipitating factors are, and through a careful evaluation of these causes, offer courses of action so as avoid the devastating consequences of act resistance. first, i will offer background on act and its extensive use; then, i shall outline the ugandan malarial profile, considering the burden of disease, the particularities of resource management and cultural climate that would foster the emergence of antibiotic resistance. finally, i will discuss how state efforts to educate the population are fruitless in the face of a crippled infrastructure, and argue for health sector refurbishment and re-equipment as priorities in addressing the impending health crisis of act resistance. 2. background plasmodium falciparum malaria is one of the most significant causes of morbidity and mortality in tropical africa. the who estimates that the parasite is responsible for 1.4-2.6 million deaths per annum, as well as 270-480 million clinical attacks. chloroquine-resistant strains of p. falciparum were first observed in 1978 in east africa and, within 10 years, similar strains had been reported in all tropical african countries, resistant to chloroquine, sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine and amodiaquine (conventional antimalarial drugs), amongst others. in response to this resistance and the health threats it entails, artemisinin-based combination therapies (act, derived from the plant artemisia annua – sweet wormwood) were deployed on a large scale, after being strongly recommended by the who, and are gradually replacing obsolete drugs in malaria-resistant areas. to the medical and public health world, these compounds appear to be the wonder-drugs: they are well tolerated by patients, and could cure falciparum malaria in 3-7 days by reducing gametocyte carriage, thus diminishing malaria transmission. the who estimated that 120 million act treatments would be needed globally annually. it is so far, undoubtedly, the most effective and modern drug approved by fda and on market (who, 2006). the possibility of act resistant strains of p. falciparum would have devastating consequences for millions of lives in dozens of countries. establishing 158 consilience whether this is a potential outcome is of crucial importance to the medical and public health world. there has been some research into the matter, the most noteworthy of which was conducted by the who in 2007. they hoped to ascertain whether there is prevalence of act resistance, or strong indicators to the prospect of it, by conducting a clinical trial in the thai-cambodian border region. its results showed that there is a noticeable trend, albeit in its very beginnings, and that this possibility will become reality (who: report of a meeting on containment of artemisinin tolerance, 2008). this paper will spotlight the risk of emerging artemisinin resistance in uganda, a tropical sub-saharan country that experiences intense perennial malaria transmission over 95% of the landmass, and where it accounts for 39-44% of outpatient presence, and 20% of inpatient mortality (amref-uganda: malaria, aids and tb (mat) integrated model baseline study, 2008). the ugandan ministry of health estimates that malaria causes between 70,000 and 100,000 fatalities per annum, the majority of which are children. the indirect and direct costs of malaria are high, as poor households spend an estimated 25% of their monthly income on malaria-related care (ministry of health, uganda, 2003). although uganda has developed a policy for integrated malaria, hiv/aids and tb management, it is poorly implemented, exacerbated by several budgetary limitations, inadequate infrastructure and equipment and a healthcare workforce crisis. the ugandan districts of luwero and kiboga, which this paper will focus on, have been part of the country‟s disease management initiatives, but with slow progress: the massive nation-wide campaigns for insecticide treated nets (itns) and intermittent preventative treatment in pregnancy (iptp) have yielded low results; 54% of pregnant women currently receive the recommended 2 doses of sp/fansidar for iptp, whilst the national target is 80%; finally, only 62% of symptomatic children under 5 years old access the antimalaria treatment they need within 24 hours of fever, and instead rely first on home-based care of fever (mat baseline study, 2008). despite the who carrying out their study on the thai-cambodian border, i deem the examination of act resistance in uganda to be a relevant course of action. it should be noted that both regions have experienced significant population movements, a risk factor for the spread of malaria resistance: approximately 200 000 people cross from cambodia into thailand on average per annum, and in uganda, civil conflict forced 2 million people into internally displaced persons, or idp, camps – 1 million have returned home since. in terms of demographics, uganda has less successful statistics on most levels than both cambodia and thailand (life expectancy, under-5 mortality, gni/capita, itn use, etc.) – if uganda is at a relatively less developed stage than the other 2 countries, with a much faster growing population (uganda‟s fertility rate is 6.6, whereas thailand and cambodia are at 1.8 and 3.3, respectively (unicef, 2006)), the need to study act resistance is uganda is just as valid and pressing, because of its rapidly expanding population. in uganda, the landmass is divided into 80 districts; each district is progressively divided into sub-districts, counties, sub-counties, parishes and villages. there are typically 1-4 villages per parish. health centres are graded as health centres ii, iii iv, with each being more equipped than the last; each serves a parish, a sub-county and a sub-district, in that order (special programme for research and training in tropical diseases, 2006). consilience siegel: act resistance 3. status quo in luwero and kiboga a baseline survey conducted by amref-uganda in june/july 2008 sought to establish awareness, treatment practices and behaviour patterns associated with malaria of local ugandans living in the districts of luwero and kiboga. the research team compiled a table of results, the most pertinent of which are listed here: household knowledge, attitude and practice kap kiboga luwero mean nº of itns in household 0.9 2 1.1 1.01 % itns in good condition 56 66 61 ratio of number of persons to one itn 6.6: 1 5.5:1 6.05: 1 % recognise itns as best protection 95 98.6 97 % of population without itns 54 56 55 % knowledge of mosquitoes as vector of malaria 96 83 90 % knowledge of breeding grounds for mosquitoes 82 91 87 % knowledge of destruction of mosquitoes 69 71 70 % awareness of irs (indoor residual spraying) 78 92 85 % favouring irs 88 45 67 % against irs 3 34 19 % recognised fever as symptom of child malaria 90 97 94 % initially try home-based treatments 76 50 63 % take child to hc within 6 hrs 69 65 67 % know of iptp 73 67 70 % with vht in community 74 45 60 % seek treatment from vht 74 all values quoted from now on will be the mean values, unless indicated as luweroor kiboga-specific results health centre surveys (mat baseline study, 2008) kiboga: level ii unit level iii unit level iv unit kiboga hospital % diagnoses done symptomatically 100 82 n/a 66 % units able to offer act 69 67 100 yes % units able to offer itns 0 17 0 no % units able to test by blood slide 0 25 n/a 34 number of pregnant women on iptp 3 30 319 454 160 consilience luwero*: level ii unit level iii unit level iv unit % diagnoses done symptomatically 94 58 69 % units able to offer act 81 100 100 % units able to offer itns 0 0 67 % units able to test by blood slide 12.5 93 100 number of pregnant women on iptp 6 16 85 * there is no hospital in luwero – health centre iv is the most equipped facility of the district kiboga and luwero (averaged) – staff and equipment: level ii unit level iii unit level iv unit kiboga hospital % actual staff of authorised 37 48 58 51 ratio patients : medical workers 206:1 96:1 65:1 41:1 presence of lab not required 68% 100% yes % actual lab staff of authorised n/a 39 73 60 presence of binocular microscope n/a 57% 100% yes power 7% 17% kiboga 73% luwero 100% yes the most sustainable way to treat and cure malaria is to educate the populations at risk about protection from the parasite: that is, how to avoid infection altogether. this can be done through the use of insecticide treated nets (itns), indoor residual spraying (irs) of huts, and finding other ways of avoiding or destroying mosquitoes, the vector of p. falciparum. therefore, the most pressing questions are those relating to the vector: breeding, habits, avoidance. however, the immediate reaction to these results is the irregularity between awareness of vector and awareness of its habits: 90% of the participants were aware that mosquitoes were the vector for malaria, but much fewer knew their breeding grounds, and, therefore, how to prevent their propagation or how to destroy them. itn usage, a world-recognized method of prevention against malaria, did not receive strong results. although respondents were very much aware of its advantages (97% assert it gives the best protection1), the availability and quality of the nets is very limited. each household has on average 1 net, with an average ratio of one net to 6 persons. because of their higher vulnerability, it is the children who are usually put under the net at night; this still leaves a large group of individuals who remain exposed. approximately one third of nets are in poor condition, and therefore less efficacious. finally, around half of the population do not own a net in the first place, 1 all values quoted hereafter are directly from the table of results from the mat baseline study, unless specified. consilience siegel: act resistance which is contrary to government policies of complete net coverage and usage. this remains despite the ministry of health‟s target to increase the proportion of household with one or more nets from 13% to 75% by the year 2005. according to the health centre survey, very few clinics are even able to provide the itns as required by the ministry of health. these are to be subsidised unless in an emergency situation (e.g. refugee or idp camps), made affordable to all who need them (zurovac, 2008). survey responses to the preferred and practiced course of action in reaction to visible infection remain varied. although 94% recognise that fever is a symptom of the parasite, 63% still opt for home-based remedies before seeking immediate clinical attention. this delay is not in the best interest of the patient, and could be due to several factors, among them: wariness of western antibiotics and trust in traditional practices, distance or inaccessibility to health centres, or inability of health centre to cater to the needs of the populace (mat baseline study, 2008). by law, level ii health centres are not required to have a working laboratory, but level iii centres are. laboratories are needed to conduct blood slide tests. the survey shows that although some clinics claim to be able to test by blood slide (i.e. have a laboratory), they still do the majority of their diagnoses symptomatically. this is due to poor infrastructure, lack of equipment, lack of personnel, and lack of electricity. every laboratory should have a binocular microscope for blood slide testing, and many still don‟t (57% of level iii centres), and continue to use the obsolete monocular microscope. furthermore, the lack of full personnel puts a huge strain on all functions of the health clinic. with 37% to 58% of the required staff manning the clinics, services are completed far less efficiently than they could be. the most common reason for this lack of staff is that they are not compensated for their services: salaries are rarely paid on time, if at all, and staff quarters are poorly maintained, if present at all. with the average number of patients to health worker ratio ranging from 41 to 206 per worker, the staff does not have the time to conduct all the necessary tests, regardless of the availability of resources. village health teams (vhts) are a national public health initiative that have been gradually implemented all over the african continent over the last few decades. they consist of several individuals, often volunteers, who are trained to diagnose illnesses by their symptoms, and recommend the best course of action to the patient. this can mean administering basic treatments and medications, such as act. this is especially useful for villages where the health centres are hard to access. unfortunately, vhts have some shortcomings: there is often a lack of trained, voluntary personnel, meaning that many targets have not been met. there have also been reports of mismanagement: drug misappropriation, or some other forms of mismanagement. furthermore, as their resources are limited, and because symptoms can differ from patient to patient, illnesses are sometimes diagnosed and drugs prescribed inappropriately. however, according to the results, 60% of the respondents report a vht in their village, and in kiboga, 74% would seek medical help from them, demonstrating their promising status within the community. all of these results point to a populace that relies more on treatment than prevention of malaria, despite national efforts to curb this unsustainable trend. with ineffectual testing methods and obsolete equipment, staffed by a fraction of the required personnel, ugandans boast little in the way of early detection systems, 162 consilience which would indicate a deep, and dangerous, reliance on pharmaceutical recourses, now in the form of act. a study conducted in 2008 investigated the effectiveness of act in three sub-saharan countries, including uganda. the researchers reported that the adherence to treatment was 81%, lower than the two other trials in nigeria and ghana (ajayi, 2008). the study did not offer suggestions as to why this was the case. firstly, in this study, unavailability of medications is not one of the factors, as these were provided by the researchers. the other options for this incomplete adherence could be negligence, or the personal judgement of the patients. in other words, participants might have feared that once the clinical trial was over, they would no longer be able to access medication regularly because of inadequate local medical infrastructure. there is some likelihood that patients personally allotted some of the medication to treat their current infection until they felt better, and then kept the rest for the next times they should fall ill (colonel robert leitch, 2008). this means they took an incomplete course of antibiotic treatment, a crucial factor in developing drug resistance. 4. how can we solve these problems? the centre for disease control (cdc) outlines three principal ways to avoid antibiotic resistance: 1. only prescribe antibiotic therapy when likely to be beneficial to the patient 2. use an agent targeting the likely pathogens 3. use the antibiotic for the appropriate dose and duration (center for disease control (cdc), 2008) given these guidelines, we can formulate courses of action pertinent to each precipitating factor, each appropriate and feasible given ugandan circumstances. first and foremost, given the poor knowledge about vector habits, education about malaria needs to be consolidated to help avoid contracting the disease altogether. the burden of disease could be significantly reduced if more locals knew to empty out old water containers, drain or pour out sources of stagnant water or cover small puddles with vegetable oil, so that the mosquito larvae cannot emerge – this would lead to a decrease in mosquito populations around the homes. although most (85%) were aware of irs, a large proportion (19%) were against the incentive. this programme has been proven to be highly effective against malaria, and although its coverage its presence is patchy across africa, full coverage would lower the frequency of malaria cases (malaria consortium, 2008). the biggest shortcoming revolving around educational initiatives about itns is that, all too often, the health clinics, responsible for providing them, cannot. according to the survey conducted by amref-uganda, a scarce handful of health centres are stocked with itns; in kiboga, even the main district hospital is out of stock. consequently, the only recourse for the population is to purchase nets, which are not always within their means, or go without and risk malaria infection. this can only end negatively: if one is told over and over that seatbelts are the only way to be protected in a car, and then no car is equipped with that feature, the at-risk consilience siegel: act resistance population will be frustrated and angry. analogously, the effects of educating locals about the marvels of an itn are lost when failing to equip them with one. i propose that this be incorporated more fully into ugandan national health policy, and that they be made completely free of charge. they should be distributed in schools, churches, clinics, police stations and post offices, and be made a mandatory parting gift for every new mother when she leaves the clinic, should she deliver there. every traditional birth attendant (tba) should have a stockpile to hand out to mothers with newborns as well. each time they should be accompanied with an explanation as to proper use: the sleeping person should be entirely covered, frayed nets or those with holes are not useful, etc. since the introduction of itn in the country in the early 1990s, the promotion of their use has been mainly by ngos in the form of limited projects covering small populations. this should be expanded to the whole country, enough for every person. a significant factor in precipitating act resistance is the fact that it can be administered inappropriately, as 83% of patients in kiboga, and 74% in luwero are diagnosed symptomatically, i.e. without undergoing a blood slide test, and treated through the judgement of the health workers. clinics need to have the proper infrastructure. if level iii clinics were updated to have full working labs, with modern equipment and full staff, the situation would be ideal. but, on a more realistic scale, the introduction of rapid diagnostic tests (rdts) would alleviate the burden of work substantially. in the face of the ongoing malaria crisis, limiting acts to individuals who are confirmed to be carrying infectious malaria parasites becomes extremely important, especially in the context of rising medication costs and drug resistance. rdts are lateral flow 'immuno-chromatographic' antigen-detection tests, which rely on the capture of dye-labeled antibodies to produce a visible band on a strip of nitro-cellulose – in other words, a malaria “prick-test”. these tests are more cost-effective ($0.95 each) than prescribing an antimalaria treatment (between $0.90 and $2.40 for an artemether-lumefantrine treatment). there are still some issues surrounding shelf-life, price and the training required to administer it. the who estimates that for the most cost-effective and successful rdt campaign each test should be priced at $0.65 (who malaria rapid diagnostic tests, 2008). this is still in the works, but could alleviate the burden of disease greatly and drastically reduce the rate at which antibiotic resistance grows, as only infectious malaria sufferers would be treated with act. ingesting act when one should not be, regardless of the possible physical side-effects, is a huge causative agent of drug resistance; it goes against all three of the guidelines stated by the cdc. malaria symptoms can be confused with those of another ailment, just as a health worker, without running the proper tests, could misdiagnose malaria as flu or food poisoning, and not administer antibiotics when needed. lack of adherence to act is a significant problem, where patient do not complete the full treatment as prescribed. one reason for this, which happens in every culture, is that once a patient begins to feel better, they will stop taking the medication, due to forgetfulness or personal judgement. this is a serious problem in all medical settings in creating drug resistance, and needs to be clearly outlined to every single patient who is given antibiotics. another reason is that the patient does not necessarily always understand the requirements and stipulations to complete the treatment. in a study by zurovac et al. (2008), they stated that they 164 consilience “found that nearly all patients left the facility with an explanation on dosing schedule; however, administration of the first al (artemether-lumefantrine) dose, and provision of advice to take al after the meal and what to do in case of vomiting was rarely performed across all age groups. despite uganda's investment in interventions to improve the quality of care such as imci (integrated management of childhood illness), deficiencies in drug dispensing and counseling practices persist. the reasons for these suboptimal practices are not clear and demand further qualitative research including health workers misperceptions on administration of first al dose in the absence of food, the effects of lack of potable water on administering drugs at peripheral facilities and the effects of al blister packages on the provision of replacement dose in case of vomiting. better understanding of these factors should guide further interventional studies to improve dispensing and counseling practices as an integral part of appropriate prescribing” (zurovac, 2008). another possible reason for disobedience to the treatment regime, more specific to developing countries, is the fear that next time they fall ill, there will not be any medication available. this is not an unreasonable assumption, given that in kiboga, 31% of level ii health clinics were unable to provide act. some patients decide to keep a small stash for when they or a loved one becomes ill and selfmedicate (colonel robert leitch, 2008). this is dangerous and unhealthy, because it means that they do not finish their own course of treatment. and although 81% adherence is high, it should consistently be as close to 100% as possible. to achieve this, act must be deployed regularly to all clinics, and perhaps other community health workers, such as traditional birth attendants, who could also be equipped with rdts and iptp when expectant mothers come for „check-ups‟. this could potentially also lower rates of malaria during pregnancy, which is immensely dangerous for both mother and baby. perhaps implementing a system similar to directly observed therapy short-course for tuberculosis, where someone checks on the patient every day to ensure they are taking their medication consistently, would be beneficial. but malaria cases are more frequent than tb, so this could prove to be inefficient; it should still be considered though. another acute problem is the insufficient production of act, and thus the relatively high price of the treatment. the cultivation of artemisia annua, from which artemisinin is derived, was up until recently confined to china and vietnam. the who has undertaken campaigns to stimulate cultivation in kenya and the united republic of tanzania, and i suggest this policy be expanded to uganda, as well as other parts of africa. this would add to the ugandan economy, help african farmers contribute more significantly to the world market, and be one more step in turning away from foreign aid to a more self-sustaining health policy ( who: meeting on the production of artemisinin and artemisinin-based combination therapies, 6-7th june 2005, arusha, united republic of tanzania, global malaria programme, who/htm/mal/2006.1113. finally, post-treatment testing to check the efficacy of act treatment, and full recovery is important to avoid recurrence and drug resistance; this could be done through another rdt, to confirm that all parasites are dead, and therefore none have survived with a resistant mutation to the antibiotic. consilience siegel: act resistance 5. obstacles ahead many of the initiatives suggested to combat mounting antibiotic resistance do not account for the shortcomings of the public health policy structure in uganda. there is widespread corruption and inefficiency in government. in fact, its ministry of health is notorious throughout the country for having its parking lot jammed with large, new land cruisers, belonging to the employees. making the system more transparent and equitable, rather than letting funds trickle down unmonitored, could help solve the problem. alternatively the installation of internationally approved financial watchdogs to ensure that the funds are routed appropriately would also be effective. this issue needs to be seriously tackled by the ugandan authorities. another growing problem in uganda is the health workforce crisis. during a conversation i had a with a 25 year old surgeon in luwero, who had been running the level iv clinic and performing surgery by himself for 5 years, he expressed his desire to relocate to the uk, or germany, for the promise of a better salary. a medical student who was present also told me she hoped to move abroad after she completed her studies. health staff are rarely paid on time, if at all, and their salaries are pitiful, even in the ugandan context. some of the rural health workers have been reported to hoard medication themselves. indeed, the level ii centre in bulaga, kiboga, had to be closed due to drug misappropriation. in another clinic, the doctor was charging $2-5 for hiv testing, and pocketing the profits (mat baseline study, 2008). often this is not out of malice, but desperation. this needs to be remedied immediately so that the ugandan people do not lose their brightest and most able medical minds to foreign countries in their time of need. the surest way to avoid drug resistance is, quite simply, to lower the burden of disease. however, the first recourse to noticeable antibiotic resistance, like in the cases of quinine and chloroquine, should not be to market a newer drug – this will not automatically lower the incidence and prevalence of malaria. there is no such thing as a successful „silver bullet‟ approach. the sheer volume of malaria sufferers will trump whatever efforts are put into drug adherence, rdt campaigns or drug availability and this is currently the case. 6. conclusion the biggest challenges facing the medical and public health community, in avoiding act resistance, is the lack of substantial success in lowering malaria incidence and prevalence. the burden of malaria is deleterious within ugandan society, abetted by the scarcity of health care personnel and mishandling of health resources. the paltry governmental successes do not account for long-term implications of pharmaceutical mismanagement: uganda‟s government and the who cannot just keep adapting medication if there is no attempt to change behavioural patterns and vector spread. resistance to an antibiotic is a natural biological phenomenon that happens inevitably when exposed to the drug – it is only a matter of time. yet, more importantly, it is useless to spend so much time, effort and money on education and raising awareness if we cannot provide the medical supplies, such as itns and the medication itself, to tackle the very problems we are deliberately highlighting to the populace. in other words, what is the point of 166 consilience educating a ugandan family about correct itn usage if we then cannot provide them with one? refurbishment of laboratories and health clinics, re-equipment with modern tools and medications regularly, and personnel training with constant appropriate compensation must come first. education about vector transmission, itns or iptp treatment should come once the infrastructure is ready to cope with this new knowledge. however, many obstacles lay within this commitment to refurbish the health system, notably in the distribution of funds within the ministry of health – whilst the necessity for transparency and efficiency are unquestionable, the challenges are undeniable in a system familiar with resource mismanagement. consilience siegel: act resistance appendix figure 1: map of kiboga district, uganda. figure 2: map of luwero district, uganda. # # x x x nsambya kyankwanzi butemba dwaniro kapeke kibiga lwamata wattuba ntwetwe gayaza bukomeromuwanga mulagi kiboga tc 1 2 kiboga hospital x x x kik yusa kamira butuntumula zirobw e katika mu luw eero makulubita kalagalany imb w a bamunanika luw eero t.c bom bo t.c 1 3 2 168 consilience figure 3: a rural health centre level ii (consulting room + store; current staffing level: 1 health worker). figure 4: a health centre level iii (laboratory, anc/ob + integrated hiv care) figure 5: patient beds in level iii facility consilience siegel: act resistance figure 6: monocular microscope (best suited to a 6th form biology class – not powerful enough to carry out necessary analyses) figure 7: binocular microscope donated by amref figure 8: empty solar-powered blood bank. figure 9: solar power for blood bank. figure10: chloroquine injection being used [and reused] in a remote health cente 170 consilience figure 11: expired drugs waiting [months] for collection . figure 12: cold chain fridge out of action due a lack of gas. figure 13: the [only] midwife leaves a health center iii for a day of immunization outreach, after spending all night with a difficult delivery. consilience siegel: act resistance bibliography n.b. personal conversations, observations and experiences were drawn upon during the compilation of this study. all are true, and took place during of july and august 2008 in uganda. interview with colonel robert leitch, m.b. e. in kampala, uganda, august 2008 ajayi et al. (2008). effectiveness of artemisinin-based combination therapy used in the context of home management of malaria: a report from three study sites in sub-saharan africa. malaria journal 2008, 7:190 doi:10.1186/1475-2875-7190 amref-uganda: malaria, aids and tb (mat) integrated model, luwero and kiboga districts – baseline study, june/july 2008. not yet published. center for disease control and prevention. antibiotic resistance: questions and answers. http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/community/anitbioticresistance-faqs.htm#4, accessed november 2008. malaria consortium: indoor residual spraying, http://www.malariaconsortium.org/page.php?id=107, accessed november 2008. policy and strategy for insecticide treated nets, malaria control programme, ministry of health, uganda, march 2003: http://www.health.go.ug/mcp/itn_policy_strategy%20final.pdf, accessed november 2008. unicef 2006 demographics statistics: http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/ world health organization (2006): facts on acts (artemisinin-based combination therapies. january 2006 update. world health organization (2008): report of a meeting on containment of artemisinin tolerance, 19th january, geneva, switzerland, isbn 978 92 4 159681 7 (nlm classification: wc 770) http://www.rbm.who.int/cmc_upload/0/000/015/364/rbminfosheet_9.htm, accessed november 2008. world health organization. (2006). diagnostics for tuberculosis: global demand and market potential. special programme for research and training in tropical http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/community/anitbiotic-resistance-faqs.htm#4 http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/community/anitbiotic-resistance-faqs.htm#4 http://www.malariaconsortium.org/page.php?id=107 http://www.health.go.ug/mcp/itn_policy_strategy%20final.pdf http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/ http://www.rbm.who.int/cmc_upload/0/000/015/364/rbminfosheet_9.htm 172 consilience diseases. foundation for innovative diagnostics. http://www.health.go.ug/health_units.htm, accessed novermber 2008. world health organization (2008). malaria rapid diagnostic tests: what is an rdt? http://www.wpro.who.int/sites/rdt/whatis/list.htm, accessed november 2008. world health organization (2006): meeting on the production of artemisinin and artemisininbased combination therapies, 6-7th june 2005, arusha, united republic of tanzania, global malaria programme, who/htm/mal/2006.1113 zurovac et al. (2008). malaria case-management under artemether-lumefantrine treatment policy in uganda, malaria journal, 7:181. published online 19/09/2008. doi: 10.1186/1475-2875-7-181. http://www.health.go.ug/health_units.htm http://www.wpro.who.int/sites/rdt/whatis/list.htm consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 5, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 25-52 public-private dichotomy in utilization of health care services in india chandan kumar indian institute of technology, roorkee c.kumar803@gmail.com ravi prakash karnataka health promotion trust ravistats@gmail.com abstract this paper attempts to highlight the differences in utilization of health care services provided by the public and private sectors in india. in addition, it also explores a marked regional pattern in utilization of health services. using the largescale national survey data (dlhs rch-ii, 2002-04 and 60th round national sample survey, 2004), the authors have selected socio-economic as well as demographic factors determining health treatment seeking behavior, in terms of availing services from public or private sources, which have been addressed with objectivity. furthermore, selected states of india have been ranked on the basis of extent of inequality (in terms of economic status) in utilization of health services from public and private sources. the paper, in its totality, advocates for economically affordable and better quality health care services for the masses. author’s note chandan kumar received an m.phil in population studies from the international institute for population sciences, mumbai in 2008. he is pursuing a ph.d. in the department of humanities and social sciences at the indian institute of technology, roorkee. his research interests include population and development, health care services, educational inequality, education and development. ravi prakash received a ph.d. in population studies from the international institute for population sciences (iips), mumbai in 2010. presently, he works with the karnataka health promotion trust (khpt) in bangalore, india. keywords: health service utilization, public vs. private health sources, india, regional pattern, dlhs rch-ii, national sample survey. in the present era of population growth and demographic restructuring, the burden of providing health care has increased. many countries have pursued health services distribution to their citizenry through merely expanding services with nongovernmental organization (ngo) assistance. this solution is not permanent, especially in developing democratic countries like india, where the prime duty of the government is to provide better and equally accessible services to every strata of the population. nonetheless, concerns about the ability of governments to finance health services adequately, the poor performance of public health service delivery systems and the desire to expand the choices available to patients have led a number of asian countries to mailto:c.kumar803@gmail.com mailto:ravistats@gmail.com 26 consilience encourage the expansion of private-sector healthcare (william & patricia, 1997). india is not an exception; private health care services are increasingly prevalent throughout the nation. today, the private sector provides almost 75 percent of health services in india (nrhm, 2005-12). the real victims of this unregulated spread of private health services in india are the poor, who need better and cheaper services but are not able to afford high priced private health care. if the government assumes that the people prefer private services over public services as a matter of choice, it need only motivate private services to enter into the health sector. however this would be a problem for the development of sustainable health services in the country. the present study attempts to explore this issue of public-private dichotomy in indian health care services. people, especially women—the focal point of country’s reproductive and child health care services—switch over to private health services once they get their first treatment in public care. this paper will also look into the factors that determine a patient’s decision to choose private health care sources over public ones.1 almost seventy percent of india’s population lives in rural areas that lack adequate health facilities. private health services are often concentrated in areas with better infrastructure facilities where they can profit more. thus, they are unable to satisfy rural health care needs. even if private services are available in rural areas, the quality differs as compared to that of private providers in urban areas. to some extent, private health services satisfy the needs of patients when compared to public health services. in some cases we find that the failure in providing treatment is not substantially lower in private services as compared to public services. post-treatment, however, people are more likely to follow-up with private rather than public services. bhat (1997) sheds light on the growth of private sector over the years. he argues that a number of factors have triggered it, including a new national economic policy, the rapid influx of medical technology, growing public sector hospital deficits and a rising middle class. its growth has profound implications for the character of the current indian healthcare system and its future course. recent studies indicate that private health care significantly affects both the cost and quality of health care services in india (uplekar, 1989; duggal and amin, 1989; vishwanathan and rohde, 1990; yesudian, 1990). it is evident that the people of india, including the poor, make considerable use of the private health sector, but at what cost? the national sample survey (nss) data reveals that the average cost of treatment in the private sector for rural and urban inpatients were 2.1 to 2.4 times higher than in the public sector respectively from 1995-96 (india health report, 2003). the national rural health mission (nrhm) document has states that curative services favor the rich. for every rupee spent on the poorest twenty percent of the population, three rupees are spent on the richest quintile (singh, 2006). the recent findings (nss, 2004) reveal that most of the people in northern states, especially uttar pradesh and uttaranchal, and north eastern states, such as nagaland, mizoram and assam, finance more than eighty percent of their health treatment expenditure from other sources, such as borrowings, 1 public and private health care services will be extensively used in this paper as modern institutional health care services. public health care services which may even somewhere be used as govt. health services includes all types of hospitals (e.g. uhc/uhp/ufwc, chc/rural hospital, primary health center, sub-center/anm, ayush hospital/clinic etc.) mobile clinic, anganwadi/icds center, asha, other community-based health workers etc. organized and administered by government of india or its states. private health care services also include hospitals, clinics, mobile clinics, but administered by individuals or private organizations including private practitioners/doctors, pharmacy/drugstore etc. consilience kumar et al: public-private dichotomy contributions from friends and relatives, and by selling ornaments. the increasing gaps in health service utilization from public versus private sources reinforce existing inequalities in the country.2 the rich benefit from having access to both better quality health care services in the private sector and to subsidized services from government sources. the poor lose out on quality in the public sector and cannot afford private health care services. utilization of health services differs by the demographic and socio-economic status of the individual as well, in addition to the availability, accessibility and quality of services in different places or regions. there appears to be a considerable convergence of both research and opinion concluding that the ability to pay is the major determinant of the utilization of health services, once symptoms are perceived as serious. the cultural and socio-psychological factors once thought to account for much of the observed variations among social classes and ethnic groups in their utilization behavior are largely irrelevant (bice et al. 1972, 1973; mechanic 1969; and montiero 1973). as discussed later in the paper, the economic status of the individual affects the utilization of health care services in different states of india.3 finally, for selected states of india (for which the sample size is sufficient), a ranking based on the extent of inequality in terms of the economic standard of the population in utilizing public and private health care services is presented. this paper will attempt to determine in which states inequality is higher in terms of utilization of different reproductive and child health (rch) care services and in terms of general health care from the public and private sectors. data and methods the study utilizes data from national sample survey (nss, 60th round: januaryjune, 2004), conducted by the national sample survey organization (nsso), a division of the government of india. the survey covers the curative aspects of the general health care system in india and also the utilization of health care services provided by the public and private sector, while measuring the expenditure households incur from using these services. it is based on the information collected over six months in 2004, from 47,302 rural and 26,566 urban households spanning the entire country. the enquiry on morbidity was conducted with a reference period of 15 days. all ailments suffered by each member, both present as well as the deceased, and whether or not the patient was hospitalized for treatment, were recorded from sample households. in addition, information was collected for every hospitalization of a member, whether living or deceased at the time of survey, and during the 365 days preceding the date of enquiry. information on the utilization of health care services by household members as inpatients of hospitals during the 365 days prior to the survey, separately for rural and urban areas, has been extracted from the above mentioned source. information on the utilization of health services for different reproductive and 2 equality of utilization is best understood as being a situation where patients with equal needs for health care receive equal treatment, both in terms of the volume and the quality of the services (mooney, 1983). equality of access represents a situation where people with equal needs have equal opportunity to use health services (mooney et al., 1991). it is a supply side phenomenon; equal access is achieved when patients with the same needs face the same costs of health care consumption both in terms of time and money. 3 economic status of the people is considered in this paper on the basis of the household standard of living and the monthly per capita expenditure, used for services received from dlhs-rch-ii survey and national sample survey (60th round) respectively. 28 consilience child health care components have also been drawn from the district level household survey (dlhs)-rch–ii. the survey extends the information on induced abortions, antenatal, natal and post-natal care, family planning services and the rti/sti related components of the women in reproductive age group. this survey also provides information on child health care. in addition, maps have been prepared to reveal marked state-wise variations in the utilization of public and private health services in general, for different reproductive and child health care component and for the utilization of health care services in rural and urban areas separately, using a geographical information system (gis) package. according to the recent nss survey (2004), almost 97 and 96 percent of rural and urban inpatients of hospitals respectively received health treatment from the private sources during the period of one year before the survey. accordingly, as such a vast majority of the study’s population had means to access such services, there is likely a bias toward a higher socio-economic background in the study’s sample. a solution to correct for this potential problem employs a logistic regression model, separately for rural and urban areas. the dependent variable is the population, who received treatment as inpatients from private health services (public health services=0, private health services=1) during the last one year before survey in 2004. the age composition of the population, sex composition, marital status, religion, social group, education level, household size, monthly per capita expenditure (mpce) and nature of ailment are considered as independent predictors. seven more separate regressions were carried out considering the inclination toward private health sources in the case of other reproductive and child health care services. these services were related to: induced abortion, antenatal check-ups, temporary contraceptive use, treatment for any health problem during pregnancy, place of delivery (excluding home delivery), rti/sti related treatment, and the treatment of diarrhea/pneumonia to children below three years of age. these were considered as dependent variables in separate logistic regression models. the possible available variables were used as independent predictors in the model. some of these were the age of women, years of schooling of women and spouse, marital duration, caste, religion, reasons for not visiting government health services, household standard of living, residential status, and a few macro regions of india. these macro regions encompassed: northern hilly region, which includes the states of jammu & kashmir, himachal pradesh, uttaranchal, sikkim and the north-eastern states; western high economy region, which includes the states of maharashtra, gujarat, punjab, haryana and delhi; centralwestern-eastern (cwe) low economy region, which includes the states of uttar pradesh, bihar, jharkhand, orissa, madhya pradesh, chhattisgarh, rajasthan and west bengal (the later might be referred to as representative of the eag (empowered action group) states); and, lastly, the southern region of india, which includes the four southern states of andhra pradesh, tamil nadu, kerala and karnataka. to study the inequality in the utilization of health services (i.e. public and private health services): (a) for general health indicator in rural and urban areas separately, and (b) for various reproductive and child health services (rch) within public and private health services, among the three economic groups across the selected states of india, a simple measure of association has been used. the economic groups were represented by the proportions of three equally comparative groups in terms of mpce quartile, which was used for nss data set and in terms of standard of living (used for dlhs-rch-ii data set) in the present paper. the standard of living index (sli) is based on different consilience kumar et al: public-private dichotomy facilities and possession of amenities in a household. to understand whether distribution of population by utilization of health services for different health care or treatment differs according to mpce group or sli group, the study employed a chi-square (χ2) test of association between the two variables. if the test revealed significant value of χ2 – which indicates an association or inequality in the distribution between two variables – the degree of association was measured by computing √(χ2/n). an association between mpce or sli and the utilization of health services by public and private sources revealed that the population of different economic groups was not equal in terms of their use of two different health services. following from this finding, states were ranked according to the value of √(χ2/n). the lower rank indicates a strong association, which implies high inequality while a higher rank indicates weak association, impliying low inequality. in the case of states with the same values of √(χ2/n), tied ranks were awarded. results and discussion utilization pattern of health care services in india the national sample survey (2004) with its 250,862 sample size in rural areas and 132,638 samples in urban areas (out of which more than 40 percent of household members in both rural as well as urban areas had experienced any health problem in the last year and also received treatment as inpatients of hospitals) provided an opportunity to assess the utilization pattern of health care services empirically. out of the forty percent of the population who experienced any health problem, two percent received services exclusively from public health sources, 53 percent exclusively from private sources and 45 percent from both, in rural areas. the figures are roughly the same in urban areas, where there is 3 percent exclusive use of public health sources, 57 percent exclusive use of private health sources, and 40 percent use of both. if we look at the information in another way, we can say almost 97 percent inpatients in rural and 96 percent in urban areas received treatment at least once in private health services in the year before the survey. the second round of the dlhs-rch (2002-04) provides information on the treatment seeking behavior for many components of reproductive and child health care services. for instance, the incidence of women in reproductive age-groups experiencing induced abortions, antenatal, natal or post natal health care services, or any health problem during pregnancy, and the treatment of their children in infancy. considering the three years period before the survey, 2002-04 (dlhs-rch-ii) data on the last pregnancy outcome of 38,182 women was extracted. it was found that, of the sample 94 percent of women had live births, 1 percent experienced stillbirths, 2 percent had spontaneous abortions and almost 3 percent of women reported induced abortions. about 66 percent of induced abortions were performed by private services, out of which almost 67 percent of the women experienced health problems within 6 weeks of abortion, compared to only 26 percent of such women in public health care services (table 1). 30 consilience table 1: india: performed induced abortions and health problems experienced after abortion by health services, 1999-01 to 2002-04 (dlhsrch ii) induced abortion performed during 3 years before survey health problem experienced within 6 weeks of abortion no. of cases percent no. of cases percent govt. services 314 27.4 60 25.8 private services 752 65.6 156 66.7 others 80 7.0 17 7.5 total 1146 100.0 233 100.0 however, during the second term of treatment for the emerged health problems due to induced abortion, 27 percent of women who had earlier performed their abortions at public health centers now opted for private health services. on the other hand, despite having the large number of unsuccessful cases of induced abortions in private health care centers, only 7 percent of women who had earlier had their abortion at private health centers went to public services for their second treatment, and 12 percent of those cases received treatment or consultation from other sources as depicted in table 2. table 2: india: health treatment after having health problem due to abortion by health services: 1999-01 to 2002-04 (dlhsrch ii) health treatment or consultation received after abortion percent of abortions, earlier performed by govt. health services percent of abortions, earlier performed by private health services govt. services 68.8 6.8 private services 27.1 81.5 others 4.1 11.7 total 100 100.0 since the government of india drew special attention to reproductive and child health care services after the 1994 icpd, provision of services like antenatal check-ups and the distribution of other supplementary courses in terms of iron folic acid (ifa) tablets and/or tetanus injections have substantially improved. however, 49 percent of women still received antenatal check-ups from private sources compared to 45 percent from public sources and 6 percent from other sources. on the other hand, the maximum proportion of women (55 percent) received ifa tablets during pregnancy from public sources, compared to only 18 percent from private sources and 28 percent from other sources. such distribution becomes easily understandable since the services were free of cost. during the 1999-2000 period and 2002-04 (three years), out of the 507,622 women in reproductive age groups (which includes ages 15 to 44), 13 percent of women experienced any type of health problem during their pregnancy. of these, 13 of percent women (66,747), more than 60 percent received treatment or consultation from private sources. there was no evidence of substantial variation in services received for different types of health problems during pregnancy. the proportion of women went for different health services for major health problems during pregnancy can be observed in table a1 consilience kumar et al: public-private dichotomy (annexure) table 3: india: place of delivery and post-delivery complication by women for their last live or still births by health services during the 3 years before survey, 2002-04 place of delivery post-delivery complication (during the first week after delivery) no. of women percent no. of women percent govt. services 7471 19.1 2104 28.2 private services 8407 21.5 2024 24.1 home 22956 58.6 7634 33.3 others 313 0.8 94 30.1 total 39146 100.0 11856 30.3 in the periods 1999 to 2000 and 2002-04, almost 59 percent of women (22,956) were reported to have delivered their children at home. 22 percent of women delivered their babies at private health centers, and 19 percent delivered in public health centers. as table 3 illustrates, the chances of post-delivery complications appeared to be highest in cases of home deliveries and deliveries at other places, while there does not appear to be a significant different in post-delivery complication experiences between institutional (i.e. public and private) deliveries. this is a refutation of the myth that the quality of services in private sources is always better than the public sources, as the statistics show that the chances of failure in both theses institutional services are not considerably different. however, if post delivery complications emerged after deliveries performed at the home, more than 60 percent of women went for private health care services, compared to only 21 percent for public services and 18 percent for other services (table 4). table 4: india: post-delivery treatment by health services during the 3 years period before survey, 2002-04 percent of deliveries earlier performed at govt. services private services home govt. services 46.4 13.0 20.5 private services 45.4 79.4 61.1 others 8.2 7.5 18.4 total 100.0 100.0 100.0 32 consilience table 5: india: modern contraceptive use and resulted health problems by health services during the last 3 years before survey, 2002-04 govt. services private services others modern contraceptive methods c.u.* h.p.* * c.u. h.p. c.u. h.p. female sterilization 80.4 17.3 18.0 14.2 1.6 21.8 vasectomy 78.4 11.2 12.3 23.8 9.4 18.8 iud/copper-t/loop 44.6 18.0 53.7 12.3 1.7 28.6 oral pills 16.5 18.8 78.5 15.6 5.0 14.2 condom/nirodh 13.5 2.4 82.5 1.6 4.0 0.0 total 58.9 16.8 38.6 10.5 2.5 14.8 * contraceptive use ** health problem emerged after contraceptive use the proportion of health treatment or consultation sought after having problems with contraceptive use by health services, in the 3 years before the survey, i.e. from 20022004 is shown in table 6. almost 41 percent and 49 percent of women who had earlier received contraceptives from public and other sources respectively, used private health services. table 6: india: health treatment or consultation received after having problem with contraceptive use by health services during the last 3 years before survey, 2002-04 percent of women, who used contraceptive methods earlier from govt. sources private sources others govt. services 47.1 4.6 9.2 private services 40.5 80.3 44.8 others 12.4 15.1 45.9 total 100.0 100.0 100.0 other sensitive health care treatments were also served primarily by the private health services. as can be seen in table a2 (annexure), almost 60 percent of women receive treatment or consultation for menstruation related problems and 61 percent for rti/sti related problems from private sources (against 25 and 22 percent from public sources respectively). similarly, 58 percent of women liked to go for private services in case of any abnormal vaginal discharge. these figures indicate a modest preference for private health services. in the case of child health care services, too, one can clearly observe the bias toward private services, except in the case of immunization (which is provided by the government free of cost) for children. almost 13 percent children of age 0-71 months had diarrhea during the last two weeks before the survey, and for the same reference period about 16 percent cases of respondents reported cases of pneumonia. out of these cases, 68 percent of children with diarrhea and 69 percent of children with pneumonia were treated with private services (see table a3, annexure). state differentials in utilization of health care services by and large, there appeared a distinct geographical pattern that explained state consilience kumar et al: public-private dichotomy differentials in utilization of the two distinct health care services across the country. in general, in the northern hilly region, the growth of private health care providers has not yet grown as much as in the central and southern states of india. this may be due to the fact that the level of urbanization or access to nearby, developed urban areas is positively associated with the development of private health services. this is apparent in figures 1 and 2. the utilization pattern of public and private health care services exclusively as well as the common services by the household members as inpatients of the hospital during the last year before survey (2004) in rural areas has been shown in figure 1. this represents the utilization of health care services, especially hospital-based care in rural india, irrespective of age, sex, education, socio-economic status of the people, as well as the severity or kind of diseases. it is a crude picture of health care utilization, as it only includes inpatient cases. nonetheless, it gives a large general overview. in these maps, one can easily observe the dominancy of private sector providers over public health care services, even in many rural areas. maharashtra, punjab, andhra pradesh, gujarat, are the states where, even in rural areas, more than 70 percent of the people exclusively utilized private hospitals. these are all states that, to some extent, are recognized as well functioning, where the people’s ability to pay for high priced private health care providers might be relatively highly. however, bihar, one of the poorest states in the union, is distinctly ahead of any state in india in terms of utilization of private services, figure 1. india (rural): treatment of household members (as inpatients) by public and private sources exclusively, 2003-04 figure 2. india (urban): treatment of household members (as inpatients) by public and private sources exclusively, 2003-04 34 consilience where more than four-fifths (86%) of the residents in rural bihar were reported to utilize private hospitals exclusively during the period. among all the states in india, jharkhand, madhya pradesh, assam and chhattisgarh had the highest proportion of people who utilized only public health care services during the period, yet in none of the states did more than 6 percent of the population do so. the higher proportions of public health care services in these less developed states of the country may indicate that people do not use private health care because they cannot afford it. it also suggests that better provision of health services by public institutions can raise public health service utilization. in almost every state in india, in urban areas, the utilization pattern of both the health care services is higher than in rural areas. in bihar, maharashtra, karnataka, meghalaya, gujarat and punjab, more than 70 percent of the people in urban areas utilized private hospitals during the year 2003-04. the utilization of public health services in urban areas is also far better than rural areas in almost all the states. figures 3 and 4 display utilization patterns of public and private health care services for various reproductive and child health (rch) care components. on average, 67 percent of women in india utilized public health care only to receive family planning services, about 11 percent each for delivery purposes and antenatal care services, about 6 percent for the consultation or treatment of rti/sti related problems, and about 3 percent for child health care services, while the utilization is even less than 2 percent for any health problem during pregnancy. the proportion of women, who went for induced abortions in public health care services, is almost negligible (0.37%). this suggests this fact that the utilization of public health care services depends mainly on the subsidized services. this is because family planning programs during the last three decades have been run from government sources. however, the proportion also varies by state. in andhra pradesh, around four in every five women received family planning services from public sources during 2002-04. in addition, more than seventy percent of women in gujarat, karnataka, maharashtra, tamil nadu, bihar and punjab had received only family planning services from public sources, compared to the less than 30 percent of women that received other rch related care from public health care sources. consilience kumar et al: public-private dichotomy on the other hand, the utilization pattern of rch care components from private health care services did not appear as skewed as from public health care services. there were only 35 percent of women in india who reported receiving family planning services from private sources, while almost 21 percent did so for sensitive rti/sti related problems, around 14 percent each for delivery purposes and child health care services, 11 percent for antenatal care services, 4 percent for any health problem during pregnancy, and almost all cases of induced abortions. this utilization pattern for the rch care component from public as well as private providers reveals that for sensitive health care cases, e.g., health problem during pregnancy, abortions, delivery, and child health related problems, people always prefer to go for private services. public services are used to benefit from government programs or to avail of free services or distribution of any health related component (e.g., medicines, contraceptives, immunization etc.). determinants influencing the utilization of health care services the characteristics of the population opting for private health services differs significantly in rural and urban areas. in rural areas, adjusting for the influence of different socio-economic and demographic determinants, the impact of income level of population seems more prominent and highly significant. the probability of using private health services, in rural areas, is higher in all quintiles, in comparison to the lowest quintile of mpce (table 10). among inpatient cases, the probability of utilizing private health services was lower among higher age groups in both rural and urban areas. there was no clear distinction found between both the sexes and among the inpatients of different marital status in the utilization of private health services. among different figure 3. india: utilization of private health services for different rch care components, 2002-04 figure 4. india: utilization of private health services for different rch care components, 2002-04 36 consilience religion and social groups, both in rural and urban areas, the probability of using private health services seems different. in rural areas, the probability of utilizing private health services was found lower among muslims compared to hindus, while it was five times higher among christians (odds ratio = 5.908, p<.001). on the other hand, the probability of utilizing private health services was higher among all other religious groups compared to hindus, in urban areas. assessing the role of different social groups or castes on the utilization of private health services, we observe a hierarchical pattern in the odds ratios, in rural areas, recording an odds ratio of 1.284 (p<.10) for schedule castes (scs), 1.512 (p<.05) for other backward castes (obcs), and a maximum of 1.564 (p<.05) for other castes, taking the scheduled tribes (sts) (believed to be the most deprived social group in india) as the reference group. on the other hand, the probability increases tremendously for the scs (odds ratio = 2.345, p<.001) and the others (odds ratio = 2.149, p<.001) group, compared to sts, in urban areas. the level of education among the inpatients was not found to contribute significantly to their choice of private or public health services. also, with an increase in household size, the probability of utilizing private health services also increases. this supports the hypothesis that the bigger the family size, and more wage earners, people will have greater economic security, which translates to better health security. the utilization of private health services was also observed likely to be more in case of sensitive diseases like gynecological disorders or heart diseases, compared to other kind of ailments. in rural areas, inpatients that suffered from any gynecological disorders were about two and a half times more likely to opt for private health services over public services, compared to general diseases like diarrhea or dysentery. on the other hand, in urban areas, gastritis/gastric or peptic ulcer, heart diseases, fever of unknown origin, accidents/injuries, and other diagnosed ailments (apart from gynecological disorders) were also observed to increase the probability of utilizing private health services significantly. similarly, regarding the use of private health services among all other reproductive and child health care services (here in the present paper, seven health care services have been considered), the impact of standard of living (sli) of the women appeared significant and implied that the utilization of private health services were more in high and middle sli group in comparison to the women of low sli group, except in the case of induced abortion (table 11). table 10: results of logistic regression models (odds ratios) for the population, who received treatment as inpatient from private health services (during the last 1 year before survey, jan-june, 2004) in india. demographic and socio-economic characteristics exp β (odds ratio) rural urban age composition below 5® 5-15 0.925 0.973 15-35 0.646** 0.482*** 35-60 0.567*** 0.365*** 60 & above 0.591** 0.538** sex composition male® consilience kumar et al: public-private dichotomy female 1.011 1.052 marital status never married® currently married 1.002 1.014 others 1.200 1.262 religion hindu® muslim 0.582*** 1.558*** christian 5.908*** 1.558** others 0.986 1.864** social groups st® sc 1.284* 2.345*** obc 1.512** 1.953*** others 1.564** 2.149*** education level illiterate® below primary 0.727** 0.978 primary 0.796** 0.881 middle 1.021 0.925 high school & above 1.070 1.095 household size 1 to 5® 5 to 10 1.119 1.243** 10 & above 2.150*** 2.006*** mpce α (in quintile) q1® q2 1.736*** 1.148 q3 1.977*** 1.033 q4 1.707*** 1.238* q5 1.790*** 2.308*** nature of ailment diarrhea / dysentery® gastritis/gastric or peptic ulcer 1.109 3.009*** heart disease 0.734** 1.981*** gynecological disorders 2.486*** 3.027*** fever(unknown origin) 0.909 3.988*** accidents/injuries/burns/ fractures/poisoning 1.098 1.663*** other diagnosed ailments 1.381** 2.215*** α monthly per capita expenditure ® reference category * significant at 10% level ** significant at 5% level *** significant at 1% level the most important result to emerge from this study is evidence of the bias toward the use of private health services, which may be due to the view that government health care services are not of good quality. as we can clearly observe in table 11, women who went to private health services for induced abortions, when asked to give reasons for not visiting government health services, reported the poor quality of government services (odds ratio= 6.429, p<.001) and were more likely to be of the opinion that in government health care services cases are not examined properly, as 38 consilience compared to reason that government health services were inconveniently located (reference category). among the four macro regions of india, the western higher economy region was found to have higher use of private health services for all selected reproductive and child health services than the other three macro regions. ranking of states by extent of inequality in the utilization of health care services knowing there is a marked inequality in utilization of health services among people of different economic groups, it appears appropriate to assess which states of the country were characterized by higher extent of inequality among different economic categories using a complete summary measure of inequality. state values of √(χ2/n) given in table 12 for the utilization of different health services show whether there was significant association between economic groups and the given indicator. if the value is not significant, it implies that economic status does not have any effect on that indicator, and the situation with respect to that indicator is more or less the same among the given groups. if the value is significant but low it means economic group has only a moderate effect on that indicator. if the value is statistically significant and high, it shows a strong correlation between given categories and that indicator implying that the specific category does affect the dimension represented by the particular indicator and that the value of that indicator is high in certain groups and not in others. it is obvious that if there is notable inequality among economic groups regarding the dimensions reflected in these indicators, the value of √(χ2/n) is likely to be high and significant. a value that is not significant but low can be taken as an indication of low inequality among the groups with respect to that particular indicator. in this sense, state ranks given in table 12, represent the relative position of states by inequality among three economic groups in utilizing the selected indicators of health services. the first rank shows the highest inequality while 14th or 15th rank shows the lowest inequality. for the same values tied ranks have been assigned. this includes the services sought for the ailing persons during the fifteen days before the survey and the day before the date of survey. the average ranking of both these components, sought from services of public and private health centers, are calculated for rural and urban areas. the overall pattern of index values clearly shows that the extent of inequality among different economic groups is lower among the services provided by public health care centers and centers in rural areas. the result shows that the inequality in utilization of different reproductive and child health care services provided by public health care centers was the highest in west bengal, followed by assam, orissa, jharkhand, chhattisgarh, uttar pradesh, madhya pradesh and so on. however, the index value was very low (below 0.2) for all these states, with the exception of west bengal. this shows that inequality is rather low in the utilization of different health care services provided by public health care centers. in contrast, there was lower inequality in the utilization of reproductive and child health service from private sources in west bengal. to some extent, this can be explained by the fact that private services are less encouraged by the communist state government. in addition, it could also be postulated that most of the reproductive and child health services that private sources provide were received by the people of almost same economic class. on the other hand, for the treatment of general consilience kumar et al: public-private dichotomy ailments, rural west bengal had the highest economic inequality in seeking health care services (i.e. public vs. private) among all other states. in urban areas too, it is second to the state of tamil nadu, which recorded the highest economic inequality in utilizing health care services. table 11: results of logistic regression models for the utilization of private health services in case of various health care components independ ent variables referenc e category ia 1 anc 2 pdt 3 tcu 4 rti/st i 5 dia./pn ea. 6 ahp 7 age in complete d years 1.112 * women's years of schooling 1.111 ** 1.085* ** 1.110* * 1.048* * 1.047* * 0.985* 1.05 3 spouse's years of schooling 1.022 1.042* ** 0.977 1.059* ** 1.017 1.046 1.02 7** marital duration 0.869 ** 0.985 0.990 0.994 1.00 5* age at consummatio n of marriage 18 years and above < 18 years 3.858 ** 1.147 age of women < 25 years 25 years & above 0.942 0.742 1.057 1.126 0.95 7 social groups (sc) others 0.394 ** 0.581* ** 1.277 0.951 0.697* * 1.321 0.58 4*** (st) 0.683 0.828 1.263 0.656 1.478 0.955 0.66 4** (obc) 0.844 1.101* 1.426 1.203* 1.092 0.971 1.09 3 religion (muslim) hindu 0.291 ** 1.149* 3.593* * 0.910 0.963 0.871 0.93 4 (christian) 0.473 1.526* * 1.549 1.509 0.732 0.329* * 1.00 7 (others) 1.609 0.833 2.693 1.352 0.750 0.400* * 1.12 1 daughter (surviving) (2) 1 1.381 (3 and more) 6.579 * children (surviving) (4 & more) 1-3 0.631 reasons of abortion unplanne d pregnanc 40 consilience kerala recorded the lowest economic inequality in utilizing different reproductive and child health care services from either source (i.e. public or private). however, the seventh and the fourth ranks of the state in seeking services for general ailment from public versus private sources in rural and urban areas respectively clearly indicates the use by lower income groups of public health care centers and higher income groups of private health care centers. apart from west bengal, the states of gujarat, jharkhand, chhattisgarh, madhya pradesh, maharashtra and uttar pradesh had the highest economic inequality in reproductive and child health care services rendered from both public and private sources. this means that services in both the service-groups (i.e from public and/or y complication in pregnancy 2.010 * last child too young 0.743 reasons of not visiting govt. services not conveniently located time not suited 1.142 0.787** 0.822 0.870 0.632** 0.470** 0.8 99 poor quality of services 6.429** * 1.659** * 0.871 1.520** * 1.294** 0.760 1.6 95* ** not examine properly 3.710** 1.678** * 1.757 1.369** 1.728** 0.868 1.7 74* ** standard of living (medium) low 0.350 1.165** 1.675* 1.112 0.975 1.061 0.9 52 (high) 0.292* 1.940** * 1.246 1.537** 1.300 2.084** 1.4 93* * residential status (urban) rural 1.426 0.987 1.608 2.090** * 1.187 1.310 1.0 66 macro regions northern hilly region western higher economy region 3.701 1.845** * 1.268 0.747 2.543** 3.207** 1.8 94* * cwe 8 low economy region 2.499 1.182 1.781 0.876 1.304 1.228 1.9 17* * southern region 3.927 2.318** * 0.830 0.303** * 1.264 1.656 1.7 96* * 1induced abortion 2antenatal check-ups 3post delivery treatment in pvt. services of those women who delivered her child at home 4temporary contraceptive use 5problems related to rti/sti 6treatment of diarrhea /pneumonia to children of age below 3 years 7treatment for any health problem during pregnancy 8central-western-eastern * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.5 *** p < 0.01 consilience kumar et al: public-private dichotomy private sources) were received by people from a variety of economic classes. this could further be observed in the increased utilization of private health care services by lower income groups, most probably due to an increase in affordable private services. the southern states of andhra pradesh and tamil nadu also recorded high economic inequality for the treatment of general ailments. 42 consilience table 12: india: ranking of selected states by extent of inequality across three economic groups based on sli 1 and mpce 2 groups in utilization of health care services utilization of public health services 3 utilization of private health services 4 utilization of health services in rural areas 5 utilization of health services in urban areas 6 states √(χ 2 /n) rank √(χ 2 /n) rank √(χ 2 /n) rank √(χ 2 /n) rank uttar pradesh 0.152 6 0.331 7 0.095 13 0.112 13 bihar 0.108 12 0.253 15 0.012* 15 0.043* 16 west bengal 0.242 1 0.284 12 0.236 1 0.322 2 andhra pradesh 0.103 13 0.326 8 0.193 4 0.207 8 maharashtra 0.155 5 0.348 6 0.215 2 0.258 6 rajasthan 0.112 11 0.315 9 0.134 8 0.102 14 madhya pradesh 0.145 7 0.400 2 0.121 10 0.282 3 assam 0.198 2 0.259 14 0.096 12 0.271 5 tamil nadu 0.118 10 0.301 11 0.213 3 0.328 1 orissa 0.196 3 0.303 10 0.074 14 0.151 11 karnataka 0.102 14 0.386 4 0.105 11 0.199 9 haryana 0.129 8 0.265 13 0.105 11 0.218 7 gujarat 0.119 9 0.398 3 0.177 5 0.183 10 jharkhand 0.159 4 0.377 5 0.122 9 0.057* 15 chhattisgarh 0.155 5 0.477 1 0.172 6 0.124 12 kerala 0.046* 15 0.172 16 0.141 7 0.273 4 1 standard of living index 2 monthly per capita expenditure * not significant 3 extent of inequality across three sli groups in utilization of public health services for different rch health care components. 4 extent of inequality across three sli groups in utilization of private health services for different rch health care components. 5 extent of inequality across three mpce groups in utilization of public and private health services (for inpatient cases) in rural areas 6 extent of inequality across three mpce groups in utilization of public and private health services (for inpatient cases) in urban areas map: 1 map: 3 map: 8 map: 8 consilience kumar et al: public-private dichotomy conclusion and policy implications the recent patterns in health care provision in india clearly show an inclination toward increased private services, as more than ninety-five percent of inpatients in rural and urban areas reported receiving treatment at least once in the year before the survey through private health services (2003-04). among all the states in india, jharkhand, madhya pradesh, assam and chhattisgarh had the highest proportion of people who solely utilized public health care services during the period, but this was no more than 6 percent of the population. the results also reveal the fact that the utilization of public health care services depends mainly on the provision of government-subsidized services. the utilization pattern of the rch care component from public as well as private providers reveals that for sensitive cases like pregnancy complications, abortions, child delivery and child health, people preferred private services. in the case of general health indicators too, there appeared to be a higher likelihood to utilize private health services in cases with more sensitive diseases, like gynecological disorders or heart diseases, as compared to other ailments. the utilization of public services appeared to be most likely driven by a desire to use government programs that provided free services or distribution of medicines, contraceptives or immunizations. most strikingly, it seems to emerge from this study that there exists a bias toward the use of private health services, due to the perception that government health care services are not high quality and patients do not receive adequate care. however, the study suggests that these misgivings are misplaced as an exploration of the pattern of treatment-failure in both institutional services suggests that in cases of delivery of babies the incidence of post-treatment complications does not differ significantly. the states of gujarat, jharkhand, chhattisgarh, madhya pradesh, maharashtra, uttar pradesh, bihar and west bengal showed the highest economic inequality in reproductive and child health care services rendered from both public and private sources. however, west bengal, maharashtra, tamil nadu, andhra pradesh, and gujarat were observed to be the five states that recorded the highest relative economic inequality in utilization of public versus private health services, for general health indicators in rural india. for urban areas, the top five were tamil nadu, west bengal, madhya pradesh, kerala, and assam. in a nutshell, the paper has provided a holistic view of the pattern of utilization of public and private health services for selected health components; explored a marked regional pattern in utilization of health services; analyzed the extent of economic inequality in choice of public or private health care services; and, finally, made an attempt to highlight those states where there is most need of more affordable health services. more specifically, the eastern and northeastern states of the country need to develop a better infrastructure in the health sector with special focus on child and reproductive health services. further micro level study is needed, especially in rural areas of these regions, to devise specific health infrastructure development to improve the quality of public health providers, and, if possible, after micro-level mapping of the concentration of particular disease, subsidize treatment in a targeted manner. in addition, the scope for public-private partnership at a decentralized level, with absolute commitment from micro-level program executors, is desirable to facilitate better and more affordable health services. 44 consilience acknowledgement the authors express their deep sense of gratitude to the anonymous referees for their useful comments facilitating improvements in the paper. references bhat. r. 1997. regulation of the private health sector in india. in: private health sector growth in asia, issues and implications, ed. by william c. newbrander. chichester: john wiley & sons. bice, thomas w., david l. rabin, barbara h. starfield, and kerr l. white. 1973. economic class and use of physician services. medical care, vol.11, pp. 287-296. bice, thomas w., robert eichhorn, and peter d. fox. 1972. socioeconomic status and use of physician services: a reconsideration. medical care, vol.10, pp. 261-271. nrhm. 2005. national rural health mission: mission document, ministry of health and family welfare, govt. of india. mechanic, david. 1969. illness and cure. in: poverty and health, ed. by john kosa, aaron antonavsky, and irving kenneth zola. cambridge: harvard university press. montiero, lois. 1973. expense is no object..: income and physician visits reconsidered. journal of health and social behavior, vol.14, pp. 99-115. mooney, g.h. 1983. equity in health care: confronting the confusion. effective health care, vol.1, p.179. mooney, g., hall j., donaldsen c, gerard k. 1991. utilization of as a measure of equity: weighing heat? journal of health economics, vol.10, p.475. singh, amarjit. 2006. private public partnership: a solution to maternal mortality. the journal of family welfare, vol.52 (special issue-2006), p.79. uplekar, m. 1989a. implications of prescribing patterns in private doctors in the treatment of pulmonary tuberculosis in bombay, india. research paper no. 41. takemi program in international health. cambridge: harward school of public health. uplekar, m. 1989b. private doctors and public health: the case of leprosy in bombay., india. research paper no. 40. takemi program in international health. cambridge: harward school of public health. vishwanathan, h., and rohde, j. 1990. diarrhea in rural india: a nation –wide study of mothers and practitioners. new delhi: vision books. william n. and patricia m. 1997. the future of health sector reforms in asia, in: private health sector growth in asia, ed. by william c. newbrander. chichester: john consilience kumar et al: public-private dichotomy wiley & sons. yesudian, c. 1990. utilization pattern of health services and its implications for urban health policy. takemi program in international health. cambridge: harward school of public health draft. 46 consilience annexure table a1. india: health services received by women for health problems during last pregnancy: 1999-01 to 2002-04 services received from health problems during pregnancy govt. sources private services others swelling of hands and feet 31.9 64.2 3.9 paleness 34.1 61.9 4.0 visual disturbances 36.3 54.1 9.5 convulsions 37.0 54.0 9.0 others 31.0 62.4 6.6 total 32.9 61.2 6.0 table a2. india: treatment or consultation for rti/sti related problems by health services during the last 3 months before survey, 2002-04 treatment or consultation (percent of women) for problems related to menstruation rti/sti any abnormal vaginal discharge govt. services 25.5 22.0 23.8 private services 59.5 60.9 55.7 others 15.0 17.1 20.4 total 100.0 100.0 100.0 table a3. india: child health care by health services during the last 3 years before survey,2002-04 percent of children, who were treated for or immunized diarrhea pneumonia immunized govt. services 18.7 17.5 62.3 private services 67.8 68.9 15.1 others 13.5 13.6 22.6 total 100.0 100.0 100.0 table a4. india: statewise utilization # of public health services by different rch care component, 2002-04 (dlhs rch-ii) consilience kumar et al: public-private dichotomy reproductive & child health (rch) care component state induced abortio n antenat al care any health problem during pregnancy place of deliver y family planning child health care rti/st i jammu & kashmir 0.05 4.17 1.84 15.24 60.38 8.79 9.53 himachal pradesh 0.28 9.20 1.94 8.82 61.76 3.56 14.42 punjab 0.38 16.83 1.31 5.14 71.01 0.92 4.41 chandigarh* 0.37 11.57 5.22 13.43 44.78 1.87 22.76 uttaranchal 0.17 21.28 1.28 7.49 58.38 2.96 8.44 haryana 0.17 17.03 1.68 6.03 68.74 1.10 5.25 delhi 0.55 15.72 1.66 17.73 50.70 2.07 11.56 rajasthan 0.44 12.88 3.21 11.49 60.04 4.66 7.28 uttar pradesh 0.84 28.29 3.30 11.24 45.66 2.59 8.09 bihar 0.35 8.33 2.62 10.16 72.54 2.18 3.82 sikkim 9.38 0.78 17.97 59.38 3.91 8.59 arunachal pradesh 0.45 16.29 3.17 17.19 42.53 9.05 11.31 nagaland 0.56 28.09 4.49 10.11 47.19 2.81 6.74 manipur 1.28 19.49 2.31 30.77 28.97 9.74 7.44 mizoram 5.86 0.42 15.90 64.02 6.28 7.53 tripura 0.34 5.93 0.85 23.73 51.69 6.44 11.02 meghalaya 28.52 3.87 29.58 22.54 11.97 3.52 assam 1.51 26.97 3.85 14.77 37.06 4.72 11.11 west bengal 0.26 11.40 1.22 17.76 61.95 1.20 6.22 jharkhand 0.52 15.53 3.08 6.84 65.43 3.97 4.63 orissa 1.42 12.36 3.14 13.26 54.25 7.31 8.26 chhattisgarh 0.23 16.95 1.40 6.09 67.74 3.00 4.60 madhya pradesh 0.15 9.06 1.60 10.42 68.53 3.59 6.65 gujarat 0.24 7.73 1.17 8.42 76.31 2.05 4.07 daman & diu * 8.00 12.00 64.00 8.00 8.00 dadra & nagar haveli * 18.37 2.04 8.16 53.06 10.20 8.16 maharashtra 0.29 5.83 1.64 10.68 74.65 2.73 4.18 andhra pradesh 0.02 4.17 0.54 6.77 83.32 1.18 4.01 karnataka 0.19 5.22 0.63 9.38 76.09 2.83 5.66 goa 0.48 4.33 0.96 30.29 55.77 4.33 3.85 lakshadweep * 11.76 5.88 47.06 11.76 11.76 11.76 kerala 0.39 1.60 0.54 13.27 70.07 2.29 11.85 tamil nadu 0.21 3.96 0.59 14.02 73.33 1.60 6.29 pondicherry * 0.29 1.18 0.29 17.11 73.16 1.18 6.78 a & n islands * 3.60 0.72 17.27 63.31 7.91 7.19 india 0.37 10.87 1.69 11.12 66.96 2.71 6.28 48 consilience # percentage of women utilized or consulted public health services for different rch care component *union territories of india table a5. india: statewise utilization # of private health services by different rch care component, 2002-04 (dlhs rch-ii) reproductive & child health (rch) care component state induced abortio n antenata l care any health problem during pregnancy place of deliver y family planning child health care rti/sti jammu & kashmir 3.78 1.10 12.44 73.41 4.27 5.00 himachal pradesh 1.78 5.15 2.38 7.13 51.09 8.91 23.56 punjab 1.47 6.12 1.32 15.00 52.62 9.94 13.53 chandigarh* 1.99 1.99 0.50 3.98 56.72 8.46 26.37 uttaranchal 0.66 4.37 2.15 7.92 42.24 16.01 26.65 haryana 1.22 7.05 2.71 12.85 42.56 14.48 19.14 delhi 1.35 5.07 1.28 8.41 62.99 7.96 12.94 rajasthan 1.05 10.86 4.48 14.44 36.72 13.86 18.59 uttar pradesh 1.34 8.38 5.09 11.05 22.31 22.66 29.16 bihar 1.15 14.09 7.93 14.83 23.23 16.80 21.97 sikkim 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 68.18 6.82 15.91 arunachal pradesh 5.48 1.37 8.22 71.23 2.74 10.96 nagaland 1.04 16.15 4.17 3.65 54.69 5.21 15.10 manipur 0.63 27.50 8.13 13.75 29.38 13.13 7.50 mizoram 21.82 5.45 9.09 34.55 7.27 21.82 tripura 8.20 2.65 3.17 72.75 5.29 7.94 meghalaya 11.72 3.91 11.72 42.19 23.44 7.03 assam 1.06 8.00 3.78 10.00 61.80 4.17 11.19 west bengal 2.25 13.67 6.03 5.33 39.69 8.66 24.37 jharkhand 1.14 16.60 6.72 13.35 33.56 11.24 17.40 orissa 1.40 14.89 4.85 8.05 38.45 14.53 17.84 chhattisgarh 0.57 23.22 3.96 11.66 26.24 15.15 19.21 madhya pradesh 0.65 11.54 5.14 7.75 26.77 19.04 29.11 gujarat 1.97 8.85 3.02 19.00 38.17 13.01 15.99 daman & diu * 2.78 8.33 2.78 16.67 47.22 13.89 8.33 dadra & nagar haveli * 7.50 2.50 15.00 37.50 15.00 22.50 maharashtra 1.13 6.10 3.94 13.72 38.50 15.40 21.21 andhra pradesh 0.25 15.30 2.45 21.03 35.58 9.00 16.38 karnataka 0.82 14.99 2.83 18.16 27.20 16.78 19.22 consilience kumar et al: public-private dichotomy goa 2.42 5.31 0.97 36.71 26.09 12.56 15.94 lakshadweep * 33.33 33.33 33.33 kerala 0.71 4.58 2.79 25.20 38.22 5.94 22.57 tamil nadu 2.41 10.14 2.11 22.90 42.08 4.95 15.40 pondicherry * 2.21 20.59 2.94 19.12 25.74 8.09 21.32 a & n islands * 25.00 58.33 8.33 8.33 india 1.27 10.50 4.17 14.28 35.15 13.64 20.99 # percentage of women utilized or consulted private health services for different rch care component *union territories of india 50 consilience table a6. india: household members (%) got treatment (as inpatient cases) in last 1 year before survey by residence, type of hospital and by economic status, 2004 (nss) urban rural utilization of public services utilization of private services utilization of public services utilization of private services states po or medi um ric h po or med ium rich po or med ium ric h po or med ium rich jammu & kashmir 12. 4 50.7 36. 9 10. 2 42. 2 47.6 4.8 33. 9 61. 3 28.2 71.8 himachal pradesh 32. 8 32.8 34. 4 6.3 45. 6 48.1 11. 1 27. 0 61. 9 7.3 26.0 66.7 punjab 18. 5 51.9 29. 6 25. 7 37. 2 37.1 10. 5 12. 9 76. 5 3.0 18.0 79.0 chandigarh 3.8 29.7 66. 5 17. 2 82.8 7.6 11. 5 80. 9 21.1 78.9 uttaranchal 44. 9 39.5 15. 6 35. 8 39. 6 24.6 14. 8 55. 9 29. 3 8.4 23.7 67.9 haryana 37. 0 36.7 26. 3 17. 4 44. 6 38.0 6.1 12. 3 81. 6 8.2 20.1 71.7 delhi 18. 1 49.3 32. 6 9.4 30. 0 60.6 100 .0 14.0 86.0 rajasthan 35. 7 40.9 23. 4 26. 3 49. 3 24.4 27. 5 37. 1 35. 4 17. 7 35.8 46.5 uttar pradesh 58. 2 29.8 12. 0 46. 8 34. 7 18.4 37. 4 36. 3 26. 2 29. 0 36.8 34.2 bihar 51. 6 34.4 14. 1 56. 7 31. 6 11.7 44. 0 36. 8 19. 2 45. 6 35.4 19.0 sikkim 7.1 49.1 43. 8 27. 5 72.5 18. 8 43. 4 37. 8 11. 1 20.6 68.3 arunachal pradesh 41. 0 52.3 6.7 33. 3 52. 6 14.0 24. 0 29. 1 46. 8 27. 9 25.5 46.7 nagaland 4.0 52.4 43. 7 34. 1 65.9 8.7 91. 3 2.8 97.2 manipur 32. 0 59.1 8.9 14. 9 68. 7 16.4 2.8 23. 2 74. 0 11.7 88.3 mizoram 5.7 45.2 49. 1 9.8 32. 2 58.0 4.1 8.1 87. 8 100. 0 tripura 45. 0 38.0 17. 0 14. 3 24. 3 61.4 34. 1 40. 8 25. 1 2.2 35.6 62.2 meghalaya 29. 3 52.9 17. 9 12. 0 37. 9 50.1 6.3 38. 3 55. 3 17.7 82.3 assam 25. 3 45.2 29. 5 12. 2 31. 8 56.1 19. 8 35. 3 44. 9 13. 3 30.8 55.9 west bengal 44. 2 34.7 21. 1 21. 5 26. 7 51.8 37. 8 37. 8 24. 3 18. 9 33.1 48.0 jharkhand 41. 8 38.2 20. 0 42. 8 33. 2 24.0 49. 8 30. 8 19. 4 41. 7 42.8 15.4 orissa 48. 7 34.2 17. 1 41. 2 27. 7 31.1 58. 7 25. 9 15. 4 50. 3 29.0 20.8 chhattisgarh 41. 8 43.7 14. 6 46. 8 32. 3 20.9 75. 5 16. 0 8.5 59. 3 29.0 11.7 madhya pradesh 64. 8 30.7 4.5 40. 6 39. 5 19.9 43. 5 38. 9 17. 6 36. 2 36.3 27.5 gujarat 24. 1 55.5 20. 4 18. 6 41. 8 39.6 22. 9 37. 9 39. 2 17. 6 24.1 58.3 daman & diu 42.1 57. 4.0 38. 57.9 100 25.7 74.3 consilience kumar et al: public-private dichotomy 9 1 .0 dadra & nagar haveli 13. 0 43.5 43. 5 18. 5 38. 9 42.6 15. 6 18. 8 65. 6 37.1 62.9 maharashtra 42. 1 41.9 16. 0 21. 3 39. 0 39.6 37. 5 37. 7 24. 8 19. 3 36.0 44.7 andhra pradesh 42. 4 43.8 13. 8 27. 2 42. 3 30.5 39. 4 34. 7 25. 8 22. 8 33.4 43.8 karnataka 47. 8 42.2 10. 1 32. 1 40. 9 27.0 33. 4 43. 9 22. 7 27. 8 39.7 32.5 goa 19. 4 51.5 29. 1 27. 8 36. 7 35.6 32. 8 67. 2 15.4 84.6 lakshadweep 20. 8 52.5 26. 7 9.5 46. 9 43.5 10. 6 89. 4 14.1 85.9 kerala 56. 0 34.8 9.2 36. 3 29. 8 34.0 13. 8 26. 4 59. 8 5.7 26.5 67.8 tamil nadu 50. 5 39.2 10. 3 24. 2 37. 8 38.0 31. 0 36. 5 32. 5 17. 3 30.3 52.4 pondicherry 40. 8 44.2 15. 0 25. 0 33. 6 41.4 8.0 43. 8 48. 2 22. 7 77.3 a & nicobar islands 5.6 59.9 34. 5 48. 6 51.4 20. 5 79. 5 100. 0 india 39. 2 40.8 20. 0 29. 5 37. 5 33.0 30. 3 33. 1 36. 6 25. 9 33.0 41.2 table a7. india: household members (%) got treatment (as inpatient cases) in last 1 year before survey by residence and type of hospital, 2004 (national sample survey) urban rural states pub. hospital / dispens ary pri vat e hos pita l public (exclu sively) privat e (exclu sively) bot h ser vic es pub. hospita l/ dispens ary pri vat e hos pit al public (exclu sively) privat e (exclu sively) bot h serv ices jammu & kashmir 82.6 17. 4 0.5 17.4 82. 1 89.8 10. 2 0.7 10.2 89.1 himachal pradesh 80.2 19. 8 1.3 19.8 78. 9 75.8 24. 2 0.5 24.2 75.3 punjab 28.9 71. 1 71.1 28. 9 27.0 73. 0 0.7 73.0 26.4 chandigarh 85.7 14. 3 14.3 85. 7 89.2 10. 8 10.8 89.2 uttaranchal 38.0 62. 0 7.5 62.0 30. 5 39.4 60. 6 1.3 60.6 38.0 haryana 32.6 67. 4 0.8 67.4 31. 8 29.6 70. 4 0.2 70.4 29.4 delhi 45.8 54. 2 1.6 54.2 44. 2 30.6 69. 4 69.4 30.6 rajasthan 60.1 39. 9 4.6 39.9 55. 5 56.0 44. 0 0.8 44.0 55.2 uttar pradesh 31.1 68. 9 3.1 68.9 27. 9 30.5 69. 5 1.9 69.5 28.5 bihar 20.3 79. 7 3.0 79.7 17. 3 14.2 85. 8 1.3 85.8 12.9 sikkim 73.7 26. 3 26.3 73. 7 93.0 7.0 0.9 7.0 92.1 arunachal pradesh 78.4 21. 6 4.7 21.6 73. 7 87.5 12. 5 2.0 12.5 85.5 52 consilience nagaland 48.3 51. 7 51.7 48. 3 71.8 28. 2 28.2 71.8 manipur 87.6 12. 4 2.4 12.4 85. 2 90.3 9.7 2.7 9.7 87.6 mizoram 80.7 19. 3 1.4 19.3 79. 3 95.6 4.4 2.1 4.4 93.5 tripura 83.6 16. 4 16.4 83. 6 97.2 2.8 2.8 97.2 meghalaya 28.5 71. 5 0.6 71.5 27. 9 73.1 26. 9 26.9 73.1 assam 60.8 39. 2 5.2 39.2 55. 5 77.9 22. 1 5.4 22.1 72.4 west bengal 65.2 34. 8 3.7 34.8 61. 5 75.1 24. 9 0.9 24.9 74.2 jharkhand 35.5 64. 5 8.5 64.5 26. 9 40.5 59. 5 6.3 59.5 34.2 orissa 73.7 26. 3 4.3 26.3 69. 4 79.1 20. 9 1.1 20.9 77.9 chhattisgar h 46.4 53. 6 1.2 53.6 45. 2 42.9 57. 1 3.3 57.1 39.6 madhya pradesh 46.3 53. 7 7.4 53.7 38. 9 50.6 49. 4 5.7 49.4 44.9 gujarat 28.6 71. 4 3.7 71.4 24. 8 29.3 70. 7 2.7 70.7 26.6 daman & diu 23.2 76. 8 76.8 23. 2 13.4 86. 6 86.6 13.4 dadra & nagar haveli 29.9 70. 1 70.1 29. 9 67.4 32. 6 7.4 32.6 60.0 maharashtr a 27.9 72. 1 2.2 72.1 25. 7 26.7 73. 3 1.7 73.3 24.9 andhra pradesh 36.1 63. 9 3.5 63.9 32. 6 28.0 72. 0 1.1 72.0 26.9 karnataka 28.0 72. 0 72.0 28. 0 36.6 63. 4 63.4 36.6 goa 53.4 46. 6 8.3 46.6 45. 1 35.8 64. 2 64.2 35.8 lakshadwe ep 40.7 59. 3 59.3 40. 7 48.7 51. 3 51.3 48.7 kerala 32.9 67. 1 1.2 67.1 31. 7 37.0 63. 0 1.5 63.0 35.6 tamil nadu 34.1 65. 9 0.3 65.9 33. 8 46.8 53. 2 0.6 53.2 46.2 pondicherr y 65.2 34. 8 34.8 65. 2 83.6 16. 4 16.4 83.6 a & nicobar islands 86.9 13. 1 1.9 13.1 85. 0 97.5 2.5 2.5 97.5 india 43.1 56. 9 2.7 56.9 40. 4 46.9 53. 1 1.8 53.1 45.1 microsoft word moore_final.doc leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 1 social responses to environmental degradation in northwest rural china a. leung university of chicago e. o’donnell michigan state university s. moore princeton university h. travis central washington university leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 2 scholarly abstract this article joins the debate over factors which affect sustainability in china’s rural areas at both the village and individual level. it assesses gender-based differences in response to environmental problems, effects of farmer innovation circles on village sustainability, and development of environmental consciousness. we find that both sexes have low environmental consciousness, but women are more likely to be environmentally aware. despite an increase in labor from agriculture reforms, women’s status does not increase within the family, limiting their ability to act on their environmentalism. education, income, and age are additional demographic factors related to environmental consciousness. villagers feel the village is most responsible for environmental protection. the importance of governmental sources of agricultural information was highlighted, as was the impact increasing wealth has on environmental consciousness. in the future women must be vital participants in future sustainability programs, due to high incidence of male migrant city workers, and women’s deep connectedness and dependence on the land. leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 3 introduction china’s environment is in dire straits. seven of the world’s ten most polluted cities are in china. forest cover has been reduced to some 3% of total land area, and up to 80% of major rivers are too polluted to even support fish1. the impact of this environmental degradation is particularly severe in china’s northwestern areas, where rapid desertification and groundwater depletion on already marginal land form a lethal cocktail of environmental stress. investigators of such situations emphasize the need for locally and culturally specific practices to counter such stresses2. despite this consensus, there is little detailed research on how people in northwestern marginal areas address these stresses. this lack of knowledge precludes a full understanding of how residents in marginal areas of china may deal with ever-increasing levels of environmental degradation. this study was conducted in an arid stretch of marginal land called the loess plateau in northern shaanxi province, which typifies the poor marginalized lands of china. this area is characterized by two major, interconnected environmental phenomena: groundwater depletion and desertification. rampant deforestation has destroyed ground cover and root systems, causing erosion of fertile topsoil and leaving the area vulnerable to the encroachment of the gobi desert. water resources, already scarce in an arid environment, have been severely depleted by wasteful irrigation practices and intensive farming of marginal land. moreover, the people in this region are among the poorest in china. these features mean that northern shaanxi is a segment of society extremely vulnerable to deleterious changes in the environment. this research attempts to redress this gap in sociological knowledge of contemporary china by conducting a detailed study of shaanxi province. three areas of research were identified in particular that have received little attention by academics that could help address china’s environmental problems in both a top-down governmental approach, as well as a bottom-up, citizen-autonomy approach. we addressed gender-based differences in response to environmental problems, the use of informal networks to spread sustainable farming technologies, and what influences the environmental consciousness (ec) of the rural chinese. leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 4 past literature on the rural chinese environment since the 1990s, scholarship on rural development in reform-era china has taken on five major themes: environment, political economy, political tension, sustainable development, and gender and migration. the rising popularity of the so-called “china threat theory,” which generally views china’s reemergence onto the global spotlight is a danger to the existing balance of power in international relations, has produced a cottage industry of books and articles that, among other things, deal with rural social discontent. the rising number of news reports in the west about china’s environmental woes, and high-profile peasant riots in the past year, has provided further focus towards the future of china’s rural environment3,4,5,6,7. furthermore, books on rural poverty and environmental damage are rising in popularity in china (sometimes for their sensational and shock value), and have attracted the attention of the central authorities and the international media8,9. despite the broad spectrum covered by existent literature, much of it does not encompass multiple perspectives in their analysis, and few seriously study the relationship between rural citizens and the environment, rural perceptions of the natural environment, and environmental awareness. one of the few comprehensive pieces of literature written to date in the west on the chinese environment is elizabeth economy’s the river runs black. economy points out that the moral engine behind china’s environmental exploitation began with the millennia-long legacy of confucian and legalist principles, which advocated man’s supremacy over the environment, stemming from the power given to the local magistrate to decide on most state matters for localities10. the resulting conflicts of interests created a rule-of-man culture that often subverted state policy in favor of economic gain, leaving issues of conservation low or off the totem pole. this man-over-nature relationship was radicalized under mao, who repeatedly declared nature as the enemy of man, and pursued campaigns such as the great leap forward and cultural revolution, which dramatically worsened water pollution, land fertility, soil erosion, and deforestation11. unfortunately, much of this current literature on the rural environment in china at present are composed through a top-down framework, focusing on central government solutions, grain market reforms, or economic incentives to resolve issues and administrative incompetence12,13,14,15,16. in addition, the passage of the “three rurals” (san nong) reforms, three major pieces of legislation aimed to reduce the financial burden of peasants and improve leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 5 their agricultural production capabilities, have been the focus of many books in china8,9. press attention on the environment has also reflected the direction of existing literature of recent5,17,18,19. thomas bernstein and xiaobo lü focus on the financial squeeze on peasants from tax policy and local government fees in rural areas as a primary flashpoint of potentially destabilizing unrest20. they take an economic view of peasant burdens, noting that the greatest tax burden is upon the rural poor, while the rural rich actually enjoy a negative tax rate21. disparities in tax burden, ineffective tax collection, illegal local fees, and general corruption, are directly linked to the largest and most publicized peasant riots in the 1990s22. though the argument frames the decision-making process of rural peasants around economic incentives, the argument ultimately draws the dominant, almost exclusive, link of peasant happiness with government responsibility and pro-activeness. studies of shaanxi province, and other western provinces, under beijing’s great western development strategy (xibu da kaifa) shows how the government’s billions of yuan in investment towards massive public works projects is more of a subsidy program rather than a development plan for rural, impoverished provinces23,24. yet again, these discussions analyze rural strife through a top-down approach of government policy to the plight of rural residents. this approach ignores the complex dynamism of the lives and environment around rural peasants, akin to the central government’s poverty reduction campaigns as simply throwing money at localities without regard to peasants’ diverse needs and challenges. other studies view the rural environment through the lens of political agitation and peasant discontent. a sizable amount of research has looked into the dynamics of rural protests, primarily caused by pollution or government corruption and incompetence20,25,26,27,28,29. o’brien and li’s research point toward then peasants’ disillusionment with the local government, and now increasingly the central government, is a serious problem in the central government’s efforts to maintain party supremacy and social stability27,28. ho’s study on the “institutional ambiguity” of rural land policy, a legacy of the commune and household responsibility systems, may serve to stir up considerable conflicts as the state pursues to more clearly define property and intellectual rights under the banner of economic development and maturation26. however, the vast majority of such studies on the rural peasantry too often draw an implicit but direct correlation between state intervention and the welfare of peasants. leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 6 the united nations development program (undp) has also conducted an extensive study on social development in china, with a particular eye towards rural areas and the environment. like economy, the undp report identified environmental degradation, such as land erosion, water pollution, air pollution, and desertification, as serious potential causes for unrest, and are issues that the government must take immediate and effective action towards in order to maintain social stability and economic growth30. the report provides to main scenarios: the “perilous path” and the “green reform path,” based on whether or not the central government decides to wholeheartedly back sustainable development and a civil society31. on the other hand, scholars who have written on china’s sustainable development and environmental policies in rural areas, such as ellen judd and bin wu, do take care to take a grassroots approach to analyze the role of peasants’ initiative and networks in improving their livelihood32,33. wu’s study displayed that farmer initiatives have the capability to organize to share technologies and innovate without state or external intervention, and typically along clan or other traditional ties33. he challenges the mainstream political approach towards viewing rural development and environmental issues by illustrating the dynamism of china’s marginal rural areas that have various issues of poverty, migration, and environmental degradation. china’s “classical approach” towards environmental response in the form of poverty reduction programs and extension services alone, he explains, simply does not match up to farmers’ needs and challenges34. overall, ordinary peasants can and do play important roles in resolving environmental problems. policies centered on state intervention, often are ineffective because they do not address peasants’ incentive structures and the complex social and environmental difficulties in many marginal areas. from this brief survey of major recent literature on rural china, it becomes apparent that most studies have taken a state/institution-first approach in analyzing various rural and environment-related issues, primarily because the state has so thoroughly penetrated society under communist rule. the disjuncture in the various directions of recent chinese rural and environmental studies thus necessitates a systematic analysis of the identity of the rural chinese peasant. furthermore, the existent literature, though extensive on examining the political, economic, and developmental aspects of the chinese natural environment, fails to seriously consider perceptions on the natural environment and environment consciousness among citizens, especially in rural agricultural areas. a closer look into how chinese peasants conceptualize the leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 7 natural environment, how they interact and relate to this environment, and their awareness of environmental conservation and preservation, are critical to understanding the basis for their social, economic, and political incentive structures in making environment-related decisions. in addition, understanding their views on how external forces, such as the government, agricultural extension services, the media, and ngos, interact with their lives is crucial to constructing a basic portrait of identity of their roles as peasants and their relation towards the natural environment. leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 8 methodology research was conducted over a one and a half month period in june and july 2005. mizhi county was chosen as the focus of research, after a review of previous literature, because of its access to researchers, and the lack of existing research in the areas of the hypotheses: gender, informal agricultural networks and measures of environmental consciousness. a survey and interview were designed to measure environmental consciousness and explore the possible existence of farmer innovation circles. both the survey and the interview also requested demographic indicators to be used in comparison between and within the above factors. demographic indicators refer to demographics of respondents. this includes information on age, sex, education level, migrant status, and annual household income. the purpose of demographic indicators are to determine the demographic composition of the survey sample population, and also to use in correlation analysis against environmental indicators. environmental indicators measure the respondent's level of environmental consciousness, as well as how that person perceives responses to environmental change. environmental indicators include questions regarding changes in environmental quality, personal impacts on the environment, the relative importance of environmental quality, responsibility for environmental quality, and sources of farming adaptation techniques. environmental consciousness was measured using the following environmental indicators: perception of change in environmental quality (see question 10), perception of personal impact on the environment (see question 14), perception of importance of improving environmental quality to future standard of living(see question 13), satisfaction with environmental conditions in the village (see question 12), and farming adaptation in response to environmental concerns (see question 18). interviews were designed to obtain supplemental information to the surveys, including more detailed questions about the environment and the role respondents take in regards to the environment. interviews were conducted by each researcher alongside graduate students from shaanxi normal university, shaanxi university, and northwest university. the interview also included questions about women’s rights and specific forms of collectivization. the survey and interview questions were also translated from english to mandarin to enable those taking the survey to respond independently and to accommodate the china-based researchers. the respondents were usually selected on a convenience sampling basis, with the researchers going door to door in search of families willing to talk or talking with the families leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 9 selected by the village leaders. the researchers attempted to separate themselves from village leaders as their presence was expected to create a bias in responses. the time limit on the researchers in the village did not allow for a random sample to be developed and carried out. each person or family was given a survey to fill out. some people encountered were unable to read and write; thus many were administered orally. after the survey was conducted, if there was still time, an interview was also conducted. the surveys were anonymous, but many people still chose to give their name and other identifying information in the interviews. the interviews were conducted by way of a translator, usually a chinese researcher and responses were recorded by hand. meals and overnight accommodations in yangjiagou were arranged with local families who were also interviewed. interview teams were formed of 2 researchers: one american and one chinese. this group formation served two purposes. first, the chinese researcher acted as translator and was able to develop a rapport with the respondents through shared language. secondly, the presence of the american researcher oftentimes encouraged people to speak when they were otherwise unwilling. a few respondents that the researchers encountered had been schooled in english and were willing to be interviewed in english. the chinese researcher could administer surveys orally if a respondent was unable to read, write, or could not otherwise fill out the survey on his or her own. a total of 123 surveys and 36 interviews were administered and collected. the third phase of research consisted of translation of surveys and interviews into english. this was done in collaboration with chinese student researchers. the data from surveys and interviews was then coded and entered into microsoft excel and spss for analysis and tests. correlation analyses were run between demographic factors responses to questions measuring environmental consciousness (see table 9). since, in all cases except age, the data was nonnormally distributed, correlation analysis was conducted using bi-variate nonparametric analysis. for a regression analysis, multivariate general linear model analysis was used to analyze regression and variance for dependent variables (environmental indicators) by factor variables (demographic indicators). leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 10 discussion the discussion of data collected from this research is split into three sections, reflecting the three focus areas of this research: gender and environment, adaptation in response to environmental change, and ec in rural china. each section begins with a reiteration of the relevant hypotheses. data collected from each phase of the research is then discussed, as is interview data. finally, third section will discuss the hypotheses. demographic correlation analysis is not discussed separately, but is referred to in the hypothesis discussion session. overall, 26 interviews and 123 survey responses were collected at three villages in mizhi county, northern shaanxi province, over the course of four days. this data is displayed graphically in a number of tables. table 1 summarizes the demographics of respondents. table 2 summarizes significant relationships between gender and environmental indicators. table 3 offers a display of significant relationships relating to fics. table 4 relates sources of information on farming techniques and environmental indicators. table 5 analyzes the effects of age, education, and income on several environmental indicators. table 6 contains the results of correlation analyses between environmental indicators. table 7 summarizes data on factors important to future standard of living. table 8 summarizes perceptions of who is responsible for environmental quality. finally, table 9 presents detailed view of all relationships between demographic and environmental indicators. all tables are set in the appendix section. gender and environment hypothesis our hypothesis with regards to gender was based on the idea that female respondents would have a higher ec than males. this is based on a wide variety of literature suggesting that women have a more intimate connection with the environment than men. • women will be more likely to rank the environment as first or second most important to their future standard of living, perceive a personal impact on the environment, and changed farming practices in response to environmental conditions. demographic correlation analysis statistical analysis did not reveal any of significance to the hypothesized correlations. table 2 outlines this analysis. in terms of both correlation and regression analysis, none of the hypothesized correlations were significant. however, one relationship between demographic leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 11 factors was discovered. one of the strongest relationships between data sets in this research is that between sex and the importance of increasing income. females tend to place a greater emphasis on the importance of increasing income in the future. much research, including that of ahmad35 and our own interview data, suggests that women typically make many everyday household decisions. this intimate familiarity with economic status may prejudice women to take a more essential view with regards to future income. in addition, migrant labor, which is often, though not exclusively, male, may exaggerate male earnings with respect to females, causing females to perceive a need to earn more by comparison. interview data women are often responsible for all work on the farm the entire year except harvest and planting times when the husband and family members come home to help. women’s status has increased a small amount in the village since the agricultural reforms and increased labor, but villagers believe this is only a result of the family appearing wealthier due to family members working in the city. despite the increase in labor, there was no change in status for women within the family. according to matthews and nee36, female family members can lose status because the woman’s income becomes smaller in comparison to wages earned by family members in the city despite increased labor. hypothesis discussion in the case of gender, there is little statistical evidence to suggest that females are more ec than males. indeed, the only significant correlation involving gender was with the importance of income. correlation and regression analysis revealed no statistically significant relationships with regards to the hypotheses. on this basis, the null hypothesis that if the respondent is female, the level of ec will be greater is accepted. however, the results of the cross tabulation analysis do point out that ec respondents are more likely to be women. these findings, while not statistically significant, are still valuable for the gender gap they highlight in terms of environmental indicators. adaptation to environmental changes hypothesis we hypothesized that farmer innovation circles would be revealed through a connection of kin both inside and outside the village. the environmental indicator summary called these leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 12 hypotheses into question, but statistical analysis provides a more complex picture. table 3 summarizes analysis of these hypotheses. • respondents who have received information on farming techniques from kin inside the village will be likely to have received information from kin outside the village as well (and vice versa), suggesting participation in fics • respondents who have received information on farming techniques from kin outside or inside the village as part of an fic will be more likely to adapt their farming practices in response to environmental concerns. environmental indicator analysis satisfaction with environmental conditions in the village shared a fairly strong positive relationship with farming adaptabilitythose who were unsatisfied with environmental conditions were more likely to change their farming practices as a result of environmental problems. this relationship suggests that farming adaptation may partially be spurred by dissatisfaction with environmental conditions. given interview responses, however, it seems that most farming adaptation is spurred by government directives. farming adaptability and perception of local government concern for the environment demonstrated a negative relationshipthe strongest correlation across the survey data (-0.514). respondents who did not modify their farming practices thought the local government was less concerned about the environment. many informants reported during interviews that farming adaptability is most likely to be initiated by government directives. the correlation referred to above could reflect the fact that if governments did not issue directives or advice to change farming practices because of the environment, respondents would also report lower concern on the part of the local government towards the environment. respondents were no more likely to give more environmentally conscious answers to environmental indicator questions if they were involved in an fic. additionally, based on the results of correlation and regression analysis, participation in an fic was not more likely to lead to adaptation of farming techniques in response to environmental concerns. interview data extension services and other avenues of agricultural information varied widely from village to village. the most help was offered to gauxigou, the model eco-village. the people of gauxigou believe the government pays attention to their environmental concerns, but responses leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 13 were less positive in other villages, where the government was pegged with varying levels of involvement with environmental concerns. there was little evidence of information sharing within villages or between villages. hypothesis discussion the correlation coefficient for the relationship between receiving farming information from kin inside and outside the village was quite strong, displaying a correlation coefficient of 0.515. this relationship is also highly significant (0.000). this relationship means that respondents receiving information on farming techniques from kin inside the village also received information on farming techniques from kin outside the village, and vice versa. such a result is interesting because it suggests a relationship between the sharing of farming techniques between kin inside and outside the villagein other words, it suggests the existence of fics. the researchers thus accept the hypothesis that if a respondent has received information on farming techniques from kin inside the village, he or she will be likely to have received information from kin outside the village as well (and vice versa). however, participants in fics were no more likely to adapt their farming techniques in response to environmental concerns. additionally, statistical analysis shows no significant relationship between participation in fics and any measure of environmental consciousness. additionally, interview responses seem to corroborate this result, with little evidence that fics led to farming innovation in the survey area. thus the researchers accept the null hypothesis that participation in fics has no discernible effect on farming adaptation. ec in rural china hypothesis several hypotheses were formulated with regards to ec. many of these were dependent on demographic factors such as age and education. the third, however, considered the effect of information sources on the transfer of sustainable farming practices. please refer to table 5 for details of relationships between demographic and environmental indicators. the hypotheses are listed again below: • respondents who get information on farming techniques from the government will not rank the environment as first or second most important to their future standard of living, perceive a personal impact on the environment, or have changed farming practices in response to environmental conditions. receiving leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 14 information on farming techniques from the government is defined as getting them from any source aside from kin inside or outside the village. • respondents who have a higher level of education will be more likely to rank the environment as first or second most important to their future standard of living, perceive a personal impact on the environment, and changed farming practices in response to environmental conditions. • respondents older than 61 will be less likely to perceive a personal impact on the environment, and more likely to consider the government as chiefly responsible for the environment. environmental indicator correlation analysis as evidenced in table 6, several strong correlations were observed between the environmental indicators themselves. one of the more interesting of these is the negative relationship between perceived changes in environmental quality and satisfaction with environmental conditions in the village. as respondents perceived more improvement in environmental conditions, their satisfaction with environmental conditions decreased. this is counterintuitive, yet given the relatively strong correlation coefficient (-0.438) and the high level of significance (0.000), this discrepancy deserves some attention. although it would appear that the two environmental indicators are related, it may have appeared to respondents that they were not. for example, “changes in environmental quality” may have been interpreted on a very general, macroscopic scale. “satisfaction with environmental conditions” may have been taken by respondents to indicate factors more closely related to their everyday lives. if, for example, various catchment ponds have been constructed in a given village, and reforestation projects initiated, a respondent may perceive that the overall environment has increased. however, concern over a hydrologic drought that year may be expressed in dissatisfaction with environmental conditionsconditions being more transient. the more a respondent perceived improvement in the quality of the environment, the less likely he or she was to change farming practices as a result of environmental conditions. this result makes perfect sense; if the environment has improved, there is no need to adapt one’s farming practices. similarly, respondents who thought that the environment had improved also ranked the local government’s concern for the environment more highly. this relatively strong relationship leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 15 (0.413) conforms with several interview responses to the question of how the environment has changed. several informants described a positive change because of reforestation programs, and these programs were promoted by local governments. the linkage made by several informants between the government and improving the local environment through reforestation probably finds expression in this strong relationship. one particularly interesting relationship is that between satisfaction with environmental conditions and perception of personal impact on the environment. respondents who reported having a personal impact on the environment tended to be more satisfied with environmental conditions. this is an interesting result, as it opens up the possibility that if a respondent was aware of his or her impact on the environment, he or she could adopt more sustainable practices. however, given that there was no significant correlation between personal impact on the environment and a change in farming practices, this interpretation is unsubstantiated by the remainder of the data. respondents who were dissatisfied with the environmental conditions in their village ranked local government concern for the environment lower. this result, while intuitive, is interesting for the direct link it suggests between dissatisfaction and placing blame on the local government. as noted by economy3, there are isolated reports of rural people protesting against local governments on the basis of environmental factors. this result may reflect similar discontent. interview data several trends came to light through the comparison of interviews conducted in mizhi county. first of all, people overwhelmingly believe the environment is getting better. several explanations were given. the main reason listed was the increase in non-native trees and grasses that the villagers were paid to plant on steep hills by the government. other reasons included the increase in roads, pressurized tap water, and the fact that their standard of living was increasing. villagers rarely focused on the actual health of the soil, water, or ecosystem. additionally most respondents did not feel their daily life had any impact on the environment. only one person believed the chemical fertilizer they were applying was bad for the soil and was aware of the degradation it was creating. in guangzhong, there was some concern over the lack of trash collection, and the negative effects of urbanization. one informant says people do not pay close attention to environmental problems because many of them work in leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 16 the city. this is a possible explanation for the apparent distance many richer respondents evidence from the environment. overall, there was little awareness nor concern for the environment. most people have wells, and divert streams for irrigation, or depend on rain. a few people expressed concern about the factories upstream releasing wastewater into the rivers they use to irrigate crops, which sometimes die from the water. one informant from guangzhong theorizes that chemical plant will contaminate well water, but village officials assured residents the plant will clean its water. another informant mentioned that the river flowing through their village used to be much deeper and flow much stronger. today it is reduced to the thinnest trickle. when asked whether there were better farming methods that could be employed, nearly everyone answered yes. but the methods mentioned almost entirely relied on expensive machines or increased use of chemicals. only one person mentioned more sustainable methods, but lamented that they were too expensive and time consuming. one final interesting anecdote is found in that the richest family interviewed, with an income of over 30000 rmb, specifically expressed a great deal of concern in the environment. this contradicts the trend expressed in the correlation analysis which predicted that respondents with higher incomes generally cared less about the environment. hypothesis discussion one of the few significant correlations involving education was between years of schooling and perception of personal impact on the environment. this relationship has been detailed in the earlier discussion of correlation analysis between demographic and environmental indicators. however, this is the only indicator of ec that demonstrated a significant relationship with years of schooling. the researchers thus, while not accepting the null hypothesis, reject the assertion that education level is a reliable predictor of ec in general. a separate table, table 4, details relationships between respondents who received farming information from governmental sources and measures of ec. those who received information on farming techniques from media were more likely to rank higher the importance of the environment. however, those who received information on farming techniques from governmental sources were unlikely to perceive a personal impact on the environment. respondents receiving information on farming techniques were no more likely to adapt farming leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 17 practices to environmental concerns. respondents receiving information on farming techniques from government documents and female cadres were no more likely to be ec. those receiving information on farming practices from male cadres were, interestingly enough, less likely to adapt farming practices. however, there is no corresponding tendency for those who obtained farming information from female cadres to adapt farming practices in response to environmental concerns. respondents receiving information from specialists or extension services were similarly less likely to adapt farming practices in response to environmental conditions. in sum, receiving information on farming techniques from governmental sources was not correlated with a lower ec. the researchers thus accept the null hypothesis. based on correlation and regression analysis, age was a predictor of perception of personal impact on the environment. older people were less likely to perceive a personal impact on the environment than younger people. this relationship was confirmed to be significant by both analyses, with a confidence interval of at least 98%. on this basis, the researchers accept the hypothesis that older respondents are less likely to perceive a personal impact on the environment. leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 18 conclusion culture and the environmental ethos western environmentalism is the result of complex intellectual synthesis. it is an ethos that was spawned from several centuries of experience with industrialization, as well as the exploration of vast wilderness areas during the colonial period. china has not had large areas of wilderness for centuries, and has only experienced large-scale industrialization in the past halfcentury. as researchers, we approached this project with western biases. our conception of “environment” is very abstract, and accepts as a precondition a divorce of human and natural interests; those of humans cannot as a matter of course take precedence. such a conception does not make adequate accommodation for china’s status as a developing nation. poverty is still the overwhelming concern, and our data reflected its urgency. in the design of our survey, we were possessed of a developed nation bias that assumed being ec would mean placing the environment first. in china, assigning the natural environment such preeminence is a rare phenomenon. part of the reason for such rarity is that the abstract nature of the english word “environment” is reflected by its chinese translation. the western conception of environment is not automatically translated by its chinese equivalent. interview informants would often say that the environment had improved because roads had been constructed. in one case, an informant responded that the environment must have gotten better because “my standard of living has gotten better.” any conclusions drawn from this research must be rooted in these biases. for the most part, null hypotheses were accepted, suggesting that most of our perception of environment in rural china was incorrect. many of these perceptions were based on the idea that in certain aspects elements of the western ideal of environmentalism could be identified in china. this has proven not to be the case. nonetheless, numerous important and encouraging environmental realities have been evidenced through this research. in the conclusion, these realities will be discussed with a view towards creating conditions for a sustainable future in rural china. gender and environment we hypothesized that females would be more ec than males. this hypothesis was not borne out by correlation analysis. however, correlation analysis and interview data revealed that leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 19 women in fact placed more emphasis on increasing income. thus, women appear to place primary emphasis on increasing social mobility, a far more tangible goal than “improving the environment.” nonetheless, the cross tabulation analysis suggests that women may be more predisposed to environmental concerns than males. in the case of virtually all environmental indicators, women were more likely to give the “environmentally correct” response than males. this suggests that sustainable development efforts may be more effective if they are designed to specifically include or target women. our research suggests that women are vital to sustainable development efforts for another reason. the rate of migration in the survey area is tremendous, with some 73% of households having someone working outside the village. interview data suggests that most of these migrants are male. several female interview informants noted that their burdens, as well as the number of decisions they make, increased as males left for work. given this trend, females will likely become more and more important in the implementation of sustainable practices in rural china. adaptation to environmental changes our hypothesis was that non-governmental innovation in the form of fics would lead to more farming adaptation in response to environmental concerns. we further hypothesized that fics would be identified by kin-based networks that include relatives both inside and outside the village. given that respondents who received farming advice from kin in villages also received advice from kin outside villages (though to a lesser extent), there is evidence that farming advice spreads from kin outside the village to kin inside the village, and then throughout the village itself. this in turn may indicate the existence of fics in mizhi. however, it seems that any such fics do not necessarily lead to farming adaptation in response to environmental concern. most innovation, environmental or otherwise, is spurred on by government action. this suggests that government may actually be the best conduit through which to spread sustainable farming techniques in rural china. of all governmental sources of information, media appeared to have the most influence. a majority of respondents reported that they had received information on farming techniques from media sourcesthe case in which most people had received such information from any source. this result suggests that mediabased approaches to spreading sustainable techniques may be most effective. leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 20 ec in rural china it was hypothesized that, in terms of developing sustainable practices, governmental sources would be less effective. further, education would be a reliable predictor of concern for the environment, and finally that older respondents would place less emphasis on personal responsibility and impact on the environment. all of these hypotheses were rejected. governmental sources in fact appear to be more effective in spreading sustainable agricultural practices. education seems to a predictor of perception of personal impact on the environment, but not of ec in general. age seems to be a negative predictor of personal impact on the environment, and a positive predictor of the importance of the environment. there is thus substantial evidence for a “generational gap” in these aspects of environmental consciousness. in general, there appeared to be a low level of ec. environment was ranked third in importance overall, behind more tangible factors such as increasing education and income. few people think that they had a personal impact on the environment. interestingly however, respondents said that village people had the most responsibility for environmental quality. this suggests a latent capacity for developing sustainable practices, perhaps catalyzed by government action. one trend evidenced by the environmental indicators was that increasing incomes tended to be associated with increasing distance from environmental concerns. in many cases, this was also related to increasing urbanization. in most cases, high incomes result from economic ties to urban areas. increasing urbanization also tended to result in less concern for environmental factors. given that both incomes and urbanization are likely to increase as the pace of china’s development continues, people may continue to feel more distanced from immediate environmental concerns. one clear finding of this research has been that there is little conception of abstract “environmentalism” in the western sense. perception of the environment tended to be limited to specific and discrete conditions. most interview informants thought of the environment in terms of the number of trees or the extent of grass cover, or things like roads. when concern for environmental issues expressed, it was similarly in response to such specifics. one informant talked about how plastic bottles were bad for the environment because they piled up by the roadside. another was concerned about the effect of chemical fertilizers. leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 21 perhaps most tellingly along these lines, the greatest concern over the environment was expressed where it faced the greatest number of visible threats. guangzhong village (location 3) is adjacent to mizhi city, and is the site of a major new chemical plant. here informants expressed concern at how farmland had been consumed by infrastructure projects, how the river flow had been reduced, and how the chemical plant may affect the quality of shallow well water. it is no coincidence that this rash of environmental concern was collocated with a large number of visible signs of environmental degradation. it seems that only when people come into intimate contact with environmental degradation does it become a concernthere is no intrinsic, abstract sense of environmentalism in the western sense. this interpretation agrees with economy’s view of chinese environmentalism being engendered by severe conditions in urban centers. sustainable futures in rural china this research offers a number of suggestions for the development of a sustainable future in rural china. the first is that environmental quality cannot be seen as an independent or preeminent objective. pursuit of this ideal requires accommodation of the powerful desire in rural china to increase incomes and urbanize to a large extent. both of these objectives are in many ways counterproductive to the goal of improving environmental quality. the key is to minimize harm to the environment in the course of inevitable development. this research offers five suggestions to help guide such an effort. first, data gathered in the course of this investigation suggests that sustainability campaigns be undertaken in response to specific cases of environmental degradation. efforts at the local level should be concentrated on confronting specific, visible issues such as the buildup of trash along roadsides or the decline in water flow. our data suggests that this approach would more effectively garner the enthusiasm of the population. second, the government should develop a comprehensive plan to spread techniques for sustainable development, both for rural and urban workers. media should play a key role in the dissemination of these techniques. at the same time, the government should not ignore fics, and should encourage villagers to spread these techniques by telling their relatives. third, in provincial areas sustainability campaigns should be village-based, as respondents invested village people with a high degree of responsibility for the environment. given this, they may be more likely to participate in village-based programs. leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 22 fourth, it is essential that sustainability campaigns make extensive provision for women. besides their potential for being more ec than men, women are also gaining importance in rural areas as more men migrate for work. sustainability campaigns may harness this trend to best use by assigning specific leadership roles to women. five, age should be a consideration. although more research is necessary to determine the exact ways in which age influences the development of sustainable choices, this research suggests that older people may be more disposed to take a long-term view of development. pilot programs could thus be developed which tap older people for environmental education programs, and their generational wisdom should be sought on major development projects. environmentalism in china differs considerably from that of the west. much of our data has highlighted these differences. nonetheless, significant potential exists to create the conditions for sustainable development in rural china. in response to concerns at severe environmental degradation in the coastal cities which have been the vanguard of china’s modernization, rural development strategies incorporate tenets of sustainable development. by looking past notions of western environmentalism existing in china, it is possible to discern conditions under which such development may be effectively focused. rural china may not be possessed of environmentalism in the western sense, but this does not preclude the possibility of a sustainable future in the fullness of time. leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 23 appendix table 1: summary of demographic indicators in mizhi county, china, july 2005 demographic factor valid percentage male 45.5 female 54.5 family member working outside the village 73.0 family member not working outside the village 27.0 age 0-30 16.4 age 31-60 61.5 age 60+ 22.1 years of schooling none 30.5 years of schooling 1-9 51.7 years of schooling 10+ 17.8 annual household income 0-10000 rmb 82.9 annual household income 10001-20000 rmb 13.5 annual household income 20001+ rmb 3.6 leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 24 table 2: relationships between gender and environmental indicators in mizhi county, china. july 2005 hypothesized correlation kendall's tau_b correlation coefficient kendall's tau_b significance n sample size type iii sum of squares df mean square f sig. sex*importance of environment -0.089 0.302 123 .006(c) 1 0.006 0.032 0.858 sex*personal impact on environment -0.019 0.821 123 .097(d) 1 0.097 0.559 0.457 sex*farming adaptation in response to environmental concerns 0.142 0.129 115 .814(e) 1 0.814 3.342 0.072 leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 25 table 3: relationships between fics and environmental indicators in mizhi county, china. july 2005 hypothesized correlation kendall's tau_b correlation coefficient kendall's tau_b significance n sample size type iii sum of squares df mean square f sig. farming adaptation in response to information from kin inside the village* outside the village 0.515 0 116 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a farming adaptation in response to information from kin inside/outside the village* farming adaptation -0.096 0.312 111 0.092 1 0.092 0.354 0.554 leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 26 table 4: relationships between sources of farming techniques and environmental indicators in mizhi county, china. july 2005 governmental source of farming techniques statistic information farming adaptation importance of environment personal impact on environment media kendall's tau_b correlation coeficient 0.088 0.186 0.235 kendall's tau_b significance (2tailed) 0.357 0.039 0.008 n sample size 111 116 116 government documents kendall's tau_b correlation coeficient -0.008 0.164 0.111 kendall's tau_b significance (2tailed) 0.936 0.069 0.213 n sample size 111 116 116 female cadres kendall's tau_b correlation coeficient -0.108 -0.064 0.055 kendall's tau_b significance (2tailed) 0.258 0.478 0.536 n sample size 110 115 115 male cadres kendall's tau_b correlation coeficient -0.405 -0.058 -0.125 kendall's tau_b significance (2tailed) 0.000 0.521 0.160 n sample size 111 116 116 specialists/extension services kendall's tau_b correlation coeficient -0.439 -0.084 -0.048 kendall's tau_b significance (2tailed) 0.000 0.348 0.588 n sample size 111 116 116 leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 27 table 5: relationships between demographic and environmental indicators in mizhi county, china. july 2005 statistic importance of environment personal impact on environment farming adaptation in response to environment age by 10-year intervals kendall's tau_b correlation coefficent 0.066 -0.109 -0.096 kendall's tau_b significance (2-tailed) 0.357 0.128 0.218 kendall's tau_b (n) 122.000 122.000 114.000 type iii sum of squares 1.501 2.447 0.633 df 6 6 6 mean square 0.25 0.408 0.106 f 1.446 2.771 0.394 significance 0.213 0.019 0.88 years of schooling kendall's tau_b correlation coefficent 0.031 0.173 0.042 kendall's tau_b significance (2-tailed) 0.690 0.026 0.616 kendall's tau_b (n) 121.000 121.000 113.000 type iii sum of squares 0.085 0.242 0.057 df 2.000 2 2.000 mean square 0.042 0.121 0.028 f 0.216 0.659 0.127 significance 0.807 0.522 0.881 annual household income in 5000 rmb intervals kendall's tau_b correlation coefficent 0.053 -0.074 -0.208 kendall's tau_b significance (2-tailed) 0.490 0.340 0.013 kendall's tau_b (n) 111.000 111.000 103.000 type iii sum of squares 0.022 0.247 2.451 df 1 1 1 mean square 0.022 0.247 2.451 f 0.114 1.348 11.032 significance 0.737 0.251 0.002 leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 28 table 6: detail of all relationships between environmental indicators in mizhi county, china. july 2005 environmental indicator descriptive statistic changes in environme ntal quality importance of environment personal impact on the environment satisfaction with environmental conditions in village farming adaptation local governme nt concern for environme nt kendall's tau_b analysis changes in environmental quality correlation coefficient 1.000 0.145 -0.075 -0.438 -0.427 0.413 sig. (2-tailed) . 0.079 0.359 0.000 0.000 0.000 n 123 123 123 117 115 123 importance of environment correlation coefficient 0.145 1.000 0.008 -0.071 -0.096 0.080 sig. (2-tailed) 0.079 . 0.927 0.427 0.286 0.356 n 123 123 123 117 115 123 personal impact on the environment correlation coefficient -0.075 0.008 1.000 0.263 0.036 -0.019 sig. (2-tailed) 0.359 0.927 . 0.003 0.684 0.826 n 123 123 123 117 115 123 satisfaction with environmental conditions correlation coefficient -0.438 -0.071 0.263 1.000 0.343 -0.304 sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.427 0.003 . 0.000 0.001 n 117 117 117 117 111 117 farming adaptation correlation coefficient -0.427 -0.096 0.036 0.343 1.000 -0.514 sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.286 0.684 0.000 . 0.000 n 115 115 115 111 115 115 local government concern for environment correlation coefficient 0.413 0.080 -0.019 -0.304 -0.514 1.000 sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.356 0.826 0.001 0.000 . n 123 123 123 117 115 123 spearman's rho analysis revised perception of changes in environmental quality correlation coefficient 1.000 0.122 -0.202 -0.498 -0.526 sig. (2-tailed) . 0.179 0.025 0.000 0.000 n 123 123 123 117 115 revised perception of importance of environment to future standard of living correlation coefficient 0.122 1.000 0.008 -0.074 -0.099 sig. (2-tailed) 0.179 . 0.932 0.429 0.290 leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 29 n 123 123 123 117 115 revised perception of personal impact on the environment correlation coefficient -0.202 0.008 1.000 0.276 0.038 sig. (2-tailed) 0.025 0.932 . 0.003 0.685 n 123 123 123 117 115 satisfaction with environmental conditions in village correlation coefficient -0.498 -0.074 0.276 1.000 0.345 sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.429 0.003 . 0.000 n 117 117 117 117 111 have you changed farming practices as a result of environment problems? correlation coefficient -0.526 -0.099 0.038 0.345 1.000 sig. 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(2001) political trends and social development in the shaanxi-gansu-ningxia region, north china, 1937-1945, beijing: china social sciences press (in chinese). liu, m. (2001) “our nation’s environmental tax policy: experiences and choices,” journal of continuing education at shaanxi normal university, 18, 4 (december): 60-63 (in chinese). marshall, m. (1985) organizations and growth in rural china, london: macmillan. matthews, r. and nee, v. (2000) “gender inequality and economic growth in rural china,” social science research, 29: 606-632. murray, g. and cook, i.g. (2002) green china: seeking ecological answers, london: routledgecurzon. ministry of land and resources website (mlrw). online: http://www.mlr.gov.cn/ (in chinese). mizhi county government website (mcgw). online: http://www.mizhi.gov.cn/ (in leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 33 chinese). nickum, j.e. (1998) “is china living on the water margin?” the china quarterly, 156 (december): 880-898. o’brien, k. and li, l.j. (2005) “popular contention in rural china,” comparative political studies, 38, 3 (april): 235-259. oi, j. (1999) rural china takes off: institutional foundations of economic reform. berkeley: university of california press. ren, z.g. and tisdell, c. (1999) “sustainability issues and socio-economic change in the jingpo communities of china,” international journal of social economics, 26, 1/2/3: 21-45. shaanxi agricultural editing group (1987) shaanxi agricultural structure 1949-1986, qinhuangdao: chinese statistical press (in chinese). shaanxi bureau of statistics (sbs) (2000) 50 years of shaanxi rural economic statistics, xi’an: shaanxi bureau of statistics (in chinese). sines, a. (2002) “civilizing the middle kingdom’s wild west,” central asian survey, 21, 1: 5-18. the standard (2005) “disaster warning as pollution levels soar,” 20 june 2005, hong kong: the standard. state environmental protection agency (sepa) (2005) “sepa supervises the licenses of nine cases of environmental violations”], 10 may 2005, beijing: state environment protection agency. online: http://www.sepa.gov.cn/eic/649094490434306048/20050510/7461.shtml (in chinese). state environmental protection agency website (sepa). online: http://www.sepa.gov.cn/ (in chinese). sun, j.m. (2002) “source regions and the formation of loess sediments on the high mountains regions of northwestern china,” quaternary research, 58: 341-351. united nations development programme (undp) (2002) china human development report 2002, oxford: oxford university press. vermeer, e.b. (2004) “shaanxi: building a future on state support,” the china quarterly, 178 (june): 400-425. wang, x.q. and gao, q.z. (2002) “sustainable development and management of water resources in the hei river basin of north-west china,” water resources development, 18, 2: 335-352. leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 34 watts j. (2005) “a bloody revolt in a tiny village challenges the rulers of china,” the guardian, 15 april 2005, london: the guardian unlimited. wolf, c., et al. (2003) fault lines in china’s economic terrain, santa monica, california: rand. wu, b. (2003) sustainable development in rural china: farmer innovation and self organisation in marginal areas, london and new york: routledgecurzon. ----and pretty, j. (2004) “social connectedness in marginal rural china: the case of farmer innovation circles in zhidan, north shaanxi”. agricultural and human values, 21: 81-92. xinhua news agency (xna) (2002) “all about xiaokang,” 10 november 2002, beijing: xinhua news agency. -----(2005a) “foreign investment welcomed in environmental protection,” 18 may 2005, beijing: xinhua news agency. -----(2005b) “first report on environmental issues published,” 23 may 2005, beijing: xinhua news agency. yep, r. (2000) “the limitations of corporatism for understanding reform in china: an empirical analysis in a rural county,” journal of contemporary china, 9, 25: 547-566. -----(2004) “can ‘tax-for-fee’ reform reduce rural tensions? the process, progress, and limitations,” the china quarterly, 177 (march): 42-70. yulin prefecture government website (ypgw). online: http://www.sxyl.gov.cn/ (in chinese). zhao, s. and wong, k. (2002) “the sustainability dilemma of china’s township and village enterprises: an analysis from spatial and functional perspectives,” journal of rural studies, 18: 257-273. zhu, s.g. and wu, h.q., ed. (2003) adjustment of agricultural industrial structure and development of cities and towns in the north-west area, xi’an: xi’an mapping press (in chinese). leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 35 endnotes 1 world health organization 1998 2 ho 2003 3 economy 2004b 4 french 2005 5 bbc 2005 6 the standard 2005 7 watts 2005 8 chen and wu 2003 9 cass 2004 10 economy 2004a: 56 11 economy 2004a: 48-55 12 oi 1999 13 murray and cook 2002 14 friedman et al 1991 15 liu 2001 16 kang, niu, and ke 2004 17 at 2005a 18 xinhua 2002 19 xinhua 2005b 20 bernstein and lü 2000 21 bernstein and lü 2000: 746-749 22 bernstein and lü 2000: 752-753 23 vermeer 2005 24 holbig 2004 25 goodman 2004 26 ho 2004 27 li 2004 28 o’brien and li 2004 29 yep 2004 30 undp 2002: 11-13 leung, moore, o’donnell, travis 36 31 undp: 13-15, 98-99 32 judd 1994 33 wu 2003 34 wu 2003: 18-19 35 ahmad 1989 36 matthews and nee 2000 brenner final version * please see the bottom of the page for a note to authors last name 1 note to authors: this template is provided to you as a formatting guide for the font type, style, and formats for any appended materials. the template includes information for use of endnotes and the proper mla format for a works cited list. we encourage you to use this template for ease – the consilience editorial board, 08-09 gad and gender mainstreaming: a pathway to sustainable development? full name: ms. alletta brenner e-mail address: a.brenner@lse.ac.uk brief biography: alletta, who recently completed a two-year tenure in great britain as a marshall scholar, holds masters degrees in human rights from the london school of economics, and international and european politics from the university of edinburgh. in addition, she has a b.a. in history and women’s studies at the university of oregon. her areas of interest include: international political discourse, normative change, and women’s and human rights. this paper, which was originally written for a class on gender and development at the university of edinburgh, arose from the early stages of research for her masters thesis on the pseudo-feminist language deployed by the u.s. bush administration in its description and justification of the ‘war on terror,’ especially with regard to the invasion of afghanistan, and the question of whether this discourse represented actual changes to u.s. development strategy. a shortened version of this thesis, “speaking transformation: us foreign policy discourse and the language of feminism,” is forthcoming in the journal of international women’s studies. brenner 2 scholarly abstract in recent years there has been increased attention to the importance of gender in securing longterm development goals. consensus has now been reached that increasing the social status and economic capacity of women is an effective way of improving outcomes. the subject of this paper is the viability of the ‘gender and development’ (gad) paradigm as a means of establishing socially and politically sustainable gains for women in developing countries. the author examines the gad paradigm using the case study of ‘gender mainstreaming’ in the reconstruction and development of afghanistan since 2001. through an analysis of some of the problems encountered so far, the author questions whether such an approach is likely to actually result in long-term, sustainable improvement in that country. three key issues include: marginalization of ‘gender mainstreaming’; lack of state capacity; and failures to fully integrate programs into social and cultural contexts. though reconstruction efforts have clearly resulted in some improvement, it is argued that it is unclear whether such an approach will lead to long-term progress. rather, there is strong evidence that gad can actually contribute to the further politicization of gender and result in a backlash against reforms. ultimately, the goals that the gad paradigm attempts to achieve are extremely difficult to translate into effective practice, especially in highly volatile and politicized situations. in conclusion, the author finds that sustainable and transformative change may be elusive if one simply applies new aims to old models of aid provision. brenner 3 author’s note a great deal of feminist scholarship focuses either on how the world we live in is rife with inequality and injustice. what is often missing in between however is a road map for how it may be possible to overcome these problems to envision and create a better future. the field of development, on the other hand, tends to be concerned primarily with pragmatic questions of how we can improve the lives of people around the world. in this context, the ‘end point’ of such efforts is often uncritically assumed. a feminist approach to development attempts in many ways to bring together these two disparate tendencies, combining a critical standpoint with a pragmatic approach. however appealing such an approach may seem, however, it is perhaps unsurprising that feminist models of development have often proved incredibly problematic, both in theory and practice. a feminist approach to development reveals particular challenges for the goals of sustainable development. for, while it is argued that gender equality is a necessary step in creating sustainable development, how to create such change in socially and politically sustainable ways remains unresolved. the holistic and transformative aims that gender-sensitive approaches to development aspire to are incredibly difficult to realize. in the end, to achieve these, it may be necessary to conceive of a wholly different model of aid provision. keywords: gender, development, mainstreaming, afghanistan, post-conflict reconstruction brenner 4 gad and gender mainstreaming: a pathway to sustainable development? until recently, the issue of gender1 has tended to be ignored and undervalued by the development community. providers of aid have paid little attention to the particular needs and problems of women and likewise have failed to recognize the importance of their well being for the overall success of the societies in which they live. since the 1970s however, a shift in thinking has been under way. ester boserup’s landmark study on agricultural production in subsaharan africa, published in 1970, pointed to the crucial role of women’s labor in sustaining local and international economies.2 since then, feminist scholars across a range of disciplines have sought to show how women act as essential players in the economic, social and cultural development of their societies and how gender-sensitivity is a crucial part of sustainable development.3 as a result of this work there has been a monumental shift in attitudes among development practitioners. increasingly, aid donors, providers and scholars alike have come to recognize the links between the status and welfare of women and a whole range of development goals, from political stability and economic growth to environmental sustainability. as the 1995 beijing platform for action proclaimed: “the advancement of women and the achievement of equality between women and men are a matter of human rights and a condition for social justice… they are the only way to build a sustainable, just and developed society.”4 promoting ‘gender equality’ would be identified as a key component of the un’s millennium development goals.5 more recently, the passage of un resolution 1325, which declared that the empowerment of women was critical to the processes of both peacemaking and democratization, has affirmed this view.6 across the board, investment in a country’s women has proven to be one of the most effective and cost-efficient means of generating substantial and sustainable development gains.7 a significant manifestation of the growing recognition of the special role women play in development has been the creation of new gender-sensitive paradigms for aid provision. one of the most important of these is the ‘gender and development’ (gad) approach, which evolved in the late 1980s in response to the limitations of earlier attempts at feminist development practice, such as a continued marginalization of women and a limited capacity for transformational change.8 defined and promoted by the theoretical work of both ‘third world’ and socialist brenner 5 feminists in the ‘west,’ the gad approach argues that development programs cannot be successful if they only take on economic problems in isolation of the social and political structures that underlie all transactions. individual capacity to command and allocate resources is just as important as access to them in the first place.9 thus, drawing on the theoretical foundations of radical feminism,10 and in contrast with other paradigms for women and development, which have tended to focus on women in isolation from larger development programs, gad draws attention to how sexual difference is constructed and inscribed via gender on social, political and economic relations within the communities where development programs function and to the ways in which these relations play a role in the need for assistance in the first place.11 as a result, it seeks not just to meet basic, material needs but to make women (and men) aid recipients aware of the structural inequalities that lead to poverty and to engage them as agents in their own improvement and thereby create more lasting and sustainable change.12 in other words, the gad approach goes beyond simply trying to integrate women into development, but argues that the whole mode by which development operates must be transformed in order to take on social and political transformation in addition to economic reallocation.13 in this way, gad aims to change the social, economic and political structures that contribute to the need for external assistance in the first place—empowering women in all aspects of their lives as a means of strengthening the foundations of their societies.14 the gad framework offers a new and appealing way of thinking about the goals and means of development because it presents the recipients of aid in a more holistic light and doesn’t shy away from culture and politics.15 one key strategy for the implementation of a gad approach that has emerged is ‘gender mainstreaming,’ which seeks to end the oppositional dualism between ‘women’s issues’ and the rest of politics, economics and culture by bringing women ‘in from the periphery.’16 on one level, this involves making the structures of government and civil society sensitive to women’s needs. however, at the same time, mainstreaming also means bringing women into the public sphere by increasing their participation. nonetheless, putting a gender mainstreaming program into practice poses a number of difficult problems. how should international development programs go about implementing this kind of approach? should change come from the bottom up through the grassroots work of non-governmental organizations? or, can it only come from the top down via aggressive intervention from the state? the possibility of this kind of transformation implies a brenner 6 process of re-structuring social and economic relations on a broad scale. how does one actually set in motion this sort of process and even then, how can we measure its ‘progress’?17 finally, does the whole idea of directing this kind of cultural and political change from the outside (as the whole development framework implies) render such a program problematically imperialistic? despite a perceptible shift in thinking within the international community towards a gender-sensitive approach, gad has largely remained on the sidelines of large-scale development programs.18 however, one exception has been the application of a gad approach to the development and reconstruction of afghanistan since 2001, primarily through the strategy of gender mainstreaming.19 in this case, the goal of improving the status and welfare of afghan women was defined both as a central goal of development in of itself and as a means of achieving greater efficiency for resources spent. in accordance, a flurry of gender mainstreaming programs and initiatives would emerge in the years immediately following the overthrow of the taliban. however, realities on the ground in the country have proven that the broader transformative agenda that gad embodies is extremely difficult to translate into effective practice. while programs may have helped improve the welfare of afghan women in some contexts up to the present, it is unclear whether a gad approach articulated through gender mainstreaming is capable of ensuring the social and political sustainability of such changes. after decades of relative isolation, afghanistan reappeared on the geopolitical stage in late 2001, when in the wake of the september 11th bombings in the usa it became the first of a series of targets in the international ‘war on terror.’20 ironically, though the terrorism that the united states was reacting against had little to do with gender specifically, issues of culture, religion and political rights became the sites where the u.s. clash with al queda could be measured, and the issue of ‘women’s rights’ in afghanistan became a focus of attention. thus, afghan women were suddenly thrown into the international limelight as the embodiment of the kind of oppression muslim terrorist groups like al queda allegedly intended to impose on the entire world. as first lady laura bush proclaimed: “the brutal oppression of women is a central goal of the terrorists…[the regime in afghanistan] is the world the terrorists would like to impose on the rest of us.”21 in this vein, the bush administration quickly adopted a kind of pseudo-feminist rhetoric in its framing of the afghanistan invasion. using the emancipation of afghan women as a means of justifying the war,22 the bush administration began to insist “the brenner 7 fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women.”23 accordingly, in the aftermath of the fall of the taliban, many saw the ‘liberation’ of afghanistan’s women as a litmus test for the success of the re-building and ‘modernization’ of this former ‘failed state.’ it is upon this backdrop that the gad approach was adopted as a guiding principle in the reconstruction of afghanistan, and that afghanistan itself became a sort of testing ground for the application of gad on a broad scale. with the establishment of a new government in afghanistan pursuant to the bonn agreement, which was signed in december 2001, advancing women’s status and welfare by a variety of mechanisms became a central tenet of state-building and development strategy in afghanistan, with the express goal of reversing taliban era restrictions on women’s lives and furthering their advancement in afghan society overall.24 as the new government’s national development strategy proclaimed: “the government’s goal is to eliminate discrimination against women, develop their human capital and promote their leadership in order to guarantee their full and equal participation in all aspects of life in afghanistan.”25 likewise, many of the key donors in the reconstruction also took up an aggressive gad standpoint, with usaid for example proclaiming that "that gender be integrated into all of the work of usaid in order to contribute to effective programs, social equity, and sustainable change."26 the development program in afghanistan has thus sought to apply a gad framework in several ways, each attempting to engage women’s strategic as well as immediate needs. building from the framework established by the bonn agreement, gender mainstreaming in afghanistan since 2001 has taken a number of forms. one of the most prominent of these has been in the political sphere: from the writing of specific rights and protections for women into the state’s new constitution and other laws, to mandating minimum levels of female participation in the country’s new governing structures via a gender quota system for the election of parliamentary representatives, which reserves a quarter of seats for female candidates.27 due in large part to such policies and laws, the percentage of women representatives and civil servants in the new afghan government is relatively high, even compared to more-developed countries in the west.28 likewise, a number of specific institutional organizations and mechanisms have been created with the aim of furthering gender mainstreaming and women’s advancement, namely: the ministry of women’s affairs, charged with developing and implementing mainstreaming projects into other government ministries; the office of the state brenner 8 minister for women, responsible for advising the president; the afghanistan independent human rights commission, which both ensures that afghan laws are in agreement with international standards and monitors conditions within the country; and a gender advisory group to help with mainstreaming and work with donors.29 at the same time, development projects, particularly in the urban area of kabul, have spent considerable energy raising the level of participation among afghani women and getting them involved as much as possible in community politics.30 finally, a significant component of mainstreaming efforts have been ‘gender training’ projects—often in tandem with other programs directed at ‘capacity building’—which attempt to educate and inform both ordinary afghans as well as community leaders about ‘gender issues’ and thereby gain their appreciation and support for the goal of female empowerment in that country.31 on the surface of things, gender mainstreaming has had a significant impact on the development of the new afghan state. for example, the new government has proclaimed establishment of a “broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government” one of its central goals.32 across the country, women are entering the public sphere—from thousands of girls returning to newly constructed schools to the large-scale participation of women in the nation’s first presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2005. the new constitution proclaims formal equality and non-discrimination between women and men, and in the new national assembly over a quarter of seats are held by women, a vast improvement over the three percent who held seats in 1990. similarly, ten percent of government employees at the ministerial level today are women.33 likewise, the building of hospitals and schools, often with a focus on providing specially for women’s basic needs, have played a real and important role in healing wounds left by decades of war.34 however despite these apparent successes, serious problems hamper the advancement of the gad agenda, resulting in significant gaps between women’s formal and substantiative rights. one reason for this may be the structural nature of the gender inequalities gender mainstreaming seeks to overcome. for, even though the need for mainstreaming has been well recognized in afghanistan, efforts to put the approach into practice have inevitably been subject to the same forces that make it necessary in the first place. despite a large amount of fanfare on the progress of women’s rights in the country, mainstreaming has tended to be sidelined—made a feature of ‘special initiatives’ aimed at certain women, rather than integrated into the whole country’s development and democratization.35 for example, while the new government promptly brenner 9 established the new ministry of women’s affairs as stipulated by the bonn agreement, it gave the new ministry neither the legal jurisdiction nor the powers needed to implement its policies.36 similarly, though the new constitution proclaims equal rights, many have criticized its overall weak language and many loopholes, which ultimately undermine and weaken the legal protections it affords.37 at the same time those programs aimed at creating this transformation have tended to be marginalized in the funding they have received from international donors, as the vast majority of funds have been diverted instead to the nation’s security needs.38 these days, it appears that gender mainstreaming (and with it the whole gad agenda in afghanistan) has been progressively left behind in favor of other concerns. as one ngo worker has noted: “in 2001, after the fall of the taliban, improving the rights of afghan women was at the top of the international agenda; [now], despite many well-intentioned programs for women, women’s human rights appears to be more of an afterthought.”39 indeed, even the united states, which was integrally involved with the advancement of women in afghanistan in the past, seems to have lost interest. in usaid's 2008 "afghanistan strategy" no mention was made whatsoever of the particular role of gender mainstreaming or of women's empowerment at all as a key goal or benchmark for progress in that country.40 indeed, the last time usaid published any report specific to gender issues in afghanistan was in 2006. while the war in iraq has largely taken over the focus of us foreign policy and development assistance, the united states apparent special concern for afghan women also seems to have diminished significantly. moreover, even those mainstreaming efforts that have been fully implemented have had debatable success. for example, despite aggressive efforts to bring women into the formal structures of governance, it is reported by observers that even when they do take part, women continue to be excluded from the actual decision-making processes where policy is made, raising questions about the actual impact of such measures.41 for example, despite a significant female presence at the nation’s first constitutional assembly (“loya jirga”), it was extremely difficult for these women to either work together or push ‘women’s issues’ to the front of the agenda.42 in fact, some argue, rather than create community support for the empowerment of afghan women, there is some evidence that mainstreaming has had the opposite effect, especially among those ordinary afghans for whom the western vision of the oppressed afghan woman has never held much resonance. instead, many seem to find this focus disingenuous and troubling. as one woman lamented: “right now our women are all over the place, being used for politics, used like brenner 10 dolls… every event they are in front of the tv, the camera. they are being used just to show that women were there.”43 despite large scale attempts to normalize the involvement of women in public decision-making, the attitudes of most afghans appear unchanged; they feel that only ‘educated’ women (who make up a very tiny portion of the overall population) ought to participate and then only in certain ways, with men remaining ultimately dominant. likewise, even as women have been increasingly encouraged to take public roles, using these to actually challenge gender inequality has proven to be extremely difficult. more often than not, these women have tended to find it necessary to accede to more traditional norms in order to be accepted as legitimate.44 finally, despite all the programs targeting them, women in afghanistan remain for the most part politically disengaged—far less likely than men to be aware of important political developments or to vote.45 these realities highlight the very real tensions inherent any time development projects become intertwined with the complex politics of state building. for even as gender has become a dominant rhetorical theme, translating this rhetoric into effective practice in an environment that lacks both political strength and stability has proven exceedingly difficult.46 decades of conflict and turmoil have left afghanistan a largely fragmented nation, split along regional, ethnic and even family lines, with many parts of the country largely outside of the national government’s influence and control.47 enforcing a national policy on women’s rights in the nation’s periphery has thus posed a monumental task that the new afghan government has not always been able to carry out. likewise, while mainstreaming may have helped make some more sensitive to women’s issues, the goals of gender mainstreaming have overall remained a peripheral concern in afghan politics. in the end, even as the new government has made genuine attempts to promote gender equality, these ideals have had to compete with the necessity of political maneuvering and coalition building.48 ultimately, in a context where the national government itself is incredibly weak and the judiciary very limited in capacity, the appropriateness of the kind of top-down approach that gender mainstreaming requires has in many ways proven questionable.49 the effectiveness of gender mainstreaming as a means to social and cultural transformation in afghanistan has also been limited by the nature of mainstreaming itself. for, while it has clearly been effective at increasing the participation of at least some women in the public sphere, mainstreaming is less adept at addressing gender inequalities in the private sphere. brenner 11 thus, even with the participation of women in government at an all time high and many new laws and policies aimed at combating them, problems like forced marriage and domestic violence have continued unabated.50 one reason for this may be the way that mainstreaming tends to focus on certain groups of women in isolation from the social ties that are so central to the way gender is defined and expressed in afghan culture.51 for afghans, ‘woman’ is an interconnected and contested source of afghan identity and political orientation that is seen as important and deserving of protection: “women have always been, and remain, wards of their families and communities...the domestic domain and the control of women are among the most jealously guarded areas in the reproduction of sub-national identities.”52 conflicts over gender in afghanistan have always been related to larger socio-political tensions, such as that between those western-educated elite afghans in urban areas who today act as the representative voice of the whole of afghanistan in the development process,53 and the conservative majority of the country which live in rural areas.54 likewise, afghans understand the identity ‘woman’ in far more complex, relational terms than acknowledged by the dominant stereotype of ‘oppressed victim.’55 as one ethnographer has argued: contemporary scholarly and humanitarian discourses evolve around the victimisation of afghan women, employ culture as a deterministic explanatory device and use islamic fundamentalism as represented by the taliban as a scapegoat to summarily account for all forms of distress in afghanistan…[these tropes fail] to account for how gender has been inflected by violence, war and occupation and subsequently what work war and its accompanying forces have performed on social institutions, family structure and individual subjectivities.56 development projects that attempt to target women, especially certain classes of women such as widows, in isolation from these relational fields results in a situation where development projects neither acknowledge the experiences of afghans--men and women alike--nor respond to the true dimensions of their needs. 57 indeed, despite its emphasis on ‘gender’ (instead of simply on ‘women’) men have been almost entirely left out the transformative agenda. as one 2004 survey found, no development workers interviewed could come up with a single mainstreaming program that meaningfully incorporated men as well as women. if the mainstreaming project in afghanistan ultimately fails to include the whole of afghan society in its transformative project, it risks inciting resentment and frustration and setting off a reactionary response that is all-too-familiar. as one afghan man reported, to most men gender mainstreaming means: “increasing the power of women while brenner 12 decreasing the power of men. women over men.”58 such attitudes are further deepened by the mistrust and hostility that many afghans feel toward foreign aid and development in general, as unhelpful and self-serving, or as the popular afghan phrase puts it: “like cows who drink their own milk.”59 while it may be too early to gauge the full political consequences of such perceptions, there is increasing evidence that a backlash is already occurring, often in the form of increased violence against women, both in the home and in public spaces.60 in the end, the big problem may not be the mainstreaming of afghan women into the public sphere, but the incorporation of the country’s men and women into a more holistic and gender-aware development program that not only seeks to increase their participation, but that aims to empower women along with their whole families and communities so that they can live better and more secure lives. sadly, gender mainstreaming as it has been realized in afghanistan today has tended to fall short of this goal. as one scholar has criticized: gender mainstreaming programs in afghanistan today seem like they “may have more to do with international politics and the agendas of external agencies than with meeting the felt and expressed needs of the majority of afghan women.”61 this is extremely problematic, because not only do such perceptions lead to a sense that the goals of gad are illegitimate, they risk inciting a sense among afghans that the prospect of changes to gender relations at all poses a threat to the very fabric of afghan society. the project of creating greater gender equality in afghanistan is not a new one, and in the past such attempts have often been seen in just such a light and been faced with stiff resistance.62 the danger of inciting a backlash is very real and should be taken very seriously by proponents of gender mainstreaming today in afghanistan. more than anything, afghans must view mainstreaming with a sense of ‘ownership’ as something legitimately rooted in their own culture and traditions, not as a pet project of outside aid groups, no matter how well meaning they are. in conclusion, gender mainstreaming has not lived up to its promise as the means of transforming gender in post-war afghanistan. one reason for this is the way mainstreaming has been executed as a policy. for, in the overall reconstruction effort mainstreaming has tended to be marginalized and this lack of commitment has only worsened over time. rather than becoming established as a new way of doing things, there has instead been a gradual decline in attention and resources paid to the advancement of women and a return instead to traditional, technocratic development programs that ignore gender completely. while an ongoing lack of brenner 13 security in afghanistan due to continued fighting has no doubt played some part in this trend, one cannot wonder if this may also be due to the fact that the novelty of gad has worn a bit thin for the countries and organizations that have so far been the lead drivers of development policy in the country. indeed, as the attention of the united states and many of its allies has progressively turned toward iraq, resources directed toward women in that conflict and for that matter any discussion of gad at all have been almost entirely absent.63 such a lack of sustained interest may be one of the biggest barriers of all for the success of gad and gender mainstreaming in afghanistan; after all, if there is one thing more than all others that large-scale societal transformations require, it is a sustained and long-term commitment. as it stands today, the lack of such commitment in afghanistan is creating a real danger that gad and with it gender mainstreaming will become seen as little more than a fashionable set of ‘buzz words’ devoid of actual meaning.64 however, not all of the problems i have highlighted in this paper can be attributed to lack of commitment and effective implementation. some are related to the inherent limitations of mainstreaming as a strategy. gad cannot be effective in transforming gender relations if it only means placing women in the political arena and ‘gender’ on the agenda, or as some have said ‘adding women and stirring.’ other structural dimensions of gender inequality such as family organization and economic independence must also be addressed, and mainstreaming is in many ways not well suited to addressing these. as a result of such limitations, some have raised the question of whether mainstreaming, or in fact any strategy of gad will ever manage to accomplish the goal of long-term sustainable change. for, a fundamental transformation of ‘gender’ may not be unattainable via the kinds of externally driven, technocratic-focused projects that make up the bulk of development practice today. as one scholar has noted: a more creative engagement with the complexities of the politics of gender, which is laden [there] as elsewhere with its own historical baggage, would mandate a contextual, nontechnocratic approach which requires temporal horizons, levels of commitment and types of coalition building and collaborating which far exceed the time frames and resources of ‘project’ cycles.65 more often than not, there has been a tendency in recent years for organizations to take up the language of gad while continuing to apply the same old kinds of strategies to their work. in many ways, one can argue that mainstreaming is exactly this sort of old strategy. for though the concept of gender mainstreaming may fit well into the theoretical aims of gad, its tendency to brenner 14 take this kind of top-down form may mean it is not an ideal strategy for achieving these goals. for, by focusing almost exclusively on formal equality, it fails to take into account the vast complexity that a successful transformation of gender relations would actually require. gender mainstreaming is an inherently ‘blunt’ instrument, where something much more flexible, creative and grassroots-oriented is needed. in the end, however, one should not take the limitations of gender mainstreaming to mean that gad simply cannot work. gender mainstreaming remains only one tactic for achieving gender transformation, and as it stands today, there have been so few attempts at implementing a large-scale gad development program it is impossible to say what outcomes are actually possible. moreover, those few attempts that have been made, such as in afghanistan, have not had nearly enough time to truly reveal all their impacts. before we can close the book on gad, far more creative and committed attempts to implement this approach will be needed. for, ultimately, if gad can ever hope to be successful, one thing is clear: it will require a whole range of localized tactics rather than one single strategy, and many years of stanch work, not just a few. however, in spite of the many challenges its application in afghanistan has revealed, gad remains a crucial link for achieving more sustainable development everywhere in the world. for, in order to create truly sustainable outcomes, development must encompass and uplift whole communities, women as well as men, and to this end gad presents the most thoughtful and nuanced approach yet. brenner 15 works cited: abirafeh, lina. lessons from gender-focused international aid in post-conflict afghanistan ... learned? (gender in international cooperation series n. 7) bonn, germany: friedrichebert-stiftung, 2005. available online: <http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs /folder/worldwide/asien/berichte/berichte2005/afghanistan0905a birafehgender.pdf>. last accessed 18 april 2007. afshar, haleh and deborah eade eds. development, women, and war: feminist perspectives. oxford: oxfam gb, 2004. agathangelou, anna m. and lhm. ling. “power, borders, security, wealth: lessons of violence and desire from september 11,” international studies quarterly 48.3 (2004), 517–538. amnesty international. afghanistan: no one listens to us and no one treats us as human beings. london: amnesty international reports, october 2003. available online: <http://web .amnesty.org/library/eng-afg/reports>. last accessed 5 april 2007. ______. afghanistan: women still under attack a systematic failure to protect. london: amnesty international reports, may 2005. available online: <http://web.amnesty.org /library/pdf/asa110072005english/$file/asa1100705.pdf>. last accessed 17 april 2007. barakat, sultan ed. reconstructing war-torn societies: afghanistan. basingstoke: palgrave macmillan, 2004. beckwith, karen. "a common language of gender?" politics & gender 1.1 (2005): 128-37. boserup, ester. women’s role in economic development. new york: st. martin’s press, 1970. chant, sylvia and matthew gutmann. mainstreaming men into gender and development. oxford: oxfam, 2000. cohn, carol et al. “women, peace and security: resolution 1325” international feminist journal of politics 6.1 (2004): 1430-40. daulatzai, anila. “acknowledging afghanistan: notes and queries on an occupation” cultural dynamics 18.3 (2006): 293-311. donini, antonio, norah niland, and karin wermester eds. nation-building unravelled? aid, peace and justice in afghanistan. bloomfield, ct: kumarian press, 2003. brenner 16 englebert, pierre and denis tull. “postconflict resolution in africa: flawed ideas about failed states” international security 32.4 (2008): 106-139. ferguson, michele l. ““w” stands for women: feminism and security rhetoric in the post9/11 bush administration” politics & gender 1 (2005): 9-38. forman, shepard and stewart patrick. good intentions: pledges of aid for postconflict recovery. boulder, co: lynne rienner, 2000. greenblatt-harrison, andrea et al. strengthening afghan women’s civil society to secure afghanistan’s future: an analysis of new u.s. assistance programs. washington d.c.: women’s edge coalition, 2005. human rights research and advocacy consortium. speaking out: afghan opinions on rights and responsibilities. kabul: hrrac, 2003. human rights watch. between hope and fear: intimidation and attacks against women in public life in afghanistan. new york: human rights watch, 2004. jaquette, jane and gale summerfield eds. women and gender equity in development theory and practice. durham: duke university press, 2006. kamal, sarah. “development on-air: women’s radio production in afghanistan” gender and development 15.3 (2007): 399-411. kandiyoti, deniz. the politics of gender and reconstruction in afghanistan. geneva: un research institute for social development, 2005. available online: <http://www.unrisd .org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/d2a23ad2d50cb2a280256eb300385855/3050be40da5b87 1cc125704400534a7a/$file/opgp4.pdf>. last accessed 16 april 2007. _____. “political fiction meets gender myth: post-conflict reconstruction, ‘democratization’ and women’s rights,” ids bulletin 35.4 (2004): 134-136. khattak, saba gul. “adversarial discourses, analogous objectives” cultural dynamics 16.2-3 (2004): 213-236. kemp, sandra and judith squires. feminisms. oxford: oxford university press, 1998. marchand, marianne and jane parpart eds. feminism/postmodernism/development. london: routledge, 1995. margesson, rhoda and daniel kronenfeld. u.s. assistance to women in afghanistan and iraq: challenges and issues for congress. washington d.c.: congressional research office, 2006. brenner 17 moghadam, valentine. “patriarchy and the politics of gender in modernising societies: iran, pakistan and afghanistan,” international sociology 7.1 (1992): 35-53. montgomery, john d. and dennis a. rondinelli eds. beyond reconstruction in afghanistan: lessons from development experience. basingstoke: palgrave macmillan, 2004. national development strategy working group. afghanistan national development strategy: summary report. kabul: government of the islamic republic of afghanistan, 2006. available online: <http://www.ands.gov.af>. last accessed 17 april 2007. oates, lauryn and isabelle solon helal. at the crossroads of conflict and democracy: women and afghanistan’s constitutional loya jirga. montreal: center for rights and democracy, 2004. parpart, jane, jennifer connelly and eudine barriteau eds. theoretical perspectives on gender and development. ottawa: international development research center (idrc), 2001. razavi, shahrashoub and carol miller. from wid to gad: conceptual shifts in the women and development discourse. geneva: united nations research institute for social development, united nations development programme, 1995. rehn, elisabeth and ellen johnson sirleaf eds. women, war, peace: the independent experts’ assessment on the impact of armed conflict on women and women’s role in peacebuilding. (progress of the world’s women series vol. 1). new york: unifem, 2002. available online: <http://www.unifem.org/resources/item_detail.php?productid=17>. last accessed 18 april 2007. richey, lisa ann. “gender equality and foreign aid” in fin tarp and peter hjertholm eds. foreign aid and development: lessons learnt and directions for the future. london: routledge, 2000, 247-270. rojos, mary hill and zulaikha aziz. recommendations for integrating gender into the rebuilding agricultural markets in afghanistan program (ramp). washington d.c.: usaid, 2004. available online at: <http://dec.usaid.gov/>. last accessed 21 february 2009. roy, kartik, clement tisdell and hans blomqvist eds. economic development and women in the world community. westport: praeger, 1999. suhrke, astri. “the limits of statebuilding” paper presented at the international studies association annual meting san diego 21-24 march 2006. bergen, norway: cmi, 2006. brenner 18 available online at: <http://www.cmi.no/pdf/?file=/publications/2006/isapapermarch 2006.pdf>. last accessed 17 april 2007. thakur, ramesh chandra and oddny wiggen eds. south asia in the world: problem solving perspectives on security, sustainable development and good governance. new york: united nations university press, 2004. unifem. “afghanistan factsheet.” available online at: <http://afghanistan.unifem.org/pdf_ documents/unifemafghanistan_factsheet_081205.pdf> last accessed 16 april 2007. united nations development programme: afghanistan. “institutional capacity building for gender equality,” available online at <http://www.undp.org.af/> last accessed 17 april 2007. afghanistan human development report 2007/8. available online at <http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_afg.html> last accessed 14 july 2008. wardak, ali, daud saba and halima kazem. afghanistan human development report: bridging modernity and tradition: rule of law and the search for justice. kabul: center for policy and human development, 2007. united nations secretary general. women, peace and security. new york: united nations publications, 2002. usaid. afghanistan strategic plan 2005-2010. washington d.c.: usaid, 2005. available online at: <http://dec.usaid.gov/>. last accessed 20 february 2009. afghanistan strategy. washington d.c.: usaid, 2008. available online at: <http://dec.usaid.gov/>. last accessed 21 february 2009. visvanathan, nalini et al eds. the women, gender and development reader. london: zed books, 1997. walby, sylvia. “gender mainstreaming: productive tensions in theory and practice,” social politics 12.3 (2005): 321-343 ware, vron. ‘info-war and the politics of feminist curiosity,’ cultural studies 20.6 (2006): 526-551. wakefield, shawna. gender and local level decision making: findings from a case study in panjao. kabul: areu case studies series, 2004. brenner 19 white house office of the press secretary (december 17, 2008). fact sheet: president bush has kept america safe. press release. available online at: <http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/12/20081217-5.html>. last accessed 2 march 2009. zulfacar, maliha. “the pendulum of gender politics in afghanistan,” central asian survey 25.12 (2006): 27–59. 1 in general usage, the term ‘gender’ tends to be interchangeable with ‘sex.’ however, ‘gender’ is actually distinct from biological sex in that it describes the social aspects of being a man or woman. as beckwith describes it: gender is made up of “socially constructed, fluid, politically relevant identities, values, conventions and practices conceived as masculine and/or feminine” which are mapped in multidimensional ways onto political structures, rules and norms (131). 2 see boserup. 3 visvanathan et al, 1-29; and parpart et al, 31-36. 4 quoted in richey, 247. 5 for more on the un millennium development goals see <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>. (last accessed 22 february 2009). 6 united nations secretary general; and cohn, 1430-40. 7 see roy, tisdell and blomqvist, 4-24. 8 parpart et al, 62. 9 jaquette and summerfield, 5-6. 10 parpart et al., 62. in general, radical feminism is the school of feminist thought that challenges the construction of sex and gender in society and aims for the transformation of these relations. for a discussion on radical feminism and some examples of radical feminist theory, see kemp and squires. 11 ravazi and miller, 12, 27-40. 12 parpart et al., 63; and visvanathan et al, 51-54. 13 ravazi and miller, 27-30. 14 jaquette and summerfield, 87-106. this argument is also made in chant and gutmann. 15 marchand and parpart, 180, 204-207. 16 see walby, 321-325. brenner 20 17 ravazi and miller, 31-40. 18 for more discussion about the use of a gad approach by non-governmental organizations in the development sector, see the journal gender and development, published three times annually by oxfam and routledge. 19 in afghanistan, the line between reconstruction and development is very blurred. much of what is currently being ‘rebuilt’ was actually destroyed not in the most recent conflict but over the course of the many different wars that have devastated the country repeatedly in the last fifty years. moreover, in many cases it can be argued that much of what is being ‘rebuilt’ was never there in the first place to start. this issue is not limited to afghanistan. for more on this critique of ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ see englebert and tull. 20 see white house bush administration archives for use of “war on terror” rhetoric: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/12/20081217-5.html. 21 first lady laura bush, on cnn 17 november 2001, quoted in khattak, 221. 22 kandiyoti “politics”, 1; ferguson, 9-24; and khattak, 221-223. 23 ferguson, 22. 24 see usaid, 3; and kandiyoti “politics”, 15-32. 25 national development strategy working group, 21. 26 rojos and aziz, 5. similarly, in usaid’s strategic plan for 2005-210, the empowerment of women as a means of creating an environment of ‘social inclusion’ was identified as a crucial aspect of sustainable development and the goal of achieving ‘gender equity’ proclaimed to be built into ‘every-aspect’ of usaid’s program; see “afghanistan strategic plan,” 5-11, 15. 27 wardak et al. 84; also see oates and helal. 28 according to the most recent numbers available, 25.9 percent of seats in the afghan parliament and held by women. see afghanistan human development report 2007/8. 29 kandiyoti “politics”, 16. 30 abirafeh, 7-13. 31 kandiyoti “politics”, 17. also see united nations development programme. 32 amnesty “no one listens”, 2. 33 greenblatt-harrison, 9; and national development strategy, 21. 34 see undp, “2007/2008 human development report: afghanistan.” 35 this marginalization also continues to be reflected in the approaches and priorities of major aid providers. for example, hirschmann argues that even though it often employs a rhetoric of gender brenner 21 sensitivity, usaid continues to exclude “women’s specific constraints and contributions” from broader policy analyses (in jaquette and summerfield 71-86). 36 this language comes from the preamble to the bonn agreement. quoted in khattak, 225. 37 khattak, 224. 38 according to the latest figures available the per capita aid received was $110.7 (in us dollars). though this has gone up from $76.6 in 2004, it still compares unfavorably with aid received in other countries. see united nations human development report: afghanistan (2007/8). also khattak, 227-228. ironically, the percentage of aid from the usa has earmarked for women has been even lower, just $189 million out of $4.2 billion! see greenblatt-harrison et al., 18; and rehn and sirleaf, 24. 39 human rights watch, 4 (quoted in abirafeh, 8). 40 usaid “afghanistan strategy,” 1-2. 41 wardak et. al, 10, 97-98. 42 see khattak, 225-226 and oates and helal, 24-35. 43 quoted in abirafeh, 8. 44 kamal, 406-409. 45 human rights research and advocacy consortium, 27. women’s lack of ‘knowledge’ is a common justification for their exclusion in public decision-making. see wakefield. 46 suhrke, 20-21, 28-31. 47 barakat, 98, 100-105; suhrke, 4-5. 48 khattak, 225-228. in the period of the civil war rural warlords galvanized support precisely on the issue of resisting imposed reforms on gender relations and today many these same leaders remain in power. 49 kandiyoti “political fiction”, 135. 50 kandiyoti “politics”, 24-27; and amnesty “women still under attack.” 51 barakat, 125. 52 kandiyoti “politics”, 12. 53 suhrke, 7-10. 54 khattak, 218-219; and barakat, 117-118. according to the most recent numbers, more than seventy percent of afghans live in rural areas. see united nations human development report: afghanistan (2007/8), section 5: “demographic trends.” 55 barakat, 119-120; and kandiyoti “politics”, 19-28, dualatzai, 14-15. 56 daulatzai, 299. 57 dualatzai, 293, 304-305. brenner 22 58 abirafeh, 13. also see kandiyoti “politics”, 30. 59 suhrke, 5. 60 see human rights watch; and amnesty “no one listens.” 61 barakat, 109. 62 moghadam, 35-53. 63 margesson and kronenfeld, 5-8. 64 parpart et al, 64. 65 kandiyoti “political fiction”, 136. microsoft word hayhtio final.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 17, iss. 1 (2017), pp. 75–102 sustainable new service development: insights of food wastage data – case: university catering unit markus häyhtiö national defence university, helsinki, finland markus.hayhtio@kolumbus.fi atte harjanne aalto university, school of business, helsinki, finland atte.harjanne@gmail.com johanna rajakangas-tolsa haaga-helia univesrsity of applied sciences, helsinki, finland johanna.rajakangas-tolsa@haaga-helia.fi abstract there are clear implications that sustainable new service development (snsd) is not only part of the future, but also an important part of contemporary service operations. however, evaluation methods in this field remain underdeveloped. this paper offers one example of how contingent data on operation performance and waste streams could be used to improve snsd. specifically, this research quantifies the amount of food waste produced by a typical managed catering business unit to evaluate this data as a measurement of the efficiency of operations management. in this research, sustainable new service development was studied empirically by employing a case study. authors used data simulation to bring insights to snsd. another purpose was to create new, easily applicable metrics for the future snsd work outside the case study unit. this study contributes to the area of new service development (nsd) by offering the utility of a case study-based simulation as a development tool. results indicate how small changes in menu planning, production processes and demand management can create positive and significant financial and environmental outcomes. our results link together the literatures on contingent operations awareness, the triple bottom line paradigm and snsd to create a baseline condition for the future sustainable hospitality development. keywords: service, sustainability, development, corporate social responsibility, csr author’s notes: markus häyhtiö holds a b.sc in hotel, restaurant and tourism management (haaga-instituutti) and m.sc in tourism management (university of surrey). currently he does his ph.d work at the national defence university, finland. consilience häyhtiö, et al: new service development atte harjanne does his ph.d work in aalto university, school of business. his area of expertise is climate change and its effects on the economy. johanna rajakangas-tolsa's works as a principal lecturer at the haaga-helia uas. her doctoral thesis is titled: "diet, cell signalling, and tumourigenesis in multiple intestinal neoplasia mice". consilience 77 introduction even as the global economy turns to focus more on services, arguments about environmental sustainability continue to focus largely on the trade of goods. in part, this makes sense since decoupling value from resource use is more straightforward for services than it is for goods production. however, the environmental footprint of service industries is far from sustainable. this paper examines the idea of sustainable new service development (snsd) following the conclusions by aragoncorrea and rubio-lopez (2007). this paper explores their conclusions in the context of food and hospitality services, which concern the management of material and people. specifically we use a restaurant case study to ask: how can waste management data be used to increase efficiency and effectiveness of hospitality operations. the research had two objectives: 1. to measure the amount of waste produced by a single managed catering business unit. 2. to evaluate the potential of using insights from food wastage data in snsd according to research by halonen (2015), the role of sustainability data affects both commercial purchasing policies and consumer attitudes. thus, we hope that the answers to these research questions will lead to more efficient hospitality operations by increasing awareness among catering practicioners and consumers of the role of sustainability in services. research problem globally, as much as one third of produced food is lost. from this massive amount of nutrition waste, 35% is wasted during consumption. (gustavsson et al., 2011.) if we look at the nutritional value lost in the food production value chain, final-stage consumption remains the largest cause of waste in five out of seven global geographical areas (figure 1). the share of consumption-stage waste is rises with the income level of the population. thus, the scale of the problem is likely to increase as the standards of living rise. according to lipinski et al. (2013), the food loss can be categorized by five stages in the production and consumption chain: 1) production 2) handling and storage 3) processing and packaging 4) distribution and market 5) consumption in the form of food purchased by consumers, restaurants, and caterers but not eaten consilience häyhtiö, et al: new service development authors focused their research on the last stage, because it is the largest source of waste in western societies. while there is a broad literature on the topic of food waste, there is a clear gap in our understanding of how to develop and measure sustainable new services. in addition, there is a need for sustainability metrics in a form of unambiguous customer requirements. several studies have shown that poorly managed sustainability requirements have a drastic effect on the development process and, most of all, on the end result of service development (almefelt et al., 2006; aurum and wohlin, 2005; barney and aurum and wohlin, 2008; hull et al., 2011). this case study looked into a single business unit that serves daily 330 customers on average. management tracks the number of customers on a daily basis by using data from the cash register/automated inventory system. the unit is operated by a global franchise, which has been granted a finnish standards association’s (sfs) environmental certificate. due to the nature of services, empirical data collection during a service development process should include components other than the end product (spohrer and maglio, 2010b; grönroos, 2011). a lack of empirical data from actual serviceenabling processes can lead to situations in which it is impossible to compare obtained results to a set development goal. this analysis follows the definitions of waste used by gustavsson et al. (2011) "global food losses and food waste" report published by food and agriculture organization of the united nations (fao) to make this study comparable to prior ones. corporate social responsibility (csr) activities emphasize social or environmental issues. thus terms like “green” and “environmental” are used in practice as synonyms for “sustainable”. development of these areas in the service context is being referred as sustainable new service development. this paper consists of five sections. the first two sections review the literature on the subject and describe how this paper contributes to existing research in the area of sustainable new service development. the third section describes the research methodology. sections four and five are the results and conclusions with suggestions for further research and limitations of the study. corporate social responsibility corporate social responsibility (csr) is a term describing actions meant to promote positive outcomes for the surrounding community and society (schubert et al., 2010). in the csr context, “sustainability” refers to sustainable development defined originally as meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (brundtland et al., 1987). in the business context, sustainable development is linked to the so-called triple consilience 79 bottom line thinking, which notes that companies should measure their success not only by economic but also in environmental and social terms (elkington, 1997). this area of business development has been studied for decades but the increasing effects of climate change and negative impacts of globalization have brought the issue from academia and media to boardrooms (moir, 2001). discussion about companies’ initial motivation to implement csr is ongoing, but typically two types of drivers are identified: csr can be either internally or externally driven (masurel, 2007; bonilla-priego et al., 2011). the former is connected to goals such as increasing profitability or developing competitive resources, whereas the latter is driven by legal regulations or explicit stakeholder expectations. shareholder and stakeholder value perspectives have been clear dividers of the discussion, but whether it is even possible to separate these two from each other (johnson et al., 2008). opportunities to enhance operative savings and increase firm value in the industry from socially responsible operations serve both approaches (kang et al., 2012). this requires a thorough contingent analysis of business environment as a whole. very good examples of this are a leadership in energy and environmental design (leed) certified and leed qualified building projects in the us hotel industry illustrated by butler (2008). in his study, butler shows the positive financial effects and stakeholder attitudes of green policies. also, reference points like leed offer an opportunity to describe the need for resources in the form of requirements (butler, 2008). new service development new service development (nsd) is a relatively new subject, and as a result, comprehensive studies especially in the area of innovation are scarce (de mark, 2010). according to sanden (2007) 40% of sales in service organizations are created by service products, that were developed within the previous 5 years. authors combined the principles of sustainability and generic service development into the idea of sustainable new service development (snsd). snsd combines the principles of nsd but takes into account the triple bottom line paradigm. services are processes created and consumed simultaneously by the service provider and consumer (grönroos, 2006). there are several academic definitions of a service (gummesson, 2010; kotler, 2007; spohrer and maglio, 2010a; vargo and lusch, 2004), and some significant differences exist between them. as bharadwaj’s et al. (1993) research illustrates, factors like equipment intensity (automated service, like atm) versus people intensity (personal banking service) and service delivery process (served vs. self-service) differentiate services even within same industries. intensity of the service process and modification variability also dictates both development and operations of a service product. intensity refers to the amount of consilience häyhtiö, et al: new service development customer’s participation in a service process and in general hospitality services are considered to belong to so-called highcontact intensity operations. high-contact intensity operations require participation from the customers’ part, but rather limited amount of customization (bullinger et al., 2003). also, a study by melton (2007) clearly underlines the importance of frontline employee and customer participation to service development across different service industries. nsd is a multifunctional and multidisciplinary process. its purpose is to create new, desired service outcomes in co-creation with a customer (spohrer et al., 2008). the purpose of the new service development is to enhance the profitability of existing offerings, attract new customers to the firm, improve the loyalty of existing customers and open markets of opportunity (menor et al., 2002). our approach assumes that the customer obtains service benefits created by the service provider. the main development and management area in service development is capability utilization, since it enables the final service offering (grönroos, 2006; vargo and lusch, 2004). this capability utilization aims to create service outcomes of a process, developed and consumed simultaneously with a service provider and end user, as described by manor, tatikonda and sampson (2002) and grönroos and voima (2013) among others. communication between all parties involved with development process should be transparent, open and most of all factbased. sustainable hospitality operations: a divided responsibility? the importance of market scanning in hospitality product development is significant in two different dimensions illustrated by veflen olsen and sallis (2006). their work divides scanning into narrow (micro) and broad (macro) scanning. narrow scanning focuses on day-to-day information, while broad scanning tries to find factors, which might have significant effect on the long-term effects of the company or the industry. the purpose of thorough scanning is to reduce the service producer’s uncertainties in the three areas in production process and planning: market, creative and process uncertainty (anderson and joglekar, 2005). there are already several environment management systems in use in the hospitality industry, and based on the research by font (2002), there are over 100 ecolabels in use. on top of this, there are industry-specific best practices and codes of conduct, intended to increase green thinking and awareness. ecolabels are meant to assure customers and other stakeholders that the product itself, processes used to produce a product and the whole management system is managed according to a certifier’s requirements (chan, 2009). green attitudes of consumers have been a topic that has received a fair amount of attention in the academia during the past years. these studies range from individual consumer’s willingness consilience 81 to pay premium fees for environmentally sustainable services to the effects of more sustainable services. but hospitality industry as a whole has not been at the forefront of green operations development (kang et al., 2012; szuchnicki, 2009; chan and lam, 2001). marketing literature (weber et al., 1989; szuchnicki, 2009; kotler, 2007) emphasizes psychographic segmentation, which is based on their values and actual motives for consumption as a means to reach existing and potential customers. for example, according to kujanen (2013), higher education correlates with more conscious consumption behavior and greener attitudes towards consumption. market responsiveness is also found to be one of the nine key areas in service development in hospitality industry (ottenbacher and gnoth, 2005). research methodology many studies of sustainable development in the service industry are based on fragmented industry data (de jong and vermeulen, 2003). in this research, sustainable new service development was studied empirically by employing a case study. the methodology was chosen because yin (2003, p. 2) states that: “a case study research would be the preferred method, compared to the others, in situations when: 1) the main research questions are “how” or “why” questions; 2) a researcher has little or no control over behavioral events; 3) and the focus of study is a contemporary (as opposed to entirely historical) phenomenon.” data triangulation is typically used in case studies (johansson, 2003; yin 1994). the purpose is to cover as many aspects of a single case as possible and enable further generalization of the results by reasoning, as illustrated by johansson (2003). the five collection methods used are: 1) literature review 2) documentation (previous research) 3) direct observations 4) interviews 5) data simulation this successful research method has also been introduced by (ranta and takala, 2007). case study unit the case study restaurant offers publicly subsidized student meals. it is operated in a university of applied science under a global franchise, which has been granted a finnish standards association’s (sfs) environmental certificate. the unit operates in the same building as a franchise hotel and uses hotel kitchen premises, equipment and personnel in its operations. also, unit has consilience häyhtiö, et al: new service development to take into consideration its international client base. the government organization responsible for the subsidization scheme, finnish social insurance institution (kela), funds student restaurants meal-by-meal based on legislation that prescribes the general requirements for the subsidies. these general rules state the maximum price and the contents of the meal. for example, a subsidized meal has to include a drink, salad, bread and a spread in addition to the main dishes (kela, 2012). health and nutritional aspects are mentioned, but sustainability is not. the legislation is accompanied by a more detailed but non-binding set of guidelines, which do mention sustainable development as an aim to be addressed in student restaurants (kela, 2011). a vast majority, roughly three quarters of daily revenue, is generated from lunchtime sales. customer base is divided between university personnel (27%) and students (73%). (karjalainen, 2015). this information underlines the importance of students as a source of revenue. collection of empirical data the data collection process took place during the week of april 16, 2015. a sample of 150 observations was collected from a sample frame of 1569 lunchtime customers. five different teams of six research assistants collected the data, and at least one member of the research team was present at all times to help assist the teams and ensure that good academic procedures were followed throughout the data collection process. data was collected from two randomly chosen, separate client groups. due to a limited time frame and time-consuming data collection method, a daily sample was restricted to 30 individuals. the first group consisted of customers collecting their meals, and the other group of those delivering their dishes to washing-up and to a bio-waste collection bin. the arrangement was done in order to reduce research bias the first observation subject was randomly chosen, subsequently, every fifth customer was selected. a similar systematic random selection process was adopted in waste measurement. each portion was measured menu item by menu item, while a client collected it from a selfservice line. measurement was done using two separate scales, whose accuracy was controlled using a standardized comparison weight. during the research period, a unit served 20 different dishes or side dishes and three types of bread along with milk, water or sour milk. there were 79 different ingredients used during the observation period. the amount of energy and the price of the measured ingredient were calculated per 100 g, based on the information gathered from purchasing database. the total amount of energy and price of the portion for each individual dish was calculated. initial results were gathered in spreadsheets to facilitate statistical analysis, which allowed researchers to compare results between the consilience 83 individual units of observation. the total amount of unspecified bio-waste was measured after the lunch period each day and possible issues reflecting to the observation day’s results were discussed with the head-chef of the unit on the spot. data about overall waste was also collected, in order to find and compare the main source of the waste in the unit. this information was collected after each day by scaling the ingredients of the waste bin. the amount of total plate waste could not be added to the consumption waste without further analysis, because the total amount of waste included parts of ingredients such as skin, bones, peels and other non-edibles, which are not included in food wastage by the fao standards. also paper napkins are thrown to the bio-waste bin, which adds-up to the weight of the waste bin. interviews and documentation although wastage information itself offered insight into sustainable new service development, there were still gaps in our understanding of the process. this impacts operations because even after analysis, researchers had to seek alternative explanations for poor financial results, which came to the authors’ attention after the interviews. as a part of the data triangulation method used here, authors interviewed both the head chef of the unit and other members participating in the production process. specifically we sought their views on the efficiency and the effectiveness of the existing csr and eco-label policies. we also collected historical data by interviewing the previous head-chef of the unit and analyzing results from previous development cases. interviewees articulated an obvious need to streamline business processes from a financial management point of view. this must be done while simultaneously following the guidelines of the sfs eco-label and satisfying a demanding customer base. they also expressed an underlying will to use more organic ingredients in food preparation, but implementation of this is limited by a higher purchasing price (erkkonen, 2015.) despite the existing sfs eco-label, organic food ingredients were not demanded to meet eco-label’s certification criteria. different approaches to the csr and snsd required as objective information about the existing operations as possible. this information needed research data, which took both financial and environmental aspects in to consideration. data simulation we implemented a business simulation to introduce statistical data into the analysis. simulated data offers insight into how service provision could be developed, thus providing an opportunity to create metrics, which could be used to track progress during the service development process. there were 150 direct observations of customers’ buying behavior. in order to innovate on the methods used in the field of consilience häyhtiö, et al: new service development snsd, we simulated answers using the whole sample frame. the focus of the observations was on the financial value of the ingredients and nutritional value in the form of amount of energy customers received in the dishes. computer-aided simulation of business systems and business processes is a well-established way to study systems and processes (proctor, 1994; laguna and marklund, 2005). however, there must be an underlying structure in a homogeneous set of selected variables. therefore, the collected data was initially analyzed (appendix 1) using spss software to assure that it met the requirements for further statistical analysis. distribution of both price /dish and energy / dish was analyzed and outliers were dropped. simulations require the use of pre-defined rules, including distributions and weighting factors. this allows interaction based upon trends, norms and incomplete information (hansford et al., 1992). keeping this in mind authors made sure that variables were statistically and conceptually valid so that further analysis was statistically sound following the guidelines by hair et al. (2006). initial statistical analysis (see appendix 1) showed that customers’ purchasing data was normally distributed. during the second phase of analysis, the authors computed the normal probabilities using the norminv function. this function returns the inverse of the normal cumulative function for the specified mean and standard deviation, which were calculated from the observed data. these results were simulated to respond to the actual number of customers during each day of the data collection period and sampling frame. lehtonen and seppälä (1997) describe the need for data reduction as a benefit of datasimulation. in our case the purpose of the simulation was quite the opposite, but the goal of the simulation was in line with their study. one of lehtonen’s and seppälä’s (1997) key findings was, that the main difficulty and disadvantage of simulation is the data collection process. this statement underlines the importance of simulation to help focus development on key development areas in a service system organization. the inter-functional and inter-disciplinary nature of service provisions is hard to analyze without data simulation as described by hansford et al. (1992) due to a vast amount of data from various service processes. dependency on the several information management systems, which enable the final service delivery emphasises the use of simulation (kano et al., 2005). also, pasivirta and kosola (2007) and hansford et al. (1992) emphasise simulation as one of the development tools in a situations where possibilities to actual observation are limited. results the research had two objectives: 1. to measure the amount of waste produced by a single consilience 85 managed catering business unit. 2. to evaluate the potential of using insights of food wastage data in snsd following the principles of methodological triangulation, several research iterations, in which different research methods were utilized, took place. in the early stages of the observation period, it became clear that the actual amount of “plate waste”, food bought but not consumed, was surprisingly small. due to our research approach in which we followed the principles laid–out by fao, the authors wanted to measure ingredient waste as precisely as possible. the purpose of this was to create food waste segments following the criteria fao uses. this approach did not enable before-and-after measurements from the same customers, since in a single unit the word-of-mouth of the on-going observation created a significant risk of measurement bias. also, the small number of wastage observations did not make it possible to simulate statistically viable wastage results. however, aggregate results offer enough information to draw conclusions. a comprehensive, 269 ingredients table of food wastage by customers is given in appendix 2. the smallest amount of unspecified waste was produced on a same day as smallest plate waste results were observed. also, the third day of the observations did not meet the requirements set to the institutional catering served by universities with the average energy value of 306 kcal. the lower average energy content of friday resulted lower unspecified waste, but there was no effect to other wastage results. the lower number of overall customers could explain this. these results are illustrated in the table 2. the data collection method made it possible to divide wastage according to main ingredients. these results show a large portion of salad and salad buffet among the wastage. among the other major sources of food waste were side orders and meat. the overall results are shown in figure 4. climate impacts of the food wastage an essential part of csr is management of the environmental impacts of operations. in the analysis of the environmental impact of the waste, climate impacts were used as a proxy for overall environmental impacts. the assumption is that the same drivers such as energy, fertilizer and land use are causing both the most significant climate impacts as well as other, more local environmental degradations. the climate impacts of different food items were estimated based on a set of guidelines developed by the finnish environment institute (nissinen et al., 2010). estimating the environmental impacts of food, taking into account the whole life cycle, is notoriously difficult, and therefore, the values depicted in figure 3 should be considered only as indicative. the production of meat has a larger environmental consilience häyhtiö, et al: new service development footprint compared to produce like vegetables. also, due to the time of the year, the majority of ingredients were imported, most likely causing a higher environmental impact. based on our estimations, some observations of the climate footprint of different food items can be made. despite the fact that meat represented 18% of the wastage, its climate impact was as high as 39% of the overall impact. a large amount of the overall impact was caused by salad and salad buffet. these ingredients had the highest overall environmental impact of 47%. one has to bear in mind that their share was clearly the largest of all the waste ingredients. as mentioned in the case description, offering salad is a mandatory requirement for a student restaurant. a breakdown of wastage figures is given in appendix 2. paradoxically, in the waste phase, the impact can actually be considered to be positive, since in helsinki, organic waste is separated and is either composted or used in biogas production. also, a growing role of biofuels as a source of energy for transportation is predicted to rise from 1,5 % to 6,8 % by the year 2030 (mykkänen, 2016). a significant source of bio-energy is biowaste generated by households and commercial food providers. this increasing role of bio-fuels will also reduce the final environmental impact of food waste. from the life cycle point of view, of course, this is not the case, since much more energy and resources go into production of the food than can ever be recovered by recycling. thus it is more reasonable to measure the impacts of the waste based on the impacts of the original food items, not the type of waste. based on the interview data, this was also the line of thinking in the restaurant management. their focus was on purchasing local and organic material and reducing unnecessary waste. efficiency and effectiveness of the operations the initial research objective was to analyze the efficiency and effectiveness of the operations with respect to csr. thus, the researchers focused on the early stages of the consumption. this included the serving of the ingredients as final dishes and the customers’ service process and their effects on the csr of the unit. the rationale was that positive csr findings, which gave financial incentives to the catering operator, would be more easily adapted. development of sustainable new services demands a comprehensive process development among all the participants in the service process. therefore, the authors included also a food production process and demand management processes to the research. due to a research focus, purchasing policies were excluded, despite their importance to csr and successful snsd. the researchers knew in advance that outside regulations set by the finnish social insurance institution (kela) dictated largely how day-to-day servings were planned and offered to the student customers. these regulations set constraints on the price of the individual ingredients and, on the other hand, the demands on the energy and nutritional values of the meals and their components. consilience 87 this highly regulated business environment creates even more demand to efficiency from the service provider’s point of view. service provider’s hands are tied by the public funder, whose regulations do not necessarily take sustainability in to account as a regulating factor. with very little negotiating power, all the catering operators operating in a subsidized environment face similar challenges as the case unit due to a metrics (the maximum price and the contents of the meal) used to follow their efficiency and effectiveness. data from the simulated results were used (appendix 3) to draw conclusions, create snsd metrics and to prescribe clear development suggestions, which would take into consideration the following: • official nutritional guidelines • financial aspects o from a buyers’ side o from a supplier’s side • csr the researchers created a set of indicators from the analyzed data set. these indicators/ratios were: • calorie/price • price/portion • production waste the first figure was created to help suppliers understand how efficiently their operations were able to produce the necessary amount of energy to answer the demand set by official guidelines. the figure was calculated as an average price for each calorie. if the average calorie amount was low or average, but the total production price of the dish was high, the supplier’s production efficiency was poor. if the operator did not succeed in producing enough calories at the acceptable price, it was not efficient for the buyers (university) perspective and ineffective for the final users. based on the simulated data (appendix 3), there were large deviations in efficiency over different periods of time. the results are illustrated in figure 4. this ratio gives a good overall view of operational efficiency, but its dependency on two (or more) characteristics requires further explanation. the ratio suggests poor performance during the last three days, but this is a result of two separate issues. on wednesday, the amount of energy is below official guidelines (minimum of 500 kcal/day), and costly ingredients draw the figure down on monday, thursday and friday. the final figure of interest is the production waste. data collection concentrated on the production of eatable food, not the raw ingredients. the rationale behind this came from the fao report, which clearly shows that over-manufacturing is a larger problem than preparation wastage. the data collection method overcame the flaws in the cash register and inventory management system, and the results indicated a clear overproduction of the consilience häyhtiö, et al: new service development dishes. on tuesday, the vegetable casserole (1) was bought by only two customers out of the 30 observed customers, the celery soup (2) by only 1/30, on wednesday, only a single customer bought lentil curry (3) and on thursday, pea soup (4) was favored by only two individuals. when these figures are multiplied to correspond to the total amount of customers, and proper confidence levels are taken into account, results for these days are as follows: • tuesday (1) ci 95% [2, 17], (2) ci 95% [2,18]. • wednesday (3) ci 95% [1,17] • thursday (4) ci 95% [2, 18]. according to the former and the present head chef of the observed unit, the minimum number of portions prepared for a lunch is 30. as results show, wastage is mainly caused by poor menu management. observations show that several kilos of prepared food are thrown away as waste every single day. conclusions and discussion this study assessed the potential of using different types of wastage data as a source for snsd. results indicated that the importance of contingent information for snsd was high. this data should be presented to all participating parties in the most transparent manner, as suggested by prior studies. in his research regarding adaptive supply chains, transparency is a mandatory component to achieve greatest velocity and ability to manage variability (davidrajuh, 2006). the price of ingredients per portion is a figure followed throughout the catering industry. students’ meals are subsidized by the government, production prices should be closely monitored, and alterations should be minimal in order for production to be efficient. these elements are crucial, to new service development’s mission to create new, desired service outcomes that satisfy customers’ requirements. also, increasing awareness of environmental sustainability cannot be neglected if the industry aspires to satisfy customers and achieve better financial results (green et al., 2007). the main source of the global food waste is the purchase of food by consumers, restaurants, and caterers, that is left uneaten. unfortunately, results did not make an exception to this. the small role of plate waste supports current studies conducted by häyhtiö (2016), and production waste figures corroborate industry averages illustrated by koivupuro et.al., (2010) and silvennoinen (2012). the average amount of food waste in the institutionalized catering is slightly over 20%. this figure includes preparation waste, service waste and plate waste. industry averages for the following areas are 4,3%, 10,4% and 5,4% respectively. without any normative framework, it has been operators’ responsibility to follow the principles of csr, but this is about to change. a new european union wide purchasing directive will consilience 89 demand more transparent and precise traceability of goods and services in order to push service providers to increase their overall transparency (hankinnat, 2016). as an end result, it is likely to increase the need to develop services and service metrics following the principles of snsd. therefore, in the process of sustainable new service development both narrow and broad methods should be utilized. it can be concluded, that factors affecting sustainable service development, decision-making and capability management represent either of the two scanning areas: • environmental awareness in the service company (narrow) • environmental awareness of the consumers (broad) • process development to create cost reduction (narrow) • suppliers demand (narrow and broad) • employee satisfaction (narrow) (kassinis and soteriou, 2003) since food life cycle assessments are very complex, the only practical way for the restaurant to reduce the environmental impact of the stages prior to preparation and consumption is to rely on external certificates and key assumptions in purchase decisions, like preferring organic or local food. the actual effects of these decisions, however, remain unclear thus limiting their usefulness for service development. broad and narrow scanning are, as our work indicates, not separate areas within the snsd. both areas have a significant weight with respect to our case study unit, so neither can be neglected. then again, this work manages to show what the possible obstacles are, when both areas are covered in the manner needed to achieve snsd goals. the role of an outside regulator in snsd, such as kela, should not be overlooked. external operators play an important part as a source of information and regulations needed to conduct snsd. the work also shows the importance of well-managed operations. the role of accurate data, which is in an easily utilizable form among all the stakeholders, is crucial and should steer day-to day development work. as qin et al. (2009) have shown, deviations in pre-assumed service quality and food quality have effects on the overall customer satisfaction. thus financial results are jeopardized and principles of the triple bottom line paradigm neglected. for the case restaurant, the most significant factor in the environmental impact was the food served, and in particular, its identity, origin, and the amount wasted. the biggest source of waste is the food that goes untouched, that is, which is prepared but never delivered to customers because demand is lower than expected. although some of it can be recovered and reused, it is unnecessary waste that could have been eliminated without any service implications. this finding was, as stated already earlier, unfortunately in line with industry averages. on the other hand, this case study showed how to effectively investigate industry wide food waste issues. consilience häyhtiö, et al: new service development there is ongoing discussion around the topic of csr and green approaches to the hospitality industry. this paper used another approach: a detailed case study and simulation of initial results. simulation enhanced the ability to analyze initial data and draw more accurate results from a limited amount of data. this method should be further developed. more detailed and sophisticated service models should also be used while assessing the service processes and their environmental effects during the different service processes. analyses showed that the data, which is collected throughout the service processes, is crucial for snsd. the interfunctional and inter-disciplinary nature of services demands knowledge of each participant’s role in the end result. transparency in service production helps create a responsible corporate culture that is line with customer requirements. organizational development, which enables csr in its various forms, is the result of a comprehensive and, most of all, constant continuous development of variables affecting the end results. having said that, positive results from the material flow and waste data measurement can also be achieved by the front line employees, but not without systematic screening of operational efficiency and effectiveness metrics, as our research shows. these screening mechanisms should be implemented to all on-site activities at the production phases as an integral part of a workflow. simple metrics like efficiency ratio introduced in this paper can help operators to start to follow their material flow, enabling them to alter their production to procedures in order to meet all the stakeholder requirements sustainably. daily comparison between the amount of dishes sold to the planned amount, measurement of unspecified waste and tighter portion control are just a few examples of easily adapted screening mechanisms. also, more precise demand projections based on the historical data and utilization of simulations based on this data should be considered. based on the results, production processes and changes to the service intensity should be changed in the case unit. current forms of self-service reduce service provider’s ability to control portion sizes and material consumption. this poses a challenge for predicting daily consumption and leads to overproduction of food. reduction of different dishes served during the lunchtime is also recommended. limited consumption of several main courses indicates clear need to this. while relying on certifications in purchases is a simple way to include csr in the operations, focusing on contingent issues and operational activities is more suitable in achieving pay-offs in multiple dimensions. it is especially useful in combining different types of performance goals such as service quality, economic viability, regulatory compliance and environmental impacts. relying only on a certifications can exclude areas crucial to snsd, such as operational efficiency, and focus the csr activities to meet certification needs instead of contingent issues, which can more heavily impact actual sustainability, as our research indicates. consilience 91 also, operational activities create a constant and steady stream of information, which can be interpreted and used to the needs of snsd. it is also a form of information used in the day-to-day operations management, aiding communication between different stakeholders even with sometimes contradicting goals. partial information can be found from a number of sources, but the legacy of new product development and a great deal of competing approaches to csr make research and development a challenging task. limitations of the research the limitations of this study are twofold: • generalization of results from an individual case study; • poorly managed menu management operations in the case study unit. the first limitation is, as stated earlier, in the nature of a case study, as the first of its kind to be conducted. the authors’ suggestion for future research in snsd development and research is that it should focus on empirically demonstrating the relationships between operational variables and their importance to the snsd processes. success in snsd requires analyzed data drawn from the analysis of trends in the acknowledged key success factors. full understanding of these key requirements in the short and long term is essential to the efficiency and effectiveness of snsd activities. consilience häyhtiö, et al: new service development references almefelt, l., berglund, f. and nilsson, p. 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(2003) ‘case study research: design and methods, 3rd ed.’, applied social research methods series, 5. sage consilience 96 figures, images and tables figure 1, share of total food available that is lost or wasted, source: lipinski et.al, 2013, p 9. monday 13,5 kg tuesday 19,5 kg wednesday 8,5 kg thursday 13,5 kg friday 11,5 kg table 2, the amount of unspecified waste 42% 25% 22% 19% 15% 17% 23% share of food lost or wasted north america and oceania industrialized asia europe north africa, west and central asia ladn america 17 17 23 23 28 32 39 6 23 12 21 22 37 37 9 2 5 4 6 4 7 7 11 9 18 17 15 13 61 46 52 34 28 13 5 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% consumpdon distribudon and market processing hadling and storage producdon consilience häyhtiö, et al: new service development figure 3, share of total waste and climate impacts by food item, n=83 efficiency ratio, counted as average calories / average price of ingredients / simulated data day ratio mean energy mean price monday 302,96 751,70 kcal € 2,48 tuesday 594,77 732,47 kcal € 1,23 wednesday 235,25 312,76 kcal € 1,32 thursday 247,55 559,31 kcal € 2,25 friday 220,76 422,27 kcal € 1,91 figure 4, efficiency ratio share of total waste by food item share of climate impacts vegetarian (waste) consilience 98 appendix 1, daily distribution of the original data (n=150) / 5 days(n=30) monday figure 1, distribution of figure 2, test of normal distribution, dish prices, n=30 dish prices, n=30 figure 3, distribution of figure 4, test of normal distribution, energy value, n=30 energy value, n=30 tuesday figure 5, distribution of figure 6, test of normal distribution, dish prices, n=30 dish prices, n=30 figure 7, distribution of figure 8, test of normal distribution, energy value, n=30 energy value, n=30 consilience häyhtiö, et al: new service development wednesday figure 9, distribution of figure 10, test of normal distribution, dish prices, n=30 dish prices, n=30 figure 11, distribution of figure 12, test of normal distribution, energy value, n=30 energy value, n=30 thursday figure 13, distribution of figure 14, test of normal distribution, dish prices, n=30 dish prices, n=30 figure 15, distribution of figure 16, test of normal distribution, energy value, n=30 energy value, n=30 consilience 100 friday figure 17, distribution of figure 18, test of normal distribution, dish prices, n=30 dish prices, n=30 figure 19, distribution of figure 20, test of normal distribution, energy value, n=30 energy value, n=30 consilience häyhtiö, et al: new service development monday number of observations average amount of energy waste (kcal)/ ingredient average € waste / observation / ingredient tuesday number of observations average amount of energy waste (kcal)/ ingredient average € waste / observation /ingredient potatoes 12 23,18 0,24 pasta 5 50,61 0,04 broccoli 0 0,00 0,00 oil 5 53,39 0,01 cheese 0 0,00 0,00 pesto 1 26,67 0,04 salad 9 14,76 0,09 onion 6 1,45 0,01 onion 0 0,00 0,00 carrot 1 1,86 0,01 oil 0 0,00 0,00 leek 1 2,60 0,02 flour 8 48,45 0,02 champignon 1 0,96 0,02 meat 0 0,00 0,00 egg 5 9,72 0,01 cottage cheese 0 0,00 0,00 milk 6 9,87 0,02 fish 8 12,54 0,10 potato 1 10,03 0,10 sour cream 6 6,93 0,01 celery 1 4,09 0,02 bread 0 0,00 0,00 cream 1 6,42 0,02 milk 0 0,00 0,00 salad 9 17,77 0,11 meat 4 15,50 0,06 bread 2 23,90 0,04 wednesday number of observations average amount of energy waste (kcal)/ ingredient average € waste / observation / ingredient thursday number of observations average amount of energy waste (kcal)/ ingredient average € waste / observation / ingredient rice 6 15,77 0,01 chickpea 0 0 0 onion 2 0,73 0,00 mayonnaise 0 0 0 garlic 2 1,05 0,01 potatoe 13 44,01 0,45 vegetable mix 6 2,71 0,02 milk 13 4,67 0,01 eggplant 2 1,07 0,01 butter 13 26,31 0,03 zucchini 2 0,87 0,01 salad 13 12,97 0,08 lentil 2 2,45 0,01 peas 1 66,30 0,12 potato 0 0,00 0,00 ham 1 30,60 0,13 carrot 0 0,00 0,00 onion 3 4,19 0,03 cream 0 0,00 0,00 meat 2 91,38 0,16 tarragon 0 0,00 0,00 flour 2 28,64 0,01 salad 7 14,56 0,09 oil 2 14,76 0,00 chicken 4 6,26 0,04 cream 2 24,38 0,06 tomatoe 2 1,12 0,01 bread 1 78,87 0,15 parsley 4 0,39 0,04 bread 3 28,68 0,05 milk 1 36,80 0,08 friday number of observations average amount of energy waste (kcal)/ ingredient average € waste / observation / ingredient bbeef 8 26,24 0,13 sweet pepper 8 2,06 0,04 onion 8 2,21 0,01 potato 6 50,29 0,52 egg 0 0,00 0,00 onion 11 2,66 0,02 garlic 3 3,47 0,02 tomato 3 10,36 0,09 salad 16 22,52 0,14 bread 1 35,85 0,06 milk 0 0,00 0,00 flour 8 75,63 0,02 consilience 102 statistics nutri,simu var00008, n valid 302 missing 4 mean 751,70 std.,error,of,mean 8,60 std.,deviation 149,43 range 819,22 minimum 335,11 maximum 1154,33 percentiles 25 656,44 50 748,01 75 858,02 statistics var00009 n valid missing mean std. error of mean median std. deviation range minimum maximum percentiles 25 50 75 302 4 2,4812 0,03662 2,45 0,63638 3,26 0,89 4,15 2,03 2,45 2,9325 statistics n valid mean median mode range minimum maximum percentiles 340 739,03 25 50 75 e355,82a 497,5 739,03 statistics n valid mean median mode range minimum maximum percentiles 340 739,03 25 50 75 e355,82a 497,5 739,03 monday monday tuesday tuesday wednesday wednesday wednesday thursday thursday friday friday statistics'nutri,sim var00005' statistics'cash+simu var00006' n valid 234 n valid 235 missing 103 missing 102 mean 422,27 mean 1,9128 std.'error'of'mean 10,48777 std.'error'of'mean 0,06641 median 424,785 median 1,93 mode 475,26 mode 1.88 std.'deviation 160,43208 std.'dev iation 1,0180 3 range 937,97 range 5,19 minimum f72,76 minimum e0,76 maximum 865,21 percentiles 25 313,0525 50 424,785 75 519,4175 maximum 865,21 percentiles 25 313,0525 5 0 4 2 4 , 7 8 5 25 4,43 50 1.24 75 2,68 statistics n valid mode range minimum maximum percentiles 340 25 50 75 2,5 1,3295 0,01621 308,1 1,32 1,35 0,29758 1,87 37,8 0,34 2,21 1,15 308,1 1,32 1,52 statistics n valid mode range minimum maximum percentiles 340 25 50 75 2,5 consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 8, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 26-33 rocinha: twenty-nine years of witnessing contrasts leandro lima leandrolima@faveladarocinha.com i remember rocinha twenty years ago. it was then the largest favela (shantytown) in latin america, but its people had another reason to be proud: despite the power of drug lords and the government’s neglect, it was the only favela in rio de janeiro to develop as a “normal” neighborhood. the settlers from brazil’s northeastern region who came to live in rocinha were known to be people who tried to improve their living conditions, even though they were in an unknown territory and had left their families behind. although i was born in rio, both my parents come from the northeast of brazil, like most friends my age who live here. we were brought up to start working at an early age and generate income as soon as possible. however, i have always wanted to do something in rocinha, since i believe there are lots of people who want to turn this place into a benchmark for actions designed to improve the life of favela-dwellers. even before i started college, i already planned to do something big in rocinha but had no idea of what it could be. it was during my freshman year as a student of journalism that i had the idea to start a community communications class, and faveladarocinha.com was born. after six months online, there were ten people working on the website. they undertook every activity of the mainstream, conventional media – photography, writing, editorial meetings, and contacts with politicians and other important people to produce material. at the beginning, our common goal was to gain experience, a normal thing for undergraduates, and over time these first collaborators used this experience to enter the professional world. today, fifteen people work on the website. since rocinha’s pacification, in november 2011, we have gained international recognition thanks to the live coverage of this operation on twitter. we also became news ourselves in the media all over brazil, and also internationally in outlets such as al-jazeera and bbc. consilience lima: rocinha photo 1. 28 consilience photo 2. i realized the project was something big, and my aim is always to go the extra mile. faveladarocinha.com fit perfectly as a local media outlet providing news about the favela, but how could its repercussion benefit the community as a whole? this question produced a partnership with an ngo called the muskoka foundation, who donated money to buy digital cameras. with the help of columbia student margaret day, we started a photography workshop for children in a sports facility called instituto reação, owned by olympic sportsman flávio canto. we also started a photography club where people from different favelas come to learn photography. consilience lima: rocinha photo 3. 30 consilience photo 4. consilience lima: rocinha photos 5 and 6. 32 consilience photo 7. the project has no boundaries, and neither have the people of rocinha. at each step, we realize how curious and eager to learn people from the favela really are. i live in a place where more than one hundred thousand people have the potential to shine. consilience lima: rocinha photo 8. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 5, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 96-118 global climate policies, local institutions and food security in a pastoral society in ethiopia pekka virtanen, phd university of jyväskylä, finland pekka.k.virtanen@jyu.fi eero palmujoki, phd university of tampere, finland dereje terefe gemechu, phd university of jyväskylä, finland abstract this paper explores climate change adaptation within national policy priorities in a least developed country (ldc). the premise of the article is that when considering food security, climate is an exogenous trigger, while the deeper causes lie in social problems. therefore, adaptation is subordinate to poverty alleviation. the paper examines how these two goals, climate adaptation and poverty alleviation, can be combined. recent studies have shown that the most effective way to adapt to changing climate conditions in a poor country is to rely on local institutions that have established sustainable mechanisms to deal with extreme climatic conditions. this research analyzes the stakeholder model, which calls for the participation of both governmental and non-governmental institutions, and how it is applied to climate change adaptation activities in ethiopia. the study includes field research to analyze how local institutions are used to strengthen the resilience of communities in changing climate conditions. this research was carried out among pastoral communities in the borana zone and in the lowland areas of the guji zone in the oromia regional state of ethiopia. the central methods of the study are semistructured interviews with key stakeholders as well as secondary materials in the form of of policy statements, project documents and research literature. this research concludes that local institutions are poorly integrated into the process, while traditional adaptation strategies such as mobility are practically neglected. keywords: ldc, stakeholder model, climate adaptation, poverty alleviation. 1. introduction this research explores how global climate policies are articulated within national policy priorities in ethiopia, which shares many common features with other least developed countries (ldcs) in africa. the focus of the study is on pastoral communities, which have been adversely affected by climate change, which is generally expected to hit developing countries harder than industrialized countries. consilience virtanen: global climate this results since ldcs are less capable of mitigating or adapting to climatic changes due to poverty and high dependence on the environment for subsistence (undp, 2007). recent research indicates, however, that in most cases of livelihood failure, climate is an exogenous trigger, while the deeper causes lie in social problems. the extent of the impact of climate change is determined by both the dependency of a national economy on climate-sensitive natural resources as well as the robustness or resilience of its social institutions to secure an equitable distribution in the face of such change (barnett and adger, 2007). adaptation to climate change can be considered successful if it reduces the vulnerability of poor populations to existing climate variability while also strengthening their potential to anticipate and react to further changes (igad, 2007; undp, 2007). in ethiopia, pastoralism provides the main livelihood for close to 15 million people spread across seven regions of the country. affected by unpredictable climatic conditions, recurrent conflicts and a generally inhospitable environment, the pastoralists are among the poorest of the poor in terms of disposable income, access to social services and general welfare. human development indicators and poverty rates among pastoralists are uniformly worse than non-pastoralists in ethiopia. health coverage is sparse, with only 10 percent of the population immunized and more than 90 percent living in malaria-infested areas. in terms of education, both primary and secondary levels of enrolment remain at 20 percent and three percent, respectively (bekele, 2008; mofed, 2006). the upredictable climate, coupled with low levels of human development, mean that the expected effects of climate change are likely to exacerbate the problems of development in pastoral regions. these effects include increasing temperatures, a shift in rainfall patterns and distribution, as well as increased frequency of extreme weather events such as droughts and floods (anderson et al., 2009; nassef et al., 2009). the local pastoralists have hitherto been able to cope with recurrent droughts through the resilience of their traditional livelihood system, but presently marked signs of crisis are visible. the pastoral modes of sustenance are under excessive – largely externally created – pressure, and the number of people dropping out of the pastoral system has increased considerably (pantuliano and wekesa, 2008; tache and oba, 2008). in global climate policies, as defined in international treaties, developed countries play the main role in climate change mitigation and adaptation. beyond merely limiting their own greenhouse gas emissions, the developed countries have to assist developing countries in adapting to the variable climate conditions. concerning the latter, however, the question of adaptation is subordinate to poverty alleviation. recent studies have shown that the most effective way of adapting to changing climate conditions in a poor country is to rely on local institutions, which have wellestablished and sustainable mechanisms to deal with extreme climate conditions (agrawal, 2008). in order to allocate assistance at the local level to local institutions, the traditional donor-recipient government model, termed the “shareholder” model, seems inappropriate. therefore, the donor community is suggesting that a stakeholder model based on broad participation replace the shareholder model for governance in climate change adaptation. this paper analyzes how donors, the ethiopian government and non-state actors (including the pastoralists) have prepared to carry out activities relevant for climate adaptation. the research does not explore global and national interfaces and their role in adaptation (i.e. how global ideas and norms are adopted in ethiopia), but 98 consilience rather the preparedness of national and local institutions to tackle these issues. this calls for an understanding of the viewpoints of local stakeholders, especially the poorest groups. the study therefore includes field research to examine how local institutions are used to strengthen the resilience of community adaption to changing climate conditions. the field study was carried out among pastoral and semi-pastoral communities in the borana zone and in the lowland areas of the guji zone in the oromia regional state. the study is based on semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and secondary material consisting of policy and project documents and research literature. altogether 64 persons were interviewed, including representatives of the government of ethiopia at the federal, regional and local levels (27 interviews), representatives of both national and international ngos and academic institutions (19), bilateral and multilateral donors (9) and local project beneficiaries (9).1 interviews were in the format of open-ended informal discussions guided by a brief set of questions and took place in addis ababa (41 interviews) and in the field study area (23). eleven interviewees were women. the interviews were carried out in english or in a local language (afaan oromoo or amharic) between april and october 2009. in the field study area the researchers also visited six smalland medium-scale water projects, which were the sites of the beneficiary interviews. 2. food security and ways of adaptation current estimates indicate that the greatest losses in suitable cropland due to climate change are likely to be in sub-saharan africa. the region‟s dependence on rain-fed agriculture means that production is vulnerable to climatic variability, which can adversely affect food security, human well-being and exports (schmidhuber and tubiello, 2007). just a single climate disaster is capable of stagnating or even reversing the economic growth achieved over a decade. in the arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid regions of africa the situation is further complicated by increasing desertification (cline, 2007; igad, 2007). therefore, the poorest and most foodinsecure continent is also expected to suffer the most serious contraction in agricultural incomes, estimated to range from two to eight percent of the agricultural gdp (schmidhuber and tubiello, 2007). according to arun agrawal and nicolas perrin, the most important impacts of climate change on rural livelihoods include increases in environmental risks, reduction in livelihood opportunities and stresses on existing social institutions (2009, p. 354-55). the basic adaptation strategies can be classified into a set of four analytical types: mobility, storage, diversification and communal pooling. however, market-based exchange can substitute for any of the above adaptation strategies. when adopted, these responses can reduce spatial, temporal, asset-related and/or community-level risks directly, or minimize them by pooling uncorrelated risks associated with different livelihoods. the prospects of adaptation practices depend on institutional arrangements: the propensity of individual households to adopt 1 when used as reference, the categories of interviewees will be identified by a for government staff, b for civil society organizations, c for donor organizations, and d for local beneficiaries. consilience virtanen: global climate specific practices depends on their social and economic endowments, social networks and access to resources and power. the effectiveness of adaptation can also be enhanced by external interventions and local collective action. in this study the above classification (summarized in table 1) is used as a framework for analysing the adaptation practices adopted in ethiopia. successful adaptation to climate change is a highly context-dependent process, and ethiopia is characterised by particularly high variability in terms of climate, physical geography and population (igad, 2007). as observed by the fao (2003), an important intra-country gap exists in current analyses of food insecurity. the fao tends to focus on the national level or the individual level, based on calculations of averages derived as ratios of national aggregates or national survey estimates. important trends may not, however, be fully evident at the national level, emphasising the need for complementary analyses at different sub-national levels. this conception has also been confirmed by recent studies on climate change and food security, which show that while macro-level vulnerability and impact assessments can be beneficial, more detailed analysis is ultimately needed on the regional and local level. this is especially true among the most vulnerable populations, as to allow effective pro-poor targeting (thornton et al., 2009). such studies will also facilitate learning from existing local and/or indigenous mechanisms for coping with difficult climatic conditions and recurrent climate shocks (devereux and sharp, 2006). 3. climate change, institutions and participation in adapting to the variable conditions of climate change, institutional development is critical. similarly, the effect of increasing climatic volatility and environmental degradation on food security is transmitted through institutions that shape the rules and rights of resource use. institutions are often overlapping, and operate on various scales, exacerbating or alleviating the adverse effects of climate change, whether directly or indirectly (barnett and adger, 2007). therefore, it is critically important to better understand the role of institutions, if adaptation is to help the most vulnerable social groups, as is required by the current emphasis on poverty alleviation (agrawal and perrin, 2009). however, while the adaptation process is predominantly local, its effectiveness depends on both local and extralocal institutions through which incentives for individual and collective action are structured. this is because “institutional arrangements structure risks and sensitivity to climate hazards, facilitate or impede individual and collective responses, and shape the outcomes of such responses” (agrawal 2008, p. 8). different adaptation practises set different requirements for governance. mobility in traditional society is realised through pastoralism, but in a centralised state system it may mean forced migration or wage labour migration, if such economic opportunities exist. to avoid coercive measures for migration in the present context, flexible institutions that respect the viewpoints of local population are necessary. the institutions of a centralised state have better possibilities for infrastructure strategies aimed at poverty alleviation through economic growth with multipurpose adaptation practices of storage, diversification and communal pooling. according to neoliberal policies, 100 consilience these development strategies may lead to developed markets, which are expected to be a central mechanism for dealing with adaptation (agrawal and perrin, 2009). the debate on the inter-linkage between climate change and development has brought new dimensions and colors to the policies of international organizations and to issues of governance. the constant failings of developing countries in their attempts to follow neoliberal economic policies have illustrated that market-based systems do not function adequately without firmly established institutions and regulative systems (lumley, 1999). the international organizations address the failings of the neoliberal model in development by introducing politico-economic concepts and models for governance, such as the multi-stakeholder (msh) model. the msh model is an economic-managerial model for broader civil society participation in governance (hemmati, 2002). the msh framework in the development industry contains all the main types of actors: states, international organizations, businesses, and global or local csos. following the established language, the shift from the donor-recipient model suggests a move “from a shareholder model, in which financial contributors (donors) largely dominated, to a stakeholder model, in which the representatives of the affected parties – developing countries, ngos, civil society organizations, private sector bodies – also play a role in decision making” (world bank, 2006, p. 13). in the ldc context, the crucial question is to what extent non-state players and local institutions are involved in adaptation activities. like most african countries, ethiopia has a long history of religious and civil society organisations (csos), including local savings groups, mutual self-help groups and ethnic-based or regional development associations. such groups provide support during times of stress and social events such as death or marriage (berhanu, 2002). since a devastating famine in 1972-73, the number of international non-governmental organizations (ingos) has increased significantly, and they have become one of the main food relief and public service providers (lautze et al., 2009). currently, the ethiopian ministry of foreign affairs mentions 14 ingos that are crucial public service providers in relief and development activities. due to the decrease in emergency relief, the government has also suggested that ingos participate in health, education, food security and water supply provision under close government guidance (mfa, 2009). while the ingo presence in ethiopia is still relatively small considering the population size and the extent of poverty and food insecurity, the current federal government has taken steps to limit the scope of operation of the csos and especially the ingos. despite strong and repeated critical statements and appeals by both csos and donors highlighted in the interviews, in 2009 the government approved a new cso law that bans domestic ngos from receiving more than 10 percent of their income from foreign sources. otherwise they are considered „foreign organizations,‟ and, like ingos, are not allowed to participate in any activity deemed political by the government. due to the extremely wide range of issues (but excluding the environment) included under this definition, including anything from women's rights to democratisation, the new law is especially problematic for the large number of ngos. this includes most ngos working with pastoralists, which have adopted rights-based approaches and engaged in advocacy work. by equating policy advocacy with politics, the government seeks to confine ngo activity strictly to service delivery under its supervision. the few national ngos with sufficient means consilience virtanen: global climate table 1. major classes of adaptation practices (agrawal & perrin, 2009, p. 358). for independent action are intimately linked to the ruling coalition (interviews, b and c, cf. lautze et al., 2009). 4. international support to adaptation: the napa in ethiopia the global environmental facility (gef), which is the main funding mechanism for climate change activities, operates with different funding instruments to support climate change mitigation and/or adaptation in developing countries. the least developed countries fund (ldcf), which is the main channel for supporting adaptation, has relatively limited assets of usd 172 million (desa, 2009). there is considerable criticism, mainly from developing countries and ingos, with respect to the gef funds in terms of adequacy and accessibility. the assets of the ldcf are barely sufficient for national planning. another problem relates to the additionality criteria: the ldcf‟s assets are intended for building resilience to change in a narrow sense, as distinct from more general climatic variability. in concrete projects it has proved particularly difficult to distinguish the adaptation component (to be funded from unfccc sources) from more general resilience building and development activities (to be funded from government budgets and/or oda). with a very low funding capacity of its own, the offer to fund only the adaptation part becomes futile unless other external sources can be identified (ayers and huq, 2009). under the ldcf, the projects concerned with adaptation are promoted by the national adaptation programmes of action (napa), which the ldcs introduced into the unfccc process in 2001. a major share of adaptation projects have focused on natural resources-related activities. for example, agriculture, forestry, water conservation, irrigation, the development of infrastructure, and disaster relief. hence, they underline the development priorities of the ldcs (agrawal and perrin, 2009, pp. 363-364). the napa documents emphasise a participatory process involving stakeholders and local communities in the preparation of napas (huq and khan class of adaptation corresponding strategies mobility pastoralism, wage labour migration, involuntary migration storage water storage, food storage (crops, seeds, forest products), animal storage, pest control diversification asset portfolio diversification, skills and occupational diversification, skills and occupational training, occupational diversification, crop choices, production technologies, consumption choices, animal breeding communal pooling forestry, infrastructure development, information gathering, disaster preparation market exchange improved market access, insurance provision, new product sales, seeds, animal and other input purchases 102 consilience 2009, pp. 192-195). however, in contrast to actual instances of adaptation reported to the unfccc, most of the napa projects appear to be geared to building the capacity of national governments and agencies to coordinate adaptation, increase service provisions, and create infrastructure, rather than to strengthen local actors. according to a recent study, local institutions were incorporated as the focus of adaptation projects in only about 20 percent of the projects analysed. there is also little evidence of consultation and coordination between local and national levels in the description of the projects selected, despite the requirement for widespread consultations as a key part of the production of napa documents (agrawal, 2008). in ethiopia, most of the 11 projects selected for high-priority status are emphatically state-centric. only in three project plans are non-state actors, such as cbos, ngos, or water users‟ associations, mentioned. in three others the nature of the project involves the possibility of the participation of non-state actors (project level and in the content of the project, i.e., markets, environmental conservation/ rehabilitation, etc.). despite the napa guidelines‟ emphasis on civil society participation in the programme, there is only one ngo representative among the 10 institutions represented in the ethiopian napa steering committee. in all 11 projects a federal ministry or other federal agency is indicated as the lead institution.2 the high-priority projects3 focus on the food security, water resources, infrastructure, health ecosystems and insurance sectors. the distribution is rather similar to the general profile of napa high-priority projects elsewhere (agrawal, 2008, pp. 43-44). however, four projects focusing on the three first-mentioned sectors amount to 738 million usd, or 96 percent of the total investments estimated at 770 million usd. in fact, one project designed for the southern pastoral and agropastoral region, „realizing food security through a multi-purpose large-scale water development project in the genale-dawa basin,‟ covers 91 percent of all funds budgeted for the ethiopian napa projects, with a total budget of 700 million usd (unfccc; tadege, 2007). the genale-dawa undertaking, which can be considered the flagship, is a large-scale infrastructure project combining the development of hydropower, irrigation, water supply/sanitation and the upgrading of rural roads. it represents broad economic and social goals over a time-span of 30 years (tadege, 2007). the project is clearly not a product of stakeholder discussion and participatory planning, but rather reflects broad government-defined economic goals which emphasise export-oriented agricultural production (see e.g. stokes et al., p. 127-128). although it is linked with the napa process, its roots in the genale-dawa river basin integrated development master plan (mowr, 2007) give it a high position in overall ethiopian development policies independently of the napa linkage. few of the 2 it was not possible to clarify the role of the local communities and csos in the napa preparation and appraisal process, as the lists of participants available only include staff from federal institutions. leading napa representatives maintain that ideas and suggestions from the beneficiaries were transmitted adequately through the consultation workshops, but this cannot be verified from independent sources (interviews). 3 the high-priority projects were selected from a group of 37 project options with a total cost of about usd 874 million (tadege, 2007). consilience virtanen: global climate authorities interviewed on the genale-dawa project even acknowledged that it is part of the climate change adaptation framework supported by the unfccc (interviews, a). the fieldwork and the interviews proved the almost total invisibility of the napa projects in ethiopia. some of the major barriers to adaptation gains listed in the national napa document include a lack of strong coordination mechanisms, inadequacy of cross-sectoral links, inadequate exchange between the coordinating institution (the national meteorology agency, nma) and plan implementers, and a general lack of capacity. these are exactly the same problems that seem to characterize the current situation. one of the authors of this report visited all five federal ministries or agencies selected as lead institutions for the 11 projects, and it turned out to be extremely difficult to find anybody who was even aware of the napa projects.4 any additional information beyond the brief descriptions included in the napa document was almost impossible to get a hold of. this is mostly because the projects are currently not being implemented or are not even close to the implementation phase. in some cases (such as the genale-dawa project), the team was given access to a parallel project document under a different heading. the overall conclusion from this work is that the napa projects are an extremely low priority within the government, and have been practically shelved. the funding available from unfccc does not allow for their implementation at the present time (interviews, a and c). there appears to have been no serious attempt to create governance based on the stakeholder model for climate change adaptation in ethiopia. proof of authentic grassroots consultations is lacking, as the napa document is more a product of the federal development authorities than of climate change realities felt on the ground. integration of non-state actors has been minimal both on the level of program preparation and in project plans. as such, the focus is on capacity building for government institutions and investment in large-scale projects imposed from above by government technocrats. while government authorities blame the failure to release support funding through the unfccc, an equally important reason seems to be a low level of national commitment. at present, the nma possess neither the institutional authority nor the capacity to monitor regional and local climate change interventions or even to report and analyze the experiences gained (interviews, a; cf. ayers and huq, 2009; brockhaus and kambiré, 2009). the process is not only statecentric, but moreover almost totally stagnant. 4 it appears that most „lead institutions‟ expected to be the forerunners of the process have not accessed and are not familiar with the napa document. there is a plan to print 3000 hard copies of the document to be delivered to the relevant institutions in late 2009, i.e., two years after it was submitted to unfccc. it would thus appear that napa has largely remained a secret of the steering committee and a few nma staff (interviews). a similar situation has been reported from some other african countries (see, e.g., brockhaus and kambiré, 2009). 104 consilience 5. adaptation and participation on the national level: the national food security program in an effort to improve governance in the context of the continued vulnerability aggravated by climate change, the ethiopian government has sought to agree with the other key actors (mostly donors, but also the private sector and csos) on a common approach to food security. these were recorded in the 2002 food security programme (fsp) developed within the framework of the national poverty reduction/development plan. the core objectives of the program reflect the results of a structural analysis: the first objective is to enable the 8.3 million chronically food-insecure ethiopians to attain food security within a five-year period, and the second is to improve significantly the food security situation of the remaining 6.7 million citizens facing transitory food insecurity (mofed, 2006). the most important element in the fsp is a productive safety net programme (psnp), which is the largest social protection scheme on the continent outside of south africa. it commenced in 2005, and has two components: laborintensive public works and direct support for labor-poor households. the majority of beneficiaries are required to contribute labor to public works, while a further set of criteria are applied to identify those who qualify for safety net support but are not required to participate in public works. payments to both groups of beneficiaries are provided in cash or food, and in theory each household member is entitled to five days paid work per month (mofed, 2006; negatu, 2009). the program‟s target group consists of people facing predictable food insecurity as a result of poverty rather than temporary shocks (undp, 2007). as the government recognizes that small transfers of cash or food are likely to be consumed rather than invested, food security and livelihood promotion are to be achieved primarily through linkages with other modes of support, especially household extension packages intended to generate complementary streams of income. the assets constructed by the public works activities will, on the other hand, contribute to creating a favourable environment for market production rather than direct income generation (devereux and guenther, 2009). most of the typical public works activities are designed for climate change adaptation. improving access to drinking and irrigation water is important for storage, while land productivity improvement, soil fertility restoration activities, and increasing fodder availability are relevant for both storage and diversification. communal land conservation measures, re-forestation, and improvement of school and health facilities are some of the typical communal pooling activities. finally, market exchange can be improved through construction and/or rehabilitation of roads, bridges, market yards, storage and stock routes. it is interesting to note that none of the typical public works activities highlighted in the implementation manual address the issue of mobility (moard, 2006; cf. agrawal and perrin, 2009, pp. 357359). the relatively effective implementation of the psnp is based on strong government ownership at the federal and regional level, and coordination between the key donors (brown and teshome, 2007). the complex institutional set-up creates considerable pressure for efficient collaboration between very different types of institutions. in theory, the mix of community and administrative targeting used in consilience virtanen: global climate the psnp should help to ensure community participation, ownership and oversight (sharp et al., 2006). however, while the responsibility for execution has been given to various actors, existing guidelines do not clearly specify the role of the different agencies. especially at the district level, the planning and implementation capacity is hindered by shortages of staff and skills, along with rapid staff turnover (interviews, a and b; see also frankenberger et al., 2007; slater et al., 2006; negatu, 2009). during the launch of the psnp design process, many ngos complained of being left out, as the government wanted sole ownership of the program (sharp et al., 2006, p. 10). on the lower administrative level, representation in district-level task forces is limited to line ministries and sometimes ngos, while ward and community level task forces consist of both elected and ex officio members. civil society is only weakly represented. ngos are usually included only in those districts where they are official implementing partners, even though they may be key actors providing important resources (slater et al., 2006, p. 22). in practice, ngo programs frequently substitute for government activities instead of complementing them (interviews, a and b; frankenberger et al., 2007, p. 6). the interviews indicate that, while the psnp structure makes possible the engagement of key stakeholders on different levels, accountability is often upward rather than downward (interviews, cf. sharp & al., 2006, p. 48). the actual power of non-state actors to influence is rather limited on lower administrative levels, though there are considerable differences between individual regional states and local administrative units. the top-down approach and the weakness of institutional linkages is manifested in the selection and timing of the public works activities implemented under psnp. such activities which communities would like to implement are not always given priority (frankenberger et al., 2007; slater et al., 2006), while the ownership of community assets created by a public work is often not clear (interviews, a, b and d, cf. negatu, 2009, p. 18). local institutions are, however, only seldom recognized by the official safety net system. in some cases, the psnp soil and water conservation activities have actually usurped communities‟ initiatives to manage their natural resources (frankenberger et al., 2007). in order for the programme to reduce vulnerability, it is crucial that public works do not obstruct the objective of supporting people in achieving improved and self-sufficient livelihoods. data from different studies show that many beneficiary households were engaged in public works during peak farming periods in most areas (sharp et al., 2006, p. 41; slater et al., 2006, p. 34). female respondents complained that participation in public works reduces significantly the time and energy available for other duties such as caring for children, the elderly, and the sick, or doing agricultural work on their own land (frankenberger et al., 2007, p. 3). even outside the peak periods, households with many non-workers, such as children and elderly, are forced to keep children out of school to take care of household livelihoods while the parents are engaged in public works. this has the perverse impact that such households become even more dependent on external support because the work requirement reduces their ability to participate in alternative livelihood activities (slater et al., 2006, p. 42, 45). 106 consilience 6. adaptation in a pastoral society 6.1 resilience among the poorest of the poor: nomadic pastoralism in the borana plateau the case study area, which comprises the borana zone and lowland areas of the guji zone in the oromia regional state, is characterized by erratic rainfall pattern between 400 and 700 mm annually. semi-nomadic pastoralism is the dominant livelihood, although small-scale rain-fed agriculture is becoming increasingly widespread (desta and coppock, 2004). mobility is the basis of the traditional coping strategy, based on opportunistic movements within and across geographically distributed grazing units, which are composed of those households that depend on common permanent water sources. the grazing units consist of semi-sedentary camps where the elderly, women, and children stay with dairy cows. the surplus herd, composed of dry cows, heifers, and male animals, join the mobile herd management unit herded by young men on more remote grazing lands. rangeland rotation during the wet and dry seasons traditionally prevented overgrazing, while controlled access to water provided the key mechanism for guaranteeing sustainable use of the grazing lands (angassa and oba, 2008). since the 1970s, various development interventions such as changing the patterns of land use through water development and sedentarization have undermined the survival strategies of pastoralists. due to internal and external conflicts, the rangelands in borana and guji have decreased to about 40 percent of their extent in the 1960s. currently, the system is subject to severe pressure due to population growth, conflicts over grazing lands, and compression of the livestock population into a much smaller geographical area. the remaining rangelands are threatened by ecological degradation from bush encroachment, land alienation and fragmentation due to the creation of ranches, expanding crop cultivation and the establishment of semi-private range enclosures (tache and oba, 2008). this has led to loss of mobility, which implies that the indigenous system of land use can no longer cope with the ecological and climatic variability likely to be amplified by the process of climate change (desta and coppock, 2004). household data from longitudinal studies over two decades show a decline in cattle holdings, and there is substantial evidence that the borana are poorer today than they were two decades ago (desta and coppock, 2004; tache and oba, 2008). wealth rankings of individual households have shifted towards the poor and destitute households, and a large proportion of the households have fallen below the sustainable economic threshold, likely to drop out of the pastoral system. at present, the poor make up 80 percent of all households, suggesting that the collapse of the whole pastoral production system may be close (tache and oba 2008, p. 26). those who fall out of the pastoral system resort to dryland farming, sale of forest products, crafts, petty trade, casual labour, or food aid. many of the new subsistence activities of the poor, such as charcoal production and crop cultivation in marginal lands, are ecologically unsustainable and simply deepen the vicious cycle (interviews, a, b and d; see also coppock, 1994; morton, 2006). increasing population spread over a diminishing land area has swallowed up traditional grazing reserves, which used to maintain stability under recurrent consilience virtanen: global climate ecological and conflict-related shocks (interviews, a and b; homann et al., 2004; oba, 1998). combined with few emigration outlets, the degraded natural resource base has led to unsustainable population densities in an inherently risky environment (desta and coppock, 2004). thus, the borana plateau provides a good example of the complex relationships between increasing climatic stress, declining resource base, and inchoate development policies, where separating climate change adaptation from more general resilience building and development activities is not realistic. 6.2 napa initiatives in the case study area somewhat surprisingly, mobility is not included among the adaptation practices supported through ethiopian napa projects.5 among the four projects that are directly relevant for the study area, two seek to address storage and communal pooling, one combines storage with diversification, and one deals with diversification and communal pooling. three projects focus on alternative livelihoods through the development of irrigation (2 projects) and forestry (1 project). the sole napa proposal focusing on livestock development seeks to improve rangeland management. none of the four projects addresses primarily the market exchange issue (tadege, 2007). instead of mobility, the current government‟s development policy promotes irrigation schemes as incentive for pastoralist sedentarization, which is favoured as a means to reduce resource conflicts and facilitate service delivery (mofed, 2006; tache and sjaastad, 2008). while the arguments are familiar, lessons learned from the previous failures recorded in numerous studies (e.g., darkoh, 1992; niamirfuller, 1999) seem to have escaped the policymakers' attention. perhaps the most striking example of the government‟s strategy for non-pastoral development in the southern lowlands is the flagship napa proposal, „realizing food security through multi-purpose large-scale water development project in genale-dawa basin.‟ the planned project, which is expected to contribute to climate change adaptation through poverty reduction and improved food security, entails large-scale irrigation for crop cultivation, securing domestic water supplies, developing water for livestock, and hydro-power generation (tadege, 2007). while the interviewed national and zonal authorities were enthusiastic about the gigantic water project, livestock and environmental experts in local administration and ngos were more concerned over its negative impacts on existing management institutions and subsequent devastation of rangelands. they noted that even though the project may show positive results in the short-term, due to the high evapotranspiration rate and salt content of the soils, salination and other forms of land degradation are likely to become a problem in the mid-term. they also drew attention to the crucial role of management institutions: infrastructure building is only a means for development, not development itself. the means may bring 5 while the absence of mobility is surprising in terms of its widely recognized importance for nomadic pastoralism (see e.g. nassef et al., 2009; niamir-fuller, 2009), mobility is actually very rarely included in officially recorded adaptation practices. this probably reflects inbuilt bias against it in government circles, where it is often viewed as a maladaptation (agrawal and perrin 2009, pp. 357-359). 108 consilience positive or negative results depending on how the resources made available (e.g., water) are used and managed. with regard to alleged active local participation in the identification and planning of the project itself, the experts called this into question, noting that neither they nor representatives of local institutions were consulted or informed beyond a request to provide logistic support. on a more general level, they maintained that agriculture is not sustainable in the region due to unreliable rainfall and poor soil, as well as its negative impact on the long-term viability of pastoralism. instead, some of the experts recommend focusing on social development and diversification to activities that do not take up more land (interviews, a). parallel to sedentarization, the government promotes modernisation of the livestock economy focusing on marketing, veterinary services, improved range management and water development (mofed, 2006). a recent development plan for the borena-guji agro-pastoral zone finds the main constraints to development in inefficient use of the existing natural resource base, market constraints and poor and inaccessible education and health facilities (mowr, 2007). the same elements are also reflected in the current development activities in the field, albeit mostly implemented by ngos (interviews, a and b; see also pantuliano and wekesa, 2008). aside from the one project focusing on rangeland resources management and inclusion of water development for livestock in the genale-dawa basin project, these issues are, however, largely neglected in the napa projects. 6.3 psnp in the case study area for the chronically poor in the study area, famine relief provides the main support mechanism. the first large famine relief operation in borana was organised in 1973, and since then famine relief in one form or another has been distributed to the region every year (helland 2001, p. 70-72). currently famine relief is distributed mainly through the psnp, where the government has assumed the leading position even though especially in the pastoral areas ngos retain a major role in actual implementation. in 2009, more than 680,000 people in the oromia regional state were estimated to require emergency food assistance. of these, 66,297 were located in the borana zone and 62,875 in the guji zone (moard, 2009). in borana the pastoral psnp operates mainly through food-for-work (instead of the theoretically preferred cash-for-work), and the labor is used in rangeland development, water development, social infrastructure construction, feeder road construction and improving market facilities. in terms of the major classes for adaptation practices, the activities fall mainly under communal pooling, and secondarily under storage and diversification (dams for irrigation, pest control) as well as market exchange (moard, 2007). while "support and recognition of importance of mobility" in pastoral areas is emphasised in the guidelines (ibid, p. 47), and is used to identify types of support required (e.g., recognition of customary pastoral institutions and land tenure arrangements, improved access to mobile services, improved security and conflict reduction), in practice these issues remain subject to conflicting views. currently, different state authorities and aid agencies in ethiopia are supporting and/or operating a plethora of largely uncoordinated food security modeling, planning, and coordination platforms. these come in the form of networks, programmes, and adaptation funds at the federal, regional, zonal and consilience virtanen: global climate class of adaptation no. of projects implementing agency ngo or io government mobility none n/a n/a storage 1 none 1 diversification 2 none 2 communal pooling 30 30 none market exchange none n/a n/a communal pooling and diversification 7 6 1 communal pooling and market exchange 1 1 none table 2. major classes of adaptation practices in the projects in psnp districts (project data based on palmer, 2007) district levels.6 in many cases collaboration with indigenous institutions is, however, left entirely to ngos who have taken over much of the concrete work. local administration does not even have the operational resources needed and has to rely on ngo support for transport, technical expertise and field expenses. for example, due to budget problems some districts do not have a food security plan as they lack resources for implementation. in reality they simply follow what the ngos plan and implement, and report it upwards. it is often very difficult to differentiate between government and ngo roles in food-for-work projects, as both tend to take credit for individual projects (interviews, a and b; see also frankenberger et al., 2007). a recent database of both governmental and non-governmental institutions with programmes engaged in food security, rural livelihoods, health and emergency response activities in psnp districts lists altogether 41 projects in the seven districts falling within the area of this study.7 six of the projects operated in all the districts, 11 projects operated in 2-5 districts, and 24 operated in only one of the districts covered. all three projects implemented by a government institution (ministry of agriculture), as well as the major food security project implemented by un organisations (wfp and unicef) were nation-wide (table 2). regional level government authorities and fao jointly implemented one project, while national or international ngos implemented the remaining 36 projects with funding from international organizations (adb, wfp, unicef, unfpa), bilateral donors (usaid, cida, norway) or ngos (palmer, 2007). in terms of major classes of adaptation practices, the projects deal mostly with communal pooling (30 projects), sometimes combined with diversification (7 projects). most of the projects seek to improve service delivery in health and 6 pantuliano and wekesa (2008) provide a useful review of the tangled institutional framework for drought management in the pastoral areas of ethiopia. while local communities have a role in identifying beneficiaries for the psnp program, the range of possible activities to be implemented through public works, as well as their timing, is largely set from above by the authorities and/or ngo staff (interviews). 7 the districts are arero, dire, liben, miyo, moyale, teltele and yabelo. 110 consilience education, access to water and sanitation at the household level, or disaster preparation. the only projects focusing on storage (1) or diversification (2) were implemented by the government (in one case jointly with a un organisation). the absence of projects directly addressing mobility or market exchange is striking. 6.4 local institutions and pastoral resilience resilience is a characteristic of the local system, and thus the federal government, donors and non-local ngos can only facilitate the process, not provide a sustainable long-term solution. nearly every recent study and assessment report addressing the current livelihood crisis in the study area highlights the importance of traditional pastoral institutions in finding and implementing a sustainable solution (e.g., angassa and oba, 2004; homann et al., 2004; muir, 2007). collaboration with traditional institutions is also emphasised in recent government policy documents (see, e.g., mofed, 2006 and 2007). it should be noted that in borana society, chronic poverty means both secession from the pastoral production system and loss of pastoral identity (tache and oba, 2008). according to a recent study, the level of poverty (measured by herd size) and distance from the nearest urban center are the key explanatory factors for household trust in traditional institutions. the likelihood of trust increases with herd size and distance from an urban center, but it is inversely related to trust in external institutions. the results are consistent with the finding that households with eroded asset status settle in peri-urban areas in search of food aid and non-pastoral opportunities (berhanu and fayissa, 2009). the wealthy, when compared with the poor, dominate not only as contributors but also as recipients in traditional cattle distribution networks. households facing prolonged hardships thus find themselves sloughed off from the network (tache and sjaastad, 2008). overall, the findings point to a bifurcation of borana society into two parts: a traditional pastoralist part and an impoverished non-pastoral part concentrated in peri-urban areas. mobility remains the main indigenous response strategy among the traditional pastoralist part. currently, it is often combined with diversification of livestock by acquiring more browsers such as camels and goats as an adaptation to changing climate and vegetation composition in the rangelands (interviews, a, b and d; see also desta and coppock, 2004; homann et al., 2004). since converting crucial dry-season grazing lands to crop lands causes further dislocation of the pastoralists, it is arguably more sustainable for them to buy the grain they need by using cash from livestock sales and non-agricultural livelihoods (tache and oba, 2008). increasing the off-take of livestock through sales is not, however, a realistic option as long as the market prices are so low that the owners prefer to slaughter animals for their own consumption (interviews, b and d; oba, 1998). pastoralist communities have also been reported to support certain livelihood-based interventions by ngos, namely commercial restocking, supplementary feeding, restocking and the construction of feeder roads to improve market access (pantuliano and wekesa, 2008). this view was supported in some interviews. on the other hand, those households who have dropped out of the pastoralist network need viable options to make a sustainable transition to alternative livelihoods. while opportunities for wage labor are currently very limited in the study consilience virtanen: global climate area, a number of households living in peri-urban areas indicated that their members participate or are willing to participate in urban labor migration. the migrants are mostly young people from poor households who seek unskilled employment in small rural towns in the region or in kenya, where this mobility option is well established. the respondents were, however, aware that unskilled labor is not a viable solution to the coming livelihood crisis (tache and oba, 2008). as a long-term strategy, they increasingly see the education of their children as an investment for the future (interviews, b and d). there are some signs that representation of the different pastoral groups in consultative and policy formulation institutions has become stronger and better organized (interviews, a, b and d). some researchers and ngo staff have reported a good working relationship between local government and indigenous institutions (anderson et al., 2009; muir, 2007), even though others refer to deep distrust and sometimes even open conflict (homann et al., 2004; tache and oba, 2008; tache and sjaastad, 2008). a few ngos regularly involve both local government (at ward level) and traditional institutions in their participatory resource management projects in forestry, rangeland and water development (interviews, b). some of these have reported concrete results in particular areas of operation; for example, preventing forest fires, dismantling private enclosures or re-introducing controlled range burning (gebru et al., 2007; muir, 2007). in the half-dozen small-scale water projects visited by two of the authors, there appeared to be relatively good collaboration between indigenous management institutions and local state authorities in the technically simple earth dams and ponds intended for domestic use and small stock, as well as the rehabilitated traditional deep well. in the slightly more complicated earth dam constructed for irrigation purposes (which the team also visited), the blueprint management structure imposed by the ministry on all agricultural production cooperatives seemed, however, to be experiencing serious problems only a year after the ngo supporting the project had withdrawn (interviews, a, b and d). the findings support the view that support should be directed to improvement of small-scale rain-fed water schemes using relatively simple technologies instead of large-scale irrigation for export crops, which draw land and economic resources from food production (stokes et al. 2010, p. 127-128). despite explicit public commitment to strengthen collaboration between traditional institutions and relevant state organs, the top-down administrative culture remains prevalent within state administration (interviews, a and b). in most cases, the enthusiasm for popular participation and strengthening of local institutions, shown by international ngos and other key actors including the government, has failed to create efficient relationships of cooperation. many of those ngos that were initially committed to work with traditional institutions have reverted to formal government partners, at least in some cases under direct pressure from government authorities. outsiders mostly make development interventions on behalf of pastoralists, and so-called consultations with local representatives are in many cases events of top-down information dissemination with no real powers conferred on local participants (helland, 2001; watson, 2003). the failure to involve all key actors and establish a political space where they can participate in a meaningful way is partly due to the unequal relationship between the pastoralists and the state authorities. the latter continue to claim hegemony and exclusive jurisdiction in the study area at the expense of indigenous institutions. 112 consilience despite the government's self-reliance rhetoric, distribution through food-for-work has transferred responsibility from the indigenous institutions to the food aid organisations, which are not in practice accountable to the beneficiaries (interviews, a and b; cf. homann et al., 2004; pantuliano and wekesa, 2008). government (and/or ngo) patronage – following the donor-recipient model has thus become the dominant institution of adaptation to environmental stress for vulnerable pastoralists. the issue is that the process creates even more vulnerability in making destitution and powerlessness the key criteria for accessing crucial subsistence resources. 7. conclusion the general idea that adaptation to climate change will take place on the local level is well established in the international community. similarly, international organisations and donors suggest broad participation of civil society in the projects related to adaptation. the strengthening of local institutions, civil society, and private actors is expected to increase the capacity to carry out adaptation related activities, both traditional and modern, such as mobility and market-based practices. however, in ldcs such as ethiopia, which are characterised by high incidences of poverty and a low level of food security, adaptation to climate change is seldom a political priority. the key objectives of the political leadership are rather economic growth and maintenance of a secure grip on political power. it is, therefore, not surprising that the interviews show that the ownership of ethiopia's napa is rather weak. the most disturbing aspect of the practically paralyzed program is the low level of civil society and private sector participation in both preparation and envisaged implementation of the selected high-priority projects, which unfortunately is not particular to ethiopia. in practice, the government is tackling climate change adaptation through national initiatives such as the fsp. in this program, the conditions for participation are somewhat better than in the napa process, and at least formally the procedural aspects are more compatible with the msh model. the fsp enjoys strong government ownership at the federal and regional level and relatively good coordination between the key donors, but suffers from unequal representation of civil society on the lower administrative levels. in practice the program, and particularly the assets constructed by the public works activities under the safety net component, represent the major local level contribution towards climate adaptation in many rural areas. the weak and essentially subordinate role given to local csos, and even representatives of decentralised state administration, is particularly evident in peripheral pastoral areas such as borana and guji. in these regions, local institutions are eagerly courted for political support before elections, but otherwise mostly neglected or used as channels to facilitate project implementation with only marginal roles in planning and monitoring. the government‟s economic policies, which rely on investment in medium and large-scale irrigation projects to produce export crops, exacerbate the problem. while the expected increase in the national gdp can theoretically be used to buy food from abroad, evidence shows that the resulting distribution problems are very difficult to solve equitably when administrative consilience virtanen: global climate capacity is weak as in many ldcs, including ethiopia. at the same time the current policy orientation reinforces the already serious problem of dependency in the pastoral areas. a key finding with respect to both napa and fsp is the insignificant role of local institutions and knowledge in the formal adaptation strategies, particularly on the implementation level. this is rather worrying in the ldc context, which is characterised by high dependency on external funding for public service delivery and weak administrative capacity at lower levels. 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lobster fishing methods used in the caribbean are harmful to the environment and the health of the fishers. however, one method, lobster houses, shows particular promise for alleviating these negative effects, but only under certain environmental and socioeconomic conditions and using the recommended management practices. lobster houses have been used for over half a century by fishing communities in ascension bay, mexico; and batábano bay, cuba; which are two of the most successful spiny lobster fisheries in the caribbean. success in these two communities has led to the implementation of lobster house projects throughout the region with varying levels of success. the objective of this study is to determine which factors contribute to the sustainability of the p. argus fishery through the examination of three lobster house case studies (ascension bay, mexico; batábano bay, cuba; and miches, dominican republic) and the scientific literature that evaluates the sustainability of this fishery. lobster houses can play a vital role in promoting sustainability throughout the caribbean by simplifying management, reducing incidental environmental damage, reduce harvest rates of illegal segments of the lobster population, reducing health risks to fishers, and standardizing practices. abstract the caribbean spiny lobster (panulirus argus) is overfished, primarily due to failures in fishery management. the most popular lobster fishing methods used are contributing to overfishing and are harmful to lobsters, the environment, and the health of the fishers. however, one method, lobster houses, shows particular promise for reducing these negative effects, but only if certain conditions are met. lobster houses have been used for over fifty years by fishing communities in ascension bay, mexico; and batábano bay, cuba; which are two of the more successful p. argus fisheries in the caribbean. success in these two communities has led to the creation of lobster house projects throughout the region with varying levels of success. the objective of this study is to determine which factors contribute to the sustainability of the p. argus fishery by examining three lobster house case studies (ascension bay, mexico; batábano bay, cuba; and miches, dominican republic) and the scientific literature that evaluates the sustainability of this fishery. lobster houses can play a vital role in promoting sustainability throughout the caribbean by simplifying management, reducing incidental consilience conrad: lobster houses environmental damage, reducing the rate of illegal lobster harvesting, reducing health risks to fishers, and standardizing practices. keywords: overfishing; lobster houses; panulirus argus; fishery management, sustainable fishing 1. introduction overfishing is a major problem throughout the world’s oceans. the fao estimates that 85% of the assessed marine fish stocks are either at capacity or overexploited, which is the highest recorded percentage since data were first collected in the mid-1970s (fao, 2010). one of these species that has experienced a decrease in catch primarily due to overfishing is the caribbean spiny lobster, panulirus argus (muñoz-nuñez, 2009). figure 1. historic landings of caribbean spiny lobster (p. argus) for the entire caribbean region including brazil (from muñoz-nuñez, 2009). the p. argus fishery faces significant challenges to sustainable management because it consists of small-scale fisheries that fail to consider several critical considerations: the lack of regional standardization, a dearth of regulations that take into account the complex life cycle of p. argus, a fishery’s dependence on environmental factors, and the irregularity in the enforcement of regulations (ehrhardt, 2005). additionally, small-scale fisheries use multiple lobster fishing methods, which can affect multiple life stages (ehrhardt, 2005) and complicate management (salas et al., 2008). compressors are the most common fishing method used, even though they are illegal throughout most of the caribbean (herrera-moreno and betancourt, 2003a). when fishing with compressors, fishers use either gaffs or harpoons to spear lobsters immediately upon sight, killing or injuring the lobsters before they can be checked for eggs or assessed as legally sized. in addition, compressors allow the fishers to stay underwater longer and fish deeper, both of which 50 consilience figure 2. lobster house design used by reef check, dominican republic, in parque la caleta (v. galvan, personal communication, 10 june, 2010). facilitate overexploitation and increase the amount of incidental damage done to the reef as the fishers search for lobsters hidden underneath corals and other living refuges. in addition to these negative environmental effects, the misuse of compressors has resulted in the development of health problems for many fishers, such as respiratory problems, limb paralysis, and death due to decompression complications (wwf, 2006). lobster houses have been suggested as a fishing method that could enhance the sustainability of fishing practices. these are shelters for lobsters usually made from ferrocement that are placed in shallow waters on the ocean floor (fig. 2). this fishing method has gained popularity in the past fifty years due to its success in cuba (cruz and phillips, 2000) and the yucatan peninsula (sosa-cordero et al., 2008), two of the most successful lobster fisheries in the caribbean. in cuba they are called ―pesqueros,‖ in mexico ―casitas cubanas,‖ ―sobmras,‖ or simply ―casitas‖ (cruz and phillips, 2000). due to their success in the caribbean, lobster houses have spread in the past decade throughout the world (herrnkind and cobb, 2008) although lobster houses hold promise for reducing environmental damage, increasing harvest of legally-sized adults, and reducing health problems for fishers, no studies have substantially supported the idea that the lobster houses will increase production of lobsters as opposed to merely concentrating the same production into fewer fisheries (herrnkind and cobb, 2008). however, one study suggests that the attraction or production of p. argus in one region in the bahamas depends on whether there is adequate post-larval supply, settlement substrate, and food resources (eggleston and lipcius, 1999). consequently, lobster houses may only be sustainable when multiple conditions are met. this study reviews the literature on lobster houses and considers three case studies in order to assess how the use of lobster houses may promote the sustainability of p. argus fisheries throughout the caribbean by limiting damage to the environment, reducinge harvest rates of juveniles and of lobsters with eggs, eliminating certain health problems to the fishers, and standardizing regional practices. 2. methods 2.1 critical literature review we conducted a critical review of the literature including policy revision studies to promote the sustainability of the p. argus fishery, socioeconomic analyses of lobster house fisheries, and environmental assessments of the effects of lobster houses. three lobster house consilience conrad: lobster houses case studies were the focus: ascension bay, méxico; batábano bay, cuba; and miches, dominican republic. when appropriate, internet searches were conducted to corroborate and expand upon the reports, using both english and spanish phrases including lobster houses, sustainability, ―casitas,‖ and the locations of the case studies. 2.2 fieldwork we designed and implemented a lobster house pilot project for los mameyes, a fishing community in miches, dominican republic from 2010 to 2011. katie conrad visited three other lobster house projects throughout the dominican republic and interviewed managers and fishers regarding the design, placement, management, regulations, enforcement, fishing methods, and success of their lobster houses. this data provided insight on how to conduct the miches lobster house pilot project. 3. results and discussion this study determined which characteristics of the three local lobster house fisheries contributed to their sustainability, as reported by the fishers, managers, and case study authors. a summary of the information obtained during our efforts is given below (table 1). each of four general categories will be discussed in turn: environmental conditions, design characteristics, management, and other socioeconomic factors. within each category, we discuss the rationale behind our evaluation as to how well each aspect was addressed within each case study. case study characteristics that may contribute to lobster house fishery sustainability ascension bay, méxico batábano bay, cuba miches, dominican republic sources sosa-cordero et al., 2008 muñoz-nuñez, 2009 current study lobster houses present  50 years  50 years  1 year exploitation status stable declining declining environmental conditions larval supply √ √ √ habitat requirements √ √ √ design characteristics material √ √ o design √ √ o placement √ √ o management organization √ √ o territoriality √ √ x regulations √ o o ban all other fishing methods √ x x ban catch of berried females √ √ √ 52 consilience closed season √ √ √ limited access √ √ x minimum size limit √ √ √ no fishing zones √ √ o co-management √ √ x enforcement √ o x socioeconomic factors openness to change √ √ o availability of alternative livelihoods √ x x access to sustainable markets √ √ x table 1. a list of the case studies examined in this study and their characteristics that contribute to the sustainability of the fishery. fishery status indicates whether the p. argus catch is increasing, declining, or stable (no increase or decrease). lobster houses present describes how long lobster houses have been used in the community. a √ indicates that the fishery has this characteristic, an o indicates that it is partially present, and x indicates that the characteristic is absent. 3.1 environmental conditions the lobster house fisheries in ascension bay and batábano bay could not be successful if they did not each meet key environmental conditions: a constant supply of lobster larvae and the required habitats for all of the lobster´s life stages. panulirus argus landings primarily consist of new recruits and therefore correspond with fluctuations in recruitment (cruz et al., 1995). both larvae and settlement substrate (such as seaweed beds or mangroves) need to be present in order to recruit juveniles and support a viable lobster house fishery (eggleston and lipcius, 1999). lobster recruitment varies from year to year due to many biological and meteorological factors. the three lobster house case studies featured in this study have the advantage of being located in an area with high larval retention: ascension bay (sosa-cordero et al., 2008), batábano bay (ehrhardt, 2005), and miches (herrera-moreno and betancourt, 2003a). we have found no evidence that any of these lobster house projects have failed due to a chronic lack of larvae. however, extreme weather events have disrupted the settlement of larvae, destroyed habitat, and decreased adult populations, resulting in a decrease in catch for years afterwards. this phenomenon has been observed in ascension bay (sosa-cordero et al., 2008), batábano bay (muñoz-nuñez, 2009), and in the western yucatan (salas et al., 2008). although these lobster house fisheries have had adequate larval recruitment in the past, climate change may influence the supply and distribution of larvae as major storms become more frequent and currents shift. the ascension bay, batábano bay, and miches sites all seem to have the lobster habitats required for development (solares-leal and álvarez-gil, 2003; muñoz-nuñez, 2009; herreramoreno and betancourt, 2003a ). these include a nearby mangrove or macroalgae bed to provide settlement substrate for larvae; a shallow, sheltered bay filled with seagrass; patches of coral reef, between which lobster houses could be placed on sand or hard bottom substrates; and an extensive outer coral reef to provide habitat for spawning adults. consilience conrad: lobster houses 3.2 material, design, and placement the material used to construct lobster houses can affect how often the houses need to get replaced, their environmental impact, and their maneuverability during installation and lobster extraction. the materials and placement guidelines described in table 2 are practiced in both the cuban and mexican fisheries and have been found to contribute to fishing success throughout the caribbean (miller, 1982; quinn and kojis, 1995; salas et al., 2008; eggleston et al., 1990). one of the greatest benefits of using lobster houses as opposed to free-diving is that the lobster houses reduce the inevitable damage to the reef by fishers and their boats. refocusing the efforts of lobster fishers away from the fragile reefs and seagrass beds to hard substrate that is not natural habitat for many marine organisms minimizes incidental environmental damage. successful lobster house characteristics purpose source ferrocement heavy enough not to cause environmental damage in minor storms and can last for multiple fishing seasons miller 1982 size: 1x1 m with a height of around 15 cm large enough to accommodate many lobsters and prevent most predators from entering eggleston et al. 1990 depth 5-20 m accessible by free diving quinn and kojis 1995 hard substrate the house does not sink into the sand or mud miller 1982 flat substrate provide stability salas et al. 2008 close to seagrass and macroalgal beds food access and minimizes incidental environmental damage salas et al. 2008 distance between houses 30-50 m maximize the use of houses for moving between food patches salas et al. 2008 sides of the house should be facing the dominant current protect the lobsters from currents and prevents the crawl space from filling with sand and debris salas et al. 2008 50 m away from natural refuges maximize the availability of shelter throughout the ocean floor and minimizes incidental environmental damage salas et al. 2008 table 2. beneficial lobster house placement characteristics derived from interviewing experienced lobster house fishers from cuba and mexico. dominican fishers using lobster houses in miches have been reluctant to follow the above guidelines because lobster houses are such a new fishing method and because it takes more time to find sites that meet all of these requirements. ferrocement lobster houses have only been introduced to the dominican lobster fishery in miches this past summer. other fishers in the community have had previous experience with lobster houses made from more impermanent materials, such as tires and aluminum roofing. lobster houses made from these 54 consilience alternative materials will cause more environmental reef damage than ferrocement houses because they are lightweight and easily destroyed during storm surges. typically they disintegrate after only one season (miller, 1982). 3.3 management ascension bay and batábano bay both share certain aspects of their management systems that contribute to the overall sustainability of the lobster house fishery: organization, territoriality, adoption of certain regulations, and regulation enforcement at the local and national level. the adoption of these management practices by other lobster house fisheries will likely contribute to their sustainability. in contrast, although the dominican republic has a relatively comprehensive set of regulatory laws, the country lacks adequate enforcement of these regulations. in addition, lobster houses were only introduced to the country a few years ago, so the adoption of the necessary management and enforcement practices are only beginning to be developed. organization at the local, national, and regional levels is important to ensure that the rights of fishers are protected and that they have access to the resources they need, facilitating the delegation of management responsibilities, and protecting the environment and fishing resources. good organization is the foundation on which the other managerial aspects of the fishery must be based in order to allow for the highest production and quality possible at the lowest cost (wwf, 2006). fishers in ascension bay (sosa-cordero et al., 2008) and batábano bay (puga millán, 2005) are organized at the local level by membership in a fishing cooperative and association, respectively. by participating in these organizations, individual fishermen receive benefits such as credit for buying fishing gear, access to storage facilities, certain fishing sites, and more markets with better prices. furthermore, participation helps fishers to develop their commercialization strategies and serves to provide more incentive to respect regulations—as well as the ability to create and enforce their own regulations (wwf, 2006). organization also facilitates the delegation of management responsibilities. a popular fishing organization is the co-management system as practiced in the mexican lobster house fishery in ascension bay, which assigns management responsibilities not just to the government´s fisheries department, but also to fishing communities. these arrangements may have additional internal regulations at the community level to ensure sustainability (sosacordero et al., 2008). these additional regulations are agreed upon by every cooperative member and can promote stewardship by increasing enforcement opportunities for resource users to control outcomes and enhancing cooperation between user groups and the government for enforcement (cochrane, 1998). when internal regulations are made, the national government must formally recognize them if cases are to be brought to court for arbitration (sosa-cordero et al., 2008). the cuban p. argus fishery is organized for top-down enforcement from the ministry of fisheries to the local fishing association but also delegates certain management responsibilities to fishing communities (joyce, 1997). in miches, fishers are unable to organize due to a lack of resources, though the national fishery council has created comprehensive regulations and implemented the collection of basic fishery data. however, the desire to organize exists, and internal regulations may be adopted if the benefits are apparent. organization at the regional level is necessary for p. argus as a common pool resource. viewing p. argus as such would require the presence of regional infrastructure to collect more information, such as the regional population dynamics, in order to support national and regional policies (ehrhardt, 2005). regional coordination has proved a challenge in the caribbean consilience conrad: lobster houses because it is one of the most socially and politically complex regions in the world, consisting of 26 countries and 19 territories that range from small to large, rich to poor, developed to undeveloped. the region also has five official languages and diverse indigenous cultures (fanning et al., 2009). there are currently seven regional and international organizations working on fishery problems in the caribbean, though these have incomplete coverage and lack effective inter-organizational communication (mahon, 2008). in may 1, 2009, clme (caribbean large marine ecosystem) project was launched with the goals of achieving maximum sustainable yield of fisheries in the region by 2015 and introducing an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management. the first step of implementation was to incorporate the caribbean´s regional organizations into a centralized framework and to designate management responsibilities (fanning et al., 2009). if clme can facilitate the process of standardizing data collection, hopefully standardization of regulations throughout the caribbean will result. the adoption of territoriality is essential to the success of a lobster house fishery. batábano bay (muñoz-nuñez et al., 2009) and ascension bay (sosa-cordero et al., 2008) lobster house fisheries, are both based on a territorial management system in which each individual fisher is given his own territory on which to place lobster houses. in the past, lobster house fisheries that have not used territoriality either failed completely or have remained small-scale because fishers do not want to invest their time and money into fishing and maintaining houses when access to their property cannot be guaranteed. communities in the northern yucatan adopted lobster houses at the same time as ascension bay but the community did not adopt the campo system (seijo, 1993). fishers soon abandoned the houses and reverted back to using other fishing methods, eventually leading to the collapse of the fishery (solares-leal and álvarez-gil, 2003). currently 10 of the lobster houses in miches are open access, but there is concern among fishers that other fishers in the community and from elsewhere will take lobsters from houses that are not theirs, from those 40 that are owned and operated individually. until territoriality is implemented and respected in miches, it is unlikely that lobster houses will be successful. to have a sustainable p. argus fishery, regulations that account for the population dynamics and complicated life cycle of the lobsters are needed. although many countries in the caribbean already have adopted some regulations to protect p. argus populations, they often provide incomplete protection from overexploitation. the most valuable management regulations for p. argus fisheries in this study are summarized in table 3. the mexican punta allen fishery has adopted and implemented all of these regulations and is regarded as a sustainable p. argus fishery (sosa-cordero et al., 2008). however, one of the possible contributors to overexploitation in cuba´s batábano bay is the disregard for a single regulation – using multiple lobster fishing methods – which in turn puts pressure on each of the life stages (muñoz-nuñez, 2009). in the dominican miches fishery, other lobster fishing methods are used as well and there are no regulations on materials used or their placement. to ensure the sustainability of these lobster house fisheries, all of these regulations should be adopted and enforced. recommended national regulations function source minimum size limit (81 cl) allows 75% of lobsters to reach reproductive age muñoz-nuñez 2009 ban illegal-sized lobster trade encourages enforcement of the size limit internationally ehrhardt 2005 56 consilience berried lobster fishing ban protects breeding females ehrhardt 2005 closed season march to may protects breeding lobsters ehrhardt 2005 no-fishing zones in major nursery habitats preserve feeding grounds, protect juveniles, and enhance overall reproduction muñoz-nuñez 2009 no-fishing zones in coral reefs preserve feeding grounds, protect larger lobsters that have a higher reproductive potential, and reduce damage to coral reefs that may provide additional food sosa-cordero et al. 2008 ban compressors reduce negative health effects, reduce overfishing because the fishers are able to stay underwater for longer and fish at greater depths herrera-moreno and betancourt 2003b ban gaffs and harpoons kill or injure lobsters before they can be assessed as legally sized or checked for eggs herrera-moreno and betancourt 2003b ban all other lobster fishing methods avoid fishing pressure on multiple life stages and reduce cannibalism induced by the use of lobster traps muñoz-nuñez 2009 limit access facilitate data collection and reduce overfishing muñoz-nuñez 2009 construction material regulations prevent incidental damage to the environment by poorly made houses during extreme weather events, as well as prevent environmental contamination salas et al. 2008 placement regulations prevent damage to coral reefs, seagrass beds, and other vegetation salas et al. 2008 standardized regional data collection procedures facilitates data collection and allows for the regional analysis of management strategies ehrhardt 2005 table 3. recommended regulations for p. argus fisheries at the local or national level. in addition to the lack of standardized and biologically-appropriate regulations within and between countries, regulations are rarely enforced due to the regional lack of governmental resources and environmental education (herrera-moreno and betancourt, 2003b). the lack of enforcement is the greatest contributor to lobster overfishing in the caribbean (ehrhardt, 2005). although this characteristic is the most prevalent in miches, it is also germane to batábano bay (muñoz-nuñez, 2009). the problems with enforcement in miches are shared with the other two fisheries and involve corruption of government officials, lack of sufficient government resources, and the absence of economic incentives for compliance (muñoz-nuñez, 2009). 3.5 socioeconomic factors lobster houses are the lobster fishing method with the highest number of lobsters caught per unit effort, resulting in higher profits per lobster, and are among the most time consilience conrad: lobster houses efficient method used. lobster houses are low cost to construct and maintain compared to other fishing methods (miller, 1982). lobster houses can also increase efficiency by accumulating lobsters during fishing bans, so that the majority of catch is caught in the first two months after the lobster fishing season opens (solares-leal and álvarez-gil, 2003). therefore, fishers can refocus their fishing efforts on other species or alternative livelihoods after this two month period. there are many advantages to using lobster houses over alternative lobster fishing methods, but the fishery must adopt appropriate management strategies. due to the difficulties involved in creating and enforcing these strategies, this may be the major barrier to fisheries adopting lobster houses. lobster fisheries in the dominican republic are an example of communities that lack the openness to change their management strategies. dominican lobster house projects face opposition by fishers skeptical of lobster houses because they are not a fishing method that has been traditionally practiced in the country and because the management strategies associated with it are unfamiliar. fishers in the dominican republic are poor and do not have the resources to invest in lobster houses, which have a prohibitively high initial investment cost and may not attract enough harvestable lobsters to pay for themselves for almost a year, which makes it difficult for them to invest in lobster house construction. dominican fishers tend to be subsistence-based and as such are focused on acquiring enough lobster to cover daily living expenses. waiting a year to start receiving the benefits of building a lobster house is not feasible. many of the fisheries are unorganized and fishers travel great distances to other areas to fish, creating concern that other fishers will construct houses in their fishing areas or steal from their casitas. in addition, regulation enforcement is non-existent and would require increased investment by the government and/or increased community involvement in order to enforce the additional regulations required for successful lobster house fisheries. another downside to exclusively using lobster houses as a fishing method is that it limits when and where fishing can take place. initially, anywhere from two months to a year may be needed for enough lobsters to be attracted to the lobster houses. the decline in lobster catch during winter migration and the high interannual variation in catch rates (ehrhardt, 2005),suggests the need for viable alternative livelihoods. this is not a problem in ascension bay, where many of the fishers are members of mexican tourism cooperatives. in cuba, however , an increasing number of fishermen have been struggling due to extension of fishery regulations and a decline in catch due to overfishing and a lack of alternative livelihoods. many cuban fishers resort to selling lobsters to the black market, further increasing overfishing (piñeiro et al., 2007). in miches, there is a lack of sustainable alternative livelihoods and fishing is the main industry in the coastal community. the development of marine tourism opportunities could provide jobs for fishers that exploit their knowledge of the ocean, such as sport fishing and whale tours (sosa-cordero et al., 2008). diving and snorkeling are popular tourist activities in the caribbean and are very profitable, but they will require the fishers to learn new skills. one study found that tourists to the dominican republic are willing to pay as much as $60 for a twodive trip and that fishers can make as much or even more money as guides (wielgus et al., 2010). in ascension bay, some mexican fishers have switched careers to become guides, reducing fishing pressure (solares-leal and álvarez-gil, 2003). in miches there are currently few opportunities for fishers to enter the tourist industry. if laws are not enforced and/or no alternative livelihoods are available, fishers may continue to use illegal lobster fishing methods, which will result in lobster overfishing. the cuban fishery is becoming overfished, now that 58 consilience other methods in addition to lobster houses are used and regulations are not enforced (muñoznuñez, 2009). a market for the higher cost of sustainably produced lobster is necessary, ideally located close to the lobster fishing community. this local financial incentive could motivate fishers to invest in the high initial cost of building lobster houses in exchange for a greater return on their product in the long-run. the use of lobster houses also allows fishers to catch live lobsters, potentially allowing them to export them abroad, where the price offered for each catch is highest. such a market is currently exploited by the ascension bay fishery in mexico (solaresleal and álvarez-gil, 2003), and one is growing in cuba (puga millán, 2005). unfortunately, assessing domestic and international live lobster markets is impractical in the dominican republic. almost all of the catch in the dr is killed upon capture and is quickly consumed domestically (wielgus et al., 2010), therefore minimal infrastructure exists for exportation. live export does not often occur. there is high domestic demand for lobster due to the well-developed tourism industry, although no distinction is made for sustainably harvested lobsters. nonetheless, the market for sustainably-caught lobster in the dominican republic is likely to grow as environmental concerns and consumer demand for local, sustainably-caught fish rise. another way to access the sustainable lobster market is through certification by the marine stewardship council. the lobster fisheries in ascension bay are currently undergoing the final stages of the certification process (l. borillon, personal communication, january 31, 2011). certification would require fisheries to meet basic requirements, such as maintaining fishing activity at a sustainable level and adhering to all local, national, and international laws (marine stewardship council, 2010). the miches fishery currently lacks all of the basic requirements for certification, so certification would take a number of years to acquire. 4. conclusions achieving sustainability in p. argus fisheries is a difficult task. the complex life cycle of the lobster coupled with the confusion of harvesting by small-scale fisheries in a politically and culturally diverse region greatly complicates sustainability efforts. a lack of adequate fishing regulations and enforcement of such regulations does not help either. however, management of this fishery is becoming easier due to the increasing global demand for sustainably-caught fish, the rising local and global awareness of the negative environmental and social effects of current lobster fishing practices, the increasing collaboration between countries with regard to fishing policy formation, and the growing number of certified small-scale lobster fisheries. we have suggested that lobster houses may contribute to a sustainable lobster fishery if certain environmental characteristics, management practices, and socioeconomic factors are present. the mexican lobster house fishery in ascension bay is a perfect model of a sustainable fishery, because there have been no significant harvest declines nor negative environmental effects over its entire 50-year existence. cuba’s batábano bay lobster house fishery is rapidly declining and lacks regulation enforcement. however, it could become more sustainable as a fishery if the regulations outlined in this paper are incorporated under regular enforcement and if there are the appropriate socioeconomic incentives for sustainable extraction. the miches fishery is only in the beginning stages of the transition to sustainability, given that it lacks sufficient organization at the local and national level, appropriate regulations, regular enforcement, and the socioeconomic incentives to support a sustainable lobster house fishery. as such, miches will require a number of years before the fishery can develop these prerequisites for lobster houses to contribute to a successful and sustainable lobster house fishery. consilience conrad: lobster houses although they may take a significant amount of time to implement in some fisheries, lobster houses can play a vital role in promoting sustainability throughout the caribbean by simplifying management, reducing incidental reef damage, reducing health risks to fishers, and standardizing fishing practices. 60 consilience bibliography cochran, k. 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(2008). are artificial devices an option to improve lobster catches?: the case of yucatan fishery, méxico. (doctoral dissertation). centro de investigación y estudios avanzados unidad mérida, mérida, mexico. seijo, j. (1993). individual transferable grounds in a community managed artisanal fishery. marine resource economics, 8, 78-81. solares-leal, i.a. & álvarez-gil, o. (2003). socioeconomic assessment of punta allen: a tool for the management of a coastal community. cancún, quintana roo, mexico. in: monro, a. & m.c. peña cocarro (eds). actas del simposio café y biodiversidad. congreso de la sociedad mesoamericana para la biología y la conservación. san salvador, el salvador. the natural history museum. sosa-cordero, e., liceaga-correa, m.l.a, and seijo, j.c. (2008). the punta allen lobster fishery: current status and recent trends. fao, fisheries and aquaculture management division, rome. wielgus, j., cooper, e., torres, r. & burke, l. (2010). coastal capital: dominican republic case studies of the economic value of coastal ecosystems in the dominican republic. world resources institute. 62 consilience wwf. (2006). como lograr mayores ingresos pescando de manera sustentable: manual de practicas pesqueras de langosta en el arrecife mesoamericano. wwf-méxico/centroamérica: 97 pp. editor-in-chief note dear readers, i am often asked to define sustainable development and its broad relevance today. the most widely used definition is surely the brundtland commission’s: that which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. with this second issue ofconsilience: the journal of sustainable development, i am eager to share with you the view that i wholeheartedly support and credit to ismail serageldin, the director of the library of alexandria in egypt and author of dozens of academic essays on sustainability: sustainable development as the sustainability of opportunity. sustainability, he argues, is giving future generations as many opportunities as, if not more than, we have had ourselves. in this second issue of consilience the authors translate this “giving” to the growth of opportunity: economic opportunity, knowledge transfer, and natural conservation. in this second issue of consilience, the editors and writers worked ambitiously to create and inspire interdisciplinary dialogue between students and development practitioners that would promote this sustainability of opportunity. we hope to provide a glimpse into the pool of exceptional motivation of our authors, who are each committed to share their interests and experiences with you. our vision: to reveal clearly the aspirations and voices of the authors, and to share the reasoning and discussion behind the competitive selection process for articles for consilience. to support this vision each article in this issue features two additional notes, as introductions to the fascinating topics and multi-disciplinarity behind each piece: the senior editor’s note, found before each piece and the author’s note, the authors’ own preface to readers. in so doing, we hope to expand the dialogue on issues of sustainable development. here, i briefly introduce to you the authors and their written work published in issue ii of consilience. these authors are students and professors of health, economics, social psychology, epidemiology, political science, transitional justice, asian studies, and pastoral development. like many of our readers, they are also development practitioners, who work at field study schools, research universities and with governmental agencies around the world. http://consiliencejournal.readux.org/2009/03/sn/ in reading their written work, you will encounter an immense diversity of research methods used, including the likert scale, a psychometric scale for evaluating survey responses, and multivariate general linear model analyses, for identifying the regression and variance of collected data. in the “author’s notes,” the contributors describe their motivations for and research experiences from schools around the world, including tanzania, ghana, togo, brazil, and parts of asia. their innovative thinking is clear when you read of their suggested tools for development and recommended solutions in maher abu-madi and rashed al-sa’ed’s “towards sustainable wastewater reuse in the middle east and north africa” and richard king’s “the political economy of the resource curse in gabon: lessons for ghana.” i invite you to relate to their experiences as expressed through distinct voices, organized into the four categories of consilience: scholarly articles, field notes, photo essays, and opinion pieces. in the scholarly articles, the authors present case studies that respond to the ideas of eminent thinkers in economics, history of the environment, the labor movement, and gender equality: amartya sen, ravi kanbur, ester boserup, and elizabeth economy. i welcome you to follow five authors as they investigate community-based watershed management in the philippines (“evaluation of the nzaid project” by freeman et al.), and four others as they conduct 123 surveys in three villages over the course of four days, in the northern shaanxi province in china (“social responses to environmental degradation in northwest rural china” by moore et al.). the field notes, photo essays, and opinion pieces are dually captivating personal transcripts and critical examinations of current development work. i was personally moved by the description of child labor issues in schapper’s “from the global to the local: how international child rights in bangladesh reach the grass roots’ level.” cumming’s “communicable disease surveillance and response in uganda,” which describes his work with village health teams and the national task force on cholera and hepatitis e. in kampala, uganda presents a novel perspective on issues of global health. burgess’ “illusions of grandeur: the role of the psychosocial in a sennian approach to escaping urban poverty” examines the psychosocial barriers to poverty alleviation projects in brazilian shantytowns in a thought-provoking and critical manner. in issue ii’s four photo galleries, you will read about what inspired photo essayist bachhuber to chronicle india’s most famous and toxic river, the ganges. batkhsihig affords us a behind-the-scenes tour of the daily tasks of mongolian herder families. laso will expose you to the hidden aquatic lifestyle and vast seasonal migration areas of the podocnemis, the river turtle of the amazonian landscape, and drs. nyasimi and okang’a of the millennium villages project will introduce you to the sauri village’s new community ambulance and community-founded theater group. to return to our understanding of sustainable development as thesustainability of opportunity, it is my hope that you will join us in commenting on each piece through this provided online medium and encouraging the growth of vast opportunities: in research methods, for actors involved in drafting policies, and in academic dialogue. we know that the opportunities must continue to grow in the context of real-world poverty alleviation projects, legislation for environmental governance, and provisions beyond basic needs. thank you for your interest in issue ii of consilience: the journal of sustainable development. i welcome you to contribute, through comments and critique, and as future writers. with regards, hannah lee editor-in-chief consilience: the journal of sustainable development consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 5, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 1-24 reduced emissions for deforestation and degradation: a critical review marc hufty development studies graduate institute of international and development studies, geneva, switzerland marc.hufty@graduateinstitute.ch annie haakenstad development studies graduate institute of international and development studies, geneva, switzerland annie.haakenstad@graduateinstitute.ch abstract “reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation” (redd) is emerging as a major new climate change mechanism that could deeply impact the financial, social and institutional dynamics of deforestation, conservation, and development in many developing countries. it has the potential to influence global forest governance in a socially acceptable way. the mechanism as it stands needs much improvement to avoid the pitfalls of earlier forest governance mechanisms. the research, at this stage, is not sufficient to improve it. most of the literature is fairly slanted towards technical issues and the prospective design of the scheme or normative opposition to it. despite this copious amounts of scholarly and advocacy work, there is too little attention focused on the social and governance dimensions of the proposals. author’s note forests are crucial in the struggle for sustainable development. not only do they have a role in the preservation of global ecological systems, but moreover they are especially important for supporting the livelihoods of local populations. when forests were first addressed in the context of climate change, they were assessed in mostly financial and technical terms. we think there is a need to insert a social perspective into the debate, taking into account the lessons learned from many years of intervening in developing countries‟ forests. engineers who have designed redd as a brilliant, but top-down, scheme for tropical forests conservation seem to have forgotten such lessons. without addressing deforestation, climate objectives cannot be reached. but further, drawing from years of work on forests, we see that without considering the impacts on local societies and the lessons learned from development aid redd cannot succeed. this paper is part of the effort to ensure redd will prevail in social terms. keywords: reduced emissions, deforestation, forest degradation, tropical forests, environmental governance, social impacts. 1. introduction forests cover 29% of the terrestrial surface (schmitt et al., 2008) and provide vital ecosystems services (mea, 2005a). they also store 50% of terrestrial organic 2 consilience carbon and contain much of the earth‟s biodiversity. tropical forests contain 50% of terrestrial biological diversity over 6% of the world‟s surface (wilson, 1992). but globally, sustainable forest management remains insufficiently competitive compared with more destructive uses of forests (van dijk & savenije, 2009); 13 million hectares are lost annually to deforestation (approximately the size of the united kingdom) (fao, 2010), 97% of which takes place in tropical countries (nabuurs et al., 2007). deforestation is responsible for 18% of global co2 emissions (stern, 2006), adding as much carbon to the atmosphere as the transport sector. moreover, deforestation inflicts high biodiversity losses (mea, 2005b) and triggers the loss of key ecosystem services (elmqvist et al., 2010). there is widespread agreement on the need to halt deforestation. direct and underlying causes of deforestation are known (geist & lambin, 2001). they are traditionally divided into proximate causes (infrastructure expansion, logging, conversion of land for agriculture and ranching, extractive industries, etc.) and underlying factors (economic aspects, such as the global demand for timber, soybeans or meat, as well as policy-related, institutional, technological, socio-cultural, demographic, et cetera). these causes are interlinked; for example, a road built for logging will attract settlers, who may clear-cut forests to ready land for agriculture. many mechanisms aimed at curbing deforestation are already in place, some more successful than others. protected areas already cover 13.5% of the world‟s forests (schmitt et al., 2008). if well managed, they can constitute an effective tool against deforestation (bruner, 2001; hayes, 2006), especially when they involve multi-user or indigenous governance systems (chhatre & agrawal, 2009; nelson & chomitz, 2009). other governance mechanisms, such as those led by the food and agriculture organization (fao), the united nations forum on forests (unff), the world bank, the international tropical timber organization (itto) and the forest stewardship council (fsc), have proven useful under certain conditions, but are manifestly insufficient if the global deforestation rate is considered (humphreys, 2006). these programs lack an effective process of governance for forests at the global level, something weakly promoted by developed countries and fiercely opposed by developing countries under the principles of national sovereignty1 and differentiated responsibility. this has resulted in segmented, fragmented, underfunded, incoherent, or “non-binding” instruments. two mechanisms have been particularly debated and tested in the context of the climate and biodiversity global governance processes. one prominent approach has been the forest-related carbon sink projects pursued under the kyoto protocol‟s clean development mechanism. these projects harness the carbon market to compensate developed countries‟ excess carbon emissions with tree plantations in developing countries. the projects‟ contribution to mitigating climate change seems very modest, and they have been criticized for promoting large monoculture tree plantations (kill et al., 2010), as well as involving problems of additionality, leakage 1 depending on the ideological lens employed, claiming sovereignty can be justified as an effort to thwart a neo-colonial attempt to control forest resources in the vein of dependency theory (see fearnside 2009), or as an endeavor to preserve internal inequalities by enhancing the domination of national elites over natural resources, a view indigenous peoples often advance (e.g. goldtooth 2010). either way, the impact has been the same – evoking sovereignty has barred global governance structures from conserving forests. consilience hufty et al.: redd and permanence (plantinga & richards, 2008). the other prominent approach is payments for ecosystem services (pes), which are payments to communities, individuals, or governments for safeguarding and maintaining ecosystem services like clean water (gómez-beggethun et al., 2010; teeb, 2010; wallace, 2007; wunder et al., 2008).2 they are considered beneficial for the involved partners (tacconi et al., 2009) but unlikely to replace other conservation instruments (wunder, 2006). they must be carefully designed to avoid focusing excessively on one resource (e.g. water) or reproducing and even strengthening power asymmetries and social inequalities (kosoy & corbera, 2010). in the context of united nations framework convention on climate change (unfccc) negotiations, “avoided deforestation” was not originally included in its implementation agreement, the kyoto protocol. controversial forest and other land issues were left out for a variety of reasons including the apparent complexity of managing deforestation and forest degradation (morgan et al., 2005; skutsch et al., 2007), fear of a possible flood of credits into the carbon markets (silva-chavez, 2005; vera diaz & schwarzen, 2005) and possible negative biodiversity impacts (greenpeace, 2003). at the 11th conference of the parties in 2005 in montreal, developing countries3 proposed a mechanism called “reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation” (redd).4 portrayed as a “win-win” for developing and developed countries alike, the mechanism has gained momentum and support. it became a widely discussed subject in view of post-kyoto arrangements (after-2012) and is one of the few consensual solutions agreed to by the unfccc negotiators in copenhagen (cop-15, 2009) and cancún (cop-16, 2010). it has also generated an abundant literature, including academic papers,5 reports and advocacy papers. this is noteworthy for a mechanism that remains experimental, only due to start after 2012. is there a chance that redd will be the first successful attempt to manage forests at global scale (grainger & oberteiner, 2010)? 2. redd: nuts and bolts the basic idea of redd is “to generate a significant level of compensation or economic incentive to outweigh the income generated through deforestation” 2 a classic example is the new york watershed management plan for the catskills, which disburses funds in upstream communities in the catskills to assure water quality to downstream users in new york city (see isakson, 2002). 3 it was proposed by papua new guinea and costa rica in 2005. (unfccc, 2005). 4 the initial discussion was about “avoided deforestation” (ad), which would have covered slowing deforestation rates in existing forests. in 2005, the discussion turned to “reduced emissions from deforestation in developing countries”, with only one “d” (red). gradually, the idea of including forest degradation was accepted and the acronym gained a second “d” (reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation). this was confirmed at bali (unfccc cop 13) in 2007. the “bali action plan” (paragraph 1b.iii) also mentioned the role of conservation, sustainable management and carbon stock enhancement, an innovation that was dubbed redd+. the debate on whether or not to include cdm‟s afforestation and reforestation (creating or re-creating a forest) in redd is still ongoing. 5 for 2010 alone, we have compiled over 60 papers in international peer-reviewed journals such as science, global environmental change, ecological economics, environmental science and policy, climatic change, international environmental agreements, the journal of environment and development, etc. we therefore do not pretend to cover the entire literature base, but a selected sample. 4 consilience (foei, 2008, p. 9). influential reports have presented avoided deforestation as a cost effective mitigation option for climate change and a potential development opportunity since it would provide additional financial resources for national governments and local communities to invest in health, education and sustainable development (chomitz et al., 2007; eliasch, 2008; lubowski, 2008; murray et al., 2009; stern, 2006). while the prospective costs of deforestation‟s contribution to climate change have been estimated between $1 and $2 trillion usd annually (eliasch, 2008; lubowski, 2008; tavoni et al., 2007), the annual costs for halving emissions from forests could be in the range of us$7 to $33 billion, sums developing countries would receive for their efforts (eliasch, 2008; kindermann et al., 2008; torres et al., 2010). the message emanating from this body of work is that by preventing deforestation, global carbon emissions could be reduced significantly and at a lower cost, while simultaneously accomplishing important development objectives (eliasch, 2008; nepstad et al., 2009; stern, 2006; sohngen & sedjo, 2006).6 the mechanism‟s design will be crucial and there are high expectations amid heated debates. in general, redd can be seen as continuous with pes, with several specificities, such as scale and the focus on the carbon stocking function of trees, while pes may address different services and often focus on water. indeed, while being more specific, proposals for redd are based largely on experiences related to pes programs (perceived as highly promising) and the carbon offset market (not seen as very promising). however, the manner in which this basic idea will be applied under the redd mechanism has been highly disputed and intensely negotiated. many points of contention remain (alvarado & wertz-kanounnikoff, 2007; angelsen, 2008; densham et al., 2009; foei, 2008; karsenty & pirard, 2007), which can be summarized as follows. 2.1 funding several funding models have been proposed (karsenty, 2008), including a specialized public fund (brazil‟s proposal in 2006, also discussed by the stern review) (grasl et al., 2003; hoogeveen et al., 2008; viana, 2009) and a private, carbon market-based approach (icf international, 2009; loisel, 2008). a third option is to include both public and private funds in a hybrid or “basket” approach (thies & czebiniak, 2008). other concerns have involved prospects for long-term funding, phases of implementation, distribution and safeguards, and sensibility to carbon market variations (brown et al., 2009; minang & murphy, 2010). under the current negotiations, it appears that the framework would use a hybrid approach, with capacity-building funds available for start-up and financial links with the carbon market for scale-up (minang & murphy, 2010; unfccc, 2010; verchot & petkova, 2009). 2.2 scale different scales for implementation have been suggested as well. under currently agreed terms, countries would report to an international funding 6 to keep things in proportion, official development assistance from oecd countries is expected to reach us$126 billion in 2010 (oecd, 2010). consilience hufty et al.: redd mechanism (unfccc, 2010), although the financial mechanism and the reporting system still have to be designed (cop-16, 2010). the mechanism would mainly follow a national or country-driven approach: states will be responsible for the implementation of redd within their borders according to the principle of national sovereignty (anderson & richards, 2001; plantinga & richards, 2008; unfccc, 2010). this national model demonstrates another difference between redd and pes. the latter is mostly oriented toward local and regional projects or carbon sinks, financed by the market-based mechanisms of the kyoto protocol. redd would, in certain versions, allow compensations for the maintenance of protected forests. concrete redd projects would nevertheless be “sub-national” (santilli et al., 2005), and projects would be established on a small scale at the outset rather than immediately implemented nationwide. this combination is called the “nested” approach (angelsen et al., 2008; pedroni et al., 2009). the scale of redd raises issues such as leakage, additionality, permanence, scope, baseline, and monitoring, as well as effectiveness, capacity, and governance (angelsen et al., 2008; pedroni et al., 2009; densham et al., 2009). the national approach poses problems for countries with weak governance capacities or institutions (plantinga & richards, 2008), while a purely sub-national approach would risk leakage and raise questions of additionality and permanence (see below). further questions, such as the relationship between a redd carbon market and existing carbon markets, the question of which specific entities should manage redd funds and coordinate the many funds recently created (e.g. the oslo-paris redd partnership), and under what monitoring system this would occur, remain open. 2.3 leakage, additionality, and permanence leakage is a situation in which deforestation avoided in one area results in deforestation in another, whether within or between countries (plantinga & richards, 2008), which could severely undermine the effectiveness of redd (schwarze et al., 2003). additionality is the idea that reduction in deforestation should be greater than what would have occurred otherwise. a related concern is permanence, the maintenance of forests and their carbon sequestration capacities over time (dutschke & angelsen, 2008). insurance policies, temporary crediting, shared liability, longterm accounting, buffering and pooling of credits have been proposed to combat the possibilities of accidents like fires or pest invasion or incidences of deforestation once credits have been distributed (dutschke & angelsen, 2008; olander et al., 2009). 2.4 scope the activities and forests eligible for financing are debated. the model presently accepted by unfccc parties is an enlarged version of redd (“redd+”) that includes activities such as conservation, reforestation, afforestation and other forest enhancement activities rather than simply deforestation and forest degradation. as fao currently defines plantations as forests, a country could theoretically increase its forest area through plantations while deforesting its standing old-growth forests. this would distort some of redd‟s environmental co-benefits, including those linked to biodiversity conservation and sustainable development (van 6 consilience noordwijk & minang, 2009). as an answer to this concern, paragraph 2(e) of the annex i (guidance and safeguards) of the decision adopted in cop 16 states that redd actions should be consistent with the conservation of natural forests and not used for their conversion (unfccc, 2010). 2.5 baseline another concern in designing redd has been determining the “baseline” or “a level of emissions that would occur in the absence of a forest carbon policy and is used as a reference case for quantifying mitigation performance” (olander et al., 2009, p. 32). since baselines serve to assess the effectiveness of programs and allocation of emissions reduction credits, they have been a source of contention (olander et al., 2007). the use of historical deforestation to project deforestation rates (sathaye & andrasko, 2007; schlamadinger et al., 2005), or the use of “business-as-usual” projections (soares-filo et al., 2006) have been critiqued as perverse incentives encouraging adverse selection since those nations historically responsible for deforestation emissions are selected and rewarded rather than those who have historically left their forests intact (plantinga & richards, 2008). 2.6 monitoring a consensus has emerged that emissions reductions should be measurable, reportable, and verifiable (verchot & petkova, 2009), but verifying how much carbon is in fact sequestered and the effective reduction of deforestation is difficult. lack of transparency (anderson et al., 2009), overor under-estimations (balzter & shvidenko, 2000), and the cost and accuracy of current technologies (anderson et al., 2009; murray et al., 2009) are limiting factors. monitoring deforestation and degradation and evaluating the carbon sequestered have greatly improved with remote sensing (defries et al., 2006; gibbs et al., 2007). still, many questions remain, such as who should certify redd schemes, on what basis, with which techniques, and whether the capacity of developing countries to undertake the program‟s technical requirements and enforce restrictions is sufficient, even with capacitybuilding activities (westholm et al., 2009). most of the expansive, fast-growing body of literature has been dedicated to these questions, but it remains mainly prospective as relatively few field cases are available for early empirical assessment. in 2007 the unfccc called upon parties and international organizations to promote redd through capacity-building and demonstration activities. consequently, undp, unep, and fao created a program (un-redd) to help countries prepare themselves for implementing redd. to this end, the world bank also administers the forest carbon partnership facility (fcpf). this support has prompted the involvement of many new actors of different natures (ngos, private firms, research networks) in redd activities and the rapid emergence of redd experiments at the sub-national level. wertz-kanounnikoff and metta kongphan-apirak studied over one hundred pioneer redd projects underway and differentiated between redd-readiness activities (65 cases of legal and institutional preparation of national strategies) and “demonstration activities” (44 projects implemented on a field level) (2009). of the latter, half are located in indonesia, the country with the highest amount of greenhouse gas emissions sourced from deforestation, and they all are local and pioneer experiments. one year later, consilience hufty et al.: redd cerbu et al. surveyed 79 preparedness activities (national level) and a hundred demonstration activities (sub-national level), in 40 countries, most of which took place in brazil (17) and indonesia (22) (2010). the survey concluded that a bias exists for activities in latin america to the detriment of africa. factors such as prior experience, the quality of partnerships, the perceived threat to forests and biodiversity, and the quality of governance determine where projects are established. clearly, the number of redd projects are growing rapidly, a rush that could be harmful for the eventual social and even environmental impacts. additionally, the concentration of projects in specific regions could be detrimental to future design. if success is highly dependent on specific conditions, reproducibility upon scale-up and across different nations might not be feasible. 3. governance and social aspects the review of literature and research on redd reveals a clear gap on two issues: governance and social impacts. while governance and social aspects have been addressed in several studies and papers regarding redd, systematic, and evidence-based arguments are still lacking. governance includes the design of the mechanism at all levels, norms-setting procedures, related legal and informal institutional arrangements, and interactions between involved state and non-state actors. additionally, governance encompasses horizontal (within a given level of government) and vertical (across levels of government) links with other issue areas (e.g. biodiversity, finance, trade, etc.), existing policies and institutions at the international, national, or local levels (forsyth, 2009; minang & murphy, 2010; unfccc, 2006). in general, governance of forests is notoriously bad (hoogeven et al., 2008). during the last 10 years, efforts to slow deforestation rates globally have had little success (pfaff et al., 2004). estimates contend that deforestation rates will continue in all geographic areas (sathaye et al., 2007). much of the literature covering the governance of redd relates to comparing the effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness of the different proposed mechanisms like scale (clarke, 2010; kaimowitz, 2008; viana, 2009), funding designs (dooley et al., 2008; viana, 2009; hoogeveen et al., 2008; clarke, 2010), monitoring systems (lutrell et al., 2007; peskett & harkin, 2007), national forest policies, (funder, 2009), state and non-state actors, and barriers and opportunities on the local scale (scriven, 2009). while it appears that much of the „what‟ related to governance may have been resolved, the majority of the „how‟ is yet to be thoroughly investigated. government competence at the national level will be a key factor in the success of redd (peskett et al., 2008). a significant concern is the problem of sending large sums of money to governments with poor track records, low institutional and governance capacities and weak commitments to transparency, accountability, and participation (peskett et al., 2008; ebeling & yasue, 2008; westholm et al., 2009). some see redd as an opportunity to strengthen forest governance, institutions and capacities (tnc, 2009; olander et al., 2009). others have questioned the capacity of redd to produce such co-benefits (bullock et al., 2009; hall, 2008; livengood & dixon, 2009; redd monitor, 2009). 8 consilience investing in governance institutions, engaging the local communities and addressing their needs has proven crucial to reducing deforestation in protected areas (madeira, 2008). pes programs can be seen as indicating some of the effects of redd, and the evidence thus far suggests that these programs have a bias against the poorest of the poor, although it is not clear whether this is due to correlation with other targeting criteria of the programs or to barriers to participation linked to poverty (muñoz-piña et al., 2008; pagiola et al., 2007). conflict over local and community land tenure, restricted access to forest resources, and unfair distribution of carbon revenues have been identified as possible consequences of poorly designed forest carbon programs (olander et al., 2009). the effectiveness of pes schemes, conversely, have been shown to depend on an array of factors that enhance the role of the poor, such as community involvement, institutional and economic drivers, and resources for surveillance and policing (mertens et al., 2004). ensuring co-benefits could thus result in more efficient and effective programs (durbin, 2007; olander et al., 2009). a comprehensive, integrative approach with strong stakeholder participation may be more likely to address downfalls in redd programs, as well as ensure success by preventing carbon emissions. in effect, legitimacy is a condition for effectiveness. in addition to governance, another central challenge for realizing redd objectives is to ensure that social needs are met and sustained alongside the conservation of forests. the reduction of the biodiversity of forest areas, for instance, is a critical concern for redd. biodiversity is already under threat, as the millennium ecosystem assessment recorded in 2005. the assessment concluded that poor countries have made little progress in reaching the convention on biological diversity (cbd) objectives of conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. loss of biodiversity deprives people of ecosystem services worth us$250 billion annually worldwide (mea, 2005) and ecosystem services and other non-marketed goods are estimated to account for 47% to 89% percent of the gdp of the poor (teeb, 2009). poor people are most critically dependent on wellfunctioning natural environments for their survival (angelsen & wunder, 2003). the need to seek synergetic solutions for diverse social-environmental challenges is recognized in the report “the economics of ecosystems and biodiversity” (teeb, 2008, p. 16). the teeb study concludes that investing in the restoration and maintenance of the earth‟s ecosystems (valued at several trillion dollars) from forests and mangroves to wetlands and river basins can have a key role in countering climate change while providing ecosystem services necessary for the sustenance and vibrancy of human life. the teeb findings recognize that enhancing the resilience of ecosystems and maintaining the planet‟s biodiversity are key elements in mitigation and adaptation agendas, and are culturally and socially valuable to diverse groups of peoples (teeb, 2010). if redd were designed to contribute to the conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services by protecting vast areas of standing forest, it could contribute to guaranteeing long-held cultural practices and social benefits. aligning social and environmental goals to promote human well-being has always been and still is the weak link in implementing sustainable development and biodiversity conservation (gbo, 2010), and redd is no exception. the appeal of redd for many of its advocates has been the prospect of significant “co-benefits” for indigenous people and other forest dwellers in terms of development and consilience hufty et al.: redd livelihoods (brown et al., 2008), but fears about local rights, unfairness, impacts on development, land use, livelihoods and food production have driven critiques of redd (griffiths, 2007). whether conservation and social goals can be achieved simultaneously is debated (newmark & hough, 2000; adams et al., 2004; barrett et al., 2005). many authors have recorded how local and indigenous people have suffered under previous conservation schemes, whether due to forced resettlement from protected areas (adams & hutton, 2007; agrawal & redford, 2009; bray & velazquez, 2009; colchester, 1997; dowie, 2009; krueger, 2009; schmidt-soltau, 2003), inadequate compensation for limitations on natural resource access (peters, 1998; shyamsundar & kramer, 1996), or the exacerbation of local conflicts (agrawal & gibson, 1999; koch, 1997). moreover, evidence from benefit-sharing schemes based on forest taxes or other revenues that were intended to be pro-poor have not been particularly successful (bond et al., 2009); these revenues have often not reached the intended beneficiaries (bandyopadhyay et al., 2008; egbe, 2001; frost & bond, 2008), or have had only modest impacts on livelihoods (bond & mayers, 2009; porras et al., 2008). given this history, many questions and concerns related to the impacts of redd have emerged, but most recent literature is composed of preventive denunciations and policy recommendations. in responding to these concerns, research relies primarily on projections or hypotheses for the scheme, economic modeling, historical examples from pes or other conservation-development projects, or the few empirical examples existing to date, notably the noel kempf project in bolivia (densham et al., 2009; griffiths, 2007; tnc, 2009). because of these methods and the limited information available until now, much of the work related to these concerns simply raises many more questions than answers. 4. gaps in the literature the narrow breadth of literature covering the design of redd means we are still speculating about how redd will be governed and what prospective effects it will produce in terms of development, livelihoods, human rights, and equity. these issues are critical, as an estimated 1.6 billion people, 60 million of whom are indigenous people, depend on forests for their survival (cbd, 2009; wb, 2004). but as the literature stands now, much more information is needed in order to design redd properly in these terms; little attention has been given to the social dimension of any of the proposals being made to address climate change and forest protection. among the main social issues requiring investigation are rights, development and equity. 4.1 rights, local and indigenous peoples, and land tenure widespread concerns relate to the impact of redd on local and indigenous people‟s rights, most particularly their right to land (butler, 2008; castro diaz, 2008; griffiths, 2007; peskett et al., 2008). funder hypothesizes that the implementation of redd could be good or bad for local peoples, either solidifying recognition for their right to land or ignoring and abusing such rights (2009). according to its promoters, the noel kempff project in bolivia demonstrated that redd can reinforce and augment certain customary property rights (tnc, 2009). however, most of the literature questions this assertion. weak land rights can potentially create 10 consilience or exacerbate local conflicts and leave local people open to manipulation (mayers et al., 2006). cotula and mayers lay out the complexity and variability of land tenure issues that redd will affect, emphasizing the past failures of benefit-sharing schemes associated with forests (2009). similarly, bond et al. look at pes schemes worldwide and observe their potential for weakening land and resource rights (2009). the risk is that redd schemes may result in governments, companies, conservation ngos or speculators carving up forest lands, along with forest protection approaches that marginalize rather than empower forest people through the recentralization of forest governance (phelps et al., 2010; sikor et al., 2010). another worry is that redd may lead to what have been known as “land grabs” (castro diaz, 2008; griffith, 2007; peskett et al., 2008; robledo et al., 2008). land grabs and the re-zoning of forest land by external actors without the participation of local people have been directly observed (griffith, 2007). castro diaz demonstrates how indigenous people have been left out of negotiations related to redd projects (2008). the recent case of papua new guinea further illustrates the importance of clear and enforced land rights (melick, 2010; mongobay, 2010; palmer, 2010). weak land tenure and associated problems also potentially play a negative role in poverty alleviation, for if payments depend on owning land, it is likely that they will not go primarily to poor people, even if they go to poor areas (kerr et al., 2004; grieg-gran, forthcoming). 4.2 development there is a general hope that redd funds could contribute to providing the resources needed for economic growth and development (olander & murray, 2007). according to patanayak et al., protecting forests in brazil could equilibrate the distribution of income, health and education in favor of rural residents (2009). for example, watershed pes schemes have demonstrated significant potential for impacting poverty (bond & mayers, 2009; bond et al., 2009; porras et al., 2008). but this enthusiasm is tempered by many interrogations based on earlier experiences. several issues must be addressed regarding the injection of large sums of money into national economies. implementing the program on a large scale implies opportunity costs and a reorientation of economic activities based on forest exploitation (chomitz, 1999; chomitz et al., 2007; grieg-gran, forthcoming). the dependence on one source of revenue, comparable to external aid, has been highlighted, as well as the danger of provoking “dutch disease” (the distortion of an economy due to high dependence on one economic sector) (peskett et al., 2008). the possible impacts on internal prices for food or energy could produce depressive macro-level employment effects (bond et al., 2009) and be detrimental to the poorest communities. ebeling & yasue correlate human development indicators (hdis) with areas likely to benefit from redd schemes and find that the program will most likely not target the regions with the direst human development needs (2008). griffiths foresees an unequal imposition of costs for the protection of forests onto local communities and indigenous peoples, underlined and enforced by inequitable and abusive contracts; he notes that the socioeconomic situation has sometimes worsened under these programs (2007). one of the most spectacular gaps in the related literature is an almost complete absence of interconnection between redd and the abundant consilience hufty et al.: redd development literature. one reason may be the divide among technical domains. since most of the redd literature concerns forestry, finance and technical issues, its authors tend not to be development experts. it appears that for some authors, redd would emerge in a virgin world where everything is to be reinvented, whereas many of the issues facing redd implementation are in fact well-known development problems. building on the lessons learned in development over the last 50 years would probably avoid much disappointment and resource waste. 4.3 equity closely linked to the issue of poverty alleviation are concerns related to equity and whether redd will instigate capture and control by the elite, to the detriment of those with less power and resources, as has been the case with other conservation schemes (balint & mashinya, 2006; fritzen, 2007; kellert et al., 2000; thompson & homewood, 2002). sommerville et al. hypothesize that redd will benefit the elite more than the non-elite and that the failure to consider fairness and distribution issues can undermine pes or other conservation projects (2009). cotula & mayers observe that as the value of the standing forest increases, powerful actors look to gain power over these carbon-based assets, often to the detriment of the less powerful, arguing that elite capture and misappropriation of the funds are potential byproducts of redd funding (2009). opportunity and transactions costs have also been linked to inequity and the perception of fairness of distribution (adhikari, 2005; kumar, 2002). bond et al. question the possibility that local peoples can participate as equals in selling carbon, emphasizing the potential for divergence in equity of payment levels and other terms due to negotiating capacity (2009). 5. conclusion the literature suggests major gaps in the way redd is studied. the first and most salient gap is the absence of sustained analysis on the social impact of implementing redd over the long term. this gap stems from the fact that most of the empirical studies conducted so far focus on how to make redd work to reduce deforestation and channel funds to developing countries rather than the problems that such mechanisms, even if fulfilling the two aforementioned objectives, would pose from a social perspective. conversely, the literature that does emphasize the potentially adverse social impact of redd tends to be rather normative, condemning redd as a dangerous and manipulative tool rather than objectively assessing its positive and negative contributions and proposing means to adjust it. if redd is to become a socially acceptable large-scale mechanism for fighting climate change, managing forests and transferring resources, lessons must be learned from both earlier experiences (forest governance mechanisms, carbon sinks, pes) and from experimental redd projects implemented thus far. whereas forest conservation mechanisms have often required important legal reforms, most notably with respect to land apportionment and distribution, there is little material on how such reforms affect the human rights of both indigenous peoples (with non-formal entitlements to their traditional land) and other sectors of the population (with property and social rights, including access to unemployment benefits in case of relocation or professional re-orientation from forest-based activities to other sectors). earlier experiences would suggest that if redd were to 12 consilience fulfill the expectations of both developing (regarding funding) and developed countries (regarding cheaper emission reductions), such results would come at the price of considerable social costs. the extent to which such costs may be worth bearing in light of the potential benefits from the implementation of redd is a matter requiring empirical assessment. the second gap concerns the link between the operation of redd schemes and governance structures. the lion‟s share of the literature focuses on those mechanisms that would be effective in making redd work from the perspective of emissions reduction and financing. some authors also mention the difficulties arising from implementing a complex system in countries and/or regions with a substantial governance deficit, but such difficulties are seldom, if ever, studied empirically. the experience of other forest-related mechanisms is typically brought to bear to shed light on the link between redd and governance. however, the particular features of those other forest-related mechanisms make such assessments difficult to transpose. only through an empirical assessment of ongoing redd projects will it be possible to understand the link between redd and governance structures. based on the unprecedented crisis of climate change and the apparent consensus of the unfccc parties on this mechanism, redd could be the first successful attempt to govern the forests at a global scale and to do so in a socially acceptable way. but with the mechanism as it stands, and with insufficient research to improve it, redd could also constitute a missed opportunity to address these issues. there is still time to address these shortcomings and design redd appropriately. consilience hufty et al.: redd bibliography adams, w.a. & j. hutton. 2007. people, parks and poverty: political ecology and biodiversity conservation. conservation and society 5 (2): 147-183. adams, w.m., r. aveling, et al. 2004. biodiversity conservation and the eradication of poverty. science 306 (5699): 1146–1149. adhikari, b. 2005. poverty, property rights and collective action: 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castro diaz, e. 2008. climate change, forest conservation and indigenous peoples rights. paper prepared for the global forest coalition for the international expert group meeting on indigenous peoples and climate change, darwin, australia, 2–4 april. cbd (secretariat of the convention on biological diversity). 2009. sustainable forest management, biodiversity and livelihoods: a good practice guide. montreal: cbd secretariat. chhatre, a. & a. agrawal. 2009. trade-offs and synergies between carbon storage and livelihood benefits from forest commons. proceedings of the national academy of sciences 106 (42): 17667-17670. chomitz, k. 1999. evaluating carbon offsets from forestry and energy projects: how do they compare? policy research working paper. washington: world bank. http://news.mongabay.com/2008/1117-png.html consilience hufty et al.: redd chomitz, k.m., p. buys, g. de luca, t.s. thomas & s. wertz-kanounnikoff. 2007. at loggerheads. agricultural expansion, poverty reduction and 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bogor: cifor. westholm, l., s. henders, m. ostwald & e. mattsson. 2009. assessment of existing global financial initiatives and monitoring aspects of carbon sinks in forest ecosystems: the issue of redd. focali report. wilson, e. o. 1992. the diversity of life. cambridge: belknap press of harvard university. wunder, s. 2006. the efficiency of payments for environmental services in tropical conservation. conservation biology 21 (1): 48-58. wunder, s., s. engel & s. pagiola. 2008. taking stock: a comparative analysis of payments for environmental services programs in developed and developing countries. ecological economics 65 (4): 834-852. note from the editor-in-chief note from the editor-in-chief https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i6.4572 how to cite subramanyan, v. (2011). note from the editor-in-chief. consilience, (6). https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i6.4572 abstract dear readers, it is my privilege to present you issue 6 of consilience. our editorial board has been working tirelessly through the late spring and summer to put this issue together, which at 319 pages is by far our longest and most ambitious issue. it is also a very international issue, as we published submissions from five continents, from norway to uganda, on topics as diverse as fisheries management, malarial vaccination resistance and the validity of economic measures. impressive statistics aside, we are proud to remain a student-run journal that showcases work by a range of authors, including undergraduate and graduate students, scholars and members of the broader sustainable development community, on a wide array of topics. i would like to take this opportunity to offer a few thanks: to our absolutely fantastic editorial team, whose intelligence and dedication continue to inspire me; to our outgoing editor-in-chief and managing editor, monica varman and delphia polle, for their tireless dedication toconsilience; to our incoming leadership team, felipe goncalves, jodie liu and kelsey umemoto, for their constant effort on this issue. i offer a large thanks to our authors, whose effort is the substance of this journal. and, finally, to you, our readers, who have helped spread word of consilience to far-flung corners of the world. our presence as a leading, student-driven voice on the global stage is very much due to you. as we continue to expand the range of media which we use to publish interdisciplinary research at the cutting edge of the field, i encourage you to continue engaging with us. enjoy the issue! vighnesh subramanyan editor-in-chief https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i6.4572 consilience: the journal of sustainable development august 30, 2011 this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution 4.0 international license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ note from the editor-in-chief ​​​ abstract microsoft word 02112008 bohl ethics of physician migration.doc 1 the ethics of physician migration and the implications for the united states daniel d. bohl1 abstract: currently, the united states trains only three quarters of the physicians it requires to fill its entrylevel residency positions. the other quarter of residents employed by its hospitals is composed of immigrants who have been trained in other countries. this reliance of our healthcare system on foreign physicians puts a tremendous strain on the healthcare systems of developing nations. at the same time, by replacing american medical school graduates with graduates of foreign schools, the policy prevents a significant number of americans who desire to practice medicine from doing so. an alarming shortage of physicians by the year 2020 has been forecasted. discussion of how this shortage will be addressed is long overdue. the options are clear: either the united states can increase its dependence on foreign medical training programs or it can expand its own. it should choose the latter. 1 daniel bohl is a biological sciences major, global health studies minor at northwestern university in evanston, il. he will graduate in june of 2008 and subsequently begin a master’s program in international health policy at the london school of economics. he can be contacted at dbohl@northwestern.edu. 2 introduction: professional migration has been an on-and-off topic for several decades. recently, a new debate with respect to physicians has brought the topic once again into the spotlight. there is no question that professional migration is harmful to developing nations. their governments make investments in the education of their people, only to have those people (and the investments in them) leave to pay off somewhere else. for the most part, however, there is a consensus among scholars that none of the actions on the parts of any of the parties involved are unethical; these arguments are justified by invoking the rights to the freedom of movement and the freedom of trade. however, this paper argues that with respect to physician migration, one action taken by developed nations is unethical: developed nations intentionally generating a demand for physicians from developing nations. developed nations, it will argue, should expand their physician training programs to generate enough physicians so that the luring of human capital from developing nations is no longer necessary. while physician migration is obviously a very complex issue with work required from many different parties for a total solution, this paper decidedly limits its scope to the development of a policy prescription to the united states. the paper will begin with a summary of the current international situation, its causes, its consequences, and its projected future. this summary will serve as background for a discussion on the ethics surrounding the issue. finally, the conclusions of this discussion will be applied to the policies of the united states government. background: physician migration and imbalance: causes, consequences, and future when, in a classroom of ghanaian medical students in accra, students were asked how many of them would like to go abroad for further study after graduation, virtually every hand went up. when they were asked how many thought they would later return home, half of the students’ hands went back down.2 a great number of the student-physicians in which ghana invests do not intend ever to practice in ghana; instead, they envision their futures in new york, london, and chicago. a total of one half of ghanaian physicians practice abroad, with 20% in the united states and another 10% in the united kingdom.3,4 ghana is not unlike other developing nations: 70% of physicians trained by zimbabwe in the 1990s have since left.5 60% of liberia’s physicians practice in the united states or the united kingdom.6 120,000 doctors currently address the needs of the 900 million people on 2 mullan f. (2007). doctors and soccer players – african professionals on the move. new england journal of medicine. 356;6. 3 mullan f. (2007). doctors and soccer players – african professionals on the move. new england journal of medicine. 356;6. 4 teferra d. (2000). revisiting the doctrine of human capital mobility in the information age. regional conference on brain drain and capacity building in africa. february 22-24. economic commission for africa, iom, international development research centre: addis ababa, ethiopia. 5 saravia ng, miranda jf. (2004). plumbing the brain drain. bulletin of the world health organization. 82:608-615. 6 gupta r, hotez p. (2006). rethinking global health training in north america. medscape general medicine. 8(3);47. 3 continent of africa, a physician to population ratio of 13 to 100,000.7 the number of physicians in the united states, the united kingdom, canada, and australia per 100,000 population are 293, 231, 220, and 271, respectively, approximately 20 times higher than the african physician population ratio. the causes of physician migration the push. conditions in which doctors working in developing nations live and practice contribute to their desires to leave. some of the conditions regularly cited include financial insecurity, political instability, and inadequate educational institutions for their children. physicians practicing in low-income countries also receive relatively low compensation and must deal with shortages of supplies and extremely high workloads. opportunities for continued education within those countries are sparse. the pull. a great attractive force draws physicians towards developed nations. the contrasts abound: physicians who migrate to developed nations share in the higher standard of living of those nations and benefit from greater financial and political stability; their children receive a better education and have greater professional opportunities; the relative abundance of high-tech equipment, medical supplies, and support staff; a much better physician to patient ratio make for far more satisfactory work conditions; and opportunities for continued education are widely available. a second factor is a necessary contributor to the pull: high physician demand in the physicianreceiving country. this demand exists in developed nations including the united states, the united kingdom, canada, and australia because these countries consistently train fewer physicians each year than their healthcare systems require. they do so because allowing already trained physicians to cross their borders is less expensive than training physicians domestically. the influx of already-trained physicians represents an influx of human capital with no monetary exchange. this induced shortage draws in physicians from less developed nations all over the world. the consequences of physician migration and imbalance for developing nations. as stated, 50% of ghana’s physicians currently work abroad. while these doctors make up only small percentages of the workforces of the developed countries in which they practice, they comprise a tremendous loss to ghana’s increasingly strained healthcare system. the major consequence of this loss is a dramatic decrease in the availability and quality of healthcare. fewer doctors means fewer patient visits, less time with patients, more expensive care, and higher rates of disease. the second consequence is the loss of considerable investment on the part of developing nations. while not always a tremendous loss in income for a developing nation due to the significant amount of money that finds its way back in the form of remittances, an individual migration always represents a tremendous loss in human capital. the united nations commission for trade and development estimates that each professional leaving africa costs the continent us$ 184,000.8 this is money lost by healthcare 7 rodnick je. (2006). africa: some thoughts on the medical brain drain. family medicine. 38;1 8 marchal b, kegels g. (2003). health workforce imbalances in times of globalization: brain drain or professional mobility?. international journal of health planning and management. 18:s89-s101. 4 systems that could be better spent on desperately needed medical supplies and support staff, and it is money that could be better spent on training physicians to practice at home. for developed nations. ironically, the countries with the strongest healthcare systems benefit from physician migration. developed nations save millions of dollars by relying on foreign-trained physicians to fill the gap between the number they need and the number they train. the future of physician migration studies forecast shortages of as many as 20% of physicians in the developed world by 2020 or 20259. this represents 40 times the current yearly immigration rate. while decisions on how to manage these shortages have not yet been made, the choices presented to developed nations are clear and defined: developed nations must either expand their physician training programs or increase their reliance on the workforces of developing nations. the ethics of physician migration: physicians as human capital on the free market to talk about physicians on the free market may not be entirely appropriate, but it does provide a useful framework for a discussion of their demand, as well as for the investments made in their training and practice. no country wants to train doctors. for wealthy nations, it is cheaper to allow them in from poorer ones; for poorer nations, it is extremely costly to have them leave for wealthier ones. with demand for physicians high in both groups, the wealthier nations with the thicker pocketbooks receive a major influx. in contrast, developing nations are left to train a higher number each year in order to retain a suitable workforce. this is a win-lose situation for the nations involved, not an equal exchange, because, unlike in free trade involving goods, developed nations do not pay developing nations upon acquiring their ‘product.’ these investments pay out only if the resultant capital remains in the investing country. when developed nations acquire the workers of developing ones, they essentially deprive developing countries of these investments. however, specific rights of developed nations justify this seeming robbery in the instance that it is not pre-meditated. in other words, developed nations have a right to be self-serving when they find themselves in need, and they have a right to see unanticipated shortages in their workforce corrected. in times of shortage, developed nations are justified in allowing foreign physicians to fill their gaps, even if it means drawing from more needy developing ones. the direct harm principle. while it may be ethical for developed nations to fill unanticipated physician shortages because of their right to self-service in a time of need, it is not ethical for them to use physician immigration as a long-term, cost-cutting solution. the direct harm principle makes this dependence unethical. in other words, the free market is allowed to run “free” except when it causes direct harm to individuals. for example, the drug trade (both 9 cooper, ra. (2002). economic and demographic trends signal an impending physician shortage. health affairs. 21;1. 5 legal and illegal) is regulated everywhere, and the sale of organs is prohibited in nations around the world. these regulations of the free market protect one or more of the parties involved in the would-be transaction. the emigration of physicians, unlike that of other professionals, causes a direct and immediate harm to individuals. physicians are direct caregivers. when a physician leaves, individuals who desperately need treatment go without the very services they need. the people of developing nations are directly and immediately harmed by the action of the free market. regulation of the free market in this situation is consistent with regulation in other instances. physicians as immigrants immigration is tolerated when the economy is strong, jobs are in surplus, and human labor is in need. employed by the businesses of developed nations, immigrants provide the economies of those nations with the means by which to grow. on the other hand, when the economy is weaker and unemployment is high, immigration takes on a different light. many nationals accurately perceive it as an influx of foreign workers who will compete for jobs. during these times, immigration law takes a more conservative stance: policies are tightened and immigration is restricted. in this sense, the “economy” is “strong” right now from the perspective of physicians in the developed world. there is a high demand/supply ratio for their service. in response, developed nations have opened their doors to immigrant doctors in order to fill their shortages and satisfy the needs of their publics. this is entirely consistent with immigration policy in other spheres and with that which is generally accepted. however, while the demand/supply ratio for trained physicians is high, that ratio for another group of nationals, domestic premedical students, is, in contrast, low. in the united states, for example, medical school admissions rates are as low as 3%, with less than half of applicants accepted annually to the schools to which they apply.10 these 21to 30-year-olds desire nothing greater than to help fill their nations’ physician shortages. yet, there are not enough spaces in medical school classes to allow them to do so. medical school admission is the bottleneck that prevents these nationals from getting work. by replacing would-be domestic medical school graduates in the workforce, immigrant doctors essentially impede potential medical students from obtaining employment. as discussed, situations that result in competition between immigrants and domestic workers generally result in a tightening of immigration policy designed to protect the jobs of nationals. the requirements of current physician workforce demand and medical student workforce demand directly conflict. high demand for physicians requires immigration law to relax to increase the number of physicians. yet, low demand for medical students requires the opposite to happen to ensure that young nationals are not put out of work. how can these two requirements be reconciled? 10 applicants, accepted applicants, and matriculates by sex, 1995-2006. (2007). american association of medical colleges. retrieved may 28, 2007, from http://www.aamc.org/data/facts/2006/2006school.htm. 6 governments must first ensure that more domestic premedical students are admitted into the physician workforce through the expansion of medical schools. in other words, it is the responsibility of a government to first find jobs for its own citizens. nonetheless, medical school expansion and physician training are slow, so the increase in physicians will not be felt in the workforce for a number of years. during these years, the immigration of foreign doctors is acceptable because it does not compete with domestic medical school admissions. once the result of training expansion is felt, immigration policy should be tightened so that medical school admissions can be kept at a maximum. the government can and should use physician immigration to satisfy short-term need, but over the long run, the government should protect the jobs of nationals by expanding medical school classes and replacing the immigration of foreign-trained physicians with the resulting increase in domestic graduates. discussion: the two ethical analyses conclude that, while it is ethically acceptable for developed nations to draw on the supply of physicians from developing nations to fill unanticipated, short-term shortages, it is not acceptable for them to do so as part of a premeditated, cost-saving strategy that puts would-be physician-nationals out of work. rather, developed nations should expand their physician training programs so that the luring of human capital and replacement of nationals in the workforce is no-longer necessary. impending physician shortage the last major debate over physician shortages took place in the 1950s and 1960s. this debate, instigated through the education assistance act of 1963, led to the opening of forty-three new medical schools between 1956 and 1980. during this time, the number of first-year enrolled students more than doubled from approximately 8,000 to 16,590.11,12 in the early 1980s, the academic pendulum swung in the other direction. a major physician surplus was forecasted to present itself with the new millennium.13,14 the federal government responded by drastically cutting funding for medical education. medical schools stopped growing their class sizes and the number of enrolled students entered a period of zero growth that would last for the next twenty years.15 however, the forecasted surplus did not materialize with the onset of the new millennium. in fact, demand for physicians remained high. this startling result prompted the undertaking of new modeling projects that have forecasted not a surplus but an alarming shortage over the next twenty years. one of these new studies published in 2002 predicts a shortage of as many as 200,000 doctors, or 20% of the 11 cooper, ra. (2002). economic and demographic trends signal an impending physician shortage. health affairs. 21;1. 12 u.s. medical school applicants and students, 1982-83 to 2006-2007. (2007). american association of medical schools. retrieved on may 29, 2007, from www.aamc.org/data/facts/start.html. 13 summary report of the graduate medical education national advisory committee. (1980). vol 1. washington, dc: government printing office. 14 graduate medical education national advisory committee to the secretary, department of health and human services. (1981). washington: us department of health and human services. 15 cooper, ra. (2002). economic and demographic trends signal an impending physician shortage. health affairs. 21;1. 7 physician workforce by 2020 or 2025.16 the authors expect that this shortage will be felt both in specialties and in primary care. since the release of this compelling evidence, the major interested advisory groups have all reversed their opinions. both the american medical association (ama) and the association of american medical colleges have stated their belief that the previously feared surpluses are not likely to materialize17,18 and the council on graduate medical education (cogme) has reversed its stance entirely, declaring instead that physician shortages are imminent.19 the response of other developed nations predictions of shortages are not unique to the situation in the united states. similar shortages are predicted in the united kingdom, canada and australia. but these countries, unlike the united states, are actively addressing the issue. the united kingdom plans to expand its physician training20. in addition, canada has announced plans to open two new medical schools;21 and australia is expanding its medical school capacity by thirty percent.22 why the united states must act now unless the united states plans to fill this yearly physician shortage with a significantly higher proportion of foreign-educated physicians over the long-term, policymakers must act now to expand the nation’s training programs. if they do not act, two decades from now an additional twenty percent of the new physicians each year will need to come from foreign programs, making the total figure fifty percent. the issue is particularly pressing because of the delay between the action taken to expand training and the resulting increase in the supply of physicians available to the public. the education assistance act of 1963 led to the last major increase in physician training and to a nearly doubling in medical school seats. yet, it was fifteen years after that legislation was passed before an appreciable increase in the amount of physicians were available to the public. experts doubt that this process could occur anymore quickly today.23 with major shortages predicted fifteen years out, now is the time to act. conclusion: 16 ibid. 17 ama revises policy to address continued demand for physicians. (2003). american medical association. press release. december 9. 18 consensus statement on physician workforce. (1997). american association of colleges of osteopathic medicine, american medical association, american osteopathic association, association of academic health centers, association of american medical colleges, national medical association. washington, dc: association of american medical colleges. 19 reassessing physician workforce policy guidelines for the us 2000-2020. (2003). council on graduate medical education. us department of health and human services. 20 cooper, ra. (2004). weighing the evidence for expanding physician supply. annals of internal medicine. 141:705-714. 21 chan b. (2003). physician workforce planning: what have we learned? lessons for planning medical school capacity and img policies. the canadian perspective. proceedings of the 7th international medical workforce conference, 11-14 september. oxford, united kingdom. 22 gavel p. (2003). physician workforce planning: what have we learned? an australian perspective. proceedings of the 7th international medical workforce conference, 11-14 september. oxford, united kingdom. 23 cooper, ra. (2002). economic and demographic trends signal an impending physician shortage. health affairs. 21;1. 8 both because it causes a direct harm to individuals in great need and because immigrant physicians replace americans in their own job market, united states policymakers must take action to reduce the country’s dependence on physicians trained in other countries. the only ethical solution is to expand domestic physician training. in order for the effects of this policy to be felt before the physician shortage gets too severe, action must be taken immediately. the inaction of united states policymakers with respect to this issue represents a failure on their part, but the united states remains in a position to act. policymakers should immediately pass legislation similar to that passed in 1963 that would facilitate the training of more united states medical students and reduce its dependence on physicians trained in the developing world. references: ama revises policy to address continued demand for physicians. (2003). american medical association. press release. december 9. applicants, accepted applicants, and matriculates by sex, 1995-2006. (2007). american association of medical colleges. retrieved may 28, 2007, from http://www.aamc.org/data/facts/2006/2006school.htm. u.s. medical school applicants and students, 1982-83 to 2006-2007. (2007). american association of medical schools. retrieved on may 29, 2007, from www.aamc.org/data/facts/start.html. consensus statement on physician workforce. (1997). american association of colleges of osteopathic medicine, american medical association, american osteopathic association, association of academic health centers, association of american medical colleges, national medical association. washington, dc: association of american medical colleges. chan b. (2003). physician workforce planning: what have we learned? lessons for planning medical school capacity and img policies. the canadian perspective. proceedings of the 7th international medical workforce conference, 11-14 september. oxford, united kingdom. cooper, ra. (2002). economic and demographic trends signal an impending physician shortage. health affairs. 21;1. ___________ (2004). weighing the evidence for expanding physician supply. annals of internal medicine. 141:705-714. gavel p. (2003). physician workforce planning: what have we learned? an australian perspective. proceedings of the 7th international medical workforce conference, 11-14 september. oxford, united kingdom. graduate medical education national advisory committee to the secretary, department of health and human services. (1981). washington: us department of health and human services. gupta r, hotez p. (2006). rethinking global health training in north america. medscape general medicine. 8(3);47. marchal b, kegels g. (2003). health workforce imbalances in times of globalization: brain drain or professional mobility?. international journal of health planning and management. 18:s89-s101. 9 mullan f. (2007). doctors and soccer players – african professionals on the move. new england journal of medicine. 356;6. reassessing physician workforce policy guidelines for the us 2000-2020. (2003). council on graduate medical education. us department of health and human services. rodnick je. (2006). africa: some thoughts on the medical brain drain. family medicine. 38;1 saravia ng, miranda jf. (2004). plumbing the brain drain. bulletin of the world health organization. 82:608615. summary report of the graduate medical education national advisory committee. (1980). vol 1. washington, dc: government printing office. teferra d. (2000). revisiting the doctrine of human capital mobility in the information age. regional conference on brain drain and capacity building in africa. february 22-24. economic commission for africa, iom, international development research centre: addis ababa, ethiopia. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 6, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 264–279 livelihood and conservation in guinea-bissau’s national parks: a photographic essay alexandre abreu school of oriental and african studies university of london, united kingdom alexjabreu@gmail.com abstract guinea-bissau is one of the poorest countries in the world, but has a wealth of biodiversity. in this context, a particularly interesting case study is the urok maritime community protected area, whose creation in 2005 involved the setting up of multi-scalar governance structures and mechanisms that have fostered participatory democracy. many eyes are set on this experiment in the political ecology of conservation. author’s note alexandre abreu is a phd candidate at the school of oriental and african studies (university of london) and a researcher at the centre for geographical studies (university of lisbon). he has taught, done fieldwork or worked as a development consultant in guinea-bissau, portugal, the united kingdom and east timor. keywords: guinea-bissau, cantanhez, national parks, conservation, participatory democracy, multi-scalar governance structures. 1. introduction a small west african country lying in the transition zone between arid grassland and tropical forestland, guinea-bissau comprises several characteristic biotopes, from mangroves and palm tree forests to the guinean savannah-forest mosaic. in addition to their importance as a source of human livelihood, many of these areas are home to a variety of important and protected species, including saltwater hippos, manatees, elephants, chimpanzees, and rare bird and plant species. with the stated aim of ensuring the protection of biodiversity and the rational and equitable use of natural resources, five natural parks and protected areas, covering a total area of around 5,000 km2, were established in the early 2000s. the establishment of a sixth one, cantanhez forest, is currently underway. all of these areas have long been inhabited with varying but moderate density by human communities, mostly belonging to the country’s various animist ethnic groups. it is usually the case that rules governing the management of natural resources have endogenously evolved within these communities and gradually acquired a sacred character. the dynamic balance in terms of the relationship between local human consilience abreu: conservation in guinea-bissau communities and nature has therefore long rested on a complex set of norms, practices and rituals that may include, for example, the rotating use of uninhabited islands for rice cultivation, or the interdiction of selling or trading in molluscs. that this dynamic balance is being increasingly subject to exogenous strains, not least by virtue of climate change, population increase and the creation and penetration of markets, is part of the reason behind the creation of the protected areas. however, the relationship between the practices and norms of the local communities and the conservation regulations and mechanisms laid down by the state is itself not always harmonious, and the conflicts that sometimes arise can enormously increase the difficulty of reconciling conservation objectives with the interests of the human communities that inhabit these areas. moreover, guinea-bissau is one of the poorest countries in the world, and its state capacity is significantly constrained by the slim tax base, the lack of an adequately trained and motivated bureaucracy, and the dismantling of government structures in the context of the structural adjustment programmes, in the late 1980s. it is therefore not surprising that the government faces a tremendous capability gap when it comes not only to upholding conservation regulations, but also to engaging local communities in decision-making processes and providing compensation mechanisms that might ensure more favourable outcomes. in this context, a particularly interesting case is that of the urok maritime community protected area, whose creation in 2005 involved the setting up of multiscalar governance structures and mechanisms that have fostered participatory democracy in this island complex and thereby seemingly enhanced the park’s beneficial impact for the resident population. many eyes are set on this experiment in the political ecology of conservation, in the hope that it might not only advance the twin aims of ecological conservation and livelihood advancement, but also add to the pool of knowledge available to others on how to do it. 266 consilience 2. essay photo 1: rapids on the corubal river at saltinho the chief features of the physical geography of guinea-bissau are its rivers, estuaries and low-lying plains. the corubal river, seen here in the vicinity of the lagoas de cufada natural park, provides food, irrigation and transport to the communities that live near its shores. consilience abreu: conservation in guinea-bissau photo 2: full moon over the city of cacheu cacheu was once the capital of the portuguese colony of guinea-bissau. the city’s political and economic significance has consistently waned since those days, but from 2000 onwards it has housed the headquarters of the tarrafes do rio cacheu natural park. photo 3: felupe celebration in bolor, tarrafes do rio cacheu natural park 268 consilience the tarrafes do rio cacheu natural park constitutes a part of the homeland of the felupe (also known as diola) ethnic group, which straddles northern guinea-bissau and southern senegal. like most other guinea-bissau’s ethnic groups inhabiting the coastal areas, the felupe are animists. photo 4: docking area in bolor, tarrafes do rio cacheu natural park the predominant ecosystem in the tarrafes do rio cacheu natural park consists of mangrove, of which the park comprises the largest uninterrupted block in west africa. mangrove is seen here on the left and in the background, behind a baobab tree. consilience abreu: conservation in guinea-bissau photo 5: portrait of felupe young men during a celebration in bolor, tarrafes do rio cacheu natural park pursuing objectives and fulfilling expectations on the interface between an evolving ‘tradition’ and encroaching ‘modernity’ poses significant challenges to local youths. 270 consilience the prospects of a better life in bissau, or in more developed senegal to the north, constitute a powerful attraction for many. photo 6: felupe elders in bolor, tarrafes do rio cacheu natural park among guinea-bissau’s animist ethnic groups, including the felupe, initiation rituals and ceremonies constitute key milestones in the individual’s life cycle. on certain occasions, these rituals involve entering the forest for extended periods, during which youth are trained and socialised by elders invested with specific socialceremonial roles. consilience abreu: conservation in guinea-bissau photo 7: meio island, joão vieira-poilão natural park the bolama-bijagós archipelago, which was awarded the status of unesco biosphere reserve in 1995, comprises three of the country’s natural parks or reserves: joão vieira-poilão, orango and urok. the joão vieira-poilão maritime natural park, which includes meio island (seen here), is considered the most important nesting site in the eastern atlantic for the green sea turtle (chelonya midas). photo 8: bijagós children in canhabaque, bijagós archipelago 272 consilience although the island of canhabaque is not officially a part of the joão vieira-poilão natural park, the two areas maintain very close social-ecological linkages: traditional ownership and management of the natural resources in the islands that comprise the joão vieira-poilão natural park rest with four autochthonous communities based on the island of canhabaque. photo 9: children by the fire in cantanhez forest with an estimated population of about 20,000 people, cantanhez forest is the most heavily populated of all the areas subject to conservation intervention in guineabissau. by virtue of its remoteness and inaccessibility, it also experiences significant problems in terms of the access to health, education, agricultural markets and employment. pursuing conservation objectives without penalising an already disadvantaged population constitutes a challenge, for which there are more questions than answers. consilience abreu: conservation in guinea-bissau photo 10: dawn in cantanhez forest cantanhez forest, whose process of conversion into a natural park is currently underway, constitutes the northernmost end of west africa’s stretch of tropical 274 consilience forest. among other species, it is home to a sizeable population of chimpanzees, which are particularly active just after sunrise. photo 11: forest guides in cantanhez forest although tourism is still an incipient reality in guinea-bissau, it is expected that it could eventually become an important source of incomeand employmentgenerating opportunities. it is hoped in a way that does not jeopardise socialecological equilibria. the forest guides seen here were trained in the context of a local development project in cantanhez forest. consilience abreu: conservation in guinea-bissau photo 12: ancadaque village, formosa island, urok maritime community protected area the urok maritime community protected area was set up in 2005 and is especially remarkable for its participatory governance structures and mechanisms, including regularly-held island assemblies, youths’ fora, elders’ fora, etc. the overall aim is to involve the local population in the decision-making process so as to cater to its needs and demands, and raise the level of local ownership of the conservation process. 276 consilience photo 13: sunset over the mangrove, formosa island, urok maritime community protected area the urok island complex comprises three nearly adjacent islands and a larger number of islets and shoals. the regulations of the maritime community protected area divide the maritime area of the park into three types of zones, whose outline was determined with the involvement of the local population: (i) zones for the exclusive use of the local population; (ii) zones accessible to all, including fishermen coming in from the outside; and (iii) no-fishing areas, destined for the recovery and reproduction of the species. consilience abreu: conservation in guinea-bissau photo 14: beach landing in nago island, urok maritime national park the lack of options in terms of transportation is one of the main problems affecting the population of the bijagós archipelago, as most islands and villages are only served by occasional pirogues. this penalises the cost structure of exports, increases the price of imports and significantly compromises access to healthcare, education and other goods and services. 278 consilience photo 15: extracting palm oil from the fruits of palm trees, urok maritime national park operating at near-subsistence output levels in the context of relatively small and isolated communities, most bijagós households opt for diversification as a resilience strategy: with very few exceptions, most households combine the practice of itinerant agriculture with the exploitation of forest products, fishing and animal breeding, occasionally complemented by small-scale commerce or crafts production. achieving output gains without the compounded risk and disaggregation that comes with specialisation and the change in social-productive relations is the challenge confronting economic development initiatives undertaken under the umbrella of conservation. consilience abreu: conservation in guinea-bissau photo 16: blackboard at the community school in botai, nago island, urok maritime national park one of the main domains in which the autochthonous population of the urok island complex has benefited the most from the creation and operation of the community maritime protected area is education: half a dozen primary and elementary schools have been built or substantially improved in these islands, drawing on funding from foreign assistance in addition to the communities’ own resources. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 8, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 115-127 econometric analysis of factors influencing fuel wood demand in rural and peri-urban farm households of kogi state anthony o. onoja department of agricultural economics and extension university of port harcourt, nigeria tonyojonimi@gmail.com ojochenemi idoko department of geography and planning kogi state university, anyigba, nigeria tonyojonimi@gmail.com abstract this study was designed to determine variables influencing fuelwood demand in rural areas of kogi state. eighty households were randomly sampled from all the agricultural zones of the state. a 2sls method was then used for estimation of the coefficients of the simultaneous equation model. the most significant determinants of fuelwood demand in the study area are the price of fuelwood, kerosene’s price, household size and personal incomes of the household heads. in light of this study’s findings, recommendations included reduction of kerosene prices, investment in renewable energy, cooking gas and electricity and use of agricultural extension agents to educate farmers on sustainable farming. author’s note anthony o. onoja is a researcher and lecturer at the department of agricultural economics and extension, university of port harcourt, nigeria, which he joined in 2008, after spending seven years in a similar capacity at kogi state university, anyigba, nigeria. he is a doctoral student at the department of agricultural economics, university of nigeria, nsukka, majoring in resource and environmental economics and has several publications in reputable journals to his credit. keywords: fuelwood, deforestation, two stage least squares, kogi state, demand function. 1. introduction forestry is a source of livelihood for many farmers and rural households in developing countries, especially in sub-saharan africa (ssa) (ayotebi, 2000; adebaw, 2007). however, the utilization of fuelwood in nigeria contributes greatly to desert encroachment, and consequently has implications with regard to climate change. yet, little is understood about the drivers and dynamics of fuelwood consumption in nigeria and other african countries (adebaw, 2007; an et al., 2002) evidence from china, another developing country, indicates that a considerable 116 consilience majority of households in the wolong region still remain dependent on fuelwood despite their access to electricity. scholars have proposed reasons for this trend in different parts of the developing world. one of the main reasons for this lack of inter-fuel substitution is that household choice, and use of a given source of fuel, hinges on a host of socioeconomic (e.g. income, and wealth), demographic (e.g. family size, household composition, lifestyle, and culture) and location attributes (e.g. proximity to sources of modern and traditional fuels) in addition to fuelwood availability (dovie et al., 2004; an et al., 2002; karekezi et al., 2002; israel, 2002). this may also hold true in the context of nigeria, as the country has different climates and a diverse mix of ethnic, religious and linguistic backgrounds. ayotebi (2000) noted that urban and rural areas of nigeria largely depend on fuelwood, however, the factors influencing the pattern and magnitude of fuel consumption by urban and peri-urban households are still inadequately understood. for instance, there is a gap in knowledge regarding how household characteristics and wealth endowment influence use of firewood and charcoal (adebaw, 2007). the food and agricultural organization, fao, (1998) observed that the challenge of bridging the gap between demand and supply of about 6 million tons per year led to the depletion of forests and consequent loss of soil fertility. in the absence of forests, flooding from rainstorms led to serious damage to material objects, as well as human casualties. fao’s “scenario analysis” on nigeria (2005), observed that in nigeria, “the land and environment is very highly devastated by climate, farming, fires, erosion and population pressures.” the report further projected that by 2020, “oil is deemphasized and the demand for renewable natural resources including wood and non-wood forest products is on the increase.” in addition, nwafor (2006) asserts that during the period from 1981-1990, the rate of deforestation in nigeria was 0.7 percent, and okafor (1990) indicates that this rate was further exacerbated by the fuelwood extraction rate, approximately 3.85 times the rate of re-growth and almost 10 times the rate of regeneration. empirical evidence indicates that this unfortunate scenario persists across the forest reserves of nigeria located in kogi, and five other states (ayotebi, 2000). the findings of the african institute of applied economics, (2005) demonstrate that real fuelwood prices in various parts of the country were doubling in the last two decades. despite the uncertainty as to what could be responsible for such a harsh environmental scenario, botkin & keller (1997) and cooke, kӧhlin & hyde (2008) stress that an economic analysis can help us understand why and how environmental resources of forests are being utilized and conserved. even though a holistic understanding of the economic systems that perpetuate consumption of fuelwood and lead to deforestation will provide better evidence for policy makers interested in addressing efficient energy use and abatement of deforestation in ssa, unfortunately, the available works on fuelwood economics in nigeria (e.g. ebe, 2006; yusuf, 2006; cooke et al., 2008) do not use the most appropriate and reliable econometric models to capture the complex nature of the fuelwood crisis. this leaves a void in research on this topic. against this background, this study was designed to find out the drivers and variables influencing fuelwood demand in kogi state, nigeria. consilience onoja et al.: fuelwood demand 2. framework 2.1 theoretical framework this study is anchored on the economic theory of land degradation. meyeres (1985) held that land clearance or land reclamation involves a market failure—the market does not value naturally occurring resources, or “natural capital”, in the production process. these are known as externalities and have value as the biosphere's environmental protection functions, despite absence of produced goods or clearly defined ownership. as a consequence, they are regarded as free goods. the theory of land degradation further posits that destruction of forested areas, wetlands, grasslands and bodies of water arises because of the difference between the discount rate of the individual and the society as a whole. as a result of the pressing need for fuel, fodder, water and land for cultivation, people of a lower economic status are subject to a larger share of these losses, assigning a higher discount rate to these resources than society as a whole. according to the theory of land degradation, the private interests of the impoverished and the social interests of the broader society diverge. the interests of the local people in using these land and water resources is intense, immediate, and focused--food, fuel, fodder, cropland, and irrigation water. they will, often unknowingly, incur almost any social cost to permit the immediate exploitation of these environmental resources to sustain their livelihood. the interests of loggers, commercial farmers, builders and others who exploit the forests, range and grasslands and water resources are equally intense, but driven more by immediate profit considerations rather than the need to survive. society, as a whole, has traditionally not placed a monetary value on the benefits derived from these resources since they are not marketable. when society has recognized these resources as having value, it has assigned a diffused, nonspecific value that has not been translated into market signals, such as financial incentives for preservation or disincentives for destruction of these resources. thus, intense, focused private interests are permitted to discount the value of environmental resources, and thereby sacrifice the longer-term benefits to society. the costs of land clearance that arise from the exploitation of natural resources for financial gain highlight the problems clearly, as these resources provide a myriad of functional processes that go beyond the tangible areas of providing food and products for commerce. on the other hand, these functional processes do not correspond to a conservationist ideology, as they are not essential to a sound ecological balance. rather, they are naturally occurring systems, on which the economic wellbeing of societies at local, national and international levels depend. cost of fuelwood and other commodities are primarily determined by the prices of inputs including time, labor, capital and technological advances (samuelson & nordhaus, 2005). economic theory relates that an array of factors influence how much will be demanded of any given commodity at any given price: average levels of income, the size of the population (e.g household size), the prices of and availability of related goods (in this case, kerosene, cooking gas and coal), individual and social tastes, special influences (e.g. distance of household to common forests and region), and season (samuelson & nordhaus , 2005; reddy, ram, sastry & devi, 2008). 118 consilience igugu (2003) and ebe (2006) noted that fuel wood demand in nigeria is specifically determined by the above factors. according to zakaria, ampadu & asante (2000), local people, particularly the resource poor farmers in the rural areas, contribute most to environmental resource degradation. mortimore & fabiyi (2003) blame environmental resource degradation mainly on problem of unclearly defined property rights of the nigerian farmers. hansen (1992) holds that environmental degradation itself can result in the poor’s productivity. desai (1992) establishes that population has linkages with poverty and environmental resource degradation. thus household size can affect fuelwood consumption and scarcity. the indicator theory given by dewees (1989) considers other factors besides population explained by indices (factors) such as labor, time, consumption of less preferred biofuels, cutting of live wood and people’s perception of fuelwood, as determinants of fuelwood crisis. a rise in price of a commodity (fuelwood) therefore signals to suppliers (fuelwood producers) that the product is desirable by consumers and is scarce (samuelson, 1981). hence, they will allocate more resources (labor, time, technology and capital) to cutting down trees, leading to deforestation and increase in quantity of fuelwood supplied in the area. 2.2 analytical framework according to gujarati (2006) and koutsoyiannis (2001), in simultaneous equation models, unlike single equation models, what is a dependent (endogenous) variable in one equation appears as an explanatory (exogenous) variable in another equation. thus, there is a feedback relationship between the variables. this feedback creates the simultaneity problem, rendering ols inappropriate to estimate the parameters of each equation individually. in addition, a simultaneous equation model in econometrics may result in an identification problem. one of ways of resolving this problem is through the order condition of identification; an equation has a unique statistical form if it is exactly identified or over-identified and can only be estimated using two stage least squares (2sls), but not ols. if it is over-identified, in addition to being 2sls, maximum likelihood methods can be used to estimate the coefficients. the system of equation similar to the aforementioned can be exemplified as follows: y1t = a1 + a2y2t + a3x1t + u1t y2t = b1 + b2y1t + b3x2t + u2t in this model, the ys are the endogenous variables (e.g. quantities of fuelwood consumed by the households and price of fuelwood). the xs are the exogenous variables (such as household size of fuelwood consumers, annual disposable income of the household, distance from home to common or open forest [in kilometers], price of substitute [i.e. kerosene per liter], cost of labor estimated for equivalent quantity of fuelwood demanded and average cost of capital used in supplying the quantity demanded) and u is the stochastic error term. all prices are quantified in naira. consilience onoja et al.: fuelwood demand 3. methodology of research 3.1 area of study kogi state lies between longitudes 5˚40‘e and 7˚49‘e, and latitudes 6˚33‘n and 8˚44‘n. it is bounded to the south by anambra and edo states and to the north by niger, nassarawa and federal capital territory; to the east by benue and enugu states. on the western flank it shares a common border with ondo, ekiti and kwara states (kogi a.d. p, 1993). in the 2006 population census, the state pooled a population of 3,278,487, representing 2.34% of the nigerian population. 3.2 data collection primary data used for the study was obtained through the use of structured questionnaires and interviews of the farm and non-farm households that make use of fuelwood in the study area. the secondary sources of data used came from published texts, journals, periodicals, and online and offline computer resources, such as dvds and cds. 3.3 sampling plan a multi-stage random sampling method was employed to draw the sample for the survey. farm households who make use of fuelwood in cooking at peri-urban and rural areas of the four (4) agricultural zones of kogi state constituted the sampling frame. the zonal headquarters for the four (4) agricultural zones include aiyetoro gbede (zone a), anyigba (zone b), koton karfe (zone c) and alloma (zone d). from each zone, one rural and peri-urban area were selected randomly (giving a total of eight sites). from these eight sites, five farm households and five non-farm households were randomly selected (i.e. 10 fuelwood consumers from each site) giving a total sample size of eighty (80) farmers from all the sites. specific sites in the order of peri-urban and rural are as follows: in zone a, kabba-bunu and ijumu; zone b, anyigba and ejule; zone c, lokoja and ganaja village; and zone d, idah and emonoja-aludu. in order to deduce price of inputs forty (40) fuelwood producers/marketers took questionnaires. 3.4 data analysis the objective was obtained using descriptive statistics such as mean, range, standard deviation etc. a two stage least squares method was used for estimation of the coefficients of the following simultaneous equation model. it is of the form: lnyfwd = αo + α1 lnpfwd + α2lnpkero + α3lnhsize + α3lnhincm + α4lndist + µ1 (1) lnpfwd = βo + (αo + α1lnpfwd + α2lnpkero + α3lnhsize + α3lnhinc + α4lndist + µ1) + β2 lnplabor +µ2 (2) 120 consilience the above equations were estimated simultaneously using spss 14 econometric software. the program estimates the parameters on the following principles: since lnpfwd = βo + β1lnqtyfwd+ β2 lnplabor + β2lntransptcost + µ2 (3) ỹfwd was used as a proxy for yfwd because of the error term, µ1 in the second equation. hence, equation (2) becomes pfwd = βo + β1ln ỹfwd + β2 lnplabor + β3 lntranspcost + µ2 (4) the simultaneous equation is now equivalent to: ln yfwd= αo + α1 ln hsize + α2 ln hinc + α3 ln dist + α4 ln pfwd + α5 ln pkero + µ1 (1) ln pfwd = βo + β1ln ỹfwd + β2 lnplabor + β3 lntranspcost + µ2 (4) where yfwd = quantity of fuelwood in consumed per month in kgs. hsize = household size of fuelwood consumers. hincm = annual disposable income of the household (naira) dist = distance from home to common (or open) forest (in kilometers). pfwd = price of fuelwood per kg pkero = price of kerosene per liter plabor = cost of labor estimated for equivalent quantity of fuelwood demanded ptranspt cost = average cost of capital used in supplying the quantity demanded. ỹfwd = estimated values of yfwd using the linear form in equation (1). α1 = coefficients of the main (demand) equation. βi = coefficients of instrumental variables (2nd equation) µi = stochastic error terms. ln = exponential log to base e. 4. results and discussion the estimated model is as follows: lnyfwd = 4.096 – 0.76lnpfwd + 0.373lnpkero + 0.316lnhsize – 0.228lnhincm – 0.192lndist + µ1 s. e. (1.088) (0.114) (0.135) (0.081) (0.050) (0.027) t ratios 3.765* -0.732 3.862* 2.149** -1.842*** -1.517 nb: * significant at 1%; **significant at 5% and ***significant at 10%. standardized coefficients were used. consilience onoja et al.: fuelwood demand table 1. results of 2sls estimation (model summary, anova and coefficients). source: field data analysis’ result using spss the descriptive statistics for the data used in modeling this relationship is not discussed (see appendix for results). the model summary, reporting a multiple correlation of 0.860, indicates that there is a very high statistical association between the exogenous variables chosen in the model and the endogenous variable of the main equation (demand function). the r square and adjusted r square of 0.739 and 0.701 respectively confirmed that the model has very good fittings, with the variations in the values of the explanatory variables of the first equation being responsible for seventy four percent (74%) and seventy percent (70%), respectively, of the variations of the quantity of fuel wood demanded or utilized by the consumers sampled in the study area. to corroborate this assertion, the anova results of the model, with f value of 19.28, estimated at 5 and 34 degrees of freedom (and a low standard error of 0.15), gave a ρ value of 0.000. this means that at a significance level of 1%, the null hypothesis of no significant effect of the exogenous variables on the quantity of fuel wood demanded is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis of the model, that the exogenous variables influences the variations in the quantity of fuel wood demanded significantly, is upheld. in evaluating the theoretical validity of the model it was observed that all the exogenous variables of the main equation conformed to the a priori expectations. coefficients 4.096 1.088 3.765 .001 -.083 .114 -.076 -.732 .469 .520 .135 .373 3.862 .000 .174 .081 .316 2.149 .039 -.092 .050 -.228 -1.842 .074 -.041 .027 -.192 -1.517 .138 (constant) lnpricefuelwoodkg lnpricekeropricelitre lnhouseholdsize lnmonthlyincome lndistancekm equation 1 b std. error unstandardized coefficients beta t sig. anova 2.271 5 .454 19.287 .000 .801 34 .024 3.071 39 regression residual total equation 1 sum of squares df mean square f sig. model summary .860 .739 .701 .153 multiple r r square adjusted r square std. error of the estimate equation 1 122 consilience the unstandardized coefficient of the intercept, which recorded a value of 4.096, was significant with a p value of 0.001, signifying that even when all the included exogenous variables remain at zero, there will still be a significant fuelwood demand increase at 1% probability level. this may be due to cultural factors or other reasons that were not explained in the model. the coefficient of -0.76 recorded for price of fuelwood implies that for every unit change in price of fuelwood the quantity demanded of fuelwood in the in the study area falls by 76%. this is in line with the theory of demand which held that as price of the commodity falls, ceteris paribus, the quantity demanded increases. the effect of this variable is, however not significant at 5% and 10% level given a t ratio of -0.732 and a ρ value of 0.469. this situation could be explained by the fact there are other alternative sources of energy in the state that consumers can fall back on when prices of fuelwood rises. the fairly positive increase in elasticity of kerosene price (37% or 0.373) is in line with theoretical expectations that the higher the price of the substitute product (kerosene in this case), the higher the consumption of the product (fuelwood). so for every unit increase in kerosene price (1 naira), a 37% increase in the quantity of fuelwood demanded by kogi state citizens is recorded. the effect of kerosene is significant at 1% alpha level with a ρ value of 0.000. for household size, the elasticity is 31% or 0.316, meaning that for every unit change in household size in the study area fuelwood consumption will increase by 31 percent. this factor has a significant effect at 5% alpha level (with a ρ value of 0.039). monthly income of the consumers of fuelwood also has a significant effect (ρ value of 0.074 or 10 percent level of significance) on quantity of fuelwood consumed or demanded in the area. with an elasticity of -0.192 (19%), one can assert that for every 1 unit of income increased in the study area, the people will reduce their demand for fuelwood by 19%. this means that higher incomes can lead to less consumption of fuelwood as those whose income are increasing could resort to use of cooking gas, kerosene and, probably, electricity. the negative sign on the distance to forest coefficient implies that the farther a consumer of fuelwood resides from sources of fuelwood supply, the less fuelwood he consumes, ceteris paribus. thus the elasticity value of -0.192 recorded for distance implies that for every kilometer distance in residence away from the forests where fuelwood are sourced there is a decrease of nineteen percent (19%) in level of fuelwood demanded. the coefficient correlation matrix of the model estimate was evaluated and the exogenous variables did not display any high correlation. the highest value recorded was 0.493 which was between distance and household size. thus multicollinearity could not be established as a threat in the model estimated. 5. recommendations based on the foregoing findings, the following policy recommendations are hereby made: 1. the nigerian federal government should intervene and urgently reduce the price of kerosene, as such a policy would reduce deforestation, and as such would help mitigate global climate change. consilience onoja et al.: fuelwood demand 2. the nigerian government should hasten to invest in the development of cooking gas, developing this as an alternative fuel source, instead of continuous flaring of this gas, which contributes to global warming. 3. the use of renewable energy sources, such as solar powered cookers and electricity, should be pursued with utmost vigor. in conclusion, more efforts need to be made by agricultural extension departments in the state to educate farmers on the use of renewable energy sources, and more action needs to be taken by the federal government to promote the use of alternative fuel resources, such as kerosene and cooking gas. 124 consilience bibliography abebaw, d. 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(2008). agricultural economics. vijay primlani for oxford & ibh publishing: new delhi. pp35-43. samuelson, p. a. 1981. economics. 11th edition. mcgraw-hill international co. pp5365. samuelson, p.a. & nordhaus, w. a. 2005. economics. tata mc-graw-hill: new delhi. the forum of energy ministers of africa 2006. energy and the millennium development goals (mgds) in africa. papers presented at the forum for energy ministers in africa fema): uganda. april. no. 36004. zakeriah, a. b. t., ampadu, m. o. & asante, w. 2000. rapporteurs’ report. workshop on soil and water conservation in sub-sahara africa, university of development studies (uds), tamale, ghana. 15th – 17th february. consilience onoja et al.: fuelwood demand appendix model description dependent predictor & instrumental predictor & instrumental predictor & instrumental predictor & instrumental predictor & instrumental instrumental instrumental instrumental lnqty f wdkg lnpricefuelwoodkg lnpricekeroricelitre lnhouseholdsize lnmonthly income lndistancekm lnpricefwd lnlabour lntranspot equation 1 type of variable mod_2 statistics 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.27 67.65 7.76 51293.75 19.35 501.88 254.15 440.13 .220 2.023 .423 3744.360 1.300 17.394 7.111 15.587 8.00 55.00 7.00 50000.00 22.00 500.00 265.00 400.00 6 55 6 50000 2 600 200 400 1.971 18.097 3.787 33490.571 11.623 155.581 63.599 139.413 3.886 327.484 14.342 1121618315 135.104 24205.301 4044.832 19436.060 .262 1.148 .407 .918 -.343 .011 -.221 1.154 .269 .269 .269 .269 .269 .269 .269 .269 -1.267 -.257 -.737 1.438 -1.049 -.784 -1.192 .759 .532 .532 .532 .532 .532 .532 .532 .532 7 55 15 159000 41 600 245 650 5 55 2 6000 1 250 105 200 12 110 17 165000 41 850 350 850 662 5412 620 4103500 1548 40150 20332 35210 valid missing n mean std. error of mean median mode std. dev iation variance skewness std. error of skewness kurtosis std. error of kurtosis range minimum maximum sum unit prices of fuelwood/kg kerosine price/litre household size monthly income(naira distance f rom f orest in km approx. av e labour p monthly f wd qty /hs kg approx. av e cost of transport coefficient correlations 1.000 .168 .408 .320 -.076 .168 1.000 .006 .350 -.104 .408 .006 1.000 .427 .493 .320 .350 .427 1.000 -.208 -.076 -.104 .493 -.208 1.000 lnpricefuelwoodkg lnpricekeroricelitre lnhouseholdsize lnmonthlyincome lndistancekm correlations equation 1 ln pricefuelwoo dkg lnprice keroricelitre ln householdsiz e lnmonthlyinco me lndistancekm consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 6, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 1–19 export composition and economic growth in subsaharan africa: a panel analysis edward bbaale center for global development washington, d.c., usa ebbaale@cgdev.org john mutenyo africa growth initiative the brookings institute washington d.c., usa jmutenyo@brookings.edu abstract this paper was guided by the hypothesis that it is not exports per se that matter, but different export components influence growth differently. we considered a sample of 35 sub-sahara african countries based on availability of data on the key variables. aggregate data were obtained from the most recent world bank‟s world development indicators and international monetary fund‟s international finance statistics online facilities. disaggregated data on exports and imports were obtained from the united nation‟s statistical database under standard international trade classification (sitc) revision 4. the generalized methods of moments estimator was employed during the analysis. we find that it is the growth in agricultural exports, and not manufactured exports, that is significantly associated with per capita income growth in our sample. these countries should adopt policies that increase agricultural exports in the medium term as they design strategies for increasing manufactured exports in the long term. other factors significantly influencing growth are gross capital formation, capital goods imports, infrastructure, government consumption, and inflation rate, political systems and governance, and education. author’s note edward bbaale is a visiting fellow at the centre for global development in washington d.c. he obtained a phd in economics from the university of linzaustria in 2008. his research interests include health care services and outcomes for women and children. john mutenyo is a research fellow at the africa growth initiative at the brookings institute washington dc. prior to that, he was a visiting scholar at the imf in washington dc and a lecturer of economics at makerere university kampala uganda. he holds a phd from university of dar es salaam tanzania. his research interests include but are not limited to investment and growth. keywords: export composition, economic growth, sub-saharan africa 2 consilience 1. introduction the role of exports in igniting and sustaining rapid economic growth rates, especially in emerging economies, cannot be underscored. exporting is associated with static gains that include access to larger outside markets, hence exploiting economies of scale. there are also dynamic gains that include efficiency advances as a result of knowledge and technological spillovers from exporting experience. exporting is also associated with efficiency in resource allocation, employment generation, and relaxing the foreign exchange constraints. accordingly, there is little wonder that countries the world over are taking deliberate and purposive efforts to promote exporting activities. owing to the usually strong synergies between rapid economic growth on the one hand, and exporting on the other, countries usually strive to achieve rapid increases in exports and, by extension, promote economic growth and development. indeed, the present literature presents several plausible theoretical arguments supporting the view that exporting activities and overall economic growth are positively associated. on the one hand, exporting implies that a country gains access to the wider external demand, which acts as a stimulus to domestic output and hence economic growth. second, it is frequently argued that small domestic markets may not grow continuously and that any positive economic shock leading to the expansion of the domestic market is more likely to decay quickly. on the other hand, large external markets do not always encompass growth restrictions on the demand side, and this leads to the exploitation of economies of scale. therefore, export expansion can be argued to be a stimulus of economic growth (agosin, 1999; giles and williams, 2000; grossman and helpman, 1991). additionally, verdoorn (1949) dwells on the argument that export growth may generate specialization in the production of export commodities. by extension, specialization is argued to lead to efficiency gains in the export sector owing to the rise in skills due to learning-bydoing. consequently, resources would flow from the relatively less productive and non-trade sector to the highly productive exports sector, leading to economic growth. futher, chenery and strout (1966), balassa (1978), buffie, (1992) and riezman (1996), dwell on an indirect argument linking exporting to economic growth. they argue that exporting activities generate foreign exchange that is required to import capital goods. increase in capital goods imports in turn stimulate a country's capacity to produce. this is more pronounced in developing countries that have an extreme disadvantage in the production of capital goods. in the same line of argument, it is suggested that the most up-to-date knowledge and technology is embodied in the capital goods (plants and equipments) imported from technologically advanced countries. this knowledge transfer through international trade may increase productivity and, by extension, lead to economic growth and development (hart, 1983 and chuang, 1998). empirically, the relationship between exports and economic growth has been tested in a number of countries, employing time series techniques. it is noteworthy that the evidence generated does not translate into a consensus on the direction of causality of the two series. for that matter, the relationship between exporting and economic growth remains hotly debated by researchers and academics. some authors consilience bbaale and mutenyo: export composition adduce evidence supporting the fact that export growth precedes economic growth hence giving a stance to the export-led-growth (elg) hypothesis (arnade et al., 1995; fosu 1996; thornton 1996). on the other hand, some authors provide evidence in support of the growth-led-export hypothesis (gle) by arguing that economic growth precedes export growth (lancaster, 1980; krugman, 1984; henriques and sadorsky 1996; al-yousif 1999; kemal et al., 2002). the stance of this argument is such that economic growth leads to knowledge and technological development in the various sectors of an economy through the learning-by-doing effect. this effect on the economy becomes a vehicle for export growth especially in those commodities where the country enjoys a comparative advantage. other authors argue that there is a feedback relationship between export growth and economic growth (helpman and krugman, 1985; dutt and ghosh, 1994; thornton 1996; shan and sun 1998a; anwar et al., 2000;). the arguments presented along these lines are that exports may arise from the economies of scale effects of economic growth. at the same time, export expansion may propel further cost reductions leading to efficiency gains, and by extension, leading to economic growth. at an extreme end, some authors find no causal relationship between the two series (mutairi, 1993; anwar et al., 2000). in addition to single country studies, there is substantial cross-country empirical literature on the effects of exports on growth (voivodas, 1973; michaely, 1977; balassa, 1978; fajana, 1979; fosu 1990; lussier 1993; greenaway and sapsford, 1994; and sala-i-martin, 1997)1. these authors provide evidence for the positive association between exports and growth. however, it is worth noting that most of the recent and earlier literature on exports and economic growth concentrated on „aggregate exports‟ only. the major deficiency of this approach is that it limits our understanding of the important differences between dissimilar export components and their influence on economic growth. it is argued that even if there is a growth-enhancing or growth-limiting effect of a particular export component, it may not be reflected at the aggregate level, and this may lead to unauthentic conclusions and implications for policy (ghatak et al., 1997). all the cross-country studies cited above do not explicitly investigate the effect of disaggregated exports on economic growth. however, there is quite scanty literature investigating the role of export composition on economic growth (feder, 1983; fosu, 1990; ghatak et al., 1997; hussain, 1998; greenaway et al., 1999; srinivasan et al., 2001; herzer et al., 2004; and wörz (2005). additionally, the literature addressing the subject, apart from fosu (1990), is overly concentrated on asia, latin america, and europe. this leaves a huge knowledge gap for africa that this paper seeks to fill. this paper tests the hypothesis that not the aggregate exports per se matter, but different export components have a differential influence on economic growth. put differently, the type of products that a country exports do matter for growth. indeed, this is connected to the argument documented by feder (1983) and wörz (2005) that efficiency, knowledge spillover, and economies of scale are different across different export components. this, in turn, implies that their growth stimulating power is obviously different. therefore, the question of interest from the policy perspective extends beyond the influence of aggregate exports on growth and 1 cited in giles and williams (2000) 4 consilience dwells on whether export components have a differential stimulating power on economic growth. gaining insights on the differential impact of export components on growth is a key to successful policy formulation, analysis, and advocacy. in addition, much of the previous country and cross-country studies have been plagued by the endogeneity problem that obviously exists in a growth model with the export variable on the right-hand-side. in light of this, we employed a dynamic panel generalized method of moments (gmm) estimator. in studying growth, this procedure ensures that parameters are estimated consistently in the presence of endogenous right-hand-side covariates. the paper is organized as follows. section 2 presents the theoretical framework and the estimation strategy. section 3 presents a discussion of the findings and section 4 concludes with the paper‟s implications for policy. 2. theoretical framework and estimation strategy the theoretical exposition of the relationship between exporting and economic growth is based on the premise that exporting influences economic growth via productivity enhancement. a number of authors have developed models in which technology and knowledge spillovers are important conduits through which international trade or exports in particular lend a vital synergy to endogenous growth. for instance, grossman and helpman (1991) present international trade as being at the forefront of promoting a country‟s research and development sector that is indispensable for growth. this is based on the grounds that in the global trading arena, exporting firms experience knowledge and technological best practices from their competitors as well as consumers. wörz (2005), present two important arguments through which exporting leads to productivity improvement at the firm level which translates into overall economic growth. the first argument dwells on the fact that a country engaged in production for export will maximize the exploitation of its comparative advantage, which enhances efficiency. this, in turn, triggers resource reallocation from the relatively inefficient non-trade sector to the efficient export sector. their second argument is based on the premise that producing for the global market is usually associated with a drive to upgrade the quality of the products in line with what international consumer dictates, hence leading to a rise in skills, productivity and, by extension, economic growth. this argument is also supported by feder (1983) who argues that efficiency enhancement may occur via spillover effects generated by the learning experience of exporters. this, subsequently, generates positive knowledge externalities to the domestic economy as a whole and, by extension, productivity enhancement that is an engine of overall economic growth. on the other hand, other authors present an important role of capital goods imports in promoting productivity and hence economic growth. the arguments presented, however, still expose exporting as an intermediary. riezman (1996) and chenery and strout (1966) dwell on the argument that export expansion may indirectly affect growth by providing foreign exchange that allows for increasing levels of capital goods imports. yet, chuang (1998) and hart (1983) argue along the lines that knowledge and technology are embodied in equipment and machinery that are sourced from technologically leading countries. this effect is presented to be consilience bbaale and mutenyo: export composition productivity enhancing and thus economic growth enhancing. this line of argument has been pursued by other authors (romer, 1992; pack, 1992; coe et al., 1995; lee, 1995; pissarides, 1997)2. they argue that capital goods imports to a country are proportional to technological spillovers that participating firms experience. the importing countries are argued to be using the ideas and information conceived from the technological leaders for which they lack capacity to develop in isolation. to sum up this argument, exporting provides a country with foreign exchange to import capital goods which bring along with it the aforementioned benefits to the economy. empirically, authors like caselli and coleman (2001)3 generated a measure of technological diffusion by considering countries' imports of high-tech equipment, mostly computers. they argue that the accumulation of computers is proportional to spillover of knowledge and technologies. however, in a twist of argument, wörz (2005) argue that the influence of imports on economic growth is not without ambiguity. whereas imports of capital goods may enhance growth through embodied technology and knowledge, it may reduce the latitude for learning-bydoing, which dampens growth. further, they contend that the positive influence of sophisticated importation very much depends on the absorptive capacity of a country in terms of the education of the labor force. an important theoretical argument that motivates this paper is on the importance of export structure on growth, proposed by feder (1983) and wörz (2005). they argue that different export components generate important differences in productivity, externalities and economies of scale and hence influence economic growth differently. they dwell on the argument that the scope for technology and knowledge spillover is highest in the manufactured export components which are usually more skill intensive. based on their foundation, we present the productivity parameter in the cobb-douglas production function as being influenced differently by the different export components. we also include capital goods imports because they embody knowledge and technology that is productivity enhancing. 2.1 the model consider a neoclassical cobb-douglas production function;  itititit lkay  (1) where ity denotes total output of economy i at time t , and, ita is the productivity parameter which represents the stock of knowledge, production technology or the blueprint. itk and itl are conventional factors of the production function representing the stock of capital and labor for different economies, respectively. since exports and imports affect growth via the productivity parameter )( ita , we can express this parameter as a function of various export and import components and control for other factors. these export and import (now also called learning coefficients) components are entered with a lag )(s because it is assumed that knowledge accumulation is not instantaneous. 2 cited in barro and sala-i-martin (2004) 3 cited in barro and sala-i-martin (2004) 6 consilience ),,,( itsitsitsitit zcmmxaxfa  (2) imposing factor shares on each of the components will make it easy for us to substitute it back into equation (1).  itsitsitsitit zcmmxaxa  (3) where ax and mx are agriculture and manufactured export components, and cm is capital imports. z is a vector of control variables including; government consumption and credit to the private sector as percentage of gdp, inflation rate, civil liberties index, , and number of telephone lines per 1000, among others. combining equation (3) and (1), we obtain:  itititsitsitsitit lkzcmmxaxy  (4) where  ,,,, and  are elasticities of output per capita growth with respect to the determinants of growth given in equation (4). taking natural logs (l) on both sides of equation (4) gives an estimable linear function: ititititsitsitsitit lllklzlcmlmxlaxcly    ' (5) in (5) all coefficients are constant elasticities, c is the intercept parameter, and it is the error term which is assumed to be well behaved with zero mean and constant variance (white noise). accordingly, our parameters of interest, called learning coefficients; ,, and  serve to measure the productivity effect of the various export and import components on gdp per capita growth. from equation (5), we test the hypothesis that it is not exports per se that matter for growth but that different components differently influence per capita output growth via productivity. it is frequently argued in the literature that manufactured exports are more productivity-enhancing and hence more growth-enhancing because they are normally more capital intensive and hence more human capital intensive. this implies that manufactured products are associated with greater latitude for spillovers and learning hence expected to have a more robust influence on economic growth. on the other hand, an increase in agricultural exports influences total output through multipliers on economic activity, value added and employmentdirect and indirect effects. for instance, increased agricultural exports increase household incomes, which in turn stimulates farmers‟ purchases of fertilizers, agricultural inputs and machinery, and a general increase in demand for consumption goods, hence providing forward and backward linkages (diao et al., 2007). also there is increased economic activity in form of food and fiber manufacturing, transportation and sales arising from increased agriculture exports. all these activities lead to increase in household incomes in form of wages, salaries, profits and rents. the greater the number of activities performed on the agricultural exports, the greater the multiplier effect, and hence the greater the economic growth. in other words, agricultural exports with value addition yield a greater multiplier effect hence impact more to economic growth than primary products. analogously since over 70 percent of agricultural output in africa is produced by small scale farmers, rather than large scale industrial agriculture, there is less incentive for value addition due to the high consilience bbaale and mutenyo: export composition implicit costs in form of collection, transportation and storage. the dominance of the small agriculture in one way or another impedes its effect on economic growth. 2.2 estimation strategy in line with the recent literature estimating growth models, we employed the generalized method of moments (gmm) estimator during the analysis. the methodology was developed by arellano and bond (1991) and introduced into the growth literature by caselli, esquivel and lefort (1996). in studying economic growth, gmm is superior over other estimators for simple cross-section regressions and other dynamic panel data models. the methodology eliminates biases originating from omitted variables, endogenous right-hand-side variables, omission of initial efficiency, and presence of measurement error. according to arellano and bond (1991), the consistency of the gmm estimator mainly depends on the assumptions that the error terms do not exhibit second order serial correlation and that the instruments are valid. the validity of the instruments is established using the serial correlation test and a sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. if we fail to reject the null hypotheses of the two tests, then we shall be sure that the assumptions of the instruments are valid. a full exposition of the gmm estimator is in the appendix 3. 2.3 data type and sources we used a panel of 354 sub-sahara african countries whose selection was based on data availability particularly on the key variables: disaggregated exports and imports. disaggregated data on exports and imports was obtained from the united nations statistics database under the standard international trade classification (sitc) revision 4. the components of agricultural and manufactured exports and capital goods imports are used as explanatory variables in the growth model. aggregate data on gdp per capita, labor force, credit to the private sector and government consumption as a percentage of gdp, gdp deflator, and gross capital formation as a percentage of gdp were obtained from the most current world development indicators (wdi, 2010) online facility of the world bank. data on exchange rate was obtained from the most current imf‟s international finance statistics online facility. data on the civil liberties index was obtained from freedom house online facility (www.freedomhouse.org). the observation period extends from 1988 to 2007 selected based on the data availability especially on the disaggregated exports and imports which do not have longer time series. 3. results 3.1 descriptive results table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the study for 35 sub-sahara african countries for the period 1988-2007. we expected to work with 700 observations but due to missing data points for some key variables we end up, on average, with about 300 observations and hence we have an unbalanced panel. 4 the list of countries is contained in appendix 2 8 consilience variable description mean std. dev. min max gdp per capita growth growth rate in percentages 1.121834 6.238654 46.89249 65.77162 gdp per capita us $, 2000 constant prices 845.9816 1255.212 102.286 8692.031 export total us $ 2.86e+09 8.55e+09 3000000 9.80e+10 agriculture exports us $ 6.29e+08 1.11e+09 338592 1.10e+10 manufacturing exports us $ 8.76e+08 3.96e+09 1736 4.50e+10 capital goods imports us $ 1.56e+09 5.22e+09 2.40e+07 6.00e+10 gross capital formation % of gdp us $ 20.9956 11.07931 23.76259 113.5779 labor force total of economically active persons 5096052 5910203 110120.9 3.82e+07 telephone lines per 100 people 1.971571 4.085503 .0579306 28.7544 government consumption % of gdp us $ 14.46118 5.77774 2.287548 39.71343 domestic credit % of gdp us $ 18.06286 20.84423 0 162.4562 inflation gdp deflator % of annual growth 14.71479 32.25547 33.53161 381.2654 civil liberties index scale 1-7; 1=maximum rights &7=fewest rights 4.37106 1.437805 1 7 real effective exchange rate trade-weighted index (1997=100) 104.481 33.49919 20.24 329.25 secondary school enrolment rate % of gross enrolment 30.20424 20.87551 4.803008 95.07371 table 1: descriptive statistics of the variables used source: authors„ own calculations from world development indicators 2010 and un comtrade data set 2009 from table 1, we note that there is no variable whose standard deviation is zero; therefore, all our variables qualify to be included in the regression. additionally, it is observed that the maximum and minimum values of our variables are well around the mean values and hence we conclude that there are no outliers. table 2 shows the average statistics of the paper‟s key variables by country. considering the average income per capita growth rate over the period under observation, equatorial guinea leads all other countries in our sample with a growth rate of 13%. it is followed by botswana (5%), mauritius and cape verde (4%), swaziland, uganda (3%), burkina faso, congo republic, tanzania, chad, lesotho, sudan and mozambique (2%). the country with the lowest average growth rate over the same period is cote d‟ivoire (-2.2%) followed by niger (-1.3%), central african republic (-1.2%), madagascar (-0.96%), zimbabwe and garbon (-0.7), and burundi (-0.6%). consilience bbaale and mutenyo: export composition country gdp per capita growth gdp per capital $2000 total exports (us $) agricultural exports (us $) manufacturing exports (us $) capital goods imports (us $) gross capital formation % of gdp labor force total inflation/ gdp deflator (%) benin .747253 324 3.83e+08 2.26e+08 20444444 2.39e+08 17.08 2296182 4.85 botswana 4.60340 2763.88 2.54e+09 5.69e+08 3.09e+09 1.93e+09 29.02 653914.3 10.01 burkina faso 1.68025 205.78 2.84e+08 2.01e+08 29818182 4e+08 19.36 4586035 3.48 burundi -.611779 128.76 90542993 56800000 9872493 1.16e+08 12.18 3005372 9.43 cameroon -.06340 715.08 2.71e+09 7.55e+08 2.3e+08 8.75e+08 19.01 5114770 4.76 cape verde 3.8247 1066.72 1.35e+08 5290360 27390909 2.03e+08 30.93 136979.5 3.33 central african rep. -1.2415 264.37 1.88e+08 51538462 42692308 78000000 10.39 1486123 5.64 chad 2.1526 196.72 8.7e+08 16.59 2820639 4.77 congo, rep. 1.53732 1141.62 2.38e+09 90000000 24666667 2.37e+08 27.17 1105562 6.95 cote d‟ivoire -2.237 652.11 4.95e+09 3.12e+09 1.05e+09 1.56e+09 12.66 5516306 5.36 equatorial guinea 12.654 2888.14 2.31e+09 51.47 165139.8 9.21 ethiopia 1.4839 134.92 1.05e+09 5.45e+08 60153846 1.67e+09 18.29 25244098 7.6 gabon -.73568 4530.8 3.26e+09 3.94e+08 99000000 8.56e+08 28.38 465794.7 6.32 gambia .45444 335.75 1.65e+08 9069231 2892145 92615385 21.1 482744.8 9.96 ghana 1.2028 244.07 2.21e+09 1e+09 3.11e+08 2.43e+09 18.6 7133370 31.37 guinea-bissau -.18168 164.44 42045149 45333333 742750 29666667 25.95 476475.9 31.97 kenya .2025 423.95 3.17e+09 1.22e+09 5.76e+08 2.17e+09 19.79 11881434 10.53 lesotho 1.5073 379.31 2.86e+08 41200000 4.42e+08 2.01e+08 43.46 719958.4 11.04 madagascar -.9633 269.03 9.02e+08 3.03e+08 2.3e+08 4.45e+08 15.48 6278304 15.61 malawi .17416 142.67 4.91e+08 4.28e+08 54583333 4.12e+08 19.17 4307710 22.24 mali 1.0949 221.65 6.35e+08 2.82e+08 33975000 5.58e+08 20.89 2746278 5.83 mauritania .17339 428.53 5.09e+08 4.13e+08 30244.84 7.64e+08 22.84 884086.2 8.83 mauritius 3.5171 3105.94 2.26e+09 4.61e+08 1.1e+09 1.11e+09 25.32 473590.5 7.93 mozambique 2.3112 223.19 8.57e+08 2.41e+08 5.03e+08 8.02e+08 18.16 7798508 28.51 niger -1.3263 186.84 3.74e+08 2.41e+08 50384615 1.92e+08 13.19 2909929 4.33 rwanda 1.6755 247.44 1.85e+08 69191667 5798708 1.73e+08 16.72 3268688 9.03 senegal .21820 478.78 1.51e+09 3.56e+08 3.53e+08 9.98e+08 17.84 3537856 4.69 south africa .38189 3229.95 4e+10 6.91e+09 2.68e+10 3.5e+10 19.43 12568533 11.47 sudan 2.3722 334.37 2.47e+09 4.01e+08 58050000 2.47e+09 16.86 9268853 39.46 swaziland 2.6813 1202.43 1.04e+09 3.88e+08 9.26e+08 5.68e+08 20.49 310327.6 10.05 tanzania 1.7726 294.57 1.47e+09 6.55e+08 1.63e+08 1.63e+09 19.77 14303236 15.96 togo -.5971 264.37 5.18e+08 1.95e+08 85121875 1.95e+08 18.08 1824532 4.66 uganda 2.783 231.13 7.28e+08 4.79e+08 79928571 7.84e+08 15.31 9117260 39.17 zambia -.4816 371.68 1.61e+09 2.55e+08 1.24e+09 1.07e+09 17.56 3389918 41.47 zimbabwe -.73279 591.29 2.03e+09 1.13e+09 7.66e+08 1.57e+09 16.9 4328739 79.43 table 2: average statistics of the major variables used in the study by country. source: authors„ own calculations from world development indicators 2010 and un comtrade data set 2009 10 consilience in terms of gdp per capita in us $ (2000 constant prices), gabon leads all other countries with an average value of 4530.8$. this is followed by south africa (3229.95$), mauritius (3105.94$), equatorial guinea (2888.14$), botswana (2764$), swaziland (1202.43$), congo republic (1141.62$), and cape verde (1066$). the rest of the countries5 have gdp per capita well below 1000$. we find that the country with the highest gdp per capita (gabon), on average, exports more agricultural than manufactured exports. however, its capital imports bill, on average, is greater than agricultural and manufactured exports treated individually, but lower than total exports. on the other hand, countries like south africa, mauritius, botswana, and swaziland, on average, export more manufacturing than agricultural exports. the capital imports bill for south africa and mauritius is, on average, greater than agricultural and manufacturing exports treated individually. for swaziland and botswana, the capital imports bill is, on average, greater than agricultural exports but less than manufacturing exports. it is noteworthy that south africa leads all other countries in our sample for total exports, agricultural and manufacturing exports as well as capital goods imports. for total exports and agricultural exports, south africa is followed by cote d‟ivoire, gabon and kenya; for manufacturing exports it is followed by botswana, mauritius, and cote d‟ivoire; for capital goods imports it is followed by sudan, ghana, kenya, botswana, and ethiopia. overall, apart from gabon, all countries whose gdp per capita is above $1000, export more manufactured than agricultural products. on the other hand, apart from lesotho, mozambique, and zambia, all countries whose gdp per capita is below 1000$ export more agricultural than manufactured products. however, these findings are mixed; it is not clear that a relatively rich or poor country exports more of a specific product. therefore, this descriptive information was insufficient for us to gain clear insights on which export component positively and significantly influences gdp per capita growth. consequently, we extend the qualitative findings into quantitative analysis to determine which export component significantly influences gdp per capita growth. we present a discussion of our quantitative results in subsection 3.2 below. 3.2 quantitative results table 3 reports the results obtained from the gmm regression. when fitting a model using the gmm estimator, it is imperative to ascertain whether the instruments used satisfy the orthogonality condition, i.e., whether they are uncorrelated with the errors. to address this issue, we employed the sargan test of over-identification of restrictions. the test statistic has a χ2 distribution under the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. we find an insignificant statistic indicating that the sargan test cannot reject the null hypothesis that all our instruments are valid. similarly, the wald test for joint significance of the variables does not reject our econometric specification. furthermore, the serial correlation test rejects the null of no first order serial correlation but does not reject the null that there is no second order serial correlation. however, according to baltagi (2005), this 5 benin, burkina faso, burundi, cameroon, central african republic, cote d‟ivoire, ethiopia, gambia, ghana, guinea-bissau, kenya, madagascar, mali, mauritania, niger, rwanda, senegal, sudan, tanzania, togo, uganda, zimbabwe, lesotho, mozambique, and zambia consilience bbaale and mutenyo: export composition is what is expected in a first-differenced equation with the original untransformed disturbances assumed not to be serially correlated. in table 3 (model 1), we investigate a case in which total exports is the main explanatory variable, in order to gain an insight on whether exports in general influence gdp per capita growth. the results show that total exports positively and significantly impacts per capita income growth. the results indicate that a unit percentage increase in total exports is associated with a growth in per capita income of about .07 percent. variables model (1) model (2) model (3) model (4) model (5) lagged gdp per capita 0.674*** 0.812*** 0.823*** 0.780*** 0.760*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) exports total 0.0697*** (0.000) gross capital formation % of gdp 0.0332** 0.0235** 0.0232** 0.0282* (0.0139) (0.0264) (0.0263) (0.0710) labor force -0.121** 0.00410 0.00625 0.00451 0.0208 (0.0475) (0.890) (0.830) (0.876) (0.776) telephone lines per 1000 0.0281** 0.0226*** 0.0212** 0.0149* 0.0145 (0.0135) (0.00969) (0.0151) (0.0709) (0.302) government consumption -0.0517 -0.109** -0.0968** -0.144*** -0.140** (0.253) (0.0284) (0.0488) (0.00172) (0.0362) domestic credit to the private sector -0.00187 -0.00626 -0.00796 -0.00175 -0.0146 (0.753) (0.253) (0.151) (0.751) (0.119) inflation -0.00822*** -0.00761*** -0.00708*** -0.00738*** -0.0112*** (0.00135) (0.000396) (0.00105) (0.000557) (0.000163) civil liberties index -0.0253** -0.0329*** -0.0272** -0.0356*** -0.0181 (0.0409) (0.00925) (0.0345) (0.00423) (0.240) secondary school enrolment 0.0660*** 0.121*** (0.00270) (0.000) agriculture exports 0.0180*** 0.0202*** 0.0247*** (0.00201) (0.000275) (0.00495) manufacturing exports 0.00154 0.00130 -0.00542 (0.614) (0.666) (0.263) capital goods imports 0.0319*** (2.93e-07) first order serial correlation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 second order serial correlation 0.1534 0.2972 0.2830 0.5396 0.0035 wald test of joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 sargan test 0.1788 0.2144 0.2704 0.3428 0.4799 observations 247 307 307 307 175 number of pid 32 30 30 30 29 p values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 table 3: regression results from gmm estimation. 12 consilience the question that remains to be answered is among agricultural and manufactures: which export component is more important to growth than the others? models 2-5 seek to provide an answer to this question. findings show that, growth in agricultural exports is positively and significantly associated with per capita income growth (model 2). specifically, on average, a unit percentage increase in agricultural exports is associated with a growth in per capita income of about .02 percent. this finding is robust across various models even when we include different control variables. however, the link between growth in manufactured exports and per capita income growth is at best weak. the estimated coefficients are not statistically different from zero at any conventional level of significance. therefore, a growth-enhancing effect can be attributed to agricultural exports and not manufactured for the case of countries in our sample. this empirical finding is in support of the paper‟s main hypothesis that it is not exports per se that matter, but that different export components differently influence per capita income growth. this finding is however contrary to the widely held theoretical view that manufactured exports are more productivity-enhancing and therefore more growth-enhancing. this is based on the premise that there is greater knowledge and technological spillover associated with manufactured compared to agricultural exports. additionally, it is frequently argued that manufactured exports are more capital intensive and hence more human capital intensive such that knowledge and its dynamic benefits to the economy is expected to be more imperative in this sector. probably this is explained by the great variation in the african countries‟ exports of both agriculture and manufactures. for instance, from table1, the standard deviation between manufactured exports is thrice that of agriculture exports, implying that most african countries‟ levels of agricultural output are closer to the mean than their manufactured exports. in other words most of the african countries export agricultural produces than manufactures. such a variation affects the level of significance of a variable. it is apparent that sub-sahara african countries still enjoy a comparative advantage in agricultural than manufacturing exports. whereas it is more benefiting for countries in our sample to promote agricultural exports, this is not to suggest that these countries should not pay attention to industrialization at all. these countries should adopt policies that increase agricultural exports in the medium term as they design strategies for increasing manufacturing exports in the long term. it might be the case that the stage of development they have so far attained is not yet conducive for gaining a comparative advantage in manufacturing exports. the evidence found in studies conducted in other parts of the world attribute a growth-enhancing effect to sophisticated rather than non-sophisticated exports (wörz, 2005; herzer et al., 2004; and ghatak et al., 1997). wörz (2005) found a superior performance of high tech exports for a large group of developing and developed countries (oecd, asia, and latin america). ghatak et al. (1997) found that nontraditional manufactures were more important than traditional manufactures for india. herzer et al. (2004) found evidence of growth-enhancing effects of manufactured exports rather than primary exports for chile. nevertheless, our findings are in line with previous literature for the held view that the composition of exports does matter for growth of a particular economy. indeed from our ssa sample, we attribute the growthconsilience bbaale and mutenyo: export composition enhancing effect to agriculture rather than manufacturing exports. from another perspective, this result may be pointing to the failure of most sub-sahara african countries to change their export composition from largely low value-added agricultural exports to high value-added manufactured exports. this may account for their meager gains from international trade despite the large volumes traded. our findings also articulate the productivity-enhancing and, by extension, growth-enhancing effect of capital goods imports. a unit percentage increase in capital goods imports is associated with a growth of per capita income of about .03 percent and this effect is significant at the 1 percent level. this result strongly supports the widely held theoretical view that capital goods imports, especially from technologically advanced countries, embody the most current knowledge and technology. they, therefore, enhance economic growth via their knowledge and technology-enhancing effect. from a policy perspective, it can be argued that any policy option that stifles capital goods imports, for the case of sub-sahara african countries, stifles economic growth too. this is due to the fact that most countries in this region have an extreme disadvantage in the production of capital goods. governments should prioritize the importation of capital goods in order to enhance growth domestically. the effect of the savings rate in the solow neoclassical growth model is measured empirically by the ratio of real investment to real gdp. the growth in the gross capital formation as a percentage of gdp is positively associated with gdp per capita growth for the case of countries in our sample. a unit percentage increase in capital formation leads to an increase in gdp per capita growth between .02 and .03 percent. this effect is significant, at most, at the 5 percent level in all our models. therefore, there is strong statistical evidence that the growth in the gross capital formation as a percentage of gdp drives gdp per capita growth for the case of countries in our sample. accordingly, policies that increase savings in a country, such as building a strong financial sector, should be of great concern to the policy maker. it is noteworthy that due to collinearity we excluded capital goods imports from all models where gross capital formation is found. also, our findings articulate the role played by the country‟s size of government. we work under the assumption that the impact of government consumption expenditure on growth is ambiguous; either it enhances growth if the expenditure is on education, health and infrastructure or it distort private activities through crowding out effects hence it does not involve any productivity enhancing effects. the results show that the growth in per capita incomes increases with a fall in government consumption expenditure. specifically, a unit percentage increase in government consumption is associated with a reduction in the gdp per capita growth of 0.1. the negative and significant relationship between government expenditure and growth in our sample is evidence that a greater proportion the share of government consumption expenditure to gdp in ssa that on average stands at 14.5 (see table 1) is spent on unproductive ventures. therefore, sub-sahara african countries should strive to reduce nonproductive government expenditure, for example by reducing the size of their governments. the inflation variable is measured by the gdp deflator as a percentage annual growth. the coefficient on inflation has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. the negative sign implies that an excessive increase in prices in an economy is a sign of macroeconomic instability and 14 consilience therefore retards economic growth. a unit percentage increase in inflation leads to a decrease in gdp per capita growth by .01 percent. from the summary statistics (table 1), we found that the average percentage inflation rate in the sample is 14.7, with a maximum of 381 and a standard deviation of 32. this is evidence that countries in africa are still experiencing some macroeconomic instability; therefore from a policy perspective, there is need for prudent macroeconomic policies that would involve a mixture of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies that are targeted at lowering and stabilizing the rate of inflation. further, our findings are assertive on the role played by the political system and governance in enhancing gdp per capita growth. we employed in our estimation the civil liberties index6 from freedom house as a means of characterizing a country‟s political system and governance. this variable has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at 1 percent. this implies that increase in civil rights enhances economic growth. literature presents the political system and governance as an important determinant of economic growth (see, for example, barro, 1996 and 2004). therefore, sub-sahara african countries should strive to achieve good governance consisting of maximum possible civil liberties as a precondition for sustained economic growth. in line with previous literature (loayza, 1996; and calderon et al., 2001) our findings are assertive on the economic growth-enhancing role of public services and infrastructure. we employ in our analysis the number of telephone lines per 1000 people as our measure of infrastructure and public services development. the choice of this measure, over others such as kilometers of paved roads and energy generation capacity, was determined by data availability issues. the growth in the telephone lines per 1000 people is positive and significant in our regressions. this implies a growth-enhancing effect via productivity-enhancing effect of infrastructural development. if telephone lines per 1000 people grow by 1 per cent, it leads to an increase in gdp per capita growth of between .02 and .03 percent. further, we also find human capital development playing an important role in the growth of gdp per capita. we used secondary school enrolment rate as a measure of human capital development and it was found to be positive and significant at 1 percent. if secondary school enrollment rate increases by 1 percent, it leads to an increase in gdp per capita growth between .07 and .12 percent. therefore, sub-sahara african countries should invest in human capital development through education for favorable economic growth outcomes. 4. conclusions this paper was guided by the hypothesis that it is not exports per se that matter, but different exports components influence growth in varying ways. we considered a sample of 35 sub-sahara african countries determined by data availability on the key variables of the study and not by arbitrary selection. the gmm estimator was employed during the analysis. we find that growth in 6 civil liberties index was sourced from freedom house. it presents freedom of expression, religion, education, travel and other personal rights. countries are ranked on a scale of 1-7. a country with fewest rights is given a rank of seven and a country with maximum rights is given a rank of one. consilience bbaale and mutenyo: export composition agricultural exports is positively and significantly associated with per capita income growth for countries in our sample. however, the contribution of manufactured exports to per capita income growth is insignificant. therefore, a growth-enhancing effect can be attributed to agricultural exports and not manufactured export for the case of countries in our sample. this empirical finding is in support of the paper‟s main hypothesis that some export components are more important for growth than others. however, it is against the widely held theoretical view that manufactured exports are more productivityand growth-enhancing due to the greater knowledge and technological spillover associated with manufactured compared to agricultural exports. it seems the case that sub-sahara african countries in our sample still enjoy a comparative advantage in agricultural rather than manufacturing exports. whereas it is more benefiting for countries in our sample to promote agricultural exports, this is not to suggest that they should not pay attention to industrialization at all. these countries should adopt policies that increase agricultural exports in the medium term as they design strategies for increasing manufacturing exports in the long term. it might be the case that the stage of development they have so far attained is not yet conducive for gaining a comparative advantage in manufacturing exports. generally, our findings are in line with previous literature for the held view that exports per se do not matter for growth. however, our results may be pointing to the failure of most sub-sahara african countries to change their export composition from largely low value-added agricultural exports to high value-added manufactured exports. this may account for their meager gains from international trade despite the large volumes traded. our findings also articulate the productivity-enhancing and, by extension, growth-enhancing effect of capital goods imports. this result strongly supports the widely held theoretical view that capital goods imports, especially from technologically advanced countries, embody the most current knowledge and technology. from a policy perspective, it can be argued that any policy option that stifles capital goods imports, for the case of sub-sahara african countries, stifles economic growth too. this is due to the fact that most countries in this region have an extreme disadvantage in the production of capital goods. governments should prioritize the importation of capital goods in order to enhance growth domestically. other factors that significantly influence economic growth are gross capital formation percentage of gdp, infrastructure, government consumption, the inflation rate, political systems and governance, and human capital development. one major weakness with our data is that the 35 countries that were selected are heterogeneous in nature. their differences rage from social-political, economic, demographic and geographical. for instance some of the countries have been relatively politically stable since independence, such as kenya, malawi, mauritius, tanzania and zambia. others are relatively more industrialized, such as mauritius and south africa. even among those considered agricultural countries, some depend chiefly on one export crop, such as burundi ethiopia and uganda. others are resource rich, particularly the mineral and oil producing countries. others are landlocked, such as burundi, malawi, rwanda, uganda and zambia. some are either conflict or post conflict countries. such diversity might lead to misleading generalized deductions. therefore future research could put this diversity into consideration. also, for further research, a deeper disaggregation of export 16 consilience components is still needed that may consider individual commodities or their broad groups as regressors in a growth model. consilience bbaale and mutenyo: export composition bibliography agosin, m. 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(2005), “skill intensity in foreign trade and economic growth”, empirica, vol. 32(1), pp. 117-144. yang, d. t., and x. zhu. 2004. modernization of agriculture and long-run growth. preliminary and incomplete notes. microsoft word schapperfinalconsilience-2.doc schapper 1 from the global to the local: how international children’s rights in bangladesh reach the grassroots level andrea schapper schapper@bigsss@uni-bremen.de andrea schapper is a phd fellow at the bremen international graduate school of social sciences in germany and is currently a visiting student at the graduate school for asian studies at cornell university in ithaca, new york, usa. for her dissertation project, she has conducted three months of field research in bangladesh and india. before taking up her phd research, she worked as an international consultant for the international labour organization at their headquarters in geneva, switzerland. schapper 2 scholarly abstract the government of bangladesh has ratified the un convention on the rights of the child and the ilo worst forms of child labor convention. although national legislation pertaining to children’s rights is inconsistent and the national child labor policy has yet to be adopted, many activities to transport children’s rights principles to underprivileged children have already been initiated in bangladesh. these mainly take the form of projects by international organizations or the bangladesh government, implemented through local nongovernmental organizations or local government structures. two programs are introduced here, the rural “food for education” program and the urban project, “prevention and elimination of selected worst forms of child labour in the informal economy in dhaka city”. both are analyzed in terms of what mechanisms and actor constellations were used to promote children’s rights at the grassroots level. even though these projects reflect the principles of global norms and transport them to the local people, reaching out to a high number of underprivileged and poor children remains a challenge. schapper 3 author’s note during my work as a carlo-schmid-scholar at the international labour organization, i conducted research on projects that aim to increase school enrolment and attendance, reduce dropout rates, and eliminate child labor. after reading quantitative evaluation reports, i wondered if these programs indeed reflect the principles of international legal instruments. additionally, i asked myself if these activities are actually necessary after national governments have already committed themselves to guarantee these rights. i also wondered why, despite increasing ratification rates, human rights situations do not necessarily improve. against this background i decided to create a qualitative research project that systematically traces the process of international human rights gaining meaning among its local addressees. this resulted in a dissertation project on children’s rights implementation with a larger case study involving field research in bangladesh. keywords: children’s rights, child labor, education, bangladesh. schapper 4 from the global to the local: how international children’s rights in bangladesh reach the grassroots level introduction inspired by mary robinson, the former united nations high commissioner of human rights, who was convinced that if human rights doesn’t have meaning locally, it has little meaning elsewhere,1 i started my dissertation project eager to find out how global human rights norms can reach the local level. i was particularly interested in the steps that need to be taken after the ratification of legal human rights instruments, and i wondered what mechanisms and actors have to be in place to make these rights meaningful to the local people. i chose bangladesh as a case study because after the ratification process of international children’s rights and the adoption of national legislation and policies, many activities were initiated there to actually transport principles of these rights to the grassroots level. in other words, children’s rights implementation in bangladesh constitutes a data rich case. the two most important principles in global child rights are 1) the right to education and the right to health, as anchored in the convention on the rights of the child; and 2) protection from economic exploitation and hazardous work as codified in the ilo worst forms of child labour convention. considering the bangladesh context, there are two compelling questions. first, how do principles of international conventions reach the 3.179 million child laborers, 40.6 percent of whom are engaged in hazardous work? second, can education be provided to working children, 41.3% of whom are illiterate?2 gender economically active children (eac) child labor (cl) children in hazardous work (chw) child labor as percent of eac chw as percent of eac chw as percent of cl total 7423 3179 1291 42.8 17.4 40.6 boys 5471 2461 1172 45.0 21.4 47.6 girls 1952 718 120 36.8 6.1 16.7 economically active children (ages 5 to 17), child labor, and hazardous work by gender in millions (current status) 3 schapper 5 may-july 2008; dhaka, bangladesh; child laborers in an urban slum making bracelets to sell. this dark, sticky room without proper equipment constitutes a hazardous working environment. the children, many of whom are below the legal age for employment, must cower on the cold stone floor. to address these two questions, i examined projects that reach out to local children. these projects are complex and multilayered, ranging from programs led by international organizations (ios) and non-governmental organizations (ngos) to governmental programs that address children’s rights in urban slums and poor rural areas. for my case study, i selected projects that have been independently evaluated to study the mechanisms that contributed most to the achievement of their objectives. during a three-month research stay in bangladesh, i conducted problem-centered interviews with ios, ngos, and bangladesh government officials to gather more data on implementation processes. i also collected observational data via field visits to the project locations and by talking to participants. these field notes summarize my observations and findings after visiting and analyzing two projects. 1. global child rights agreements the government of bangladesh commits itself to numerous global child rights agreements, including the 1990 united nations convention on the rights of child (crc). on august 3rd, 1990, the bangladeshi government ratified the crc with only a single schapper 6 reservation. 4 the principles of this convention, summarized as the views of the child,5 include non-discrimination, consideration of the best interests of the child, the right to life, survival, and development, and the idea that children’s opinions must be heard and taken seriously. the crc highlights the need for free and compulsory education, the entitlement to the highest attainable standard of health, protection from economic exploitation and from work that interferes with children’s education and health, and time to rest and play. 6 on march 12th, 2001, bangladesh also ratified the 1999 ilo worst forms of child labour convention. this convention calls for the immediate elimination of the worst forms of child labor defined as (a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery; (b) child prostitution or pornography; (c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, such as drug trafficking; and (d) work which is by nature and circumstances likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.7 forms of labor that jeopardize children’s mental, physical or moral wellbeing are called hazardous child labour and their abolition is mandated as a priority for ratifying state governments. an additional international standard of global child rights, which bangladesh still refuses to legally commit itself to, is the 1973 ilo minimum age convention. this convention demands that ratifying governments determine a minimum age for employment. for countries with less developed economies and education systems, the minimum age for entry into work should be no less than 14 years.8 2. national legislation and policies in bangladesh there are also national policies in bangladesh that concern child labor. several parallel national acts define various ages for legal admission to the labor market between 12 and 18 years of age. these rules and acts only partly reflect the regulations of the ilo convention on minimum age, but are generally in tune with the ilo convention on the worst forms of child labour. apart from this rather antiquated national legislation, there are few national laws and policies that promote child rights. one policy, the compulsory primary education act (1990), attempts to achieve universal primary education in accordance with the crc. 9 after 1993, a compulsory primary education system was established in bangladesh and in the following years, the government significantly increased its budget.10 the constitution of the people’s republic of bangladesh contains two major ratified principles of international children’s rights, namely free and compulsory education and the prohibition of forced labor. schapper 7 after 1992, there were attempts to rearrange this group of rules and regulations under a single umbrella legislation. finally, in 2006, the new labour code was passed, including national standards that reflect the 1973 ilo minimum age convention.11 to respond to the ratification of the ilo worst forms of child labour convention, several drafts of a national child labor policy are now circulating among government officials, io experts, local ngo staff, and academics. even though it has not yet been adopted, signals are positive that a final draft will be passed within the foreseeable future.12 altogether, national legislation and policies pertaining to child protection are inconsistent, but newer regulations are becoming more effective. nevertheless, even if these national laws constitute a necessary condition for the promotion of children’s rights, they do not sufficiently assure that these rights will reach the children at the grassroots. 3. project interventions transporting rights to the local level legally protecting and reaching out to poor and underprivileged children in urban slums and rural areas of bangladesh is a challenge. two different interventions that aim to transport principles of children’s rights to the local level are introduced here. first, the bangladesh government initiated food for education programs in target rural areas to promote the right to free and compulsory education as defined in the crc. in 2002, the governmental food-for-schooling program turned into a primary education stipend (pes) program because of leakage in food distribution. second, the ilo project “prevention and elimination of selected worst forms of child labour in the informal economy in dhaka city” promotes the immediate elimination of hazardous child labor in urban areas. to analyze the programs’ strategies, mechanisms, and actors, i undertook several problemcentered interviews with relevant governmental and nongovernmental experts, informal interviews with project participants, and on-site field observations. 3.1 food for education the government of bangladesh initiated the food for education (ffe) program as an incentive to increase school enrollment and reduce dropout rates. one essential strategy was the use of a two-step targeting mechanism to help reach out to the most needy. in the first step, economically aggrieved areas with low literacy rates were selected. within these areas, households with primary school aged children were eligible to participate if they met at least one of the following conditions:  the family was landless or owned less than half an acre of land;  the parents were day laborers; schapper 8  the household was female-headed;  the parents were engaged in certain low-income occupations, such as fishing, pottery, or blacksmithing.13 beneficiary households were entitled to receive a free monthly food ration, in the form of up to 20 kilograms of wheat or 16 kilograms of rice, if their primary school aged child attended school on a regular basis (at least 85 percent of classes). the families could either consume the food ration or sell it for cash to satisfy other basic needs. local government structures like the school management committee and private food retailers arranged the food distribution and project implementation. tapan kumar chakravorty, deputy director of the primary education and stipend program in bangladesh’s ministry of primary and mass education, told me about the challenges that the ffe faced.14 the challenges he identified had to do with project management, time constraints, manpower constraints, and the rise in food price. however, he did not mention the harmful influence of heavy leakage, corruption allegations found by the international food policy research institute (ifpri). private food retailers did not distribute the designated amount of wheat or rice to the beneficiaries and too much food got lost on the way to the ones in need. as a response to the problems that the program faced, the ffe program turned into a primary education stipend project in 2002. eligible students now receive 100 bdt per month and their mothers obtain the bankcards needed to collect the money. the conditions for participation remained almost the same. students now have to attend at least 85 percent of classes and achieve 40 percent pass marks. a 2002 ifrpi evaluation revealed that school enrollment increased by about 35 percent, particularly remarkably for girls, whose enrollment increased by 44 percent. it is also important to note that the program has helped raise awareness of children’s rights: as mr. chakravorty told me, “the teachers are telling the students that it is your social right; you must be educated. […] education for all is the government commitment.”15 additionally, attendance rates have risen, dropout rates have decreased, and the quality of education has improved as it becomes less disturbed by fluctuation. as of 2008, 5.5 million students receive the stipend in 65,000 primary schools in rural bangladesh. gorad government primary school in savar upazila was one of the first schools to introduce the ffe program in 1993. miah mohammed kahlilur rahman, the headmaster, told me that after the program was introduced, enrollment increased significantly. however, the right to education created unexpected problems; for instance, there were not enough teachers schapper 9 or enough space after the enrollment increase. the parents and teachers’ association and the school management committee solved these problems by hiring voluntary, unpaid honorary teachers. two program beneficiaries who i talked to, sonia and uzzale of class 5 of gorad government primary school, explained that they can even use part of the money for a private tutor who helps them advance their learning achievements. they said that without these benefits it would be hard for them to regularly attend school. may-july 2008. savar, bangladesh: classroom at gorad government primary school. when i visited the classes, the effect of the program was obvious. in the first class, 74 of 92 total students were present. of the 30 students in the class who received a stipend, 29 were in class. according to mohammed abdul aziz, an upazila education officer in savar, all unions in bangladesh are now covered with the stipend program. this is another advantage over the ffe, which only reaches the poorest areas. still, due to financial constraints, only 40 percent of the students in program schools are eligible to receive the stipend, a challenge that remains to be addressed. my visit to this project site also revealed opportunities and challenges of undertaking grassroots research in developing countries. because the education officer and district monitoring officer accompanied me to the school, i was easily able to gain access; however, it was also almost impossible to discuss difficulties with participants due to the presence of schapper 10 my official companion. the classes at the primary school seemed to be showcased to me as an example, as they had a high number of attending students who took classes in relatively well-equipped classrooms. after visiting with students, i ate lunch with the headmaster and a few teachers. the lunch was luxurious for that part of bangladesh, however the interpreter— a government official—blocked my critical questions about attendance rates and the possibility of students continuing to be involved in child labor. may-july 2008. savar, bangladesh: school children at gorad government primary school. the world food program continues the ffe program with its own component called the school feeding program. the short-term objectives of the program are identical to the ffe project, namely to improve school enrollment and attendance and to reduce the number of dropouts. however, according to shahida akther, project officer at the world food program in bangladesh, it is unfeasible to give a cooked school meal to every student in bangladesh, the most densely populated country in the world. it is too difficult to handle the cooking along with space problems at school facilities. the school feeding program responds to these challenges by providing high nutrition biscuits to children as an incentive to attend school regularly. one package of biscuits contains 67 percent of the recommended daily schapper 11 nutrient intake for each student. teachers hand out the biscuits in the morning so children do not have to be hungry during class. the distribution of biscuits is conditional on regular school attendance and the teachers have to ensure that students finish their package in class and do not take it home to sell or share it with others. additionally, health services are delivered to program participants. together the ffe programs and the governmental primary education stipend program have promoted the principles set forth in the convention on the rights of the child, including the best interests of the child, the right to life, survival and development, the need for free and compulsory education, the entitlement to the highest attainable standard of health, and protection from economic exploitation and work via regular school attendance. increased school enrollment and attendance indicates that engagement in the worst forms of child labor is prevented. therefore, the program indirectly fosters principles in accordance with the ilo worst forms of child labour convention. the sophisticated targeting mechanism ensures that these principles of global norms are transported to the local level. 3.2 prevention and elimination of selected worst forms of child labour in the informal economy in dhaka city the project entitled “prevention and elimination of selected worst forms of child labour in the informal economy in dhaka city” was launched in 2001 by the ilo’s international programme on the elimination of child labour. the program aimed to address hazardous child labor in bangladesh. out of an estimated 1.3 billion bangladeshi children who are engaged in hazardous child labor, 90 percent are involved in the urban or rural informal economy. the project strategy included the following four components: (a) social protection; (b) monitoring, verification, and tracking; (c) advocacy and awareness; (d) capacity building.16 after a child withdraws from a hazardous workplace, three complimentary modules provide economically and socially viable alternatives for his or her family. a local ngo, dhaka ahsania mission (dam), helps provide project participants with non-formal education (nfe). nfe is a yearlong, child-friendly reintroduction to education, generally comprising of two-hour, daily sessions held in community-owned multi-purpose centers. after completion of this reintroduction program, younger children are integrated into the schapper 12 formal education system while older children move on to participate in skills development training (sdt). another local ngo, the underprivileged children’s educational program (ucep), which specializes in vocational training, provides these skill development courses. course options include motorcycle repairing, refrigeration and air conditioning, signboard and banner writing, embroidery and jori-chumki,17 tailoring, and dressmaking. the social and economic empowerment (see) component of the program targets the parents and guardians of former child laborers and seeks to provide them with an economic alternative to the children’s lost income. the resource integration centre (ric), another bangladeshi ngo, provides mothers of working children with a micro credit of 5,000-25,000 taka depending on what kind of business they want to start. the see component also provides women with business training to help them gain success in self-employment.18 may-july 2008. dhaka, bangladesh: the hazardous workplace of children in an informal biscuit factory. laborers kneel on the floor during their long working day; the huge oven in this tiny room creates an extremely hot environment. the factory owner revealed that he can only maintain his factory if he employs cheap laborers, predominantly child immigrants from rural areas who are, from a legal perspective, too young to take up employment. impact assessments showed that of the 30,000 children who enrolled in the nonformal education component of the ilo/ipec project, about 20,000 completed the course.19 children who graduated from the nfe component also significantly improved their health status. an change in attitude regarding child labor became apparent as more participants schapper 13 became convinced that children should not start working at such a young age. only 180 children have graduated from skills development training; this low graduation rate can be attributed to the fact that the sdt component had to be redesigned throughout the project when it did not meet the determined objectives. nevertheless, more than 90 percent of the sdt graduates found a decent workplace. lastly, about 9,500 guardians and parents of former child laborers received micro-credit through the see component of the project. those participating in three loan cycles experienced a significant increase in economic wellbeing. ronald e. berghuys, ilo/ipec chief technical advisor in bangladesh, attributed the success of the program to its comprehensive and participatory approach, and especially the fact that the community took over program ownership. during the targeting process, very poor children could be identified at hazardous workplaces and were convinced to take part in the project. before this project intervention, children had been unaware of their rights: “they are surviving in an urban jungle,” said mr. berghuys, “the notion that they have certain rights is very often simply not there. and that’s also sustained, of course, by, let’s say, by overall society.”20 to speak with some of the project’s participants, i visited hazaribagh and lalbagh, target areas in of the ilo/ipec project. i felt like a gatecrasher when i entered this independent entity at the margin of the mega city of dhaka. it appeared like a world of its own, with its own structures, laws, citizens, and authorities, and i left with a sense of not having learned enough. finding a particular spot in hazaribagh seemed impossible if you were unfamiliar with the area, especially as a “bedeshi,” a white foreigner—while in hazaribagh, i attracted the attention of the locals who did not hesitate to show curiosity and question my country of origin. the slum was overcrowded with informal businesses and houses, as well as littered with leather shreds from the tanneries, garbage rifled through by crows, goats, and countless flies. cooking smells mixed with the smoke of informal shops and the stink of human excrement on unfortified tiny paths, which during monsoon time turned into smelly muddy creeks; the water on these creeks reflected the colors of the nearby factory’s chemicals. one of the most impressive encounters i made in hazaribagh was with a group of ilo/ipec beneficiaries who break with ingrained gender roles and family traditions to struggle for a brighter future of their formerly working children. the women’s group i met was comprised of 22 enthusiastic female business owners cramped into a single room in one of their homes. the ilo field workers who guided me and my companion, a dutch researcher, to hazaribagh translated our informal interviews. once a week, the women get schapper 14 together to pay back dues and discuss problems related to their new self-employment in the urban slums of dhaka. they seemed shy at first, quietly watching us while sitting on the floor and offering us the only comfortable seats on the bed. however, the longer we remained their guests, the more thrilled they became about sharing their experiences in the ilo micro-credit program. their children had formerly been working in the leather industry, but now the women acted as breadwinners, buying and lending out rickshaws, garments, or dishes on the market, or doing block and batik printing. may-july 2008. dhaka, bangladesh: women’s group receiving micro-credit. when i asked if their children still worked, the women became enraged and loudly exclaimed replies at the same time. they felt it was a mistake that their children worked earlier, they told me. now the children were in school and not employed because school education is more profitable in the long run. also, with the help of their businesses and micro-credit possibilities, the women could afford the school costs. after school, the children engaged in homework, reading, and playing; some of them even saw a private tutor. however, the women’s experience in the see component of the program hadn’t run altogether smoothly. they frankly referred to the problems they faced, like the fact that some of their cycle schapper 15 rickshaws had been stolen. but in cases like these, they stuck together and profited from a common pot of savings. my experiences studying the “prevention and elimination of selected worst forms of child labour in the informal economy in dhaka city” program led me to believe that the principles anchored in the ilo convention and the worst forms of child labour reached project participants at the grassroots level. the program also addresses the rights set forth in the crc regarding education, health, and development. principles like free and compulsory education and entitlement to the highest attainable standard of health were also reflected in the project objectives and promoted with the help of this ilo/ipec project. despite the fact that the ilo minimum age convention has not been ratified in bangladesh, its basic principles have still been promoted through enrolling working children in non-formal education and providing them with skill training when they reach the legal age of employment. through a targeting strategy aimed at catering to needs of child laborers engaged in hazardous occupations, local ngos have reached the working children in the dhaka slum of hazaribagh. 4. conclusion as seen in these case studies, the process of implementing child rights norms can be successfully traced from the global to the local level. after the ratification and adoption of international children’s rights, certain interventions were necessary for these rights to reach the grassroots level. these interventions were largely successful; however, problems still existed, including management problems, corruption, and ignorance about the root causes of the child rights situation, such as education deficits and socio-cultural perceptions. in order to achieve a sustainable impact after these projects have terminated, it is essential to create an environment for change, a community awareness of children’s rights, and a demand for the provision of all rights-related services that the government has committed to provide. if this is accomplished, protected and empowered children may break the cycle of poverty and contribute to a process of sustainable development. reaching out to children in developing countries who are deprived of their basic rights remains a challenge, but the programs mentioned here have been largely successful in achieving their goals by using sophisticated targeting procedures, increased awareness, capacity building, and community ownership of project initiatives. schapper 16 notes 1 mary robinson, “making human rights matter: eleanor roosevelt’s time has come,” harvard human rights journal 16 (2003): 2. 2 bangladesh bureau of statistics, ministry of planning, report on national child labour survey (dhaka, bangladesh: government of the people’s republic of bangladesh, 2003) 63. 3 ibid. 4 the government of bangladesh claims that article 21 on child adoption is not in accordance with muslim law. 5 office of the high commisisoner for human rights, “fact sheet no.10 (rev.1): the rights of the child,” ohchr.org, 17 feb. 2009 <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs10.htm>. 6 ibid. 7 international labor organization, “c182 worst forms of child labour convention, 1999,” ilo.org, 2006, 17 feb. 2009 <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?c182>. 8 international labor organization, “c138 minimum age convention, 1973,” ilo.org, 2006, 17 feb. 2009 <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?c138>. for the specific problem context in bangladesh see mathew j. bannermann and ronald e. berghuys, breaking the cycle: key learning from an ilo-ipec project in bangladesh (international labour office, 2008) 11. 9 sumaiya khair, child labour in bangladesh: a forward looking policy study (geneva: international programme on the elimination of child labour, ilo, 2005) 5. 10 international programme on the elimination of child labour, child labour and responses: overview note – bangladesh, geneva: international programme on the elimination of child labour (geneva: international labour office, 2004) 3. 11 khair 37. 12 “nat'l policy on elimination of child labour within month,” the daily star [bangladesh] 12 jun. 2008: 3. also see “govt targets child labour phase out,” the daily star [bangladesh] 7 jul. 2008: 16. 13 akhter u. ahmed and suresh c. babu, “the impact of food for education programs in bangladesh,” food policy for developing countries: case studies, 2007, cornell university, 17 feb. 2009 <http://cip.cornell.edu/dns.gfs/1200428158> 5. 14 tapan kumar chakravorty, personal interview, dhaka, bangladesh, 17 jul. 2008 schapper 17 15 chakravorty. 16 bannermann and berghuys 1. 17 a special kind of glitter work from bangladesh. 18 bannermann and berghuys 24. 19 ibid. 42. 19 ronald e. berghuys, personal interview, dhaka, bangladesh, 19 may 2008. schapper 18 works cited ahmed, akhter u., and suresch c. babu. “the impact of food for education programs in bangladesh.” food policy for developing countries: case studies. 2007. cornell university. 17 feb. 2009 <http://cip.cornell.edu/dns.gfs/1200428158>. bangladesh bureau of statistics, ministry of planning. report on national child labour survey. dhaka, bangladesh: government of the people’s republic of bangladesh, 2003. bannermann, mathew j., and ronald e. berghuys. breaking the cycle: key learning from an ilo-ipec project in bangladesh. geneva: international labour office, 2008. berghuys, ronald e. personal interview. dhaka, bangladesh. 19 may 2008. chakravorty, tapan kumar. personal interview. dhaka, bangladesh. 17 jul. 2008. “govt targets child labour phase out.” the daily star [bangladesh] 7 jul. 2008: 16. international labor organization. “c138 minimum age convention, 1973.” ilo.org. 2006. 17 feb. 2009 <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?c138>. ---. “c182 worst forms of child labour convention, 1999.” ilo.org. 2006. 17 feb. 2009 <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?c182>. international programme on the elimination of child labour. child labour and responses: overview note – bangladesh, geneva: international programme on the elimination of child labour. geneva: international labour office, 2004. khair, sumaiya. child labour in bangladesh: a forward looking policy study. international programme on the elimination of child labour. geneva: international labour office, 2005. “nat'l policy on elimination of child labour within month.” the daily star [bangladesh] 12 jun. 2008: 3. office of the high commissioner for human rights. “convention on the rights of the child.” ohchr.org. 2003. 11 aug. 2008 <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm>. ---. “fact sheet no.10 (rev.1): the rights of the child.” ohchr.org. 17 feb. 2009 <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs10.htm>. ---. “status of ratification of the convention on the rights of the child.” ohchr.org. 2003. 11 aug. 2008 <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/crc/treaties/status-crc.htm>. ---. “united nations treaty collection 2001: declarations and reservations.” ohchr.org. 9 oct. 2001. 11 aug. 2008 <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty15_asp.htm>. schapper 19 robinson, mary. “making human rights matter: eleanor roosevelt’s time has come.” harvard human rights journal 16 (2003): 2-11. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 6, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 91–112 urban nomads of petra: an alternative interpretation of the bedoul bedouin‟s relationship with history and space layan fuleihan department of anthropology columbia university, new york, ny lsf2114@columbia.edu abstract jordan‟s efforts to become a stronger state in the global community have frequently conflicted with the bedouin population‟s desire to continue its seminomadic and pastoral tradition. the bedoul, who claim ancestral heritage to the ancient city of petra, face a complex conflict with the urbanizing state. this paper offers an alternative evaluation of the relationship between the state and seminomadic communities by reexamining historical trends and the bedoul bedouin condition through a multi-dimensional analytic, which is inspired by the concept of the global city as defined by saskia sassen. by referring to this analytical lens as the “global city aesthetic,” i intend to make use of the analytical method that allowed for the global city to be defined, to make room for the reality of contradictions, and finally, to be sensitive to the imagery and dynamics inspired by the concept of the global city. furthermore, i hope to demonstrate the ability of this alternative approach to transcend the limitations of historiographical approaches that emphasize divergent over synthetic trends, and thereby to reevaluate conflicts to create space for reconciliation. this analytical method also transcends the temporal hierarchy that overvalues the present and devalues the past by considering historical realities in an assessment of contemporary conditions. finally, an application to the issue of desertification illustrates the analytic‟s versatility and relevance to a variety of issues. acknowledgements i would like to thank elif alp for her invaluable encouragement and support and chie sakikabara phd, for her edits, comments, and suggestions throughout the writing process. finally, i would like to extend my gratitude to prof. saskia sassen for designing a curriculum that, with a combination of theoretical readings and engaged discussions of applications, inspired this research. keywords: bedouin, petra, desertification, nomadism, jordan. . 92 consilience 1. introduction directly translated as “desert dweller,” the term “bedouin” describes an individual who practices pastoral nomadism in the semi-arid terrain of the middle east. historically, the bedouins comprised the majority of the region‟s population; however, due to urbanization and development of the jordanian state, an increase in large-scale agricultural activity and changing cultural and economic norms, there are currently very few communities that identify as semi-nomadic. although government attempts to impose sedentism have been much more respectful and beneficent when compared to similar programs in other countries, especially israel (berman-kishony, 2008), the cultural and societal losses and the destructive potential of this forced transition cannot be ignored. the situation of the bedoul bedouins is much more complex than that of other tribes. claiming to be the descendents of the nabataeans,1 they inhabited the ruins and remains of the ancient nabataean city of petra until it was listed as a world heritage site in 1985. to preserve the archeological site and because historical inquiries have proved the bedouin‟s ancestral claims to be false, jordan, with the help of unesco, forcibly resettled the bedoul to the nearby village of um sayhun (university of arkansas, 2010; ronay, 2002). due to overpopulation, inadequate resources, and a desire to reclaim cultural identity, the bedoul have slowly started to return to petra in violation of governmental ordinances (ma'ayeh, 2010). the bedoul understand themselves as “urban nomads:” as both nomadic bedouins and petra-dwelling urbanites. although this position is not problematic for them, it seems paradoxical by definition. in reaction, one might dismiss their romanticized cultural history and claims of ancestry as a result of historical ignorance, yet the strength of bedouin attachment to the space is so strong that the danger of this solution poses an immediate and urgent threat of cultural destruction. by reexamining the bedoul bedouin condition with a multi-dimensional approach that is inspired by and based upon the concept of the global city, i hope to challenge perspectives that characterize the relationship between the state and seminomadic communities as mutually exclusive. using the proposed analytical framework, this paper explores alternative ways to understand this dichotomy in order to resolve the contradiction inherent in the bedoul bedouin‟s claim to petra. i argue that much of the problem arises from a temporal hierarchy that overvalues the present and devalues the past. the proposed analytical framework, known as the “global city aesthetic,” seeks to revalue the past by reconsidering the effect of history on contemporary realities. this revaluation will involve a redefinition of the categories “sedentary” and “nomadic” by reconsidering their historical meanings as well as a reconsideration of the bedouin identity, taking into account petra‟s urban legacy. firstly, i will clearly define the direct effect of temporal hierarchies on the bedoul and identify how this complicates or obscures their relationship to the state. then, i will define the global city aesthetic and its analytical utility and then apply the analytical framework to redefine the historical perception of petra and the categories 1 the nabataeans (previously nomadic tribe) founded petra about 2000 years ago. they developed into a strong, sedentary empire known for their economic success in frankincense trade and fine pottery. petra was their main urban center. consilience fuleihan: urban nomads of sedentism and nomadism. finally, i will return to the bedoul with these historical reevaluations to resolve the contradiction created by their position as “urban nomads.” finally, the appendix offers a more specific application of the global city aesthetic to contemporary struggles with desertification in jordan to show the analytic‟s flexibility and relevance to multiple issues. this test of the global city aesthetic as an analytical lens aims to not only shed light on the bedoul condition, but also to demonstrate the need to consider abstract and multidimensional aspects of the conflicts created by globalization. especially in the field of sustainable development, this interdisciplinary outlook is absolutely essential because it makes room for an approach that considers all possible consequences of proposed policy, regardless of when or how these consequences are felt. furthermore, planning for the future requires us to give value to time beyond the present. an analytical framework that equips us to transcend temporal hierarchies can enable this reevaluation. this article, specifically concerning the bedoul, will define such an analytical framework through its application to the current conditions of the relationship between the bedoul, petra, and the state of jordan. such a demonstration hopes to not only provide an alternative perspective of these relationships but to also define a new method of analysis that can be used in other areas of sustainable development. 2. the bedoul bedouin: refugees of history the website of the late king hussein observes that “jordan is a land steeped in history,” a characterization, which hints at the source of internal conflict jordan now faces. the desire to become a strong and urbanized economic contender in the new globalization paradigm is countered by the nation‟s self-definition, which depends upon its rich historical past. continuing through the text on king hussein‟s website under the subtitle “keys of a nation,” one can see how strong and central this historical national consciousness actually is: it [jordan] has been home to some of mankind's earliest settlements and villages, and relics of many of the world's great civilizations can still be seen today. as the crossroads of the middle east, the lands of jordan and palestine have served as a strategic nexus connecting asia, africa and europe. thus, since the dawn of civilization, jordan's geography has given it an important role to play as a conduit for trade and communications, connecting east and west, north and south. jordan continues to play this role today... (a living tribute to the legacy of king hussein i, 2010) effortlessly and seamlessly, ancient jordan is thus linked to the contemporary nation, maintaining a static and constant identity both internally and in relation to the external world. the perspective offered by the official governmental website demonstrates both a strong feeling of nostalgia for the past as well as historical foundations for national pride. logically, one might expect that this very same reverence extends to the bedouin people, the remaining semi-nomadic pastoralists who, as it is generally understood, are the last to maintain the traditional lifestyle of ancient jordan. it is 94 consilience certainly true that they are celebrated. petra is jordan‟s most advertised and cherished tourist site, and the jordanian historical discourse includes the bedouin as their ancestors and founders even though this has been proven false. visitors to petra are encouraged to not only enjoy the archeological aspects of the site, but to also get a feel for the bedouin way of life in surrounding areas. by participating in one of the visits offered by petra nights tours, a tourist can “spend some time in wadi rum, dana, wadi arava, where some of them [bedouin] still live the traditional way… ride a camel, hike with a bedouin guide or spend a night camping with a bedouin meal” ("jordan special interest tours," 2010). in this way, the bedouin are simultaneously admired and relegated to part of the archeological exhibit. like the ruins of petra, they are historical remnants and are not considered as participants in the modern world. rather than considering the bedouin as part of the contemporary jordanian population, the tourist industry considers them a nostalgic demonstration of history. the bedouin make up a very small proportion of the contemporary jordanian population: according to the u.s. department of state, 70% of the jordanian population is urban, and less than 6% remain nomadic. despite the small size of the nomadic population, however, jordan‟s developmental goals seem to be in urgent conflict with the bedouin way of life. nomadism is established as a contradiction to urban development; historically, there have always been tensions between the two lifestyles in which the sedentary state seeks to control the mobile pastoralists (shoup, 1984). consequently, as jordan has developed stronger urban centers and more modern infrastructure, bedouins have been marginalized (burnett, 1999) (bocco, 1994). most obviously, as borders, highways, and conscious spatial reordering occurred throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, these boundaries obstructed traditional pastoral travel patterns and fragmented available land. this also forced the bedouins to give up rotating cereal cultivation in favor of fruit and vegetable gardens: a combination of this land fragmentation and new ownership policy as well as jordan‟s development of mining economies are blamed for the involuntary shift from semi-nomadic pastoralism to sedentary agriculture (khairy, 1984). along with these indirect pressures, jordan has implemented programs to explicitly encourage sedentarization (berman-kishony, 2008). such programs are generally understood to be inspired by the perception of the traditional bedouin as a threat to the general appearance of jordan‟s development. generally, nomadic pastoralism is perceived as incongruent with modern development (walls, 1980); however, it is also plausible that in the current political context characterizing the middle east, jordan is especially averse to the image created by mobile communities because of their similarities to refugee populations. ostensibly, both are temporary, transitional human settlements that have no designated place in the organization of the nation and, as living evidence of policy failures and conflict, can affect the nation‟s international relationships as well. (zolberg, 2006). therefore, it is highly likely that jordan‟s policy approach to the bedouin is informed by such fear and disapproval of the international communities towards the refugee. perhaps in response to this international attitude, or to make the transition to sedentarism more appealing and thus reduce conflict, jordan has also created programs to bring the benefits of urbanity to bedouin communities, providing greater access to education, healthcare centers, and even computers (trombly, 200). consilience fuleihan: urban nomads as a result, bedouins have become increasingly reliant on the state for their health and well-being. according to typical discourse and conversation concerning distributive justice, jordan‟s imposed urban resources are generally understood as necessary to ensure that development does not marginalize sections of the population, for with greater development comes greater responsibility to ensure that all have access to basic needs (walls, 1980). this method of imposing change has allowed the government to characterize the transition from a nomadic to a sedentary lifestyle as a responsible and beneficial change, even one that is welcomed by the bedouins themselves (madeley, 1986). misrepresenting bedouin attitudes, jordan describes forced sedentarization as a positive and welcomed policy. to enhance this positive portrayal, jordan also seeks to establish the traditional bedouin lifestyle as backwards and therefore, incompatible with modern society. logically, an outdated mode of living should be abandoned in order to achieve a higher quality of life. similarly, the website of the jordanian embassy, which is directed at an american audience with western developmental ideals, characterizes these changes as beneficial and well-received: “the bedoul bedouin today are in transition from a pastoral existence where most of them lived in the rooms they call „caves‟ carved by the nabataeans two thousand years ago,” ronay stated. they farmed in very small plots of land and herded their livestock.. today, she adds, these bedouins are “adjusting to „modern‟ life which now includes running water, electricity, mass media and cell phones as well as a greatly expanded diet and better health care in their village of um sayhun initially built by the jordanian government for this tribe. (embassy of jordan (washington, d.c.)) from this description, sedentarization is defined as a form of aid and as a beneficial change for the community. unfortunately, these benefits also have consequences. while increased education and health care is of course beneficial to any community, such introductions to the bedouin are accompanied by decreased access to traditional sources of food, namely milk and meat, which depend on a pastoral nomadic lifestyle. this decreased access has been shown to be harmful to the health of bedouin children. in his study of the nutrition and health of bedouin preschool children, ibrahim m.d. khatib and ibrahim elmadfa concluded that the lack of access to milk and meat has forced urbanized bedouin to rely on powdered milk, creating lactose-intolerance and calcium deficiency in the population‟s youth. furthermore, he found that urbanization indirectly requires bedouin to spend money on other household goods besides food, such as appliances, toys, and entertainment products, if they intend to participate in sedentary lifestyle and culture. these expenditures limit their ability to afford the fresh produce from which urban communities benefit. consequently, the sedentary bedouin communities increasingly experience health problems arising from malnutrition and vitamin deficiency. khatib and elmadfa predict that this situation will only worsen with further urbanization. as illness and poor health deteriorates, bedouins increasingly rely on urban institutions to provide access to healthcare, yet with this increased participation in sedentary consumptive practice, health and well-being continues to decline. although increased healthcare seems beneficial, the resulting sedentarization is actually quite destructive. 96 consilience in effect, the tourism industry and governmental initiatives have defined the remaining bedouin population as a community that refuses to participate in modern society. in the eyes of the state, the bedouin not only reject jordan‟s national goals, but also refuse the positive changes globalization and urbanization can bring by asserting their nomadic lifestyle. they seem to be completely outside the mainstream jordanian social and national consciousness because they do not share the same desires or values. essentially, they are leftovers of a past historical era. combining both the negative connotations of a mobile lifestyle and the attitudes and approaches of the sedentary nation towards such communities, i characterize the condition of the bedouin as “refugees of history.” the space in which the bedouin traditionally practiced pastoral nomadic lifestyles is no longer available, leaving the community stranded and estranged much like current refugees of conflicts and nations. yet, this space is located historically rather than geographically; therefore, attempts to resolve this conflict must necessarily be of an unorthodox nature. regarding the condition of the bedoul, i offer the “global city aesthetic” as an alternative way of understanding petra as both a historical and contemporary presence in hopes of overcoming the obstacle created by relegating an entire community to a past era. using this analytical framework that reconsiders the importance of historical trends in contemporary perspectives, the bedoul‟s claims to petra can be seen as legitimate and worthy of consideration. 3. the global city aesthetic the “global city aesthetic” is based on saskia sassen‟s definition of the global city. noting some of the limitations of traditional approaches to understanding globalization, sassen characterized global cities as “command points in the organization of the world economy, key locations and marketplaces for the leading industries of the current period, and major sites of production including the production of innovations for these industries.” (sassen 2006, p. 9). these cities are also characterized as “nodes” in emerging global networks and are therefore, constantly in contact with other global cities and influenced by other geographic areas. this new definition is intended to consider what was neglected in the traditional discourse surrounding globalization: that the territorialization of capital and spatial attachment of services as information technologies make physical distance irrelevant and location arbitrary. a focus on the imagery of networks and nodes resolves this contradiction by taking a multi-scalar and multidisciplinary approach. the global city includes “multiple dimensions” (sassen 2006, p. 11) in its analysis of globalization and consequently produces alternative solutions to the most pressing issues of the contemporary world that are intensified by globalization, such as environmental destruction, growing wealth disparity, and violent conflict. this analytical method that looks for links, networks, and the coexistence of contradicting trends is essentially what the “global city aesthetic” is intended to invoke. the image of the global city as dynamic, connected, constantly oscillating, producing and receiving, and most importantly, illuminating the simultaneous processes of spatial attachment and detachment is quite singular and unique. it thus provides a framework for an analysis that can consider both specific and general processes and trends without the hindrance of contradiction. if this image and consilience fuleihan: urban nomads pattern-based approach is applied in other situations, perhaps a similar result will occur. an analysis of the urban metropolis of petra that includes both its historical and contemporary presence, focuses on its connectivity with other centers and other populations, and includes seemingly unrelated pastoral and agricultural transitions makes use of this global city aesthetic. furthermore, since this alternative historical analysis intends to shed light on contemporary issues that are partially derived from jordan‟s emergence as a more powerful state in a globalizing world, the global city aesthetic is relevant in that it connects jordan‟s developmental trajectory to ongoing global processes. through its application to petra, the obstacle created by temporal hierarchies can be overcome, allowing the bedouin lifestyle a space within the image of a modern and global community without classification as a backwards, nostalgic tradition. however, in order to apply the global city aesthetic to petra, petra must first be established as a global city in its own right. 3.1 petra: a global city due to its historical urban strength and its consistency with sassen‟s definition, petra can be considered a global city in its own context. inhabited by the nabataeans until about 300 ad, petra was a major site of both frankincense and pottery production (richard, 2003, p. 437). strategically located on one of the major paths of the over-land frankincense trade route that connected the arabian peninsula with damascus and eventually, with markets in europe and north africa (smith, 2005), petra‟s economic success was rapid. combined with the agricultural and infrastructural innovations of the nabataeans, petra soon became a flourishing metropolis characterized by wealth and cultural fusion. (politis, 2007). it experienced its peak in economic activity, wealth, and trade interactions under the reign of aretas iv in the century after 100 ad. at that point in time, the nabataeans had trade connections with the greek empire and possibly even india.2 with this position, the nabataeans also regulated economic activity in the surrounding regions and had significant influence over a large geographic area in the realm of cultural development and intellectual exchange (politis, 2007, p. 339). like sassen‟s global city, petra had far reaching international influences as well as accessed and sustained multiple networks. most archeological and historical discourses, focusing on these very impressive characteristics, depict petra as uniquely urban and as an anomaly in its surrounding environment with scattered, nomadic tribes (falconner, 1995). yet this portrayal of the ultimate “bustling metropolis” might be inaccurate. much of our understanding of daily life in petra comes from secondary accounts that were primarily concerned with the novelty of urbanization and economic production, which possibly colored the depiction of the city to express this preoccupation (falconner, 1995). more importantly, the general archeological approach tends to focus on the household as the main unit of societal structure. the consequence of 2 this high economic activity as well the existence of far-reaching international connections is proven by both historical texts and the discovery of large amounts of coins from impressively varied origins that date from that period. 98 consilience this focus is an emphasis on urban development and a de-emphasis on rural or alternative lifestyles (falconner, 1995). studies that attempt to overcome these preoccupations show that petra was, in fact, much more complex than simply a cosmopolitan and urban center with farreaching trade connections. besides the fact that the nabataeans had a nomadic heritage, and according to recent studies, never truly lost some of the consciousness of mobility that accompanies such a lifestyle (levy, 1999), it is also true that much of petra‟s organization and structure relied on scattered rural settlements, smaller villages, and nomadic and semi-nomadic communities (politis, 2007). to understand the mutual dependency between petra and pastoral communities, it is necessary to reexamine the historical definitions of sedentarism and nomadism. using the global city aesthetic as the mode of analysis, the next section will emphasize interdependence rather than opposition, thereby escaping the conflict created by these binary terms. after this redefinition, the bedoul condition can be revaluated and reconsidered in a way that allows solutions to arise from the contradiction of their claims to petra. 3.2 sedentism and nomadism in history it is generally assumed that urbanization is a phenomenon that results from an agricultural surplus (falconner, 2007; berelov, 2006). as surplus accumulates and wealth grows, a movement from rural lifestyles to the urban center increases, which also increases the diversification of skills and enhances the power of the center itself. furthermore, higher population density requires more complex land ownership plans and politicized social organization. as the diversity of economic output increases, it attracts further migration, speeding up and intensifying the urbanization process. in the specific case of jordan, a study of general trends shows that an intensification of cereal production is accompanied by greater investment in irrigation, greater need for farming and domesticated animals, and consequently, the build up of permanent settlements around a spring or a well to maintain this high level of production. likewise, abatement in agricultural activity traditionally suggests a decline in urbanization (khairy, 1984). however, there are some contradictions inherent in this simple model that complicate our understanding of the relationship between the urban and the rural, especially when considering the nature of commerce in the middle east. first of all, the more mobile pastoral lifestyle allows for a greater flexibility of travel and consequently, a greater mobility of goods and commerce. furthermore, mobile pastoralism created and sustained international networks that are usually associated with the urban sites (smith, 2005; richard, 2003). since the commerce that allowed urban centers to develop depended on the strength of nomadic communities, this challenges the assumed correlation between sedentarization and increased commerce. also, jordanian agriculturalism was not necessarily a sedentary activity and therefore did not necessarily lead to permanent settlements; in fact, such a development might have harmed agricultural output. the dryland climate forced crop rotation and the constant movement to new lands; this was complemented by the grazing and herding tradition, creating a mobile agricultural economy. the consilience fuleihan: urban nomads assumed evolutionary relationship between agriculture and urban settlements, then, does not apply in this case (labianca, 2006). the result is an unclear relationship between agricultural and urban activities and the image of a multi-leveled sedentarism that incorporates both urban and nomadic communities: “because sedentarism may occur on many levels of intensity which can include seasonal occupations of different durations, the material culture repertoire of sites may often conflate attributes normally associated with sedentary groups, with those normally associated with migratory groups.” (berelov, 2006, p. 137). this complex relationship and its ambiguous archeological remains defy the characterization of urbanization that focuses on agricultural development and necessitates the consideration of other possible forces to explain the transition and relationship between the two livelihoods. just as the contradiction of simultaneous spatial attachment and increased mobility of capital was resolved to define the global city, perhaps the contradiction of simultaneous nomadism and sedentarism can be explained through a similarly multidisciplinary approach. ølystein s. labianca, in his paper "tells, empires, and civilizations: investigating historical landscapes in the ancient near east," shows how the constant oscillation between sedentarism and pastoralism can be derived from both internal and external cultural and political conditions. internal conditions, he claims, are “little traditions,” or rather “innovations by local populations that enhance their survival.” specifically, these are historically informed abilities and approaches of a community such as local-level water management, mixed agropastoralism, fluid homeland territories, residential flexibility (knowledge of different forms of shelter), hospitality, honor and shame. external conditions are also historically informed and include the pressure and influence from empires and civilizations that introduce “normative principles and behaviors propagated by literate elites that reach specific localities.” in the case of jordan, this seems to be a highly likely cause, given the frequency and diversity of foreign contact and invasion. considering these political and cultural conditions also has implications for the way archeological evidence is interpreted. the shift between abatement and intensification is so frequent that it further supports the idea that conditions of sedentarism and nomadism were not totalized or mutually exclusive; there must have been overlaps in the transition. this assumes a general coexistence between pastoral and urban lifestyles, challenging the conceived idea that they are opposite reactions to opposite economic conditions. in jordan, this is supported by archaeological evidence that shows a close material relationship between sedentary centers and nomadic outposts, as well as a highly interrelated spatiality between the two types of archeological remains that previously confused or obscured the understanding of the development of civilization in the region (politis, 2007). the relationship between the two, therefore, must have been mutually beneficial, especially since agricultural production as well as commercial trade required mobility while material production required immobility. in this way, regarding sedentarism and nomadism through a multidisciplinary lens makes the relationships between seemingly opposite ways of life legible. furthermore, sedentarism and nomadism are not, in this context, in opposition; in reality they work together in the same system. therefore, rather than its typical characterization as an exception or as an impressively urban center in a non-urban 100 consilience environment, petra is better understood as a node within a system that incorporates urban and non-urban experiences across space and time.. if the cycle between sedentary and nomadic lifestyles is redefined as multilayered with many overlaps, the jordanian government can be considered as an “external condition” that is imposing new behavioral expectations on the bedouin. one might accept that this is simply a part of this cycle, citing the many historical transitions between nomadism and sedentarism. adaptation to a new age should be expected of all peoples; perhaps the irrelevance of nomadism should be accepted rather than contested. however, the effect of governmental pressure, as already demonstrated, is more permanent and destructive than what labianca described in his study. this is not a situation in which changing political climates create an environment in which nomadic communities voluntarily settle, indirectly suppressing mobility. rather, it is a situation in which the political power directly imposes sedentarization, destroying nomadism entirely and effectively ending the cycle. these direct efforts of the state obviously derive from the conceived idea that sedentarism and nomadism are in opposition, which was challenged in the previous section. despite the historical legacy of a mutually-beneficial relationship between nomadism and sedentarism, a new self-awareness of the nation‟s developmental status and efforts to direct development along a certain path characterize the governmental attitude towards internal affairs. consequently, the unique relationship between mobile and sedentary communities present throughout jordanian history is replaced by the developmental standards of the rest of the international community where nomadism is rare if not entirely absent. therefore, attempts to destroy the cycle between nomadism and sedentarism are due in part to a change in the way the nation evaluates itself as well as an increasing internalization of the expectations of the rest of the world. although increased international awareness is an inevitable result of globalization that cannot and should not be limited as the global community attempts to improve the quality of life of all communities, there is no need to reject the unique internal developmental patterns that have worked consistently for more than a thousand years. just as the bedoul are experiencing a loss of cultural identification and feel that their traditional self-awareness is threatened, perhaps jordan, on a national scale, is experiencing the same trauma subconsciously. it is even more urgent, therefore, to find a way to resolve the contradiction between the contemporary and traditional standards of development. this can be achieved by integrating the two new reinterpretations made possible by the analytical framework of the global city aesthetic: petra as a global city, and sedentarism and nomadism as mutually beneficial and dependent lifestyles. their combination will hopefully allow a new understanding of the issue that creates a space within jordan‟s conception of development for the bedoul bedouin to maintain the integrity of their cultural identity. 4. the bedoul as urban nomads if one accepts that, due to the interdependence of sedentarism and nomadism, the bedouin lifestyle is informed by the myth of petra as a global city, it can be shown that, perhaps, the bedouin existence and a developed jordanian state consilience fuleihan: urban nomads are not incompatible. to demonstrate this effect, a comparison between the historical inhabitants of petra, the nabataeans, and the bedoul of the present is necessary. establishing that there is a relationship between the two groups even though it might not be biological can help us better understand the importance of petra to bedoul cultural identity. some similarities between the two groups are quite obvious: both the nabataeans and the bedoul arrived at petra from nomadic backgrounds, so it is possible that the reaction towards the area was similar. although the nabataeans founded the city while the bedouins did no building of their own, both used the site for shelter in similar ways: living in a combination of caves and tents around the region (shoup, 1985). the bedoul also experienced a similar change in lifestyle, transitioning from an agricultural and pastoral subsistence to a commercial engagement with the tourist trade, drawn by the potential for almost a doubling of daily income (shoup, 1985). this could, perhaps, explain the spatial attachment to petra, and it could even imply economic motives for claiming ancestral heritage. however, applying the alternative understanding of the transition between sedentarism and nomadism as described earlier, it becomes clear that the cause of the bedoul‟s shift in livelihood was not entirely due to the draw of profit; rather, there were both external and internal reasons why they settled into the sedentary lifestyle. specifically, one can find in the “little traditions” of general bedouin culture a discourse informed by urbanity: specifically, the strong tradition of hospitality and welcoming of the guest. in fact, the concept of the household pervades much of bedouin culture and tradition even though this contradicts the conceived understanding of nomadic existence (racy, 1996). furthermore, the bedoul who live in petra have capitalized on the tourist trade because of the increased amount of foreign visitors. just as the nabataeans inhabited petra because of its strategic placement on the frankincense trade route, the bedoul inevitably experience a huge amount of traffic and exposure that created a market for “exotic,” cultural goods. even though they resist the traditional lifestyle of urbanity, their attachment to petra has connected them to a global network of cultural exchange that produces the sensation of mobility on an abstract level. one significant difference that has grave implications for the relationship between the bedouins and the nabataeans is the nature of what is actually traded. unlike the nabataeans, whose main exports were pottery and frankincense, the goods of the bedoul are more experiential in nature; essentially, the bedoul sell themselves as cultural exhibits (shrycock, 2004). as a result, the bedouin appropriate exactly what susan stewart calls the “double function” of the souvenir: “to authenticate a past or otherwise remote experience, and at the same time discredit the present” (shrycock, 1996). in essence, the bedoul make legible and profitable another network to which petra has given them access: the network of history. this role of the bedouin as symbolic or representative is further supported by their general conception as refugees, which was explored in earlier sections. their “camp,” or inhabitance of petra, has an effect similar to the refugee camp that is both spatially and symbolically significant as well as the source for the production of urbanity. as michel aiger shows, “the camp creates opportunities for encounters, exchanges, and re-workings of identity among all who live there. in this sense, the humanitarian device of the camps produces cities, „de la ville,‟ if one considers the city from the point of view of its essential complexity” (aiger, 2002, p. 322). aiger 102 consilience demonstrates how the camp not only creates a community that maintains the memory and myths of its origins, but also can give meaning to what was a deserted place before. this is essentially what the presence of the bedoul in petra has done. how can one escape refugee status? the gesture of accepting this characterization of the bedouin at least partially overcomes the marginalizing effect of history by not only legitimizing the urgency of their predicament but also by characterizing the conflict as a typical byproduct of globalization processes. hence the situation is commonly understood as a modern problem the international community is used to confronting and is thus possible to be resolved. however, as refugees, they still are defined as external to society and as an unwanted, surplus population. essentially, the refugee status does nothing to resolve the contradiction embodied by the bedoul: simultaneous identification as nomads and as inhabitants of an urban site. they are self-proclaimed “urban nomads.” returning to the “global city aesthetic” and the demonstration of its effect on historical interpretation, it is clear that the bedoul, by physically and symbolically reasserting petra‟s position as a node in an international network that directs and produces an economic flow, do not resist national urbanization and development desires. by demonstrating the dynamics of globalization as defined by saskia sassen: “the formation of global markets, the intensifying of transnational and translocal networks, and the geographic redeployment of a growing range of economic and financial operations” (sassen 2002, p. 380), they are engaging in the new globalization paradigm. furthermore, the bedoul‟s position in petra gives them multi-dimensional access since they are both connected to the global community and to historical communities through their evocation of the petra myth. in this way, they demonstrate the contradiction that required the creation of the term “global city:” a simultaneous devaluation of physical distance and valuation of physical and spatial location with the added dimension of time. petra therefore maintains its urbanity and international reach even after its abandonment through the mythology of its cultural image. this significance of the myth, while at first might seem contrary in a modern context informed by scientific and factual understanding of truth, is not alien to the current condition at all: “one easily supportable „truth‟ is that modern society is as myth-bound and mystical as any that has preceded it” (rees, 2002, 16). for this reason, it is reasonable to accept mythology as well as economic and political influences as what shapes the conditions and trajectories of current communities. urban nomadism, when examined through the “global city aesthetic,” is much more compatible with jordan‟s development goals than previously perceived because it locates the bedoul within this mythology and consciousness of an urban paradigm. urban nomadism is the lifestyle that embraces both a traditional and historical cultural practice and the contemporary standards of developed communities. hence, the bedoul bedouin, in claiming attachment to petra while maintaining identification as pastoral nomads, are in fact resolving the opposing forces of international globalization and historical and cultural nostalgia. this not only allows the bedoul to share a common national identity with the rest of contemporary jordan, but also allows the state to find a place in the globalized international community without compromising its cultural heritage. consilience fuleihan: urban nomads 5. conclusion andré wink states that the most urgent issue concerning contemporary nomadic societies is an exploration of “post-nomadism,” which sweepingly encompasses “all those cultural practices and traditions that are found among pastoral nomads which became part of the sedentary world... post-nomadism itself can only be understood as a corollary of transition that reflects the condition of a whole range of societies over many centuries which were without fixed parameters and boundaries” (khazanov, 2007, p. 295). yet with the forces of globalization, technological communications seem to have increased our mobility rather than emphasize the sedentary tradition. it is only recently that the terms “perpetual tourist,” or “global citizen,” or “third-culture kid” have become part of our vernacular. in a sense, we are becoming increasingly nomadic as we create faster communications and broader networks, and physical space becomes less relevant to our society and economy. in a way, the bedouin are a step ahead of us; they have already embraced the abstract reality of globalization. at the very least, we can acknowledge that their predicament is not so different from our own. communities are no longer necessarily defined by physical location nor by cultural homogeneity. instead, they are vague, abstract, intangible categorizations that are constantly changing, expanding, shrinking, splitting, and combining. how does one legitimize an identity based on imagined and abstract connections? the global city aesthetic is an analytical framework that provides for a multidimensional reality. by considering both fact and myth as sources of truth and accepting the direct influence of history on the conditions of the present, it creates a justifiable space for the abstract in the perception of our current world. thus the forces that are partially responsible for shaping contemporary conditions escape evaluation and control by virtue of the unreality becoming real, recognizable, and approachable. as a reifying tool, the global city aesthetic is perhaps the lens through which we must view both others and ourselves to adjust to the constantly changing globalized environment in which we live. 104 consilience appendix an application: desertification the benefits of the alternative analysis provided by the global city aesthetic can be further demonstrated by an application to specific issues in which tensions between urban and nomadic lifestyles are more obvious, such as the problem of desertification in jordan. this environmental issue has long blamed pastoral agriculture and nomadic practices as its cause, but with this reanalysis, it is evident that this perspective is oversimplified and reductive, which obstructs effective solutions. considering historical trends in a different way, a solution that allows the continuation of nomadic practices can be discovered. desertification is defined as “reduction or loss of biological or economic productivity of ecosystems resulting from climatic variations, land uses, and a combination of processes” (warner, 2009, p. 9). jordan‟s semi-arid and arid regions are expanding, and the threat to the available fertile land and biodiversity is palpable. in 2006, the minister of agriculture estimated that desertification causes a loss of about 30,000 donums of fertile land each year (wardam 2006). reports from the un and pressure from the un conference on desertification has pressured jordan to take action to contain desertification (thomas, 1994, p. 28-36). jordan is very cooperative, possibly partially as a result of the general conversation that associates developed countries with environmental responsibility. as previously demonstrated, much of jordan‟s policy decisions could potentially be derived from an attempt to fit international conceptions and standards of development. as stated in an article from the star newspaper in january 2010: the global trend towards the green economy was reiterated by the recent financial crisis which underscored the need to invest in a green economy that is based on sustainable resource management. several countries in europe as well as the united states have injected vast financial resources in the green sectors of the economy ... jordan may be a small market in size, but it has adequate human resources that can, with some additional education and systematic training provide great services to the region in sectors of green economy. it is important that some of the brightest students in jordan be encouraged to study energy, water, environment, recycling and environmentally friendly engineering and management of natural resources. (wardam, 2010) in this case, such a reaction to global trends can hardly be deplored. jordan‟s environmental awareness has increased dramatically over the past decade. jordan not only has made many more environmental reports accessible and public, but is also investing much more of its budget in environmental programs. in 2009, jordan announced its investment in a 4.3 million (unit) program that would address climate change adaptation, as well as increasing investment in renewable energy (wardam, 2010). the government is very much aware that this is an urgent problem and is therefore, anxious to contain the problem both for the sake of the environment as well as to maintain an image of fertility and wealth sustained throughout history. returning to king hussein‟s website: perhaps an even greater threat to jordanian fauna and flora is the loss of consilience fuleihan: urban nomads habitat. historically, jordan used to be renowned for its forests and verdant vegetation. numerous verses of the bible refer to the “land of milk and honey,” yet today jordan‟s forests are much reduced in area. (a living tribute to the legacy of king hussein i, 2010) similar to the historical implications of resolving the situation of the bedouin, desertification is also an issue that engages history while maintaining relevance to larger global concerns. further complicating the situation is the explanation for desertification. in general, desertification is understood to be an anthropogenic phenomenon caused by overgrazing, overcultivation, and deforestation (thomas, 1994, p. 67). in the memorandum report prepared for usaid/amman, desertification, defined as “range degradation, erosion and inefficient resource allocation in livestock subsector,” (richards, 1993, p.6) was directly blamed on bedouin pastoral activity. the report also warned against potential conflict arising from policy efforts to preserve the steppe lands by enforcing and restricting land ownership. this is not surprising: since the general view is that nomadic activities have a destructive impact on sedentary agricultural endeavors (khazanov, 2007), nomads in the general international community are a popular scapegoat beyond jordan as well. furthermore, uncod often supported and encouraged sedentarization as a potential solution. this uncontested correlation between bedouin practices and land degradation is once again informed by traditional historical perspectives that blame the abandonment of settlements, including petra, on desertification, therefore oversimplifying the issue and obscuring possible solutions. while it is logical and probable that much of the motivation to abandon settlements was derived from the consequences of desertification, blaming desertification on the poor practices of the people themselves is a dangerous assumption. firstly, the impact of nomadic communities on sedentary civilizations is not very well studied; usually academics are more concerned with the influence of sedentary civilization on nomadic lifestyles (khazanov, 2007). hence, it is more of an assumption rather than a studied and proven statement that nomadic practices are threatening to sedentary subsistence and well-being. more importantly, blaming desertification entirely on nomadic activity obscures the dangers land degradation poses to the bedouin communities themselves. besides acting as another force that limits mobility and threatens livelihood practices, nomadic communities are especially vulnerable economically to the increase of arid lands. since nomadic pastoralists rely directly and completely on environmental conditions for subsistence, desertification has direct negative economic impacts and can spark a poverty cycle from which the only escape is sedentarization. increasing fodder prices (wardam 2006) and decreased access to fertile grazing lands, for example, are financially disastrous for nomadic agriculturalism. desertification, therefore, acts almost in accordance with sedentarization agendas of the government by limiting mobility and creating an economic climate that does not accommodate a space for nomadic pastoralism. as a result, desertification is a natural sedentarization policy. therefore, blaming the bedouin for desertification is reductive, manipulative, and dangerous. challenging this general assumption, a recent study of environmental impacts on jordan‟s soil shows that in fact, soil erosion was probably due to the 106 consilience frequency of extreme climate events and droughts (schmidt, 2006). the study also suggests that this historical precedence should be considered in light of the future threat of global warming, implying that such a narrow perspective has a dangerous effect on the efficiency of current policy initiatives (schmidt, 2006). clearly, both the issue and the solution must be redefined. the global city aesthetic can be applied to this problem in order to escape such a narrow view. this would require a conscious awareness of the “myths” that inform motives of both parties. william e. rees describes the modern myth of expansion as the dominant logic behind the approach to environmental problems and locates it as one of the obstacles for achieving sustainability. he calls for a new cultural myth as part of the solution, one that does not see expansion as the only end to human development. perhaps, the combination of the myth of petra, which includes a cycling, oscillating, and unconventional urban relationship to the land, with the modern myth, can provide the new outlook rees proposes. david s.g. thomas and nicholas j. middleton offer a new definition of desertification that is more flexible: they reinterpret desertification as both a process of change and a descriptive state. they also define it as a “total social phenomenon, total in its potential direct and indirect effects on everyone and total in that people are involved in all its stages, not just as cause and victim” (thomas, 1994, p. 11). such a definition, which considers desertification as a process, not a consequence, of changing social conditions not only allows for more varied solution-based approaches but also renders the social aspect of these solutions as immediately relevant, increasing the potential for success. a more flexible solution that might act in accordance with this definition would be an environmental policy that retains the beneficial aspects of the traditional and historical agricultural practices while adapting them to current conditions. this would require an alternative understanding of the patterns of desertification and agropastoralism throughout history that takes into consideration the duration of nomadic lifestyles. how can a system that survived for so long and through so many different eras suddenly become destructive? in fact, traditional bedouin agropastoralism seems to actually benefit the environment. since this was the primary mode of agriculture until recently, it is safe to assume that pastoralism shaped the current composition of the land, plant growth, and soil composition. furthermore, studies show grazing has a positive effect on plant biodiversity and that local species have adapted to pastoral activity, while imposed methods of combating desertification, such as afforestation, have a negative effect on species diversity (alrababah, 2007). in order to combat desertification as a direct result of agropastoralism, a more successful approach would be to encourage practices that were historically traditional. in israel, such a proposal has already been developed in the form of a four model approach: protection from grazing, grazing rotation (which would require some sort of pastoral mobility), planting trees in eroded areas, and revegetation of degraded areas. this cooperative approach is necessary since, as shown in satterthwaite's article “adapting to climate change in urban areas: the possibilities and constraints in lowand middle-income nations,” a one-sided approach to sustainability projects in less developed nations are doomed to failure. “if they do not consider and engage the more vulnerable communities, resilience will not be guaranteed nor can general well-being be supported. all climate change efforts must consilience fuleihan: urban nomads be multi-scalar, and must be grounded in both the national and local systems of governance” (sattertwhaite, 2007, p. 63-65). for jordan, this includes the bedouin communities. jordan‟s hopes for development cannot be founded on inequality: its future must include all of its communities. the current approach is to eliminate the diversity of the community by encouraging assimilation and sedentarization; yet, as shown, this only causes conflict, poor health, and inefficient management of largerscale issues. an alternative approach that evokes the global city aesthetic will help jordan speed up the development process so that it can interact with other nations at the level it desires. furthermore, it will allow the reconciliation of seeminglydisparate world views that could destroy efforts to create a sustainable and equitable future. if the government would understand that its goals are not in opposition with those of the bedouins and that a sustainable, developed state is part of the imagination of both groups, it would be possible to implement cooperative and much more successful measures to combat environmental crises. this would allow policy makers to move beyond the ostensible contradiction between urban and bedouin communities and focus on solutions rather than conflicts. 108 consilience bibliography a living tribute to the legacy of king hussein i. 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(2006) managing a world on the move. population and development review 32, 222-53. microsoft word 8 111-124 davies final formatted.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 10, iss. 1 (2013), pp. 111 – 124 appraising weak and strong sustainability: searching for a middle ground george randal davies university of reading, berkshire, united kingdom email: georgerdavies@btinternet.com abstract this paper seeks to address the issue of weak and strong sustainability as well as the search for a middle ground. it discusses the differences between weak and strong sustainability while arguing for the harmonisation of both nature and humankind. achieving harmony requires a move towards an idealist eco-sociofeminist point of view. through this, full equality and balance may be attained. author’s note george davies has recently completed his m.sc. in environmental management at the university of reading. he also completed his b.a. in geography at the university of exeter. keywords:   sustainability, weak, strong, natural capital, eco-sociofeminism 1. introduction to weak and strong sustainability: a middle path this paper critically analyses the differences between strong and weak sustainability by arguing for a middle-of-the-road approach to sustainability. by analysing the differences, commonalities can be drawn out, which facilitates the discovery of a middle pathway. there are many differing worldviews of sustainability (barr, 2008); this naturally illustrates the wide range of differences between a strong or weak approach to sustainability. however, the meaning of sustainability is contested; dobson (1996) noted that there are over 300 definitions of sustainability. therefore, this paper will be structured thus: firstly, the term sustainability will be defined and justified. secondly, there will be an overview and critical analysis of the economic paradigms of the weak-strong debate with regards to manufactured capital (the economy) versus natural capital (the environment). the ‘weak sustainability’ paradigm states that man-made capital is more important than natural capital (neumayer, 2003). ‘strong sustainability,’ on the contrary, is based on the idea of non-substitutable natural capital (dobson, 1998). many academics and disciplines take different viewpoints. for example, dryzek (1997) takes a ‘strong’ (not ‘very strong’ – see table 1) approach – which recognises environmental limits – unlike khan (1995), who 112 consilience takes a weak approach (barr, 2008: 46). many models have been developed trying to conceptualise the weak and strong approaches (see: barr, 2008; giddings et al., 2002; pearce, 1993; roberts, 2004). they have often been regarded as opposing paradigms due to their different philosophical and ethical perspectives (hediger, 1999; 2004). this then raises questions about consequences and whether sustainability and economic growth are compatible (verburg and wiegel, 1997). however, sustainability is necessary for economic growth in the long run, with the issue being that people only think in short-term horizons (see meadows et al., 1972: 8). thirdly, there will be an in-depth analysis of the resolution of weak and strong sustainability, offering an alternative to norton’s (1995) view of nonresolution between the two ends of the spectrum. this section discusses a hybrid approach, attempting to merge deep ecology (a common worldview of strong sustainability) and cornucopian views (a common view of weak sustainability), therefore arguing for a middle-of-the-road approach. finally, this paper will conclude by arguing for a movement towards an eco-socio-feminist perspective as an idealist point of view (figure 3). in the future, however, we will need to compromise before reaching this ideal viewpoint because large societal transformations will be required and practice is always different from theory. 2. sustainability – a contested paradigm? as this paper charts two starkly different (economic) paradigms of sustainability, an understanding of this concept and the related concept of sustainable development is vital. over time, sustainability has become a broad, continuously evolving paradigm (redclift, 1988; 1992; 2005). there is much criticism over the lack of clarity in its meaning (butler, 1999; collins, 1999; mowforth and munt, 2003). however, the wced (1987), which popularised sustainability through its definition of sustainable development, is outlined in the four principles below: 1. holistic planning and strategy making 2. preservation of ecological processes 3. protection of heritage and biodiversity 4. development that can be sustained for future years (from wced, 1987) it is essential that these four aspects are understood as they underpin the wced’s (1987: 43) definition of sustainable development: “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. even though dobson (1996) notes that there are many interpretations, the brundtland (wced) definition has achieved “authoritative status” (baker, 2006: 17). barr (2008) argues the brundtland definition has a technocentric focus and is thus an anthropocentric ideal (dresner, 2002; manning, 1990). therefore, one could argue that it falls within the weak paradigm. a definition of sustainable development that many economists would accept is, “development [that] […] does not decrease the capacity to provide non-declining per capita utility for infinity” (neumayer, 2003: 7); this illustrates a weak approach. however, sustainability is a precondition for human life because there are many essential consilience davies: weak and strong sustainability ecological processes that underlie its functioning (dobson, 1998). therefore, sustainability is, in a sense, a contested paradigm resulting from the differing views of the concept, making it flawed from its very conception (redclift, 2005). due to the wide range of views, a middle of the road approach is necessary if we are to make progress towards sustainability. those who are at the weak end of the spectrum must understand that technological solutions may not always be available, while those at the strong end of the spectrum need to realise that we as humans have a part to play on the earth; not all of us will be willing to make sacrifices vis-à-vis the way that we live. for example, limiting air travel is considered “unacceptable by […] tourists” (becken, 2007: 351), and yet achieving a ‘very strong’ sustainability would necessitate either this or drastically increasing taxes on air travel. therefore, achieving a middle ground – or trying to satisfy both ends – appears to be the most beneficial option. 3. weak and strong sustainability – notions of capital capital is defined as “stock that provides current and future utility” (neumayer, 2003: 8), with natural capital being the totality of nature (resources, plants and ecosystems that can be put to human use – see baker, 2006: 21), or that which is capable of providing humans with “material and nonmaterial utility” (neumayer, 2003: 8). man-made capital, in contrast, includes factories, machinery and roads. there is a third type of capital, however, which is human capital; this differs from man-made capital as it is viewed as ‘knowledge’ – essence rather than practice (neumayer, 2003: 8). natural capital is a complex idea that has three dimensions: critical, constant and tradable natural capital (barr, 2008). critical natural capital is that which is vital to life (e.g. atmosphere/ozone layer); it also contains valued capital (e.g. rare species). pearce et al. (1989) emphasized the significance of critical natural capital, as it cannot be restored. constant natural capital is that which is important, but not essential in its own right, and can be substituted (e.g. forest for a nature park); tradable capital is that which is not highly valued and can be replaced (baker, 2006; barr, 2008). it is these three components that allow differing interpretations of sustainability along the weak-strong sustainability continuum, as illustrated by roberts (2004) in figure 1. weak sustainability is based on the work of two neoclassical economists: solow (1974; 1986; 1992; 1993) and hartwick (1977; 1978; 1990). it can be viewed as an extension of neoclassical welfare economics, thus based on a belief that manmade capital is more important than natural capital. it is possible to substitute natural capital for man-made capital according to this paradigm (neumayer, 2003). in contrast, the strong sustainability paradigm states that natural capital cannot be substituted by man-made capital. 114 consilience figure 1: weak and strong approaches to sustainability (roberts, 2004; also see barr, 2008: 44) figure 1 illustrates the concepts of weak and strong sustainability in their most basic and fundamental form: the process of intergenerational capital exchange, which ensures that the “total capital passed on to the next generation is constant or growing” (barr, 2008: 44). in both weak and strong cases, ‘capital’, whether natural or human, is carried on throughout the generations. it is the ‘type’ of capital that is important; strong sustainability implies carrying on to the next generation the same amount of natural capital, with human capital increases over time; whereas weak sustainability implies a declining natural capital over time while human capital increases (dasgupta, 2004; 2007). at present, the trajectory of the developed world is arguably tending towards the stronger end of the spectrum with its designation of national parks, especially in the united kingdom with its sites of special scientific interest and areas of outstanding natural beauty; this is an explicit recognition of the need to preserve our natural resources. as a global community, we are at the weak end of the sustainability spectrum, the developing world, for example, damages natural capital due to its oppression by multinational corporations such as shell or exxon mobil, and in many cases the damage is irreversible (osaghae, 1995). while mncs do bring opportunities, tuodolo (2009) argues in the case of shell in the niger delta that most of the services and infrastructure that shell provides to the local community to protect the environment are either absent or dysfunctional. this illustrates atkinson’s (1991) argument that the environment and development are intrinsically linked, that a progression along the path of weak sustainability, where natural capital decreases over time, can result in unsustainable development (barr, 2008). consilience davies: weak and strong sustainability the concepts of weak and strong sustainability can also be viewed as having a temporal dimension, as illustrated by the environmental kuznets curve (ekc) (see baker, 2006: 32; cole, 2003; 2004). the ekc (figure 2) illustrates a direct relationship between development and the level of pollution. however, there is a ‘turning point’ that occurs during an enlightenment of environmental values, causing pollution to subsequently decrease (baker, 2006). in the case of the western world, this ‘enlightenment’ came about after world war ii mostly through rachel carson’s (1962) silent spring, paul ehrlich’s (1968) population bomb and d. meadows et al. (1972) with the stockholm conference that was held that same year. thus, there is a movement from strong to weak and from weak to strong sustainability again as the economy and societal values shift over time. figure 2: environmental kuznets curve (from baker, 2006: 32) de groot et al. (2004) discuss the ekc in relation to china’s development and argue that solid and gas emissions decelerate at intermediate levels of gross regional product per capita, but reaccelerate at high levels of gross regional product. however, there is an inverse relationship between water pollution and gross regional product in their sample. even though this is not representative of the whole of china, it illustrates the usefulness of the weak and strong sustainability paradigms in relation to the ekc in practice. this paper argues that it is useful to an extent. 4. weak and strong sustainability: a variety of values and dimensions the weak and strong sustainability concepts have a foundation in economics (solow, 1974; hartwick, 1977). however, there are a variety of values, both ethical and philosophical, that are associated with these concepts. these have naturally become better known in the wider public arena, and are summarized in table 1. in practice, gibbs et al. (1998) undertook a study of local authorities in england and wales and their interpretations of sustainable development – these tended towards the weak end of the scale, which from table 1 can be seen as technocentric or anthropocentric approaches. 116 consilience technocentric ecocentric cornucopian accommodating communalist deep ecology sustainability labels very weak: modification of existing structures; surface appearances and minor changes. weak: some processes changes; less tangible problems dealt with. strong: system changes as a whole, examining ‘system’ as one element. very strong: a ‘cultural’ change; external as well as internal elements of system altered. green labels resource exploitative, growthorientated position. resource conservationist and ‘managerial’ position. resource preservationist position. extreme preservationist position. ethics support for traditional ethical reasoning rights and interests of contemporary individual humans instrumental value in nature. extension of ethical reasoning: ‘caring for others’; intra and intergenerational equity; instrumental value in nature. further extension of ethical reasoning; collective interests take over individual interests. acceptance of bioethics. intrinsic value in nature (i.e. valuable in its own right). type of economy anti-green economy, unfettered free market. green economy and green markets guided by economic incentives. deep green economy; no economic and population growth. very deep green economy; heavily regulated to minimise ‘resource-take’. figure 3: sustainability spectrum, adapted from pearce’s (1993) sustainability spectrum in barr (2008: 46) we are living in an era of pollution control, which is closely associated with the notion of weak sustainability because it is underlain by the notion that human innovation, especially technological innovation, will be able to solve the problem (baker, 2006; koontz and thomas, 2006). in addition, it is an ‘end-of-pipe’ solution to pollution management, which affects a range of critical natural capital such as the atmosphere. this approach may be able to reduce pollution in a local area, but not the globe. japan, where there is a high level of forest protection, for example, uses the forest resources of other countries for the production and packaging of consilience davies: weak and strong sustainability consumer goods (baker, 2006). while japan is not alone in this behaviour, it presents but one example of how displacing pollution-intense activities to the developing world is not a solution. some have argued (dresner, 2002) that the best way to preserve critical natural capital is to put a price on nature (see costanza et al., 1997; ayres, 1998; daly 1998; thornes and mcgregor, 2003). however, the pricing of nature leads to other problems. placing a value on nature is similar to measuring weak and strong sustainability (dietz and neumayer, 2007), which is a complex issue. valuing nature depends on our worldview; worldviews on the interactions between humanity and nature affect the degree to which protection is given to the environment. figure 3 illustrates the differing worldviews and their relation to both the environmental and socioeconomic factors. figure 4: various worldviews in relation to weak and strong sustainability paradigms (hopwood et al., 2005: 41; after o’riordan, 1989) as illustrated in figure 3 (in conjunction with table 1), the viewpoint that we should adopt is that of eco-socio-feminism, the combination of eco-socialism and eco-feminism. the main reasoning behind this is that it is a strong approach boh socioeconomically and environmentally, which attains maximum equality. the inclusion of gender (little, 1994; mcdowell, 1999) as well as indigenous and southern movements (lynn, 2003) is vital for social equality. as saegert (1980: 97) argues, “culturally bifurcated perceptions...have power.” therefore, dichotomies need to be broken down if progress is to be made; this argument not only applies to gender, but also to weak and strong sustainability. there needs to be an effort to pull the two ends of the spectrum closer together so that they can meet on common ground. this paper views this to be a form of strong sustainability, as it brings together the two ends of the spectrum in an attempt to include and not exclude; by analysing the differences, commonalities can be drawn out, thus breaking down the dichotomy. 118 consilience the deep ecology and cornucopian worldviews are each at extreme ends of the weak-strong sustainability continuum, as illustrated in table 1. this section will attempt to bring them closer together, breaking down the dichotomy and going against norton’s (1995) view that the debate between weak and strong sustainability cannot be resolved as there are no universally agreed-upon definitions or methodologies. to an extent, norton (1995) is correct because all paradigms of sustainability, in particular the notions of weak and strong, are non-falsifiable as “neither paradigm can be unambiguously supported by science” (neumayer, 2003: 3). however, this does not imply that they cannot be brought closer together, in essence breaking down the dichotomy. deep ecology is best described as a contemporary ecological philosophy or discourse (dryzek, 1997). therefore it is a shared way of viewing the world that focuses on the biosphere as a whole (naess, 2005 [1986]). the ‘deep’ aspect of deep ecology is its basis for the philosophy of putting the planet first, “valuing the intrinsic rights of organisms” (conesa-sevilla, 2006: 26). however, as with every movement, the concept has broadened out, with each branch being derived from the basic philosophy mentioned above. this paper argues that we are moving towards a deep ecology approach through the commodification of nature (urry, 1990). the reasoning behind hailing this as progression is that we are protecting and preserving nature from its consumption by other humans, which is one of the facets of a strong approach to sustainability. therefore, as long as we place a monetary value on nature in the capitalist (neoclassical economics) and neoliberal sociopolitical sense (peck and tickell, 2002), we will be able to take a relatively strong approach to sustainability by maintaining a substantial amount of intergenerational capital for the future (see figure 1, roberts, 2004). van den bergh (2007) argues that we can merge the two ends through evolutionary economics, as it tries to explain how humans are naturally destructive to the environment. if we can explain this, then we can look for a middle road. penn (2003) gives an explanation as to why we are destructive; it is due to “the human species being maladapted to its current natural environment” from population pressures (van den bergh, 2007: 523). this brings us back full circle to the malthusian arguments of ehrlich (1968) and meadows et al. (1972). if strong sustainability is seen in terms of a deep ecology approach – “valuing the intrinsic rights of organisms” (conesa-sevilla, 2006: 26), we gain what hediger (1999: 1120) terms “constant environmental quality,” a key feature of strong sustainability. therefore, a way to bring the two views closer together is to introduce a minimum requirement for sustainability, which shall be “ecosystem resilience and basic human needs” (hediger, 1999: 1120). hediger (1999) goes on to argue that reconciling weak and strong sustainability requires reconsidering from an ecological economic perspective the notion of total capital – the “economy’s generalised productive capacity and the aggregate of natural capital” (hediger, 1999: 1121) – and the basic requirement for sustainability (above). sustainability, and therefore sustainable development – the means of achieving the goal of sustainability – is only feasible if these two minimum requirements are fulfilled. this brings us back to valuing nature and the environment. teeb (2010) is a study that draws attention to the global economic benefits of biodiversity. it estimates the losses in monetary terms at us$2-5 million a year. by placing a monetary value on a loss of an externality, it can then be brought into the market system. however, to truly eliminate this issue of having to monetize the consilience davies: weak and strong sustainability environment, coarse (1960) argues that we need to assign property rights. even though this evokes the weak approach as it promotes a free market economy over the environment (see table 1 – ‘very weak ‘), it is a step towards reconciling the two ends of the spectrum. 5. conclusion and looking towards the future this paper has tried to discuss and critically analyse the differences between strong and weak sustainability by arguing for a middle-of-the-road approach to sustainability. by analysing the differences, commonalities can be drawn out, thus allowing us to discover a middle pathway. weak sustainability is the idea that manmade capital is more important than natural capital; therefore it is possible to substitute natural for man-made capital (neumayer, 2003). the strong sustainability paradigm states that natural capital cannot be substituted. we must remember that natural capital is made up of three intrinsic parts: critical, constant and tradable natural capital (barr, 2008); each play a different role in formulating the aforementioned worldviews. strong sustainability values all three, yet weak sustainability arguably views all three as substitutable. therefore, the view taken is naturally boserupian – that “improvements in technology […] increase the carrying capacity of the environment” (boserup, 1976: 21) – or the idea that our own ingenuity will be able to solve the problem of environmental limits. this paper does not take that view, but argues more in line with a strong approach, which recognises environmental limits to growth as illustrated by giddings et al. (2002) in their nested three rings model. however, there cannot just be environmental sustainability; it has to be implemented in conjunction with socioeconomic and political sustainability as well, as it is impossible to have one without the other in our present economic system; we must try and think more inter-generationally (meadows et al., 1972). the illustrated middle pathway is here to protect the environment by commodifying it, or bringing the externality of the environment and nature into the market. however, there needs to be a movement towards an eco-socio-feminist perspective if we are to gain both social and environmental equality, thereby reaching the ultimate goal of sustainability. by understanding the differences between the two ends, this paper has brought them closer together with the hope that the environment and human society will come closer together in the future. there has to be a recognition of environmental limits if any progression is to be made. when mainstream economists realise the value of ecological economics (see daly and farley, 2011) in working to understand and value the environment not just in monetary terms, then can progress be made towards an eco-socio-feminist world, a world with high social equality and deep ecology. 120 consilience bibliography atkinson, a (1991) environment and development: concepts and practices in transition, public administration and development, 11: 401-413 ayres, r (1998) the price-value paradox, ecological economics, 25: 17–19 baker, s (2006) sustainable development, routledge, abingdon barr, s (2008) environment and society: sustainability, policy and the citizen, ashgate, aldershot becken, s (2007) tourists’ perception of international air travel’s impact on the global climate and potential climate change policies, journal of sustainable tourism, 15(4): 351-368 boserup, e (1976) environment, population, and technology in primitive societies, population and development review, 2: 21-36 butler, r (1999) sustainable tourism: a state of the art review, tourism geographies, 1(1): 7-25 carson, r (1962) silent spring, penguin books, london cole, m (2003) development, trade and the environment: how robust is the environmental kuznets curve? 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roberts, j (2004) environmental policy, routledge, london saegert, s (1980) masculine cities and feminine suburbs: polarized ideas, contradictory realities, journal of women and culture in society, 5(5): 96111 solow, r (1974) the economics of resources and the resources of economics, american economic review, 64: 1-14 solow, r (1986) on the intergenerational allocation of natural resources, scandinavian journal of economics, 88(1): 141-149 solow, r (1992) an almost practical step toward sustainability, resources for the future, washington dc solow, r (1993) an almost practical step toward sustainability, resources policy, 2: 162-172 teeb: the economics of ecosystems and biodiversity (2010) mainstreaming the economics of nature: a synthesis of the approach, conclusions and recommendations of teeb, accessed on 10th october 2010, <http://www.teebweb.org/linkclick.aspx?fileticket=byhdohl_tum%3d &tabid=1278&mid=2357> thornes, j and mcgregor, g (2003) cultural climatology, in: trudgill, s and roy, a (eds.) contemporary meanings in physical geography, springer, london, pp 73–197 tuodolo, f (2009) corporate social responsibility: between civil society and the oil industry in the developing world, acme, 8(3): 530-541 124 consilience urry, j (1990) the consumption of tourism, sociology, 24(1): 23-35 van den bergh, j (2007) evolutionary thinking in environmental economics, journal of evolutionary economics, 17:521–549 verburg, r and wiegel, v (1997) on the compatibility of sustainability and economic growth, environmental ethics, 19(3): 247-265 wced: world commission on environment and development (1987) our common future, oxford university press, oxford consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 6, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 63–90 drinking water in the united states: are we planning for a sustainable future? erin derrington yale school of forestry and environmental studies, m.e.sc. yale university, ct erin.derrington@yale.edu abstract maintaining drinking water quality and quantity is a resource management challenge worldwide. in the united states, there are federal, state and local laws to further drinking water quality protection, but few regulations that address water quantity. the first part of this article summarizes existing water protection laws, especially the division of water quality protection and local land use regulation between federal and state government. the second part assesses current water quality and quantity trends. the third part concludes the article with a discussion of drinking water case studies in the united states, to give a snapshot of current use and protection trends, highlighting planning tools, best management practices and solutions. given the current status of water protection laws and policies in the u.s., this discussion of best management practices is targeted towards municipalities, with the aim of linking it to sustainable development policies. author’s note erin derrington is an environmental consultant and a recent joint-degree graduate, receiving her master in environmental science from yale school of forestry and environmental studies and her juris doctor from pace school of law in 2011. this article draws on research and analysis from her interdisciplinary thesis, protecting drinking water quality for human and environmental health: assessing efforts to ensure safe drinking water in the united states. keywords: drinking water protection, security risk reduction planning. 1. introduction . despite existing water quality protection laws at national, state, and local levels, water impairment trends suggest that drinking water security is at risk throughout the united states. although each region faces different quality and quantity concerns, it is clear that proactive, multi-tiered solutions are necessary to ensure high quality water is available to meet the needs of growing populations (ernst, 2004). despite non-uniform development and population growth, the census bureau predicts that the u.s. population will increase from 275 million to 403 million between 2000 and 2050 (uscb, 2000). this growth will have negative 64 consilience impacts on water quality and availability, posing amplified resource management challenges (fitzhugh, 2004). while national action to support water security is desirable, this paper emphasizes municipal interventions that promote sustainable water use. local land use planning, green infrastructure deployment, and targeted open space conservation efforts will be critical solutions to this resource stewardship problem (white, 2008). the first part of this article summarizes existing water protection laws and the federalist division of national and state water quality protection and local land use regulation. the second part then assesses current water supply status and regulatory trends. the third part concludes the article with a discussion of drinking water case studies and impairment in the united states to give a snapshot of current use and protection trends, highlighting planning tools, best management practices and applied solutions. 2. drinking water protection laws in the united states 2.1 national and state water quality protection laws in 1972 the federal water pollution control act, also known as the clean water act (cwa), established the first comprehensive national water quality protection program. it mandated that federal agencies cooperate with state and local agencies to develop solutions ―to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing water resources‖ (cwa, 1972). under the cwa, states were required to establish water quality standards based on ―use designations,‖ ranging from high-quality waters used for consumption and recreational use to lowquality waters, often used in industrial processes. these standards are the underpinning of permit-based limits on point source discharges and overall ―total maximum daily loads‖ (tmdls) for water bodies that do not meet use designations (cwa, 1972). while use classifications vary by state, domestic drinking water is generally the highest and most restrictive use designation. the cwa does not supersede state authority to regulate water allocation. east of the mississippi, such authority is generally administered by water authorities and rooted in riparian rights frameworks, while allocation in the west is typically based on prior appropriation regimes. national legislation does not address water quantity management or allocation. in 1974 congress established the federal safe drinking water act (sdwa) to address evidence of unsafe contaminant levels in drinking water (sdwa, 1974; environmental defense fund v. costle, 1977). the sdwa authorized the epa to establish drinking water quality criteria and reporting requirements. the original approach to drinking water protection under the 1974 sdwa focused on water treatment. the 1986 amendments to the sdwa passed with ―overwhelming‖ congressional approval. they mandated ―state-developed critical wellhead protection programs,‖ increased drinking water quality criteria, and banned lead and copper in plumbing infrastructure (epa, 1986). these amendments targeted improved source water assessment (epa sdwa, 2009), source protection (epa, 1996), and enhanced public participation to ensure high quality drinking water (epa, 2004). today, the sdwa is implemented through health-based standards – consilience derrington: drinking water maximum contaminant level goals (mclgs) and maximum contaminant levels (mcls) (anisfeld, 2010). mclgs are aspirational guidelines established to protect against any adverse human health effects, while mcls are enforceable standards determined by balancing health risks against the cost and feasibility of implementing control measures.1 like the cwa, the sdwa regulates water quality, but does not, with the exception of the epa’s 1991 ―lead and copper rule‖2 address quantity and infrastructure considerations needed to ensure systematic drinking water security. current epa rulemaking is aimed at expanding the sdwa coverage of certain pollutants, as well as changing the regulatory scheme to target ―contaminant groups‖ (us epa strategy, 2010). in november 2010, the epa’s office of chemical safety and pollution prevention partnered with epa’s office of water to identify a list of 134 chemicals to be screened as potential endocrine system disrupters, and the two offices are continuing to collaborate to develop human health benchmarks for pesticides in drinking water and a tool for states and the public to use to interpret drinking water information (with targeted publication dates in spring, 2011) (epa strategy, 2010). administrator jackson reaffirmed the epa’s goal to ―update our laws in a way that is sensible and practical for protection of the health of the american people,‖ as well as ―evaluate the feasibility and affordability of treatment technologies, and the costs and benefits of potential standards,‖ noting the agency’s continued efforts to regulate hexavalent chromium (epa testimony, 2011). she concluded her testimony emphasizing that ―clean and safe water is the foundation of healthy communities, healthy families, and healthy economies‖ as well as the ―right of all americans‖ (epa testimony, 2011). pending regulations will almost certainly increase monitoring and certain water quality standards. given the epa’s emphasis on cost benefit analysis, increased drinking water standards may yield increased national watershed protection efforts. additionally, states may take steps to protect their lands and waters so long as the substance of these laws is not preempted by or less stringent than existing federal legislation. 2.2 state enforcement of federal water protection provisions the federal clean water act and safe drinking water act delegates the responsibility to establish and maintain water quality standards (wqs) and enforce maximum contaminant levels (mcl) to the states.3 today, use designations and tmdls under the cwa and mcls under the sdwa are driving interstate agreements for watershed protection, and can be used to initiate dialogs and 1 despite the health-protective objective of these standards, some question their effectiveness. studies suggest that current mcls for several contaminants, such as arsenic, chromium, tetrachlorethylene and uranium, represent ―significant lifetime cancer risks‖ (anisfeld, 2010). additionally, the sdwa only establishes enforceable standards for 114 of the 80,000 chemicals in use within the us (environmental working group, 2011), (us epa administrator jackson remarks, 2010). 2 the 1986 sdwa amendments included a provision requiring epa to regulate lead and copper in public water systems (epa, 1986). the epa’s 1991 regulation focuses on contaminant levels from lead and copper in customer piping, requiring sampling at the faucet, and when action levels are exceeded, education and service line replacement. (epa, 1991). 3 the safe drinking water act enforcement is delegated to 49 of the 50 states (as of november 2010, wyoming is the only state without a delegated reporting and enforcement program)(ecos, 2010), and clean water act permitting is approved for 47 of the 50 states (epa, 2003). 66 consilience litigation regarding interstate water quality issues. the epa reports that virtually every state implements some comprehensive surface and groundwater protection program. this includes enacting legislation and regulations, coordinating activities of the agencies responsible for water management, performing surface and groundwater mapping and classification, monitoring ambient water quality, developing data management systems, and implementing remediation and pollution prevention programs. nevertheless, the agency concludes that to ensure high quality water supplies ―more comprehensive planning needs to be done to make the best decisions regarding remediation and the efficient use‖ of water resources (epa, 1999). federal funding is a major driver in state-level water quality protection and remediation projects. the cwa’s clean water state revolving fund (cwsrf) and the swda’s drinking water state revolving fund (dwsdf) programs enable the epa to provide grants to capitalize state loan funds. through federal contributions, state matching, loan repayments and interest earnings, total cwsrf assets have grown to over $42 billion (world water forum, 2003). clean water act and safe drinking water act financing can support statewide and regional watershed-based planning efforts and has led to integrated planning in several regions. leading examples of successful interstate planning partnerships that further water quality protections include the chesapeake bay commission, the great lakes planning commission, and the new york city watershed memorandum of agreement (anisfeld, 2010). conversely, other areas such as the chattahoochee river and colorado river basins struggle to effectively manage water resources. these regions are experiencing challenges regarding how to plan the use of shared waterways, and these conflicts will likely be resolved in court (clemons, 2004). issues ranging from declining water quality, reduced availability, and insufficient or even dangerous infrastructure are gaining increasing attention in some areas. some states are earmarking funds to allow communities to sell development rights in watershed areas in order to reserve future water harvest rights. some states support this funding model through water quality targeted conservation and management improvement programs. for example, in 2004 the new jersey legislature passed the new jersey highlands water protection and planning act (sb1, a2635), a ―comprehensive, long-term approach to the protection and preservation of the drinking water and natural resources in the new jersey highlands region, which is the source of the drinking water of more than half of the residents of new jersey‖ (rutgers, 2010). this act required improved management capabilities and comprehensive plan conformity, encompassing efforts to ―protect the natural, scenic, and other highlands resources, including but not limited to forests, wetlands, stream corridors, steep slopes, and critical habitat for fauna and flora‖ within the watershed (7 njac 38, 2009). enforcement of water quality and land use regulatory violations can also provide significant funding for environmental projects. state water quality protection efforts can target point source and nonpoint source pollution in urban and rural areas, and further incentivize efficient water use and environmental benefits through funding and regulation. for example, in 2009 california approved an $11.14 billion water bond to support the ―co-equal goals‖ of ―providing a more reliable water supply system and protecting, restoring and enhancing the delta system‖ (family water alliance, 2010). additionally, states are authorized to create water quality standards, pollution control and drinking water consilience derrington: drinking water treatment requirements more stringent than federal policy, although currently only a handful do so.4 for example, california’s state standards for uranium and numerous volatile organic compounds (vocs) and synthetic organic compounds (socs), are lower than national limits, and many were in place before national limits were established (ca dept. pub. health, 2008). through increased regulatory enforcement, enhancement of water quality standards, and participation in forwardlooking watershed conservation initiatives, states play a vital role in water resource stewardship. 2.3 local land use zoning and development regulatory authority state delegation of land use and building development authority to municipalities provides powerful tools at the local level to further drinking watershed protection and water security planning efforts. local land use laws can facilitate drinking water protection by restricting impervious surface coverage and limiting subdivisions (newton county board of commissioners, georgia, 2006). encouraging high-density mixed use development to deter sprawl, establishing enhanced aquatic buffers, and creating septic management standards can also help protect aquatic ecosystems and water quality (epa hdd, 2006). local laws can also create open space requirements, establish designated growth areas, and incentivize cluster development, particularly in drinking watersheds (epa open space development, 2006; epa smart growth, 2004). zoning laws can also further state and national management efforts. for example, in suffolk county, new york, local zoning laws were amended to support watershed land acquisitions funded by the federal clean water state revolving fund. similar ―best management‖ development practices have been codified in the towns of clinton and wappinger, in dutchess county, new york (nys dec, 2011; nys dec). model development principles identified by the local site planning roundtable included recommendations for both the natural and built environments such as buffer management, tree conservation, street design, runoff management, and open space stewardship (hudson partnership, 2006). the town of wappinger’s 2010 comprehensive plan sought to ―[p]reserve the quality and quantity of the town’s surface and groundwater resources through land use regulation, monitoring, testing and promotion of water-saving systems.‖ it included requirements for runoff control, especially during construction, as well as establishing open space corridors and restrictions on sensitive area development (town of wappinger, 2010). the wappinger town code reflects these principles in its chapters on watercourse 4 citing the importance of balancing growth and health protective environmental regulation, in 2010, governor christie issued executive order #2 establishing ―common sense principles‖ directing all new jersey agencies to apply cost benefit analysis and ―not exceed the requirements of federal law except when required by state statute or in such circumstances where exceeding the requirements of federal law or regulation is necessary in order to achieve a new jersey specific public policy goal.‖ the order requires agencies to redraft rules identified by the governor’s ―red tape review group‖ to conform to national regulatory standards, effectively ending new jersey’s lead in establishing more stringent standards for these chemicals. despite this lapsed leadership, in 2011, delaware proposed standards to follow new jersey’s 2004 standards. 68 consilience protection, stormwater management, water and zoning (town of wappinger, 2011). the town of wappinger’s water management and watershed protection efforts show that zoning can directly enable water quality protection through source watershed conservation and adoption of development standards. in addition to direct water quality improvements and avoided treatment costs, planned development can also have indirect water quality and quantity benefits. by planning for growth in existing developed areas, undeveloped areas can be protected from sprawl and its associated impacts: more road area, impervious surfaces, and infrastructure needs (usda, 2001). similarly, municipalities can amend and update building codes that encourage sustainable development and green infrastructure deployment, decreasing residential, commercial, and even industrial water demand (mn eqb, 2000; american rivers, 2010). high density, mixed use, transit oriented development (―tod‖) requires support from both zoning and building regulations, and can yield social, economic and ecological benefits (holmes, 2008). the epa reports that lower-density development ―requires more land than higher densities to accommodate the same amount of growth‖ (epa, 2006). most states have delegated planning and development authority to local governments (nicholas, 1999). additionally, the international code council (icc) a conglomerate of policy analysts and industry representatives has recently developed the ―international green construction code‖ (igcc). like the icc’s ―international energy conservation code,‖ the igcc can be adopted by states to require varying degrees of local-level code enforcement. the adoption of the igcc could yield substantial water infrastructure benefits. some states such as maryland (rodriquez, 2011), arizona, washington and rhode island (public works, 2011) have set a precedent of adopting the icc’s international standards at the state level while also empowering municipalities to enhance these standards. even without specific state-level guidance, local building codes can continue to accommodate growing populations while minimizing impacts to ecosystem functions and assets. municipal land use laws are increasingly enacted to ensure development of sustainable communities. reducing allowable impervious surface coverage and requiring projects to offset impacts of development and provide for water supply demands can have direct watershed stewardship benefits. furthermore, the epa encourages watershed protection through strategic local development planning that minimizes overall land disturbance and impervious surface cover (epa, 2006). some communities are implementing this model. municipal-level water quality protection efforts are codified primarily through local zoning laws and building codes that encourage low-impact development, efficient use, and demand reduction. the epa reports numerous case studies where municipal storm water regulations (epa gics, 2010) and development restrictions such as open space management, compact development, and measures to reduce overall imperviousness of the built environment have improved water quality (epa scorecard, 2009). despite the difficulty in determining how municipal land use policies contribute to water quality conditions, there are clear correlations between upland development activities and water quality. these impacts can be addressed through local policy and planning tools (benoit, 2007). best management practices and recommendations will be discussed in section 5. consilience derrington: drinking water 3. the status of drinking water protection in the u.s. 3.1 water quality and aquatic ecosystems national, state, and local regulations interact to form a mosaic of drinking water quality regulations across the united states. nevertheless, drinking water quality remains a policy concern and a management challenge. there is considerable uncertainty that must be resolved concerning whether current environmental regulations are sufficiently protective of public health, water quality, and aquatic systems. between 1991 and 2003 there were 183 documented outbreaks of waterborne disease.5 waterborne illness from drinking water contamination impacts estimated 19.5 million americans annually, a figure that does not include illnesses caused by chemicals or toxins (the new york times, 2009-2010). in 2003, a nrdc study concluded that safe drinking water in u.s. cities is increasingly at risk, revealing troubling shortcomings in source water protection, water delivery infrastructure, and treatment systems (nrdc, 2003). the new york times’ toxic waters series echoed these findings (the new york times, 2009-2010). in the epa’s 2009 report, ―water on tap,‖ the agency warned of threats, noting that ―[s]hort-term disease outbreaks and water restrictions during droughts have demonstrated that we can no longer take our drinking water for granted‖ (epa, 2009). in addition to known waterborne disease outbreaks and demand pressures on public water infrastructure, cumulative compound impacts of chemical contaminants from natural and human sources are being linked to long-term health impacts. the epa’s toxic control substances act identifies more than 83,000 chemicals in use in the united states (epa tsca, 2011). in a speech to the association of metropolitan water agencies, administrator jackson noted that the epa is ―not keeping pace with the increasing knowledge we have about chemicals in our products, our environment and our bodies‖ (epa administrator jackson remarks, 2010). although the epa is taking steps to expand drinking water quality regulations, the environmental working group reported that 316 contaminants were present in drinking water supplied to 256 million americans in 45 states. they noted that the epa has enforceable drinking water safety standards for 114 of the 316 substances detected (36%) (environmental working group, 2011). however, some caution that strengthening standards does not necessarily ensure improved water quality or regulatory compliance. the new york times surveyed five years of clean water act discharge records, finding more than 506,000 self-reported violations from more than 23,000 facilities (duhigg, 2009). the study also noted that violations of the cwa have risen steadily across the nation (duhigg, 2009). while the extent of surface and groundwater pollution is not well established, national data elucidating chemical, hydrological, and physical water parameters (maddock, 1999) show declining trends in water quality and aquatic ecosystem health. in 2010, the usgs conducted a nationwide assessment of 2,888 monitoring sites and concluded that stream flows have been significantly altered in eighty-six 5 about 75% of these outbreaks, except for the highly publicized 1993 milwaukee cryptosporidium outbreak that infected 400,000 people, involved groundwater. about 65% involved individual wells, which are subject to less water quality regulation (anisfeld, 2010). 70 consilience percent of these rivers – a concerning finding given that flow alterations are a ―primary contributor to degraded river ecosystems‖ (carlisle, 2010). analysis of state-integrated water quality reports indicates that about 50 percent of all assessed rivers and streams are ―impaired‖ and 50 percent are rated as ―good,‖ with a small fraction rated as ―threatened‖ (anisfeld, 2010; epa, 2011). additional reports from the usgs’ national water quality assessment program indicate ongoing water quality concerns associated with pesticides (gilliom, 2006), volatile organic compounds (zogorski, 2006), nutrient loading (sprague, 2009),6 trace elements (mahler, 2006) such as mercury (brigham, 2003), and overall aquatic ecology. increasingly, water resources and surrounding ecosystems are burdened by growing populations, mounting withdrawals from water supplies, expanding impervious cover, deforestation, pollution, and shifting climatic patterns (the new york times, 2009-2010). 3.2 water security trends in the united states 3.2.1 water quantity it is uncertain how much water extraction is sustainable at a national level. although water use is monitored,7 detailed water budgets assessing available water withdrawals are not available for the majority of u.s. watersheds. nevertheless, the well-studied ogallala basin that covers portions of eight high plains states and california’s central valley aquifers show irrefutable signs of unsustainable use (gleick, 2010). the same trends are evident in surface water. wri shows that per capita sustainably available water exceeds per capita withdrawals on a national level. but, what constitutes ―water scarcity‖ or ―water stress‖ is a complex issue, and national assessments may not capture regional variations. one scholar claims that ―there is some strong evidence that the united states may have already passed the point of peak water, including peak renewable, nonrenewable, and ecological water‖ in numerous watersheds (gleick, 2010). compounding these use pressures, the epa also predicts climate change will intensify some regional water management challenges. for example, the southeast, gulf, and mid-atlantic may experience longer droughts, more storm events, and higher floods, while the northeast is likely to see decreased snow cover and possible saline intrusion into coastal aquifers (epa 2011). projections indicate that by 2050 nearly one in three u.s. counties will be facing water scarcity (nrdc, 2010). 6 nitrates in particular are nutrients that may pose human health concerns. see ward et al., (2005, november). drinking-water nitrate and health – recent findings and research needs. 7 in 2005, 44,200 million gallons a day were withdrawn for ―public water supply,‖ a term which includes public and private water suppliers that provide water to at least 25 people or have a minimum of 15 connections. usgs reports that an estimated 258 million people – about 86 percent of the u.s. population – relied on public water supplies for household use, and that about two-thirds of this water came from surface water sources (usgs, 2009). consilience derrington: drinking water figure 1: nrdc water sustainability index – 2050 projections (nrdc, 2010). as figure 1 demonstrates, while some water stress is predicted throughout the united states, arid areas such as the colorado river basin, the west gulf of mexico, and the atlantic slope drainage will have concerns about water quantity and availability. 3.2.2 water quality debate surrounds whether current environmental regulations are sufficiently protective of public health, water quality, and aquatic systems. while some outbreaks are significant enough to be documented and publicized, as in the case of the 1993 cryptosporidium infection in milwaukee, reported cases only reflect a small fraction of actual infections (craun, 2006). despite the considerable toll of waterborne illness, from occasional hospital visits to missed work and school days, this ongoing epidemic is not routinely portrayed as a human health ―crisis.‖ this may be because most waterborne illnesses in the united states do not result in death as frequently as in other countries. however, deaths do occur. between 1971 and 2002, there were 764 documented waterborne disease outbreaks associated with drinking water, resulting in 575,457 cases of illness and 79 deaths (reynolds, 2008). recent reports suggest these illnesses may cost the healthcare system more than $500 million annually (ledue, 2010). exposure to the numerous chemicals used in the united states ought to also be explored. organic and synthetic chemicals may enter ground and surface water sources through numerous pathways. some chemicals, such as arsenic,8 occur naturally in the environment and result from human activities (epa aidw, 2010). contamination risks differ between surface water and groundwater (ritter, 2002), and may raise diverse human and environmental health concerns. 8 arsenic has been linked to long-term risks, including several types of cancer and blindness, as well as short-term effects such as skin discoloration, rashes, stomach pain, nausea, vomiting and diarrhea. in 2000, usgs published a national report showing that well water samples from many counties contained high levels of arsenic (usgs, 2000). in 2001, the epa lowered the mcl for arsenic from 50 micrograms per liter to 10 micrograms per liter after the national research council published reports that higher levels posed greater health risks. nevertheless, recent region specific usgs reports indicate that numerous water systems are in violation of this limit. see e.g. usgs, 2010. assessment of arsenic concentrations in domestic well water, by town, in maine, 2005–09. 72 consilience additionally, while the cwa limits point source pollution, nonpoint source pollution remains a leading cause of concern for our nation’s surface waters (anderson, 1999). in the united states, leading causes of impairment are assessed by water category. for rivers and streams, pathogens, sediments and nutrients are the top three causes of impairment, while for lakes, ponds, and reservoirs, mercury, polychlorinated biphenyls (pcbs), and nutrients are the three leading causes of impairments (epa, 2011). agriculture is the leading probable source of impacts to rivers and streams, while atmospheric deposition is the leading probable source of impairment in assessed lakes, ponds, and reservoirs (epa impacts, 2011). national information on groundwater contamination is less available. however, in a 2010 report, more than 20% of 932 untreated public wells that the usgs sampled contained one or more chemical contaminants at concentrations greater than sdwa mcls (science daily, 2010). the 2010 usgs study showed that naturally occurring contaminants such as arsenic and radon were present in about 75% of contaminated samples at levels greater than human health benchmarks. anthropogenic pollutants including herbicides, insecticides, solvents, disinfection byproducts, nitrates, and chemicals from gasoline were detected in 64% of contaminated samples, with about 25% of these detections exceeding existing health benchmarks (science daily, 2010). the sufficiency of mcls to protect human health is also a complicated and much debated issue. thousands of potential contaminants may pose threats to water quality and human health, while only about 90 pollutants are currently regulated under the sdwa. the sdwa requires the epa to review drinking water standards every six years to determine whether current health effects assessments, changes in technology, and/or other factors provide a basis to support regulatory revisions (epa syr, 2011). these reviews consider dose-response and exposure assessments to establish a risk characterization (epa, 2000). possible regulatory changes are then considered using a cost-benefit analysis framework, as required by the 1996 sdwa amendments. risk assessments today may provide more accurate estimates than in the past, with models that purport to ―qualitatively and quantitatively‖ address uncertainties such as variability in physical and biological processes and model uncertainty in dose-response extrapolations (epa, 2005). unfortunately, acknowledging uncertainty in itself may not ensure health protective decisionmaking. the regulatory bottom line often boils down to a consideration of how much risk is economically acceptable, and ignoring ambiguous risks of cumulative exposure to toxins as acceptable costs of development or doing business. the precautionary principle dictates that great care should be taken in the face of uncertainty in order to ensure protective, data-driven standards for human and environmental health and optimal resource stewardship. drinking water quality data is reported on a system-by-system basis, with a regrettable scarcity of nationwide case studies. in part, the bifurcation of water quality reporting requirements for surface waters and drinking water systems reports confound analysis of national water quality trends. from the epa’s national surface water reports between 2002-2008, it is clear that a significant number of surface water systems are not meeting their use designations and are thus ―impaired.‖ of the 26% of rivers and streams assessed, 50% are impaired and 24.1% were not meeting their use designation, as illustrated in figure 2 (epa, 2011). consilience derrington: drinking water figure 2: public water supply water quality attainment for rivers and streams. adapted from us epa’s national public water supply data (epa, 2011). figure 3: public water supply water quality attainment for lakes, reservoirs and ponds. adapted from us epa’s national public water data (epa, 2011). of the 42% of lakes, reservoirs and ponds assessed, 66% are impaired and 8.9% of these waters serve as public water supplies (figure 3; epa 2011). overall, pathogens, sediment, and nutrients were the leading causes of impairment for all assessed rivers and streams, while mercury, polychlorinated biphenyls (pbcs), and nutrients were leading causes of impairment in assessed lakes, reservoirs, and ponds (epa, 2011). this data is indicative of water quality challenges, as well as the muchcited criticism that the clean water act’s focus on point-source pollution is insufficient to prevent degradation of aquatic systems. as water quality declines it 74 consilience becomes more difficult to ensure drinking water security due to reduced availability of high-quality water sources. 3.2 water security – regulatory response use restrictions addressing water quantity concerns are relatively new regulatory phenomena that are increasingly found at the state and local levels, especially in more water-scarce areas. for example, georgia’s 2010 water stewardship act requires local governments to adopt ordinances limiting outdoor water uses, mandates that agencies include water conservation measures in comprehensive plans, and encourages efficient use and water loss abatement activities throughout the state (ga wsa, 2010). in tampa, florida, the municipality restricts irrigation of lawns and landscaping, and limits new plant establishment (tampa code, 2010). it is reasonable to suspect that this trend will continue, as water availability is an increasing development concern. additionally, while not addressed at length in this paper, water infrastructure deployment and maintenance are critically related to water quality and quantity concerns.9 in a recent annual report from the office of ground water and surface water, the epa asserted that ensuring longterm sustainability of drinking water infrastructure is a key challenge. the epa advocates a ―multi-faceted approach to managing and sustaining the nations’ water infrastructure assets‖ to address ―both the supply and demand problems in order to better optimize available resources‖ (epa, 2006). despite future water quality concerns, expanding delivery and treatment infrastructure are current management challenges receiving attention. approximately 160,000 epa regulated drinking water systems supply water to about 90 percent of the american population. although there has not been a major reported waterborne outbreak since 1993, a recent national academies report warns that ―the ability of these drinking water systems to continue to meet increasing water demands over the coming decades cannot be taken for granted‖ (the national academies, 2008). there are over 155,000 public drinking water systems (pws) in the united states, and sdwa violations were reported in 33% of small pws serving 3,300 or fewer customers and 30% of all large pws. the epa acknowledges that health-based violations in at least 10,615 public supply systems10 that serve 17.7 million customers 9 in 2009, the american society of civil engineers (asce) gave the united states’ drinking water infrastructure a ―d-‖ grade, noting that ―drinking water systems face an annual shortfall of at least $11 billion in funding needed to replace aging facilities … and to comply with existing and future federal water regulations,‖ a shortfall that does not fully account for growing demand (asce, 2010). a 2009 epa needs assessment concluded that to comply with drinking water regulations, a $276.8 billion investment in infrastructure improvements would be needed over 20 years, requiring annual investments of $13.84 billion. a 2002 congressional budget office report estimated annual costs between $24.6 and $41.0 billion (copeland, 2010). despite significant increases in population and usage (both total and per capita), the asce highlights low-hanging solutions that could yield longterm benefits. 10 while public supply systems reported 10,615 health-based violations, epa notes that primary agencies reported 18,169 health-based violations in 2009. of the 18,169 agency reported violations, 50% of these violations were for exceedence of the total coliform rule, 24% for chemical contaminant standards, 16% for the stage 1 disinfection byproduct rule, 6% for the surface water treatment rule, and 4% for the lead and copper rule. epa also acknowledges possible consilience derrington: drinking water are a cause for concern (epa npwscr, 2011). in addition to the fact that some claim existing health-based standards are not sufficiently health protective (nrdc, 2003), compliance challenges may implicate environmental health equity issues, where smaller communities may face a disproportionate risk of drinking water that violates health standards. the epa indicates that small systems account for approximately 91% of systems in significant noncompliance (epa npwscr, 2011). while the epa continues to take steps to provide compliance assistance and develop capacity for small systems, billions of dollars in investment and planning will be required to merely maintain current service levels (asce, 2010; copeland, 2010). 4. supply trends and approaches to ensuring drinking water security in order to better understand public drinking supply challenges, the following section will highlight nrdc’s tap water assessment reports and conclusions. water supply management will briefly be discussed to further emphasize regional drinking water protection approaches. this article will conclude discussing case studies of successful interventions and literature-based discussion of best-management practices and recommendations. 4.1 nrdc’s city table water studies in 2000, the natural resources defense council (nrdc) began their tap water quality assessments of major u.s. cities. by 2003, the nrdc published results from nineteen cities, ranked by water quality, ―right to know‖ information availability, and source water protection. this data was assessed based on epa compliance records and annual reports. five ―ranks‖ were possible – excellent, good, fair, poor, and failing. no city received perfect marks. in fact, if ranked numerically (with 4 being ―excellent‖ and 0 being ―failing‖), the average score in this assessment was about a 6 out of 12 (figure 4). while the report concluded that overall tap water quality varies widely between cities, nrdc warned that ―there is one overarching truth that applies to all u.s. cities: unless we take steps now, our tap water will get worse‖ (nrdc, 2003). among overall water quality trends observed in this study, the nrdc found lead, pathogens, chlorination by-products, and naturally occurring carcinogens to be particularly ubiquitous (nrdc, 2003). although the report found relatively few cities to be in outright violation of national standards, ―[t]his fact did not necessarily imply low contaminant levels, but rather low standards: in short, the epa has written most standards in a way that the vast majority of cities will not be in violation‖ (nrdc, 2003). underreporting and inaccuracies in this data, and is taking steps to improve the quality of data available through sdwa reporting. (epa npwscr, 2011). 76 consilience figure 4: nrdc city survey summary. adapted from nrdc, 2003. the nrdc’s study concludes that ―in order to improve water quality and protect public health, we must invest in infrastructure, upgrade treatment and distribution facilities, improve public understanding through the efficacy of right-toknow reports, [and] safeguard source water‖ (nrdc, 2003). while it is difficult to quantify the state of water security throughout the united states, the nrdc study offers a persuasive example that continued system investments and improvements are necessary. population growth and development pressures, along with shifting precipitation and temperature patterns associated with climate change, will continue to compound the challenge of maintaining safe and sufficient drinking water supplies. multi-tiered protection and management approaches will remain critical systematic stewardship elements. 4.2 approaches to drinking water supply management – filtration and conservation overview the safe drinking water act requires all public water supply utilities either filter their water supplies or demonstrate that their water quality meets current drinking water standards. providers seeking to avoid filtration required under the safe drinking water act must demonstrate that their drinking water complies with primary (health related) and secondary (nuisance-related) standards. water systems that can demonstrate this can apply for a ―filtration avoidance determination‖ (fad) (epa, 1989). it is worth noting that only two of the nineteen cities assessed in the nrdc tap water study – seattle and boston – have sdwa fads, and thus, are not required to filter their water supplies. in fact, only five large u.s. cities—new york city, seattle, boston, san francisco, and portland have standing fads (ferrara, 2011). although these water utilities have found that protecting source water land is an efficient, economic way of complying with standards and avoiding filtration costs, fad applications can also be arduous. for example, to achieve fad approval, new york city’s department of environmental protection developed a detailed longconsilience derrington: drinking water term watershed protection and filtration avoidance program (epa, 1997).11 new york’s ―multi-barrier,‖ management practices aim to ―reduce or eliminate pollutants at the source, control the transport of pollutants across the landscape and protect the stream corridor,‖ while their ―multi-tiered‖ modeling addresses terrestrial and aquatic systems to develop predictive loading models to address water quality concerns (epa, 2000). these watershed management efforts and subsequent fad allowed nyc to avoid construction of a $6 billion water filtration facility that would have been necessary to ensure the system’s nearly 9 million users received water that met sdwa standards (messina, 1994-1995). although more the exception then the norm, watershed conservation has been demonstrated to be a cost-effective approach to drinking water quality protection, and cities are increasingly looking upstream to assess watershed scale protection efforts (cannon, 2008). resource management agencies increasingly perceive implementation of conservation programs as being ―crucial for restoring and protecting waters and watersheds‖ and are targeting funding to meet these ends (arabi, 2007). communities continue to lead the charge in water-supply sensitive smart growth innovation. for example, the town of bedford, new york, has authorized cluster development to preserve surface and groundwater supply areas, and new york’s freshwater wetland act empowers municipalities throughout the state to adopt broad wetland protection legislation (nolon, 2000). coordination of state and local laws that are protective of water quality and quantity will become increasingly important to ensuring drinking water security as populations grow and development pressures increase. while source water protection is not a panacea to water quality challenges, a patchwork of national, state, and local regulations and funding programs directly and indirectly incentivize watershed conservation for drinking water quality protection, thus recognizing the connection between aquatic ecosystem health and water quality. case studies of water supply systems throughout the u.s. support the proposition that as quality and quantity pressures continue to grow, communities and water suppliers will need to work together to ensure drinking water needs are met. 5. solutions to drinking water concerns: bmps and recommendations despite federal protection efforts, drinking water supplies are stressed to varying degrees throughout the united states. these stressors can be attributed to water quality and quantity limitations, as well as infrastructure pressures, all of which can be linked to population growth, climate change, water extraction and land use trends (nrdc, 2010). water quality impairments are often correlated to surrounding land uses, while water quantity sustainability is linked to regional availability, which is projected to be increasingly impacted by climate fluctuations. although international 11 this plan included (1) comprehensive water quality inventory, surveillance and monitoring planning; (2) new watershed regulation promulgation; (3) stakeholder outreach programs; (4) reservoir coliform remediation and spill protection; (5) sewage treatment facility upgrades; (6) septic systems reviews, inspections, and remediation actions; (7) enhanced water quality regulation enforcement; (8) expanded land acquisition efforts; (9) stream corridor protection; and (10) natural resources management considerations (epa, 1997). 78 consilience and national efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions to mitigate climatic irregularities are certainly desirable, bottom-up local and regional solutions to reduce demand and protect water supplies are available now. as populations expand and weather patterns and temperatures become more erratic, supplying adequate quantities of high quality drinking water will be a growing sustainable development challenge. 5.1 watershed level best management practices and tools – protecting supply watershed level management is already espoused by the environmental protection agency and funding is available to support coordinated planning and protection efforts (epa watershed approach, 2011; epa watershed academy, 2011). as the much-studied watershed management and filtration avoidance of the new york city water system exemplifies, the tangible economic benefits of improved water quality can incentivize source protection, but partnerships with local communities and system-wide watershed stewardship approaches are critical. there, downstream users fund upstream watershed protection efforts to ensure supply needs are met. the new york city approach to valuing ecosystem services and implementing cooperative resource stewardship planning is a testament to both the quantitative and qualitative values of watershed scale management. by building watershed considerations such as flow patterns and water budgets into regional development and land use planning efforts, upstream and downstream communities can benefit from expanded source water protection efforts. both water quantity and quality planning considerations can guide land use decisions to ensure ―low impact development.‖ using drainage maps, modeling, and watershed plans, municipal land use regulations can ensure that development incorporates strategies to safeguard water quality, protect soils and conserve biodiversity (benoit, 2007). watershed planning is a crucial, scalable tool that can help communities address aquatic system impairments (iles, 2003; epa watershed academy, 2011; watzin et al., 2007). although national, state, and regional programs exist to regulate water quality, local land use and building codes are flexible tools for community development that can incorporate protective water and environmental management decisions. growing bodies of literature advocate an ―integrated water resource management‖ at the basin scale (mitchell, 2005). the world water council recommends system-wide improvements in water extraction, delivery and use infrastructure as well as significant changes to water and ecosystem valuation (cosgrove, 2000). development policies are increasingly targeting needs of municipalities and watershed catchments.12 case studies suggest that local governments are already implementing scalable interventions to support sustainable aquatic system stewardship through resource inventories, goal-setting and performance benchmarks that consider environmental, social, and economic 12 epa’s system for urban stormwater treatment and analysis integration model (sustain) offers an arcgis platform to perform hydrologic and water quality modeling in watersheds, including land use and bmp simulation modules, to facilitate watershed planning and help identify management solutions at multiple scales. consilience derrington: drinking water criteria.13 developers and the community at large can achieve valuable benefits from watershed planning and best management practices (bmps). for example, current bmps of watershed development site design can involve aesthetically appealing surface water protection features and open space, reduce costs of water conveyance systems and flood risks, and facilitate achievement of national pollutant discharge elimination system (npdes) stormwater phase ii and total maximum daily load permits. development bmps that localities can mandate to support lower impact development include using bioengineering elements to reduce volume and slow velocity of water within drainage ways, preserving natural contours and avoiding extensive regrading at development sites, using natural drainage areas to site rain gardens, developing stormwater capture systems capable of reusing stormwater, and minimizing erosion and high velocity stormwater runoff (benoit, 2007). to reduce development impacts in watershed areas, zoning and building codes can also require less than 10% effective impervious cover, encourage high density growth in areas that are already developed and offer conservation incentives in undeveloped or less developed upper watershed areas. these tools have been shown to be effective in improving water quality by reducing runoff volume, peak flow rates, and duration (benoit, 2007). this is achieved by promoting aquifer recharge, infiltration, and evapotranspiration (jaffe et al., 2010). many of these interventions have already been incorporated into development codes to incentivize higher density lower impact construction around the nation. for example, the city of seattle’s green factor program requires 30% parcel vegetation in business and multifamily residential districts (epa gics, 2010; city of seattle, 2010). the seattle department of planning and development reports that the green factor program improves air quality, creates habitat, and mitigates urban heat island effects, as well as reducing stormwater runoff, protecting receiving waters from pollution, and decreasing public infrastructure costs (city of seattle, 2011). in addition to local development regulations, overlay zoning, planned unit development, low impact transportation design, and collaborative conservation planning efforts can support sustainable terrestrial and aquatic resource uses, yielding ecological, social, and economic benefits (aware colorado, 2007). planned growth can be more sustainable growth, and numerous tools are available at the local, regional, and state levels to support proactive planning that incorporates watershed stewardship in order to protect drinking water supplies (epa watershed handbook, 2008). precautionary resource stewardship and community partnerships are critical to preserving, improving, and safeguarding invaluable drinking water supplies. 5.2 recommendations for national incentives for watershed protection and water security planning watershed protection is a fundamental step in a multiple-barrier approach to protecting drinking water (ernst et al., 2004). as world bank environmental 13 for example, the american society of landscape architects’ sustainability toolkit includes social, economic, and environmental sustainability design and planning models. available at http://www.asla.org/contentdetail.aspx?id=26060. 80 consilience specialist david cassells warns, ―[p]rotecting forests around water catchment areas is no longer a luxury but a necessity. when they are gone, the costs of providing clean and safe drinking water to urban areas will increase dramatically‖ (reuters, 2003). this article emphasizes watershed protection because, as established above, the tools to achieve effective source water stewardship are already available at the local level. watershed management aimed at drinking water supply protection is only one element of nrdc’s recommended interventions – their report stresses the need to protect supply, maintain and improve infrastructure, and ensure effective treatment (nrdc, 2003). certainly, improving infrastructure and ensuring water quality standards and treatment that are human health protective are further steps needed to safeguard drinking water supplies, but these steps must be taken at state and national levels, where it can be more difficult to establish political consensus. nevertheless, achieving these goals should not be divisive partisan issues. the economic downturn should not be a justification to avoid much needed water security investments and stewardship programs. indeed, low-cost interventions such as mandating green infrastructure and water protective development today could avoid higher system overhaul costs in the future (dunn, 2007). population growth and urbanization trends make green infrastructure solutions essential. moreover, such solutions can be affordable interventions to protect and improve water quality (dunn, 2007). as more case studies develop it will become increasingly clear: widespread action is needed at multiple levels to ensure that surface and groundwater in the united states is wisely used and adequately protected, and that infrastructure is sufficiently maintained and developed to meet the needs of growing populations. water needs should be assessed to plan for sustainable secure supplies. maintaining high quality drinking water is critical for human development (undp & unicef, 2006). despite the advancement of regulation and protection efforts at national, state, and local levels, drinking water quality and aquatic ecosystem health remain imperiled to various degrees throughout the united states. while drinking water quality and watershed protection legislation in the u.s. is not unsubstantial, clearly much more needs to be done to ensure sufficient safe drinking water for people while maintaining healthy ecosystems. the new york times’ toxic waters series asserts that congress should expand the protections of the clean water act, give state agencies more resources, and hold the epa and states accountable for their failures, acknowledging that ―some say changes will not occur without public outrage‖ (duhigg, 2009). while increased top-down regulation of water discharges may anger some, increasing understanding about short-term and long-term human health impacts of declining water quality should be sufficient to provoke public support of enhanced drinking water protection. already, americans are more concerned about drinking water pollution than any other environmental issue (gallup, 2009). if the history of environmental regulation is any indication, public outrage may be necessary to move congress to national action. in the meantime, forward thinking communities can continue to work to strengthen state water quality standards and develop local land use laws that plan for water security and are 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(2006). volatile organic compounds in the nation’s ground water and drinking-water supply wells. united states department of the interior, united states geological survey. library of congress. microsoft word pearse-smith-micro.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 11, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 123–131   the return of large dams to the development agenda: a post-development critique scott w.d. pearse-smith national centre for peace and conflict studies university of otago, new zealand email: scottps@gmail.com abstract large dams are making a comeback. however, large dams reflect an outdated development paradigm narrowly focused on economic growth through modernization. this article employs a post-development lens to highlight three biases of the narrow development perspective that underlies large dams. first, it views rivers, and nature more generally, as an unrealized source of economic growth and an input to production. second, it is blind to distributional impacts and is resultantly inequitable: the benefits of large dams are concentrated in the hands of the wealthy, while conditions for the poor worsen or do not improve. third, it disempowers its supposed beneficiaries by de-politicizing the development decisions to pursue large dam projects. each of these biases is illustrated in reference to the mekong river basin’s experience with large dam development. it is alarming, therefore, that large dams seem to be making a resurgence in asia, africa and south america, and are once again receiving world bank support. this article serves as a reminder of why large dams do not deliver equitable development and why they thus faded from the development agenda at the turn of the century. author’s note scott pearse-smith is a research affiliate of the national centre for peace and conflict studies, university of otago, new zealand. scott’s research interests lie in development geography and political ecology. he is particularly interested in the role of the natural environment in development. keywords: post-development; large dams; natural resources; development; modernization; economic development. 124 consilience   1. introduction: here we go again large dams are making a comeback.1 the first in a cascade of large dams planned for the main stream of the mekong river—a project that was conceived in the 1960s—is currently under construction (international rivers, 2013). the brazilian government recently revealed its intention to pursue an aggressive hydropower agenda in the amazon river basin (fearnside, 2012). and more large dams are planned for the congo and zambezi rivers—three of which are listed by the world bank as “regional transformational projects” in its recent strategy paper, which signals the bank’s objective of pursuing large infrastructure projects to “catalyze very large-scale benefits” (world bank, 2013, p. 8, p. 1). this article serves as a reminder of why large dams do not deliver equitable development. it draws on post-development theory to critique large dam projects and the outdated development agenda they reflect. the arguments presented are illustrated in reference to the mekong river basin’s experience with large dam development. 2. dams and development by the time the world commission on dams presented its scathing critique of large dams in 2000 (wcd, 2000a), it was clear that the heyday of large dams had passed (mccully, 2001). the loss of faith in large dam projects followed increasing empirical evidence of the all-too-often environmentally destructive and socially inequitable impact of large dams (hirsch & wilson, 2011). strong political opposition in countries that had witnessed the negative consequences of large dams made future projects unviable. this was the case in thailand, for example, following the controversy surrounding the pak mun dam (middleton, garcia, & foran 2009; hirsch & wilson, 2011). following the release of the world commission on dams’ report, mccully (2001, xvi) observed that “the rate of new dam construction is dropping fast in every region of the world.” this trend, mccully (2001, xvi) noted, was accompanied by fast-declining public appetite for dams in many parts of the world, with a shaking of “the old belief in dams as shining icons of prosperity and modernity.” prior to the shift away from large dams in the late 1990s, there existed an “entrenched belief that large-scale water development schemes are an essential part of the process of economic development – a process which we have been taught to see as the only means of combating poverty and malnutrition, and of assuring health, longevity and prosperity for all.” (goldmsith & hildyard, 1984, p. 276) this meshed well with the contemporary view of development as a process of economic growth through modernization—a paradigm referred to throughout this article as “classical development.”                                                                                                                           1 according to the international commission on large dams, a dam is ‘large’ if it is more than 15 metres in height or, if 5 to 15 metres high, has a storage capacity of more than 3 million cubic metres (wcd, 2000). consilience pearse-smith: return of large dams   classical development measures development in terms of gross domestic product (gdp) per capita. the focus is on increasing aggregate economic output, with little concern for the distribution of the benefits of economic growth. modernization, according to the classical development paradigm, is central to increasing economic output. the application of modern scientific and technical knowledge to large-scale development projects is therefore a preferred means of pursuing development. this approach to development often manifests itself in massive infrastructure projects, such as large dams. the shift away from large dams over the previous two decades has coincided with a general broadening of the concept of development. critiques of classical development recognized that narrowly focusing on increasing gdp did not deliver equitable development—that is, it did not improve the quality of life across society. consequently, the notion of development has been expanded to include “social, cultural, political and environmental concerns and conditions.” (mcgregor, 2008, p. 12) post-development critiques of classical development—and, indeed, development in general—were perhaps the most scathing, arguing that development projects ultimately do more harm than good (mcgregor, 2008; potter, conway, evans, & lloyd-evans, 2012). while this article does not contend that this is the case for all development projects, it does contend that it is generally the case for large dam development projects. post-development provides a useful lens through which to critique some of the fundamental biases that exist within the classical development paradigm as it applies to large dams. these include viewing nature as a collection of underutilized natural resources, being blind to the distributional impacts of development projects, and deferring political decisions to the ostensibly objective realms of science and economics. 3. nature becomes natural resources classical development views nature as a collection of natural resources. in this light, nature, as natural resources, is viewed as an input to production and is valued accordingly (shiva, 2010). hence, undeveloped natural spaces are seen as unproductive—as missed opportunities for economic growth. the dominance of this perspective arises in the context of many of the world’s rivers. rivers are often described as water resources and ascribed a particular quantum of hydropower potential (bakker, 1999). thus, the lower mekong river basin is framed as a water resource of nearly 30,000 megawatts of unexploited hydropower potential (mrc, 2010). when a river system is reduced to an unrealized source of energy and of inputs to production, refusing to develop and realize that potential becomes illogical. rivers are not, however, simply unrealized sources of “free energy” (hirsch & wilson, 2011 p. 1644). from an eco-centric perspective, rivers, and nature more generally, have intrinsic value that is independent of human use (mcgregor, 2008). from an anthropocentric perspective, rivers have enormous value to those who depend on them for their livelihoods. this is well illustrated by the lower mekong river basin, where the dietary and economic security of the vast majority of the lower basin’s 60 million people depends on the natural environment supported by the mekong river (pearse-smith, 2012a). eighty-three percent of the economically active population in the lower mekong basin is engaged in a water resource–related activity as a primary occupation (mrc, 126 consilience   2010). such reliance on nature is common to large numbers of people throughout the global south. yet, the economic analyses underlying large dam projects frequently ignore the value of nature to local people. in particular, difficulties in measuring the informal economy mean that such analyses often do not account for the value nature provides to small-scale economic activities that exist outside of the formal economy. this reinforces the perception that natural resources are underutilized. in monetary terms, the economic value currently provided by the mekong’s natural resources is estimated at up to us$3 billion annually (keskinen et al., 2008), with its fisheries alone valued at more than us$2 billion (middleton, garcia, & foran, 2009).2 yet this value goes largely unrecognized in hydropower development plans, which means that the mekong is viewed by policymakers as underutilized and ripe for large-scale development projects (keskinen et al., 2008; sarkkula et al., 2009). 4. inequitable development classical development is blind to the distributional impacts of development projects and is resultantly inequitable. the benefits are largely concentrated in the hands of the wealthy, while conditions for the poor either worsen or do not improve. classical development therefore exacerbates existing inequalities instead of providing any benefit to those who need it most. the focus of classical development is on growing gdp, with the distribution of benefits generally left to the ineffective economic theory of the trickle-down of wealth (chang, 2010; quiggin, 2012). as was outlined above, large numbers of people in the global south rely on the natural environment for their livelihoods. constructing large dams almost invariably involves appropriating natural spaces from “communities whose livelihoods they have supported for centuries.” (shiva, 2010, p. 237) as seen in the mekong, resettlement separates people from their livelihoods, forcing them to find alternative income sources such as low-wage laboring (jenkins, mcgauhey & mills, 2008). it is not just those who are displaced by dam sites and reservoirs who are affected. those living downstream from large dams have faced unpredictable flooding, causing a reduction in water quality and damage to life and property (wyatt & baird, 2007). those living upstream from large dams have faced significantly reduced fish catches (wcd, 2000b). while bearing such significant costs, those who are worst affected receive very little benefit from large dams. the electricity produced by hydropower dams is largely consumed by industry and urbanites. the revenues from the sale of electricity generally flow to developers and the state. often, those most immediately impacted by large dams do not even have access to electricity despite living closest to its source. this has been the case in the mekong basin, where, despite considerable hydropower development, rural electrification rates remain low (adb 2008; icem 2010). the extent of the spatial separation between those who reap the benefits and those who face the immediate impacts of large dams is                                                                                                                           2 such valuations do not even account for the cultural, aesthetic and widerecosystem values of the natural environment, which cannot properly be ascribed a monetary value. for more on the difficulties and dangers of attempting to quantify the value of nature, see bertram & terry (2013) and wilson (2013). consilience pearse-smith: return of large dams   well illustrated by the large dams of laos. from these dams, the vast majority of the electricity generated is exported to thailand, while the social and environmental costs remain in rural laos (mitchell, 1998; middleton, garcia, & foran, 2009). the benefits that large dams do provide are frequently overstated. as goldmsith and hildyard (1984) warned, “those who stand to gain politically and financially from the building of a large dam are willing to go to inordinate lengths to ensure that it will be built.” for example, many of the large dam projects in the mekong basin have been predicated on habitually overestimated energy demand growth forecasts (greacen & palettu, 2007). as observed by sachs (2010, p. 32), the pursuit of classical development has led “many third world governments [to] sacrifice the vital interests of half of their populations.” again, this is the case for the mekong. national and international interests are privileged over the interests of the local people who bear the costs of large dams (pearse-smith 2012b). however, “local” people actually constitute the majority of the mekong basin’s population (mitchell, 1988). 5. de-politicization and disempowerment classical development de-politicizes development decisions and disempowers its supposed beneficiaries. once nature is viewed as a pool of natural resources, it lends itself to scientific management and technological development (shiva, 2010). when a free-flowing river is reduced to an unrealized source of energy and irrigation, it makes sense to develop that potential through the construction of large dams. in presenting the decision to construct large dams as a rational scientific and economic decision, policy-makers essentially masquerade a political decision as an apolitical one. the knowledge offered by science and economics is presented as rational and indisputable, and therefore outside the realm of politics (chang, 2002; alvares, 2010). the resulting “‘fact’-driven debates … ‘free’ policy-makers from the inherently political nature of the decisions.” (käkönen and hirsch, 2009, p. 349) this process of de-politicization makes it difficult for those opposing dams to legitimately challenge their construction. once de-politicized, a dam project can be challenged only by contesting the scientific and economic analyses that underpin the project. dam opponents are forced to contest whether the predetermined objectives of the project will be achieved rather than the objectives themselves and the process by which they were set. in a politicized environment, those being developed would have the opportunity to help formulate their own development goals and needs. in a depoliticized environment, on the other hand, the goal—national economic development—is already set and the process is also set. it is up to the engineers, economists, funders, developers and the state to decide the “right” way to achieve their goal. the exclusion of local people from development planning, even from decisions that affect them directly, pervades the mekong basin (lauridsen 2004). challenging the economic and scientific analyses of a large dam project is very difficult for local people to achieve given their limited resources vis-à-vis the state and project developers. where affected local people do attempt to challenge the science and economics of a project, they face the rejection of their alternative analyses as illegitimate. the was seen in the case of the yali falls dam in 128 consilience   vietnam, where affected locals, with the help of ngos, collected data and presented to the state their own research on the effects of the dam. their findings were rejected by the state as unverifiable and unscientific. the state preferred its own environmental impact assessment, despite the fact that it has been widely critiqued as “shoddy” (hirsch & wyatt 2004, 65). not only should local knowledge be considered just as legitimate as the state’s “scientific” knowledge, but in many cases local people may also be more reliable experts about their environment than outside consultants (käkönen & hirsch, 2009). de-legitimizing local knowledge amounts to a monopolization of knowledge production by the state, based on the state’s science and the state’s economics. 6. conclusion: back to the future large dams and the development paradigm they reflect are out of date. the quintessential classical development project, dams focus narrowly on economic development through modernization. they undervalue nature, viewing it as a collection of unexploited natural resources and inputs to production. they deliver inequitable development, sharpening inequities by delivering benefits to the wealthy while the local poor bear the costs. they disempower local people by de-politicizing development and removing the opportunity for those being developed to provide input and direction to that development. each of these traits of large dams has been witnessed in the mekong river basin. we should be concerned, therefore, that large dams appear to be making their way back to the development agenda. the brazilian government’s hydropower development agenda is particularly concerning given its rapid pace and scale. brazil’s energy-expansion plan includes the construction of 48 large dams between 2011 and 2020 (fearnside, 2012). this includes the monte belo dam project, which is the largest dam project under consideration anywhere in the world (international rivers, 2012). construction of the first of the mainstream dams on the lower mekong river has commenced, with the potential to open the way for another ten mainstream dams that were planned last century. perhaps most concerning of all, the world bank appears to be taking a step back toward the development of old by recommencing its support for large dams (bosshard, 2013; world bank, 2013). unfortunately, once they are conceived, large dam projects never really disappear. instead, they sit on developers’ shelves ready to re-emerge when the development climate is amenable (mccully, 2001). let us not slip back into an outdated development paradigm that would allow developers to reach into their archives and dust off the plans for abandoned large dam projects. consilience pearse-smith: return of large dams   bibliography adb (asian development bank). 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(2013). the green economy: the dangerous path of nature commoditization. consilience: the journal of sustainable development, 10(1), 85–98. kolawole final(4) 1| consilience: the journal of sustainable development kolawole: situating local knowledge 2009: issue 2, scholarly article no. 5 situating local knowledge within development agenda: some reflections dr. oluwatoyin dare, kolawole i e-mail: toyinkolawole@oauife.edu.ng or t.kolawole@ids.ac.uk or toyin_kolawole@yahoo.com mailto:toyinkolawole@oauife.edu.ng mailto:kolawole@ids.ac.uk mailto:toyin_kolawole@yahoo.com 2 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge abstract the paper endeavors to personify development and shows the multi-dimensionality of the concept. it argues against the power relations influencing knowledge production while attempting to shed light on what knowledge is all about. it provides a range of definitions of local knowledge (lk), presents its stages of production and expressly buttresses the importance of lk in agenda-setting for development initiatives. the paper also argues that the framing and labeling of lk and its custodians by outsider-professionals in connivance with their insider expert colleagues have been one of the challenges to placing a premium on local knowledge within the development agenda. while emphasizing the need for stakeholders‟ partnership to enable working towards congruence in the midst of chaos and order, the paper calls for a more eclectic approach and reflexivity amongst development experts when drawing the agenda for development programs. it also advocates for the codification and teaching of local knowledge in universities and colleges. keywords: development, local knowledge, power relations, framing and labeling, partnership. 3 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge introduction development “business” is without doubt a serious matter. it is likened to a pregnant woman who, until she delivers the baby, tries hard to follow through with her daunting pregnancy. perhaps using a better description, development business comes across as a case of the hapless woman who, for the umpteenth time, has had a stillbirth! while the woman is synonymous with development initiatives and their “powerful” actors, the baby is equated with the aftermath of development endeavors wherever they are seen and felt. by and large, the failings of development initiatives (as they come in their various forms and designs over the years) attest to this argument. it seems development problems have continued to defy solutions so much so in sub-saharan africa. the un millennium development goals (mdgs) approach is one of the most recent of these global initiatives towards international development meant to target the poor wherever they are situated, particularly in the global south. although this initiative has recorded a positive outcome elsewhere, the same cannot be said of africa, where the hiv/aids pandemic has continued to ravage the populations, malaria upsurge has continued to soar, environmental degradation has progressed unabated, child and maternal mortality have been a major problem, where the standard of education has fallen over time and where conflicts have continued to hold sway. essentially, the complex nature of development has been largely influenced by the complex nature of man himself. to overcome development challenges, therefore, a whole range of approaches and multiple pathways are needed to overcome diverse human problems. while, for instance, anthropologists are undertaking qualitative research aimed at unearthing useful information on the realities of everyday life of a particular group of people located within a cultural milieu (issues in local knowledge also apply here), economists are engaged mainly in scientific reductionism engendered by their age-long, traditional quantitative analyses replete with hypothesis formulation. it is safe to admit that a combination of the various modes of scientific investigation, therefore, enhances a holistic approach to viewing and solving development problems. various approaches of implementing development research and programs have been delineated. for the purpose of clarity, i have attempted to shed light on these interwoven approaches elsewhere. thus, i have attempted a comparative analysis of the four interrelated concepts of disciplinarity 1a , which are cross-disciplinarity, multi-disciplinarity, inter-disciplinarity and trans-disciplinarity ii . i further argued that a trans-disciplinary rather than inter-disciplinary approach appears to be the most appropriate strategy for doing development 4 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge research and/or business. although indian-born applied economist ravi kanbur affirmed that “[c]ross-disciplinarity is not straight forward,” iii he contended that “[p]erhaps the best that can be hoped for is multidisciplinarity (sic), where different disciplines are set the task of answering a common set of analytical or policy questions, and once this task is done, a synthesis is attempted which provides an over-arching analysis and policy conclusion” 3 . but then, his proposition may be faulty as he tends to overlook the ambiguities and disagreements which are inherent in situations where an attempt is made to create hurriedly a synergistic relationship amongst the various traditions of scientific enquiries. thus, trans-disciplinarity seeks to minimize these potential attritions from the on-set by ensuring that all parties agree on a common front before the commencement of the proposed scientific endeavor 2 . certainly, development is all about people and people themselves are about development. iv exigencies have, thus, continued to compel people – in the process of unleashing their potentials to devise means of comprehending and overcoming their environment. over many years, personal experiences, reasoning, and “unregulated” investigations and experimentation have been means of achieving this within a given local environment. from this derives what has come to be known as local knowledge (lk) or indigenous knowledge (ik) v . in recognition of the practical and research dimensions of the concept, a delineation of three interrelated concepts of local knowledge (lk) has been made vi , thus, showing the relationships between the concepts of indigenous knowledge (ik), indigenous knowledge systems (iks) and indigenous technological knowledge (itk). while other authors seem to have overlooked the distinctions between these three concepts and as such lump them together or interchange their usage without restraints vii , these definitions and/or demarcations tend to remove certain ambiguities about lk itself. essentially, indigenous knowledge represents a general umbrella concept, meaning the participants‟ knowledge of their temporal and social space. as such, ik refers not only to the knowledge of indigenous people, but to that of any other defined community. going by this claim, therefore, ik would need a separate identity from traditional knowledge. true tradition, as opposed to invented tradition, is seen and felt in the originality of people‟s way of life and this “…[o]perates on the practical level of repeated actions based on opinion or belief. the actors 5 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge need not have any knowledge, indigenous or otherwise, to successfully carry out and pass on their traditions” 6 . indigenous knowledge systems, on the other hand, are conceived to mark out a “cognitive structure in which theories and perceptions of nature and culture are conceptualized” 6 . here, “…definitions, classifications and concepts of the physical, natural, social, economic and ideational environments” are taken into consideration. in a way, „[t]he dynamics of iks operate on the cognitive and empirical levels. empirically, iks are visible in institutions, artifacts and technologies” 6 . indeed, research in lk is rooted within this sphere. elsewhere, iks is defined as the sum of experience and knowledge of a given culture, society or group which, therefore, forms the basis for decision-making in diverse myriad of problems and challenges in agricultural production viii . however, this definition is limiting. although central to grassroots communities‟ everyday existence, agriculture is just an aspect and not the totality of an entire rural life. indigenous technological knowledge, which is conceived of as being practically-oriented, is “concerned with operationalized local thinking in such fields as agriculture, fisheries, health, horticulture, and forestry” 6 . these are essentially the observable scenarios where local ways of knowing are put into actions for problem-solving and development purposes. in this paper, i attempt to shed some light on development as a concept. the article also endeavors to explore the politics of knowledge and particularly what is framed as “local knowledge”, while it also, in the same vein, outlines how this form of knowing comes about. i contextualize lk and situate it within the framework of the development agenda. the paper also presents the challenges this may pose to development practitioners and how the perceived obstacles can be overcome. practical experiences are then provided to buttress the strength of lk in an attempt to argue for its significance in the development process and discourse. in sum, this article gives a strong voice for providing a framework for the valorization and entrenchment of lk within the mainstream of development theory and practice. development as “freedom” development is conceived to be a necessity in all human endeavors. its all-encompassing features, therefore, buttress its importance in any interventionist program. development has, therefore, been aptly equated with human freedom. it has to do with “…the removal of major sources of unfreedom” in the sense of people”s ability to fight “economic poverty”, tyrannical 6 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge oppression, systematic social deprivation, etc., which do deny people of their basic physiological, social, psychological and political needs. ix mahbub ul haq, the renowned pakistani economist, who together with amartya sen created the human development index (hdi), gives a vivid description of what development is all about: the basic purpose of development is to enlarge people's choices... people often value achievements that do not show up at all, or not immediately, in income or growth figures: greater access to knowledge, better nutrition and health services, more secure livelihoods, security against crime and physical violence, satisfying leisure hours, political and cultural freedoms and sense of participation in community activities. the objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives (emphasis mine). x haq‟s description is apparently in agreement with sen‟s. both submissions are explicit and seem to be pointing our attention to abraham maslow‟s hierarchy of needs. accordingly, some levels of human needs in a progressive order of importance are: physiological (comprising air, food, shelter, sex, etc.), safety (depicting protection, security, order, etc.), belongingness and love (representing family, affection, relationships, etc.), esteem (achievement, status, responsibility), and self actualisation the highest form of need which reflects in one‟s personal growth and fulfilment; to become all that one is capable of becoming xi . needless to say then, that true development seeks to achieve all of this for people; due consideration for and attainment of such yearnings are the motivators that propel individual human progress. it is noteworthy that humanistic theories do agree that culture and society within which people operate play, to some extent, an important role in shaping human personality 11 . the environment in which an individual lives partly shapes his or her thinking and creativity. nonetheless, it is a matter of coincidence that the last sentence in haq‟s submission [as emphasized in the quotation above], which aligns with what maslow identified as the highest form of human need, is central to this discourse. man‟s ability to become creative and impact his environment positively is, therefore, the highest form of development. this he can only do through knowledge production and its meaningful utilization. a people‟s ability to identify their needs, develop the strategies to achieve them, and then go further to use those strategic [local] knowledges does enhance the realization of their potentials. nonetheless, there has been an age-long attrition between “dominant” [global] and local knowledge. the following section, thus, addresses the power tussles and conflict situations existing between the two bodies of knowledge. 7 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge the politics of knowledge the rise of post-modernist thought has changed the way knowledge is perceived. thus, it is somewhat difficult to provide a simple meaning to what knowledge is all about. scoones and thompson argue that “[e]very system of knowledge…has its own epistemology, its own theory of what constitutes and what counts as knowledge.” xii thus, a delineation has been made between two forms of knowledge as they have been generally perceived: erudite knowledge (scientific) and local popular knowledge (without a common meaning; unscientific) xiii . in what foucault terms a “return of knowledge” he alludes to the insurrection of subjugated knowledges. by subjugation he refers “to the historical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or formal systematization”. he, on the other hand, referred to this as “a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity…” 13 either directly or indirectly, “dominant” and/or global knowledges have always sought to suppress other forms of knowledge, which ordinarily desire a voice. thus, a hostile environment has not allowed the “parasite” and “minor literature” a free expression xiv . foucault argues elsewhere that “…the criteria of what constitutes knowledge, what is to be excluded and who is designated as qualified to know involves act of power” xv . true as this claim might be, it pre-supposes that the politics of knowledge can always be brought to bear where aggregation of knowledge is the emphasis within the formal context of international discourses and socio-economic and political actions. even at the local-level frontiers, this may, in a way, obtain where there are grassroots power actors. but then, do politics and power relations actually stop the resource-poor farmer or the native doctor from experimenting, even with his poverty? does “popular legitimacy” take away from individuals what they have? whether acceptable or not, local knowledge will continue to thrive within its own context even in the face of modernity. and if the development agency fails to recognize the potency of local knowledge, it becomes harder to break through the self-erected barrier. time and again, experience shows that “[r]egardless of the degree to which they have embraced modernity, local people continue to prefer concrete knowledge, which belongs to them in time and space, and which they deem suitable for particular purposes” 4 . that said, it is heart-warming to note that the postmodernists‟ positionality about knowledge not being a “commodity” meant for a particular region or race is a 8 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge giant stride towards turning around the conventional way of doing development business. what then is local knowledge? the following section answers this question. local knowledge (lk) described the concepts of local or indigenous knowledge are often used interchangeably. some schools of thought believe that the use of the word “endogenous” is even more appropriate than “local”, “traditional” or “indigenous”, which are considered derogatory in the description of the knowledge systems that are associated with grassroots people xvi . “local knowledge is tempting for its simplicity” because people tend to overlook its “…system of concepts, beliefs, and ways of learning” xvii . the term “local” or indigenous knowledge (ik) has, thus, been used to distinguish the knowledge developed by a given community from international knowledge systems or scientific knowledge, which could sometimes be referred to as “western” knowledge systems (wks) that are generated by universities, government research centers and private industry xviii . elsewhere, indigenous knowledge is conceived as “[t]he unique, traditional, local knowledge existing within and developed around the specific conditions of women and men indigenous to a particular geographic area”. xix to give a more holistic definition of the concept, ik is viewed as the “technical” insight or wisdom gained and developed by a people in one particular locality, through years of careful observation and experimentation with the natural phenomena around them. 4 in emphasising the importance of ik, it is affirmed that the knowledge of local people is an enabling component of development. ik is, thus, described as the feathers of a bird, since “a bird can only fly if it has feathers” xx . historical antecedent of local knowledge iks are acknowledged to be “… as old as the history of man's search for ways and means of dealing with his environmental circumstances to satisfy his basic needs of food, shelter and clothing” xxi . anthropologists, since about 1900, have commenced a systematic investigation into the subject. having undergone a period of lull for many years, there began a renaissance in the seventies when geographers, agriculturists and other natural scientists developed interest in the subject. the term “indigenous knowledge” had metamorphosed from an array of terms used to portray the knowledge possessed by local communities 21 . in 1980, the team of david brokensha, oswald werner and michael warren had struggled to find a term that could replace “traditional” in the designation “traditional knowledge”. around the time they were contending that the word 9 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge “traditional” denoted the 19th century attitudes of simple, savage and static society, robert chambers and his group at the university of sussex were also struggling with the same idea. however, "[i]ndependent of each other, they both came up with the term “indigenous” which has, over the years, come to overshadow the various other terms 21 . for the purpose of convenience and identification, advocates of lk have been referred to as neo-indigenistas while their belief in the value and contribution this form of knowledge offers in sustainable development has been tagged neo-indigenismo xxii . indeed, the failings of “grand theories of development” have influenced a change in the lens for mirroring development amongst social scientists. considerations are, thus, made “…to favor middle-range theories that are siteand time-specific” 21 . nonetheless, contrary to the claim that there are no dissimilarities between local and global knowledges xxiii , some scholars have conceived lk as different from the western knowledge systems (wks) on substantive methodological or epistemological and contextual grounds xxiv . arguing from some personal reflections and viewpoint, no salient differences could be associated with the local knowledge systems (lks) and the wks other than in formalization/codification, documentation and cultural features. in a way, both systems of knowing involve careful observation, experimentation and validation. but then, as it has been argued elsewhere, regardless of the similarities existing between the two knowledge systems it may never be possible to take away the cultural underpinnings guiding their development xxv . against the view that delineating these two ways of knowing could become problematic 22 , contextualizing local knowledge and making it available ex situ would not create any “mausoleum of knowledge” exclusively meant for the rich and the powerful. rather, it would make lk easily accessible to all stakeholders situated anywhere as globalization continues to unfold through the power of information and communication technology (ict) 4 . local people have aspirations too personal yearnings and aspirations tend to discourage complacency amongst a group of people within a locale. that said, the resilient nature of grassroots people in the face of daunting problems attests to their willingness to experiment and explore new opportunities. thus, in a desperate bid to achieve certain goals within their given circumstances, local people undergo five stages of lk utilization. these are awareness (of a particular phenomenon); perception (of the 10 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge phenomenon as a problem); motivation (to search for a solution); evidence (arising from a specific approach employed to bring about a solution); and utilization (of the tried and tested approach). 4 indeed, these stages or processes are essential for approaching development problems as they relate to local people. the ability of development workers to identify different stages at which people are in addressing a particular problem and the reasons why they are doing so could make a difference in achieving success in an aided but locally initiated project. the ability of people to envision a better life informs their unrelenting drive to seek solutions to the myriad daunting challenges they are faced with on a daily basis. people would naturally control their own lives when there is a reference value (an image of the desired state); a perceptual function (the ability to observe the existing state); a mechanism for making comparisons (the ability to compare the existing state and the desired state for differences); and the ability to act to bring the existing state closer to the desired state. to get from the existing state to the desired state, a mental model, which is a construction in the mind, is used to provide order in the course of taking actions xxvi . local people (such as farmers and artisans) have, thus, continued to take action by way of experimentation in order to satisfy their curiosity, solve problems and adapt technology xxvii . essentially, the scientificity and legitimacy of lk are apparent in the desirable results they produce, and also in their seeming perpetuation amongst grassroots people. local knowledge and development in-as-much as it is a cultural issue, lk has featured prominently in all fields of human endeavors, including agriculture, medicine, technology, climatology, conflict management and forestry. its sectoral prominence and role in rural societies cannot in any way be gainsaid. local or indigenous knowledge forms the basis for local level decision-making in agriculture, ethno medicine/veterinary medicine 1b , and in other vocations of grassroots people. it is therefore seen as a potent tool with which development practitioners could work to bring about a meaningful change, particularly within rural communities. some authors are unequivocal in their warning: “to ignore people‟s knowledge is almost to ensure failure in development” xxviii . elsewhere, development agencies have been alerted that to ignore “traditional practitioners and the indigenous knowledge systems they represent is to court disaster when introducing innovations” xxix . an earlier emphasis on the importance of indigenous knowledge is also 11 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge instructive. rather than employ the age-long traditional top-down approach of project execution, development professionals now believe that local participation is essential for the success of any development initiative. development work becomes meaningful and sustainable when local people participate alongside project staff in the conceptualization, implementation and evaluation of development projects that affect them [grassroots people]xxx . thus, the latter part of the twentieth century saw the growing awareness among practitioners that ik was pivotal above all in discussions on sustainable resource use and balanced development 21, xxxi . the reason is not far fetched. development initiatives focus attention on poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods in grassroots communities in the global south. regardless of the degree of modernity and modernisation, people on which attention is focussed (in terms of the enhancement of improved living standards) have certain values and ways of life in which they pride themselves. lack of due consideration for such socio-cultural and political factors by the “outsider-expert” in the [social] change process may automatically serve as an impediment for meaningful interventionist efforts. it thus appears then that the role of lk in development initiatives is sine qua non for sustainable human development. nevertheless, some measure of emphasis has, in recent times, been on participatory methodologies in order to enhance recipients‟ involvement in project execution. rather than relegated, lk needs to be prioritized in the agenda of development debate and practice. some empirical evidence time and again, there has been proof (through research studies) that local people have a strong attachment to their knowledge base 4, 25, xxxii . this is perhaps reflected in the way in which indigenous people esteem their culture and seek to perpetuate it through certain practices and festivities. for this author, personal and field experience seems to be the best teacher. in the course of interacting with local farmers during field research and in community service activities, one thing has always come out clearly. inasmuch as they respect the view of the outsider academic or expert, farmers have the penchant to declare that their practices are informed by many years of acquired experience and interaction with nature, and whatever outsider experts bring may not necessarily fit into their situation all the time. it is a common belief amongst people, too, that modernization through western science is the ruin of the earth. 12 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge a social survey 1c was conducted in the last quarter of 2007 in southwestern nigeria with emphasis on certain categories of respondents ranging from parents, pupils, elementary and secondary school teachers, and university lecturers. the main thrust of this work was to unearth relevant information and policy issues related to the relevance of mainstreaming local knowledge in the conventional [western] education system in nigeria for sustainable development. using a likert scale to rate respondents based on a set of statements, they were interviewed on their perception 1d about the appropriateness of introducing indigenous knowledge systems into the school curriculum. subjecting the data to regression analysis, it was found that, with the exception of university lecturers, the respondents‟ preferences for indigenous knowledge had very strong and positive relationships with their perception about the appropriateness of introducing elements of indigenous knowledge systems into the school curriculum. 1e parents‟ and elementary/secondary school teachers‟ cultural inclination (the majority of whom had had close connections with the grassroots) may have impacted directly on the favorable perception of pupils investigated in the study. on the other hand, the indifferent or negative disposition and perception of university lecturers (who apparently have had greater exposures to western knowledge) would most likely have been influenced by their advanced academic trainings and perhaps, also because of their cosmopolitanism. specifically, well over 80.0 percent of secondary school teachers interviewed either agreed or strongly agreed that the use of indigenous knowledge is appropriate. while an average of 85.0 percent of parents did attest to the appropriateness of the use of indigenous knowledge, 60.0 percent of pupils and students ranging from primary to tertiary institutions exhibited some degree of preference towards the use of indigenous knowledge systems. conversely, while 64.0 percent of university lecturers were indifferent as regards their perception on the appropriateness of including elements of indigenous knowledge systems in school curricula, only 23.5 percent indicated that it was appropriate for inclusion in school curricula! these findings thus serve as a lead to the discussions in the following section of this paper. challenges of situating local knowledge within development framing and labeling are important influences on the relationships that exist between national/international development institutions and grassroots people for whom development programs are designed. these constitute great impediments to smooth relationships between 13 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge development agencies and program recipients. it has been argued that development actors have pre-conceived ideas and frames of mind [perhaps informed by their academic background or wrong information], which they tend to bring into different real life situations, leading to wrong assumptions about the people whose socio-economic lives they intend to improve. informed by their wrong perceptions about individuals, they go ahead to make wrong assumptions, categorizations and labels that may persist for a long time. somehow, these “socially acquired preferences” or “(mis)information” subsequently prevent those actors from seeing people through an objective lens that may have allowed them to think otherwise xxxiii . thus, the main challenge to deal with in the first place is the way outsider-experts or scientists view their clientele. although not directly addressing the subject-matter here, some light was shed on the critical and cynical academics/social scientists whose pre-occupation, by virtue of their trainings, is to find fault, which invariably affects their views about many issues and especially those including rural development programs 17 . thus, from the outsiders‟ biases, it was argued that “… the centre-periphery biases of outsider‟s knowledge are reflected in the concentration of research, publication, training and extension on what is exotic rather than indigenous, mechanical rather than human, chemical rather than organic, and marketed rather than consumed…” resource-poor farmers, for instance, have generally been perceived as traditional, conservative, risk averse, lazy, unprogressive and fatalistic! 17 rather than do research to enhance lk, most african scientists go about branding their people negatively. not until very recently when they began to see the relevance of local knowledge in the fields of medicine and agriculture, scientists‟ views had, in the past, been marred with certain prejudices against local knowledge with regard to its scientific validity and methodology. even so, many of us still hold some reservations about its appropriateness. once again, an author provided a true picture of what we (as knowledge producers and carriers) seem to stand for: “as expert researchers, policy makers, program managers and evaluators, we all harbor biases that are not displayed publicly but may be the subject of our private conversations or become much more evident „when only [we] and a mirror are about.‟” 33 one would think that there is need for some measure of reflexivity among development experts at the moment. it appears again that even though they play a crucial role in power relations as to whom knowledge belongs, the challenges are not so much the obstacles that are met in outsider-experts‟ standpoint but those in the cynical insider-academics and scientists who would not see anything 14 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge good in ideas emanating from within, perhaps because they have been brainwashed by western education. of interest are the african academics/scientists, the majority of who do not see reasons in promoting what belongs to africa. all they see is darkness and anachronism! unlike their asian counterparts who have since taken the lead, valorizing local knowledge has not been the primary pre-occupation of african academics and scientists. there have been cases where local initiatives by “deviants” amongst them have been literally killed. an aborted initiative of a maverick, western-trained nigerian medical doctor (who was working on hiv/aids some few years ago) serves as a good example at this point. based on his preliminary findings, he had openly declared and claimed that it was possible to cure hiv/aids through some herbal preparations. some scientists, however, differed on the truth of these findings by affirming that the procedure had not followed any western standards. rather than find out the authenticity of his claim and explore some avenues to encourage him if this were true, the federal ministry of health overseen at the time by a professor of medicine immediately clamped down on his laboratory and prevented him from going any further with the research! xxxiv again, the issue of power relations come to the fore here. if university people and those who are educationally empowered give moral and intellectual support to the local custodians, artisans and native philosophers (in the latter‟s quest to advance knowledge frontiers), by way of democratizing the african education system, there is no reason why outsiders and development practitioners would hesitate to join hands in promoting what belongs to the people. nonetheless, south africa is already, at the moment, blazing a trail in this respect. for over a decade, the south african government has implemented education policies that encourage the incorporation of local knowledge contents in school curricula and teaching. the following section points our attention to the indispensable nature of lk in local level development initiatives. evidence-based scenarios emphasizing the role of local knowledge in development in order to show how significant it is for development initiatives to build on lk in their designs, two practical and true life examples are cited below for the purpose of analysis in this paper. thus, a description of what people‟s knowledge could do to enhance the success of any development program is provided. the case of a hospital project that never saw the light of day supports the argument of this paper. xxxv based on long standing knowledge and previous 15 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge experience of its people, a community once advised the government against building a proposed hospital on a site it [the government] thought was a choice land for the purpose. acting contrary to this advice and wielding the political big-stick, the government in ignorance of the grassroots‟ viewpoint went ahead with the project. to the government, this suggestion by grassroots people was irrational and laughable. nonetheless, after the project was completed, a herd of elephants numbering about one hundred ran over the structure and flattened it as it was built on a path which the mammoth beasts have used since primordial times! local people build their wealth of knowledge through cognitive mapping and validation. experience plays key roles in the way they carry about their daily businesses. almost always, they have reasons for the action they take. the failure of the hospital project could have been better imagined than experienced by the project initiators if only they had listened to the voice of wisdom. another case is of a hindu water temples rice production project that never took cognizance of the role of indigenous knowledge in the process of its execution. this case again drives home the point that ignoring local knowledge of the people in development programs is to “ensure failure” and, therefore, “court disaster” 28, 29 . a rice production initiative was introduced in, the hindu water temples in bali, which became an irrigation project that brought chaos. a $54 million project, which was introduced by a development agency in bali to modernize irrigated rice production, overlooked the role of the water temples in rice production. overlooking the indigenous knowledge of the temple priests, new management systems with high chemical inputs were used. this resulted in a dramatic decline in the eel, frog and fish populations in the rice paddies; an increase in rice pests; a decline in rice production and soil fertility; and considerable confusion over water rights. officials later realized that the rice production system had been managed by the network of temples and their priests from time immemorial xxxvi . this apparent failing would have been avoided if only the development agency had realized that the success of rice production in bali was closely linked with the local wisdom of the temple priests. the foregoing is another piece of evidence that local knowledge is crucial to the success of any development projects as they relate to grassroots people. the erroneous perception of the superiority of sophisticated (western) science over the “traditional” local approach was, thus put to test in yet another show of shame! 16 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge conclusions the multiple dimensions of development call for an eclectic approach to blotting out human mysteries. this means that development issues need be viewed from various windows and addressed through diverse pathways in order to bring about meaningful social change. thus, “[i]f development is seen as an initiative that comes from within, then the people are the subject” 5 . as odora hoppers puts it, grassroots people are not “enmeshed in the cold condescending gaze of the rich upon the poor, because endogenous development begins at the point when people start to pride themselves as worthy human beings inferior to none; and where such pride is lost, development begins at the point at which this pride is restored, and history recovered” xxxvii prejudices against the indigenous knowledge of rural people have thus become apparent in the way priorities are placed on crop, livestock and forestry research, in which the western paradigm is entirely the emphasis. contrary to the modernist‟s claim that the western scientific way of knowing holds the ace, neither local nor western knowledge can confidently stand on its own. both have inherent features that are desirable for the enhancement of human progress. indeed,“[c]ombined, they can achieve what neither would alone.” and “for this combination of complimentarity to occur, outside professionals have to step down off their pedestals, and sit down, listen and learn.” 17 insider-academics‟ pride and self-alienation are challenged here, too. and in humility they must come off their perch! above all, working towards congruence in the midst of chaos and order to enable great things to emerge 1f is an imperative for stakeholders‟ partnership in the business of development. the university system has a role to play here. the codification, introduction and teaching of lk in the mainstream education system have long been left unnoticed and unattended. regardless of the amount of effort exerted by the west, nay international development (and other multi-lateral) agencies, to bring about sustainable development in the global south, if bridges are not properly built and the wide gulf between the two divide filled, any initiatives brought under the umbrella of development in poor economies will continue to remain abysmal failures. whether we like it or not and contrary to hobart‟s belief xxxviii , the “unbridgeable” needs be bridged and every schism must be filled. nonetheless, timely and sincere advice has been offered: “to be part of the solution we must recognize ourselves as part of the problem” xxxix 17 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge consequent upon the arguments of this paper, the following recommendations are, therefore provided: • policy makers need to recognize the crucial role of local knowledge in enhancing sustainable development at all levels. thus, it is an imperative for national governments and policy makers to place local and western knowledge side by side within the framework of policy processes (its formulation and implementation) without necessarily jeopardizing the role of any of the two bodies of knowledge for any reason. • national governments, particularly in the south, have the onus of creating a legitimate environment for the recognition and development of local knowledge systems. this could be achieved by engaging universities and colleges in the restructuring of school curricula that incorporate local knowledge contents into teaching and research in all stages of educational development. hence, bringing local knowledge into the mainstream education system would automatically ensure the formalization of its role in the development process. achieving a high motivation in this respect for academics and researchers would entail strong political will and funding for research. not only that, well seasoned local artisans and native philosophers would need recognition and training to enable them to serve as resource persons in specialized teaching programs (where necessary) within the formal education system. • development agencies will need to strengthen their work within grassroots communities by identifying useful local insights that directly affect their activities. as such, native philosophers and artisans provide formidable sources of information and assistance in building a development information bank for community-level project implementation. this will, in a way, create a meaningful atmosphere for recognizing the intellectual property rights (ipr) of local knowledge producers too. endnotes 1a. kanbur (2002: 483) had conceptualized cross-disciplinarity as an umbrella or general “term to mean any analysis or policy recommendation that is based substantially on the analysis and methods of more than one discipline”. this is, of course, seen as a “generic term”, which represents a continuum that spans across the entirety of all the other three concepts. multi-disciplinarity as an approach “comes to bear when each discipline is given all the space and freedom to use its own methodology and system of analysis to address a particular issue, and then analytically synthesizing its output with those of other disciplines” with a view to using the emerging integral result for policy conclusion, as the case may be (kanbur 2002: 483). this categorization conceived as an “additive approach” in the work of molteberg 18 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge and bergstrom (2000: 11) portrays a near disjointed design amongst concerned disciplines as they seem to stand aloof within the same sphere of knowledge production” (kolawole 2007: 5-7). kanbur (2002:483) was of the view that “inter-disciplinarity entails “inextricable interweaving” or integration of all disciplines right from the beginning of the analysis of a problem up to the stage of policy recommendation if that is the objective. in the design of molteberg and bergstrom (2000: 11), it is an interface between multi-disciplinarity and trans-disciplinarity approaches” (kolawole 2007: 5-7). 1b. the prefix “ethno” has been used to imply the distinction between western science and indigenous or local knowledge. this delineation is intended to prevent the danger of the latter being assimilated [leaving it with no meaningful identity] by the former. 1c. the design of the field survey was made to elicit the different positionalities of certain stakeholders in the process of knowledge production. the research, which is still on-going in southwestern nigeria, also intends to address research personnel working in research based organization in nigeria. essentially, the surveys were simultaneously carried out by four undergraduate students with each of them investigating one category of the respondents studied. 1d. perception of respondents were measured drawing a set of statements placed on a rating scale of strongly agreed (sa); agreed (a); undecided (u); disagreed (d); and strongly disagreed (sd). some examples of the drawn statements are: indigenous knowledge helps people to acquire complete knowledge of traditional culture ; there is nothing as valuable as the knowledge of our people; western knowledge should not be allowed to suppress the local knowledge of the african society; sustainable development can only be enhanced if traditional knowledge systems are incorporated into the educational curriculum in nigeria; the introduction of iks into higher institutions is welcomed; i would rather esteem my own culture above other people”s culture; introduction of iks into higher institutions is appropriate; iks introduction into the educational curriculum is important for societal development; indigenous knowledge should be used as the mode of communication in schools and colleges; and indigenous knowledge systems that have been proved should not be compromised for any form of foreign ideas in the educational system. the mean of each respondent was then calculated as the value of the dependent variable (y) for regression analysis purpose. 1e. preference for the use of indigenous knowledge was measured using the same criterion but with a different set of statements such as: there is no amount of modernity that will take the knowledge of our people from them; regardless of the degree to which people embrace modernity, they will use the knowledge that belongs to them; i would rather prefer the knowledge of our people over and above western knowledge; local tradition enhances sustainable human development through child socialization and is mostly not hazardous to the environment. indigenous knowledge is backward and as such, i cannot promote it; indigenous knowledge is not organized and systematic; traditionalism is conservative and impedes change. indigenous knowledge is archaic; and indigenous knowledge is too secretive. the average for each respondent was calculated as the score value of the independent variable (x) for analysis. 1f. these two principles were extracted from the reference manual (2006-2007) of the interaction leadership program (ilp) of the british council. working towards congruence might mean showing consistency with one”s word and action and it could also explain a situation in which individuals having different points of view work together towards achieving the same goal in an atmosphere of mutual respect. working with chaos and order… suggests bringing out worthwhile and positive results while pursuing a goal in the midst of a veritable complex environment. this reflects in the complex adaptive system (cas). 19 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge references agrawal, a. indigenous and scientific knowledge: some critical comments. indigenous knowledge and development monitor. 3(3). (1995). agrawal, a. dismantling the divide between indigenous knowledge and scientific knowledge. working paper. (indiana university, bloomington, 1994). acessed on-line: dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00003270/ (10 november, 2008). banuri, t. and f. apffel-marglin (eds.) who will save the forests? knowledge; power and environmental destruction, (london: zed books, 1993). bhattacharya, s. 2004. controversial aids vaccines are „plausible‟. newscientist. september. accessed on-line: http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn6451-controversial-aids-vaccines-are plausible.html (22 january 2009). brokensha, d., warren, d. and werner, o. (eds.) indigenous knowledge systems and development. (lanham: university press of america, 1980) brouwer, j. ik, iks and itk. indigenous knowledge and development monitor. 6(3). (1998). chambers, r. reversals, institutions and change, in chambers, r., pacey, a. and thrupp, l.a. (eds.) farmer first: farmer innovation and agricultural research. (london: intermediate technology publications, 1989). chambers, r. rural development: putting the last first. (new york: longman scientific and technical, 1983). dei, g. sustainable development in the african context: revisiting some theoretical and methodological issues. african development. 18(2), (1993). dewes, w. introduction. in davis s.h. and ebbe, k. (eds.) traditional knowledge and sustainable development. proceedings of the conference on environmentally sustainable development held at the world bank washington, d.c., sept. 27 – 28. series no. 4 (1993). emelumba, o. 2006. derided at home, jeremiah abalaka takes vaccines to world congress. daily sun. saturday, september 2. accessed on-line: ttp://www.sunnewsonline.com/webpages/features/living/2006/sept/02/living-02-09-2006-004.htm (21 january 2009). eyben, r. labelling people for aid, in moncrieffe, j. and eyben, r. (eds.) the power of labelling. 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(eds.) indigenous knowledge systems and development. lanham, md: university presss of america. (1980). kanbur, r. (2002). economics, social science and development. world development, vol. 30, no. 3 kolawole, o.d. indigenous knowledge and effective agricultural extension delivery in the south. in akinyemiju, o.a. and torimiro, d.o. (eds.) agricultural extension: a comprehensive treatise. (lagos: ikeja abc agricultural systems ltd., 2008). kolawole, o.d. the contribution of an inter-disciplinary approach to development studies. term paper submitted to the institute of development studies for the fulfillment of ma program in development studies. brighton: ids. 5 november (2007). kolawole, o.d. mainstreaming local people”s knowledge and implications for higher education in the south. south african journal of higher education. volume 19, special issue (2005). kolawole, o.d. the role of local knowledge in sustainable rural development, in jibowo, a.a.; a.a. ladele; and a.b. ogunwale (eds.) food security and rural development in a deregulated economy. proceedings of the 13 th annual conference of the nigeria rural sociological association held at ladoke akintola university of technology, ogbomoso, oyo state, nigeria from 26-28 november (2003). kolawole, o.d. factors associated with the utilization of indigenous knowledge systems for soil fertility conservation by farmers in ekiti state, nigeria. phd thesis, ile-ife, nigeria: department of agricultural extension and rural sociology, obafemi awolowo university (2002). kolawole, o.d.. local knowledge utilization and sustainable rural development in the 21 st century. indigenous knowledge and development monitor. 9(3). (2001). lansing, j.s. and kremer, j.n. a socioecological analysis of balinese water temples, in warren, d.m., slikkerveer, l.j. and brokensha, d. (eds.) the cultural dimension of 21 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge development: indigenous knowledge systems. (london: intermediate technology publications, 1995). maslow, a. h. a theory of human motivation. psychological review. 50(4). (1943). milovanovic, d. dueling paradigms: modernist v. postmodernist thought. postmodern criminology. (new york: garland publishing, 1997) accessed on-line: http://www.soci.niu.edu/~critcrim/papers/drag pomo.html#bottom (19 april 2008). molteberg, e. and bergstrom, c. our common discourse: diversity and paradigms in development studies. noragric working papers no. 20, paper no. 1 of 2. (2000). moncrieffe, j. when label stigmatize: encounters with “street children” and “restavecs” in haiti, in moncrieffe, j. and eyben, r. (eds.) the power of labelling. (london: earthscan: 2007). odora hoppers, c.a. indigenous knowledge and the integration of knowledge systems: towards a conceptual and methodological framework, in c.a. odora hoppers (ed.) indigenous knowledge and the integration of knowledge systems: towards a philosophy of articulation. (cape town: new africa books, 2002). pottier, j. negotiating local knowledge: an introduction, in pottier, j., bicker, a. and sillitoe, p. (eds.) negotiating local knowledge: power, identity in development. (london: pluto press, 2003). rhoades, r. and bebbington a. farmers who experiment: an untapped resource for agricultural research and development. paper presented at the international congress on plant physiology. new delhi. 15-20 february. (1995). rogers, e.m. diffusion of innovations (fifth edition). (new york: free press, 2003). scoones, i. and thompson, j. (reprinted 2007). knowledge, power, and agriculture – towards a theoretical understanding, in scoones, i. and thompson, j. (eds.) beyond farmer first. (eastbourne: intermediate technology publications, 1994). sen, a. development as freedom. (oxford: oxford university press,1999). smith, l. c. introducing miks: a methodology for the utilization of indigenous knowledge. indigenous knowledge and development monitor. 5(2). (1997). warren, d.m.. using indigenous knowledge in agricultural development. world bank discussion papers. (washington, d.c.: the world bank, 1991). warren, d. m. indigenous knowledge and development. background paper for seminar presented at the world bank. (washington, d.c.: world bank, 1990). http://www.soci.niu.edu/~critcrim/papers/drag22 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge warren, d. m. and cashman k. indigenous knowledge for sustainable agriculture and rural development. gatekeeper series no sa10. london: international institute for environment and development. (1988). i toyin kolawole earned a phd in agricultural extension and rural sociology from the obafemi awolowo university, ile-ife, nigeria, where he has been involved in teaching and conducting research in indigenous knowledge, and sustainable agriculture. he was at the institute of development studies (ids) in the university of sussex, brighton, united kingdom, between september 2007 and october 2008. ii kolawole 2007, pp. 1-9 iii kanbur 2002, p. 484 iv kolawole 2001, pp. 13-15 v kolawole 2008, pp. 320 – 333 vi brouwer 1998 [p. 13] in kolawole 2005, pp. 1433-34 vii howes and chambers 1980, pp. 329-40 viii warren and cashman 1988, p. 15 ix sen 1999, pp. 3-4 x hdr-undp 2006 xi maslow 1943, pp. 370-96. xii scoones and thompson 1994, p. 24 xiii foucault 1980, p. 82 82 xiv milovanovic 1997, p.11 xv foucault 1971 in pottier 2003, p. 17 xvi hountondji 1997, pp. 1-39 xvii chambers 1983, pp. 31-86 xviii warren 1991, pp. 1-34 xix grenier 1998, p. 1 xx dewes 1993 cited in kolawole 2001, p. 13 xxi osunade 1996 cited in kolawole 2005, pp. 1427-43 xxii agrawal 1994, p. 3 xxiii agrawal 1995, pp. 3-5 xxiv banuri and apffel-marglin 1993; dei 1993, pp. 97-110 xxv kolawole 2005, pp. 1433-34 23 |consilience kolawole: situating local knowledge xxvi smith 1997, pp. 17-18 xxvii rhoades and bebbington 1988 in chambers 1989, p. 185 xxviii brokensha et al. 1980 xxix rogers 2003, p. 256 xxx warren 1991: 1-34 xxxi warren 1990, p. 1 xxxii kolawole 2002, [pp. 26, 31] in lansing and kremer 1991, pp. 1-10 xxxiii moncrieffe 2007, pp. 84-85, 92 xxxiv see for instance emelumba 2006, and bhattacharya 2004 xxxv kolawole 2003, pp. 49-54 xxxvi lansing and kremer 1995, pp. 258-68 xxxvii odora hoppers 2002, pp. 2-22 xxxviii hobart 1993, p. 16 xxxix eyben 2007, p. 43 trying discipline the “green economy” of rio+ 20 with international environmental law consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 7, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 64–72 the 2012 united nations conference on sustainable development and the future of international environmental protection donald k. anton college of law the australian national university, australia abstract this opinion piece addresses concerns about the suitability of the continuing use of sustainable development as a concept around which to organize international environmental protection. despite advances made in international environmental law over the last 40 years, progress in abating global greenhouse gas continues to be slow, and predictions about global average temperature increases remain disturbing. the upcoming geo5 publication based on the united nations environment programme‘s global environmental outlook data portal reveals that prospects for improvements in global environmental standards are grim. some of the challenges facing the advancement of international environmental law can be largely attributed to inefficiencies associated with treaty congestion; however, there is a more fundamental reason why international environmental law remains ineffective. there has been little, if any, progress because we have been focusing solely on the concept of sustainable development for the last quarter century. it is clear that ‗sustainable development‘ has become too malleable a theory to serve its vital purpose. consequently, it needs to be replaced with a straightforward title for the environmental movement. the international community needs to reconsider its approach in dealing with today‘s pressing environmental concerns. 1. introduction this opinion piece addresses concerns about the suitability of the continuing use of sustainable development as a concept around which to organize international environmental protection. despite advances made in international environmental law over the last 40 years, the vast majority of today‘s environmental indicators continue to show mostly unabated environmental decline and remain disturbing. for instance, the upcoming geo5 publication based on the united nations environment programme‘s global environmental outlook data portal1 reveals that prospects for improvements in global environmental standards are grim. some of the challenges facing the advancement of international environmental law can be largely attributed to inefficiencies associated with treaty congestion; however, there is a more fundamental reason why international environmental law remains ineffective. there has been little, if any, progress because a misshapen concept of sustainable development has been the organizing principle for international environmental law for the last quarter century. it is clear that ‗sustainable development‘ has too often prioritized environmentally 1 see http://geodata.grid.unep.ch/. http://geodata.grid.unep.ch/ consilience anton: international environmental protection harmful action ahead of protection. consequently, the international community needs to reconsider its approach in dealing with today‘s pressing environmental concerns. the time has come to return to environmental protection as the focus for international environmental law. 2. forty years of development in international environmental law the rapid growth in international environmental conventions over the last thirty years of the twentieth century is striking. the 1972 stockholm conference on the human environment was the world‘s first major diplomatic dialogue dedicated to addressing global environmental concerns, and since then few issues have blossomed on the global scene with as much unplanned fecundity. fittingly, in 1971, john lawrence hargrove posed the question, ―[h]ow much international law-making is required‖ to protect the global environment? (hargrove, 1971). no one knew. by the late-1990s, it was estimated that over 1000 different international environmental legal instruments—both hard and soft—and 139 major international environmental treaties were in existence (unep, 1989). between 1972 and 1992 alone, more than 50 multilateral treaties solely concerning the protection of marine environments were established (adede, 1992). it became apparent that the increasing number of treaties and areas of international environmental concern would pose several distinct challenges. these challenges were neatly encapsulated in an influential critique of contemporary international environmental law by edith brown weiss. brown weiss identifies that the surfeit of international environmental law could constitute too much of a good thing and result in negative outcomes. (weiss, 1993). in particular, she points out two problems arising from this body of international environmental law. first, the large number of new treaties might overwhelm the capacity of the international system and of the individual states to implement and monitor a plethora of new obligations. consequently, the excess of regulation would prove ineffective in ameliorating the environmental problems addressed. second, weiss emphasizes that a large and uncoordinated body of laws will result in inconsistent obligations, overlapping norms, gaps in coverage, and outright duplication. accounting for ‗treaty congestion‘ does not inevitably involve slowing down necessary norm creation; however, states must act now to make international environmental law more manageable and efficient (weiss, 1993). 3. taking issue with rio+20 twenty years ago in rio, regulatory and public attitudes towards the united nations conference on environment and development (unced) were optimistic. governments were committed to negotiating a firm legal agenda and to establishing international cooperation. this is evident in the successful adoption of the convention on biological diversity and the framework convention on climate change. alongside these legal developments, the international community‘s commitment to sustainable development escalated. agenda 21 and its 40 chapters were adopted as a roadmap and a new institution 66 consilience was created to supervise implementation: the commission on sustainable development. importantly, civil society successfully fought for recognition and the right to participate to a degree in both these unced developments as well as environmental decision-making more broadly. next year‘s environmental meeting of the decade, the united nations conference on sustainable development—popularly known as rio+20— promises to end in disappointment. the problem, however, does not stem from an absence of participation from civil society. quite the contrary, the biggest issue facing rio+20 is the lack leadership from governments driving any sort of environmental agenda. governments are simply not interested in creating new international environmental law that appears necessary or even in reforming and improving the law we already have. without this sort of leadership by states, no amount of civil society participation can bring improvements, because only states can make international law and create governance structures. by design, the only work product expected to come out of rio+20 is a non-legal statement of political aspiration, or in other words, a rio+20 declaration on sustainable development. commendably, the whole world was invited to provide input to the declaration – what has been called the ―zero draft.‖ this invitation went out to governments, international organisations, ngos, business associations, and individuals. a total of 646 submissions were received. of that, only 75 countries out of the 194 invited could muster the interest to make any sort of contribution to the zero draft.2 states seem to lack interest in using rio+20 to advance legal protection for the global environment. indeed, it was recently reported in the guardian that the environmental meeting of the decade was of such low priority that it had to be rescheduled to accommodate celebrations for queen elizabeth‘s diamond jubilee (gersman, 2011). while we might like to think that rio+20 will be a major international environmental gathering of world leaders, the truth is that it will not. first, it has not been designated a summit. the general assembly is only requiring that it be held ―at the highest possible level,‖ and even if it does attain summit status, global environmental problems will not be its central concern (un g.a. resolution 64/236, 2009). the general assembly has limited the conference‘s objective to securing ―renewed political commitment for sustainable development‖ and its focus to two themes: ―a green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication‖ and ―the institutional framework for sustainable development.‖ in neither objective nor focus, then, has the global environment been explicitly mentioned, much less given prominence. one might ask what difference a word makes. i suggest very much. 4. stunting international environmental policy over the last 40 years there has been a discernible shift away from a specific environmental emphasis in international environmental policy, which of course informs international environmental law, to detrimental effect. the international community today apparently wears its environmental concern on its sleeve, but it is in fact mostly a pretense – a pretense that is driven by an almost wholesale embrace of the concept of sustainable development, around which the 2 see http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/index.php?menu=115. http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/index.php?menu=115 consilience anton: international environmental protection international community has organized environmental protection. the most recent manifestation in the lead up to rio+20 is the green economy, but underneath it all is the misplaced faith (or wish) that continued economic growth will drive effective protection of the global environment. the full name of the event to take place in rio de janeiro in 2012 is the united nations conference on sustainable development (uncsd) (un g.a. resolution 64/236, 2009). ten years ago in johannesburg it was called the world summit for sustainable development. not even in name has the environment been featured in these two most recent global gatherings, but it was not always so. both the original ―earth‖ summit in rio 20 years ago and the 1972 stockholm conference were truly environmental conferences not only in name, but also in their outlook, agendas, and outputs. this is not to say that there was no recognition in 1972 that the environmental problems of developing countries were different in kind and prominently included under-development;3 or that the conference in rio in 1992 did not account for the idea of sustainable development popularized by the world commission on environment and development in its well-known report, our common future (world commission on environment and development, 1987). however, it was generally recognized at the time that those ―who planned [these conferences] certainly had foremost in mind the . . . the spiritual qualities of our relation to the earth [and] the ecological health of our planet‖ (ward et al, 1972). this concern over the continuing deterioration of the state of the world‘s environment4 largely disappeared in the years following the 1992 rio conference. instead, we find ourselves today preoccupied with green growth, in a global green economy, in which environmental protection is to be integrated in a ―balanced‖ way with economic growth and social development, and this shift has been insidious for the international environmental agenda. in order to think about what we might constructively do about this situation, we must first understand what has happened. in 1987, the world commission on environment and development issued our common future. the report laudably defined the concept of sustainable development as ―development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.‖ the report also stressed the need to get a handle on unsustainable patterns of consumption and production with the more affluent reducing the amount consumed. the report, however, did much more than this. for a start, it highlighted with striking certainty that ―inequality is the planet‘s main ‗environmental‘ problem.‖ inequality is, of course, a disturbing and persistent problem and most certainly deserves to be addressed in its own right as a matter of priority. however, it is much less clear that it is our main environmental problem. more disturbingly, when our common future was presented to the governing council of the united nations environment programme by the commission‘s chair, gro harlem brundtland, she asserted that the idea of 3 see development and environment, report and working papers of a panel of experts convened by the secretary-general of the united nations conference on the human enviornment, founex, switzerland, june 412, 1971 (mouton, paris & the hague, 1972) 4 as reflected in the general assembly resolutions convening the 1972 conference on the human environment, ga res 2398 (xxiii)(3 dec 1968) and the 1992 conference on environment and development, ga res 44/228 (22 dec 1989). 68 consilience sustainable development was really a ―new concept for economic growth.‖ it did not take long for many with free market, free trade and capitalist agendas to seize this notion and recast their ambitions for unbridled economic growth in the ―green language‖ of sustainable development. the first step was to equate sustainable development with sustainable economic growth. then, losing all pretense, sustained economic growth (unlimited in any way) apparently became the way to achieve sustainable development. in 1989, this subversion of sustainable development found its way into the general assembly resolution during the 1992 rio conference. while the resolution redundantly defined the objective of the conference as the promotion of ―sustainable and environmentally sound development in all countries,‖ it also affirmed the importance of economic growth (un g.a. resolution 44/228, 1989). in particular, it stressed ―the importance of a supportive international economic environment that would result in sustained economic growth… in all countries.‖ then, twenty years ago in rio, at least three additional developments took place that crucially shaped the scope of the discussion. first of all, unlike stockholm in 1972, the ecological tenor of the 1992 conference in rio was downgraded. instead of recognizing human beings as part of nature, principle 1 of the rio declaration anthropocentrically declares ―human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development.‖ those who had hopes for an earth charter in rio not only failed in that respect but moreover saw nature and planet earth placed in the shadows of the economic concerns of sustainable development. second, by 1992, the brazilian delegate on working group iii of the preparatory committee of the conference had successfully persuaded all the delegates to substitute the term ―international environmental law,‖ an established field, with the new term ―international law in the field of sustainable development‖ throughout all of the conference documents. it was reported that following his success, the brazilian delegate flashed a mischievous look and said, ―[t]hat will keep you lawyers busy well into the 21st century‖ (sand, 1993). third, this change in name had weighty implications: it constituted a change from the discourse of international environmental law, with a focus on environmental protection, to rhetoric bound up with international law in the field of sustainable development, with a focus on economic growth. as marc pallemaerts presciently saw back in 1992, international environmental law became diminished and subordinated to economic growth and social development under what has become known as the principle of integration. the principle of integration reduces environmental imperatives to just one factor (along with economic and social desires) to be weighed in decision-making (pallemaerts, 1993). the problem, of course, is that the environment usually comes out on the losing end. the so-called meeting of the decade in johannesburg in 2002 amounted to a rather anemic gathering where all specific focus on environmental protection faded. instead of the robust international environmental law output of rio in 1992, the 2002 conference saw no such progress. even the political declaration produced in johannesburg was a disappointment when compared to the strong ecological nature of the declaration in stockholm and with the world charter for nature adopted by the un general assembly in 1982. the same trajectory proceeds apace today. instead of policies to support the global environment through modifications of our own economic activities, consilience anton: international environmental protection we find documents like the united nations environment programme‘s 4th global environmental outlook turning the idea of using the economy to support environmental protection inside out like a glove. the 4th unep outlook is subtitled environment for development and states that ―society has the capacity to make a difference in the way the environment is used to underpin [economic] development . . .‖ this formulation clearly renders the environment a mere instrument of development and the green economy. in this way, environmental degradation is seen as a spoiler of development rather than an undesirable result in itself. this economic view of sustainable development is evident in many documents now circulating around rio+20. two examples will suffice. first, the general assembly in convening rio+20 ―reaffirmed‖ the environment as subservient to the economy by emphasizing that ―the protection and management of the natural resource base of economic and social development… is an overarching objective and essential requirement of sustainable development‖ (un g.a. resolution 64/236, 2009). second, last december, the secretary-general reported on the objectives and themes of the conference, putting forward a formulation of sustainable development that ―emphasizes… strong economic performance [and] rests on integration and a balanced consideration of social, economic and environmental goals and objectives…‖5 in the same report, the secretary-general highlights that any transition to a green economy requires ―public polices to avoid negative effects on economic growth.‖ all of this is far removed from the objective of global environmental protection as an important end in itself. this objective needs to become the primary focus of international environmental diplomacy, international environmental policy, and international environmental law. how to accomplish this, though, is far from clear and will be a struggle regardless of the approach. 5. bringing the environment to the fore again through new international environmental law-making one approach may be an ambitious new international environmental lawmaking push – lawmaking to govern the fundamental drivers of our destructive impact on the global environment. the detrimental impact that we have on the earth is largely a function of population, affluence or consumption, and technology – reflected in paul ehrlich and john holdren‘s famous i=pxaxt formula – so it makes sense to finally start the difficult and delicate task of negotiating international legal cooperation in these realms (ehrlich and holdern, 1972). to do so requires that leaders confront head on what we are doing to the global environment instead of tinkering around the edges under the guise of promoting a green economy. i cannot prove that law-making efforts in these realms will pay dividends. however, what we are doing now – using sustainable development as our pole star – is not working. there are good people invested in the concept of sustainable development with a genuine belief that at least certain aspects 5 objectives and themes of the united nations conference on sustainable development, report of the secretary-general, u.n. doc. a/conf.216/pc/7 (22 dec 2010), at para 4. 70 consilience promote a healthy environment: indeed, i used to be one of them. however, as i always tell my students on the first day of the course in international environmental law, we must always be attuned to the effectiveness of our efforts to protect the planet. if i look out my window or study environmental indicators, it is clear that 25 years of sustainable development has done little to improve global environmental conditions. 6. conclusion so this is the situation: we are about six months away from the decade‘s world premier ―environmental‖ gathering and the major theme capturing our attention is the green economy, instead of the health of the planet. it is no doubt too late now to alter the focus of rio+20. indeed, at the very first meeting of the bureau of the preparatory process for the conference, bureau members clearly rejected the need for states to revisit the objective and focus of the conference. clearly, though, we can do something. we can tell the vested interests the truth that sustainable development, as currently twisted, insulates and protects. we can also start thinking today about what lies after 2012 so that by 2022 we can truly have a 50th golden anniversary of true planetary concern in the spirit of stockholm. in the meantime we should work on improving the effectiveness of what we have. i raised the question earlier – ―what‘s in a word‖? – in relation to the absence of the word ―environment‖ in the focus for the upcoming un conference on sustainable development. i suggest almost everything. as philip allott eloquently sums it up: our words make our worlds. to choose our words is to choose a form of life. to choose our words is to choose a world. . . . to change our words is to change a form of life and a world. . . . to make a new word or to alter the meaning of an old word is to make possible new realities. (allott, 1990) we have lost our way on the international protection of our shared global environment because we let our words be changed to that of something else. we must change our words so that we once again insist on more effective legal limits to preserve ―this endangered planet‖ (falk, 1971). consilience anton: international environmental protection bibliography adede, andronico o. (1992). international environmental law digest: instruments for international responses to problems of environment and development 1972-1992, amsterdam: elsevier. allott, philip. (1990). eunomia: new order for a new world. oxford: oxford univ. press. ehrlich, paul r., and john p. holdern. (1972). ―a bulletin dialogue on ―the closing circle‖: critique.‖ xxviii bulletin of the atomic scientists. falk, richard a. (1971). this endangered planet: prospects and proposals for human survival. new york: random house. gersman, hanna. (2011). ―rio earth summit postponed after clash with queen‘s diamond jubilee.‖ the guardian. london hargrove, john lawrence. (1971). law, institutions & the global environment, dobbs ferry, ny/leiden: oceana publications, inc./a.w. sijthoff. pallemaerts, marc. (1993). ―international environmental law from stockholm to rio: back to the future?‖ greening international law. london: earthscan. sand, peter h. (1993). ―unced and the development of international environmental law.‖ yearbook of international environmental law. united nations conference on environment and development. (1992). rio declaration on environment and development, a/conf.151/26/rev.1 (vol. 1). united nations conference on sustainable development, report of the secretary-general. (2010). u.n. doc. a/conf.216/pc/7. united nations environment programme. (1989). register of international treaties, u.n. doc. unep/gc.15/inf.2 united nations environment programme (2007). global environment outlook: environment for development. un g.a. res. 44/228. (1989). u.n. doc. a/res/44/228. new york un g.a. res. 64/236 (2009). u.n. doc. a/res/64/236. new york. ward, barbara, and rené dubos. (1972). only one earth: the care and maintenance of a small planet. new york: w.w. norton & co. weiss, edith brown. (1993). ―international environmental law: contemporary issues and the emergence of a new world order.‖ georgetown law journal. 72 consilience world commission on environment and development (1987). our common future. oxford: oxford univ. press. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 7, iss. 1 (2012), pp.144–154 striving towards a sustainable solution: water and community in veron, dominican republic erica bower columbia university, new york ny erb2157@columbia.edu abstract access to clean and sanitized water is one of the most fundamental of human rights. however, in many communities around the world, water remains contaminated and a danger to human health. this photo essay seeks to outline an example of such circumstances in domingo maiz, shed light on the potential for a sustainable solution, and embody the cultural beauty of the local community. author’s note erica bower is an undergraduate student at columbia university studying sustainable development, human rights and economics. her interest resides in exploring the ways in which these fields intersect, both academically and in fieldwork, and is inspired by the role that photography can play in capturing this multifaceted nexus. this photo essay documents research conducted during the summer of 2011 in domingo maiz, veron, dominican republic. keywords: dominican republic, water access 1. introduction among many other factors, development of the tourism industry in the dominican republic has made the dichotomy between wealthy and poor increasingly stark (weiner, 2010). nowhere is this disparity more evident than in domingo maiz, veron, a neighborhood community just 9 miles inland from punta cana resort area. over the past 25 years, veron has become a settlement of migrant labor, both dominican and haitian, who work at hotels during tourist seasons. this seasonal variation in population density, compounded with the lack of official governmental structure, makes obtaining census data extremely difficult. in addition, the population of this informal community is in constant flux and lacks uniform awareness about proper water cleanliness and sanitation concerns (reiff, 1996). this mindset therefore exacerbates improper waste disposal, unofficial well construction, and bacteria-infected water in veron. in fact, data from recent studies demonstrates that an overwhelming number of wells, specifically in the barrio domingo maiz, are contaminated at levels with drastic impact on public health in the community (novack, 2011). this past summer, with the help of peace corps volunteer sabine bergmann, colgate student alexis apostol, columbia ph.d. student natalia rossi, and numerous volunteers from the local community, i was a part of the efforts to explore these consilience bower: water and community photo 1: a typical housing structure in the “barrio” of domingo maiz, veron. circumstances further. after conducting a household assessment of water circumstances and a demographic census of domingo maiz, we collected startling sociological data. in particular, the extent of parasitic infections, specifically with regard to concentration of children per household, was truly overwhelming. on a more optimistic note, the study also calculated that a wastewater treatment plant to serve the neighborhood could be implemented on land located within domingo maiz. with incorporation of the perspective and help of local community organizers to ensure long term sustainability, volunteers from peace corps, save the children, grupo punta cana and various universities hope to make this project a reality in the upcoming months. access to clean and sanitized water is a fundamental human right, and every community, including domingo maiz, veron, deserves a sustainable solution to such existing problems (ishay, 2010). this photo essay seeks to outline the need for a sustainable solution, illustrate the prospects for the future of the water treatment plant, and embody the rich cultural fabric of the community in domingo maiz. 146 consilience photo 3: a narrow path between houses, empty now but ordinarily crowded with children playing and animals roaming around. photo 2: a man sits under a sign that translates ―do not throw trash‖, while garbage ironically litters the foreground. a ―tinaco‖ water carrier sits above the building. consilience bower: water and community photo 4: trash and discarded materials line the boundaries of the community and thereby contribute to the contamination of the water supply. photo 5: fecal matter from animals, both domesticated and non-domesticated, also leads to contamination of wells in the vicinity. 148 consilience photo 6: a typical ―tinaco‖ water storage container sits atop a house; these devices often hold contaminated water. photo 7: pipes for water transport line the walls of houses. photo 8: the community organizer of domingo maiz, chelo, explains the potential contamination of this particular well. consilience bower: water and community photo 9: a reflection peering into a well during inspection; notice the peeling blue paint on the sides, another potentially contaminating factor. photo 10: a young boy glances over his shoulder at the mound of cement that covers the top of an informal and poorly constructed septic tank in his yard. 150 consilience photos 11-15: a series on the intimate relationship between a mother and daughter—the delicate placement of her footwear is the embodiment of both maternal care and of empowerment of future generations. consilience bower: water and community photo 16: a young boy walks through the street with a stray dog. photo 17: an optimistic girl helps to care for her younger sibling. 152 consilience photo 18: a haitian woman sews clothes for a sale below; her efforts contribute to creating the intangible fabric of the community in domingo maiz. photo 19: an array of cloth and clothing for sale; despite the fact that a large portion was donated from abroad, this sale both generated income and strengthened the fabric of the community. consilience bower: water and community photo 21: this is ―el solar‖, the plot of land where the wastewater treatment plant for the domingo maiz community will be constructed in the upcoming months. however, this is merely a pilot program—if the project proves successful, this type of sustainable solution can be replicated and escalated to larger regions, in the dominican republic and across the globe. photo 20: volunteers from the local community, peace corps, and columbia and colgate university collaborated to work on this water and sanitation study. by incorporating the perspective and ideas of community members, they are empowered to take the project into their own hands and ensure its completion and sustainability in the long term. 154 consilience bibliography ishay, m. "the universal declaration of human rights at 60: a bridge to which future?" perspectives on global development and technology 9.1 (2010): 11-27. novack, j and m. widdowson. ―report on threats to water quality‖, virginia polytechnic institute and state university. july 2011. reiff, fred m., mirta roses, linda venczel, robert quick and vicente m. witt. ―low-cost safe water for the world: a practical interim solution,‖ journal of public health policy , vol. 17, no. 4 (1996), pp. 389-408 article stable url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3343099 weiner, angelica. the tourism industry and its link to poverty alleviation in the dominican republic. thesis. massachusetts institute of technology, dept. of urban studies and planning, 2010. mit. print. retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/58275 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/58275 microsoft word 02112008 yeow race for sustainable development.doc consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 1 the race for sustainable development daniel yeow1 abstract: the world has changed a great deal in recent times and the challenges which present themselves are unlike any that we have faced before. foremost among these are climate change, world poverty, and the many forces which are inextricably linked to these such as population growth, economic development, and the spread of technology. in this article, the convergence of these pressures is examined in light of the challenges and opportunities offered by globalization. the role of information will be examined with the view to shedding new perspective on some of the more pervasive problems that accompany globalization and economic growth 1 daniel yeow is a current m.a. student at columbia university's graduate school of arts and sciences. this is his first year in the climate and society program. he completed his undergraduate studies at the university of melbourne with majors in mathematics, philosophy, and archaeology. he can be contacted at largestprime@gmail.com. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 2 the race: the gun fires. your muscles tighten; you jump off the start line. “calm down” you tell yourself. there is chaos. an elbow here, a palm there, you struggle to find your space. the field spreads, the pace quickens. or maybe the pace quickened first, causing the field to spread. you forget. your heart plays pinball inside your chest, you can feel it hammering away. your legs feel heavy as the unmistakable sensation of lactic acid overwhelms you. pins and needles pierce your skin and sink into muscles you never knew existed. it is too late. you hit the wall three quarters into your mile. runners pass you left and right, you slow to a jog then stagger to a halt. your head is spinning. your race is over;your pace was unsustainable. the question of sustainable development is one of the most intractable questions of the modern age and one which is increasing rapidly in urgency. sadly this urgency has less to do with the fact that millions of innocent people are dying from easily-preventable causes than from reasons of pure economic self-interest. although widely recognized that, in the long run, economic prosperity and environmental sustainability for all benefits everybody, the causation of this sudden urgency is the other way around. it has arisen because the realization has hit us that, if we don't act with the utmost expediency, then we will all soon feel the direct effects of our failures. the scarcity brought on by climate change has finally tightened the time scale of the feedback loop enough for us to feel it. so much for altruism. forgetting for the moment about sustainability, there are many problems with development, and these are only exacerbated when sustainability is thrown into the mix. different countries have developed via very different paths and in very different environments. some, such as south korea and china, have started with a focus on health then followed with a focus on wealth, while others as diverse as brazil and the united arab emirates, for very different reasons, have done it the other way around. there have also been significant shocks to development for which economists generally don't plan, such as long droughts and world wars. information technology has also changed the landscape of development introducing variables which development practitioners would not have even imagined as recently as ten years ago. the issue of population growth further complicates matters: current developed countries simply did not have to consider the astronomically higher numbers of people which current developing behemoths such as china and india must. perhaps we, the citizens of this planet, are fortunate. no, i know we are fortunate. the size of this planet, the composition of its atmosphere, and its distance from the sun (among many other critical factors) are just about exactly fine-tuned for humanity to have flourished in the way that it has. or perhaps it is the other way around: we have evolved to be perfectly well-suited to developing the way we have on this particular planet. it is also fortuitous that the issues of wealth disparity, environmental sustainability and growth of the global economy have come to the forefront within such a short time of each other, allowing us to more easily see their interconnectivity and the necessity of an integrated solution. in any case, neither the parameters of the planet nor the biological makeup of humankind are easily or quickly alterable so it would be prudent for us to be careful in all matters which may disturb the delicate balance that governs the consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 3 relationship between us and our environment. it is an important relationship, and we can't just ‘break up’ when things get too hot. globalization is our best hope. the monotonic increase in connectivity in the global community has been a given for a long time. the progress of this connectivity in the economic realm has far outstripped that of any other, except perhaps information technology. the result of this laissez-faire global expansion is that, without any other significant power than the market to hold back the invisible hand, a great many things were exploited including people and, of course, the environment. as a result of this, globalization has been politicized as the devil that increases disparity. but if i give a hammer to a person who then kills someone with it, does that make the hammer evil? while the exploitation is obviously deplorable, i believe that this perspective could easily be the other way around. hammers can be fabulously creative tools as well. what would rodin have said if we had accused him of using evil tools? globalization is the infrastructure through which global problems will be addressed with global solutions. the problems brought on by climate change especially, are necessarily global in nature, and any effective solution will necessarily require an operational framework that only a global tool like globalization can provide. in addition, the kind of increases in productivity needed to raise the poorest of the poor out of poverty will require a division of labor on a scale which can only be realized within the framework of globalization. many cite the increased complexity of these new frameworks as unnatural and therefore ultimately doomed to failure. still others argue that humans are naturally exploitative and that larger networks will only lead to greater exploitation. however, i believe that it is the other way around, that the current climate of exploitation is only temporary and increased connectivity is perfectly natural. after all, we evolved in an environment of an iterative game, where cooperation is the norm and exploitation the exception (à la tit-for-tat, in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma). we have not so much outgrown our planet as we have outgrown ourselves. the world in which adam smith wrote the wealth of nations is vastly different to ours, and the theory of free markets seems as out of place as classical physics in a relativistic world. the sheer size and complexity of networks in the world we live in requires that we can no longer apply theories which assumed negligible transaction and information costs. these assumptions predict a world in which the market is able to efficiently and fairly allocate resources. instead, lack of good information leads to an inefficient and, importantly, inequitable distribution of resources. we have grown past the realm where transactions are simply impersonal, and where institutions keep transaction costs reasonable, and into a world where effective information transmission is the dominating force in our decisions concerning the division of these scarce resources. there are enough resources in the world to go around but, owing to the quirks of the geopolitical climate brought on by self-reinforcing path-dependencies (like that darned qwerty keyboard), we continue to fight wars over them, both on the ground and in the boardrooms of diplomatic institutions and multinational corporations.2 2 path dependency is the phenomenon of choices being made which become very difficult to reverse or change. for example, the qwerty keyboard was originally designed to prevent early typewriters from jamming by slowing down the typist through a deliberately inefficient arrangement of keys. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 4 information is now the world's most valuable commodity. the distribution and dissemination of information will rise exponentially in importance as we continue to struggle with these problems. the institutions and infrastructure that globalization will provide will facilitate a global division of labor on a massive scale which will, in turn, require cooperation between world leaders on a scale which has hitherto never been seen. as human networks increase exponentially in size and complexity, the infrastructure of information will need to keep up; in fact, it will need to catch up. the disadvantages caused by the disparity in information, the information asymmetry between the haves and have-nots, are at the heart of the causes of wealth disparity around the world. it is somewhat remarkable that in this modern age, an information advantage can still lead to unfair bargaining which then leads to an inequitable equilibrium. but black swans like the internet are turning this the other way around: access to information is flattening the world.3 our challenge is to proceed both cautiously and with the utmost urgency and expediency. the role of the state is now more important than ever. due to its unique comparative advantage in the collection of information, it will always have an unusual advantage when it comes to information asymmetry. in the tradition of mechanism design theory, through the rule of law, the state’s responsibilities will now encompass the nurturing of global institutions in order to mitigate the effects of negative externalities of globalization and ensure that everyone gets a slice of the bigger economic pie. it must ensure that the cogs of this intricately balanced machine continue to spin because, even if this machine might make things worse, it may also make things better, but if it becomes trapped in its current state, our world will surely spiral towards disaster. the damaging costs of war are no longer linked to the question of direct economic and human loss. rather, the unsettling of these cogs by conflict will adversely threaten the goal of keeping the world sustainable for us to live in. some say that this kind of international cooperation will only be realized once world peace has been established, but i believe that unless we can establish this kind of cooperation, world peace will never be established. things do not look good. the population continues to grow alongside its ecological footprint. the benefits of globalization are struggling desperately in a losing race with its own unfortunate ill-effects. over a billion people continue to ‘live’ on less than a dollar a day. our information technology struggles to keep up with the mammoth demands that are made of it. global warming continues to wreak havoc with the world's climate in ways which we are only beginning to understand. climate shocks have a long and welldocumented history of precipitating social upheaval and have already been found to be an important factor in several current world conflicts. unless we learn to bring these diverse disciplines together and recognize the inescapable connections which exist between them, we will be faced with an unpleasant climate, both meteorologically, economically and politically from which there will be no escape. there is certainly no other way around and if this does not change, the world will certainly not end, but it will become a world which is 3 a “black swan” is a term coined by nassim nicholas taleb in a book of the same name. it is a phenomenon which satisfies three criteria: it (1) lies outside the realm of regular expectations (2) carries an extreme impact, and (3) there is a tendency to try to explain it in a way that makes it seem less of an outlier after the event. it is named for the discovery of black swans in australia (all observed swans prior to this were white). consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 5 far more difficult to inhabit, a world which will not be able to sustain even a fraction of our current population and a world in which our current level of productivity will be utterly unfeasible. it is somewhat sad that it has come to this. i had hoped that we would address these problems sooner and for no other reason than for equity’s own sake. unfortunately, this is often not good enough, so now economics compels us to act. we are forced not by our conscience but by the threat that the very equations which govern the allocation of scarce resources, both natural and human, will consume civilization as we know it and replace it with something far less palatable. without global cooperation, we cannot hope to solve any of these problems in the long run and, with a fifth of this globe living in abject poverty, we can only be a fraction as effective as we should be in trying to break out of this cycle. unfortunately, as climate-caused complications worsen, the economies most vulnerable to the changes are negatively affected, making it even more difficult to find their way onto that bottom rung. we need to harness the power of positive feedback and exponential growth to everyone’s advantage and travel upwards on this unfortunate spiral before it is too late to turn this cycle the other way around. by putting the word ‘sustainable’ alongside ‘development,’ we thrust the issue into the realm of economists, who generally sit higher on the policy pecking order than environmentalists. but, this is not just a problem for economists; this problem affects us all. we need to educate ourselves and recognize this unique historic opportunity and seize it. we must be creative in our approach, and if we get stuck, we must find another way around because the stakes are too high for anyone to ignore. economic prosperity is useless if the environment cannot sustain it, and we would simply be betraying the trust of our descendants. we haven't hit the wall just yet, and nobody is going to pass us on this race, but if we don't want to run ourselves into the ground we need to keep our wits about us and realize that the real urgency isn't in reaching the finish line quickly, but in staying on our feet to ensure that we reach it at all. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 9, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 123 – 131 the extraterritoriality nexus: manifestation of extraterritoriality as natural phenomenon in urban context melanie fessel open network ecology odyssey email: melanie.fessel@gmail.com abstract architecture and urban planning have to be renegotiated in the context of an increasingly globalized world, where immeasurable human impressions are so complexly woven that it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain a distinction between nature, culture and the built environment. within these global networks are our ever-changing cities and landscapes. fragmented exceptions, defined as geographically autonomous zones of extraterritoriality, disseminate these cities, bringing unstable processes and mutated landscapes that will undeniably affect our futures. author’s note architect and designer melanie fessel initiated the open network ecology odyssey (one), an interdisciplinary research enterprise working to integrate ecological issues into the urban environment through philanthropic design. melanie is currently the director of design research at terreform one, an ecological design group for urban infrastructure, building, planning, and art. she received her post-professional degree, a master of architecture ii, from the cooper union for the advancement of science and art in 2011, and her diploma in architecture and engineering from the berlin university of technology in 2008. before that, she attended the universitat politècnica de catalunya, in barcelona, spain. she was an associate in the cooper union institute for sustainable design, and has worked as an architect and urban designer in spain, switzerland, and new york city, with a focus on municipal buildings and master planning. keywords: architecture, sustainability, ecology, urban studies. 1. remnants, resilience, and resistance: disturbances as opportunity we no longer map territories; instead territories map us. humanity is transforming the earth’s surface, establishing zones of ambiguity with no boundaries. these newly engraved zones portray who we are, what we have done, and where we are moving. the disciplines of architecture and urban planning have to be transformed in the context of an increasingly globalized world, where immeasurable human activities are complexly woven to the extent that it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain a distinction between nature, culture, and the built environment. this global network is composed of the ever-changing city and its environs. fragmented 124 consilience exceptions located beyond this sphere are defined as geographically autonomous zones of extraterritoriality that broadcast these global agents. what opportunities for humanity lie within these confined processes? extraterritoriality is a term applied to many places, its roots tracing back to antiquity and its modern principals codified in the middle ages. the system of extraterritoriality emerged with the imperative need of protection for the political, economic, and cultural agents of sovereign nations as they went out into the world. this need emerged from the differences in the cultures, religions, and legal systems of western christian nations and those of africa, the near east, and asia, which motivated western countries to secure legal and economic exemptions for their nationals. modern extraterritoriality served not only as a means to protect the agents of sovereign powers, but also as an instrument of imperialism. extraterritorial zones are areas where national or international law have been applied and from which discourse on human rights and politics emerge concurrently with the concepts of space and time.1 these hybrid spaces are discontinuous fragments that can be mobile and transitory. they are shaped through a variety of contemporary processes that make their boundaries invisible and create fragments of existing constitutional surfaces. extraterritorial zones are positioned outside of the jurisdictions of the sovereign nations that surround them or are contiguous to them. the predicate of extraterritoriality is also physically manifested in the global infrastructure, necessitated by the demands of globalism and the conflicting interaction of the national and global. they allow humans to connect remotely and exchange internationally, and include ports and airports, which are havens of trade without being under the jurisdiction of a certain territory and holding a status of exception. international ownership treaties outline many extraterritorial zones, such as “international waters,” “international seabed,” “moon,” “outer space,” “international zone,” “united nations,” “antarctica,” and “extraterrestrial real estate.” these spaces aspire to be worlds within themselves, and they are spaces from which vivid evidence of weakness, resilience, or violence are particularly articulated. jurisdictionally ambiguous, they are infused with myths, desires, and symbolic capital.2 the condition of extraterritoriality transforms these hybrid spaces into places that attempt to create long-envisioned utopias and a radical new socioecological order. extraterritorialities relate crucially to sustainable development because increasing ecological change from climate change creates more areas of instability. without applicable jurisdiction, these new zones of exception could provide exploratory genealogies vis-à-vis ecology for the cross-national, transnational, and transcultural exchange of global connectivity, where the cultural collision and segregation provide a new lens from which there can be discourse on the political composition of our urban landscapes.3 in this investigation, the concept of 1 von martens, g. f. (1788). summary of the law of nations. 2 easterling, k. (2007). enduring innocence: global architecture and its political masquerades. cambridge, ma: mit press. 3 archipelago of exception: sovereignties of extraterritoriality. (2005, november). in consilience fessel: the extraterritoriality nexus extraterritoriality in urban genealogy is utilized as a lens with which to discuss the socio-ecological factors of architecture and urban planning. 2. nexus on extraterritoriality to challenge a discourse on post-sustainability one catalyst to reimagine the good city is based on the establishment of a patently new field that trumps the outmoded agenda of urban design. kevin lynch originally conceived urban design as “city design” in the late 1950’s at mit.4 this school has not been significantly upgraded to meet contemporary insights. lynch could not have ever imagined unprecedented contemporary agents of change: google, social networks, ubiquitous smart phones, climate dynamism, energy addictions, global economic calamities, etc. throughout the developed world, urban design is at an impasse, unable to mend the rift between theory and practice, and stuck in cryptic debate between the “landscape urbanism” and “new urbanism” schools of thought. landscape urbanists deploy concepts that favor the landscape over architecture in order to plan a city.5 on the contrary, new urbanist schemes promote historical pedestriancentered neighborhood developments.6 the dissimilarity between the two approaches is of interest to almost no public body beyond architects, planners, and their ilk. think of the neo-traditionalist town extension of poundbury, england endorsed by the new urbanists or the landscape urbanists’ high-tech interactive open space zone of schouwburgplein in the netherlands. both of these urban fractions have their merits yet fail to incorporate other ideas outside their respective schools of thought that could lead to the holistically ideal future city. moreover, the public – those who occupy theses complex urban spaces – dedicates little time to understanding these minutiae. for the public, this debate is purely black and white, an archaic clash between tradition and novelty. removed from the predisposed artificial boundaries and constraints projected onto traditional human society, zones of extraterritoriality reveal opportunities for an interactive new environment that could embrace the best of both schools of thought. sparks of utopian reflection throughout human history have been indispensable to contemporary society. utopias display maximal solutions to real l. ortega (chair), archipelago of exception: sovereignties of extraterritoriality. symposium conducted at centre de cultura contemporània de barcelona, barcelona, spain. 4 lynch, k. (1960). the image of the city. cambridge, ma: mit press. 5 landscape urbanism. (1997, april). in c. waldheim, m. mostafavi, j. corner, & a. geuze (chair), landscape urbanism. symposium conducted at graham foundation, chicago, il. 6 new urbanism. (1991). in p. calthorpe, a. duany, & e. plater-zyberk (chair), ahwahnee principles. symposium conducted at local government commission, sacramento, ca. 126 consilience world problems.7 as humans, we aspire to create an ideal society. utopian thought has been critical to our evolution, and will be a necessary component for humanity to envision the interconnection between extraterritoriality and ecology as a novel scenario of experimentation challenging the conventional norms of our time. this would allow for an innovative discourse on sustainability. since the world as it is today cannot seem to embrace sustainability due to its current, traditional systems, these ambiguous zones, fueled by man’s yearning for utopia, could provide just what is necessary to do so. the nexus of extraterritoriality would spur new approaches to the reification of the city. this may be best accomplished by further understanding these emerging fragmented ecologies of exception, and how they relate to architecture and urban design as concise instruments in the development of society. in order to verify this socio-ecological vision, the aim is to structure an inquiry of mutable urban conditions as they pertain to global crisis and phenomena. how can we integrate and reinvent the already-existing political mechanism of extraterritoriality as a tool of exception to address social and ecological disturbances that prevail in our urban landscapes? what can we learn and extract from our past conceptions of cities and humanity? today, events occur with such speed and complexity that nothing remains certain. large numbers live in a world where local economies and cultures are tightly bound into global ones through which effects ripple with enormous velocity and consequence.8 3. terms, conditions and the unknown natural and synthetic disturbances are dynamisms of immense force that have major ramifications worldwide. governmental guidebooks and laws around the world map out detailed solutions for rescue operations in crisis scenarios. hazard mitigation plans, military scenarios, and crisis strategies are instrumental directives that provide society with a safety mechanism to prevent and overcome the dangers created by forces of natural disasters: fire, mudslides, earthquakes, hurricanes, flooding, tsunamis as well as crime, violence, acts of terror, war, destruction. planned in every detail, they enable their creators to satiate society with a constant answer (appeasing insecurity in society) for unpredictable demands that relate to the influence of natural and societal instabilities on our built environment.9 after the traumatic event of 9/11, the act of terror is still desensitizing our resilience to conquer new challenges. the effects of catastrophe on the built environment and its inhabitants continue to intrude into every day life. new york city provides a significant locus to analyze the politics of shock and terror. a city of 7 more, t. (1516). utopia. 8 sassen, s. (1996). losing control? sovereignty in an age of globalization. new york, ny: columbia university press. 9 hazard mitigation plan state of california. (n.d.). retrieved from http://emergency.lacity.org/stellent/groups/departments/ @emd_contributor/documents/contributor_web_content/ lacityp_019906.pdf consilience fessel: the extraterritoriality nexus immigrants, many of whom are connected to other cities that have suffered catastrophe, new york citizens have a unique contribution to offer to the many urgent projects of reimagining cities around the world today. to address the devastating destruction by the events that took place on september 11, 2001, the call for entries to rebuild the world trade center site resulted in the world’s largest architecture competition with the most amount of entries in history. the immediate urgency to restore and recover from such damaging incidents is implied.10 if we are going to study cities than we should also study forces that threaten the establishment of the city, forces that are essentially “anti-city.” threats against our cities are measured in terms of armed gangs or moments of staged terrorist assaults, as well as disturbances created by natural disasters. hovering over all of this is still the apocalyptic thought of something that could simply annihilate cities altogether. nuclear catastrophes mark the only true long-term marker of human presence on earth. weapons created by geological minerals form a destructive power that turns them into a ubiquitous anti-landscape, something that no geography, built or natural, can resist. the worst nuclear disaster to strike japan since the nagasaki bombing in 1945 occurred in the spring of 2011, at the fukushima nuclear power plant following the epic tsunami.11 the fear of radiation release has forced the japanese and others all over the world to reflect on what happened to the country in 1945, and the continuing threat of nuclear weapons and energy today. on august 6, 1945, the first atomic bomb was dropped from an american plane on the 245,000 residents of hiroshima, japan. most of the city was destroyed and thousands of its inhabitants died. some of its citizens survived, suffering debilitating effects of terrible burns and radiation illness. more than six decades after the events in hiroshima a new activism of survivors of the bombing is campaigning against nuclear power, which has provided most of their country’s energy needs. survivors, who are now called hibakusha, have become the targets of politics and the peace movement. the radioactive fallout in fukushima, japan as the most recent nuclear disaster reminded everybody that there are no boundaries for threats. the earthquake that set off a tsunami that then destroyed the fukushima nuclear power plant was just the beginning of a keychain that will affect all future life on earth and beyond. three elements – buildings, communications, and transportation – constituted the immediate effect of the disaster in fukushima. a further ominous phase of the disaster appeared after news of the first explosion at the fukushima daiichi nuclear power plant unwrapped. power cuts, product shortages, radiation and health warnings followed this information, and there were many uncertainties about the actual aftermath of this impact. within a week, the nuclear cloud arrived at the coast of california, continuing its journey cross-country heading towards europe 10 injured cities: urban afterlives. (2011, october). in injured cities: urban afterlives. symposium conducted at the columbia university engendering archives project of the center for the critical analysis of social difference, new york, ny. 11 hirose, t. (2012). fukushima meltdown: the world's first earthquake-tsunami-nuclear disaster. createspace independent. 128 consilience and asia. carried by aeolian forces and strong ocean currents the effects of the threat are immeasurable and its longevity is implied. this period of suffering, restraint, and sobriety recalled the struggles of the postwar years. despite their difficulties, however, the following reconstruction years were times of energy and aspiration,when a new city and a new nation were built. by designing fallout shelters as a critical part of civil defense strategy of the 1950s and 1960s, architecture was the immediate response to the threat of nuclear weapons.12 in an era of nuclear weapons, the federal government, tasked with protecting american citizens and communities, relied on architectural expertise in order to survey, design, and build fallout shelters. during the height of the cold war architects and urban planners became instrumental to the importance and efficacy of both purpose-built and ad hoc fallout shelters, which granted them expert status. architecture for civil defense planning in the united states was, ultimately, a failure due to a lack of federal funding, contradictions and ambiguities in fallout shelter design, and growing resistance to its political and cultural implications. yet the partnership between architecture and civil defense influenced the perception and use of urban and suburban spaces. the result of this bunker architecture was a philosophy of building and urbanism that shifted focus from nuclear annihilation to urban unrest.13 the future will not be the same as the past, as disruption on the one side sparks legacies of feedback on the other. hip hop, a cultural movement during the 1970’s in new york city, was in many ways the response to a disruption – the disruption of a bronx neighborhood community by massive highway infrastructure. soon, neighborhoods were separated, and newly formed gangs gained impact, interrupting the built environment. robert moses was the lead figure for these massive urban renewal projects and practices in mid 20th century new york city.14 facing the destruction of another local neighborhood in 1961, community activist jane jacobs organized grassroots efforts to block urban-renewal projects for greenwich village, setting off another response that was instrumental in leading to the cancellation of moses’ lower manhattan expressway.15 social, political, economical, and ecological disturbances around the world are impacting our fragile ecosystem and ultimately influencing how we imagine cities today. understanding these unstable processes and environments is an attempt for a new and suggestive contemporary global order that recognizes a continuous spatial flow of extraterritorial zones and utilizes their exception as a progressive tool for envisioning our future. an investigation on extraterritoriality emerges as a nexus for explorations of ecological and social disturbances, an active tool to re-invent and reimagine our cities and vast networks today. the framework for this emergence 12 monteyne, d. (2011). fallout shelter: designing for civil defense in the cold war. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. 13 office of civil defense, & mcnamara, r. (1961). fallout protection: what to know and do about nuclear attack (publication). u.s. government printing office. 14 caro, r. a. (1975). the power broker: robert moses and the fall of new york. new york, ny: vintage. 15 jacobs, j. (1992). the death and life of great american cities. new york, ny: vintage. consilience fessel: the extraterritoriality nexus defines our history, present and future. the urge to recognize these processes as a positive impulse for generating new emergent landscapes has to be created. 130 consilience bibliography archipelago of exception: sovereignties of extraterritoriality. (2005, november). in l. ortega (chair), archipelago of exception: sovereignties of extraterritoriality. symposium conducted at centre de cultura contemporània de barcelona, barcelona, spain. caro, r. a. (1975). the power broker: robert moses and the fall of new york. new york, ny: vintage. easterling, k. (2007). enduring innocence: global architecture and its political masquerades. cambridge, ma: mit press. hazard mitigation plan state of california. (n.d.). retrieved from http://emergency.lacity.org/stellent/groups/departments/ @emd_contributor/documents/contributor_web_content/ lacityp_019906.pdf hershey, j. (1989). hiroshima. new york, ny: vintage. hirose, t. (2012). fukushima meltdown: the world's first earthquake-tsunami-nuclear disaster. createspace independent. injured cities: urban afterlives. (2011, october). in injured cities: urban afterlives. symposium conducted at the columbia university engendering archives project of the center for the critical analysis of social difference, new york, ny. jacobs, j. (1992). the death and life of great american cities. new york, ny: vintage. landscape urbanism. (1997, april). in c. waldheim, m. mostafavi, j. corner, & a. geuze (chair), landscape urbanism. symposium conducted at graham foundation, chicago, il. lynch, k. (1960). the image of the city. cambridge, ma: mit press. monteyne, d. (2011). fallout shelter: designing for civil defense in the cold war. minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press. more, t. (1516). utopia. new urbanism. (1991). in p. calthorpe, a. duany, & e. plater-zyberk (chair), ahwahnee principles. symposium conducted at local government commission, sacramento, ca. office of civil defense, & mcnamara, r. (1961). fallout protection: what to know and do about nuclear attack (publication). u.s. government printing office. consilience fessel: the extraterritoriality nexus sassen, s. (1996). losing control? sovereignty in an age of globalization. new york, ny: columbia university press. von martens, g. f. (1788). summary of the law of nations. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 8, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 50-69 from colonial port to post-revolution: urban planning for 21st century havana laura peñaranda currie harvard extension school, cambridge, ma penarandacurrie@gmail.com abstract coffee table books are filled with them: the clichés of havana as "frozen in time", scented with "nostalgia for a bygone era". at first sight, the city's unique combination of urban design and architectural styles suggest a tension between the island's various historical and political periods. at second glance, the tension lessens into what is a mostly complimentary relationship between patterns, designs, and vision. that is, a city made rich by its combination of continuous innovation and historic preservation. the result is an avant-garde, mostly european (compact, pedestrian, gridbased), urban planning agenda with many assets and challenges to its name. this photo essay aims to: examine how havana’s colonial history created the city’s basic modern grid street pattern, compact block structure; identify what elements make havana's urban character different from that of other major latin american cities; observe current projects as outlined by the new master plan; and, finally identify challenges ahead. by covering these points, the essay sets out to challenge the “frozen in time” perception of havana by replacing it with one of a unique and historically rich city on the brink of major changes. author’s note laura peñaranda currie was born in bogotá, colombia and attended high schools in washington d.c., south america, southern africa, and jordan. she is currently on a gap year working on women’s rights in new york city while completing online classes through the harvard extension school on journalism, international law and human rights. her passions include women’s rights, the palestinian cause, and latin american revolutionary movements. in august 2011, her most recent visit to cuba, laura hitch-hiked across the cuba with her sister isabel. keywords: cuba, havana, urban development, urban planning. consilience currie: planning for 21st century havana 1. laying the foundation (1519-1799) 1.1 the creation of grid street patterns founded in 1519, havana’s strategic importance as a port propelled it to become one of latin america’s most important cities by the 1700s, rivaled only by buenos aires (coyula, 2002). its thriving export-economy, based on the slave and sugar trade, funded the extravagant architectural foundation in estates and public buildings. its modern urban layout, traced to the 18th and 19th centuries, was founded on the spanish urban tradition of multiple churches and squares, leading to the city's polycentric format, complimented with narrow grid street patterns. 1 figures 1: growth patterns of havana 1519-1958 (coyula, 2002). figure 2: old havana’s abundant displays of classic architecture act as living history of the city’s rich colonial heritage. 1.2 calzadas: havana’s arteries the poor and freed-slave classes, in settling outside the fortress walls, literally paved the way to future development: the network of roads built to supply the growing populations became today's famous "calzadas" (wide streets, referred to as havana's arteries). the expansion of these calzadas explains the city’s initial southern finger-like expansion (pictured). 2 52 consilience figure 3: havana’s historically valuable buildings actually cover a large area – more than 2,000 hectares – that exhibit almost all the western architectural styles seen in the new world. 2. independence and neocolonialism (1800s) up until the 1700s, the inner city aristocracy had preferred their mansions styled in the baroque tradition. nineteenth century creole patrician families on the other hand favored detached villas in the neoclassical tradition, a style very prevalent in today's havanamost notably in the neighborhood of el vedado, known for its historically upscale atmosphere and its landmark inclusion of trees into its regular street pattern, a first for havana. the neighborhood boomed after independence and today acts as the seat of government. after the revolution, many of the original landowners fled their villas, which were then transformed into schools and government offices.3 consilience currie: planning for 21st century havana 3. transformation in the 20th century 3.1 miramar by 1902, the year of independence, havana was a largely european city, in both its style and urban structure. the 20th century would see an increasing influence from the united states in political and economic affairs, as well as the 1959 revolution led by fidel castro. perhaps better than any other neighborhood, miramar neighborhood encapsulates the two drastically different 19th century periods. it was originally developed in the 1920s for the new money of havana. the neighborhood followed the grid pattern, but differed in its even greener arrangement and in its absence of store properties (an initiative taken to discourage lower income populations from moving in). 4 figures 4-5: (left) construction for the national institute of arts (isa) began in 1960 where the exclusive country club park had previously stood. the internationally-renowned structure resembles organic revolutionary architecture and was constructed with locally produced brick and terracotta tile. (right) during the early revolutionary years, many of miramar’s mansions were abandoned and confiscated by the government for alternative uses. 54 consilience 3.2 the revolution after the revolution, many of the upscale houses were abandonedas in vedadoby their fleeing owners. the vast majority of land coming into government hands was the result of a 1961 law mandating confiscation of property of emigrants who permanently left cuba5. although miramar continues to be an upscale neighborhood, housing many of the city's embassies, it has also reinvented itself as a tourist destination and as the stage for the city's most varied display of modern architecture, a style that boomed after wwii and extended into the late 1960s. 4. post-revolution years figures 5-6: (left) national “balanced development” policies led to slowed population and economic growth in the capital. (right) soviet-style housing units in the city outskirts. consilience currie: planning for 21st century havana 4.1 balanced development and the neglect years when rebel troops marched into havana on january 1, 1959, the city housed one fifth of the island's total population, and urban structures were virtually unscathed, a rare occurrence in countries undergoing revolution. the years that followed were marked by castro’s initiative to create a more balanced national distribution of population and wealth. these policies led to prioritization of rural villages and other cities and resulted in a period of neglect for the city’s capital. the city's percentage of economic activity dropped drastically; havana's national share of non-sugar industry dropped from 70 to 34 percent between 1959 and 1988. 6 as for population changes, havana experienced a slow growth for various reasons: (1) high emigration rates coupled with low domestic migration rates, (2) a low birth rate, and (3) the restrictions implied by the city's housing shortage. the ‘balanced development policies’ in turn helped become cuba one of the few developing states with contained growth in its largest city.7 4.2 soviet style architecture and the “special period” in order to address the housing shortage, the government built large shapeless housing units on the city's outskirts. described as 'soviet-style' modern architecture, these buildings provided a sharp contrast to the previous exuberance of baroque and neoclassical structures. an interesting and important side effect of these massive housing units was the preservation of the inner city's colonial architectural history. 8 despite advances made in social equality during the early years, the 1990s marked the “special period”; following the fall of the soviet union, this period was characterized by severe scarcity of resources which in turn led to a radical restructuring of the economy. 56 consilience 4. spotlight: havana differentiated there are five unique characteristics of havana’s urban development that distinguishes it from its latin american counterparts.9 1. colonial exposure. cuba’s colonial experience outlasted that of the continental colonies by nearly eight decades. this, coupled with havana’s proximity to the united states, made for a stronger-than-usual dosage of european, and later american, influence. 2. an expansion pattern of addition, rather than replacement. this allowed for a rich coexistence of architectural patterns from a wide range of architectural styles from different periods. havana’s unique skyline is therefore a combination of a grid street pattern, outstanding urban heritage preservation, and mostly low-rise buildings. 3. havana’s characteristic low density. the result is a unique quality of life made evident when juxtaposed with other cities which have been over-developed. 4. the comparatively large number of wealthy families and their seemingly never-ending quest for more upscale outskirts. throughout the years the aristocracies left a powerful trail of grandiose villas, which were later refurbished to fit the needs of several families. this quest spared havana of gentrification cycles seen in other cities. 5. a sizeable lower middle class with decent housing. the relative absence of shanty-town growth provides a steady foundation on which future development and housing improvement projects can thrive. 10 consilience currie: planning for 21st century havana figures 7-10 (clockwise from top left): dancers in havana’s carnival; grandiose windows in centro habana neighborhood; centro habana’s cozy barrio atmosphere after a summer rain; terraces provide a multi-layered feel to the city’s residential areas. 5. planning havana 5.1 why pérez’s “master plan for 21st century havana”? as an evidently unique city, havana both enjoys exclusive advantages and faces exceptional challenges. to tackle the latter, teams of urban planners from across the world have proposed their own master plans for havana’s future development. julio cesar pérez hernandez, one of cuba’s leading city planners, and his team are taking lead with their “master plan for 21st century havana”. the team is a work of cooperation between cuban architects and urban planners with the council for european urbanism. in pérez’s own words: “we propose a holistic and integrated vision. the previous plans did not consider havana for what it is: a whole, a territory with a particular ecosystem that arises from its geographical condition, its idiosyncrasies, and its culture. for the first time in history, and this is perhaps its greatest merit, this master plan conceives and develops ideas to transform the capital city in the short, medium, and long term, and to turn it into a modern city that honors its long history and expresses its continual process of change.” 11 the plan is also unique in that it is non-government affiliated while recognizing the need to work in partnership with the government. the following is a closer look at three of some of the master plan’s main elements: waterfront revitalization, environmental sustainability and housing maintenance and renovation. 58 consilience figures 11-12: (left) malecón drive and el vedado in the backdrop. sporadic flooding of malecón drive during the rainy season puts pressure on nearby traffic routes. (right) sunset watching from malecón drive -whether on a date or with grandparentsforms part of many havanans’ daily routine. 5.2 the waterfront: malecón drive the waterfront is particularly important in that it greatly defines havana’s historical character and its contemporary culture. the overarching goal and longterm vision would involve allowing havana a new façade by having it relate directly to the sea. the master plan focuses on the famous malecón drive (pictured) by arming it with a protective buffer against the eroding saltwater mist and the possibility of rising sea levels due to climate change.12 additionally, the plan suggests a highly ambitious two-level tunnel underneath the drive to reduce vehicular pollution above, and allow for several uninterrupted kilometers of clean pedestrian space.13 5.3 environmental sustainability: ventilation the island has an outstanding international reputation for environmental sustainability. according to the world wildlife fund, cuba is the only country that successfully combines a satisfactory high quality of life (as measured by the un human development index) and a per capita environmentally sustainable footprint.14 domestically however, cuba’s capital faces several sustainability challenges. the master plan pays particular attention to reinforcement of the polycentric layout, greening, and ventilation projects. the latter of these is most urgent in centro habana, where the average temperature is two centigrade warmer than that of the rest of the city. this ‘heat island’ phenomenon, present in other neighborhoods as well, is the result of high density, lack of green space, and poor wind circulation. in addition to the introduction of cool roofs (with high solar reflectance) and green zones, the proposal aims to modify the compact grid system so as to orient road grids, particularly those on the waterfront, to the sea to create a natural ventilation system for the larger neighborhood. 15 consilience currie: planning for 21st century havana figures 13-15 (clockwise from left): street-level interactions are one of havanans’ most common ways of socializing; young and elderly cubans alike often organize dances or “roller-chair” races with neighborhood friends; bikers in vedado. 60 consilience 5.4 environmental sustainability: public spaces the greening component of the master plan focuses on increasing the current per capita ratio of open space (currently at ten square meters) through the creation of new public parks, the up-keeping of existing ones, green landscaping of the city’s calzadas andas was previously mentionedthe prioritization of pedestrian traffic alongside malecón drive. planners hope that by providing ample spans of green public space, havanans will gradually feel inspired and empowered to develop a common consciousness against the littering and contamination of these areas, in turn creating a cleaner city. the planting and celebration of native species through gardening coops is another common way of encouraging sentiments of community, pride, and belonging. public parks, mario coyula argues, are in many senses the gift that keeps giving. as a prominent cuban urban designer, he studies the optimization of urban land use and believes parks, in addition to their economic, health, and community benefits, have the power to act as social-levers. rather than converting privileged land into a building for exclusive use, the space becomes visitor’s land, and every havanans responsibility. simultaneously, the value of near-by properties shoots up significantly “just like it happens in manhattan's central park,” coyula points out. “maybe that would have solved the contradiction in the popular north american saying that you cannot keep the cake and eat it.” 16 figures 16-17: (left) open plazas such as the one directly in front of the national academy of science (“el capitolio”) encourage pedestrian traffic. (right) malecón drive swamped with festive pedestrians during carnaval. consilience currie: planning for 21st century havana 5.5 environmental sustainability: reinforcing polycentrism the last of pérez’s main greening proposals, namely preservation and reinforcement of the city’s polycentric layout, aims to create and preserve large open spaces (the original churches and squares mentioned previously embedded within city pockets. pérez refers to the historic layout as an “ecological alternative to suburbanization”. the plan explains the importance of reversing previous urban amalgamation processes begun in 1975. according to pérez, doing so would restore the individual character of each neighborhood, decrease bureaucracy, and increase civic engagement in local neighborhood proposals. maintaining individual character is facilitated by the outlawing of land speculation in cuba. 17 such reinforcement would pay homage to the city’s european tradition of mixed-use zoning, by encouraging each neighborhood to have its own cultural, commercial and residential culture. providing a variety of resources and services that address different social groups additionally providesas in the case with public spacessocial-equalizer properties. the rationale, all the meanwhile, is to promote an ecological alternative to suburbanization. 18 6. housing as a leading challenge 6.1 shortage and living conditions housing and transportation as largely considered havana’s two greatest challenges by urban planners, including pérez. succeeding the balanced growth policies, only one-third of havana housing was state-built, while the remainder was self-built. additionally, the special period caused building deterioration due to lack of construction resources, further aggravating the situation. in 2001, cuba’s national institute for housing categorized conditions into three categories: good, fair, and poor, based on their need for rehabilitation and level of deterioration. the official figures were: 64% in “good” condition (up from 50% in 1990); 20% in “fair” condition and 16% in “poor” condition. 19 20 62 consilience 6.2: reforms and finances the current castro administration has responded to the state of housing through political reforms. on november 10th 2011 a new property law was passed allowing cubans to buy and sell their homes for the first time in 50 years, a practice that had existed only through the constraints of the black market. in addition to trading property, reforms include legalizing ownership of a second home beyond the city’s borders, legalizing private contractors, stocking construction stores, reducing housing paperwork, and, in true cuban style, offering subsidies to homeowners. despite these reforms, tackling shortage and deterioration will require a significant financial commitment for all players involved. the cost of investing in rehabilitation of a deteriorating house presents high figures for a low-income country under a usa-imposed embargo. the creation of construction and housing cooperatives is among the low-cost alternatives being proposed. 21 the government hopes these cooperatives would allow groups to invest in small apartment blocks, thereby reducing building costs and relieving some of the financial burden on individuals and small family units. figures 18-19: deteriorating multi-family buildings in centro habana pose a security threat to the families inhabiting them. the government is currently pursuing housing reform through various policy changes including new housing laws. as pérez explained, “changes are needed. my guess is that the government is doing this right now; they are aware of the need for changes, but they cannot do all the changes at the same time, they are doing things gradually.” consilience currie: planning for 21st century havana figures 20-23: (top row) two versions of the popular and inexpensive bicitaxis. (bottom left) a new city bus pulls up to its station in centro habana. (bottom right) a main street in bogotá closed off for sunday ciclovía (photo credit: radio santa fe). 7. transportation as a leading challenge 7.1: the special period and alternative transportation methods methods of transportation are remarkably diverse in havana. coco-taxis (small, round motorized scooters) and state-run taxis are available for dollar-carriers; locals meanwhile rely on city buses, private trucks, almendrones (1950’s cars), bicitaxis (pictured bottom left), and hitchhiking, depending on their location and destination. despite the variety of options, transportation remains, alongside housing, one of the city’s leading concerns. like many other industries, transportation suffered significant setbacks during the special period. as fuel imports and availability of vehicle parts dropped, cubans were forced to look for alternative methods of transport, including the introduction of the ‘home-made’ camellos (double-humped buses) and what soon thereafter became the biking craze. between 1992 and 1995, the havana bicycle population exploded from 70,000 to 1 million. 22 64 consilience 7.2: the recuperation process naturally, recuperating from the special period will take more than improvisation methods. the process will include three main elements: maintenance, replacement, and innovation. maintenance: while havana’s main streets are well kept, maintenance is urgently needed in the inner-city shantytowns, where strong signs of negligence are evident. dim lighting, potholes, lack of pedestrian crossings, and degradation of gravel are just some of the problems. replacement: currently, havana only has a quarter of the number of buses that operated in the late 1980s. creating a reliable bus system involves increasing the bus populations as well as replacing the worst of the pre-1990’s buses with new, more fuel-efficient ones. the government began this initiative in the early 2000s.23 innovation: while havana has valuable lessons to offer other latin american cities, it can also learn from them, perhaps most notably in the transportation sector. with a large per capita biking population, for example, havana could benefit from assimilating bogota’s ciclovía and cicloruta (the closing off of streets for non-vehicular traffic on weekends and the creation of extensive bike-lane networks). similarly, it can look to the colombia’s internationally recognized “trans-milenio” bus system, which has already been imitated in several latin american cities. 8. government involvement 8.1: grassroots and political cooperation the master plan makes a point to work independently of the government orders but simultaneously recognizes the crucial role of government cooperation, involvement, and support in the plan’s success. getting the government on board can and should, according to pérez and his team, begin at the grassroots level. the goal, they explain, is to promote local government participation by encouraging neighborhood-based organizations including the “committees for the defense of the revolution” and the “federation of cuban women”, in addition to the very locally active trade unions. the master plan’s mixed-use component is particularly reliant on government support due to its inclusion of small private business. here too the government has reacted favorably: last year the state granted an unprecedented number of licenses to individuals looking to launch small-scale businesses, such as home-based restaurants and flower stands. the government and the master plan therefore share the common vision of balancing “individual initiatives without unleashing unbridled market forces, speculation, corruption and exploitation”. 24 consilience currie: planning for 21st century havana figure 24-25: “el capitolio” was constructed in 1929 and remained the tallest building in havana until the 1950s. it acted as the seat of government until after the revolution, later becoming the national institute of sciences. figure 25: a committee for the defense of the revolution (cdr) logo displayed on ally wall in centro habana. 8.2: government in support of cuban academia addressing shortfalls in the country’s educational institutions may be another avenue for government involvement in urban planning. recent constructions have lacked the design quality characteristic in havana’s architectural heritage. perez points to the “uncritical assimilation” of foreign projects as the reason current architecture and urban planning professors lack the needed authority, esteem and professional experience their position demands.25 therefore, giving greater consideration and opportunity to cuban professionals in construction projects insofar as government decisions are involved may prove a worthwhile investment in the incoming generation of planners and in the city’s future as a whole. 66 consilience figure 26: the quality of today’s urban studies programs have long term consequences for tomorrow’s urban planning. 9. questions by mario coyula mario coyula is one of cuba’s most prominent arquitects and architectural historians. since 1964, he has taught full-time at the faculty of architecture of havana and has been a visiting professor in harvard university’s urban planning and design school. in his essay “havana forever, forever havana”, coyula poses a set of questions reflecting the concerns of a man deeply involved in his city’s heritage and development. the following is a selection of the questions most relevant to this essay’s concerns:²⁶  how can we steer what will inevitably be million-dollar investments into the dilapidated central districts in order to prevent gentrification and the dislocation of current residents to the margins? if inevitable, what action is needed to assure an adequate social mix in the redeveloped central areas?  how much of a capital layout is required to carry out redevelopment, who will provide it and how will it be recuperated?  how should "trade-off" or equitable options be presented throughout the planning procedure in order to help decision-making as well as to later explain those decisions?  in a city whose built frame and ways of urban living were mainly determined by the middle and lower-middle class, what would be a post-modern equivalent of those disappeared social sectors at the end of a millennium marked by the ambivalent sign of globalization?  what does "local" mean --what will be the scale of local action and who will the actors be? who of these actors should define priorities and how?  where will the necessary resources come from to allow a more decentralized, grassroots participation? if in fact, the one who pays controls, how do those who cannot afford to pay, dream of controlling? consilience currie: planning for 21st century havana figure 27: sun-bathed waterfront buildings and the afternoon trickle of pedestrian traffic. 10. conclusion: demonstrated ingenuity challenges face havana left and right: combining decentralized community planning with a centralized government, and realizing the plan’s components while under embargo, are alone a sufficient set of concerns. overcoming these challenges however is less of an option than a responsibility, if havana is to advance. failing to do so would come at a heavy cost. the symptoms of rapid, unplanned overdevelopment have manifested themselves in other latin american cities through gentrification, unchecked land speculation, highways of disproportionate size, competing high rise developments, neighborhood loss of identity, indistinguishable building complexes, uncapped pollution, sprawling shanty towns, chronic traffic jams, and the disappearance of urban green spaces. to name a few. the cuban people, however, have a longstanding history of answering to unexpected obstacles, restrictive circumstances, and limited resources with high resilience and unmatched creativity. such reactions are in themselves a celebration of cuban ingenuity and affirmations of the larger cuban outlook towards struggle. 68 consilience bibliography 1 scarpaci, j l, r segre, and m coyula (2002) havana: two faces of the antillean metropolis. revised edition, university of north carolina press, chapel hill. first edition: r segre, m 2 mario coyula and jill hamberg (2003) urban slums report: the case of havana, cuba understanding slums: case studies for the global report on human settlements, havana 3 scarpaci, j l, r segre, and m coyula (2002) havana: two faces of the antillean metropolis. revised edition, university of north carolina press, chapel hill. first edition: r segre, m 4 sonia hirt and joseph l. scarpaci, (2007) “cuba in transition” peri-urban development in sofia and havana: prospects and perils in the new millennium, havana 5 vega vega, j (1986) comentarios a la ley general de la vivienda. editorial de ciencias sociales, havana. 6 pnc, preparatory national committee, republic of cuba (1996) cuba’s national report. habitat ii. [n.p.] havana. 7 cedem, centro de estudios demográficos (1996) resultados de la encuesta nacional de migraciones internas según niveles de sistema de asentamientos: el caso de ciudad de la habana. cedem, havana. 8 scarpaci, j l, r segre, and m coyula (2002) havana: two faces of the antillean metropolis. revised edition, university of north carolina press, chapel hill. first edition: r segre, m 9 coyula and j l scarpaci (1997) havana: two faces of the antillean metropolis. john wiley & sons, chichester 10 scarpaci, j l, r segre, and m coyula (2002) havana: two faces of the antillean metropolis. revised edition, university of north carolina press, chapel hill. first edition: r segre, m 11 cuban art news (january 2011) julio césar pérez part i: “the city must be dreamed, designed and conceived for the future”, the farber foundation 12 cuban art news (january 2011) julio césar pérez part i: “the city must be dreamed, designed and conceived for the future”, the farber foundation 13 international network for traditional building, architecture, and urbanism (2012) "havana urban design charrette: cuba 19-25 february 2012" consilience currie: planning for 21st century havana 14 richard wilkinson (2008), “follow cuba's emissions standard”, the guardian, october 30, 2008 15 regula modlich (2012), master plan for havana: an encounter with julio césar pérez hernández, planner’s network, march 2012 16 mario coyula (1998)havana forever, forever havana, sustain vol. 2 “sustainable development in cuba” summer 1998, london. 17 regula modlich (2012), master plan for havana: an encounter with julio césar pérez hernández, planner’s network, march 2012 18 international network for traditional building, architecture, and urbanism (2012) "havana urban design charrette: cuba 19-25 february 2012" 19 inv, national housing institute (2002) control del fondo de viviendas. 2001. inv, havana. 20 lee, s (1997) migraciones incontroladas hacia la capital: para que los esfuerzos del país no sean baldíos. granma 13 may1997 21 victoria burnett (2012) havana journal: cuba unleashes the pent-up energy of real estate dreams, the new york times, february 15 2012. 22 gonzález sedeño, m (1997) un transporte alternativo en la habana: la bicicleta. in: l e camacho (ed) ¿quiénes hacen ciudad? ambiente urbano y participación popular. cuba, puerto rico, república dominicana. ediciones siap, cuenca. 23 mario coyula and jill hamberg (2003) urban slums report: the case of havana, cuba understanding slums: case studies for the global report on human settlements, havana 24 regula modlich (2012), master plan for havana: an encounter with julio césar pérez hernández, planner’s network, march 2012 25 cuban art news, (2011) julio césar pérez, part 2: “i feel very proud, very happy when i speak about havana”, january 2011 26 mario coyula (1998)havana forever, forever havana, sustain vol. 2 “sustainable development in cuba” summer 1998, london. photo essay 140 the story of hope thomas lee afghanistan is back in the news. it is “the other war” that presidential candidates mention in their debates. it is the kite runner. it is the 23 south korean missionaries kidnapped near kandahar by the taliban. it is osama bin laden and september 11. to americans, it could be all of the above, but rarely is it a quartercentury of struggle during consecutive wars, fear of violence, and devastated economy. to afghans, that is both the memory and reality of their homeland entering 2008. arzu, meaning "hope" in dari, is a chicago-based non-profit organization that has worked in afghanistan since 2004 to help employ and educate women through sourcing and selling rugs that they weave. for illiterate, underprivileged afghan women, weaving is often their only option to generate income in a culturally acceptable way. to date, arzu has enrolled almost 700 women weavers, or 230 families, in the kabul, bamyan, and andkhoi districts. in order to become an arzu weaver, the women must sign a social contract, agreeing to register their children in school and themselves in literacy classes. in return, arzu provides these literacy programs and access to health care, and pays weavers fair market value for their work as well as a 50% bonus for the completion of each rug. profits from the rug sales in the united states allow arzu to cover its costs and to expand the project. arzu’s work—blending private and public sector activities to empower women in remote villages—has so far yielded a sustainable aid operation in a nation contending with the resurgence of the taliban, an addiction to the opium trade, and the plight of returning refugees. it has demonstrated that perhaps afghanistan’s greatest hope lies in the gradual undertaking of many small projects. thomas lee, a journalist-artist, meanders between the east and the west, seeking inspiration for his work. he has completed projects in afghanistan, uganda, the united states, and china. his work has been published in the new york times, international herald tribune, pdn, american photo, and need, among other u.s. and international publications. ph o to e ss ay 141 the fall of the taliban led to afghanistan’s first democratically elected legislature, but in a land scarred by more than two decades of war, afghan people still face tremendous challenges: a devastated economy, drug trafficking, the plight of returned refugees, and lingering insecurity due to the resistance of warlords and taliban remnants. 1 ph o to e ss ay 142 afghan children play in the war-torn street of kabul, afghanistan, july 2006. sitting at the foot of the hindu kush mountains, the flat, brown, dusty capital is slowly being rebuilt. signs of violence, however, still prevail in the streetscape. 2 ph o to e ss ay 143 the gatekeeper of a building compound in kabul, afghanistan, june 2006. electricity is unstable; afghans use gas lamps during blackouts, which may happen several times a day. 3 ph o to e ss ay 144 the cannon of a burnt-out tank, most likely a relic of the war against the soviet union, lies along the valley road of bamiyan, afghanistan, june 2006. burnt-out tanks can be seen in unexpected places: along village sidewalks, in vegetable fields, or in rivers. they continue to dot the countryside because the money and motivation to dispose of them are luxuries that many parts of afghanistan cannot afford. 4 ph o to e ss ay 145 a construction site in kabul, afghanistan, june 2006. 5 ph o to e ss ay 146 an afghan child of an arzu weaver family, bamiyan, afghanistan, june 2006. bamyan, the location of one of arzu's three projects and the site where the famous buddha statues once stood, is located in the rolling mountains northwest of kabul. arzu's 70 weaver families in this region are recent returnees from refugee camps in iran and pakistan who have had to rebuild their lives completely. many only recently moved into mud and straw houses after living in un tents. 6 ph o to e ss ay 147 arzu weaver kubra and her family at their home loom in district 10 outside kabul, afghanistan, july 2006. arzu helps 31 weaver families in this impoverished district. the weavers live in one-room rented homes, the kabul equivalent of baltimore row houses. the houses are outfitted with common courtyards for shared use of a toilet, a kitchen, a laundry area, and a well for water. 7 ph o to e ss ay 148 wool storage at arzu's kabul office, afghanistan, july 2006. 8 ph o to e ss ay 149 one of arzu's weaver villages, dragon valley, bamiyan, afghanistan, june 2006. 9 ph o to e ss ay 150 an arzu weaver at her loom, bamiyan, afghanistan, june 2006. 10 ph o to e ss ay 151 an arzu weaver shifts a loom bar to reposition a rug being woven, bamiyan, afghanistan, june 2006. 11 ph o to e ss ay 152 afghan men of shash pul, a weaver village, gather for a meeting with arzu workers, bamiyan, afghanistan, june 2006. there is an eagerness to re-establish a sense of community in the weaver village, perhaps because the returnees have experienced similar tribulations; each of the families lost at least one loved one under the taliban. 12 ph o to e ss ay 153 an afghan household in dragon valley, one of arzu's weaver villages, bamiyan, afghanistan, june 2006. 13 ph o to e ss ay 154 a young afghan man weaves at his loom, bamiyan, afghanistan, june 2006. 14 ph o to e ss ay 155 afghan children transform war remnants like cannons and burnt trucks into playgrounds in bamiyan, afghanistan, june 2006. 15 ph o to e ss ay 156 photo essay the story of hope consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 6, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 20–47 female education, contraceptive use, and fertility: evidence from uganda edward bbaale center for global development washington, d.c. ebbaale@cgdev.org paul mpuga united nations children’s fund (unicef) kigali, rwanda paulmpuga@yahoo.co.uk abstract we use the demographic and health survey of 2006 to examine the relationship between female education, contraceptive use, and fertility rates in uganda. our findings reveal that female education, especially at the secondary and post-secondary levels, increases the likelihood of using contraceptives and reduces fertility. as a result, measures that aim to educate women beyond secondary level are needed. the government programme to extend free education at the secondary level is an important measure that may help to reduce fertility and should therefore be strengthened. author’s note edward bbaale is a visiting fellow at the centre for global development in washington d.c. he obtained a phd in economics from the university of linzaustria in 2008. his research interests include health care services and outcomes for women and children. paul mpuga holds a phd in economic and social sciences from johannes kepler university, linz-austria. he is currently working with unicef in rwanda as social policy manager, where he is in charge of supporting evidence-based policy making and research. his research interests include health, population and rural development. paul loves peace and tranquility around him. the authors wish to thank the african economic research consortium (aerc) for sponsoring a project that contributed to much of this paper. however, the views in this paper are those of the authors and not of aerc. the authors also thank the lord almighty for the work done in this article. keywords: female education, contraceptives, fertility, family planning, uganda. consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education 1. introduction remarkable socio-economic progress has been achieved in uganda in the past two decades, with economic growth (percentage change in gross domestic product) averaging about 6% since 1992. the government of uganda (gou) has made great strides in its attempt to meet the targets set out in the previous two rounds of the poverty eradication action plan (peap, 1997-2002 and 2002-2007) and the millennium development goals (mdgs) by 2015, including reducing poverty levels and increasing access to social services. the gou is now implementing a new national development plan (ndp 2010-2015). through the ndp and the peap, the government underscores the important linkages between better health outcomes, poverty reduction, and economic growth. progress has been most notable in the achievement of universal primary education enrollment, gender parity in primary education, and the fight against hiv/aids (undp, 2007; republic of uganda, 2004). however, huge challenges remain in ensuring gender parity in secondary education, reducing infant and child mortality, and improving maternal health. as a consequence, uganda experiences some of the poorest health indicators in the world. for example, the country’s life expectancy at birth of approximately 50 years is low compared to the world average of about 66 years. in 2005/6, infant mortality was estimated at around 76 for every 1,000 children live births, a slight decline from 88 out of every 1,000 births in 2000/01 (republic of uganda, 2007). the maternal mortality rate is estimated at 435 for every 100,000 women giving birth. uganda’s total fertility rate (tfr)1 of about 6.7 children per woman is one of the highest in the world, (republic of uganda, 2007, 1998a, 1998b; population reference bureau, 2001). because of these high fertility rates, uganda has population growth rates of about 3.2% per annum, the third highest in the world, and a dependency ratio of about 108 dependants for every 100 working persons, the highest in the world. the uganda demographic and health survey report (dhs, 2006) elaborated on some of the factors that contribute to the high fertility rates among the women of uganda. the factors considered include age, and sexual characteristics of women such as the age at which a woman first enters marriage, age of first sexual relations, and frequency of sexual relations. others include post-partum amenorrhea2 and abstinence from sexual relations. the dhs analysis provides descriptive evidence on the underlying factors, dwelling mainly on age group and regional differences, but does not provide a rigorous quantitative analysis, for example, on the 1 total fertility rate (tfr) is defined as the average number of children a woman would have in her lifetime assuming the current age-specific birth rates, (population reference bureau, 2001). 2 total fertility rates for countries of western europe and north america are as low as 1.5 and 1.9 children per woman, respectively. on the other hand, the average for developing countries as a group is about 3.6 and about 5.6 children per woman for sub-saharan africa. 22 consilience impact of the level of female education on fertility or level of education on contraceptive use. a number of studies, using data from both developed and developing countries show that female education is associated with a decrease in fertility (sackey, 2005; lam and duryea, 1999; ainsworth et al, 1996; vavrus and larsen, 2003; guilkey, 1998; ben-porath, 1973; gardner, 1973; schultz, 1973; 1974; 1997; 2008). according to lam and duryea (1999), brazil provides an intriguing case of a developing country (probably the best example) that experienced rapid fertility decline (since the 1960s) in the absence of a major family planning effort. the authors estimate that slow but steady improvements in the distribution of schooling, especially at low levels, combined with a strong negative effect of schooling on fertility, can explain around 70 percent of the fertility decline from the 1935-39 birth cohort to the 1951-53 cohort. additionally, the authors document other important factors influencing fertility such as age at first marriage, and husband’s education and earnings. it is noteworthy that the case of brazil contradicts studies from various countries which document that fertility declines follow periods of active family planning programs3. in addition to the importance of women’s education, higher levels of education of people in the community have a strong negative impact on fertility. using demographic and health surveys data for 22 countries in subsaharan african, the kravdal (2002) findings indicate that education at the community level had a strong negative impact on fertility rates. however, the quantitative impact of the level of female education on fertility has not been explicitly estimated for uganda. this paper aims to examine the relationship between female education, contraceptive use, and fertility. we sought to provide answers to the following questions: does the level of education acquired by a woman affect her decision in terms of the number of children born, and if so, how many years of a woman’s schooling have a significant negative impact on fertility in uganda? what are the factors that are more likely to influence a woman’s decision to use contraceptives? we test the hypothesis that female education leads to higher contraceptive use which in turn leads to a lower fertility rate. the paper comes at an opportune time, when the debate on the likely implications of high population growth rates and the impact of female education on fertility is hottest in uganda. the uganda national population policy aimed to reduce fertility rates from 6.9 in 1995 to under 6.5 live births per woman by the year 2000 (republic of uganda, 1998a). however, according to the 2005/06 dhs, this reduction was not realized. this paper provides evidence on the relationship between female education, contraceptive use, and fertility in uganda. additionally, we document other socioeconomic and demographic factors influencing contraceptive use and fertility in uganda. our findings provide a rich body of recommendations that can be used for policy formulation, analysis, and advocacy in an attempt to increase contraceptive use, thus leading to women’s economic empowerment and gender equity. by extension, women’s economic empowerment is essential for the attainment of sustainable development and millennium development goals 1 (eradication of extreme poverty), 4 (reducing child mortality by two-thirds), and 5 3 this is considered because it is realised that many women have sexual relations before marriage, which increases their chances of getting pregnant. consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education (reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters) by 2015. whereas similar studies have been conducted in other parts of the world, the uniqueness of country-specific conditions dictate that policy options may not be applied universally. therefore, this paper attempts to close the knowledge gap for the case of uganda and hence represents a real value added. 2. review of the literature there is wide body of literature concerning the importance of female education in reducing fertility rates and the general improvement in labour force participation and social welfare. neoclassical theory suggests that as investment in human capital increases and as more women participate in the labour market, the fertility behaviour of households is bound to change in favour of fewer children (singh, 1994). empirical evidence from both developed and developing countries unambiguously reveals that female education is associated with a decrease in fertility (sackey, 2005; lam and duryea, 1999; ainsworth et al., 1996; vavrus and larsen, 2003; singh, 1994; ben-porath, 1973; gardner, 1973; schultz, 1973). increased participation of women in schooling and the labour market raises the economic value of their time, which increases the opportunity cost of raising children (guilkey, 1998; singh, 1994; ben-porath, 1973; gardner, 1973; schultz, 1973). schultz (1993) confirms that women’s education is associated with smaller desired family sizes across the world. to the best of our knowledge, there is no study in uganda that has explicitly analyzed the impact of female education on fertility and contraceptive use, thus there is a strong need for empirical inquiry into this issue. this negative relationship between women’s education is explained by a number of factors, which have been explored by both economists and sociologists. first, the longer a woman stays in school, the longer they defer giving birth to their first child. this lowers the chances of giving birth to many children. moreover with more education and exposure, women acquire more information about their bodies and are more able to process that information to their advantage (vavrus and larsen, 2003; singh, 1994). the positive impact of women’s education on their autonomy, leading to later marriages, increased use of contraceptives and lower fertility is discussed by mason (1986). indeed, the link between women’s education and fertility is much stronger than that of the husband’s (ainsworth et al., 1996). in general, there are two major determinants of fertility in uganda. first, underlying or indirect factors include education, the desire for large families, extended family influence, and economic value of children, occupation, property ownership, and residence. second, immediate or direct determinants include marriage patterns, sexual customs, frequency of sexual activity, access to and use of contraceptives, length of postpartum amenorrhea, sterility, and abortion. in this study, we focus on the negative impact of women’s education on fertility, since, according to schultz (1993), it represents one of the most important nonmarket returns to women’s education. in addition, education has other important synergies including its role in influencing participation in labour force, poverty reduction, and improved standards of living. 24 consilience 3. theoretical framework our theoretical foundations are based on a modified version of a household structural model proposed by rosenzweig and schultz (1983). in the model, the household is assumed to maximize a utility function subject to the budget, children and health production functions, and time constraints. the utility of a typical household is a function of the number of children )(c , child health )( ch , and consumption of market goods )(x , leisure )(v , and taste )( . in the model, children are treated as a special form of good from which satisfaction is derived but involving an opportunity cost of time and financial resources required to bring them up. it is to be noted that although this model refers to children in purely economic terms, this is not a complete reflection of how children are viewed in developing countries. the same line of argument has been taken by other authors (see for example, ajakaiye and mwabu, 2007; mwabu, 2009; bbaale, et al., 2011; and many others). the household is assumed to maximize a utility function conventional in the standard microeconomics specified as follows: ],,,,[ vxhcuu c (1) in this model, there are two household production functions, one for fertility and the other for child health. the production function for fertility includes a term for the number of children that the couple would have without engaging in any contraception minus a function of contraceptive inputs that reduces the number of children a couple can have. )(1 zcc   (2) where  and z refer to the number of children without contraception and contraceptive inputs respectively. the model further comprises the production function for child health that basically maps health inputs to the health outcome of the child. some health inputs may be purchased from the market, such as medicine and nutritious foods like milk. these inputs are normally complemented with the time of the mother and father allocated to producing child health, education of the mother and father, and the innate endowment of the child in health terms. ),,,,,( fmcfcmcc eettnhh  (3) here ,,,,, fmcfcm eettn and  refer to market purchased child health inputs (such as medicinal items and milk), time of the mother devoted to producing child health, time of the father devoted to producing child health, education of the mother, education of the father, and the innate child endowment respectively. since the total time in a day is limited to 24 hours, coupled with the argument that various activities or chores requiring human labour are mutually exclusive, this model introduces the time constraint. therefore, it is inevitable that a mother and father allocate her/his time amongst such activities as leisure, work, and producing child health. cmmmm cffff tlvt tlvt   (4) consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education here ,,, fff lvt and cft are total time available to the father, distributed to leisure, work, and producing child health, respectively. ,,, mmm lvt and cmt are total time available to the mother, distributed to leisure, work, and producing child health respectively. the model introduces a budget constraint to match income flows with various household expenditures. in this model, we assume that the household spends money on consumption goods, child health inputs, and contraceptive inputs. on the other hand, the income streams are the labour income of the mother and father as well as the exogenous non-labour income. ywlwlxpzpnp ffmmxzn  (5) here ,,,,, ffmmxzn wlwlxpzpnp and y refer to the cost of market purchased child health inputs, cost of contraceptive inputs, cost of the consumption good, labour income of the mother, labour income of the father, and the exogenous non-labour income, respectively. maximizing the utility function in equation (1) subject to the set of constraints in equations (2), (3), (4), and (5) gives rise to the reduced form equations of endogenous variables written in terms of exogenous variables. the endogenous variables include contraceptive use, fertility, labour force participation, and child health. for this paper, our concern is on contraceptive use in equation (6) and fertility in equation (7); hence, our analysis is restricted to only these two outcomes. the exogenous variables include female and male wages, prices of contraceptive inputs and child health inputs, mother and father education, and household wealth (instead of non-labour income). the reduced form specifications for contraceptive use )(z and fertility )(c that emerge from the maximization problem above appear as follows: ),,,,,,,,( xnzhfmfm pppweewwzz  (6) ),,,,,,,,( xnzhfmfm pppweewwcc  (7) where ,,,,,,, nzhfmfm ppweeww and  , refer to wage rate of the mother, wage rate of the father, education of the mother, education of the father, household wealth, price of contraceptives, price of child health inputs, price of the consumption good, and taste, respectively. the mother’s and father’s expected lifetime wage rate is a crucial variable that may affect contraceptive use and fertility. but since the expected lifetime wage rate is not a directly observable variable, it is prudent to use educational attainment to substitute for wages. this proxy has been used by previous researchers, namely gardner (1973) and ben-porath (1973), who found that women’s schooling is associated with a fertility decline in the us and israel, respectively. consequently, we find this proxy appropriate in our study since the returns to education are greater the higher the level of education in uganda, everything else held constant. 26 consilience 4. methodology 4.1 data and variable definitions the data were obtained from the uganda demographic and health survey (udhs) 2006, conducted by macro international on behalf of the uganda bureau of statistics (ubos). the 2006 udhs is a nationally representative survey of 8,531 women aged 15-49 and 2,503 men aged 15-54. three questionnaires were used: household questionnaire, women’s questionnaire, and men’s questionnaire. the udhs provides information on the demographic characteristics of the country. it contains information on household size, age and sex distribution, region, location, religious affiliation, occupation of household members, the number of children ever born by a woman, child mortality, marital status, and educational attainment of women and men. for our analysis ,we used three dependent variables: (a) current use of contraceptives, which was defined as a binary variable equal to 1 if a mother was currently using any contraceptives at the time of the survey and zero otherwise. methods of contraception are divided into two: modern and traditional methods. the modern method included the use of condoms, pills, injections, implants, and sterilization. traditional method included the use of rhythm, withdrawal, and folk methods. (b) total fertility: this was defined as the total number of children ever born by a woman. (c) cumulative fertility to age 20, 25, and 30: this included the total number of children a woman had before reaching ages 20, 25, and 30 respectively. cumulative fertility as a dependent variable has been used by previous classic studies (duryea and lam (1999) and ainsworth et al., (1996)). the greatest virtue of using cumulative fertility as a dependent variable, other than total fertility per se is that it helps us to gain insights into the fertility behaviour of younger women, which is extremely important for policy analysis and advocacy. the central independent variable in our analysis is female education. this was categorized into four outcomes as follows: 0=no education, 1=primary education, 2=secondary education, 3=postsecondary education. in all our regressions, no education is the reference category. it is noteworthy that the educational attainment of men was defined and categorized in the same way. in addition to female and male education, this paper sought to control for other socioeconomic, demographic, and behavioural factors: age of the mother, which was broken into five year age cohorts as 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, and 4549. age is used to capture the fact that younger women, compared to older women, may be more dynamic and more willing to utilize modern contraceptives, creating lower future fertility trajectories. in all our regressions, the 15-19 cohort was used as the reference category. in order to capture the effect of location and regional peculiarities such as ease of access to health centres or pharmacies, we defined dummy variables for location and region. location was defined as equal to one if a mother was in the rural area and zero otherwise. four region dummies were defined as 1=central, 2=east, 3=north, and 4=west. in all our regressions, the central region was the reference category. to capture the traits or traditional beliefs of mothers, we defined three religious dummies as 1=catholics, 2=protestants, 4=muslims, and 5= “others.” the category “others” is used to include evangelicals (born-again christians), seventh day adventists, orthodox, and traditionalists/non-believers. in consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education all our regressions, catholics were used as the reference category as they are the least likely to use contraceptives because the catholic church in uganda is openly opposed to the practice. the wealth index is provided in the data set in terms of quintiles; 1=poorest quintile, 2=poor, 3=medium, 4=rich, 5=richest. in all our regressions, the poorest quintile was used as the reference category. we also defined a discrete binary variable equal to one if a mother was married and zero otherwise. 4.2 estimation strategies in order to estimate the contraceptive use model, we use maximum likelihood probit techniques in order to generate the probability of contraceptive use. the general form of the probit model takes the following form: nixz iii ,...,1,*   (8)      otherwiseif zif z i i :0 0:1 * (9) where iz is a binary variable equal to 1 if the thi woman used contraceptives in the year of the survey and is equal to zero otherwise. this response is determined by the latent variable * iz . ix is a vector of explanatory variables,  is a vector of parameters to be estimated and i is the error term. the specific probit model used to estimate the determinants of contraceptive use takes the form: ),,,,,,( fm erlrnlwbefz  (10) where rlrnlwbez m ,,,,,, and fe is the probability of contraceptive use, mother’s level of education, birth cohort dummies, wealth status (measured by the wealth quintiles), location dummy, region dummies, religion, and husband’s level of education respectively. mother’s education is hypothesized to have a positive influence on contraception use. the basic argument is that education induces women to prefer fewer children because of the high opportunity cost of the income forgone if they concentrated on child care. consequently, such women use contraceptives as a way of reducing their fertility rates. also due to affordability advantages, women living in wealthier households are more likely to use contraceptives compared to their counterparts living in relatively poor households. considering the location, women living in the urban areas are more likely to use contraceptives and hence experience lower fertility rates compared to their counterparts in the rural areas. on the other hand, we use ordinary least squares (ols) technique to estimate our reduced form specifications for total fertility and cumulative fertility. the greatest virtue of using ordinary least squares for this particular analysis is that the coefficients can be interpreted directly in terms of the number of children. the specific fertility model we estimated appears as follows: ),,,,,,( fm ernrllbefc  (11) where ,,,,,, rnrllbec m and fe is cumulative or total fertility, woman’s level of schooling completed, age cohort dummies, location dummy, religion, region, and husband’s educational attainment respectively. 28 consilience 5. results and discussion in this section we discuss the results of the analysis of the relationship between female education, contraceptive use, and fertility outcomes. we begin with a discussion of the descriptive evidence on contraceptive use, fertility, and household characteristics to provide a foundation for the quantitative results. 5.1 descriptive evidence the udhs 2006 final report makes a detailed presentation on the underlying factors of contraceptive use and fertility in uganda (ubos, 2006). in this section, we therefore only highlight the descriptive evidence relevant to the current study, as summarized in tables 1-2. the summaries are generated using the sample weights implying that they are nationally representative and are consistent with those in the udhs report. 5.1.1 current use of contraceptives as a precursor to understanding the fertility behaviour of women, we present descriptive evidence on the current use of contraceptives (table 1). it is interesting to note that the use of contraceptives increases with education level. it is observed that more women with post-secondary education use any method (43.4%) and modern method (38%) respectively, compared to those with no education (12% use any method and 10% use modern method). this underscores the role of education in changing the fertility behaviour of women. category current use, any method current use, modern method female education: no education 11.7 9.7 primary 17.9 16.1 secondary 28.2 24.7 post-secondary 43.4 38.0 wealth status: poorest quintile 8.4 7.5 poorer quintile 12.6 11.5 middle quintile 15.9 13.4 richer quintile 21.9 19.2 richest quintile 33.9 30.1 region: central 29.1 25.8 east 17.7 15.9 north 9.7 9.3 west 18.7 15.5 location: rural 32.5 29.4 urban 16.9 14.7 female age cohorts: 15-19 6.4 5.9 20-24 21.2 19.1 25-29 24.2 22 30-34 27.2 24 consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education 35-39 24 20 40-44 23 20 45-49 19 15.3 female head 18.9 17.4 non female head 19.8 17.1 only girl children 24.1 21 only boy children 24.2 21.1 no. of children: 0 7.1 6.7 1 20.7 18.6 2 24.3 20.6 3 24.4 21.6 4 26.2 23.5 5+ 23.2 20.2 partner’s education: no education 11.1 9.5 primary 19.6 17.1 secondary 30.7 27.1 post-secondary 42.1 35.6 married 19.1 16.9 not married 20.1 17.8 married by 20 21.9 19.3 married by 25 22.5 19.7 married by 30 22.6 19.7 religion: catholic 18.2 16.3 protestant 20.1 17.3 muslim 24.7 21.6 other faith 17.3 15.6 working 20 17.7 not working 17.2 15.1 working for pay 23 20.3 paid in cash 32.3 28.3 paid in kind 13.1 12.2 paid in cash + kind 21.8 19.3 women years of education: 0 11.3 9.3 1-3 13.2 11.0 4-7 20.1 18.3 8-10 26.8 23.5 10+ 38.0 33.3 total 19.5 17.2 n 8,531 8,531 table 1: current use of contraceptives source: author’s own analysis using the uganda demographic and health survey 2006 in addition to education attainment, we explain differences in contraceptive use by the wealth status of households in order to capture the inequality in access originating from the ability to pay. the average percentage of women using 30 consilience contraceptives increases steadily the higher the wealth status of the households (table 1). for example, there are more women in the richest quintile using any method (34%) compared to 8.4% in the poorest quintile. this may imply that for the government to encourage increased use of contraceptives, affordability is a very important factor to consider. the government should subsidize the prices of contraceptives or remove any taxes that may be levied on them. considering regional differences, the central region is observed to have a higher average percentage of women using contraceptives than any other region with the lowest average being the northern region (table 1). this can be attributed to the fact that the central region houses the capital city of the country which has a very high concentration of modern health facilities, pharmacies, and health professionals. this implies that contraceptives are more available and can be afforded by the residents given the nature of the cash economy existing in much of the central region. therefore, purposive regional interventions are needed in order to have a universal utilization of family planning techniques. unexpectedly, the rural area is doing better than the urban area in using any method of contraceptives (32% compared to 17%). age is used in this analysis to reflect differences in contraceptive use owing to differences in traits between old and young women. young women are thought to be more dynamic and hence more likely to utilize modern contraceptives compared to their old counterparts. table 1 reveals that the utilization of contraceptives increases steadily with age reaching a peak (27% for any method and 24% for modern method) at the age cohort 30-34 beyond which it falls. this can be attributed to the fact that at a later age cohort women are almost getting over the reproductive period. for women that are heads of households, 92% of contraceptive use is a modern method (17.4/18.9) compared to the non female heads where 86% of contraceptive use is a modern method (17.1/19.8). thus on average, a higher percentage of women who are female heads use modern methods of contraception. women with fewer children are observed to use contraceptives less than those with many children. the percentage of women increases steadily (from 7.1-26% and 6.724%, for any and modern method, respectively) up to 4 children beyond which it falls. this can be attributed to age such that by 5 children and over the woman is almost getting over the reproductive period and may not use contraceptives so frequently. the utilization of contraceptives also varies directly with husband’s education. the percentage of women increases from 11.1% (for husbands with no education) to 42.1% (for husbands with post-secondary) for any method and from 9.5% (for husbands with no education) to 35.6% (for husbands with post-secondary) for the modern method of contraception. this can be attributed to accessibility to information and affordability amongst the educated. it is also interesting to note that there are more unmarried women using contraceptives compared to the married irrespective of whether it is any method (20.1% compared to 19.1%) or modern method (17.8% compared to 16.9%) of family planning. this can be attributed to the differences in the readiness to have children amongst the married and unmarried women. in fact, there is a lower percentage of women married earlier (21.9% for those married by age 20) using contraceptives than those married later (22.6% for those married by age 25). religion is used in this analysis to capture the traits and beliefs of women in different religious affiliations. it is revealed that “other faith” and catholics, consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education compared to muslims and protestants, have a lower percentage of women using either any method or a modern method of contraception. this is not surprising because, in uganda, amongst the catholics and “other faith” (especially the evangelicals) there is a serious campaign against the use of condoms. this suggests that the government should establish a sensitization program intended to change the beliefs of religious leaders, who in turn may communicate to their congregations about the importance of contraceptive use. the employment status and the mode of payment are important in influencing the use of contraceptives. there are more women in the working class using contraceptives. the percentage is highest (32% and 28% for modern and any method, respectively) amongst those paid in cash compared to those paid in kind. this implies that increased participation of women in the labour force, particularly in the formal private and public sectors where they are paid in cash, increases the likelihood of contraceptive use. government efforts to increase female employability, particularly through education, are therefore necessary. there are more women (38% and 33% for any and modern methods, respectively) with over ten years of education using contraceptives irrespective of the method used compared to those with zero years of education (11% and 9% for any and modern method, respectively). therefore, it appears ensuring the effectiveness of family planning campaigns must be preceded by campaigning for higher education amongst girls. 5.1.2 fertility characteristics a long reproductive period and poverty are some of the underlying reasons for the high fertility rates in uganda. limited access to family planning services, low education, and residing in rural areas compound the problem. in table 2 we note that on average 66% and 74% of women aged 15-49 years were married by the age of 20 and 25 respectively. these percentages are quite high and this implies that women have a long reproductive period, hence being vulnerable to producing many children. for those with no education, over 83% were married by age 20 compared to only 23% with post-secondary education. also for women in the poorest quintile, 74% got married by age 20 compared to only 48% in the richest quintile. there is little wonder then, that women with low education, those in lower welfare groups, those in the north, the east, and in rural areas tend to have more children compared to those with higher education, the relatively rich, and those in the central, west, and urban areas. married number of children ever born cumulative fertility category all women by age 20 by age 25 by age 20 by age 25 by age 30 female education: non education 77.7 83.4 93.9 5.5 1.0 2.3 3.6 primary 78.6 70.3 76.5 3.5 1.2 2.6 4.0 secondary 72.1 39.4 50.8 1.8 0.7 2.1 3.5 post-secondary 71.8 22.8 48.0 1.6 0.2 1.0 2.2 wealth status: poorest quintile 78.8 73.7 83.8 4.1 1.1 2.3 3.7 poorer quintile 78.3 75.0 82.1 3.9 1.0 2.5 3.8 middle quintile 78.0 69.9 76.7 3.9 1.0 2.5 3.8 richer quintile 79.0 67.2 74.7 3.8 1.1 2.6 4.0 richest quintile 73.0 48.0 59.1 2.4 0.8 2.2 3.5 32 consilience region: central 71.6 57.0 67.1 3.1 1.0 2.4 3.7 east 80.8 71.3 77.9 3.9 1.2 2.7 4.0 north 80.3 69.2 79.5 3.7 0.9 2.1 3.4 west 78.2 66.9 74.6 3.6 1.0 2.4 3.8 location: rural 67.6 51.1 62.1 3.8 0.8 2.1 3.3 urban 79.4 68.6 76.8 2.3 1.1 2.5 3.8 partner’s education: no education 72.1 81.3 96.9 5.1 .94 2.1 3.4 primary 70.8 89.2 97.8 4.9 1.2 2.6 3.9 secondary 71.8 86.4 98.3 3.7 1.1 2.5 3.8 post-secondary 72.4 68.9 92.3 3.6 .72 2.0 3.3 religion: catholic 72.1 67.5 76.8 3.6 .97 2.3 3.6 protestant 71.2 64.5 73.1 3.5 1.0 2.4 3.8 muslim 71.1 67.2 73.4 3.4 1.2 2.6 3.9 other 68.3 60.1 69.4 3.4 .96 2.4 3.7 working 71.6 71.1 80.0 3.9 1.0 2.4 3.7 not working 69.8 41.9 49.3 1.9 .88 2.3 3.7 working pay 70.4 72.6 82.8 4.0 1.0 2.4 3.7 paid in cash 67.3 65.7 79.3 3.5 .9 2.1 3.4 paid in kind 74.9 71.3 79.1 3.6 1.1 2.4 3.8 paid in cash + kind 70.2 77.8 86.9 4.5 1.1 2.5 3.8 female head 68.8 57.1 66.3 3.3 .94 2.2 3.4 not female head 72.4 69.3 77.8 3.6 1.0 2.5 3.9 any method 69.7 73.8 85.9 4.3 1.1 2.6 4.1 modern method 70.1 73.5 85.1 4.1 1.1 2.6 4.1 age cohorts: 15-19 71.6 .23 20-24 71.3 72.4 1.7 .98 25-29 71.9 78.8 92.8 3.5 1.0 2.5 30-34 72.2 81.7 93.5 5.1 1.1 2.6 4.0 35-39 68.1 80.1 93.2 6.3 1.0 2.4 3.8 40-44 71.0 79.8 93.7 7.0 .93 2.2 3.5 45-49 71.5 82.0 94.8 7.7 .96 2.2 3.5 only boys 71.7 84.3 94.8 5.2 1.2 2.6 4.0 only girls 71.3 84.2 94.9 5.2 1.2 2.6 4.0 women years of education: 0 73.3 83.2 93.7 5.5 1.0 2.3 3.6 1-3 73.4 82.6 87.8 4.5 1.2 2.6 3.9 4-7 71.6 64.3 70.9 3.1 1.1 2.6 4.0 8-10 68.3 43.8 52.2 1.9 .87 2.3 3.6 10+ 64.7 27.7 49.3 1.6 .33 1.33 2.6 total 77.0 65.6 74.3 3.5 1.0 2.4 3.7 n 8,531 5,49 4 6,29 6 8,531 6,583 4,921 3,511 table 2: fertility characteristics source: author’s own analysis using the uganda demographic and health survey 2006 consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education table 2 also reveals that there are fewer women (68.9%) married earlier (by age 20) having partners with post-secondary education compared to 81.3% having partners with no education. a similar observation is amongst those married by age 25. this may mean that highly educated men marry highly educated women, and this occurs at a later age. women married to men with no education are associated with a fertility rate of 5.1 children compared to 3.6 children for women married to men with post-secondary education. additionally, lower cumulative fertility is also observed amongst women with more educated spouses. this may imply that education of both boys and girls is critical in reducing the fertility rate in the country. there is a higher percentage (80%) of working women married by age 25 compared to their counterparts married by age 20 (71%). in fact, for all categories of working women (irrespective of the mode of payment), there is a higher percentage of women married later (by age 25) compared to those married earlier (by age 20). this can be attributed to the fact that most working women stay longer in school and hence get married later. it is rather surprising that working women are associated with a higher average fertility rate of 3.9 children compared to 1.9 children amongst those that do not work. as expected, women that are heads of households are associated with a lower fertility rate (3.3 children) compared to the non-heads; (3.6 children) the same applies to the cumulative fertility. this underscores the role of independence of women in making fertility choices. also women using a modern method of contraception are associated with a lower average fertility (4.1 children) compared to their counterparts using any method of contraception (4.3 children). therefore the government should strive to increase the supply and accessibility to modern methods of contraception. as expected, the number of children increases with age of the woman (7.7 children for the age cohort 45-49 compared to 0.23 children for the age cohort 15-19). conversely, the number of children that a woman gives birth to varies negatively with her years of education (1.6 children for women with ten years and over compared to 5.5 children for women with zero years of education). this underscores the role of education in fertility reduction just as it is in table 1 for contraceptive use. 5.2 quantitative evidence 5.2.1 determinants of current use of contraceptives in table 3, we present evidence on the determinants of the current use of contraceptives as an initial step towards our understanding women’s fertility choices.4 the importance of female education in fertility choices cannot be understated, and the benefits increase with the level of education. our analysis shows that holding everything else constant, women with a primary level of education are 8-10% more likely to be using a modern or any method of contraception compared to those with no education. we do not seem to notice any discernible differences in the use of contraceptives between unmarried and married women having primary education. secondary education increases the probability of using contraceptives in the range of 14-17%, and post-secondary education increases the probability to the range 16-20% 4 this refers to the period between childbirth and the next cycle of menstruation. 34 consilience apart from married women using any method whose probability is only 12%. while the partner’s level of education has a positive impact on the use of contraceptives, its impact is lower than that of the woman’s education. other factors held constant, married women are 6-8% more likely to have used a modern or any method of contraception if their partner has a primary education, 7-11% if the partner has secondary education, and 12-17% if he has post-secondary education. specifically, female education increases the probability of using condoms. women with at least secondary education are 21%-45% more likely to use condoms compared to their counterparts with no education at all. women whose partners have post-secondary education are 15% more likely to use condoms compared to their counterparts whose partners have no education at all. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) modern method condoms any method all women married women all women married women all women married women education: primary 0.079 0.101 0.088 0.048 0.078 0.086 (7.02)*** (4.49)*** (1.60) (1.21) (6.69)*** (3.64)*** secondary 0.142 0.166 0.210 0.056 0.153 0.162 (7.99)*** (4.71)*** (3.10)*** (1.10) (8.33)*** (4.47)*** post-secondary 0.176 0.155 0.453 0.117 0.194 0.118 (6.74)*** (2.94)*** (5.21)*** (1.65)* (7.10)*** (2.21)** age cohort: 20-24 years 0.199 0.135 -0.163 -0.073 0.225 0.156 (12.08)*** (2.91)*** (5.05)*** (2.33)** (13.00)*** (3.16)*** 25-29 years 0.251 0.164 -0.246 -0.093 0.281 0.190 (14.03)*** (3.53)*** (8.57)*** (3.06)*** (15.01)*** (3.83)*** 30-34 years 0.295 0.179 -0.227 -0.097 0.335 0.224 (15.42)*** (3.72)*** (7.80)*** (3.23)*** (16.84)*** (4.34)*** 35-39 years 0.286 0.188 -0.206 -0.093 0.331 0.229 (13.71)*** (3.72)*** (7.24)*** (3.34)*** (15.20)*** (4.25)*** 40-44 years 0.302 0.243 -0.193 -0.065 0.352 0.278 (13.08)*** (4.41)*** (6.51)*** (2.04)** (14.66)*** (4.80)*** 44-49 years 0.244 0.155 -0.179 -0.072 0.298 0.216 (9.72)*** (2.72)*** (5.48)*** (2.26)** (11.38)*** (3.54)*** rural resident -0.024 -0.030 -0.014 -0.006 -0.021 -0.029 (2.04)** (1.31) (0.50) (0.26) (1.64) (1.16) religious affiliation: protestant -0.010 -0.006 0.025 0.003 -0.006 -0.011 (1.09) (0.32) (0.92) (0.14) (0.68) (0.59) muslim -0.003 0.015 -0.026 -0.006 -0.001 0.003 (0.29) (0.63) (0.77) (0.25) (0.05) (0.10) other faith -0.034 -0.010 -0.026 0.001 -0.041 -0.020 (2.82)*** (0.41) (0.66) (0.03) (3.20)*** (0.75) region: east -0.022 -0.017 -0.029 -0.019 -0.031 -0.030 (2.00)** (0.79) (0.90) (0.74) (2.74)*** (1.34) north -0.057 -0.072 0.053 0.041 -0.079 -0.111 (4.78)*** (2.93)*** (1.18) (1.13) (6.24)*** (4.29)*** west -0.022 -0.034 -0.017 -0.021 -0.017 -0.016 (2.04)** (1.58) (0.53) (0.79) (1.43) (0.69) wealth quintile: poorer 0.045 0.098 0.012 0.049 0.042 0.097 (2.93)*** (2.98)*** (0.19) (0.87) (2.62)*** (2.83)*** middle 0.053 0.097 0.023 0.060 0.063 0.103 (3.27)*** (2.81)*** (0.36) (1.01) (3.69)*** (2.89)*** richer 0.095 0.127 0.024 0.033 0.105 0.131 (5.55)*** (3.59)*** (0.40) (0.61) (5.86)*** (3.58)*** richest 0.161 0.271 0.068 0.067 0.180 0.291 (8.32)*** (6.63)*** (1.15) (1.29) (8.87)*** (6.89)*** partner’s 0.056 0.035 0.080 consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education education: primary (2.12)** (0.67) (2.84)*** secondary 0.074 0.099 0.108 (2.33)** (1.61) (3.15)*** post-secondary 0.115 0.146 0.171 (2.69)*** (1.90)* (3.64)*** observations 8,525 2,763 1,267 911 8,525 2,763 table 3: determinants of current use of contraceptives absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% as observed under the descriptive evidence, age is another important determinant of using contraceptives, with the young more likely to use contraceptives than the old. the results show that all women in the age cohorts 2040 years are 20-30% more likely to use a modern method of family planning compared to those in the age group 15-19 years (the excluded category). yet, all women in the age cohort 44-49 years are only 24% (significant at 1%) more likely to be using a modern contraceptive method of family planning. married women in the age cohorts 20-40 years are 14-24% more likely to be using a modern method of family planning. however, married women in the age cohort 44-49 are only 16% more likely to be using a modern method of family planning. the scenario is not any different once we look at the age cohorts in relation to the probability of using any method of family planning for all women and married women, respectively. it is noted that for all age cohorts, the probability of using either a modern method or any method of family planning is smaller for married women than for all women. this may be partly attributed to the need to first seek the opinion of the partner before using any contraceptives, which reduces their application among the married women. the wealth of the household is an important factor in women’s use of family planning. we examine the impact of wealth on family planning by using wealth quintiles with the poorest quintile (bottom 20%) as the base category. the results show that all women in the second poorest quintile are about 4-5%, and married women in the same quintile are about 10% more likely to be using a modern or any method compared to the poorest. all women in the middle quintile are about 5-6%, and married women in the same quintile are 10% more likely to be using a modern or any method compared to the poorest. women in the top two quintiles are even more likely to be using a modern or any method of family planning – all women in the second richest quintile are 10%, and married women in the same quintile are 13%, more likely to be using a modern or any method of family planning. all women in the richest quintile are 16-18% and married women in the same quintile are about 30% more likely to be using a modern or any method of family planning. it is worth noting that at all levels of welfare (wealth quintiles) married women possess a higher likelihood of using either a modern or any method of family planning than when all women are considered. access to modern contraceptive methods is also underscored by the residence of women. other factors held constant, all women in rural areas are 2%5 5 jain (1999) in the introductory chapter to the book “do population policies matter?” notes that the existence of charismatic leaders and diversity of family planning 36 consilience less likely to be using a modern method compared to their urban counterparts. again compared to the central region, all women in the north, east, and west of the country are less likely (in decreasing order of magnitude) to be using a modern or any method of family planning. thus, increased access to family planning services in these areas is critical to helping women (and their partners) meet their fertility needs. 5.2.2 determinant of total and cumulative fertility evidence on the determinants of fertility, using the number of children born to a woman in her lifetime as the dependent variable, is presented in table 4. we also present evidence on the determinants of cumulative fertility by age 20, 25 and 30 in table 5 in order to understand the fertility behaviour of younger women. in both tables 4 and 5, we present results for all women and married women. the analysis shows that other factors held constant, education, particularly at the secondary level and above plays a very powerful role in reducing fertility. this suggests that efforts to improve access to education beyond the primary level need to be strengthened. for all women, the coefficient on primary education is -0.15, implying that every 100 women with primary education will, on average, have 15 fewer children than those with no education at all. for women married by age 20 and 25, the coefficient on primary education is -0.37 and -0.53, implying that every 100 women married by 20 and 25 years of age will, on average, have 37 and 53 fewer children than those with no education at all. the coefficients on secondary and post-secondary education for all women, married women, married by age 20 and married by age 25, range from 0.5 to -2.1 respectively, implying that every 10 women with at least secondary education will, on the average, have 5 to 21 children less than those with no education at all (ref. table 4). for all women, by age 20, 25, and 30 (cumulative fertility), every 10 women with at least secondary education will, on average, have 2 to 14 children less than those with no education at all (ref table 5). the scenario is not very different from married women. male partners’ primary education increases fertility by about 0.3 compared to those with no education at all. this suggests that men with at least a primary level of education may have higher earnings and this can lead to higher fertility (ref. table 4). on the other hand, male partners’ primary and secondary education increase cumulative fertility by about 0.13-0.2 compared to those with no education at all. yet, partners’ secondary and post-secondary education has limited impact on fertility. other important factors in altering fertility behaviour include age cohorts and residence in rural areas. as would be expected, the number of children ever born to a woman increases with her age and this is consistent with both married and unmarried women. we note that fertility among all women in the age cohort 20-24 years is, on average, about 1.5 children higher than those in the age cohort 15-19 years while fertility in the age cohort 44-49 years is over 7 children. we notice that the same trend is portrayed for married women (ref. table 4). methods are critical in the successful implementation of population policies to achieve declines in fertility. consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education dependent variable is number of children ever born to a woman (1) (2) (3) (4) all women married women married by age 20 married by age 25 woman’s education: primary -0.149 0.003 -0.369 -0.525 (2.76)*** (0.04) (4.48)*** (5.82)*** secondary -0.853 -0.746 -0.476 -0.560 (11.53)*** (6.91)*** (5.01)*** (5.71)*** post-secondary -2.093 -2.024 -1.139 -0.878 (18.35)*** (11.20)*** (9.90)*** (7.63)*** partner’s education: primary 0.303 (3.72)*** secondary 0.037 (0.37) post-secondary -0.047 (0.35) age cohort: 20-24 years 1.490 1.347 (24.28)*** (11.84)*** 25-29 years 3.222 3.036 1.843 (49.81)*** (26.72)*** (23.53)*** 30-34 years 4.753 4.595 3.419 2.414 (70.44)*** (39.76)*** (38.67)*** (23.09)*** 35-39 years 5.856 5.792 4.582 3.341 (79.52)*** (47.71)*** (49.69)*** (28.82)*** 40-44 years 6.556 6.476 5.625 4.378 (80.47)*** (49.91)*** (54.10)*** (32.72)*** 44-49 years 7.305 7.253 6.124 4.948 (82.81)*** (52.94)*** (52.32)*** (32.36)*** rural resident 0.612 0.563 0.341 0.127 (10.06)*** (6.22)*** (5.11)*** (2.25)** religious affiliation: protestant 0.056 0.045 0.025 0.049 (1.21) (0.72) (0.44) (1.00) muslim 0.227 0.266 0.044 -0.003 (3.35)*** (2.97)*** (0.52) (0.04) other faith 0.020 0.001 -0.193 -0.058 (0.29) (0.01) (2.43)** (0.86) region: east 0.148 0.150 0.031 -0.105 (2.44)** (1.86)* (0.41) (1.63) north -0.270 -0.311 -0.132 -0.065 (4.55)*** (3.90)*** (1.80)* (1.00) west -0.185 -0.112 -0.167 -0.239 (3.04)*** (1.34) (2.30)** (3.84)*** constant 0.284 0.340 0.564 0.699 (2.99)*** (2.11)** (5.09)*** (6.45)*** observations 8,525 5,347 3,429 2,301 r-squared 0.68 0.59 0.72 0.62 table 4: determinants of fertility absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 38 consilience women residing in rural areas are more likely to have more children than those in urban areas, which is consistent with the usually lower education level in the rural areas. other factors held constant, every 10 rural women married by age 20 to 25 have between 1.3 and 6 children more than those in urban areas (ref. table 4). for all women in the rural areas, cumulative fertility by ages 20, 25, and 30 for every 10 women is 1, 2, and 4 children, respectively, which is higher than in urban areas. the picture is no different to that of married women (ref. table 5). this suggests that fertility behavioural change campaigns in uganda need to focus on women in these areas if they are to have greater influence. the impact of regional differences on fertility is pronounced in our regression. for all women in the eastern region, every 10 women, on average, have 1.5 children more than those in the central region. the picture is not different for married women. on the other hand, for all women in the northern region, every 10 women, on average, have 3 children less than those in the central region. almost the same picture is observed for married women. on average, for all women and those married by ages 20 and 25 in the western region, women have 1.7-2.4 children less compared to those in the central region (ref. table 4). considering cumulative fertility by ages 20, 25 and 30 for the entire sample, every 10 women in the northern region will have on average 4, 5, and 6 children, respectively, less than those in the central region. yet, by ages 20, 25 and 30 for married women, every 10 women in the northern region will have on average 4, 6, and 6.2 children, respectively, less than those in the central region (table 5). this may be explained by the war in the northern region, which pushed many people out of their homes, leaving mothers and fathers with little or no opportunity to concentrate on child bearing. also, with much economic activity and property devastated during the war, parents may have doubted their ability to bring up many children in the given circumstances. for cumulative fertility by ages 20 and 25 for the entire sample of women, every 10 women in the western region, on average, have 2 children less than those in the central region (table 5). consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education dependent variable is cumulative fertility (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) all women married women by age 20 by age 25 by age 30 by age 20 by age 25 by age 30 education: primary 0.064 0.202 0.268 0.065 0.204 0.235 (2.27)** (4.56)*** (4.01)*** (1.40) (2.88)*** (2.20)** secondary -0.406 -0.325 -0.227 -0.305 -0.348 -0.211 (9.82)*** (4.53)*** (1.96)* (4.34)*** (3.07)*** (1.15) post-secondary -0.937 -1.402 -1.332 -0.913 -1.343 -1.388 (15.71)*** (13.54)*** (7.43)*** (8.19)*** (7.87)*** (5.06)*** age cohort 25-29 0.036 -0.135 (1.10) (2.51)** age cohort 30-34 0.068 0.010 -0.073 0.007 (1.99)** (0.20) (1.30) (0.09) age cohort 35-39 -0.053 -0.167 -0.199 -0.206 -0.168 -0.213 (1.41) (3.04)*** (2.68)*** (3.44)*** (2.08)** (1.96)* age cohort 40-44 -0.153 -0.380 -0.414 -0.282 -0.431 -0.428 (3.71)*** (6.28)*** (5.10)*** (4.24)*** (4.74)*** (3.52)*** age cohort 45-49 -0.124 -0.368 -0.445 -0.325 -0.486 -0.566 (2.79)*** (5.66)*** (5.10)*** (4.46)*** (4.88)*** (4.24)*** rural resident 0.095 0.221 0.389 0.124 0.239 0.393 (2.71)*** (3.70)*** (4.02)*** (2.27)** (2.69)*** (2.73)*** religious affiliation: protestant 0.067 0.091 0.091 0.098 0.151 0.156 (2.53)** (2.06)** (1.32) (2.28)** (2.25)** (1.48) muslim 0.164 0.165 0.107 0.223 0.257 0.180 (4.25)*** (2.51)** (1.04) (3.85)*** (2.78)*** (1.25) other faith -0.004 0.006 0.011 0.056 0.124 0.185 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.89) (1.27) (1.22) region: east 0.007 0.055 0.095 -0.004 0.046 0.220 (0.22) (0.97) (1.07) (0.07) (0.55) (1.68)* north -0.365 -0.554 -0.583 -0.403 -0.607 -0.623 (10.94)*** (10.05)*** (6.75)*** (7.55)*** (7.24)*** (4.71)*** west -0.221 -0.222 -0.133 -0.229 -0.263 -0.103 (6.45)*** (3.89)*** (1.48) (4.24)*** (3.08)*** (0.77) partner’s education: primary 0.154 0.207 0.221 (2.86)*** (2.55)** (1.82)* secondary 0.134 0.316 0.244 (2.08)** (3.13)*** (1.56) post-secondary 0.143 0.218 0.341 (1.61) (1.59) (1.60) constant 1.114 2.490 3.739 1.082 2.295 3.555 (22.31)*** (30.39)*** (29.30)*** (12.36)*** (17.26)*** (17.17)*** observations 6578 4920 3510 2617 2077 1473 r-squared 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.11 table 5: determinants of fertility by age 20, 25, and 30. absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 40 consilience 6 conclusions and recommendations 6.1 conclusions using the demographic and health survey 2006, we examine the relationship between female education, contraceptive use, and fertility in uganda. the results of the analyses confirm the hypothesis of this study. we show that education, particularly of women, is an important factor in reducing fertility in uganda. while the partner’s education is also negatively related to the number of children born, the magnitude is much smaller. there is near universal knowledge of methods of family planning, but very few women have used these methods and even fewer the modern methods. our findings further show that access to or use of contraceptives is positively associated with the education of both the woman and her partner. these findings are important for improving the quality of life of ugandan women (and also children) through a number of policy actions. policies to reduce fertility can play both direct and indirect roles in enhancing maternal and child mortality reductions. when women give birth to fewer children, it reduces their exposure to the risks of child birth, particularly in rural areas where health and maternal care services are poor or non-existent. having fewer children also implies that family income is shared among fewer heads. with fewer children born, parents (both women and men) are more likely to provide more and adequate care thus ensuring their survival and attention to their early childhood development requirements. 6.2 recommendations reducing total fertility is expected to play an important role in achieving both the national development goals contained in the national development plan and the millennium development goals. however, reducing fertility needs concerted efforts from various stakeholders including the central government, the health sector, district authorities, and communities. the central government needs to provide the overall direction, political commitment and financial support for family planning. in addition, the health sector needs to provide the technical guidance on all actions needed to reduce fertility and facilities for family planning. district authorities and communities need to provide adequate facilities to ensure access to family planning. lastly, parents require sustained information over a long period of time on the importance of planning their families in order to change their aspirations and behaviour. the findings of the study suggest that efforts to reduce fertility need to target measures that aim to educate women beyond the secondary level. the government programme to extend free education at the secondary level is therefore an important measure that may help to reduce fertility. this needs to be embraced by all stakeholders, including donors, parents, community leaders, and local government authorities as well as women’s organisations with special interests in female education. the ministry of education on behalf of the central government in collaboration with community leaders and local government authorities and school administrators should actively sensitize parents about the importance of female education beyond secondary level. government legislation can be put in place to consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education penalise parents who discourage their children from taking advantage of the universal secondary education program established by the government. measures need to be put in place to remove, or at least minimise factors that may lead girls to drop out of school early, including improving the quality of schools and teaching, government legislation against early marriages, and ensuring that all schools have separate sanitary facilities for girls and boys. measures to expand access to family planning facilities and the capacity to use them are needed. the evidence shows that while almost all women in uganda know of at least one method of family planning only half have used any. both government and non-government organizations can play an important role in improving women’s access to contraceptives through stocking public and private health centers and pharmacies with the required contraceptives. policies to eliminate all barriers of access to family planning services are needed, for example by removing any taxes and ensuring accessibility in the rural areas. consistent information and public awareness of the importance of appropriate family size is needed. for the recommendations emerging from our study to be realized, political and financial commitment on the part of the government is necessary. this should be complemented with donor financial support as well as sensitization campaigns by non-governmental organizations concerning the utilization and importance of contraceptives and family planning. village level sensitization seminars are highly recommended to catch women who may not be reached via the mass media; this is a powerful instrument for ensuring more understanding of gender justice and equity. the strong linkage between female education and contraceptive use and fertility found in this study portrays the quantity-quality trade-off and the opportunity cost of time that highly educated women face, which induces them to have fewer children. prioritizing female education is a prime future strategy for important demographic change not only in uganda but also in other developing countries. 42 consilience appendix figure 1: age-specific fertility rates for uganda. source: republic of uganda, 2006. figure 2: distribution of women in the age group 15-49 years. source: derived from author’s own analysis of the udhs 2006. 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 mother's age group n u m b e r o f c h ild re n p e r 1 ,0 0 0 w o m e n 1995 2000/01 2006 consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education a. number of children born plotted against years of education of the woman b. number of children born plotted against level of education of the woman (0 = none, 1 = primary, 2= secondary and 3 = post-secondary) y = -0.3865x + 5.0029 r2 = 0.1312 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 woman's education in years n u m b e r o f c h il d r e n b o r n y = -0.6189x + 5.3314 r2 = 0.0266 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 0 1 2 3 partner's education level n u m b e r o f c h il d r e n b o r n 44 consilience c. cumulative fertility at age 30 plotted against woman’s education in years figure 3: fertility vs. women’s education. source: derived from author’s own analysis of the udhs 2006. y = -0.1566x + 3.2852 r2 = 0.0845 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 woman's education in years c u m u la ti v e f e r ti li ty a t 3 0 consilience bbaale and mpuga: female 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(1994). fertility-mortality variation across ldcs: women’s education, labour force participation and contraceptive use. kylos, vol.47(2), pp. 209-229. undp (2007). millennium development goals: uganda’s progress report 2007. kampala, united nations development programme. vavrus, f. and u. larsen (2003). girls’ education and fertility transition: an analysis of recent trends in tanzania and uganda. economic development and cultural change, vol. 51(4), pp. 945-76. article title laso 1 challenges to the conservation of river turtles (spp. podocnemis) in the peruvian amazon francisco laso fjl2102@columbia.edu francisco received his b.a. in environmental biology from columbia university in 2008. he melds science and art in his attempt to broaden the scientific community's sphere of influence. he is currently working for the network of conservation educators and practitioners (ncep) at the american museum of natural history (amnh). mailto:fjl2102@columbia.edu laso 2 abstract these images were captured during the summer of 2007 as part of an ongoing study that addresses habitat and community dynamics from broad to narrow ecological vantage points. amazonian river turtles are ecologically important as they play an essential role in the seed dispersal of several fruit tree species in the flooded plain. these turtles also have religious, cultural, and economic significance for indigenous river communities. the endangered amazonian river turtles podocnemis expansa, p. unifilis, and p. sextuberculata are a local delicacy in iquitos, peru. despite their importance and familiarity to people, we know very little about these species and commercial exploitation has decimated turtle populations outside natural reserves. conservation of these species is aimed at the sustained wellbeing of the flooded forest ecosystem and its inhabitants. the hope is that future generations will inherit the success of our good stewardship rather than the failings of our negligence. laso 3 author’s note the following is a selection from a group of pictures that was taken for a visual manual to be used by researchers, park officials, and river communities. the photo-manual is meant to serve researchers and conservationists in recognizing the basic physiology and biology of the three turtle species, learning basic blood sampling techniques, qualifying threats for extinction, and proposing strategies for conservation. keywords: testudines, podocnemididae, podocnemis, turtle, amazon, iquitos. laso 4 challenges to the conservation of river turtles (spp. podocnemis) in the peruvian amazon june-august 2007, iquitos, peru. created with the support of the kluge fellows summer research program. the amazonian river turtles, podocnemis expansa, p. unifilis, and p. sextuberculata, have long been of great ecological, economic, and cultural importance for the amazon rainforest and its inhabitants. all three species were once known for their astonishingly large population sizes all over the amazon river basin. today, they are a rare sight and are listed as species of conservation concern on several international endangered species listings. most inhabitants of river communities in the peruvian amazon, who have hunted turtles for their meat and eggs for centuries, are aware of the severe drop in turtle populations during the past few decades. river community members identified the cause of the turtles’ disappearance to be the unsustainable commercial exploitation of this resource to meet the growing demands of large urban areas such as iquitos, peru. tourism is one of iquitos’ main economic strengths, and much of the increasing demand for wildlife meat comes from tourists with adventurous palates. after having extirpated turtle populations for miles around iquitos, turtles, especially rare specimens such as giant river turtles (p. expansa), are likely to be brought from within peru’s largest protected area, the pacayasamiria national reserve (rnps). unfortunately, current regulations and conservation efforts are insufficient. an anonymous rnps park ranger explained that his organization is often unable to handle illegal activities like poaching and logging on its own because of fuel scarcity and conflict with armed offenders is dangerous. as a result, authorities rarely intercept turtles that are smuggled into iquitos in the cargo of transportation barge passengers. the genus podocnemis is a primitive one, and it has evolved through millions of years to become intricately integrated with the flooded forest ecosystem. since the turtles are important seed dispersers, scavengers, and sources of food for other predators, their disappearance has profound ecological implications. historically, fresh water turtles can reach very high biomasses and densities, which can give us an idea about their significant contribution to nutrient cycling and to energy flow patterns in both lakes and rivers (moll). in tropical forests, most plants produce fruit during the flooding season, and 70-90% of plant species are vertebrate-dispersed (ganesh and davidar); podocnemis turtles have the potential to be high-quality seed dispersers laso 5 because their diet is predominantly comprised of fruits, which are swallowed whole and generally pass unharmed (moll and moll). seeds that have been ingested by turtles actually fare better than non-ingested seeds as turtles carry them away from the parent tree and are fertilized by the nutrients in turtle droppings (moll and jansen). the most important factor to determine the extent to which podocnemis turtles fulfill their role as one of the flooded forest’s key seed dispersers is the density of turtle populations. it is probable that the consequences of the sudden disappearance of this genus from the amazon basin ecosystems are not yet fully perceptible because the cycles that are being disrupted by the unfulfilled niches of these turtles occur at larger time scales than humans can effectively perceive. the sheer longevity of fruit trees that depend on turtles to disperse their seeds is enough to camouflage their disrupted life cycles. the ramifications of these turtle species’ extinctions goes well beyond bottom lines of fishermen and market vendors. their survival or demise might influence the existence of the flooded forest itself and of all the life, resources, and ecological services it provides. the crucial role that these turtles play in the life cycles of amazon plant species binds their destiny to both local and global processes. it ranges from a single tree providing food and a habitat to the entire flooded forest acting as a carbon sink, regulating global climate and producing the oxygen we breathe. after just a couple centuries of rapid anthropogenic growth in the area, these species are likely to face extinction if their situation is ignored. this resource urgently needs to be managed with improved information and organization. laso 6 the amazonian giant river turtle (p. expansa). its hidden aquatic lifestyle, vast seasonal migration areas, and the lack of baseline quantitative demographic data leave us with very little knowledge about this species. laso 7 close-up of a female p. unifilis, the medium-sized species. more is known about female turtles than male turtles for all three species since only females come out to nest in the sandy beaches while males remain out of sight. nesting is the most vulnerable time for an adult turtle. laso 8 sandy banks on the peruvian amazon during dry season (june to september) are the preferred nesting ground for podocnemis turtles. the land left by the receding river is also prized agricultural ground for the people of the amazon. laso 9 p. unifilis basking in the sun. the yellow markings on their heads are characteristic of male turtles. since female turtles are more vulnerable to poachers, the species’ gender ratios are likely strongly male-biased. laso 10 these turtles leave the safety of the water at night and sometimes come out to nest in great numbers. this event is known as a turtle “derrame” or “spillover.” in spite of the turtle’s concealment efforts, many people await the spillover with great anticipation; annual feasts with turtle soup and eggs usually follow. laso 11 town elders recall such an abundance of giant river turtles (p. expansa) that "they could be easily caught every day." younger people reported never having met anyone who had caught a p. expansa. laso 12 passerby traders buy turtles from fishermen for a fraction of their price in iquitos markets. turtles are brought to iquitos on large cargo barges, which stop along river communities transporting everything from people and animals to construction materials and fuel, all at once. laso 13 boats travel for weeks before they reach their final destination, and all passengers come prepared with hammocks. we were able to spot over 50 p. unifilis hidden in the personal belongings and cargo of passengers from a single transportation boat heading to iquitos from bretaña, a small town at the entrance of the pacaya-samiria natural reserve. laso 14 over 400 tortoises (motelo) which were confiscated at airports, cannot be returned to the wild due to possible diseases they might have contracted, so they are kept indefinitely by park officials under poor living conditions. there is no available room to house confiscated river turtles. laso 15 with 402,481 reported inhabitants (inei), iquitos’ remote location is not immediately apparent. tourists and settlers have quickly turned iquitos into a modern and global city. laso 16 as more people from the outskirts move to iquitos to work in tourism, urbanization spreads, and its pressure on the environment rapidly increases. because the city lacks land access, many basic products must be imported by boat or plane to iquitos, increasing iquitos’ ecological footprint. laso 17 since no turtles are found for miles around iquitos, turtle product availability is not constant. belén market vendors stock up on live turtles as soon as traders in transportation barges arrive. laso 18 belén market, representing 71.3% of the entire city’s wildlife trade, is the most commercially active market for wildlife products in iquitos. here, podocnemis turtles are sold as bushmeat and pets (bendayan, 1991). laso 19 despite its rarity in the wild, during its nesting season p. expansa is an alarmingly common sight in markets, particularly in mercado de belén. here, turtle meat is more expensive than imported beef. laso 20 a saleswoman at the belén market sells potions for ailments. turtle products are common in traditional medicine and have religious value for many people since the turtles are known for their longevity and fertility. with the unsustainable harvest of this resource, few turtles reach sexual maturity. laso 21 early morning preparations for a day at the market. this vendor alone prepared five p. unifilis that she expected to sell that same day. as populations of giant river turtles have dwindled, the medium-sized turtle (p. unifilis) has become the most commercialized species. laso 22 front hand of a massive adult female p. expansa. targeting larger specimens has not only reduced the average size of the population, but it has also targeted the most important portion of the population for its conservation, the breeding individuals. laso 23 three different traditional turtle dishes: from left to right, estofado, zarapatera, and picadillo. laso 24 lacking refrigeration, vendors who cannot sell all their fresh eggs must quickly boil them so that they will last a few more days. focusing on the integral cultural, economic, and ecologic support provided by river turtles to the amazon region is a powerful approach for localized conservation efforts aiming to have larger-region impacts. laso 25 a community member helps park officials find and transfer nests to artificial beaches for protection against poachers and predators. most conservation efforts in peru seem to be aimed at the reproduction of podocnemis turtles. laso 26 every artificial beach may contain hundreds of nests each nesting season. thousands of hatchlings are then released at their original nest site. laso 27 a boy helps build the roof of his classroom. in collaboration with park officials, a number of rural schools have built artificial beaches and looked after a small number of p. unifilis nests that park officials have collected. school programs have been very effective in promoting community involvement, showing that, while securing the survival of these turtle species is not child’s play, everyone can have a significant role in it. laso 28 works cited badayan, acosta. influencia socioeconomica de la fauna silvestre como recurso alimentario – iquitos. universidad nacional de la amazonia peruana, facultad de ciencias biologicas. 1991. inei. peru: proyecciones de poblacion por años calendario segun departamentos, provincias y distritos. lima, instituto nacional de estadistica e informatica. 2002. moll, d. and k. p. jansen. "evidence for a role in seed dispersal by 2 tropical herbivorous turtles." biotropica. 2002, 27(1): 121-127. moll, d. "population sizes and foraging ecology in a tropical fresh-water stream turtle community." journal of herpetology. 1990, 24(1): 48-53. moll, don and moll, edward. “river turtles” new york: oxford university press, 2004. microsoft word 02112008 pinkovskiy growth and productivity.doc consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 0 growth, productivity, and policy instruments during the lost decade: a replication of beason and weinstein (1996) for the period 1992-1998 maxim l. pinkovskiy 1 abstract: we replicate the analysis of the connection between japanese sectoral productivity growth and industrial policy performed by beason and weinstein (1996) of national accounts data for the period 1992 to 1999. we show that despite some positive raw correlations between growth and industrial policy tools, there is no robust association between growth and industrial policy in the 1990s. this is consistent with the conclusions of beason and weinstein for the high-growth period (1960-1973). we also confirm the development of some trends evident in the previous data, such as the skewed distribution of policy instrument application to politically influential industries and the inconsistent application of different instruments to industries. overall, the data is much more consistent with a theory of japanese industrial policy as a product of political economy than industrial policy as a response to growth and productivity. 1 maxim pinkovskiy is a senior at columbia college, columbia university, studying economics and mathematics. he can be contacted at mlp2005@columbia.edu. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 1 introduction: as japan grew to exceed the u.s. in per capita gdp in the 1980s, scholars attributed its rise to the politically-uninfluenced use of policy instruments – low-interest loans, tax relief, subsidies, and protection – in order to transfer resources out of stagnating business sectors and into sectors with high growth and increasing returns to scale (tyson and zysman, 1990). this view informed much of u.s. trade policy towards japan, and some of its leading proponents (tyson) were appointed to influential positions in the u.s. government. beason and weinstein (1996) argue that such a view of japanese industrial policy is mistaken; in particular, that 1) there is, if any, a negative association between japanese sectoral productivity growth and the amount of targeting a sector receives, and 2) application of industrial policy tools is heavily skewed to politically influential sectors. we replicate the analysis of the connection between japanese sectoral productivity growth and industrial policy performed by beason and weinstein (1996) over national accounts data for the period 1992 to 1999. owing to the dismal performance of the japanese economy during that period, the question of whether the japanese government was targeting increasing-returns industries is no longer interesting; rather, we wish to investigate whether beason and weinstein’s conclusions remain valid for the 1990s, our provisional hypothesis being that there is no positive association between favorable application of industrial policy to a sector and its productivity growth. we show that despite some positive raw correlations between growth and industrial policy tools, there is no robust association between growth and industrial policy in the 1990s, as is consistent with the conclusions of beason and weinstein for the high-growth period (1960-1973). we also confirm the development of some trends evident in the previous data, such as the skewed distribution of policy instrument application to politically influential industries and the inconsistent application of different instruments to industries. overall, the data is much more consistent with a theory of japanese industrial policy as a product of political economy than industrial policy as a response to growth and productivity discussion of beason and weinstein (1996): a traditional approach in the study of the effects of japanese industrial policy was to consider the effects of specific policies on specific firms or industries through case studies. beason and weinstein (1996) argue that a superior approach considers the effect of the favorability of industrial policy relative to the mean policy across industries, or alternatively, the extent to which some sectors receive access to lowinterest loans or to tax relief over and above what other sectors receive. beason and weinstein reason that the essence of “picking winners” consists not merely in aiding favored sectors, but in granting them treatment that other sectors do not enjoy since it is the relative differentials in profitability between sectors that drive movements of factors of production, labor and capital, from one sector into another. using regression as well as simple correlation measures, beason and weinstein show that while japanese industrial policy induced factors to flow to favored industries, the favorability of sectoral industrial policy had a negative association both with sectoral productivity growth and long-run sectoral output growth. this conclusion challenged the prevailing view that japanese industrial policy was a significant element in the consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 2 japanese postwar economic miracle, and suggested that policy favoritism served more to support unproductive but politically important sectors, rather than foster productivity growth in emerging ones. data and variable definitions: in replicating beason and weinstein (1996), we obtain data from the same sources they used, which we list in the data appendix. we restrict our attention to low-interest loans from the japan development bank (jdb), tax rates, and subsidies, and ignore the use of tariffs and quotas. we justify this omission by noting that 1) it would be extremely difficult to generate measures of tariff rates comparable to those used in beason and weinstein, since their source (shouda (1982)) does not extend to the 1990s and would require out-of-sample extrapolation, and 2) it is reasonable to assume that protection is negligible in japan owing to trade liberalization in the wake of the uruguay round.2 however, since the data contains relevant information on multiple non-manufacturing industries, (non-manufacturing industries are expected to be more important in the 1990s than in the high-growth period owing to the transition to a service economy), and since the rise of non-manufacturing industries may affect the use of industrial policy tools, we include data for all available industry categories of the private sector.3 the key variables used in the analysis are defined as follows: sectoral gross domestic product is value added per sector in each year, deflated to 1990. fraction jdb is the ratio of outstanding jdb loans to total outstanding loans within a sector. tax rate is the ratio of corporate tax rates to taxable income, while subsidy rate is the negative of the ratio of net tax receipts from a sector to its gross domestic product.4 the labor share is the ratio of employment compensation to gdp, and the capital share is the difference between unity and the labor share. growth is computed as the difference of logs of the lead and the current value of a variable. productivity growth is computed according to the tornqvist formula, as the difference in gdp growth and the sum of factor growths weighted by the average factor shares in the lead and current period. in order to look at relative policy favorability towards sectors, we follow beason and weinstein, and transform the policy variables into deviations from their yearly economy-wide average values. descriptive data: we first consider summary tables of the data and compare them to table 1 of beason and weinstein (1996). table 1.1 shows the average values and ranks of growth and industrial policy variables for all sectors under analysis. looking at growth, one immediately sees the noticeable slowdown during the 1990s in comparison with the 1980s. only electrical machinery and finance grow at 1980s levels, while all other manufacturing sectors grow at no more than 3% (lower than the median growth for 1980s), and many shrink outright. among sectors that declined are those with heavy government support, such as 2 this assumption comes from conversation with prof. weinstein 3 we also added an aggregate “manufacturing” sector in order to compute aggregate quantities for differencing. it is excluded in all correlations and regressions. 4 since the subsidy rate is a cross-section ratio, it is formed using quantities that are not deflated. all variable definitions follow beason and weinstein (1996), or were created with assent of prof. weinstein. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 3 agriculture, mining, textiles, and construction. however, some of the declined sectors, such as general machinery, used to be among the high-growing sectors of the 1980s. a possible explanation may be that most sectors suffered from the economy-wide negative effects of the banking crisis, while electrical machinery and finance were able to offset some of these effects owing to the global finance and technological boom. a similar pattern is present in the productivity growth data: the only significant growth in productivity is in electrical machinery, automobiles, and finance. the decent productivity growth in finance confirms the continuation of an upward trend in the productivity of japanese finance noted in weinstein (2001). looking at the application of industrial policy tools, one sees that the distribution of the application of the policy instruments is highly skewed, a result consistent with beason and weinstein (1996). mining is heavily favored with tax breaks, just as petroleum, transport and communications, and utilities are heavily favored with jdb loans. construction, agriculture, and finance are favored with subsidies. (it is likely that the “subsidies” received by finance reflect bank recapitalization in the wake of the financial crises of the 1990s).5 however, while in the high-growth period, some sectors appear to have been winners in the application of all or most policy tools; in the 1990s data, large gainers from some policy tools do not seem to receive favored treatment across the board, and often are large losers in the application of other tools. this is particularly evident in the differential application of jdb loans versus tax relief (taxes and subsidies). for instance, mining receives by far the largest tax breaks, but no longer has first or second rank with respect to jdb loans or subsidies, while transport and public utilities, though almost completely funded by the jdb, are in next-to-last place with respect to taxes. similarly, petroleum refining, which receives the highest proportion of jdb loans among manufacturing firms, has the lowest subsidy rate. textiles and processed food, which used to be large gainers from trade policy, do not appear to be especially favored with the industrial policy tools under consideration. this pattern suggests an inconsistency in the application of industrial policy tools if one considers the aim of the government to be to transfer resources to specific industries (for growth or political economy reasons) and if one considers the application of different policy tools to be fungible. this pattern can be explained if one considers that sectors prefer the application of certain tools to others (it is plausible, for instance, that some sectors may value easy credit more than tax breaks), and if sectors must negotiate for preferred treatment by the government in an environment of increasingly scarce government funds. in contrast to the similar data from the high-growth period, it is no longer apparent that a negative correlation exists between growth and the industrial policy measures. rank seems to be unassociated with gdp or productivity growth, and high-ranking sectors in terms of industrial policy are represented among the fast and the slow growers. when one considers the pure correlations between growth and industrial policy measures, presented in table 1.2, one is surprised to see that jdb loans are positively correlated with gdp growth, while tax rate differentials and subsidy rates are positively correlated with productivity 5 the relatively low ranking of agriculture in terms of low-interest loans may be explained by the fact that agriculture receives low-interest loans from governmental financial institutions other than the jdb: there exists, for instance, the agriculture, forestry and fisheries financial corporation (doi 2005) consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 4 growth. one does note, however, that while this observation is very surprising in light of beason and weinstein (1996), it is not indicative of causal links between growth and industrial policy. in fact, since jdb loans and tax rate differentials are negatively correlated, it may be the positive correlation of jdb loans with growth is driven by the loans serving as a proxy for the absence of tax breaks and subsidies. the negative correlation between jdb loans and tax rate differentials also substantiates the observation that sectors favored with easy lending are disfavored in terms of tax breaks and vice versa. therefore, one must use regression analysis to disentangle the partial correlations between growth and industrial policy and to make any causal inference. table 1: industry labels label industry 100 agriculture, forestry, fisheries 200 mining 300 manufacturing 310 foodstuffs and beverages 320 textile products 331 chemical and allied products 332 petroleum refining 333 ceramic, stone and clay products 341 iron and steel 342 fabricated metal products 351 general machinery 352 electrical machinery equipment and supplies 353 transportation equipment 354 precision instruments and machinery 400 construction 500 wholesale and retail trade, eating & drinking places 600 finance and insurance 700 real estate 800 services 901 electricity, gas, heat supply and water 902 transport and communications consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 5 table 1.1: growth, productivity, policy tools: ranks. industry label rank growth tornqvist growth gdp 1990 fraction jdb tax rate subsidy rate 352 1 7.96 (1) 6.38 (1) -0.89 (9) 2.62 (2) 0.87 (6) 600 2 1.60 (3) 3.18 (2) -3.57 (21) 2.59 (6) 7.13 (1) 800 3 -1.67 (12) 2.43 (3) -2.40 (13) -0.95 (16) 2.07 (4) 353 4 2.33 (2) 2.31 (4) -0.21 (7) 2.62 (2) -0.48 (13) 902 5 0.17 (5) 2.17 (5) 20.85 (2) -1.35 (19) -0.21 (11) 901 6 -2.08 (15) 2.12 (6) 81.10 (1) -1.35 (19) -2.42 (16) 500 7 -1.08 (9) 1.97 (7) -3.17 (18) -0.42 (15) -0.55 (14) 700 8 -3.81 (21) 1.89 (8) -1.96 (11) -1.42 (21) 1.82 (5) 332 9 -3.30 (19) 1.59 (9) 16.22 (3) -0.11 (12) 43.75 (21) 331 10 -0.64 (8) 1.59 (10) 2.40 (4) -0.11 (12) -0.33 (12) 300 11 0.57 (4) 0.47 (11) -0.50 (8) 0.71 (7) -5.02 (19) 310 12 -2.53 (17) 0.01 (12) -2.35 (12) -1.04 (18) 23.88 (20) 333 13 -1.12 (10) -1.35 (13) -1.37 (10) -0.11 (12) -1.61 (15) 341 14 -1.88 (13) -1.84 (14) 1.57 (5) 0.42 (10) -3.27 (17) 342 15 -2.04 (14) -2.27 (15) -2.80 (16) 0.42 (10) -0.08 (10) 400 16 -3.76 (20) -2.58 (16) -3.50 (20) -0.97 (17) 2.46 (3) 354 17 -0.19 (7) -2.61 (17) -3.26 (19) 2.62 (2) 0.54 (7) 100 18 -2.47 (16) -2.80 (18) -3.17 (17) 0.47 (9) 3.35 (2) 351 19 -2.89 (18) -2.98 (19) -2.78 (15) 2.62 (2) 0.17 (9) 200 20 -1.59 (11) -3.11 (20) 0.31 (6) 14.07 (1) 0.18 (8) 320 21 -0.07 (6) -4.63 (21) -2.61 (14) 0.64 (8) -3.96 (18) notes: numbers in the "rank" column represents the average of the rank in all five categories. all values in variable columns give growth rates for tornqvist productivity and gdp and differences for other variables. the numbers in parenthesis are ranks for the particular variable. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 6 table 1.2: growth, productivity, policy tools: correlation matrices growth gdp90 fraction jdb tax rate subsidy rate growth gdp90 1 fraction jdb 0.1074 1 tax rate -0.0628 -0.2011 1 subsidy rate -0.0535 -0.1537 0.144 1 growth tornqvist fraction jdb tax rate subsidy rate growth tornqvist 1 fraction jdb -0.0732 1 tax rate 0.141 -0.2099 1 subsidy rate 0.1054 -0.1439 0.1568 1 notes: all values are raw correlations. variables are the same as those in table 1.1. regression: the model used by beason and weinstein (1996) involved regressing productivity growth on one and fiveyear lags of the policy variable differentials. since we are looking at a much shorter time period, and since the five-year lags (except on taxation) are insignificant in beason and weinstein’s regression with tornqvist growth in all specifications, we regress productivity growth only on one-year lags of the policy variable differentials. from table 2.1, we see that the regression results broadly sustain the hypothesis of no positive association between policy variables and productivity growth. all coefficients are insignificant, the null that all coefficients are jointly zero cannot be rejected at any reasonable significance level, and the model explains only 2% of the variation. the magnitudes of the coefficients are even smaller than in beason and weinstein (1996), with only the coefficient on the tax differential being of the same order of magnitude as the beason and weinstein coefficients6. therefore, one may conclude that the positive pure correlations observed earlier are products of noise, and that there is no true statistical association between productivity growth and the policy measures. a regression of gdp growth on the same variables (table 2.1.5) produces the same null result. 6 since tornqvist growth is expressed as a percentage in this paper, and is expressed as a fraction in beason and weinstein (1996), all coefficients should be divided by 100 to be compared with the beason and weinstein results in table 5. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 7 one may legitimately ask whether the regression results are driven by sectors that are large winners or losers by a particular policy measure, since the distribution of the policy tool applications is extremely skewed. to account for this problem in their paper, beason and weinstein re-estimated the model with exactly one sector omitted in each estimation. taking the same step, we observe that omitting any one sector has almost no effect on the magnitude, significance, or sign of the coefficients, as well as on the significance and explanatory power of the model (table 2.2). the coefficients on jdb loan differentials and on the subsidy differentials are always trivial, while the coefficient on taxes ranges from .14 to .21, which would suggest that tax relief of 5% relative to the average tax level should increase productivity by 1%, but is always insignificant at even the 10% level. the one exception to this pattern is the exclusion of mining (table 3), which received large tax breaks and had mediocre (small negative) productivity growth during the relevant period. in the regression where mining is excluded, the coefficient on the tax rate is 0.8 and is significant at the 1% level. nonetheless, while the specification is significant at the 5% level and explains 6% of the variation. we performed a similar exercise on the regression of gdp growth on the policy variables (tables not reproduced), and obtained a full confirmation of the original null result. the change in regression results upon the omission of mining is a potentially important indicator of an underlying connection between tax rate differentials and productivity growth. however, looking at table 1.1, one sees that the positive association between tax rate differentials and productivity growth may be driven by a few observations that may be the result of an imperfection of the data. the top two sectors by productivity growth, electrical machinery and automobiles, are classed as “machinery manufacturing” in the national tax office data, and “machinery manufacturing” is a modest winner in terms of tax relief in the 1990s. however, not all sectors in “machinery manufacturing” exhibit strong productivity growth. general machinery has the fourth lowest performance, while precision instruments has only the seventh highest. therefore, it is entirely possible that most of the tax relief went to general machinery, and is being mistakenly attributed to having gone to electrical machinery and automobiles. such an interpretation is plausible from a political economy perspective when one considers that general machinery was one of the fastest-growing industries in the high-growth period and was one of the slowest-growing industries in the 1990s. failure in the sector probably resulted in a severe disappointment of expectations for owners of factors (labor and capital) invested in the sector, so the government may have pressed to aid general machinery. to see if these considerations matter for the exercise at hand, we estimate our specification over all sectors except mining and electrical machinery, and from table 3 model 3.2, obtain a significant coefficient of 0.5 on the tax differential, while the regression as a whole is no longer significant. excluding all sectors in machinery manufacturing (table 3 model 3.3), we see that the tax differential coefficient loses significance. therefore, if the above explanation of the unusually high tax break apparently given to electrical machinery and automobiles is correct, there is no significant positive association between tax differentials and productivity growth, and the hypothesis is sustained. to conclude, we follow beason and weinstein (1996) in estimating the specification separately for sectors whose overall (not just productivity) growth was above and below the median. from table 3 model 3.4, we see that slow growers have similar results to table 2.1, while fast growers (table 3 model 3.5) have consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 8 similar results to table 2.2, from which mining was excluded. considering the same logic as in the previous paragraph, we look at the specification estimated over all fast growers not in machinery manufacturing (table 3 model 3.6), and obtain the same results as in table 3 model 3.2. therefore, if machine manufacturing, with its likely mistake in representing tax breaks given to general machinery as tax breaks given to electrical machinery, is removed from the data, there are no significant differences in the specification between slowand fastgrowing firms. table 2.1 regression results all sectors included variable model 2.1 productivity model 2.1.5 growth jdb (1) -0.005 0.032 (0.20) (1.41) tax rate (1) 0.198 -0.210 (1.38) (0.21) subsidy rate (1) 0.038 -0.360 (0.89) (0.36) constant -0.988 -0.250 (1.90) (0.25) number of obs 180 200 r2 0.003 0.059 f 1.15 1.15 notes: all values are the result of regressions using ols. for each variable, the coefficient is the upper value, and the absolute value of the t-statistic is in parenthesis below. for variables, the number in parenthesis indicates the amount of lag between the recorded variable value and its effect on the dependent variable, in months. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 9 table 2.2 regression results for productivity with sectors omitted variable main 100 200 300 310 320 331 332 diff jdb (1) -0.005 -0.008 0.011 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 (0.200) (0.320) (0.450) (0.200) (0.230) (0.180) (0.200) (0.120) diff tax (1) 0.198 0.183 0.807 0.198 0.195 0.192 0.198 0.194 (1.380) (1.270) (2.990) (1.380) (1.320) (1.350) (1.360) (1.350) diff subsidy (1) 0.038 0.046 0.034 0.038 0.033 0.037 0.038 0.039 (0.890) (1.060) (0.820) (0.890) (0.680) (0.880) (0.880) (0.480) number obs 180 171 171 180 171 171 171 171 r2 0.020 0.020 0.060 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.02 f 1.150 1.250 3.690 1.150 0.930 1.110 1.140 0.85 variable main 333 341 342 351 352 353 354 diff jdb (1) -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 (0.200) (0.200) (0.230) (0.210) (0.270) (0.040) (0.170) (0.180) diff tax (1) 0.198 0.197 0.187 0.21 0.207 0.144 0.182 0.191 (1.380) (1.340) (1.320) (1.420) (1.440) (1.090) (1.260) (1.300) diff subsidy (1) 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.037 0.04 0.025 0.037 0.038 (0.890) (0.880) (0.940) (0.860) (0.950) (0.650) (0.860) (0.870) number obs 180 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 r2 0.020 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 f 1.150 1.12 1.15 1.19 1.29 0.65 1 1.03 variable main 400 500 600 700 800 901 902 diff jdb (1) -0.005 -0.009 -0.005 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005 0.04 -0.009 (0.200) (0.360) (0.200) (0.110) (0.320) (0.210) (0.480) (0.350) diff tax (1) 0.198 0.156 0.195 0.205 0.162 0.194 0.194 0.217 (1.380) (1.050) (1.320) (1.390) (1.100) (1.300) (1.330) (1.470) diff subsidy (1) 0.038 0.046 0.038 0.028 0.043 0.039 0.051 0.034 (0.890) (1.050) (0.860) (0.640) (1.000) (0.880) (1.050) (0.780) number obs 180 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 r2 0.020 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 f 1.150 1.06 1.09 0.93 1.04 1.09 1.08 1.25 notes: all values are the result of regressions using ols. for each variable, the coefficient is the upper value, and the absoulte t-statistic is in parenthesis below. bold values are significant to 1%. for variables, the number in parenthesis indicates the amount of lag between the recorded variable value and its effect on the dependent variable, in months. the number above the results indicates the excluded sector. the results for all sectors is repeated in each row for comparison. consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 10 table 3 productivity regression results variable model 3.1 no mining model 3.2 no mining and electrical machinery model 3.3 no mining and machinery mananufacture model 3.4 slow growers model 3.5 fast growers model 3.6 fast growers, no machinery manufacturing jdb (1) 0.011 0.008 0.007 -0.048 0.000 -0.001 (0.450) (0.370) (0.310) (0.120) (0.010) (0.050) tax rate (1) 0.807 0.502 0.482 0.153 1.019 0.473 (2.990) (1.960) (1.520) (0.910) (2.820) (1.280) subsidy rate (1) 0.034 0.026 0.028 -0.046 0.057 0.045 (0.820) (0.710) (0.780) (0.520) (1.210) (1.160) constant -1.120 -1.486 -1.436 -2.310 -0.073 -0.888 (2.250) (3.230) (2.930) (1.910) (0.100) (1.320) number of obs 171 162 135 90 90 72 r2 0.062 0.030 0.023 0.011 0.123 0.049 f 3.69 1.65 1.070 0.320 4.050 1.170 notes: all values are the result of regressions using ols. for each variable, the coefficient is the upper value, and the absolute valule of the t-statistic is in parenthesis below. bolded values are significant at least at the 5% level. for variables, the number in parenthesis indicates the amount of lag between the recorded variable value and its effect on the dependent variable, in months. conclusion: we observe that the fundamental result of beason and weinstein (1996) – the lack of a positive association between productivity growth and policy tool application – remains valid during the recession of the 1990s. in particular, while beason and weinstein (1996) found a negative association between tax rates and productivity, we find differences in policy across sectors to be largely irrelevant for productivity growth outcomes. beason and weinstein explain such negative associations in part by arguing that governments aid declining sectors to avoid the dislocation that follows their collapse. since such considerations should become particularly salient in a recession, it is surprising that we do not observe negative correlations. one may conjecture that the political economy of japanese transfers in the 1990s depended not only on the desire of governments not to disappoint expectations, but also on factors unrelated to current industry growth, such as political influence of given sectors. such an explanation may be plausible, since it is known that certain sectors – agriculture, mining and textiles – have been consistently favored by the japanese consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 11 government for most of the postwar period, and have developed powerful advocacy groups in government for their interests.7 our confirmation of beason and weinstein (1996) provides further evidence that the fundamental insight of this paper about the political economy of industrial policy holds true. contrary to popular accounts, government is not observed to transfer resources from stagnating sectors into growing sectors, to correct market inefficiencies that may arise in sectors with increasing returns to scale, or to improve longrun growth. rather, government sets taxes, subsidies, and favorable loans according to political necessity in cushioning the losses of investors in declining industries, or in responding to the wishes of organized and influential sectors. these observations question the currently accepted public finance theoretical framework in which government is viewed as a benevolent agent attempting to maximize social welfare subject to the constraints of using particular policy instruments,8 and suggest instead that government is a bargaining process between groups competing for preferential treatment, with holders of formal power concerned far more with ensuring reelection and strengthening political support than with long-term economic efficiency. ultimately, these results call for treating government intervention in the marketplace in public finance models as they treat supply and demand – all three should be seen as arising from the optimizing behavior of agents under resource or institutional constraints. such a modeling approach would preclude seeing government policies as free variables that can be altered by policymakers at will, and rather consider them as part of a politico-economic equilibrium, in which only changes in the fundamental parameters of the market or political structure will lead to changes in policy. 7 it is well-known that the ldp, japan’s most powerful party, sees agricultural workers as some of its key constituents. 8 see e.g. the utilitarian paradigm in public finance, originating with mirrlees (1971): mirrlees, j.a. (1971). “an exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation.” review of economic studies, 38: 175208 consilience | 11 february 2008 | vol. 1 | 12 data appendix: all data is annual and sectoral. value added (gross domestic product): annual report on national accounts, esri 2005. data downloaded from http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html on 04/08/07. data deflated by the gdp deflator provided to the price level of 1990. employment: annual report on national accounts, esri 2005. data downloaded from http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html on 04/08/07. the calendar year table is used to avoid discrepancies with the rest of the data. gross capital stock: japan statistical yearbook, statistics bureau, management and coordination agency, government of japan, 1992-2003. the primary source of the data is the capital stock of private enterprises, published by esri (used by beason and weinstein (1996). taxable income and corporation taxes: japan statistical yearbook, statistics bureau, management and coordination agency, government of japan, 1995-2005. the primary source of the data is the sampling survey of corporations, which is used by beason and weinstein (1996). the survey assigned to each year is the survey that is begun during that year. subsidies: computed as the negative of the ratio of net sectoral taxes less subsidies to sectoral gross domestic product. all data from annual report on national accounts, esri 2005. jdb loans: economic statistics monthly, research and statistics division, bank of japan, 1990-1999, all issues for the month of february. fraction jdb loans computed as ratio of total loans outstanding to the sector from the jdb over the total loans outstanding to the sector from domestically registered banks. references: beason, r. and weinstein, d. e. (1996). “growth, economies of scale, and targeting in japan (19551990).” the review of economics and statistics, 78(2): 286-295 doi, t. (2005). “government financial institutions: what and how to reform” in ito t.; patrick, h.; and weinstein, d. e. eds. reviving japan’s economiy: problems and prescriptions. cambridge, mass: the mit press. tyson, l. d., and zysman j. (1990). "development strategy and production innovation in japan," in c. johnson, l. d. tyson and j. zysman (eds.) politics and productivity: the real story of why japan works. new york: ballenger press. weinstein, d. e. (2001). “historical, structural, and macroeconomic perspectives on the japanese economic crisis” in blomström, magnus; ganges, byron; and la croix, sumner eds. japan’s new economy: continuity and change in the twenty-first century, new york, ny: oxford university press,. aesop2010 full paper template consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 7, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 46–63 peri-urban livelihood and adaptive capacity: urban development in dar es salaam liana ricci department of urban studies sapienza university of rome liana.ricci@gmail.com abstract this research focuses on the interactions between urban development and global environmental change processes as crucial for reducing the impacts of climate change. together with the challenges of rapid urban growth, environmental change impacts will undermine efforts to achieve sustainable development. peri-urban refers to the area where urban and rural features and processes meet, intertwine and interact, usually located between city and countryside. peri-urban growth patterns are shaping most of the urban development in sub-saharan africa, raising concerns regarding vulnerability to global environmental change in unplanned settlements. to date, there has been little exploration of the implications of peri-urban patterns for social vulnerability and adaptation options. the study discussed in this paper, conducted in dar es salaam, tanzania, illustrates the livelihood strategies and environmental management practices used by peri-urban dwellers, while underlining challenges and opportunities for adaptive capacity. according to a few scholars, the acknowledgement of such hybridity leads to a reconsideration of the dominant strategies for addressing environmental issues in peri-urban areas. assuming the transition to urban is the best solution, those strategies emphasize the role of infrastructure and services provisioning. moreover, a criticism of dominant approaches arises through analysis of the recent trend toward ecological security in global cities‘ environmental management. author’s note liana ricci is a phd candidate in urban studies at sapienza university of rome. she holds an msc in environmental engineering, also from sapienza university of rome. her dissertation focuses on spatial and environmental planning for adaptation to environmental change in sub-saharan african cities. she has research and teaching experience at interuniversity research centre on sustainable development—cirps, sapienza university of rome. she is particularly interested in urban development and global environmental change in peri-urban areas and natural resource-dependent communities. keywords: peri-urban, livelihood, vulnerability, sub-saharan africa, adaptive capacity 1. introduction this paper analyzes the livelihoods, natural resource management and autonomous adaptation strategies in the peri-urban areas of dar es salaam, tanzania. the purpose of this research is to illustrate how the interacting dynamics of livelihood, institutional activities, rural-urban relations, and environmental change offer both opportunities and challenges for enhancing peoples‘ adaptive capacity. the aim is to document how peri-urban communities consilience ricci: peri-urban livelihood experience and address environmental changes and institutional actions and strategies they adopt for local adaptation or adaptive capacity improvement. the investigation focused on natural resource systems upon which peri-urban households depend, looking at vulnerability of human–environment systems. the following section will provide background, describing the existing literature. the next section will detail the location and survey method. in the last two sections, evidence of how different people living in peri-urban areas address environmental change is presented and the links to both urban and rural features and dynamics are explored. finally, the relevance of the study with regards to interpretive approaches and spatial planning for peri-urban areas is discussed. 1.1 peri-urbanization according to un habitat, ―for the first time, in 2009, africa‘s population exceeded one billion, of which 395 million, almost 40 per cent, lived in urban areas. this urban population will grow to one billion in 2040, and to 1.23 billion in 2050, by which time 60 per cent of all africans will be living in cities.‖ (un habitat, 2010b). rapid urban growth leads to the proliferation of unplanned settlements and, in fact, in the last several decades peri-urban informal areas have accommodated most of the demographic expansion in african cities. the processes of growth have shaped highly fragmented and dynamic rural-urban interfaces, characterized by constantly changing land uses, activities, social and institutional arrangements. these interfaces have been defined by simon (2008) as ―forms of hybridity‖ due to the coexistence of urban and rural features. the term ―peri-urban‖ has different interpretations and meanings. although there is no consensus on the definition of the peri-urban areas there is growing recognition in the current debate, among development professionals and institutions, that rural and urban features coexist within cities and beyond their limits, and that solely urban or rural systems are inadequate for addressing processes of environmental and development change in the peri-urban context. peri-urban1 refers to the area where urban and rural features and processes meet, intertwine and interact, usually located between city and countryside. peri-urban areas are characterized by mixed populations, important environmental services and natural resources consumed in towns and cities. in this conceptualization, peri-urban refers ―not just to the fringe of the city but to a context where both rural and urban features tend to coexist, in environmental, socio-economic and institutional terms‖. (allen et al, 2006, pp. 20-21). peri-urban areas are complex hybrid systems in which the urban and the rural are blended together. ―in these peri-urban or ‗‗rur-urban‘‘landscapes, common assumptions about the values, activities, land use and social organization of ‗‗rural‘‘ or ‗‗urban‘‘ populations may not be valid, and policies for addressing the vulnerability and adaptive capacity of these populations to environmental change may be ineffective‖ ((reardon et al., 2007; eakin et al, 2010, p. 14). because of residents‘ relationships to environmental changes and their heavy dependence on natural resources, and because the ―rural‖ and the ―urban‖ are so intertwined, these spaces pose ―new‖ institutional challenges for socio-ecological planning and vulnerability assessment (eakin et al, 2010). it is broadly assumed across academic disciplines that the degree to which urban and peri-urban populations 1 commonly ―desakota‖, ―peri-urban interface‖,“urban-rural fringe‖, ―urban transition zone‖ and ―semi-urbanised‖ area, have, to some extent, become interchangeable with `peri-urban'. 48 consilience depend on natural resource-based economic activities plays a significant role in determining their vulnerability to environmental risk: resource dependency in this context can be characterized as dependent on the structure and diversity of income, social stability and resilience. dependency and its implications can be observed through a combination of reliance on climate dependent resources; variability in such income sources; and migration and other social variables associated with stability and resilience [...] the diversity of income sources, and the variability of those income sources across time, can be used as an indicator of vulnerability at the household level, where it is hypothesized that the greater diversity of income the greater resilience of livelihood to disruption of particular sources.‖ (adger, 1999 p. 254). however, in peri-urban areas, vulnerability is equally likely to be associated with a heterogeneous flow of materials and resources involving a variety of economic activities, actors, institutions, power relations, global-local processes, and drivers of change (eakin et al, 2010). the residents‘ close relation to environmental changes, their heavy dependence on natural resources, and the intertwining of rural and urban characteristics cause these spaces to pose ―new‖ institutional challenges for socio-ecological planning and vulnerability assessment. how do peri-urban livelihoods and the rural-urban interplay shape autonomous adaptation strategies to environmental change? and in what ways is institutional environmental planning and management evolving to support the capacity of peri-urban communities to respond to environmental change? are the ―informal‖ autonomous and ―formal‖ institutional strategies and practices acting synergistically? in a context of lack of resources and ―poor‖ fiscal systems, this synergy may be an essential element of, if not a precondition for, the effectiveness of planning actions. in order to address the effects of environmental change, the presumed distinction between urban and rural, even if it is already becoming increasingly less relevant for planning (allen, 2003), needs to be overcome completely. in sub-saharan african cities, functional decentralization and infrastructure provisioning are often advocated as sustainable ―solutions‖ for improving unplanned and underserviced settlements. it is widely argued that improved urban planning and provision of public services and infrastructure are crucial for the development and promotion of resilient cities (stern, 2007) and for addressing environmental threats. there is a broad consensus that betterment of housing conditions and provision of modern infrastructures are the best ways to reduce environmental risk and vulnerability to climate change in unplanned settlements (un habitat, 2003). the majority of studies agree that ―in most cities, planning for adaptation must first overcome an inadequate infrastructure base‖ (satterthwaite, 2008) in order to enhance adaptation and reduce urban vulnerability. governments play a key role in enhancing adaptation (adger and agrawala et al. 2007) and monitoring land-use management systems and sources of urban vulnerability. they should ensure that all urban dwellers have access to infrastructure and services, should guide where settlements develop, regulate hazardous human activities that can produce disasters, design land use regulations and zoning to influence land availability and encourage and foster better quality housing and safer sites (satterthwaite et al 2007). consilience ricci: peri-urban livelihood these positions are linked to the broader discussions of environmental sustainability. there is increasing concern over urban ecological security (ues), which generates strategies to reconfigure cities and their infrastructures in order to secure their ecological and material reproduction. in addition to other contemporary sustainability objectives, ues is expected to respond to challenges of resource constraints and climate change (hodson and marvin, 2009). hodson and marvin stress the new dominant ‗logic‘ of infrastructure provisioning which is characterized as secure urbanism and resilient infrastructure (suri), and express their concern about ―how the pressures of ues and suri as a strategic response are designed to secure the divisible securitization of resources at the metropolitan scale[…], rather than actively contributing to wider collective solutions for the implications of climate change and resource constraints (hodson and marvin 2009 p. 212). their primary criticism is that the predominant focus is on economic aspects in urban governance, while ecological aspects are neglected. the same article also questions the applicability of the urban ecological security approaches and solutions in contexts that are different from world cities: world cities are using their capability, resources and networks to develop a style of transcendent urbanism that is claimed can overcome the potential limits of climate change and resource constraints to guarantee future economic and territorial growth. critically, we need to ask what this means for the by-passed places, the new peripheries constructed by ‗enclosure‘ and the ordinary cities of the north and global cities of the south. the implication is that such cities simply ‗make-do‘ or ‗improvise‘ with their restricted resources and constrained capacity as world cities establish themselves as ecologically secure spaces. alternatively, ‗ordinary‘ cities and cities of the south are configured as potential new markets that ‗consume‘ the architectural and engineered eco-city fixes produced in the exemplary world cities (hodson and marvin, 2009, p. 210). there are, however, alternative approaches to suri (e.g. transition towns) that may help in developing alternative or hybrid solutions. these alternative approaches aim to construct responses based on other principles, such as fair shares, mutual interdependences, social justice and the styles of socio-technical solutions these would imply (hodson and marvin, 2009). traditionally, all these strategies and policies categorize specific economic activities, land use, infrastructures and resources as either rural or urban and adopt a sector-based approach. to overcome this urban/rural dichotomy, mattingly (2009) has proposed a way to address planning in peri-urban areas. he reviewed the results of past research on the peri-urban interfaces (pui) 2 and proposed policies and actions to ―improve the passage from rural to urban living‖. these policies and actions should reinforce other policies, such as land planning and land-related policies, ―aiming at better environmental management, and […] strengthen[ing]local and family food security through support for small farmers with market knowledge, better access to seeds and fertiliser, micro-credit and so on‖ (mattingly, 2009 p. 50). he argues in favor of conducting ―[…] land 2 he mainly refers to the development planning unit research groups on pui at the university college of london, where he is an associate professor. 50 consilience planning that is sensitive to peri-urban social and economic factors or help[s] farmers obtain more of the value of their land rights […]‖ (mattingly, 2009 p.50). to implement this planning the coexistence of different institutions in peri-urban areas and the overlap of their competences and functions must be managed. this implicates the resolution of conflicts between urban governments, which are oriented to develop ―not natural resource-based‖ activities, and rural governments focused mainly on agricultural uses. both urban and rural government can contribute to the creation of sustainable peri-urban systems. mattingly asserts that rural governments give more support to peri-urban agriculture. ―they could take the lead in providing technical advice on peri-urban farming and soil fertility maintenance; improving access to credit, […] strengthening security of tenure; [and defending] the land needs and land rights of farmers, including […] against more powerful and aggressive urban governments‖ (mattingly, 2009 pp. 50-51). on the other hand, urban governments should take responsibility for the impacts of their actions, such as new land demands and waste management, through planning ―the expansion of the city to give more time to the most vulnerable farmers,‖ using sensitivity in design and timing, transparency in decision making, supporting initiatives, and compensation (mattingly, 2009 p. 51). in our case study, dar es salaam, local government addressed the problem of rural-urban integrated planning by designing a strategic urban development plan in 1999 (sudp,1999)3. however, plans for land use zoning and building regulation are still designed along relatively rigid urban/rural divides. while detailed urban plans regulating building activity exist within pre-defined ‗‗urban‘‘ boundaries, development and land use plans in the remaining extra-urban domain, which are regulated by numerous land acts at the national level, are still inconsistent and waiting for ―the city‖ to come. the same problem occurs in vulnerability assessment and adaptation planning at the local level; in fact the entire region of dar es salaam is considered to be a future ―urban region‖ requiring infrastructure provisioning. 1.2 linking peri-urban dynamics and adaptive capacity the rural–urban interface is particularly challenging when addressing adaptive capacity concerns. while the environmental change in african cities (and in least developed countries in general) is broadly studied, these issues have received little attention in peri-urban areas, despite the fact that they constitute the most at-risk part of african cities. peri-urban areas should be treated as integral elements of urban systems in spatial, social, economic, ―functional and planning terms, because they and their environments are integral to the growth and operation of growing cities‖ (simon 2008). those same peri-urban areas include features and are relevant to rural development and livelihood policies. furthermore, the focus on peri-urban areas 3 strategic urban development plan (sudp) designed to replace the dar es salaam master plan was one of the key objectives of the sustainable dar es salaam project (sdp). the sustainable cities programme is a un-habitat/unep programme started in the early 1990's, its aim is to assist cities in achieving more environmentally sustainable growth and development. it is founded on a participatory urban decision making process, and promotes sustainability through environmental planning and management (epm) approach. although a draft document was ready in 1999; even today, the sudp has not legally superseded the 1979 master plan. consilience ricci: peri-urban livelihood is crucial because the urban-rural interface is also the place with the most potential for positive change, due to the many ―forces‖ that come together in this space (erling, 2007, cited in simon 2008). while explaining the nature of this potential, erling gives the example of multifunctional urban agriculture as a source of ―creative and ingenious new approaches to producing food amid competition for land use‖. others (davila, 2002; allen,2003; …) argue that there are other opportunities for positive changes that could be useful for adaptation to environmental change, such as livelihood diversification, access to services, reuse of waste in agriculture, and waste recycling for re-sale in the city (though this might be associated with health problems and pollution), and greater access to information and decision-making. according to common conceptualizations emerging across climate change literature (smit and wandel, 2006), vulnerability is a function of the exposure and sensitivity of a system to hazardous conditions and the ability of the system to cope with, adapt to, or recover from the effects of those conditions. exposure and sensitivity are linked to the properties of a community or group and are dependent on the interaction between the group‘s characteristics and the environment, as well as the characteristics of the climate impulse (change). adaptive capacity refers to a ‗‗system‘s ability to adjust to a disturbance, moderate potential damage, take advantage of opportunities and cope with the consequences of a transformation that occurs‘‘ (gallopin, 2006, p. 296). for other authors this means ―the capacity to modify exposure to risks associated with climate change, absorb and recover from losses stemming from climate impacts, and exploit new opportunities that arise in the process of adaptation‖ (adger and vincent 2005, p. 400). according to these definitions, while exposure and sensitivity orient the potential impact of climate change, adaptive capacity can be a major influence on the eventual impacts of those changes. adaptive capacity is therefore an obvious focus for adaptation planning because it is the component of vulnerability most amenable to influence social systems in coping with climate changes (marshall et al, 2010). adaptive capacity is closely related to many other concepts, such as resilience, coping ability, adaptability, management capacity, flexibility, robustness and stability (smit and wandel, 2006). in this paper resilience is conceived as a perspective for adaptation planning, rather than a clear and well-defined concept to address vulnerability reduction. we apply these principles to address periurban development in dar es salaam. 1.3 case study: dar es salaam dar es salaam is the largest city in tanzania and the third fastest growing urban center in africa. in 2000 it accommodated 33.7% of the mainland urban population and kinondoni was the most populous municipality in the city (un habitat, 2010c). while tanzania‘s urban growth rate is expected to be 4.5% between 2015 and 2020, in dar es salaam it is projected to be higher (un 2010). as in most rapidly growing cities of sub-saharan africa, informal growth represents the predominant ―mode of urbanisation‖ (roy 2005). several studies estimate that about 70% of dar es salaam‘s population lives in informal settlements (kombe 2005; a. lupala 2002). other scholars, like kironde (2006), argue that more than 80% of the buildings in dar es salaam are located in unplanned areas (hill and linder, 2010). 52 consilience this urban growth will occur in an environment that is particularly at risk to the negative impacts of climate change. according to data collected by undp (2009) and ipcc (2007), the main effects of climate change in dar es salaam are flooding, sea level rise, drought and changes in rain patterns. furthermore, global climate change scenarios show that the temperature will continue to rise and rainfall will continue to increase in the years to come (ipccb, 2007). in addition, urban development and changes in socioeconomic conditions in peri-urban areas are altering exposure and sensitivity to environmental changes. these factors are likely to exacerbate the physical drivers of the changes mentioned above, thereby affecting the probability of climate events and stresses and orienting their positive or negative impacts. facing environmental change, peri-urban dwellers are already beginning to diversify their livelihoods, in some cases moving towards lower dependence on the natural resource base and an increased reliance on urban employment and services. this diversification entails changes in social relations, values and livelihood priorities. 2. methods the research seeks to build the knowledge base for the identification and development of adaptive measures tailored to the needs of peri-urban communities in sub-saharan africa. the aim is neither to measure current adaptive capacities and vulnerabilities nor to quantify impacts or effects of adaptation practices. rather, the focus is to document the ways in which periurban communities experience and address changing environmental conditions and the strategies institutions are implementing to improve adaptation or adaptive capacity. this paper looks at human–environment systems vulnerability, including communities, households and groups located in peri-urban areas, with a focus on the natural resource systems upon which people depend. 2.1 scale of analysis adaptive capacity can be investigated on a range of levels (individual, household, institutional, national. etc); this paper focuses on community adaptive capacity and is based on investigations conducted at the household level. this investigation is centered on rural-urban processes and community assets, analyzing household livelihoods, adaptation strategies and environmental management as the main factors that determine adaptive capacity. the analysis also considers that asset-oriented approaches may mask the role of processes and functions in supporting adaptive capacity. an understanding of adaptive capacity needs to give relevance to the different intangible processes such as decisionmaking and governance, fostering of innovation, experimentation and opportunity exploitation. adaptive capacity must also address both formal and informal institutions and entitlements systems. this implies a shift ―from simply looking at what a system has that enables it to adapt, to recognizing what a system does to enable it to adapt (wri,2009)‖ (jones et al 2010: 1). the household focus enables a better understanding of how and why people organize their activities and of collective and individual processes of decision-making within families (preston, 1994). thus, household livelihood strategies give relevant information regarding both collective and individual processes of environmental management and adaptation strategies. consilience ricci: peri-urban livelihood given the crucial role of peri-urban areas in settlement processes, the activities undertaken in these areas must be included as a fundamental resource in adaptation action plans4. it is hypothesized that adaptive capacity in peri-urban areas depends on four factors: type and magnitude of the local environmental impacts of climate change, rural-urban dynamics, land-use patterns and urban fabric, local capacity to cope with climate change effects, and institutional capacity in environmental management and urban development planning. based on this interpretative framework5, a household questionnaire was developed and administrated in 2009. the questionnaire was structured around four main areas of investigation (see appendix i), identified through a review of the literature on peri-urban areas and through discussion at the ardhi university of dar es salaam. these four areas are as follows: rural-urban interaction, access to resources (land, water, energy, etc.), environmental management (water, waste, soil, etc.), and environmental transformations and autonomous adaptation strategies due to climate change. rural-urban interaction, economic flows, the flow of resources and sociocultural relations are fundamental to understanding urban and regional development dynamics. the rural-urban divide has been addressed in key documents that constitute the core of the un habitat mandate. as underlined in the istanbul declaration and the habitat agenda (§ 613 and 169), rural and urban areas are interdependent from an economic, environmental and social point of view. as such, integrated planning approaches are needed. successful approaches should combine advantages of urban, peri-urban and rural processes to promote a more balanced use of natural resources, support mutually reinforcing social and economic development initiatives, and encourage sustainable environmental management (allen and you, 2002). the survey featured questions regarding resource access that aim to identify resource use and the management regime as well as obstacles and opportunities in adaptation to climate change in peri-urban areas. access to water, land, shorelines, sea and raw materials are factors in communities‘ adaptive capacities. similarly, resource management modalities have a considerable effect on the vulnerability of communities. finally, the questionnaire was designed to collect information on local autonomous practices and strategies for adapting to environmental changes, which, as established by cop 7 (decision 28/cp.7), must be considered in identifying adaptation priority actions. overall, the research aims to help in understanding the environmental changes observed by residents of peri-urban areas, their perceptions of the causes of these changes and the strategies implemented to address them in both short and medium-term. 4 refers to action planning or ―a multi-dimensional and on-going process that takes place in real time‖ (friedmann, 2005 ) as a viable solution for addressing the uncertainty, fast-changing environment and lack of financial resources which characterize contexts like sub-saharan african cities. 5 the survey presented here is part of a broader research study in which several types of investigation have been performed: a) household questionnaires; b) ward and district questionnaires (to understand policies and instruments for urban planning and environmental management in kinondoni district); c) surveys and data collection (to gather data and information on the current status of natural resources, infrastructure and services, land use, informal activities, pressures and environmental concern in peri-urban areas); d) interviews with research development centres, government institutions and ngos (to acquire broader knowledge on policies, programs and tools for natural resource management, for adaptation to climate change and for urban and regional development at the national and local levels). 54 consilience 2.2 sampling location the questionnaires were completed by 40 households in four different wards (ten in each ward) (fig.1) in the kinondoni district6: bunju, kunduchi, kawe and msasani. the wards were selected on the basis of a series of field visits, a review of the literature on dar es salaam‘s peri-urban areas and discussion with academics from ardhi university. to obtain a better distribution of cases, two subwards were identified within each of the four wards: one in a coastal area and the other in an inland area. subwards bunju a and boco were selected in the bunju ward; subwards madale and mtongani were selected in the kunduchi ward; subwards makongo and changanikeni were selected in kawe ward. the fourth ward is urban rather than peri-urban ward. it has been selected as a control in order to verify the responses from the other three peri-urban wards. all selected wards are characterized by the coexistence of urban and rural activities (agriculture, livestock, businesses, schools, transport), informal settlements and activities, and low-medium density settlement areas (each lot must be between 0.08 and 6 ha). the neighborhoods chosen to receive the questionnaire are located in areas with different environmental characteristics (coastal and inland areas with different morphologies) and are close to major natural resources (rivers, ocean, wetlands, forests). households were identified according to criteria of socio-economic and cultural heterogeneity in order to obtain a sample as representative as possible of the different dynamics of periurban areas. furthermore, stable and settled households, which have extensive knowledge of resources and local development dynamics and which are dependent on both urban and rural activities and resources, were selected. figure 1: dar es salaam city – municipal boundaries (source: socio-economic survey city of dar es salaam, 2007) 6 dar es salaam has a regional administration with three municipal councils, namely ilala, kinondoni and temeke. the three municipalities are the three districts of the region and are divided into divisions, which are in turn divided into wards. wards are divided into villages in the case of rural areas and streets in the case of urban areas. consilience ricci: peri-urban livelihood 3. results and discussion this survey consisted of a limited number of interviews and could only observe some aspects of households‘ behavior and peri-urban dynamics. although it is not possible to obtain generalized conclusions, the information collected is an important starting point for structuring a more comprehensive and targeted survey, with more tailored questionnaires. involving a larger sample of households in the survey could be useful in assessing the potential impacts of climate change and adaptive capacity and in developing methodologies for supporting the design of appropriate local adaptation actions. there were a number of constraints on survey methodology and its application. local authorities lack adequate knowledge and capacity regarding planning processes and implementation, which are mainly based on "western principles" and there is limited knowledge of climate issues at the local level. other obstacles include limited financial resources and other more important things that must be addressed, such as natural disasters, health, and environmental emergencies, which force medium and long term planning to be pushed aside. as a result, projects that are not included in short-term policy are rarely implemented. the analysis of the empirical data, collected in the four targeted wards in dar es salaam, shows that rural-urban interactions are crucial for livelihood maintenance in a changing environment, due to their economic, social and environmental relevance. furthermore, households have developed multiple adaptation strategies and environmental management practices to cope with environmental threats, but these activities are still neglected in vulnerability assessment and adaptation planning. as a result, there is a need for better understanding of the autonomous practices taking place in peri-urban areas and for strategies to integrate those practices into adaptation planning at the local level. 3.1 rural-urban interaction the analysis of the responses concerning rural-urban interaction showed that in the three wards the majority of households surveyed came from the same district. only a few families were from other regions or other districts of dar es salaam. this shows that the development of peri-urban areas is not solely due to rural-tourban migration flows; an urban to peri-urban migrations also exists, often induced by the upgrading programs undertaken in those areas closer to the city centre from where several interviewees came. fifty percent of the respondents have indicated labor or family as their reason for moving to peri-urban areas. indeed peri-urban areas attract many people seeking a place that allows them simultaneously to undertake or continue rural activities and be close to urban dynamics, benefits and facilities. migration between peri-urban areas and the inner-city, and vice versa, occur frequently and necessarily imply flows of people, resources, information, commodities, production inputs and decision-making power (tacoli, 1998). it implies that a plurality of activities and physical patterns are based on urban and peri-urban interdependencies. most respondents said they travelled to the city centre on a weekly basis (67%) while only 10% travelled either on a daily basis or only rarely. these movements are possible thanks to the local bus system, daladala, which serves almost every area of the region and is used by 90% of the respondents. in 56 consilience remote areas, this mode of transport is supplemented with private transport services that use motorcycles and small vehicles (bajaj and pikipiki). the main sources of livelihood identified are agriculture and livestock (97%), along with other local informal activities, such as petty trade. for this and other reasons, the majority of respondents (83%) wish to live in environments with "free" spaces, while only 17% of respondents wish to move to a more urbanized area with better infrastructure and facilities. 3.2 access to resources the second section of the survey highlighted access to resources such as water, land and energy and the presence or absence of related facilities in populated areas, including solid and liquid waste collection. in this section land tenure arises as an important issue linked to the urban planning process and actions implementation. among respondents, over 60% do not have land title (for house and land), more than 30% have a title deed for rent (leasehold title), and the remaining 7% own a customary title (right of occupancy derived from ancient communities). this title is becoming ever less popular and, although legally recognized, is not protected if other interests arise in urban development (kironde, 2005). even if only 30% have a title deed, almost all respondents claim they pay taxes for land and housing. this means that in some cases there are ―indirect‖ and informal fiscal systems. for example, those who lack a title deed and rent their land or their house from other land ―owners‖ may also pay taxes to the owner for services or land uses. in addition, 26% pay fees for water and electricity and only 9% have to pay for waste collection services, which are often provided illegally by private parties, particularly in denser areas. 3.3 environmental management the responses concerning environmental management (which includes waste management) indicate that only 6% of households use a collection system provided by private parties while the remaining 94% manage waste independently. of that 94%, some manage waste by burning, abandoning and burying it (46%), or by recycling useful materials and composting organic waste to be reused as fertilizer (46%). the remaining 8% of autonomous waste managers practice other activities like collecting materials, such as plastics or metals, for sale to companies or people that can treat or reuse them. none of the respondents uses a sewage collection and disposal system; waste is usually abandoned in pits until saturation (pit latrine). only in very rare cases is a septic tank used. most households surveyed also undertake practices for water management, such as rainwater harvesting, and rely on a variety of water sources. there are also informal groups and community-based organizations for maintenance of roads, canals, and common spaces. 3.4 climate change: observed changes and adaptation practices in the survey section on climate change, almost all respondents noted changes in water availability, soil fertility, soil aridity, air humidity and rain patterns. results show that water availability has been declining significantly in recent years. rivers that normally flow year round have become seasonal, and the amount of water drawn from shallow pits in the wetlands or near rivers has decreased, requiring deeper digging. other significant changes were observed consilience ricci: peri-urban livelihood both in the amount of rain and in normal seasonal rainfall patterns. furthermore, coastline—up to 100 meters in the last 30 years in some places—has eroded significantly, changing village morphology and fishermen's activities. these and other environmental changes result from a complex set of factors, including global warming as well as anthropogenic pressures and inadequate local environmental and urban policies. different strategies for coping with environmental changes are being implemented. because of the decrease in water availability, many people change crop systems (e.g. moving from rice to cassava, which requires less water) or decide to stop farming and start breeding livestock. most respondents, who have been observing rapid and significant environmental changes in recent years, are contemplating plans for coping with further deterioration of environmental conditions that go beyond immediate reactive solutions. they are considering strategies such as change of employment, transition from subsistence activities dependent on natural resources to activities only partially or indirectly dependent on them, such as trade or small business. in some cases, respondents have even thought of moving to another area or returning to their rural native region. these strategies are being considered not only in response to exacerbation of environmental problems but also in the event of higher population pressure and new urban developments, which would interfere with ordinary practices, such as agriculture and the cultivation of livestock. this response is partly linked to the effects of environmental change. these environmental changes are equally attributed to changes in land use, local anthropogenic actions (mainly urban development) and global environmental change, which is more or less humaninduced. in addition, only a few people attribute the ongoing changes to weak institutions and mismanagement of resources. 4. conclusions the results described in the previous paragraph demonstrate that the blend of ―rural‖ and ―urban‖ features is crucial to people‘s livelihoods and is thus strictly linked to their adaptive capacity. ignoring the importance of the availability of land for farming and other activities, the possibility of reusing waste materials, the variety of water sources, and the different ―informal‖ dynamics (and opportunities) could damage people‘s livelihoods and compromise their assets. migration, information, money and commodities intensify rural-urban linkages and increase livelihood diversification. temporary or permanent migration to or from the city, motivated by the search for housing and employment, is a helpful mechanism for increasing earnings, expanding social networks and reducing vulnerability. mobility and migration may also give rise to a growing phenomenon of ‗multi-spatial‘ households and enterprises (adell, 1999). peri-urban development and migrations may generate a local market for street vendors and hawkers and facilitate the arrival of high-middle income dwellers in search of more space or cheaper housing. this, in turn, may constitute job opportunities for domestic help workers. easy access to a variety of transport options enables high levels of commuting between peri-urban-areas and the city center, providing commuters with access to services such as health and education as well as work opportunities. 58 consilience intense rural-urban interplay also creates the possibility of access to solid and liquid waste facilities. the growing flows of liquid and solid waste out of the city into surroundings areas and between peri-urban neighborhoods, although associated with health problems, represents opportunities for reducing the use of commercial fertilizers in agriculture, or for recycling solid waste for sale in the city. this contributes to an increase and diversification of sources of income. rural-urban interplay could also facilitate access to information and decisionmaking processes and structures, which are usually better represented in urban areas. in a rapidly changing environment, access to environmental information and warning systems are vital for risk and vulnerability reduction. peri-urban dwellers have access to resources, but this access is oriented by ―urban biased‖ development. there are already many options for obtaining water, using land, and gaining access to housing or other activities in peri-urban areas, but urbanoriented development plans could undermine these opportunities by pushing for full urbanization, ignoring the positive effects of the existing array of opportunities. providing infrastructure and services to accelerate the transition to the ―urban‖ may reduce vulnerability, but it could also modify or damage the livelihoods system and its flexibility. the focus on infrastructure ―protection‖ and economic competiveness as basic requirements for addressing environmental threats leads to the expulsion of hybrid practices and land uses in peri-urban areas. conversion from peri-urban to urban uses (or pressure to convert) increases commercialization of land, thereby changing peri-urban areas into investment zones where customary practices of land allocation are no longer possible or allowed. this also implies a land regularization process and the imposition of certain fees, which may force poorer people to migrate, further marginalizing them and making them more vulnerable to environmental changes. peri-urban dwellers have a high capacity to change and adapt the ways in which they access and manage resources but at the same time are exposed to considerable uncertainty. the presence of multiple autonomous adaptation strategies and environmental management practices could be a crucial resource in the absence of financial revenues. institutions responsible for implementing adaptation strategies at the local level are required to better understand how urban development and planned interventions affect the community‘s adaptive capacity, both positively and negatively, and how existing approaches could be improved in order to contribute to communities‘ adaptive capacity. the increasing concern over urban ecological security (ues) misses the ecological aspects, focusing on economic aspects of urban governance. the dominant strategic response aspires to construct enhanced ecological security for ―world cities‖ through the creation of secure urbanism and resilient infrastructure (hodson and marvin, 2009). the characteristics and extension on peri-urban features and dynamics in african cities call for alternative approaches, such as tailored rural-urban hybrid solutions. after investigating adaptive capacity in periurban areas, one can highlight specific aspects on rural-urban relation, resources access, environmental management and autonomous adaptation practices. these aspects are strictly linked to mutual interdependence, social justice, human agency and socio-technical solutions, which could inform the aforementioned alternative approaches. this document has highlighted the dynamics and resources of the peri-urban interface, and paid particular attention to areas, processes, and functions that can consilience ricci: peri-urban livelihood be influential in both the development of adaptation strategies and actions implementation. the information obtained through the field survey is essential to identifying sustainable and viable adaptation options. not only does this information provide data on environmental management and autonomous adaptation strategies, but it also reveals a neglected part of urban and rural-urban development processes, emphasizing the conflicts and contradictions between urban development, under the dominant logic of ecological security, and periurban dynamics. further studies focused on the peri-urban context and on ruralurban dynamics may contribute to a reduction in the uncertainty surrounding climate change projection. the experiences, strategies, and actions of people at a local level require even more exploration. ultimately, if environmental change is tied to rapidly evolving social and economic landscapes—as it is in peri-urban areas—it is even more of a challenge to define appropriate measures for minimizing vulnerability. enhancing adaptive capacity requires a conception of populations and communities as an integrated system, free of the urban bias, where urban and rural features, cultures, economies, natural cycles, and livelihoods are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. as adell (1999) states, those who stress the importance of the urban bias, relying on the socially reductionist assumptions ―that the main difference between rural and urban consists in their social ‗classes‘‖ do not consider ―the conflation of people and space.‖ people, not places and physical infrastructure, are responsible for creating 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general climate un-habitat 2010a, state of african cities 2010, governance, inequalities and urban land markets, nairobi: united nations human settlement programme un-habitat 2010b, population of african cities to triple, spokesperson & head press & media relations unit. available at http://www.unhabitat.org/documents/soac10/soac-pr1-en.pdf [accessed, january 2011] un-habitat 2010c, informal settlements and finance in dar es salaam, tanzania, nairobi, 2010 un (united nations) 2010, world population prospects: the 2008 revision and world urbanization prospects: the 2009 revision, http://esa.un.org/wup2009/unup/, wednesday, february 09, 2011 http://country-profiles.geog.ox.ac.uk/ http://country-profiles.geog.ox.ac.uk/ http://www.unhabitat.org/documents/soac10/soac-pr1-en.pdf http://esa.un.org/wup2009/unup/ microsoft word ebere.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 15, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 34-49 a comparative analysis of productivities in shellfish collection in oil spill and non-oil spill communities of river state, nigeria 1ndubueze-ogaraku, mercy ebere, 2onoja, anthony. o & 3monsi, blessing 1,2 &3 department of agricultural economics and extension, faculty of agriculture, university of port-harcourt, east-west road, choba rivers state, nigeria corresponding author’s address: eberem2@gmail.com abstract this study compares the incomes generated from periwinkle and dog-winkle catch amongst farmers in oil spillaffected and non-oil -spill-affected areas in gokana and khana local government areas, rivers state, nigeria. a total of 120 farmers were randomly selected and data were collected using structured questionnaires and personal interviews. analytical tools used included descriptive statistics, net income model, ttest and regression analysis model. results indicated that income realized by the farmers from shellfish sales in non-oil spill-affected local government was higher than that of the oil spill-affected local government area per annum and was estimated as ₦407,812.79.00 and ₦182,485.00 respectively. the level of profit recorded among the farmers in the two areas was significantly different with a t-value of 14.42. the null hypothesis was rejected. the regression model employed three functional forms; linear, semi log and double log. linear model was chosen as the lead equation because of the highest r2 of 59%. cost of labor and transportation had significant effect on the level of profit. cost of labor positively influenced profit while cost of transportation negatively influenced the profit. it is recommended that government intervention programs provide a cheaper means of transportation in the area. keywords: comparative, shellfish, collection oil-spilled, nonoil spill communities consilience ndubueze-ogaraku: comparative productivities of shellfish collection introduction an oil spill is the release of a liquid petroleum hydrocarbon into the environment, especially marine areas due to human activity, and is a form of pollution (uslegal, 2015). the term usually applies to marine oil spills, where oil is released into the ocean or coastal water, but spills may also occur on land. oil spills may be due to releases of crude from tankers, offshore platforms, drilling rigs and wells as well as spills of petroleum products (such as gasoline, diesel) and their by-products. oil spillage is harmful to the environment, posing threats to fresh water and marine environment. it affects surface resources and a wide range of subsurface organisms that are linked in a complex food chain that includes human food resources. spilled oil can harm the environment in several ways, including the physical damages that directly impact wildlife and their habitats such as coating birds or mammals with a layer of oil), and the toxicity of the oil itself, which can poison exposed organisms (nomack,2010). oil pollution threatens the health of shellfish and shellfish industry as well as other aquatic life. oil pollution in many intertidal creeks has left mangrove-nurseries for fish and natural pollution filtersdenuded of leaves and stems with roots coated in a layer of bitumen-type substance sometimes one centimeter or more thick (lazzeri, 2011). pollution kills shellfish and their food source and damages their ability to reproduce, causing both immediate and long-term damage, cumulative harm to shellfish. oil spills have seriously damaged the niger delta mangrove, which is an important fish and shellfish breeding area (obire & amusan, 2003). the severity of an oil spill's impact depends on a variety of factors, including the physical properties of the oil, whether oils are petroleum-based or non petroleum-based, and the ultimate fate of the spilled oil (nomack, 2010). nomack further states that freshwater bodies are highly sensitive to oil spills and are important to human health and the environment. they provide drinking water and nesting grounds and food sources for various freshwater organisms. all types of freshwater organisms are susceptible to the deadly effects of spilled oil, including mammals, aquatic birds, fish, insects, microorganisms, and vegetation. oil spills have a widespread impact on a host of interconnected species (john, 2010). according to john, lush marsh vegetation provides nurseries for shellfish and fish, a food source for many organisms, and a home for fish, birds, and mammals. species that are not directly in contact with oil can be harmed by a spill. predators that consume contaminated prey can be exposed to oil through ingestion. because oil contamination gives fish and other animals’ unpleasant tastes consilience 36 and smells, predators will sometimes refuse to eat their prey and may begin to starve. sometimes, a local population of prey organisms is destroyed, leaving no food resources for predators. there were more than 7,000 spills between 1970 and 2000 in nigeria, and there are 2,000 official major spillages sites, with thousands of smaller ones also waiting to be cleared up (vidal, 2010). more than 1,000 spill cases have been filed against shell alone. the department of petroleum resources estimated 1.89 million barrels of petroleum were spilled into the niger delta between 1976 and 1996 out of a total of 2.4 million spilled in 4,835 incidents (vidal, 2010). several efforts had been made by the government and oil companies to control oil spills in the state but the problem of oil spill has yet to be sufficiently addressed. the nigerian government is financially dependent on oil companies and the actions of the oil companies are encouraged by the favorable regulations of the government (pitkin, 2013). the country is so reliant on its oil that it has relatively little leverage when negotiating with the oil companies. oil producing communities in nigeria experience extensive environmental degradation as a result of oil company activities. according to pitkin, reckless oil extraction has many damaging environmental impacts, from the initial clearing of sensitive ecosystem to pollution during the extraction process to the treatment of industrial wastes. shellfish is a term for exoskeleton bearing aquatic invertebrates used as food; it includes various species of mollusks, crustaceans and echinoderm. despite the name, shellfish are not real fish but simply animals that live in water. most shellfish are found in salt water environments while some others are found in fresh water environments (pawley, 2004). periwinkle (tympanotonus fuscatus) and dog-winkle (thais nodosa) are among the most popular shellfish found in bodo and kaa creek in gokana and khana local government area of rivers state (amnesty international, 2009). they exist in intertidal swamps where the substratum is muddy. periwinkle (t. fuscatus) and dog-winkle (t. nodosa) are very important sources of animal protein, especially in communities around coastal areas. the shells obtained from shellfish are good source of calcium for animal feed and for construction purposes. the shells also provide erosion control in villages around coastal regions in nigeria (bob-manuel, 2011). in gokana local government area of rivers state, the shellfish market constitutes an important industry and means of livelihood for several people within the area (zabbey, hart &wolf, 2010). akinrotimi, abu, ibemere and opara (2009), recommend that 35g out of the required minimum of 77g of reference protein should be obtained from animal products. but only 7g out the 35g available in nigerian diets comes from animal sources. this means that only one fifth of the minimum animal protein requirement is presently supplied by animals consilience ndubueze-ogaraku: comparative productivities of shellfish collection produced in the country. they further estimated the quantity of fish required in nigeria to be 869,000 tons/year, whereas the quantity produced from all sources was 663,000 tons leaving a deficit of 206,000 tons. of this deficit, a little over 106,000 tons was met by imports. it could be concluded from the trend of events between 1975 and 1985 that the deficit value must have risen higher within the decade. aviachie (1976) as cited in akinrotimi., et al, (2009) reported that maximum sustainable yield of fish from all sources was 484,000 metric tonnes while the demand for human consumption alone for the target years 1975, 1980, and 1985 were 380,000tons, 574,000 tons, and 1,229,000 metric tons respectively. nigeria is blessed with quite a lot of marine shellfish with potential for culture but the country has recorded a disparity between demand and supply of the product. according to akinrotimi., et. al (2009), marine shellfish could contribute significantly to our nutritional needs in this country, as shellfish are cheaper protein source than conventional sources such as beef, chicken meat, pork, egg, and fish. the generally low fat content of shellfish makes them useful in mitigating obesity in our society. the above factors, coupled with an abundant natural seed supply, are good indicators that marine shellfish cultures such as oysters, periwinkle and cockles have good prospects for investment in nigeria. periwinkle (t. fuscatus) and dog-winkle (t. nodosa) are sources of food, livelihood and income, yet their productivity and availability has been constrained by several occurrences of oil spills on bodies of water in gokana, especially in the bodo community (zabbey, 2008). it was further observed that oil pollution substantially degrades the delta network of alluvial swamps, creeks and rivers, which in turn produce undesirable impact on the environment and income levels of the people in the area. the activities of petroleum exploration, exploitation and production produce various wastes, which are a major source of pollution in the coastal states (ekpo and essien-ibok 2013). the disposal of these wastes in the niger delta has polluted land and water, damaging fisheries and agriculture, which has affected the standard of living of the people. oil spill pollutants affect aquatic life in the sediments and the open water, thus leading to massive fish kill, including all the organisms that contribute to the food web of fish species (enyenihi, 1990). according to pyagbara (2004), one of the fallouts of oil pollution in gokana in rivers state is the destruction of the traditional local economy of fishing and farming. fish and shellfish are driven from in-shore as a result of water pollution and gas flaring, causing poor shellfish catch, which has led to consilience 38 dysfunction socio-economic fishing activities. oil exploration and exploitation in the coastal waters and creeks causes the pollution of the aquatic environments, which poses a serious threat to the survival and development of fish stocks. in the coastal waters, especially estuaries, it destroys the nursery and feeding grounds, thereby impoverishing the artisanal fishermen. pollution kills fish, their food sources and fish larvae, and damages the ability of fish to reproduce, causing both immediate and long-term damage to fish stocks. when oil and wastes are discharged into an enclosed body of water, fish are directly exposed to pollutants and can die (ifunanya, 2010). the problem of oil pollution has plagued the collection of periwinkle (t. fuscatus) and dog-winkle (t. nodosa), which has affected the income levels as well as the living standards of the people. the reduction in the quantity supplied in the markets may have been responsible for increase in the price of shellfish in the study area. over the past 5 to 6 years, the influence of oil spillage on water bodies in the community has resulted in very low harvest of t. fuscatus and t. nodosa (zabbey 2008). according to zabbey, the danger of oil pollution has threatened the locality where periwinkle and dogwinkle are found. according to local sources, oil spillage occurred in august, 2008 and the spill continued for over 4 years. before the year 2008, the bodo community was the major market for periwinkle (t. fuscatus) and dog-winkle (t. nodosa) and the major distributor of these shellfish to bori, onne, and tai markets in ogoni (onugbuta-enyi, zabbey, and erondu 2008). the people in these communities hardly catch enough quantity of these products for family consumption. the study was designed to compare income generation from shellfish collection in the oil spill-affected and non-oil spill-affected communities of gokana and khana local government areas, rivers state. the specific objectives of the study were to; estimate and compare the cost and returns from shellfish collection in oil spill and non-oil spill communities per annum and determine the effects of socio-economic variables on profit from shellfish collection in oil spill and non-oil spill communities in the study area. hypothesis of the study ho1: the profit level from shellfish collection in nonoil spill-affected community is not significantly different from oil spill-affected communities. consilience ndubueze-ogaraku: comparative productivities of shellfish collection methodology the study was carried out in bodo and kaa communities gokana and khana local government areas of rivers state, eastern niger delta of nigeria. there are 18 communities in gokana local government area, including bodo, and 38 communities in khana local government area, including kaa. bodo and kaa creeks provide opportunities for large-scale shellfish. bodo community creek lies approximately between latitudes 40 361 and ‘40 35 n and between longitudes 70 151 and 70 161 “50 9. gokana and khana local government areas are located between latitudes 40 33 and 40 50’ n and longitudes 70 20’ and 70 35’ e. the population of the of gokana people according to npc 2006 figure was estimated at 233, 813 comprising 188, 22 males and 115 females. there are 18 settlements in the study area and each settlement has a majority of fishermen and farmers, with an estimated 22,000 farmers in kaa khana local government area (pyagbara, 2002). sampling techniques purposive and random sampling techniques were used in selection of the respondents. bodo city was purposively selected from gokana local government area, which is an oil spill-affected community (amnesty international, 2009). kaa was purposively selected from khana local government area, which is a non-oil spill community (zabbey, 2009). random sampling technique was adopted in selection of respondents who are involved in shellfish catch. sixty (60) respondents were selected from bodo city in gokana local government area and 60 respondents were selected from kaa in khana local government area, giving a total of 120 farmers in the entire study area. data sources and collection method the study relied on both primary and secondary sources of data. primary sources of data were collected using questionnaires, personal observations and interviews to obtain relevant information from farmers while secondary sources of data were collected from journals, textbooks, and internet publications. the study used a questionnaire including questions about the type and quantity of shellfish collected, unit price, cost of labor, transportation and sales. interviews and personal observation were used to obtain other relevant information from the respondents. consilience 40 method and technique for data analysis objective one (1), which is estimation of cost and returns from periwinkle and dog-winkle, was analyzed using net farm income model and objective two (2) was analyzed using multiple regression model. net income model tc = tvc + tfc where: tc = total cost of shell fish collection tvc = total variable cost shellfish collection which include; cost of labor (n), cost of transportation (n), cost of packaging materials (n) and miscellaneous expenses (n) tfc = total fixed cost ie the depreciation value of the fixed assets; depreciation value of basins (n), basket in (n), lantern in (n), bowls in (n) tr = p x q; where: tr = total revenue of the shellfish collector p = price of shellfish per unit q = quantity of periwinkle and dog-winkle harvested (collected); ni = gm – tfc where: ni = net income of the farmers gm = gross margin regression analysis model y = a + b1 x1 + b2 x2 + b3 x3 + b4 x4 + b5 x5 + b6 x6 + b7 x7 + b8 x8 + e where y = amount of net income in naira x1 = amount of labor in naira x 2 = age in years x3 = educational level x4 = household size in numbers x5 = gender (female (1), male (2)) x6 = years of experience in numbers consilience ndubueze-ogaraku: comparative productivities of shellfish collection x7 = marital status x8 = cost of transportation in naira a = constant term e = random term assumed to have zero mean and constant variance. the functional term is fitted below using three (3) functional forms: linear production function y = a + b1x1 + b2x2 + b3x3 + b4x4 + b5x5 + b6x6 + b7x7 + b8x8 + e ……….. (1) semi-log production function. logy = a + b1x1 + b2x2 + b3x3 + b4x4 + b5x5 + b6x6 + b7x7 + b8x8 + e …….. (2) cobb-douglas’ production function (double log) logy = a + b1 logx1 + b2 logx2 + b3 logx3 + b4 logx4 + b5 logx5 + b6 logx6 + b7 logx7 + b8 logx8 + e ………………………………………………………………...... .............(3) where; x1-----x8 = independent variables b1----b8 = regression coefficients a = constant term e = error term t-test analysis where and are the means of the two samples δ is the hypothesized difference between the population means s1 and s2 are the standard deviations of the two samples n1 and n2 are the sizes of the two samples. consilience 42 results and discussion table 1 presents the result of the profitability of shellfish collection in gokana and khana local government areas, rivers state. table 1: cost and returns of shellfish collection in the nonoil spill community in khana local government area of rivers state. items amount in naira (n) cost of labor 61,285.42 cost of transport 3,860.34 packaging materials 768.86 miscellaneous expenses 4,717.97 total variable cost 70,632.59 revenue revenue from periwinkle 163,848.22 dog-winkle 243,964.57 total revenue from dog-winkle 407,812.79 gross margin 337,180.20 total fixed cost 3,059.32 total costs 73,691.91 net profit 334,120.88 source: field survey, 2013. the results in table 1 show the cost and returns of shellfish farmers in the non-oil spill community (kaa) in khana local government area, demonstrating that variable cost was seventy thousand six hundred and thirty two naira fifty nine kobo (n70,632.59), fixed cost was estimated as three thousand fifty nine naira thirty two kobo (n3,059.32) and the total cost was seventy three thousand six hundred and ninety one naira ninety one kobo (n 73,691.91). the total revenue was four hundred and seven thousand eight hundred and twelve naira seventy nine kobo (n407,812.79). the gross margin was estimated as three hundred and thirty seven thousand one hundred and eighty naira twenty kobo (n337,180.20) while the net profit was found to be three hundred and thirty four thousand one hundred and twenty naira eighty eight kobo (n334,120.88). table 2: cost and returns of shellfish collection in oil spill community in gokana local government area items amount in naira (n) cost of labor 35,800 cost of transportation 7,008.00 packaging materials 539.08 miscellaneous expenses 4,696.00 total variable cost 48,043.08 revenue periwinkle 78600.1 consilience ndubueze-ogaraku: comparative productivities of shellfish collection dog-winkle 182,485.74 total revenue from periwinkle and dogwinkle 182,485.74 gross margin 134,442.66 total fixed costs 3,074.50 total cost 51,117.58 net profit 131,368.16 field survey, 2013 the results in table 2 show the cost and returns of shellfish farmers in the non-oil spill community (bodo city) in gokana local government area, demonstrating that the variable cost was estimated at forty thousand forty-three naira eight kobo (n48,043.08), fixed cost was estimated at three thousand seventy-four naira fifty kobo (n3,074.50) and the total cost was fifty-one thousand one hundred and seventeen naira fifty-eight kobo (n51,117.58). total revenue of farmers in oil spill area was one hundred and eighty-two thousand four hundred and eighty-five naira seventy-four kobo (n182,485.74). gross margin was estimated at one hundred and thirty-four thousand four hundred and forty-two naira sixty-six kobo (n134,442.66) while the net profit was one hundred and thirty-one thousand three hundred and sixty-eight naira sixteen kobo (n131,368.16). net profit from oil spill community was one hundred and thirty-one thousand three hundred and sixty-eight naira sixteen kobo (n131,368.16). table 3: difference in profits level between oil spill and non-oil spill communities parameter mean profit from non oil spill community (n) mean profit from oil spill community(n) mean profit 89,296.84 27,532.22 person correlation 0.067 std. deviation 29084.38 18040.43 std. error 3754.78 2329.01 hypothesized mean difference 0 df 59 t stat 14.420 p(t<=t) one-tail 5.3193572e-4 t critical one-tail 1.671 p(t<=t) two-tail 7.0335676-e4 t critical two-tail 2.000 source: field survey, 2013 the results in table 3 show the mean net profit of farmers of shellfish collection in non-oil spill community in khana local government area, which was estimated as eighty consilience 44 nine thousand two hundred and ninety-six naira eighty-six kobo (n89,296.84), while the mean net profit of farmers in oil spill community in gokana local government area was twentyseven thousand five hundred and thirty-two naira twenty-one kobo (n27,532.21). the t-value was (14.42) which indicates that the mean profit value between the two local government areas is significantly different at 1 percent level of significance. the null hypothesis was rejected. the alternative hypothesis that the mean profit from non-oil spill community was higher than the mean profit from oil spill community was accepted. this implies that people in non-oil spill community made higher profit than those in oil spill community. the oil pollution in the study area may have damages some aquatic life, causing the low catch recorded by the collectors in the oil spill-affected community. this is in line with the report of zabbey (2008), which observed that oil pollution substantially degrades the delta network of alluvial swamps, creeks and rivers, which in turn produces undesirable impacts on the environment and local income levels. table 4: determinants profit for periwinkle and dog-winkle in the study area linear semi-log double log variables coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficie nt t-value constant 124273.500 5.435*** 12.508 8.440*** 21.478 2.593** sex -12800.800 -1.609 -0.473 -0.917 -0.019 -0.330 education 3990.388 1.055 0.160 0.654 0.390 0.909 household -5595.95 -1.419 -0.149 -0.583 -0.196 -0.445 experience -2325.338 -0.787 -0.038 -0.200 0.106 0.206 labor cost 0.347 2.181** 0.000 1.146 0.448 0.925 transport cost -11.534 -8.882* 0.000 -3.852*** -1.890 3.956*** age -396.885 -1.077 -0.011 -0.481 0.029 0.036 marital status 2774.262 1.015 -0.120 -0.677 -0.201 -0.548 rsquared = 0.585 0.228 0.216 adjusted r square 0.555 0.172 0.159 field survey, 2013 consilience ndubueze-ogaraku: comparative productivities of shellfish collection table 4 presents the regression results of determinants on profitability for periwinkle and dog-winkle, showing that linear functional form had the highest r2 (i.e. coefficient of multiple determinants of 58.5% was chosen as the lead equation and used for discussion. the estimated r2 of 58.5% implies that 58.5% of the variability of the exogenous variable is attributable to the explanatory variables used in the model. cost of transport had a significant and negative coefficient, which indicates that an increase in money spent on transportation resulted to decrease in profitability from shellfish collection. this implies that transportation plays a significant role in the profit level of shellfish collection in khana and gokana local government areas. this is in consistent with the finding of yesufu and ayanwale (2013) which showed that cost of transportation negatively influenced the level of profit realized in broiler processing in southwestern nigeria. the results also show that the cost of labor was statistically significant and positively correlated with revenue. this is consistent with the findings of dziwornu (2014), who found that costs of day-old chicks, feed, labor, medicine/vaccines, and other cost had positive and significant correlation with profit. the study also agrees with the finding of adebayo, anyanwu, ikenwachukwu and onyia (2014), which indicated that amount of the labor used in harvesting fish in nigeria positively influenced the quantity of fish harvested at a statistically significant1% level. this implied that more labor expended in the business led to greater output and therefore greater revenue and profit. the positive correlation between labor and net profit in shellfish collection implies that increased cost of labor results in increased net profit for the farmers. this is because if farmers employ more labor, they will harvest a greater quantity of periwinkle and dog-winkle, resulting in increased sales and revenue and increased profit levels. conclusion this study estimated mean profit differentials in non-oil spill-affected and oil spill-affected communities. it found that productivity of non oil spill-affected communities was higher than their counterparts engaged in shellfish collection activities in oil spill community. the significant difference in mean profit value between the two local government areas suggests that crude oil pollution may have contributed to the low catch recorded in the oil spill-affected communities. given the above findings, it is recommended that immediate and proactive measures to be taken to avert further degradation of the fishery consilience 46 resources in the area, which could jeopardize the livelihood of the fishermen in the area. in light of these findings, the authors recommend that; crude oil drilling companies in the area should replace faulty oil drilling pipes with new ones. they also suggest that educational and research institutes including national institute for fishery, oceanography and marine research should fund studies and experiments on the domestication of shellfish in the study area. they further suggest that the government and oil companies involved in crude oil drilling should ensure that oil spillage be controlled in the study area and that efforts should be made to reduce the cost of transportation through programs that subsidize transportation costs. references adebayo e. f., anyanwu s. o, ikenwachukwu n. & onyia l. u. (2014). economics of fish harvesting in nigeria: a case study of yola north local government area of adamawa state. consilience ndubueze-ogaraku: comparative productivities of shellfish collection iifet 2014 australia conference proceedings. https://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1957/5 4437/adebayo%20135.pdf?sequence akinrotimi, o.a., abu o.m.g, ibemere, i.f., opara. c.a., (2009). economic viability and marketing strategy f periwinkle in rivers state, nigeria. retrieved on 12/12/13 from www.aquaticcommons.org/7321/1/vol_5_2 amnesty international (2009). nigeria: petroleum, population and poverty in niger delta. london: amnesty international publication. retrieved on 20/03/13 from http:amnesty.org amnesty report (2011). nigeria: oil giant shell criticized over niger delta pipelines “sabotage” claims. amnesty international publication. retrieve on 20/08/2013 from www.amnesty.org/en/news/shell bob-manuel, f. g., (2011). food and feeding ecology of the mudskipper periopthalmiskoelreuteri(pallas) gobiidae at rumuolumeni creek, niger delta, nigeria. agriculture and biology journal of north america. 2 (6): 897 – 901 dziwornu, r.k (2014). econometric analysis of factors affecting competitive advantage of broiler agribusinesses in ghana. journal of development and agricultural economics. vol. 6(2), pp. 87-93. ekpo, i.e and essien-ibok, m.a (2013). development, prospects and challenges of artisanal fisheries in akwa ibom state, nigeria. international journal of environmental science, management and engineering research vol. 2 (3), pp. 69-86, jul-aug., 2013 available online at http://www.ijesmer.com enyenihi u.k. (1990). biological conservation for environmental stability and food production. trans. nig. soc. boil. conserve. 1: 4 – 10. ifunanya a.s. (2010). the impact of oil spillage on agricultural production: a case study of ibeno local government area, akwa ibom state, nigeria. pp 117. lazzeri, t (2011). shell accepts liability for two oil spills in nigeria', the guardian, 03/08/2011, consilience 48 http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/aug/03/shellliability-oil-spills-nigeria national population commission (npc)(2006). legal notice on publication of 2006 census final results. federal republic of nigeria official gazette, abuja 2 (96), 1 – 42. nomack, m. (2010). environmental impacts of oil spills. retrieved from http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/158443 obire, o. &amusan, f.o., (2003). the environmental impat of oilfield formation water on a fresh water stream in nigeria. journal of applied science & environmental management. onwugbuta-enyi, j., zabbey, n. and erondu, e.s. (2008). water quality of bodo creek in the wet niger delta basin. advance environmental biology. 2(3): 132-136. pawley a, (2004). are crustaceans shellfish. retrieve 2013-03-17 from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/shellfish. pitkin, j (2013) oil, oil, everywhere: environmental and human impacts of oil extraction in the niger delta. an unpublished b.a thesis submitted to the department of art for environmental analysis. theses. paper 88. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/pomona_theses/88 pyagbara, s. l. (2004). impacts of oil pollution on the environment and wellbeing of a local indigenous community: a paper prepared for movement for the survival of the ogoni people (mosop) of nigeria. retrieved on 04/04/2013 from www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii uslegal, inc (2015). oil spill law and legal definition. definitions.uslegal.com › legal definitions home. vidal, j (2010) nigeria's agony dwarfs the gulf oil spill. the us and europe ignore it. the guardian newspaper sunday 30th may, 2010. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/30/oilspills-nigeria-niger-delta-shell. accessed on 16th november, 2015 yesufu, o. a and ayanwale, a.b (2013). economic analysis of factors affecting the profitability of broiler processing in south western nigeria. learning publics journal of agriculture and environmental studies vol 3 (2). 1-19. retrieved on 16/06/2015 form learningpublics.org/index.php/agricjournal/article/download/26/23. zabbey. n., (2008). oil and water: the bodo spill and the destruction of traditional livelihood structures in niger delta. oxford consilience ndubueze-ogaraku: comparative productivities of shellfish collection university press and community development journal. retrieved on 2/04/2012 from http://cdj.ofordjournals.org zabbey, n., (2009). pollution and poverty in the niger delta regionwhat is the responsibility of oil companies in nigeria. (electronic version). zabbey, n., hart, a.i, and wolf, w.j. (2010). population structure, biomass and production of the west africa lucinid kelestis-les rhizoecus (bivalua, mollusca) in sivibilagbara swamp at sido creek, niger delta, nigeria hydrobiologia 654, 193-203. appendix 1 (a) pictures of periwinkle (tympanotonus fuscatus) (b) dog-winkle (thais nodosa) consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 9, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 33 – 46 the monitoring and evaluation system of the millennium villages projectpotou/senegal: close look at the midterm evaluation report ousséni kinda kindaousseni@yahoo.fr abstract this paper explores the monitoring and evaluation system of the millennium villages project in potou, rural senegal. it specifically focuses on the first evaluation report undertaken in 2009 after three years of intervention to assess the impacts of the project on communities in potou. theory of change, causal attribution, scaling-up, use of evaluation, and learning are the key issues that are addressed throughout the paper. interviews with beneficiaries and project staff as well as the analysis of the project’s evaluation report revealed that the project has created many positive impacts in the communities of potou. however, unintended negative results have been observed in the sectors of education, health, and agriculture. given the weaknesses that have been identified in the evaluation method, this paper suggests some strategies to strengthen the methodology of future evaluations, thus allowing for distinct attribution of the impacts to the project. author’s note kinda is an economist working on the issues of development with a focus on monitoring and evaluation. he has participated in field work in the millennium villages project in senegal addressing evaluation issues. keywords: attribution, evaluation, method, millennium villages, potou. 1. introduction the millennium villages project (mvp) was launched in 2006 in ten african countries, including senegal. it focuses on achieving the millennium development goals (mdgs) and helping develop strategic sectors with local leaders in communities. in senegal, the intervention site of the mvp is the rural, northwestern community of leona. the project seeks to have a great positive impact in that locality, and thus mdgs are monitored and evaluated to ensure this purpose. monitoring and evaluation (m&e) are essential in managing development projects. a good m&e system enhances the action of a project, such as the mvppotou, and ensures the development of learning and knowledge. m&e are accepted by many experts as key ingredients to a successful project life. 34 consilience the mvp-potou has its own m&e tool that was designed by the headquarters of the mvp located in new york. the monitoring system provides mvp with the instruments and tools it needs to collect information in project areas and thus evaluate its progress, achieved objectives, and allocation of resources. conducting evaluations of its interventions since 2009, mvp has been able to identify some of its accomplishments. beyond these achievements, though, is there plausible evidence for the advancement of learning, generation of knowledge, and causal attribution produced from the project? the paper explores the m&e tools of mvp-potou and analyzes the 2009 mid-term evaluation report results with a close look at the methodological approach used. drawing from a literature review, interviews with key actors in potou, and personal observation, the paper is organized as follows. first, it provides a background of the mvp-potou as well as an overview of its m&e system. then, there is an examination of the main results in the 2009 evaluation and their internal and external validity. finally, the lessons learned are addressed. 2. the millennium villages project:1 the case of potousenegal at the millennium summit in september 2000, world leaders set forth quantified and time-bound goals, known as the millennium development goals (mdgs), to alleviate key development problems across the world. the millennium villages project was thus established with the joined efforts of the earth institute of columbia university, ngo millennium promise, and united nations development program (undp) to aid communities in developing countries suffering from poverty. by employing well-targeted and practical inputs, the mvp can help guide communities to a path leading to self-sustaining development (kanter et al, 2009). the mvp argues that poor villages can overcome underdevelopment issues by 2015 if they are empowered with efficient and modern technologies. countries participating in the mvp were selected with regards to community poverty levels, potential of agro-ecological zones, standards of good governance, stability, and commitment to the idea of achieving the mdgs. another important criterion was that at least 20% of a country’s children under the age of five years old are malnourished (mvp, 2009b). the mvp reaches nearly a half million people across fourteen sites in ten countries in sub-saharan africa. in the first five-year phase, each of the millennium villages had a donor budget for core interventions of $60 per capita ($24 million total) per year, half of the total project budget. of this per capita budget, $110 directly supported mvp interventions in agriculture, education, health, infrastructure, gender equality, and business development, and $10 was budgeted for establishing, training, and paying local staff to lead the village-based systems in each mvp site (mvp, 2011b, p.12). 1throughout the paper, the use of mvp will refer to the millennium villages project while mvp-potou applies to the case of senegal. consilience kinda: monitoring and evaluation of mvp – senegal in senegal, the area covered by the mvp consists of 6 millennium villages (mv) located in the rural community of leona with potou as pilot mv. the 6 mv are sub-zones, or groups of villages, each having between 4000 and 7,000 inhabitants living in the same administrative unit (mvp, 2009a). the rural community of leona has an area of 415 square kilometers and is made up of 32,2182 inhabitants located within 106 villages (mvp, 2011a). each mvp site includes a research village or mv1 (e.g. mv-potou in senegal) covering approximately 5,000 persons. these sites participate in research activities, such as answering household surveys to contribute to data collection. potou, the pilot millennium village, has a population of 7,264 people and covers 16 villages of the 106 villages within the intervention area. although all interventions concern the rural community of leona, this paper is structured around the mv potou. the objectives of the mvp-potou stem from the mdgs and focus on the following components: agriculture and environment, development of business enterprises, infrastructure, education, and health and nutrition. on a subsidiary basis, “local governance and sustainable strategies” can be included as components through which the mvp-potou seeks to provide the rural community of leona with mobilized technical, financial, and negotiation resources. the approach developed by mvp-potou is intended to be participative and gender sensitive. the first project phase was spread over 5 years and provided mostly free services to achieve “quick-wins” in its components. the second phase that was recently launched in 2011 is a logical continuation of the first phase. however, the second phase differs from the first by which it seeksto promote a support of local actors in exchange of a financial contribution. 3. monitoring and evaluation system of the mvp-potou the mvp-potou has a system of m&e that can be presented in the table 1 below. 2 this is the target of the project interventions. 36______________________________________________________________________________________ consilience table 1: system of m&e of the mvp-potou monitoring & evaluation lines activities/ interventions responsibilities periodicity methods/monitori ng& evaluation tools/data source scope resources  assessment of the impact of the mvp interventions on accelerating progress toward mdg targets  review of costs of the interventions and the contribution of project partners relative to the $120 per capita cost ceiling of the project  performance monitoring of the adequacy, uptake, and coverage of project interventions  qualitative implementation science that documents the timing and sequence of interventions, alongside key barriers and facilitators to implementation  education: supply of free school infrastructures  health: improving the geographical accessibility and health coverage (free basic health services supply), development of communication for behavior change  water and sanitation: water connections, civil engineering, supply of sanitation regulatory devices  energy, ict, roads: maintenance of facilities, introducing new technologies and promoting good practices (improved stoves, etc.), technical support  environment: reforestation, development of natural reserves, technical support  agriculture/fisheries /livestock: technical and financial support  business enterprises development: entrepreneurship development key points transversal to all sectors:  strengthening skills and capacities of actors sensitization of beneficiaries  the managers of each component are in charge of monitoring interventions  sharing responsibilities in some cases between managers of components  monitoring committees located within the mv are actors of monitoring  monthly, quarterly and annual monitoring of activities  evaluations: baseline (2009), midterm, final first phase evaluation, final evaluation of the project (2015) methods/ instruments  surveys  annual work plans  registers  periodical reports  conventions  computerized database  planning and dialogue meetings  supervision missions  millennium villages information system (mvis) sources  specific survey data  reports data  mvis data  data from a single component or multiple components of the project  coverage  costs  achievements/ progress  challenges recommendations  qualitative learning  experts1 in charge of the project components and specialists in finance, communication, administration, accounting, and monitoring and evaluation  governmental services agents  monitoring and evaluation department: includes an experienced statistician (data manager) and three data entry operators  “field teams” composed of agricultural technicians, nurses, midwives, community workers (installed in the rural community) facilitates the implementation of interventions  financial resources (from west africa focal point of the project (mali) or the headquarters) source: self-construction, 2012 3 there is a recurring mobility of the mvp-potou staff. this is a risk factor to be taken into account during the planning of the project activities. consilience kinda: monitoring and evaluation of mvp – senegal the mvp-potou is led by a team of individuals and experts divided among the various components of the project. in the 6 millennium villages in the rural community of leona, m&e committees were organized in areas related to the 5 components of the project: agriculture and environment, health and nutrition, education, infrastructure, and business enterprise development. the community with the help of the rural council defined the criteria for the selection of m&e committees. these committees assisted with project implementation, including identification of problems, planning, implementation, and monitoring of interventions. monitoring ensured the effectiveness of the timing, sequencing, and progress of interventions. the information system of the projects of the millennium villages (millennium villages information system (mvis))4 was established specially to facilitate the monitoring of the mdgs’ indicators. this allowed different sites to monitor mdg indicators, such as birth rate, immunization coverage, and mortality rate. this information helped identify the main gaps in staffing, services, and infrastructure. the project team analyzed all the reports to learn about the project interventions in the field. if the data showed inefficiency, the team would reframe the project’s approaches. each report was sent to the headquarters of mvp in new york, which provides checks and balances in decision making with the office of mvp-potou. the mvp-potou chain of results followed an inputs-activities-results model. the examination of the relationship between activities and outputs allowed for the measurement of all components in order to see what extent to which the results have been achieved or not. according to the head of m&e,“evaluating the cost of interventions follows a cost-benefit analysis in order to assess the profitability of the interventions.” as mentioned in table 1 above, the overall project design incorporated a set of evaluations. as such, data collected at both baseline and year 3 were the main steps of the overall approach implemented to make a first evaluation of the project. 4. evaluation methodology 4.1 the baseline data collection method data collection through surveys in the pilot mv monitored the progress towards achieving mdgs. the surveys focused on the different components of the project. a population census before the implementation of the project allows for the collection of detailed data on households and population characteristics. questionnaires designed in accordance with the requirements of each segment were administered to a random sample of 300 households. a set of indicators6 was used to collect information on the mdgs. the database manager and project coordinators 4 as an illustration of the information system of the mvp-potou; the "childcount+" is an initiative to collect information concerning the nutritional status of children and pregnant women. 6 over the implementation of the project, it was necessary to adjust some indicators because they were not appropriate. 38 consilience identify the accomplishments and challenges of each sector. if needed, managers and coordinators provide other courses of action for struggling sectors. they also mentioned the specific support needs (managerial, scientific, operational and technical support) that their mvp programme has in the area. thus, if needed, the mvp-potou can request assistance from the west african regional mvp office based in mali. the surveys were conducted by teams located in different project sites between december 2006 and september 2007. the introduction of a number of women investigators addressed the sensitivity of surveys relevant to women (mvp, 2009a). 4.2 project impacts evaluation after 3 years of intervention to assess the impact of the intervention of mvp, the project uses the approach “before versus after.7” it incorporates socio-economic and detailed health surveys, plus an anthropometric and biological monitoring among 300 randomly selected households, stratified by wealth at the beginning of the project and three years after the project intervention. surveys that were conducted in the millennium village potou cover only 21% of the total population in the rural community of leona. these surveys have been programmed in order to coincide with the preharvest8 for both periods. the data of crop yields were estimated from surveys of plots. as such, biophysical data were collected randomly from 30 plots in potou. control villages were not originally included in the design of the project evaluation. thus, they were recently introduced in mvp-potou to better evaluate the project’s impacts (mvp, 2009b). in a neighboring rural community, five control villages were selected from a larger number of “candidate villages.” the choice of these villages was based on their similarity with the intervention villages in potou, namely according to agroecological, geographical, socio-economic, and demographic parameters. operationally, about 3249 households were selected for data collection. 5. overall character of taking stock: discussion mvp-potou recorded positive progress in several of its components with more pronounced achievements in some areas than in others in three years of intervention. however, unintended negative effects were observed mainly in education, health, and agriculture (cf table 2). 7 this approach consists of comparing households at a given period (in our case, third year of the project intervention) to the same households of the baseline. 8 this period was chosen to help maximize the socioeconomic and nutritional vulnerability data collection. 9 the innovation in this number is that it takes into account the growth of the population. consilience__________________________________________________kinda: monitoring & evaluation of mvp senegal table 1 : key results of the mid-term survey components indicators baseline year 3 comments agriculture chronic undernutrition (stunting) among children under two years 30.77% 31.93% increasing food production and income in potou has not improved nutrition conditions. to improve nutrition, the project undertook to make a cmam (community based management of acute malnutrition). water and sanitation proportion of population using an improved drinking water source 19,8 78,1 a partnership was established between the project and the millennium drinking water and sanitation program (pepam) of senegalese government. 81 boreholes were built to make water safe drinking geographically accessible to the public. primary type of sanitation facility improved 29,4% 76% access to improved sanitation has been improved in mv potou. unimproved 76,8% 2,3% open defecation 68,5% 21,7% education gross attendance rate in primary education1 71.9% 74.1% the gross and the net rate of children enrolled in primary schools experienced a slight increase. despite the gratuity of primary education, the effects are not immediate. in fact, the monitoring system shows that cultural and religious factors present many challenges. a majority of parents prefer to send their children in koranic schools. the project aims to build a partnership with teachers in koranic schools by providing a subsidy so that they can agree to let their students benefit from courses in french schools. net attendance rate2 in primary education 45.1% 53.2% health proportion of women receiving at least one antenatal visit 87.1% 93.3% an improvement of various indicators concerning maternal health and management of malaria, tuberculosis, and hiv/aids was recorded. however, challenges remain regarding child health. for example, the monitoring of beneficiaries of bed nets shows that the bed nets are not used for intended causes. proportion of children under five sleeping under insecticide-treated bed nets 13.8% 29.2% hiv testing in last year 0.6% 10.5% infrastructures (ict) household cell phone ownership 39,6% 84,1% the proportion of households owning a cell phone in potou has increased. source: self-elaboration from the midterm evaluation report, 2012 10 the gross attendance ratio (gar) is the number of children attending primary school regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total children of official primary-school age. 11 the net attendance ratio (nar) is the percentage of children in the official primary school age bracket (6-11) actually attending school. 40 consilience the project proved to be both influential and beneficial; it satisfied the expectations of the beneficiaries as well as its intended objectives. interviews with beneficiaries have confirmed this statement. there is a concordance between the project and national programming frameworks, notably the strategy for growth and poverty reduction strategy paper (dsrp), which shows that the project also took into account national priorities and needs. however, several issues, such as individual reluctance, culture, and religion, impede the project’s effectiveness. due to these issues, the project has struggled to generate positive effects in education, health, and agriculture. according to a school director in potou,“the project needs to find ways to collaborate with the koranic schools in order to have a great visibility so that parents could allow their children to attend the french schools.” there is a probability that the observed results reflect the interventions of private and state institutions and ngos. this implies that the results obtained at the mv-potou, and more widely in the rural community of leona, cannot be exclusively attributable to the project resources.12 thus, the effectiveness of mvp-potou determined by the mid-term evaluation is unreliable. a different timescale and method is needed to better understand the impacts and effects of mvp-potou. for the head of m&e of the project, “many efforts need to be made in terms of monitoring to ensure the reliability of data notably in agriculture and health; the team for m&e’s purpose should also be strengthened by additional persons with good and strong skills.” evaluation methods should produce empirical evidence (undp, 2009). specifically, impact evaluations are generally designed to estimate the average impact of a program on the welfare of beneficiaries (gertler et al., 2011). the approach employed must be valid to ensure that the effects are attributable to a given project. authors have identified deficiencies13 and criticized the evaluation method used by the mvps. although the study protocol recognizes these deficiences, the issues are not always fully addressed. for example, the protocol said that the lack of baseline data on control villages is a limit (mvp, 2009b, p.20). it added that the introduction of control villages would make a more coherent evaluation in terms of causality. 5.1 the selection of intervention sites the sites selected for intervention were chosen based on their agro-ecological potentials and poverty levels. however, these criteria lacked statistical rigor, which denoted a selection bias for the project interventions. rather, the choices were considered to be “reasoned” choices. indeed, selection bias occurs when an individual’s motives for participation in a given program are correlated with the results. this could challenge achievements claimed by the program. in the case of 12it is possible to implement an impact evaluation controlling for spillover effects from other projects or programs but it is not as obvious as such. 13 the deficiencies were noted by authors such as clemens and demombynes (2010) and discussed on several blogs. both the approach of the mvp and the method of evaluation are the subject of discussions by researchers and evaluators (clemens, 2010; fresch, 2009a, 2009b). consilience kinda: monitoring and evaluation of mvp – senegal mvp, the criteria of good governance and potential related to agro-ecological zones can make a priori beliefs that the results of these projects will be good (clemens, demombynes, 2010). 5.2 the comparability of villages in the mid-term review, treated villages were compared to the same villages before the intervention. the “before versus after”15method employed during evaluation provides simple and straightforward results, but it neglects to address whether or not the indicators of interest would change in the absence of the project. the mvp requires a rigorous impact approach because of its complexity and goal to achieve the mdgs as well as be a successful model for the rest of the world to follow. a rigorous impact evaluation requires a valid comparison group16 (valid counterfactual). for example, the randomized control trial is widely accepted by evaluators as one of the strongest methods in assessing impacts and allowing for causal attribution. as noted also by bamberger et al. (2006, p.351), to get valid results within an experimental or quasi-experimental study, data on a control group in both the reference period and ex-post are required. this, however, is not the case of the mvp-potou and for the mvps in general. 5.3 challenge of introducing control villages the introduction of control villages in the mvp-potou is an attempt to improve the evaluation methodology, but it implies many considerations. first, the introduction of control villages questions the internal validity of the evaluation. in other words, if the control villages serve their intended purpose, do they therefore provide a valid estimate of the counterfactual? how should observed characteristics be balanced? how should unobservable characteristics be taken into account? how much weight should be placed on the criteria? one of the major challenges of mvp-potou is determining the reliability of the control villages. if the control villages are unreliable, they will negatively affect the quality of future evaluations. in addition, the selection of indicators is significant in the monitoring and evaluation of a project. some of the baseline indicators chosen by the mvp-potou, such as anthropometry, were subsequently adjusted because they were unreliable. therefore, particular attention should be given to indicators. there is also a pessimism that has grown around the millennium villages due to previous unsatisfactory results from other forms of village projects. examples 15 this method is seen as a counterfeit estimate of the counterfactual (gertler et al, 2011). 16 a valid comparison group will have the same characteristics as the group of beneficiaries of the program (treatment group), except that the units in the comparison group do not benefit from the program. comparison groups are used to estimate the counterfactual (gertler, 2011). 42 consilience include the mofan villages in rural china (1930-1970) and the later southwest project17 also in china, which was a similar model to the mvp in the 1990s. ineffective evaluations of these projects are the major reasons behind this discontent. additional analysis concerns the scaling up and sustainability of the mvps. the possibility of scaling up and ensuring the sustainability of the mvp is analyzed by many authors (buse et al., 2008a, 2008b, 2008c) who conclude that these goals require the investment in infrastructure, quality human resources, rural and urban inter-sectoral links, government commitment, and donor support. they also add that it is necessary to have a suitable village model that minimizes the costs of interventions. the designers and managers of mvp responded to the previous critics by further explaining the cost entailed by the randomization of the villages, the ethical considerations taken into account during intervention (sanchez et al., 2007), and the project’s foundation based on the experimental model of learning by doing. 5.4 proposition of potential solutions solution scenarios are proposed by authors to address the challenges of measuring the "stringent" impacts of the project. the literature on this subject recommends a randomized trial, which is, however, impossible at this stage of progress in the mvps. to better determine the effects of the mvp-potou and, more generally the mvps, a single method should not be preferred. it is critical to take advantage of the robust selection of methods. the impacts of the project should be assessed by combining a “propensity score matching”method and “double difference” method rather than the “before versus after” method, which implies a counterfeit counterfactual. depending only on the before-and-after method does not accurately portray the outcomes of the project since other factors are likely to have influenced the results founded by the mvp. the “propensity score matching”is a technique that statistically creates comparable groups based on an analysis of the factors that influence people’s propensity to participate in a program. for each unit in the treatment group and group of non-enrollees, the probability of a unit in the program is computed by observing the value of its characteristics, also known as its “propensity score.” the program’s impact is then estimated by comparing the average outcomes of a treatment or enrolled group and the average outcome among a statistically matched subgroup of units, the match being based on observed characteristics available in the data at hand (gertler et al, 2011). the “double difference” method compares the “before-and-after difference” of the groups that underwent intervention with the“before-and-after difference” of the groups that did not experience intervention. these two methods are powerful statistical tools that can be used together when assignment rules are unclear. in addition, the “double difference” and “propensity score matching”methods are useful in assessing the project and making comparisons between variables. 17see chen, shaohua, ren mu, and martin ravallion (2009).―are there lasting impacts of aid to poor areas? journal of public economics 93 (3–4): 512–528. consilience kinda: monitoring and evaluation of mvp – senegal in addition to the quasi-experimental methods mentioned above, other methods should be considered for assessing the effects of the project. these methods can involve the input of beneficiaries and project specialists. for example, the beneficiaries can provide narratives about the progress and impacts of the project. this will reveal any additional influences acting in the area of the project. it would also allow for project specialists to establish which impacts were connected to the project intervention. the method of multiple lines and levels of evidence (mlle) is also a useful method that examines the causal relationship between actions and effects. this method reviews the factors that support a causal relationship between intervention and observed impact. to achieve this, it considers the strength, consistency, specificity, temporality, coherence, and plausibility of the established relationship. drawing from this paper’s research, the scaling-up of the mvp-potou is not an option. a consistent learning from intervention is fundamental to ensuring the external validity of the project actions. 6. conclusion and way forward the system of m&e of the mvp-potou allows managers to learn from interventions, notably through periodic qualitative assessments that are performed by the project in collaboration with communities, government, and other partners. the community is associated with the planning, the implementation, and the m&e of the project. however, the monitoring committees need to be strengthened technically and institutionally to generate more effective synergies in mvp-potou. not only will this improve project monitoring, but it will also develop a real learning culture within the project. the mid-term evaluation reveals the progress made in the project’s various components. more efforts need to be made in the areas of education, health, and agriculture. due to culture, religion, and lack of accurate data, addressing these areas of the project prove to be more difficult than others. another major challenge is selecting a different evaluation method for the project, although the “before versus after method” is considered simple. also, the recent introduction of control villages raises numerous thoughts on the reliability of these villages as a rigorous counterfactual. improvements were recorded on the potou site, but the results should be interpreted with caution at this stage of the project. to accurately comment on the attribution and casualty of the project, the project must be examined on another time scale. this will also help assess how learning and the use of findings can enhance project interventions. ultimately, a number of considerations need to be addressed. improving the swot (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) framework of the mvppotou could help improve the m&e system and contribute to the generation of learning and knowledge. executive mobility is a risk factor that must be incorporated in planning. another key point is that this mid-term evaluation can be perceived as partial since it is an internal evaluation. this may weaken its credibility and limit its use. finally, the methodological approach for the assessment of the progress made 44 consilience by the site needs to be strengthened particularly in terms of scientific inquiry as it affects the nature of the results and consequently their internal and external validity. the engagement of stakeholders vis-à-vis the use of evaluation findings can be enhanced and developed through their active involvement in the important decisions of future evaluations. consilience kinda: monitoring and evaluation of mvp – senegal bibliography bamberger, m., rugh, j., mabry, l., (2006). real world evaluation, sage publications. buse, k., e. ludi, m. vigneri. (2008a). beyond the village: the transition from rural investments to national plans to reach the mdgs. sustaining and scaling up the millennium villages. synthesis report of a formative review of the millennium villages project. london: overseas development institute (odi). buse, k., e. ludi, m. vigneri. (2008b). can project-funded investments in rural development be scaled up? lessons from the millennium villages project. natural resource perspectives 118, overseas development institute (odi), november 2008. buse, k., e. ludi, m. vigneri. (2008c). sustaining and scaling up millennium villages: beyond rural investments. project briefing n°16, overseas development institute (odi), october 2008. chen, shaohua, ren mu, and martin ravallion (2009). are there lasting impacts of aid to poor areas? journal of public economics 93 (3–4): 512–528. clemens, michael, “why a careful evaluation of the millennium villages is not optional,” march 2010. http://blogs.cgdev/globaldevelopment/tag/millennium-villages. clemens, m, demombynes, g, (2010). when does rigorous impact evaluation make a difference? the case of the millennium villages. center for global development, working paper 225, october 2010. gertler, p., g., et al., (2011). impact evaluation in practice. world bank. kanter et al, (2009). millennium global village-net: bringing together millennium villages throughout sub-saharan africa. international journal of medical informatics, 78, 802–807. fresch, laura, (development research institute), (2009a), “can we push for higher expectations in evaluation? the millennium villages project, continued,” october 16, 2009.http://aidwatchers.com. http://blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2010/03/why-a-careful-evaluation-of-the-millennium-villages-is-not-optional.php http://blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2010/03/why-a-careful-evaluation-of-the-millennium-villages-is-not-optional.php http://blogs.cgdev/globaldevelopment/tag/millennium-villages http://aidwatchers.com/ 46 consilience fresch, laura, (development research institute), (2009b), do millennium villages work? we may never know, october 15, 2009. http://aidwatchers.com. millennium villages project, (2009a). baseline report, millennium research village potou, senegal, june 2009. millennium villages project, (2009b). study protocol, integrating the delivery of health and development interventions: assessing the impact on child survival in sub-saharan africa. millennium villages project potou/senegal, (2009c). annual report, 2009. millennium villages project, (2010). harvests of development: the millennium villages after three years (new york: the earth institute at columbia university). millennium villages project potou/senegal, (2011a). a 3-year review, january 2011, draft. millennium villages project, (2011b). the next five years: 2011-2015. sanchez, et al., (2007), ―the african millennium villages, proceedings of the national academy of sciences 104 (43): 16775–16780. undp, (2009). handbook on planning, monitoring and evaluating for development results. http://aidwatchers.com/ consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 7, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 73-86 the impact of continued mekong basin hydropower development on local livelihoods scott william david pearse-smith national centre for peace and conflict studies university of otago, new zealand scottps@gmail.com abstract hydropower development of the mekong basin is proceeding at an increasingly rapid pace. hydropower has already affected the natural and social environments of the mekong, and threatens to cause further devastation for local livelihoods as hydropower projects increase in size and number. this article builds upon scientific knowledge of the environmental effects of mekong hydropower development to consider what impacts these environmental changes will have on local livelihoods. attention is focused on how hydropower development will affect crucial renewable resources, and how this will affect the production of food and income for millions of the basin‟s inhabitants. this study contends that the food and economic security of the majority of the local population is inextricably intertwined with the integrity of the natural environment. therefore, continued hydropower development will have a devastating impact on the livelihoods of millions of the basin‟s inhabitants. more sustainable alternatives are desperately required. author’s note scott pearse-smith holds an llb from the university of otago faculty of law, and is currently an ma candidate at the national centre for peace and conflict studies, university of otago. this article draws on research and analysis from his thesis, hydro-development and conflict: the mekong basin. the author would like to thank the graduate research committee for their support, by means of the university of otago postgraduate publishing bursary. keywords: mekong, hydropower development, livelihoods, water resources, food security. 1. introduction hydropower development of the mekong basin is proceeding at an increasingly rapid pace (friend, arthur & keskinen, 2009). the relatively smallscale hydropower projects that have been developed to date provide some insight into the expanding environmental and social impacts that can be expected as hydropower projects increase in number and scale. an exploration of the impact of hydropower development on local livelihoods demands input from a broad spectrum of disciplines across both the natural and social sciences. fortunately, a wealth of information has already been generated by the natural sciences on the environmental impacts of mekong hydropower development. the mekong basin is defined as “the land area surrounding all the streams and rivers that flow into the mekong river” (mrc, 2011, para. 1). the mekong river begins its 4800-kilometer journey on the tibetan plateau in china, travels southeast through six developing nations and eventually empties into the south china sea (adamson, rutherford, peel & conlan, 2009). 74 consilience the mekong basin can be usefully divided into two sub-basins: the upper mekong basin and the lower mekong basin. the upper mekong basin refers to the area of the mekong basin that is within the national territories of china and myanmar (radosevich & olson, 1999). this comprises about thirty percent of the area of the basin as a whole and has a population of about fifteen million. the lower mekong basin, from the “golden triangle” south, represents the area of the mekong basin within the national territories of lao pdr, thailand, cambodia, and vietnam (elhance, 1999). this accounts for the remaining seventy percent of the area of the mekong basin, and is home to about sixty million people (mrc, 2010a), 29.6 million of who live and work with fifteen kilometers of the mekong river itself (icem, 2010a). this study is largely focused on the impact on the lower mekong basin, which is “more important, both socio-economically and environmentally,” than the upper basin (unep, 2006, p. 11). in recent years, the mekong basin has undergone significant hydropower development (friend et al., 2009). pre-1990, most hydropower development in the mekong was publically funded, but this new wave of development has generally been led by commercial partnerships between private sector developers and host governments (hirsch, 2011). in the lower basin, there are currently twenty-five operational hydropower dams and an additional ninety-nine tributary hydropower projects at various stages of exploration (icem, 2010a; mrc, 2010a). as such, most mekong tributaries have cascades of dams either already in place or planned for completion by 2030 (icem, 2010a). although it considers dams throughout the basin, this piece focuses on two particularly well-publicized tributary dams as examples: the pak mun dam in north-eastern thailand, and the yali falls dam in vietnam. to date, china is the only nation to have dammed the mainstream mekong, and has so far constructed the first four dams in a planned cascade of up to eight hydroelectric projects. of these, the xiaowan dam will be the world‟s highest arch dam,1 whose construction will mark the first time in the mekong basin‟s history that “a single development will influence the entire hydrological regime” of the basin (icem, 2010a, pp. 26-27). the final four mainstream dams in the yunnan cascade are due to be completed by 2020 (icem, 2010a; mrc, 2010a). in the lower mekong basin, at least twelve potential mainstream hydropower developments are currently being considered by private sector developers (mrc, 2009a). ten of these proposed projects are planned for lao pdr, and the other two for cambodia (icem, 2010a). site preparation for the first of these projects, xayaburi, is underway. the lao government and its thai developer are beginning preparatory earth works and resettlement plans for those whose land is needed for the dam‟s construction (“xayaburi dam work begins”, 2011). 1 at 292 metres high (icem, 2010a). consilience pearse-smith: mekong basin hydropower figure 1: map showing current and proposed mainstream mekong hydropower dams (from lee & scurrah, 2009). 2. hydropower development as a constraint on agricultural and capture-fisheries productivity 2.1 the changing environment of the mekong basin the mekong is “one of the few large river basins yet to be irreversibly modified by large-scale infrastructure” (sarkkula, keskinen, koponen, kummu, richey & varis, 2009, p. 227), and is the last remaining river to still flow freely through five nations. the mekong‟s hydrological system has remained in dynamic equilibrium with the ecology and climate of the basin for thousands of years (icem, 2010a). many of the basin‟s ecosystems are tailored to, and reliant on, the predictable seasonal fluctuation of the river (mrc, 2009b). over the past fifteen years, however, hydropower development has begun to alter the hydrology of the basin (unep, 2006; icem, 2010a). the cumulative effects of hydropower dam construction on the mainstream and its tributaries are transforming the fundamental characteristics of the river regime with pervasive repercussions not only for natural systems, but also social systems and economies (icem, 2010a). the construction of four mainstream dams in the upper mekong has already affected the timing and scale of the mekong‟s natural pulse, 76 consilience as well as the many other natural features of the system that are tuned to it. proposed future mainstream hydropower projects, including the remainder of the yunnan cascade and the lower basin mainstream hydropower projects, are all expected to further disrupt the mekong‟s flow regime. while the hydropower development of tributaries does not have such a profound impact on the equilibrium of the mekong ecosystem, it does have severe localized impacts, as seen in the cases of pak mun and yali falls (icem, 2010a). further hydrodevelopment of mekong tributaries could be expected to create similarly destructive environmental changes. the changing natural environment impacts the human environment in a number of ways. most notably, the environmental change created by hydropower development will increasingly constrain the productivity of fishing and agriculture. the altered mekong hydrology will degrade or diminish a number of the basin‟s natural resources, such as fish stocks, natural nutrients, agricultural land and forested land, all of which are crucial inputs to either agriculture or fishing. the vast majority of the lower basin‟s sixty million inhabitants rely on these resources for food and economic security. 2.2 the impact of hydropower development on capturefisheries the mekong fishery is the “world‟s largest freshwater fishery” (icem, 2010a, p. 95). however, a number of environmental changes created by hydropower development have recently reduced the supply of fish stocks in the mekong basin. people claim to have observed declining fish populations in the mekong basin since construction began on the yunnan cascade (icem, 2010a). the impact of the proposed lower mekong basin mainstream dams on fish stocks is predicted to be “dramatically destructive” (sarkkula et al., 2009, p. 243). they will “fundamentally undermine the abundance, productivity and diversity of mekong fish resources” (icem, 2010a, p. 16). broadly speaking, hydropower development has two main impacts on fisheries; it creates a physical barrier to migration, and it degrades and destroys fish habitats (sarkkula et al., 2009). the productivity of mekong fisheries has been declining for years, due largely to an increasing number of fishers2 (unep, 2006). now, with the added supply-side threat to fish stocks posed by hydropower development, the productivity of capture-fisheries will be even further reduced. hydropower development can also hinder fishing productivity because local fishing techniques have been adapted to particular flow conditions and may respond poorly to changes in the river‟s regime (wyatt & baird, 2007). further, as was witnessed downstream from the yali falls dam, unexpected flooding events can wash away productive assets such as fishing boats and equipment. the case of the yali falls dam also demonstrates that agricultural assets, including crops and livestock, are at risk of loss to flooding events and unusual flow fluctuations as well (lauridsen, 2004). 2 fish catch per fisher declined about forty-four percent between the 1940s and 1995 (unep, 2006). consilience pearse-smith: mekong basin hydropower 2.3 the impact of hydropower development on agriculture hydropower development adversely affects the productivity of agriculture by degrading or depleting a number of natural resources that constitute vital agricultural inputs. perhaps the most obvious way hydropower development restricts agricultural productivity is by reducing the supply of agricultural land. a minimum of 9,000 hectares of agricultural land is expected to be inundated by the proposed lower basin mainstream dams (icem, 2010a). the land that replaces it will invariably be less productive, as per the principle of the low-hanging fruit. the unpredictable and severe flooding that can result from hydropower development can also affect the supply of suitable agricultural land. flooding can wash away crops and livestock, and there is a strong fear in vietnam that upstream hydropower development could induce salt-water intrusion in the mekong delta (wyatt & baird, 2007; rix, 2003; hoanh, facon, thuon, bastakoti, molle & phengphaengsy, 2009). salt-water intrusion increases the salinity of agricultural land, affecting the fertility of the soil and, in severe cases, renders the land unsuitable for agricultural purposes (unep, 2006). hydropower development further intensifies soil salinity by reducing the wet season flood pulse that otherwise flushes out much of the salt annually (weatherebee, 1997; goh, 2004; lam, 2009). a less obvious, yet no less significant, threat to mekong agriculture is the reduction in the supply of natural nutrients that results from hydropower development. in the absence of costly large-scale synthetic fertilization programs, the reduced supply and delivery of natural nutrients will reduce soil fertility and further constrain agricultural productivity (blake, 2001). currently, approximately 26,400 tones per year of nutrients “are supplied to the mekong floodplains and delta by the fine-sized suspended sediment load” (icem, 2010a, p. 79). the floodplains of the mekong region are reliant on these nutrients for fertilization, especially the cambodian and mekong delta floodplains (icem, 2010a). dams, however, trap nutrient-carrying sediment load, preventing it from reaching the floodplains (unep, 2006). the current nutrient load will be reduced by seventyfive percent by 2030 if all of the proposed mainstream hydropower development projects go ahead (icem, 2010a). an estimated fifty percent of the mekong‟s annual sediment load is derived from the chinese section of the mekong basin; the construction of the yunnan cascade therefore poses a disproportionately large threat to the supply of nutrients downstream. the reduction in the wetseason flood pulse caused by dams also limits the annual natural distribution of nutrients by floodwaters (goh, 2004). a loss of forested land, both as a direct and indirect result of hydropower development, will further constrain agricultural productivity. deforestation affects agriculture by accentuating flood and drought events and destabilizing soil (unep, 2006). while the amount of forest inundated by hydropower development will be small relative to the total forested area of the mekong basin (icem, 2010b), the inundation does contribute to a larger trend of decreasing forest cover throughout the basin (mrc, 2010a). as seen in the cases of the pak mun and yali falls dams, hydropower development also contributes to deforestation indirectly, as it induces migration away from the river into forested areas, which are subsequently cleared as substitute agricultural and residential land (unep, 2006; wyatt & baird, 2007). finally, continued hydropower development could harm mekong agriculture by reducing the availability of clean freshwater. while freshwater 78 consilience scarcity is unlikely to become a major issue in the foreseeable future, were it to worsen, it would impose a massive constraint on agricultural productivity by limiting the amount of water available for irrigation. water quality, however, is a more pressing concern, as it is likely to be degraded as development of the mekong river continues. while the mekong is “still regarded as a fairly unpolluted river with generally good water quality” (mrc, 2010a, p. 60), increasing industrial, agricultural, and hydropower development is beginning to have an effect (mrc, 2010a; unep, 2006). for instance, in the se san river, downstream from the yali falls dam, water quality is reportedly more turbid than it was before the dam was built. this is due to the increased riverbank erosion that results from fluctuating river levels. 3. reduced food security 3.1 the importance of fishing to food security agriculture and fisheries are so important to rural3 regions of the mekong that the people are described as having “river-based livelihoods” (shoemaker, baird & baird, 2001, p. 59). fish, together with rice, forms “the foundation of food security in practically all riparian countries” (sarkkula et al., 2009, p. 227). the four lower basin nations in particular “feature the highest consumption of freshwater fish in the world” (icem, 2010a, p. 96). any reduction in fish catch or agricultural productivity will therefore threaten local livelihoods and food security (sarkkula et al., 2009). without access to capture-fisheries and other free sources of nutrition, such as forest products and wild game, malnutrition is a major concern for the poorest people of the basin. poor nutrition is already common in the cambodian and lao areas of the mekong basin, causing stunting and wasting, threatening children‟s health and lowering life expectancy (icem, 2010a). fishing is not just an activity of the poor: all socio-economic classes fish (garaway, 2005), and small-scale family fishing produces most of the basin‟s total fish catch (mrc, 2010b). however, a recent case study highlights that the “poorest groups are deeply dependent on aquatic resources, and are therefore particularly vulnerable to the changes in river flow and availability of aquatic resources” (mrc/wup-fin, 2007, p. 81). “fisheries do not only benefit the people living next to the river or the floodplains, but all of the lower mekong basin countries” (sarkkula et al., 2009, pp. 242-243). for example, the exceptional levels of aquatic production in the tonle sap region are not only of critical importance for cambodia, but for the entire mekong basin (sarkkula et al., 2009). 3.2 the importance of agriculture to food security rice “is the staple for most of the region‟s inhabitants” (mrc, 2010b, p. 8). in the lower mekong basin, over ten million hectares of cultivated land is used to produce it (mrc, 2010b). rice is generally eaten at all meals in the mekong basin, and contributes seventy-six percent of the average daily calorific 3 about eighty-five percent of the lower mekong basin population live in rural areas (mrc, 2010a). consilience pearse-smith: mekong basin hydropower intake. with an average calorific intake of only 2,407 compared to a food poverty line of 2,100 calories, any decrease in the production of rice would be troublesome. those living in areas of the mekong basin where rice is less available, generally have the lowest calorific intakes (mrc, 2010a). the mekong delta is a particularly important agricultural region in the mekong basin, accounting for the majority of vietnam‟s food production (cabrera, 2003). over half of the rice farms in vietnam are located in the delta, so any disruption to the delta‟s agricultural productivity could be especially problematic for the country (mrc, 2010a). riverbank gardens, common all along the lower mekong, are another threatened agricultural tradition (roberts, 2001; blake, 2001). they are used to grow a variety of fruit, vegetables and other crops, which provide an important supplementary food source during the dry season (roberts, 2001; jenkins, mcgauhey, & mills, 2008). 4. reduced economic security 4.1 the importance of agriculture and fishing to the local economy throughout the mekong basin, agriculture involves a mix of commercial and subsistence production. generally, farming households‟ primary focus is on production for household consumption, with any surpluses sold to generate income (mrc, 2010a). therefore, as well as strongly influencing food security and rural welfare, agricultural productivity also has a critical influence on “the economic growth that ultimately helps alleviate poverty” (mrc, 2010a, p. 178). eighty-three percent of the economically active population in the lower mekong basin is engaged in a water resources-related activity as their primary occupation.4 this includes “farming, fishing, collection of other aquatic animals, or edible plants, aquaculture, use of mini-hydro, fish processing, fish marketing, marketing of other water-dependent products, net making/repairing, boat making and/or repairing and farm labour” (mrc, 2010a, p. 48). clearly, therefore, the constraint of agricultural or wild-capture productivity would also impose a major constraint on economic productivity. agriculture is “the single most important economic activity in the [lower mekong basin]” (mrc, 2010b, p. 8). in a recent survey, seventy-three percent of lower basin households said agriculture was the most important occupation in their household. fifty percent of rural households in the mekong corridor reported receiving income from the sale of rice, making it easily the most common source of income of those surveyed (mrc, 2010a). agriculture is also the largest employment sector in each of the lower mekong basin nations, employing between sixty-five and eighty-five percent of the labor force in vietnam, cambodia, and lao pdr. “even in thailand, where agriculture accounts for less than 10 per cent of gdp, 70 per cent of the workforce in the northeast region works in the agricultural sector” (mrc, 2010a, p. 48, citing mrc, 2003). when focusing just on the riparian population of the 4 based on a survey of five different ecological zones in the lower mekong basin (mrc, 2010a). 80 consilience lower basin nations, it is estimated that around ninety percent of all people are engaged in agriculture (blake, 2001). fishing is the next most important economic activity in the mekong basin. as well as the important contribution it makes to regional food security, it also provides significant economic benefits. many locals who fish for subsistence also sell their surpluses in order to supplement their primary income, which is usually from agriculture. twenty-five percent of rural households in the mekong corridor reported receiving income from the sale of their own fish catch, making it the second most common source of income of those surveyed (mrc, 2010a). the cash income from the sale of fish surpluses is often used to buy rice seed for the following season (mrc, 2010b). the local fishing industry also creates economic opportunities for those involved in supporting industries such as the manufacture, sale, and repair of fishing equipment (mrc, 2010a). 4.2 constrained agricultural and fishing productivity as a constraint on local incomes and profits hydropower development over the past six years has already impacted local economic productivity. nearly one in six households polled in a recent survey reported having a member who has changed occupation due to the declining productivity of aquatic ecosystems. “the high degree of dependence of the population on water resources for livelihoods and food security implies a high vulnerability to declining availability, quality, and diversity of the resources” (mrc, 2010a, p. 51). in cambodia alone, more than one million people face losing their livelihoods if the two proposed cambodian mainstream dams proceed (icem, 2010a). the 21 percent of households that claim to have no second occupation are especially vulnerable to the effects of increasing resource scarcity in the mekong basin (mrc, 2010a). another factor reducing profits will be expenses incurred in battling the environmental changes and scarcities resulting from hydropower development. in particular, the cost of large-scale fertilization programs—required to compensate for the reduced supply of natural nutrients—will heavily affect the profitability of local agriculture. irrigation costs, too, will increase as farmers move to more marginal land. the costs of replacing productive assets that are either destroyed by flooding, or rendered unsuitable for the altered ecological conditions, will also impact the economic viability of agricultural and fishing livelihoods (blake, 2001). if agricultural and fishing productivity declines, the surpluses of farmers and fishers will be reduced or eliminated, reducing their cash income. in some cases, such as near the yali falls dam, many farming households‟ agricultural output was so reduced that they were forced to sell the little rice they did produce and borrow rice to eat (perera, 2007). ultimately, this could result in a purely subsistence-based local economy where farmers are only able to produce enough food for their own consumption, with no surpluses to be exchanged for other goods. the yali falls dam is a rare instance of mekong hydropower development where the economic impact has actually been assessed in monetary terms. mckenny (2001) assessed the income of cambodian households situated downstream from the dam site before and after the dam‟s construction. he found that the average household income fell from 109 us dollars per month before the dam‟s construction to forty-six us dollars per month three years after consilience pearse-smith: mekong basin hydropower its construction. this amounted to a combined annual income loss of 2.5 million us dollars for 3,434 households within a three-year period. additionally, property losses of 800,000 us dollars were recorded, although this is thought to be an underestimate due to the difficulty of quantifying many of the losses (wyatt & baird, 2007); the resulting loss in economic productivity is also hard to measure. flooding caused by the yali falls dam has also killed a number of cambodian villagers, and declining water quality has made many more fall ill (saroeun & stormer, 2000; perera, 2007). 4.3 constraints on purchasing power the depletion and degradation of renewable resources resulting from hydropower development is likely to be reflected in price rises. for example, with the depletion of forested areas, wood prices are likely to rise (homer-dixon, 1999). because wood constitutes a key input cost, it will make heating, cooking and building more expensive. the purchase of wood will therefore consume more of the household budget of many mekong locals, reducing the amount available for other items in the budget. those buying fish and agricultural outputs will likely experience similar price rises as environmental scarcities worsen, with the urban poor particularly at risk (icem, 2010a). some of the most serious potential economic impacts of hydropower development on the people of the mekong basin are not easily valued in monetary terms. many of the region‟s people are “poor in monetary terms, but rich in natural resources” (sarkkula et al., 2009, p. 239). in this regard, they rely on natural resources for their “income,” which is not necessarily in the form of cash (mrc/wup-fin, 2007; sarkkula et al., 2009). for example, the nam songhram wetlands in northeast thailand “are considered to be … „nature‟s supermarket‟ where you need no money to „shop‟ [for] the large variety of different resources they provide” (mrc/wup-fin, 2007, p. 83). hydropower development will reduce the availability of these natural sources of wealth, which will force many locals to find ways of earning cash income in order to buy the resources they need. the prevalence of subsistence agriculture obscures the true economic value of the mekong‟s natural resources. current estimates of the total economic value of fish production in the mekong basin vary, ranging from two to three billion us dollars per annum (barlow, 2008; dugan, 2008). however, we must add to this the unknown value of all subsistence fish catches that never enter the market place, making an accurate valuation of mekong fisheries very difficult (sarkkula et al., 2009; mrc, 2010b). attempts to calculate an accurate valuation of total agricultural production—and thus the value of natural resource inputs to agricultural production—encounter the same challenges as do fisheries. difficulties in measuring renewable natural resource wealth mean that the negative economic impacts of hydropower development are often underestimated (mrc/wup-fin, 2007; sarkkula et al., 2009). this oversight is especially common in macro-level social and economic assessments, as the losses in wealth that result from hydropower development often occur at the microeconomic level (mrc/wup-fin, 2007). therefore, despite general agreement that the health of the ecosystem feeds directly into the livelihoods of the local people of the basin, the local level implications of hydropower development are largely overlooked by policy-makers at the national level (mrc/wup-fin, 2007; sarkkula et al., 2009). policy-makers consider the current lack of large-scale 82 consilience hydro-development to be an underutilization of the mekong‟s resources. in reality, however, the mekong‟s resources are being extensively utilized on a smaller, more local scale (sarkkula et al., 2009). 5. conclusion the livelihoods of the mekong basin population are inextricably linked to the region‟s natural resources. any agent of environmental change that compromises these resources will therefore have a profound impact on local livelihoods. a reduction in the productivity of fishing and agriculture will have major consequences for the food and economic security of the local people. hydropower development will deny much of the basin‟s population the ability to sustainably support themselves. many will be forced to find alternative livelihoods, which will often lead to further environmental destruction, highlighting the unsustainability of continued hydropower development. it is important to take an interdisciplinary approach while assessing the impact of natural resource development projects. while environmental impact assessments have often been conducted for mekong hydropower projects, the social impacts have generally received significantly less attention. assessing only the environmental impacts fails to recognize the value of these natural resources, in their current state, to the basin‟s inhabitants. as summarized by witoon permpongsacharoen:5 “this is the lifeblood, the life source, for millions of people. you simply cannot afford to make any big mistakes with the mekong” (blake, 2001, p. 5). if the basin‟s inhabitants are to maintain the livelihoods they have enjoyed for centuries, policy-makers must strike a delicate balance between the pursuit of economic growth and the conservation of natural resources (rix, 2003). this undoubtedly involves looking at more sustainable alternatives to the proposed hydropower projects. 5 director of the thai ngo „towards ecological recovery and regional alliance‟. consilience pearse-smith: mekong basin hydropower bibliography adamson, p. t., rutherfurd, i.d., peel, m. c., & conlan, i. a. 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(2007). transboundary impact assessment in the sesan river basin: the case of the yali falls dam. international journal of water resources development 23 (3), 427-442. doi:10.1080/07900620701400443. xayaburi dam work begins on sly. (2011, april 17). bangkok post. retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com. microsoft word hue and lempert_medoff edits, dl and hn edits2.doc consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 17, iss. 1 (2017), pp. 220–246 accounting for threats to sustainable development: an indicator for holding ngos and international organizations accountable to creating the context for sustainable development david lempert, ph.d., j.d., m.b.a., e.d. (hon) international development consultant, global superlemp@alumni.stanford.org hue nhu nguyen, m.s. nhuhuenguyen@yahoo.com abstract this article takes the simple, nine point, indicator that the authors devised for determining whether international organizations and governments were fulfilling the professional requirements and international legal mandates for sustainable development interventions and expands it to a second level to account for the management of external (natural) and human-created threats/risks to the context for sustainable development. the standard assumption in sustainable development planning is that communities and countries have controls over their own resources and can then plan their use of resources and their consumption in a way that is sustainable, but the reality is that resources are continually under threat and increasingly from outside sources (e.g., pollution, climate change, war). since these barriers to sustainable development are often induced by or subject to influence by the very same global powers that comprise the donor community today, the challenge facing communities and programs seeking to achieve sustainability is not merely one of following the appropriate measures of sustainability. the challenge is also one of working to assure that governments and organizations reduce the political and environmental threats that they, themselves, are creating (such as climate change and threats of military conflict) through their own political choices and consumption patterns and the impacts these have for weaker countries and cultures, as well as share superior technology to help reduce other threats where technology can play a role in risk reduction (e.g., planetary threats, global pandemics).. keywords: sustainable development, rio declaration, global security, decolonialization, globalization, climate change, cultural protection, resource protection, risk management biographical notes: david lempert, ph.d., j.d., m.b.a., e.d. (hon) & hue nhu nguyen, m.s. have worked for a combined total of 45 years in consilience 221 development and are the inventors of the basic indicator for whether ngo and international projects are sustainable. dr. lempert is author of several books including, a model development plan. he is an anthropologist, lawyer, and educator who has worked in more than 30 countries for the undp, unicef, world bank, usaid, ec, wwf, iucn, and several other development organizations. ms. nguyen is an environmental policy analyst who has worked for the un, mekong river commission, ffi, and the vietnamese government. authors’ note: several years ago when the two of us were working on several of the so called international “sustainable development” projects promoted by donors and governments, we couldn’t understand why none (or next to none) of them actually did anything that remotely fit the simple textbook definitions of long-term integrated culturally protective “sustainability” (or, for that matter, “development”). the idea of “sustainable development” and sustainable development planning seemed simple and obvious and it had already been around for decades if not for at least a century (dating back to malthus and others). david brought harvard and brown students to ecuador to write a national development plan for that country, also geared to survival of cultural groups, and it had already been published as a text for more than a decade. that was when we decided to start putting the professional standards into measurement indicators that could be used for accountability tools (and legal enforcement); so that development actors could no longer claim that they “didn’t know” the basic standards or that they were “too hard” to measure, or that the goals and priorities were ambiguous. we have gone on to publish not only that simple indicator but also several others that now form a codification of international development “law” that ngos and citizens and practitioners can use to assure an appropriate focus. but having laws and measures doesn’t mean that they will be enforced or used. and even if they were, we now see that globalization has created so many interdependencies that even local attempts at sustainability can now be destroyed by spillover harms coming from outside. that calls for an indicator to hold large international actors accountable for their very actions that pose global threats for sustainable development and to recognize specific responsibility. that is what we offer in this article. consilience lempert, nguyen: ngo’s and sustainable development introduction nearly a decade ago, we designed the first sustainable development indicator (“a sustainable development indicator for ngos and international organizations”) for holding ngos and international organizations accountable to the principles of sustainable development that have long been recognized by international experts and that were affirmed in international agreements some 25 years ago (lempert and nguyen, 2008). despite continuing recognition of the planetary threats from climate change and threats to human security and peace from unsustainability, there has been little real progress over that time by the international community and by agencies promoting development interventions in moving towards cultural protections and sustainability. though “sustainable development” has become the new mantra of the united nations in its “sustainable development goals” (“sdgs”) as of 2016, not even these sdgs go very far in meeting the measurements for sustainable development that the international community had previously agreed to in declarations and treaties, and that we presented in our indicator. in seeking explanations why developing countries seemed both unwilling and unable to implement even the basics of sustainable development that they have already agreed to in international declarations (un conference on environment and development, 1992), we unveiled in a follow-up article some of the hidden features of the global system that have created an underlying climate of insecurity to which developing countries feel they must respond (lempert and nguyen, 2011). indeed, the paradox of the global system today is that while it claims to promote a system of trade and interdependency that favor security and conditions for “growth”, it has actually done so in a way that threatens cultures and nations, or that works by escalating fears and insecurities. that has led to the prioritization of resource destruction for the purposes of military spending as the best form of “protection”, though paradoxically it demands the destruction of culture and the environment as well as prospects for sustainability. if international governmental organizations, governments, and international (and domestic) non-governmental organizations (“ingos” and “ngos”) are to be held accountable for sustainable development, they must, in fact, also be accountable for creating the conditions for the workings of international law and the assurances of security of all types (e.g., environmental/climate security as well as peace) to set the context in which sustainable development can occur. this article seeks to identify these unpleasant realities in the international system and the risks they create, as well as the positive aspects of global cooperation for reducing these and other risks (e.g., planetary disasters, global pandemics) and to incorporate them in a more robust accountability indicator for sustainable development, that takes them into account. while international organizations and governments have long funded support for “disaster risk management” planning and systems, including those that they consilience 223 are now strengthening in the face of climate change, the reality is that they are in fact one of the contributing causes to these disasters and to their risks, including now the risks of war and political instability as a result of their policies. only by taking these into account alongside better global systems for risk management and sharing of the costs, can communities and countries effectively move towards sustainable development. this article provides a checklist of these threats to be taken into account in a robust analysis of sustainable development planning that can be used in the form of an indicator to determine whether international development organizations and agencies as well as local and national governments are working to create the conditions necessary to achieve sustainable development. many of the measures of security, risk, hazard and spending needed to insure against these risks are highly specialized, and subject to error as a result of human inability to accurately perceive some kinds of risks as well as the inability of current levels of science to provide some measures. while it may not be possible to fully account for appropriate spending and steps to assure the context for sustainability, or to appropriately allocate the costs between different parties, it is at least possible to build systems that recognize these concerns and seek to appropriately incorporate them into sustainable development planning. the article outlines those risks that form the context for sustainable development, defines the appropriate systems and locations in government for addressing these issues, offers a measurement indicator to troubleshoot governmental and international organizations working in the area of “development” and international interventions to assure that these concerns are incorporated, and then tests this indicator on the united nations system and its sustainable development goals (sdgs). theoretical context expanding and strengthening the approach to sustainable development by communities and countries and development agencies requires placing the concepts of disaster risk management and systems for supporting disaster risk management functions within the context of sustainable development and within the context of government functions. this section describes the theory behind this accounting in a number of sub-section. • the first sub-section shows where disaster risk management fits within an approach to sustainable development. • the second sub-section lists the specific disasters that are relevant to consider in sustainable development and who bears the responsibility for addressing them. • the third sub-section describes the theory of disaster risk management as a government function in ways that are cost-effective in dealing with risk. • the final sub-section describes the administrative and legal mechanisms for assuring and enforcing appropriate disaster risk management in the context of sustainable development as well as the economics of allocating the costs consilience lempert, nguyen: ngo’s and sustainable development the current approach to “sustainable development” and where disaster risk management fits although much of the discussion about sustainable development focuses on detailed technical issues or politics, with the word “sustainable” often distorted beyond recognition in what may be purposefully obstructionist (lempert and nguyen, 2011; shellenberger and nordhause, 2004) the principle is actually very simple as is the relationship of disaster risk management. the principles that underlie the work of environmentalists and development experts, and that have long been rooted in international agreements are easy to state. according to principle 8 of the rio declaration, sustainability is a balance of consumption (number of people and the amount of consumption per person) with resources (a fixed amount of resources and an amount of productivity per resource that ensures the resources are replenished and not used up for future generations) (united nations, rio declaration, 1992). population x consumption = resources x productivity/resource in working through the mechanics of sustainable development, much of the discussion focuses on the final element (productivity per unit of resources) and on restricted consumption of certain protected resources that are simply taken out of the equation and viewed as key factors of survival (such as green forest cover, biodiversity in general or specific species in particular), with regulations on use of certain common planetary resources such as the oceans, fresh water, and air. some focus is increasingly given to the left side of the equation in recognition that cultures have the right to not increase their consumption or population (i.e., the right not to “industrialize” or “modernize” and to be absorbed into the global monoculture, and therefore the right to “no growth” or “slow growth” with consistent productivity). there are also discussions as to whether technological growth (increased productivity per unit of resources) is actually sustainable or not (nguyen, 2008). in general, the focus on the third element of this equation, resources, is on whether the resources in a system are sustainable over time; i.e., the resources are not “consumed” or sold to generate short-term productivity but are continually replenished. in our nine question indicator determining whether or not communities, countries and development projects were actually doing “sustainable development”, our fourth question included this determination drawn from the principles for measuring “strong sustainability”. that question is as follows. question 4. the project results in no total loss of value of per capita assets (wealth) in the system. in other words, production does not consume assets but either replenishes them or replaces them with an asset of equal consilience 225 value. another way of saying it is that if production and income increase, the sum total of per capita resource inputs consumed following the increased production is replaced directly or replaced by something of equal value. yes – 1; debatable – 0.5; no – 0 (lempert and nguyen, 2008). implicit in the protection against “loss of value” of per capita assets is the need for basic asset accounting for all assets, and not gdp accounting, though we did not state this formally in our original indicator: beyond the direct “consumption” of assets for production, however, is the possible loss of assets from several kinds of threats. in a stable, isolated, and sustainable system, the usual assumption is that cultures are experienced in maintaining their asset base and insuring against the various risks to their assets. in our original model, we incorporated this assumption. the assumption of anthropologists studying cultures who have adapted to their environments is that these cultures understand all of the cycles of nature that threaten their “productive assets”. in other words, they understand the cycles of flooding, fires, droughts, and even epidemics and conflicts with neighboring cultures, and that they have developed sophisticated systems for managing these costs and insuring against them. they maintain certain savings as security to last through these cycles and they build or prepare certain structures or systems to minimize their vulnerability (e.g., highland shelters for animals, boats in the cases of floods, and so on). in other words, they already have traditional systems for “disaster risk management”. these traditional disaster risk management systems clearly do what modern systems do: they measure the frequency of the hazard (the type of disaster and its severity) and they create systems to reduce the vulnerability (the harm) when these disasters occur. this local disaster risk management system protects the resources over time and reinforces sustainability. while we did not mention “disaster risk management systems” as essential “to protect the sustainability of assets” in our original nine question indicator, two of the questions that we included implicitly recognized the value of protecting and restoring such traditional practices as traditional disaster risk management systems in order to assure sustainability. our question 8 asked whether “the cultural integrity and special characteristics of each separate cultural group” was protected and whether any interventions were “positive system preserving changes” and our question 9 asked whether any “legacy of colonialism” that reinforced dependency and destroyed these traditional mechanisms was reversed in a way that would promote “self-sufficient communities”. in our original indicator, we assumed that the threats of war, climate change and other global risks were small and relatively insignificant in the focus on sustainable development. our goal was to start with the most simple and universally agree principles that were still not being incorporated in development planning and to keep the focus simple. consilience lempert, nguyen: ngo’s and sustainable development the reality, however, is that hazards and vulnerabilities to assets may in fact be outside of the control of the local community seeking to plan sustainable development. if so, we need to introduce specific systems to protect the “resources”; the key third factor of the sustainable development equation”. traditionally, cultures were relatively closed systems but today, all systems are subject to human induced global climate change, to various forms of pollution in the air and water, and to other global hazards like regional wars. dealing with these global hazards (i.e., what are often in the form of “disasters” as well as lower level continuous hazards) is outside of the traditional systems of disaster risk management. it requires more modern systems. the function of disaster risk management that is required for dealing with hazards that are beyond their traditional experience serves the same function as the traditional methods. it is part of the security and viability of resources. it fits in the same place in considering sustainability of a system. the difference is that it requires a modern system to analyze all of the new, additional risks to resources in order to deal with them effectively. these are new, unexpected, and often extremely high costs for systems to bear. when we sought to analyze why so many governments and communities do not even attempt sustainable development today, the answer we found was that the costs of these human induced disasters is now so high, that countries are forced to insure themselves now by generating high consumption of items needed for protection (largely building their militaries and their economic influence) that they are caught in a “prisoners’ dilemma” of unsustainability” (lempert and nguyen, 2011; following morganstern and von neuman, 1947; nash, 1951). in the next sub-section, we begin to generate a list of these new risks to sustainable development before considering how to incorporate them into global disaster risk management systems that can offer the “insurance” to protect resources of countries and communities so that they may then move to plan for sustainable development. disasters to consider in sustainable development and the responsibilities for them the first step in disaster risk management, before assessing actions to take in a disaster risk management system, is to try to generate a basic list of the types of disasters/risks that threaten resources. this section identifies six categories of disasters/risks that are relevant to consider in sustainable development (though there may be more) and identifies who bears the responsibility for addressing them using economic principles of allocating legal liability: consilience 227 the risks to community and national resources today that go beyond borders seem to fall into two overarching categories. in one category are those risks that are the result of human action (like war, pollution, and climate change) or that may be influenced by human action or made more likely by human action (such as global pandemics resulting from contacts between peoples and from human encroachment on ecosystems) (totaling four sub-categories). in a second category are risks that are recognized as natural risks but that are extraordinary events that we are now able to recognize as a result of the advance of science and that are also potentially manageable risks with advances in human technology. these risks were traditionally not even considered in planning. they include things like major earthquakes and other geological events on earth as well as threats from space, like meteors (falling into the two sub-categories of natural events on earth and events from space). although these are natural events, they can also be partly influenced by human action. there is a long and detailed literature on actuarial science (the setting of insurance rates) and on setting liability for various risks to assets. the basis of law and economics addresses some of the mechanisms for allocating liabilities between parties in ways that are most efficient and recognize ways to link benefits and costs (coase, 1960). the use of insurance systems can now also be applied to protection of global resources and risks such as in the area of biodiversity (lempert, 2015). generally, we calculate risk management as an insurance cost that is something like 1 or 2% of the current value of the insured asset, such as insurance for valuables or property1 (though health insurance is not a fixed percentage; it is higher for the elderly, for example, and reflects the protection costs). what insurance systems do is spread the risk over the insured populations, and also seek to create incentives for lowering the overall risk; use the law to increase protections; eliminate moral risk problem. for ldc’s, costs of selfinsurance against a military threat (e.g. east timor) or climate (e.g. tuvalu); it is a survival question and is more than these countries can ever hope to cover and remain sustainable. where a risk is beyond the ability of a local government to control, the penalties and costs must be placed at the source of the threat. that is what the international legal system claims it seeks to ultimately do. whether it can or ever will is subject to question, but this is how it “should” work, in principle. table 1 presents these two categories (six sub-categories) of disaster risks (column 1), identifies their root causes (column 2) and then suggests, in 1 the standard insurance contract for jewelry, such as wedding rings, is 1 to 2%, added to homeowners insurance or in separate contracts. (cyril tuohy, “compare reviews for jewel insurance”, on the web at https://www.consumeraffairs.com/insurance/jewelry-insurance/ ). homeowners insurance can often be less, at about 0.35% according to the u.s. federal reserve bureau, given that homes are secure property with fewer risks than moveable property or personal health. (ashley henshaw, “what is the average cost for homeowners insurance” on the web at: http://homeguides.sfgate.com/average-cost-homeownersinsurance-3020.html) consilience lempert, nguyen: ngo’s and sustainable development principle, the allocation of costs for insuring against these risks and creating a world where countries and communities all then have sufficient resources to focus on planning sustainable development. translating these principles into actions requires effective implementation of modern disaster risk management systems and an appropriate international legal and administrative system to assure the allocation of costs to achieving these ends. the next sub-section describes the basic mechanics of effective disaster risk management systems and the following sub-section addresses the institutional requirements for placing the costs at the source of the harms and the ability to manage the risks, as well as some of the conflicts of interest and institutional failures that exist today and that would need to be overcome. consilience 229 table 1. liability and insurance efficiency for risks to sustainability/survival type o f threat/risk to sustainabi l i ty role o f major powers in contr ibut ing to the cause or harm appropriate place for eff i c i ent insurance against the threat/risk areas where larger or technologically advanced countries (or sectors/cultures within countries) may increase risks to other countries (or sectors/cultures within countries) 1. war or other violence/hegemony (including state terrorism and state-induced terrorism) threatening resources or sustainability, both global (species annihilation) and local major powers are a source of fear and destabilization, though not the only cause. the damage of major power technologies (unexploded ordinance, toxic agents) are rarely covered by those causing the harm. costs to be placed on all countries in reference to exercise of hegemony and with the goal of eliminating the threats 2. climate change, creating unanticipated weather cycles, greater risks and damages high consumption of major powers and the transfer of technologies to spur consumption is the cause of climate change costs to be placed on countries in relation to the production of co2 with a move towards reducing consumption in major countries 3. toxic pollutants (chemical, radiation, etc.), genetic change agents, and other pollution interfering with natural cycles/biodiversity and creating safety hazards beyond borders industrial technologies and military activity without appropriate safeguards and cleanup create global externalities costs to be placed on the polluter to reduce the current practice of exploiting weaker countries to transfer harms 4. global pandemic health threats rapid mobility, population growth spurred by global industrialization, and intruding on natural habitats spreads the diseases allocation based on contribution to causes with industrialized and high population growth countries paying a premium areas where larger or more technologically advanced countries (or sectors/cultures within countries) can better measure and reduce overall risks for others 5. unusual national disasters (earthquake, volcanic eruption, tidal wave) some slight increase due to major changes on earth such as nuclear tests global risk sharing based on ability to pay 6. meteors and threats from space (not including “space junk”) unknown global risk sharing based on ability to pay consilience lempert, nguyen: ngo’s and sustainable development the current approach to risk management/ disaster risk management the basic approaches to disaster risk management are “textbook” recipes that this article simply presents here without any need for specific adaptations or innovations in the context of sustainable development planning (drabek, 1991; dorfman, 2007; hubbard, 2009; smith, 2001; un, 2002). a knowledge of the standard terminology and approaches is important to include here as a basis for incorporating into sustainable development tests presented later in the article. in short, the modern methods of coping with disasters are focused on planning activities, not on responses -estimating the probability and the potential loss of every type of risk and seeking ways of reducing the potential losses by managing the risks. the main tasks in modern risk management are finding ways to measure risks and costs over long periods of time and identifying the kinds of technical actions and expenses that can be undertaken now to result in future savings. the goal is to spend more now on safety and sustainability in order to reduce the likelihood of losses and to limit the amount of potential losses. disaster risk management is increasingly an activity of combining scientific knowledge with sound financial accounting tools and administrative systems rather than simply that of building higher walls to potential dangers or responding more quickly to crises. in a modern disaster risk management system, the key skills needed are no longer just those of construction, forecasting, and emergency services, but long-term forecasting, resource measurement and valuation, and economic and risk assessments that one finds in an insurance system. increasingly, the question is not what should be done about disasters, but whether losses are at the lowest acceptable level for the costs of preventing those losses. by definition, disasters have always been the result of hazards interacting with humans or human structures. human actions by individuals, themselves, or by others, can actually change the hazard and/or vulnerability, thereby increasing disaster risk. the key terms in any discussion of disaster risk management are: risk, hazard, and vulnerability. these terms relate to each other in an equation where: disaster risk = (hazard) x (vulnerability) the terms are used slightly differently than in business or common terminology and it is important to establish their clear meaning. this equation is about two "probabilities". "risk" is really the probability of harm as a result of the interaction of the probability of hazard and the vulnerability, which is also a probability. consilience 231 "hazard" is defined as the occurrence of a (natural or social) phenomenon that has the potential for causing a loss. in talking about hazard, one is really discussing the "hazard probability"; the likelihood of a spectrum of natural occurrences that have the potential for causing a loss. "vulnerability" is defined as the inability to withstand a phenomenon that has the potential for causing a loss. in talking about vulnerability, one is really discussing the "probability that damage will occur from a particular type of hazard." "disaster risk" is, therefore, the probability of loss from a hazard, given the probability of that hazard and the probable inability that capacity of the community to cope or withstand it (the probability that damage will occur from the hazard because of the inability to withstand it). in talking about risk, one is really discussing the probability that a hazard will occur and that damage will result from it. the different missions, functions and tasks of disaster risk management generally follow six (sometimes five, if two of them are merged into one) phases. these are: 1) prevention and mitigation 2) preparation and forecasting (warning) 3) response and 4) relief (often combined into one) 5) recovery 6) reconstruction the real intellectual work, however, is in the prevention and mitigation (reducing the vulnerability) so that these other aspects of implementation of the spending to deal with the disasters (phases 2 through 6) are reduced to acceptable levels. generally, the work is just straightforward scientific and economic measurement. for example, assessing the vulnerability is a three step process of: (a) standardizing the value of the "assets" for comparison and decisionmaking; (b) valuing the assets to be protected (human life and various forms of property) before disasters happen, as part of the planning process; and (c) measuring the potential cost of harm to each of these assets. value judgments are needed at some stages, however, and this makes the analysis tricky, particularly when it comes to “standardizing” asset values and considering values over time as well as in measuring risks of extreme and unusual events like climate change and war. it has not been easy to come to agreement on the actual risks of climate change or of terrorism and war, or even to define them, due to the psychological processes that humans use to measure risks, that incorporate fears, ideology and denial in ways that distort actual risk. so, this is all possible in principle, but the science is not (and perhaps cannot be) “exact” in practice. consilience lempert, nguyen: ngo’s and sustainable development conflicts of interest with sustainable development in international functions of government the basic theoretic principle for good governance is to identify all of the functions (missions) of government and to place them appropriately so that there are no conflicts of interest. in the area of “development” interventions from powerful, industrial cultures in their dealings with weaker communities/cultures, overlaps and conflicts of interest are far too common. rather than work to protect the resources of weaker communities/cultures to create the conditions for sustainable development planning, powerful countries/cultures regularly now include disaster risk management as a “development” intervention and use it simply to compensate weaker countries or cultures (including weaker cultures within their own countries) for part of the harms that they cause to those cultures. the result is to increase disaster risks and to reinforce conflicts of interest at the expense of cultural protections and prospects for sustainable development. in a previous article, one of the authors of this piece examined the set of government functions in the area of international relations as well as internal domestic relations between powerful industrial cultures in countries and weaker minority communities (lempert, 2016). the goal of that piece was to identify the areas of overlaps of functions as well as to point out the conflicts between promotion of national interests (or interests of the more powerful internal communities) and international laws calling for protection of minority communities (u.n. 1948, 1976, 2007). table 2, taken from that article presents the range of international functions that are currently in most governments. it notes the conflicts and overlaps. that article then offered sets of criteria to use in identifying conflicts of interest that could be described as promoting “colonialism” in international relations or “internal colonialism” within countries. the indicator in that piece can be used for overall design of departments with international or cross-community functions and for separating out the overlaps and conflicts. in that scheme, for example, it is important to separate out “disaster risk management” and “relief” (post-disaster help) from “development” in order to prevent the internationally agreements on sustainable development to be replaced by forms of compensation that may actually undermine sustainable development. the current incentives in disaster risk management, for example, as naomi klein has widely publicized in her attention to what she calls the “shock doctrine” is for wealthy countries to create harms like human induced climate change or resource wars and then to pick favored countries where there is some reason to promote relations (e.g., economic exploitation or military strategy) to offer some compensation that relieves some of the impacts while exploiting the harms of others (klein, 2007; lempert and nguyen, 2009; lempert 2016). this is not fit within the context of promoting sustainable development in either consilience 233 country as a way to save on these costs. it is simply to treat some of the symptoms in a way that continues or may increase the harms. once the overall functions are placed in appropriate departments, the next step is to define specific missions of disaster risk management and of international law compliance to assure that countries deal with the root causes of disasters (including human actions) as well as the appropriate ways of sharing costs. some of the specific guidelines for doing that, as suggested above, can be placed in a set or principles or indicator (below, in this article). in fact there are international organizations addressing all six of the categories of disasters/risks that are threats to sustainable development (both at the global level and at the country/community level) and most countries also now at least recognize, by name, these categories of threats (with the exception of those from space). nevertheless, other than perhaps in some calculations of the risks of climate change and of nuclear war and some other categories (specific diseases), there do not seem to be routinized global assessments of all of the disaster risks and the costs of reducing vulnerabilities and hazards, nor do there appear to be full allocations of all of the costs on the basis of liability and ability to pay. while perhaps the measurements are increasing and improving, the real failure is that there is no linkage to international law in ways that protect cultures and communities from the conflicts of interest in actions by major country/cultural actors that prevent them from addressing their own role in disaster risks and undermining the context for sustainable development. currently, it is very rare for major powers to include any measurement of social costs or externalities that they impose on the world system, to internalize. to translate that into non-economic language: powerful, industrialized countries simply do not take responsibility for the harms that they cause to the resources and cultures of developing countries and to the fears that they create that make it impossible for countries/communities to focus on sustainable development. that is both the underlying reality of the global system and its inequalities of power (the dynamics of hegemony, dependency, and colonialism/neo-colonialism) (gunder frank, 1967; wallerstein, 1974) and also of the institutions that almost every country now creates for its foreign relations, including those for “development aid” and “international relations”. national institutions in foreign relations (and international organizations that respond to these agencies) have built-in conflicts of interest (lempert, 2016). the key task for creating the context for sustainable development planning everywhere, is to assure that disaster risk management functions fully incorporate the externalities (human created harms to others) such that countries have incentives to change behaviors that create these externalities and also that they bear the costs of compensation and protection of those who are suffering from increased risks in ways that impede their ability to do sustainable development planning. consilience lempert, nguyen: ngo’s and sustainable development the indicator below offers a way to troubleshoot disaster risk management systems to assure that they are meeting their responsibilities in this area. consilience 235 table 2. international affairs line functions other than “development” (long-term, humanitarian support) (from lempert, 2016) line ministry/department in internat ional affairs funct ions potent ia l conf l i c t s or over laps with internat ional development law requirements international obligations disaster risk management (of non-military, natural threats) yes, conflicts and overlaps: the approach is to deal with threats and symptoms in ways that can distort local approaches and sustainability climate and space threats (same as above) disease control (same as above) pest control (same as above) global security management (of other human created threats) yes, overlaps and conflicts: poverty alleviation is often substituted for “development” and creates dependency rather than sustainability poverty alleviation (same as above) cross border crime prevention (same as above0 relief (crisis insurance; an adjunct of disaster risk management) yes, conflicts: relief can create a culture of dependency international law enforcement/legal accountability and international governance yes, conflicts: nothing creates legal accountability of the stronger to the weaker and laws and agreements are easily overridden and unenforced, including replacing laws with other conflicting agreements (trade and investor protection agreements, “development” goals that redefine “development”) indemnification and compensation (uxo, agent orange, climate change) (same as above) national self-interest promotion military (response to military threats) yes, conflicts: the forcing of alliances, sales of weapons, destabilization of “neutral” or strategic border countries commerce (short-term interests) yes, conflicts: promotion of commerce through marketing and agreements with country leaders can create vulnerability by undermining self-sufficiency and traditional practices of cultures in their environments access to raw materials (same as above) access to markets (same as above) information and promotion yes, conflicts: promotion and information can easily become propaganda and cultural imperialism, changing values and culture updating the indicator: to make it easier for sustainable development planners to differentiate between approaches to resource protection that establish a truly secure context in which sustainable development can take place and those that simply give lip service to sustainable development while actually furthering the very fears and risks that undermine it, we have consilience lempert, nguyen: ngo’s and sustainable development devised the following specialized additional indicator. the indicator has 8 questions that even non-experts can quickly used as a litmus test of resource protection creating the context for sustainability. by asking these 8 easy “yes or no” questions and then counting up the results, you can determine the relative ability of a community/country or project to set the basis for sustainable development planning by the following scale: scale: all 8 points fully creates the context for resource protections and the incentives for sustainable development planning in line with the rio declaration and international human rights conventions 4 7.5 points works towards the security of countries/cultures and their resources by recognizing the real threats to cultural diversity and sustainability in the global system and seeks responsibility and enforcement to protect a shared human future to be achieved through sustainable development planning 2 – 3.5 points recognition of the basics of disaster risk management but not of the links to sustainability for protecting the resources and cultural base for sustainable development planning 0 – 1.5 points colonial approach to sustainability that pays no attention to the context and incentives or the causes of unsustainability needed as the basis for sustainable development planning and likely continues the planet on course to cultural genocide, dislocation, and collapse note that the indicator is not an absolute scale since it is not offered as a social science research tool but as a project evaluation and selection tool. it is best used to show the relative value of different projects, with some leeway offered in judgments for calibrating the indicator for specific needs of the user and for application to meet the specific needs of countries. like most indicators, answers to each question would need to be “calibrated” to assure that different observers make the exact same determinations. to do so would require a longer manual for standardized, precise answers across observers. we have fit the eight questions into three different categories: two questions that simply ask whether the community/country seeking sustainable development for itself and for communities where it intervenes have established the basic system for resource management and protection; four questions on whether the country or project or organization that intervenes elsewhere has taken responsibility for the distortions it creates to the context of sustainable development by increasing disaster risks elsewhere; and two questions on whether the country or project or organization that intervenes has taken responsibility for natural global disaster threats to consilience 237 sustainability where it has the technology and ability to work with others to help minimize these global risks. the eight questions are as follows. i. basic asset/resource measurement and protection framework within countries and communities for identifying and measuring risks within specific communities/cultures/countries: question 1. establishes an appropriate disaster risk management system within government as part of sustainable development, to assure that within each government agency with the functions of protecting and development of specific assets that there are measures of the full range of recurrent and recognized hazards and vulnerabilities to those assets/resources as well as inventorying and valuing existing assets. does government routinely measure the expected range of hazards (e.g., floods, earthquakes) and vulnerability as part of the functions of protecting the full range of national assets and include the full list of new and non-traditional risks that were not included in traditional cultural systems for disaster risk management? yes: 1 point debatable: .5 point (some assets and hazards are neglected or measures are weak) no: 0 points question 2. government funds appropriate cost-effective projects to reduce vulnerabilities and hazards, following best practices of disaster risk management. does government taxation link assets to spending on insuring the value of those assets and creating incentives for minimizing risks? does the system seek to reduce the vulnerabilities by addressing root causes (e.g., the relationship of consumption to climate change) and not just seek to prepare for the symptoms? yes: 1 point debatable: 0.5 point no: 0 points ii. frameworks for minimizing sustainability risks to other cultures, that are human created (internalizing the costs of externalities/eliminating conflicts of interest) question 3. establishes measures of threats of war/violence and (state) terrorism against other countries or cultures that are caused by desires for resources or markets in those other cultures or some other exploitation (military, strategic or other motive) and creates incentives for eliminating those exploitative dependencies in order to fully minimize or eliminate such threats, in full accordance with principles of international law and sustainability. does government routinely monitor its conflicts of interest and exertion of hegemony over other countries and cultures and work towards minimizing it in keeping with international agreements and principles (un, 1948; 1976; 2007)? yes: 1 point consilience lempert, nguyen: ngo’s and sustainable development debatable: 0.5 points (measures the harms to others and seeks to work with other countries and cultures to create a system that will eliminate the human risks but is not yet fully committed to doing so) no: 0 points question 4. establishes measures of threats of climate change created in stronger/industrialized countries/cultures and causing harm to other countries/cultures and its root causes (e.g., population, consumption, use of fossil fuels) and creates incentives for eliminating those exploitative dependencies (e.g., reasons for promoting population growth, for high consumption and use of fossil fuels) in order to fully minimize or eliminate such threats, in full accordance with principles of international law and sustainability. does government routinely monitor its conflicts of interest in the contributing factors to climate change (e.g., promoting population growth, consumption, and use of fossil fuels) and work towards minimizing it in keeping with international agreements and principles (un, 1992)? yes: 1 point debatable: 0.5 points (measures the harms to others and seeks to work with other countries and cultures to create a system that will eliminate the human risks but is not yet fully committed to doing so and its support does not prioritize smaller cultures) no: 0 points (the only real action is to compensate for some of the harms in some favored countries or to prepare for further harms, but not to address the root cause behaviors causing the harms) question 5. establishes measures of threats of pollution/toxicity caused by one country/culture against other countries/cultures and of its root causes (e.g., dirty and risky technologies) and creates incentives for eliminating those exploitative dependencies in order to fully minimize or eliminate such threats, in full accordance with principles of international law and sustainability. does government routinely monitor its conflicts of interest in the contributing factors to pollution/toxicity and work towards minimizing it in keeping with international agreements and principles? yes: 1 point debatable: 0.5 points (measures the harms to others and seeks to work with other countries and cultures to create a system that will eliminate the human risks but is not yet fully committed to doing so and its support does not prioritize smaller cultures) no: 0 points (the only real action is to compensate for some of the harms in some favored countries or to prepare for further harms, but not to address the root cause behaviors causing the harms) question 6. establishes measures of threats of global and localized pandemics and the contributing causes induced by larger cultures (globalization that increases transmission; consilience 239 industrialization and encroachment on eco-systems; overuse of anti-biotics) and creates incentives for reducing such threats as well as for assuring that attention to disease control prioritizes threats to individual cultures and not just to industrial societies, in full accordance with principles of international law and sustainability. does government routinely monitor its conflicts of interest in the contributing factors to global health emergencies and work towards minimizing it as well as focusing support on protection of smaller cultures, in keeping with international agreements and principles? yes: 1 point debatable: 0.5 points (measures the harms to others and seeks to work with other countries and cultures to create a system that will eliminate the human risks but is not yet fully committed to doing so and its support does not prioritize smaller cultures) no: 0 points (the only real action is to compensate for some of the harms in some favored countries or to prepare for further harms, but not to address the root cause behaviors causing the harms) iii. frameworks for minimizing sustainability risks to all cultures, that are natural events but where larger cultures have the technologies for minimizing the risks question 7. establishes measures of threats of earth based global disasters (e.g., earthquakes, tsunamis) and of human contributory factors and creates incentives for global cooperation reducing such threats, including promoting expansion of the human species beyond earth, as well as for assuring protections for smaller cultures and not just industrial countries with the information and technology to minimize their own risks, in full accordance with principles of international law and sustainability. does government routinely monitor global disasters and work towards minimizing them in coordination with all of the countries and cultures on earth, with a focus of support on protection of smaller cultures and on expansion of human cultures and diversity outside of earth? yes: 1 point debatable: 0.5 points (measures the harms and seeks to work with other countries and cultures to create a system that will eliminate the human risks but is not yet fully committed to doing so in a way that protects all cultures) no: 0 points question 8. establishes measures of threats of global disasters from space (including human created space junk) and creates incentives for global cooperation reducing such threats, including promoting expansion of the human species beyond earth, as well as for assuring protections for smaller cultures and not just industrial countries with the information and technology to minimize their own risks, in full accordance with principles of international law and sustainability. does government routinely monitor global disasters from space and work towards minimizing them in coordination with all of the countries and cultures on earth, with a focus of consilience lempert, nguyen: ngo’s and sustainable development support on protection of smaller cultures and on expansion of human cultures and diversity outside of earth? yes: 1 point debatable: 0.5 points (measures the harms and seeks to work with other countries and cultures to create a system that will eliminate the human risks but is not yet fully committed to doing so in a way that protects all cultures) no: 0 points results in the current era of globalization and industrialization, there is a common mindset among country leaders, the international organizations they establish, and the projects that they fund that avoids real discussion of the stable context that countries/communities/cultures need for their peoples and resources in order to offer the basis for sustainable development planning, and of the elements of sustainable development planning, itself. the single-minded global ideology of “growth”, “industrialization”, globalization, and creation of a global mono-culture not only violates the basis of sustainable development (lempert and nguyen, 2008, 2011) but also serves to undermine the basic security that countries/communities/cultures need in order to be able to consider sustainable development planning. we have tested our eight question (8 point) indicator on the sustainable development goals (sdgs) that the international community now universally supports as its set of goals for “sustainable development” (un, 2015). the result is presented in the annex. on the 8 point scale, the sdgs score at best 0.5 points, which reflects an international agenda that is a failed, colonial approach to the context of sustainability. it avoids any recognition of the human threats that undermine the context for sustainable development planning and avoids any attempts to allocate responsibility or to establish professional disaster risk management systems to protect resources. since this is the agenda supported by international leaders and also their systems of “international development” and domestic “development” interventions, developed countries, developing country governments, other international organizations, and most of the development projects they fund that work with government partners, will all score about the same. while these findings offer little “new” to anyone in the field of sustainable development planning, they are at least backed now by some clear measures and standards that can be used to try to promote accountability and improvement. conclusion consilience 241 this article documents the processes that are occurring, offers a set of professional measures of what is happening and a path to creating accountability of the international system for moving towards sustainable development. there is no magic bullet we know of to change incentives in systems that are hierarchical and based on self interest and authority to those that are cooperative and protective where there is no universal outside threat that requires it. we know that government systems are corrupted by selfinterest and power and pernicious incentives that are found in human cultural behaviors. all we can do is to start calling attention to the measurement of the harms and real costs to imagine the ideal and to recognize how it can and must work this article is just one of several measures for exposing contemporary colonialism by development agencies and governments (lempert, 2016) and one among many approaches to documenting threats to cultures and their sustainability (lempert, 2010). at least these standards and measures offer the product of rational human thinking and guides to cooperation that go beyond the turn towards religious invocation in studies of sustainability and collapse, including various predictions for cooperation (axelrod, 1984) or renewal (homerdixon, 2006; korten, 2007; speth, 2008) that do not really have a scientific basis in the study of cultural change. consilience lempert, nguyen: ngo’s and sustainable development testing the indicator on the un’s sustainable development goals (sdgs): preliminary information for assessment the un systems sustainable development goals sustainable development goals (sdgs) or “agenda 2030” is an agreed list of “development” goals ratified by the united nations at the end of 2015, for the period of 2016 to 2030. it consists of 17 broad thematic goals and 169 “targets” (un, 2015). none of the goals are enforceable. they are a list of priorities for fundraising and spending to be coordinated by the un system. sdgs and the categories of disaster risk management and asset protection the mention of disaster risk management frameworks includes: target 1.5 for building the “resilience of the poor” to climate and environmental disasters (without saying how); target 2.4 for increasing food productivity in ways that are sustainable and resilient to disasters; target 11.5 and 11.b for reducing vulnerability of human settlements to disasters; and target 13.1 to expand resilience and adaptability to climate disasters without specifics; the mention of global and individual state action on four human caused threats to resources (war/violence, climate change, pollution/toxins, and pandemics) includes the following additional information: war/terrorism: none climate change and its root causes: goal 12 mentions “sustainable consumption” but does not offer specifics for reduction or allocate responsibility. pollution: target 3.9 offers a vague statement on reducing deaths and illnesses from pollution, while 6.3 calls for reducing water pollution, and 14.1 calls for reducing ocean pollution. there is no mention of causes or responsibilities. target 12.4 calls for “environmentally sound” management of wastes through their lifecycles. pandemics: goal 3 calls for “healthy lives” but assigns no responsibility for externalities that impact on health or diseases. target 3.3 calls for ending epidemics but does not mention root causes or link them to sustainability or to human practices. target 3.8 calls for “affordable vaccines” for all without explaining the costs of development, production or distribution. the mention of natural disasters and technology to address them (on earth and from space) includes the following: natural disasters: nothing beyond target 13.1. space disasters: none overall analysis of the sdgs in setting the context for sustainable development there is little or nothing in the sdgs on the context and barriers to sustainable development that are created by developed countries or by industrial sectors in developing countries and the actual focus of the document is on promoting industrialization and growth, which are the contributing factors. the goal seems to be to raise money for projects in developing countries without any real changes of behaviors in the developed countries and without any acknowledgment of responsibility, incentives, or enforcement. consilience 243 analysis questi on indicator scoring i. basi c asse t/resource management and prote c t ion framework though the basic topic is mentioned, there are no specifics and no professionalism. 0.5 points 1. establishes an appropriate disaster risk management system within government as part of sustainable development? debatable. the sdgs mention disaster risk management but makes no mention of asset measurements or of the types of systems needed. in some cases, donors will recognize the needs and follow but there is no consistent systematic approach. 0.5 points. 2. government funds appropriate cost-effective projects to reduce vulnerabilities and hazards, following best practices of disaster risk management? no. there is no mention of root causes or funding and no specifics that promote professionalism in this area for resource protection. 0 points. ii. frameworks for minimizing susta inabi l i t y risks to other cul tures , that are human created the international community seems to promote growth and colonialism/industrialization through the sdgs without any recognition of how powerful countries create threats to resources and undermine the context for sustainability. 0 points 3. establishes measures of threats of war/violence and (state) terrorism against other countries or cultures that are caused by desires for resources or markets in those other cultures or some other exploitation (military, strategic or other motive) and creates incentives for eliminating those exploitative dependencies? no. there is nothing in the sdgs that recognizes the link between peace and security for peoples and resources and that this is the very context needed for sustainable development that is often under threat, even though the very purpose of the un system is to promote peace and security.. 0 points. 4. establishes measures of threats of climate change created in stronger/industrialized cultures/countries and causing harm to other countries/cultures and its root causes (e.g., population, consumption, use of fossil fuels) and creates incentives for eliminating those exploitative dependencies (e.g., reasons for promoting population growth, for high consumption and use of fossil fuels) in order to fully minimize or eliminate such threats? no. climate change is viewed as an act of nature whose symptoms need to be addressed by developing areas, rather than a human caused problem that industrialization and “growth” continue to worsen. the sdgs actually reinforce the problem by promoting growth and do little to address the causes and responsibility. 0 points. 5. establishes measures of threats of pollution/toxicity caused by one country/culture against other countries/cultures and of its root causes (e.g., dirty and risky technologies) and creates incentives for eliminating those exploitative dependencies? no. while the sdgs mention pollution as a threat and calls for local planning, there is no recognition that pollution is “exported” to weaker systems and that it occurs as part of a system of exploitation that requires recognition of its root causes and responsibilities.. 0 points. 6. establishes measures of threats of global and localized pandemics and the contributing causes induced by larger cultures (globalization that increases transmission; industrialization and encroachment on eco-systems; overuse of anti-biotics) and creates incentives for reducing such threats as well as for assuring that attention to disease control prioritizes threats to individual cultures and not just to industrial no. while there are calls for international cooperation in vaccinations, there is no attention to root causes of global health problems or of the differential risks of these harms to weaker cultures/countries and the difference between existing diseases to which cultures have adapted (and may have consilience lempert, nguyen: ngo’s and sustainable development societies? co-evolved) and those to which they have not. 0 points. iii. frameworks for minimizing susta inabi l i t y risks to all cul tures , that are natura l events but where larger cul tures have the techno log i e s fo r minimizing the risks the sdgs does not yet have any consciousness of global threats and global responses and responsibilities as a factor linked to human survival and sustainability. 0 points 7. establishes measures of threats of earth based global disasters (e.g., earthquakes, tsunamis) and of human contributory factors and creates incentives for global cooperation reducing such threats? no. while the un system may be promoting this through its agencies, the sdgs do not recognize these threats as relevant to the context for sustainable development and places them in a separate category.. 0 points. 8. establishes measures of threats of global disasters from space (including human created space junk) and creates incentives for global cooperation reducing such threats? no. the sdgs does not consider global threats as part of the equation for human survival and sustainability. 0 points. total 0.5 points. failed, colonial approach to sustainability context. the sdgs take a colonial approach to sustainability with no recognition of the human threats that undermine the context for sustainable development planning, no attempts to allocate responsibility and little attempts to establish professional disaster risk management systems to protect resources. consilience 245 references axelrod, robert (1984). the evolution of cooperation. new york: basic books. coase, ronald h. (1960). "the problem of social cost". journal of law and economics 3 (1): 1–44 dorfman, mark s. (2007). introduction to risk management and insurance (9 ed.). englewood cliffs, n.j: prentice hall. drabek, thomas (1991). emergency management: principles and practice for local government. washington, d.c.: international city management association gunder frank, andre (1967), capitalism and underdevelopment in latin america new york: monthly review press. homer-dixon, thomas (2006), the upside of down: catastrophe, creativity an the renewal of civilization, island press. hubbard, douglas (2009). the failure of risk management: why it's broken and how to fix it. john wiley & sons klein, naomi (2007). the shock doctrine: the rise of disaster capitalism, new york: macmillan. korten, david (2007), the great turning: from empire to earth community, berret-koehler publishers. lempert, david (2017, forthcoming). “testing the global community’s sustainable development goals (sdgs) against professional standards and international law” lempert, david (2016). ““the logic of imperial economics: distinguishing development agencies from colonial bureaus exercising soft power”, journal of globalization studies, volume 7:1:87-111, may. on line at: http://www.sociostudies.org/journal/files/jogs/2016_1/lempert%20full%20version.pdf lempert, david (2015). “how much is saving humanity and our planet worth?,” review of michael jones, “accounting for biodiversity,” ecological economics, volume 117, september, pages 214-215. lempert, david (2010), “why we need a cultural red book for endangered cultures, now,” international journal of minority and group rights, fall/winter, no. 17 (4), 511-50. lempert, david and hue nhu nguyen (2008), “a sustainable development indicator for ngos and international organizations,” international journal of sustainable society, 1:1:44-54. on line at: http://www.pelicanweb.org/solisustv07n8page4.html lempert, david and hue nhu nguyen (2011). “the global prisoners’ dilemma of unsustainability: why sustainable development cannot be achieved without resource security and eliminating the legacies of colonialism,” sustainability: science, practice and policy, (spring), volume 7, no. 1. http://sspp.proquest.com/archives/vol7iss1/1006-031.lempert.html consilience lempert, nguyen: ngo’s and sustainable development lempert, david and hue nhu nguyen (2009). “a convenient truth about global warming: why most of the major powers really want global warming,” with nguyen nhu hue, the ecologist, february. http://www.theecologist.org/pages/archive_detail.asp?content_id=2112 reprinted in mother pelican: http://www.pelicanweb.org/solisustv07n09page4.html morgenstern, oskar and john von neumann (1947) the theory of games and economic behavior princeton university press. nash, john (1951) "non-cooperative games" the annals of mathematics 54(2):286-295. nguyen, hue nhu (2008). toxic omissions: and cancerous growths: addressing the unexamined assumption of sustainable consumption in technologically innovative societies. masters thesis, lund, sweden: iiiee lund university, iiiee theses 2008:xx. http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2008/nguyen_hue.pdf shellenberger, michael, and ted nordhaus (2004). the death of environmentalism: global warming politics in a post-environmental world, the breakthrough institute. http://www.thebreakthrough.org/images/death_of_environmentalism.pdf smith, keith (2001). environmental hazards: assessing risk and reducing disaster. new york, new york, usa: routledge speth, james g. (2008), the bridge at the edge of the world: capitalism, the environment, and crossing from crisis to sustainability, yale university press, new haven, ct. united nations conference on environment and development. (1992) rio declaration on environment and development. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm united nations convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (1948), u.n. general assembly, december 9, 1948. united nations covenant on civil and political rights (1976), and optional protocol. united nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (2007). un international strategy for disaster reduction secretariat, (2002). living with risk: a global review of disaster reduction initiatives, geneva, july. united nations (2015), “draft outcome document of the united nations summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda,” august 12, a/69/l.85. wallerstein, immanual (1974), the modern world-system, vol. i: capitalist agriculture and the origins of the european world-economy in the sixteenth century. new york/london: academic press. article title nyasimi and okang’a 1 images and voices of change: engaging local community in assessing impact of millennium villages project in their lives in sauri village, western kenya. dr. mary nyasimi. mnyasimi@ei.columbia.edu dr. nyasimi is a postdoctoral research fellow at the earth institute at columbia university, new york. nyasimi attained her phd from iowa state university and she is currently engaged in ethnographically documenting the socio-cultural transformation occurring among ethnic groups in the millennium villages projects in sub-saharan africa. nyasimi’s research interests lie in the human-environment interface particularly in exploring the complex rural african livelihood and cultural systems, community development and, participatory research and development. joseph okang’a jonje67@yahoo.com okang’a is a research assistant based at sauri millennium villages project, kenya. okang’a is working towards his high national diploma in community development at cefored institute, nairobi, kenya. okang’a research interests are in rural development with focus on community participation and empowerment. mailto:mnyasimi@ei.columbia.edu mailto:jonje67@yahoo.com nyasimi and okang’a 2 abstract the earth institute at columbia university is implementing a development program in ten countries in sub-saharan africa. referred to as the millennium village project (mvp), the project aims to use a combination of science-based interventions and community participation to transform the livelihoods of african people and ultimately lift them out of extreme poverty. involvement of local people is a critical ingredient and key processes of empowering them and ensuring sustainability of mvp. to engage local people in assessing the impact of mvp on their lives, a community led photovoice project was initiated in the first millennium village, sauri kenya. in this project, local research participants used digital cameras and their own narratives to share their emic view of their changing world. the main objective of this photo essay is to share photographs and narratives from ten local research participants composed of different ages, educational levels and gender. the photographs and stories indicate that mvp is positively impacting on local people and it can be used as a monitoring tool for various activities. in addition, the research participants were enthusiastic about photovoice and they provided a powerful insider visual interpretation of community changes. all the photographs and their stories will be shared in a community photovoice exhibition later this year. nyasimi and okang’a 3 author’s note one image that has become too familiar to african people is the increasing number of photographs taken of them by development workers, tourists and journalists. however, local people never get to see the photographs because they get published in foreign magazines, books and/or journal papers. when we begun working among the local residents of sauri millennium village, we witnessed the same influx of visitors who were busy photographing local people. during one village meeting that we attended, we were busy taking photos of people and one woman requested us “why don‟t you give me your camera and i will take photographs for you. i will provide you with personal pictures of our people engaged in various activities in sauri village. since you do not live here and you visit occasionally, i can take photographs at all community events during the day and night, photograph children at the school, people in churches, markets and community center. every week, i can provide you with photos that tell my stories, and you will have a better understanding of the impact of millennium project on sauri people”. there and then, the idea of photovoice project dawned on us. we knew that we had to provide sauri residents with cameras and note books and empower them to photograph their changing lives as they participate in the millennium project. we shared the idea at the next weekly village meeting and sauri residents were quite ecstatic about the project. the sauri people will be holding a photovoice exhibition once every three months to share their photos and stories with other villages, government officials and other organizations. keywords: photographs, personal narratives, sauri village, millennium project nyasimi and okang’a 4 images and voices of change: engaging local community in assessing impact of millennium villages project in their lives in sauri village, western kenya. background images and voices of change project (invocp) „see our pictures and read our stories, our lives are changing everyday‟ paul omondi, sauri village the millennium villages project (mvp) implemented by the earth institute at columbia university is piloting a photovoice project in sauri village, western kenya. the aim of mvp is to work in partnership with local people and national governments in selected african countries to harness packages of integrated solutions to transform the lives of african people and lift them out of the poverty trap (sachs, 2005). to transform their economies, the earth institute is concentrating investment in growing more and diversified foods, improving health, supporting education, extending information and communications technologies, and building possibilities for new livelihoods (sachs, 2005; mvp annual report, 2005). since its inception in 2004, reports from four village in sauri (kenya), koraro (ethiopia), mwandama (malawi) and mayange (rwanda) indicate that about 120,000 people have increased their staple food production by threeto eight-fold, thereby eliminating seasonal hunger cycles of 3-4 months (sanchez et al., 2007). primary school enrollment has also increased as school feeding programs were initiated. malaria infestation rates have also declined as villagers are sleeping under insecticide-treated, long-lasting bednets. to engage the local people in documenting the changes occurring in their lives, a community led documentation project – photovoicewas initiated and piloted in sauri village, western kenya, with intentions to scale up to other villages in subsaharan africa. for decades, anthropologists have used photography as a research tool to reveal and understand social and cultural realities that shape people’s lives (worth and adair, 1972; ruby, 1975). in recent years, this technique is embracing the voices of local people in a participatory action tool referred to as photo-essay or photovoice (hockings, 1995; banks, 1992; crawford and turton, 1992; wang, 1998). as a participatory tool, photovoice has been extensively used nyasimi and okang’a 5 in eliciting community involvement and participation, raising critical consciousness, information sharing and as an impetus of social change (wang et al., 2004; henley, 1997). this is because photovoice is a process and tool by which local ‘people can identify, visually represent, and enhance their community’ (wang and burris, 1997). it’s based on three concepts; a) images teach, b) images can emphasize and spur collective action and social change and, c) images can influence policy makers (wang, 1998; wang et al., 2004; rhodes et al., 2008; oliffe and bottorff, 2007; carlson et al., 2006). photovoice is currently being used in various development programs including health, biodiversity and conservation, water and sanitation, education and natural resource management. combined with other approaches, photovoice has the potential for developing long term community involvement in social action to bring about real economic and social change within mvp across sub-saharan africa. engagement of local people in the photovoice project is expected to spur personal and social growth and put the whole community on the right highway towards achieving the millennium development goals (mdgs). the goal of photovoice project is to involve local people in photographically documenting impacts of mvp activities in their lives, facilitate and critically understand their experiences and increase awareness about the complexity and diversity of impacts and effectiveness of mvp. indeed, visual images are powerful representation of reality and they can lead to improving the creativity and efficiency of implementing mdgs elsewhere across the developing world. in the spirit of participatory action research, we also plan to disseminate the findings from invocp through creation of a photoalbum collective that would have an economical and social value to local people. sauri millennium village the photovoice project was initiated in sauri village located close to the eastern shores of lake victoria in kenya. sauri village lies about 1450 meters above sea level with average daily temperatures of 24 o c (mvp annual report, 2005). the topography is undulating with ephemeral streams and a permanent river and receives an annual rainfall of 1800mm that is bimodally distributed. a total of about 5,521 people live in sauri village and are mainly engaged in agricultural activities (mvp annual report, 2005). there are three and one primary and secondary schools, respectively. this is the first millennium village and local people have had more than three years engaged in various development activities. nyasimi and okang’a 6 nine local research participants drawn composed of men and women of different ages and educational level were selected for this project. in addition, one woman who was the chairperson of the sauri executive board for two years was purposively selected. through their own eyes and voices, these ten participants were expected to provide a powerful insider visual interpretation of community changes. a local photojournalist was invited to train the participants on photographic techniques that included photography composition, outdoor and indoor environments, center of interest, subject placement, simplicity, viewpoint and camera angle and balance. the research participants decide on a theme and spend two weeks capturing images and writing personal narratives related to the theme. for this photo essay, the research participants requested us to share two main themes that they have photographed. these are basic health provision and identification and support of vulnerable groups – the widows, girls and physically disabled people. nyasimi and okang’a 7 theme of health service provision sauri health clinic the clinic was opened in 2005 to provide basic health care to the people of sauri. the clinic provides testing, treatment, drugs and health awareness education to the community. at the clinic we also get antiretroviral drugs and condoms. there is a clinical doctor in charge with nurses and community health workers. before the clinic was built in sauri, we only obtained minimum medical care at the sub-district hospital. in most cases, we were treated by nurses and a doctor came occasionally. most of us could not afford to purchase medicine and now we have our own sauri pharmacy that is well stocked. the clinic does not have enough chairs for people to sit on or for children to sleep. as a community we also need to provide shade for patients from the strong afternoon sun. the clinic is usually filled with patients of all ages each day of the week. some come as far as 8 kilometers away because they know they will get to see the doctor and get drugs (photo and story by paul omondi, 2008). nyasimi and okang’a 8 patients lining at pharmacy having a well equipped pharmacy at sauri health clinic is attracting a lot of patients. the pharmacy is well stocked with drugs that we need particularly malaria, diarrhea and antiretroviral drugs. the patient queues at the pharmacy are never long because the nurse dispensing drugs is very efficient. she does not want anyone to wait on the queue for more than 10 minutes because there is no shade (photo and story by leonida owino, 2008). nyasimi and okang’a 9 patients arrive very early at the sauri health clinic patients start arriving as early at 6.00am in the morning to the clinic. patients come from far away and by 8.00am when the clinic opens, the clinic is swarming with patients with all kinds of ailments. both adults and children arrive very early so that they can see the doctor before it gets so hot. some community health workers assist in getting new patient’s history such as age, married, and number of children. sauri clinic has become quite popular with neighboring people because there is guarantee of medicine once the clinical doctor has diagnosed you. we can also get free male condoms at the clinic. are there condoms for women that we can get at the clinic? we want women to take charge of their sexual behavior because some men might refuse to use a condom (photo and story by roseline adhiambo, 2008). nyasimi and okang’a 10 community health worker (chw) at every doorstep these are the most important people in our village right now. a chw does not have a scheduled time to help with sickness in sauri village. all chw work everyday of the week, very committed to their community work. anyone in sauri can visit a chw at their home anytime there is a medical crisis or emergency. chw also checks in our house to ensure that every sleeping space has a treated malaria bednet and that the house is clean. if they find that there is no bednet, they threaten to report to the assistant chief. chw also helps to keep medical records at sauri clinic, helping in taking the weight and height of patients. this month is the busiest period at the clinic because it is malaria season and most of the chw come to help because people from neighboring villages are coming for treatment at the clinic. chw also advises pre and post-natal mothers and teach the whole community on importance of sanitation. there are male and women chw of different ages so that every person in the community can easily approach a chw of their age and discuss private issues affecting them. chw also keep minimum records and information they discuss with sauri people in notebooks and report back to the mvp health team (photo and story by paul omondi, 2008). nyasimi and okang’a 11 we are not afraid of aids anymore this woman has aids but she is not afraid of letting everyone know that she has the disease. this is because people in sauri are not afraid of aids anymore. anyone with aids now has a future, including children with mothers who have aids. we have arvs (antiretrovirals) right at our door and it is saving a lot of lives in sauri. people are not ashamed to talk about aids, or tell our children how to safeguard themselves against aids. we now know that aids is not a curse. community health workers are doing excellent work sensitizing sauri people about aids and everyone is openly talk about sexual behaviors and how we can change. through intensive aids programs in our village, mvp team has enabled us to readily accept people with aids, help them when they require help and even collect medicine for them from the clinic. we attend nutritional session organized by mvp team because all of us have someone who has aids and hence we need to know the right foods to cook for them. more and more people are also readily enrolling at the clinic to get arvs. i encourage women who has aids and have children that they ensure they do not transmit the virus to their children (photo and story by monica okech, 2008). nyasimi and okang’a 12 responding to medical emergencies faster the community ambulance before we started working with mvp, we used to transport the sick to yala sub-distrcit hospital using bicycles. even now villages that are not included within the project target area still using bicycles to transport the sick. we now have a community clinic ambulance that in case of medical complications, it transports the patient to the district hospital, particularly for women who are delivering a baby and require caesarian operation. most women especially young teenage girls cannot die during childbirth. the community ambulance is also used to carry patients who cannot walk to the hospital. it is on standby the whole day and night in case there is an emergency. unfortunately, there is no nurse or medical officer accompanying the ambulance when its carrying a patient (photo and story by shadrack rading, 2008). nyasimi and okang’a 13 a father taking a son to sauri health clinic before mvp built the sauri health clinic, men hardly carried their sick children to the sub-district hospital. this was a job mainly left to mother of the child. since mvp initiated its activities, more men are engaging in activities they considered ‘women’s job’ such as carrying their own sick children to the hospital. young and middle aged men in sauri village are realizing the importance of helping their wives in household duties, particualry taking care of children. since all young girls are attending school and not available to care for the child, the men have to take up that responsibility. as a young man myself, i know its our responsbility to change because the rest of kenya is pushing ahead with development while in sauri we will languish behind. through mvp i have had opportunity to travel to other places in nyanza among the kipsigis people in kericho and saw men engaged in farming activities more intensely than women, especially in raising vegetables for the market in nairobi. i was encouraged and decided to assist my wife in establishing a vegetable garden so that we sell vegetables at kisumu market , which is 35 kms away from sauri village (photo and story by aggrey ranyondo, 2008). nyasimi and okang’a 14 sauri theatre group disseminating mvp information a group of young men and women felt the need to form a theatre group to share information about mvp activities to the rest of sauri community. this group has become important to us because they get information in english and then translate it into luo and use drama, short plays, poems and games to share it with the community. i am a member of this group and we target adults and school children. we perform our shows to audiences at the primary and secondary schools, health clinic, churches, village meetings and at funerals. our topics range from prevention of aids, sanitation, stop of early marriages of teenage girls, protecting the environment, improving soil fertility, use of latrines and stop culture of beating women (photo and story by samuel ougo, 2008). nyasimi and okang’a 15 theme b: targeting of vulnerable people in sauri millennium village a widow in sauri is triple disadvantaged for a long time, widows suffered a great deal in sauri village. they were triple disadvantaged, never seen nor heard. first, they are women; second, they are widows; and third, have refused wife inheritance. now with mvp widow can be seen and they are readily getting help. however, more work needs to be done to assist widows escape poverty. i am requesting mvp to include a 9th mdg which is: to provide quality shelter particularly to widows. this is because widows are shunned by the community and most men do not want to help them (photo and story by monica okech, 2008). nyasimi and okang’a 16 a new home for a widow one of our cultures is wife inheritance after the death of a woman’s husband. the widow has to be inherited before the dead husband is buried. however, with increasing cases of aids infection, many widows are refusing to be inherited. since this widows do not have a man to build a house for them or even repair the old one, their houses collapse. when mvp initiated community activities, we realized that widows do need help in rebuilding their houses. so, we requested support from mvp and this is one of the homes that sauri community with help from mvp built for widows. the houses have iron sheet roofs and they have a gutter to direct rain water into a huge storage tank. this widow does not need to go to the protected springs to collect any water. she can use the spare time to do other jobs in the house or just rest or meet her friends. not all widows have benefited from this generous gift but we are requesting our local leaders particularly our chief and assistant chief and member of parliament to assist these widows. there is constituency funds that can be used to rebuild houses for widows and we want our local member of parliament to allocate some funds. we cannot depend on mvp all the time because they will be here for a short time and we need to continue the work we begun together (photo and story by shadrack rading, 2008). nyasimi and okang’a 17 my close friends provide a safe haven and comfort these are my friends who support me. two of these women are widows who really need our support especially social and emotional morale support. we depend on each other to borrow household foods such as salt, sugar, maize flour and soap and also to provide a safe place when our husbands beat us. our doors are open to each other day and night. we have formed a silent women group that includes both widows and women with husbands because we need each other. these women have assisted me getting fertilizer and maize seed on loan. we attend village meetings together at sauri centre where we get information from the assistant chief or mvp team (photo and story by pascalia odando, 2008). nyasimi and okang’a 18 young girls engage in household work and attend school the problem of being a girl in sauri is that we are expected to attend school some days and stay at home to help our mothers. this girl is my friend and classmate at sauri primary school but she did not come to school today (a thursday). i came to check on her thinking that she might be sick. her mother informed me that she had gone to collect water from the spring. i found her returning home with a pail and jerrican of water on her head and hand. despite having free primary school and the school meals, some parents do not send their daughters to school everyday and instead involve them in water and firewood collection and other activities around the home. all parents should enroll girls and ensure that the girls attend school everyday (name withheld to protect identity of photographer). nyasimi and okang’a 19 physically disabled people are actively engaging in community activities physically disabled people in sauri have been neglected by the community for a long time. i can remember a long time ago that physically disabled people were supported by the community and provided with food and clothing. however, in recent years disabled people became ignored and lost within sauri. now mvp has raised our awareness of these people. we help them plant their crops and harvest as well. we have created a special seat for them in the sauri executive committee so that they have a representative who can voice their concerns (photo and story by jackline odindo, 2008). nyasimi and okang’a 20 a widow consumed by jiggers (tunga penetrans) this woman’s husband died and her house collapsed. with the help of community members particularly the former sauri executive chairlady, monica okech and mvp helped her build a new one but forgot about cementing the floors. with poor hygiene and sanitation, jiggers invaded her house and attacked her feet and fingers. she does her swept her house regularly or even keep it clean, so jiggers decided to make a home there. the community health workers could like to target her and assist her, but everyone in sauri village thinks her late husband is cursing her. so many people are keeping away from her. even me i was scared of taking the picture but i want the mvp team to see what is happening to this woman and they can plan on how to assist her with medicine. she cannot walk to the clinic because her feet are very painful (photo and story by pamela adhiambo, 2008). nyasimi and okang’a 21 offering hope and a home to orphaned children of sauri village in the past 12 years, a lot of people have died in sauri village leaving behind orphans. traditionally some of the orphans could be taken care of and supported by immediate family members such as uncles and aunts. however, since aids hit our village, you find that this people have also died or have limited resources (land and cash) to take in more mouths to feed. with wife inheritance practice and other rituals that we perform, many adults in sauri contracted aids and died. so, orphans were left to fend for themselves. some were too young and ended up as street children in kisumu, kakamega and siaya towns. they did not attend school at all and never had a responsible adult to guide them through life. since mvp started and we recognized the need to support orphans, we started placing them under care of an adult not necessarily an immediate family member, but someone willing and ready to provide a home and guide them. targeting of orphaned children in sauri has offered a beacon of hope and opportunities for orphans to attend bar sauri primary school where they get a nutritious school meal at lunch. once someone agrees to take care of orphans we ensure that they get medicine from sauri clinic, nutritious food, second hand clothes and shoes (photo and story by roseline adhiambo, 2008). nyasimi and okang’a 22 references: carlson, elizabeth, joan engebretson and robert chamberlain. 2006. photovoice as a social process of critical consciousness. qualitative health research 16(6): 836-52. crawford, peter and david turton. eds. film as ethnography. manchester. manchester university press. 1992. henley, paul. 1997. the promise of ethnographic film. visual anthropology 13: 207-26. hockings, paul. ed. principles of visual anthropology. berlin & new york: 1995. millennium village project annual report. july 2004 to june 2005. millennium promise, new york. downloaded on january 5, 2008 from http://www.millenniumvillages.org/ oliffe, john and joan bottorff. 2007. further than the eye can see? photo elicitation and research with men. qualitative health research 17(6): 850-58 rhodes, scott, kenneth hergenrather, aimee wilkin and christine jolly. 2008. visions and voices: 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http://www.pnas.org/search?author1=alia+malik&sortspec=date&submit=submit http://www.pnas.org/search?author1=vijay+modi&sortspec=date&submit=submit http://www.pnas.org/search?author1=patrick+mutuo&sortspec=date&submit=submit http://www.pnas.org/search?author1=amadou+niang&sortspec=date&submit=submit http://www.pnas.org/search?author1=frank+place&sortspec=date&submit=submit http://www.pnas.org/search?author1=frank+place&sortspec=date&submit=submit http://www.pnas.org/search?author1=sonia+ehrlich+sachs&sortspec=date&submit=submit http://www.pnas.org/search?author1=david+siriri&sortspec=date&submit=submit http://www.pnas.org/search?author1=awash+teklehaimanot&sortspec=date&submit=submit http://www.pnas.org/search?author1=karen+wang&sortspec=date&submit=submit http://www.pnas.org/search?author1=justine+wangila&sortspec=date&submit=submit http://www.pnas.org/search?author1=colleen+zamba&sortspec=date&submit=submit http://www.photovoice.com/ microsoft word 11 154-179 wu final formatted.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 10, iss. 1 (2013), pp. 154 – 179 independent study on changing student behaviour to increase energy sustainability and efficiency at the macdonald campus of mcgill university andrew wu mcgill school of environment mcgill university, montreal, canada email: andrew.wu2@mail.mcgill.ca jaaved singh faculty of agricultural and environmental sciences mcgill university, montreal, canada email: jaaved.singh@mail.mcgill.ca peter tikasz faculty of agricultural and environmental sciences mcgill university, montreal, canada email: peter.tikasz@mail.mcgill.ca abstract this paper explores social perception towards energy consumption on macdonald campus, as seen by different subsections of the macdonald community: undergraduate, graduate, faculty and staff. a total of 118 community members were randomly surveyed via a semi-structured questionnaire. the main findings of our research suggest that, as a whole, community members believe macdonald campus to be a relatively energy-efficient place. however, results indicated a discrepancy between students and faculty/staff in terms of their perception of energy efficiency on campus. furthermore, there was broad agreement regarding the inaccessibility of information on energy use on campus, suggesting that this was a primary leverage point for enacting social change. various initiatives are presented that are aimed towards increasing information accessibility. with a planned implementation date of fall 2012, these initiatives are expected to have a significant impact on environmental awareness, leading to a decrease in energy use on campus and a reduction in environmental impact. author’s note we would like to thank the following people for their help during the project, their presence and guidance through our research, and all the time they spent with us and answered our questions: professor george mccourt; dr. caroline begg; mr. denis mondou; mr. peter knox & jerome conraud; ms. lilith wyatt & jennifer dumoulin; mcgill energy project (mep); harriet kim; committee for environmental responsibility, education and sustainability (ceres). we would also like to thank everyone who did the survey. keywords: energy consumption, social behaviour, macdonald campus, mcgill university consilience wu et al.: changing student behavior 1. introduction as an established institution, mcgill university has numerous incentives to create a culture of sustainability and reduce energy consumption on campus. first and foremost, the impact of technical improvements can be compounded if community members similarly decrease their energy demand. furthermore, there are undeniable environmental and social benefits: lowering energy use would decrease co2 emissions and lessen mcgill’s impact on the environment (governors, 2010). not only would this assist in meeting mcgill’s energy goals and bolster mcgill’s reputation as a leader in the field of sustainability (m. luke, fall 2011), but it would also translate to significant amounts of savings in electricity bills over time (mcgill, 2010). these savings could be reinvested in energy-efficient technologies, leading to a self-sustaining loop of cost savings and energy efficiency. hence, efforts to establish a culture of sustainability have numerous potential benefits; compared to costly investments in advanced, energy-efficient technology, they offer an alternative approach to decreasing energy consumption that is both cheap and potentially long lasting. in 2006, a group of mcgill students on macdonald campus set the stage for a sustainable campus culture, publishing a report assessing the campus’ environmental sustainability. the ecosystem sustainability assessment macdonald campus focused on various aspects of environmental sustainability, including energy; apart from identifying key areas of improvement, such as the lack of sustainable technology, a dearth of meters and gauges, and wasteful social behaviour; the report also provided a detailed list of initiatives that the campus could implement to improve its energy use (n. castellanos, fall 2006). ceres (committee for environmental responsibility, education and sustainability) brought these initiatives up in 2011 even as they were not explored in further detail at the time. it assigned groups of students to different sections of the report, intending to ultimately enact the recommended initiatives. originally intended as a follow-up to the “energy” section of the 2006 report, our research project has since evolved to serve another purpose. upon further research, we discovered that the majority of initiatives were already underway; be it the macdonald campus energy project or the mcgill energy project, improvements to the technical aspects of energy use flourished. to our greatest knowledge, however, there had been no formal attempt at macdonald campus to change social behaviour with regards to energy use. contrary to popular belief, the 2006 report clearly indicated areas of social behaviour on macdonald campus that were anything but environmentally friendly (n. castellanos, fall 2006). hence, our research project sought to address this wasteful behaviour while filling in the absence of social initiatives for energy use. our research objectives were formulated with the benefits of sustainability in mind. through interviews and surveys, we wished to gain greater insight into social perception towards energy efficiency at mac campus. more specifically, we wished to obtain a comprehensive understanding of whether community members were concerned with their energy use, and whether their degree of concern was reflected in their actions. furthermore, we sought to develop effective, implementable methods of promoting energy-conscious behavior, targeting leverage points 156 consilience identified by the surveys. as will be seen, our report focused on research-informed solutions to reduce energy use that could be implemented in the near future. 2. methodology in order to better understand the macdonald campus community’s attitude towards energy efficiency, a survey was designed for distribution throughout the campus. the questions in the survey were designed to explore the different aspects of social perception with regards to energy efficiency. key areas of interest included the respondent’s awareness about energy efficiency, and whether this was reflected in the respondent’s consumption patterns. the respondent was also asked to gauge the general culture of macdonald campus, and whether it was conducive to promoting energy efficiency and environmental awareness. to maximize the number of respondents, we sought to make the survey as succinct as possible. thus, we made extensive use of the likert scale, a widespread method that is used in quantifying and scaling survey responses. likert scales are highly useful in surveys, as they take minimal time to respond to while providing useful, quantitative results; however, their quantitative nature can prove insufficient for questions that are more nuanced. (neil j salkind, 2007). hence, in areas where numerical responses were inadequate, we made use of semi-structured questions – questions with relatively open frameworks – which allowed for greater freedom of expression from respondents while still providing focused, relevant answers (bert klandermans, 2002). this effort to keep the survey succinct yet informative assisted our effort to obtain results, as potential surveyors were more receptive to short surveys than long ones. over the course of two weeks, we spent two hours per weekday gathering responses from members of the macdonald community. the first half of this period was spent collecting data from respondents in the link café and centennial center. this was because the two locations act as focal points, with the vast majority of community members at mac campus passing through these areas at one point or another. soon, however, it became evident that the vast majority of responses were solely from undergraduate students. as a means of ensuring that the data samples were representative of the community as a whole, the second week was primarily spent targeting underrepresented groups (i.e. graduates, faculty, and staff). we accomplished this by visiting areas where these members could be found such as offices, classrooms, and dorm rooms. overall, a sizeable total of 118 survey responses were collected, with the demographic breakdown of the responses being representative of the macdonald community. 3. results and discussion the following sections will address the results for different questions in the survey (see appendix). each section is composed of a discussion of survey results, which can be found in the appendix. consilience wu et al.: changing student behavior 3.1 occupation, fume covers, windows, and recycling relevant questions: • question 1 occupation • question 2: how often do you do the following on mac campus? o close fume covers when not in use o keep windows closed during winter o sort waste into proper recycling bins • question 5 have you been at mac campus over the past 3 years? the survey grouped the results into four categories based on occupation: undergraduate, graduate, faculty and staff (see figure 1.1). to ensure that the survey results were representative of the general population, we had to distribute surveys such that the number of respondents in each category was correspondent to the proportion of each group as part of the general population. while undergraduates were relatively easy to find, grad students proved to be a bit more difficult. hence, we engaged in selective targeting at laird hall to increase the number of graduate students surveyed. both staff and faculty members were also difficult to record, as most were busy and thus failed to fill out the surveys. overall, the samples were relatively small but were reflective of the composition of mac campus. the survey consisted of 72% undergraduates, 14% graduates, 10% staff members and 4% faculty members (compared to the macdonald community, which is composed of 60% undergraduates, 25% graduates, 10% staff members and 5% faculty members). in contrast to the findings of the 2006 report that was mentioned before, the results indicated that the majority of community members closed fume covers and windows as needed (95% of respondents “always” or “usually” closed windows during winter, while 65% “always” or “usually” closed fume covers when not in use – see figures 1.2 and 1.3) (n. castellanos, fall 2006). this suggests that, to a certain extent, there is already a preexisting culture of sustainability, as certain energy-saving habits are already ingrained in individual behavior. similarly, a significant proportion of respondents regularly engage in recycling (86% “always” or “usually” properly sorted waste – see figure 1.4). however, it should be noted that improvements can still be made; a waste audit done by ceres in 2011 concluded that 10% (11.72kg out of 122.37 kg of waste measured) of garbage is composed of recyclable material. given this substantial proportion of misplaced recyclable materials, it is reasonable to conclude that proper recycling behavior must be enforced if a culture of sustainability is to flourish on campus. 3.2 energy efficiency and consciousness relevant question: • question 3 on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), how do you feel about the following statements relating to how environmental mac campus is? o mac campus is an energy-efficient place o people at mac campus are conscious about their energy use 158 consilience according to the results shown in figure 2.1, 34.15% of surveyed individuals said that the campus was relatively energy efficient, while 42.28% believed the campus to be of standard energy efficiency. while these results are seemingly inconspicuous, a deeper analysis reveals a discrepancy between the responses from the different occupational groups (see figure 2.2). this figure reveals one startling difference: faculty members tend to perceive the campus as being energy inefficient, while students tend to think otherwise. on the other hand, the staff is split across the board, with a slight skew towards the “efficient” side. one possible explanation of this is the differences in perception between these groups. comments left on the survey indicate a general preconception that having recycling and composting around makes the campus more energy-efficient (see appendix 1 – questions 3, 5, and 6). it is true that recycling and composting can reduce the carbon footprint of the campus; however, these actions alone are insufficient, and do not address the primary issue of energy efficiency. the staff and faculty, on the other hand, are more aware of energy use on campus. faculty members are primarily responsible for running the laboratories, which are a significant source of energy consumption; many are also experts in fields related to environmental issues. hence, it is reasonable to conclude that they possess certain awareness about an energy-inefficient side of campus that many students simply have not been exposed to. this divergence in perception towards energy efficiency may need to be remedied if sustainability efforts are to be carried out properly. 3.3 individual action and your action relevant question: • question 4 on a scale of 1 (not important at all) to 5 (extremely important), how do you feel about the following statements relating to sustainability? o how important is individual action in promoting sustainability (as opposed to institutional action)? o how important do you believe your actions are in promoting sustainability? this question of individual action vis-à-vis sustainability yielded very interesting results. it was expected that respondents would believe individual action to be important, and this was demonstrated in figure 3.1; however, the perception of individual importance was significantly downplayed once personal action was called into question (see figure 3.2). this indicates that a significant proportion of the community believes individual action to be important, whereas personal action is not. an implication of this double standard is that calls for action based solely on environmental arguments may not be enough; some may agree that individual contributions are needed, but refuse to take personal action under the premise that their own actions are irrelevant. consilience wu et al.: changing student behavior 3.4 accessibility of information relevant question: • question 7: on a scale of 1 (not accessible at all) to 5 (extremely accessible), how accessible is information on energy efficiency developments at mac campus? reponses indicated that most people at macdonald campus do not know about energy efficiency developments on campus (see figure 4.1). this was reflected during our discussions with various individuals; the majority of people were unfamiliar with initiatives like the macdonald energy project and the mcgill energy dashboard. this lack of accessibility to information can prove problematic in establishing a culture of sustainability as it may hinder individual action. passionate individuals willing to contribute to environmental movements on campus may find themselves in a state of inaction, simply because they do not know what options and initiatives are available. these results suggest that the general lack of awareness about environmental initiatives is a significant hindrance to environmental action within the campus. 3.5 mac vs. home relevant question: • question 8: relative to your behavior at home, are you more or less conscious about your energy use when on mac campus? the majority of people surveyed indicated that they are not more conscious about energy use at mac (see table 5.1). combined with the results from figure 2.3, which indicated that people at mac are more energy conscious, this implies that community members apply their studies to their daily lives at home. such a finding is quite important, as it further compounds the necessity to establish a culture of sustainability on campus. if the culture at macdonald campus were to condone blatant energy inefficiency, such actions would have far-reaching impacts that stretch beyond the boundaries of the campus. 3.6 green activities relevant question: • question 9: please list any green activities at mac campus dealing with student life that you are familiar with, and indicate how often you take part in the activity on a scale of 1 to 5. table 6.1 illustrates all the activities that people on campus consider to be environmentally friendly. the most common activities are composting and recycling. while this may initially seem encouraging, it should be noted that most people selected the value 3 for composting, meaning that they don’t compost all the time. this is in accord with results from a gorilla composting waste audit, which indicated that up to 48% of all material in garbage bags were compostable (ceres, 160 consilience 2011). this suggests that, if done properly, initiatives that are designed to increase awareness and enforce proper sorting behavior would have pronounced effects. question 9 also casts light on the perception issue. as demonstrated, people believe that the most prominent “green” actions that they can engage in on campus are composting and recycling. unfortunately, these behaviors, while important, are not enough. recycling – and to a lesser extent, composting – is considered by many to be customary in this day and age. 4. solutions and initiatives apart from commenting on energy use at macdonald campus, one of the primary aims of this report is also to provide ways of influencing social behavior to decrease energy use. based on an envr 401 project conducted in fall 2011, this objective is achievable given the use of proper methods, but there will be obstacles. it should be noted that the project listed “education,” “competition,” and “incentives/disincentives” as the most effective ways to change behavior (m. fabian, 2011). taking their recommendations and our survey results into account, we have proposed solutions with two primary goals in mind: raising awareness and encouraging personal motivation. as elaborated below, we believe that both objectives are key to furthering a culture of sustainability on campus. 4.1 awareness based on survey responses, it appears that efforts towards sustainability are substantially hindered by a general lack of awareness. as discussed in sections 1, 2, and 4, the macdonald community is fairly conscious about energy consumptionbut does not have the information necessary to improve its energy footprint. in addition, results from section 6 indicate that community members are not entirely aware of environmental groups on campus. given that awareness is the first step to influencing social behavior, it is imperative to publicize information on environmental initiatives and energy use. by informing and educating the macdonald community about sustainability initiatives, we would be able to dispel any misconceptions about the campus’ current environmental state and encourage community members to get more involved. the following are some proposals to raise awareness of macdonald campus’ energy consumption, with the end goal of influencing behaviour and decreasing energy use. firstly, we believe that “one-day-a-month” awareness events are effective remedies to the situation. as the name suggests, the campus could host monthly events featuring different energy or environmental issues, providing information that community members would need in order to get involved (as indicated by the results of section 4). by encouraging cooperation between staff, faculty, and environmental groups on campus, these events would facilitate dialogue within the macdonald community, lessening the discrepancies in the perceptions of campus energy efficiency (as shown in section 2). furthermore, by emphasizing the value of individual action in reducing energy use, these events could effectively galvanize community members to get personally involved, fostering the culture of consilience wu et al.: changing student behavior sustainability from ground-up. a list of eight theme ideas can be found in the appendix. aside from creating new initiatives on campus, it is also important to utilize existing resources on campus and realize their full potential. in recent years, mcgill has begun to improve its transparency by developing the mcgill’s energy dashboard, a comprehensive energy monitoring system that measures daily energy use on a per-building basis. despite its immense academic and environmental value, few people are aware of its existence, let alone its potential in informing the community of energy issues. hence, to improve access, we recommend that the energy dashboard be advertised through the various forms of media available on campus. television sets on campus could broadcast information on the energy dashboard in key locations, providing real-time statistics to keep community members aware and informed of energy use. concurrently, the campus’ environmental advisor could also use this to monitor energy consumption, alerting the community when particular situations arise. the dynamic and ever-changing nature of the macdonald community offers yet another opportunity to raise awareness and establish a culture of sustainability. prospective and newly accepted students are eager to learn about what the “agricultural and environmental campus of mcgill” has to offer. as such, we propose a green orientation event, consisting of a succinct presentation on environment-related resources available on campus – green initiatives, courses, and environmental groups – that students may be interested in. be it fast facts on the campus’ energy use or discussions on individual behaviour and energy consumption, the orientation would cover a broad range of environmental topics to promote general environmental awareness on campus. we are confident that this event will disseminate needed information (as seen in section 4) and promote active participation in the variety of green initiatives available on campus. ultimately, we believe that the aforementioned proposals are effective vehicles for change, driving us towards a more sustainable future. 4.2 personal motivation while raising awareness is an essential step towards fostering a culture of sustainability, it fails to translate into tangible results if community members lack personal motivation to get involved. thus, it is equally vital to ensure that individuals understand the importance of personal action in environmental efforts. as demonstrated in section 3, a substantial proportion of the macdonald community appear to downplay the value of personal involvement in energy initiatives; while previous proposals may remedy this flawed perception, they do not give this topic the attention that it deserves. with this in mind, the following activities will focus on demonstrating the value of personal involvement: competitions, incentives and disincentives. harnessing the potential of friendly competition is one way of improving personal motivation. by creating a competition on reducing energy use, macdonald community members would be motivated to engage in energy-conscious behaviour, learning first-hand the individual impacts on energy consumption while generating immediate results. both interand intra-university competitions can be organized; by 162 consilience collaborating with inter-university groups and applying tools like the mcgill energy dashboard, mcgill can face off against other montreal universities as they race to achieve the greatest proportional drop in energy consumption within a predetermined amount of time. in a similar fashion, this idea could be applied within mcgill’s own boundaries by having the macdonald campus challenge the downtown campus. an alternative competition proposal would be to design an obstacle course as part of frosh orientation. by incorporating engaging challenges that promote environmental awareness, such as racing to sort waste into proper bins or cartwheeling compost across campus, the competition would reiterate the value of individual action and encourage environmentally-friendly behavior within the campus community. given that community members usually simulate their behaviour on campus at home (as indicated in section 5), campus-wide initiatives that encourage energy and environmental awareness are likely to have spillover benefits within households as well. aside from competitions, incentives and disincentives would also be effective means of promoting personal motivation and involvement (m. fabian, 2011) as they clearly demonstrate the impacts of individual action. as stated earlier, this would address the individual’s personal detachment from environmental responsibility as highlighted in section 3. one potential proposal, then, is to have residences place a cap on energy use for individual students; if a room’s energy consumption goes above the cap, the occupants would be billed that amount in their next rent payment. the main challenge with this particular idea, however, is that residences on campus do not have the proper energy meters in place to measure consumption on a roomby-room basis. without the ability to measure individual energy use, it would be difficult to properly distribute incentives or disincentives. hence, as supported by interviews with the residential housing office, said incentive/disincentive approach is unlikely to work until energy-recording equipment of high resolution is placed on campus. nonetheless, the potential of incentives and disincentive in reducing energy consumption and fostering a culture of sustainability should not be overlooked. 5. conclusion much was learned about energy use and fostering sustainability on campus. this research project illuminated the status quo on macdonald campus – an ironic phrase, perhaps, considering that “obliviousness” is likely the most befitting term to describe the community’s attitude towards sustainability initiatives. this is clearly demonstrated in the survey results. for example, based on section 2, students showed a proclivity to characterize the campus as being environmentally friendly; however, this view was not shared by faculty and staff, who are more acquainted with the inner workings of the campus and are thus more aware of its sheer energy consumption. this observation is further supported by the results of section 4 and 6; community members generally felt that there was limited accessibility to information pertaining to sustainability initiatives, and were consequently unable to list the multitude of initiatives present on campus. many written responses bolstered our findings, with some explicitly stating that they were unaware of the happenings and green events going on at campus. simply put, the lack of awareness is arguably the consilience wu et al.: changing student behavior greatest hurdle to developing a culture of sustainability on campus, and should be a primary leverage point to enact behavioral change. this is not to say, however, that the future of sustainability initiatives on campus is bleak. on the contrary, there exists a multitude of projects that are underway across the campus. clubs such as gorilla composting and ceres (comité étudiant pour une �esponsabilité environnementale et sociale) are reaching out to students, seeking to integrate sustainability into their everyday lives. as evidenced by the existence of the mcgill energy dashboard and the macdonald campus energy project, members of the administration are working diligently to establish energy-efficient infrastructure crucial to the sustenance of a culture of sustainability. furthermore, as shown through findings in section 7, the community appears to be quite receptive to environmental initiatives, and has indicated a willingness to learn and adapt to sustainability initiatives if given the information and opportunity. apathy and inaction do not seem to be the main problem; rather, survey results suggest (as discussed in section 2 and 4) that communication and awareness are the elements most in need. as our proposed solutions have yet to be carried out, their efficacy at improving environmental awareness is ultimately unknown. nonetheless, based on our findings, it is reasonable to conclude that initiatives designed to enhance the accessibility of information are likely to have a substantial impact on energy use on campus. what macdonald campus needs most, then, are seeds of communication to help the garden of sustainability grow. 164 consilience bibliography bert klandermans, s. s. 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(1992). sampling (2 ed. ed.). new york. consilience wu et al.: changing student behavior appendix table of contents appendix i 166 questionnaire 166 certificate of ethical responsibility 169 appendix ii 170 section 1: occupation, fume covers, windows, and recycling 170 figure 1.1 170 figure 1.2 170 figure 1.3 171 figure 1.4 171 section 2: energy efficiency and consciousness 172 figure 2.1 172 figure 2.2 172 figure 2.3 173 section 3: individual action and your action 174 figure 3.1 174 figure 3.2 174 section 4: accessibility of information 175 figure 4.1 175 section 5: macdonald campus vs. home 176 figure 5.1 176 section 6: green activities 177 figure 6.1 177 section 7: information event 178 figure 7.1 178 appendix iii 179 one day a month awareness event 179 166 consilience appendix i questionnaire questionnaire on energy use at mac campus -filling out and returning the survey is implicit consent 1. occupation: undergraduate student graduate student faculty staff 2. how often do you do the following on mac campus? 3. on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), how do you feel about the following statements relating to how environmental mac campus is? mac campus is an energy-efficient place. 1 2 3 4 5 people at mac campus are conscious about their energy use.1 2 3 4 5 please state your reason for giving the above ratings: 4. on a scale of 1 (not important at all) to 5 (extremely important), how do you feel about the following statements relating to sustainability? 1 2 3 4 5 how important do you believe your actions are in promoting sustainability? 1 2 3 4 5 5. have you been at mac campus over the past 3 years? yes no if yes, please answer the following question: na never rarely sometimes usually always close fume covers when not in use 0 1 2 3 4 5 keep windows closed during winter 0 1 2 3 4 5 sort waste into proper recycling bins 0 1 2 3 4 5 how important is individual action in promoting sustainability (as opposed to institutional action)? consilience wu et al.: changing student behavior over the past 3 years, has the degree of energy/environmental consciousness at mac campus increased, decreased, or stayed the same? please explain. 6. on mac campus, are there any areas of energy use in particular need of improvement? 7. on a scale of 1 (not accessible at all) to 5 (extremely accessible), how accessible is information on energy efficiency developments at mac campus? 1 2 3 4 5 8. relative to your behavior at home, are you more or less conscious about your energy use when on mac campus? less consc ious somewhat less no differ ence somewhat more more consc ious 1 2 3 4 5 9. please list any green activities at mac campus dealing with student life that you are familiar with, and indicate how often you take part in the activity on a scale of 1 to 5.   not   applicable   no   impact  at   all   barely   any   impact   some   impact     quite  a   bit  of   impact     a  lot  of   impact       0   1   2   3     4     5       0   1   2   3     4     5       0   1   2   3     4     5       0   1   2   3     4     5       0   1   2   3     4     5   168 consilience 10. if an information session about green initiatives available at mac was hosted during your orientation session, how likely would you have been to attend? not applicable not likely at all barely likely somewhat likely likely very likely 0 1 2 3 4 5 consilience wu et al.: changing student behavior certificate of ethical acceptability 170 consilience appendix ii section 1: occupation, fume covers, windows, and recycling figure 1.1: (question 1 and 5) respondents classified according to their occupation and their response to question 5. respondents that have been on macdonald campus for 3 or more years were placed in the “yes” category, and the “no” category otherwise. figure 1.2: (question 2) reponses regarding the relative frequency of closing fume covers when not in use. the results represent a cumulative answer from all occupations. consilience wu et al.: changing student behavior figure 1.3: (question 2) reponses regarding the relative frequency of keeping windows closed during winter. the results represent a cumulative answer from all occupations. figure 1.4: (question 2) reponses regarding the relative frequency of sorting waste into the proper bins. the results represent a cumulative answer from all occupations. 172 consilience section 2: energy efficiency and consciousness figure 2.1: (question 3) macdonald campus’ perceived energy efficiency, on a scale of 1 (a perception of low energy efficiency) to 5 (a perception of high energy efficiency). figure 2.2: (question 3) macdonald campus’ perceived energy efficiency on a scale of 1 (a perception of low energy efficiency) to 5 (a perception of high energy efficiency), broken down into respective occupational groups. consilience wu et al.: changing student behavior figure 2.3: (question 3) macdonald campus community’s perceived energy awareness, on a scale of 1 (a perception of low energy awareness) to 5 (a perception of high energy awareness), broken down by occupation. 174 consilience section 3: individual action and your action figure 3.1: (question 4) the importance of individual action in promoting sustainability, on a scale of 1 (no importance) to 5 (high importance), broken down by occupation. figure 3.2: (question 4) the importance of survey respondents in promoting sustainability through their own actions, on a scale of 1 (no importance) to 5 (high importance), broken down by occupation. consilience wu et al.: changing student behavior section 4: accessibility of information figure 4.1: (question 7) accessibility to information regarding energy efficiency developments on macdonald campus, on a scale of 1 (not accessible at all) to 5 (extremely accessible). the results represent a cumulative answer from all occupations. 176 consilience section 5: macdonald campus vs. home more  conscious  or  less  conscious  about  energy  use     1   2   3   4   5   no   answer   undergraduate   1.63%   8.94%   41.46%   19.51%   1.63%   -­‐-­‐   graduate   -­‐-­‐   2.44%   4.07%   1.63%   4.07%   0.81%   faculty   -­‐-­‐   1.63%   2.44%   -­‐-­‐   -­‐-­‐   -­‐-­‐   staff   0.81%   1.63%   5.69%   -­‐-­‐   -­‐-­‐   1.63%   total   2.44%   14.63%   53.66%   21.14%   5.69%   2.44%   table 5.1: (question 8) breakdown of relative energy consciousness by occupation. the scale is from 1 (less conscious) to 5 (more conscious). consilience wu et al.: changing student behavior section 6: green activities   0   1   2   3   4   5   compost   0.71%   5.00%   0.71%   19.29%   12.86%   6.43%   recycling   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   3.57%   10.71%   10.71%   farm   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   1.43%   0.00%   0.71%   compost   (link  cafe)   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.71%   0.00%   mseg   0.00%   0.00%   1.43%   0.00%   0.00%   2.86%   food  box   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.71%   0.00%   transportati on  (shuttle   &  free  bike)   0.71%   0.00%   0.00%   0.71%   1.43%   2.14%   bring  your   own  plate   0.00%   0.00%   0.71%   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   happy  belly   0.00%   0.00%   1.43%   2.14%   0.71%   0.71%   ceres   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   2.14%   0.00%   0.71%   out  of  the   garden   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.71%   0.71%   2.14%   use  stairs   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.71%   turn  off   lights   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.71%   hug  your   mug   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.71%   0.71%   0.00%   eco  rez   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.71%   0.00%   0.00%   mac  market   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.71%   0.71%   0.00%   table 6.1: (question 9) the table enumerates actions and initiatives on campus that are considered to be “green.” it also indicates the proportion of total respondents that participate in the action/initiative at a particular frequency, 1 (never participate) to 5 (frequently participate). 178 consilience section 7: information event figure 7.1: (question 10) willingness to attend an informational event during orientation, on a scale of 1 (not accessible at all) to 5 (extremely accessible). consilience wu et al.: changing student behavior appendix iii one day a month awareness event • an exhibition of lights would be set in the ms (macdonald-stewart building) foyer, using a predetermined amount on energy that would be put on display. this would help provide a visualization of energy use on campus, and could potentially reflect the energy used in at least one building on campus. • to bring awareness to water consumption, a shower will be displayed in the foyer, along with relevant figures on daily water use. numerous options for the figures could be used, such as national averages from government databases or estimates from macdonald campus’ pipelines. • to help combat bottled water use on campus, a figure made of plastic water bottles will be constructed; this figure would hold a single refillable water bottle to represent the amount of plastic that could be saved. • regarding the misplacement of plastic into garbage bins, instead of recycling bins, (gorilla composting waste audit), a display would be designed to illustrate the volume of mishandled plastic. • a flash mob event will be planned to highlight the water bottle refill stations available to students. ceres in co-ordination with cenem hosted this event for the 2011-2012 year. • to illustrate energy use, aa batteries will be used to show the energy use of ipods, cell phones, computers and dryers. as each battery represents a certain amount of energy, estimates of appliance energy use would be represented using the equivalent number of batteries. • another event would focus on presenting the proportion of energy delivered to the campus from various energy sources. this is also to illuminate the fact that the campus has yet to reach its mandate of being powered by 90% renewable energy; it is currently sitting around 30% instead (r. proulx, 2012). • the final event planned would be a map of the campus, warped so that each building is represented according to its energy use – i.e. the macdonaldstewart building would be the largest building on the map (r. proulx, 2012). consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 9, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 97 – 106 climate change oppression: media production as the practice of freedom grady walker environmental conservation education new york university, new york grady36@gmail.com abstract communities most vulnerable to climate change must educate themselves on how to adapt to the new challenges they face. the use of participatory media, especially video, can be an effective tool for doing so, allowing users to incorporate indigenous knowledge and create an alternative to the dominant, objectifying narratives of conservation and development. following the methodology of educator and philosopher paulo freire, a program in community-based media, with an emphasis on social and environmental action, has the potential to empower the world’s oppressed against the challenges of the coming decades. author’s note grady walker grew up in kathmandu, nepal. he received his ma in environmental conservation education from new york university, and has recently made films for the red cross in africa. he is a ph.d. candidate at the university of queensland’s centre for communication and social change. keywords: participatory approach, climate change, adaptation, media, freire. 1. introduction 1.1 background education as the practice of freedom—as opposed to education as the practice of domination—denies that man is abstract, isolated, independent, and unattached to the world; it also denies that the world exists as a reality apart from people. authentic reflection considers neither abstract man nor the world without people, but people in their relations with the world. in these relations consciousness and world are simultaneous: consciousness neither precedes the world nor follows it. –paulo freire1 in the foreword to educator paulo freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed, richard shaull elaborates on freire’s notion of education as the practice of freedom, writing that it is “the means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world.”2 in the 1 freire, p. (1970). pedagogy of the oppressed. new york, ny: continuum international. 2 freire, p. (1970). pedagogy of the oppressed. new york, ny: continuum international. 98 consilience case of climate change, education as the practice of freedom can grant men and women the power to adapt to a world that is transforming around them as a result of phenomena largely beyond their control. these are the people whom freire refers to as “the oppressed,” and are otherwise known euphemistically as the poor or disenfranchised. victims of the greed and negligence of distant societies, these men and women are oppressed because they suffer from a form of global injustice— climate change. they are the most vulnerable to environmental threats, while at the same time possessing the lowest capacity to adapt. the importance of climate change adaptation cannot be overemphasized. adaptation strengthens the resiliency of communities and increases their capacity to deal with threats. the participatory approach to adaptation is essential because it engages the community, rather than just the individual, and it is at the community level that climate change adaptation will be most successful. according to media scholar henry jenkins, “we are moving away from a world in which some produce and many consume media toward one in which everyone has a more active stake in the culture that is produced.”3 the purpose of this paper is to present the concept that media production in itself is education as the practice of freedom, and that through the application of participatory media education, the oppressed can adapt both to climate change and to the objectifying forces of the current inequitable world order. 1.2 foundational concepts participatory video (pv) is a technique in which trained professionals teach basic video production skills, such as storyboarding, framing, and camera operation to a motivated but relatively unskilled group of people. the traditional concept of participatory video is used widely in education, activism, and development. existing participatory video models substantially influence the media-based participatory approach advocated in this paper. although a diverse range of media can be incorporated into the participatory approach (radio, print, etc.), this paper will focus almost exclusively on video. video is arguably the most powerful of the aforementioned media, with the greatest capacity to communicate and engender change. this is reflected in the steady rise of video consumption worldwide. the seamless integration of video and the internet, along with the surge of online video content, means that the worldwide consumption of media that utilizes video will only continue to grow. according to a 2010 cisco report, ninety percent of internet traffic will be video by the year 2015, with one million minutes of video content crossing the network every second. currently, ip traffic is growing fastest in latin america, followed by the middle east and africa.4 more significant, however, is the impact that video production has on the producers themselves, especially in relation to education as the practice of freedom. no other form of media requires producers to play such an active role in their work. 3 jenkins, h. (2009). confronting the challenges of participatory culture: media education for the 21st century. cambridge, ma: the mit press. 4 cisco visual networking index: forecast and methodology, 2010-2015. (2012, may). san jose, ca: cisco. consilience walker: climate change oppression video makers must physically be at the location of their subjects and must interact with them directly. video production is more than just reporting—it requires critical thinking, teamwork, and engagement. this process is what makes video production such a profound and transformative experience for participants. at once, they become storytellers, activists, and creators of knowledge and information. it should also be noted that vulnerability, when referring to a community threatened by climate change, natural disasters, or other forms of environmental degradation, implies a community with low adaptive capacity, therefore qualifying it as “oppressed.” many regions of the world will be greatly affected by anticipated climate change, from manhattan to bangladesh. what makes manhattan different from bangladesh, however, is its capacity, backed by the resources of a powerful and wealthy government, to adapt to that change. 2. the need for climate change adaptation even with reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, it is projected that global temperatures and sea levels will continue to rise, and that extreme weather events associated with climate change will become more frequent.5 for this reason, it is essential that adaptation, along with mitigation, be considered an important response to climate change.6 the variability of climate change effects on a given community differs for a number of reasons. according to a 2010 oxfam report, poverty, above any other factor, determines a community’s vulnerability, as it puts a limit on its capacity to adapt.7 the poverty is usually then compounded by a high dependence on natural resources. the millennium ecosystem assessment states that, “most of the world’s 2.7 billion poor people depend on natural resources (water, forests, seas, soil, biodiversity, and so on) for survival and economic development, but the environment and the world’s natural resources are already being substantially degraded and increasingly being affected by changes in the climate.”8 here, it is important to note that, for these natural resource dependent communities, the threat of climate change lies mainly in extreme events, rather than average climate variability. the australian climate commission reports that, “many of the impacts of climate change are due to extreme weather events, not changes in average values of climatic parameters. the most important of these are high temperature-related events, such as heat waves and bushfires; heavy precipitation events; and storms, such as tropical cyclones and hailstorms.”9 5 intergovernmental panel on climate change. (2007). climate change 2007: synthesis report (r. k. pachauri & a. reisinger, eds.). geneva, switzerland. 6 intergovernmental panel on climate change. (2001). adaptation to climate change in the context of sustainable development and equity (b. smit & o. pilifosova, authors). geneva, switzerland. 7 pettengell, c. (2010, april). oxfam research reports: climate change adaptation: enabling people living in poverty to adapt. oxfam international. 8 millennium ecosystem assessment. (2005). washington, dc: world resources institute. 9 commonwealth of australia climate commission. (2011, november). the critical decade: climate science, risks, and responses. 100 consilience furthermore, oxfam highlights that men and women will be affected differently by climate change. because women are more frequently marginalized by unequal access to resources and opportunities, they have an even higher level of vulnerability.10 in the anthropocene, the warming of the earth’s climate system is undeniable.11 despite the global body of knowledge, however, information at the local level is often insufficient for people to make conventional planning decisions.12 the following selection from oxfam’s 2010 report on climate change adaptation is particularly noteworthy because it stresses the importance of education in the adaptation process: “adaptation is…not a choice between reducing general vulnerability or preparing for specific hazards, such as floods; adaptation requires both, in an ongoing change process whereby people can make informed decisions about their lives and livelihoods in a changing climate. learning to adapt is as important as any specific adaptation intervention.”13 because adaptation can be social, economic, or ecological, there is a need for an equitable, interdisciplinary approach to educating people about climate change. this can be achieved by designing approaches on a case-by-case basis. the diversity of adaptations across all sectors, including the variety of stakeholders, makes it “infeasible to systematically evaluate lists of particular adaptation measures.”14 the threats that communities face, their current level of resilience, and their adaptive capacity must all be taken into account. adaptation to climate change and sustainable development are closely linked by a number of factors. as such, increasing the adaptive capacity of a community frequently involves the same implementation methodology as sustainable development. sustainable development implemented without any understanding of climate change can be hugely detrimental and even increase a community’s vulnerability. it is, therefore, imperative that climate hazards and risks be taken into account when planning sustainable development initiatives.15 10 pettengell, c. (2010, april). oxfam research reports: climate change adaptation: enabling people living in poverty to adapt. oxfam international. 11 intergovernmental panel on climate change. (2007). climate change 2007: synthesis report (r. k. pachauri & a. reisinger, eds.). geneva, switzerland. 12 pettengell, c. (2010, april). oxfam research reports: climate change adaptation: enabling people living in poverty to adapt. oxfam international. 13 ibid. 14 intergovernmental panel on climate change. (2001). adaptation to climate change in the context of sustainable development and equity (b. smit & o. pilifosova, authors). geneva, switzerland. 15 intergovernmental panel on climate change. (2001). adaptation to climate change in the context of sustainable development and equity (b. smit & o. pilifosova, authors). geneva, switzerland. consilience walker: climate change oppression 3. the participatory approach although people in more developed regions have greater access to media, especially the internet, it is the very protean nature of this media that allows it to be successful in developing areas, where citizens, as illustrated above, are the most vulnerable to climate change. regardless of the setting, however, the importance of a participatory approach to education remains the same. jenkins succinctly writes: “a participatory culture is a culture with relatively low barriers to artistic expression and civic engagement, strong support for creating and sharing creations, and some type of informal mentorship whereby experienced participants pass along knowledge to novices.”16 in their field handbook, insights into participatory video, nick and chris lunch write, “pv is a tool for positive social change; it is a means of empowerment for the marginalized and it is a process that encourages individuals and communities to take control of their destinies.”17 this is largely due to the fact that, with participatory video, these marginalized groups are able to exercise a high degree of artistic control to tell their story the way they want it told. they can create their own video concepts, arranging and capturing the shots in the order that they are intended to be presented. also fundamental to this educational and skills-building technique is its focus on community engagement. producing a video requires teamwork and group decision-making as well as shared ownership of the completed project. as jenkins writes, “new media literacies should be seen as social skills, as ways of interacting within a larger community, and not simply as individualized skills to be used for personal experience.”18 participatory videos, in theory, differ from traditional documentary films because they more fully represent the voice of the participants. documentary films will always, to some extent, reflect the views of the filmmakers, however sensitive they may be towards their subjects. in additional, participatory videos are usually not intended to meet the standards of professional documentary films, as they are often made with specific audiences and objectives in mind.19 participatory videos can take many forms and are made for a wide variety of purposes. in the context of climate change, there is evidence that these videos improve the way in which vulnerable communities use climate information.20 they often have the power to affect change where more traditional informational sources have failed. suarez, benn, and macklin argue, “current inequities in patterns of flow 16 jenkins, h. (2009). confronting the challenges of participatory culture: media education for the 21st century. cambridge, ma: the mit press. 17 lunch, n., & lunch, c. (2006). insights into participatory video: a handbook for the field. oxford, united kingdom: insightshare 18 jenkins, h. (2009). confronting the challenges of participatory culture: media education for the 21st century. cambridge, ma: the mit press. 19 lunch, n., & lunch, c. (2006). insights into participatory video: a handbook for the field. oxford, united kingdom: insightshare. 20 suarez, p., ching, f., ziervogel, g., wisner, b., mendler de suarez, j., lemaire, i., & turnquest, d. (2008). video-mediated approaches for community-level climate adaptation. ids bulletin, 39(4), 96-104. 102 consilience and use of information make it very difficult for national and sub-national governments, humanitarian and development organizations and other stakeholders to reach the ‘last mile’ where adaptation measures are most needed.”21 participatory videos, though, allow producers to bypasses these inequities. according to lunch and lunch, they can be used “to communicate the situation and ideas of local people to development workers and formal researchers and to decision-makers and policymakers.”22 as such, their potential to influence is profound. 4. collective action media production collective action media production (camp) is an umbrella term referring to the participatory model introduced in the previous sections. this section will highlight the ways in which camp projects differ from typical development-based and ngo-facilitated media projects. in freire’s “banking” model of education, information flows in one direction only, from a “teacher,” considered knowledgeable, to a “student,” considered to know nothing. this model projects an absolute ignorance onto others and is thus characteristic of the ideology of oppression. the alternative to this form of education is what freire calls “problem-posing,” or education as the practice of freedom. in the problem-posing model, “people develop their power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in which they find themselves; they come to see the world not as a static reality, but as a reality in process, in transformation.”23 camp projects fall directly in line with this “problem-posing” concept of education. the guiding forces of a camp project are the participants and the facilitators. traditional media, as used by many ngos and developmental organizations, falls more closely in line with the “banking” model, which is rarely successful at empowering marginalized people. collective action media production, however, is inherently empowering—it is a tool belonging to oppressed peoples in their struggle to overcome objectifying forces. 5. policy implications of camp in order to establish a campsite, or place where the camp model is practiced, there must be a high level of motivation among members of the community. levels of vulnerability and adaptive capacity must be taken into account, and educators responsible for establishing a campsite must be familiar with the local community. ideally, the educators themselves would be members of the community, but at the very least, they must be sensitive to the area’s cultural and geographical issues. it is the responsibility of the educators to ensure that the camp 21 suarez, p., benn, j., & macklin, c. (2011, april). world resources report: putting vulnerable people at the center of communication for adaptation: the case for knowledge sharing through participatory games and video tools. washington, dc: world resources institute. 22 lunch, n., & lunch, c. (2006). insights into participatory video: a handbook for the field. oxford, united kingdom: insightshare, 13. 23 freire, p. (1970). pedagogy of the oppressed. new york, ny: continuum international. consilience walker: climate change oppression program stays on track and remains in the custodianship of the participants. the participation of women and youth must also be encouraged. a long-term commitment is ideal since the goal is not to produce a single video or piece of media, but to establish a collective action group that will grow to develop and create its own projects. as experience bolsters the confidence and skills of the group, the media that they create will reflect greater sophistication and purpose. campsites reinforce the principle that decisions should be made at the lowest level of any hierarchy, where issues can be most effectively managed. this is especially pertinent in regards to climate change adaptation. according to david hunter, a preeminent scholar of environmental law and policy, “decisions made at the local level are often viewed as more likely to take account of local environmental conditions and the opinions of the local people who often bear the highest environmental costs of development decisions.”24 collective action media production is also a viable way to integrate indigenous knowledge into climate and environmental issues. up to this point, the value of indigenous knowledge in regards to climate change has received painfully little attention. with collective action media production, however, doing so is at the heart of the participatory approach. educators will provide campsites with video production tools and basic skills training. they should make long-term commitments to the community, rather than just visiting for a two or three-day training and video production workshop. for some period of time, they should be available as resources to the community, giving them the initial confidence needed to transform ideas into videos. in the camp model, emphasis is on the process of production, not the output. the opportunity for more people to participate, in whatever capacity, is valued over what is actually produced by any given group. the emphasis is on engagement and not efficiency. values such as high productivity and efficiency, which are associated with growth and capital, should have only secondary roles in the program, meaning their importance is significant only after all of the primary goals of the program have been met. the primary goals are participation, horizontal community engagement, teamwork, critical thought, and collective action. 6. a note on access the lack of access to media around the world has been a major barrier to entry. what are the implications of having a campsite in a remote corner of the world, where it may be unlikely that reliable electricity will even be available, much less connectivity to the online global network of information? collective action media production is a process-based rather than ends-based program. the limitations imposed upon a finished video, or piece of media, by the realities of global inequalities to access should not unnecessarily be imposed upon the production process, which, using freire’s “problem-solving” method of education, is the transformative element of the program. 24 hunter, d., salzman, j., & zaelke, d. (2011). international environmental law and policy (4th ed.). new york, ny: foundation press. 104 consilience a fundamental principle behind collective action media production is that a lack of access to media should not be used as a reason to deny entry to the process of media making. the educators can help a collective action group try to realize any goals that they may have for the exhibition or distribution of their finished work, but this is secondary, and limited avenues for exhibition should not preclude production. because of the archival properties of digital media, whatever is produced will be waiting once the access gap has been closed. the creation of media content using freire’s approach reverses the traditional direction of information. knowledge and ideas are sent up the chain, rather than down. this type of information uploading creates a greater demand for access. in the developing world, this will effectively put added pressure on nations to improve their internet infrastructure. in the future, the media created by campsites could be hosted on a global visual interface based on the geographical features of the planet, such as google earth. if groups so choose, their projects could be uploaded to this interface and become accessible to all people, with its information defined not by political borders but by the geography of the environment. 7. conclusion collective action media production is education as the practice of freedom, and through its practical application, the oppressed can adapt to both climate change and the objectifying forces of an unjust world order. against the backdrop of climate change, the world’s most vulnerable—those with the lowest capacity to adapt to change—must become the architects of their own awareness, education, and empowerment. this is the confluence of environmentalism and problem-posing education. as technology changes the way we communicate, it is important that education keep pace with information. collective action media production is based on two tested approaches to education: participatory video and “problem-posing” pedagogy. together, they have the potential to inspire oppressed communities to rise to roles of empowerment, forming the foundation upon which a new world will be established. consilience walker: climate change oppression bibliography chakrabarty, d. 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(2011, april). world resources report: putting vulnerable people at the center of communication for adaptation: the case for knowledge sharing through participatory games and video tools. washington, dc: world resources institute. suarez, p., ching, f., ziervogel, g., wisner, b., mendler de suarez, j., lemaire, i., & turnquest, d. (2008). video-mediated approaches for community-level climate adaptation. ids bulletin, 39(4), 96-104. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 9, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 16 – 32 a review of economic instruments employed for biodiversity conservation edem kodzo ekpe department of biology university of central florida 4000 central florida boulevard, orlando florida, usa email: edemekpe@knights.ucf.edu abstract globally, the use of economic instruments for biodiversity conservation has gained a lot of support. this is because of the concern for the economic well being of people living in and near biodiversity-rich areas. also, economic drivers are the main threats to biodiversity. this policy of using economic instruments is being used on a case-by-case basis worldwide. a review of their use from a global perspective is important to facilitate learning from issues resulting from their implementation. this article documents and reviews the specific economic instruments being used in different parts of the world for biodiversity conservation. an analysis of the economic instruments using a demand or supply classification suggests that more instruments are targeted at increasing supply of biological resources for human use. a review of literature and field documents was also employed to determine trends in the use of economic instruments for conservation. a major trend observed is the relatively low investments in economic instruments used for biodiversity conservation in developing countries, even though such countries tend to be rich in biodiversity. author’s note edem kodzo ekpe is research associate at the university of central florida, orlando, fl, usa, where he graduated with a phd in conservation biology. he also works in ghana, where he has had extensive professional experience in socioecological research and management of biodiversity conservation projects. keywords: economic instruments, biodiversity conservation and development, conservation strategy. 1. introduction biological diversity (or biodiversity) is the basic support for life on earth. therefore, its importance to the survival of humans and their needs and wants cannot be overemphasized. however, global biodiversity is declining, thereby threatening the future survival of humanity. without ambitious policies, biodiversity is projected to decline by a further 10% globally by 2050 (organisation for economic cooperation and development (oecd) 2012). this decline of biodiversity and the biological resources they provide worldwide has been of increasing concern such that many tools and strategies are being used to address the threats (groom et al. 2006). among these strategies are economic instruments, such as policies, strategies and activities. these economic instruments are used to influence how people conduct their economic activities in mailto:edemekpe@knights.ucf.edu consilience ekpe: economic instruments for biodiversity conservation order to reduce the rate of biodiversity loss in various parts of the world. some examples include market-oriented tools such as fees and ecotourism, and financial incentives such as compensations and tax incentives. in developing countries, development interventions such as alternative livelihood programs near protected areas are also implemented. investments in local economic livelihood activities are therefore used to influence how people’s actions affect biodiversity. it is important to determine whether and how effective all these different economic instruments are for biodiversity conservation. however, since they are employed on a case-by-case basis, information on them is scattered in several books and papers. a global perspective that documents their use and lessons from their successes and failures is necessary. this study aims at presenting a consolidated global perspective of experiences of the use of economic tools for biodiversity conservation. the objectives of the study are to determine and describe the following:  the role of economics in biodiversity conservation.  the economic instruments being used for biodiversity conservation and the justification for their use.  some global trends and results from the use of economic instruments for biodiversity conservation. 2. biodiversity and economics the convention on biological diversity (cbd) defines biodiversity as the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems (cbd, 2008). by this definition, biodiversity is the “variability among” instead of the “full extent or scale” (bennet, 2003) of all living organisms at various organizational levels including genetic, species and ecosystem levels, and the functions that maintain the biological organisms and their habitats. biodiversity therefore captures two dimensions: number of biological organisms and their variability (perman et al. 2003). this technical definition makes biodiversity a very complex concept and its absolute empirical assessment or measurement cumbersome. however, since scale and variability are linked, it is often understood in terms of the wide variety of plants, animals and microorganisms. for many reasons, the most common unit of measurement is in terms of the number and diversity of species. estimates range from 3 to 100 million species but an estimate by dobson (1996) claims 6 million is more realistic. in economics, biodiversity is usually valued in terms of the biological resources that are generated from it. it is therefore perceived in terms of biological resources that humans use directly and indirectly and also perceived to be important for maintaining the environment in which they live. these biological resources include genetic resources, organisms and/or their parts, populations, or any other biotic component of ecosystems with actual or potential use or value for humanity. therefore, though economics is also concerned about biodiversity conservation, it acknowledges that individuals and/or organizations do not decide directly upon how 18 consilience much diversity to preserve, but rather make decisions about the way in which biological resources and their habitat are used (van kooten and bulte, 2000). the overriding goal of economics is to deliver choice solutions that make society better off. therefore, economists view biodiversity as a scarce and valuable resource which humans use to improve their well-being through both present and future potential values. this makes biodiversity anthropocentric and utilitarian from an economic point of view. it has the peculiar attribute of a renewable resource which “grows” even when it is used for the different values humans place on it. biodiversity has many values of importance to humans. groom et al. (2006) classify them into instrumental and intrinsic values. the instrumental values include their use as goods such as food, fuel, fiber and medicine; for ecosystem services such as nutrient recycling, air and water purification, climate regulation, and the generation of moisture and oxygen; information values such as genetic storehouse for biotechnology, genetic engineering and other life sciences research; and psychospiritual uses such as aesthetic beauty, religious awe and cultural identity (ibid.). the intrinsic value, as seen in terms of its existence, means it is important and that satisfies some humans. apart from the values outlined above, biodiversity also has future potential uses, which may be difficult to foresee. all these values can be assigned economic values, but with limitations. many attempts to put dollar values on the present and future potential values of biodiversity have been inadequate but still resulted in values which are many times the world’s total gross national product, which humans cannot afford to substitute. from the different values that humans generate from biodiversity, it can be said that we need it for both our economic survival and existence. 2.1 threats to biodiversity and approaches to biodiversity conservation both biodiversity and sustainable development are currently threatened by human action. direct threats include habitat degradation and loss, habitat fragmentation, overexploitation or resources, species invasion and climate change (groom et al, 2006). high losses driven by land-use change and management (e.g. for pasture, food crops and bioenergy crops), commercial forestry, infrastructure development, habitat encroachment and fragmentation, pollution (e.g. nitrogen deposition) and climate change are projected in parts of asia, europe and southern africa (oecd, 2012). habitat degradation and loss (as well as fragmentation) are largely caused by conversion, modification, and fragmentation of natural ecosystems for alternative uses such as agriculture and infrastructural development, which do not maintain species diversity or which undermine the provision of vital ecological services. these changes in land use are often driven by the perception that employing land for alternative use would generate higher economic returns (norton-griffiths and southey, 1995). land use changes often result in irreversible changes to the habitat whose natural systems and component species are destroyed and replaced (ehrlich and kremen, 2001). overexploitation is largely due to the increasing demand for natural resources because of increasing human population. due to human migration and other factors, several species are introduced in new areas where they invade and consilience ekpe: economic instruments for biodiversity conservation dominate native species. climate change which is being observed globally is making the results of these threats worse. scientific information now indicates that though climate change is a natural process, human consumption patterns contribute to its increase. these threats are resulting in many more species becoming endangered. the 2008 update of the international union for conservation of nature (iucn) red list includes 44,838 species, of which 869 (2%) are extinct or extinct the wild; 16,928 (38%) are threatened with extinction (with 3,246 critically endangered, 4,770 endangered and 8,912 vulnerable); 3,513 (8%) are near threatened; while 5,570 (12%) have insufficient information to determine their threat status (data deficient). the number of extinctions might well exceed 1,100 if the 257 critically endangered species tagged as ‘possibly extinct’ are considered (iucn 2008a). a review of the trends in the numbers of endangered species by ayoo (2008) indicates an increasing number of endangered species. european commission (2008) indicates that the current decline in biodiversity and the related loss of ecosystem services will continue and in some cases even accelerate – some ecosystems are likely to be damaged beyond repair. it estimates that if human development continues in a “business-as usual” scenario, 11% of natural areas in 2000, 40% of the land currently under low-impact forms of agriculture and 60% of coral reefs could be lost by 2050. these studies indicate that human actions play a big role in the decline of biodiversity. as a result of these anthropogenic threats and the consequent biodiversity decline, different biodiversity conservation approaches are used. these include establishment of protected areas on public lands, educational programs, government acquisition of private lands, regulatory prohibitions and requirements and economic instruments. these strategies are largely used complementarily. the major direct threats to biodiversity loss outlined above are to a large extent driven by economic factors. 2.2 underlying economic causes of biodiversity decline the major direct threats to biodiversity loss outlined above are to a large extent driven by economic factors because of the close links that exist between economic policies and the actions of humans as economic agents. economic factors such as markets, policies and institutional arrangements tend to undervalue many goods and services associated with biological resources, ecosystems and their diversity and the premium attached to conserving them (emerton, 2000). this results in biodiversity being underpriced, over-consumed and under-conserved because it is treated as a free good, which can be mined, converted, depleted or otherwise degraded at no social cost. therefore, activities that lead to biodiversity degradation are permitted or even encouraged to occur because of failures and distortions in policies and laws, markets, institutions and livelihoods (unep, 2004; ayoo, 2008) that govern the use of biological resources. swanson (1995) as cited by van kooten and bulte (2000) adds portfolio choice and development as other underlying causes of biodiversity decline. i argue that these are similar to the institutional and livelihood failures respectively of ayoo (2008) because portfolio choice is usually influenced by institutional arrangements. also, development is largely concerned about different dimensions of human livelihoods. 20 consilience policy and legal failures occur when governments formulate and implement policies that are backed by legislations aimed at increasing economic activities. these could be in the form of agricultural subsidies or land re-distribution programs or increasing producer prices for certain crops. these may in turn encourage the use of more environmental amenities such as land and water for those activities and thus result in reduced biodiversity. in economics, markets allocate resources and so influence choice decisions about production and consumption of goods by economic agents. economic activities therefore depend on markets and prices. this is because markets determine the marginal profitability of different production options and the marginal economic desirability of different consumption options. however, markets are imperfect and can give wrong information about the value of renewable natural resources that are generated from biodiversity. together, these phenomena result in the depletion of biodiversity because of increased land conversion. institutional failures occur when organizations fail to coordinate their development in order to reduce its impact on biodiversity. portfolio choice by these institutions occurs because biodiversity decline is an outcome of society’s own free will and this comes into play when developing countries copy the route taken by industrialized countries – the route of exploiting natural capital (van kooten and bulte, 2000). livelihood failures occur when people are forced to engage in economic activities that degrade biodiversity. this occurs because people’s livelihoods, constraints and opportunities depend critically on biophysical and demographic conditions and local pressures that are, in turn, intricately linked to the nature of economic policies, markets and institutions (ayoo 2008). also in terms of human development, human societies and economies necessarily leave less room for other species, and possibly ecosystems (swanson 1995 as cited by van kooten and bulte, 2000). all the above underlying causes of biodiversity decline give a strong justification to the use of economic instruments such as fees and taxes for biodiversity conservation. this is because they provide a suite of tools for overcoming market, policy and institutional failures and for encouraging people to conserve biodiversity in the course of their economic activities (emerton, 2000). these economic instruments can therefore be used improve the efficient allocation and use of natural and environmental resources so as to better reflect the social cost of using these resources (oecd, 2004). 3. economic instruments for biodiversity conservation. economic instruments are widely used in the health and education sectors to achieve development goals. for biodiversity conservation, economic instruments can be defined as mechanisms that aim at changing behaviors of economic agents by internalizing costs to natural resource utilization. their use is predicated on the assumption that the social costs or benefits of biodiversity use, degradation, and restoration can be internalized in the price of activities that cause these losses or gains in biodiversity (oecd, 2004). this is because it is assumed that economic agents will use natural capital for activities that are most productive as per the consilience ekpe: economic instruments for biodiversity conservation ricardian rent theory, which posits that the economic rent (price) for a fixed factor of production such as land will be higher for more productive lands. natural capital usually has high discount rates, thereby making economic sense to convert them to reproducible capital now. economic instruments are therefore aimed at lowering the discount rate so that the people who bear the immediate cost of conserving the resource can conserve for longer periods. this can be explained by understanding the underlying causes of biodiversity decline. examples of these economic instruments include measures such as property rights, taxes, conservation easements, subsidies, charges, fees, market establishment, funds, loans, performance bonds, deposit systems, payment for ecosystem services, and livelihood support systems. they aim to change people’s behavior by making sure that they take into account the real value of biodiversity and the broad costs associated with its loss when they make decisions (emerton, 2000). in many parts of the world they are used to supplement and not replace other conservation strategies such as existing regulations and land acquisition programs designed to conserve habitats and species (defenders of wildlife, 2006). the use of economic instruments for biodiversity conservation could be explained with the following example: a forest owner cuts the forest down for agriculture because that provides more marginal and immediate benefits. he or she does that without considering future costs such as watershed protection, source of medicine to him/her or to society. if future costs to the owner or society were considered or internalized, the owner could have kept the forest. therefore, economic instruments should be aimed at making the forest owner appreciate and consider the future costs of cutting the forest now in his or her decision-making – internalization of future costs. if that makes the returns from of cutting the forest down now (including future costs of having no forest such as erosion, loss of potential medicine source, loss of habitat for pest-controlling species and loss of windbreak) lower than keeping the forest, the owner will decide to keep the forest. so the core aim of these instruments is to maintain optimal value of environmental goods and services for current and future generations. in low-income countries, development assistance in the form of livelihoods support programs is provided to communities living near biodiversity hotspots and other conservation areas. some of these include development and promotion of ecotourism, beekeeping and wildlife domestication. such interventions indirectly provide desirable services by redirecting labor and capital away from environmentally unsustainable activities, such as agricultural intensification that degrade ecosystems, and by encouraging commercial activities such as ecotourism that supply ecosystem services as joint products (ferraro 2001). 3.1 classification of economic instruments for biodiversity conservation several economic instruments are currently used for biodiversity conservation. to facilitate their understanding different organizations use different criteria for classification. the international union of conservation of nature (iucn) classifies them into market-based mechanisms and non market-based mechanism (iucn, 2008b), while defenders of wildlife (2006) classifies them into 22 consilience property rights innovations, market-oriented institutions, financial incentives and public tax incentives (tables 1 and 2). classified group examples market-based mechanisms  markets for carbon sequestration  markets for watershed services  biodiversity offsets and mitigation  conservation banking  markets for recreation non-market-based mechanisms  global environment facility  debt-for-nature swaps  conservation trust funds or environmental funds  taxes  compensation to communities for opportunity cost and damages table 1: iucn classification of economic instruments for biodiversity conservation. consilience ekpe: economic instruments for biodiversity conservation classified group examples property rights innovations  conservation easements  covenants and deed restrictions  stewardship exchange agreements market-oriented institutions  user fees  ecotourism  eco-labeling and certification  mitigation banking  conservation banking  transferable development rights  ecosystem services markets financial incentives  compensation programs  insurance  cost-share incentives  conservation stewardship incentives  land and water rental leases  conservation contracts  debt forgiveness public tax incentives  income tax incentives  property tax incentives  estate tax incentives  capital gains tax table 2: defenders of wildlife classification of economic instruments for conservation. examples in the defenders of wildlife classification are largely those economic instruments being used in the usa. as explained by iucn (2008b), there has been increasing interest in market-based approaches to environmental conservation. the rationale is to create incentives for resource managers and/or owners to behave in ways that sustain environmental functions like carbon sequestration, watershed protection, and habitat for endangered species, maintenance of landscape beauty. the incentives can take the form of direct payments for ecosystem services or ecosystem markets, tradable permits or quotas, and ecolabeling or certification schemes (ibid.). markets for carbon sequestration (iucn, 2008b) stem from the growing evidence of global warming due to the greenhouse effect, and increasing credence to the threat of rising sea levels, loss of coral reefs, diseases, and desertification. this led to the development the united nations framework convention on climate change in 1992 and the signing of the kyoto protocol in 1997 to help reduce the build-up of greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide and methane. the kyoto protocol set emission reduction targets for countries, providing a foundation for a system of emission rights trading – a carbon market. the rationale is that some countries will find it simpler and cheaper to reduce emissions than others, for instance through 24 consilience carbon sequestration activities such as aforestation. they can therefore sell emission rights with those who will find it expensive to reduce emissions. funds from such sales would be used for aforestation and reforestation which sequester greenhouse gases and contribute to biodiversity conservation. though big emitters such as the usa and china have not ratified the protocol, a voluntary market in carbon offsets has emerged and is likely to continue developing, both within and outside the framework of the protocol (iucn, 2008). this market includes industries, project developers, consumers, several registries and even a trading exchange, the chicago climate exchange (bayon et al. 2006). markets for watershed services stem from the growing recognition of the watershed services provided by forests. the increasing willingness of downstream populations to pay for these services has led to the emergence of payment mechanisms in parts of the world, from new york to quito, and from haryana to costa rica (iucn, 2008b). costa rica’s pioneering environmental services program seeks to maintain socially optimal forest cover by compensating landowners for the external benefits provided by their forests (chomitz et al., 1999). biodiversity offsets and mitigation, as well as conservation banking refer to protected areas that are created and managed as a means of providing compensation for habitat loss resulting from land development. in this, developers buy credits from approved conservation bankers for each area of habitat that is destroyed. these funds are used to support species and habitat conservation efforts in the surrounding areas. examples used in the usa are mitigation banking, conservation banking, and transferable development rights. markets for recreation stem from the fact that alternative forms of tourism (ecotourism, green tourism, or nature tourism) are the fastest growing segments of the tourism sector, constituting about 30 percent of the global market today (iucn, 2008b). ecotourism is defined as responsible travel to natural areas that conserves the environment and improves the well-being of local people (international ecotourism society 2008). ecotourism is therefore culturally and environmentally sustainable and so minimizes adverse impacts, especially in the long term. ecotourism helps in effective conservation of biodiversity-rich areas and improving livelihoods in poor indigenous communities by providing jobs, income and business opportunities to local communities. many other market-based mechanisms to finance biodiversity have emerged, including bio-prospecting, certification schemes for sustainable practices, ecolabeling for organic products and user fees. iucn (2008b) describes the rationale for non-market based mechanisms as that biodiversity and ecosystem services have both public as well as private good/service characteristics, and that the market will fail to deliver on the value of public goods. thus public investment (in the form of various taxes, funds and other measures) is required in order to finance conservation. the global environment facility (gef) provides grants to developing countries and countries with economies in transition for projects that achieve global environmental benefits in the area of biodiversity (gef 2008). gef funds are contributed by donor countries. in 2002, 32 donor countries pledged usd 3 billion to fund operations between 2002 and 2006 (iucn 2008). gef finances only the incremental cost of projects, which is the difference between the benefits that will accrue to the country, and the benefits to the world. consilience ekpe: economic instruments for biodiversity conservation debt-for-nature swaps are debt conversions which mean the cancellation of a country’s foreign debt in exchange for new obligations. a variety of debt conversion mechanisms exist, such as debt-for-equity, debt buy-backs, and debt-fornature swaps (moye, 2001). debt-forgiveness programs are also used in the usa (defenders of wildlife, 2006). conservation trust funds or environmental funds include trust funds established by legislation, foundations, common-law trusts and non-governmental organizations (ngos). their aims range from financing the cost of protected areas (park funds), supporting national environmental plans or strategies (strategy funds), and providing grants for biodiversity conservation (grant funds) (bayon, lovink and veening, 2000 as cited by iucn, 2008b). taxes are also used as economic instruments. these include income tax incentives, property tax incentives, estate tax incentives, capital gains tax. these taxes are usually enjoyed by landowners for conservation actions. iucn (2008b) gives some examples of other taxes such as visitors to the fernando de noronha marine national park on the atlantic coast of brazil have to pay a daily environment tax that increases incrementally as the visit continues. the caribbean island of dominica levies usd 1.5 on all tourists on departure. another example is the ecological valueadded tax in brazil. this levy on the circulation of goods and services rewards municipalities for the positive externalities of their conservation areas, thus giving them an incentive to increase the area under conservation (ibid.). another instrument is compensation to communities for opportunity cost and damages or investments in livelihoods support activities. these stem from factors such as increasing demographic pressure, expansion of cultivation and the emergence of large-scale commercial farming. these are usually in terms of integrated conservation and development projects (icdps). icdps aim at compensating people for the costs or providing alternative and/or complementary livelihoods activities. thus they increase supply of ecosystem services by increasing supply of natural resources which would have been exploited from within protected areas or other conservation areas. 3.2 a demand and supply classification of economic instruments as explained earlier, biodiversity is viewed in economics as the source of biological resources which can be allocated by providing choices to improve human welfare. therefore, the relationship between demand and supply underlies the forces that drive the allocation of natural resources from biodiversity. an evaluation of the success or failure of economic instruments for biodiversity would be to figure out whether they have addressed the demand and supply of resources they were aimed to address. i therefore classified the economic instruments by the demand and supply. this is an attempt to use the basics of economics to classify economic instruments for biodiversity conservation. though the instruments affect both demand and supply of biological resources, the criteria is based which of these two factors are directly affected by the economic instrument. the specific determining criteria are that demand instruments directly decrease or increase demand for biological resources and the supply instruments directly increase or decrease supply of biological resources. the classification is presented in table 3. 26 consilience for example, ecotourism is a demand instrument. ecotourism in a forested area will reduce how the nearby communities which benefit from the tourism proceeds may demand biological resources such as timber and bushmeat from the forests. eco-labeling and certification also increases demand for products from sustainably managed resource bases. on the other hand, when there are tax incentives for landowners to keep biological resources on their land that directly reduces the supply of resources such as timber to the markets. also, debt conversion mechanisms such as debt-for-nature swaps encourage poorer countries to protect their natural resources and this directly reduces the supply of biological resources from their natural areas. demand instruments supply instruments  ecotourism  markets for recreation  eco-labeling and certification  user fees  markets for carbon sequestration  markets for watershed services  compensation programs for opportunity cost and damages  biodiversity offsets and mitigation  conservation banking  conservation easements  covenants and deed restrictions  stewardship exchange agreements  mitigation banking  transferable development rights  tax cuts  insurance  cost-share incentives  conservation stewardship incentives  land and water rental leases  conservation contracts  property and estate tax incentives  capital gains tax  debt conversion mechanisms table 3: a demand and supply classification of economic instruments. 4. experiences with the use of economic instruments for biodiversity conservation many experiences of the use of economic instruments for biodiversity conservation focus on their economic effectiveness and efficiency. defenders of wildlife (2006) state that from an economic perspective study of 1,250 land trusts in the usa (parker, 2004), conservation easements have been one of the most cost effective incentives for conserving land. iucn (2008b) explain that though the voluntary carbon markets are not doing much because of the increasing emissions, all countries stand to potentially gain from such trade. but the economic impacts on poor people in developing countries will depend on whether aforestation activities engage local communities, and whether they lead to loss of access to forest resources and fast-growing plantations that deplete groundwater supply. also, there is little consilience ekpe: economic instruments for biodiversity conservation evidence that mechanisms exist for and little reason to be confident that the benefits from credits will be transferred to communities and especially the poor. there are a few examples of positive social impacts from carbon markets. the noel kempff mercado national park is a partnership between the government of bolivia, various non-governmental organizations, american electric power, bp amoco and pacificorp to protect four million acres of tropical forest. the primary purpose of the project is to capture carbon dioxide, but it also includes health care programs and alternative economic development activities to assist local people who live in and around the park and who depend on local resources for their livelihood. more than half the park rangers were hired from local communities. the project has resulted in formalized land tenure for the local communities. another example is a community silviculture carbon offset project in the sierra norte of oaxaca, mexico, which finances the development of women’s groups (ibid.). in ghana, united nations development program/ global environment facility (gef) projects that have largely employed investments in alternative livelihoods activities resulted in about 2500 square kilometers (250,000 hectares) of land outside protected areas being placed under effective community management (gef, 2008b). these examples show some of the positive effects of economic instruments used for biodiversity conservation. there are also negative impacts. the biggest social concerns from carbon projects are exclusion and erosion of rights, eviction, and the potential negative impacts of fast-growing plantations on soil, water and biodiversity. there is real potential for carbon projects to help poor people through new sources of income, diversified income streams, institutional development, and formalization of rights over resources. there are also real risks, however, of exclusion and increased vulnerability of the poor, and control of benefits by more powerful actors (gef, 2008b). in the usa, it is generally acknowledged that although there are many public and private incentive programs designed to encourage conservation, they tend to be overly specialized and prescriptive, fragmented and under-funded. these programs are also generally constrained by the fact that the primary threats to biodiversity – habitat loss, degradation and fragmentation – operate across public and private ownerships (defenders of wildlife 2006). according to the regional environmental center (rec, 2008) of central and eastern europe, as in many countries in that region, there is low efficiency on using economic instruments for conservation in romania because of inadequate funding. other reasons for the low efficiency of the economic instruments used in the past system include the following:  deficiencies in the monitoring system, partly due to the lack of technical and material support, making it impossible to establish a link between the pollution and the polluter.  socialist property generalization; the inappropriate use of economic instruments in environmental protection reduced the importance and character of those instruments;  lack of priorities concerning environmental protection necessary for an economy with limited economic resources. 28 consilience the forest biodiversity program for southern finland started in 2003 as a toolbox of several government-financed conservation programs (mayer and tikka 2006). one tool, natural values trading, is being actively tested. it involves contracts with private forests to conserve usually for 10 years. however there is not systematic monitoring. the mean value of incentive is us$1790 lump sum per hectare. in sweden, nature conservation agreements were started in 1995 (mayer and tikka 2006). the program is run as a contract between a landowner and swedish forest agency to maintain or restore ecologically valuable forest habitats for a maximum of 50 years. this program is systematically monitored every four to five years. the mean value of incentive is us$1260 lump sum per hectare. the indiana classified forest program started in 1921 in indiana, usa (bennet et al. 1995). it uses property tax relief as an incentive to encourage forest owners to manage or restore forests. there is no fixed-term contract so landowners can withdraw but they have to pay the tax back with interest. it is monitored every five years. the mean value of the incentive is us$1300 per hectare per year in tax relief two examples from africa are the selous game reserve, tanzania (gillingham and lee 1999 as cited in spiteri and nepalz 2006); and afadjatoagumatsa community forest, ghana. in both examples there is high level of dependency on resources. in the selous game reserve, incentives are in the form of support for livelihoods, promotion of agroforestry and plantation. the land is stateowned but with traditional interests. the value of the incentive is $9.09 per hectare per year. in afadjato, incentives are in the form of support for livelihoods, promotion of agro-forestry and benefit-sharing from ecotourism. the project started in 1999. the value of the incentive is $7/hectare per year. in australia, (australian department of the environment, water, heritage, 2008) there is a government taxation concession in which the government providing a donor, who has donated a gift of $5,000 or more to an environment or heritage organisation, the opportunity to claim the donation against their tax returns over a five year period. in india, as in many parts of asia, economic instruments were used for soil conservation. this conserves biodiversity in the soil as well as reduces the use of biodiversity-rich areas for agriculture. incentives provided include were input subsidies, distribution of tree seedlings, implements under subsidy, compensation for wages, investment in water harvesting structures (reddy et al, 2004). an observation of the level of investments is that there has been a significantly lower dollar value of the incentives employed in developing countries. the examples in this paper do not represent the total figures from the regions. however, a computation of the figures from finland, sweden and the usa compared to those from ghana and tanzania gives a ratio of 181:1 in the dollar value of incentives employed per hectare of land being conserved for biodiversity. this is the situation despite the fact that the developing countries tend to have more biodiversity. consilience ekpe: economic instruments for biodiversity conservation 5. conclusion one obvious trend from this study is that there are a lot more supply instruments than demand instruments worldwide. this could be because of the need to increase supply of biological resources to satisfy human needs and wants. this is especially important because of the slower growth of natural resources compared to the demand for them by an increasing human population and other factors. current research methodologies are biased because they fail to use controls, which would be required in an experiment. this is because the sites at which conservation programs are implemented are not selected randomly (ferraro and pattanayak (2006). i therefore suggest that future research in evaluating the effectiveness of economic instruments should use controls by using matching method which can account for observable correlated covariates. the results of this will present more objective evaluations of economic instruments used for biodiversity conservation. an example of the use of this is in andam et al (2008). however, they studied the effectiveness of protected area networks and not economic instruments. another issue for future research and conservation project implementation is the need to account for the value of the resources to be conserved before deciding the type and quantity of economic instruments to be used. this is not clear in current research and projects. an example is that gef funds by policy are to pay for incremental costs, which is the difference between the benefits that accrue to the implementing country and benefits that accrue to the whole world. however no empirical valuation has been documented to be used to determine what the incremental cost will be. this process is even not accounted for in the in gef’s project cycle policies and procedures (gef, 2007). generally, economic instruments being used for biodiversity conservation are serving good economic as well as conservation purposes. based on current research, they contribute a lot to biodiversity conservation. they are, however, not panacea that can be used on their own and should therefore be used as complements and supplements of other biodiversity conservation strategies. 30 consilience bibliography andam, k. s., ferraro, p. j., pfaff, a., sanchez-azofefia, g. a., & robalino, j. a. 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(2000). the economics of nature: managing biological assets. massachusetts: blackwell publishers. http://www.oecd.org/env/environmentalindicatorsmodellingandoutlooks/49897175.pdf http://www.oecd.org/env/environmentalindicatorsmodellingandoutlooks/49897175.pdf http://www.rec.org/rec/publications/ecinstruments/romania.html http://www.ecotourism.org/ http://www.unep.ch/etu/etp/events/economic_instruments/eimeaworkingpaper.doc http://www.unep.ch/etu/etp/events/economic_instruments/eimeaworkingpaper.doc microsoft word onoja.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 14, iss. 2 (2015), pp. 173-188 large-scale land acquisitions by foreign investors in west africa: learning points anthony o. onoja department of agricultural economics and extension university of port harcourt, port harcourt, nigeria tonyojonimi@gmail.com anthonia i. achike department of agricultural economics university of nigeria, nsukka, nigeria abstract recent reports indicating that large portions of land (estimated 50-80m hectares) have been bought by international investors in middleand low-income countries, with roughly two-thirds of those purchases occurring in sub-saharan africa, calls for a cursory appraisal of the implications of the trend of land grabbing for west african food security. this study reviews cases of land grabbing by foreign investors in west africa, identifies the possible drivers of large-scale land acquisition by foreign investors in the region, and discusses the implications of the findings for agricultural and land policy reforms in west africa. land transactions involving foreign investors have increased in the area over the past 10 years. over 100,000 ha have been documented in nigeria. ghana and mali have many significant transactions on land by foreign investors. several investors have more than 100,000ha. burkina faso has one significant land transaction (200,000 ha) while niger and senegal have relatively small land transactions. most lands grabbed in west africa were profit driven (by biofuel investors) and were made under the guise of using the lands acquired for agricultural investments. there were noted dangers in the deals with respect to food security drive, food safety, environmental safety, employment generation, and land tenure threats, which endangered peace, sovereignty, and the economic wellbeing of citizens. we recommend applying a regional approach by african countries, implementing land reforms that will involve the local communities who own the land, stopping long-term leasing beyond 50 years, building capacity, and creating awareness about land transactions of large magnitudes. author’s note dr. anthony o. onoja (ph.d.) is a researcher/consultant and lecturer at the department of agricultural economics and extension, university of port harcourt, nigeria. he majored in resource and environmental economics. he has published extensively, is well-travelled as a researcher, and is currently a treccafrica research exchange fellow at the institute of climate and society, mekelle university, mekelle, ethiopia. professor (mrs.) a. i. achike (ph.d.) is a professor of agricultural economics, university of nigeria, nsukka. professor (mrs.) achike was the head of department of agricultural economics university of nigeria nsukka from 2005 to 2007. she is currently the director, african climate change adaptation initiative (accai), university of nigeria, nsukka. consilience onoja and achike: large-scale land acquisitions acknowledgments the authors are particularly grateful to trade policy training centre in africa (trapca), whose call for a paper and sponsorship of the presentation of this paper at their 6th annual trade conference held on 24th – 25th november, 2011, at arusha, tanzania (under the theme: “foreign land acquisitions in africa: implications for trade, investment and development policies") provided the impetus for writing up this article. we also remain grateful to all authors whose works were consulted in writing this review. keywords: land acquisition, land use, land tenure, nigeria, west africa 1. introduction land tenure and investment in land have far-reaching economic and social implications and are therefore key issues for small family-operated farms and their relations with agribusiness (sahel west africa countries, swac/oecd 2010a). land is defined as a physical entity which includes natural resources: soils, minerals, agriculture, and forests. these components are essential to maintaining the productive capacity of an economically sustainable environment (food and agricultural organization, fao, 2003). according to the fao, many problems which are now being recognized in natural and agricultural land systems have arisen out of the use of inadequate technologies for assessing and monitoring land resources, preventing land pollution, and rehabilitating contaminated lands. large-scale land acquisition deals take many different forms and proceed in a wide diversity of contexts. according to cotula, vermeulen, leonard, and keeley, transactions labelled as “large-scale” may involve between 1,000 and 500,000 hectares (2009). land grabs are accelerating the development of industrial farming, with multinational companies producing for the world market and further marginalizing small-scale producers and local markets (sawyer 2010). increasing evidence is emerging to affirm that the problem of large-scale land acquisition by foreign investors in africa is following a dangerous trend, which needs to be monitored. farming matters noted that, in africa, large tracts of agricultural land are being bought or leased by foreign investors for far below-market prices (2011). they added that whatever the shape these transactions take, they all illustrate one major development: land has become currency in the hands of politicians, investors and speculators, just like food and water. land is the basis of existence for 400 million small-scale farm families. the earth is their “mother” and needs to be respected and cared for. thus, farmers will be the first victims of the present rush for land. global development (2010) reported that research findings have indicated that a million chinese farmers have joined the rush to africa, and that some of the world's richest countries are buying or leasing land in some of the world's poorest to satisfy their insatiable appetites for food and fuel. in the new scramble for africa, the report added, 2.5m hectares (6.2m acres) of farmland in five sub-saharan countries have been bought or rented in the past five years at a total cost of $920m (£563m). according to a recent report by the international fund for agricultural development (ifad), land that only a short time ago seemed of little outside interest is currently being sought by international investors to the tune of hundreds consilience onoja and achike: large-scale land acquisitions of thousands of hectares. the report described the huge deals reported to date as “the tip of the iceberg.” the above scenario is even more disturbing when one further notes that fao (2010) also indicated that access to arable productive land in africa has been in decline due to the pressure of growing population trends and worsening land degradation from climate change. many low-income rural households are dependent on land to access limited sources of credit, with land providing the only means to accessing financial markets. recent high-profile land purchases encompassing thousands of hectares of prime agricultural land have raised concerns over equitable land access (fao 2010). sub-saharan africa, especially nigeria and other west african countries, are not exempt from this development (see cotula, vermeulen, leonard. and keeley, 2009). such a trend is more disturbing when considered alongside the future of food production from ssa land, where fao (2003) put the estimated share of arable land in total agricultural land at only 15.6 per cent as of 2000. the fao report indicated that the total agricultural area in the world amounted to 5.0 billion ha. of this, about 1.5 billion ha (30.4%) is arable land and land under permanent crops. a decreasing growth rate of 0.3% has been noted over the ten-year period. response indicators show that the value of agricultural production per hectare of agricultural land is highest in south asia, at i$ 720.6, while sub-saharan africa trailed behind, globally ranking lowest with a value of i$ 71.8. under this scenario, worrying over the growing trend of large-scale land acquisition by foreign investors—who are, at best, interested in growing crops that can only contribute to food security and economic growth of countries outside ssa—while the limited land available for african farmers is diminishing in the face of lingering hunger and poverty is justified. cotula et al. observed that despite the spate of media reports and some published research, international land deals and their impacts remain little understood (2009). while pressure on land is not a recent development, the increased pace of such pressure is unprecedented. recalling the opportunities (relating to the flows of public and private investment which west african agriculture, and particularly the family farming sector, need) and the risks (relating to the management of natural, food, and financial resources) of such investments, the president of the swac, mar. de donnea, stressed that many of the solutions had to be sought at the regional level if there was to be any hope of achieving practical results (swac, 2010). the swac report is a step towards filling this knowledge gap. it specifically focuses on discussing key trends and drivers in land acquisitions, the contractual arrangements underpinning them and the way these are negotiated, as well as the early impacts on land access for rural people in recipient countries within west africa, especially in nigeria, as gleaned from current literature that aims to inform useful measures for nigerian agricultural and economic policy reforms. the report looked at large-scale land acquisitions in sub-saharan africa, especially the west african region, as this is the region in which a majority of land deals are being made (world bank, 2010a), and which has been promoted internationally as having an abundance of under-utilised land and water for agricultural development: a “sleeping giant” ready to be awakened by commercial agriculture (world bank, 2010b). 2. drivers of land grabbing in west africa: an overview consilience onoja and achike: large-scale land acquisitions according to sahel and west africa club (swac/oecd) (2010), land transactions have increased in many west african countries over the past 10 years. in some countries, large-scale land acquisition is not new and was even more important in the 70s. national populations continue to be the most important investors in land in west africa. the scale of land acquisition by foreign investors varies between west african countries: ghana and mali have many significant land transactions by foreign investors, with several investors owning more than 100,000 ha. burkina faso has one significant land transaction (200,000 ha), while niger and senegal have relatively small land transactions. respectively, these transactions have recorded land acquisitions of 600,000 ha (in ghana), 410,000 ha in mali, 213,000 ha in burkina faso, 16,000 ha in niger republic, and 12,000 ha in senegal. table 1.0 gives instances of some of the major investors in west african countries’ lands as recorded by sahel and west africa club (swac)/organisation for economic co-operation and development (oecd) (2010). investors came from europe, africa, and asia. in sierra leone, addax bioenergy, a swiss company, obtained 26,000 ha for sugarcane, while in ghana, the italian company agroils obtained 105,000 ha. a united kingdom company, jatropha africa, acquired 120,000 ha; scanfuel (norway) cultivated 10,000 hectares and had contracts for ca. 400,000 ha. galten (israel) acquired 100,000 ha. in the republic of benin, there is a proposal to convert 300,000-400,000 ha of wetlands for oil palm production by a foreign investor. table 1: major investors in west african land countries of origin of investors (selective list) examples of companies/investors france agroed germany flora ecopower norway biofuels africa and scan fuel ltd india hazel mecantile sweden svensk etanolkemi ab (sekab) italy agroils china n sukala south afri ca and uk sosumar/canco; lonhro saudi arabia foras, al tamini khaled alhil international, groupe bin taleb international source: swac/oecd (2010) consilience onoja and achike: large-scale land acquisitions 3. land grabbing: the case of nigeria in nigeria, it has been reported by friends of earth for africa and friends of earth for europe (2010) that recent land acquisitions by the state using foreign capital and expertise are estimated to amount to 100,000 ha. such land acquisitions were mostly brokered by the state-owned nigerian national petroleum corporation (nnpc) with foreign capital and expertise, the report added. examples of such acquisitions are summarized in table 2. table 2: selected indices of land grabbing in nigeria company land acquired crop type source nnpc 200 sqr kms sugar cane local information nnpc 20,000 ha sugar cane fadare, sola, “gombe alternative source of energy biofuel blazes the trail,” nigerian tribune, 18 july 2008. nnpc 20,000 ha sugar cane and cassava “can nigeria develop ethanol as alternative fuel? – news analysis.” daily trust, 18 july 2006, http://allafrica.com/stories/200607181 026.html. kwara casplex limited 15,000 ha cassava “case study: innovative agriculture project set to take off in kwara – maritz, jaco,” june 18 2008, http://www.tradeinvestnigeria.com/ne ws/621995.html: nnpc 30,000 ha cassava “inyang, bassey, cross river and nnpc partner on biofuel plants,” daily independent, 6 february 2008. global fuels 11,000 ha sweet sorghum “jakpor, francis biofuel company unveils renewable source of energy,” businessday, 13 july 2008, http://www.businessdayonline.com/ene rgy/12883.html. nnpc 10,000 ha cassava http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/new s/article19/010606. global fuels 30,000 ha sweet sorghum http://www.globalbiofuelsltd.com/new s/chairmanspeech.html. source: friends of earth for africa and friends of earth for europe (2010: 32) consilience onoja and achike: large-scale land acquisitions 3.1 contractual arrangement in most cases, each land acquisition deal typically involves a wide range of parties during multiple stages of preparing, negotiating, contracting, and operationalising the project (cotula et al. 2009). first, multiple agencies within the host government are engaged. even in countries where there is a central point of contact (a “one-stop shop”) for prospective investors (such as an investment promotion agency, e.g., in nigeria, the nigerian investment promotion commission, nipc), this agency alone will not deal with all aspects of the land deal. at a minimum, the investor is likely to need to engage separately with government agencies at the local level. although some land has been purchased outright, more often it is leased with long-term leases, in some cases up to 99 years. there are also cases of “outgrowing,” in which local farmers are contracted to grow a particular crop, such as jatropha. the report added that in nigeria, communities are facing a resettlement programme after the nigerian national petroleum corporation (nnpc) requisitioned a 200 km2 area to grow sugar cane for ethanol. the land is currently used by small farmers to grow food crops. land in nigeria is officially held by the state government; local communities have no say in its allocation. world agronomy and vm group (2011) observed that leases are now the preferred method of transaction instead of outright ownership. but striking favourable terms for such leases has not been easy. in eight african countries, recent lease terms varied from 20 to 50 years, with renewals often possible for up to 99 years. the fao report noted that the majority of such leases involved payment of an annual rental ranging from less than $2/ha in ethiopia to $5/ha in liberia to $13.8/ha in cameroon. it was also observed that some contracts allowed for a five-year rental free period and, in some cases, for adjustment of the rental over time (2010). where fees are low, investors may be expected to commit capital to develop infrastructure, such as irrigation canals, roads and processing plants. most contracts made some allusions to provision of employment, but often in such opaque terms that it would be difficult to hold the investor accountable for noncompliance. the legal status of land proposed for transfer, or actually allocated to investors, varies across countries and across regions within countries. as the pace of foreign investment has accelerated in developing countries, many governments have updated their land tenure legislation to clarify rights over land and natural resources, to offer incentives for people to invest in land, and to specify terms for international investor access to national resources. the fao points out that state ownership was common, though government could also invoke eminent domain, on the grounds that it is acting in the public good, and reclassify private or village land to public land. ironically, provision of a formal title can actually speed up landlessness as poorer farmers may be forced to sell after a bad harvest, leading to a concentration of land in wealthier sections of the community. in indonesia and benin, it was observed that where land mapping occurred, there was a greater likelihood of the land being sold to investors. farmland acquisitions also have important gender implications. the fao noted that in many farming regions, most agricultural workers are women whose tasks covered planting to postharvest processing on their immediate and extended consilience onoja and achike: large-scale land acquisitions family’s land, making them central to household food security. despite the centrality of women in the drive for household food security, farming contracts are often done with male household heads, with payments made to men even when it is women who do most of the work. in some cases, cash crops controlled by men may encroach upon lands erstwhile used by women for food crops. 3.2 drivers of land acquisition in west africa the global rush for land is being justified by claiming that small-scale farmers are unproductive and incapable, and that the best option is to ease them out and invest in “rational” agriculture (farming matters, 2011). this misrepresentation of the importance of small-scale farmers, pastoralists and forest dwellers, to the earth and the denial of their productivity and of their rights to land, food, water, and other resources, must be challenged head-on. in 2007, foreign direct investment (fdi) to sub-saharan africa amounted to over us$ 30 billion, a new record level up from the records of about us$ 22 billion in 2006 and us$ 17 billion in 2005. the distribution of fdi flows and stocks is highly uneven, shaped by cross-country differences in resource endowments. large shares of investment are concentrated in countries with important petroleum and mineral resources, such as nigeria (unctad, 2008). in nigeria, most land grabs have been profit-driven, occurring under the guise of using the lands acquired for agricultural investments, especially for cassava, sugarcane, and sweet sorghum, which ultimately would become raw materials for biofuel production (friends of earth for africa and friends of earth for europe, 2010). this is in agreement with trends cited by iied, fao, and ifad, which noted that the production of liquid biofuels was a key driver of much of the recent land acquisitions (cotula, vermeulen et al. 2009). internationally, government consumption targets have been the key driver of the biofuels boom, as they create guaranteed markets for decades to come. in mali, there a was a public-private split in investment commitments, which was affected by some large, capital-intensive projects in the country (vermeulen et al. 2009). the projects were mainly driven by local development or food security considerations such as the union economique et monétaire ouest africaine (uemoa) deal and a project funded by a united states donor. the reasons for the trends in large-scale land acquisition for farming in west africa do not differ from the drivers in other parts of africa. increasing rates of return in farm investments could be one reason. an fao report in world agronomy and vm group (2011) refers to anecdotal evidence suggesting that while normal rates of return on capital might be considered around the 6-7 per cent level, recent investors claim they have been securing annual returns of between 20-30 per cent and, in some cases where little competition exists, the returns can be as high as 50-60 per cent a year. further, over the past two decades, the driving forces behind large-scale land investment in developing countries have become increasingly diverse (fao report in world agronomy and vm group, 2011). foreign governments have preliminarily invested in african and south american land markets in hopes of securing long-term food supplies, while biofuel producers have cleared thousands of acres for palm oil plantations. the idea here was to add extractive industries developing coal and metal reserves, to add commercial farmers expanding their consilience onoja and achike: large-scale land acquisitions activities into neighbouring countries, and to embellish the resulting system with financial institutions looking to broaden their portfolios, setting the scene for wholesale changes to national economic landscapes. an estimated 50-80m hectares of land have been bought by international investors in middleand low-income countries in recent years, with roughly two-thirds of those purchases occurring in sub-saharan africa. ostensibly, the logic behind purchasing agricultural land has been to grow crops or to exploit underlying natural resources. but there are also other factors at play. the fao makes the point that water and water rights are becoming more important in land purchases: water scarcity is a major driver of international flows of investments in land (2010). scholars have argued that water is the hidden agenda behind many land acquisition deals. thus, investors may be seeking to gain control of water resources in states perceived to have a surplus of water instead of a surplus of land. when this is the case, there is incentive to acquire long-leases or freeholds, but not necessarily to commit significant capital to develop the land as a producing asset in itself. evidence suggests that many land deals have not been followed up with productive investment; according to the fao, only 20 per cent of investments that were announced actually showed that agricultural production was really happening on the ground (2010). several factors appear to underpin these land acquisitions (cotula et al. 2009). these include food security concerns, particularly in investor countries, which are key drivers of governmentbacked investment. food supply problems and uncertainties are created by constraints in agricultural production due to limited availability of water and arable land, by bottlenecks in storage and distribution, and by the expansion of biofuel production, an important competing land use. increasing urbanisation rates and changing diets are also increasing global food demand. the food price hikes of 2007 and 2008 shook the assumption that the world will continue to experience low food prices. while grain and other food prices have dropped from the highs seen in the summer of 2008, some of the structural factors underpinning rising prices are likely to stay. government-backed deals can also be driven by investment opportunities rather than food security concerns. in addition, global demand for biofuels and other non-food agricultural commodities, expectations of rising rates of return in agriculture and land values, and policy measures at home and in host countries are key factors driving new patterns of land investment. with regard to biofuels, government consumption targets (in the european union, for instance) and financial incentives have been a key driving force. it is possible that the recent decline in the oil price from the highs of 2008 may dampen enthusiasm for biofuel investments. but given the projections of diminishing supplies of non-renewables, biofuels are likely to remain and increase as an option in the longer-term, unless policies shift in response to concerns about the impacts of biofuel expansion on food security. as for rates of return on agricultural investments, rising agricultural commodity prices make the acquisition of land for agricultural production an increasingly attractive option. some agribusiness players traditionally involved in food processing and distribution are pursuing vertical integration strategies to move upstream and enter direct production. although political risk remains high in many african countries, policy reforms have improved the attractiveness of the investment climate in several consilience onoja and achike: large-scale land acquisitions countries—including through a growing number of investment treaties and codes, and through reform of sectoral legislation on land, banking, taxation, customs regimes, or other aspects. these policy reforms also drive the land grabbing trend in africa. land prices in africa are in many places “very cheap” compared to the international market. land values are also rising, suggesting the potential for investment. where the host country is supportive, as it is in nigeria, land can also be acquired on favourable terms. with a guaranteed market, cheap access to land, and cheap labour, agrofuel development can be seen as a good business opportunity for european companies, explaining the sudden rush of “land grabs” taking place (friends of earth africa and friends of earth europe, 2010). unctad (2008) observed that over the past decade, economic liberalization, the globalization of transport and communications, and global demand for food, energy and commodities have fostered foreign investment in many parts of africa—particularly in extractive industries and in agriculture for food and fuel. what are the implications of these developments? 3.3 implications and lessons of land grabbing for nigerian land reforms, international trade, and economic development the companies and governments promoting agrofuels in africa promise locally grown fuel supplies, jobs, and economic development, but how real are these promises? a cursory review of literature (see unctad, 2008; swac/oecd, 2010; and cotula et al., 2009) uncovers many hidden dangers in the trend of land grabbing in nigeria, and indeed in africa as a whole. these dangers threaten food security, food safety, environmental safety, employment generation, and land tenure, endangering the peace, sovereignty, and economic well-being of citizens. dangers inherent in land grabbing include perceived risks by individuals that are likely to be victimized by the arrangement, which in turn can lead to communal conflict that may threaten the fragile security situation in nigeria, thus jeopardizing attainment of a conducive business environment that can boost fdi either in agriculture or industry. for instance, it was reported that plans for large sugar-cane plantations in gombe state, nigeria had raised concerns over pesticide use and the impact on surrounding farmland, leading to agitation among some members of the community who felt threatened by the looming implications of the deal (salihu, 2008 in daily independent). food security is a current issue in nigeria, as it is across africa. the un fao noted that there are 307 million hungry people in africa, most of whom live in sub-saharan africa (265 million). a recent fao statistic indicated that at least 9.4 million nigerians were undernourished and that out of nigerian’s 147.7 million citizens, 6 per cent were highly undernourished (2011). instead of dealing with food supply or food security problems at such a critical time, the country is selling off arable lands to foreign investors prospecting in biofuels production to the extent of losing greater than 136,000 ha of land from only 8 deals that could have been used in producing food crops (see table 2). the implication of this is that the drive for food security will still be a farfetched dream as long as attraction of foreign investment in agriculture only aims to produce biofuels for profit. the auctioning of fertile farmlands for this purpose also portends danger of losing job opportunities, consilience onoja and achike: large-scale land acquisitions increasing poverty in the country, and helping the growth of foreign companies to the disadvantage of poor land owners in nigeria. the overall implication of these trends is to increase poverty, unfavourable terms of trade against nigeria, desertification, increased global warming and the adverse consequences of climate change, and the disempowerment of indigenous citizens, who will now be left with few pieces of land that may not reach even one hectare. the extent of land fragmentation and land disputes that may arise in future will be unfathomable if these issues are not addressed and incorporated into nigerian agricultural and land policies. fao country studies suggest that in many rural areas, most land is used or claimed by somebody, regardless of how it may be labelled officially. this is one reason why there has been so much unrest in the oil-rich niger delta region of nigeria in the past few years. does the nigerian government, which has just granted a costly amnesty to militants that were terrorizing the country, have another excuse to go back to the creeks and start the ugly incidents of bombings and kidnapping again as they introduce yet another form of land grabbing and pollution into the region? there are reports of land being given to more than one person as a result of confusion over who actually has the right to allocate land use. this can precipitate communal clashes. all of these incidents will discourage foreign investment in the country and consequently lead to retarded growth rate. in ghana, development agencies have reported that the spread of jatropha is pushing small farmers and particularly women farmers off their land. valuable food sources such as shea nuts and dawadawa trees have been cleared to make way for plantations. some 50 per cent of the ghanaian population work on the land, mostly growing food for local consumption according to one report (see friends of earth africa and friends of earth europe, 2010). furthermore, local communities may agree to land transfers in exchange for promises from the company to improve facilities in the area. but such promises are not always fulfilled, leading to resentment from the community (ambiental and união, mozambique, 2009). proper land governance policies and practices, whether indigenous-based or emulating other countries’, can provide lessons for the drive for nigerian land reform. land governance is the process by which decisions are made regarding access to and the use of land and natural resources, the manner in which those decisions are implemented, and the way that conflicting interests are reconciled (hilhorst, 2011). in rural areas, informal processes managed by families or communities are often more important for accessing land than statutory law and processes; hence, there is a need for supporting these existing systems. the growing demand for land also means an increasing role for local governments. one approach for coping with competition between indigenous stakeholders over land resale, which results from the arrival of external investors, is the wider and more precise marking of boundaries and better recording of rights and transactions (hilhorst, 2011). this requires more use of paper, witnesses, and tangible markers (such as stones or plants), and can be started by any of the parties in a transaction, i.e. land-holding families and customary leaders, ngos, or farmers’ organisations. an interesting example is the “petits papiers” seen in countries as far apart as madagascar and mali. these are formal paper contracts between farmers that are prepared in the presence of witnesses to record sales and leases. local governments in benin, for example, are starting to play a role in improving the quality of the “petits papiers” by making standard forms available. another approach that is currently spreading is consilience onoja and achike: large-scale land acquisitions engaging local government officials as witnesses and asking municipalities to keep copies of the land transactions (hilhorst, 2011). in burundi, local governments promote taking preventative measures against land-related conflict by encouraging the demarcation of fields using locally available materials and promoting the registration of polygamous marriages. without registration, women and children cannot inherit. one other response is to develop local conventions that regulate access to collectively used resources, such as grazing areas and forests. following negotiations, the agreements are written up and involve the engagement of local authorities. this approach has been spreading since the early 1990s, and is now also being supported and promoted by local governments. in other cases, local governments have prepared by-laws on land use and common pool resources (e.g. niger, ethiopia). in mali, local governments are also involved in protecting livestock corridors, forests and fisheries. there is also a need for an urgent push in registering local rights to land and natural resources. this becomes even more important when investors are moving into the area, or when claims are being made by actors who do not adhere to the local mores. such registration is essential in places where local institutions in charge of managing resource tenure are breaking down and where conflict is becoming entrenched and vicious. rural areas often lack the services to secure rights to land, or these services are not appropriate or accessible (where appropriateness refers to services that are responsive to local requirements and circumstances, and accessibility concerns issues such as proximity, language, and costs). although formal titling systems were established during colonialism and after independence, the percentages of titled land are low and occur primarily in urban areas. titling services are often expensive, poorly accessible, and time consuming. in addition, when titling systems were rolled out in rural areas, inequity often increased as many – particularly women, herders, and indigenous communities – lost user rights that provided access to land, trees, and pastures. titling has also accelerated the individualisation of rights and the concentration of land. the individualization and privatisation of grazing land that was once managed by the community or clan can strengthen the position of women and younger people in the short run—at least in those cases where they receive their share. in the longer run, however, these parties may lose these assets when tempted to mortgage and sell to outsiders. moreover, the process of individualisation through title systems undermines the wider pastoral production system because there is, in general, less land and fodder tree area available. although it is rarely mentioned, the water scarcity dimension to the issue of large-scale land acquisition and land grabbing in west africa must also be considered.. availability of adequate moisture is a fundamental requirement for the agricultural use of land. designation of exclusive rights to use land provides prior rights to “green” water (rainfall and plant transpiration) on that land. however, in many contexts, such a delineation of rights also implies a demand for “blue” water resources (rivers, lakes, and aquifers), since agriculture typically accounts for 70-80 per cent of such water “abstracted” (pumped, stored, or diverted) in less industrialised economies (undp, 2006; woodhouse and garnou, 2009). despite its importance, in current debates about the impact of foreign investment in agricultural land, the consideration of water has been peripheral. in the absence of a more sophisticated understanding of how different types of water resources (e.g. riverbanks, swamplands, river flows) are used at different times of the year by consilience onoja and achike: large-scale land acquisitions different types of users, there is a risk that large-scale commercial agriculture will cause unforeseen but disproportionate damage to existing small-scale production systems (woodhouse and garnou, 2009). this is likely even where existing smallscale water use has legal protection because it may lack visibility, in part due to its small physical extent and (often) intermittent duration. a final aspect of the water dimension of large-scale land acquisitions is that impacts are likely to be far more extensive than might be anticipated from the area of land occupied. unlike land which has a distinct spatial boundary, water use depends on flows through the landscape. consequently, restriction or interruption of flows of water in an area occupied in one part of the landscape will have potentially widespread downstream impacts. we agree with the concerns that perception of abundance and the investment strategies it fosters among both african governments and foreign investors fails to address the specific ways in which water underpins land productivity in the semi-arid and sub-humid african savannahs. as a consequence, the land deals risk underestimating not only the water management needs of agricultural production, but also the impacts upon existing local water resource users. 4. conclusions and suggestions it has been established in this review that land grabbing in west africa has assumed dangerous dimensions, and that citizens have been deceived into thinking that these potential risks were necessary for economic development, job creation, saving the environment, and attaining food security. contractual arrangements are not favourable to the indigenes who own the land in the regions under assessment, thus threatening their heritage and source of livelihood. unfortunately, not much has been done at either the regional or country levels to address the problem of land grabbing in west african region. retrospectively, otheino (n.d.) highlighted the fact that no other continent in the world has more fertile, more extensive, and more fallow yet cultivable land than africa. therefore, what appeared to be a looming crisis for the world, he noted, could indeed, paradoxically, be an economic opportunity for africa. however, for african countries to strategically seize this opportunity will require that they jointly and purposefully amalgamate their national agricultural policies and start foresightedly thinking from concrete regional perspectives. the most visible organizational approach to address this issue in the west african region so far is the swac. swac brought stakeholders to the same table at bamako in 2009 to hold a meeting which provided a common platform for occasionally divergent analyses and stances (swac, 2010a). swac contended that the issue of pressure on land needed to be approached from three angles: human rights, land tenure policies, and investment frameworks. in their view, land is a socially and politically sensitive issue lying at the heart of african societies, and one that could potentially trigger tension or conflict. the implementation of swac’s proposals would require the development of common regulatory frameworks for responsible investment. in the 2009 meeting, they placed emphasis on the southsouth dimension of the issue; this was not at odds with an approach at the global level in that the general principles of human rights are the universal benchmark. the search for regional solutions in west africa has to be conducted in close cooperation consilience onoja and achike: large-scale land acquisitions with actions pursued both at the level of the african continent and at the global level. swac resolved that the principles thus far laid down at the global level (united nations, world bank, fao) and the guidelines set out by the african union had to inform regional action. nigeria and other west african countries will certainly learn a lot from the proposed approach of swac. in nigeria, the state collaborated with foreign investors to grab large tracts of land using the nigerian national petroleum company (nnpc). land grabbing in nigeria was driven by the state’s determination to encourage economic growth through liberalization of trade and by foreign investors seeking profits in the cheap and fertile land of nigeria and other african countries. the terms of sale for these lands are unfavourable to the indigenes and portend dangers in the area of food security, wealth of the citizens, land tenure, and the availability of arable land for future use by generations, in addition to the threats they pose to the environment and health of individuals. more importantly, the trend may lead to the aggravation of conflicts in the region and in nigeria, where national security is currently threatening foreign direct investments and national peace. based on findings from this review, we hereby make the following recommendations: 1. the international community and international agencies should assist in providing expert advice, capacity building, and other support services for governments, the private sector, and civil society, especially as they pertain to the negotiation of contracts, tackling food security issues, promoting innovative ways to provide legal support to local people, and developing business plans that build on know-how of the wide range of business models for agricultural production beyond plantations. 2. long-term land leases for 50 to 99 years should not be tolerated in west africa or in africa as a continent, since they are unsustainable unless there is some level of local satisfaction. in this context, therefore, innovative business models that promote local participation in economic activities may make even more commercial sense. these include outgrower schemes, joint equity with local communities, and local content requirements. 3. the economic community of west african states (ecowas) and member countries should bring the issue of land grabbing and its inherent dangers to their economies to the forefront of their agenda. they should enact treaties that will discourage large-scale land acquisitions that have unfavourable implications for their citizens. if well enforced, a regional approach will be a better way of stemming the ugly trend of african land auctioning in the name of opening doors to fdi. 4. ecowas and governments of member states should also promote and fund studies on investment trends in the agricultural sector within the region to understand the dimension of dangers posed to their agricultural land and to recommend actions to increase investment in agriculture without jeopardizing their sovereignties and the future livelihoods of their citizens. 5. west african countries should hasten the reform of their land use policies. such policy reforms should enable the indigenes who own the land to have input in designing the terms of leasing or land tenure, which may involve foreign investors. the outright purchase of land by foreign investors for agricultural activities should be forbidden in the new land policy and more emphasis should be given to strengthening the protection of local land rights, including customary rights—even where land is state owned or vested with consilience onoja and achike: large-scale land acquisitions the state in trust for the nation, as it currently stands in the nigerian land use act. 6. however, as a matter of desideratum, west african governments should balance investment protection with public interests (for instance, with regard to tensions between commercial confidentiality and public oversight in investment arbitration, arbiters should reconcile the investor’s need for regulatory stability with the host state’s capacity to regulate any land deal in the public interest). this is to ensure that the goal of attracting direct foreign investment in agriculture under the current globalization and liberalization policies in the region is not jeopardized. 7. west african countries’ environmental safety standards must be strengthened, and estimated impacts of proposed uses of the land (in monetary terms) must be properly factored into land deals so that communities bearing the environmental effects of the project can use these funds (the monetary value of the impact cost) to fund projects that will reduce or abate the environmental hazards inherent in such investment. 8. even when land is being leased for production of biofuels, west african countries must ensure that a reasonable percentage of the production of such crops—at least 35 per cent—is devoted to supplying food for their economy. west african agricultural policy should encourage the promotion of food crops over cash crops; this way, the danger of abandoning the food insecurity issue can be averted. 9. west african governments must institute programmes that will empower women and boost their participation in land ownership in addition to programmes that focus on agriculture in general. in some parts of nigeria, like in the south east and south-south, women are more involved than men in farming, yet they are denied the right to own farmland. lands owned by men are easily sold out under the pressure of financial challenges outside the household farming activities. women in agriculture also need to be reoriented to the benefits of owning their own lands, even if it means obtaining credit to do so. they should also be given the rights to register their lands. consilience onoja and achike: large-scale land acquisitions bibliography ambiental, j. & união mozambique. “jatropha! a socio-economic pitfall for mozambique, retrieved on 30th june, 2011 from www.swissaid.ch/global/pdf/entwicklungspolitik/agrotreibstoffe/report_j atropha_ja_and_unac.pdf (2009). cotula, l., vermeulen, s., leonard, r. & keeley, j. “land grab or development opportunity? agricultural investment and international land deals in africa,” iied/fao/ifad, (london/rome: 2009). farming matters (formerly leisa magazine). planet for sale. farming matters. december 2011. friends of earth for africa & friends of earth for europe. “africa: up for grabs: the scale and impact of land grabbing for agrofuels”. retrieved on 12th october, 2011 from http://www.foeeurope.org (2010). food and agricultural organization, “fao. faostat”. retrieved on 23rd october,2011 from http://www.fao.org/hunger/en/. (fao: rome, 2011). fao. compendium of agricultural – environmental indicators 1989-91 to 2000. statistics analysis service statistics division food and agriculture organization of the united nations rome. retrieved on 28th february from http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/j0945e/j0945e00.htm. fao. “africa’s changing landscape: securing land access for the rural poor. fao regional office for africa”. retrieved on 25th august, 2011 from www.fao.org/africa (fao: rome, 2010). global development. “the food rush: rising demand in china and west sparks african land grab”. retrieved on 29th august, 2011 from http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development (2010). hilhorst, t. “land and land rights, local governance: the contributions of local governments”. in farming matters, december, 2011. pp 24-26. othieno, a. feed the hungry, and think ahead, the trapca alumni network (tan)journal vol 2. (n.d.).pp. 5-8. sahel and west africa club (swac). “land, investment and development, fao/sdc/ifad” summary of stakeholders meeting held in rome on 24 january 2010a. sahel and west africa club (swac/oecd). “land transactions and investment in west africa: a regional perspective on principles for responsible agroinvestment”. annual bank conference on land policy and administration consilience onoja and achike: large-scale land acquisitions washington dc • 26‐27 april 2010 sahel and west africa club (swac/oecd). retrieved on 20th august from http://www.westafricaclub.org (2010). salihu, a. nnpc’s ethanol project and the fate of gombe communities : daily independent , tuesday may 20, 2008. also available at http://www.punchontheweb.com/articl.aspx?theartic=art20080515143356 2. (2008). sayer, j. m. sustainable agriculture – a challenge for the 21st century conference report bonn,: deutsche gesellschaft für internationale zusammenarbeit (giz) gmbh. 23-24 november 2010. united nations conference on trade and development (unctad) . world investment report 2008 – transnational corporations and the infrastructure challenge, geneva, united nations conference on trade and development, http://www.unctad.org/templates/webflyer/asp?docid=10502&intitemid =4629&lang=1&mode=downloads. (2008). woodhouse, p. & garnou, a. s. “is water the hidden agenda of agricultural land acquisition in sub-saharan africa?” a discussion paper is based on an earlier paper (http://bit.ly/q14sxh) presented at the global land grabbing conference organised 6-8 april 2011 by the land deals politics initiative ( ldpi) in collaboration with the journal of peasant studies and hosted by the future agricultures consortium at the institute of development studies, university of sussex. retrieved on 29th february, 2012 from http://www.tni.org/article/water-hidden-agenda-land-acquisition-africa. world agronomy & vm group. “rush of investors forces spotlight on land tenure”. (world agronomy august, 2011). world bank (2010a) rising global interest in farmland. can it yield sustainable and equitable benefits? washington dc: the world bank. world bank (2010b) awakening africa’s sleeping giant. prospects for commercial agriculture in the guinea savannah zone and beyond. washington dc: the world bank. microsoft word lin-copyedited.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 11, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 27–40   a comparative study on payment schemes for watershed services in new york city and beijing fanyuan lin school of arts and sciences university of pennsylvania email: fanyuanl@sas.upenn.edu abstract payment for ecosystem services (pes), also known as payment for environmental services, has become an increasingly popular economic approach to address environmental problems. according to the united nations food and agriculture organization (fao), watershed is among the services that are currently receiving most funds and interest worldwide. the author compares two distinctive watershed pes programs, namely the new york city watershed program and beijing watershed program in china, discusses their different levels of success due to approach towards the program, program framework and watershed economic gains and program management and operation, and put forward suggestions for program improvement for similar pes projects. consilience lin: payment for watershed services payment for ecosystem services (pes), also known as payment for environmental services, has become an increasingly popular economic approach to address environmental problems. in absence of an officially recognized definition, pes is generally understood as the payment made by the beneficiary of a particular ecosystem service to the service provider (wang 2007). the variety of ecosystem services, which are “components of nature, directly enjoyed, consumed or used to yield human well-being” (boyd and banzhaf 2006), has enabled diversified pes programs targeting different ecological services. according to the united nations food and agriculture organization (fao), watersheds are among the services currently receiving the most funds and interest worldwide (2007). this author compares two distinctive watershed pes programs, namely the new york city watershed program and beijing watershed program in china, and attempts to discuss their differential levels of success. 1. overview of new york city watershed program the new york city water supply system is comprised of 19 reservoirs and 3 controlled lakes, which are located up to 125 miles from the city and are interconnected by a complex series of tunnels and aqueducts (new york city environmental protection department 2012). the system provides water services to 9 million people and comes mostly (90%) from the catskill-delaware watershed system west of the hudson river (appleton 2002). since the 1980s, concern over the quality of unfiltered surface water from the catskill-delaware watersheds began to grow in response to the advent of more toxic land use and agricultural practices. in consultation with the u.s. environmental protection agency (epa), new york city decided to avoid a filtration plant—estimated to cost between $4 billion and $6 billion for construction, and 250 million annually for operation and maintenance—and instead, opt for a comprehensive watershed protection program to meet federal and state water quality standards in a cost-effective manner (appleton 2002). the comprehensive watershed protection program of new york city included a number of projects aiming at promoting sustainable farming practices and better forest management, and proved to be remarkably successful. as a result of this success, the epa issued the first new york city filtration avoidance determination in 1997, which stated that the city would not be required to filter catskill-delaware public water if it complies with the filtration avoidance criteria and all conditions set in the determination (epa 1997). in 2007, epa issued a second new york city filtration avoidance determination recognizing that the city has an adequate long-term watershed protection program for catskill-delaware water supply and extending the program for another 10 years until 2017 (epa 2007). after rounds of consultations among relevant stakeholders, such as environmental protection, agriculture, and forestry authorities, as well as the local communities in catskill-delaware watersheds, the non-profit watershed agricultural council (wac) was created in 1993. this organization oversees the continuously evolving voluntary incentive-based watershed protection programs. the main pes schemes administered by 29 consilience   29     wac are: (1) watershed agricultural program; (2) watershed forest management plan; and (3) conservation easement (wac 2011). 1.1 watershed agricultural program (wap) landowners in the catskill-delaware watershed can sign up to the wap and agree to follow the prescribed whole farm plan (wfp) on a voluntary basis, their farm operation will follow individualized state-of-art best management practices (bmps) that benefit water quality and land conservation. new york city will cover all the cost for infrastructure construction and follow-up technical assistance throughout the period of a wfp contract, which is normally 10 to 15 years (wac 2012). 1.2 watershed forest management plan (wfmp) owners of over 10 acres of forest in the watersheds can be voluntarily enrolled in wfmp, which provides technical assistance from certified foresters regarding better forest management (wac 2012). the forest owners would have the technical capacity to reduce pesticide use and hence mitigate water contamination risks. healthy forests also serve as natural purifiers for rainwater, which will be then stored in aquifers. technical assistance can be costly and the support from wac makes it much more viable economically for land owners to seek for such help. 1.3 conservation easement wac’s conservation easement program was initially prescribed in the new york city watershed memorandum of agreement as part of the land acquisition program (new york city 1997). in practice, conservation easements are normally sold by a landowner to the city at a fair price suggested by a certified appraiser and constitute a legally binding agreement that may limit or condition certain types of uses or activities from occurring on a property or prevent development from taking place on a property in order to fulfill the conservation purposes of the easement. conservation easements function as non-possessory, legal covenants on a property. as such, landowners still possess the property and may sell or transfer a property encumbered by an easement. only those who own a land larger than 50 acres in size and have an active and current whole farm plan (wfp) are eligible for conservation easement program (wac 2012), which serves as an additional incentive for farm owners for watershed protection. 2. overview of beijing watershed program consilience lin: payment for watershed services china is a water stressed country with per capita water resources less than a third of the world average (fao 2003). for the national capital city beijing, the situation is even worse. the population in beijing reached 19.61 million in 2010, while the per capita water resources was merely 107 cubic meters, or 1/20 of national average (beijing municipal government 2011) (united nations 2011). in addition to severe water shortage, the city’s water challenge is futher complicated by water pollution. in 2010, only 54.4% of monitored surface water in beijing met national and municipal water quality standards (beijing environmental protection bureau 2011). to ensure sufficient quantity and safe quality of water supply, beijing has historically used command-and-control policies. since the 1990s, beijing has also tried pes schemes to help protect the chao-bai watersheds in neighboring zhangjiakou and chengde municipalities of hebei province that feeds the miyun reservoir in beijing, which provides 60% of the city’s tap water (liao and li 2003). the following are examples of these schemes. 2.1 beijing-chengde water resource protection program in 1995, a working group on water resource protection between the governments of beijing and chengde municipality was established. the working group oversaw a water resource protection program under which beijing municipal government provided 2.08 million rmb annually to chengde between 1995 and 2002. the fund was dedicated to water protection projects in chengde watershed (zheng 2010). 2.2 beijing-chengde/zhangjiakou water protection program in 2005, beijing agreed to provide 20 million rmb each year for a five-year period until 2009 to chengde and zhangjiakou municipalities. according to the utilization guidelines of water resource protection and environmental treatment fund between beijing and surrounding areas, the fund was to ensure water quality and quantity of miyun reservoir through energy saving technology promotion, water quality monitoring, water pollution treatment and soil erosion abatement projects in chengde and zhangjiakou watersheds (beijing municipal government 2005). in the end of 2008, the mayor of beijing and the governor of hebei province agreed to extend this program until 2011. 31 consilience   31     2.3 “paddy to dryland” program in october 2006, a memorandum of understanding (mou) was signed between the beijing municipal government and hebei provincial government to promote economic and social cooperation between the two neighbors. as part of the mou, chengde and zhangjiakou municipalities of hebei province would carry out “paddy to dryland” programs, converting a total of 183,000 mu (30,134 acres) of water-intensive rice paddies to dryland suitable for less water-demanding crops. recognizing the income loss may incur on the farmers, beijing would subsidize the farmers for each mu of rice paddy converted at the rate of 450 rmb (beijing municipal government 2006). the “income loss” subsidy was raised in 2008 to 550 rmb/mu (3,339 rmb or roughly 520 u.s. dollars/acre). between 2008 and 2011, an annual subsidy of 39.05 million rmb were provided by beijing municipal government. the program was extended in 2012 and the subsidy rate remained the same (hebei provincial government 2012). 2.4 forest management program to review the progress under the mou, the mayor of beijing and the governor of hebei met in 2008 and agreed to carry out cooperation on forest management to better protect the watersheds of chengde and zhangjiekou municipalities. for the period 2009-2011, beijing would provide 100 million rmb to create 200,000 mu (32,933 acres) of “water conservation forests” in the watersheds. an additional 50 million rmb was committed by beijing for fire prevention and pest control projects in the watershed forests (zheng 2010). 3. comparison of new york city and beijing watershed programs the two payment programs for watershed services in new york city and beijing differ in terms of how the program was approached, structured and implemented. the reason for varied level of success may be deeply rooted in the political, institutional and legal differences of the two countries. 3.1 approach towards the program in developing the catskill-delaware watersheds pes program,, the authorities of new york city took a bottom-up approach. policy makers in the new york city department of environmental protection (nycdep) had rounds of face-to-face discussions and consultations with residents of the watersheds, a process that helped consilience lin: payment for watershed services build understanding and trust between the beneficiaries of the watershed services, namely 9 million people in new york city represented by the nycdep, and the service providers, namely the landowners in the watersheds who commit to bmps that protect the watersheds (appleton 2002). this participation of all the stakeholders in the watersheds during the design and decision making phases is essential to ensure their active future participation in the payment scheme. in contrast, in the case of chao-bai watersheds program, the governments of beijing and hebei province played a dominant role in developing the scheme, setting the subsidy standard, and implementing the program. that was a top-down approach with no evidence that farmers and residents in chao-bai watersheds were consulted for the development of the payment scheme. the bottom up approach of the catskill-delaware pes scheme is a typical decentralized approach, where the individuals involved in the environmental problem work out the solution themselves. the advantage of a decentralized approach is that the stakeholders have a strong incentive to put forward a solution; because they are the ones with the best knowledge of damage and abatement costs, they may be able to find the most efficient solutions (field and field 2009). in contrast, the case of chao-bai pes scheme was a centralized policy where a control administrative agency determined the types of projects and standard of subsidy to be carried out. as a result of the knowledge limitations of the policy makers, it would be extremely difficult for them alone to identify an efficient level of payment. the figures of millions committed by beijing municipal government to chengde and zhangjiakou municipalities in the water protection and forest management programs appeared arbitrary, if not random, and thus may not be effective. 3.2 program framework and watershed economic gains the 1997 and 2007 epa filtration avoidance determinations and the 1997 new york city watershed memorandum of agreement laid a consolidated framework for the pes schemes in catskill-delaware watersheds. under the purview of these umbrella documents, separate agreements and contracts were negotiated and signed to help institutionalize the scheme. the tools of watershed agricultural program (wap), watershed forest management plan (wfmp) and conservation easement are all incentive-based. as such, the participants can receive tangible benefits in the form of direct income, subsidies, cost sharing or technical assistance. these strong incentives have helped promote active participation by the local community and effective watershed protection practice. by march 2011, 254 large farm operations in the catskill-delaware watersheds had signed up for the wap, representing 96% of identified large farms, and 90% of all large farms had achieved “substantial implementation” of the practices called for in their whole farm plans (wfp). in terms of land acquisition, since 1997, the city’s ownership interest in watershed real property has increased by 321% as a result of conservation easement program (holloway and rush 2011). during the one-year period between july 1, 2010 and june 30, 2011, about $15.7 million were spent on wap, wfmp 33 consilience   33     and conservation easement. of that, over $6.6 million went to payment for conservation easement alone, and this part was translated as direct income for farm owners who participated in this scheme (wac 2011). in contrast, the chao-bai watersheds program consisted of stand-alone schemes based on separate mous or arrangements that operated in different time periods. there was no single framework that provides a basis for long-term pes programs in the watersheds. at the same time, with the exception of “paddy to dryland” program where the farmers in the watersheds could be subsidized directly, all other schemes were based on government-led projects for constructing pollution treatment facilities, disseminating water saving technology, and reforestation efforts. the benefits of such projects were not always felt by the local farmers. in fact, the per capita gdp of the concerned watershed regions was only a quarter of that in rural counties of beijing (beijing academy of social sciences 2006). the ecological compensation made by beijing so far does not make up for the economic sacrifice made by the upper watersheds in hebei province, and the watershed areas had deteriorated into a “belt of poverty” around beijing (xiao jincheng, li, and qi 2012) (asian development bank 2005). the conservation easement stands out as a unique component of the catskill-delaware watersheds program and nothing similar can be found in the chao-bai watersheds program. the legal basis for conservation easement is that the farmers have both property rights and operation rights over the farmland. in china however, socialist public ownership prevails and the country’s land management law stipulates that urban lands are state owned, rural lands are collectively owned, and no individual may sell or transfer land property rights (2005). the farmlands in rural areas are leased to farmers on contracts with a normal term of 30 years in accordance with the rural land contract law (2002). therefore the farmers in chao-bai watersheds own only operation rights for the period of their contracts, but not the property rights over their farmlands. while the land management law does allow the state to acquire rural land for public welfare and compensate the contracted farmers (2005), which could serve as a legal basis for a similar conservation easement scheme, this would be politically inpalatable, as the farmers would lose their only operation rights over the farmlands and hence risk their basic livelihood. 3.3 program management and operation the catskill-delaware pes programs are administered by the non-profit watershed agricultural council (wac) in accordance with its contract with the nycdep, which provides more than 90% of funds for the programs (wac 2011). wac is overseen by a board of directors, who represent the interests of farm and forest owners in the watersheds. among the 17 board members of 2012, 16 are current or retired farmers, forest landowners or relevant businessmen (wac 2012). a single administering entity by the local community representatives ensured the smooth operation and wider participation of the pes programs. in the case of chao-bai watersheds program, a single consilience lin: payment for watershed services organization in charge of all programs was missing. various government agencies, such as environmental protection, water resources, forestry and agricultural authorities oversaw and approved submitted project proposals according to their respective administrative mandates. the chao-bai program’s time-consuming review and approval process, which involved multiple levels of government authorities constituted higher transaction costs than that of catskill-delaware program . 4. discussions the catskill-delaware watersheds payment scheme represents a model pes program, while the chao-bai watersheds program represents room for improvement. 4.1 insufficient funding there has been a general understanding that the funds currently “compensated” for chao-bai watersheds by beijing are not sufficient to reflect the full value of the ecosystem. some scholars estimated the ecological value of miyun reservoir as over 47 billion rmb (hu et al. 2007). the compensation funds, both indirect payment in the form of public projects and direct payment in the form of monetary subsidies, shall be substantially increased to better protect the watersheds and help alleviate the degrading “belt of poverty”. unlike the catskill-delaware watersheds where water quantity is not a main issue, chao-bai watersheds face challenges in both water quantity and quality. indirect and direct funds play different roles in ensuring water quantity and quality and are hence both indispensable. for example, indirect funds in the form of public projects work better in treating point industrial pollution and protecting water quality, and direct funds such as “paddy to dryland” subsidies work well in ensuring water quantity. 4.2 source of funding for indirect compensation in the form of public projects, the beijing municipal government should be able to appropriate a larger portion of its continuously growing budget and support water pollution treatment and forest management projects in the watersheds. as for funding direct subsidies, water price adjustment could be a possible solution. currently, water in urban beijing is seriously underpriced. compared to water-abundant philadelphia, where water is priced at about 1.2 cents/gallon (philadelphia water department 2011), the price in beijing is 4 rmb/ton, or 0.25 cents/gallon (beijing water authority 2012), a mere 1/5 that of philadelphia. taking into account the water scarcity in beijing, it is justifiable to raise the water price so that the downstream users can pay a fairer price for the water resources from upstream watersheds. as there are about 20 million residents in beijing paying water bills, even a slight increase in water price accumulates to considerable funds. 35 consilience   35     4.3 fund management while a national pes law remains missing in china, the existing mou on economic and social cooperation signed between beijing and hebei is an acceptable basis upon which a separate long-term framework agreement dedicated to pes schemes between beijing and chao-bai watersheds can be developed. under this framework agreement, the type and rate of pes measures could be specified. for indirect compensation in the forms of public projects, relevant government agencies shall remain responsible for implementation. for subsidy funds, collected from higher water prices for example, a ngo could be set up for its management. this ngo shall reach out to the farmers to understand their practical needs and help develop subsidy rates at a more efficient level. the organization shall also be responsible for direct reimbursements to the farmers according to the agreed rate to minimize transaction costs. in addition, a farm management plan similar to the whole farm plan (wfp) used in the catskill-delaware watersheds can be developed for the chao-bai watersheds with the full support from the subsidy funds. in addition to the “paddy to dryland” program, which mainly targets water quantity assurance, this farm management plan can encourage the farmers to employ individualized best management practices (bmps) to reduce non-point pollution from farmlands and better protect water quality. 4.4 positive verses negative incentives in both catskill-delaware and chao-bai programs, positive incentives (ie financial rewards for better practices), are adopted rather than negative incentives (ie penalties for non-compliance). in almost all countries, non-point pollution in rural areas, mainly caused by fertilizer and pesticide overuse and animal waste, is a problem more challenging for regulators than point pollution from industrial sources. industrial pollution can be easily monitored at the chimney or wastewater discharge point and once non-compliance is detected, the polluting factory is undeniably responsible. in the case of farmers, however, the source is less obvious—when pollution is detected in a river, it is not possible to be sure which farmers are responsible and how much each of them contributed. meanwhile, financial rewards are far more politically palatable than penalties. therefore, for many watershed pes schemes, positive incentives may prove more pragmatic and effective over negative ones. consilience lin: payment for watershed services 5. recommendations this paper only discusses two cases of watershed pes programs, but some lessons can be drawn from the comparison and be potentially applied to other localities where a watershed pes program is being considered. first, a well thought out funding scheme is of integral importance. in many cases, the government is the only funding source. it may be applicable in some countries where the government enjoys steady and sufficient revenue, but in others where the government struggles to support important public programs, innovative approaches, including public private partnership (ppp), could be explored to tap private capital. second, the improvement of ecological services will take years, therefore any pes schemes must be long-term so ensure tangible outcome. in this regard, political support will be essential. the government should lead the efforts in developing a long-term framework under which pes schemes can be implemented. third, without active engagement of local stakeholders (ie farmers who live in the watershed), no pes programs can be truly successfully implemented. local stakeholders should be engaged in the whole process, from the program design to the implementation, so that they can be motivated to participate in the initiative. 37 consilience   37     bibliography appleton, a. 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"a framework for ecological compensation mechanism in china." china environment and development commentary 3. jincheng, x., li, j., & qi, r.. 2012. study on beijing-hebei compensation mechanism for water resources. zheng, h. 2010. study on ecological compensation models in water source areas of beijing and coordinated regional development. consilience lin: payment for watershed services ---------------------------------------------- my signature below certifies that i have complied with the university of pennsylvania's code of academic integrity in completing this paper. fanyuan lin ____________________________ name (printed) ____________________________ ______________ signature date consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 6, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 192–209 promoting renewable energy in longyearbyen: a sustainable means to prevent svalbard‟s environmental degradation fabio buonsanti sum – centre for development and the environment university of oslo, norway fabiobu@student.sum.uio.no abstract this study aims to separately investigate: 1.the political reasons behind norway‟s controversial decision to encourage a coal enterprise on svalbard (an archipelago in the arctic) and, 2.the current and future potential of wind and solar energy as untapped renewable sources, locally exploited through a hybrid wind-pv system. in doing so this preliminary study attempts to provide insights for the implementation of an alternative, sustainable strategy to keep a norwegian yearround settlement at longyearbyen, svalbard, without any recourse to polluting mining operations. such an eventuality, despite the need for further research, is promisingly described as feasible, environmentally advantageous and politically conceivable. author’s note fabio buonsanti graduated with honours, in 2009, from the university of basilicata‟s literature and philosophy department. he studied mechanical engineering and modern and contemporary history. he currently resides in oslo, norway, where he is enrolled in an interdisciplinary master‟s program in „culture, environment and sustainability‟. an earlier version of this article was submitted as part of coursework completed for the class „sum4000development and environment: theory and policy challenges‟. keywords: norway, svalbard, longyearbyen, renewable energy, coal mining, wind energy, solar energy. 1. introduction as a country with well-established traditions in environmental and climate research, it is highly surprising to learn about the controversial choice of norway to encourage a coal industry on svalbard, the vastest and northernmost wild area in western europe (barr 1987). despite recent warnings launched by scientists on the increasing emission of dangerous pollutants in the extraction process of coal and in the production of energy (klif 2009), there is still an opposition to a full climate protection policy, an attitude that is threatening the vulnerable, local ecosystem. this circumstance seems strictly related to the interpretation of the treaty of spitsbergen (1920), which consilience buonsanti: renewable energy in svalbard formally assigns the sovereignty of the archipelago to norway, but even so, leaves a few „open doors‟ to other claimant countries, in particular russia (brown 2000). politicians, on one hand, claim the key-importance of coal to a permanent norwegian presence on the group of islands, mandatory for maintaining their political control. in the following debate, however, i argue the existence of an alternative, sustainable strategy to keep a year-round settlement as longyearbyen alive, which i believe can be achieved without any recourse to polluting mining operations. from a methodological point of view, i will mainly draw on quantitative information, in particular on the emission data issued in 2009 by klif (norwegian climate and pollution agency), in collaboration with nilu (norwegian institute for air research) and unis (university centre in svalbard), on historical weather observations provided by met (norwegian meteorological institute), on the report on climate change in the norwegian arctic, freshly made public by npi (norwegian polar institute 2011), and on statistics issued by ssb (statistics norway). fundamental to the contextualization of this research has also been my extensive stay in situ1, as part of a long experience in the arctic, which gave me the unique opportunity to discuss my ideas with scientists and researchers from different parts of the world. the interaction with inhabitants of longyearbyen also proved itself useful, especially in considering their present degree of dependence on the coal industry. although a minute scientific analysis is beyond the ambition of this short report, i will try to argue why it is environmentally advantageous and politically conceivable to assume the existence of a norwegian stable settlement on svalbard, even in the absence of the local coal enterprise. in the second part of the paper, i will argue about the current and future potential of renewable sources (wind and pv) to replace the town coal-based power plant. a preliminary assessment of the estimated investment, of the social, political, technical and environmental challenges to overcome and of the possible visual impact, will also be included in my exploratory scenario. 2. historical overview in the last two centuries, svalbard has been theatre of several „cold wars‟ between different countries (norway, great britain, denmark, sweden, russia, holland, usa, germany, france, spain, poland), that have silently fought each other, either for the monopoly on fishing and hunting, for the conquest of the north pole, for the strategic area, for scientific reasons, or for the exploitation of mineral resources (hoel 1925, orheim 2006). in 1920, the negotiations after the end of the first world war were taken as an opportunity to establish order also in this „nobody‟s land‟. norway, at that time a poor country, was then granted sovereignty on it, together with the absolute authority on rules for industrial operations and on safety and protection of the environment. despite that, oslo never felt the complete control of the region, mainly because, according to the obsolete (and to a certain extent, unsustainable) treaty of spitsbergen (1920), still valid today, citizens from signatory countries can 1 15th february 2010 – 14th march 2010. 194 consilience benefit from the same rights as norwegians to engage in industrial activities as mining, fishing or hunting and to conduct scientific research. this circumstance is particularly evident in relation to the russian claims on the area, historically considered a threat (brown 2000), in so much as we have assisted to a case of “environmental colonialism” (agarwal and narain 1991:1, emphasis in the original), a continuous rush of norway to exploit and occupy svalbard, way more than any other signatory country. an onerous strategy, often economically arguable, but believed to be advantageous in case of future international resolutions (orheim 2006). no country is ready to give up. on one hand, despite an extremely low productivity (ssb 2005a:152), russia unexplainably keeps running its mine in barentsburg. on the other hand, norway, through the minister of foreign affairs gahr støre (2006), declared to “have initiated a number of dialogues (…) with states that have an interest in the region”, but also made it clear that “there are some questions that are not up for discussion or negotiation. one of these is the question of norway‟s continued jurisdiction in accordance with international law”. from a political perspective, the building of a strong norwegian community, longyearbyen, the strategic establishment of a campus (unis), the creation of a raising business around tourism and the extensive exploitation of mineral resources, make a lot of sense. what is less clear, though, is the systematic exploitation of mineral resources in such a fragile environment, as the magic formula to resolve a political puzzle. robert hermansen, the former managing director of the mining company (snsk2), interviewed by brown (2000:2), made it no secret: “to keep control of svalbard we have to have a community here. if we left, the russians would immediately claim it”. yet, a careful reading of the treaty (1920) and of the following acts3 reveals no connection between mining and sovereignty. on the contrary, hermansen indirectly confirms that what‟s politically needed is only a stable settlement, not a polluting mine! in these terms it becomes quite complicated for norway, an oil producer, to justify the subsidies given to the only coal industry of the country (hoel 1925, wwf 2001), which until 2001 was always in economic loss (store norske spitsbergen grubekompani as 2004:6), and together with the russian mine, was responsible in 2007 for the emission of 52% of carbon dioxide (co2), 99% of methane (ch4) and 92% of sulphur dioxide (so2), within the archipelago (klif 2009:16). the embarrassment grows even more if we consider the plan to boost the production and open a new mine in 2013 (snsk 2011a), an act that alone admits the 2 store norske spitsbergen kulkompani (snsk) is the northernmost coal industry in the world. established in 1916, it currently operates in two coal mines on svalbard: gruve 7, just outside longyearbyen, and svea nord (sveagruva), about 60 km south of the capital. a new mine, located in lunckefjell, is scheduled to start its operations in winter 2013 (snsk 2011a). 3 to the treaty of spitsbergen (1920), which recognized norwegian sovereignty and included regulations on taxation, environmental conservation, non-discrimination and military restrictions, followed four acts: the svalbard act (1925), which made the archipelago officially part of norway; the mining code (1925), on the exploitation of mineral resources over the archipelago; the svalbard environmental protection act (2001), that introduced strict laws on the protection of flora, fauna and large areas; the boundary treaty (2010), signed by norway and russia, on the marine boundaries between svalbard and novaya zemlya (royal ministry of justice 1988, regjeringen 2001, kramer 2010). consilience buonsanti: renewable energy in svalbard failure of the much advertised goal, declared in the norwegian parliament in 1995, to make svalbard “one of the best-managed wilderness areas in the world” (guðmundsdóttir and sæþórsdóttir 2009:2). 3. a contradictory climate policy when the un world commission on environment and development, chaired by gro harlem brundtland, published its report, our common future, and recognized climate change as a main issue for sustainable development (wced 1987), norway saw itself as “a natural leader in international environmental policy” (hovden and lindseth 2002:146). its commitment in the stimulation of the „montreal protocol‟ (npi 2011), in the contribution to agenda 21 (unced 1993), in the promotion of flexible mechanisms before the ratification of the kyoto protocol (hovden and lindseth 2002, torvanger et al. 2004), and even in the failed try to find a common agreement in copenhagen (wbgu 2010), seems to demonstrate the same. according to hovden and lindseth, though, the norwegian position on the issue of climate change, must be accounted: as a product of two important considerations for any norwegian government: the need to maintain credibility nationally and internationally as an environmental pioneer, and the fact that norway, as a leading petroleum exporter is heavily dependent on income from its considerable oil and gas exports (2002:146). norway is today the world‟s sixth largest exporter of oil (eia 2010:2), and the second largest supplier of natural gas to the european union (2010:4). these data still do not collide with the environmental leadership, especially if we consider the possibility for industrialized countries to achieve the targets ratified in kyoto, concerning the reduction and stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, “by action abroad, rather than at home” (woodhouse 2000:143). what is more surprising, instead, is the contradictory way of norway to justify its oil business as a product “less pollution intensive than fossil alternatives such as coal” (hanisch4 1990, cited in hovden and lindseth 2002:150), and its gas exports as a greener option than “the much more polluting coal” (2002: 152). if coal is such an evil pollutant, and this argument is widely employed to defend the norwegian trade around oil and gas, why is it still extracted on svalbard? is not the archipelago part of norway? how worthy and necessary is it to run a polluting, often unprofitable industry, furthermore sole in the country, whose economic return is dependent on the fluctuations of an unstable market? to both the norwegian pollution control authority5 and the stortinget (the norwegian parliament) goes the uncomfortable duty to provide answers to all these 4 ted hanisch, former director of cicero (center for international climate and environmental research), in 1990 became part of the norwegian delegation to the climate negotiations as an observer (hovden and lindseth 2002). 5 the norwegian pollution control authority (sft) “has the responsibility for controlling and licensing the norwegian and russian coal industry and the energy production from the coal power plants in longyearbyen and barentsburg” (governor of svalbard 2011:1). 196 consilience questions, in addition to the ethical responsibility of implementing a more coherent international climate policy. 4. environmental degradation: a way out in the last century, the temperature in the arctic has increased twice as quickly as the world‟s average (ipcc 2007). according to npi (2011:8), the mean annual temperature on north-east of svalbard, compared to the current, may even increase of 8°c by the end of this century, a scenario that would certainly induce dramatic ecological consequences at a local and global level. by reflecting back to space the received solar energy (albedo effect), light surfaces like snow, glaciers and sea ice, act “like a mirror” (klif 2009:10). their melting on svalbard, already in place, is not only causing sea level to raise, a shorter winter season and the release into the atmosphere of huge quantities of previously trapped ghg as methane (ch4) or carbon dioxide (co2) (npi 2011), but also more absorption of solar radiation, which is accelerating even more the ongoing process of global warming (borroughs 2007). as a result, also the biological diversity on the archipelago is in danger: several species are dependent on sea ice, such as ice algae that grow in and under the ice, seals that need sea ice to give birth to their young, polar bears6 that prey on seals, and several species of seabirds, as many aspects of their lifecycle are associated with sea ice (npi 2011:11). although climate change in the norwegian arctic is mainly caused by ghg emissions in other areas of the world, local pollutants can also visibly affect the surrounding ecosystem (npi 2011). a recent study of the university of science and technology of trondheim, for example, has demonstrated how the problem of acid mine drainage in bjørndalen (svalbard), caused by “degradation of sulphide minerals in presence of water and oxygen” (holm et al. 2003:1), is persistent in creating “damage to the local tundra vegetation” (ibidem), despite the fact that the mine has been closed down since 1996. among the scientific community, there is very little doubt that the main local contributors to svalbard‟s climate change are the substantial emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, black carbon (soot), and organic carbon. these are all ghg and pollutants directly connected with the energy production in the coal-based power plant and with the operations of extraction, transportation and shipping of coal (klif 2009:15-16). yet, data on the total emission of co2 within the archipelago in 2007, surprisingly account for only 1% of the carbon dioxide emitted from the mainland in the same year (2009:15). this is a very small number, as seen in these terms. if, instead, we espouse the more sustainable sharing theory of per-capita emissions, supported by agarwal and narain (1991) and wilhite and norgard (2004), then we 6 a study commissioned by the us government, has shown how long-distance swimming for a female polar bear in arctic waters, in a year of extreme sea ice retreat, “may result in high energetic costs and compromise reproductive fitness” (durner et al. 2011:1). consilience buonsanti: renewable energy in svalbard realise how intolerable the current situation on svalbard is7. here the per-capita emission of co2 in 2007 is 181 tons, 3 times more than that of a citizen of qatar, the country with the highest per-capita emission in the world (55.4 tons); 20 times more than a norwegian living on the mainland (9.1 tons); 36 times more than a chinese (5 tons), and 129 times more than an indian (1.4 tons) (world bank 2007). despite the reassurance of the mine company on the priority given to safety, so to make sure that as a result of its operations “no humans or wildlife become sick or injured nor the natural environment damaged” (snsk 2011b, emphasis added), the environmental impact of the coal enterprise on the local ecosystem is no longer disputable and, as mentioned above, proved by different scientific studies (holm et al. 2003, klif 2009, npi 2011). all of them confirm that today‟s local emission rates “will continue to increase in the future unless additional measures are taken” (klif 2009:39). i argue that such a serious environmental alarm already constitutes a sufficient argument to justify a forced closedown of the norwegian mines on svalbard, a possibility that is also politically feasible, since, as demonstrated above, it would not undermine the sovereign rights of norway on the region (treaty of spitsbergen 1920). how would such a decision affect life in the norwegian settlements of sveagruva and longyearbyen? a scenario in which gruve 7 and svea nord are closed, is likely to cause the complete abandoning of sveagruva, as already happened in pyramiden in 1998, an effect of russia‟s decision to closedown the local mine (orheim 2006). more complex, instead, appears the analysis of potential repercussions in longyearbyen, where, since the early 1990s, “there have been major changes in working life” (ssb 2009:12). although mining and construction, with 387 persons employed (ssb 2010b:383), are still the largest endeavours in terms of occupation (26%)8, “all private-sector service industries have more than doubled their employment in the period 1993-2007” (ssb 2009:12), with particular reference to the fields of tourism, research and education (guðmundsdóttir and sæþórsdóttir 2009, ssb 2009). despite a large scepticism noticed among the inhabitants9, the trend underlined by ssb statistics is very useful in considering their current degree of dependence on coal. data suggests that a permanent community would probably survive anyway to a closedown of the mines. the other industrial sectors, in fact, appear mature and strong enough to manage the loss of direct and indirect business provided by the coal enterprise in town and to absorb a number of unemployed individuals, for instance, in the fast-growing tourist industry. in a scenario without mines, though, the replacement of coal in the local power plant becomes a vital, as well as an ethical, issue to solve. bearing in mind that “things which are easy today because of the availability of suitable fossil fuels (…) will not be easy in the future” (ferguson 2008:137, emphasis in the original), the recourse to renewable energy seems the only viable alternative. 7 on 01/01/2007 svalbard’s total population was of 2,338 inhabitants (ssb 2010a:1). 8 calculated in relation to 1,495 persons (adult population employed in 2009) (ssb 2010c:1). 9 the perspective of closedown of the mines appears unrealistic to most of the inhabitants, mainly for political reasons (source: author’s informal conversations). 198 consilience jan feb ma r apr ma y jun jul au g sep oct no v de c 6.01 5.97 5.0 4.84 4.3 4.28 4.29 3.79 4.22 4.98 5.67 5.83 table 1: monthly wind speed average, observed at svalbard airport (4.8 km northwest of longyearbyen) in the period 2001-2010. unit: m/s (nmi 2011:ffm). the entire second part of this report, thus, will concern a preliminary analysis of the potential adoption of photovoltaic (pv) and on-shore wind power, as complementary substitutes of coal in meeting longyearbyen‟s energy demand. 5. the present and future potential of renewable energy in longyearbyen: an exploratory scenario svalbard‟s abundance of wind and sun constitute the basis of the following exploratory scenario. through the use of literature and statistics, i seek for ideal conditions and numerical evidence to prove the benefit of investments into the field of renewable energy in longyearbyen. 5.1. designing a wind park. on a global scale, wind is the result of “uneven heating of the earth‟s surface combined with the rotation of the planet” (dahl 2004a:3). at svalbard this condition is stressed even more by the warm gulf stream that hits the stiff shore. the colder the coast, the stronger the winds generated. it is mainly for this reason that the windiest months of the year in longyearbyen are those who present a lower solar irradiation (table 1). according to dahl, in order to assess whether the wind can be considered a reliable option for any polar renewable energy project, a given site must present “average wind speeds of greater than 4 m/s” (2004a:6). this is because wind velocity, due to its cubed expression, is extremely decisive in the output formula of a turbine: p = 1/2 ρ a v 3 where p is the available power from the wind (measured in watt), ρ the air density (kg/m3), a the swept area of the rotor (m2), and v the wind speed (m/s). an increase of any of these factors, in particular v, will lead to a considerable expansion of the final power output (ngô and natowitz 2009). the need to find the windiest location possible, then, is of crucial importance in the design-stage of a wind park. although the only official data available (table 1) already show that all months of the year, apart from august, appear perfect to the development of a wind farm just outside longyearbyen, there is still room for improvement, for example, by finding a location with stronger wind. consilience buonsanti: renewable energy in svalbard jan feb ma r apr ma y jun jul au g sep oct no v de c 7.81 7.76 6.5 6.29 5.59 5.56 5.58 4.93 5.49 6.47 7.37 7.58 table 2: monthly wind speed average assumed to be found on top of platåberget, calculated by rising of 30% the data in table 1. unit: m/s (seifried and witzel 2010:102). since the observations have been made near the airport, at an altitude of only 28 m (nmi 2011), and considering that wind velocities are generally 30% higher at peaks (seifried and witzel 2010:102), it would be much more convenient to place wind turbines on top of a hill. thus, with the help of a topographical map (annex 1), we may locate a perfect site, for instance, on top of platåberget (450 m), between the airport and town. from a morphological point of view, this plateau, with its flat and large clear area, seems ideal for hosting big turbines. at the same time, it presents the remarkable advantage of being very close to the grid of the settlement. following seifried and witzel, then, we can presume to meet the monthly average velocities on top of platåberget, specified in table 2. as a result of such a small change in location, we are now expected to meet suitable conditions for the design of a wind park even in august. in addition to that, the annual wind speed average increased from 4.93 m/s to about 6.5 m/s, a significant difference in terms of power output. once located the site, the next step is to select the right type of wind turbine, in relation to the environmental conditions and to the energy demand (dahl 2004a). the most recent statistics available10, relative to the year 2003, quantify in 68 gwh the annual consumption of electricity in longyearbyen (ssb 2005b:158), a number partially explainable by the harsh weather conditions that force households and offices to keep their heating systems on, all year long. to cope with such a hostile weather, the choice of the most resistant, efficient and technologically advanced turbine on the market, is advisable. let us take, for example, the new gamesa g97 (gamesa 2011), a medium-sized turbine with a capacity rate of 2 mw that, in relation to our wind data (average wind speed of 6.5 m/s and a supposed air density of 1.225 kg/m3), promises to release about 760 w of instantaneous power (gamesa 2011:8). assuming a capacity factor of 40% (3500 h/year), “the percentage of its nameplate capacity that a turbine installed in a particular location will deliver over the course of a year” (ewea 2009:445), a level of efficiency very common in newgeneration turbines (dahl 2004a), we are now able to calculate the expected annual power output of a single g97 placed on top of platåberget: 760 * 3500 = 2.66 gwh 10 the total consumption (68 gwh) also includes the electricity used in mining activities in both gruve 7 and svea, quantified in 7 gwh. i have decided not to deduct this term from the total, in order to balance the increase in consumption, which is likely to have occurred in longyearbyen in the years following the preparation of these statistics (2003). 200 consilience to hypothesize the number of turbines of this kind needed to meet longyearbyen‟s energy demand it is sufficient to divide the annual consumption of electricity by the expected output of a single turbine: 68 / 2.66 ≈ 25 turbines g97-2mw this preliminary assessment, whose demanding investment would add up to € 80,000,000 (viva energie 2011, private correspondence), due to lack of precise data from the chosen location, does not claim to be scientifically accurate. what is important, instead, is only to identify the potential of a still unexploited renewable resource. yet, developing wind energy on svalbard, might be a demanding task. a series of technological, environmental, financial and social challenges still need to be addressed. first of all, it is very difficult to make a heavy turbine stand upon the unstable thawing permafrost. the rise in temperature, caused by climate change, heavily affects permafrost by bringing changes in its form and consistency over time (npi 2011:36). to master this problem and stand above the surface, houses and research stations in polar regions have adopted elevated, adjustable foundations (dahl 2010). would it be possible to implement the same kind of system on weighty wind towers? another big issue related to permafrost is the storage of power. even in longyearbyen, despite a certain constancy, the wind does not blow with the same force all year long. historical observations highlight days of absolute calm (on average 10-11 days/year), and prolonged windy periods, with gusts that exceed 35 m/s (nmi 2011). on such days, in normal conditions, there would exist different ways to store considerable amounts of electricity. pumped storage plants and compressed air energy storage, for example, are systems able to make the overproduced power available in periods of low production (seifried and witzel 2010:156). yet, in longyearbyen, due to the impenetrability of permafrost, these systems cannot be used. how to store the exceeding energy then? is it conceivable an outdoor storage system? solutions to these and other similar engineering matters have already been found on a small scale, where renewable technologies (wind-powered turbines, photovoltaic panels and solar thermal collectors), together with ingenious storage systems, allow citizens and researchers in polar regions to reduce environmental and financial costs, operating with zero-emission approaches. remote examples as the city of kotzebue in alaska (caddet 2001), or the research centres of summit station in greenland (dahl 2010), and princess elisabeth station in antarctica (polar power 2011), have the realistic potential to develop useful applications in places like longyearbyen, where issues of the same kind are required to be solved on a larger scale. other concerns, though, in addition to technical and logistic ones, might also prevent investors from running smoothly a wind project at svalbard. wind turbines, for instance, have a very short service life, generally between 4 to 10 years (dahl 2004a:7), require continuous maintenance and are not exempt from bringing environmental and social threats. will the investment be able to pay-off in the long run? will local people refer to the visual changes in landscape as “fascinating symbols of progress” consilience buonsanti: renewable energy in svalbard (seifried and witzel 2010:100, emphasis added), or will they think in terms of environmental degradation and noise pollution (lorinc 2011)? and again: could a wind park be dangerous for local wildlife, in particular for rare, migrating species of birds directed to the protected sanctuaries in the north of the archipelago (pimentel 2008:5)? the impression is that we will not be able to produce any detailed and rigorous scenario on the implementation of wind turbines in longyearbyen, until we provide reliable answers to all these questions. for that to happen, though, it is essential to sustain scientific research, develop small-scale examples and make them available to larger communities as longyearbyen. 5.2. pv: a ready-made solution. since the issues connected with the exploitation of wind power on svalbard still need time to be overcome, the direction of our attentions to other renewable resources like sun, capable of stemming ghg emissions right from the beginning, is fundamental. although solar energy in longyearbyen, in terms of significant power output, is available only for four-five months a year (from april to august), the almost nonexistent cloud coverage, scarce level of precipitations (nmi 2011), low temperatures (nsidc 2011), and land availability, make me think that the archipelago is a perfect place for the implementation of mono-crystalline pv panels. the efficiency of this kind of solar cells, proved around 14-17% in polar applications (dahl 2004b:2, seifried and witzel 2010:52), is the highest on the market. it means that on a cloudless summer day, when at solar noon about 1,000 w/m2 hit pv panels placed perpendicular to the sun (dahl 2004b:11), the output converted into electrical power will be of 140-170 w/m2. the promotion of energy generated from pv is already a feasible project in longyearbyen. unlike wind turbines, in fact, this silent, durable and fully recyclable technology (seifried and witzel 2010:54), does not require storage, transportation, special maintenance or additional research to be installed at polar latitudes. a pv project might be carried out either in a big plant outside the settlement or, alternatively, on the roofs of houses and offices in town. despite the benefits related to the higher power output, the first option, as for the design of a wind park, could end up looking like an „environmental monster‟ for someone. the visual impact, yet, might not be the only shortcoming. the very “low energy density” (2010:26) of solar panels, together with the limited access to solar resource, would constrain to maximise the production in the 127 days of perpetual daylight (nmi 2011). in order to do that, the requirement of an automated tracking system, capable of orienting the panels always perpendicularly to the sun, could be a demanding technology to build in such a windy location (dahl 2004b:11, nsidc 2011). much easier and free of drawbacks, instead, would be the installation of pv on the roofs of the houses. in such a scenario, strongly dependent on the willingness of the inhabitants to accept the new technology, households provided with gridconnected panels would take full economic advantage of their own „microproduction‟. 202 consilience if all 816 households in longyearbyen (ssb 2005c:54) accepted it on their roofs, a drastic reduction in consumption of coal-based electricity and a drop of local ghg emissions is likely to be expected in summer. the quality of pv projects in polar environments has already been tested. summit station in greenland (dahl 2010), and most of the research stations in antarctica, for example, use photovoltaic panels as a complementary source of wind turbines to enhance reliability in less windy or dark periods. together, these renewable technologies feed common battery banks in so called “hybrid systems” (dahl 2004a:3, emphasis in the original). 6. conclusion demonstrating that the local extraction, transportation, shipping and burning of coal are responsible of worsening the ongoing effects of global climate change on svalbard (holm et al. 2003, klif 2009, npi 2011), in this paper i have argued the urgent need to closedown such activities to respect the amenity of svalbard‟s environment. a decision like that, though, is very likely to cause the loss of a considerable number of jobs, hence the depopulation of longyearbyen and the consequent political risk for norway to lose sovereignty of the archipelago. to get around these threats and incentive an alternative option to the coal-based power plant, i have proposed large investments into the field of renewable energy. my exploratory report has highlighted big untapped resources of wind and sun on svalbard, reciprocal assets that, if implemented in a hybrid, grid-connected windpv system, might have the potential to free the town from its energy dependence on a polluting and finite fossil reserve11. at the moment, pv is the only practicable renewable technology on svalbard, although only for a few months a year. even if alone it will hardly reach the same potential of wind to meet longyearbyen‟s energy demand, it can still play an important role in terms of immediate reduction of local ghg emissions. thus, i argue the need to prioritise its diffusion as soon as possible. of course, a new climate strategy, more focused on investments in research and development of small-scale renewable solutions, would be required to complete the process. such a policy should support the local community of longyearbyen in particular, whose involvement and conviction in the overall project could prove essential to its final success (adams and hulme 2001, wbgu 2010). according to torvanger et al. (2004:13), if achieved, “early actions” have the power to bring relevant environmental, political and economic effects. considering the environmental impact first, a reduction of local ghg emissions may slow down svalbard‟s ecological degradation, buying precious “time for humans and other species to adapt to climate change” (ibid.). political measures (i.e. economic incentives to households who provide their roofs with pv panels), in addition to implement a more coherent norwegian climate policy, might bring the loss of the world record of co2 per-capita emission, which 11 with the current extraction even at 2.5 million tons/yr, coal reserves will allow operations for only 25 more years (klif 2009:39). consilience buonsanti: renewable energy in svalbard cannot be considered a good image for a country that sees itself as a leader in the fight against global warming (hovden and lindseth 2002). lastly, the whole local economy may take advantage of a huge renewable project. lower bills for households, new job opportunities, new markets for industrial sectors, an impulse to research, innovation and technology and huge savings in energy consumption12 would be just some of the possible positive effects. if we agree not to compromise even more of svalbard‟s environmental ability “to meet present and future needs” (wced 1987:43), there is no other way than to bring green energy to longyearbyen and to make it a reality. keeping alive the local tradition connected with coal seems neither environmentally, nor economically sustainable. how paradoxical, though, that making the political decision to break such a „black tradition‟, appears today harder than to overcome scientific obstacles to the implementation of a wind park. but, after all, this is only one of the many contradictions peculiar to the norwegian climate policy. 12 the norwegian mines are currently consuming 7 out of 68 gwh of electricity produced (ssb 2005b:158). 204 consilience appendix figure 1: topographical map of longyearbyen (npi 2000). consilience buonsanti: renewable energy in svalbard bibliography adams, w., hulme, d. 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(2000): “environmental degradation and sustainability” in t. allen, a. thomas (eds.): poverty and development into the 21st century. oxford: oxford university press. wwf (2001): “norway to dump coal from arctic wilderness into eu”. [online].url: http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/search_wwf_news/?2433/norwayto-dump-coal-from-arctic-wilderness-into-eu (08.03.2011 15.54). http://www.ssb.no/sts_en/tab-2010-09-01-01-en.html http://www.ssb.no/sts_en/tab-2010-09-01-01-en.html http://img9.custompublish.com/getfile.php/1089165.1589.epxbtbdadr/ar2004.pdf?return=www.snsk.no http://img9.custompublish.com/getfile.php/1089165.1589.epxbtbdadr/ar2004.pdf?return=www.snsk.no http://www.cicero.uio.no/media/2776.pdf http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/en.atm.co2e.pc http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/search_wwf_news/?2433/norway-to-dump-coal-from-arctic-wilderness-into-eu http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/search_wwf_news/?2433/norway-to-dump-coal-from-arctic-wilderness-into-eu consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 7, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 155–166 looking at a new strategy to save the sacramento-san joaquin delta julia fredenburg school of international and public affairs columbia university, new york julia.fredenburg@gmail.com robert fredenburg bob.fredenburg@sbcglobal.net abstract water supply, flood control, and environmental management are fundamental challenges for the western united states. california’s unique development patterns, with nearly 20 million of its residents living in water starved southern california, has resulted in a system of water transfers and aqueduct systems that rely on water being pumped, collected and transferred from northern california through an extensive and damaging pumping and aqueduct system. the sacramento – san joaquin delta (the delta) is the heart of california’s water source and the center of the transfer system. the delta is an 837,594 acres area where the sacramento and san joaquin river join before entering the san francisco bay and then the pacific ocean. water is pumped from the delta through a system of aqueducts to agricultural users in the san joaquin valley and urban centers of the san francisco bay, los angeles and other communities throughout southern california. unsustainable pumping of vast amounts of water yearly from the delta has caused the collapse of several fish populations and has forced a rethinking of the federal and state water policies. united states federal and state river and water policies for the past 150 years have relied on maximizing conversions of wetlands for agricultural uses while placing a high priority on flood control on major rivers like the mississippi, missouri and sacramento. as we move well into the 21st century the historic water policies of flood control and water exports have left the delta facing an imminent collapse that threatens the massive california water transfers and the delta fisheries if immediate action is not taken. the effect of the collapse is potentially the loss of water to the 20 million california residences and the agricultural economy of the california san joaquin valley. fortunately, the delta provides a new laboratory for water policies and improved habitat and water quality while addressing the need for flood control. images of the delta will help to illustrate the multiplicity of interests that form the heart of the debate over california’s water future. author’s note julia fredenburg is a student in the masters program in public administration at columbia university’s school of international and public affairs. previously, she worked for the city council of kansas city, missouri and worked as a photojournalist throughout rural missouri. she received a b.a. in mathematics and fine arts from the university of california, santa cruz in 2008. robert fredenburg is a consultant to the california state assembly committee on environmental safety and toxic materials. he has worked for more than thirty years for the california state assembly to improve the state of california's environment. keywords: sacramento – san joaquin river delta, flood control, sustainable water management; california; yolo bypass, salmon; delta smelt. 156 consilience 1. exploring the sacramento – san joaquin delta system the sacramento – san joaquin delta is the heart of california’s water source, an 837,594-acre area where the sacramento and san joaquin rivers join before entering the san francisco bay and then the pacific ocean at the golden gate bridge. it is a region where two of california's largest rivers meet to create a vast mazelike system of islands, marshes, and small farming communities. freshwater from the rivers combine with saltwater from the pacific ocean, creating the west coast’s largest estuary. composed of 57-leveed island tracts and 700 miles of sloughs and winding channels, the delta is an impressive and intricate water system. photographs, clockwise from top left: crawdad, sacramento – san joaquin delta waterway, fishing in delta, tule grass. consilience fredenburg: san joaquin delta california department of water resources, map of sacramento – san joaquin delta waterway 158 consilience 2. development of the delta the development of today’s delta was shaped in the late 1850’s when the federal swamp and overflow land act gave the state of california ownership of all swamp and overflow land, including delta marshes. the public support for land reclamation encouraged the drying of wetlands for agricultural purposes. when flood control efforts later relied on channelized flood control systems, the structure of the delta was set. later initiatives to deliver water to the drier southern california from the delta, worked further to alter the structure of the waterway. photographs, clockwise from top left: sacramento – san joaquin delta waterway, historic ryde hotel in the delta, concrete scale model of delta, antioch bridge over delta. consilience fredenburg: san joaquin delta 3. water’s journey the demand for water from the southern reaches of the state has left the delta with a system that relies on pumped, collected, and transferred water through an extensive and damaging transfer system. water is pumped and delivered through a series of channels from the delta to agricultural users in the san joaquin valley and cities in the san francisco bay area and southern california. the risk to long-term sustainability for the delta is tied to the likely failure of the complex physical infrastructure with land subsidence, sea level rise, and credible earthquake effects. beyond infrastructure risk, the effects of increased water pumping have left the salmon, delta smelt, and sacramento splittail in precipitous declines. without new policies and corrective actions, the water pumping will stop and nearly 6 million acre-feet of water per year to urban and agricultural users will end. photograph: antioch bridge and pier in big break inlet, delta 160 consilience 4. water pumping the delta is the major collection point for water that serves more than 25 million people, two-thirds of california's population. during an average rainfall year, 6.3 million acre-feet of water is exported from the delta. this export of water represents an ever-increasing diversion of water from the historic river flows to residential, industrial and agricultural uses. due to water exports from the delta, outflows to the ocean have decreased from 81% to 48% of total delta flows since 1930. photograph: agricultural canal, williams, ca consilience fredenburg: san joaquin delta 5. delta resources and fish populations the reduction in water flowing from the delta to the ocean causes many problems for current fish populations. the pumping of an estimated 6 million acre feet of water yearly from the delta has been linked to the collapse of the fish populations with the near complete loss of delta smelt. additionally, alterations to annual salmon migrations have forced a rethinking of the federal and state water policies. sustainable practices will require state and federal water managers to no longer rely on heavily engineered levee systems for flood control and maximizing the flow of water destined for pumping facilities. photographs, clockwise from top left: agricultural canal in grimes ca, new housing development near yolo bypass, agricultural area in delta, water pollution in delta. 162 consilience 6. damaging results the natural operation of the delta is in jeopardy of collapse as a result of the state's increasing population, demand for water, changing environmental conditions, and historic use patterns. water pumping causes many problems throughout the delta, but is not the only source of concern. housing demands propel the use of inflexible solutions, like levees, to create more developable land. property that was once flood-prone has been made profitable through waterway engineering which channels water in order to reduce the threat of floods. rigid water channels are not the singular tool being implemented in the delta. through the yolo bypass, we can see a more sustainable solution to flood management. photograph: new housing in delta, raised in the case of flooding consilience fredenburg: san joaquin delta 7. positive management: yolo bypass fortunately, the yolo bypass, one of the seasonal floodplains in california, offers an example of sustainable management and flood control within the delta. the unique systems of weirs and bypasses allow the american and sacramento rivers to flow into 59,000 acres of low lying agricultural land when there is danger of flooding. this encourages responsible flood control that allows for natural migrations of fish species. the bypass provides a unique habitat to native fish species, agricultural production and flood protection to the city of sacramento. increased flows provide critical habitat to native fish species, in particular chinook salmon and sacramento splittail. this longstanding flood control measure has been linked to restoring delta fisheries and reducing damage done by increased water diversions. photographs, clockwise from top left: agricultural canal in yolo bypass, field in yolo bypass, agricultural canal in yolo bypass, dry field in yolo bypass. 164 consilience the yolo bypass has received increasing attention as a potential solution to fishery failures in the delta. appropriately managed floodplains provide multiple benefits to society in a synergistic way. more flooding of the yolo bypass increases benefits to native fish species, in particular juvenile chinook salmon that use the floodplain as a nursery habitat. the yolo bypass is a successful example of a flood risk management strategy that achieves multiple benefits for the delta. there are opportunities to expand this type of scenario and increase the benefits to provide a more sustainable delta system. photographs, clockwise from top left: sacramento weir, yolo bypass, water storage, sacramento river. consilience fredenburg: san joaquin delta 8. california and the delta’s future the future of the delta and all of california, will be linked to its water supply. emerging environmental science is fundamental to a future water system that protects and improves the delta. a new delta system will need to recognize the multiple uses and users of the delta. urban areas in northern and southern california, west coast iconic salmons, in-delta agriculture and tourism activities are all being placed in jeopardy by historic practices and policies. finding new habitat, restoring past damaged wetlands and allowing rivers more room to spread in response to flooding are all new management tools that hold promise for the delta. photograph: sacramento river 166 consilience bibliography all photographs by julia fredenburg, 2006-2011 american rivers. (2010). putting green to work: economic recovery investments for clean and reliable water. retrieved from http://www.americanrivers.org/library/reports-publications/putting-green-to-workreport.html american rivers. (2011). flood bypasses in california. retrieved from http://www.americanrivers.org/ourwork/restoring-rivers/floods-floodplains/flood-bypasses-in-california.html california department of water resources. (2011). map of sacramento san joaquin delta waterway. division of flood managment. (2010). fact sheet sacramento river flood control project, weirs and flood relief structures: california department of water resources. opperman, j. j., galloway, g. e., fargione, j., mount, j. f., richter, b. d., & secchi, s. (2009). sustainable floodplains through large-scale reconnection to rivers. science. the governor's delta vision blue ribbon task force. (2008). our vision for the california delta. sacramento, ca: california resources agency. http://www.americanrivers.org/library/reports-publications/putting-green-to-work-report.html http://www.americanrivers.org/library/reports-publications/putting-green-to-work-report.html http://www.americanrivers.org/our-work/restoring-rivers/floods-floodplains/flood-bypasses-in-california.html http://www.americanrivers.org/our-work/restoring-rivers/floods-floodplains/flood-bypasses-in-california.html countertopographies of agriculture consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 8, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 101-114 countertopographies of agriculture gender, food production, and development in a globalizing world emma gaalaas mullaney department of geography pennsylvania state university, university park egm133@psu.edu abstract this paper examines the potential of geographic analysis to empower rural women through development policy. women have remained at the margins of agricultural policy in spite of decades of research documenting their importance in maintaining food security and crop diversity, and continued national and international efforts at gender mainstreaming. existing approaches to gender analysis are inadequate in dealing with global social and institutional structures that gender mainstreaming seeks to transform. a ‘contertopgraphic’ methodology, developed by geographers to trace structural similarities between different places is used to analyze the dynamic connections between gender, food production, and development. through the juxtaposition of rural women’s experiences in four distinct agricultural settings, this paper demonstrates how inequality and inequity in different locales are the result of broad-scale political and economic change. a geographic framework may be more suitable to recognize and address the disempowerment of rural women in a globalizing world. . keywords: agriculture, gender, countertopographies 1. introduction decades of interdisciplinary research has built a strong scientific consensus regarding the importance of small-scale agricultural work as a source of empowerment for women in rural communities around the world. in many countries, women are the primary producers of food for local consumption in rural communities (fao 2010). they are key stewards of agro-biodiversity, know placespecific crops and skills necessary for sustainable food production, and are essential to local food security (fao 2005). however, the value of rural women’s work usually goes unrecognized in economic policy, and economic restructuring often functions to undermine women’s agricultural practices along with the communal social and ecological benefits they generate (howard 2003). globalization and trade liberalization have caused the expansion of international food markets and the widespread adoption of crops and cultivation techniques that caters to them. these shifts favor large-scale agricultural producers who have more resources, access, education, and capacity to compete in global markets, meanwhile excluding poor and small-scale producers such as women (world bank 2009). 102 consilience development policies of the 1970s and 1980s sought to address women’s subordination across the world by incorporating women into existing strategies and programs. in agriculture, such interventions often focused on training women in various techniques and giving them access to the latest technology. by the 1990s, international organizations and women’s organizations argued that little had been done to enhance women’s equality or empowerment for two decades, and that rural women in particular were becoming increasingly vulnerable as governments in many countries retreated from rural development (sachs and alston 2010). as stated in one government reference manual, “the feminization of agriculture has been a trend which, unfortunately, has grown hand in hand with the feminization of poverty” (commonwealth secretariat 2001). following the 1995 world conference on women, gender mainstreaming became the policy strategy of the future: rather than focusing on women’s participation and perceived challenges, gender mainstreaming aimed to transform social and institutional structures in order to make them responsive to gender and beneficial to those who are less empowered (unep 2006; sachs and alston 2010). yet, this approach too has stagnated in recent years. to date, many efforts to “mainstream gender” have been limited to technical interventions that fail to challenge inequitable power structures. gender disparities remain among the deepest and most pervasive of inequalities (undp 2005; unep 2006). such concerns are summarized in a policy document from the international food policy research institute, which critically assesses a decade of development interventions and policies designed to increase poor female farmer’s access to and control over productive resources. the review concludes that, in order to have anything more than a superficial impact on gender inequality, future interventions must rigorously consider the “context specificity” of gender relations (quisumbing and panfolfelli 2009). this paper argues that bringing an explicitly geographic methodology to research on gender and agriculture may provide precisely the kind of rigorous approach to gender analysis that researchers have been calling for. geography has regularly been described as a “science of context,” an analytic approach that seeks to explain how places and spatial patterns are produced by relationships between humans and their environments at multiple, interactive scales (knox and marston 2010). indeed, due to their central focus on relationships and processes, geographers were among the first to call attention to the important role that women play in traditional agricultural systems (sauer 1952), and among the most consistent to warn of the harmful social and ecological consequences of gender-blind development policies (rocheleau et al., 1996; zimmerer, 1996; momsen, 2004; chambers and momsen 2007). this paper explores how geography, as a scientific method designed for the analysis of complex systems, might serve as an enabling framework for the design of effective gender mainstreaming interventions. more specifically, this paper applies a research method known as “countertopography” designed by geographer cindi katz (2004) as a means for examining the connections produced by a common historical process between disparate places. a topography is a map that illustrates the contours of landscape showing its shape and variance. a countertopography likewise traces such contours, but seeks to do so in counterintuitive ways. seemingly unrelated places and livelihood struggles are brought together analytically in order to illustrate the contours of a social landscape rather than a physical one, in the process revealing consilience mullaney: countertopographies of agriculture the impact of a globalized agriculture system on human lives. the goal of this approach is to show unexpected dimensions of places we thought we knew, draw connections to places we think of as distant, and look for new alternatives to entrenched inequalities. development scholars and practitioners have long argued that gender inequalities will persist if we think of such injustices as a third world woman’s problem and fail to consider how we (and our development projects) all contribute to the creation of unequal power structures (cf. rocheleau et al., 1996; sach and alston 2010). countertopography was designed as part of an effort to produce new “geographical imagination[s]” that “could work across and against distinctions of ‘us’ and ‘them’” (katz, 2011: 58). this paper thus seeks to imagine what gender mainstreaming might look like as a first step toward transformational change. at stake in the countertopography presented here is the process of agricultural globalization, and its impact on the empowerment of rural women around the world. the paper therefore proceeds through four case studies of distinct populations of rural women whose livelihoods depend on their agricultural labor and investigates how globalization has restructured this labor and how the women have adapted to or resisted such restructuring. the first case study is of women in villages in western sudan who struggle to maintain household subsistence in the wake of national structural adjustment programs. the second is of indigenous kurichya women in kerala, india, whose traditional rice paddy cultivation is being rapidly replaced by commercial banana plantations. the third focuses on women who migrate from their rural villages in nicaragua to the costa rican countryside, and devote their agrarian skills to work in export-oriented yucca and pineapple processing plants. the fourth case study is of mexican migrant women in los angeles, california, who established one of the largest urban farms in the united states using the traditional crops and techniques they brought from home. the range of case studies presented is intended to slightly destabilize our conventional understandings of who a “rural woman” is and what kind of work she does, in the hopes that such a move might open up new ways of appreciating and supporting her efforts. together, these four case studies highlight how mobile and dynamic the target populations of a given development effort can be. rural women – understood here as women whose livelihoods depend on the skills of a rural life – may be found working on farms in the sudanese or indian countryside but may also be working inside a factory located in rural costa rica, or even on a farm in the middle of a metropolis, thousands of miles from the small villages where they were raised. a final section reflects on all four situations together, revealing possibly surprising connections between gender, food production, and development in these different parts of the world. following katz (2004), this is not strictly a comparative method, but rather an analytical one that focuses on drawing out the structural similarities in rural women’s lives in each of the four case studies. the countertopographic approach used here allows us to reinterpret the processes that produce unequal power relationships and to better understand the kinds of displacements that rural women can suffer in the course of broad-scale political economic change. countertopography has proven a particularly valuable analytic tool in geographers’ recent engagements with gender (see wright 2009) and has great 104 consilience potential to advance innovative efforts to change persistence patterns of gender inequality. 2. western sudan as environmental degradation and civil conflict threaten local livelihoods in the predominantly-rural western region of sudan, women have become responsible for an increasing share of household food security. since the international monetary fund (imf) instituted sudan’s first structural adjustment policy (sap) in 1978, which emphasized export-oriented agriculture, many men have left their small-scale agricultural and pastoral work in their home villages and migrated to seek work in urban areas or as wage laborers on large, mechanized farms (katz 2004). the rate of male out-migration from rural areas has increased dramatically in recent years, and female-headed households now constitute a majority in many rural areas. with village men gone, and sending very little if anything in the way of remittances, women find themselves suddenly in charge of all aspects of farming and household work (ibnouf 2011). traditionally, western sudanese men have been in charge of crop selection, planting the fields, and grazing the livestock. this left some of the most arduous and time-consuming tasks, such as weeding, harvesting, post-harvest processing, water collection, and food preparation, to women (katz 2004). however, with so many men migrating either permanently or seasonally, women find themselves responsible for every aspect of agriculture and animal husbandry in addition to household duties and raising the family’s children. recent studies show that, when both male and female adults of a household are living in their village, women tend to work far longer: an average of 11-12 hours each day, compared to 7-8 hours for men (ibnouf 2011). rural development projects that have cycled through the region, typically promoting the cultivation of irrigated cash crops such as cotton and oilseeds, enroll the labor of men, leaving women to fill in the gaps left in activities for household consumption. as staple subsistence crops such as sorghum and millet are replaced by inedible cash crops, households rely to an increasing extent on home gardens, which are tended exclusively by women and feature a variety of crops such as okra (hibiscus esculentus), cucumber (cucumis sativa), arugula (eruca sativa) and beans (lupinus termis), (ibnouf 2011). additional calories and diverse nutrients are provided through the collection of wild plants by women and children (katz 2004). these daily livelihood activities take place in a landscape that has been transformed and, in many ways, degraded, by agricultural development (abdelgalil and cohen 2001). the expansion of cash-crop cultivation reduces the areas available for grazing or forestry and requires, among other things, the use of chemical inputs. in the rural villages where development projects are sited, women and children frequently work weeding in the fields and are routinely exposed to pesticides, which are sprayed without warning. they also often come into direct contact with herbicides, which are regularly sprayed on the “weeds” that they pick as greens for family meals. the highly water-consumptive techniques of statesponsored irrigated agriculture and the devegetation involved in clearing large fields for commercial cultivation have exacerbated the vulnerability of rural villages during periods of low rainfall or drought. (katz 2004). consilience mullaney: countertopographies of agriculture agricultural development projects tend to undermine the stability of rural livelihoods even when they are deemed a success because rain-fed subsistence is replaced by irrigated commercial agriculture. (ayoub 1999; magdoff and tokar 2010). as globalization restructures local economies in western sudan, only the most privileged – in this case, young men – are mobile enough to chase the (often unrealized) promises of opportunity in urban areas, leaving women to come up with creative and innovative means of survival under increasingly harsh conditions. those who remain in rural villages support their families by continuing the traditional livelihood practices that have sustained their community for generations – rain-fed agriculture, animal husbandry, and forestry – but over a vastly expanded terrain. in one sudanese village studied such activities took place within a 5-kilometer radius of the village before the introduction of an irrigated agricultural project. ten years later, animals were grazed more than 100 kilometers from the village, charcoal was collected over 200 kilometers away, and agricultural laborers routinely travelled over 50 kilometers to work. in other words, this village had to draw on an area 1,600 times larger just to stay in place (katz 2004). within a given rural community, the restructuring of gender relations brought about by development projects offers women some opportunities for raising their social and economic status as they fill roles left vacant by male out-migration. however, these opportunities expose women to a great deal of risk in terms of livelihood, and add tremendously to the work they must complete each day. women’s labor continues to go unacknowledged in sudan’s economic analyses, and remains unrecognized in national development policies (ibnouf 2011). 3. kerala, india the expansion of cash crop cultivation has been transforming southern india in ways as dramatic as the restructuring taking place in western sudan, though with important distinctions. southern india is a global hotspot of biodiversity and is home to one of the highest concentrations of indigenous peoples in the world, many of whom derive their subsistence directly from the natural resources of their local environment (kulirani 1996). the district of wayanad in the state of kerala is home to many autonomous tribal communities, including the kurichya peoples, who have long sustained rich local agrobiodiversity through the cultivation of landrace (genetically-heterogeneous, locally-adapted) varieties of rice. through established seed exchange networks and the cultivation of landraces for subsistence use, the kurichyas have actively maintained the cultural, medicinal, dietetic, and ecological value of different rice varieties (pramod et al 2003). this agrobiodiversity is also closely linked to women’s status and power within tribal communities. not only do women perform the majority of cultivation activities, they also wield primary influence within the tribal institutions that govern landholdings under paddy cultivation. though matrilineal traditions of property were officially abolished in the state of kerala in the 1930s, the kurichyas continue to employ informal rules of inheritance along the female line as means of organizing communal landholdings (padmanabhan 2011). women play a central role in managing paddy cultivation, which provides extended family networks with important sources of protein such as 106 consilience crab and fish that live in the rice paddies, in addition to diverse varieties of the staple crop itself (padmanabhan 2011). however, this system of land management and rice paddy cultivation itself is currently threatened by the expansion and intensification of cash crop cultivation. in recent decades, the land under paddy cultivation in wayanad has decreased severely, from a peak of 40,000 ha to 21,770 ha in 1990, to fewer than 9,000 ha in 2000 (vishnudas 2006; narayan et al. 2004). this land has been primarily converted to commercial banana production, a lucrative cash crop in the region, and the shift has come at the direct expense of the local environment and women’s empowerment. commercial banana cultivation in kerala involves intensive application of the pesticide carbofuran, one of the most highly acute toxins currently in use as an insecticide. carbofuran is highly toxic to wildlife, and a dose of the chemical as small as a quarter teaspoon (1ml) has been shown to be fatal to humans. there have been multiple widely-publicized incidents of harmful exposure to the pesticide in wayanad, including the 2003 hospitalization of 24 children due to respiratory problems while attending school downwind from a banana farm during a chemical spraying and the 2006 death of a child after eating a pesticide-laden banana (vishnudas 2006). intensive cash cropping has taken a toll on the wayanad environment in other ways as well; in addition to reducing local biodiversity through monocropping and pesticide use, banana cultivation is undermining the landscape’s water storage capacity. without the deep-seated underground pore spaces formed by rice root systems, soils are prone to compacting, rendering them unable to absorb water. the reduction in paddy cultivation area has led to a dramatic drop in groundwater levels in wayanad and is blamed for recent drought conditions in the region (padmanabhan 2011). the conversion of rice paddies to banana plantations brings clear consequences to all who live and subsist in wayanad, but the toll exacted on women is particularly violent. cash crop cultivation imposes pressure on tribal communities to privatize their communal landholdings in order to gain access to the credit needed for expensive agricultural inputs. the gender division of labor also shifts during this conversion: though women play a central role in paddy cultivation, they are not involved in commercial banana cultivation, which is deemed socially to be a man’s domain (padmanabhan 2011). thus, when rice paddies are converted to banana plantations, kurichya women suddenly lose their work, their access to and control over land, and their means of subsistence and household food provision. as a result, their agricultural knowledge of traditional techniques and diverse rice varieties becomes obsolete. in kerala, women’s loss of status and power within their community is a direct consequence of agricultural modernization and shrinking agrobiodiversity . 4. nicaraguan migrant women in costa rica the experiences of rural women in western sudan and southern india illustrate how difficult it can be to maintain an agricultural livelihood on the margins of a booming agricultural industry. this third section turns to the experiences of women who migrate from rural communities across nicaragua in order to work in the produce processing and packing plants of pital, costa rica. it examines what this consilience mullaney: countertopographies of agriculture shift, from subsistence cultivation to working in export-oriented agricultural production, means for these women’s livelihoods and empowerment. the tropical countryside of pital, costa rica, is ideal for agriculture, with yearlong rains and deep, well-drained soils. since the early 1980s, when structural adjustment programs (saps) shifted the country’s agricultural production from crops for domestic consumption (primarily maize and beans) to those for export, this rural landscape has been dominated by two crops: pineapple (ananas comosus) and yucca (manihot esculnenta) (fernández 2004). this export economy has created an increased labor demand for both crop production and postharvest processing, demands which have been met by immigrants, in this case from nicaragua. nicaraguans, fleeing political and economic instability in their country and drawn by the promise of employment in costa rica, migrated by the hundreds of thousands. between 1984, the beginning of saps in costa rica and the height of nicaragua’s civil war, and 2000, the documented nicaraguan population in costa rica had grown nearly fivefold (castro valverde 2002). nicaraguan labor, both documented and undocumented, currently dominates nearly all agricultural export production in costa rica (lee 2010). despite the great demand for cheap labor in costa rica’s expanding agricultural industry, there are few available legal means for obtaining work visas. surveys of migrants and their families reveal that an overwhelming majority of nicaraguan migrants from rural areas enter costa rica without documentation (lee 2010). the vulnerability of these workers is intensified by industry regulation and export standards that segment labor according to documentation status and gender. costa rican pineapples, destined for european supermarkets, are required to comply with united nations guidelines for farm management practices. this standard, known as globalgap (formerly eurepgap), has requirements for the protection and welfare of agricultural workers. in contrast, costa rica’s yucca is largely purchased by buyers in the united states and therefore subject to far less stringent requirements that set no standards at all for production methods or labor practices (veerabadren 2005). these differentiated export standards have a direct impact on labor conditions and work, especially limiting opportunities for women seeking employment in this rural area. men, even undocumented migrants, occupy a privileged position in costa rica’s agricultural workforce. they have the option to work in either the fields or the processing and packaging factories, and this flexibility gives them enough leverage to demand an hourly wage and a guaranteed eight-hour workday. women, on the other hand, work exclusively in the factories and are paid per crate of produce that they prepare and package. they work long and unpredictable hours, beginning their day at 7:00am and ending whenever there are no more crates to pack. they have no holidays and must leave their children in the care of others, often separating from them for months at a time. a stark hierarchy exists between women – who sit on the plant floors, cleaning, scrubbing, and pruning produce – and men, who have the authority to reprimand women and to determine whether a given woman will be paid in full for her finished crates. men are also responsible for bringing crates of unprocessed produce to the women, thus controlling women’s access to the pieces for which they are paid and further exacerbating gendered power differences. in addition, female migrant workers are divided amongst themselves, between the documented, clean, higher-wage, stably employed workers processing pineapples, 108 consilience and the undocumented, dirty, lower-wage, precariously employed root crop scrubbers (lee 2010). in both the pineapple and yucca industries, nicaraguan women workers bring skills and knowledge from their previous (and sometimes simultaneous) involvement in subsistence and small-scale production, and yet the skilled nature of their labor earns them less in wages than the unskilled work of men in the same factories (sachs and alston 2010). these women, without whose labor costa rica’s export agriculture industry could not exist, left the poverty of their own country only to be impoverished in another country (lee 2010). economic liberalization in costa rica has been lauded as an overwhelming success; macroeconomic indicators such as per capita income, education levels, foreign direct investment, and infant mortality rates have improved significantly throughout the 1980s and 1990s (lee 2010). however, the hundreds of thousands of migrant workers in costa rica are not included in the country’s development statistics. the visible signs of development and progress rely on an invisible and highly-exploited female migrant labor force. the social divisions of citizenship and gender intersect and work in tandem to establish a hierarchy among agricultural workers, one which functions, in this case, at the direct expense of migrant women. not only do the efficient structures of industrialized agricultural production work to divorce migrant women from the value of their own labor, but they isolate this labor from broader social and ecological systems, thereby curtailing the rippling benefits to food security and biodiversity that such agricultural labor would otherwise accomplish. 5. mexican migrant women in los angeles, california this fourth and final case study examines rural women’s agricultural work in a different setting entirely: a 14-acre community garden known as the south central farm located in the industrial core of one of the world’s top global cities, los angeles, california. from 1994 until 2006, this urban farm, one of the largest in the united states, was cultivated and managed collectively by local community members, including families of mixtec, tojolobal, triqui, tzeltal, yaqui, and zapotec descent, most of whom had migrated from small rural villages in mexico. women were the primary cultivators in the south central farm; they managed the communal space, tended it daily, and produced plots of land that seemed like transplanted versions of the huertos familiares or home gardens they had left behind. through the same practices of seed saving and cultivation that, over thousands of years, turned mexico into a world center of agrobiodiversity, these farmers transformed an industrial urban lot into a vibrant site of in situ conservation of cultural and genetic wealth. of the estimated 150 species of row crops, trees, shrubs, cacti, vines, and herbaceous plants cultivated in the community garden, many seeds were brought directly from household gardens in mexico as families migrated to the united states (peña 2006). these mexican migrant women arrived in los angeles poor and facing stiff competition for the few low-paying jobs available. the south central farm became a resource base and source of empowerment for some 360 low-income families in the neighborhood. using agricultural skills and knowledge developed over generations, they grew nutritious produce in what would otherwise be a vast food desert, providing some of the stability of a rural land-based livelihood amidst a volatile consilience mullaney: countertopographies of agriculture urban economy. the community garden also provided a space in which to teach children the knowledge of how to grow edible and medicinal plants and how to use them, and to instill in them a pride in their native heritage (peña 2006). however, these 14 acres had long been a site of conflict between the local community and city developers. in 1986, well before the creation of the community garden, the city of los angeles acquired the land through eminent domain for the purpose of building a waste-to-energy incinerator known as the los angeles city energy recovery project (lancer). the project was ultimately abandoned after strong local opposition from what was, at that time, a low-income african american community led by activist juanita tate and the concerned citizens of south central. in 1994, two years after the violent unrest of the rodney king riots, city officials granted permit to the 14 acre site to the l.a. regional food bank for use as a community garden (chang 2006). the south central farm flourished for the next nine years, fueled by the activism and agricultural labor of a majority female force. it produced a lot of food and medicinal crops each year as the low-income neighborhood shifted demographically from predominantly african american to a principally mexican-origin population. then, in 2003, the city sold the land to a developer with plans to build a warehouse and distribution center on the site. the l.a. regional food bank promptly acquiesced and withdrew, but residents formed their own organization, the south central farmers feeding families, and mounted a public campaign to save the community garden. despite years of protests and over $16 million raised (more than three times the sale price) to buy back the land, the farm was bulldozed over in 2006. as of june 2011, no construction of the proposed warehouse had begun and the lot remained empty, guarded by a private security firm hired to keep community members from squatting on the land (south central farm 2011). the united states, in contrast to countries like sudan, india, nicaragua, or costa rica, is declared a “developed” country, presumed to serve as a model for those countries classified “developing” (cf. undp 2011). in terms of macroeconomic growth and investment infrastructure, the united states has indeed long been a member of an elite group of wealthy countries (though recent crises in financial systems have somewhat disrupted global country rankings in this regard). however, the unequal distribution of wealth and influence accumulated in the united states is increasingly has been felt throughout its population, and has been particularly acute in the second half of the 20th century (heathcote et al., 2009). in terms infant mortality rates and access to health care, the united states ranks below countries, such as cuba, that are considered “less developed” (knox and marston 2010). the unitied states’ problems with food insecurity has also caused persistent hardship among certain populations. a usda study found that 14.7% of households in the united states were food insecure at some point in 2009, and 5.7% had “very low food security” throughout the year; these are the highest recorded levels of food insecurity in the country since the first national food security survey was conducted in 1995 (nord et al., 2010). lack of available resources or technology is not an issue in the united states, and yet communities, like the residents of south central l.a., experience similar hardships to those in extremely resource-poor countries. the failed attempts to save the south central farm demonstrate that development often brings new insecurities to already vulnerable populations. 110 consilience women who arrived in los angeles with few resources other than some seeds and a wealth of agricultural knowledge found their efforts to grow food for their community to be in conflict with the city’s idea of progressive change. in this respect, their struggles have much in common with those of the low-income rural women discussed above. whether in sudan, india, costa rica, or the united states, gender relative to other forms of social difference – such as race, class, and citizenship –produce a fundamentally unequal social landscape. 6. the importance of geographic analysis a juxtaposition of these four case studies makes visible the myriad ways that large-scale processes like agricultural globalization ricochet through and between disparate places. the strength of a geographic approach is that the diversity of rural women’s experiences in different parts of the world are seen, not in isolation, but as intimately connected to one another. using countertopographic analysis exposes the simultaneous disruptions associated with globalizing agricultural production, giving us a view of the breadth of social and institutional structures that create dirty, dangerous, and disempowering working conditions. one message comes through powerfully in these four stories: the food that most people eat every day arrives through the labor of a highly gendered and marginalized workforce. this is true for rural households in sudan and india that rely on women’s small-scale agriculture for their subsistence. it is also true for the consumers in the u.s. and u.k. who purchase pineapples and yucca from costa rica, as seen with the families in south central l.a. who once lived off what women produced from their local urban farm, and now must travel miles outside of their neighborhood to the nearest grocery store to buy groceries imported from all over the world. from this perspective, we can see what one might call the flip-side of globalization. the hallmark of globalization is that money, information, commodities, and people are travelling across greater distances at ever faster rates. from a privileged position, far-away places and ideas become more accessible and the world seems to be shrinking through a process that geographer david harvey (1989) has termed “time-space compression.” however, for those from places like the small villages of sudan, india, nicaragua, and mexico –increasingly marooned by these processes – the world seems to be getting bigger all the time. geographer cindi katz uses the concept of “time-space expansion” to describe “the local fallout of time-space compression at a higher scale,” (2004); in a globalized world, those with the least privilege must expand their work terrain and stretch their livelihood activities over greater distances, or risk being left behind. we can see this effect clearly in western sudan, as rural women increasingly travel farther for water, forage a greater distance from home, and send male family members to cities and other countries to find work. in kerala, india, rural women who try to continue with the small-scale agriculture that they are skilled in and that has supported their families and environment for generations are subsequently marginalized by agricultural systems geared for global exporting. women who leave their villages in nicaragua to seek opportunity in costa rica’s booming agrarian economy find that this displacement did not ease the struggle to produce a viable world for them and their families. women from rural mexico sought to bring their agricultural livelihood with consilience mullaney: countertopographies of agriculture them when they moved to los angeles, only to find that such forms of subsistence are incompatible with the city’s definition of development. even the mere idea of a productive industrial space had more political and economic value than an already established intensely productive but non-commercial community farm. a geographical approach to understanding the role of agricultural work in rural women’s empowerment not only gives us insight into the myriad consequences of agricultural restructuring, but also helps elucidate how gender itself works. in addition to the cultural prejudices and forms of discrimination that function primarily on a local scale, gender inequality works on a global scale to constrain and further disempower those who are least privileged. these power relationships that disempower, for example, poor rural women, are, in this globalizing age, fundamentally fluid and highly mobile themselves. we can see infinite examples of how women’s efforts to improve their circumstances are subverted by economic systems that have so long depended on the subsidies of women’s uncompensated labor. for example, on the ground in costa rica, and elsewhere, regulations and standards designed to protect workers have, ironically resulted in a dual-tiered system of protected and unprotected workers divided by gender and by citizenship. gender mainstreaming cannot effectively work to correct the inequality of existing power relationships unless its approach to identifying problems and conceiving solutions is as fluid and mobile as the global processes which generate inequality. clearly we need a new approach to mainstreaming gender: decades of research document the critical importance of women’s work in maintaining crop biodiversity and providing food security, and yet women and gender remain on the margins of agricultural policy (sachs and alston 2010). geography in general, and countertopography in particular, have proven useful in lending visibility to unequal social and institutional structures that are often so common in our daily lives that we have trouble analyzing them. these methods also highlight how global patterns of gender inequality persist in spite of how hard women work each day to overcome them. even with these methods, the restructuring of unequal power relationships will be a big struggle demanding creative collaboration across all forms of social and geographic difference. however, 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wright, m. 2009. gender and geography: knowledge and activism across the intimately global. progress in human geography. 33(3):379-86. zimmerer k. 1996. changing fortunes: biodiversity and peasant livelihood in the peruvian andes. university of california press, berkeley. microsoft word 9 125-135 nilsson final formatted.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 10, iss. 1 (2013), pp. 125 – 135 gender and development: the challenge of mainstream patricia nilsson school of oriental and african studies, london, uk email: nilssonpatricia@gmail.com abstract mainstream institutions have only begun to address issues in gender and development since the 1970s, and it is time to evaluate how sustainable the progress in this field has been. in this essay, i briefly discuss three specific challenges facing gender advocates. first, i discuss the risks gender advocates take and the opportunities they miss when treating women as a homogenous group. second, i evaluate the difficulty of balancing transformative policy and integrationist policy. the former seeks to change entire systems but risks being seen as too radical to be adopted by international influential institutions. the latter allows gender awareness to become adapted by these same institutions (i.e. gender mainstreaming) but risks not truly bringing the transformation needed. in the final part of my essay, i argue the importance of halting the “sanctity of culture,” a phrase coined by feminist economist, naila kabeer (1999). i further this analysis by looking at an indian case in which an increased ratio of women is gaining education but see little increase in other factors of equality. author’s note patricia nilsson is pursuing a degree in economics and development studies at the school of oriental and african studies in london. keywords: gender and development, humanitarianism, education, feminism 1. introduction the fight for the equal treatment of women has been hindered by a veil of tradition and religion, which has stood in the way of criticism and rationalism. whether it is an australian woman’s fight against sexism in parliament (al jazeera, 2012), a pakistani girl’s protests for her rights to an education (new york times, 2012), or a polish girl’s battle to abort a pregnancy caused by rape (bbc, 2012), these women are all fighting against their society’s values, values that do not stem from the women themselves but affect them in every respect. in this essay, i focus on gender issues in developing countries where women are often overrepresented amongst the very poorest because of gender disadvantages (kabeer, 1999, p.35). in many 126 consilience cultures,1 women suffer from an imposed role of inferiority which, as kabeer (1999, p.15) summarizes, leads to “gender differentials in nutrition, food allocation, health status and health expenditure, education, mortality rates and life expectancy.” in most development movements, criticism is directed towards the mainstream status quo that hinders transformative policies (kabeer, 1999), and gender advocates are seen as having a trademark of relatively radical and transformative ideas. when it comes to development, the most prominent and influential multi-lateral institutions are the united nations and the world bank. as with any other organization of such immense size, the un and world bank suffer from bureaucratic problems that make it hard for minority movements to make their demands for transformative change heard. i will discuss the problems that gender advocates face when switching from transformative policy to integrationist policy as well as study how integrationist policy is needed to reach long-term transformative effects. i will also briefly cover the dangers of treating women as a homogenous group with equal interests, as in the popular myths of a global “sisterhood.” in the final part of my essay i will argue the importance of halting the “sanctity of culture,” an excellently descriptive phrase from kabeer’s work. (kabeer, 1999, p.7) 2. the dangers of treating women as a homogenous group the term “sisterhood” appears frequently in feminist discourse as a signifier of the unification of women for a common cause. (morgan, 1996; see kabeer, 1999, for related critique). this idea of global sisterhood is a fallacy for two reasons: it implies that women around the world have no conflicting interests to those of “womanhood,” and it ignores that women live in completely different contexts, political systems, moral structures and belong to different age cohorts, ethnicities, and income groups. in reality, women of some regions, societies, or classes often benefit from structures that discriminate against women living in different systems. for example, the poor working conditions of a middle aged bangladeshi woman may not be of concern to a british student indulging in cheap fashion. another example might be the first wife of an ivory coast household who might oppose the abolition of polygamy since additional wives often function as unpaid servants (boserup, 1970, ch. 2). in the words of kabeer, “women carry identities other than those of gender”(kabeer, 1999, p.30), 2). the idea of a global sisterhood would imply that there is an equivalent brotherhood two groups with clashing interests. for equality to ever occur, both sexes need to be supportive of it. the terms of sisterhood and brotherhood convey the idea of a power struggle between the sexes where men are seen as a homogenous group of “holders of privileges or perpetrators of violence” (stocking, 2004, p.vii). some feminists still want to argue that men really are and should be addressed as the barrier to equality, but such a debate creates damage 1 the word “culture” is an indefinable and imprecise word that i usually refrain from using. in this essay, however, it will appear when i reference different traditions and ways to structure society in unspecified regions. consilience nilsson: gender and development rather than progress for the gender awareness movement. the book gender equality and men: learning from practice, released by oxfam, offers examples of how important it is to include men in the work for female rights. therefore, the women’s movement is not exclusively addressing a “sisterhood,” but needs to reach all members of society, both women and men. 3. the risks attached to mainstreaming gender and development philosophy is essentially a critique of the mainstream approach to development. for development critics, the main problem is the unwillingness of major influential policy makers to change current structures of economy and power. even if the gender awareness advocates’ goals are transformative, their message must be comprehensible and implementable for policy makers in the current development structure, otherwise the message will not be heard (kabeer, 1999; standing, 2004; razavi, 1997; razavi and miller, 1995). an important example of this is the views of ester boserup in her 1970 text woman’s role in economic development, a work that led to a shift in the view on gender issues within the un, world bank, and other multilateral institutions (razavi, 1997, p.1113). boserup describes women as important in the both the economic and productive sphere; therefore, they are a significant factor in the process of economic growth that no country can afford to overlook (boserup, 1970). the way to influence policy-making is through speaking the instrumental language of policy makers. there are, however, risks with gender mainstreaming or alteration of gender theory to fit into mainstream policy. one risk is that institutional gender mainstreaming is not political, but merely terminological. an example talked about widely by feminists such as kabeer (1998), kandiyoti (1998), and standing (1991) regards the neo-classical view of the household. mainstream economists view the household as a “unit,” and the head of the household maximizes utility for every member of that household. however, several feminist economists have shown that relationships within households are more often depicted by power relations than by self-sacrifice (kabeer, 1999). kabeer’s argument means that even though an institution calls itself genderaware, it might still implement policies in ways that disable women from having participatory roles, hence preventing female economic and social empowerment. standing (2004) argues that “[theoretical feminist analysis] cannot just be advocacybased but require[s] a grounding in how institutions work, how to develop contextually-based strategies and create workable alliances in constrained environments.” standing raises a valid point on how it should be the feminist economists themselves who must be responsible for adapting their theories to the context of institutions (that is “mainstreaming” them) in order to minimize the risk of gender untrained bureaucrats deviating from the core values of gender theories. an excellent example of this is the world development journal, volume 23(11), that deals explicitly with gender economics. its introduction, written by feminist economists cagatay, elson, and grown, reads that “this issue grew out of the efforts of feminist economists to go beyond analyses of the gendered effects of adjustment and to demonstrate the relevance of gender as an analytical category in macroeconomics” (cagatay, elson, and grown, 1995). 128 consilience clearly, it is better for gender theory to have a role within policy making than to be disengaged and without influence due to rigidity, but gender advocates face problems with no straightforward answers as they enter the mainstream. as summarized by razavi, “… selective up-take of gender [theories] presents useful insights into the way development institutions work. it also hints at the political dilemmas facing feminist advocates: entering the mainstream entails making alliances and compromises, and modifying one’s agenda and language. some feminist critics have argued that […] what has been lost in the process of assimilation has been so central to the feminist agenda that there seems to be little reason to pursue the same strategies any further.” (razavi, 1997, p.1112) 4. the urgent need to put female rights above sanctity of culture so far, i have discussed challenges that feminist theorists face within their own field (the fallacy and dangers of the idea of women as a homogeneous group) and the challenges of influencing institutional implementation (the need for scientific and rigorous arguments for female empowerment and the risks associated with gender mainstreaming). the last part of this piece will focus on obstacles at the grassroots level, which include structural and traditional discrimination of women and sanctity of culture.2 gender discrimination often stems from biological differences between men and women (for example, women being physically weaker and women’s ability to childbirth) being distorted into constructed social differences (for example, women being mentally weaker and women’s innate desire and suitability to raise children) (kabeer, 1999). kabeer separates what she calls discrimination through “biological differences,” using what are perceived to be “facts“ about how the world is, from discrimination through sanctity of culture, using a set of values of how the world should be (kabeer, 1999, p. 4-12). i would not use that distinction since these “facts” arise to fit a certain set of values (for example, a woman’s place is in the home taking care of children and household, thus she will not need an education), and discrimination always derives from ideals of how the world should be. furthermore, socalled “factual” explanations (women do not want to vote, or, wearing a chador liberates women from staring men) are invented to suit these specific beliefs. the mistake of addressing women as a group with homogenous interests is again apparent since both women and men adopt values that are disadvantageous and discriminatory toward women. if a woman undeniably expresses a desire to be treated unequally to a man, then who is to tell her that she is wrong?3 indeed, not accepting her opinion would be quite the opposite of what female rights advocates try to enforce. but to leave the matter at that is a dangerous oversimplification of the 2 arguments based on values and not facts are harder to argue against. much discrimination against women (not allowing women the right to education or the right to sexual freedom) is protected by the concept of it in fact being “culture” and therefore legitimate. 3 see figure 2 consilience nilsson: gender and development context in which we live. it must become apparent how offensive to humanity it is to try to argue that a woman, who thinks that she is less worthy of an opinion than a man, thinks so because of biological reasons rather than of cultural ones. a question that is relevant when discussing which obstacles gender advocates face on a grassroots level is whether current development policies are improving the situation for women in developing countries. a seemingly evident way to encourage independence and critical thinking would be through education and participation in the public sphere. women have a higher rate of return to education than men (psacharapoulos and patrinos, 2004), and studies show that gender-based violence decreases with the education of women (see figure 1: dhs, 2005, as cited in simister, 2011). however, as figures 2, 3, and 4 show us, discriminatory gender roles appear not to be affected by higher education for women. indeed, it seems likely that a school operating in a gender discriminating society will not be an arena for the development of critical thinking, but instead be responsible for reinforcing gender roles. increased levels of education for women do not directly mean greater autonomy for women. in many cases, particularly where higher education is of poor quality, students do not expand on their abilities to critique and create opinions, but instead become more deeply indoctrinated within current societal structures. 130 consilience figure 1: gender-based violence by wife’s education (source: dhs 2005 (all indian states) as cited in simister, 2011 consilience nilsson: gender and development wife’s education (years) figure 2: attitude to obedience by wife’s education source: was 2002 & 2007 (all indian states) as cited in simister, 2011 wife’s education (years) figure 3: unpaid housework by wife’s education source: was 2002 & 2007 (all indian states) as cited in simister, 2011 132 consilience it is widely believed that low education is the most prevalent among both perpetrators and victims of domestic violence (world health organization, 2010, p.21). therefore, the data on decreasing domestic violence in figure 1 has more to do with the above-mentioned phenomena than with the empowerment of women. the data in figures 2, 3, and 4 clearly show that “education is necessary, but not sufficient, for development” (simister, 2011, p22). to overcome the sanctity of culture, gender advocates must defend the idea of social justice for all, with equal right to education, equal right under the law, and equal right to sexual freedom. additionally, to “not presume an undifferentiated public with identical needs and interests” (molyneux, 1998, p. 242), advocates should support feminist groups in developing regions and help them to engender local policy and encourage women to take a place in the public sphere. values, tradition, and therefore, culture are not and cannot be sacred. the malice of refusing women the right to be independent individuals cannot be protected behind the veil of values called culture. 5. conclusion there is a sense of frustration surrounding the concept of gender and development. the first multilateral institution to appoint a women in developmentadviser was the world bank in 1977 (two years after the first conference on women), and the concept of gender mainstreaming was first formally endorsed during the 1995 conference on women in beijing (world bank, 2010, p. 12). in other words, the inter-structural and bureaucratic gender awareness movement is wife’s education (years) figure 4: husband & wife’s earning by wife’s education source: was 2002 & 2007 (all indian states) as cited in simister, 2011 consilience nilsson: gender and development fairly young, and patience is required in anticipation of transformative results. however, nearly 20 years have gone by since the last conference on women. feminists are afraid that a new conference would detract from the progress made during the fourth conference on women. this unfortunate state is largely due to the global rise of religious fundamentalism and conservatism (kabeer, 2012). clearly, this is a time when gender advocates may struggle to keep their influence over states and multi-lateral agencies. thus, it is more important than ever that they stay united as a movement rather than torn apart by inter-organizational disagreements (kabeer, 2012). in this essay, i have discussed how the gender equality movement will not garner enough support if it does not invite men into the movement. furthermore, the feminist movement should never assume that all women have equal interests, or that they necessarily conflict with the equal interests of men. when it comes to influencing policy, gender advocates need to keep using well-reasoned arguments when they propose policy to legitimize the fight for equality, even in the purely economic sphere. however, gender has been widely adapted by mainstream institutions, and this is the time for feminists to demand more transformative actions. gender advocates should never accept sanctity of culture and always demand equal social rights. 134 consilience bibliography al jazeera, (18.10.12) australian “misogyny” redefined: accessed on 10.12.12 bbc (30.10.12) polish rape victim 'should have had abortion access': accessed on 10.12.12 boserup, e. (1970) woman's role in economic development, london: earthscan publications limited. cagatay, n., elson, d. and grown, c. (1995) introduction, world development journal 23(1 l), 1827-1836. kabeer, n. jumping to conclusions. in: jackson, c. and pearson, r. (1998) feminist visions of development: gender analysis and policy, london: routledge kabeer, n. from feminist insights to an analytical framework: an institutional perspective on gender inequality. in: kabeer, n. subrahamian, r, (1999) institutions, relations and outcomes: a framework and case studies for gender-aware planning, kali for women 1999 kabeer, n. (2012) gender and development, lecture, school of oriental and african studies, london university, unpublished. kandiyoti, d. rethinking bargaining with patriarchy. in: jackson, c. and pearson, r. (1998) feminist visions of development: gender analysis and policy, london: routledge miller, c. and razavi, s. (1995) gender mainstreaming: a study of efforts by the undp, the world bank and the ilo to institutionalize gender issues, united nations research institute for social development morgan, r. (1996) sisterhood is global, the feminist press at the city university of new york new york times (09.10.12) taliban gun down girl who spoke up for rights: accessed on 10.12.12 psacharapoulos, g. patrinos, h, a. (2004) returns to investment in education: a further update, taylor & francis ltd razavi, s. (1997) fitting gender into development institutions, elsevier science ltd simister, j. (2011) assessing the 'kerala model' : education is necessary but not sufficient, journal of south asian development 2011 6:1 standing, h. (1991) dependency and autonomy: women’s employment and the family in calcutta, london: routledge consilience nilsson: gender and development standing, h. (2004) gender, myth and fable: the perils of mainstreaming in sector bureaucracies, ids bulletin, 35: 82–88 stocking, b. (2004) foreword. in: ruxton, s. gender equality and men: learning from practice, oxfam gb world bank (2010) an evaluation of world bank support 2002-08: gender and development, ieg world bank world health organization/london school of hygiene and tropical medicine (2010) preventing intimate partner and sexual violence against women: taking action and generating evidence, geneva: world health organization consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 11, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 132–152   the effect of sedimentation levels on tarebia granifera in freshwater lagoons in punta cana, dominican republic caroline damienne harfouche earth institute columbia university, new york email: cdh2127@columbia.edu diane jung columbia college columbia university, new york email: dj2320@columbia.edu abstract punta cana, one of the largest tourist destinations in the caribbean, is located in the western part of the dominican republic on the island of hispaniola. increased human activity has had a negative impact on the aquatic ecosystems, significantly decreasing the number of coral reefs, mangroves and sea grasses. the decline is not only occurring in the caribbean, but also worldwide and is attributed to human and natural causes. it is believed that the degradation of aquatic ecosystems is partially driven by increased sedimentation. sedimentation levels directly impact the wellbeing of aquatic ecosystems. suspended particles reduce the amount of light that penetrates the water, which reduces photosynthesis and the production of dissolved oxygen. the suspended material can clog fish gills reducing their resistance to disease, lowering growth rates and affecting egg and larval production. increased sedimentation means a thicker layer of particles accumulates on the floor of the aquatic biome and smothers eggs and benthic macroinvertebrates. the indigenous eyes ecological reserve, situated on 1500 acres of protected land on the resort, has twelve freshwater lagoons. since only three of them are open to swimming, it was an ideal natural setting to conduct an experiment to compare the effect of human activity on the levels of sedimentation in two lagoons – one open and one closed to swimming. we also measured the effect of sedimentation levels on the size of the tarebia granifera in each of the lagoons. the data was analyzed using one-way anova. author’s note c. damienne harfouche is a senior majoring in sustainable development at columbia university and is a member nominated to serve on the earth institute student advisory council, which will be working this year with the office of environmental stewardship at columbia university to increase student voice in sustainability initiatives on campus. diane jung is a junior also majoring in sustainable development at columbia university and worked as an intern in the united nations global compact korea, which works to promote voluntary corporate citizenship initiatives in the areas of human rights, labor, anti-corruption, and the environment. this experiment was the result of fieldwork done at the indigenous eyes ecological reserve in punta cana, dominican republic through the see-u program, which is a five week ecosystem experience that took place in july and august 2013. we would like to thank omar perez-reyes for his guidance throughout the process. consilience harfouche et al.: sedimentation levels   keywords: punta cana, dominican republic, lagoons, sedimentation, tarebia granifera 134 consilience   1. introduction the goal of this study was to measure the effect of anthropogenic activities on the sedimentation level in each of two freshwater lagoons – one open and the other closed to swimming – situated in the ecological reserve ojos indigenas (indigenous eyes) in the punta cana resort. punta cana is the eastern tip of hispaniola, an island shared with haiti. we compared the effect of the sedimentation level on the size of tarebia granifera, a nonnative resident snail, in each lagoon. figure 1. location of punta cana on hispaniola island (galileo travel) aquatic ecosystems are affected by radiant energy, water temperature, oxygen and clarity. the clarity or turbidity of water is a measure of the number of suspended particles in the water and since suspended particles absorb heat, an increased number of them cause the temperature of the water to increase. elevated water temperatures increase the metabolic rate of the resident species, the rate of decomposition, and the water density. consilience harfouche et al.: sedimentation levels   figure 2. punta cana resorts turbidity and sedimentation levels directly impact the wellbeing of an aquatic ecosystem. suspended particles reduce the amount of light that penetrates the water, which reduces photosynthesis and the production of dissolved oxygen. the suspended material can clog the fish gills reducing their resistance to disease, lowering growth rates and affecting egg and larval production. increased sedimentation means that a thicker layer of particles accumulates on the floor of the aquatic biome and smothers the eggs and benthic macroinvertebrates. (minnesota rural water association, sedimentation) 136 consilience   figure 3. life outside the resorts: a family home in the country side (left) and a fisherman who supplements his income by giving boat tours (right) sedimentation occurs when gravity causes the suspended particles to settle at the bottom of an aquatic ecosystem. the sediment may consist of sand, clay, or silts and are transported by wind, water or ice. the size of the particles, the water temperature, the currents, and the shape of the basin affect the rate of sedimentation. sediment particles can be naturally-occurring material or the result of anthropogenic activities such as agriculture, deforestation, and construction. anthropogenic sediment has two aspects: 1) physical – top soil loss and land erosion; 2) chemical – the absorbed chemicals in clay and silt, such as phosphorous, pesticides, and metals. both aspects contribute to increased levels of turbidity in the receiving waters. bioturbation, the reworking of soils by animal and plant organisms, is a particularly important process with regard to sedimentation. consilience harfouche et al.: sedimentation levels   figure 4. inside the indigenous eyes ecological reserve, a protected area within the punta cana resort: blue land crab (left) and iguana (right) are among the many species that live in the reserve 2. questions/hypothesis what is the effect of human activity on the level of sediment in the freshwater lagoons in the indigenous eyes reserve? what is the effect of the level of sediments on the size of snails (tarebia granifera)? h0: we hypothesize that increased human activity in the lagoon will not result in higher levels of sediment. h1: we hypothesize that increased human activity in the lagoon will result in higher levels of sediment. h2: we hypothesize that increased human activity (higher levels of sediment) will result in different size of snails (tarebia granifera). 3. site information 138 consilience   there are twelve freshwater lagoons in the indigenous eyes reserve in punta cana. the reserve is situated in the lowland subtropical forest of the dominican republic. the lagoons are the result of emerging water from quaternary reefal limestone aquifer, one of the three major aquifers of the dominican republic (gilboa 1980). the main sources contributing to aquifers are rainfall, inflow from rivers and canals, irrigation losses and other aquifers. only three out of twelve lagoons in the reserve are open to the public for swimming in order to protect the lagoons and the surrounding environment from degradation as result of development. not only are the lagoons economic resources from tourism, but they also play a crucial role in the ecosystem of punta cana, providing habitats for diverse species as well as flood and climate control. the primary criterion in site selection was ensuring that there is significant enough difference in level of human activity between the lagoons. therefore, we chose the open lagoon that seemed most popular to tourists, and the closed lagoon that was most easily accessible for our twice daily collection, but also small and located deep enough in the reserve area to minimize the likelihood of human activity. by comparing the sediment levels in the lagoon open to swimming versus the one closed to the public, we observed the impact of human activity on the number and size of the snails (tarebia granifera) figure 5. laguna turey (left) open for swimming and laguna yucahu (right) closed to swimming. the lagoons are within the reserve, which is a protected area on the resort 3.1 taribia granifera snails are an important part of the food web and they link and influence the different trophic levels. they are able to filter food from the water and from the sediment consilience harfouche et al.: sedimentation levels   through their gills. snails feed across trophic levels on bacteria, algae, zooplankton, detritus (non-dissolved organic material) and dissolved organic material (cc vaugn et al. 2008). the tarebia granifera is a freshwater snail that is non-native to the dominican republic. originally from asia, it is believed that it was first introduced to the united states in 1940 when an aquatic plant dealer used improperly washed tubs to gather native plants. the range of this mollusk continues to expand due to transport by humans. the diet of the adult tarebia granifera is primarily algal growth on rocks as well as various microorganisms and small particles of organic material. it has not been found to harm aquatic vegetation (tarebia, 2007). figure 6. tarebia granifera, the snails we collected from both lagoons. these were collected by hand by removing them from rocks and from underneath sediment 140 consilience   4. methods figure 7. since there was no sign at the entrance of laguna yucahu indicating that it was not open to swimming, we made one and blocked the entrance to ensure that the site remained undisturbed for at least the duration of the experiment two sites were selected for the experiment. laguna turey, the one open to tourists, is larger and less covered with tree canopy than laguna yucahu, which is closed to tourists. out of the twelve lagoons in the ecological reserve, only three are open to tourists, but there were no signs indicating that the lagoon is closed. therefore, we created a sign and blocked the entrance, to ensure that there would no human activity in the closed lagoon. consilience harfouche et al.: sedimentation levels   figure 8. diane assembling the containers to be placed at the bottom of the lagoons for sediment collection we used plastic containers, tiles, and flagging tape to collect the accumulated sediments in two lagoons. two plastic containers were attached on each tile with flagging tape, and placed underwater. initially, we had planned to use tiles only and collect them with the settled sediment using ziploc bags underwater; however, through trial and error, we realized that the sediments would float off if we moved them underwater. therefore, in order to minimize disruption to the settled sediments, we placed the lids on the containers underwater before lifting them out of the water. 142 consilience   figure 9. top: damienne replacing the containers in the yucahu lagoon after removing them for our daily collection of sediments. bottom: location of cumulative accumulation containers (placed in a different location than our daily collection containers), placed under the stairs in order to capture more sediment accumulation from swimmers tracking in matter and stirring up the sediments as they go in and out of the lagoon we had two different types of collection: one for daily sediment accumulation and consilience harfouche et al.: sedimentation levels   one for cumulative accumulation. for the daily accumulation of sediments we collected three containers (replicas) from each site twice a day: in the morning (normally between 8 am and 9 am) and afternoon (normally between 4pm to 5pm). for the cumulative accumulation there was only one daily collection in the morning over six days and in order to minimize sediment disruption, those containers were placed in a different part of the lagoon away from the twice daily containers. figure 10. outdoor lab (top): as soon as the containers were removed from the water we drained them using coffee filters in a funnel to trap the sediments of each container at each location. indoor lab (bottom): the wet coffee filters were set out to dry inside the lab and once completely dry, the sediment specimens were weighed and measurements entered on paper and into excel tables. once containers were removed from the water, we used coffee filters and funnels to filter them immediately at the site. the drained sediment on the filter papers were then carried to the lab and left out to dry with silica packs for a couple of days. lastly, the 144 consilience   completely dry filter papers with sediment accumulations were weighed on a scientific scale that measures in grams to one decimal point. placing an unused filter on the scale and resetting it to zero deducted the weight of the filter paper. every day, for each site, there were three types of data: 1) three weight measurements for morning daily sediment accumulations 2) three weight measurements for afternoon daily sediment accumulations 3) one weight measurement of cumulative sediment accumulations collected in the morning. table 1. sediment weight measurements in grams daily and accumulated levels of sediments in turey and yucahu cenotes turey cenote (open) yucahu cenote (closed) am pm am am pm am daily daily accumulated daily daily accumulated 1 7/14 sun 0.4 0.1 0.3 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.3 0 0 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.1 2 7/15 mon 0 0 0.8 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 3 7/16 tues 0 0 1 0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 4 7/17 wed 1.7 0.1 1.5 0 0 0.2 0.2 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0 5 7/18 thur 0.1 0 2.1 0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0.1 6 7/19 fri 0.2 0.2 1.5 0 0 0.3 0.1 0.2 0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0 0 7 7/20 sat 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0.2 0.1 there were three replicas for daily accumulations. since those were collected twice a day (morning and afternoon), there were six measured weights for the daily accumulation in each site, plus the one cumulative accumulation collected every morning in each site; there was a total seven measured weights recorded daily for each site. while daily accumulations consilience harfouche et al.: sedimentation levels   were collected over seven days and cumulative accumulations were collected over six days, there were a total of ninety-four weights measured for daily and cumulative accumulations in both sites. finally, we took the average of three replicas in morning and afternoon of each day and brought down the numbers to fourteen weight measurements for the daily accumulation. in sum, there were seven averaged weights of sediment accumulations each for the morning and afternoon collection in each site and six weights of sediment accumulations for the cumulative accumulation. there were forty weights in total in the finalized data for the one-way anova analysis. the second part of the experiment consisted of measuring an organism, which in this case was the tarebia granifera. we randomly collected the snails over the period of an hour in each of the open and closed lagoons where we had collected our sediments, and measured their lengths with calipers on site before releasing them. thirty-one snails were captured in the open lagoon, and fifty-six snails were captured in the closed lagoon. figure 10. tarebia granifera. most of the snails we found in the lagoon that was open to swimming were the size of the tiny ones in the photograph, whereas in the closed lagoon the large ones were readily visible and easy to collect. 5. results we used one-way anova (analysis of variance) to compare our data from each lagoon. anova is a statistical model that compares differences (or variances) between two or more means of certain collections of numbers. the p-value is a probability value in test statistics. when p-value is larger than 0.05, the results are considered to be insignificant, meaning that the numbers do reveal anything meaningful. 146 consilience   we have four one-way anova analysis: two for the comparison between am and pm (daily accumulation) for each site and two for comparison between the two sites for cumulative accumulations and size of snails. table 2. anova: am/pm accumulation in the open lagoon open average variance p-value am 0.19 0.05 0.39 pm 0.1 0.02 pvalue (open) : 0.39 > 0.05 value (closed): 0.51 > 0.05 * no significant difference between sediment accumulations in morning and afternoon for both sites the first two one-way anova analyses compares sediment accumulations in two different times (morning and afternoon) in each site. the p-values for each site (0.39 and 0.51) is much larger than 0.05, showing that there is no significant difference between sediment accumulations in morning and afternoon for either lagoon. the first one-way anova analysis shows the averages and variances of sediment accumulations of the open lagoon that was measured in morning and afternoon. for the open lagoon, both averages of sediment accumulations in morning and afternoon (0.19g and 0.1g) are similar and small. also variances of sediment weights in both morning and afternoon (0.05 and 0.02) are small, meaning that sediment accumulations were very consistent. the second one-way anova analysis, like the first one, shows the averages and variances in sediment accumulation for the closed lagoon. as with the open lagoon, both averages and variances of sediment accumulations in morning and afternoon (0.02g and 0.03g) were similar and small. variances of sediment accumulations in both morning and afternoon (0.0006 and 0.0007) were much smaller for the closed lagoon than for the open lagoon, showing that sediment weights were very consistent both in the morning and afternoon. table 3. anova: cumulative accumulations in open and closed lagoons average variance p-value anova: am/pm accumulation in the closed lagoon open average variance p-value am 0.02 0.0006 0.51 pm 0.03 0.0007 consilience harfouche et al.: sedimentation levels   open 1.2 0.4 0.003 closed 0.18 0.014 p-value: 0.003 << 0.05 * significant difference between cumulative accumulations in laguna turey (open) and laguna yucahu (closed) figure 11. comparison of cumulative accumulations between open (left) and closed (right) lagoons. the container on the left has a large quantity of fish fecal matter indicating that the swimming by people may increase the fishes’ metabolic rate. the third one-way anova analysis, unlike the first two, compares two sites in cumulative accumulations of sediment. the p-value for this analysis (0.003) is much smaller than 0.05, implying that there is a significant difference between cumulative accumulations in the open and closed lagoons. there is a substantial difference in averages of sediment accumulations (1.2g and 0.18g) between the open and closed lagoons. there is also a significant difference in variances of sediment accumulations (0.4 and 0.014) between the 148 consilience   two lagoons, meaning that sediment accumulations had been more consistent over six days in the closed lagoon than in the open lagoon. table 4. anova: size of snails in open and closed lagoons average variance p-value open 1.90 cm 1.15 0.00019 closed 2.92 cm 1.49 p-value: 0.00019 <<< 0.05 * significant difference in sizes of snails in laguna turey (open) and laguna yucahu (closed) the final one-way anova analysis compares snail sizes in the open and closed lagoons. the p-value for this analysis is smallest, 0.00019, meaning that there is a significant difference in sizes of snails between the open and closed lagoons. there is a substantial difference in averages of snail sizes (1.90cm and 2.92cm) between the open and closed lagoons. variances of snail sizes (1.15 and 1.49) for the two lagoons are similar, and they are quite large, meaning that snail sizes vary substantially in both open and closed lagoons. 6. discussion the indigenous eyes reserve, with natural control zones of lagoons open and closed to swimming, is an ideal setting to observe differences in sedimentation levels and sizes of organisms. the analysis of our data confirmed that there was an increased level of sedimentation as a result of anthropogenic activity in the open lagoon. according henley et al., increases in sedimentation produce negative cascading effects on organisms in an aquatic ecosystem, causing mortality, a reduction in physiological function and avoidance of the area. swimming in the lagoon carries in sediments, stirs up existing sediments, and adds biofilm, but in our daily collection there was evidence that human activity also had a significant impact on the metabolic activity of the organisms. in addition, we found that there was a clear difference between the two lagoons in the number and size of snails we were able to find. according to watters, even naturalists who appreciate and try to be mindful of natural areas cannot avoid trampling. in turey, the lagoon open for swimming, the snails were difficult to find because they were mostly very small and hidden in crevices or under sedimentation, whereas in yucahu, the closed lagoon, the snails were a lot larger and readily accessible. we believe that trampling was a factor in the shortage of larger snails in the open lagoon. surprisingly, natural disturbances like heavy rain and storms didn’t have a noticeable effect on the levels of sediment in our daily collection. even when storms cause destruction, natural disturbances are part of the cycle of an aquatic ecosystem and consilience harfouche et al.: sedimentation levels   may have other benefits (noaa). we have seen that human activity, even as seemingly innocuous as swimming, causes a measurable increase in sedimentation. sedimentation has a direct impact on the trophic levels and threatens the overall health of aquatic ecosystems (henley et al., 2000). it has been documented that this extends to larger ecosystems as well. in fact, the collapse of coral reefs in certain areas of the ocean has been linked to increased sedimentation. according to noaa, a world resources institute report estimates almost sixty percent of the world’s reefs are threatened by anthropogenic activity. suspended sediment, or turbidity, blocks sunlight, smothers corals and interferes with larval production and benthic macroinvertebrates. if we were to extend our study we would want to examine the relationship between turbidity and temperature and the effect of temperature fluctuations on the metabolic activity of organisms in different trophic levels. also, it would be worthwhile to consider other factors that can alter the level of sediments besides human activity, such as organism activity (bioturbation) or depth and amount of light in different locations in the lagoons. 150 consilience   7. conclusion while the entire process of our experiment only took a little over two weeks, we were able to gain a deeper understanding of the impact of human activities on an aquatic ecosystem. the first half of the experiment entailed the set up of procedures for on-site collections of sediment samples, while the second half of the experiment focused on the analysis of the results. in the dominican republic and other tropical areas that are biodiversity hotspots, tourism and related human activities have increased the threats to ecosystems, which act as the earth’s haven for a myriad of organisms. competing lucrative interests have prevented appropriate measures to be taken to protect the fragile ecosystems in these hotspots, since short-term economic returns often seem to render the long-term environmental costs negligible. in addition to the environmental problems that are readily visible, like the decreased metabolic and growth rates of organisms described in our experiment, there are also potential problems that may surface later with much broader consequences. since decreased metabolic and growth rates of organisms can further slow the reproduction rates, it could lead to a decrease in species diversity in the lagoons. a few strong invasive species, like tilapia fish and red-eared terrapin, were observed in the lagoons and an increase in their population could threaten the diversity of native species weakening the entire ecosystem by disturbing the food chain and web. these problems may be a sign of disturbances to larger ecological cycles and are likely to be more costly and challenging to address in the future if ignored. thus we should consilience harfouche et al.: sedimentation levels   not neglect seemingly trivial yet immediate changes in the ecosystem, and even small experiments, when they aggregate related data, can be the basis of impactful findings that can deepen our understanding of the natural world and motivate us to take strong actions to ensure sustainable development in order retain the future viability of ecosystem services in both our niche and the surrounding environment. figure 12. (clockwise starting top left) children at play in the country side, in an urban village, and on the resort next to a mangrove 152 consilience   bibliography connolly, n. m., & pearson, r. g. (2007). the effect of fine sedimentation on tropical stream macroinvertebrate assemblages: a comparison using flowthrough artificial stream channels and recirculating mesocosms. hydrobiologia (2007), (592), 423-438. doi: 10.1007/s10750-007-0774-7 control of water pollution from agriculture. (1996). natural resources management and environment department. retrieved fromhttp://lindorm.com/rd/sedimentation1.php henley, w. f., patterson, m. a., neves, r. j., & lemly, a. d. (2000). effects of sedimentation and turbidity on lotic food webs: a concise review for natural resource managers. reviews in fisheries science,8(2), 125-139. doi: 10.1080/10641260091129198 sedimentation. (n.d.). lindorm, inc. maker of the sedimeter. retrieved from http://lindorm.com/rd/sedimentation1.php sedimentation. (n.d.). minnesota rural water association. retrieved from http://www.mrwa.com/op-sedimentation.pdf tarebia (thiara) granifera quilted melania. (2007). retrieved from http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/ansrp/ansis/html/tarebia_granifera_quilted_melania.htm vaughn, c. c., nichols, s. j., & spooner, d. e. (2009). community and foodweb ecology of fresh water mussels. the society of freshwater science, retrieved from http://www.jnabs.org/doi/abs/10.1899/07-058.1 watters, g. t. (1999). freshwater mussels and water quality: a review of the effects of hydrologic and instream habitat alterations. ohio biological survey proceedings of the first freshwater mollusk conservation society symposium, ohio. williams, e. h., & buckley-williams, l., lilyestrom, c. g., ortiz-corps, e. a. r. (2001). a review of recent introductions of aquatic invertebrates in puerto rico and implications for the management of nonindigenous species. caribbean journal of science, 37(3-4), 246-251. 5.5 turbidity. (n.d.). epa united states environmental protection agency. government. retrieved from http://water.epa.gov/type/rsl/monitoring/vms55.cfm microsoft word baldinelli-micro.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 11, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 153–166   agrobiodiversity conservation as a coping strategy: adapting to climate change in the northern highlands of bolivia giulia maria baldinelli department of development studies school of oriental and african studies email: gm.baldinelli@gmail.com abstract this article is the result of my observations in two aymara communities of the northern bolivian altiplano, where i am collecting data for my phd thesis. my thesis aims to explore the connections between on-farm conservation of local crop varieties and migration of aymara people away from their communities of origin in the altiplano to urban areas. while studying the conservation of agrobiodiversity performed by bolivian farmers, i investigated the use of different crop varieties, conserved by indigenous people, in response to climate change. the consequences of climate change are evident in the rural areas of the altiplano norte: prolonged droughts, followed by heavy precipitations and floods. agriculture is severely affected by such extreme climatic events and the response of the farmers varies. in this article, i focus on a possible adaptation approach enabled by a strategic use of the numerous crop varieties that many aymara farmers still own. although the relevant knowledge is slowly being lost, some agrobiodiversity “champions” still hold it and use it to adapt sustainably to new climatic conditions. research about the agronomic characteristics and the use of local varieties is still needed to provide indigenous farmers with further options to face environmental and climatic change in the altiplano norte. author’s note conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity for food and agriculture are sponsored in a number of international agendas and supported by strategies including ex situ and in situ conservation initiatives all over the world. in situ on-farm conservation practices, performed by farmers in locations where varieties are encountered, maintain natural genetic interactions between crops, their wild relatives and the local environment. they are, therefore, particularly valuable for the conservation of agrobiodiversity and farming systems. in the andes, traditional farming techniques and the existence of indigenous food systems make on farm in situ conservation activities successful and grant the preservation of crop diversity. during my fieldwork in the northern highlands of bolivia, i observed how indigenous farmers adapt to climate change through their strategic use of local crop varieties. in other words, the richness that aymara small-scale farmers own, in terms of both agricultural varieties and traditional knowledge, is used to adapt to rapidly shifting climatic patterns. i would like to thank the fundación proinpa, oficina regional altiplano, for the support provided during my fieldwork in bolivia. keywords: agrobiodiversity, climate change, indigenous farmers, adaptation, bolivia 154 consilience   since august 2012, i have been carrying out my fieldwork in the northern altiplano of bolivia, collecting data for my phd research on the connections between indigenous farmers’ rural-urban migration and on farm agrobiodiversity conservation. while studying the phenomenon of the conservation of agricultural varieties performed by aymara smallholder farmers in some communities of the altiplano norte, i observed the way different crop varieties are used in response to climatic variability, such as new precipitation patterns, prolonged periods of drought, and harsh frosts during the wet season. the central andes is one of the major centers of origin and biodiversity in the world (gade, 1999; amend et al., 2008). aymara small-scale farmers in the bolivian andes grow and consume crops such as numerous varieties of potato, oca, isaño, papalisa, quinoa, cañahua and tarwi. this is an expression of their lifestyle, traditional knowledge and cultural identity (alarcon vicente, 2011; mamani et al., 2010). figure 1: some of the potato varieties owned by doña viviana herrera from cachilaya, municipio puerto pérez, provincia los andes, departamento la paz, bolivia. september 2012. agrobiodiversity can be defined as “the variety and variability of animals, plants, and micro-organisms on earth that are important to food and agriculture which result from the interaction between the environment, genetic resources and the management systems and practices used by people” (fao, 1999). the concept of agrobiodiversity not only takes into account genetic and agroecosystem diversity, but also values cultural diversity. indigenous farmers all over the world conserve numerous varieties of crops, which are often “neglected and underutilized”, due to the past and present consilience baldinelli: agrobiodiversity conservation       -­‐  155  -­‐   efforts to increase high yields and productivity of a narrow set of crops, suited to high-input farming, rather than protect and use diversity (par & fao, 2011). “neglected and underutilized” crops have traditionally been excluded by agricultural research and conservation carried out in developed countries, which has focused on a few staple crops that produce most food supply on a global scale: rice, wheat and maize, for example, produce more than half of the global food energy needs (global facilitation unit for underutilized species, 2007). however, many “neglected and underutilized” crops are adapted to marginal growing conditions, such as those of the andean altiplano. although they are neglected at the global level, these crops are often staples at the national or regional level and contribute to a nutritionally rich and well-balanced diet for those who harvest them (hermann & heller, 1997). figure 2: the flower of the potato variety luki. comunidad coromata media, municipio huarina, provincia omasuyos, departamento la paz. february 2012. 156 consilience   figure 3: the flower of the potato variety waycha. comunidad coromata media, municipio huarina, provincia omasuyos, departamento la paz. february 2012. figure 4: the flower of two oca varieties warichuchulla and keni. comunidad cachilaya, municipio puerto pérez, provincia los andes, departamento la paz. february 2012. indigenous smallholder farmers’ conservation activities are crucial for the preservation of agrobiodiversity, the promotion of sustainable food systems, and the resilience of local farming (deruyttere, 1997; par, 2010). indigenous people have rich traditional ecological knowledge systems, including ecosystem management, adaptation to changing environmental conditions, and biodiversity conservation (berkes et al., 2000). their value system is based on a close relationship with natural resources for subsistence as well as for spiritual reasons and, as a consequence, they play a crucial role in the stewardship of natural resources and biodiversity (iucn inter-commission task force on indigenous peoples, 1997). in recent decades, international attention has focused not only on the call to increase global food production for a growing population, but also on the need to make this increase sustainable—in order to prevent environmental degradation, climate change, and excessive simplification of agro-ecosystems (par & fao, 2011). it was also recognised that “a wide food crop base is crucial for supporting local economies, traditions, and cultures and, above all, for being able to provide farmers with options for dealing with whatever agricultural problems may emerge in the future” (global facilitation unit for underutilized species, 2007). agricultural problems that can be easily caused by climate change constitute a challenge that farmers, fishers, herders, and indigenous peoples have to deal with more than anybody else. consilience baldinelli: agrobiodiversity conservation       -­‐  157  -­‐   figure 5: an apthapi (traditional aymara shared meal). the most important staple is potato, consumed in different varieties and transformed in chuño and tunta (freeze-dried products). cachilaya, municipio puerto pérez, provincia los andes, departamento la paz. september 2012. in the andes, the indigenous cosmovision implies such a strong connection between “lo andino” and nature, that it has been defined an “agroecologic vision” of the world (lozada pereira, 2006). nature is personified by the pachamama, the mother earth, a “living dynamic system made up of the undivided community of all living beings, who are all interconnected, interdependent and complementary, sharing a common destiny” (art.3, asamblea legislativa plurinacional de bolivia, ley de derechos de la madre tierra, december 2010). bolivia, under the guide of its indigenous president evo morales, approved the first law on the rights of mother earth, which considers nature a subject of legal rights and promotes the model of “vivir bien” (living well) that should shape production and consumption behaviors, as an alternative to capitalism (wessendorf, 2011). this implies an “ecological reorientation of bolivia’s economy and society, requiring all existing and future laws to adapt to the mother earth law and accept the ecological limits set by nature” (buxton, 2011). despite this apparently favorable framework, however, indigenous farmers must face a series of both anthropic and natural challenges, such as the rise of industrial farming, land dispossession, out-migration from rural areas, water scarcity, or, last but not least, climate change (velásquez-milla et al., 2011). 158 consilience   figure 6: drought on the shores of lake titicaca, due to a late beginning of the rain season. cachilaya, municipio puerto pérez, provincia los andes, departamento la paz. october 2012. climate change is severely affecting agricultural activities in the northern highlands of bolivia. precipitations have become irregular and unpredictable and the traditional agricultural calendar has changed. the dry season, which should last until october, stretches now until late november, making aymara smallholder farmers postpone the sowing because of the lack of rain which keeps the soil dry and unsuitable for production. figure 7: a flooded plot of papa in the community of cachilaya, municipio puerto pérez, provincia los andes, departamento la paz. february 2012 consilience baldinelli: agrobiodiversity conservation       -­‐  159  -­‐   during the wet season, on the contrary, precipitations are often too intense and cause floods especially around lake titicaca. for example, between february and march, in the community of cachilaya, on the northern side of the lake, large portions of the plots situated on the shore were entirely submerged with water. figure 7: doña viviana herrera, a farmer of the community of cachilaya, is taking out a plant of papa, since the last furrows of her plot, which are close to the lake, have been flooded by water. cachilaya, municipio puerto pérez, provincia los andes, departamento la paz. february 2012. farmers are forced to harvest part of their production before its time, in order to save it from complete rot and destruction. however, since this is done before harvest time, the growing process of the cultivations is interrupted, and, in the case of potato, tubers are still very small when they are taken out of the soil and they have not yet reached complete maturation. 160 consilience   figure 8: a farmer gathers the potatoes which have just been taken out of the soil because of a flood. tubers are still small and not yet mature. cachilaya, municipio puerto pérez, provincia los andes, departamento la paz. february 2012. the same happens in the plots of quinoa. large portions of the plots situated on the shores of lake titicaca end up under the water, as it has happened in this agricultural year 2012-2013. quinoa, as well as cañahua, is an andean grain that doesn’t need too much water. on the contrary, it is resistant to drought and to frost, while in case of excessive precipitations or hail the harvest is easily lost. consilience baldinelli: agrobiodiversity conservation       -­‐  161  -­‐   figure 9: a flooded quinoa plot on the shores of lake titicaca. cachilaya, municipio puerto pérez, provincia los andes, departamento la paz. february 2012. figure 10a: a flooded haba bean plot on the shores of lake titicaca. cachilaya, municipio puerto pérez, provincia los andes, departamento la paz. february 2012. 162 consilience   figure 10b: a flooded haba bean plot on the shores of lake titicaca. cachilaya, municipio puerto pérez, provincia los andes, departamento la paz. february 2012. while many farmers in the bolivian northern highlands prefer to harvest high-yielding easy-to-sell varieties, some agrobiodiversity “champions” still conserve a large number of local varieties, together with the traditional knowledge related to their agronomic characteristics, their use and their resistance to climatic agents. local traditional knowledge, which has been passed down through generations and is still owned by bolivian aymara farmers, makes it possible for them to choose, at the moment of the sowing, the varieties that can respond better to the climatic challenges that they foresee. furthermore, distributing the risk among different crops and crop varieties is proved to be a winning strategy. in the case of papa, according to the farmers of the community coromata media, municipio huarina, provincia omasuyos, the variety sakampaya is precocious and it is resistant to frost. the varieties luki and ajahuiri are resistant to drought and frost and are good for making chuño and tunta, dehydrated products which are also staple in the andean diet. in the case of quinoa, the indigenous varieties choquepito, wila jupha red quinoa, and junqu jupha white quinoa are the most productive and suited to the northern highlands’ climate. cañahua is resistant to frost and can endure long periods without much water. consilience baldinelli: agrobiodiversity conservation       -­‐  163  -­‐   figure 11: in a potato plot burnt by a heavy frost, the variety luki is the only one that has survived. cachilaya, municipio puerto pérez, provincia los andes, departamento la paz. march 2012. traditional knowledge concerning the characteristics and use of different crop varieties is going lost, due to the substitution of local varieties with highyielding non-native varieties and to rural-urban migration, especially of young people. research about the agronomic characteristics and the use of local varieties is needed, in order to provide indigenous farmers with further options to face environmental and climatic change. there are initiatives like the project nus ifad, funded by ifad and implemented in bolivia under the supervision of the fundación proinpa, that aim at recuperating traditional knowledge, promoting the documentation and the monitoring of locally-conserved crop varieties and identifying the main threats to smallholder indigenous farmers generated by climate change. bolivian researchers, such as the agronomists of the fundación proinpa, have been working for years in this direction, obtaining good results in rural communities such as cachilaya, municipio puerto pérez and coromata media, municipio huarina. however, much scientific and practical work still needs to be done, in order to help a larger number of indigenous farmers to recuperate their self esteem, their traditional knowledge and, ultimately, the agricultural varieties that they have gradually lost, as these are crucial means for them to respond effectively to the consequences of climate change. 164 consilience   figure 12: doña rufina torrez, of the community of coromata media, showcases her varieties of cañahua. march 2012. consilience baldinelli: agrobiodiversity conservation       -­‐  165  -­‐   bibliography alarcon vicente, v. p. (2011). inventariación de la agrobiodiversidad en la comunidad coromata media provincia de omasuyos. tesis de grado. la paz. amend, t., brown, j., kothari, a., phillips, a., & stolton, s. (2008). protected landscapes and agrobiodiversity values. national wildlife. asamblea legislativa plurinacional de bolivia ley de derechos de la madre tierra (2010). berkes, f., colding, j., & folke, c. (2000). rediscovery of traditional ecological knowledge as adaptive management. ecological applications, 10(5), 1251–1262. buxton, n. (2011). the law of mother nature: behind bolivia’s historic bill. global alliance for the rights of nature. retrieved from http://therightsofnature.org/bolivia-law-of-mother-earth/ deruyttere, a. (1997). indigenous peoples and sustainable development: the role of the inter-american development bank. washington, d.c.: idb forum of the americas. fao. (1999). agricultural biodiversity. agriculture. maastricht. gade, d. w. (1999). nature and culture in the andes. madison, wisconsin: the university of wisconsin press. global facilitation unit for underutilized species. (2007). inviting all the world’s crops to the table. supporting traditional crops to supply future needs. hermann, m., & heller, j. (1997). andean roots and tubers: ahipa, arracacha, maca and yacon. promoting the conservation and use of underutilized and neglected crops. rome: institute of plant genetics and crop plant research (ipgri). iucn inter-commission task force on indigenous peoples. (1997). indigenous peoples and sustainability. cases and actions. utrecht: iucn indigenous peoples and conservation initiative international books. lozada pereira, b. (2006). cosmovisión, historia y política en los andes. la paz: producciones cima. mamani, e., mamani, r., & rojas, w. (2010). conocimientos tradicionales en la conservación in situ de la agrobiodiversidad. la paz. par. (2010). the use of agrobiodiversity by indigenous and traditional agricultural communities in: adapting to climate change. synthesis paper. par, & fao. (2011). biodiversity for food and agriculture. contributing to food security and sustainability in a changing world. outcomes of an expert workshop held by fao and the platform on agrobiodiversity research from 14-16 april 2010 in rome, italy. 166 consilience   rome: food and agriculture organization of the united nations and platform for agrobiodiversity research. velásquez-milla, d., casas, a., torres-guevara, j., & cruz-soriano, a. (2011). ecological and socio-cultural factors influencing in situ conservation of crop diversity by traditional andean households in peru. journal of ethnobiology and ethnomedicine, 7(40). wessendorf, k. (2011). the indigenous world 2011. copenhagen: international work group for indigenous affairs. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 8, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 128-141 high dependency on quacks – is there a gap in the public health care delivery system? reflections from a district located in the thar desert (india) alok chauhan singh banaras hindu university varanasi, india alokres@gmail.com abstract this paper tries to analyse the availability and role of public health care services provided by the public sector in india. in addition, it also explores the reasons behind the high dependency on quacks in the study area. data was acquired through in-depth interviews of 610 respondents with the help of a structured questionnaire from september to december 2010. here, an attempt has been made to probe the pattern of utilization of health care services available at public health facilities by the sample respondents. it has been assessed in relation to socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the interviewees which exert significant influence on the utilization of health care facilities. the study finds that the number of chcs/phcs/sub-centres in the study area is not adequate to meet the health needs (medical advice or treatment) of entire the population. the results recommend improving the availability and accessibility of health care facilities in the area under study. author’s note alok chauhan received an m. sc. in geography from the banaras hindu university, varanasi in 2006. he is pursuing a ph.d. in the department of geography at the banaras hindu university, varanasi. his research interests include population and family welfare, health care services, maternal and child health. keywords: public health care system, quacks, primary health centre, accredited social health activists. 1. introduction health remains the topmost priority in every individual’s life. its importance is evident in the old saying “health is wealth.” health is not only essential for an individual’s well-being; it is also necessary for all productive activities in a society (goel, 2002). hence, it is an issue of common concern. in fact, all communities have their own concept of health as part of their culture. according to the world health organization (1964), health is defined as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.” consilience singh: public health care delivery the rajasthan state population policy in 1999 aimed to bring in a quantum change in many health indicators by 2011 in the state of rajasthan, the focus of the present study. the state has ensured strong delivery of health and family welfare services through a plethora of voluntary workers such as anganwadi workers, trained birth attendants, jan mangal couple and asha (accredited social health activists). consistent efforts are being made to provide primary health care to all, acknowledging issues of inequity, gender imbalance, accessibility, availability, affordability, and delivery of quality health care services. in order to improve the effectiveness and quality of health care delivery systems, rajasthan health system development project is being implemented in all the 32 districts of the state with financial assistance from the world bank. the primary goal is to strengthen secondary level medical institutions. one of the major challenges facing good medical care in india is the fact that untrained/unqualified quacks can provide medicine with impunity. quacks generally do not possess a recognised practice in the field of medical science. many of them have served as assistants to a doctor and thus present themselves as a qualified doctor. in the study area, a quack is a person either from the same village or nearby villages who doesn’t possesses any professional qualification or practice but merely knows of some fast relief medicines. since the study area has a very strict patriarchal society with limited rights to women, women are forced to use comparatively less expensive and easily available medical assistance, which is commonly provided by quacks. in a traditional indian society women have very few rights, particularly in rural areas (haub and sharma, 2006). women get secondary position in food and nutrition as well as in health care. they are not allowed to go for modern medical help for illnesses unless the male members of the household, particularly the husband, consider the modern medical help necessary. the inadequate freedom of women limits the success of public health care delivery in the study area. under the prevailing conditions, women are forced to consult a quack for less expensive and easily available medical help. the right to receive medical help by a qualified medical practitioner in times of illness is one of the basic health-care rights to which all citizens are entitled (who, 1978). unfortunately, it is indeed very difficult for a sick person to decide whether or not a person posing as a doctor is professionally qualified. the rio declaration states that "human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. they are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature." this stresses the important inter-linkages between the social, economic and environmental pillars of sustainable development, all of which are underpinned by good health. furthermore, chapter 6 of agenda 21 of the declaration emphasizes the fundamental commitment within sustainable development of "protecting and promoting human health.” it is quite worrisome that despite so many representations and efforts made by the indian medical association, quacks continue to practice in india. the major aim of the present study is to examine various determinants of the use of public health care delivery systems across different geographical regions and population sub-groups in hanumangarh district. the study includes socio-economic variables, which affect the health care choices of the people in the study area. in addition, the study also tries to identify the factors responsible for poor utilization of public health care delivery systems and high dependency on quacks. the findings of 130 consilience the present study will also lead to an improved delivery and management of public health care in the study area. 2. data base and methodology the present study is based on both primary and secondary data. secondary data have been collected from the office of the chief medical and health officer in hanumangarh district. intensive field work from september to december 2010 was conducted to collect the primary data. the primary data have been collected through sample surveys of 610 households selected from fourteen villages (two villages from each tahsil) and two urban centres of hanumangarh district. the villages under study (possessing at least 50 households) have been selected according to their distance from primary health centres (phcs). two phcs have been selected from each tahsil. after selecting phcs, villages in the vicinity of both phcs were categorised according to their distance from the nearest phc. out of these distance categories, two villages from each tahsil have been selected in such a way that one village must lie within a radius of 1km to the first phc, while the second village must lie farther than 7-8km from the second phc. this technique has been applied in every tahsil on a rotation basis so as to equal the sum of the distances of both villages from their respective phcs. to ensure accuracy, selected villages do not lie in the vicinity of any other phc/chc/district hospital except the selected phc. while selecting villages, it was important to ensure that the entire sample represented the physical, social, economic, cultural and religious characteristics of the study area. accordingly, selected villages included one that was more than 80 per cent muslim, one that was more than 80 per cent sikh, one that was more than 80 per cent scheduled castes, and another that was more than 80 per cent from other backward castes households. in each selected village, 35 respondents were chosen for an in-depth interview through a structured questionnaire based on age, caste, religion, education, occupation, and income. in total, 490 respondents were selected from rural areas of all the seven tahsils of the study area. households have been categorised into three classes according to socioeconomic status: high, medium and low. 20 households were selected from each socio-economic class in both urban centres. in total, 120 respondents were selected from urban areas. altogether, a total of 610 respondents have been selected from various parts of the study area. the distance categories have not been considered since the urban centres in the district have small spatial extension. 3. results and discussion 3.1 distribution of health care facilities in accordance to a who resolution of 1978, the government of india expanded health care facilities all over the country and established a good network of primary health institutions. health services are usually organized at three levels, each level supported by a higher level to which the patient is referred. it was planned to have a community centre for every 120,000 human population in plain area (on every consilience singh: public health care delivery table 1: tahsil-wise distribution of health facilities, 2010 source: office of the chief medical and health officer, hanumangarh district, 2010. figure 1. location of the hanumangarh district in rajasthan, india. 80,000 population in hilly and tribal areas), a primary health centre for every 30,000 population in plain area (on every 20,000 population in hilly area and tribal areas) and a sub-centre for every 5,000 population in plain area (on every 3,000 population in hilly area and tribal areas). health care services in rural areas are being provided through these health centers and district hospitals. thus at the district level, there are sub-centers (scs), primary health centers (phcs) and community health centers (chcs). district hospitals (dhs) have been set up as a first referral unit (fru). tahsil/district chc phc sub-centre ayurvedic homeopathic unani sangaria 1 5 32 5 tibi 1 3 29 12 hanumangarh 1 7 45 18 1 pilibangan 2 4 28 10 rawatsar 1 5 43 9 nohar 2 11 71 20 1 1 bhadra 2 10 71 22 1 total 10 45 319 96 2 2 132 consilience the area under study (fig.1) is served by one district hospital, 10 chcs, 45 phcs and 319 scs. there are 96 ayurvedic, 2 homeopathic and 2 unani hospitals providing health care services to the people (fig. 2). tahsil-wise distribution of various health facilities is provided in table 1. spatial variations in health care facilities have been analyzed at tahsil/district level with reference to phcs. the highest number of phcs are found in nohar (11) followed by bhadra (10) and hanumangarh (7) tahsils. the sangaria, tibi and rawatsar tahsils experience abject conditions in terms of the number of phcs (table 4.3). it is notable that four tahsils, namely pilibangan, tibi, hanumangarh and sangaria lie in the plain area while the remaining three tahsils, nohar, bhadra and rawatsar, lie in desert area. since the norms for establishment of an sc/ phc/chc are different for plain and desert area, the availability of health care facilities is not strictly comparable between the two areas. the tahsil area varies notably in the study area. thus, the availability (density) of health care facilities has been analyzed in reference to per 100 sq. km of surface area. similarly, all the tahsils of the study area do not contain equal population so the availability of health care facilities (e.g. phcs and scs) has been made in reference to per 10,000 people. figure 2. location of health care facilities in hanumangarh district, rajasthan, india. consilience singh: public health care delivery table 2: tahsil-wise distribution of phcs and sub-centres, 2010 source: self computed. figure 3. distribution of health facilities in hanumangarh district, rajasthan, india. table 2 presents the density of phcs and scs in terms of area and population. it is apparent from fig. 3a that the density of phcs per 100 km2 of area is highest in sangaria tahsil and lowest in rawatsar tahsil. the remaining tahsils have moderate density of phcs. while considering the availability of phcs per 10,000 people it has been found that nohar tahsil is best served while tibi is the least served tahsil. nohar and sangaria tahsils recorded high availability of phcs per 10,000 people while rawatsar and bhadra showed moderate density. the remaining three tahsils registered low density of phcs (fig.3b). it is clear from the preceding tahsil/district phcs sub-centres per 100 km2 of area per 10,000 of pop. per 100 km2 of area per 10,000 of pop. sangaria 0.76 0.47 4.88 2.98 tibi 0.40 0.21 3.90 2.05 hanumangarh 0.57 0.30 3.68 1.92 pilibangan 0.42 0.28 2.92 1.93 rawatsar 0.27 0.35 2.30 3.05 nohar 0.45 0.49 2.91 3.16 bhadra 0.58 0.45 4.14 3.22 district 0.47 0.37 3.32 2.63 134 consilience table 3: distance-wise distribution of villages from nearest phc tahsil/district distance (km) from nearest phc total 0-5 5-10 > 10 sangaria number 42 40 97.00 179 per cent 23.46 22.35 54.19 100.00 tibi number 14 31 193 238. per cent 5.88 13.03 81.09 100.00 hanumangarh number 33 58 290 381 per cent 8.66 15.22 76.12 100.00 pilibangan number 39 73 164 276. per cent 14.13 26.45 59.42 100.00 rawatsar number 26 59 212 297 per cent 8.75 19.87 71.38 100.00 nohar number 35 23 146 204 per cent 17.16 11.27 71.57 100.00 bhadra number 32 51 115 198 per cent 16.16 25.76 58.08 100.00 district number 221 335 1217 1773 per cent 12.46 18.89 68.64 100.00 source: jansankhya sthirata kosh (jsk) (national population stabilization fund), district level health data, 2006. discussion that five tahsils have a sufficient number of phcs as per norm set by the government of india. density of sub-centres also varies in the study area. sangaria and bhadra tahsils registered a high density of scs per 100 km2 of area while tibi and hanumangarh tahsils showed moderate density. pilibangan, rawatsar and nohar tahsils showed low density of scs (fig.3c). the density of scs per 10,000 of people is high in nohar, bhadra and rawatsar tahsils while sangaria and tibi tahsils recorded moderate availability of scs. availability of sub-centres has been found low in hanumangarh and pilibangan tahsils (fig.3d). although the study area has a sufficient number of phcs and scs, accessibility and affordability are still major hurdles to universal health provision. there is wide variation in density of health care institutions. the majority of the settlements, particularly in the southern three tahsils, are scattered in nature. these scattered habitats located in vast desert areas have very low rail and road connectivity with the health care institutions. poor accessibility and low availability of health care institutions force people to seek medical help from a quack in case of illness. better accessibility and higher availability may in turn lessen the role of quacks in the study area. 3.2 distance of villages from phcs to analyse accessibility to phcs, all the inhibited villages of the study area have been categorised into three groups according to their distance from the nearest consilience singh: public health care delivery phc (table 3). it is evident from table 3 that 12.46% of villages are between 0-5 km, whereas 18.89% of villages are between 5-10 km. more than two-thirds of the total villages are located at a distance more than 10 km from the nearest phc. clearly, for the majority of the villagers, distance to a phc is a significant constraint. it is very difficult to travel a distance of 10 km in the desert, particularly for poor people who do not possess their own transport/vehicle. 3.3 types of hospitals in the study area there are altogether 96 ayurvedic hospitals in the study area. sangaria tahsil has the lowest number of ayurvedic hospitals while bhadra has the highest number (fig.1). at the same time, there are two homeopathic hospitals in the study area, one each in the hanumangarh and nohar tahsil. in the study area there are two unani hospitals, one each in the nohar and bhadra tahsil. 3.4 utilization of health care facilities the area under study is commonly served by public (government) health care centers. however, a few specialized private hospitals and nursing homes located in six urban centres of the study area also provide services. an attempt has been made to probe the pattern of utilization of health care services available at public health facilities by the sample respondents. it has been assessed in relation to socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the interviewees, which exert significant influence on the utilization of health care facilities. in addition, effort has been also made to assess the magnitude of utilization of various medicine systems with social, cultural and economic variables. 3.5 socio-economic profile of the respondents the study under reference covered 610 respondents (one from each household) in the age group of 15-49 years in fourteen sample villages and two urban centres. of the sample households, 86.9% are hindu while 5.7% and 7.4% are muslim and sikh, respectively. according to social groups, 34.9% belong to general castes while 44.3% and 20.8% per cent belong to other backward castes (obc) and scheduled castes respectively. the computed mean age of the male respondents is 33.20 years and 30.24 years for female respondents. the average monthly family income was computed as rs. 7432. the literacy rate of males is 88.2% while that of females is 62.3%. the level of educational attainment of both male and female respondents in the sample villages is depicted in fig.4.4 and 4.5 respectively. only 1% of female and 14.6% of male respondents have an education of 14 or more years (graduation and above). nuclear families account for 62.3% of the surveyed population while the remaining 37.7% respondents belong to joint families. most of the male respondents are farmers (35.2%) whereas the majority of females are agricultural labourers (20.8%). 136 consilience 3.6 first visit in case of illness table 4: religion and first visit in case of illness source: based on personal survey, 2010. note: the figures in parenthesis indicate the number. availability, affordability, accessibility and reliability of health care facilities decide the first visit in cases of illness. in the study area out of 610 households, 341 (55.9%) sought help from quacks while 102 (16.7%) respondents visited chcs/phcs/scs, 69 (11.3%) respondents consulted registered medical practitioners (rmp), 91(14.9%) visited private hospitals and 7 (1.1%) sought help from traditional healers in cases of illness. easy availability, convenience, low expense and frequent visits to household members are the main reasons behind the high dependency on quacks. distance to health facilities coupled with poor transportation resulted in low use of health care facilities. 3.7 socio-economic characteristics and first visit in case of illness the socio-economic and demographic variables discussed in this section include religion, social-group (caste), family structure, monthly income of households, age, education and occupation of the respondents. since information regarding health care behaviour of the household has been collected from the husband, only husband’s age, education and occupation have been considered. 3.8 religion use of health care facilities is associated differently with religion in the study area (table 4.). a high percentage of hindus and muslims consulted quacks while sikhs visited private hospitals in cases of illness. a perusal of fig.4.6b reveals that traditional healers were not consulted by the muslim or sikh populations while a small number (1.3%) of hindus visited traditional healers during illness. religion chc/phc/subcentre private hospital rmp quack traditional healer total hindu 16.8% (89) 13.6% (72) 10.8% (57) 57.5% (305) 1.3% (7) 100% (530) muslim 5.7% (2) 11.4% (4) 17.1% (6) 65.7% (23) 100% (35) sikh 24.4% (11) 33.3% (15) 13.3% (6) 28.9% (13) 100% (45) total 16.7% (102) 14.9% (91) 11.3% (69) 55.9% (341) 1.1% (7) 100% (610) consilience singh: public health care delivery 3.9 social-group table 5: social-group and first visit in case of illness source: based on personal survey, 2010. note: the figures in parenthesis indicate the number 80% of the total population in the study resides in rural areas. in indian villages, caste strongly influences the life style of the people and symbolizes their social and economic status. the central government of india classifies some of its citizens based on their social and economic condition as scheduled caste (sc), scheduled tribe (st), and other backward class (obc) (premi, 2003). the castes, which were the elite of the indian society, were classified as high castes. the other communities were classified as lower castes or lower classes. the lower classes were listed in three categories. the first category is called scheduled castes. this category includes communities of untouchables. the untouchables call themselves dalit, meaning depressed. the second category is scheduled tribes. this category includes those communities who did not accept the caste system and preferred to reside away from the main population in the jungles, forests and mountains of india. the scheduled tribes are also called adivasi, meaning aboriginals. the third category is called other backward classes or backward classes. in the constitution of india, obcs are described as "socially and educationally backward classes," and government is enjoined to ensure their social and educational development. all the castes in the study area have been broadly grouped into three social-groups, i.e., general, other backward castes (obcs) and scheduled castes (scs). there is no scheduled tribe population in the study area. all the social-groups showed a high dependency on quacks in general and scheduled castes in particular. scheduled castes belong to lowest strata of the society and possess comparatively lower socioeconomic status because a very high proportion (89.45%) of scheduled castes is engaged as agricultural labourers. poverty and illiteracy are the main reasons, which resulted in very high (69.3%) dependency on quacks among scheduled castes (table 5). all the social-groups, however, showed a high dependency on quacks except the scheduled castes, which possess comparatively lower socio-economic status and are mainly engaged as agricultural labourers, registered high preference (69.3%) in consulting quacks in case of illness (table 5). this table clearly reveals that the public health system is not popular in the study area among the weaker sections of the society. about one-fourth of the socialgroup chc/phc/ sub-centre private hospital rmp quack traditional healer total general 16.9% (39) 23.5 % (50) 18.3% (39) 41.3% (88) 100% (213) obc 15.6% (42) 13.0% (35) 8.9% (24) 61.1% (165) 1.5% (4) 100% (270) sc 18.9% (24) 4.7% (6) 4.7% (6) 69.3% (88) 2.4% (3) 100% (127) total 16.7% (102) 14.9% (91) 11.3% (69) 55.9% (341) 1.1% (7) 100% (610) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/scheduled_caste http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/scheduled_tribe 138 consilience table 6: family structure and first visit in case of illness source: based on personal survey, 2010. note: the figures in parenthesis indicate the number. interviewees from general castes visited private hospitals, while the proportion of interviewees is only 13% and 4.7% for obcs and scs, respectively. 3.9 family structure family structure also plays a significant role in the use of various health care facilities, though a very large proportion of respondents consulted quacks irrespective of their family structure. there is no significant difference in visits to chcs/phcs/sub-centres and rmps, but there is a wide variation in utilization of services of private hospitals between the two family structures (table 6). only 8.3% of respondents belonging to joint families visited private hospitals, while 18.95% of respondents from nuclear families visited the private hospitals in case of illness. in joint families, expenditures are decided by the head of the households so there is less freedom for choices. 3.10 income income of the household to a large extent decides the use of available health care facilities. it is clear from table 7 that the percentage of respondents visiting private hospitals increases with the increase in household income. visits to chc/phc/sub-centre increases with higher income up to a certain limit; thereafter it shows a negative relationship with the income. it is apparent that those respondents whose monthly family income is less than rs 1000 have the highest (90.8%) dependency on quacks, while the proportion of respondents who visited private hospitals in case of illness, is highest in the income category of above rs 15000. 3.11 age an individual’s age affects health care behavior as well. table 8 shows the relationship between age of the respondents and their use of health care facilities. it is apparent from table 8 that as age increases, the percent of respondents who sought help from quacks decreases due to the inability of quacks to cure some specific old age diseases. the percentage of respondents who visited private hospitals during illness increases up to the age group of 40-44 years; thereafter it declines family structure chc/phc/ sub-centre private hospital rmp quack traditional healer total nuclear 17.4% (66) 18.9% (72) 10.8% (41) 52.4% (199) 0.5% (2) 100.0% (380) joint 15.7% (36) 8.3% (19) 12.2% (28) 61.7% (142) 2.2% (5) 100.0% (230) total 16.7% (102) 14.9% (91) 11.3% (69) 55.9% (341) 1.1% (7) 100.0% (610) consilience singh: public health care delivery table 7: income and first visit in case of illness source: based on personal survey, 2010. note: the figures in parenthesis indicate the number. table 8: age of respondents and first visit in case of illness source: based on personal survey, 2010. note: the figures in parenthesis indicate the number. significantly. it is clear from table 8 that after the age-group of 35-39, respondents’ dependency on registered medical practitioner (rmp) increases significantly. percentage of respondents who visited chcs/phcs/sub-centers increases as the age of respondents increases. the highest percentage of respondents who visited chcs/phcs/sub-centers is in the age-group of 45-49 years. monthly income (rs) chc/phc/ sub-centre private hospital rmp quack traditional healer total < 1000 4.6% (4) 90.8% (79) 4.6% (4) 100% (87) 1000-5000 15.5% (17) 3.6% (4) 2.7% (3) 77.3% (85) 0.9% (1) 100% (110) 5000-10000 20.5% (60) 12.0% (35) 14.7% (43) 52.1% (152) 0.7% (2) 100% (292) 10000-15000 17.3% (19) 40.9% (45) 19.1% (21) 22.7% (25) 100% (110) > 15000 18.2% (2) 63.6% (7) 18.2% (2) 100% (11) total 16.7% (102) 14.9% (91) 11.3% (69) 55.9% (341) 1.1% (7) 100% (610) agegroup chc/phc/ sub-centre private hospital rmp quack traditional healer total 20-24 4.0% (4) 16.0% (4) 16.0% (4) 64.0% (16) 100% (25) 25-29 18.4% (28) 11.8% (18) 5.3% (8) 63.2% (96) 1.3% (2) 100% (152) 30-34 10.9% (16) 15.0% (22) 13.6% (20) 60.5% (89) 100% (147) 35-39 20.4% (42) 16.0% (33) 8.3% (17) 52.9% (109) 2.4% (5) 100% (206) 40-44 16.4% (9) 21.8% (12) 16.4% (9) 45.5% (25) 100% (55) 45-49 24.0% (6) 8.0% (2) 44.0% (11) 24.0% (6) 100% (25) total 16.7% (102) 14.9% (91) 11.3% (69) 55.9% (341) 1.1% (7) 100% (610) 140 consilience table 9: educational attainment and first visit in case of illness source: based on personal survey, 2010. note: the figures in parenthesis indicate the number. 3.12 education a perusal of table 9 reveals a strong association between educational attainment and use of health care facilities. it is interesting to note that health services rendered by quacks are found to be very high in illiterate respondents (69.4% per cent) as well as in respondents with primary level schooling (72.3%). with an increase in educational level, services provided by the qualified practitioners increases rapidly, while a declining trend is found in use of services provided by quacks. however, visits to a chc/phc/sub-centre in case of illness have no direct relationship with educational attainment, indicating that educated as well uneducated respondents are not satisfied with government run health care institutions. use of private hospitals is highly significant in respondents who have higher education (graduation and above). educated persons generally earn more and are more aware of the quality of health care facilities. a very small percentage of illiterate (6.9%) and poorly educated respondents (3.08%) sought help from traditional healers during their illnesses. 3.13 occupation the occupation of individuals reflects their economic status, which in turn, influences the health care behaviour of the household. in general, the occupational structure of india’s population reveals the backwardness of the economy since more than 60% of the total work force is engaged in agriculture (ramachandran, 2008). a similar situation exists in the case of the study area where over three-fourths of the working population is engaged in agriculture-related activities. education chc/phc/ sub-centre private hospital rmp quack traditional healer total primary 12.3% (8) 1.5% (1) 10.8% (7) 72.3% (47) 3.08% (2) 100% (65) middle 21.4% (44) 10.2% (21) 5.3% (11) 63.1% (130) 100% (206) high school 9.9% (9) 18.7% (17) 11.0% (10) 60.4% (55) 100% (91) intermediate 20.7% (18) 12.6% (11) 20.7% (18) 46.0% (40) 100% (87) graduate and above 13.48% (12) 43.8% (39) 25.8 (23) 16.8% (15) 100% (89) illiterate 18.6% (13) 2.78% (2) 2.78% (2) 69.44% (50) 6.94% (5) 100% (72) total 16.7% (102) 14.9% (91) 11.3% (69) 55.9% (341) 1.1% (7) 100% (610) consilience singh: public health care delivery table 10: occupation and first visit in case of illness source: based on personal survey, 2010. note: the figures in parenthesis indicate the number. the occupations shown in table 10 represent both high-skilled as well as low-skilled jobs. table 10 shows that respondents who are cultivators (72.6%), agricultural labourers (93.5%) and construction workers (100.0%) have a high dependency on quacks. this may be attributed to their low level of educational attainment and poverty coupled with poor awareness about the services available at health care institutions. it has also resulted in low use of chcs/phcs/sub-centers and private hospitals. those respondents who are engaged in the service sector registered the highest percentage (39.0%) of private hospital visits in case of illness. 4. conclusion the study found that public sector health care facilities are neither adequate nor easily accessible in the study area. poverty, poor levels of literacy, and lack of proper transport facilities contribute to the role of quacks in primary health care. the utilization pattern of health care facilities in the study area reveals that the people of the study area, irrespective of their background characteristics, are highly dependent on quacks in terms of medical help. the problems faced by the public health care system in the study area are the result of interplay of different social, economic, demographic and infrastructural factors. this research may assist in formulating policies and programmes by identifying critical variables, target groups, and grey areas for effective management of public health care delivery systems. to achieve the goal of universal health care, occupation chc/phc/ sub-centre private hospital rmp quack traditional healer total cultivators 4.2% (9) 13.5% (29) 8.4% (18) 72.6% (156) 1.4% (3) 100% (215) agri. lab 6.5% (2) 93.5% (29) 100% (31) indus. lab. 66.7% (8) 33.3% (4) 100% (12) business 37.5% (54) 13.2% (19) 15.3% (22) 34.0% (49) 100% (144) construction 100% (18) 100% (18) service 14.3% (15) 39.0% (41) 25.7% (27) 21.0% (22) 100% (105) transport 22.7% (5) 9.1% (2) 9.1% (2) 59.1% (13) 100% (22) others 14.3% (9) 79.4% (50) 6.3% (4) 100% (63) total 16.7% (102) 14.9% (91) 11.3% (69) 55.9% (341) 1.1% (7) 100% (610) 142 consilience future strategies and initiatives must recognize critical variables and target groups and grey areas that pose challenges to adherence of proper use of public health care facilities. availability and affordability of health care facilities as well as accountability and responsiveness of health care providers must be incorporated into policy formulation and implementation to make health care facilities more effective at the grass-root level. such measures will surely help to reduce gaps in public health care systems, which consequently decrease high dependency on quacks in the study area. consilience singh: public health care delivery bibliography bansal, r.k .and verma, a. 2007. indian journal of community medicine vol. 32, no. 2. goel, r. 2002. community health care. new delhi: deep & deep publications pvt. ltd., pp.1-26. haub, c. and sharma, o.p. 2006. india’s population reality: reconciling change and tradition. population bulletin, population reference bureau, washington dc. vol. 61, no.3, pp. 1-19. international institute for population sciences (iips) and orc macro.2007. national family health survey (nfhs-3), 2005-06: india, mumbai. janani suraksha yojana.2010. rajasthan government initiatives: state institute of health and family welfare, jaipur. park, k. 1991. text book of preventive and social medicine. jabalpur: m/s banarasidas bhanot publishers, p. 220. premi, m. k. 2003. social demographya systematic exposition. jawahar publishers & distributors, new delhi. ramachandran, p. 2008. population growth trends, projections, challenges and opportunities. working paper no. 2/2000-pc, planning commission, government of india, pp.1-36. united nations. 1992. agenda 21: programme of action for sustainable development. [http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/]. accessed on december 24, 2011. world health organization.1964. constitution of world health organization, geneva, p.3. world health organization.1978. declaration of alma-ata. health for all, series no.1 geneva. world health organization.1989. global strategy for health for all by the year 2000, geneva. microsoft word king final.doc king, page 1 an institutional analysis of the resource curse in africa: lessons for ghana by: richard king email: r.e.king@alumni.lse.ac.uk biography: i have recently graduated with a masters in the international political economy from the london school of economics, having previously read history at the university of nottingham. king, page 2 abstract the experience of oil producing countries in africa has largely been a negative one, with development indicators suffering as a resource curse takes effect. this article examines the role that institutions will play in preventing ghana from falling victim to the curse of oil following its discovery of off-shore oil in 2007. it draws upon the experiences of two other african nations with off-shore oil reserves, angola and gabon, to highlight the potential dangers that ghana faces in managing its oil resources. the analysis is based around the role that oil can play in breaking down formal mechanisms for guaranteeing accountability between state and society and promoting instead discretionary forms of governance that operate along neo-patrimonial lines. the leading role that ghana’s highly developed civil society must take in preventing this from happening is stressed. more broadly, the article seeks to understand the internal dynamics of resource management in african states, arguing that this should serve as the departure point for future interactions between resource-rich african countries and external forces. the article will conclude by emphasizing the importance of ghana’s building upon its success as a model for democracy in africa by also acting as a leader in resource management on the continent. king, page 3 author’s note my interest in this topic follows from my interest in politics and development on the continent generally. this was really born during my trip to tanzania in 2003 where i spent four months teaching prior to joining university. since then i have returned to the continent a number of times, including a brief trip to ghana in 2006 after doing some work in neighbouring togo. the resource curse is an interesting topic for me because it draws on insights from many different disciplines including politics, economics and development. however it also relies on a firm understanding of contextual factors to account for the divergence in experiences between resource-rich countries and therefore, in the case of ghana, relies heavily on an understanding of comparative african politics. ghana’s prominence in both academia and the media as a leading light for democracy and good governance in africa adds weight to this issue and there is a real sense that if ghana cannot overcome these challenges then no country on the continent will be able to. key words: resource curse, institutions, neo-patrimonialism, oil, ghana, gabon, angola. king, page 4 an institutional analysis of the resource curse in africa: lessons for ghana introduction following the conclusion of its fifth democratic election since the restoration of democracy in 1992, ghana finds itself at a critical juncture in its development. recent trends have been overwhelmingly positive and ghana has become perhaps the most frequently cited model of good governance and economic management on the continent. nevertheless, the national democratic congress (ndc) party and its new president dr. john atta mills continue to face a range of old and new challenges as they establish control over the country and embark on their political agenda. high amongst their priorities will be tempering the effects of the global recession and volatile commodity prices as well as assuaging the ethnic, political and economic divides that remain apparent in ghanaian society. however, the single challenge that may prove to have the greatest influence on ghana’s future will be avoiding a resource curse once its newly discovered oil starts to flow in 2010. this article will examine the role that institutions will play in determining whether ghana falls victim to the malign effects that oil has had on other african countries. it will argue that institutions relating to governance, bureaucracy, civil society and judiciary will be the major determinants of the effects of oil. the article will emphasise the importance of maintaining state-society linkages that determine the incentives under which political leaders act and the role that civil society can play in achieving this. the focus of the article will be on issues related to development rather than macroeconomic outcomes. the next section will show that the examples of gabon and angola are relevant to ghana’s situation and the subsequent analysis will draw on the experiences of these two countries to fully understand the nature of the threat that oil poses to ghana. the issue will be addressed strictly from a domestic standpoint and the external factors that receive a lot of attention in the literature, such as relations between major powers and oil producing states and the role of international oil companies (iocs) will not be examined. this is because, as the article makes clear, the primary causes of the resource curse lie in the internal dynamics of a country’s institutions and these must be understood in isolation before successful external intervention strategies king, page 5 can be devised. the role of oil in causing or prolonging war (relevant to the case of angola) will also not be considered directly as this is unlikely to be relevant to ghana’s experience. the remainder of this article will proceed as follows: in the following section the case studies will be examined in more detail and the outcomes of the resource curse in countries similar to ghana established through an examination of angola and gabon. the subsequent section will analyse the role of institutions, addressing in turn governance, bureaucracy, civil society and judiciary. the final section will conclude and examine the potential policy implications of the analysis made. king, page 6 symptoms of the resource curse the concept of a natural resource curse was first articulated in 1995 when sachs and warner empirically demonstrated that countries which were heavily reliant on natural resources achieved worse growth outcomes than their counterparts.1 early formulations of the resource curse followed the lead set by sachs and warner and focused mainly on the links between poor macroeconomic performance and abundance of non-renewable natural resources. however, the concept of the resource curse was later expanded to identify the causal links between resource abundance and other outcomes, such as lack of political freedom, poor development outcomes and even conflict.2 beyond the academic realm, nations, international organizations, and global civil society alike have recognized the existence of a resource curse, as seen in by the creation of initiatives such as the extractive industries transparency initiative (eiti).3 although the resource curse literature refers to all forms of natural resources it is considered most potent with regards to point-source natural resources and particularly oil. excessive generalisations about the resource curse can, however, be misleading and the general trend for poorer development performance by resource-rich countries can hide considerable divergence of experiences amongst resource rich countries. thus, just as resource-poor south east asian countries have been amongst the most successful performers of recent decades, so too have some resource-rich countries such as norway, canada and botswana. amongst those resource-rich countries that have undergone a curse, the negative effects have ranged in terms of both severity and form depending upon the nature of the natural resources themselves and the internal make-up of the country. ghana’s post-independence history will be very important in determining the effects of the resource curse there. despite its recent stability and progress much of this history was turbulent and occasionally violent as the widespread optimism of nkrumah’s early years disappeared and the country descended into political and economic turmoil. this peaked in the early 1980s as flight lieutenant jerry rawlings seized power. however under his watch the country slowly recovered and reformed culminating in 1992 with its first democratic elections. by january 2009 ghana had completed its fifth peaceful election, had experienced four consecutive years of above 6 percent gdp growth and had reduced the poverty headcount dramatically (from 40 per cent in 1998 to 29 percent in 2006).4 king, page 7 the progress ghana made in this period meant that upon discovering commercial quantities of oil in 2007, the country was optimistic that it could avoid the pitfalls into which its fellow african oil producers had fallen. this sentiment was summed up by then-president kufuor who declared that “with oil as a shot in the arm we are going to fly.”5 the amount of oil ghana has in reserves remains unclear, though the government estimates it may be as high as 3 billion barrels. ghana currently uses between 40,000 and 45,000 barrels of oil a day and has a fuel bill that reached an estimated $1.6 billion by 2007. with oil production rising from just 2,000 barrels a day currently to an estimated 60,000 barrels in 2010 and up to 200,000 barrels beyond that, the discovery of oil promises to have a profound impact on all aspects of ghanaian society.6 exploration and development of oil reserves are being carried out by international oil companies, with the ghana national petroleum corporation holding a minority stake in the ventures and the state receiving revenues from a variety of entitlements, such as income tax and royalties. however, ghana cannot be complacent about the effects oil will have, as the experiences of angola and gabon show. as will become apparent in the analysis, oil had a similar effect on development outcomes and political freedoms in both of these countries, contributing in each case to a breakdown of state-society linkages. this happened despite significant differences in their post-independence histories, with angola being at war for most of the period from 1976 to 1998, whilst gabon enjoyed remarkable political stability and continuity in leadership in this period. the comparison between ghana and these two nations is valid because of a series of commonly held starting characteristics. most importantly, oil in each of these countries is almost entirely based off-shore. this is a crucial factor in determining the nature of the resource curse that emerges as the oil industry will become an enclave industry with minimal ties to the rest of the economy (such as employment) and with its massive revenues going directly to the government. this effectively eliminates the sort of scramble for resources that has characterised the resource curse in countries like nigeria. another crucial similarity is that the political systems of all three countries are characterised by tensions between institutional, rules-based forms of governance and more traditional neo-patrimonial forms. the latter can be defined as the continued rewarding of supporters and appeasing of political opponents through the allocation of resources within the framework of a modern state structure.7 although the balance between these opposing forces has been different in each of the three countries, this tension is an important prerequisite for understanding the effects of king, page 8 oil in afirca and will be studied in further detail below. the key difference between the countries will be in their institutional maturity, with ghana having the advantage of discovering oil 50 years after both angola and gabon.8 the symptom of the resource curse that has probably received the greatest attention in the literature is dutch disease for which angola and gabon are particularly good examples. it occurs when the non-resource sectors of a resource-dependent economy become uncompetitive domestically and internationally and fall into stagnation and decline. typically this is triggered by an appreciation of the real exchange rate following the influx of foreign currency from natural resource sales. this was what occurred in the netherlands following the discovery of natural gas reserves in 1959, the event that gave this phenomenon its name. however, it can also occur due to political decisions made by elites who choose to concentrate resources in the oil and non-tradables sectors at the expense of other sectors. agriculture, a crucial component of ghana’s economy, was ruined by this process in angola and gabon. in both countries agriculture represented the only realistic source of mass employment and the oil industry, which employs relatively small numbers of highly skilled workers, could not compensate for this. this was represented by the large volumes of rural unemployed that flooded to the cities in search of work in recent decades in both countries. in gabon the decline in agriculture was so steep that it went from being a net exporter of agricultural products prior to independence to having to import nearly 90 percent of its food by 2004.9 similarly, angola continues to be heavily reliant on food aid, though the war also explains the decline of the rural sector in many regions. more significant in angola was the collapse of the coffee industry which went from exporting 213,000 tonnes in 1973 to just 3,000 tonnes in 1998.10 this is a crucial point of comparison with ghana whose economy is currently largely based around cocoa production in much the same way angola’s was on coffee prior to independence. by being highly dependent on oil, the angolan and gabonese economies also opened themselves up to dangerous price fluctuations in the price of oil illustrated so vividly by the shifts in oil prices which have occurred over the last two years. the extent of this dependence is seen in the dominant proportion of oil in exports with 94 percent of exports in angola in 2005 being from oil,11 compared to 78 percent of earnings for gabon in 2000 (despite declining production).12 volatile prices make economic planning very difficult and in african states have often led to excessive borrowing in times of low prices as political demands make king, page 9 spending patterns, even those that have little economic rationale, hard to scale back. unfortunately, oil producing states also have access to more credit as they can use future oil earnings as collateral on loans. in this way, angola’s ruling popular movement for the liberation of angola (mpla) was able to finance its war effort, with external debt increasing from less than $3billion in the early 1980s to over $11billion in 1995. meanwhile in gabon, the government was able to continue to fund the spectacularly wasteful transgabonese railway during the construction of which external debt rose from $230million in 1972 to $1.9billion in 1986.13 however, it is the political and social dimensions of the resource curse rather than the economic ones that are the most important for development. as figure 1 shows, angola and gabon, in contrast to contemporary ghana, rank considerably more strongly with regard to gdp per capita than for human development index (hdi) indicators.14 this is one sign of the extent to which both countries have failed to use their resources to improve the quality of lives of their citizens. thus approximately 70 percent of angolans continue to live on less than $2 a day,15 and 60 percent of the gabonese population also lives below the poverty line.16 health indicators remain especially poor in both countries with the life expectancy being just 54 in gabon, 17 and 43 in angola where one in four children die before their fifth birthday. 18 the politically and economically unequal systems that result from oil abundance are a crucial dimension of the resource curse, and do much to explain the disparity in macroeconomic and development indicators. in this system the very rich exist beside the very poor and are able to isolate them from political power. data to quantify the extent of these inequalities is hard to come by as these systems tend towards being strongly opaque to cover up the extent of corruption and mismanagement within them. nevertheless, estimates put the gini coefficient, the standard measure for economic inequality in a country, at 0.62 for angola in 2000,19 and 0.44 in gabon in 2003.20 while these figures put both countries amongst the most unequal in the world, the survey methods contain a strong urban bias that suggests that they are probably underestimations.21 nevertheless, the extent of economic inequality is apparent to any observer in the major cities of both countries where the expensive houses and cars of the rich 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 ghana gabon angola figure 1: country rankings for gdp per capita and hdi gdp per capita hdi source: united nations development programme 2008 king, page 10 exist beside the vast slums of the urban poor. the political inequality between these groups will be examined in the following section as it lies at the core to understanding how the resource curse occurs. the following section will link these outcomes in angola and gabon to the institutional processes that caused them. it will show that in each instance the lessons from these countries are potentially relevant to ghana as it looks to start production. king, page 11 institutions the role of institutions in determining the effects of natural resources has been widely recognised in the literature. mehlum, moene and torvik for example have demonstrated using regression analysis that the resource curse is strongly present in countries with weak institutions but is barely present in countries with strong institutions.22 their distinction between strong and weak institutions is determined by the extent to which institutional arrangements encourage production to take place in an economy as against allowing corrupt practices that inhibit economic efficiency. however, in the case of ghana, institutions cannot be treated in isolation as their role is tied to their relationship to informal neo-patrimonial forms of governance. these more traditional forms of rule have a long history in most colonised african countries but have adapted in recent times to operate within modern state structures. the extent to which institutions continue to operate along the formal rules-based forms as opposed to along neo-patrimonial lines will determine the incentives under which political actors operate and thus ultimately the overall impact of oil on a country. governance this section will argue that oil revenues lead to a strengthening of discretionary, neopatrimonial forms of governance at the expense of the formal bureaucratic forms thus reducing the accountability of government to the people. as well as altering their incentives for action, the revenues from oil also give these elites additional resources with which to better protect their positions. as such oil leads to a concentration of power in the hands of elites concerned primarily with their own short-term political survival. in both angola and gabon, the elites used the vast oil rents to distribute favours to supporters or potential rivals in important positions. principally, this involved politicians, military officers, magistrates, businessmen, and senior civil servants. however, during periods of instability for the ruling elites, such as elections, the distribution of patronage would be distributed to lower levels, though still failing to reach the poorest and most politically isolated elements of society. these favours took various forms, including the selective awarding of business licenses, jobs in the civil service, payment of large off-budget ‘bonuses’, and fuel and water subsidies for select groups. even the disastrously expensive transgabonese railway in gabon was identified by some to be a form of neo-patrimonialism after it was diverted to reach president bongo’s loyal batéke tribe in the southeast. 23 king, page 12 having bought the support of key players, the elites were thus able to operate with a large degree of autonomy and there were few within the system that could effectively challenge their position, either electorally or militarily. the huge electoral victory margins of president bongo’s parti démocratique gabonais (pdg) in gabon and the mpla in angola were testament to systems where political opposition was neither tolerated nor productive. rather, the pattern in both countries was for new parties or opponents that appeared on the political radar to be quickly drawn into the establishment through the careful direction of the state’s vast resources. the union between rassemblement pour le gabon, the largest opposition party, and the pdg prior to bongo’s convincing electoral victory in 2005 is an example of this. in most countries, the reliance of the state on taxes has also acted as a form of accountability with the implied threat by the people to stop paying them ensuring that the government continue to provide public services and goods. however, middle east scholars have shown that in ‘rentier’ economies where the state can draw on large revenues from oil, the fiscal tax system is either very weak or non-existent. instead, oil provides them with all the revenue required to hold onto power, and another source of government accountability is thereby compromised.24 in gabon, the system that emerged allowed for a great deal of stability, with bongo ruling from 1964 until the present with only infrequent recourse to violent forms of repression. in angola too, oil allowed the government to hold onto power despite fighting a war and doing little to help its people. this role of oil in contributing to regime continuity can be contrasted to the forms of the resource curse that have affected countries like nigeria where oil resources are located on-land and direct conflict between groups competing for control of the resources arises. the main threat to this stability therefore comes when oil prices or production drops. this was seen in gabon following the 1986 collapse in oil prices when government spending had to be scaled back and the neo-patrimonial system used to remove dissent was interrupted.25 the elites only managed to survive due to the previously rare use of violent measures by the government combined with democratic reforms and the return of high oil prices. similar reforms also took place in angola in 1991 following the drop in oil prices. however, the continuity in governance styles in both countries following these reforms goes to show that neo-patrimonial systems of governance can continue to adapt and grow in modern state king, page 13 systems. it also demonstrates that reforms forced onto governments from external sources are of little use if domestic conditions do not ensure the accountability of government to the people. as the economist intelligence unit notes, it is “better to view the reform effort in angola less as an attempt to improve transparency and open up markets, and more as an attempt by the presidency to make the system of political patronage more acceptable, efficient and sophisticated.”26 although seemingly more advanced in terms of political and institutional development, neopatrimonial forms of governance continue to exist, albeit on a smaller scale, in ghana. this was more widespread in the 1980s as from 1992 ghanaians became increasingly engaged with the democratic processes and the rules-based forms of governance that accompanied it. the continued existence of both forms of governance in ghana can be seen by the 80 percent of ghanaians who cite democracy as their preferred form of governance and the 65 percent who say that government should act as a parent to the people (often a sign of neo-patrimonial expectations).27 the danger will be that as oil revenues increase, the new government of ghana will increasingly look to use its resources to buy support in the politically divided country along neo-patrimonial lines rather than winning it through effective development policies. ghana differs markedly from both angola and gabon in one important respect: the existence of a strong two party tradition,28 exemplified by the closeness of the recent elections. conversely in angola and gabon, the mpla and pdg have had no real political opposition, even since the single-party state was abolished in both countries in the early 1990s. this situation stifled genuine political debate and benefitted the executive branch of government due to the presidents’ dominance of the party in both countries. nevertheless, important lessons from their experiences remain for ghana. first, they highlight the dangers to democracy in ghana if the ndc uses the oil revenues available to them as the incumbents to establish a significant electoral advantage over the new patriotic party through neopatrimonial methods. secondly, the experience of the legislatures in angola and gabon also shows that if neo-patrimonial systems do become more important, then this is likely to lead to a shift in power more generally away from the legislature and towards the executive. in summary, the presence of vast oil revenues removes accountability between state and society. in this context, the government, lacking the incentive to act in the best interests of society, does not follow sound developmental policies, leading to poor hdi scores, nor does king, page 14 it worry about the fate of the non-oil sectors, allowing dutch disease to develop, increasing the economies’ vulnerability to price volatility. bureaucracy within this unaccountable system, the quality of the bureaucracy declines as elites focus on political stability and treat the civil service as a source of neo-patrimonial rewards rather than a tool for delivering development. in the context of a system that is flush with oil revenues, corruption, opaqueness, capacity constraints and bloating are the natural consequences. as such, the bureaucracy remains unable to deliver effective public policies aimed at reducing poverty. in gabon and angola, even when spending was directed towards public services or development policies, implementation was poor. efforts have been made in both angola and gabon to increase the efficiency of institutions related directly to the oil industry, particularly the state oil companies, the ministries of finance and the central banks. the world bank and international initiatives such as the eiti have focused on the role these institutions play in good revenue management. it is likely that ghana, under such external instruction, will put in place rigid monitoring programmes to stop vast oil funds from disappearing from them as they did in angola and gabon in the early years of oil extraction. however, while these institutions are no doubt important, corruption across the bureaucracy must be addressed as oil revenues will increase incentives to expropriate funds throughout the system, obstructing development policies in other areas. the opaqueness of the system again makes quantifying the poor bureaucracy hard, but the economist intelligence unit’s poor rating of angola (scoring one out of five) for both “policy formulation and execution”, and “quality of bureaucracy” is a sign of the extent of the problem.29 capacity constraints are also a serious problem in angola with a 2004 survey showing that just 29 percent of government workers had completed secondary school.30 elsewhere, the elites’ focus on neo-patrimonial rewards rather than development is also reflected in how revenues are spent. for example, a large proportion of the education budget in angola goes towards funding scholarships abroad (implicitly for the children of elites) and large chunks of the health budget are dedicated to ensuring emergency evacuation procedures for elites. the extreme bloating of both angola’s and gabon’s civil services shows the prevalence of neo-patrimonial awarding of jobs there. in angola’s public sector, employment increased by king, page 15 49 percent between 1990 and 1998 and provided 30 percent more jobs than the formal private sector.31 gabon’s civil service was equally inefficient. in the 1980s and 1990s gabon had one of the highest ratios of public employment to population in the developing world, and its wage bill expanded from 30 percent of gdp in 1970-6 to 69 percent in 1987-94. 32 in ghana, the large scale embezzlements of funds of the type that occurred in angola and gabon have largely disappeared from the bureaucracy for the time being. however, corruption at lower levels remains widespread accounting for the success of dr. mills’ anticorruption electoral campaign. whether corruption will increase once oil revenues filter into the civil service has yet to be seen and will depend on the government’s commitment to fighting corruption, even if it means weakening its capacity to use neo-patrimonial forms to shore up its support. civil society civil society is a potential link between state and society. as such, in the context of strengthened neo-patrimonial patterns of governance and a weak tax system, its role becomes absolutely vital. the main limitations on its ability to operate effectively are transparency, interference and capacity. civil society is perhaps the most noteworthy area of difference between ghana, and angola and gabon, and also offers the greatest chance of successfully helping it to tackle the resource curse. in angola and gabon the pattern was for the independence of civil society to be totally compromised. most organisations either relied on the support of the state and were drawn into the neo-patrimonial networks or were reliant on aid from western organisations.33 both of these methods of funding themselves compromised their independence and ability to represent the larger population. in fact, prior to the 1991 reforms, much of civil society in gabon actually operated within a branch of the pdg, the central committee, including women and youth groups, and trade unions. genuine grassroots organisations have been generally overlooked by external and internal forces alike. prior to the 1990s reforms, the press in both countries were completely controlled by the state. following the reforms, which offered nominal independence for the press, these groups have remained largely uncritical of the presidents, preferring to attack lower level ministers or civil servants. in gabon, press freedom continues to be attacked with crackdowns on media councils, jailing of critical journalists and discrediting of the independent press by the king, page 16 influential state owned media.34 the opaque nature of both states’ political systems also renders the critical role of civil society and the media very difficult as evidence of corruption and malpractice is hard to substantiate. in ghana, by contrast, civil society not only enjoys total independence from government, but its role is becoming increasingly supported by the wider population whose engagement with civil society is very important. capacity constraints too are less of a problem compared to angola and gabon, with an educated middle-class fast emerging to improve the quality of monitoring that civil society can perform on the government. this extends to the press whose independence from interference places them at a respectable 34th out of 168 countries in the world press freedom index.35 with the breakdown of state-society linkages in angola and gabon, much of the impetus for accountable governance has necessarily come from external forces. the lack of success this pressure has enjoyed, particularly in periods when oil prices are high, is indicative of the extent to which the reform process, when driven from external sources, can be distorted from within by neo-patrimonial forces. unfortunately, civil society in both countries has been too weak to challenge these malign forms of governance. ghana could be different. its capacity and independence are well-established and if these can be maintained in the future, together with transparency in the political system, then ghanaian civil society may be able to reinforce the crucial state-society linkages. if it can do this then development outcomes will be strengthened as the government will be forced to demonstrate the progress it makes from the oil revenues it receives. judiciary the role of civil society and any attempts to improve governance or efficiency in the bureaucracy are reliant on an independent and effective judiciary. where political power is based on discretionary neo-patrimonial forms of governance, elites will have an incentive to interfere in the judicial system which, if left unchecked, could disrupt their basis for holding power. however, if interference is prevented, then accountability between government and society can be restored as the executive and bureaucracy are forced to operate according to enforceable rules. the dangers of a judiciary without independence can be seen clearly in the cases of both angola and gabon. in gabon pre-1990, the judiciary was totally subservient to the executive king, page 17 both formally, through the president’s ability to appoint the head of the supreme court, and informally, through the use of political and monetary rewards or the threat of punishment.36 in angola too, the courts deferred to government, though the war also partly explains this. attempts to overcome interference in the angolan judiciary have been half-hearted, as shown by the failure to follow through on the commission for the high authority against corruption in 1996 and the continued absence of an effective constitutional court.37 capacity constraints also play a role with a lack of well trained lawyers hindering the ability of the system to operate effectively. the judiciary is more advanced in ghana and defends its autonomy, though there is a clear precedent for a discretionary and politically compromised system dating back to the early 1990s. its role is supported by strong support amongst the population for the rule of law with seven in ten people saying that people must always obey the decisions of the courts.38 particularly important has been the role of the electoral commission of ghana under the stewardship of dr. kwadwo afari-gyan since 1992, not least in overseeing the knife-edge election of december 2008. nevertheless, in a tightly divided country and with greater rewards for the victors of any elections, the job of the electoral commission of ghana will only get harder with time and a retreat back to the days of political interference in the judicial system is perfectly plausible. king, page 18 conclusion the examples of angola and gabon highlight the effects that oil revenues have on institutions and how these effects lead to poor development outcomes. international organizations and academic sources alike have built up policy recommendations that countries with oil should adopt to tackle many of the symptoms of the resource curse outlined above.39 however, the experiences of angola and gabon show the versatility of neopatrimonial systems of governance in oil-producing countries, even during periods of reform, and as a result the limited impact reforms can have on development outcomes. therefore, any policies recommended by external groups, such as international organizations and global civil society groups, must have at their centre a deep understanding of the core challenge of maintaining state-society linkages in african countries possessing off-shore oil. only once this is achieved will the government have the incentive to act in the best interests of their citizens and adopt the most appropriate laws for managing their natural resources. ghana’s vibrant civil society must work towards holding the government accountable for its revenue management by involving itself, as far as possible, in the formulation of resource management policies. every effort must also be made to maintain the progress in institutional development that ghana has made in recent years and to continue to improve capacity and efficiency in democratic and bureaucratic procedures. thus in ghana, by contrast to angola and gabon where external pressure on the government remains a necessity, domestic forces will be the primary determinant of the extent to which problems arise from oil. following its tightly fought but peaceful recent elections and in the context of rigged and violent elections in zimbabwe and kenya during 2008, ghana has recently been much hailed amongst the international media as an example for african democracy.40 now, with oil starting to flow in 2010, ghana must step up and meet its next challenge: to act as an example of good natural resource management for other african countries like angola and gabon. it will not be an easy task, but for the people of ghana, the stakes could not be higher. king, page 19 works cited afrobarometer. “popular attitudes to democracy in ghana.” afrobarometer briefing paper 51.(2008): 1-7. auty, r., ed. resource abundance and economic development. oxford: oxford university press, 2001. “first oil drops in 2010” bftghanaonline.com 5 march 2008. 28 january 2009. http://bftghanaonline.com/portal/modules/news/article.php?storyid=19. beblawi, h, and g. luciani., eds. the rentier state. london: routledge. 1987. chabal, p. seminar. post-war resource management in angola. centro de estudos e investigação cientifica (ceic), angola and chr. michelsen institute (cmi), norway. february 2008. 12 december 2008. available at: http://www.cmi.no/events/?post-warresource-management-in-angola. economic commission for africa. gabon. 12 december 2008. available at: www.uneca.org/era2003/mediakit/gabon.pdf. economist intelligence unit. angola – country forecast. 2008.london: economist intelligence unit ltd. engel, u., and g. erdmann,. “neo-patrimonialism revisited: beyond a catch-all concept.” giga german institute of global and area studies, working paper no. 16 2006. “ghana ‘will be an african tiger’’ bbc news, 19 june 2007. 12 december 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6766527.stm “ghana’s new leader takes office” bbc news, 7 january 2009. 21 january 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7814524.stm hodges, t. angola: anatomy of an oil state. bloomington: indiana university press. 2004. humphreys, m., j. d. sachs and j. e stiglitz, eds, escaping the resource curse. new york: columbia university press. 2007. international press institute. world press freedom review 2007. 12 december 2008. available at: http://www.freemedia.at/cms/ipi/freedom_detail.html?country=/kw0 001/kw0006/kw0203/&year=2007 mehlum, h., k. moene, and r. torvik. “institutions and the resource curse.” economic journal, 116.508 (2006): 1-20. nze-nguema, f-p. l’etat au gabon de 1929 a 1990: le partage institutionnel de pouvoir. paris: l’harmattan. 1998. king, page 20 reporters without borders. worldwide press freedom index. 2006. 12 december 2008. available at: http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=19386. robinson, j., r. torvik, and t. verdier. “political foundations of the resource curse.” journal of development economics. 79.2 (2006): 447-468. sandbrook, r., closing the circle: democratization and development in africa. london: zed books. 2000. shaxson, n. poisoned wells: the dirty politics of african oil. new york: palgrave macmillan. 2007. united nations development programme. profil pays du gabon. 2006. available at: http://www.ga.undp.org/publications/profil_jan_06.pdf world bank. what happens when a country does not adjust to terms of trade shocks: the case of oil-rich gabon. washington dc: world bank. 2004. world health organization. angola country overview. 2008. 12 december 2008. available at: http://www.who.int/countries/ago/en/. yates, d.a., the rentier state in africa: oil rent dependency and neo-colonialism in the republic of gabon, trenton nj: africa world press. 1996. king, page 21 endnotes 1 jeffrey sachs and andrew warner are prominent american development economists. 2 for example auty has shown that social development and civil liberties are hampered by resource abundance and robinson et al. have argued that the incentives created by natural resources are the key to understanding their effects. both of these points are central to the arguments of this article. 3 the extractive industries transparency initiative was announced in 2002 by then prime minister of the united kingdom tony blair, following consultations between nations, civil society groups and the world bank. it is tasked with increasing transparency of payments made between companies and governments of resource-rich countries. 4 world bank, country overview, ghana. 5 bbc, 19/6/2007. 6 bftghanaonline.com, 5/3/2008. 7 erdmann and engel, 2006, 18. 8 oil was discovered prior to independence in both gabon and angola in 1957 and 1955 respectively. 9 world bank, 2004, 7. 10 hodges, 2004, 105. 11 world bank, 2007, 141. 12 economic commission for africa. 13 world bank database, 2008. 14 the human development index is a broad measure of development achievement for countries, constructed by the united nations development programme. it combines measures relating to life expectancy, educational attainment and income. 15 world bank, 2007, 8. 16 economic commission for africa. 17 shaxson, 2007, 102. 18 world health organization, 2008. 19 world bank, 2007, 9. 20 united nations development programme, 2006, page 8. 21 world bank, 2007, 9. 22 mehlum, moene and torvik, 2006. halvor mehlum and karl moene are economists at the university of oslo. ragnar torvik is a professor of economics at the norwegian university of science and technology. 23 yates, 1996, 183. 24 beblawi and luciani, 1987. 25 yates, 1996, 142. 26 economist intelligence unit, 2006, 35. 27 afrobarometer, 2008, 3. afrobarometer has carried out a series of four surveys assessing the progress of ghanaian democratization. the latest, conducted between 4 and 27 march 2008, interviews 1200 ghanaians face-to-face in a language of their choice. the results have a margin of error of ± 2.5 percent at the 95 percent confidence level. 28 sandbrook, 2000. king, page 22 29 economist intelligence unit, 2008, 46. 30 ibid,7. 31 hodges, 2004, 77. 32 world bank, 2004, 17. 33 chabal, 2008. 34 international press institute, 2007 35 reporters without borders, 2006. 36 nze-nguema, 1998, 117. 37 hodges, 2004, 81. 38 afrobarometer, 2008, 4. 39 see for example humphreys, sachs and stiglitz, 2007. 40 see for example bbc, 7/1/2009 for media report of ghana as an example for democracy in africa. microsoft word winther-micro.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 11, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 97–114   electricity consumption: should there be a limit? implications of people’s attitudes for the forming of sustainable energy policies   hege westskog cicero center for international climate and environmental research, oslo, norway email: hege.westskog@cicero.oslo.no tanja winther centre for development and the environment (sum), university of oslo, norway email: tanja.winther@sum.uio.no authors’ note our interest in socially and environmentally sustainable development derives from a deep concern for the current global state of affairs. the effects of climate change are felt dramatically in many parts of the world (one of us has done fieldwork in west bengal where the number of floods and cyclones is increasing and in kenya where droughts are threatening people’s livelihoods). in countries like norway, however, the pressing global concerns seem distant, and consumption levels remain high. in light of this, we are concerned with western policies and the apparent lack of willingness to introduce efficient tools for change, which seems to be a task that policy has largely left up to the individual consumer. as an economist interested in the multifaceted aspects of behaviour and an anthropologist trying to understand and convey people’s own perspectives and realities, we aim to show how interdisciplinary approaches, together with people-centred empirical material, could contribute to the forming of policy for sustainable development. keywords: electricity consumption, savings, attitudes, market, norm 98 consilience   1. introduction this is a people’s movement directed towards our authorities! it is soon time to start using the good old h3 tariff. those who use less than 20.000 kwh (which covers what is most necessary for sustaining a minimum standard of living) should be able to buy electricity at a very low price, while those who use more should pay more. in this way we will get a more socially responsible profile so that those who over-consume and live in luxury will also pay more per kwh. (facebook 2013)1 this quote from a facebook campaign launched in norway in 2010 calls for re-introducing a two-price system for electricity. the initiative came in response to the relatively high electricity prices during the winter of 2010. as most norwegian households use electricity for heating, some families froze, according to the media. by mentioning the “good old h3 tariff”, the actionists were referring to a former pricing system which encouraged consumers to maintain stable consumption below a given level. consumption above the limit was defined as over-consumption and was charged up to five times more per unit (nou 1998:419).2 by using words like “socially responsible” and “luxury”, the facebook initiative linked the argument for a two-price system to a question of fairness. they thought the former system had ensured a fair distribution of limited electricity resources amongst households in norway. this paper presents a qualitative study of people’s attitudes towards electricity and electricity consumption within the norwegian market context. the aim is to examine people’s attitudes towards electricity when they are presented with appeals for sustainable electricity practices (savings and renewable energy guarantees). as in any kind of market, the principle embedded in the norwegian domestic electricity market is that the pricing system is supposed to allocate scarce resources in the most efficient way. in practice, this implies that there are periods of considerable scarcity3 when electricity prices may double or even triple, when the authorities and the press remind consumers about the importance of saving electricity. however, purposes other than allocating resources in an efficient manner could also serve as a premise for energy policy. a pricing system could also seek to allocate resources in a fair manner. the extent to which norwegians perceive electricity in terms of market efficiency, fairness or other moral criteria is a central part of this study. we draw on theories that assume that different types of logics motivate behaviour. amartya sen and karine nyborg make distinctions between logics                                                                                                                           1  the facebook campaign was named “we who demand a differentiated electricity price now! (h3 tariff)”. (vi som krever differensiert strømpris nå! (h3 tariff). the site only obtained 105 followers/likes. the population of norway is five million.   2  the two-price system was common in norway up to 1980, a decade before the introduction of a market system for electricity in 1991. in the former system, the reference for over-consumption was power (e.g. 3kw) rather than energy (kwh), the unit referred to in the campaign.   3  in economic terms, scarcity is a central premise for making efficiency considerations. if there were no scarcity, a good would have no market value. however, we follow popular rhetoric and use the term to denote a perception of national electricity scarcity as opposed to a normal state of affairs.     consilience westskog et al.: electricity consumption     that are based on individual self-interest on the one hand and logics that originate from an individual’s concerns as a member of society on the other (sen 1985, nyborg 2000). sagoff (1988) pointed to a similar duality and introduced a dichotomy between consumer and citizen logics. westskog et al. (2011) and their model on energy behaviour develop this theory further by focusing on various factors that affect a given type of logic for action. this model incorporates the social and material structures that surround and affect individuals when they perform a given behaviour. developed as an interdisciplinary approach, the model also includes a multi-level perspective, focusing simultaneously on individuals, groups and the societal level. a focus on logics will facilitate the analysis and categorisation of people’s attitudes towards electricity, consumption and savings, as well as a comparison between people’s own logics and the logic embedded in the norwegian electricity market. we argue that insight into people’s perceptions of electricity and what they regard as a fair pricing system may be the key to forming policies that would have legitimacy in the population and would produce sustainable effects (cf. also winther and ericson 2013). hence, we end this paper by indicating how the results may be used for informing policies towards a more sustainable consumption pattern for electricity. 2. the norwegian electricity context – a historical glance   before the deregulation of the norwegian electricity sector, prices were determined by the authorities. vertically-integrated utilities handled production, transportation and supply, and were required to conduct detailed energy planning. the cost of increased production or transportation was evaluated in relation to the cost of obtaining electricity savings for the end user, and such analyses informed strategies for securing electricity supply (eikeland 1998). many households were subject to a two-price tariff on electricity, referred to as an h3 tariff. the purpose was primarily to limit the outtake of power because of the limited capacity of the electricity grid. customers were charged a higher rate per kwh when they exceeded a certain power level (kw). accompanying this system, a wattmeter was installed in people’s home. this metering device showed customers when they exceeded the limit (nou 1998). in the 1980s the two-price system was replaced by a new tariff (h4) in which the price per kwh remained the same irrespective of people’s power outtake and consumption.4 the norwegian electricity sector was liberalized in 1991 and included a household market from the start. the purpose of deregulation was to achieve higher economic efficiency in resource utilization (bye and hope 2005). consumers were given the opportunity to choose their energy supplier in a competitive market.5 the transportation of electricity was not deregulated and                                                                                                                           4  the shift from h3 to h4 is said to have been made with a concern for stimulating energy efficiency (nou 1998:420). apparently, many people did not understand the wattmeter and the h3 tariff.     5 as of 1 july 2013, there are 85 energy suppliers on the norwegian competition authority’s list of energy suppliers offering electricity to private consumers in norway (konkurransetilsynet 2013). 100 consilience   the power grid is still a natural monopoly in which prices are regulated. owners of the grid have a duty to deliver electricity to consumers irrespective of which energy supplier the consumer chooses. both network companies and energy suppliers issue electricity bills to their customers. customers may choose various kinds of contracts depending on what their supplier offers. progressive charges are not practiced. eikeland observes that one of the effects of deregulation was that the duty to find solutions to environmental challenges became institutionally fragmented (eikeland 1998). further, producers, network companies and suppliers all received economic incentive to increase the volume of electricity trading. as eikeland argues, this placed a new kind of responsibility on the individual consumer to choose energy-efficient solutions (eikeland 1998: 922),6 which would obviously be closely linked to the price of electricity. in norway, 96% of electricity production is hydropower (nve 2011), and a large supply of hydropower has resulted in electricity prices that have been historically low compared to the rest of europe, which poses a challenge to realising energy saving potentials. the country exchanges power with other countries, but the variation in electricity prices is considerable (see also bye et al. 2010). the authorities have a policy of promoting energy efficiency as well as a shift towards more renewable sources.7 hence, in addition to being customers in a market, electricity consumers are sometimes also positioned within a saving discourse. 3. the logics behind energy consumption   we draw on theories that assume there are a range of potential logics for action. an early study by sen (1985) points to two types of logics in people’s reasoning. he makes a distinction between “well-being” and “agency”. the wellbeing aspect is based on people’s individualistic preferences or self-interests (see sen 1987). the agency aspect comprises the opinions and beliefs that individuals hold, for instance about different policies in a society. an individual’s preferences could be based on both a well-being and an agency perspective. later came sagoff’s book economy of the earth (1988), which focused on a similar dichotomy: sagoff made a difference between “consumer” and “citizen” logics. the consumer role is the position you take when you are primarily concerned with your personal or self-regarding wants and interests. as a citizen, on the other hand, you are concerned with and behave according to the public interest. thus, you focus on the community rather than on your own immediate well-being. the                                                                                                                           6 eikeland holds that “a basic normative assumption underpinning any system of market-based trading is consumer sovereignty – supply of goods and services are supposed to be driven by consumer demand. indeed, both the uk 1989 electricity act and the norwegian 1990 energy act state the major responsibility that consumers have for choosing energy-efficient end-use solutions.” 7  see for example the aims of enova, a state enterprise owned by the norwegian ministry of petroleum and energy: http://www.enova.no/about-enova/about-enova/259/0/   consilience westskog et al.: electricity consumption     position of an individual may shift contextually (sagoff 1988: 8).8 nyborg’s (2000) “homo economicus – homo politicus” distinction has much in common with sagoff’s consumer–citizen dichotomy. homo economicus is a person who maximises his own well-being, whereas a person acting in the logic of homo politicus puts himself in the role as an ethical observer, and tries to consider what is best for the society (nyborg 2000: 309–10). as indicated, individuals might base their choices on logics other than the traditional economic one. as a consequence, people might also use different logics depending on the particular issue in question (westskog 1997). when issues relating to policies come on the table, a homo politicus or citizen logic would often be the one that guides behaviour or views. the same would often be the case when people are asked to explain their opposition to policies and/or their willingness to act according to such policies. acknowledging the strength of situational and contextual factors that influence what logic comes into play also has methodological implications, as we discuss below. westskog et al. (2011) develop a framework for understanding the various factors that produce a given logic and rationale for action. the model is useful for studying the degree of coherence between logics on different levels (i.e. the individual, the group and the societal levels), but in this paper we focus on the degree of coherence between logics embedded on the system level (electricity) and the logics held by people themselves. the model incorporates the social and material structures that surround and affect individuals when performing a given behaviour.9 when the logics held by people are known to policymakers, the implementation of policies that are attuned to the yielding logic is likely to be understood and could potentially have the intended effects (ibid.). this is so because people operate under the same logic as the one within which the policy was formulated. similarly, kahan et al. (2011) discuss the importance of communicating in a way that is consistent with the cultural cognition of people. cultural cognition refers to the tendency of people to form perceptions of risks and facts that are in accordance with their own values (kahan 2010). hence, coherence between policy and the field in which people operate enhances acceptance (see also winther and ericson 2013). conversely, if policymakers erroneously believe that individuals are operating under the same logic as the one underlying a given policy, the introduction of the policy might result in behavioural effects other than those the                                                                                                                           8  nyborg’s (2000) “homo economicus – homo politicus” distinction has much in common with sagoff’s consumer–citizen dichotomy. homo economicus is a person who maximises her own well-being, whereas a person acting in the logic of homo politicus puts herself in the role of an ethical observer, and tries to consider what is best for society. 9  there is a distinction between societal structures on the one hand, which are the existing elements that make up a society, and policies of various kinds that influence but do not determine behaviour on the other hand. in the model, hard policies (taxes, regulations) fall into the category of material conditions that may or may not change people’s logic for action (e.g. the smoking law affected people’s morality when it came to smoking in private homes). soft policies often intend to directly affect societal norms and values, and may or may not succeed in providing such shifts. in this paper we do not discuss each of the factors on all three levels further, but are concerned with the resulting fields or logics for action.   102 consilience   policymaker expected or in no response at all. throughout this paper we will present several examples of conflicting logics that lead to the misunderstanding of policies, protest and types of behaviour other than those intended by the policymaker. 4. methodology   our empirical data derives from 18 in-depth interviews with people in their homes and eight focus group sessions attended by 64 people in total. the first round of interviews was conducted in asker (a town 30 km west of oslo) in february 2011. the main purpose of these interviews was to get customers’ responses to different types of information on energy saving being tried out in a field experiment with hafslund nett.10 we conducted nine interviews with both men and women, all living in detached houses.11 the second round of in-depth interviews was conducted in august and september 2012 in follo (30 km east of oslo) and askøy (an island lying 20 km outside of bergen). these interviews focused on the families’ use of displays to visualise energy consumption.12 here we conducted nine interviews with families living in apartments and detached houses. semi-structured interview guides were used during the two rounds of indepth interviews. in all cases we covered general questions on energy behaviour, as well as if, how and to what extent the interviewees try to save electricity, and how they regard electricity consumption in a societal context. we also asked if they consider electricity to be a right or a commodity in line with other commodities traded in a market. finally, the interviewees were asked about their views on energy policies aimed at reducing energy consumption. we arranged focus group sessions in december 2009.13 four sessions were held in kirkenes (northern norway) and four in oslo. all sessions included eight participants and the groups were age and gender specific.14 the discussions were led by a moderator from synovate, who used a focus group guide developed by the researchers for structuring the two-hour discussions. in both places,                                                                                                                           10  these interviews formed part of the project “do customer information programmes influence electricity consumption?”, financed by the research council of norway (2009-2011), project no 190769/s60. hafslund is a major energy supplier in norway serving most of the oslo area with electricity. the nett division is responsible for the transport system of electricity within this energy supplier company.     11  the reason why we only interviewed individuals living in detached houses was that only households from this category had been included in the field experiment.     12  these interviews formed part of the project “esparr energy savings: from regulation to realisation”, financed by the norwegian research council (2012-14), project no 216473/e20. we recruited these families from a list of approximately 80 households who had volunteered to test out the display “ewave” in their homes for about one year, related to a project at sintef. 8 out of 9 in our sample expressed a high concern for saving electricity. 13  the recruitment of participants was handled by synovate via telephone using the telephone register or by contacting people who had previously volunteered to participate in focus groups. 14 the four groups in each place consisted of men aged 30-45, men aged 50-65, women aged 3045, women aged 50-65, respectively. consilience westskog et al.: electricity consumption     people were exposed to, and were asked to comment on, information material regarding electricity.15 in addition, all groups were asked general questions about electricity, their energy behaviour at home and what they do for saving energy, including the reasons for this. the participants were also asked if they regard electricity as a right or as a market good in line with other goods, and if they think that people are entitled to use as much electricity as they want as long as they pay for it. these conversations did not take place in the context of normal, everyday life, especially during the focus group sessions that were organised outside of people’s homes. thus, the answers can sometimes be seen as reflecting people’s attitudes towards electricity use in general, not their personal electricity use at home. participants were also aware of the agenda of this research and were presented with material promoting either savings or renewable sources. moreover, the phrasing of some of the questions, e.g. “are people entitled to use as much as they want”, may have been interpreted as biased (e.g. it sounded “wasteful”), thus leading people to give answers in a sustainable, normative direction. to some extent, we therefore assume that people’s statements were influenced by their underlying expectation that normative, “right” answers would be appreciated. however, the variation in people’s responses and their often-nuanced accounts signal that they were not uniformly directed to provide certain type of answers. 5. the logics electricity as a commodity or common property? allocation within national borders i am not a communist, but when it comes to electricity i am somewhat of a communist. this is a national thing in my eyes. it’s ours. it’s our rivers that we have devastated. we are the ones who built the dams. 1/nikolai, male participant in focus group 8, kirkenes, 2009 the quote above illustrates an often-stated view among interviewees and focus group participants: norway’s hydropower is a renewable resource that belongs to the norwegian population (winther and bouly de lesdain 2013). there is a clear distinction in our material between the views expressed on the management of scarce electricity resources within norwegian borders and the export of this resource. in this section we discuss people’s views on the management of electricity within norwegian borders. we turn to the issue of exports later on. in the collected material, people’s perceptions of electricity, consumption and savings can be divided into two main categories that correspond to the consumer and citizen logics, respectively. the groups that articulated these distinct logics were fairly equal in size.16 the main findings will be presented below. but first,                                                                                                                           15  in kirkenes the focus group participants were presented with information about electricity with a renewable guarantee, and in oslo the material contained information about electricity savings.       16  it is difficult to quantify people’s statements in a precise ways. in the focus groups participants were influenced by each other; thus if one person made a strong argument, others would tend to 104 consilience   an introductory description of how we arrived at these categories is in order. when people were asked if they thought that electricity is a commodity or a common property, they often hesitated. to elaborate, we asked if they thought that electricity is a good in line with other goods such as sugar and coffee, which are traded in a market, or if they think that electricity is something different. many said that it is different from other goods in that it is something “needed.” or an “infrastructure”. others simply stated that electricity is a market good. to address moral and normative issues, we went on to ask participants in the focus groups if they think that there should be a limit to individual consumption. we used people’s answers to this question, and similar statements from the interviews about the need for a “limit”, as the main criterion for placing respondents into one of the two categories. 5.1 the consumerist logic; electricity managed as a commodity many respondents expressed the view that people have a moral right to use electricity as much as they want. “as long as i pay for it, it is ok” (lars, 4/focus group 3, oslo). “we have the right to use a commodity that we pay for” (ola, 2/fg 4, oslo). in line with a consumerist logic, this view follows the energy act of 1990, which is the legal basis for the current electricity market in norway and mainstream economic thinking. the scarcity of the electricity product should be regulated by market forces in the same way as other products and services in a market economy. this makes electricity a product in line with other market products. regarding the potential environmental costs of producing and consuming electricity, some said that these should be integrated into the electricity price (fg 3, oslo): moderator: so you think that we may use as much as we want as long as we pay for it? 4|lars: yes, if nature is affected, the price will be increased. then you cannot afford it and that is how the regulation works. moderator: so you think that the price increases if nature is affected? 4|lars: yes, and then you must find alternative ways to keep warm if you lose your job or something. moderator: (addressing the whole group): do you think that the price increases if the environment is affected? 8|helge: yes. 4|lars: yes. others: yes. 2|kenneth: i think the price should encourage people to save. following the logic of market thinking, the argument is that if negative environmental effects occur because of electricity production or consumption, this should be regulated by increasing the price in accordance with the cost of the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               agree. also, the open approach adopted during the interviews implied that the questions were not identical in every interview (see section 4).   consilience westskog et al.: electricity consumption     effects on the environment (externalities in economics). the last comment by kenneth links the issue of price back to savings, and underlines that individuals are not morally obliged to save but will do so when the price rises. a few participants regarded regulations as unacceptable per se: “there are enough restrictions in life. we don’t need restrictions on everything.” (geir, 2/fg 8, kirkenes). economic liberalists would make the same argument, favouring the free market and opposing government intervention. this view can be interpreted as belonging to a consumerist logic, although in a more extreme direction and not in line with economic theories on the effective allocation of resources. in sum, people in the consumerist group expressed their adherence to and moral support of the liberal norwegian electricity market. they did not think that individuals have a moral obligation to limit consumption, which is an issue to be solved through pricing mechanisms in the market. this finding may not be surprising given that norwegians have become habituated to their role as consumers in the electricity market, which was introduced more than 20 years ago. approximately one quarter of norwegian households has chosen a supplier other than their local one (nve 2011: 74-5). what we find interesting is that a considerable share of our respondents seemed to follow a different logic than the pure market logic when it came to their perceptions of electricity and savings. 5.2 the citizen logic; electricity managed as a common property   in this group of respondents, which we refer to as citizens, electricity tended to be associated with “necessities” and “infrastructure” rather than with a typical market good. they share the consumerist view that norwegian hydropower belongs to the population, but they take the common property idea further and use it as a reference for how they believe electricity should be managed. they believe that there should be a limit to individual consumption. their arguments were sometimes anchored in altruistic perceptions such as environmental concerns or a moral obligation to save (e.g. “norway uses far more electricity than other countries, so we should reduce consumption”). but most of the citizens directly referred to the problem of scarcity, the need to allocate resources and the burden of saving electricity in a fair manner, as we demonstrate below. many would highlight the importance of ensuring that nobody freezes when prices are high. to ensure affordable prices for all, some suggested introducing differing prices, which we will treat in the next sub-section. when the moderator asked participants in the focus groups if they think that people are entitled to use as much electricity they want as long as they pay for it, all four of the female focus groups began a discussion about conspicuous consumption. miriam said, “it shouldn’t be unlimited in terms of how much you can use. if there is a cabin that consumes as much as four households…” (4/fg 5, kirkenes). within the male focus groups, some argued for the need to limit exaggerated consumption as well. johannes also expressed his critique: “i have even been to cabins in geilo that have heating cables outdoors to prevent the foundation from freezing” (4/fg 8, kirkenes). 106 consilience   there has been a trend in norway to construct new cabins of considerable size, fully equipped with modern appliances (aall et al. 2011). these are not for all, and critiques of “cabin castles” are sometimes referred to in the press. many participants made associations with this kind of practice when asked about people’s right to consume as much as they want. by referring to the cabin discourse, participants in effect distanced themselves from the problem of scarcity and how it should be solved. when arguing for the need for some kind of limit to consumption, citizens often implied that they think some groups are currently over-consuming without having to pay accordingly. by this, they indicated that they do not regard electricity as an ordinary commodity in line with, say, sugar or coffee, where there are no limits to the level of consumption. when voicing such critiques of other groups, the citizens seemed just as concerned about being subject to policy appeals for reducing consumption as they were with personally having experienced the drawback of peaking prices and high electricity bills. in other words, appeals to reduce consumption trigger debate about justice. many people found it unfair that ordinary people are asked to save electricity. some asked why they should try to save when wealthy people, industry and even public buildings over-use electricity, such as when street lights are kept on all the time. maria said: it’s not only about the household, it’s the whole thing. you see the shops with christmas lighting and all that. we’re supposed to work as a team. you cannot just tell private people that now you have to save. (8/fg 2, oslo). inga, in another group, stated: i become a bit irritated when we see these people who construct cabins of more than five hundred square meters, keeping the heat on everywhere. am i supposed to save while they... i think it is nearly despicable. if everybody is supposed to save, then everybody has to contribute. if we’re all supposed to save, everyone has to take part. (5/fg 5, oslo). the view that resources should be distributed in a fair manner, as expressed by maria and inga, has a parallel in egalitarian thinking. egalitarian principles in ethics assert that the best social policy is one where the welfare of the society is maximised subject to the constraint that all individual members should enjoy equal benefits from society (see e.g. myerson 1981). egalitarian principles could be interpreted as giving each individual an equal right to use a resource, for instance by arguing that each individual should have an equal percapita right to pollute (see for instance baer et al. 2000). embedded in citizens’ arguments were issues of responsibility17 and how to encourage individual energy savings. as illustrated in the quotes above, many people find it provoking to be asked to save when they believe that other groups are using much more electricity. this may trigger an unwillingness to save electricity for reasons of sustainability. several studies have documented that                                                                                                                           17  nyborg (2000) terms this a «homo politicus» with shared responsibility as opposed to a homo politicus with sole responsibility. both types of homo politicus is in line with what we have termed a citizen logic.     consilience westskog et al.: electricity consumption     when people perceive the burden to be unfairly distributed, their own motivation to act altruistically will decline (see for example fraselle and scherer-haynes 2007). in sum, the group referred to as citizens thinks that electricity consumption should be restricted in some ways. the underlying premise is that electricity is a common, national resource which should be managed in a fair way. in contrast to the consumerists, they put forward the view that a person’s level of consumption is a moral issue and that the distribution of electricity has to do with justice. 6. policy solution for bridging two logics: a progressive pricing system policies for reducing electricity consumption were discussed during the interviews and focus group sessions. across the different logics, and particularly among families who were testing out displays,18 many respondents suggested a two-level pricing system as a tool to obtain savings (cf. the facebook campaign). citizens would tend to come up with this idea on their own initiative as a tool to obtain savings in a fair way. for example, on the issue of cabins and conspicuous consumption, hilde followed up and proposed how fair prices could be set: i totally agree. we see these cabin palaces with all kinds of electric equipment, and then they talk about people in general and say they should save, and the electricity becomes more and more expensive. we have to think about the fact that there are people living on a minimum pension who can’t afford it. if we don’t have enough electricity, we have to focus on the ones who waste electricity and large office buildings that keep the lights on 24 hours. it’s not right. then we have to do it this way – that if you use more than a certain amount, it will be twice as expensive. we need a kind of norm that says this is how much it takes to heat a house, this much we have to accept as the ordinary price, and then those who want luxury will have to pay more. (2|fg 5, kirkenes). some of our consumerists who adhere to the logic of the market also mentioned a two-price system when asked what kind of policy could lead to electricity savings in norway. above we referred to kenneth, who argued that the price (rather than moral obligation) should encourage people to save. when asked specifically what would make people save, he suggested a special tax on consumption beyond a certain limit: “the state could put a tax on [consumption] over a necessary level, for example over 20 000 [kwh]” (2/fg 3, oslo). another man, per, expressed a high moral and altruistic concern for saving (which he and his wife were observably also practicing), thus we consider him a citizen. he also                                                                                                                           18  among the 18 interviewed families, the two-price system was most often brought up and/or appreciated by individuals who had voluntarily been testing a display showing electricity consumption in their homes. out of nine interviewees with display families (follo and askøy), two suggested a two-price system on their own initiative, four were positive when we mentioned such a system, one preferred setting different prices for day and night, one preferred higher prices for businesses than households, and one did not respond to the question.   108 consilience   held in-depth knowledge about the electricity market and seemed to trust its organisation except on the issue of producing enough incentives for savings. to make more people in norway reduce consumption, per recommended, “i think it would have been even better if in norway you could get cheap electricity for the initial amount you use and then pay for your over-consumption. then you would be much more concerned with that peak” (interview no 2, follo, norway). hilde and kenneth’s arguments for such a system differ. to hilde, and probably other citizens, the two-level pricing system is viewed as having a role to play in allocating scarce energy resources and the burden of saving in a fair manner. she suggests introducing a new or modified market mechanism in order to solve the issue of justice to obtain a fair market for electricity. in contrast, kenneth proposes the two-price system, not as a solution to a moral problem, but as a pragmatic solution for obtaining savings at large. per is situated between the two, feeling a personal responsibility to save and behave altruistically, but seeing the two-price system as a way to also obtain energy savings at the societal level. because such a system appears justifiable within both of the logics treated in this paper, the two-level pricing system appears to be a promising tool for obtaining energy savings. a norm would signal the level of consumption that is considered necessary. 19 consumption below this level should be priced reasonably low, while consumption above that level should be priced much higher. here, the pricing system would not only be a mechanism that contributed to an efficient allocation of scarce resources, but also one that establishes the norm for consumption and how the burden of saving should be distributed. 7. exports: the common evil   the issue of exports represents an area of highly conflicting logics between those for electricity and systemic policy and those held by people, including nearly all our respondents. the exceptions were a few citizens who maintained that exports are good for environmental reasons. historically, hydropower was developed in norway by building dams and regulating rivers, which might be argued belong to the people of norway through the regulations of the outdoor recreation act (1957). the norwegian “right to access” (allemannsretten) is regulated through this law and is based on an old consuetudinary law called the “allemannsrett”. this law safeguards the public right to access and passage through the countryside as well as the right to spend time there.20 in that regard, regarding the rivers and water basins as common property is reflected in old norms as well as in the law on the right to access the countryside. this might give rise to a low level of acceptance for policies that                                                                                                                           19  respondents who argued for a two-price system said that they realised the difficulty of deciding how a given norm should be set. it is illustrative that among three people who gave their specific opinions on what the limit should be, all suggested a level for “normal” consumption that corresponds to their own consumption (ranging from 10 000 to 20 000 kwh per year).   20  in general, people can pass through, camp and spend time on uncultivated land even if it is private property. there are some specific regulations that limit this, but the overall policy is clear. see government 2011.   consilience westskog et al.: electricity consumption     appear to be leading to the export of the common property. 21 rather, people in our material, both consumerists and citizens, overwhelmingly questioned the export of electricity. jon said: i feel that the water here in norway belongs to me. when they reduce the level of water in the reservoirs, i think it’s wrong. the fact that the companies exploit the water in the early autumn to make money during the winter when it becomes empty and we have to import ... i find that system to be wrong. i can see the arguments for such a system, but considered in isolation, i think it’s wrong. (interview no 5, asker). this interviewee argues that because electricity for him is a common norwegian resource, it is not right that producers and suppliers focus on making a profit and managing the resource so that norway must import [apparently expensive] electricity from other countries. this issue has been hotly debated in norwegian media, especially in periods when electricity prices rise and the water magazines in hydropower dams are reduced (e.g. facebook 2013). from a consumerist point of view, the request to regulate norway’s export with surrounding countries could be understood as a call for establishing a boundary in terms of how far the consumerist logic should apply: for those who belong to the community that owns this common commodity, the resource should be handled according to standard market principles. for those who do not belong to the society that shares this common resource, other rules should apply; thus people in other countries should not have access to this resource in the same way that norwegians do. figure 1 sums up the empirical findings. the group referred to as consumerists follows the market logic embedded in the system up to the point where electricity is exported through power exchange with other countries, after which they call for regulation. the other group, referred to as the citizens, also perceive norwegian hydropower as a resource that should primarily benefit the norwegian population. they call for regulation vis-à-vis the outside world to ensure that the country does not export electricity before norwegians have fulfilled their needs at a favourable cost. in addition, the citizens call for                                                                                                                           21  norway exchanges electric power with its nordic neighbours sweden, denmark and finland (the four countries also form part of a common market: the nord pool spot power exchange) as well as russia and the netherlands. these interconnectedness implies that the power price in norway is dependent on the conditions for generation, transmission and consumption in the nordic region as well as other european markets to which the nordic countries are connected. because of the high share of hydropower in norwegian (nordic) power supply,  variations in precipitation and temperature result in considerable fluctuations in power prices (the ministry of petroleum and energy 2013: 52). hence, in years with low precipitation and winters with low temperatures, total consumption in norway is likely to be higher than total power production and in this case, electricity (annual net volume) is imported from abroad (ibid.: 57). with opposite conditions, norway exports electricity. for example, in 2012 norway produced 146.4 twh electricity of which 128.8 twh were consumed inside norway. the remaining power (12%) was exported (statnett 2013). 110 consilience   appropriate consumption norms, as they are concerned with the question of fair resource allocation in norway. figure 1: two kinds of logics for perceiving electricity and appropriate pricing systems arising from the norwegian material. the “broken” arrows towards export illustrate that the market logic and the citizen logic do not apply for the case of export. very few respondents mentioned that norway also imports electricity from neighbouring countries. 7. conclusion: the importance of coherence in logics   our findings show that the norwegians under study employ two different logics when it comes to electricity consumption and savings. they all share the view that electricity is a common norwegian resource, and most respondents are therefore highly sceptical towards what they view as a unidirectional export (i.e. disregarding import) of norwegian power to surrounding countries. however, in terms of how the common resource should be managed within norway, two distinct groups emerged from the material that was collected through 18 interviews and eight focus group discussions that included 64 participants. we have drawn on theories on logics for action (sen 1985, sagoff 1988, nyborg 2000, westskog et al. 2011) to interpret the results. the logic underpinning the electricity market in norway largely resonates with the viewpoints of about half of our respondents, who we have referred to as consumerists: “as long as i pay for it, it is ok.” the market logic is mainly the one underlying the energy act (1990) and much of policy-making vis-à-vis electricity in norway. however, this market logic is at odds with the views that are expressed by the other group of respondents, which are based on a citizen logic. with regard to situations of scarcity, the citizens think that “luxury” consumption should be restricted in some way in times of cold weather and high electricity prices,. given norway’s more than 20 years of liberalised markets in the household sector, this finding, along with the emotional intensity with which citizen-arguments were sometimes put forward, are striking. consilience westskog et al.: electricity consumption     the sources of the problem of conflicting logics seem partly linked to the observation that the norwegian electricity system itself entails a double set of messages. on the one hand, it presents a market-based system in which people are invited to purchase and use electricity in the same way that they buy and consume sugar and bread. on the other hand, policy makes sporadic appeals for saving electricity, particularly in periods when scarcity is perceived to be a problem (cold season, high prices). thus according to the situation, electricity users are asked to switch between various logics of action. in this light, it is perhaps little wonder that they have mixed views and moral judgements about consumption and savings. moreover, we believe that the high degree of complexity associated with the electricity market, together with the volatile prices and uncertainty, contribute to blurring picture of the kind of logic that yields (or should yield) in this field. ordinary people tend to have fragmented knowledge about the technical and financial aspects of the electricity (see winther and ericson 2013 for a treatment of customers’ “ignorance”, a state created by the system). as a result, they hold on to the overall, national discourse on electricity in which electricity is seen as a common norwegian resource (prolongation of rivers and lakes) and where “export” is regarded as the main problem. electricity exchange represents an area of highly conflicting logics between the policy and system level on the one hand and electricity users on the other. the “problem of export” most often came up in conversations on the potential for achieving electricity savings, reflecting that people tend to see these issues as interlinked. when there is a lack of coherence between the logics, people hold onto the one(s) entailed in the system. thus, a conflict may arise that negatively affects people’s willingness to voluntarily engage in energy saving activities. our results indicate that a two-level pricing system that takes into account a call for justice could potentially merge the two kinds of logics make them more coherent, resulting in a higher motivation for energy savings; many of our respondents advocated this pricing system in norway. such a system has also been proposed in france (assemblée nationale, 2012). this would entail merging the market and citizen logics by placing a cap on normal consumption while at the same time retaining the basic components of the market system. inefficiencies in an economic sense would of course be a result of progressive pricing. however, faced with the possibility of increased energy savings through a price system that signals the level of consumption that is considered necessary for all, this could outweigh the disadvantages of these inefficiencies. acknowledgements we wish to thank participants during the milen conference in oslo 2012 and the behave conference in finland in september 2012 for their valuable contributions. we appreciate the useful input provided by two anonymous readers, and we thank our colleagues on the research team, einar strumse, håkon salen and torgeir ericson. connie stultz proofed the english language. 112 consilience   bibliography aall, c., i. g. klepp , a. b. engeset , s. e. skuland and e. støa (2011), leisure and sustainable development in norway: part of the solution and the problem, leisure studies 30, pp. 453-476 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02614367.2011.589863 assemblée nationale (2012), “proposition de loi instaurant une tarification progressive de l’énergie no 150”, presented by f. brottes and b. le roux paris, france. http://www.assembleenationale.fr/14/dossiers/tarification_progressive_energie.asp accessed in october 2012. baer, p., j. harte, b. haya, a. v. herzog, j. holdren, n. e. hultman, d. m. kammen, r. b. norgaard and l. 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(1997), the use of cost-benefit analysis to decide environmental policy a dead end?. the journal of interdisciplinary economics 8, pp. 185-208. winther, t. and t. ericson (2013), matching policy and people? household responses to the promotion of renewable electricity, energy efficiency 6, pp. 369-385. winther, t. and s. bouly de lesdain (2013), electricity, uncertainty and the good life: a comparison of french and norwegian household responses to policy appeals for sustainable energy, energy and environment research 3, pp. 71-84. batkhishig 1 sustainable living and mongolian nomads: is there development? dulguun batkhishig dulguun@gohelp.org.uk a native mongolian, dulguun batkhishig studied development and economics at the university of london’s school of oriental and african studies. she works for uk charities striving to bring sustainable development and social justice to mongolia. mailto:dulguun@gohelp.org.uk batkhishig 2 author's note though originally from mongolia, i have lived and studied in london since 1997, but during this time, my connection with my homeland has motivated me to maintain a passion for its development. consequently, i have studied development and economics at the university of london’s school of oriental and african studies. at the moment, i'm working for camda, a uk charity that assists nomads in overcoming the difficult challenges they face, as well as go help uk, an organization with a strong presence in mongolia fighting for child protection. involvement with these groups has allowed me to take part in the arduous journey toward a developed mongolia. i have plans to study further in the field of agricultural and sustainable development, and, as the processes of development are not uniform from place to place, i want to explore the unique way mongolia can attain proper development. keywords: mongolia, nomads, self-sustainability. batkhishig 3 sustainable living and mongolian nomads: is there development? the first nomadic pastoral society developed around 8500-6500 bc in the southern levant (modern-day jordan and southern israel). it subsequently spread to the eurasian steppe and, in the middle ages, to turko-mongol lands. since then, nomadism has been a way of self-sustained living for the herders of mongolia. reliant on the vacillating seasons and the well-being of their livestock, nomadic herder families have developed a unique mode of living. in the 1990s, the rapid transformation of the mongolian economy and the country’s political fomented radical changes. the most drastic shifts occurred in rural areas since nomadic living was no longer subject to state support as during the socialist era. the open economy brought with it the need for herders to acquire sources of income and take part in the monetary market to supply themselves with basic necessities once provided by the government. over the last decade, tourism has grown rapidly in mongolia. travelers from all over the world are eager to explore a large chunk of asia previously unseen in modern times. tourism has generated a constant, albeit small, rise in mongolia’s gdp, and that upward trend is predicted to continue. in the summer during tourist season, employment opportunities arise at resorts, ger camps and spas in regions of the country that tourists are inclined to visit. some herder families send their children to schools and then further education in tourism and language courses so they can eventually secure full-time employment at the camp or resort. such was the case with saraa, the woman whose family i photographed. after graduating from university in the capital city ulaanbaatar, saraa had worked at the resort near where she is settled for three years as assistant manager. for many children of herder families, this career path is the only way to make a living that does not depend on the seasons. for herders that settle near a resort or camp, their traditional ways of life have been adapted to as what mongolians call zah zeel, which literally translates as market and loans. the term means that, with the rapid burgeoning of tourism, the unique rituals and techniques of herders are now being performed for income. though an economic boon, the flourishing tourism industry also poses problems, increasing strains on resources of regions that are popular with visitors. one such resource is the water supply, an issue that has, in the last few years, received considerable attention from herders as well as ngos and international organizations i . droughts and poor pasture has exacerbated the need for water, which is usually utilized in huge amounts at tourist attractions batkhishig 4 and resorts. furthermore, the seasonal nature of tourism in mongolia means herders see many difficult winters if their primary income is tourism. plus, nomadic communities are vastly spread out, and not all herder families benefit from tourists in summer months, especially in remote regions. for nomads, sustainable living is an important tradition and vital to their livelihood. this lifestyle needs more support to continue as viable for the significant portion of the mongolian population that practices it. we need to learn from their simplicity of life and also recognize that nomadic herders can embrace development and progress, especially technological. solar panels, wind generators and briquettes from recycled wood chippings are useful tools in their lives, as well as compact and environmentally friendly. mongolians ourselves and travelers who visit must all realize that the preservation of this way of life is important. otherwise, destabilizing plights like mass migration, unemployment and urban strains as well as illegal mining activities will increase due to herder poverty. when we photographed her in july 2008, saraa had moved back to live with her nomadic community, including her parents and siblings, and was celebrating her engagement on the day we met. the photographs have been taken in arkhangai province near tsenher village where saraa and her family had settled for the summer. with their kindness and the support of tseveendavaa ozoi, who assisted me, i was able to enter their lives for a brief time. batkhishig 5 although herders move with the seasons to more accommodating areas, some families find it profitable to return annually to where tourists hotspots during the summer months. indeed, it can be the only source of their livelihood in years when the seasons are not kind to their livestock. such was the case between 2000 and 2003 when dzud ii occurred and depleted the nation's stock, which has not recovered fully since. batkhishig 6 when choosing seasonal settlements, water is a big issue for herder families. it is often necessary for them to travel long distances to wells. in the province of arkhangai, water supply is not as scarce as in more remote regions like the gobi desert to the south. batkhishig 7 saraa's family had settled near a hot spring resort known as 'shiveet mankhan' not far from tsenher village in arkhangai province. here, water is relatively easy to access. many people from herder families find summer work in this resort and its neighboring camps. they also benefit from electrical generators and wells. thus, it is practical to remain close to camps resorts like this one. batkhishig 8 a national program iii in mongolia was implemented to attempt to satisfy the basic energy needs of nomadic herding families in the dispersed and distant poor rural communities. so far, 48,000 families have adopted solar panels and wind generators. following this success, the '100,000 solar lights' program has been implemented to supply, at a steeply discounted price, the remaining 120,000 families lacking a connection to the central grid with solar and wind generators. this initiative is an important improvement since the vastness of mongolia can leave a herder family totally isolated for much of the year. electricity means access to news broadcasts and weather reports along with a better chance of political participation in the rural areas and the growing awareness of environmental sustainability and resource management. batkhishig 9 settling near a tourist camp or resort gives the entrepreneurial herder the opportunity to make small profit from selling dairy produce as well as meat and boodog iv directly to the curious tourists. sometimes, they can even make an agreement to supply the camp itself for a consistent flow of income. such economy has become profitable for herders, but the decreased total number of livestock and prospects for maintaining a sustainable level of cattle needs to be addressed in the long term. batkhishig 10 dairy produce yields a significant proportion of a herder family's income and daily diet. yaks are particularly useful as their milk can be used to make orom. v along with orom, aaruul, aarts and byaslag vi and simple milk are all self-sustainable foods. batkhishig 11 the yaks are milked every morning by hand. each family owns different numbers of yaks. this particular summer, four families had settled together, owning about five yaks each and sharing the work amongst themselves. batkhishig 12 the amount of milk produced from each family's yaks depends on the growth of vegetation and quality of the pastures in that year. batkhishig 13 simmering of the yak milk is a morning ritual for herder families. batkhishig 14 the process of clotting the milk can take all day; a cup of salted milky tea is a herder family culinary staple. batkhishig 15 byaslag is made by sieving aarts vii from the milk through a bag and molding into a shape. it is later sliced and served to guests. most of the guests are from next door and frequently visit unannounced. batkhishig 16 making aaruul is an old tradition done by wrapping the aarts in a piece of cloth, forming a shape and cutting it into thin pieces with a string. the aaruul is placed on a board to dry. batkhishig 17 it is usual for the board with aaruul to be placed on top of the ger. when a family is expecting guests or holding a gathering (as it was saraa's family for their engagement party), tsagaan idee viii is essential and used as asnack, decorating the table and serving as farewell gifts. dairy products are associated with goodness and generosity. batkhishig 18 the last stages of making aaruul. batkhishig 19 one use of a mare's milk is to produce mermel ix in the ger. batkhishig 20 from an early age, children of herder families learn many skills and techniques of animal husbandry, the nomadic way, as well as methods of self-sustainability. many families believe in the benefits of having many children, who prove helpful at all ages. however, the consistency and quality of education received by each child vary from province to province and based on the family’s financial situation. a family’s financial health generally boils down to good pasture growth. batkhishig 21 in the mountains in arkhangai, wild strawberries grow in abundance, and many kids pick them to sell to tourists and campers. batkhishig 22 the mares are milked in the mornings and evenings. their milk is used as a natural remedy and is often sold to mongolians and some tourists. it is also used to produce airag x —made by fermenting the mare's milk over the course of hours or days, often while stirring or churning. because mare's milk contains more sugar than the cow's or goat's milk, airag has a higher, though still mild, alcohol content. batkhishig 23 herders have developed to use new technologies as well as new means of living. however, living standards have stagnated. this arrested development of their quality of life can be explained by the lack of long-term strategic development projects and plans to improve the capacity of herders to endure natural disasters. as mentioned above, herders’ ability to remain self-sustained and independent of seasonal boosts like tourism also must be addressed. batkhishig 24 the changes tourism brings to the herders and their lives can benefit those who, for example, were previously unable to attend school, but how sustainable are these changes? nomadic living may need to evolve so that the next generation of herder families can have better opportunities and, more importantly, the knowledge to sustain their unique way of living. batkhishig 25 endnotes 1 one involved group is the cambridge and mongolia development appeal (camda), which was established to support the mongolian nomadic community through grassroots solutions. you can learn more www.camda.org.uk. 2 natural disaster affecting the livestock caused by severe natural conditions such as drought and/or excessive heat/snow. 3 the '100,000 solar gers.’ 4 steam cooked whole goat. 5 simmering of the milk and standing to cool to create clotted cream. 6 various types of cheeses made using different methods. 7 made by curdling the milk and using the solids to form other types of dairy produce. 8 literally meaning white produce. 9 fermented mare’s milk is strengthened through freeze distillation, but it is more commonly distilled into the spirit known as arkhi in a large metal container. it is commonly drunk by herders and is said to be a very pure form of alcohol. 10 also known as kumis amongst the people from the central asian steppe. http://www.camda.org.uk/ dear reader, we are pleased to present issue xxii of consilience: the journal of sustainable development. this issue arrives at a time of broad uncertainty and turbulence. covid-19 continues to inflict tragedy upon our world: it has torn social fabrics, exacerbated inequalities, and shuttered economies. as a field which puts these systems, among many others, in a direct conversation with one another, the study and practice of sustainable development is eminently important at this time. another tragedy is the persistent and poisonous racial inequality in the united states, which continues to inflict violence upon black americans. the sustainability community, including consilience, must act against the racism and underrepresentation that exists silently, structurally, and explicitly in our field – complacency must no longer be the norm. responses to current challenges disturbingly parallel the world’s response to the climate crisis, ranging from exasperating scientific denialism to the devastating neglect of marginalized groups. consilience confronts such challenges in issue xxii by continuing to uphold fact-based research and incorporating diverse voices. the issue opens with a perspective by world-renowned economist and global leader in sustainable development dr. jeffrey sachs, who stresses the importance of emerging from the pandemic with a multilateral global framework. in the remainder of the issue, our writers have worked diligently to expand the boundaries of our thinking and understanding around a range of sustainable development topics. they critically evaluate traditional water structures in india, discuss the power of narratives in the lives of climate refugees, and thoroughly analyze the relationship between a nation’s culture and its urban climate resilience, to describe a few. the issue is geographically diverse, with pieces covering brazil, ghana, australia, india, and others. issue xxii frames discourse around a solutions-oriented approach to the collective well-being of our planet and its people. upon your completion of the issue, we encourage you to further engage with consilience through our events and briefings column. we have expanded these branches substantially over the past year and have grown our team to over 40 columbia students. we are incredibly proud of what consilience has achieved this year, ultimately allowing the journal to provide increasingly engaging and relevant content to a larger audience. we hope that this issue allows our readers to envision a more sustainable future. thank you for your readership. warmly, amar bhardwaj and sophia ahmed co-editors in chief consilience: the journal of sustainable development view journal | view issue note from the editorsnote from the editors doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6730 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 1-12 http://consiliencejournal.org https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/consilience/issue/view/651 consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 6, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 20–47 female education, contraceptive use, and fertility: evidence from uganda edward bbaale center for global development washington, d.c. ebbaale@cgdev.org paul mpuga united nations children’s fund (unicef) kigali, rwanda paulmpuga@yahoo.co.uk abstract we use the demographic and health survey of 2006 to examine the relationship between female education, contraceptive use, and fertility rates in uganda. our findings reveal that female education, especially at the secondary and post-secondary levels, increases the likelihood of using contraceptives and reduces fertility. as a result, measures that aim to educate women beyond secondary level are needed. the government programme to extend free education at the secondary level is an important measure that may help to reduce fertility and should therefore be strengthened. author’s note edward bbaale is a visiting fellow at the centre for global development in washington d.c. he obtained a phd in economics from the university of linzaustria in 2008. his research interests include health care services and outcomes for women and children. paul mpuga holds a phd in economic and social sciences from johannes kepler university, linz-austria. he is currently working with unicef in rwanda as social policy manager, where he is in charge of supporting evidence-based policy making and research. his research interests include health, population and rural development. paul loves peace and tranquility around him. the authors wish to thank the african economic research consortium (aerc) for sponsoring a project that contributed to much of this paper. however, the views in this paper are those of the authors and not of aerc. the authors also thank the lord almighty for the work done in this article. keywords: female education, contraceptives, fertility, family planning, uganda. consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education 1. introduction remarkable socio-economic progress has been achieved in uganda in the past two decades, with economic growth (percentage change in gross domestic product) averaging about 6% since 1992. the government of uganda (gou) has made great strides in its attempt to meet the targets set out in the previous two rounds of the poverty eradication action plan (peap, 1997-2002 and 2002-2007) and the millennium development goals (mdgs) by 2015, including reducing poverty levels and increasing access to social services. the gou is now implementing a new national development plan (ndp 2010-2015). through the ndp and the peap, the government underscores the important linkages between better health outcomes, poverty reduction, and economic growth. progress has been most notable in the achievement of universal primary education enrollment, gender parity in primary education, and the fight against hiv/aids (undp, 2007; republic of uganda, 2004). however, huge challenges remain in ensuring gender parity in secondary education, reducing infant and child mortality, and improving maternal health. as a consequence, uganda experiences some of the poorest health indicators in the world. for example, the country’s life expectancy at birth of approximately 50 years is low compared to the world average of about 66 years. in 2005/6, infant mortality was estimated at around 76 for every 1,000 children live births, a slight decline from 88 out of every 1,000 births in 2000/01 (republic of uganda, 2007). the maternal mortality rate is estimated at 435 for every 100,000 women giving birth. uganda’s total fertility rate (tfr)1 of about 6.7 children per woman is one of the highest in the world, (republic of uganda, 2007, 1998a, 1998b; population reference bureau, 2001). because of these high fertility rates, uganda has population growth rates of about 3.2% per annum, the third highest in the world, and a dependency ratio of about 108 dependants for every 100 working persons, the highest in the world. the uganda demographic and health survey report (dhs, 2006) elaborated on some of the factors that contribute to the high fertility rates among the women of uganda. the factors considered include age, and sexual characteristics of women such as the age at which a woman first enters marriage, age of first sexual relations, and frequency of sexual relations. others include post-partum amenorrhea2 and abstinence from sexual relations. the dhs analysis provides descriptive evidence on the underlying factors, dwelling mainly on age group and regional differences, but does not provide a rigorous quantitative analysis, for example, on the 1 total fertility rate (tfr) is defined as the average number of children a woman would have in her lifetime assuming the current age-specific birth rates, (population reference bureau, 2001). 2 total fertility rates for countries of western europe and north america are as low as 1.5 and 1.9 children per woman, respectively. on the other hand, the average for developing countries as a group is about 3.6 and about 5.6 children per woman for sub-saharan africa. 22 consilience impact of the level of female education on fertility or level of education on contraceptive use. a number of studies, using data from both developed and developing countries show that female education is associated with a decrease in fertility (sackey, 2005; lam and duryea, 1999; ainsworth et al, 1996; vavrus and larsen, 2003; guilkey, 1998; ben-porath, 1973; gardner, 1973; schultz, 1973; 1974; 1997; 2008). according to lam and duryea (1999), brazil provides an intriguing case of a developing country (probably the best example) that experienced rapid fertility decline (since the 1960s) in the absence of a major family planning effort. the authors estimate that slow but steady improvements in the distribution of schooling, especially at low levels, combined with a strong negative effect of schooling on fertility, can explain around 70 percent of the fertility decline from the 1935-39 birth cohort to the 1951-53 cohort. additionally, the authors document other important factors influencing fertility such as age at first marriage, and husband’s education and earnings. it is noteworthy that the case of brazil contradicts studies from various countries which document that fertility declines follow periods of active family planning programs3. in addition to the importance of women’s education, higher levels of education of people in the community have a strong negative impact on fertility. using demographic and health surveys data for 22 countries in subsaharan african, the kravdal (2002) findings indicate that education at the community level had a strong negative impact on fertility rates. however, the quantitative impact of the level of female education on fertility has not been explicitly estimated for uganda. this paper aims to examine the relationship between female education, contraceptive use, and fertility. we sought to provide answers to the following questions: does the level of education acquired by a woman affect her decision in terms of the number of children born, and if so, how many years of a woman’s schooling have a significant negative impact on fertility in uganda? what are the factors that are more likely to influence a woman’s decision to use contraceptives? we test the hypothesis that female education leads to higher contraceptive use which in turn leads to a lower fertility rate. the paper comes at an opportune time, when the debate on the likely implications of high population growth rates and the impact of female education on fertility is hottest in uganda. the uganda national population policy aimed to reduce fertility rates from 6.9 in 1995 to under 6.5 live births per woman by the year 2000 (republic of uganda, 1998a). however, according to the 2005/06 dhs, this reduction was not realized. this paper provides evidence on the relationship between female education, contraceptive use, and fertility in uganda. additionally, we document other socioeconomic and demographic factors influencing contraceptive use and fertility in uganda. our findings provide a rich body of recommendations that can be used for policy formulation, analysis, and advocacy in an attempt to increase contraceptive use, thus leading to women’s economic empowerment and gender equity. by extension, women’s economic empowerment is essential for the attainment of sustainable development and millennium development goals 1 (eradication of extreme poverty), 4 (reducing child mortality by two-thirds), and 5 3 this is considered because it is realised that many women have sexual relations before marriage, which increases their chances of getting pregnant. consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education (reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters) by 2015. whereas similar studies have been conducted in other parts of the world, the uniqueness of country-specific conditions dictate that policy options may not be applied universally. therefore, this paper attempts to close the knowledge gap for the case of uganda and hence represents a real value added. 2. review of the literature there is wide body of literature concerning the importance of female education in reducing fertility rates and the general improvement in labour force participation and social welfare. neoclassical theory suggests that as investment in human capital increases and as more women participate in the labour market, the fertility behaviour of households is bound to change in favour of fewer children (singh, 1994). empirical evidence from both developed and developing countries unambiguously reveals that female education is associated with a decrease in fertility (sackey, 2005; lam and duryea, 1999; ainsworth et al., 1996; vavrus and larsen, 2003; singh, 1994; ben-porath, 1973; gardner, 1973; schultz, 1973). increased participation of women in schooling and the labour market raises the economic value of their time, which increases the opportunity cost of raising children (guilkey, 1998; singh, 1994; ben-porath, 1973; gardner, 1973; schultz, 1973). schultz (1993) confirms that women’s education is associated with smaller desired family sizes across the world. to the best of our knowledge, there is no study in uganda that has explicitly analyzed the impact of female education on fertility and contraceptive use, thus there is a strong need for empirical inquiry into this issue. this negative relationship between women’s education is explained by a number of factors, which have been explored by both economists and sociologists. first, the longer a woman stays in school, the longer they defer giving birth to their first child. this lowers the chances of giving birth to many children. moreover with more education and exposure, women acquire more information about their bodies and are more able to process that information to their advantage (vavrus and larsen, 2003; singh, 1994). the positive impact of women’s education on their autonomy, leading to later marriages, increased use of contraceptives and lower fertility is discussed by mason (1986). indeed, the link between women’s education and fertility is much stronger than that of the husband’s (ainsworth et al., 1996). in general, there are two major determinants of fertility in uganda. first, underlying or indirect factors include education, the desire for large families, extended family influence, and economic value of children, occupation, property ownership, and residence. second, immediate or direct determinants include marriage patterns, sexual customs, frequency of sexual activity, access to and use of contraceptives, length of postpartum amenorrhea, sterility, and abortion. in this study, we focus on the negative impact of women’s education on fertility, since, according to schultz (1993), it represents one of the most important nonmarket returns to women’s education. in addition, education has other important synergies including its role in influencing participation in labour force, poverty reduction, and improved standards of living. 24 consilience 3. theoretical framework our theoretical foundations are based on a modified version of a household structural model proposed by rosenzweig and schultz (1983). in the model, the household is assumed to maximize a utility function subject to the budget, children and health production functions, and time constraints. the utility of a typical household is a function of the number of children )(c , child health )( ch , and consumption of market goods )(x , leisure )(v , and taste )( . in the model, children are treated as a special form of good from which satisfaction is derived but involving an opportunity cost of time and financial resources required to bring them up. it is to be noted that although this model refers to children in purely economic terms, this is not a complete reflection of how children are viewed in developing countries. the same line of argument has been taken by other authors (see for example, ajakaiye and mwabu, 2007; mwabu, 2009; bbaale, et al., 2011; and many others). the household is assumed to maximize a utility function conventional in the standard microeconomics specified as follows: ],,,,[ vxhcuu c (1) in this model, there are two household production functions, one for fertility and the other for child health. the production function for fertility includes a term for the number of children that the couple would have without engaging in any contraception minus a function of contraceptive inputs that reduces the number of children a couple can have. )(1 zcc   (2) where  and z refer to the number of children without contraception and contraceptive inputs respectively. the model further comprises the production function for child health that basically maps health inputs to the health outcome of the child. some health inputs may be purchased from the market, such as medicine and nutritious foods like milk. these inputs are normally complemented with the time of the mother and father allocated to producing child health, education of the mother and father, and the innate endowment of the child in health terms. ),,,,,( fmcfcmcc eettnhh  (3) here ,,,,, fmcfcm eettn and  refer to market purchased child health inputs (such as medicinal items and milk), time of the mother devoted to producing child health, time of the father devoted to producing child health, education of the mother, education of the father, and the innate child endowment respectively. since the total time in a day is limited to 24 hours, coupled with the argument that various activities or chores requiring human labour are mutually exclusive, this model introduces the time constraint. therefore, it is inevitable that a mother and father allocate her/his time amongst such activities as leisure, work, and producing child health. cmmmm cffff tlvt tlvt   (4) consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education here ,,, fff lvt and cft are total time available to the father, distributed to leisure, work, and producing child health, respectively. ,,, mmm lvt and cmt are total time available to the mother, distributed to leisure, work, and producing child health respectively. the model introduces a budget constraint to match income flows with various household expenditures. in this model, we assume that the household spends money on consumption goods, child health inputs, and contraceptive inputs. on the other hand, the income streams are the labour income of the mother and father as well as the exogenous non-labour income. ywlwlxpzpnp ffmmxzn  (5) here ,,,,, ffmmxzn wlwlxpzpnp and y refer to the cost of market purchased child health inputs, cost of contraceptive inputs, cost of the consumption good, labour income of the mother, labour income of the father, and the exogenous non-labour income, respectively. maximizing the utility function in equation (1) subject to the set of constraints in equations (2), (3), (4), and (5) gives rise to the reduced form equations of endogenous variables written in terms of exogenous variables. the endogenous variables include contraceptive use, fertility, labour force participation, and child health. for this paper, our concern is on contraceptive use in equation (6) and fertility in equation (7); hence, our analysis is restricted to only these two outcomes. the exogenous variables include female and male wages, prices of contraceptive inputs and child health inputs, mother and father education, and household wealth (instead of non-labour income). the reduced form specifications for contraceptive use )(z and fertility )(c that emerge from the maximization problem above appear as follows: ),,,,,,,,( xnzhfmfm pppweewwzz  (6) ),,,,,,,,( xnzhfmfm pppweewwcc  (7) where ,,,,,,, nzhfmfm ppweeww and  , refer to wage rate of the mother, wage rate of the father, education of the mother, education of the father, household wealth, price of contraceptives, price of child health inputs, price of the consumption good, and taste, respectively. the mother’s and father’s expected lifetime wage rate is a crucial variable that may affect contraceptive use and fertility. but since the expected lifetime wage rate is not a directly observable variable, it is prudent to use educational attainment to substitute for wages. this proxy has been used by previous researchers, namely gardner (1973) and ben-porath (1973), who found that women’s schooling is associated with a fertility decline in the us and israel, respectively. consequently, we find this proxy appropriate in our study since the returns to education are greater the higher the level of education in uganda, everything else held constant. 26 consilience 4. methodology 4.1 data and variable definitions the data were obtained from the uganda demographic and health survey (udhs) 2006, conducted by macro international on behalf of the uganda bureau of statistics (ubos). the 2006 udhs is a nationally representative survey of 8,531 women aged 15-49 and 2,503 men aged 15-54. three questionnaires were used: household questionnaire, women’s questionnaire, and men’s questionnaire. the udhs provides information on the demographic characteristics of the country. it contains information on household size, age and sex distribution, region, location, religious affiliation, occupation of household members, the number of children ever born by a woman, child mortality, marital status, and educational attainment of women and men. for our analysis ,we used three dependent variables: (a) current use of contraceptives, which was defined as a binary variable equal to 1 if a mother was currently using any contraceptives at the time of the survey and zero otherwise. methods of contraception are divided into two: modern and traditional methods. the modern method included the use of condoms, pills, injections, implants, and sterilization. traditional method included the use of rhythm, withdrawal, and folk methods. (b) total fertility: this was defined as the total number of children ever born by a woman. (c) cumulative fertility to age 20, 25, and 30: this included the total number of children a woman had before reaching ages 20, 25, and 30 respectively. cumulative fertility as a dependent variable has been used by previous classic studies (duryea and lam (1999) and ainsworth et al., (1996)). the greatest virtue of using cumulative fertility as a dependent variable, other than total fertility per se is that it helps us to gain insights into the fertility behaviour of younger women, which is extremely important for policy analysis and advocacy. the central independent variable in our analysis is female education. this was categorized into four outcomes as follows: 0=no education, 1=primary education, 2=secondary education, 3=postsecondary education. in all our regressions, no education is the reference category. it is noteworthy that the educational attainment of men was defined and categorized in the same way. in addition to female and male education, this paper sought to control for other socioeconomic, demographic, and behavioural factors: age of the mother, which was broken into five year age cohorts as 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, and 4549. age is used to capture the fact that younger women, compared to older women, may be more dynamic and more willing to utilize modern contraceptives, creating lower future fertility trajectories. in all our regressions, the 15-19 cohort was used as the reference category. in order to capture the effect of location and regional peculiarities such as ease of access to health centres or pharmacies, we defined dummy variables for location and region. location was defined as equal to one if a mother was in the rural area and zero otherwise. four region dummies were defined as 1=central, 2=east, 3=north, and 4=west. in all our regressions, the central region was the reference category. to capture the traits or traditional beliefs of mothers, we defined three religious dummies as 1=catholics, 2=protestants, 4=muslims, and 5= “others.” the category “others” is used to include evangelicals (born-again christians), seventh day adventists, orthodox, and traditionalists/non-believers. in consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education all our regressions, catholics were used as the reference category as they are the least likely to use contraceptives because the catholic church in uganda is openly opposed to the practice. the wealth index is provided in the data set in terms of quintiles; 1=poorest quintile, 2=poor, 3=medium, 4=rich, 5=richest. in all our regressions, the poorest quintile was used as the reference category. we also defined a discrete binary variable equal to one if a mother was married and zero otherwise. 4.2 estimation strategies in order to estimate the contraceptive use model, we use maximum likelihood probit techniques in order to generate the probability of contraceptive use. the general form of the probit model takes the following form: nixz iii ,...,1,*   (8)      otherwiseif zif z i i :0 0:1 * (9) where iz is a binary variable equal to 1 if the thi woman used contraceptives in the year of the survey and is equal to zero otherwise. this response is determined by the latent variable * iz . ix is a vector of explanatory variables,  is a vector of parameters to be estimated and i is the error term. the specific probit model used to estimate the determinants of contraceptive use takes the form: ),,,,,,( fm erlrnlwbefz  (10) where rlrnlwbez m ,,,,,, and fe is the probability of contraceptive use, mother’s level of education, birth cohort dummies, wealth status (measured by the wealth quintiles), location dummy, region dummies, religion, and husband’s level of education respectively. mother’s education is hypothesized to have a positive influence on contraception use. the basic argument is that education induces women to prefer fewer children because of the high opportunity cost of the income forgone if they concentrated on child care. consequently, such women use contraceptives as a way of reducing their fertility rates. also due to affordability advantages, women living in wealthier households are more likely to use contraceptives compared to their counterparts living in relatively poor households. considering the location, women living in the urban areas are more likely to use contraceptives and hence experience lower fertility rates compared to their counterparts in the rural areas. on the other hand, we use ordinary least squares (ols) technique to estimate our reduced form specifications for total fertility and cumulative fertility. the greatest virtue of using ordinary least squares for this particular analysis is that the coefficients can be interpreted directly in terms of the number of children. the specific fertility model we estimated appears as follows: ),,,,,,( fm ernrllbefc  (11) where ,,,,,, rnrllbec m and fe is cumulative or total fertility, woman’s level of schooling completed, age cohort dummies, location dummy, religion, region, and husband’s educational attainment respectively. 28 consilience 5. results and discussion in this section we discuss the results of the analysis of the relationship between female education, contraceptive use, and fertility outcomes. we begin with a discussion of the descriptive evidence on contraceptive use, fertility, and household characteristics to provide a foundation for the quantitative results. 5.1 descriptive evidence the udhs 2006 final report makes a detailed presentation on the underlying factors of contraceptive use and fertility in uganda (ubos, 2006). in this section, we therefore only highlight the descriptive evidence relevant to the current study, as summarized in tables 1-2. the summaries are generated using the sample weights implying that they are nationally representative and are consistent with those in the udhs report. 5.1.1 current use of contraceptives as a precursor to understanding the fertility behaviour of women, we present descriptive evidence on the current use of contraceptives (table 1). it is interesting to note that the use of contraceptives increases with education level. it is observed that more women with post-secondary education use any method (43.4%) and modern method (38%) respectively, compared to those with no education (12% use any method and 10% use modern method). this underscores the role of education in changing the fertility behaviour of women. category current use, any method current use, modern method female education: no education 11.7 9.7 primary 17.9 16.1 secondary 28.2 24.7 post-secondary 43.4 38.0 wealth status: poorest quintile 8.4 7.5 poorer quintile 12.6 11.5 middle quintile 15.9 13.4 richer quintile 21.9 19.2 richest quintile 33.9 30.1 region: central 29.1 25.8 east 17.7 15.9 north 9.7 9.3 west 18.7 15.5 location: rural 32.5 29.4 urban 16.9 14.7 female age cohorts: 15-19 6.4 5.9 20-24 21.2 19.1 25-29 24.2 22 30-34 27.2 24 consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education 35-39 24 20 40-44 23 20 45-49 19 15.3 female head 18.9 17.4 non female head 19.8 17.1 only girl children 24.1 21 only boy children 24.2 21.1 no. of children: 0 7.1 6.7 1 20.7 18.6 2 24.3 20.6 3 24.4 21.6 4 26.2 23.5 5+ 23.2 20.2 partner’s education: no education 11.1 9.5 primary 19.6 17.1 secondary 30.7 27.1 post-secondary 42.1 35.6 married 19.1 16.9 not married 20.1 17.8 married by 20 21.9 19.3 married by 25 22.5 19.7 married by 30 22.6 19.7 religion: catholic 18.2 16.3 protestant 20.1 17.3 muslim 24.7 21.6 other faith 17.3 15.6 working 20 17.7 not working 17.2 15.1 working for pay 23 20.3 paid in cash 32.3 28.3 paid in kind 13.1 12.2 paid in cash + kind 21.8 19.3 women years of education: 0 11.3 9.3 1-3 13.2 11.0 4-7 20.1 18.3 8-10 26.8 23.5 10+ 38.0 33.3 total 19.5 17.2 n 8,531 8,531 table 1: current use of contraceptives source: author’s own analysis using the uganda demographic and health survey 2006 in addition to education attainment, we explain differences in contraceptive use by the wealth status of households in order to capture the inequality in access originating from the ability to pay. the average percentage of women using 30 consilience contraceptives increases steadily the higher the wealth status of the households (table 1). for example, there are more women in the richest quintile using any method (34%) compared to 8.4% in the poorest quintile. this may imply that for the government to encourage increased use of contraceptives, affordability is a very important factor to consider. the government should subsidize the prices of contraceptives or remove any taxes that may be levied on them. considering regional differences, the central region is observed to have a higher average percentage of women using contraceptives than any other region with the lowest average being the northern region (table 1). this can be attributed to the fact that the central region houses the capital city of the country which has a very high concentration of modern health facilities, pharmacies, and health professionals. this implies that contraceptives are more available and can be afforded by the residents given the nature of the cash economy existing in much of the central region. therefore, purposive regional interventions are needed in order to have a universal utilization of family planning techniques. unexpectedly, the rural area is doing better than the urban area in using any method of contraceptives (32% compared to 17%). age is used in this analysis to reflect differences in contraceptive use owing to differences in traits between old and young women. young women are thought to be more dynamic and hence more likely to utilize modern contraceptives compared to their old counterparts. table 1 reveals that the utilization of contraceptives increases steadily with age reaching a peak (27% for any method and 24% for modern method) at the age cohort 30-34 beyond which it falls. this can be attributed to the fact that at a later age cohort women are almost getting over the reproductive period. for women that are heads of households, 92% of contraceptive use is a modern method (17.4/18.9) compared to the non female heads where 86% of contraceptive use is a modern method (17.1/19.8). thus on average, a higher percentage of women who are female heads use modern methods of contraception. women with fewer children are observed to use contraceptives less than those with many children. the percentage of women increases steadily (from 7.1-26% and 6.724%, for any and modern method, respectively) up to 4 children beyond which it falls. this can be attributed to age such that by 5 children and over the woman is almost getting over the reproductive period and may not use contraceptives so frequently. the utilization of contraceptives also varies directly with husband’s education. the percentage of women increases from 11.1% (for husbands with no education) to 42.1% (for husbands with post-secondary) for any method and from 9.5% (for husbands with no education) to 35.6% (for husbands with post-secondary) for the modern method of contraception. this can be attributed to accessibility to information and affordability amongst the educated. it is also interesting to note that there are more unmarried women using contraceptives compared to the married irrespective of whether it is any method (20.1% compared to 19.1%) or modern method (17.8% compared to 16.9%) of family planning. this can be attributed to the differences in the readiness to have children amongst the married and unmarried women. in fact, there is a lower percentage of women married earlier (21.9% for those married by age 20) using contraceptives than those married later (22.6% for those married by age 25). religion is used in this analysis to capture the traits and beliefs of women in different religious affiliations. it is revealed that “other faith” and catholics, consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education compared to muslims and protestants, have a lower percentage of women using either any method or a modern method of contraception. this is not surprising because, in uganda, amongst the catholics and “other faith” (especially the evangelicals) there is a serious campaign against the use of condoms. this suggests that the government should establish a sensitization program intended to change the beliefs of religious leaders, who in turn may communicate to their congregations about the importance of contraceptive use. the employment status and the mode of payment are important in influencing the use of contraceptives. there are more women in the working class using contraceptives. the percentage is highest (32% and 28% for modern and any method, respectively) amongst those paid in cash compared to those paid in kind. this implies that increased participation of women in the labour force, particularly in the formal private and public sectors where they are paid in cash, increases the likelihood of contraceptive use. government efforts to increase female employability, particularly through education, are therefore necessary. there are more women (38% and 33% for any and modern methods, respectively) with over ten years of education using contraceptives irrespective of the method used compared to those with zero years of education (11% and 9% for any and modern method, respectively). therefore, it appears ensuring the effectiveness of family planning campaigns must be preceded by campaigning for higher education amongst girls. 5.1.2 fertility characteristics a long reproductive period and poverty are some of the underlying reasons for the high fertility rates in uganda. limited access to family planning services, low education, and residing in rural areas compound the problem. in table 2 we note that on average 66% and 74% of women aged 15-49 years were married by the age of 20 and 25 respectively. these percentages are quite high and this implies that women have a long reproductive period, hence being vulnerable to producing many children. for those with no education, over 83% were married by age 20 compared to only 23% with post-secondary education. also for women in the poorest quintile, 74% got married by age 20 compared to only 48% in the richest quintile. there is little wonder then, that women with low education, those in lower welfare groups, those in the north, the east, and in rural areas tend to have more children compared to those with higher education, the relatively rich, and those in the central, west, and urban areas. married number of children ever born cumulative fertility category all women by age 20 by age 25 by age 20 by age 25 by age 30 female education: non education 77.7 83.4 93.9 5.5 1.0 2.3 3.6 primary 78.6 70.3 76.5 3.5 1.2 2.6 4.0 secondary 72.1 39.4 50.8 1.8 0.7 2.1 3.5 post-secondary 71.8 22.8 48.0 1.6 0.2 1.0 2.2 wealth status: poorest quintile 78.8 73.7 83.8 4.1 1.1 2.3 3.7 poorer quintile 78.3 75.0 82.1 3.9 1.0 2.5 3.8 middle quintile 78.0 69.9 76.7 3.9 1.0 2.5 3.8 richer quintile 79.0 67.2 74.7 3.8 1.1 2.6 4.0 richest quintile 73.0 48.0 59.1 2.4 0.8 2.2 3.5 32 consilience region: central 71.6 57.0 67.1 3.1 1.0 2.4 3.7 east 80.8 71.3 77.9 3.9 1.2 2.7 4.0 north 80.3 69.2 79.5 3.7 0.9 2.1 3.4 west 78.2 66.9 74.6 3.6 1.0 2.4 3.8 location: rural 67.6 51.1 62.1 3.8 0.8 2.1 3.3 urban 79.4 68.6 76.8 2.3 1.1 2.5 3.8 partner’s education: no education 72.1 81.3 96.9 5.1 .94 2.1 3.4 primary 70.8 89.2 97.8 4.9 1.2 2.6 3.9 secondary 71.8 86.4 98.3 3.7 1.1 2.5 3.8 post-secondary 72.4 68.9 92.3 3.6 .72 2.0 3.3 religion: catholic 72.1 67.5 76.8 3.6 .97 2.3 3.6 protestant 71.2 64.5 73.1 3.5 1.0 2.4 3.8 muslim 71.1 67.2 73.4 3.4 1.2 2.6 3.9 other 68.3 60.1 69.4 3.4 .96 2.4 3.7 working 71.6 71.1 80.0 3.9 1.0 2.4 3.7 not working 69.8 41.9 49.3 1.9 .88 2.3 3.7 working pay 70.4 72.6 82.8 4.0 1.0 2.4 3.7 paid in cash 67.3 65.7 79.3 3.5 .9 2.1 3.4 paid in kind 74.9 71.3 79.1 3.6 1.1 2.4 3.8 paid in cash + kind 70.2 77.8 86.9 4.5 1.1 2.5 3.8 female head 68.8 57.1 66.3 3.3 .94 2.2 3.4 not female head 72.4 69.3 77.8 3.6 1.0 2.5 3.9 any method 69.7 73.8 85.9 4.3 1.1 2.6 4.1 modern method 70.1 73.5 85.1 4.1 1.1 2.6 4.1 age cohorts: 15-19 71.6 .23 20-24 71.3 72.4 1.7 .98 25-29 71.9 78.8 92.8 3.5 1.0 2.5 30-34 72.2 81.7 93.5 5.1 1.1 2.6 4.0 35-39 68.1 80.1 93.2 6.3 1.0 2.4 3.8 40-44 71.0 79.8 93.7 7.0 .93 2.2 3.5 45-49 71.5 82.0 94.8 7.7 .96 2.2 3.5 only boys 71.7 84.3 94.8 5.2 1.2 2.6 4.0 only girls 71.3 84.2 94.9 5.2 1.2 2.6 4.0 women years of education: 0 73.3 83.2 93.7 5.5 1.0 2.3 3.6 1-3 73.4 82.6 87.8 4.5 1.2 2.6 3.9 4-7 71.6 64.3 70.9 3.1 1.1 2.6 4.0 8-10 68.3 43.8 52.2 1.9 .87 2.3 3.6 10+ 64.7 27.7 49.3 1.6 .33 1.33 2.6 total 77.0 65.6 74.3 3.5 1.0 2.4 3.7 n 8,531 5,49 4 6,29 6 8,531 6,583 4,921 3,511 table 2: fertility characteristics source: author’s own analysis using the uganda demographic and health survey 2006 consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education table 2 also reveals that there are fewer women (68.9%) married earlier (by age 20) having partners with post-secondary education compared to 81.3% having partners with no education. a similar observation is amongst those married by age 25. this may mean that highly educated men marry highly educated women, and this occurs at a later age. women married to men with no education are associated with a fertility rate of 5.1 children compared to 3.6 children for women married to men with post-secondary education. additionally, lower cumulative fertility is also observed amongst women with more educated spouses. this may imply that education of both boys and girls is critical in reducing the fertility rate in the country. there is a higher percentage (80%) of working women married by age 25 compared to their counterparts married by age 20 (71%). in fact, for all categories of working women (irrespective of the mode of payment), there is a higher percentage of women married later (by age 25) compared to those married earlier (by age 20). this can be attributed to the fact that most working women stay longer in school and hence get married later. it is rather surprising that working women are associated with a higher average fertility rate of 3.9 children compared to 1.9 children amongst those that do not work. as expected, women that are heads of households are associated with a lower fertility rate (3.3 children) compared to the non-heads; (3.6 children) the same applies to the cumulative fertility. this underscores the role of independence of women in making fertility choices. also women using a modern method of contraception are associated with a lower average fertility (4.1 children) compared to their counterparts using any method of contraception (4.3 children). therefore the government should strive to increase the supply and accessibility to modern methods of contraception. as expected, the number of children increases with age of the woman (7.7 children for the age cohort 45-49 compared to 0.23 children for the age cohort 15-19). conversely, the number of children that a woman gives birth to varies negatively with her years of education (1.6 children for women with ten years and over compared to 5.5 children for women with zero years of education). this underscores the role of education in fertility reduction just as it is in table 1 for contraceptive use. 5.2 quantitative evidence 5.2.1 determinants of current use of contraceptives in table 3, we present evidence on the determinants of the current use of contraceptives as an initial step towards our understanding women’s fertility choices.4 the importance of female education in fertility choices cannot be understated, and the benefits increase with the level of education. our analysis shows that holding everything else constant, women with a primary level of education are 8-10% more likely to be using a modern or any method of contraception compared to those with no education. we do not seem to notice any discernible differences in the use of contraceptives between unmarried and married women having primary education. secondary education increases the probability of using contraceptives in the range of 14-17%, and post-secondary education increases the probability to the range 16-20% 4 this refers to the period between childbirth and the next cycle of menstruation. 34 consilience apart from married women using any method whose probability is only 12%. while the partner’s level of education has a positive impact on the use of contraceptives, its impact is lower than that of the woman’s education. other factors held constant, married women are 6-8% more likely to have used a modern or any method of contraception if their partner has a primary education, 7-11% if the partner has secondary education, and 12-17% if he has post-secondary education. specifically, female education increases the probability of using condoms. women with at least secondary education are 21%-45% more likely to use condoms compared to their counterparts with no education at all. women whose partners have post-secondary education are 15% more likely to use condoms compared to their counterparts whose partners have no education at all. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) modern method condoms any method all women married women all women married women all women married women education: primary 0.079 0.101 0.088 0.048 0.078 0.086 (7.02)*** (4.49)*** (1.60) (1.21) (6.69)*** (3.64)*** secondary 0.142 0.166 0.210 0.056 0.153 0.162 (7.99)*** (4.71)*** (3.10)*** (1.10) (8.33)*** (4.47)*** post-secondary 0.176 0.155 0.453 0.117 0.194 0.118 (6.74)*** (2.94)*** (5.21)*** (1.65)* (7.10)*** (2.21)** age cohort: 20-24 years 0.199 0.135 -0.163 -0.073 0.225 0.156 (12.08)*** (2.91)*** (5.05)*** (2.33)** (13.00)*** (3.16)*** 25-29 years 0.251 0.164 -0.246 -0.093 0.281 0.190 (14.03)*** (3.53)*** (8.57)*** (3.06)*** (15.01)*** (3.83)*** 30-34 years 0.295 0.179 -0.227 -0.097 0.335 0.224 (15.42)*** (3.72)*** (7.80)*** (3.23)*** (16.84)*** (4.34)*** 35-39 years 0.286 0.188 -0.206 -0.093 0.331 0.229 (13.71)*** (3.72)*** (7.24)*** (3.34)*** (15.20)*** (4.25)*** 40-44 years 0.302 0.243 -0.193 -0.065 0.352 0.278 (13.08)*** (4.41)*** (6.51)*** (2.04)** (14.66)*** (4.80)*** 44-49 years 0.244 0.155 -0.179 -0.072 0.298 0.216 (9.72)*** (2.72)*** (5.48)*** (2.26)** (11.38)*** (3.54)*** rural resident -0.024 -0.030 -0.014 -0.006 -0.021 -0.029 (2.04)** (1.31) (0.50) (0.26) (1.64) (1.16) religious affiliation: protestant -0.010 -0.006 0.025 0.003 -0.006 -0.011 (1.09) (0.32) (0.92) (0.14) (0.68) (0.59) muslim -0.003 0.015 -0.026 -0.006 -0.001 0.003 (0.29) (0.63) (0.77) (0.25) (0.05) (0.10) other faith -0.034 -0.010 -0.026 0.001 -0.041 -0.020 (2.82)*** (0.41) (0.66) (0.03) (3.20)*** (0.75) region: east -0.022 -0.017 -0.029 -0.019 -0.031 -0.030 (2.00)** (0.79) (0.90) (0.74) (2.74)*** (1.34) north -0.057 -0.072 0.053 0.041 -0.079 -0.111 (4.78)*** (2.93)*** (1.18) (1.13) (6.24)*** (4.29)*** west -0.022 -0.034 -0.017 -0.021 -0.017 -0.016 (2.04)** (1.58) (0.53) (0.79) (1.43) (0.69) wealth quintile: poorer 0.045 0.098 0.012 0.049 0.042 0.097 (2.93)*** (2.98)*** (0.19) (0.87) (2.62)*** (2.83)*** middle 0.053 0.097 0.023 0.060 0.063 0.103 (3.27)*** (2.81)*** (0.36) (1.01) (3.69)*** (2.89)*** richer 0.095 0.127 0.024 0.033 0.105 0.131 (5.55)*** (3.59)*** (0.40) (0.61) (5.86)*** (3.58)*** richest 0.161 0.271 0.068 0.067 0.180 0.291 (8.32)*** (6.63)*** (1.15) (1.29) (8.87)*** (6.89)*** partner’s 0.056 0.035 0.080 consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education education: primary (2.12)** (0.67) (2.84)*** secondary 0.074 0.099 0.108 (2.33)** (1.61) (3.15)*** post-secondary 0.115 0.146 0.171 (2.69)*** (1.90)* (3.64)*** observations 8,525 2,763 1,267 911 8,525 2,763 table 3: determinants of current use of contraceptives absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% as observed under the descriptive evidence, age is another important determinant of using contraceptives, with the young more likely to use contraceptives than the old. the results show that all women in the age cohorts 2040 years are 20-30% more likely to use a modern method of family planning compared to those in the age group 15-19 years (the excluded category). yet, all women in the age cohort 44-49 years are only 24% (significant at 1%) more likely to be using a modern contraceptive method of family planning. married women in the age cohorts 20-40 years are 14-24% more likely to be using a modern method of family planning. however, married women in the age cohort 44-49 are only 16% more likely to be using a modern method of family planning. the scenario is not any different once we look at the age cohorts in relation to the probability of using any method of family planning for all women and married women, respectively. it is noted that for all age cohorts, the probability of using either a modern method or any method of family planning is smaller for married women than for all women. this may be partly attributed to the need to first seek the opinion of the partner before using any contraceptives, which reduces their application among the married women. the wealth of the household is an important factor in women’s use of family planning. we examine the impact of wealth on family planning by using wealth quintiles with the poorest quintile (bottom 20%) as the base category. the results show that all women in the second poorest quintile are about 4-5%, and married women in the same quintile are about 10% more likely to be using a modern or any method compared to the poorest. all women in the middle quintile are about 5-6%, and married women in the same quintile are 10% more likely to be using a modern or any method compared to the poorest. women in the top two quintiles are even more likely to be using a modern or any method of family planning – all women in the second richest quintile are 10%, and married women in the same quintile are 13%, more likely to be using a modern or any method of family planning. all women in the richest quintile are 16-18% and married women in the same quintile are about 30% more likely to be using a modern or any method of family planning. it is worth noting that at all levels of welfare (wealth quintiles) married women possess a higher likelihood of using either a modern or any method of family planning than when all women are considered. access to modern contraceptive methods is also underscored by the residence of women. other factors held constant, all women in rural areas are 2%5 5 jain (1999) in the introductory chapter to the book “do population policies matter?” notes that the existence of charismatic leaders and diversity of family planning 36 consilience less likely to be using a modern method compared to their urban counterparts. again compared to the central region, all women in the north, east, and west of the country are less likely (in decreasing order of magnitude) to be using a modern or any method of family planning. thus, increased access to family planning services in these areas is critical to helping women (and their partners) meet their fertility needs. 5.2.2 determinant of total and cumulative fertility evidence on the determinants of fertility, using the number of children born to a woman in her lifetime as the dependent variable, is presented in table 4. we also present evidence on the determinants of cumulative fertility by age 20, 25 and 30 in table 5 in order to understand the fertility behaviour of younger women. in both tables 4 and 5, we present results for all women and married women. the analysis shows that other factors held constant, education, particularly at the secondary level and above plays a very powerful role in reducing fertility. this suggests that efforts to improve access to education beyond the primary level need to be strengthened. for all women, the coefficient on primary education is -0.15, implying that every 100 women with primary education will, on average, have 15 fewer children than those with no education at all. for women married by age 20 and 25, the coefficient on primary education is -0.37 and -0.53, implying that every 100 women married by 20 and 25 years of age will, on average, have 37 and 53 fewer children than those with no education at all. the coefficients on secondary and post-secondary education for all women, married women, married by age 20 and married by age 25, range from 0.5 to -2.1 respectively, implying that every 10 women with at least secondary education will, on the average, have 5 to 21 children less than those with no education at all (ref. table 4). for all women, by age 20, 25, and 30 (cumulative fertility), every 10 women with at least secondary education will, on average, have 2 to 14 children less than those with no education at all (ref table 5). the scenario is not very different from married women. male partners’ primary education increases fertility by about 0.3 compared to those with no education at all. this suggests that men with at least a primary level of education may have higher earnings and this can lead to higher fertility (ref. table 4). on the other hand, male partners’ primary and secondary education increase cumulative fertility by about 0.13-0.2 compared to those with no education at all. yet, partners’ secondary and post-secondary education has limited impact on fertility. other important factors in altering fertility behaviour include age cohorts and residence in rural areas. as would be expected, the number of children ever born to a woman increases with her age and this is consistent with both married and unmarried women. we note that fertility among all women in the age cohort 20-24 years is, on average, about 1.5 children higher than those in the age cohort 15-19 years while fertility in the age cohort 44-49 years is over 7 children. we notice that the same trend is portrayed for married women (ref. table 4). methods are critical in the successful implementation of population policies to achieve declines in fertility. consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education dependent variable is number of children ever born to a woman (1) (2) (3) (4) all women married women married by age 20 married by age 25 woman’s education: primary -0.149 0.003 -0.369 -0.525 (2.76)*** (0.04) (4.48)*** (5.82)*** secondary -0.853 -0.746 -0.476 -0.560 (11.53)*** (6.91)*** (5.01)*** (5.71)*** post-secondary -2.093 -2.024 -1.139 -0.878 (18.35)*** (11.20)*** (9.90)*** (7.63)*** partner’s education: primary 0.303 (3.72)*** secondary 0.037 (0.37) post-secondary -0.047 (0.35) age cohort: 20-24 years 1.490 1.347 (24.28)*** (11.84)*** 25-29 years 3.222 3.036 1.843 (49.81)*** (26.72)*** (23.53)*** 30-34 years 4.753 4.595 3.419 2.414 (70.44)*** (39.76)*** (38.67)*** (23.09)*** 35-39 years 5.856 5.792 4.582 3.341 (79.52)*** (47.71)*** (49.69)*** (28.82)*** 40-44 years 6.556 6.476 5.625 4.378 (80.47)*** (49.91)*** (54.10)*** (32.72)*** 44-49 years 7.305 7.253 6.124 4.948 (82.81)*** (52.94)*** (52.32)*** (32.36)*** rural resident 0.612 0.563 0.341 0.127 (10.06)*** (6.22)*** (5.11)*** (2.25)** religious affiliation: protestant 0.056 0.045 0.025 0.049 (1.21) (0.72) (0.44) (1.00) muslim 0.227 0.266 0.044 -0.003 (3.35)*** (2.97)*** (0.52) (0.04) other faith 0.020 0.001 -0.193 -0.058 (0.29) (0.01) (2.43)** (0.86) region: east 0.148 0.150 0.031 -0.105 (2.44)** (1.86)* (0.41) (1.63) north -0.270 -0.311 -0.132 -0.065 (4.55)*** (3.90)*** (1.80)* (1.00) west -0.185 -0.112 -0.167 -0.239 (3.04)*** (1.34) (2.30)** (3.84)*** constant 0.284 0.340 0.564 0.699 (2.99)*** (2.11)** (5.09)*** (6.45)*** observations 8,525 5,347 3,429 2,301 r-squared 0.68 0.59 0.72 0.62 table 4: determinants of fertility absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 38 consilience women residing in rural areas are more likely to have more children than those in urban areas, which is consistent with the usually lower education level in the rural areas. other factors held constant, every 10 rural women married by age 20 to 25 have between 1.3 and 6 children more than those in urban areas (ref. table 4). for all women in the rural areas, cumulative fertility by ages 20, 25, and 30 for every 10 women is 1, 2, and 4 children, respectively, which is higher than in urban areas. the picture is no different to that of married women (ref. table 5). this suggests that fertility behavioural change campaigns in uganda need to focus on women in these areas if they are to have greater influence. the impact of regional differences on fertility is pronounced in our regression. for all women in the eastern region, every 10 women, on average, have 1.5 children more than those in the central region. the picture is not different for married women. on the other hand, for all women in the northern region, every 10 women, on average, have 3 children less than those in the central region. almost the same picture is observed for married women. on average, for all women and those married by ages 20 and 25 in the western region, women have 1.7-2.4 children less compared to those in the central region (ref. table 4). considering cumulative fertility by ages 20, 25 and 30 for the entire sample, every 10 women in the northern region will have on average 4, 5, and 6 children, respectively, less than those in the central region. yet, by ages 20, 25 and 30 for married women, every 10 women in the northern region will have on average 4, 6, and 6.2 children, respectively, less than those in the central region (table 5). this may be explained by the war in the northern region, which pushed many people out of their homes, leaving mothers and fathers with little or no opportunity to concentrate on child bearing. also, with much economic activity and property devastated during the war, parents may have doubted their ability to bring up many children in the given circumstances. for cumulative fertility by ages 20 and 25 for the entire sample of women, every 10 women in the western region, on average, have 2 children less than those in the central region (table 5). consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education dependent variable is cumulative fertility (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) all women married women by age 20 by age 25 by age 30 by age 20 by age 25 by age 30 education: primary 0.064 0.202 0.268 0.065 0.204 0.235 (2.27)** (4.56)*** (4.01)*** (1.40) (2.88)*** (2.20)** secondary -0.406 -0.325 -0.227 -0.305 -0.348 -0.211 (9.82)*** (4.53)*** (1.96)* (4.34)*** (3.07)*** (1.15) post-secondary -0.937 -1.402 -1.332 -0.913 -1.343 -1.388 (15.71)*** (13.54)*** (7.43)*** (8.19)*** (7.87)*** (5.06)*** age cohort 25-29 0.036 -0.135 (1.10) (2.51)** age cohort 30-34 0.068 0.010 -0.073 0.007 (1.99)** (0.20) (1.30) (0.09) age cohort 35-39 -0.053 -0.167 -0.199 -0.206 -0.168 -0.213 (1.41) (3.04)*** (2.68)*** (3.44)*** (2.08)** (1.96)* age cohort 40-44 -0.153 -0.380 -0.414 -0.282 -0.431 -0.428 (3.71)*** (6.28)*** (5.10)*** (4.24)*** (4.74)*** (3.52)*** age cohort 45-49 -0.124 -0.368 -0.445 -0.325 -0.486 -0.566 (2.79)*** (5.66)*** (5.10)*** (4.46)*** (4.88)*** (4.24)*** rural resident 0.095 0.221 0.389 0.124 0.239 0.393 (2.71)*** (3.70)*** (4.02)*** (2.27)** (2.69)*** (2.73)*** religious affiliation: protestant 0.067 0.091 0.091 0.098 0.151 0.156 (2.53)** (2.06)** (1.32) (2.28)** (2.25)** (1.48) muslim 0.164 0.165 0.107 0.223 0.257 0.180 (4.25)*** (2.51)** (1.04) (3.85)*** (2.78)*** (1.25) other faith -0.004 0.006 0.011 0.056 0.124 0.185 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.89) (1.27) (1.22) region: east 0.007 0.055 0.095 -0.004 0.046 0.220 (0.22) (0.97) (1.07) (0.07) (0.55) (1.68)* north -0.365 -0.554 -0.583 -0.403 -0.607 -0.623 (10.94)*** (10.05)*** (6.75)*** (7.55)*** (7.24)*** (4.71)*** west -0.221 -0.222 -0.133 -0.229 -0.263 -0.103 (6.45)*** (3.89)*** (1.48) (4.24)*** (3.08)*** (0.77) partner’s education: primary 0.154 0.207 0.221 (2.86)*** (2.55)** (1.82)* secondary 0.134 0.316 0.244 (2.08)** (3.13)*** (1.56) post-secondary 0.143 0.218 0.341 (1.61) (1.59) (1.60) constant 1.114 2.490 3.739 1.082 2.295 3.555 (22.31)*** (30.39)*** (29.30)*** (12.36)*** (17.26)*** (17.17)*** observations 6578 4920 3510 2617 2077 1473 r-squared 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.11 table 5: determinants of fertility by age 20, 25, and 30. absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 40 consilience 6 conclusions and recommendations 6.1 conclusions using the demographic and health survey 2006, we examine the relationship between female education, contraceptive use, and fertility in uganda. the results of the analyses confirm the hypothesis of this study. we show that education, particularly of women, is an important factor in reducing fertility in uganda. while the partner’s education is also negatively related to the number of children born, the magnitude is much smaller. there is near universal knowledge of methods of family planning, but very few women have used these methods and even fewer the modern methods. our findings further show that access to or use of contraceptives is positively associated with the education of both the woman and her partner. these findings are important for improving the quality of life of ugandan women (and also children) through a number of policy actions. policies to reduce fertility can play both direct and indirect roles in enhancing maternal and child mortality reductions. when women give birth to fewer children, it reduces their exposure to the risks of child birth, particularly in rural areas where health and maternal care services are poor or non-existent. having fewer children also implies that family income is shared among fewer heads. with fewer children born, parents (both women and men) are more likely to provide more and adequate care thus ensuring their survival and attention to their early childhood development requirements. 6.2 recommendations reducing total fertility is expected to play an important role in achieving both the national development goals contained in the national development plan and the millennium development goals. however, reducing fertility needs concerted efforts from various stakeholders including the central government, the health sector, district authorities, and communities. the central government needs to provide the overall direction, political commitment and financial support for family planning. in addition, the health sector needs to provide the technical guidance on all actions needed to reduce fertility and facilities for family planning. district authorities and communities need to provide adequate facilities to ensure access to family planning. lastly, parents require sustained information over a long period of time on the importance of planning their families in order to change their aspirations and behaviour. the findings of the study suggest that efforts to reduce fertility need to target measures that aim to educate women beyond the secondary level. the government programme to extend free education at the secondary level is therefore an important measure that may help to reduce fertility. this needs to be embraced by all stakeholders, including donors, parents, community leaders, and local government authorities as well as women’s organisations with special interests in female education. the ministry of education on behalf of the central government in collaboration with community leaders and local government authorities and school administrators should actively sensitize parents about the importance of female education beyond secondary level. government legislation can be put in place to consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education penalise parents who discourage their children from taking advantage of the universal secondary education program established by the government. measures need to be put in place to remove, or at least minimise factors that may lead girls to drop out of school early, including improving the quality of schools and teaching, government legislation against early marriages, and ensuring that all schools have separate sanitary facilities for girls and boys. measures to expand access to family planning facilities and the capacity to use them are needed. the evidence shows that while almost all women in uganda know of at least one method of family planning only half have used any. both government and non-government organizations can play an important role in improving women’s access to contraceptives through stocking public and private health centers and pharmacies with the required contraceptives. policies to eliminate all barriers of access to family planning services are needed, for example by removing any taxes and ensuring accessibility in the rural areas. consistent information and public awareness of the importance of appropriate family size is needed. for the recommendations emerging from our study to be realized, political and financial commitment on the part of the government is necessary. this should be complemented with donor financial support as well as sensitization campaigns by non-governmental organizations concerning the utilization and importance of contraceptives and family planning. village level sensitization seminars are highly recommended to catch women who may not be reached via the mass media; this is a powerful instrument for ensuring more understanding of gender justice and equity. the strong linkage between female education and contraceptive use and fertility found in this study portrays the quantity-quality trade-off and the opportunity cost of time that highly educated women face, which induces them to have fewer children. prioritizing female education is a prime future strategy for important demographic change not only in uganda but also in other developing countries. 42 consilience appendix figure 1: age-specific fertility rates for uganda. source: republic of uganda, 2006. figure 2: distribution of women in the age group 15-49 years. source: derived from author’s own analysis of the udhs 2006. 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 mother's age group n u m b e r o f c h ild re n p e r 1 ,0 0 0 w o m e n 1995 2000/01 2006 consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education a. number of children born plotted against years of education of the woman b. number of children born plotted against level of education of the woman (0 = none, 1 = primary, 2= secondary and 3 = post-secondary) y = -0.3865x + 5.0029 r2 = 0.1312 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 woman's education in years n u m b e r o f c h il d r e n b o r n y = -0.6189x + 5.3314 r2 = 0.0266 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 0 1 2 3 partner's education level n u m b e r o f c h il d r e n b o r n 44 consilience c. cumulative fertility at age 30 plotted against woman’s education in years figure 3: fertility vs. women’s education. source: derived from author’s own analysis of the udhs 2006. y = -0.1566x + 3.2852 r2 = 0.0845 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 woman's education in years c u m u la ti v e f e r ti li ty a t 3 0 consilience bbaale and mpuga: female 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(2005). female labour force participation in ghana: the effects of education. african economic research consortium research paper 150, nairobi. schultz, t.p. (1993). mortality decline in the low-income world: causes and consequences. american economic review, vol.83, pp. 337-42. schultz, t.p. (1990). women’s changing participation in the labour force: a world perspective. economic development and cultural change, vol. 38, pp. 457-88. schultz, t.p. (1974). fertility determinants: theory, evidence, and application to policy evaluation. santa monica, california: rand corp. http://www.prb.org/ consilience bbaale and mpuga: female education schultz, t.p. (1973). explanation of birth rate changes of space and time. journal of political economy. no. 81, pp. 238 – 274. singh, r.d. (1994). fertility-mortality variation across ldcs: women’s education, labour force participation and contraceptive use. kylos, vol.47(2), pp. 209-229. undp (2007). millennium development goals: uganda’s progress report 2007. kampala, united nations development programme. vavrus, f. and u. larsen (2003). girls’ education and fertility transition: an analysis of recent trends in tanzania and uganda. economic development and cultural change, vol. 51(4), pp. 945-76. microsoft word beck.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 14, iss. 2 (2015), pp. 25–45 mind the gap: the discrepancy between the normative debate and actual use of human rights language in international climate negotiations gregor beck institute of political science technische universität darmstadt, germany gregor.beck@unitedgames.org cora ditzel institute of political science technische universität darmstadt, germany cora-zon@t-online.de sofia ganter institute of political science technische universität darmstadt, germany sofia-ganter@gmx.de olga perov institute of political science technische universität darmstadt, germany op.perov@gmail.com abstract there has been an emerging normative debate in political theory literature on how the impacts of climate change not only affect the environment, but also have dire consequences for the enjoyment of basic human rights in vulnerable regions. a human rights-based approach to climate negotiations could improve the debate beyond a mostly scientific and technical discussion. this paper analyzes a case study of how human rights are actually articulated within international climate negotiations and what role they play in the international political debate on climate change. through an inductive analysis of state submissions and interview data collected at the 2nd session of the adp during unfccc cop-19, we examine how state parties make use of human rights in international climate negotiations. the paper shows that despite the growing normative debate on the topic, almost no parties refer to human rights directly in the actual climate negotiations. when human rights are mentioned, they are more likely to be articulated by state groups, they are often referred to in an indirect way, and non-binding rights are articulated more often than universally binding human rights. this shows that there is a clear gap between the normative debate and the political realities of the linkages of human rights and climate change. author’s note the authors are graduate students of political science and are finishing their master of arts in international studies/peace and conflict studies at the universities of frankfurt am main, germany and darmstadt, germany. they regard the fight against climate change as an important step towards sustainability. consilience beck et al.: mind the gap acknowledgments this paper is based on a research project conducted in the course of an empirical research seminar at the tu darmstadt. we thank dr. andrew schapper and prof. dr. markus lederer for their support and helpful comments. keywords: human rights, climate change, climate negotiations, unfccc, theory-praxis-gap. 1. introduction in 2005, the inuit people of canada filed a petition to the inter-american commission on human rights accusing the united states of america of being largely responsible for climate change and, therefore, responsible for the negative effects that climate change has on the inuit people (hunter 2009: 336-337; limon 2009: 441; knox 2009: 479). this was one of the first explicit attempts to link violations of human rights to climate change. even though the petition was rejected, it led to an increased scientific and political awareness of the negative effects climate change impacts may have on human rights. since then countries that are facing serious threats due to climate change have been active in promoting a debate on the links between human rights and climate change. in 2009 a report by the office of the high commissioner for human rights (ohchr) named the right to food, the right to adequate housing, the right to water, the right to self-determination and the right to life, among others, as human rights that relate most directly to climate change-induced impacts (ohchr 2009). there has been a considerable normative discussion in political theory literature on the linkage of human rights and climate change and the possible benefits and disadvantages of including a human rights approach into climate negotiations (e.g. brandstedt/bergman 2013; caney 2008; hiskes 2005; knox 2009; shue 2011; fian international 2010; ohchr 2009; oxfam international 2008; spd 2013). by normative, we understand the discussion of an issue on the basis of whether this issue is desirable or not. however, empirical evidence on the actual use of human rights in these negotiations is scarce. it is of scientific interest to know if the emerging normative debate on the implications of climate change effects on human rights is also reflected in the actual political debate on the topic and how a human rights-based approach could influence ongoing climate negotiations. based on our results, we argue that there is a considerable discrepancy between the normative debate and the empirical research in this field. to address the aforementioned research gap, this study posed the following research question: how do states use human rights in international climate negotiations? to answer this question, we conducted a single case study of the 3rd meeting of the 2nd session of the ad hoc working group on the durban platform for enhanced action (adp). we are aware that the selection of the adp as our case does not allow inferences to the use of human rights in other forums and bodies of international climate negotiations. however, the adp does lend itself as a particularly suitable case for a first systematic analysis for several reasons. the adp negotiations within the united nations framework convention on climate change (unfccc) process are a typical case in the field of climate negotiations, and as the adp comprises a global membership, the discourses within the adp negotiations are not regionally confined. the adp is furthermore charged with the task of developing a follow-up agreement for the kyoto protocol until 2015 consilience beck et al.: mind the gap (iisd 2013: 2), so the outcome of the adp negotiations is of particular relevance to all members of the international community and all future international climate negotiations. in the following we will first take a look at the existing literature on links between human rights and climate change as well as the arguments brought up by the scientific community to argue for or against a human rights-based approach in climate negotiations. we will then outline the methodological approach we used to conduct our inductive research, and present the data corpus of the study and the methods used to analyze the data. this is followed by an overview of the findings of our analysis. thereby, we will illustrate how human rights are referred to within the statements of states and state groups in the context of the adp negotiations. in addition, we present some first insights into possible reasons for and against the articulation of human rights in the negotiations that were derived from interviews with various experts. as our research shows, human rights are of almost no significance to the negotiations in the adp, and there is very little evidence of actual human rights usage. we will then put the results into a broader perspective, highlight some policy implications arising from them, and suggest questions for further research. 2. state of the academic debate and research gap the academic debate on the link between climate change and human rights has mainly focused on the advantages and disadvantages of taking into account a human rights-based approach when dealing with climate change. this is what we call the current normative debate. the advantages of a human rightsbased approach are grounded on the general recognition that the impacts of climate change affect several human rights such as the right to life or the right to health (e.g. rajamani 2010; dudai 2009). accordingly, the latest comprehensive publications on climate change and justice argue in favor of a human rights-based approach (jamieson 2014; moellendorf 2014; shue 2014). some scholars argue that focusing on the link between human rights and climate change could bring attention to individual welfare, strengthen the voices of the most affected, and provide ethical perspectives in international climate negotiations currently focused on deal-seeking between countries (rajamani 2010: 4; limon 2009: 450451). sébastien jodoin and yolanda saito point out that international human rights law could offer a legal justification for states to combat climate change and even impose obligations on states to adequately respond to climate change (jodoin/saito 2011). furthermore, a human rights framework, with an established set of principles and quasi-judicial bodies (hunter 2009: 361-362), could deliver binding principles that are currently lacking. moreover, human rights could provide moral authority for calls to action against climate change and provide a set of moral principles that would place power inequalities and injustice at the center of the debate on climate change (nicholson/chong 2011: 126). such justice arguments are based on the assumption that human inaction concerning the mitigation of climate change will have adverse effects for future generations (hiskes 2005; caney 2008; bulkeley/newell 2010). these authors consider this as unfair for future generations because they do not have a lobby and therefore are unable to defend their interests. on the other hand, the literature also discusses possible disadvantages of linking human rights and climate change. tim hayward warns that a focus on rights instead of responsibilities could encourage state claims of a self-interested consilience beck et al.: mind the gap character. he argues that there is a danger that some states might claim a right to pollute (hayward 2007: 431). to ron dudai, it seems that the defenders of the link ignore some potential points of tension between human rights advocates and environmentalists. thus, he argues in favor of remaining skeptical about the normative desirability of the link because human rights and climate change have very different foci. dudai also considers practical problems by questioning whether the advocacy of human rights non-governmental organizations (ngos) would bring enough added value to climate change debates to justify the invested resources needed by the already under-staffed human rights ngos (dudai 2009: 295-296). dudai concludes that environmental movements have performed better than human rights movements in advocating their cause. in his view, the human rights framework is not adequately equipped to deal with climate change. rather, human rights organizations should stick to their area of expertise (dudai 2009: 305-306). nevertheless, most members of the scientific community are in favor of linking human rights and climate change. however, what is of great interest here is that even when calling for a human rights-based approach to climate change, the academic debate on the link almost completely remains on a theoretical normative level and thus lacks empirical research on the topic with few exceptions. sébastien jodoin conducted a research study on the dynamics of policy debates involving human rights issues during cop-15 (jodoin 2010). lavanya rajamani analyzed human rights references in climate treaties and documented human rights-based interventions made by parties at climate negotiations (rajamani 2010). apart from these two studies, the literature on the topic only offers very little empirical data on human rights in climate negotiations. the two mentioned studies have been rather selective in their approach; the use of human rights by states is especially lacking in systematic research. so far, the debate seems to focus mostly on the theoretical and normative aspects of the issue. the goal of this paper is, therefore, to address this research gap, provide a first systematic analysis of human rights use in climate negotiations, and offer new data and insights through empirical results. in sum, the prevalent normative arguments seem to suggest that relevant actors could also refer to human rights in climate negotiations in order to strengthen their positions. therefore, our analysis focuses on the use of human rights language. by human rights language we mean the direct denomination of a specific human right or a human rights document. our results in part four will highlight that this kind of language was largely absent from the documents analyzed in this study. human rights do not seem to play a major role in the adp negotiations. thus, we argue in this paper that there is a disagreement and discrepancy between the academic normative debate and the empirical findings. 3. methodological approach considering the aforementioned lack of systematic analyses of empirical data in the yet under-researched field of human rights in climate negotiations, we chose a method triangulation approach in our single case study. we contended that the conflation of different methods of data collection and evaluation is better suited for crosschecking our findings and generating valid results beyond the empirical data of the single case (bryman 2012: 392, 635). hence, the data corpus consists of three datasets: documents, and two kinds of expert interviews. consilience beck et al.: mind the gap the systematic analysis of the usage of human rights by states in the documents the states submitted to the adp negotiations was the starting point of our research. we complemented these findings with two different kinds of semi-structured guideline-based expert interviews (gläser/laudel 2009) that were conducted for the most part during the cop-19. state representatives were interviewed as experts on the state position during the negotiations, and civil society observers (i.e. social scientists and civil society representatives) were interviewed as experts on the climate negotiations in a broader sense. the data from the interviews enhanced the confidence of the validity of the document analysis results. it also allowed us to gain deeper insight into the case that the analysis of the documents only offered an overview of (meuser/nagel 2009: 471). the first part of the analysis was based on submissions of unfccc parties to the adp workstream 1 that were submitted until october 18, 2013.1 the data corpus contained 57 submissions, 33 made by 23 different states2 and 24 submissions made by ten different state groups.3 the submissions were analyzed with qualitative content analysis, using a selective coding procedure that started with the definition of a selection criterion, namely human rights. the recognition of human rights underlies development; therefore, we focused on universally binding human rights recognized in the international bill of human rights4 as well as non-binding human rights. subsequently, the submissions were screened through in order to mark text segments that mentioned human rights language, which means that they named a specific human right or referred to binding human rights documents. such segments were sorted under the main category “direct human rights articulations” which is defined by the exact wording of the right (e.g. “right to development”) or the framing of an aspect of human life as being a right, e.g. “right of our vulnerable communities to live and prosper without having their lives threatened and affected by impacts of climate change” (ailac submission 01.03.2013). for differentiating between the articulated rights, each different type of right was sorted to a specific subcategory. these sub-categories were also established in order to get information about the potential importance of certain human rights within the adp process. because human rights have a strong legal character, we expected that states might not often make use of human rights language in the adp and instead refer to                                                                                                                           1 all analyzed submissions are available at http://unfccc.int/bodies/awg/items/ 6656.php#workstreamone, 14.01.2014. 2 the 23 states were algeria, australia, belarus, brazil, canada, china, ecuador, ethiopia, india, indonesia, japan, kuwait, new zealand, norway, pakistan, rep. of korea, russia, singapore, south africa, st. lucia, turkey, usa, and uzbekistan. 3 submitting state groups were the african group, the independent alliance of latin america and the caribbean (ailac), the alliance of small island states (aosis), the coalition for rainforest nations (cfrn), the environmental integrity group (eig), the european union (eu), the least developed countries (ldc), the like-minded developing countries (lmdc) as well as two other group formations. the first group consists of bangladesh, cameroon, costa rica, dominica, dominican rep., gabon, guyana, honduras, kenya, nigeria, papua new guinea, rep. of congo, and uganda (in the following: group of 13). the second group is composed of canada, japan, new zealand, norway, and the usa (in the following: juscanz+norway). 4 the international bill of human rights consists of the universal declaration of human rights (udhr), the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights (icescr) and the international covenant on civil and political rights (iccpr). consilience beck et al.: mind the gap human rights in a more indirect way. consequently, text segments that indirectly referred to human rights were sorted to the second main category “indirect human rights articulations.” indirect human rights references were defined as text segments that contain the (legitimate) need, will or entitlement to protect human beings, aspects of human life, or worries about climate change negatively affecting the lives of human beings. text segments that demanded respect for outcome documents that contain human rights references, e.g. the cancún agreements, were sorted under this category, too. here again, sub-categories were established for each different type of right, e.g. “these climate change impacts in our countries have killed thousands of people and set back our poverty eradication and sustainable development” (lmdc submission 29.04.2013) was coded as the sub-category “right to life” of the main category, “indirect human rights articulation.” this lmdc submission clearly expresses the worry that climate change is affecting the lives of human beings. the sub-category “right to life” was coded here, because the killing of people represents a violation of this right. the results of this first systematic analysis of all submissions to the adp 2 provided us with the criteria for the theoretical sampling of state representatives for the expert interviews (stern 2007: 117; hood 2007: 157-159; wiener 2007: 304). the two criteria for a diverse selection of state experts within our case were: (1) the number of direct human rights articulations in the submissions of the state or state group, and (2) the level of vulnerability of the state or state group to the negative impacts of climate change.5 to determine the vulnerability of each state actor, we followed the notre dame global adaptation index (nd-gain), which integrates a variety of relevant factors.6 we classified the vulnerability of a state as “very high,” at a nd-gain vulnerability score of 0.40 or higher. for state groups, the average of the group’s members’ nd-gain vulnerability scores was the decisive indicator (see figure 1). on the basis of this selection, we recruited interview partners among the state delegates to the adp negotiations. the data from the state expert interviews afforded us a first valuable insight into their motives for or against human rights articulations. in addition, interviews with observing civil society experts of the unfccc process such as ngo members and social scientists provided further insights and contextual information. the two selection criteria for the civil society experts were (1) their human rights expertise, and/or (2) their unfccc/adp expertise. both expert question guidelines contained broad questions about the general role of human rights in climate negotiations as well as more specific questions on human rights articulations by states. the state experts were also questioned on their reasons for or against the usage of human rights language.                                                                                                                           5 the second criterion is based on the assumption that the level of vulnerability of a state’s population to climate change impacts may influence the decision to employ human rights language in climate negotiations and that highly vulnerable state actors were more likely to articulate human rights than less vulnerable states. 6 “vulnerability – a country's nd-gain index score is composed of a vulnerability score and a readiness score. vulnerability measures a country's exposure, sensitivity and ability to cope with climate related hazards, as well as accounting for the overall status of food, water, health and infrastructure within the nation.” (http://index.gain.org/ranking/vulnerability, 24.01.2014). consilience beck et al.: mind the gap the interview datasets were analyzed using a constructivist grounded theory approach (charmaz 2011).7 the data from the state expert interviews was analyzed in an open coding procedure in which the categories were derived inductively. the objective of the civil society expert interviews, which constitute a complementary dataset of this study, was to embed the prior analyses into their context and, even more importantly, to cross-check prior results. therefore, this third dataset was analyzed in a process of selective coding (titscher et al. 1998: 99-100) based on categories derived from the state expert interview analysis. the aim of the expert interviews was to highlight which prior results can be confirmed or disconfirmed and/or further developed by the two different groups of experts. 4. results8 4.1 results of submission analysis the main result of the analysis is that human rights do not play a big role within the adp, which is evidenced by the fact that only 25 out of 57 submissions contained any direct or indirect human rights articulations. at that, human rights were articulated rather in an indirect than in a direct way. out of 89 identified text segments that referred to human rights, 70 were indirect human rights articulations, and were made by 17 different actors9 in 25 submissions. direct human rights were coded only 19 times within seven submissions made by five different actors. 51.52% of all submitting actors articulated human rights indirectly, and only 15.12% of them articulated human rights directly. furthermore, human rights language was only used by non-annex i parties,10 namely by the african group, ailac, ecuador, the ldc and the lmdc. another result is that state groups did refer to human rights more often than single states did, both directly and indirectly. while state groups articulated them 58 times, states used them only 31 times. nine out of 19 direct human rights codings were included in state submissions, but those nine were all made by ecuador. in contrast, the ten identified direct human rights codings in the state group submissions were made by four different actors, namely the african group, ailac, the ldc, and the lmdc. the indirect codings show a comparable result: 22 indirect articulations were coded within submissions made by nine different states.11 nevertheless, state group submissions contained 48 of                                                                                                                           7 grounded theory was employed as the method of analysis not to generate a new theory, but because of the inductive nature of the study and the previously unexamined empirical data. 8 all data that our results are based on can be provided to interested parties on request. 9 the following actors referred to human rights indirectly: african group, ailac, aosis, australia, belarus, china, ecuador, eig, ethiopia, eu, juscanz+norway, india, ldc, lmdc, norway, south africa, turkey. 10 the list of all annex i parties to the unfccc is available at https://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/ parties/annex_i/items/2774.php, 17.02.2014. most of the non-annex i parties of the unfccc are developing countries or economies-in-transition and “have not been subject to quantitative emission commitments up to now” (winkler/brouns/kartha 2006: 472). 11 australia, belarus, china, ecuador, ethiopia, india, norway, south africa, turkey. consilience beck et al.: mind the gap such codings that were made by eight different actors.12 to sum up, only 39.10% of the states (nine out of 23 submitting states) articulated human rights directly or indirectly, compared to 80.00% of the state groups (eight out of ten submitting state groups). figure 1 demonstrates that the direct human right articulated the most within the submissions is the right to (sustainable) development. ten out of 19 (52.63%) direct human rights codings are articulations of the right to (sustainable) development. four different actors, ecuador, the african group, the ldc, and the lmdc, directly referred to this right.13 in contrast, other nonbinding rights, such as the right to water14 and the rights of indigenous peoples,15 were mentioned only once. all other segments sorted under the main category of “direct human rights articulations” referred to universally binding human rights, but did not play a prominent role in the debate either (see figure 1). all of these direct human rights articulations were made by ecuador except for the right to life, which was mentioned by ailac as well. the ecuadorian submission was the only one that actively promoted a human rights-based approach. ecuador not only made 47.37% (nine out of 19) of all coded direct human rights articulations, but it was also the only state that mentioned a central human rights document, the udhr, and that pushed for the integration of human rights in the 2015 agreement (ecuador submission 02.03.2013).                                                                                                                           12 african group, ailac, aosis, eig, eu, juscanz+norway, ldc, lmdc. 13 even though the right to (sustainable) development was proclaimed in the declaration on the right to development by the united nations general assembly (unga) in 1986 (ohchr 2014: 1), it is not (yet) a legally binding right on the international level (fukuda-parr 2012: 844). however, the right is legally recognized in the african charter on human rights and peoples’ rights and the arab charter on human rights (ohchr 2014: 1). 14 the right to water “has not been explicitly recognized as a self-standing human right in international treaties” (ohchr 2010: 3), that is the udhr, the iccpr or the icescr (ohchr 2013: 5-6) as it is only implicitly included in the right to food. therefore, the right to water is not a universally binding human right, even though it is included in certain regional and international declarations (ohchr 2013: 4). 15 in 2007, the unga adopted the united nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (ohchr 2013: 4, 8). even though the declaration contains many rights (e.g. the right to self-determination) that are recognized in the udhr (ohchr 2013: 8), it is not legally binding. the indigenous and tribal peoples convention from 1989 is a legally binding document, but we did not consider indigenous rights as universally binding rights in this study as this convention has only been ratified by 22 states (ilo 2014). consilience beck et al.: mind the gap figure 1: number of direct and indirect human rights articulations by type of right (own illustration) concerning the indirect human rights articulations, non-binding and emerging human rights had been articulated most frequently. the right to (sustainable) development was again the right that was articulated the most, followed by intergenerational rights16 (see figure 1). nine out of the eleven intergenerational rights codings were made in the context of a unfccc citation or a reference to unfccc principles, because wording such as “protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind” (lmdc submission 13.03.2013) is included in the unfccc (un 1992: art. 3 (1)). again, universally binding human rights like the right to self-determination or the right to life were less often mentioned than the aforementioned nonbinding rights. another result is that most of the indirect human rights articulations (55.71%) were made by ecuador (eight times) and the lmdc (31 times17), which were the two actors that referred most frequently to human rights both directly and indirectly. in all, indirect human right references were made by 66.67% (six18 out of nine) of the submitting annex i parties. in comparison, only ten19 out of 22 (45.45%) submitting non-annex i parties articulated human rights in an indirect way.20 taken together with the aforementioned results that direct human rights articulations were made only by non-annex i parties, we conclude that                                                                                                                           16 intergenerational rights are not binding human rights so far. nevertheless, some national constitutions, like the norwegian or the bolivian constitution, include a concern for future generations (grosseries 2008: 448). as intergenerational human rights are currently discussed in the scholarly debate (e.g. hiskes 2005; caney 2008) they were considered as emerging human rights in this study. 17 the lmdc is the actor articulating most indirect human rights; 29.00% of all indirect codings were found in lmdc submissions. however, this fact should not be overestimated as the lmdc made five submissions, so that on average a submission does only contain 6.2 indirect human rights articulations. 18 australia, belarus, eu, juscanz+norway, norway, turkey. 19 china, ecuador, ethiopia, india, south africa, african group, ailac, aosis, ldc, lmdc. 20 the eig is not included in this calculation, because it consists of non-annex i as well as annex i parties. 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 right to (sustainable) development (non-binding) intergenerational rights (non-binding) right to food right to adequate standard of living indirect human rights right to self-determination right to water (non-binding) right to life right to health right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress right to gender equality right to adequate housing indigenous rights (non-binding) right to property right to work direct articulation of the udhr direct human rights articulations consilience beck et al.: mind the gap annex i parties tend to refer to human rights in climate negotiations only in indirect terms. 4.2 results of expert interview analyses as direct human rights articulations are unambiguous, less prone to our interpretation, and a lot more likely to stem from the actor’s decision to explicitly use human rights than in the case of indirect articulations, we based our selection of state expert interviewees only on the direct human rights articulations. the results of the submission analysis revealed that the only state parties that articulated direct human rights in their submissions many times (more than three) were ecuador and the state group lmdc.21 despite neither of them being highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change,22 they both constitute extremes for this study (gerring 2007: 101-102). therefore, we chose to interview both. among the parties with few direct human rights articulations (from one to three) were only state groups. our interview partners were a representative of the ldc,23 a group highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, and a representative of ailac24 as a group with lower vulnerability. the majority of all parties did not articulate human rights directly in their adp submissions. among those, aosis25 constitutes a particularly interesting case, because this state group did refrain from direct human rights articulations despite many of its members being highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.26 all five state expert                                                                                                                           21 the membership of the lmdc group is not fixed, but a lmdc submission from march 13, 2013 was submitted on behalf of bolivia, china, cuba, dominica, ecuador, egypt, el salvador, india, iran, iraq, malaysia, mali, nicaragua, saudi arabia, sri lanka, sudan, and venezuela. 22 we are aware of the fact that some members of the state groups we classified as state actors with “lower vulnerability” are in fact particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts. the classifications are based on the nd-gain index and the average score of all members of each state group (see part 3). 23 according to the least developed countries report 2013, the un recognize the following 49 states as the ldc: afghanistan, angola, bangladesh, benin, bhutan, burkina faso, burundi, cambodia, central african rep., chad, comoros, dem. rep. congo, djibouti, equatorial guinea, eritrea, ethiopia, gambia, guinea, guinea-bissau, haiti, kiribati, lao people’s dem. rep., lesotho, liberia, madagascar, malawi, mali, mauretania, mozambique, myanmar, nepal, niger, rwanda, samoa, sao tome & principe, senegal, sierra leone, solomon isl., somalia, south sudan, sudan, timor-leste, togo, uganda, tanzania, tuvalu, vanuatu, yemen, and zambia (unctad 2013). 24 the ailac group that was formed in 2012 consists of chile, colombia, costa rica, guatemala, peru, and panama (honty 2012). 25 the members of aosis are antigua & barbuda, bahamas, barbados, belize, cape verde, comoros, cook isl., cuba, dominica, dominican rep., fiji, micronesia, grenada, guinea-bissau, guyana, haiti, jamaica, kiribati, maldives, marshall isl., mauritius, nauru, niue, palau, papua new guinea, samoa, singapore, seychelles, sao tome & principe, solomon isl., st. kitts & nevis, st. lucia, st. vincent & the grenadines, suriname, timor-leste, tonga, trinidad & tobago, tuvalu, and vanuatu (aosis 2014). 26 the (self-)perception of the state experts we interviewed corresponded to the classification of our selection matrix (see table 1). palau/aosis (2013: 1) and ldc (2013: 2) both viewed their state groups and were named by others (chile/ailac 2013: 3; ecuador 2013: 3) as being particularly vulnerable and already affected by adverse consilience beck et al.: mind the gap interviews were conducted with state or state group representatives who were explicitly following the adp negotiations. table 1: selection matrix of state/state group experts (own illustration) states/state groups (submissions) with very high vulnerability to impacts of climate change lower vulnerability to impacts of climate change many direct human rights articulations (>3) ecuador (9), lmdc (5) few direct human rights articulations (1-3) african group (1), ldc (2) ailac (2) no direct human rights articulations ethiopia, india, pakistan, aosis, cfrn, group of 13 algeria, australia, belarus, brazil, canada, china, indonesia, japan, kuwait, new zealand, norway, rep. of korea, russia, singapore, south africa, st. lucia, turkey, usa, uzbekistan, juscanz+norway, eig, eu as it turned out, there were not many civil society experts observing the adp negotiations as such, but all civil society interviewees were longtime observers of different processes within the unfccc. in total, our civil society expert interview dataset consists of six interviews with the following experts from ngos and academia: marcial arias, spokesperson for the indigenous ngo coordinadora de las organizaciones indígenas de la cuenca amazónica (coica); eva filzmoser, director of the ngo carbon market watch; alyssa johl, senior attorney at the ngo center for international environmental law (ciel); victoria taulicorpuz, executive director of the indigenous ngo tebtebba and philippines delegate on redd+; wolfgang sterk, researcher at the wuppertal institut für klima, umwelt, energie; and sébastien jodoin, researcher at the yale school of forestry & environmental studies.27 in some regards, the civil society experts’ answers complemented the responses of state experts even though the state experts seemed often unaware of the scientific debate of which some of the civil society experts were not only aware of but active participants in. the evaluation of the interview data confirmed our central submission result that human rights do not play an important role in the adp negotiations at all (johl 2013: 1; filzmoser 2013: 1; sterk 2013: 1; tauli-corpuz 2013: 1). based on the state expert interviews, ecuador was the only party explicitly pursuing a human rights-based approach to the adp negotiations and the 2015 agreement (ecuador 2013: 1). el salvador/lmdc was supportive of this position, but saw the primary importance rather in human rights safeguards for implementation mechanisms (el salvador/lmdc 2013: 3-4). chile/ailac supported a more prominent role of human rights in the negotiations but did not pursue this in the adp, mostly out of reservations about the operationalization of human rights in this context (chile/ailac 2013: 1, 2). the ldc group had not deliberated yet on purposely including human rights language into the negotiations, but it was open for “moral” arguments and considered its references to the vulnerability of people as an inclusion of human rights aspects (ldc 2013: 1-2). both ldc                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               climate change impacts. from this it follows that, contrary to our assumption, being highly vulnerable does not prompt parties to adopt human rights language in the negotiations. 27 the expertise backgrounds are as follows: sterk is adp expert, tauli-corpuz, johl and jodoin are redd experts, and filzmoser is cdm expert. arias has been observing the cops for 15 years. consilience beck et al.: mind the gap (2013: 1) and chile/ailac (2013: 2) were less aware of their own few direct human rights articulations than of their indirect references to them.28 palau/aosis deliberately refrained from framing climate change as a human rights issue due to perceived external pressure, and instead focused in the negotiations on human suffering as an indirect reference to human rights (palau/aosis 2013: 1). the civil society experts also contended that human rights are articulated more often indirectly rather than directly (filzmoser 2013: 1; johl 2013: 4, 5; tauli-corpuz 2013: 4). in view of the states or state groups that champion human rights within the adp negotiations, the expert interviews only partly confirmed the findings from the submission analysis. the experts seemed to not be fully aware that state groups were (much) more prominent in articulating human rights directly than states on their own. the experts named bolivia as a human rights champion (ldc 2013: 2; arias 2013: 1, 2; jodoin 2013: 4; johl 2013: 7) and “some european countries together with mexico” (chile/ailac 2013: 1; see also jodoin 2013: 2; johl 2013: 2), which we interpreted as a reference to the eig.29 chile/ailac also named itself as one of the parties referring to human rights in a previous session (chile/ailac 2013: 2), and did in fact articulate direct human rights twice in its submission to the adp at cop-19. furthermore, the civil society experts named ecuador, venezuela, brazil, argentina, the philippines, the maldives, and the state group alba (tauli-corpuz 2013: 2; arias 2013: 1, 2; jodoin 2013; 4; johl 2013: 2). ecuador was justly identified as one of the strongest proponents of human rights in the climate negotiation context. bolivia did not make any submissions to the adp by itself, but it is a member of the lmdc group and the author of at least one of their submissions (lmdc submission 12.09.2013). the eig submissions on the other hand did not contain any direct human rights articulations (and only one indirect reference), and neither did brazil’s submissions. the other mentioned state parties did not contribute to the adp with their own submissions within the evaluation period. the result that arises from all three analyses is that bolivia and ecuador have been using human rights and were perceived as doing so. the divergence from the submission results was more apparent regarding the human rights that state parties considered as important in the climate negotiation context. the rights mentioned by the interviewees as important for states in this context were gender equality (chile/ailac 2013: 1, 2), the rights of indigenous peoples (el salvador/lmdc 2013: 4; sterk 2013: 1; johl 2013: 5), the collective right to enjoy and utilize the natural wealth and resources (el salvador/lmdc 2013: 1), the collective right to self-determination (palau/aosis 2013: 1; johl 2013: 5), the right to an adequate standard of living (ecuador 2013: 1), and the still non-binding human right to development (el salvador/lmdc 2013: 1), and intergenerational human rights (ecuador 2013:                                                                                                                           28 admittedly, the right that the ldc group articulated directly in their submission is the non-binding right to (sustainable) development (ldc submission 03.03.2013). this right not being universally recognized as a human right may explain why the ldc expert was not aware of this articulation. ailac on the other hand refers directly to the right to life and the right to an adequate standard of living in their submission from 01.03.2013. 29 the eig consists of mexico, liechtenstein, monaco, rep. of korea, and switzerland (see https://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/negotiating_groups/items/2714.php, 20.02.2014). consilience beck et al.: mind the gap 1).30 only three of these human rights (right to adequate standard of living, rights of indigenous peoples, and right to development) are counted among the rights that were articulated directly in the submissions, and only the non-binding right to development was articulated by the same party (lmdc) as in the submissions. the expert interviews offered us a first insight into possible reasons for and against the articulation of human rights by state actors. since ecuador and the lmdc group were the only parties articulating direct human rights in their submissions purposely and to an exceptional extent, they were the only ones to give us an insight into the reasons for articulating human rights in the adp. an important reason mentioned by both was because they wanted human rights to be integrated (to some degree) into the 2015 agreement (ecuador 2013: 1; el salvador/lmdc 2013: 3). furthermore, both of these parties took the moral stance that the human rights of their population take precedence over climate mitigation (ecuador 2013: 2; el salvador/lmdc 2013: 4). human rights are “the limit that we [ecuador] are not willing to breach” (ecuador 2013: 2). ecuador pushed for human rights in the adp for two additional interconnected reasons. first, it sought to remind other parties that they are already part of the internationally established and recognized human rights regime which they may not breach within the climate change context, a notion that was endorsed by several civil society experts as well (filzmoser 2013: 3; sterk 2013: 4; taulicorpuz 2013: 4). and second, invoking this universally accepted international regime could help to dissolve the considerable discord in the adp on the interpretation of equity (ecuador 2013: 3). the civil society experts addressed two further potential reasons for human rights articulations which seemed substantiated given the submission analysis results: human rights are articulated among other things for political reasons or as a strategy especially of left-leaning south american states which use them embedded in their general political orientation (sterk 2013: 2-3). furthermore, the reference to human rights may be seen as a consequence of and an attempt to prevent human rights violations through implementation measures. “the reasons why some states are mentioning it [human rights] is because it has been highlighted what can go wrong if it’s not mentioned explicitly” (filzmoser 2013: 2). the reasons against human rights articulations in climate negotiations were more numerous. one important reason that was mentioned by four of the five state experts and two of the civil society experts was that many state parties have not (yet) considered that there is a close link between the fight against climate change and human rights. this means that these state parties have not thought about adopting human rights language to negotiations that focus on climate issues (el salvador/lmdc 2013: 4; ldc 2013: 1-2; palau/aosis 2013: 4; chile/ailac 2013: 2; sterk 2013: 1; tauli-corpuz 2013: 1, 3). this disregard is a strong indicator of the vast gap between the normative literature and political reality. it confirms our general impression of the negotiations: the academic debate on the linkages between human rights and climate change has not yet reached the political debate and the reality of the negotiations. many reasons are, however, directly related to the structure of the unfccc. first of all, the                                                                                                                           30 here, again, the responses from state experts and civil society experts somewhat diverged. the interviewed civil society experts thought that in addition to the rights of indigenous peoples and the right to a nation state states would articulate the right to food, right to water and the right to adequate housing (sterk 2013: 2; johl 2013: 6). consilience beck et al.: mind the gap convention contains no references to human rights,31 therefore the debates never framed climate change as a human rights issue (palau/aosis 2013: 4). furthermore, interviewees deplored the dominance of powerful actors, i.e. “developed countries,” that are simply unwilling to talk about human rights in the climate negotiations context (arias 2013:1; jodoin 2013: 2, 3) and “to put economic interests at stake to act” (ecuador 2013: 3-4). the palauan interviewee was more outspoken and named several countries (e.g. usa, japan, canada) and the eu as those parties that he perceived as highly influential yet obstructive actors for the progress of the climate negotiations (palau/aosis 2013; ecuador 2013: 1). “if we continue to talk about human rights i don’t think they’re gonna wanna listen to us” (palau/aosis 2013: 6). other reasons against the articulation of human rights that were mentioned include the very strong legal aspect that rights language contains (ldc 2013: 2) which many countries may shy away from because of sovereignty concerns (sterk 2013: 1; tauli-corpuz 2013: 4) and to avoid additional obligations and costs that they just cannot or do not want to afford (jodoin 2013: 2; johl 2013: 4-5). to a large extent it is also the structure of the negotiations process itself that inhibits parties from integrating human rights. some state actors worried that the introduction of human rights into the already highly complex process of international climate negotiations would only further increase the complexity of the issues at hand and create new problems (chile/ailac 2013: 2, 3; palau/aosis 2013: 8; sterk 2013: 4; johl 2013: 7-8) or shift the focus further away from the main issue, mitigation of climate change, to the “side issue” of human rights (palau/aosis 2013: 8). moreover, the ldc expert (2013: 1) located human rights on the individual level and international negotiations between sovereign countries, by contrast, on the international level. references to the individual level may be deemed unnecessary or inappropriate in the context of international negotiations. there was large overlap between the reasons against human rights articulations given by state experts and the ones observed or presumed by the civil society experts. however, many civil society experts (tauli-corpuz 2013: 2-3; filzmoser 2013: 3; johl 2013: 5) still advocated a human rights-based approach to climate negotiations because “the underlying rationale is all about human rights” (johl 2013: 5). concerning a possible change of the role of human rights, the experts were not unanimous. jodoin stated that the importance of human rights in climate negotiations had a peak in cancún and has since then decreased (jodoin 2013: 2). johl added that the conversation has not progressed since cancún (johl 2013: 2). she argues that the institutional linkages between the human rights and the climate change regimes are still quite weak. for johl, a clear mandate by the human rights council on the issue of human rights and climate change would help to move things further by raising awareness on the implications climate change has on human rights and by highlighting which rights need to be protected in relation to that (johl 2013: 3). on the other hand, sterk and filzmoser (2013: 4) stated that the importance of human rights within the negotiations is slowly increasing, even though sterk qualified this statement by limiting it to redd (sterk 2013: 1).                                                                                                                           31 this is also a matter of interpretation. both ecuador and el salvador/lmdc, the human rights-articulating parties, see human rights implicitly included in the principles of the convention (“i think there are many principles in the convention itself that promote human rights, not explicitly but implicitly also.” (ecuador 2013: 1); el salvador/lmdc 2013: 1). consilience beck et al.: mind the gap 4.3 synthesis of the results the results of our research clearly show that human rights did not play a major role in the negotiations of the adp at cop-19. only 25 out of 57 submissions contained any human rights references at all and most of those were indirect references. this was further confirmed by the state and civil society experts who agreed that human rights are of almost no importance in the ongoing negotiations. if human rights are articulated in submissions or within the negotiations, state groups are more likely to refer to them than single state parties, and nonbinding rights are mentioned much more often. there has, however, not been a clear distinction by the state experts regarding which human rights are seen as “(more) important” rights within the climate negotiations. when arguing for the inclusion of a human rights-based approach to climate negotiations, state experts stated that such an approach could help dissolve discord in adp negotiations. furthermore, parties would be reminded of their existing obligations under an already established and internationally accepted human rights regime. asked about possible hindrances for the integration of a human rightsbased approach in climate negotiations, several reasons were pointed out. surprisingly, many state experts thought that state parties have simply not yet considered the link between human rights and climate change, showing a clear gap between the progress of the normative scientific debate and the actual political debate on the topic. the structure and the process of climate negotiations at the cop were heavily criticized and seen as another hindrance for the inclusion of human rights into the negotiations, already starting with the wording of the convention itself, which does not contain any human rights language. the interviewed experts also argued that introducing a human rightsbased approach to the negotiations would further increase the complexity of an already complex negotiation process. one of the main obstacles, however, was, according to state experts as well as civil society experts, the unwillingness of the dominant and powerful actors to include this approach out of reservations that it could entail further costs and obligations for them. 5. conclusion and outlook this study has dealt with the role of human rights in the adp negotiations at cop-19 by examining how they are used by state actors and shedding some light on potential reasons for the (non-)use of human rights language. the empirical research has revealed that human rights do not play a major role for states in the adp negotiations. the analyses of documents and expert interviews showed that there are only few states that use human rights language in the negotiations. for the most part, states seem to be unaware of the normative scientific debate which links human rights and climate change. this first systematic inductive empirical study presented new data concerning the empirical side of this debate. even though this study only analyzed the negotiations of one body, namely the adp, it offered some interesting and significant findings concerning the debate on the relationship between human rights and international climate negotiations. these findings should be further evaluated against the backdrop of human rights articulations in other unfccc bodies. it is reasonable to assume that certain rights such as indigenous rights and consilience beck et al.: mind the gap the right to self-determination may play a more prominent role in negotiation bodies such as redd+ or cdm. a systematic analysis of other bodies would provide new insights and add to the empirical understanding of the role that human rights play in international climate negotiations as a whole. our study discovered that there are underexposed additional aspects in the negotiations that came up during the interviews and that should be considered in further research. some states feel the prevalence of injustice and inequality in the negotiations. power relations are seen as a major hindering reason for the integration of human rights language. these aspects are the reason why we consider the following policy implications to be of importance: given that until now civil society organizations and activists, not states, have been the main actors pushing for a human rights-based approach in climate negotiations, states should be more open to their arguments and the implications of this approach. even though human rights can be misused by powerful states in order to defer effective climate commitments, they can still provide good arguments for less powerful, vulnerable states, as they are based on the already established human rights regime. this could strengthen the position of vulnerable states and lead to their empowerment within the international climate negotiation process. furthermore, due to the existing adverse effects of unequal power structures at the negotiations, a reform of the negotiation process should be considered and encouraged. in order to enhance participation justice, the number of delegates could be limited to the size of the smallest delegation. alternatively, an international fund could be set up for less affluent countries to ensure that they are adequately represented. this goes hand in hand with a reduction of the number of simultaneous negotiation meetings. moreover, the host country should provide all state delegations with adequate office space in order to offer them appropriate working conditions. unequal power structures and a lack of awareness of the scholarly debate are the main reasons for the theory-praxis-gap on the political side. this gap can further be explained by the characteristics of normative science itself, which offers theoretical arguments but does not make any claims about their empirical application. however, our inductive study suggests that there is unawareness of the normative arguments even though there is openness and to some extent a need for these arguments on the side of the less powerful and more vulnerable state actors. this 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17.02.2014). unctad (united nations conference on trade and development) (2013): the least developed countries report 2013 (http://unctad.org/en/pages/publication webflyer.aspx?publicationid=700, 20.02.2014). unfccc (united nations framework convention on climate change): list of annex i parties to the convention (https://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/ items/2774.php, 17.02.2014). unfccc (united nations framework convention on climate change): submissions from parties to the adp (2012-2013) (http://unfccc.int/bodies/awg/items/6656.php, 14.01.2014). unfccc (united nations framework convention on climate change): party groupings (https://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/negotiating_groups/it ems/2714.php, 20.02.2014). wiener, carolyn (2007): making teams work in conducting grounded theory, in: bryant, anthony/charmaz, kathy (eds.): the sage handbook of grounded theory, los angeles a.o.: sage publications, 293-310. winkler, harald/brouns, bernd/kartha, sivan (2006): future mitigation commitments: differentiating among non-annex-i countries, in: climate policy 5, 469-486. state expert interviews chile/ailac (2013): interview with waldemar coutts, chilean ministry of foreign affairs, on november 13, 2013. consilience beck et al.: mind the gap ecuador (2013): interview with andrés e. mogro, ecuadorian ministry of environment, on november 15, 2013. el salvador/lmdc (2013): interview with salvador ernesto nieto cárcamo, ministry of environment and natural resources of el salvador, on november 15, 2013. ldc (2013): protocol of the interview with dr. achala c. abeysinghe, legal advisor of the ldc group, on november 14, 2013. palau/aosis (2013): interview with caleb otto, palauan ambassador to the united nations, on november 15, 2013. civil society expert interviews arias, marcial (2013): interview with marcial arias, spokesperson of the indigenous ngo coordinadora de las organizaciones indígenas de la cuenca amazónica (coica), on november 14, 2013. filzmoser, eva (2013): interview with eva filzmoser, director of the ngo carbon market watch, on november 15, 2013. jodoin, sébastien (2013): interview with sébastien jodoin from the yale school of forestry & environmental studies, on december 4, 2013. johl, alyssa (2013): interview with alyssa johl, senior attorney at the ngo center for international environmental law (ciel), on november 16, 2013. sterk, wolfgang (2013): interview with wolfgang sterk from the wuppertal institut für klima, umwelt, energie, on november 14, 2013. tauli-corpuz, victoria (2013): interview with victoria tauli-corpuz, executive director of the indigenous ngo tebtebba, on november 13, 2013. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 9, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 160 – 171 warming climates, changing forests: temperature tolerances of trees and carbon dynamics in northeastern temperate forests angelica e. patterson department of earth and environmental sciences, lamont-doherty earth observatory columbia university, new york email: angelica@ldeo.columbia.edu abstract extensive botanical surveys and long term plots have shown that since the early 1930’s, black rock forest, located in the hudson highlands of new york, three tree species were extirpated and seven were gained. these results are consistent with a warming climate and suggest the hudson river valley may be an important location to study the effects of climate change on northeastern forests. classic global vegetation and species distribution models primarily use species presence/absence or presence only distribution with preferred environmental parameters to predict range distributions of plant communities under increasing co2 regimes, and thus climate warming. although these models have begun to incorporate physiological data (photosynthesis, stomatal response, and respiration), they lack a sophisticated parameterization of species-specific physiological characteristics and complex interactions within plant communities. more experimentation is necessary to validate assumptions regarding the mechanisms behind tree species responses to climate change and narrow the variability of model outputs. during the summer of 2012, i explored the physiological mechanisms for species tolerance to increasing temperatures and considered the potential effects on the carbon storage capacity of forest trees under the predicted warmer climates of the coming century. author’s note angelica patterson is a ph.d. student in the department of earth and environmental sciences at columbia university in new york, and is majoring in plant eco-physiology. the author would like to thank barnard student and research assistant jamie yu for her help in collecting and analyzing data. also, many thanks to the author’s academic advisors, dr. kevin griffin, dr. natalie boelman, and dr. hilary callahan for their guidance and advice on this project. william schuster, matthew munson, john brady, katie pavlis, and the staff of black rock forest have also been instrumental in the success of this project, and the author expresses deep gratitude for their generous support. keywords: carbon cycle, climate change, photosynthesis, physiology, range limits, respiration consilience patterson: warming climates, changing forests 1. plant responses to climate change climate change forecasts predict global surface air temperature increases of 2.0 – 5.4°c over the next century (pachauri, 2007). in the northeast u.s., temperatures have already increased by 0.8°c in the last 30 years (frumhoff et al. 2007). temperatures of this magnitude may seem subtle, but the effect has made an impact on our ecosystems and its inhabitants. historical records in northern europe, dated as early as the 1700’s, have documented migrations and range expansions for plant, insect, and bird species. for example, butterflies in england have been seen to move northward in warmer summers that have succeeded mild winters (ford, 1945; parmesan, 2006). unfortunately for plants, responses to increasing air temperatures are not as simple, as they are sessile organisms, relying on seed dispersal to migrate to areas of climatic tolerance and successful establishment and reproduction for a thriving population. plant communities’ response to the predicted increases in air temperature will be observed through changes in geographic distribution (aitken et al. , 2008; corlett, 2008; loarie et al., 2009)), persistence at current range via local adaptation (aitken et al., 2008), or extirpation (i.e. local extinction) (aitken et al., 2008; corlett, 2008). several studies have observed significant movement of tree-lines to high-altitude regions as well as increases in tree density in higher elevations over time (aitken et al., 2008; danby & hik, 2007a, 2007b; millar et al. 2004). the advantage of living on high slopes includes a slower rate of migration necessary to displace oneself to track temperature tolerances. unfortunately, plants on low slopes require higher rates of migration where large displacements are necessary to track climate change (loarie et al., 2009). global vegetation models (gv) and species distribution models (sdms) have shown that 1 km y-1 migration rates for plants may be necessary in regions of rapid climate change (aitken et al., 2008). however, fossil records and molecular evidence show that tree species may be moving slower than what current models predict (pearson, 2006). research indicates that the species tolerance will be critical in determining whether a tree will be able survive given the rate of regional warming. the tolerance of a species to extreme climate conditions is a measure of the persistence of a species and their ability to locally adapt to a changed environment (midgley, thuiller, & higgins, 2007). persistence is particularly important for species that lie on the “rear edge” of their geographic range, where their persistence is necessary to maintain genetic diversity and promote the evolution of their species (hampe & petit, 2005). species at the margins of their migratory range are under high abiotic stress, such as interspecific competition due to low relative fecundity and population density (aitken et al., 2008). unfortunately, if plants have low tolerances to increasing temperatures, they will not be able to adapt fast enough to the low residence time of the current climate, thereby risking lower fitness and possible extinction (loarie et al., 2009). however, species with high tolerances can acclimate via physiological processes or exhibit inherent life history traits that allow them to persist under changing climate conditions. further study on species tolerances is critical in forecasting plant community shifts where the implications may result in tree species survival and persistence or extirpation. consilience patterson: warming climates, changing forests 2. regional climate effects on plant communities regional climate effects on natural communities has not only affected species distribution directly, but has been linked with increased forest disturbance (e.g. fires and disease) impacting future forest composition (pachauri, 2007). in a previous review article, schuster et al. (2008) summarized changes in forest composition at black rock forest (brf) over a seventy-six year time period. they found that three tree species were extirpated. one of these species, the american elm (ulmus americana l.), was once dominant in northeastern u.s. forests but declined in numbers due to dutch elm disease (ophiostoma ulmi (buism.) nannf.). introduced to north america from the netherlands and spread by the native elm bark beetle (hylurgopinus rufipes eich.; (gibbs, 1981; schuster et al., 2008)), dutch elm disease nearly eradicated the brf american elm population after 1949. accounts of paper birch (betula papyrifera marsh.), a northern-ranged tree species whose southern margin occurs at brf, were rare in the 1930’s, with only one individual documented in 2003. black spruce (picea mariana (mill.) b.s.p.), a northern-ranged conifer once located in high-elevation wetlands failed to reproduce and survive and was last documented as present in the forest in 1949 (schuster et al., 2008). these extirpated species provide evidence to the direct and indirect effects of climate change that will continue to have profound impacts on plant community composition. there is no doubt that compositional changes have occurred at brf over the past seventy-six years. however, these changes are not anything new. paleoecological records from sediment cores at brf’s sutherland pond have collected thousands of years of vegetation profiles. sediment cores are cylinders of compacted soil and mud that have preserved fallen pollen grains, seeds, conifer needles, and charcoal. these macrofossils fall to the bottom of lakes or ponds, accumulate, and are covered with soil deposits over time creating a series of layers that correspond with a certain period in the surrounding environment’s history. sediment cores collected at brf date as far back as the younger dryas, a “cold snap,” which occurred approximately 11,600 13,000 years before present (ypb) (maenzagmelch, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c; peteet, 2000). the earliest pollen records show a dominance in herbaceous and shrub species, indicating a tundra-like climate (maenza-gmelch, 1995; peteet, 2000). around 12,500 ybp increases in pollen influx and organic deposition suggest a climactic warming period in which a “mixed boreal coniferous-temperate deciduous woodland” dominated the forest (maenza-gmelch, 1995). the warming period was succeeded by the younger dryas cold snap, which lasted over 1500 years and featured spruce, fir, and alder as the dominating tree species. the transition from the younger dryas to the holocene occurred over 5070 years with average july temperatures increasing 3-4°c (peteet, 2000) provoking the establishment and the expansion of tree species that make up our current northern hardwood-conifer forests. although we continue to observe plant community shifts several thousand years later, accelerated increases in air temperature and short residence times of local or regional climates have narrowed the opportunity for plants to track ecological niches (aitken et al., 2008; iverson, schwartz, & prasad, 2004; loarie et al., 2009). the extirpation of three tree species at brf has been succeeded with the establishment of eleven tree species, which have either been planted (acer saccharum consilience patterson: warming climates, changing forests marsh.), migrated naturally, or been introduced anthropogenically over the past thirty years (eight of the eleven species shown in table 1). the majority of these introduced species have a southern-range distribution in which brf lies at their northern margin. the remainders are non-native to north america and are regarded as invasive in their habit (tree-of-heaven (ailanthus altissima (mill.) swingle), and white poplar (populus alba l.)) (schuster et al., 2008). mitigated through climate change, the migration of southern tree species and persistence of those that were introduced via planting have been deemed successful at changing the forest species richness, bringing about larger implications for regional and global cycles. 3. plant community shifts and forest carbon storage currently, the hudson highland’s region has a high dominance of oak species, which are known to sequester large amounts of carbon (schuster et al., 2008) in a region known to be one of the largest aboveground terrestrial carbon pools in the world (pederson, 2004). however, various factors, such as insect outbreaks, severe droughts, and extensive forest clearings in the surrounding hudson highlands region have resulted in the mortality of dominant tree species and have controlled the long-term biomass and carbon dynamics of brf since the late 1940’s (schuster et al., 2008). one of the most influential factors influencing the sequestration of carbon at brf involves shifts in tree species composition. oak species have inherent physiological and physical traits that contribute to their long-term persistence in northeast u.s. forests. however, declining oak recruitment (due to increased deer browsing and competition) and periodic landscape disturbances threaten the forest’s carbon storage potential. introduced or migrant tree species that are successful at establishment and reproduction as a product of climate change may negatively influence carbon storage capacity changing the forest into a source of carbon dioxide perpetuating warmer atmospheric temperatures. in addition, the replacement of both young and mature oaks with migrant or introduced species could reduce the set of important ecosystem services oak-dominated forests provide (schuster et al., 2008). researching the physiological capacities of trees under a warming climate, interspecific competition of species and tolerance to environmental disturbance is crucial in our understanding of how these factors will affect forest composition and forest carbon storage. this summer, i studied the physiological response to increasing temperature of tree species (i.e. species tolerances) that have northern or southern range limits distributed across the hudson highlands region of the northeastern united states. through quantitative observational and experimental tests, this research seeks a better understanding of what species will be best able to physiologically acclimate to the region’s changing climate, how plant community composition is likely to change, and what the impact of these changes could be on the global carbon cycle under future warmer conditions. 4. black rock forest study site this study was conducted at the black rock forest, a 1,550 ha preserve located in the hudson highlands region of southeastern new york state. the consilience patterson: warming climates, changing forests forest encompasses a mixed hardwood forest with a canopy comprised of about 67% oak and 33% non-oaks (schuster et al. 2008). red oak (quercus rubra l.) and chestnut oak (quercus prinus l.) dominate the canopy, while the understory is dominated by red maple (acer rubrum l.). sugar maple (acer saccharum marsh.), black birch (betula lenta l.), and yellow birch (betula alleghaniensis britt.) make up a significant composition of the forest as well. air temperatures are strongly seasonal ranging from a mean of −2.7 °c in january to 23.4 °c in july, and the average annual precipitation is 1,200 mm (noaa, 2000). brf is the site of extensive long-term research with data on species replacements over the last 80 years. first colonized by english settlers in 1700, the forest has been repeatedly logged with some portions converted to agriculture and pastureland until it was abandoned around 1900. in 1928, the forest became a research forest, and in 1989 brf was bought from harvard and established as part of a consortium of local educational and research institutions (schuster et al., 2008). columbia university’s membership as part of the brf consortium made our research possible during the summer of 2012. 5. data collection researchers and brf staff collected canopy leaves from six replicate mature trees from ten species that were categorized into four groups (southern-ranged, northern-ranged, centrally-ranged, and newly introduced; table 1). a pole pruner or line saw are common and inexpensive tools used to retrieve branch samples. however, canopy heights in mature forests reach well over 100 ft., requiring unconventional methods for the acquisition of intact tree branches. scientists sometimes use industrial equipment such as cherry-pickers as a lift to reach high branches. in extreme cases, scaffolding may be installed for long term projects. unfortunately, these methods are often consuming and expensive. one method that is commonly employed is the “shot-gun” method, where a shot-gun is used to sever branches off canopy trees that are inaccessible with the use of traditional tools. although the method requires a few hours of safety training and target practice, the method can be efficient and moderately inexpensive. the use of a 12-gauge semi-automatic shotgun (tristar sporting arms, ltd., missouri, usa) was implemented to shoot down branches grown in direct sunlight from six replicate trees per day. once the branches fell to the ground, they were placed in a bucket of water where the stem was pruned for optimal water uptake. leaf porosity, a measure of leaf conductance to water vapor (used to infer more general environmental response of gas exchange including co2 uptake) was recorded (image 2). plants were then tagged with their appropriate labels and brought back to the lab for processing. consilience patterson: warming climates, changing forests image 1. the shotgun method is employed to retrieve canopy tree branches. consilience patterson: warming climates, changing forests image 2. porosity measurements were conducted in the field. image 3. photosynthetic measurements were made using the licor® 6400. consilience patterson: warming climates, changing forests image 4. leaf respiration measurements were conducted on a leaf from each branch sampled. in the lab, fully expanded leaves were chosen for measurement and allowed to acclimate to room temperature prior to the first measurement. six leaves were then sampled off the main branch, freshly weighed, and run through a leaf area meter used to acquire the leaf area (cm2). a healthy leaf (still attached to the main branch) was selected and inserted into a portable photosynthesis machine (licor®, nebraska usa) to measure net photosynthetic rates at three temperatures (16, 23 (ambient), and 29°c) over eleven co2 levels (1000, 740, 650, 550, 450, 350, 250, 150, 75, 50, 25 µmol) (image 3). once data were collected, the leaf’s area (cm2) and weight (mg) were recorded. concurrently, one leaf from the six previously sampled leaves was placed in the cuvette of a respiratory system where co2 expelled from the leaf was continually measured as the temperature inside the respiratory system increased from 5 to 35°c (image 4). the leaf used in the licor® as well as the remaining five leaves removed from the main branch were placed into separate coin envelopes and dried in an oven at 60°c for two days. leaves that were dried in the oven were ground into powder using a ball mill, which is a cylindrical device used to grind or mix materials (spex 8000 mixer/mill®, new jersey, usa). two to four milligrams of dried leaf powder were then placed into tin capsules where they were then run through a carbonnitrogen flash analyzer (ce elantech, new jersey, usa) to acquire carbon and nitrogen grams per unit of leaf tissue. preliminary data exploration has revealed interesting patterns related to physiological capabilities of migrating plant populations. further statistical analysis performed over the next several months will test whether net photosynthetic and respiratory rates are species specific and if native/historic species ranges dictate physiological ability to acclimate to increasing temperatures. consilience patterson: warming climates, changing forests 6. future research plans and conclusions future experiments that are conducted under laboratory conditions will be necessary to determine baseline measurements of tree physiological capabilities in a controlled environment without competitors. our lab proposes to study trees seedlings, which are earlier in their life stage than the mature trees sampled in our field study. our aim is to test whether seedling growth temperatures dictate physiological ability to acclimate to increasing temperatures (assess local adaptation potential for each species). seedlings will not be considered physiologically identical to mature trees or indicative of mature tree response, but rather will provide information related to how physiological capacity may influence forest regeneration and species migration as affected by temperature. the parallel field and lab study presented and proposed will quantify tree species that have little to no published data. the data collected from this research will enable us to rank/categorize species best able to acclimate to rising temperatures, forecast community composition using sdms, and evaluate carbon storage potential under various temperature scenarios. continued study on thermal tolerances and acclimation potential of plant species to increasing temperatures is critical for assessing which species will flourish under projected environmental conditions and which species may struggle to adapt if migration to preferred niches is failed. future research will enable scientists and policy makers to identify regions most affected by climate change and designate protected areas large enough to contain moving climates (loarie et al., 2009). slowing climate change through reduced emissions is the optimal way to ensure plants are able to migrate to suitable environments (huntley, 1991). however, assisted migration or recolonization efforts may be necessary to prevent local extinction of some plant species (huntley, 1991). given the rapid pace of moving climates, ex situ conservation programs, such as the millenium seed bank project, an international conservation project coordinated by the kew royal botanic gardens, have been instituted to collect and cryopreserve seeds from around the world (kew royal botanic gardens, 1996). as scientists fill gaps in the current understanding of plant responses to climate change, policy makers will be better equipped to employ innovative conservation strategies that will increase the likelihood of plant survival and maintain compositional and functional diversity in plant communities around the world. consilience patterson: warming climates, changing forests bibliography aitken, s. n., yeaman, s., holliday, j. a., wang, t., & curtis-mclane, s. 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(2006). climate change and the migration capacity of species. trends in ecology & evolution, 21(3), 111–3. doi:10.1016/j.tree.2005.11.022 consilience patterson: warming climates, changing forests pederson, n. (2004). the influence of winter temperatures on the annual radial growth of six northern range margin tree species. dendrochronologia, 22(1), 7–29. doi:10.1016/j.dendro.2004.09.005 peteet, d. m. (2000). sensitivity and rapidity of vegetational response to abrupt climate change. proceedings of the national academy of sciences of the united states of america, 97(4), 1359–61. doi:10.1073/pnas.97.4.1359 royal botanic gardens kew. (1996). introducing the millennium seed bank partnership. retrieved december 12, 2012, from http://www.kew.org/scienceconservation/save-seed-prosper/millennium-seed-bank/index.htm schuster, w. s. f., griffin, k. l., roth, h., turnbull, m. h., whitehead, d., & tissue, d. t. (2008). changes in composition, structure and aboveground biomass over seventy-six years (1930-2006) in the black rock forest, hudson highlands, southeastern new york state. tree physiology, 28(4), 537–49. retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18244941 microsoft word mutami.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 14, iss. 2 (2015), pp. 140-157 smallholder agriculture production in zimbabwe: a survey cephas mutami department of rural and urban development great zimbabwe university masvingo, zimbabwe cmutami@gmail.com abstract the study focuses on smallholder agriculture production in zimbabwe as a pathway for fighting rural poverty and underdevelopment. the entitlement approach was used to analyse the agriculture issues of smallholder farmers. using questionnaires and interviews to gather household data, the study employed quantitative and qualitative data analysis through spreadsheet and atlas ti analysis. the study revealed that smallholder agriculture in zimbabwe is predominantly staple production, with cash cropping more prevalent in resettlement areas. poverty remains deeply entrenched in communal areas where land tenure systems, input supply programs, and farmer representations are detrimental to sector development. revitalising smallholder agriculture would provide pathways of nearly 7 million people in rural zimbabwe out of poverty. thus development would need a refocus of policy conditions in communal areas to allow smallholder agriculture growth and development. keywords: rural development, smallholder agriculture, land tenureship, input and institutions 1. introduction the paper analyses findings of a survey on smallholder production practises and challenges in zimbabwe. smallholder farmers are identified as farmers who are in communal areas, resettled small scale areas (makoni district), and small scale commercial areas in mazowe who own less than 35 hectares of land. the study is based on the entitlement approach by sen (1981) as a conceptual and theoretical framework for analysing rural development conditions. the study further adapts the theoretical framework to a rights-based approach which recognises the frame of entitlements open to smallholder farmers. the study uses a mixed-methods research design which emphasis the views and perceptions of smallholder farmers in production decisions and operations. interviews, document content analysis, and questionnaires were used to gather data on land tenure, productivity, markets, and farmer organisations. the study revealed that smallholder farmers in communal areas and resettled areas have different crop and livestock production practices which are influenced differently by government policy and the effectiveness of producer organisations. smallholder farmers in zimbabwe face a number of challenges ranging from lack of land tenure security, poorly-designed input supply programmes which consilience mutami: smallholder agriculture production   push production costs, and a lack of effective producer organisations which can represent the different needs of smallholder farmers. it is important that the zimbabwean government develop policy interventions and implementation matrices that would create benefits for the poor. such policy need to be comprehensive and able to stimulate effective markets for smallholder produce to allow resilience and sustainability. 2. theoretical framework the paper uses sen’s entitlement approach to contextualise conditions in rural areas and actions and ways to alleviate poverty (1981). entitlement denotes a set of different alternative commodity bundles that a person can acquire through the use of the various networks of relationships that are influenced by a variety of social, political, and legal factors open to someone in this position (sen, 1990: 23). sen’s entitlement approach allows the understanding of substantive entitlements and development issues in a multi-dimensional and pluralistic manner. the study further adopts as the theoretical framework the entitlement approach to a rights-based entitlement to the socio-economic rights of rural citizens. though sen (1981) looked at entitlements during famines, the study extends this concept to the inclusion of rights of smallholder farmers in zimbabwe. rural people have social, legal, economic, cultural, political, and environmental rights. they also have development rights, meaning development should also be afforded to it. the state has an obligation to ensure that these rights are enjoyed by its citizens through the creation of conducive development policy and food security. the right-based approach to rural development is critical, as it elucidates issues like food security in terms of the unalienable rights of rural people. the entitlement approach helps in analysing the opportunities for smallholder agriculture growth and rural transformations. in this regard, an entitlement can also be considered a right to various developmental needs shaped by the policy framework in a country. though the entitlement approach (sen, 1981, 1984, 1986 and1990) is predominantly a famine analysis framework, its generality and applicability to the field of poverty and social policy means its adaptation to rural development is of immense value. it is important to note that rural development is a composite of food security, employment, social, and economic issues, which are basically the same human conditions issues which preoccupied sen (1981). a rights-based entitlement approach does not only explain the social processes and dynamics of rural communities, but also provides a very integral way of looking at the opportunity bundles available to rural people. perhaps the failure of earlier rural development efforts in africa is their failure to look at the socio-political contexts in which rural people construct their livelihoods. moreover, with the rights-based entitlement approach, one has the liberty to use an individual person, group, or community as the unity of analysis, which is of great significance to rural analysis. sen’s entitlement approach is built upon the endowment set, entitlement mapping, and entitlement set of an individual (sen, 1981; murugan, 2003, osman, 1995). the endowment set is defined as the combination of all resources legally owned by a person (osman, 1995). in this study the composite rights of rural citizens are viewed as an endowment set of rights. in the context of rural consilience mutami: smallholder agriculture production   development, resources may mean tangibles, such as land and equipment, and intangibles, such as skills, knowledge and social networks, which are disposable to a household. of course the utilisation of resources is subject to norms, culture, rules, and laws governing their extraction and use. this is important for rural poverty reduction, as resources may be available but with limits on utilisation based on race, gender, caste, or political practice. thus, the state ought to provide and secure an appropriate rights mixes and guarantees for rural people. central to the rights-based entitlement approach is entitlement mapping, such that the relationship between the endowment is set on the one hand and the entitlement on the other. entitlement mapping entails the rates at which resources of the endowment set can be converted into goods and services included in the entitlement set (kuklys and robeyns, 2004; osman, 1995). entitlement mapping basically include three aspects of production, exchange, and transfer components. in rural development, understanding entitlement mapping provides a holistic analytical framework for efficient production systems, trade markets and state welfare systems. the critical role of the state in safeguarding, promoting, and capacitating smallholder farmers is an essential component of a rights-based entitlement approach. it can also allow the measurement of the efficiency of the markets in terms of lowering transaction costs. the third and last component of the entitlement approach is the entitlement set, which can be defined as the set of all possible combinations of goods and services that a person can legally obtain by using the resources of his endowment set (sen, 1981:29). it is the goal of rural development to broaden the entitlement set within a locality so that people would always have alternative pathways for development. broadening the rural economy through both on-farm and non-farm opportunities is another way of providing adequate entitlement bundles for poor rural citizens. conceptualising the ‘entitlement set’ in rural development would require a central role by the state. the state should have deliberate efforts to provide appropriate policies and subsidies in smallholder agriculture production systems (which are cereal based), exchange markets (free or regulated) and social protection systems. in rural development the study adapts the entitlement failure concept not only to refer to food only, but as failure to meet developmental rights sets. a rightsbased entitlement failure thus requires reflections on the approach so as to properly diagnose whether the failure is due to endowment loss, production failure, exchange failure, or transfer failure. this is of immense value to policymakers, as some form of rights failure in rural development may require direct state intervention (through strengthening rural assets or production systems) or some form of trade-related interventions (such as lowering of transaction costs and input and output subsidies to stabilise the market). it should be emphasised that the concept of entitlement as adapted in this study is to provide lens through which the effects of various rural development efforts and narratives can be understood. the entitlement approach does not provide the substantive issues of rural development, but ensures that the substantive issues of smallholder farmers and institutions are discussed; their impact to the human conditions would be sufficiently dealt with. in this regard, it is important now to look at the development of the narration on rural development in africa, but with a focus towards zimbabwe. consilience mutami: smallholder agriculture production   3. methodological overview the study uses the triangulation research method in both data collection and analysis. these methods were taken as the primary sources of information for the study. the mixed methodology is critical for cross-checking data on documents and from interviews. rural development and underdevelopment require a rigorous interrogation of stylized theories, facts, and hard economic data in official and nonofficial documentary sources in order to fully articulate the role of agriculture and rural development in the socio-economic transformation of the poor. the study also utilizes archival research (particularly classified and non-classified documents of both the state and non-state development agencies) in probing state interventions in smallholder agriculture. the study utilises the household as the basic unit of observation, analysis, and source of information. ellis (1998) defines a household as a social group which resides in the same place, shares the same meal, and makes joint or coordinated decisions over resource allocation and income pooling. this definition accommodates most of the households in the researched districts. the household head (hh) will be the respondent for the selected households. village heads were also interviewed to verify household data and look for trends and triangulation in the study. government officials in agricultural and socio-economic line ministries were also interviewed, especially on the rural development projects and policies of the state. unstructured interviews were the basis of data collection, but questionnaires were also administered to collect critical and statistical data on smallholder agriculture production. overall, the study depended on the qualitative approach to research and borrows some few techniques from the quantitative approach to analyzing and quantifying the impacts and effectiveness of production and livelihood activities. the study used primary data sources from questionnaires and archival sources of information in gathering information on the efficacy of an agriculture-led rural development. the study also used both structured questionnaires and unstructured interviews to collect information. structured questionnaires were administered to household heads (hh). these have limited open-ended questions as their main use in the study to gather basic household characteristics and assets. unstructured interviews were used to gather detailed data on policy issues which are key to a vibrant rural economy. the study uses all households in each of the three selected districts as the sample frame. the responding households were selected from a pool of sampled villages. interviewees for unstructured interviews were selected using the purposive sampling method, with the job position of relevant ministries determining whether the questions to be asked were policy or operationally related to rural development. 4. findings presentations, discussions and analysis 4.1 agriculture production in communal and resettlement consilience mutami: smallholder agriculture production   in mudzi district, the study found that the communal farmers predominately produce maize, small grains, groundnuts, and cotton. figure 1 below shows the crop mix for an average household in mudzi communal area: figure 1: percentage household annual crop mix (ton/year, n=50) (source: fieldwork, 2013) the study reveals that the crop mix is tilted toward cash crops, with cotton and groundnuts constituting 56% of annual crop output. maize also has a significant percentage due to its primary role as a staple crop in zimbabwe. small grains also have a significant portion as they are normally taken as sadza, the staple foodstuff. vegetables have a low output, as most households produce them in winter when surface water is available. this crop mix of communal farmers has a direct impact on poverty alleviation and rural development for smallholder farmers in communal areas. first, the respondents revealed that they do not change the average hacterage for maize, as it is the backbone of their food security and survival. however, output has remained constant, at approximately 1.6 tonnes per year due to lack of maize seed and the costs of fertilizers. this implies that any policy intervention in communal food security has to include seed maize and fertilizers as part of an input package if it is to be successful. traditional small grains are now a common crop in mudzi. 86% of the respondents revealed that they have started growing small grains in the last two years due to the decline in annual rainfall and campaigns by non-governmental organisations that see them as adaptive strategies to the effects of climate change. however most communal farmers blame low output on the low hacterage in which they farm small grains, as they require a lot of labour in their processing. an example is the millet crop, which would need labour for re-planting, weeding, harvesting, pounding to remove stalks, and pounding for mealie-meal. one interviewee indicated that they only produce small grains like millet as a fall-back crop in times of droughts, as they can be stored for a long time. cotton 29% groundnuts 16% small grains 15% maize 36% vegetables 4% consilience mutami: smallholder agriculture production   cotton production in communal areas has been on a steady increase in terms of area under cultivation and number of households. the increase of population in rural zimbabwe due to unemployment and shortages of housing in urban areas (herald, 2013) has led to an increase in adult labour force, particularly for communal farmers. labour is a critical input in cotton production. economic factors have also led to an increase in the number of households producing cotton. the dollarization of the economy, which has led to the circulation of us dollars, means farmers have to grow cash crops so they can make payments for school fees, grinding mill, and other services. however the increase in the number of households cultivating cotton as a cash crop is under threat due to declining cotton prices in zimbabwe. this is shown in figure 2 below: figure 2: average cotton producer prices in zimbabwe (us$/kg) (source: fieldwork, 2013) the declining cotton price in zimbabwe, which has been a result of declining international cotton prices, has led to farmers rethinking their continued cultivation of the crop. however 46% of communal farmers interviewed indicated that they may continue producing cotton and groundnuts, which are cash crops as they are viable sources for the cash economy in zimbabwe. 34% of the respondents indicated that since they are under contract farming for cotton, they are willing to produce the cash crop and gain the little profit left on the open market. communal agriculture is heavily linked to family size and gender. this is due to the fact that most resources such as labour and capital are provided by close family members and kinsmen. the study found out that households with more than five adult members tend to increase the area under cultivation for cash crops and cereal grain, which is due to the availability of labour. however, households with elderly members and headed by women are mostly growing cereals rather than cash crops, indicating challenges in procuring inputs and providing labour for production. in the resettled small-scale commercial farms, production is skewed toward the production of maize, though flue-cured tobacco production has been on the rise. 1   0.45   0.47   0.5   0   0.2   0.4   0.6   0.8   1   1.2   2010-­‐2011   2011-­‐2012   2012-­‐2013   2013-­‐2014   u s$ /k g   agricultural  season   consilience mutami: smallholder agriculture production   maize production in smallholder resettled farmers is for both household consumption and commercial trading. figure 3 below shows the average crop mix of small-scale farmers in mazowe district, where the average farm size is 50ha: figure 3: crop mix in mazowe (average hectars/season, n=50) (source: fieldwork, 2013) the study shows that maize crop dominates the crop mix of resettled farmers just as in communal areas. however the average hectares under maize since the year 2010 have been 12 ha, signifying that resettled farmers are in the commercial production of maize. tobacco and soya beans production has been on the rise since 2010, owing to support systems such as contract farming to farmers from private companies. sugar beans have the lowest area under cultivation as compared to other cash and staple crops over the years, with an average of one hectare, owing to the depressed market and lack of seed inputs for this crop. the crop mix cultivated area analysis has a number of implications for small scale development in zimbabwe. first, the prime agricultural area which is remaining fallow in mazowe is a cause for concern. this was also the case with the former landowners before land reform left vast prime agriculture land fallow. in mazowe, the study showed that over 50% of the farm area was being left fallow. there has to be policy interventions to increase area under cultivation per farm so as to boost production output. the study revealed that output per unit area for staple crops is on the rise, particularly for resettled small-scale farmers. generally, output per hectare tends to rise depending on sector, such as communal areas (cas), resettled a1, and resettled a2 farmers. this is shown on figure 4.5 below. it should be noted that in communal areas where there are low endowment sets and where rainfall is low and soils poor, cereal output has remained low below 2 tonnes per hectare per annum. one respondent indicated that maize production as the key cereal produce has become expensive due to the high costs of fertilizers and the soils’ dependence on fertilisers. though cereal output in resettled a1 farmers are above 4 tonnes per hectare, they are over 60% lower than the expected yield of 12 tonnes per hectare by the government’s agricultural planning agency, agritex. however, it should be noted that within the a2 small-scale resettled farmers, cereal production has been on the rise since 2010 (see figure 4). this is basically due to intensive farming systems used 10 2 1 2 20 13 2 1 2 17 14 5 0.5 3 12.5 10 6 2 4 13 0 5 10 15 20 25 maize tobacco sugar beans soya beans others la nd u nd er c ul tiv at io n (h a) crop type 2010 2011 2012 2013 consilience mutami: smallholder agriculture production   by these farmers, as they tend to reduce the area under cereal cultivation and increase the area under cash crops, especially tobacco. figure 4: smallholder agriculture staple production by sector (ton/ha, n=150) (source: fieldwork, 2013) another variant in smallholder agriculture in zimbabwe is income. income tends to be lower in communal areas where crop output is low and livestock sales are low due to huge transaction costs. one interesting finding of the study is that average income within resettled a1 farmers is increasing at a faster rate than that of resettled small-scale a2 farmers. this has been explained by a number of issues. first a1 farmers have just 6ha of land while their counterparts have an average of 35ha of land, and thus their operations tend to be intensive. second, most a1 farmers have been increasing land under cash crops, particularly tobacco, as they take advantage of reforms in the tobacco industry, such as input provision and marketing. respondents in mazowe (a2) indicated that since 2010, inputs are increasingly difficult to access, as most programmes for input provision have scaled back or have collapsed due to the liquidity crunch in the country. respondents from the ministry of agriculture pointed to the high default rates on loans accessed in banks, which have led them to be snubbed by local financial institutions. one critical finding of the study is that if cereal and cash crop output are to be increased to meet both national food security needs and trade balances, the state has to improve the endowment sets of communal farmers since that is where most farmers are located through the provision of modern inputs. the state also has to improve input supply systems in resettled areas and find appropriate financing options for farmers. this necessitate the study to closely examine the findings on agriculture input distribution and financing. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 year 2010 year 2011 year 2012 year 2013 1.5 1.8 2 2.2 4 3.8 4.2 4 6 8 8 10 o ut pu t t on ne s/ ha agricultural harvest year communal areas (cas) resettled a1 resettled small scale a2 consilience mutami: smallholder agriculture production   in communal farming areas, livestock production is practiced by all the respondents interviewed, though 65% have only small livestock such as goats, sheep, and chicken, while about 45% have both cattle and small livestock. despite the huge benefits of small livestock in nutrition and income generation through sales, respondents noted that they require cattle for draught power and as a precaution against livelihood shocks such as death, drought, and prolonged sickness. it was also noted from the study that households with cattle are likely to be male headed and have an average output of cereals of 4 tonnes per annum with a significant output of cash crops. this means that poverty in communal areas in gendered and structured by family structure and size. livestock production is also a key farming practice in resettled farming areas. over 90% of all interviewed respondents indicated that they own cattle and have at four cows per household. this is significant for draught animal power, especially in light of the fact that farm mechanisation is minimal in resettled farming areas. however respondents pointed out that insecurities on farms have resulted in many farmers losing their livestock to theft. this is corroborated by the zimbabwe republic police (zrp), who have indicated that cattle rustling has been increasing at a rate of 5% yearly from reported cases of 1223 in 2009, especially in peri-urban farming areas like mazowe (herald, 2013). improving the security of resettled farmers improves their endowments sets and provide opportunities for further investments in agriculture. 4.2 input distribution and agricultural financing agricultural inputs are essential in the production process, and their supply at appropriate prices and locations is vital. agriculture in zimbabwe, both small and large scales, has options of inputs provision and financing options which range from government-funded to private schemes. the effectiveness of these financing options to various farmer groups such as communal, small-scale resettled farmers, is the subject of this analysis. 4.2.1 government input schemes the agriculture sector productivity enhancement facility (aspef) was introduced by the reserve bank of zimbabwe (rbz) as part of its quansi-fiscal approaches to agriculture financing in 2005. the fund was to finance agricultural inputs, equipment, and infrastructure provision. the input facility was to procure inputs and loan them to farmers at concessional rates so as to stimulate production given the country’s socio-economic decline. farmers in resettled areas were also funded for the construction of dams, barns for tobacco processing, and other infrastructure as a capacity building measure. aspef funds were allocated to irrigation infrastructure, horticulture, beef cattle support, dairy support, piggery and poultry, crops, and other livestock facility and export promotion. except for export promotion and horticulture, all other funded areas were allocated 20% each of the zw$5 trillion (equivalent to us$60 million, gono, 2007). the rbz’s aspef facility has a number of challenges. first, prioritisation under the facility was a problem, as the government failed to allocate resources to consilience mutami: smallholder agriculture production   crops such as cereals which are vital for food security. food security is not only a key driver to economic development, but also a right to citizens (rahim, 2011). secondly, the fund failed to allocate funds per sector or agricultural type, such as communal farmers, a1, and a2 farmers. the allocation of inputs was generally per province and farmer, and thus smallholder farmers were crowded out of the facility. 70% of communal farmers interviewed in the study revealed that inputs under aspef were secured only by influential a2 farmers and political leadership, including chiefs and headman. one respondent indicated that in ward 2 of mudzi, it was only the headman who got a tractor under aspef, which is being used to fetch water and for private transport by her nephew. failure to categorise beneficiaries and allocation of inputs based on party structures resulted in the programme being abused. operation maguta was launched in 2005, as an input scheme run by the zimbabwe national army aiming to boost agriculture production and food security, and by extension ensure a stable security environment in the long run. the program initially had a target of 250,000ha of cultivated land targeting cereal production. soldiers were assigned to districts, especially in communal areas where they assist in the dissemination of farming information, tillage of land, and distribution of seeds and fertilizer packs to farmers. the programme was expanded in 2007 to bring up to 800 000ha of land under cultivation. though operation maguta managed to deliver input packs to deserving communal farmers, it neglected a1 and a2 farmers who were also facing challenges to source inputs due to the economic recession. the input scheme placed orders on input suppliers in the country, leaving low stocks on the open market. fertilizer manufacturing companies were always behind in stocking the program and were left with no room for stocking the open market. this means that farmers who did not benefit from the input scheme were left with no alternative to purchase inputs, hence the subdued production. critics of operation maguta point to the partisan distribution of inputs, particularly in communal areas. this is vividly captured by one respondent, who narrated his assessment of the scheme in figure 5 below: figure 5: respondent’s view of operation maguta (source: fieldwork, 2013) the challenges of operation maguta as put forward by the respondent of the partisan selection of beneficiaries were also corroborated by other sources in the ministry of agriculture. officials from the agriculture ministry felt that they were supposed to run the program since they have structures in farming communities who the army came with operation maguta when things were difficult. inflation was very high and most of us here did not have money to finance our farming operations. the major challenge of the operation was to do with selection of beneficiaries for the program. since the inputs were free local political leaders were demand a share hence as a result very few common villagers were taken aboard in the program. if one was labelled an opposition activist or a sympathizer then you could not enroll in the program. another problem was that the input scheme did not work with existing agriculture extension workers in our ward but relied on soldiers whom we know are not farmers, so their methods were always different from ours when it comes to production. consilience mutami: smallholder agriculture production   could distribute the inputs efficiently. it was clear that the government in the preceding years of 2007 to 2008 was facing a serious economic meltdown, which has left many government departments dysfunctional, hence the need for a coordinated response from the army. pazvakavambwa (2009:3) further notes that, “there was gross abuse of this scheme resulting in the squeezing-out of genuine farmers, secularized input distribution, and the diversion of inputs to the black market by unscrupulous profiteers. the potential for food security had suffered another damaging blow”. even the preceding champion farmer scheme by the army suffered the same fate as operation maguta, as there were late delivery of inputs and targeted output failed to reach 50% of yields (world bank, 2007). another government input scheme is the presidential well-wishers special agriculture input scheme (pwsais) which was launched in the 2010/2011 agricultural season. the input scheme objectively sought to avail agriculture inputs at no costs to the farmers by the president as a response to the poor funding of agriculture by the inclusive government (herald, 2010). the justification was that the finance ministry was stifling funding to agriculture so as to sabotage the zanu pf government’s land reform program (the then minister of finance was the honorable tendai biti from the former opposition movement of democratic change (mdc)). the pwsais sourced inputs such as maize seeds and fertilizers and distributed them to provinces which then distributed to farmers in districts in turn. the scheme targeted 800,000 farmers, including resettled farmers and smallholder and large-scale farmers. it also distributed inputs to communal farmers who were supposed to be the majority beneficiaries. inputs were largely distributed through zanu pf structures, hence allegations that opposition supporters were not allocated inputs, particularly in communal areas such as muzarabani, chipinge, gokwe nembudziya, mudzi south, and murehwa north. in most provinces, the large quantities of fertilizers were reportedly looted by senior politicians, resulting in even zanu pf supporters failing to access the inputs. it should be noted that the pwsais has become a yearly input scheme, hence efforts should be made to improve its transparency so as to benefit targeted households. in 2013, the government of zimbabwe launched the agriculture input support programme (aisp) for the 2013/4 farming season, targeted at 1.6 million households at a total cost of us$161million. the input scheme targeted the communal, old resettlement, small-scale and a1 scale and a1 farmers. under the scheme, each household is to be given 50kg of compound d fertilizer, 50kg of ammonium nitrate (an), 50kg of lime, and 10kg maize seed pack (moyo, 2010). under the same fund, the government intended to clear its debt with input suppliers such as seed houses and fertilizer manufacturing companies, which stood at us$11.9 million. the government also owed about us$10 million to the grain marketing board (gmb), resulting in its failure to pay farmers for past grain deliveries. aisp intended to distribute the input packs through the gmb. however it was noted that this became the major challenge for the scheme, as gmb is not situated in all farming communities. gmb has also suffered perennial logistical challenges in input deliveries, resulting in its failure to deliver inputs on time (pazvakavambwa, 2009). farmers also have to incur high transport costs to the gmb depots to check on the availability of inputs and to collect them. consilience mutami: smallholder agriculture production   perceptions of respondents to the effectiveness of these government schemes vary due to the issue of whether the respondent benefited from the scheme or not, and political affiliation, as most ruling party supporters are eager to paint a rosy picture of party-distributed input schemes. perceptions also varied as to whether the respondent is a communal, a1, or a2 farmer. on the effectiveness of each scheme, the subsidized voucher input scheme (ais) by the government in the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 agricultural seasons was highly regarded, especially by small scale communal farmers. this is shown in figure 6 below: figure 6: percentage positive perceptions on various input programmes by farmers (n=150) (source: fieldwork, 2013) overal, communal farmers ranked higher with the donor and government funded ais where they used vouchers, reflecting the effectiveness of the system and its ability to deliver inputs on time to farmers through agro-dealers. all the input schemes except the pwsais were ranked below 50% owing to their lack of transparency and poor selection criteria by the distributors. most a1 and a2 ranked favorably the free inputs schemes which were distributed through party structures. this may be explained by the fact that most of these farmers have the political muscle to tussle the inputs, especially when they were able to be allocated during the land reform process. 4.2.2 donor funded and private input schemes the input scheme which was co-administered by the united nations’ food and agriculture organisation (fao) and the ministry of agriculture was funded by 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 35 43 95 53 45 40 45 30 55 60 65 70 25 68 61 pe rc en ta ge p os iti ve p er ce pt io n input programme communal farmers a1 &old resettlement a,b,c,d smallholder a2 consilience mutami: smallholder agriculture production   the uk department for international development (dfid), the australian agency for international development (ausaid), the european union, and zimbabwe's agriculture ministry, which also provides extension and training services. the agriculture input scheme was targeted at communal farmers for inputs and tools for agriculture and was subsidized at the level of 90%, with farmers expected to pay 10% of the costs. the inputs were distributed through agro-dealers who were selected by fao and were situated in the selected communities and have the ability to stock up to appropriate levels. farmers were given a voucher with us$128 and farmers top it with $35 so that they can redeem it at the agro-dealer’s shop. agro-dealers stocks comprise of seeds, fertilizers, and tools such as ploughs, wheel boroughs, and small implements. this subsidized voucher scheme was hailed by farmers and agriculture respondents. respondents in mudzi were ranking the scheme positively, as they emphasized that the selection of beneficiaries was politically neutral and the scheme enrolled almost 95% of households in a village. analyst pointed the scheme’s effectiveness on the structure of input packs were farmers who were allowed to select the quantities and composition of the voucher basket on their own, meaning resources were optimally deployed. moreover the fact that farmers were to contribute 10% of the costs meant that none were able to prioritise what they require and could not hoard inputs on the expense of others. challenges of the scheme include “the lack of collateral security among agro-dealers, resulting in reluctance by suppliers to supply in bulk, and a tendency among dealers to hike prices of inputs and tools” (fao, 2009). the private sector has been running input schemes for farmers. this has been through contract farming where farmers are given all the input requirements for a crop or livestock. farmers would sign contracts agreements with financiers on a specific hacterage and agree to sell the produce to the financier. this is mainly the case with cotton, tobacco, and soya bean production. companies which have been practicing contract farming in the cotton company of zimbabwe (cotco), ivirnes, dairyboard zimbabwe, and other financial institutions, have been of late financing tobacco growing. challenges of contract farming in zimbabwe have been largely due to mistrust between private financiers and farmers. farmers allege that they are given inadequate inputs at inflated costs while at the same time being forced to sell their produce at low prices, thereby running loses to their operations. private companies point to the distorted input supply chain where government interventions distort prices and force available stock to be expensive, passing on the costs to the farmer. the prevailing liquidity crunch means that the available financial options remain depressed, hence credit becomes and farming largely unprofitable. for effective rural development in zimbabwe there is need for the active role of the state in the provision and financing of agriculture inputs. the state has to develop a framework for donors, the private sector, and agro-dealers to work together in providing affordable inputs in efficient markets. the subsidised voucher system where government partnered fao and agro-dealers to offer subsidized inputs is a start. the state’s direct involvement in the distribution and supply of inputs will remove market efficiencies, raise prices in secondary markets, and may spearhead corruption and the speculative hoarding of inputs. this kind of distortion may result in expensive financial options to farmers and sub-standards input consilience mutami: smallholder agriculture production   products, which will affect productivity on farmers. the state need to devise a wellcoordinated input supply chain at appropriate subsidy levels to various categories of farmers. 4.3 labour for smallholder agriculture smallholder agriculture in both communal and resettlement areas is labour intensive. it is therefore important to consider the labour shortages and supply constraints of smallholder farmers. of great importance to the study is the household headship in various tenure systems. household headship is shown in figure 7 below: figure 7: percentage household headships of smallholder farmers (n=150) (source: fieldwork, 2013) the study revealed that in all tenure systems, household heads are predominantly male, though women constitute a significant proportion of these households. further analysis revealed that of the 60% male-headed households in communal areas, half of them are working or living away from their families, mainly due to work commitments, leaving women in charge of the households. this squarely puts the women responsible for production and labour arrangements. combining the proportion of women whose husbands are away and female-headed households means that communal agriculture is done mainly by women and children, which is the same view of the world development report 2008. women are also keen to take ownership of land, especially resettled land, as the government moves to achieve gender parity. household headship has a number of implications on communal agriculture. womenand child-headed households face challenges in accessing inputs, particularly those which are distributed through party and government structures such as gis and pwsais. this is mainly due to the patriarchal dominance in traditional rural authorities where power allocates resources and women without husbands are seen as having low morals. the study further supports this contention 0   20   40   60   80   male-­‐headed   female-­‐headed   child-­‐headed   60   35   5   58   40   2   70   30   0   pe rc en ta ge  to  to ta l  h ou se ho ld s   household  headship   figure  7  percentage  household  headships  of   smallholder  farmers  (n=150)   communal  areas   a1&old  reseblement   smallholder  a2   consilience mutami: smallholder agriculture production   in its discovery that only 20% of femaleand child-headed households were able to access inputs under pwsais. representation in local committees and institutions which decide on beneficiaries of input schemes normally excluded female and child households heads, leaving males to dominate production and financial issues in the communities. gender relations in resettled areas have less bearing on resource mobilisation and access to subsidised inputs. the study finds that the conditions of women in resettled areas (both a1 and a2) are better off than their communal area counterparts, owing to their social status. 70% of these women are either local leaders of political parties or war veterans, which means they do command power to wrestle resources with their male counterparts. the study further revealed that 73% of communal households entirely rely on family labour for the production of both crops and livestock. the average family size is five per household, though the average adult working members are three per household. households with paid labour were less than 20% in communal areas of which mostly included one labourer who herds cattle. crop production in communal areas is mainly by own family labour. this lack of paid labour indicates risk aversion strategies of substantive communal farmers, a fact which is noted by todaro and smith (2012:438). the use of paid labour tends to increase in both resettlement tenure systems, with an average of two workers in a1 sector and four workers in a2 sector. this may be an indication of rising income level owing to favourable farming regions and cash cropping. it was further noted that 80% of households who exceeded their category level of number of paid workers are all producing flue-cured tobacco. it should be noted that farmers with few adults who can work in the fields and have no paid labourers tend to cultivate fewer hectares of land and tend to work seasonally on their farms. this is in contrast to a1 and a2 farmers who tend to cultivate over 6 ha per household and work for over three quarters of a year in their fields. thus, if production is to be raised in communal areas, more production systems which minimise labour ought to be adopted. 4.4 farmer producer organisations farmer organizations are critical in efficient agriculture systems. they are critical in price negotiations for produce by farmers and assist in knowledge transfers on best practices for farming. “membership of a farmer organization helps farmers learn new ideas and techniques for ecologically sound farming and for conserving an area’s natural resources” (mupetesietal., 2012). farmers in zimbabwe are mainly represented by two main producer organisations, which are zimbabwe farmers union (zfu) and commercial framers union (cfu). these organisations have other numerous affiliates which are crop or livestock specific. historically, these farmer organisations have a racial divide, with the zfu being dominated by black zimbabweans and the cfu by white farmers. though zfu indicates that they have small-scale farmers and large-scale farmers, their membership diaries indicate that most of their members are large-scale farmers. the cfu has large-scale commercial farmers as the majority of its members. though both organisations have affiliates where small-scale farmers are members, their basis consilience mutami: smallholder agriculture production   is commercial farming, leaving small-scale communal farmers without representation. this is clearly shown in the study, where 96% of interviewed communal farmers are not members of any farmer organisations. most communal farmers indicate that they only channel their representations to government through local party structures and agriculture extension officers. however, about 6% of small-scale farmers in resettled areas indicated that they were members of zfu affiliated producer organisations, though none were affiliated with the cfu. in terms of technical farming expertise and organisational strength, cfu appears to be on top, as it has a proper secretariat to run it. cfu has run a number of commissioned studies in zimbabwe, particularly on reviving the agriculture sector. however, the efficiency of cfu as a farmer organisation to engage the state and other stakeholders has been undermined by its racialized membership and allegations that it was against the post-2000 land reform. although zfu is favoured by the current government in zimbabwe, it lacks the capacity to influence policy and practice. this has been to its lack of resources, as the bulk of its membership is from the post-2000 land reform when the economy was in recession, making contributions negligible. the most visible activity of zfu is on negotiating producer prices, particularly cotton and maize. however, in most of these negotiations, farmers seem to lose much, as pegged producer prices of staple crops are usually below production costs (chronicle, 2012). it is critical that farmer organisations in zimbabwe embolden their capacity in substantive issues of agriculture and engage the government effectively on policy matters. current investment climate in zimbabwe may be in favour of industrial growth and using agriculture as a cheap source of raw materials. policy issues on the supply chain of inputs and output pricing needs to be agreed upon by farmers, government, and the private sector buyers. effective representation of all farmers in markets and government policy level usually help in boosting production, particularly of small-scale farmers (bratton 1987:397; ifad, 2013 and mupetesietal., 2012). 5. conclusion a rural development policy in zimbabwe ought to recognise the central role of small-scale agriculture. the realities of agriculture and rural development in zimbabwe points to the existence of small-scale farming households. empirical evidence has pointed to the fact that small-scale agriculture is the mainstay of the zimbabwe economy, as it has the largest share of national populations, yields, and agricultural land. thus, an effective rural development policy should identify itself with the socio-economic setting of smallholder agriculture with the overall aim of improving efficiency, productivity, and transformation. small-scale agriculture would be greatly enhanced through appropriate input supply systems, technological innovations, infrastructure, and produce markets. the temptation for populist regulations of these rural cardinal conditions should be resisted, as it will wipe out all market benefits of households. this does not imply a docile state, but an activist one which strives to provide the policy framework for market-friendly approaches through both the public and private sectors. the state’s role should be to stimulate markets and monitor initiatives so that they may not be hijacked by profiteering capitalists. encouraging win-win scenarios in rural development would remove consilience mutami: smallholder agriculture production   distortions in both inputs and produce markets. it is in pursuant of this narrative that the state ought to roll back produce marketing boards and replace them with competitive markets such as the tobacco auction market in zimbabwe. bibliography bratton, m. 1987. drought, food, and the social organization of small farmers in zimbabwe. in drought and hunger in africa, ed. m. glantz, 213-244. cambridge, united kingdom: cambridge university press. chronicle, 2012. ‘maize producer price consultations begin.’ chronicle business. 20 may (6). fao. 2009. the state of commodity markets, fao, rome. gono, g. 2007. ‘agriculture sector productivity enhancement facility.’ reserve bank of zimbabwe, harare. gotora, p. 2013. ‘housing a basic human rights’, herald, 28 november, (3). ifad, 2013.“rural livelihoods improvement and sustainable agriculture management within an enabling policy environment.” report: ifadkuklys, w. and robeyns, i. 2004.‘sen’s capability approach to welfare economics’, cambridge working paper in economics 0415, cambridge university, cambridge. mupetesi, t. etal. 2012. ‘gendered patterns of social capital among farmers in guruve district of zimbabwe.’ gender & behavior, vol. 10 (2). murugan, g. 2003. ‘entitlements, capabilities and institutions: problems in their empirical application’. paper prepared for presentation in the conference on economics for the futureunder the auspices of cambridge journal of economics, university of cambridge, 17-19, september 2003. osmani, s. 1995. ‘the entitlement approach to famine: an assessment’, in: k. basu, p. pattanaik and k. suzumura (eds) choice, welfare and development. oxford; oxford university press. pazvakavambwa, s. 2009. ‘achieving household and national food security in zimbabwe,’ a-mdtf initiative, harare. rahim, a. 2011.“rights to food with a human face in the global south."journal of asian and african studies. 46(3)237-249. sen, a 1981. poverty and famines: an essay on entitlement and deprivation. oxford: claredon press. sen, a. 1984.resources, values and development. oxford, basil blackwell. consilience mutami: smallholder agriculture production   sen, a. 1986.food, economics and entitlements, lloyds bank review, 160, pp. 1–20. sen, a. 1990. gender and cooperative conicts, in i. tinker (ed) persistent inequalities: women and world development (new york, oxford university press). todaro, m. p. and smith. c. s. (2012). economic development.11th edition. england: pearson education limited. world bank, 2007.world development report (wdr) 2008: agriculture for development. washington dc: world bank. microsoft word mubazi.doc consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 15, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 119-133 interdependency of aid effectiveness and good governance john kigongo e. mubazi makerere university jkem@bams.mak.ac.ug abstract the spirit of this article is to offer a fresh perspective related to the future of aid as a way of informing the ongoing discourse on development assistance to the benefit of policy makers and key stakeholders. it suggests that aid deployment ought to change in such a way as to improve governance and has shown where and how. we explore governance’s focus as well as the world bank dimensions. under focus, we concentrate on the transparency of government, the simplicity of procedures, accountability and responsibility, the need to fight against corruption, individual freedom and collective expression, and independence of the legal system. for the world bank dimensions, the concentration is on: voice and accountability, political stability and the absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. with respect to regulation and corruption, we address whether to use market-based or regulatory measures, possible policy instruments, implementation issues, and difficulties and problems. under possible policy instruments, mandatory policy instruments, voluntary agreements, compliance instruments, and precautionary measures are explored. implementation issues include introductory matters, costs, free riding and voluntary agreement and compliance. in addition, we examine difficulties associated with distributional issues, compensation, regulatory capture phenomenon, and the effect on innovation. regarding corruption, we examine its definition, state capture versus conventional corruption, corrupt acts, forms of corruption, hypothetical causes of corruption, some analytical points, theoretical consequences, unbinding bribery, incidence of corruption, fraud, and control measures. keywords: aid, governance, policy, regulation, fraud, corruption consilience 120 introduction as governments and institutions continue to provide development financing, aid deployment should change in such a way as to improve governance. good governance has proven central to economic development that is specific to a given country or set of countries. fresh thinking related to the future of aid informs the ongoing discourse on development assistance and should therefore be availed to policy makers and key stakeholders. such is the spirit of this article as it focuses on governance, particularly in relation to regulation and corruption. governance according to jha and zhuang (2014), the concept of governance is broad – but nearly always includes voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. good governance has political, economic, and institutional dimensions; kaufmann (2005: 41) defines it as the following: “traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. this includes the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored, and replaced (the political dimension); the government’s capacity to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies (the economic dimension); and the respect of citizens and the state for the country’s institutions (the institutional respect dimension)”. the world bank offers a narrower definition, describing good governance to be “epitomized by predictable, open, and enlightened policy making (that is, transparent processes); a bureaucracy imbued with professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law” (rajkumar and swaroop, 2008: 7). jha and zhuang (2014) states that good governance requires transparency, accountability, rule of law, and effective and legitimate institutions. much emphasis has been recently placed on good governance as a key to development effectiveness and it has been argued, for example, that merely spending money on public goods and services may not lead to desirable outcomes if the country does not have the right governance environment. indeed, economists have known for some time that there is a highly significant correlation between governance and economic growth over the long run, but the precise nature of this relationship is difficult to pin down because growth is a function of many variables. that said, the world bank clearly states, “the direction mubazi: aid effectiveness and good governance consilience of causality is clear: it goes from better governance to higher income and not vice versa”. governance focuses on the following1: 1. transparency of government: citizens must be kept informed of the decisions of the state and their justification. 2. simplicity of procedures: whether in fiscal matters, investment, or other areas, administrative procedures need to be as simple as possible, with the number of participants reduced to a minimum. 3. accountability/responsibility: public officials must be held accountable and, if necessary, penalized for offences. 4. fight against corruption: eradicating this scourge is imperative for promoting health competition, eliminating surcharges, and strengthening the efficiency of economic management. 5. individual freedom and collective expression: a free and responsible press, in particular, is an important pillar of democracy. 6. independence of the legal system: to be free from pressure and intervention from political forces or other organizations to ensure that its decisions are independent and impartial. the world bank’s database on governance is based on the following six dimensions2 which are also covered more briefly than below by kaufmann (2005: 41-43): 1. voice and accountability includes indicators that measure various aspects of the political process, including civil liberties, political and human rights, and the extent to which citizens of a country are able to select their governments. 2. political stability and absence of violence combines several indicators that measure perceptions of the likelihood that government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconventional means, including through domestic violence and terrorism. 3. government effectiveness combines responses on the quality of public service, the independence of the civil service from political pressure, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to various policies. 1 rajkumar and swaroop (2008) used two indicators of governance in a country, the level of corruption and the quality of bureaucracy, to examine the link between specific budgetary allocations and outcomes and to see how these relationships are affected by improved governance. 2 for more information about the world bank’s work on governance, visit www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/index.html. the governance indicators are available at www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata. consilience 122 4. regulatory quality focuses on policies that hamper the functioning of an efficient market, such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development. 5. rule of law includes several indicators that measure the extent to which citizens have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. these include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the ability to enforce contracts. 6. control of corruption is a measure of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain or, according to kaufmann (2005: 41) “abuse of public office for private gain”.3 it is based on scores of variables from polls of experts and surveys. regulation we start by addressing whether to use market-based or regulatory measures. regulatory policies are generally government imposed restrictions or controls, while market-based policies encourage economic principles of supply and demand to determine the course of action. there are several reasons why politicians traditionally take a regulatory approach rather than an economic incentive-based approach. industry tends to favor direct regulation over incentive mechanisms because if a tax instrument is used, the offender must pay fees in addition to controlling costs, although the acceptance of this approach will be influenced by any revenue recycling while firms may have greater influence over the specifics of uniform standards. the effects of quantity regulation are perceived to be more certain while economic efficiency arguments often rely on a relatively sophisticated understanding of market operation and price effects which are indirect compared with regulation. in the final analysis, governments are likely to choose a mixture of regulatory and market-based approaches. in economies without well-developed market systems, there may be net efficiency gains from applying regulatory approaches. on the other hand, the adoption of a market-based approach may speed the development of the market system. net efficiency gains may favor the development of market-based systems at an earlier date than otherwise would be the case. after looking at the reasons why regulatory or market based policies might be preferred, we now look at the various possible policy instruments in this area: 3 the broader definition and other aspects are given in the second last section of this article. mubazi: aid effectiveness and good governance consilience • mandatory policy instruments may include imposing quantity limits on the use of particular inputs or outputs. for instance, a company may be required to use so much power or water per day in its production and/or consumption activities. technology standards can be imposed like a producer being asked to use only a particular or a better technology in the production processes. • beyond mandatory policy instruments, voluntary agreements can also play an important role. the threat of mandatory government intervention may be enough to encourage voluntary agreements. forward-looking firms may undertake some control steps if they fear costlier mandatory controls in the absence of voluntary actions. • compliance instruments may include deposit requirements and/or tax obligations. deposit refund systems can be compared to tax/subsidy schemes where the deposit acts like a tax, while the refund acts like a subsidy. one of the advantages of deposit refund systems is that ordinary taxes are not required for financing the refund/subsidy incentive. • as precautionary measures, policy instruments should be designed to provide needed information. ways in which this can be done include government taking actions that directly reduce regulatory uncertainty. at a minimum government or regulatory authorities can avoid creating regulatory barriers that drive up transaction costs and discourage trading. implementation issues we have looked at some policy instruments that can be used under regulation in order to make aid effective. below we look at some implementation issues that come into play so as to make regulation effective in directing and assisting aid efforts by aid agencies. in assessing any of the wide range of instruments as potential devices, it is imperative to give due consideration to the implementation issues that can severely affect real-world outcomes. such issues need to be considered in the design, whether at the national, multilateral, or global level (sacasa, 2008). consilience 124 in terms of costs, a number of factors can adversely affect the performance of actual regulatory programs or policies. these include: administrative and transaction costs; nonprofitmaximizing behavior such as sales or staff maximization; the preexisting regulatory environment; and the degree of monitoring and enforcement. transaction costs, among others, are potentially important in the performance of a regulation. potential sources of transaction costs include search and information, bargaining and decision, and monitoring and enforcement. the magnitude of these transaction costs will depend on the structure of the market and the extent to which individual transactions require regulatory approval. implementation costs may be least where incentives to comply are self-enforcing. monitoring, for instance, could rely partly on selfreporting, supplemented by access to inventories. an effective enforcement system makes ultimate sanctions credible, so that penalties would rarely need to be imposed. monitoring and enforcement can be significant but these costs are typically borne by the respective government authority. although technology-based standards may seem to be the least cost-effective of the policy instruments, if monitoring costs are high in some particular circumstances they may have an advantage because they are relatively easy to monitor and enforce. an inspector can simply check whether a particular piece of equipment has been installed, rather than continuously monitor information. the direct cost of regulation is the reduction in profits and consumer welfare due to regulatory constraint on choice. the distribution of this cost is often hidden, but that does not make it unimportant (fisher et al. 1996: 415). as long as participation is voluntary, participants will have incentives to free ride, sharing the benefits without sharing the costs. this is a distortion. free-rider deterrence is concerned with securing broad participation in an agreement. a stable coalition of co-operators may exist in spite of free-rider incentives. the size of this coalition will depend on the ability of the co-operators to punish that might withdraw from the coalition and reward that who might accede. however, to be effective, such punishments and rewards must be substantial and credible, but these requirements often clash. as a result, the size of the stable coalition may be quite small. there is also a compliance concern, or the incentive that participants have to fulfill their pledges under an agreement. some agreements contain explicit compliance measures. however, it is more usual for agreements to seek alternative means for securing compliance. mubazi: aid effectiveness and good governance consilience sheng (2009) is of the view that regulatory circles must include constant reviews of outcomes against objectives. these reviews must examine how the strategy, priorities, incentives, standards, structures, processes, and execution have been done; and whether in the right dimensions and contexts. further, regulators should focus on making and implementing rules, not making market choices. however, they should improve the trading system, monitor special interest groups, ensure adequate information disclosure, penalize offenders, and educate investors. difficulties and challenges adoption of any instruments will have some impact on the distribution of wealth between and within countries. negotiations about distributional issues are likely to be crucial in determining the final policy mix that is chosen. for instance, some of the government revenues from taxes may be returned to the affected parties. although the precise nature of the distribution will be the subject of vigorous political discussions, participants are unlikely to accept an agreement that substantially shifts the distribution of wealth or political power. all instruments probably will have to, and also can, be connected with compensatory measures. where the costs of regulation are regressive, compensatory transfers may be used, funded from a specific tax or general government finances, or the regulation might be modified, exempting some individuals or firms from the regulatory net. regulatory capture phenomenon is a difficulty with a regulatory approach where the regulatory agency may, over time, develop such a close working relationship with the regulated industry, for example, that it relaxes its enforcement standards in the interest of the industry itself (fisher et al. 1996: 413). the state regulatory agency created to act in the public interest instead acts in favor of the commercial or special interests that dominate in the industry or sector it is charged with regulating. another regulatory problem is that once a performance standard has been satisfied, there is little benefit to the individual firm from developing and/or adopting even cleaner or better technology. in addition, regulated firms may fear that if they do develop a cleaner or better technology, the performance standard will be tightened. in this way innovation is affected negatively. technology standards are even worse than performance standards in inhibiting innovation, since, by their nature, they constrain the technological choices available, and may therefore remove all incentives to develop new technologies. in this way regulation may inhibit innovation or remove incentives to develop new technologies. it is therefore very important while considering consilience 126 regulation to consider its likely effect on innovation. aid agencies would therefore try to strike an optimal balance so as not to prevent innovation while at the same time they are effective with their regulation. specific policy suggestions would include setting standards, instituting bans, unifying technology and performance, and using incentives. since technology-based (or design) standards typically require the use of specified equipment, processes, or procedures, aid agencies would spell them out. uniform standards can also take the form of outright bans of certain products or processes. aid agencies could set up uniform technology and performance-based standards which may be effective in achieving particular goals and standards. use of conventional technology can also be encouraged. as with virtually all policy instruments, the administration of uniform standards typically includes programs for compliance monitoring and enforcement. all forms of intervention have the potential for inducing or forcing some amount of technological change because, by their nature, they induce or require firms to do things they would not otherwise do. the specific combination of methods that might best achieve the goals and the value of the used methods to the various nations would depend on the intervention approaches used. in the literature there are the general equilibrium, the policy (socialism and development), and the social market economy. the general equilibrium approach is based on the assumption of independent decision making of economic units (households and firms) interacting in such a way as to maximize efficiency and social welfare in terms of the pareto optimality conditions and the abba lerner welfare conditions. for the policy approach we start with the social objective function (sof) specifying goals and priorities. it is a macroeconomic function exogenously given by the state in a socialist setting but under perfect competition we assume it is there and originates from each household. under the socialist approach, the sof defines equality of opportunities as an ultimate social objective derived from collective ownership and central planning of the means of production. in this case state intervention abolishes the market mechanism. the development approach contains a development function, like fair distribution of opportunities and social-economic transformation of resources. here intervention requires achieving these goals within a market mechanism environment. it may imply dealing with both the limitations and improvements of the efficiency of the market mechanism but the criterion for intervention is the sof. the value system under the social market economy approach or model is based on market efficiency that rests on equal opportunity. mubazi: aid effectiveness and good governance consilience corruption corruption can be broadly defined as the use and/or abuse of public office or exercise of public power for personal private unlawful gain. it is the misuse of office for unofficial ends. within this broad definition of corruption, we now distinguish between state capture/influence peddling and the conventional or traditional corruption. according to shah and schacter (2004: 41), state capture/influence peddling is a collusion by private actors with public officials or politicians for their mutual, private benefit. the private sector “captures” the state legislative, executive, and judicial apparatus for its own purposes. state capture coexists with the conventional (and opposite) view of corruption in which public officials extort or otherwise exploit the private sector for private ends. state capture, according to anderson (2005), is the undue and illicit influence of the elite in shaping the laws, policies, and regulations of the state. it differs from the conventional corruption, the use of bribery to influence the implementation of laws and regulations. state capture has potentially wider impact and can severely hinder a country’s ability to benefit from economic growth if the fruits of income growth largely accrue to an elite that benefits from improper governance. we need to look specifically at corrupt acts before we delve further in the subject of corruption. corrupt acts include bribery and extortion which involve two parties who often both benefit. fraud and embezzlement are carried out alone. as seen above, state capture and/or influence peddling are/is also a corrupt act so is nepotism. “speed money”, money paid to government officials to speed up their consideration of a business matter falling within their jurisdiction is a corrupt act. practices of insider lending and use of inside information and/or knowledge for private gain are also corrupt acts. appropriation of public assets for private use, appropriation of rents and excessive profits, and misuse of aid and public funds are also corrupt acts. corruption can be of different forms like high-level or grand, for example kickbacks to ministers. it can be low-level, like petty bribes to juniors. it can also be well-organized and wellknown or chaotic, surrounded with uncertainty. high-level and low-level tend to coexist and reinforce each other. the chaotic form has worse effects (more deleterious) than the well-organized and well-known. this is because it creates a lot of uncertainties, among other things. consilience 128 theory is also useful in explaining corruption. we therefore turn to some very simple hypothetical causes of corruption. namely, corruption is most likely where government regulation gives public officials discretional powers. indeed, rajan (2005: 56-57) argues that “…discretion is problematic in the hands of the corrupt.” hypothetically, corruption is likely where there are institutional inefficiencies, though it can be argued that corruption can bring about institutional inefficiencies. the causal relationship is not obvious but can be established empirically.4 other hypothetical causes are the restrictions and government intervention that lead to the presence of excessive profits. also, when very low wages are paid to workers/employees corruption may result. however, it can be argued that reasonable wages are necessary but not sufficient to avoid corruption. analytically we can state that: c = m + d – a where c = corruption; m = monopoly; d = discretion; a = accountability (transparency). c = f(bribe size, chances of being caught, penalties when caught – giver and taker). (+) (-) (-) combating corruption would work on the above variables given political will. basu, et al. (2013) argue that the way to root out corruption in society is to ensure that corrupt behavior is not worthwhile for amoral individuals by, for instance, enacting policies of punishment that make it not worthwhile for officers to accept bribes. some negative consequences that may arise from the hypothetical causes discussed above include the reduction of economic growth as a result of lower incentives to investment thereby reducing private investment. this reduction of growth may push firms underground and acts as a regressive tax in addition to contributing to the misallocation of talents to rent-seeking activities. corruption also reduces growth through the public investment channel by lowering the quality of public investment thereby distorting the composition of public expenditure. thus, government ability to raise revenue is undercut, raise tax rates to the few that are taxed, undermines state’s legitimacy, and increases income inequality and poverty. nevertheless, corruption has some positive contributions sometimes referred to as counterarguments. it can be argued that corrupt officials work harder because they are often in their offices in order to exploit corruption opportunities. another counter argument is the grease argument: corruption helps entrepreneurs get around bureaucratic impediments, burdensome regulations, and 4 a granger causality test to test for the causal direction and all that surrounds the exercise would do this. mubazi: aid effectiveness and good governance consilience ineffective legal systems. however, the direction of this causal relationship is ambiguous as it may be subject to reverse causality whereby corruption itself helps establish these bureaucratic impediments. related to the grease argument is the notion of unbinding bribery, through which private parties can “purchase” certain benefits from a politician or bureaucrat. these include government benefits like allocations, both monetary and in kind; government contracts like allocations; public revenues like reducing it; time savings and regulatory avoidance; influencing outcomes of legal and regulatory processes like illegal activities and/or outcomes; and monopoly rights to markets like energy. fraud returning to an examination of fraud, it can be defined as the intentional false representation or concealment of a material fact for the purpose of inducing another to act upon it to his or her injury, or it is dishonesty in the form of intentional deception or a willful misrepresentation of material facts in order to induce another to part with something of value or surrender a legal right. terms used in reference other than those already mentioned are: conflict of interest, fraudulent financial/non-financial statements, kickbacks, lapping especially in the banking sector when money has been banked but can still be used fraudulently, larceny, and skimming. red flags or signs of danger that fraud might be taking place include the gift taker; odd couple, two people in a company that is difficult to rationalize; excuse maker; rule breaker; the gift bearer; the too successful bidder; poor quality high prices; and the one-person operation, also known as briefcase business person. some popular schemes in fraud include money laundering counterfeit currency, intellectual property, cyber cash, black dollars, document forgery, cheques, and credit cards. negative effects of fraud on business other than those covered under the theoretical consequences of corruption earlier include staff anxiety, compromising confidentiality, bad press, seminar cost to combat the practice, and increased costs of its investigation. measures of fraud control include whistle-blower protection, filing, promoting transparency in the operations, using committee systems, duties being segregated, registering assets, clarity about debtors and creditors, and streamlining cheques and cash use. complementary to the fraud control measures above, corruption control measures, in general, would involve the use of international organizations and donor groups, such as the imf code of good practice on fiscal transparency. the code is based consilience 130 on four principles: clarity of role and responsibilities, public availability of information, open budget processes, and assurances of integrity. other guidance could come from the world bank country assistance strategy and the poverty reduction strategy paper approach that give priority to cross-cutting governance issues. in addition, high-level/profile government watchdogs can be used. the government can establish such to keep an eye on corruption activities and report to it when anything is detected so that action can be taken. in uganda, for instance, are the auditor general, public accounts committee, and inspector general of government (mubazi, 2012). the influence of the civil society or non-government organizations is critical to controlling corruption. transparency international that compiles the corruption index is one of the examples of civil societies that help to expose levels of corruption. the media plays a large role in exposing corruption, as can be seen in the prime minister’s office in uganda resulting in top accountants being prosecuted. while the media promotes accountability through the disincentive of negative publicity, transparency of government activities and costs is crucial to restricting corruption in its initial instance. examples include “expenditure tracking surveys” that publish data on government expenditures in delivering services such as education in uganda and the extractive industries transparency initiative, which aims to publish revenues accrued from oil, gas, and mining sectors in many ldcs. “freedom of information” laws have been passed by a number of countries in order to help fight or control corruption and, indeed, have done a commendable job. economic policy reforms have also been used. they include trade and financial liberalization that can reduce opportunities for corruption by limiting the situations where officials might exercise unaccountable discretionary powers, introducing transparency and limiting public sector monopoly power. another potentially effective countermeasure against corruption is decentralization as it increases the accountability of public authorities to citizens. however, this can create new public authorities, each having powers to tax, spend, and regulate that are liable to abuse. hence it may multiply, rather than limit, opportunities for corruption, and this problem has been observed in many developing countries that have implemented this reform. raising salaries and reducing wage compression the ratio between the highest and lowest pay -, can help. however, with weak governance wage-based strategies are not likely to succeed. in fact, reducing wage compression may even encourage corruption if positions are viewed as a lucrative career option. mubazi: aid effectiveness and good governance consilience raising wages would simply raise the purchase price and subsequent corruption efforts to repay loans. in controlling corruption, institutional arrangements and enforcements are important. basu, et al. (2013) argues that corruption may be significantly less pervasive in the developed world than in the developing world because institutional arrangements and enforcement make it less possible or less attractive. in these countries, traditional state activities are relatively efficient, civil societies are relatively effective, and the private sector work well. some societies may establish self-enforcement norms whereby bad behavior, like corruption, is collectively punished by all and people punish bad behavior because not to punish bad behavior is itself bad behavior. it has been argued in some developing countries that this is not happening and by so being it breeds corruption. conclusion by way of conclusion, the article has addressed the ways aid deployment ought to improve governance since good governance is central to economic development based on an understanding of a given country or countries. the article has highlighted the areas where and how aid should change such that it improves governance. an intuitive principle is that good governance accompanies development and empirical evidence shows that, on the whole, better governance is positively correlated with higher growth and better development outcomes. indeed, jha and zhuang (2014), among others, take governance as one of the biggest hurdles of growth and development but argue that its reform priorities need to take into account cultural and institutional realities, by focusing on areas that address the biggest hurdles to a country’s growth and development. the nitty-gritty of governance and its major constituent parts (regulation and corruption in this article) have been analyzed or explored and in some cases very briefly discussed. the rationale has been to show exactly where work, through aid, ought to focus and how. after all, according to martins (2014) “all successful developing countries have undergone a fundamental and potent process of structural change”. with such in place, development assistance availed to policy makers and key stake-holders would produce better fruits or results for all of us to enjoy. consilience 132 references anderson, camilla 2005 “why measuring governance matters”, imf survey august 1: 230-231. basu, kaushik, tamara, mcgavock, and boyang zhang 2013 “when competition corrupts: a theoretical analysis of market structure and the incidence of corruption” policy research working paper 6596, world bank, washington, dc. fisher, b. s., s. barrett, p. bohm, m. kuroda, j. k. e. mubazi, a. shah, and r. n. stavins 1996 “an economic assessment of policy instruments for combatting climate change” in bruce, james p., hoesung lee, and eric f. haites (editors) 1996 climate change 1995: economic and social dimensions of climate change, new york: cambridge university press pp. 397-439. jha, shikha and juzhong zhuang 2014 “governance unbundled” finance and development 51 (june) 2 pdf version kaufmann, daniel 2005 “ten (10) myths about governance and corruption” finance and development 42 (september) 3: 41-3. martins, pedro 2014 “structural change in ethiopia: an employment perspective” policy research working paper 6749, world bank, washington, dc. mubazi, john k. e. 2012 selected development issues in economics, usa: scientific and academic publishing. rajan, raghuram 2005 “straight talk – rules versus discretion: should the imf have less of a free hand in resolving crises?” finance and development 42 (march) 1: 56-7. rajkumar, andrew sunil and vinaya swaroop 2008 “public spending and outcomes: does governance matter?” world bank research digest, 2 (spring) 3: 7. sacasa, noel 2008 “preventing future crises – priorities for regulatory reform after the meltdown” finance and development 45 (december) 4: 11-14. mubazi: aid effectiveness and good governance consilience shah, anwar and mark schacter 2004 “combating corruption: look before you leap” finance and development 41 (december) 4: 40-43. sheng, andrew 2009 from asian to global financial crisis, cambridge: cambridge university press. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 8, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 34-49 ciudad de la cultura: modernity and architecture in santiago de compostela simon fique universidad nacional de colombia abstract santiago de compostela has been a pilgrimage site for centuries. it was founded due to the discovery of the tomb of st. james (santiago), whose remains are said to lie inside the city’s famous cathedral. compostela is, nonetheless, a modest city of around 100,000 inhabitants, with a small but consolidated historic centre, and is the cultural and political centre of galicia. it is the capital of the autonomic community of northwest spain. with the objective of projecting galicia as a centre of culture and knowledge on the world stage, the xunta de galicia (council of galicia) approved the construction of a monumental building complex over the top of monte gaiás, a hill that dominates santiago and its surrounding topography. construction began in 2001, supervised by architect peter eisenman, and the structure is still incomplete. the project has provoked a great deal of controversy, transcending all sectors of gallegan and spanish society. it has become an enormous expenditure for a gallegan economy that is still one of the most traditional and modest in spain. the controversy is especially sensitive given that spain is already enduring a profound economic crisis. critics say the project lacks clear purpose, without a sense of mission for the uses of the new buildings. this is especially so when contrasted to the historic centre of the city, a complete success in terms of public space habitability and economic solvency (due to tourism). one can only ask: why, in front of such an exemplary model of small-scale, high-impact development, promoting long-term, ‘small-dose’ growth, is a complex built that opposes all the values of the community and city it represents? haven’t the gallegans learnt from their millenary past and their strong cultural heritage? it is becoming more evident, with time, that the city of culture (ciudad de la cultura), the new development, is an example of what should not be done in the fields of urban and social development, at least in the context into which it has been inserted. keywords: santiago de compostela, architecture, modernity, urban planning. the lack of consideration towards the scale of the ciudad de la culturea project is evident in the design. the intention of the program was to create a new centre for santiago, with a new focus of attention, constructed with a size similar, if not bigger, than that of the historic centre. the complex, which is 650,000 square meters large and is made up of 6 buildings, looks to cast galicia as a 21st century community. according to manuel fraga, ex-president of the xunta who promoted and approved the project, “because if it was the portico1 during the middle ages and the cathedral´s façade during modern times, ‘we had to do something for these consilience fique: ciudad de la cultura figure 1: model of the project showing the relationship between the city of culture and the historic center of compostela. times’ to continue attracting visitors to galicia.”2 roberto varela, current commissioner for culture at the xunta, goes further by comparing the city of culture with emblematic and equally controversial developments that have had a positive effect in their respective contexts, such as the guggenheim museum in bilbao, the lincoln center in new york and sydney’s opera house. what fraga and varela didn’t take into account is that the city of culture is located completely outside the urban and historic centre of santiago (being accessible only through a national highway). thus, it is unlikely to revitalize in a city which, is already vital in itself, contrary to the aforementioned mentioned project. perhaps of equal, if not greater, importance is that the complex is conceived as one enormous monumental form (monumentality only achieved in size and at all costs), without consideration of its contents. it appears that the planners did not note that “from the idea to the plan a long and complicated path must be covered, but the trajectory from the plan to its execution is no less complex and the better way to deal with it with guaranties is through the exercise of consensus and dialogue between the administration and the citizens.”3 tellingly, rosina gómez-baeza, director of an equivalent (albeit smaller) city of culture in asturias (a community near galicia) states that “architecture should respond to its contents. that’s the ideal, reality is different.”4 36 consilience figure 2: santiago de compostela, showing communion between modernity and tradition: the gallegan center for performing arts in the same perspective. figure 3: the mass of the city of culture of santiago appears always in the outline of the mountains surrounding compostela, as a mountain constructed by men. consilience fique: ciudad de la cultura figure 4: rua da raiña, santiago de compostela. the city of culture of galicia is the perfect example of what christopher alexander calls “growth in big doses,” in which the “built environment is constructed massively. ‘perfect’ and isolated buildings are built and abandoned to their luck.” this is in contradiction to his ideal of ‘organic order,’ where “planning and construction should be guided through a process that permits the gradual emergence of the whole from localized acts. the community chooses its own order, not through a map, but through a common language” within “a living organism (that) must constantly reformulate itself to survive, therefore maintaining its quality of being an equilibrated whole”, that bears attention to the “smallest details.”5 “it’s a growth that depends on a dynamic and continuous vision of the environment.” contrastingly, in the city of culture of galicia, although its architectural and design concept (theoretical and far away from the reality of the experience of the project) aims to blend into the landscape through forms, it is really a forced redefinition of mount gaiás. it is an example of the complete ‘deification’ of “the concept” to the point it is no longer really feasible and it becomes an absurdity. though true that it should have a strong physical presence, it will be very difficult for the sole physical presence to facilitate the mission of attracting the gigantic cultural activity that would be needed to fill its hundreds of thousands of square meters with life. this is especially so in town of only 100,000, and a region of no more than three and a half million. it’s a presence that in itself negates the teachings of the design of the historic santiago de compostela, a fine example of alexander´s organic growth. 38 consilience figure 5: city of culture of galicia. “the important thing in a building is not how it is seen from the air. it is the way it is lived in the human scale,”6 says jan gehl, responsible for much of modern copenhagen where more than 37% of the population use bicycles as primary transport. the sloped roofs of the city of culture are, without a doubt, imposing. its facades catch the attention with a complex rhythm of apparently random geometrical shapes. as explained in the field of theory and concept, the weaving effect present in the project responds to a recreation of the medieval grid of the city of santiago, which is superimposed over another grid inspired by the mountains – it transmits the ‘encripted’ message of the project and links it with its site. however, what is the actual relation between this and the genuine experience of the project? does the common visitor really experience, live and understand all this while walking among any of the five monumental lanes of the complex (in reference to the five main streets of downtown compostela)? and at what price? ‘aesthetic’ gestures, such as the 60° slope in some of the roofs, the unique character of the grand majority of the pieces that make up the complex (a single unique glass piece can cost up to 1000 euros), that make prefabrication and constructive efficiency almost impossible, or the vast unoccupied (and inaccessible) spaces left between the actual roof and the ceiling, inevitably imply that such a price is unsustainable. at the beginning of the project, the city of culture had a budget of 100 million euros. although immersed in controversy, it has grown into a massive 500 million ten years later, which is equivalent to more than 7% of the 2012 budget for the whole autonomic community of galicia (also equivalent to four times the budget of the city of consilience fique: ciudad de la cultura figure 6: roofs in santiago. compostela for the year 2007).7 one must seriously consider the viability and raison d’être of a project of such a magnitude. in addition to being built at the expense of contributions from the gallegan people, it will surely carry huge maintenance costs that will only be calculated after the complex is finished.8 40 consilience figure 7: roofs in the city of culture: they appear transitable, but their inclination makes it impossible. figure 8: monastery of san paio de antealtares. consilience fique: ciudad de la cultura figure 9: façade of the new ‘biblioteca de galicia’. a lot has been said throughout the history of architecture and cities about the beauty of the ruin and antique constructions and about their historical and aesthetic value. we conserve and visit them since they constitute a vestige, sometimes living and in use, of a past, which, with the passage of time, has gained significance and symbolism. the cathedral of santiago is an archetypical example of this, and the imprints made by the public, such as the mark left by the pilgrims on the cathedral stone when they reached their destination, are examples of the aggregated value produced by time. ruins are emotive, yearning spaces made for introspection and awe. nonetheless, the passage of time does not always have the same effect on a building and its space. in the case of the city of culture, which, before completion, is already beginning to wear in undesirable ways, deterioration, lack of maintenance and neglect ironically appear in front of the construction of the complex’s biggest building currently under construction. the space here is alienating and disorienting, and its immensity is impossible to comprehend, not because of its complexity, but because it leaks in all directions under the grey sky of northern spain’s climate. 42 consilience figure 10. figure 11. consilience fique: ciudad de la cultura figure 12. figure 13: time in the city of culture: completed and unfinished buildings. 44 consilience figure 14: roofs of the buildings that are, so far, the biggest built. figure 15: cathedral of santiago: entrance staircase. consilience fique: ciudad de la cultura figure 16: traditional street sign at santiago. one of the main ideas behind the project is to provide a space for the integration of gallegan culture in a single place. according to roberto varela, “gallegan culture is in need of a big library, of a big archive, of a meeting place for the artistic avant-gardes and of a centre for creation and investigation whose programs are capable of travelling further than our geography, and this cannot be accomplished with small and disperse facilities.”9 however, “the galicia of the 21st century has its own multinationals and many individual talents (…) but galicia is also that country where gasoline is charged with extra taxes as there are no funds for the sergas (the regional health commission), overburdened by an aging population. galicia is a country where its biggest cities, a coruña and vigo, drain its waters forcefully into the rivers because elementary drainage facilities have not been completed. galicia is the curious place where the alvedro airport hasn’t been connected with a highway that runs just 500 meters away, or where nobody thinks about building a single metro line, when valencia, seville and malaga are already constructing, or where building a second bridge over the vigo river seems a utopia, even if the rande10 is nearing collapse. but the xunta has other priorities. the gallegan government will 54,9 million euros (almost 9.000 million of the old pesetas) this year in the city of culture. (…) santiago, for the satisfaction of all gallegos, is the city with the best cultural equipment of galicia in relation to its population. apart from the treasures of its cathedral and its university, it counts with auditorium at monte del gozo (which is used less than a time a week), the auditorium of galicia (which rarely fills itself up) of the multiusos 46 consilience figure 17: a pretentious aim: the archive of galicia already exists in a coruña, economic capital of the gallegan community. del sar (also underused as spectacle venue) and two theatres. the xunta has also financed the construction of a first-class stadium (which is currently used by a fifth tier football club) and an avant-garde art museum with moderate affluence. as if these infrastructures where insufficient, all gallegans are defraying a burdensome city of culture, which will finally cost well over 25,000 million pesetas.”11 it is clear from this point of view that the concept of ‘uniting’ gallegan culture was misjudged in its location, idea and scale. consilience fique: ciudad de la cultura figure 18: rua do vilar, santiago. figure 19: although the construction attempts to rescue traditions of local masonry, what it achives is a lack of constructive efficiency and high costs. 48 consilience the objective of this essay is not to condemn the construction of monumental and paradigmatic works or the ideas of the project’s architect. the article’s aim is to question (as it has been done in a diffuse manner throughout the ten years of construction) the viability of this specific project. its utility and integration with the landscape are problematic, given the economic and social context in which it is built, especially in comparison with the historic centre of santiago de compostela. it is a project where architecture and urbanism become lost in ideas and concepts. furthermore, it does not manage to give a convincing or effective response to the problems reality presents. it is an unsustainable project. it is unsustainable because its concept, its place, its moment in time and the way it is carried out do not coincide. there is no harmony as the one sought by christopher alexander. it is simply the product of an impulse, an almost momentary political whim (that responds to the spanish ‘bubble’ of the late nineties) in the wake of vast efforts by secondary communities to stand out economically and politically (even though not culturally, ironically) in comparison to cities such as bilbao and barcelona. only time will reveal the effect of these massive projects in the experience of the cities, yet there are already murmurs of these being “white elephants” – giant projects lacking in purpose and vitality. in its present form, the city of culture seems on course to become a primary example ambiguous use facilities, even before the conclusion of its construction. the city of culture is perhaps a sign that maybe what we’re look for is not what our time requires. perhaps the idea of the monumental, today, is not building pharaonic masterpieces typical of the past. maybe the magnificent in our days should be to manage our resources wisely, to consolidate and decant, to the benefit of our contemporary works as it has benefited the works of older days. unsustainability isn´t solely created by the mismanagement of specific resources; it’s part of a much wider palette, in which planning is fundamental. this planning has to take the context into account, not only as a tool for design, but also as a way of understanding reality, which is much more complex than an architecture project. perhaps once the city of culture is finished, its immense spaces will gradually fill up with cultural and artistic activities and the archives of northwestern spain’s history. the price paid, however, will have been too high and the ruin far from beautiful. consilience fique: ciudad de la cultura endnotes 1 referring to the ‘portico de la gloria’ at the main entrance of santiago’s cathedral. 2 “ciudad de la cultura. fraga defiende con calor el gaiás y lo compara con el pórtico de la gloria” in voz de galicia, november 8th 2007. 3 estévez fernández, gerardo. 2001. “santiago de compostela, conservación y transformación”. in arbor clxx, 671-672 (november december 2001), 473-478pp. 4 “«la arquitectura debería responder a los contenidos; la realidad es otra»” in voz de galicia, january 23, 2009. 5 all from: alexander, christopher. 1978. “urbanismo y participación”. barcelona. gustavo gili. english versión: “the oregon experiment” 6 “el arquitecto de las personas”. story by marcus hurst in february’s edition of yorokobu. consulted in http://www.yorokobu.es/el-arquitecto-de-las-personas/ march 12, 2012. 7 “el ppdeg aprueba en solitario los presupuestos para 2012 con un total de 9.135 millones” in galicia en el mundo, december 26 2011. http://www.cronicasdelaemigracion.com/articulo/galicia/2011-12-26/ppdegaprueba-solitario-presupuestos-total-135-millones/15089.html, consulted on 12 march 2012. 8 roberto varela: «la ciudad de la cultura no es un elefante blanco», in la voz de galicia, april 30, 2010. http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/galicia/2010/04/30/00031272635089566843104.htm consulted on 12 march 2012. 9 “roberto varela dice que la ciudad de la cultura es una inversión «imprescindible» para el conjunto de galicia” in la voz de galicia, april 15, 2011. http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/galicia/2011/04/15/00031302865807757401915.htm consulted on march 12, 2012. 10 emblematic bridge over the vigo river built in the late 1970s. 11 “la obra”, opinion column in la voz de galicia, september 6, 2004. http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/hemeroteca/2004/09/06/2999940.shtml?utm_source =buscavoz&utm_medium=buscavoz consulted on march 12, 2012. http://www.yorokobu.es/el-arquitecto-de-las-personas/ http://www.cronicasdelaemigracion.com/articulo/galicia/2011-12-26/ppdeg-aprueba-solitario-presupuestos-total-135-millones/15089.html http://www.cronicasdelaemigracion.com/articulo/galicia/2011-12-26/ppdeg-aprueba-solitario-presupuestos-total-135-millones/15089.html http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/galicia/2010/04/30/00031272635089566843104.htm http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/galicia/2011/04/15/00031302865807757401915.htm http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/hemeroteca/2004/09/06/2999940.shtml?utm_source=buscavoz&utm_medium=buscavoz http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/hemeroteca/2004/09/06/2999940.shtml?utm_source=buscavoz&utm_medium=buscavoz consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 7, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 103-114 male circumcision pilot program in lilongwe, malawi jaehyun jung school of international and public affairs columbia university, new york city jjung6@gmail.com abstract male circumcision is one method of effective prevention against hiv/aids. in malawi, however, male circumcision is not the predominant practice. project malawi conducted a pilot program of male circumcision for villagers with fully subsidized operation costs. after we conducted sensitization programs to create demand for circumcision, the rate of male circumcision has increased. this pilot project allowed us to consider the acceptability of male circumcision in malawi. unsafe surgery, a long recovery period, religious beliefs, and age were the mostcited reasons malawians rejected male circumcision. we also have found three critical barriers—operation cost, transportation cost, and opportunity cost—which can largely explain the limited accessibility of male circumcision procedures. lastly, in order to scale up male circumcision in malawi, the importance of delivering the complete information and significant availability issues need to be addressed. author’s note jaehyun is a second-year master student at sipa, columbia university. he worked as a research assistant for project malawi during the summer of 2011 in lilongwe, malawi. key words: male circumcision, hiv/aids, acceptability, accessibility, malawi. 1. introduction male circumcision, the surgical removal of the foreskin of the penis, is one of the oldest and most common surgeries in the world. it is typically performed for social, cultural, religious or medical reasons. since male circumcision was indicated as possible protective measure heterosexual hiv transmission in 1986, many studies have shown a negative correlation between male circumcision and hiv prevalence in africa (weiss, et al. 2008, westercamp, et al. 2007). it was significant that three recent studies based on randomized controlled trials in south africa, kenya, and uganda suggested up to a 60% reduction in heterosexually-acquired hiv infection among circumcised men (auvert et al. 2005, bailey et al. 2007, gray et al. 2007). finally, in 2007, unaids and the world health organization strongly recommended male circumcision as a key strategy for reducing female to male transmission of hiv, particularly in regions where the incidence of heterosexually-acquired hiv infection is high, such as sub-saharan africa. moreover, considering the lifelong benefits, male circumcision is currently considered the most cost-effective and sustainable prevention against hiv/aids (galárraga, o. et al. 2009). malawi, a landlocked country in southeastern africa, has one of the highest prevalence rates of hiv/aids in the world. the 2010 unaids hiv report 104 consilience indicated that hiv prevalence in malawi in 2009 was 11%, which is more than twice that of the sub-saharan african average (5%) and thirteen times higher than the world average (0.8%). nearly one million people are estimated to live with hiv, and many of those do not know they are infected. furthermore, every year 73,000 people are newly infected with hiv, and the primary mode of hiv transmission is unprotected heterosexual intercourse, which accounts for 88% of hiv infections in malawi. according to the 2010 male circumcision situation analysis report in malawi (henceforth referred to as “the situation report”), only one in five men reports that he has been circumcised, which demonstrates that male circumcision is not a predominant practice in malawi (bengo et al., 2010). moreover, many of those circumcised may not have the full benefits of male circumcision because most circumcisions in malawi follow traditional procedures, which, unlike medical circumcision operations, do not completely remove the foreskin. the situation report also tells us that a majority of malawians know the definition of male circumcision, but it is primarily understood in its cultural and religious context. muslims and members of the yao tribe are circumcised to conform to islamic tradition. muslims and yaos account for 12% and 13% of malawian males respectively (mdhs, 2010), and a majority of them inhabit the southern and lakeshore districts of malawi. therefore, male circumcision in malawi is regarded as a religious or tribal ritual in the southern region of malawi and is not readily accepted by other ethnic and religious groups. however, the situation report also suggests that once people receive complete information about male circumcision, particularly regarding preventive benefits against hiv and the affordable operation cost, willingness to accept male circumcision significantly increases. 2. project malawi and male circumcision pilot program 2.1 project malawi project malawi was started in 2010 in conjunction with the south korean government as the daeyang luke hospital’s1 community outreach program in the lilongwe area for hiv/aids prevention for mother and child. for hiv/aids prevention, project malawi provides the most effective interventions for the secondary students within the hospital’s catchment area. it provides services according to unaids and who’s recommendations, which include the following: 1) free voluntary male circumcision, 2) hiv/aids education and 3) hiv voluntary counseling and testing. in order to evaluate the impact of these three interventions, this project plans a controlled trial of male circumcision for secondary school students in the lilongwe area. 2.2 male circumcision pilot program 1 daeyang luke hospital is a mission hospital founded in march, 2008 and is one of the best hospitals in lilongwe, malawi, with more than 150 beds for inpatients. the hospital is responsible for the health care of approximately 70,000 people who reside in the hospital’s catchment area. consilience jung: male circumcision in lilongwe, malawi in preparation for the main intervention—male circumcision for students— project malawi staff tried to learn how to create demand for male circumcision and streamline the logistics of the circumcision operation. hence, we decided to conduct a pilot program of male circumcision. we provided fully subsidized male circumcision operations for villagers in the neighborhoods of the hospital during the months of june to september of 2011. considering the low perceived acceptability of male circumcision for most malawian males, with the exception of muslims and yaos, the pilot program needed to start with a sensitization program to provide villagers with information about the health benefits of male circumcision and a free operation at the hospital. we started the sensitization programs through the neighboring health centers, which are located within the daeyang luke hospital’s catchment area. for the first four sensitization programs at the health centers, however, we could not find our target audience, adult men, but only saw mothers with children in need of medical care. therefore, at the recommendation of the health center directors and our local staff members, we decided to visit local markets instead of the health centers. many adult male villagers are unemployed or employed in the informal sector, so they spend their most of their daytime in markets. in order to attract public attention in markets, we created a one-and-halfhour sensitization program consisting of songs, information and q&a sessions, and two skits (short dramas). the first skit informed people about the health benefits of male circumcision and how to be provided with a free circumcision operation at daeyang luke hospital. the information session explained in detail the benefits of male circumcision and other hiv/aids prevention strategies. the second skit emphasized the importance of voluntary hiv/aids counseling and testing. lastly, there was a q&a session to discuss common misconceptions about male circumcision. we distributed brochures explaining the benefits of male circumcision and directions for getting the free operation, and we put up posters in the market. we completed sixteen sensitization programs at ten neighboring markets and four health centers between the first week of june and the third week of july. for every sensitization program at local markets, about three hundred brochures were distributed to adult men and housewives, and more than one hundred audience members stayed throughout the program. 2.3 sensitization created demand for male circumcision daeyang luke hospital performed approximately five male circumcisions per month in 2010 and 2011 before this pilot program started. the first four sensitization programs at the health centers were apparently not effective because only four patients visited during the first two weeks of the program, and all of them were unaware that the operation was free of charge. from the fourth week of june after the fifth market sensitization program, however, the number of male circumcision operations at the hospital drastically increased. on average, fifteen men were registered and four patients got circumcised every week. eventually, in july, the hospital expanded its operation capacity to twelve cases per week to meet the greater demand. for the three months from june to august, 158 men were registered for the operation, and 99 were circumcised. 106 consilience among the 99 circumcised, eighteen people were younger than 10 years old, twenty were between 10 and 20 years old, and the majority, 61, were over 20 years old. we did not ask for patients’ religion, but given that most yao’s circumcisions are performed for the young boys between 7 and 15 years old, most of the people over 20 years old were not likely yao or muslim. out of the 80 men surveyed, 60 men responded that they were at the sensitization programs. they watched our sensitization program, read the brochure, or saw the posters. word of mouth also played an important role. eighteen men came to know about the free circumcision thanks to friends or neighbors who were at the sensitization programs or heard of the free circumcision. the others heard of the information from the clinical officers at the health centers. 3. acceptability of male circumcision in the villages for each sensitization program, we had a q&a session for about twenty minutes and answered seven to ten questions from a diverse audience ranging from teenage boys to old women. letting villagers express their deepest concerns after they were provided with relevant information in the previous session allowed us to consider the villagers’ level of acceptance of male circumcision. we have categorized the most frequently asked questions into four categories of reasons villagers might be against male circumcision based on the acceptability study of male circumcision in malawi (ngalande et al. 2006). the most commonly expressed reasons against male circumcision were 1) unsafe procedure of male circumcision, 2) pain and the healing period, 3) religion and 4) preferred age. in addition, we asked the men who were circumcised at the hospital about what would have prevented them from being circumcised in the post-operation survey. (1) unsafe procedure of male circumcision the acceptability study reveals that the most critical barrier against male circumcision is the perception that the procedure is unsafe. the most frequently asked question during our sensitization programs was about the possible adverse effects. 23 of the 80 circumcised men responded in the post-operation survey that the risks of the surgery were their greatest fear regarding circumcision. since most male circumcisions in malawi are performed at muslim or yao’s traditional facilities, most people perceive male circumcision as not a medical operation but a part of complex initiation ceremonies. in addition, the operations performed by traditional circumcisers in unsterile environments can cause excessive bleeding and other side effects. therefore, little knowledge about the operation and concerns about side effects have discouraged people in other ethnic or religious groups from accepting male circumcision as a viable practice. (2) pain and the healing period the acceptability study suggests that pain during the operation does not serve as a critical barrier to male circumcision. instead, the pain after the procedure and the six-weeks of required abstinence seem to be more crucial in deterring men from circumcision. during the sensitization programs, we observed that the adult men who were particularly interested in male circumcision were seriously worried about the abstinence after the operation. given that the benefits of male consilience jung: male circumcision in lilongwe, malawi circumcision are insufficiently perceived, the compulsory abstinence for six weeks can be regarded as a considerable sacrifice for sexually active adults. (3) religion the study reveals that religion can partially account for a man’s circumcision status and acceptance of circumcision. since male circumcision in malawi is performed mainly among muslims as a religious tradition, many christians (who account for approximately 80% of the population) do not approve of male circumcision as a righteous procedure (mdhs, 2010). our interviews with the villagers who are not muslims also confirm the study’s observation. they agreed that getting circumcised is associated with muslim tradition and so is regarded as a sort of renunciation of one’s religious beliefs. household heads and teenagers whose decisions are significantly influenced by the family or village headman showed particularly high intolerance to male circumcision. contrary to the generally negative view of male circumcision among interviewees, there were a few villagers who asked about a religious legitimacy of male circumcision during the sensitization programs. furthermore, 61 of the 80 circumcised men answered in the survey that they decided to get circumcised because of its health benefits regardless of their religious or cultural tradition. (4) preferred age the question that particularly attracted our attention during the sensitization programs was about the preferred age of male circumcision. many people thought that men should be circumcised as young boys and that the operation is not appropriate for adult men. the acceptability study also reveals that opinions on the drawbacks and benefits of circumcision can be affected by the age at which the circumcision is performed. because traditional male circumcision in malawi is performed primarily for boys who are between 7 and 15 years old as a rite of passage, people think that the operation is not proper for adult men. however, our pilot program has involved a majority of adult men—61 of the 99 circumcised were men over the age of 20. 4. poor accessibility to medical male circumcision even after people realize the health benefits of male circumcision and hope to get circumcised, they often find that the operation is not easily accessible due to its substantial cost (ngalande et al. 2006, bengo et al. 2010). the acceptability study reveals that a great majority of the respondents were concerned with high costs that include not only payment to the operator but other costs associated with the procedure and the healing process. from this pilot project, we have found three critical barriers that make male circumcision less accessible: operation cost, transportation cost and opportunity cost. (1) operation cost the national aids commission of malawi has estimated that the marginal cost of medical male circumcision is mk1,200 (about $7), excluding indirect costs. in the case of daeyang luke hospital, the male circumcision costs amount to at least mk2,000 (about $11), including the operation, medication and postoperative checkups. it is a substantial burden for ordinary malawians considering that about 75% of the population lives on less than $1 a day. according to the situation report, over a 108 consilience third of the respondents indicated a reluctance to pay for circumcision, and about two thirds indicated a willingness to pay up to mk1,000 (about $6). lack of trained doctors (especially surgeons) and medical supplies make the cost too high for many people to afford the operation (bengo et al. 2010). (2) transportation cost in addition to the operation cost of male circumcision, indirect burdens such as high transportation costs substantially decrease the accessibility to male circumcision services at daeyang luke hospital. even though we conducted the sensitization programs at the markets located in the vicinity of the hospital, we found some men could not visit the hospital because they were not able to afford transportation. the distances from the hospital to most of the markets and health centers that we visited are less than 6 km. however, the minimum transportation cost is as high as mk150 (about $0.80), and it ranges up to mk300 (about $1.70) and above based on the distance to paved roads and other factors. furthermore, considering the circumcised men are discharged from the hospital right after the surgery and experience high levels of pain, it is not an option for them to travel back home by foot or bicycle. (3) opportunity cost project malawi team has tried to examine how much time is spent for the male circumcision operation and found that inefficiencies during the process incur a substantial opportunity cost. due to poor transportation networks, it takes at least a half an hour to travel to the hospital even for the people who live in the nearest villages. in the hospital, patients need to wait for about five hours on average to have pre-check-ups including hiv and hemoglobin tests before the circumcision operation, which itself only takes 40 minutes. in total, the patients need to spend at least six hours for the surgery, time they could spend at work or school. moreover, the patients need to revisit the hospital and spend additional hours there for postoperation check-ups. daeyang luke hospital is one of the best-equipped hospitals in malawi, and other health facilities operate with greater inefficiencies. this highlights the many barriers to male circumcision that ordinary malawians face. 5. discussions to scale up male circumcision since male circumcision has been proven to be an effective prevention against hiv/aids, international organizations have set ambitious goals to encourage male circumcision in sub-saharan african countries, scaling-up male circumcision to reach 80% of adult males. malawi is one of the thirteen southern and eastern african countries indicated for the male circumcision scale-up by unaids and the who, but it has not made significant progress in developing its country-level strategy compared to its neighboring countries. with such a challenging goal ahead, our pilot program of male circumcision in malawi suggests the following agendas must be discussed: 1) delivering complete information regarding male circumcision, 2) externalities of decision-making about male circumcision and 3) financial subsidies and expanding capacities. (1) delivering complete information regarding male circumcision the situation report argues that implementing male circumcision as an hiv prevention strategy in malawi will require a very dramatic generation of demand to consilience jung: male circumcision in lilongwe, malawi further the spread of the practice. it also suggests that people will change their perceptions on the acceptability of male circumcision if the right information is provided. since the official prevention strategy against hiv/aids in malawi is “abc” (abstain from sex, be faithful, use a condom), the efficacy of male circumcision against hiv/aids has not been prioritized or sufficiently explained. therefore, a majority of the respondents of the situation report knew the definition of male circumcision, but few precisely understood its health benefits, especially its preventive effect against hiv/aids. however, once they became aware of the preventive benefits against hiv/aids, their support for circumcision substantially increased. the result of our pilot project in the lilongwe area also suggests that it is important to deliver complete information about medical male circumcision. after the sensitization programs, the number of circumcision operations increased, and 54 of the 80 circumcised answered in the survey that their primary reason for undergoing circumcision was knowledge of the health benefits and the safety of the medical circumcision, information they received from the sensitization program. however, we have also recognized that incomplete information about male circumcision can be dangerously misleading. a few villagers believed that male circumcision leads to an increase in one’s sexual ability or provide complete immunity against hiv/aids. based on such responses, the acceptability study notes that promotion of male circumcision could result in men engaging in riskier sex after circumcision—such as unprotected sex with multiple partners. therefore, the promotion of male circumcision should deliver complete information explaining that it is only partially protective against hiv infection. this must remind us of the importance of the combined prevention strategies against hiv infection. the effectiveness of the male circumcision scale-up strategy, if combined with hiv education or voluntary counseling and testing, should be further investigated (merson et al. 2008, hogan et al. 2005). (2) externalities of decision-making about male circumcision if the scale-up strategy aims at increasing the male circumcision of a specific age group, such as teenage boys or adult men, we need to consider different decision-making processes among age groups. we have observed that given the same information about the health benefits of male circumcision, the decision-making process seems quite different among people depending on one’s age. for example, even though there were many housewives who wanted their neonatal or infant children to be circumcised and did register for the operation, most of them did not show up. this can be partly explained by the fact that the decision on a young boy’s circumcision is not made solely by his mother, but primarily by the family headman or village headman. in case of a young adult man, however, his decision-making seems relatively independent from other family members. rather, it is considerably influenced by his sexual partners’ or peer group’s opinions. for instance, one young college student we interviewed showed negative sentiments about circumcision because it is not acceptable in his religious community. however, he decided to get circumcised shortly after all his classmates were circumcised at the hospital. given that those externalities exist, the scale-up strategies will not be successful without further investigations about the different factors that critically influence one’s decision on circumcision. (3) financial subsidies and expanding capacities 110 consilience in addition to indicating current low acceptability, our pilot program suggests that the operation cost and incurred indirect cost could be the most critical factors that discourage people from getting circumcised. thus, the scale-up strategy should consider subsidizing not only operation costs but also indirect costs such as transportation and the opportunity cost of lost wages. providing transportation vouchers with subsidized operation costs could attract more men than our pilot project, though the optimal combination of financial supports requires further study. the mobile male circumcision clinic could be a good solution to lower the indirect or opportunity cost for remote villagers, provided that confidentiality of circumcision in the local communities can be maintained by providers (usaid pepfar 2009). we hope that providing not only the right information but also the proper financial assistance can substantially boost demand for male circumcision in malawi. however, dramatically scaled-up male circumcision might end up being an elusive goal without more extensive support in solving availability issues. even though daeyang luke hospital is relatively resourceful in terms of professional medical staff, equipment and consumables for operations, it was not easy to expand its male circumcision operation capacity due to lack of medical doctors and supplies. therefore, in addition to creating demand for male circumcision, expanding and improving the capacity of existing health facilities is another serious issue that must be addressed in order to promote male circumcision in malawi. consilience jung: male circumcision in lilongwe, malawi appendix figure 1: the first skit is performed at the kauma market. figure 2: villagers view the male circumcision posters at the senti market. 112 consilience figure 3: a man asks a question about male circumcision at the area 25-a market. table 1: male circumcision sensitization program schedule in june and july figure 4: map of sensitized markets and health centers in lilongwe and the transportation costs from those places to the hospital consilience jung: male circumcision in lilongwe, malawi bibliography auvert, b. et al. 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(2009). the potential cost and impact of expanding male circumcision in malawi. usaid pepfar. (2009). male circumcision partners meeting: commodities and improved coordination of male circumcision for hiv prevention. washington, dc: pepfar male circumcision technical working group. weiss, et al. (2008). male circumcision for hiv prevention: from evidence to action?. aids, vol. 22(5), pp. 567-574. westercamp et al. (2007). acceptability of male circumcision for prevention of hiv/aids in sub-saharan africa: a review. aids and behavior, vol. 11(3), pp.341-355. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 9, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 107 – 122 was the highly indebted poor country initiative (hipc) a success? sarajuddin isar department of development studies school of oriental and african studies, london abstract historically, the sustainability of long-term debts has been a primary concern for both indebted countries and those who finance their debts. in the late 1990s the bretton wood’s institutions (the international monetary fund, imf, and the world bank) launched the highly indebted poor countries initiatives (hipc i, 1996 and hipc ii, 1999) to reduce the burden of debt on highly indebted countries. if countries could meet certain complex criteria, the hipc would stop the rescheduling of their debts. this article analyzes the effectiveness of the hipc initiative and finds that its successes remain questionable. author’s note sarajuddin isar is a phd candidate in the department of development studies at the school of oriental and african studies, london. he studies the role of taxation in building states in post conflict countries with a particular focus on afghanistan. isar holds an ma in political economy of development from the university of manchester, a bsc in economics and a diploma in business administration from afghanistan. isar is a political economy professional with over 12 years of overseas experience in banking, finance and international development. isar has worked in different key roles in organizations including the central bank of afghanistan, united states agency for international development, united nations world food program and international charities such as catholic relief services, acted and afghanaid. keywords: debt sustainability, debt relief, indebtedness, debt rescheduling. 1. introduction the sustainability of long-term debt has been brought to the forefront of economic discussion in the last three decades. this concern has involved both the indebted countries and those who finance the debts as seen in a number of schemes from the paris club1 debt treatments on the terms of toronto (1988), london (1991) and naples (1995) to those of the imf and the world bank highly indebted poor 1 the paris club refers to an informal group of creditor governments from 19 big economies of the world, which have been meeting regularly since 1956 to coordinate debt restructuring, relief, and cancellation for indebted countries and their creditors. it has increasingly been granting larger debt reductions for the hipcs. 108 consilience countries initiatives (hipc i, 1996) and (hipc ii, 1999) and the multilateral debt reduction initiative2 (mdri, 2005). the hipc i & ii, launched in 1996 and 1999 respectively, were particularly notable schemes. these initiatives differed because of the involvement of multilateral institutions like the imf and the world bank (spratt, 2009, p. 246). the hipc initiative was proposed to reduce the burden of debt on highly indebted countries after meeting certain criteria and to stop the process of repeatedly rescheduling their debts. the success of this initiative has remained a controversial matter today, drawing interdisciplinary discussion with scholars from a variety of fields. the initial section provides some background on both the hipc i and ii initiatives while section three discusses the theoretical and empirical literature and analyzes critical shortcomings of the initiatives. the last two sections briefly highlight the paper suggestions and findings and concluding remarks respectively. 2. background the initiative has gone through two stages: the hipc i, the original hipc or o-hipc, and the hipc ii, or the enhanced hipc. 2.1 the hipc i: the hipc was launched in september 1996 in response to increasing pressure for debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries. it also aimed to permanently end repeated rescheduling of debts for these countries (addison, hansen and tarp, 2004, p. 24). the hipc i was initially intended to reduce the burden of debt in the poorest economies. to be eligible for debt relief a poor country’s macroeconomic policy should be robust from the imf and the world bank perspective after a six year term and a number of complex criteria had to be met, including those of debt sustainability. under the hipc i, the debt relief mechanism necessitated that a debtor country undergo structural reforms in its economy to be eligible for concessional loans from the imf and the world bank. the first of these was to form a “flowrescheduling agreement” with paris club creditors regarding concessional terms. the second was to ensure a good track record of meeting imf arrangements and 2 the mdri refers to a new initiative of debt relief proposed by g8’s meeting of gleneagles in june 2005 in which three multilateral institutionsthe world bank, international development association (ida) of the world bank and the african development fund (afdf) forgive 100% debts of countries who owe them only on their reaching to the completion point. countries with per-capita income of $380 a year or less (whether hipcs or not) will receive debt relief. visit (http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/mdri.htm) and (http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/news/0,,contentmdk:200409 42~menupk:34480~pagepk:34370~thesitepk:4607,00.html). consilience isar: hipc success rescheduling agreements. the “flow-rescheduling” agreement would apply when there was a reduction in the stock-of-debt over a three year period. thirdly, the debtor country needed to seek comparable debt terms from private and bilateral creditors outside the paris club. fourthly, the debtor country also needed to seek bilateral debt relief in the form of official development assistance (oda) from other creditors. only after meeting these concessions and terms could the debtor be refinanced under the hipc (esquivel, larraín and sachs, 1998, p. 15). under the hipc i up to 80 percent of net present value (npv) of debt could be relieved by paris club creditors, but the exact value would be decided on a case-by-case basis. multilateral creditors would commit to lower their claims’ present values to ensure a sustainable debt level. however this too was to be decided on a case-by-case basis (ibid). a country would be eligible to debt sustainability when it could meet its current and future external debt-service obligations in full and without needing alternatives to debt relief, debt rescheduling, accumulating the arrears and with no unduly compromising growth. the ratio of npv of a country’s debt-to-exports would need to exceed 200-250%, the ratio of debt service-to-exports needed to be over the range of 20-25% (boote and thugge, 1997, p. 17) while the npv of debtto-fiscal revenue needed to be over 280%. the minimum ratios of export-to-gdp and fiscal revenue-to-gdp would need to reach 40% and 20% respectively (gautam 2003, p12). three years after its inception, the hipc i was considered “not sufficient to provide hipcs with a permanent exit” (g24, 2003, p. 1). it was further discovered to be too slow and stringent on qualifying criteria. in 1999 the hipc i initiative was modified and re-presented as the enhanced hipc, or the hipc ii. 2.2 the hipc ii: the hipc was considerably modified in 1999 based on a g7 proposal during a meeting in cologne, germany (michaelow, 2002, p. 462) and is still in use today. among the important changes are faster debt relief processes, expansion of relief plans for which more countries were eligible (spratt, 2009 p. 249), creation of an interim process between the decision and completion points, addition of a floating completion point and requirement of a poverty reduction strategy paper (prsp) from indebted county (payne, 2005, p. 150). for more on differences, see table 1. the hipc ii has three key objectives: to ensure debt sustainability and provide a permanent exit from rescheduling. the initiative aims to decrease the obligations of debt services so that the county can increase its export incomes and transfers in the future. it eliminates the need for future rescheduling, defensive lending, and debt forgiveness. secondly, the initiative seeks to ensure an increasing long-term growth rate by removing overhung debts. finally, it seeks to reduce the poverty rate by freeing up resources and promoting social spending to reduce cash debt-service payments (gautam, 2003, p. 16). however these objectives come with the condition that only ‘poor’ countries are eligible for debt relief for sustainable debts. a country is considered poor when it depends on highly concessional financing from the concession lending-arm of the world bank, the imf and the international development association (g24, 2003, p. 1). 110 consilience the debt sustainability criteria were also altered following the introduction of the hipc ii. the net present value of debt-to-export was lowered from 200-250% to 150% while the debt-to-revenue was reduced from 280% to 250%. in addition, the minimum ratio of export-to-gdp and fiscal revenue-to-gdp each were reduced from 40% and 20% to 30% and 15% respectively (gautam, 2003, p. 12). the hipc ii consists of two stages. the first is that the country should complete a three year term of good economic performance and sustained poverty reduction strategy papers. following this, the imf and the world bank decide upon the sustainability of the country’s debt. at this, the decision point, a package of debt relief is determined (teunissen and akkerman, 2004, p. 74-8) as shown in figure 1 below. after three years if the country’s debt is considered sustainable, it is not eligible for debt relief. however if the debts are judged unsustainable, the country moves on to the second stage and creditors commit the delivery of debt relief to the floating completion point. additional policies are implemented during this stage and additional support from the imf and the world bank may reach the country on an interim basis. finally if the second stage is deemed successful, the process reaches the completion point and all creditors act on their commitments from the decision point (gautam 2003, ch. 4), (teunissen and akkerman, 2004, p. 74-8) and (spratt, 2009, p. 248-9). this process is summarized in figure 2. figure 1: enhanced hipc initiative flow chart: first stage decision point either or figure 1 enhanced hipc initiative flow chart of first stage (source: teunissen and akkerman 2004, 76) consilience isar: hipc success figure 2: enhanced hipc initiative flow chart: second stage floating completion point figure 2 enhanced hipc initiative flow chart of second stage (source: teunissen and akkerman 2004, 77) 112 consilience figure 3 summary of the original and enhanced hipc (source: gautam, 2003, 12) 3. theoretical and empirical literature following the observations of the mechanisms and criteria of the hipc, this section examines theoretical and empirical evidence which suggest that, although the hipc was desirable in countries which met the complex criteria, it excluded many and accumulated a number of critiques. of 40 hipcs, 32 achieved the completion point while the other four reached the decision point (as shown in the below table). the debt relief of these 36 countries in post decision-point under the hipc represents 35% of their total gdp consilience isar: hipc success in 2010. the debt relief of hipc initiative has cost its creditors an estimated amount of us$75 billion in 2010 present value terms (imf, 2011, p. 2–5). figure 4 highly indebted poor countries in july 2011 (source: imf 2011, 2) the imf (2011, p. 4) argues that concurrently to delivering debt relief, the hipc also increased these countries’ poverty-reducing expenditure. from 2001 to 2010, poverty reduction spending for the 36 post-decision point countries increased by over three percent point of gdp on average while debt service payment decreased by a relatively smaller amount. however, the development of hipcs in some cases is limited progress as far as meeting millennium development goals is concerned. in most of the 32 countries which reached the completion-point, universal primary education can be achieved; however, almost half still cannot make additional reforms to meet this target. more than half of these countries still need to reach their targets pertaining to gender equality and the prevention of hiv/aids, tb and malaria spread. about half of these countries are on track to reduce mortality rate of children under five as well as ensure environmental sustainability targets. these countries face many challenges beyond just the high cost of debt relief. for instance, only a quarter of completion-point countries are on track to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger (mdg1). there is even less certainty that these countries will improve maternal health as in the 6th millennium development goal. for instance, only a few are on track to build a global partnership for development (mdg 8) (ibid). in addition to these challenges, the hipc is also associated with a number of critiques which indicate that the initiative has been less successful than claimed by the imf and the world bank. these critiques are discussed in the following sections. 3.1 the inappropriateness of the initiative despite the fact that the initiative was considerably modified under the enhanced hipc, the suitability of the scheme remains questionable. the eligibility criteria and the debt sustainability indicators used by the hipc are arguably completely inappropriate. a g24 paper (2003, p. 3) argues that the hipc is 114 consilience extremely politically charged and uses ida-only criterion. it suggests replacement by a more poverty-focused criterion to omit the two ratios applicable for fiscal criteria and to take into consideration other factors that could lead to vulnerability such as export concentration and export price volatility. there are still countries which are equally as poor and as indebted as the hipcs but have exited the hipc due to the inappropriate consideration of the criteria. for instance countries like nigeria and equatorial guinea were hipcs at first but were later excluded as they were not considered ida-only eligible countries. this was particularly so in the case of nigeria which was highly indebted and whose value of debt-to-export ratio was around 188%, 38% higher than what is eligible under the hipc, and was a poor economy with gdp per capita below us$300 (gunter 2001, p. 19-20). watkins (2004) claims that as a result of complexity in debt eligibility criteria, countries’ debt reliefs have either been repeatedly delayed or cut off as they could not meet the imf loans conditions. using debt relief as a force for deep structural reforms in difficult policies like privatization, civil service pay and utility management is difficult to justify. another critique observed in malawi is on the profits from improved hybrid types of maize which need substantial applications of fertilizer. farmers were forbidden from being subsidized as this would be considered a breach of the criteria set under the free market mechanism (dent and peters, 1999, p. 54). the fact that most poor countries are ineligible for the hipc initiative attracts much criticism. the reason that certain countries’ debts were not considered sustainable even though they were poor and heavily indebted as gunter (2007, p. 7) observes is due to a very narrowly defined criterion of debt sustainability, particularly regarding debt-to-export and debt-to-revenue ratios as in the case of nigeria discussed above. there is also similar empirical evidence in the cases of some other countries that have suffered the inappropriate treatment of the initiative. for instance, bangladesh and cambodia, despite having low gdps per capita of us$413 and us$377 respectively in 2006, are not yet part of the hipc while ghana, whose gdp per capita was higher (us$ 457), is eligible for debt relief (spratt, 2007, p. 8-9). 3.2 slowness of the initiative the slowness of the hipc has consistently been a matter of concern. for instance, by 1998, only seven countries (uganda, bolivia, burkina faso, guyana, cote d’ivoire, mozambique and benin) were actually issued with resolutions from the imf and the world bank, and only six of these countries were decided eligible. benin’s debt was considered sustainable and therefore would not benefit from the initiative (esquivel, larraín and sachs, 1998, p. 21). in this respect the world bank and gautam (2003, p. 27) argue that the initiative was only slow in the early years and was later expedited, particularly after the enhancement of the initiative. however the slowness of the process was also evident in the following years. for instance, by december 2003, the total number of countries that reached the completion point was only ten (teunissen and akkerman, 2004, p. 7). this means that within six years after 1998, only four countries could achieve the consilience isar: hipc success completion point. the slowness of the process further continued until 2009 and, as spratt (2009, p. 251) argues, since 2004 only 15 countries are eligible to reach the hipc completion point. finally when three debtor countries, bolivia, uganda and mauritania achieved the debt relief on the conditions set by the hipc, they still had to wait for months until creditors could organize the distribution of the funds (roy, 2000, p. 27). 3.3 limited coverage over the decade and a half since the hipc initiative was launched, the countries considered eligible for the hipc are below 40. however the number of countries potentially eligible should be far higher. for instance, dent and peters (1999, p. 55) argue that the imf and world bank only predict 40 countries under hipc, where in fact there are some 51 countries which are in desperate need of debt remission. this critique has also been noticed in the un report (1999, p. 16) which emphasizes that about half a dozen global south countries are not covered in the hipc although their debt indicators classify them as severely and moderately indebted and they are vulnerable to unfavorable external development. 3.4 hipc ignores economic shocks the world has inevitably witnessed a number of economic shocks throughout history and many of these have been caused by exogenous factors which affected many poor economies beyond their control. the hipc ignores the reality of such factors because countries, including those eligible for debt relief, as addison, hanson and tarp (2004, p. 97) indicate, are usually subject to very wide variation in their terms of trade (tot) and in their agricultural primary export volumes. likely payne (2004, p. 151) claims that the global fall of prices of commodities has harmfully affected the debt sustainability measurement in africa, particularly in uganda, despite being the first and the best performer of the hipc. as a consequence of the global fall in commodity prices, the tot for uganda’s exports3 deteriorated. for instance during the decision point stage of hipc, the three-year average value for exports earnings of uganda for the year ending 2002-03 was projected over one billion dollars while the actual value only amounted us$726 million, representing a 28% decline. additionally, tanzania, although it similarly reached the completion point, still remained vulnerable to exogenous economic shocks like adverse weather and deteriorating tot (teunissen and akkerman, 2004, p. 22, 54, 61). spratt (2009, p. 251) also argues that the secular fall of agricultural product prices lead to lower earnings from exports for most hipcs despite their economies being based on a debt-to-export ratio. 3 uganda’s economy is largely dependant on its agriculture, which almost supplies all of its foreign exchange earnings. its coffee alone makes it the leading producer in africa and accounted for 27% of its exports in 2002. 116 consilience furthermore the imf (2010, p. 2) itself admits the shortfall of this section of the initiative. it states that many countries are still vulnerable to shocks, particularly those which affect exports. the table below shows the continuous falling trend in prices of some real commodities from the 1970s to 2005. as can be seen in the table below, the prices of sugar and coffee between the 1970s and 2005 decreased by over three times. the decline for maize and rice was more than a half, whereas for butter and bananas, it was over 97 and 52 percent respectively for the same period (fao, 2007, p. 42). figure 5 trend in commodity prices (source: fao 2006, 2) 3.5 hipc, tool for the creditors trotsenburg from the world bank and macarthur from the imf (1999) argue that the hipc is a sound and effective instrument to provide a way out of the debt trap for poor countries. yet, rather than being an effective instrument for debt relief in favor of poor countries, the initiatives have been strategic tools for creditor countries to realize their objectives. enrique and et al (2007) argue that the hipc was mainly designed to protect the interests of the creditors. it left countries with unsustainable debt burdens, even though they qualified for the decision point. the world bank’s comprehensive development framework (cdf) and that of the poverty reduction strategy papers framework and supporting matrix4 have not been developed to address the debt relief and poverty reduction in low income countries, but rather were means for intervening in the economic and social policy and political governance, trialed in most of the hipcs dependant on the imf and the world bank (wilkinson and hughes, 2002, p. 50). furthermore sachs (2000) states that the imf and the world bank were instrumentally utilized tools by a few rich governments and that the debt sustainability criteria that they put forward for poor countries has nothing to do with actual debt sustainability. they ignore the deaths of millions of people who demand access to basic medication and nutrition. 4 in january 1999, the world bank launched the cdf where its heart was constituted by a matrix which covered key policy issues in regards to four actors including those of the international development community, the governments, civil society and the private sector (wilkinson and hughes 2002, p36). consilience isar: hipc success even the treatment of certain countries by the imf and the world bank has been more favorable than their criteria would seem to allow under a strict interpretation of the rules. for instance, payne claims that countries like turkey, due to its geopolitical location in regards to the middle east, brazil, because of its good relationship with the fund and lately iraq, whose 80% of us$39 billion debt owed to the paris club was forgiven after the re-election of president bush are obvious examples where countries benefited for extraneous reasons over those that really deserved support. 3.6 other shortcomings of hipc other failures of the hipc initiative are that it fails to address the human and social development perspective (eurodad, 2001, p. 7) and that its prsp does not do enough to deal with ethnic, religious and social tensions affecting the lives of most africans (gunter, 2002, p. 11). furthermore it is criticized for having unrealistic and over-optimistic assumptions and projections of growth (teunissen and akkerman, 2004, p. 6-7) (addison, hansen and tarp 2004, p45). the hipc also omits other types of debts, such as domestic and private sectors, which are becoming more predominant in low-income countries. the thresholds of debt sustainability particularly those of debt-to-export and debt-to revenue ratio are still high (teunissen and akkerman, 2004, p. 14-8) and the initiative was not supported with funding from the millennium development goals (mdg). additionally the program designed for six years was too long with too little flexibility to meet the individual needs of debtor nations (teunissen and akkerman, 2004, p. 62), (spratt, 2006, p. 8-11), (enrique and et al, 2007) (spratt, 2010, p. 250). third, the imf and the world bank did not commit to cancel any debt unless the debtor country reached the completion point. this left countries under the pressure of debt payments while they also struggled to institute structural reforms (enrique and et al, 2007). fourthly, any efforts of poverty reduction were weakened by enhanced structural adjustment facility (esaf) conditions. for instance, privatizing the utilities led to rising service costs which were beyond the ability of citizens to pay (ibid). finally the funding allocated for development under the initiative was insufficient for long-term progress (teunissen and akkerman, 2004, p. 7), (un, 1999, p. 15) (addison, hansen and tarp, 2004, p. 45). 3.7 suggestions although the hipc was relatively successful in countries which met the criteria, it was associated with a number of challenges and shortcomings discussed previously. the following modifications could improve the success of the hipc: the complex criteria need further enhancement and modification despite modification under the hipc ii. the only-ida criterion limits the ability of many poor countries to qualify for debt relief. as a g24 paper (2003, p. 3) argues, the ida-only criterion should be replaced by a more poverty-focused criterion to omit the two ratios pertaining to the fiscal criterion and must take into consideration other factors of vulnerability such as export concentration and export price volatility. many 118 consilience countries, equally as poor and indebted as the hipcs, have exited the hipc due to the limited scope of the criteria. the slow process of the hipc should be expedited as many more countries with immediate needs have the potential to be eligible for debt relief. as discussed earlier, by december 2003 the total number of countries that reached the completion point was ten (teunissen and akkerman, 2004, p. 7) while by 2009 the number was only 15 (spratt, 2009, p. 251). 32 out of 40 hipcs had to wait for over one and a half decades to reach the completion point. only 40 countries meet the ida-only criterion while there are many other countries that need support. as dent and peters (1999, p. 55) argue, there are 51 potential hipcs in desperate need of debt remission. a un report (1999, p. 16) noted that about half a dozen ldcs are not covered by the hipc although their debt indicators classify them as severely and moderately indebted countries which are furthermore vulnerable to unfavorable external development. thus the limited list needs further expansion to include other potential hipcs. the hipc is meant to be a financial tool to help relieve the debt burden of poor countries. however it has been politicked and instrumentalized to ensure the interests of creditor countries. creditors, the imf and the world bank show favoritism which may eventually lead to resistance and uprising, especially likely in this financial crisis, as a result of which the hipc may inevitably collapse. 4.0 conclusion the hipc initiative cannot be considered an absolute failure or success. however, available theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that the initiative has been associated with a number of shortcomings which raise doubts about its success. it was discovered that the hipc rests on a number of complex criteria which restrict eligible conditions. empirical evidence has analyzed the cases of bangladesh and cambodia. although these countries were poor and highly indebted they were not able to meet the criteria. similarly nigeria, although only eligible for debt relief, was still excluded because it was not an ida-only country. bangladesh and cambodia in spite of being poor and highly indebted have not yet been included in the hipc. the hipc is also a very slow process. for instance bolivia, mauritania and particularly uganda, the first and best candidate of the hipc, had to wait for months until their creditors distributed the responsibility of funding the relief. by 2009 only 15 countries had reached the completion point of the hipc. more importantly, the hipc ignores exogenous economic shocks that unavoidably affect many debt-burdened countries. in the case of uganda, the fall of global commodity prices damaged its economy and particularly its exports, a main source of its foreign exchange earnings. even the imf, creator of this initiative, confessed this failure. most significantly, the hipc initiative, rather than being a useful mechanism for countries to reduce their debt burden and develop their economies, has been a tool for larger economies to influence global governance and maintain smaller countries dependence on biased decisions. therefore, this essay concludes that the hipc cannot be an entirely successful initiative 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word krisel.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 14, iss. 2 (2015), pp. 214–224 gentrifying a superfund site: why gowanus, brooklyn is becoming a real estate hot spot rebecca salima krisel school of international and public affairs columbia university, new york rsk2160@columbia.edu abstract this feature length article tells the story of gowanus, a brooklyn neighborhood on the gowanus canal, haunted by the pollutants of its industrial past.. the environmental protection agency recognized the gowanus canal as a superfund cleanup site in march 2010. yet gowanus is experiencing an economic and cultural revival. what was historically a booming manufacturing area with active warehouses spilling their waste into the gowanus canal is now an industrial site where middle to upper class families, seeking to purchase organic foods, are willing to relocate and settle down. as of december 2014, a two-bedroom condo boasting waterfront views and located just one block away from the gowanus canal on carroll street was priced at $1,549,000. the average price per square foot for homes in gowanus is 50 percent higher than the rest of brooklyn. this story links issues of sustainable development and current urban housing needs in new york city. my research rested primarily on interviews with subjects who have expertise in the changes of the neighborhood. i was fortunate to speak with a real estate agent who specializes in gowanus, a representative at an affordable housing advocacy group working on development in gowanus, two separate families who moved to the area when they started began having children, and a life-long resident of 27 years. i also attended two community meetings relating to the sustainable development of gowanus in addition to speaking with some old and new shop dwellers. author’s note i am passionate about telling the story of the gentrification of gowanus because it brings to light two major challenges that new york city is facing: a lack of affordable housing and funding for sustainable and environmentally friendly areas. having worked as a child-care provider in the brooklyn neighborhood of gowanus during the 2013-2014 academic year, i had a strong interest in understanding why an area that lies along the banks of one of america’s most contaminated waters and appears so desolate is transforming into a hip, familyoriented neighborhood. as a graduate student at the school of international and public affairs at columbia university, where i am a degree candidate in the master of international affairs, i am focusing my studies on environmental policy and management. i am specifically interested in policy issues surrounding urban planning and water management. i am also specializing in media and communications. my future goals are to continue writing about issues of sustainable development in urban areas to shed light on the ways urban areas can manage environmental issues. keywords: superfund site, gowanus canal, gentrification, residential development, industrial displacement, super-gentrification, affordable housing, urban sustainable development. consilience krisel.: gowanus canal gentrification photo credit: rebecca salima krisel 1. introduction from the windows of the organic greenhouse on the roof deck at whole foods, the high-end supermarket of gourmet food in brooklyn’s gowanus, visitors have a view of a pile of metallic debris beneath an abandoned yellow shovel truck. across the street is an abandoned warehouse with graffiti along the roof that reads: “end stop and frisk. hands off the kids.” what was historically a booming manufacturing area with active warehouses spilling their waste into the gowanus canal is now an industrial wasteland, or brownfield, where families are willing to purchase organic chickens at $5 per pound. with more than a dozen contaminants and heavy metals found at high levels in the canal’s sediment and water, the gowanus canal poses a threat to people’s health and the quality of their daily lives. when the wind blows, the rotten stench emanating from the gowanus canal can cause your stomach to turn. yet, in a city of absorbent housing prices, new yorkers are willing to relocate and gentrify gowanus regardless of these high levels of toxic pollutants. the following is a study of the challenges that arise at the nexus of housing affordability and sustainable development in new york city. the gentrification of gowanus is a narrative for pressures of high-real estate prices in major cities displacing local communities. through interviews with current residents of south brooklyn, affordable housing advocates and real estate agents, i sought to uncover the story behind the recent spike in real estate prices in gowanus and the subsequent “cool factor” that has accompanied its cultural and economic revival, in spite of its being a superfund site. although some industrial displacement has arisen as the result of the gentrification of gowanus, potentially reducing employment opportunities for low-skilled or immigrant workers, the increase in residential units and the low impact on residential displacement make gowanus an ideal neighborhood to gentrify. consilience krisel.: gowanus canal gentrification 2. gentrification and the brooklyn housing market while one in five u.s. housing markets are now less affordable than their historic average due to price gains having outpaced income growth across the nation, the housing market in brooklyn, also known as kings county, was found to be the least-affordable market, followed by san francisco and manhattan. in a december 2014 report from realtytrac, the nation’s leading source for comprehensive housing data, studied affordability across the u.s. by measuring the percentage of the locality’s median monthly household income that is required to make monthly payments on a median-priced home in the area. the study demonstrated that of the 475 counties analyzed, 21 percent of counties weren’t as affordable compared to the average level for the period starting in january 2000. as depicted in the charts below, a brooklyn household would need to devote 98 percent of its median income to afford the payment on a median-priced home of $615,000. in contrast, nation-wide payments on a median-priced home required 26 percent of the average household income. brooklyn is now even less affordable than manhattan and san francisco, where half of all homes sell for $1 million or more. it was also among the 12 percent of counties studied in which the median home price is higher now than at the peak of the 2005 to 2008 property bubble.1 figure 1: (source: realtytrac) 1 from the realtytrac report “21 percent of u.s. housing markets now less affordable than their historical averages” accessible at http://www.realtytrac.com/news/homeprices-and-sales/21-percent-of-u-s-housing-markets-now-less-affordable-than-theirhistorical-averages/ consilience krisel.: gowanus canal gentrification figure 2: (source: realtytrac) over the past two decades, brooklyn has become associated with the hipster movement, presenting itself as a safe haven for artists and artisans of all trades from writers to chocolatiers. while relatively lower housing rental and sale prices in kings county had initially attracted people holding these offbeat occupations to the borough, the popularization of this artisanal brooklyn movement has led many artists and artisans to be priced out of brooklyn, along with poorer long-time residents who are not involved in the arts. in fact, the rise of the “brooklyn-hipster class” coincided with the gentrification of many deteriorating neighborhoods of kings county. in this context, gentrification describes the urban planning process whereby developers purchase or renovate property in deteriorating neighborhoods, increasing property values and often displacing low-income families and small businesses. 3. the super-gentrification of south brooklyn since the early 2000s, the ever-increasing real-estate sale-and-rental prices in manhattan have pressured families to look for housing options in south brooklyn. in fact, real-estate values in brooklyn have been surging as wealthy new yorkers priced out of manhattan displace the poor. south brooklyn – which includes park slope, cobble hill, carroll gardens, boerum hill, gowanus and red hook – has experienced at once a cultural and economic revival linked to the advent of new residents as well as the displacement of past residents and communities due to a lack of remaining affordable housing. gowanus itself is located along the gowanus canal with park slope to its east, carroll gardens to its west, and boerum hill to its north. consilience krisel.: gowanus canal gentrification figure 3: map of gowanus canal (source: google maps) i met with sabine aronowsky, a 45 year-old community development consultant at the fifth avenue committee, which is a community organizing and advocacy group for affordable housing in south brooklyn, on december 1, 2014 at the fifth avenue committee offices at 621 degraw street at fourth avenue. “park slope, boerum hill, and carroll gardens are neighborhoods that began gentrifying fifteen years ago, and now those are very expensive and wealthy neighborhoods. what we are seeing happening currently in gowanus are the effects of a second and third wave of gentrification in south brooklyn,” stated ms. aronowsky. the effects of second and third waves of gentrification can be described as a process of “super-gentrification.” scholar loretta lees defines the latter as a process whereby the “transformation of already gentrified, prosperous and solidly uppermiddle-class neighborhoods” can lead to much more exclusive and expensive enclaves.2 furthermore, neighborhoods experiencing this issue of super-gentrification “have become the focus of intense investment and conspicuous consumption by a new generation of super-rich “financiers” fed by fortunes from the global finance and corporate service industries.”3 though gowanus itself is experiencing its first wave of gentrification, its geography makes it an ideal location for a spillover effect of the super-gentrification of neighboring carroll gardens, park slope and boerum hill. in fact, “it make sense for gowanus to be the of-the-moment popular neighborhood since it’s in between park slope and carroll gardens” said shari cohen, 38, a real estate agent who specializes in south brooklyn real estate. ms. cohen and i met on november 7, 2014 at the roof, a café on the rooftop of the whole foods. developers in south brooklyn are looking to gowanus as unchartered territory to invest in housing developments and are relying on the already gentrified surroundings to lure investors and secure capital for development. one reason it took gowanus longer to gentrify than its adjacent neighborhoods was because of its industrial zoning laws and manufacturing past. zoning laws limit commercial use of land in order to prevent oil, manufacturing, or other types of businesses from building in 2 lees, loretta. “super-gentrification: the case of brooklyn heights, new york city,” 2487. 3 ibid. consilience krisel.: gowanus canal gentrification residential neighborhoods. “they changed the zoning laws on fourth avenue and parts of third avenue from commercial to residential about five years ago, so that’s why you see a lot of warehouses shutting down and renovated residential spaces opening up,” cohen, explained. in an interview with the real deal in march 2013, a real estate publication, the senior vice president of ideals property group justin dower confirmed this information regarding the rezoning of parts of gowanus: “the rezoning of fourth avenue and parts of third avenue four to five years ago started the transition [from manufacturing to residential] and the peak is coming.”4 a potential result of these updated zoning laws could be industrial displacement. though the latter is a common side effect of gentrification since many neighborhoods targeted for gentrification are industrial areas, the industrial displacement “is the result of speculative real estate pressure that is tied directly to gentrification.” 5 industrial displacement is not simply an unfortunate by-product of gentrification, but rather it is “an active process undertaken by real estate developers, city planners, policy-makers, landlords and even individual gentrifiers.”6 however, the decline in the manufacturing industry in gowanus occurred largely right after world war ii, and thus, the current industrial displacement can be described as minimal. 4. a closer look at real estate values in gowanus having zoning laws that are favorable to residential units is certainly a large factor for the recent residential growth of the neighborhood. much of gowanus is zoned m1-2, for light manufacturing, even though residential homes already exist in the zone. in fact, according to trulia, a website that tracks real estate trends, sales prices have appreciated 31 percent over the last five years in gowanus. just in the last year, gowanus rents have risen by 17 percent. moreover, as of december 2014, a two-bedroom condo boasting waterfront views and located just one block away from the gowanus canal on carroll street in between nevins street and third avenue, was selling for $1,549,000. it is important to note that the average price per square foot for homes in gowanus is $676 per ft², which is 50 percent higher than the average price per square foot for homes in brooklyn. though still relatively more affordable than the rest of south brooklyn where the average price per square foot for homes in park slope is $1,052 per ft² and in carroll gardens is $890 per ft², the recent popularity of gowanus remains somewhat of an enigma to current residents. 5. the gowanus “cool factor” with inactive warehouse spaces being replaced by box stores, chain hotels, and new residential buildings, the current industrial landscape of gowanus along with the rotten stench of the gowanus canal have left many wondering about its recent popularity. 4 see real deal interview with justin dower in “gowanus gets ready,” http://therealdeal.com/issues_articles/gowanus-gets-ready/ 5 curran, winifred. “‘from the frying pan to the oven’: gentrification and the experience of industrial displacement in williamsburg, brooklyn,” 1428. 6 ibid, 1428. consilience krisel.: gowanus canal gentrification i met with mr. bloom, founder and ceo at ordr.in, and his wife naama, 41, founder and ceo at hello flo, in their home located on carroll street in between hoyt street and bond street, just a half block away from the gowanus canal, on november 4, 2014. the couple lives in carroll gardens with their children orly and micah, who are 5 and 3 years old, respectively. “strangely, now, there’s a cool factor about gowanus,” said david bloom, 43, a resident of carroll gardens since 2007. “there’s an organic ice cream place with a roof deck [in gowanus] that opened up literally across the street from a verizon staging yard, and i guarantee you it sits on top of hundred years worth of toxic waste,” continued mr. bloom. ample hills creamery is the ice cream shop mr. bloom is referring to and like many other new and artisanal businesses, the shop opened in gowanus in july of 2014. located at 305 nevins street at union street, just one block away from the gowanus canal, it charges costumers $3.90 for a scoop of homemade organic ice cream. figure 4: (source: ample hills creamery) the ice cream shop displays its humor with its special ice cream flavor named “it came from the gowanus” featuring salty dark chocolate ice cream with hazelnut crack cookies topped with white chocolate pearls and orange-scented brownies. “it’s meant to look like the canal: dark brown with bits of color floating around!” said han greenwood, 31, who works at the ice cream shop. the flavor description card is illustrated with a drawing of a man wearing a full scuba diving suit fetching ice cream scoops from the depths of the canal. while the facetious humor with which the ice cream store addresses the toxic waste site that lies beneath it is sure to attract its customers, this image is emblematic of a general wonder about what exactly rests below the murky waters of the canal. “when we were kids, my siblings and i heard so many stories about weird animals appearing in the gowanus,” said ana gordon-loebl, 27, a born-and-raised resident of south brooklyn who has lived in gowanus since 1999. “i remember hearing something about a sperm whale that ended up swimming into the gowanus and my brother is still convinced there was an octopus found floating around,” she continued. i met with ms. gordon-loebl at lucey’s lounge, a bar located at 475 third avenue and 11th street in gowanus, on november 30, 2014. the myths surrounding the questionable waters are not unfounded. the environmental protection agency (epa) deemed the gowanus canal a superfund cleanup site in march 2010 because of its hazardous waste contamination, which poses a threat to the nearby residents who use the canal for fishing and recreation. the epa consilience krisel.: gowanus canal gentrification has determined that contaminants found in the waters of the gowanus canal include pcbs, coal tar wastes, heavy metals and volatile organics. furthermore, as a consequence of “years of discharges, storm water runoff, sewer outflows and industrial pollutants, the gowanus canal has become one of the nation's most extensively contaminated water bodies.”7 with a federal grant of $500 million, new york city government will begin the clean up in 2015 and is projected to be done in 2025. 6. gentrifying a superfund site and the space and cost tradeoff when it was an industrial hub, the canal became the dumping site of raw sewage and an alleged mafia dumping ground. as the shipping industry ended in the 1950s, gowanus was left with abandoned warehouses and a heavily contaminated canal. artists and community activists gradually moved in, turning the warehouses into art spaces and bringing life to the once industrial area. after the epa named the gowanus canal a superfund site, many residents and local leaders initially worried about the continued economic and real estate growth of south brooklyn. as stated in the fifth avenue committee 2010 report, “getting a fair exchange,” developers had halted assembling properties for development because “banks [were] unwilling or reluctant to lend in areas adjacent to superfund sites.”8 however, as discussed above, the real estate value trends have shown otherwise. “ultimately [the superfund site] will help our property values,” indicated mr. bloom. this sentiment was echoed in the new york times article, “gowanus is counting on a clean-up,” where journalist ronda kaysen wrote, “concerns about pollution and the neighborhood’s tendency to flood have not deterred residents.”9 in fact, the presence of the waste site does not appear to have much bearing on the popularity of the neighborhood. “i don’t think anyone cares about the canal being a superfund site. not in this city. with the constraints of real estate, no one cares. people want space, and there is space to develop in gowanus,” explained ms. bloom. “there is a never-ending search in this city for space and cost tradeoff,” interjected mr. bloom. capitalizing on this issue of the space and cost trade-off in new york, real estate developers have two major projects in planning that could reshape the landscape in gowanus. the first being the gowanus green affordable housing development, which boasts a 774-unit apartment building with a two-acre park at smith and fifth streets that is expected to open in 2017. however, the project is contingent upon the city’s approval. this is being stalled until “the site’s former owner, national grid, completes a voluntary environmental cleanup.”10 the second 7 as explained on the environmental protection agency webpage: http://www.epa.gov/region2/superfund/npl/gowanus/ 8 fifth avenue committee, “getting a fair exchange: preserving and creating truly affordable housing in the rezoning of gowanus, brooklyn,” 10. 9 kaysen, ronda. “gowanus is counting on a clean-up,” new york times. october 3, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/realestate/gowanus-is-counting-on-acleanup.html?ref=topics 10 kaysen, ronda. “gowanus is counting on a clean-up,” new york times. october 3, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/realestate/gowanus-is-counting-on-acleanup.html?ref=topics consilience krisel.: gowanus canal gentrification major development is a 700-unit rental along a two-block stretch of bond street between carroll and second streets at 363-365 bond street. the development will adhere to the 80-20 rules of affordable housing, reserving 20 percent of the units for the affordable housing lottery. the buildings are overlooking the canal and are currently scheduled to open in early 2016. with units rising to the 12th floor, these buildings will dwarf low-rise residences nearby. 11 it is precisely this space-cost tradeoff that leads many to leave manhattan. in particular, couples with children, or couples anticipating having children, are seeking real estate in south brooklyn for greater convenience. i met with ms. mcgown, an education consultant, at the margaret palca bakes coffee shop at 191 columbia street and degraw street in cobble hill on november 5, 2014. her youngest daughter was in a ballet class next door. “we lived on a fourth floor walkup in the east village [of manhattan], and we had to carry ophelia up and down the stairs sometimes with the stroller,” said carolyn mcgown, 45. the family moved to boerum hill on hoyt street and wyckoff street four years ago, when the couple was expecting their second child, lorelei, now 3 years old. “we needed more space and a more convenient location for younger children,” she continued. “i miss the convenience of living in manhattan and having the ability to run most errands on foot,” ms. mcgown stated, “however, with two young kids, this area makes sense because there are two strong public schools and there’s more space available.” 7. maintaining an affordable gowanus in an effort to reach new yorkers ranging from those at the bottom of the economic ladder to those in the middle class, mayor bill de blasio announced his affordable housing plan in may 2014: “housing new york: a five-borough, tenyear plan.” in it, he pledges to preserve 120,000 existing affordable units and to build an additional 80,000 new units—all within ten years. in new york, the threshold used to define affordable housing is spending no more than 30 percent of your income on rent. requiring an initial investment of $41 billion, paid for with city, state, federal, and private funds, the program will become the most expansive affordable housing agenda of its kind in the nation’s history. with gowanus gaining popularity and the costs of real estate increasing rapidly, the demographics of the neighborhood are also changing very quickly. a contraction in the supply of affordable housing available in the area is leading some to be priced out of the neighborhood. furthermore, with the changing zoning laws, gowanus is also seeing some industrial displacement. “it’s very hard to track data and quantify the displacement occurring currently in gowanus,” explained ms. aronowsky of the fifth avenue committee. “much of the displacement from gowanus and the surrounding areas already happened ten to fifteen years ago,” she continued. according to data in the fifth avenue committee 2010 report, “getting a fair exchange,” gowanus remains a diverse and inclusive neighborhood with a median 11 kaysen, ronda. “gowanus is counting on a clean-up,” new york times. october 3, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/realestate/gowanus-is-counting-on-acleanup.html?ref=topics consilience krisel.: gowanus canal gentrification income that is 15 percent lower than the rest of brooklyn and 30 percent lower than new york city. african-american and latino residents make up 50 percent of the population within the areas zoned for manufacturing. 12 while somewhat outdated, this data nonetheless underlines the demographic fabric of the community. “in gowanus, you are seeing polar extremes in terms of income distribution with 22 percent of the population living in extremely low income households and 55 percent of the population living in moderate to middle income households,” explained ms. aronowsky of the fifth avenue committee. these numbers were confirmed with the census data income chart for the brooklyn community board 6, which covers carroll gardens gowanus, park slope, and red hook, added to appendix a. with housing affordability in new york city defined as spending less than 30 percent of a household’s income on rent, it is not surprising that tenants in brooklyn are finding themselves rent-burdened. in fact, in mayor de blasio’s 10 year housing plan, he addressed his constituency in his “letter from the mayor” by first acknowledging: “we have a crisis of affordability on our hands.”13 the housing plan demonstrates that between 2005 and 2012, rents in new york rose by 11 percent while renter’s income stagnated, after adjusting for inflation. furthermore, in 2012 almost 55 percent of all rental households were rent-burdened, and more than 30 percent of all rental household were considered “severally rent-burdened” because they spent more than 50 percent of their income on housing. gowanus is no exception to rent-burdened tenants. in fact, “with rents rising in gowanus faster than the rest of brooklyn, we are seeing more and more tenants who are rent burdened,” elena conte, 35, stated at the bridging gowanus meeting held on november 24, 2014 at p.s. 32 in carroll gardens. conte is the senior organizer for planning and policy at the pratt center for community development. bridging gowanus is a community-planning framework for the infrastructure investments and land use regulations needed to insure a sustainable, vibrant, and inclusive future for the area around the gowanus canal. the constituents of community board six, which covers the neighborhoods of south brooklyn, were invited to voice their concerns about the framework at the november 24th bridging gowanus meeting. the pratt center for community development was facilitating the planning for the framework along with the new york city council member brad lander, congresswoman nydia velazquez, new york state senator velmanette montgomery, new york city council member stephen levin, new york city council member carlos menchaca, and new york state assemblywoman-elect jo anne simon. the subject of affordability was at the forefront of the bridging gowanus meeting and as conte claimed: “you can’t have affordable housing without an affordable neighborhood.” with businesses like whole foods and ample hills creamery cropping up, the availability of mainstream and affordable businesses is diminishing. “you still see steadfast business like c-town and key foods in the neighborhood,” said ms. gordon-loebl, the lifelong south brooklyn resident, referring to local supermarkets. “on my block though, developers bought four houses from families who had lived 12 fifth avenue committee, “getting a fair exchange: preserving and creating truly affordable housing in the rezoning of gowanus, brooklyn,” 12. 13 new york city, “housing new york: a five borough, 10 year plan,” letter from the mayor. http://www.nyc.gov/html/housing/assets/downloads/pdf/housing_plan.pdf consilience krisel.: gowanus canal gentrification there since i remember moving in as a 12-year-old and the laundromat on the corner recently shut down. one older lady held off for five years from selling her house even though they were pressuring her, and she finally gave in,” she continued. ms. gordon-loebl lives with her parents, twin sister, and younger brother in the family home on 11th street between third avenue and fourth avenue. “my parents frequently get letters from developers asking them to sell the house. since we are a full house right now, they see no reason to do so,” explained ms. gordon-loebl who, at the time, was a nursing student at long island university, and who has since graduated in may 2015. 8. gowanus as a token for gentrification and sustainable development with the pressures of gentrification affecting a large portion of the borough of brooklyn, gowanus is no exception. however, taking into account the fact that gowanus rests on top of a toxic waste site that used to be a primarily commercial use area that is now becoming residential, it can be considered an optimal neighborhood for gentrification. specifically, the impact of the change in the community will cause less residential displacement than other gentrifying residential areas in brooklyn. for urban planners, policy makers, and developers alike, gowanus is perceived as a blank slate with the potential of being a pilot neighborhood with a sustainable outlook. the superfund cleanup will bring new life to this toxic waste site and provide a safer environment for the residents. furthermore, the opportunity to develop housing with an emphasis on affordability has the potential to establish a community that is socio-economically diverse. it remains to be seen what the future of gowanus will be. for the moment, the changes affecting the neighborhood appear to be welcomed: “gowanus to me was a no man’s land growing up. i never used to say i lived here because no one knew what i was talking about,” expressed ms. gordon-loebl. “now, i appreciate the diversity in businesses that are opening up and the sheer presence of other human beings.” consilience krisel.: gowanus canal gentrification bibliography curran, winifred. “‘from the frying pan to the oven’: gentrification and the experience of industrial displacement in williamsburg, brooklyn.” urban studies 44.8 (2007): 1427–1440. web. 21 feb. 2015. fifth avenue committee, “getting a fair exchange: preserving and creating truly affordable housing in the rezoning of gowanus, brooklyn.” report created by the fifth avenue committee in 2010. print. kaysen, ronda. “gowanus is counting on a clean-up,” new york times. october 3, 2014. web. 21 feb 2015 lees, loretta. “super-gentrification: the case of brooklyn heights, new york city.” urban studies 40.12 (2003): 2487–2509. web. 21 feb. 2015. new york city, “housing new york: a five borough, 10 year plan.” may 2014. web. 21 feb 2015. real deal, “gowanus gets ready.” march 2013. web. 21 feb 2015. realty trac, “21 percent of u.s. housing markets now less affordable than their historical averages.” december 2, 2014. web. 21 feb 2015. consilience krisel.: gowanus canal gentrification appendix a figure 1 below was given to me by ms. sabine aronowsky when we met at the fifth avenue committee on december 1st, 2014. it is based upon the census bureau data. figure 1: community board 6 income chart consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 7, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 115–129 challenges and opportunities of waste collection in caracas: sucre municipality case study camille ramos school of international and public affairs columbia university, new york city crj.ramos@gmail.com adriana vicentini economic studies unit sucre municipality, venezuela adrianavicentini@gmail.com daniela ortega economic studies unit sucre municipality, venezuela daniela.m.ortega@gmail.com abstract this paper provides an overview of solid waste management by local authorities in the sucre municipality in caracas, venezuela. sucre is currently faced with serious demographic, economic, social, urban, and administrative challenges in solid waste management. the municipality, called petare, has one of the largest slums in latin america. it is estimated that more than a million people live in petare, and 30% live in poverty. venezuela is also facing a political problem that has affected the solid waste management throughout the country. local authorities in sucre have worked with communities to develop solutions to confront these difficulties. author’s note camille ramos, originally from brazil, is currently a master in public affairs candidate from columbia university and just completed an internship at the sucre municipality in caracas working on solid waste collection. she holds a masters degree from tel aviv university in conflict mediation and resolution. adriana vicentini, originally from venezuela, has an economics degree from cornell university and a masters in public administration from instituto de estudios superiores en administración (iesa, caracas). she leads the economics studies unit which focuses on the municipality`s economic policy, including income planning and resource allocation. daniela ortega, also a venezuelan, has a bachelor in economics from universidad católica andrés bello (ucab, caracas) with a postgraduate diploma in urban design and city planning from universidad metropolitana (unimet, caracas). she has been a research analyst in the economic studies unit of the sucre municipality since july 2009 where she has established a number of strategies to improve waste fees and collection in sucre. keywords: venezuela, petare, slums, garbage, waste collection, solid waste, recycling, community involvement, municipality, urban, environmental education, mochileros, participatory budgeting 116 consilience 1. introduction “when night falls we are greeted with violence, with the onset of morning we are welcomed with the garbage”, said a resident of the petare slum of venezuela. the brick labyrinth of petare began as a small independent city that was at the eastern hills in the outskirts of caracas. however, the two cities eventually merged as caracas grew. the urban settlement, which is today a slum, emerged during the decade-long construction of a highway (brillembourg, a., & klumpner, h., 2008). the number of squatters increased as workers built ad-hoc barracks on the foot of the hills. today it is estimated that about a million people live in the slums of petare. the slopes extend for miles, covered in patched houses made of brick, tin, and cardboard. in recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in urban-dwelling populations. in 2008, for the first time in history, more people lived in towns and cities than in rural areas (united nations population fund, 2007). while urbanization has brought increased wealth and opportunities, it has also brought poverty and deteriorating living conditions. about 1 billion people in today’s world call the slums home (global report on human settlements – un-habitat, 2003) urban poverty has been recognized as an important subject in the international development agenda, and one focus of the un millennium goals is to improve the lives of slum dwellers. to accomplish this goal much has to be addressed, from serving the basic needs of society to infrastructure and security. in order to sustainably meet these, the solution should incorporate a more holistic approach by involving the community in the improvement of living conditions. this allows them to take ownership of possible solutions and facilitates dialogue between municipal authorities and communities (un-habitat, 2003). figure 1: picture of petare. consilience ramos: waste collection in caracas one of the consequences of denser urban fabric is the increased generation of waste. the rapid expansion of urban dwellers in slums makes it increasingly challenging for municipal authorities to provide basic services such as waste collection. it is estimated that each person produces over 1-1.5 kg (2.2-3.3 lbs) of garbage a day and this accumulation of waste can lead to severe environmental degradation. the issue of waste collection is extremely significant because it links to health, environment, and safety. uncollected waste can lead to flooding, insects, rodents, and diseases. improper disposal of waste can pollute water and air, making it an important environmental challenge. improper burning of garbage causes pollution and can become a serious fire hazard. municipalities in venezuela usually have limited financial resources to deal with such issues. the municipality often has to rely on taxes from richer areas to cover the costs of waste collection in poorer areas; the case of petare is no different. a datanalis1 survey showed that garbage is the slum dwellers’ biggest issue after insecurity. 2. solid waste collection in urban settings there are different strategies through which municipalities can have approach the issues of solid waste collection (andre & cerda, 2006). one option is that the municipality undertakes the responsibility of waste collection fully, thus assuming the responsibility for the health and safety of its population. in this model, the population served is not restricted to certain types or quantities of garbage, and they are in charge of collecting the garbage as often as possible. the costs must be born on domestic, commercial and industrial users, and materials are not recycled most of the time. another alternative is a more managed approach. the model is based on environmental precaution, and includes the separation of organic waste. the waste is treated as the responsibility of the producer because the municipality can be selective in what it collects, and materials are recycled. strategies are implemented to minimize waste generation, and technology is applied to treating waste. there are several benefits to the involvement of the community. for one, it develops a sense of citizenship and ownership. citizens become managers of the project and a part of the solution. this not only addresses the needs of the community, but also generates internal management mechanisms. it also develops local knowledge on the topic, empowering the community and enhancing the social capital of the municipality. however, there are disadvantages to consider as well. by transferring the responsibility to the community, including administrative and labor costs, the overall cost of waste collection may increase. another possibility is a decentralization of the collection process. several different organizations, such as neighborhood associations and cooperatives, will participate and dilute the responsibility to optimal service. 1 this study was led by the office of strategic analysis of the municipality of sucre. the survey was developed by datanalisis (private company) in 2010. range of study: individuals, male and female, aged 18 years and socioeconomic status a, b, c, d and e. sample size: 1,250 people. 2.77% sampling error. confidence level: 95%. type of sampling: in homes. information collection: semi-probabilistic. random, stratified by sex, age, socioeconomic status and region. 118 consilience 3. the sucre municipality case 3.1 background on the challenge the city of caracas is divided into 5 municipalities. sucre is the secondlargest municipality in caracas and holds some of the largest urban slums in latin america, including petare. the petare slum is a single slum that includes an estimated 10 major neighborhoods, which are further divided into subdivisions. there are an estimated 1,200 barrios (mini neighborhoods) within the slums (ñañez, 2009). figure 2: entrance to julian blanco waste transference plant. each municipality is responsible for managing its solid waste disposal. in sucre, local authorities have chosen to establish an agreement with a private concessionaire, a solid waste management company called sabenpe. the garbage disposal fees are charged through the electricity bill. however, given that most electricity in slum dwellings is illegally connected to the grid, the collection of fees is drastically lower than the extension of the service. another issue that further affects the subscriptions is the lack of an enforcement mechanism. although the users are liable for paying the collection fees, they often do not pay since there are few potential consequences. previously, people would have their electricity cut if they did not pay the collection fees. however, the central government ruled that the collaboration of different services is illegal, and thus eliminated any incentive to pay. given that waste collection is a public health concern, the municipality cannot halt the collection of garbage in a neighborhood simply because a percentage of users avoid paying the collection fees. aside from these challenges, a presidential decree in 2003 forbade the increase of the garbage collection fees. since the company does not receive enough consilience ramos: waste collection in caracas money to make the necessary investments, their workers often go on strike, and the consequences are felt by citizens. since 2009, the municipality has had to subsidize a part of the private company’s operating costs, making the company a public and private initiative. the municipality of sucre produces an average of 1,100 tons of garbage a day. on average, between monday and thursday, 1200-1,380 tons of garbage are collected per day, while friday, saturday, and sunday only 700-800 tons of trash are collected due to limited resources. solid waste collection is a particularly challenging situation in the areas further up the hills and the inadequacy of current services is obvious. figure 3: open air garbage accumulation at the entrance of jose felix in petare. at the entrance of the neighborhoods, there are often overfilled giant garbage containers, each with a capacity of 5,000 kgs. the overflow of garbage is exacerbated by people that rip open the trash bags in search for food and spread the waste. the spilling of the garbage not only causes foul odors and unsanitary conditions, but also the stoppage of traffic in characteristically narrow roads. in theory, the garbage from smaller containers is collected every morning; however not everyone brings his or her garbage down in time. by the afternoon, the container is usually full again. also, other communities take their garbage to existing containers since some areas lack proper disposal infrastructure, adding to this overflow. the larger containers (roll-ons) are too big for the regular garbage disposal trucks, and they require a special truck with a crane. the truck can only handle one roll-on container at a time, so it must drop off an empty one before taking the full one. however, each truck can only pick up a limited number of containers a day on its route, which results in the accumulation of trash for days. in the upper parts of the slums, where there are no roads and no containers, so many people dispose of their waste indiscriminately. this causes the community 120 consilience to overflow with garbage. small tractor-like machines come to pick up the garbage in these areas, but collection is only twice a week. figure 4: stairs in petare leading to houses further up the hill. 3.2 the venezuelan political-economic context the issues of waste collection have to be seen within the greater politicaleconomic issues the country is facing. waste collection has multiple dimensions beyond the inadequate number of containers, infrequent collection, and scarce access in remote areas. there is also a larger structural problem stemming from the lack of investment due to the political and economic instability within the country. the central government has taken on a regulatory role and the venezuelan economy is in a deep recession after shrinking 1.4 % in 2010 and facing almost 30% inflation (reuters, 2011). this year the government has already expropriated a record number of companies. just eight months into 2011, and 384 companies so far have been expropriated compared to 286 companies in 2010, 139 in 2009, and 26 in 2008 (la segunda, 2011). venezuela has had a currency control regime since 2003, creating a large black market. currency control has restricted companies’ access to foreign currency, and they are obliged to import dollars from the black market, whose rates are about double the official rate. today, the official exchange rate is estimated to be 4.30 bolivares to the dollar; however the rate for a dollar on the black market is 8.30 bolivares. this has caused a scarcity of goods, which has greatly affected solid waste collection. new trucks and vehicles are in very short supply, and used vehicles are worth triple the price of a new vehicle because of the shortage of new trucks and cars. this makes it too expensive for both sabenpe and the municipality to buy new machinery. another crucial factor affecting the high costs of solid waste collection is labor. venezuela has strict labor laws, making it costly to hire and fire workers. in the case of garbage collectors, they are entitled to more benefits than most industries as a result of several strikes that left the city flooded with garbage. workers have exploited their strategic position and demanded higher pay and benefits. consilience ramos: waste collection in caracas in this context, administration of garbage disposal no longer seems viable, given that the revenue is not enough to sustain costs of operations, maintenance, collection and service modernization. figure 5: truck at a garbage transference plant called “julian blanco,” where larger containers are filled to take garbage to the landfill. 3.3 the local context: strategies applied in sucre local governments have been searching for strategies to provide sustainable urban waste management services through policy reform. these include anything from financing sweeping staff to purchasing waste containers. one of the tools the municipality has created to address the needs of the communities is the presupuesto participativo (participatory budgeting). its objective is to allow the communities to designate their own priorities and take part in decisionmaking. the municipality designates funds for each division of its municipality (41 in total), and each community has three boards: social, construction, and public space. any resident of that community can join the boards and has voting power to decide on which projects will be planned and participate in the implementation boards, which receive technical support from the mayor’s office. the objective is to reflect and prioritize the needs of each community. in 2011, 2% of the presupuesto participativo funds are being designated to projects related to solid waste, including the recovery of open-air landfills and programs that introduce recycling in the communities. there have been significant changes to the administration of solid waste collection since the municipality assumed a part of the responsibility and a number of solutions have been formulated. they are at different stages of implementation and many more are in the process of being devised. the municipality wants to both improve garbage collection and the perception of the process. however, the municipality has limited funds and therefore needs to consider how to reach the maximum impact with the available resources. it is also searching for solutions through which certain programs become self-sustainable. 122 consilience 4. solutions 4.1 containers while in theory the containers are the responsibility of the garbage company sabenpe, they commonly ignore the issue. there are two types of containers, smaller containers that make up the majority and can hold up to 1.5 tons of garbage, as well as roll-ons which can hold up to 5 tons. many of the containers are in poor condition, filled with holes that allow the trash to fall outside the container and litter the surroundings. there are also not enough of them. some containers are always overfilled, while other areas there are none whatsoever. collecting trash from the empty spaces delays the trucks further and slows down the collection routes. the information on the location and state of the containers belongs to sabenpe, which makes it hard for the municipality to monitor. therefore, the municipality is currently georeferencing all the containers with a gps. they will document the location of each container and their condition in order to replace those that are damaged. all areas that should have a container but have already been noted and georeferenced, and new containers will be purchased. this solution will be implemented quickly and have a strong impact on the community. figure 6: roll-on container. consilience ramos: waste collection in caracas figure 7: municipality of sucre georeferencing containers. 4.2 mochileros (backpackers) the mochileros are people in the community equipped with garbage bags who climb into areas where there are no roads or containers to collect the trash directly from people’s houses. the term mochila means backpack in spanish. while initially they came with backpacks to collect garbage, it became easier to drag the bags. nonetheless, the term mochileros stuck. since some people have to travel long distances up and down the stairs to dispose their garbage, many of them throw the garbage in any empty space they can find or leave it on the access stairs. since these areas are not on the garbage truck routes, the garbage can sit in these areas for days, which contributes to the bad odors and unsanitary conditions. thus, the mochileros have begun to collect the garbage on a daily basis. it has been a very successful initiative that has been piloted in two neighborhoods within petare: “19 de abril” and “josé félix ribas.” the project in “josé félix ribas” has been very successful and efficient, mostly due to contributions from local leadership. the neighborhood is particularly important because it connects all the sub-neighborhoods in petare, but it is also has the reputation of being the most dangerous. the mochileros project is run by junior, a community leader with political ambitions in next year’s elections. junior has been living in the neighborhood for 30 years and claims to know everybody, “even the scoundrels.” they have hired 61 mochileros and one supervisor from the community using the presupuesto participativo. the supervisor is junior’s daughter, who goes through all the routes on a motorcycle with her husband to ensure efficient collection. 124 consilience there are 10 sub-neighborhoods, each with its own supervising collector, and a team of anywhere from 2 to 4 other members, male or female. “it is important to have both men and women on the teams. the women are more reliable workers, and they are more often on time and can be counted on, reliable, but men are also needed for carrying all the heavy garbage and wheeling it down to the truck route,” explains junior. they work from 6:30 to 9:30 in the evening mondays through fridays, and being a mochilero is usually their second job. many of them work for the municipality in the cleaning squads that sweep the streets during the daytime. the project is estimated to affect 200,000 people. the mochileros go from house to house collecting the garbage and dumping it into the larger containers. though many of the sub-neighborhoods are dangerous, junior emphasizes that his workers are allowed access into certain stairwells because he knows everyone that lives there. the mochileros mentioned that it is not uncommon for people to come running after them when they take out the trash, re-open the garbage bags, and remove the guns that they were hiding inside. figure 8: mochileros moving house to house to pick up garbage. figure 9: mochilero carrying the garbage to the collection point. consilience ramos: waste collection in caracas figure 10: team of mochileros bringing trash to the collection point. in “19 de abril” community leaders attempted to make a garbage collection program, recycling cooperative, and an educational initiative. this project was intended to reach 600 families, which consisted of 2700 people. they hired a total of 96 young people from the community during the first year to collect the garbage from door to door. the requirements for participation in the program were current enrollment in school and being drug-free. in order to establish the recycling cooperative, neighbors and the community had to be trained. sessions were held for the community where the organization and monitoring of the recycling project were explained. there was also capacitation training for several different levels within the community. these training sessions had the objective of promoting recycling. a total of 48 recycling bins were placed where people separated paper, cardboard, and glass. glass and paper were stored in a warehouse and sold on a monthly basis. in planning the project, the amount derived from recycling was estimated to cover the labor costs of the mochileros and administrators, as well as 30 % of the operational costs and a fund for social projects in the community. unfortunately, the income did not cover all of these costs, and the money collected was only used to improve public spaces in the community. the project was unable to move forward, as its biggest constraint was the transportation of recycled materials. they needed a truck that was designated for recycling purposes and were unable to obtain one. the initiative was suspended but there are plans to restart it in 2012. 4.3 educational campaign in order to maintain the cleanliness of the public spaces, it is crucial to have the participation of the community. therefore, the municipality is developing an educational program that will be implemented in both the schools and the neighborhoods. the idea is to establish environmental brigades composed of about 126 consilience 30 different people per sub-neighborhood. these are volunteers from the communities who will be trained and will keep watch over the practices in the neighborhood. the idea is that the training will be dynamic and interactive, where residents are able to fully engage and aid in the development of educational activities. the program will also begin in schools this coming academic year. this will aim to bring awareness to the importance of civic participation by addressing issues such as taking out the garbage at the right times and throwing it in the right places. 4.4 proposal for recycling a longer-term project that is in the planning stages is a proposal for recycling. recycling will be crucial in the coming years as caracas’ main landfill will soon be full, and recycling might be a way of reducing the environmental impact and improving the sustainability of waste management extra money from recycling programs can be returned to communities in need. there are different ways of going about this, and the first thing that would have to be done is a feasibility study to assess the economic viability of the project. currently, aluminum and relatively small quantities of glass and paper are recycled. studies should look at the viability of recycling plastic and making fertilizer out of organic waste. the municipality of sucre produced an in-depth study where it separated and analyzed the amount and types of garbage in each zone. the objective of the study was to generate both quantitative and qualitative information about the composition of the garbage. the information was matched with information about the population per district, including age, income, type of housing, education, employment situation, and type of employment. matching the decomposition of the garbage with the sociodemographic information was important in order to understand the patterns of waste production. with data on the characteristics of the population and the garbage, future programs can be better managed and focused. currently the municipality of sucre generates 1.45 kg of garbage per capita every day. the garbage is 19% organic waste, 34% paper/cardboard, 27% plastics and glass, metal and textiles occupy no more than 4% each (proconsult c.a., 2010). there are also breakdowns per neighborhood. petare generates almost one third of the solid waste and its primary garbage component is paper. (figure 11). consilience ramos: waste collection in caracas figure 11: composition of wasted from sucre and petare (proconsult c.a, 2010) with this information, the municipality plans on hiring a consulting company that can analyze the viability of a recycling or composting industry. with plastic and pet bottles, the material can be transformed to make jeans, carpets, hoses, plastic bags, car bumpers, and other goods. the study will implement a cost benefit analysis to examine further development of the industry. the organic waste can be composted to create fertilizer. venezuela currently imports fertilizer, and the organic waste can be used to derive compost. the municipality has a piece of land on which it established a tree nursery to launch a composting pilot using the organic waste. there is only one glass company, owens-illinois, currently operating in the country, and it was taken over by the government in october 2010. the company buys back glass bottles and are able to set a very low repurchase price due to their government-imposed monopoly power. furthermore, they are situated a few hours away from caracas and require a large stock of glass before sending a truck for a pick up. however, 44% less energy is consumed by recycling glass as opposed to producing it from scratch (the equivalent of 136 liters of petroleum), and 1.2 tons of raw material are saved. three thousand bottles recycled reduces 1 ton of garbage and reduces fresh water use for the process by 50% (martinez chang et al., 2010). though recycling is not an easy task for petareños, the key to solving the problem lies in finding the right marketing idea. if the municipal government succeeds in conveying the message that recycling glass is both sustainable and profit-generating, people will surely start recycling this material. carton and paper is currently recycled but also at low prices. if half of all paper consumed were to be recycled, it would account for 75% of the fiber needed to make new paper. it also would avert the release of 2.5 tons of carbon dioxide, the destruction of 17 trees, save 100,000 liters of water, and free up 3.57 m3 of space inside the landfill (martinez chang et al., 2010). it can be argued that the lack of recycling activities in municipio sucre and the rest of the country stems from the lack of a market for this practice. since the supply side of this activity is controlled by the central government through the expropriation of the recycling industry, and environmental policy is not on the national agenda, there is no existing recycling 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% o rg an ic w as te p ap e r/ ca rd b o a rd p la st ic s te xt ile s g la ss m e ta ls d an ge ro u s m at e ri al s o th e r comparison of the components found in garbage sucre and petare sucre petare 128 consilience industry. an effective answer could lie with the local government igniting this practice through grassroots educational campaigns. 5. conclusion the technical complexity, political dynamics, and administrative issues complicate the provision of public services in the sucre municipality of caracas. urban waste collection is particularly challenging for policy makers and authorities of the municipality. sucre generates more waste than any other municipality. it is also economically and topographically diverse: it incorporates a small rich segment at its borders with impoverished slums, and flatter areas accessible by truck with entire sides of mountains. with such a scenario, effective urban collection services are not economically efficient. consequently, the municipality has to subsidize about half the cost of the service. in april of this year, a new law for waste administration was passed, allowing the municipalities to fix the tariff structure of the collection service. this is an opportunity that the municipality has to not only evaluate their current structure, but also look into new management models that can increase efficiency and sustainability of collection. despite these difficulties, the sucre municipality has found creative solutions to challenging problems, seeking to improve the quality of life of the inhabitants of the municipality with regards to solid waste collection. the initiatives derived from the presupuesto participativo, such as the mochileros and recycling in “19 de abril” should be replicated in other communities within the municipality. leaders should continue to seek alternative ways through which these projects can be self-sustaining rather than dependent on a mayor’s term. the municipality is analyzing how to implement an effective tariff for the following year and continues its search for creative ways to collect and process solid waste. several of its initiatives have been innovative, and should serve as models for other similar political divisions within the country. figure 12: camile (far left), junior (center), daniela (far right), and mochileros in jose felix. consilience ramos: waste collection in caracas bibliography ñañez, r. (2009, october 07). como está conviviendo la democracia en petare, un breve reflejo de venezuela. globedia noticias de venezuela hoy. retrieved from http://ve.globedia.com/conviviendo-democracia-petare-breve-reflejovenezuela andre, f. j., & cerda, e. (2006). gestión de residuos sólidos urbanos: análisis económico y políticas públicas. información comercial española, ice: cuaderno economico, 170, 71-91. retrieved from http://www.revistasice.com/cachepdf/cice_71_7192__fa00fda9c7b35add65df5956edc31464.pdf brillembourg, a., & klumpner, h. (2008, fall). a design revolution caracas on the margins. revista harvard review of latin america. retrieved from http://www.drclas.harvard.edu/revista/articles/view/1116 chávez alcanza récord de expropiaciones en venezuela. (2011, august 4). lasegunda.com. retrieved from http://www.lasegunda.com/noticias/internacional/2011/08/669573/chave z-alcanza-record-de-expropiaciones-en-venezuela martinez chang, a., rodríguez, j., vásquez, a., garcía, w., vera, e., & hernández, g. (2010). diseño e instalación de planta de reciclaje de basura (plástico, papel y vidrio) (unpublished master's thesis). universidad bolivariana de venezuela. retrieved from http://www.monografias.com/trabajos81/diseno-plantareciclaje-basura/diseno-planta-reciclaje-basura.shtml#referencia proconsult c.a. (2010). caracterización preliminar de desechos sólidos generados en el municipio sucre del estado miranda (pp. 1-104, tech.). caracas. united nations population fund. (2007, may). urbanization: a majority in cities: population & development : unfpa. unfpa united nations population fund. retrieved from http://www.unfpa.org/pds/urbanization.htm venezuela economy and risks. (2011, march 28). reuters.com. retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/28/us-latam-summit-venezuelaidustre72r1wb20110328 acknowledgements we would like to thank the support of the mayor’s office in providing us the relevant information and lending their time for interviews. this would have not been possible without the collaboration of junior and his team of mochileros for proudly showing us their project. microsoft word adewumi_ed.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 15, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 1-33 planning of wastewater reuse programme in nigeria james rotimi adewumi (ph.d) department of civil and environmental engineering federal university of technology, akure jradewumi@gmail.com; tel: +2347062320141 abiose matthew oguntuase (ph.d) department of civil and environmental engineering faculty of engineering elizade university, ilaramokin awoguntuase@yahoo.com abstract despite the great awareness on the health and environmental implications of poorly disposed wastewater, the continuous pollution of the environment and surface water with wastewaters generated from domestic, institutional, and industrial activities in many nigerian cities still remains a major concern. as population grows with rising standard of living, more wastewater is generated and disposed to sensitive environments with negative impacts on humans and ecosystems. to promote sustainable and efficient wastewater management, global attention must be drawn toward wastewater reuse for both potable and non-potable uses. this paper presents baseline information on global wastewater reuse that can serve as a valuable guide on the integration of wastewater reuse in nigeria as a component of national integrated water resources management, where wastewater reuse will form an important component of water sources in addition to surface and groundwater sources. it will also eliminate the pollution effects of indiscriminate disposal into sensitive ecosystems. keywords: wastewater, treatment, planning, reuse, nigeria consilience 2 1. introduction safe disposal of wastewater still remains a serious problem in nigeria where it has the potential of causing groundwater and surface water contamination and creates environmental pollution. as the country occupies the position of the largest economy in africa, coupled with the transformation agenda of the federal government, it will begin to experience rapid growth in population, urbanization, agriculture, and industrial development. this growth will also result in corresponding increase in wastewater generation in urban areas raising concerns about environmental pollution resulting from the quality of wastewater disposed to sensitive environments. the effects of untreated or poorly treated wastewater can be detrimental to public health, the environment, and the economy. if implemented under uncontrolled or unregulated circumstances, poorly treated wastewater can be harmful to living beings (if ingested directly or through irrigated crops) and irrigated soil (due to the chemicals and potential bacteria within the effluent) (adewumi, et al., 2010 (a)). water contaminated by human, chemical, or industrial wastes can cause a number of diseases through ingestion or physical contact. water-related diseases include dengue, filariasis, malaria, onchocerciasis, trypanosomiasis, and yellow fever. in peru, there was a cholera epidemic that resulted in an estimated loss amounting to three times the expenditure on water and sanitation for the entire country over the preceding 10 years; likewise, in shanghai, china, a major outbreak of hepatitis a was attributed to sewerage contamination (rose, 1999). the costs of poorly managed domestic wastewater are very high. in india, the 1994 plague epidemic resulted in a loss of tourism revenue estimated at us$ 200 million. consequently, no other type of intervention has greater impact upon a country’s development and public health than the condition of clean drinking water and the appropriate disposal of human waste (sida, 2000). discharge of untreated wastewater has a tendency to promote the growth of numerous alien aquatic species that exhibit the characteristics of being invasive and threaten to cause ecological and economic harm. it can also lead to the loss of native stream fauna, which would degrade the entire native stream ecosystem. invasive aquatic species could also cause economic impacts to agricultural users of water, resulting in crop damage, infrastructure damage, or contamination. introductions of aquaculture and aquarium species into streams occur via flooding, effluents discharged back into streams, intentional introduction, and by overland travel. in addition, diseases and pathogens associated consilience adewumi: wastewater reuse with untreated wastewater could potentially spread through direct or indirect human contact with the receiving streams or rivers. untreated wastewater discharged into the environment is increasingly becoming a major source of nutrients, causing eutrophication of surface water bodies. eutrophication is a growing problem in nigeria, and, as a result, the ecological integrity of surface waters becomes compromised, fish populations become extinct, toxic cyanobacteria blooms are abundant, and oxygen levels are depleted. eutrophication is the rapid growth of phytoplankton species and aquatic macrophytes. in extreme cases, this leads to the development of mono-specific blooms of cyanobacteria. harmful cyanobacterial blooms are typically characterized by heavy biomass accumulations that often consist of a single or a few species, usually members of the genera microcystis and anabaena (oberholsteret al., 2009). it can also lead to the alteration of the ecological integrity of fresh water resources. this may lead to a decline in macroinvertebrate abundance and composition as well as species richness (beyeneet al., 2009). finally, eutrophication causes the total depletion of oxygen. this is associated with the accumulation and decomposition of dead organic matter which consumes oxygen and generates harmful gases such as methane and hydrogen sulphide (nyenje et al., 2010). with these problems associated with discharge of untreated wastewater into the environment, wastewater reuse has become an attractive option for pollution abatement when water reuse replaces effluent discharge to sensitive surface waters bodies, furthermore conserving and extending available water supplies. other benefits of reuse include the decrease in diversion of freshwater from sensitive ecosystems, replenishment of soil nutrients in agriculture due to irrigation, enhancement of groundwater recharge, delay in future expansion of water supply infrastructure, and the creation or sustenance of wetlands (angelakis and bontoux, 2001; joksimovic, 2006). wastewater reuse involves the collection and treatment of wastewater so that it may be used for certain applications. wastewater reuse can form an important component of both wastewater management and water resource management and can offer an environmentally sound option for managing wastewater that dramatically reduces environmental impacts associated with the discharge of wastewater to surface waters. in addition, reuse can provide an alternative water supply for many activities that do not require drinking water quality and, as such, permit the saved drinking water to be used elsewhere. costly projects for drinking water supply may also be delayed due to the reduced demand for drinking as a result of reuse. lastly, reuse is attractive in many communities because the cost of producing treated wastewater has consilience 4 been found to be lower than the cost of producing drinking water. these reasons form the major drivers for wastewater reuse in many communities across the world. the most significant restraints to reuse include the potential risks to public health and the potential for reduced sewer or stream flows. wastewater reuse has formed an essential component of water demand management (wdm) in many countries including jordan, kuwait, israel, spain, australia, namibia, germany, united kingdom, and the united states (adewumi et al., 2012). with the broad range of effective wastewater treatment technologies that exist and records of successful wastewater reuse implementation in many of these countries, it has become imperative to evaluate the potential of wastewater reuse as a viable alternative in the drive toward overcoming the challenges of environmental pollution and surface-/groundwater contamination in nigeria. 2. global review of wastewater reuse unregulated wastewater reuse has been in practice for centuries in many parts of the world. the concept of integrated wastewater reuse, however, has received increase attention in recent times due to the degradation of freshwater resources resulting from improper disposal of wastewater and drought and prediction of further droughts from climate change in many arid areas. furthermore, reuse has gained traction due to increasing competition for freshwater resources, therefore highlighting the need to conserve higher quality water for suitable uses to meet growing industrial, agricultural and domestic needs. also, there have been growing demands for greener water strategies and water conservation as well as growing recognition of the resource value of wastewater especially in supplementing freshwater for nonpotable uses and irrigation and the high costs of supplying sufficient quantities of potable water to arid areas (who, 2006; ilemobade et al., 2009). wastewater reuse is an important component of both wastewater management and water resource management. it offers an environmentally sound option for managing wastewater that dramatically reduces environmental impacts associated with discharge of wastewater effluent into surface waters. in addition, reuse provides an alternative water supply for many activities that do not require potable quality water and, as such, permits the saved potable water to be used elsewhere. in arid regions where there has traditionally been a scarcity of water, wastewater reuse technology has been successfully implemented via dual reticulation systems. examples are in jordan (al-jayyousi, 2003; 2004), israel (friedler consilience adewumi: wastewater reuse and hadari, 2006; brenner et al., 2000), spain (march et al., 2004), australia (john, 1996; eric, 1996; diana et al., 1996; dillion, 2000), and some parts of south africa (marilyn, 2006; adewumi et al., 2010 (a)). in addition, water scarcity experienced globally has led to the embracing of wastewater and other sources of non-potable water in many large urban areas in regions previously considered to have sufficient water sources like china (junyinget al., 2004), japan (dixon et al., 1999), canada (exall, 2004), germany (nolde, 1999), the united kingdom (ukea, 2000) and the united states (okun, 1996). some existing wastewater reuse projects in various countries are summarized in table 1. table 1. existing wastewater reuse projects in some selected countries (adapted from metcalf and eddy, 2004; usepa, 2004 and aquarec, 2006) country location level of treatment application (s) argentina campo espejo, mendoza secondary treatment unrestricted irrigation australia aurora, melbourne tertiary treatment toilet flushing and irrigation mawson lakes, north of adelaide tertiary treatment toilet flushing, irrigation, and car washing bolivar and virginia project, south australia tertiary treatment groundwater recharge for unrestricted irrigation south east queensland tertiary treatment unrestricted irrigation hunter water tertiary treatment coal washing and power generation east irrigation scheme tertiary treatment unrestricted irrigation, toilet flushing, and garden irrigation mcclaren vale tertiary treatment irrigation rose hill tertiary treatment toilet flushing and garden irrigation georges river program tertiary treatment toilet flushing and garden irrigation northern shoalhaven tertiary treatment urban irrigation sydney olympic park tertiary treatment irrigation, water fountains, and domestic/residential uses city of waggawagga tertiary treatment landscape irrigation belgium wulpen tertiary treatment groundwater recharge and saltwater intrusion barrier waregem tertiary treatment industrial uses brazil sao paulo tertiary treatment irrigation, industrial, and toilet flushing chile santiago secondary treatment irrigation china taiyuan tertiary treatment industrial uses cyprus cyprus tertiary treatment irrigation egypt egypt secondary treatment irrigation of tree crops france aubergenville tertiary treatment groundwater recharge consilience 6 clermont ferrand tertiary treatment irrigation noirmoutier island tertiary treatment irrigation greece levadia tertiary treatment irrigation of cotton amfisa tertiary treatment olive tree irrigation palecastro tertiary treatment olive tree irrigation chalkida tertiary treatment landscape and forestry irrigation karistos tertiary treatment landscape and forestry irrigation lerisos tertiary treatment landscape and forestry irrigation agioskonstantnos tertiary treatment landscape and forestry irrigation kentarchos tertiary treatment landscape and forestry irrigation chalkida tertiary treatment irrigation and industrial uses india hyderabad secondary treatment irrigation israel dan region scheme secondary treatment groundwater recharge for irrigation kishon scheme secondary treatment irrigation jeezrael valley secondary treatment irrigation gedera secondary treatment irrigation getaot kibbutz secondary treatment irrigation city of arad secondary treatment irrigation italy emilia romagna secondary treatment irrigation grammichele tertiary treatment irrigation palermo and gela tertiary treatment irrigation turin tertiary treatment irrigation and industrial uses japan tokyo tertiary treatment irrigation, toilet flushing, and industrial uses chiba prefecture kobe city tertiary treatment irrigation, toilet flushing, and industrial uses fukuoka city tertiary treatment irrigation, toilet flushing, and industrial uses jordan city of jordan tertiary treatment environmental enhancement, irrigation, and industrial uses kuwait ardhiya, reqqa, and jahra, tertiary treatment irrigation mexico mexico city tertiary treatment irrigation monterrey metropolitan area tertiary treatment industrial uses morocco ben slimane secondary treatment irrigation of golf courses casablanca secondary treatment irrigation of crops drargaprject tertiary treatment irrigation namibia city of windhoek tertiary treatment potable reuse oman city of muscat tertiary treatment irrigation city of dhofar tertiary treatment irrigation city of al-batinat tertiary treatment irrigation city of salalah tertiary treatment groundwater recharge pakistan city of faisalabad secondary treatment irrigation peru riyadh north tertiary treatment irrigation and industrial uses consilience adewumi: wastewater reuse lima secondary treatment irrigation tacna secondary treatment irrigation saudi arabia riyadh tertiary treatment irrigation and industrial uses jeddah tertiary treatment irrigation and industrial uses singapore city of singapore, newater tertiary treatment industrial and potable water augmentation spain girona, municipality of portbou tertiary treatment landscape irrigation, street cleaning, and fire protection costa brava (title 22 reclamation treatment trains) tertiary treatment landscape irrigation, street cleaning, and industrial use aiguamolls de l’emporda natural preserve tertiary treatment environmental enhancement city of victoria tertiary treatment irrigation tunisia great tunis area secondary treatment irrigation united arab emirate abu dhabi tertiary treatment irrigation al-ain tertiary treatment restricted irrigation united kingdom water resource plan for east anglia tertiary treatment indirect potable reuse waterwise tertiary treatment domestic non-potable uses and river flow augmentation beazer homes district tertiary treatment car washes, cooling, fish farming, and industrial uses watercycle , millennium dome tertiary treatment toilet and urinal flushing and landscape irrigation united state of america fulton county, georgia tertiary treatment golf course and landscape irrigation orange county water district (factory 21), california tertiary treatment ground water recharge irvin ranch water district, california tertiary treatment irrigation and toilet flushing city of st. petersburg, florida tertiary treatment irrigation and industrial uses yemen sana’s, ta’aiz, alhudeidah, and aden. tertiary treatment irrigation several international wastewater reuse experiences have been proven to help communities meet water demands and alleviate supply challenges without significant health risks if there is significant buy-in by the public and if properly implemented. consilience 8 3. wastewater management in nigeria there is a significant lack of proper wastewater treatment in most african countries. untreated wastewater effluent is one of the most common types of pollution found around urban rivers and in groundwater sources in many african cities (omosa et al., 2012). nigerian cities are expected to participate in the global trend of sustainable environmental improvements or innovations that focus on projects such as water supply and sanitation, solid waste management, air pollution, environmental health, and access to means of livelihood; hence, there is a need for a better understanding of the existing situation of facilities and infrastructures in these cities. in aba, one of the nigeria’s commercial cities, odurukwe (2012), reported that there is no central wastewater system, and there are no septic tanks for domestic wastewater. the sewers for industrial wastewater coming from big industries and the open drains used for the wastewater of mediumand small-scale industries are channeled in such a way that their contents are emptied into aba river. the pollution of aba river is very likely to increase in the next decade. there is inadequate or hardly any treatment of the wastewater produced by the industries, and no efforts are being made to change this situation. in minna, the capital of niger state, idris-nda et al. (2013) reported that domestic wastewater management consists of the use of septic tanks, unplanned and partially planned open drainage systems. in their report, about 35% of domestic wastewater generated goes into the septic tank while the remaining 65% flows freely on ground surface and sometimes forming stagnant pools. the residents in some areas resort to the use of unlined channels to convey wastewater away from their residential areas. a result of this method of disposal is a pool of stagnated water at the terminal end and the production of obnoxious odors. according to mustapha (2013), in kano, nigeria’s third largest city, most of the industries do not have wastewater treatment facilities and thus discharge their untreated effluents into the adjoining receiving water bodies; the receiving water courses are now grossly polluted, and the polluted water courses are being extensively used for water supply, irrigation, fishing, and recreation while the only treatment plant in kano central is nonfunctional. adesogan (2013) discovered in his study that only kaduna has a functional industrial wastewater treatment facility (nigerian brewery, kaduna) in the northern part of nigeria. similarly, the only functional system in the middle belt is in abuja, while benue, consilience adewumi: wastewater reuse niger, kogi, kwara, and plateau states have non-functional wastewater treatment facilities. despite the preponderance of wastewater treatment plants in the south, many of the southern states lack functional wastewater treatment systems while some states (bayelsa, ondo, anambra, ebonyi, abia, imo, cross river, and akwaibom) do not have wastewater treatment facilities. it is disheartening to note that nigerians still dispose wastewater from domestic areas (washrooms, laundries, and kitchen) directly into surface waters without any treatment. wastewater from commercial and industrial applications has also experienced the same fate without any plan by most environmental stakeholders to ensure safe disposal. the indiscriminate release of wastewater into the environment in many nigerian cities has adversely affected sanitation and claimed the lives of many people through diseases such as cholera, hepatitis b, and typhoid (giwa, 2014). the endocrine-disrupting substances in untreated wastewater can alter the hormone system of human beings, resulting in reproduction predicaments, cancerous growths, and deformations of body organs. in many densely populated areas in lagos state such as badagry, mushin, oshodi, and ikorodu, most septic tanks are in dilapidated conditions, leading to severe cases of groundwater contamination. lagos state alone generates a massive 1.4 trillion cubic centimeters of wastewater every day, according to government statistics (giwa, 2014). change of attitude toward wastewater management is the key to sustainable management of water resources. government at all levels needs to embrace implementation of wastewater treatment and reuse programs and policies. without this, the preservation of our water resources and the environment for the future (i.e. sustainability) remains an illusion. 4. wastewater reuse application treated wastewater has been used to supplement or replace natural water resources in several ways. the intended reuse application is the major factor influencing the level of treatment needed to protect public health and the environment and the degree of reliability required for the treatment processing and operation (metcalf and eddy, 2004). different end-user classifications have been proposed in the past, and a brief overview of these classifications based on the nature of use, reuse application, and main constraints is presented in table 2. in broad terms, the major non-potable reuse activities are irrigation (restricted and unrestricted), industrial use, toilet flushing, general cleaning, surface water replenishment, and groundwater recharge. of the consilience 10 different activities, agricultural irrigation has been identified as the major user in many areas where wastewater is reused. this is mainly because large volumes of water are used in irrigation with relatively lower quality required in comparison to other uses (yang and abbaspour, 2007). table 2: categories of wastewater reuse and main constraints (asano, 1998; metcalf and eddy, 2004) wastewater reuse categories potential constraints 1. agricultural irrigation ● crop irrigation ● commercial nurseries 2. landscape irrigation ● parks ● school yards ● freeway medians ● golf courses ● cemeteries ● greenbelts ● residential ● surface and groundwater pollution, if not properly managed ● marketability of crops and public acceptance ● effect of nutrients, particularly salts, on soil and crops ● public health concerns related to pathogens (bacteria, viruses, and parasites) 3. industrial recycling and reuse ● cooling ● boiler feed ● process water ● heavy construction ● constituents in reclaimed wastewater may cause scaling, corrosion, biological growth, and fouling ● public health concerns, particularly aerosol transmission of pathogens in cooling water 4. ground water recharge ● ground water replenishment ● salt water intrusion control ● organic chemicals in reclaimed wastewater and their toxicological effects ● total dissolved solids, nitrates, and pathogens in reclaimed wastewater 5. recreational/environmental uses ● lakes and ponds ● marsh enhancement ● stream flow augmentation ● fisheries ● snowmaking ● health concerns due to bacteria and viruses in the effluent ● eutrophication in receiving water due to nitrogen and phosphorus ● toxicity to aquatic life 6. non potable urban uses ● fire protection ● air conditioning ● toilet flushing ● public health concerns concerning pathogens transmitted by aerosols ● effect on scaling, corrosion, biological growth, and fouling ● potential drinking water and non-potable water cross connection 7. potable reuse ● blending in water ● constituents in reclaimed wastewater, especially trace organic chemicals (mutagenic consilience adewumi: wastewater reuse supply reservoir ● pipe to pipe water supply and carcinogenic) and their toxicological effects ● aesthetics and public acceptance ● health concerns about pathogen transmission, particularly viruses 4.1. wastewater reuse in agriculture and landscape irrigation agricultural irrigation accounts for a third of total withdraws in the united states, 65% worldwide, and about 75% in developing countries (chaturvedi, 2000). the 16% of the cultivated land that is irrigated worldwide contributes 36% of total food production. the landed areas being irrigated throughout the world in 1940, 1970, and 1995, comprised about 76, 242, and 256 million hectares, respectively. 54% of the irrigated land is in four countries: china (20%), india (19%), the united states (8%), and pakistan (7%) (wurbs and james, 2002). irrigation increases crop yield and the amount of land that can be productively farmed, stabilizes productivity, facilitates greater diversity of crops, increases farm income and employment, helps alleviate poverty, and contributes to national development and economic growth. many internationally existing wastewater reuse systems supply treated wastewater for agricultural irrigation as indicated in table 1. agricultural reuse is often included as a component in wastewater reuse programs because of the large volumes of water that are required in agricultural irrigation and the beneficial use of the nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorus) present in wastewater, as well as in order to conserve freshwater resources and abate the pollution of freshwater sources resulting in eutrophication. wastewater reuse for irrigation is broadly classified into two categories: restricted irrigation and unrestricted irrigation. 4.1.1. restricted irrigation restricted irrigation is carried out in an area where public access is restricted at any time during or after application of reclaimed water. water used for restricted irrigation is usually of lesser quality than that of unrestricted irrigation and, as such, secondary treatment with disinfection is satisfactory (table 3). human and animal restriction is enforced so as not to compromise public health. typical plants irrigated with this quality of water are seed crops, trees, non-recreational parks, food crops not eaten raw, orchards and vineyards, pasture, parks, sports fields, and school grounds. for restricted irrigation, who recommends that the treated wastewater should contain no more than one human consilience 12 intestinal nematode egg per liter. the use of sprinkler irrigation is allowed in restricted irrigation of forage crops, drip or trickle systems for vineyard, or orchard crops, while vegetables must be irrigated using subsurface systems. table 3: suggested guidelines for wastewater reuse (usepa, 2004) types of reuse treatment reclaimed water quality reclaimed water monitoring setback distance urban reuse secondary filtration disinfection ph = 6-9 < 10mg/l bod < 2 ntu no detectable faecal coli/100ml 1 mg/l cl2 residual (minimum) ph weekly bod weekly turbidity continuous coliform – daily chlorine residue continuous 15 m to potable water supply wells restricted irrigation secondary disinfection ph = 6-9 < 30mg/l bod < 30mg/l tss < 200 faecal coli/100ml 1 mg/l cl2 residual (minimum) ph weekly bod weekly tss daily coliform – daily chlorine residue continuous 90 m to potable water supply wells unrestricted irrigation secondary advance disinfection ph = 6-9 < 10mg/l bod < 2 ntu no detectable faecal coli/100ml 1 mg/l cl2 residual (minimum) ph weekly bod weekly turbidity continuous coliform – daily chlorine residue continuous 15 m to potable water supply wells industrial application secondary advance disinfection ph = 6-9 < 30mg/l bod < 30mg/l tss < 200 faecal coli/100ml 1 mg/l cl2 residual (minimum) ph weekly bod weekly tss daily coliform – daily chlorine residue continuous 90 m to potable water supply wells groundwater recharge site specific and use dependent site specific and use dependent depend on treatment and use site specific 4.2. unrestricted irrigation unrestricted irrigation is carried out in an area where public access is not restricted at any time during or after application of reclaimed water. this is due to the high quality of the reclaimed water used for irrigation. typical plants irrigated with this quality consilience adewumi: wastewater reuse of water include pastures for milking animals, fodder, sports fields, school grounds, food crops eaten raw, lawns, nurseries, and play parks. to irrigate unrestricted access areas, sprinkler and/or drip irrigation can be used while for turf and landscape applications, pop-up sprinklers and spray heads or drip or trickle can be used. 4.2.1. wastewater reuse for industrial purposes industries have been using treated wastewater for cooling, boiler-feed, and process purposes since the early 1990s. the us states of california, arizona, texas, florida, and nevada have major industrial facilities using reclaimed water for cooling water and process/boiler-feed requirements (usepa, 2004). utility power plants are ideal facilities for reuse due to their large water requirements for cooling while petroleum refineries, chemical plants, and metal working facilities could use treated wastewater for their process needs. treated wastewater reuse potential is presented in table 4. table 4: potential for wastewater reuse for non-potable purposes in various sectors (visvanathan and asano, 2004) high potential medium potential low potential ● pulp and paper ● cotton textile ● glass and steel ● utility power plants ● slaughterhouse ● dairy ● canning and food processing ● distillery ● wool textile ● photographic processing ● chemical ● fertilizer ● oil refining ● petroleum ● electroplating ● meat processing ● tanneries and leather finishing ● pesticide ● rubber ● aluminium ● explosives manufacturing ● paint manufacturing 4.3. wastewater reuse for urban activities treated wastewater can be used in urban areas for the irrigation of public parks and recreation centers, athletics fields, school yards and playing fields, golf courses, highway medians and shoulders, and landscaped areas surrounding public buildings and facilities; irrigation of landscaped areas surrounding single-family or multifamily residences, commercial areas, office buildings and consilience 14 industrial developments; commercial uses such as vehicle washing facilities, laundry facilities, window washing, and mixing water for pesticides; ornamental landscape uses and decorative water features, such as fountains, reflecting pools, and waterfalls; dust control, block making and laying, and concrete production for construction works; and fire protection through reclaimed water fire hydrants and toilet and urinal flushing (usepa, 2004). using dual reticulation systems (i.e. two systems of pipes conveying potable water and treated wastewater for different uses), treated wastewater is delivered to consumers through a parallel network of distribution pipes separate from the community’s potable water distribution system as shown in figure 1. this reclaimed water distribution system becomes a third water utility, in addition to wastewater and potable water. reclaimed water systems are operated, maintained, and managed in a manner similar to the potable water system. dual water systems have been used extensively in countries like australia (rouse hill, sydney olympic park, aurora estate, bluestone green estate, manor lakes estate, melbourne, pimpama coomera, gold coast, mawson lakes, new haven, and adelaide) (radcliffe, 2004) and the us (st. petersburg, florida; city of pomona, california; city of altamonte springs, florida; the irvine ranch water district, california; city of avalon and california) (usepa, 2004). figure 1: dual water reticulation system (western australia water corporation, 2013) consilience adewumi: wastewater reuse 4.4. wastewater reuse for artificial groundwater recharge artificial recharge is a process where water is introduced into the sub-surface by anthropogenic means. this procedure can be utilized for the disposal of wastewater or storage and recycling. artificial groundwater recharge (agr) has for a long time provided means to mitigate depletion of groundwater levels, to protect coastal aquifers from saltwater intrusion, to reduce subsidence, to reduce abstractions from rivers, and to store surface water for future use. artificial groundwater storage has some advantages over surface water reservoirs that might be costlier, high in evaporation loss, and have a high environmental impact. also, soil percolation and aquifer storage act as treatment steps with various filtration, adsorption, and degradation processes occurring in the different subsurface horizons, while evaporation as well as taste and odor problems due to algae growth in surface storage are avoided. the utilization of reclaimed water for agr is of growing importance and offers additional advantages. wastewater is an alternative water source available throughout the year, depending on population, industry, and climatic changes; hence, recharge is not limited to periods of surplus surface water. this concept has been in practice in many countries including australia (charlesworth et al., 2002), israel (kanarek and michail, 1996), palestine (el sheik and hamdan, 2002), and south africa (murray et al., 2007). the concept of agr offers potential for various uses such as irrigation, industrial process water, and augmentation of urban water supplies. the latter is regarded as indirect potable use. while there are obvious advantages associated with agr, some drawbacks include: the extensive land areas that may be needed for spreading basins; prohibitive costs of treatment, water quality monitoring, and operation of injection/infiltration facilities; recharge may increase the danger of aquifer contamination due to inadequate or inconsistent natural treatment; not all recharged water may be recoverable due to movement beyond the extraction well capture zone or mixing with poor-quality groundwater; clogging occurs at the point of recharge which decreases the rate of recharge; uncertainty in aquifer hydraulics; controlled recovery by different users. the concept of whoever stores the water has the right to recover it is generally acceptable throughout the world. it would be highly problematic if there was uncontrolled usage of the stored water; hydrogeology uncertainties, such as transmissibility, faulting, and aquifer geometry, may reduce the effectiveness of the consilience 16 recharge project in meeting water supply demand; inadequate institutional arrangements or groundwater laws may not protect water rights and may present liabilities and other legal problems; and environmental concerns relating to fluctuating groundwater may arise. artificial recharge could result in groundwater levels being raised above and below the norm, and this can have negative environmental consequences such as affecting groundwaterdependent ecosystems, increased aquifer vulnerability to contamination, and sinkhole formation in dolomitic aquifers (usepa, 2004; murray, et al., 2007). these problems can be minimized or eliminated through detailed feasibility studies of the hydraulic and geotechnical properties of the proposed site. the design and construction must be done using sound engineering judgment while adequate financial provision is made for operation and maintenance. the degree to which these factors might affect the implementation of a groundwater recharge system depends on the management and severity of the site-specific barriers against wastewater reclamation and reuse. there are two main techniques for artificially recharging wastewater – surface distribution (spreading) or injection. surface spreading techniques require a detention area (basin, pit, pond, canal, or weir) situated over a permeable unsaturated zone. the detention area is filled with the recharge liquid, which infiltrates through the unsaturated zone to the saturated zone. injection techniques comprise a well or bore that can introduce recharge liquid into an aquifer or a permeable region of the vadose zone. if conducted by infiltration and percolation through soil and subsoil, the recharge processes, e.g. through the so-called soil aquifer treatment (sat), offer an additional barrier, particularly for microbial contaminants which are of most concern in any water reuse application. the mixture of reclaimed wastewater with natural groundwater prior to any intended use also positively influences the public acceptance of a reuse scheme. 5. planning of wastewater reuse projects planning of wastewater reuse projects involves a multidisciplinary approach that incorporates the triple bottom line aspects of sustainability. a thorough feasibility study required a multidisciplinary approach by considering several diverse aspects of the proposed project such as technical (e.g. operational efficiency), economic (e.g. life cycle costs), environmental (including public health and safety), and social (public acceptability and legislation) issues. these factors contribute to the final decision that could lead to the success or failure of a dual consilience adewumi: wastewater reuse public involvement in implementation water reticulation project, and their due consideration should reliably lead to correct decisions. a detailed decision support tool to evaluate the technical, economic, environmental, and social issues has been developed in adewumi et al., (2010 b) and its application is present in adewumi et al. (2013). the three major steps that guide the planning of wastewater reuse project as shown in figure 2 are preliminary investigation, screening of potential markets, and detailed assessment of selected markets for reuse (usepa, 2004). each step builds on previous steps until the assessment is complete. usepa (2004) therefore recommends the following flow process in assessing wastewater reuse projects: figure 2: process of wastewater reuse projects assessment (usepa, 2004) 5.1. preliminary investigation preliminary investigations prepare the foundation upon which other investigations are made. it incorporates a wide scope by exploring all possible options in the early planning stage. this is to establish a practical context for thorough assessment of all viable alternatives before settling on the line of action to be taken. at this stage, questions to be asked include (usepa, 2004): i. what is the detailed background information of the area under consideration? i. how sustainable is the present situation of freshwater supply in the area? ii. what are the present and projected tariffs of freshwater in the area? iii. who are the potential consumers (local markets) for the treated wastewater? iv. what sources of funding are available to support the reuse project? v. how would wastewater reuse form an integral part of water resources management in the area? vi. what are the potential environmental impacts of wastewater reuse in the area? vii. what public health considerations are associated with reuse, and how can these considerations be addressed? preliminary investigations screening of potential markets detailed assessment of selected markets consilience 18 viii. what type of reuse activities are likely to attract the public’s interest and support? ix. what are the existing or proposed laws and regulations that would affect reuse in the area? x. what local, provincial, or national agencies must review and approve implementation of reuse program? xi. what are the legal liabilities of a reclaimed water user? 5.1.1. background information of the area study area data collection and analysis is fundamental in the feasibility study of any water reuse project. the necessary data to be collected are basic data and characteristics of the area such as landforms, soils, vegetation, topography, etc., as well as climate data, and data pertaining to the water balance of the area, the current water supply situation, and water cost and quality requirement (aquarec, 2006). in order to obtain this information, it is important to contact main stakeholders such as federal government agencies, state government agencies, and local government authorities, industries, water and wastewater agencies, farmers’ associations, water users associations, etc. it may also be necessary to obtain maps showing locations of water and wastewater facilities, as well as the different water sources, the different land use zones, locations of the possible users of reclaimed water and population distribution, different geological zones, and so on. this may easily be obtained using aerial photographs and geographic information systems (gis). 5.2. screening of potential markets an important task at the wastewater reuse project planning stage is to conduct a preliminary market assessment to identify potential treated wastewater users. this involves identifying the location of large and medium water users in order to initiate discussion. on the basis of information gathered in the preliminary investigations, there might be possibilities of implementing a wastewater reuse project for one or more applications in an area. for example, if a large agricultural farm or industry site is located next to a wastewater treatment plant, there is a strong potential for reuse. users such as these have a high demand for water, and the costs to convey treated wastewater would be low. the cost-effectiveness of providing reclaimed water to a given consumer is highly dependent on the consumer’s potential demand (volume required), quality requirements, and the location of the consumer in relation to the source of treated wastewater. it should also be noted that a concentration of smaller consilience adewumi: wastewater reuse consumers (e.g. domestic users) might represent a service area that would be as cost-effective to serve as a single large user. once these anchor customers are identified, it is often beneficial to search for smaller customers located along the proposed route of the main distribution pipeline. it is necessary at this stage to determine what portion of total water use might be satisfied by reclaimed water, what quality of water is required for each type of use, and how the use of reclaimed water might affect the user’s operations or discharge requirements. this information can be obtained through a questionnaire. 5.3. detailed assessment of selected markets for reuse following the screening of the potential markets, detailed assessment of the selected market must be done. this is a factfinding stage where technical, economic, social, environmental, and legal/institutional issues are sorted out. a detailed assessment should lead to a thorough assessment of the technical, economic, and financial feasibility of a reuse project. comparison among alternative reuse programs should be made as well as comparison between the potential reuse projects and alternative water supplies, both existing and proposed. in this phase, economic comparisons, technical feasibility, and environmental assessment activities leading to a detailed plan for reuse might be accomplished. 6. technical and environmental assessment of a wastewater reuse project one of the key considerations in any reuse project is the technical viability of the project. this factor is a fulcrum in the decision-making regarding the implementation of any wastewater reuse project. the possible constraints include understanding the treatment requirements for producing safe and reliable treated wastewater that is suitable for its intended applications; resource requirements (land, civil works, installation of pipelines, storage tanks, energy, human resources, etc.) and identification of the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to operate and maintain the proposed system (usepa, 2004; aquarec, 2006). 6.1. treatment requirements to meet reuse quality one of the major critical issues for consideration in a water reuse project is to ensure that public health is not compromised through the use of treated wastewater. this is achieved by safe consilience 20 delivery and proper use of the treated wastewater. protection of public health is achieved by reducing or eliminating concentrations of pathogenic bacteria, parasites, and enteric viruses in the reclaimed water, controlling chemical constituents in reclaimed water, and/or limiting public exposure (contact, inhalation, ingestion) to reclaimed water (usepa, 2004). potential health risks will vary depending on the reclaimed water applications and the level of human exposure. where human exposure is likely in a reuse application, reclaimed water should be treated to a high degree prior to its use. conversely, where public access to a reuse site can be restricted so that exposure is unlikely, a lower level of treatment may be satisfactory, provided that worker safety is not compromised. determining the necessary treatment for the intended reuse application requires an understanding of: the constituents of concern in wastewater; level of treatment and processes applicable for reducing the constituents to levels that achieve the desired reclaimed water quality; reliability of and risks attached to the different levels of treatment; and the reticulation infrastructure which will be used to convey, treat, and/or store wastewater. 6.1.1. constituents of reclaimed water reclaimed wastewaters contain two general types of hazards for humans. the first is microbial contaminants, largely present in fecal waste and which have potential to cause outbreaks of viral, bacterial, and parasitic diseases. untreated municipal wastewater contains varying levels of pathogens including bacteria, viruses, protozoa, and helminths. the second risk comes from various chemicals, including pharmaceutical products that end up in wastewater. this may cause a range of ill effects should people be exposed to them for prolonged periods of time. environmental contaminants, industrial chemicals, domestic chemicals, and pharmaceuticals can also affect treated effluent composition. both sets of hazards require sound risk management systems for effective control (radcliffe, 2004). the important constituents of concern in municipal wastewater, subject to treatment, are classified as conventional, non-conventional, and emerging. typical constituents included under each category are described in table 5. the term “conventional” is used to define constituents that serve as the basis for the design of most conventional treatment plants. “non-conventional” is used to describe constituents that may be removed or reduced using advanced wastewater treatment processes before the water can be used beneficially. the term “emerging” describes classes of compounds that may not be removed effectively with advanced treatment. although there is consilience adewumi: wastewater reuse little or no information concerning health or environmental effects, some of the compounds that have been identified in reclaimed water are known to have both acute and chronic health effects, depending on their concentrations and exposure pathways (metcalf and eddy, 2004). table 5: classification of typical constituents found in wastewater (metcalf and eddy, 2004) classification constituents conventional total suspended solids colloidal solids biochemical oxygen demand total organic carbon ammonia nitrate nitrite total nitrogen phosphorus bacteria protozoa viruses non-conventional refractory organics volatile organic compound surfactants metals total dissolved solids emerging prescription and non-prescription drugs home care products veterinary and human antibiotics industrial and household products sex and steroidal hormones other endocrine disrupters 6.1.2. levels of treatment required for different applications depending on the composition of the wastewater to be treated and on the required reclaimed water quality, the treatments and systems will differ. in table 6, different treatment trains are proposed depending on the reclaimed water application (lazarova, 2001). usually, intensive treatments are more expensive, require advanced technologies, and require less space compared to extensive ones. levels of wastewater treatment are generally classified as preliminary, primary, secondary, and advanced. advanced wastewater treatment, sometimes referred to as tertiary treatment, is generally defined as any treatment beyond secondary. a consilience 22 generalized wastewater treatment option for various reuses is shown in figure 3. jhansi and mishra (2013) discusses sustainable wastewater treatment systems in the context of urban areas of the developing world. table 6: recommended treatment schemes as a function of wastewater reuse applications (lazarova, 2001) reuse application type extensive treatment (e) intensive treatment (i) 1. irrigation of restricted crops e.1. stabilization pond in series or aerated lagoons; wetland; infiltration percolation i.1. secondary treatment by activated sludge or trickling filter with or without disinfection 2. irrigation of unrestricted crops, vegetables eaten raw e.1. same as e.1. with polishing steps and storage reservoir i.2. same as i.1. with tertiary filtration and disinfection 3. urban uses for irrigation of parks, sport fields, golf courses e.3. same as e.2. i.3. same as i.2. with filtration in the case of unrestricted public access 4. groundwater recharge for agricultural irrigation e.4. same as e.2. completed by soil-aquifer treatment i.4. same as i.2. with nutrient removal (when necessary) 5. dual distribution for toilet flushing e.5. not applicable i.5. same as i.3. with activated carbon (when necessary) or membrane bioreactors and disinfection 6. indirect and direct potable use e.5. not applicable i.6. secondary, tertiary, and quaternary treatment including activated carbon, membrane filtration (including reverse osmosis), and advanced disinfection 6.1.2 treatment reliability because of the potential harm that could result from the delivery of improperly treated reclaimed water to the user, a high standard of reliability is required at wastewater treatment plants. water reuse requires strict compliance with all applicable reclaimed water quality parameters. the need for reclamation facilities to reliably and consistently produce and distribute reclaimed water of adequate quality and quantity is essential and dictates that careful attention be given to reliability features during the design, construction, and operation of the facilities. in reclaimed water reliability assessments, close monitoring of all elements that make up a water reclamation system is imperative. these elements include power supply, individual consilience adewumi: wastewater reuse treatment units, mechanical equipment, the maintenance program, and the operating personnel. critical units in the water reclamation system include the disinfection unit, power supply, and various treatment unit processes. according to usepa, (2004), reliability of water reuse should also consider the followings: i. operator certification to ensure that qualified personnel operate the water reclamation and reclaimed water distribution systems ii. instrumentation and control systems for on-line monitoring of treatment process performance and alarms for process malfunctions iii. a comprehensive quality assurance program to ensure accurate sampling and laboratory analysis protocol iv. adequate emergency storage to retain reclaimed water of unacceptable quality for retreatment or disposal v. supplemental storage to ensure that the supply meets user demand vi. a strict industrial pretreatment program and strong enforcement of sewer use ordinances to prevent illicit sewage of hazardous materials that may interfere with the intended use of the reclaimed water; and vii. a comprehensive operating protocol that defines the responsibilities and duties of the operations staff to ensure the reliable production and delivery of reclaimed water. consilience 24 figure 3: wastewater treatment options for various reuse applications (usepa, 2004; adewumi et al., 2012) consilience adewumi: wastewater reuse 7. risk analysis risks are closely related to the treated wastewater quality and the reuse application of the water. risk analysis is used to analyze health implications of an action on humans and the environment. typically, risk analysis is divided into two parts, risk assessment and risk management (metcalf and eddy, 2004). risk assessment involves the study and analysis of the potential of certain hazards to human health and environment, while risk management is the process of reducing risks that are deemed unacceptable (figure 4). both human and environmental risk assessments take place in four major steps in sequential order as follows: hazard identification, dose (concentration) – exposure (effect) assessment, risk characterization, and risk management (metcalf and eddy, 2004; aquarec, 2006). hazard identification involves weighing the available evidence and determining whether a substance constitutes/exhibits a particularly adverse health hazard. this is usually carried out by gathering evidence on the potential for the substance to cause adverse health effects in humans or unacceptable environmental impacts. exposure is the process by which an organism comes in contact with the substance. dose response assessment defines a relationship between the amount of toxic constituents to which a human is exposed and the risk that there will be an unhealthy response to that dose. exposure is the link between hazard and risk. risk characterization is the last step in risk assessment, in which the questions of who is affected and what are the likely effects are defined for further investigation. risk management involves the development of standards, guidelines, and management strategies for specific constituents of hazardous influence on human health and environment (metcalf and eddy, 2004; adewumi et al., 2012). figure 4: risk assessment process and risk management (metcalf and eddy, 2004) hazard identification risk identification risk management dose response exposure assessment consilience 26 8. treated wastewater reticulation the major concern guiding design, construction, and operation of a reclaimed water distribution system is the prevention of cross-connections. a cross-connection is the point in a distribution system where a potable water system is connected to a non-potable system or a system of questionable water quality. another major concern is the wrong use of reclaimed water. to protect public health from the onset, a reclaimed water distribution system should be accompanied by health codes, pipe color codes, procedures for approval (and disconnection) of service, regulations governing design and construction specifications, inspections, and operation and maintenance staffing. according to usepa (2004), the public health protection measures that should be addressed in the planning phase are: i. to establish that public health is the main concern, as well as to devise procedures and regulations to prevent cross-connections, ii. to develop a uniform system to mark all non-potable components of the system, iii. to prevent improper or unintended use of non-potable water through a proactive public information program, iv. to provide for routine monitoring and surveillance of the nonpotable system, v. to establish and train special staff members to be responsible for operations, maintenance, inspection, and approval of reuse connections, and vi. to develop construction and design standards and provide for the physical separation of the potable water, reclaimed water, sewer lines, and appurtenances. 9. recommendations for establishing a wastewater reuse programme in nigeria in planning a wastewater reuse program in nigeria, the first step is the implementation of a sound research program directed and funded by the federal ministry of water resources. universities, polytechnics, and research institutions, including private organizations, can take part in such nation-wide projects through which the base data survey of wastewater generation, collection, treatment, and storage can be undertaken in the urban areas of the country. there is a need for total water supply inventory from which the volume of wastewater produced per capita per day can be consilience adewumi: wastewater reuse established. research programs will also establish accurate knowledge of the various wastewater pollutants in our environment. the data obtained will be most useful in the formulation of the appropriate policies in the disposal of wastewater and the planning for reuse after different levels of treatment. as wastewater treatment is relatively expensive (far more than water supply treatment) pilot programs and projects must first be established after detailed feasibility studies are conducted in selected locations to determine the efficacy of nation-wide programs for wastewater reuse. starting point could be in the northern parts of nigeria where there exist vast arable lands for irrigation due to low annual rainfall (< 700mm) and high atmospheric temperatures (>35oc). this will enable farmers to increase their output and cultivate year-round rather than seasonally during raining season (maximum of 7 months per of the year). this will boost the national agricultural output and enhance food security. it will also create employment for the teeming population while at the same time increasing the national gdp and improving the economy. it is also necessary that the government formulate policies targeted at stiffening water permits for industrial and agricultural use to encourage wastewater reuse. water tariff for the industrial, agricultural, and commercial sectors can also be increased to encourage reuse. for any new program or policy, there is a need for enlightenment of the populace. wastewater reuse programs are even more acute as they will involve some potential conflicts with cultural practices, even though most people do not know that the water they use is seriously contaminated by wastewater in various forms. any reuse program must involve the related ministries, departments, and agencies dealing with the environment such as the federal environmental protection agency (fepa), the federal ministry of environment, housing and urban development, state water corporations, and sewage disposal agencies to increase levels of success. consilience 28 9. conclusion as wastewater reuse is gaining global attention, the success of any reuse project largely depends on the criterion that cuts across technical, economic, and environmental factors that supports sustainability. positive community perceptions toward recycled water use have been identified as a key component of wastewater reuse project success. it is widely recognized that the following factors highly influence public acceptance of treated wastewater reuse: perceived health risk, political issues, and the degree of human contact with treated wastewater (adewumi et al., 2014). for the purpose of developing strategy and policy, perception studies are required in each national and even subnational context because of large variations in culture, climate, water availability, economy, etc. (friedler et al., 2006). such variability makes the transferability of specific findings and conclusions from one country to another somewhat difficult. also, many wastewater treatment schemes are not successful in developing countries because they are simply copied from western treatment systems without considering the appropriateness of the technology for the culture, land, and climate. often local engineers educated in the western development programs have supported the choice for inappropriate systems. many of the implemented installations were abandoned due to the high cost of running the system and repairs. as a starting point on the planning and implementation of treated wastewater reuse in nigeria, this paper presents a comprehensive guide for the formulation of a necessary policy and program that could guide the federal ministry of water resources for the successful integration of wastewater reuse program as part of the national integrated water resources management mechanism. consilience adewumi: wastewater reuse references adesogan, s.(2013).sewage technology in nigeria: a pragmatic approach, science 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(2007). analysis of wastewater reuse potential in beijing. desalination, (212) 238-250 editor’s note editor’s note https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i11.4653 how to cite rehaut, l. (2014). editor’s note. consilience, (11). https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i11.4653 abstract dear readers, it is my sincere pleasure to announce the official publication of issue xi of consilience: the journal of sustainable development. our team has spent the past few months working to gather the diverse and substantial selection of articles you see here today. consilience celebrated the publication of its tenth issue in may of 2013, and issue xi represents another strong step forward for the journal, as well as another great contribution to the expanding body of sustainable development research. as per the mission of consilience, the articles in xi cover a wide array of topics, geographies, and academic disciplines. fanyuan lin compares watershed service payment schemes in new york city and beijing, while innocent chirisa discusses the challenge of balancing local needs, costs, and sustainability for urban planning in zimbabwe. rachel tiller considers the effects of expanded salmon aquaculture in norway, and giulia baldinelli’s photo essay shows the ways bolivians are using conservation as a means of adapting to climate change. the articles of issue xi concern serious problems. caroline harfouche and diane jung document their research on the negative effects of anthropogenic activity on freshwater lagoons in the dominican republic. rochanya generous explains the relationship between bacterial quorum sensing and coral reef health, as well as how it is threatened. scott pearse-smith argues against the use of large dams as a development tool, focusing on the mekong river basin as an enlightening case study. in his opinion piece, ranu dhillon looks at america’s obesity epidemic through the lens of sustainable development and comes to some interesting conclusions. but there are also solutions. drs. mishra and dash discuss the merits of biofertilizers as a tool for sustainable agricultural development. hege westskog and tanja winther explore the ways public attitudes about energy use can be integrated into better energy policies. finally, subas https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i11.4653 dhakal takes us via his photo essay to perth, australia, and shows us how activist groups are successfully communicating and implementing sustainability goals in their local domains. our mission remains to promote dialogue and understanding of issues in sustainable development that affect not only individual communities, but the greater collective well-being of our planet. our authors have worked diligently to provide innovative perspectives to perpetual challenges in sustainable development. we invite you to think critically about their arguments, further our understanding of their claims, and challenge their assumptions. through interaction between practitioners, scholars, and researchers, we hope the ensuing dialogue will offer fruitful solutions to the most pressing challenges facing our planet. i invite you to read issue xi as well as our past publications and briefings articles. as always, please contact us with any questions, critiques, feedback or submissions at contact@consiliencejournal.org. regards, lucas rehaut editor-in-chief consilience: the journal of sustainable development this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution 4.0 international license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ editor’s note how to cite​​​​​​ abstract microsoft word mishra-copyedited.doc consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 11, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 41–61   rejuvenation of biofertilizer for sustainable agriculture and economic development dr. pallabi mishra abit-jrd tata institute of management, odisha, india email: pallabi.iitkgp@gmail.com dr. debiprasad dash orissa university of agriculture & technology, odisha, india email: dpd.bhu@gmail.com abstract the economy of india thrives on agriculture, the most practiced occupation in the country. agricultural fertilizers are essential to enhance proper growth and crop yield. recently, farmers have been using chemical fertilizers for quicker and better yield. but these fertilizers endanger ecosystems, soil, plants, and human and animal lives. in contrast, naturally grown biofertilizers not only give a better yield, but are also harmless to humans. this paper aims to study the rejuvenation of biofertilizers for sustainable agriculture economic development (saed) in comparison to chemical fertilizers. field experiments were conducted with azolla, a biofertilizer, in the district of balasore in odisha. the results show that the yield, the number of tillers, plant height, profit to farmers, and the benefit to cost ratio of azolla were higher than chemical fertilizer, proving that rejuvenating biofertilizers would lead to better sustainable economic development for the farmers and their country. keywords: saed, biofertilizers, agriculture management 42 consilience 1. introduction agriculture is one of the most important factors contributing to the economic growth of india. out of the 329 million hectares of india’s geographical area, about 114 million hectares are under cultivation (raghuwanshi, 2012). in order to reap a better harvest, farmers inoculate the soil with fertilizers. fertilizers come in two types—they are either chemical or biofertilizers. increasingly high inputs of chemical fertilizers during last 150 years have not only left soils degraded, polluted and less productive but have also posed severe health and environmental hazards. organic farming methods (such as the use of biofertilizers) would solve these issues and make the ecosystem healthier. the current global market for organically raised agricultural products is valued at around us$ 30 billion with a growth rate of around 8 percent. nearly 22 million hectares of land are now cultivated organically. organic cultivation represents less than 1 percent of the world’s conventional agricultural production and about 9 percent of the total agricultural area. there are 17 essential elements required for proper plant growth. the dearth of any of these essential nutrients, listed in table 1, can result in severe damage to crop health. of the mineral elements, the primary macronutrients (nitrogen, phosphorous, and potassium) are needed in the greatest quantities and are most likely to be in short supply in agricultural soils. secondary macronutrients are needed in smaller quantities, and are typically found in sufficient quantities in agricultural soil, and therefore do not often limit crop growth. micronutrients, or trace nutrients, are needed in very small amounts and can be toxic to plants in excess. silicon (si) and sodium (na) are sometimes considered essential plant nutrients, but due to their ubiquitous presence in soils, they are never in short supply (parikh and james, 2012). consilience mishra et al.: rejuvenation of biofertilizer     essential plant element symbol primary form non-mineral elements carbon c co2 (g) hydrogen h h2o (l), h+ oxygen o h2o (l), o2(g) mineral elements primary macronutrients nitrogen n nh4 +, no3 phosphorus p hpo4 2-, h2po4 potassium k k+ secondary macronutrients calcium ca ca2+ magnesium mg mg2+ sulfur s so4 2 micronutrients iron fe fe3+, fe2+ manganese mn mn2+ zinc zn zn2+ copper cu cu2+ boron b b(oh)3 molybdenum mo moo4 2 chlorine cl cl nickel ni ni2+ table 1: essential plant nutrient elements and their primary form utilized by plants (parikh and james, 2012). agriculture alters the natural cycling of nutrients in soil. intensive cultivation and harvesting of crops for human or animal consumption can effectively deplete the soil of plant nutrients. in order to maintain soil fertility for sufficient crop yields, soil amendments are typically required. in the past, farmers nourished their fields with animal manure, charcoal, ash, and lime (caco3) to improve soil fertility. today, farmers add inorganic chemical fertilizers and organic nutrient sources to enhance soil fertility, often resulting in surplus quantities of primary macronutrients. chemically enhanced productivity has depleted the natural resource base for sustainable agricultural growth. earlier technology has disturbed the biological composition, which might have lasting adverse impact on equilibrium. unless the disturbed natural resource base equilibrium is restored, sustainable agricultural growth with a competitive edge will not be possible. to increase agricultural production, it is necessary for chemical fertilizers and organic manure to be used in moderation. present fertilizer consumption in the state of odisha is 53 kg/ha, compared to the national average of more than 100 kg/ha. while suitable measures will be taken to increase fertilizer consumption in the state, emphasis would be laid on ‘balanced fertilization’, meaning an accurate fertilizer application equal to the plant need and soil nutrient content. integrated nutrient management (inm) is very important for balanced nutrition in sustainable crop production. inm aims to integrate the use of all natural and man-made sources of plant nutrients required for 44 consilience high agricultural productivity as well as ensure the health of the soil. the state will endeavor to promote inm practices and biofertilizer use through suitable programs and incentives. the prolonged overuse of chemicals on soil results in soil health deterioration, human health hazards and pollution of the environment. therefore, it is necessary to switch to an alternate source of nutrient supply to the crops that is ecologically protective of farming. 1.1 objective of the study this study has been undertaken with the following objectives. • to compare biofertilizers with chemical fertilizers • to study the role of biofertilizers in rejuvenating sustainable agriculture economic development (saed) 2. literature review a biofertilizer is an organic product containing a specific microorganism in concentrated form, which is derived either from the plant roots or from the soil of root zone (chen, 2006; gupta and sen, 2013). these bioinputs, or bioinoculants, improve plant growth and yield. biofertilizers are the products containing living cells of different types of microorganisms that have the ability to mobilize nutritionally important elements from non-usable forms through biological stress. biofertilizers can be defined as substances that contain living microorganisms that colonize in the rhizosphere, or the interior of the plant. these promote growth by increasing the availability of primary nutrients and/or growth stimulus to the target crop when applied to seed, plant surfaces, or soil (muraleedharan et al, 2010). biofertilizers have shown great potential as supplementary, renewable and environmental friendly sources of plant nutrients and are an important component of integrated nutrient management (inm) and integrated plant nutrition system (ipns) (raghuwanshi, 2012). the production of biofertilizers in the country is 10,000 mt / annum and the production capacity is 18,000 mt / annum. average annual consumption of biofertilizers in the country is around 64g/ha. 2.1 biofertilizers vs. chemical fertilizers fertilizers act as catalysts in providing nutrients to plants for their optimum growth and yield. they can be roughly categorized into three types: chemical, organic and biofertilizer. each type has its advantages and disadvantages. these advantages need to be integrated in order to achieve optimum performance by each type of fertilizer and to realize balanced nutrient management for crop growth. consilience mishra et al.: rejuvenation of biofertilizer   2.1.1. the advantages of using chemical fertilizer 1. nutrients are soluble and immediately available to plants, creating a direct and fast effect. 2. the price is lower and more competitive than organic fertilizer, which makes it more popular with farmers. 3. they are quite high in nutrient content; only relatively small amounts are required for crop growth. 2.1.2 the disadvantages of using chemical fertilizer 1. overuse can result in negative effects such as leaching, pollution of water resources, destruction of microorganisms and beneficial insects, crop susceptibility to disease attack, acidification or alkalization of the soil, or reduction in soil fertility, all of which cause irreparable damage to the overall ecosystem. 2. oversupply of nitrogen leads to softening of plant tissue resulting in increased susceptibility to diseases and pests. 3. they reduce the colonization of plant roots with mycorrihizae and inhibit symbiotic nitrogen fixation by rhizobia due to high nitrogen fertilization. 4. they enhance the decomposition of soil, which leads to degradation of soil structure. 5. nutrients are easily lost from soils through fixation; leaching or gas emission and can lead to reduced fertilizer efficiency. 2.1.3. the advantages of using biofertilizers 1. the nutrient supply is more balanced, which helps keep plants healthy. 2. they enhance soil biological activity, which improves nutrient mobilization from organic and chemical sources and decomposition of toxic substances. 3. they enhance the colonization of mycorrhizae, which improves phosphorous supply. 4. they enhance soil structure, leading to better root growth. 5. they increase the organic matter content of the soil, thereby improving the exchange capacity of nutrients, increasing soil water retention, promoting soil aggregates and buffering the soil against acidity, alkalinity, salinity, pesticides and toxic heavy metals. 6. they release nutrients slowly and contribute to the residual pool of organic nitrogen and phosphorous in the soil, reducing nitrogen leaching loss and phosphorous fixation; they can also supply micronutrients. 7. they encourage the growth of beneficial microorganisms and earthworms. 8. they help to suppress certain soil-borne plant diseases and parasites. 46 consilience 2.1.4. the disadvantages of using biofertilizer 1. they are comparatively low in nutrient content, so a larger volume is needed to provide enough nutrients for crop growth. 2. the nutrient release rate is too slow to meet crop requirements in a short time, hence some nutrient deficiency may occur. 3. the major plant nutrients may not exist in organic fertilizer in sufficient quantity to sustain maximum crop growth. 4. the nutrient composition of compost is highly variable. 5. the cost is high compared to chemical fertilizers. 6. short shelf life, lack of suitable carrier materials, susceptibility to high temperature, problems in transportation and storage are all biofertilizer bottlenecks that still need to be solved in order to promote effective inoculation (chen, 2006). 2.2 azolla azolla is a tiny free-floating fresh water fern of tropical and sub-tropical asia, africa and america. there are now seven extant species of the family azollaceae – azolla caroliniana, a. maxicana, a. filiculoides, a. microphylla, a. rubra, a. nilotica and a. pinnata. azolla is an ancient associate of green plants on earth, dating back to the cenozoic era (which began 65 million years ago). there are fossil records of a. filiculoides and a. pinnata from pleistocene deposits (west 1953; moore 1969). moore (1969) first reported the agronomic significance of azolla. literature on azolla is now voluminous (lumpkin and plucknett 1982; khan 1988; kumarasinghe and eskew 1993; mian 1993). azolla has the unique capacity to fix significant amounts of atmospheric dinitrogen (n2) through its phycsymobiont anabaena azollae and thereby can act as the nitrogenous biofertiliser for irrigated rice. since azolla can be grown simultaneously with irrigated rice without extra land or water use, its utility as biofertilizer has become a reality (kikuchi et al. 1984; singh and singh 1990; mian and kashem 1995). systematic research was necessary to find out the proper methods of culturing azolla year-round to ensure the proper supply of inoculum and the adjustment of the growth of azolla in coordination with the rice crop. the technology azobiofer is the product of our continuous target-oriented research on azolla since 1978. this technology can be a model for most tropical and sub-tropical rice growing countries. azolla is used as green manure and for dual crop cultivation. as green manure, azolla is grown in fields prior to transplantation of rice seedlings. when fully grown it is mixed with the soil and acts as green manure for the plants. as a dual crop, azolla is grown in the same field after the rice seedlings are transplanted and acts as a biofertilizer. consilience mishra et al.: rejuvenation of biofertilizer   2.3 types of biofertilizers 2.3.1 nitrogen fixers rhizobium: belongs to family rhizobiaceae , symbiotic in nature, fixes nitrogen 50100 kg/ ha, with legumes only. it is useful for pulse legumes like chickpea, red-gram, pea, lentil, black gram, and oil-seed legumes like soybean and groundnut, and forage legumes like berseem and lucerne. it colonizes the roots of specific legumes to form tumor like growths called root nodules, which act as factories of ammonia production. rhizobium has the ability to fix atmospheric nitrogen in symbiotic association with legumes and certain non-legumes like parasponia . azospir i l lum: belongs to family spir i laceae ; it is heterotrophic and associative in nature. in addition to their nitrogen fixing ability of about 20-40 kg/ha, they also produce growth-regulating substances. there are many species under this genus such as a.amazonense, a.halopraeferens, and, a.brasilense. however, worldwide distribution and benefits of inoculation have been seen mainly with the a.lipoferum and a.brasilense. the azospirillum form associative symbiosis with many plants particularly with those with the c4-dicarboxyliac pathway of photosynthesis (hatch and slack pathway), because they grow and fix nitrogen on salts of organic acids such as malic and aspartic acid. thus it is mainly recommended for maize, sugarcane, sorghum, pearl millet etc. the azotobacter colonizing the roots not only remains on the root surface but also penetrates into the root tissues and lives in harmony with the plants. they do not, however, produce any visible nodules or outgrowth on root tissue. azotobacter : belongs to family azotobacteriaceae; it is aerobic, free living, and heterotrophic in nature. azotobacters are present in neutral or alkaline soils and a. chroococcum is the most commonly occurring species in arable soils, while a. vinelandii, a. beijerinckii, a. insignis and a.macrocytogenes are also common species. the number of azotobacter rarely exceeds of 104 to 105 g-1 of soil due to lack of organic matter and presence of antagonistic microorganisms in soil. azotobacter produces anti-fungal antibiotics that inhibit the growth of several pathogenic fungi in the root region and help prevent seedling mortality. the occurrence of this organism has been reported in the rhizosphere of a number of crop plants such as rice, maize, sugarcane, bajra, vegetables and plantation crops. blue green algae (cyanobacter ia) and azol la : these belong to eight different families. they are phototrophic in nature and produce auxin, indole acetic acid and gibberllic acid, and fix 20-30 kg nitrogen/ha in submerged rice fields. as they are abundant in paddies, they are also referred as ‘paddy organisms’. nitrogen is the key input required in large quantities for low land rice production. soil nitrogen and biological nitrogen fixation (bnf) by associated organisms are major sources of nitrogen for low land rice. the 50-60% nitrogen requirement is met through the combination of mineralization of organic nitrogen from the soil and bnf by free living and rice plant associated bacteria (roger and ladha, 1992). to achieve food security through sustainable agriculture, the requirement for fixed nitrogen must be 48 consilience increasingly met by bnf rather than by industrial nitrogen fixation. most nitrogenfixing blue green algae (bga) are filamentous, consisting of chains of vegetative cells including specialized cells called heterocysts, which function as micronodules for synthesis and nitrogen-fixing machinery. bga forms symbiotic associations capable of fixing nitrogen with fungi, liverworts, ferns and flowering plants, but the most common symbiotic association is that found between a free floating aquatic fern, the azolla and anabaena azollae (bga). the important factors in using azolla as biofertilizer for rice crop are its quick and the efficient availability of its nitrogen to rice plants. besides nitrogen fixation, these biofertilizers, or biomanures, also contribute significant amounts of phosphorous, potassium, sulfur, zinc, iron, molybdenum and other micronutrients. azolla can be applied as green manure by incorporating it in the fields prior to rice planting. the most commonly occurring species in india is a. pinnata, which can be propagated on commercial scale by vegetative means. 2.3.2 phosphate solubilizers several reports have examined the ability of different bacterial species to solubilize insoluble inorganic phosphate compounds, such as tricalcium phosphate, dicalcium phosphate, hydroxyapatite, and rock phosphate. among the bacterial genera with this capacity are pseudomonas, bacillus, rhizobium, burkholderia, achromobacter, agrobacterium, microccocus, aereobacter, flavobacterium and erwinia. there are considerable populations of phosphate-solubilizing bacteria in soil and in plant rhizospheres. these include both aerobic and anaerobic strains, with a greater prevalence of aerobic strains in submerged soils. a considerably higher concentration of phosphate solubilizing bacteria is commonly found in the rhizosphere in comparison with non-rhizosphere soil. the soil bacteria belonging to the genera pseudomonas and bacillus and fungi are more common. the major microbiological means by which insoluble-phosphorous compounds are mobilized is by the production of organic acids, accompanied by acidification of the medium. the organic and inorganic acids convert tricalcium phosphate to diand-monobasic phosphates, resulting in an enhanced availability of the phosphorous to the plant. 2.3.3 zinc solubilizers nitrogen fixers like rhizobium, azospirillum, azotobacter, bga and phosphatesolubilizing bacteria like b. magaterium, pseudomonas striata, and phosphate mobilizing mycorrhiza have been widely accepted as bio-fertilizers. however, these biofertilizers only supply major nutrients. but a host of microorganisms found in the soil can be used as biofertilizers to supply micronutrients like zinc, iron, copper, etc. zinc is of utmost importance. it is found in the earth’s crust at a concentration of 0.008 percent, but more than 50 percent of indian soils exhibit zinc deficiency with content far below the critical level of 1.5 ppm of available zinc. the plant deficiencies in absorbing zinc from the soil are overcome by external application of soluble zinc sulfate (znso4). there appears to be two main mechanisms of zinc fixation; one operates in acidic soils and is closely related with cation exchange and other operates in alkaline conditions where fixation takes place consilience mishra et al.: rejuvenation of biofertilizer   by means of chemisorptions (chemisorptions of zinc on calcium carbonate form a solid-solution of zncaco3), and by complexation by organic ligands. zinc can be solubilized by microorganisms viz., b. subtilis, thiobacillus thioxidans and saccharomyces sp. these microorganisms can be used as biofertilizers for the solubilization of fixed micronutrients like zinc. the results have shown that a bacillus sp. (zinc solubilizing bacteria) can be used as a biofertilizer for zinc or in soils where native zinc is higher or in conjunction with insoluble cheaper zinc compounds like zinc oxide (zno), zinc carbonate (znco3), and zinc sulfide (zns), instead of costly zinc sulfate. 2.4 rejuvenating sustainable economic development (sed) rejuvenation leads to increased market share and profit maximization (berenson and jackson, 1994). it is less risky than new product development, cost effective, saves time and helps gain market share. product rejuvenation can be done in two ways—reintroducing an abandoned product by marketing it to old or new users, or reviving a seriously declining product by creating new value, then marketing it to old or new users (berenson and jackson, 1994). sustainable development (sd) refers to a mode of human development in which resource use aims to meet human needs while preserving the environment so that these needs can be met for both present and future generations. sustainable development has three constituent parts: environmental sustainability, economic sustainability, and sociopolitical sustainability. economic sustainability is also known as the development and maintenance of the present and future economic growth of a country. achieving this sustainability in agriculture is essential as the economy of india depends on agriculture. sustainable agriculture can be defined as environmentally friendly methods of farming that allow the production of crops and livestock without damage to human or natural systems. more specifically, it can be said to avoid adverse effects to soil, water, biodiversity, and surrounding or downstream resources—or to those working or living on the farm or in neighboring areas. furthermore, the concept of sustainable agriculture extends intergenerationally, as it means passing on a conserved or improved natural resource, biotic, or economic base instead of one that has been depleted or polluted. combining agriculture and economy, the term sustainable agriculture economic development (saed) has been coined as used in the study. this study also formulates strategies for sustainable agriculture economic development by comparing biofertilizers like azolla to chemical fertilizers. the government of india and other agencies are coming up with rejuvenation strategies for sustainable agriculture economic development such as promoting the nascent biofertilizer market both at the level of the user-farmer and the producer-investor. they use the following measures: (i) farm level extension and promotion programs, (ii) financial assistance to investors in setting up units, (iii) subsidies on sales and (iv) direct production in public sector and cooperative organizations and in universities and research institutions. over time, as the industry 50 consilience emerges from infancy with public guidance, the government expects to see the following: (a) increasing sales volumes and diffusion across the country, (b) greater role of profit motivated private enterprise (ghosh, 2013). the government of odisha also endeavors to train farmers to use azolla as a biofertilizer (orissa reference annual, 2011). 3. methodology the research was exploratory and experimental in nature. a sample of 15 farmers from the balasore district of odisha participated in the study. the experiment was performed on rice, the most cultivated crop in balasore. azolla was used as a green manure and dual crop and compared with chemical fertilizer. 4. results and discussion the study was conducted by comparing the application of azolla as a biofertilizer in green manure and dual crop with chemical fertilizer. the analysis and discussion follow. 4.1 paddy yield when azolla was incorporated in to the paddy field; the increase in paddy yield varied from 21 % to 34 % due to green manuring (graph 1.1) and 15 % to 23% due to dual cropping (graph 1.2). consilience mishra et al.: rejuvenation of biofertilizer   graph 1.1: yield of rice in green manure the utilization of azolla as green manure has been extensively investigated and an increase in paddy yield ranging from 9-38% has been observed in field experiments when azolla was incorporated to the soil (singh 1977). incorporation of azolla into the soil also enhances the release of other nutrients. a 50% reduction in chemical fertilizer use can be achieved without significant loss to the rice yield with the use of azolla along with chemical fertilizer (francisco carrapico, generosa teixeira and m. adelia diniz 2000). 52 consilience graph 1.2: yield of rice in dual crop application of azolla as green manure and dual crop improved the fertility status of soil. application of azolla also plays a definite role in enhancing soil fertility by increasing available nitrogen, organic carbon, phosphorous and potassium (mandal et al. 1999, sharma et al. 1999). their utilization also helps curb nh3 volatilization, prevent rise in ph, reduce water temperature, build up organic matter, and influence the transformation and availability of iron, manganese, zinc, and copper, which improves the infiltration and movement of water in soil (vlek & craswell 1981, mandal et al. 1999, pabby et al. 2004). mian and azmal (1989) found that when azolla was cultured with rice and incorporated, about 28% of the phosphorus present in azolla was subsequently taken up by rice plant tissue. consilience mishra et al.: rejuvenation of biofertilizer   4.2 plant height the application of azolla biofertilizer as green manure in the paddy fields resulted in continuous growth throughout the paddy crop in comparison to conventionally grown, chemically fertilized paddies as shown in graph 1.3. graph 1.3: plant height in green manure the graph clearly depicts the increase in plant height in the case of paddy crops greenmanured with azolla as compared to chemically grown paddy crops. similarly, the dual growth paddies showed far more growth than conventionally grown paddies, as shown in graph 1.4. 54 consilience graph 1.4: plant height in dual crop since incorporation of azolla as green manure and dual crop enhanced the fertility status of soil, a growth of paddy crop was evident. many researchers have revealed the beneficial effects of azolla such as enhancing soil fertility by increasing total available nitrogen, organic carbon, phosphorous and potassium. azolla also curbs nh3 volatilization, prevents rise in ph, reduces water temperature, builds up organic matter and influences the transformation and availability of iron, manganese, zinc, and copper, improving the infiltration and movement of water in soil (vlek & craswell 1981, mandal et al. 1999, sharma et al. 1999, pabby et al. 2004). consilience mishra et al.: rejuvenation of biofertilizer   4.3 number of tillers the increase in the number of tillers of paddy crop was clearly observed in both green manure and dual crop paddies, as shown in graphs 1.5 & 1.6. graph 1.5: number of tillers in green manure graph 1.6: number of tillers in dual crop 56 consilience the number of effective tillers is a yield-attributing characteristic. the increase in tiller production might be due to a greater supply and more efficient utilization of nitrogen for cell multiplication, as well as the formation of nucleic acids and other vitally important organic compounds in the cell sap (chandravanshi and singh, 1974; simons, 1982). besides n-fixation, azolla also contribute significant amounts of p, k, s, zn, fe, mo and other micronutrients, potentially also contributing to the increase in the number of tillers. 4.4 profit to farmers graph 1.7 and 1.8 represent the effects of azolla as a green manure and dual crop on rice cultivation profits, as compared to a chemically grown paddy crop. graph 1.7: profit in green manure consilience mishra et al.: rejuvenation of biofertilizer   graph 1.8: profit in dual crop the data shows that the average profits of rs. 23,342/and rs. 19534.67 were obtained from the application of azolla as green manure and dual crop, respectively. the average net return of rs. 10,943.33 and rs. 10,604/when using chemical fertilizer is additionally depicted. the data shows that the profit obtained by the use of azolla as biofertilizer is significantly greater than chemical fertilizer showing better saed. 4.5 benefit to cost ratio graph 1.9 shows that the average b:c ratio observed was 1.89 and 1.39 in the cases of green manuring and chemically grown paddies. similarly, in graph 1.10, one can see that the average b:c ratio was observed 1.73 & 1.38 in case of the dual crop. 58 consilience graph 1.9: benefit to cost ratio in green manure graph 1.10: benefit to cost ratio in dual crop the above data confirms that there is higher sustainable agriculture economy development with the use of azolla rather than chemical fertilizer. consilience mishra et al.: rejuvenation of biofertilizer   5. rejuvenation strategies of biofertilizers for sustainable agriculture economic development the following strategies can be used for rejuvenating sustainable agriculture economic development: • identifying and selecting efficient locations, crop, soil, and specific strains for n-fixing, p, zn solubilizing and absorbing (mycorrhizal) to suit different agro climatic conditions. • strain improvement through biotechnological methods. • exchanging cultures between countries of similar climatic conditions and evaluating their performance for a better strain for particular crop as well as checking the activity of cultures during storage to avoid natural mutants. • developing suitable alternative formulations viz., liquid inoculants / granular formulations for all bioinoculants, to carrier based inoculants, standardizing the media, method of inoculation etc., for the new formulations. • employing microbiologists in production units to monitor the production. • developing cold storage facilities in production centers. • technical training on the production and quality control to the producers and rendering technical advice and projects to manufacturers. • organizational training to the extension workers and farmers to popularize the technology. • disseminating information through mass media, publications and bulletins.(gupta and sen, 2013) 6. conclusion biofertilizers represent a new technology for indian agriculture that promises to balance many of the shortcomings of the conventional chemical-based technology. biofertilizers are products that are likely to be commercially promising in the long run once adequate information becomes available to producers and farmers. the use of biofertilizers in india will not only have an impact on sustainable agriculture’s economic development but it will also contribute to a sustainable ecosystem and the holistic well-being of the country. 60 consilience bibliography alexander, m. (1974). introduction to soil microbiology. new york, ny: john wiley & sons. chen. j. h. (2006). the combined use of chemical and organic fertilizers and/or biofertiliser for crop growth and soil fertility, international workshop on sustained management of the soil-rhizosphere system for efficient crop production and fertilizer use, 16 – 20 october, land development department, bangkok, thailand. francisco, c., generosa, t., & diniz, m. a. (2000). azolla as a biofertilizer in africa, a challenge for the future. revista de ciências agrárias, 23 (3-4): 120-138. gupta, a. & sen, s. (2013), role of biofertilisers and biopesticides for sustainable agriculture, scholar.google.com. liu, c. (1979) use of azolla in rice production in china, in nitrogen and rice. irri los bafios, laguna, philippines, pp 375-394. mlan, m. h. & azmal, a. k. m. (1989). the response of azolla pinnata r. brown to the split application of phosphorus and the transfer of assimilated phosphorus to flooded rice plants. p1. & soil 119:211-216. moore, a. w. (1969) azolla: biology and agronomic significance. botanical reviews 35, 17-30. muraleedharan.h, seshadri. s and perumal. k. (2010), biofertiliser (phosphobacteria), shri murrugapa chettiar research centre. parikh, s. j. & james, b. r. (2012) soil: the foundation of agriculture. nature education knowledge 3(10):2 patrick jr., w. h. and reddy, c.n. (1978) chemical changes in rice soils. in soils and rice. irri los bafios, laguna, philippines, pp 361-371. raghuwanshi. r. (2012), opportunities and challenges to sustainable agriculture in india, nebio, vol.3, no.2, pp. 78-86. singh, p.k. (1977) multiplication and utilization of fern azolla containing nitrogen fixing algal symbiont as a green manure in rice cultivation.riso 46 642-644. singh, p. k. (1979) use of azolla in rice production in india. in nitrogen and rice. irri los bafios, laguna, philippines, pp 407-418. consilience mishra et al.: rejuvenation of biofertilizer   singh, p. k.; panigrahi, b. c. and satpathy, k. b. (1981) comparative efficiency of azolla, blue green algae and other organic manures in relation to n and p availability in a flooded rice soil. plant and soil 62, 35--44. sustainable development, www.wikipedia.com, (2013), accessed14.2.2013. tisdale, s. l. and nelson, w. l. (1975) soil fertility and fertilizers. macmillan publishing co., inc., new york. watanabe, i., espinas, c. s., berja, n. s. and alimango, b. v. (1977) utilization of azolta anabaena complex as a nitrogen fertilizer for rice. irri los bafios, laguna, philippines, research paper series no. 11. west rg (1953) the occurrence of azolla in the british interglacial deposits. new phytoogy 52, 267-271. microsoft word 12 180-190 sunyani final formatted.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 10, iss. 1 (2013), pp. 180 – 190 environmental challenges facing a growing city: sunyani case study edward twum anane faculty of economics and business administration catholic university college of ghana. email: ananeedward@gmail.com abstract this photo essay illustrates the environmental challenges facing a rapidly growing urban settlement in ghana. sunyani is one of the fastest growing cities in ghana. the population of the city increased from 38,634 in march 1984 to 61,992 in march 2000 (ghana statistical service, 2002). this trend presents serious development challenges to the city as high rates of population growth are not matched with increased provision of social services and infrastructure. the city authorities will have to adopt appropriate urban planning strategies if the city is to develop sustainably. author’s note edward twum anane is a lecturer at the faculty of economics and business administration of the catholic university of ghana. anane is also the founder and research coordinator of the innovation lab, a sustainability research initiative at the catholic university. he attained his master of science in management from the university of italian switzerland, lugano. he is currently documenting urban settlements of the brong ahafo region of ghana. anane’s research interests lie in sustainable energy, climate change, and sustainable urbanization. keywords: ghana, sunyani, sustainable urbanization 1. introduction to the sunyani city sunyani is a city in the west african republic of ghana and is the capital of both the sunyani east municipal district and brong ahafo region. it lies between latitudes 70.20°n and 70.05°n and longitudes 20.30°w and 20.10w. sunyani also lies within the middle belt of ghana between 750 (229 meters) to 1235 feet (376 meters) above sea level. the costs of constructing houses and roads are relatively minimal due to the nature of the topography. today sunyani is home to both the regional government and high court and the region's post-secondary institutions including a polytechnic school. the city is host to the university of energy and renewable resources and the catholic university college of ghana. several of the country's best primary and secondary schools can be found within the metropolitan area and its suburbs. an estimated 87,642 people reside in the city as of january 2012. consilience anane: sunyani environmental challenges figure 1: the location of sunyani in ghana (perry-castañeda library map collection, 2006) surrounded by the forested southern ashanti uplands, the city of sunyani originally developed as an outpost camp for elephant hunters during the 19th century. the name sunyani is derived from the akan word for elephant: ‘osono,’ and the area is an important hub for the distribution of cocoa, kola nuts, and staple foods such maize and yam. the city falls within the wet semi-equatorial climatic zone of ghana. the mean monthly temperatures vary between 23°c and 33°c with the lowest observed around august and the highest around march and april. the relative humidities are high, averaging between 75 and 80 percent during the rainy seasons and between 7080 percent during the dry seasons of the year creating an ideal climate for luxurious vegetative growth. (ghana districts, 2006) the average rainfall for between 2000 and 2009 was high, at approximately 88.987cm. the city experiences a double maxima rainfall pattern and the main rainy season between march and september and the minor between october and december. 182 consilience figure 2: among the city’s attractions is the cocoa house, a high rise that dominates the sunyani skyline. the building houses the headquarters of several regional companies. in 1924, the british colonial government designated sunyani as district headquarters following the construction of roads connecting it with the city of kumasi. since then, the city has attracted a number of financial institutions including a branch of the bank of ghana, stanbic bank, ecobank, and barclays bank. sunyani is a clean and well maintained city and was voted the cleanest city in ghana by the ghana tourist board in 2007. consilience anane: sunyani environmental challenges figure 3: aerial view of sunyani new town from the top floor of the tallest building in the city the cocoa house. (source: author’s field work, december 2012) the first four localities of the city, created in 1924, are areas that today house recreational centers, a market, a lorry park, a hospital, and other relevant facilities. the city currently has over 15 localities. over 6 localities created since the country gained independence in 1957 lack the facilities that the first 4 localities have. for example, new town, penkwase, and new dormaa lack recreational centers, lorry parks, community halls, and health centers. 2. environmental challenges facing the city low crime rate, a relatively clean environment, the availability of good secondary and tertiary educational institutions, and an abundance of affordable produce are some of the factors that have made sunyani a very attractive city for ghanaians. consequently, rapid rates of population growth are expected to continue. as a result, there are signs that the city is facing increasing pressure on the environment. a recent study of the city has revealed the following challenges: • pollution of water bodies • lack of drainage systems in some areas • poor waste management in some areas • traffic congestion in the central business district 184 consilience • inadequate sanitation facilities • poor access to roads in some areas • gully erosion • lack of car parking spaces in the central business district • lack of neighborhood parks the city authorities will have to address these challenges if the city is to grow sustainably. figure 4: polluted city water body. this area was an attractive water body a few decades ago (source: author’s field work, december 2012) sunyani has many small rivers and streams which feed into the main source of treated water for the city, the river tano. seven of the rivers are polluted. these seven water bodies are located in the districts of sunyani (stretches across four neighborhoods of the city), akokora kwadwo (sunyani estate), agyei (number 2), nsakonsuano (nkwabeng north), aboshyensua (ministries area), danyame, and tuasua (sunyani estate). an estimated 60% of the sunyani water bodies are under threat from human activities. residents of densely populated and low income sunyani localities such as number 2 and penkwase do not have access to adequate pipe-borne water supplies. the city’s water supplier, abesim head works, ensures less than 50% of the water demand of the city’s 87,642 residents. the pollution of the seven water bodies is one of the major causes of the water supply deficit. furthermore, there are not enough waste collection containers in some of the areas. residents dump solid and liquid waste into the water bodies which are washed into the tano river, a source of water consilience anane: sunyani environmental challenges for the abesim water treatment plant. this often creates water shortages for both domestic and agricultural needs during the dry season. figure 5: poor drainage system in a section of sunyani area 2. (source: author’s fieldwork, december 2012) there are areas in the city which lack drainage systems. an estimated 20,000 residents live in areas with no proper storm drains, such as in number two, penkwase and new town. in addition, the population densities in these areas are very high. consequently, it is estimated that 22.8% of all residents live in these flood risk areas and face damage and losses every time it rains. city authorities must therefore pay attention to the infrastructural needs of these flood risk areas if future disaster is to be averted. for instance, the incidence of malaria is already high in these neighborhoods and the chances for an epidemic are immense. 186 consilience figure 6: buildings at risk due to gully erosion (source: author’s fieldwork, december 2012) due especially to the flat topography, houses are easily and cheaply constructed. however, the lack of drainage in some areas has exposed houses to gully erosion. an estimated 3000 houses are at risk with the most affected areas being number two, new town, and penkwase where the poorest residents live. this problem has worsened the already poor housing conditions of the areas. residents of low income localities in the city use gullies created by erosion as waste dumpsites (figure 7). authorities currently service roughly 40 communal collection container sites. 40 collection sites are collecting roughly 40% of the solid waste generated in the city with the remaining 60% of uncollected waste being dumped in open areas. children who do not have access to sanitation facilities in their homes use the dump sites as toilets. the under five mortality is consistently high, mostly attributed to sanitation-related diseases, including malaria, typhoid, cholera, and diarrhea. consilience anane: sunyani environmental challenges figure 7: exposure of children to disease pathogens at dumpsite (source: author’s fieldwork, december 2012) 188 consilience figure 8: one of the many open air final waste disposal sites (source: author’s fieldwork, december 2012) it has been estimated that the city generated 12,010 tons of solid waste in 2010; however, only 4,805 tons were actually collected. organic matter constitutes 69% of the total solid waste. the city has one landfill site only about 1000 meters from 40 residential buildings. the landfill is a non-engineered site with limited supervision and, due to ashes in the garbage, there are numerous fires in the waste with smoke heading towards the nearest and largest neighbor, the sunyani polytechnic. the over 8000 students of the polytechnic and the health of the students residing in the affected residential buildings will be at risk if the landfill is not relocated. consilience anane: sunyani environmental challenges figure 9: one of the sites of the metal waste collectors (source: author’s fieldwork, december 2012) waste generated in the city ranges from plastics and food waste to metals, paper, wood, and glass. solid waste is burnt at landfill sites and little is recycled in the city. scavengers collect metal and e-waste from households, which are shipped to the national capital, accra, for recycling. under such conditions, city authorities will have to implement sustainable waste management programs before conditions worsen beyond recovery as is the case in larger cities such as accra (largest city in ghana) and kumasi (second largest city). 190 consilience figure 10: a section of the central business district with street vendors (source: author’s fieldwork, december 2012) another challenge facing the city is a lack of parking spaces for cars. private cars parked on the streets come into conflict with street vendors, especially in the number one, number two, and number three districts. these three areas constitute the city’s central business district. the streets of the city are becoming congested, noisy, and filthy, and there are very few litter bins. therefore, private car parks must be created, and the lack of markets to accommodate street vendors must be addressed as well as the installation of litter bins on the streets. microsoft word oginni.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 14, iss. 2 (2015), pp. 158-172   social media and public policy process in africa: enhanced policy process in digital age simon oyewole oginni institute of governance, humanities and social science pan african university, soa, cameroon simonoginni3@yahoo.com, +237679177333, +2347032302401 joash ntenga moitui institute of governance, humanities and social science pan african university, soa, cameroon joash.moitsui@gmail.com, +237654984092, +25472868826 abstract in recent times, civic engagement in policy process has been emphasized globally, but channels to facilitate public participation in the policy process in africa remain unexplored. given the conservative nature of policy process in most of africa countries, the study examines levels of social media use for civic engagement among government/policymakers and proposs a model to enhance policy process in a digital community using easton’s theory of political analysis. the study employs case studies, and descriptive and correlation analysis covering 53 african countries. findings revealed that social media use has taken new shape with respect to citizens’ engagement in the electoral process, but its use for civic engagement in policy process is very low (and below the global average); increased investment in telecommunication infrastructures is yet to have a significant effect on human capital ict literacy in africa. investment in icts should include the building of human capital ict literacy, and the government/policymakers should explore online citizens’ engagement and adjust policies to incorporate technology in sub-regional and national development plans. keywords: social media, public policy, civic engagement, soft power. 1. introduction conventional instruments of public policy are becoming inadequate for addressing phenomena present in the digital age. it seems there is a “missing rib” for which the traditional policy process seeks to complement as the world goes digital. the unprecedented proliferation of social media engendered by the internet boom has provided a novel platform for virtual connection that permits civic engagements in social, economic, and political life. social media has emerged as a fundamental game changer in that it connects governments, citizens, and their ideas across the most complex of geographical divides. the new technological tools provide an opportunity to gather real-time insight: much of government policy is based on out-of-date information, with yesterday’s questions answered today. hence, there is a need for real-time instruments to address social, political, and economic phenomena in the digital age. in recent times, citizens’ engagement in policy process has been globally emphasized. at the united nations conference on sustainable development, the general assembly resolution 288 of 2012 entitled the future we want, states in consilience oginni and moitui.: social media and public policy in africa   paragraph 13: “we recognize that opportunities for the people to influence their lives and future, participate in decision-making and voice their concerns are fundamental for sustainable development” (ecosoc, 2012). to strengthen the resolution on civic engagement, the 51st session of the united nations on social development concluded that: “the empowerment and participation of all members of society in social, economic and political life is critical to achieving sustainable development” (ecosoc, 2013). hence, governments need sophisticated real-time tools to drive civic engagement and establish mechanisms for effective policy implementation and feedbacks in digital age. recent statistics show that 1.32 billion people of the world population make use of social media for social, political, and economic purposes (wis, 2014). more than 66 percent of americans are online and the use of social media is increasing in triple folds year after year (wis, 2014). in the arab world, about 71 million people make use of social media among 135 million people on the internet and social media has been used increasingly to promote good governance and arab social integration (mbrsg, 2013). in china, the use of social media has become instrumental to public diplomacy and social transformation (lagerkvist, 2005), though popular social media like facebook and twitter were barred and replaced with locally developed ones (like sina weibo) for online engagement (mou, 2011). africa is a growing market region for mobile technology adoption and the use of social media has been on credible increase (dalberg, 2013). recent statistics indicates that internet users in africa comprise about 8.6% of the world’s internet users, with an exponential increase in active users of social media every month (wis, 2014). in the past decade, the number of africans engaging in online activity was relatively few, but the numbers have increased dramatically to about 240 million with social media holding the highest proportion of online engagements (ipsos-markinor, 2012; itu, 2012). recent revolutions in egypt and tunisia drew governments’ attentions to the potential of social media tools in africa (khair e., 2011). such revolutions have resulted in a subsequent shift in social media use towards political and activist agendas in various countires of africa. (ishengoma, 2013; salanova, 2012). additionally, social media can be seen as a platoform and an incubator for business development, and as such, makinwa (2012) comments on the potential for the african continent’s economic growth. in a similar vein, yu-shan (2013) opines that social media technology has the capability to connect the african public and translate to a strong political tool on the continent. if we are to realise the dreams of the internet pioneers, then we need to challenge the context and demand a fresh set of proposals to empower public oversight of and participation in online networks (duncan 2012). however, the credibility and sufficiency of social media as a tool for policymaking remains controversial among scholars, policymakers, and governments globally. as a consequence of these mixed views, this study assesses levels of social media use for civic engagement in africa, (2) and examines the potential of social media to inform public policy process in africa (3) in order to to propose a model to enhance policy process in a digital community. consilience oginni and moitui.: social media and public policy in africa   2. literature review 2.1 conceptualizing social media and public policy the development of social media tools over the last decade has altered modes of communications between governments and citizens. social media has opened ways for greater political participation, thereby creating a new social dynamic. it is an internet-based tool that unifies geographically dispersed individuals on virtual platforms through user-generated content. leavey (2013) defines social media as a social structure made of nodes comprised of individuals or organizations tied by one or more specific types of interdependencies, such as values, ideas, financial exchange, friendship, kinship, dislike, conflict, or trade. in reality, the innovative tool brings together people of common value systems, visions, and aspirations to collaboratively form opinions on issues of concerns in virtually-connected environments. pinzón (2013) posits that social media is part of a wider trend in a communication landscape that is characterised by mass collaboration; it is responsible for a significant portion of time expended online. in the context of this study, social media refers to the online tools that permit real-time interactions and feedbacks (for instance, web 2.0); it is a broad term that extends beyond facebook, twitter, and linkedin to include e-government. social media can also be seen as a productive tool that relives social struggle. the concept of public policy was developed in response to heightened social struggle and duties of governments to ensure citizens’ welfare (nyong'o, 1998). public policy is concerned with how societal issues are defined, constructed, and approached on a political level, and is used to examine the effects of a government’s actions or inactions. although the inclusion of inaction may seem counterintuitive, public policy encompasses all aspects of a government’s decision-making process. public policy covers a wide range of issues which affect the public; it includes economic, social, and political issues that are subdivided into strata such as education, health, environment, security, agriculture, finance, etc. according to smith (2003), policy moves through six steps: agenda setting, policy formulation, decision making, implementation, evaluations and termination. however, policy process is not restricted to a linear timeline: it can be improvised or tailored in a predefined manner by actors or the dictates of some set objectives. research into the policy process is designed to ask how problems and policy solutions come to be defined, by whom, and with what effect. ids (2006) states the following characteristics of policy process: § policy-making should be understood as an analytical or problem-solving process; § policy-making is incremental, complex, and messy—it is iterative and often based on experimentation, learning from mistakes, and taking corrective measures. therefore, there is no optimal policy decision; § policy process involves overlapping and competing agendas which may not allow total consensus among concerned parties over what the essential policy problem is; § policy process includes some perspective at the expense of others. in each stage of policy processes, technology has an important role to play in the digital age. the policy process requires quality inputs, decision making, consilience oginni and moitui.: social media and public policy in africa   and feedback mechanisms to be successful. one important quality of enhanced policy is wide participation in the policy process. social media thereby presents an opportunity to incorporate a multitude of opinions or alternatives during policy processes. citizen engagement is crucial in directing policy to the most pertinent issues within the receiving locality (imurana, 2014). a recent study on online activity in social media for public policy, social, and political issues of some selected countries reveals that developing countries seem to have the highest proportion of engagement in online public policy and social and political issues (ipsos-markinor, 2012). the argument was based on the assertion that the democratic history and experience of a country play a role on the magnitude of online engagements and extent of social media use. that is, a grown-up democratic country tends to have a more organized system of channels for citizen to air their views than do emerging economies. therefore, social media might provide more of a focal point in african countries than other developed countries. the argument supports findings that social media has the highest proportion of online engagement in africa (itu, 2012; wis, 2014). 2.2 social media and political change in the 21st century political strategies are increasingly based on social media principles: dialogue, and participation (mcgirt, 2009). united states president, barrack obama, employed social media to drive public opinion and gain support of electorates with about two million personal profiles and 35,000 groups by simply creating mybarackobama.com. the political campaign strategy has been recognised as the most successful social media campaign (leavey, 2013; nnanyelugo, 2011). the success of barrack obama’s strategies facilitated the use of social media tools for political campaigns in other countries of the world. the genius of democracies is seen not in the great number of new words introduced but even more in the new ideas they express (alexis, 1969). however, the use of social media as a fundamental game changer to bring political change and inform the development of public policy process remains controversial among scholars, practitioners, and policymakers. morozov (2011) contends that the internet boom does not automate democratization in that social media tools can be employed in helping political activists realize their demands as powerfully as they can back up authoritarian regimes. deibert (2014), supporting morozov (2011), argues that internet control mechanisms are advancing and that more governments use more sophisticated methods to filter and monitor web-based contents and websites of opposition movements. thus, social media tools can also have an adverse effect: its use by state actors could lead to completely opposite outcomes called the “dyadic nature of social media.” pragmatically, the new technological tool can produce dyadic effects: it can promote democratization or strengthen authoritarianism or despotism. more often than not, governments are known for their late adoption of technology when compared to private institutions and citizens who are in a better position to pursue their interests tactically. the barring of network connections during the 2011 revolution in egypt strengthened activist initiatives to devise alternatives using the same social media (khamis, 2012; muller, 2012). furthermore, some scholars have jettisoned social media as leaderless tools. hassan (2011) argues that events fostered through networkable consilience oginni and moitui.: social media and public policy in africa   technologies lead to a “power vacuum” because there are no roots to back up an online social movement—social media has neither visible leadership nor power for real change. lynch (2011), similar to hassan (2011), submits that online activists cannot defend their interests because there is no visible leader present during the negotiation process and hence, they become frustrated. there is probably no substitute for intimacy that forms when individuals are physically drawn together (putnam, 2000). in support of putnam (2000), rusciano (2001) argues that the internet prompts people to lose sight of the ability to share and form physical relationships with one another. in another words, wellman (2001), using the concept of “networked individualism,” emphasizes that new technologies are shifting the core communities from physically-fixed and bounded groups to social networks. arguably, the development of social media was driven to bridge a divided world by connecting people who are geographically separated. on the contrary, etling (2009) submits that social media might be the only means left for citizens in authoritarian regimes to influence government, fight corruption, or defend their rights. of course, this happened during the 2011 revolution in egypt, when the activists relied solely on social media for information supplied to the international community (cottle, 2011; salanova, 2012). information provided on social media often triggers actions and provides directions during negotiation processes, however invisible online activists seem to be. social media remains the fastest and richest tool to drive results in a despotic regime. despite arguments against social media, it remains powerful as a tool to bring about democratic changes in africa, as evidenced in tunisia, egypt, libya, ghana, nigeria, zambia, uganda, kenya, and south africa (issaka, 2011; kasozi, 2011; khair e., 2011; muller, 2012; mwilu, 2011). two exceptional cases, nigeria and gambia, provide interesting scenarios of political participations through social media. during the 2011 presidential elections in nigeria, president goodluck jonathan strategically utilized social media to declare his presidential candidacy on facebook in around september 2010 to over 217,000 facebook followers. by april 2011, which was the month of the election, the number of jonathan’s followers on facebook was rounded to a million. some civil society groups, political parties, and the independent national electoral commission (inec) also used social media to monitor electoral process and engage voters (nnanyelugo, 2011). in 2011, the zambian presidential election illustrated an increased use of social media (especially facebook and twitter) by citizens, which was further encouraged by bantu watch, a civil society group that encourages voters to report incidents involving election-related violence and corruption via the online link, “zambialections.” citizens participated in the electoral process, and the election went peacefully (mwilu, 2011). social media strengthens advocacy, activisms and increases protests against economic hardships, government repression, and corruption. tunisia’s ‘jasmine revolution’ and egypt’s revolution were mainly organised and facilitated through social media. citizen engaged in facebook and twitter to mount protest against government corruption and the authoritarian regime during 2010/2011 (muller, 2012). in 2011, ugandans also adopted social media to advocate and protest against economic hardships and high inflation of commodities prices (kasozi, consilience oginni and moitui.: social media and public policy in africa   2011). issaka (2011) reveals that violent protests in the united kingdom mid2011 were driven by facebook, twitter and blackberry messenger. iran, china, uk, and the united states have used social media for public diplomacy (crouch, 2012; salanova, 2012; scherer, 2012; yu shan, 2013). social media was adopted as an active tool to spread news of haiti’s earthquake to millions of internet users who subsequently donated to disaster relief. the digital endevours positively affected lives and forged volunteer efforts (leavey, 2013). social media reenergises government, making it more efficient, transparent, accountable, and open to the active participation of the citizens it serves. 3. social media and public policy process in african countries within africa, social media practices have appeared in extraordinary magnitudes. they have led to revolutions (egypt, tunisia and libya), strengthened and monitored best practice during elections (nigeria, ghana, bostwana and zambia) and contributed to wider growth on the continent (dalberg, 2013; lesch, 2011; nnanyelugo, 2011). in the past decade, the number of africans engaged online was relatively few compared to about 240 million today (wis, 2014). but today, social media holds the highest proportion of online engagement in africa (issaka, 2011). dalberg (2013) examines the impact of the internet on development in africa and found that public opinion is increasingly internet based but its use within the african continent as a policy negotiation tool remained untapped. generally, public policy processes in africa are very conservative, with no contributions or inputs from larger communities directly or indirectly affected by policy (imurana, 2014; makinwa, 2012; obasi). this poses serious omission given that public policy is an influential tool for understanding and solving social problems (nhema, 2004). a recent study on public policy process in africa reveals that the social dichotomy between policymakers and citizens, inadequate information, politicization of policy implementation, and weakened feedback mechanisms are factors responsible for the formulation of unrealistic policies in the continent (imurana, 2014). social media has emerged as a fundamental game changer to complement the shortfalls of traditional public policy process by connecting governments or policymakers directly to citizens. smith (2003) posits that citizen engagement must be employed to achieve policy directions that are expected to have a major impact on them. engagement of citizens during the policy process provides an opportunity to address conflict with values or difficult policy choices, and investigate emerging issues that need considerable learning to reach consensus by reconciling competing interests. social media provides a platform for common citizens’ inputs, in the form of opinions or in some cases expert opinions, during policy negotiation processes. 4. enhanced public policy process in a digital community using david easton’s theory of the political system, public policy is divided into several parts: policy environment, inputs process, a conversion process (decision-making system), policy outputs, and feedback mechanisms consilience oginni and moitui.: social media and public policy in africa   (easton, 1965). at each stage of the public policy process, factors such as social distance between policymakers and the general public, information asymmetry, the politicisation of policy implementation, and weakened feedbacks mechanism have been identified as challenges of public policy processes in africa (imurana, 2014; obasi). africa is one of the fastest growing regions in technological adoption, and prior studies show that social media holds the highest proportion of online engagements in africa (itu, 2012). notwithstanding, the use of social media within the african continent as a policy negotiation tool remains unexplored. following david easton’s theory of political system, a framework was developed to enhance the public policy process in the digital age as shown in figure 1 below. figure 1: enhanced public policy process in a digital community. (source: authors, 2015). in order to embark on successful public policy decisions, governments or state actors need to influence citizens through effective media tools in order to realize gains. this kind of emotional and psychological influence is called “soft power” (jing, 2012). social media can be a useful tool for obtaining soft power. china adopted soft power in its foreign policy to gain access to developing countries, especially africa and south asia. in the early stages, there was resistance from african leaders to the interests of china in africa. tactfully, china penetrated africa through hospitality and interactions (i.e. the continuous visiting and hosting of their leaders until a cordial relationship was established). today, china has successfully established bilateral relations with most african countries (yu-shan, 2013). these relations have led to the development of infrastructure such as super highways, airport constructions, hydro electric plants etc. in angola, kenya, republic of congo and other parts of african countries. environment   citizens/society   inputs   conversion   process   outputs   feedbacks   government/   policymakers   consilience oginni and moitui.: social media and public policy in africa   hence, governments or state actors need to identify effective media tools in order to get citizens involved in the policy process. citizens have to be engaged to understand problem situations (environment). it is possible that policymakers have shadow knowledge of the phenomena that prompted the policy initiation process. in this situation, citizens become material evidence to transform shadow knowledge and bridge the knowledge gap. citizens’ engagement through social media lends policy process too much flexibility as indicated by the open space with dotted arrows (figure 1). imurana (2014) emphasizes the importance of citizens’ engagement during the policy process so as to direct policy to the satisfaction of the receiving locality. figure 1 explains the policy process in a digital community. in countries where there is no civic engagement (both online and offline), a conservative policy process is usually adopted. few selected cliques participate in the public policy process. this is indicated by a direct movement from a black rectangular box (governments or policymakers) to the (policy) environment. the cliques are part of the government that have shadow knowledge of problem situation. the movement continues until the feedback stage. in the event of no productive outcome, the cliques can manipulate feedback reports given that citizens’ opinions are not valued. the conservative policy process makes no provision for civic engagement during the policy process. hence, th epossibility of formulating unrealistic policy is apparently feasible. in countries where citizens’ engagement is valued, the public policy process is usually democratic and consultative. a consultative policy process makes for quality inputs, better decision-making processes, and effective implementation and feedback mechanisms. social media promotes a consultative policy process. in figure 1, the policy process starts from preliminary discussion of the problem situation on a real-time basis through the engagement of citizens online or both online and offline as depicted through the triangle. the triangle connects governments to citizens, both online and offline. citizens are engaged right from the agenda setting (environment) to the feedback stage. civic opinion can inform the progress, withdrawal, or altering of policy at any state to ensure that enhanced policy is formulated. the consultative policy process enjoys much flexibility since one stage is logically interlinked to another (figure 1). it is important, however, to note that the model in figure 1 does not capture the factors that aid online engagement, the influence of leadership style on civic engagement (online), or how to select from pools of public opinion on social media. social scientists are still in search of best scientific methods to ensure the credibility of evidence obtained from social media. auer (2011) argues that social media could be a potential danger owing to the large quantity of what is transmitted, thereby leading to misinformation— sorting out information from junk on social media networks until they gain reputation poses a challenge. whatever the case, it is important to identify online communities where citizens exchange relevant information to enhance policy process. in fact, the ability of governments to develop an electronic portal that permits online interactions with citizens on a real-time basis makes for the easy recognition of online users. 5. analysis and discussion in the context of the study, social media refers to online tools that permit real-time interactions and feedbacks (for instance, web 2.0); it is a broad term that extends beyond facebook, twitter, and linkedin to include e-government. consilience oginni and moitui.: social media and public policy in africa   generally, several variables measure the level of social media use for civic engagement. in the analysis of the impact of social media on arab region, mbrsg (2013) used the internet penetration rate, digital access index (dai), income (gdp per capita), social media penetration (facebook), internet freedom, and other development indicators like the global gender gap index and human development index. this study adopted the united nations’ model of the electronic government development index (egdi) to assess the extent of social media use for civic engagement among 53 africa governments. egdi is a composite indicator which measures the use of information communication technology to deliver public service at national level. the component of egdi include: the online service index (osi), telecommunication infrastructure index (tii) and the human capital index (hdi). added to these variables was facebook penetration to establish a relationship between social media and internet penetration in africa. this study utilised data from wis (2014) and undesa (2014). internet penetration and social media penetration was obtained from wis (2014) and egdi, osi, tii, and hci from undesa (2014). the study employed descriptive statistics and correlation analysis through spss version 21. figure 2: level of social media use for civic engagement in africa (source: author’s design, 2015) figure 2 depicts logical interlinks of variable measures of the level of social media use for civic engagement in africa. movement between the development status of information telecommunications (tii) and the scope of online service (osi) shows that africa has invested in information telecommunication technology beyond the global average, but this has translated little into online engagement. however, movement between human capital (hci) and tii projects are different case—level of investment in tii is not commensurate with inherent human capital. overall, africa’s egdi is below the global average. table 1 shows results on the level of social media use for civic engagement in africa. africa’s egdi (0.02661) falls below the world average of 0.4712 with a standard deviation of 0.01242 (t-statistics 12.135, p-value <0.001). compared to other regions of the world (table 3, appendix 1), africa has the lowest electronic government development index. this implies that the level of 0   0.1   0.2   0.3   0.4   0.5   0.6   0.7   egdi   osi   tii   hci   africa   world   consilience oginni and moitui.: social media and public policy in africa   social media use for civic engagement is very low in africa. the scope of online services (t-statistics 11.292, p-value <0.001) and the development status of telecommunication (t-statistics 20.902, p<0.001) were above the world average, but inherent human capital (t-statistics 0.962, p (0.340) > 0.001) was below average. by implication, increased investments in telecommunication infrastructures have not imparted much on human capital ict literacy in africa. ict illiteracy is still at a very high rate despite rising investments in icts by governments. the level of human capital literacy in a country might facilitate a degree of online engagement by its government. the result represents africa on average; individual countries have different results: some better and others worse off. morocco and mauritius have been identified as leaders in the online engagement of citizens in africa (undese survey, 2014). table 2 reveals the results of the relationship between internet penetration and social media use in africa. holding constant other factors influencing internet penetration, internet penetration and social media are highly positively correlated (0.837**) at the 1% significance level. this implies that the internet penetration rate aids social media use in african countries. the result was similar to that of dalberge (2013), who found that social media holds the highest proportion of internet users in africa. as citizens continue to have more access to information telecommunication and the level of human capital ict literacy increases, social media use for making intelligible decisions would increase in africa countries. 6. conclusion and recommendations the emergence of social media over a decade has altered the dimension of communication between governments and citizens. social media has opened channels for a more participatory government, new social dynamic, and a more inclusive civil society. globally, civic engagement in policy process has been emphasized and governments need sophisticated real-time tools to drive civic engagement and establish mechanisms for effective policy implementation and feedback. in order to facilitate empowerment and citizens’ participation in social, political, and economic life, a model was developed to enhance policy processes in a digital age using easton’s theory of the political system. it is worth noting that the model does not capture the factors that aid online engagement, influence leadership style on civic engagement (online), or how to select from pools of public opinions on social media. nonetheless, it provides a model for technology-driven citizens’ engagement in a digital age. in africa, social media use has taken new shape in terms of citizens’ engagement in the electoral process (zambia, ghana, libya and nigeria), revolutions (tunisia, egypt, and libya), and protests and advocacy (uganda). but, the level of social media use for civic engagement in the policy process is very low (below the global average with significant deviation). increased investment in telecommunication infrastructures is yet to have significant impact on human capital ict literacy in africa. there are high records of ict illiterates in africa, which affects the choices of adoption of online civic engagement. investment in telecommunications should include the building of human capital ict literacy. to achieve this, governments at all levels should encourage publicprivate partnerships in ict industries to afford ordinary citizens opportunity to acquire practical ict skills. policymakers should also explore citizens’ engagement online and adjust legislation and policies to incorporate technology consilience oginni and moitui.: social media and public policy in africa   in sub-regional and national development plans. further research is required to explore the level of social media use for civic engagement in individual countries or sub-regions of africa continent. it is also reasonable to assess the impact of investment in telecommunications on human capital ict literacy in african countries. consilience oginni and moitui.: social media and public policy in africa   bibliography alexis, t. 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(2003). nine digital divide truths. digital divide institute. retrieved from http://www.digitaldivide.org/digital-divide-topics/nine-digital-dividetruths.html undesa. (2014). united nations e-government survey united nations department of economic and social affairs consilience oginni and moitui.: social media and public policy in africa   wellman, b. (2001). physical place and cyberplace: the rise of personalized networking. internation journal of urban & region, 227-248. wis. (2014). internet world stats usage and population statistics. retrieved 4th january, 2015 www. http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm yu shan, w. (2013). the role of public sentiment and social media in the evolving china–africa relationship occasional paper no 134: south african institute of international affairs. appendix a: tables table 1: degree of social media use for civic engagement in africa ( variables africa world std. deviation tstatistics df sig. (2tailed) egdi 0.2661 0.4712 0.1242 12.135 53 0.000** osi 0.5074 0.3919 0.1758 11.292 53 0.000** tii 0.4951 0.365 0.1137 20.902 53 0.000** hci 0.4086 0.6566 0.1678 0.962 53 0.340 ** significant at 1% source: authors’ computation (2015) using spss version 21. table 2: correlations between internet penetration and social media use in africa variables internet penetration rate social media use (facebook penetration) internet user (penetration) pearson correlation 1 .837** sig. (2-tailed) .000 n 58 58 facebook (penetration) pearson correlation .837** 1 sig. (2-tailed) .000 n 58 58 **. correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). source: authors’ computation (2015) using spss version 21. table 3: top 20 countries in africa (electronic government development index) country level of income egdi egdi 2014 rank 2012 rank change high egdi tunisia upper middle 0.539 75 103 28 mauritius upper middle 0.5338 76 93 17 egypt lower middle 0.5129 80 107 27 consilience oginni and moitui.: social media and public policy in africa   seychelles upper middle 0.5113 81 84 3 morocco lower middle 0.506 82 120 38 middle egdi south africa upper middle 0.4869 93 101 8 botswana upper middle 0.4198 112 121 9 namibia upper middle 0.388 117 123 6 kenya low 0.3805 119 119 libya upper middle 0.3753 121 191 70 ghana lower middle 0.3735 123 145 22 rwanda low 0.3589 125 140 15 zimbabwe low 0.3585 126 133 7 cape verde lower middle 0.3551 127 118 9 gabon upper middle 0.3294 131 129 2 algeria upper middle 0.3106 136 132 4 swaziland lower middle 0.3056 138 144 6 angola upper middle 0.297 140 142 2 nigeria lower middle 0.2929 141 162 21 cameroon lower middle 0.2782 144 147 3 regional average 0.2661 world average 0.4712 source: undesa (2014) table 4: regional groupings (electronic government development index africa 0.2661 0.2011 0.1478 0.4492 americas 0.5074 0.4216 0.3805 0.7202 asia 0.4951 0.4652 0.3584 0.6615 europe 0.6936 0.5695 0.6678 0.8434 oceania 0.4086 0.2621 0.2564 0.7073 world 0.4712 0.3919 0.365 0.6566 source: undesa (2014) microsoft word mullenite.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 14, iss. 2 (2015), pp. 126-139 historical repetition and development narratives in guyana’s coastal drainage and irrigation system joshua mullenite department of global and sociocultural studies florida international university joshua.mullenite@fiu.edu abstract this article takes a critical look at the historiography of development in guyana as it appears in archival materials and the primary (governmental and nongovernmental reports) and secondary (scholarly) literature. i ask why development schemes were so heavily focused on drainage and irrigation (d&i), how this focus was justified, and whether there is another way to think about the possibilities for development in guyana in the future. it is argued that, in guyana, various development actors attempt to relocate what they perceive to be the previous regimes failures through discourses on racial and political difference. their solutions to these problems are often subsequently portrayed as corrections to the failures of the previous regime despite the significant repetition of certain themes. finally, it offers insight into how these development projects might be reconsidered. keywords: drainage and irrigation, agriculture, guyana, planning, historiography, repetition “one of [british guiana’s] fundamental needs is the improvement of the main drainage system in the coastal areas without which no progress towards the adoption of a better system of agriculture will be possible.” – extract from secret despatch from sir wilfrid jackson to the secretary of state for the colonies, dated 2 april, 1940. “lack of maintenance of the [drainage and irrigation] system is the main constraint mentioned by farmers and is the most frequently cited reason for land abandonment” – region vi sub-regional land use plan, september 2004. 1. introduction when karl marx famously stated that “all great world historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice […] the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce” (marx, 1852) he seemingly failed to account for the necessary double role that the effects of these reappearances would play. for many, the reappearance of historic facts is always, at least in part, a tragedy. this is especially true when experiences of “underdevelopment” collide with relatively recent experiences of colonialism and are read as mutually-occurring processes (cf. rodney, 1972). as a result, the third-world development experience requires an understanding of the consilience mullenite: guyana’s coastal drainage lasting political, economic, and social effects of colonialism in its many forms. it has been made clear by allan pred (2004) and others (e.g., haraway, 1989; mbembe, 2001; stoler, 2013; trouillot, 1995) that history (and particularly colonial history) is not a sequence of events that have happened only in the past with no bearing on the present, nor is it ever a complete and factual representation of what has happened. instead, history is an on-going process that both structures and is structured by the present and by the systems of power when events were transcribed and when they are interpreted. that is to say, history is an on-going process of transcription and translation. for guyana, a country on south america’s caribbean rimland, this means many things but, importantly, it has meant that development schemes focusing on increasing agricultural production have been transcribed and read in ways that allow for repetition, not only in their overarching goals (e.g. to grow more food domestically) but also in the ways in which they plan on achieving these goals. this has meant expansion of the country’s drainage and irrigation (d&i) system. in each decade beginning with the 1940s, references to major coastal d&i projects can be found throughout the colonial and postcolonial archives as well as in the other governmental and non-governmental literatures on economic development in guyana. in this article, i ask why development schemes were so heavily focused on d&i, how this focus was justified, and whether there is another way to think about the possibilities for a more sustainable development in guyana’s future. to answer this, i critically examine the historiography of development in guyana as it appears in archival materials and the primary and secondary (scholarly) literature. i argue that, in guyana, various development actors attempt to relocate what they perceive to be the previous regimes failures through discourses on racial and political difference. their solutions to these problems are often subsequently portrayed as corrections to the failures of the previous regime. what results is a nearly complete repetition of the schemes they claim have failed. because this model of development rests on the breakdown of the previous attempts, it is inherently unsustainable. to overcome the challenges associated with this repetition-based system of development, new ways of understanding the politics of infrastructure and the vibrancy of nature are required. by viewing d&i infrastructure as political, and by giving nature agency, sustainable development practice will be able to more adequately account for them in their design and implementation. i am not the first to note the repetition of economic factors of development in guyana. kenneth jameson (1980) spoke of the “repetition to most measures of performance in the economy,” particularly as they dealt with international trade deals with the imf (p. 77). while jameson offers important insights into the role of transnational trade agreements in the postcolonial era, his work does not speak directly to how these affected development initiatives on the coast. that is, while he looks at the goals of development from a multinational financial perspective, he does not explore the means by which these goals are to be met. this paper takes the idea of repetition further. it is not just that development’s ends and the actors are being repeated, but the means are as well. consilience mullenite: guyana’s coastal drainage 2. situating guyana before delving into the developmental historiography, it is important to understand a few, somewhat unique, facets of guyana’s history, and thus its present state. this is the historical geography of guyana’s population density, the country’s reason for relying so heavily on drainage and irrigation, and the political conditions guyana has experienced through its history. while many authors have focused on certain of these aspects in regards to guyana’s development, often mixing them (e.g. hintzen, 1989; hope, 1985; mistry et. al., 2009; pierce, 1984; williams, 1991; etc.), there has yet to be what might be called a historical political ecology of guyana. i attempt to outline one below, but it is not meant to be in-depth. currently home to 90 per cent of the country’s population, the coastal plain remained largely uninhabited until permanent colonial settlement of the region in the eighteenth century (evans & meggars, 1960). 2 the plain itself sits largely below sea level on nearly impermeable clay/silt soil and granite bedrock (williams and johnson-bola, 2009). aside from a few areas of higher elevation scattered throughout, it was historically inhospitable due to the constant inundation and poor drainage resulting from its low elevation and the inability of water to escape through soil and bedrock into the aquifer. as a result, indigenous populations settled further inland and only ventured to the coast on occasion to work for or trade with the colonialists (rodway, 1912; see also williams, 2003). originally a dutch colony, the land along the coast had to be “reclaimed” using a complex system of levees and canals before being settled. the initial construction and continued colonial maintenance of infrastructure was by african slave labor and later indentured labor from portugal, china, africa, indonesia, and india (rodney, 1981). regardless of the elevation in comparison to sea level, the most populated areas remain those that have been reclaimed for use in the plantation economy along the northern coastal plain with 39 percent of the population and 43 percent of the gdp on land that is considered to be at serious risk of flooding (hickey and weis, 2012). as a result, the majority of the current guyanese population live in an almost entirely built environment; an environment which is only partially connected to the historical ecological processes of the region prior to colonialism, and one which is tied directly to the colonial-agricultural export economy. the built landscape of the guyanese coast was designed specifically for the development of a plantation agriculture system with sugar production in mind (rodney, 1981). the trenches to drain rainwaters and divert flooding from the country’s many rivers doubled as a system of irrigation and transport for cane fields along the coast (jenkins 1871). the trenches also acted as logical boundaries for the various plantations that made up the coastal environment and currently, along with the rivers, help to define the boundaries of the country’s coastal neighbourhood democratic councils. the seacoast is protected from intrusion by a large sea wall broken up by water management control devices, which drain the canals via gravity 2 it is possible that there had been some settlement on the coast in prehistoric guyana and settlement upstream, but what were to become the most populated areas were seemingly uninhabited. for more on pre-contact archaeology of the region see williams, 2003. consilience mullenite: guyana’s coastal drainage feed at low tide. in some areas, mechanical drainage (in the form of pumps) is used so that water can be pumped out any time, but these are not as common, existing primarily on the largest plantations only (hickey & weis, 2012). since water on much of the coast drains naturally to the north (i.e. toward the sea, where the largest plantations and the capital city of georgetown are located), large drainage conservancies were built slightly inland as well to keep the draining water from backing up to the point of running into the seawall and causing flooding (hickey & weis, 2012). this does little when heavy rains cause flooding in the coastal areas to the north during the rainy season and the water has nowhere to escape (see, e.g. vaughn 2013). the impact of such flooding is felt especially in the city of georgetown, which has been built up massively since the planning and inception of original d&i system (see hickey & weis, 2012; pelling, 1999). aside from georgetown, the remainder of the coast is made up of a patchwork of small villages connected by a levee-top roadway. these villages are the remnants of the plantation system and bear the names of the plantations that once occupied that space. the houses are in the same spaces as the plantation worker houses and much of the labor force works in the sugar and rice fields that were once a part of the plantation agricultural system. they are a part of what ann stoler (2013) has called “imperial debris,” the ‘protracted imperial processes that saturate the subsoil of people’s lives and persist, sometimes subjacently, over a longer durée’ (p. 5).3 each village, with its associated fields and canals, act as a reminder of the history and legacy of this system as well as the tensions between life and water which exist along the coast. the period leading up to and immediately following independence brought with it a new way that guyana’s built agricultural landscape would become politicized. though it started as a broad marxist front united by a history of colonial exploitation, the ppp would soon divide along racial lines with the urban, primarily afro-guyanese portion, leaving to form the people’s national congress (pnc) led by forbes burnham, while the rural, mostly indo-guyanese base, stayed with cheddi jagan (see hintzen, 1989). though the two political parties were approximately the same size, the ppp maintained a more active political base that allowed it to win all of the pre-independence, tutelage era elections. however, leader cheddi jagan’s ties to the soviet union provoked us intervention that would lead to forbes burnham becoming the first independence-era president (rabe 2005). the now geographically divided political base would have divergent interests, not only in how terms of how the economy should be managed, but also of the importance of d&i infrastructure expansion and maintenance. the pnc would remain in power under burnham until his death in 1985 and would lose the 1988 election to the ppp, inverting at least some aspects of guyana’s racially bifurcated political system. 3 i think it is important to recognize that it is problematic to call the spaces in which people live ‘debris.’ despite this, the idea remains a useful to think about why people live in the places they live. consilience mullenite: guyana’s coastal drainage 3. infrastructure expansion, development, and decolonization the victories of marxism and the global processes of decolonization (and the corollary process of development) after world war ii had a profound effect on guyana. guyana’s first major trade union movement (which consisted primarily of agricultural workers) coincided with the creation of the first specifically developmental discourse globally (see ppp, n.d.; escobar, 1995). occurring alongside all of this shifting in the global and local political economies was a reinvestment in agricultural industry as a means to alleviate labor unrest through the economic stabilization of the colony as a whole. according to the 1955 annual report of the colonial government, the total expenditure on agricultural development, including d&i expansion and repair, between 1951 and 1955 was bwi$8,678,912, or around 12.5 percent of total development expenditure (british guiana, 1955). the 1959 annual report stated that the d&i system, including sea defenses, required bwi$11 million, 4 which was more than half of the total development expenditure for the year (british guiana, 1959). the goal of this development was to produce food (specifically rice) for the global market to feed “the progressive increase in population”5 while ostensibly also increasing national income and prosperity (british guiana, 1959). many of the plans set out by the colonial government during the 1940s and which were to be carried out through the 1950s never came fully to fruition (though many others did, at least according to the colonial report of 1955; see british guiana 1955). happening simultaneously to the new development and expansion of water control systems was a focus on increasing rice production along the coast. a 1941 report from the director of agriculture in british guiana mentions a “grow more food campaign” that, in part, rested on increases in rice production, but failed ostensibly due to weather constraints – specifically a lack of rainfall (british guiana, 1941). the 1944 drainage and irrigation scheme map and supplement released by the bureau of publicity and information (bpi) mentions that water shortages were a major part of the expansion of the d&i system (bpi, 1944). rice is the only crop mentioned by name in the supplement and has a whole page dedicated to how the expansion will aid the industry. sugar, long a staple crop and a source of considerable power within guyana’s unions, is not mentioned. the projects culminated with the creation of the black bush polder land settlement scheme in the early 1960s which reclaimed 27,000 acres of land for rice production and population settlement along a previously unusable part of the coast (standing & sukdeo, 1977). these projects were deemed failures, in part due to climatological “factors which led to crop failure in 1976 [and] demoralised most of the farmers, who subsequently drifted away, mostly back to georgetown” (standing & sukdeo, 1977, p. 312). a 2011 report from the guyana ministry of agriculture titled “food and nutrition security strategy for guyana” (fnss) continues the emphasis on the rice 4 this is about £105,000,000 or 2013 us$170,173,500. however, since the currency no longer exists there is some difficulty in converting it. 5 the quote comes from an ad placed at the beginning of a number of issues of the official agricultural journal of guyana, timheri, in the 1950s. consilience mullenite: guyana’s coastal drainage and sugar industries and notes the role of the deficincies of the current d&i system. a part of maintaining rice production and keeping its costs low is the creation of the agriculture support services project, (assp) “which aims to increase rural incomes by increasing the efficiency of agricultural production” (ministry of agriculture, 2011, p. 9). increasing efficiency, and “rural incomes,” is directly tied to the maintenance of the d&i system which also falls under the control of the assp as a part of rehabillitation projects which began in 2009 under the agricultural export diversification program (adp). these projects, while a part of the fnss, are also a part of the 2006 national competitiveness strategy, which shared many of the same goals. a partial goal of these projects is to enhance guyana’s food security while also increasing the country’s food sovereignty and agricultural exports (ministry of agriculture, 2011). in 2008, the ministry of agriculture furthered these efforts with the establishment of the ‘grow more food campaign’ (ministry of agriculture, 2011, p. 8). this campaign, despite its nominal allusion to its 1940s counterpart, encourages “households to become involved in backyard gardening” and thus removes a portion of the burden of project failure from the state and places it within the households. a similar plan had been inacted before in relation to structual adjustments programs (saps) which emerged in the 1980s as part of guyana’s requirements to re-enter the imf (ferguson, 1995; pelling, 1999). one of the goals of the saps was the democratization and liberalization of development in the country and, as a result, there was an increase in petit agriculture as the fnss and current “grow more food campaign” suggest. according to mark pelling (1999), though, many of those who had engaged in petit agriculture during that period had given up due to losses resulting from a general failure of the d&i system. the solution, which in part was intended to address the failures of the state-led development in the previous thirty years, failed at the hands of the still state-maintained d&i system. as pelling (1999) shows, some of the least vulnerable to the effects of flooding on the guyanese coast were the informal (i.e. squatter) housing settlements that attempted to live outside of the official, state-sanctioned housing system. he argues that this may have been partly the result of grassroots communal action taken by these groups (pelling, 1999). the state had failed the market-led system and the market failed to address the shortcomings of the state. given this, it would seem that guyana has learned partially from its past while still re-enacting the schemes it seeks to correct. d&i are scantly mentioned in the 2011 food and nutrition security strategy. however, the national land use plan released in 2013 goes into much more detail on the role of d&i systems, not only in the “grow more food campaign,” but also in developmental plans in general. this includes “the development of new d&i areas (particularly for rice)” that will undoubtedly result in the reclamation of the remaining “unusable” coastal system, harkening back to the development of the black bush polder scheme in the 1960s, which has its own contentious socio-political history (burrowes, 1984; government of guyana, 2013, p. 11). the land use plan also mentions plans to rehabilitate the canals polders d&i system which, if its near-constant mentioning in consilience mullenite: guyana’s coastal drainage official reports published in the british guiana gazette6 are any indication, was a major area of interest in the 1950s. the reason areas like canals polders and other parts of the d&i need work is relegated to the negligence of the past. these are required, according to the local development discourse, for continued agricultural development, including massively increasing rice production. the land-use plan mentions “historically poor maintenance” as one of the primary reasons for the large amount of unused land in these areas, putting one idea before the other when it would perhaps be best to think about them as mutually reinforcing (government of guyana, 2013, p. 99). how can one say with any certainty whether the land is unused due to poor maintenance or that poor maintenance is the result of lack of need? if one is more true than the other, what made it so, and how is this to be avoided this time around? development historiography places the blame for lack of development on past practices without recognition that the historicity of these claims is potentially problematic. in development discourse in the region, the colonial government and the nominally socialist regime that followed it failed to maintain the infrastructural system that would have allowed guyana to prosper (munslow, 1998). this ignores the fact that, for the majority of guyanese, the country has never been particularly prosperous regardless of how well the system was or was not maintained. however, we can also see that the plans put in place are largely the same as those which are described as being at fault for the current conditions. the role of the state has changed in the different “grow more food campaigns” but the methods and goals, when viewed in a larger context, remain largely the same. growing more food no longer means just an intensification of rice production but also an increase in petit agriculture so that more rice can be exported—similar means to reach a similar end. the ideas and planning have not actually changed significantly over the course of several decades; they have simply swapped the names of the actors around. the d&i system has been and largely remains the cornerstone of agricultural development in guyana. without it, one cannot imagine life on the coastal plain. perhaps that is where some of the problem lies. the need for a functioning drainage system to populate the coast is a result of historical paths which make populating the coast a necessity. the result has been a constant search for solutions to coastal problems as well as a constant reference to the d&i system and the need to expand coastal agriculture to support it. this raises an important question that i think must be considered, especially in light of the potential impacts of sea level rise and increasingly volatile weather patterns associated with climate change: what does a guyana without a coast look like? this is almost impossible to imagine no matter how likely of a scenario it may be. this is particularly true when viewing guyana’s future from a position which ignores the problems of the present in order to place the blame in the past. 6 the gazette was a monthly report that outlined the administrative happenings in the colony and would include announcements of policy, listings of recent arrests, government property sales, etc. consilience mullenite: guyana’s coastal drainage 3. the impacts of developmental historiography and sustainable development this article makes two important points. first, development discourse is a historiographical discourse, and the ability of development projects to take hold depends on a certain representation and understanding of the past, regardless of the historicity of those claims. second, in the case of guyana and other postcolonial agricultural states, these representations are themselves a product of what might be envisioned as an always inchoate development process. that is, reptitious development is self-defeating. new development projects are directly respondent to those that have passed. the projects repeat themselves in ways that, through certain discursive formations, appear to always be new and emergent rather than reimaginings of previous projects. even then, they never truly develop completely before the next wave comes in to wash them away. as the threat of sea level rise and the volatile weather patterns associated with climate change become more imminent, it becomes increasingly important that countries seriously consider the impacts of climate change alongside development initiatives. recent scholarship on climate change in guyana (e.g. vaughn, 2013) has noted a discursive shift in the politics of vulnerability since the 2005 floods, but this shift in language may in fact obscure the repetition this article has sought to expose. hickey and weis (2012) have laid out a detailed analysis of guyana’s infrastructural issues related to climate adaptation, mitigation, and the d&i system, but their main argument falls within the realm of what disaster sociologist lee clarke (2006) calls ‘probabilistic thinking.’ in this mode of thought, risk management is handled based on what will most likely happen rather than what could happen. as a result, populations remain at risk because risk planning fails to account for chain reactions, secondary effects, or, in the case of climate change, rapid shifts in the predicted impacts. while a system that ‘centres on rehabilitating and strengthening the crucial sea and river defences and drainage and irrigation system’ will in all likelihood provide some level of risk mitigation, it keeps a relatively large population tied to a potentially volatile coastal plain (hickey & weis, 2012, p. 72). this is presumably done for their own good, for economic development, through increased export in their agriculture and rice sectors—but who really benefits here? with decades of research on utilizing interior soils and an abundance of fresh water that could easily provide for a large population, why does the coast remain the focus of developmental schemes7? is this sustainable? is there a viable alternative? in presenting this research a a simple question was posed to me, why not just move people away from the coast? there are a number of issues there, but regardless of this the idea still replays another idea of guyana’s development history, which saw amerindian groups displaced from their land in the name of progress (see hennessy, 2013; mistry et. al. 2009) or which saw the movement of peoples away from the coast to take part in economic (and agricultural) diversification (david, 1969; standing & sukdeo, 1977). it is also important to consider, as mark pelling (2012) 7 see, e.g. discussion in (robert r. nathan associates, inc., 1974) for an early history of this, my own archival research at the university of florida confirms not only important aspects of the history of development in the interior, but also that such research has continued. consilience mullenite: guyana’s coastal drainage has, that ‘flood control projects actually serve to encourage floodplain development’ (p. 77). as development occurs in the coastal plain and population increases, not only will more people come under currently existing threats, but risk will increase as more areas become impermeable and the drainage system becomes more taxed as a result. in short, the d&i-as-development and d&i-as-mitigation, while compatible and logical sentiments, are not sustainable in relation to the often non-considered possibilities of the future. it is a challenging and troubling proposition to ask the question of what might be done to make development in guyana more sustainable. the d&i infrastructure certainly needs to be updated, repaired, and, often times and in many places, replaced. the problem is thus not in existing developmental means but in the failure of these means to fulfill their promises of increased human security. this can be partially linked to the fact that projects have the potential to hurt economic incomes through the disruption of farming practices and therefore never come fully to fruition (see marks & ellis, 2013). the means, here, are used to reach an end which is to provide not just environmental security but, and primarily, economic security. if the means continously disrupts economic processes, it faces a contradiction in its own logic that must be overcome. this points to a larger issue: the d&i system becomes viewed as somehow separate from the people who live within it. it is presented as asocial, and ahistorical. its history only exists as a tool for social actors to manipulate in different ways to advance social ends rather than as something which may be able to inform future development. infrastructure becomes a means or a burden without taking into account local affective understandings of it. affective not only in the meanings ascribed to it through memory, but also in the ways in which the history and politics of the infrastructure itself shape guyanese identity. as langdon winner (1989) puts it, “in our accustomed way of thinking technologies are seen as neutral tools that can be used well or poorly, for good, evil, or something in between. but we usually do not stop to inquire whether a given device might have been designed and built in such a way that it produces a set of consequences logically and temporally prior to any of its professed uses. […] if our moral and political language for evaluating technology includes only categories having to do with tools and uses, if it does not include attention to the meaning of the designs and arrangements of our artifacts, then we will be blinded to much that is intellectually and practically crucial” (p. 25, original emphasis). drainage and irrigation on guyana’s coast is a technology, no doubt, and it is a technology with political implications ingrained in its history. without the colonial history of agricultural production, the continued development debates in guyana would likely not be necessary. the infrastructure is therefore a technology not just of agriculture, but of the human trafficking that existed with the creation of this space as an agricultural region. its politics take many forms and many meanings, ranging from histories of colonial extraction, slavery, indentureship, and the violence of these systems, to the racial politics of decolonization, a racially bifurcated political system, and the politics of global capitalism and the promises and problems that come with it. is it possible to relocate the impetus of d&i development toward an understanding of d&i (and water, sugar, rice, and rain) as a relational aspect that, on consilience mullenite: guyana’s coastal drainage its own, has a need to survive? implicit in the nature of the question is an important way of reimagining development. jane bennett (2010) suggests that scholars “take seriously […] the capacity of things – edibles, commodities, storms, metals – not only to impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, and tendancies of there own,” (p. viii). if this is done, what changes about the development project in guyana or globally? if the inanimate world is understood to have agency, then the only way to proceed with development is to understand its “trajectories, propensities, and tendancies” and take an active role in alleviating people from the risk caused by them. in order for development to be sustainable, it must be led by the individuals who have lifetimes and generations of experience with the attitudes and understandings of what is necessary to make life possible and viable; take seriously the knowledges gleened from a lifetime of struggle with and against these new vitalyet-material aspects of everyday life. the goal is not to foreclose on the possibility of functional and sustainable development within the existing system nor to place the prospects for a more humanistic development into the future, but rather to cast new light on the combined limitations of the state and the market to the functioning of development. additionally, repetition does not always have negative effects. as anthropologist jean rahier (2013) suggests, “what is repeated is always a previous temporality, which was itself already a repetition. and it is because they represent preceding periods that repetitions incarnate creativity, at the very same time that they give some illusion of return, of recurrence. but one should not be mistaken. a manifestation never has the same value twice” (p.96). consilience mullenite: guyana’s coastal drainage bibliography bennett, j. 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(1989). the whale and the reactor: a search for limits in an age of high technology. chicago: the university of chicago press. microsoft word badichek.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 14, iss. 2 (2015), pp. 1-24 resolving conflicts between endangered species conservation and renewable energy siting: wiggle room for renewables? gregg badichek juris doctor candidate, 2016 columbia law school, new york gmb2149@columbia.edu abstract two federal policies—the protection of endangered species, and the rapid creation of renewable energy infrastructure—currently exist in significant legal tension. while both are important for the development of necessary sustainability, climate change induced by the continuous burning of carbon-based fuels likely poses a greater threat to endangered species than does the growth of commercialscale renewable energy sites. this paper outlines several points of conflict between the two policies and subsequently considers the extent to which federal agencies responsible for renewable energy oversight and development possess “wiggle room” under the endangered species act. a few recommendations for greater leeway are then offered. author’s note the author would like to thank professor michael gerrard of columbia law school for providing intellectual resources and constant mentorship, as well as ashleigh pp hunt for invaluable editing, inspiration, and support. keywords: endangered species act, energy policy act, renewable energy infrastructure, endangered species, indiana bat, climate change. 1. introduction it is widely accepted that the united states’ energy infrastructure must undergo a dramatic restructuring away from traditional fossil fuel energy sources, and toward low-carbon renewable energy sources, if the most catastrophic effects of anthropogenic climate change are to be avoided in the long term.1 1 the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc) has long held that global warming must not exceed 2°c from preindustrial levels to stave off catastrophic climate change. see climate change 2014: mitigation of climate change, intergovernmental panel on climate change (2014), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg3/. nations pledged to work toward this goal at the 2009 united nations framework on climate change summit in copenhagen. see rep. of the conference of the parties on its fifteenth session, u.n.f.c.c. (dec. 2009), available at http://maindb.unfccc.int/library/view_pdf.pl?url=http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/c op15/eng/11a01.pdf. an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas pollution by 2050 is generally agreed upon by scientists as the target necessary to reduce significant impacts from climate consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy surprisingly, the u.s. congress has not been wholly inactive in pursuing this goal, even though the federal and state governments have made considerable progress in revamping the nation’s energy infrastructure.2 however, due to the considerable ecological disturbances that accompany large-scale infrastructural change generally and renewable energy development specifically, this vital policy runs up against another, older congressionally endorsed effort: the protection of threatened and endangered wildlife species. this paper presumes that it is preferable to risk the individual lives and, if necessary, existence of some species in pursuit of rapid renewable energy infrastructure development. the alternative—prioritization of species’ survival over energy reformatting, resulting in inaction—would increase global climate risk, and ultimately threaten more species and habitats in the long term. the relevant question is: what “wiggle room” do federal agencies, both administering the endangered species act (esa) and subject to its provisions, have that allows them to facilitate the development of a renewable energy infrastructure while complying with the act? part ii of this paper provides a background of the two policies, and contextualizes the conflict between them. part iii provides technical details of major renewable energy sources and technologies, and specific ways in which they harm wildlife. part iv transitions to the legal framework that underlies the conflict. part v presents “wiggle room” in the statutory framework that would facilitate the speedier development of renewable energy infrastructure. part vi offers potential solutions and statutory innovations that would further expedite renewable energy development. 2. dueling policies integral to this paper’s inquiry is an examination of laws and actions supporting the two environmental policies, endorsed by congress, that ultimately clash—endangered and threatened species protection, and the rapid development of a national renewable energy infrastructure—and the reasons that they were not designed to complement one another. 2.1 endangered and threatened species protection over a century of jurisprudential developments constitute the corpus of federal laws protecting wildlife. congress has protected wildlife by statute since the passage of the lacey act in 1900.3 this act makes it unlawful to import, export, sell, acquire, or purchase fish, wildlife, or plants that are taken, possessed, transported, or sold: 1) in violation of u.s. or indian law, or 2) in interstate or foreign commerce change; approaching this target would require a deep restructuring of the fossil fuel economy. see u.s. can cut greenhouse gas emissions 80 percent by 2050, study says, yale environment 360 (nov. 21, 2014), http://e360.yale.edu/digest/us_can_cut_greenhouse_gas_emissions_80_percent_by_2050_s tudy_says/4305. 2 see infra part ii.b. 3 see lacey act, u.s. fish and wildlife service, http://www.fws.gov/international/lawstreaties-agreements/us-conservation-laws/lacey-act.html (last accessed apr. 28, 2015). consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy involving any fish, wildlife, or plants taken, possessed, or sold in violation of state or foreign law.4 illegal trade of animals and plants results in civil and criminal penalties and permit sanctions.5 subsequently, and throughout the 20th century, congress passed numerous statutes that protect particular species and groups of species.6 1972 saw the notable passage of the marine mammal protection act (mmpa), which prohibits the taking of marine mammals in u.s. waters and by u.s. citizens on the high seas, and the importation of marine mammals and their products into the u.s. 7 in contrast to earlier, pointed conservation laws, the mmpa was the first legislation promoting an ecosystem approach to natural resource management and conservation. 8 this approach thoroughly permeated the conceptual underpinning of the subsequent esa. the presence of a considerable body of wildlife legislation ultimately permitted the employment of statutory focus on demographic conceptions of species, namely endangered and threatened species. this came to the fore with the passage of the seminal endangered species act of 1973, which, as the predominant conservation law dealing with threatened and endangered species, is the most important legislation to the conflict described in this paper. built upon the basic framework of the earlier, insufficient endangered species preservation act of 1966,9 the new law reflected the “policy of congress that all federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species,”10 and was enacted “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered11 species and threatened12 species depend may be conserved.”13 the esa empowers the departments of the interior and commerce, through the fish and wildlife service (fws) and the national marine fisheries service (nmfs) (collectively “service(s)”), respectively, to take legal measures to protect these wildlife and their habitats.14 4 16 u.s.c.a. § 3372 (2014). 5 id. § 3373. 6 see, e.g., the bald and golden eagle protection act, 16 u.s.c. §§ 668-668d, passed in 1940, which prohibits “taking” bald eagles without a permit. 7 16 u.s.c.a. 1631–1407 (2014). 8 see marine mammals, u.s. fish and wildlife service, http://www.fws.gov/habitatconservation/marine_mammals.html (last updated sep. 22, 2014). 9 see endangered species act, u.s. fish and wildlife service, http://www.fws.gov/endangered/laws-policies/esa-history.html (last updated jul. 15, 2013). 10 16 u.s.c.a. § 1531(c)(1) (2014). 11 an endangered species is “any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range . . .” id. § 1532(6). 12 a threatened species is “any species which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range. . .” id. § 1532(20). 13 id. § 1531(b). 14 id. § 1533. consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy 2.2 renewable energy infrastructure more recently, congress has presented a clear policy supporting the widespread development of renewable energy infrastructure. in 2001, president bush ordered that “[f]or energy-related projects, agencies shall expedite their review of permits or take other actions as necessary to accelerate the completion of such projects” in a safe and environmentally sound manner.15 the energy policy act of 2005 (epa) commanded that the secretary of the interior should, by 2015, have approved non-hydropower renewable energy projects located on the public lands totaling at least 10,000 megawatts. 16 this meant that the bureau of land management (blm) had to approve leases for that amount of renewable energy development on public land. this goal was met in october 2012 with the secretary’s approval of the wyoming wind project site.17 the american reinvestment and recovery act of 2009 (arra), which encapsulated the stimulus package launched in response to the financial crisis of 2008, created numerous subsidies for wind, solar, and geothermal energy development. the act ultimately allowed the department of energy (doe) to invest more than $31 billion in clean energy projects across the nation.18 the act also provided tax incentives for renewable development, extending the production tax credit for wind energy development through 2012;20 implementing an option to elect a 30% investment tax credit or cash grant in lieu of the production tax credit; and expanding a federal loan guarantee program managed by the doe.21 several states have aligned their policies with congress’. many have adopted renewable portfolio standards (rpss), tools mandating that a certain percentage of retail electricity sold in the state must derive from renewable sources such as wind, solar, and biomass.22 most states currently have either mandatory rps programs or voluntary renewable portfolio goals in place,23 with percentage and absolute targets varying considerably among them.24 more recently, congress has presented a clear policy supporting the 15 exec. order no. 13,212, 66 fed. reg. 28,357 (may 18, 2001). 16 energy policy act of 2005, 42 u.s.c.a. §§ 15801–16538 (2014). 17 see press release, department of interior (oct. 9, 2012), http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/salazar-authorizes-landmark-wyoming-windproject-site-reaches-presidents-goal-of-authorizing-10000-megawatts-of-renewableenergy.cfm. note, however, that approval of this much energy is very different from actual installation. the latter process is still in early stages of development. 18 for an infographic of doe arra funded projects, see recovery act, department of energy, http://www.energy.gov/recovery-act (last accessed apr. 8, 2015). 20 2009 american recovery and reinvestment act, pub l. no. 111-5, 123 stat. 115. 21 2008 wind technologies market report, u.s. department of energy 44–45 (july 2009), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/46026.pdf. 22 see renewable portfolio standards, nrel, http://www.nrel.gov/tech_deployment/state_local_governments/basics_portfolio_standar ds.html (last updated sep. 8, 2014). 23 see renewable portfolio standards, u.s. epa, http://www.epa.gov/agstar/tools/funding/renewable.html (last accessed apr. 28, 2015). 24 california, e.g., is much higher than most rpss, and mandates 33% renewable energy sourcing by 2020. cal. pub. util. code §§ 399.11–.20 (west 2015). consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy widespread development of renewable energy infrastructure. in 2001, president bush ordered that “[f]or energy-related projects, agencies shall expedite their review of permits or take other actions as necessary to accelerate the completion of such projects” in a safe and environmentally sound manner.25 the energy policy act of 2005 (epa) commanded that the secretary of the interior should, by 2015, have approved non-hydropower renewable energy projects located on the public lands totaling at least 10,000 megawatts. 26 this meant that the bureau of land management (blm) had to approve leases for that amount of renewable energy development on public land. this goal was met in october 2012 with the secretary’s approval of the wyoming wind project site.27 the american reinvestment and recovery act of 2009 (arra), which encapsulated the stimulus package launched in response to the financial crisis of 2008, created numerous subsidies for wind, solar, and geothermal energy development. the act ultimately allowed the department of energy (doe) to invest more than $31 billion in clean energy projects across the nation.28 the act also provided tax incentives for renewable development, extending the production tax credit for wind energy development through 2012,29 and implementing an option to elect a 30% investment tax credit or cash grant in lieu of the production tax credit, and expanding a federal loan guarantee program managed by the doe.30 several states have aligned their policies with congress’. many have adopted renewable portfolio standards (rpss), tools mandating that a certain percentage of retail electricity sold in the state must derive from renewable sources such as wind, solar, and biomass.31 most states currently have either mandatory rps programs or voluntary renewable portfolio goals in place,32 with percentage targets varying considerably among them.33 the executive branch under president barack obama has actively supported the move toward large-scale renewable energy infrastructure development, 25 exec. order no. 13,212, 66 fed. reg. 28,357 (may 18, 2001). 26 energy policy act of 2005, 42 u.s.c.a. §§ 15801–16538 (2014). 27 see press release, department of interior (oct. 9, 2012), http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/salazar-authorizes-landmark-wyoming-windproject-site-reaches-presidents-goal-of-authorizing-10000-megawatts-of-renewableenergy.cfm. note, however, that approval of this much energy is very different from actual installation. the latter process is still in early stages of development. 28 for an infographic of doe arra funded projects, see recovery act, department of energy, http://www.energy.gov/recovery-act (last accessed apr. 8, 2015). 29 2009 american recovery and reinvestment act, pub l. no. 111-5, 123 stat. 115. 30 2008 wind technologies market report, u.s. department of energy 44–45 (july 2009), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/46026.pdf. 31 see renewable portfolio standards, nrel, http://www.nrel.gov/tech_deployment/state_local_governments/basics_portfolio_standar ds.html (last updated sep. 8, 2014). 32 see renewable portfolio standards, u.s. epa, http://www.epa.gov/agstar/tools/funding/renewable.html (last accessed apr. 28, 2015). 33 california, e.g., is much higher than most rpss, and mandates 33% renewable energy sourcing by 2020. cal. pub. util. code §§ 399.11–.20 (west 2015). consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy particularly as a means of climate change mitigation.34 notably, the administration has declared ambitious goals that dwarf the benchmark set by the 2005 epa: to install 100 megawatts of renewable capacity across federally subsidized housing by 2020, permit ten gigawatts of renewable projects on public lands by 2020, deploy three gigawatts of renewable energy on military installations by 2025, and double wind and solar electricity generation in the united states by 2025.35 regarding federal permitting, the president has ordered all agencies to “take all steps . . . to execute federal permitting and review processes with maximum efficiency and effectiveness.”36 the administration has also called for congress to make permanent the renewable energy tax production credit.37 2.3 the tension between these two policies these efforts demonstrate the strong desire of both congress and the executive branch to reinforce the protection of threatened and endangered species while also quickly developing a robust national renewable energy infrastructure. utility-scale renewable facilities often come at the cost of a large amount of incidental taking of endangered and threatened species populating the ecosystems where renewable energy resources are abundant. however, facilities of considerable size are integral to fulfilling both the federal renewable energy policy goal and the scientific recommendation to mitigate anthropogenic climate change via the rapid transition away from a fossil fuel-based energy system. the tension between these two policies can be partially explained by chronological misalignment: the majority of america’s larger infrastructural ambitions—the interstate highway system, the intracoastal waterway, the oil and gas pipeline system, the electric power grid, the airport and air traffic network, and the major river navigation and flood control systems—had been largely accomplished before the passage of the esa in 1973.38 the federal government did not then contemplate the eventual necessity for renewable energy resources, nor the universal dangers that anthropogenic climate change would eventually pose.39 for this reason, the esa’s legal framework does not contemplate the accommodation of infrastructural endeavors on such a titanic scale. this oversight, combined with the 34 see, e.g., climate change, the white house, https://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/climate-change (last accessed apr. 25, 2015). 35 securing american energy, the white house, https://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/securing-american-energy (last accessed apr. 25, 2015). 36 exec. order no. 13,604 (2012), 77 fed. reg. 18,887 (mar. 22, 2012). 37 the white house, supra note 24. 38 j.b. ruhl, harmonizing commercial wind power and the endangered species act through administrative reform, 65 vand. l. rev. 1769, 1774 (2012) (recounting the history of major infrastructural development in the united states). 39 kalyani robbins, responsible, renewable, and redesigned: how the renewable energy movement can make peace with the endangered species act, 15 minn. j. l. sci. & tech. 555, 560-61 (2014) (“climate change mitigation and adaptation were not foremost in the minds of the legislators who drafted the statute.”); id. at 584 n.19 (noting that the author found nothing in legislative history of the esa about climate change). consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy specific harms that renewable facilities impose upon threatened and endangered species, 40 produce a cumbersome and contradictory system that effectively undermines the ambitions of both policies. 3. the renewable landscape while comprehensive technical details are beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth briefly describing renewable operations and the manners in which specific energy sources and facilities harm endangered and threatened species. of primary concern to the federal policies described and this paper are wind and solar power, and their respective impacts on specific threatened or endangered species. 3.1 wind wind energy is the most important energy source in the developing renewable infrastructure. it became the primary source of new u.s. energy in 2012, then producing 43 percent of new generating capacity.41 wind energy produces no carbon pollution during operation, and, in the nation’s windiest corridors, is limited only by transmission and storage.42 generally, wind turbines require a higher initial capital investment than comparable fossil fuel energy generators, yet cost far less over their operating lives due to the absence of fuel costs.43 the esa presents one of the few major hurdles to otherwise environmentally positive wind energy development. 3.1.1 technical facts wind turbines generally consist of three blades mounted to a tower; wind propels the blades, which power a generator located within the structure. the turbines operate most effectively when the blades are situated at altitudes higher than 100 feet.44 control mechanisms within the turbines maintain maximum speeds of typically fifty-five miles per hour in order to avoid wind speed damage.45 wind farms comprise numerous wind turbines, substations, and typically transport roads. 46 40 see infra part iii. 41 see brian scheid, wind became leading source of new us generating capacity in 2012: doe, platts: mcgraw hill financial (aug. 6, 2013, 11:35 am), http://www.platts.com/latest-news/electric-power/washington/wind-became-leadingsource-of-new-us-generating-21381199. 42 robbins, supra note 29, at 569. 43 wind energy basics, department of the interior, http://windeis.anl.gov/guide/basics/ (last accessed apr. 25, 2015). 44 how a wind turbine works, department of energy (june 20, 2014, 9:09 am), http://energy.gov/articles/how-wind-turbine-works. 45 id. 46 see generally congressional research service, wind power in the united states: technology, economic, and policy issues (2008), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/rl34546.pdf. consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy larger wind farms can span hundreds of square acres, and may contain hundreds of turbines. 3.1.2 threats to wildlife wind turbines threaten birds and bats through direct mortality risk. wind farms operate best on landscapes where wind blows strongly and reliably; flying animals utilize these same windy corridors to efficiently propel themselves great distances. inevitably, some of these animals collide with the turbines and are killed.47 contrary to scientists’ and developers’ hopes that bats’ echolocation abilities would deter them from wind turbines, these animals appear to be attracted to the turbines instead.48 wind farms likewise pose implications for wildlife habitats. wind farms require about 100 times as much land as coal and nuclear counterparts to produce a comparable amount of energy49 and thus interfere with roosts and nests located across the farm area. large-scale construction of this nature fragments habitats,50 while the laying of transport roads and substations often requires grading and vegetation removal.51 these effects harm both aerial and land-based species. relevant to and illustrative of easily-triggered esa prohibitions, wind farms are known for dangers they pose to the endangered indiana bat, a species with a vast range of at least twenty midwestern and eastern states;52 much of its habitat overlaps significantly with current or planned wind farm locations. 53 because the esa prohibits the taking of even individual members of an endangered or threatened species, the indiana bat poses tremendous difficulties and delays for the permitting of wind facilities. 47 it is difficult to accurately estimate the number of birds and bats killed by turbines annually. estimates generally range in the hundreds of thousands. see rose eveleth, how many birds to wind turbines really kill?, smithsonian.com (dec. 16, 2013), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/how-many-birds-do-wind-turbines-reallykill-180948154/?no-ist. 48 brian handwerk, wind turbines give bats the "bends," study finds, national geographic news (aug. 25, 2008), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2008/08/080825-batbends.html. 49 alexandra b. klass, energy and animals: a history of conflict, 3 san diego j. climate & energy l. 159, 184 (2011–12). 50 defenders of wildlife, making renewable energy wildlife friendly 1, available at http://www.defenders.org/publication/making-renewable-energy-wildlifefriendly (last accessed apr. 25, 2015). 51 id. at 8. 52 indiana bat (myotis sodalis), endangered species, u.s. fish & wildlife service, http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/mammals/inba/inbafctsht.html (last updated apr. 14, 2015). 53 see indiana bat fatalities at wind energy facilities, u.s. fish and wildlife service, http://www.fws.gov/midwest/wind/wildlifeimpacts/inbafatalities.html (last updated dec. 2014). consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy 3.1.3 offshore wind wind farms may be sited in coastal waters to capture the significant wind resources abundant there.54 offshore wind in state and federal waters blows more reliably than land-based, utility-scale energy source counterparts.55 the development of this resource is therefore a significant tactic in the strategy for fulfilling the country’s renewable energy policy goals; for this reason, the department of energy has allocated over $227 million since 2011 to facilitate it.56 the majority of offshore wind projects would be located quite far from land, in areas where the water is deep enough that traditional support structures, such as steel piles fixed to the seabed, cannot be reliably placed.57 coastal turbines pose the same threats to nearby birds and bats as to land-based turbines; an additional danger is possible, as the impact from sounds generated from turbine operations and construction on local marine species is not yet understood.58 3.2 solar the sun’s rays are a promising source of clean energy. every hour, the sun projects more energy onto earth than the human race uses in an entire year.59 commercial solar energy facilities have proven to be fairly land-intensive.60 unlike wind energy, solar energy typically cannot share land with agricultural systems. however, solar energy systems may be placed on degraded, otherwise unused land and brownfields.61 solar energy is also a promising option for small-scale, distributed systems, such as rooftop solar panels. overall, solar energy use has been surging for nearly twenty years, while capital investment costs have continued to fall.62 54 offshore wind research and development, department of energy, http://energy.gov/eere/wind/offshore-wind-research-and-development (last accessed apr. 26, 2015). 55 id. 56 id. 57 id. 58 new study calls for continuing need to assess impacts of offshore wind farms on marine species, chesapeake biological laboratory (oct. 16, 2014), http://www.umces.edu/cbl/release/2014/oct/13/assess-impacts-offshore-wind-farmsmarine-specie. 59 solar energy, national geographic, http://environment.nationalgeographic.com/environment/global-warming/solar-powerprofile/ (last accessed apr. 24, 2015). 60 see environmental impacts of solar power, union of concerned scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/renewableenergy/environmental-impacts-solar-power.html .vulhsgbfhz0 (last updated mar. 5, 2013). 61 id. 62 see solar energy prices see double-digit declines in 2013; trend expected to continue, nrel (oct. 20, 2014), http://www.nrel.gov/news/press/2014/15405.html. consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy 3.2.1 technical facts electricity-generating solar systems, known as “active” solar,63 fall into two categories: photovoltaic cells, also known as solar panels, and concentrated solar power (csp). solar panels permit sunlight to collide with semiconductor materials, which convert the light directly into electricity.64 however, solar panel efficiency is fairly low. csp utilizes mirrors to direct sunlight to a fluid-filled focal point, which heats the fluid sufficiently to boil encapsulated water and power a traditional steamturbine generator.65 csp has only been proven to operate efficiently at a commercial scale, and is therefore always land-intensive.66 3.2.2 threats to wildlife both categories of active solar energy pose direct mortality risks to wildlife. csp facilities tend to attract birds who confuse the mirrored panels for water bodies, and instinctively home in on them, unknowingly plunging themselves into superheated air streams.67 the siting of csp and solar panel facilities in the nation’s sunniest areas harms the habitat of the ground dwelling species such as the desert tortoise, listed as threatened under the esa.68 these animals may be killed during construction and maintenance activities associated with solar facilities and transmission corridors.69 like wind farms, solar facilities likewise threaten wildlife through habitat alteration. facilities that may span thousands of acres are typically fenced off, cleared of vegetation, and graded, effectively segmenting desert corridors that local species would naturally traverse.70 4. legal framework based on the common harms that renewable facilities inflict on certain protected species, as described in part iii supra, it is clear that the majority of utilityscale facilities will need to comply with the legal framework for species conservation. 63 the other category of solar energy is “passive,” in which the sun heats stationary objects that retain the heat for discrete applications. 64 solar photovoltaic technology basics, nrel, http://www.nrel.gov/learning/re_photovoltaics.html (last updated jul 25, 2014). 65 concentrating solar power (csp) technologies, solar peis, http://solareis.anl.gov/guide/solar/csp/ (last accessed apr. 25, 2014). 66 csp technology overview, department of energy, http://solareis.anl.gov/documents/docs/nrel_csp_1.pdf (last accessed apr. 25, 2014). 67 john upton, solar farms threaten birds, scientific american (aug. 27, 2014), available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/solar-farms-threaten-birds/. 68 mojave desert tortoise, u.s. fish and wildlife service, http://www.fws.gov/nevada/desert_tortoise/dt/dt_threats.html (last updated apr. 16, 2014). 69 id. 70 defenders of wildlife, supra note 40, at 7. consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy the esa is of primary relevance to this framework, as is a federal district case applying it in the context of wind energy development. 4.1 the endangered species act the esa creates a vast regulatory framework with which energy developers must comply in order to construct facilities that may adversely affect endangered or threatened species. five discrete esa elements characterize the conflict between renewable energy infrastructure development and the protection of endangered and threatened species: the listing provision, the take prohibition, the interagency consultation requirement, the incidental take provisions, and the citizen suit provisions. 4.1.1 the listing provision section 4 of the esa authorizes the administrating agencies to designate by regulation, “on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available,” endangered and threatened species.71 these categorizations extend esa protection to the listed species. determinations involve a variety of scientific factors,72 and subsequently require the agency to designate “critical habitat”73 in which the listed species dwell.74 the agencies must also develop “recovery plans” for the listed species, unless there is a determination that such a plan would not promote the conservation of the species.75 4.1.2 the take provision section 9 of the esa prohibits the “take”76 of listed species by all persons, including private and public entities subject to federal jurisdiction. a take includes “harm,” which the services have defined to include a significant habitat modification that leads to actual death or injury of protected species.77 there is no “de minimis” exception to this prohibition: a take of even one individual of a listed species violates the esa. relevant here, both private renewable energy developers and federal action agencies that intend to lease or permit federal lands for development must comply with the take prohibition. 71 16 u.s.c.a. § 1533 (2014). 72 id. § 1533(a). 73 “(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species . . . (i) essential to the conservation of the species and; (ii) which may require special management considerations or protection; and (ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species at the time it is listed in . . .” id. § 1532(5)(a). 74 id. § 1533(a)(3). 75 id. § 1533(f)(1). 76 “the term “take” means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” id. § 1532(6). 77 babbitt v. sweet home chapter of communities for a great oregon, 515 u.s. 687 (1995) (interpreting harm in this manner). consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy 4.1.3 the interagency consultation requirement in cases where federal agencies are acting in a manner that may cause harm to wildlife, or where private activities implicate a “federal nexus,”78 the esa’s extensive interagency consultation provisions, provided in section 7(a)(2), 79 are activated. ultimately, “action agencies”—the agency considering leasing or permitting activity on federal land— must use “best scientific and commercial data available,” to “consult” with the relevant service to ensure that actions they carry out, fund, or authorize do not “jeopardize” the continued existence of listed species or “adverse[ly] modif[y]” their critical habitat.80 prior to the jeopardy determination, the action agency must take several determinative steps to ascertain whether such a determination is even necessary.81 initially, the action agency must determine whether a listed species or critical habitat may be adversely affected by its action. if the agency determines that its action may not adversely affect either, then the esa is not relevant insofar as the action is concerned; conversely, if there is a possibility of harm, the action agency must engage the relevant service through informal consultation. if informal consultation results in a determination that the action is likely to adversely affect a listed species, the action agency must then submit a request for formal consultation with the service. formal consultation may last up to ninety days, and requires the agencies to share information about the proposed project and species likely to be affected.82 at the conclusion of the ninety-day consultation period, the service then has forty-five days to determine whether the proposed activity will jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species. a jeopardy determination by the service leaves the action agency with a limited number of options: i. implement reasonable and prudent alternative provided by the service, often obtained in consultation with the action agency;83 ii. modify the proposed project and consult again with the service; iii. decide not to undertake, fund, or authorize the project; iv. disagree with the opinion and proceed; or v. apply for an exemption.84 in the event of a non-jeopardy determination, the service will inform the action agency whether any reasonable and prudent measures should be applied, and activate the incidental take procedure. 78 a federal nexus is present when the project is being undertaken by a federal “action” agency, or when a private developer’s project is significantly connected to a federal resource. 79 16 u.s.c.a. § 1536(a)(2) (2014). 80 id. 81 see s7 process flow chart, u.s. fish and wildlife service, http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/section7/s7process/s7stepxstep.html (last updated apr. 14, 2015). 82 16 u.s.c.a. § 1536(b)(1)(a) (2014). 83 id. § 1536(a)(3)(a). 84 id. § 1536(g). consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy 4.1.4 the incidental take provisions: statements and permits incidental take “results from, but is not the purpose of, carrying out an otherwise lawful activity.” 85 action agencies that must obey the interagency consultation provisions, and private actors subject only to the take prohibition, may incidentally take listed species through respective approval processes before the services. 4.1.4.1 incidental take statement action agencies who have received a non-jeopardy determination following formal consultation with the service will receive an incidental take statement, which includes the amount of anticipated take due to the action in question, reasonable and prudent measures to minimize the take, and terms and conditions that must be observed when implementing the minimizing measures.86 4.1.4.2 incidental take permit and habitat conservation plan a private developer’s application for an incidental take permit (itp) activates a rigorous approval process under section 10 of the esa. the applicant must submit a habitat conservation plan (hcp) to the service; this detailed document allows the applicant to comply with the esa despite the likelihood of harm to a listed species though maximum possible mitigation of incidental takes.87 the hcp outlines: the impact which will likely result from such taking; what steps the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate such impacts, and the funding that will be available to implement such steps; what alternative actions to such taking the applicant considered and the reasons why such alternatives are not being utilized; and any such other measures that the service may require.88 to approve the hcp, the service must determine that: i. the taking described in the plan will be incidental; ii. the applicant will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of the taking; iii. the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for the plan will be provided; iv. the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild; and v. any other measures the service requires will be met.89 upon approving the hcp, the service will provide the private applicant with an itp, which legally binds the applicant to the commitments in their hcp.90 85 glossary, u.s. fish and wildlife service, http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/glossary/index.html (last updated apr. 14, 2015). 86 id. 87 16 u.s.c.a. § 1539(a)(2)(a) (2014). 88 id. 89 id. §1539(a)(2)(b). consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy 4.1.5 citizen suit provision the esa provides that virtually any person may commence litigation to enjoin violations of the act or to compel the service to perform its nondiscretionary statutory duties.91 the vast majority of esa enforcement occurs through the citizen suit mechanism.92 4.2 animal welfare institute v. beech ridge energy, llc in this case from the federal district court of maryland, 93 a plaintiff conservation group sued to enjoin the operation of a wind farm for failing to apply for and obtain an itp despite the project’s high likelihood of adversely impacting the indiana bat. the plaintiff’s theory of esa violation was that the defendant’s construction and future operation of the wind project would impermissibly take members of the species. the court made three holdings relevant to the interaction between the esa and wind development, and possibly renewable energy development more broadly: i. the esa's citizen-suit provision allows allegations of wholly-future violations of the statute, and does not require actual harm to have occurred;94 ii. in an action under the section 9 prohibition on takes, a plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence, a relatively low standard of persuasion, that the challenged activity is reasonably certain to imminently harm, kill, or wound the listed species;95 and iii. injunctive relief is appropriate where such takes are reasonably certain as shown by a preponderance of the evidence.96 this case appears to stand for two propositions: an expanded reading of the esa citizen suit provision, allowing allegations that rely on a likelihood of whollyfuture takes based on a mere preponderance of the evidence; and that renewable energy developments, or at least wind projects, do not receive special treatment, consideration, or exemption under the take prohibition and itp procedures of the esa.97 on the other hand, the opinion affirms that the protection of endangered species and the development of renewable energy need not be in conflict; rather, the latter must follow the legal permitting procedures established pursuant to the former, 90 “the permit shall contain such terms and conditions as the secretary deems necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this paragraph. . .” id. 91 id. § 1540(g). 92 j.b. ruhl, harmonizing distributed energy and the endangered species act, 4 san diego j. climate & energy l. 121, 131 (2012–13) (“outside the context of illegal trade and transport of protected species, virtually all esa enforcement is through this citizen suit mechanism.”). 93 animal welfare institute v. beech ridge energy llc, 675 f.supp.2d 540 (d.md.,2009). 94 id. at 561. 95 id. at 563. 96 id. at 580. 97 ruhl, supra note 28, at 1786. consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy an obligation which the defendants inexcusably neglected.98 indeed, the injunctive relief commanded only partial cessation of turbine operations, and only under circumstances where indiana bats would be endangered;99 the injunction would be lifted upon the receipt of an appropriate itp.100 had defendants applied for and received an itp, they would have been shielded from section 9 liability. 5. wiggle room under existing statutory framework as described supra, renewable energy projects often disagree with certain listed species. under beech ridge, mere likelihood of taking a single member of a listed species, based on a preponderance of evidence, is grounds for an injunction on operations that have not been granted an itp. near all applicants therefore need to comply with the incidental take procedure or risk greater susceptibility to legal battles and an injunction. the esa thus hampers the development of renewable energy infrastructure temporally, through delayed project approval and completion; and financially, through increased costs of compliance and greater legal risk. developers, both with and without a federal nexus in their renewable project, must utilize all available “wiggle room” within the statutory framework to facilitate development and the obtainment of an itp. wiggle room is available to developers with or without a federal nexus, and includes the following categories: programmatic section 7 consultation; expanded hcps under section 10; itp authority delegation; the “no surprises” rule; exemptions from section 7 requirements provided by the endangered species committee; guidance; and listing and prosecutorial discretion. 5.1 programmatic section 7 consultation federal agencies may attempt to facilitate the placement of multiple largescale utility projects across great, interstate swaths of federal land. rather than fully consulting with service pursuant to section 7 for each individual project on that land, the agencies may instead engage in a programmatic consultation that largely satisfies the section 7 requirement for future individual projects within the area.101 this programmatic consultation can be integrated into a broader programmatic 98 beech ridge, 675 f.supp.2d at 581 (“the two vital federal policies at issue in this case are not necessarily in conflict. indeed, the tragedy of this case is that defendants disregarded not only repeated advice from the fws but also failed to take advantage of a specific mechanism, the itp process, established by federal law to allow their project to proceed in harmony with the goal of avoidance of harm to endangered species.”). 99 id. at 580–81 (“the court sees little need to preclude the completion of construction of those forty turbines already under construction, but . . . any construction of additional turbines should not be commenced unless and until an itp has been obtained.”). 100 id. at 581. 101 a subsequent, site-specific consultation under section 7(a)(2) may be required. however, it would benefit from the programmatic consultation underlying the broader federal project, and would presumably be quicker and cheaper to accomplish than it would be without the programmatic consultation. see endangered species act—section 7 compliance, blm solar energy program, http://blmsolar.anl.gov/program/laws/esa/ (last updated aug. 14, 2013). consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy environmental impact statement (peis) prepared by the agencies to fulfill the requirements of the national environmental policy act of 1969 for federal approval of the same projects.102 a programmatic consultation’s frontloaded costs would be preferable to full interagency consultations for each individual project in the area, which would delay infrastructural development and thereby disincentivize capital investment into the projects. a major federal renewable energy projects conceived in light of the 2005 epa’s ambitious 10,000 megawatt goal exemplifies the programmatic section 7 innovation. in 2008, the bureau of land management (blm) and the doe began the peis for solar energy program for utility-scale solar energy103 development on blm-administered federal lands in six southwestern states. 104 the program designated for analysis viable solar energy zones (sezs), but excluded other areas from consideration to maximize species conservation. in february 2012, the blm began formal consultation with the fws under sections 7(a)(1) and 7(a)(2). 105 consultation was completed in july of that year, and produced a programmatic biological opinion describing likelihood of harm to dozens of listed species in the assessed areas.106 notably, the biological opinion determined that solar projects in sezs are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of these species or to destroy or adversely modify designated critical habitat.107 by laying consultation groundwork for future solar projects on the land in question, the program allows permitting of individual solar projects in analyzed sezs to proceed in a more efficient, standardized, and environmentally responsible manner than they otherwise would.108 5.2 expanded section 10 hcps 5.2.1 general conservation plans private developers whose projects do not involve a federal nexus may also take advantage of a large-scale approval mechanism to facilitate the granting of itps under section 10. in 2007, fws developed the general conservation plan (gcp) to streamline and reduce processes associated with hcp submission and itp provision. 109 the gcp approach allows the service to develop a section 10 102 national environmental policy act, 42 u.s.c.a. §§ 4321–4347 (2014). 103 as applicable to the solar energy program, utility-scale projects are those with capacities of 20 megawatts (mw) or greater that generate electricity that is delivered into the transmission grid. 104 arizona, california, colorado, nevada, new mexico, and utah. 105 blm, supra note 91. 106 id. 107 id. 108 record of decision for solar energy development in six southwestern states, blm solar energy program 1 (oct. 2012), available at solareis.anl.gov/documents/docs/solar_peis_rod.pdf. 109 final general conservation plan, u.s. fish and wildlife service (oct. 5 2007), available at www.fws.gov/policy/m0369.pdf. consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy conservation plan suitable for the needs of a designated local area and the listed species therein, and to issue itps to landowners who demonstrate compliance with the gcp. ultimately, a finalized gcp would make itp issuance formulaic and expeditious, thus greatly facilitating abundant project development in the given area.110 furthermore, the gcp process shifts the burden of developing a suitable conservation plan to the agency, thus freeing developers to apply resources on other facets of their projects.111 5.2.2 regional habitat conservation plans a grander, related mechanism is the regional habitat conservation plan (rhcp),112 which expands the hcp process over a broad region and unifies the itp processes for all listed species within that region.113 individual projects within that region could utilize the rhcp and obviate further permitting processes.114 interested private and public parties along with the fws typically prepare rhcps; benefited parties thus share a regulatory burden that would otherwise greatly delay private project development. because the rhcp mechanism can cover vast geographical corridors and account for multiple listed species within them, it can greatly expedite utility-scale commercial wind and solar development.115 currently, three major renewable energy rhcps are in various stages of completion: i. the great plains wind energy hcp: covering four listed species116 in a 200 mile-wide, 1500 mile-long corridor—approximately 268 million acres—through the country’s center, this plan intends to “comprehensively address potential wind energy development impacts to listed or sensitive species, allowing for more effective conservation and a more efficient permit process.”117 the plan’s primary developer is a coalition of fifteen wind energy companies,118 working in concert with two fws regional offices and the wildlife agencies of the nine affected states 119 in the plan area. plan completion is scheduled for 2015.120 110 id. 111 id. at 2. 112 fws developed these in 1990s for centers of urban land development. ruhl, supra note 28, at 1783. 113 id. 114 id. 115 id. 116 the whooping crane, the piping plover, the lesser prairie-chicken, and the interior least tern. 117 home, wewag (2013), http://www.greatplainswindhcp.org/index-2.html. 118 acciona-north america, allete, bp wind energy, competitive power ventures inc., duke energy renewables, edp renewables north america, element power, edfrenewable energy, iberdrola renewables, infinity wind power, map royalty, nextera energy resources, res americas, trade wind energy, and wind capital group. 119 north dakota, south dakota, montana, colorado, nebraska, kansas, new mexico, oklahoma, and texas. 120 schedule, wewag (2013), http://www.greatplainswindhcp.org/schedule.html. consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy ii. the midwest habitat conservation plan: this plan covers twentyseven million acres and thirty federally listed species.121 its developers comprise a coalition of eight affected midwestern states, 122 the fws, and representatives of the wind industry. iii. the desert renewable energy conservation plan: focused entirely in california and encompassing multiple renewable energy sources,123 this plan covers 22.5 million federal and non-federal acres. the plan also intends to facilitate the state’s rps and other renewable energy ambitions.124 overseeing it is a coalition of federal and state agencies, local governments, environmental advocates, and renewable energy industry representatives.125 plan completion is scheduled for 2015.126 in addition to offshore wind development, the regions covered by these plans could, according to the department of energy, provide renewable energy sufficient to meet the electrical needs of the country “several times over.” 127 promisingly, the development of these rhcps appear to demonstrate a broad movement toward preferred use of the mechanism; 128 despite the frontloaded financial requirements and long timeframes required for completion,129 these tools will considerably expedite the renewable infrastructure development in areas where the energy is most abundant. 121 strategic mitigation for wind energy in the midwest, the conservation fund, http://www.conservationfund.org/projects/wind-energy-in-the-midwest (last accessed apr. 28, 2015). 122 indiana, ohio, michigan, iowa, missouri, illinois, wisconsin, and minnesota. 123 “the drecp will encompass development of solar thermal, utility-scale solar photovoltaic (pv), wind, and other forms of renewable energy and associated infrastructure such as electric transmission lines necessary for renewable energy development within the mojave and colorado desert regions of california.” the desert renewable energy conservation plan (drecp), renewable energy action team, http://www.drecp.org/whatisdrecp/ (last accessed apr. 28, 2015). 124 “streamlined permitting of renewable energy projects is critical to meeting the renewable portfolio standard (rps) established by state law. in addition to the rps, senate bill 2x (simitian), signed into law by governor edmund brown, jr. on april 12, 2011, as public resources code § 25740, requires california to meet the 33 percent renewable energy portfolio standard by 2020.” id. 125 the u.s. bureau of land management (blm), u.s. fish and wildlife service (usfws), california energy commission (cec), and california department of fish and wildlife (cdfw) several other state and federal agencies that manage lands or programs in the desert or that manage or regulate renewable energy development and transmission. local governments, environmental organizations, renewable energy developers, and utilities are also involved. the frequently asked questions, renewable energy action team, http://www.drecp.org/whatisdrecp/faq.html (last accessed apr. 28, 2015). 126 schedule, renewable energy action team, http://www.drecp.org/whatisdrecp/schedule.html (last accessed apr. 28, 2015). 127 ruhl, supra note 28, at 1784 (citing the department of energy). 128 robbins, supra note 29, at 574 (arguing that there is a broad movement toward creating rhcps to “reduce both risk and delay”). 129 ruhl, supra note 28, at 1783–84 (noting that large rhcps will take years to complete). consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy 5.2.3 itp authority delegation developers who choose to comply with the criteria of a gcp or an rhcp, and thus avoid submitting their own hcp, must still apply for an itp to receive insulation from take liability.130 to facilitate this process, the service may delegate itp approval authority to local governments situated within the expanded plan territory so long as they sign onto the plan’s criteria. the local government can then issue itps to renewable energy developers sited inside their jurisdiction.131 this approach shifts significant administrative burden away from the service and onto local governments; doing so not only expedites itp issuance and facilitates project development, but also promotes tighter interaction between the permit issuer and developer. 5.2.4 the “no surprises” rule the “no surprises” rule132 is an itp policy under which the service cannot be held accountable for unforeseen circumstances that adversely affect listed species once the developer has been issued an itp for that species. a situation of this nature could arise, for example, where a developer’s mitigation plan, contained in their hcp, has been approved by the service and ultimately proves insufficient. the rule effectively clarifies conservation costs for the developer by hemming the risk that they will increase, and redistributes liability over the project’s lifespan to the service. 5.2.5 exemptions perhaps the most infamous abrogating provision in the esa regards a federal-nexus developer’s ability to obtain from the endangered species committee an exemption from the section 7(a)(2) prohibition on jeopardizing a listed species in situations where a listed there exists no reasonable alternative to the action.133 in effect, exemption from this requirement allows a listed species’ continued existence to be jeopardized. in other words, the committee can allow a species’ extinction. the committee comprises seven members, each possessing a single vote on the exemption determination: the head officials of six relevant federal agencies,134 and a representative from the state in which the species’ existence is to be determined. five votes in favor of an exemption are sufficient. these votes represent the committee’s opinion that the project under consideration satisfies the following criteria:135 130 see renewable energy action team, supra note 115 (describing the itp delegation in that plan). 131 id. 132 63 fed. reg. 8,859 (fed. 23, 1998). 133 16 u.s.c.a. § 1536(g) (2014). 134 agriculture, army, interior, council on environmental quality, environmental protection agency, and national oceanic and atmospheric administration. id. at § 1536(e). 135 id. at § 1536(h). consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy i. there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action; ii. the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of action consistent with conserving the species or its critical habitat, and such action is in the public interest; iii. the action is of regional or national significance; and iv. neither the federal agency concerned nor the exemption applicant made any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources . . .136 additionally, the committee must establish “reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures . . . to minimize the adverse effects of the agency action upon the [species].”137 the committee’s ability to permit extinction initially seems to make exemption a viable means for renewable energy projects with a federal nexus to proceed expeditiously; given the great abundance of solar and wind energy sources available on federal lands, the exemption option should expedite the energy infrastructure’s transformation. however, exemptions are limited in application due to the narrow circumstances under which they must be applied: only federal nexus actions that jeopardize the continued existence of the species, and have no reasonable and prudent alternatives of application, are under consideration for an exemption. it is difficult to imagine a renewable energy project involving a federal nexus that both jeopardizes a species’ existence and has no alternatives. this structural limitation explains the infrequency of committee meetings.138 5.2.6 guidance the service may employ non-binding, communicative guidance to facilitate development of renewable energy projects in as efficacious a manner as possible, while ensuring compliance with esa prohibitions. such guidance could outline the most efficient procedures for a developer to follow in order to quickly gain project approval and reduce the likelihood of legal liability during operation. the fws applied this method by crafting its land-based wind energy guidelines in march 2012, based on the recommendations of the wind turbine guidelines advisory that the agency had commissioned in five years earlier.139 the guidelines promote a five-tiered methodology to project monitoring and communication between the wind project developer and the fws that is intended to “form the best practical approach for conservation of species of concern.”140 although the guidelines intend to promote compliance with the esa, in the cheapest and most efficient manner possible, adherence to them is voluntary and 136 id. at § 1536(h)(1)(a)(i)–(iv). 137 id. at § 1536(h)(1)(b). 138 as of 2008, the committee had only met three times. 139 ruhl, supra note 28, at 1778–79; land-based wind energy guidelines, u.s. fish and wildlife service (mar. 23, 2012), available at http://www.fws.gov/windenergy/docs/weg_final.pdf. 140 id. at 1. the tiers are: 1. preliminary site evaluation (landscape-scale screening of possible project sites); 2. site characterization (broad characterization of one or more potential project sites); 3. field studies to document site wildlife and habitat and predict project impacts; 4. post-construction studies to estimate impacts; 5. other postconstruction studies and research. consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy does not “relieve any individual, company, or agency of the responsibility to comply with laws and regulations.”141 however, a documented history of a developer’s efforts to maintain communication with the fws and adhere to the guidelines may benefit them in the event of violation.142 despite the obvious shortcomings of voluntary guidelines, guided communication between project developers and services would benefit the move toward a renewable energy infrastructure by both facilitating individual projects, and developing a standardized, reusable development procedure for situated projects. 5.2.7 listing and prosecutorial discretion the service, upon determining that creation of renewable infrastructure is necessary to the grander well-being of endangered and threatened species, could simply choose not to list species or prosecute violations of the esa. however, the majority of esa enforcement occurs through the act’s citizen suit provision, through which any person can either commence litigation to enjoin esa violations, or compel the service to perform its nondiscretionary statutory duties.143 6. potential solutions and improvements services and action agencies clearly have some discretion within the current esa statutory framework to facilitate the development of a renewable energy infrastructure. however, these options are limited. major amendments to the esa that explicitly provide renewable energy projects with special leeway would be the most effective means of expediting infrastructural transformation, but it is also unlikely given the current legislative climate. this part suggests additional means of facilitating renewable development under the current statutory framework. 6.1 land ranking within rhcps rhcps already represent a substantial innovation in the large-scale incidental take permitting and expediting esa compliance; these collaborations allow insight as to siting in locations within the vast area where there is a lower likelihood of taking a listed species. services could enhance rhcps by “rank” areas within the considered region at which a taking may occur.144 rather than simply advise which parts of the region would be unsuitable for development, the agency might rate locations according to the likelihood of taking, and make development more “expensive” as the likelihood and number of listed species affected by the project increases.145 under this approach, development on areas of low concern would not change, while 141 id. at vii. 142 “however, if a violation occurs the service will consider a developer’s documented efforts to communicate with the service and adhere to the guidelines.” id. 143 ruhl, supra note 82, at 130–31. 144 robbins, supra note 29, at 575 (suggesting that services “rank” land within rhcps). 145 id. consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy development on regions of moderate concern where listed species transit more frequently would obligate the developer to adopt more stringent commitments.146 these commitments might be embodied in technological or mitigation requirements, such as the usage of safer wind turbines or solar panels designed to ward off aerial animals. molding rhcps in this flexible fashion would benefit both clashing policies: it will open up a greater amount of land to the development of renewable energy sources, attach development incentives to the potential of threatened species, and ultimately preserve more listed species. 6.2 triggering an exemption from section 7 interagency consultation as described supra, it is difficult to obtain an exemption from the section 7(a)(2) non-jeopardy requirement because only federal-nexus projects that jeopardize a listed species’ existence and have no reasonable alternatives can come under the endangered species committee’s consideration. even then, the committee would need to determine that allowing the extinction outweighs preserving the species, benefits the public interest, and is of national importance. only rarely would an exemption applicant—likely a federal agency rather than a private developer—craft a project of this magnitude. it is perhaps ironic that an exemption could allow an action agency to more easily implement a project significant enough to threaten a listed species’ existence than a safer, more conservative project with numerous alternatives. based on the policy supporting the development of a renewable energy infrastructure, federal agencies could align their positions such that the granting of an exemption is more likely. initially, an action agency, such as the blm, could design a renewable energy project, like the solar energy program described supra, of magnitude sufficient to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species. following programmatic section 7 consultation, the service could maintain the position that the project meets threshold requirements for exemption consideration. 147 the committee would then need to determine if the project satisfies the criteria for an exemption. by recognizing that catastrophic climate change would very likely wipe out listed species, the committee could feasibly determine that a large-scale renewable energy project: has no reasonable and prudent alternatives; offers benefits that outweigh conserving species; is in the public interest, and is of national—indeed, global—significance.148 6.3 enhanced service guidance even if an alignment of action agency and committee positions with the renewable energy policy yielded an exemption, however, the result would suffer from 146 id. 147 16 u.s.c.a. §§ 1536(g)(1)–(3) (2014). 148 id. § 1536(h)(1)(a). consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy drawbacks. first, the decision would be susceptible to judicial review.149 second, an exemption as to one jeopardized, listed species would not necessarily aid the action agency in regards to esa requirements concerning other listed species that would be affected in a less dramatic fashion. services could more regularly employ informal, non-binding guidance mechanisms to facilitate renewable energy development. these agencies could create a set of universally applicable guidelines analogous to those that the fws formulated for utility-scale wind power. perhaps the five-tiered approach described therein could be generalized for application to development of all major renewable energy schemes, such as utility-scale solar, offshore wind, and distributed wind and solar.150 following a developer’s demonstration of compliance with the guidelines, the service could issue “no take” letters indicating there is no risk of taking a listed species.151 such letters would indicate the agency’s concurrence that the project in question was designed to avoid taking listed species, though they would not necessarily authorize a take were one to occur. regardless, the letter would help the developer to secure financing and local and state approvals for the project.152 6.4 esa amendments amending the esa to accommodate renewable energy development would be the most reliable way of ensuring that the act does not significantly inhibit the development of this new and necessary infrastructure. given the current political and legislative climate, amendment seems unlikely. however, were political realities set aside, and esa amendment possible, the following measures would prove beneficial. 6.4.1 the provision of a “green pass” for renewable energy projects the foregoing demonstrates that there is no “green pass” under either the spirit or letter of the esa that would permit renewable energy projects to possess a blanket exemption from the take prohibition. implementing provisions whereby the service could determine if a project developer satisfies criteria for such a pass, and then grant one, would preclude many of the difficulties expounded in this paper. these criteria would need to be explicit and clearly define what constitutes a green pass project.153 rather than pour time and money into assuring that siting, agency consultations, and mitigation plans accord with the esa, developers could initially focus on formulating projects sufficiently deserving of a green pass and develop 149 see, e.g., portland audubon soc. v. endangered species committee, 984 f.2d 1534 (9th cir.1993) (holding that the “whole record” of the committee’s deliberation had to be made available for judicial review). 150 see ruhl, supra note 82, at 134 (suggesting the use of guidance in this fashion). 151 id. 152 id. at 138 n.52 (describing the author’s experience with “no take” letters). 153 vagueness would undermine this provision by exposing it to misappropriation by private developers for whom it was not intended, e.g., hydraulic fracturing companies that attempt to claim they provide “clean energy.” consilience badichek: endangered species and renewable energy securely thereafter. this innovation would likely open the statutory floodgates to widespread, low-cost renewable energy development immune to liability under the esa. 6.4.2 discourage citizen suits for renewable projects amending the esa to prohibit citizen suits against renewable energy projects would effectively protect such projects from esa enforcement. this amendment would retain the service’s prosecutorial discretion, and allow litigation against renewable energy developers to proceed at a pace and in a direction determined by the executive branch, rather than by the judiciary. as with a green pass amendment, the statute would need to state explicitly exactly what constitutes a renewable energy project deserving of insulation from a suit. ideally, the developer would apply for and receive that designation at the initial stages of application. 7. conclusion the esa clearly inhibits the country’s ability to achieve its goal of implementing a renewable energy infrastructure and escaping the bondage of fossil fuels. while the services and project developers have made strides towards that infrastructure in recent years, the nation’s long-standing focus on protection of listed species, embodied by an act that prohibits takes across the board, continues to hamper progress towards this vital ambition. federal agencies have been creative in their means of expediting renewable energy project development, notwithstanding the likelihood that such projects will regularly take endangered and threatened species. large-scale innovations like programmatic section 7 consultations and rhcps are promising, but they, along with every other measure so far employed, are not bringing the nation a new energy landscape with necessary speed. stringent, bright-line amendments to the esa would provide a highly effective means of boosting the renewable transition; but legislative reform of this nature is likely not practical at present. administrative efforts and technological progress that push projects through the esa more expeditiously will hopefully suffice until the day for reform comes—if it ever comes. microsoft word caytas.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 14, iss. 2 (2015), pp. 71-89 legal aspects of technology assessment and systems analysis in sustainable urban development joanna diane caytas columbia law school columbia university joanna.caytas@law.columbia.edu abstract large-scale urban development, not to mention synthetic urbanization, will not remain sustainable absent structural changes to the normative and decision making framework that include rolling technology assessment and systems analysis. technology policies need to be based on outcomes as well as on significant improvements in complexity management at critical stages of planning and implementation. this conclusion endures even if it requires limiting options of political decision making in open democratic societies through normative structural automatisms. independent of political trends, social consensus almost everywhere favors a prioritization of energy efficiency, alternative energies, resource recycling, urban farming, costand time-effective public transportation, water economy, and extended product life. but public interest-driven decision making processes, legislation, and dispute resolution do not adequately take into account the acceleration of technological innovation on the one hand, and of environmental deterioration on the other hand. this paper exposes fundamental weaknesses and future needs for technology assessment drawing on european, american and global experiences. it highlights challenges to avoid possible crises of legitimacy and anti-technology groundswells of luddite proportions as well as forgoing groundbreaking opportunities for an open knowledge society based on informed consent rather than state mandate. keywords: sustainable urban development, technology assessment, systems analysis, environmental regulation, policy and procedures. “when i say the earth belongs to each generation during its course, fully and in its own right… then, no generation can contract debts greater than can be paid during the course of its own existence.” – thomas jefferson, letter to james madison, 1789 consilience caytas: legal aspects in sustainable urban development 1. introduction during 2014, 54% of a global human population of 7.3 billion lived in cities, up from 34% in 1960. this share is expected to grow at a degressive rate of 1.84% p.a. between 2015 and 2020, 1.63% p.a. between 2020 and 2025 and 1.44% p.a. between 2025 and 2030.1 notwithstanding the considerable benefits of rural life, the overall balance weighs heavily in favor of accelerated synthetic urbanization or sustainable additions to organically grown historic settlements. planning and delivering turn-key cities, boroughs, or entire special-purpose municipalities such as company towns that support refineries, sea ports, or airports has grown into a sophisticated profit center for global infrastructure project firms and engineering groups like siemens.2 delivering synthetic livable urbanization has turned into a mega-business with project volumes amounting in each case to many billions of dollars. this development of habitats raises as many challenges as it appears to resolve. in its genesis, it will have to change important aspects of our legal system and routinely apply a host of sophisticated practices, standards and procedures. it also provides a noteworthy example for the increasing integration between cybernetics, big data, mathematical and statistical modeling and forecasting, sociopolitical processes of technology assessment, systems engineering and control. it involves, inter alia, applications of artificial intelligence, robotics, hydrogen technology,3 nuclear technology,4 geoengineering,5 ambient intelligence, ubiquitous computing, and nanotechnology.6 one of the fundamental realizations required for a closer look at the matter is that, as a result of increases in the complexity it engenders, human dependence on technology is bound to become near-absolute, with a wide range of ethical and legal implications that will arise sooner rather than later. neither fossil fuels nor energy resources overall, nor land resources or nourishment supplies are likely to run out in our lifetimes or in our grandchildren’s; nor will nuclear energy realistically be rescinded. the club of rome’s 1972 1 who global health observatory, urban population growth, http://www.who.int/gho/urban_health/situation_trends/urban_population_growth_text/e n/. 2 see siemens, green light for sustainable urban development, http://www.siemens.com/entry/cc/en/urbanization.htm. 3 see, e.g. sukhvinder p.s. badwal, sarbjit s. giddey, christopher munnings, anand i. bhatt and anthony f. hollenkamp, emerging electrochemical energy conversion and storage technologies, 79 frontiers in chemistry (2014). 4 william b. hurlbut, altered nuclear transfer: scientific, legal, and ethical foundations, 22 j. contemp. health l. & pol'y 458 (2006). 5 see generally albert c. lin, geoengineering governance, 8 issues legal scholarship 1, 2 (2009). 6 see j. clarence davies, woodrow wilson int’l ctr. for scholars, oversight of next generation nanotechnology 21 (2009), http://207.58.186.238/process/assets/files/7316/pen-18.pdf; arie rip, nanoscience and nanotechnologies: bridging gaps through constructive technology assessment, handbook of transdisciplinary research 145, 152 (g. hirsch hadorn et al. eds., 2008); albert c. lin, size matters: regulating nanotechnology, 31 harv. envtl. l. rev. 349, 353-54 (2007); see also douglas a. kysar, ecologic: nanotechnology, environmental assurance bonding, and symmetric humility, 28 ucla j. envtl. l. & pol’y 201, 208-09 (2010). consilience caytas: legal aspects in sustainable urban development predictions of ‘limits to growth,’7 while conceptually entirely correct, did not account for human ingenuity or exponential growth of technological innovation once computational resources became unlocked and their development was largely selfperpetuated in terms of moore’s law. but creation of livable and environmentally sustainable habitats for a safe, sane and satisfied human population in the multimillions in each location has already begun as an industry and will only increase in pace as urban population growth rates continue to multiply. as this happens, a number of grave deficiencies in the legal, ethical and integrative perspectives are uncovered.8 to think that societies will manage the complexity and challenges of global migration with continued variations of the nation state as we know it, or with a legal system that unquestionably values precedent more than it worries about taking advantage of future opportunities, and that took half a century to even recognize a need for environmental ius cogens (even if it has not managed to this day to define sustainable development or to agree on impact targets for the purpose of reducing climate change), is bound to provide its own dire prognosis. as an example, the 2008 financial crisis could have been averted almost in its entirety if, but only if, mechanisms and authority to act on a national, international, and multilateral levels had been put in place in anticipation of, not in belated response to, the events resulting in the most profound loss of confidence in public markets in world history. thus it is our sociopolitical system and its most significant product, our legal and regulatory system, that will face the greatest pressures to adjust from a reactive to a proactive approach under the new realities created by technology and demographics. survival of the human race may be endangered less by nuclear armageddon or by greenhouse gases than by the inability of a large portion of the voting population to imagine situations that can only be addressed if they are adequately provided for– admittedly at great expense, not least in terms of the opportunity costs of funding. even in not-so-democratic systems, the population still needs to be consulted9 7 dennis l. meadows, donella h. meadows, jorgen randers, the limits to growth (1972) (presenting a computer simulated system dynamics model of exponential economic and population growth under conditions of finite resources, commissioned by the club of rome and funded by the volkswagen foundation. it solved the problem of simultaneity (i.e., mutual causation) by updating all variables in small time increments with positive as well as negative feedbacks and appropriate time delays structuring the various interactions and control processes). substantially advanced since, system dynamics-based modeling is used throughout the public and private sectors for policy analysis and design. see michael j. radzicki and robert a. taylor, origin of system dynamics: jay w. forrester and the history of system dynamics, u.s. department of energy’s introduction to system dynamics, http://www.systemdynamics.org/dl-introsysdyn/start.htm. 8 daniel barben et al., anticipatory governance of nanotechnology: foresight, engagement & integration, in the handbook of science & technology studies (edward j. hackett et al. eds., 3d ed., 2008). 9 monika kurath & priska gisler, informing, involving or engaging? science communication in the ages of atom-, bio-, and nanotechnology, 18 pub. understanding sci. 559, 568 (2009) (contending that public outreach efforts in europe with respect to nanotechnology have occurred after major investment decisions were already made and “tend[ed] to limit public engagement to matters of values and social and ethical aspects, rather than to expose expertise to scrutiny”). see also hart research assocs., nanotechnology, synthetic biology, & public opinion 16 (2009), consilience caytas: legal aspects in sustainable urban development because technological change has a foreseeable and likely impact on the public interest with broad societal implications. even just for the appearance of democratic legitimacy,10 citizens increasingly need to be informed and educated under dramatic time pressure and in a climate of rapidly diminishing trust,11 if not to vote in favor of a necessary measure then at least to comply with it without civil disobedience and obstruction. this essay highlights key aspects of the impending challenges for legal systems everywhere and points to needs, if not proposals, for an expedited upgrade of its functionality. sustainability depends on managing complexity by qualitative methods. quantitatively maximizing or minimizing a single, objectively quantifiable target is essentially a trivial task. the same cannot be said about a multitude of targets requiring value-based balancing as well as trade-offs of conflicting interests subject to society’s changing values and preferences. one of the hallmarks characterizing sustainable development is the necessity of such cost-benefit analyses at every step. sustainable urban development (sud), a multidimensional, multipolar, and multiscalar concept, depends on an at least a seven-dimensional matrix of factors: http://www.nanotechproject.org/process/assets/files/8286/nano_synbio.pdf (reporting that 90% of respondents believed that “more should be done to inform the public about this research” and that 66% of respondents agreed that the “federal government should regulate this research”). see further maria powell & daniel lee kleinman, building citizen capacities for participation in nanotechnology decision-making: the democratic virtues of the consensus conference model, 17 pub. understanding sci. 329, 341, 344 (2008). 10 andy stirling, opening up or closing down? analysis, participation and power in the social appraisal of technology, science and citizens: globalization & the challenge of engagement 218, 220 (melissa leach et al. eds., 2005) (discussing rationales for public participation in science and technology matters). see generally jürgen habermas, legitimation crisis 17-24, 95111 (thomas mccarthy trans., beacon press 1975) and john rawls, the idea of public reason revisited, 64 u. chi. l. rev. 765 (1997). 11 jane macoubrie, woodrow wilson int’l ctr. for scholars, informed public perceptions of nanotechnology and trust in government 8 (2005), http://www.pewtrust.org/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/nanotechnologies/n anotech_0905.pdf. see also sheila jasanoff, designs on nature: science and democracy in europe and the united states 265 (2005). • natural resources (renewable and recyclable) • financial resources • technology and innovation (avoidance of waste by planned obsolescence) • legal and regulatory framework (international, national, state and municipal levels) • public education, information and compliance • supraregional influences (war, migration, large-scale natural disasters) consilience caytas: legal aspects in sustainable urban development 2. technology assessment as a tool and as a process “all of science is nothing more than refinement of everyday thinking.” – albert einstein although it may be easier than an accurate weather forecast, technology assessment (ta) still poses major challenges12 for the study and evaluation of technological innovation’s future impact on society. it involves scientific as well as ethical judgment, 13 intellectual property rights, 14 legal and regulatory issues, 15 manufacturing problems, 16 environmental matters, 17 commercial facets, 18 and competitive aspects.19 after all, it is far from predictable that the most advanced, sophisticated, or elegantly engineered technology will—or should—prevail in the marketplace in a particular instance.20 the concept of technology assessment evolved over the last five decades in the u.s.21 and europe.22 it can be only a matter of time 12 albert c. lin, technology assessment 2.0: revamping our approach to emerging technologies, 76 (4) brook. l. rev. 1 (2011). 13 kristin s. shrader-frechette, evaluating the expertise of experts, 6 risk: health, safety & env’t 115, 117 (1995) (arguing for a right of public participation in risk assessments because they have consequences for public welfare). 14 cf. robert frodeman & jonathan parker, intellectual merit and broader impact: the national science foundation’s broader impacts criterion and the question of peer review, 23 soc. epistemology 337, 339 (2009). 15 einer elhauge, the limited regulatory potential of medical technology assessment, 82 va. l. rev. 1525-1617 (2002); see also stephen mcg. bundy & einer elhauge, knowledge about legal sanctions, 92 mich. l. rev. 261, 267-79 (1993). 16 ulrich beck, risk society: towards a new modernity (mark ritter trans., sage publ’ns 1992). 17 see generally holly doremus, albert c. lin, ronald h. rosenberg, environmental policy law (6th ed. 2012). 18 a. mark fendrick & j. sanford schwartz, physicians’ decisions regarding the acquisition of technology, adopting new medical technology 76-78 (annetine c. gelijns & holly v. dawkins eds., ch. 5, 1994). 19 see daniel c. esty & andrew s. winston, green to gold: how smart companies use environmental strategy to innovate, create value, and build competitive advantage 11, 9495 (2006). 20 richard sclove, woodrow wilson int’l ctr. for scholars, reinventing technology assessment: a 21st century model 2-3 (2010), http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/reinventingtechnologyassessment1.pdf. see also hart research assocs., nanotechnology, synthetic biology & public opinion 1 (2009), http://www.nanotechproject.org/process/assets/files/8286/nano_synbio.pdf. 21 the u.s. agency primarily tasked with technology assessment is the executive office of the president, office of science and technology policy. deborah d. stine, cong. research serv., rl 34736, the president’s office of science and technology policy (ostp): issues for congress 5-7, 24-25 (2009), available at http://ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/09mar/rl34736.pdf. the ostp, in turn, receives external advice from the president’s council of advisors on science and technology (pcast) whose membership is selected from industry, education, research, and ngos in other areas. pcast conducts workshops and convenes technical advisory groups that could conceivably perform certain functions key to technology assessment. id. at 9, 24-25. from consilience caytas: legal aspects in sustainable urban development until its purpose of ensuring a measure of scientific integrity and objective, forwardlooking analysis of known lines of innovation23 will have to be formally recognized by virtually every major government worldwide. however, arguably, r&d and industry trends are so global in nature that the significance of national influence is on the wane. ta has become an indispensable tool of technology policy and of effective regulation.24 efforts to control r&d are subject to the collingridge dilemma: while large-scale impacts cannot be adequately identified, weighed, or even predicted before the technology is already extensively developed, commercialized, and widely used, control or change becomes increasingly difficult the more entrenched the technology in question has become.25 typically, ta is not, and arguably should not be, locally or nationally parochial; however, ta should take a global outlook that is cognizant of broader consequences and impacts on society that are not commonly 1972-1995, a congressional office of technology assessment existed but was de-funded as an ‘unnecessary agency’ under newt gingrich’s ‘contract with america.’ robert m. margolis & david h. guston, the origins, accomplishments, and demise of the office of technology assessment, science and technology advice for congress 53, 66 (m. granger morgan & jon m. peha eds., 2003). its function was later assumed by the center for science, technology and engineering (cste), the technology assessment unit of the u.s. government accountability office (gao). see m. granger morgan & jon m. peha, analysis, governance, and the need for better institutional arrangements, science and technology advice for congress 3, 11 (m. granger morgan & jon m. peha eds., 2003); and jon m. peha, science and technology advice for congress: past, present, and future, 24 renewable resources j. 19, 20-21 (2006). 22 for example the european parliamentary technology assessment (epta) network; the european parliament’s science and technology options assessment (stoa), brussels; parliamentary office of science and technology (post), london; office parlementaire d’evaluation des choix scientifiques et technologiques (opecst), paris; institute for technology assessment and systems analysis at karlsruhe that operates tab, the office of technology assessment at the german bundestag; ta-swiss, the swiss center for technology assessment; institute of technology assessment (ita) of the austrian academy of sciences, vienna; norwegian board of technology; danish board of technology; committee for the future, helsinki; parliamentary evaluation and research unit, stockholm; biuro analiz sejmowych (bas), warsaw; rathenau institute at the hague. see also rinie van est, the rathenau institute’s approach to participatory ta, ta-database-newsl. (institut für technikfolgenabschätzung und systemanalyse, oct. 2000), 13, 18, http://www.itas.fzk.de/deu/tadn/tadn003/vest00a.pdf; reinhard coenen, the legacy of the studiengruppe für systemforschung. 44 (2) minerva 143 (2006); and lars klüver et al., european participatory technology assessment 173 (2000), http://www.tekno.dk/pdf/projekter/europta_report.pdf (observing that “the inequalities and uncertainties attached to scientific-technological developments . . . call[ ] for more inclusive social policy analysis and decision-making”). 23 see arie rip et al., constructive technology assessment: a new paradigm for managing technology in society, managing technology in society: the approach of constructive technology assessment 1, 2 (arie rip et al. eds., 1995). see also johan schot and arie rip, the past and future of constructive technology assessment, 54 technological forecasting & soc. change 251268 (1997). 24 sheila jasanoff, designs on nature: science and democracy in europe and the united states 265 (2005) (“in the united states, a preferred method for displaying objectivity in public decisions has been to clothe the reasons for allocative choices as far as possible in the language of numbers.”). 25 david collingridge, the social control of technology 17-19 (1980). consilience caytas: legal aspects in sustainable urban development realized by scientists, and are characteristically ignored by their financial backers while r&d continues as a work-in-progress. today, ta is used in different jurisdictions in a broad variety of forms and concepts: as a legislative function; classical or expert ta performed by scientific or technical experts; participatory ta involving obvious and conceivable stakeholders; constructive ta that feeds back findings into the technology design process; or discursive ta aiming at a holistic socioeconomic policy dialog within society about cost-benefit, legitimacy, and desirability. in all its functions, however, ta connects developments in science and technology with the decision making processes in society (including legislative and adjudicative processes, but also in a general, consensus-building discourse). 3. need for use of systems analysis and cybernetic tools under increased complexity at its core, sustainability is about avoidance of waste and optimized use of resources through complex adaptive regulatory systems that form part of any human settlement. cybernetics26 involves a circular causal relationship where a system forms part of a closed signaling loop: action by the system causes change in its environment; that change in turn produces some effect on the system through feedback; this, then, causes the functioning or future actions of the system to change or adjust. it is a process that involves both chaos and order on multiple levels. functional system behavior includes communication, connectivity, cognitive methods, learning, adaptation, emergence, efficiency, efficacy and social control. cybernetic27 tools, in particular process controls based on forecasting and feedback, employ mathematical and statistical modeling. the structure of any system, with its numerous circular, interlocking, sometimes time-delayed relationships among complex components, is just as important in determining system behavior as the individual components themselves. an urban environment appears as an open, selforganizing dynamic system where each subsystem adapts to the environment created by all other subsystems.28 in fact, urban dynamics was the first non-corporate application of computational system dynamics technology.29 26 kevin kelly, out of control: the new biology of machines, social systems and the economic world (1994, 2014). 27 contributors to the cybernetic approach include, inter alia, andré-marie ampère, w. ross ashby, gregory bateson, karl ludwig von bertalanffy, stafford beer, julian bigelow, herbert brün, bruce buchanan, fritjof capra, louis couffignal, peter corning, felix von cube, rené descartes, jeff dooley, charles a. fink, heinz von foerster, jay forrester, frank honywill george, ernst von glasersfeld, viktor m. glushkov, john h. holland, erich jantsch, immanuel kant, ilya prigogine, georg klaus, andrey n. kolmogorov, chris lucas, niklas luhmann, humberto maturana, warren mcculloch, marshall mcluhan, margaret mead, john von neumann, michael o’callaghan, paul pangaro, talcott parsons, gordon pask, andrew pickering, anatol rapoport, larry richards, alan scrivener, bronislaw trentowski, alan turing, francisco varela, norbert wiener and james wilk. 28 w. ross ashby, principles of the self-organizing system, 6 (1-2) e:co 102-126 (1962, 2004), available at http://csis.pace.edu/~marchese/cs396x/computing/ashby.pdf. 29 radzicki and taylor, supra note 7. consilience caytas: legal aspects in sustainable urban development modeling and forecasting techniques have advanced significantly, with the benefit of some generations of systems engineering and systems dynamics invested in its current state of the art. this can be seen in the improved accuracy of weather forecasts, economic projections, and corporate estimates, among other prognostic statements. modeling and forecasting are still far from exact sciences, yet the accuracy achieved today is surprising in many instances. nevertheless, the transmission mechanisms for socio-political feedback do, in most cases, lag decades behind: political, legal, regulatory and educational transmission instruments do not work as they ought to in order to allow meaningful use of them as effective cybernetic tools. as an example, the adjudication of statistical events on a unitary, individualized basis, taking into account the gamut of the substantive and procedural rights of every party (and thus conveying to each such stakeholder de facto a limited veto power), cannot lead to either a time-efficient or a cost-efficient result. both time-efficiency and cost-efficiency also need to be balanced against the supposedly superior quality of individualized adjudication, especially when taking procedural economy and litigation cost as additional categories into consideration. to handle dozens, hundreds, or even many thousands of similarly situated claims in accordance with class action rules is an option, but not a very good one. arbitration tends to be more flexible in adjusting to the specifics of a case in issue but it also tends to favor more economically resourceful parties. a better option would be a procedure similar to insurance adjustment in cases of mass calamities because this approach permits focusing on elements common to all similarly situated cases without distraction by fact-finding in the individual case. from a cybernetic viewpoint of systems theory, the purpose of legislation, regulation and adjudication is to provide the most accurate feedback to the operational system at lowest cost in the shortest time. it is clear that the current system fails all these criteria: in addressing complexity, all the world’s major legislative and legal systems, being largely precedent-oriented and therefore looking backwards instead of seeking to anticipate potential developments, rely only in small part on collective intelligence and self-organization to produce emergent behavior. 4. managing finite natural and financial resources “[a] man … knows that the world is not given by his fathers, but borrowed from his children.”30 sustainability is closely tied to resource management. if man is meant not to use up more than he can return, an optimization challenge needs to be resolved that includes maximization of recycling, re-use, and energy efficiency on the side of savings. this optimization challenge also requires a cost-effective increase in creating additional knowledge and innovation. given imminent demographic realities, it will be implausible to save our way out of existing constraints and resource limitations. in the words of senator mark udall: “our livelihood is intimately tied to the food we 30 wendell berry, the unforeseen wilderness: an essay on kentucky’s red river gorge 26 (1971). consilience caytas: legal aspects in sustainable urban development eat, water we drink, and places where we recreate.”31 renewable and recyclable resources have already coined the term urban engineering, which describes the professional tasks of recovering recyclables from the city’s obsolete elements to put them toward infrastructure and services.32 management of such materials is an economic optimization task largely resolvable by the tools that science, technology, and operations research already provide. at the core of the optimization challenge is a reality created by prevailing accounting standards: contemporary industrial production is not geared toward preserving natural resources, but toward financial efficiency. as a result, a commodity that is cheap today due to temporary market forces will not be prioritized for preservation. not least because of their growing share of human population, urban areas represent the heaviest drain on nonrenewable natural resources. still, by far more challenging than management of materials are the political choices concerning allocation of scarce financial resources. after all, “[g]overnment is a way by which every individual believes he can live at the expense of everybody else.” 33 analysis and planning rely largely, albeit with exceptions, on the assumption of ceteris paribus and rebus sic stantibus, that is to say, on continuation of circumstances prevailing or foreseeable at the time of forwardlooking observations. this approach is bound to fail because, if anything can safely be assumed to be a virtual certainty, it is the fact that things will not stay as they are. but because neither direction nor degree of change can be predicted meaningfully beyond a certain event horizon, this principle reflects lack of alternatives rather than a rational assumption. still, the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and its consequences for debt-based credit ratings of nations and their public finances demonstrated the need to curb budgetary sovereignty by rescinding politicians’ ability to buy re-election through promises of populist spending that would harm future generations, since at least a fraction of those promises will have to be fulfilled at attendant cost. one key measure of sustainability is the indefinite maintenance of processes by replacing resources consumed with resources of equal or greater value and without endangering the system. unmanageable risks tend to arise out of public guarantees: in the u.s., this happened inter alia by way of federal statutory guarantee of savings & loan institutions, by fnma and gnma mortgage lending, and, with losses yet to materialize, in the case of slm corporation (sallie mae student loans have long kept many unemployable students off the unemployment rolls at the price of future indentured debt servitude), by allowing bipartisan political misuse of the social security trust fund, but also by way of continuous congressional ‘pork’ spending–a central reason why the line item veto was never and will likely never be accepted by any congress. by definition, governments spend other people’s money. whenever proposals of automatisms such as spending or debt limits are introduced or their enforcement is attempted, populist argument invariably appeals to emotional knee-jerk reflexes by opposing ‘cold’, ‘soulless’, ‘robotic’ mechanisms said to exclude ‘political judgment.’ this ritual will always present dramatic examples of why 31 senator mark udall on earth day, april 22, 2012, http://www.markudall.senate.gov/?id=2179&p=blog. 32 ian jenkinson, municipal engineer – the silver anniversary. proceedings of the institution of civil engineers, 162 (2) municipal engineer 65-68 (june 2009). 33 milton friedman, presidential report card, uncommon knowledge, feb. 10, 1999, available at http://www.hoover.org/research/presidential-report-card-milton-friedman-state-union. consilience caytas: legal aspects in sustainable urban development spending discipline would produce one or the other heart-wrenching and ‘unconscionable’ result. yet, the complex needs for sustaining funding of a community’s numerous balanced sub-systems—such as education, arts and culture, science and research, infrastructure, elder care, health care, environmental concerns, energy choices, the list goes on—are always first to be cut when elected officials, under bond market pressure, declare ‘austerity’ to be society’s paramount survival need. while this claim is, in large measure, inaccurate, resulting from accounting standards that ignore most intangible values, it helps politicians avoid or delay measures that would be likely to affect their re-election within limited terms of office. examples include raising the retirement age, lowering pension benefits and other mass entitlements, or declining bail-outs for recklessly managed industries—all items that, due to their large aggregate funding needs, would be the only path to significantly affecting the bottom line. as milton friedman noted,34 the only way to save taxpayers from periodic disasters caused by their elected representatives is to deprive those representatives of the power of the purse, be it through constitutional automatisms, judicial review, or some mechanism of expert intervention. significantly, most nations have an attorney general, a solicitor general, a surgeon general, an independent central bank—but hardly any society affords an ‘accountant general’ or court of accounts with adequate powers. processes such as sud have no politically significant lobbies to date. budget cuts often do not affect the individual noticeably until years later, and even then not in a readily demonstrable causal nexus that matters enough to voters to mobilize them for a show of mass discontent. this is all the more true of cuts across the board. as in many political or executive decisions, there is almost always a clearly predictable winner in any conflict between short-term and long-term interests, between simple solutions and complex reality. this predictability results from the education of the audience, the effect of mass media, and, most importantly, man’s decreasing attention span and susceptibility to rhetoric denying proof of a confirmable nexus between present cause and future effect. 5. sustainability as economic core value inherent in technology and innovation the human mind’s creativity and its ability to generate intellectual property counts among the few infinitely renewable resources. planned obsolescence, i.e., the 34 “you would rather have people who have a presumption against government expansion but that won’t protect you. it’s only the people who can protect you by cutting taxes and taking away the dollar from the government.” milton friedman, the economic impact of the war on terrorism, uncommon knowledge, sept. 25, 2001, available at http://www.hoover.org/research/economics-and-war-economic-impact-war-terrorism. perhaps it is worth contrasting with some other of friedman’s memorable pronouncements: “i say thank god for government waste. if government is doing bad things, it’s only the waste that prevents the harm from being greater.” the open mind (1975), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=stfjztrmpvs and “nobody spends somebody else’s money as carefully as he spends his own. nobody has the same dedication to achieving somebody else’s objectives that he displays when he pursues his own.” from cradle to grave, free to choose (1980), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ejfslacxfkk. consilience caytas: legal aspects in sustainable urban development artificial limitation of useful product life to limit its functionality or fashionable desirability past a given period, a practice presently entirely legal in the u.s., was reclassified by statute as a form of consumer fraud in france,35 a concept likely to influence legislation throughout the european union and elsewhere in due course,36 assuming that predicted conceptual weaknesses of this legislation (regarding plaintiff’s burden of proof, correlation with price, legitimacy of consumer expectations) do not develop into a deterrent. in the 1920s, major global lightbulb manufacturers including osram, philips, and general electric entered into a secret agreement to reduce the quality and thus the life span of their bulbs (the phoebus cartel).37 a decade later, around 1935, dupont discovered that the first pantyhose had a nearly unlimited lifespan. dupont ordered its product designers to change that.38 laser and inkjet printers sold by hp, canon, epson and brother contain a chip that counts pages. after a certain number is reached, the chip renders the printer dysfunctional and forces the customer to request maintenance—consisting of a technician inserting a code that resets the page counter chip—for a fee.39 many consumers, on the other hand, will not bother with repair but will instead replace the product altogether: a manufacturer’s dream. digital technology has turned consumer goods into an environmental catastrophe because it is increasingly easier to program planned defects, while it is almost impossible to prove that this is the case. manufacturers intentionally make repairs as complex and costly as possible to force product replacement as a more cost-effective alternative under the circumstances. in many cases, repair instructions are kept secret (apple is a notorious example40) and individuals uploading them online face lawsuits. some manufacturers design their 35 see loi n° 2014-344 du 17 mars 2014 relative à la consommation, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichtexte.do?cidtexte=jorftext000028738036&categ orielien=id. 36 see anneli jäätteenmäki, mep, parliamentary question for written answer to the commission under rule 117, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getdoc.do?pubref=//ep//text+wq+e-2011-004273+0+doc+xml+v0//en. 37 patrick gaughen, structural inefficiency in the early twentieth century: studies in the aluminum and incandescent light markets, soc. sci. 610, dec. 1998, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20050204082354/http://www.andover.edu/aep/papers/610/ pgaughen98.pdf. the generalized argument that longer life spans result in wasteful energy consumption is as misleading and unsupported by evidence as the concept that shorter life spans are a natural result of pricing pressures in consumer markets – a cheap product supposedly cannot possibly last as long as an upscale one. this falsely implies a rigid nexus between sales price and production cost. 38 jennifer s. li, the story of nylon, http://kaufmann-mercantile.com/nylon/. see also generally giles slade, made to break – technology and obsolescence in america (2007); vance packard, the waste makers (1960, 2011). 39 jason beam, designed to fail: planned obsolescence in printers, reports from earth, http://www.reportsfromearth.com/155/designed-to-fail-planned-obsolescence-in-printerstricks-to-fix-them/ see also pyramids of waste. planned obsolescence documentary (2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vii6uaxqeoy. 40 kyle wiens, the shady world of repair manuals: copyrighting for planned obsolescence, wired, nov. 12, 2012, available at http://www.wired.com/2012/11/cease-and-desist-manualsplanned-obsolescence/ consilience caytas: legal aspects in sustainable urban development products to make battery replacements impossible.41 while henry ford steadfastly resisted proposals aimed at limiting product life span, planned obsolescence emerged at the same time as the mass manufacturing that he pioneered. this correlation is no coincidence—a product that refuses to die is deemed a tragedy for business (and, by extension, for organized labor). there were even ultimately unsuccessful legislative attempts during the great depression to make planned obsolescence mandatory as a means to secure employment and return on capital.42 planned obsolescence has been at the heart of consumer society since the 1950s and became a core emphasis of engineering and industrial product design. it is an instrument to promote growth in excess of the rate naturally necessitated by technology and demographics. as a result of planned obsolescence, shiploads of electronic waste (declared for customs as ‘second hand goods’) are carried from industrialized countries to the third world, creating vast environmental problems with grave consequences. 43 from a legal perspective, planned obsolescence forces consumers to choose innovation over low cost of ownership and lengthy product life cycles, effectively depriving them of a choice arguably based on justified expectations. planned obsolescence is part of a post-wwii concept that challenges the finality of ownership by associating it with ever-increasing streams of expenses that result in a total cost of ownership over the asset’s life span that is very different from the initial purchase price. other examples of this trend can be observed in the taxation of property or its use (e.g., taxation of digital communication), and in increasingly routine software engineering and product support policies that have, for all intents and purposes, turned an asset that was once ‘owned’ into the functional equivalent of a rental, creating a constant future stream of income for the seller/licensor, the net present value of which can become a central aspect for the seller/licensor’s stock market valuation. however, rethinking production processes and methods showed in countless instances that it is entirely possible to redesign and avoid toxicity along with other aspects of environmental footprint without significant adverse effects on productivity, functionality, design, or price. it is primarily a matter of the priorities expressed in regulatory requirements, not one of feasibility or of aversion to innovation or technological progress, that limits increases in technological sustainability. 41 jens lubbadeh, die reparatur-rebellen, tech. rev., sept. 4, 2013, http://www.heise.de/tr/artikel/die-reparatur-rebellen-1935015.html. 42 serge latouche, bernard london, ou la planification de l’obsolescence à des fins sociales (2003). 43 toxic 'e-waste' dumped in poor nations, says united nations, the guardian, dec. 14, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/dec/14/toxic-ewasteillegal-dumping-developing-countries; mike ives, in developing world, a push to bring e-waste out of shadows. environment 360, feb. 6, 2014, http://e360.yale.edu/feature/in_developing_world_a_push_to_bring_ewaste_out_of_shadows/2736/. consilience caytas: legal aspects in sustainable urban development 6. supraregional influences and challenges to urbanization aside from black swans 44 such as war and lower-level military and paramilitary confrontations, continuing migration and large-scale natural disasters such as earth quakes, river floods, tsunamis, volcanic activity, tropical storms and rising sea levels present the greatest challenges to sud because of the resulting disproportionate financial dislocations. migration has reached spectacular dimensions: about one billion individuals or about one-seventh of the planet’s human population (214 million international migrants and approximately 740 million internal migrants) roamed the world in 2009.45 until the ascendancy of the nation state in the 17th and 18th centuries, and de facto well beyond that time until the universal introduction of passports, freedom of movement was, if not always recognized as a defined political right, at least treated as a natural right.46 it eventually became formally recognized as one of the four freedoms of movement (of goods, services, labor and capital) fundamental to the acquis communautaire of the european union, if only among its member states.47 7. legal and regulatory framework at the international, national, state and municipal levels “if you intend to drain a swamp, you should not consult the frogs.”48 the fact remains that frogs are almost the only ones to be consulted reliably. in western democratic systems (although not only there), regulators and regulations are predominantly influenced by lawyers, consultants, and lobbyists—professionals that are typically retained by the targets of the intended regulation. as a result, 44 an event or occurrence that deviates beyond what is normally expected of a situation and that would be extremely difficult to predict. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blackswan.asp. 45 brad k. blitz, migration and freedom – mobility, citizenship and exclusion 1 (2014) (citing united nations population division, international migrant stock: the 2008 revision population database (2009), http://esa.un.org/migration and martin bell and salut muhidin, cross-national comparisons of internal migration (human development research paper, 2009), http://hdr.undp.org/fr/content/cross-national-comparisonsinternal-migration. 46 satvinder s. juss, international migration and global justice 11 (2013). see also alan dowty, closed borders: the contemporary assault on freedom of movement (1989); jonathon w. moses, migration: globalization’s last frontier (2006); frederick g. whelan, citizenship and freedom of movement: an open admission policy? open borders? closed societies? 3-40 (mark gibney ed., 1988). 47 consolidated version of the treaty on the functioning of the european union art. 45, 2008 o.j. c 115/47 (name changed by the treaty of lisbon from treaty of rome, march 25, 1957, 298 u.n.t.s. 3, 4 eur. y.b. 412) (tfeu). 48 for experience from dodd-frank regulatory efforts directly applicable to this matter see http://www.marketplace.org/topics/business/economy-40/dodd-frank-if-you-want-drainswamp-dont-ask-frogs. consilience caytas: legal aspects in sustainable urban development international law on the subject of sustainable development is still largely aspirational, non-binding, unspecific, and focused on establishing broad common principles for a baseline consensus that is largely summed up in declarations of diplomatic or ila conferences, most importantly the stockholm declaration of 1972,49 the world charter for nature of 1982,50 the rio declaration of 1992,51 the johannesburg declaration of 2002,52 the new delhi declaration of 2002,53 and the sofia declaration of 2012.54 while their character as international opinio iuris, much less as ius cogens, remains controversial and their enforceability is subject to a variety of caveats regarding international legal norms (with the debate over sources of international law still undecided55),56 these declarations have distilled seven general principles57 that have become recognized over a half-century and in due course were implemented by international tribunals58 to a tentative and halting59 but nonetheless increasing degree: 49 report of the united nations conference on the human environment, a/conf. 48/14, 2-65, and corr. 1, stockholm, june 16, 1972, 11 int’l legal mats. 1416-69 (1972). 50 world charter for nature, a/res/37/7, oct. 28, 1982, a non-binding resolution of the u.n. general assembly. the only vote in opposition was cast by the united states, with 18 abstentions. 51 declaration on environment and development, a/conf.151/26 (vol.1), rio de janeiro, june 14, 1992. 52 declaration on sustainable development, a/conf.199/20, chapter 1, resolution 1, johannesburg, sept. 4, 2002. 53 new delhi declaration of principles of international law relating to sustainable development, ila resolution 3/2002, un doc a/57/329, international environmental agreements: politics, law and economics 2: 211-215, new delhi 2002. 54 sofia declaration, ila resolution 7/2012, which affirmed the new delhi declaration and adopted the 2012 sofia guiding statements on the judicial elaboration of the 2002 new delhi declaration of principles of international law relating to sustainable development, available at http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/7c2f958b-c576-4c5594f79f50a87ae74d. 55 almost half a century ago, oscar schachter stated thirteen possible bases of international legal obligation. the list of potential sources has since no doubt increased. oscar schachter, towards a theory of international obligation, the effectiveness of international decisions 9-10 (stephen schwebel ed., 1971) (citing consent of states; customary practice; a sense of “‘rightness’-the juridical conscience”; natural law or natural reason; social necessity; the will of the international community; “direct (or ‘stigmatic’) intuition”; common purposes of the participants; effectiveness; sanctions; “‘systemic’ goals”; shared expectations as to authority; and rules of recognition). 56 see harold honju koh, why do nations obey international law? 106 yale l.j. 2599 (1997) and andrew t. guzman, a compliance-based theory of international law, 90 cal. l. rev. 1823 (2002). 57 new delhi declaration of principles, supra note 53. 58 e.g., gabčíkovo-nagymaros project (hungary/slovakia), judgment, icj reports 1997, 7 ss.; pulp mills at the river uruguay (argentina v. uruguay), judgment, icj reports 2010, 14. 59 the very concept of sustainable development is still awaiting even basic judicial definition. see afshin a-­‐‑khavari and donald rothwell, the icj and the danube dam case: a missed opportunity for international environmental law? 22 melb. u. l. rev. 507, 519-520 (1998). consilience caytas: legal aspects in sustainable urban development 1. the duty of states to ensure sustainable use of natural resources 2. the principle of equity and the eradication of poverty 3. the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 4. the principle of the precautionary approach to human health, natural resources and ecosystems 5. the principle of public participation and access to information and justice 6. the principle of good governance 7. the principle of integration and interrelationship, in particular in relation to human rights and social, economic and environmental objectives of these, principle 4, the precautionary principle, arguably has the most direct bearing not only on sud60 but also on a range of other applications of untried technological innovation. 61 this precautionary principle reverses the burden of proof: absent consensus in the scientific community that an action or policy is not harmful, a party taking or permitting the action or implementing the policy carries the burden of proof as to its harmlessness. expectably, this principle has come under enduring attack by some as risk-averse, hostile to innovation, and a source of stagnation.62 on another issue, porras has observed a growing global trend toward disintermediation of the city and its emancipation from the state with regard to its international dimension, 63 as at least some cities become notably internationalized while sustainable development initiatives are increasingly localized.64 as international 60 although refraining from terming it a norm of customary international law, due to the icj’s failure to pronounce on it in gabčíkovo-nagymaros, the u.n. international law commission as the primary multilateral body for the codification and development of international law noted that the precautionary principle is “embraced worldwide.” pemmaraju sreenivasa rao (special rapporteur). third report on the legal regime for the allocation of loss in case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities, 58th session of the ilc, un doc. a/cn.4/566 [24], (2006). see also daniel dobos, the necessity of precaution: the future of ecological necessity and the precautionary principle, 13 fordham envtl. l.j. 375, 381 (2002). gabčíkovo-nagymaros did, however, recognize an international duty of care in conducting an eia. see generally erika l. preiss, the international obligation to conduct an environmental pact assessment: the icj case concerning the gabcikovo-nagymaros project, 7 n.y.u. envtl. l.j. 307 (1999). 61 see roberto andorno, the precautionary principle: a new legal standard for a technological age, 1 j. int’l biotechn. l. 11-19 (2004) and paolo f. ricci, dave rice, john ziagos, louis a. cox, precaution, uncertainty and causation in environmental decisions, 29 (1) envtl. int’l. 1–19 (2003). 62 see generally noah m. sachs, rescuing the strong precautionary principle from its critics, 2011 (4) u. ill. l. rev. 1285–1338 (2011), and alhaji b.m. marong, from rio to johannesburg: reflections on the role of international legal norms in sustainable development, 16 geo. int’l env. l. rev. 21 (2003). one of the sharpest criticisms of the principle was levelled by cass r. sunstein, beyond the precautionary principle, 151 u. pa. l. rev. 1003, 1008 (2003), and id., your money or your life, new republic, mar. 5, 2004, 27, 30; see also id., the paralyzing principle: does the precautionary principle point us in any helpful direction? regulation 33-37 (winter 2002-2003). 63 ileana m. porras, the city and international law: in pursuit of sustainable development, 36 fordham urb. l.j. 537, 559-563 (2009). 64 see also yishai blank, the city and the world, 44 colum. j. transnat’l l. 875, 877 n. 1 (2006), and id., comparative visions of global public order (part 2): localism in the new global legal order, consilience caytas: legal aspects in sustainable urban development consortia and multilateral banks have stepped up direct lending to cities without sovereign guarantee, 65 and trends such as decentralization and subsidiarity gain political momentum, urban legitimacy now more closely correlates with the higher degree of participatory democracy cities offer.66 privatization stands a greater chance of yielding cost benefits in cities because large pools of cheap and mobile labor can be accessed there.67 at the same time, though, frug and barron argue that the city is becoming disempowered by the international community as the latter asserts a growing direct regulatory role over system-relevant urban settlements under changed concepts of governance.68 notably, sud is an area where, despite initial reservations, ngos have been welcomed and advanced over the last three decades as representative players articulating in a legitimate fashion the authentic voice of global citizenry when it comes to cities as people’s ‘chosen community.’ ngos, rapidly proliferating and increasingly sophisticated in many areas and funded by an increasing variety of highly divergent and sometimes diametrically opposed sources and forces, have become able and accepted as representative actors advocating for the public interest69 in the previously hermetic forum of international law that was narrowly defined as a ‘sovereigns only’ domain for most of its existence. similarly, transnational associations of cities and local governments have now emerged as forces of significant impact in the international discourse.70 8. changing models of organization and leadership new and important dynamics are at work in business organizations today, more so in technology-driven companies than in others. in the knowledge economy, there appears to be a law that empowerment of individuals always happens at the expense of organizations,71 be they political parties, churches, unions, or corporate structures. the strength of such traditional organizations lay in centralizing in-house 47 harv. int’l l.j. 263 (2006), gerald e. frug & david j. barron, international local government law, 38 urb. law. 1 (2006); hari m. osofsky, defining sustainable development after earth summit 2002, 26 loy. l.a. int’l & comp. l. rev. 111, 116 (2003). 65 porras, supra note 63, at 539 n. 6 (referring to the international community as consisting of un, world bank, organization for economic co-operation and development, and eu). 66 george a. bermann, taking subsidiarity seriously: federalism in the european community and the united states, 94 colum. l. rev. 332, 405 (1994) (addressing whether subsidiarity increases public participation). 67 gerald e. frug, city services, 73 n.y.u. l. rev. 23, 88 (1998). 68 gerald e. frug & david j. barron, international local government law, 38 urb. law. 1 (2006). 69 steve charnovitz, nongovernmental organizations and international law, 100 am. j. int’l l. 348, 348 (2006). 70 judith resnik, joshua civin and joseph frueh, ratifying kyoto at the local level: sovereigntism, federalism, and translocal organizations of actors (togas), 50 ariz. l. rev. 709 (2008). but see duncan b. hollis, why state consent still matters – non-state actors, treaties, and the changing sources of international law, 23 berkeley j. int’l l. 137, at 146-155 (2005)(arguing for restraint with regard to over-interpreting aspirational nonbinding action). 71 liam magee, andy scerri and paul james, measuring social sustainability: a communitycentered approach. 7 (3) applied research in the quality of life 239–61 (2012). consilience caytas: legal aspects in sustainable urban development functions and routing processes through them. whatever advantages a large private or public organization still maintains, it derives from the collective brainpower of all its increasingly highly-educated and trained members. the star system of executives is on the wane,72 along with frederick winslow taylor’s scientific management process. any function that can be automated will be, for reasons of both manpower and time efficiency. in many ways, business organization is starting to take on characteristics of swarm intelligence, much like beehives, ant hills, schools of fish, or flocks of birds.73 this trend produces a workforce that has become too self-reliant, too independent, and undistracted by fear: a considerably less manageable workforce in the traditional sense. even if management remains privy to more information, it can no longer claim qualifications or intelligence superior to its collective staff. today’s organizational leader is not a forbidding, mercurial figure but rather someone able to listen well, discern patterns, make analogies, and obtain organizational buy-ins. 74 meaningful contributions are increasingly made by telecommuters from home. this by no means results in fewer hours spent on work, only in work hours spent in different arrangements and with different etiquette. doing the best work possible is no longer tied to dress code and work place. strengths and limitations of the organization are viewed differently—work is performed in a mobile, distributed, networked fashion by professionals moving between competitors with great ease and few regrets. managing these new forces at the workplace will be crucial if ever-shrinking life spans of products, concepts, and management visions are to be harnessed in a sustainable, that is, a lasting way. 9. the imperative of fundamental paradigm change in accounting standards ultimately, sustainable development and the adjustments and prioritizations it axiomatically requires cannot be achieved without a comprehensive reform of accounting standards. but there, developments come very slowly. 75 accounting reflects concepts of valuation and provisioning. something that is not—and cannot be—reflected meaningfully in an accounting statement falls outside the scope of how we value and assess managerial, administrative, and policy-based achievement. a goal 72 nicholas carlson, what happened when marissa mayer tried to be steve jobs, n.y. times, dec. 17, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/magazine/what-happenedwhen-marissa-mayer-tried-to-be-steve-jobs.html?_r=3. 73 carl zimmer, from ants to people, an instinct to swarm. n.y. times, nov. 13, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/13/science/13traff.html?ei=5087&em=&en=27704228 53e9f63e&ex=1195102800&pagewanted=print. see also, much earlier, norbert wiener, the mathematics of self-organizing systems. recent developments in information and decision processes (1962). 74 tom hayes, why so many ceos are struggling today. huffington post, dec. 29, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-hayes/why-so-many-ceos-arestru_b_6383634.html?ncid=txtlnkusaolp00000592. 75 see generally robert h. herz, kimberley r. petrone, international convergence of accounting standards –perspectives from the fasb on challenges and opportunities, 25 nw. j. int'l l. & bus. 631 (2004-2005). consilience caytas: legal aspects in sustainable urban development not reflected in valuation76 and accounting standards does not actually exist except as lip service; it may be meaningful as a concept on paper, but it is not ‘real’ where it counts: in day-to-day operational and financial decision making. if, on the other hand, reformed accounting standards77 are to reflect changed thinking in valuation, the consequences clearly will not end with their reflections in financial statements. this is where the challenge reaches its next level—and that is not an irresolvable problem, either: if value is created, it must be capable of some form of collateralization and alienation, or it is value without ‘value as we know it.’ the difficulties of pledging or executing against undeniably ‘valuable’ assets such as architectural design quality, clean air, fresh water supply, short commutes, urban farming, or aquaculture appear daunting only at first impression. but market-based innovative solutions have been found to exist for intangibles:78 if value is what someone is prepared to pay for an asset, then there is a market for arts and antiques and all manner of collectibles despite their demonstrable inutility. no copyright exists, but billions of dollars in revenue are generated each year through performances of works of composers who have been dead for centuries. valuation may be based on cost, market price, present or future income, share valuation,79 or pay-off. might it be conceivable to pledge a superbly designed urban community and later evict its bankrupt population defaulting on its debts due to refusal of or reluctance toward reforms, without destroying the valued asset in the process? it is this sort of question that will require a substantive as well as procedural answer in an adjusted legal system. we must realize that without affirmative answers, we cannot have meaningful valuation and accounting reform. without valuation and accounting reform, goals of sustainability will, in all likelihood, remain pipedreams. it is not more difficult to conceive of such solutions than it must have been for our parents’ generation to imagine, much less accept, the far-reaching erosion of privacy and of the bill of rights brought about by the advent of the digital age. 10. conclusion sud’s many facets determining the quality of human life require advanced, case-appropriate use of multidisciplinary tools with substantial flexibility and sociopolitical sensitivity. its challenges are not just quantitative in nature, resolvable 76 paul flignor and david orozco, intangible asset & intellectual property valuation: a multidisciplinary perspective. ipthought, wipo document 1 (june 2006) (“when you measure what you are speaking about and express it in numbers, you know something about it, but when you cannot (or do not) measure it, when you cannot (or do not) express it in numbers, then your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind.” sir william thompson, lord kelvin (1824-1907), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/sme/en/documents/pdf/ip_valuation.pdf). 77 see, e.g., john patzakis, new accounting reform laws push for technology-based document retention practices, 2(1) int’l. j. digit. evid. 1 (2003). 78 see, e.g., mikael collan and markku heikkilä, enhancing patent valuation with the pay-off method, 16 j. intell. prop. rts. 377-384 (2011). 79 james lyons-weiler, time for an ip share market? direct investment in market-valued intellectual property could drive translational success. the scientist, feb. 1, 2009. consilience caytas: legal aspects in sustainable urban development by mathematical, logical, and scientific optimization, but also require value-based use of qualitative cybernetic instruments and sophisticated models based on systems theory80 and systems analysis.81 a superficial observation might conclude that these issues can be safely entrusted to a caste of technocratic policy wonks, but ta’s scope reaches much further and requires adaptation not only of our legal reasoning but also of modern legislative and adjudicative procedures for substantially greater timeefficiency and suitability to increasingly complex technological tasks. traditional forms of business organization evolved since the days of the east india company are about to undergo more fundamental changes in style and substance of leadership than they have ever seen, for no other reason than for the dimensionally accelerated pace of technological change. it will also become necessary to revamp how we look at valuation and provisioning in accounting as well as in substantive law governing title (or, in the case of public goods, entitlement) to intangibles. unless technology assessment proves capable of bridging not just the information, participation, and legitimacy gaps apparent today, luddism, 82 as experienced from the machine breakers in europe during the first age of mechanization circa 1811-1849 during the industrial revolution, 83 may pale before an anti-technology backlash driven by environmental concerns and income inequality. the current grass-roots movements surrounding, for example, gmos, could prove but a foretaste of an amish-style response to the concept of an advanced technology-based megalopolis.84 it becomes clear that the economic and socio-political consequences of technology are so portentous, in some cases relative to the very survival of the human species as well as many others, that technology cannot be left to patent holders, patent trolls, investment bankers, industry groups, and their lobbyists, nor to a generally unreflective enthusiasm for free markets and the unfettered entrepreneurial spirit. this article or prudent practices developed in its subject matter does not advocate the opposite approach, but logic suggests that privatization of profits contrasted with socialization of multidimensional costs of delayed and potentially highly adverse consequences cannot be allowed to continue in light of the substantial and sometimes uncontrollable degree of leverage that contemporary technology can offer, particularly in its non-assessed or ill-assessed form. without appropriate anticipatory solutions, sustainable human life might not survive in urban settings to articulate meaningful responses by remedial action. 80 karl ludwig von bertalanffy, general systems theory: foundations, development, applications (1968); see also kristo ivanov, hypersystems: a base for specification of computersupported self-learning social systems, c. m. reigeluth, b. h. banathy, & j. r. olson eds., comprehensive systems design: a new educational technology 81-407 (1993). 81 jeffrey whitten and lonnie d. bentley, systems analysis and design methods, 7th ed. (2007). 82 see kirkpatrick sale, rebels against the future: the luddites and their war on the industrial revolution: lessons for the computer age (1995). 83 eric j. hobsbawm, the machine breakers, 1 (1) past and present 57-70 (1952). see also karl marx, capital (1867) (vol. 1, ch. 15, sec. 1 discussing the strife between workman and machine). 84 steven e. jones: against technology: from the luddites to neo-luddism (2006). microsoft word olawuyi.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 16, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 29-37 ontario’s climate change mitigation and low carbon economy act: pious aspirations or new dawn? damilola s. olawuyi dolawuyi@ogeesinstitute.edu.ng abstract the government of ontario has unveiled the underlying legal framework for its cap-and-trade program. like the european union emissions trading system, the proposed act places a cap on carbon emissions and facilitates the trading of pollution allowances. the ultimate objectives of the act are to reduce the emission of ghgs, while providing financial incentives to businesses. this article assesses the proposed act with respect to the criteria of a robust capand trade system, including: effectiveness; comprehensiveness; transparency and fairness; and offset eligibility. keywords: ontario, climate change law, carbon emissions, capand-trade consilience 30 introduction on february 24, 2016, the province of ontario in canada introduced the climate change mitigation and low-carbon economy act (the “ontario climate act”), and a cap and trade program regulations (the “regulations”) on february 25, 2016.1 the act and the regulations, will undergo a 45-day public and stakeholder comment period. if passed, this legislation would formally establish a cap and trade program in ontario, adding it to a growing roster of municipal, provincial, federal, regional, and international regimes that have embraced the cap and trade system as the instrument of choice for combating climate change.2 the ontario climate act integrates essential precepts of a cap-and trade system with unique governance innovations. the cap-and-trade program is expected to come into effect on january 1, 2017. a cap and trade program, also known as emission trading, is a market-based mechanism to reduce greenhouse gases (ghg), under which emitters are provided economic incentives and flexibility to achieve ghg reductions. under this approach, a regulatory body sets a cap on the specific annual carbon dioxide levels that the capped entities are allowed to emit. 3 capped entities that emit below their annual targets, mainly companies or operators of high emitting facilities, can sell unused credits to another participant. meanwhile, companies that cannot meet their reduction obligations can buy carbon credits to offset their emissions.4 in essence, carbon credit is a financial instrument that represents the removal of one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (tco2e) from the atmosphere.5 therefore, this 1 proposed climate change mitigation and low-carbon economy act, 2016 (bill 172) <http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/bills/bills_detail.do?locale=en&billid=3740&detailpage=bills_detail_the_bill> accessed march 03, 2016. see also the cap and trade program regulations, <http://www.downloads.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/env_reg/er/documents/2016/012-6837_draftreg.pdf> accessed march 03, 2016. 2 while command and control instruments, such as carbon tax, focus on imposing emission reduction standards/targets by an authority that must be complied with, with sanctions resulting from non-compliance, market-based instruments include cap-and-trade schemes, offsets schemes or baseline-and-credit schemes that puts a price on ghg emissions with the purpose of reducing them. emission trading schemes have been adopted in 12 jurisdictions across the world. these include the european union emissions trading system (eu ets), the australian emissions trading system, the new zealand emissions trading system, the regional greenhouse gas initiative in the northeastern united states, the california emissions trading system, alberta-based greenhouse gas reduction program and offset credit system; quebec cap-and-trade scheme; and the tokyo emissions trading system. others schemes stand on the verge of commencing operations, including and the republic of korea’s cap-and-trade scheme. chinese provinces (hubei and guangdong) and cities (beijing, tianjin, shanghai, chongqing, and shenzhen) have also proposed cap-and-trade schemes. china will by 2017 launch a nationwide cap-and-trade system. 3 emissions trading under the international climate regime, as set out in article 17 of the kyoto protocol, allows countries with commitments under the kyoto protocol to buy emission units from other countries with commitments and use them towards meeting a part of their targets. 4 generally, carbon trade is a transaction whereby a buyer purchases, and a seller sells, carbon credits; while carbon markets are virtual financial marketplaces where sale and exchange of carbon credits occur. participants in the carbon market, mostly governments and business enterprises, divide carbon credits into commodity units, which are then tracked, priced and traded, depending on the participant’s relative capacity and needs vis-à-vis their targets. for detailed examination of the nature and scope of carbon finance, see d olawuyi, the human rights based approach to carbon finance (cambridge university press, 2016) 31-32. 5 to find a common unit for this commodity, all ghgs are converted to co2 equivalents (co2-eq). co2-eqs are traded consilience olawuyi: ontario’s climate change mitigation system aims to provide flexible options for large emitters to reduce carbon emissions over time. in theory, this flexibility should decrease the overall costs of compliance with emission reduction targets. the cap on carbon emissions also incentivizes investment in clean technologies, thus facilitating the creation of new jobs and the transition to a low-carbon economy. the ontario climate act enshrines into law ontario's ambitious plans and targets to achieve 15 percent ghg reduction below 1990 levels by 2020, 37 percent below 1990 levels by 2030, and 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050.6 it also establishes a greenhouse gas reduction account for deposit of all proceeds from ontario's cap and trade program. furthermore, based on government estimates, ontario expects to generate approximately $1.8-1.9 billion per year in proceeds from the cap and trade program, and will invest such proceeds in “programs that reduce greenhouse gas pollution, help save families’ money and reward innovative companies by creating more opportunities for investment in ontario.”7 ontario’s cap-and-trade program is both ambitious and innovative. by committing to a mid-term target to reduce emissions by 37 per cent below 1990 levels by 2030, ontario became the first province in canada to set a mid-term greenhouse gas pollution reduction target for 2030.8 furthermore, ontario’s cap and trade program innovatively addresses questions on how proceeds of the cap and trade program can be sustainably invested and utilized to deliver benefits to ontarians, it establishes a finance mechanism through which proceeds from the program can be reinvested to alleviate social and environmental problems in ontario. the government of ontario has already created a $325-million green investment fund that will commit to projects that will fight climate change, grow the economy and create jobs.9 this fund, if effectively administered, provides realistic and long-term strategies to combine emission reduction goals with economic and social development programs such as public and green transportation; renewable energy; retrofits to improve energy on carbon markets. see d olawuyi, the human rights based approach to carbon finance, ibid. 6 see l goldstein, “cap-and-trade: the next liberal rip-off” (toronto sun, february 25, 2016) < http://www.torontosun.com/2016/02/25/cap-and-trade-the-next-liberal-rip-off> stating that “the plan repeats almost every blunder made by europe’s decade-old cap-and-trade market, the emissions trading scheme, unsurprising given the liberals consulted with ets bureaucrats in drafting their plan.” see also k libin, “ontario’s new cap-and-trade plan is a tawdry tax-and-spend scheme sold as a gift of ‘clean air for our children” (financial post, february 25, 2016) <http://business.financialpost.com/fp-comment/kevin-libin-ontarios-new-cap-and-trade-plan-is-a-tawdry-tax-andspend-scheme-sold-as-a-gift-of-clean-air-for-our-children> accessed february 25, 2016, stating that “the truly surprising thing about the new ontario cap-and-trade emissions regime isn’t that, when so many layers of feel-good enviro-coddling spin is stripped away, it’s ultimately designed to suck what could amount to hundreds of dollars from families’ pockets and funnel it into a big slush pile for the liberals to then sprinkle treats over favored sectors. the real marvel is that it took them this long to land on the scheme.” 7 see “ontario introduces new climate change legislation” < https://news.ontario.ca/ene/en/2016/02/ontario-introduces-new-climate-change-legislation.html> accessed february 25, 2016. 8 see government of ontario, “ontario first province in canada to set 2030 greenhouse gas pollution reduction target: new target builds momentum toward a low-carbon economy” https://news.ontario.ca/ene/en/2015/05/ontario-first-province-in-canada-to-set-2030-greenhouse-gas-pollutionreduction-target.html> accessed april 02, 2016. 9 government of ontario, green investment fund, <https://www.ontario.ca/page/green-investment-fund> accessed march 03, 2016. consilience 32 efficiency in homes, buildings and businesses; clean technologies and energy efficiency projects that reduce greenhouse gases while creating jobs. this holistic approach has delivered positive prospects in countries such as romania, where proceeds of carbon credits have been utilized for social development programs.10 furthermore, as canada’s most populous province, home to nearly 50 percent of all canadians, it is imperative for ontario to lead effective climate action in order for canada to achieve its intended nationally determined contribution (indc) to reduce ghg emissions economy-wide by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030.11 ontario’s proposed program is a positive effort that, if effectively implemented, could influence and inform canada’s future climate action. despite its innovative approach however, the proposed act has already received flak from commentators who consider the proposed legislation as less of a carbon-reduction plan than a public rip-off, a “feel-good enviro-coddling spin,” and a false start to climate change action.12 many of the early criticisms and concerns regarding the ontario climate act relate to wider debates on whether a cap and trade instrument, as opposed to carbon taxation, represents the most effective legal instrument choice for combating climate change; whether a cap and trade regime can deliver real, measurable, additional, long term and sustainable reduction of ghgs; whether a cap and trade program immorally rewards the polluter and allows trade in hot air; and whether a cap and trade program will not result in social, economic and human rights problems for the public. these debates have been extensively considered in the literature and will not be rehashed in this article.13 rather, the aim of this article is to 10 in 2013-2014, romania generated about 260 million euros, and are hoping to raise another about 2 billion euros during the 2016-2020 period, from the country’s cap-and-trade program. the proceeds have been used to construct new bike lanes and metro stations. see the world bank, new bike lanes and metro stations in bucharest paid for by carbon credits <http://blogs.worldbank.org/climatechange/new-bike-lanes-and-metro-stations-bucharest-paid-carbon-credits> accessed march 03, 2016. 11 the government of canada submitted its intended nationally determined contribution (indc) to the united nations framework convention on climate change (unfccc) secretariat in may 2015. canada intends to reduce greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions economy-wide by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030. see canada’s indc submission to the unfccc, <http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/published%20documents/canada/1/indc%20-%20canada%20%20english.pdf> > accessed march 03, 2016. 12 see l goldstein, “cap-and-trade: the next liberal rip-off” (toronto sun, february 25, 2016) <http://www.torontosun.com/2016/02/25/cap-and-trade-the-next-liberal-rip-off> sting that “the plan repeats almost every blunder made by europe’s decade-old cap-and-trade market, the emissions trading scheme, unsurprising given the liberals consulted with ets bureaucrats in drafting their plan.” see also k libin, “ontario’s new cap-and-trade plan is a tawdry tax-and-spend scheme sold as a gift of ‘clean air for our children” <http://business.financialpost.com/fp-comment/kevin-libin-ontarios-new-cap-and-trade-plan-is-a-tawdry-tax-andspend-scheme-sold-as-a-gift-of-clean-air-for-our-children> accessed february 25, 2016, stating that “the truly surprising thing about the new ontario cap-and-trade emissions regime isn’t that, when so many layers of feel-good enviro-coddling spin is stripped away, it’s ultimately designed to suck what could amount to hundreds of dollars from families’ pockets and funnel it into a big slush pile for the liberals to then sprinkle treats over favoured sectors. the real marvel is that it took them this long to land on the scheme.” 13 see t alton, “introducing carbon taxes in south africa” (2014) 116(1) applied energy, 344-354; d olawuyi “rethinking the place of flexible mechanisms in kyoto's post 2012 commitments” (2010) journal of law, environment and development 23-35; also m sandel, editorial, ‘it’s immoral to buy the right to pollute’, n.y.times, 15 december 1997, page a23. see also, t. jackson, k. begg, s. parkinson , ‘the language of flexibility and the flexibility of language’, (1998) 10/3-4 international journal of environment and pollution. consilience olawuyi: ontario’s climate change mitigation evaluate the scope and content of the ontario climate act with respect to some essential criteria of a robust cap-and trade system, including: effectiveness; comprehensiveness; transparency and fairness; and offset eligibility. this article assesses the potentials and pitfalls of the ontario climate act. it identifies its areas of innovation and strengths, key implementation and logistical questions that may arise, and offers perspectives on how to address such gaps. evaluation of the ontario climate act the essential normative requirements for assessing the environmental integrity of a cap-and trade system include: effectiveness; comprehensiveness; transparency and fairness; and offset eligibility.14 this section evaluates ontario’s proposed legislation in the light of these key requirements. it aims to determine whether the ontario climate act, in its current form, can potentially deliver measurable long term and sustainable reduction of ghgs in ontario. a. effectiveness an ex-ante evaluation of the effectiveness of a cap and trade program focuses on the stringency of targets set by the program and on whether the scope of the regulated ghg sources are extensive enough to drive ghg abatement from key sources.15 therefore, the first point to address is whether the ontario emission trading scheme adequately regulates major emission sources. the ontario climate act in section 1 establishes a verifiable emissions amount and sets a deadline within which capped entities must submit their emission allowances and credits, following the end of the compliance period in section 5. the compliance period is stated in section 2 as january 1, 2017 to december 31, 2020, january 1, 2021 to december 31, 2023, and each subsequent three-year period. section 4 describes the cost equivalent per tonne of reductions. the cap will decline by 3.7 percent over each subsequent three year-period, falling to 15 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020. the act is sweeping in its coverage of emission sources. the definition of ‘prescribed activity’ in section 3 includes all key sectors 14 see a radu, “alberta's co2 reduction strategy – assessing the environmental integrity of emissions trading schemes” (canadian institute of resources law 2014) 7-11 <http://dspace.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/1880/50352/1/emissionsop45w.pdf > accessed march 03, 2016; see also misato sato, .tim laing, simone cooper, & lixiang wang, “methods for evaluating the performance of emissions trading schemes” (november 2015) http://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/cs-chinaets-evaluation-paperfinal1.pdf; world bank, mapping carbon pricing initiatives: developments and prospects (washington dc: world bank, 2013); j arlinghaus, “impacts of carbon prices on indicators of competitiveness. empirical findings” (oecd environment working papers no. 87, 2015); c munnings, r morgenstern, z wang, and x liu “assessing the design of three pilot programs for carbon trading in china” (october 2014) <http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/workimages/download/rff-dp-14-36.pdf> accessed april 3, 2016; j coria, a lofgren, and t sterner, “to trade or not to trade: firm-level analysis of emissions trading in santiago, chile” (2010) 91(11) journal of environmental management 21262133. 15 see radu, ibid at 24, also c munnings, r morgenstern, z wang, and x liu, “assessing the design of three pilot programs for carbon trading in china”, ibid at 4. consilience 34 with high historical emissions of ghgs that are already subject to ontario’s greenhouse gas emissions reporting regulation (the “reporting regulation”).16 section 14 (2) of the proposed ontario climate act stipulates that any entity required by the reporting regulation to submit a report and verification statement in 2016 is a mandatory participant under the proposed cap-and-trade program. this covers a wide range of sectors across agriculture, electricity generation, iron and steel production, natural gas distribution and petroleum product supply. furthermore, in order to avoid a flood of business-as-usual allowances, section 6 restricts emission allowances that may be submitted for a compliance period. they are allowances transferred into a compliance account as a result of a successful purchase of emission allowances offered for sale, and ontario’s annual emission allowances classified by the minister as generated in the compliance period or an earlier year or within the first or second year following the end of the compliance period. furthermore, the act elaborates types of initiatives that may be funded from proceeds of the cap and trade program, of which concern energy use, land use and buildings, infrastructure, transportation, industry, agriculture and forestry, waste management, education and training, and research and innovation. by extending its reach to a wide range of activities and sectors, the proposed ontario climate act arguably meets the requirement of effectiveness and has strong potentials to adequately regulate key emission sources in ontario. b. comprehensiveness a sustainable emission-trading scheme must identify and encapsulate all sources of ghg emissions. as radu rightly notes,“the extent to which the particular ets covers sources of emissions and emission gases is a measure of the comprehensiveness of the ets.”17 furthermore, as the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc) recommends in its guidelines for compiling ghg inventories that methodologies for estimating, assembling, documenting, and transmitting ghg inventory data must be consistent and comprehensive, regardless of the method used to produce the estimates.18 the proposed ontario climate act identifies two types of eligible ghg emissions: co2 and non-co2 emissions. however, the act fails to include a comprehensive list of gases that come under the non-co2 emissions. the act references methane (ch4) and nitrous oxide (n2o), but fails to mention the wide array of other ghgs that have also been identified by the ipcc as contributors to climate change. these include hydrofluorocarbons (hfcs); perfluorocarbons (pfcs); sulphur hexafluoride (sf6); nitrogen trifluoride (nf3); 16 see section 5 of ontario’s greenhouse gas emissions reporting regulation, reg. 452/09, under the environmental protection act, r.s.o. 1990, c. e.19. a person who owns or operates a facility at which ghg emitting activities, that are comprehensively listed in table 2 of the reporting regulation, occurs is required to quantify and report ghg emissions associated with those activities as applicable under the regulation. 17 ibid at 9. 18 intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc), 2006 ipcc guidelines for national greenhouse gas inventories (hayama, japan: institute for global environmental strategies, 2006). consilience olawuyi: ontario’s climate change mitigation trifluoromethyl sulphur pentafluoride (sf5cf3); halogenated ethers; and halocarbons not covered by the montreal protocol including cf3i, ch2br2 chcl3.19 by failing to create a comprehensive list of non-co2 gases to be capped and regulated, the proposed ontario climate act falls into the trap of non-specificity, a gap that could pose long-term implementation challenges. one way of ensuring specificity is for the act to reference the comprehensive list of ghgs contained in the reporting regulation, some of which are also included in canada’s indc.20 c. transparency and fairness a robust cap-and-trade system must adopt transparent mechanisms for creating emission allowances, setting price caps, and distributing emission allowances through auction. transparency requires that the “rules of the game” are clarified in a fair and open manner. the ontario climate act, arguably, incorporates robust mechanisms that, if effectively implemented, could help ensure transparency. section 34 of the act sets a reasonable number of ontario emission allowances that the minister for environment and climate change will create each year: year number of allowance (tonnes – units?) 2017 142,332,000 2018 136,440,000 2019 130,556,000 2020 124,668,000 in section 35, the minister granted the power to reserve and sell five percent (5%) of all ontario emission allowances created. section 36 allows the minister to auction submitted and reserved emission allowances. to provide fair and adequate notices to participants, section 38 provides that the minister shall provide notice of an auction or sale to the public. the minister must also provide information on the date, time, location, process, and requirements of the auction or sale. section 42 requires the minister to make a written summary of each auction or sale available to the public within 45 days following its conclusion,. this summary sets out key information such as the lowest bid price accepted, registered participants who submitted bids in the auction or sale, details regarding the number of emission allowances sold, the number of emission allowances sold for each vintage year or category, and a description of how the emission 19 ibid. 20 see table 1 of the reporting regulation, see also ‘gases covered’ in canada’s indc submission to the unfccc, supra note 10. consilience 36 allowances were distributed among the bidders, without identifying the participants. by incorporating provisions ensuring that clear and detailed information on market activities and transactions are transparently disclosed, the ontario climate act has the potential to stimulate trust and protect access to information rights. d. offset eligibility flexibility is very important in combating climate change. by allowing participants to utilize international credits generated by project-based mechanisms – such as the kyoto protocol’s cdm and its joint implementation (ji) mechanism – toward fulfilling part of their domestic obligations, emission reduction schemes can provide opportunities for participants to achieve emission reduction at the least possible cost. section 7 of the ontario climate act provides that offset credits may be submitted for a compliance period. in order to create a robust offset credit program in ontario, it is envisaged that separate offsets regulation will be proposed later in 2016 if the climate change legislation passes. according to the ontario climate act, the offsets regulation will describe the required conditions which must meet to be able to create, verify and register offset credits for use in ontario’s greenhouse gas cap and trade program, including requirements for protocols. protocols set out the requirements to demonstrate the offset criteria such as ownership, and that proposed offsets are real, additional, verified, unique, permanent, and enforceable, to ensure that offset projects produce the emission reductions claimed. in designing offset regulations, it is important to adopt a lessons-learned approach that draws on some of the implementation challenges facing offset mechanisms seen on the international level with the clean development mechanism (cdm). studies show that failure to introduce human rights safeguards in carbon actions and projects may exacerbate human rights violations and create complex challenges and risks for a cap-and-trade system.21 it is particularly important to consider how allegations of forceful land grabs, violation of human rights, siting and concentration of projects in poor communities, and lack of accountability by project participants, have stifled the overall efficacy of the cdm. these precedents should provide some useful lessons. new international policy recognizes the importance of these considerations. for instance, the paris agreement states the following in its preamble: parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as 21 see d olawuyi, the human rights based approach to carbon finance, supra note 4. see also d olawuyi, climate justice and corporate responsibility: taking human rights seriously in climate actions and projects (2016) 34: 1 journal of energy & natural resources law, 1-18; united nations environment program, climate change and human rights (unep 2015) 910; and international bar association, climate change justice and human rights task force report, achieving justice and human rights in an era of climate disruption (international bar association 2014) 147-153. consilience olawuyi: ontario’s climate change mitigation gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.22 conclusion the ontario climate act is timely, comprehensive and positive legislation with far more strengths than weaknesses. coming at a time when the world is looking to hold the increase in the global average temperature well below 2 °c above pre-industrial levels and 1.5 °c above pre-industrial levels, the proposed legislation provides a new impetus for a dynamic carbon market that can stimulate significant progress, heralding a new dawn in achieving this goal. the efficacy of the proposed legislation can be further improved if it is infused with procedural and accountability safeguards to address human rights risks and concerns that will inevitably arise in carbon offset projects. the legislation, and its accompanying regulations, should establish inspection panels and a dispute resolution mechanism through which emission reduction actions and projects that violate existing environmental and human rights laws can be identified and screened out from credit trading. 22 emphasis added. united nations framework convention on climate change (unfccc), the paris agreement, conference of the parties, twenty-first session paris, 30 november to 11 december 2015, <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf> accessed february 25, 2016. microsoft word chirisa-copyedited.doc consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 11, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1–26   building and urban planning in zimbabwe with special reference to harare: putting needs, costs and sustainability in focus innocent chirisa, phd department of rural & urban planning university of zimbabwe abstract this article examines construction and its relationship with urban planning in zimbabwe. urban planning has been blamed for making the building process cumbersome, thereby raising transaction costs. such transaction costs include planning and associated bureaucratic processes, which are often underestimated by construction investors. although planning is critical for the sustainability of buildings in zimbabwe, it still relies heavily on outdated building standards set by the british. the social, economic, and physical environment in which construction takes place has greatly changed. issues concerning costs, investments, building materials, planning laws, and climate change play a key role in shaping urban environments. they are thus examined in the context of sustainable construction, a field of science that addresses relevant societal needs and issues of technology. this article is a theoretical and empirical review of the present needs and costs characterizing the construction industry. it examines both micro and macro-scale building processes and issues raised by different players in the industry. can sustainability be achieved with the current mantra of building operations, guided by the present planning diktats and procedures? keywords: town planning, standards, transaction costs, urban policy, economic meltdown, sustainability 2 consilience 1. introduction this article examines construction and its relationship with urban planning in zimbabwe. urban planning has encumbered the building process, elevating the costs of development in the form of transaction costs. transaction costs have been a cause of disagreement among economists over the years (allen, 1999; cai, 2004; cordella, 2004; marinescu, 2012). transaction costs entail activities such as “... information searching, negotiation, monitoring, and enforcing transactions” (cai, 2004:1). they also include planning and associated bureaucratic processes (christiansen and signe, 2007), which are often underestimated by construction investors. although planning is critical to ensuring the sustainability of buildings in zimbabwe, it still relies heavily on the outdated building standards set by the british. the social, economic, and physical environment in which construction takes place has greatly changed. issues concerning costs, investments, building materials, planning laws, and climate change play a key role in shaping urban environments. they are thus examined in the context of sustainable construction. this article is based on desktop study and empirical reviews of the present and future needs and costs within the construction industry. it examines both micro and macro-scale building processes and issues raised by different players in the industry. under the current mantra of building operations guided by the current planning diktats and procedures, it is uncertain whether sustainable construction is achievable. sustainable construction is defined as “... an emerging field of science that aims at incorporating the general sustainable development concepts into conventional construction practices” (sarkis, meade and presley, 2008: 2582). sustainable construction embraces integrating success factors in the planning of such projects (nwachukwu and emoh, 2011). sarkis, meade and presley (2008: 2582) argue that when evaluating the built environment, “…it is important to take a broad view incorporating broader stakeholders and communities, beyond immediate investors or building users [taking into account] the intergenerational aspect of sustainability [and] influencing the needs and requirements of future generations.” this emerging concept of sustainable construction addresses issues of the economy, society, and environment, and embraces building as a way to create a better future for both the users and inhabitants of the buildings. in light of this, bakar, razak, abdullah and awang (2006:2) assert, “in order to be sustainable […] initiatives must be economically viable, socially acceptable, technically feasible and environmentally compatible.” this article examines how urban planning attempts to provide a platform for bringing these issues together. figure 1 is a framework for implementing sustainability in building construction adapted from akadiri, chinyio and olomolaiye (2012:131). it places an emphasis on the following three objectives emphasized by akadiri, chinyio and olomolaiye (2012: 141): “implementing sustainable building construction practices has been advocated as a way forward in fostering economic advancement in the building industry while minimising impact on the environment. in order to reduce these detrimental impacts of construction on the environment and achieve sustainability in the industry, three consilience chirisa: urban planning in zimbabwe 3   principles emerge, namely resource efficiency, cost efficiency and design for human adaptation. they form the framework for integrating sustainability principles into construction projects right from the conceptual stage.” figure 1: framework for implementing sustainability in building construction besides financial and fiscal matters relating to the construction sector in zimbabwe and the application of new technologies, the construction process is at the core of building in the country (zami, 2011; zami and lee, 2009; zami, and lee, 2011; zami, 2010; ndlovu and umenne, 2008). 2. literature review construction in zimbabwe dates back to pre-colonial times. the same precolonial building style still typifies most rural building practices in the country (chenga, 1986; ndlovu and umenne, 2008). for example, zami and lee (2011) argue that the use of earth for construction dates as far back as the 12th century, the period associated with the construction of the great zimbabwe. the adoption of the zimbabwe standard code of practice for rammed earth structures, published in 1996, and its inclusion in the zimbabwe model building bylaws in 2004, saw the recognition of stabilised earth construction in the country (sirdc, 2004). building with rammed earth is relatively cheap in cost, being 60% cheaper than the traditional concrete brick and blocks construction (zami and lee, 2011, zami, 2010). the intermediate technology group (itg), in collaboration with chitungwiza municipality in 1993, implemented the method in a low-income housing pilot project. the idea was to evaluate the response of the people towards earth structure and the performance of low technology and sustainable materials used in the construction of low-cost housing. sustainable building and construction is a function of many factors, including the macro-economic environment, and the capacity of builders to bear different industry-related costs. additional factors include policy, in 4 consilience terms of providing a stimulating space and environment for the testing and piloting of emerging technologies, and establishing the level of acceptability of the diverse stakeholders involved (dberrcsu, 2008; fred and rossow, 1975). in zimbabwe, the construction industry has the potential to account for at least 20% of the country's annual gross domestic product (bulawayo24news, 2011; cf. world bank group, 2012). the sector was set to grow by 1.5 percent in 2012 and create new job opportunities (nyakazeya, 2012). in the 1990s, construction as an industry employed about 100,000 people; in 2011, only 30,000 workers had jobs in this industry, indicating a decline of about 60% in employment capacity. despite such a sharp decline in the sector’s employment share, estimates indicate that zimbabwe would require approximately $15 billion for infrastructure development between 2011 and 2016, even as local pension funds are heavily invested in commercial property. results indicate that tapping this growth from the residential market is critical for mortgage market redevelopment in the country (zimbabwean, 2011). zimbabwe has confronted a number of economic challenges since 1990, one involving the adoption of the economic structural adjustment programme (esap). this development has constrained the construction sector in the country. for example, the construction industry federation of zimbabwe (cifoz) has tried to engage financial institutions for the issuance of a bond worth us $25 million in order to revive the construction sector (zbc, 2010). the generally low performance of the construction sector relative to other sectors may reflect “the impact of sanctions leading to the scaling down of operations […] over the years” (zbc, 2010). the preparations for the world cup soccer tournament in south africa in 2010 saw zimbabwe experience a “skills’ flight,” as south africa proved a better destination for most engineers, land surveyors, quantity surveyors, and urban planners. at the same time, the country was in a deep macro-economic crisis. building sustainability hinges on proper planning. urban planning standards, espoused in zimbabwean statutes, have inhibited the majority of homebuilders and low-income families from building houses that meet the requirements of public authorities (tibaijuka, 2005; chaeruka and munzwa, 2009; mubvami and musandunyamayaro, 1993). these standards serve a minimalist agenda. this minimalist agenda – stressing order, control, health, security, and amenity, as stipulated in the preamble of the regional, town and country planning act (chapter 29:12) – has continued to characterise the planning of urban settlements in the country (davison, 2002). urbanisation, poverty, unemployment, and homelessness are growing daily. generally, and in the context of increasing urban poverty in developing countries, households resort to overcrowding, resulting in the development of slums (tevera and chikanda, 2000; tevera and chimhowu, 1998). the government often intervenes with strategies such as demolitions or strict monitoring of urban development processes, also known as development control (toriro, 2007; tibaijuka, 2005). in zimbabwe, housing and urban development is highly technical, with an emphasis on the strict observance of building and housing standards (goz, 1999; 2001; kamete, 2009). this represents a major impediment to the delivery of urban housing. specifically, the separation of land uses and bureaucratic procedures in planning are the cause of inefficiency in the general urban system. additional factors include urban sprawling effects; insensitivity to low-income groups such as planning consilience chirisa: urban planning in zimbabwe 5   regulations that exclude the informal sector of urban centres; and the mismatch between what the poor can afford in terms of resource mobilisation, and what the regulations prescribe (cf. christiansen and winding, 2007). all these may be referred to as "planning failures" (toriro, 2007). planning failures are the principal explanation as to why housing delivery systems exclude many of the poor (cf. payne, 2005). they are also the major reason why urban construction remains low when demand for the buildings is high. 3. urban planning and construction in zimbabwe: issues, constraints and prospects supply factors such as capital; skilled labour; training; policy; technology: and legal framework and demand factors such as people’s preferences, the sale price of housing, and the financial capability of the average urban family; are important aspects of consideration in sustainable building. however, construction in zimbabwe must strictly adhere to the diktats of urban planning. the construction process usually follows consolidation or the subdivision of land in keeping with the provisions of the rtcpa (musandu, 1993). sometimes this follows a shift in land use. sometimes these processes are too cumbersome to allow for quick wins in development, as bureaucracy leads to uncalled-for transaction costs (olsen, 2005; natsios, 2010). newsday (24 august 2010) carried the headline, "town planners blast legislation," in which town planners were reported to have agreed to lobby for a review of town-planning laws and regulations. in their submission, the planners blamed the “current legal regime [for stifling] growth in urban housing, where the backlog is currently estimated at over 500,000” (newsday, 2010:4). this emerged at the zimbabwe institute of regional and urban planners (zirup) annual conference held in kariba, whose theme was "planning legislation procedures and best practices." major bottlenecks associated with national housing provisions, particularly stringent procedures and delays in the approval of plans hold back the rate of growth in housing stands. these major impediments slow down the construction of roads and water pipes before people can settle in any given area. incremental development, as an approach to building housing, is a recent development in urban planning, embracing innovation and flexibility in land delivery and management. it should be noted that zimbabwe produced the lowest number of stands in 2004; 200 allotments were made nationally. the highest figure of stands produced was in 1989, when 10,000 were made available (newsday, 2010). construction is very much dependent on land development processes, the main determinant of which is physical planning. however, it is in the application of planning standards that corruption sometimes creeps in (cf. financial gazette, 2012). a simple definition of corruption is “the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit” (jiménez and garcía, 2012:4). villoria, van ryzin and lavena (2011:4) argue that, “when corrupt networks expand and become the norm, they erode the functioning of the state and government performance as well as the image that citizens have of the integrity of democratic institutions.” 6 consilience physical and spatial planning in zimbabwe are directed by the department of physical planning (dpp), a technical arm of the government that is in charge of managing the spatial planning system and providing technical advice for the implementation of the development planning systems (ibrd/wb, 2012; toriro, 2007). the department has oversight on the country’s local authorities, who must adhere to the provisions of the regional, town and country planning act (rtcpa) (chapter 29:12) and related legislation. in addition, the dpp advises the minister of local government on the interpretation of planning provisions and the execution of planning functions under the reserved powers of the minister, in accordance with the rtcpa. the department is also involved in facilitating sites for the development of government, state enterprises, as well as parastatal activities and the detailed planning of housing estates on state land. it also carries out technical evaluation of plans (master plans, local plans and layout plans) originating from local planning authorities to aid the minister in making decisions on the plans, mediating in stakeholder conflicts arising from spatial planning decisions that interfere with other people’s land rights. furthermore, the dpp provides technical assistance relating to the planning of preparation structures for the development planning system – which the provincial councils and administration act of 1984 prescribes – manages urban public transport, and carries out tachometric survey and pegging of state land. physical planning embraces aspects of environmental planning, building codes (cote and grant, 2008), and balancing between land-uses to avoid incompatibility and conflict in land-use. williams (2000:8) has pointed out that conventional planning “… is about nudging and accommodating prevailing trends, but ecosystem planning is about choosing and pursuing a desirable future.” overall, in physical planning terms, construction is an intervention in a natural environment that brings about development, in the form of improvement and value addition to land (alexander, 1987). land-use planning is a critical determinant in the siting of any facility. such provisions are specified in the master, local, structure, and subject plans of a given local authority. in zimbabwe, section 22 of the regional, town and country planning act (rtcpa) provides for the meaning of development with regards to planning. master plans can be sectorspecific (i.e. water or transport) or generic (covering a combination of developmental factors). the general master plan of an area takes into account the various aspects of a settlement. section 14 (2a) defines a master plan as an instrument through which a local authority lays down its “general proposal for a planning area with respect to coordinated and harmonious development and other uses of land.” this includes measures for the regulation of land use, improvement of the physical environment, economic development of the area, and movement of traffic in that area. specific master plans may be for water, housing, industry, commerce, or tourism development, to name but a few. it is important to ensure that there are no conflicts between the master plans and the local plans, as sometimes expected from the development of physical plan products like houses and roads, in keeping with section 21 of the rtcpa. sections 17 and 18 of the rtcpa provide for the preparation and management of local plans. it is an instrument to ensure coordinated and harmonious development and re-development of land use in a given area. sometimes the development proposed is incompatible with existing and proposed uses of land. existing local development plans assist in showing the consilience chirisa: urban planning in zimbabwe 7   current and future pattern of development. thus, the available local development plans cover aspects of residential distribution, industry, commerce, and tourism. a structure plan is a statutory plan identifying many neighbourhoods where residential, commercial, institutional, and recreational areas will be located in a previously undeveloped area. these plans also indicate the number of people expected to live in the new area and the implementation of the development over time. also included in the urban planning debate relating to construction are designs factors, which are aimed at promoting human health and comfort (smith, 2012). these also have to do with the artefact and the site and location in which that building is situated. this is also a function of urban policy (rakodi and mutizwamangiza, 1990; roth and sukume, mupambireyi and ncube, 2003). for example, toriro (2006:4) observes, with respect to the attainment of independence in zimbabwe, the changes that accompanied change of government and policy thrust (see box 1). by increasing the size of urban stands, toriro argues, the government wanted to make the cost of servicing the stands high to discourage households from investing in urban housing (mutekede and sigauke, 2007; 2009). what is questionable is the extent to which such a move was sustainable over time. evidence on the ground indicates that in today’s urban zimbabwe, there are actually more lodgers than homeowners (kamete, 2009; mafico, 1991; mashoko, 2012; marongwe, 2003). this has had the adverse effects of overcrowding and the deterioration of the quality of the urban environment (kamete, 2009). box 1: government policy and urban development thrusts at independence in 1980, the new policy sought to encourage home ownership, whereas prior to independence, blacks had always been regarded as visitors to towns who would retire to their village once their working days were over. the new government changed this in order to allow blacks to become property owners in urban areas. the policy meant that housing stock under the control of both the state and councils was significantly reduced. the government also introduced a policy to control rents, thus protecting tenants from overcharging by landlords. under this policy, rentals could only be increased within certain regulated parameters. the reaction of landlords and property developers was to shun the rental market. as a result, the private sector developed very few new flats during this time. the ultimate effect of that policy was to remove other players in the housing delivery system, thereby reducing housing output. in 1982, ambitious housing standards were introduced. these put the minimum stand size at 300 square metres. the impact of this policy was to make servicing expensive, thereby limiting the ability of local authorities to provide an adequate number of stands or houses. the lengths of the road, water and sewer pipes to each stand were major contributors to the expense. source: toriro, 2006:4 thus, in trying to redress the impacts of apartheid policy (cf. yiftachel, 2008), which held during ninety years of colonialism (1890-1979), the new zimbabwean government used a cocktail of instruments, ranging from technocratic-induced minimalist ideology to socialist populism. in order to increase the supply of housing and encourage densification, the government formulated circular number 70 of 2004, which sets down the new standards for the planning and construction of infrastructure and houses in all urban areas in zimbabwe (see box 2). 8 consilience box 2: specifics on circular number 70 of 2004 circular number 70 of 2004 stipulates that minimum stand sizes for low-cost or high-density housing range from 70 to 200 square metres (previously it ranged from 150 to 300 square metres). stand sizes ranging from 70 to 89 square metres apply to semi-detached and terraced housing only, and 90 to 200 metres apply to detached housing. the development of low-cost and middle-income housing only constitutes (accommodates) a single family with no outbuildings permitted on the stands. low-density or high-cost housing plots range from 800 and 2000 square metres. larger stands can have on-site sewage treatment. moreover, all urban centres should reserve 10 percent of their land for medium and high-rise flats in residential areas close to the city/town centre, except where there are waivers granted by the director of physical planning; and 5 percent for garden and four-storey flats in other mediumcost residential centres. in a bid to reduce servicing costs, particularly in the case of highor lowdensity housing schemes, access roads in the high-density areas are to be appropriately gravelled with a cross gradient of about 5 percent. a gravel thickness of between 100 and 150 mm compared over the widths of the recommended (depending on site conditions and gravel quality). where possible, dish drains are to be used instead of piped culverts, so as to reduce costs. all the higher order roads (local and district distributors) in all areas and access roads in medium and low-density areas are to be surfaced. it is a standard requirement that all stands are to be connected to a reticulated water supply network. communal standpipes may be provided in semi-detached and terraced housing schemes as temporary measures until they can be independently connected. this is, however, subject to approval by the department of public works. walls can be constructed of burnt clay brick or block, cement bricks or blocks and stabilised soil bricks or blocks. burnt farm bricks, as approved by the department of public works, can be used for the construction of single-storey buildings. recommended roofing materials include asbestos sheets, clay tiles, and zinc. the herald (2005), on the outlined standards in circular number 70 of 2004, argues that “this [circular provisions] shall apply to new schemes, infill stands shall maintain a general character of the neighbourhood surrounding them. the maximum stand size is to encourage densification and reduce premature urban sprawl …” a concern with the spatial sustainability of urban development achieved by way of real estate expansion may be discerned from this citation. thus, the circular, as an instrument crafted by town planners, sought to achieve compact urban development, as opposed to sprawled development (peterson, 2009; lewyn, 2007). in this respect, sustainability and attempts to reduce ecological footprint resulting from uncontrolled urban development were the basis of this instrument. sprawling cities are costly to the city in terms of the financial sustainability of households, as they travel long distances, and are costly to the environment as they ‘spread out’ carbon emissions (ewing, pendall and chen, 2002; coyne, 2003). in zimbabwe, before the planning application is submitted to the local authority for approval, the building inspectorate section assesses and approves it (ibdr/wb, 2012). without planning permission, development or construction does not generally take off in zimbabwe. this is aimed at ensuring the compatibility with the required use of land and space in question before the actual implementation of any given construction project. box 3 indicates the section in the planning statute of enforcement and prohibition orders in planning law in zimbabwe. consilience chirisa: urban planning in zimbabwe 9   box 3: enforcement and prohibition orders in planning law in zimbabwe section 32 of the rtcpa is about enforcement orders. subsection 1 of the section spells out that: if it appears to the local planning authority that any development has been or is being carried out in contravention of this act, it may, if it considers it expedient, having regard to the provisions of any operative master plan or local plan or an approved scheme and to any other material considerations, serve upon the owner of the land concerned and upon any other person who, in the opinion of the authority, will be affected thereby an order which – a. states the nature of the contravention; and b. specifies the action required to be taken by the person or persons specified in the order within such period as may be specified therein: provided that, where the owner of the land concerned is specified in the order, the order shall have effect as though it specified any successor in title to the land. section 34 of the same legislation is on prohibition orders, states that: at the date of issuing an enforcement order or at any time thereafter before the enforcement order becomes operative, the local planning authority may, subject to section fifty, serve upon any person upon whom the enforcement order was served an order prohibiting the continuation of such operations or use as may be specified in the order, being operations which are or use which is the subject of the enforcement order. a prohibition order – a) shall specify the date when, notwithstanding any appeal against the enforcement order, it shall become operative; and b) shall cease to be operative – i. upon its withdrawal by the local planning authority by notice served on all persons upon whom the prohibition order was served; or ii. when the enforcement order becomes operative or is set aside. in light of the provisions indicated in box 2, which rigorously control development, the following cases illustrate its recent application in the country’s capital city. shava (2011) indicates that the harare city council is considering taking action through prohibition orders on several property owners who have illegally converted residential areas to commercial properties. the city’s environmental management committee acknowledged the conversion of several properties to commercial instead of residential use, in violation of municipal bylaws–a misuse attributed to the rise of informal sector activity owing to the high unemployment rate in the country (shava, 2011). land use violations have triggered disputes in urban land management. for example, the harare mayor muchadeyi masunda clashed with tycoon phillip chiyangwa over the building of a multi-million dollar two-storey private clinic in the alexandra park residential area (masvingise, 2012). the mayor argued that the application for change of land use for the particular piece of land was not submitted for approval before the construction of the clinic, which warranted no planning permission. tycoon chiyangwa is reported to have previously clashed with the city of harare over the development of a piece of land in borrowdale, a highclass residential suburb of the city (masvingise, 2012). it is also important to note interplay between urban planning and construction in terms of the model building bylaws. the ministry of local government and housing published the model building bylaws in zimbabwe in 1977, in accordance with the urban councils act chapter 214 section 183 and section 83a of the rural councils act. they cover issues relating to structural design and control, foundations, masonry and walling, miscellaneous materials 10 consilience constructions, water supply, lighting, drainage and sewerage, ventilation and fire protection, and public safety (cf. musandu-nyamayaro, 1993). in essence, these bylaws define the aspects entailed in the construction of buildings including alteration, subdivision, conversion, reconstruction or an addition to a building (box 4). box 4: model building bylaws – reference to chapters on building and planning chapter 2, with reference to plans and drawings, stipulates that no building or sewerage work shall be undertaken without approval of the local authority. it further clarifies on colours to be used on the plans, and requires building and sewerage work to follow approved plans. the model building bylaws also stipulate that single doors must not be more than 1.1 metres in width, and that no door or window shall open to obstruct any passageway or rump. chapter 10 section 2 sets down the dimensions of habitable rooms to be adhered to. it further states that every habitable room shall have a clear height of not less than 2.1 metres; that in all habitable rooms except kitchens the minimum floor area shall be 7 square metres measured exclusive of immovable objects such as columns, built-in cupboards, and such minimum floor area shall have a minimum width dimension of 2.1 metres. these health standards generally follow simple principles of ergonomics and anthropometry. section 50 of chapter 2 recommends the testing of any new building material by the la before it is used in residential or commercial construction. in addition to this, chapter 6 section 13 subsection (c) stipulates that for all rectangular pattern slates, the minimum roof slope or pitch shall not be less than 17 degrees. this standard has proven to be suitable for tropical grasslands in particular. the argument that the model building bylaws (1977) are rigid is somewhat nullified by section 58 of chapter 2, which gives room for possible departures or deviations from the provisions of the model building bylaws, where necessary. critics of the existing model building bylaws state that they are very rigid, outdated, and inhibitive to the smooth implementation of infrastructure development works in local authority areas. critics also state that the standards of the model building bylaws are very high, rigid and not amenable to physical and climatic conditions, and not responsive to the needs and requirements of the end users (toriro, 2007). as a result, they fail to adequately accommodate for the urban poor. 4. environmental impact assessment (eia) according to jay, jones, slinn and wood (2007:287), an environmental impact assessment is “… the evaluation of the effects likely to arise from a major project (or other action) significantly affecting the environment. it is a systematic process for considering possible impacts prior to a decision being made on whether or not a proposal should be given approval to proceed.” goz (2005:27) defines an eia as “… both a process and a tool for project planning and decision-making […] [whose] purpose is to ensure that during development planning, possible impacts on biophysical, economic and social cultural elements of the environment are taken into account […] [so as] […] to identify likely impacts, estimate their security, indicate which impacts may be significant and what opportunities there might be to avoid or minimise negative impacts and enhance potential benefits” (goz (2005:27). sections 97 to 108 of the environmental management act provide for eias in zimbabwe (goz, 2004). there is a need to align the development subject of eia with the national environmental plan and local economic actions plans (leaps). guiding consilience chirisa: urban planning in zimbabwe 11   principle 52 of the national economic policy document underscores the centrality of eia, and construction projects are one major sector that it caters for. part three of statutory instrument 7 of 2007 on environmental management regulations specifies how eias are conducted in zimbabwe. despite such provisions in the statutes and statutory instruments about environmental management, issues of environmental sustainability seem to be receiving contradictory results. for example, bell (2012) reports on the development of a new shopping mall planned on a wetlands area in borrowdale (cf. mstd, 2012). for bell and other critics, the construction on the building site is going to have a negative environmental impact. nevertheless, the project has already been commissioned by vice president joice mujuru, and has therefore received the ‘political blessing’ to go ahead. thus, in spite of public resistance to the plans and the absence of an independent eis, the project will go ahead. among the groups opposed to the development is the conservation society of monavale (cosmo), for whom wetlands are ‘sponges’ that are critical to the water supply of the city of harare. these water sponges absorb water during rainy seasons and release water during dry seasons. an estimated 6.5 million people in the catchment depends on the water stored by these wetlands, and there is no other source from which water can be supplied. cosmo notes how the water flowing into lake chivero, the main water supply of greater harare, has diminished by 50% relative to the 1990s (bell, 2012). the majority of the urban residents now rely on water from wastelands. it is unfortunate that, despite these concerns, harare city council has already approved the construction of said mall. indeed, politics interferes with the technical arguments of development indicated in eia reports (cf. venter, 2008). in this case, the harare city council is too naive to tell that, “… there is little it can do over a project that has been approved by cabinet; councillors had no power to stall the development of national projects [and that] the council is just a substructure of central government [that] cannot go against national policies” (bell, 2012:5). in the same vein, the environment minister francis nhema dismissed allegations against the construction of the west properties project in borrowdale (zimbabwe independent, 2012). for nhema, the project is lawful since it satisfies environmental management agency (ema) standards. as long as there are environmental groups around, the issue of environmental sustainability will remain central to the construction debate. however, technical considerations like the eia are sometimes ‘arm-twisted’ to suit the interests of the politicians. 5. performance of the building industry in zimbabwe after 2009 the building industry in zimbabwe, as is the case elsewhere, is complex. it involves a diversity of actors, investment decisions, material pricing, and technological considerations in infrastructure and superstructures. with respect to construction finance, equipment and labour, bulawayo24 news (2011) reports on the acknowledgement by the construction industry federation of zimbabwe 12 consilience (cifoz) that several projects were put on hold in the period of economic crisis only to be resuscitated after the adoption of the multiple currency system in 2009 (cf. rvop, 2011). the capacity utilisation of the construction sector increased to 33% in 2011 from 22% in 2010. the government had financed the majority of construction projects. it injected huge sums of funds into various sites across the country. despite public investment, the industry still faced acute funding shortages owing to stringent borrowing conditions at short-term durations (on short-term loans) by local banks. overall, the construction sector was still faced with the challenge of re-attracting skilled labour (primarily engineers who left the country for greener pastures in the decade 1998 to 2008). box 5 crystallises nyakazeya’s (2012) observations on capacity utilisation within the construction sector. in addition, he notes that high cost of building is burdening the sector. at its peak, the construction sector employed more than 350,000 people. the figure dropped to just over 30,000 in 2009 (nyakazeya, 2012). box 5: capacity utilisation and cost factors in the construction sector the brick and motor industry is currently operating below 40 percent. contributing factors to the low-capacity utilisation include liquidity challenges and lack of public-private sector contracts. as of december 31, 2011, capacity utilisation was at 33 percent. this is an improvement from 22 percent as of december 2010. some official statistics in the 2012 budget indicate that the sector would grow by 1.5 percent by december 31, 2012. the property industry still has a hyperinflation hangover. most contractors' quotations are still very high compared to what the region is charging, and this is inevitably slowing down projects. the cost of building in zimbabwe is still very high. to mention a few examples, in zimbabwe, 1,000 common bricks cost between us$60-us$90 while the same quantity in the region costs less. semi-common bricks are selling for us$40-us$90 while semi-common bricks in the region cost between us$30us$70. face bricks cost between us$100-us$190 locally while the regional average was between us$80-us$160. in botswana and south africa, plumbing materials, doorframes and window frame cost about 20 percent less than what they are worth in zimbabwe. source: nyakazeya’s (2012:4) after years of hyperinflation, capacity utilisation in the sector shows potential for improvement as does employment, which is likely to be boosted by increased funding for civil and building construction projects across the country in the road, public housing, and mining sectors, such as projects by the zimbabwe platinum mines and unki mine in shurugwi. however, the domination and control of these projects by foreign companies is a cause for concern, since local construction companies have lost out to foreign companies. this is part of the politics of the construction development debate. the chinese are now dominating zimbabwe's construction industry in an environment where there are still very few projects on offer (zimbabwean, 2011). by way of example, a top construction firm, murray and roberts (zimbabwe), has pointed to ‘stiff competition’ from china and sometimes, ‘south africa.’ the chinese have registered their presence in the telecommunications industry, and they capitalise on cheaper and more skilled labour. they also have a record of accomplishment in the construction sector of zimbabwe, having built the 60,000-seat national sports stadium in harare, the chitungwiza general hospital, and the chinhoyi general hospital (zimbabwean, 2011). consilience chirisa: urban planning in zimbabwe 13   during the 2008 global recession, the chinese embarked on a massive infrastructure development programme. this invariably assisted european economies in turning around their economies through the massive importation of building materials. countries that benefitted were mainly from europe and the united states and they managed to revive their manufacturing industries that had closed down. since the construction industry is largely capital-intensive, those actors who tend to do well are those that are heavily capitalised. in times of economic stress, including the global financial crisis, the chinese economy managed to remain afloat (breslin, 2011; yu, 2010). in regards to material pricing and technological considerations in superstructures, box 6 provides examples of how new technologies in the construction materials have been piloted in the country. these include the use of polystyrene panels in construction of a house, of hydraform blocks, which do not use mortar, and of locally dug sand used. despite these initiatives, much of the construction using polystyrene panels and hydraform blocks remain at an experimental level, and has not been applied at a mass scale. most local authorities remain sceptical about fully embracing these new technologies, citing the model building bylaws as the reason for not using them. in spite of the need to service the national housing backlog, addressing the housing demand by embracing new technologies has not received the much-required political will to do so. box 6: technology for sustainability and cost reduction on 10 october 2012, the minister of housing and social amenities, giles mutsekwa unveiled a new housing model built with polystyrene panels (commonly known as kaylite). such houses are considered cheaper and worth building in addressing the national backlog pegged at over a million (1,250,000 housing units). the polystyrene panels were manufactured by schnell construction system, an italian company,+ astra building centre also recently constructed a demonstration house in the emganweni suburb, bulawayo. bulawayo city council donated a site for the construction of the house. the house was handed over to a needy family from the city. using hydraform technology allows savings on construction by cutting down on cement usage. no mortar is used with the interlocking blocks. transportation costs are cut down given that blocks are produced on-site using locally dug soil. ++ sources: masvingise (2012)+; saayman (2011)++ 6. sustainability one chief executive officer in a survey by lacy, cooper, hayward and neuberger (2010:11) remarked, “currently, the burning issue is how to better incorporate sustainability into daily practice.” adams (2006:10) aptly observes that, “the problem with sustainability and sustainable development is not that the aspirational values they represent are wrong, but that they are over-worked and tired. as currently formulated they are too loose to drive effective change on the scale required.” for prugh and assadourian (2003:11), sustainability is a shifting concept but “… can be approached in many different, and equally legitimate, ways. it may be 14 consilience convenient to think about sustainability in terms of four dimensions–human survival, biodiversity, equity, and life quality.” from the three citations, it is clear that the concept of sustainability has not been very substantive in terms of bringing about tangible benefits to populations in need. however, the suggestion by prugh and assadourian is useful in capturing important aspects discussed in this article. we adapt the suggested four dimensions of human survival, biodiversity, equity, and life quality to address issues of sustainable building and the role of urban planning in zimbabwe. these are also related to resource efficiency, cost efficiency and design for human adaptation as earlier indicated in the conceptual framework of the article. nevertheless, as already highlighted, bureaucracy and corrupt tendencies tend to raise the costs of building (easterly, 2002). in addition to the normal financial costs associated with any type of urban construction, there are transaction costs that most builders often underestimate and which work against the goals of resource efficiency and cost efficiency. in the following section, we discuss sustainability as indicated by the factors of human survival, biodiversity, equity, and life quality. 6.1 human survival in this article, human survival covers the aspect of design for adaptation. this adaptation can be at the following levels: the design of the building itself is in keeping with model building bylaws and the design of settlement patterns, so that the grand plan of the built environment has features that adapt well to climate and related factors, with the overall goal being human comfort. 6.2 biodiversity sustainability can be achieved by greening the environment, such as through the practice of community gardening (sithole, nkala and dube, 2012). in this way, the built environment is no longer just a ‘concrete jungle.’ mostly, such an initiative is within the wide range of contemporary planning practices aimed at improving the global health of the communities (smith, 2012). this same philosophy is part of the human survival dimension of sustainability espoused earlier on. however, when urban farming as a practice hinders housing projects, it becomes an issue of concern (zimbabwean, 2012b). urban farming is often practiced on land awaiting urban or housing development. thus, urban farming is accommodated in certain spaces as a temporary development that must give way to the building. nevertheless, there are instances when such builders have incurred more cost to servicing their land because urban farming had induced those costs. an example is that of the university of zimbabwe’s association of university of teachers (aut) project in hatcliffe, harare. in this project, after the land surveys and pegging had been done, the project was delayed, and thus urban farmers removed the pegs, giving the aut no option but to do the costly process again. 6.3 equity equity is about fairness. in this article, some building contractors have pointed out the lack of equity in the awarding of contracts. moreover, it has been consilience chirisa: urban planning in zimbabwe 15   noted that, instead of playing a policing role, government has also been a major contractor. this represents a conflict of interest in that policing development becomes compromised, as the one supposed to ‘referee’ the process is also a player. equity is about giving locals a significant role to play in the industries and sectors. for zimbabwe, such a motif has been spelt out in indigenization and youth empowerment programmes, which promote the lagging sectors and segments of the population within society. ideally, this should cover all sectors. 6.4 life quality the building sector is a major contributor to the welfare and social development of any society, given that it creates employment and related benefits. this leads to better life for local communities. as such benefits cascade down to the lowest-ranking people in communities, especially the unemployed, they translate to tangible benefits for families and households. 7. sustainable building in zimbabwe: can it be achieved? the extent to which sustainable construction in any region or place can be achieved depends on the interplay of costs, planning, strength of materials, the place and its context (history and geography), and the influence of politics. the real estate market has largely moved the property market to a buyers' market, given financial constraints in the sector, resulting in distortions in the market (nyakazeya, 2012). there are a limited number of financial institutions offering mortgage finance. the absence of mortgage financing and long-term loans has negatively affected the industry. ideally, the sector requires access to plant and equipment, since existing stocks owned by construction companies are antiquated and cannot perform tasks efficiently. the new plant and equipment available on the market are extremely expensive, as indigenous (local) companies, as they are called, lack in the financial capacity to procure them. globalisation has offered competition in the local market: foreign companies with their highly skilled labour, state-of-the-art technology and equipment have grabbed both local and regional business away from local companies (cf. lam and liu, 2006; weinstein and bedi, 2010). since government is the greatest client in the construction industry, it ought to protect local players. nyakazeya (2012:4) argues that the building sector in zimbabwe has “... immense potential, if everything is set in the right place, with the right pricing, right equipment, right products and right market.” nevertheless, the building industry has been stagnant and not much activity has been taking place. a summary of the constraints by nyakazeya (2012) regarding the full performance of the sector includes, but is not limited to: • load shedding due to efforts to rationalise the energy sector, particularly electricity, • acute funding shortages, as local banks continue to impose stringent borrowing conditions at short-term durations, 16 consilience • failure to re-attract skilled labour (mainly engineers and quantity surveyors, who left the country for greener pastures over the past decade), • prohibitive costs – relative to the region – of building materials, and relative to other sectors adjusting in line with regional pricing after dollarization, and • attitudes and perceptions by the zimbabweans given their limited understanding of the construction industry’s contribution to employment and wealth creation. these factors militate against efforts to achieve sustainable construction. as such, these factors are in conflict with the objectives of resource conservation, cost efficiency and design for human adaptation in sustainable construction (akadiri, chinyio and olomolaiye, 2012). the following paragraphs focus on the constraints and prospects of sustainable construction in harare and the implications it has on urban planning. 7.1 sustainable construction in harare: constraints and prospects on 28 october 2010, the author of this article had a dialogue with the city architect of harare over issues relating to town planning and construction in the city. box 7 provides some snippets from the dialogue of which the challenges of financial and human resources support are highlighted. box 7: on sustainable building in harare: perspective of the city architect “we had to stop certain constructions in the areas west of chinhoyi street. the types of constructions were too small to allow for viable parking. this area is zoned for flats and offices. single storeys are not allowed but flats. but it is equally difficult to compel anybody to build more storeys. the government must chip in. as such, for two years now, we have been seriously examining the town planning legislation and byelaws, checking on the way we have to go with high-rise building in general. the team looking into this matter is quite diverse and includes members of the private sector as well as those from rural local authorities. just grouping these people is a mammoth task. for example during the 2008/9 period, due to economic challenges most local authorities could not afford funding (to fund) their representatives to the meetings. in town, a house must have a lifespan of 50 years (this is conventional wisdom) but some have lived for more than 100 years. timber construction can be done but in an atmosphere where it can be unbundled and replaced. in greece, where i studied, they have a tradition of constructions that last. building is a specialized field. there are no shortcuts to processes, for instance brick making and cement production and its use. however, here, i am sorry to say, we have much shoddiness. this explains the cracks that we see in certain houses. when a house cracks, it is difficult to mend. we have had cases were people plaster before inspectors come. in that case we just use ‘the external eye’ to judge if that is going to last. our inspectorate section has not been spared by the economic challenges that met our country in the past decade or consilience chirisa: urban planning in zimbabwe 17   so. the section has a shortage of vehicles. the problem is now 20 years old and so what we do are just haphazard checks. as i am speaking to you today, we only have one vehicle for the whole city, to do the checks. so it is very difficult to police the construction taking place in the city. this is also explained by the general lack of finance to fund all these critical aspects.” one of the questions focused on whether the city has any intention to expand vertically. major constraints included limited financing for vertical construction. in the view of the city architect, most of the building and property owners in the city find it difficult to build upwards since they cannot afford it. there has been a development, in the city, involving the chinese and nigerian retail investors operating in the central business district (cbd). these investors are “occupying small spaces.” as a results, they are renovating existing spaces or constructing small cubicles rather than embarking on massive constructions. parking is a major aspect to consider when verticalising; in the cbd, it is already a major constraint. the architect stresses that the main issue in planning and construction is the conservation of land. this entails techniques likely to maximise on open spaces by way of smart growth and infill development, revising the building bylaws and including and embracing new technologies. the strength of bricks, according to the city architect, is a major issue of concern for sustainable construction. 8. conclusion this article has been an attempt to examine the process of construction through the planning lens and working towards the goal of achieving sustainability in its broadest sense. it has discussed the aspects of costs, investment, technology, climate change, building materials, and planning laws in zimbabwe. the building process is cumbersome owing to institutional constraints of legislation and bylaws. institutions are there to ensure certainty. the process of building construction generally takes a very long time, so that the cost of waiting and ‘oiling’ the bureaucracy are generally intolerable. the government, especially after 2009, has been at the forefront of getting building contracts and giving some to the chinese community of building constructors, lowering the level of confidence among local building firms. such a tendency works against sustainable construction. however, planning is not all bad, given that it is there to ensure the sustainability of the environment and ultimate artefacts of buildings. failure to adhere to the so-called high standards of planning results in the construction of buildings of questionable quality. the case of harare has indicated how some shortcuts in the building sector reduce confidence in the technocrats involved, which include architects, engineers, and planners. the use of cheap materials and shortcut methods is risky and hazardous to the building users and to the environment in general. instead of viewing planning in zimbabwe as heavily anchored in the so-called outdated standards set by the british critics, there is a need to appreciate that though the environment (social, economic, environmental) has greatly changed, such standards are pillars to ensuring sustainability. 18 consilience sustainably-built environments are created by striking a balance between societal needs, technological adaptation or the general application of appropriate of technology; while also aiming to reduce social, economic and environmental risks and hazards in future. both micro and macro-scale building processes in the construction industry are very important aspects to consider, and the field of play is a continuum from the site of construction to the global environment in which aspects like climate change are brewed and conceptualised. achieving sustainability takes into account technical matters, political will, economic performance, and a conducive environment in which corruption and favouritism do not overshadow rationality, especially in the awarding of tenders. at the city level, investment into the building inspectorate departments is critical if the management of the construction process is to be wholly monitored to ensure the sustainability of structures. zimbabwe, like most developing countries, is not without building codes and byelaws. rather, the enforcement of these instruments is lacking, making it critical to ensure that a conducive environment is 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http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk. consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 24, 2021 sustainability education for namibian youth to advance efficient cookstoves and energy development samantha lindgren1 1 assistant professor, university of illinois, urbana-champaign, champaign, il 61820, united states abstract efficient cooking has long been of interest for its presence in multiple sustainable development goals (sdgs) including good health and well-being, affordable and clean energy, quality education, gender equality, and climate action among others. widespread uptake of an efficient cooking device, such as an “improved” biomass or lpg cookstove, has the potential to contribute to progress on many simultaneous fronts. however, unlike other sustainable development and public health initiatives, few cookstove programs include all household stakeholders, and rarely are youth, the future and current users of cookstoves, purposefully engaged in diffusion efforts. the results of a 2019 stratified survey of 200 households in two rural towns, one serving as a control group, in the hardap region of namibia indicate that youth-oriented education for sustainable development (esd) programming may be an effective means of inspiring changes in energy-related attitudes and behaviors in the home and across the community. households with children who were past participants of an esd program in the namib desert demonstrated an awareness of, and an openness to, solar energy as an alternative to biomass. this study highlights the importance of broadening the definition of stakeholder in the cookstove and energy development sector to include children, and points to youth-oriented esd as a potential framework for shifting attitudes and behaviors, generationally at home and across the community. keywords education for sustainable development, energy, cookstove, youth, stakeholder, sustainable energy transition, technology adoption introduction nearly 2.9 billion people in lowand middle-income countries cook and heat their homes by burning solid fuels such as firewood, charcoal, or crop and animal waste (international energy agency et al., 2020). the collection and subsequent combustion of these fuels indoors are responsible for economic (clancy et al., 2012; garcía-frapolli et al., 2010; sovacool, 2014), environmental (arnold et al., 2006; bond et al., 2013; hutton et al., 2006), and health burdens, including nearly 2 million premature deaths annually (forouzanfar et al., 2016; gbd 2019 risk factors collaborators, 2020; iea et al., 2018). women and children are most impacted, both by loss of paid work and educational opportunities, as well as prolonged exposure at the hearth (bonjour et al., 2013; evans et al., 2018; kelly, 2018; lewis et al., 2016; listo, 2018; masera et al., 2007). these concerns have positioned efficient cooking technologies, taken here to include fuel efficient biomass combustion stoves, electric or lpg cookstoves, and solar cookers, as socio-technical solutions for reducing the negative health, economic, and environmental effects associated with indoor biomass combustion (bazilian et al., 2011; cordes, 2011; ezzati & kammen, 2002; masera et al., 2005). efficient, also called improved, cooking has long been of interest for its presence in multiple sustainable development goals (sdgs) including good health and well-being, affordable clean energy, quality education, gender equality, and climate action among others. and indeed, widespread uptake of an efficient cooking device does have the potential to contribute to progress of many sdgs simultaneously. however, adoption at scale of these cooking technologies continues to be unrealized (rosa et al., 2014; shankar et al., 2014). the challenges associated with sustained use of efficient cooking technologies vary with context and are well-documented (e.g., jeuland & pattanayak, 2012; malla & timilsina, 2014; miller & mushfiq mobarak, 2015; mobarak et al., 2012; rehfuess et al., 2014; shankar et al., 2014). there are many strategies employed to advance adoption of these devices including, but not limited to, behavior change communication techniques, participatory design, and collaborations with trusted local organizations. most efforts aimed at increasing rates of adoption, or sustained use, that address the user directly are focused on adult women. unlike other sustainable and international development fields such as sanitation, nutrition, and sexual health (bresee et al., 2016; kepha et al., 2016; mahanta et al., 2016; okyere et al., 2017), few cookstove programs include all household stakeholders, and rarely are youth, current and future users of cookstoves, purposefully engaged in diffusion efforts (lindgren, 2020). the sustainable development goals mention the importance of youth and their position as “critical agents of change,” for their potential to act on a large scale (united nations, 2015). improved, or efficient, cookstoves have been promoted by the cookstove and broader development community for nearly 40 years. in this time, an entire generation of cookstoves users have been born, raised, and are now making energy-related choices for their own households. and though the inclusion of youth in cookstove efforts has been raised periodically and indirectly, there are few studies that purposefully include children in cookstove implementation efforts (lindgren, 2020). recently, there have been studies that have indicated that when children are included in the behavior change efforts aimed at their mothers, the uptake rate of the new cooking technology is high (toonen, 2009), and that energy transitions within the home require buy-in from all household members, including children (kar & zerriffi, 2018). however, youth are often overlooked and not systematically engaged in most cookstove efforts until they are already adults with fully formed habits and attitudes. there is evidence that knowledge and attitudes gained in youth-oriented education for sustainable development (esd) programs can be “transferred between generations and indirectly induce targeted behavioural changes” (damerell et al., 2013). further, using esd or other sustainability education approaches in other public health and international development fields have shown to be successful in promoting healthier behaviors across a range of topics and settings across the globe including household sustainability practices like recycling and energy savings, improved sanitation, agricultural innovations, and disease prevention among others (e.g., ajiboye & silo, 2008; conley & udry, 2010; kioko & kiringe, 2010; maruyama et al., 2013; puffer et al., 2016). thus, when trying to encourage changes in household attitudes and behaviors, it may be more effective to target the children than the parents (robinson & borzekowski, 2006) because the attitudes and behaviors of youth are flexible. esd, a united nations policy and agenda aligned to the sdgs, may be one such way of educating and empowering youth to inspire change within their communities. this study examines the role of youth-oriented esd as a driver of cooking-related energy attitudes in the home and across the community. specifically, this study seeks to answer the question, to what extent do households with children exposed to energy-specific esd programming exhibit attitudes about cooking energy that are more sustainable than similar households without children? background information this study occurred in the spring of 2019 in the hardap region of namibia. the hardap is one of namibia’s poorest provinces, where less than half of residents currently have access to the electric grid. consequently, half of all hardap residents, and 90% of rural households, burn solid fuels, primarily firewood, for their household energy needs (namibia statistics agency, 2011). the majority of rural namibians cook indoors or in a semi-enclosed space, and more than half are affected by household air pollution (global alliance for clean cookstoves, 2017). a combination of the state of infrastructure in rural areas as well as a depressed economy, makes cooking with electricity, an energy-intensive task, economically unavailable to many households. the namib desert environmental education trust (nadeet) is a non-governmental organization dedicated to youth-oriented esd. nadeet has been hosting school groups from the hardap and across the country at their camp, nadeet centre, situated in the hardap on the namibrand nature reserve since 2003. school-aged students (grades 5-12) spend four days learning sustainable lifestyle behaviors meant to alleviate the economic and health burdens associated along four main themes; access to clean and modern energy, improved water and sanitation, biodiversity and conservation, and responsible waste management. nadeet, a recent awardee of the unesco-japan prize, is one of few organizations on the african continent recognized by unesco as advancing esd goals. since it formed, nadeet has hosted more than 300 school groups, and nearly 100 teacher and community development groups, at their camp. as part of energy programming, youth participants prepare their own meals using efficient biomass cookstoves and solar cookers (figure 1), neither of which are commonly found in the hardap. students also learn about the social, economic, and environmental concerns of firewood collection, a dwindling resource in the hardap (palmer & macgregor, 2009). this occurs through direct lessons that examine namibia’s sustainability challenges as well as indirectly through games and activities, such as a relay race that simulates the disadvantages of those who must spend a significant portion of their day collecting firewood. students learn about alternatives to firewood and charcoal while using solar cookers and efficient cookstoves, and while making recycled paper fireballs. figure 1. a pizza made by camp participants baking in a solar box cooker. photo taken march 2019. while solar cookers are used for lunch and dinner preparation at nadeet centre, the morning meal, typically mielie pap, a maize porridge, and hot water for coffee and tea is prepared over fuel efficient stoves. school groups make recycled fireballs for use in these stoves as an alternative to firewood. all used paper is saved at nadeet for this purpose, simultaneously teaching children how to decrease fuelwood consumption and eliminate paper-based rubbish, which often becomes litter due to few municipal waste management programs nationally. paper is soaked in water, children shred the wet paper into small bits, and then press handfuls together to form a tight ball (figure 2). each fireball is then dried on a rack for one week. fireballs made during the previous session are used in the stoves during the children’s camp visit. approximately ten fireballs are needed to heat a pot of water using a commercially available efficient cookstove. nadeet knows of no other organization in namibia that makes recycled fireballs or a similar product. figure 2. student at nadeet centre pressing shredded paper into a recycled fireball. photo taken march 2019. methodology i. survey a stratified survey of 200 households in two rural towns in the hardap region of namibia was conducted in the spring of 2019. two demographically-similar communities were selected, one with a history of sending school groups to nadeet centre, and a second community, serving as a control group, with no such association. the treatment town, the one with a history of engagement with nadeet, has sent at least one school group to the camp in 9 of the last 10 years. the two towns are equidistant from nadeet centre, but are not close to each other. similarly, the two communities are equidistant from the region’s largest town, and therefore have similar access to markets. the control town is somewhat closer to the interstate than the treatment town, which may make hitchhiking somewhat easier than from the treatment town. vehicle ownership is low in both communities. one hundred households in each community were surveyed, sampling occurred via random walk. all interviews were carried out by two namibian research assistants, a female interviewer and a male interpreter. interviews were audio recorded, with participant consent, and later transcribed and translated into english if they were conducted in afrikaans or nama/damara, a local language. this study was approved by the university of illinois at urbana-champaign’s institutional review board and by the republic of namibia’s national commission of research, science, and technology. in the treatment town, a third (n = 34) of the households had at least one family member who had previously experienced nadeet’s programming. these households were asked a series of questions about that experience including which family member(s) participated and in what year(s), and what was remembered about their time at the centre. the responses were either firsthand memories from an adult who had attended nadeet centre as a student, or were memories of conversations parents or other guardians had with younger family members upon their return from the centre. at the end of the interview, all participants were asked a series of questions from two knowledge and attitude instruments. a short questionnaire developed for assessing women’s perceptions and knowledge about solar cookers in mali was used (mercy et al., 2008). consisting of ten 5-point likert scale items, this instrument was used to assess knowledge and general attitudes about solar energy and solar cooking. minor adjustments were made to the instrument to replace references to mali, the location of the instrument development, with namibia. the second instrument, the short, four-question version of the global warming’s six americas survey, the sassy, was used to assess a participant’s perceptions about global warming risks, expected harm to future generations, and how important the respondent found these issues (chryst et al., 2018). these four questions were asked at the very end of the survey as to not introduce bias into earlier questions, including those regarding solar cooking or nadeet centre experience. results several key variables were measured to ensure that the control town was indeed an appropriate control for the treatment town. independent samples t-tests and two proportion test of means were used to determine that there were no significant differences across a range of variables including household size, appropriate number of years of schooling based on the child’s age, average adult educational level, local language spoken, as shown in table 1. table 1. demographic comparisons of treatment and control towns using t-tests and two proportions test of means. † indicates z-scores from a two proportions test of means due to the dichotomous nature of these variables. more households in the treatment town had access to electricity (97%) as compared to households in the control town (81%), however, electricity use (hours used per day) overall is significantly higher in the control town, as measured by an independent samples t-test t(168) = 3.38, p = .009, with a medium effect size as defined by cohen (1988), d = 0.52. a key difference between the two towns, and one that helps explain the discrepancy in electricity access and usage, is overall socioeconomic status (ses). initially observed as a visual assessment in the communities, a variable was created as a proxy for ses. five variables, including percentage of households in the community that are not informal, improvised or temporary, presence of an indoor tap, primary cooking fuel is not firewood, ownership of a television, and ownership of an electric stove, were selected as indicators of higher ses for the types of amenities and conveniences they afford households. these variables had adequate internal consistency, as measured by cronbach’s alpha,  = 0.71. an unrotated factor test was also performed, which produced one eigenvalue over 1.0 accounting for 95% of the variance with all items loading at 0.5 or higher. an independent samples t-test comparing the two towns reveals that households in the control town have a higher mean ses (m = 3.47, sd = 1.34) than those in the treatment town (m = 2.10, sd = 1.79), t(198) = 6.13, p < .001, with a large effect size, cohen’s d = 0.87, confirming visual observations. specifically examining households with children in both communities, parents in the control town again have a significantly higher ses (m = 3.13, sd = 1.57) than those in the treatment town (m = 2.17, sd = 1.47), t(160) = 4.00, p < .001, cohen’s d = 0.63, despite similar rates and types of employment across both towns. within the treatment town, there is not a significant ses difference in households with children who had nadeet centre experience and those who have not, t(75) = 0.81, p = .418. similarly, there is not a significant difference between children having the appropriate years of education for their age between the two towns, t(131) = 0.46, p = .645, or between those with and without nadeet centre experience in the treatment town, t(63) = 0.47, p = .640. nadeet subsidizes schools who are unable to pay for their attendance through grants and fund-raising, making this opportunity available to all schools, even the most economically under-resourced. school attendance is not based on neighborhood proximity but by family choice, further decoupling ses and nadeet opportunity. in the last ten years, all four of the primary schools in the treatment town have attended nadeet centre at least once. i. treatment town participation at nadeet centre of the 100 households in the treatment town, 34 had at least one family member who had attended nadeet centre in the past. of these, 21 respondents were mothers or other adult female relatives with guardianship responsibilities of a past nadeet centre participant, including four grandmothers and one aunt. no fathers or other adult male relatives were interviewed. from this point forward, “parent” will refer to any of these guardians, and “children” will refer to the former nadeet centre participants whether they are the respondent’s biological child or a child relative. ii. recall of activities or topics during the beginning of the survey when household demographics were being collected, parents were asked if their child(ren) had attended nadeet centre and if so, to recall what their children had done while at the camp. the majority of parents, 81% (n = 17) were able to recall at least one topic. the average length of time since the child’s participation for these parents who was 3.82 years (sd = 3.30), and 4.5 years (sd = 3.51) for parents who could not recall any specifics (n = 4). of these four parents, one woman expressed sentiments such as “my son tells me nothing,” to explain why she was unaware of what her son did the previous year at nadeet centre. the other three parents’ children had attended nadeet an average of 5.67 years (sd = 3.21) in the past. the parents of former nadeet participants listed 29 specific topics or activities that their child engaged in, or 1.71 topics per parent. half (n = 15) of all responses were related to energy, while the other 14 topics spanned nadeet’s other focus areas of biodiversity conservation, water, and waste. ten of the 15 energy responses were focused on their child’s experiences preparing meals (n = 1), solar cooking (n = 5), and making recycled fireballs (n = 4). the other 5 energy responses were similarly specific, recalling details about the centre’s solar panels and tips learned for conserving energy. iii. solar cooking attitude inventory the average score of all ten likert-type questions on the solar energy and cooking attitude inventory was used as respondents’ final score on this instrument. parents of former nadeet participants, including those who could not recall what their child had done while at nadeet, scored higher (m = 4.28, sd = 0.35) than the other parents/guardians in the treatment town (m = 3.83, sd = 0.69) as indicated by a ttest, t(76) = 2.78, p = .007, with a medium effect size, cohen’s d = 0.72. this difference persists when compared to all other parents across either communities, t(163) = 3.04, p = .003, cohen’s d = 0.71. iv. sassy the final score on this instrument was compared for the same groups of parents in both towns. there was not a significant difference between parents who had a child attend nadeet centre, whether or not they recalled specific programming topics, and other parents in the treatment town as measured by an independent samples t-test, t(76) = 0.40, p = .689. the same is true when comparing nadeet parents to all parents in both towns, t(163) = 0.61, p = .542. discussion this study sought to determine if children influence energy-related knowledge or attitudes in the home as a result of their own education at a non-formal esd camp. data collected in two rural communities provide support for the view that learning within a household is bi-directional, that is, that parents learn from their children in addition to the commonly held belief that children learn from their parents. support for this idea comes from two primary sources. the first is that majority of respondents that were parents of former nadeet centre participants could name specific activities, or topics, in which their child was engaged while attending nadeet’s programming, despite the average length of time since the child’s attendance being nearly 4 years. the second is that there are significant differences in knowledge and attitudes about solar energy used for cooking, but not the environment in general, that demonstrate a transfer of knowledge between children and parents. having established that children do share their educational experience at nadeet centre with their parents, it was necessary to determine whether and how this experience influenced the household. the data collected from respondents regarding their energy-related knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors points to nadeet programming’s impact on adult non-participants within the household. for instance, on an inventory of solar energy and cooking knowledge and attitudes, parents of past nadeet participants, whether or not they were able to recall specifics about their child’s experience at nadeet centre, scored significantly higher than parents of children with no such experience, indicating an openness to, or favorable views of, solar cooking. not a single parent of a past nadeet centre participants reported practicing solar cooking at home nor ownership of such a device, further suggesting that their views of the practice is not based on their personal experiences but rather on information learned from their children. one might expect that an understanding, or a more favorable view, of solar cooking to be correlated with higher attitudes about the environment in general or with higher adult education levels, variables often correlated with each other. however, this is not the case. parents of past nadeet centre participants scored significantly higher than parents in the control town whose socioeconomic status is significantly higher and who are slightly more educated (table 1). within the treatment town, there is no significant difference between parents of past nadeet participants and other parents’ educational levels or concern about global warming, as shown by an analysis of sassy scores in the previous section. residents in both communities live in a desert and are experiencing the effects of a severe drought. climate change is not a politicized topic in namibia, but a lived reality. reducing the vulnerability of poor rural communities to the negative consequences of climate change and improving communities’ adaptive capacity and resiliency is a priority, and included in the namibian constitution (republic of namibia, 1990, 2011). taken together, this then suggests the presence of an external source of information influencing parents’ views about solar energy and solar cooking, specifically children’s exposure to nadeet’s esd programming. viewed with a wider lens, this study highlights the ways that youth-oriented esd, as part of a behavior change framework for international energy development projects, might lead to intergenerational shifts in attitudes about sustainable cooking energy, and may complement efforts aimed at adults. this is not to suggest that educational institutions, whether schools or informal institutions such as camps, should be co-opted for marketing innovations directly to youth. rather, educational organizations that implement esd curriculum and principles promote behaviors and attitudes that are already aligned with the goals of the cookstove sector and energy development community, and may be strong local partners. establishing and developing relationships with educational institutions strengthen the community and the project by preparing the next generation of household energy users to use healthier and more efficient means of cooking, thereby supporting the project’s desired outcomes, without waiting until they are adults. limitations both towns were systematically sampled to achieve a representative sample of each community, however it is possible that groups of households were missed due to the random walk method employed during sampling or interviewer errors. households may have been unobserved from the primary residential areas, especially if part of an informal settlement outside of the neighborhood centers. two namibian research assistants conducted the household interviews to minimize social desirability bias but given that the assistants were in each community for several weeks, it is possible that some respondents, especially those interviewed later in the process, knew who the research assistants were and which organizations they represented before being interviewed. lastly, the evidence presented points to nadeet’s impact, however there is no way confirm that observed differences are entirely attributed to nadeet and not to other factors that remained uncovered during the interview protocol and time spent in these communities. this may also be compounded by the fact that the researcher and her research assistants were outsiders to the communities. nuance in responses may not have been detected due to a lack of understanding of cultural context, shared experience, and interpretation. conclusion this study highlights the importance of the inclusion of children as stakeholders in the cookstove and energy development sector through sustainability education. households with children who were past participants of energy-themed education for sustainable development (esd) programming, the united nation’s education agenda to support the sustainable development goals (sdgs), were more receptive to, and had more favorable views of, solar cooking and solar energy than households without children in the same community and in the control group. given that solar cooking is not practiced in either community, and that solar pv systems were not observed, this indicates that the students’ learning about such practices had been shared with adult family members and influenced their opinions. the use of youth-focused esd as a framework for advancing sustainability within the home is not a new concept, and has in fact enjoyed success across topics and global contexts. yet its use in household energy research and practice, particularly those that focus on residential solid fuel use, remains largely unexplored. this study recommends future research evaluating youth-oriented esd as a framework for shifting intergenerational sustainability attitudes and behaviors, by positioning children as agents of change within their own homes. specifically, partnerships between energy 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(2015). transforming our world: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development. in a new era in global health. https://doi.org/10.1891/9780826190123.ap02 microsoft word owusu.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 14, iss. 2 (2015), pp. 225–243 domestic rainwater harvesting in a water-stressed community and variation in rainwater quality from source to storage g. owusu-boateng faculty of renewable natural resources kwame nkrumah university of science and technology (knust), kumasi godfredowusuboateng@yahoo.com m. k. gadogbe department of material engineering knust, kumasi   abstract the quality of rainwater, which is the main source of domestic water in dzodze, a community in the volta region of ghana, was unknown. therefore, the possible utilization of contaminated domestic water and occurrence of health hazards could not be underestimated due to prevailing poor hygiene and a great lack of standard maintenance and treatment systems in the community. in this study, we assessed the quality of rainwater in the dzodze community and how it varies along the drwh chain from free-fall to storage. rain samples were collected at three points along the domestic rainwater harvesting (drwh) chain. specifically, the three points were free-fall, roof catchment, and storage tank, and the two systems were “poorly-maintained” and “well-maintained” systems. the physico-chemical and bacteriological patterns of rainwater samples were analyzed for physicochemical and bacteriological parameters and results were compared with world health organization (and ghana standards board guideline values. the harvested rainwater was found to be of good physico-chemical quality, but not bacteriological quality, calling for treatment before utilization. also, irrespective of the type of drwh system (poorly-maintained or wellmaintained), there were substantial changes in rainwater quality upon interaction with roof catchment, with an increase noticed in all parameters. keywords: rainwater harvesting, physico-chemical, systems, standards   1. introduction safe drinking water is essential for human survival, yet water scarcity remains a serious problem for both urban and rural communities throughout the world; this is in part due to population growth, frequent droughts and the changing climate. the united nations’ millennium development goal (mdg) seven had a target to halve the proportion of global population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation by 2015. although about 1.6 billion people have gained access to safe drinking water through various technologies since the implementation of mdg seven (united nations, 2008), many people worldwide, especially in developing countries, are still in dire need of safe and sustainable drinking water. rooftop rainwater harvesting, a technology used to supply water for domestic purposes in developing countries, involves the collection of rainwater from the roofs of buildings via a guttering system and storage in a cistern (doyle, 2008). at the 2006 climate change convention in nairobi, rainwater harvesting consilience owusu-boateng and gadogbe: domestic rainwater harvesting     (rwh) was recognized as a viable option for addressing current water needs and providing security against future droughts in many african countries. in ghana, along with general water-scarcity, the situation is especially acute in many communities. in an attempt to circumvent the problem, rwh has been recognized as an appropriate technology to meet their water requirements. despite this, rwh technology has not received adequate support from the governments of these water-scarce countries. for instance, the ghana national water policy only focuses on the enactment of legislation for the provision of incentives for rwh systems and their incorporation and enforcement in all new building designs (national water policy, 2007). no consideration has been given to already existing settlements that are making the strategy inadequate. lundgren and akerberg (2006) made the observation that public interest in permanent domestic rainwater harvesting (drwh) and its sustainability as a useful and appropriate source of clean drinking water is on the rise in many areas in ghana. however, the absence of affordable systems, institutional support, and relevant research, especially in terms of the water quality, present significant constraints to drwh’s widespread adoption and usage. one example of a successful use of rwh can be seen in dzodze, a community in the volta region of ghana, where water is scarce and the limited available sources perceived to be of undesirable quality. rwh serves as a highly dependable source of domestic water and has contributed immensely to its socioeconomic development. given the region’s climatic and geographic characteristics and the storage capacity of the tanks used, rwh represents an appropriate way to improve water supply and has gradually received widespread adoption, serving households even in the extended dry seasons. one potential issue with rwh is the potential effects it may have on health, especially given the high number of infections in this community. still, there is no evidence that rwh is linked to these infection rates, so rwh seems to provide a low-cost solution to the water crisis and contributes to the prevention of water-related health problems. 1.1 rainwater quality variation along the supply chain from free-fall to storage rainwater harvesting systems are open to environmental hazards because of the nature of the catchment area. there are several points along the drwh chain where contaminants can enter and compromise water quality. contamination can occur during the free-fall of rain, after contact with roof catchment, and during storage (through complex interactions within the storage system). during free-fall, rainwater picks up atmospheric aerosols contributing to variations in the quality of rainwater as it reaches the place of collection. roof catchment contamination may arise from contaminants deposited on roof and guttering systems, such as droppings from birds and small animals, leaf litter from overlying vegetation, and aerosols deposited by the wind. in storage, microbial contamination comes primarily from insect accumulation; salmonella carriers, e.g., frogs (spinks et al, 2003); and bacterial growth in stagnant storage tanks. microbial contamination, according to nair and ho (2009), is a primary health risk as it varies depending on location, season, environment, and maintenance practices, which leads to unpredictable water quality. in their study, consilience owusu-boateng and gadogbe: domestic rainwater harvesting     the ph of the free-fall was 5.94, 7.11 after contact with roof catchment, and 6.8 at the point of exit from the harvesting storage tank (after a month of storage). conductivity varied from 14.82 µs/cm at free-fall and 36.61 µs/cm on roof catchment, to 104.65 µs/cm after a month of storage. similarly, they observed that total hardness increased from 3.68 mg/l (free-fall) to 7.24 mg/l (roofharvested) and 13.00 mg/l in storage after a month. free-fall and roofintercepted rainwater samples analyzed in ile-ife, nigeria (adeniyi and olabanji, 2005), revealed that values of different quality parameters for roof-intercepted samples were higher than those of free-fall samples with an enrichment factor within the range of 1 and 5. 1.2 ph measured ph gives indication of the balance between hydrogen ions (h+) and hydroxide ions (oh-) in water (usepa, 2006). according to diwakar et al (2008), ph less than 7.0 may cause corrosion of metal pipes, thereby releasing toxic metals like zn, pb, cd, cu, and other substances that result in a higher ph, adversely affecting the disinfection process. as rainwater is often slightly acidic, high ph values are caused by contact with the catchment and the concrete tank (amin and han, 2011). thomas (2009) noted that the ph of rainwater usually increases slightly after falling on the roof and during storage in tanks, and water sampled from cement tanks tends to be alkaline. scott and waller (1987) observed a rise in ph from 5.0 on roof surface to 9.4 in tank and 10.3 from tap, and that higher ph inhibits coliform growth. 1.3 turbidity turbidity is a water quality parameter that reflects the amount of small solid particles such as silt, finely divided organic matter, and biological material suspended in water. an increased turbidity may increase the risk of waterborne diseases, such as gastro-intestinal infections (who, 2011). in drinking water, the maximum allowed turbidity is 5 ntu (gsb, 2009); however, the ideal is 1 ntu or lower (nhmrc, 2004). studies on rainwater harvesting have often reported variability in turbidity levels; mostly within the range for filtered water, though some exceeded 5 ntu (yaziz, et al, 1989). according to the who (2011), turbidity is important to track because it affects the acceptability of consumers and the selection and efficiency of treatment processes. consilience owusu-boateng and gadogbe: domestic rainwater harvesting     1.4 electrical conductivity conductivity is a measure of the ability of water to pass electric current (epa, 2008). it is an indirect measure of the presence of dissolved solids and can be used as an indicator of water pollution. however, no health-based values have been proposed (who, 2011; gsb, 2009). according to suttar et al (1990), electrical conductivity of pure rainwater is usually < 15 µs/cm. natural waters are found to vary between 50 and 1500 µs/cm. 1.5 total hardness water hardness, the capacity of water to react with soap, is reflected by the total concentration of ca2+ and mg2+ ions in the water. water hardness is important to these communities, as it has been reported that fabrics washed in hard water tend to wear out as much as 15% faster than fabrics washed in soft water (hairston and laprade, 1995). gupta and saharanb (2009) reported a range of 75 1110 mg/l for total hardness in drinking water while the gsb (2009) noted 500 mg/l. tay (2004) reported a mean hardness value of 496.7 mg/l for boreholes in dzodze and a generally high concentration of dissolved calcium, magnesium, and chlorides in groundwater throughout the district. a study by thomas (2009) showed hardness of rainwater increasing upon storage. 1.6 sulfate, nitrate, iron, aluminum sulfates are discharged into water through industrial wastes and atmospheric deposition. sulfates have been found in rainwater at concentrations between 1.0-3.8 mg/l in canada and at a mean value of 6mg/l in europe (watkins et al, 2011). the gsb (2009) sets its recommend cap at 250 mg/l. it is recommended that at levels above 500mg/l, health authorities should be notified (who, 2011). nitrate is the more stable, oxidized form of combined nitrogen in most environmental media (usepa, 2006). there is usually no noticeable taste at iron concentrations below 0.3 mg/l, although turbidity and color may develop. corrosion of iron is possible at high dissolved oxygen values (who, 2011). background concentrations of aluminum (al) in rural air range from 0.005 to 0.18µg/m3, whereas concentrations in urban and industrial areas can be considerably higher, ranging from 0.4 to 8.0µg/m3 (sorenson et al, 1974). concentrations of al are highly variable in drinking water, ranging from <0.001 to 1.029 mg/l (schenk et al, 1989), though the limit by gsb (2009) is 0.2 mg/l. however, under good operating conditions, an al concentration of less than 0.1 mg/l is achievable (who, 2011). consilience owusu-boateng and gadogbe: domestic rainwater harvesting     1.7 coliform bacteria the microbial quality of water is determined by the presence of bacteria total coliforms, including fecal coliforms such as escherichia coli, and indicates fecal contamination. according to abbott et al (2006), escherichia coli or fecal coliforms should be used as indicator bacteria for stored rainwater since escherichia coli specifically indicates human or animal fecal pollution. in water, coliform bacteria have no taste, smell, or color, and can only be detected through a laboratory test. the who (2011) and gsb (2009) recommends zero escherichia coli or thermotolerant coliform forming unit (cfu) per 100 ml for all drinking water supplies. krishna (2003) proposed the following alternative bacteriological water quality standards for potable roof-collected rainwater in tropical regions and developing countries: class i: 0 fecal coliform per 100 ml – highest and ideal quality class ii: 1 10 fecal coliform per 100 ml – marginal quality class iii: > 10 fecal coliform per 100 ml – unacceptable for drinking 2. methodology 2.1 description of the study area the ketu-north district (figure 1), created in 2008 out of the former ketu district, is located at the south-western corner of volta region, ghana, and lies between latitudes 6º 03’ n and 6º 20’ n and longitudes 0º 49’ e and 1º 05’ e. the district capital, dzodze, is located on the main trunk road linking the regional capital (ho) to aflao, 80 km away from ho. the district has a total land area of 754 km2 (mofa, 2011). dzodze was chosen for the study because of its long standing history of drwh. figure 1: ketu-north district map with the location of dzodze (source: ketunorth district planning coordinating unit (2010)) 2.2 rainwater sample collection consilience owusu-boateng and gadogbe: domestic rainwater harvesting     rainwater samples were collected during rain events at three points along the drwh chain: from free-fall, after contact with roof catchment and the storage tank. the free-fall samples were collected with containers mounted about 1.5 meters above the ground to avoid the influx of rain splash. all samples were collected in triplicate and each placed in sterile 500 ml bottles. the samples were transported to the ghana water company laboratory at ho in a chilled ice chest for analysis. 2.3 laboratory analysis of water samples the investigated water-quality parameters were ph, turbidity, electrical conductivity, total hardness, sulfate, nitrate, iron, aluminum, total coliform, and fecal coliform. total coliform and fecal coliform were determined through the use of the multiple tube fermentation technique (mpn method) using lauryl tryptose broth for the presumptive phases of total and fecal coliforms, and brilliant green lactose bile broth and ec medium for the confirmation phases of total coliform and fecal coliform, respectively. standard laboratory methods were followed for analysis, and great care was taken to ensure that the integrity of the samples was not compromised. the water-quality analysis was carried out in accordance with procedures and protocols outlined in the standard methods for the examination of water and wastewater (apha, 1998). 2.4 data analysis data obtained from laboratory analysis of rainwater samples was checked for quality and entered into the computer. microsoft excel was used to organize the data. mean values of parameters were compared with who guideline and the gsb standard values for drinking-water quality. 3. results 3.1 variation in rainwater quality from source (free-fall) to storage the results of the laboratory analyses of rainwater quality along the drwh chain and for domestic use are presented in this section. the mean values of all measured water quality parameters (physico-chemical and bacteriological) computed are presented in table 1. consilience owusu-boateng and gadogbe: domestic rainwater harvesting     3.2 physico-chemical parameters ph at each sampling destination, the range of values of ph recorded in the well-maintained system (s2) was lower than in the poorly-maintained system (s1) (table 1). in both systems, acidity decreased from free-fall to storage tank and only samples within storage tank were within the who and gsb recommended values of 6.5 – 8.5. turbidity the well-maintained system recorded the lowest and narrowest range of turbidity values except at free-fall (table 1). the highest mean turbidity values were recorded in samples collected from roof catchment in both systems. they were 6.33 ntu and 7.77 ntu for the welland poorly-maintained systems, respectively. there was also a general increase in turbidity from free-fall (where values were the same for both systems) to roof catchment destination followed by a decrease in the storage tank. values fell below the who and gsb guideline value of 5 ntu, except for samples collected from roof catchment. conductivity conductivity increased generally along the chain for both systems. there was no difference in mean conductivity at free-fall for both systems. however, higher values were recorded in the storage tank destination for the wellmaintained system (55.60 µs/cm vs. 46.67 µs/cm), but not in the roof catchment destination. consilience owusu-boateng and gadogbe: domestic rainwater harvesting     table 1: water quality parameters measured in the poorly-maintained system (s1) and the well-maintained system (s2)   parameters range of values 5% lsd free-fall roof catchment storage tank s1 s2 s1 s2 s1 s2 s1 s2 ph 6.0–6.4 6.0–6.1 6.0–7.0 6.0–6.4 6.9–7.3 7.1–7.4 turbidity (ntu) 0.9–1.1 (1.00) 0.8–1.2 (1.00) 5.4-11.3 (7.77) 4.9–8.3 (6.33) 2.8–6.2 (4.00) 2.5–4.7 (3.30) 4.22 2.48 conductivity (µs/cm) 11.5– 23.6 (17.50) 11.0–24.2 (17.50) 22.5– 59.2 (43.63) 20.2–38.8 (27.03) 41.7– 54.1 (46.67) 54.8–56.2 (55.60) 24.2 1 14.0 9 total hardness (mg/l as caco3) 2.1–3.2 (2.77) 2.3–3.0 (2.77) 4.2–6.0 (4.87) 2.8–3.9 (3.37) 6.5–8.0 (7.17) 6.0–9.0 (7.37) 1.59 1.92 sulfate (mg/l) 0.9–3.3 (1.77) 0.8–3.0 (1.77) 4.3–6.1 (4.93) 2.3–4.7 (3.57) 2.2–2.7 (2.50) 1.9–5.3 (3.27) 1.96 2.81 nitrate (mg/l) 0.6–1.0 (0.80) 0.7–0.9 (0.80) 1.0–2.1 (1.53) 0.8–1.5 (1.20) 0.9–1.3 (1.10) 0.6–1.1 (0.90) 0.72 0.53 iron (mg/l) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0.16– 0.19 (0.11) 0.03–0.11 (0.06) 0.01– 0.06 (0.04) 0–0.05 (0.02) 0.09 0.05 8 aluminum (mg/l) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0.02– 0.06 (0.04) 0.07-0.1 (0.09) 0.02– 0.05 (0.03) 0.03–0.06 (0.04) 0.02 9 0.02 5 total coliform (mpn/100ml) 0–3.0 (1.00) 0–3.0 (1.00) 9.0-16.0 (11.00) 5.0-16.0 (9.00) 3.010.0 (5.00) 0–3.0 (2.00) 6.9 7.86 fecal coliform (mpn/100ml) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 9.0-16.0 (11.00) 5.0–9.0 (6.00) 3.010.0 (5.00) 0–3.0 (2.00) 6.6 3.33 * values in parentheses are means total hardness with the exception of the free-fall destination where the mean value of total hardness recorded for both systems was the same (2.77 mg/l), different values were recorded at the other sampling destinations, with higher values recorded at roof catchment for the poorly-maintained system (4.87 mg/l vs. 3.37 mg/l). the poorly-maintained system exhibited a wider range of total hardness than the well-maintained system, except in the storage tank (table 1). however, values recorded in this study were below both the who and gsb guideline value (500 mg/l). consilience owusu-boateng and gadogbe: domestic rainwater harvesting     sulfate higher concentrations of sulfate were recorded in the poorly-maintained system. in both systems, however, there was a general increase in concentration from free-fall to roof catchment destination, but a decrease from the latter to the storage tank. values were below the who guideline value of 500 mg/l and the gsb value of 250 mg/l. nitrate results of nitrate concentrations followed a trend similar to that of sulfate, although higher values were recorded for sulfate concentrations than nitrate concentrations. nitrate concentrations at roof catchment and storage tank destinations were higher in the poorly-maintained system than the wellmaintained system. values recorded were well below the who and gsb guideline value of 50mg/l. iron the trend of concentrations observed for sulfate and nitrate was also observed in iron concentrations in both poorlyand well-maintained systems. although no iron was detected in free-fall samples, it occurred at the other sampling locations, with those of the poorly-maintained system recording the highest values. values were below the who and gsb guideline value (0.3 mg/l). aluminum in every aspect of comparison with iron, the trends observed in the concentrations of aluminum in this study were similar. bacteriological parameters the well-maintained system exhibited better bacteriological quality than the poorly-maintained system. total and fecal coliforms were present in the roof catchment and storage tank destinations of both systems, but at the free-fall destination, only total coliform was present. 4. discussion 4.1 variation in rainwater quality from source (free-fall) to storage the quality of rainwater is essential because it serves as the source of water in all domestic rainwater harvesting (drwh) systems. variations in rainwater quality are reflected in its physical, chemical, and biological conditions. these conditions are also vital for determining the safety of the water in public health terms (nhmrc, 2004). 4.2 variation in physico-chemical parameters consilience owusu-boateng and gadogbe: domestic rainwater harvesting     physico-chemical parameters such as iron, nitrate, sulfate, ammonia, and turbidity can have adverse public health impacts when present in water at high levels or at varying concentrations. thomas (2009) reported significant variations in the physico-chemical quality of rainwater from free-fall as it interacts with various components of the harvesting system. also, adeniyi and olabanji (2005) reported higher values for roof-intercepted samples than free-fall samples. 4.3 ph the results of this study, subjected to anova, indicate significant variation in ph of water in both the poorly-maintained system (5.53) and the well-maintained system (60.45), p < 0.05. for both systems, acidity decreased from free-fall to storage tank (table 1). this agreed with findings by thomas (2009) and may be attributed to the dissolution of acid-forming gases such as carbon dioxide (co2) and sulfur dioxide (so2) from the atmosphere, which causes the build-up of these acid-forming compounds in free-fall. the acidity of rainwater decreased from free-fall through roof catchment to storage tanks. this supports the assertion by amin and han (2011) that rainwater is often slightly acidic and that increases in ph are caused by contact with catchments and concrete tanks. the slightly higher ph values observed for the storage tank may be due to the presence of calcium carbonate (caco3) in cement material, of which the concrete tanks are made. caco3 might have leached into the water on interaction with the slightly acidic water entering the tank to cause the decreased acidity. according to lundgren and akerberg (2006), concrete tanks have the capacity to increase the ph of stored rainwater by dissolving caco3 from the walls of the tank. scott and waller (1987) posited that ph is usually higher in tanks but gradually decreases with addition of rain during rain events. the contribution of the time lapse after rain events for collection cannot be discounted as well. most biochemical reactions are sensitive to variations in ph. water with ph below 6.5 can cause corrosion of metal pipes and ph higher than 8.0 affects disinfection (diwakar et al., 2008). higher ph values facilitate the solubilization of ammonia, heavy metals, salts, and also the precipitation of carbonated salts. also, low ph increases co2 and carbonate concentration. the ph values of rainwater destinations recorded in this study were below the who and gsb recommended guideline values (6.5 to 8.5) at free-fall and roof catchment. this may signal a potential corroding effect on roof material and the possible release of aluminum/iron into the water. according to chang et al (2004), older roofs tend to release more metals in this process, suggesting that the age of the roof can negatively impact the quality of harvested rainwater. this may explain the relatively high acidity of water in the poorly-maintained systems, which involved relatively older sheets. 4.4 turbidity turbidity increased upon contact with the roofs of rainwater harvesting systems through the entry of particles such as clay, silt, organic matter, and biological materials that may be present on the roofs. the values exceeded the who and gsb guideline value of 5 ntu with an ideal level of 1 ntu or lower (nhmrc, 2004). the mean turbidity of rainwater in this study varied from 0.83 consilience owusu-boateng and gadogbe: domestic rainwater harvesting     ntu to 7.77 ntu (both systems) and does not indicate pollution (yaziz, et al., 1989; nhmrc, 2004). values decreased in storage tanks, however. this may be due to the settlement of particles. the observed higher turbidity in poorlymaintained systems may suggest that the roofs of the poorly-maintained systems were laden to a greater degree with contaminants or may be due to factors such as exposure of the storage system. high turbidity increases the total surface area of particles in suspension upon which bacteria can grow. high turbidity may therefore promote water-borne diseases (risc, 1998). there was significant variation in turbidity along the chain in both the poorly-maintained system (7.74) and the well-maintained system (13.93) at p < 0.05. at 5% lsd, turbidity varied significantly at free-fall and roof catchment for both systems, and at the storage tank for the well-maintained system. 4.5 electrical conductivity according to the who (2011), conductivity is an indirect measure of the presence of dissolved solids and can be used as an indicator of water pollution. the mean conductivity for the poorlyand well-maintained systems were 17.50 µs/cm and 55.60 µs/cm, respectively. electrical conductivity values obtained were high (suttar et al., 1990). this may imply that the rainwater was impacted by local air pollution and the accumulation of debris in rainwater catchment and conveyance components. conductivity increased generally along the drwh chain for both systems. this agreed with findings by thomas (2009), who reported the conductivity of rainwater in the range of 14.82 µs/cm at free-fall, 36.61 µs/cm on roof catchment, and 104.65 µs/cm after storage over a month. the differences in conductivity at the various stages along the drwh chain as well as between the two systems appear to be real and not due to chance. 4.6 total hardness total hardness varied from 2.77 mg/l to 7.37 mg/l (s1 and s2), with hardness increasing generally along the drwh chain. this could be attributed to increased levels of dissolved salt ions such as ca2+, fe2+, and al3+ after rainwater made contact with roof catchment. also, because hardness depends on the presence of these ions in the water, al3+ and fe2+ ions in water samples from roof catchment and caco3 in the cement material of the concrete tanks may account for the increases noticed in total hardness after free-fall. similarly, a study by thomas (2009) observed that hardness of rainwater increases upon storage, reporting that total hardness increased from 3.68 mg/l (free-fall) to 7.24 mg/l (roof-harvested) and 13.00 mg/l (storage tanks). in this study, rainwater may generally be considered as “soft”: hardness between 0 and 60 mg/l (thomas, 1953; gupta and saharanb, 2009 and gsb, 2009). soft water is appropriate for domestic use since hardness exerts great negative impact on household resources e.g. extra detergent, a rinsing cycle, and fabric destruction. for both systems, variation in total hardness along the drwh chain was significant based on anova results and lsd calculations. according to who (2011), although consumers can tolerate water hardness in excess of 500 mg/l, domestic water of hardness above 500 mg/l is not recommended due to potential scale formation and high soap consumption. one benefit of hard water is its tendency to reduce the toxicity of some metals including copper, lead, and zinc. consilience owusu-boateng and gadogbe: domestic rainwater harvesting     however, the detriments of the formation of scaling from the presence of ca2+ ion and overall contamination outweigh potential benefits. 4.7 sulfate mean sulfate concentrations recorded in this study did not indicate threatening situations (gsb, 2009; watkins et al, 2011; who, 2011). anova revealed significant variation (8.63) at p < 0.05 in sulfate concentration along the drwh chain in the poorly-maintained system but no significant variation (1.41) at p < 0.05 in the well-maintained system. pairwise mean differences comparison with corresponding lsd value of 1.96 (poorly-maintained system) showed that sulfate concentration at free-fall (1.77 mg/l) varied significantly from sulfate concentration at roof catchment (4.93 mg/l), which also varied significantly from storage tank sulfate concentration (2.50 mg/l). however, concentration at freefall (1.77 mg/l) did not vary significantly from that in storage tank (2.50 mg/l). a general increase was observed in sulfate concentration upon contact with roof catchment. this could be attributed either to the natural occurrence of sulfate compounds in surrounding soils that could have been blown onto the roof or sulfate compounds from automobiles. refuse dumping and burning in the open could also be a contributing factor. the presence of sulfate in drinking water is believed to cause noticeable differences in taste, and very high levels (1000-1200 mg/l) might have a laxative effect in unaccustomed consumers (who, 2011). 4.8 nitrate results in this study showed that nitrate concentrations were well below the who and gsb guideline value of 50 mg/l. when subjected to anova, nitrate concentration did not vary. however, post-hoc comparisons using the fisher lsd test (table 1) revealed that for the poorly-maintained system, nitrate concentration at free-fall (0.80 mg/l) and roof catchment (1.53 mg/l) varied significantly. in this study, nitrate concentration was lowest at free-fall and highest on roof catchment. this, like for sulfate, could be attributed to the natural occurrence of nitrate salts in surrounding soils and plant debris that were blown onto the roof catchment or from vehicular exhaust fume emissions. it may also result from fecal matter deposited on the roof by birds and rodents. according to the who (2011), water naturally contains less than 1 mg nitratenitrogen per liter and is not a major source of exposure. 4.9 iron no iron was detected in free-fall samples due to its absence in the atmosphere. varying levels were detected in roof catchment and in storage tank samples but were below the who and gsb guideline value (0.3 mg/l). the slightly acidic nature of the rainwater may have accounted for the traces of iron, as ph below 6.5 is believed to have a corroding effect (diwakar et al, 2008). anova indicated that for both systems, iron concentration did not vary significantly at all sampling destinations. however the fisher lsd test (table 1) revealed significant variation in iron concentration at free-fall and roof catchment for both systems. iron imparts objectionable taste to water, stains laundry (at levels above 0.3 mg/l), and promotes turbidity (who, 2011). consilience owusu-boateng and gadogbe: domestic rainwater harvesting     4.10 aluminum the presence of aluminum at concentrations in excess of 0.1 0.2 mg/l leads to consumer complaints (who, 2011). this exerts important health effect on consumers. traces of aluminum were observed in roof catchment and storage tank samples but not in free-fall samples. this may be attributed to the slightly acidic nature of the rainwater or the age of the roofs since both systems had galvanized iron/aluminum roofs aged more than 10 years. chang et al (2004) noted that older roofs tend to exude more metals. the maximum mean concentration of al did not signal a contamination threat (gsb, 2009). anova results indicate significant variation in aluminum concentration along the drwh chain of both the poorly-maintained system (6.53) and the well-maintained system (36.21) at p < 0.05. lsd calculations revealed significant variation in aluminum concentration at all sample destinations except between the poorlymaintained system’s roof catchment and storage tank. variability in concentration of al have been (sorenson et al, 1974; schenk et al., 1989) previously observed. 4.11 variation in bacteriological parameters microbial contamination is of main concern for health risk and varies with location, the surrounding environment, and maintenance practices (nair and ho, 2009). the microbiological quality of the rainwater was assessed using total coliform and fecal coliform as the main indicators of bacteriological quality. 4.12 total coliform total coliform was recorded in at all destinations and in all systems and at levels above the who and gsb guideline value of 0 mpn/100 ml (table 1). there was significant variation (6.79) at p < 0.05 in total coliform in the poorlymaintained system but not for the well-maintained system (3.37) at p < 0.05. even though total coliform bacteria are mostly unlikely to cause illness, their presence indicates the water supply may be vulnerable to contamination by more harmful microorganisms (epa, 2008). the presence of total coliform in samples may thus suggest some level of health risk to consumers. the results also revealed highest total coliform counts in roof catchment samples, implying that the rainwater was impacted by roof catchment and run-off contamination perhaps through fecal depositions by birds and rodents or accumulated organic debris. this finding agrees with the assertion by lye (1996) that microbial contamination and other water quality problems associated with rainwater harvesting systems are most often derived from the catchment area and storage components. in this study, rainwater was most turbid on roof catchment. it is thus not surprising that total coliform counts were greatest on roof catchment. according to shelton (2000), there is a positive correlation between the level of total coliform bacteria and the grade of turbidity in roof-collected rainwater. again, the results demonstrated that even though the level of system maintenance employed was not generally effective in totally eliminating bacteriological contaminants, the well-maintained system still exhibited better bacteriological quality than the poorly-maintained system. consilience owusu-boateng and gadogbe: domestic rainwater harvesting     4.13 fecal coliform anova revealed significant variation in fecal coliform along the drwh chain of both the poorly-maintained system (8.86, p < 0.05) and the wellmaintained system (11.32, p < 0.05). in this study, only free-fall samples met set standards (gsb, 2009; who, 2011). no fecal coliform was detected at free-fall destination. levels were increased upon contact with roof catchment and then reduced in storage tank. this finding was consistent with a study by vasudevan et al, (2001) which reported that fecal coliforms, total coliforms, and fecal streptococci decline rapidly in rainwater storage tanks. the observed reductions in the storage tank may be attributed to the change in ph from slightly acidic to about neutral or to the change in environmental conditions. this is because biochemical reactions and processes are mostly sensitive to and affected by variations in ph and environmental conditions. again, the well-maintained system had better bacteriological quality in terms of fecal coliform levels. this observed impact of system maintenance on rainwater quality confirms findings of hammad et al (2008) that well covered household tanks showed less microbial contamination compared to uncovered or poorly covered ones. according to spinks et al (2005), improvement in water quality upon storage can be attributed to a number of processes including sedimentation, through which contaminant load becomes higher in sediment than the water column itself. moreover, it can also be attributed to low temperatures in the tanks and the detention of rainwater in storage tanks (amin and han, 2011). consilience owusu-boateng and gadogbe: domestic rainwater harvesting     5. conclusion this study showed variation in all physio-chemical parameters along the drwh chain from free-fall to storage and, irrespective of system type, there was a substantial change in rainwater quality upon interaction with roof catchment, with an increase in concentration of all unwanted parameters. although the harvested rainwater for domestic purpose in the dzodze community was of good physico-chemical quality, its bacteriological quality is below the who guideline values and gsb standard for its designated usage. boiling and other treatments of the harvested water could be employed before consumption to ward off possible health-related hazards. consilience owusu-boateng and gadogbe: domestic rainwater harvesting     bibliography abbott, s. e., douwes, j. and caughley, b. p. “a survey of the microbiological quality of roof-collected rainwater of private dwellings in new zealand”. in proceedings: water 2006 international conference hyatt regency hotel auckland (2006). adeniyi, i. f. and olabanji, i. o. “the physico-chemical and bacteriological quality of rainwater collected over different roofing materials in ile-ife, southwestern nigeria”. chemistry and ecology, 21.3(2005.): 149-166. amin, t and han, m. y. “microbial quality variation within a rainwater storage tank and the effects of first flush in rainwater harvesting (rwh) system.” australian journal of basic and applied sciences, 2011, 5.9(2011): 1804-1813pp. apha (american public health association). “standard methods for the examination of water and wastewater.” 20th edn. washington, d.c. (1998). chang m., mcbroom m. w., and beasley s. r.. “roofing as a source of nonpoint water pollution.” journal of environmental management 73.4(2004): 307315pp. diwakar, j., yami, k. d. and prasai, t. “assessment of drinking water of bhaktapur municipality area in pre-monsoon season.” scientific world, 6.6(2008.): 95pp. doyle, k. c. “sizing the first flush and its effect on the storage-reliability-yield behavior of rainwater harvesting in rwanda.” massachusetts institute of technology. (2008). dwaf (department of water affairs and forestry). “quality of domestic water supplies. assessment guide.”, 2nd edn. dwaf, department of health and water research commission, pretoria, south africa. (1998). epa (environmental protection agency). “results of the interlaboratory testing study for the comparison of methods for detection and enumeration of enterococci and escherichia coli in combined sewer overflows” (csos).(2008). [http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/methods/method/biological /csoreport200809.pdf]. (accessed: 25th june, 2012). gsb (ghana standards board). water qualityspecification for drinking water. gs 175-1:(2009), 3rd edition. ketu-north district planning co-ordinating unit. “strategic environmental assessment (sea) of the ketu-north district assembly medium term development plan” (2010-2013). (2010). 5-6pp. consilience owusu-boateng and gadogbe: domestic rainwater harvesting     lundgren, a. and akerberg, h. “rainwater harvesting in peri-urban areas of accra: status and prospects”. msc thesis submitted to the royal institute of technology, stockholm, sweden. (2006):27-35pp. gupta, d. p. and saharanb, j. p. “physiochemical analysis of ground water of selected area of kaithal city (haryana ).” haryana college of technology and management-kaithal(hr), india. vol. 1.2(2009):1-4pp. hairston, j. e. and laprade, j. c. “hard water can be a nuisance”. environmental education series. (1995). hammad, z. h., ali, o. a. and ahmed, h. h. “the quality of drinking water in storage tanks in khartoum state.” national health laboratory, khartoum. (2008). 1-3pp. krishna, h. “an overview of rainwater harvesting systems and guidelines in the united states”. proceedings of the first american rainwater harvesting conference; august 21-23, 2003; austin (tx), (2003):335-343pp. lundgren, a. and akerberg, h. rainwater harvesting in peri-urban areas of accra: status and prospects. msc thesis submitted to the royal institute of technology, stockholm, sweden. (2006):27-35pp. lye, d. j. “water quality of american cistern systems. american rainwater catchment systems association (arcsa).” austin, tx. (1996). nair, j. and ho, g.e. “monitoring bacterial water quality in rainwater tanks using the h2s method.” (2009). [http://www.docstoc.com/docs/17798836/monitoring-bacterial-waterquality-in-rainwater-tanks-using-the-h2s-method]. (accessed: 13th december, 2012). national water policy. “government of ghana. ministry of water resources, works and housing” (2007). [http:// www.watermwrwh.com/waterpolicy.pdf]. (accessed: 23rd may, 2012). nhmrc (national health and medical research council). “australian drinking water.” (2004). risc (resources information standards committee). 1998. guidelines for interpreting water quality data. province of british columbia. [http://www.ilmb.gov.bc.ca/risc/pubs/aquatic/interp/interp-01.htm]. (accessed: 27th july, 2013). schenk, r. u, bjorksten, j., and yeager, l. “composition and consequences of al in water, beverages and other ingestibles.” in: environmental chemistry and toxicology of al (lewis t. e., ed.). chelsea, m. i: lewis publishers inc. (1989). consilience owusu-boateng and gadogbe: domestic rainwater harvesting     scott, r. and waller, d. “water quality analysis of a rainwater cistern system in nova scotia, canada.” in: proceedings of the 3rd international rainwater collection system association conference. khon kaen, thailand (1987). shelton, t. b. “interpreting drinking water quality analysis-what do the numbers mean.” rutgers cooperative extension (2000). sorenson, j. campbell, r. j., tepper, l. b. and lingg, r. d. “aluminium in the environment and human health” environ. health persp., 8(1974): 395pp. spinks, a. t., coombes, p., dunstan, r. h. and kuczera, g. “ water quality treatment processes in domestic rainwater harvesting systems.” in: proceedings of the 28th international hydrology and water resources symposium, wollongong, australia, 10–14 november 2003. spinks, a., berghout, b., dunstan r., coombes, p. and kuczera, g. “tank sludge as a sink for bacterial and heavy metal contaminants and its capacity for settlement, re-suspension and flocculation enhancement.” in: proceedings of the 12th international rainwater catchment systems association conference, new delhi, india, november 2005. suttar, s., switzer, c. and codling, j. “ribbons of blue handbook”. scitech discovery centre, 1990. tay, c. “chemical characteristics of groundwater in the akatsi and ketu districts of the volta region, ghana.” csir – wri. accra, ghana (2004). thomas, j. f. “industrial water resources of canada”. water survey rep. no.1. scope, procedure, and interpretation of survey studies. quen’s printer, ottawa (1953). thomas, r. m. “studies on the quality of rainwater at various land use locations and variations by interaction with domestic rainwater harvesting systems”. doctor of philosophy thesis submitted to cochin university of science and technology (2009). thomas, t. h. and martinson, d. b. “roofwater harvesting: a handbook for practitioners. delft.” the netherlands, irc international water and sanitation centre. technical paper series; no. 49. (2007):160pp. un (united nations). “the millennium development goals report 2008. [http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/resources/static/products/progress20 08/mdg_repo rt_2008_en.pdf%5d. (2008). (accessed: 2nd may, 2012). usepa (united states environmental protection agency report).(2006): 311pp. consilience owusu-boateng and gadogbe: domestic rainwater harvesting     vasudevan, p., tandon, m., krishnan, c. and thomas, t. “bacterial quality of water in drwh.” proceedings of 10th international rainwater catchment systems conference, weikersheim, germany. international rainwater catchment systems association, (2001):153-155pp. watkins, c., raftery, j. and schaden, c. “parameters for rainwater quality testing at isla urbana and the ajusco lab.” [http://www.appropedia.org/parameters_for_rainwater_quality_testing_ at_isla_urbana_and_the_ajusco_lab%5d. (accessed: 29th may, 2012h). who (world health organization) “guidelines for drinking-water quality.” 4th ed. geneva, switzerland (2011): 1-564pp. isbn 978 92 4 154815 1. yaziz, m. i., gunting, h., sapri, n. and ghazali, a. w. “variations in rainwater quality from roof catchments.” water research 23.6 (1989): 761765pp. enhancing the implementation of sustainable development in nigeria through legal strategies consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 8, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 86-100 enhancing the implementation of sustainable development in nigeria through legal strategies orji uchenna jerome department of public and international law university of ibadan, nigeria jeromuch@yahoo.com abstract despite an abundance of resources, attempts to reduce poverty and promote sustainable development have not become a reality in nigeria. this article suggests legal routes for supporting nigerian sustainable development, including the establishment of a constitutional right to sustainable development alongside intergenerational rights; public interest litigation; and the recognition of the public trust doctrine and budget analysis. author’s note orji uchenna jerome holds a bachelor of laws (ll.b) honours degree from the university of nigeria and a masters of laws (ll.m) degree from the university of ibadan, nigeria. he is also qualified to practice as a barrister and solicitor of the supreme court of nigeria and presently works as a legal counsel and consultant with interests in environment and development law and policy. keywords: sustainable development, law, constitutional rights 1. introduction despite an abundance of economic resources, attempts to reduce poverty and promote sustainable development have not become a reality in nigeria. sustainable development in this case is defined as development that is balanced between people’s economic and social needs and the preservation of natural resources and ecosystems to meet present and future needs. lack of political will, corruption, a deficiency of proper coordination for sustainable development programs, and wasteful patterns of production and consumption have hindered any meaningful progress in this regard. to a great extent, the implementation of sustainable development is dependent on the political will of the government in power. it is also difficult for citizens to legally compel the government to pursue the implementation of sustainable development with available state resources as a result of the non-justiciable nature of the fundamental objectives and principles of state policy enshrined in chapter ii of the 1999 constitution of the federal republic of nigeria. thus, the government’s failure to implement sustainable development is usually considered a political question that should be decided by the citizens through elections. as such, the power of citizens to compel their government to implement sustainable development may only be exercised during political elections. the government’s failure in this regard is not subject to any legal consequences. consilience jerome: sustainable development and law however, unsustainable development exacerbates poverty, environmental crises, social and political disintegration, and national security challenges. to avoid these eventualities, it is necessary that citizens are legally empowered to enhance the implementation of sustainable development. this article explores several legal strategies that will enhance the implementation of sustainable development in nigeria. 2. establishing substantive constitutional rights to sustainable development presently, the effective implementation of sustainable development plans generally depends on the ability of the electorate to elect a responsible government that will faithfully implement such plans. however, this may be hindered by the unreliable nature of the nigerian electoral system where elections are often manipulated to enthrone public officials who do not have the mandate and interests of the people. even in some cases, governments that have a legitimate mandate may not be interested in effectively pursuing programmes that will enhance sustainable development. given the fickle nature of nigerian politics, it appears that one of the best ways to avoid a breakdown of law and order resulting from unsustainable development is to constitutionally guarantee the right to sustainable development. the constitutional guarantee of a right to sustainable development will translate issues of sustainable development from being mere political questions to fundamental human rights. since most nigerian governments usually forget the sustainable development aspirations of the people, such a right will serve as a constant reminder to the government that the people will not have to wait until election time to assert their rights to sustainable development. by establishing the right to sustainable development, citizens can rely on the judiciary when the government fails to pursue sustainable development initiatives in accordance with the fundamental objectives of chapter ii of the nigerian constitution. the implementation of sustainable development depends on the availability of government resources, and granting the judiciary the power to determine the allocation of those resources will amount to giving the courts power to determine government priorities, thus usurping the powers of the executive.1 however, the faithful and progressive fulfillment of the people’s aspiration for sustainable development is the basic priority of a responsible government, and the courts should be given the power to enforce this relationship. for example, in the south african case, government of the republic of south africa and others v. irene grootboom and others,2 which dealt with the right of the respondents to adequate housing, justice yacoob of the south african constitutional court observed: i am conscious that it is an extremely difficult task for the state to meet these obligations in the conditions that prevail in our country. this is recognized by the constitution which expressly provides that the state is not obliged to go beyond available resources or to realise these rights immediately. i stress, however, that despite all these qualifications, these are rights, and the constitution obliges the state consilience jerome: sustainable development and law to give effect to them. this is an obligation that courts can, and in appropriate circumstances, must enforce.3 thus, under a legally ordained sustainable development program such as a free basic education scheme, primary health care, or an improved railway system, the court can serve as recourse for beneficiaries of the program where the government fails to implement the program. in this regard, the beneficiaries of the program will have to show that the state has enough funds to implement the program but is diverting most available funds to the payment of huge salaries and allowances to public officials or other unsustainable programs. where the diversion of developmental funds is not justified, the court could compel the executive to prioritize sustainable development programs in fulfillment of the constitutional right to sustainable development. 3. budget analysis budget analysis is a novel and practical tool devised for accessing national budgets to determine whether the state has complied with or violated its socioeconomic obligations within a specified period of time.4 budget analysis mandates the fulfillment of the fundamental objectives of the state policy to be measured by the courts. thus, the budget analysis procedure has become: necessary since the mere laying down of policies has been shown to fail in securing economic and social justice for the people. this procedure has emanated as an alternative, but feasible method derived essentially to ensure that governments fulfill their constitutional duties. to determine the extent to which a state has effectively and prudently allocated its financial resources toward the fulfillment of its constitutionally imposed duties and obligations, it would be necessary to examine the budget of the government with its action plan. to do otherwise would be to permit states to conveniently over look their obligations to respect, protect and fulfill these objectives when in fact the provisions relating to socioeconomic rights should serve as the basis for choices to make.5 while contributing to the debate on the wisdom of entrenching the budget analysis clause in the provisions of the nigerian constitution in 1976, professor ben nwabueze noted that: a mere declaration by the court that given resources available to it, the government should be able to provide free education, does more to reinforce the objectives and directives principles of state policy and to bring the matter ...to the attention of the government.6 in some countries, budget analysis has been used over a period of five to ten years to invoke the courts’ jurisdiction regarding whether a state has complied with its socioeconomic obligations under the constitution.7 the extension of the constitutional consilience jerome: sustainable development and law powers of the courts to establish the budget analysis procedure will enhance the effective implementation of sustainable development initiatives in nigeria. citizens will be able to approach the court to analyze the state’s budget and thereby determine whether or not the state has complied with the socio-economic obligations established in the constitution. on the strength of this, citizens will be able to approach the court to analyze the state’s budget to determine whether or not the state has complied with its socio-economic obligations under the constitution. relying on this mechanism, citizens can approach the court to determine whether a government agency has judiciously utilized funds allocated to it over a period of time for the implementation of sustainable development. 4. public interest litigation and intergenerational rights the constitutional guarantee of public interest litigation and intergenerational rights would remove hurdles hindering the right of action by providing citizens easy access to courts. that provision would strengthen the roles of individuals and nongovernmental organizations (ngos) in the promotion of sustainable development. thus, by relying on the constitutional guarantee of public interest litigation and intergenerational rights, individuals and ngos would be able to protect the rights of vulnerable groups to sustainable development.8 recent judicial developments have attempted to increase the use of public interest litigation. the fundamental rights (enforcement procedure) rules, established in 2009 by the chief justice of nigeria,9recognizes the need for public interest litigation in the actualization of the fundamental human rights under the constitution and the african charter on human and peoples rights (ratification and enforcement) act. in this regard it provides that: the court shall encourage and welcome public interest litigations in the human rights field and no human rights case may be dismissed or struck out for want of locus standi. in particular, human rights activists, advocates, or groups as well as any non-governmental organizations, may institute human rights application on behalf of any potential applicant.10 by recognizing the right to public interest litigation under the fundamental rights (enforcement procedure) rules, individuals and ngos could more easily support sustainable development initiatives through the enforcement of the economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights under the african charter. 5. access to information access to information is very crucial to the effective implementation of sustainable development. timely access to information will enhance the participation of citizens in making decisions that will affect sustainable development. access to information affecting or relating to sustainable development will also enable citizens to check fiscal rascality and corruption through the monitoring of government expenditure on sustainable development projects. however, the right to freedom of consilience jerome: sustainable development and law expression and the press under the nigerian constitution11 does not adequately guarantee the right of citizens to access information in government possession.12 thus, the constitution only guarantees the freedom to receive and impart information without hindrance;13 however, it neither creates an explicit right to access information, nor does it impose a state duty to communicate information. the same problem also exists under the african charter on human and peoples rights (ratification and enforcement) act. to remedy this state of affairs, the nigerian government recently enacted the nigerian freedom of information act.14 the act establishes the rights of citizens to access or request information that is in the custody or possession of any public official, agency, or “public institution.”15 a person who is requesting information under the act does not need to demonstrate any specific interest in the information for which it is being applied.16 a person who is requesting information under the act also has the right to institute legal proceedings for the purpose of compelling any public institution to comply with the provisions of the act.17 the act also imposes a duty on every public institution to ensure that it records and keeps information about all of its activities, operations, and businesses.18 although the act has enhanced the access of citizens to information, the provisions of the act are not yet elaborate with regards to access to environmental information. there is also a need to enshrine a constitutional state duty creating the state’s responsibility to collect and publicly render information about hazardous activities that affect the environment. 6. citizen suits apart from the guarantee of the rights discussed above, another way of getting around the ineffective implementation of sustainable development programs and policies by government agencies is to empower citizens to legally compel the state to implement those policies through the establishment of citizen suit provisions in such programs and policies. this measure will serve as a means of ensuring the continuity of viable sustainable development policies. thus, where a policy has been established as a long term solution to a sustainable development problem, such a policy should not be jettisoned without due public consultation. as such, where a policy is meant to enhance the actualization of sustainable development, citizens should be empowered to seek judicial recourse to protect the policy from being arbitrarily jettisoned by the state without due public consultation to determine its viability. in such an event, the state will have to show the court justifiable reasons why the said policy lacks viability and requires abolishment. accordingly, policies established to implement sustainable development should include provisions empowering citizens to compel the government to fulfill the policy in accordance with its resources. relying on this, citizens can also approach the court to compel the government or its agencies to show practical steps it has taken to tackle issues addressed in a sustainable development policy or how it aims to implement such policy. through this approach, sustainable development programs and policies will become self-enforcing as citizens will no longer have to wait endlessly for government agencies to implement them.19 thus, the empowerment of citizens to individually or collectively enhance the implementation of sustainable development in this regard has the effect of transferring sustainable development issues from the consilience jerome: sustainable development and law domain of government agency responsibility to the collective responsibility of all citizens. in this way, citizens and government agencies will work together to promote sustainable development. there is also a need to entrench citizen suit provisions in environmental protection laws so as to empower citizens to enforce such laws. this approach is necessary due to the fact that it is virtually impossible for government agencies to effectively monitor and enforce sustainable development laws in every part of the country. 7. entrenching punitive sanctions for environmental degradation establishing punitive legal and economic sanctions that practically entrench the “polluter pays principle” environmental protection laws will effectively deter environmental degradation and unsustainable development. however, it appears that undue reliance on the economic approach for pollution control may to some extent encourage a situation whereby unsustainable development activities are carried out in the most economically affordable way in which every cost of such activity is transferred to the consumer in the form high prices. this does not help sustainable development but only encourages environmental degradation and the impoverishment of consumers. on the other hand, punitive legal sanctions involving penal servitude will greatly discourage the idea of unsustainable development as an economically viable option. this approach can be applied in such a way that individuals embarking on developmental activities will from the onset be compelled to use clean development mechanisms. the costs expended on the acquisition of such mechanisms will be cushioned by the government through tax and investment incentives. while this approach could be seen as a disincentive to foreign direct investment, which is needed to support economic growth and poverty alleviation, foreign direct investments that may help alleviate poverty do so more effectively if grounded in positive corporate conduct,20 which includes the pursuit of sustainable development. 8. purposeful judicial interpretation of the constitution another way of implementing sustainable development in nigeria will be through a broad judicial interpretation of the constitution to promote sustainable development. thus, it has been said that “the courts, by interpreting the constitution as a living charter requiring frequent interpretation to enable it to address new problems, uniquely permits an equilibrium to be maintained between liberty and constraint.”21 this has also been aptly observed by justice pats-acholonu of the nigerian supreme court in the following words: it is said that the function of the court is to interpret laws made by the legislature and not to make laws. in theory that is so. but it must equally be admitted that judges are not robots (or zombies) who have no mind of their own except to follow precedents. … as the society is eternally dynamic and with the fast changing nature of things in the ever changing world and their attendant complexities, the court consilience jerome: sustainable development and law should, empirically speaking, situate its decisions on realistic premise regard being had to the society’s construct and understanding of issues that affect the development of jurisprudence.22 thus, broad judicial interpretation of existing constitutional norms can be applied to promote sustainable development even where there are no explicit constitutional provisions in that area. this approach has been taken by courts to enhance the actualization of sustainable development in several jurisdictions. for example, in government of the republic of south africa v. grootboom,23 the constitutional court of south africa expansively interpreted the constitution to hold that the right of access to adequate housing cannot be in isolation of the right to human dignity and other socio-economic rights. the court also held that the state must take positive action to address the needs of those living in extreme conditions of poverty, homelessness, or intolerable housing. according to the court: the right of access to adequate housing cannot be seen in isolation. there is a close relationship between it and the other socio-economic rights. socio-economic rights must all be read together in the setting of the constitution as a whole. the state is obliged to take positive action to meet the needs of those living in extreme conditions of poverty, homelessness or intolerable housing. their interconnectedness needs to be taken into account in interpreting the socio-economic rights, and, in particular, in determining whether the state has met its obligations in terms of them.24 india provides the most practical example of how the judiciary can promote sustainable development through a broad interpretation of existing human right norms guaranteed under the constitution as seen in a litany of cases. in deo singh tomer v. state of bihar,25 the supreme court of india held that the right to life includes the right to live in dignity. therefore a person’s right to adequate housing was deemed intrinsic to his right to life.26 in mohini jain v. state of karnataka,27 the supreme court of india held that the right to education is essential to the right to life, which is a compendious expression to all those rights that the court must enforce because they are basic to the dignified enjoyment of life. in the absence of explicit legal rights to sustainable development, indian courts have also adopted the approach of applying the principles of environmental law to promote sustainable development.28 in vellore citizens welfare forum v. union of india,29 the supreme court of india, in granting a restraining injunction against a leather factory that was polluting the environment of several communities in the state of tamiluadu, noted that, although the industry generates foreign exchange and provides employment, it had no right to degrade the environment and pose a health hazard. also, in people united for better living in calcutta v. state of west bangel,30 the plaintiff filed a petition to prevent the encroachment of wetlands in calcutta. the court observed that there should be a proper balance between the protection of the environment and the development process. the court went ahead to state that, “the present day society has a responsibility towards posterity for proper growth and development so as to allow posterity to breath normally, live in a clean environment and have further development.”31 consilience jerome: sustainable development and law the pakistani judiciary has also adopted the approach of applying the principles of environmental law to promote sustainable development. for example, in the pakistani case of shehla zia v. water development authority (wapad),32 the court applied the precautionary principle to balance the safety and welfare of the citizens and the importance of commerce and industry, thus promoting sustainable development. the peruvian supreme court has taken a similar approach as well. in a case33 regarding the protection of a mangrove area from coastal shrimp farming industries, the supreme court of peru incorporated the principle of sustainable development alongside the “polluter pays principle” to hold that it was profitable for the present and future development of the region to preserve and sustainably manage the mangroves rather than risk their depletion. consequently, the court ordered all shrimp farms in the mangrove area to suspend their operations and restore the degraded areas to their natural state. following the above examples in other jurisdictions, nigerian courts can overcome the absence of direct constitutional rights on sustainable development by giving a broad interpretation to fundamental human rights, especially the right to life, regarding its linkages with the socio-political, economic, and environmental objectives under chapter ii of the constitution with the aim of promoting sustainable development. more can also be done by relaxing the rigid and technical rules associated with environmental litigation and giving a broad application to the “polluter pays principle”34 and the “precautionary principle.”35 additionally, some obstacles to public interest litigations such as the strict requirement of a right of action (locus standi)36can be relaxed by interpreting the constitutional duty of every nigerian citizen to “make positive and useful contributions to the advancement and well being of the community where he resides”37 and to include his right to promote sustainable development in his community.38 furthermore, the fundamental objectives of the nigerian constitution provide that, “the exploitation of natural resources in any form other than the good of the community shall be prevented,”39 and that “the state shall protect and improve the environment and safeguard the water, air and land, forest and wild life of nigeria.”40 this should be seen as creating a public trust in which in the nigerian government, in accordance with the sovereignty of the people,41 holds the natural resources in nigeria in trust for the nigerian people42 and is hence subject to the fiduciary duties of a trustee with respect to the management of such resources. through this approach, courts can apply the “public trust doctrine”43 and also interpret the doctrine to accommodate intergenerational rights in order to prevent the unsustainable development and exploitation of nigeria’s natural resources. it is also paramount that whenever the need arises, the judiciary should render a purposeful and broad interpretation of the african charter on human and peoples rights (ratification and enforcement) act and the child rights act in order to realize the sustainable development objectives of these laws. with regards to the african charter, the fundamental rights (enforcement procedure) rules of 2009 recognize the importance of giving a purposeful interpretation to provisions of the charter. hence it provides that, “…the african charter, shall be expansively and purposely interpreted and applied, with a view to advancing and realizing the rights and freedoms contained in them and affording the protections intended by them.”44 consilience jerome: sustainable development and law 9. conclusion enhancing the implementation of sustainable development in nigeria will also require the strengthening of law enforcement agencies to effectively combat corruption, increasing infrastructural development through the sincere and progressive implementation of policies and projects. in this regard, there is a need for a reduction of frequent and unpredictable changes in government administrative policies in order to create a stable and predictable policy and regulatory environment for the implementation of sustainable development. as such, the inclusion of measures to ensure the continuity of sustainable development policies is necessary. thus, it is important to ensure that such policies are not jettisoned without due consultation with the citizenry. it is necessary that measures are taken towards empowering citizens to compel the government to fulfill such policies in view of available resources. it is also imperative to establish measures that will enhance the participation of private citizens and ngos in the monitoring of the implementation of sustainable development policies. the pursuit of sustainable development will ultimately lead to the emergence of a sustainable human society. it has been said that, “a sustainable society is not an idealistic utopia in which human nature have been perfected, rather it is a society peopled by real people whose economic and social activity protects and even restores the environment whether they care deeply about the environment or not.”45 to a great extent, the realization of sustainable development in nigeria will depend on the state’s balanced understanding of the complex nature of the intimate connections between socio-economic development and environmental issues and their implications to national progress, democratic stability, national security, and human life as well other fundamental freedoms. thus, the state’s pursuit of sustainable development greatly implies good governance. this calls for the enthronement of a very high level of patriotism and fiscal discipline on the part of the government. as such, it is necessary to put an end to the prevailing culture of corrupt mismanagement, wasteful expenditure, and fiscal rascality in nigerian public administration. achieving sustainable development greatly depends on collective economic and social responsibility hinged on the active participation of the government and the citizens. thus, strengthening the legal capacity of the citizenry to enhance the implementation of sustainable development is very crucial in creating an environment for the government and citizens to actively work together in making the right development choices that will reverse the current trend of unsustainable development in nigeria. endnotes 1 see m. uwais, ‘fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy: possibilities and prospects’ in c c nweze (ed), justice in the judicial process: essays in honour of justice eugene ubaezonu (jca) (fourth dimension publishers, enugu, 2002) p. 177. 2 2000 (11) bclr 1169 (cc). consilience jerome: sustainable development and law 3 id at para 94. 4 see m. uwais, ‘fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy: possibilities and prospects’ in c. c. nweze (ed), justice in the judicial process: essays in honour of justice eugene ubaezonu (jca) (fourth dimension publishers, enugu, 2002) p.189. 5 id. 6 see w. i. ofonagoro, et al, (eds), the great debate (daily times, lagos, 1977) p. 49. see m. uwais, id. 7 see m. s. i. diokno, primer: a tool for monitoring states economic, social and cultural rights obligations (a violations approach towards budget analysis) cited in maryam uwais, id. 8 ‘vulnerable groups’ in this regard include un-born generations, minors, and individuals who may be unable to pursue their rights due to financial constraints or lack of awareness. regarding the use of public interest litigation to promote sustainable development, see, minors of oposa v. secretary of the department of environment and natural resources (denr) (gr no. 101083: supreme court of philippines) where a class action was brought on behalf of a group of filipino minors and future generations unborn by their parents under the philippine ecological network inc., contending a violation of their right to a healthy ecology. the plaintiffs also contended that they were entitled to the use and enjoyment of the country’s rain forest and therefore sought an order of court, directing the secretary of denr to cancel all timber license agreements and to cease from approving new agreements for lumbering in the rain forests. the supreme court of the philippines recognized the concept of intergenerational rights and responsibility and held that the plaintiffs had the locus standi to sustain the action. presently many countries have entrenched the concept of public interest litigation in their constitutions. see for e.g. article 50(2) of the constitution of uganda 1995, which allows any person or organization to bring an action against the violation of another person’s or group’s human rights. 9 see section 46 (3) of the 1999 constitution of nigeria, which empowers the chief justice of nigeria to make rules with respect to the practice and procedure of a high court for the purposes of enforcing all provisions related to fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution. 10 see, preamble 3(e) fundamental rights (enforcement procedure) rules, 2009. 11 see section 39(1) of the 1999 constitution of nigeria, which provides that “everybody shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference.” 12 see section 39 (3) of the 1999 constitution of nigeria. 13 see section 39(1) of the 1999 constitution of nigeria. 14 see the nigerian freedom of information act [2011]. 15 see section 1(1) nigerian freedom of information act [2011]. consilience jerome: sustainable development and law 16 see section 1(2) nigerian freedom of information act [2011]. 17 see section 1(3) nigerian freedom of information act [2011]. 18 see section 2(1) nigerian freedom of information act [2011]. 19 for more insight on the use of citizen suits to promote sustainable development, see j. c. dernbach, ‘citizen suits and sustainability’ widener law review (2004) vol. 10 p. 503. 20 see s. narula, “reclaiming the right to food as a normative response to the global food crisis” yale human rights and development law journal, vol. 13, p.419. 21 see w. h. mccree jr., ‘civil liberties and limited government’ national forum at 45 cited in see b. o. nwabueze, the ideas and facts in constitution making (spectrum books ltd, ibadan, 1993) p. 19. 22 see patrick magit v. university of agriculture, markudi & 3 ors (2006) all fwlr (pt. 298) 1313, 1345 d – f. 23 (2001) 1 chr 261; 2000 (1) sa 46 (cc) (s. afr.). 24 id at para 24. 25 (1988) air s.c 1782. see m. uwais, ‘fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy: possibilities and prospects’ in c. c. nweze (ed), justice in the judicial process: essays in honour of justice eugene ubaezonu (jca) (fourth dimension publishers, enugu, 2002) p.185. 26 see also, coralie v. union territory of delhi, where the supreme court of india gave a broad interpretation of the right to life to include non-justiciable directive principles by holding that, “the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely: the basic necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter over the head.” see c. c. nweze, ‘evolution of the concept of socio-economic rights in human rights jurisprudence: international and national perspectives’ in c. c. nweze (ed) justice in the judicial process: essays in honour of justice eugene ubaezonu (jca) (fourth dimension publishers, enugu, 2002) p. 542. 27 (1992) air s.c 1964 (app.6). 28 see also, kinkri devu v himachal pradesh (1989) air, hp 4, 6 para. 4, where an indian court pointed out the need for maintaining a proper balance between the tapping of mineral resources for development and industrial growth and the protection of ecology and the environment. 29 (1996) 5 scc 647; ( 1996) air sc.2715. see also, j. razzaque, ‘human rights and the environment: the national experience in south asia and africa’, joint unep-ohchr expert seminar on human rights and the environment (unep-ohchr, geneva, 14 – 16 january 2002) background paper no. 4, pp. 20-28. 30 (1993) air cal. consilience jerome: sustainable development and law 31 see also, the dehradum lime stone quarrying case, where an indian court held that economic growth cannot be achieved at the cost of environmental destruction. cited in g. sahu, ‘implications of indian supreme court’s innovations for environmental jurisprudence’ law, environment and development journal (2008) vol. 4(1), p. 9. 32 (1994) sc 693 at 710. in this case, a group of pakistani citizens from islamabad brought an action to prevent the municipal water and power development authority from constructing a grid station in their neighborhood, contending that the high voltage transmitted by the station would create a health hazard. the court, deciding in favour of the plaintiffs, held that, “the precautionary principle is to first consider the welfare and safety of human beings and the environment and then to pick up a policy and execute the plan which is more suited to obviate the possible dangers or make such alternate precautionary measures which may ensure safety.” 33 see, societad peruana de derecho ambiental v. direccion~ regional del ministerio de pesqueria (1993) [corte sureme de justicia expediente no. 1058 – 92 dictamen fiscal n1476 – 92. 17.2 1993]. see a. fabara and e. arnal, ‘review of jurisprudence on human rights and the environment in latin america’ joint unep-ohchr expert seminar on human rights and the environment (unep-ohchr, geneva, 14 – 16 january 2002) background paper no. 6, p.10. 34 the “polluter pays principle” is a principle of environmental law that promotes the approach that the polluter should in principle bear the cost of pollution. see principle 16 rio declaration. 35 see principle 15 rio declaration. see, vellore citizens welfare forum v. union of india, (1996) 5 scc 647 ;( 1996) air sc.2715, where the court applied the precautionary principle to hold that if there are threats of serious and irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation. see also shehla zia v. water development authority (wapad) (1994) sc 693. 36 locus standi refers to the right to bring an action or to be heard in a given forum such as a court of law. see, blacks law dictionary (8th edn) p. 960 37 see, sec. 24 (d) of the 1999 constitution of nigeria. 38 see, the ganga water pollution case where an indian court extended the right to life to include the right to defend the human environment for present and future generations. cited in g. sahu, ‘implications of indian supreme court’s innovations for environmental jurisprudence’, law, environment and development journal (2008) vol. 4(1) p. 9. 39 see section 17 (2) (d) of the 1999 constitution of nigeria. 40 see section 20 of the 1999 constitution of nigeria. 41 see section 14 (2) (b) of the 1999 constitution of nigeria. consilience jerome: sustainable development and law 42 see section 1 land use act [cap. 202 lfn 1990; cap l5 lfn 2004], which provides that all land comprised in the territory of each state of the federation is solely vested in the governor of the state who shall hold it in trust for the people. 43 the “public trust doctrine” is a principle of law that supports the notion that certain resources are held in trust by the state for public use and common good. the doctrine has been applied by courts in some foreign jurisdictions to promote sustainable development. see, peter waweru v. the republic of kenya [high court of kenya of nairobi miscellaneous civil application no.118 of 2004]. for further reflections on the use of the public trust doctrine in environmental protection, see p. kameri – mbote, ‘the use of the public trust doctrine in environmental law' law, environment and development journal (2007) vol. 3(2), p.195. see generally, d. takacs, “the public trust doctrine, environmental human rights, and the future of private property”, new york university environmental law journal (2008) vol. 16, p.711. see j. l. sax, the public trust doctrine in natural resource law: effective judicial intervention, michigan law review (1970) vol. 68, pp. 471, 476. 44 see, preamble 3(a) fundamental rights (enforcement procedure) rules, 2009. 45 see j. c. dernbach, ‘citizen suits and sustainability’ (2004) 10 widener law review, p.504. according to professor j. c. dernbach, “since sustainable development is directed against widespread environmental degradation and large scale poverty, it follows that a sustainable society would be a society in which the two do not exist.” microsoft word moyer.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 14, iss. 2 (2015), pp. 106-125 an impact assessment model for web-based time banks – a thought-experiment in the operationalization of social capital liz moyer school of international and public affairs columbia university, new york, ny lizkmoyer@gmail.com abstract the following paper is meant to be practical, in that it offers an impact assessment model for web-based time banks that was produced as a consultancy project deliverable; and academic, in that it offers a thought-experiment about the measurement of social capital and its association with sustainable development. as the development field continues to transition towards sustainable models that include social variables, innovative impact assessment tools are needed to fully understand the role of these variables for planning and investment. web-based time banks – online networks that members exchange services by using an alternative currency in the form of time – offer an opportunity to look at the operationalization of social variables in a unique way, particularly social capital and its relationship to economic development. the impact assessment model seeks to answer: how do time banks as a development intervention augment the social capital of communities? the model was designed based on three dimensions of social capital, psychological, social and economic, and edgar cahn’s theory of coproduction. the model contributes to the economic valuation of time bank participation through the metrics: market value savings and economic risk of participation. author’s note in alignment with the nature of time banks, i have been blessed with the generosity of mentors, colleagues, strangers, and friends in collaboration on this research project. first and foremost, i thank my faculty advisor dr. andre correa d'almeida, who guided me in both my development practice summer field placement, and in the sipa independent study that were used to develop the research. his expertise was crucial in the construction of the model and the paper’s arguments. i am grateful to tomás gonzález olavarría and the minkay team, with whom i had the pleasure of working in-person and remotely. i would like to thank gabriele donati and timerepublik for their openness to being interviewed and sharing data and information. thank you to kathy perlow from lehigh valley health network (lvhn)/office of health systems research and innovation’s (ohsri) community exchange timebank, and lois arkin from the los angeles ecovillage’s arroyo seco network of timebanks. thank you to rebekah clark, maria lagorous, and dr. eva weissman in the development of the economic value models. and last, but certainly not least, thank you to all of the friends and family who worked with me on this, through brainstorming sessions and general inspiration. i was introduced to time banks three years ago while working with a housing and education project for homeless youth in the dagoretti market of nairobi, kenya called harambee youth kenya (sponsored by the nonprofit organization harambee usa inc.). i designed an extension of the project called the harambee consilience moyer: an impact assessment model aquaponics project, which incorporated a time bank model into a social entrepreneurship that sold and installed aquaponics systems. since then, i have been fascinated by complementary currencies, taking advantage of research opportunities to expand my knowledge base. time banks hold particular interest to me because the model goes beyond offering an alternative system of currency, and provides a new framework for community interaction. what happens when community members interact with each other based on principles of equality and inclusion? and, of equal importance for development practitioners, how do we measure this impact for evaluation purposes? lastly, i would be amiss if i did not mention my larger career vision of being a bridge between alternative approaches to development practice and the emerging field of sustainable development. i believe it is incredibly important for my generation of practitioners to listen to our hearts and be creative in finding ways to translate what we hear into the institutional language the development field can digest. this is what a time bank impact assessment framework symbolizes for me. keywords: social capital, time bank, sustainable development, monitoring and evaluation, project management, case study 1. introduction 1.1 time banks time banks – community development programs entailing members exchanging services through an alternative currency in the form of time – have been growing in popularity over the past few decades, with a myriad of articles citing their positive impact on communities’ social capital stock (válek and jašíková, 2013; reed, 2008). beginning in the 1980’s, edgar cahn developed the time bank model in response to decreased social program funding, with the intention of turning welfare recipients into “co-producers” of the services they receive. this type of a participatory program is directly in line with shifts occurring in the development field, as the discipline transitions towards sustainable frameworks and practices that empower communities as active stakeholders instead of passive beneficiaries. the time bank model was built on a four-pillared philosophy, coining the theory of co-production: every person is an asset, work has value beyond monetary terms, reciprocity is beneficial, and social networks build community (cahn, 2004). because of this, the alternative currency has been associated with strengthening local networks of mutual support through an egalitarian system of reciprocity (seyfang, 2004). programs have been primarily implemented on a small-scale throughout the united states and europe, and are typically housed within larger organizations, such as hospitals, universities, and ecovillages (cahn, 2004). consilience moyer: an impact assessment model figure 1: principles of time banking by founder edgar cahn (2004) in action, time bank members earn credit for volunteering their time helping someone, and are then able to spend that credit on other services offered within the network. for instance, let us take the example of sophia, a mexican immigrant who moves to the united states and needs to improve her english to integrate into her new environment. sophia joins her local time bank by signing up through their website, which is used to connect members, facilitate transactions, and monitor activities. when sophia joins, she builds a profile that displays her name, location, offered talents, and needed services to other time bank members. because she built her profile, showing a keen interest in participating, she receives an initial credit. through the online platform she scans member profiles, reading reviews and contacting members to learn more about them. she finds darnel, a bilingual english tutor with strong spanish skills who she feels good about. she and darnel message each other to negotiate a time, date, and curriculum for the tutoring session, in this case a two-hour session on verb tenses. once they complete the two-hour session, darnel receives time bank credit worth two hours of someone else’s time in the network, and sophia’s time bank account is reduced by two hour credits. the transaction is complete once both sophia and darnel review each other’s experience to help promote each other on the website and inform other members. 1.2 social capital in sustainable development as the development field transitions towards a more sustainable paradigm of growth, institutions require contemporary tools to measure and understand newly incorporated social and environmental variables. sustainable development, as an approach, aims to grow a country’s gross national product (gnp) while simultaneously improving sociopolitical and environmental conditions, without compromising resources for future generations (wced, 1987). the world bank (1997) defines it as “a process of managing a portfolio of assets to preserve and enhance the opportunities people face.” the need to introduce social inclusion and environmental conservation into national planning is in part a response to the neoliberal economic paradigm that took precedence over the past thirty-five years (harvey, 2005). since the late 1970’s, consilience moyer: an impact assessment model neoliberal economic policies have institutionalized the belief that physical and financial capital are the driving forces of economic development. from this, development interventions, programs, and tools have been built to reflect the ideology by instilling top-down policies that emphasize physical and financial infrastructure. by the late 1990’s, practitioners began noting the limitations of this approach, calling for models that incorporate social capital, human capital, and natural capital into national accounting, which resulted in the inception of sustainable development (soubbotina, 2004; piazza-georgi, 2000). out of these newly incorporated variables, social capital has proven the most challenging to plan for because of its range of definitions and relative ambiguity that make operationalization difficult (wbo, 1997). social capital is defined as the features of a social system that serve as a resource for individuals and the collective (putnam, 2001; woolcock and narayan, 2000). of particular relevance to sustainable development is the perspective that a community’s social capital is a public resource that can be augmented through state and market operations, affecting the community’s economic development (pronyk et al., 2008; soubbotina, 2004). although there is consensus on this, the development field lacks a standardized definition about which observational aspects of things like networks, interactions, and institutions characterize beneficial social capital construction. over the past 30 years, measurement methodologies have incrementally progressed, evidenced by the wbo social capital initiative (1997) that sought to advance the operationalization of the concept, coupled by its publication of “expanding the measure of wealth” (1997), which reviewed attempts to promote social capital within economic growth. because the measurement of social capital has not been standardized, development projects aimed at augmenting a community’s social capital stock are pursued less and viewed as politically risky. these projects require strong monitoring and evaluation (m&e) systems to understand the impact of the intervention, to inform donors, and to guide planning and budgeting. web-based time banks that use online platforms offer the sustainable development field a thought-experiment on how to advance the monitoring of social capital. the following paper outlines an impact assessment model that was designed for minkay—a start-up, web-based time bank in bogota, colombia. the model was shaped by qualitative interviews with a sample of time bank administrators in the united states, as well as participatory field research in three low-income neighborhoods in bogota as part of a larger consultancy contract with minkay. cahn’s theory of co-production was used to design the metrics, coupled with a function of social capital that is outlined in the literature review. 2. literature review: social capital and time banks generally speaking, social capital is the collective properties of a social system that serve as a resource for psychosocial support, collective action, and social and economic development (putnam, 2001; woolcock and narayan, 2000). what this resource looks like varies highly across communities, with each manifestation having different qualities marked by unique benefits and consequences. in this way, social capital, as a general concept, is not inherently positive or negative, but rather a natural feature of a community that can be changed (woolcock and narayan, 2000). consilience moyer: an impact assessment model it is with this in mind, that social capital research aims to identify what characteristics of a social system produce different types of social capital, and which types of social capital should be cultivated for sustainable development. figure 2: social capital a time bank is an example of a program that is associated with positively developing the social capital of a community (knapp, 2012; seyfang, 2004). however, interviews with a sample of time bank administrators in the united states show a deficit in time bank m&e systems, with programs either not monitoring impact or conducting small-scale internal surveys. in line with this, few research institutions have conducted scientifically rigorous studies on the social and economic impacts of the time bank model. the majority of quantitative research has been based on membership satisfaction surveys that pose methodological concerns because of small sets of primary data and limitations from self-reporting (lrcp, 2014; collom, 2012). a recent trend in the last decade shows hope for the research deficit as time banks begin using online platforms to connect members. now time banks are able to reach larger population sizes and more easily collect social network and demographic data through time bank software packages. whether the time bank is a small-town program of 200 members part of the time bank usa network, or a large-scale operation like timerepublik’s ever-growing 20,000 member international community, every time bank uses a software package to log information about their members and the services exchanged. with this in mind, the following section outlines literature on social capital measurement methodologies, as well as relevant research on the impact of time banks. this outline was used to build the paper’s impact assessment model, which evaluates if and how time banks influence a community’s social capital stock. the literature is organized into three scopes of analysis: community psychology, representing the micro, psychosocial level; social networks, representing the meso, social level; and economic development, representing the macro, economic level. consilience moyer: an impact assessment model 2.1 community psychology although social capital is considered a collective resource that is not embodied by one individual, a community’s social capital stock is analyzed by looking at the aggregate of individual attitudes (wbo, 1997). therefore, to understand the impact of time banks, it is necessary to collect data about psychosocial indicators of social capital, such as feelings of trust and belonging, and norms of reciprocity. this can be used to assess the claim that time banks improve levels of social cohesion within communities (knapp et al., 2010). time banks are associated with strengthening levels of trust among members, which is the most frequently cited indicator of social capital (knapp et al., 2012; lochner et al., 1999). feelings of physical safety are used as a metric for trust, as well as opinions about general feelings such as, “people in this neighborhood can be trusted” (lochner et al., 1999). the world value survey (wvs) is a world-renowned data collection instrument that measures people’s attitudes and beliefs. for the past 35 years, the wvs has gathered data from approximately 100 countries to compare how belief trends influence political and social development. additionally, a network’s community competency, often associated with social capital, is based on members’ beliefs that the community can provide for itself in times of need (lochner et al., 1999). this concept directly aligns with cahn’s theory of coproduction, in which people receive tools to actively participate in generating their own welfare. another feature associated with time banks is that they create a sense of community among members, which is a common psychosocial indicator of social capital (wallis and killerby, 2004). according to a report by the hawaii executive office of aging (2014), 85% of its time bank members report an increased sense of community belonging since joining the program. this indicator reflects individual identity with the collective, in terms of objective perception of the unit and the community’s supply of emotional support. this is useful for analyzing the public good characteristic of a community’s social capital stock. questions about shared sense of history and values, as well as feelings of comfort and significance within the community, are common metrics (lochner et al., 1999). in a similar vein, time banks are said to promote norms of reciprocity, a hallmark indicator of social capital, because members are allowed and encouraged to ask each other for help (válek and jašíková, 2013; zischka, 2013). research shows that the majority of time bank members join the program because it allows them to participate in society in a way that aligns with their values, such as contributing to community and helping those in need (collom, 2007). within the social capital field, norms of reciprocity are traditionally measured through metrics about favor lending and goods exchanged among community members, as well as frequency of volunteer work, seen in the approach by the households and subjects module of the italian multipurpose survey on households (schrivens and smith, 2013). consilience moyer: an impact assessment model 2.2 social networks at a basic level, an online time bank is a network through which people exchange services. this holds strong implications for social capital research because social networks are its primary unit of analysis. these analyses take a quantitative and qualitative research approach through examining information about the services and resources accessible within a network, as well as the collective characteristics of a network, such as participation levels and community competency (schrivens and smith, 2013). online time bank software provides an opportunity to analyze social networks through data collected from the web platform. according to collom (2012), time bank transaction records are a rare form of social network data because metrics can be followed over a longitudinal period, network connections are asymmetrical, and exchanges are quantified according to time. although time banks use a variety of software packages, every package has similar features in terms of monitoring membership transactions, such as accounting for the type of service exchanged, number of hours exchanged, date of exchange, and members involved in the exchange (collom, 2012). collom was the first to explore this connection, identifying seven derivable indicators, such as number of active members, frequency of hours exchanged, and ego network density. for instance, in regard to social capital augmentation, he proposed that the average number of reciprocated contacts between members provide indication for the type of social capital being cultivated. if software data shows a high degree of two-way exchanges, it can be surmised that the time bank is generating bonding ties among its members (collom, 2012). traditionally, social capital research measures network characteristics by collecting quantitative data about the density and size of groups (woolcock and narayan, 2000). this is done through group participation measures that use survey responses to aggregate the number of different organizations in which the average community member participates (glaeser et al., 2002). it is most easily done through formal membership surveys, such as census data or association records, but is also conducted at the informal level to examine local and neighborhood connections. again, this suggests strong potential for analyzing social capital change through time bank software packages because this information is readily available. in terms of analyzing the qualitative characteristics of a network, authors have created network typologies to better understand the wide range of social capital manifestations that exist, as well as their associated development outcomes (woolcock and narayan, 2000). for instance, network systems have been categorized as either having a formal structure or an informal structure, which influences the type of ties that comprise the network (putnam, 2001). formal networks are products of an institution or market, and define rules of behavior through policies, laws, or contracts. informal networks are born from communitybased family ties and have implicit standards of conduct reinforced by positive and negative social reinforcement (wbo, 19997). formal network structures tend to be made up of bridging ties that are characteristic of an intercommunity network (piazzi-georgi, 2001). bridging ties are thin connections common among large, heterogeneous groups that benefit from the fluid transmission of information and opportunities (woolcock and narayan, 2000). this is commonly seen in developed consilience moyer: an impact assessment model countries, in which sparse connections between people, companies, and institutions are the glue that facilitate economic activity, technology advancements, and knowledge sharing (cattell, 2001). on the other hand, intracommunity networks are more indicative of informal structures that are made up of bonding ties. this type of social capital is prevalent among homogenous groups of people with tight-knit connections born from family, ethnicity, or geographic location (piazzigeorgi, 2001). bonding ties create close networks of people who share similar life experiences and use trust and personal knowledge as currency to facilitate transactions and activity (woolcock and narayan, 2000). low-income communities have been cited as having high stocks of bonding social capital – due to reliance on informal networks for support and opportunities – and limited bridging capital, explaining the deficit in resources, like new ideas and job opportunities, that are outside of the community’s immediate scope (piazzi-georgi, 2001). 2.3 economic development although limited in sources, time banks have been cited as having a positive impact on a community’s access to resources and levels of trust among members, which hold implications for local economic development (seyfang and longhurst, 2012). in general the economic valuation of social capital is difficult because it is a resource acquired by a group of people; it cannot be reduced to a single unit of account, nor can a person be described as having or not having social capital (rose, 1999). in a similar way, valuing the economic impact of time banks is challenging because of the host of intangible impacts and ripple effects related to the program. to date, the new economics foundation and the london school of economics and political science (lse) are the two primary institutions that have conducted economic research on time banks. knapp’s (2013) team used decision modeling to understand the economic costs and benefits to time bank participation. they found an annual cost per member of between £312 and £902 with an estimated return of over £1,300, plus a reduction of £187 per member in benefit claims. echoing knapp’s findings, the new economics foundation conducted several social return on investment analyses that found a conservative estimate of a £3.40 social return per £1 invested (lrcp, 2014). the external validity of these findings is questionable, as the economic returns of a time bank rely heavily on the services offered and the socioeconomic standing of participants. the economic value created by time banks is especially relevant because a large proportion of people who join time banks are categorized as socioeconomically impoverished (seyfang, 2004). in a review of twelve time banks, seyfang (2004) found that 67% of programs targeted low-income communities, with 72% of members unemployed, 54% receiving government-sponsored support, and 58% living in a household with an annual income of less than £10,000. this is supported by an evaluation survey from the visiting nurse service of new york community connections timebank, which found that 73% of members said participation helped them save money, with the greatest impact felt by members with an annual income of less than $9,800 (lrcp, 2014). consilience moyer: an impact assessment model in addition to this, time banks have been associated with increasing the likelihood of formal employment and/or volunteer work from program participation. although a small probability, knapp (2012) found a 4.5% increase in likelihood of returning to employment due to participating a time bank. this is supported by seyfang’s (2004) finding that 51% of surveyed time bank members would not have participated in volunteering outside of the time bank if it was not for the program. this is relevant to the corporation for national and community service’s report that the rate of community service within the united states continues to rise, with 64.5 million americans having volunteered 7.9 billion hours in 2012, implying a need for systems like the time bank model to account for this work. the time bank model helps organize and incentivize volunteer work, which has been found to reduce social welfare issues, according to data from the british household panel survey (zischka, 2013). all of this influences the type of social capital a community is endowed with, which has implications for the area’s economic output. levels of trust among community members, which is associated with social capital, influence an area’s economic activity in terms of how business is conducted, information is shared, and opportunities are generated. woolcock and narayan (2000) purport that social norms facilitate economic activity by influencing transaction and information costs, trade negotiations, the collective management of resources, and civic participation. they conclude that strong networks of formal and informal support increase the capacity of communities to address issues of poverty and vulnerability. these social norms include how reputations are formed and what type of reputations are valued, directly related to levels of trust among individuals. authors continuously explore the relationship between reputation, trust and economic output, applying theoretical explanations to its association with development (dasgupta, 2005) or empirical models to concepts like altruism (mui et al., 2013). a large-scale wbo study that looked at the impact of social capital on household income in rural tanzania reflects woolcock and narayan’s point. the analysis was based on 1995 social capital and poverty survey data, which provided information about the associational activity of 5,000 rural households and household members’ levels of trust in institutions and community members. it concluded that there was a significant positive correlation between a village’s social capital level and average income level. a one standard deviation increase in social capital was associated with an increased household expenditure of 20% to 30% for each person. this associated impact was attributed to improved public services, greater access to credit, use of improved agriculture inputs, and increased community activity. it was noted as being comparable to an increase in non-farming assets or the tripling of a person’s education level (piazzi-georgi, 2000). 3. methodology based on edgar cahn’s theory of co-production and the literature review on social capital operationalization, an impact assessment model was designed to answer the question: “how do web-based time banks augment the social capital of the program’s community?” consilience moyer: an impact assessment model the impact assessment model was a deliverable for a six-month consultancy project for minkay, a start-up, web-based time bank in bogota, colombia. the design of the model was based on participatory field research, qualitative interviews, and secondary research. the participatory field research was conducted in three lowincome neighborhoods in bogota, colombia (rincon de lago, la colina, and laureles), in which groups of participants were asked to respond to words associated with time banking (“trust,” “exchange,” “community support”) and describe how these ideas are reflected in their neighborhood. this was supplemented by quantitative data collected from a survey of approximately 100 people. the quantitative survey used questions from the world value survey (wvs) to measure attitudes about norms of reciprocity, safety, and trust, as well as collect demographic information related to socioeconomic status. further, a sample of time bank administrators from the united states was interviewed about the type of m&e techniques their programs use, specifically in regard to how they assess the progress of their program. the sampled time banks varied in institutional context, ranging from a geriatrics program at a pennsylvanian hospital, to the extension of an ecovillage in california, to a for-profit web venture connected with the sharing economy. interview data was fortified by a literature review of social capital operationalization and time bank impact evaluation, which was used in a logical framework (logframe) analysis. the logframe approach is relevant for time bank project management because it is designed around a theory of change that is then defined using measurable indicators, outputs, and metrics. the following time bank impact assessment model is designed around the theory of change that: “if a time bank program is implemented in a community, then the social capital of that community will change.” 4. impact assessment model the impact assessment model offers a basic framework for measuring social capital as a function of psychological, social, and economic variables that are impacted by a web-based time bank program. it includes data collection instruments, a theoretical framework, and indicators with formulas of analysis. the model is contingent on the assumption that the time bank operates through a web-based platform, and that the population sample consists of active members within the specific program. time bank programs are encouraged to use this model as a foundation for their m&e system and to adapt it to meet the specific contextual needs of its program. for example, a time bank that is housed by a hospital can incorporate metrics about quality of health into the model to evaluate health care impacts correlated with time bank participation. additionally, the model can be used to monitor the effect of time bank participation on individual members’ attitudes, as well as the local economy of the time bank’s network. the model is part of a comprehensive m&e plan, in which a full-time staff gathers and synthesizes data, as well as reports the findings for funding and program development. in the competitive arena of government and donor funding, evidencebased reporting is needed to attract financial investment and to demonstrate returns on an investment. an impact assessment model quantifies the social and economic effects of the time bank, which provides easily digestible information for donors and consilience moyer: an impact assessment model government agencies. in addition to this, information from an impact assessment model can be translated into program milestones, which are relevant to investors as well as participants. a m&e system can also inform the internal management of the time bank, specifically in regards to planning and budget development. 4.1 data collection instruments the impact assessment model provides a means of evaluating incremental progress, as well as annual and long-term impact through qualitative and quantitative metrics. the three data collection instruments are an entry-level (baseline) survey questionnaire, an annual survey questionnaire, and the time bank website’s software package. data from surveys and the website should be collected on a quarterly basis. this recommendation is derived from literature, which found three-month periods to be the most accurate reflection of time bank program activity. this time period accounts for fluctuations due to differential participation, a common trend in voluntary organizational activity (collom, 2012). the survey collects data about the affection and attitudes of participants as psychological metrics of social capital. survey questions measure members’ personal experiences participating in the time bank and how this experience is reflected in concepts such as social cohesion, sense of belonging, trust, and community competency. the questions align with the framework of indicators, which was designed based on the social capital and time bank literature review. a time bank’s web-based platform offers the program an easy-to-use data collection tool that provides the m&e system with a host of metrics. because transactions are coordinated and negotiated through a website, evaluation data is easily generated through the software package. collected data will be used to assess the social capital indicators associated with network size, participation rate, and trust, as well as the economic value created within the time bank community. metrics of social capital augmentation align with the same set of indicators used to analyze survey data. consilience moyer: an impact assessment model 4.2 framework indicators and metrics of analysis were developed based on the three social capital themes outlined in the literature review: community psychology, social networks, and economic development. edgar cahn’s theory of co-production was organized within these categories to draw parallels between the social capital literature and the time bank model. see appendix a for a full table of metrics. figure 3 – time bank impact assessment model framework 4.3 indicators: community psychology & reciprocity figure 4 – community psychology and reciprocity indicators the indicators psychological sense of community and norms of reciprocity were developed from the social capital literature on community psychology, as well as cahn’s theory that reciprocity is helpful. consilience moyer: an impact assessment model 4.3.1 psychological sense of community does the time bank program create a psychological sense of community among its members? do members identify as being part of a collective unit that they share an emotional and social connection with? if so, are there implications that the academic and development community can draw from about egalitarian systems of governance and trade? in general, survey questions for this indicator measure individual member’s perception of how they view themselves as part of the community, how they feel the community views them, and other such metrics of social cohesion. 4.3.2 norms of reciprocity does the time bank create norms of reciprocity among its members through the way it structures and facilitates interactions? survey questions capture data about members’ views on the motivations of fellow community members’ actions. as an institution built on cahn’s theory that reciprocity is beneficial, does participating in an egalitarian system of exchange influence cultural norms beyond the scope of the network? a control group is needed in further research to accurately measure how the presence of a time bank influences the greater community at large. 4.4 indicators: social networks & building community figure 5 – expansion of social network and participation indicators the indicators expansion of social network and participation were developed from the social capital literature on social networks, as well as cahn’s theory that social networks build community. 4.4.1 expansion of social network does the time bank program expand members’ social networks? the indicator primarily examines social networks through quantitative metrics with the assumption that larger time bank networks provide members with greater access to service opportunities. it is necessary to verify this assumption through data analysis about the number and types of services offered within specific time bank networks. consilience moyer: an impact assessment model through this indicator, the time bank network as a whole is analyzed, as well as members’ personal networks of “followers” that are built based on interests, services offered, or geographic location. 4.4.2 participation how does participation in a time bank affect members’ community competency and perspective on their ability to influence community? does the time bank model accomplish cahn’s vision of individuals being co-producers of their own welfare? if community competency is increased, how does it translate into members’ perceptions of their ability and the community’s ability to be agents of change? the indicator uses survey questions to measure levels of community competency, and website analytics to capture the number and frequency of member exchanges. it is necessary to control for time within this indicator category because of differential participation. 4.5 indicators: economic development & redefinition of work and assets the indicators trust and economic value creation were developed from the social capital literature on economic development, as well as cahn’s theories that work has value beyond the market price and that every person is an asset. figure 6 – economic development and redefinition of work and assets indicators 4.5.1 trust does the time bank program increase levels of trust among its members? part of many time bank platforms is reputation-rating systems that ask members to provide feedback on their experience with other members. how does this transparency and provision of information influence transaction decisions and local economic development? are levels of trust higher among time bank members than among members of the general community? consilience moyer: an impact assessment model 4.5.2 economic value does the time bank program generate economic value for participants and the local community? for small programs it is possible to calculate this for every service exchanged within the time bank network. for programs that are larger in size, such as timerepublik’s growing population of 20,000 members, it is recommended to use information about the top twenty services exchanged on the platform, and their associated market value via wage rates to calculate the net financial impact. the two primary metrics for this indicator are market value savings and the economic risk of participation. market value savings is based on the assumption that accessing services through the time bank generates economic value in the form of disposable income. it is assumed that members receive services they would have otherwise purchased in the formal economy. economic risk of participation operationalizes the potential loss of economic return that a member takes on by performing a service within the time bank market, as opposed to the formal market. the calculation is based on the financial compensation that is foregone within the formal market because of participation in the time bank market. it is not a direct loss, however, which would be considered a transfer, because every hour of performed service is compensated by a credit that is worth access to another service; this credit has an economic value. therefore, the economic risk of participation comes in the form of potentially exchanging the credit for a service that has a lower economic value than the service the member contributed. figure 7 – example of economic risk of participation valuation 5. further research and implications the aforementioned impact assessment model was built based on progress in the field of social capital operationalization and research on time bank programs and their software technology. the model provides a tool to capture the surface-level socioeconomic impacts of time banks on local communities through the lens of social capital development. while the model provides a basis for time bank m&e, there are a number of opportunities to strengthen the model by quantifying nonmonetized benefits, such as effects on human capital development, civic lowest  economic  value   consilience moyer: an impact assessment model participation, and municipal budgets. there are also opportunities to advance market research on low-income communities, all of which hold implications for sustainable development. the time bank model has been associated with human capital development because members have the opportunity to exchange skills-learning services, and are able to practice skills within the parallel time bank market. these both contribute to increased readiness to participate in the formal market. knapp (2013) found that there is a 4.5% likelihood of returning to or entering the job market because of time bank participation. this statistic requires further verification across time bank communities, as well as a comparative analysis of the number and types of skillslearning services that are being exchanged within programs. time banks have been cited as positively impacting the social cohesion of local communities (seyfang and longhurst, 2013), which affects local systems of governance because programs organize and reward civic participation. this is reflected in the way that time banks strengthen neighborhood networks, ultimately reducing social isolation and inclining people to see themselves as part of a community and to care about its wellbeing. strengthened networks improve information sharing, which can be used to advertise community events, local forums, and association meetings. enhanced communication channels provide a means to organize collective action to achieve political goals and hold government officials accountable. the various impacts of social cohesion have the potential to generate longterm savings for national and state budgets, as communities become less reliant on the state due to strengthened community networks. social cohesion has been associated with reduced crime and antisocial behavior, as well as increased public safety (knapp et al., 2012). similarly, time banks have been associated with having positive physical and mental health impacts, such as improved self-esteem and confidence, because of reduced social isolation (knapp, 2013; reed, 2008). all of these factors influence state welfare programs, and require advanced operationalization to monitor and monetize this influence. lastly, there is a significant opportunity to use time bank m&e systems to collect data about emerging markets in developing countries. as of now, there is limited information about consumption patterns in low-income communities throughout the world. gathering data about access to resources opens up doors for several fields of interest, including cost-benefit analyses and other such analytical models of assessment. 6. thought-experiment for sustainable development without proper m&e systems, time banks cannot say with certainty the type of effect they have on social capital. based on information from the literature review, though, the time bank model and social capital typology constructs allow for an interesting thought experiment on how a participatory model like time banking can impact a community’s social capital, and what role time banks can play in the sustainable development arena. projects within the sustainable development field seek to improve the conditions of low-income communities by providing access to resources and consilience moyer: an impact assessment model improving a community’s capacity to utilize the resources. rural and urban communities that are targeted by development projects often naturally rely on informal networks to operate and survive. a project that incorporates a time bank model into it can tap into the pre-existing social infrastructure of the village or urban neighborhood, and build upon it. this has the potential to increase the likelihood of community ownership over the project, which increases its success and sustainability. an example of how a time bank could be incorporated into a development initiative is by using the model to compensate community health workers (chw). chws are local community members that deliver basic health care services to rural households as part of a country’s larger health care system. chws serve the community that they live in and are often unpaid, which has been cited as a challenge to the sustainability of the approach (who, 2010). a time bank would provide the chw model with a credit system that would reward and incentivize chw work through access to other services or goods, depending on the model. on a more theoretical level, cahn’s theory of co-production is in line with emerging trends in participatory development practice, in which beneficiaries are active participants in the project’s design and implementation instead of passive beneficiaries. the time bank model invites community members to actively participate in the development of their community, in contrast to merely receiving resources from an external source. this has psychosocial implications for the way a community feels about development assistance, and how a community develops ownership over newly installed wells or hygiene programs. ultimately, participatory methods of development speak to a shift in the power relationship between development agencies and communities, as communities are more accurately being seen as having equal stake. lastly, it can be said that a time bank is a system that formalizes informal networks of local community support, which implies that the program develops beneficial features of both bonding and bridging social capital ties. time banks use trust (based on a reputation rating system) as the currency with which members exchange services. using this type of community-specific trust as a mechanism for economic activity is a hallmark feature of bonding ties that are common within informal networks. on the other hand, online time banks offer a means for intercommunity relations in that they connect diverse groups of people with one another, which is typical for formal networks with bridging ties. in this way, time banks offer a model that taps into the positive aspects of both informal and formal network typologies, actualizing the potential of local community support through structure and organization. 7. limitations the model design was based on metrics and indicators used in sociological, community psychology; social network analysis; and development research studies that hold academic credibility, but it is the first of its kind to evaluate a time banking model specifically. this has to do with the traditionally small-scale, community-based nature of time banks, in which programs often lack certain formalities, such as m&e systems. this is a limitation to the model’s design, as there was limited literature to compare the model to. consilience moyer: an impact assessment model along with this, the model is conservative in the extent to which it can generate accurate estimates of economic value creation, indicated by the “further research” section. because time banks are built on cahn’s theory of work having a value beyond market estimates, challenges arose when applying formal economic models of financial valuation to time bank activity. for instance, the economic risk of participation metric in the economic value creation indicator provides a safe estimate of the 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(2013). valuing social capital by the resources people allocate to one another: valuing social capital. journal of international development, 25(5), 609–625. doi:10.100 consilience moyer: an impact assessment model appendix a: indicator table with metrics social capital time bank (tb) indicator metric instrument answer format/formula of analysis community psychology reciprocity is beneficial psychological sense of community “ i feel a strong sense of community within my neighborhood.”/”i feel a strong sense of community within tb.” survey 5-point likert scale “people in my neighborhood respect me.”/ “people in tb respect me.” survey 5-point likert scale “i am an important part of my neighborhood community.”/”i am an important part of the tb community.” survey 5-point likert scale norms of reciprocity “would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?”/”would you say that most people in tb try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?” survey multiple choice “in the past month have you helped a stranger or someone you didn’t know who needed help?”/”since joining tb, in the past month have you helped a stranger or someone you didn’t know who needed help outside of the tb network?” survey multiple choice account balance: ratio of the total number of hours spent to the total number of hours earned within the network. website analytics f(reciprocity)=h_spent⁄h_earned social networks social networks build community expansion of social network “in the past month, how many new people have you met?” /”what percentage of your tb contacts did you meet for the first time through tb?” survey multiple choice annual growth rate of tb member population website analytics f(growth rate)=(p_present p_past)/p_past total number of active members in the tb network website analytics software data average size of personal member networks website analytics f(personal contacts) = (σsamples' personal contacts)/(sample size) number of different types of services offered by tb members website analytics software data participation “i can improve the conditions of my neighborhood.” /”through tb i can improve the conditions of my neighborhood.” survey 5-point likert scale “the community can solve its own problems.”/”through tb i can solve problems that arise in my survey 5-point likert scale consilience moyer: an impact assessment model community.” total number of hours exchanged (earned and spent) between tb members website analytics software data average number of hours exchanged per member website analytics f(frequency of exchanges) = h_total/p_total frequency of exchanges (earned and spent) between tb members website analytics f(frequency of exchanges)=(h_total/p_total) /(time frame) economic development every person is an asset & redefining the value of work trust “i trust people in this neighborhood.”/”i trust people who i interact with through tb.” survey 5-point likert scale percent of tb members that received an average reputation rating of 4 stars or more in all categories: “punctuality,” “communication,” and “quality.” website analytics f(reputation)= p_reputation/p_total economic value market value of service exchange website analytics marginal: f(market value)=h(s_1) × w (s_1) = v(s_1) aggregate: f(market value)=σ[v(s_1), v(s_2)…v(s_20 )] economic risk of service exchange website analytics marginal: f(risk) = [w(s_1) w(s_min)] × h(s_1) = r(s_1) aggregate: f(risk)= [r(s_1), r(s_2), ...r(s_20)] net economic benefit website analytics f(net)=f(market value) f(risk) consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 7, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 1–16 waste not, want not: how utilities can help consumers save energy frank hemmes institute for environmental studies vrije universiteit amsterdam, the netherlands hemmes.f@gmail.com elissaios papyrakis 1. institute for environmental studies, vrije universiteit amsterdam, the netherlands 2. school of international development, university of east anglia, norwich, uk elissaios.papyrakis@ivm.vu.nl pieter van beukering institute for environmental studies vrije universiteit amsterdam, the netherlands pieter.van.beukering@ivm.vu.nl academic abstract residential energy use constitutes a large part of global energy demand and consequent greenhouse gas emissions. much research in many different fields, including behavioral sciences, economics and sociology, has been carried out to understand and possibly influence domestic energy consumption patterns. in this paper we conduct a field experiment of an online application, jointly developed with dutch energy utility greenchoice. during one month, a sample of customers was requested to record and submit the readouts of their electricity meter. these readouts were then converted to easily comprehensible information that was fed back to the customer. performance was also compared to a control group which did not receive any feedback and served as a baseline. the results suggest that feedback through the web application does indeed increase perceived consumer awareness and reduces electricity consumption. experimental groups consumed on average 6-7 percentagepoints less electricity compared to the control group. public abstract energy consumption by households plays an important part in the creation of greenhouse gasses and thus contributes to climate change. decreasing this consumption can thus help to reduce emissions. in this article, we look at means to assist consumers in controlling their energy use, by giving them customized feedback on their electricity meter readouts. during a one-month test, customers of dutch energy utility greenchoice could upload their electricity meter readouts and receive information to monitor their consumption. feedback on consumption is thought to stimulate consumers to use less energy. the results of the experiment support this theory, as participating customers consumed 6-7 percentage points less electricity compared to non-participants. authors’ note frank hemmes holds an msc in environmental and resource management at the institute for environmental studies at the vrije universiteit amsterdam in the netherlands. elissaios papyrakis is a senior researcher in this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 30 dec 2020 16:13:22 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 2 consilience environmental economics at the institute for environmental studies at the vu university, amsterdam in the netherlands and an assistant professor in economics at the school of international development at the university of east anglia in the uk. pieter van beukering is an associate professor in environmental economics at the institute for environmental studies at the vu university, amsterdam in the netherlands. we wish to thank jasper gremmen and ron huizer, as well as greenchoice more broadly, for providing support and hosting the experiment. keywords: residential energy consumption, consumer behavior, online feedback 1. introduction reducing residential energy consumption has been on policy agendas since the late 1970s (geller et al. 2006; socolow 1978). consumers exert substantial influence on global energy consumption through daily behavior and consumption patterns (abrahamse et al. 2007), and evidence shows households are responsible for a large percentage of energy consumption (levine et al. 2007). changes in consumer behavior can thus have an impact on the entire production chain, making them an ideal starting point for energy reduction initiatives. this also justifies continued research into means of influencing consumer behavior toward increased energy efficiency. this paper falls into the field of research examining potential stimulants of energy efficient behavior, placing an emphasis on potential synergies between scientific research and commercial development. jointly with greenchoice – a 100% 'green' dutch energy utility with about 300,000 customers – the authors developed an online application that monitors daily residential electricity consumption. a sample of customers was asked to monitor their electricity use for one month, with the implicit aim of reducing their consumption. the purpose of this exercise was to investigate whether the developed online application helped customers to save energy, as well as to evaluate how individuals valued this new addition to the online services greenchoice already offered before the experiment. to assess whether an online feedback tool could assist greenchoice customers in saving energy, four subquestions were posed: 1. does feedback encourage customers to reduce energy use? 2. can weekly reminders stimulate customers to participate more actively in the program? 3. do practical suggestions help consumers translate their insight into consumption reduction? 4. does the form and presentation of a savings tool influence its effectiveness? in this paper, we contribute to this strand of the literature in a novel way, not only by evaluating whether such online feedback applications stimulate energy-saving behavior, but also by investigating whether the user-friendliness of such applications plays a role. furthermore, this is the first time that such an experiment with self-reporting customers on energy consumption has been conducted in the netherlands. finally, our findings suggest that such online feedback tools can have a direct application in a commercial context, taking the implications of our research beyond the academic realm. section 2 provides an overview of the literature and discusses current models that explain environmentally friendly consumer behavior. section 3 describes the design and methodology of our experiment. section 4 discusses the key findings and section 5 outlines our conclusion. this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 30 dec 2020 16:13:22 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience hemmes: waste not, want not 2. review of the literature since the oil shocks of the 1970s, residential energy consumption has been the target of myriad efforts aiming to control and reduce energy use. beginning in the 1980s, concerns about the adverse environmental effects of energy production have also become an increasingly important driver (poortinga et al. 2003). global residential energy consumption accounts for roughly 7% of greenhouse gas emissions directly and 13% indirectly through electricity generation in power stations (levine et al. 2007a). for example, in 2007 global residential and commercial buildings emissions amounted to over 8gt of co2eq (levine et al. 2007a). dutch domestic energy consumption composes 17% of total national consumption, divided evenly between direct and indirect consumption (abrahamse et al. 2007, reinders et al. 2003). looking forward, the dutch government has formulated ambitious targets for energy reductions through efficiency-promoting schemes, with savings in commercial and residential sectors constituting about 40% of prospective emission reductions by 2020 (minbzk 2011; harmelink et al. 2010). energy consumption can be reduced by either changing behavior or replacing inefficient devices (görts & jonkers 2000; poortinga et al. 2003). investments in technical replacements tend to result in relatively high energy and monetary savings, but are inhibited by high upfront costs and confusing payback times (tietenberg 2009; faiers et al. 2007), and are often affected by a rebound effect (i.e. energy/monetary savings in one area can be offset by additional energy use elsewhere, see berkhout et al. 2007). therefore, some technical measures are often not adopted even though they are economically rational (jaffe & stavins 1994). encouraging environmentally responsible behavior (abrahamse et al. 2007; de young 2000) is another energy-saving strategy – and one less susceptible to the rebound effect – but often with smaller gains than technical solutions (abrahamse et al. 2007; matthies 2005; de young 2000). a change to environmentally responsible behavior often needs to be triggered by some external intervention. consumers often have to be encouraged to re-evaluate their behavior such that they will adopt new behavioral norms that require further motivation, capacity, and information (fischer 2008; matthies 2005; de young 2000). the extent of behavioral adjustment depends on whether behavior is conscious or habitual. most environmentally relevant behavior is often habitual and so minimizes the time and effort required for constant conscious decisionmaking, see stern 2000, matthies 2005). this is especially true for energy consumption, which is rarely consciously evaluated because of the omnipresent and homogeneous character of electricity. since electricity is not used directly as a resource, but only through use of appliances, it remains largely invisible to the consumer (fischer 2008; kempton & layne 1994). there is no observable diminishing stock, nor are there many easy methods to directly attribute energy consumption to different types of electricity use (kempton & layne 1994). except for a non-itemized and infrequent bill, most consumers are not exposed to more detailed or disaggregated information that encourages and helps them to save energy (van raaij & verhallen 1983). this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 30 dec 2020 16:13:22 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 4 consilience information is necessary to make consumers aware of their current use, link their behavior and consumption, and reduce electricity usage (matthies 2005; van raaij & verhallen 1983). more frequent feedback on electricity use is one way of increasing awareness and presenting consumers with the option of adapting their behavior (fischer 2008). customers can recognize that their current behavior is causally connected to the suboptimal situation of high energy use (matthies 2005; stern 2000), following which reasonable, alternative consumption choices that produce better results should be presented (steg 2008; lindenberg & steg 2007; matthies 2005). feedback can inform consumers as to whether an alteration in behavior has yielded the expected results, creating a sense of control and ownership over the problem (darby 2001). several models have been advanced to explain the interplay between feedback and behavior, some focusing on (economic) stimuli and others on social context, pro-environmental attitudes, or norms (lindenberg & steg 2007; parnell & popovic larsen 2005; de young 2000). matthies (2005) has combined many of these factors into a heuristic model of norm activation, shown in figure 1. norm activation models acknowledge that in order to sustain pro-environmental behavior, consumers need to be motivated by normative reasons instead of incentives (lindenberg & steg 2007; matthies 2005) to prevent reversal to the original behavior upon removal of the latter (de young 2000). norms are considered essential in sustaining new pro-environmental behavior until this becomes routine (lindenberg & steg 2007). figure 1: matthies' model of norm activation. authors‟ interpretation. 3. experiment methodology this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 30 dec 2020 16:13:22 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience hemmes: waste not, want not central to the experiment was the joint development of a new web application with the dutch energy utility greenchoice, which converted users' readings of their electricity meters into daily consumption values. customers provided their meter readings between may 31st and june 30th 2011. voluntary daily reporting was encouraged, and for longer intervals the consumption was averaged for the intermediate period. the results were displayed in a histogram showing bars with kwh/day values. an example display is shown in figure 2. “actual” consumption was compared against “expected” consumption, which was the daily average over the previous year, and “target” consumption, which was 90% of expected consumption. this target was established to show that goal setting can stimulate additional savings, provided the target is neither too ambitious nor too trivial (wood & newborough 2007; mccallen & midden 2002; houwelingen & van raaij 1989; becker 1978). 3.1 design the sample was randomly divided into three groups, depending on the type of information they received (see table 1). experiment group 1 (“basic”) received only feedback on electricity consumption. experiment group 2 (“motivated”) received both feedback and reminders. experiment group 3 (“assisted”) was exposed to all three types of information: feedback, reminders, and suggestions. suggestions on energy savings were categorized into four themes, one for each week of the trial: i.e. general knowledge, large appliances, small appliances and standby/silent consumption – the sequence corresponding with the „folk logic‟ that larger appliances are larger consumers of energy (schuitema & steg 2005). a fourth group was established as a control, creating a baseline based on two measurements at the beginning and end of the trial period. differences in performance across the various groups were used to measure the effect of the different types of information (feedback, reminders, suggestions). group 1: basic group 2: motivated group 3: assisted feedback reminders suggestions table 1: characterization of the three experimental groups 3.2 sampling only customers that met a number of criteria were eligible for participation. first, in order to compute a representative historical reference level, participants should neither have moved residences over the past year or during the trial, nor have had major changes to the number of people in the household. second, having access to the internet and being present in the residence during the experiment were also required. third, to ensure sufficient consumption during the experiment, average use in the previous year had to be between 4,000 and 10,000 kwh (less consumption would suffer from inaccuracies due to approximations in the tool, whereas 10k+ consumption is likely to be commercial rather than residential). this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 30 dec 2020 16:13:22 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 6 consilience figure 2: example of the feedback tool. dark blue bars indicate measured use. light blue bars indicate expected use. the green horizontal line represents the saving target. below the graph, detailed feedback on consumption is provided (translated from dutch). using the above criteria, 4,500 customers out of 40,774 eligible candidates were invited. with a response rate of 8%, this resulted in three groups of approximately 120 participants each, balancing demands for statistical rigor with the resources needed to respond to assistance requests. for the control group, 1,000 different customers received an invitation. no incentives to participate were offered. applicants were informed that their feedback would be used to review and improve the new application before deployment. a total of 409 customers signed up for the trial, out of which 320 actually completed the entry survey. this left 104 subjects in group 1, 107 in group 2 and 109 in group 3. for the control group, 143 customers initially signed up, of whom 94 completed the entry survey (see below). the experiment generated three data sources, a copy of the database with meter readouts and responses to two surveys, conducted before and after the trial. this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 30 dec 2020 16:13:22 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience hemmes: waste not, want not 3.3 entry survey the entry survey was used to obtain limited background information on the participants, score their attitude towards a number of motivators, and gauge their expectations and willingness to participate. providing personal information was voluntary for privacy reasons and confined to household net income, education level, house type, and household size. respondents were also asked to indicate the value they placed on environmental, financial, and energy security concerns. all scoring questions were asked using a 5-point likert scale, a psychometric scale commonly used in questionnaires (likert 1932). 3.4 exit survey the exit survey was used to collect the evaluations and experiences of all subjects. it tested a range of topics, such as the experienced level of effort of participants, the perceived usefulness of various means of feedback, and the perceived added value of potential features that were not included in the experiment. 4. data analysis & results analysis of the data required converting data sources into compatible formats and extracting relevant values. total consumption and a daily average per customer were computed using the raw meter values. dividing daily average use by the expected average consumption yielded the variable performance score, with values below 1 corresponding to lower consumption compared to customer's average. the total number of entries and the day of the last entry by a participant (end day) were selected as proxies for a customer's participation rate. records with fewer than two pairs of meter readings did not allow for computation of performance scores and were removed, resulting in a lower number of nominal participants. a more stringent criterion of participation was used to identify real participants as those who had engaged for at least 75% of the trial period, since this would allow for feedback to have an effect on energy use. a higher threshold (e.g. 100%) was rejected because active participants that did not necessarily make their final entry on the last day might then be excluded. the numbers of remaining records for each group meeting these criteria can be found in table 2. note that initial participants are those who decided to participate in the experiment from the beginning – day 0 – irrespective of whether they completed the entry survey. the loss (attrition) rates were calculated using the following formulas: attrition(gross) = (initial – real) / real attrition(net) = (nominal – real) / nominal initial nominal real gross loss rate net loss rate group 1. basic 132 70 57 57% 19% group 2. motivated 135 84 62 54% 26% group 3: assisted 129 82 64 50% 22% table 2: participation rates for the three experimental groups this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 30 dec 2020 16:13:22 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 8 consilience the number of participants over the duration of the experiment is shown in figure 3, with day 0 giving the total number of initial enrollments. note that the figures do not display the number of entries made on a particular day, but rather the number of participants who had not yet contributed their final entry of meter readings. while only 33% of participants submitted a value on the final day compared to day 1, about 70% adhered to the criterion for real participation. 4.1 statistical analysis hypothesis 1: does energy consumption feedback increase awareness and energy-saving behavior? as shown in table 3, for statistical tests on performance score, only real participants were considered and suspicious outliers were excluded using spss filters. filter a excluded customers with performance scores outside a 30% to 250% interval. this interval was chosen because such larger or smaller consumption suggested either changes in the household or self-generation of electricity, which disqualified the record. filter b used the same interval as a, but only included real participants. no filter filter a filter b means: experiment; control 0.731; 0.917 0.778 ; 0.848 0.785 ; 0.848 difference 0.187 0.070 0.063 t-value 3.542 2.678 2.277 significance (equal s) 0.000 0.008 0.024 significance (unequal s) 0.010 0.039 0.063 figure 3. evolution of the number of remaining participants over time. the different colors correspond to the different groups, whereas the survival rate indicates which percentage of nominal participants still remained. participants 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 day number r e m a in in g s u b je c ts 0,0% 10,0% 20,0% 30,0% 40,0% 50,0% 60,0% 70,0% 80,0% 90,0% 100,0% p e rc e n ta g e s u rv iv o rs group 1 group 2 group 3 survival rate this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 30 dec 2020 16:13:22 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience hemmes: waste not, want not table 3: results of an independent sample t-test for filters a & b and without filter. values assume equal variances. independent sample t-tests using both filters were performed to check whether the performance scores of the experimental groups differed significantly from the control group. the difference was of a magnitude of 7 and 6.3% points when applying filters a and b respectively. results are displayed in table 3, with higher t-values denoting more significant results. levene's test was included as a standard to determine whether the variances of both samples (the combined experimental groups and the control group) were equal or unequal, as different distribution of values around the two means diminishes the power of a t-test. with both filters, the variances proved unequal at a level of 0.01 and 0.05 significance for filter a and b respectively. however, even with unequal variances, the results in both cases are still significant, as can be seen from table 3. this suggests that the experimental groups used on average 6-7% less energy than the control group. to measure a change of „awareness‟, customer satisfaction with regard to learning effects of participation was used as a proxy. about 60% of participants reported to be satisfied with what they had learned from participating. only 14% was dissatisfied. this result can also be seen in figure 4 and emerged despite the fact that more than 50% of participants indicated their energy consumption was as they had expected. figure 4: overview of satisfaction among participants about the knowledge they obtained. hypotheses 2 & 3: can energy-saving behavior be actively encouraged with the use of reminders and suggestions? no clear differences across the three experimental groups emerged from the data. applying filter b a one-way anova found no difference across the groups. means on performance across groups 1, 2, and 3 were found at 0.766, 0.803, and 0.783, respectively, with motivated and assisted groups actually performing relatively worse compared to the basic group. although the difference was not statistically significant, a possible explanation could be that unmotivated participants lasted longer in the motivated and stimulated groups, i am satisfied with what i learned during the trial 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 strongly disagree disagree neutral agree strongly agree n u m b e r o f a n s w e rs this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 30 dec 2020 16:13:22 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 10 consilience depressing performance relative to group 1. this explanation is supported by the participation proxies in figure 3, which show that group 1 lost most participants at the start of the trial, whereas the other groups did so towards the end. qualitative responses from participants themselves support the presumed limited impact of reminders and suggestions: suggestions and reminders did not receive strong approval from the participants. nevertheless, as can be seen from figure 5, reminders were associated with increased participation on the days that they were sent. hypothesis 4: does user-friendliness affect performance? in the exit survey, participants rated the functionality and usability of the web application at a 1-5 likert scale, while also indicating their possible fatigue with participating. ratings applied to individual elements and factors of the page and experiment. the results of these individual responses were aggregated into three overall variables: aggregate effort, usability and appreciation. aggregated effort was the main measure of how fatiguing a customer experienced the trial. usability expressed how easy customers found it to navigate the website, submit their results and interpret the resulting feedback. appreciation was an indicator derived from scores customers gave for the utility of specific pieces of information. the effort of recording the meter values, readout effort, was also tested individually because it proved to be the most important contributor to the variable aggregate effort. all variables were compared against performance score, number of entries and end day using pearson tests, which measure the extent to which two independent variables are linearly correlated. the results can be found in table 4. figure 5: total number of submitted meter values per day. the orange dashed lines indicate the days on which reminders were sent to groups 2 & 3. table 4 shows that the participation indicators (number of entries and end day) are most strongly negatively influenced by the effort experienced by the customer, since both aggregated effort and readout effort have correlation coefficients of over 0.6 with the number of entries. the negative entries per day 0 50 100 150 200 250 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 day number n u m b e r o f e n tr ie s this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 30 dec 2020 16:13:22 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience hemmes: waste not, want not sign expresses that for increased effort, the total number of submitted values decreases. user-friendliness on the other hand positively influenced participation, though less strongly than the negative effect of fatigue. appreciation of the online application appears to be strongly correlated with the number of entries of participants. none of the variables appear to be correlated with performance score, indicating that user-friendliness contributes to the rate of participation but does not necessarily encourage consumers to save more energy. performance score number of entries end day aggregated effort .-0.100 -0.636** 0.263** readout effort -0.048 -0.621** -0.228* usability 0.078 0.271** 0.210** appreciation -0.082 0.226* 0.127 table 4: correlation coefficients (pearson) between respondent indicators and performance and participation proxies. ** and * denote significance level at 1% and 5%, respectively. the conclusion from table 4 is that the perceived effort required to participate is the main determinant in both the frequency and duration of submitting meter values, with higher perceived effort leading to lower rates of participation. on the other hand, participation is encouraged by a user-friendly website, though this effect is less pronounced than the negative influence of fatigue. the actual level of savings realized by customers seemed to be independent of both the required effort and user-friendliness of the website. although these results appear to confirm the hypothesis, they nevertheless need to be interpreted with some caution. results were based on a smaller number of participants with a possible bias towards more motivated and successful customers. the high correlation between appreciation and performance score may, for example, reflect that some participants appreciated the application more because of their good performance. second, although participants generally responded that the target (90% less energy compared to previous year) was useful either as a reference level or motivator, future research should experiment with different target levels. moreover, future research should also pay more attention to the impact of potential seasonal variations in domestic electricity use. due to the short period of our experiment, seasonal impact could not be considered. 5. conclusion the results suggest that feedback through web applications does indeed increase perceived consumer awareness and reduces electricity consumption. experimental groups scored an average much lower in terms of energy savings compared to the control group. customers were also satisfied with what they had learned from participating in the experiment, implying that their awareness of electricity consumption had increased. 5.1 implications for further research the experiment makes a significant contribution to the understanding of feedback use for energy-saving across dutch consumers. a similar experiment, requiring self-metering and converting raw data into useful feedback, had not been performed in the netherlands before. it contributes to the growing this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 30 dec 2020 16:13:22 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 12 consilience literature on preferences and energy consuming behavior of households. the experiment shows that even during a relatively short period, a substantial reduction in energy consumption is feasible. further experiments could be done over longer periods of time and in other seasons, to determine whether differences in performance become more pronounced. finally, the form and presentation of the feedback also exerted an influence on the participation rate of customers. the design of the website, its user-friendliness, and functionality of the different elements of the application all contributed to participants' motivation to continue with the trial. the perceived effort and fatigue of customers strongly influences their motivation. these results suggest that to encourage participation, the presentation and functionality of a tool need to be as carefully chosen as the method itself. future research may hence try to quantify the extent to which energy saving is attributed to goalsetting and feedback or the way information is presented. other recommendations concern the sample size and composition. in this experiment, participants were volunteers, drawn from customers of a sustainable energy utility delivering only electricity from renewable sources. the participants may hence not be representative of the average dutch household and were probably already more motivated and knowledgeable than the average consumer. the authors plan to run similar experiments with more representative samples in the future, possibly employing smart-meters to avoid self-selecting biases. furthermore, future research should attempt to increase the sample size, which was kept relatively low in our experiment due to limits in resources and manpower. 5.2 implications for policy makers and utilities two additional concrete conclusions can be drawn from this research. first is that investing in 'smart' technologies is not the only method to reduce energy consumption by households. second, the user-friendliness of energy saving tools should be given more emphasis. recently, there has been a trend by governments and utilities alike to invest in so-called 'smart meters' to assist consumers in reducing their energy consumption. however, it will certainly be a number of years before such meters are widely deployed. it would be a waste to neglect the savings potential that exists among consumers with more traditional metering equipment. this experiment has shown that consumers are willing to invest of time and effort to save energy. the tool used in this experiment was relatively simple and easy to develop. especially energy companies, but also (local) governments should consider investing in more 'do-it-yourself' methods for energy saving, since the majority of consumers will not be equipped with a smart meter in the near future. evidence from our research suggests that the energy feedback tools should also be carefully designed to improve their user-friendliness. previously, most attention has been on the method for reducing energy, rather than the means of presentation. though more research might be necessary in this area, organizations developing energy saving tools might consider asking feedback from their customers. during this experiment, customers proved to be highly motivated to give their views on the feedback tool and its efficiency. finally, a slightly more conjectural recommendation can be made. that is that in designing energy saving tools, utilities or governments might take into this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 30 dec 2020 16:13:22 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience hemmes: waste not, want not account the sense of ownership of energy consumers over their utilities. while this effect was not explicitly quantified as part of the experiment, it appeared that the active involvement of customers increased their motivation to a certain extent. this related to both the communication between the utility and the participants, as well as participants' effort to collect their own meter readouts. of course, excessive demands on customers could become fatiguing rather than motivating. however, this trial does suggest that customers might prefer being asked to invest a modicum of time and effort rather than being treated as passive consumers of feedback information. with the trend towards more automated systems, this might be an effect worthy of some consideration. this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 30 dec 2020 16:13:22 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 14 consilience bibliography abrahamse, w., steg, l.., vlek, c. & rothengatter, t. 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(2007). energy-use information transfer for intelligent homes: enabling energy conservation with central and local displays. energy and buildings 39: 495 – 503. this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 30 dec 2020 16:13:22 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms microsoft word 6 typ 6670-article text-11863-1-2-20200711 consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 23, 2021, pp. 59-64.  abstract this paper explores policy options aimed at the mitigation of methane emissions produced as a byproduct of enteric fermentation in ruminant animals. through a comparative analysis of government policies utilized in europe, australia, and new zealand, this paper explores options for implementation within the united states. after focusing on the extensive subsidies received by the agriculture sector in the united states, this paper concludes that requiring farms and corporations to meet mitigation standards in exchange for subsidies is plausible and has worked in other, comparable foreign industries. author’s note farming and raising livestock is not an abstract concept for me. growing up in rural missouri and attending the university of nebraska has presented me with countless opportunities to personally interact with agriculture. i understand the impact and importance of the united states’ agricultural sector, and have become interested in researching ways in which agriculture can become cleaner and safer for our climate while still maintaining the level of production and profitability necessary for our world. the global community must make significant changes in the near future if we hope to salvage the climate that we have long taken for granted. i believe this paper provides a unique and relevant approach regarding how the united states can begin making small, yet meaningful, changes on the journey toward a more sustainable industry. © 2021 patrick baker. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution license (cc-by 4.0), which permits the user to copy, distribute, and transmit the work provided that the original author(s) and source are credited. patrick baker is with the university of nebraska-lincoln, 1400 r st, lincoln, ne 68588 usa (email: patrickwbaker1@gmail.com). i. introduction scientific consensus on the issue of climate change solidifies the belief that anthropogenic activities are responsible for the earth’s changing climate. various sectors of industrial life (commercial, transportation, agriculture, residential, energy) have been identified as the main emitters of harmful pollutants that are trapped within the atmosphere and warm our planet. methane (ch4) gas accounted for 10% of all united states emissions in 2018, with nearly 28% of methane emissions coming solely from enteric fermentation in the agriculture sector (epa, 2020). according to the united nations, methane’s qualification as a short-lived pollutant shows that a reduction of enteric methane can mitigate climate change within a lifetime (fao, 2017). currently, there are limited government policies or subsidies available for research on enteric emissions reduction within the united states. this paper will analyze comparative policies from european and oceanic states, specifically focusing on subsidization programs in each country and the feasibility of implementing similar programs in the united states. ii. livestock and agriculture emissions the agriculture sector has established itself as the foundation of economic and supply chain systems around the world. according to the united nations, over 60% (4.6 billion) of earth’s human population is reliant upon agriculture for survival (fao, 2013). in developing countries, this dependence has been exacerbated by practices that prioritize successful yields, while government subsidization and the reduction of enteric emissions in the united states is implementing a policy of national enteric emissions standards a feasible national policy option to reduce methane emissions in the united states? patrick baker consilience: the journal of sustainable development baker: government subsidization developed countries with diversified industrial sectors are slightly less reliant on agriculture economically. although dependence on agriculture as an occupation is not a prevalent occurrence, worldwide supply chains have created interdependence between developed countries’ agriculture sectors that, in turn, feed the vast majority of the world. this massive web of agriculture supply chain creates a damaging byproduct of harmful greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions that are catalyzing the climate change process. due to the multi-step process that is required to move food from farm to table, as well as the various cross-sector collaborations between the transportation, agriculture, and energy sectors, exact measurements of agriculture emissions can be difficult to calculate. estimates currently maintain that agriculture is responsible for between 8-12% of global ghg emissions (c2es, 2019). the agriculture sector, however, is vast and comprised of various sub-sectors (crop, livestock, grasses). they produce different emissions, the majority of which are methane and nitrous oxide from livestock and crop practices, respectively (russell, 2014). livestock plays a large role in both the economic and emissions sides of the agriculture industry. meat, milk, and eggs comprise more than 34% of the world’s protein intake, and provide income and food-security to billions of people (russell, 2014). that reliance, albeit beneficial, creates harmful emissions. similar to the agricultural sector, the sub-categories of emissions produced by livestock-raising practices are numerous. manure management and enteric fermentation are currently the two largest methane emitters in the livestock industry (key & tallard, 2012). the majority of gas produced is methane, which is disproportionately released via the process of enteric fermentation—a natural digestive process in ruminant animals such as cows, goats, and sheep. enteric fermentation accounts for over 44% of livestock emissions and nearly 88% of the methane produced by livestock (fao, n.d.). iii. reducing livestock methane emissions current research provides farmers, policymakers, and scientists with a variety of ways to reduce enteric emissions. the most promising and effective technique remains altering feed ingredients and introducing engineered additives that assist in the digestive process. a change in feed ingredients to produce a more fibrous and carbohydrate-rich feed has the ability to lower microbial populations in the rumen and therefore decrease methane emissions (jones, 2014). increased foraging and corn-based feed, as opposed to hay, has shown reductions in microbial production, therefore reducing methane emissions (jones, 2014). multiple private companies, scientific research institutions, and universities are working to develop a feed additive that reduces emissions and sustains necessary nutrients for the animals. dsm, a health and wellness company headquartered in the netherlands, has created bovaer, a feed additive that promises to reduce enteric methane emissions by 30% (dsm, n.d.). dsm claims that the daily addition of one quarter teaspoon of bovaer into a ruminant animal’s feed will immediately begin to reduce ch4 emissions (dsm, n.d.). this additive has no effect on the animal’s health or the safety of human consumption, making it a promising step towards emissions reduction. in a university of california research project, researchers found that adding seaweed into cattle’s daily feed has similar emissions reducing effects as those of the bovaer additive. the addition of seaweed actively impedes methane-producing enzymes from developing in a ruminant’s stomach (kennedy, 2018). researchers involved in the project claim that breathalyzing tests prove that emissions reduction is nearly immediate, with substantial reductions being seen in less than twenty-four hours (kennedy, 2018). similarly to bovaer, the seaweed has been proven to not affect the taste of the cow’s milk. genetically engineering and modifying the enzymes in a ruminant’s stomach provides a third methane reduction option. new zealand scientists have developed a vaccine that targets the methane-producing microbes in the rumen in an effort to alter the byproduct process (watts, 2019). vaccination and removal of these methanogens is currently in early stage testing. if successful, however, this technique could provide farmers with a safe and environmentally friendly option for methane reduction. iv. linking government and scientific interests with the effects of climate change poised to impact countries across the entire globe, government leaders have called upon policymakers to regulate emissions in order to slow rising temperatures and mitigate the 61 consilience: the journal of sustainable development forthcoming impacts. policy solutions have targeted methane emissions, and an increase in research and public knowledge on the methane byproduct of animal production will likely only further intensify calls to regulate the ruminant industry. governmental policy options are only feasible when both farming and economic production are not harmed. currently, two policy options have been researched as economically feasible and scientifically effective: taxation and subsidization. specific programming examples implemented in european and oceanic states that prove the potential for these policy methods to be implemented in the united states will be explored in further sections. the taxation of beef is currently touted as an effective policy option that naturally balances the economic market while decreasing methane emissions produced by cattle. studies on the effectiveness of variables to tax (emissions, beef output) are in general agreement that the taxation of head of cattle provides the most market friendly option (bonnet et al., 2016). taxing farmers for each head of cattle will, in turn naturally raise the price of beef for consumers. this will likely reduce the demand, which will lead to less heads of cattle being raised. as a result, less methane will be produced via enteric fermentation in cattle. a beef tax requires little operational and technical change from farmers and producers compared with the methane mitigation options (vaccination, altering feed) offered in the previous section. taxation, however, is notorious for being politically difficult to win support, so a beef tax has yet to be successfully implemented anywhere in the world. subsidization, on the other hand, is a policy tool that requires less political finesse in implementation and has current precedence for success around the world. subsidies are utilized by governments worldwide to monetarily support businesses or industries in order to maintain competitive market prices on goods. subsidies tied to the relationship between livestock and emissions are best described by two categories: abatement and abatement technology (gerber et al., 2010). abatement subsidies reward farmers based on emissions reduction compared with a pre-determined standard. in this model, subsidy amounts will often vary. technological abatement, on the other hand, offers subsidies correlating to technology that produces less, or mitigates, emissions. for example, a subsidy may be offered to a farmer who uses a feed additive that is proven to produce fewer emissions through enteric fermentation. v. successful policy initiatives: a comparative policy study the prevalence of subsidies in capitalistic market structures provides support for the implementation of an enteric emissions-reducing subsidization plan in the united states. the european union is the first presented case study. in response to climate change, the european union launched multiple programs aimed at reducing emissions across all industries in europe, including the common agriculture policy (cap), which focused on cutting non-co2 emissions from across the eu’s agriculture sector (european commission, n.d.-b). cap balances funding and projects between both mitigation and adaptation efforts. in working to understand the shift in farming practices and alter the means of production that farmers will have to endure, the cap program offers subsidies to producers that partake in environmentally friendly farming practices (european commission, n.d.-a). this program would be categorized under the “abatement technology subsidy” presented in the previous section. subsidies offered through the cap are available to rural, landowning farmers who produce high-demand crops, maintain necessary sinks and forestry, and are compliant with environmental regulation (delayen, 2007). for example, the eu boasted an impressive 22% reduction in agricultural emissions from 1990-2012 (matthews, 2020). the cap has played a major role in this reduction, and new reforms that further improve the efficiency of the subsidies provide exciting prospects to agriculture subsidization programs in europe. a key component of cap is its focus on rural development. nearly one-third of europe’s land is categorized as “rural,” a substantial amount of which is utilized for agricultural practices (european commission, 2020). the rural development program distributes funds to rural landowners and farmers that meet a comprehensive standards requirement. for example, the program offered an abatement technology subsidy to a pepper farm in hungary that utilizes only renewable energy (european commission, n.d.-c). similarly, australia and new zealand have formulated comprehensive agriculture policies aimed at reducing emissions. each, individually, has extensive consilience: the journal of sustainable development baker: government subsidization agricultural emissions mitigation goals that have the ability to have industry-wide impacts. what distinguishes the two countries with regard to agriculture and methane emissions are their plans and successes in reducing enteric methane emissions while maintaining solid economic growth and cattle yields. agriculture plays a major role in new zealand’s economy. in 2015, approximately 5% of the country’s gdp was comprised by the agriculture sector, and nearly $30 billion was accumulated by the country just in agriculture exports (environment foundation, 2018). methane released through the process of enteric fermentation in cows and sheep accounts for nearly onethird of the country’s ghg emissions per year (roy, 2019). the reliance on new zealand’s agriculture sector for economic stability requires a fluid emissions plan that will mitigate any harmful economic impact. unlike cap, new zealand has created a top-down approach. whereas the eu funds individual farms’ implementation of solutions, new zealand has directed government subsidies into complex scientific research in an effort to find applicable and scientifically-proven solutions that can eventually be implemented by farmers. thus far, these solutions have focused on efforts similar to those previously mentioned in section iii. current scientific projects that are receiving subsidies include research into the mass production of seaweed (roy, 2019) and producing genetically modified sheep that emit less ghgs (smee, 2019). new zealand’s cattle exports grew by 2% over the past five years, while methane emissions from agriculture shrunk by roughly half a ton of methane in carbon dioxide equivalent (stats nz, 2020). this is an encouraging sign for the industry. reduction programs currently subsidized by the australian government bridge the gap between the topdown and bottom-up approaches seen in new zealand and the eu, respectively. in 2012, australia launched the national livestock methane program, which connected researchers with livestock farmers, enabling scientists to conduct field research on farms and provide input on how production would change with the implementation of their research findings (meat & livestock australia, n.d.). in addition to research subsidies, australia provides direct abatement technology subsidization to farmers (department of primary industries and regional development, 2019). vi. implementing abatement technology subsidy programs in the united states in 2019, the united states granted over $19 billion in subsidies to farmers (charles, 2019). the agriculture industry in the united states is notorious for its constant need for subsidization. subsidies are primarily used for keeping farm commodities competitive on the global market, though some grants are also available for research and development. the united states’ massive subsidization budget for agriculture provides room to increase the budget put toward sustainable research. increased awareness and implementation of cleaner farming techniques have the ability to mitigate climate change, a benefit for both agriculture producers and the united states government. as politics continue to dominate legislative efforts aimed at mitigating emissions, implementing abatement technology subsidy programs offers policymakers a less political and more cost-effective solution. cost has become a primary target of republican lawmakers toward the recent green new deal legislation. in addition to politicians’ unease with the cost of climate legislation, the majority of the american public is hesitant to fund large-scale emissions reduction programs (hamel et al., 2019). this program would not require any new budget allocations, therefore preventing politics from intervening in the implementation of the program. decreasing political stagnation is a crucial element of any climate legislation, so, without budget allocation, this subsidization program provides an effective and realistic policy proposal. the implementation of a subsidy program in response to the enteric emissions problem in the united states is feasible. while there is no clear blueprint for implementation, pairing enteric methane reduction strategies with government subsidization has the potential to benefit all parties involved. with high levels of subsidization currently in place in the united states, new legislation or additional appropriation of funds is unnecessary. rather, the creation of new standards regarding ruminant animals and increased subsidization for on-farm research is a plausible solution to enteric emissions reduction. these standards can be set by the usda with input from various agencies, including the epa and other environmental and farm interest groups. 63 consilience: the journal of sustainable development the agriculture sector of united states is currently experiencing a chasm between the agricultural and economic production of large factory farms and small family-owned farms. although small family farms (designated by less than $350,000 in gross cash farm income) accounted for 90% of united states farms in 2015, these small farms only accounted for 24% of production (mcdonald & hoppe, 2017). however, larger and/or corporate farms account for more of the economic production of the agriculture industry and often receive more government subsidization. piloting an enteric emissions standard on a corporate farm that produces a high volume of enteric methane will help policymakers and researchers understand the plausibility of applying subsidy standards to smaller farms. this is due to the sheer size and significant emissions of larger family and corporate farms. similar to the australian approach to their policy, utilizing research and experimentation on large farms provides the usda opportunities to learn how to better transpose the policy to fit smaller farms. while there is no one solution to this issue, a fluid and flexible process of implementation, though difficult, is achievable. the european union, new zealand, and australia are clear case studies of successful government subsidization of the agriculture industry that reduces enteric emissions. taking the direct government-to-farm subsidy program from cap incentivizes farmers to reform farming practices and encourages clean farming. the united states currently houses scientific research institutions that would benefit from increased subsidy programs similar to those seen in oceanic states. through this, the united states could potentially move to the forefront of research and progressive environmental policies that benefit both farmers and the economy. vii. conclusion enteric methane emission reduction techniques are available and plausible for implementation in the united states. a program focused on livestock emissions that joins cap’s direct abatement technology subsidies program, combined with scientific research subsidization as seen in australia and new zealand, can work in the united states. implementing standards on current subsidization programs is not only possible, but is the most likely solution to reduce enteric emissions standards in the united states. requiring new technology, reducing emissions, and funding new research will only help the agriculture industry in the united states prepare for the inevitable consequences of climate change. references bonnet, c., bouamra-mechemache, z., & corre, t. 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(2019, november). managing manure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. https://www.agric.wa.gov.au/climate-change/managingmanure-reduce-greenhouse-gas-emissions. dsm. (n.d.) farm wise, climate friendly: minimizing methane from cattle. https://www.dsm.com/corporate/solutions/climateenergy/minimizing-methane-from-cattle.html. environment foundation. (2018, february 19). environment guide: agriculture. http://www.environmentguide.org.nz/activities/agricultu re/. environmental protection agency. (n.d.). overview of greenhouse gasses. https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overviewgreenhouse-gases. european commission. (n.d.-a). the cap and climate change. https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farmingfisheries/sustainability-and-naturalresources/agriculture-and-environment/agriculture-andclimate-change_en. european commission. 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(2019, december 31). from red seaweed to climatesmart cows: new zealand leads the fight against methane. the guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/01/fromred-seaweed-to-climate-smart-cows-new-zealand-leadsthe-fight-against-methane. russell, s. (2014, may 29). everything you need to know about agricultural emissions. world resources institute. https://www.wri.org/blog/2014/05/everythingyou-need-know-about-agricultural-emissions. smee, b. (2019, 30 november). new zealand begins genetic program to produce low methane-emitting sheep. the guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/01/newzealand-begins-genetic-program-to-produce-lowmethane-emitting-sheep. stats nz. (2020). new zealand’s greenhouse gas emissions. https://www.stats.govt.nz/indicators/new-zealandsgreenhouse-gas-emissions. watts, g. (2019, august 6). the cows that could help fight climate change. bbc. https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190806-howvaccines-could-fix-our-problem-with-cow-emissions. microsoft word oyakhilomen.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 14, iss. 2 (2015), pp. 244-259 technical efficiency-food security nexus in kaduna state, nigeria: a case study of poultry egg farmers oyinbo oyakhilomen department of agricultural economics and rural sociology, ahmadu bello university, nigeria ooyinbo@abu.edu.ng +2348032779442 adah itodo daniel department of agricultural economics and rural sociology, ahmadu bello university, nigeria rekwot grace zibah national animal production research institute ahmadu bello university, nigeria abstract this study analysed the technical efficiency of poultry egg production for sustainable food security in the study area using primary data. the data were analysed using stochastic frontier, the us department of agriculture (usda) food security measurement, and correlation analysis to determine the relationship between technical efficiency and food security. the result of the study revealed that the poultry egg farmers had a very low technical efficiency of 23%, which implies that the poultry egg farmers have a chance of improving their technical efficiency by 77% using their available resource efficiently. the result also revealed that few of the households (10%) were food secure while most of them (90%) were food insecure at different levels of food insecurity. the result of the study further indicated a direct relationship between technical efficiency and food security at 1% level of probability, implying that as average productivity increases, food security increases. the policy implication is that food security among the poultry egg farmers is linked with improving their farm efficiency. if food security is to be ensured among the poultry egg farmers, their farming activities must be efficient. the study recommended that the poor food security status of the poultry egg farmers be improved by addressing their low level of technical efficiency through ensuring the efficient utilization of their available resources. this calls for emphasis on extension activities to focus on training poultry egg farmers on improved production management practices. author’s note this study was borne out of the need to address the issue of food security among poultry egg farmers in the study area in a bid to ensure sustainable development. however, the pertinent question of interest which formed the basis for this study was whether the efficiency of production of the farmers has a significant link with their food security and what policy implication can be drawn from the outcome of such a link. keywords: egg, food security, poultry, technical efficiency. consilience oyakhilomen, et al.: technical efficiency-food security nexus 1. introduction although the nigerian economy depends significantly on the oil sector, agriculture remains its mainstay. agriculture contributed 42% of nigeria’s gross domestic product (gdp) in 2008 (national bureau of statistics, 2010). agriculture is the second-largest export earner after crude oil and employing over 70% of rural labour; thus, the sector ranks as a key contributor to wealth creation and poverty reduction (nwafor, 2008). nigeria’s agricultural sector comprises four sub-sectors: crops, livestock, fisheries and forestry. crops contribute about 85% to agricultural gdp, livestock production about 10%, fisheries about 4%, and forestry about 1% in 2006. the crops and livestock sub-sectors have maintained their shares in recent years, while the fishery has been expanding and the forestry shrinking (nigeria vision 2020, 2009). given the large size of the crops sub-sector relative to the other three, growth performance in the crops sub-sector drives overall growth performance in agriculture. however, growth in the sector has not kept pace with the needs and expectations of the nation. over the years, the contributions of the livestock subsector to gross domestic product (gdp) have decreased from 5.61% in 1960 to about 2.64% in 2010 (cbn, 2010). food production increases have not kept pace with population growth (except in recent times), resulting in rising food imports and declining levels of national food self-sufficiency. poultry production is one of the important components of the livestock subsector in the nigerian economy, which can be embarked upon by the people with small or no land capital (conroy, 2005). nigeria’s poultry industry is composed of local unimproved breeds and high performing commercial breeds. over the last 50 years, the exotic breed has made an aggressive incursion into the productive economy of the country. while the local chicken is driven by the traditional system of management, the exotic breeds have stimulated an industrial advancement of the poultry industry through specialization as eggor meat-type strains to satisfy the increasing demand for poultry commodity in the food market. poultry meat and eggs offer considerable potential for meeting human needs for dietary animal supply (folorunsho and onibi, 2005). this single reason, among others, has made the enterprise attractive and popular among small-, medium-, as well as large-scale poultry farmers. efficiency is an important factor of productivity growth, especially in developing agriculture where resources are meagre and opportunities for developing and adopting better technologies are dwindling (ali and chaudhry, 1990). such economies can benefit greatly by determining the extent to which it is possible to raise productivity or increase efficiency, at the existing resource base or technology. the analysis of technical efficiency is generally associated with the possibility of farms producing a certain optimal level of output from a given level of resources, or certain level of output at least cost. technical efficiency of poultry egg farmers varies due to the presence of technical inefficiency effects in poultry production in nigeria (adepoju, 2008). the presence of shortfalls in productivity means that output can be increased without requiring additional conventional inputs and without the need for new technology. if this is the case, then empirical measures of technical efficiency are necessary in order to determine the magnitude of the gains that could be obtained by improving performance in poultry production with a given set of inputs. consilience oyakhilomen, et al.: technical efficiency-food security nexus challenges of food insecurity and hunger worldwide and in developing countries like nigeria in particular have continued to receive attention from experts and governments. (emaikwu et al., 2011). food security is a dynamic idea that has undergone significant transformations in its conceptual lifetime. perhaps the most significant of these transformations is the shift from an initial view of food security as a product of reliable supplies of food to the growing contemporary emphasis on food, such as egg production as a single input in diffuse local livelihood strategies (edward, 2006). the production of eggs has been troubled by unstable trends in the economy. the several problems plaguing the industry make it difficult for existing firms to expand while new ones are reluctant to go into the business. such problems include high cost of feed, low capital base, inefficient management, technical or production inefficiency, diseases and pests, poor housing, poor quality of day-old chicks, inadequate extension and training facilities, and other marketing problems (ohajianya et al., 2013). this situation has forced many small-scale poultry farms to close down, and those still managing to survive are producing at very high cost and also contending with serious inputs limitations. in most situation, measures adopted by both the government and farmers to improve the situation are geared towards reimbursing the input supplies, which are mainly targeted to production increase neglecting the productivity aspect of the enterprise. however, in line with onyenweaku and effiong (2006) and ashagidigbi et al. (2011), one of the major problems of poultry production in nigeria is that of low productivity and inefficiency in resource allocation and utilization. improvement of efficiency can be as one of the most effective methods to realize production development. from the available literature, studies have been carried out on technical efficiency of poultry farmers in different parts of nigeria. such studies were under taken by alabi and aruna (2006), binuomote et al. (2008), ohajianya et al. (2013), ojo (2003) and adepoju (2008). however, there is limited information on relationship between technical efficiency and food security of poultry egg farmers, and this constitute the gap in research that formed the basis for this study. in view of the foregoing, this study was carried out to i. determine the technical efficiency of poultry egg farmers in the study area; ii. estimate the determinants of technical efficiency of poultry egg production in the study area; iii. estimate the food security status of poultry egg farmers in the study area; iv. determine the relationship between technical efficiency and food security of poultry egg farmers in the study area; 2. methodology 2.1 description of the study area the study was carried out in sabon-gari local government area of kaduna state of nigeria. sabon-gari is located in the northern guinea savannah zone of kaduna state. the local government area is situated on a plateau of a height of about 700m above sea level at latitude 11° to 12° north and longitude 7° to 8° east. it consilience oyakhilomen, et al.: technical efficiency-food security nexus has an estimated population of 291,358 (national population commission, 2006). with a projected population of 932,346 in 2013 using an annual growth rate of 3.2%. 2.2 sampling procedure and sample size a two-stage sampling technique was used in the study. first stage involved the purposive sampling of four (4) wards out of eleven (11) wards in sabon-gari local government area. the selected wards were; samaru, bassawa, jama’a, and hanwa ward. these wards were selected because of their prominence in poultry egg production. the second stage involved the sampling of thirty (30) poultry egg farmers from samaru ward and all poultry egg farmers from bassawa (10), jama’a (5) and hanwa wards (6), to give a sample size of fifty-one (51) poultry egg farmers in sabon-gari local government area. the use of purposive sampling of thirty poultry egg farmers from samaru is on the basis of the fact that there is high number of poultry egg farmers in samara ward, especially within the university community. 2.3 method of data collection the study made use of primary data. the primary data were collected through the use of a well-structured questionnaire. data were collected on the socioeconomic characteristics of respondents (such as age, educational level, household size, income, access to credit, farming experience, gender, marital status, extension contact, membership of cooperative, and so on). data on the inputs and outputs of poultry farming such as flock size, labour, feeds, medication, fuel, drinkers, feeders, egg, spent/culled layers and poultry manure were also collected. finally, data were collected on the food consumption of the farmers to estimate their food security. 2.4 analytical techniques analysis of data collected from the field was done using the following analytical tools; stochastic frontier production function, the united states department of agriculture (usda) food security approach, and pearson correlation analysis. 2.4.1 stochastic production frontier function this analytical tool was used to achieve objective (i) and (ii) of the study. the stochastic production frontier function is specified as y = f(xi, a) exp(ei )………………………………………………………………. (1) where, y = egg output in ith farm (measured in physical terms as number of creates of eggs). xi = vector of inputs used by the ith farmer. •i = vector of unknown parameters. ei = vi ui (composite error term). consilience oyakhilomen, et al.: technical efficiency-food security nexus the specified cobb-douglas production functions is as follows: iny = in�0 + �1inx1 + �2inx2 + �3inx3 + �4inx4 + ei………………………..(2) where, y = eggs (number of egg crates) x1 = labour (man-days) x2 = feed (kg) x3 = stock of size (number of birds stocked) x4 = water (litres) in = natural logarithm a1 a4 = parameters to be estimated. where, a0 = intercept e = composite error term defined as v -u in equation (1) some farmers’ characteristics were incorporated into the frontier function, as it is believed that they have direct influence on efficiency. the efficiency function in specified as r =�0 + �1z1 + �2z2 + �3z3 + �4z4 + �5z5 + �6z6 + 7 �z7 + e………………(3) where, r = technical inefficiency z1 = age (years) z2 = poultry farming experience (years of poultry farming experience) z3 = educational status (years of formal education) z4 = household size (number of members of a given household) z5 = membership of association (years of membership of association) z6 = access to credit (amount of credit obtained) z7 = extension contact (number of extension contacts) 2.4.2 usda food security approach the usda food security approach adopted from fakoyode et al. (2009) was used to achieve objective (iii) of the study. the usda method categorizes households using a constructed food security scale (usda, 2000). this scale is a number continuum in a linear scale that ranges between 0 and 10. the scale measures the degree of food insecurity/hunger experienced by a household in terms of a single numerical value. the procedure that determines a household scale fundamentally depends on the household responses to some structured survey questions. in determining the household food security status on the food security consilience oyakhilomen, et al.: technical efficiency-food security nexus scale, the food security scale is first simplified into a small set of categories as in table 1. four categories can be defined for this purpose. these include: food secure households: these are households that show zero or minimal evidence of food insecurity. the group’s value ranges between 0-2.32 on the food security scale. food insecure without hunger households: this group of households shows concern about the adequacy of the household food supply. they therefore show adjustments in their daily food management. this group’s value ranges from 2.334.56 on the food security scale. food insecure with hunger (moderate) households: this group of households have their food intake reduced such that the household adults have repeatedly experienced the physical sensation of hunger. the group’s value is between 4.57-6.53 on the scale. food insecure with hunger (severe) household: households in this group have their children’s food intake reduced to an extent that the children have experienced hunger. the group’s value on the food security scale ranges between 6.54-10.0. table 1: household food security status 0-2.32 2.33-4.56 4.57-6.53 6.54-10.0 food security food insecurity food insecure without hunger food insecure with hunger “moderate” “severe” 2.4.3 pearson’s correlation analysis this was used to achieve objective (iv) of the study. correlation is the relationship between two variables. correlation coefficient is the measurement of correlation. it indicates how well the two set of data are interconnected. it is also referred to as pearson product moment correlation coefficient. the values of pearson’s correlation coefficient lies between -1 to +1. if the coefficient of correlation is 0, then there is no correlation between given two variables. on the other hand, the perfectly positive correlation has a value of +1 while a perfectly negative correlation has a value of -1. pearson’s correlation coefficient is denoted as “r” and is obtained as follows: r = n (∑xy) – (∑x) (∑y)............................................................ (4) [n∑x2 – (∑x2)] [n∑y2 – (∑y) 2] consilience oyakhilomen, et al.: technical efficiency-food security nexus where, r = pearson’s correlation coefficient x = values in first set of data y = values in second set of data n = total number of values ∑ = summation 3. results and discussion 3.1 technical efficiency of poultry egg farmers 3.1.1 input-output relationship in poultry egg production cobb-douglas stochastic frontier production function is estimated to examine the nature of the input-output relationship in poultry egg production and to determine the technical efficiency of the farmers. the result presented in table 2 revealed that the estimated coefficients for all input are positive except stock, which was negative. in the result presented in table 2, the coefficient of labour was found positive and significant at 5% level for probability. the positive sign implies that an increase in labour estimate by one unit will lead to an increase in poultry egg output. the result clearly shows that labour is relevant in poultry egg production. this agrees with several other studies such as muhammed-lawal et al. (2009) and amaza and maurice (2005), who reported that the coefficient of labour was positive and statistically significant, and that an increase in labour usage would result in increase in output level of farmers. a unit increase in labour will increase output by 0.775 for the poultry egg farmers. the coefficient of feed was observed to be positive and significant at 5% level of probability. this implies that an increase in the quantity of feed given to the poultry birds (layers) will lead to an increase in output of poultry egg farmers in the study area. the estimated coefficient for stock was found to be negative and insignificant. the negative sign implies that an increase in the stock will lead to a decrease in output. the negative sign was against a priori expectation because an increase in stock was expected to increase output given that feed was positive and significant. the coefficient of water was found to be positive and insignificant. the positive sign implies that an increase in the quantity of water given to the birds (layers) will result in an increase in output of egg produced. consilience oyakhilomen, et al.: technical efficiency-food security nexus table 2: maximum likelihood estimates of the stochastic frontier production function for poultry egg farmers variables coefficient s.e. t ratio production model constant 0.861 1.138 0.756 labour 0.775** 0.322 2.406 feed 0.727** 0.296 2.459 stock -0.222 0.216 -1.027 water 0.162 0.248 0.654 inefficiency model 0.217 1.004 0.216 age -0.172* 0.102 -1.685 farm experience 2.603 2.322 1.121 education 0.036 0.494 0.737 household size 0.379 0.281 1.345 association -0.866** 0.367 -2.358 access to credit -0.000 -0.000 -1.289 extension contact -3.432* 1.953 -1.757 variance sigma squared 32.270*** 1.013 31.852 gamma 0.939*** 0.028 32.995 log likelihood function -125.201 lr test 25.143 *** = significant at 1% ** = significant at 5% * = significant at 10% 3.2 determinants of technical efficiency of poultry egg production maximum likelihood estimate of the cobb-douglas stochastic frontier production function was carried out to determine the technical efficiencies as well as the determinants of the inefficiencies of the poultry egg farmers in the study area. sigma square (�2) and gamma (ϒ) were estimated to be 32.28 and 0.94, respectively, and are significant at 1% level. the sigma square (�2) show the goodness of fit of the model while the gamma (ϒ) shows the proportion of total deviation from frontier attribute to inefficiency of the poultry egg farmers. 0.94 was observed in this study to indicate the presence of inefficiency in poultry egg production among the farmers. this shows that about 94% of shortfall below the frontier output was due to the technical efficiency of the farmers. the results presented in table 2 reveal that age was negative and show a significant relationship with technical efficiency among poultry egg farmers in the study area. this result agrees with the finding of ajibefun and abdulkadir (2004) on the impact of farm size operation on resource-use efficiency in small-scale farming in south-western nigeria who said the age of farmers had an increased relationship with farm productivity. farming experience is positively related to technical efficiency, thereby decreasing technical efficiency, but is not significant. the more experienced a farmer, the more efficient his decision-making processes, and the more he will be willing to take risks associated with the practice of improved technologies. however, this result consilience oyakhilomen, et al.: technical efficiency-food security nexus differs from that of onu et al. (2000), whose result showed a negative relationship between farming experience and technical efficiency in cotton production in nigeria. level of education is positive and insignificant in influencing the technical efficiency of the respondents. education enhances farmers’ ability to derive, decode, and evaluate useful information, as well as improving labour quality. household size was positive and insignificant in influencing technical efficiency of the poultry egg farmers in the study area. a unit increase in household size will decrease technical efficiency by 0.379. suggesting that increase in household size of poultry egg farmers decreases technical efficiency. this finding is in agreement with okoruwa and ogundele (2006) on technical efficiency differentials in rice production technologies in nigeria. they reported that household size has no significant effect on the technical efficiency of technology of farming. association was negative and significant at 5% level of probability. this implies that membership association increases technical efficiency. a unit increase in membership association will increase technical efficiency by a factor of 0.866. however, this result differs from that of ohajianya et al. (2013), who said that membership in farmers association/cooperative is positively and significantly related to technical efficiency. members of farmers associations have more access to agricultural information, credit and other production inputs, as well as more enhanced ability to adopt innovations. access to credit was negative and insignificant in influencing the technical efficiency of the poultry egg farmers in the study area. the negative sign implies an increase in technical efficiency. this result is consistent with that of okike (2000), who found a negative relationship between credit and technical efficiency in northern nigeria. this result, however, differs from that of ohajianya et al, (2013), who found out that credit access is significant and positively related to technical efficiency. credit is needed to improve the production of table eggs, and hence the positive relationship between credit access and technical efficiency. extension contact was negative and significant at 10% level of probability. the negative sign implies an increase in technical efficiency. as the extension contact of the poultry egg farmers increases, technical efficiency also increases in accordance with a priori expectation that extension contact leads to more efficient transmission of information to farmers, as well as enhancing the adoption of innovations. 3.2.1 distribution of technical efficiency of poultry egg farmers the distribution of poultry egg farmers technical efficiency presented in table 3 shows that the majority (35.3%) of the respondents were operating at a technical efficiency of 0.0-1.0, with a mean technical efficiency level of 0.23%. this implies that the poultry egg farmers are operating at very low technical efficiency and could increase output if the efficiency of inputs usage were increased by 77% for operating on the production frontier. consequently, great opportunities still exist for increasing productivity through increased efficiency through the use of available inputs. this result differ from that of ohajianya et al. (2013 ), whose results showed individual technical efficiency indices range between 16.23% and 94.17% with a mean technical efficiency of 62%. consilience oyakhilomen, et al.: technical efficiency-food security nexus table 3: distribution of technical efficiency of poultry egg farmers efficiency score frequency percentage (%) 0.00-0.10 18 35.3 0.11-0.20 7 13.7 0.21-0.30 10 19.6 0.31-0.40 6 11.8 0.41-0.50 5 9.8 0.51-0.60 3 5.9 0.61-0.70 2 3.9 total 51 100 maximum 0.69 minimum 0.00 mean 2.23 3.3 food security status of poultry egg farming households based on the food security analysis results, presented in table 4, few of the households (10%) were food secure, meaning that these groups of households are able to meet their food requirement without making any extensive adjustment. sixty one per cent (61%) of the respondents were food insecure without hunger, and this implies that this group of households has to make extensive adjustment to meet the food needs of their households. fifteen per cent (15%) of the respondents were food insecure with hunger (moderate), and this implies that this group of households has its food intake reduced such that the household adults have repeatedly experienced the physical sensation of hunger. while 14% of the respondents were food insecure with hunger (severe) as shown in figure 1, implying that households in this group have their children’s food intake reduced to the extent that the children have experienced hunger. these results compares favourably with those of fakayode et al. (2009), which indicated that only 12.2% of the country’s households were food secure, while 87.8% of nigerian households were food insecure at different level of food insecurity. table 4: food security status of poultry egg farming households food security status frequency percentage food security fs 5 10 food insecure without hunger fiswh 31 61 food insecure with hunger (moderate) fiswhm 7 15 food insecure with hunger (severe) fiswhs 7 14 total 51 100 consilience oyakhilomen, et al.: technical efficiency-food security nexus figure 1: food security status of poultry egg farming household 3.4 relationship of technical efficiency and food security among poultry egg farming households the results in table 5 show that there is a positive relationship between food security and technical efficiency estimates among the respondents at a 1% probability level, suggesting a direct relationship between technical efficiency and food security estimates among the respondents. this result is in line with that of asogwa et al. (2012), who found a significant negative correlation between poverty gap and technical efficiency estimates among farming households in nigeria, suggesting an inverse relationship between poverty gap and technical efficiency estimates. the implication of the finding of this study is that as the technical efficiency estimate increases (that is, increase from zero towards one, which is the production frontier), food security increases (that is, accessibility of the households to nutritious food that meet their daily nutrient requirement is increasing). this implies that as average productivity increases, food security increases, suggesting that output is being maximized from a given quantum of inputs. the policy implication is that food security among the poultry egg farmer’s is linked with improving technical efficiency. if food security is to be ensured, among the poultry egg farming households, poultry farming activities must be technically efficient. table 5: correlation analysis of technical efficiency and food security among poultry egg farming households food security technical efficiency food security 1.00 0.9* technical efficiency 0.9* 1.00 *: correlation coefficient (r) is significant at 1% probability level   14%     15%     61%     10%   fiswhs   fiswhm   fiswh   fs   consilience oyakhilomen, et al.: technical efficiency-food security nexus 3. conclusion based on the findings of this study, it can be concluded that poultry egg farmers are technically inefficient as indicated by their mean efficiency of 23%; implying that their technical efficiency can be improved by a scope of 77% through efficient resource utilization. there is a direct relationship between technical efficiency and the food security of the poultry farmers in the study area. this implies that the low food security status of the poultry egg farmers in the study area can be enhanced if their technical efficiency is improved upon. based on the findings of the study, it is recommended that: i. the poor food security status of the poultry egg farmers be improved by addressing the low level of technical efficiency of the poultry egg farmers, which can be achieved through efficient utilization of their available resources. ii. extension activities focus on the training of poultry egg farmers on improved production management practices to enable them to use their available resources efficiently and increase productivity such that their food security is enhanced. consilience oyakhilomen, et al.: technical efficiency-food security nexus bibliography adepoju, a.a. 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(2000). determinants of agriculture and social research. journal of economic development. 6 (1): 9-16. onyenweaku c.e and nwaru j.c (2005). application of a stochastic frontier production unction to the measurement of technical efficiency in food crop production in imo state, nigeria. the nigerian agricultural journal, 36 (1):1–12. onyenweaku, c.e and e.o. effiong (2006). technical efficiency in pig production in akwa-ibom state, nigeria, paper presented at the 40th annual conference of the agricultural society of nigeria, held at nrcri, umudike. united states department of agriculture, (2000). guide to measuring household food security in the united states: reports of the federal interagency food security measurement project. office of analysis, nutrition, and evaluation food and nutrition service, usda 3101 park center drive alexandria, va 22302. introductionintroduction the deccan plateau consists of several present-day states, principally including telangana, maharashtra, andhra pradesh, karnataka, kerala, and tamil nadu. the region has produced numerous major dynasties in history, including the pallavas, satavahana, vakataka, chalukya, and rashtrakuta dynasties, as well as the kakatiya, kamma nayakas, vijayanagara, and maratha empires. prominent indo-muslim architecture, including the water sites discussed in this paper, were built by the muslim bahmani sultanate, the post-bahmani deccan sultanates, and the nizam of hyderabad (sohoni 2018; michell and philon 2018). the region has witnessed conquer and turmoil with the formation of muslim states, power struggles between dynasties, and was briefly home to the mughal capital in aurangabad under emperor aurangzeb (pillai, 2018). the region was a battleground for the eighteenth century french and british rivalry, with the british emerging victorious. they would establish two major presidencies within the plateau: bombay and madras. after independence in 1947, most of the native states were incorporated into the present-day republic of india. in 1956 the states reorganisation act redistricted states along linguistic lines, leading to the current political states (koshi 2016). water for many of these great dynasties was a symbol of power. it was cherished and is manifested in many architectural wonders (bindia 2004). one example is view journal | view issue water quality pilot study for traditional water structure water quality pilot study for traditional water structure revitalization potential in the deccan plateau of indiarevitalization potential in the deccan plateau of india jonathan bessette1 and eric niblock2 1school of engineering and applied sciences, 2college of arts and sciences, university at buffalo, suny, buffalo, ny 14260, united states, email: jbessett@buffalo.edu, ericnibl@buffalo.edu keywords:keywords: water structures, deccan plateau, water quality, revitalization abstract:abstract: traditional water structures such as stepwells and canal systems historically function as sustainable water sources. they are advantageous within india’s cyclic climate of flooding and drought, especially in regions of the deccan plateau. structures in the deccan particularly tend to leverage laterite, a porous, geological feature specific to the region. laterite is especially useful for collecting and maintaining water from surrounding aquifers, permitting reliable storage of water even during the dry season. unfortunately, many of these structures have been damaged, polluted, and misused. this pilot study investigates the water quality of traditional water structures in the western deccan plateau region of india and their potential for revitalization. samples were drawn from traditional water structures and domestic taps located across central maharashtra and northern karnataka. water quality parameters were converted into a single water quality index (wqi) to characterize their current state. qualitative site information such as degree of conservation and visible pollution level are compared via wqi. quality amongst some traditional water structures was discovered to be comparable to domestic drinking sources despite a lack of conservation and usage in the former. some sites exhibited strong potential for revitalization as domestic and agricultural water sources. finally, a detailed case study of a karez system in bidar outlines current characteristics, challenges, and future work in promoting sustainable development practices for revitalizing traditional water structures. 6 doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6739 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 6-17 author’s note:author’s note: about a year ago, i found myself hobbling off a bus in maharashtra, india. my fibula was fractured and i was backpacking india on crutches—trying to grasp as good of an understanding as i could on the water usage in rural india. it all started when eric and i met our advisor, dr. walter hakala, who suggested we travel with him to india. we saw it as an opportunity not only to explore deccani architecture and their beautiful water systems, but to also explore water quality amongst many of these traditional water structures. we wanted to identify the state of these water structures and see if they had utility in revitalization. as it turns out, these aged, polluted, and unused water structures were not all that bad! in fact, not only are they (sometimes) comparable in drinking water quality to municipal sources—they also have high potential, if restored, to bring cultural and religious value. revitalizing these old methods could prove useful as sustainable water sources in the future of india as water becomes a more constrained resource. july 6, 2020 http://consiliencejournal.org https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/consilience/issue/view/651 consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6739 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 6-177 at daulatabad, a historic fort that contains an elaborate system of reservoirs, tanks, wells, and channels—some still utilized today (world monuments fund 2020). however, an estimated 70 percent of india’s fresh water sources are now polluted (banerji 2018; asian development research institute 2017). such pollution includes agricultural agents, septic leakage, industrial waste, landfill leaching, and mining (gupta, rai, pandey, and sharma 2009; agrawal, pandey, and sharma 2010). water pollution leads to a myriad of diseases and is responsible for the death of over 14,000 individuals every day. as such, it is a major concern for both developing and industrialized nations (agrawal, pandey, and sharma 2010). backgroundbackground the region of our focus is the deccan plateau of india. basaltic lavas characterize this region, with alternating layers of thickness occupying preexisting valleys. a key component of the soil in the regions of bidar is laterite, formed as a derivative of basalt. laterite is a porous rock that is typically rich in iron which causes its rusty-red color. the formation of laterite typically relies on cyclic wet and dry seasons. rocks are leached of soluble salts within the rock from the constant rainfall and then the salts are deposited on the surface all via capillary action. these salts are then washed away the next rainy season, forming porous pockets where the salts once existed (whitten and brooks 1972). in some regions of the deccan, this geological composition is especially beneficial for agriculture and water storage. common crops grown in the moisture retentive areas include cotton, sugarcane, millet, rice, oilseeds, wheat, as well as tea and coffee plantations in the southern areas (heitzman and worden 1995). such crops are highly dependent on climate, which in the deccan, can vary widely. most annual rainfall falls in the northern and eastern regions, including madhya pradesh and chhattisgarh. the southern region, especially central-western maharashtra and northern karnataka fall under a “rain shadow,” and receives about 50 to 1,000 mm (2 to 39 inches) of rainfall a year. while this water might be sufficient in quantity, in many cases, it is not sufficient in quality. for a water source to be usable, it necessitates both quantity and quality. two major factors affecting water in india are (1) the overuse and misuse of bore wells and (2) pollutant contamination (sharma 2017). bore drilling is commonly utilized around the world, not only for water extraction but also for petroleum and natural gas extraction (chen 2018). however, cases of overused bore wells drain aquifers by drawing more water than is annually replenished; one study suggests that india’s average groundwater levels are being depleted by an average of 0.3 meters per year, and up to 4 meters per year in the worst scenarios (economist 2016). these wells can reach down into “paleo-historic storages,” depleting millennia old water sources (sainath 2016). unfortunately, farmers often consider these wells their only option. sinking new bore wells costs about 150,000 inr ($2,114 usd) on average, which is extremely burdensome on small farmers, who are only assured 6,000 inr annually (sainath 2016). many of these farmers are under significant financial debt which has been linked to an increase in suicide rates of up to 45 individuals per day (singh 2019). natural water structures that harness groundwater aquifers closer to the surface are historically sustainable and could prove a potential solution to combat aquifer depletion, economic hardship, and increase the quantity of water available to nearby communities (khandekar, kamadi, and collyns 2015). even with the abundance of water in these natural water structures, this groundwater is potentially unsafe; the 2006 department of drinking water supply figures indicate unhealthily high abundance of chemicals across india: fluoride in 203 out of 593 reporting districts, iron in 206 districts, salinity in 137 districts, nitrate in 109 districts, and arsenic in 35 districts (shankar 2011). furthermore, the lack of proper wastewater treatment is widespread. currently, 93 percent of sewage in india terminates in natural waterways without treatment (chaturvedi 2017). figure 1: thematic map of geographical regions of india (deccan plateau 2019) consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6739 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 6-178 unfortunately, this remained true in our observations; sewage was prevalent at many of the sample sites. for municipal waste disposal in india, especially in rural areas, residents tend to use open-incineration or disposal in waterways (kumar s., smith, fowler, velis, kumar s. j., arya, kumar r. and cheeseman 2017). some suggest the adoption and widespread use of burning is related to the longstanding hindu religious rite of cremation—such a practice in india even inspired the modern cremation movement in the west (arnold 2016). much of this practice is ultimately linked to limited awareness caused by lack of education and a lack of suitable infrastructure; many municipalities fail to provide waste dumping facilities (ferronato and torretta 2019). incentives for infrastructure improvement include waste-to-energy facilities, which is proven to be a major opportunity; however, a key barrier is a shortage of qualified engineers and environmental professionals (kumar et al. 2017). municipal pollution of waterways, coupled with the lack of usage and circulation of these water structures results in rapid eutrophication (majumder, gupta, saha, datta, and mondal 2006). again, environmental education is a potential method by which to combat these common practices of pollution and preserve the utility of these sites (sarkar, saha, takada, a. bhattacharya, mishra, and b. bhattacharya 2007). however, before enhancing rural education, it is suggested that fundamental improvements in sanitation are necessary; this highlights the circular nature of water quality rooted in the intertwined sustainable development issues of sanitation, poverty, lack of infrastructure, and lack of education (malik 2015). traditional water structures traditional water structures india’s climate is characterized by annually cyclic floods and droughts. the northern and inland regions of the deccan plateau typically receive rainfall of about 700 mm annually due to geographic sheltering from the western ghats (baumann 2008). the central deccan region, along with the western states of gujarat and rajasthan, typically receive the least annual rainfall in india, making these regions especially susceptible to drought. consequently, many regions have adopted their own idiosyncratic ground water harvesting techniques from early water structures. they are distinguished by name, language, cultural references, and geological construction. such structures include horizontal well-canal systems called karez or qanat, which work to recharge nearby well systems. others include baoli (stepwells), anicut (dams), and hauz (water reservoirs) (barah 1996; davison-jenkins 1997; pal 2016). all are traditional methods of providing accessible groundwater to users. figure 3 displays examples of baoli, or stepwells, in (a), (c), (d), and (f). karez system components of both the (e) head and the (b) mouth of this underground horizontal canal system are also pictured. while there are many names for these structures, their general architectural forms and categories are common across great physical and cultural distances. for instance, a horizontal well system in bidar paralleled canal systems common to iran and pakistan. another example is while stepwells have high frequency in the deccan, they are also found in different geometries across europe and africa. in the deccan, however, these structures are distinguished by figure 3: examples of traditional water structure sample sites (a) daulatabad fort; (b) bidar karez; (c) bidar fort; (d) chaukhandi; (e) shahpur karez mother well; (f) ashtoor. figure 2: hydrogeological setting of groundwater (hillewaert 2007) consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6739 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 6-179 their basaltic rocks and laterite, which function especially well for retaining water. aside from function, there also exists a cultural impetus that historically has driven the construction of these structures. some are opulent and decorated, representing the establishment of former rulers. much of these decorations also serve the purpose of venerating religion. they are built as “temple tanks,” and are claimed to prevent and cure diseases; examples include the bhramanya dev temple in madhya pradesh. offerings to ancestors are also made at these water structures, such as at the dakshinaarka temple (kannikeswaran 1996). stories of miracles also encompass stepwells. a story that dates back to the thirteenth century recounts how devout followers of nizamuddin auliya, a sufi saint, were tasked with stopping work on a baoli, and instead were forced into building a citadel for ghiasuddin tughlaq, the new sultan of delhi. the laborers continued to work on the baoli for the saint at night, enraging ghazi malik; he banned the sale of oil lamps to stop their work. it is said that the saint blessed the well’s water and told his followers to use that instead; miraculously, it burned (india’s magnificent stepwells 2019). additionally, these traditional water structures even emerged as social spaces for women. while they were used for agriculture and drinking, they were also used for bathing and washing—historically feminine roles. the architecture of hindu stepwells especially was encompassed by fertility goddesses—with few cases of male gods—perhaps also indicating the strong linkage to women. women at these sites participated in gatherings to sing bhajans and narrate stories as religious activities. however, these often extended into sessions where women were able to talk about their problems and form a support group—this included muslim women, who were excluded from mosques and bazaars in many societies (dhwani, 2019). traditional water structures have recently been documented online via a crowdsourcing website called “stepwells.org” (earis 2016). however, many of these traditional water structures have undergone stress from pollution, neglect, and abandonment with the onset of modern water distribution systems such as piping. with the increased abundance of industrialized plastic and foil packaging—correspondent with india’s rapid development—many of these sites are used as places to discard waste. both their functional sustainability as a water source and cultural significance drives the question: why have they become increasingly neglected and abandoned? secondly, is there potential for them to re-emerge as sustainable structures—proving beneficial in increasing water sustainability and reinvigorating the culture surrounding these structures? methodologymethodology to explore revitalization potential from a quantitative perspective, we examined water quality within traditional water structures and bodies in the western deccan plateau—a region of india with an abundance of water structures. we sampled areas with known clusters of traditional water bodies across maharashtra and northern karnataka. our geographical sample size was relatively small due to time and resource constraints; hence, our study is limited in scope and should only be considered a pilot study specific to these regions. our research was primarily focused in and around the two cities of aurangabad and bidar because of the abundance of various traditional water structures. aurangabad is situated in a dry region of central maharashtra and is heavily influenced by local steppe climate. the city is known for several educational institutions, including marathwada university, and is located near the ajanta and ellora caves—both are unesco world heritage sites. bidar is located on an escarpment in the northernmost region of karnataka, near the border of telangana. this city is characterized by rapid urbanization, an over 500-year-old fort, and hosts the second largest indian air force training center in the country (sohoni 2015). aurangabad’s rainy season is between the months of june to september; bidar’s rainy season is in a similar time frame: from june to october (climate graph 2018). sites where water samples were taken and analyzed are included in appendix a. india’s deccan plateau has a seasonal pattern that consists of winter, the dry season (november to february), summer (march to june), and the monsoon or rainy season (june to october). our samples were taken in the month of january during the dry season. some of the traditional water structure sites we visited had dry wells, and thus no samples were taken at these sites. the study was limited by cost, portability, and customs restrictions in the water quality assays utilized in india. the kits employed included a 14-parameter water testing strip from two separate companies, two general electronic water quality test meters which measured an additional four parameters, and general bacteria concentration testing. the parameters measured are included in appendix b. the parameters of greatest relevance to this study included lead, iron, nitrate, total dissolved solids (tds/ec), chlorine, and ph. these parameters received consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6739 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 6-1710 greater weighting when a single metric of overall water quality was developed due to the significance of their health consequences as outlined in the who guidelines for healthy drinking-water quality (world health organization 2017). a parameter called “visible pollution” was developed based on photographs and physical surveying of the area surrounding sample sites. this involved multiple individuals rating the site pollution level on a scale of 1 to 7 by method of general site observations. these ratings by multiple individuals were then averaged for each site and are considered as the visible pollution index. we generated a single parameter for each specific site, j, that is composed of a linear combination of each specific chemical parameter, i, of total parameters, n. a weight was determined for each specific chemical parameter by giving reference to the toxicity of ingesting, or otherwise coming into contact with, the given substance. normalization of some specific weight, wi, then yields wreli. the singular metric generated for each site is noted as the water quality index (wqi). this equation is similar to a prior water quality evaluation described by rao and krishna (2014). (1) (2) we further note that ji represents the value for a specific parameter i at site j. additionally i0 is the who standard for chemical parameter i. wqij therefore represents the linearly composed, weighted sum of chemical parameters which exceed the who standard, at some site j. a sensitivity analysis on the weighting was conducted and variation in parameter weighting could affect wqi results. these weightings are a possible source of error within assumptions for this study. current status and resultscurrent status and results data compiled for each site was averaged and normalized against the who standard value regarding each parameter. while numerous parameters were tested, the parameters considered were narrowed down to lead, iron, nitrates, bacteria/coliform, tds/ec, chlorine, and ph. the parameters not considered were either redundant or did not have a significant effect on water quality. results for each site can be seen in appendix a. this was a reduction from the entire dataset of chemical measurements taken because parameters most hazardous to health were prioritized in this study. we are able to compare our quantitative wqi with a variety of qualitative parameters regarding each sample site. these qualitative parameters included architectural structure type, location, level of conservation, visible pollution, and water source type. some findings of potential interest are shown in the following section. to understand the general quality of the sites surveyed, we compared the water quality metric against who standards for safe drinking levels to see how many sites failed a given number of standards. our results show all of the sites failed at least one standard and most failed most standards. few failed more than five of the six major standards tested. our results regarding the water quality of traditional water structures across the deccan in comparison to modern municipal sources such as tap water from bore wells is shown in a combined dot and boxplot in figure 4 below. it appears that contemporary sources have higher water quality than traditional sources when analyzed with our wqi metric. this is theorized to be related to the lack of care and usage of traditional water sites. some traditional sites shown have wqi levels comparable to contemporary sites, perhaps indicating potential for usage as sustainable agricultural or municipal water sources. there exists significant variance amongst the traditional water structures, likely due to the variation in factors such as pollution, location, usage, and conservation levels. exploring the level of conservation amongst all of the sites, we found little relationship between conservation efforts and corresponding water quality. many preserved sites scored poorly when employing our wqi. conservation amongst traditional sites, was split into three categories: preserved, partially preserved, and unpreserved. preserved structures had some level of supervision or oversight, which occurred in a variety of forms including but not limited to religious institutions, tourism, and historic site security. partially preserved sites were recognized by locals and partially maintained table 1: critical parameter weights consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6739 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 6-1711 by the constituents. unpreserved sites were completely abandoned and had no signs of revitalization or maintenance efforts; most were stagnant, polluted bodies of water. we found that the only preserved site possessed the lowest wqi (thus, the highest water quality). however, some unpreserved sites showed similarly low levels of wqi. the variation in the data and lack of sample size makes it difficult to conclude the effect of conservation on water quality, as seen in figure 5. we hypothesize that no strong correlation between conservation efforts and lower water quality index (more potable water) is due to a continuation of past contamination practices by some residents, and nonpoint source pollution (nps). maintained sites typically are not able to afford constant protection via gates or guards; thus, we observed some municipal waste at even highly conserved sites. less easily discernible is the possibility of nps such as excess fertilizer, urban runoff, sediment, salt from irrigation, and atmospheric deposition. understanding nps is especially essential for groundwater in agricultural regions such as the areas of rural india we sampled (kourakos, klein, cortis, and harter 2012). nps as a confounding factor on water body revitalization is not unique; it has been observed in many water sources throughout india (jha, singh, ojha, and bhatia 2006). however, we also note lack of correlation could be due to small sample size, as well as potential flaws in our classification ontology. visible pollution is a metric taken based on the average of two individuals observing the site in the field and rating the pollution level on a scale of 10-70, with 70 being the highest level of pollution. it is apparent that the higher visible pollution levels do not show correlation to better or worse wqi levels as seen in figure 6. interestingly, we notice even the most visibly “cleanlooking” water sources can contain the most harmful substances in the forms of heavy metals, high levels of nitrates, and so on. thus, even the most visibly appealing water sources could be extremely hazardous. the most potable water occurred at the kumatgi hauz, one of the more isolated sites which corresponded to a visible pollution rating of 2 and a partially preserved level of conservation (philon and arni 2014). it was in a relatively flat area likely fed by the nearby artificial reservoir. it is hypothesized that its location—farther from major populations than other structures we visited—aided in the mitigation of pollution and bolstered the low wqi. additionally, the three religious sites (all stepwells) had generally low wqi, regardless of preservation; amrut tirth in khuldabad and the wells at chaukhandi, bidar showed wqi of 2.52, 4.37, and 4.97 respectively. this puts them amongst some of the highest quality sites we visited. this potentially suggests that religious significance could play a part in preventing pollution and aid in maintenance of revitalized sites. lastly, in general, there was no correlation between structure type and water quality; this is likely due to the minimal role of structure type in mitigating nps pollution or municipal waste. based on our findings, traditional water structures show potential for agricultural and drinking water usage. in rare cases, they can be utilized as sources in their current state. but in most cases, further treatment and remediation must figure 4: water structure type versus wqi figure 5: structure conservation versus wqi figure 6: visible pollution versus wqi consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6739 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 6-1712 be undertaken. advocating for the cultural and religious value of these structures could prevent degradation and be potential sustainable development strategies beyond simply desilting and removing municipal waste. future workfuture work our water quality analysis was done with limited metrics. future work could include the addition of measurements relating to possible arsenic contamination from bore wells both by extraction from crops and directly in water concentration from wells; this can also be studied in its transport to municipalities. furthermore, metrics of dissolved oxygen concentration, chemical oxygen demand, and total organic carbons could assist in understanding the water quality and aquatic life within these water structures. specific microbial assays might help determine the severity level of bacteria and other microbes in the water; particular metrics of exploration would include resistance of present microbes to non-chemical methods such as heating, filtration, and radiation, which are more likely to be feasible than chemical treatments in low-resource communities. longitudinal case studies could be explored where entire cycle analysis of water is conducted on a particular community, tracing from rainwater to aquifers, then through the water systems (both traditional and contemporary) and to municipal sources and irrigation sources. water quality at various intervals could be explored over time and at various seasons of the year using continuously monitoring water quality field sensors. a case study of the naubad karez system in a case study of the naubad karez system in bidarbidar a karez (also known as qanat) is a “tunnel through which groundwater is conducted to the command area by gravity” (khan and nawaz 1995). it is an irrigation system that dates back to 1000 b.c.e. with origins in persia and can be thought of as a horizontal well (see figure 8 below). these tunnel systems are the same systems the hamas and taliban are utilizing for strategic maneuvers (kelso 2001). traditional construction begins with digging of the motherwell. in the case of afghanistan, pakistan, and iran, these are often built on alluvial fans (datta 2019). the sites we visited had no indication of alluvial fans and rather were built typically on hilltops or local plateaus. such structures were classified as rain-fed karez systems rather than as the other three forms: alluvial or piedmont karez, infiltration gallery karez, and spring karez. from the motherwell, a tunnel is dug in the shortest possible distance to the command area, where water demand exists. air vents are typically dug approximately 30 meters apart and utilized as both pressure relief and as a location to remove tunnel sediment during construction and subsequent maintenance. the karez tunnel emerges at the surface near the command area with water flowing at a gradient of 1-meter vertical depth per 1000 meters horizontal length in order to limit damage to the tunnel and maintain a sustainable flow rate (khan and nawaz 1995). bidar is unique in the sense that many neighborhood villages cover the natural karez system. furthermore, unlike many traditional karez systems, it transports water from a lower altitude to a higher one; the mother well is lower than the mouth of the karez. small depressions between vents allow for water storage, which, when it flows over, will progress forward and upward until it reaches the mouth (goode 2018). with the continued development and urbanization of india, unplanned organic growth often exploits natural and historic systems such as the karez. until three years ago, the karez system did not contain free flowing water— many vents and pathways were blocked by garbage, damaged from erosion, and crowded with silt due to lack of usage. local ngo team yuva and the indian heritage cities network foundation (ihcnf) handled the revitalization effort, which entailed clearing the tunnels of silt and debris. the project was initiated and funded by the karnataka urban infrastructure development finance corporation (kuidfc), a state governmental branch. figure 7: sample from the kumatgi hauz consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6739 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 6-1713 unfortunately, the karez system (like other traditional water bodies) faces the challenge of cleanliness. municipal waste on roads and in open drains can, and often does, seep into and pollute the water. in the case of bidar, many locals are even consciously and consistently utilizing the karez system as a sewage tunnel. this was supported by our analysis of the nitrate content (along with a variety of parameters) of the water at various points along the karez: high nitrate content indicates a high likelihood of human waste contamination, animal defecation, or fertilizer runoff. water quality of the naubad karez system was analyzed at three major points of access: (1) mother well; (2) opening/vent; (3); end/municipal. there exists a noticeable increase in nitrate concentration as well as in dissolved solids as one continues from the mother well to the end of the karez—the municipal draw. in the case of bidar, this could be due to the aforementioned use of the karez system as a means for sewage and waste disposal, as nitrate is a strong indicator of fecal waste. according to a representative from ihcnf, mr. govindan kutty, despite the knowledge of waste and sewage dumping upstream, residents downstream continue to utilize the karez system for drinking water. in a similar case in rural andhra pradesh, hamoudi et al. studied the response of residents when questioned about their water quality: 90 percent of the tested households had fecal bacteria contamination. interestingly, instead of remediating their water source with a filter or other methods, most affected residents initially reacted by purchasing more commercially sourced water, but often reverted to contaminated sources within a month (hamoudi et al. 2012). likewise, residents continue to drink water from lower portions of the karez without regard for quality, even after ihcnf and local ngo groups gave warnings. perhaps this is because the karez is their only source of water, they simply cannot afford commercially sourced water, or there is no funding for a public treatment system. though education and revitalization of old water systems are prime tools for local ngo goals concerning historical conservation and sustainable water systems, often funding is undermined by bureaucratic processes and changing leadership. india has amended legislation such as the foreign contribution regulatory act, curbing contributions from international nonprofit organizations—though, this reformation is sometimes necessary to combat potential corruption within ngo funding structures themselves. in general, however, this legislation makes contributions from overseas ngos and organizations more difficult (kumar, s. 2019). some argue that the original practice of employing ancient water systems was lost to bore wells and piping after the british colonization of india (unnikrishnan, nagendra, broto 2018). historical preservation proposals take years to process; one of mr. govindan kutty’s pending proposals has been processing for five years. according to govindan kutty, such processing time is often accompanied by a change of leadership, which again delays processing even further. new leadership results in the need to reeducate and persuade new leaders that traditional water systems are important and, in some cases, profitable for both commercial and touristic purposes. often this education and relationship redevelopment takes years. despite this, functional bureaucracy undoubtedly does exist. one example within bidar is an air force base which has allowed for the preservation of nearby lands and thus, the karez system in bidar was able to be restored and the watershed was able to be recharged. in this case, a government body aided in the maintenance of these revitalization sites in an indirect way; searching for similar symbiotic relationships between government entities and water structures could aid in sustainable development. currently, the region around bidar and regions within maharashtra suffer from drought. unfortunately, the current practices of some farmers can contribute to the water deficit. cultivating non-native cash crops in the region—such as sugarcane and cotton—can be a highly unsustainable practice (singh, a. 2016; mohan 2015; figure 8: naubad karez system (kutty 2018) table 2: analysis of three points in the naubad karez consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6739 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 6-1714 roy 2016). the farmers in some regions of bidar receive free electricity and thus are able to operate pumps and irrigation systems ceaselessly, limited only by water availability. when wells run dry, though, the typical solution is to drill another bore well on their property—either in a different location, or simply deeper. this practice is unsustainable and farmers cannot afford it. thus, one of their only options is to lobby government officials in the hope that they will subsidize more drilling (gupta 2019). one suggested solution to this is the usage of alternative, more native crop species such as guava, fig, and millet (rajendran 2001). some farmers in bidar are starting to cultivate millet as a more sustainable crop for the semi-arid region with information from govindan kutty’s ngo. the region is also exploring education options for affordable drip irrigation techniques, which are much more efficient in water usage, but costly and difficult to maintain (narayanamoorthy, devika, and bhattarai 2016). revitalized traditional water systems such as the karez in bidar provide new opportunities for sustainable water distribution. built on a large geologic fracture which serves as a water source, the karez distributes water great distances to various municipalities. since its revitalization, it has yet to dry up. challenges to the implementation of a system like the karez predominantly include urbanization and sanitation. the region has uncontrolled population growth and few zoning laws, which often leads to these traditional structures being demolished, neglected, and polluted (dellapenna 2009). additionally, sanitation and sewage treatment must be improved and separated from these systems; potential suggestions included increased composting and increased recycling, but none of these systems are in place yet. however, even with these resources, lack of accessibility still provides barriers. in bidar, a sewage treatment plant exists, but constituents do not have piping to it. the city has high technological potential but lacks holistic infrastructure integration. suggestions which aim to mitigate the negative effects of urbanization on sustainable traditional water systems are generally centered around government legislation. the most successful systems often have zoning laws, or no build zones to help the recharge of the karez and prevent pollution (wagle, warghade, and sathe, 2012). unfortunately, even in locations with zoning laws, corruption and bribery can still result in illegal construction and exploitation (rajendran, 2001). the creation of new zoning laws and the implementation of more anti-corruption legislation would certainly aid in the protection of the karez and similar water systems. additionally, educational programs concerning sanitary practices could potentially increase public demand for government intervention. in summary, we observe a functional revitalization program must not only include initial restoration (desilting, cleaning, reconstruction), but also incorporate various initiatives, the first being educational. understanding sanitary practices and the impact of water quality on public welfare is essential in order to draw public commitment (dellapenna 2009). the work of ngos and the ihcnf hold promise for this cornerstone of progress. from here, the financial incentive of the karez and other systems must be shifted into a more sustainable framework, with the support of residents (aartsen 2018). this could come in many different forms, including (1) lowering and altering the distribution of water to less needy species of crops, (2) attracting tourists by marketing water systems’ cultural value, and/or (3) removing financial incentives by use of sustainable zoning and anti-corruption legislation. public support would help to drive these more technical changes, though they are initially derived directly from education. while the karez system appears to be functioning successfully in bidar, unfortunately, it is unlikely that an equal set of conditions will be found in many other cities across the deccan. these traditional water structures typically run beneath currently established houses, and residents often are reluctant to cooperate with ngo and government inquiries about land near their homes (kutty 2018). conclusionsconclusions our water quality pilot study shows that many of the observed traditional water structures have varying degrees of pollution, usage, and maintenance. however, even visibly neglected and polluted water sources still have high potential for restoration, sometimes with a water quality index that is comparable to municipal drinking water. revitalization includes both initial restoration and maintenance: without maintenance, structures can fall into their prior states of neglect. a particular case study of the bidar karez system shows positive applications, but also exemplifies a specific set of sociopolitical conditions needed for this type of revitalization to be successfully maintained. barriers to this goal include uncontrolled urbanization and lack of sanitation. we also observe that a lack of education surrounding the significance of water structures—both functionally and culturally, combined with the short-term financial incentive of unsustainable farming practices, also represents a burden to sustainable revitalization. potential solutions—as suggested by local consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6739 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 6-1715 ngos—include leveraging cultural heritage value or tourism as a secondary incentive for both initial restoration and maintenance. additionally suggested was enhanced government involvement in land protection to prevent pollution. future work includes longitudinal case studies that examine the hydrology and water quality surrounding these sites in an epidemiological fashion. additionally, an investigation into new potential maintenance policies of these sites should be studied to explore not only barriers to initial restoration, but also barriers to sustainability. acknowledgementsacknowledgements this work was supported in part by the community of excellence in global health equity, honors college, and grace capen academic fund at the university at buffalo –state university of new york. the authors would also like to acknowledge and thank the university at buffalo asian studies program, kayleigh hammernik, david tallents, alexander covert as well as dr. pushkar sohoni of the indian institute of science education and research and dr. govindan kutty of government college, chittur, palakkad. additionally, the authors especially want to thank dr. walter hakala for his enthusiasm, encouragement, and mentorship. referencesreferences aartsen, m., koop, s., hegger, d. et al. 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(1972). dictionary of geology. penguin books, london, uk. world health organization, (2017). guidelines for drinking-water quality: fourth edition incorporating the first addendum. geneva: world health organization; license: cc by-nc-sa 3.0 igo. world monuments fund, (2020). historic water systems of the deccan plateau. world monuments fund. https://www.wmf. org/project/historic-water-systems-deccan-plateau microsoft word cain final.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 147–157   a different path: the global water crisis and rainwater harvesting nicholas l. cain school of international and public affairs columbia university abstract the global water crisis is predicted to kill 34 to 76 million people by 2020. largescale infrastructure projects can provide water, but construction of these projects has not proven adequate to meet growing populations and, even where feasible, large-scale projects have significant social, economic and environmental impacts. a different path to solving the global water crisis that emphasizes efficiency and sustainable, communityscale projects in addition to centralized infrastructure, has been mapped by a range of scholars and activists. small scale rainwater harvesting is one sustainable approach that is proving increasingly effective in both rural and urban settings in the developing world. this paper surveys the use of rainwater harvesting in india and draws some lessons for the application of this approach to other regions. keywords: water crisis; rainwater harvesting. 1. the problem: improving access to water the dimensions of the global water crisis are massive: some 1.2 billion people do not have access to safe drinking water, 2.6 billion lack access to adequate sanitation and at least two million people die per year from a lack of clean water-a large portion of them children.1 an analysis of these numbers finds that by 2020, some 34 to 76 million people may perish from water related disease2-potentially a greater toll than that of the aids crisis over a similar time scale (see figure 1). as the global water crisis has received increasing attention from policy makers, activists, corporations and governments, a debate has grown over the best way to help those who suffer without clean water. despite years of discussion, small-scale approaches like rainwater harvesting continue to get scant attention or support at the international level. this paper argues that rainwater harvesting is a sustainable and widely applicable approach to providing water in both developing and industrial nations-and that it should receive more vigorous support from ngos and governments. 1 watkins et al, 2006 2 gleick 2005 148 consilience   figure 1: deaths from the global water crisis; even if the un millennium development goals are met, the global water crisis could exact a terrible toll over the coming years with 34 to 76 million deaths predicted by 2020. (source: gleick and cain, 2005). in 2003, the world water council, an international water think tank and policy group, released "financing water for all".3 with the laudable goal of laying out various options for providing the massive aid needed to fund global efforts to improve water and sanitation access, the report found that some $100 billion, most of it for large-scale centralized projects, is needed. to fund these massive projects, the report calls for increased privatization and corporate investment. however, a growing body of scholarship and work in the field has shown that large-scale, centralized projects are rife with ecological, economic and social impacts. the construction of large dams, especially in the developing world, has destroyed ecosystems and communities while failing to provide flood protection, irrigation or other benefits at a sufficient level to justify the project. the benefits that do accrue often fail to impact the lives of those in marginalized urban and rural communities. as the world commission on dams states in their report: while dams have delivered many benefits and made a significant contribution to human development, in too many cases the price paid to secure those benefits, especially in social and environmental terms, has been too high and, more importantly, could have been avoided. applying a balance-sheet approach to assess the costs and benefits of large dams that trades off one group's loss with another's gain is seen as unacceptable, particularly given existing commitments to human rights and sustainable development.4 another school of thought, represented by researchers like those at the council of canadians, public service international, water aid, and the pacific institute of oakland, california holds that a different approach is possible. broadly speaking, this approach has been dubbed the "soft path" for water and emphasizes smaller-scale, sustainable approaches.5 these researchers have found that a soft path would be a 3 camdessus and winpenny, 2003 4 world commission on dams, 2001 5 gleick 2003 149 consilience   more effective and economical solution to the issue of global water access, with funding needs in the range of $9 to $30 billion per year. the soft path for water emphasizes the importance of using community-scale and environmentally sustainable approaches before turning to large, centralized infrastructure. one soft path technique that has been the focus of much recent study is small-scale rainwater harvesting. although rainwater harvesting using current technology shows great promise, it is hardly a new idea: indigenous communities in africa and asia have been using similar approaches for thousands of years. this paper will examine the options for creating or recreating this approach in contemporary settings. although global issues will be considered, i will focus on the recent experience of india. 2. a community scale approach: engaging new and traditional stakeholders as critics of the hard path have detailed, the lack of adequate community and individual involvement in project planning is, in many circumstances, the first mistake in a chain of errors that begets future problems with project design, construction, and operations and maintenance. the literature on foreign aid in general, and large-scale water projects in particular, is replete with examples of projects that were designed based on false assumptions and without even considering the needs of those most at risk.6 even when the needs of marginalized urban and rural communities are considered, the hard path solutions put forward are frequently inappropriate or even counterproductive. in some cases, projects that have provided a reasonably functional benefit have fallen into disuse due to lack of operations support and the inability to maintain them.7,8 one common thread that links these failed projects is a top-down planning approach that bypasses or ignores community knowledge, concerns and input. although it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine in detail the best planning approaches for large-scale projects, it is clear that effective planning involves considering the community impacts and engaging all relevant stakeholders especially traditionally marginalized communities.9 for water projects, the stakeholders must include affected individuals and communities, governments, finance organizations, and ngos. although many international finance organizations are at least giving rhetorical support to community-level projects, the bulk of international funding still goes to large, centralized projects, such as large dams, reservoirs and irrigation systems (see figures in box 2). there are scale challenges to small-scale projects: many more may be required to provide access to large numbers of people. international finance organizations and some ngos may also lack the capacity to engage communities in a productive fashion. 6 world commission on dams, 2001 7 leslie, 2006 8 rosenberg et al, 2000 9 black, 2001 151 consilience   however, despite potential barriers, ongoing work in indian cities such as delhi, mumbai, chennai and bangalore10 provides strong evidence that not only is rainwater harvesting socially acceptable to poor communities (defined as those without access to basic services such as water, or living on less than $1.25 per day11), but also that these kind of efforts can build local capacity to create a self-sustaining movement. there is also some evidence that individual rainwater harvesting programs can help educate consumers about the importance of demand-side efficiency and ensure adequate maintenance by fostering a sense of ownership.12 3. potential for rainwater harvesting in waterscarce regions with positive evidence that small-scale water harvesting is not only socially permissible in developing communities, but can actually help engage and activate a wide range of stake holders, let us look at some of the applications and challenges in more detail. 3.1 capacity and climate the first question we must consider is related to climate, can rainwater harvesting provide enough water to meet basic human needs, assist with irrigation or be otherwise useful to people in a given region? john gould's assessments of the relevant literature has found, "in a semi-humid climate with a mean year round rainfall of 1,000 mm, event a modest sized 50m2 roof, can potentially yield up to 40m3 of water annually, equivalent to more than 100 liters of water per day." in a semi-arid climate, with annual mean rainfall of 500 mm, a similar sized roof could provide 20m3 of water, or about 50 liters per day. the systems would require a storage capacity of 2 to 4 m3 and 5 to 10 m3, respectively, to ensure reliability for each system.13 field testing has confirmed these figures and demonstrated that rainwater harvesting is practical in a wide range of environments in india. efforts by the rainwater club, a nonprofit organization based in bangalore, india, have shown that capacity-wise, small systems based on a 50m2 roof and 500 to 1,000 liter storage system are proving effective for urban users in central india14. in rajasthan, in arid northern india, rainwater harvesting is also proving to be successful. the barefoot college has helped 13 villages in the rajasthan region build community-scale systems, creating at least a partial water supply for 470 schools and community centers and 150,000 people. the college, dedicated to help "the poorest of the poor"15 through practical research and education, trains rural youth to help 10 see http://rainwaterclub.org/ for details on efforts in bangalore, accessed: 8/15/07. 11 see http://go.worldbank.org/rqbdctuxw0 for a full discussion of global poverty measures, accessed 9/30/09. 12 kahmat, 2007 13 gould, 1999 14 see http://www.rainwaterclub.org, accessed 8/15/07. 15 see http://www.barefootcollege.org/, accessed 9/30/09. 152 consilience   test water quality and trains village women as engineers and mechanics to design and repair systems16. other more urbanized regions of india are also successfully using rainwater harvesting. in mumbai, india's most populous city, the rainwater club is educating residents of all income levels about the benefits of rainwater harvesting and the nuts and-bolts issues of how to create a system.17 the city and the state of gujarat have recently passed laws to mandate the installation of rainwater harvesting infrastructure in new construction. in fact, a growing number of regional and local governments across india have begun mandating or encouraging this approach18. notable efforts include: • the city of new delhi and the state of kerala, which have mandated rainwater harvesting technology for all new buildings with a roof size of over 100m2 or a plot size of over 1000 m2; • the city of hyberabad, which has mandated rainwater harvesting for all new buildings with a plot size of over 300m2; • the southern state of tamil nadu, which now requires all new public and private buildings to include the technology. the state has the ability to add the technology to structures that do not comply and bill the users. and it is not just urban users that are benefiting. efforts to restore and build traditional earthen rain catchments for agriculture and groundwater recharge are proving popular in northern india19 and this traditional approach has the double benefit of improving the lives of rural farmers and reducing migration to large urban centers.20 even when rainwater harvesting is not sufficient to provide all of a family's needs, it can still provide substantial benefit.21 every liter of water that does not have to be hauled from a communal water source or purchased from a vendor allows poor households to free up time and money for more productive purposes, which, in turn can provide an economic boost. 3.2 cost concerns although many of the systems covered above are quite inexpensive by western standards, their costs may still be prohibitive for poor people in the developing world. the basic system pictured in figure 3 costs the equivalent of $60, but for a poor person, that could represent several months of income and would be impossible for them to afford without assistance.22 adding to cost concerns is that, in areas with a highly variable rainfall or an arid climate, larger storage systems may be needed to ensure reliable supply-although it is worth noting that other 16 see http://www.barefootcollege.org/prog_rwh.htm, accessed 8/15/07. 17 kamat, 2005 18 see http://www.rainwaterharvesting.org/policy/legislation.htm for a list of recent legislation, accessed 8/15/07. 19 suutari, 2007 20 rajvanshi, 2002 21 gould, 1999 22 un, 2006 153 consilience   figure 3: basic system design; a basic rainwater harvesting system, such as the one pictured above, can be built of basic materials for the equivalent of $60, depending on local costs and system size; the main technical requirements are an impervious roof and room for a cistern or tank (photo: s. vishwanath, rainwater club). alternative options, such as buying water from vendors, may be more expensive or time consuming than even expanded rainwater harvesting systems23. mandating the addition of the rainwater harvesting equipment to new construction, as discussed above, is one relatively easy way to expand its use, but this approach will provide benefit mostly to those of higher incomes. for low-income urban and rural communities, direct aid from governments and ngos is clearly needed to expand the use of rainwater harvesting. public-private efforts that mix ngo and governmental aid with small-scale entrepreneurial efforts are also proving effective as demonstrated by the rainwater club and barefoot college programs. 3.3 water quality concerns another key technical barrier to the wider adoption of rainwater harvesting is ensuring that the water is fit for drinking, or at least for washing, irrigation, recharge or whatever the intended purpose may be. although rainwater is generally free of gross industrial pollution, microorganisms, heavy metals and other hazards that plague surface and groundwater, rainwater can become contaminated by atmospheric pollution, which is rampant in developing urban areas.24 microorganisms, although usually not present in rainwater, can be picked up during collection and can taint cisterns, tanks and other infrastructure. certainly, if the water is to be consistently used for drinking, some kind of treatment is needed. of course many highly effective approaches like membrane filtration are not appropriate to the developing world. simple sponge-based filters, 23 gould, 1999 24 ibid. 154 consilience   such as the one shown in box 3, can keep out debris and prevent insects from entering storage systems. however, approaches using chlorine, biosands, ceramic vessels, solar-powered uv-disinfection, flocculation, filtration-or, ideally, some combination of these approaches-provide a greater margin of safety and have proven effective in the developing world.25 another interesting alternative to cleaning the water to potability, is to use rainwater harvesting to irrigate small gardens or farms, which has shown to be very effective in ethiopia. even if rainwater harvesting is only used for supplementary irrigationincreasing the amount of food that can be grown in small gardens-it can help "millions of people. achieve household food security through home garden micro irrigation, and [create] modest wealth for emerging commercial farmers."26 in certain areas of india, untreated rainwater is being used to recharge groundwater aquifers. by channeling rainwater into small-scale storage and then letting it drain directly into borehole wells, aquifers that have been drawn down by pumping can be restored.27 in turn, this water can be drawn into municipal systems and treated at the community scale. 3.4 cultural concerns along with any technical barriers, it is also important to consider cultural concerns and, indeed, the rainwater club has noted that it takes education and outreach to convince some prospective users that the systems are worth the investment in time, money and space. this area is where a peer-based educational system combined with some third-party oversight by ngos or governments can be useful. despite these challenges, there is substantial evidence that community-scale rainwater harvesting programs can assuage these concerns and that a grassroots approach that focuses on assisting early adopters and empowering them to reach out to their neighbors can be especially effective. 3.5 environmental concerns in most cases, rainwater harvesting has a minimal or even positive environmental impact. by reducing the need to pump groundwater or divert ecological flows, rainwater harvesting can help reduce pressure on ecosystems. in urban areas, rainwater harvesting not only reduces demands on whatever water infrastructure may exist, but it also can greatly reduce storm water and wastewater flows, which, in many poor communities may carry a significant amount of pollution into area waters. despite these positives, there are some potential environmental risks, especially in rural areas where large-scale adoption of water harvesting for agriculture could reduce environmental flows.28 25 lantagne, 2005 26 awulachew, 2005 27 gupta and deshpanade, 2004 28 gould, 1999 155 consilience   climate change also presents a challenge to rainwater harvesting. any phenomena that reduces rainfall, reduces yields from rainwater harvesting. climate change, in certain regions, could render existing systems ineffective if storage capacity is not sufficient to hold a reliable supply or if precipitation falls below a practical threshold. however, here too, the positives may outweigh the negatives as rainwater harvesting can be used to adapt to climate change if properly deployed.29 4. policy recommendations and conclusion rainwater harvesting has a wide range of potential applications in the developing world. from providing potable water to urban areas, to creating irrigation alternatives for farmers, and even assisting with recharge of aquifers, it is a flexible and effective technology that deserves wider support and expanded use. the approach also has few environmental impacts, is cost-effective and, with proper aid and government funding, can be made affordable to even the poorest people. rainwater harvesting systems can also be adapted to a wide range of climates. in much of asia, africa and the americas, and in many of the areas hit hardest by the global water crisis, average rainfall is greater than 1,000 mm per year-a more than sufficient threshold for viable rainwater harvesting.30 there are challenges to implementing rainwater harvesting on a large scale. it will take time and scores of community-level campaigns to reach even a small fraction of those without access to water. in turn, these small-scale efforts require the trust and support of individuals and communities, who, in some cases, may be skeptical of new technology and outside aid. however, as many successful examples from india have illustrated, not only is it possible to gain the trust of local communities, but, with proper training and incentives, community members can be empowered to help educate neighbors, design systems and maintain existing infrastructure. the biggest barrier to the wider adoption of rainwater harvesting seems to be the scant funding it has received from international ngos and finance organizations. although this is starting to change, the lion's share of aid and financing continues to go to large, centralized projects. a concerted effort to gather successful case studies, perform quantitative assessments and communicate the results is needed to change these funding priorities. in some areas, issues of conflict and government support may be the biggest barriers. it can be very difficult to convince hostile governments to provide assistance to marginalized communities and, in a war-torn region, any kind of investment in infrastructure may be seen as aid to one political group or another. however, even in these regions, small-scale projects may be more feasible than large scale approaches. in summary, rainwater harvesting can be adapted to a wide range of tasks and settings and should be more widely used. although cost can be a barrier, simple systems are relatively inexpensive and more complex systems can be cost effective at the community scale. pollution can be an issue in urban areas, but rainwater is 29 pandey et al, 2003 30 gould, 1999 156 consilience   generally cleaner than groundwater or surface water, and inexpensive filtration techniques are available. compared to large-scale approaches to providing water to those without basic access, rainwater harvesting is a cost-effective and feasible approach that should gain greater support and financing. 157 consilience   bibliography anjali prayag, "karnataka: rainwater harvesting as people's movement," the hindu business line, june 14, 2002, accessed 8/15/2007. awulachew, s. b, et al, "experiences and opportunities for promoting small scale/micro irrigation and rainwater harvesting for food security in ethiopia," iwmi, colombo, sri lanka. no date. black, harvey, "dam-building decisions: a new flood of fairness," environmental health perspectives 109:2, february 2001. gleick, p. "deaths from water related disease," pacific institute white paper, 2005. gleick, peter h., "global freshwater resource: soft-path solutions for the 21st century," science 302: 1524, 2003. gleick, p. and n. cain, "the global water crisis," issues in science and technology, summer 2005. gould, john, "contributions relating to rainwater harvesting," world commission on dams, october 1999. gupta, s. k. and r. d. deshpande, "water for india in 2050: first-order assessment of available options," current science 86:9, 5/10/04. lantagne, daniele s., et al, "household water treatment and safe storage options in developing countries: a review of current implementation practices," in water stories, environmental change and security program, woodrow wilson international center for scholars, 2006 leslie, jaques, deep water: the epic struggle over dams, displaced people, and the environment, farrar, straus and giroux, 2006. michael camdessus and jame winpenny, "financing water for all," world water council, 2003. pandey et al, "rainwater harvesting as an adaptation to climate change," current science, 85:1, 7/10/2003. rahul kamat, "save water, live better," project monitor, may 2005, accessed 8/15/07. rajvanshi, anil k., "talukas can provide critical mass for india's sustainable development," current science 82:6, 3/25/02. rosenberg, david m. et al, "global-scale environmental effects of hydrological alterations: introduction," bioscience 50:9, september 2000. suutari, amanda, "restoring rajasthan's traditional earthen dams for rainwater harvesting and groundwater replenishment," an eco tipping points project paper, 6/14/07, accessed 8/15/07. watkins et al, "the 2006 human development report," united nations, 2006. world commission on dams, "dams and development: a new framework for decision-making," world commission on dams, february 2001. yunus, muhammad, banker to the poor: micro-lending and the battle against world poverty, publicaffairs, june 1999. microsoft word park.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 14, iss. 2 (2015), pp.189–206 climate change and capitalism jonathan t. park university of utah jonathant.park88@gmail.com abstract capitalism was designed as a mechanism for efficiently allocating scarce resources, encouraging human ingenuity, and improving the quality of life for those willing and able to participate in the system. this economic model has been prodigiously effective at enabling people to convert natural resources into fungible commodities and monetary wealth. by transmuting vast amounts of natural resources into marketable products, capitalism has generated an unparalleled degree of wealth and prosperity. in theory, the production of wealth and the collective quality of life can be constantly enhanced under this economic model. although wealth accumulation has hitherto entailed the unsustainable depletion of natural resources, capitalism maintains that when a commercially viable resource is exhausted, the market will produce an alternative. thus, capitalism is supposedly an indefatigable method for perpetually generating more wealth and greater social prosperity. while capitalism has produced a plethora of socioeconomic benefits over its relatively brief history, it has also instigated unforeseen and undesirable consequences. with every product having a byproduct, our ability to extract and consume an immense bounty of natural resources has generated a correspondingly monstrous amount of waste in the form of physical garbage, atmospheric pollution, and other forms of environmental degradation. global climate change has been the most severe consequence of our society’s excessive atmospheric pollution. we now know that our primary method of generating energy – burning fossil fuels – releases carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, heating up the planet and severely altering the climate system. anthropogenic climate change poses an imminent threat to the planet’s lifesustaining ecological systems, and it represents one of humanity’s most difficult challenges to date. if humanity is to overcome this problem, we will need to place strict, explicit limitations on the amount of atmospheric pollution that can be emitted globally. since pollution is a direct consequence of consumption, we must also limit the amount of resources we use. any viable solution to climate change will therefore require a global agreement to drastically inhibit the extraction, production, and consumption of natural resources. yet, the capitalist system as it currently stands is neither designed for nor capable of consciously inhibiting its own propensity for unsustainable growth. the basic assumptions under which neoliberal capitalism operates renders it incapable of correcting climate change. author’s note as a student of environmental sustainability science, i am fascinated, and admittedly frightened, by the complex issue of climate change. the climatic challenge captivates me because it is inseparably linked to all aspects of our lives, and has far reaching implications for every sphere of human society, yet it seems that most people view it as an esoteric, abstract conundrum that is many degrees removed from daily life. it is a problem that looms ominously over us, threatening to irrevocably alter our natural and socially constructed systems. still, very few people are willing to admit that if we do not halt the unsustainable consumption consilience park: climate change and capitalism habits that have landed us in this predicament, nature will do it for us. to me, we are at a momentous crossroad where we must decide whether to act by consciously reducing our fossil fuel emissions and changing the way we evaluate our natural resources, or to be acted upon and suffer the vengeance of the natural world. the dominant capitalist economic model appears inherently incapable of reconciling the discrepancy between our appraisal of natural resources and their actual value. it did not take very long after i began studying climate change and other prevalent environmental issues that i came to recognize the need for an economic paradigm shift that would enable us to more accurately assess the value of our natural world. this paper is my personal exploration of the failures of capitalism insofar as it impacts climate change, and a small window into how we might best begin the process of re-evaluating our relationship with (and our perception of) nature. keywords: climate change, global warming, capitalism, economics, revolution. 1. the reality of climate change the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc), established in 1988, has been instrumental in cultivating a consensus on and fostering an international forum for assessing the science of climate change (helm, 2008). composed of the world’s top scientists, the ipcc produces regular assessments on the state of climate knowledge, forecasts future changes, and offers emission reduction policy recommendations to the united nations. the panel’s findings have indicated that if the planet were to warm by more than two degrees celsius above pre-industrial levels, the world would experience a plethora of disastrous environmental consequences. sea levels would rise by a meter or more, swallowing up coastal and low-lying island populations. intense wildfires would rage around the world, consuming large swaths of the planet’s remaining forests. some regions would experience heavy rain and flooding, while others would suffer protracted periods of severe drought. extreme weather events, such as tornados and hurricanes, would become more common (world resources institute, 2014). if we were to exceed the two degrees celsius warming threshold, we would effectively usher in a new epoch of climatic chaos. the environmental conditions under which life on earth has evolved and acclimated to over hundreds of thousands of years would change radically. the current, observable rate of change in the climate system, marked by oceanic warming, snow and ice melt, sea level rise, and atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, is historically anomalous. skeptics are quick to argue that the climate is, and always has been, in a state of constant change (lindzen, 2009). while this is undeniably true, ice core evidence of atmospheric composition over the past 420,000 years reveals that the ongoing rate and degree of change far surpasses any and all historical precedents (petit, et al., 1999, p. 430). when the earth’s climate has undergone significant warming in the past, it has occurred gradually, over tens of thousands of years, giving the planet and its myriad of inhabitants time to adapt. yet, even the relatively slow climatic transitions of the past have brought about mass extinctions of plant and animal life. the extraordinarily rapid transformation that the climate is currently undergoing is outpacing many species’ evolutionary ability to adapt. if global warming continues to accelerate unabated, the web of life – of which people are an inseparable element – consilience park: climate change and capitalism that has evolved to exist within a very specific set of environmental conditions might be unfit for survival in the near future. considering this unsettling reality, it is clear that we must take immediate action to curtail and, if possible, halt climate-disrupting greenhouse gas emissions. 1.1 global carbon budget in order to track humanity’s steady advance towards the brink of climate chaos, the ipcc devised a “global carbon budget.” the global carbon budget is a measure of how many more tons of carbon humans can collectively emit before we eclipse the 2 degrees celsius warming threshold. the international community of climate scientists has determined that our budget is around one trillion tons, or 1,000 petagrams of carbon (pgc), above pre-industrial levels for a “reasonable chance” of not exceeding 2 degrees celsius. this figure does not account for the effects of additional greenhouse gases, such as nitrous oxides and methane, on the climate system, and thus it is a very conservative estimate of how much more pollution we can safely emit. even so, our carbon budget has already dwindled to about 500 gigatons, and the most recent ipcc report estimates that, if we continue on our current emissions trajectory, we could max out our budget by as early as 2045 (kirtman, et al., 2013, p. 981). in the summary for policymakers section of the ipcc’s latest report, the authors warn that “continued emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes in all components of the climate system. limiting climate change will require substantial and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions” (stocker, et al., 2013, p. 19). human-produced greenhouse gas emissions clearly pose an imminent and serious threat to the stability of our climate system. if we are to limbo under the 2 degrees celsius warming threshold and avoid the most devastating consequences of climate change, we will have to make swift, stringent alterations to our consumption habits. 1.2 promises of capitalism capitalism is premised on the law of supply and demand. this law assumes that every consumer rationally evaluates each purchase that they make using a costbenefit analysis. if the benefits of purchasing an item outweigh the costs, then the consumer will buy the item; otherwise, they will not. the logical corollary to this assumption is that more consumption will always be more beneficial to society. furthermore, it is presupposed that consumers drive the demand for products, and suppliers will only produce at the equilibrium quantity dependent on consumer demand. thus, in theory, capitalism is the most efficient method of allocating resources. the theory maintains that we will not convert resources into products unless those products are going to benefit society more than they will cost society. the implicit assumption built into the logic of capitalism is that economic growth is directly correlated with social prosperity. as the economic system expands exponentially, society will consequentially improve at an exponential rate, for society is theoretically better off for having more wealth than not, irrespective of how that wealth is allocated. the finite nature of resources is not a concern because when any consilience park: climate change and capitalism given resource becomes scarce, the market will naturally produce an alternative. this is founded on the idea that if there is a great enough demand for a product, price signals will mobilize firms to meet that demand. even when the resources required to make the product are exhausted, the demand for the product will still exist, therefore encouraging firms to innovate, and inevitably spurring the discovery of an alternative resource or product to satisfy the unmet demand. the promise of an inexhaustible well of human ingenuity, capable of overcoming any conceivable scarcity of socially-desirable resources, ensures that capitalist economies will, theoretically, never need to shrink or slow down. 2. problems with the capitalist model 2.1 assumptions regarding cost/benefit analysis the theory of capitalism is much tidier than its actual application. in practice, capitalism is not functioning as it is supposed to. one of the primary problems is that no one conducts a true cost-benefit analysis for each purchase that they make. consider the purchase of gasoline, for example. according to supply and demand, consumers will carefully weigh the true costs and benefits of their purchase before buying so much as a single gallon of gas. the consumer would thus have to contemplate where and how the gasoline was produced, where it will go after it is used, and what the consequences of using it will be. they would consider that burning one gallon of gas will emit 19.64 pounds of carbon into the atmosphere (eia, 2014), and that we can collectively burn around 500 gigatons of carbon before the climate will be dangerously and irrevocably altered (quick, 2014). the rational consumer would then divide 19.64 pounds by 825 gigatons to find the precise percentage of the carbon budget that is being eaten away by each gallon of gas they buy. next, the consumer would convert that percentage into a dollar amount that would incorporate the value of a stable climate, including biodiversity, life-supporting natural systems and services, and natural resources. after factoring everything mentioned and the myriad of other consequences into the cost of a gallon of gasoline, the consumer would weigh that cost against the benefits of the same gallon of gas. if the benefits outweigh the costs, and the cost is less than the asking price, then the consumer will make the purchase. no one who has ever bought a gallon of gas, or anything else for that matter, has ever done an accurate, consummate costbenefit analysis. it is simply not possible because there are way too many factors to consider, but also because there is no accepted way to assign a dollar value to our climate system and the services it provides. meanwhile, it is also difficult to assign a dollar value to the cost of climate change, which the market has not integrated into the price of gas at the pump. the fundamental problem, however, is that without a healthy atmosphere and self-regulating climate, we would not be able to survive, and money would be worthless. yet capitalism in its current form assumes everything, including natural capital, has a monetary value and is interchangeable. this is the heart of the problem; by evaluating the world in terms of dollars, we confound market price with actual value. when making this distinction between cost and price, the theory of capitalism begins to crumble. consumer purchases, even those based consilience park: climate change and capitalism on cost-benefit analyses, are not always more beneficial to society than they are costly. when we consider the cost-benefit methodology at a higher level than the individual consumer, the consequences of miscalculation can be devastating. consider this anecdotal evidence of the potentially disastrous social ramifications of decisions that hinge on the outcome of fallible cost-benefit analyses: “several years ago, states were in the middle of their litigation against tobacco companies, seeking to recoup the medical expenditures they had incurred as a result of smoking. at that time, w. kip viscusi a professor of law and economics at harvard and the primary source of the current $ 6.3 million estimate for the value of a statistical life undertook research concluding that states, in fact, saved money as the result of smoking by their citizens. why? because they died early! they thus saved their states the trouble and expense of providing nursing home care and other services associated with an aging population. viscusi didn't stop there. so great, under viscusi's assumptions, were the financial benefits to the states of their citizens' premature deaths that, he suggested, "cigarette smoking should be subsidized rather than taxed” (ackerman & heinzerling, 2002, p. 1). this summary is disturbing because it explains the outcome of a completely conventional method for evaluating the social costs and benefits of a proposed policy. some may argue that, economically speaking, having a statistical value of life is necessary for making informed policy decisions, and that it is not unwarranted given that people do not value life infinitely in their everyday decisions (e.g. choosing not to wear a seatbelt). however, ethical considerations cannot be discarded, as lackluster efforts to tackle climate change indicate is the case with the current system. when we consider the efficacy of cost-benefit analyses in the context of environmental policy, its shortcomings become dramatically more apparent. as articulated by ackerman and heinzerling, “to weigh the benefits of regulation against the costs, we need to know the monetary value of preventing the extinction of species, preserving many different ecosystems, avoiding all manner of serious health impacts, and even saving human lives. without such numbers, cost-benefit analysis cannot be conducted” (2002, p. 6). not only do cost-benefit analyses concerning environmental regulation require the monetary evaluation of current human and nonhuman life, but they must also consider posterity. to illustrate that capitalism is ill-equipped to accurately evaluate the true worth of our environment as a whole, and the climate system in particular, consider australia’s unsuccessful attempt to implement a carbon tax. on july 1, 2012, australia became the first country to adopt an explicit, national carbon tax, and on july 17, 2014, australia became the first country to repeal a national carbon tax. when the tax was implemented in 2012, it was intended to initiate a transition to non-fossil fuel based energy sources and inspire investments in clean, renewable energy. an initial tax of $23 per ton of carbon emissions, which rose to $24.15 in 2013, was levied against australia’s foremost 500 polluters. the targeted group of polluters, primarily comprised of energy and industrial companies, only constituted .02% of the nation’s 3 million businesses. when australia’s carbon tax experiment met its demise in 2014, it had effectively reduced emissions from the power generation sector by 1-2%. as for the anticipated surge of clean energy consilience park: climate change and capitalism investments that was supposed to result from the tax, it never materialized. investments in large-scale clean energy projects in the first six months of 2014 were the lowest that they had been since 2001 (levitan, 2014). when tony abbott was elected prime minister of australia, the fate of the carbon tax was essentially sealed. mr. abbott was elected on the promise that he would repeal the tax, which he deemed “useless” and “destructive.” business leaders, especially those in australia’s gigantic coal industry, were vocal about their opposition to the tax from its inception, claiming that it would destroy jobs and cause electricity prices to soar. there was a slight rise in electricity rates over the time that the tax was in place, though some have argued that it was the result of excessive spending by energy companies, who were pouring money into unnecessary electricity infrastructure projects. in spite of the equivocal effects that australia’s carbon tax had on electricity consumers, during his campaign mr. abbott claimed that repealing the tax would save consumers roughly $520 (u.s.) a year. while the prime minister has acknowledged that climate change is a serious issue, he maintains that solutions, such as a carbon tax, should not “clobber the economy” (baird, 2014). australia’s attempt at implementing an effective carbon tax that would lower emissions failed because the economic cost outweighed the perceived environmental benefits. according to the institute for energy research, the lofty economic costs of the carbon tax included: the loss of 80 jobs, a 16-19% increase in electricity rates, and a net loss of $4.38 billion to the australian government (robson, 2013, p. 9). the ier, which receives the majority of its funding from energy companies (harkinson, 2009) and whose ceo doesn’t believe in anthropogenic climate change, is by no means unbiased, and their numbers are highly inflated compared to other economic analyses. for instance, the financial review estimated that the tax only contributed to a 6% hike in electricity rates, and that it actually generated a net income for the government (minchin, hopkin, 2014). regardless, it does not really matter who was right, or what the exact economic costs were, because we have no way of accurately assessing the environmental benefits. within the confines of capitalism, it is more difficult to appraise the legitimate value of a stable climate than it is to determine the true cost of a gallon of gasoline. the value of australia’s carbon tax was weighed in terms of new clean energy investments, jobs, and estimated carbon dioxide emission reductions. ironically, the only category that offered any direct indication of how effective the carbon tax was at mitigating climate change – emissions reduction – is also the only category that cannot be expressed in a dollar amount. it is also the one category that appeared to improve, if only slightly, from the tax. this further demonstrates the limits of costbenefit analysis in effective public policymaking. carbon dioxide emissions from australia’s energy sector, which account for roughly 75% of the national total, dropped by 1-2% while the tax was in place. according to the union of concerned scientists, australia is responsible for less than 1% of global carbon dioxide emissions, which means that its economyclobbering carbon tax reduced global atmospheric carbon dioxide pollution by about a hundredth of a percent. when viewed through the lens of neoliberal capitalism, which serves as the foundation of australia’s mixed-market economy, which is also heavily reliant on the energy sector, the costs of mitigating climate change will almost always outweigh the benefits. consilience park: climate change and capitalism the problem is not necessarily inherent to the idea of carbon taxation itself, but rather with the broader economic perspective that the tax is placed in. regardless of whether the ier’s assessment that carbon taxation cost australia roughly $4 billion dollars is more accurate than the financial review’s estimate of roughly $6 billion is, there was nevertheless a staggering amount of money changing hands. regardless of how one looks at it, the carbon tax and the associative movement of that money only accomplished a .01% decline in global carbon dioxide emissions. in the context of neoliberal capitalism and cost-benefit analysis, mitigation is a horrible investment because it does not offer a precise, quantifiable return. as evidenced in australia, when we demand that any possible solution to climate change yield economic benefits, or at the very least, not come with any discernible economic costs, we doom ourselves to failure. economic growth is a function of population, technology, and resource consumption, and climate change abatement ultimately requires a dramatic reduction in the consumption of resources. thus, these two goals – economic growth and environmental sustainability – are at irreconcilable odds. as long as we allow national and global climate change mitigation efforts to be dictated by the capitalist dogma that the economic reward of any endeavor must outweigh the costs, we will be utterly incapable of preventing or avoiding the catastrophic consequences of climate change. leaders, policy makers, and humanity as a whole will have to accept the fact that there is simply no way to put a price tag on our planet, or its life-sustaining climate system. any and all attempts to do so will inevitably prove to be insufficient and ultimately immoral. though capitalism itself may not be inherently immoral, it does have the inclination to promote behaviors of dubious moral quality. take, for example, the assertion that limitless resource consumption is a virtuous pursuit, which will always produce greater social prosperity. this premise of capitalism might very well hold true if the world operated in the way that capitalist idealists assume it does. capitalist theory dictates that society need not worry about fossil fuel depletion, or that of any finite resource, because the invisible hand of the market will inevitably conjure up a viable alternative. if this assumption were true and there existed an inexhaustible well of alternative resources and products, then the rate of resource consumption might possibly correlate with increased social well-being. however, that is simply not the reality of our situation. we live in a world of finite resources and, as incredible as the power of human innovation has proven itself to be, even ingenuity has its limits. the notion that any desirable resource can be replaced if the incentive is great enough is a fallacious justification for indiscriminate consumption. there is simply no way to replace clean air, potable water, or a stable, hospitable climate, nor can it be assumed that man-made capital would be distributed equitably. there is an old native american proverb that exemplifies this moral critique of capitalist theory as it applies to climate change. the saying goes: “we do not inherit the earth from our ancestors, we borrow it from our children.” it is wrong to impoverish and pollute the planet’s life sustaining natural resources and services, on the delusory assumption that future generations will develop “alternatives” to the naturally occurring prerequisites for survival. so long as we continue to propagate life, we have the moral obligation to ensure that our children are born into a world that is capable of facilitating and sustaining their existence. consilience park: climate change and capitalism 2.2 broken supply and demand mechanism in addition to the problematic assumptions underlying cost-benefit analysis, capitalism is not working in practice as it is said to work in theory because the law of supply and demand is not functioning as it is supposed to be. in theory, the demand for goods and services is driven by rational cost-benefit analysis. a major reason why capitalism is said to produce perennially positive social consequences is because the theory assumes that people will not buy things that they do not want or need, and that suppliers will not produce things that people will not buy. thus, each purchase represents the satisfaction of a true social want or need, which is conceivably benefiting both the consumer and the producer, and is therefore producing a net positive benefit for society as a whole. the problem is that people buy things that they do not want or need all the time. marketing and advertising schemes are designed to convince people that they need or want things that they would not need or want otherwise. every single day, suppliers are constantly trying to convince consumers to buy their products. consequently, the dynamics between supply and demand are much more multifaceted than they seem on the surface. ideally, companies in a capitalist system should not have to wage multibillion dollar ad campaigns to generate demand for their products, as their products would be in response to an existing demand; the script for the law of supply and demand is essentially flipped. suppliers are generating a demand for products, rather than consumers. this is problematic because it means our scarce natural resources are being converted into cash for the mere sake of generating wealth for the supplier, and not in order to provide people with the things that they actually need and want. by exchanging natural capital for monetary wealth without producing any tangible, social benefits, we are squandering natural resources and generating an inordinate, unnecessary amount of waste. therefore, capitalism, which contains markets such as advertising synthetically spawn demand for products that could otherwise not be as desirable, is not necessarily an efficient means of allocating resources. additionally, economic growth within this manifestation of capitalism does not directly translate into social prosperity. this is important because it reveals a gaping fissure in the capitalistic logic of indefinite growth. if perpetual economic growth does not result in perpetual social prosperity, it needs to slow down, or stop altogether, because it is still exhausting finite resources which might otherwise be employed, or preserved, to yield actual positive social benefits. 2.3 capitalism’s approach to climate change whether or not we are able to remain within the confines of our carbon budget will be the first test of our capacity to ultimately correct climate change. if we can inhibit the amount of carbon that we emit by limiting the amount of fossil fuels that we burn at such a pace and to such a degree that we avoid incurring irreversible, environmentally detrimental consequences, then we may yet pass the test. there are a myriad of different routes we might take to achieve this goal, but the purpose of this essay is to critique the capitalist course, so that is the one we will consider. this critique is partially theoretical as no nations have “purely” capitalist economies—most are mixed economies, which are characterized by varying degrees consilience park: climate change and capitalism of government intervention in the market, and a blend of publiclyand privatelyowned industries. however, every nation that participates in global trade, which essentially includes every nation on earth, plays by neoliberal capitalist-dictated rules. a major consequence of globalization has been the expansion free trade. so-called developed countries have successfully sought to incorporate “lesser developed countries” into a global trade network designed to foster greater economic growth, as defined by neoclassical economic metrics. gdp, the contemporary, universal marker of a nation’s success and prosperity, is the measure of all finished goods and services produced. the fastest way to grow gdp, and thus international prestige and perceived prosperity, is to exchange natural resources for monetary wealth in the form of goods. developed nations have become wealthy by converting most of their resources into currency, and thus the supplies of natural resources in developed nations are generally much smaller, and more expensive, to extract, than those of lesser developed nations. this is one of the great ironies of capitalist economies: the more resources a nation uses, the more that nation grows. the more that nation grows, the less resources the nation has. the less resources the nation has, the less that nation can grow, but the bigger the nation is, the more resources the nation must consume in order to keep growing. this is why capitalism is so closely related to globalization. so the free market is constantly expanding, assisted by the removal of governmental barriers to natural resources extraction, and paving the way for transnational corporations to continue meeting the ever-growing global demand for their products. it’s a vicious, self-perpetuating cycle that will eventually exhaust all of the world’s natural capital if it continues unabated. in the global economic system, every nation is subject to this capitalistic cycle because every nation seeks to improve its perceived prosperity, global prestige, and cumulative wealth, as measured by gdp. so although most countries technically practice mixed-market economics, the ideals of capitalism, such as the priority it places on unrelenting economic growth and resource consumption, as well as the edict of supply and demand, permeate and influence practically every national economy. thus, a critique of capitalist theory is relevant to assessing the capacity for national and global economies to intentionally reduce resource consumption in order to deal with climate change. matthew kahn, a professor of economics in the environment and public affairs department at ucla, authored the book climatopolis: how our cities will thrive in the hotter future. in this book, kahn articulates the free-market capitalism solution to the problem of climate change (kahn, 2012). he argues that unfettered capitalism is the key to simultaneously improving the quality of our environment and lifting the global population out of poverty. his argument is based on the idea that, as we consume more resources and accumulate more wealth, we expect a higher quality of goods and a higher quality of life in general. because consumers in a capitalist society are rational actors who comprehensively contemplate the consequences of their purchasing decisions, they will increasingly demand products that foster greater social and environmental prosperity. kahn hypothesizes that, as capitalism proliferates, and generates greater wealth for more people, the demand for higher quality products, and a higher quality environment, will likewise expand. capitalism assumes that supply follows demand, and thus as the demand for products that are conducive to a healthy environment grows, suppliers will abandon environmentally-degrading products and processes and adopt ones that are consilience park: climate change and capitalism environmentally friendly in order to meet the new demand. in this way, capitalism will naturally phase-out dirty fuels, wasteful practices, and low-quality goods that erroneously consume scarce resources, before permanent damage is done to the environment. not only does kahn argue that free-market capitalism is the best approach to mitigating climate change, he also asserts that it is the best system for adapting to climate change, because wealthier regions tend to weather the storm much more effectively than poorer regions. when extreme weather events occur, wealthier areas are less impacted and rebound much faster than poorer areas. additionally, when environmental disasters impact a region, capitalist economies are capable of sending price signals to the market that disincentivze people from living in these hazardous areas. for example, insurance companies raise their rates for people living in riskprone neighborhoods. this discourages habitation of these neighborhoods, and so when disaster strikes, less damage is incurred. on the contrary, when the market is not allowed to operate uninhibited and the government steps in to repair or protect private property, it encourages more people to live in these areas because they feel more artificially secure. government intervention creates the illusion of protection, but it is economic wealth, in kahn’s opinion, that actually shields us from mother nature’s violent outbursts. kahn’s view, which is the archetypical capitalist perspective, maintains that the role of government should be limited to providing information regarding natural disasters to the public, such as hurricane and flood warnings. the government need not coerce people to react to these warnings, because if individuals have access to the information, they will respond appropriately. kahn’s viewpoint is relieving and palatable. it invokes that characteristically capitalist optimism towards human ingenuity. it promises, as all persuasive capitalist arguments do, that if we just continue to consume resources to our heart’s content, we will create a future that is superior to the present in every conceivable way. 2.4 counterargument to capitalist-centric solutions to climate change there are several glaring defects in kahn’s capitalism inspired logic. though some of these issues have already been introduced, they will be reiterated and expanded upon here in direct response to the arguments presented in support of capitalism as the solution to climate change. firstly, kahn assumes that consumers are rational, well-informed actors who possess a consummate understanding of, or at least a genuine desire to understand, the causes and consequences of climate change, and who will model their behavior accordingly. however, the empirical evidence suggests that an astonishingly significant segment of the american population is ignorant of, and reluctant to become informed on, the reality of climate change. a 2013 survey, titled climate change in the american mind, revealed that 23% of americans are certain that climate change is not happening, while 14% do not know whether it is happening or not. (leiserowitz, et al., 2013, p. 5) if kahn’s presumption that capitalism fosters greater understanding and appreciation of the environment were true, we would expect to see a decline in the percentage of the population who are unaware and unconcerned with climate change. climate change in the american consilience park: climate change and capitalism mind indicates a burgeoning trend in the opposite direction. the survey found that the percentage of americans who do not believe in climate change, 23%, is swelling rapidly, even as the number of people who are uncertain about climate change shrinks. among those who do believe in climate change and global warming, less than half believe that is caused by human activities, and that number is declining (leiserowitz, et al., 2013, p. 5). if people do not believe in global warming, or do not believe that their actions are affecting the climate, they will have absolutely no reason to reduce their consumption of fossil fuels and other products that diminish the quality of our environment. this illuminating information is indicative of a growing degree of societywide ignorance towards the science of climate change, which is counterintuitive considering that the international scientific community reached a consensus on this subject nearly two decades ago. if american consumers were the rational actors that kahn and other avid proponents of capitalism considered them to be, their beliefs and behaviors would reflect the scientific consensus on climate change. they would realize that understanding the facts is in their best economic interest, and would therefore seek out the truth, modeling their consumption habits accordingly. kahn’s assessment relies almost entirely on the notion that consumers behave this way, but the evidence reveals, most assuredly, that they do not. the primary reason for this stems from the perverted nature of supply and demand, and the resultant dissemination of misinformation. as mentioned previously, many suppliers generate a synthetic demand for their products via marketing and advertising schemes. this fact is inherent to the very essence of advertising. advertising is the process of convincing people to buy a product that they might not buy otherwise. major ad campaigns almost universally attempt to connect their product to something that is much more desirable. for example, the new coke cans and bottles have common names written on them, and coke commercials explicitly suggest that buying and sharing their products will animate new platonic and romantic relationships. these campaigns attach their product to a fundamental human desire for love and social connection. this aggressive marketing tactic of associating low-quality, resource-intensive products with actual human needs and wants manipulates consumers to purchase a product based on unrealistic promises of satisfying a psychological longing, rather than on the product’s actual utility. potent examples of this phenomenon can be found nearly everywhere in modern, capitalist societies. by compelling people to buy products through playing on their unrelated, often intangible desires, advertisers distort the actual demand for social goods. when people are buying products that are mere representations of the things that they actually need or want, suppliers are not really responding to the needs and wants of society, and thus economic growth is failing to facilitate improved social prosperity. additionally, people’s consumption habits come to be based on illusory promises, unattainable expectations, and irrational associations rather than their substantive self-interests. the informationand expectation-distorting nature of advertising helps to explain why consumers are growing increasingly uneducated on the subject of climate change. although it is in every individual’s best interest to consume fewer resources, specifically fossil fuels, so as not to contribute as much to the escalation of climate change, the vast majority of information that we are bombarded with on a consilience park: climate change and capitalism daily basis is disseminated by companies and industries that have a compelling economic interest to convince us to constantly consume more. consider the way in which the law of supply and demand determines the value of products, and, by extension, natural resources. the number of people who want to buy a product and its availability determine its price and value. when demand is growing and supply shrinking, the price goes up, making the product more valuable. in theory, this characteristic of capitalism is what inspires people to invent or discover an alternative to the scarce product or resource. however, there is no built-in market mechanism to prevent the complete depletion of any given resource. it is simply assumed that, if the absolute expenditure of a given resource would cause adverse social consequences, people would realize this through the process of conducting their cost-benefit analyses and through price signals, and they would cease to consume and demand said resource. however, it has already been established that consumers do not behave as quintessential rational actors, and that the cost-benefit analysis is incapable of assessing the true value of natural resources. what all of this means with regard to climate change is that our economic system is designed to use up more fossil fuels than our environment is designed to handle. the known total of the earth’s extractable supply of fossil fuels is around 2,750 gigatons, of which 745 gigatons are owned by fossil fuel companies (quick, 2014). the proliferation of neoliberal capitalism and industrialization, coupled with population growth, is cultivating an ever-growing demand for fossil fuels that shows no signs of abating. recent data from the u.s. energy information administration, displayed in figure 1, shows the current and projected trends in global fossil fuel consumption. figure 1: (source: the global education project, 2014) as we can see in figure 1, there is no indication that the market is responding to the undeniably dire social need to consume fewer fossil fuels. what we see is quite the opposite. the market is signaling a need for the increased extraction, consilience park: climate change and capitalism production, and consumption of fossil fuels. the global demand for fossil fuels is a function of the global population, and both categories are experiencing consistent annual growth. thus, as population grows, the subsequent demand for fossil fuels grows, diminishing the total supply and jacking up the market value. inevitably, the fewer fossil fuels that are available, the more valuable they become. the irony is that, the more economically valuable fossil fuels become as a consequence of increased demand and reduced supply, the more imperative it will become for us not to consume them. unfortunately, that fact is unbeknownst to the free-market, and to the majority of its participants. this paper is not intended to vilify the fossil fuel industry or any other industry; it is merely a critique of the capitalist system that has cultivated the unproductive incentives for these industries to behave as they do. the systematic incentivization to indefinitely exhaust scarce resources, which are assumed to be replaceable upon depletion, inevitably ensures that unfettered capitalism will push us to the brink of climate chaos and beyond. the final major logical pitfall of the free-market, capitalist approach to resolving and adapting to climate change is the assertion that environmental regulation is unnecessary, and even counterproductive. proponents of a free-market resolution to climate change insist that the government’s role should be limited to providing the public with informative warnings regarding imminent natural disasters (kahn, 2012). they maintain that the government should not meddle with the freemarket by imposing limitations on the production or consumption of fossil fuels and all other resources. proponents also purport that government policies intended to buffer the effects of climate change, such as the provision of recovery funds for the victims of natural disasters, encourage people to subject themselves to inevitable environmental hazards, as they come to expect that the government will protect them from future natural disasters. government is critically important for providing the public with accurate information on present and future environmental hazards. on this point, there is no disagreement. however, the role of government should be not confined to this singular aim. national governments and international governance entities such as the united nations are in a unique position to enlighten people on the science of climate change. in fact, it was the united nations that spurred the establishment of the international scientific consensus on climate change via the ipcc. government and corporate entities are among the few organizations that possess the resources necessary to effectively compile and disseminate information on a national and global scale. additionally, these entities enjoy a high level of social influence, necessary for convincing people of the veracity of their claims. as previously mentioned, most corporations who are in a position to enlighten the public on climate change, specifically those in the fossil fuel and energy industries, have a powerful economic incentive to persuade consumers that climate change is not occurring, or that it is not a product of human action. these corporations frequently employ their influence to stir specious uncertainty into the mix of public perception of climate change, and thus protect their assets. while corporate influence no doubt permeates the political sphere, government is relatively less biased in climatic matters, and has an entrenched consilience park: climate change and capitalism interest, and a social responsibility, to provide people with the real facts of climate change, and to set a course for remediation. the greatest strides that have been made towards environmental protection and the abatement of global warming have been initiated by government entities. one of the best examples of this can be found in the national clean air act, passed in 1970. since 1980, this act has reduced sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide, both of which are harmful airborne pollutants, by 71% and 46%, respectively (union of concerned scientists, 2013). the caa has also forced commercial chlorofluorocarbons, which deteriorate the ozone layer, to be phased out, thus facilitating a recovery of ozone molecules in the upper atmosphere. if we were to allow the free-market to provide us with information that is relevant to environmental protection and climate change without government interference, we would be highly susceptible to adopting viewpoints that are skewed by economic interests. government involvement and regulation is necessary for preserving the environment, as well as mitigating and adapting to climate change. 3. conclusion the heart of our pressing environmental woes is that capitalism is incapable of accurately assessing and conveying the true value of natural resources. within our economic paradigm, it is irrational and undesirable not to extract and consume the total global supply of fossil fuels because they are considered more valuable as a commodity than as a benign, unemployed resource. yet, in our environmental reality, burning even a quarter of the available supply of fossil fuels would severely endanger the survival of life on earth as we know it, and thus we should strive to develop clean, reliable, and renewable energy sources as soon as possible. it is a global issue that will require global cooperation and coordination to resolve. it will require sacrifices, and large scale changes to our social order. the honest truth is that it will require a revolution. not a violent, impassioned uprising, but rather a cool, wellreasoned and intentional economic enlightenment. capitalism was born from a desire for liberty and prosperity. it freed people from the bonds of feudal oppression and enabled us to lay a claim to our own destinies. capitalism represents mankind’s incredible ability to adapt to and overcome problems. with this tool we have subdued the earth, and we have bent it to our will. but if we continue to employ this powerful economic utensil, the comfortable world that we have shaped for ourselves will snap under the strain. while we cannot deny our own tremendous talent for overcoming obstacles and devising alternative solutions when forced to do so, we also cannot ignore the wise words of albert einstein, who said: “we cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used to create them.” we live in a world that is much different from the one that gave rise to capitalism. we are faced with a much different set of problems than were the founders of the modern economic system. they sought freedom to explore the world, to connect it through intricate trade networks, to profit from its natural richness, and to protect those profits. they were immensely successful, and the capitalist model has handsomely improved the condition of humankind in innumerable ways. however, the solutions of the past have produced the problems of the present, and in order to address them we will have to look at the world through a new lens. we will have to design a method of assigning value to the world that is capable of preserving that value long into the consilience park: climate change and capitalism future. yet thinking alone cannot solve our climate conundrum; solutions will require action. as a start, we must rapidly phase out fossil fuels and transition to a renewable-energy based system. we will need to place immediate, globallyenforceable restraints on the production and consumption of fossil fuels, among other resources. we will definitely need to abandon our apparent obsession with making money, because resolving climate change will not be a profitable venture. but it will be truly invaluable, and somehow, some way, we will do it. the course that we must pursue to overcome this prodigious planetary problem cannot be the same course that led us to where we are today. the way to a brilliant, sustainable new future certainly exists, but it does not lie down the beaten path of capitalism that we currently tread. consilience park: climate change and capitalism bibliography baker, b. 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(2014, january 8). retrieved december 12, 2014, from http://www.theglobaleducationproject.org/earth/energy-supply.php. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 9, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 47 – 69 aiding development or aiding politics? how politics in sub-saharan africa impact the efficacy of official development assistance in ethiopia courtney meyer development studies the school of oriental and african studies, london, england email: c_meyer@soas.ac.uk abstract this article approaches the concept of sustainable development with a mind to the sustainability of the neoliberal economic philosophy through which official development is currently allocated. this article examines a contemporary aiddependent state in sub-saharan africa, ethiopia, to question how governance strategies impact the efficacy of official development assistance. much contemporary development literature neglects politics, concluding that aid effectiveness is contingent on economic variables. an increasing number of econometric studies consider the impact of aid on institutions, yet few discuss the political and developmental objectives, ultimately illustrating the naïveté of the neoliberal good-governance framework and the importance of recognizing how interests, ideas, and ideologies combine to create the specificities of politics in africa. i argue that aspects of politics in africa such as neopatrimonialism and patronage must be recognized as ends to governance strategies and that these may sometimes take precedence; however, whether these factors impede development depends on the regime’s objectives. although it accompanied its development efforts with human-rights abuses to secure the regime’s future, the meles zenawi regime nonetheless made great strides toward economic prosperity. author’s note courtney meyer recently obtained an msc in development studies from the school of oriental and african studies in london, england. her research interests include politics and the effectiveness of official development assistance in subsaharan africa. keywords: official development assistance, foreign aid, politics, sub-saharan africa, ethiopia. 1. introduction the personalist and kleptocratic zairean state designed by mobutu sese seko was maintained using aid gained from playing the cold war superpowers against each other and threatening chaos in his absence (naniuzeyi, 1999; young & turner, 1985; kabwit, 1979). though extreme, zaire exemplifies well how politics may impact aid’s facilitation of development. the objective of this dissertation is to examine contemporary aid-dependent states in sub-saharan africa to consider how governance strategies impact the efficacy of official development assistance. much contemporary development literature neglects politics, concluding that aid 48 consilience effectiveness is contingent on economic variables (see mcgillivray et al., 2006 for an overview). an increasing number of studies consider the impact of aid on institutions (e.g., bräutigam & knack, 2004; burnside & dollar, 2004; dutta, leeson, & williamson, 2011), yet few discuss the political strategies that establish these institutions. boone (1995) insinuated the relevance of this idea, concluding that regardless of the regime type, aid increases government consumption. concern regarding the relationship between aid and rent-seeking led svensson (1996) to encourage focus on the political processes shaping policy and aid use. but a regime’s political strategies can only be meaningfully understood after correcting misconceptions about how politics work, a secondary objective. econometric studies drawing mathematical correlations between variables say little about how official development assistance is used, and their conclusions are complicated by aid’s often-contested, conflicting, and geopolitical objectives. therefore, this article aims alternatively to assess aid’s impact using individual cases to discern how aid fits into political and developmental objectives. i argue that aspects of politics in africa such as neopatrimonialism and patronage must be recognized as ends to governance strategies and that these aspects may sometimes take precedence; however, whether these factors impede development depends on the regime’s objectives. section two reviews literature on official development assistance and politics in africa. section three applies these ideas to ethiopia, an aiddependent country and an “aid darling.” it shows how a regime trying to increase its food security may rationalize denying portions of the population human rights in order to maintain power. the final section includes comments regarding the applicability of the conclusions to other states. 2. literature review and critiques this section will first sketch the debates within the relevant literature around the efficacy and impact of aid. second, it outlines characteristics of politics in africa. while i will attempt to use phenomena particular to african politics to explain how aid is used, my undertaking in no way suggests that the 48 diverse countries of the sub-saharan region are politically homogenous. despite the non-econometric approach adapted in the analysis, the tradition of analyzing aid econometrically ensures that many referenced studies were conducted this way. the themes explored include the historical purpose of aid, the aid-effectiveness debate, the effect of aid on the receiving political environment, and politics in africa. i begin with a foundation of definitions. following the development assistance committee (dac) of the organization for economic co-operation and development (oecd), i define official development assistance (oda, henceforth used interchangeably with aid) as a type of foreign aid composed of flows to countries and territories on the dac’s list of oda recipients and to multilateral development banks and institutions. this assistance must be provided by official agencies or their executive counterparts, must be administered with the promotion of economic development and welfare as the primary objective, and must contain a grant element of at least 25% (oecd, 2008). except where noted, aid statistics used stem from oecd reports and their query wizard for international development statistics, the most recent available being from 2010. i adopt bräutigam and knack’s consilience meyer: aiding development or aiding politics? definition of aid dependence: a situation in which government is unable to perform core governance functions without foreign aid and expertise, measured via aid allocation as a percentage of gdp (usually exceeding 10%). clemens, radelet, and bhavnani (2004) contend that allocations in excess of 17% of gdp will saturate the economy, arguing that the 8% saturation point most studies identify is favorable for short-impact aid. aid is currently being allocated in an era defined by a neoliberal philosophy derived from neoclassical economics. after considering the negative impact of rent-seeking and corruption (krueger, 1974; north, 1981; olson, 1997), the washington consensus initially suggested that predatory weak states should be checked with economic liberalization to minimize rent creation and corruption (see naim, 1999). after the world bank’s structural adjustment programs failed, however, the post-washington consensus shifted away from declaring government failure to emphasizing correcting market failure using institutions (see khan, 2007; world bank, 1997). any study considering the impact of foreign aid must first understand the goals of the aid. structural economists like nurkse, prebisch, singer, lewis, and rostow (1971) (hunt, 1989; easterly, 2006b), emphasized that industrialization and development accentuate shortages in foreign exchange and balance of payments disequilibria but do so at the expense of import capacity. accordingly, they advocated a “big push” of aid. contemporary econometric debates about whether aid works (e.g., sachs, 2005; easterly, 2006a) tend to neglect these impediments (gerschenkron, 1962), a tendency that fischer (2009) argues renders them irrelevant. others elaborated on this foundation, claiming that aid could fill a finance, savings, or foreign-exchange gap (harrod, 1939; domar, 1946 and 1947; rostow, 1971; chenery, 1961; chenery & strout, 1966; mikesell, 1968; riddell, 1947, chapter 8). until the late 1990s, when the theory was largely discredited, whether aid worked or failed revolved around a development-oriented adaptation of the harrod-domar model determining the growth and investment rates to maintain full employment (thirlwall, 2002, chapter 1; see solow, 2000 for an adaptation and lucas, 1990 for its critique). mcgillivray et al. (2006) classifies early studies beginning in the 1950s and ending with boone (1995) as using poor econometric methodology and weak theory. only in recent decades has politics been introduced into the aid-effectiveness debate, generally to call attention to the politics behind aid allocation by donors rather than recipients (e.g., white, 1974; collier & dollar, 1999; alesina & dollar, 2000; action aid, 2005 and 2006; grant & nijman, 1998). the only two scholars to assert the latter have been economic-freedom advocates milton friedman and peter bauer (1981). following in their footsteps, boone (1995) argues that, regardless of whether the government was laissez-faire, elitist, or egalitarian, aid given via political motivations fails to promote investment, growth, or improvement in the economic conditions of the poor and instead increases government consumption (i.e., spending that does not contribute to an increase in national productivity). despite scrutiny (summarized by hansen & tarp, 2000a), his conclusion that allocations unequivocally increase government consumption has been upheld by both supporters (e.g., burnside & dollar, 2000 and 2004; clemens, radelet, & bhavnani, 2004) and opponents of aid. boone’s assertions led subsequent researchers to discern additional variables upon which the effectiveness of aid allocations could be conditional. one of the first attempts was a monumental world bank (1998) study, which concluded that aid 50 consilience is associated with higher growth if the receiving regime’s policy environment proves appropriate (see also cassen & associates, 1994); this upheld the post-washington consensus’ “good governance” agenda, derived from new institutional economics, which considers an appropriate policy environment one in which the state’s role is to establish frameworks such as rule of law, property rights, and contract enforceability that strengthen the market’s ability to encourage development (world bank, 1997). other researchers remained within this paradigm (e.g., dollar & easterly, 1999), suggesting aid’s effectiveness is conditional upon low inflation, a balanced budget, trade openness (burnside & dollar, 2000), an index of economic freedom (ovaska, 2003) or institutional quality (burnside & dollar, 2004). however, easterly, levine, and roodman (2004) discredit the econometric analysis of burnside and dollar (2000) from which many others derived their work, and cast a significant level of doubt, as results seem to be highly sensitive to indicator choice (clemens, radelet, & bhavnani, 2004; see also rajan & subramanian, 2005; hansen & tarp, 2000a; brumm, 2003; easterly, 2003). neoliberal discourse implies that by making aid allocations conditional on economic liberalization and democratization, aid is a means to better governance. democratization and decentralization are thus valued for their ability to introduce political competition promoting accountability. in spite of debates spanning nearly half a century around the effectiveness of aid (see hansen & tarp, 2000b for a summary), few studies consider aid’s effect on the receiving political environment. those that do tend to fit into the neoliberal paradigm or take a stance against it by suggesting that aid may degrade institutions and environments (e.g., goldsmith, 2001, implying that aid encourages democratization by encouraging political and economic freedom, with knack, 2004, refuting). studies like knack’s (2001) and bräutigam and knack’s (2004) discuss a tendency for aid to weaken government accountability in institutions crucial to development (called an “aid-institutions paradox” by moss, pettersson, & van de walle, 2006) by encouraging corruption (ovaska, 2003) and rent-seeking (tornell & lane, 1999; svensson, 1996) in aid-dependent countries (moss & subramanian, 2005). oya and pons-vignon (2010) contend that aid decreases policy space and disincentivizes mobilizing domestic resources while creating a logic of aid maximization; in doing so, the aid prioritizes appeasing donors instead of developing policies geared toward long-term development. dutta, leeson, and williamson (2011) consider both camps in the literature (i.e., that aid degrades policy environments, or that according to the good governance agenda, aid may make governments more democratic) to argue that aid has an “amplification effect” that enhances the tendencies already present. two years earlier, wright (2009) provided a more detailed causal explanation for similar observations: as the authoritarian leader’s coalition increases in size, aid first increases the probability of democratization, and second, as economic growth decreases, aid decreases the likelihood of democratization. similarly, bueno de mesquita and smith (2008) contend that the effect of aid on democratization prospects depends on the institutional context and on whether a revolutionary threat is imminent. while aid seems to provide a social incentive to increase citizen welfare, unless the rulers face a revolutionary threat and their political coalition is large, aid actually provides the opposite political incentive and encourages autocratization. kono and montinola (2009) aim to draw out nuances in a connected inquiry concerned with whether or not aid advances political survival; they consilience meyer: aiding development or aiding politics? conclude affirmatively but note that the degree to which regimes can stockpile aid and use it politically varies by regime type, with autocratic leaders being more able than their democratic counterparts to develop “slack resources.” to consider the political calculations that leaders make in employing aid, it is necessary to explore the nature of politics in sub-saharan africa (henceforth africa). but a few additional definitions are in order. first, for alence (2004), the term neopatrimonial is a characterization of a system in which the states possess formal modern bureaucracies yet utilize informal patrimonial principles like personalist political authority, weak checks and balances, and clientelism. such structure is characterized and reproduced by insecurity. second, like erdmann and engel (2007), i define clientelism as an exchange or brokerage of services and resources for political support, often via votes. finally, patronage is the politically motivated distribution of favors to groups, primarily ethnically. while the former is a type of highly asymmetrical personal relations, the latter serves more as an instrument for maintaining political cohesion (pp. 106-108). the idea that african governments will use certain policy instruments as part of their governance strategy is neither new nor specific to aid. rulers have historically institutionalized their regimes by using parastatals and import licenses from quotas and agricultural marketing boards to intervene in markets and allow resources to flow to important constituencies (herbst, 1990). sandbrook (1985) maintains that the political instability, systemic corruption, and maladministration that stem from neopatrimonialism and personal rule impede economic activity. bates (1981) attributes such decisions to the prioritization of political stability over economic growth with the belief that the economic irrationality is compensated for, something van de walle’s (2001) analysis of regime manipulation of structural adjustment programs echoes (see also williams, 1994). for chabal and daloz (1999), politics in africa “works” because patron-client relations pervading states’ poorly institutionalized neopatrimonial systems allow actors to maximize returns despite uncertainty. such personalist logic may cause politically insignificant citizens to be strategically neglected, a strategy that can result in the state losing legitimacy and acting oppressively to maintain control (erdmann & engel, 2007, pp. 13-15; agbese, 2007, p. 41). i briefly leverage four critiques whose implications will be illustrated through the case study of ethiopia. first, i draw attention to the naïveté of neoliberal good governance. despite the fact that neoliberalism was developed with the aim of breaking the corrupt and clientelistic connections pervading african states and stopping government failure, focusing on the institutions that shape the market (world bank, 1997) neglects how rationally calculated governance strategies affect the shape of institutions and may even choose to disregard development in favor of political stability. indeed, the market itself is a politically constructed and enabled institution (craig & porter, 2006). considering these strategies yields an understanding of former prime minister meles’ desire to refuse food aid to communities affiliated with political opponents. second, i aim to understand the interests, ideas, and ideologies of politics and accept that, while different from the west, they are legitimate in their own right. neoliberal economic philosophy (or rather, the organizations and donors developing it) should aim not to alter politics in africa (craig and porter, 2006) but to work with them. admitting that politics in africa are unfavorable and 52 consilience neopatrimonial (see van de walle, 2001 for an example of this tendency and pitcher, moran, & johnston, 2007 for a critique) does not advance one’s understanding about how and why the phenomena that come hand in hand with neopatrimonialism, such as clientelism and corruption, occur and are rationalized. rather than searching for “alternatives to corrupt and incompetent central governments in low-income states” (van de walle, 2005, p. 63), or suggesting that states would become stronger by weakening the informal institutions around them (migdal, 1988), i aim to understand why these traditions continue and how development may be realized within the confines of the political paradigm. kelsall (2011) suggests that if economic rents can be centralized and focused over a long-term horizon (olson, 1997) and pro-market, pro-rural policies are implemented, neopatrimonialism may indeed be harnessed for development. this leads me to my third point. how do we know whether aid works in good policy environments as the current discourse anticipates (e.g., burnside & dollar 2000 and 2004 and collier & dollar, 1999) if no attempt is made to assess the politics that shape and sometimes even impede the nature of the system and the institutions that fuel growth? failure to acknowledge the ways in which politics may impede development not only leads to inaccurate predictions about the impact of aid but also fails to understand the pervasiveness of, let alone resolve, corruption. fourth, and finally, it is necessary to question the shared optimism held by donors, academics (burnside & dollar, 1997; dutta, leeson, & williamson, 2011) and international financial institutions (world bank, 1997, chapters 5-7), about aid and democratization. this optimism results from a failure to acknowledge that democracy in sub-saharan africa does not resemble western liberal democracy (diamond, 1999). rose and shin (2001) fear that the consolidation of liberal democracy has not been realized because the democratizing states are not modern weberian states that have formal institutions establishing an efficient, autonomous bureaucracy and a monopoly of force (jackson & rosberg, 1982). in fact, forrest (1988) articulated ways in which african states appear “soft”: no structural autonomy, (e.g., clientelist connections shaping socioeconomic policy and generating regime support), local structures that are not integrated into the central administration, and limited capacity to extract resources or to ideologically persuade the populous states to act in their best interest. there remains a question as to whether western democracy can be sustained given the socioeconomic conditions, corruption, clientelism, and widespread poverty, but also whether its continuation would lead to higher standards of living (owusu, 1992; sandbrook, 1996). therefore, fundamentally, failure to comprehend why certain state structures and political institutions are overdeveloped (i.e., patronage) in comparison to others (i.e., balance of power) stems from an inability to recognize the historical origin of how this trajectory originated and what fuels its continuation (koelble & lipuma, 2008, p. 11). i apply the critiques and understandings of politics in africa to ethiopia in the next section. the concern is not only whether aid discourages policy reform by substituting private capital and insulating governments from political change, but also to what extent policy reform is relevant, given that ethiopia ranked fifth in a list of the world’s ten fastest-growing economies of the last decade (van de walle, 2001, pp. 21, 50 and 52-53; the economist, 2011). i hope that the clarifications and critiques leveraged in this section can provide understanding in how official consilience meyer: aiding development or aiding politics? development assistance is used as a means to an end, whether that end is development, a political strategy, or a combination. 3. case study and implications: ethiopia this section aims to understand the motivations and priorities of ethiopia using scholarly and news articles, and analyses by international organizations and embassies. i first give a selective political-historical overview, followed by an analysis of how aid has advanced governance strategies. the section will show that while neopatrimonialism and patronage may impede development, whether they do depends on the governance strategy of the regime. in the case of prime minister meles zenawi’s regime, while human rights abuses were often conducted to ensure regime security, strides were nonetheless made toward development objectives. a few numbers help set the scene. official development assistance has increased significantly, with the average between 2000 and 2010 reaching $2.395 billion. in 2010, ethiopia was largest aid recipient in africa and the second largest in the world (oecd, 2012b). in 2011, its largest bilateral donor, the united states, provided $847 million in aid, over a third of which was in food aid. in 2010, 34% of the aid went to social sectors, 17% was programmatic, and 16% was humanitarian (u.s. department of state, 2012a; oecd, 2012a; oecd, 2012c; furtado and smith, 2007). moss and subramanian found in 2005 that 23% of ethiopia’s gdp was derived from aid, marking it as an aid-dependent country. although ethiopia defeated colonial power italy in 1896, it was briefly reoccupied in 1935-1936 (novati, 2008). pressured by economic crisis, drought, famine, corruption, and the eritrean nationalist movement, emperor haile selassie’s regime yielded to revolutionary protests in 1974. the provisional administrative council of soldiers (i.e., the derg) that deposed him installed an infiltratory marxist government. mengistu haile mariam’s regime fared no better at alleviating drought, and impoverishing socialist economic policies coupled with famine encouraged through war against self-determinism caused millions to starve in the “biblical” famine of the 1980s (bbc, 2012; de waal, 1997; keller, 1992). in spite of the 1987 adoption of a new constitution that devolved power and established autonomous regional governments, most nationalist movements coordinated military strategies as the ethiopian people’s revolutionary democratic front (eprdf) (keller, 1995; donham, 1992; de waal, 1997). after the eprdf took political control in 1991, elections in 1995 established a multiparty democracy. yet it is a pseudo-democracy (or for hagmann & abbink 2011, a revolutionary democracy) that has increasingly reverted toward authoritarianism since the 2005 elections (u.s. department of state, 2012a; human rights watch, 2010; clapham, 2004). because the regime largely determines the country’s development direction (and stability is seen as a prerequisite for development), critics are labeled “anti-development” or “anti-peace.” in spite of the constitution’s ethnic federalism, a centralized policy and decision-making structure is paradoxically maintained. in an extreme bid for political control, the 2009 anti-terrorism proclamation no. 652 uses the buzzword “terrorism” to gain favor as an ally in the war on terror and crack down on free speech and protests with minimal donor 54 consilience complaints. in june 2011, parliament employed it to designate five groups as terrorist organizations: two separatist ethnic political organizations, one opposition political party, al-qaeda, and al-shabaab (u.s. department of state, 2012a; salisbury, 2011). thus, not unlike mengistu in the 1980s, in summer 2007 and fall 2011, amidst continuing drought and famine across the horn of africa, then-prime minister meles zenawi employed aid as a tool of repression, denying food, seed, and fertilizer to the ogaden region while insisting its blockades merely prevented guns and material from reaching the separatist ogaden national liberation front (onlf) (gettleman, 2007a; gettleman, 2007b; waterfield, 2011; garrison, 2011; bbc newsnight, 2011; keen, 1994). in 1995, after sudanese-backed egyptian terrorists attempted to assassinate then-president hosni mubarak, whose regime had aided the tplf in ousting mengistu, meles endeared himself to the west by supporting the sudanese people’s liberation movement/army (splm/a) (verhoeven, 2012b). his positions on somalia later made him the united states’ junior sheriff in the horn of africa (the economist, 2008). despite his disrespect of human rights and political and civil liberties, meles earned a reputation for being technocratically focused on pro-poor sustainable development (dowden, 2012a; furtado & smith, 2007). although an aid darling, meles defied neoliberal prescriptions, making centralized economic decisions and leaving land government-owned and businesses affiliated with the ruling party, a tendency furthered by a pervasive patronage system (furtado and smith, 2007). for these reasons, the regime was developmentally patrimonial, or focused on achieving long term economic development for itself and others in spite of its political intolerance (vaughan & gebremichael, 2011). the country has maintained an average growth rate between 8% and 11% since 2000, primarily the result of foreign investment in the country’s agricultural and manufacturing sectors (african economic outlook, 2012a). given the tendency of food aid to be used politically and geopolitically (thurow and kilman, 2009; keen, 1994), i examine the agricultural sector. ethiopia remains a low-income food-deficit country (rosen, 2012). food insecurity is a product of the population’s low purchasing power and poor infrastructure. there is also a direct correlation with the amount of food imported (and food aid received) and the volatility in the price of exports, more than 75% of which are agricultural (adenew, 2004). while economic liberalization was necessary to escape the damage of import substitution industrialization from the derg era (vaughan and gebremichael, 2011), the regime’s prudence is appropriate; too closely following neoliberal prescriptions may defeat efforts to improve food security (oya, 2005; adenew, 2004; porter, 2012). i now draw broader implications about the situation reviewed. the case study shows how a regime aiming to increase its food security denies portions of the population a human right in order to maintain power. in doing so, this study ultimately disagrees with whitfield and fraser (2008), who argue that only weak negotiating countries use foreign aid to stabilize their political regime. in spite of its current account deficit, ethiopia has more control over aid negotiations than nearly all of sub-saharan africa because its state and planning institutions are strong and well established (furtado & smith, 2007). however, questions have been raised about the future of ethiopia given the death of meles zenawi on august 21, 2012. meles was a shrewd political negotiator consilience meyer: aiding development or aiding politics? who influenced american strategies on sudan and somalia, sat on blair’s commission for africa, represented the african union in climate-change negotiations, and peacefully managed south sudan’s succession (verhoeven, 2012a and 2012b). although the eprdf elite stresses that meles’ deputy and successor, foreign minister hailemariam desalegn, will maintain his vision, concerns about the future of eprdf’s coalition have made his premiership largely a figurehead role to avoid shifts in power for the state and military (woldemariam, 2012a; blunt, 2012; abdi, 2012). perhaps he will manage to hold together meles’ pan-africanist visions, but grievances connected to ethnic and income inequality could emerge as a result of meles’ economic modernization policies and political intolerance. furthermore, much of the unlikely partnership between a regime with marxist roots and western donors stem from meles’ charisma and negotiating skill. however, the u.s. has thus far supported him, hoping that his non-amharic or -tigrayan roots will allow him to foster broader political support (woldemariam, 2012b). the study yields a number of conclusions. first, the case illustrates the benefit of individualized analysis to examine each country’s politico-economic utilization of aid. it is difficult to conclude that aid is facilitating a “big push” (sachs et al., 2004) since the objective of the bulk of aid received (particularly with ethiopia’s large percentage of food aid) is not meant to impact economic growth, or, in the case of most social expenditures, cannot do so in the short term (oecd, 2012a). second, neoliberal standards regarding economic governance ignore the political considerations that influence the regime’s effort to maintain power (meyer, 2012a). when overlooked, decisions to withhold food from communities defy conditionalities, (or, as other neighboring countries have done, fund a rebel movement, maintain violence in part of the country, or pay voters to maintain the status quo) may appear illogical (cammick, 2007). ultimately, this underscores the importance of understanding the interests, ideas, and ideologies of politics in africa, as applying a political lens allows us to recognize why outcomes include corruption, patronage, clientelism, and political violence. third, neopatrimonial systems need not be juxtaposed with development objectives, or impede economic activity as sandbrook (1985) alleged. the case study, an example of developmental patrimonialism (booth & golooba-mutebi, 2012), shows that contrary to the good governance agenda’s assumptions, corruption and patronage need not derail economic growth. this upholds a conclusion noted by allen (1995), sandbrook (1985), kelsall (2011), and jackson and rosberg (1982): the personalized nature of governance makes some strategies more developmentally effective, stable, or skilled than others. fourth, the ethiopia case study illustrates the difficulty of realizing neoliberal expectations that aid might encourage democratization. this seems to uphold moss, pettersson, and van de walle’s (2006) conclusion that substantial aid revenues may make regimes less accountable; however, the differing nature of democracy in africa and the use of patronage and clientelism to connect with politically relevant citizens make identifying causality difficult (see sandbrook, 1996; owusu, 1992, koelble & lipuma, 2008). ironically, in some circumstances, there is donor complacency about politics and aid misuse (alesina & weder, 2002), perhaps out of a willingness to pick battles, even when the compromise means ignoring the governance strategies that the neoliberal philosophy aims to counter. 56 consilience 4. conclusion this article argues that whether aspects of politics in africa such as neopatrimonialism or patronage impede development depends on a regime’s governance strategy. while the case study of ethiopia is unique because of the amount of food aid it chronically receives and the level of donor significance it has as an ally in the war on terror, the conclusion about whether politics impairs development objectives may be applied to other sub-saharan states by examining how aid fits into their governance strategies. rwanda has used aid to promote regional and internal stability by backing the tutsi m23 rebellion in the eastern democratic republic of the congo (reyntjens, 2010 and 2004; hayman, 2007; meyer, 2012b), while uganda’s museveni has used aid to prolong the conflict with the lord’s resistance army and corruption in the military meant to fight them to maintain his hold on power (doom and vlassenroot, 1999; prunier, 2004; van acker, 2004; tangri and mwenda, 2006). despite the high level of aid dependence that the zambian economy has shown since kaunda, the summer of 2010 yielded the suspension of health aid by the global fund to fight aids, tuberculosis, and malaria, while the european union suspended infrastructure aid—a result both of evidence of embezzlement of public funds and of graft by subsequent regimes (rakner, 2003; mfula, 2010; fraser, 2007; iol news, 2010). in malawi, the united kingdom suspended general budget support in 2011 as a result of concerns over mismanagement and human rights violations; but the change in leadership following president mutharika's death in april has altered the political strategy, and thus, improved relations between the countries and respect for economic conditionalities (bbc news, 2012; farrell, 2012). the 2008 inaugurated coalition government in zimbabwe has also behaved differently, and its increased efforts to improve freedom and prosperity have led the european union to ease some aid restrictions (croft, 2012). this does not, however, mean that these regimes (whose sometimes violent responses against perceived threats to their stability support agbese, 2007’s assertions) are juxtaposing security with development. their actions resemble samudavanija’s (1991) conception of a three-dimensional state, which retains legitimacy by tackling three objectives: security, development, and participation, with the first being made paramount. one final point of clarification to allay skepticism: i could not possibly suggest that all official development assistance is “misused.” skarbek and leeson (2009) argue that aid which can solve the simple problem of a lack of capital for a singular, predetermined end, such as the production of vaccines, has the potential to be most developmentally effective because it provides a means to a clearly delineated end (see also sachs, 2006). some aid is fungible (pack & pack, 1993; devarajan & swaroop, 1998), and some may be co-opted into governance objectives, but these need not be derailed. my aim is to call attention to differences in regional politics and how recognition and acceptance of such differences may yield better understanding of the reasoning behind, and the varying paths toward, certain outcomes. by understanding why such phenomena like corruption and patronage continue, we can more accurately understand africa’s needs as it breaks from the hopeless, violent, and impoverished stereotypes of its past. consilience meyer: aiding development or aiding politics? bibliography abdi, r. 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(1985). the rise and decline of the zairean state. madison, wi: the university of wisconsin press. microsoft word tiller-micro.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 11, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 62–96   assessing stakeholder adaptive capacity to salmon aquaculture in norway rachel tiller ntnu, norway email: rachel.tiller@svt.ntnu.no russell richards griffith university, australia hugo salgado universidad de concepcion, chile hillevi strand ntnu, norway espen moe ntnu, norway john ellis ntnu, norway abstract this paper explores the socio-ecological effects of increased aquaculture/farmed fish production, around the island group of frøya in trøndelag, norway, as a result of new licenses accorded to the industry. this is investigated from a stakeholder perspective by assessing the adaptive capacity of selected stakeholder groups through workshops combining scenario analysis, systems thinking and bayesian belief network and by developing conceptual frameworks and structural diagrams that visualize the perceived effects of the industry on the given stakeholder system. this adaptive capacity is critical to explore before a de facto industry expansion. this is because context-specific adaptation policies and measures can reduce a given stakeholder group´s vulnerability to negative consequences of industry expansion. policy makers’ a priori knowledge of these variables can lessen conflicts that may arise as a result of stakeholder discontent with top-down approaches to fisheries management and can also bring a legitimizing aspect to the political process leading to integrated coastal zone management (iczm) in the region for affected stakeholder groups, possibly lessening simmering conflicts. keywords: aquaculture, stakeholders, frøya, norway, bayesian belief networks, scenarios, coastal management "the present study was supported by the cintera project, with project manager jennifer bailey, funded by the research council of norway" consilience tiller et al.: salmon aquaculture   1. introduction the demand for farmed fish is strong and growing, a natural result of some research suggesting that 24–36% of wild fish stocks have collapsed worldwide and that 68–72% of global fish stocks are overexploited or collapsed (worm, barbier et al. 2006, pauly 2007, pauly 2008, fao fisheries and aquaculture department 2010). capture fisheries have a strong impact on the ecosystem in which they operate and if the regular rate of capture continues, serious threats to global food security could be imminent given the decrease in wild fish reserves coupled with an increased global reliance on seafood for protein, largely driven by big emerging economies like india and china (antunes zappes, da silva et al.). for decades, global fisheries policies have mitigated commercial fishing efforts in an attempt to reduce the amount of fishing pressure on wild stocks. several solutions have been suggested to stop this downward trend of fish supply, including no-take marine protected areas (mpas) and moving from single species fisheries management to that of ecosystem based fisheries management (ebfm) (ray 2011). there has been, however, increased attention on more direct adaptation possibilities in order to balance the increased demand for seafood and declining wild supply and the necessity to find more efficient means of food production to feed a growing population. during the last few decades, the primary method has been by aquaculture expansion (abdallah and sumaila 2007, van vliet, kok et al. 2010). aquaculture already accounted for 46 percent of total global food fish supply in 2008 and is the fastest-growing animal-food-producing sector globally, even outpacing human population growth (fao fisheries and aquaculture department 2010). the per capita supply of animal protein from aquaculture has also increased, from 0.7 kg in 1970 to 7.8 kg in 2008, reflecting an average annual growth rate of 6.6 percent although this growth rate is beginning to slow. this mitigation path by policy makers is still to be considered a de facto realization that the attempts to mitigate capture fishing efforts to reduce pressure on wild stocks is failing (kalikoski, quevedo neto et al. 2010). norway has seen enormous aquaculture growth since its inception and is currently the world leader in the production and export of farmed salmon. however, this was not always so, given that commercial fishing initially emphasized the use of the coastal zone. given that the norwegian coastline is 21 000 km long, and the sea area within the datum line is 90 000 km2, the country is a natural selection for the exploration of the adaptive capacity to an even higher increase in production. the topography and the hydrography of the country are much varied, altering between deep fjords and shallow sea, calm bays and areas of rapid currents. temperature and salinity are stable and highly suitable for coldwater fish-farming, pollution and eutrophication are restricted to few areas, and water quality is good—all of which lays the ground work for both commercial fisheries and the large and increasingly diversified aquaculture industry (ervik, j. et al. 2007). the norwegian coast has naturally, given these benefits, always been influenced by human activity, and has historically been of great significance for the norwegian society as a food source and a basis for development and prosperity. the living coastal areas offer great opportunities, but also present challenges unfortunately, especially with regards to the change from wild harvest of commercial fish species to the farming thereof. this was visualized with life on the norwegian coast and its changes after the second world war. 64 consilience   rationalization and modernization of the commercial fishing industry and the fishing vessel-structure was characterized by conflicts and there was natural resistance against readjustments of these fisheries in coastal communities. prior to this, the fishing industry had experienced great expansion and there were dramatic increases in production of different commercial species and highly developed fish-products, even resulting in the employment of women several places (christensen 2013). increased efficiency and better technology, however, made the fishing vessels more mobile and the total catch of some species soon neared collapse (e.g. norwegian herring, smelt and coastal cod, ibid), in line with the global experience at the time. in the coastal communities where the fisheries earlier had an important role, new and other businesses soon took over for this now declining industry, resulting in major conflict between the fisheries, the government and the politicians. the process resulted in severe deconstruction of the industry both at sea as well as on land, as measured by employment, but the fishing fleet in and of itself and fishing processing industry still kept increasing their fishing capacity. but life at the coast had nevertheless changed, as had the coastal communities and businesses. oil and gas extraction, aquaculture and tourism became increasingly more important activities along the coast, resulting in both positive and negative reactions between the groups. in light of this, the focus of this article is on the human dimensions of growth of the aquaculture industry, which currently represents 60% (us$ 5.4 billion) of seafood exports, and where farmed salmon represents over 80% (850,000 tonnes) of annual aquaculture production (fisheries-norway 2010). there are many interests tied to the coastal zone such as conservation interests and recreation, to fishing, aquaculture, production of oil and gas, wind parks, transport and tourism. this necessitates good up-to-date coastal zone plans, especially since 276 out of 430 municipalities border directly on these coastal waters, and as many as 80% of the norwegian population lives less than 10 km from the coast. as such, the following article has chosen to use as its case study the small island community of frøya, located in the middle of norway, about 2,5 hours from trondheim. here, the effects of aquaculture have been clearly visible, and, thus, adaptation and mitigation options in light of a tenfold increase in production are critical to investigate. this community has recently seen a positive population growth rate of around 3% and is highly dependent upon the aquaculture and subsidiary industries (statistics norway 2013), and the stakeholders interviewed in this paper generally expressed great content with the industry and its planned expansions and were very interested in providing their perceptions of future scenarios in this respect. in light of this, the paper first introduces the theories surrounding scenario developments in general, and the methodologies used in this project to develop quantitative scenarios based on the perceptions derived from four participatory stakeholder workshops during the end of 2012-beginning of 2013. this is followed by a general introduction to aquaculture and its role in society, both globally and norway specific, after which a thorough contextual setting in the archipelago of frøya is introduced. finally, the respective stakeholder groups and their scenario development sessions are introduced, and the future political consequences of a ten-fold increase in aquaculture production are discussed. consilience tiller et al.: salmon aquaculture   2. definitions, theory and methodology in order for the reader to comprehend the arguments of this paper in greater depth, the following section introduces some definitions of repeated concepts throughout the paper. these are all limited descriptions that are explored further later in the article. the first of these concepts that is repeated throughout the article is that of a scenario. scenario is a concept that is introduced in the following section, and that is often brought up in the article. it entails a series of hypothetical events that describe what could potentially happen within our environment in the future. in order to develop these scenarios scientifically and quantitatively, a range of methods is used in different disciplines. in our case, we chose to use the snowball method to find stakeholders that could participate in workshops and during this process develop scenarios for their group. the snowball method is a method that gives you a sample of respondents through referrals made among those that know others who have the same qualifications that the researcher looks for. for instance, in this case, we wanted to speak with local enthusiasts in frøya. although there are no organisations that assemble local enthusiasts, individuals who so self-identify may naturally interact with others of the same category (biernacki and waldorf 1981). we therefore contacted one person who had received an award for his local enthusiasm, and used the snowball method to find more candidates like him where he made the first calls and thereby started rolling the ball. once we had found a group of candidates that were a representative sample, regardless of size of the group, we used the method of systems thinking to start the process towards developing the scenarios. this method is a group conceptualization tool that has as its aim to create a whole picture of phenomena, such as how a given group would be able to adapt to a ten-fold increase in aquaculture production, and create a model that represents this imagery and that catches the complexities inherent in a community. these models in turn can then be used either as a research tool for further exploration, or as a management tool in and of itself, to predict action of given groups for instance (flood 2010, belue, carmack et al. 2012). in our case, we used the software program vensim1 specifically designed for systems thinking, and developed by ventana inc., to explore the results of the systems thinking process and develop the actual model (helfrich and schade 2008, lan, lan et al. 2013). the variable with the most inand output arrows from the systems thinking process is what is then usually the priority issue for the given group, like infrastructure was for the local enthusiasts, or preservation of commercial fisheries for that group. the group specific variables were then brought into the bayesian belief network (bbn) session, where the process towards the development of the scenarios was continued. during the bbn session, as used in this project, the stakeholders were helped to develop structural diagrams, which can be used as tools for constructing coherent probabilistic representations of knowledge that is uncertain (henrion 2013), such as that of stakeholders. the stakeholders, represented as experts of their groups, shared their perceptions of how a ten-fold increase in aquaculture production could affect their priority issue, such as income or cultural protection, to name a few. the structural diagrams are simple models that stakeholders develop during the bb sessions, which quantify probabilistic influences by showing how one variable affects another. these                                                                                                                           1 vensim.com 66 consilience   diagrams can then result in, through the software program netica, developed by norsys2, and ms excel (or equivalent), a set of conditional probability tables (cpts). these cpts are the framework used in bayesian network modeling to quantify the scenarios that the stakeholders have developed and require each stakeholder to ‘populate’ them by assigning a probability of outcome based on their perceptions about the future realization of each scenario. to account for multiple stakeholder perceptions, an auxiliary expert variables (labeled “stakeholder”) is included in the bbn. this auxiliary variable enables assessment at both group and individual-level regarding the scenarios. these definitions will be often mentioned in the rest of the article, and are key concepts for the study of stakeholder perceptions to a future ten-fold increase in aquaculture production in the island community of frøya in trøndelag, norway. 2.1 aquaculture aquaculture, or fish farming, is the production of aquatic organisms such as fish, seaweeds, and mollusks, using tanks onshore and cages in coastal and fresh waters. the early 1900’s marked the beginning of aquaculture as an industrial system that relied on regional and some international trade. by the 1970’s the industry had expanded globally and has had exponential growth ever since, with a focus on high value species with a high export demand (fao fisheries and aquaculture department 2010). as it is practiced today, modern farming techniques resemble any other industrial system, and contribute to political, social and environmental challenges. these challenges generate a considerable amount of conflict between stakeholders who are competing over precious coastal zones. aquaculture benefits from its similarity to agriculture in meeting customer demand through quality, reliability, and year-round production capacity. as demand for seafood increases worldwide, wild fish stocks have not been able to keep pace, allowing aquaculture an opportunity into the marketplace. in 2006, the global collapse of fisheries represented nearly one third of fished species, trending toward further collapse if sustainable fisheries management were not implemented (worm, barbier et al. 2006). aquaculture also puts an enormous strain on wild fisheries, though, and it is believed that 31% of the worldwide catch of wild fish in 2005 went toward feeding fish in farms (weible, pattison et al. 2010). it is furthermore estimated that by 2030, 85 million tonnes (nearly 50%) of the global supply of seafood will come from aquaculture (fao fisheries and aquaculture department 2010, marine stewardship council 2012), indicating an even higher strain on global wild fish for fish feed for carnivorous species like salmon (rosamond l. naylor, rebecca j. goldburg et al. 2000). the aquaculture industry also struggles with negative publicity such as, among others, diseases, parasites and escapes. diseases such as infectious salmon anemia (isa), parasites such as sea lice and mass escapes can have dire consequences for the eco-system within which the farms are located, and spillover effects to the human population as well (costello 2009, hansen and onozaka 2011, torrissen, jones et al. 2013). given this information, it is going to take a coordinated effort to ensure this industry grows in a sustainable way that prevents both negative social and environmental effects.                                                                                                                           2 http://www.norsys.com/netica.html consilience tiller et al.: salmon aquaculture   norway is a fishery nation with long traditions for hunting and fishing both on the high seas and near shore, and its expansion to aquaculture was natural given that the natural prerequisites for both commercial fisheries and aquaculture are fortunate in norway where the country`s long coastline includes deep fjords, islands and sheltered coves, stretching out more than 58,133 km (cia 2011). as opposed to commercial fisheries, though, aquaculture along the coastline makes it possible to harvest seafood all year independent of the fisheries seasons. this industry has therefore become of great value and has created many jobs along the rural areas of the norwegian coast, in line with the political priorities of the sitting government in norway of keeping the lights on in the homes of these areas (pedersen 2006). the aquaculture industry has also been critical in the development of spin-off industries and is an important contributor to the supply and processing industry as well. this is of crucial importance for the life in the coastal communities, and creates economic growth in both rural districts as well as larger cities. norway is currently the world leader in the production and export of farmed salmon, and seafood is the largest industry in norway after gas and oil. the aquaculture industry represents 60% (us$ 5.4 billion) of seafood exports, and farmed salmon represents over 80% (850,000 tonnes) of annual aquaculture production (fisheries-norway 2010). in 2008, it was estimated that 5,000 jobs were directly related to the aquaculture industry, and 20,000 jobs indirectly (ibid). the products from the industry currently represents the third most important export article from norway (after oil 40,4 % and gas 23,4%; seafood is at 6,6%), and the export of farmed salmon and trout has even exceeded the export value of natural caught marine species. the value of norwegian salmon exports in the first quarter of 2013 alone was 8,2 billion nok (about usd 1.4 billion), with the main export markets being france, poland, eu, russia, denmark, usa, spain, germany, sweden, great britain and japan (purcell 2007, statistics norway 2013). since industrial scale aquaculture began in norway, the industry has struggled with stakeholder contentment, though. one struggle has been the competition for coastal use at the exclusion of other uses such as tourism and open access, and another struggle has been the social and environmental impact (tiller, brekken et al. 2012, tiller, gentry et al. 2013). outbreaks of diseases at salmon farms have also caused large scale environmental impacts, such as the spread of the parasite gyrodactylus in 1975 that devastated wild salmon populations, the 1984 isa outbreak that killed 80% of farmed salmon and permanently spread to wild populations, and the bio-accumulation of antibiotics and chemicals (fao fisheries and aquaculture department 2010, fao fisheries and aquaculture department 2012). one of the reasons for the stakeholder struggles also lies at a more cultural level, with the decline of the commercial fisher. in the commercial fisheries, though there still represent about 5400 fishing vessels employing a total of about 12 200 fishermen, export goods represented only 2, 6 billion tonnes of seafood, valued at 1 billion nok, in 2013. this is a result of reconstruction, white fish filet plans closings and industry bankruptcy, and has led to widespread decrease in employment in the commercial fishing industry businesses the last 10 -12 years (kim, seo et al. 2012). at the same time, the amount of migrant workers in the farmed fisheries industries has increased dramatically, especially after the entry in 2004 of 10 new states into the european union. in many industries, the number of hired workers from latvia, estonia, lithuania, poland, russia, romania, and bulgaria 68 consilience   has ranged from a few percent in 2001 to 18 % in 2009 and in some companies, up to 80% percent (graham, martin et al. 2003). though this was likely not the intended path of the soria moria declaration of the sitting norwegian government, where keeping the lights on in the homes along the rural coast line was one of the election promises (regjeringen stoltenberg ii 2005), it has nevertheless had the desired positive effect, especially in small communities with great natural advantages when it comes for the farming of salmon, like frøya, in trøndelag, norway. in both frøya and hitra, the neighbouring archipelago, significant restructuring in both commercial fishing and agriculture caused a population loss of 38% from 1964-1995 (van auken and fredrik rye 2011, statistics norway 2013). however, with the advent of aquaculture, this trend has been dramatically changed to a population change that has been positive since 2008, and was at 3.04% in 2013, with the current population being 4506 inhabitants (statistics norway 2013). the norwegian success story of seafood production is in many ways also the success story of the island community. the first attempts at reproducing salmon found in the oceans was done in frøya and hitra in the early 1970 `s. the first experiences of salmon farming with smolt from the wild salmon in the regional rivers were also done there, when the pioneers started hatching eggs and creating one of the first successes in norwegian salmon farming history and a new era begun in norwegian coastal industries (imh, 2008). the salmon industry has since become an international business, and this coastal region of trøndelag has played an important role and has had a leading position in the development of the aquaculture farming history in norway. you may say that it was no coincidence that the salmon-adventure started in this region given that both geographical and climate issues are ideal for salmon farming here. additionally, the pioneers’ experience and knowledge obtained from the commercial fishing industry through the centuries, was of crucial importance for the success story of frøya. these fishermen tried and they failed, and did it all over again. their work has also contributed to a significant body of aquaculture expertise in the region, and as early as 1980, the frøya high school offered a genuine education in aquaculture. today, frøya is ranked the 5th of the 10 most successful rural municipalities in norway (richardson, bakun et al. 2009). this means that frøya is one of the municipalities that has been successful both in terms of industrial development and in population growth. the archipelago of frøya has traces of human activity going all the way back to 11 to 12,000 years ago, and there have been several stone age discoveries such near the community center of sistranda. early ice-free coast and abundant supply of fish and marine animals were the reasons for the very early settlements, and the rich fisheries then provided a good basis for existence, and have at all times since. frøya was even the most populated municipality on the trøndelag coast until the 1970s, after which it experienced its collapse until its recent rebirth. today aquaculture is the largest value creator by far on the island 0   1000   2000   3000   4000   5000   6000   7000   19 64   19 68   19 72   19 76   19 80   19 84   19 88   19 92   19 96   20 00   20 04   20 08   20 12   frøya  population   changes   1964-­‐2013   consilience tiller et al.: salmon aquaculture   community. frøya is one of the leading municipalities in both salmon farming (37 sites in seawater) and processing of aquaculture products. 14 of the 15 largest companies on frøya in 2007 were either salmon farmers or other aquaculture related industries. value added per capita is among the highest, and on top in trøndelag. the municipality's largest business, the salmon farmingand processing company salmar, completed and launched in 2011 an extensive construction and a huge expansion of their new salmon-processing plant located on kverva, frøya, which is europe's largest salmon processing plant of its kind (webb 2007). this kind of incrase in production also leads with it the need for more workers, which in the case of the salmon industry resulted in a need for foreign immigrants. in 2013 the region had around 500 migrant workers from around 40 different nations (dunlap 2013). the salmar asa company alone employs 660 persons, 400 specifically on the innovamar-plant on frøya, representing 25 different nationalities. in light of these challenges, the municipality of frøya has put a lot of effort to preserve and facilitate for the working-migrants on the island. but frøya is also facing a huge challenge when it comes to developing and managing a multi-cultural community. the municipal report (frøya kommune 2012) points out that there many examples of good individual efforts to create good relationships between nationalities, but that it lacks continuity. as the population in a few years may consist of nearly a thousand new residents as a result of labor migration, this can no longer be ignored or taken lightly, according to the report. these challenges are those that could seem most pressing in a future of a tenfold increase in aquaculture production, and was what expected to come up most often in the discussion with the stakeholder groups as a focus of needs for the future. 2.2 scenario analysis quantitative stakeholder-driven scenarios, created in a participatory workshop setting, are effective in assessing the effects of a ten-fold increase in aquaculture production in a limited area. these scenarios can be both positive and negative and are important tools for policy makers, especially when they are flexible and can be operated by the end user after its creation. the need for such scenarios arises due to the inability of the traditional single sector management to effectively address the cumulative impacts of multiple stressors, resulting in declining productivity of ocean ecosystems and escalating conflicts between user groups (lester, mcleod et al. 2010, lubchenco and sutley 2010). understanding stakeholders’ perceptions of how potential changes in management will affect them is essential to both guide managers to identify and resolve areas of potential conflict before the fact and to assess how stakeholder perceptions compare to scientific analysis of impacts. the founder of the scenario method was herman kahn. the original intentions of the storylines in the scenarios, namely the different futures the researcher envisioned, were to be lively but realistic and attempt to draw attention to causal relationships between actual developments and the possible interventions policy makers or businesses could prepare for in the event of an actualization of a given scenario (botterhuis, van der duin et al. 2010). the use of the word ‘scenario’ is increasingly popularized in the social sciences, with great variability to the methods used to reach them. there is a great level of 70 consilience   scholarship that offer typologies, methodologies and theories about the use and interpretation of the term, as well, but the consensus appears to land on the agreement of scenarios being hypothetical, causally coherent, internally consistent and/or descriptive (philip van notten 2006), all of which are achieved by using participatory workshop method mixes of systems thinking and bayesian belief networks. the literature generally highlights, though, that scenarios are not predictions (steven p schnaars 1987, hugues 2000, kristóf 2006, lena börjeson, mattias höjer et al. 2006). this is in line with the schrödingers cat analogy, and admittance from the scholar that scenarios only can indicate explorations of the future. the cat analogy, from quantum physics and applied to scenarios, visualizes how one can never predict any one outcome with certainty; only a certain number of possible or plausible results within a range of predetermined levels of probability can ever be proposed. furthermore, until the future takes place, neither proposed results are real. the schrödringer cat analogy is a thought experiment that has the participant imagine a confined space such as an enclosed room or a closed box and in this room there are two items – a cat and a vial of poison. if the poison container is broken by the cat, or in some other manner, the cat will die. looking at the confined space from the outside we therefore state that the cat is either alive or dead. however, without an actual observation thereof, the paradox of schrödringer cat demonstrates that we actually do not know whether the cat is alive or dead. the cat is therefore neither dead nor alive, until otherwise proven (gribbin 1984), just like the future is to a scenario building scholar (tiller 2010). forecasts and scenarios can be proposed and explored, but neither suggestion offered, whether based on linearity or history or expert opinion is correct until it is observed at a future time. however, it is critical to employ both quantitative and qualitative research to get a full and nuanced picture of the ramifications of policy change. some sectors typically focus on variables and relationships that are more clearly structured than others and therefore are more able to be predicted. for example, there are standardized algorithms used in the prediction of climate indicators (e.g. temperature, irradiance), physical processes (e.g. hydrodynamics) and biogeochemical rates (e.g. mortality, mineralisation, solubility). these mathematical-based models are often used for predictions and forecasting, such as in the area of meteorology (gould 2011). however, human interaction is changing this in a range of areas; the human breakage of what has been named the natural rhythm is observable in the atmosphere currently, a scenario that was foreseen by natural scientists as early as 1910 (de jouvenel 2000). the effect of human interference has also been experienced in fisheries and forestry (ostrom 2009). how people perceive the interactions that they have with natural resources, as well as other stakeholders, has great influence on both their behavior and the nature of the conflict. in order to account for this, policy makers often look to identify trends, assess different possible or plausible futures, and evaluate the information to see what changes could be critical in the future. this envisioning of future landscapes is well within our grasp of comprehension, even if one can never accurately foresee exact events in a case where human and social variables are involved, given the complexities of free will and coincidences (slaughter 1994, botterhuis, van der duin et al. 2010). consilience tiller et al.: salmon aquaculture   3. methodology the function of the scenarios is in many cases, and in the frøya aquaculture expansion case specifically, to aid policy makers and business owners in their quest to evaluate and select strategies for the future by exploring all options and being prepared for possible conflict lines. a methodological approach that helps achieve this outcome is to involve stakeholders in developing future scenarios, or possible images of different futures, relative to their system. in the current project, we used the method of systems thinking to map mental models based on the stakeholder group analysis, providing a conceptualization of the system based on the given stakeholder group`s beliefs. this process also aids in identifying important elements or variables within the system conceptualization that have influence over, or are influenced by, other variables within the same system. a benefit of using this approach is that it allows exploration of a complex system at the local scale (in this case, stakeholders in the community of frøya, norway) based on the expertise of the stakeholders themselves. this process utilizes the knowledge of the stakeholders to identify potential drivers and consequences of offshore aquaculture to their sector. we started the group model building experience by presenting pertinent background information about the project, and encouraged the participants to imagine a future where there was a ten-fold increase in aquaculture, and reflect on how they felt this would affect them. we used this future scenario as a proxy for eutrophication, which is the focus of the cintera project3. this was done to make the imagery more relevant for the stakeholder, and to obtain more context related answers. the 5 workshops, which ranged in size from 10 scientists, 9 students (future generation), 6 local enthusiasts, 6 foreign workers and 5 commercial fishermen, were conducted during the spring of 2013. the stakeholders were selected using the snowball method through their respective organization (the commercial fishermen), their teachers (we were allowed to lead a class for four hours), their supervisors (the foreign workers at the aquaculture company), the main local enthusiast (he knew who would be the best representatives of this category), and through invitations to relevant research networks (the scientists). the quality of the results sampled from these groups far outweighed their relative small number, as is often the case in qualitative research studies where large samples can be ineffective and do not provide the detailed and contextual information wanted by the researcher. in a narrative analysis, which this project included, the researched judged 15 to be the upper limit of what would provide a holistic narrative where all participants were given ample opportunity to share. the sample size can be as small as one or two as well, if this participant has information that is of critical value for that given sector and advances the research towards a specific goal (sandelowski 1995). the participants in this project were sought out because they were considered experts of their own sector, and good sources of information and perceptions about the future of the frøya community with a ten-fold increase in aquaculture production. in order to elicit information and scenarios, the stakeholders were first provided with contextual information regarding the project. this included being                                                                                                                           3 cintera (a cross-disciplinary integrated eco-systemic eurtrophication research and management approach) is nfr project 21667. it started in july 2012 and will continue through june 2015. 72 consilience   briefed on the project aims and, from the literature, an overview of negative and positive issues related to aquaculture in their area or sector of concern, including visualizing possible aquaculture nets and pens and how these would be located in the water column (impson 2011). the briefing was supported by projections concerning global seafood availability, the expansion of aquaculture and preliminary outcomes of research about eutrophication, focusing on the implications of aquaculture expansion on the vulnerabilities of different stakeholders in the sector which was of primary concern to them. the system conceptualization process was initiated by presenting the participants with seven predetermined ‘drivers’, selected by the researchers before the workshop. these drivers were presented as variables and therefore included multiple states or settings (e.g. if the variable is ‘the color of a boat’ then potential states could be red/blue/green etc). the selection of these drivers was based on literature review and expert interviews. here, drivers can influence other variables, but are typically not affected themselves, within the stakeholder´s sector and are therefore independent variables. the drivers presented to the workshop participants were: • the quantity of farmed seafood released to the market; • the space taken up by the aquaculture industry; • the animal welfare of the farmed fish in their pens; • the waste from the farmed seafood; • traffic to and from the farm sites, both in water and on land; • industry waste such as nets, buoys, and “normal” trash; and • the design and construction of the nets in the area. the participants were then asked to nominate additional variables (within the context of their sector) that they believed would be influenced, either directly or indirectly (via other variables), by the driver variables. examples of this process might include themes such as whether the availability of fishing grounds would affect their income, or how aquaculture pens drifting off course due to weather would affect them. this exploration then led to identification of additional variables that represented possible management responses that could be used to mitigate any negative impacts of offshore aquaculture on this specific sector. the variables identified by the stakeholders through this process were recorded on a large white board using colored ‘post-it’ notes (example figure 1). the workshop participants were then prompted by the researcher (workshop facilitator) to identify connections between these variables in the form of directional associations; for example, such connections could highlight that employment in the fisheries sector is affected by the area taken up by the aquaculture industry, or if the amount of fish that an aquaculture venture released to the market directly affected the landing prices for a given wild fish stock from the capture industry. consilience tiller et al.: salmon aquaculture   figure 1: conceptual diagram created with post-it notes on the board. the pink notes are the 7 drivers. at the same time as the lead researcher is working on these on the board, another researcher is working on vensim, translating these notes to a computer model. the result of this variable identification and interconnection process, which took about two hours, was a system conceptualization or group mental model that represented how this particular group of workshop participants (example figure 2) collectively viewed the causal pathways between variables, and how they identified by closer inspection where possible conflict points could be located. 74 consilience   figure 2: vensim model of conceptual diagram created in figure 1. this example is from the stakeholder workshop for scientists. this model is presented to the participants during the break to illustrate which variables the program finds to have the highest priority for the group. the group then discusses whether it agrees with this or if they want a different version for the bbn session. this process was followed by identification of some priority issue, which is the issue that most of the participants in each workshop felt was most important (and often identified through what had the most arrows going in or out in the systems thinking part of the workshop – figure 2) in the conceptualization process for further exploration in the modelling of the bayesian belief networks (bbn). bbn modelling is a methodology that is well– suited to representing causal relationships between variables4 in the context of variability, uncertainty and subjectivity. they have demonstrated ability in utilising subjective expert opinions to both derive the structure of, and variables within, a bbn (uusitalo 2007, richards, sano et al. 2012). bbn modelling also provides a mechanism, via the underlying probabilistic framework of bayes theorem, to integrate social, economic and environmental variables within a single model (kjaerulff and madsen 2008). in terms of evaluating the relationships between the impacts of a ten-fold increase in aquaculture production and socially driven adaptation to the consequences thereof, this attribute enables the variables that represent system determinants or stressors (e.g. the 7 pre-determined stressors) to be linked emphatically with other variables (e.g. adaptive capacity, political will).                                                                                                                           4 variables are objects, elements or attributes that can change e.g. temperature is a variable because it has different values; the colour of a car (red, green, white etc) is another example of a variable. net construction production waste area work animal welfare trafficfeed waste traffic in-out to aquaculture facilitiesfisherman affected shift in nitrate lower level food web affected ship traffic use of coastal zone occupy area local harbor infrastructure could be improvedprotected area niches for other species cabin owners aestetics tourism negative kayakers energy producers use same areas use group conflicts tourist fishermen happy with more fish in protected areas tunnels and roads positive for community good for the economy employment increase safety for workers submerged will be positive plant design more efficient energy consumption collection of waste enviromentalists happy environmentalists sad housing price sellers happy land based activities bad construction can lead to escapesfood producers negative for norwegian companies giving advantages to international companies water pollution antifouling / toxic to reduce algae negative effect on ecosystem good for industry need for protein consumption in the world what are the consecuences of other sources? knowledge can be exported responsability to make aquaculture sustainable type of feed used (animal/vegetal) fish meal producers anchoveta used for human consumption mackerel used for human consumption change from fishmeal to soymeal energy intensive crops (negative) food efficiency reduction in fish availability for fishmeal competing markets, bigger consumer of fishmeal is poultry not aquaculture use krill instead of fishmeal, opportunities for local industry need of new sources of food for salmon aquaculture new jobs in the fishing industry new areas for scientists increase immigration city development production workers high education jobs goes to better cities not to local community better education attract norwegian could be positive if food web change to support more fish norwegianforeigners localoutsiders site specific eutrophication consilience tiller et al.: salmon aquaculture   the framework for developing the bbns was presented to the workshop participants. as a group, they were first instructed to assign two (dichotomous) states to their priority issue, “infrastructure” in the case of the local enthusiasts for instance, as a means of discretising this variable. the workshop facilitator guided the participants on the selection of these states including informing them that they had to be discrete states (as opposed to continuous), mutually exclusive (only one state can be true at any given time) and that the states be exhaustive (all potential outcomes are covered by the states). these rules are fundamental tenets of bbn development (marcot, steventon et al. 2006) although the selection of dichotomous states entails that these are often broad qualitative descriptions. conversely, restriction to dichotomous states enhances the tractability of the associated conditional probability tables (described elsewhere), which can otherwise be a serious impediment in bbns that rely heavily on expert elicitation to parameterize them (kjaerulff and madsen 2008). further guidance on the selection of the dichotomous states was provided in that they should reflect a desirable and undesirable state respectively. often, the stakeholders select states of “high” and “low” or “good” and “bad” for the variable. in the example of “infrastructure development”, the states chosen were “realistic” and “not realistic” with reference to a ten-fold increase in production. in the next step of the bbn development process, the stakeholders were asked to identify three primary variables that would directly influence their capacity to manage their priority issue at their desirable state (i.e. infrastructure developments = “realistic”). the priority issue and the three primary variables along with their respective states were then put up on colored post-it notes on the board, so that the stakeholders at all times could see what they were deciding upon in unison. this was helpful when the second level of causality (secondary variables) in the developing bbn diagram was created. this process required that they assign up to three variables for each of the three primary variables, based on the concept that these secondary variables directly influenced the primary variables. the participants assigned dichotomous states to each of the secondary variables in a similar manner as for the priority issue and the primary level variables (figure 3). 76 consilience   figure 3: bayesian belief network development example from workshop. the priority issue is on top. a co-researcher is filling this out in a table format in ms word (or equivalent) at the same time, creating conditional probability tables for filling out individual probabilities of scenarios. as introduced earlier, the cpts quantify the strength of the relationships between the variables in a bbn. consequently, a cpt is required for each variable (also termed the child node in bbn nomenclature) that is directly influenced by at least one other variable (also termed a parent node). in the bbn developed using the approach outlined here, four cpts are required. ‘populating’ the cpt was achieved here by assigning the probabilities of observing particular outcomes for a child variable given a combination of states (a bbn scenario) for the parent(s) variables that directly influence it (i.e. a ‘conditional’ probability). we used the expert opinions of the different stakeholders to provide these probabilities this process was carried out with each stakeholder individually at the conclusion of the workshop. table 1 shows an example of a populated cpt of the bbn developed during the workshop as was presented to each stakeholder. each row represents a different combination of the different parent variables involved (scenarios) and all combinations are shown. consilience tiller et al.: salmon aquaculture   table 1 – an example of a populated conditional probability table from the foreign workers. stakeholders provide the %s by going through the scenarios and responding to the question ”what is the percentage probability (0-100%) that your language learning will be so good, it will make you ‘fluent´ in norwegian for the following 8 scenarios?” local community speaking norwegian with you course offerings teaching quality and method probability in % of your language learning being so good, you will be able to learn fluent norwegian from 0100. actively interested flexible adaptable at the individual level 100% actively interested flexible not adaptable at the individual level 60% actively interested note flexible adaptable at the individual level 80% actively interested note flexible not adaptable at the individual level 10% not actively interested flexible adaptable at the individual level 80% not actively interested flexible not adaptable at the individual level 10% 5not actively interested note flexible adaptable at the individual level 20% not actively interested note flexible not adaptable at the individual level 0% through this process, the cpts required to parameterize the bbns were provided by individual stakeholders. these probability tables were then combined into a single bbn model through the inclusion of an auxiliary variable (called 'stakeholders') that represents the weighted input of each stakeholder (kjaerulff and madsen 2008). in our study, each stakeholder was weighted equally entailing that the opinions of each of the stakeholders were viewed as equal. the secondary variables, which had no other variables influencing them in the bbn (also termed stem nodes), were assigned probabilities of 50% for each of the two states. 3.1 workshops the aim of the five stakeholder driven workshops was to look at the adaptive capacity of a local community to eutrophication from aquaculture, with a ten-fold increase in aquaculture development being a proxy for eutrophication. the only 78 consilience   workshop not held on the island group of frøya itself was the scientist workshop, which was held at the norwegian university of science and technology (ntnu), for the purposes of getting a more detached view. the workshops all followed the same method described above, and started with systems thinking group conceptualization efforts, followed by a bbn session, where the priority issue, as identified in the first part of the workshops using vensim, was explored further, and from which conditional probability tables were created for individual reporting to add to the group element of the methodology. the bbn-development process also facilitated the capture of further information through the discussions that accompanied the development of these networks. this narrative would further contextualize the importance of different variables, whether the narrative was occurring within a group environment (e.g. during the development of the bbn structure) or individually (e.g. during the population of the cpts). during the development of a bbn structure, for instance, the stakeholders would invariably negotiate or discuss what variables were more or less important in implementing their adaptation option (i.e. identification of the primary-level variables), giving the variables and cpts greater meaning. the following is an overview of the systems thinking and narratives of the four different stakeholder groups, leading up to their priority issues. 3.2 scientists the ten scientists that took part in the workshop, looking at possible consequences of a ten-fold increase in aquaculture production for the local community of frøya, represented a variety of field of studies, including marine chemistry, political science, economy, ecosystem modelling, philosophy, biology and marine technology as well as representatives from sintef fisheries and aquaculture. they were recruited through the marine coastal development program at ntnu, and attended voluntarily based on information in an introductory email explaining the project. their remoteness from the local population at frøya coupled with their diverse aquaculture expertise gave the group a unique angle from which to view the hypothesized ten-fold increase in aquaculture production and the effects this would have on the local population in a small coastal community, most specifically frøya. though their focus at first was mainly technical, focusing first and foremost on general aspects of aquaculture production and feed problems globally, it soon narrowed itself in on the topic of the local community in and of itself. the discussion focused on living, working and travelling to and from frøya for these purposes, with some disagreement over whether or not norwegians, especially highly educated ones, would want to live on frøya or whether they would prefer to live in trondheim. some even felt that the production would likely move off shore and that there would be similar work conditions on aquaculture barges as the offshore oil industry is experiencing today, where the location of one’s home is of little importance. the discussion finally settled on a “if you build it, they will come” philosophy. this means, if there are jobs for two people in a family, good schools, good infrastructure, opportunities, after-school activities and other scenarios associated with norwegian family welfare requirements, the highly educated norwegian families will come as well, and not just the foreigners. the priority issue that was decided upon in the end was to take a broad look at this consilience tiller et al.: salmon aquaculture   ten-fold increase, and prioritize how this can have a positive effect on the local community in general, and on frøya specifically. 3.3 high school students specializing in aquaculture this priority issue of the local community also resonated well for the high school students specializing in the field of aquaculture at sistranda high school in frøya, representatives of the future generation of the island community. all the students in the class were present throughout the workshops, and the main topics that came up were attached to problems associated with illness in the salmon production industry. this included discussions on how the nets are being perforated by cod eating through them, the nets rubbing onto rings made of steel holding the construction together, and even perforations created by the illegal fishing of tourists within the 100 meter zone surrounding the aquaculture construction. the result of this is that the salmon can escape, and some spread diseases to wild salmon and destroy their spawning territories there by. this was all tied together with the quality off the salmon keepers on site, which was another topic of great interest to this group of youth. their focus on this, naturally, was not surprising, given that their field of study would educate them to become just that, salmon keepers. the quality of the aquaculture cages and nets, the feeding process, and the conflicts with fishermen over aquaculture vs. fishing areas were all topics that came back to the quality of the keepers on site. another topic of great interest to this youth at the local high school was the future of the local community. there was no discussion surrounding the fact that their community was growing. they did acknowledge, though, that some of this growth was coupled with incomplete integration, given that the growth was based on foreign immigrants working in lower waged jobs such as the salmon slaughter and packing factory on the island and norwegians not mingling with them. these production jobs are jobs that norwegians do not want, they proclaimed, and they felt that this had led to the foreign immigrants sticking to themselves in smaller groups rather than integrating themselves with those from the local community. they nevertheless preferred this growth though, as it led to a community in growth, better schools, more youth and a feeling that there was an actual future there for them. this latter is also what ended up being their priority issue, namely the development of their local community on the archipelago being positive. 3.4 commercial fishermen community development was important for the commercial fishermen as well. despite the fact that salmon farming has so far been the most successful and commercialized species of the island community, traditional fisheries are still seeking new possibilities for production and sales, which could save this industry as well. they operate test-fishing licenses for new commercial species, and new niches like whelk (sea-snail), sea cucumber and scallops and many believe these new opportunities can be an important source of income in the future for this group. during the season from may to december, fishermen in the area deliver daily crab from the clear waters of the island region and in 2011 a total of 3.500 tons of edible crab was processed at hitramat as (hitra food inc.). the fishermen interviewed in this project naturally had a more focused priority area with regards to aquaculture than the high school students though, given their 80 consilience   choice of profession as business owners and their need to protect this business, though they too, like the scientists and the students, had their local community in frøya and the positive contribution of aquaculture to its development close at heart and at focus in the discussion. the workshop even started with a caveat that they did not want the workshop to say that they had any problems with the aquaculture industry, because, they were, in fact,very happy with it. a total of five fishermen, representing norges fiskarlag, a politically independent organization that is built on voluntary membership, participated in the workshop that were to represent the views of the frøya fishermen with regards to aquaculture expansion in the area. norges fiskarlag was established in 1926 to safeguard the collective interests of the norwegian capture fishermen, and it is the largest fisheries organization in norway, with some 7000 members. it consists of eight local chapters spread along county lines, as well as two group organizations (sør-norges notfiskarlag and fiskebåtredernes forbund). members are both coastal fishermen with small smacks, as well as the crew of ocean-going trawlers, thereby ensuring a broad and encompassing membership base, and the group taking part in the participatory workshop represented the same mix of fishing vessels. though their priority issue later ended up focusing on the expected topics of their business surviving, the main topic in this participatory workshop was at first how the fishermen felt they were actually not at all affected by problems associated with the salmon aquaculture industry. this was a completely different narrative from similar participatory workshops with commercial fishermen considering aquaculture in central california (tiller, gentry et al. 2013), where the antagonism against another business competitor to limited coastal areas were adamant. the commercial fishermen in frøya were clear, however, that they were absolutely in favour of aquaculture on the archipelago, and that there were no conflicts between the industries. the island group had been revitalized by the salmon industry, and they claimed no commercial fishermen had suffered job losses as a consequence of this industry expanding. they emphasized that rather than taking jobs away from commercial fishermen, the industry had actually given rise to an increase in other related industries that were positive for all sectors, as well as new school offerings such as the commercial fishermen major at the local high school. after a while, however, once they had spoken on the topic for a while, they did seem to agree that the commercial fishing industry could in fact suffer, and be downsized substantially because of the competition from aquaculture – in fact – they even agreed that the industry could become obsolete because of not only the salmon industry but also other farmed marine species that demand large areas that currently are in use by the commercial fishing industry. the culmination of the discussion was that the financial aspects trump all others. there are clear overlaps between aquaculture localities and spawning areas for commercial fish species, with the former being prioritized, mainly because the decision making process has been moved from the local municipality to the more centralized political entity of the county, which consists of a group of municipalities and is geographically removed from the municipalities in question. the growth potential for the commercial fishing industry on frøya is therefore less certain than that of the aquaculture industry, which worried the fishers some, and led to their priority issue being the survival of the capture fisher industry. consilience tiller et al.: salmon aquaculture   3.5 local enthusiasts in line with the other stakeholder groups, but with a more concrete priority issue than just a positive development of their community, were the local enthusiasts on frøya, who were selected using the snowball method as well (snijders 1992). the group of seven were represented by both men and women; local politicians from both the far right, left and middle; industry representatives and board members; educational leaders; historians; local enthusiastand cultural price winners; as well as municipality advisors – many of whom held several of these titles. the first element this group brought up with regards to aquaculture, beyond sheer enthusiasm for all the benefits thereof, was that the main group that had raised any kind of objection to the effects of aquaculture were those that did not live on the archipelago permanently, namely second home owners. this was a group that would complain about visual contamination of the area, such as nets being driven on shore, or lights on the water at night. the group was clearly irritated about these objections from the second-home owners, and clearly stated that the concerns of the main population that actually lived on the islands permanently were those that were prioritized, even if everybody had the right to state their opinions at hearings about new and current aquaculture localities. what was a concern for this group, however, was the increased traffic to the archipelago as a result of the increase in aquaculture production and how this would only get worse if the hypothesized 10-fold increase were to come true. even if the future increase in road traffic is diluted by an immense increase in traffic by sea instead, the traffic was hypothesized by the group to at least double regardless, which would be intolerable, even at that rate given the current problems they had with infrastructure at todays rate. they felt though, that even if this was negative, the salmon industry had provided for lights on the island group, which was the critical factor. the local high school had had an enormous increase in applicants to both the aquaculture and the commercial fisheries majors, with the former having had an increase from 1 applicant in 2007 to 32 applicants in 2013 and around 85% of all the students actually stay on frøya after the end of their education. the largest problem with this increase, in addition to infrastructure, was the lack of qualified applications that were needed to fill teaching positions, which could not be resolved with the increasing immigrant population. with 15% of the population of the archipelago not being norwegian, they did concede some societal as well as logistical problems despite all the positive association they had with aquaculture. in 2010, the birth rate of children with immigrant parents on the island was significant, at 41%, which was reflected in the day care situation on the island as well, where at least one day care reports the ratio of foreign children that do not speak norwegian being at 70%, and only 13 % being norwegian (strømøy 2012). they felt the integration at the high school went well, however, though they did acknowledge having observed that the foreign students mostly kept to themselves during breaks, something which was acknowledged by the high school stakeholder group as well. they also commented on having read about loneliness among the foreign youth (strømøy 2013), and decided that language was the biggest challenge to the integration process on the archipelago. given that these immigrants are on the island group voluntarily for work purposes, they have no rights to norwegian language education, as refugees do (new in norway 2013). they therefore have to learn 82 consilience   the language voluntarily, which often hinders their social integration. by the end of 2012, however, the local government on frøya decided to go into a dialogue with salmar, where the official work language is norwegian, about joint language training for foreign workers to ease integration of these groups into the society (frøya kommune 2012, strømøy 2012). moving away from foreign immigrants, however, the group fast reapproached infrastructure as its main issue of concern, with the lack of boat communication being a large problem in addition to the roads not being prepared for the kind of traffic they were experiencing nowadays, and would in the future. the main issue was because they wanted not only foreign workers to come move to frøya – they also wanted norwegians, which was in line with what the scientists had suggested as well in their workshop. the local enthusiasts felt that there ought to be no more than 1,5 hours to trondheim – either by boat or by road – for it to be possible to tempt people in the trondheims region to make the move to the archipelago frøya. another wished for option was a max half hour boat route to ørlandet, where the main air station for the royal norwegian air force was recently relocated (the storting 2012), which would provide job opportunities for two income families where one could conveniently work in frøya. infrastructure expansion and planning thus became the main priority issue for this stakeholder group, which was reflected in the development of the future scenarios in the second part of the workshop. 3.6 foreign workers finally, the last workshop consisted of the group whose role in the society was a sub-factor in all the workshops, namely representatives of the foreign workers in the salmon industry on the archipelago. this proved to be a distinctive group, composed of variety of immigrants, a group that is currently relatively marginalized in this local community. this group will soon make up 20% of the population of frøya but few of these immigrants speak any norwegian. they are employed in relatively low-skilled, low prestige jobs, particularly in the processing of salmon. these workers are, however, critically important to the future of the industry since the local authorities and employers have been unable to attract norwegian workers to these jobs. the survival of the industry and the health of the local communities therefore depend on understanding the needs of this group. the workshop clearly indicated that the priority of these stakeholders was inclusion in society. the foreign workers did not want to be on the outskirts of society any more – whether there was a tenfold increase in aquaculture production or not. they felt that their lack of language skills was inhibiting their ability to move across sectors, to be integrated in the local community, and to have upwards motion in their careers. they therefore almost immediately changed most of the drivers away from environmental factors to more social factors. what this group wanted was for the local norwegian community to recognize their need to have training in speaking norwegian in a natural setting. they wanted their fellow island inhabitants to actively help them in their effort to learn norwegian; they wanted the norwegians to correct their language respectfully when they said something wrong and to explain the correct way of saying the sentence. they felt that it is currently “us” (the foreign workers) versus “them” (the norwegians), and they felt that the salmon industry management looked down upon them. these consilience tiller et al.: salmon aquaculture   workers also perceived that they were stuck in both the company where they worked and in frøya because of their lack of integration and norwegian skills. this lack of upward mobility options was a great source of frustration and led to lack of interest on the part of many in staying in norway, and instead dreaming of returning home to their respective home countries. 4. results four of the stakeholder groups were located in frøya, and thus had the same frame of reference with regards to their local community and the changes they had seen and were foreseeing therein. the fifth stakeholder group consisted of experts in the field of aquaculture in general, specifically from a scientific and technological point of view. after the initial part of the workshop, where the group conceptualization process explored and unearthed the priority issue of the given stakeholder group, and the bbn development created the causal links leading to this priority issue, conditional probability tables (cpt) were given to the participants to fill out. the data elicited from the participants were used to construct and compile functioning bbns using the dedicated bayesian software package netica using these tables. auxiliary ‘expert’ variables were introduced to each of the bbns (kjærulff and madsen, 2007). these auxiliary variables were specified for every child variable within the bbn structure with the contribution of each stakeholder’s cpt weighted equally. the goal was to have the participants create quantitative future scenarios, where they would come up with their user group’s priority issue given the prerequisite scenario of an imagined ten-fold increase. the background for wanting this information was to ascertain a priori what the conflict lines could be in the future for these user groups, and provide a management tool to that would better prepare local and national policy makers to the potential conflict lines that may emerge. the following are graphical representations of the bbns for the five different workshops. for the purposes of easing the readers understanding of the networks, an in depth explanation of how these work will be presented first. each stakeholder group was first instructed to assign two (dichotomous) states to their priority issue as a means of discretizing this variable. the priority issues are stated in table 2. table 2: priority issue in each workshop workshop priority issue scientists – ntnu positive effect on local community local enthusiasts realistic infrastructure commercial fishermen existence of a commercial fishery on frøya future generations (high school students) positive development of local community foreign workers in salmon industry learning to speak norwegian adequately the workshop facilitator guided the participants on the selection of these states including informing them that they had to be discrete states (as opposed to continuous), mutually exclusive (only one state can be true at any given time) and that the states be exhaustive (all potential outcomes are covered by the states). 84 consilience   these rules are fundamental tenets of bbn development (marcot, steventon et al. 2006) although the selection of dichotomous states entails that these are often broad qualitative descriptions. conversely, restriction to dichotomous states enhances the tractability of the associated conditional probability tables (described elsewhere), which can otherwise be a serious impediment in bbns that rely heavily on expert elicitation to parameterize them (kjaerulff and madsen 2008). further guidance on the selection of the dichotomous states was provided in that the stakeholders were instructed to reflect on a desirable and undesirable state respectively. in the next step of the bbn development process, the stakeholders were asked to identify three primary variables that would directly influence their capacity to manage their priority issue at their desirable state. after some group discussion, the participants agreed upon three primary variables (dichotomous states were assigned as per the priority issue (see the bbn figures under each heading under). the priority issue and the three primary variables and states were then put up on colored post-it notes on the board during the workshop, so that the stakeholders at all times could see what they were deciding upon in unison. this was helpful when the second level of causality (secondary variables) in the developing bbn diagram was created. this process required that they assign up to three variables for each of the three primary variables, based on the concept that these secondary variables directly influenced the primary variables. again, they were prompted to assign percentage influences that these secondary variables would have on the primary variables. the participants assigned dichotomous states to each of the secondary variables in a similar manner as for the priority issue and the primary level variables. the priority issue and the primary variables (the first and second levels of the pyramid) were the basis for the scenarios produced (see example in table 1) where the stakeholders then assigned individual probabilities for each scenario being realized. in the figures below, the results of those probabilities have been added to netica, and the group results are presented. consilience tiller et al.: salmon aquaculture   figure 4 – bbn scientist workshop – red is most influential pathway, blue is next. the scientists had chosen to have as their priority issue, given the instructions from the research team, the need for a positive effect of a tenfold increase in aquaculture production on the local community of frøya specifically, but also more generally, given that there are many “frøyas” in norway. they had a very positive outlook of this, given the results of their conditional probability tables, and all in all, of the 7/10 participants that did fill out the forms after the workshop (3 had to leave early and never filled these out though participated in the workshop), the results showed that they anticipated that with a ten fold increase in aquaculture production, there was a 57.8% chance it would have a positive effect on the local community. this was under the caveat of the production being sustainable, however, with little negative effect on other user groups or the marine environment, and a strong integration between the industry and other sectors in the community. with this lacking, this positive outlook would shrink to only 39% certainty of a positive effect. a low integration, set at 100%, of newcomers to the community was deemed less important, however, though it did make the outlook fall right under 50%. similarly with environmental sustainability, the third scenario looking at local development, also suffered if the effect on local development was set to 100% negative, making the prediction of positive effects fall to 38.4%. what the initial conditional probability tables show, however, is that the scientists as a group appear convinced that the effect on local development, with 62.9% certainty, will be positive. based on the narratives from the workshop itself, these results are not surprising. the workshop consisted of scientists with a dedication to aquaculture as a field of specialization, and they were in general very positive to the industry in general and less focused on the environmental aspects that could negatively have an effect on a coastal community. they saw the benefits of this industry as being more prominent than any potential negativity, which was again reflected in their output. though, as observed in the bbn, the variable with the highest chance of changing the positive outlook was still those that related directly to sustainability of the industry. when doing the sensitivity analysis of the bbn, we found that the implementation and management node is most influential on the priority node and is mainly driven by the effect on marine environment (unsurprisingly for scientists!). the effect on local development is also important and the main determinant acting on this is the industry contribution to local community. integration of effect on local community positive negative 57.8 42.2 stakeholder stakeholder1 stakeholder2 stakeholder3 stakeholder4 stakeholder5 stakeholder6 stakeholder7 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 implementation and management sustainable unsustainable 53.9 46.1 integration of local community with newc... high low 57.5 42.5 nationality of newcommers national international 50.0 50.0 family state married unmarried 50.0 50.0 language skills of newcommers norwegian others 50.0 50.0 effect on local development positive negative 62.9 37.1 industry contribution to local community high low 50.0 50.0 government investment in local community high low 50.0 50.0 tax to local community high low 50.0 50.0 effect on marine environment low high 50.0 50.0 effect on other users of ocean positive neutral negative 50.0 50.0 integration of aquaculture industry with ot... strong weak 50.0 50.0 86 consilience   local community is a weak determinant and this is reflected in the sensitivity analysis with all three parent nodes (family state; language skills; nationality) the three bottom ranked nodes. similar to the fishermen, there is a strong stakeholder effect but there is not clear divergence in which nodes are the most influential. this suggests differences in the conditional probabilities but not in the sentiment (or perception) about which are the important nodes in the bbn. figure 5 – bbn future generations. variables in red rectangles highlight most influential path, blue indicates second most influential path. labor market/access to work was the most influential determinant acting on the priority node (development of local community) for the local high school students on frøya. in turn, this (labor market/access to work) was almost equally sensitive to its three parent nodes (places to work, employment opportunities, opportunity to earn wages) showing how the students felt that it was critical not only that there were jobs on the island for them in the future, but also that they were local and that they had the opportunity to earn good wages. the second most influential pathway was via the teachers and educational opportunities, demonstrating the actual importance young high school students place on the experience of their teachers and mentors. note that the auxiliary variable representing the stakeholder beliefs (stakeholder) was also influential, emerging as second only to labor market/access to work. this indicates a divergence in the conditional probabilities assigned by the nine stakeholders. there does seem to be some convergence about the importance of the labor market/access to work among the nine stakeholders, although there is divergence in whether ’employment opportunities’, ’places to work’ or ’opportunity to earn wages’ is more important. labor market/access to work sufficient insufficient 57.4 42.6 educational opportunities k-12 exists does not exist 57.8 42.2 number of inhabitants in the community sufficient insufficient 58.5 41.5 employment opportunities local not local 50.0 50.0 quality of students engaged passive 50.0 50.0 teachers experienced inexperiences 50.0 50.0 attractiveness of schools attractive not attractive 50.0 50.0 homes in community accessible no access to homes 50.0 50.0 perception of nature in community nice and clean trashy and ugly 50.0 50.0 leisure activities in community good bad 50.0 50.0 stakeholder stakeholder1 stakeholder2 stakeholder3 stakeholder4 stakeholder5 stakeholder6 stakeholder7 stakeholder8 stakeholder9 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 places to work exist do not exist 50.0 50.0 opportunity to earn wages exist do not exist 50.0 50.0 development of local community positive negative 55.7 44.3 consilience tiller et al.: salmon aquaculture   figure 6 – bbn commercial fishermen. variables in red rectangles highlight most influential path, blue indicates second most influential path. the importance of work and salary also is evident among the fishermen on frøya. during the sensitivity analysis it was found that profitability of commercial fishing is easily the most influential node in this network and this is predominantly influenced by the market price for wild fish. the stakeholders actually perceived the other two parent nodes for profitability (i.e. taxation and operating costs) as having quite low influence on profitability, which is understood more clearly when the narrative of the workshop is taken into account. one of the participants was a large-scale business owner with several employees and large costs, and was very set on the critical importance of predictability, given the high costs unpredictability would inflict upon his company. the others were smallscale boat owners and were not equally sensitive to these fluctuations. however, this also demonstrates the flexibility of this system in that it captures what the majority actually felt, discarding what dominant stakeholders in a workshop setting may overlook. the next main pathway of influence is through the node ‘commercial fishermen workforce exists’, although the sensitivity analysis indicates this is a lot less influential than profit, which is not surprising giving that these are business owners and are representing an industry as such. the main influence on workforce exists is salary-leisure although fishermen reputation is also important. the area set aside for aquaculture is a minor determinant judging by the sensitivity analysis although out of its three parent nodes, the type of aquaculture species is the important one (the politics and municipality themed nodes are very weak in terms of influence). the narrative shows that this is because of a perceived threat they have of future kelp aquaculture developments on the island, something which they perceived to be much more space needing than the aquaculture industry, thus forcing them further out of their fishing areas. lastly, stakeholder, as a variable, has considerable influence on the priority node indicating some degree of divergence between the beliefs of the stakeholders themselves. however, looking at the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis, it would seem that this variability probably reflects more the difference in the actual probabilities assigned but does not reflect the underlying sentiment (e.g. two stakeholders share a belief in which parent node is more important but use different probabilities to reflect this). commercial fishery in frøya exists does not exist 45.3 54.7 stakeholders: commercial fishermen stakeholder1 stakeholder2 stakeholder3 stakeholder4 stakeholder5 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 combination of salary and leisure time competitive not competitive 50.0 50.0 area set aside for aquaculture lots little 50.1 49.9 profitability of commercial fishing good bad 50.1 49.9 commercial fishermen workforce exists yes no 51.8 48.2 commercial fisheries politically prioritized not politically prioritized 50.0 50.0 regulatory power of municipality powerful not powerful 50.0 50.0 type of aquacultured species not area demanding area demanding 50.0 50.0 fishermen reputation good bad 50.0 50.0 fishermen education political priority not a political priority 50.0 50.0 general taxation on fisheries predictable unpredictable 50.0 50.0 operating cost for fisheries high low 50.0 50.0 market price for wild fish high low 50.0 50.0 88 consilience   figure 7 – bbn local enthusiasts. the local enthusiasts chose to be more specific in their quest for a priority issue and the path towards it. rather than focusing on the positive effects on the local community, which they took as more of a given, and focused instead on how to prepare the community for all these positive effects, namely through realistic infrastructure investments that would take into account this tenfold increase in production on frøya. based on the six stakeholders’ conditional probability tables, the initial joint results were not entirely positive, with a likelihood of only 47% of “infrastructure” being realistic relative to the needs of the community. with “global marketing of frøya food production” being manipulated to 100% positive, however, this changed to 62.2%. similarly, with a “will to finance” set at 100%, it changed to 62.6%. despite the heavy emphasis of the group on the importance of “long term mental understanding” – which meant that the stakeholders felt the global community needed to change its mentality about farmed marine products from the bottom up, at the local community, this variable nevertheless did not change much, even when set at 100% at which it only reaches 55% chance of infrastructure being realistic. global marketing of frøya food production positive negative 45.9 54.1 reputation of marine sector political priority not political priority 50.0 50.0 long term mental understanding awareness not awareness 58.3 41.7 situation of patriotic capitalists economic advantages no advantage 50.0 50.0 research locally based remote base 50.0 50.0 local enthusiasts strong will weak will 50.0 50.0 department of aquaculture exists does not exist 50.0 50.0 political priority yes no 50.0 50.0 accepted environmental reputation sustainable unsustainable 50.0 50.0 industry action towards reputation building proactive reticent 50.0 50.0 infrastructure realistic unrealistic 47.0 53.0 financing will no will 54.1 45.9 stakeholders stake1 stake2 stake3 stake4 stake5 stake6 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 integrated costal zone management postive negative 50.0 50.0 consilience tiller et al.: salmon aquaculture   figure 8 – foreign workers in the salmon industry the foreign workers, as opposed to the other groups, were not as concerned about the local community per se – but of their role within it. they chose as their priority issue being able to speak fluent norwegian (language learning), and what what variables they felt were influential in reaching this end. the initial results showed that, based on the individual probabilities, the participants felt it was almost a 46% chance of them becoming fluent in norwegian. the most influential variable for them was teaching quality and methods. in turn, the sensitivity analysis (above table) indicates that ‘commitment from company’ is the most influential determinant (of teaching quality and methods) and therefore the most influential pathway to the priority node is via these two variables (as indicated by the red nodes in the diagram below).’ this variable (commitment from company) rests on their view that the commitment from the company to not schedule them for mandatory work or overtime when there was a course that they needed to go to had to be real. although not entirely logical, this was clearly the most important factor for them, naturally, the adaptive capacity of teaching methods is not related to, or affected by, whether or not a workplace will schedule someone for work in the same period. the two other variables affecting teaching quality and methods are, however, but these were not equally important to the participants. this showed that in addition to their need for good teachers, they had an underlying assumption that there had to be a real commitment from the company to let them learn fluent norwegian on their own time and according to their own schedule, and without the company demanding work over language. there is general cohesion about which nodes are the most important and which are least important among the stakeholders too. four out of the six stakeholders placed teaching quality and method as the most important variable influencing the priority node. furthermore, five of the stakeholders placed commitment from the company as the most important node influencing teaching quality and methods. the main divergence from this pattern was stakeholder 6, who appeared to place greater on local community (and local interest). based on the sensitivity analysis, the second most influential node is ‘courses’. at the next hierarchical level (i.e. the parent nodes for ‘courses’), courses flexible notflexible 47.7 52.3 committment from company real not so real 50.0 50.0 individual level teaching exists does not exist 50.0 50.0 teacher quality inclusive and understanding not inclusive n understanding 50.0 50.0 schedule of course offerings great variation little variation 50.0 50.0 local community activelyinterested notactivelyinterested 49.2 50.8 local interest exists does not exist 50.0 50.0 community understanding of wishes better than today same as today 50.0 50.0 local knowledge of this need publicinformationevent nopublicinfoevent 50.0 50.0 course offerings many and diverse few and same 50.0 50.0 location of the course easily reachable difficult to reach 50.0 50.0 teaching quality and methods adaptive to individual level not adaptive 51.3 48.7 language learning fluentnorwegian notfluent 45.9 54.1 foreignworkers stakeholder1 stakeholder2 stakeholder3 stakeholder4 stakeholder5 stakeholder6 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 90 consilience   ‘course offerings’ is the most influential with the remaining two parent nodes having similar (but lower) influence. this second-most influential pathway is shown in blue in the following bbn. there is more variability (or divergence) regarding the second-most important node influencing the priority node, which was split between ‘courses’ and ‘local community’. the greater influence given to ‘courses’ in the group-level sensitivity analysis appears to be a result of more widespread probabilities assigned to the effect of courses (i.e. the impact of whether these were flexible or not) and the low importance assigned by one of the stakeholders (stakeholder 4). 6. conclusion the implications of the findings of these workshops to policy makers are many, both at the local, regional and national scale. policy makers are constantly faced with both the interests of new investments that could provide job opportunities and increase seafood production, and also existing constituents, including stakeholders with different levels of power and influence over policy decisions. it has been argued that stakeholders should play a large role in determining public policy in a given area. this is because it facilitates legitimacy in the process for the stakeholders, greater satisfaction and often more innovative solutions (gopnik, fieseler et al. 2012). policy makers’ a priori knowledge of these variables can lessen conflicts that may arise as a result of stakeholder discontent with top-down approaches to aquaculture management, and give managers a better understanding about what they propose could have negative repercussions with stakeholder groups. it can also bring a legitimizing aspect to the political process for affected stakeholder groups, possibly lessening simmering conflicts. in light of this, the article has explored the socio-ecological effects of a ten-fold increase in aquaculture production through the granting of new licenses to the industry around the island group of frøya in trøndelag, norway. this was investigated from a stakeholder perspective, assessing the adaptive capacity of the local community frøya in the middle part of norway to a ten-fold increase in aquaculture production. this was done through participatory stakeholder workshops combining scenario analysis, systems thinking and bayesian belief networks, where we developed conceptual frameworks and influence diagrams visualizing the perceived effects of the industry on the given stakeholder system. this adaptive capacity is, even in its raw state, an important tool for policy makers to explore the effects local communities foresee with de facto industry expansion. this can then provide context-specific adaptation policies and measures that can be pursued that reduce a given stakeholder group´s vulnerability to negative consequences of industry expansion. a few assumptions were proven wrong in this project. beforehand, it was expected that the challenges of integrating an increasing number of foreign immigrants into the small island community would be a priority issue for many of the stakeholder groups. we also expected income to be a priority issue for commercial fishermen, and that environmental issues would be of big importance to the stakeholders. however, we were surprised by the results, especially since there was an apparent lack of conflict over even something as dramatic as a tenfold increase in aquaculture production in the relatively small geographical consilience tiller et al.: salmon aquaculture   area of the archipelago of frøya in norway, even in light of known environmental effects and displacement of other user groups and how much more integration need would result from it. the survival of the island community was that which was of utmost importance in these communities, and with expressed gratitude towards the industry saviours that were contributing to this growth and the foreign immigrants that were contributing to it. underlying all this positivism, however, is the fact that there are definite integration issues prevalent in the community that now has near 20% foreign inhabitants, and where day-care centres can have upwards of 70% non-norwegian speaking children attending. “if you build it, they will come” was resonated in the workshops, with a reference to native norwegians, not foreign workers, and that an increase in population as a result of a tenfold increase in production could as easily be filled with norwegian migrants as foreign ones, if only the infrastructure challenges, as relates to the necessity of two jobs per family, could be overcome. when exploring the other side of this issue, the foreign workers, we did find that there were simmering conflicts where they felt marginalized on the outskirts of society at times and wanted to be included. one worker summed it up nicely when she said: “…if i could speak fluent norwegian, and be part of society, i would stay here forever!” this is important information for the policy makers at all levels of management to understand and to act upon before increasing licenses for aquaculture in remote areas along the norwegian coast. unless you have a workforce of norwegians ready to fill the associated positions for these new licenses, there needs to be critical work done in the language acquisition 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"impacts of biodiversity loss on ocean ecosystem services." science 314(5800): 787-790. microsoft word altmann.docx   1   consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 82 – 94 good life as a social movement proposal for natural resource use: the indigenous movement in ecuador philipp altmann freie universität, berlin, germany email: philippaltmann@gmx.de abstract the ecuadorian indigenous movement has developed the concept of good life (sumak kawsay or buen vivir) as a conceptual weapon in order to defend the territories of indigenous nationalities as the movement itself defines them. starting in 2002, petroleum exploitation in indigenous areas in the amazon has been denounced as an attack against the principles of the traditional concept of good life. the introduction of the concept of good life allowed the local as well as the national indigenous organizations to define their vision of the country and society, while allowing easier coalitions with a growing ecological left. good life is not only a new content in the indigenous discourse, but also an instrument for social movement mobilization and coalition building. this text aims to offer a clearer idea of what the indigenous movement in ecuador understands as good life, the development of the concept, the different contents and relations it has, and its strategic use in ecuadorian politics. keywords: ecuador, indigenous movement, good life 1. introduction the concept of sumak kawsay or good life has made an impressive career since its first use in 2000. since its integration into the constitutions of ecuador and bolivia in 2008 and 2009, it has been widely discussed as an alternative to capitalist development and the possible principle of a new way of understanding the economy. in this context, the new concept lost most of its origins even if many of the participants point out that the good life is “a category in the philosophy of life of the ancestral indigenous societies [and] invites us to assume other `knowings´ and other practices” (acosta 2010: 10). the fact that it “questions the western concept of well-being” (acosta 2010: 13) has been understood especially by non-indigenous intellectuals as a radical alternative in the sense of a “new paradigm of development for latin america” (ramírez 2010: 5) or a “biocentric turn” (hernández 2009: 62). in this way, the good life was integrated into the political project of a “socialism of the sumak kawsay or republican bio-socialism [that] recovers a biocentric ethic of living together” (ramírez 2010a: 73). these free readings of the concept claim that “the andine vision is not the only source of inspiration in order to impulse the good consilience altmann: good life as a social movement proposal     83   life” (acosta 2010: 13). the good life or sumak kawsay is also attributed to afroecuadorian (fernández-juárez 2010: 17-18) and western sources, such as “aristotelian, marxist, ecologic, feminist, cooperativist, humanist...” (acosta 2010: 13) ones. only a few intellectuals stick to a more verifiable and, necessarily, basic definition: in its most general sense, buen vivir denotes, organizes, and constructs a system of knowledge and living based on the communion of humans and nature and on the spatial-temporal harmonious totality of existence. that is, on the necessary interrelation of beings, knowledges, logics, and rationalities of thought, action, existence, and living. this notion is part and parcel of the cosmovision, cosmology, or philosophy of the indigenous peoples of abya yala (walsh 2010: 18). in this text, good life will be seen as a proposal of the indigenous movement that, despite its wide usage in non-indigenous circles, remains part of the discourse of this movement. as the good life is a new concept that builds on an older discourse, this text will provide a short summary of the general development of the discourse of the indigenous movement in ecuador in order to allow an analysis of good life as a part of this discourse. thus, an interpretation of the concept and its political and economic implication will be made possible. 2. indigenous movement discourse from the mid-1970s to 2000 the 1970s and 1980s in ecuador were marked by an “ethnic re identification” (quijano 2006: 32) of the indigenous in the context of a renewed indigenous movement with new emerging organizations. the earlier organizations, defined by a unionist and classist vision, lost ground after the second land reform in 1973. ethnic organizations were able to gain influence with the support of the catholic church. this changing hegemony of organizations was accompanied by a shift in discourse towards an identitarian understanding of the indigenous and their position in society, leading to a reorientation aiming at their “self-determination […] in a new concept of the pluralist ecuadorian state.” (federación de centros shuar 1976: 129) in short, a discourse oriented towards difference could complete or, in some cases, replace the earlier discourse orientated towards equality. a central part of this shift was “the re-encounter of a vision of the world from which the acts of agrarian life and collective life acquire an explicit and valorized common sense.” (león 1983: 8) this “idealization of the past” (león 1983: 8) was accompanied by a renewed concept of the indigenous that understood “a population that has community of culture, past, perhaps language, and considers that it should dispose of a common or own authority” (león 1983: 8) as an indigenous nationality with the right for self-determination. this concept of nationality has marxist origins as it sees “the emergence of state elements” (pacari 1984: 115-116) as a typical characteristic of a nationality. it comprises “concrete specifications of 84 consilience    84   organization of life and destiny, specifications in the mode of production and in the socio-cultural manifestations” (unae s.a.: 47). following those concepts, the new indigenous movement fights for the self-determination and liberation of the indigenous peoples (pacari 1984: 115). the acknowledgment of diversity and difference, sometimes as part of a model of autonomy (león 1983: 8), took the place of equality in the core of the demands of the indigenous movement. the indigenous started to fight for “a citizenship with the right to difference” (león 1983: 10) within a multinational state (león 1983: 8). multinationality1 with indigenous autonomies was seen as explicitly opposed to the traditional regime of integration, a reason for the early completion of this new idea with concepts of pluriculturality (pacari 1984: 119). it is also important to emphasize the fact that those concepts do not imply any kind of ethnic isolation (pacari 1984: 118-119). the fight of the indigenous movement was for a recognition as different peoples and nationalities within society and state, “in the level of equality” (pacari 1984: 121). a central base for this change in discourse has been the understanding of the land of the indigenous peasants. following the failure of the land reform in 1973, a reconceptualization of land took place within the indigenous movement. land was now understood not only as an economic asset, but also as cultural place. a local amazonian organization stated in 1985: the land for the native doesn't mean the lot that the law can assign to him, or the family patrimony […]. the land means a certain place where he lives and finds the reason for his existence. his concept of land is that of a territory, an extensive home country in which he mobilizes freely in relation to the other members of the group. a territory whose concept is basically integrated by the forest (sacha pacha). inside the sacha pacha (forest) is everything, included, as a further element, the land (allpa). the sacha pacha (the forest) is an extensive territory that has preserved itself, that has defended itself for the group and in which can be found freely and roaming in all its scope, more than the ashes and bones of their ancestors, their souls, the powers and spirits that guide their life and their destiny (unae s.a.: 34). there is a direct connection between an indigenous nationality and its territory. the economic, social, and political expressions of the nationality were “born and developed in a territory historically linked to the raison d'être of this people, in which the territoriality, the origin of man, the historical development as well as its objective manifest themselves within a culture, a knowledge and unique cosmovision.” (unae s.a.: 47). from this perspective, the fights of the indigenous movement are “fights of defense of the territory, of the survival of the group” (unae s.a.: 22). since the very beginning of this new movement, mobilizers demanded the recognition of and guaranty for “(each nationality) the property of their [each nationality’s] territory, registering it orderly in a collective form, 1 some years later renamed plurinationality. consilience altmann: good life as a social movement proposal     85   inalienable and sufficiently extensive in order to secure its demographic growth and cultural development.” (pacari 1984: 122) the relation between indigenous nationality and its territory is reflected in a traditional socio-political structure that goes from family (ayllu) to wider community (llacta ayllu) and finally to people (mama ayllu), the latter defined by a common language, culture, territory and economic connections. these three levels of social organization correspond with three levels of legislation: family norms (ayllu camachic), social norms (llacta camachic), and legal norms for the whole people (mama ayllu camachic) complete each other harmoniously in the different social entities (pacari 1984: 115). their moral bases are traditional principles, such as `don't be lazy, don't lie, don't steal´ (ama quilla, ama llula, ama shua) and the “harmonious relation between universe-earth-man (pachamama-allpamama-runa), that resumes the ideological and cultural cosmovision” (pacari 1984: 115). the idea of a harmonious relation between different principles or between man and nature is a central characteristic of the new indigenous discourse, and it influenced the concepts developed by the movement. in the following years, said concepts and ideas were integrated into a homogenous political project that sought “the transformation of the nature of the actual power of the hegemonic uninational state, exclusive, antidemocratic and repressive; and to build the new humanist plurinational society” (conaie 1994: 7). the leading principle, formulated ten years earlier, continues to remains present. in the integral project “the man and the nature in close and harmonious interrelation guaranty the life” (conaie 1994: 11). in 1994, conaie,2 the main organization of the indigenous movement, made “the integral humanist principle in the interrelation man-nature-society” (conaie 1994: 11) the central part of its fight for “the construction of the new plurinational society.” (conaie 1994: 11) in the latest formulation, in 2001, conaie stated that: we sustain the principle of the integral philosophy, in the interrelation and reciprocity between the cosmos, man-nature-society; in order to achieve better condition of individual and collective life, advocating for it the construction of the new plurinational, communitarian, collective, egalitarian, multilingual and intercultural, equitable, with vision of sustainable development (conaie 2001: 3-4). 3. the birth of good life in the year 2000, the german agency for development, gtz, organized a series of events aimed at the discussion of cultural aspects of the fight against poverty called national dialog 2000 (diálogo nacional 2000). one part of this program was called `good life´ (suma qamaña) and, in collaboration with the federation of municipal associations (federación de asociaciones municipales), inspired a great quantity of publications on indigenous concepts of good life and their different aspects that could spread through the whole country. in this context, good 2 confederación de nacionalidades indígenas del ecuador, confederation of indigenous nationalities of ecuador 86 consilience    86   life was presented as being different from development (medina 2011). here, a group of members “of the intellectual aymara elite, formed in an anthropological, ethnological or ethnohistorical academic tradition” (uzeda s.a.: 2) around javier medina and simón yampara (spedding, in: uzeda s.a. 1-2), among others, developed a coherent indigenous concept of the good life. before this moment, suma qamaña did not form part of the historical or everyday discourse of the indigenous in bolivia. it can therefore be considered “a postmodern invention of the aymara intellectuals of the xxi century” (uzeda s.a.: 20). the anthropologist alison spedding indicates that qamaña, in the bolivian indigenous communities she studies, means something along the lines of `staying at home´ after work or because of illness. therefore, suma qamaña does not represent any kind of ideal of life. spedding offers the concept of sum sarnaqaña, which refers to the compromise and collaboration of the whole family with each other and inside of their community as a moral ideal, as an alternative that covers the vision of an economic ideal better than suma qamaña (spedding 2010: 6). nevertheless, she accepts the texts that participate in the definition of suma qamaña as “steps towards the elaboration precisely of an ideal type of social and economical system” (spedding 2010: 19-20). in the following years, the gtz was able to disseminate the new concept in a series of events on the whole american continent, including a workshop in panama in 2002. at that moment, the good life seemed to be based primarily on an opposition of the `western´ life and way of thinking to the indigenous alternatives (gtz 2002: 22-23). good life was understood as “quality of life” (gtz 2002: 24) and defined provisionally as “living mostly in harmony and equilibration with one self, with the community and with the cosmos” (gtz 2002: 24). a part of this process of expansion of the new concept of good life was an adaptation of suma qamaña to the quechua sumak kawsay – not a direct translation, given that the quechua version of good life doesn't dispose of the same ethnic and linguistic reflections as the aymara pioneers did (uzeda s.a.: 14). some intellectuals pointed out that the concept of good life exists in a series of different expressions in different cultures, which are not synonyms but complementary understandings of the same problem (gudynas 2011: 8/12). this is something that allows the good life to be culturally and politically transversal and to offer a broad alternative to capitalist development (gudynas 2011: 8). 4. the introduction of good life in ecuador an article by carlos viteri gualinga that has been circulating in different versions since 2000, was the first application of the concept of good life in ecuador. analyzing the indigenous vision of development in the amazon viteri, himself an amazonian kichwa, concludes that there is no indigenous conception of development: but there is a holistic vision about what should be the objective or the mission of all human effort, that consists of looking for and creating the material and spiritual conditions in order to construct and maintain the `good life,´ which is also defined as `harmonious consilience altmann: good life as a social movement proposal     87   life,´ that in languages as the runa shimi (quichua) is defined as the `alli káusai´ or `súmac káusai´ (viteri 2002: 1). therefore, alli káusai is “a central category of the philosophy of life of the indigenous societies” (viteri 2002: 1) that comprehends knowledge, ethical, and spiritual norms of treating the environment, human values, and visions of the future, among other things. as the good life transcends the sole satisfaction of basic needs and the access to services, it cannot be understood as an analogue to development (viteri 2002: 1-2). it is rather the fundament of a new form of knowledge that “is the basic condition for the administration of the local ecological and spiritual bases of subsistence and the autonomous decision of the necessities.” (viteri 2002: 2) good life means a way of living that tries to adapt to its environment. it refers to a reconstruction of indigenous principles, adopting them to actual and future realities but always based on the local community and its autonomy (viteri 2002: 5). the spiritual aspects of good life are the special relationship between man and nature, mediated through certain members of the community: inside of this vision, the forest and the land are layers that unite the physical spaces with the untouchable, the material with the spiritual, whose mediator is the wise person (yachac in runa shimi). the social praxis of this vision on life and cosmos results fundamentally in the dynamics of the construction of the alli káusai (viteri 2002: 3). that same year, in 2002, economist alberto acosta cites the concept of good life in order to critique the western understanding of economic development (acosta 2002: 46). he offers the good life as an alternative to development in which economic growth is secondary. one year later, in 2003, the local indigenous organization autonomous territory of the aboriginal nation of the kichwa people of sarayaku, an amazonian filial of conaie that fights against petroleum production in their territory, issued a text called “the book of life of sarayaku in order to defend our future” (“sarayaku sumak kawsayta ñawpakma katina killka”) where a broader definition of the good life in the context of demands for territorial autonomy and a plurinational state is developed (sarayaku 2003: 1). good life, which in this text appears for the first time as sumak kawsay, is described as “life in plenty” (sarayaku 2003: 10) and “life in harmony” (sarakayu 2003: 26-27). the sarayaku definition is of a more spiritual nature as it invokes not only the indigenous tradition but also certain gods and cosmological rules: our main divinities, amazanga and nunguli, remind us that we should only use the necessary from the forest if we want to have a future. they never accepted that we hunt more than the allowed or that we sow without respecting the rules of the ukupacha and the kaypacha. their wraths, pleasures and wisdoms have been revealed to us through our wise men and women, who taught us about the secrets to achieve the harmony of one with himself and with the nature, our maxim of the sumak kawsay. so, a time of regeneration has to be given to the nature, in order to be able to renew our own life. we 88 consilience    88   have been in constant movement, allowing us and the other forms of life to continue their circle. mushuk allpa, the land in permanent renovation, has been a fundamental premise of the sumak kawsay. […] this living together and harmony taught us to understand the multiple dimensions that compose the sumak allpa. the muskuy (knowledge and understanding) allowed us to adapt appropriately to the conditions of life in the forest and to define our presence in these territories, since hundreds of years ago, with our ancestors tayak runa (sarayaku 2003: 3-4). following these principles, the organization demands a declaration of their territory as a “zone of biological, cultural and historical interest for the country and humanity” (sarakayu 2003: 26-27), which is to be protected in different degrees defined by ecological characteristics and traditional usage of the land. in this context, projects of development and education are to be promoted in order to strengthen communitarian tourism, traditional handicraft, and sustainable agriculture (sarakayu 2003: 26-27). in this text, the good life appears not only as a spiritual alternative to development on a general level, but also as a decisively local and concrete project. also in 2003, the state development agency codenpe (development council of the nationalities and peoples of ecuador) under control of the indigenous organizations, presented its strategic plan, which proposes a development that combines all social, economical, and environmental aspects: “it includes the sustainability as a productive relationship in agreement with the preservation of a permanent process of search of the good life or personal, family, communitarian and collective well-being” (codenpe 2003, in: maldonado 2006: 114). nevertheless, this kind of development is not further specified by codenpe or other state actors. in 2004, the newly founded intercultural university amawtay wasi, close to conaie, made the good life a guiding principle for their way of education. the latter should be: a shared responsibility for the entirety of social actors of the diverse cultures that intervene in the process of the transformation and control of the local, national and international human development, in order to achieve a appropriate `good life´ for the actual and future generations (universidad intercultural amawtay wasi 2004: 168). an education that grows out of the interrelation of different cultures and visions of the world should, in this sense, be “a way among others to walk towards wisdom, to approach the comprehension of the `good life´” (universidad intercultural amawtay wasi 2004: 172-173). in the following years, the discussion around the new concept of good life became quieter, a silence that was broken only by the structural political changes that brought the new party, alianza país, into the government. in its plan for the government of 2007-2011, it defines good life as a central part of its political proposal in the terms: “good life in harmony with the nature, under an unrestricted respect of the human rights” (alianza país 2006: 3/10). hence, the concept of good life was an important part of the discussions in the constituent assembly that consilience altmann: good life as a social movement proposal     89   elaborated a new constitution for ecuador in 2007 and 2008. in a proposal to this assembly, conaie expressed its hope that the new constitution may be a starting point “for the construction of a post-capitalist and post-colonial society, a society that promotes the `good life,´ transmitted from generation to generation by our ancient taitas and mamas, a society that regains the teaching of its ancient peoples and can live in harmony with our pacha mama” (conaie 2007: 1). in this society, the economy should not be oriented towards profit, but towards human well-being. it has to become a tool in service of community and society (conaie 2007: 7) and as such, it has to be based on the principles of the good life, including the principle of reciprocity as it is lived by the indigenous communities (conaie 2007: 21). finally, good life was defined in the preamble and 99 articles (acosta 2010: 6) of the new constitution as social purpose and as responsibility and duty of the state. this fact has been discussed widely by intellectuals in the world and is, along with the constitution of bolivia, the reason for the international interest in the concept of good life. but its integration into the constitution does not end the discussions about its meaning, how it is to be realized, and if it can be an alternative to capitalist development. the constitution meant a complete adaptation of the concept of good life in the discourse of the state as the already cited publications by the national secretary of planification and development, senplades, and the ministry of public health (ministerio de salud pública) of 2010, or the national plan for good life 2009-20133 by the senplades show. these adaptations have in common that the good life is depoliticized and loses its critical contents – it becomes another word that sounds good and means nothing. in 2008, marlón santi became president of conaie. santi had been the president of the community of sarayaku in 2003 and co-author of the manifesto with which this organization introduced the concept of good life into the discourse of the indigenous movement. his presidency was the moment of the final and total integration of the concept of good life into the discourse of conaie and the indigenous movement as a whole. in those years, the politics of conaie were oriented towards socio-ecological problems. most of the conflicts between the indigenous movement and the government were conflicts over laws that had to do with environmental questions, not economical or cultural ones as in previous years. nevertheless, the concept of good life and its integration into the constitution and the government program meant a strengthening of the indigenous movement. as the authentic originator of this concept, the indigenous movement could use “the theology of the world, of the mother earth, of the pachamama” (tenesaca 2010: 108-109) within the new constitution in order to press for its interests. included in the deep structural changes that were behind the concept of good life (as they are behind plurinationality or interculturality) and that have not been undertaken by the government was a motive for further mobilization for the indigenous movement (tenesaca 2010: 108-109). these mobilizations went mostly against neo-extractivist activities that the movement defined as contrary to good life: “[t]he pachamama is the mother that nurses her children; if this mother that 3 to be found under http://plan2009.senplades.gob.ec/web/en 90 consilience    90   nurses is not poisoned, is not looted, is not contaminated, it is possible that, really, there is a socialism” (tenesaca 2010: 109). in 2010, conaie broke up the dialogue with the government (conaie 2010: 1) and justified this measure with the good life. they stated, “the government of rafael correa is a false socialist traitor, populist, genocidal, fascist to the principles of the sumak kawsay, furthermore, it covers up the colonialism of the xxi century” (conaie 2010: 2). the specific reasons were the new law of mining and new concessions for petroleum exploitation in the amazon, among others (conaie 2011: 25). conaie and the indigenous movement used this moment to present their ideas as an alternative for the ecuadorian society, an alternative “that includes the respect for collective rights, a solidary economy, defense of the pachamama, inclusion and the respect in the public politics of interculturality and plurinationality, towards the construction of the true sumak kawsay” (conaie 2011: 28). in the same text, the good life appears as part of an economic proposal. following conaie, ecuador should count “with an economical model of life based on the sumak kawsay” (conaie 2011: 7). 5. conclusion the good life is a new political concept that resumes contents that have been under development since the beginning of the 1980s in the discourse of the indigenous movement. this reorientation of the idea expressed 30 years ago, that the indigenous tradition offers a special and harmonious relationship between the individual, society, and environment, was integrated with the concept of good life into a discourse that aims to offer alternatives to capitalist development. the establishment of a proper concept that expresses this idea allowed a further development of a vision of the world without the need for economic growth (alongside the vision of a world without oppression and discrimination, which is expressed in other concepts within the same discourse). at least until its wide acceptance in 2007-2008, the concept of good life seems to have been tightly connected with some influential persons. marlón santi took part in the introduction of this concept in the discourse of the indigenous movement in 2003 as president of the local organization of sarayaku and also in its complete integration since 2008 as president of conaie, the largest indigenous organization. alberto acosta, a mestizo intellectual, introduced this new concept into the academic discourse in ecuador and later, as a member of alianza país and the government, into the state politics and the new constitution. nevertheless, it is built on discoursive contents that seem actually to have a longer history, especially the idea of a harmony between human beings, society, and nature that nina pacari specified as the first organized indigenous in 1984. even if the central waypoints in the development of good life in ecuador have been defined by certain persons, the concept as such has been able to integrate the other central demands of the indigenous movement. as a result, it could establish itself as a clear and well defined alternative not only to capitalist development, but also to the centralist nation-state with its institutionalized discrimination. the concept of good life may not be the complete change some intellectuals may desire. still, it is a concise and solid representation of certain ideas consilience altmann: good life as a social movement proposal     91   that formerly had been present in a more implicit manner in the discourse of the indigenous movement. in short, the good life as a central concept amongst others makes ecological aspects of the economy an important matter for the movement. it is not a fight against exploitation and oppression only, but also against a way of life that does not allow a harmony inside society and between society and nature. in this sense, good life is an integral part of indigenous thinking that will remain inalienable by external agents, such as the government or political parties. 92 consilience    92   bibliography acosta, alberto (2002): en la encrucijada de la globalización: algunas reflexiones desde el ámbito local, nacional y global, in: ecuador debate 55, 37-55. acosta, alberto (2010): el buen vivir en el camino del post-desarrollo. una lectura desde la 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nacionalidades al iv. congreso de la conaie. enero 2008-marzo 2011, http://www.movimientos.org/imagen/informe%20del%20gobier no%20de%20la%20conaie%202011%20final.pdf (15.8.2011). federación de centros shuar (1976): solución original a un problema actual, sucúa: federación shuar. fernández-juárez, gerardo (2010): sumak kawsay: retos y paradojas de la salud intercultural, en: ministerio de salud pública (ed.): salud, interculturalidad y derechos. claves para la reconstrucción del sumak kawsay-buen vivir, quito: ministerio de salud pública, 17-51. gtz (2002): cooperación con pueblo indígenas en américa latina. taller, 28 al 30 de abril del 2002, boquete, panamá, s.l.: gtz. gudynas, eduardo (2011): buen vivir: germinando alternativas al desarrollo, in: américa latina en movimiento 462, 1-20. consilience altmann: good life as a social movement proposal     93   hernández, maribel (2009): sumak kawsay y sumak qamaña, el reto de aprender del sur. reflexiones en torno al buen vivir, in: obets 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(¿qué quiere decir ‘vivir bien’?),http://www.iseatbolivia.org/vivirbien/index.php/articulos-y documentos/doc_download/3-articulo-alison-speddingsuma-qamana (20.3.2012). tenesaca, delfín (2010): pueblos indígenas: exclusión histórica, aportes civilizatorios y nuevo contexto constitucional, in: lang, miriam/santilana, alejandra (eds.): democracia, participación y socialismo. bolivia, ecuador, venezuela, quito: rosa-luxemburg-stiftung, 107-110. universidad intercultural amawtay wasi (2004): aprender en la sabiduría y el buen vivir, quito: unesco. 94 consilience    94   unae (s.a.) [ca. 1986]: problemática indígena y colonización en el oriente ecuatoriano. reflexiones nacidas al interior de la u.n.a.e. (unión de nativos de la amazonía ecuatoriana), s.l.. uzeda, andrés (s.a.): suma qamaña, visiones indígenas y desarrollo, http://www.bibliocomunidad.com/web/libros/suma%20qama%f1a,%20vi siones%20ind%edgenas%20y%20desarrollo.pdf (15.3.2012). viteri, carlos (2002): visión indígena del desarrollo en la amazonía, in: polis, revista de la universidad bolivariana 1 (3) 1-6. walsh, catherine (2010): development as buen vivir: institutional arrangements and (de)colonial entanglements, in: development 53 (1), 15-21. note from the editor-in-chief note from the editor-in-chief https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i9.4633 how to cite sing, a. (2013). note from the editor-in-chief. consilience, (9). https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i9.4633 abstract dear readers, it is my great pleasure to announce the publication of our 9th issue. our editorial and managing teams have worked diligently over the past few months to compile a collection of articles we believe effectively address topics trending in sustainable development today. as editor-in-chief, i would like to extend my appreciation to our editors and supporting boards for their tireless efforts in producing another critical asset to the field of sustainable development. this season’s issue features a variety of articles attending to topics ranging from sustainable agriculture, urban planning, climate change, and development initiatives, among others. we are particularly excited to present professor douglas kelbaugh’s opinion piece on “the environmental paradox of cities.” in this article, professor kelbaugh presents new ways of thinking about the impact that densely inhabited urban zones have on the local and global environment. in addition to several provocative opinion pieces, issues ix also features several scholarly articles, photo essays, and a field note. in one of our featured scholarly articles, damilola olawuyi addresses a timely topic through her discussion of the impacts of major oil spills. for those who followed our coverage of the systematic contamination of the ecuadorian amazon by texaco, this article may be of particular interest. our featured field note, by angelica patterson, focuses on the topic of climate change through the lens of a local case study based in new york state’s black rock forest. finally, we have included a collection of photo essays, which we hope will give human value to the topics we discuss. the mission of consilience has always been to initiate dialogue on issues in sustainable development. we hope that, through engagement, our readers, editors, and authors can come https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i9.4633 together in some capacity to discuss solutions to the many problems threatening sustainable development. the interdisciplinary nature of our publication is a deliberate attempt to illustrate the range of people, institutions, and systems unsustainable practices affect. yet, through collective action, we can find solutions to address some of our planet’s most pressing communal problems. it is our hope that consilience can play some small role in setting this communal awareness and cooperation in motion. i invite you to read issues ix as well as our past publications and briefings column. as always, please contact me with any questions, critiques, feedback or submissions at contact@consiliencejournal.org. regards, alexandra sing editor-in-chief consilience: the journal of sustainable development this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution 4.0 international license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ note from the editor-in-chief abstract microsoft word generous-copyedited.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 11, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 116–122   environmental threats to the symbiotic relationship of coral reefs and quorum sensing rochanya a. generous college of charleston, charleston, sc abstract the coral reefs are declining in vitality and quantity in all parts of the world. microbiomes exist symbiotically on the individual coral polyps. with this understanding comes the idea that microbiomes may coordinate survival through their inhabiting microbe colonies in order to sustain the life of the coral polyps. of particular interest is quorum sensing, a form of bacterial communication known to coordinate gene expression in density-dependent bacteria. the importance of understanding the symbiotic relationship between microbes’ use of quorum sensing and the coral it inhabits may offer insight in how microbiological colonies promote reef health and how external toxins alter these molecular processes. consilience generous: coral reefs and quorum sensing quorum sensing is a form of bacterial communication known to coordinate gene expression in bacteria dependent on population density. this system might offer insight in better understanding how microbial colonies promote reef health and could help explain why reef health is dependent on the diversity and density of microorganisms and the bacteria, like diploria strigosa and montastraea annularis, that inhabit them. of particular interest is understanding how gene expression in the microbial colonies is regulated, how that might influence reef health, and how environmental threats affect cell-to-cell communication within a coral bacterial system. coral reefs are complex and biologically diverse colonies of holobionts, which themselves are whole beings made of smaller sub colonies with diverse microbial processes. temperature change, pollutants, and human activity all threaten the complex but vital microbial processes within these holobiont colonies as well as the overall biodiversity of the coral reefs (burke, 2012). coral reefs represent a vast collection of microbial colonies that cover over 600,000 square kilometers of the earth’s surface (crossland, hatcher, & smith, 1990). they constitute one of the most highly diverse ecosystems in the world, providing a marine habitat to over 30,000 species of organisms (burke, 2012). these microbial coral colonies are important socially, biologically, and economically as they support the aquatic environment, fisheries, and nurseries and produce income for developing nations. in addition to providing for a diverse marine ecosystem, reefs also provide protection from erosion on coastlines and sand for beaches. preserving the biodiversity of the microbial colonies within the coral is vital to promoting a healthy aquatic ecosystem. these colonies help preserve the reef against the damage caused by threats like climate change, fish-farming, human activity and environmental pollutants. the activities of all of these threats have increased over time in positive correlation with the deterioration of the reefs themselves. the importance of the symbiotic relationship between the microbial colonies and coral reefs are not well known but have the potential to become a vital part in determining how to promote reef health and sustain current reefs in poor conditions. results from climate research by peters et al (2012) argue that prevention of global temperature increasing over 2 degrees celsius is unlikely given the meteorological measurements used in their research analyzing global carbon dioxide emissions. this mean that cases of coral beaching and ocean acidification will continue to increase and decimate reefs on a global level. coral reefs are colonies of coral, a marine animal in class anthozoa of phylum cnidarian. there are three taxonomic subcategories of coral: hermatypic, ahermatypic, and perforate coral. the most common kinds of coral found in reefs are hermatypic stony coral. the coral reefs are considered to support biodiversity because they provide a habitat to over 300,000 different species of plants, marine and land animals that all use the reefs as their source of nutrients (brown 1997). 118 consilience   the individual hard coral polyps are typically a few millimeters in diameter. the polyps sit in a cavity called the calyx that is created when the coral secretes calcium carbonate. this process serves to expand the reef structures. there are the walls surrounding the calyx and on the bottom of the calyx is a calciferous ring called the basal plate. the ridges on the coral grow vertically and out of the base of the polyp. included in their anatomy is the tabulae, which isolates the face of the coral from surrounding calcium carbonate skeleton allowing the upward growth of the coral ("noaa coral reef," 23 a). their internal structures consist of a gastrovascular cavity that serves to ingest food and expel waste. within the gastrovascular cavity is the septa, which functions to support its internal structure. individual polyps connect through gastrovascular canals which enable them to share nutrients and algae. within the gastrodermis of reef building coral lies the complex and vital symbiotic relationship between itself and their internal protozoan component zooxanthellae. the coral protects and provides compounds the zooxanthellae needs for photosynthesis and in return, zooxanthellae provides food and nutrients in the coral that allows for the continued secretion of calcium carbonate, which enables reefs to continue to grow. a release of the zooxanthellae due to high temperature change results in a phenomenon called coral bleaching (brown 1997). soft corals, such as gorgonian corals, have a slightly different structure than hard coral. soft coral, also known as ahermatypic and alcyonacea coral, differ from hard coral in that they do not produce a rigid calcium carbonate skeleton. unlike hard coral, they do not form in reefs although they are commonly found in a coral reef ecosystem. soft coral are mostly colonial, meaning that a large organism may be made up of several smaller individual polyps. these colonies grow two to four centimeters a year. instead of secreting solely a calcium carbonate skeleton, they contain sclerites. schlerites are found in coenchyma, the tissue between polyps, and are made of protein and calcium carbonate. they provide a dense and supportive structure to soft coral ("noaa coral reef," 23 a). coral reefs provide a marine habitat that serves as the basis of one of the most biodiverse ecosystems in the world. not only do they support aquatic life, but they also protect and support the ecosystem of coral islands. in his article “coral: life’s a bleach...and then you die,” rob painting writes that coral reefs house 25% of the total fish population (painting, 2011). the fish are attracted to the coral reefs as they are a source of nutrients andprotection from predators. coral reefs depend on micro bacterial organisms that surround the reef, which are free-living and feed on dissolved organic matter. coral reefs consume these bacteria that make up most of the biomass of plankton and as a result, they are responsible for approximately 30% of reef production. additionally, coral reefs protect shores from the impact of waves, consilience generous: coral reefs and quorum sensing provide food and medicines, and economic benefits to local communities through tourism. this is particularly important to coastline economies in developing countries like indonesia, who rely on the tourism of their reefs as income. the national oceanic and atmosphere administration put the economic value of coral reefs to be approximately $375 billion dollars each year. this statistic takes into account the services the coral reefs provide including food, tourism, and jobs. with the declining vitality of coral reefs, the prices will only increase ("world meteorological organization," 2011). bacteria benefit the coral by breaking down waste, fixing nitrogen, and recycling nutrients back to the photosynthetic algal symbionts (e.g. zooxanthellae). bacteria may also ward off other potentially harmful microbes by producing antibiotics or by occupying the available space. the microbial loop in the oceans’ coral reefs is highly dependent on organic particles, bacteria, and consumers of bacteria. a level of microbial substrate produced by the flora and fauna provides a haven for bacterial production and is responsible for 40% of the picoplankton production and 25% of microplankton production. bacteria are vital to the plankton that provide food for the coral reefs. the main nutrient that prevents bacterial growth is carbon. at a slow rate, the ocean absorbs carbon dioxide from the atmosphere in order to reach equilibrium with the carbon in the atmosphere. a carbon atom will remain in the ocean once dissolved in the ocean and directly affects the reefs. these carbon amounts have increased on a level that cannot be processed by the reefs ("the ocean carbon," 2002). there are existing systems of corals that have been hinted at using a cellular microbial process, known as quorum sensing, to regulate bacterial cell-to-cell communication to aid in reef health. in a study by hunt, downum and mydiarz at the university of arlington, scientists extracted four kinds of gorgonian coral samples and used a pseudomonas aeruginosa quorum-sensing-gfp biosensor system that senses long chain acyl homoserine lactones. two of the four kinds of gorgonian corals plexaura flexuosa and briareum, had an inhibitory effect on quorum sensing, with a 80% and 90% reduction in signal respectively, which meant that the bacterial colonies within the gorgonian coral systems ceased to communicate. the remaining eunicea laciniata has a 20% signal reduction rate. all of the coral samples showed a dose-response effect. pseuoplexaura, the last sample, tested stimulated quorum sensing activity in the absence of ahl with a tenfold increase in signal with background fluorescence. the results of this study validated the theory that there are stimulatory and inhibitory compounds in coral reefs that indicate ongoing communication between coral and prokaryotic and interspecies bacterial colonies (hunt, downum, & mydiarz, 2012). in recent years, the idea of microbial sensing and response systems have been brought to light in the form of cell-to-cell communication and small signaling molecules. quorum sensing was once believed to be limited to a few obscure examples such as vibrio fischeri, the bacteria responsible for 120 consilience   the chemical response of bioluminescence. now, it is becoming increasingly notable in a wide range of microorganisms that bear the ability to sense and respond to the presence of neighboring coral reef microbial colonies. in addition, quorum sensing is a type of bacterial communication known to facilitate virulence, biofilm formation, and antibiotic production. after extensive research, i have concluded that quorum sensing can be applied to the bacterial systems within coral. the microbial colonies shown to be active in gorgonian coral systems support that theory. quorum sensing allows these bacterial and coral colonies to coexist harmoniously and to respond to changing environmental conditions and temperature. these colonies use quorum sensing to facilitate defense mechanisms by using various signaling molecules mediating perception and response pathways. the term quorum sensing relies on the production of low molecular mass signaling molecules, an extracellular concentration correlating with population density of the host organism. the signaling molecule can be perceived by cells and allow the whole colony to start a communal action once a certain cell density has been completed. it is important to research whether these communication systems are present in other coral-associated bacterial colonies besides gorgonian coral systems and whether these systems are affected by other environmental perturbations. if one understands the symbiotic relationship between coral and microbial colonies that use quorum sensing, it is likely that ecologists and other scientists can better understand how the environmental threats impact the symbiotic relationship between these microbial processes and coral, thus reducing positive gene expression in the coral reefs. microorganisms are constantly being bombarded by various environmental threats. these threats include change in ph, nutrient availability, ocean acidification, and temperature. in response, these microorganisms have developed ways to adapt to the fluctuations. an example of these adaptations are the two-component signal transduction phosphorelay mechanisms that allow these coral bacterial colonies to sense and respond to these environmental threats by activation and repression of certain target genes (croxatto, 2006). these microbial colonies enable the coral systems to support the overall health of the reef. other possible environmental threats to the microbial process of quorum sensing are ocean acidification, temperature change, water pollution, sedimentation, coastal development, unsustainable fish farming, ozone depletion, and careless tourism. ocean acidification is the decrease of ph in the ocean due to the absorbing of excess carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. when carbon dioxide reacts with ocean water, the availability of carbonate ions decreases as well. this process affects the reefs’ ability to facilitate quorum sensing within these microbe systems and their ability to expand the carbonate skeleton, thus slowing the growth of the reef and making it more vulnerable to erosion. the prevention of reef growth inhibits appropriate microbe colonies from forming in the reefs. without the growth consilience generous: coral reefs and quorum sensing of appropriate microbe colonies, the strength of the overall defense mechanisms the coral colonies use against environmental threats decreases. in addition to ocean acidification, corals are incredibly sensitive to temperature change. the average temperature increase in the ocean has been the main reason for coral bleaching, the microbial process where coral releases zooxanthellae from its gastrodermis signaling environmental distress. in the past century, the ocean temperature has increased by one degree celsius and increases about one to two degrees per century (hoeghguldberg, 1999). reef building stony coral are living at their thermal limit due to their sensitivity to rising temperature. coral bleaching is a sign of their distress and is triggered by a small increase in the water temperature. when coral bleaching occurs, the symbiotic relationship between zooxanthellae and coral is damaged and leads to the detachment of zooxanthellae from its host organism. coral bleaching is a sign that the microbe colonies within coral have been decimated and their use of quorum sensing has discontinued. experts expect these sorts of events to increase in frequency and intensity in the next fifty years as sea temperatures rise. this example is one of multiple ways that coral decreases its biodiversity in the overall reef structure. these environmental threats are damaging to reef health since they not only decrease the biodiversity of the reefs and aquatic organisms that surround reefs by directly damaging the biodiversity, but they also interfere with the symbiosis of the bacteria/microorganisms on the coral which interferes with proper cellular communication, thus also negatively impacting the reefs. they kill the diversity of bacteria, which means that there are not the proper concentrations, density, and diversity of species to promote proper gene expression for quorum sensing. since they cannot use this mechanism and give off their beneficial byproducts because they do not facilitate mechanisms associated with quorum sensing, the reefs suffer. when the microbial processes within coral are decimated due to environmental threats, their use of quorum sensing seizes, thereby decreasing the overall biodiversity within the reef. the importance of understanding the role of bacterial cell communication in coral reef habitats may lead to ways of understanding the role it plays in life and may lead researchers to ideas relating to sustaining their life given the inevitable variables threatening their survival. temperature, pollutants, and human direct and indirect contact create a response in the coral by decimating their bacterial cell communication system and therefore decreasing the overall biodiversity of the coral reefs. in order to provide solutions on how to sustain the coral reefs through the coming climate change, one must understand their microbe colonies and their use of quorum sensing. once scientists and experts have an idea about how quorum sensing and microbe colonies work with coral, ideas such as density manipulation in microbes facilitating quorum sensing may restore balance and overall reef health and prevent coral disease in atrisk areas. 122 consilience   consilience generous: coral reefs and quorum sensing bibliography brown, b. e. 1997b. coral bleaching: causes and consequences. coral reefs 16: s129-s138. burke, l. (2012). reefs at risk revisited in the coral triangle. washington, dc: world resources institute. crossland, c. j., hatcher, b. g., & smith, s. v. (1991). role of coral reefs in global ocean production. coral reefs, 10(2), 55-64. croxatto, a. (2006). vant, a central regulator of quorum sensing signalling in vibrio anguillarum (doctoral dissertation, umeå university). hoegh-guldberg, o. (1999). climate change, coral bleaching and the future of the world's coral reefs. marine and freshwater research, 50(8), 839-866. hunt, l. r., smith, s. m., downum, k. r., & mydlarz, l. d. (2012). microbial regulation in gorgonian corals. marine drugs, 10(6), 1225-1243. noaa coral reef conservation program. (23 a). retrieved from http://coralreef.noaa. gov/aboutcorals/coral101/anatomy painting, r. (2011). coral: life's a bleach… and then you die. retrieved from http://www.skepticalscience.com/coral-lifes-a-bleach-and-then-you die.html peters, g. p., andrew, r. m., boden, t., canadell, j. g., ciais, p., le quere, c., & wilson, c. (2013). the challenge to keep global warming below 2 ºc. nature climate change, 3, 4-6. the ocean carbon cycle. (2002). harvard magazine. world meteorological organization. (2010). climate, carbon and coral reefs (wmo publication no. 1063). geneva, switzerland. columbia university participatory assessment and adaptation for resilience to climate change author(s): john michael humphries choptiany, benjamin ernst graeub, sinan hatik, daniele conversa and samuel thomas ledermann source: consilience, no. 21 (2019), pp. 17-31 published by: columbia university stable url: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26775081 accessed: 17-04-2020 02:48 utc references linked references are available on jstor for this article: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26775081?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents you may need to log in to jstor to access the linked references. jstor is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. we use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. for more information about jstor, please contact support@jstor.org. your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of the terms & conditions of use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution 4.0 international license (cc by 4.0). to view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. columbia university is collaborating with jstor to digitize, preserve and extend access to consilience this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 02:48:26 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 21, iss. 1 (2019), pp. 17-31 participatory assessment and adaptation for resilience to climate change dr. john michael humphries choptiany farmbetter john@farmbetter.io benjamin ernst graeub ricolab ltd. sinan hatik george washington university daniele conversa farmbetter professor samuel thomas ledermann george washington university abstract traditional monitoring and evaluation tools are often costly and are not well placed to assess complex, multi-dimensional dynamic livelihood attributes, such as resilience. while these approaches may be accurate in measurement, they often fail to empower respondents to take action. drawbacks of other participatory resilience approaches include a requirement for a large amount of information, significant time required to administer surveys, and data analysis burdens (schipper and langston 2015, 19; cop 2016). they also need a baseline and an end line to assess change. they typically fail to capture how farmers actively address specific shocks and stresses or what lessons can be learned. given these limitations, an opportunity exists to review alternative approaches and develop different tools. our approach and tool, farmbetter, attempts to build on lessons learned from developing and implementing these tools. rather than characterizing the user as lacking agency in a challenging environment, farmbetter helps users make conscious decisions to adapt and withstand specific shocks and stresses such as floods, drought, or conflict, which can require contradictory coping strategies. we aim to then further connect farmers whose properties have similar agro-ecological conditions and challenges to better facilitate knowledge-sharing between food producers, ultimately improving learning and resilience. this allows for the connection of big data with (traditional) knowledge and competences already being used by farmers to improve resilience. this is enabled by advances in technology (e.g. mobile phone availability), this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 02:48:26 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms mailto:john@farmbetter.io 18 consilience which offer new opportunities to more easily and cheaply collect data as well as giving access to marginalized groups’ views and knowledge (e.g. raghavan et al. 2016). keywords: adaptation, resilience, climate change, agriculture, participatory, assessment this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 02:48:26 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience choptiany et. al: agricultural resilience tool introduction climate change and its effects on agriculture present a major global challenge to sustainable livelihoods. agricultural adaptation and resilience to climate change are still poorly understood in the context of economic development, in part due to their complexity and paucity of data. with the new goals of agenda 2030 (united nations 2015), resilience and adaptation to shocks and stresses have gained importance. however, measuring and providing meaningful, action-oriented, and empowering recommendations remains difficult (choptiany et al. 2017). this difficulty is due in part to recommendations requiring significant amounts of context-specific data, that advice be practical and actionable for people to become more resilient, and the diverse and multidimensional aspects that make up resilience (altieri et al. 2015; darnhofer et al. 2016). many of the current approaches are frameworks rather than tools that can be used to measure resilience, lacking the qualitative (self-assessment) and quantitative (academic) parts needed to assess the complex attributes of sustainability (choptiany et al. 2015). a few tools, such as sharp (fao 2018b), are participatory, including both insider (self-assessment) and outsider (academic) assessments. others, like rima (fao 2018a), have a strong econometric basis, whereas others like undp’s community based resilience analysis (cobra) provide an approach which works with communities to discuss resilience (undp 2018). all of these tools, however, fail to provide farmers with a set of actionable recommendations, lacking a significant step towards improving resilience at the farm-level. the ‘one-off’ snapshot produced by existing tools gives a picture of resilience but requires outsiders (often a development project or organization) to support changes following from the assessment. additionally, efforts to measure resilience are often based on the need to monitor or evaluate development projects, rather than on empowering local communities to adapt or mitigate climate change themselves. they are thus top down and focus on the needs of development projects and practitioners. given the challenges climate change will be increasingly posing, traditional development projects will not be adequate due to their limited funding and capacity. approaches focusing on sustainably empowering local populations directly have a higher potential for success. to be successful, such approaches should harness the knowledge of local actors, be sensitive to political, economic, and environmental factors, and build upon advances in research. based on these considerations we are proposing a novel approach described in the remainder of this article. the structure of our article is as follows: we first outline the objective, followed by a description of the methods and an illustrative case study of a section of the tool. we subsequently review the challenges and our proposed way forward before concluding. objective our objective is to empower farmers and pastoralists in developing and emerging countries to measure and improve their resilience. we believe that this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 02:48:26 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 20 consilience technological and economic developments are increasingly aligning for such an approach to become viable outside of developed countries. our technology-based approach features knowledgeor labor-intensive solutions that are expected to not only improve resilience in the long-run, but also do not require financial investments due to their nature as a public good (and not patentable) (e.g. vanloqueren and barret 2009). with the rise of increased computing power (both localized and server-based), higher mobile (smartphone) penetration rates even in rural areas in sub-saharan africa (gsma 2018; world bank 2016; qelp 2018; deloitte 2016 ), and improved literacy rates (unesco 2017), a market is emerging for mobile app-based technologies operating on android and ios systems in developing countries. the increased availability of spatial data globally (e.g. open-source remote sensing data for assessing normalized difference vegetation index [ndvi] ) and locally (e.g. sensor data from farm equipment or small weather stations used in precision agriculture (walter et al. 2017)) is supporting the long-term viability of data-intensive approaches for farm-level assessments in developing countries. we argue that this increasing access to data, if paired with additional relevant information through surveys (similar to the approach of the sharp tool) (choptiany et al. 2017), could serve to better measure resilience at the farm level in sub-saharan africa on a large scale. this approach becomes feasible as, in parallel to better assessment approaches and data sources, a growing evidence base of effective solutions to improve farming practices is being documented and becoming available online (aker 2011). while existing tools use individual segments of these approaches, the time is ripe to integrate them for a comprehensive and holistic farm-level assessment which provides recommendations for improvement of resilience using locally and globally sourced solutions presented in a farmer-centric approach. methods and material below we describe five key parts of our novel approach, outline how we plan to marry machine-learning approaches with rapid prototyping, and highlight the schematics of our farmer-centric approach. we conclude the section with an illustration of a hypothetical case of a smallholder farmer in kenya. novel methods based on these observations, we have developed a prototype of an actionoriented tool which measures resilience in a participatory manner, providing five crucial improvements: first, it is a user-friendly mobile tool, available offline and accessible to anyone with a smartphone. second, the tool breaks from past conventions of a dependency on this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 02:48:26 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience choptiany et. al: agricultural resilience tool development actors by using a farmer-centric approach where the farmer is the primary user and entry point for the tool and to implement solutions (see section 3.3 below). while development actors may find value in farmbetter to better understand and support farmers, the tool has been explicitly designed to be implemented and used directly by farmers. this empowers them to work without external support to improve their resilience. third, the tool disaggregates a person’s livelihood into distinct resilience attributes to assess what specific shocks and stresses have impacted them in the past. this provides a better understanding of how the person has adapted in the past through a self-assessment of their effectiveness. fourth, farmbetter harnesses external data sources as foundational layers to build a unique profile of each farmer (e.g. agroecosystem zone, precipitation, soil type, land-use maps, climate projections, demographic data) and combines this with public, scientifically-verified databases of proven approaches to improve resilience (e.g. at the level of sustainable land management (wocat 2018); at the level of sustainable crop production (cabi 2018)). we hope to combine farmers’ knowledge with a database of existing adaptation and coping mechanisms that have been shown to be effective at improving resilience or adaptation. connecting this external data with the participatory resilience survey subsequently provides us with a set of individualized recommendations. fifth, the tool will ultimately provide actionable advice and access to information on how to adopt these practices. this includes the ability for users to interact and learn from each other (e.g. by identifying and visiting (virtually or physically) nearby farmers using the tool to witness a specific technology adopted), closing the farmer-to-farmer feedback loop. this will be done in a user-friendly way (i.e. using paired down text and visual descriptions where possible), recognizing the differing capacity levels of farmers in developing countries. farmers are also able to rate solutions to improve our filtering system for recommending solutions. from machine-learning to rapid prototyping we aim to deploy a machine-learning tool (e.g. the open-source tensorflow), including a recommender system, to ensure that recommendations for farmers are tailored specifically to their context and preferences and consistently improving based on user feedback (e.g. via adoption rates, solutions shared and user ratings of solutions of past and current approaches) . by drawing on externally verified technologies documented based on farmers’ implementations, our machine-learning approach will be strengthened through the continuous evidence-based feedback from the farmers themselves (including the option for them to report and share their own solutions from past interventions). based on experience from developing and implementing sharp and reviewing existing resilience measurement, monitoring, and evaluation tools, we have identified the above gaps and opportunities. to fill these gaps, we used the google venture design sprint method to build an initial prototype between july 23rd and july this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 02:48:26 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 22 consilience 27th, 2018. it included interviews with seven thought leaders across various domains (development practitioners, entrepreneurs, survey implementors etc.) acting as outside experts and advisors during the week. we also began (re)engaging with practitioners who work in resilience building, m&e, and program management to understand their successes and challenges, which helped tailor our approach. this method offers a stark contrast from the traditional development model of project cycles, which require a lengthy period of project development and annual or bi-annual cycles for monitoring and evaluating. by drawing on inspirations from lean start-ups, (ries 2011; hbr 2013) design-thinking (brown 2009), and humancentered design approaches (brown 2009), we aim to work fast and directly with potential customers – commercial smallholders in loose and tight value chains (usaid et al. 2016) – to rapidly prototype the tool through several iterations in a buildmeasure-learn loop (ries 2011). farmer-centric approach inspired by doing development differently (2014), we aim to work with local stakeholders to develop country-specific versions of a localized mobile app. this will train the learning mechanism in local contexts (on the high-tech side) and draw on local user-interface designers to illustrate and test the application (on the low-tech side). the trade-off of our chosen approach will be delayed indicators of the results from adoption of technologies in favor of ensuring the potential of the tool’s usability, uptake, and scalability. by starting out with an approach that has farmers as clients, we aim to provide a turnkey solution that has a reduced dependency on donor funding or development partner support (see also later section). the farmer-centric approach is furthermore emphasized by allowing the user to set their own priorities based on which resilience gaps they would like to address on their farm and what adaptations they would like to have strengthened. the farmer profile represents the input side of the system. it is compiled based on the farmbetter survey alongside outside data sources. the solutions section is the output of the tool, with our custom recommender system matching the farmer profile alongside priorities to provide tailored resilience-building solutions. the steps and components of the tool are outlined in figure 1 below. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 02:48:26 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience choptiany et. al: agricultural resilience tool figure 1: flowchart depicting farmer-centric tool source: author’s own illustration of farmer-centric tool here we use the example of a fictional farmer, anah, based in muranga, kenya to illustrate how segments of the farmer-centric tool might work. what follows are four key steps visualized. the first visualization of the application (figure 2) displays resilience building priorities. as farmbetter captures substantial amounts of data, only some of the key attributes are summarized here: • location: muranga, in the highland area of kenya • soil type: black cotton clay soils (suitable for maize) • crop production types: maize • slope: 8-16 degrees • temperature annual mean: 19.3oc • agroecological zone: tropics, cool • altitude: 1,550 m • annual precipitation: 1,027 mm shocks and stresses • flooding: fields flood once every two years • fire: never experienced a fire this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 02:48:26 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 24 consilience • drought: has not severely impacted the area source: author’s own source: author’s own the results of the farmbetter resilience assessment tool are shown in figure 3. this represents the farmer profile, which is then matched to potential resilience building solutions. in this example, we have used the wocat sustainable land management practices database to identify three potential solutions to present to anah. solutions (practices) have been labeled as decreasing, having no effect upon, or increasing (e.g. –, 0, +) the following seven attributes: labor requirements, crop yields, soil erosion, crop or animal water use, biodiversity, flood risk, and fire risk. three of the sample technologies identified are: 1. low-cost drip irrigation (an example from nepal), which has the attributes of labor (-), yields (+), erosion (-), water use (-), biodiversity (0), flood risk (0), and fire risk (0); 2. zero tillage farming, which has the attributes of labor (-), yields (+), erosion (-), water use (-), biodiversity (+), flood risk (0), fire risk (0); and figure 2: mockup of sample resilience improvement priorities selected by the farmer anah figure 3: mockup of resilience score from farmbetter above a graphical representation of her farm, illustrating some attributes as well as shocks and stresses experienced. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 02:48:26 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience choptiany et. al: agricultural resilience tool 3. crop rotation maize with legumes which has the following attributes of labor (0), yields (+), erosion (-), water use (0), biodiversity (+), flood risk (0) and fire risk (0). finally, figure 4 outlines the solutions page of the tool. this provides a broad overview of sustainable land management, followed by potential solutions. these solutions can be selected for more general information as well as step-by-step guides on implementation. source: author’s own challenges we have identified the following five key challenges. they range from difficulties of programming to implementation, adoption, and financial viability. regarding computer programming, the first significant obstacle is the development of a recommendation system which integrates machine learning. while there will be a human curation aspect of the system, filtering through many diverse and non-uniform datasets will be computationally intensive and calculations will need figure 4: mockup of sample recommendations for anah based on her unique farmer profile, preferences and potential resilience improvement solutions. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 02:48:26 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 26 consilience to be completed on a server in the cloud rather than directly on a device. the filtered data includes publicly available datasets serving as knowledge banks (e.g. sustainable land management datasets) and data gathered from farmers’ input, such as their geolocation (e.g. matching with global agroecological zones), their agroecosystem, their soil use, and their land use. tagging and sorting the recommendations database to allow matching filters to search for the solutions with these key agroecological variables represents the most significant challenge which will require extensive labor. a second key challenge entails recording existing innovations at the farm-level that have taken place outside the purview of development practitioners. beyond the participatory self-assessment of the current resilience state of a farm, it will be essential (yet challenging) to capture any successful adaptations that have already taken place, to build and complement existing databases. from a farmer’s point of view, it is unfortunate that current resources – reflecting the existing reporting bias in development practice only contain successful implementations, with failures, lessons learned, or adaptations (which would provide a pertinent field of learning) usually missing. regarding adoption, a third challenge is to ensure that the tool will build successfully upon the development field’s improved understanding of successful adoption pathways. for example, while radio has been proven to serve as a successful pathway for advertising (ultimately creating interest or awareness for a tool or agricultural method), translating it into a decision and an action is much more challenging. based on the literature, the approach needs to involve the ability for farmer-to-farmer learning, including visits to demonstration, trial, or implementation sites (see, for example, findings from the adoption of a knowledge-intensive technology in kenya; murage et al. 2011, 2012; amudavi et al. 2009). thus, we aim to avoid the technocentric pitfalls of a singular focus on the tool and its sole ability to positively transform livelihoods by embedding the deployment of the tool in group settings (e.g. among farmer cooperatives) and facilitating the ability to connect with other farmers (both virtually and physically). this enables them to share experiences, ask questions, and learn from each other. providing feedback through the adaptation (or possible dis-adoption) of a technology option is key to reflecting the changing agroecological environment under pressure from climate shocks and stresses. we are also breaking the pattern of donor dependency by creating a system in which farmers themselves are empowered to select and adapt recommendations out of a large pool of options. a fourth key challenge with this approach is to make the tool financially viable and ultimately scalable, as the reduced dependency of donor flows also reduces the risk of becoming captive to ebbs and flows in donor financing. the conscious decision not to use the tool to promote sales (unlike e.g. mfarm), but rather to focus on the diffusion of public knowledge, poses an additional challenge to create a viable business model. this obstacle will be explored during the piloting phase of the tool to see under which conditions there is sufficient demand and a willingness to pay from farmers, which would make the app financially viable. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 02:48:26 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience choptiany et. al: agricultural resilience tool there is increasing awareness by development practitioners that “development is a fundamentally political process” (thinking and working politically community of practice, 2018). drawing on insights from the community of practice around thinking and working politically (twp) will be a fifth key challenge for any application aiming to break through numerous political and economic layers to reach farmers effectively. the agricultural technology sector especially has historically operated with the premise that the landscape is an apolitical space. in this context, we draw upon our own additional expertise in advocacy work (both at the level of the un and the scaling out of ecological agricultural practices) to ensure that our farmer-centric intervention is embedded not only within the immediate value chain of farmers, but also their political economy. this involves building upon rather than ignoring existing farmer networks (at local levels) or institutional support by governments (e.g. through extension officers), as well as engaging both local and national stakeholders in an eventual nation-wide launch of the tool with similar feedback mechanisms. areas of future work based on the methods and challenges outlined above, we have identified the following three areas of future work. first, the task of creating an all-in-one tool to assess and improve the resilience of farms is substantial and challenging. for our future work, we have decided to postpone designing and programming the final application. rather, we plan on building a “minimum viable product” (mvp) as a first step, to validate whether a business potential exists. this will mean not developing all potential features at the beginning, but only building a basic version of the tool. in an early test with farmers – possibly in different countries – we are hoping to gain information on the market demand and the usefulness of such a tool to clients. based on this we plan to either further develop the mvp into a full-fledged application, pivot to a new approach, or halt work altogether. these learnings from building a community-based prototype are expected to also be of relevance to actors beyond the farming resilience sector. second, we aim to document for the larger development community the data and information that this process and eventually the tool could provide for the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. this will necessitate, in the mid-term, a research project to ensure that the data gathered can be used to this end. this includes partnering with national governmental actors to review research findings and position the tool in country-led strategies for resilience. third, we hope to establish a farmer-practitioner-academic network for collaboration to produce this scalable tool that is not dependent on volatilities in donor funding. shocks and stresses, exacerbated by climate change, are also not static and therefore the responses recommended to build resilience to them will need to improve and adapt. this network, alongside machine learning from farmer feedback, will be used to continually improve a growing database of solutions and recommendations. feedback from this network can continuously be used to engage policymakers and influential actors, such as the global resilience partnership, on impacts and challenges in building resilience. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 02:48:26 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 28 consilience conclusions climate change is one of the major challenges of our time, especially for farmers in developing and emerging countries who lack sufficient support systems. the trends towards increasing populations will only further exacerbate the pressure of climate change on agriculture. while resilience is still an emerging concept and as such not clearly defined, development and research work on resilience has been growing. approaches to measure resilience in agriculture have been developed and are in use. the main disadvantages of existing approaches are that they are often focused on the needs of development actors and stop at measuring resilience. what is needed, given the scale of the challenge, however, is to empower farmers themselves to improve their resilience to climate change. with our tool, farmbetter, we ultimately hope to better equip farmers for an uncertain future by bringing together the best of (traditional) knowledge and technology, thus offering a unique approach that leverages local knowledge with academic research in a simple it package to assess and improve their resilience to specific shocks and stresses. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 02:48:26 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience choptiany et. al: agricultural resilience tool references aker, jenny c. dial “a” for agriculture: a review of information and communication technologies for agricultural extension in developing countries. 42: 6. 631-647. 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(6): 971–83. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2009.02.008. walter, achim, robert finger, robert huber, and nina buchmann. opinion: smart farming is key to developing sustainable agriculture. proceedings of the national academy of sciences 114 2017. (24): 6148–50. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1707462114. wocat. sustainable land management database. 2018. www.wocat.net/en/. world bank. world development report 2016: digital dividends. 2016. www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2016. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 02:48:26 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms microsoft word 1 typ 7198-article text-13635-1-15-20201130 consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 23, 2021, pp. 1-14.  abstract sub-saharan africa is at a crucial juncture in shaping its energy future: while two-thirds of its population lack access to electricity, the continent is projected to surpass china’s oil demand growth by 2040. marine renewable energy (mre), with far less intermittency than other renewable resources, can potentially contribute to sustainably electrifying africa in the long term. however, the technology has been adopted by few countries worldwide, and there are no comprehensive studies of its potential in africa, despite seemingly promising environmental conditions in the ocean, estuaries, and rivers of eastern and southern africa (esa). this paper discusses the potential for mre electricity generation in esa, and how to overcome some of the barriers to its development and implementation. the discussion addresses the concerns that are often associated with electricity generation in developing countries, such as equity, accessibility, and affordability. an analysis of the energy mix in the esa region shows that mre could fill some of the electricity supply gaps. the largest barriers to mre are not technological, but rather linked to policy design and financing capacity. three complementary solutions are outlined to set a working framework for mre deployment in esa: short-term, small-scale hydrokinetic river projects with public or private financing (similar to microgrid and off-grid solar projects); long-term, large-scale tidal projects with public and concessional financing (similar to geothermal power generation); and capacity building to ensure the employment of local citizens. © 2021 elena belletti and milo mcbride. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution license (cc-by 4.0), which permits the user to copy, distribute, and transmit the work provided that the original author(s) and source are credited. elena belletti is with the united nations department of economic and social affairs, two un plaza new york, ny 10017 usa (email: eb3269@columbia.edu). milo mcbride is an advisor & contributing writer with climate & capital media, 189 franklin street suite 593, new york, ny 10013 usa (email: mbm2227@columbia.edu). *the views expressed in this paper are those of the authors only and do not necessarily represent those of the united nations. author’s note renewable energy discussion in africa revolves mostly around hydroelectric power generation, wind, and solar photovoltaic (pv). however, these resources have limitations: hydroelectricity is expected to decline and become more unreliable because of climate change, and, although wind and solar pv both have a high potential, according to irena they will only count for up to 15 percent of the energy mix in 2030. in this context, we became curious about why tidal and hydrokinetic power seem to be overlooked, despite their reliability and seemingly promising environmental conditions in eastern and southern africa. given our professional backgrounds, once we understood the barriers, we immediately started thinking about how these challenges can be overcome with policy, financing, and capacity building solutions. keywords tidal energy, marine renewable energy, eastern and southern africa, policy design, sustainable development, democratizing energy access against the tide: potential for marine renewable energy in eastern and southern africa elena belletti* and milo mcbride consilience: the journal of sustainable development belletti & mcbride: against the tide i. introduction as a global push for decarbonization takes center stage in today’s energy policy, bringing renewable electrification to low-income countries is essential to achieving the sustainable development goals (sdgs). while africa has abundant solar photovoltaic (pv) potential, the continent’s 20,000 kilometers of oceanic coastline (authors’ calculation based on cia, n.d.) also shows potential for a lesser-known energy source: hydrokinetic energy. also known as marine renewable energy (mre), hydrokinetic energy systems are being explored in various shapes, sizes, and configurations. because mre is modular and adaptable to different environments, as well as the fact that tides are predictable and have lower intermittency than other renewable sources, this technology has significant potential as a stable source of renewable energy. additionally, this source of energy is relatively resilient and adaptable in the context of climate change. however, the number of countries worldwide that have adopted mre is still small, and, in africa, there are very few mre projects (mostly small and still in the development phase). while south africa has early developments of wave energy, the following sections will focus on tidal energy, which has more regional applications and potential for market penetration. in 2015, the international renewable energy agency (irena) reported that “africa’s extensive coastline also suggests long-term ocean energy potential, but this is unlikely to be a significant source by 2030” (irena, 2015). while barriers to africa’s utilization of mre are in part technological, the large capital costs required to develop these projects pose financing difficulties. these issues can be solved with adequate project design and supporting policies, rather than with technological advancements. this paper discusses the potential for mre electricity generation in the coastal countries of eastern and southern africa (esa). it analyzes the barriers that prevent hydrokinetic energy, in particular tidal and river energy, from being an economically viable source in areas where environmental potential is high. in doing so, the paper provides a framework of what policy instruments might support a more prevalent introduction of this technology in the region’s future energy mix. based on this analysis, the paper proposes and discusses a range of policy options that countries in the region could consider in order to facilitate the introduction and scaling of mre. this discussion addresses concerns that are often associated with electricity generation in lowincome countries, such as equity of access and the necessity of keeping costs low to promote development. it is important to note that while countries in esa may share issues of energy inequality and scarcity, energy resources and development fluctuate greatly throughout the region. although traditional hydroelectricity supplies a majority of energy in some esa nations today, many are already experiencing issues of drought and subsequently reduced electrical generation (othieno & awange, 2016a). building equitable renewable power requires a holistic perspective that can foster the best interests of local communities and the potential of their environment. according to the international energy agency (iea), africa’s oil demand is expected to grow at rates analogous to china’s until 2040 (iea, 2019a), paving the way for fossil fuels to continue playing a predominant role in the energy mix. although renewables could potentially supply up to 22 percent of africa’s total energy consumption by 2030, there is room for improvement, especially since the continent’s electricity demand is expected to triple in the same timeframe (irena, 2015). nearly half the population in sub-saharan africa (ssa) today is living in “energy poverty,” (iea, 2019a) a concept that can be defined as “a) lack of access to electricity networks; or b) dependence on burning solid biomass such as wood, straw, and dung, in inefficient and polluting stoves to meet energy needs” (laldjebaev et al, 2016). in this regard, scaling diverse, sustainable, and renewable energy systems in esa can be seen as a means to diminish future dependence on fossil fuels and reduce their consequences, namely global greenhouse gas emissions and local health concerns. ii. trends in the energy sector and power generation in ssa this section analyzes the current challenges faced by power generation, including the energy sector’s role in equitable energy access and climate change resilience. the discussion below will be instrumental in understanding what role tidal and hydrokinetic power can 3 consilience: the journal of sustainable development play in the energy mix, and how they can fill existing gaps. while north africa is mostly well-electrified, around 600 million people in ssa live in energy poverty (iea, 2018). two-thirds of people in ssa (with the exception of south africa) do not have any access to electricity, and access for the remaining one-third is unreliable, with regular blackouts and brownouts (hafner et al., 2018). figures vary greatly between urban and rural settings, with only one-fourth of the population in rural areas having access to electricity, versus threefourths in cities (iea, 2019a). eastern africa has increased electrification rates at 4 percent per year between 2014 and 2018, a notable success. while countries such as kenya, ethiopia, and rwanda are on track to domestically eliminate energy poverty by 2030, the majority of nations in ssa are expected to maintain the same levels of access as in 2020 (iea, 2019a). with around 40 percent of the population of ssa surviving on less than 1.90 usd a day (castaneda aguilar et al., 2019), energy poverty can create additional barriers to ensuring equitable development and inequality reduction. a. hydroelectricity and climate change like the rest of the world, the most common type of renewable energy in esa comes from hydroelectric dams (othieno & awange, 2016a). in recent years, hydroelectricity in esa countries has been increasingly threatened by climate change. in kenya, the effects of the 2017 drought were so dire that the country declared a national disaster. the severity of the drought not only impeded hydroelectric power generation, but also hindered fossil fuel-powered generators that require water for cooling; during this time, the country’s reserve energy margin dropped well beneath the threshold to avoid blackouts (wang et al., 2017). since 2015, mozambique has been the largest producer of hydroelectric energy in ssa (eia, 2018), generating 87 percent of electricity through this source (around 2.1 gw) (usaid, 2020a). the cahora bassa dam, the nation’s largest generator, also supplies electricity to neighboring countries like zambia. as early as 2015, extreme drought affected the reliable generation of hydroelectricity to meet both domestic and export demands (kuo, 2016). figure 1: zambezi river basin hydropower facilities (world bank, 2018) these issues extend beyond the needs of mozambique. the zambezi river is considered a lifeline to the region, providing fresh water to the six ssa nations through which it flows. with a multitude of dams already constructed, the river today is at its lowest level in almost 50 years. the consequences of this drought include not just energy depletion, but also destabilized crop harvests, fishing yields, and consistent access to clean drinking water (hill, 2019). the case of tanzania is similar to mozambique. more than a third of the nation’s 1.5 gw comes from hydroelectricity, and that capacity has frequently been unfulfilled. the dry spells have been so dire that, as early as october 2015, the nation was forced to temporarily shut down the entirety of its hydroelectric generators (makoye, 2015). unsurprisingly, greenhouse gas emissions rose significantly when the country turned to gas and coal as a replacement (hellmuth, 2019). in sum, droughts can significantly impact hydroelectric generation in esa, and, as a result, threaten both the sustainable development and stability that hydroelectricity galvanized. to mitigate future disruptions in energy supply, alternative methods of sustainably harnessing energy from bodies of water and other natural resources must be considered. b. the rise of geothermal in the midst of depleting hydroelectric resources, geothermal is a renewable energy source that is becoming more prevalent in the region with its massive, untapped potential; less than one percent of african geothermal is currently utilized (othieno & awange, 2016a). it draws parallels to hydrokinetic power in that it consilience: the journal of sustainable development belletti & mcbride: against the tide has a more continuous baseload than solar or wind and can require massive capital investment. unlike tidal energy, this source has already been successfully deployed in esa. kenya uses geothermal energy for nearly half of its electrical production (ministry of energy of kenya, 2018) and is expected to double its installed generation by 2030 (iea, 2019c). furthermore, the heat from geothermal production can be redirected to low-temperature industries like manufacturing and, in kenya’s case, insulated flower farms (irena, 2015). while kenya is home to traditional hydroelectric and geothermal energy, the latter is now considered a more stable investment due to the severity of drought (watts, 2019). figure 2: global geothermal potential (university of calgary, 2019) while geothermal resources are abundant in eastern africa (as shown in figure 2), they are not a silver bullet solution to growing renewable energy demands. environmental groups in kenya have raised concerns over infrastructure, from electrical wires to water pipes. geothermal requires water to create the steam needed to spin the turbine; if not adequately replenished, overdrawing surface water can deplete ground resources. as in the aforementioned case of the region’s hydroelectric dams, water scarcity and resiliency again fall into question. while geothermal production is likely to increase in areas with high potential (see figure 2), limited water and geothermal resources could prevent this energy source from replacing hydroelectricity altogether. iii. overview of tidal and river energy a. technology tidal and river energy come in several forms, but the general principle is analogous to a wind turbine. the momentum of the water current spins the blade to create electrical generation. while the physics are similar to wind energy, a tidal rotor must be significantly stronger, as water is 800 times denser than air. accordingly, if a tidal blade and a wind blade were the same size, the tidal rotor would harness more energy than its wind counterpart due to the increased force of its surroundings (eia, 2019). a hydrokinetic rotor is deployed in a continuously flowing river; the rotor is capable of spinning 180 degrees as the tide changes direction, thus capturing the energy in the opposite flow. it is important to note that, unlike pv and wind turbines, the intermittency is highly predictable (as it correlates directly to lunar patterns), making it more easily harnessed for continuous electricity generation (hollaway, 2013). the rotor is mounted to the river or estuary floor or floats on the surface. there are advantages to placing tidal rotors on the river or estuary floor, including safety of navigation for ships and boats, lower ecological impact, and protection from storms (charlier & finkl, 2009). however, the cost of installing buoyed turbines is lower (neill & hashemi, 2018). mre systems, available in various shapes, sizes, and configurations, are modular and adaptable to different environments. like their wind turbine counterparts, the size of an mre rotor is inversely correlated to the speed at which it spins (that is, a large rotor will spin slowly and vice versa). this versatility allows the technology to be applied to different conditions and meet different needs. for example, france and south korea have installed tidal capacities of up to 250 mw (irena, 2014). these power stations require a large bridge-like structure called a barrage. the barrage holds the tide and then releases it to cause the mre propeller to spin at higher speeds. however, barrages are capital-intensive, disruptive to shipping channels, and pose environmental risks to marine life (charlier & finkl, 2009). most tidal projects deployed today are in the form of rotors—either a single one or a cluster. with operational maintenance every five to seven years, the turbines are expected to last around 20-25 years (roberts et al., 2016), although some sources claim this could be longer (husseini, 2018). 5 consilience: the journal of sustainable development b. market penetration and deployment in recent years, tidal energy has made significant progress from a stagnant r&d stage toward becoming commercially deployable. the united states and the european union both measure the development of technology through a metric known as the technology readiness level (trl). while the wording between u.s. and eu systems varies slightly, the general principles are the same: there are nine stages, with trl 1 representing the initial observations of the design and trl 9 signifying the technology’s proven ability to deliver operational capabilities. the majority of tidal specific rotors sit at trl 7 (prototype demonstration), trl 8 (system completion), and trl 9 (proven operation) (u.s. doe, 2008; emec, n.d.). while there are a plethora of rotor models that have reached trl 9, this does not imply market viability—let alone market penetration. in fact, tidal energy is likely entering the “valley of death,” a period in technology transfer that describes the gap between operational capacity and market viability. as in the case with openhydro, an early tidal pioneer (offshore energy, 2018), firms without public sector subsidization might not generate enough positive cash flow and subsequently fall victim to bankruptcy. this signals that technology innovators will need support from government bodies and multilateral institutions to ensure adequate demand for energy systems that have not yet been fully commercialized. this could mean that utility providers and consumers will not reap the benefits of nascent energy technologies without adequate support for market penetration and more realistic costs. recent studies have indicated that it is possible to achieve a lower levelized cost of energy (lcoe) for tidal energy through economies of scale and optimized installation, operations, and maintenance (iom) (goss et al., 2020). in the united kingdom, simac atlantis energy has successfully deployed the world’s largest tidal generator as part of the meygen tidal farm. the project is composed of four 1.5 mw turbines, powering an estimated 4,000 homes in 2019, and has an overall goal of 400 mw (frangoul, 2020; power technology, 2018). while these advancements in deployment are largely due to government grants like scotland’s saltire tidal power fund (renewables now, n.d.), the firm claims that their momentum on the meygen project will open opportunities for commercial investors after 2020. additionally, they estimate that the next stages of development could create around 5,000 new jobs, many of which can be repurposed from the oil and gas sector, likely from offshore rigs (hanley, 2020). these forward motions come as the european commission has promoted the potential for mre to contribute 10 percent of eu energy demand by 2050 (frangoul, 2020). while u.k. firms have dominated the space for large-scale rotor deployment, different approaches are being taken elsewhere. in the united states, verdant power deployed three 35 kw rotors in the east river, a tidal estuary in new york city. though production can take as little as one to two years, deployment can be set back seven to ten years by regulatory processes, despite the fact that, according to verdant, environmental impacts are negligible (taylor, 2020, personal communication). german-based smart hydro has specialized in small, modular five kw hydrokinetic generators that are ideal for rivers. the rotors are easily removed from their position in the river, and iom does not require heavy machinery or construction (a design consideration for if a river runs dry due to drought, for example). the firm has deployed 40 projects across the world, and has begun installing hydro rotors to run irrigation pumps, purify water, provide internet access, and bring electricity to small villages. while these smaller systems generate a small fraction of the energy that verdant and atlantis have displayed, they incorporate modular integration into technologies critical for sustainable development (smart hydro power, n.d.-b). iv. tidal energy: opportunities, barriers and potential solutions in esa tidal rotors have the potential to provide climateresilient, stable baseload energy in areas such as the coast of esa, where energy poverty and inequality negatively affect the livelihoods and health of around 525 million people (authors’ calculations based on un population division, n.d.). tidal energy also has the potential to meet future energy demand sustainably rather than with fossil fuels or biomass (both of which exacerbate climate change and health issues). figure 3 shows the high environmental potential for tidal energy along the consilience: the journal of sustainable development belletti & mcbride: against the tide oceanic coast of eastern and southern africa given the area’s high tidal amplitudes. figure 3: tidal range resources worldwide (nasa, 2006) despite discussion on the potential of mre in africa since the 1980s (uneca, 1980), comprehensive studies of how to implement tidal energy in the continent have not been conducted. this oversight is largely due to the significant challenges of introducing this source of energy that often impede implementation. in this section, we will analyze the main barriers to deploying tidal energy in esa and discern practical solutions to these challenges. in the following section, we will discuss potential policy measures that could support the introduction of tidal energy in esa. this paper identifies four main barriers to the implementation of mre in esa: 1. high initial investments are a substantial obstacle. domestic resources and public financing in esa countries are generally scarce (oecd, n.d.), and interest from official development assistance has not been significant in the development of tidal energy in africa. 2. the relative newness and under-exploitation of the technology make it difficult to correctly estimate both capital and operational costs, as well as expected returns on investments. this uncertainty can further decrease the appeal of these projects for private investors. 3. the manufacturing and iom of turbines and other equipment needed for supplying energy need specialized local knowledge, which is currently absent—and might take years to develop. 4. finally, regulatory complexity (for example, in terms of environmental permits) can represent a significant barrier as it causes delays in the deployment of technology. while regulatory complexity and specialized personnel are relatively straightforward issues to address, once there is the political will to overcome these barriers, it can still be exceedingly complex—or even impossible—to finance large projects or attract suitable investors. in fact, the energy return on investment (eroi) of tidal and wave projects is currently considered quite low, potentially resulting in low interest from investors (capellán-pérez et al., 2019). larger projects, which can provide a stable source to satisfy baseline energy demand in esa, can be appealing for institutions like a green bank or a multilateral development bank. however, hydrokinetic projects can be scaled down and installed in a river rather than in an estuary, with lower costs and significantly higher geographical potential. figure 4 shows an overview of rivers with a yearly discharge of over 10km3, demonstrating the significant potential for river tidal energy generation in esa. figure 4: potential for river tidal energy generation at the global level (based on world rivers with over 10km3 of yearly discharge) (mcglynn, 2014) due to the significant investment required, the potential for larger ocean tidal projects has been deemed low in esa (irena, 2015). however, these projects could benefit from future advancements of projects in 7 consilience: the journal of sustainable development other countries, such as in the united states or the united kingdom, where technologies are currently close to commercialization and are increasingly being deployed. esa’s larger ocean tidal projects can also benefit from lessons learned from other high-investment renewable energy projects, such as geothermal (as we will discuss in section 5(c)). v. proposed policy options to introduce mre in esa this paper outlines three proposed policy and financing options that can support the adoption of mre in esa. the proposals should not be seen as mutually exclusive; instead, they intend to fill several gaps in the electrification of the region through complementary solutions. together these solutions respond to different energy needs (urban vs. rural, low-investment and low supply vs. high-investment and large supply), investment opportunities, and ownership modalities. a. small hydrokinetic projects in rivers and estuaries as mentioned in section 4, hydrokinetic projects can be scaled down to the level of a single turbine; however, even a medium-sized project (providing up to 35 mw of energy) has manufacturing and installation costs as low as 1 million usd (taylor, 2020, personal communication). thus the scale of investment can be appropriate for public investors, donors, or even private investors (including those financed under non-recourse energy loans). despite not contributing significantly to the baseline energy of the future, small projects have the potential to support a range of sustainable development outcomes and democratize access to energy. several countries in africa have been implementing local, small-scale solutions that rely on different renewable energy sources. currently, around 15 million people are connected through micro-grids; however, this is still a very low number compared to the 600 million people who have limited or no access to electricity (iea, 2019a). as it stands today, the only hydrokinetic project in ssa is extremely small. smart hydro, a german firm specializing in small modular rotors has successfully deployed one of its systems in the nigerian village of akwanga along the mada river (smart hydro power, n.d.-a). in the western cape of south africa, a one mw wave energy power station is in the early stages of construction; it is intended as the first stage of a power plant eventually reaching a 3.5 mw capacity (creamer, 2019). ghana has signed a deal with swedish firm seabased to supply mre energy to the ada estuary. the project is likely still at an early stage and the logistics remain extremely unclear (balaji, 2014; harris, 2018). figure 5: small-scale hydropower potential in africa (korkovelos et al., 2018) while figure 5 shows the potential for small-scale hydropower projects in the region, further research is needed to effectively assess which rivers in esa would be ideal to implement small rotor mre technology. for optimal cost-effective performance, rivers should flow at a speed of at least two meters per second. if the turbine is to be mounted to the river floor, the body of water should be at least seven meters deep (taylor, 2020, personal communication). this constraint can be circumvented if the turbine floats, as is the case of smarthydro. the initial investment for these projects is smallscale enough to be funded with government funds or grants from multilateral development banks (irena, 2012); this model is already frequently employed by the international finance corporation (ifc) to bring lowcarbon electricity to ssa. it is an approach that bypasses large-scale electrical grids and allows for development to be centralized in smaller regions (lawrence, 2020). as consilience: the journal of sustainable development belletti & mcbride: against the tide traditional, monolithic hydropower becomes more precarious, there is room to reimagine how hydrokinetic energy production is financed and deployed. these projects have a number of benefits, notably that they can be owned by the local community and used to provide basic services, such as water purification or telecommunication hubs. they do not require extensive distribution grids; since they are localized, these projects can electrify remote, non-urban areas with sparse populations. once the solidity of these projects is proven, they can become more complex instruments and be incorporated into green bonds and international carbon offset schemes. in terms of ownership and financing of small-scale mre projects, we propose a model whose ultimate goal is to promote equity and sustainability and not just deliver power to final consumers: i. private ownership and/or financing this first option reduces the need for public financing of the projects. private investors would supply the capital investment that would essentially work as a loan to the local community—the central government would intervene solely as a regulator, not as a lender. to ensure the attractiveness of investment in these projects, governments could introduce a series of supporting measures, including incentives in the form of full or partial tax deductions to investors. initial ownership of the project stays with the private company; it is gradually passed to the local authority as the power generated from the project is sold (at regulated rates), repaying the investment over time plus a reasonable rate of return. this option could be made less risky through the use of collateral from the central government. it could be extremely attractive for investors and private companies while requiring limited administrative efforts, since the repayment of the loan is essentially operated through a fee collection system in the local community. the beyond the grid project, promoted by power africa, is an example of the significant role that the private sector can play in powering africa. with a goal to double the access to electricity in africa by 2030, beyond the grid brings together 40 private sector partners to support and finance (or facilitate access to private financing for) off-grid renewable energy companies (usaid, 2020b). ii. public ownership and/or financing or public-private partnerships (ppp) a second option can be the public financing of projects (or public participation in a private partnership) by the central government. this option can be particularly useful in cases where the project’s eroi is low (which might discourage investors) or there is too much risk for private investors. the process should still be inserted in the context of policies to increase community participation and ownership. for example, building the project can be seen as a loan from the central government, which has to be repaid by the community through a percentage of collected electricity fees over a specified period of time; at the end of this period, fees can be administered by the local community and used for social purposes. as in the previous case, fees should be regulated. nigeria has been spearheading this approach through the rural electrification agency and a combination of micro-grid and large-scale electricity projects mostly focused on solar pv (nigeria rural electrification agency, 2017). the effort is a good example of a mix of development assistance and lending: through the green energy project, the un development programme (undp) provides funds to nigeria’s bank of industry (a national development bank), which in turn provides loans at favorable terms to local businesses for the installation of offgrid solar projects (burger, 2017). another successful example of this model is the scaling solar project in zambia. zambia receives nearly 80 percent of its electricity from hydroelectric power (othieno & awange, 2016b). as a result of their high dependence on hydro and continuing climate disruption, zambia has been working alongside the ifc to rapidly deploy solar pv with a current mandate of 600 mw and 2030 goals of reaching 6,000 mw installed capacity (world bank, 2019). the project promotes private sector growth and low-cost electricity supply. 9 consilience: the journal of sustainable development both options would also require investment in building the capacity of the local community to operate the project and to conduct related administrative tasks (such as fee collection). while these solutions are relatively simple from a financing and technological point of view, they pose a significant political problem to the power dynamics between the local and central government, as the central government may not be willing to relinquish control (and potential revenue) over the supply of energy. additionally, suitable pre-existing conditions must be in place—for example, the project must maintain a certain degree of autonomy of municipalities or other local entities and their ability to collect fees, have sufficient transparency, and be accountable. in this respect, kenya could be a good candidate for a pilot project, since the country has strong potential for river deployment, coupled with a rising degree of grid decentralization and reliable administrative capacity at the central and local government levels. b. large mre projects in the ocean in scenarios of increasing droughts, it will not be possible to rely solely on small-scale or conventional hydropower. it is, therefore, important to also consider complementary sources of energy to counter hydro depletion. for this reason, coastal countries should start investigating large projects that use ocean tides to generate energy. as mentioned earlier, the potential for ocean tide mre is particularly ripe in coastal countries of eastern africa (see figure 3). from 2030 to 2040 when ocean power projects will have already been deployed in a number of countries— indicating that costs and risks have decreased due to more extensive commercial penetration—the potential for mre will be even more interesting. ocean tidal technology is expected to overcome the “valley of death” in the eu market and become commercially viable by around 2025 (european commission, 2018). the question for larger projects, which aim to supply an extended geographical area, remains how to build the distribution infrastructure necessary for the population to use the generated power. therefore, this technology would be best suited to supply electric power to urban areas, rather than sparse communities. geothermal energy generation in kenya can provide a useful parallel for identifying strategies and mechanisms to deploy and finance large-scale tidal energy. kenya has invested in long-term infrastructure and capacity-building like the geothermal training and research institute (getri) in nyeri (dedan kimathi university of technology, n.d.). relying on a mix of public finance and concessional funding from several multilateral development banks, kenya plans to develop over 5,000 mw of its 7,000 mw potential from geothermal (currently, only 200 mw are on stream) (climate investment funds, 2015). in harnessing geothermal power, kenya has positioned itself as a leader in a geothermal-rich region, and tanzania and ethiopia are also exploring projects. not only will geothermal energy play an essential role in decarbonization and hydro replacement, but it could also help with the deployment of tidal energy in the country. while kenya has the potential for river and stream tidal systems, it is also a strong choice to deploy marine tidal power. research has identified ideal locations in the estuaries of lamu, mombasa, and most notably, watamu (onundo, 2017), in addition to a promising overall environment for the energy source (onundo & mwema, 2017). as illustrated in figure 6, the tide in watamu (listed as location “a”) moves at a rate of 2.5 meters per second (hammar et al., 2012), which exceeds the aforementioned minimum speed of two centimeters per second required for economically viable tidal development. figure 6: seasonal average surface current speed in eastern africa (hammar et al., 2012) consilience: the journal of sustainable development belletti & mcbride: against the tide with the bay of dar es salaam, tanzania also has a high potential for tidal power (dubi, 2007); the city’s current electrical struggles are due primarily to an outdated grid rather than inadequate supply (garside & wood 2018). still, the city’s electrical supply stability comes at the cost of expanding gas consumption and infrastructure (world bank, 2016). in the dar es salaam district, the resort town of kunduchi (location “b” in figure 6) has tidal speeds of around 4.5 meters per second (hammar et al., 2012), establishing tidal technology here would likely be an exceptionally lucrative move. mozambique also has a large potential for tidal development. in particular, maputo bay has already been researched for its tidal patterns (canhanga & dias, 2005) and can contribute to the large energy demand of maputo. however, more research is needed to conclusively establish prime deployment locations. c. facilitating an equitable technology transfer of tidal energy the deployment of hydrokinetic energy in esa must coincide with the empowerment and employment of local citizens. education in tidal technology should be a critical component of sustainable projects. the aforementioned getri geothermal program in kenya is a prime example of how to build the necessary workforce for the iom of projects. for example, the united nations university (unu) hosted a geothermal workshop in kenya through unu’s geothermal training program, gtp (unu, 2018). similar programs could help disseminate the expertise on mre, potentially in collaboration with institutions such as oxford university, which has a leading tidal research program (university of oxford, n.d.). because kenya is a prime location for tidal deployment and is already advanced in geothermal adaption, it could also be a location to integrate tidal technology into education. nairobi is already home to a technical university (the technical university of kenya, n.d.) and a technical training institute (nairobi technical training institute, n.d.), both of which could have early programs in renewable energy as well as environmental studies. south africa also shows potential for capacity building. for example, the cape peninsula university of technology has a program known as the south african renewable energy technology centre (sartec) that specializes in wind turbine technician certification (cput, n.d.). stellenbosch university’s centre for renewable and sustainable energy studies (crses) is already teaching a course on hydro and ocean energy (crses, n.d.). additionally, south africa is the only african nation to produce wind turbines. kestrel wind turbines are extremely small, but function in an analogous manner to smart hydro rotors and can be paired with adjacent processes such as water treatment or telecommunication (kestrel renewable energy, n.d.). having manufacturing infrastructure already in place can help ensure the feasibility of a local content requirement in the event the production of small-scale hydrokinetic energy is scaled up. vi. conclusions while africa is projected to surpass china’s oil demand growth at 3.1 mb/d by 2040 (iea, 2019a), solar pv and wind energy are only projected to supply around 15 percent of the electricity demand in the continent in 2030 (irena, 2015)—leaving a huge gap in the energy mix. there is evident potential for additional renewable resources to supply clean energy. in this context, mre technologies can offer some solutions for the long-term strategy of sustainably electrifying the region. however, despite hydrokinetic potential in the rivers and estuaries of esa, power stations harnessing mre in the region have not yet been fully developed. barriers to the implementation of mre in the region are mainly not technological, but rather linked to policy design and financing capacity. these challenges can be addressed through the suitable design of projects, the political will to build financing options, an incentivizing policy environment, and capacity building. in a nutshell, the penetration of mre will be based on political commitment backed by sufficient public resources, rather than on revolutionary innovation and technological development. both of these essential ingredients can be provided by governments, but should be supported by the commitments of multilateral financial institutions invested in a long-term vision of diversifying renewable energy sources and expanding their potential. in this paper, we outline three complementary solutions to set a working framework for mre deployment in esa: short-term, small-scale hydrokinetic projects with public or private financing (similar to 11 consilience: the journal of sustainable development microgrid and off-grid solar projects); long-term, largescale tidal projects with public and concessional financing (similar to geothermal power generation); and capacity building measures to ensure the employment of local citizens. in particular, small scale hydrokinetic projects can have ownership structures that favor local authorities or communities. as the world moves away from greenhouse gasemitting energy sources, it is imperative to conceptualize long-term visions of how various re energy can work together synergistically. it has been argued that when pv reaches between 30-40 percent penetration of the electrical grid, issues of balancing intermittent generation with storage could reduce the value of solar energy and thus prevent further momentum toward its generation (sivaram et al., 2018). in the long run, advancing other renewable energy systems will be required to help ensure progress towards net zero decarbonization goals, an area in which mre can play an important role. one of the most promising examples of how mre can be accelerated is alongside offshore wind. developers are currently testing how mre technologies could be attached beneath floating offshore wind turbines. it is believed that this hybridization could help wind farms balance out periods of low-velocity wind, since mre systems will generate a more continuous baseload. for mre firms, this could be a prime means of building their systems to a greater scale and thus catalyzing necessary advancements in technology, expertise, and cost reduction (deign, 2020). according to irena, “the theoretical potential for wind in africa exceeds demand by orders of magnitude, and about 15 percent of the potential is characterized as a high-quality resource. this enormous capacity is not evenly distributed: eastern, northern, and southern africa have particularly excellent wind resources” (irena, 2015). a more recent study in renewable and sustainable energy journal concludes that the coast of esa has the highest offshore wind speeds in the continent (elsner, 2019). thus, as esa is ripe with offshore wind resources that geographically overlap with the aforementioned tidal potential, there could be ample opportunity for the implementation of mre alongside wind farms, helping propel the technology forward. while these programs would be both environmentally and socially beneficial, further research is required to assess the feasibility and potential costs of specific tidal energy locations in the region. additionally, before either small or large projects are deployed, a better understanding of their ecological impacts on the specific environmental conditions of esa countries is needed. acknowledgments the authors would like to thank trey taylor, cofounder and chief commercial officer at verdant power, for providing useful background material and advice; as well as their colleagues at the international conference on sustainable development (held virtually on september 22, 2020), where the paper was presented, for their useful feedback. references balaji, s. 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(2019, may 14). unlocking low-cost, largescale solar power in zambia. the world bank feature story. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2019/05/14 /unlocking-low-cost-large-scale-solar-power-in-zambia. columbia university examining the validity of the environmental kuznets curve author(s): nicole marie karsch source: consilience, no. 21 (2019), pp. 32-50 published by: columbia university stable url: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26775082 accessed: 17-04-2020 04:19 utc references linked references are available on jstor for this article: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26775082?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents you may need to log in to jstor to access the linked references. jstor is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. we use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. for more information about jstor, please contact support@jstor.org. your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of the terms & conditions of use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution 4.0 international license (cc by 4.0). to view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. columbia university is collaborating with jstor to digitize, preserve and extend access to consilience this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:19:28 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 21, iss. 1 (2019), pp. 32-50 examining the validity of the environmental kuznets curve nicole marie karsch nicole karsch just completed her master’s degree in environment and sustainability from western university and she received her honors b.a. in social justice and peace studies from king's university college in 2017 nkarsch@uwo.ca abstract this research essay analyzes the environmental kuznets curve, the first hypothesis to make the correlation between economic development, environmental clean-up, and the kuznets curve. in essence, the ekc states that environmental quality deteriorates in the initial stages of a country’s economic development, but once a particular average income is reached that this trend will reverse and environmental degradation will begin to slow down considerably. thus, rather than being a threat to the environment, economic growth would actually be the means to eventual environmental improvement. although proponents of the ekc have shown some empirical evidence suggesting that rising income levels in developing countries can be advantageous rather than detrimental for the environment, this article demonstrates that there is no guarantee that economic growth will lead to an improved environment. more specifically, this essay proves that the notion that income growth by itself will be beneficial for the environment is fictitious, as a causal relationship between income and environmental quality cannot be consistently demonstrated. author’s note i have always been interested in the relationship between economic development and environmental sustainability. the environmental kuznets curve was a hypothesis that i came across when i was finishing my undergraduate degree at king’s university college at western university, and i dedicated the vast majority of my final year examining its validity. for me, this research is significant in the field of sustainable development as it demonstrates a very important thing: that the ekc hypothesis does not reflect real world outcomes. therefore, it must be acknowledged that there are environmental limits to growth. in terms of future avenues for research, i am interested in focusing on the environmental impacts of destructive mining practices as well as the politics of the arctic. keywords: environment, environmental kuznets curve, ekc, economic growth, economic development, gdp this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:19:28 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms mailto:nkarsch@uwo.ca consilience karsch: environmental kuznets curve introduction in the article “the environmental kuznets curve in a world of irreversibility,” university of montpellier professor fabien prieur (2009) articulates that during the early 1990s, there was a substantial amount of interest in the relationship between economic growth and various indicators of environmental degradation. as a direct consequence of this attention, a hypothesis referred to as the environmental kuznets curve (ekc), arguably the single most important concept to emerge at the time, surfaced. it insisted that economic growth would be the means to eventual environmental improvement (stern, 2004). the ekc predicts that in the early stages of industrialization, a developing country will experience an increase in environmental degradation and pollution because individuals are far more concerned with their income and their employment than with environmental quality until a specific level of income per capita is met (prieur, 2009). as soon as a country reaches a state of overall affluence, this trend will completely reverse. the ekc emphasizes that once individuals no longer feel economically insecure, they will be in a position to concentrate extensively on responding to the environmental degradation that made their wealth accumulation possible. as such, the ekc postulates that when an economy reaches full maturity, the environmental damage that occurred during its development will fall dramatically (stern, 2004). while literature on the ekc has increased exponentially over the past two decades, it has not yet produced a serious consensus, as the vast majority of studies are devoted to either confirming or invalidating its existence (prieur, 2009). critics of the ekc assert that it is troublesome that it blatantly supports economic growth at the expense of environmental protection, that assuming that economic growth will inevitably lead to an improved environment is highly problematic, and that there is insufficient proof that it holds across all environmental problems including biodiversity loss, energy use, and the most pressing issue of our time: climate change. on the other hand, proponents of the ekc contend that economic growth can be compatible with an improved environment, that there are highly industrialized nations that have been successful in cleaning up the environment, and that it is unnecessary to worry about the potential of irreversible environmental ruin because the damage can always be repaired. this essay argues that although the attention of economists has been captured by some empirical evidence which suggests that rising income levels in developing countries could be environmentally advantageous, the notion that income growth itself will eventually be beneficial for the environment is unfounded, as a causal relationship between income and environmental quality cannot be demonstrated consistently. origins and explanation of the environmental kuznets curve as a result of increasing public concern over extensive environmental deterioration in the 1990s, an effort sparked to more clearly comprehend the dominant causes of environmental degradation (dinda, 2004). the vast majority of the discussion at the time was motivated by a widespread fear concerning the real this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:19:28 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 34 consilience ramifications that economic development could have on the environment. in particular, an uncertainty about whether or not economic growth could be compatible with environmental improvement emerged as countless individuals questioned if it was actually possible for intense economic growth to refrain from triggering extreme environmental degradation (dinda, 2004). in response to this prevalent skepticism, a concept known as the environmental kuznets curve emerged. it was the first theory to draw a correlation between economic development, environmental clean-up, and the kuznets curve (franklin & ruth, 2012). deriving its name from the work of simon kuznets – who demonstrated that the shape of the relationship between economic development and income inequality is an inverted ‘u’ – renowned economists gene grossman and alan krueger coined the term ekc to characterize the relationship between economic development and environmental degradation (franklin & ruth, 2012). they publicized evidence which indicated that while certain measures of environmental quality appear to deteriorate in the initial stages of a country’s economic development, they progressively improve as the economy grows. in other words, grossman and krueger maintained that environmental pressures increase more quickly than income in the earliest stages of a country’s development, but that they slow down once a particular income per capita is reached (allen & webber, 2010). grossman and krueger insisted that this certain amount of income was a turning point: at high income levels the rate of environmental degradation would begin to slow down considerably (allen & webber, 2010). therefore, rather than being a threat to the environment as is often claimed by environmentalists and ecological scientists, economic growth would actually be the means to eventual environmental improvement (stern, 2004). their explanation was relatively simple and intuitively appealing and it attracted more detailed empirical analysis as well as theoretical research hoping to support the “grow first, then clean up” expression. in contrast to the idea that economic growth itself is the root of environmental deterioration, numerous advocates of the ekc endeavored to substantiate the relationship between economic development and environmental quality (franklin & ruth, 2012). in fact, proponents of the ekc contended that it was unnecessary for governments of pre-industrial and agricultural economies to be worried about their environments as they transitioned from low levels of per capita income to high levels of per capita income (munasinghe, 1999). for ekc advocates, this worry was inessential because economic growth would enable a country to pay for a better environment down the road. although economic growth would undoubtedly be initially environmentally onerous, ekc supporters argued that once a country achieved a level of acceptable economic growth, they would be able to address all forms of environmental degradation. proponents explained that as development and industrialization progress, material output is prioritized, and the environmental consequences of growth are vastly overlooked. therefore, everything from the increased use of resources to more emissions of toxic pollutants to less efficient and dirty technologies would all contribute to environmental damage (munasinghe, 1999). however, this damage is not everlasting, as the ekc stresses that things take a radical turn for the better during a county’s final post-industrial stage. once an economy reaches this stage, supporters of the ekc state that it will have achieved a level of economic stability with greater financial surpluses which can then this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:19:28 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience karsch: environmental kuznets curve be used to pay for a more preemptive approach to environmental protection. along with these surpluses, because citizens feel economically secure, they will urge their governments to invest in cleaner technologies and encourage corporations to include environmental externalities in the final costs of their goods or services (munasinghe, 1999). proponents of the ekc also claim that due to the improvement in economic development there will be public demand for better quality of life and a cleaner environment, which they maintain can be achieved through the implementation of natural conservation polices and improved coastal, forest, urban, and marine management (al-mulali & ozturk, 2015). with this justification, supporters of the ekc insist that economic growth is not something to be apprehensive about because while it does lead to environmental degradation in the earliest stages of industrialization, in the end, the best way to attain a decent environment is for a country to prosper (stern, 2004). evidence of the environmental kuznets curve the idea that economic growth is necessary for environmental quality to be maintained or improved was first popularized by grossman and krueger’s study of the potential impacts of nafta in the early 1990s. the world development report by the world bank in 1992 similarly insisted that “as incomes rise, the demand for improvements in environmental quality will increase, as will the resources available for investment” (proops & safonov, 2004). other proponents of the ekc have also provided empirical proof that environmental degradation does fall after an economy achieves a certain level of income. more importantly, they have reached a general consensus that: “at higher levels of development, structural change towards informationintensive industries and services, coupled with increased environmental awareness, enforcement of environment regulations, better technology and high environmental expenditures, result in leveling off and gradual decline of environmental degradation” (proops & safonov, 2004). a substantial amount of research has been published which tests the existence of the ekc in china. one of the most comprehensive articles is “searching for an environmental kuznets curve in china’s air pollution”, which compiles empirical evidence from a large number of general papers. to help present a more complete picture of china’s true relationship to the ekc, this article not only incorporates statistics from 1982 to 2005 but also examines a wide variety of pollutants (brajer et al., 2011). the article summarizes one specific instance in which de groot, withagen, and zhou surveyed chinese industrial gas emissions in thirty provinces between 1982 and 1997. the results were consistent with the kuznets hypothesis. another experiment by shen and hashimoto investigated four different water pollutants and so2. they discovered the expected inverted u relationship. furthermore, as part of a broader overview of environmental issues in china, rousmasset, burnett, and wang observed concentration levels of nox and tsp in eleven chinese cities and found evidence of the ekc in each of them (brajer et al., 2011). similarly, after analyzing data from 1995 to 2005, diao, zeng, and tam found that china had an inverted u this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:19:28 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 36 consilience shape for discharges of industrial waste gas, soot, and industrial dust. interestingly, yaguchi, sonobe, and otsukua conducted a comparative study of so2 and co2 emissions in china and japan from 1985 to 1999. while no ekc relationship seems to exist in japan, their research concluded that it is definitely evident in china (brajer et al., 2011). with evidence spanning many different pollutants as opposed to one specific type, this article effectively demonstrates persuasive evidence that china does exhibit ekc-type behavior. while china is a significant case because it has experienced tremendous economic growth in recent years, there are other countries that can also convincingly prove the existence of the ekc from earlier time periods. notably, empirical results from the united kingdom show very strong support for an ekc, especially in terms of co2 and so2 (mann & sephton, 2016). when the united kingdom was on its way to full development, emissions of co2 and so2 were so substantial that a thick fog engulfed most of the country. this caused significant visibility problems, which was highly dangerous for transportation. official figures also indicate that over the course of just five days in december 1953, approximately 4,000 people died prematurely due to severe health implications (mann & sephton, 2016). to combat the smog, the united kingdom introduced its clean air act in 1956, which “banned emissions of dark smoke from chimneys, trains, and industrial furnaces”. later on in 1968, the clean air act was revised to include harsher prohibitions on the emission of dark smoke and, by the 1970s, the uk had decided to transition from a coal-based economy into one based on nuclear power and later on the establishment of north sea oil (mann & sephton, 2016). by the time the uk entered the 1980s, it had realized that a considerable amount of co2 and so2 was still being released into the atmosphere, and appropriate adjustments were made to environmental standards and policies. as a result of these adjustments – which included reducing greenhouse gas emissions using an assortment of policy tools including environmental taxation and increased use of renewable energy – co2 emissions began to flatten out and so2 emissions began to steadily decline (mann & sephton, 2016). since the mid-1990s, the uk has been one of the world’s largest economies in both gdp and purchasing power, yet it has simultaneously strived to maintain low levels of greenhouse gas emissions so as reduce its contributions to anthropogenic climate change (lapinskiene, tvaronaviciene, & vaitkus, 2014). while it is clear that the uk does exhibit some ekc-type behavior, the evidence is limited; the only available literature studies only co2 and so2. in contrast, a great deal of research has been published which seeks to establish relationships between economic growth, environmental degradation, consumption of energy from fossil fuels, and trade liberalization in iceland from 1960 to 2010. while iceland was impacted when major financial institutions collapsed in 2008, it has been able to recover quite remarkably. its gdp has grown considerably, investment and consumption have increased, and unemployment is extremely low (pacheco-borja et al., 2016). alongside these achievements, iceland has made enormous strides towards this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:19:28 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience karsch: environmental kuznets curve environmental sustainability. nearly all of its electricity is generated from geothermal sources and it has vowed to completely eliminate the use of fossil fuels for cars by 2025. not only is iceland considered to be a world leader in renewable energy use and in the treatment of environmental pollution, it is also the highest-ranking country on the environmental performance index (pacheco-borja et al., 2016). iceland has also endorsed the kyoto protocol and has agreed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 50-75% by 2050. the nation has invested in greater social and technological development to improve production efficiency, and has openly declared that it will only exploit marine and land resources if the country can do so sustainably (pachecoborja et al., 2016). evidently iceland, as an advanced industrialized country, pays much attention to the environment. with the correct policies and regulations in place, iceland is exerting itself to mitigate the environmental damage that precipitated as a result of its industrialization. in addition to the admirable accomplishments listed above, iceland has also reached a point at which its growth translates into lower co2 emissions (pacheco-borja et al., 2016). as a result of the icelandic government disseminating necessary information to raise awareness about the benefits of forests, the total area of forests in the country has doubled or even tripled since the 1950s. moreover, 95% of the total energy in iceland currently comes from renewable energy sources and one of the most ambitious goals of the icelandic government is to get this number to 100% by 2020 (pacheco-borja et al., 2016). criticism of the environmental kuznets curve even though there is certainly some empirical evidence supporting the ekc, the vast majority of the literature is econometrically weak (stern, 2004). various studies have endeavored to prove its existence mainly by showing how a certain environmental issue is rectified after a country reaches a certain level of income. however, countless researchers have contended that the ekc has never actually been shown to apply to all pollutants or environmental impacts. for example, the results of shafik and bandyopadhyay’s famous study, which was incorporated into the 1992 world development report, looked for ekcs in ten different indicators of environmental deterioration in a number of countries (stern, 2004). what the final report failed to include was that within these countries, only two out of the ten indicators conformed to the hypothesis. therefore, even if emissions of some pollutants do decline over time, it seems that most indicators of environmental degradation consistently rise rather than decrease as incomes grow (stern, 2004). critics of the ekc also argue that the idea that wealthy nations will be at the forefront of environmental reform is naïve, as the world’s most modern countries are accountable for escalating environmental degradation (clausen & york, 2008). mills and waite (2009) powerfully show that economic growth and biodiversity conservation are incompatible goals. while affluent countries do have the luxury of investing more heavily into conservation efforts, mills and waite claim that the increased growth of the human economy poses a major threat to biodiversity: species are currently disappearing 1000 times faster than in all of history. while the ekc suggests that a country will invest in conservation practices once it has acquired this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:19:28 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 38 consilience enough wealth, the authors emphasize that the ekc is only valid in cases where environmental damage is reversible (mills & waite, 2009). they claim that an ekc for biodiversity is impossible, as anthropogenic-driven extinctions are permanent. the authors investigated the five richest countries in central america, south america, africa, and asia and discovered that despite their relative prosperity, these countries have never tried to address deforestation, which is responsible for driving many species to extinction. more specifically, malaysia and mexico have lost more forest area than more than thirty-five other nations, and brazil, gabon, and venezuela follow this trend (mills & waite, 2009). because these are richer countries, to validate the ekc they would need to be actively addressing their high deforestation levels. instead, the opposite is occurring as the number of threatened species in these countries is escalating with their increasing prosperity. a vast variety of plant, amphibian, reptile, and invertebrate species have become extremely threatened in these countries while others have completely vanished (mills & waite, 2009). although often overlooked, some ekc critics also point out that even if certain pollutants do decrease with economic growth, industrial society has a tendency to constantly create new, unregulated, and potentially toxic pollutants. from this perspective, it does not matter whether some sources of contamination follow the ekc because new, lesser-known pollutants will simply take their place (dasgupta et al., 2002). researchers mazzanti, montini, and zoboli (2008) examined nine different pollutants, including greenhouse gases and other emissions in italy, and discovered that only a handful of them have actually decreased. while all nine emissions are a result of economic activity, only co2, n2o, nox, and nh3 support the ekc relationship. in contrast, the evidence for the other pollutants, which include pm10, nmvoc, sox, co, and ch4, subvert the hypothesis (mazzanti et al., 2008). though italy is a thriving developed nation, it does not verify the existence of the ekc since the inverted u-shaped relationship between income and pollution does not hold across all nine of these contaminants. moreover, others have proven that when italian data for co2 and nox is split into two samples representing the southern and central northern provinces, the ekc is only supported in the central-north region (sica, 2014). not only does this imply that the inverted u-shaped relationship for co2 and nox can only be found at the national level because of the contributions of the centralnorthern provinces, it also indicates that italy’s southern provinces have not attempted to address their exceedingly high co2 and nox emissions. of countries that have been reluctant to confront their environmental degradation, canada is one of the most prominent examples. its severe carbon dioxide problem has not been resolved. using data published by the world resources institute and statistics canada from 1948 to 2004, researchers found that following the oil crisis of 1973, canada was one of only two nations that continued the increasing trend of co2 emissions (he & richard, 2010). currently canada has the second largest fossil fuel reserve on earth, is the largest producer of natural gas after russia and the usa, and fossil fuels continue to dominate its energy market. canada’s emissions per capita are also considerably higher than most developed countries. its total co2 emissions have increased by an overwhelming 50% over the past forty years and it is the top oil exporter among the oecd countries (gohari et al., 2015). this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:19:28 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience karsch: environmental kuznets curve although the above examples clearly illustrate that the ekc hypothesis does not always hold, there are those who claim that economic growth is not a threat to sustainability. in response to this optimism, critics argue that resources are oftentimes exploited beyond a safe limit. thus, even if there is a demand for environmentally friendly goods once a country’s income is high enough, an environment may be too degraded to fully recover. for example, when comparing direct material flow data over a span of twenty years in germany, the usa, finland, japan, and the netherlands, researchers found that the ekc hypothesis does not hold (haukioja et al., 2001). if ecological systems are to be sustained, reductions of material flows are necessary, including minerals, fossil fuels, wood, forest by-products, fisheries output, and agriculturally cultivated resources produced in agriculture. researchers discovered that even though these countries are incredibly rich, they have the highest direct material flows per capita. for the ekc hypothesis to have been supported, the empirical evidence needed to show that environmental stresses had declined rather than escalated (haukioja et al., 2001). the majority of ekc literature maintains that the development trends of many developed countries proved to be vastly unsustainable. after analyzing numerous publications, it is evident that the main shortcoming of the ekc hypothesis is that it does not acknowledge that economic growth is limited by the resilience of the environment. on the contrary, the ekc encourages unrestrained economic growth as it mistakenly posits that all forms of environmental degradation will eventually be repaired. ekc critics argue that an absolute fixation to accumulate more while allowing “transient” environmental damage, as the ekc suggests, is immensely dangerous (he, 2003). not only does the ekc fail to consider environmental limitations, critics spotlight how it falsely believes that all forms of environmental damage can be remediated. relatedly, a major fault of the ekc is that it implies that economies can grow infinitely but does not acknowledge that economies are mainly based on finite natural resources on a finite planet. in other words, once certain environmental limits have been surpassed, they are incapable of returning to their original conditions. worse, the ekc does not recognize that there are some environmental issues such as animal extinction that are permanent, and therefore no amount of money or time can rectify it after the fact. as opposed to waiting for priorities to shift as income increases, ekc critics suggest that developing nations embrace an economic route that respects environmental protection throughout all stages of development (gara, 2019). while already developed countries may claim that they lacked knowledge regarding various forms of environmental deterioration – mainly because some effects do not show up immediately – it is now known that the pollute first and fix later approach is both reckless and unsustainable. the “making money, makes sense” route of industrialized nations in particular gave no consideration to the environment that provided valuable resources. in their pursuit of economic luxury, industrialized nations created an exhausted and dangerous world for future generations, which has resulted in the vicious problem of climate change. as a direct consequence of this approach, millions of individuals are fearful of the impending global warming disaster, and ekc critics highlight the need to redefine the concept of development to incorporate sustainability (gara, 2019). this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:19:28 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 40 consilience since it is anticipated that developing nations will want to follow the development route of industrialized nations to emulate their economic prosperity, ekc critics bring attention to the importance of reducing the value attributed to a high gdp. while gdp has been the traditional measure of economic development, there are certain things that it does not consider which are absolutely necessary for the economy (“gdp,” 2013). specifically, the only time that natural resources are included in gdp calculations is when they are being sold, which means that neither the value of natural capital nor the environment are included. for example, if a country decided to sell all its fish in a single year, their gdp would rise immensely even though the entire fishing industry would collapse and that resource would forever be depleted (“gdp,” 2013). due to this country’s unquenchable thirst for a high gdp, it mismanaged its fish supply so dramatically that it was incapable of keeping up with demand. for ekc critics, it is not a question of whether a developing country is willing to sacrifice rapid growth of their gdp to protect the environment (gara, 2019). instead, they emphasize that if developing nations strive to copy the development route of industrialized nations, as opposed to paying attention to ecological constraints, it will prove vastly counterproductive. the resources necessary to maintain growth will cease to exist and the world will be one step closer to a total climate catastrophe. which position is more convincing? before analyzing existing literature in depth, it is important to examine basic concerns with the hypothesis itself. the ekc supports unrestrained economic growth because it is confident that a country will experience environmental improvement once it reaches a turning point. however, it does not consider the possibility that a nation may struggle to attain the income level necessary to begin prioritizing the environment. without achieving economic stability, a nation cannot pay for high environmental damage costs or introduce more modern and less pollution-intensive technology (özdemir & özokcu, 2017). furthermore, the “grow now, clean up later” logic of the ekc is naïve. the ekc assumes that all nations will prioritize restoring the environment after a turning point. there is no guarantee, however, that a country would ever put environmental improvement before the economy. it cannot be assumed that a country would care enough to address environmental degradation even if it could shoulder the substantial costs of remediation (neumayer & van alstine, 2010). the ekc also drastically downplays how much work is necessary to restore the environment to an appropriate condition. besides major structural changes towards information-intensive industries and services, a nation would also need to increase environmental awareness and education, pass and then enforce compliance with environmental regulations, and adopt new technologies such as renewable energy (stern, 2017). even with these changes in place, it may take years to create tangible improvements in the environment and there is the very real possibility that some things would never improve. for example, extinctions are classified as permanent changes in biodiversity, which means that once a species is considered extinct there is no possibility of bringing it back. thus, no matter how much money or effort a country invested into environmental restoration, some things can simply never be restored. in other words, the ekc does not consider resilience capacity or acknowledge the this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:19:28 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience karsch: environmental kuznets curve possibility that uncontrolled economic growth may not be a requirement for environmental improvement. clearly the relationship between economic growth and environmental quality is a contentious topic, and it is especially controversial when it is argued that economic growth is ultimately advantageous for the environment (dinda, 2004). both researchers and policymakers have voiced conflicting opinions regarding whether prominent industrial sectors have become cleaner, if regulatory institutions have become more effective, and most importantly, if countries actually begin to value the environment once they successfully transition from a middle-income country to a high-income country (dasgupta et al., 2002). concerns have also arisen regarding the income range that is associated with maximum pollution on the ekc, as it is strikingly evident that there are some countries not even close to achieving this income per capita. for example, in purchasing power parity dollars, per capita gdp in 1998 was $1440 in the countries of sub-saharan africa, $2060 in india, and $2407 in indonesia (dasgupta et al., 2002). it is clear that these countries have a long way to go before they are considered wealthy. because they are still developing, a literal interpretation of the curve implies that substantial increases in pollution will occur over the course of the next several decades. besides the risk of this pollution having irreversible impacts on the environment, empirical evidence from researchers suggests that pollution in these countries is already having dangerous consequences. the world bank issued a report in the early 2000s stating that estimates of mortality and morbidity from air pollution in india imply annual losses in the range of 2-3% of gdp (dasgupta et al., 2002). beyond these worries, there is widespread uneasiness about industrialized countries pretending to have made progress as their income rises. for one thing, while a country may indeed reduce a handful of well-known and easily measurable pollutants, it is likely that new and potentially greater environmental problems will emerge (dasgupta et al., 2002). it is important to note that the only available data is for the most well-known air pollutants; a broader class of emissions referred to as toxic pollutants have not been subjected to laboratory analysis. thousands of pollutants that could be incredibly damaging are currently untested and unregulated (dasgupta et al., 2002). above all, the likelihood of irreversible environmental degradation contradicts the notion that nature is somehow equipped to constantly regain its strength after encountering challenge after challenge (prieur 2009). researchers have insisted that it is unwise to assume that the environment’s ability to absorb pollution will increase as it encounters more and more of it. countries must acknowledge that as pollution levels continue to rise, the environment will gradually lose its ability to respond to excessive demands. critics contend that due to the irreversible character of some pollution, even if a wealthy country does decide to engage in restorative efforts, their attempts will not be enough: the environment will already be permanently degraded (prieur, 2009). after evaluating evidence from both sides of the debate, those who try to invalidate the ekc are far more persuasive than those who strive to confirm it. while there is empirical evidence in china, the united kingdom, and iceland which demonstrates that some environmental impacts do decline at high income levels, it is this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:19:28 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 42 consilience important to acknowledge that economic activity is always environmentally disruptive in some way. more importantly, as renowned economist nemat shafik underlines in her research, at no time has it ever been proven that all negative environmental impacts are remediated at high-income levels (stern, 2017). moreover, the only environmental problems that have actually declined in wealthy countries are those that are relatively uncomplicated to solve, are well known, and are incredibly well documented (dinda, 2004). other environmental problems are much more complex and considerably harder to document. available research indicates that they either follow an n shape rather than an inverted u, or that they never actually decrease. furthermore, land-use change and biodiversity loss, which are conceptually different from certain air pollutants that can decline, are completely irreversible and therefore it is impossible for the ekc to apply (dinda, 2004). additionally, research on global environmental indicators such as municipal waste, energy consumption, traffic volumes, and co2 demonstrate that they either increase monotonically with income or have very high turning points. in other words, most countries are nowhere near wealthy enough to address their worsening environmental conditions (dinda, 2004). the ekc also holds a basic but equally important assumption that economic development trajectory will be the same for all countries. not only should this be criticized because countries vary considerably in terms of economic, political, biophysical, and social factors, but due to the heterogeneity of conditions, very little attention has been given to specific countries (dinda, 2004). consequently, data from different countries is thrown into one large group, which means that little attention has been given to individual trends. transboundary and intergenerational externalities have been completely ignored in existing ekc literature, and trade is often left out of discussion despite being an extremely relevant component. examining trade shows that high-income countries have the means to move their most environmentally destructive industries to other, less developed countries (dinda, 2004). by disregarding trade, existing ekc literature mistakenly points out that certain countries have tried to tackle their environmental problems when in fact they have simply relocated them elsewhere. finally, there is mounting evidence that the countries with the worst environmental restoration records, or the countries that have been the least successful in reducing environmental degradation, are among the most prosperous (bradshaw, hiam, & sodhi, 2010). particularly in terms of deforestation, marine captures, habitat conversion, species threats, carbon emissions, and water pollution, the countries with the worst proportional records include singapore, the netherlands, and qatar. the countries with the worst absolute records are the usa, australia, and japan (bradshaw, hiam, & sodhi, 2010). in traditional economic terms, these countries are some of the world’s wealthiest; however, they have the most irresponsible environmental performances. this clearly shows that economic growth is not the solution but rather the cause of environmental problems (dinda, 2004). significance this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:19:28 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience karsch: environmental kuznets curve despite encountering criticism from the beginning, the ekc remains one of the most popular topics in environmental economics. given that empirical evidence of the ekc is neither consistently supportive nor statistically strong, it is clear that developing countries should not strive to achieve faster economic growth so as to accelerate out of a high rate of environmental pollution. as noted above, some of the world’s most prosperous nations still have appalling environmental records. powerful statements from ekc proponents such as “the best – and probably only – way to attain a decent environment in most countries is to become rich” must continue to be challenged (allen & webber, 2010). without question, one of the most dangerous issues with this type of literature is that it could encourage policymakers to pursue economic growth while simultaneously de-emphasizing the environment (stern, 2017). worse, if policymakers believe that economic growth is not a threat to sustainability, they may not see the point of pursuing environmental policy at all (haukioja et al., 2001). however, since it is indisputable that the ekc is not irrefutably valid, it is unwise to believe that economic growth on its own will inevitably lead to a better environment in the long run. additionally, it would be reckless for world leaders to believe that nations can simply grow their way out of environmental dilemmas (raymond, 2004). policymakers should refrain from making any policy recommendations that propose that environmental pressures be solved with even greater economic growth. though proponents of the ekc would insist that there is a causal relationship between income growth and environmental outcomes, it has been proven time after time that their hypothesized explanations are not accurate reflections of real-world outcomes. there is no evidence that eventual environmental improvement occurs as a result of all affluent nations investing in eco-friendly and cleaner technologies, nor is there proof that every wealthy society begins to demand environmental quality once their basic needs have been met (raymond, 2004). accordingly, it is imperative that effective public policy measures be implemented which are directly aimed at reducing environmental burdens, as it is apparent that economic growth will not come to the rescue (egli & steger, 2007). rather than waiting for economic growth to come to the aid of the environment, policymakers everywhere must endeavor to fulfill plans of action that can enable countries to become environmentally sustainable. not only does this require a country to ensure that vital environmental systems are recovering rather than deteriorating, it also involves cooperating with other countries to control common issues such as transboundary pollutants (raymond, 2004). for example, one effective way to regulate and limit emissions that are currently causing dramatic changes in the climate is to set clear targets and severe penalties for violating them. since a reliable world government does not presently exist, international policy is entirely dependent on what each country is prepared and able to implement (victor, 2011). because every nation has various resources that it can spend, it is up to each to make its own decision about how much of their own resources they will dedicate to mitigation. for instance, a developing nation may not have an administrative system in place that can monitor emissions. a developed country would almost certainly have the resources to prioritize regulating emissions. thus, the entire global effort depends this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:19:28 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 44 consilience on developed countries’ environmental ambition and how they organize national mitigation policies (victor, 2011). as countries gradually become wealthier, it is imperative that they increase their efforts as well as their penalties so that they contribute more to reducing emissions that are dangerous for the entire planet. a government in a developing nation, for instance, can create market signals like a pollution tax, which will encourage emitters to change their ways. it can also introduce regulations that require industries to install specific technologies. since it is difficult to know how fast industries can adjust, it is important to start with simple reductions and then progressively set strict emission limits that require both technological and behavioral change (victor, 2011). when these strict limits are firmly in place, it is crucial that companies and individuals be aware that they must pay a high cost if they either perform insufficiently or blatantly fail to comply. this is far more likely to be successful with international agreements that are well matched to what nations are actually capable of implementing. moreover, if all nations did their part to reduce emissions, countries will no longer believe that such regulations will plunge their economies into disaster and will strive to find new green industries that can help alleviate the dangers of global warming (victor, 2011). with current research indicating that within the next thirty years most developing economies will have become developed, it is absolutely imperative to disprove the notion that an inverted-u shaped ekc will exist for all of these countries and across different environmental issues (waslekar, 2013). as shown throughout this paper, only some wealthy nations have experienced environmental improvements, and only a small handful of them have observed recovery in more than one area. because developing economies will most likely strive to achieve wealth in the same way that others have, it may be advantageous to focus on the exceptional instances where an inverted-u relationship can be found. more importantly, it is beneficial to analyze the courses of action that were effective in achieving that relationship and examine which strategies proved to be valuable. as observed previously, iceland is an example of a very prosperous country that has seen remarkable environmental improvement. even though iceland experienced rapid economic growth during the beginning of the twentieth century just as other countries did it was different than the rest in that its first environmental policies arose at the same time (gregory, 2016). world war ii, in fact, led to major economic and social changes in iceland such as the introduction of the heavy industry sector, population movement to urban areas, and the utilization of renewable energy resources due to a growing aluminum industry. around the same time, iceland gained control of approximately 200 miles of cod fishing zones from britain and was able to entice large energy companies such as alcoa and century aluminum to construct facilities in the nation (gregory, 2016). as growth accelerated, iceland concentrated on how the country could move past a history of severe poverty and economic constraints into a period of prosperity. the country acknowledged that to maintain long-term economic success, certain strategies that would encourage sustainable action had to be implemented (gregory, 2016). therefore, in 1907, a main newspaper published an article emphasizing that the government was serious about protecting the environment not only to preserve the this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:19:28 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience karsch: environmental kuznets curve country’s unique scenery but to also provide for the icelandic population. this particular article resonated with the icelandic population as it reminded them of fjölnir jónas hallgrímsson, an iconic native poet who first called iceland the “fjallkonan” in 1835 (gregory, 2016). translated as the mountain woman, hallgrímsson instilled the idea of iceland as a nurturing mother that would continuously provide for its citizens so long as those resources were well conserved. consequently, the icelandic people believed that conserving their environment was necessary to maintain their national identity and disapproved of activities that disrupted it. thus, iceland first legislated the protection of plants and animals, then approved the planting of woodland and prevention of wind erosion act in 1907, and the county’s first land preservation named þingvellir a national park in 1928 (gregory, 2016). landvernd, a nongovernmental organization focusing on conservation, was founded in 1965. as early as the 1960s, the icelandic government put a significant amount of money into geothermal energy research and utilization. by the early 1970s, iceland was no longer relying on imported fossil fuels for a large portion of their energy consumption and instead constructed independent hydropower plants across the county (gregory, 2016; “sustainable energy sector”, 2015). iceland passed the iceland nature conservation act in 1971, which states that neither life nor land can be needlessly wasted or polluted, and the fisheries management act of 1990, which mandates that fishing stocks are common property of the nation and therefore cannot be exploited or depleted (“bagheera,” 2019). presently, nearly 100% of the country’s electricity comes from renewable energy sources, 9 out of 10 homes are heated with geothermal energy, and more than 2,000,000 hectare of land is protected under the nature conservation act (“sustainable energy sector”, 2015; “environmental protection”, n.d). the global peace index of 2019 named iceland the most peaceful nation on earth, and it is ranked at the top the 2016 environmental performance index (“index”, 2019; “ecofriendly countries”, 2017). it is the fourth richest among 44 european regions and has one of the lowest unemployment and poverty rates of any nation (“economic freedom”, 2019; “word leader”, 2017). clearly, iceland is an extraordinary example of a country that has proven that it is possible to achieve economic security without sacrificing the environment. what is most remarkable about iceland is that it did precisely what needed to be done for both the environment and the economy to succeed before sustainability discourse was popularized. the country successfully accelerated economic growth and implemented structural changes that respected environmental constraints long before the world commission on environment and development (wced) – more commonly known as the brundtland commission – coined the term “sustainable development” in 1987 (gregory, 2016). the brundtland commission emphasized that the environment and development were one single issue and stressed the importance of nations meeting current needs without compromising the ability of future generations to do the same (“global futures past”, 2017). the brundtland commission also publicly disapproved of traditional economic routes. it declared that developed nations became rich due to unsustainable patterns of consumption and production as well as unchecked economic growth (“brundtland report”, n.d). this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:19:28 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 46 consilience overall, it is clear that iceland understood that it could not allow the environment to endure extreme deterioration on the country’s way to economic comfort. besides very targeted policy – which included plans to give up a dependency on fossil fuels by ceasing all imports by the 1970s – the icelandic government also claimed at the onset of the country’s economic revolution that it was wholeheartedly committed to conserving the environment. this very proclamation evoked memories of hallgrímsson’s poetry among the icelandic people, who viewed their nation as a nurturing entity that would provide for its people. by proposing specific courses of action early on and by speaking to the nationalistic ideology within iceland, the country was able to meet its development goals without undermining the stability of natural systems. given that the earth is in the midst of a global climate catastrophe, it is imperative that countries do all that they can to emulate iceland’s achievements. by doing so, it is probable that they too can propel themselves out of economic precariousness and into prosperity. to aid transitioning countries with their development, it is important that international organizations give the same level of prominence to the environment as they do to poverty, peace, health, and economic security. this is significant because international organizations are crucial for providing leadership and outlining goals, and they can set priorities for global environmental policies (“governing council”, n.d). international organizations are oftentimes regarded as authoritative and as the most legitimate sources of information. these organizations are essential for progressing into an era where nations can work towards economic and social development while focusing on environmental protection. one notable example of an international organization that is calling for environmental action is the united nations environment assembly (unea). the highest-level decision-making body on the environment, the unea was founded in 2012 to more fully comprehend environment challenges and to accelerate intergovernmental action (“governing council”, n.d). the unea is comprised of 193 member states and its focal point is the need for all nations to improve their resource management strategies and achieve resource-efficient and low-carbon economies (“sustainable development goals”, 2019). as a result of its eminence in global environmentalism and its ability to disseminate information universally, the unea has the potential to emphasize to all nations what is considered sustainable and what has proven to be ineffective. more specifically, it can stress how following the traditional path to economic security only undermines the environment, and that the “grow now, fix later” approach that the ekc highlights has weak credibility. as more international organizations like the unea encourage a new development course, countries may no longer wait until they have reached a turning point to reconcile economic growth and environmental improvement (he, 2003). conclusion seldom do many see eye to eye on what precisely must be done to alleviate environmental degradation, but it is clear that we should not be convinced that economic growth on its own will be the solution to these problems. nor must we be persuaded that at higher levels of development, countries will surely level off and gradually decrease their environmental degradation. it is not certain that they will have this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:19:28 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience karsch: environmental kuznets curve increased environmental awareness, that they will invest in cleaner technology, that they will enforce effective environmental regulations, or that they will put money into conservation efforts. because the data in this paper plainly demonstrates that very few true ekc curves actually exist, each of us, especially our policymakers and scholars, must not propose unlimited economic growth as the answer to environmental ills. as long as the literature continues to illustrate that evidence of an actual ekc is scarce, we should not rely on the erroneous hypothesis that countries can merely grow their way out of the most pressing environmental issues. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:19:28 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 48 consilience references allen, dave., & webber, don (2010). environmental kuznets curves: mess or meaning? international journal of sustainable development & world ecology, 17(3), 198-207. al-mulalil, usama., & ozturk, ilhan. 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(2013). world environmental kuznets curve and the global future. procedia social and behavioral sciences, 133, 310-319. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:19:28 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms http://vr2pk9sx9w.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=z39.882004&ctx_enc=info%3aofi%2fenc%3autf8&rfr_id=info%3asid%2fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3aofi%2ffmt%3akev%3amtx%3ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=un+environment+assembly+focuses+on+moving+faster+towards+sustainable+development+goals&rft.jtitle=down+to+earth&rft.date=20190317&rft.pub=ht+digital+streams+ltd&rft.issn=09712879&rft.externaldbid=iof&rft.externaldocid=a578832637&paramdict=en-uk 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http://vr2pk9sx9w.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=z39.882004&ctx_enc=info%3aofi%2fenc%3autf8&rfr_id=info%3asid%2fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3aofi%2ffmt%3akev%3amtx%3ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=un+environment+assembly+focuses+on+moving+faster+towards+sustainable+development+goals&rft.jtitle=down+to+earth&rft.date=20190317&rft.pub=ht+digital+streams+ltd&rft.issn=09712879&rft.externaldbid=iof&rft.externaldocid=a578832637&paramdict=en-uk microsoft word mohtadi.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 16, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 14-28 the complementarity of improving quality of life and reducing environmental footprints in urban spaces: the argument for ‘hedonistic sustainability’ tara mohtadi columbia university tzm2105@columbia.edu abstract in recent decades, the phenomena of urbanization and globalization have transformed cities into agglomerations of technology, innovation, wealth and human capital. cities have become spaces of high environmental destruction, and concurrently, frontrunner of climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies. the urban landscape consists of a complex network of actors, requiring an integrative and adaptive approach to be taken when considering sustainability and environmental soundness. much of the sustainability discourse focuses on functionality, sacrifice, and often, individual lifestyle changes. this paper seeks to challenge that perspective by proposing that a collectivistic approach with implications of prosperity can optimize urban adaptation, remediation, and expansion amidst the threat of climate change. keywords: hedonistic sustainability, collectivism, urbanization, green space, design, adaptation consilience mohtadi: hedonistic sustainability “as much as we have tried to separate the functions of the city into discrete units spread out across the landscape, everything remains inherently connected to everything else. the ways we move, the things we buy, the pleasures we take, the trash we produce, the carbon we blow into the atmosphere, and the economy itself are intertwined and interdependent. if you follow these threads far enough, they lead to a point of intersection where the projects of urban prosperity, sustainability, and happiness really do converge– not in a single object or building, but in the complex weave of energy, mobility, economics, and geometric systems that define city life” (montgomery 2013). the interconnectedness of the built environment consider erving goffman’s theory in the presentation of self in everyday life, that life is a series of presentations influenced by the actor’s audience and environment (goffman 1959). in urban spaces, this implies that architecture, public spaces, and other elements of a community along with their inhabitants, affect both our intrapersonal and interpersonal relationships. our unconscious and conscious responses to the built environment are a direct result of the elements within that environment. in essence, the city and the living and nonliving elements within it constitute an ecosystem. consequently, within the ecosystem of the city, design, public space, mobility, and accessibility take on different forms. not only are these elements interconnected to one another, they are also related to the emotive, mental, and physical states of its inhabitants. the city is often seen as the antithesis of nature and a contradiction to sustainability. but in recent years, global innovations have reimagined sustainability not only in terms of the environment, but also in terms of the quality of life and prosperity of its inhabitants. hedonistic sustainability encapsulates this approach. a term popularized by the danish architect bjarke ingels, hedonistic sustainability emphasizes the interaction of people and spaces, and the role of sustainability within this interaction. a key element of hedonistic sustainability is a collectivistic attitutde. observing three distinct forms consilience 16 of hedonistic sustainability in three cities–copenhagen, bogotá, and new york city– from a critical point of view, this paper seeks to expose the various successes and failures, and draw recommendations within this approach. the focus on cities in particular is due to the specific and significant role of cities with regards to the impact of climate change. cities are, by nature, spaces of high consumption and production. simultaneously, they are hubs of technological and intellectual capital that yield innovative solutions. therefore, it is crucial to discuss the city as a space that can “produce positive outcomes,” as saskia sassen argues, in order to take advantage of a city’s role within the fabric of global governance connectedness (sassen 2009). hedonistic and collectivistic sustainability the relationship between hedonistic design and individualism versus collectivism provides a framework for the discussion of hedonistic sustainability. in a transdisciplinary perspective on hedonomic sustainability design, fiore et al. present a matrix depicting this relationship (fig. 1). most sustainable development-related policies or lifestyle changes fall into the category of low hedonomics and individualistic orientation, imposing the responsibility on the individual (e.g., quotidian changes like using less water, turning off lights, recycling). the category of low hedonomics and collectivistic orientation describes community actions based on functionality, for example when residential or office buildings convert to meet leedcertified standards. the category of high hedonomics and individualistic orientation could consist of an individual seeking pleasure from a natural landscape. this calls attention to studies on the mental health benefits of nature. these three approaches constitute the majority of sustainable policies and actions. the fourth category in the matrix, collectivistic and high hedonomics, is a relatively untapped field of study and design, but has the potential to revamp the entire discourse of urban sustainability. an example of such design is “a leed certified building that provides natural lighting from multiple windows, thereby saving energy, supplying an appropriate level of workspace lighting, and offering a pleasing view of the natural landscape” (fiore et al. 2014). this category of design is complex and not only relies on an interconnected network of actors, but also necessitates a consilience mohtadi: hedonistic sustainability new category of actors –that of “community stakeholders”– in order to mediate the relationship between the design and the end users (fiore et al. 2014). that is, rather than just the stakeholders (designers, investors, planners, etc.) implementing the design, and the end-users receiving the design in its complete form, community-stakeholders would participate in the project from its inception to its completion, allowing for a more bottom-up, communityintegrated design. this sort of intervention is necessary for the endurance and acceptance of any policy or structural designs. a transformation of public space in bogotá, colombia for more than forty years, colombia was entrenched in the longest-running conflict in the western hemisphere. the asymmetric war, between guerillas, paramilitaries, and government forces was rooted in extreme poverty and inequality. escaping the chaos of the countryside, refugees migrated to cities, primarily the country’s capital, bogotá. with a population of over 6.7 million today, bogotá continues to experience burgeoning urbanization and high inequality, and is considered one of the world’s most unequal countries, with a gini coefficient of 53.5 in 2013 (world bank). with deteriorating infrastructure, widespread corruption, unbearable congestion, and high rates of violence, the city was considered dangerous and un-governable. starting in the late 1990’s, bogotá experienced a political transformation with the elections of effective, more transparent mayors and with the 1993 organic statute, which granted mayors greater autonomy and flexibility: a key requisite for raising taxes and generating revenue towards municipal projects (gilbert 2015). spurred by the elections of mayors antanas mockus (1995-1997) and enrique peñalosa (1997-1999), this political transformation was met with a simultaneous transformation of the public space. in 1997, plans to build an elevated urban highway, the “inner ring expressway,” were being considered to reduce congestion. like most 20th century cities, bogotá’s development was influenced by the previous decades’ urban legacy of prioritizing privatized vehicles. however, peñalosa's first act as mayor was to declare war: not on consilience 18 crime or drugs or poverty, but on cars (montgomery, 2013). deviating from previous decades’ traditions of urban planning, peñalosa scrapped the expressway plans in order to build an extensive network of bicycle and walking paths. the bicycle paths supplemented the 1976 policy known as ciclovía, which closed off roads to motorized vehicles on a weekly basis. peñalosa also added parks, community plazas, and the transmilenio: bogotá’s first rapid transit system. construction of the transmilenio system began in december 2000, in several phases. in the years following, it received international accolades, including the stockholm partnership prize in 2002, it was the first transport system to be accredited under the united nations’ clean development mechanism, and it has inspired similar systems in several cities. in a report on the benefits of bus rapid transit systems, the world research institute’s embarq program cited increases in quality of life in terms of travel time benefits, environmental impacts, and public health and safety benefits (carrigan et al. 2013). these reforms certainly reduced congestion and emissions: traffic fatalities were reduced by nearly 89 percent, and co2 emissions were reduced by an estimated 246,000 tons per year on average (carrigan et al. 2013). additionally, reduction was seen in so2 by 43%, nox by 18% and particulate matter by 12% (turner et al. 2012). the effects of peñalosa’s reforms, however, went beyond the scope of environmental benefits. they also brought social reform and a restructuring of the public space. mayor peñalosa, as he explains in a 2013 ted talk, sought social equality through mobility: “mobility, as most other developing country problems, more than a matter of money or technology, is a matter of equality, equity. the great inequality in developing countries makes it difficult to see, for example, that in terms of transport, an advanced city is not one where even the poor use cars, but rather one where even the rich use public transport (peñalosa 2013). the transmilenio offered mobility to those without cars: a powerful statement amidst the 20th century ideal of prioritizing the privatized vehicle, which in essence, enables the middle to upper classes. bogotá, like many other latin american cities, has rampant informal housing settlements along its periphery. with 375,000 clandestine consilience mohtadi: hedonistic sustainability houses in bogotá in 2001, workers in these areas had to pay for multiple transport fares to get to the city. (cervero 2005, hidalgo 2011). concurrent to the construction of the transmilenio, a land-banking/poverty-alleviation program called metrovivienda was introduced with the goal of “accessibility-based site development and planning” (cervero 2005). the program allowed those living in peripheral, often illegal, settlements, to live along the transmilenio route, improving access to the city, and lowering transportation costs for low-income commuters. compounded, the extended metro lines and affordable housing near the lines provided accessibility to populations who had traditionally been marginalized. the city simultaneously recovered from its financial crisis and its burgeoning social crisis, to the extent that in 2002, the united nations development program called bogotá an “example city” (ciudad ejempo) (gilbert 2015). however, bogotá’s remarkable turn-of-the-century progress was short-lived. with the election of samuel moreno rojas in 2008, the city faced a downward trajectory due to a series of contract breaches and corruption scandals, which included the construction and upkeep of the transmilenio (gilbert 2015). peñalosa’s mayoral term and the simultaneous transformation of bogotá were not coincidental. these reforms were concurrent with a shift towards more transparent municipal governance, with the 1993 statute. the construction of bicycle lanes instead of highways, closing of roads to motorized vehicles, and initiation of the transmilenio completely transformed the hierarchy of the public space. these reforms provided the socially and economically marginalized urban population with a space in the city– a space that had long been domineered by the upper class. sustainable designs at their core, these programs are rooted in collectivism and equitability. therefore, the rupture of equity following mayor moreno’s election and subsequent corruption scandals were the catalyst for the decline of the transmilenio. the collectivistic nature of the plans implemented by peñalosa and the temporary success of the transmilenio highlight the necessity for an equally collectivistic-minded government in order to sustain such designs. efforts like the transmilenio, the annual día sin carro (car free day), and the weekly ciclovía were not initiated as projects to mitigate city emissions (though they certainly did). rather, their success lies in the fact that they transformed consilience 20 the city into a livable space that procured mobility and safety, and improved quality of life. concurrent with affordable housing projects, the transmilenio provided a means of access to the city that was otherwise unattainable by peripheral populations. similarly, empowering cyclists subverted the exclusionary power that vehicle owners held. on peñalosa’s reforms, charles montgomery offers this testament: “his policies may resemble environmentalism, but they are no such thing. rather, they were driven by his conversion to hedonics, an economic philosophy whose proponents focus on fostering not economic growth but human happiness (montgomery 2007). bjarke ingels designs: innovative sustainable design in copenhagen, denmark a stark contrast from colombia, denmark is highly affluent and ranks as a country with one of the most equal distributions of wealth, with a gini coefficient of 29.1 in 2012, and is (world bank). known for its innovative design and sustainable standards, copenhagen offers an alternate version of successful collectivistic and hedonistic urban design. hedonistic design has been a focus of copenhagen’s city planning since the inception of the “five-finger plan” in 1947 (moughtin 2009). the plan ensured that urban and suburban growth would be controlled, while also leaving ample green space, and easy access to public transportation. furthermore, copenhagen has had a prominent tradition of cycling since the 1980’s, inverting the traditional car-centric model of the city. with “free bike sharing services, bike parking complexes, and traffic lights both designated for bikers and timed to favor their speed and pace,” the city has successfully reduced carbon emissions, at the rate of 90,000 tons annually (maternoski 2013). with its cycling culture, and a city plan that facilitated access to denmark’s nature, copenhagen has been dedicated to maintaining a balance between urban growth and the natural environment far before the global climate change discourse pushed for such changes. however, with the growth that the region experienced in the early 1990’s, the five-finger plan was no longer sustainable. in 2010 the copenhagen-native design and architecture firm bjarke ingels group (big), along consilience mohtadi: hedonistic sustainability with a coalition of other firms, proposed a bi-national master plan known as the “loop city.” the 11-km2 loop encompasses 10 municipalities of the øresund region, which consists of the coastlines of denmark and sweden. the plan includes light rail transport infrastructure, waste management plans, an energy smart grid, and more, accounting for population growth in the next 50 years (maternoski 2013). the first project to be executed within the new “loop city” master plan was a response to the 2010 international competition to design a new power plant for copenhagen. contrary to the unordinary structures of most power plants, devoid of character or intent beyond function, big proposed a completely different concept. the amager bakke, as its known, is an installation that incorporates and considers the urban and natural ecosystem around it. at its core, it generates heat and electricity by burning garbage. but amager bakke, whose construction began in march 2013, intends to achieve far more. beyond a sleek and attractive design, the structure’s sloping façade is designed to serve as an artificial ski slope. moreover, it contains an educational element: the elevators that take skiers to the peak will allow them to view the plant’s processes through inward-facing windows. supposedly, the plant will provide heating to 97% of copenhagen’s homes, and electricity to 4,000 (ingels 2011). the plant is also designed to release a visible smoke ring every time it produces one ton of co2: a tangible reminder of the city’s waste problem. despite being known as a forerunner of sustainability, denmark has the highest percentage of incinerated waste in the eu and the highest amount of waste generated per capita as of 2013, the same year that construction of the waste plant began (eurostat). the co2 smoke rings challenge these less than ideal statistics by providing a visible reminder to city residents. by providing a space for public interaction, amager bakke has reinterpreted the often isolated and dejected concept of the waste plant to an entirely different level of a public good: one that is both collectivistic and hedonistic in nature. fiore et al. describes the innovative designs of big as eliminating the boundary between end users and designers: “the group envisions the buildings and the design process behind them not as a closed, in-group project but as a forum for public participation” (fiore et al. consilience 22 2014). the waste plant’s design has transformed the city’s undesirable processes to a space that will be accessible, educational, and sustainable, all while continuing to serve its functional purpose as a waste plant. to reasons why attempts to create sustainable design and policy have stagnated– the cop15 conference is a prime example– and why big’s design provides an alternative vision, bjarke ingels explains, “the general misconception that sustainability is a question of how much our existing quality of life are we prepared to sacrifice in order to be sustainable” (ingels 2011). that is, generally the approach to sustainability has been to focus on sacrifice– what would be categorized as low hedonomics according to fiore et al (fig. 1). by contrast, hedonistic sustainability, focuses on the idea that “sustainability is not a burden, but that a sustainable city in fact can improve our quality of life” (ingels 2011). with his designs that span several cities globally, ingels envisions a future where positive change is not a contradiction to sustainability. ‘green gentrification’ following urban greening: the case of prospect park in new york city while introducing transportation programs or designing innovative buildings are essential steps towards essential progress, cities can (and should) also incorporate the already existing natural ecosystems into their sustainability plans. urban green spaces such as parks, green roofs, gardens, etc. can provide benefits ranging from storm water management, to diminishing the urban heat island effect, and improving biodiversity. additionally, green spaces have been shown to improve quality of life, with social, mental, and physical benefits (white 2013). to achieve these holistic benefits, an efficient and thoughtful approach to both the distribution of green spaces, and the relationship between green spaces and the built environment, is essential. in new york city, mayor bill deblasio’s 80x50, introduced in 2014, promises to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the city by 80 percent by 2015. to do so, the plan requires public and private buildings to undergo retrofitting processes in order to improve energy efficiency (city of new york: office of the mayor). though consilience mohtadi: hedonistic sustainability significant, 80x50 is one-dimensional in its results. it will surely reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but will be costly for landlords–and in turn, residents– and lacks public, or even individual, incentives or benefits. green space, conversely, is a collective good that improves quality of life, and promotes physical activity, psychological health, and public health in general. therefore, a lack of access is often considered to constitute an issue of environmental justice. many cities are built around some extent of green space, but the distribution is often inequitable, based on income, ethno-racial characteristics, age, gender, (dis)ability, and other differences (wolch et al. 2014). termed “green gentrification,” this phenomenon exposes the paradoxical effects of urban greening. take brooklyn’s prospect park, for example. brooklyn is new york city’s most populated borough, and has a vastly diverse demography. throughout the 1970’s, brooklyn was considered to be in decline; with low wage employment replacing higher wage manufacturing jobs, dependency on investments for aid, and increases in crime (gould et al 2014). the image of prospect park, once a crime-ridden, urban liability, became an asset to real estate developers following restoration efforts. as wolch et al. describe, “by simultaneously making older and typically low-income and/or industrial areas of existing cities more livable and attractive, urban greening projects can set off rounds of gentrification, dramatically altering housing opportunities and the commercial/retail infrastructure that supports lower income communities” (wolch et al. 2014). in other words, urban greening can create a localized wave of gentrification, which over time will leave socially vulnerable populations without access to urban green space. a 2014 study meticulously quantifies the resulting displacement of socio-economically vulnerable populations. using census data, gould et al. found that following the park’s restoration, rents increased and housing became less accessible to minority and poor populations (gould et al. 2014). therefore, minority populations were pushed back from the green space, further entrenching the issue of inequitable distribution of green space. while generally seen as a positive, apolitical planning effort, adding or restoring urban green spaces can have paradoxical effects under the combination of market consilience 24 forces in urban real estate, and institutional and cultural racism (gould et al. 2014). under green gentrification, environmental inequality persists, and the benefits of urban green space become concentrated to wealthy populations who can afford the rising prices of living near green spaces. the power of profit-driven forces makes urban greening a largely negative socioeconomic process. therefore, cities must take a more integrated approach to the planning process with regards to green space, foregoing profitcentric goals for community-specific needs and desires. this requires grassroots discourse, and collectivist-driven strategies to ensure that local communities can fully utilize the space. using a bottom-up approach, green gentrification can be avoided so that the benefits of urban green space can be equitably distributed. equitable sustainability the role of hedonism or quality of life in sustainability discourse may be considered cursory within the scheme of climate change, and issues of human rights and justice amidst rising sea levels, droughts, forced migrations, among other climate-related disasters. however, within the built environment of the urban landscape, a space of concentrated consumption, production, wealth, and human capital, a more integrated and holistic approach is necessary to achieve changes that are ecologically sound and will endure for years to come. the multiscalarity of actors and processes within cities, and the multi-nodal connection between cities globally has at once deemed cities as highly culpable for environmental degradation, while also giving them the means to pursue innovative technologies and designs. as saskia sassen argues, “[cities] contains the sites of power of some of the most destructive actors, but also potentially the sites at which to demand accountability of these actors. the former is a model for municipal-level reforms, the latter is emblematic of changes on the individual building scale” (sassen 2009). the built environment, natural environment, and the population of a city are highly interconnected forces. as discussed, green spaces, provide benefits ranging from impeding the urban heat island effect, storm water management, improving biodiversity, and even carbon sequestration. they provide mental and health benefits, and consilience mohtadi: hedonistic sustainability can increase property values. the ecological and anthropocentric benefits of green spaces are not mutually exclusive. projects like bogotá’s transmilenio or ciclovía, copenhagen’s updated master plan or waste plant, are successful because of their holistic nature: they offer benefits that scale from individual mental health to community-wide public health and quality of life, while also contributing to the mitigation of climate change on both a local and global scale. the addition or restoration of urban green space has the potential to provide communitywide benefits, but only if approached from a bottom-up (rather than profit-driven) approach. to be sustainable, cities must strive to mitigate climate change and its effects while also accounting for the relationship of local populations with the urban landscape and natural ecosystem. with community-based, collectivist-rooted solutions, cities can employ their agglomeration of assets towards growth that is both environmentally sound and collectively beneficial. consilience 26 figures figure 1. fiore et al., 2014. consilience mohtadi: hedonistic sustainability references cervero, r. 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(2014). urban green space, public health, and environmental justice: the challenge of making cities ‘just green enough’. landscape and urban planning, 125, 234-244. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/s0169204614000310 consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 24, 2021 a regional energy market to achieve california’s renewable energy goals hannah findling1 1 university of southern california, sol price school of public policy, master of public administration candidate, 2021, los angeles, california 90007, united states. email: hfindlin@usc.edu abstract the intermittency of renewable energy poses challenges for california’s energy stability and reliability as the state pushes towards its goal of reaching 100% renewable electricity by 2045. electricity generation from solar and wind power is increasing rapidly, but energy storage technology has not yet reached the levels of capacity to enable california to maintain energy stability on its own. california should merge into a regional energy market because this would solve the issues posed by renewable energy’s intermittency, and it would simultaneously enable renewable energy to stimulate the market for the entire region. a regional energy market could accelerate transitions to renewable energy beyond california’s borders and further california’s ultimate goal of mitigating climate change. the western region is already trending towards integration as more states join california’s energy imbalance market every year, and the new federal administration could usher in a new era of climate action. california should capitalize on the current regional and political momentum to pass a bill in the state legislature to merge into a regional energy market. author’s note as a resident of california, i live in a state that is leading efforts to address climate change. this is empowering and inspiring, and yet, california cannot curb climate change on its own. if my generation is going to have a future on this planet, then it is not solely about california achieving 100% renewable electricity, but about all regions reaching 100% renewable electricity. that is why the idea of a regional energy market stands out to me – it facilitates collaboration and change on a larger scale. this is the type of action that we need, and there is no time to spare. hannah findling is completing her master’s of public administration at the university of southern california, price school of public policy, in los angeles, california. keywords california, renewable energy, intermittency, energy market mailto:hfindlin@usc.edu 1 introduction: challenges posed by the intermittency of renewable energy california has long been a leader in action on climate change, and in september of 2018, the state set a goal of reaching 100% renewable electricity by 2045. transitioning to renewable electricity is critical to california’s efforts to curb climate change, and the benefits of this transition are visible in the 40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from the state’s electricity sector in the last decade (petek 2020). california was not the first state to set a goal of 100%, but it has the 5th largest economy in the world (domonoske 2018). therefore, powering california with 100% renewable electricity is an ambitious goal and, given the size of the state’s economy, california will face new challenges to reach 100% at this scale. california residents are largely supportive of a transition to renewable energy. a state-wide survey conducted in july 2020 found that 77% of california residents support the goal of 100% renewable energy by 2045 (baldassare 2020). despite strong public support, some critics of california’s policy tried to capitalize on the rolling blackouts that california experienced in august 2020 to argue that renewable energy is unreliable and will cause more blackouts in the future (olsen 2020; the editorial board 2020). these blackouts were the first that the state had faced in almost twenty years. shortly after the blackouts, the california independent system operator (caiso), the california public utilities commission (cpuc), and the california energy commission (cec) sent a joint letter to governor newsom stating, “collectively, our organizations want to be clear about one factor that did not cause the rotating outage: california’s commitment to clean energy. renewable energy did not cause the rotating outages” (batjer et al. 2020). after spending months completing a “root cause analysis” report released in january 2021, the organizations concluded that the blackouts were caused by three factors: 1) a rare extreme heat wave caused by climate change, 2) insufficient planning targets, and 3) market design issues that obscured the supply-demand imbalance (caiso et al. 2021). the blackouts were a public reminder of how critical reliable energy is for california’s residents and businesses. figure 1. renewable generation serving california each year. wind and solar power generation have increased dramatically in california over the last decade (illustrated in figure 1), and both of these sources are intermittent (albright et al. 2019). these sources are not dispatchable as needed because they are dependent on changing conditions that cannot be controlled, like the environment (hanania et al. 2020). transitioning to renewable energy is not simply about producing sufficient energy, but about matching the timing of energy production with energy use. 2 figure 2. the “duck curve” on a typical spring day in california. renewable energy poses an interesting challenge by producing too much energy at some hours of the day and not enough energy at others. the “duck curve” is a well-known graph of a 24-hour period on a standard spring day in california that illustrates the difference between the demand for electricity and the available solar energy at each hour of the day (see figure 2). the mismatch between supply and demand forms the shape of a duck, with excess energy produced during most daylight hours, and a deficit in supply as people return home in the evening, after the sun sets. the “belly” of the duck curve grows larger every year as california’s solar energy capacity increases (jones-albertus 2017). sending an excess of energy supply to the grid depresses prices (schulte & fletcher 2019). to avoid the market consequences of an excess of supply, california is often forced to curtail its solar energy production during the day, intentionally reducing the output of generators. the amount of renewable energy curtailed in california has been increasing rapidly over the last few years. in 2019 alone, 922,000 megawatt-hours of solar energy were curtailed, compared to 432,000 megawatt-hours in 2018 (o'shaughnessy, cruce, & xu 2020). this energy is essentially wasted (schulte & fletcher 2019). as california moves toward its goal of 100% renewable energy, the intermittency of renewable sources becomes even more challenging. the state will no longer be able to rely on sources such as natural gas to fill in the gaps when the sun sets or when the wind stops blowing. this report will examine the policy option of a regional energy market that could enable california to mitigate the risk of intermittency from renewable energy, pursue its goals to reach 100% renewable energy, and act on climate change. diagnosis: technical problems with system-wide solutions multiple factors contribute to the challenge california faces from intermittent energy. first, there is a lack of diversity in the state’s renewable energy sources. solar energy made up about 50% of california’s renewable energy in 2019, and wind made up about 27% (see figure 1) (cec 2020). this lack of diversity hampers the state’s ability to balance the grid when one source stops producing (e.g., when the sun sets). further, since california extends north to south geographically, the entire state is in one time zone. therefore, it lacks diversity in both the timing of solar energy production and in the timing of demand patterns. due to the lack of diversity in sources, production timing, and demand patterns, california may still face the issue of intermittency even if it significantly increases its renewable energy generation (schulte & fletcher 2019). 3 electricity storage technology would be the logical solution to intermittency because excess energy that is currently being curtailed could be stored and used at times when demand is higher than supply. however, current technology is not able to provide the capacity and affordability necessary to accommodate california’s needs. according to caiso, which manages 80% of california’s electricity, approximately 15,000 megawatts of battery storage will be required to reach 100% renewable energy by 2045. to put this in context, caiso had only 550 megawatts of storage capacity as of february 2021 (balaraman 2021). technological advancements led to a 65% – 85% decrease in storage costs between 2010 and 2019 (phadke et al. 2019), but the cost of developing a sufficient system for the state of california still makes this option unfeasible as a standalone solution. leaders must move quickly to prevent the catastrophic impacts of global warming and cannot simply wait for storage technology to improve (leahy 2019). therefore, alternative policies must be devised, in conjunction with storage technologies, to achieve california’s goal without sacrificing energy stability or reliability. to develop a solution, an analysis of the system in which the problem takes place is essential. this involves looking at the structure, relationships, and incentives within the larger electricity system in which california operates (stewart & ayres 2001). california is part of the regional entity called the western electricity coordinating council (wecc). the wecc region is notable in that it has the greatest size and geographic diversity out of all six regional entities under the north american electric reliability corporation and the federal energy regulatory commission (wecc 2015) (see figure 3 in the appendix). within the wecc, there are 38 separate balancing authorities, which are each responsible for operating infrastructure in their area to balance supply and demand (see figure 4 in the appendix). since 2014, caiso has run a voluntary market within the wecc called the western energy imbalance market (eim) (caiso 2020a). the market enables real-time trading, balancing supply and demand at five-minute intervals using the lowest cost energy in the grid (international renewable energy agency, 2019). this real-time trading allows participants to make up the difference between the demand and supply that was predicted and the demand and supply that occurred. the governing body of the eim is now working on developing an extended dayahead market (edam), which would enable further integration and trading (zichella 2019b). whereas only about 5% of total power is traded in the eim, edam would enable trading of almost 100% of the region’s electricity (trabish 2021). however, the edam does not achieve full integration. unlike a regional energy market, the edam does not centralize control and would not be able to assess transmission costs or dispatch generation directly (st. john 2019). the fact that an edam would not have regional transmission planning is important because that is where most cost-savings come from in regionalization (roberts 2018). integration of entities in the wecc through the eim has been very successful. the efficiency of the market can be seen in the $1.11 billion in savings that the eim has generated for its members since it was initiated in 2014 (caiso 2020a). these savings are especially impressive considering the eim only accounts for approximately 5% of total volume, since the only type of trading supported is in real-time (trabish 2018b). 4 figure 5. participants in the energy imbalance market. figure 5 shows the regions that are already part of the eim, as well as those that are planning to enter the eim in the coming years. the figure illustrates the trend towards integration that is already taking place. by the end of 2022, 21 balancing authorities will be part of the eim (caiso 2020a). proposal: integration into a regional energy market to address the issue of intermittence inherent in california’s solar and wind energy, the state should merge into a wholesale regional energy market, which would enable full integration and electricity trading within the region. this policy option addresses the roots of the problem by diversifying the supply of renewable energy, thereby increasing stability. this solution spreads out electricity demand, reducing variability and increasing the entire system’s reliability. a regional energy market would enable renewable energy to stimulate the market for the entire region, reduce reliance on fossil fuels, and increase the diffusion of renewable energy beyond california’s borders. the stability of a regional energy market would also allow other states to transition to renewable energy more securely, accelerating transitions in neighboring states and further supporting california’s ultimate goal of mitigating climate change (paulos 2018). 5 the elements needed to develop a regional energy market include collaboration, investment, and political effort. caiso must continue to build partnerships with other balancing authorities to establish a unified energy market for trading renewables. california must invest in technologies that increase transmission efficiency and resiliency while decreasing initial capital costs and maintenance costs. california and other states must build on existing infrastructure to develop and maintain stable, high voltage electricity transmission systems and a smart grid that can balance and redirect electricity supply and demand. politically, california must pass a bill in the legislature in order to merge into a regional energy market. this element will likely be the most challenging. previous attempts to pass a bill merging california into a regional energy market have repeatedly failed in the legislature. assembly bill 813 is the most recent bill that would have expanded caiso into a regional energy market. the bill was rejected by california’s legislators in august of 2018 (trabish 2018b), which marked the third consecutive year that regionalization failed in the legislature (sangree 2018). some of the strongest opponents to previous bills were labor unions, which argued that merging into a regional energy market would cause job loss in california. proponents argued that a regional energy market would result in around 9,900 to 19,300 new jobs in california by 2030 (caiso et al. 2016). neither side was necessarily incorrect, and this debate highlighted the tradeoffs of regionalization. labor unions were focusing on jobs specific to renewable energy construction that could move to other areas of the region outside of california. proponents were evaluating the number of new jobs across sectors that would likely be created due to the reduced cost of electricity from regionalization (caiso et al. 2016). while studies showed that overall job numbers would increase due to regionalization, this did not resolve the concerns of the labor unions regarding renewable energy construction jobs within the state (trabish 2018a). when amendments were introduced to keep jobs in california, the bill advanced slightly but ultimately lost the support of renewable energy advocates and environmental groups. while the potential of renewable energy jobs moving outside of california can be a downside of regionalization, it is important to remember that the reason california is pursuing these policies in the first place is to address climate change. building a sustainable future also means finding ways to make an equitable transition, and alternative pathways should be created for those workers whose jobs may leave the state. it is possible to simultaneously address the needs of stakeholders and pursue bold action on climate change. merging into a regional energy market will benefit many of california’s communities—the reduced price of electricity will be especially beneficial to low-income communities, and the benefits of the resulting job creation will be widespread. further, the creation of renewable energy jobs in other states is ultimately beneficial to california as well. lawmakers’ opposition to ceding control to a regional entity is another barrier to the passage of a bill in the state legislature. currently, caiso’s board of governors is appointed by the governor and approved by the senate. if california merged into a regional energy market, the board of the regional entity would be independent of california’s government. california would have a place on an advisory committee of state representatives, but this would be significantly less authority than the state is accustomed to (trabish 2018a). some fear that giving away this control would put california’s progressive policy at risk as states still supporting fossil fuels would have significant decision-making power. however, analysis of regional markets in other parts of the country shows that regionalization is beneficial to renewable sources and detrimental to fossil fuels. regionalization increases market competition, and low-cost renewable sources have caused many coal plants in regional markets to shut down (paulos 2018). caiso’s eim has already led to increased use of renewable energy and a decrease in the use of fossil fuels (zichella 2019a). although previous attempts to alter the governance structure of caiso have failed, the context in which california would make this change is shifting. the new federal administration is unlikely to subsidize fossil fuel plants or pass legislation favoring fossil fuels, as the outgoing administration has over the last four years (the economist 2018). the biden administration seeks to make the united states a leader in clean energy technology (biden for president 2020), and a significant portion of the president’s upcoming $4 trillion recovery package is dedicated to accelerating a clean energy transformation (friedman & tankersley 2021). additionally, states surrounding california are increasingly adopting ambitious goals for renewable energy (zichella 2019a). these changes suggest that relinquishing some authority now would not be as consequential as it might have been in the past. 6 further, recent increases in competition between caiso and other system operators for power providers illustrate that a change in caiso’s governing structure may be necessary for caiso to stay competitive in the future. caiso recently won the participation of power provider xcel energy over another system operator, southwest power pool (spp). xcel energy decided to join caiso’s market because studies showed caiso offered greater cost savings than spp. however, governance structure has been identified as an important factor when power providers make these decisions (trabish 2021). as spp catches up in the cost savings it can provide, caiso may lose its advantage. in caiso’s current structure, other entities have neither formal membership nor voting rights (paulos 2018). spp, on the other hand, uses a governance framework that delegates decision-making power among all members. a change in caiso’s governance structure may be critical to gain the support of other power providers moving forward. evaluation of proposal criteria commonly used to evaluate a policy proposal include its effectiveness in addressing the problem, its feasibility of being implemented, whether it is an efficient use of resources, whether it is equitable for all groups in society, and its acceptability by the public and decision-makers (bardach 2015). this proposal will be evaluated under each of the stated elements. a regional energy market is an effective option to address the intermittency of renewable energy because it resolves root issues of reliability and stability. the quantifiable measurements to evaluate the effectiveness of a regional market integration would include the following: 1) the reliability of electricity for california’s consumers, 2) the cost of electricity, 3) the percent of california’s power system that transitions to renewable sources over the following fiveand ten-year periods, and 4) the percent of other wecc states’ power systems that transition to renewable sources over the following fiveand ten-year periods. this option is feasible because regional energy markets have been successful in the rest of the united states. two-thirds of electricity demand in the u.s. is already served by regional transmission organizations, yet california’s iso is the only regional market in the wecc (paulos 2018). the feasibility of a regional energy market is also increased by the fact that the west is already trending towards integration. a regional energy market is efficient. studies have shown that a regional energy market is the most costeffective way to incorporate renewable energy into california’s power grid, and it produces financial benefits for all participants (paulos 2018). studies conducted in 2016 showed that california ratepayers would have been expected to benefit in the amount of approximately $55 million annually by 2020 and $1 billion to $1.5 billion annually by 2030 had california merged into a regional energy market at that time (caiso et al. 2016). the proposed solution is equitable in that a regional energy market would provide stability and affordability to all of california’s residents and businesses. low-income communities would receive the greatest benefit proportionally, as a greater portion of their budgets is spent on utilities. low-income households spend an average of 8.6% of their gross household income on energy costs, which is almost three times higher than households that are not low-income. in some areas of the u.s., households spend up to 30% of their gross income on energy costs (office of energy efficiency & renewable energy). a reduction in the cost of electricity would lessen this burden on low-income communities. a regional energy market would also likely speed up transitions to renewable energy, therefore reducing pollution from non-renewable sources that disproportionately impacts marginalized communities (ash et al. 2009). merging into a regional energy market is acceptable in the sense that there is wide-ranging public support for a transition to renewable energy. however, political acceptability is likely the biggest obstacle to putting this policy in place. proponents of a regional energy market must engage stakeholders and design alternative pathways for those whose jobs would move outside of california. discussions with legislators should emphasize the growing prominence of renewable energy policy both on the federal level and in california’s surrounding states in the wecc. proponents should highlight the importance of engaging in collaborative action to combat climate change that is inclusive and extends beyond the state’s borders. 7 conclusion california should merge into a regional energy market to enable the state to achieve 100% renewable energy by 2045 while maintaining reliability for its businesses and residents and simultaneously increasing the development of renewable energy beyond its borders to mitigate climate change. states are increasingly committing to renewable energy and integrating into the eim every year, and the new federal administration may usher in a new era of climate action. california should capitalize on this momentum to form a regional energy market. the first step in doing so is gaining the support of unions and building the political will to pass enabling legislation in the california legislature. while merging into a regional energy market is not a silver bullet to solve energy 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(2019b, september 27). western eim expands, electricity markets outlook brightens. nrdc. https://www.nrdc.org/experts/carl-zichella/western-eim-expandselectricity-markets-outlook-brightens. 13 appendix table 1: abbreviations abbreviation full name caiso california independent system operator edam extended day-ahead market eim western energy imbalance market iso independent system operator wecc western electricity coordinating council 14 figure 3: the six regional entities under the north american electric reliability corporation and the federal energy regulatory commission (image from north american electric reliability corporation 2020) 15 figure 4: the 38 balancing authorities in the wecc (image from western clean energy advocates 2018) 16 figure 6: theory of change *conflicts that could result over land for transmission infrastructure are not considered in this project. **this proposal is based on the assumption that surrounding regions are willing to negotiate a collaborative program to foster the regional energy market. credit for the creation of this theory of change diagram goes primarily to my colleague yuning zhu. reason for change policy problem • intermittent renewable energy supply california’s needs and goals • affordable electricity for california’s residents and businesses • a stable energy grid capable of meeting peak demands • 100% renewable energy by 2045 • mitigation of climate change planned works potential solution • regional energy market major activities needed to achieve solution gain political will to pass a bill in the california legislature: • organize and engage in a facilitated negotiation with opposition groups (primarily unions); • organize educational campaigns about the impacts of a regional energy market geared towards lawmakers and the general public. invest: • invest in technologies that increase transmission efficiency and resiliency while decreasing initial capital costs and maintenance costs; • invest in smart grid technology that can balance and redirect supply and demand across the grid; • improve electricity transmission systems across neighboring states and regions. build partnerships:** • partnership-building with states and other balancing authorities in the wecc; • work collaboratively to develop the necessary regulations and plans for regional integration. intended results outputs • efficient energy transmission systems across states; • a unified regional energy market for trading renewable energy; • a controlled smart grid; • streamlined cross-regional energy trading procedures. outcomes • states in different geographic regions trade energy at different times of the day. • use of renewable energy that has previously been curtailed; • reduced electricity costs; • reduced energy instability; • flexible grid capable of providing reliable electricity; • increased use of renewable sources and reduced use of fossil fuels. impact • a transition to 100% renewable energy in california without sacrificing energy stability; • other states have easier transitions to renewable energy; • reduced carbon emissions generated by energy sectors in the wecc; • less polluted environments; • potentially slowed or reversed climate change. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 10, iss. 1 (2013), pp. 191 – 201 sustainable indigenous orchards: an agroforestry project in the colombian amazon jorge shigematsu green hope colombia foundation www.greenhopecolombia.org chanshigematsu@gmail.com sylvia garcia sadowski ll.m. alumna columbia university school of law, new york shs2155@columbia.edu abstract in 2010, ngos green hope colombia and forestever started the development of an agroforestry project in the colombian amazon to address both environmental and social challenges facing indigenous lands in this area. the use of unsustainable agricultural practices such as tree cutting, burning and monoculture by amazonian indigenous communities will, in the long term, cause the destruction of many parts of the amazon forest. the sustainable indigenous orchards agroforestry project was created with three objectives in mind: first, to improve the life and health conditions of amazonian indigenous communities; second, to limit and fight deforestation in the region by establishing healthy agroforestry practices and introduce concepts of species’ diversity, the cycle of organic matter, and environmental conservation; and third, to rescue the value of local species and biodiversity through the creation of orchards of familiar fruit trees. the project was conceived as a “joint venture” where the communities provide their land and workforce to plant different sorts of trees, and the ngos green hope and forestever provide them with all the necessary materials, instruction and technical support to perform the work. at the end of the project, the families would receive payment for each planted tree. this project can serve as a case study for research on economic development and sustainability in indigenous lands, educational outreach and relations between state and indigenous governments. it also provides a perspective on the question of how to approach and balance potential differences between ancient indigenous practices and environmental sustainability. 192 consilience keywords: communities, colombian amazon forest, environmental and social sustainability, agroforestry, education, social and economic development. 1. introduction this photo essay aims to present the sustainable indigenous orchards agroforestry project developed by the ngos green hope colombia and forestever in the southern end of the colombian amazon. the essay is integrated with a series of photographs taken by jorge shigematsu, the director of green hope colombia, during his participation in the project. in 2010, the ngos green hope colombia and forestever started the development of an agroforestry project in the colombian amazon. jorge shigematsu, who had been involved in social work with indigenous communities in this region since 2007, witnessed how lands in the area were being subjected to indiscriminate tree cutting and light-burn agriculture resulting in land degradation, loss of biodiversity, food scarcity, and displacement of agricultural activities for illegal hunting and animal trafficking. eventually, these practices would result in the destruction of parts of the region’s amazon forest. jorge reasoned that investing in education on sustainability would become essential to protect the forest and to rescue the land and people’s cultural values and traditions. in 2010, he met maikov dumas, a french agro-development engineer and director of ngos forestever and up2green. they partnered to execute the sustainable indigenous orchard reforestation program, which, by the end of 2012, was responsible for planting 20,000 native species trees the program emphasized both environmental and economic sustainability. maikov dumas had been developing and implementing similar agroforestry models with indigenous communities in iquitos, peru. this experience provided him with key knowledge of the local environment and allowed forestever to create the appropriate methodology to successfully implement the project in association with green hope colombia. communities in san antonio de los lagos, valencia, and mocagua reserves near leticia are currently part of the project. thousands of trees have been planted, and the ngos are working on reaching out to other surrounding communities to present them with the project and get them involved. they are also building alliances across the border in the brazilian amazon to collaborate with communities along the amazon river basin. for the first time this year, the colombian government has shown interest in supporting the project, and there are ongoing conversations with public educational institutions to create student volunteer opportunities. the area is near the southern end of the colombian amazon department, close to its capital, leticia. communities in the region include boras, yaguas, huitotos, tikunas, mirañas, and cocamas. indigenous people here use wood to obtain vegetablebased fuel, build transportation devices such as canoes, and construct and repair their homes and “malokas” (ceremonial houses). consilience shigematsu & sadowski: indigenous orchards figure 1: aerial view of the bio-diversity of the amazon forest figure 2 figure 3 figure 4 figures 2, 3 and 4: local people use their natural resources to build canoes, houses and vegetable coal. they also prepare cereal from yucca (farinha) that they consume and sell in the market. fishing is another alternative, but during the summer season there are problems of food scarcity. the communities’ means of subsistence is state support, eco-tourism and short-scale fishing and agricultural activities. but these only allow for limited subsistence. illegal hunting and animal trafficking businesses easily “trap” young people by offering them attractive options for “easy money.” globalization and the arrival of non-traditional lifestyles have also affected the communities’ traditions and their capacity to adapt. 194 consilience figure 7: visit to a deforested zone at an indigenous community in valencia, a reserve located two hours by boat from leticia. some farmers still practice burning as a traditional deforestation method to sow yucca and plantain. the idea was for the communities to provide their land and work-force to plant different sorts of trees, while green hope and forestever would provide them with all the necessary materials, instruction, and technical support to perform the work. at the end of the project, the families would receive payment for each planted tree. figure 5: green hope colombia´s director (mr. shigematsu), traveled inside the forest close to tarapacá, colombia (an indigenous town). he witnessed the reality about the illegal timber market. figure 6: traveling along the amazon river, many villages in peru are involved in timber trade. consilience shigematsu & sadowski: indigenous orchards figure 8 figure 9 figures 8 and 9: planting of fruit and timber trees typically cedar, ceiba and mahogany in deteriorated areas (before and after) in san antonio de los lagos. local people learned that they can apply agroforestry and longer-lasting agricultural practices that will allow them to use their natural resources sustainably. figure 10: green hope colombia´s director together with some of the project’s team members, traveling in a peke peke (“small boat”) along indigenous reserves on the amazon river. they were on their way to san antonio de los lagos to talk to the communities about the project. in 2011, after holding several meetings with “curacas” (community leaders), the tikunas, a community that lives in the san antonio de los lagos reserve, signed on to the project. at the beginning of 2012, the tikunas and cocamas, living in the valencia reserve, also decided to join the project. 196 consilience figure 11: visiting and socializing with the tikuna community in san antonio de los lagos. this was the first encounter with local people and with the curaca (community leader), who showed interest in the sustainable reforestation project. figure 12: meeting with indigenous families in the valencia reserve. after listening to the proposal by the green hope and forestever directors, they approved and signed an agreement to implement the program. the objectives were three-fold: first, to improve life and health conditions of amazonian indigenous communities by securing and diversifying families’ food sources and agricultural production; second, to limit and fight deforestation in the region by establishing healthy agroforestry practices and introducing concepts of species’ diversity, the cycle of organic matter, and environmental conservation; and third, to rescue the value of local species and biodiversity through the creation of orchards of familiar fruit trees. consilience shigematsu & sadowski: indigenous orchards figure 13: the project manager, mr. juan ferreira, explains to miss. diane garcon, a french volunteer, how to make notes about growth rates in the reforestation area in san antonio de los lagos. various french volunteers worked for a year on this project. figure 14 figure 15 figures 14 and 15: showing fruits typical from the region in a market in leticia, including soursop, pomarosa, copoazu, araza, and mango. sustainable use of traditional orchards and varied fruit crops help to secure and diversify families’ food sources and create economic and commercial opportunities. involved parties are committed to obtaining set objectives within a deadline, and to exercise the discipline required to attend workshops, understand the technical aspects, and become autonomous in order to administer their parcels without supervision in the long term. 198 consilience figure 16. an indigenous woman in the community of valencia shows her seed nursery. she also showed jorge and maikov where she will plant the native trees, which will be grown in a deforested area. figure 17: mr. maikov dumas, green hope colombia´s partner, analyzes a young plant after a year in the community of valencia. it is very important to follow up every month with beneficiaries to identify if something has not been done properly and to take corrective steps based on the reforestation schedule. two years after its inception, green hope and forestever organizers visited san antonio de los lagos lands to follow up on the development of the project. they found community members engaged and happy that their reforested plants consilience shigematsu & sadowski: indigenous orchards were growing healthily. they are expecting to begin production of fruit pulp at the end of 2014. in valencia, tikunas and cocamas have already planted 10,000 trees. during maikov and jorge’s most recent visit last february, project participants spoke to them about how they expect the reforested plants to provide them with small business and income opportunities to help the community. figure 18: visit to the project after a year of reforestation. the photograph shows pineapple, avocado, cedar, plantain, and native species planted in the community of valencia. figure 19: ecocert manager, ms. liana morera, traveled from france to visit, evaluate, and certify the success of the project in san antonio de los lagos. ecocert is an international certification company based in france. 200 consilience most recently, the community of mocagua signed on to the project. mocagua is located an hour and a half away from leticia, next to amacayacu national park. launching the project with this community is of special importance as some years ago, a conflict arose between the national park and community concerning land rights. the matamata river divides their borders. reforestation activities have created an opportunity of mutual understanding, particularly because it includes planting of more than 500 trees of surba, one of the favorite foods of the churuco monkey (lagothrix) that is in danger of extinction. figure 20: members of the community of mocagua, sowing seeds for the 2013 project. we built a nursery and germinator and prepared the soil with organic fertilizer. the young plants had already begun to germinate. the next step will be to put the young plants in bags and plant them in deforested zones next semester. for the first time this year, the colombian government has shown interest in supporting green hope and forestever’s work in the amazon region. the ngos expect to sign an agreement soon. they have also held conversations with the national university of colombia’s sinchi institute and the colombian national education service (sena) to open up the option for students to volunteer with the project. additionally, the organizations are looking to build alliances across the border. they visited the national indian foundation (funai) in brazil. this foundation has shown interest in visiting project areas in colombia with the idea of implementing a similar project in brazil. green hope colombia and forestever would also like to see their project implemented in other communities along the basin of the amazon river. consilience shigematsu & sadowski: indigenous orchards figure 21: members of a nearby community in iquitos (peru), carrying seeds and young plants to deliver them to a neighboring community that wants to get involved in the project. jorge and maikov emphasize and promote the importance of using the work in the seed nurseries as a way of creating liaisons with neighboring communities, empowering the reforestation project in the region. microsoft word bernard.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 14, iss. 2 (2015), pp. 207-213 the longevity of the magnet effect: fire-herbivory interactions in central kenya miranda bernard department of ecology and evolutionary biology princeton university, princeton, new jersey mirandab@princeton.edu alyssa menz earth institute columbia university, new york city, new york amm2358@columbia.edu laura booth department of ecology, evolution and environmental biology columbia university, new york city, new york lsb2137@columbia.edu abstract the coexistence of grass and trees that typifies savanna ecosystems is maintained in part by top-down forces including herbivory and fire. understanding fire-herbivore interactions is an integral step in determining the effect of these forces individually and informs decisions about the use of fire as a livestock management technique. the magnet effect, in which grazers are drawn to an area after it is burned, is one such interaction between fire and herbivores. while the process of the magnet effect has been described, neither its longevity nor the manner through which fire intensity affects its strength is understood. in this study, we explored whether the increase in herbivory pressure predicted by the magnet effect is maintained over long periods after a fire, how fire intensity influences the strength of the magnet effect, and which feeder types are most influenced by the magnet effect. we established five field sites at the mpala research centre in laikipia, kenya that ranged in fire intensity and elapsed time since last the burn. we found that the magnet effect is transient on a seven-year scale and affects grazers more than browsers or mixed feeders, though herbivory and grass biomass responses to fire intensity were conflicting. this research clarifies the role of the magnet effect in maintaining savanna ecosystems and can aid agriculturalists seeking to use fire as a management technique by indicating how long after a burn increased palatability of grass can be expected. author’s note the authors completed this research while studying in columbia and princeton’s joint program in tropical biology and sustainability in kenya. we would like to thank dr. carla staver for her helpful comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. we would also like to thank josphat mwangi, agnes wachu, and the rest of the staff at the mpala research centre, all of whom were so kind to us during our stay with them. keywords: savanna, fire, herbivores, magnet effect consilience bernard et al.: fire-herbivory interactions in central kenya 1. introduction the savanna ecosystem, which is characterized by the co-dominance of grasses and trees, supports more herbivore biomass than any other terrestrial habitat (frank et al. 1998, higgins et al. 2000). this biomass comes not only in the form of wild ungulates, but also of domestic livestock. african pastoralists have long used fire as a management strategy for increasing food availability and quality (archibald 2005). when a plot of land is burned either naturally or intentionally, it attracts wild and domestic feeders through the increased palatability of re-sprouting grass, nutrient availability, and visibility of predators (savala and holdo 2005, archibald et al. 2005, riginos and grace 2007, allred 2011). this phenomenon is known as the “magnet effect” (archibald et al. 2005). while the mechanics of the magnet effect are understood, the timescales over which it operates and how it interacts with fire intensity and herbivore feeder type are not known (archibald et al. 2005, allred 2011). in this study, we explored for how long herbivores preferred certain sites due to the magnet after a plot was burned, as well as whether fire intensity or feeder type influenced herbivore preference. if the magnet effect is enduring, we expect a positive feedback to result, causing grass biomass to remain low and herbivory to remain high for long periods post-fire. conversely, if the magnet effect is transient, grass biomass will rebound within one year and herbivory should concurrently return to pre-fire levels. if fire intensity is positively related to herbivory because severe fires increase grass palatability and nutritional value (savala and holdo 2005, archibald et al. 2005), then burned plots would demonstrate higher grazing pressure than unburned plots. finally, because domestic grazers and wild ungulates of all feeder types utilize savanna, we investigated how the magnet effect impacts feeder types due to the improved forage quality of grass and tree leaves as well as increased predator visibility (archibald et al. 2005). if the magnet effect impacts grazers more severely because it primarily affects grass, then we expect grazers to be more prevalent than other feeder types on burned plots. 2. methods 2.1 study site we conducted this study at the mpala research center (mrc) in the laikipia district in central kenya (0°17’ n, 37°52’ e) on the black-cotton soil, which receives ~450-500 mm rainfall annually. we collected data in february, the middle of the dry season. we set up five 80m by 60m plots: two control plots, one plot that burned at mild intensity one year ago, one plot that burned at severe intensity one year ago, and one plot that burned at severe intensity seven years ago. we surveyed all plots for herbivory and grass biomass by dividing each plot into 12 equal 20m by 20m subplots, which served as “replicates.” consilience bernard et al.: fire-herbivory interactions in central kenya 2.2 biomass and herbivory data collection we quantified biomass using a disk pasture meter (dpm). starting at one corner of each subplot, we walked five transects spaced 4m apart. dpm measurements were taken every 4m, starting 2m from the edge of the subplot, and resulting in five measurements per transect. to calibrate the dpm values, we used the equation, “calibrated grass biomass = -3019+2260 √(dpm reading),” where calibrated grass biomass is in kg · ha-1. we used dung counts as a proxy for grazing. data collectors used walking transects to count all dung piles within each subplot. dung was identified for cow, zebra/donkey, elephant, giraffe, impala, and dik-dik. 2.3 data analyses we used jmp pro 10 to perform statistical analyses on our data. we ran anova tests to compare means between plots and students’ t-tests to compare the means. tukey tests were used for post-hoc model analysis. 3. results we collected a total of 1500 dpm measurements (300 measurements for each of the five plots) and a total of 1659 dung counts (elephant, n=111; equine, n=702; impala/goat, n=139; cow, n=667; dik-dik, n=3; giraffe, n=37). we found that increased grazing pressure results in decreased fuel loads, indicating that the inverse relationship between herbivory and biomass underlies the magnet effect (r2=0.21, p < 0.0001, n= 1659; figure 1). log-transformed grazer dung counts g ra ss b io m as s (k g/ ha ) figure 1. the correlation between grazer dung counts and grass biomass. grazer dung counts were log-transformed and included counts from cows and equines, defined as donkey or zebra. r2 = 0.21. consilience bernard et al.: fire-herbivory interactions in central kenya because the seven-year and control plots demonstrated statistically similar high mean grass biomass (t=1.96, n=1500, p = 0.86) and low mean dung counts (t=1.96, n=1659, p=0.91) when compared to both of the one-year plots (t=1.96, n=1500, p<0.05; figures 2 and 3), we conclude that the magnet effect is transient. the one-year severe plot demonstrated both marginally significantly higher total dung counts (t=1.96, n=1500, p = 0.077) and significantly higher mean biomass (t=1.96, n=1500, p < 0.0001) than the one-year mild plot (see figures 2 and 3), contradicting our predictions that higher rates of herbivory result in lower biomass, and that increased fire intensity will produce a stronger magnet effect. we found that the mean number of dung counts responded differently for each plot depending on feeder type (f11,348= 90.92, p<0.0001, n=1659), and that the mean number of grazers was both significantly higher than the mean number of any other feeder type across plots, and significantly higher in both one-year plots than in either the sevenyear or control plots (figure 3). 1-year severe 7-year severe control m ea n gr as s bi om as s (k g/ ha ) c c b a 1-year mild plot type figure 2. grass biomass depending on time since fire. mean grass biomass compared by plot type. plot types included two one-year plots (mild and severe), one seven-year severe plot and one control plot. different letters above each bar indicate statistically significant differences between those categories. error bars indicate one standard error from the mean grass biomass value. consilience bernard et al.: fire-herbivory interactions in central kenya 4. discussion our study clarifies the longevity of the magnet effect, indicating that positive feedbacks between herbivores and grass biomass keep fuel loads low for at least one year, but have disappeared by seven years after a burn. although we identified conflicting responses of herbivory and grass biomass to fire intensity (figure 4), this ambiguity may have been caused by a number of factors. firstly, the one-year and seven-year fires were in close proximity to each other, which may have drawn grazers prematurely off the seven-year burn (archibald et al. 2005). secondly, all of the burned plots were relatively near a cattle ranch (personal observation), which may have skewed dung counts in favor of cattle and produced more uniform grazing than would otherwise have been observed. lastly, dung counts are not a perfect proxy for herbivory because of varying herbivore digestion rates and defecation patterns (archibald et al. 2005). it is also possible that, if fire intensity is sufficient to cause volatilization of vital nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus – thereby reducing figure 4. herbivore type use depending on plot type. mean dung counts for each of three feeder types compared by plot type. plot types included two one-year plots (mild and severe), one seven-year severe plot, and one control plot. browsers included dik-dik and giraffe; grazers included donkey, zebra, and cow; mixed feeders included impala and elephant. different letters above each bar indicate statistically significant differences between those categories. error bars indicate one standard error from the mean dung count. plot type consilience bernard et al.: fire-herbivory interactions in central kenya nutritional quality of future forage (augustine, 2003) – then the relationship between fire intensity and herbivory is inverse rather than direct. while we expected that browsers and mixed feeders would also prefer burned plots due to the increased palatability of re-sprouting tree leaves and predator visibility (archibald et al. 2005, anderson et al. 2010), this effect did not appear. the absence of this response indicates that the magnet effect is a more powerful determinant of grazer preference than of browser or mixed feeder preference. this information is useful to pastoralists, because it demonstrates that using a burn to increase forage quality will not attract significantly greater numbers of browsers and mixed feeders. it will, however, attract more predators due to increased prey density (anderson et al. 2010). it is also worth considering that browsers and mixed feeders may not have responded strongly to the magnet effect in this case because none of the fires examined noticeably increased predator visibility (personal observation). given our findings, future work should seek to determine exactly when the magnet effect dissipates by assessing finer increments of time between one and seven year burns. because savannas are regulated by fire and herbivory, understanding how herbivory affects fire regimes and vice versa would increase our understanding of savanna persistence through positive and negative feedbacks (higgins et al. 2000, sankaran et al. 2013, waldram et al. 2008). more complete knowledge of the magnet effect and its impact on long-term fire regimes would inform agriculturalists seeking to use fire as a management technique, as it establishes how long after a burn increased forage quality may be expected (archibald et al. 2005, mcgranahan et al. 2012). consilience bernard et al.: fire-herbivory interactions in central kenya bibliography allred, b.w., s.d. fuhlendorf, d.m. engle, and r.d. elmore. ungulate preference for burned patches reveals strength of fire-grazing interaction. ecology and evolution. 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(2013) 101: 1389-1399. savala, miguel and ricardo m. holdo. delayed effects of fire on habitat use by large herbivores in acacia drepanolobium savanna. african journal of ecology (2005) 43: 155-157. waldram, m., bond, w., and william d. stock. ecological engineering by a mega-grazer: white rhino impacts on a south african savanna. ecosystems (2008) 11: 101-112. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 6, iss. 1 (2011), pp. 1–19 export composition and economic growth in subsaharan africa: a panel analysis edward bbaale center for global development washington, d.c., usa ebbaale@cgdev.org john mutenyo africa growth initiative the brookings institute washington d.c., usa jmutenyo@brookings.edu abstract this paper was guided by the hypothesis that it is not exports per se that matter, but different export components influence growth differently. we considered a sample of 35 sub-sahara african countries based on availability of data on the key variables. aggregate data were obtained from the most recent world bank‟s world development indicators and international monetary fund‟s international finance statistics online facilities. disaggregated data on exports and imports were obtained from the united nation‟s statistical database under standard international trade classification (sitc) revision 4. the generalized methods of moments estimator was employed during the analysis. we find that it is the growth in agricultural exports, and not manufactured exports, that is significantly associated with per capita income growth in our sample. these countries should adopt policies that increase agricultural exports in the medium term as they design strategies for increasing manufactured exports in the long term. other factors significantly influencing growth are gross capital formation, capital goods imports, infrastructure, government consumption, and inflation rate, political systems and governance, and education. author’s note edward bbaale is a visiting fellow at the centre for global development in washington d.c. he obtained a phd in economics from the university of linzaustria in 2008. his research interests include health care services and outcomes for women and children. john mutenyo is a research fellow at the africa growth initiative at the brookings institute washington dc. prior to that, he was a visiting scholar at the imf in washington dc and a lecturer of economics at makerere university kampala uganda. he holds a phd from university of dar es salaam tanzania. his research interests include but are not limited to investment and growth. keywords: export composition, economic growth, sub-saharan africa 2 consilience 1. introduction the role of exports in igniting and sustaining rapid economic growth rates, especially in emerging economies, cannot be underscored. exporting is associated with static gains that include access to larger outside markets, hence exploiting economies of scale. there are also dynamic gains that include efficiency advances as a result of knowledge and technological spillovers from exporting experience. exporting is also associated with efficiency in resource allocation, employment generation, and relaxing the foreign exchange constraints. accordingly, there is little wonder that countries the world over are taking deliberate and purposive efforts to promote exporting activities. owing to the usually strong synergies between rapid economic growth on the one hand, and exporting on the other, countries usually strive to achieve rapid increases in exports and, by extension, promote economic growth and development. indeed, the present literature presents several plausible theoretical arguments supporting the view that exporting activities and overall economic growth are positively associated. on the one hand, exporting implies that a country gains access to the wider external demand, which acts as a stimulus to domestic output and hence economic growth. second, it is frequently argued that small domestic markets may not grow continuously and that any positive economic shock leading to the expansion of the domestic market is more likely to decay quickly. on the other hand, large external markets do not always encompass growth restrictions on the demand side, and this leads to the exploitation of economies of scale. therefore, export expansion can be argued to be a stimulus of economic growth (agosin, 1999; giles and williams, 2000; grossman and helpman, 1991). additionally, verdoorn (1949) dwells on the argument that export growth may generate specialization in the production of export commodities. by extension, specialization is argued to lead to efficiency gains in the export sector owing to the rise in skills due to learning-bydoing. consequently, resources would flow from the relatively less productive and non-trade sector to the highly productive exports sector, leading to economic growth. futher, chenery and strout (1966), balassa (1978), buffie, (1992) and riezman (1996), dwell on an indirect argument linking exporting to economic growth. they argue that exporting activities generate foreign exchange that is required to import capital goods. increase in capital goods imports in turn stimulate a country's capacity to produce. this is more pronounced in developing countries that have an extreme disadvantage in the production of capital goods. in the same line of argument, it is suggested that the most up-to-date knowledge and technology is embodied in the capital goods (plants and equipments) imported from technologically advanced countries. this knowledge transfer through international trade may increase productivity and, by extension, lead to economic growth and development (hart, 1983 and chuang, 1998). empirically, the relationship between exports and economic growth has been tested in a number of countries, employing time series techniques. it is noteworthy that the evidence generated does not translate into a consensus on the direction of causality of the two series. for that matter, the relationship between exporting and economic growth remains hotly debated by researchers and academics. some authors consilience bbaale and mutenyo: export composition adduce evidence supporting the fact that export growth precedes economic growth hence giving a stance to the export-led-growth (elg) hypothesis (arnade et al., 1995; fosu 1996; thornton 1996). on the other hand, some authors provide evidence in support of the growth-led-export hypothesis (gle) by arguing that economic growth precedes export growth (lancaster, 1980; krugman, 1984; henriques and sadorsky 1996; al-yousif 1999; kemal et al., 2002). the stance of this argument is such that economic growth leads to knowledge and technological development in the various sectors of an economy through the learning-by-doing effect. this effect on the economy becomes a vehicle for export growth especially in those commodities where the country enjoys a comparative advantage. other authors argue that there is a feedback relationship between export growth and economic growth (helpman and krugman, 1985; dutt and ghosh, 1994; thornton 1996; shan and sun 1998a; anwar et al., 2000;). the arguments presented along these lines are that exports may arise from the economies of scale effects of economic growth. at the same time, export expansion may propel further cost reductions leading to efficiency gains, and by extension, leading to economic growth. at an extreme end, some authors find no causal relationship between the two series (mutairi, 1993; anwar et al., 2000). in addition to single country studies, there is substantial cross-country empirical literature on the effects of exports on growth (voivodas, 1973; michaely, 1977; balassa, 1978; fajana, 1979; fosu 1990; lussier 1993; greenaway and sapsford, 1994; and sala-i-martin, 1997)1. these authors provide evidence for the positive association between exports and growth. however, it is worth noting that most of the recent and earlier literature on exports and economic growth concentrated on „aggregate exports‟ only. the major deficiency of this approach is that it limits our understanding of the important differences between dissimilar export components and their influence on economic growth. it is argued that even if there is a growth-enhancing or growth-limiting effect of a particular export component, it may not be reflected at the aggregate level, and this may lead to unauthentic conclusions and implications for policy (ghatak et al., 1997). all the cross-country studies cited above do not explicitly investigate the effect of disaggregated exports on economic growth. however, there is quite scanty literature investigating the role of export composition on economic growth (feder, 1983; fosu, 1990; ghatak et al., 1997; hussain, 1998; greenaway et al., 1999; srinivasan et al., 2001; herzer et al., 2004; and wörz (2005). additionally, the literature addressing the subject, apart from fosu (1990), is overly concentrated on asia, latin america, and europe. this leaves a huge knowledge gap for africa that this paper seeks to fill. this paper tests the hypothesis that not the aggregate exports per se matter, but different export components have a differential influence on economic growth. put differently, the type of products that a country exports do matter for growth. indeed, this is connected to the argument documented by feder (1983) and wörz (2005) that efficiency, knowledge spillover, and economies of scale are different across different export components. this, in turn, implies that their growth stimulating power is obviously different. therefore, the question of interest from the policy perspective extends beyond the influence of aggregate exports on growth and 1 cited in giles and williams (2000) 4 consilience dwells on whether export components have a differential stimulating power on economic growth. gaining insights on the differential impact of export components on growth is a key to successful policy formulation, analysis, and advocacy. in addition, much of the previous country and cross-country studies have been plagued by the endogeneity problem that obviously exists in a growth model with the export variable on the right-hand-side. in light of this, we employed a dynamic panel generalized method of moments (gmm) estimator. in studying growth, this procedure ensures that parameters are estimated consistently in the presence of endogenous right-hand-side covariates. the paper is organized as follows. section 2 presents the theoretical framework and the estimation strategy. section 3 presents a discussion of the findings and section 4 concludes with the paper‟s implications for policy. 2. theoretical framework and estimation strategy the theoretical exposition of the relationship between exporting and economic growth is based on the premise that exporting influences economic growth via productivity enhancement. a number of authors have developed models in which technology and knowledge spillovers are important conduits through which international trade or exports in particular lend a vital synergy to endogenous growth. for instance, grossman and helpman (1991) present international trade as being at the forefront of promoting a country‟s research and development sector that is indispensable for growth. this is based on the grounds that in the global trading arena, exporting firms experience knowledge and technological best practices from their competitors as well as consumers. wörz (2005), present two important arguments through which exporting leads to productivity improvement at the firm level which translates into overall economic growth. the first argument dwells on the fact that a country engaged in production for export will maximize the exploitation of its comparative advantage, which enhances efficiency. this, in turn, triggers resource reallocation from the relatively inefficient non-trade sector to the efficient export sector. their second argument is based on the premise that producing for the global market is usually associated with a drive to upgrade the quality of the products in line with what international consumer dictates, hence leading to a rise in skills, productivity and, by extension, economic growth. this argument is also supported by feder (1983) who argues that efficiency enhancement may occur via spillover effects generated by the learning experience of exporters. this, subsequently, generates positive knowledge externalities to the domestic economy as a whole and, by extension, productivity enhancement that is an engine of overall economic growth. on the other hand, other authors present an important role of capital goods imports in promoting productivity and hence economic growth. the arguments presented, however, still expose exporting as an intermediary. riezman (1996) and chenery and strout (1966) dwell on the argument that export expansion may indirectly affect growth by providing foreign exchange that allows for increasing levels of capital goods imports. yet, chuang (1998) and hart (1983) argue along the lines that knowledge and technology are embodied in equipment and machinery that are sourced from technologically leading countries. this effect is presented to be consilience bbaale and mutenyo: export composition productivity enhancing and thus economic growth enhancing. this line of argument has been pursued by other authors (romer, 1992; pack, 1992; coe et al., 1995; lee, 1995; pissarides, 1997)2. they argue that capital goods imports to a country are proportional to technological spillovers that participating firms experience. the importing countries are argued to be using the ideas and information conceived from the technological leaders for which they lack capacity to develop in isolation. to sum up this argument, exporting provides a country with foreign exchange to import capital goods which bring along with it the aforementioned benefits to the economy. empirically, authors like caselli and coleman (2001)3 generated a measure of technological diffusion by considering countries' imports of high-tech equipment, mostly computers. they argue that the accumulation of computers is proportional to spillover of knowledge and technologies. however, in a twist of argument, wörz (2005) argue that the influence of imports on economic growth is not without ambiguity. whereas imports of capital goods may enhance growth through embodied technology and knowledge, it may reduce the latitude for learning-bydoing, which dampens growth. further, they contend that the positive influence of sophisticated importation very much depends on the absorptive capacity of a country in terms of the education of the labor force. an important theoretical argument that motivates this paper is on the importance of export structure on growth, proposed by feder (1983) and wörz (2005). they argue that different export components generate important differences in productivity, externalities and economies of scale and hence influence economic growth differently. they dwell on the argument that the scope for technology and knowledge spillover is highest in the manufactured export components which are usually more skill intensive. based on their foundation, we present the productivity parameter in the cobb-douglas production function as being influenced differently by the different export components. we also include capital goods imports because they embody knowledge and technology that is productivity enhancing. 2.1 the model consider a neoclassical cobb-douglas production function;  itititit lkay  (1) where ity denotes total output of economy i at time t , and, ita is the productivity parameter which represents the stock of knowledge, production technology or the blueprint. itk and itl are conventional factors of the production function representing the stock of capital and labor for different economies, respectively. since exports and imports affect growth via the productivity parameter )( ita , we can express this parameter as a function of various export and import components and control for other factors. these export and import (now also called learning coefficients) components are entered with a lag )(s because it is assumed that knowledge accumulation is not instantaneous. 2 cited in barro and sala-i-martin (2004) 3 cited in barro and sala-i-martin (2004) 6 consilience ),,,( itsitsitsitit zcmmxaxfa  (2) imposing factor shares on each of the components will make it easy for us to substitute it back into equation (1).  itsitsitsitit zcmmxaxa  (3) where ax and mx are agriculture and manufactured export components, and cm is capital imports. z is a vector of control variables including; government consumption and credit to the private sector as percentage of gdp, inflation rate, civil liberties index, , and number of telephone lines per 1000, among others. combining equation (3) and (1), we obtain:  itititsitsitsitit lkzcmmxaxy  (4) where  ,,,, and  are elasticities of output per capita growth with respect to the determinants of growth given in equation (4). taking natural logs (l) on both sides of equation (4) gives an estimable linear function: ititititsitsitsitit lllklzlcmlmxlaxcly    ' (5) in (5) all coefficients are constant elasticities, c is the intercept parameter, and it is the error term which is assumed to be well behaved with zero mean and constant variance (white noise). accordingly, our parameters of interest, called learning coefficients; ,, and  serve to measure the productivity effect of the various export and import components on gdp per capita growth. from equation (5), we test the hypothesis that it is not exports per se that matter for growth but that different components differently influence per capita output growth via productivity. it is frequently argued in the literature that manufactured exports are more productivity-enhancing and hence more growth-enhancing because they are normally more capital intensive and hence more human capital intensive. this implies that manufactured products are associated with greater latitude for spillovers and learning hence expected to have a more robust influence on economic growth. on the other hand, an increase in agricultural exports influences total output through multipliers on economic activity, value added and employmentdirect and indirect effects. for instance, increased agricultural exports increase household incomes, which in turn stimulates farmers‟ purchases of fertilizers, agricultural inputs and machinery, and a general increase in demand for consumption goods, hence providing forward and backward linkages (diao et al., 2007). also there is increased economic activity in form of food and fiber manufacturing, transportation and sales arising from increased agriculture exports. all these activities lead to increase in household incomes in form of wages, salaries, profits and rents. the greater the number of activities performed on the agricultural exports, the greater the multiplier effect, and hence the greater the economic growth. in other words, agricultural exports with value addition yield a greater multiplier effect hence impact more to economic growth than primary products. analogously since over 70 percent of agricultural output in africa is produced by small scale farmers, rather than large scale industrial agriculture, there is less incentive for value addition due to the high consilience bbaale and mutenyo: export composition implicit costs in form of collection, transportation and storage. the dominance of the small agriculture in one way or another impedes its effect on economic growth. 2.2 estimation strategy in line with the recent literature estimating growth models, we employed the generalized method of moments (gmm) estimator during the analysis. the methodology was developed by arellano and bond (1991) and introduced into the growth literature by caselli, esquivel and lefort (1996). in studying economic growth, gmm is superior over other estimators for simple cross-section regressions and other dynamic panel data models. the methodology eliminates biases originating from omitted variables, endogenous right-hand-side variables, omission of initial efficiency, and presence of measurement error. according to arellano and bond (1991), the consistency of the gmm estimator mainly depends on the assumptions that the error terms do not exhibit second order serial correlation and that the instruments are valid. the validity of the instruments is established using the serial correlation test and a sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. if we fail to reject the null hypotheses of the two tests, then we shall be sure that the assumptions of the instruments are valid. a full exposition of the gmm estimator is in the appendix 3. 2.3 data type and sources we used a panel of 354 sub-sahara african countries whose selection was based on data availability particularly on the key variables: disaggregated exports and imports. disaggregated data on exports and imports was obtained from the united nations statistics database under the standard international trade classification (sitc) revision 4. the components of agricultural and manufactured exports and capital goods imports are used as explanatory variables in the growth model. aggregate data on gdp per capita, labor force, credit to the private sector and government consumption as a percentage of gdp, gdp deflator, and gross capital formation as a percentage of gdp were obtained from the most current world development indicators (wdi, 2010) online facility of the world bank. data on exchange rate was obtained from the most current imf‟s international finance statistics online facility. data on the civil liberties index was obtained from freedom house online facility (www.freedomhouse.org). the observation period extends from 1988 to 2007 selected based on the data availability especially on the disaggregated exports and imports which do not have longer time series. 3. results 3.1 descriptive results table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the study for 35 sub-sahara african countries for the period 1988-2007. we expected to work with 700 observations but due to missing data points for some key variables we end up, on average, with about 300 observations and hence we have an unbalanced panel. 4 the list of countries is contained in appendix 2 8 consilience variable description mean std. dev. min max gdp per capita growth growth rate in percentages 1.121834 6.238654 46.89249 65.77162 gdp per capita us $, 2000 constant prices 845.9816 1255.212 102.286 8692.031 export total us $ 2.86e+09 8.55e+09 3000000 9.80e+10 agriculture exports us $ 6.29e+08 1.11e+09 338592 1.10e+10 manufacturing exports us $ 8.76e+08 3.96e+09 1736 4.50e+10 capital goods imports us $ 1.56e+09 5.22e+09 2.40e+07 6.00e+10 gross capital formation % of gdp us $ 20.9956 11.07931 23.76259 113.5779 labor force total of economically active persons 5096052 5910203 110120.9 3.82e+07 telephone lines per 100 people 1.971571 4.085503 .0579306 28.7544 government consumption % of gdp us $ 14.46118 5.77774 2.287548 39.71343 domestic credit % of gdp us $ 18.06286 20.84423 0 162.4562 inflation gdp deflator % of annual growth 14.71479 32.25547 33.53161 381.2654 civil liberties index scale 1-7; 1=maximum rights &7=fewest rights 4.37106 1.437805 1 7 real effective exchange rate trade-weighted index (1997=100) 104.481 33.49919 20.24 329.25 secondary school enrolment rate % of gross enrolment 30.20424 20.87551 4.803008 95.07371 table 1: descriptive statistics of the variables used source: authors„ own calculations from world development indicators 2010 and un comtrade data set 2009 from table 1, we note that there is no variable whose standard deviation is zero; therefore, all our variables qualify to be included in the regression. additionally, it is observed that the maximum and minimum values of our variables are well around the mean values and hence we conclude that there are no outliers. table 2 shows the average statistics of the paper‟s key variables by country. considering the average income per capita growth rate over the period under observation, equatorial guinea leads all other countries in our sample with a growth rate of 13%. it is followed by botswana (5%), mauritius and cape verde (4%), swaziland, uganda (3%), burkina faso, congo republic, tanzania, chad, lesotho, sudan and mozambique (2%). the country with the lowest average growth rate over the same period is cote d‟ivoire (-2.2%) followed by niger (-1.3%), central african republic (-1.2%), madagascar (-0.96%), zimbabwe and garbon (-0.7), and burundi (-0.6%). consilience bbaale and mutenyo: export composition country gdp per capita growth gdp per capital $2000 total exports (us $) agricultural exports (us $) manufacturing exports (us $) capital goods imports (us $) gross capital formation % of gdp labor force total inflation/ gdp deflator (%) benin .747253 324 3.83e+08 2.26e+08 20444444 2.39e+08 17.08 2296182 4.85 botswana 4.60340 2763.88 2.54e+09 5.69e+08 3.09e+09 1.93e+09 29.02 653914.3 10.01 burkina faso 1.68025 205.78 2.84e+08 2.01e+08 29818182 4e+08 19.36 4586035 3.48 burundi -.611779 128.76 90542993 56800000 9872493 1.16e+08 12.18 3005372 9.43 cameroon -.06340 715.08 2.71e+09 7.55e+08 2.3e+08 8.75e+08 19.01 5114770 4.76 cape verde 3.8247 1066.72 1.35e+08 5290360 27390909 2.03e+08 30.93 136979.5 3.33 central african rep. -1.2415 264.37 1.88e+08 51538462 42692308 78000000 10.39 1486123 5.64 chad 2.1526 196.72 8.7e+08 16.59 2820639 4.77 congo, rep. 1.53732 1141.62 2.38e+09 90000000 24666667 2.37e+08 27.17 1105562 6.95 cote d‟ivoire -2.237 652.11 4.95e+09 3.12e+09 1.05e+09 1.56e+09 12.66 5516306 5.36 equatorial guinea 12.654 2888.14 2.31e+09 51.47 165139.8 9.21 ethiopia 1.4839 134.92 1.05e+09 5.45e+08 60153846 1.67e+09 18.29 25244098 7.6 gabon -.73568 4530.8 3.26e+09 3.94e+08 99000000 8.56e+08 28.38 465794.7 6.32 gambia .45444 335.75 1.65e+08 9069231 2892145 92615385 21.1 482744.8 9.96 ghana 1.2028 244.07 2.21e+09 1e+09 3.11e+08 2.43e+09 18.6 7133370 31.37 guinea-bissau -.18168 164.44 42045149 45333333 742750 29666667 25.95 476475.9 31.97 kenya .2025 423.95 3.17e+09 1.22e+09 5.76e+08 2.17e+09 19.79 11881434 10.53 lesotho 1.5073 379.31 2.86e+08 41200000 4.42e+08 2.01e+08 43.46 719958.4 11.04 madagascar -.9633 269.03 9.02e+08 3.03e+08 2.3e+08 4.45e+08 15.48 6278304 15.61 malawi .17416 142.67 4.91e+08 4.28e+08 54583333 4.12e+08 19.17 4307710 22.24 mali 1.0949 221.65 6.35e+08 2.82e+08 33975000 5.58e+08 20.89 2746278 5.83 mauritania .17339 428.53 5.09e+08 4.13e+08 30244.84 7.64e+08 22.84 884086.2 8.83 mauritius 3.5171 3105.94 2.26e+09 4.61e+08 1.1e+09 1.11e+09 25.32 473590.5 7.93 mozambique 2.3112 223.19 8.57e+08 2.41e+08 5.03e+08 8.02e+08 18.16 7798508 28.51 niger -1.3263 186.84 3.74e+08 2.41e+08 50384615 1.92e+08 13.19 2909929 4.33 rwanda 1.6755 247.44 1.85e+08 69191667 5798708 1.73e+08 16.72 3268688 9.03 senegal .21820 478.78 1.51e+09 3.56e+08 3.53e+08 9.98e+08 17.84 3537856 4.69 south africa .38189 3229.95 4e+10 6.91e+09 2.68e+10 3.5e+10 19.43 12568533 11.47 sudan 2.3722 334.37 2.47e+09 4.01e+08 58050000 2.47e+09 16.86 9268853 39.46 swaziland 2.6813 1202.43 1.04e+09 3.88e+08 9.26e+08 5.68e+08 20.49 310327.6 10.05 tanzania 1.7726 294.57 1.47e+09 6.55e+08 1.63e+08 1.63e+09 19.77 14303236 15.96 togo -.5971 264.37 5.18e+08 1.95e+08 85121875 1.95e+08 18.08 1824532 4.66 uganda 2.783 231.13 7.28e+08 4.79e+08 79928571 7.84e+08 15.31 9117260 39.17 zambia -.4816 371.68 1.61e+09 2.55e+08 1.24e+09 1.07e+09 17.56 3389918 41.47 zimbabwe -.73279 591.29 2.03e+09 1.13e+09 7.66e+08 1.57e+09 16.9 4328739 79.43 table 2: average statistics of the major variables used in the study by country. source: authors„ own calculations from world development indicators 2010 and un comtrade data set 2009 10 consilience in terms of gdp per capita in us $ (2000 constant prices), gabon leads all other countries with an average value of 4530.8$. this is followed by south africa (3229.95$), mauritius (3105.94$), equatorial guinea (2888.14$), botswana (2764$), swaziland (1202.43$), congo republic (1141.62$), and cape verde (1066$). the rest of the countries5 have gdp per capita well below 1000$. we find that the country with the highest gdp per capita (gabon), on average, exports more agricultural than manufactured exports. however, its capital imports bill, on average, is greater than agricultural and manufactured exports treated individually, but lower than total exports. on the other hand, countries like south africa, mauritius, botswana, and swaziland, on average, export more manufacturing than agricultural exports. the capital imports bill for south africa and mauritius is, on average, greater than agricultural and manufacturing exports treated individually. for swaziland and botswana, the capital imports bill is, on average, greater than agricultural exports but less than manufacturing exports. it is noteworthy that south africa leads all other countries in our sample for total exports, agricultural and manufacturing exports as well as capital goods imports. for total exports and agricultural exports, south africa is followed by cote d‟ivoire, gabon and kenya; for manufacturing exports it is followed by botswana, mauritius, and cote d‟ivoire; for capital goods imports it is followed by sudan, ghana, kenya, botswana, and ethiopia. overall, apart from gabon, all countries whose gdp per capita is above $1000, export more manufactured than agricultural products. on the other hand, apart from lesotho, mozambique, and zambia, all countries whose gdp per capita is below 1000$ export more agricultural than manufactured products. however, these findings are mixed; it is not clear that a relatively rich or poor country exports more of a specific product. therefore, this descriptive information was insufficient for us to gain clear insights on which export component positively and significantly influences gdp per capita growth. consequently, we extend the qualitative findings into quantitative analysis to determine which export component significantly influences gdp per capita growth. we present a discussion of our quantitative results in subsection 3.2 below. 3.2 quantitative results table 3 reports the results obtained from the gmm regression. when fitting a model using the gmm estimator, it is imperative to ascertain whether the instruments used satisfy the orthogonality condition, i.e., whether they are uncorrelated with the errors. to address this issue, we employed the sargan test of over-identification of restrictions. the test statistic has a χ2 distribution under the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. we find an insignificant statistic indicating that the sargan test cannot reject the null hypothesis that all our instruments are valid. similarly, the wald test for joint significance of the variables does not reject our econometric specification. furthermore, the serial correlation test rejects the null of no first order serial correlation but does not reject the null that there is no second order serial correlation. however, according to baltagi (2005), this 5 benin, burkina faso, burundi, cameroon, central african republic, cote d‟ivoire, ethiopia, gambia, ghana, guinea-bissau, kenya, madagascar, mali, mauritania, niger, rwanda, senegal, sudan, tanzania, togo, uganda, zimbabwe, lesotho, mozambique, and zambia consilience bbaale and mutenyo: export composition is what is expected in a first-differenced equation with the original untransformed disturbances assumed not to be serially correlated. in table 3 (model 1), we investigate a case in which total exports is the main explanatory variable, in order to gain an insight on whether exports in general influence gdp per capita growth. the results show that total exports positively and significantly impacts per capita income growth. the results indicate that a unit percentage increase in total exports is associated with a growth in per capita income of about .07 percent. variables model (1) model (2) model (3) model (4) model (5) lagged gdp per capita 0.674*** 0.812*** 0.823*** 0.780*** 0.760*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) exports total 0.0697*** (0.000) gross capital formation % of gdp 0.0332** 0.0235** 0.0232** 0.0282* (0.0139) (0.0264) (0.0263) (0.0710) labor force -0.121** 0.00410 0.00625 0.00451 0.0208 (0.0475) (0.890) (0.830) (0.876) (0.776) telephone lines per 1000 0.0281** 0.0226*** 0.0212** 0.0149* 0.0145 (0.0135) (0.00969) (0.0151) (0.0709) (0.302) government consumption -0.0517 -0.109** -0.0968** -0.144*** -0.140** (0.253) (0.0284) (0.0488) (0.00172) (0.0362) domestic credit to the private sector -0.00187 -0.00626 -0.00796 -0.00175 -0.0146 (0.753) (0.253) (0.151) (0.751) (0.119) inflation -0.00822*** -0.00761*** -0.00708*** -0.00738*** -0.0112*** (0.00135) (0.000396) (0.00105) (0.000557) (0.000163) civil liberties index -0.0253** -0.0329*** -0.0272** -0.0356*** -0.0181 (0.0409) (0.00925) (0.0345) (0.00423) (0.240) secondary school enrolment 0.0660*** 0.121*** (0.00270) (0.000) agriculture exports 0.0180*** 0.0202*** 0.0247*** (0.00201) (0.000275) (0.00495) manufacturing exports 0.00154 0.00130 -0.00542 (0.614) (0.666) (0.263) capital goods imports 0.0319*** (2.93e-07) first order serial correlation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 second order serial correlation 0.1534 0.2972 0.2830 0.5396 0.0035 wald test of joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 sargan test 0.1788 0.2144 0.2704 0.3428 0.4799 observations 247 307 307 307 175 number of pid 32 30 30 30 29 p values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 table 3: regression results from gmm estimation. 12 consilience the question that remains to be answered is among agricultural and manufactures: which export component is more important to growth than the others? models 2-5 seek to provide an answer to this question. findings show that, growth in agricultural exports is positively and significantly associated with per capita income growth (model 2). specifically, on average, a unit percentage increase in agricultural exports is associated with a growth in per capita income of about .02 percent. this finding is robust across various models even when we include different control variables. however, the link between growth in manufactured exports and per capita income growth is at best weak. the estimated coefficients are not statistically different from zero at any conventional level of significance. therefore, a growth-enhancing effect can be attributed to agricultural exports and not manufactured for the case of countries in our sample. this empirical finding is in support of the paper‟s main hypothesis that it is not exports per se that matter, but that different export components differently influence per capita income growth. this finding is however contrary to the widely held theoretical view that manufactured exports are more productivity-enhancing and therefore more growth-enhancing. this is based on the premise that there is greater knowledge and technological spillover associated with manufactured compared to agricultural exports. additionally, it is frequently argued that manufactured exports are more capital intensive and hence more human capital intensive such that knowledge and its dynamic benefits to the economy is expected to be more imperative in this sector. probably this is explained by the great variation in the african countries‟ exports of both agriculture and manufactures. for instance, from table1, the standard deviation between manufactured exports is thrice that of agriculture exports, implying that most african countries‟ levels of agricultural output are closer to the mean than their manufactured exports. in other words most of the african countries export agricultural produces than manufactures. such a variation affects the level of significance of a variable. it is apparent that sub-sahara african countries still enjoy a comparative advantage in agricultural than manufacturing exports. whereas it is more benefiting for countries in our sample to promote agricultural exports, this is not to suggest that these countries should not pay attention to industrialization at all. these countries should adopt policies that increase agricultural exports in the medium term as they design strategies for increasing manufacturing exports in the long term. it might be the case that the stage of development they have so far attained is not yet conducive for gaining a comparative advantage in manufacturing exports. the evidence found in studies conducted in other parts of the world attribute a growth-enhancing effect to sophisticated rather than non-sophisticated exports (wörz, 2005; herzer et al., 2004; and ghatak et al., 1997). wörz (2005) found a superior performance of high tech exports for a large group of developing and developed countries (oecd, asia, and latin america). ghatak et al. (1997) found that nontraditional manufactures were more important than traditional manufactures for india. herzer et al. (2004) found evidence of growth-enhancing effects of manufactured exports rather than primary exports for chile. nevertheless, our findings are in line with previous literature for the held view that the composition of exports does matter for growth of a particular economy. indeed from our ssa sample, we attribute the growthconsilience bbaale and mutenyo: export composition enhancing effect to agriculture rather than manufacturing exports. from another perspective, this result may be pointing to the failure of most sub-sahara african countries to change their export composition from largely low value-added agricultural exports to high value-added manufactured exports. this may account for their meager gains from international trade despite the large volumes traded. our findings also articulate the productivity-enhancing and, by extension, growth-enhancing effect of capital goods imports. a unit percentage increase in capital goods imports is associated with a growth of per capita income of about .03 percent and this effect is significant at the 1 percent level. this result strongly supports the widely held theoretical view that capital goods imports, especially from technologically advanced countries, embody the most current knowledge and technology. they, therefore, enhance economic growth via their knowledge and technology-enhancing effect. from a policy perspective, it can be argued that any policy option that stifles capital goods imports, for the case of sub-sahara african countries, stifles economic growth too. this is due to the fact that most countries in this region have an extreme disadvantage in the production of capital goods. governments should prioritize the importation of capital goods in order to enhance growth domestically. the effect of the savings rate in the solow neoclassical growth model is measured empirically by the ratio of real investment to real gdp. the growth in the gross capital formation as a percentage of gdp is positively associated with gdp per capita growth for the case of countries in our sample. a unit percentage increase in capital formation leads to an increase in gdp per capita growth between .02 and .03 percent. this effect is significant, at most, at the 5 percent level in all our models. therefore, there is strong statistical evidence that the growth in the gross capital formation as a percentage of gdp drives gdp per capita growth for the case of countries in our sample. accordingly, policies that increase savings in a country, such as building a strong financial sector, should be of great concern to the policy maker. it is noteworthy that due to collinearity we excluded capital goods imports from all models where gross capital formation is found. also, our findings articulate the role played by the country‟s size of government. we work under the assumption that the impact of government consumption expenditure on growth is ambiguous; either it enhances growth if the expenditure is on education, health and infrastructure or it distort private activities through crowding out effects hence it does not involve any productivity enhancing effects. the results show that the growth in per capita incomes increases with a fall in government consumption expenditure. specifically, a unit percentage increase in government consumption is associated with a reduction in the gdp per capita growth of 0.1. the negative and significant relationship between government expenditure and growth in our sample is evidence that a greater proportion the share of government consumption expenditure to gdp in ssa that on average stands at 14.5 (see table 1) is spent on unproductive ventures. therefore, sub-sahara african countries should strive to reduce nonproductive government expenditure, for example by reducing the size of their governments. the inflation variable is measured by the gdp deflator as a percentage annual growth. the coefficient on inflation has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. the negative sign implies that an excessive increase in prices in an economy is a sign of macroeconomic instability and 14 consilience therefore retards economic growth. a unit percentage increase in inflation leads to a decrease in gdp per capita growth by .01 percent. from the summary statistics (table 1), we found that the average percentage inflation rate in the sample is 14.7, with a maximum of 381 and a standard deviation of 32. this is evidence that countries in africa are still experiencing some macroeconomic instability; therefore from a policy perspective, there is need for prudent macroeconomic policies that would involve a mixture of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies that are targeted at lowering and stabilizing the rate of inflation. further, our findings are assertive on the role played by the political system and governance in enhancing gdp per capita growth. we employed in our estimation the civil liberties index6 from freedom house as a means of characterizing a country‟s political system and governance. this variable has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at 1 percent. this implies that increase in civil rights enhances economic growth. literature presents the political system and governance as an important determinant of economic growth (see, for example, barro, 1996 and 2004). therefore, sub-sahara african countries should strive to achieve good governance consisting of maximum possible civil liberties as a precondition for sustained economic growth. in line with previous literature (loayza, 1996; and calderon et al., 2001) our findings are assertive on the economic growth-enhancing role of public services and infrastructure. we employ in our analysis the number of telephone lines per 1000 people as our measure of infrastructure and public services development. the choice of this measure, over others such as kilometers of paved roads and energy generation capacity, was determined by data availability issues. the growth in the telephone lines per 1000 people is positive and significant in our regressions. this implies a growth-enhancing effect via productivity-enhancing effect of infrastructural development. if telephone lines per 1000 people grow by 1 per cent, it leads to an increase in gdp per capita growth of between .02 and .03 percent. further, we also find human capital development playing an important role in the growth of gdp per capita. we used secondary school enrolment rate as a measure of human capital development and it was found to be positive and significant at 1 percent. if secondary school enrollment rate increases by 1 percent, it leads to an increase in gdp per capita growth between .07 and .12 percent. therefore, sub-sahara african countries should invest in human capital development through education for favorable economic growth outcomes. 4. conclusions this paper was guided by the hypothesis that it is not exports per se that matter, but different exports components influence growth in varying ways. we considered a sample of 35 sub-sahara african countries determined by data availability on the key variables of the study and not by arbitrary selection. the gmm estimator was employed during the analysis. we find that growth in 6 civil liberties index was sourced from freedom house. it presents freedom of expression, religion, education, travel and other personal rights. countries are ranked on a scale of 1-7. a country with fewest rights is given a rank of seven and a country with maximum rights is given a rank of one. consilience bbaale and mutenyo: export composition agricultural exports is positively and significantly associated with per capita income growth for countries in our sample. however, the contribution of manufactured exports to per capita income growth is insignificant. therefore, a growth-enhancing effect can be attributed to agricultural exports and not manufactured export for the case of countries in our sample. this empirical finding is in support of the paper‟s main hypothesis that some export components are more important for growth than others. however, it is against the widely held theoretical view that manufactured exports are more productivityand growth-enhancing due to the greater knowledge and technological spillover associated with manufactured compared to agricultural exports. it seems the case that sub-sahara african countries in our sample still enjoy a comparative advantage in agricultural rather than manufacturing exports. whereas it is more benefiting for countries in our sample to promote agricultural exports, this is not to suggest that they should not pay attention to industrialization at all. these countries should adopt policies that increase agricultural exports in the medium term as they design strategies for increasing manufacturing exports in the long term. it might be the case that the stage of development they have so far attained is not yet conducive for gaining a comparative advantage in manufacturing exports. generally, our findings are in line with previous literature for the held view that exports per se do not matter for growth. however, our results may be pointing to the failure of most sub-sahara african countries to change their export composition from largely low value-added agricultural exports to high value-added manufactured exports. this may account for their meager gains from international trade despite the large volumes traded. our findings also articulate the productivity-enhancing and, by extension, growth-enhancing effect of capital goods imports. this result strongly supports the widely held theoretical view that capital goods imports, especially from technologically advanced countries, embody the most current knowledge and technology. from a policy perspective, it can be argued that any policy option that stifles capital goods imports, for the case of sub-sahara african countries, stifles economic growth too. this is due to the fact that most countries in this region have an extreme disadvantage in the production of capital goods. governments should prioritize the importation of capital goods in order to enhance growth domestically. other factors that significantly influence economic growth are gross capital formation percentage of gdp, infrastructure, government consumption, the inflation rate, political systems and governance, and human capital development. one major weakness with our data is that the 35 countries that were selected are heterogeneous in nature. their differences rage from social-political, economic, demographic and geographical. for instance some of the countries have been relatively politically stable since independence, such as kenya, malawi, mauritius, tanzania and zambia. others are relatively more industrialized, such as mauritius and south africa. even among those considered agricultural countries, some depend chiefly on one export crop, such as burundi ethiopia and uganda. others are resource rich, particularly the mineral and oil producing countries. others are landlocked, such as burundi, malawi, rwanda, uganda and zambia. some are either conflict or post conflict countries. such diversity might lead to misleading generalized deductions. therefore future research could put this diversity into consideration. also, for further research, a deeper disaggregation of export 16 consilience components is still needed that may consider individual commodities or their broad groups as regressors in a growth model. consilience bbaale and mutenyo: export composition bibliography agosin, m. 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(2005), “skill intensity in foreign trade and economic growth”, empirica, vol. 32(1), pp. 117-144. yang, d. t., and x. zhu. 2004. modernization of agriculture and long-run growth. preliminary and incomplete notes. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 9, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 1 – 15 legal and sustainable development impacts of major oil spills damilola s. olawuyi faculty of law university of oxford email: damilola.olawuyi@law.ox.ac.uk abstract oil spills trigger the application of several interrelated national, regional, and international laws and regulations that provide windows of redress for victims. this paper provides a summary of the legal and sustainable development principles at play where oil spills occur. it provides a simplified synopsis of the relevant principles of international environmental law through which victims of oil spillage can seek compensation. it also highlights the absence of a comprehensive convention on safety standards for oil platforms in international laws applicable to oil spillage. author’s note damilola is a clarendon scholar and doctoral candidate at the faculty of law, university of oxford. he holds a master’s degree in energy and environmental law (ll.m) from harvard law school and another ll.m in natural resources, energy and environmental law from the university of calgary, canada. keywords: sustainable development, oil spillage, human rights. 1. introduction on december 21, 2011, shell nigeria announced what it describes as its worst oil spillage in a decade in the niger delta area.1 over 40,000 barrels of crude oil spilled in one day. for over five decades, a series of similar oil spills have caused extensive damage to the ecology of the niger delta. according to a 2011 report of the united nations (un), many of the environmental and social consequences of oil spillage in the niger delta are now irreversible.2 the niger delta’s dire situation is not an isolated one; the tragic consequences of oil spillages are apparent in many nations of the world. one of the largest oil spills in history occurred in 2010, when up to 4.9 million barrels of bp oil 1 j vidal, ‘nigeria on alert as shell announces worst oil spill in a decade’ available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/dec/22/nigerian-shell-oil-spill> (accessed 23 may 2012). 2 unep, ‘environmental assessment of ogoni land’ available at < http://www.unep.org/nigeria/> (accessed 02 june 2012). http://www.unep.org/nigeria/ 2 consilience flooded the gulf of mexico over a three-month span.3 these events have farreaching legal consequences, which i will discuss. oil spills raise similar legal issues regardless of where they occur, whether in the waters of nigeria’s niger delta or off the mississippi coast. as such, i have adopted a crosscutting international perspective in this discussion. i also highlight the absence of a comprehensive convention on safety standards for oil platforms in international laws applicable to oil spillage. 2. legal and sustainability issues raised by oil spillage sustainable development in international law refers to “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”4 in the context of state actions and policy measures, it refers to “state efforts to achieve progress (development) qualified by the condition that such efforts should be possible to maintain over the long term (sustainable).”5 sustainable development envisions a symbiotic balance between two pursuits that are often portrayed as mutually exclusive: maintenance of a sound environment, and economic and social development.6 it advocates for the adoption of developmental policies that protect the environment from degradation. it also emphasizes a comprehensive and integrated approach to economic and social development processes through judicious and thoughtful use of the environment such that it will be maintained for coming generations.7 in essence, sustainability in its broadest sense refers to the use of the environment and its resources at a rate less 3 u.s president obama declared it as the ‘worst environmental disaster america has ever faced’. see nat’l comm’n on the bp deepwater horizon oil spill & offshore drilling, report to the president, deepwater: the gulf oil disaster and the future of offshore drilling vi (2011) available at <http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/deepwate r_reporttothepresident_final.pdf.> (accessed 02 june 2012). 4 the united nations world commission on environment and development report (the brundtland report) our common future (oup 1987). 5 h christian bugge & c voigt, (eds), sustainable development in international and national law (europa law publishing 2008) 88. for detailed and extensive discussions on sustainable development, its evolution, principles and application to national and international laws, see generally, marie-claire cordonier segger and ashfaq khalfan, sustainable development law (oxford university press 2004)1; nico schrijver, the evolution of sustainable development law: inception, meaning and status (martinus nijhoff publishers 2008) 1. 6 see r mushkat, ‘environmental sustainability: a perspective from the asia-pacific region’ (1993) 27 ubc l rev 153 at 155.153. 7 see t kuokkanen, international law and the environment (kluwer law international 2002) xxi at 333 see also gabcikovo-nagymaros project (hungary v. slovakia) where the international court of justice noted that `the need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development’. consilience olawuyi: impacts of major oil spills than or equal to the natural rate of regeneration or reproduction.8 it advocates that our use of the environment today must not diminish its usefulness for future generations.9 the agreed-upon considerations for assessing sustainability are economic, social, and environmental.10 to achieve sustainable oil exploration, these three considerations must be balanced in a way that minimizes trade-offs. i) the economic criteria: for exploration to be considered sustainable, it must lead to financial returns and profits to local entities as well as a positive balance of payments and technology transfer.11 it must lead to improvements in the economic activities in the resource-based country and the economic development of the host country. it should also result in the emergence of clean and efficient technologies in the host country. ii) the social criteria: this focuses on the need for oil exploration to result in greater equity and improved quality of life in the resource-based country. it must alleviate the suffering of the country by providing social infrastructures that were previously non-existent or inefficient. examples include improved access to clean, affordable and sustainable water supply; improved transportation through projects that emphasize efficiency and reduced reliance on fossil fuels; improved health facilities and services through the transfer of modern, energy-efficient technologies; and improved power supply through the transfer of alternative energy sources such as solar panels, wind turbines, and hydroelectric power plants. as such, if oil exploration does not bring about improvements in the quality of life for the citizens of the resource-based country, it cannot be adjudged as leading to sustainable development.12 iii) the environmental criteria: these are arguably the most important criteria of all. the concept of environmental sustainability advocates the use of the environment and its elements in a way that preserves its capacity to serve future generations. the needs of the present population should be met without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.13 this calls for prevention and precaution in the use of the environment. for example, the rio declaration on environment and development declares that “man…bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future 8 d pearce & kerry r turner, economics of natural resources and the environment (baltimore, maryland: the john hopkins university press, 1990) 24. 9 the report of the national task force on environmental economy (ottawa: the national task force on environmental economy, 1987) 1 at 3. 10 see marie-claire cordonier segger and ashfaq khalfan, sustainable development law (oxford university press 2004) 1. 11 ibid. 12 see h christian bugge & c voigt, (eds), sustainable development in international and national law (europa law publishing 2008) 88. 13 the world commission on environment and development, our common future (oxford university press, 1987). 4 consilience generations.”14 article 192 of the law of the sea convention (losc) places an obligation on states to “protect and preserve the marine environment.” this includes a duty to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment from any source.15 in essence, international law advocates that oil production should not result in pollution or environmental degradation in the resource-based country. the use of environmentally sustainable technologies (ests) during oil exploration could help companies avoid oil spillage and gas flaring. oil exploration should instead catalyze the resource-based country’s progress in environmental sustainability through promoting the conservation of local resources, preservation of biodiversity in oil producing areas, and reduced pressure on local environments.16 unfortunately, oil production in many resource-based countries has produced opposite results. 2.1 environmental impacts of oil spills major oil spills have resulted in environmental pollution in many resourcebased countries. this spillage is a violation of a multitude of national and international laws and regulations on environmental pollution and damage.17 the situation in nigeria’s niger delta helps illustrate how oil spillage negatively impacts the environment. as a result of the high frequency of oil spills in the niger delta, many local communities have been destroyed, drinking water has been contaminated, and the ecosystem and soil composition have been altered irreversibly. studies show that in the niger delta, a year’s supply of food is often destroyed by only a minor leak of 14 united nations, rio declaration on environment and development , see online: un, http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?documentid=78&arti cleid=1163 15 article 194. any source covers oil spillage or pollution incidences outside the rig for example oil spillage in marine waters during transportation. as such there are several international treaties for such maritime oil spillage. these include: the convention on limitation of liability for maritime claims(llmc) 1976; the international convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage (clc) 1992; the international convention on the establishment of an international fund for compensation for oil pollution damage (the fund convention) 1992; the international convention on civil liability for bunker oil pollution damage (the bunkers convention) 2001; the international convention on liability and compensation for damage in connection with the carriage of hazardous and noxious substances by sea (the hns convention)1996. 16 see d pearce & kerry r turner, economics of natural resources and the environment (baltimore, maryland: the john hopkins university press, 1990) 24; nico schrijver, the evolution of sustainable development law: inception, meaning and status (martinus nijhoff publishers 2008) 1. 17 environmental damage is a change that has a measurable adverse impact on the quality of a particular environment or any of its components, including its use and non-use values, and its ability to support and sustain an acceptable quality of life and a viable ecological balance. http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163 http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163 consilience olawuyi: impacts of major oil spills oil, debilitating the farmers and their families who depend on the land for their livelihood. drinking water has also been contaminated by oil causing serious health problems to the inhabitants of the niger delta. over 3,000 inhabitants of the niger delta have died from drinking contaminated water. offshore spills, which are usually much greater in scale, taint coastal environments in the niger delta, causing a decline in local fishing production. the rainforest, which previously occupied 7,400 km2, has disappeared. similarly, oil spillage in the niger delta has destroyed its mangrove forests. estimates suggest that 5-10% of nigerian mangrove ecosystems have been wiped out by oil, which acidifies the soils, thus halting cellular respiration and starving plant roots of oxygen. the overall adverse effects of oil exploration in the niger delta, nigeria, have been summarized as follows: we witnessed the slow poisoning of the waters of this country and the destruction of vegetation and agricultural land by oil spills which occur during petroleum operations. but since the inception of the oil industry in nigeria more than twenty five years ago, there has been no concerned and effective effort on the part of the government, let alone the oil operators, to control environmental problems associated with the industry…we don't have pipe borne water here, our only source of drinking water is the surrounding stream and creeks, but we can no longer drink the water because it has been polluted. everywhere you go, you see dead fishes and layers of crude oil.18 oil spillage brings about devastating and sometimes irreversible damage to wetland ecology, wildlife, and biodiversity, most of which have been accorded legal protections in national and international law.19 oil spills put the state in violation of various treaty obligations under international law. the duty of a state to perform its obligation under a treaty is clearly provided for in article 26 of the vienna convention on law of treaties.20 international environmental law recognizes environmental sustainability as one of the pillars of sustainable development and one of the millennium development goals (mdgs).21 major oil spills violate these 18 quoted in greenpeace international, ‘shell shocked: the environmental and social costs of living with shell in nigeria (1994) , available at < http://archive.greenpeace.org/comms/ken/hell.html>; see also h dappa-biriye, r briggs, b idoniboye-obu and m fubara, ‘the endangered environment of the niger delta: constraints and strategies’ (an ngo memorandum for the world conference of indigenous peoples on environment and development and the united nations conference on environment and development, rio de janeiro) 52. 19 there are currently over hundred international treaties seek to protect and preserve each of these elements of the environment. see for example 1992 convention on biological diversity); adopted 22 may 1992; in force on 29 december 1993. 20. the pacta sunt servanda principle: ‘every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith’. 21 article 7, annex iii of the convention for the protection of the marine environment of the north-east atlantic (ospar convention) imposes a specific http://archive.greenpeace.org/comms/ken/hell.html 6 consilience international environmental principles of sustainable development, particularly the prevention principle and the precautionary principle.22 international law aside, oil spills also violate a number of domestic laws in resource-based countries. many oil-producing countries have environmental laws, such as clean water acts, oil pollution acts, fishery acts, and endangered species acts that seek to prevent environmental pollution and even to provide penal consequences for violation.23 oil spillage results in a violation of some of these local enactments and provides justiciable causes of action by state enforcement authorities for civil and criminal lawsuits. for example, over 130 lawsuits relating to the bp spill have been filed in u.s. courts by different agencies.24 by respecting and promoting sustainable oil exploration, many international oil companies (iocs) can avoid such long and often expensive litigation. the other sustainable development and human rights impacts of oil spills are described in more detail below. 2.2 loss of business profits and subsistence rights oil spillage leads to loss of income and means of subsistence for individuals and companies in the commercial fishing, shrimp, and oyster industries. this affects fishermen and -women, charter boat operators, owners of hotels, tourist management agencies, rental property owners, and other businesses in coastal resort areas. thus, oil spillage is a violation of some of the international and national law principles, which seek to protect the rights of individuals to their means of subsistence. for example, over 30,000 individual claims have been filed by businesses obligation on the contracting parties to ‘take appropriate measures, both individually and within the relevant international organizations, to prevent and eliminate pollution resulting from the abandonment of offshore installations in the maritime area caused by accidents`. also the 1976 convention for the protection of the mediterranean sea against pollution (the barcelona convention) applies the precautionary and polluter pays principles (article 4(3)) and requires the use of best available techniques and best environmental practices (article 4(4)) to minimize pollution resulting from seabed exploration and to cooperate in dealing with any pollution incidents. 22 this principle requires that where there are threats of damage to the environment, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. 23 see for example canada`s 1985 fisheries act r.s.c. 1985 c. f-14, ss. 34-42; 1999 cepa (the canadian environmental protection act) s.c. 1999 c. 33, ss. 39-103; the united states`1980 cercla (comprehensive environmental response, compensation, and liability act of 1980) 42 u.s.c. ss. 9601-9675, us 1990 opa (oil pollution act of 1990) 33 u.s.c. ss. 2701 – 2761; german environmental liability act 1990; venezuela`s 1976 environmental “frame” act; venezuela’s 1992 criminal environmental act section 16 and 22. denmark`s 1994 compensation for environmental damage act 225/94; nigeria`s national environmental standards and regulations enforcement act (nesrea). 24 see a. sachdev, ‘tide of oil spill lawsuits begins to rise’ (chicago tribune, 18 may 2010). consilience olawuyi: impacts of major oil spills and workers in the gulf region against bp, seeking repayment for profits and income that were lost because of the oil spill. a number of international treaties recognize subsistence rights as inherent human rights, which must be protected by states.25 paragraph 10 (c) of the un norms and responsibilities of transnational corporations and other businesses with regard to human rights compels multinational corporations (mncs) to protect the subsistence rights of individuals in their operations.26 subsistence rights were recognized in the yanomami case in which the inter-american commission called on states to restore, protect, and preserve the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral territories because they depend upon them for farming, hunting, subsistence, and continuity of life.27 similarly, in the toledo maya case, the commission noted that “development activities must be accompanied by appropriate and effective measures to ensure that they do not proceed at the expense of the fundamental rights of persons who may be particularly and negatively affected, including indigenous communities and the environment upon which they depend for their physical, cultural and spiritual wellbeing.”28 to protect subsistence, international environmental law places a duty on the polluter corporation to pay victims of oil pollution adequate compensation for economic and pecuniary losses incurred. for example, in line with this obligation, after the deepwater horizon explosion, bp announced a $20 billion escrow fund that would be used to compensate businesses and workers in louisiana, mississippi, alabama, florida, and texas, whose financial livelihood suffered as a result of the oil spill.29 2.3 forced displacements and loss of property 25 see article 23 of the universal declaration of human rights (udhr) and article 6 of the international covenant of economic and social rights (icesr). 26 it provides that: indigenous peoples and communities shall not be deprived of their own means of subsistence, nor shall they be removed from lands which they occupy in a manner inconsistent with convention no. 169. further, they shall avoid endangering the health, environment, culture and institutions of indigenous peoples and communities in the context of projects, including road building in or near indigenous peoples and communities. transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall use particular care in situations in which indigenous lands, resources, or rights thereto have not been adequately demarcated or defined. e/cn.4/sub.2/2003/38/rev.2 27 see, e.g., yanomami case, rep. no. 12/85, case 7615 (brazil), (1985); mary and carrie dann case, report no. 99/99, case 11.140 (united states) (1999); precautionary measures, de vereninig van saramakaanse (suriname) (august 8, 2002). 28 toledo maya case; see also inter-am. c.h.r., report on the situation of human rights in brazil, oea/ser.l/v/ii.97 doc. 29 rev.1, ch. vi (sept. 29, 1997). 29 ‘bp establishes $20 billion claims fund for deepwater horizon spill and outlines dividend decisions’ available at <http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryid=2012968&contentid=706296> (accessed 12 may 2012). 8 consilience closely intertwined with the loss of subsistence is the loss of property or damage to property occasioned by major oil spills. oil spillages most times result in damage to residential and commercial properties located along the coastal zones and small islands offshore where major oil spills occur. property damage also arises from the use of toxic chemicals and oil dispersants to aid the clean-up of major oil spills. this also results in forced displacements and relocation for individuals in affected areas. for example, over 200,000 niger deltans have been forcefully displaced from their homes due to oil spillage. such loss of property violates some of the constitutional rights to free and exclusive ownership and enjoyment of property in many national constitutions.30 it is also a violation of the right to exclusively own and possess property as guaranteed under international law. the right to property is one recognized in john locke’s famous human rights tripod of “life, liberty and possessions.”31 the universal declaration of rights (udr) recognizes the right of individuals to the exclusive possession and use of property.32 this right is also recognized by the american convention on human rights,33 the african charter on human and peoples rights,34 and the european convention on human rights.35 the african court on human rights upheld this 30 for example the fifth amendment to the united states constitution provides that ‘nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation’. 31 j locke, two treatises of government, available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm. (accessed 21 january 2011). 32 see article 17 `everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others` 17 (2) no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. see udhr, adopted 10 dec.1948, g.a res.217a9 (iii), 3 un gaor, un doc. aé810 at 71 (1948) available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ 33 article 21 provides that `everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. the law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society. 21(2) `no one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law. 21(3) usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by law. see american convention on human rights (pact of san jose) signed 22 nov. 1969, entered into force 18 july, 1978, 1144 unts 123, oasts 36, oasts 36. available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-32.html 34 the right to property shall be guaranteed. it may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws`. charter on human and peoples right, adopted 27 june 1981, entered into force 21 oct. 1986, o.a.u doc. cab/leg/67/3 rev. 5. available at http://www.africaunion.org/official_documents/treaties_%20conventions_%20pro tocols/banjul%20charter.pdf. 35 it provides: “every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. no one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. the preceding provisions shall not, however, in any consilience olawuyi: impacts of major oil spills right in the case of serac v. nigeria in which the court found the government of nigeria in violation of right to property of the ogoni people in nigeria’s niger delta due to its condoning and facilitating the operations of oil corporations in ogoniland. the commission also held that the implied right to housing, including protection from forced eviction, which is derived from the express rights to property, health and, family, was violated by the destruction of housing and forceful eviction of residents from their homes.36 2.4 health risks major oil spills affect human health and well-being, an important tenet of environmental sustainability. residents of oil-producing areas at times have to cope with drinking water that contains residual oil even many years after clean-up. there are also the lasting health effects of chemical dispersants used during clean-up.37 for example, many residents of the niger delta have complained of asthma, breathing difficulties and pain, headaches, nausea, and throat irritation as well as chronic bronchitis.38 such health concerns can bring about substantive causes of action in toxic tort for exposure to dangerous substances and chemicals.39 it has also been held to be a violation of the fundamental right to health in the nigerian case of jonah gbemre v. shell, in which the nigerian federal court held that gas flaring and oil spillage by shell in the course of their oil exploration and production activities in the applicant’s community were violations of the fundamental right to a healthy environment and dignity of human persons. this right was guaranteed by the constitution of the federal republic of nigeria and the african charter on human and peoples rights, which provides that every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health.40 the right to health can be found in a number of international treaties. the udr provides that everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family. the united nations international covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights (icescr) recognizes the “right way impair the right of a state to enforce such laws at it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 36 (2001) ahrlr 60 (achpr 2001). communication 155/96. 37 see ‘oil clean-up chemicals worry environment watchdogs’ ( reuter 04 may 2012) available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/04/oil-rig-leak-chemicalsidusn0411028320100504> ( accessed 23 may 2012). 38 see environmental rights action, ‘gas flaring in nigeria: a human rights, environmental and economic monstrosity’ amsterdam, june 2005. this booklet can be found at both www.climatelaw.org and at www.eraction.org. 39 see for example abiola v ijeoma (1970) 2 anlr . 40 see sections 33(1) and 34(1) of the 1999 constitution of nigeria. see also jonah gbemre v. shell petroleum development company nigeria ltd and others. no. fhc/b/cs/53/05, (nov. 14, 2005) federal high court of nigeria, available at http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/case-documents/nigeria/ni-shell-nov05judgment.pdf 10 consilience of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”41 one of the steps listed in in the icescr for states to achieve this is the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene. this would include environmental sustainability and the prevention of industrial and environmental health hazards. article 11 of the american declaration of the rights and duties of man also provides that every person has the right to the preservation of his health, while the first protocol of the american convention on human rights provides that “everyone shall have the right to health, understood to mean the enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental and social well-being.” 42 in order to foster the protection of the right to health, states are to take public health measures to prevent epidemic, endemic, occupational, or environmental diseases. for example, article 11 of the european social charter enjoins member states to remove as much as possible the causes of ill health. one way to minimize the short and long term impacts of climate change is to ensure that transparent environmental impact assessments (eia) are conducted before the approval of projects to show clearly their likely environmental and health impacts.43 in the 2006 case of sawhoyamaxa indigenous community v. paraguay, the inter-american court of human rights unanimously found paraguay in violation of rights to health, life, and property of the sawhoyamaxa indigenous community for failing to remove projects that cause pollution, ill health, and diseases in this indigenous community.44 the court called on the state to demarcate the indigenous lands and provide a development fund, among other remedies.45 2.5 loss of life and wrongful death major oil spills lead to loss of lives of oil workers and residents of oilproducing areas. for example, 11 bp workers were killed in the 2010 disaster. families of these deceased workers have consequently filed wrongful death lawsuits against bp.46 the tort of wrongful death exists in many common law countries for cases when a person dies due to the legal fault of another person. for example, virtually every state in the united states has a wrongful death law, which allows 41 article 12 of the icescr. 42 article 10. 43 see unece, the espoo convention on environmental impact assessment in a transboundary context adopted february 25, 1991 emut 991:15. 44 case of the sawhoyamaxa indigenous community v. paraguay, 2006 inter-am. ct. h.r. (ser. c) no. 146, 248(1)–(3) (mar. 29, 2006). 45 id. at 239–241. 46 nat’l comm’n on the bp deepwater horizon oil spill & offshore drilling, report to the president, deepwater: the gulf oil disaster and the future of offshore drilling vi (2011) available at <http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/deepwate r_reporttothepresident_final.pdf.> (accessed 12 may 2012). consilience olawuyi: impacts of major oil spills families of a deceased person who dies in accidental or negligent circumstances to sue for compensation.47 under international law, the right to life enjoys maximum guarantee. it is a supreme human right from which no derogation is permitted, even in times of war or public emergency.48 as such, the un norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights places a responsibility on multinationals to protect the right to life of their workers and of the residents of any country where they do business. 2.6 international liability issues major oil spills could affect the waters and environmental quality in nearby countries. for example, mexico claims that the bp oil spills provided cross-border effects in mexico. this is a violation of article 194(2) of the law of the sea convention, which requires states to “take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other states and their environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this convention.” this convention places a duty on states to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states in the use of resources and to prevent trans-boundary pollution. principle 21 of the 1972 stockholm declaration also provides that states have the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.49 an aggrieved state can bring an action before the international court of justice (icj) under the court’s jurisdiction in article 36(2) (c) for a violation or breach of an international obligation to prevent trans-boundary pollution.50 2.7 clean-up obligations and costs major oil spills can take several years to clean up. for example, the united nations estimates that the restoration process in nigeria’s niger delta could take up to 30 years with a projected cost of $1 billion (usd) in the first five years.51 this 47 see for example wrongful death act of indiana, ind. code 34-23-1-1; see also wrongful death statutes in ohio rc 2125.01 and 2125.02. 48 m nowak, ‘civil and political rights’ in j symonides, human rights concepts and standards (ashgate, 2000) 75. 49 see unep, http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?documentid=78&articleid= 1163. 50 see trail smelter arbitration (u.s.a. v. canada), 1938-1941, 9 i.l.r. 315; lac lanoux arbitration (france v. spain), 1957, 24 i.l.r. 101.; case concerning the gabcikovo-nagymaros project (hungry v. slovak republic), 32 ilm (1993) 1293; 51 unep, ‘environmental assessment of ogoni land’ available at <http://www.unep.org/nigeria/> (accessed 02 june 2012). http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163 http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163 http://www.unep.org/nigeria/ 12 consilience illustrates the fact that the costs of clean-up, restoration, and reclamation are often enormous and far-reaching. international environmental law therefore places a duty on the multinationals to pay for such clean-up costs. the polluter-pays principle advocates that the polluter should bear the cost of preventing damage to the environment. the object of this principle is to channel the costs of prevention and reparation of environmental damage to the legal or juristic person who is in the best position to prevent such damage and thus “internalize” the costs of pollution damage.52 for example, the un recommended that shell should set up an environmental restoration fund to support clean-up and restoration in the niger delta.53 3. conclusion the principle of sustainable development advocates the balancing of environmental goals and objectives with economic and social goals. as such, while oil exploration has enormous economic potential, it must be done in ways that would protect the human and natural elements of the environment. unsustainable oil exploration and oil spillage could jeopardize human health, threaten human life, and result in the violation of several interrelated national, regional, and international laws and human rights principles that took the world many years to foster. international law places an obligation on international oil companies (iocs) and governments to avoid pollution related to oil production. as such, whenever oil spillage occurs, the ioc involved often bears the risk of paying compensation, while the country where such a corporation is located may bear more responsibility in cases of trans-boundary pollution. there are also other parties who could be joined to such lawsuits. these might include owners of the drilling rig, well contractors, and manufacturers of any malfunctioning equipment, such as the underwater well’s blowout preventer.54 despite these concrete regulations, there is a gap in international laws applicable to oil spillage. this is the absence of a comprehensive convention on safety standards for oil platforms. the un convention on the law of the sea 52 european environmental bureau. environmental liability in europe: concerning the need for a european directive on environmental liability. 1997. chapter 1. 53 unep, ‘environmental assessment of ogoni land’ available at <http://www.unep.org/nigeria/> (accessed 02 june 2012). 54 for example in the bp case transocean, which owned the deep-water horizon drilling rig, halliburton, the well contractor, and cameron international, the company that manufactured the underwater well's blowout preventer, which malfunctioned and failed prevent the oil spill gave all being sued in different cases by individuals and state authorities. many of these diverse suits have been consolidated as class actions or multidistrict litigation (mdl). see www.laed.uscourts.gov/oilspill/oilspill.htm. (to learn more about mdl and what happens when cases like these are consolidated, see nolo, ‘multidistrict litigation (mdl) for drug lawsuits and other cases’ available at <http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/multidistrict-litigation-mdl-druglawsuits-32952.html> (accessed 12 may 2012). http://www.unep.org/nigeria/ http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/oilspill/oilspill.htm http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/multidistrict-litigation-mdl-drug-lawsuits-32952.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/multidistrict-litigation-mdl-drug-lawsuits-32952.html consilience olawuyi: impacts of major oil spills currently relies on its parties to prevent pollution from oil platforms. such an approach has led to varied and at times low standards of regulation in many countries. an international convention might help to establish international best practice standards that could prevent and reduce the incidences and reoccurrences of major oil spillage. its importance is underscored by the fact that some effects of oil spillage are permanent and irreversible. such a convention would offer a preventive approach to ensure that minimum safety standards are applied wherever a drilling operation takes place. in order to comply with the theory of sustainability, such regulation or treaty should include provisions that enforce three standards: prevention, response, and financial liability. to ensure prevention, technical standards must be imposed on corporations to ensure that only oil drilling equipment that meets the highest safety standards will be approved for exploration activities. this would prevent instances such as the bp oil spill in which the blow-up preventer allegedly failed when pressure reached rose past the limit. this would also prevent instances whereby international oil companies use below-par drilling technologies for operations in developing countries. an international safety standard would enforce unified technical requirements for drilling irrespective of the location or country where drilling would be carried out. under response, corporations must be required to demonstrate response plans in case of blow-ups or spillage. for example, the absence of an adequate response plan was demonstrated in the deep-water horizon case when it took bp several months to design and drill a relief well that would stop the massive amount of oil leaking into the seawater. to prevent this, corporations must be required to submit their contingency and response plans to national authorities before getting the goahead for oil exploration. in the contingency plans, they should be required to demonstrate that they can design these relief wells in a timely manner and that they have the capacity and technology in place to minimize the effects of a blow-up or spillage. corporations must also demonstrate their plans for clean-up in case of oil spillage. this would include showing that they have the financial means to pay for the cost of clean-up, restoration, and reclamation in the event of an accident. corporations must also demonstrate the capacity to pay compensation to victims of environmental damage in case of spillage. as shown in this paper, many victims of spillage lose their income, subsistence, properties, and health to major oil spills. corporations must demonstrate strong financial capacity to pay for the losses suffered by these victims in case of spillage. this would prevent the situation in nigeria’s niger delta, in which many residents who have lost their subsistence, lives, and properties to oil spillage have gone without compensation for several years. the importance of an international convention that provides safety standards for oil platforms and enforces them cannot be overemphasized. such a convention would prevent or minimize the human rights and sustainable development consequences of major oil spills. 14 consilience bibliography aspatore special report, ‘the ongoing legal effects of the bp oil spill: an indepth look at the claims filing process and continuing litigation in response to the gulf coast oil disaster’ (westlaw 2011). bradlow a., ‘private complainants and international organizations: a comparative study of the independent inspection mechanisms in international financial institutions’ (2005) 36 georgia j int’l l 403. christian bugge, h., & c voigt, (eds), sustainable development in international and national law (europa law publishing 2008). cordonier segger m.c, and ashfaq khalfan, sustainable development law (oxford: oxford university press 2004). european environmental bureau, (1997), environmental liability in europe: concerning the need for a european directive on environmental liability. 1997. iucn, ‘the future of sustainability – re-thinking environment and development in the twenty-first century’ report of the iucn renowned thinkers meeting, 29–31 january 2006 (iucn 2006) <msdata.iucn.org/downloads/iucn_future_of_sustanability.pdf.> accessed 12 september, 2011. kuokkanen, t., international law and the environment (kluwer law international 2002). locke, j., two treatises of government, available at <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm> (accessed 21 january 2011). mushkat, r., ‘environmental sustainability: a perspective from the asia-pacific region’ (1993) 27 ubc l rev 153. nowak, m., ‘civil and political rights’ in j symonides, human rights concepts and standards (ashgate, 2000). pearce d., & kerry r turner, economics of natural resources and the environment (maryland: the john hopkins university press, 1990). pearce, d., & kerry r turner, economics of natural resources and the environment (baltimore, maryland: the john hopkins university press, 1990). sachdev, a., ‘tide of oil spill lawsuits begins to rise’ (chicago tribune, 18 may 2010). consilience olawuyi: impacts of major oil spills schrijver, n., the evolution of sustainable development law: inception, meaning and status (martinus nijhoff publishers 2008). schrijver, n., the evolution of sustainable development law: inception, meaning and status (martinus nijhoff publishers 2008). unep, ‘environmental assessment of ogoni land’ available at < http://www.unep.org/nigeria/> (accessed 02 june 2012). united nations world commission on environment and development report (the brundtland report) our common future (oup 1987). united nations, (1992) rio declaration on environment and development , un, <http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?documentid =78&articleid=1163> accessed 12 may 2012. united states government, nat’l comm’n on the bp deepwater horizon oil spill & offshore drilling, report to the president, deepwater: the gulf oil disaster and the future of offshore drilling vi (2011) available at <http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/deep water_reporttothepresident_final.pdf.> (accessed 02 june 2012). vidal, j. (2012) ‘nigeria on alert as shell announces worst oil spill in a decade’ available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/dec/22/nigerian-shell-oilspill> (accessed 23 may 2012). zalik, a. (2009). “zones of exclusion: offshore extraction, the contestation of space and physical displacement in the nigerian delta and the mexican gulf”. journal compilation. canada: antipode. microsoft word gumbo final.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 46–62       scaling up sustainable renewable energy generation from municipal solid waste in the african continent: lessons from ethekwini, south africa trynos gumbo, phd sustainable development program africa institute of south africa abstract the three processes of urbanization, industrialization and globalization are positively correlated with municipal solid waste generation and energy consumption in global urban centers. heavy reliance on fossil fuels in most world cities has contributed not only to global warming and climate change, but also to astronomical increases and volatility in the prices of energy sources. africa has suffered from energy shortages and climate change as well, for it depends on very limited oil reserves and on finite, toxic coal resources. thus, the need for innovation in renewable energy generation is more urgent now than ever. africa is home to many renewable energy sources, ranging from sun and water to municipal solid waste and wind. this article discusses the conversion of waste to energy in the ethekwini municipality, a south african metropolis, and describes prospects for implementing a similar model in other african countries. the study unearths cutting-edge work by the department of cleansing and solid waste of ethekwini municipality, which has adopted modern municipal solid waste management and treatment systems. for almost a decade now, the municipality has demonstrated the potential for african cities to achieve two primary objectives: first, to generate clean renewable energy sources that contribute to economic development, and second, to reduce urban social and environmental problems resulting from improper waste disposal. the municipality’s success also reveals tremendous opportunities to improve waste management, financial investments, technological take-up, and skillsets to support the african green energy revolution. keywords: sustainable renewable energy, municipal solid waste, african, ethekwini, south africa 1. introduction more than half of the world now lives in cities, and it is projected that more than 70% of the global population will have been urbanized by the year 2030 (sanchez-rodriguez 2002). although africa—with 37% of the urban population—is the least urbanized of the civilized continents, it is currently experiencing the highest rate of urbanization at approximately 4%. hence, a significant fraction of urban growth in the world today can be attributed to africa (cunningham and cunningham 2008; jacobsen, webster et al. 2012; gumbo 2013). it is important to mention that a few african countries already surpass this level of urbanization. case in point: there are south african urban centers that already contain about two thirds of their country’s population (un-habitat 2012). however, urban growth in africa has yet to slow down, and as mutanga, pophiwa, simelane explain (2013), african cities will continue to experience rapid population growth thanks to processes like rural-urban consilience gumbo: energy from msw       migration, natural increase, modernization, and globalization. the continent has benefited from advances in production processes and improvements in consumption and standards of living, which have brought to the fore new challenges. it has been widely observed that the growth of urban populations is positively correlated not only with the generation of municipal solid waste in the urban centers of the world but also with energy consumption (simelane and mohee 2012). these sentiments have been echoed by igoni, ayotamuno, ogaji, and probert (2007), who posit that most african urban centers, particularly large and capital cities, are experiencing high urbanization rates that in turn increase the generation of municipal solid waste. besides urbanization, processes such as industrialization and globalization similarly trigger the generation of large volumes of municipal solid waste (achankeng 2003) and result in astronomical rises in energy consumption, which in most cases derives from fossil fuels that contribute to climate change. these related processes bear directly on both the volumes of municipal solid waste (msw) that are generated in urban centers (medina 1997) and the amount of energy that is consumed (zeng , sun, huo, wan and jing 2010). according to cointreau (2008), countries in the developing world generate, collect, and dispose of very low volumes of waste as compared to those found within mediumand high-income areas. this scenario is summarized in table 1. table 1: waste generation per capita, total waste generated, collected and disposed in low, medium and high income worlds. level of income level of urbanizatio n level globalizati on waste generation rate (lbs/person/d ay) total waste generation (million tons/year percentag e collected percentage disposed low income lowly urbanized lowly globalized 1.3 559 40% 5% middle income medium urbanized medium globalized 1.8 986 60% 30% high income highly urbanized highly globalized 3.1 566 100% 100% source: adopted from cointreau (2008) and updated the table shows how high populations in urban areas generate high amounts of waste as compared to low populations (babayemi and dauda 2009). for example, china generated more waste than the united states in 2005 because of the former’s staggering population (cointreau 2008). industrialization and globalization promote economic growth that leads to high standards of living and improved purchasing power, and this is presently the case in transitional economies and the developed world (medina 2010). as a consquence of stunted economic growth in developing countries, their municipal solid waste is dominated by organic materials and cheap imported materials, in contrast to the developed world, where waste comes mostly in the form of inorganic materials, metals, and glass stemming from highly industrialized economies. the developing world faces serious challenges with collecting and disposing the quantities of waste depicted in table 1. closely associated with these formidable challenges is the incessant depletion of non-renewable energy reserves such as coal and the continuous rise and volatility 48 consilience   of the prices of oil—the dominant global energy resource at present. all these challenges are a wake-up call that demands innovative strategies to generate sustainable, affordable, secure, reliable, clean, and renewable energy sources from alternative sources like municipal solid waste, water, wind, and sun (strachan, wright, pass, couth, pearson 2008). if there is indeed a positive correlation among population concentrations in urban centers, increased demands for energy sources, and huge quantities of generated waste, then said waste should be properly managed and creatively harnessed in service of a sustainable future. this article focuses specifically on the experiences in msw conversion to renewable energy, the so-called waste-to-energy (wte) projects. the study was conducted in the ethekwini municipality, one of the four largest cities in south africa. the municipality was the first to adopt appropriate technologies to generate much-needed green energy from msw. the paper goes on to discuss the prospects of establishing similar projects in other african countries with the aim of not only improving energy supply sources but also conserving the urban environment via green energy sources. challenges that wte projects commonly must confront in african countries are also highlighted. the article ends by offering recommendations going forward, as the continent steers toward a green revolution agenda. adopting the case study approach and applying interview and observation techniques, field data was collected from various stakeholders, including engineers working on the projects, environmentalists, professors, and residents from surrounding urban communities that benefited from the waste-generated energy. three projects that were either producing electrical energy from waste or generating and burning gas in the ethekwini municipality were all studied. these projects include the bisasar, marrianhill, and buffelsdraai landfill sites. purposive and snowballing sampling techniques were employed to identify participants in the field work data collection. random sampling was used to select participants from the neighboring communities in the city that are benefiting from the energy generated and the clean urban environment that results from the extracting and burning of gas from the landfill sites. 2. conceptual frameworks on municipal solid waste urban centers, particularly in the developing world (e.g., africa, asia, and south america), generally lack sound municipal solid waste management. they face serious challenges in the collection, transportation, disposal, and treatment of waste. this results in the indiscriminate dumping of waste at uncontrolled dumpsites and, even worse, on river banks, street corners, passageways, and the backs of buildings (mazhindu, gumbo and gondo 2012). the msw phenomenon is a consequence of the lifestyle in urban centers, where volumes of waste rise in proportion with population and standards of living. however, cities that lack adequate means of waste collection, transportation, and treatment—and that harbor negative attitudes toward safe disposal—suffer from indiscriminate dumping of waste and decomposition that releases dangerous gases, thereby harming the environment (johari, ahmed, hashim, alkali and ramli 2012). a number of factors—such as the lack of access to adequate recycling and waste disposal facilities, the inconvenience of collecting and sorting waste, the discrepancies between intention and action as defined by government policies, and the general lack of trust in local government by residents in developed nations—result in a negative outlook on participation in waste management (o’connell 2011). reviewing the barriers to curbside waste recycling by households in the united kingdom, jesson and stone (2009) discovered a wide range of inhibiting consilience gumbo: energy from msw       behaviors that can be categorized as being related to individuals and households, to information and levels of knowledge, to local situations, and to general attitudes and levels of motivation. these categories are summarized in table 2. table 2: factors influencing recycling behaviors of households household i ssues / indiv idual behavior information and knowledge services / local s i tuat ion atti tudes /motivat ion inconvenient no time too much effort involved, too difficult, too much organising, extra work, see it as a hassle, not a habit, recurrence of old habits, individual forgetfulness, storage is an issue, storage and handling problems, lack of space to locate bin, shared bins, no space in residence, a lack of storage space, not practical lack of information ignorance about what can be recycled, low awareness of how to recycle lack of information from the council not so concerned about why’s wherefores, what’s and outcomes confusion over what services might be available and how to use them facilities too far away / inadequate, physical location, street layout and type inadequate provision by council, lack of provision wanted better and more convenient infrastructures for recycling estate and flat dwellers left out decided or took away bin) negative about the council making money perceived effectiveness of the activity, thinks council throws it away not bothered, never considered, disinterested in recycling, unrewarded effort i do not want to participate in the scheme not important enough issues source: adapted from jesson and stone (2009) and modified municipal authorities have for a long time singlehandedly administered and executed municipal solid waste collection, transportation, treatment, and disposal such that other stakeholders have always considered it to be the duty of government. generally, the belief tends to be that someone working for the municipality— someone who is employed to keep the city clean—will collect and dispose of waste properly without involving the public, thus framing perceptions of the management of msw (tucker and & speirs 2010). this sentiment has also been observed by zurbrügg (2002), who posits that ordinary people’s attitudes and perceptions about waste management have only recently started to change. furthermore, as highlighted in table 2, msw has generally been considered worthless and hence a waste of time to sort and dispose of. however, in almost all developing countries, communities and individuals have of late been participating in msw management by informally scavenging and trading in recycled waste. such efforts require support and partnership between local authorities and the private sector to ameliorate the situation of msw management (o’connell 2011; zurbrügg 2002). landfilled municipal solid waste, particularly the organic component, degrades anaerobically productive methane gas that has on average 21 times the potential of 50 consilience   polluting the global atmosphere than carbon dioxide (noor, yusuf, abba and hassan 2013). the msw growth trend is expected to continue as 4.3 billion people that are likely to be living in urban centers of the world by 2025, will be generating at least 2.2 billion tons of waste (hoornweg and bhada-tata undated). 2.1 municipal solid waste streams municipal solid waste (msw) can generally be defined as rubbish or garbage that comprises leftovers, garden waste, paper, plastic, glass, and metal that are thrown away. such waste is commonly regarded as worthless. in reality, msw is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that is difficult to define and conceptualize—a phenomenon that is more than the sum of its parts (fobil, carboo and armar 2005). msw can be categorized according to either its components or its sources of generation, which include major streams such as households, commercial activities, and markets, as well as minor contributors such as street sweepings, construction, and demolition debris. such streams exclude industrial and biomedical waste that is classified as hazardous and infectious, respectively. households, commercial, and marketplaces generate most of the solid waste in urban centers. at source, msw sometimes is categorized into dry and wet materials to avoid contamination. the dry components of the municipal solid waste are further categorized as paper, plastics, metal, and glass, while the wet part of the waste includes wood, yard, and food waste materials. the dry waste materials can be categorized further into combustible and non-combustible materials. countries in the developing world generate msw that has more biodegradable contents than found within the developed world (jesson and stone 2009). it is the organic component of the msw that is essential in generating renewable energy. said organic matter can be incinerated or placed into landfills while the non-organic matter can be either recycled and reused or buried underground to promote environmentally healthy urban centers. 2.2 municipal solid waste management processes the maintenance of hygiene and cleanliness in urban communities involves several stages of msw management. the various processes of managing msw include collection, transfer, treatment, recycling, resource recovery, and disposal (world bank/sdc, undated). as part of fulfilling traditional roles and responsibilities of maintaining the cleanliness of their areas of jurisdiction, municipalities have always single handedly collected, transported, treated and disposed msw (bartelings and sterner 1999; zurbrügg 2002). the complex and integrated processes of managing msw range from eco-design of production plants to reduce waste at its source to reusing, recycling, and recovery of waste generated. they also included composting, incineration, and landfilling of collected waste from various sources. disposal at landfill sites can be done directly from sources or from temporary community collection points such as skips, bunkers, standby trailers and open lots (okot-okumu 2012). collection may be done at sources where the msw is directly disposed of at its final destination, which is normally the landfill sites, or the waste can be gathered at centralised collection points such as skips, bunkers, standby trailers, and open lots before it is transferred to the landfill sites. 2.3 municipal solid waste as a renewable energy source consilience gumbo: energy from msw       energy from waste is renewable in the sense that the major component of msw is organic matter that is derived from plants and trees, which are themselves renewable resources that form constituent parts of the natural ecosystem (togo and kaggwa 2013). the energy is produced by incinerating the waste, or disposing of it in landfills and extracting gas, which is converted to electrical energy. the greenhouse gases (ghgs) that are emitted during the energy-generation process from the waste are recycled in the process helping to reduce greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (ryu 2010). the gases would have been removed from the atmosphere during the lives of the trees and plants. therefore, there are no additional or new gases that are released into the air during this cycle. this is much better than the burning of fossil fuels such as coal, which releases carbon dioxide that would have stayed a part of the atmosphere for several centuries. faced with the daunting challenges of dwindling reserves of coal, which is the most common source of energy, and low oil reserves fetching high and volatile prices, some african countries have started shifting towards adopting and using renewable energy sources. these countries assert they follow a socalled green energy revolution agenda in the continent (kaggwa and togo 2013). indeed, msw has lately come to be regarded as a resource in africa, with many countries adopting integrated management practices that emphasise recycling, reusing, and recovery strategies. 3. case study of waste-to-energy projects in ethekwini municipality, south africa south africa is not only a progressive country politically and socially, but also the economic power house in africa, with a population of about 50 million (oecd 2013; statistics south africa 2011). just like any other developing country, south africa is facing serious challenges of msw management in almost all of its urban centers. according to the department of environmental affairs (2012), only 59% of the waste in the country’s urban centers is collected. even the four metropolitan cities johannesburg, pretoria, cape town and ethekwini face issue with msw management. the south african government has noted the great challenge that arises from msw and has in turn put in place legislations, policies, and strategies that seek to alleviate the problem. the waste act of 2008 and the national environmental management act of 1998 have been adopted not only to improve msw management in the country’s urban centers, but also to promote innovations in containing the challenge. in response, a sizeable number of cities in the country have adopted innovative solid waste management strategies at varying levels and degrees depending on capacity. an example of this is the ethekwini municipality, which has embraced innovative technologies to convert solid waste into energy since the turn of the new millennium. this municipality was the first city council not only in south africa, but also in the continent as a whole, to initiate and implement a landfill gas to electricity project. the ethekwini municipality is located in the kwazulu natal province, covering an area of 2297 km2 and with a total population of about 3 million residents (department of cooperative governance and traditional affairs undated). figure 1 shows the location of ethekwini in south africa and the landfill sites as well as msw transfer stations within the municipality. 52 consilience   figure 1: map of ethekwini showing landfill sites and msw transfer stations the idea to generate energy from msw by the municipality was mooted in 2002, refined in 2003, and finalized in 2004 when the world bank agreed to support the project due to its potential reduction of emissions in the atmosphere and actual generation of electricity from waste started in 2006. although wte technologies had long been adopted in the developed world, particularly in the united states and western european countries , the department of cleansing and solid waste of the ethekwini municipality would adopt the same modern systems three decades later. for almost a decade now, the municipality has demonstrated to the entire continent and the world at large that it is possible for african cities to achieve the twin objectives of generating clean renewable energy sources that contribute to economic development and reducing social and environmental problems associated with improper disposal of waste in an urban context, a common blot on the african citylandscape. consilience gumbo: energy from msw       figure 2: diagrammatic representation of energy generation from msw in ethekwini according to figure 2, gas collector wells that create a vacuum within the decomposing waste are drilled into the mound of landfilled msw to suck the gas that is later transported along the pipes to the gas pump and flare station. the gas is converted into electrical energy by the turbines and a step-up transformer is used to assist in feeding the electricity of the same voltage into the municipality’s grid. three projects at la mercy, mariannhill, and bisasar landfill sites were initiated under the clean development mechanism (cdm), a brainchild of the united nations framework convention for climate change (unfcc), formed through the kyoto protocol (strachan lj, pass j. undated). currently the two operational projects are generating a total of 7.5 mw of electricity, which provides power to about 3 500 residents of the municipality, generating a revenue of r48 million through the selling of certified carbon credits and the selling of electricity to the municipality. the projects are also estimated to generate a total of r400 million revenue during its life span. 3.1 projects specifications initially, the project was supposed to include all three landfill sites that were in existence at the time: la mercy, mariannhill and bisasar. however approval and registration procedures and requirements under the clean development mechanism (cdm) of the united nations framework convention on climate change (unfccc) in line with the kyoto protocol of 2005 were cumbersome, forcing the splitting of the project into two. the kyoto protocol encouraged private sector investment in developing countries that reduce emission reductions in greenhouse gas (ghg) to the atmosphere as a way of supporting development in poor counties that lack advanced technologies and necessary funding. 3.1.1 phase 1: la mercy and mariannhill landfill sites the study unearthed cutting-edge innovations in the management and treatment of municipal solid waste since the turn of the new millennium. la mercy started operating as a landfill site in 1980 and was closed in 2006. it is located to the north of the ethekwini municipality, on the rural sugar cane farmlands owned a few kilometres from shaka international airport. it covered an area of 7.2 ha, had an average depth of 18 m and had contained an estimated 1.1 million m3 amount of waste. it used to receive 300 tons of waste daily during its operation. the landfill site had 17 vertical wells on both the southern and northern sections that contained older relocated and newly disposed waste respectively. the wells extracted only 183nm3/hr. of gas and this could not supply the 0.5mw engine with enough gas for the generation of electricity, hence the project was abandoned and the engine was transferred to the bisasar road landfill site where there are very high gas levels being extracted. although leachate pumps had been installed to remove waste water from the wells, the high levels of the leachate and the high amounts of fine sand that had been used to cover the waste before the decommissioning of the landfill site led to blockages to the gas wells, resulting in very low gas levels. after realising that gas flows could not improve the extracted gas levels, the la mercy landfill site was closed, and it has been rehabilitated into a natural land mass of green grass and forest. 54 consilience   on the other hand, mariannhill is a sanitary and engineered landfill site that is located on a valley in a peri-urban area of ethekwini municipality. it operates in lined cells that are used to dispose general municipal solid waste, garden refuse, hospital waste, and construction and demolition waste. it started operating in 1997 and covers a total area of 49.5 ha, where the actual landfill covers 18.5 ha and 31 ha act as a buffer zone and are used for conservancy. it has an estimated capacity of 5 m3 million waste. it receives between 500 and 700 tons of waste per day and is expected to be full and closed by 2022. it has a weighbridge, a material recovery facility (mrf), a sequencing batch reactor for the treatment of leachate, and a registered conservancy area, the first of its kind on the african continent. there is gas extraction and the generation of electricity at the site. it has seventeen vertical wells that extract about 500 nm3 per hour and horizontal wells with new cells that were added recently and extract 200 m3 per hour. in total, the landfill site supplies about 700 m3/hr and 1 mw of electricity to the engine that was commissioned in 2006. the 1 mw of power is stepped up by a transformer and is fed to the 11kv that is connected to the ethekwini municipality grid. the marrianhill landfill site has largely contributed to the conservation of the environment within and around the dumpsite as indicated in figure 3. figure 3: leachate treatment plant and the read bed that purifies waste water from the landfill site the landfill site has a well-run and managed leachate treatment plant that is also supported by a reed bed. the plants process 50m3 of leachate per day and the excess is directed to waste water. there is also a plant rescue unit (prunit) on marrianhill landfill site that serves to help conserve the indigenous species and preserve the environment within and around the dumpsite as depicted in figure 4. consilience gumbo: energy from msw       figure 4: the conservancy and plant rescue units (prunit) besides the primary objective of reducing contamination of land and underground water , the plant treatment also purifies water, which is used to irrigate the plants and trees within the landfill site. generally, the project has resulted in the reduction of gas emissions in the atmosphere and it has successful reached about 16,000 carbon emissions reductions every year since its inception. 3.1.2 phase 2: bisasar road landfill site the bisasar road landfill site first used disposable waste in 1980. there is now only one year left until it’s retired, although there are plans to extend its life. bisasar is a deep valley landfill site, situated atop old municipal solid waste and closely located to commercial and residential zones of the municipality. it receives about 3,000 tons of waste per day and about 1 million tons per year. overall, bisasar can hold up to 21 million m3 of waste. just like the mariannhill landfill site, it receives different kinds of waste, ranging from from general municipal solid waste, garden refuse, medical, industrial, constructional, and demolition waste. the landfill site has an average depth of 40m and covers an area of 44 ha. in 2007, work to install vertical gas extraction wells, gas collection pipework, and flare systems began. this includes wells and riser pipes that could extract about 2500 nm3 and supply 4 mw of electricity. eleven horizontal wells were also installed to augment the gas extraction of the 48 old and new vertical wells. thirty-eight leachate pumps were installed, despite the absence of a leachate treatment pump. initially only 2000 nm3 was used to generate 4mw of electricity by the four engines. each engine generated 1mw, while the remaining 500 nm3 was flared. more wells were installed in 2009, during which fourteen vertical wells and nine horizontal ones were sunk. gas extraction increased to 4000 nm3, which caused two more engines to be installed and the 0.5 mw engine at la mercy to be relocated. this brought the total electricity generated at bisasar landfill alone to 6.5mw. transformers increased power from 400v to 11kv, and the switch gear was connected the municipal grid. the project has alleviated the burden of electricity shortage in the city and also reduced the amount of ghgs in coal fired power stations. this has resulted in improved air quality in nearby communities. 1 mw of electricity generated provides energy to 500 small houses within the municipality, allowing the bisasar road project to currently service 3,500 households in the municipality. 56 consilience   the project has also resulted in new local employment opportunities for fourteen skilled personnel at the project’s inception stage, thirty-eight semi-skilled and fifty-seven unskilled personnel during construction, and eleven skilled and four unskilled personell as well as one trainee during the operation stage of the project. three black students who were part of the previously disadvantaged communities were awarded bursaries to study civil engineering at the local university, the university of kwazulu natal. figure 5: recycling activities and spraying activities at bisasar road landfill site at the landfill site, there are coordinated and well-managed recycling activities in addition to spraying activities aimed to contain the odors within the landfill site, for the benefit of surrounding communities. the bisasar landfill site has resulted in the realization of about 218,000 carbon emissions reductions each year since its inception. the project has generated in excess of 6 million carbon credits and reduced the burning of coal by 800,000 tons every year. by selling the excess certified carbon credits, the project has generated about r48 million and is estimated to generate a total of r400 million total. the project successfully achieved its socio-economic and environmental objectives in fostering sustainabile cities, particularly in the developing world. 4. prospects of scaling up renewable energy from waste many literary sources have highlighted the potential in untapped and underutilized renewable energy sources in the african continent (hussein, el-khattam and abdel-rahman 2011). there is great potential in increased generation and supply of renewable energy from waste in the african continent. benefits from converting waste to energy lie in the positive correlation between high population concentrations in urban centers that generates huge quantities of waste, and advancements in technology and production processes that occur as economies grow. millions of tons of waste, rich in organic content and value, generated in african cities, need to be properly managed and used innovatively in order to contribute to renewable energy production (abdel-rahman, and simelane 2011). moreover, climatic conditions in africa, such as heavy rainfall and high temperature are conducive to rapid decomposition of landfilled waste. consilience gumbo: energy from msw       in 2006, ethekwini, an african municipality, developed and began operating buffelsdraai landfill site. the landfill site is 100 hectares large and is expected to last for approximately 70 years. it has a buffer area of 787 hectares that extend for about 800m. it currently receives and processes close to 450 tons of general municipal waste daily, but is expected to receive about 2,000 tons per day when the bisasar landfill site closes. the landfill is located about 25 km north of the cbd and lies approximately 8 km west of the small town of verulam. the landfill site is still constructing works more cells and lay pipes for gas and waste water drainage. this landfill site has great potential to generate electricity energy once it becomes fully operational. other metropolitan cities in south africa such as johannesburg, pretoria and cape town have also started wte projects. other african countries have potential to either scale-up existing wte projects or initiate new ones. for instance, the municipality of abidjan, in côte d’ivoire, has been working since 2009 to generate about 30 mw of electricity from landfill waste. about 200,000 tons of waste is treated anaerobically, where gas is extracted from the landfills and is later converted into electrical energy. in ghana starting in 2014, wte projects have already generated about 6 mw of electricity. the landfill site receives 270,000 tons of waste each year and it is expected close by 2044. starting in 2014, there will be a a further 10-mw wte project in accra due to investments by private companies about 1,000 tons of waste will be processed per day. the projects are predicted to generate 100 million usd in revenue per year over 30 years. other african countries have also generated electrical energy without landfills through incineration and cogeneration of organic waste. mauritius produces about 87 mw, kenya 35 mw, uganda 12 mw, and south africa about 6 mw from either bagasse or biomass. the wte initiatives in these african countries have gone a long way towards improving energy security while expanding and widening available choices. a number of african countries are flaring gas running into several kilotons of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions (kt co2-e) from landfills, biomass and bagasse. these materials can be converted into electrical energy if appropriate technologies are adopted. in dar es salaam, tanzania, about 202, 27 kt co2-e of landfill gas is flared every year, while in dakar, senegal, the number is about 13,132 kt co2-e. in south africa, a total of 23,767 kt co2-e is flared every year in ekurhuleni municipality within the gauteng province, while about 18,839 kt co2-e is burnt every year in various urban centers by the country’s enviroserv landfill gas recovery project. all of these developments represent great potential for energy generation from waste. all that is needed are engines that convert the currently flared gas into energy. great prospects and promises also lie in the recent shifts in the policy of various african governments towards increased generation and use of renewable energy as well as the reduction of the fossil fuel use that causes global warming and consequently climate change. it is also hoped that efforts will be made to enforce these policies to regulate productive activities. in some countries, interest has been shown in evaluating the potential of diversifying energy sources through the conversion of waste to energy. this is the case in nairobi, kenya, where kenya power may investigate possibilities of generating energy from waste at dandora dumpsite. such plans will hopefully be converted into tangible action. 5. challenges with wte in the african continent in most african countries, modern technology is efficient and effective in converting waste to energy, particularly the equipment used to suck gas from landfills, as well as the engines that are used to cool and convert the gas to electricity. 58 consilience   however, these technologies are still lacking due to prohibitive costs (mudombi 2013; simalenga 2011). the few projects implemented in the continent suffer critical shortages of experienced and well-trained personnel (el-khattam w, hussein and abdel-rahman 2011). appropriate policies that support investments in renewable energy production are also lacking in most african countries, and where they exist, there are serious inconsistencies in their application. 6. conclusions and recommendations unfortunately, the majority of the african population is not connected to modern energy services. this makes the adoption of technological innovations in generating renewable energy from sources such as waste imperative in the continent. admittedly, this is a predicament that demands not only immediate and concerted efforts from many stakeholders, but also a complete shift in approaches and techniques of problem solving. in response to demand, a few african countries have recently embraced modern technologies and innovations to affect the generation and supply of renewable energy sources to their populations, and more are on the way. against the backdrop of dwindling fossil fuels such as coal and the volatility of oil prices, renewable resources are critical to secure future energy supplies and socioeconomic development within the continent. the immediate and long-term energy demands of the ever-exploding populations in african cities need to be met, while simeltaneously ensuring progressive reduction of ghgs, such as methane and carbon dioxide that directly cause global warming and climate change. there is need for a change in behaviour and attitudes so that waste be regarded as a valuable resource. this can only be possible through awareness and sensitization of the general populace to its usefulness. the pursuit of sustainable and clean cities calls for not only a shift in attitude about waste, but also a better and more clear understanding of modern methods of waste management. there is a need for wte technological uptake and training of personnel to improve the skillset in the continent. lessons from existing practices in the few african countries such as south africa and some other previously mentioned countries should provide motivation for the programs and endeavours that are being implemented in other urban centers of the continent. besides realizing direct benefits of increasing and securing energy sources, scaling up the green revolution in the african continent will also help african countries achieve sustainable socio-economic and environmental development. consilience gumbo: energy from msw       bibliography gumbo, t (2013) “towards a green energy revolution in africa: reflections on waste to energy projects”, policy brief 101, december 2013, pretoria, africa institute of south africa mutanga ss, pophiwa n, and simelane t. cities as green economy drivers: making a case for green cities in south africa, in mutanga, s.s., simelane, t. & pophiwa, n. 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https://www.jstor.org/stable/26775083?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents you may need to log in to jstor to access the linked references. jstor is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. we use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. for more information about jstor, please contact support@jstor.org. your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of the terms & conditions of use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution 4.0 international license (cc by 4.0). to view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. columbia university is collaborating with jstor to digitize, preserve and extend access to consilience this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:22:39 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 21, iss. 1 (2019), pp. 51-65 strategies to promote the international private sector’s contribution to global health beyond an “established” community michikazu koshiba michikazu koshiba is the head of the center on global health architecture (http://www.murc.jp/corporate/virtual/globalhealth), managed by mitsubishi ufj research and consulting co., ltd. michikazu.koshiba@murc.jp mitsubishi ufj research and consulting (murc) is a comprehensive think tank/consulting arm of the mitsubishi ufj financial group (the mufg group, a universal banking group that represents japan) and based in the three major cities in japan. murc established the “center on global health architecture” in 2017 and organized a public private collaborative action-oriented research meeting on global health issues. we aim to promote relationships among stakeholders, “break down silos,” and take an interdisciplinary approach to create new and innovative projects. abstract our prioritized areas are i) re-mapping private companies that make a contribution to global health to create a new evaluation tool to promote investment from the private sector; ii) advocating the reform of un procurement and public procurement mechanisms in emerging countries to japanese and other private companies, and; iii) promoting regulatory harmonization on medical devices/equipment beyond borders and building capacity for regulators and policymakers in lowand middle-income countries (lmics). of these focus areas, we are commencing specific projects to explore the first two items. in this paper, we share our proposed solution to global health issues from the perspective of the effective promotion of public private partnerships (ppps). this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:22:39 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms mailto:michikazu.koshiba@murc.jp 52 consilience figure 1: the three ideas which underpin this paper and its proposed solutions. this article will focus mostly on the two highlighted in red. source: author’s own. re-map private companies which contribute to global health and create a new evaluation tool to promote investment from the private sector despite advances in global health, including improved access to medical technologies such as medicines, vaccines, medical devices and equipment, and aidriven systems, the world is still facing anxiety and uncertainty over future pandemics and the threat of new infectious diseases1. in recent years, new types of global health issues have emerged. for example, antimicrobial resistance (amr) is attracting notable attention. because of amr, some standard treatments are becoming ineffective, which means that infections persist and may spread to those previously unaffected. the world health organization (who) estimates that antibiotic treatments add an average of 20 years to all of our lives, but in the 80 years since the discovery of penicillin, the overuse of antibiotics has put pressure on bacteria to evolve resistance. this has led to the emergence of untreatable superbugs that threaten the basis of modern medicine. malnutrition also remains a major issue and affects health in developing countries. furthermore, we must now also confront the rampant increase in various non-communicable diseases (ncds) such as diabetes and obesity. these ncds are currently an issue in both developed and developing countries. in some nations where the population is aging, brain-related diseases such as alzheimer’s disease and dementia are becoming serious issues. all these afflictions are intertwined with each other in complex ways. when looking at the amount of investment flowing into global health, can we say that it is sufficient? the purpose of this report is not to show accurately whether it is or is not. if we focus on how to secure a stable budget for international health, information can be gleaned from several global health metrics. one in-depth article collected budget data on the primary agencies and organizations that provided financial assistance to lmics for global health issues from 1990 to 2014. during this period, 458 billion usd was distributed through major channels for health funding 1 bryan walsh, “the world is not ready for the next pandemic”, time, may 15, 2017, http://time.com/magazine/us/4766607/may-15th-2017-vol-189-no-18-u-s/ digital technologies improve/solve the global health issues more effectively and efficiently 1. re-map of & engagement from industrial sector 2. advocacy on reform of un/public procurement 3. promotion on regulatory harmonization ◼ promote regulatory harmonization on medical devices/equipment beyond borders and capacity building for regulators and policy makers in lmics. ◼ advocate the reform of un procurement and public procurement mechanism in emerging countries to japanese private companies and some others. ◼ re-map private companies which make a contribution to global health and create a new evaluation tool to promote the investment from private sector. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:22:39 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms http://time.com/magazine/us/4766607/may-15th-2017-vol-189-no-18-u-s/ consilience koshiba: expanding private investment in global health from donor countries to lmics. annual disbursements increased substantially from $6.9 billion in 1990 to $35.9 billion in 2014 2. following the transition to a new administration in the united states, it is likely that public funding for global health will face new difficulties. however, the un adopted its sustainable development goals (sdgs) in 2015, and the new international framework for global development emphasizes the importance of the private sector in driving solutions, including for global health issues. now is the time for us to think about how we can stabilize or increase global funding for global health by inducing greater commitment from the private sector. figure 2: development assistance for global health (2014 us dollars) source: joseph l. dieleman et al., “sources and focus of health development assistance, 1990-2014”, jama vol.313, no. 23 (june 2015):2362 in terms of investment in the private sector, increasing attention is being paid worldwide to environmental, social, and governance (esg) investment. esg investment criteria are a set of standards for a company’s operations which socially conscious investors use to screen investments. the “e” in “esg” is concerned with how a company performs as a steward of the natural environment; “s” examines how a company manages relationships with its employees, suppliers, customers, and communities; and “g” deals with a company’s leadership and the adequacy of its management and administration, including relationship-building with various stakeholders. in 2016, $22.89 trillion was invested based on perspectives of esg, an increase of 25% compared to 2014. in 2016, global esg investment accounted for 26% of all outstanding assets under management3. there are several possible reasons for the 2 joseph l. dieleman et al., “sources and focus of health development assistance, 19902014”, jama vol.313, no. 23 (june 2015):2362 3 global sustainable investment alliance, “global sustainability investment review 2016”, 2016 global sustainable investment review, (2017):3, http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/gsir_review2016.f.pdf this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:22:39 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/gsir_review2016.f.pdf http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/gsir_review2016.f.pdf 54 consilience increase in esg investment. first, the advent of principles for responsible investment (pri) in 2006 is having a meaningful impact on decision-making and is supported by an international network of investors who have pledged to incorporate esg into their investment and ownership (asset management) decisions4. second, esg indices themselves have become diversified and more detailed. therefore, it is becoming easier for investors to evaluate companies based on esg or similar criteria. third, research has confirmed the positive correlation between esg and corporate financial performance5. figure 3: growth of esg assets by region 2014–2016 source: global sustainable investment alliance, “global sustainability investment review 2016”, 2016 global sustainable investment review, (2017):27, http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/gsir_review2016.f.pdf the social aspect of the esg framework (“s”) has a high “affinity” for global health issues and their associated businesses and activities, and it has the potential to induce investment from private companies. some corporations might have anxiety about rising costs and being negatively evaluated under such a framework. however, we believe that esg will generate opportunities for companies to enhance their value. esg rating agencies and their frameworks for private companies, such as the dow jones sustainability index and ftse4good, can be useful tools. for global health-related industries, the access to medicine index is one of the most well-known esg-related frameworks. it is managed by the access to medicine foundation based in amsterdam. another example is the access to nutrition index. these indices are 4 “pri: home,” the pri, accessed march 19, 2018, https://www.unpri.org/ 5 gunnar friede, timo busch and alexander bassen, “esg and financial performance: aggregated evidence from more than 2000 empirical studies”, journal of sustainable finance & investment. vol.5, no. 4 (2015):225 this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:22:39 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/gsir_review2016.f.pdf http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/gsir_review2016.f.pdf https://www.unpri.org/ consilience koshiba: expanding private investment in global health categorized as human rights-focused frameworks6. according to a survey by globescan and sustainability, the access to medicine index was ranked one of the most credible indices by respondents7. figure 4: ranking of experts’ familiarity with esg-related indices source: globalscan and sustainability, “the 2013 ratings survey: polling the experts.” the access to medicine index is a framework mainly for the pharmaceutical industry, and the access to nutrition index is generally used by the food and beverage industry. however, the manufacturers that make contributions to global health issues are diverse. most public-private collaborative communities for global health issues have been organized by the pharmaceutical industry and/or the food and beverage industry. 6 casey o’connor and sarah labowitz, “putting the ‘s’ in esg; measuring human rights performance for investors”, putting the “s” in esg, (2017):11, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/547df270e4b0ba184dfc490e/t/58cad912e58c627418 0b58b6/1489688854754/metrics-report-final-1.pdf 7 globalscan and sustainability, “the 2013 ratings survey: polling the experts”, a globescan/sustainability survey, (2013):8, https://globescan.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/rate_the_raters_2013-polling_the_expertsglobescan_sustainability-3.pdf this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:22:39 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms https://static1.squarespace.com/static/547df270e4b0ba184dfc490e/t/58cad912e58c6274180b58b6/1489688854754/metrics-report-final-1.pdf https://static1.squarespace.com/static/547df270e4b0ba184dfc490e/t/58cad912e58c6274180b58b6/1489688854754/metrics-report-final-1.pdf https://globescan.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/rate_the_raters_2013-polling_the_experts-globescan_sustainability-3.pdf https://globescan.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/rate_the_raters_2013-polling_the_experts-globescan_sustainability-3.pdf https://globescan.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/rate_the_raters_2013-polling_the_experts-globescan_sustainability-3.pdf 56 consilience their main purpose is generally to discuss innovative social mechanisms to promote the research and development of specific products geared particularly for lmics, and to subsidize the purchase of such products. however, we have come to recognize that it is necessary to include the participation of the diverse industries which have the potential to contribute to global health issues. in the last 5-10 years, more attention has been paid to the importance of diagnostic industries. recently, startups related to supply chain management and cold chains with innovative digital technologies are beginning to work with international organizations in this field. current indices, however, do not properly grasp a holistic view of who is actually working and what kind of products or technologies have potential in the field. our proposal would “re-map” all those private companies which contribute to global health. if we re-map the contributors working on global health issues and establish another index for related industries, estimates of global health investment also shift. for example, diagnostic devices are indispensable at the first stages of health interventions. to monitor and control diseases, important roles in global health are played by information and communication devices, the internet of things (ict/iot) and, more recently, artificial intelligence (ai). personal protective equipment (ppe) has long been provided to promote patient safety as well as to protect medical workers. currently, there is no direct framework for evaluating these varied industries according to esg, especially from the perspective of “s”. as previously mentioned, we face a wide variety of issues in global health, ranging from infectious diseases to ncds. these growing issues are matters of international concern. when we consider how to secure diverse investment to resolve or mitigate these complex problems, there is an urgent need to review and map all of the private sector industries and companies contributing to global health. we call this approach “corporate taxonomy.” under this type of corporate taxonomy, multiple stakeholders who are willing to work for global health internationally should collaborate to establish several new indices for esg. the purpose should not be just to measure it, but also to have the index disseminated to and utilized by stakeholders such as investors, asset managers, shareholders, ngos, and companies themselves. of course, this is not the only approach that could encourage more engagement from private sector on global health issues; however, a holistic new framework would encompass many new industries and introduce new interest in global health investment. it is important to properly understand the advantages and disadvantages of a new index to promote more investment from private industries. positive aspects include promoting constructive competition between manufacturers in the same industry to enhance the r&d investment and contributions to access and delivery issues. the manufacturers can compare their corporate performance more objectively in the industry, learn their positioning based on the framework, and utilize it to restructure their strategies for international contribution. this could also send a message to their stakeholders. there may be negative aspects, too. in some cases, the indicators of the index might mislead the industry. while the framework is more holistic, it cannot encompass every single indicator. for example, if the organizers of the index did decide not to focus on certain specific products or technologies and the indicators were affected by such a decision, that might encourage unmet needs in global health issues by ignoring some spaces of potential innovation. our proposal is to create a new, more holistic index which includes diverse this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:22:39 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience koshiba: expanding private investment in global health industries such as the diagnostics field and products like novel digital technologies. figure 5: consciousness of problems on private engagement with global health and esg index source: author’s own. figure 6: mapping global health and its solutions: “corporate taxonomy” source: author’s own. < examples of existing indices > ◼ the access to medicine index is a ranking system published biennially since 2008 by the access to medicine foundation. ◼ the foundation is funded by the bill & melinda gates foundation (bmgf), the uk department for international development (dfid) and the dutch ministry of foreign affairs. ◼ it ranks the world’s 20 largest pharma companies biennially ◼ the evaluation framework is composed of the ability to make their pharmaceutical drugs more available, affordable, accessible and acceptable in lmics. ◼ the purpose is to stimulate pharma industry to improve access to health in developing countries by sharing the info of the peers, and to encourage the stakeholders to improve the situation. ◼ the access to nutrition index was founded in 2009. ◼ the methodology was developed by gain (global alliance for improved nutrition), and is jointly funded by gain, bmgf and the wellcome trust. ◼ the purpose of the index is to improve the access of consumers to more nutritious products, and make a contribution to address the serious global problems such as undernutrition and obesity. ◼ that will allow food/beverage enterprises to benchmark their performance on nutrition by sharing the information of their peers. ◼ it will also play a role as a platform to share the useful information and promote better decision making by the stakeholders. “for pharma industries”access to medicine index “for food/beverage industries”access to nutrition index from 1990-2014, g/h assistance from public sectors increased, but instable the adoption of sdgs encourages more engagement from private sectors under the concept of esgs, private sectors need to meet proactively with social investment with new indices to evaluate corporate performances, extract more private investment for global health start with re-mapping of contributors to g/h, share the information and decide the target of next indices ◼ corporate taxonomy: the center on global health architecture, murc analyzes the complexity of the global health issues as the following matrixes. ⚫ regions and issues: categorized the global health issues and scored its seriousness in the regional level by the statistics from international institutions ⚫ issues and solutions: mapped the issues analyzed above and possible solutions ◼ the center is currently preparing the mapping of solutions and its providing enterprises issue hiv/aids tb malaria hepatitis ntds amr (re)emerging i/d heart disease cancer diabetes chronic recipiratory illness undernutirition anemia obesity infertility stdｓ maternal death infant death vascular degenerative smoking drug alcohol depression mental illness ptsd region africa 1.22 254 ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ 17.2 59.3 ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ 542 52.3 ・・・ ・・・ 9.8 ・・・ 6.3 11.96 ・・・ ・・・ america 0.16 27 ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ 1.6 22.7 ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ 52 12.1 ・・・ ・・・ 16.9 ・・・ 8 9.25 ・・・ ・・・ southeast asia 0.08 240 ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ 26.2 51.4 ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ 164 31.5 ・・・ ・・・ 16.9 ・・・ 4.5 13.4 ・・・ ・・・ europe 0.18 32 ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ 22 ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ 16 8.3 ・・・ ・・・ 29.4 ・・・ 9.8 12.85 ・・・ ・・・ eastern mediteranean 0.06 114 ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ 12.8 45.3 ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ 166 40.6 ・・・ ・・・ 18.1 ・・・ 0.6 4.3 ・・・ ・・・ western pacific 0.06 95 ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ 2.7 22.4 ・・・ ・・・ ・・・ 41 10.8 ・・・ ・・・ 24.5 ・・・ 7.3 8.45 ・・・ ・・・16.2 20.6 15.1 23.1 16.7 22.2 reproductive health mental healthinfectious disease non-communicable disease nutrition dementia substance use disorder (dependence) solution sanitation nutritious foods vaccine vector control products birth control devices ・・・ diagnostic imaging devices ivd ・・・ antimicrobial antiviral anti-cancer drug ・・・ cold chain products injection devices medical equipment ・・・ health system surveilance ・・・ issue hiv/aids 〇 〇 〇 △ △ △ 〇 tb △ 〇 〇 △ △ 〇 malaria 〇 △ △ 〇 hepatitis 〇 〇 △ △ △ 〇 ntds △ 〇 〇 △ △ 〇 amr 〇 〇 △ △ 〇 (re)emerging i/d 〇 △ △ 〇 heart disease 〇 〇 △ △ cancer 〇 〇 〇 △ △ diabetes 〇 △ △ chronic recipiratory illness 〇 〇 △ △ undernutirition 〇 △ anemia 〇 △ obesity △ △ infertility △ stdｓ 〇 △ maternal death △ infant death △ vascular △ degenerative △ smoking △ drug △ alcohol △ depression △ mental illness △ ptsd △ substance use disorder (dependence) mental health prevention diagnosis medical treatment infectious disease reproductive health digital technologies non-communicable disease nutrition dementia others (equipment and devices etc) regions issues issues solutions seriousness of the issue in regional level based on the statistics mark whether the solution is effective for each issue < issues and solutions > < regions and issues > this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:22:39 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 58 consilience figure 7: mapping of regions and issues source: author’s own. figure 8: mapping of issues and solutions, and future development of new index source: author’s own. finally, we would like to highlight three essential points so that the new index can be broadly recognized and used. first, the index framework should be established by several players, including specifically a human rights-focused agency and a corporate rating agency focused on financial performance alongside different types of organizations that would bring together their different skillsets to create the index. secondly, the framework should be operated objectively, with the index itself managed infectious diseases ncds nutririon hiv/aids tb amr heart diseases cancer undernutrition anemia maternal death infant death depression africa america southeast asia europe eastern mediterranean west pacific × × × × × × × × △ △ 〇 △ △ 〇 △ 〇 〇 〇 〇 × × × × × △ △ △ △ 〇 △ △ 〇 △ 〇 〇 △ 〇 △ × × × × △ × 〇 〇 △ △ △ 〇 △ 〇 〇 〇 reproductive health mental health u n d e r in v e s ti g a ti o n sanitation prevention diagnosis medical treatment vaccine nutritious foods dx imaging ivd antibiotic antiviral health system surveil. monitoring cold chain othersdigital tech. h e a lt h maternal death hiv/aids － － 〇 － ◎ － ◎ 〇 ◎ 〇 tb － ◎ 〇 ◎ ◎ ◎ － 〇 ◎ 〇 heart diseases ◎ － － ◎ ◎ 〇1 〇1 〇 ◎ － cancer － － － ◎ ◎ － － 〇 〇 〇 undernutrition － － － ◎ ◎ － － 〇 〇 〇 anemia － － ◎ － － － － 〇 〇 － 〇 － ◎ － － － － 〇 〇 － i/ d s n c d s n u tr it io n amr － － － － － － － 〇 〇 － notes: 1. we categorized antibiotics and antivirals as an indirect solution in the sense of stopping overuse and misuse of them prevents the expansion of amr a c c e s s t o m e d ic in e i n d e x a c c e s s t o d x i n d e x a c c e s s t o n u tr it io n i n d e x a c c e s s t o n u tr it io n i n d e x a c c e s s t o d ig it a l t e c h i n d e x this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:22:39 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience koshiba: expanding private investment in global health separately from the commercial base. finally, these indices typically target large, multinational conglomerates which constantly seek external funding and large amounts of investment. however, it is more important for this proposed framework to focus on new technologies and businesses operated by small and medium-sized corporations all over the world. while there may be some negative impact from increasing the available number of indices, it is more important to pursue ways to improve global health by establishing new tools. to encourage more engagement from private industries in global health, such an index for new industries created after re-mapping contributors would be indispensable. it is important to provide adequate supplies and to install relevant products and services into lmics. while valuable, the index approach is not the only way to encourage private investment. there are other channels to consider. for example, if we can promote the harmonization of regulations regarding medicaland healthcare-related products and services among different countries, private corporations could enter more markets. even during the r&d phase of new technologies, current international cooperation is insufficient for clinical trials. encouraging public-private collaborative projects beyond borders could accelerate global health research by private corporations. key to this challenge, the recent reform of un procurement and public procurement mechanisms in emerging countries has huge potential to encourage private industries to invest in the global health field. after this reform, countries observe more and more private corporations joining its public tender as suppliers; japanese companies are one example of this trend. because of this contribution, the access and delivery of services and technologies is improving for some cancer patients in these countries. this kind of social system reform leads to behavioral change in private corporations and could also make headway regarding the “s” of the esg framework, as discussed below. advocate for the reform of un procurement and public procurement mechanisms in emerging countries the world bank group (wb) introduced a new procurement framework and regulations called the “new procurement framework” in 20158. although implementation of the new scheme began in july 2016, a couple of years will be necessary before it covers the entire range of procurement-related programs of the wb. the most significant change in the new procurement framework is the shift from seeking the “lowest evaluated compliant bid” to seeking the bid that “provides the best overall value for the money,” which allows the wb to balance quality, cost, and other factors when selecting suppliers. by transitioning to the new framework, the wb is expected to play a more active role in contract management of procurements to pursue greater overall value, 8 “the world bank: new procurement framework and regulations for projects after july 1, 2016”, the world bank, accessed march 19, 2018, http://www.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/products-andservices/brief/procurement-new-framework#framework this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:22:39 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms http://www.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/products-and-services/brief/procurement-new-framework#framework http://www.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/products-and-services/brief/procurement-new-framework#framework 60 consilience even though this strategy requires it to account for additional risk factors in order to ensure the best possible outcomes. however, focusing on greater value in procurements can allow the wb to make a better contribution towards its development goals. the most important characteristic of the new system is its emphasis on value for money (vfm). this change will influence how global procurement throughout the wb is conducted. the attention to the vfm principle will also result in changes to standard bidding document forms, including the request for bid (rfb) and request for proposal (rfp) forms. the rfp form now allows greater flexibility when responding to the “specification” and “design” options. other significant changes have been made to the evaluation criteria. the wb is adopting a more comprehensive framework for evaluation that incorporates mid and long-term maintenance costs, safety considerations, environmental and social considerations, and various qualitative factors. although such evaluation criteria have commonly been used in national private financial initiative programs, the new wb procurement framework also applies these concepts to the international development field. thus, greater attention must be paid to balancing lifecycle impacts of programs and their multidimensional cost. to give a direct comparison, under the previous rfb system, “cost-related” criteria accounted for 70% of the bid evaluation and “quality” criteria for the remaining 30%, whereas under the new scheme “quality” accounts for up to 50% of the evaluation. this change will apply to all types of procurements, from goods and services to consultancies. given that the annual amount of the wb’s procurement is about 64 billion usd, the new scheme will have a huge impact on affected businesses and suppliers9. the annual procurement volume of the united nations (un) and its funds, programs, specialized agencies, and other divisions totals about 20 billion usd, half of which is for the procurement of goods. in the coming years, the total un budget is likely to decline. however, the volume of the un-related procurement is still huge, existing as “a global marketplace.” the wb and the un, to a significant extent, have a shared agenda and have many collaborative projects. the wb has some influence on the un’s agenda setting, policy making, and on-site implementation. when the two (or more) organizations implement a joint procurement, the procurement policy of one organization could be used by other collaborative partners in similar situations. therefore, the new scheme of the wb could affect the procurement policies of other international agencies, especially as the sustainable development goals (sdgs) become more widespread. we expect that the new wb scheme will create a good opportunity to support international agencies, governmental policymakers, and multinational private corporations and to help reconsider the meaning of “sustainable development” and ways that “sustainable procurement” can be pursued as part of the sdgs. one 9 united nations office for project services, “major purchase orders and contracts by un organization,” 2015 annual statistical report on united nations procurement, 2016, https://www.unops.org/sitecollectiondocuments/asr/asr_2015_major_purcha se_orders_and_contracts.pdf, accessed on july 31st, 2017 this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:22:39 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms https://www.unops.org/sitecollectiondocuments/asr/asr_2015_major_purchase_orders_and_contracts.pdf https://www.unops.org/sitecollectiondocuments/asr/asr_2015_major_purchase_orders_and_contracts.pdf consilience koshiba: expanding private investment in global health example of this is found in japan. since 2009, the government of japan has renewed its strategy on public– private partnerships for international development and begun accepting proposals from private companies, organizations, and universities that plan to enter into the market in developing countries. these private entities intend to pursue not only profit, but also social objectives to contribute to international development and cooperation. the ministry of foreign affairs, the japan international cooperation agency (jica) and the ministry of economy, trade, and industry are working collaboratively to implement and manage public-private partnerships. this new scheme was originally called the “preparatory survey for base of pyramid (bop) business promotion” and was renamed the “feasibility survey for sdgs business promotion” in 2017. it has already adopted more than 100 proposals by private entities, ranging from infrastructure-related plans to projects with social objectives. many intend to improve development problems and introduce innovative solutions in developing countries for issues such as the prevention of hospital-acquired infections, vector control, the improvement of malnutrition, and the introduction of renewable energy sources. this governmental program provides financial assistance for feasibility studies. figure 9: preparatory survey for bop business promotion: examples of adopted projects source: japan international cooperation agency, “preparatory survey for bop business promotion – list of projects,” 2017, https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/ 2017/8/1, accessed july 31st, 2017 several private entities that have received support are providing their own products to contribute to solving and improving development issues in target countries. the sales models of these businesses show that one of their targets is public procurement, including by the un and its concerned parties. japanese products tend to be “high quality but high cost,” and this has long ghana 【ajinomoto co., inc.】 preparatory survey on bop business on nutrient enriched food during weaning period （2010.8） uganda 【saraya co., ltd.】 preparatory survey on bop business on infection control with new alcohol hand rub （2011.6） brazil 【fruta fruta , inc.】 preparatory survey on bop business on green economy development through agroforestry system promotion and forest conservation （2011.6） myanmar 【panasonic corporation】 preparatory survey on bop business for solar storage unit and solar lantern （2015.7） india 【daiwa house industry co., ltd.】 preparatory survey on bop business on japanese industrialized housings in india (bop business promot ion survey) （2011.12） senegal 【yamaha motor co.,ltd.】 preparatory survey on bop business on village water supply with clean water system in west africa （2010.8） this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:22:39 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 62 consilience been a characteristic of goods “made in japan.” recently, some japanese manufacturers have been trying to cooperate with local and foreign companies to create a new type of product that is “made with japan.” however, they are just in the beginning stages of these efforts. it is important to note, as previously mentioned, that the approval of the new procurement framework by the wb will potentially increase the use of the vfm concept in the procurement systems of international agencies. these practices will spread to current emerging and developing countries. because of this, more “high cost but high quality” goods and services will be purchased and will make an even greater contribution to “sustainable procurement for sustainable development” than ever before. of course, businesses must continuously push to control costs without reducing quality. a new initiative on “open contracting” in emerging countries is moving forward. “open contracting” is the reform of public procurement mechanisms to improve transparency and accountability for sustainable development. public procurement system reform has been conducted in ukraine for the last 3 years. additionally, most of the countries in the southern common market (mercosur) are joining the initiative. behind the discussion on “open contracting,” there is a motivation to encourage local authorities to be more accountable. this includes including clarifying their attitude towards anti-corruption and promoting eprocurement to achieve higher efficiency and to improve the effectiveness of their system. in 2013, the price for anticancer drugs in ukraine was 40% higher than market price. only a few suppliers were operating. the minister of health made a fundamental reform on medicine supplies to assign undp, unicef, and crown agents as the procurement agencies for anti-hiv drugs, anti-tb drugs, and anticancer drugs to promote the reform in 2016. by sticking the knife into vested interests, 38% of the procurement cost were reduced from 2015. furthermore, the number of suppliers increased from 2-3 to 29. they improved the quality of goods and held strict observance of delivery times. with this political reform, new foreign companies, including japanese companies, are also joining the public tender in ukraine. in 2017, due to the savings achieved, ukraine was able to procure coronary stents for all patients for the first time ever. before then, only 50% of the patients had received treatment. the ukrainian ministry of health is internally considering a new division to manage a comprehensive system for public procurement, to be installed in 2020. figure 10: editorial by the lancet on ukrainian reform on public procurement source: “measles, war, and health-care reforms in ukraine”, the lancet vol. 392 (september 2018). ◼ “the health-care reforms, led by us-born uluana suprun, profiled in this week’s issue, include the introduction of an internal market structure, a shift of care from a hospital to a community-based service, and the elimination of corruption and bribery.” ◼ “patients currently make up the 45.6% shortfall of the 7.6% of gdp spent on health with out-of-pocket and informal payments.” ◼ “bed numbers and patients’ average length of hospital stay will be reduced. western-backed support for the reforms comes from the un development programme, unicef, and the uk procurement agency, crown agents, now responsible for purchasing 5.9 billion ukrainian hryvnia (about us$ 212 million) of medicines for the country.” ◼ “the service— developed from the soviet semashko system—is seen by many as inefficient and inequitable; nevertheless some politicians and doctors remain opposed to the changes.” ◼ “more generally, the world bank has also endorsed ukraine’s efforts to achieve lasting economic recovery.” this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:22:39 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience koshiba: expanding private investment in global health conclusion for years, the established communities for global health issues have been those organized by the pharmaceutical and the food and beverage industries. their main objectives were to discuss innovative social mechanisms, promote r&d of products mainly for lmics, and subsidize those purchases. we have, however, come to recognize that it is necessary to promote the participation of more diverse industries which have great potential to contribute to global health issues. in the last decade, diagnostic industries have had an increasing presence in the field. for the last few years, industries focusing on supply chain management and cold chains have especially been adopting novel digital technologies such as ai and machine learning. however, we must reflect on what more we can do to get different players involved with global health. it is one of the most complex issues internationally, and yet there is not a holistic and adequate understanding who is actually working and what kind of products and technologies have potential. thus, we need to re-map the contributors to global health issues and solutions. based on this re-mapping, an index for new industries to evaluate and visualize the performance of corporations would be indispensable so that we can induce more engagement from private companies in global health. such an index couples well with the recent trend of esg investment to attract more interest from social investors, which can lead to more engagement from new industries. there is a particularly high expectation that creating a new index would make a huge impact for diagnostic industries and new digital technology-related industries. however, the index approach is not the only way to encourage more investment from private industries. it is also important to reform certain established social systems in the world. the reform of un procurement and public procurement mechanisms in emerging countries could have a huge potential to encourage engagement by private industries on global health issues. that, too, could also contribute to the “s” of the esg framework. figure 11: basic framework for sustainable development in global health source: author’s own. ◼ conclusion for this paper < intervening opportunities from the perspectives on “social infrastructure” to provide products/services > 1. re-map of & engagement from industrial sector 2. advocacy on reform of un/public procurement “corporate taxonomy” & new evaluation/index reform on public procurement more engagement from more industries presence by more suppliers incl. foreign companies private investment effective/efficient provision of product/service adequate implementation on public procurement g /h p ro m o ti o n new indices for various private industries more private investment for r&d, engagement… adequate provision/installation of products/services contribution to g/h, sustainable development needs matching (quality, function) un tender/ public procurement regulatory affairs (harmonization) clinical trial delivery maintenance supply management/ stockpiling leasing system ・・・ this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:22:39 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 64 consilience furthermore, there are other intervening opportunities based on social infrastructure to enhance the provision of products/services by encouraging commitments from private industries. continuous r&d investment in innovative products is always really indispensable. to innovate and to drastically change the social situation surrounding global health issues, we must develop a new type of solution. for that, we need to promote r&d investment and support r&d within the private sector. in some industries, several established product development partnerships (pdps) collaboratively work together with private companies to invent new products, especially medicines and diagnostic devices. these pdps have great capacity to work in other industries, too. in some cases, an accelerator program to seek ideas for new technology-based products and to support the scaling-up of such new disruptive solutions is necessary. clinical trial is also key. to support r&d, establishing networks with and collaborative environments in local institutions in emerging and developing countries for clinical trial is also indispensable. international ngos and local ngos could be additional strong partners for clinical trials. thus, private companies should have a deeper understanding of their culture and way of thinking. a multiple stakeholder approach may be more effective to enhance collaboration based on better mutual understandings. similarly, regulatory harmonization has garnered more and more attention in recent years. current regulatory affairs also pose a challenge to putting products and solutions into the field. recently, the coordination of regulations among countries and regions is being implemented. to provide solutions more efficiently, regulatory harmonization is sine qua non. what ultimately matters is to take regulatory harmonization one step further by investing in capacity building for regulators and policymakers in lmics at the same time. unfortunately, there is still a severe problem regarding product delivery. “last-mile” interventions should be prioritized as well to reach underserved populations and to minimize negative factors affecting sustainability. japanese players have been establishing distribution systems in asean countries to some extent; however, there has not been enough done in african countries. in such areas, we need to work collaboratively with global cooperation. alongside last-mile interventions, there are also challenges in supply chain management and even stockpiling, in some cases. stockpiling strategies, such as supply division storage by unicef for development and emergency situations, and the international depot by the united nations humanitarian response depot (unhrd) for emergency relief, enable prompt action when emergency demands need to be met. although the japan disaster relief team uses unhrd depot for emergency cases, the japanese private sector does not fully understand its existence and importance. for both developmental and emergency purposes, a more efficient and effective system for supply management based on a public-private collaborative approach will be required to increase efficiency and effectiveness. lastly, maintenance of installed products and the introduction of leasing contracts should be considered. as products and services become more high-tech, maintenance in developing countries becomes more important. to pursue sustainable development, we should not accept a culture in which products are disposable and thrown away while similar goods are repurchased. it is vital to determine how to provide maintenance through the private sector and how to foster the use of local agencies. it would be worth considering contracting to provide such this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:22:39 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience koshiba: expanding private investment in global health products. the use of leasing will become more common as we seek to reduce procurement costs and to promote adequate maintenance. for example, leasing systems for automobiles, agricultural machines, construction machines, and some back-office products such as photocopiers could be applied to the un procurement system. while a new, holistic valuation framework based on remapping of global health contributors and procurement reforms can encourage different companies to invest in complex international issues, there are still many other aspects that we should consider to inspire more and more private corporations to make a contribution to global health issues. some of them would also lead to broader stake in sdgs. to materialize these concepts, we believe that we need to take action with the evidence and suggestions provided in this paper. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:22:39 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms microsoft word hollender_ addressed micro edits.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 15, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 50-76 capitalizing on public discourse in bolivia – evo morales and twenty-first century capitalism rebecca hollender the new school hollr061@newschool.edu abstract the 2005 election of evo morales as the president of bolivia marked a moment of celebration for the social movements who backed the rise to power of the movimiento al socialismo party (mas – movement for socialism), with morales as its leader. morales adopted discourses derived from popularly supported buen vivir, alternatives to development, social and solidarity economies, and other forms of localized political and economic autonomy, creating a politics of possibility around such proposals. however, despite initial commitments and actions taken by morales to improve wellbeing without replicating historically unsustainable and destructive pathways to industrial development, bolivia continues to be characterized by fiscal dependence and macroeconomic prioritization of growth-centric policies sustained by extractive activities. in addition, the country is now rife with socioenvironmental conflict. this paper will explore morales’ neglect of longer-term political goals for economic independence, selfsufficiency, and sustainability by considering competing theories of social movements, political parties, and the state that provide different lenses for understanding mas’ abandonment of its original political platform for change, twenty-first century socialism (socialismo del siglo xxi). the paper reveals how the current scenario creates new barriers for the social movements that uphold proposals for sustainable futures, including deepened structural entrenchment in extractivism, the cooptation of alternatives to development proposals by government, the division of once-unified popular fronts, shifting electoral constituencies, and the emergence of new economic elites. lessons from the bolivian case are significant for guiding wider efforts at building sustainable alternatives to capitalist development. consilience hollender: evo-morales 1. introduction latin american social movements and cycles of struggle the 2005 election of evo morales as the president of bolivia marked a moment of celebration for the social movements who backed the rise of the movimiento al socialismo party (mas – movement for socialism), with morales as its leader. the emergence of mas came at a time of increasing social organization and resistance across latin america against the negative socioeconomic and environmental effects of nearly two decades of structural adjustment policies, neoliberal political reforms, and heavy-handed foreign involvement across public sectors (reyes 2012). throughout latin america various “moments of rupture,” marked by increasing social uprising and protests beginning in the 1980s, resulted in the formation, rise to popularity, and election of “progressive” political parties in venezuela, brazil, argentina, bolivia, ecuador, uruguay, paraguay, nicaragua, el salvador and peru. in addition, a number of regional integration institutions (alba, unasur, mercosur, celac) were created to promote regional collaboration and the implementation of shared progressive agendas (ibid.). while the histories, contexts, and dynamics of the social movement uprisings and election victories have their own particularities, their parallel and interrelated emergence reflects the existence of a broader “cycle of struggle” against the penetration of the continent by globally dominant socioeconomic forces, including neoliberal development, globalization, and imperialism (ibid.). despite the initial success of latin american social movements to place populist, progressive, and anti-systemic candidates at the helm of states, and the subsequent improvements in economic and traditional development indicators in most of these countries, the more radical promises by many of these candidates have gone unmet. the increasing (albeit uneven) opening of these countries to transnational corporations and private capital, the expansion of extractive industries and mega-infrastructure, and continued entrenchment of illicit drug, arms, and mining activities reveal grave contradictions between political discourse and practice (hollender 2015, villegas 2013 and 2014). these activities have resulted in serious environmental, social, and economic consequences, as well as new impediments to achieving the sustainable pathways originally envisioned by the groups who supported these governments’ rise to power. in turn, these countries have seen a shift in the composition of political constituencies, including the rise of new opposition movements, which are consilience 52 frequently met with repressive silencing tactics, and the backing of progressive governments by unlikely supporters that blur traditional left – right divisions. this paper will examine the phenomena of the abandoned political agendas of progressive latin american countries by focusing on the experience of bolivia under evo morales and the mas party. it will examine a number of competing theories of social movements, political parties, and the state that provide different lenses for understanding mas’ abandonment of its original radical political platform for change, known as twentyfirst century socialism (socialismo del siglo xxi). the rise to power of evo morales and mas “...the election of evo morales did not bring about a revolution. it was a revolution that brought about the government of evo morales.” (forrest and thomson 2007) morales’s political legacy is rooted in the coca growers federations of cochabamba (confederación cocalero del trópico de cochabamba), where he grew in prominence as a leader, thanks to his charisma, indigenous descent, and revolutionary discourse. out of this base, morales attracted the backing of broad swaths of social movements, progressive intellectuals, academics, leftists, and policy analysts within bolivia, latin america, and globally. together with his supporters he constructed a political platform that promised improvements in material and non-material well-being without replicating the unsustainable and destructive pathways to industrialization taken by the north. mas raised (and continues to raise) expectations that bolivia could achieve universal and culturally-appropriate standards of well-being (according to the values and principles of buen vivir1) through inclusive and endogenous processes. the rhetoric vowed to simultaneously liberate the country from oppressive forces of capitalism and imperialism, while embarking on the pluriversal2 construction of sustainable alternatives. 1 the literal translation of buen vivir is “good life.” it was originally made popular by kichwa, quechua, and aymara populations in the andes, but similar concepts can be found in diverse indigenous cosmovisions around the world, for example ubuntu in south eastern africa. buen vivir incorporates a plurality of concepts, allowing for an intersection of indigenous and occidental knowledge, focusing on human well-being, the “fullness of life,” the need to coexist with nature, recognize its intrinsic value, and respect its physical limitations. buen vivir also focuses on the need to change the market’s role, position, and mechanisms, and the way in which humans relate to each other economically. (hollender 2015) 2 pluriversality is a radical democratic principle that encourages the coexistence of multiple ways of being. under morales and the new bolivian constitution, bolivia was re-named the plurinational consilience hollender: evo-morales the success of morales’s first five-year term in office was marked by the passing of a new constitution that established the preliminary framework for the construction of a non-capitalist, plurinational state. the constitution included provisions to protect the rights of the mother earth and for prioritizing buen vivir over economic indicators. despite controversy surrounding its final approval, the legislation gained morales international acclaim and a second resounding electoral victory in 2010. another widely celebrated achievement of morales’s first term was the “nationalization”3 of the oil and gas sector, a process which was followed by nationalizing portions of the telecommunications and electricity sectors in his second term. during this initial period, the mas administration enjoyed the unified support of the country’s six umbrella indigenous and peasant social movements, grouped together in the unity pact (pacto de unidad). alongside the government, the unity pact bolstered their resistance against external forces of domination by demonstrating how the imposition of neoliberalism, capitalism, and imperialism resulted in negative consequences for bolivia’s people, environment, and economy. simultaneously they engaged in participatory processes for rebuilding the country’s institutional and legislative framework to enable the construction of sustainable alternatives, essential pieces for bolivia’s “process of change” (proceso de cambio). however, over the course of morales’s second mandate (2010-2015), the coherence of mas’ anti-capitalist and antiimperialist discourse began to unravel, as did the tightly woven social fabric of the unity pact. in addition to the unity pact disbanding into pro and anti-government factions, a number of the individual social movement members of the pact have also split, a process which has weakened the ability of these groups to influence political outcomes, as will be examined later in the paper. a comprehensive description of the contradictory events, processes, and policy outcomes that began over the course of morales’s second term and continue into the present is beyond the scope of this paper. however, during this period (from around 2006-present), it became evident that mas had abandoned both its radical political platform state of bolivia (estado plurinacional de bolivia), acknowledging the countries’ prioritization of the harmonious and mutually respectful co-existence of multiple indigenous and non-indigenous identities. 3 nationalization appears in quotes because of doubts that have been raised by analysts as to the validity of this term. villegas (2013) reveals how the nationalization of oil, gas, and mining sectors across progressive latin american countries was, in reality, a restructuring of contracts between host countries and private corporations that maintains preferential access for transnational corporations and reduces the possibilities for bolivia to gain from the industrialization process. consilience 54 and the movements that enabled its rise to power. this is revealed by three parallel and interwoven trends that will be described briefly in the following section: (1) the unbridled development of legislation and policies favorable to private, capitalist, and transnational interests, often through non-transparent and noninclusive processes; (2) the rise of protest and opposition groups from within morales’s original bases of support, which has been met by the bolivian government with repression (sometimes violent) and manipulative tactics to fragment, coopt, and punish social movements; (3) a shift in the composition of mas’s political constituents, including newly emerging entrepreneurial groups and members of traditional right-wing voters, such as industry and private interests. discourse vs practice: three trends reveal mas’s abandonment of political promises trend 1: twenty-first century capitalism in bolivia – policy examples the most blatant evidence of the abandonment by mas of its promises to reduce bolivia’s dependence on foreign capital and reverse over 500 years of unsustainable of extractive development has been the expansion of predatory extractivism.4 although the morales government originally opposed extractivism for being environmentally and socially destructive, unjust, economically unstable, and associated with the expansion of capitalist processes of accumulation, mas’ policy record reveals the contrary: morales has opened national parks to fossil fuel exploration, exploitation, and pipelines, reversed the process of land reform to favor private interests and large landholders, inaugurated new mining, hydroelectric projects, and highways without and/or in spite of the lack of legally-required prior informed consent by local communities (hollender 2015, bjork-james 2013, villegas 2013 and 2014, webber 2012a and 2012b). the negative impacts of these projects are documented by local communities, with the support of organized civil society groups, in efforts to build opposition campaigns to the government’s unsustainable activity.5 less 4 predatory extractivism refers to the expansion of extractive activities beyond hydrocarbons and minerals to agriculture, forestry, and fishing, and also to foreign control of arable land and water resources. it involves the use of increasingly risky technologies (such as fracking and deep-sea drilling), and reduced regard for ecosystem integrity and social rights (as extractive activities have expanded into protected areas and indigenous territories). 5 see, for example: http://tipnisresiste.blogspot.com/, http://www.somossur.net/, http://www.territoriosenresistencia.org/, http://www.ftierra.org/, http://www.cedib.org/, consilience hollender: evo-morales documented, but equally obvious to the public eye in bolivia is the proliferation of illicit drug cultivation, trafficking, and related money-laundering operations which has resulted in an unprecedented boom in bolivia’s real estate, construction, and auto import sectors. the explosion of illegal mining activities in bolivia’s remote and fragile natural areas are more widely documented (see cedib 2014). an explosion in new legislation, natural resource concessions, contracts with transnational corporations, and growth in export volumes of primary materials6 reflect the intensification of extractive fossil fuel, mining, and agroindustry activities. at the beginning of morales’s second term many of these legislative processes were hidden behind closed doors, unbeknownst to the participants of lengthy and inclusive drafting processes, often with unity pact involvement. these non-transparent and secretive legislative process provoked shock, discontent, and outcry as unrecognizable legislation was passed, sideswiping legitimate participatory processes. currently, however, mas makes fewer attempts to hide its plans. in 2014 bolivia’s chief of cabinet of the ministry of economics and public finance confirmed mas’ plans to “take advantage of the possibility of growth through the exploitation of natural resources, with the state capturing the surplus and redistributing it to social programs and to other economic sectors that generate unemployment” (webber 2014, williams and olivera 2015). likewise, the country’s vice president, alvaro garcia linera, announced the expansion of bolivia’s “agricultural frontier” at a rate of one million hectares per year until 2025 (bustillos 2015). it is expected that the country will officially legalize7 genetically modified organisms (gmos) in the coming year, despite widespread public opposition (ibid., williams and olivera 2015). while bolivia’s export-oriented extractive development model has resulted in impressive economic growth, as reflected by 6 mining growth increased from 170,000-450,000 metric tons from 2006-2012 and the value of mineral exports doubled to $1.6 billion from 2008-2013. natural gas exports also doubled to 64.54 million cubic meters/day from 2005-2014. (zibichi 2014) 7 gmos are currently prohibited by the constitution, but make up 99% of bolivia’s 1 million acres of soy, and significant percentages of the country’s sugar cane and wheat crops. in 2013 mas legislators took a first step toward legalizing gmos through the use of ambiguous and contradictory language in the 2013 law of agrarian reform (ley de la reforma agraria), which was passed in secret and without consideration of years of participatory work on the law’s proposal by the unity pact and bolivian campesino movements. consilience 56 bolivia’s continuously increasing gdp8 (until early 2014), social spending, and international reserves9, bolivia’s 2015 growth and budget projections reflect government plans to cut back in the face of plummeting mineral, gas, and oil prices.10 villegas questions the soundness of many economic decisions taken by the mas government in order to attract private capital and foreign investment to bolivia’s extractive sector. for example, bolivia’s mining law, rewritten in 2014, includes a provision that allows transnational mining corporations to cease tax payments if mineral prices drop below certain thresholds. due to the current (predicted) drop in global commodity prices, bolivia is not receiving tax payments for minerals extracted by international companies aside from those removing zinc ores (villegas 2013 and 2014). another questionable response by bolivia to the commodity crash has been to make up for lost revenue by increasing rates of mining and gas exploitation in conjunction with increasing the taxation of citizens, a perverse bailout by bolivian taxpayers (villegas 2014). not only do these policies contradict mas’ policy discourse, they result in a further embedding of bolivia in capitalist relationships of economic volatility and dependency on foreign capital, environmental destruction, and inequality, making it even more difficult for bolivia to follow the alternative pathways to well-being that many social movement groups still uphold (hollender 2015). trend 2: internal outcry and repression of dissent mas’ contradictory policies have sparked costly internal economic and political problems. many waves of anti-morales protests, such as the tipnis highway controversy, have attracted global attention due to their magnitude.11 less visible are the near 8 since 2005 the economy has grown at an average of 5% annually, due to high international prices for primary materials and growth in export volumes. (zibichi 2014, villegas 2015) 9 international reserves exploded from $1.7 $14.43 billion from 2005-2013, representing 47% of gdp. (zibichi 2014). 10 the sustainability of basing social spending and redistribution programs on finite resources has been widely critiqued, as has the effectiveness of the programs (hollender 2015). 11 perhaps the most visible of these is the conflict surrounding the highway project in the isiborosécure national park and indigenous territory (tipnis) in bolivia. in 2008 the bolivian government signed an agreement with brazil to finance and build a 177km highway through the legal territory of three indigenous groups (64 communities). tipnis is also a national park with globally significant biodiversity. the brazilian development bank (bndes) agreed to finance 80% of the highway construction leaving the remaining 20% to the bolivian government. in a questionable bidding process, the brazilian construction company constructora oas ltda., was hired to carry out the project. the deal also included preferential access for brazil to the phosphates that were to be extracted along with lithium from the salar de uyuni, another controversial project (hollender & shultz 2010). the tipnis highway project was approved without consulting local communities, and consilience hollender: evo-morales daily instances of local communities defending their social and environmental rights from extractive projects and policies. the multiple forms of protest, including marches, roadblocks, occupying public spaces, hunger strikes, etc., reflect the discontent with mas’ failure to carry out the changes that their initial supporters expected (bjork-james 2013). whereas mas was once known as a “government of social movements,” morales’ second and third terms have been marked by oppressive and anti-democratic backlash tactics against the very movements that carried the party into power. such tactics include: violent repression of indigenous protest against environmentally and socially destructive projects (such as the tipnis march); stigmatization of environmentalists, critics, and opposition members as “counterrevolutionary” or secretly allied with imperialist powers12; deliberate strategies to divide and weaken opposition movements; and nepotism exercised through political and material rewards for pro-government countermobilizations that “defend the process of change” in the face of protesters (hollender 2015, zibichi 2014). as a result, the unity pact has been completely dissolved and once-unified movements split into pro and anti-government factions. the split initiated during the 65 day march to protest the tipnis highway project as a result of a series of (sometimes violent) confrontations that erupted between unity pact movements and members of conamaq and cidob movements. the confrontations revealed the diverging opinions of movement members over whether to continue supporting mas, despite the party’s growing acceptance of activities including megaprojects and predatory extractivism. the more critical factions of both conamaq and cidob, which eventually split off to form new, “organic” movements, are concerned that these activities necessitate forming relationships of dependency with transnational corporations and multi-lateral development banks, violating legal environmental and social safeguards, and increasing the extent to aroused fierce opposition, including a 65 day, 526 km protest march from tipnis to la paz. the march met violent government repression resulting in 72-280 protesters injured. the highway project was temporarily suspended, but the conflict has yet to be resolved. (see bjork-james 2013, villegas 2013, and www.territoriosenresistencia.org) 12 the labeling by evo morales of northern environmentalism as a new “predatory colonialism” at the un “rio+20” conference and in other international forums has resulted in mixed messages to the international environmental community. see articles in bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-21/bolivia-s-morales-calls-environmentalismpredatory-colonialism.html) and at ejolt (http://www.ejolt.org/2013/10/full-bellyenvironmentalism-of-lead/) consilience 58 which bolivia’s economy is wedded to volatile global markets and neoliberal policy institutions. while continued loyalty to mas has afforded economic and political benefits to pro-government factions (see below), pact members who have been vocal in exposing mas’ betrayal accuse the government of engaging in physical violence, looting of headquarters, and corruption tactics in order to “manipulate, divide, and influence of the functional and representative bodies of the indigenous peoples of bolivia” (achtenbeg 2014, zibichi 2014). aside from the physical, psychological, and economic impacts of mas’ tactics in the short-run, bolivian social movements can no longer focus their efforts on building sustainable and culturally appropriate alternatives to global systems of domination, but instead must confront internal repression by their own government (gutierrez 2012, reyes 2012). ironically, the success of bolivian social movements to bring mas to power has led to a deterioration of the conditions and possibilities for legitimate political participation upon which the success of the movements has been measured (ibid.). in addition to government repression of social movements, four highly-regarded bolivian non-profit organizations13 that conduct research and analysis on the economic, social, and environmental implications of extractive activities, natural resource concessions, land reform, agro-industry expansion, international investment relationships, etc. and have been accused by the government of “lying and political meddling” for criticizing the expanding extractive development model (achtenberg 2015a).14 the data collection, analysis, and documentation done by these ngos is crucial for understanding the relationship of local environmental, social, and economic conditions to national and global policies and trends, with findings that have implications far beyond bolivia’s borders. there is concern that mas’s backlash on critical voices in civil society, including those of ngos and social movements, threatens intellectual and academic knowledgeproduction, political organizing, and ultimately, democratic processes. trend 3: unlikely solidaritiesindigenous bourgeoisie and traditional elite 13 the four ngos include the center for the study of labor and agrarian development (cedla), the bolivian center for documentation and information (cedib), and the tierra and milenio foundations. 14 in addition to cracking down on bolivian ngos who are critical of mas policies, the government expelled danish ngo ibis in 2013 for its involvement in supporting indigenous communities around their legal right to free and prior informed consent in their territories, and has mandated that all foreign and domestic ngos undergo a registration process, including approval of their social contribution (achtenberg 2015a). consilience hollender: evo-morales given the shifting loyalties of the mas government away from its pro-indigenous political agenda to uphold local environmental and social priorities, it isn’t surprising that the political constituencies in bolivia have shifted. in overall terms mas continues to be the favored party nationally, as evidenced by its 61% presidential victory in october 2014 and its retaining of the majority of legislative seats (majority in six out of nine departments), municipal mayor positions (66% popular vote across municipalities nationally), and departmental governorships (secure wins in 4 departments, leading in 2 contested elections) in subnational elections in march 2015. however, upon closer look it is possible to see significant shifts in party loyalty away from previous supporters and towards non-traditional constituencies. for example, the breakdown of votes from the 2014 presidential election reveals significant losses in support from traditional stronghold aymara and quechua indigenous populations in la paz, el alto, and cochabamba (fidler 2015). in sub-national elections in 2015 mas also lost key positions including governor of la paz, mayor of el alto, and mayor of cochabamba (ibid.). however, for the first time mas won a majority of votes in the presidential election in santa cruz, which is the traditional seat of power of the agroindustry lobby and large land holding elite. this victory is thought to reflect the strategic alliance with the country’s traditionally right-winged agricultural oligarchy, which is the primary beneficiary of the largescale expansion of agro-industrial sectors, such as soy, timber, cattle ranging into the country’s forested lowlands (zibichi 2014). these election results reflect the abandonment of mas by lowland indigenous communities as they witness the government hand over land concessions, once promised to grant permanent rights to ancestral territories, over to agribusiness and timber interests (achtenber 2015b). outside of election results, the (coercive) reorganization of social movements and the rise of a new indigenous elite also reveal new unlikely government allies and foes. the tumultuous breakup of the unity pact has created rival offshoots of previously united social movements, divided according to pro vs antigovernment stance. in addition, the significant economic growth in the country has contributed to a rise of a new economic elite in bolivia, who do not form part of the traditionally right-leaning elite. this group, often referred to as the “new indigenous bourgeoisie,” is made up of agricultural producers and traders in bolivia’s low-lying areas and small mining cooperatives in the highlands15 (williams and olivera 15 while highland mining cooperatives have been granted protection to mining concessions, practices, and market access in the face of state and private-sector mining companies, these consilience 60 2015). the emerging bourgeoisie reflects a new entrepreneurial spirit embodying the values of homo economicus16 and defying the revolutionary stereotype that has come to characterize members of bolivia’s popular classes. the financial times has drawn attention to the economic savvy of this group, who engage in “responsible” practices of savings, investment, fiscal austerity, and responsiveness to the market (financial times 2014). also noteworthy is the crucial role that these new market-driven sectors play in facilitating alliances between the government and key sectors of international capital, thereby “opening the door to transnational corporations…” (williams and olivera 2015). mas has capitalized on the “ethnic” support it receives from the new bourgousie, whose presence gives the appearance of continued indigenous backing on the surface, despite social movement upheaval.17 sociologist sarela paz confirms that mas’ composition has changed: “it’s a reflection of the breakdown of the popular coalition and the rise of a new power structure whose epicenter is partnership and coordination between eastern agribusiness sectors, oil sectors, and emerging sectors using ethnic rooting as a device for political mobilization” (zibichi 2014). 2. theoretical analysis despite the blatant contradictions that underlie morales’ radical political rhetoric, the mas government continues to pay lip service to the original campaign platform. the remainder of this paper will explore different explanations for the abandonment by mas of its political promises. it will draw from theories of social movements, political parties, and the state, but ultimately argue that cooperatives are notorious for engaging in exploitative labor practices, unregulated mineral refining processes, illegal acquisition of concessions from indigenous territories, tax fraud, and political corruption that have devastating effects on local communities and ecosystems and distort the economic context of the mining sector. (villegas and gandarillas 2014) 16 a term referring to john steward mills (1874) conceptualization of the rational economic man, based on the argument that human behavior is grounded in pursuing self-interest and personal profit, denying the possibility of collective values, altruism, or reciprocity that are traditionally associated with andean culture. 17 the government continually uses a series of rhetorical and political tools to mask the implications of their betrayal of political promises. for example, the incorporation of indigenous concepts, styles of dress, rituals, and language into the governments’ promotion and celebration of new extractive projects is a manipulative and contradictory tool of cooptation (bjork-james 2013: 257). these tactics serve to minimize the importance of environmental criteria in decision-making and distract from the fact that now-declining social spending and budget booms are based on finite resources. consilience hollender: evo-morales the interaction of these realms together, and with wider economic and political contexts, is required for understanding bolivia’s case. social movement theory “any analysis of movement outcomes must examine the structure and strategies of the relevant exogenous political actors and institutions.” (andrews 2001, p73) one possible frame for understanding the abandonment of political promises by morales is to look at whether and how social movements contributed to this abandonment. although social movements celebrated morales’ victory, they were unable to further effectuate their longer-term political goals for economic independence, self-sufficiency, sustainability, etc. this section will examine social movement theories that postulate how the structures, objectives, and strategies of social movements influence their ability to influence policy making and to resist forces of repression. social movements are considered important actors in agenda setting, and for their ability to influence the discourse, procedures, and behavior of states (keck and sikking 1999). as such, they contribute to the creation of “policy windows,” or the unique opportunities for policy proposals to be adopted by decision-makers, resulting in changes in the policy status quo (baumgartner and jones 2009, keeler 1993). the introduction illustrated the extraordinary political circumstances in latin america in the late 90’s and early 2000’s, which were marked by the electoral victories of progressive leaders in more than half the countries in the region. while it is impossible to pin down the exact factors that allowed for this unusual degree of policy change, it is certain that the region’s social movements were instrumental. one hypothesis is that the cumulative efforts of national and regional social movements created a “moment of rupture” (or policy window) that allowed a new type of leadership and political agenda to take the policy stage (changing the policy status quo) (reyes 2012). in bolivia, breaking the status quo involved the election of the world’s first indigenous president, followed shortly with the passing into legislation of the new constitution, both exceptional examples of policy change. another possible explanation of this unique historical moment in latin american history is kingdon’s (2003) multiple streams theory, which attributes policy change to the coming together of problem, policy, and politics. applied to bolivia, the rise of distinct social movements who each proposed alternatives to neoliberalism (problem) occurred at a time when national and consilience 62 regional political environments were favorable to the replacement of neoliberal regimes (politics) with progressive presidents (policy). with this socio-political confluence in place, unified social movements enabled the leadership that would later be responsible for policy formulation and implementation. in addition to contributing to the conditions for policy change, social movements employ a number of organizational and tactical strategies that allow them to have an impact on policy. in latin america the strategies of social movements cannot be understood in isolation, but must be seen as the result of accumulated learning from previous and parallel social and political struggles. in other words, the contiguous “cycles of revolt” that have marked the continent since colonial times cannot be taken separately from the current movement’s achievements (reyes 2012). for example, it can be argued that characteristics of the communal and traditional structures of bolivia’s indigenous communities, in continuous evolution since precolonial times, have been inherited by modern social movements (mignolo 2010). in addition, the lessons afforded by bolivia’s transition to democracy in the 1980’s has been important for preparing new social movement leaders (including morales himself), as well as for creating a political dynamic responsive to movement-led change (centellas 2015). finally, morrow and torres (2007) argue that the strength of transnational civil society in latin america, which encompasses a wider group of political actors and is itself a product of historical trajectories of struggle and change, provided support and contributed to the initial success of bolivian movements. deliberately generating cumulative efforts and impacts is also an important strategy of social movements, as shown by andrews (2001) in his examination of the mississippi civil rights movement. andrews defines successful social movements, not in terms of isolated legislative changes or electoral victories, but via their ability to present a sustained challenge to existing power relations. this discrepancy is important for evaluating the extent to which bolivian social movements were “successful” beyond initial presidential and legislative victories. andrews demonstrates how the mississippi civil rights movement was able to impact policy implementation continuously and across levels by focusing on a combination of “infrastructure” (including organizational structure, resources, and leadership) and mechanisms of influence (including disruption, persuasion, and bargaining). his resulting “movement infrastructure model” can be applied to the six movements of the unity pact to evaluate their ability to achieve long-term viability and impact. according to andrews’ model, the strong initial infrastructure of the unity pact movements, each with their own consilience hollender: evo-morales organizational structures, autonomous decision-making processes, and independent leadership, should have served to reduce threats to disarm or weaken them. however, this infrastructure changed after morales’ election when many social movement leaders were given roles within the mas party. also at this time, government resources were channeled to support the movements of the unity pact in the form of funding, office space, etc. the newly blurred boundaries that resulted from mas taking power may have contributed to the dissolution of the unity pact over time. whereas the leadership of evo morales was originally strategic for the unity pact, the resulting recruitment of pact leaders by mas split their loyalty between movement and government, setting the stage for later instances of cooptation and corruption. pact members who maintained independent funding streams from international actors or members of transnational civil society became targets of mas’ attack for having alleged ties to imperialist interests (zibichi 2014). according to andrew’s theory, the relationships of dependency and related conflicts of interests of social movement leaders explains the inability of the unity pact to withstand divisive, cooptive, and corrupt tactics by the bolivian government. the pact’s eventual disbanding prevented the movements from following up on implementation and compliance of the policy agenda and legislation that they’d fought so hard to achieve. theories of political parties “mas is…the product of the accumulation of social forces around which today commands scant consensus and remains poorly defined with regard to its precise political and ideological whims.” (harten 2014) although the means through which bolivian social movements gained insertion into national policy-making was through the formation of a successful political party, mas, the decline in coherence and impact of the unity pact is insufficient for explaining the behavior of morales and mas once elected to the presidency. since it was ultimately the mas party that failed to implement its promised agenda for change, it is necessary to investigate theories that examine the role of political parties and the state in policy change. what is important here is to examine why mas abandoned its political agenda once the party had control of the government. burstein and linton (2002) suggest that political parties with strong consilience 64 ideological leanings (such as mas) enter in a dilemma once they are elected to power. on one hand, parties are concerned with consolidating their power, either through reelection, expansion into legislative bodies, or through legislative backing. depending on the wider political environment, this might require abandoning extreme political positions in order to garner votes across diverse publics. on the other hand, parties remain concerned with transforming ideological agendas into policies (ibid.). it can be argued that during morales’ first term, the mas party was able to address both electoral and ideological concerns in a complementary fashion. the landslide presidential victory in 2005 (53.72% of votes compared to 28.62% for the closest competitor) and overwhelming support and participation from bolivia’s indigenous and social movements gave morales the endorsement he needed to move forward with bold legislative changes that simultaneously consolidated mas’ power and laid the foundation for progressive policy implementation, such as the strong social and environmental priorities that are reflected in the new constitution. as a result, the new constitution18 and nationalization measures were passed in morales’ first term despite staunch opposition from the eastern lowland “media luna” region. 19 morales was never dependent on this region for electoral victory, yet he has favored policies that are attractive to media luna voters, for example measures to expand agroindustry. this demonstrates that it is insufficient to analyze mas’ behavior according to electoral concerns alone. the party’s internal dynamics must also be evaluated. a review by centellas (2015) examines how, during its period of formation, mas employed strategies to attract allies across political sectors, including social movements and traditional bolivian parties, in order to improve its chances of winning the 2005 elections. however, after rising to power mas began to exclude longtime supporters as well as latecomers who weren’t formal party members, resulting in the alienation of some social movements and the disbanding of the unity pact (ibid.). this strategy of party consolidation suggests that mas had considerable agency in attracting and selecting from a wide pool of supporters, in contrast with narratives that attribute both mas’ existence and composition to unity pact social movements. these opposite accounts of the relationship between mas and social movements up to and during 18 the new constitution effectively re-set morales’ presidential term count to zero, allowing for him to run for a third term in october 2014, a controversial move that followed the example set by presidents chavez and correa after they instituted new constitutions in venezuela and ecuador. 19 the ruling parties of bolivia’s eastern lowland “media luna” (half moon) region are traditionally associated with transnational capital and the landholding political elite. their primary political concerns include maintaining rights to land, private property (including businesses), and natural resource royalties, essential to their economic and political power. consilience hollender: evo-morales morales’ first term have important implications for understanding the shifting constituencies that occurred after his reelection in 2010. for example, if mas was never a party of social movements, but merely cooperated with and adopted social movement discourse as an electoral strategy, its eventual betrayal of radical movements can be more easily understood. it is impossible to determine whether morales ever fully intended to pursue a radical political agenda or if wealth distribution and constitutional reform were also strategies to obtain electoral victory. however, even in his third term morales continues to espouse the anti-systemic and anti-imperialist “socialism of the twenty-first century” discourse that marked his rise to power. regardless of mas’ true priorities, the party’s policy legacy can be described as contradictory, patchy, or inconsistent at best. on one hand, morales increasingly conforms to an economic growth agenda based on extractive activities and catering to the demands of transnational corporations/interests (?). on the other hand his high spending on social programs and public services (albeit financed by extractive revenues) reflect an adherence to populist redistribution. beyond social movement and party politics, these contradictions demand a continued examination of wider contextual factors that constrain bolivia’s autonomy in policy making. theories of the state in context “…the state is not…helpless against the onslaught of global economic forces but rather an area of contestation in which political (and ideological) rivals challenge each other within the constraints and opportunities afforded by ever-changing political and economic landscapes.” (centellas 2015, p231) mas’ shifting agenda did not happen in a vacuum and cannot be understood by electoral politics and organizational dynamics alone. in order to analyze mas’ abandonment of political promises, these actions must be examined within a context of global systems that dictate a series of demands and constraints on state actors. a number of theories will be useful for understanding the role that dominant global paradigms have in influencing the behavior of the bolivian government under mas. together these theories form the backbone of a longstanding debate about whether using the state as a vehicle for change is a viable strategy for radical actors. critical theory argues that the actions of states must be understood as a function of diverse and interdependent relationships consilience 66 and contexts beyond state borders, and not limited to internal political and institutional arrangements and activities (morrow and torres 2007). in other words, no state can act in isolation from its wider context. given that the state has real needs for resources and legitimacy in order to act, not all of which are bestowed internally, it must act in accordance with certain systems in order to obtain these capacities (ibid.). depending on each state’s capacity and position, this might involve subscribing to the rules of multiple and overlapping systems of domination, such as neoliberalism, globalization, capitalism, development, and hegemonic politics. as a result, it is impossible to understand the rise of new political actors and policy agendas at the state level without considering the contextual factors that shape their motivation and behavior. in the case of bolivia, the government has justified its expansion of extractive activities and preferential treatment to foreign corporations as necessary for generating revenue for extensive social spending, a strategy that mas claims does not preclude the construction of twenty-first century socialism (hollender 2015). however, it has not gone unnoticed that this strategy coincides with the long-term interests of transnational capital. theories that examine how actions of the state are affected by and respond to dominant socioeconomic contexts might conclude that mas’ expansion of extractivism is evidence that the bolivian state has been reconstituted to serve the mandate of global economic and political prerogatives (drezner 2001, reyes 2012, gutierrez 2012). in other words, to the extent that bolivia depends on the resources and legitimacy it obtains by participating in international capitalist relationships, as rulers of the state, mas becomes at once a participant in and instrument of capitalist expansion, regardless of its ideological position.20 this allows us to draw two conclusions about mas’ mixed bag of policies: first, morales and mas have had limited room to maneuver within bolivia’s entrapment in structures of dependent development, resulting in their catering to the interests of transnational capital (and inability to uphold the environmental and social safeguards that are upheld in the new constitution); second, mas retains a certain level of autonomy as 20 this echoes concerns from post-development theorists who argue that official development policies, as an extension of capitalist agendas, are in direct contradiction with environmental and social goals. post-development theorists agree that (1) development is grounded in a universal conceptualization of modernity and progress that mimics northern models of industrialization, consumption, and economic growth, which (2) necessitates the use of top-down, coercive, forceful, or hegemonic implementation mechanisms and the elimination or cooptation of alternatives; (3) development policy furthers the global embedding of capitalist systems, norms, and institutions that serve and protect the interests of powerful elites; (4) development is in direct contradiction with its own stated environmental and social goals (gudynas 2012, escobar 2010, esteva 2013, lang et al. 2012, pieterse 1996). consilience hollender: evo-morales the government of a sovereign state, which allowed it to direct the resources generated by increased extractive activities during a commodity price boom to populist redistribution and social policies. the mix of policies has had mixed results for bolivia. for example, different groups have benefited from the high levels of social spending: first, bolivian citizens benefited from the (albeit uneven) distribution of benefits (reyes 2012, hollender 2015); second, redistributive policies reinforced the popularity of the mas government; and third, the market stability and economic growth generated by the programs were celebrated by neoliberal institutions who promote “’the market’ as the “organizing principle and objective of the state,” (reyes 2012, p11). as a result, the spending policy has been labeled as “nationally redistributive neoliberalism,” referring to the fact that while bolivia has the autonomy to designate revenue destinations, this can only occur “under the supervision of the market,” (as opposed to a socialist model of markets under state regulation) (ibid.). this relationship of market dependence is further exemplified by the measures taken by mas to attract transnational capital in the extractive industries at the expense of environmental sustainability, indigenous rights, and macroeconomic stability. hence, despite the short-term gains afforded by social spending, the very possibilities afforded by bolivia’s state leadership within a global market-driven system reveals the limited and relative nature of morales’ authority. social movements and the state “taking power is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to change the world.” (holloway 2005) “currently, emancipatory struggles occur in the midst of neoliberal capitalist relations and under a political order embodied by increasingly transnationalized nation-states.” (gutierrez 2012, p57) mas has expanded extractivism and constructed a model of social spending that is highly subjected to volatile international markets, which has taken bolivia further from conditions of wellbeing, economic independence, and alternatives to development, especially as commodity prices have plummeted (hollender 2015). whereas marxist theory might attribute this situation to the capitalist cooptation of the political party, decolonial theorists argue that the situation is far more complex (and irremediable through state processes): “the social movements have lost their position of political protagonism due to the symbolic authority afforded to the consilience 68 progressive governments while the progressive governments have in turn increasingly lost the social base necessary to produce substantive change within the state” (reyes 212, p13). this view questions whether the election of progressive leaders to the head of states should be celebrated as a victory, given that state leaders are necessarily embedded in institutions and processes that legitimize neoliberalism and capitalist globalization, the very systems which the movements elected mas to oppose. the result of the current scenario in bolivia is doubly debilitating for the social movements of the unity pact: first, the movements have been relegated from their position of influence as engaged subjects in participatory political processes to objects of government coercion and social assistance (at least until assistance runs out or becomes constrained by conservative fiscal policy due to the commodity bust); second, as a result of fragmentation and dissolution, social movements have lost the ability to effectively pressure mas to respond to their demands (reyes 2012, gutierrez 2012). as repression tactics are extended from social movements to include foreign and domestic ngos, the only voices advocating for environmental protection and sustainable alternatives to extractive development are silenced. these discouraging results require more closely examining the contradictions inherent in pursuing a strategy of radical anti-systemic change from within the structures of the state, an actor that necessarily operates within the logic of dominant systems. despite marxists’ convictions of the ability to change the world by taking state power, reyes (2012) argues that this creates a “never-ending chain of hegemony and counterhegemony” (p14) in which the demands of social movements will always be reactions to the existing social order, an irreconcilable impasse for the construction of alternatives.21 from the perspective of bolivian social movements, the initial election of morales and achievements of mas’ first term were seen as successes. for the social movement constituencies and new bourgeoisie that remain supportive of mas these successes have continued into the second and third terms. however, from the lens of radical movements, taking state power may have been one tactic among many in a wider strategy of transformation and not an end in itself, and therefore not a measure of long-term success. movement participant and anthropologist raquel gutierrez (2012) 21 this view is similar to that held by the zapatistas who are explicit in their rejection of the state as a vehicle for transformational change. they argue that power is something that some have and others don’t, and therefore taking state power will always be a tool of control and domination, involving an impossible and inescapable cycle (esteva 2014, leon de mattis 2011). massimo de angeles (2014) differentiates between “power-to” versus “power-over” as a key distinction that must be made in building strategies for confronting capitalism. consilience hollender: evo-morales argues that the notion of success held by radical social movements isn’t anchored in concrete end goals, but rather to an ideal of social emancipation. she defines this emancipatory ideal as “a growing and intermittent trajectory or itinerary that arises from the persistent state of subjection and powerlessness that we bear in order to collectively and directly intervene in the decisions about and implementation of issues that concern each and every person – what are usually called “public matters.” (this contrasts with political emancipation, or the “persistence of the capacity to subvert the dominant order,” by which andrews (2002) measures success (ibid. p58).) similarly, reyes (2012) argues that the idea of success for the radical movements only results from “the struggle for the creation of nondominination (a reordering made possible by the creation of as-yet-unknown places)” (p17). both of these visions emphasize the importance of the gradual and evolving construction of alternatives to the dominant order, above and beyond the antagonistic resistance to repressive systems. this vision resonates with a growing group of global actors engaged in radical democratic processes of open-ended, pluriversal, and prefigurative politics in order to build alternatives to capitalism, a point that will be taken up in the conclusion (hollender 2015b). what is important to emphasize here, is that while taking the state has led to important achievements in bolivian political and legislative history, it has revealed itself to be a questionable strategy for transformational change. if new social movement uprisings replicate the state-taking strategy they will face two risks: (1) repeating the cycle of radical political parties being dissolved by the tasks, obligations, and rational of the state, or (2) once again reducing radical subjects to a mere interest group within civil society with competing demands before the state (reyes 2012). despite the historical tendency of these processes to repeat by groups who challenge capitalism, theorists and movements alike continue to argue the possibility of inverting state structures so as to foster the construction of environmentally, economically, and socially sustainable alternatives by social movements (ibid.) this paper does not argue in favor of either side in the longstanding state vs. non-state debate, but agrees with a growing view that recognizes the value of both approaches to change. “either can happen anywhere…the two aspects can be complementary or contradictory.” (midnight notes collective and friends 2009, p13). this approach acknowledges both the inevitability and the value of the persistence of both state and nonstate approaches to systemic transformation. just as state-focused efforts are seen to be at risk for cooptation, they are also viewed as offering real possibilities for creating alternatives. similarly, while consilience 70 the anti-state focus may be admired for ideological force, such initiatives don’t guarantee the widespread participation necessary for society-wide transformation. in addition, any attempt to be totalizing in strategy, regardless of whether it favors state or nonstate approaches, threatens to be a limitation to all efforts to transform politics22 in order to allow for the construction of alternatives, at least until the future becomes clearer. 3. conclusion implications for alternative futures the outcomes of mas’s rise to power have been disappointing for bolivians and onlookers who hoped that bolivia (and other latin american countries undergoing similar processes) would become the site of lasting anti-capitalist experimentation for large-scale and long-term system change. the initial commitments by president morales to improve well-being without replicating historically unsustainable and destructive pathways to industrial development created a politics of possibility around these proposals, as did notable redistributive economic policy measures, nationalized natural resources, constitutionalization of principles of sustainability (e.g. rights of mother earth, plurinationality, noneconomic conceptions of quality of life such as buen vivir, etc.), spearheaded regional integration through alba, unasur, celac, etc., and upheld environmental justice agendas in international arenas (e.g. equal but differentiated responsibilities, prior informed consent, right to development, climate debt, etc.). however, notwithstanding these achievements, bolivia continues to be characterized by fiscal dependence and macroeconomic prioritization of growth-centric policies sustained by natural resource extraction. the immediate economic, social, and environmental consequences have led to extensive socioenvironmental debates. while the current bolivian policy environment continues taking the country further away from alternative possibilities, the cumulative nature of social movement learning and cycles of resistance do not preclude the possibility of future transformation. reyes (2012) argues that despite the failures at state and policy levels, social movements and indigenous groups continue to work at local levels to create spaces and processes where groups can link local alternative practices and ideas to jointly build new futures. he believes that a new cycle of revolt will emerge in latin america, 22 in another working paper i argue for “commoning the political,” or the sharing of the political process between all actors who aspire for non-capitalist futures. such a process requires continuous evolution and reinvention until post-capitalist future(s) has(ve) been reached and involves ongoing, bottom-up collaboration and cooperation of diverse groups in open-ended, pluriversal, and prefigurative processes towards loosely defined, dynamic end goals (hollender 2015b). consilience hollender: evo-morales building upon the lessons of the past, as evidenced by the continuous bubbling of outcry and discontent against the contradictions of current progressive governments. however, reyes fails to point to the exact locations and groups that he believes can rise from the still smoldering ashes. where he sees a continent rife with potential, others argue that the worst has yet to come, pointing to the drop in commodities prices and the systematic attacking and undermining of any remaining alternatives or opposition, especially those with foreign support (villegas 2013 and 2014). this raises doubt as to how and where alternatives can gain a viable foothold. granted the precariousness of alternatives, there is a tendency by scholars to oversimplify or romanticize bolivian social movements and the achievements mas through claims that have not been backed by empirical evidence. many scholars eagerly grasp the colorful discourse and personae of evo morales, magnifying his image as a champion of indigenous social movements and the rights of nature, while neglecting the underlying contradictions and failures of mas. such views frequently equate legislative victories with policy outcomes, despite warnings by scholars like burstein and linton (2002) that policies on paper are not always implemented or enacted into law. also, latin american social movements are frequently portrayed as a unified force that is linked to a global “movement of movements,” despite the internal divisions and conflicts. this misrepresentation is reinforced by studies who examine the influence of global “transnational advocacy networks” on states (keck and sikkink 1999), when in actuality the strategies, goals, and types of social movements look far beyond state-centric advocacy, as demonstrated by the growing presence of “autonomists, direct-actionists, post-anarchists, and post-marxists, as well as some indigenous, anarcha-feminist, and anti-colonial tendencies” (reitan 2012). in celebrating the progressive image of evo morales and the exotic otherness of bolivian social movements without examining the conflict and contradictions below the surface, scholars perpetuate inaccurate perspectives and legitimize the gap between discourse and practice. by overlooking the negative and contradictory policies and practices of the mas administration, scholars contribute to these tendencies continuing with impunity. while celebrating and analyzing the implications and potential of the new constitution, “nationalization,” and high social spending is important, rigorous research and investigation is also needed to examine disconcerting tendencies in bolivia’s social, political, and economic spheres. for example, allegations link the growth of real estate, commercial, and finance sectors, even as oil prices plummet, to the rise in illegal coca consilience 72 production, narco-trafficking, and corruption. such research would be useful for exposing the structural barriers to change, both in bolivia and beyond. the bolivian social movements that maintain committed to the construction of non-capitalist alternatives are confronting oppressive systems at multiple scales, beginning with their own government. the ongoing protests against the abandonment by mas of campaign promises signals that a new cycle of struggle may be on the rise, one that encompasses a growing variety of social movement and non-movement actors within and outside of bolivia. the lessons from the last cycle of bolivian and latin american struggles will continue to inform the cumulative learning of this new cycle within latin america. these lessons are important globally, as local populations increasingly identify and speak out against problems of inequality, injustice, and environmental destruction due to wider political, social, and economic systems (hollender 2015). it is my hope that the perspectives provided in this paper about socio-political dynamics surrounding bolivia’s mas will serve as strategic tools for citizen groups, networks, and movements around the world that remain engaged in legitimate struggles for building alternatives. consilience hollender: evo-morales references achtenberg, e. 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(2014). developmentalism and social movements in bolivia. upside down world, http://upsidedownworld.org/main/boliviaarchives-31/5147-developmentalism-and-social-movements-inbolivia (accessed 20 april 2015). the “human faces of climate change”the “human faces of climate change” due to the increased public awareness of climate change within the last decades, the general public has begun to acknowledge the direct effects of climate change on human populations, and many highly affected communities find themselves in situations of forced migration. consequently, the intensification of climate change over recent years has led to the formation of a new identity and label for peoples forced to migrate due climate change’s expansive consequences: “climate change refugees” or “climate refugees.” however, because the identity, “climate refugee,” has only surfaced within recent decades following the ever-increasing effects of climate change, a dearth of knowledge and awareness exists about climate refugees and their experiences. in response to this gap of recognition and understanding, i offer an alternative analysis of the processes which surround “knowing” and “defining” climate refugees. this analysis employs the interpretive framework of narratives detailed in jean françois lyotard’s the postmodern condition: a report on knowledge to position the narrative of climate change itself in dialogue with the personal perspectives of climate change refugees. moreover, i contend that the dominant narrative of climate change complicates and influences the personal narratives of climate change refugees through specific characteristics of climate change discourse. specifically, the temporal characteristics, “slow causality” and “apocalyptic themes,” impress themselves upon the stories of climate refugees and thus impact the experiences of climate refugees as reflected in the case studies of shishmaref, alaska and the maldives, respectively. by recognizing the dynamics of the thematic elements at play in narration, through the experiences of community members in alaska and the maldives, we will be able to gain a deeper understanding of the experiences of climate refugees, which will enable us to more effectively address their needs and advocate for more sustainable policies and practices. narrative definition as an interpretative narrative definition as an interpretative framework framework while media and spaces of public discourse employ the term, “climate refugee”—defined in the oxford english view journal | view issue complications of the climate change narrative within the lives complications of the climate change narrative within the lives of climate refugees: slow causality and apocalyptic themesof climate refugees: slow causality and apocalyptic themes raphaella mascia college of the holy cross, worcester, ma 01610, united states, email: rmasci21@g.holycross.edu keywords:keywords: climate change discourse, refugees, narratives, media abstract:abstract: with projections of rapidly increasing numbers of climate refugees in the next decades, the discourse surrounding climate refugees becomes ever more pertinent within the field of sustainable development and the public sphere. i offer an alternative analysis of the processes which surround “knowing” and “defining” climate refugees by employing an interpretive framework which disseminates the term “narrative” according to jean françois lyotard’s the postmodern condition: a report on knowledge. in the discourse surrounding climate refugees, two main narratives interact with each other: the dominant climate change narrative and the individual narratives of climate refugees themselves. i contend that the dominant narrative of climate change complicates the narratives of climate change refugees through specific characteristics of climate change discourse, specifically, the temporal characteristics of slow causality and apocalyptic themes as evinced in two case studies, one in the small town of shishmaref, alaska and the other in the maldives. through researching and examining the thematic elements featured in narration, we gain a fuller comprehension of the personal narratives of climate refugees. the dominant climate change discourses permeate almost all environmental issues, and therefore, the field of sustainable development continuously confronts and interacts with such discourses. furthermore, one aspect of sustainable development involves the ongoing circumstances of forced migration due to climate change. illuminating the ways in which the dominant climate change narrative reduces the personal narratives of climate refugees compels us to look towards climate refugees themselves as sources for their own narratives instead of permitting the dominant narratives to overshadow their experiences. 31 doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6741 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 31-38 july 6, 2020 http://consiliencejournal.org https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/consilience/issue/view/651 consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6741 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 31-3832 dictionary as “a person who has been forced to leave their home as a result of the effects of climate change on their environment” (“climate refugee: definition of climate refugee by lexico,” n.d.)—under international law, such refugees effectively do not exist. the united nations refugee agency, unhcr, affirms that, “the term ‘climate refugee’ is often used in the media and other discussions. however, this phrase can cause confusion, as it does not exist in international law” (united nations (u.n.), n.d.). this “confusion,” as elucidated by the unhcr, significantly affects those forced to migrate, as they are unable to receive the same assistance and resources as persons recognized as “refugees” under law. since the term “refugee” is defined on the basis of the fear of persecution “for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion,” climate refugees remain blatantly excluded from this definition (u.n., 1951, p. 3). these lacunae in international law and international discourse convey a trend in the study of climate refugees, a trend of “confusion” and exclusion that hinders understanding and communication of information about them. in addition, this lack of clarity and support raises concerns relating to other important fields involving climate refugees, such as those of sustainable development, immigration policy, and international governance. specifically concerning sustainable development, the absence of legal definitions may restrict or even impede such development from occurring in the places that need it most, because without the identification of “refugee,” climate refugees do not yield the same resources and pathways as legally recognized refugees. and, as the consequences of climate change on humans become more evident, climate change refugees are often deemed the “human face of climate change” (piguet, 2013; bettini, 2013). this designation places climate refugees at a unique, yet precarious position on the global stage, a position of both prominence and ambiguity. therefore, understanding climate change refugees becomes more pertinent than ever in understanding the consequences of an ever-warming global climate on humanity. to analyze the interaction between climate change discourse and the personal narratives of climate refugees, i first designate a definition of “narrative” that encompasses both the discussion surrounding climate change and the lives of climate refugees. in defining the term “narrative,” i employ the interpretative framework put forth in lyotard’s the postmodern condition. this “report on knowledge” aims to broadly outline an analysis and construction of knowledge throughout history. within this interpretive framework, lyotard claims, “narration is the quintessential form of customary knowledge” (lyotard, 1984, p. 19); therefore, “narration” can generally be construed as knowledge. however, lyotard delves more deeply into this widely encompassing definition, specifying his definition of “meta narratives” or “grand narratives” which act as ways of perceiving and understanding various aspects of the world. lyotard asserts that, “narratives...determine criteria of competence and/or illustrate how they are to be applied. they thus define what has the right to be said and done in the culture in question, and since they are themselves a part of that culture, they are legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they do” (lyotard, 1984, p. 23). thus, according to lyotard, narrative serves as a widely accepted form of explaining and perceiving knowledge “in the culture in question.” additionally, narratives exist “as a part of that culture,” and they possess a sense of legitimacy in the knowledge relayed through narratives. two conditions mentioned within lyotard’s definition of narrative should be emphasized: the fact that narratives in themselves are deemed legitimate by a culture and the fact that a narrative serves as a means of conveying knowledge, albeit within appropriate designations. these two conditions assert the significance of narratives in our daily lives as well as the importance of contemplating the formation and characterization of grand narratives. in elucidating the definition of “grand narratives,” in particular, lyotard presents examples that encompass the subjects of history and thought, such as “the enlightenment” narrative and the marxist narrative (lyotard, 1984, p.xxiii). yet, most pertinent to the topic of climate change and climate refugees is lyotard’s stance that science, such as the knowledge of climate change, is also a “grand narrative.” lyotard comments that when “scientists... appear on television or are interviewed in the newspapers after making a ‘discovery’... they play by the rules of the narrative game; its influence remains considerable not only on the users of the media, but also on the scientist’s sentiments” (lyotard, 1984, p. 28). lyotard’s theory thus insinuates the slippery nature of a narrative; the scientists themselves believe in the narrative they tell, and then “feed” the narrative they have created to the media, which, in turn, disseminates the scientific grand narrative to the public. the relevance of media in the depiction and propagation of the scientific narrative promoted by lyotard is expounded upon in brooke gladstone’s the influencing machine which examines the various biases evident in news media, specifically emphasizing “narrative bias.” in news media, narrative biases employ a reusable “template” which involves the same “plots and characters” used “when consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6741 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 31-3833 reporting on the same subject” (gladstone et al., 2011, p. 66). gladstone’s narrative bias echoes lyotard’s definition of grand narratives in that both narrative bias in media and grand narratives remain predicated in consensus. as narratives are repeated about the same topic—for instance, the topic of climate change—a coherence, or “consensus,” develops in the communication of knowledge on that subject comparable to the consistent conveyance of information within lyotard’s grand narratives. moreover, gladstone highlights the disadvantages in narrative bias, especially in relation to disseminating science in media. although narratives, like stories, possess “beginnings, middles, and ends,” science, a subject that is continuous and dynamic, does not inherently follow this story-like structure. since science, and the study of climate change specifically, is frequently evolving, the narrative bias in media confounds scientific knowledge by instituting and forcing an “ending,” when science narratives, according to gladstone, are “all middle” (gladstone et al., 2011, p. 65). both lyotard’s and gladstone’s analyses of narrative and narrative bias imply that scientific topics are primarily disseminated through narrative. therefore, they affirm the necessity of understanding the form of narrative in relation to science—and in this case, the necessity of understanding the dominant narrative of climate change—in our attempt to fathom the transformations occurring in our world due to climate change, including that of forced migration. the dominant climate change narrativethe dominant climate change narrative from lyotard’s discussion of grand narratives, i understand the narrative of climate change to encompass how we, as an international community, widely perceive and accept the scientific knowledge surrounding climate change, involving the way in which the knowledge of science is understood and propagated by a culture. within the global context, the ipcc report serves as the scientific basis for the dominant climate change narrative. the ipcc, or intergovernmental panel on climate change, is the united nations body tasked with assessing climate change; this body regularly releases a comprehensive report on climate change, including its causes, its effects, and possible responses based on the newest scientific data (international panel on climate change (ipcc), n.d.). widely considered the leading authority on climate change science, “the ipcc epitomizes the scientific discourse with its synthesis of the best available climate science... ipcc reports are extremely widely cited, and to be part of ipcc narratives substantially amplifies the attention that a topic receives within... in the media, and in policy circuits” (bettini, 2013). with the ipcc report acting as the scientific foundation of the dominant climate change narrative, several other facets of the climate change narrative should be noted. although a plurality of climate change narratives exists, the one i focus on and reference in my research is the prevailing, most widely disseminated narrative. this dominant narrative is characterized by a future-focused, western perspective and has been espoused by “the international climate change discourse coalition over the past 30 years” (arnall & kothari, 2015). this dominant climate change narrative then “becomes locally appropriated” which involves “ordinary” people assimilating the dominant narrative into their established belief-systems, knowledge, and perceptions (arnall & kothari, 2015). this appropriation occurs more frequently in communities more obviously experiencing the impacts of climate change, and therefore, climate refugees regularly come into contact with the dominant climate change narrative. despite this appropriation, refugees also establish their own perceptions on the effects of climate change that diverge from aspects of the dominant climate change narrative. the personal narratives of climate refugeesthe personal narratives of climate refugees as more populations confront the negative impacts of climate change, they also encounter the dominant climate change narrative in their daily lives. but, because “these outcomes [of climate change]” cause significant uncertainty “for different populations” living in disparate locations around the earth, the application and presence of a single dominant climate change narrative convolutes the personal storylines of climate refugees (farbotko & lazrus, 2012). two scholars researching climate refugees in the island nation of tuvalu, carol farbotko and heather lazrus, assert that, “to understand its [climate change’s] effects fully, analysts must integrate perspectives, values, and knowledges of people who live in climate change affected places along with the biophysical changes occurring” (farbotko & lazrus, 2012). yet to observe the individual and cultural aspects of climate refugees’ personal stories, we must also recognize the ways in which the dominant climate change narrative complicates and pervades climate refugees’ lives. the leading climate change discourse often uniformly implements “abstractions of time, space and belonging,” which “are not universally shared,” onto the experiences of climate refugees, eliciting sweeping over-generalizations (farbotko & lazrus, 2012). by comprehending and being cognizant of the most pervasive characteristics of the dominant climate change narrative, we gain a more holistic perspective of the climate refugees’ personal narratives, meaning their consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6741 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 31-3834 accounts of their lived experiences. for instance, the field of sustainable development is concerned with those who are most vulnerable and most impacted by the effects of climate change; through understanding the unique perspective of climate refugees, sustainable development initiatives could develop goals and strategies that more closely mirror the actual needs and desires of climate refugees. through this awareness and application, we can actively seek to read dominant narratives as espoused in media circles and the public sphere against the grain. i explicitly seek to read the two case studies of shishmaref, alaska, and the maldives “against the grain” to demonstrate how the dominant climate change discourse profoundly influences the personal narratives of climate refugees and how climate change refugees are discussed within the international community. slow causalityslow causality in expressing the unique characteristic of slow causality within the climate change narrative, literature scholars tina choi and barbara leckie affirm the requirement and need for a climate change narrative in their paper “slow causality: the function of narrative in an age of climate change.” by declaring that “thinking about climate change as a set of conditions, processes, and events demands an engagement with narrative” (choi & leckie, 2018), they establish that the engagement of narrative serves a necessary purpose in conveying the science of climate change to the general public. this imperative employment of narrative endows “place, objects, entities, and events” with a sense of sequence or chronology as an attempt to comprehend and distinguish “the relationships between them” (taylor, 2016, p. 16). we then utilize narrative in our endeavors to “forecast the consequences of our actions” on our environment and the future of the planet (taylor, 2016, p. 16). choi and leckie engage in dialogue with lyotard’s definition of narration by expounding on various instruments that lead narratives to be a source of “understanding” or “perceiving” a specific subject; they describe causality as the instrument of narration that supports a sense of understanding. the establishment of narrative “performs and realizes causal relations” (choi & leckie, 2018), and in these causal relations, we attain a greater ability and sense of “perceiving the subject,” which in this case is climate change. the temporal characteristic of slow causality relates to the challenge of understanding the causal relationships of climate change through narrative as a result of extensive and complicated time spans. as choi and leckie elucidate in their paper, “climate change...considers a chronology that extends beyond ‘our actions’ and encompasses the earth and ‘deep time’” (choi & leckie, 2018). however, this extended “chronology,” which includes climate change before and after the age of humans, remains difficult to communicate broadly. as humans, we face limitations in our ability to imagine the state of the earth before our inception as a species and after our eventual extinction. to examine the long-term impacts of climate change— for example, the rising amount of carbon dioxide in the earth’s history—climate scientists must refer to a time before humans. in elucidating the effects of climate change, climate scientists often reference the conditions of the earth using geologic time, and in geologic time, humans have only existed for a minute portion of the earth’s existence. for scientists, “slow causality functions...as it might for us, too, in an age of climate change—as a narrative practice, a strategic methodology for reconciling human to geological temporalities and allowing incomplete evidence to support a more complete understanding” (choi & leckie, 2018). furthermore, as choi and leckie highlight, the projection of climate change’s impacts includes describing effects that will continue beyond the lifespans of anyone alive today; the processes exacerbated by climate change such as higher sea levels, increased temperatures, erosion, and decreased biodiversity have an ongoing temporality. often, within colloquial rhetoric surrounding climate change, the trope that we must consider “the generations that come after us,” remains insufficient in clarifying the full length of the impacts of climate change on the planet. in reality, the consequences of climate change will be felt long after humans cease to exist on earth (choi & leckie, 2018). shishmaref, alaska: a case study of slow shishmaref, alaska: a case study of slow causality causality to elucidate how the characteristic of slow causality impresses upon the lives of climate change refugees, i explored the story of the kigiqtaamiut inupiaq of shishmaref, alaska, outlined in the book climate refugees. the kigiqtaamiut inupiaq are an indigenous people who resided on the island of shishmaref long before the area was considered “alaska” (collectif argos et al., 2010). their livelihood depends on the subsistence hunting of seals and fish, and especially during the winter months, the community relies on the presence of pack ice to allow for mobility during hunting. like many other arctic communities, the kigiqtaamiut inupiaq endure the most severe effects of climate change in the form of decreased ice coverage and warming temperatures, both of which directly impact their food sources and their ability to continue to live on the island of shishmaref, which will soon be uninhabitable. the community continues to encounter the dominant narrative of climate change as consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6741 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 31-3835 outside actors, such as the u.s. federal government, the alaskan state government, the media, and scientists, turn their gaze towards this small, indigenous community being forced to move from their island as a result of climate change. the personal narratives of the inupiaq community of shishmaref, alaska interact with the temporal characteristic of slow causality present in the dominant climate change narrative. as rising sea levels and decreasing ice coverage over the past few decades have caused extreme erosion and depleted food resources, the kigiqtaamiut inupiaq have encountered slow causality as related to the discussion of geologic time. the interplay between the characteristic of slow causality within the dominant climate change narrative and the climate refugee experience is elucidated here: “as the island shrinks at an ever-increasing pace, the 600 inhabitants of shishmaref have no other solution than to retreat. in 2001, most of them voted to relocate the village by 2015, their last chance before sarichef becomes uninhabitable, according to geologists, meteorologists and other experts who have flocked to the aid of these climate refugees living on borrowed time” (collectif argos et al., 2010, p. 22). the interaction between the dominant climate change narrative and the experiences of those living in shishmaref involves slow causality as “scientists, meteorologists, and other experts” impart geologic time spans upon the refugees’ encounters of the natural processes around them such as rising sea levels, erosion, and decreased ice coverage. for scientists, this “shrink[ing]” of the island of shishmaref contributes to concepts of geologic time as well as to the notions of the pre-human state of the arctic; they often cite the arctic region in illustrations of humanity’s impact on the changing environment, for example, by describing the state of glaciers in arctic regions before and after the industrial age. however, these vast temporal spans articulated in the dominant climate narrative diverge from the temporal spans observed by the inupiaq themselves. within their own observations, the members of the shishmaref community experience the climatic processes on much smaller scales of time. for instance, a kigiqtaamiut inupiaq named joe braach noted that “erosion is spreading...when he moved to the island in 1987, several dozen metres of shoreline separated him from the sea when he looked out his window, and he could see a semaphore station, the school’s basketball court and sand dunes; all of these are now gone” (collectif argos et al., 2010, p. 20). this observation of erosion speaks to the processes that exhibit slow causality reiterated in the dominant climate change narrative. yet, mr. braach only witnessed them for a few decades. furthermore, he comprehends the complicated processes of erosion in relation to “a semaphore station, the school’s basketball court” both of which represent modern times. (collectif argos et al., 2010, p. 20). mr. braach’s illustration evinces discrepancies between the dominant climate change narrative and the actual lived experiences of the climate refugees themselves; the dominant discourses employ complex temporal spans to describe the effects of climate change, while climate refugees use observations of physical changes in their surroundings during their “small” lifespans to recognize alterations in environmental conditions. not only does slow causality appear in considerations of the environmental processes occurring in shishmaref, but it also emerges in how the kigiqtaamiut inupiaq consider their future. another member of the community, mina weyiouanna, asked, “‘what’s going to become of us?... i’m having trouble imagining a future for myself.” (collectif argos et al., 2010, p. 28). this inability to see an “end” engages with the characteristic of slow causality since the processes forcing them to migrate have existed for decades, if not centuries, and will continue to progress. when discussing the fate of the shishmaref inupiaq, scientists, state officials, ngo’s, and even the people of shishmaref themselves believe that “the shishmaref inupiaq face an uncertain future.” (collectif argos et al., 2010, p. 36). the community of shishmaref does not know exactly how long they have before they are effectively forced to leave. and, as the government seeks relocation in alaska, the consequences of climate change will not cease after initial relocation. to preserve their culture, the shishmaref inupiaq desire to either stay as close to shishmaref as possible or else be relocated to a similar place. this decision stems from a prioritization of preserving culture as clifford weyiouanna, a village elder, explained, “‘we have a very old tradition of community life...people work together for the needs of the community...that may be what gives our community the strength and vitality to hand down our culture from generation to generation” (collectif argos et al., 2010, p. 24). consequently, the effects of climate change on the community will follow them as they seek to relocate to other places in the arctic. apocalyptic themesapocalyptic themes the notion of an “uncertain feature,” as faced by the kigiqtaamiut inupiaq, interacts with the other temporal characteristic of the climate change narrative i will address: apocalyptic themes. literature scholar frank kermode defines “apocalypse” as a consensus between an “imaginatively recorded past and imaginatively consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6741 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 31-3836 predicted future, achieved on behalf of us, who remain ‘in the middest’” (kermode, 1968, p. 8), for whom this “imaginatively predicted future” mirrors our need to have a comprehensible end. in this case, the “end” refers to the end of humanity; however, in terms of the dominant climate change narrative, “the end” refers to the end of climate refugees’ abilities to inhabit a location before they are forced to move. kermode asserts that, through the construction of the “apocalypse,” humans aim to “project ourselves...past the end.” in other words, by “predicting an end,” we aim to fathom our own place in the middle of the narrative (kermode 1967, p. 8). as we experience events around us, we cannot possibly know when the exact “end” will occur, but we can imagine one by employing an “apocalyptic” narrative (kermode 1967, p. 8). however, this metaphorical act of predicting the “apocalypse” compels us to shape our present knowledge to “conform” to this prediction. in essence, as our predicted future becomes the present, we expect the present to resemble this apocalyptic prophecy (kermode 1967, p. 8). the dominant discourse on climate change imagines the future as an extreme time of crisis for people and all other living beings on this planet. this idea of the “apocalypse,” of the “end,” is found within climate change discourse and consequently impresses itself onto the climate change refugee narrative. in the article, “climate barbarians at the gate? a critique of apocalyptic narratives on ‘climate refugees,” the author questions how the personal narratives of climate refugees are structured and imbued with intense emotions of foreseen calamities and urgency connected with the notion of time. the scientific evidence is commonly bolstered by “such jaw-dropping numbers” as “hundreds of millions of climate refugees,” and infinite lists of consequences; but “without such staggering numbers the apocalyptic tones would deflate” (bettini, 2013). because media, scientists, and policymakers apply apocalyptic themes in the discourse of climate change, the climate change narrative becomes imbued with “alarmist” tones that may obscure and “distort” the actual scientific evidence, despite the fact that science should ideally be wholly objective (bettini, 2013). yet, in the dominant climate change narrative, science is used to support proclamations of “the end” of “life as we know it”. with the imposition of “doom and gloom” emotions tied to the climate change narrative, bettini contends that using this foreboding tone may be “counterproductive...for communicating the urgency of climate change migration” (bettini, 2013). indeed, such doomsaying does not encourage improvement, as it explicitly contradicts any hope for the future, since apocalyptic themes are predicated in the very notion that no future exists. referring to the interpretative framework in the beginning of the analysis, the narrative of climate change acts as a way for the majority to perceive the science and consequences of climate change. the apocalyptic theme found within the dominant climate change narrative attaches an emotional condition to this perception. the grand narrative of climate change, through the emphasis on the “end,” perpetuates a sense of fear and inevitability. the implementation of apocalyptic themes begs the question: if the dominant environmental discourse proclaims that the “end” is evident, how should climate refugees act to confront this? this “sense of emergency” remains embedded within the experiences of climate refugees as they are broadly described as having an “end” to their lives as they know it. akin to the temporal characteristic of slow causality, the apocalyptic themes espoused by the dominant climate change narrative resurface in many communities facing forced migration due to environmental alterations. again, the international community imprints a sentiment of doom that some communities, like those in the maldives, do not relate to their changing environment, thus recalling the importance of unearthing the real perceptions of climate refugees in their encounters with climate change’s effects. the maldives: a case study of apocalyptic the maldives: a case study of apocalyptic themesthemes as with the case study of shishmaref, alaska, the residents of the maldives encounter a confluence of the effects of climate change, including coral bleaching due to ocean acidification, rising sea levels, and warmer temperatures (arnall & kothari, 2015). with the rising sea levels, scientists predict that the maldives will soon be underwater, prompting emergency measures from the maldivian government including the construction of barrier walls and considerations of population consolidation, which would involve moving the entire population of the maldives from the two hundred inhabited islands to between 10 and fifteen islands” (arnall & kothari, 2015; vidal, 2017). in recent years, the international community has speculated about the bleak future of the maldives, considering whether the entire population will be forced to relocate (arnall & kothari, 2015). because of such predictions, the maldivian people are widely considered to be “climate refugees.” indeed, this crisis may have already begun: small parts of the archipelago are now submerged, and the process continues with no end in sight (arnall & kothari, 2015). while this prognostication of mass migration has, fortunately, not yet come to fruition, the people of the maldives nevertheless experience “smaller,” consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6741 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 31-3837 less publicized effects of climate change such as transformations of beaches and differences in rainfall patterns (arnall & kothari, 2015). interestingly, in their daily interactions with the consequences of climate change, the native maldivians do not attribute these changes with the “apocalyptic” end of their small island nation, as the dominant climate change narrative would imply. in the research paper, “challenging climate change and migration discourse: different understandings of timescale and temporality in the maldives,” alex arnall and uma kothari discuss the existence of “a clear construction of a crisis narrative” within the maldives. through a series of interviews with local people, government officials, and ngos, the authors seek to record the interactions between the dominant climate change narrative and the personal narratives of the maldivian people. as previously explained, the “apocalyptic narrative” instigates a sense of emergency within the discourse surrounding climate change and climate refugees. the maldives serve as the epitome of this climate change-caused apocalypse; the “end” of the islands as we know them, may very well be near, at least according to the dominant climate change narrative engendered by the international community. examples of the construction of the figurative “apocalypse” come from the tourist sector, which advertises “‘come to the maldives before they sink,’” as well as from the maldivian government, which, to gain attention and publicity, hosted a “historic underwater cabinet meeting” (arnall & kothari, 2015). these examples clearly reveal how the actions of the media and the maldivian government impress a sense of urgency upon the inhabitants of the maldives that conforms to the apocalyptic nature of the dominant climate narrative. this apocalyptic narrative affects the individual perceptions of climate change refugees by its continued presence in the media and public discourse. however, while this tone increasingly pervades the dominant climate change narrative, native maldivians resist such a catastrophic stance. the pervasiveness of the dominant climate change narrative made climate change become “a bit of a taboo subject,” in some local communities (collectif argos et al. 2010, p. 126). a maldivian government official reiterates this opposition, “if you ask local people about fuel or food subsidy, they would be interested to talk about it, as it affects their daily life, but climate change-induced sea level rise is not a concern as it is occurring so far ahead. they do not know and don’t understand what tv or newspapers have to say about this” (arnall & kothari, 2015). the government official’s statement illumines the juxtaposition between the apocalyptic-themed dominant climate change narrative and the experiences of the local people. by insisting that “climate-change-induced sea level rise is not a concern” and “they do not know and don’t understand what tv or newspapers have to say about this,” the official presents key facets of the dominant climate change narrative, yet, locals mainly care about day-to-day matters such as “fuel or food subsidy.” this clearly exhibits a discrepancy between the locals’ concern for food and fuel and the government’s worries about sea level rise. if the government were to appeal to the locals utilizing aspects of their own views, such as the importance of food and fuel in their daily lives, instead of employing the fear and anxieties embedded in the dominant climate change narrative, then both the locals and the government officials would benefit. this improved communication between the government and locals could have boundless positive implications for the future, especially as the consequences of climate change continue to impact their nation. furthermore, within the government official’s statement, the official appears to insinuate a focus on the “end” for those living in the maldives, enhancing the distinctive, urgent, “doom and gloom” qualities attributed to apocalyptic narratives. nevertheless, individual climate refugees in the maldives remain hopeful as they confront the more prominent apocalyptic themed discourse surrounding climate refugees. one local affirms, “we have always managed...we will always survive by building sea walls, floating islands, underwater homes, whatever we need to do’” (arnall & kothari, 2015). thus, the opinions of local residents blatantly diverge from an “end of the world” mindset to one of survival. this outlook of adaptation towards climate change signals an inherent difference between the apocalyptic themes featured in both the dominant climate change narrative and the personal experiences of climate refugees in international discourse. instead of feeling a sense of doom, many maldivian communities feel hopeful. here the locals eschew the impending “end” imposed by the apocalyptic narratives surrounding them; this act of resiliency should serve as an indicator to many environmental actors and the public, relaying that the people most affected by climate change still believe that we have an opportunity to respond and adapt. for if not, how can international organizations and governments set “sustainable development goals” and “carbon emission reduction goals” without believing in a future? instead of an “end,” environmental actors should take a note from local maldivians and work to engender a sense of possibility, so that we can believe in our efforts to create a more just and sustainable world. consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6741 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 31-3838 conclusionconclusion understanding how the predominant climate change narrative impresses upon and complicates the perspectives of climate refugees and the lives of climate refugees themselves remains foundational to an array of fields, particularly the practice of sustainable development. by distinguishing the climate change narrative relative to the true accounts of climate change refugees, we seek to prevent the overshadowing of climate refugee experiences by the dominant climate change narrative. moreover, we must acknowledge the dynamic relationship in the varying interactions between diverse narratives surrounding climate refugees. by illuminating the outside narratives which complicate the narrative of climate refugees, we gain a wider perspective of the discourses extant in their lives. we are also better able to pursue a “true,” multifaceted climate refugee narrative and to look to the climate refugees themselves for access to their own personal narratives. furthermore, employing lyotard’s definition of a “grand narrative” as a widely held perception of specific knowledge which is deemed legitimate within a certain context or culture, examining the narrative of climate change refugees becomes inseparable from understanding the climate refugees themselves. in other words, to fully understand and recognize climate refugees, we must first understand the narratives that surround, encompass, and shape their collective identity. referencesreferences arnall, a., & kothari, u. (2015). challenging climate change and migration discourse: different understandings of timescale and temporality in the maldives. global environmental change, 31, 199–206. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.01.011 bettini, g. (2013). climate barbarians at the gate? a critique of apocalyptic narratives on ‘climate refugees.’ geoforum, 45, 63–72. doi: 10.1016/j.geoforum.2012.09.009 choi, t. y., & leckie, b. (2018). slow causality: the function of narrative in an age of climate change. victorian studies, 60(4), 565. doi: 10.2979/victorianstudies.60.4.03 climate refugee: definition of climate refugee by lexico. (n.d.). retrieved may 18, 2020. farbotko, c., & lazrus, h. (2012). the first climate refugees? contesting global narratives of climate change in tuvalu. global environmental change, 22(2), 382–390. doi: 10.1016/j. gloenvcha.2011.11.014 gladstone, b., neufeld, j., jones, r., & jones, s. (2012). the influencing machine: brooke gladstone on the media. new york: w.w. norton. kermode, f. 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(1951). convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees. retrieved may 3, 2019, from https://www. unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10 united nations. (n.d.a). climate change and disaster displacement: an overview of unhcr’s role. retrieved may 13, 2019, from https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/environment/5975e6cf7/climate-change-disaster-displacement-overview-unhcrs-role.html vidal, j. (2017, march 3). ‘we need development’: maldives switches focus from climate threat to mass tourism. retrieved may 5, 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/ mar/03/maldives-plan-to-embrace-mass-tourism-sparks-criticism-and-outrage introductionintroduction the essay below was prepared in march to discuss the contrast between the globalization that we need to fight covid-19 and the reality of rising geopolitical tensions as the u.s. increasingly turns its back on multilateralism. since then, events have accelerated, and not for the good. the world is even more unstable in june than it was in march. since then, the u.s. has failed to contain the epidemic at home, with deaths rising to more than 100,000 and the virus continuing to spread within the u.s. the trump administration doubled down on its attack on the global system by announcing the withdrawal from the world health organization, ostensibly as a kind of punishment for who relations with china, but really out of the stark unilateralism of the trump administration. the economic situation has worsened dramatically in the u.s., with unemployment reaching 20 percent, and all of this likely to intensify in the midst of social turmoil following the brazen killing of several african-americans and the unrest that has followed. in short, we find ourselves in the u.s. in an epidemic, a depression, a geopolitical conflict, and a period of deep social instability. this is certainly the worst u.s. crisis in nearly one hundred years, since the great depression. what is more, the country is very deeply divided on how to respond. in this moment, it is crucial to keep our eye on our long-term goals and principles, as guideposts for escaping from a downward spiral of unrest, disease, and economic collapse. the united states at its best is about diversity, with people of all ethnicities, countries of origin, cultures, and religions, forging common efforts for the common good. new york city at its best is the world’s leading exemplar of that unity in diversity. throughout american history, the truth of diversity has confronted the ugly reality of racism and exclusion. we face that challenge again today. similarly, the us at its best is about cooperation with the world, building institutions and efforts for a world that shares peace and prosperity. yet at its worst, the us is about extreme chauvinism, overthrowing governments, inciting conflicts, and even instigating wars of choice with devastating consequences. again, we are at a crossroads. will the u.s. cooperate with china and other countries as it must do to secure its own wellbeing and the world’s, or will it deepen conflicts unnecessarily, in some naïve attempt to gain the upper hand against china? the future hangs in the balance, more urgently than we might have imagined just a few months ago. the covid-19 epidemic continues to surge in many parts of the world, the us included. the world economy will suffer its largest downturn since the 1930s. many environmental crises, such as destruction of the rainforests, actually accelerate at the moment because conservation efforts, regulations, and enforcement are withdrawn. and while greenhouse gas emissions have been reduced temporarily by the very deep contraction of the world economy, some countries will be tempted to build back through fossil fuels rather than renewable energy, as the path of least resistance and greatest lobbying pressure. all of this means that we must redouble our efforts to choose a path out of this crisis built on public health, sustainable development, and most importantly, the view journal | view issue covid-19 and multilateralismcovid-19 and multilateralism jeffrey d. sachs center for sustainable development, columbia university, new york, ny 10027, united states abstract:abstract: the world faces its greatest crisis since world war ii and its greatest economic calamity since the great depression. history shows two ways out of a global crisis: a global leader that guides an effective response—and helps to pay for it—or global cooperation through the un multilateral framework. alas, we have no global leader today. the united states today is more a force of destruction than a leader. our only way forward is cooperation under the un mandate. let me explain. 1 doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6729 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 1-5 perspective july 6, 2020 http://consiliencejournal.org https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/consilience/issue/view/651 consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6729 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 1-52 common good and global cooperation. the first and most urgent step is public health: to contain the pandemic everywhere in the world. this should be done through intensified public-health efforts, including testing and quarantining infected individuals, physical distancing, and safe workplace practices. global cooperation to support the who is vital; the us withdrawal from who should be condemned and reversed. the second urgent step is financial, logistical, and humanitarian support, for the hardest-hit regions and most vulnerable peoples on the planet. this requires greatly stepped up financial backing for the world’s poor countries in the form of grants, loans, and debt relief. the third urgent step is a global, cooperative effort to build a new global economy that is socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable, using the framework of the sustainable development goals, the paris climate agreement, and the convention on biological diversity. the european union is adopting a green deal for europe. this should be combined with a green new deal in the united states, a sustainable belt and road initiative in china, and similar steps in other regions, such as an asean green deal and an african union green deal. by cooperating globally across the world’s major regions, and keeping our eye on the core concepts of sustainable development, we have the real possibility, and the vital need, to turn the current crisis into the first steps of a sustainable and inclusive path for the world. hegemonic stabilityhegemonic stability in his remarkable account of the great depression, the late and great economic historian charles kindleberger famously argued that the great depression occurred because there was no world leader to step in with effective solutions, and the league of nations was not up to the task. the united kingdom had been the world leader until the great war but emerged from that devastating war in debt to america and with deep and chronic economic problems. the united states was by far the world’s largest economy in the interwar period, but america was not yet prepared for global leadership. only the experience of world war ii thrust the united states into active global leadership. thus, when the crisis of the great depression hit america starting in 1929—after a decade of political and financial instability in europe—the united states viewed the crisis almost entirely in domestic terms rather than as the global crisis that it soon became. the great depression represented first and foremost a misfiring of the gold standard, compounded by the war debts and reparations payments imposed after world war i. global-scale cooperation during 1930-2, led by the treasuries and the central banks of the major economies (the u.s., uk, france, and others), might well have salvaged the global economy without massive loss of output. no such cooperation arose. by 1933, hitler was in power. the depression lasted until 1939, when germany dragged europe into its second conflagration in as many decades. kindleberger’s theory came to be known as hegemonic stability theory—the idea that a dominant power, or hegemon, was needed to provide global public goods such as financial stability. the world of the 1930s was between hegemons, so to speak, with the baton not yet handed off from london to washington, which would occur only in the 1940s. the world suffered years of disarray as each individual country entertained inward-looking policies, and often “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies such as tariffs became the norm—meaning that “solutions” in one country merely shifted even greater losses to other countries. after world war ii, the united states became the new hegemon, albeit one that faced off against the soviet bloc in the cold war. america also led the establishment of global institutions, notably the united nations, the bretton woods institutions (imf and world bank), the rule-based open trading system, various specialized un agencies, and other multilateral institutions. the united states helped to fund the west’s postwar recovery through the marshall plan and helped to launch an era of development aid. much of this was narrowly self-interested, especially geared to promote america economic interests; much was in direct competition with the soviet union; and much was truly instituted with a view towards avoiding global conflicts and creating a more peaceful and prosperous world. moreover, much was disastrously wrongheaded, such as the vietnam war. through the period from the 1940s to the 1980s, narrow american self-interest and global idealism were both at play in u.s. foreign policy, and american policies varied between inspiring (creating the un system), insidious (repeated cia-led regime-change operations), and downright destructive and incompetent (u.s.-led or u.s.-supported wars in southeast asia, latin america, and the middle east). waning u.s. leadershipwaning u.s. leadership after the demise of the soviet union in december 1991, the united states thought it could go its own way without investing much in the international system. after all, with the end of the soviet union, america viewed itself as even more powerful and even more exceptional than during the cold war. consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6729 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 1-53 a quintessential example of this way of thinking was a statement made by u.s. secretary of state madeleine albright in 1998: “if we have to use force, it is because we are america; we are the indispensable nation. we stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.” yet in fact the united states was already weakened as a global leader and american blunders and ignorance accelerated the decline of u.s. leadership. the main reason for the decline in american predominance was simply the declining share of the united states in the world economy. the american share of planetary economic output, measured in purchasing-power-adjusted prices, declined from 27 percent of global gdp in 1950 to 19 percent in 2008 (according to estimates by the late angus maddison, another great economic historian), and to just 15 percent in 2019 (according to the imf). but the united states accentuated the decline by launching or participating in several disastrous wars in afghanistan (starting in 1979 and continuing off and on until the present), central america (in the 1980s), iraq (1990 and again in 2003), syria, libya, and elsewhere, that cost vast numbers of lives and trillions of dollars of wasted spending. on top of this, much of america’s political establishment came to believe naively that leadership through war and regime change could substitute effectively for leadership through diplomacy, compromise, and development finance. the united states would get its way because of its unrivaled military power, not because it was providing public goods and increasing global wellbeing. the united states increasingly refused to sign un treaties and protocols. the u.s. senate, for example, after ratifying the un framework convention on climate change in 1992 then refused to implement the treaty. america absented itself from countless other international agreements and treaties over the past three decades, including the international criminal court, the convention on biological diversity, and the un law of the sea—just to name three. american leaders willfully ignored the judgments of the un security council, such as when president george w. bush went to war in iraq in 2003 after failing to win its backing. along with turning its back on un treaties, the united states also became more and more resistant to development aid and cooperation on global tax reform. america would go its own way—the rest of the world be damned. rogue state rogue state under u.s. president donald trump, america has abandoned any semblance of being the world’s leader of the multilateral order. the united states has become, instead, a sort of rogue state, with a direct assault on many international agreements (including the us withdrawal from the iran nuclear deal and the paris climate agreement), and the imposition of unilateral trade and sanction policies at variance with international law and international rules. in terms of values, trump boasts of “america first,” rather than the world together. the united states remains a very powerful country economically and technologically, but it is no longer the predominant economic or technological power. the european union and china are roughly the same size economically as america, and the spread of digital technologies is worldwide. the united states is by far the most powerful military country in the world, though it finds out war after war that the us military can solve no political problems whatsoever. america has around 6,000 nuclear warheads, 800 military bases around the world, and many wars. it bears repeating: under trump and his nationalist doctrine of america first, the u.s. has become a sort of rogue state, rejecting the constraints of the un charter and global treaties. in both speech and deed, trump evinces overt hostility towards the rest of the world, including many ostensible allies, and overtly rejects the values of multilateralism that the us supported for decades. the historical record clearly shows that trump has blocked virtually every multilateral initiative of recent years. the united states is the only country pulling out of the paris climate agreement. it is the only country that pulled out of the iran nuclear agreement. moreover, it’s a misnomer to speak of a china-u.s. trade war; there is a u.s. trade war on china. that is quite different. this “trade war” was an unpremeditated american attack because of china’s rise in technological capacity. have no doubt about it: the u.s. attacks on huawei, zte, and others is because the united states realizes that china is gaining massive technological capability in artificial intelligence and other security-related areas. yes, china is making massive gains because china is home to vastly talented and well-educated people, and is minting hundreds of thousands of phds every year. that’s how the world works—and how it should work. there is no monopoly of knowledge; there’s no monopoly of talent. consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6729 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 1-54 this is driving trump and american right-wing nationalists to distraction because america’s grand strategy is based on american dominance—or “primacy,” to use the language of geopolitics. and that’s not some fantasy of mine, this is in countless american foreign policy and defense documents and doctrines. there can be no u.s. primacy in the world anymore that is safe for the world. that’s not how the world works anymore. but that is how american policy still works. the united states under trump is also attacking the global taxation of online activities. america has made disastrous cuts to corporate taxation, which is deeply undermining the worldwide taxation on companies. in addition, the united states has tried to dismember the wto by killing the appellate process. moreover, the trump administration now claims that it’s going to adjudicate exchange rates and put unilateral tariffs against countries that america alone deems to be manipulating the exchange rate. well, i know the u.s. treasury, and with all due respect, that venerable institution does not have an honest view in this. the claims of “currency manipulation” are political—top to bottom. such claims have nothing to do with anything meritorious; they are all about some temporary “advantage” in some geopolitical contest. in january 2020, when iraq said it wanted american military forces to leave the country, if you can imagine, the u.s. treasury basically said: “we’ll confiscate your foreign exchange reserves at the new york fed if you persist in pushing our troops out.” this is a kind of thuggery. it is a complete violation of the international rule of law. yet this is what we are facing with the united states as a sort of rogue state. i’m sorry to say it—it’s my country, i’m not very happy to say it—but the united states is a resentful imperial power in decline. america is a dangerous country right now, and it will absolutely become more dangerous if trump wins reelection. covid-19 and multilateralismcovid-19 and multilateralism the world has therefore reached another “kindleberger moment.” the world is bereft of global leadership and shared solutions. no single state or overarching alliance of states is willing or able to provide global public goods. when the going gets tough, no one group by itself can provide stability—financial or political. that’s what the world look like before covid-19. and that’s what it looks like now, too. with the emergence of the covid-19 epidemic we face a global calamity with no hegemonic power, and with gravely weakened global cooperation. the world is falling into depression with the united states playing america first politics. even worse, trump’s game-plan is to try to blame china for the epidemic. the facts are these. the covid-19 virus emerged in china just as hiv emerged in west africa, mers emerged in the arabian peninsula in 2012, zika emerged in africa and spread to south america, and h1n1 emerged in mexico in 2010 and was greatly amplified in the united states before becoming global. in short, emerging infectious disease emerge in all parts of the world, generally as zoonotic events (a shift of the pathogen from an animal reservoir to humans)—from bats to humans, in the case of covid-19. the united states wants to blame china, and the republican party has now made blaming china a core part of its 2020 electoral strategy. this action has been taken mostly to cover-up trump’s complete and shocking incompetence in confronting the epidemic, but it is also an instrument to continue trump’s war on china, trying to blame china for the epidemic and thereby promoting u.s. primacy over china. indeed, american election-year politics is rapidly descending into an abyss of nationalist emotions, with trump’s rival, former vice president joe biden, attacking trump for being too soft on china! these attacks on china would merely constitute part of the internal politics of an american election year but for the fact that they are quickly spreading to the international arena. not only is there no global leader; the united states is actively trying to undermine the international system in the belief that multilateralism is a hindrance to trump’s anti-china strategy. thus, trump has done the seemingly unimaginable: cutting off american funding to the world health organization (who) in the middle of the pandemic on the ostensible grounds that it is too pro-chinese! one wouldn’t believe this in a work of fiction, much less as the real actions of a major power in the midst of a full-blown global epidemic and economic emergency. world output is plummeting as nation after nation goes into lockdown to try to slow the spread of the virus. the imf projects a decline in world output of several percent of global gdp—the gravest decline in economic activity since world war ii. yet it could become far worse. on kindleberger’s reasoning, the global downturn could turn into a full-fledged depression, with no country or group of countries exercising the leadership to pull the world out of the downturn. and in one important way, the situation is even more precarious than in the 1930s. back then, neither london nor washington took the lead. consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6729 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 1-55 today, the united states is in direct and active opposition to the multilateral order. it dangerously seeks a u.s.-led world order to replace the un-centered multilateral system, but even in that regard it is unwilling to invest other than militarily in any kind of global order. our best hope: effective multilateralismour best hope: effective multilateralism with the world falling into depression, and the united states actively threatening the un-based order (because it includes china), we find ourselves in one of the most dangerous periods in modern history. the good news is that the vast majority of the world would like to continue—and indeed to strengthen— the global un-centered order. the bad news is that the european union may prove to be too weak and too disunited to be much of a bulwark against trump’s actions, and indeed some governments in western europe (for example, boris johnson’s government in the uk, but probably some eu governments as well) will instinctively follow the united states, since america remains the leader of nato, the defense alliance of these countries. the right-wing governments of australia, brazil, israel, and others will also follow trump’s lead. the good news is that more and more european leaders are recognizing the need for a strong, united european union that defends the multilateral system rather than following trump’s dangerous unilateralism. what will save us from ourselves, if we are to be saved, is this. the vast majority of the world will agree to strengthen who, rather than weaken it as the us wants. who would provide the vital logistics and material supply chains to fight the pandemic, as well as the organizational global leadership in the search for a covid-19 vaccine. the imf, another vital creation of the us at the end of world war ii, would provide the emergency financing to low-income and emerging economies to keep them afloat. the paris club of creditor nations, plus china, would grant deep debt relief to heavily indebted developing countries that are battling the epidemic and the economic collapse. the food and agricultural organization (fao), together with the world food programme, unicef, and the un office for the coordination of humanitarian assistance (ocha), would protect the world’s food supply chains and ensure emergency food assistance to guard against mass hunger—a real prospect now on the horizon. i would therefore amend kindleberger’s thesis in one vital way. as kindleberger rightly noted, it is hard to fight a global crisis without a leader. the hegemon of the recent past is a hegemon no more. yet our aim should not be to promote a new hegemon to replace the united states. we should not seek any single country or region to step into the gap. our goal instead should be to replace american leadership or hegemony by an effective multilateral system operating under the un charter, our global foundation for peace; the universal declaration of human rights, the world’s moral charter; the framework convention on climate change, our covenant for protecting the planet; and the convention on biological diversity, our binding pledge to preserve all life against the damages that humanity is causing. defending, protecting, preserving, and supporting the multilateral system should be the imperative of our times. unilateralism is countered not by more unilateralism but by multilateralism; not by enmity but by cooperation. that should be the goal: global cooperation—urgently—to overcome the greatest challenge to humanity of modern times. this must become our abiding purpose. jeffrey d. sachs is university professor and director of the center for sustainable development at columbia university, director of the un sustainable development solutions network, and commissioner of the un broadband commission for development. this article first appeared in horizons magazine. parts of this essay draw upon the author’s speech on geopolitics and multilateralism at a february 2020 meeting of the pontifical academy of social science, vatican city. microsoft word 2 typ 6178-article text-13893-1-6-20201123 consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 23, 2021, pp. 15-21.  abstract although current literature in the environmental humanities establishes the existence of ecoracism and embodied toxicity, the discourse does not explicitly identify the connection between these two phenomena. this research paper argues that ecoracism, as seen in instances such as the violation of indigenous rights experienced by the standing rock sioux tribe or the infringement of corporations on the sacred land of maunakea, creates expendable bodies that are either invisible or negligible to the public. in this system, the suffering of the oppressed groups similarly goes unseen. this process can be specifically traced to instances of embodied toxicity, in which the contamination of communal land, water, or air with toxic waste is ignored by lawmakers. this research proposes a new framework for discussing toxic pollution by linking the creation of expendable bodies under ecoracism to the normalization of embodied toxicity. further, upon examining contributions from prominent scholars of eco-social justice activism, this work illustrates the ways in which this new lens can be applied in order to advocate for those who suffer from embodied toxicity. author’s note i became interested in this topic after reading “denormalizing embodied toxicity” by julie sze, which i cite in this piece. this reading, paired with my studies in the environmental humanities, prompted me to examine the systems that normalize embodied toxicity. through observation, i found that issues of ecoracism and embodied toxicity are often underrepresented in the media, in part due to the inability of these longstanding issues to fit into the confines of a traditional media cycle. thus, i hope this paper can analyze the connections between ecoracism and embodied © 2021 vivian g. shinall. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution license (ccby 4.0), which permits the user to copy, distribute, and transmit the work provided that the original author(s) and source are credited. vivian g. shinall is with pacific lutheran university, 12180 park avenue s, tacoma, wa 98447 (email: shinalvg@plu.edu). toxicity to allow for more effective advocacy on behalf of the affected communities. keywords ecoracism, embodied toxicity, eco-social justice, toxic contamination, environmental humanities, activism i. introduction in 2016, members of the standing rock sioux tribe organized to oppose the construction of the dakota access pipeline (million, 2018). although native communities have continuously resisted the construction of pipelines and other structures on sacred native land in the past, this specific movement prompted much wider public attention and support from across the united states. however, this hard-won publicity was not enough to convince u.s. lawmakers of the lakota people’s claim to the land and water in the region (million, 2018). as the construction of the pipeline continued, the stakeholders reinforced the time-tested hierarchy in which white western culture usurps that of native peoples. the push to construct the pipeline is a case of ecoracism, or environmental discrimination against minoritized groups. in this system of oppression, groups suffer from environmental degradation because their cultural values are deemed lesser than the monetary interests of the oppressors. in the decision to proceed with the pipeline, the culture of the lakota people was sidelined and deemed unimportant. across the country from standing rock, the people of kettleman city, california have been suffering from adverse health effects for over a decade because one of the largest hazardous waste facilities in the united states expendable bodies: examining the connection between ecoracism and embodied toxicity to advance eco-social justice activism vivian g. shinall consilience: the journal of sustainable development shinall: expendable bodies is located nearby. this issue only became of interest to the state of california in 2007, when research discovered that infants in the communities surrounding the facilities were more likely to be born with cleft palates. unlike in standing rock, the struggle of the mostly latinx farming community in kettleman city to effect change for themselves and their children has never garnered national attention. while discussing the case of kettleman, julie sze refers to her concept of embodied toxicity—the adverse health effects suffered by populations due to environmental degradation—to draw connections between the cases in which the human body is contaminated by toxic chemicals (sze, 2018, p. 107). this paper argues that the ecoracist practices against the standing rock sioux tribe and the embodied toxicity in kettleman city both exemplify how the two phenomena progress by way of expendable bodies. the cultural hierarchy that is established through the systems of ecoracism creates bodies that are viewed by popular society as expendable. this discursive framework normalizes the embodied toxicity experienced by marginalized populations. by applying new frameworks, this paper examines the pathways forward for affected groups and activists as they attempt to construe to lawmakers and the public a suffering that is uniquely invisible. ii. ecoracism and the creation of expendable bodies in the lakota tradition, mni sose, known as the missouri river, is a life force. not only does it provide sustenance for nature and people, but, “according to ella deloria in speaking of indians, the ‘ultimate aim’ of lakota life is being ‘a good relative’” (howe & young, 2019, p. 56). in their struggle to protect this area, protesters against the dakota access pipeline had to alter their rhetoric to fit their audience. as they attempted to present their case to a white majority, the lakota people argued for the rights to the water––a pattern of logic that fits within an accepted western discourse on ownership.1 1 here, i use the word “western” to refer to the culture derived from europe that has traditionally come to be widely accepted as the mainstream in the united states. i recognize that by employing a “west vs. rest” discourse, i am also relying on a set of assumptions that has been harmful to many cultures. i hope to use this discourse to challenge the shortsightedness of western society and the gatekeeping that exists within the type of language it uses and the ideas on which it however, their true goal was much deeper than what could be expressed through this framework; they protested not in the hope of retaining resources for the sake of personal gain, but to be good relatives to mni sose, as it had always been to them. this effort culminated in the movement known as standing rock, where the lakota, nakota, and dakota peoples came together, standing firm to protect the land by forming encampments that eventually grew larger than a small town (howe & young, 2019). community members worked together to provide sanitation, food, housing, health care, schooling, and other necessities throughout the encampments, uniting to weather the stresses of the environment. not only were the protestors strong in their conviction to protect their relative, but they were acutely aware of the consequences should their mission fail to succeed. as they believed, “it is prophecy. a great black snake, zuzeca sapa, will spread itself across the land bringing destruction to the land, the water, and the people” (estes & dhillon, 2019, p. 1). the black snake posits what ecofeminist scholar donna haraway calls a “speculative fabulation,” as it crafts a narrative that allows the people to more thoughtfully interact with nature and rally around its protection (haraway, 2016, p. 2). a speculative fabulation such as this one warns of real outcomes: if the dakota access pipeline were to burst, it would contaminate the drinking water of millions of people (estes & dhillon, 2019). given this cultural history, the eventual construction of the pipeline was devastating to the native population. as professor dian million bluntly states, “the subsequent drilling beneath the missouri river (at lake oahe) was an act of rape, a violence that ignored standing rock’s long-embodied sovereignty in that lakota place” (million, 2018, p. 20). the sheer magnitude of the police force deployed against the protestors made clear the government’s goal to push the project through and “finish the job” without consideration of the lakota people or their claim to sacred land (million, 2018, p. 20). in the case of standing rock, the message from lawmakers to native peoples is evident: your culture does not matter. a decision like this one reverberates throughout a society, effectively acting as an earthquake places the most importance, namely capitalism and the constant quest to grow individual affluence and power. 17 consilience: the journal of sustainable development that forces strata to resettle accordingly. the corresponding cultural hierarchy is thus further solidified, more deeply embedding norms that dictate who matters and who does not. the u.s. government is now slated to coordinate development in another native space, this time in hawaii. maunakea is quite possibly the most sacred place in the hawaiian islands to kānaka maoli, or native hawaiians.2 the giant dormant volcano is the highest point in all of hawaii, and figures prominently in ancient hawaiian legends. the mountain is now threatened by the construction of the thirty meter telescope (tmt). supporters of the telescope tout the importance of new scientific discoveries, but the native hawaiian population argues that the construction will defile the sacred site. in hawaiian creation stories, the earth mother and the sky father created the islands, beginning with the island of hawai’i, on which maunakea is the highest point. according to these traditional stories, the mountain “is considered to be first born, and is held in high esteem” (hitt, 2019). moreover, because this site was the first-born, it holds significance as the piko of the island, or the center of the beginning (hitt, 2019). the sacred site reappears in many other texts, most notably in mele hānau, or birth chants, which explicitly establish a connection between the newborn native chiefs and the land (hitt, 2019). the summit of maunakea is so sacred that the people rarely go there themselves, as described by pualani kanaka‘ole kanahele: there was no wanting to go to [the] top. […] and so it was kind of a hallowed place that you know it is there, and you don’t need to go there. you don’t need to bother it. […] and it was always reassuring because it was the foundation of our island. […] if you want to reach mana, that [the summit] is where you go. (kanahele, 1999, as cited in hitt, 2019) from the perspective of the kānaka maoli, the construction of the thirty meter telescope represents a 2 in this paper, i adhere to the guidelines of the university of hawaii hilo school of hawaiian language in using “maunakea” spelled as one word, since it relates to a specific place and serves as a proper noun. as two words, “mauna kea” means “white mountain” and functions as a descriptor. desecration of sacred land. in protest, the kia’i, who are known as the guardians of the sacred land in the native tradition, attempted to physically stop the development through a system of “corporeal refusals and collective resurgence” (maile, 2019, p. 58). one protestor, jazmyne alston, attested to the gravity of the protests, describing how “watching the kupunas [elders] i knew get arrested was a chilling experience […]. in a world of unwanted colonization, i feel that the last thing they should be taking is the mauna” (j. alston, personal communication, may 13, 2020). for native hawaiians, the struggle against the thirty meter telescope is a struggle to preserve their connection with the land, which is intrinsically tied to their personhood. as the fight against the thirty meter telescope continues, hawaii’s supreme court has approved the telescope’s construction. according to the tmt international observatory, the base of the structure was set to be completed on june 25, 2020. the site also boasts a finish date of july 20, 2027, proclaiming that, on that day, the observatory will be “ready for science!!” (tmt international observatory, n.d.). in this case, native hawaiian culture has not only been sidelined, but deemed of little importance to the united states by an official hawaiian governing body. in the words of david uahikeaikalei’ohu maile, the construction of the tmt telescope is nothing short of “capitalist-colonialist violence disguised as scientific progress” (maile, 2019, p. 62). in the cases of both standing rock and maunakea, there has been a devaluation of native cultures in pursuit of the u.s.’s “capitalist-colonialist” goals. within these examples, a clearer understanding of the word “ecoracism” can be achieved. in deciding to capitalize on sacred spaces, a judgment is imposed on the cultures that hold those spaces dear, and said cultures are thus marginalized and devalued. i argue that this creates expendable bodies, delineating those who are nonessential to society. while this ongoing process of creating expendable bodies is uniquely visible in the cases of native peoples, it has already occurred many times over in spaces occupied by racial minorities and impoverished communities. in the following sections, i will further illuminate how this process has led to increasing environmental degradation of the spaces in which expendable bodies reside, and how these bodies consilience: the journal of sustainable development shinall: expendable bodies have ultimately suffered from embodied toxicity due to the toxic conditions of their environments. iii. embodied toxicity in her piece, “denormalizing embodied toxicity,” american studies professor julie sze references stacey alaimo’s idea of trans-corporeality: the human is always the very stuff of the messy, contingent, emergent mix of the material world. […] the body is enmeshed in social and material systems and systems of domination that are enacted in individual and community bodies, cultural representations, and modes of knowing and thinking. (alaimo, 2010, as cited in sze, 2018, p. 107) in emphasizing the porous quality of our human bodies, alaimo develops an understanding of the body as constantly permeated by social and environmental factors. this pushes studies of embodied toxicity past the typical black-and-white considerations of human experience and wellbeing, calling scholars and scientists alike to consider the unseen, abstract nature of humans’ relationship with their surrounding environment and social structures. allowing for consideration of this “messy” grey space prompts consideration of the intersectionality of this issue, leading to further examination of the connections between the many factors that shape the human experience. through this framework, one can better understand the systems at work in the case of kettleman city. kettleman city is a small town of 1,500 people, just over an hour’s drive from bakersfield, california and only 3.5 miles from the largest hazardous waste facility west of the mississippi river (sze, 2018). the town’s population is majority latinx and low-income, and many residents are undocumented (sze, 2018). these factors have caused the state of california to overlook the people of kettleman city and the adverse health effects they continue to suffer as a result of toxic environmental pollutants. the population is continually subjected to pollutants through runoff from surrounding farmland; there are elevated levels of arsenic and benzene in their water; the town receives sewage from los angeles; and there is constant exposure to emissions from trucks driving on the nearby interstate (sze, 2018). one of the greatest contributing factors to the creation of this toxic environment is the nearby hazardous waste facility, which is owned by chemical waste management inc. (chem waste). according to sze, “the company has been fined more than $2 million over twenty-eight years for violations such as the mishandling of pcbs [polychlorinated biphenyls], and most recently for not following proper quality-control procedures” (sze, 2018, p. 110). the people of kettleman city had been suffering from adverse health effects caused by living near hazardous waste for over a decade before the state of california took notice in 2007, after a slew of babies were born with cleft palates and other birth defects (sze, 2018). before this, kettleman city citizens had suffered from higher rates of asthma, cancer, and miscarriages (sze, 2018). public outcry about the birth defects finally led the governor to instruct the department of public health and the environmental protection agency to conduct an investigation (sze, 2018). however, it became clear that the questions asked by the study focused on the individual actions of the people of kettleman city rather than the system and pollution that they were suffering from. the mothers of the children with birth defects were asked to recount their actions and behaviors as possible causes of their babies’ health conditions. as one mother stated bluntly, you want to know if we ever smoked cigarettes or took drugs. […] i’m telling you that if the dump is allowed to expand, we’ll suffer more damage and illness. why? because we are poor and hispanic. the people who issue those permits don’t care about us getting sick from it because all they think about is money. (sze, 2018, p. 115) in choosing this phrasing for their questions, the investigators sought to reframe the issue to implicate the citizens themselves, taking the pollution caused by nearby industry out of the equation. when the results of the study came out, residents were dismayed. while the report affirmed that there were higher levels of pollutants in the residents’ environment, it did not make a link to where these may have originated (sze, 2018). while citizens continue to fight for government intervention in the expansion of the waste 19 consilience: the journal of sustainable development facility, the report allowed the state of california to remove kettleman city from the spotlight, disregarding their continued suffering. the example of kettleman city illuminates how the issue of embodied toxicity can be normalized. because those who suffered from embodied toxicity were predominantly latinx and low-income, they were already viewed as expendable by the u.s. government and much of society. therefore, their suffering from toxic waste was easily pushed from the public purview. iv. reframing eco-social justice activism while the suffering of those in kettleman city went largely unseen in part because the population was made up of expendable bodies, it is also true that toxic contamination on the body is often hard to see. as such, activists face a unique battle in raising awareness. there are multiple factors that play into the invisibility of toxic contamination. the speed at which toxic contamination occurs is in itself an obstacle to its visibility. rob nixon’s idea of “slow violence” addresses the nature of gradual harm on a population, referring to “a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all” (nixon, 2013, p. 2). in applying this concept to toxic contamination on the body, one can more clearly understand how a violence that takes place slowly and increases gradually may not capture the public’s attention. the sensational nature of news cycles is not conducive to issues of slow violence, as these either seem too insignificant or occur over too long of a period to fit the programming. in a more literal sense, issues of toxic contamination are typically not visible. toxic pollutants often spread undetected in communities for years before their harm is noticed. as associate professor phaedra c. pezzullo writes, “one of the primary constraints for anti-toxic activists is a lack of visual evidence. if you are familiar with toxins you know that their detection often is not predicated on sight” (pezzullo, 2014, p. 29). this literal invisibility makes it difficult to spread awareness of these issues, as the contaminant cannot be easily visually represented. in a similar sense, the harmful effects of toxic contamination are not immediate in the body, and tracing the pathway of the pollutant to a victim’s cancer is far messier than connecting a victim’s broken arm to a car accident. with the gradual nature of toxic contamination, its lack of visibility—and the simple fact that sufferers are often marginalized peoples—activists are presented with a complex labyrinth of barriers to affecting change for communities. however, by altering the framework of activist discourse and imagery around toxic contamination, these issues can be better expressed to the public. in his 2015 article, “toxic portraits: resisting multiple invisibilities in the environmental justice movement,” joshua trey barnett examines how portraits can be used to effectively argue the existence of toxic contamination and motivate viewers to act (barnett, 2015). barnett highlights the aforementioned obstacle of tracing the origin of a victim’s illness back to the toxic source, and therefore argues that for a toxic portrait to be effective, it must include a connection to the site that is producing the toxic waste (barnett, 2015). in one photograph that barnett cites, horace smith, a resident of corpus christi, is shown with the backdrop of a nearby refinery (barnett, 2015). figure 1: horace smith stands in his hometown of corpus christi in front of a nearby refinery. (barnett, 2015, corpus cristi [photograph]) in the photo, smith wears an oxygen tube to breathe. without the backdrop, the origin of smith’s health condition would be untraceable to the viewer, but positioning him in front of the refinery clearly implicates it in the shot. as barnett writes, consilience: the journal of sustainable development shinall: expendable bodies by picturing human bodies in toxically assaulted places, toxic portraits like these resist multiple invisibilities. together with textual narratives, toxic portraits make visible the interconnections between human bodies, toxic pollution, and the pain and suffering that frequently result from their combination. (barnett, 2015, p. 421) by highlighting the importance of including polluters in photos of embodied toxicity, barnett’s piece channels the power of photography for toxic contamination advocacy. in a different sense, the rhetoric of activists can also be used strategically to resist traditional invisibilities. activists succeed when they are able to reframe the lens through which opposing forces justify the creation of new toxic sites or obfuscate the link between toxic pollutants and victims’ health conditions. in one case study of an underprivileged town resisting the development of a new garbage incinerator in their neighborhood, activists’ arguments incorporated themes of identity, effectively employing these themes to change the nature of discourse surrounding the incinerator’s installation. one such theme was the role of a concerned mother: “we were compelled to unite, because the future quality of life for our children is being threatened” (peeples, 2003, p. 24). in deploying this trope, activists were able to accomplish three things. first, it served as a rallying cry under which mothers throughout the community could unite to protect their children––a noble goal by popular standards. second, it allowed women without much education on health and safety to speak with more authority. third, it gave the women a permissible basis for entering the realm of politics (peeples, 2003). by using identity-based language to structure discourse, the women of this community were able to qualify their personhood and gain an agency of which they had initially been deprived due to their position in society. to achieve more effective advocacy strategy for those affected by toxic contamination, it is imperative for activists to think critically about the imagery and rhetoric they use. in doing so, the many barriers that inhibit protestors from affecting change––physical invisibility, the slow rate of toxic contamination, and victims’ societal positions as expendable bodies––may be counteracted. v. conclusion using her trademark performative style, donna haraway argues that “it matters what thoughts think thoughts. it matters what knowledges know knowledges. […] it matters what worlds world worlds. it matters what stories tell stories” (haraway, 2016, p. 35). when approaching issues of ecoracism and embodied toxicity, it is necessary to step outside traditional modes of thought to observe underlying patterns. once this is done, it becomes clear that ecoracism results in an othering that marginalizes affected groups and creates expendable bodies which are far more likely to suffer from embodied toxicity. by using this knowledge to inform advocacy, activists can shape photography and rhetoric to ultimately dismantle systems of ecoracism and embodied toxicity. references barnett, j. t. (2015). toxic portraits: resisting multiple invisibilities in the environmental justice movement. quarterly journal of speech, 101(2), (pp. 405-425). estes, n., & dhillon, j. (2019). introduction: the black snake, #nodapl, and the rise of a people’s movement. in estes, n., & dhillon, j. (eds.), standing with standing rock: voices from the #nodapl movement (pp. 1-10). minneapolis; london: university of minnesota press. haraway, d. j. (2016). staying with the trouble: making kin in the chthulucene. durham: duke university press. hitt, c. (2019, august 5). the sacred history of maunakea. honolulu magazine. http://www.honolulumagazine.com/honolulumagazine/august-2019/the-sacred-history-of-maunakea/. howe, c., & young, t. (2019). mnisose. in estes, n., & dhillon, j. (eds.), standing with standing rock: voices from the #nodapl movement (pp. 56-70). minneapolis; london: university of minnesota press. maile, d. u. (2019). resurgent refusals: protecting mauna a wākea and kanaka maoli decolonization. hūlili: multidisciplinary research on hawaiian well-being, 11(1), (pp. 57-69). million, d. (2018). “we are the land, and the land is us”: indigenous land, lives, and embodied ecologies in the twenty-first century. in nishime, l. & hester williams, k. d. (eds.), racial ecologies (pp. 19-33). seattle, wa: university of washington press. nixon, r. (2013). slow violence and the environmentalism of the poor. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. 21 consilience: the journal of sustainable development peeples, j. a. (2003). trashing south‐central: place and identity in a community‐level environmental justice dispute. southern communication journal, 69(1), 8295. pezzullo, p. c. (2014). toxic tourism: rhetorics of pollution, travel, and environmental justice. tuscaloosa: university of alabama press. sze, j. (2018). denormalizing embodied toxicity: the case of kettleman city. in nishime, l. & hester williams, k.d. (eds.), racial ecologies (pp. 107-122). seattle, wa: university of washington press. tmt international observatory. (n.d.). tmt construction timeline. https://www.tmt.org/page/timeline?category=observato ry+construction. introductionintroduction society has progressively demanded an increased power of data computing, processing, and analytics to find solutions to current problems. one current problem is alleviating the stresses of overpopulation and reducing overcrowding in urban regions. one study states that “more than half of the global population now live in a city. the united nations estimates that by 2050 this percentage will rise to 66 percent” (tanda, 2018, pp.77). according to another study, the world health organization predicts growing urban challenges, with cities having a larger proportion of the burden of health, environmental, and security issues (world health organization, 2016). the internet of things (iot) technology can provide innovative solutions to these growing population trends. the definition of iot technology has been re-written and conceptualized by various scholars. according to haller, iot technology is “a world where physical objects are seamlessly integrated into the information networks, and where the physical objects can become active participants in the business process” (zhang, 2014, pp.1). yet zhi-kai zhang defines iot technology as a physical or virtual object that connects to the internet and can communicate with human users and other objects (zhang, 2014, pp.1). in this article, i define iot technology as representing virtual or physical objects that are integrated across a view journal | view issue sustainable cities and the internet sustainable cities and the internet of things (iot) technologyof things (iot) technology iot technology improves the development of smart cities’ iot technology improves the development of smart cities’ infrastructures and reduces over-population stressesinfrastructures and reduces over-population stresses nicole a. drepaul school of professional studies, columbia university, new york, ny 10027, united states, email: nicole.drepaul@columbia.edu keywords:keywords: sustainability, internet of things (iot) technology, overpopulation, city infrastructure, urban development, planning, overpopulation stresses abstract:abstract: in this paper, i aim to understand how iot technology can improve the development of smart cities’ infrastructures and alleviate the strains of population growth. in order to understand this inquiry, i will begin by defining iot technology. then i will examine the function and capabilities of iot technology and how it helps smart cities’ urban development in areas such as architectural, agricultural, safety and surveillance, and health and sanitary needs. i will develop a prognosis that provides targeted solutions for how iot can specifically reduce urban population strains and challenges in particular urban sectors, and analyze the environmental implications of iot technology. lastly, in the discussion section, i propose applying sustainable frameworks, that can incorporate iot technology, and showcase iot weaknesses. this research concludes with describing the impact of implementing iot technologies to address specific urban infrastructure and overcrowding problems. it can allow readers to view the interdisciplinary potential of sustainability with the use of technology, environmental science, and engineering, and social science through urban development and planning. internet of things technology, through a cross disciplinary approach, can alleviate and resolve humanity’s rising problems. 39 doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6742 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 39-47 author’s note:author’s note: i am a graduate candidate in the master of science negotiation and conflict resolution program at columbia university. i am interested in resolving conflict in numerous dimensions, including urban overpopulation, environmental pollution, and threats to sustainability. my graduate research is a comparative case study examining international conflict and the persistence of attractors threatening peace agreements in common areas of conflict. my previous undergraduate research relates to areas of ineffective governance to environmental sustainability. the culmination of my research and studies can be used to change policy, inform future research, reduce conflict, and improve urban planning initiatives to create a peaceful and sustainable future. july 6, 2020 http://consiliencejournal.org https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/consilience/issue/view/651 consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6742 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 39-4740 system to form a network of communication with beings or things. the interconnectivity of iot technology can enhance society’s capacity in creating smarter and more efficient cities. it can assess and address problems and provide solutions to sustainability challenges within the sectors of architecture, agriculture, safety and surveillance, and sanitation. it balances these sustainability challenges by processing and facilitating the exchange of information, communicating the needs and problems of each sector through technical sensors. iot technology can increase our efficiency by allowing objects to work together, increase our decision making through greater data collection, and improve our environment through better resource savings, application, and distribution. this research expands on four elements: (1) how iot functional capabilities create smart cities; (2) solutions to reduce and alleviate overpopulated cities’ stresses; (3) sustainable implications; and (4) a discussion of iot weaknesses and applying sustainable frameworks. iot technology & smart citiesiot technology & smart cities iot technology can advance smart cities in six domains: “smart economy, smart people, smart governance, smart mobility, smart environment, and smart living” (tanda, 2018, pp. 79). smart cities, with the implementation of iot technology, can allow the process of “an intelligent infrastructure [by] linking objects, information, and people through computer networks” (tanda, 2018, pp.79). in order to successfully implement iot technology, sensor-related issues such as precision, accuracy, bandwidth, and cloud computing must be consistently maintained. data receptors can affect the data acquisition sample, numerical variables, and infrastructure inferences. the internet of things technology consists of billions of interconnected nodes that cooperate simultaneously, similar to a system of functionalism, in that these nodes transform environmental adaptations into compressed versions of data. iot technology categorizes data through ubiquitous cloud computing through the extension of internet connectivity by communicating with devices and everyday objects. many scholars have attempted to describe the nature of iot technology. fleish describes it with the words “things do not turn into computers, but they can feature tiny computers” (fleisch, 2010, pp.3). objects can act like tiny computers through various methods of data compilation. iot technology can foresee logical patterns, evident with machine learning, and signal learned information from sensors via wireless cloud platforms. iot technology is significant because it can advance the development and prosperity of smart cities. iot iot functional capabilities create smart functional capabilities create smart citiescities iot technology provides numerous benefits to the environment. it promotes the progression of future sustainability by developing smarter and more efficient cities. in particular, it can reduce challenges and population stresses occurring in architecture, agriculture, safety and surveillance, and health and sanitation sectors. this section provides an overview of the iot technological capabilities and how it can function within different urban sectors. architecture sector iot technology performs operations through the integration of multiple devices in any setting such as homes. these multiple devices involve technological applications such as “audio and video equipment, lighting, curtain control, air-conditioning control, security systems, digital cinema system, video server, shadow cabinet system, network appliances and more” (zhang, 2015, pp.1). smart homes facilitate the exchange of information systems that are time and cost-efficient. the integration of information commences mobile computing with a microsd (micro secure digital card) and/or ic (integrated circuit) card. the flow of information begins with interconnected nodes that sense and share data through the internet. iot technology enables smart cities’ housing development through its technical foundations. the technicalities rest in numerous layers: the perception layer, center control platform, middle layer, and application layer. the perception layer manages tasks that rely on the sensor signal and monitoring equipment. for example, sensors can convey photosensitivity, chemicals and chemical composition, and physical conditions. in a setting where the chemical composition is smoke, and the physical conditions are light and heat, the sensors can internalize the physical stimuli and respond to this data. in particular, in detecting light, photosensitivity generates an output signal that detects the range of light energy in altering frequencies. photosensitivity sensors convert photons into electrons, which can utilize photo emissive and photovoltaic cells to convert light energy into electrical energy. this process allows the sensors to experience efficient savings on energy consumption. other instruments used in light detection are pyroelectric sensors to ensure housing surveillance and safety. the sensors are sensitive to the temperature of a human body that radiates infrared energy with a wavelength between 9 and 10 micrometers. the perception layer involves sensors that detect a range of 8 to 12 micrometers of infrared energy, and the control center can relay to individuals consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6742 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 39-4741 if there is an intruder or high motion sensitivity. zhang summarizes this informative process with the words “first, the central controller receives the information passed from the perception. then the central controller would send the control information to the command execution of a simulated launcher” (zhang, 2015, pp. 2.) after the functions of the control system are complete, the middle layer acts on this information. middleware technology detects data sharing and allows the exchange of information between household equipment. one example of using the middleware layer in iot technology is in detecting water shortages. iot technology can connect to a city’s cloud computing public service centers to detect water shortages or fluctuations in temperature. the cloud computing software can then transmit information on water shortages and reduction of water usage during periods of drought. access to the city’s data can enable iot technology to guide individuals and their housing conditions by translating that information into both device and consumer knowledge. iot technology has the potential to convey knowledge in an actionable matter in languages that both humans and technological devices understand. the middle layer highlights how the cloud’s housing system becomes an ‘intelligent village.’ this intelligent village utilizes the application layer to access a user interface that operates on a variety of household appliances and services. the application layer, with the intermix of the middle layer, relays information to the cloud housing system. iot can employ the house’s cloud computing data and further transmit signals to the city’s mainframe cloud by notifying police, ambulance, and much more with the time, water usage, location, and any incident occurring within a matter of seconds. the interrelation of devices computing and connecting data allows these devices to tell a story and fill in knowledge gaps. agriculture sector iot technology can help the development of smart cities’ agricultural sectors by streamlining production, increasing efficiency, reducing resources, and cultivating farming transparency. iot technology in the agricultural sector has numerous components. iot technology establishes agricultural cloud-based computing, the storage of agricultural information, the construction of iot technological plant factories, and smart agricultural farming. in the agricultural sector, the construction of iot technology is divided between user management (access license, user interaction management, user accounting), task management (image management, task dispatching, task performance, life cycle management), and resource management (load, failure detection, recovery from failure, monitory statistics). agricultural cloud-based computing involves utilizing a cloud database to manage data and data analytics. the cloud can identify “management defects, measurement, and analysis of productivity and property based on a productivity curve” (tongke, 2013, pp.3). the productivity curve can be developed by creating initial productivity and target productivity points. these points can be transmitted through cloud computing to aid farming processes. it can help farming through: (1) managing planting; (2) measuring productivity effects and management measures; (3) tracing and controlling farm produce security; and (4) monitoring plant growth. in plant management, cloud computing can analyze behavior trends per crop and per plant. furthermore, it can document the plant given specific subsections such as date, sunlight, humidity, location, species breed, soil quality, and production yield. cloud computing data can also analyze the success of plants based on tagging, analyze trends within the data, and enforce meta-data compilation and assessments to improve productivity and agricultural decisions. another element of cloud computing is assessing plant productivity effects and the management of resources. cloud computing can calculate a production function per input measurement through computer simulations and mathematical modeling. the movement of the production line contingent upon x inputs portrays to farmers a visual and mathematical measurement of their errors and successes. for the purposes of farm produce security, cloud computing creates a system of monitoring and is able to track the produce from farm to farm to consumers’ tables. furthermore, it encourages plant growth by monitoring and motivating farming transparency by analyzing data constituents stored on an agricultural cloud. iot technology can construct dynamic plant factories. as tongke states in the article, “smart agriculture based on cloud computing and iot,” a plant factory is a “highly efficient agricultural system that achieves continuous production of crops around the year through highly accurate control of the environment within the facility. it uses computers to control temperature, humidity, carbon dioxide concentration automatically, and culture solution of crops, to achieve labor-saving production of crops which are subject to no or little natural condition limitation” (tongke, 2013, pp.5). iot technology can develop a successful plant factory through the intermix of a sensing, delivery, and intelligent control subsets. the plant factories can construct a sensing structure through environment testing sensors, biosensors, global consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6742 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 39-4742 positioning systems, and radio frequency identification. for example, in sensing systems, iot technology can document specific details like the germination period, growth spurt, and development stages. the spectral analysis of botany can determine the plant’s condition and the environment the plants must acclimate to. the sensing layer collects pertinent information, whereas the delivery layer is concerned with reliable conveyance and transmission of data. for quick and shortterm delivery preferences, wireless connections such as wlan802, bluetooth, and zigbee can transmit data at different speeds and at low costs. lastly, the intelligent control layer is composed of elements that could include a “pda or controller, regulation equipment, and operating terminal” (tongke, 2013, pp.5). for instance, the system can create parameters based on internet data, such as regulating weather and irrigation patterns. iot technology can specialize each day, directing a plan given the daily parameters of wind, weather, soil, and sunlight per crop. smart agriculture consists of measuring subsystems to achieve a holistic data center. there are components to measure in a given subsystem. agroecological systems can be developed to include three subsystems. the first is water quality monitoring, fertilization, and soil monitoring: soil humidity, light, wind, and air. the second subsystem includes automated greenhouses, water irrigation, and pest monitoring. the third agroecological subsystem consists of agricultural equipment and facilities that monitor, control, and operate farm machinery. the implementation of these systems is completed through the iot technology’s management system, resource pool, presentation layer, and user interface. smart agriculture advances the development of smart cities and iot technology, and can further develop feasible solutions to agriculture’s multiplicity of problems. safety and surveillance sector iot technology offers viable safety and surveillance measures for smart cities, such as “network security, encryption, pki, security analytics, and api security” (press, 2017, pp.1). it can change the interface of smart cities by providing safer street lighting, transportation methods, traffic-easing solutions, and surveillance.. iot technology has changed safety measures by creating a video interface by utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles (uavs) or drones to provide commercial, governmental, and civilian security. for example, uavs can aid in environmental disaster relief, as exemplified by the japan east earthquake. in the aftermath of the earthquake, uavs helped by “coordinating disaster relief efforts, [capturing] images of the damager reactors at the fukushima daiichi nuclear power plant for site assessment, providing real time data of radiation levels at the nuclear power plant, and assessing the state of the cleanup and reconstruction efforts taking place in fukushima prefecture” (motlagh, 2017, pp.128). iot technology can deliver information and provide an informative spatial analysis to ensure the safety of the population. another example of iot technology promoting safety is through the local binary pattern history method that derived from open source computer vision. the algorithm has roots in 2 dimensions textures. the operating system can summarize an image by comparing pixels with neighboring pixels. the center pixel is measured by the intensity of the pixels in contrast to the neighboring pixels. if the pixel is greater or equal to the neighboring pixel, it is denoted with a 1, or a 0 if it is not. the lbp operator consists of 3x3 cells that follow binary code in classifying facial recognition. iot technology can detect suspected people by monitoring different facial details and expressions, i.e. open and closed eyes, smiling or not smiling, glasses, or no glasses. through this, it creates a platform to find individuals and create accurate surveillance and safety systems. health and sanitation sector iot technology can create a better health and sanitation system, namely by preventing various hazards and bad odors generated by garbage. to avoid these outcomes, a system utilizing iot technology can ensure that garbage disposal happens efficiently. iot technology can be used to invent a “smart alert system for garbage clearance by giving an alert signal to the municipal web server for instant cleaning of a dustbin with proper verification based on the level of garbage filling” (kumar, 2016, pp.1028). cleaner sanitary processes can abide by ultrasonic sensors, which are interfaced with arduino uno to monitor the levels of garbage. furthermore, the system’s garbage bins send alerts to the web server once sensors detect the garbage is at high levels. once the alert transmits to the garbage disposal personnel, the personnel can clean the bin and confirm the completion of the task with rfid tags. the system adopts essential elements such as an rfid tag, an rfid reader, a micro-controller, liquid crystal display, and a gprs. a functional diagram can model this process of transmitting the information. the system implementation will involve an rfid tag which “is a tiny device that stores and forwards the data to a rfid reader” (kumar, 2016, pp.1031). the rfid tag consists of active and passive sensors, with the former having stronger distances than the latter’s distances. they do not operate consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6742 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 39-4743 with batteries, but they gain power from rfid readers. the rfid tag will identify the radio frequency placed inside the tag and convert it into electrical power to support the transmission of data to the rfid reader. the system of garbage alert will rely on the rfid tag responding to the rfid reader and the ultrasonic sensor responding to arduino uno r3, connected to a power supply. finally, this process will be placed on the webserver and formulated in an android application. a more concise version of the data process is depicted in figure 1. iot technology solutions to reduce and iot technology solutions to reduce and alleviate overpopulated cities’ stressesalleviate overpopulated cities’ stresses the demands of growing populations in emerging cities can create distress among numerous stakeholders and government officials. therefore, it is crucial to see how iot technology can make real changes in the sustainability and long term growth of overpopulated areas. i have highlighted the urban needs of each sector—architecture, agriculture, safety/surveillance, and health/sanitation—and demonstrated how iot technology can provide solutions to each sector’s sustainability and efficiency challenges. the adoption of iot technology has the potential for numerous sustainable development implications. iot technology has beneficial environmental impacts, can stimulate long term growth, and can reduce monetary, timely, and environmental costs. it can also encourage sustainability as a common and necessary step for future development. furthermore, iot technology can encourage the development of the marketplace resources, and expand human and social capital. these environmental implications, along with the following solutions, show how iot technology can reduce urban population stresses in different sectors. architectural sector iot research allows policymakers to determine a cost and benefit analysis and measure the returns on investment from iot technology. this technology has numerous drivers, such as “savings on the public budget, a better quality of life of the citizens, and the city’s wealth” (tanda, 2018, pp.77). furthermore, smart cities provide initiatives to ensure cities’ overall growth, as well as their environmental, social, and economic well-being. one way in which the architectural sector can reduce overcrowding is through statistical analysis of demographics and population migration trends. for instance, the city can devise housing grids that ensure the efficient allocation of natural resources per household. iot technology can then enhance the effectiveness of this system by comparing the cities’ geographical and space limitations to its population, and ultimately showcase housing limits. another example of how iot technology can influence overpopulation is in the emergence of transportation limits. iot technology can detect flaws and limits within smart cities’ infrastructures, such as the increased human and car traffic that results from overcrowding and disrupts the transportation system. iot technology can be utilized for real-time updates on not only car congestion, but also human congestion and over-trafficked areas as well. iot technology can improve the architectural sector by transferring data efficiently in order to improve decision-making on policies and projects related to housing, development, and the maintenance of public spaces. it does so by allowing the facilitation of data acquisition to guide future processes. the sustainability implication is that, by improving our decisions iot technology will lead to better housing and transportation designs, improved construction processes, and healthier lifestyles in cities. agricultural sector the agricultural sector can reduce the concentration of overpopulated cities first by identifying a concentration of food waste through geotag technology, and second by acknowledging high levels of food waste per area, indicating that overpopulation leads to higher amounts of food waste per square meter. the agricultural sector can provide incentives to diminish food wastes by imposing punitive actions, i.e., tickets targeting areas with high levels of waste. the deterrence and identification of food waste can enable civilians to rectify errors while reducing overpopulation and growing strains of highly populated cities. in doing so, the agricultural sector can utilize iot technology to monitor levels of food production and food waste with geotags specifying the zip code, state, and figure 1: functional block diagram of the embedded system (kumar, 2016, pp.1029) consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6742 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 39-4744 city, and can administer a system of accountability with recording which regions account for the most food waste, food storage, and food shortages. it can also help alleviate the growing strains of overpopulation by ensuring the proper resource allocation to eco-sustainable farming. finally, the agricultural sector can assess food as a valuable asset that must be strategically administered and quantified. through this, iot technology can prevent food waste and increase farming fertility, food and resource allocation, and plant yield production. iot technology can improve the agricultural sector by allowing a greater ratio of agricultural output to limited input. further, it can ensure the progression of agricultural tasks, management, and resource allocation. thus, it can improve the output and management of the agricultural processes and products. the environmental implication is that this leads to a greater number of populations that reduce food waste and have less food shortages. safety and surveillance sector the safety and surveillance sector, utilizing iot technology, can mitigate the stresses of highly populated cities. for example, iot technology can prevent crime by mechanizing automotive surveillance in urban areas. surveillance can then reduce the rise of overpopulated cities by monitoring human development and growth. through spatial modeling, satellite imaging, and geophysical factors, iot surveillance can mark levels of human growth. once iot technology detects growing population demands, it can begin to rectify overcrowding. for instance, iot technology can influence the economy’s social benefit by monitoring or decreasing housing prices and raising the accessibility of housing resources. iot tech can help the safety and surveillance sector by detecting problems and the perpetrators of said problems. surveillance fosters accountability that can prevent the curvature of future actions taken against safety. it can also detect dangerous situations and faulty security operations, as well as monitor areas that are out of reach or vulnerable to humans. this sector can be more sustainable by fostering accountability, transparency, and alternative, non-human, skills that can ensure security. it can create sustainability by allowing problems to be detected quicker and enhances the range of options one can take to sustain security. the greater the opportunities for security the greater chances our society can be sustainable even in the midst of security threats. health and sanitation sector the health and sanitation sector influences population trends through the strenuous task of decomposition and disposal of waste. in major populated cities, waste and waste treatment pose health risks to air quality, human repository systems, and to sanitation through increased bacteria, animal infestation, and garbage liquid waste that affects water quality. the overflow of garbage and waste can deter overcrowding, but, the management of waste can motivate population wellbeing and population stresses. furthermore, to deter overpopulation, iot technology can implement a system of accountability regarding waste and consumption. each individual consumes at a level contingent upon household income, size, and bodyweight; then, iot technology can measure healthy standards of the garbage disposal and weight per household and place these standards across a standard mean of deviation. in totality, iot technology can reduce the strains of a growing population and spread a system of accountability stringent on individuals in crowded cities. iot technology can benefit the health sector by reducing the spread of health hazards, improving clean up and sanitary processes, and creating a system of structure and division of tasks. it can expedite waste disposal. avenues to explore include (a) increased movement of waste to recycle or compost facilitates near one’s home through in home transport machines, (b) machines, at home or the workplace, that repurpose materials instantly or carry waste directly to the city’s disposal and compost sites (c) and early detection of waste overflow. this process contributes to sustainability by reducing waste and air pollution. by reducing human exposure to harmful waste, the use of iot technology inadvertently alleviates the stresses of health care systems as well by reducing environment-related health concerns and risks. iot can speed societal processes, reduce negative environmental impacts, provide a more organized structure to society, and push labor saving strategies. sustainable implicationssustainable implications iot technology can enable more structural changes in policy and future governmental regulations. according to one scholar, mazhar rathmore, smart cities contain multiple tiers of planning. by examining iot’s structure of multiple tiers and their application, we can improve policy making, urban planning, and sustainable practices. there are multiple tiers to planning. the first bottom tier is responsible for “iot sources, data generations, and collections”; the second intermediate tier consists of communication between the sensors and relay connections; the third intermediate tier consists of data management and processing; and the top tier is responsible for the application and usage of the aggregated data (rathore, 2016, consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6742 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 39-4745 pp.1). this model of tiered frameworks can supplement the data aggregation, filtration, and computing data that aid in future decision-making processes. furthermore, the tiered framework provides us with a model of numerous ways by which iot technology can prevent overcrowding and alleviate the challenges of overpopulation. it can allow for greater urban planning, decision-making, and intersectionality between technology and human prosperity. policies can be amended to enhance the greater usage of iot technology. one policy is the executive order 13748 of november 16, 2016: establishing a community solutions council. this order established policies that help develop community solutions. iot can contribute to “community-driven, locally led vision and long-term plan[s] for clear outcomes [that] should guide individual projects” (national archives, 2016, pp.1). the community can utilize technology to guide the division of tasks and reach community sustainable goals. another policy that can be influenced by iot technology is the executive order 13503 -establishment of the white house office of urban affairs. this order impacts the adoption of technology in resolving urban challenges. various stakeholders were involved in the implementation of this order. one can influence these stakeholders some of which are: the department of health and human services, the department of housing and urban development, the department of transportation, the department of energy, the department of education, and the environmental protection agency. these stakeholders can learn how iot technology can guide future urban planning processes. iot can impact a more recent policy called the executive order regarding efficient federal operations. this order states that it aims to “achieve and maintain annual reductions in building energy use and implement energy efficiency measures that reduce costs; meet statutory requirements relating to the consumption of renewable energy and electricity, [and]...utilize performance contracting to achieve energy, water, building modernization, and infrastructure goals” (the white house, 2018, pp.2). iot technology can encourage the pursuit of these sustainable infrastructure goals and change policies to encourage interdisciplinary solutions to resolve urban sustainability challenges. discussion: applying sustainable discussion: applying sustainable frameworks and iot weaknessesframeworks and iot weaknesses iot technology has evolving beneficial and disadvantageous effects. this section expresses weaknesses and strengths to adopting sustainable frameworks that are inclusive of iot. sustainable frameworks include corporate social responsibility, stakeholder theory, corporate sustainability, and green economics. these theories can show the application of sustainable frameworks to foster iot technology usage. according to chang, corporate social responsibility consists of legal, ethical, discretionary responsibilities. such responsibilities relate to social issues such as “consumerism, environment, discrimination, product safety, occupational safety, and shareholders” (chang, 2017, pp.50). businesses must notice how they affect civilians’ choices and perspectives. therefore, businesses can affect consumer’s knowledge and perspectives of sustainability and its practices. businesses affecting consumers is similar to the perspective of the theory of coevolution. the theory of coevolution rests on darwin’s fundamental groundings. this theory’s definition is founded upon interacting agents. these interacting agents refer to “organizations and their environments [which] evolve in relation to each other” (chang, 2017, pp.52). as, one organization evolves it contributes to societal evolution. this interaction is similar to the interaction of various devices that iot incorporates. it is beneficial because iot technology aims to foster this similar type of co-evolutionary change. as technology advances society advances as well. similarly, the green economics theory highlights civilian and business participatory measures. these participatory measures showcase the quality of businesses and stakeholders as they participate in sustainable discourse and ideas. further, it can be used to analyze how coevolution commences and its effects on businesses and sustainable stakeholders. stakeholders play an essential role in the way businesses and society progresses its sustainability goals or lack thereof. stakeholder theories emphasize business relations, with businesses fostering relationships with non-traditional and traditional populations. for example, it encourages businesses to form relationships with non-traditional actors such as the government, special interest groups, or environmentalists. these groups can serve as change making agents to foster the usage of technology and sustainable practices. corporate sustainability plays a role in different sectors, emphasizing four dimensions of sustainability: social, environmental, financial, and economical. these dimensions can give organizations clarity by allowing them to establish a ‘bottom line’ for each social, environmental, financial, and economic element that can fulfill the businesses’ goals. it can also promote the application consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6742 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 39-4746 of iot technology, since corporations, in some manner, have sustainability as one of their central goals. additionally, organizations can adopt a triple bottom line strategy that implements coevolution theory, multilevel perspective, and transition management. this strategy stays grounded in environmental, financial, and economic dimensions by bridging principles such as, “shifting from what to how, shifting towards broader systems, and shifting to the growing use of interdisciplinary approaches” (chang, 2017, pp.53). these suggestions correlate to bridging broader systems of competitors such as shareholders, customers, and media, as well as promoting the inclusion of employees, local communities, social pressure groups, and the government. it allows one to shift from “what” one should do to “how” one can do it. it teaches people how to create a sustainable future through interdisciplinary approaches. interdisciplinary approaches include utilizing the natural environment, innovation and industrial policies, and natural capital (chang, 2017, pp.53). in presenting these frameworks, it can show the role that businesses and civilians have on the potential success of iot technology. it also shows the benefit of adopting sustainable frameworks through the inclusion of iot technology. there are alternative perspectives and challenges to iot technology. according to zhi-kai zhang, iot technology endures authentication and authorization, privacy, resource constraints, software vulnerability, and malware challenges. it has authenticity challenges due to the multiplicity of devices that make pre-shared keys and key management difficult or not viable options. another challenge arises in relation to the collection of extensive information about users’ lifestyles, which can limit privacy. iot technology also involves numerous devices, some of which are resource constrained, with limited computing power and battery usage. the whole system can be vulnerable to attacks due to its diverse hardware platforms and no general system of coherence across different operating systems (zhang, 2014). according to patel, there are also challenges to interoperability, data management, and usability standards. the interoperability or the communication these devices have with other devices can be difficult to achieve because some systems may not be ‘speaking the same language.’ another challenge is the increased size of the data, which can make managing it a critical and arduous process. lastly, the costs of implementing iot technology includes the cost of equipment such as sensing, tracking and other management mechanisms that may be costly and pose costly challenges to increased usage (patel, 2016). conclusionconclusion the internet of things technology has numerous benefits, such as improving traffic, environmental pollution, surveillance, smart parking, weather tracking, water monitoring, and more. iot technology continues to excel and can be implemented at three levels: the physical level, the intermediate level, and the upper level. the physical level consists of data sets; the intermediate level consists of statistical measurements or correlation chi-square, probability calculation, and graphical analyses; and the upper level relates to future planning derived from the data collected. my research paper is grounded mostly in the higher level, and argues that data aggregated and computed by iot technology can spur ideas and further human prosperity. smart cities have numerous sustainable implications for advancing human development, improving societal processes, and reducing environmental costs. iot technology merges interdisciplinary fields of technology, environmental resources, and urban systems development to enhance human capital and create a sustainable future. referencesreferences ahonen, t., hadid, a., & pietikainen, m. (2006). face description with local binary patterns: application to face recognition. ieee transactions on pattern analysis & machine intelligence, (12), 2037-2041. angelidou, m. (2014). smart city policies: a spatial approach. cities, 41, s3-s11. chang, r. d., zuo, j., zhao, z. y., zillante, g., gan, x. l., & soebarto, v. (2017). evolving theories of sustainability and firms: history, future directions, and implications for renewable energy research. renewable and sustainable energy reviews, 72, 48-56. fleisch, e. (2010). what is the internet of things? an economic perspective. economics, management & financial markets, 5(2). kumar, n. s., vuayalakshmi, b., prarthana, r. j., & shankar, a. (2016, november). iot based smart garbage alert system using arduino uno. in 2016 ieee region 10 conference (tencon) (pp. 1028-1034). ieee. motlagh, n. h., bagaa, m., & taleb, t. (2017). uav-based iot platform: a crowd surveillance use case. ieee communications magazine, 55(2), 128-134. consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6742 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 39-4747 national archives. (2016, november 16). presidential documents: executive order 13748 of november 16th, 2016: establishing a community solutions council. national archives. retrieved from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/fr-2016-11-21/ pdf/2016-28203.pdf obama white house archives (2009, february 19). executive order 13503 – establishment of the white house office of urban affairs. obama white house archives. retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-establishment-white-house-office-urban-affairs patel, k. k., & patel, s. m. 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(2014, november). iot security: ongoing challenges and research opportunities. in 2014 ieee 7th international conference on service-oriented computing and applications (pp. 230-234). ieee. note from the editors dear readers, we are proud to present issue xxiv of consilience: the journal of sustainable development. as we approach the middle of 2021, we reflect on these past six months with a great sense of hope and optimism. the efficient vaccine distribution in the united states has brought back a feeling of normalcy as cases are dropping across the country. although the covid-19 pandemic is still very much real and full recovery from the tragedy that it has imposed will require a lot of time and resources, an end to the pandemic feels within reach and we are very inspired by the leadership and research that is paving the way. we recently passed the one-year anniversary of the murder of george floyd, that sparked conversations and protests against racism across the globe. racial inequality remains a deeply rooted problem in the united states and we are saddened to see that this spring brought with it further condemnable acts of hatred and violence towards individuals based on race and ethnicity. while we are very delighted to watch as the world has come together to eradicate the covid-19 virus and distribute the vaccine, it has become clear that these systems are also characterized by inequality. the quest for sustainability is symbiotic with that of equity, we can therefore not look towards a sustainable future without addressing this issue as well. although the end of the pandemic may be a time for celebration, we have greater challenges ahead of us. the climate crisis is gaining urgency for each day that passes and it is imperative that the world unites and works together to tackle it. in issue xxiv, we selected a collection of articles that examine the state of the planet and climate change with scientific rigor and objectivity. we open the issue with innovative ideas of applying biofluorescent bacteria to solar concentrators and bamboo for climate change. then, the issue dives into studies of the potential for namibian youths in sustainable cooking and groundwater resources in long island and shelter island. finally, we close the issue with an opinion piece evaluating renewable energy goals in the state of california. we are immensely proud of the work that has been put into this issue by our team of editors and the authors that have submitted to us. we encourage you to further engage with us and take a look at our briefings column, which publishes shorter opinion pieces on hot-button topics. you can also subscribe to the consilience pages on facebook, instagram, and twitter to stay informed about new articles that are posted, author highlights, events, and other journal news. this spring also saw the launch of our very own newsletter that we invite you to subscribe to here. if you have any questions, comments, or concerns, please don't hesitate to contact us at consiliencejournal@gmail.com. we hope this issue has instilled you with the same feelings of hope and inspiration that we felt putting it together. warmly, agnes thornberg jocelyn chen editor-in-chief academic journal director https://www.facebook.com/consiliencejournal/ https://www.instagram.com/consiliencecu/ https://twitter.com/consiliencecu?lang=en https://lb.benchmarkemail.com/listbuilder/signupnew?jaxkftwyca21wfi7j46czf5pwvnajssigwutxhi4a9tto5inrn8gs049tyw7spdj mailto://(null)consiliencejournal@gmail.com microsoft word sabah.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 15, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 101-118 sustaining standard of living amidst volatile oil prices – lessons from the gulf countries khaleefah jaber al sabah finance student and independent scholar college of business and economics, american university of kuwait tel: +965 1802040 e-mail: s00027648@auk.edu.kw ralph palliam associate professor of business management college of business and economics, american university of kuwait tel: +965 1802040 e-mail: rpalliam@auk.edu.kw athmar al salem associate professor of management college of business and economics, american university of kuwait tel: +965 1802040 e-mail: aalsalem@auk.edu.kw abstract improving living standards amidst falling oil prices among countries relying heavily on an ample supply of oil presents numerous challenges. therefore, the relationship associated with oil price changes with identifiable metrics that explain standards of living becomes critical. the following issues are presented in this paper: the management of wealth; sustaining a standard of living; peculiarities of oil trade; oil price determination; and management and the uncharacteristic application of supply and demand. since aspects of the world oil market remain unclear and opaque, society is in need of credible research and verifiable theory. data relating to kuwait over a 32-year period (1983 – 2014) were obtained. five independent variables—investment growth, inflation, percentage change in price per barrel, unemployment, and percent change in the number of incarcerations—are regressed with a change in real gdp (dependent variable). finally, to determine the robustness of the model, the durbin-watson test was used. the coefficient of determination (r2) suggests that 66.24% of variations in lifestyle can be explained by variations in the five independent variables (p < 0.01). standards of living can be sustained by increasing growth in investment, decreasing inflation, decreasing unemployment and incarcerations, and most importantly increasing the price of oil. this study places kuwait as a proxy for the gulf countries and should ideally be extended to the other five gulf countries. comparative studies over multiple periods of time ought to be undertaken to measure the robustness of different sustainability measures. keywords: standard of living, sustaining lifestyle, oil price volatility gulf countries consilience 102 introduction the oil market currently suffers serious contradictions. in addressing the impact of oil prices on the indian economy, aparna (2014) argues that an understanding of the peculiar nature of oil trade, the nature of price determination, and the uncharacteristic application of supply and demand are necessary prerequisites to explain the events that trigger major political reactions worldwide. in analyzing the consequences of oil price volatility on energy security, bordoff and stock (2014) contend that there is an arguably urgent need to address the concerns associated with major swings in oil prices, and furthermore it is necessary to identify those individual countries that are responsible for the staggering collapse. appropriate policy responses are therefore required and should ideally address the concerns of killian and vigfusson (2014)—namely, the degree to which nations are financing their foreign policies through oil production and consumption. indeed, oil prices have not been stable over the last five decades. dramatic events in the seventies saw the price of crude oil at over forty dollars a barrel. the prices continued to be volatile and in the eighties fell to a low of twenty dollars a barrel. figure 1 reflects the oil price volatility from january 1946 to april 2015. notwithstanding the price volatility, the role of governments of both oil exporting and importing nations is to raise the living standard of their citizens. from figure 1, one would observe that from 1946 to the early 1970s the prices were somewhat stable. the dramatic volatility from around 1980 to 2015 is a cause for concern. zoheir, inderwildi and king (2014) in their seminal work, “macroeconomic impact of oil price volatility: mitigation and resilience,” maintain that such swings are not compliant with economic thinking and reasoning. it is therefore not surprising that economists of oil-producing countries were not completely startled by the sudden drop in prices. the reaction of politicians in oil-producing countries of the gulf, however, attracted much attention. their social, economic, and political outcomes are aligned to oil production. consistent with this, fawad (2013) maintains that economic sustenance, political stability, social cohesiveness, and per capita growth of gulf countries are highly positively correlated with oil prices. sabah, palliam, salem: standard of living consilience figure 1. oil price volatility jan 1946-may 2015 (prices are reflected in us $) source: extracted from macrotrends.net the recent impact of the decline in oil prices has reconfigured the thinking of gulf countries, affecting their budgets and resulting in current account deficits. moreover, sfakianakis (2014) contends that some gulf countries are reported to have drawn on their foreign reserves to cover expected budget deficits as a result of volatility in oil prices. it is within this context that this study has been undertaken to illustrate the effects of oil price fluctuations on lifestyle and living standards of the citizens of the gulf. through oil revenues the six countries of the gulf boast a level of infrastructural development that is second to none. concomitantly, these countries have emerged to be financially affluent, the consequences of which resulted in placing monetary value above all else and applauding unbridled greed and rapacious consumerism at enormous social costs. dasgupta and heal (1979) point out that the world bank, nongovernmental organizations, and other supranational organizations have as early as 1975 recommended that natural resource exploitation countries reap the rents from the extraction and sales of natural resources. the custodial conduct of countries in ownership of these natural resources is an area of important study. gulf countries have over the years adopted hartwick’s rule (1977) which suggests that the marginal rents on natural resources should be fully saved and reinvested in physical capital, infrastructure, and education. in the event of the savings being greater, economies are bound to grow at an even higher growth rate. there is extensive research (auty 2000, sachs and warner 2001) suggesting that a negative relationship exists between resource abundance and poor economic growth consilience 104 indicators. this problem is commonly referred to as the paradox of plenty or simply the “resource curse hypothesis” (sarraf and jiwanji, 2001). nabli and silva-jauregui (2005) in their study, “democracy for better governance and higher economic growth in the mena region,” argue that countries richly endowed with significant natural resources tend to perform poorly in terms of economic growth, productivity, and economic development. this is a result of poor governance, pervasive corruption, and various forms of conflicts, among other things. this evidence supports the “resource curse” hypothesis. in the case of gulf countries the effects of the curse are further exacerbated by a benevolent government that provides generous benefits also in the form of subsidies, beyond what any other country accords. consequently, research findings by hamilton (2009) and acemoglu, finkelstein, and notowidigdo (2013) suggest high oil prices are likely to result in deteriorating national health for economies that are dependent on imported oil and gas, while for the producers, it acts as a boom. the reverse is true when the prices fall. for this reason oil and gas are often known as recession-proof commodities. oil-producing economies have shown tendencies to gain advantage by using their bargaining power in the oil industry. inevitably, the oil and gas sector of oil-producing economies is a major economic contributor to the national health of the economy. heloisa (2012) contends that economic performance indicators in terms of gross domestic product (gdp), inflation, investment trends in the domestic market, and budgetary trends become major indicators of living standards and sustainability. these indicators should therefore be correlated with the social development of an economy. this view is consistent with that of sharpe et al. (2008), who argue that the future development of oil prices carries significant political, social, economic, and environmental challenges. accordingly, abosedra and baghestani (2004) assert that crude oil price deteriorations create serious budgetary problems for oil-exporting countries. acemoglu, finkelstein, and notowidigdo (2013) further suggest that any instability in oil prices results in innumerable social costs. these studies reflect the degree of influence caused by oil price fluctuations on the living standards of an economy. identifying this literature gap, the study intends to examine the relationship between oil price fluctuations and living standards within economies. hence, assumptions taken for this study emphasize oil as a commodity that has made significant contributions to the development of many economies as well as having transformed their geopolitical landscape. the world economy has also become stronger by large volumes of oil trade, owing to the oft-argued nature of oil trade being recession-free. hence, with huge amounts of oil traded in the international markets, economies such as saudi arabia’s, kuwait’s, uae’s, and qatar’s among others, have obtained competitive sabah, palliam, salem: standard of living consilience advantages over other nations. purpose and methodology the objective of this study is to define the relationship of a change in oil prices with identifiable metrics that explain standards of living. the relationship between these factors and the change in the price of oil will also be identified and explained. the gulf countries are the focus of the study, and data relating to kuwait will be used as a proxy to represent the gulf countries. in order to evaluate the relationship between oil prices and living standards, the study will describe the importance of oil revenue to the gulf economy. the study identifies the possible reasons for the current fluctuation in oil prices and its impact over the living standards within the economies of the gulf countries. the study places the political, social, and economic issues associated with oil price fluctuations under the spotlight. data (identified as dependent and independent variables) for this study were obtained from several sources. these sources include: the ministry of oil in kuwait; websites such as the world bank, macrotrends, and imf world economic outlook that carry crucial data that meet the objectives of the study; several literature sources; data published by the various ministries in kuwait. political and social issues associated with oil price volatility rojas and stinson (2015) maintain that the 21st century has firmly established the oil and gas industry as a critical industry; indeed, the oil industry has emerged as the main source of income for the world economy today. rojas and stinson (2015) further maintain that it is within this context that international dealings in commodities have become more complex as a result of oil being a strategic commodity that transcends the political, social, and economic dimensions of trade. managing oil dependency has therefore become a critical exercise of both oil-producing and oil-consuming nations. while a fall in the price of oil sees the consuming nations gleeful, the oil-producing cartels begin to frown. consequently, aparna (2014) contends that addressing issues associated with lifestyle within the context of oil price volatility becomes necessary. the fluctuation and volatility of oil prices was already presented in figure 1. over the course of recent months, however, oil prices have been drastically falling at a rapid pace. it is during these periods of drastic oil fluctuations that the market price of oil has considerable impact on business and consilience 106 economic cycles. the fluctuation becomes an important proxy for economic slowdown of oil-producing economies. the world bank group (2015) argues that in non-oil-producing countries, the substantial decrease in oil prices ought to have resulted in decreased commodity prices that ideally should have been passed over to consumers. this would ideally result in economic growth. the june 2014 statistical findings suggest that the oil price had fallen by more than 40% since the previous year. this presented no major threat to the oil-producing countries of the gulf. january 2015, however, was the seventh consecutive month in which monthly average crude oil prices decreased, reaching a low $48/barrel, the lowest since march 2009. one is made to believe that like all other commodities, oil prices are determined by adam smith’s invisible hand associated with supply and demand. consequently, the falling oil prices were the result of fluctuations in the global demand and supply. the global supply of oil was observed to have increased considerably, surpassing the current levels of global demand. as a consequence, in order to sustain the equilibrium position, prices for crude oil and oil products declined. according to bordoff and stock (2014), a major political reason for such increase in the supply volume was the inclusion of new producer nations including the united states. as a major oil-consuming nation, the united states decided to considerably reduce its importation of oil from the oil-producing nations. the political reasoning for the united states to recommence its oil production in large quantities was to reduce its oil dependency on middle east countries as a result of a weakening political and diplomatic relationship. through this reduced dependency together with the incentives associated with its own supply, the united states is able to increase its bargaining power on other oil-producing nations. at the same time, the united states brought some order and discipline into the market (rojas and stinson, 2015). outbursts reacting to such a politically motivated initiative adopted by the united states and also by a few other global powers culminated in the form of political unrest in several oecd countries. notwithstanding this political unrest, the price reductions proved beneficial for nonoil-producing communities. oil-exporting nations, particularly the gulf countries, faced a major deficit in their trade balance. to sustain the gap, these economies increased the price of oil within their domestic markets (rojas and stinson, 2015). alley et al. (2014) suggest that during the last decade, oil prices were bargained and price determination was made possible through intense negotiations within closed meetings of opec countries. rivalry or conflicts soon emerged among the opec member countries. following the global unrest associated with oil price fluctuations, several countries of asia were observed to have reduced their oil subsidies also resulting sabah, palliam, salem: standard of living consilience in a great fall in demand (alley et al., 2014). the industry dependency ratio of these countries also became a vital factor in price control. some oil-producing economies could not sustain production at $50. slower growth was a result of lower profits. for the united states and for other net petroleum importers, the decline in oil price was an economic windfall. as a consequence, a huge fall in crude oil price led to another economic downfall of the gulf economy (bordoff and stock, 2014). this also became a major challenge for other energy-dependent countries that were struggling to balance their financial inflows and outflows to reach the breakeven point, owing to their high percentage of production costs. kilian and vigfusson (2014) contend that as long as opec countries are establishing prices in disorganized proportions, the ill effects of a disorganized market will result in fluctuations that are not consistent with supply and demand. libya, iraq, venezuela, and russia have been hard hit by the falling prices. hamilton (2009) points out that these countries are not in a position to sustain production costs at price levels that fall below $80 per barrel. the rise of america as an oil-producing nation played a major role in reducing the united states’ dependence on foreign-produced oil. the united states aims to significantly decrease its import quantity of crude oil while also regenerating thoughts of alternative energy sources. supporting research and development for alternative energy sources together with its reentry into the export market, the united states will play a major role in ensuring that prices are kept down and bringing order in the volatile oil market (rojas and stinson 2015). from the above discussion it can be noted that political interests to obtain competitive advantages through international trade was the key factor leading to declining oil prices in the global market. kilian and vigfusson (2014) argue that the stand taken by the united states cannot be condemned, particularly when oil-producing economies conducted themselves as bullies of the market. they further add that these falling prices will be short-term. notwithstanding this, the boom-bust pattern of the international oil market brings some reorganization to the oil industry. for oil-producing nations, the governments and companies are united in actions to limit the adverse effects of price declination. it is an appropriate time for economies to take the necessary measures to address the oil industry in a manner compatible with stakeholder interests. measures of standard of living establishing an exact quantitative measure of a standard of living is a complex exercise as it is a broad phrase that exacts a scoreboard requiring a multiplicity of relevant metrics, both objective and subjective. a utility function is usually an economist’s idea of well-being and a measure of the standard of consilience 108 living. this is measured in terms of pecuniary and nonpecuniary values. dasgupta and heal (1979) identify the rate of change in gross national income per capita, life expectancy, infant mortality rate, education, and engagement in political activism as measures of well-being. consequently, the standard of living has come to connote several factors such as income, quality and availability of employment, poverty rate, gdp, inflation rate, quality and affordability of housing, life expectancy, incidence of disease, number of vacation days per year, cost of goods and services, national economic growth, infrastructure, and political stability (dowrick, dunlop and quiggin, 2001). the ratio of gross domestic product (real gdp) to a country’s population is often referred to as the gdp per capita, a conservative measure that is often used by economists to estimate the country’s average standard of living. gdp per capita is biased toward economic growth as a policy objective, however, rather than striving for a balanced human development measure or indicator. increasing growth rates have not been a true indicator of poverty alleviation and have recently been criticized by a group of social activists, including ghosh of the united nations research institute for social development and marone, writing for oxfam. a very limited number of studies evaluate the relationship existing between oil price and the living standard of an economy. identifying this literature gap, three indicators of standard of living, gdp per capita, inflation rate, and unemployment rate, have been adopted. notwithstanding the criticisms associated with gdp per capita as an indicator of standard of living, it can be used as a proxy. the world bank continues to use gdp per capita as a measure of the economic health of a country and maintains that gdp is one of those vital and most commonly used economic measures that help to critically evaluate the structure of the overall growth of the country. additionally, gdp, as a vital economic indicator is highly involved in measuring the country’s productivity. as observed from the literature survey, oil price fluctuations impose a non-linear influence on real gdp within the global context. the sensitivity of an increase in oil prices is considered to be more significant than a decrease in oil prices. consequently, the impact of oil price increase on gdp is comparatively higher than a decrease in oil prices. within the context of oil-importing countries, higher oil prices impose a negative impact on the economic health of the country (kilian and vigfusson, 2014). on the contrary, it has also been stated that lowering the oil price leads to increased consumer power parity and thus, it has a positive impact on domestic consumers. to be precise, oil-producing economies such as kuwait are likely to witness a dual effect on the rise of oil prices when importing and exporting. for instance, people who are living in kuwait have benefited from lower oil prices that boost industrialization and contribute to sustainable innovation sabah, palliam, salem: standard of living consilience capacity in oil rich gulf countries. concomitantly, price increases in the international market facilitate inflow of foreign direct investment (fdi) in the country. oil-importing nations are more likely to face the burden of increased spending within the economy and hence shall be challenged by rising inflation rates (killian, 2007). the second indicator of the standard of living is the inflation rate. a literature review suggests that identifying the causes of inflation is critical for the development of the country’s economy. the growth of an economy entails the capacity to increase production of goods and services. the objective of policymakers is to ensure that the price of goods and services are stable. the fundamental reason for this is to establish sustainable standards of living. sfakianakis (2014) identifies inflation as a factor that contributes to some form of instability in the economy. the overriding characteristic that presents high inflation rates is world commodity price volatility that includes the price of energy. theoretically, inflation is described as the sustained increase in the general level of price of goods and other commodities and is presented as an annual percentage increase. high inflation results in lower purchasing power and lower value of money. generally, higher oil prices contribute to higher inflation rates for net oil-importing countries and lower rates for net exporting countries. the third indicator of the standard of living relates to employment or more specifically unemployment levels. unemployment is perhaps the most widely suggestive indicator of the labor market and gdp. the basic assumption is that a lower rate of unemployment results in higher gdp and wellbeing. hence, the unemployment rate is often regarded as an important indicator to evaluate the future growth of economies. unemployment as a variable provides information relative to wealth and the strength of the economy. if financial well-being entails happiness of citizens of a country, policymakers require tangible measures for wellbeing. there is no consensus as to what entails the best measure. real gdp is the most widely followed metric for assessing the performance of an economy and measures the market value of goods and services produced within a country within a given period. this is consistent with the views of dasgupta and weale (1992) who argue that gdp per capita is the most commonly used indicator to compare living standards among countries. while gdp per capita is a flow concept, it may be used as a measure of a stock concept too. change in real gdp was used as a measure for the standard of living. table 1 presents alternative measures of standard of living and authors that espouse them. consilience 110 table 1. alternative measures of standard of living author measurement simon kuznets (1965) real gdp per capita the inflation-adjusted value. john talberth, clifford cobb, and noah slattery (2007) gpi: the genuine progress indicator elizabeth a stanton (2007) hdi: the human development index marque-luisa miringoff (1999) index of social health dependent and independent variables and the model the following variables over a 32-year period (1983 – 2014), relating to kuwait as a proxy for the gulf countries, were obtained from various sources identified in the previous section. the data pertinent to this study are presented in table 2. table 2. dependent and independent variables symbol variable brief discussion y' dependent variable standard of living measured by real gdp growth rate gdp as a measure of a nation's economy essentially measures the buying power of a nation over a given time period. as gdp increases, the overall standard of living is said to rise. there are few shortcomings associated with the use of gdp as a measure of living standard. for example, gdp does not provide an indication of the quality of goods purchased. the consumption of cheap, inexpensive, low-quality, and short-lived products purchased repeatedly ideally increases gdp at the cost of waste and inefficiency. that being said, gdp continues to be the best indicator of a nation's overall standard of living. x1 independent variable 1 investment growth (oneyear lagged data) the country’s growth in investment in the previous year was regressed with the current real gdp growth. this is based on the assumption that the impact of the benefits of the investment is felt in subsequent years. x2 independent variable 2 inflation % the impact of oil price trends is reflected in the consumer price index. x3 independent variable 3 % δ price per barrel lower oil prices directionally benefit struggling economies. declining oil prices pose economic and other risks to oil-producing nations. x4 independent variable 4 unemployment % unemployment is a variable that affects standard of living. the degree to which unemployment has an impact on standard of living is tested in this study. x5 independent variable 5 % δ in the number of incarceration this study also tests the relationship between the number of incarcerations and the standard of living. ideally, higher incarceration levels would be consistent with lower standards of living. incarceration might be connected to economic inequality. incarceration is a proxy data for the social ills in society. sabah, palliam, salem: standard of living consilience statement of hypothesis the following hypotheses are tested: h1 : there is a positive relationship between investment and real gdp growth; h2 : there is a negative relationship between inflation and real gdp growth; h3 : there is a positive relationship between price per barrel of oil and real gdp growth; h4 : there is a negative relationship between unemployment and real gdp growth; h5 : there is a negative relationship between the level of incarcerations and real gdp growth; regression model the prediction of the standard of living measured by real gdp growth rate y' (the dependent variable) is accomplished by the following regression model: y'i = b0 + b1x1i + b2x2i + … + b5x5i + e (equation 1) where the "b" values are referred to as the regression weights or coefficients and e is the error estimation. these values are computed in a manner that minimizes the sum of the square: (equation 2) based on the models cited in equations 1 and 2, the following statistical findings emerged: (table 3). the equation predicting growth in gdp is given as follows: y'i = 17.8226 + 0.9025 growth in investment – 3.44 inflation + 0.689 price per barrel – 7.497 unemployment – 0.011 incarcerations. consilience 112 results table 3. regression statistics summary output regression statistics multiple r 0.813896 r square 0.662427 adjusted r square 0.597509 standard error 3.28744 observations 32 anova df ss ms f regression 5 55139.25 11027.85 10.20408 1.70164e-05 residual 26 28098.97 1080.73 total 31 83238.22 coefficients standard error t stat p-value intercept 17.8226 3.14754 5.662379 5.91e-06 investment growth x1 0.902519 4.674418 0.193076 0.8484 not significant inflation (%) x2 -3.44071 2.021289 -1.70224 0.10064 not significant % δ price per barrel x3 0.689475 0.384219 1.794481 0.084373 not significant unemployment % x4 -7.49743 1.287107 -5.82503 3.87e-06 significant % δ in incarcerations x5 -0.01162 0.009477 -1.22651 0.230999 not significant the relatively large coefficient of determination (r2) in the model, namely 66.24%, suggests that 66.24% of changes in lifestyle can be explained by the five independent variables (x1 to x5) where the p value is less than 0.01. investment (x1) and price per barrel (x3) are both positively correlated with gdp growth rates; the higher the price of oil, the higher the growth in gdp of oil producing countries. inflation (x2), unemployment (x4), and number of incarcerations (x5) are negatively correlated with growth in gdp. low inflation, low unemployment rates, and low number of incarcerations result in higher growth in gdp and vice versa. sustaining lifestyle and standard of living amidst falling prices of oil and consistent with boom periods in oil production and higher oil prices requires increasing growth in investment and decreasing inflation, unemployment, and incarcerations. incarceration is a proxy for social ills in society. investment sabah, palliam, salem: standard of living consilience growth is critical for economic growth. the economy’s investment growth in infrastructure, education, and health, among other things, presents opportunities for further growth and development. it is therefore not surprising that economists tend to provide investment growth rates as a key determinant of economic growth and ultimately growth in gdp. inflation in this study was found to have a negative impact on growth rates and subsequently reduce living standards together with the efficiency with which productive factors are put to use. notwithstanding this, mallik and chowdhury (2001) found that there exists a long-run positive relationship between gdp growth rate and inflation for bangladesh, india, pakistan, and sri lanka. inflation was found to be helpful toward growth initiatives. the negative relationship in this study can best be explained in terms of the gulf countries’ benevolent conduct in sustaining living standards during increase in price levels of goods and services. empirical studies on the relationship between inflation, interest rate, real gdp, money supply, and exchange rates are still in the infancy stage in the gulf states, and therefore a more detailed study is recommended. in this study, the average percentage change in the price per barrel of oil had a positive impact on gdp growth rates. this is not unusual for oil-producing countries. a fall in oil prices results in a fall in gdp growth rates as well. high levels of incarceration as a proxy for social ills and other corruptionrelated crimes reduce economic growth and subsequently living standards. a sustained increase in incarceration rates resulting from several social ills has broader implications, not only for the criminal justice system, but also for the broader economy as well (kirchhoff 2010). unemployment also has a major negative impact on growth rates. finally, to determine the robustness of the model, the durbin-watson test was used. the test statistic of the durbinwatson procedure is known as d and was calculated as follows: (equation 3) ho : ρ = 0 (there exists no serial correlation) h1 : ρ • 0 (there is a positive serial correlation) consilience 114 table 4. durbin-watson calculation durbin-watson calculations sum of squared differences of residuals 1,282,841 sum of squared residuals 971,849 k number of dependent variables 5 n sample size 32 dl 1.11 du 1.82 durbin watson statistic 1.32 α 0.05 accept h0 for n =32, k = 5 and α =.05, dl = 1.11 and du = 1.82. since dl < d < du we accept the null hypothesis that there is no significant serial correlation. conclusion the study, sustaining standard of living amidst volatile oil prices lessons from the gulf countries, identifies oil shocks and their effect on economic variables. the creation of wealth is the fundamental mission of all economies and is key to the impact that an economy has on its population. the actions that economies take and choices they make in managing wealth have direct and indirect impacts on the personal well-being of the citizens of the country. consequently, in determining lifestyle and living standards, economies are required to ensure that economic growth is a priority and is sustained. countries relying wholly on high oil prices and ample supply of oil and gas, are required to monitor the volatility of prices and ensure that sustainable consumption associated with a living standard becomes a central focus for national and international policy. the prospect of these economies sustaining or improving on living standards amidst falling oil prices becomes low. best practice standards that have been established in oil producing economies may ideally suit successful and well-resourced producers. however, the same initiatives may be inappropriate for the gulf countries that have navigated a standard of living for their citizens through their benevolent conduct. to address this challenge, this study identified five independent variables— sabah, palliam, salem: standard of living consilience investment, inflation, price per barrel, unemployment, and number of incarcerations—that were regressed with the change in real gdp. the findings of the study suggest that standards of living in gulf countries can be sustained by an increased growth in investment, decreased inflation, decreased unemployment and incarcerations, and most importantly increased price of oil. while managing high growth rates over time will sustain better lifestyles, the task becomes enormous particularly when standards of living are dependent on a single commodity whose price is subjected to constant volatility. consilience 116 references abeysinghe, t. 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(2014), “macroeconomic impacts of oil price volatility: mitigation and resilience”, front energy, higher education press and springerverlag berlin heidelberg, vol. 3, pp. 1-15. introductionintroduction human waste management divides humanity into the fortunate “haves” and the unfortunate “have nots.” adults produce approximately 130g of feces and 1.4l of urine every day (harada, strande, & fujii, 2015). fecal sludge sanitation technology addresses sanitation issues by aggregating the human excreta and wastewater. while those in developed countries have the privilege of disposing their waste sanitarily and eliminating common fecal borne pathogens, about 1.2 billion people lack the access to basic sanitation, with the majority living in developing countries (lalander, hill, & vinnerås, 2013). improper fecal management results not only in water pollution but also the transmission of infectious diseases through personto-person interaction, water, and food due to pathogens found in human excreta. the diseases transmitted through human excreta accounts for 4% of deaths in the world, and children are the most affected (academies, 2007). in response to this issue, the sustainable development goal 6 of the sustainable development goals (sdgs) established by the united nations (un) in 2015 focuses on establishing the availability and sustainable management of water and sanitary systems for every society by 2030 (“making every drop count,” 2018). although many efforts have been made to remedy this issue, illegal dumping of human excreta still persists, and there is still a lack of adequate and safe disposal of human excreta into the environment which prevents developing nations from attaining proper fecal sludge management (goal 6 sustainable development knowledge platform, 2019). in a number of areas, fecal sludge has been used for fertilizing food crops, since ensuring food security to sustain 9 billion people on earth by 2050 is one of the major global challenges. in response to this issue, sdg 2 view journal | view issue reuse of human excreta in developing countries: reuse of human excreta in developing countries: agricultural fertilization optimizationagricultural fertilization optimization risa sugihara department of international studies, soka university of america, aliso viejo, ca 92656, united states, email: rsugihara@soka.edu keywords:keywords: fecal sludge, human excreta, pathogen, biosolids, composting, vermicomposting abstract:abstract: in developing nations, 1.2 billion people suffer from a lack of a basic sanitation system and fecal sludge management challenges, despite many efforts to combat this issue. fecal sludge is a mixture of waste, including human excreta, soil, and water. human excreta contains a significant amount of nutrients that can be used in agricultural fertilizers. the use of human excreta in agricultural fertilizers would reduce the need for artificial fertilizers and improve human excreta disposal through the use of composting and vermicomposting toilet systems. in developing nations where soil conditions are poor and fresh water is unavailable, the use of human excreta in fertilizer can ameliorate two problems: low food productivity and lack of sanitation service. among the seventeen sustainable development goals (sdgs) established by the united nations (un), ensuring a sanitation system for everyone addresses the goal 6, securing food for everyone. additionally, enhancing low food productivity addresses the second goal of the sdgs, improving low food productivity. thus, more efficient use of human excreta can help achieve two sdgs at the same time. 58 doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6732 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 58-64 author’s note:author’s note: this world has so many problems that i sometimes feel helpless. however, a change in sanitation systems might open the possibilities of achieving other global goals, including eradicating poverty, reducing health risks, and improving the environment. because i grew up with sanitation systems such as toilets, i have taken them for granted without realizing the interconnection among sanitation systems, health risk, gender inequality, and poverty. while human excrement is regarded as a distasteful topic we try to ignore, it has the potential to enrich agricultural soils and lead to an increase in food supplies and a reduction of poverty. establishing efficient sanitation systems would be key to utilizing the potential of human excrement. this article argues that enforcing sanitation systems in developing countries can contribute not only to improving health risk, but also breaking down the vicious cycle. july 6, 2020 http://consiliencejournal.org https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.vi22.6732 consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6732 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 58-6459 was established to work towards achieving food security and improved nutrition and promoting sustainable agriculture (goal 2 sustainable development knowledge platform, 2019). although sometimes unhygienic and diseasespreading, human excreta in fecal sludge has great potential as an enriched agricultural fertilizer (klingel et al., 2002). the reuse of human excreta involves several risks, however, and the treatment process for it to be used in fertilizers seems to be costly and require advanced technology. nevertheless, the reuse of human excreta in an appropriate way promotes agricultural fertility and higher crop yields, as well as the improvement of local sanitation systems including fecal sludge management and toilet systems in developing nations. historical use of human excreta as historical use of human excreta as fertilizerfertilizer historically, human excreta were collected as “night soils.” in asian countries such as china and japan, untreated human excreta were commonly used as a fertilizer for crop fields from the sixteenth century to the early twentieth century (ferguson, 2014). the asian farmers’ success with excreta fertilizer garnered interest from europe. in the second half of the nineteenth century, european farmers began to use human waste as an agricultural fertilizer. for example, many people from finland and the netherlands use dry toilet latrines, from which excreta is collected and regularly used as fertilizer for arable farming (tanski & wijk-sijbesma, 2005). despite recognizing the value of human waste as a night soil fertilizer, after the nineteenth century, european and north american farmers ultimately replaced the usage of excreta in favor of chemically synthesized fertilizers (ferguson, 2014). the implementation of large-scale sewage systems was also introduced in europe at that time, and the water-based systems have since been combined with all domestic waste and industrial effluent, and technology and the regulation of wastewater management have progressed to a high standard level in the developed nations. in europe, for instance, the eu legislation about sewage sludge regulates the application of biosolids to land. in the case of source-separated human excreta, however, the regulation is unclear on the reuse of treatment products (moya, parker, & sakrabani, 2019). in 2006, the world health organization (who) provided guidelines that focused on the safe use of excreta and greywater in agriculture to protect people from health risks (who, 2006). however, untreated human excreta reuse is still practiced in an inappropriate way in several regions, such as china, southeast asia, africa, and latin america, to enhance agricultural productivity regardless of the potential hygiene and health risks that human excreta can pose (dring, 2015). why is human excreta valuable?why is human excreta valuable? micronutrients are essential for plants and crops to grow, and human excreta contains almost all those which are necessary for such growth. micronutrients consist of nitrogen (n), phosphorus (p), potassium (k), sulfur (s), calcium (ca) and magnesium (mg). while urine is rich in nitrogen, feces are rich in phosphorus, potassium and organic matter. the need for nitrogen is highest at times of vigorous growth, when leaf and seed proteins develop. although air contains 79% nitrogen, plants cannot fix atmospheric nitrogen without specific nitrogen-fixing microorganisms (tanski & wijk-sijbesma, 2005). as for their effects on crop growth, moya, parker, and sakrabani (2019) found that, compared to artificial fertilizers, there was a 30% increase in yield using human excreta fertilizer on french beans in nairobi. in addition, manufacturing fertilizers depends on phosphorus and requires fossil fuels, which are non-renewable resources predicted to be exhausted by 2033 (dring, 2015). thus, not only could human excreta fertilizers replace the unsustainable reliance on artificial fertilizers, but they would also be more effective for crop growth. animal manure is another commonly used fertilizer, and researchers have found that there is no significant nutrient difference between them (penakalapati et al., 2017). however, the nutrient levels vary depending on whether livestock and animal manure nutrient value is accurately estimated (leip et al., 2019). also, since animal feces management is often careless, pathogen transmission associated with exposure to animal feces could, in some cases, be higher than exposure to human feces, which may result in health risk (penakalapati et al., 2017). furthermore, the contents of hazardous or contaminating substances such as heavy metals and pesticide residues are generally low in human excreta and urine compared to artificial fertilizers and farmyard manure (jönsson, et al., 2004). thus, human excreta will not harm human health more than animal manure. rather, it can be used to create a nitrogen-enriched fertilizer. food security and sanitation challenges in food security and sanitation challenges in developing nationsdeveloping nations the reuse of human excreta would solve two challenges in developing countries. one challenge is that food productivity is unable to meet the demand of the population; the other key challenge is outdated excreta sanitation systems. consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6732 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 58-6460 first, food security, which is not ensured in developing countries, could be increased by using rich nutrients derived from human excreta to promote food production. food production requires resources such as water, energy, and fertilizers (doukas et al., 2019). nowadays, however, the issue of fertilizers becomes more critical as soil nutrient depletion is predicted to affect one-fourth of all agricultural land. this compromises low-income countries such as sub-saharan africa (ssa) due to population growth, agricultural expansion, and inadequate use of fertilizer (moya et al., 2019). in order for developing countries to secure food, ensuring that the nutrients remain in the soil for food production is vital. secondly, the sanitation system is inadequate in low-income areas. the lack of a disposal system often results in a discharge of fecal sludge, which is a threat to human health (moya et al., 2019). ingestion of water contaminated with feces results in a variety of diseases important via fecal-oral route of transmission. in 1998, 2.2 million deaths were estimated as being associated with diarrhea, which was more likely to result from fecal pollution of water. the majority of the victims were children in low-income countries (who, 2000). therefore, the introduction of reusing human excreta as fertilizer would help not only to increase food production, but also to build safe sanitation systems through the treatment of fertilizers from human excreta. obstacles and solutions over human obstacles and solutions over human excretaexcreta transmission of pathogen despite the benefit of lower contents of heavy metals and other contaminating substances in feces than in artificial fertilizers, human excreta can contain pathogens such as viruses, protozoa, and parasitic worm eggs (tanski et al., 2019). these pathogens can cause serious diseases, such as cholera, typhoid, schistosomiasis, infectious hepatitis, and polio (academia, 2007). in a recent chinese study, covid-19, a virus that spread from animals to humans and has infected millions of people around the world since the outbreak in china in december 2019, has been found to possibly be transmitted through human feces, in addition to other paths of transmission (nouri-vaskeh & alizadeh, 2020). furthermore, once these pathogens are brought into the environment, some of them are likely to remain infectious for the long-term, although the affected people are often asymptomatic. if the sludge treatment is not sufficiently conducted, pathogenic organisms contained in the sludge are easily dispersed in the crop fields, where they can infect the farmers working there. bacteria and worm eggs in the soil may also attach to the plants and infect consumers who eat raw crops or do not thoroughly wash the crops prior to ingestion (klingel et al., 2002). another example of exposing people to risk is the reuse of excreta by an infected person. the urine of infected persons can be a passage for some human parasitic germs such as certain helminth eggs or schistosome miracidia. because of inadequate sludge treatment, the eggs can enter the soil through urine. this becomes particularly problematic for developing countries in the tropics, where the number of infected persons is high. nevertheless, with appropriate heat treatment, all harmful pathogens in human excreta can be reduced to produce fertilizers safe to use in agriculture. increasing temperatures of 30°c-40°c can prevent the helminth eggs from surviving. in developing countries where temperature levels are high, the preserved urine will often be in the soil. moreover, the resulting heat-dried soil can decrease relative humidity, which will further reduce the survival chances of the pathogenic agents (tanski & wijk-sijbesma, 2005). another way to eliminate harmful pathogens is to store the sludge for over six months. this allows natural pathogens to die off. although natural drying is not an effective way to reduce moisture content to a level that is sufficiently low for complete pathogen destruction, the drying of sludge can enhance the pathogen destruction during storage. thus, this method increases the security of the excrement sludge soil (klingel et al., 2002). in most developing countries, the high temperatures can eradicate harmful pathogens. this pathogen control increases the efficiency of food production. thus, heating and drying human excrement effectively kills pathogens that could otherwise compromise its safety as an agricultural fertilizer. the increased nutrients in fertilization lead to higher crop yields. cost management another obstacle is that extracting nutrients from human fecal sludge is technically complicated and requires expensive technology. this is because the sludge consists of a variety of materials such as flush water, heavy metals, toilet paper, domestically used water, industrially used water, and possibly even stormwater (harder et al., 2019). in most urbanized areas, fecal sludge treatment facilities, including breeding insect larvae on feces, are employed to convert fecal sludge to biosolids. biosolids are biochemically stable and hygienically safe solids known as the nutrient-rich organic materials that are agriculturally valuable (klingel et al., 2002). in the uk, consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6732 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 58-6461 for instance, approximately 80% of biosolids are applied to soils following safe sludge matrix guidelines, 75% of which are applied to agricultural land (moya et al., 2019). building highly mechanized systems for resource recovery from fecal sludge is too expensive in low-income countries. in most urbanized areas in developing countries, excreta are disposed of in facilities such as septic tanks, dry latrines, bucket latrines, or communal toilets, and they all accumulate fecal sludge (klingel et al., 2002). in accra, ghana, for instance, the cost of emptying a latrine is ten times more expensive than an average household income; therefore, introducing fecal sludge treatment facilities to low-income countries becomes economically challenging (diener et al., 2014). sludge management is less likely to be advanced in developing countries due to financial restrictions and inadequate waste management in poor education institutions (fagnani & guimarães, 2017). however, if urine and feces can be separated, both of these factions can be treated independently and utilized so that infectious diseases (pathogens) can be prevented. the process of composting is the best way of doing so without using expensive technology. a simple pit latrine or ventilated improved pit latrine can also be used to divert feces from urine and to make it fall directly into the pit container (tanski & wijk-sijbesma, 2005). the use of vermicomposting is yet another treatment used to separate feces. vermicomposting is a composting process that optimizes the movement of worms. various species of worms facilitate microbial decomposition by maintaining aerobic conditions and changing the biochemical properties of the excrement. the optimal conditions for vermicomposting are placing feces at the moisture of 65–80% at 20–25°c, and achieving a 50–80% reduction in organic carbon after 96 days of treatment (lalander et al., 2013). in developing countries where western processing technology can be cost prohibitive, these waterless and inexpensive systems can be used in both rural and urban communities. they help heighten nutrients in human excreta and decrease pathogen contamination. additionally, these alternative toilet facilities create more sustainable sanitation systems. concerns entrenched in use of human concerns entrenched in use of human excretaexcreta public perception of food quality even though the use of human excreta has positive effects on soils, public perception of excreta is critical. one of the concerns could be the quality of crops and vegetables grown using human excreta as fertilizer compared to artificial chemical fertilizers. since hegemonic standards currently do not allow the use of treated human sewage sludge on fields, many farmers showed their unwillingness to use the excreta (moya et al., 2019). in addition, some farmers suspect composting could spread infections; they assume that consumers would avoid crops on which co-compost had been used for fear of infections. studies have shown, however, that both local farmers and their customers preferred to use human excreta base fertilizer if it had a positive effect on their soil enrichment and was affordable (danso et al., 2002; diener et al., 2014). in finland, an experiment that compares urine-based fertilizer to the same amount of commercial mineral fertilizer was conducted. as a result, almost the same yields of cucumber and the same quality of cucumbers were produced (tanski & wijk-sijbesma, 2005). another study investigated the productivity of hydroponic tomato production. this study was designed with three nutrient conditions: decentralized wastewater treatment system (dewats) effluents, nitrified urine concentrate (nuc), and commercial hydroponic fertilizer mix (chfm). tomato plants treated with commercial fertilizer mix showed higher growth performance compared to those from human excreta derived materials. however, both dewats and nuc treated plants indicated specific positive effects: improving plant height, photosynthetic rate, fruit mass, harvest index, and nutrient uptake in dewats. in nuc, the result showed improved growth performances in terms of shoot dry matter, leaf area index, and chlorophyll content. therefore, nutrient balances and the maximization in excreta could be adjusted and supplemented to enhance the production of tomatoes in the hydroponic system, which could meet the same nutrient quality level as commercial fertilizers (magwaza et al., 2020). in terms of health risk, the people who ate the food produced with urine-containing compost have not reported any health problems (tanski & wijk-sijbesma, 2005). concern about nutritional value as for the limitations on excreta as a fertilizer, the nutritional content of human waste largely depends on how nutritious the diet of those producing the waste is. the diet varies from person to person and country to country. although nutritional content of diets varies, there are not significant differences overall in nutritional value of excreta from country to country. for example, harder et al. (2019) found negligible differences in nutritional nitrogen (n) and phosphorus (p) levels in urine and excreta comparing results from both sweden and china. there is a successful example of the composting of human consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6732 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 58-6462 waste in haiti, which is known as a low-income country. in haiti, in response to the earthquake that occurred in 2010, thermophilic composting was developed to safely treat human fecal waste and transform it into nutrient-rich compost. through the compost treatment, they were able to eliminate pathogens and create a reusable nutrient-rich soil condition (preneta et al., 2013). therefore, regardless of whether it is in developed nations or developing nations, the nutrients contained in human excreta positively affect soil conditions. education and communication to raise public awareness in order to reduce these concerns and to achieve better sludge management, raising public awareness about human excreta and hygienic facilities is significant. one of the ways of doing so is hygienic education. hygienic education should be targeted not only on issues related to fecal sludge management but also on all aspects of hygiene and sanitation (klingel et al., 2002). hygienic education in a community involves several steps: communication with the local agencies, selection of hygiene behavior change, and analysis of influence of the behavior. hygiene behaviors are difficult to change because the behavior strongly relates to daily activities such as the community’s culture and tradition (world health organization [who], n.d.). through hygiene education, individuals’ behavior changes. changes manifest when people empty the vault of their toilets and their septic tank more often or promote the prohibition of throwing waste into the toilets (jönsson, et al., 2004; klingel, et al., 2002). it is significant, therefore, to cooperate with the whole community and especially with school children because children are more susceptible to be exposed to the risks that improper waste management poses. it is also important to let them engage in all stages of hygiene education, including selecting hygiene behaviors, understanding the influences on such behaviors, choosing educational approaches, and implementation. the educational methods can not only raise both farmers’ and customers’ awareness regarding the importance of human excreta but also strengthen and empower individuals and communities to work and further understand for change (who, n.d.). challenges in consent with a wide range challenges in consent with a wide range of regulations and creating a certification of regulations and creating a certification scheme of human excreta usescheme of human excreta use currently, in europe, the use of biosolids in farming is generally regulated by the sewage sludge instruction of the global gap, known as the standard for quality assurance of agricultural crops, and it does not allow the use of human sewage sludge on certified farms. however, several countries such as the uk, sweden, australia, and the us created specific certification schemes to reduce public prejudice and fear of contamination with various compounds from sewage sludge (moya et al., 2019). as for the regulation of human excreta, neither use of human excreta nor use of composting excreta has clear national standards due to lack of knowledge of human excreta potential and risks regarding its application to agriculture (malkki, n.d.). in low income countries, the export of agricultural products is profitable and important rather than the local market. in kenya, for instance, horticultural exports to the eu account for its large economy. therefore, eu laws for product quality, safety, and chemical residues could encourage kenyan compliance with these regulations. this causes kenyan farmers to be reluctant to employ human excreta base fertilizer. therefore, a similar scheme could be applied for human excreta delivered fertilizer. creating the certification or assurance scheme that provides the importance of recovering nutrients from human excreta would increase confidence in the quality and safety of the products and clarify the safe level of contaminants. this clear understanding of human excreta potential could result in creating a national standard of use of fertilizer from human excreta. also, the founding in ghana shows that certification of human excreta base fertilizer could encourage to pay for compost. nevertheless, while the biosolids assurance scheme created in the uk seems to have had a positive effect on the acceptance of biosolids for agriculture, the use of biosolids for growing vegetables is still controversial. furthermore, gaining the necessary certification remains difficult. such a certification usually requires not only the adoption of specific farm practices and infrastructure but also a yearly renewal, which can have significant cost implications. the costs of applying and complying with global gap certification can account for 30% of the annual crop income for farmers in kenya. thus, creation of certification brings challenges and takes time to spread understanding within a community (moya et al., 2019). conclusionconclusion even though human excreta potentially provides many nutrients to improve soil fertility rather than artificial fertilizer, the reuse of human excreta is difficult to adopt due to the pathogen risk, fecal sludge management, and public stigma regarding excreta in the fertilizer. in developing nations such as ssa, rich nutrient fertility is crucial for food productivity. moreover, the sanitation system is not satisfactory due to lack of fecal sludge management and the consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6732 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 58-6463 devaluation of sanitation such as toilets. in order to deal with these obstacles, composting and vermicomposting toilets should be introduced. regarding the concern of the food production quality, fertilizer from human excreta is proven to work the same as normal artificial fertilizers or even provide better crop yield due to the nutrient difference in human excreta. moreover, the stigma regarding human excreta could be eliminated by educating people to gain support to propagate the significance of human excreta. if more people are aware of the potential that human excreta and improved waste management have, laws and policies of use of excreta, which are currently strict, can be improved. as a result, use of human excreta contributes to solving the issue of low soil fertility as well as the problem of fecal sludge management. thus, sanitation, including the collection and treatment of human excreta, involves ensuring the well-being of 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(n.d.). 7. hygiene education. microsoft word 7 70-85 angassa final formatted 1.doc consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 8, iss. 1 (2012), pp. 70-85 community-based knowledge of indigenous vegetation in arid african landscapes ayana angassa school of animal and range sciences hawassa university, ethiopia botanical institute, university of cologne ayanaangassa@yahoo.com gufu oba noragric department of international environment and development studies norwegian university of life sciences gufu.oba@umb.no nils chr. stenseth centre for ecological evolution and synthesis department of biology, university of oslo n.c.stenseth@bio.uio.no abstract this article is based on comparative research conducted in three african countries—mali, botswana and kenya—between 2006 and 2007. the research focuses on local perceptions of biodiversity loss and land degradation in grazing pastures as a result of anthropogenic activities. we show that land degradation can be motivated by climate change, while local overuse of indigenous vegetation can lead to resource conflict. we then examine how changes in indigenous vegetation might influence the livelihood and security of local communities. in drawing key findings common to all three countries, we suggest that the sustainability of indigenous vegetation in dryland ecosystems can be maintained through seasonal mobility of herds, preservation of dry season grazing and improved livestock marketing, and that failure to do so can result in far-reaching consequences for rural communities. authors’ note ayana angassa is an associate professor in the school of animal and range sciences, hawassa university in ethiopia. gufu oba is a professor in the department of international environment and development studies, norwegian university of life sciences in norway. nils. chr. stenseth is a research professor and chair of the centre for ecological and evolutionary synthesis, university of oslo in norway. professor nils. chr. stenseth is also a chief scientist at the institute of marine research. keywords: indigenous vegetation, indigenous knowledge, land degradation, livelihood security consilience angassa et al: community-based knowledge 1. introduction in dryland ecosystems, the conservation of indigenous vegetation biodiversity poses major challenges (lykke, 2000; oba et al., 2000b; sheuyange et al., 2005; lópez et al., 2006), and the effect of land degradation is diverse and complex (behnke and scoones, 1993; oba et al., 2000b; sullivan and rhode, 2002; walker and sinclair, 1998). anthropogenic factors and climate change can exacerbate the loss of native resources and vegetation and jeopardize the region’s unique biodiversity. further, many habitants of arid and semi-arid areas in africa derive most of their incomes from extensive livestock production totally reliant on indigenous vegetation (kamara et al., 2004), and may be hugely affected should these resources be allowed to degrade (leakey, 2002). thus, in order to effectively manage the biodiversity of indigenous vegetation in african drylands and ensure sustainability for the future generation, it is critical to gain a better understanding of how local communities adapt to changes in their environment (berkes et al., 1998; bolling and schulte, 1999; brown, 1971; stringer et al., 2007). in arid african landscapes, population growth, increasing demand for natural resources, and environmental degradation create environmental stresses that have considerable socio-economic and ecological consequences (bolling and schulte, 1999; mouat et al., 1997; sinclair and fryxell, 1985; unccd, 2000; unced, 1992). these pressures have led to inappropriate systems of land use that can greatly contribute to the loss of indigenous vegetation (angassa and oba, 2008). according to angassa and oba (2008), land use changes linked to bush invasion in dryland ecosystems threaten both indigenous plants and animals and exacerbates soil erosion, with far-reaching implications for local communities. oba et al. (2000) have reported that the grazing effectiveness of dryland ecosystems is completely eliminated if bush encroachment exceeds 90% of the vegetation cover. generally, dryland ecosystems are subject to increasing land use changes as human need for food and natural resources rise, which eventually contributes to climate change (grover et al., 2011). shifts in rainfall patterns and frequent droughts, which are indicators of such climate change, cause massive loss of livestock in the region (oba, 2001; angassa and oba, 2007). as a whole, widespread environmental degradation exacerbates the advancement of global climate change and furthers the reduction of ecosystem productivity (berkes et al., 1998). the challenges in finding environmentally sound and culturally acceptable natural resources management practices thus lead researchers to consider community-based-knowledge (berkes et al., 1998; bolling and schulte, 1999; fernandez-gimenez, 2000; mapinduzi et al., 2003; oba, 2001; oba and kaitira, 2006; angassa and oba, 2008). in addition, there is little data on indigenous vegetation in arid african landscapes and its historical changes. hence, the knowledge of local people becomes indispensable in order to fully understand longterm changes in indigenous vegetation. local awareness of environmental issues is fairly comprehensive (bolling and schulte, 1999) and effective in sustainable development research and application (bowman, 2002; brown, 1971; dale and beyeler, 2001; mouat et al., 1997; romstad, 1999). 72 consilience indigenous vegetation resources may provide a range of ecosystem benefits apart from local livelihood security (beer et al., 1998). in the case of african drylands, feed for livestock (angassa and oba, 2008), preservation of the natural landscape and its biodiversity (menke and bradford, 2001), carbon sequestration options (de jong et al., 1995; lal, 2001) and soil protection (beer et al., 1998) are all major benefits of maintaining indigenous vegetation. local people often possess detailed knowledge of indigenous vegetation and the ecological value of individual plants (de jong et al., 1995; seely, 1998; seely and moser, 2004; seely and wöhl, 2004) that can assist policymakers in designing suitable land management policy (brown, 1971; mapinduzi et al., 2003). in general, they also acquire a comprehensive knowledge of how plants adapt to dryland environments (ellis and swift, 1988; mapinduzi et al., 2003). the driving forces behind land degradation in dryland ecosystems, however, can be complex. thus, local ecological knowledge of climate change must be integrated with the scientific approach in order to understand the causes and consequences of land degradation. such an approach, which involves the participation of the local community, has proven to be effective in devising proper management system for the sustainable use of arid landscapes (grice and hodgkinson, 2002). based on research in these three african countries, this article focuses on the value of indigenous ecological knowledge in future development endeavors for the sustainable usage of indigenous vegetation in the region. in particular, we consider communities’ experiences in managing indigenous vegetation and common strategies adopted by the local community for sustainable use of drylands. we also attempt to determine whether local communities use key environmental indicators in describing their local situations. our main interest is to know how local herders may respond to environmental challenges with regard to natural resource management and livelihood strategies. we are further interested in whether local decisions regarding indigenous vegetation have exacerbated threats to biodiversity. overall, our study reports on the role of indigenous knowledge regarding environmental changes, perception of indigenous vegetation, land use practices, effects of water points on vegetation, land degradation, local indicators of degradation and the consequences of these factors on local livelihood conditions. regarding local ecological knowledge, we focus on three aspects: (a) knowledge and experiences of local people in the management and conservation of indigenous vegetation resources; (b) dependency of local livelihood systems on indigenous vegetation and socio-economic status, and (c) local perception of land degradation. we first briefly describe the nature of african arid landscapes and their management. 1.1 african arid landscapes arid landscapes are defined as ecosystems and landforms that are not suited for intensive types of land use due to limitations imposed by the physical environment (climate, soil) and other natural forces (arnalds and archer, 2002; stoddart et al., 1975). extensive livestock production is the primary contribution of consilience angassa et al: community-based knowledge such habitats in africa (homewood and rodgers, 1991). there is also a growing recognition of the importance of these landscapes for other uses, including wildlife habitation, hydrology and tourism (homewood and rodgers, 1991). the drylands of africa comprise 60% of the continent and a major part of botswana (80%), kenya (80%) and mali (70%) (cees, 2007). they support more than 70% of the livestock population and 90% of the wildlife in botswana, 50% of the livestock and 75% of the wildlife in kenya, and 60% of the national livestock herd in mali (cees, 2007). the result is a great diversity of cultures and human-environment interactions across these three countries (cees, 2007), which provide a number of opportunities for improving our understanding of environmental processes. the greatest strengths of such african arid landscapes are their ability to support diverse indigenous vegetation resources (woody and herbaceous layers) and their resilience to natural calamities and climate change. 1.2 sustainable management of arid landscapes sustainable management of arid landscapes in africa requires an understanding of interactions among environmental processes, socio-cultural components and local livelihood systems across both temporal and spatial scales (behnke and scoones, 1993; ellis and swift, 1988; fernandez-gimenez, 2000). progress towards environmental resiliency will originate from basic adjustments in local people’s beliefs about their environment (salem, 2007). furthermore, establishing sound natural resource management will necessitate the participation of local users, due to their experience and intimate knowledge of their local environment passed on through generations (bolling and schulte, 1999; fernandez-gimenez, 2000). it is also widely recognized that local knowledge systems have been largely overlooked by researchers until very recently (salem, 2007). novel management approaches to the sustainable use of arid landscapes in africa can also provide opportunities for local people to explore feasible and alternative livelihoods while maintaining the diversity and social values of their culture and landscape. overall, the effective rehabilitation of african arid landscapes must entail a novel combination of policies and technologies that draw from both the scientific approach and the participation of local people in research and development activities. 2. methodological approach this article synthesizes findings of a study based on the msc education and training (see for details cees[1], 2007) funded by the global environmental facility-indigenous vegetation project (gef-ivp), which was conducted in three african countries focusing on botswana, kenya and mali. biophysical, socioeconomic and cultural approaches were analyzed to investigate the role of local knowledge and indigenous institutions in the management and maintenance of indigenous vegetation, contribution of natural resources in supporting local livelihood systems. data were collected by 12 msc students (4 msc students from each of the three countries, i.e., botswana, kenya and mali) between october 2006 and january 2007. the different studies employed local knowledge and ecological methods in assessing socio-economic and cultural information, as well as evaluating 74 consilience the status of indigenous vegetation and conservation of biodiversity at landscape level. the following methods were employed to collect information: (1) local perception on indigenous vegetation resources were collected using household interviews, through a semi-structured questionnaire, group discussion and key informant interview; (2) information related to impacts of traditionally managed water wells along radial distances on indigenous vegetation resources was evaluated with the participation of local community members along a transect walk. locally managed traditional wells aged between 150 and 350 years were considered to assess effects of water points on indigenous vegetation resources. such information is believed to provide a chronological time scale and an appropriate method of evaluating the effect of grazing intensity on indigenous vegetation resources when using radial distance as a proxy indicator (angassa, 2012), since grazing intensity was heavier nearer to well points; (3) perceptions of local indicators such as lack of rain, lowered water flows, dried out wells, reduced vegetation cover and soil exposure to erosion were used to collect information on the impact of climate change; (4) local perception of degradation was assessed in terms of decline in biomass (productivity) and species richness, reduced herbaceous coverage, abundance of exotic species and disappearance of indigenous plant species. the productivity indicators were related to vegetation status and livestock performance in terms of milk production, calving rates, mating frequencies and livestock body conditions, which local people used to assess environmental changes (dembele, 2006). ecological indicators like natural disturbances, vegetation changes, reduced water source and decline in wildlife number might only inform a fraction of the story about an environmental problem, while production indicators, which ecologists seldom consider, remain a key element for influencing indigenous systems of land management. 3. results and discussions 3.1. local perception on indigenous vegetation resources this article adapted a participatory research approach (i.e., integrated indigenous knowledge and ecological methods) in understanding how different forms of land use and management practices of grazing lands influenced the status of indigenous vegetation and conservation of biodiversity (table 1). the present results showed that local perceptions of biodiversity conservation were based on the connection between people, environmental conditions and ecosystem productivity. it has been shown that local knowledge of vegetation monitoring and conservation of biodiversity involved an evaluation of the status of indigenous vegetation, soil types and access to water as proxy indicators of land productivity (oba and kotile 2001). for example, in the malian case studies, we observed a negative correlation between grazing pressure (as evaluated by herders) and herbaceous cover (as evaluated by ecologists) (r = -0.96, p < 0.001). generally, grazing pressure was positively correlated with tree cover but there was no significant relationship between grazing pressure and tree cover. by comparison, grazing pressure was negatively correlated with the cover of shrubs (r = -0.91, p < 0.001). we realized that local people’s knowledge in terms of assessing the status of indigenous vegetation using environmental indicators might be relevant in conducting integrated assessments that consilience angassa et al: community-based knowledge could help to set research and development priorities (table 1). based on our results, we were able to establish that local people have a detailed knowledge of environmental indicators that are effective in evaluating the status of indigenous vegetation and changes in biodiversity at the landscape level (table 1). herders in the three african countries emphasized that environmental factors such as soil type, topographic variation and grazing pressure were important factors to map the spatial variability of indigenous vegetation. overall, it was stated that variation in grazing pressure resulted in greater species richness in the open grazed areas than protected sites. such findings might be contrary to the expectation that grazing contributes to the loss of plant species biodiversity. our hypothesis suggested that such findings would confirm the role played by grazing animals as part of an ecosystem service in contributing to the conservation of biodiversity, as long as the ecosystem is not misused. on the contrary, the result indicated that protected areas were dominated by few species, probably through the process of ecological succession. however, the protected pastures showed greater accumulation of biomass than the adjacent continuously grazed areas. it was interesting to note that herders used both ecological and anthropogenic indicators in assessing the abundance of indigenous vegetation at the landscape level (table, 1). this may be related to three key factors: different grazing landscapes might disclose differences in performance with respect to the unique feature of an individual landscape that would enable it to support different levels of grazing pressure. secondly, a landscape with low grazing potential may be vulnerable to degradation and loss of biodiversity, while landscapes with higher potential could be resistant to grazing pressure and more resilient in terms of recovery after the removal of grazing stress. thirdly, in the herders’ experience, all landscapes may be varied in terms of utility and suitability for livestock use (table 1). some landscapes may be preferred for grazing and/or browsing by a given species of livestock (e.g., cattle, sheep and goats or camels) and their utilities might also be diverse according to seasons. using such comprehensive knowledge systems, herders in the three countries had no difficulties in adjusting livestock grazing according to the suitability and potential of each landscape (oba et al., 2000a). overall, indigenous landscape classification and land use practices by the local people greatly reflected herders’ detailed knowledge of ecosystem variability (table 1). classification of landscape level grazing suitability as adopted by the local herders was based on soil types, grass species composition and shrub and tree densities. furthermore, the relative abundance of species (i.e., the number of individual species per unit area) was used to classify the various landscapes according to their suitability. from the results of this study, we confirmed herders’ knowledge of landscape classification with respect to the landscape’s grazing potential and degradation status (degraded and less degraded). generally, herders’ perspectives of a degraded versus less degraded landscape inferred from vegetation status and soil types in response to grazing pressure (oba and kotile, 2001). according to the results of this study, landscapes highly sensitive to grazing were often grazed for shorter periods during the wet season as opposed to being considered as key resources. this might imply that contrary to the perception of environmental degradation, herders do not continue to degrade their environment; they rather rotate their land use based on seasons. however, degraded lands could be inevitable around settlements where grazing pressure is expected to be high year round. in 76 consilience northern kenya for instance, grazing pressure was seasonally avoided through livestock mobility by sending excess herds elsewhere. on the contrary, in the other two countries (i.e., botswana and mali) livestock mobility as a strategy in reducing pressure on grazing lands was not an option. herders in the three countries used the abundance of palatable species as indicators for assessing range condition. based on the current grazing condition of each landscape, herders could show landscape preferences by livestock where they often referred to the abundance and palatability of herbaceous species. the herders’ observations suggested that the dominance of unpalatable grass species and forbs are indicators of poor range condition. similarly, previous studies (e.g., oba, 2001; oba and kaitira, 2006; oba and kotile, 2001; oba et al., 2000a) have confirmed herders’ knowledge of foraging species as an indicator of the status of rangeland condition. many herders claimed that some foraging species not recorded during the vegetation sampling in the field were species that are disappearing from their grazing lands. therefore, the incorporation of local knowledge into the scientific approach may improve our understanding of environmental changes affecting indigenous vegetation. the value of such information cannot be disregarded, considering that field vegetation surveys usually lack long-term experimental monitoring and as a result, there is little history of vegetation change other than from local communities’ knowledge or other more sophisticated but generalizing methods (e.g., satellite imagery). 3.2. effects of water points on vegetation composition the evidence suggests that an increased number of artificial water points in a communal land use system leads to the degradation and loss of indigenous vegetation resources. due to increased grazing pressure nearby the water points, the cover of indigenous vegetation correspondingly decreases, as seen in mali. what we also confirmed from the results of this study was that sites associated with the younger age of well points (3 to 45 years old) had a higher grass cover than sites nearby the older wells (150 to 350 years old). nevertheless, sites associated with the older water points had superior grass species diversity. overall, even though vegetation cover increases in relation to increased distance from water points, this does not indicate species richness. our analysis indicates that plant cover and species richness was higher at intermediate distances from water points in accordance with the intermediate disturbance hypothesis (connell, 1987). this hypothesis suggests that older wells in communally managed rangelands might enhance species richness but reduce plant cover. these results might be a surprising departure from conventional ecological expectations that older and heavily used wells would be associated with poorer range condition and lower plant species richness and diversity than younger and lightly utilized range sites. generally, such conclusions may undermine systems of indigenous range management, which were highly efficient in terms of regulating livestock density and setting time of use in the wells zone. quite often, the well rangelands are rested from any form of use during the wet season when rain pools are available, and the livestock return to them during the dry season when plants are in dormancy (oba, 1998). we did not however compare these wells with the more modern boreholes developed by states or aid agencies where consilience angassa et al: community-based knowledge traditional systems of land management might have broken down. according to herders’ observations, the impact of climate change and frequent drought remain the most critical risks to the management of grazing lands and consequently, the exploitations of indigenous vegetation by humans. accordingly, we also emphasized the role of climate change and the impact of recurrent drought on local livelihood security in botswana and kenya (table 2). 3.3. impacts of climate change the findings from botswana and kenya pointed out that multiple droughts had substantially reduced livestock resources and threatened the livelihood security of pastoral communities (table 2). similar evidence (e.g., berge, 1999) has shown that the impact of climate change on livestock population is critical because of its direct implication for local livelihood systems (table 2). the evidence implied that slow herd recovery following droughts would increase the impoverishment risk of the local pastoral households. in general, the present study provided a wealth of knowledge on drought coping strategies and methods for early warning systems based on those practiced by the herders. the present results suggest the importance of linking indigenous early warning systems with modern drought management strategies in order to achieve effective drought management in arid regions of africa. previous studies (ellis and galvin, 1994; angassa and oba, 2007) have shown that rainfall is a dominant driver of ecosystem dynamics in the drylands of africa. in such environments, livestock responses to climate variability would demand opportunistic herd management and flexibility (ellis and swift, 1988; oba et al., 2000b) such as through increased herd mobility in response to effects of multiple droughts (angassa and oba, 2007) and the scarcity of resources (mccabe, 2004). based on the botswanan case study we could summarize the relationship between global climate change indices (e.g., north atlantic oscilation-nao and el nińo southern oscillation-enso) and patterns of livestock species (table 2). the results of the study from botswana showed that the more variable climate has strongly influenced livestock population dynamics and suggest that more frequent drought will cause substantial reductions in herd numbers (table 2). conversely, a fixed time lag after average rainfall years reflected an increase in livestock populations. overall, there was a strong relationship between rainfall variability and livestock performance indicators, suggesting that management needs to be improved in order to protect the loss of livestock during drought periods. the current study therefore suggests that drought management strategies must be improved to minimize the negative impact of variable environmental conditions on livestock population. it also recommends that the link between indigenous drought management strategies and modern systems of early warning should be further explored and integrated. based on herder knowledge, the most problematic deduction is the link between the drivers of drought and land degradation. we suggest, however, that the impact of rainfall alone might not be a problem; rather the interactions between rainfall variability and increased population pressure that cause greater demands on the local environment might explain the links. 78 consilience 3.4. perceived drivers of land degradation local herders would argue that the impoverished situation associated with rainfall variability and greater demands on the local environment might exacerbate the process of land degradation. generally, our synthesized results suggest that seasonal mobility, preservation of dry season feed and improved livestock marketing are methods to be explored in order to cope with environmental risk. we concluded that both anthropogenic and natural events contributed to land degradation and the livelihood insecurity of households. when comparing herders’ knowledge of land degradation to an ecologist’s, herders combine the same indicators as those used by ecologists with production indicators. they determine the impact of land degradation on the basis of rangeland condition indicators and livestock performance rather than ecological indicators alone. 3.5. local indicators of land degradation an important aspect of indigenous ecological knowledge could be the application of complex indicators (i.e., the link between rainfall, fodder availability, livestock productivity and household food security) in order to show that processes involved in land degradation are not simple and straightforward. indigenous knowledge can also explain the close connection among rainfall, primary production and secondary productivity (hiernaux et al., 1990; ellis and swift, 1988). for instance, the view that milk production is directly related to the availability of fodder, while forage productivity is dependent entirely on rainfall has been confirmed (berge, 1999). the complexity of separating cause-effect relationships in driving land degradation and loss of biodiversity might be above the informal reasoning used by herders, while ecologists can combine many varieties of environmental and socioeconomic indices to come up with more cohesive conclusions. 3.6. consequences of land degradation according to herders’ observations, one of the many consequences of land degradation is the severity of famine associated with the occurrence of droughts. the probable reason is that, in degraded environments, additional stress will simply exacerbate the problem of food production. the impact of environmental variability may lead to a decline in crop and animal production performances, threatening livelihood security. generally, with failure of rain and prolonged drought, households may be threatened with lack of sufficient milk to feed family members when feed resources for animal maintenance are in short supply. in reality where famine and poverty prevail, “communities’ health conditions have become endangered by malnutrition, followed by infant death,” as stated in the msc studies used as primary literature in this study. in arid regions of africa, livestock is part of the local communities’ culture and hence an important asset. however, many sedentary households have lost large numbers of their animals due to recurrent drought and inadequate feed supply. in general, our analysis suggests that loss of livestock is linked to drought, and the problem of land degradation can cause severe poverty for inhabitants of arid environments. what emerges from the present analysis across the consilience angassa et al: community-based knowledge three countries of africa is that management of indigenous vegetation resources cannot be separated from a community’s development endeavors. proper management and sustainable use of indigenous vegetation resources can be achieved successfully by bringing in conservation education through community participation. consequently, conservation education would enhance local ecological knowledge and therefore help local communities realize their capacity to respond to environmental challenges. we suggest that this could be achieved through a proper extension of public education (oettlé et al. 2004; chanda 1996). 4. conclusion this study provides insight for more effective strategies of resource utilization and management, drought coping mechanisms and adaptation to local circumstances under changing climate. from the findings, several issues have emerged: (1) the use of local ecological knowledge indeed might be a key element for sustainable management and preservation of indigenous vegetation in the arid landscapes of africa; (2) traditional management systems have important contributions to be made for conservation of the biodiversity of indigenous vegetation; (3) communitybased knowledge is crucial in strengthening local institutions for sustainable use of indigenous vegetation and conservation; (4) this article may also contribute to current knowledge of sustainable farming systems that aim at improving food security and risk minimization. this article has been presented with the hope that it might contribute to an exchange of knowledge and experiences among the various stakeholders in developing models that could be adopted in other arid zones of africa. we suggest that indigenous ecological knowledge needs to be promoted, as well as supported by scientific-based methods of resource management and conservation of natural landscapes. the implication of this synthesis article is that the maintenance and proper use of african arid landscapes will require integration of local ecological knowledge with the scientific approach that can be achieved through a participatory research approach within local communities. 80 consilience acknowledgements the gef-ivp is thanked for funding the research work. we acknowledge y. dembele, a. dembele, s. fongoro, d. doumbia, h. t. wario, b. h. dabasso, s. l. gambare, p. e. aemun, k. motlopi, c. leutlwetse, o. e. kgosikoma, g. m. khwarae for their assistance in data collection during field work in their respective countries. bibliography angassa, a., & oba, g. 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(1998). an assessment of desertification and land degradation in arid and semi arid areas. 2. iied. london. consilience angassa et al: community-based knowledge tables landscape types species list local name authority life form indicator frequency (%) cenchrus biflorus kekene hort.bengal herb increaser 30 borreria sp koutoukoumbe g.mey herb decreaser 24 schoenefeldia gracilis sokekulé kunth. herb decreaser 18 zornia glochidiata kosossafune reichb.dc herb decreaser 12 niesokema landscape mitracarpus villosus layik (s.w) d.c herb decreaser 9 digitaria sanguinalis diadie bol.soc. herb increaser 4 digitaria ciliaris narakata koeler grass stable 3 combretum nigricans tiagran leprieur shrub decreaser 54 guiera senegalensis camou j.f.gmel shrub stable 46 acacia tortilis bague hayne. tree increaser 77 balanites aegyptiaca zekene var. tree increaser 23 cenchrus biflorus kekene hort. herb increaser 62 schoenefeldia gracilis sokekule kunth. herb decreaser 38 combretum nigricans tiangran leprieur shrub decreaser 3 mari landscape guiera senegalensis camou j.f.gmel shrub stable 30 combretum nioroense gore aubrev shrub decreaser 19 leptadenia hastata saharate decne. shrub decreaser 13 calotropis procera popopokolo aiton. shrub decreaser 3 acacia tortilis bague hayne tree increaser 95 ziziphus mauritiana fah lam. tree increaser 5 schoenefeldia gracilis sokekule kunth. herb decreaser 45 zornia glochidiata kosossafune rchb. herb decreaser 31 mitracarpus villosus layik (sw) d.c herb decreaser 24 seguendi landscape combretum nigricans tiagran leprieur shrub decreaser 74 leptadenia hastata saharahate decne. shrub increaser 26 acacia tortilis bague kast. tree increaser 71 balanites ayegyptiaca zekene var. tree increaser 21 acacia senegalensis dibe hout. tree increaser 4 ziziphus mauritiana fah lam. tree increaser 4 table 1. indigenous plant species identified based on indigenous ecological knowledge from three arid landscapes of africa in mali livestock species nao (t – 1) enso (t– 1) sst (t – 1) (feb) sst (t – 1) (may) sst (t – 1) (july) sst (t – 1) (september) sst (t – 1) (november) cattle 0.015 0.002 0.111 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.016 goat 0.010 0.044 0.004 0.004 0.051 0.048 0.071 sheep 0.026 0.033 0.044 0.144 0.176 0.192 0.172 table 2. coefficient of determination (r²) for the relationship between livestock population dynamics and global climate indices in kgalagadi district editor's note editor's note https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.vi12.7533 how to cite rehaut, l. (2014). editor’s note. consilience, (12). https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.vi12.7533 abstract dear readers, it is, as always, my absolute pleasure to bring you to the newest issue of consilience: the journal of sustainable development. for our twelfth issue, we have decided to do something a little different. in addition to five excellent new pieces, we are highlighting and re-publishing a selection of articles from past issues that we believe demonstrate the very best of consilience. as a journal, our foundational goal has been to promote interdisciplinary thinking and to expand the boundaries of sustainable development. each of the pieces we included in this new volume in some way challenges us to approach a topic we thought we understood in a new way, suggests alternative perspectives we may have failed to consider. from ecological agriculture to health care policy to psychosocial approaches to poverty reduction, our authors have continually helped us reassess what pursuing sustainable development truly entails. our featured new pieces also promote unique and important perspectives on contemporary issues in sustainable development. dr. gumbo weighs the opportunties and challenges of using municipal solid waste for energy generation in south africa. ho looks at the development patterns of the mekong river basin and determines that they are not sustainable and must be reevaluated. lempert questions the adequacy of the un’s milennium development goals and boldly espouses a new set of goals that may better represent the true values of the international community. ramirez analyzes our efforts to advance sustainable development from a project management perspective and provides useful insights for how such projects can be more effective going forward. finally, schipani weighs in on the air pollution crisis in beijing, helping to elucidate a topic that resists a simple interpretation. https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.vi12.7533 i hope the new issue — both new and old pieces — stimulates and inspires you to think about these topics in a fresh and exciting way. while sustainable development can sometimes seem to focus on the problems our society faces, consilience strives to advance perspectives and policy solutions that can point us towards a more hopeful, sustainable world. enjoy issue xii. finally, it is also my great pleasure to officially pass on the role of editor-in-chief to ryan elivo, who will be guiding the journal for the next year. i am very excited to see the journal continue to progress under his and the rest of our new board’s excellent leadership. thank you all again for your continued support of consilience. best regards, lucas rehaut editor-in-chief this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution 4.0 international license. copyright (c) 2014 lucas rehaut https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ editor's note ​​​ how to cite ​ abstract columbia university environmental crisis in the eastern himalayan landscapes in india author(s): sayan bhattacharya source: consilience, no. 21 (2019), pp. 66-85 published by: columbia university stable url: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26775084 accessed: 17-04-2020 04:25 utc references linked references are available on jstor for this article: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26775084?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents you may need to log in to jstor to access the linked references. jstor is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. we use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. for more information about jstor, please contact support@jstor.org. your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of the terms & conditions of use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms this article is licensed under a creative commons attribution 4.0 international license (cc by 4.0). to view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. columbia university is collaborating with jstor to digitize, preserve and extend access to consilience this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 21, iss. 1 (2019), pp. 66-85 environmental crisis in the eastern himalayan landscapes in india dr. sayan bhattacharya dr. sayan bhattacharya is currently working as an assistant professor in the school of ecology and environment studies, nalanda university, rajgir, india. he completed his msc and phd in environmental science from the university of calcutta. he completed two years of post-doctoral research at presidency university, india. he has published 30 international journal papers, 10 book chapters, 45 international conference proceedings, and many national conference proceedings, and delivered lectures at the university of oxford, university college london, university of indonesia, vietnam national university, and jadavpur university, among others. he has over 10 years of teaching experience at the university of calcutta, rabindra bharati university, viswa bharati university, and vidyasagar university, india. sbhattacharya@nalandauniv.edu.in abstract the eastern himalayas in india demonstrate vast ecological diversity in its varied range of flora and fauna. the local communities also form an integral part of the ecological landscape, deriving various services from the forest and mountain ecosystems. recently, however, due to severe anthropogenic pressure and unplanned developmental activities, the eastern himalayans have displayed signs of rapid habitat destruction. this photo essay aims to discuss the nature of the challenges in the eastern himalayas which pose a palpable threat to the local ecology and environment, and to establish how a more sustainable approach is necessary to salvage this ecologically unique region. keywords: eastern himalayas, biodiversity, ecology, sustainable development this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms mailto:sbhattacharya@nalandauniv.edu.in consilience bhattacharya: crisis in the eastern himalayas introduction the mountainous regions of india have always played a significant role in the climatic and physiographic features of the country. the eastern himalayas are considered the meeting ground of the indo-malayan, palaearctic, and sino-japanese bio-geographical realms with diverse ecological and altitudinal gradients and an equally diverse range of flora and fauna (icimod, 2010). the eastern himalayan rivers and landscapes provide valuable ecosystem services such as soil retention, climate regulation, carbon sequestration, etc. the welfare of millions of people downstream is inextricably linked to the natural resources of the eastern himalayas. shaped by their natural environment, the indigenous communities in the region have a rich blend of religious, cultural, and local traditions. these societies derive various ecosystem services from the forest resources. these include provisioning (finding food and fodder), cultural (aesthetic, religious), supporting (soil formation and water cycle), and regulatory (erosion, climate) services (chettri et al., 2007). the main challenge, however, lies in using these natural resources sustainably. the glaciers of the eastern himalayas are important sources of several rivers in asia, including the yangtze, the indus, and the ganges. people across the continent depend on the himalayan water sources for drinking, irrigation, industry, and power generation (wwf, 2018). the dooars are alluvial floodplains in the foothills of the eastern himalayas in north-east india. the dooars valley is home to many wildlife sanctuaries such as gorumara national park, chapramari wildlife sanctuary, buxa tiger reserve, and jaldapara sanctuary, which together represent the ecological wealth of the region (bhattacharya et al., 2016). however, unplanned developmental activities like hydro-electrical projects, road construction, the establishment of tea gardens, and mining activities lead to calamities such as landslides, forest fires, etc. these factors have an incremental effect on the fragility of the himalayan ecosystems. furthermore, poaching wild animals, livestock grazing, overexploitation of forest resources, and pollution in the eastern himalayas are major threats to biodiversity and natural resources (bhattacharya and ghosh, 2014). many of the dams built in the region are located in high-seismic zones, which are prone to landslides, flashfloods, and earthquakes. the construction of several dams has been undertaken and/or proposed without a proper environmental impact assessment. this may lead to arable lands in a biodiversity hotspot being submerged in water. the himalayas are highly prone to erosion and the rivers carry heavy silt loads. the accumulation of sediment behind these dams also deprives downstream plains of nutrients and silt deposits that are a source of their fertility. unsustainable developmental activities like these are destroying the himalayan ecosystem, and can force-displace the indigenous population who have been the traditional drivers of conservation. the construction of roads and infrastructure activities also pose major threats to the biodiversity and ecological corridors of the forests. well-built roads naturally attract tourist inflow, as they enable easier access to the area, but also open up the possibility of commercial developments like hotels, guest houses, and other permanent establishments that lead to severe pollution in the area, which would ultimately endanger the ecology of the region. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 68 consilience the eastern himalayas, with its unique ecological conditions and geomorphic characteristics, may not support the excessive concentration of an urban population in its towns and cities. the carrying capacity assessment and the sustainability of tourism are critical issues in the eastern himalayas (bhattacharya and ghosh, 2014). climate change, too, has a considerable impact on the local communities in the eastern himalayas. recent studies in the region indicate less snow in the mountains and intense but short episodes of rainfall, which cause increased run-off, poor water recharge, and the consequent drying up of water sources. more than 75% of the local inhabitants in and around darjeeling himalaya believe that water sources are drying up, and 60% of them feel that there has been a reduction of snow in the mountains over time (chaudhary et al. 2011). traditional water springs have dried up, leading to water crises in different hamlets of the eastern himalayas. warmer temperatures and changing humidity have increased the occurrence of pest attacks and disease in areas where they were previously absent. the photo essay aims to discuss the nature of the challenges in the eastern himalayas which pose a palpable threat to the local ecology and environment, and establish how a more sustainable approach could salvage this ecologically exceptional region. methods and materials photographs have been taken in different parts of the eastern himalayas in india. nikon dx format dslr cameras (d5100, d7000 and d7100) and a canon dslr camera (eos rebel t5) were used. these were take using nikkor lenses (18140 mm. f/3.5-5.6 g ed vr, 18-105 mm. f/3.5-5.6g ed vr, 55-300 mm. f/4.55.6g ed vr) and canon lenses (ef-s 55-250 mm. f/4-5.6 is ii). the manual and program mode of the cameras was used. the images have been processed using adobe photoshop 7.0 and olympus master 2.0 image editing software. minor corrections in color, contrast, and sharpness have been made. essay the following photographs demonstrate the diversity of the eastern himalayan region and how different factors, natural and anthropogenic, play together to affect the natural landscape. in a nutshell, the eastern himalayan landscape is a vast platform of complex interplay between natural resources, climate, ecotourism, and human development, and a fine balance between all is essential for the sustainable development of the region. photos 1 and 2 demonstrate the diverse natural landscape of the eastern himalayas, both in the mountain ranges and foothills. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience bhattacharya: crisis in the eastern himalayas figure 1: kanchenjunga, the world’s third largest mountain range, is situated in the eastern himalayas. the kangchenjunga transboundary landscape is shared by bhutan, china, india, and nepal, and contains 14 protected areas with a total of 6,032 km2. the protected areas are habitats for several species of ecological importance. figure 2: the dooars are the floodplains in the foothills of the eastern himalayas. during floods, there is huge amount of erosion on the banks of rivers this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 70 consilience and streams. of all the eastern himalayan rivers in india, teesta has the highest sediment yield (cse, 1991). the eastern himalayan rivers and landscapes provide valuable ecosystem services such as soil retention, climate regulation, carbon sequestration, etc. the next two photos portray how the water and snow content of a river and a lake, respectively, have altered in recent times, which may have a significant impact on local biodiversity and on the geological and geographical characteristics of the landscape. figure 3: a dry riverbed in the foothills of the eastern himalayas in india. recent changes in climatic conditions significantly affect water inflow in the himalayan rivers. changes in water flow can significantly impact himalayan biodiversity and local livelihoods. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience bhattacharya: crisis in the eastern himalayas figure 4: tsomgo lake in sikkim, india. the amount of snow has been significantly reduced in recent times, according to local sources. the photo was taken in december 2016. hardly any snow is present, as opposed to some years back when the entire lake would be frozen. the following four images display the potential of the eastern himalayas as an ecotourism destination and recent initiatives undertaken in ecotourism with the example of community-based ecotourism in the darjeeling district of the eastern himalayas. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 72 consilience figure 5: a forest in the eastern himalayas in darjeeling, india. many scattered hamlets are found in the eastern himalayas and most of them are proximate to the forests enriched with endemic biodiversity. many hamlets with indigenous inhabitants are in the forest areas. the spectacular view of the himalayan ranges, forests, and biodiversity attracts tourists from different parts of the world. photo 6: darjeeling, india is one of the most popular tourist destinations in the eastern himalayas. the town experiences huge population pressures and tourist inflows. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience bhattacharya: crisis in the eastern himalayas among the administrative units, darjeeling is the most vulnerable compared to sikkim, eastern nepal, and western bhutan. figure 7: tourism activities in the eastern himalayas have recently increased. the number of home stays and hotels has increased exponentially in the past ten years in many parts of the eastern himalayas. a surge in nature-based activities like trekking and hiking, bird watching, and camping and unrestricted tourist inflow can increase waste generation and consumption of water resources, which in turn can affect local biodiversity. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 74 consilience figure 8: community-based ecotourism in lamahatta village, darjeeling district, india. ecotourism activities in darjeeling district have been rapidly increasing. the carrying capacity assessment and sustainability of tourism are critical issues in the region as they will form the basis for resource allocation and future development. photos 9 through 13 illustrate the adverse effects of unplanned ecotourism, such as water crises, waste generation, and air pollution. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience bhattacharya: crisis in the eastern himalayas photo 9: local stream water flow has decreased during the summer and negatively impacted water availability for domestic use and irrigation. ecotourism further increases water demand as tourist inflow is greatest during the summer. this image shows a local initiative of summer rainwater harvesting in one of the home stays in darjeeling (bhattacharya et al., 2019). photo 10: in the eastern himalayan hamlets, solid waste is collected in bins. every community burns their solid waste once a week or buries the waste this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 76 consilience underground. waste burning is a daily practice for many homestays with high tourist pressure. the burial and burning of bottles and plastic packets may have serious effects on the local ecosystem and biodiversity (bhattacharya et al., 2019). photo 11: trekking is common in the eastern himalayas, which leads to plastic pollution and waste deposition in the mountain areas. inorganic solid waste can create health hazards in human and livestock populations and can harm the growth of vegetation and crops. the problem of solid waste management (swm), particularly in trekking areas, is one of the major issues to be tackled in the eastern himalayas. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience bhattacharya: crisis in the eastern himalayas photo 12: one of the consequences of plastic pollution in the himalayan foothills: a dog choking on a plastic jar, found in the riverbed. separate waste collection and disposal systems should be operated by the government to safeguard the sensitive ecosystems of the areas. effective management design should be implemented for plastic waste generated in these mountain hamlets. photo 13: air pollution in the eastern himalayas. the number of vehicles has increased significantly with tourist growth. the vehicles used in these areas should be monitored regularly so that pollution can be checked. the installation of modern this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 78 consilience devices in vehicles for pollution control as well as routine and random checks may help this cause. the final photos of this essay highlight recent developmental and construction activities in the eastern himalayas and how these activities, along with population pressure, pose a grave threat to local ecosystems, biodiversity, and indigenous communities. photo 14: road construction has led to soil erosion, slope destabilization. and landslides. railway tracts run through forest areas in the himalayan foothills. consequently, railway accidents result in deaths of wild animals. railway and road construction in the region should be inspected thoroughly after proper study of the corridor networks and management strategies. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience bhattacharya: crisis in the eastern himalayas photo 15: areas in kalimpong district are overpopulated. kalimpong city has recently been experiencing periodical water crises. population pressure in these areas is a serious issue, which has adverse effects on natural resources and biodiversity and can increase the occurrence of natural and anthropogenic disasters like landslides and earthquakes. technology and funding to develop low-cost earthquake-resistant and energy-efficient housing would be beneficial. photo 16: landslide in the kalimpong district in india due to the construction of roads. the eroded rocks and soil are deposited in the teesta river. some areas of the this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 80 consilience eastern himalayas are understood to be at seismic risk, in zone v of the earthquake hazard conation (bhattacharya et al., 2016). the seismicity of this area loosens the hillsides, causing rockslides and siltation in riverbeds. the vegetative control measures of soil conservationists should be adopted to prevent further damage to the landscape. photo 17: the hydel power project in the eastern himalayan foothill region. the construction of numerous dams without proper environmental impact assessments might lead to the submergence of arable lands in a biodiversity hotspot. conclusion the forest and mountain regions of the eastern himalayas have become attractive tourist destinations for pleasure trips, trekking, camping, biological and geographical excursions, and medical research projects. despite the beginnings of consolidated conservation efforts, there are considerable gaps in managing and conserving forest resources and biodiversity. there is an urgent need for sustainable management planning in these areas in order to ensure holistic socio-ecological conservation. the effects of climate change are more severe in the himalayas than compared to other regions (ipcc, 2007). the annual and seasonal temperature trends in the kanchenjunga landscape indicate an increase at the rate of 0.01 – 0.015o c/year, with higher altitudes experiencing greater warming (singh et al., 2011). extensive study is required on the effects of climate change on the eastern himalayan biodiversity, with special focus on the forests enriched with endemic species and medicinal plants. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience bhattacharya: crisis in the eastern himalayas an integrated approach is necessary to revive the eastern himalayan landscape. taking action for the revival of hilltop lakes, critical streams, and springs can develop their catchment using rainwater harvesting, including watershed and springshed approaches. rainwater harvesting structures along hill slopes can be constructed to mitigate water crises. rooftop rainwater harvesting systems need to be installed in village houses, and household filters can be provided to the local inhabitants for rainwater purification. it is possible to supplement the natural recharge of the spring aquifers by implementing artificial rainwater harvesting in the recharge (springshed) areas in the eastern himalayas. resource mapping of the springs on a gis platform and the preparation of a spring atlas in all the villages of the eastern himalayas need to be initiated. water storage and micro-irrigation equipment businesses can be developed for the use of local inhabitants. in some areas, local indigenous groups appear to have been formed and trained to identify particular issues and implement solutions accordingly. however, the recognition of these groups by financial service providers such as banks, challenges from local government, and the establishment of proper training facilities remain major challenges in this context (sandhu and sandhu, 2014). this initiative may be taken up on a larger scale. enhancing ecosystem services can lead to improvement of food and nutrition security in the himalayan landscape. this can be achieved by implementing sustainable methods such as crop rotation with legumes to fix atmospheric nitrogen in soil instead of nitrogenous fertilizers (wratten et al., 2013). promoting organic farming in eastern himalayan villages can stabilize both ecology and economy. the establishment of community seed banks and preservation of the germplasm of indigenous crop varieties can ensure availability of food resources in the future. however, the impacts of climate change on these varieties must be identified. pit toilets should be re-designed using appropriate technology under the specifications provided by who. this can reduce groundwater, soil, and stream water pollution (who, 2013). local youth can be trained for the technical skills required to construct and manage pit toilets and to understand how the right technology can minimize impacts on the surrounding ecosystems. however, the key challenge is procuring financial assistance to help local entrepreneurs learn technical skills and to start the small-scale business (sandhu and sandhu, 2014). the use of energy-efficient and smokeless cook stoves should be promoted to increase fuel efficiency, to reduce cooking time, and to reduce pollution from fuel wood (barnes et al., 1993; pandey et al., 1990). the pellet fuel required for these cook stoves can be made from the biomass waste of agricultural activities. it can prevent the unsustainable harvest of wood and fuelwood from the forest. biogas plants and the use of solar cookers in the villages can also reduce the pressure on fuel wood. there is a lack of awareness among villagers about the advantages of afforestation in the hill areas. specific trainings and awareness campaigns from the forest department have to be undertaken to educate people on the adverse effects of deforestation. plant varieties should be increased in the silviculture units and modern methods of conversation should be implemented in association with gene banks and genetic and molecular databases. ecological restoration should focus on the damaged, degraded areas destroyed by landslides. priority should be given to the protected areas critically important to floral and faunal habitat, water catchments, and areas important to indigenous social and cultural values. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 82 consilience the forest areas of the eastern himalayas suffer from illegal cattle grazing, firewood collection, and poaching. more intense surveys and management practices should be initiated to mitigate these anthropogenic threats. the factors responsible for the depletion of medicinal plant diversity in the eastern himalayas include the shrinking of natural habitat due to population pressure and developmental activities; the overexploitation of natural resources; forest fires; illegal trading; livestock overgrazing; cutting of medicinal trees for fuel and timber; and changes in climate and weather patterns. the sustainable conservation of medicinal plants is necessary, considering the factors responsible for their depletion. extensive genetic databases need to be prepared and local centres for conservation of medicinal plants need to be established. biopiracy is a major problem in the eastern himalayas which can affect endemic plant diversity. neora valley national park and senchal wildlife sanctuary are considered among the richest medicinal plant diversity zones in the eastern himalayas. initiatives should be taken to promote medicinal resources and to provide economic support to build up private nurseries, where several varieties of important plant species may be preserved. the eastern himalayas are prone to landslides due to natural and anthropogenic factors. the vegetative control measures of soil conservationists should be adopted to restrict further damage of land in the eastern himalayas. the promotion and implementation of vermicomposting techniques in this area can maintain the soil structure, increase agricultural productivity, and reduce waste (wwf, 2009). technology supported by funding to develop earthquake-resistant and energy-efficient housing would also be beneficial. the number of automobile vehicles has been increasing significantly in the ecotourism destinations of the eastern himalayas. these vehicles should be monitored regularly to mitigate pollution in the forest areas. modern antipollution devices should be installed in vehicles and routine checking systems should be implemented. separate waste collection and disposal system should be operated by the government in all the villages of the eastern himalayas, especially those near forests. effective management practices are necessary for plastic waste and hazardous waste. proper management of solid waste through collection, storage, transportation, recycling, and disposal should be implemented to promote sustainable development. there remains the need for a clearer understanding of resource flows to and from mountain areas. this will lead to the increased income of mountain communities and a fairer distribution of earnings from natural resource services and exploitation. a number of innovative mechanisms allowing a greater share of the proceeds from mountain-based economic activities to reach mountain people must be continuously invented and evolved. markets which channel local products and the establishment of distribution systems with strong communication could uplift local village economies. specific components of cultural tourism can be promoted in the eastern himalayan hamlets including fairs and festivals, arts and crafts, and village tourism. a portfolio of tourism products should be developed based on their unique ecological assets. the development of handicrafts made from forest bioresources could be beneficial for the socio-economic development of local communities. the carrying capacity assessment and sustainability of tourism in the eastern himalayan villages should be an important component of ecotourism studies; it will form the basis of resource allocation and future development (karmakar, 2011). this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience bhattacharya: crisis in the eastern himalayas roads and infrastructure are development priorities that also pose major threats to biodiversity, and to animal movement corridors in particular. road networks would enable easier access to the area but would also open the site to commercial development and tourist inflow, which can damage ecological assets. a number of pwd roads, including a national highway, nh 31c, pass through the forest areas of eastern himalayas. consequently, wild animal deaths due to accidents have also increased. railway and road construction should be inspected thoroughly after proper study on the corridor networks and their management strategies (chaudhury, 2015). over the years, the incidences of cattle grazing in the villages of eastern himalayan foothills have exponentially multiplied. with an increase in households, cattle numbers have also increased rapidly. reduction in cattle grazing in the forest areas can increase soil stability, reduce erosion, and balance the ecosystems. however, a management strategy like rotational grazing might be preferable instead of sticking to the strategy of reduction and curtailing villagers’ rights to forests, especially within protected areas. it is a challenge for ecologists and environmental scientists to ensure that modernization of the native cultural values in the eastern himalayas happens through a careful, step-by-step transformation. the aim should be to provide lasting, synergistic benefits for the local population and their economy and culture in rural and semiurban landscapes. extensive investigations in the hill areas should be carried out so that necessary measures can be undertaken for their conservation. bringing local communities into protected area management will also have a significantly positive impact on long-term biodiversity conservation in the trans-boundary himalayan landscapes. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 84 consilience references barnes, d.f., openshaw, k., smith, k.r., van der plas r.. 1993. the design and diffusion of improved cooking stoves. world bank research observer 8: 119– 141. bhattacharya, s., maity, r., sarkar, g., ghosh, g., mukherjee, d., mukhopadhyay, c. 2016. socio-environmental survey of an ecologically important forest edge hamlet in buxa tiger reserve, west bengal, india. international letters of natural sciences, 52: 67-83. bhattacharya, s., ghosh, u.c., 2014. socio-environmental surveys of tinchuley and takdah: two emerging ecotourism hamlets of north bengal, india. international letters of natural sciences, 23: 9-26. bhattacharya, s., de, s., shome, a., dutta, a. 2019. socio-environmental survey of a forest hamlet proximate to neora valley national park in the eastern himalayas, india. indonesian journal of environmental management and sustainability, 3: 1-13. chaudhary, p., bawa, k.s. 2011. local perceptions of climate change validated by scientific evidence in the himalayas. biology letters 7(5): 767-770. chaudhury, k. wildlife management in buxa tiger reserve rhino resource centre. accessed on march 2019; accessed from: http://www.rhinoresourcecenter.com/pdf_files/138/1382156557.pdf chettri, n., sharma, e., shakya, b., bajracharya, b. 2007. developing forested conservation corridors in the kangchenjunga landscape, eastern himalaya. mountain research and development, 27(3):211-214. cse. 1991. state of india’s environment: floods, flood plains and environmental myths. centre for science and environment, new delhi, india. icimod, 2010. biodiversity in the eastern himalayas: status, trends and vulnerability to climate change. climate change impact and vulnerability in the eastern himalayas – technical report 2. kathmandu, nepal. ipcc. 2007. climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. cambridge university press, cambridge, uk. karmakar, m., 2011. ecotourism and its impact on the regional economy-a study of north bengal(india). tourismos 6(1): 251-270. pandey, m.r., neupane, r.p., gautam, a., shrestha, i.b., 1990. the effectiveness of smokeless stoves in reducing indoor air pollution in a rural hill region of nepal. mountain research and development 10: 313–320. sandhu, h., sandhu, s., 2014. linking ecosystem services with the constituents of human well-being for poverty alleviation in eastern himalayas. ecological economics, 107: 65–75. singh, s.p., bassignana-khadka, i., karky, b.s., sharma, e. 2011. climate change in the hindu kush-himalayas: the state of current knowledge. international centre for integrated mountain development. kathmandu, nepal. world health organisation (who). 2013. simple pit latrines. accessed on march 2019: this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms http://www.rhinoresourcecenter.com/pdf_files/138/1382156557.pdf consilience bhattacharya: crisis in the eastern himalayas http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/hygiene/emergencies/fs3_4.p df world wildlife fund (wwf). 2009. annual activity report, 2008: project serve. darjeeling field office, wwf-india. world wildlife fund (wwf). eastern himalayas. accessed on august 10, 2018; accessed from: https://www.wwf.org.uk/where-we-work/places/easternhimalayas wratten, s., sandhu, h., cullen, r., costanza, r., (eds.), 2013. ecosystem services in agricultural and urban landscapes. wiley-blackwell, oxford, uk. this content downloaded from 68.61.68.201 on fri, 17 apr 2020 04:25:55 utc all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/hygiene/emergencies/fs3_4.pdf http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/hygiene/emergencies/fs3_4.pdf https://www.wwf.org.uk/where-we-work/places/eastern-himalayas https://www.wwf.org.uk/where-we-work/places/eastern-himalayas consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 24, 2021 carbon sinks of steel: exploring bamboo’s use to combat climate change erica kirchhof1 1 cornell university, ithaca, ny 14850, united states abstract according to the united states environmental protection agency, conventional agriculture accounts for approximately 19-29 percent of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide—a proportion destined to increase with the rising world population. as a result, it is important to uncover areas where methods of sustainable agriculture can be implemented or improved, and fostering these opportunities in the agricultural communities of developing nations offers great potential for reducing international greenhouse gas emissions. for many areas of the world, one promising strategy can be found in the cultivation of bamboo. a perennial plant within the grass family (poaceae), bamboo belongs to the subfamily bambusoideae and consists of over 1500 known species in approximately 119 genera. although endemic to nearly every continent, the greatest species diversity of bamboo can be found in the subtropical regions of asia, africa, and latin america. this paper aims to examine the cultivation of bamboo in rural communities and developing nations as a strategy of climate change mitigation and land revitalization. the potential of bamboo to be used in international carbon trading schemes is also analyzed. as an agriculturally relevant crop for many remote communities, the cultivation and harvest of bamboo can provide a meaningful source of income to developing areas while also helping nations meet sustainability and emissions reduction goals. author’s note as a botany student, i typically find myself immersed in the study of various physiological and biochemical processes of plants. i am often left with a strong desire to apply this knowledge to pressing issues that face our modern world, such as climate change. over my years of study, i have realized that though solutions to climate change lie in natural science, the ability to implement them requires an understanding of international relations, social inequality, and world economies. perhaps most importantly, however, is the fact that solving complex issues such as climate change will require participation of all peoples and integration of indigenous knowledge with existing science, especially in rural areas of developing nations. it is my goal, therefore, to use this paper as a means of highlighting not only the climate science behind sustainable bamboo production, but also its positive implications for rural development and economic equity. keywords carbon sequestration, bamboo, sustainable agriculture, agroforestry, rural development introduction the twenty-four filial exemplars is a collection of short stories written in the 13th century by confucian thinker guo jujing. one of these stories, entitled “he wept until the bamboo sprouted,” features a young boy named meng zong. zong’s mother grows very ill, and she desires bamboo soup. finding no bamboo in the grove, zong weeps. moved by his piety, bamboo shoots miraculously sprout from the ground. zong collects the shoots and makes his mother the soup. after consuming it, she is fully healed. “he wept until the bamboo sprouted” represents just one of many references made to bamboo over the span of human history. often regarded as a symbol of luck, health, and creation, bamboo has always served as a significant nexus between agriculture, nature, and humanity. today, climate change poses significant threats to all three of those aforementioned aspects, as anthropogenic activities drive greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere. the adaptation of agricultural strategies that actively work to mitigate climate change, while also coexisting with local ecosystems, is therefore imperative. moreover, it is ethically necessary for these strategies to address the socioeconomic inequalities that are often exacerbated by the consequences of climate change. thus, climate change solutions are best achieved when they combine opportunities for greater access to world markets with mitigation and adaptation techniques. one possible mitigation strategy lies in bamboo. as one of the fastest carbon-sequestering plants, bamboo stands have the potential to draw large amounts of carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere while rapidly accumulating biomass (gu et al., 2019). in short periods of time, large quantities of bamboo can be harvested and sold to provide a source of income for rural communities and smallholder farmers. therefore, sustainably grown, well-managed bamboo forests can act as powerhouses of carbon sequestration and increase access to capital for rural and developing areas that have been exploited by conventional agricultural markets worldwide. thus, it is worthwhile to explore the use of bamboo as a crop to fight the climate change crisis. life cycle and biodiversity bamboo is a perennial plant belonging to the grass family (poaceae). despite being classified as a grass, bamboos tend to have tree-like growth habits, stretching up to one hundred meters in height (nath et al., 2020). bamboo shoots, also known as culms, arise continuously from an underground rhizome. typically, a culm can grow to its full height within one growing season but requires roughly five growing seasons to become fully mature (thokchom & yadava, 2015). for this reason, bamboo is considered to be one of the fastest-growing higher plants (nath et al., 2020). the conclusion of the bamboo life cycle begins with flowering. after pollination and seed maturation, the plant senesces and dies (thokchom & yadava, 2015). therefore, any effort to harvest bamboo should be made before the flowering stage. however, since it takes several growing seasons for culms to reach this stage, there are numerous opportunities for usable product to be harvested over the course of its life cycle. the biomass lost from harvested culms can usually be replaced within a year, much faster than other forest plants of similar size, such as trees. bamboo is endemic to all continents, except for europe and antarctica, with the greatest diversity occurring in subtropical asia, latin america, and africa (thokchom & yadava, 2015). it is one of the only grasses that have been able to successfully occupy forest land. currently, it is estimated that about one percent—or roughly 30 million hectares—of the total worldwide forest area is occupied by bamboo (kuehl, 2015). within poaceae, bamboo has been further classified into the subfamily bambusoideae, with all extant members belonging to three tribes: bambuseae, olyreae, and arundinarieae (nath et al., 2020). in total, there are about 119 genera and 1500 known species of bamboo, ranging from herbaceous to “woody” in growth habit (nath et al., 2020). such geographic and physiological diversity makes bamboo an important crop in many regions of the world, and thus an even more important subject of study in the fight to combat climate change. carbon sequestration, agriculture, and mitigation there are over 1500 documented applications of cultivated bamboo, which range from human consumption to construction materials and bioenergy (nath et al., 2020). bamboo culms can be harvested after just one growing season for pulp or left to grow for longer. the longer the culms grow, the more carbon is sequestered as biomass, and the sturdier they become. in fact, bamboo that has been allowed to grow to structural maturity is known to have the tensile strength of steel and compressive strength of concrete (muchiri & muga, 2013). currently, a majority of bamboo is harvested for construction purposes, ensuring that carbon sequestered as biomass does not rapidly reenter the atmosphere (nath et al., 2020). bamboo cultivation also provides employment for small communities in developing countries, which helps local economies (nath et al., 2020). at the communal level, it is imperative to evaluate and incorporate indigenous knowledge related to species growth habits and ecosystem services when advocating for well-managed bamboo growth systems. it is also important to work with local smallholder farmers to integrate the growth of bamboo stands with other crops of economic importance. in some instances, agroforestry is employed, wherein bamboo is planted alongside another crop in order to increase revenues for smallholder farmers and sustain community nutritional requirements. for example, agroforestry practices in the miombo region of africa, which includes malawi, mozambique, tanzania, zambia, and zimbabwe, have synthesized the growth of timber-bearing forest plants with fruit and medicinal crops to help meet the human health needs of the region (sileshi et al., 2007). the versatility of bamboo as a product, combined with indigenous knowledge, creates enormous potential for the inclusion of smallholder farmers and developing communities in the fight to combat climate change. one of the chief concerns regarding climate change is the rise in atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. the increase of these gases in the atmosphere causes the planet to warm, which leads to various disruptions of the biosphere. therefore, it is necessary that immediate steps be taken to sequester carbon from the atmosphere. carbon sequestration occurs when carbon is stored for a long period of time in biomass or soil, and bamboo is known to sequester carbon faster than nearly any other plant (gu et al., 2019). this is largely due to the tendency of bamboo to have a very rapid growth rate, such that harvested biomass is quickly replaced by new culms. the sequestration power of bamboo was demonstrated in a recent study focused primarily on moso bamboo (phyllostachys heterocycla j.houz) cultivation in china (gu et al., 2019). moso bamboo is considered to have several highly desirable traits for cultivation, such as rapid growth, a short regeneration cycle, and the ability to be continuously harvested (gu et al., 2019). notably, it was determined that well-managed moso bamboo stands sequestered two to four times more carbon than chinese fir and red pine forests of similar acreage (gu et al., 2019). figure 1 illustrates the mean annual carbon sequestration rates per hectare for p. heterocycla and four other woody plants common to central asian forests: the sal tree (s. robusta), the small-flowered crape myrtle (l. parviflora), axlewood (a. latifolia), and the chinese fir (c. lanceolata). the carbon sequestration potential of bamboo was also explored in a 2011 study focused on smallholder farming in barak valley, assam, india (nath & das). this study found that bamboo stands grown, managed, and harvested by local smallholder farmers were more efficient at sequestering carbon than traditional plantations or natural bamboo forests (nath & das, 2011). taken together, both studies offer evidence to suggest that bamboo cultivation managed by smallholder farmers increases the carbon sequestration potential of the land while also providing farmers with a harvestable and sellable crop. moreover, these results provide further support for involving smallholder farmers and rural communities in participatory systems that integrate their existing knowledge with bamboo cultivation and management. bamboo has also been known to grow well in eroded and nutrient-poor soils, which are often characteristic of degraded lands. degradation, caused by deforestation and other anthropogenic activities, can leave soils largely infertile and unable to support the growth of agricultural crops without substantial amendments, such as fertilizers. as incidences of severe weather increase with the progression of climate change, soil degradation is projected to increase (borrelli et al., 2020). a study by the university of las villas in santa clara, cuba, was performed in order to analyze the effects of bamboo production on the quality of degraded soils (cairo et al., 2018). the study evaluated the prevalence of several mineral nutrients, in addition to beneficial fungi and bacteria, at different soil depths over a period of time in plots present and absent of bamboo stands (cairo et al., 2018). it was determined that the presence of the bamboo and the resulting biomass it produced significantly improved the consistency, structure, and biological properties of the previously degraded soil (cairo et al., 2018). therefore, it is possible to use bamboo as a vessel for revitalizing soils while simultaneously sequestering carbon and providing an economically viable crop. opportunities for growth generally speaking, research regarding the benefits of bamboo cultivation on carbon drawdown and land revitalization is only in its infancy, but current results are promising. the greatest opportunity for economic growth and improved sequestration lies in smallholder cultivation of bamboo on degraded soils not otherwise viable for more potentially lucrative food crops (which are likely to have carbon sequestration capabilities inferior to those of bamboo). currently, it is estimated that bamboo is grown on roughly 33.52 million hectares of land (project drawdown, 2020). if bamboo production is increased to include an additional 69.8 to 174.3 million hectares of degraded lands by 2050, a total of 8.3 to 21.3 gigatons of carbon dioxide could be sequestered (project drawdown, 2020). even if the amount of carbon dioxide sequestered were to reach the midrange of this prediction, it would roughly equate to the total net greenhouse gas emissions of the united states between the years of 2017 to 2019, on a co2-equivalent basis (us-epa, 2021). an additional reduction in emissions can be achieved when bamboo is used in place of less sustainable construction materials, such as steel or aluminum. in total, it is estimated that such an increase in bamboo production could lead to a lifetime net profit anywhere in the range of $1.71to $4.35 trillion u.s. dollars (project drawdown, 2020). on a global scale, one method by which the emissions of carbon dioxide can be regulated or mitigated is through carbon trading schemes. broadly speaking, carbon trading schemes involve the generation of carbon offsets by farmers, which are then traded as “credits” with investors who are emitting carbon dioxide as a greenhouse gas. presently, bamboo cultivation is not a significant contributor to carbon trading markets. because bamboos have a fast growth rate and high carbon sequestration potential, they are worth exploring as a crop for carbon trading schemes. when bamboo is cultivated in a developing country, it is usually done at the smallholder farmer and village level. in some instances, bamboo is the primary source of subsistence and income for these villages (nath et al., 2020). by involving these farmers in a carbon trading scheme, an additional source of revenue could be obtained through the acquisition of carbon credits. this could be especially useful as an incentive for farmers to plant bamboo on degraded lands or in situations where sustainable agriculture has not traditionally been an economically viable option. these carbon credits could be traded on a national or international scale, helping to mitigate carbon dioxide emissions worldwide. certainly, there is exciting potential for bamboo be used as a vessel for bringing smallholder farmers into international carbon trading markets. in recent years, the potential for bamboo as a lucrative crop has even gained attention in the media. article headlines across the world, from jamaica (“gov’t targeting value-added production from bamboo”) to india (“bamboo wood industry: dark horse in ne economy”), to florida (“why bamboo might be worth the climb for florida farmers”) all suggest that interest in bamboo cultivation is growing. one such article even referred to bamboo as “green gold” (saha, 2020). such enthusiasm is a necessary and welcomed step in expanding the cultivation of bamboo worldwide. limitations one of the many reasons why bamboo is aptly suited to mitigate climate change is its resiliency and its ability to grow rapidly in variable climatic regimes and precipitation conditions. however, these same characteristics also give bamboo the potential to become invasive. invasive bamboo has been known to hinder the ecological succession of an area, often causing disruptions to natural forest structures and biodiversity (buziquia, 2019). therefore, when implementing bamboo cultivation, the use of species that are native to the area of interest must be utilized. this limits the growth of various bamboo species to areas where they are endemic. in many countries, there are also political barriers that limit bamboo cultivation. in uganda and kenya, for example, the government has restricted and/or banned the harvest of bamboo since the late twentieth century (muchuri & muga, 2013; sheil et al., 2012). the bans were intended to conserve bamboo stands and protect ecosystems and biodiversity. recent studies, however, have suggested that these bans have actually hindered the optimal growth and reproduction of bamboo, due to a lack of harvest activity (muchuri & muga 2013; sheil et al., 2012). these governmental limitations could be overcome by instead advocating for community-based, smallholdermanaged sustainable bamboo cultivation and harvest. governments should be made aware of the positive implications of bamboo cultivation on both economies and ecosystems, as well as the value of indigenous farmer knowledge when considering policies to ensure sustainable production is achieved. there are also some technical constraints that pertain to use of bamboo in carbon trading schemes. the reduced emission from deforestation and forest degradation program (redd), which has instituted one of the principle international carbon trading schemes, currently only considers forest areas covered by trees (nath et al., 2015). as a member of poaceae, bamboo is not considered a tree in the botanic sense, though it does have a tree-like growth habit. a similar lack of clarity exists under the clean development mechanism (cdm) instituted by the kyoto protocol, which does not define “trees” in its charter (nath et al., 2015). to overcome this issue, the 2013 warsaw framework for redd gave countries the responsibility of defining forestland, thereby opening up the possibility of bamboo to be used in international carbon trading markets (nath et al., 2015). however, some international confusion still exists over this issue. in order to realize the full potential of bamboo in international carbon trading schemes, further clarification by redd and the united nations could be helpful. conclusion today, humankind faces a climate crisis that will undermine both the natural world and everyday life. in order to combat such a complex issue, innovative and sustainable solutions must be enacted. the cultivation of bamboo provides a unique opportunity to synthesize long-term carbon sequestration with lucrative agriculture, smallholder farming systems, soil revitalization, and global economies. in particular, bamboo growth and cultivation provide a novel opportunity to involve smallholder farmers and rural communities in gaining access to global carbon trading markets, thereby allowing these regions to develop robust and sustainable economies, societies, and nations. in order to realize the full benefits of bamboo cultivation and provide long-term, sustainable mitigation against climate change, such integrative solutions are necessary. from the tale of the pious boy in guo jujing’s “he wept until the bamboo sprouted,” to the grandiose philippine myth of human creation, the story of bamboo has always been intimately intertwined with the story of humanity. upon first read, “he wept until the bamboo sprouted” seems fantastical at best. perhaps, though, the great storytellers of centuries past underestimated the true healing, life-restoring power of bamboo. references borrelli, p., robinson, d.a., panagos, p., lugato, e., yang, j.e., alewell, c., wuepper, d., montanarella, l., and ballabio, c. (2020). land use and climate change impacts on global soil erosion by water (2015-2070). proceedings of the national academy of sciences, 117(36), 21994-22001. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2001403117 buziquia, s.t., lopes, p.v.f., almeida, a.k., and almeida, i.k. (2019). impacts of bamboo spreading: a review. biodiversity and conservation, 28, 3695–371. https://doi.org/ 10.1007/s10531-019-01875-9 cairo, p.c., alonso, o.a., yera, y.y., urrutia, a. r., mollineda, a., artiles, p.t., and lopez, o.r. (2018). the biomass of bambusa vulgaris as an alternative for the recovery of degraded soils. centro agrícola, 45(3), 51-58. http://cagricola.uclv.edu.cu/descargas/html/v45n3/body/cag08318.html giles, f. (2018, august 21). why bamboo might be worth the climb for florida farmers. growing produce. https://www.growingproduce.com/fruits/florida-growers-giving bamboo-go/ gu, l., wu, w., ji, w., zhou, m., xu, l., and zhu, w. (2019). evaluating the performance of bamboo forests managed for carbon sequestration and other co-benefits in suichang and anji, china. forest policy and economics, 106, 101947. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.forpol.2019.101947 jamaica star staff. (2020, december 8). gov’t targeting value-added production from bamboo. the jamaica star. http://jamaica-star.com/article/news/20201208/gov’t targeting-value-added-production-bamboo jujing, g. (1973). the twenty four filial exemplars (d.k. jordan, trans.). university of california press. (original work published ca. 1300 ce). https://pages.ucsd.edu/ ~dkjordan/chin/shiaw/filialexemplarsenglish.pdf kuehl, y., (2015). chapter 4: resources, yield, and volume of bamboos. in: w. liese, & m. kohl, (eds.), bamboo: tropical forestry (vol. 10, pp. 91–112). doi: 10.1007/978–3– 319–14133–6_4. mandal, r. a., jha, p. k., dutta, i. c., thapa, u., and karmacharya, s. b. (2016). carbon sequestration in tropical and subtropical plant species in collaborative and community forests of nepal. advances in ecology, 1-7. https://doi.org/10.1155/2016/1529703. muchiri, m. n., & muga, m. o. (2013). a preliminary yield model for natural yushania alpina bamboo in kenya. journal of natural sciences research, 3, 77–84. https://doi.org/ 10.4236/jsbs.2017.73007 nath, a., & das, a. (2011). carbon storage and sequestration in bamboo-based smallholder homegardens of barak valley, assam. current science, 100(2), 229-233. https://www jstor-org/stable/24073051 nath, a. j., lal, r., and das, a. k. (2015). managing woody bamboos for carbon farming and carbon trading. global ecology and conservation 3: 654-663. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.gecco.2015.03.002 nath, a. j., sileshi, g.w., and das, a. k. (2020). bamboo: climate change adaptation and mitigation, 1st edition. apple academic press, new york. https://doi.org/ 10.1201/9780429297311 project drawdown. 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(2015). bamboo and its role in climate change. current science, 108(5), 762-763. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24216487 [us-epa] united states environmental protection agency. (2021). draft inventory of u.s. greenhouse gas emissions and sinks, 1990-2019. epa 430-r-21-001. washington, dc: us-epa. https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/draft-inventory-us-greenhouse-gas emissions-and-sinks-1990-2019 [us-epa] united states environmental protection agency. (2012). global anthropogenic non co2 greenhouse gas emissions: 1990 – 2030. epa 430-r-12-006. washington, dc: us epa. http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/epaactivities/economics/ nonco2projections.html yuming, y., kanglin, w., shengji, p., & jiming, h. (2004). bamboo diversity and traditional uses in yunnan, china. mountain research and development, 24(2), 157-165. http:// www.jstor.org/stable/3674587 yen, t. and lee, j. (2011). comparing aboveground carbon sequestration between moso bamboo (phyllostachys heterocycla) and china fir (cunninghamia lanceolata) forests based on the allometric model. forest ecology and management 261(6): 995-1002. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foreco.2010.12.015 microsoft word lie_microedited.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 15, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 77-100 reproducing development’s trusteeship and discursive power jon harald sande lie norwegian institute of international affairs e-mail: jon.lie@nupi.no abstract development aid is characterised by an inherent asymmetry between donor and recipient institution. despite regular aid reforms and bold ambitions to change this relation, the asymmetry seems to persist. inspired by post-development theory, and drawing on both a review of development theory and fieldwork within the world bank, this article argues that the lopsided aid-relations are continuously being reproduced through the formation of development expert knowledge within authoritative donor communities. here, contemporary knowledge/power formations shape and are shaped by historically embedded structures and epistemic communities that benefit the donor’s need for legible and operational knowledge. hence, top-down approaches to development planning are reproduced at the cost of participatory, bottom-up ones, as per the official rhetoric. keywords: development theory, discourse, post-development theory, world bank consilience 78 introduction power can operate in various ways. this article is about the discursive formation and power of international and institutional development. from the very inception of institutional development in the post-second world war period, the era of development has come to manifest a seemingly hegemonic discourse shaped and spread by the west to the rest. this article draws on fieldwork from within the world bank’s headquarter in washington dc and seeks to couple and analyse this information with the institutional development discourse that has been manifested during the last half century and in which the world bank is seen to be the prime gatekeeper. the argument is that there is a strong notion of trusteeship inherent to institutional development, and that the underpinnings of this trusteeship are continuously being reproduced in and through established systems of institutions, knowledge, and funding. these knowledge/ power formations configure and reproduce the international development apparatus despite the formal and official rhetoric stating the opposite, as suggested by the new aid architecture’s girding ideas of partnership, ownership and participation, which explicitly seeks to revamp inherent asymmetrical aid relations. the world bank holds a gatekeeping position in international development, and just about all development actors globally relate, directly or indirectly, to world bank policies and procedures. hence, different, distinct and globally dispersed actors are shaped by a particular discourse emanating from one central node and operating on an abstract global level, but simultaneously reproduced by concrete transnational linkages between actors participating in the development apparatus. this article is about the conceptual elements of development and seeks to grasp how development works rather whether it works. development and its apparatus the concept of development is understood different from an outsider’s analytical perspective than from conventional practitioner perspectives. from an analytical perspective, the concept of development can be conceived of in two ways, as either reflecting immanent or intentional change (cowen and shenton 1996). whereas the former directs attention to the natural change and advancement of society over time, i.e. “…the transformation that moves towards an ever more perfect form” (esteva, 1992: 8),1 the latter denotes that this transformation, or development, necessarily needs to be directed and guided by someone – who already knows this perfect form – through active interference in 1 the conception of immanent development originates from biology (cf. estava, 1992). this view is highly associated with adam smith and his notion of ‘the invisible hand’, i.e., that the aggregate of individuals’ moral free choices would benefit society (1779). consilience lie: trusteeship and discursive power society.2 the active intervention in a society (intentional change) is illustrated by the many projects implemented by development agencies, while development as a process that unfolds over time (immanent) is illustrated by e.g. the development of capitalism. nustad argues that “[i]t was when development in the immanent sense was seen as creating problems that could be solved by active intervention, that intentional development was created” (2004: 14) and we saw the uprising of an international development apparatus that would gradually assume the monopoly to define both the problems and solutions to development. intentional change through development assistance is characterised by a donor–recipient relationship that binds together geographically detached actors with uneven material and conceptual resources. while a donor agency contributes with funding, technical aid and administrative guidelines, the receiving end is to do the implementation but also supposed to devise the plans and make policy decisions on how to spend the allocated funds. the latter is however not the usual case as development assistance always comes with certain strings attached so that the policy measures reflect the politics and intention of the donor rather than those of the recipient. this reflects the everlasting development debate about conditionality vs. participation. participation first entered the development discourse from the 1980s and draws on an idea that the recipients themselves know best their own constraints and thus are best suited to make their own policy decisions (see chambers 1995). the girding idea was that aid recipients’ participation in and ownership to policymaking processes would improve the appropriateness of externally funded projects and create local ownership in order to enhance local commitment and thus effectiveness. however, as private, bilateral and multilateral donor agencies are responsible to their respective constituencies, there is a need of tying aid to their own organisational values and making development assistance conditioned on their own policies. conditionality denotes the means applied to enforce the adoption and implementation of donor’s policy. “[c]onditionality is not an aim in itself but an instrument by which other objectives are pursued” (stokke, 1995b: 3),3 thus the donor’s conditionality represents an exercise of coercion having the rationale to pursue donor’s stipulated goals regardless of the ideas of recipient participation and bottom-up 2 this view rose among positivistic scholars who asserted humans’ capability to take control over their future and development. this view is associated with the saint-simonians, who rejected the idea of progress as a natural non-intended process and instead proposed an idea about development as an active interference in society by its managers. august comte enhanced these ideas in his promotion of rationality, planning and science, which have been labelled as positivism. 3 stokke also states that conditionality is “…basically a means to obtain a variety of objectives” (1995b: 3), and that the “…key element is the use of pressure by the donor, in terms of threatening to terminate aid, or actually terminating or reducing it, if conditions are not met by the recipient” (ibid.: 11-12). emphasis is put on the donor’s coercive aspects, “…to promote what the donor perceives to be in its own interests” (ibid.: 3). consilience 80 planning. the conditionality–participation nexus thus represents a seeming paradox within the formal configuration of development assistance and reveals an intention on the donor’s side of establishing governance mechanisms to ensure its recipient follows the donor-established policies. this nexus thus merges the theory and rhetoric of participation with practices of conditionality, demonstrating how established discursive practices override new strategies, practices and ambitions. a post-structural approach to development when entering the 1990s ‘development’ laid with broken back. the end of the cold war disbanded institutional development’s geopolitical aspects as development in many instances had been used to counter the spread of communism. secondly, various studies pointed out that over four decades with development still hadn’t produced the desired results – there were almost a total lack of success stories. the continuous failure of development projects also triggered debates on development’s role and the vast spending of taxpayers’ money around the world. development, which stood as the idea with the us as the ‘beacon on the hill’ (sachs 1992) guiding postcolonial and emerging nations now started to loose its popular founding. this scepticism got reflected in academic writing, and coupled with emergent post-modern thoughts a group of authors started to analyse development from a post-structural perspective.4 this perspective – which were to become known as post-development theory – started to analyse development as a powerful discourse, and the analytical focus shifted “[t]o the way in which discourses of development help shape the reality they pertain to address, and how alternative conceptions of the problem have been marked off as irrelevant” (nustad 2004: 13). to get to grips with development practice and its mindset, postdevelopment scholars usually trace the genealogy of development and give emphasis to its initiation after the second world war.5 by depicting development’s genealogy postdevelopers illustrate how development constitutes a discourse where social meaning is produced and maintained, while diverging and contesting knowledge largely is ignored and thus has small pragmatic influence. post-development scholars argue that development agents, institutions and policy-makers have legitimised, constituted and reproduced the development discourse rather than considering the critique frequently directed against it. hence, development practice reproduces existing knowledge and the discursive formation of development. 4 see for example ferguson 1994; escobar 1991, 1995; cowen and shenton 1996; hobart 1993; sachs 1992. 5 some trace the origin of the concept of development, and in particular intentional development, to the era of enlightenment and the school of positivism, the st. simonians and august comte (see lie 2004). consilience lie: trusteeship and discursive power seeing development as a discourse came because development studies were in a crisis, and some intellectual circles declared the concept of development dead when entering the age of post-modernity. pieterse argues that “[p]ostdevelopment overlaps with western critique of modernity and techno-scientific progress” (2000: 176). as post-modernity is a cultural and intellectual rejection of modernity, postdevelopment is a rejection of development (gardner & lewis, 1996). scholars who adhere to the post-structural development critique take advantage in analysing development as a discourse in which development actors operate within and thus reproduce in practical development. thus post-development theory position itself with an analytical distance outside the constraining structures of development. in doing this postdevelopment theory does not seek to present a solution to the problem of failed development and underdevelopment – which also is the main critique directed against this approach from practitioners working within the development apparatus. the strength of post-development’s discursive approach is that it allows one to distinguish between the moral aspects of development issues and the theoretical apparatus that has monopolised development discussions, solutions and interventions (lie 2008; 2015a). as such, post-development perspectives aim not to provide policy suggestions, but to understand the social dimensions and knowledge/power formations of the system that do so. the development discourse authors writing from a post-structural perspective tend to trace the origin of the development discourse as manifested in the current international development apparatus back to us president truman’s inauguration speech january 20 1949, where he proclaimed that: “we must embark on a bold new programme for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. … for the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people. … the old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our plans … greater production is the key top prosperity and peace. and the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific knowledge” (cited in porter, 1995: 66–67). according to truman, development needed the modern technical and scientific knowledge the already developed nations possessed and who therefore had to share this with the consilience 82 underdeveloped countries. the implementation and institutionalisation of truman’s project became rooted in the bretton woods institutions, i.e. the world bank and the international monetary funds (imf) which were the results of the united nations’ bretton woods meeting in 1944 on how to counter the elements that were seen as the second world war’s triggers. hence, the newly established multilateral institutions’ mandate “were to safeguard liberal capitalist global policies” (preston 1996: 168). there are several interesting elements in truman’s speech, which are reflected and sustained in later development practice and rhetoric. first, the speech represents the first time the term ‘underdeveloped’ was used in a formal setting, thus defining certain nations in a negative relation to the developed ones, having the effect of dichotomising ‘us’ and ‘them’. second, it explicitly outlines what constitutes a developed society. third, it stipulates how underdeveloped societies can become developed. fourth, is says who to ascribe this task of developing the underdeveloped. lastly, the speech defines what is ‘expert’ knowledge and the importance of disseminating it. närman argues that “[w]hen truman institutionalised development assistance, he could hardly have imagined that it would still exist in basically the same form fifty years later” (1999: 149). a weighty reason to this was because truman’s ideas later got manifested and theorised in the american economist walt rostow’s “the stages of economic growth. a non-communist manifesto” from 1960. rostow’s theory was later to be labelled the modernisation theory, which proved to have long-lasting impact on development thinking and practice. development as modernisation basic to rostow and the modernisation school is that modernisation is an inevitable process and that western modernity is the objective to be achieved on a global level. the thoughts of the modernisation theory draw on adam smith who two centuries earlier argued that economic growth and the wealth of nations are based on economic growth and a freemarket economy (cf. immanent development). hence, the process of industrialisation came to play a key role in national modernist projects, and to rostow an “…expanding industrial sector was the prime vehicle behind the stages of growth – the ultimate development process” (nërman 1999: 151). the basic assumption of rostow’s theory is that all nations inevitably develop in the same directions, following the same path having the same objective; i.e. a stage of mass-production and consumption, but that some nations lag behind on his five-stage consilience lie: trusteeship and discursive power universal and evolutionary scheme.6 this is because the immanent process of progress has been obscured and thus he makes a call for active intervention by intentional development projects to assist and improve the progress of the failed immanent development. the modernisation theory is portrayed as an inevitable path unfolding over time in which all societies are passing through with different velocity. societies are placed long a universal and linear continuum with the us as the model, or ‘the beacon on the hill’, and it is the responsibility of those at the end of the scale to help others achieve the same level, because poverty was explained by nations’ lack of integration into the world market, which to the modern project is the litmus test of a society’s development. development was thus seen as a uniform process supposed to be the same everywhere, thus neglecting contextual variations. the modernisation approach added one effect in addition to reproduce those already produced by truman, viz. what fabien (1983) calls ‘temporal segregation’. temporal segregation denotes the phenomenon when contemporary political linkages between societies are cut of because a society’s poverty is explained with reference to it lagging behind on the evolutionary scale and not as a matter of relations between actors. poverty is explained as a matter of historical development and that societies coexist isolated from each other. this non-relational conception of poverty was to be countered by the other paradigmatic development theory that has influenced global development thinking. underdevelopment as dependency the modernisation theory got its counter reaction in the 1970s in what was to become known as the dependency or underdevelopment theory. dependency theory counters the modernisation theory by explaining poverty as due to unequal structural and economic possibilities and relations between the north and the south. hence it was relational and it did not only give an explanation to why some societies are poor, but also why some are rich. inequality was due to structures established during the colonial era, which were sustained after 6 in ‘the stages of economic growth: a non-communist manifesto’ (1960), walt rostow stipulates five stages or phases the process of development consists of on the way to contemporary, western modernity: the first stage is the traditional society, or pre-newtonian stage as rostow calls it. secondly is the ‘transitional stage’ where the conditions for “take-off” are developed. thirdly and most crucial is the “take-offstage”. this stage is short in time (about two decades) and is compared to the english revolution; characterised by rapid growth and expansion, being a period in which modernism is victorious over traditionalism. stage four is ‘drive to maturity’ which no longer has industrialisation as a goal, but administrative and technological potential to produce everything they choose and want to produce. fifth is the ‘stage of mass-consumption’, which, according to rostow, had its break-through in the us in 1913–14 with fordism. this stage was reached in europe and japan after ww2, through the marshall help initiative. consilience 84 decolonisation. whereas modernisation theory was apolitical and explained poverty in terms of (lack of) immanent historical progress, dependency theory was highly political. the theory rose from the works of andre gunder frank (1967), who draws on lenin’s theory of imperialism and marx’ analysis of capitalist societies (cf. gardner and lewis 1996). the theory was initially embraced by people normally associated with the political left, and was ascribed academic credentials when frank later was joined by emmanuel wallerstein (1974) who analysed the structural inequalities between north and south as a relationship between metropolis and satellites. the theory insisted on the coherence between underdevelopment, exploitation and political structures, describing underdevelopment as a political active process and not due to a partition in time. where the modernisation school saw poverty as due to poor nations’ lack of integration in the world economy, the dependency theory saw it opposite around: that rich and poor countries are highly interconnected and that underdevelopment was caused by the poor nations’ factual integration in the world marked on unequal premises when compared to the wealthy nations. as a consequence, the dependency theoreticians argued that until these structural inequalities are altered, development would essentially remain an unequalising process: the rich nations get richer and the rest gets inevitably poorer. some comments on the two development paradigms modernisation and dependency theory have to a large extent been seen as poles apart in development discourse, but it is difficult to pinpoint what really distinguishes them in defining the central objectives of development (närman 1999). the important dividing line is that while modernisation theory sees poverty as a historical problem caused by a slow immanent development process and thus makes a call for active intervention, dependency theory explains underdevelopment in terms of unequal structural and political relations between north and south. while “…modernisation seems to neglect inequality and conflicting agendas in the development process, these are crucial in dependency thinking” (ibid.: 157). however, dependency theory did not give a direct pragmatic solution on what to do except making a call for a total restructuring of the world economic order, which was seen as a too far-fetched and unlikely solution. dependency theory was celebrated in representing input from the south (frank is mexican) to the south’s problems. yet, the dependency theory did contribute to reproduce the schism between expert and local knowledge as the theory was just as alien to the poor rural farmers as the modernisation theory was. consilience lie: trusteeship and discursive power dependency theoreticians never managed to create a viable alternative to development practice and their theoretical predecessors. while dependency theory mainly got its resonance among political leftism and people engaged in research, modernisation theory continued to prevail among development practitioners. this was probably not based on a deliberate choice. those engaged in the development sector are usually equated with radical mindsets and thus on the rhetorical level reproduce the mentalities of the dependency theory, most notably by adopting the term ‘underdevelopment’ which has the effect of dividing the world into two separate entities. development practice on the other hand reflects notions of a paternalistic approach that reflect the structures of the modernisation theory. despite new and continuously changing development rhetoric and policies, post-development scholars’ analysis illustrates that development practice to a large extent reproduces the basic notions and effects of the modernisation theory (lie 2015b). already in 1962 renè dumont argued that the change in rhetoric from the paternalistic concepts of ‘help’ and ‘aid’ to ‘co-operation’ is mere hypocrisy (referred in närman 1999). the language of development rhetoric changes fast and development practice will always lag behind its rhetorical representations. thus, some words lapse into oblivion while others persist and prevail whatever happens to the field’s reality and development practice. according to chambers (1995), participation, which got its renaissance in the 1990s, is among those words: “so widespread is its use that some talk about a paradigm shift to participatory development” (ibid.: 30). participation implies that the intended recipients of aid are supposed to do the planning and make the decisions. this paradigm shift was never reflected on the practical level of development – turning development upside down is too an ambitious alteration of the development apparatus, illustrating that development language does not necessarily reflect development practice. the conceptual development apparatus consists of lots of words that are widely used among development agents; still these conceptual representations are merely on the linguistic level and should not be taken as descriptive terms of development practice, which always lag behind the conceptual apparatus. using the language of participation does not in itself constitute a transferal of power, nor any significant shifts in discursive practice. in referring to porter (1995) nustad argues that “…development since truman has been the domain of technocrats, and with the construction of a technocratic discourse followed a denial of human agency” (2004: 21). the denial of human agency and the technocratic and discursive formation of development have contributed to establish an consilience 86 apparatus highly reluctant to change with the effect of reproducing itself while also neglecting alternative knowledge and solutions. this kind of expert knowledge monopolises knowledge formations and thus generates ignorance towards other systems of knowledge (cf. hobart 1993). another aspect, thus, is how particular forms of knowledge – often introduced as ‘concepts’ – are not only shaping, but also shaped in and by their practical articulation in the nexus of culture, practice and policy (lie and de carvalho 2010; de carvalho and lie 2011). this reflects foucault’s point about knowledge/power formations as discourses, in which post-developers draw. there is a parallel between foucault’s writings about the court and the post-structural reading of development: “in the same way that the form of the court was the expression of a certain conception of justice, so the apparatus of development is … built on an idea of trusteeship … development therefore implies an idea of trusteeship: that someone who has the necessary vantage point guides the process of development… for this reason, proposals for reform look more like recapitulations of old efforts than true attempts at reform” (nustad 2004: 21). it is difficult to implement a total reform of development practice. it is highly rooted in embedded mindset and structures evolving from over 50 years of development practice, which has contributed to reproduce the original existing system. already from its inception, development was based on an understanding of an elite-driven process where some know and others do not. as the most important and influential development actor, while also being one of the few actors that have existed during the whole era of development, the world bank provides a good empirical point to study how current notions of and discourses surrounding development are articulated and reproduced at the headquarters level in dc. world bank stories in the aula of the world bank’s headquarters in washington dc there is a statue of a young boy leading an old, blind man (see lie 2015b; chapter three). the boy is holding the front end of a stick and the old man holds the back of the same stick. the statue was donated by a private pharmaceutical company (merck pharmaceutical company) after jimmy carter got the medical company, various governments and the world bank together at a who-conference where it was decided that the medical company should produce a medicine to counter river-blindness to be distributed by the various governments. world bank was to cover the costs both in developing the medicine as well as producing it. intentionally the statue was to symbolise the disease’s cruelty while also representing the helplessness and hopelessness of human conditions as the boy at the end of the stick knows that he one day will be at the other consilience lie: trusteeship and discursive power end of the stick. alongside the one in the world bank’s lobby, there exist three similar statues where one is placed in who’s geneva office, another at the carter centre and at the third at the pharmaceutical company. as the collaboration between the various actors on developing the medicine and curing the disease were successful, the statue has today become the symbol of cooperation founded on strong leadership. in late january 2005, three editorials – in the washington post (january 23), financial times (january 24) and the guardian (january 25) – which all addressed the issue of whom to succeed james wolfensohn as the president of the world bank after his resignation taking effect june 1 2005. the washington post wrote that: [i]t matters who takes over the world bank, because the institution is both powerful and fragile. it is powerful because it pumps out around $20 billion in commercial loans, subsidized credits and grants each year and because its 10,000-strong staff represents the strongest concentration of development expertise anywhere. this combination of financial and technical muscles has given the bank a lead role in many ventures that affect american interests, from reconstruction in the balkans and afghanistan to the campaign against aids to the refining of development theory (emphasis added). january 26 james wolfensohn held a speech to his staff in one of the larger conference halls in the world bank. the objective of the meeting was to thank his staff for their efforts in collecting money for the 2004 tsunami-victims and that it was good to see that the staff stood together in this hard period which affected many people working in the bank. also, as he was to travel extensively the coming months, he also took a temporary farewell with his staff as he soon was to retire. in celebrating his staff, wolfensohn quoted the washington posteditorial, giving emphasis to the part where his staff’s development expertise is highlighted. furthermore, wolfensohn said that among his main achievements during his decade-long tenure, was that he and his ‘development experts’ had changed the mode of doing development and that he had put up front and in the centre the idea that the bank should “listen to our clients – not as policemen or professors – but as partners”. so, how does a partnership work when one side of the partner comprising a donor–recipient relationship is addressed as clients – a term that indicates a patron and thus a partnership between a patron and client? what does it say about ‘partnership’ with the world’s leading development agency? consilience 88 wolfensohn had at least three paramount contributions to the rearrangement of the international development apparatus through ‘reinventing’ the bank, known as the strategic compact (weaver and leiteritz 2005). first was his ‘corruption as the cancer of development’speech which enabled the bank and its staff to work more explicitly on corruption than ‘rent seeking’ – which was the previous and more apolitical term for the same phenomenon. as a previous investment banker, wolfensohn saw corruption to be among the worst impediment to growth and progress, and by opening up the space for the bank to work with issues related to corruption, there was a major shift in bank mentality turning into a more political agency. according to its mandate, the bank is not supposed to be political – a mandate that was seen to hamper the bank’s other dedicated role of alleviating poverty. hence, wolfensohn enabled the bank to become more political in its activities, if not directly so at least indirectly by reconfiguring the methods applied of giving aid.7 this interlinks with his other major contribution, namely his launch of the comprehensive development framework (cdf) – being a framework for development concerned less about what countries should invest their aid in, but rather how aid should be spent. this might be accounted for due to the policies of cdf, which includes an extensive list that in practice might legitimise all possible choices. the cdf was in 1999 manifested when the poverty reduction strategy paper (prsp) was introduces by the world bank as the guiding principle for aid partnership and giving development loans or credits. a prsp is supposed to be devised by the recipient government and approved by the bank and imf in order for the country at stake to receive funds and to qualify to debt-relief. via the prsps, governments were supposed to take control over their own development under the rationale that this generates ‘ownership’ and thus enhance the effectiveness of doing development. prsps were supposed to represent a shift from the top-down approach of the prevailing structural adjustment lending (sap) method – where the bank attached strict conditions to its aid – to a situation where recipients are to define their own agendas, thus shifting the responsibility of bank-programmes from the bank it self to its recipients. coupled, addressing corruption more explicitly and emphasising how development aid should be spent represented a critical break with the bank’s apolitical traditions and its apolitical mandate. third and also interlinked was wolfensohn’s statement that the world bank is to become a knowledge bank, i.e. that it is supposed to produce knowledge 7 despite here described as indirect, it was still an intention on the bank’s side to become more political. knowing that the mandate is apolitical – a mandate which is printed on posters that hang in many of the bank’s offices – it needed to become political in a subtle and indirect way. hence, the indirectness is not the same as to say the bank has political effects. as post-development scholars argue, development assistance has always had and will always have political effects. consilience lie: trusteeship and discursive power to the betterment of recipient so that ‘they can make their decisions based on unbiased and scientific knowledge’ (see pincus and winters 2002). the bank was just supposed to be a facilitator and helper of the recipient when they were to devise their cdf by providing knowledge. however, as knowledge might take various forms and there is several power aspects attached to knowledge formation, it is not irrelevant what kind of knowledge that is produced within the bank and thus shapes the institution’s external representation and activities. comprehensiveness and politics the comprehensive development framework (cdf) gives emphasis to governance issues. a clean government, that is one without corruption and where administrative and bureaucratic routines follow stipulated guidelines, is seen as the main vehicle for development. alongside this, the cdf prioritises an effective justice system as essential for fighting corruption, and a good, healthy and properly supervised financial system. these elements are all essential to the new approach to states and governments as recipients of development assistance and credits from the multilateral financial institutions. comprised, these new elements make up what is labelled as ‘good governance’, which is a cluster of policies representing the latest paradigmatic shift in postsecond world war development discourse (cf. orlandini, 2003). the sudden rise of good governance policies and how this policy package is disseminated and circulated in the development apparatus’ conceptual toolbox, illustrates world bank’s rather hegemonic role in defining obstacles to development while at the same time delivering policies and solutions to these development problems. from the world bank, a weak government was seen as a major obstacle to development; hence good governance became the major means to and objective of development (see kapur 2002). whereas the era of structural adjustment, particularly the 1980s and early 1990s, was characterised by a significant top-down approach from the world bank in its relation to its lenders, the cdf and prsp intended to turn this relationship upside-down. recipient governments were now supposed to be in charge of devising their own poverty reduction plan based on own priorities and needs as opposed to previously when development grants came with strong strings attached so that the policies pursued reflected the interests of the donorinstitutions more than the receiving governments’ needs. instead of being subjected to strict conditionalities through structural adjustment programmes, the governments were now themselves to decide how to spend their loans. this transition consilience 90 indicates a change in the modality of how aid is given and how aid is expected to work. ‘empowering’, ‘emancipating’ and enabling the recipients to themselves be in charge of the process had the objective of bringing the decision-making process closer to those it affected and were based on the rationale of stimulating ‘participation’ and ‘ownership’ in order to make development assistance more effective – as efficiency and effectiveness have always been among the prime motors of reshaping development policies and systems. instead of the donors dictating what the money should be spent on by claiming their knowledge of the correct path of progress, it was now supposed to be in the hands of national authorities to come up with their own plan – which had to be approved by the donors. these elements illustrate a seeming shift in the general disbursement tactics, giving aid recipients greater freedom and control. but as development assistance always comes with certain strings attached, this shift represented more a rhetorical then a practical shift regarding both the policy content and the way of organising development. instead of “you get the money if they are invested in this and that (i.e. structural adjustment policies)” it is now “you get the money of you have done this and that”. funding was now to be given on previous achievements and results, and the funding was to cover further strengthening of these processes when there exist commitment from the national authorities’ side. precisely because the governments need approval for the prsps from the donorinstitutions, there is an asymmetric power-relation implicit in this mode of organising the partnership. those in imf and world bank responsible for accepting the prsps know what they want, and those producing a particular prsp know what the donors desire. the knowledge bank: a battlefield of knowledge from the 1970s, the bank sought to redefine its identity from being an international financial institution to become a global development agency. from the late 1990s, it started to think of itself as a knowledge bank, and production and dissemination of bank-knowledge increased rapidly. this is also reflected in the reorganisation of the bank’s internal structures – also among wolfensohn’s achievements during his tenure. the agency was reorganised for knowledge management creating ‘knowledge-based communities’ and thematic networks (king and mcgrath 2004). the restructuring of the bank revolved around producing a matrix where different sectoral divisions produce knowledge about its own thematic area which they are supposed to transfer into the various regional defined operational units who ultimately brings this knowledge into bank projects. “the knowledge bank would no consilience lie: trusteeship and discursive power longer enforce policy change through conditionality but would instead teach poor countries how to transform themselves, encourage participation in the process of change through partnerships, and encourage commitment and ‘ownership’ through the vehicle of cdf” (pincus and winters 2002: 12). the bank produces knowledge it desire to disseminate to its lending countries so that these eventually will incorporate the bank knowledge and later make decisions based on it. this also illustrates the transferral of responsibility: instead of the bank telling recipients what to do, recipients are supposed to know what to do themselves and thus secure local ownership to the processes. however, ownership is not an easy thing to grapple with as the recipient institutions need to state themselves what the donor wishes to hear. as a donor-informant put it: “ownership exist when they do what we want them to do but they do so voluntarily” (randel, german and ewing 2002: 8). making ‘them’ do as ‘we’ want is dependent on knowledge transferal, and consequently it matters what kind of knowledge that is disseminated. internal to the bank there is a great multitude of knowledge. this was quite prevalent during my fieldwork within the bank in january and february 2005. it is difficult to grasp the vast and complex field of an institution containing around 10.000 employees, but some trends are more significant than other. despite having the possibility to meet a variety of staff, i was primarily connected to the social development branch of the bank, which is located in the larger environmentally and socially sustainable development (essd). this department has the key role of being an anchor’ of the bank’s work on social development and seeks to disseminate its knowledge about social issues and social capital into the bank’s operational branches. many employees expressed difficulties doing this, because they felt they were not taken as that important when addressing the ‘operations’. on the operational side they were more stressed by those seeking to infer in their work, and “particularly are those from the social development at times very busy in our corridors. it is somewhat annoying. i know they are doing their job, but let us do ours. we know what is important and what’s not”, as one informant working in operations put it. on the sector side, an informant said: “well, we are supposed to be an anchor, and be available with resources whenever the operations need us. but they never consult us. we therefore need to address them directly. if not because social development issues are important, so at least because we need to make ourselves relevant to secure further funding of our department”. despite being two isolated quotations from a long fieldwork, these do nevertheless reflect the major trends of the ‘battlefield of knowledge’ (long and long 1992; lie 2012) consilience 92 internal to the bank. the bank as a knowledge battlefield is most prevalent in its operational branches and in ‘the field’, i.e. at its country offices located in the various recipient countries. i conducted eight months fieldwork in uganda (in addition to the two in the world bank), focusing on the government–donorsnexus of the policy process – a fieldwork which also reflects how people in operations are under constant press from various interest groups or bank-sectors seeking to have their voice heard and their issues reflected in the final policy documents. for instance, within the bank those working for the various thematic networks spearheading new development thinking talked about their ideas and policies in market terms, i.e. that they had to ‘sell’ their ideas to the operational side of the bank to become relevant and make a difference. in such processes, converting ideas and policies to please and fit the existing operational demands also meant subverting the original intent of these ideas. those pioneering new policies and initiatives thus usually turned into pragmatic aid practitioners when seeking to influence operational activities. similar ‘knowledge battlefields’ occurs also in the interface between donor and recipient institution, between the bank and its clients, where existing practice and operational demands tend to trump new and alternative perspectives regardless if these emerge from the recipients themselves or from within the bank (lie 2015b). however, even though operational activities are the central node to understand the knowledge encounters of development, these encounters are not solely between operations and the social development family. the great divide goes between various systems of knowledge internal to the bank. one the one hand there is the knowledge reflected in the social development family, which could be classified as complex, qualitative, local and contextual, fragmented, irrational, and empirical. on the other hand is the knowledge that spans around the poverty reduction and economic management (prem) network. this is probably the most influential sector of the bank and close to all prem-staff are economists. this sector’s knowledge could be characterised as legible, rational, straight lines, quantitative, causal and theoretical. whereas the former system of knowledge is dedicated to long-term thinking, the latter predicts short-term thinking and results. this finding is also reflected in david mosse’s work, who also, as an anthropologist, conducted fieldwork within the bank: “the bank is an organisation dominated by economists and economist paradigms. the framing goals, the definition and the measurement of development success all derive from economic frameworks, and the discipline is privileged in the bank’s career structure and in its streams of promotion” (mosse 2004: 2). consilience lie: trusteeship and discursive power legible planning despite just about all bank-staff emphasis the importance of the social aspects of development knowledge, people engaged in this sector express difficulties of achieving any substantial influence whereas those working in prem acknowledge that the bank is “mainly concerned with growth and economic management” – as an economist at the bank’s uganda country office expressed it. the problem of making social development aspects relevant to the bank’s planning, policies and operations is precisely due to the means and methods applied in planning: there is a great need for straight lines, legible knowledge and causality. it would be difficult for the executive directors at the bank to plan and make decisions on a knowledge that is not portrayed as universal and causal, and that lacks two straight lines under the stipulated objectives in the end of a project document. development planning is essentially about producing causality between input and expected output, and intervention becomes a question of straight lines and transparency, hence what is local and complex are simplified and standardised. “planning relies on simplifications and the production of legible units. the larger and more ambitious the plan is, the more reductionistic and simplistic planning becomes, and the more of the ethnographic particularism it tries to grasp is missed in its representations” (lie 2004: 140–141). it would not be possible for world bank staff to deliver a project proposal to its board of directors that states that the world is complex which needs to be taken into account when planning without giving any guarantees of shortterm success. as scott (1998) shows, planning and intervention always tend to neglect the social and complex local knowledge, or metis which is the practical knowledge only acquirable through lived life, and experience and impossible to codify. the bank’s need to establish causality between intentions, plans, input and expected output minimises the influence of the social development knowledge because a particular knowledge’s complexity is reduced in symmetrical relation to the higher up in the bank hierarchy knowledge is disseminated and circulated. the closer knowledge moves from researchers to decision-makers, the more the economic rationality seem to prevail over more complex and illegible knowledge. this is not to say that some kind of anthropological knowledge – or other kinds of knowledge deriving from the social sciences – is ‘better’ in terms of policymaking and development on a normative standard. the above argument is merely to illustrate how planning works, why it is plausible to argue on the bank’s knowledge-heterogeneity and as a battlefield of knowledge on the inside. externally, the bank consilience 94 appears homogenous, which is a direct result on the means, methods and knowledge applied in planning. the result is that one observes a highly monolithic and standardised development apparatus being quite reluctant to change. as green argues, with reference to arce (2000) and ferguson (1994): “…while the standardization of development globally is partly a function of the standardization of development problems and solutions, …it is also a consequence of the kinds of practices used to plan and implement development as a process of transforming policy visions into manageable realities through the social constitution of ‘projects’ subject to specific techniques of audit, organization and control” (2003: 123–4). turning development cooperation upside-down? despite good intentions of letting the recipient participate more in the process of devising development plans concerning themselves, this never really materialised. cdf and the introduction of prsps as the guiding policy instrument did not enhance recipient actors’ ownership and participation over the process – at least not regarding the final outcome. recipients were to devise their own prsp documents and the knowledge bank was intentionally only supposed to help facilitate the process. as argued above, knowledge is never an unbiased objective entity – it is always positioned and shaped by its purpose. staff in the operational units of the bank argued that it would be better if the bank still had been in full control over the process of devising poverty reduction plans as it would be much more effective and time-saving, “after all, we are to approve the documents, and surely we won’t approve anything that deviates from our interests”, as a bank-staff put it. several at the bank argued that it would be better if the bank made the plans itself, as it is “too much dialogue and negotiations” in letting the recipient produce the papers. on the uganda-side, a senior official at the ministry of finance, planning and economic development stated: “surely there’s an imbalance in our relationship with the bank. we are acutely aware that we need to produce what the bank likes and what we think the bank will approve. … basically, it is because we need the money”. despite recipients and lending government are to produce the mandatory papers to release world bank funding, this has not altered the relationship in any substantial way. the bank still defines, though more indirectly, the desired knowledge and policies. concluding remarks formally, the changes in the international development apparatus deriving from the world bank had the intention of consilience lie: trusteeship and discursive power altering the paternalistic legacy of previous means and methods of doing development by turning it upside down. the intention was to ‘put the recipient agency in the driver’s seat’. the shift from the top-down approach of structural adjustment lending to a seemingly more bottom-up and inclusive process of the comprehensive development framework (cdf), with its poverty reduction strategy papers (prsp) as the guiding documents, has not managed to alter development practice in any significant way. the world bank is still the leading, gatekeeping agency for both development policy and procedures, despite its self-imposed reorganisation giving aid recipients the freedom and responsibility to devise their own policy. the recipient’s freedom is, however, truncated by mechanisms implied by the reorganisation itself. first, the aid recipient knows it has to align with the bank’s knowledge regime when devising its own policy in order to have it accepted. second, and related, the bank seeks to make its own policies those of the recipient as a way to limit knowledge discrepancies between the bank and its counterpart. this illustrates a new power formation at play, organising and reproducing development practice. the seemingly consignment of power has only had the effect of making the recipient responsible for the bank’s policies. current development practice still reflect the patrimonial legacy of the modernisation theory, but now in a more subtle manner: it is no longer stated explicitly that the donor knows what is best or not – recipients are those who are supposed to do and plan development initiatives. as these initiatives need bank-approval, the bank and its knowledge system still prevail in international development discourse reproducing the effects deriving from truman’s 1949 speech, i.e. the schism between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and between expert and local knowledge, as well as the faith in an active, intentional interference in society to guide and improve what is seen as unilinear and immanent processes. the world bank plays a key gatekeeping role in international and institutional development. through its central node in washington dc, and supported by various detached nodes, i.e. country offices, around the world in addition to the fact that just about all development agencies worldwide relate to the bank’s paradigmatic input to the global development discourse, the bank as an actor and development as a discourse represent “…as a bureaucratic force with global reach and an explicitly pro-capitalist agenda, operating as a tool of regimes that seek to perpetuate relations of inequality and dependence between the west and the rest and, through their representation, to perpetuate the construction of others as post-colonial subjects” (green, 2003: 124, emphasis added). it seems difficult to escape business as usual – culture eats strategy for breakfast. development is highly embedded in consilience 96 its own discourse and development practice only seems to reproduce the very same discourse despite intentions on the donor-side of altering systemic aspect of development cooperation. that development practice seems to reproduce itself is thus due to both the discursive power of development and the technocratic operations of bureaucracies. both are contingent on the combination of a particular set of knowledge, that together contribute in maintaining a form of asymmetrical trusteeship that the development apparatus formally seeks to escape. consilience lie: trusteeship and discursive power references de carvalho, benjamin and jon harald sande lie (2011). "chronicle of a frustration foretold? the implementation of a broad protection agenda in the united nations." journal of international peacekeeping 15: 341-362. chambers, robert. 1995. paradigm shifts and the practice of participatory research and development. in power and participatory development, eds. nici nelson and susan wright, 30–42. london: intermediate technology publications. cowen, michael p., and shenton, robert w. 1996. doctrines of develpoment. london: routledge. dumont, rene. 1962. l’afrique noire est mal parti. editions du seuil, paris. escobar, arturo. 1991. anthropology and the development encounter: the making and marketing of development anthropology. american ethnologist: a journal of the american anthropological association 4:658–682. escobar, arturo. 1995. encountering development: the making and unmaking of the third world. princeton: princeton university press. esteva, gustavo. 1992. development. in the development dictionary. a guide to knowledge as power, ed. wolfgang sachs, 6–25. london and new jersey: zed books ltd. fabien, johannes. 1983. time and the other. how anthropology makes its objects. new york: columbia university press. ferguson, james. 1994. the anti-politics machine: "development", depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in lesotho. minnesota: univeristy of minnesota press. frank, andrè g. 1967. capitalism and underdevelopment in latin america. new york: monthly review press. gardner, katy, and lewis, david. 1996. anthropology, development and the crisis of modernity. in anthropology, development and the post-modern challenge, eds. katy gardner and david lewis, 1–25: pluto press. hobart, mark. 1993. introduction: the growth of ignorance? in an anthropological critique of development: the growth of ignorance, ed. mark hobart, 1–30. london: routledge. consilience 98 king, kenneth & simon mcgrath 2004. knowledge for development? comparing british, japanese, swedish and world bank aid. london: zed lie, jon harald sande lie (2004). ‘discursive development order and local informal practices: a development project in northern ethiopia.’, cand. polit. thesis, university of oslo. lie, jon harald sande. 2007. post-development and the discourseagency interface. exploring post-development: theory and practice, problems and perspectives. a. ziai. london, routledge: 47-62. lie, jon harald sande. 2008. post-development theory and the discourse-agency conundrum. social analysis 52(3): 118-137. lie, jon harald sande (2012). "the knowledge battlefield of protection." african security 5(3-4): 142-159. lie, jon harald sande (2015a). "developmentality: indirect governance in the world bank-uganda partnership." third world quarterly 36(4): 723-740. lie, jon harald sande (2015b). developmentality. an ethnography of the world bank–uganda partnership. new york: berghahn books. lie, jon harald sande and benjamin de carvalho (2010). "between culture and concept: the protection of civilians in sudan." journal of international peacekeeping 14(1-2): 60-85. long, n. and a. long, eds. (1992). battlefields of knowledge: the interlocking of theory and practice in social research and development. london, routledge. mosse, david. 2004. ‘social analysis as product development: anthropologists at work in the world bank’. in giri, van harskamp and salemik (eds) the religion of development – the development of religion. delft: eburon. nustad, knut g. 2004. the development discourse in the multilateral system. in global institutions and development. framing the world?, eds. morten bøås and desmond mcneill, 13-23. london & new york: routledge. consilience lie: trusteeship and discursive power närman, anders. 1999. ‘getting towards the beginning of the end for traditional development aid. major trends in development thinking and its practical application over the last fifty years’. in simon, david and anders närman (eds) development as theory and practice. longmann; essex, uk. orlandini, barbara. 2003. consuming 'good governance' in thailand. the european journal of development research 15:16-43. pieterse, jan nederveen. 2000. after post-development. third world quarterly 21:175–191. pincus, jonathan r and jeffrey a winters. 2002. ‘reinventing the world bank’ in pincus and winters (eds) reinventing the world bank. cornell university press; cornell. porter, douglas j. 1995. scenes from childhood: the homesickness of development discourses. in power of development, ed. jonathan crush. london: routledge. preston, p.w. 1996 development theory – an introduction. blackwell, oxford randel, judith, german, tone, and ewing, deborah. 2002. the reality of aid, 2002. an independent review of poverty reduction and international development assistance. manila, the philippines: ibon books, ibon foundation, inc. rostow, walt. 1960. the stages of economic growth: a non-communist manifesto. cambridge: cambridge university press. sachs, wolfgang ed. 1992b. the development dictionary. a guide to knowledge as power. london and new jersey: zed books ltd. scott, james c. 1998. seeing like a state. how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed. new haven and london: yale university press. stokke, olav. 1995a. introduction. in aid and political conditionality, ed. stokke, olav. london. frank cass stokke, olav. 1995b. aid and political conditionality: core issues and state of the art. in aid consilience 100 and political conditionality, ed. stokke, olav, london, frank cass. wallerstein, immanuel. 1974. the modern world-system. new york: academic press. weaver, c. (2008). hypocrisy trap. the world bank and the poverty of reform. princeton, nj, princeton university press. weaver, c. and r. j. leiteritz (2005). ""our poverty is a world full of dreams:" reforming the world bank." global governance 11: 369-388. microsoft word young final.docx   consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 197–215 rio conventions redux: an argument for merging the trio into a single convention on environmental management walker young environment, development, and sustainability chulalongkorn university bangkok, thailand* abstract it has been argued that the separation of environmental management into three different subject areas climate change, biological diversity and desertification with different implementing bodies is not an ideal approach to the rio conventions. specifically, the united nations (un) would achieve better results if the three rio conventions were consolidated into one convention on environmental management (cem). this would allow the streamlining of un organizations into a stronger, consolidated body. such a unified structure would be more effective in addressing the convention goals, due to its enhanced integration and coordinated assessment and implementation. by consolidating secretariats and moving operations to a single location, the cem would benefit from enhanced knowledge management and greater efficiency of operations. further, a systems theory view of environmental management supports an integrated approach that maximizes sustainability by addressing interdependent ecosystem functions in a holistic matter. author’s note having spent a number of years working with a fortune 500 multinational enterprise in the united states and throughout southeast asia, i decided to switch career paths and embrace my passion sustainable development and all that it entails. i am highly interested in bringing greater corporate social responsibility to the private sector. in particular, i want to create awareness in the sector of the sustainable use of environmental resources and the value of natural capital. in 2009, i had the opportunity to work on a undp-sponsored national capacity self assessment (ncsa) report, which assessed thailand‘s progress in implementing the convention on biological diversity (cbd) and identified areas where additional capacity development was needed. from my extensive research of the cbd and the joint liaison group (jlg), i realized how much overlap existed between the cbd and the other rio conventions, namely the united nations framework convention on climate change (unfccc), and the united nations convention on combating desertification (unccd). this opinion piece was written with the intention of creating new debate and dialogue about reform within the existing structure of global environmental governance. regardless of whether readers agree or disagree with the arguments put forth, discussing the strengths and weaknesses of existing multilateral environmental * email: wsy9@caa.columbia.edu consilience author et al.: abbreviated title     agreements (meas) like the rio conventions may lead to new ideas for reform. my master‘s thesis continues this line of research by assessing the relationship of the private sector to the national implementation of the cbd in thailand. keywords: rio conventions; biological diversity; desertification; climate change; global environmental governance; efficiency 1. introduction the 1992 united nations conference on environment and development (unced), also known as the earth summit, was held in rio de janeiro, brazil, and was a milestone event for the cause of sustainable development. the brundtland report, our common future, had first laid out the now widely accepted definition of sustainable development1 in 1987 at the meeting of the world commission on environment and development (wced). the earth summit moved theory towards action with the implementation of agenda 21. this was a program which would further the goal of sustainable development in an effort to lessen human impact on the natural environment, while simultaneously addressing social issues such as poverty, health and consumption. this international development agenda – particularly the environmental aspect – was further benefitted by the initiation of the rio conventions, which included the united nations framework convention on climate change (unfccc), the united nations convention to combat desertification (unccd), and the convention on biological diversity (cbd2. the rio conventions took the concepts of biological diversity, desertification and atmospheric protection initially described in agenda 21 and expounded upon them in a much more profound and extensive manner. a detailed description of the structural framework of the rio conventions is found in the appendix below. over the past seventeen years of operating within the frameworks of the rio conventions, implementation progress within countries has varied. indeed, some experts like mohammed el-ashry, senior fellow with the un foundation and facilitator of the global leadership for climate action (glca), feel that the majority of countries have not made major progress in the areas of environmental management including climate change, biodiversity and land degradation. el-ashry, former chairman and ceo of the global environment facility (gef), grimly sums up the lack of progress by noting that �greenhouse gases are steadily increasing; ecosystems that are critical for human survival continue to be undermined; and land degradation threatens food security and livelihoods, especially in africa�.3 in november 2006, the un secretary-general convened a special task force known as the �high-level panel on system-wide coherence� to explore ways in which the un could better manage the complicated areas of environment, development and humanitarian aid.4 in its findings, the panel concluded that �substantial gains in efficiency and effective responses can be 199 consilience     made through enhanced coordination and improved normative and operational capacity.�5 this critique was not only leveled at the un agencies, but also at the secretariats and affiliated bodies which manage environmental agreements such as the rio conventions. indeed, the panel pointed out that �synergy needs to be pursued between the united nations organizations that address environment, and multilateral environmental agreements [meas] should continue to pursue efficiencies and coordination among themselves.�6 the meas have heeded this call for continued improvement by taking measures to increase partnerships and identify synergies. some meas, such as the basel convention alongside the stockholm and rotterdam conventions, have pursued functional clustering of convention activities in areas which overlap in subject matter and scope. in the case of the rio conventions, the joint liaison group (jlg) comprises members of all three conventions and was created �for exchanging information, exploring opportunities for synergistic activities and increasing coordination.�7 each convention calls on the jlg to be the solution, notably in unccd decision 12 at the sixth meeting of the conference of the parties (cop); cbd decision vi/20; and unfccc decision 13/cp.8 however, even with such support, the jlg has not been successful at generating meaningful improvements in the conventions‘ implementation, quite possibly because of the inherent reductionism that led to the creation of the unfccc, the cbd and the unccd in the first place. it is possible that the parties at the earth summit, in all their wisdom and good intent, made the roles of the rio conventions more complicated than necessary by isolating their foci away from the larger picture of ecosystem homeostasis and sustainable development. are the rio conventions actually a lesson in why reductionist thinking is not the answer to holistic and integrated problems? there are ample reasons to believe this is the case. reductionism is defined by professor yaneer bar-yam of the new england complex systems institute as �an approach to building descriptions of systems out of the descriptions of the subsystems that a system is composed of, and ignoring the relationships between them.�9 by seeking to address global environmental issues through the subsystems of biological diversity, desertification, and climate change, the rio conventions take a complex system – earth, its species, and the myriad processes which integrate them – and reduce the system to parts which are unrepresentative of the unified whole. hence, reliance on the jlg may not be the most effective approach to bring collaborative action and synergy to the three conventions. in order to maximize operational efficiencies and address the complex nature of environmental management in a sustainable and holistic manner, the secretariats of the rio conventions, alongside the member parties, should consider merging the three into one, thereby creating a single convention to address the collective mission. while the jlg ostensibly attempts to serve this role by weighing in on all three of the conventions, the group is marginalized by its lack of authority and power within the operational structure of the rio consilience author et al.: abbreviated title     conventions. the jlg is simply another subsidiary body which meets independently of the three conventions and issues recommendations. the unccd, unfccc and cbd may take the recommendations under consideration, but there is no legal precedent which mandates that they must adopt the jlg positions. thus, the rio conventions are still operating independently of each other. in so doing, they are making their objectives more difficult to address because there are reasons to believe that, by working together directly, they could achieve more. in order to improve the ability of member parties to deliver the goals set forth in the rio conventions, the author proposes a merger of the cbd, unfccc, and unccd into a new convention – the convention for environmental management (cem). the merger concept is further supported by knowledge management and efficiency arguments. 2. merging the rio conventions while the rio conventions appear on the surface to address the different issues of climate change, biological diversity and land desertification, they are actually all aimed at promoting sustainable development. this idea of sustainability is best imagined as what development �should be�10, something that avoids �compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs�11, in contrast to what it �should not be.�12 such an approach to development acknowledges that societal actions and choices have meaningful and profound impacts on natural resource availability and land productivity, which potentially affect the ability of societies to survive over the longer term (i.e., by threatening food security). the objectives and norms of each rio convention are based on this approach (see table 1), which may set a framework for where the three conventions overlap. for example, the unccd believes that land conservation and sustainable management of land and water resources are integral to combating desertification, because the roots of healthy flora help to stabilize the ground and prevent nutrient rich soil from becoming dry dust. but the conservation of land in its natural state is also a goal of the cbd when it calls for conservation of biological diversity because productive soil allows plant life to flourish, thereby providing a healthy ecosystem for a variety of species. these goals of the unccd and cbd are both addressed by proper land management in order to avoid desertification of soil and loss of species. on a broader level, the sustainable use of resources as mentioned by the cbd is in line with unccd‘s call for sustainable management of water and land resources as well as unfccc‘s normative qualifier that food production should not be threatened by development. hence, the objectives of the rio conventions are ingrained in the sustainable development approach and their outcomes rely heavily upon the societal actions taken in the course of economic development. 201 consilience           convention cited reference main objectives (�) and norms (à ) unccd final text of the convention, article 2 • combat desertification • mitigate the effects of drought in countries experiencing drought è achieved through land rehabilitation, conservation and sustainable management of land and water resources unfccc final text of the convention, article 2 • achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system è should be achieved in such a timeframe to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner cbd final text of the convention, article 1 • conserve biological diversity • use its components sustainably • share the benefits arising out of the utilization genetic resources fairly and equitably è achieved through appropriate access to genetic resources, appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, and appropriate funding table 1: objectives and norms of the rio conventions even where not explicitly tying the objectives of the conventions together, there are actions which cut across the rio conventions that would fundamentally assist the secretariats and implementing bodies of all three meas in achieving their mandates. one such complementary area is addressing poverty reduction. an assessment of poverty and desertification conducted by the organisation for economic co-operation and development (oecd) is of particular relevance to the unccd‘s objective: desertification and poverty create a vicious cycle where deteriorating natural resources contribute to declining livelihoods, as people are forced to encroach further on fragile soils, sparse vegetation and limited water resources to meet basic needs.13 consilience author et al.: abbreviated title     of concern to the unfccc, poverty is implicit in the vulnerability of communities to climate variability, as it directly lessens resilience. the national biodiversity strategies and action plans (nbsaps) of the cbd explicitly ask for promotion of �synergies between activities to implement the convention and poverty eradication.�14 the cbd‘s 2010 biodiversity target program seeks a notable reduction in biodiversity loss, in part to alleviate poverty.15 by taking steps to reduce poverty, the missions of all three of the rio conventions stand to benefit. the oecd identifies this relationship between the rio conventions and poverty reduction and describes a number of development strategies, such as sustainable forest management and agricultural reforms, which would address poverty while also focusing on climate change, biological diversity, and desertification.16 given this undercurrent of sustainable development, all three rio conventions should be considered tools for enhancing sustainable environmental management. one of the keys for effective management in any large context is having disparate functions work together as a team and not alone as individuals. with this in mind, there are a number of arguments to be made for merging the rio conventions into one master convention on environmental management (cem). the cem would address all areas that the cbd, unccd, and unfccc currently address, but it would do so with enhanced coherence, more efficient utilization of financial and staff resources, and with fewer meetings of the parties. to understand how the cem would effectively replace the cbd, unfccc and unccd, two arguments for merging and consolidating must be explored. the first argument in favor of consolidation is based on holistic knowledge management. the second argument is a classic example from the business management theory behind corporate mergers. 2.1 the knowledge management argument to date, international environmental policy-making has generally been segregated on the basis of topic, sector, or territory. the result is the negotiation of treaties that often overlap and conflict with one another. this engenders unnecessary complications at the national level as signatories struggle to meet their reporting obligations under multiple agreements.17 the establishment of three rio conventions, by delineating ecosystem issues into three separate strands (climate change, biological diversity, and desertification), mirrors the type of reductionism that was seen in the academic world with the isolation of the chemical and physical sciences into chemistry, geology, and other fields. fritjof kapra identifies the birth of this reductionist thinking in �cartesian mechanism� where �the notion of an organic, living, and spiritual universe was replaced by that of the world as a machine, and the world-machine became the dominant metaphor of the modern era.�18 kapra argues that this analytic approach is doomed from 203 consilience     solving the great mysteries of life because life has intertwined and interdependent processes which are lost when viewed from the molecular level. from kapra‘s viewpoint, knowledge of living systems, such as the earth, is best kept integrated at the holistic level so that vital complex systems are not deconstructed in the process of deeper analysis. the environment is a highly complex, self-organized living system and must be studied in a systemic manner. kanie19 confirms that �the climate, forests, oceans, wetlands, and diverse bio-systems are naturally co-dependent within the global ecosystem� yet laments that �the multilateral approach to these issues still remains fragmented, however, in terms of methods and mechanisms of scientific assessment and the development of consensual knowledge.� kanie‘s critique holds ground against the rio conventions because the cbd, unccd and unfccc each have their own scientific subsidiary body which operates independently of the other. there is no reason why these separate scientific bodies cannot be integrated into one scientific arm that studies environmental issues including climate change, biodiversity and desertification. indeed the conventions are doomed to fall short of their lofty goals. for example, by spending years of unwavering focus on biodiversity without considering climate change as a relevant factor, the parties to the cbd were at a disadvantage in achieving their conservation mandate. in tandem, the unfccc was also affected by not realizing the carbon offsetting benefits of biological systems such as forests. the secretariat to the cbd acknowledges this �oversight� on the cbd website, obliging that �it is now widely recognized that climate change and biodiversity are interconnected. . . . consequently, conserving and sustainably managing biodiversity is critical to addressing climate change.�20 however, it remains that the parties to the conventions have implicitly acknowledged this interconnectedness by creating the joint liaison group (jlg).21 the jlg is now a fundamental resource to be consulted when determining implementation of action items for any of the rio conventions. for the parties to the rio conventions, the formation of the jlg was a good step towards a systems approach, but it does not go far enough. the jlg should take on the job of a management consultant and determine how best to merge the cbd, the unfccc and the unccd into one convention. within one convention, the environment could be managed as the whole entity that it is and not as three separate parts of an entity. going back to the examples of scientific reductionism in fields such as molecular biology and physics, the opposite can be observed in the science of life: ecology, which is inherently holistic. kapra speaks at depth as to how the principles of ecology are the basis for ecosystem resilience, something of utmost concern to the unfccc in terms of climate change, the unccd regarding soil versatility, and the cbd with regard to maintaining biological diversity: the principles of ecology mentioned so far – interdependence, the cyclical flow of resources, cooperation, consilience author et al.: abbreviated title     and partnership – are all different aspects of the same pattern of organization. this is how ecosystems organize themselves to maximize sustainability.22 if the parties at the earth summit had established the rio conventions along the lines of ecological frameworks – under the same pattern of organization – instead of reductionist frameworks according to perceived threats (i.e., climate change, desertification, loss of biological diversity), there would be much more progress achieved relative to the initial objectives. such gains in progress would be most visible in the area of cross cutting issues such as forest management. healthy forests are incubators for biodiversity (beneficial to the cbd‘s objective). they absorb carbon dioxide gas, thus offsetting greenhouse gas emissions (beneficial to the unfccc‘s objective) and they aerate and provide substantial nutrients to the soil through decaying organic matter and extensive root networks (beneficial to the unccd‘s objective). the concept of clustering further validates the argument for consolidating the cbd, unccd and unfccc into a broader convention on environmental management. indeed, a group of ministers discussing international environmental governance noted in a 2001 meeting report23 that �the possibility of clustering certain multilateral environmental agreements (meas) to enhance coherence and effectiveness in their implementation has been discussed at each meeting of the open-ended intergovernmental group on international environmental governance since the group was established�. in the case of this unep report, the meas under consideration were the rotterdam convention, the stockholm convention and the basel convention. to some degree, all three of these conventions deal with chemicals and waste. the reason that the intergovernmental group of ministers (igm) were even considering the functional clustering of legally sovereign agreements was due to paragraph 3 of decision sc-1/18 of the stockholm convention, which holds that this collaborative grouping might �ensure maximum coherence, efficiency and effectiveness in the field of chemicals and wastes.�24 one could envision similar results if the rio conventions were �clustered� to address the field of integrated environmental management. the parties would benefit from the streamlined administrative powers of a single entity while still enjoying the flexibility to study and undertake projects of differing types. for example, the cem would allow for enhanced sharing of experiences across the unfccc, the unccd and the cbd through joint meetings and shared databases and websites. the jlg already calls for these sorts of improvements to be applied to the existing rio framework; however, the difference is that cem would fall under one secretariat and one administrative body, thus consolidating functions that previously fell across three secretariats and various administrative bodies. this means there would less of a need for the distribution of summary reports to 205 consilience     other meas because the parties would naturally be privy to the information since it falls under the cem. further, the cem structure would still allow for isolated study that may not overlap with other subjects. for example, the cbd is involved in the study of genetic resources. on the surface, there is no reason to combine the subject of genetic resources with areas such as climate change or desertification. therefore, genetic resources could occupy a special working group under the newly formed cem. all of the experts who currently work in the field of genetic resources could still collaborate in this area under the special working group with no loss of productivity. the combination of the rio conventions into one central convention need not limit the power or scope of the initial conventions to accomplish their objectives related to climate change, biological diversity or land desertification. quite the opposite scenario is envisioned where each area is actually enhanced due to better access to resources and knowledge, which were not easily accessible previously. 2.2 the efficiency argument developing countries are unable to cope with the extensive reporting and participation requirements of the current multilateral environmental structure, which has depleted expertise and resources for implementation. a survey by the panel revealed that the three rio conventions (biodiversity, climate and desertification) have up to 230 meetings days annually.25 leaving aside the argument of knowledge management, there is still ample reason to consider merging the rio conventions in order to better align their implementing bodies and secretariats towards accomplishing their respective mandates by using fewer financial resources and reducing overlap. dan h. mccormick26 finds that an effective merger should provide �greater organizational efficiency through combining positions, reducing administrative costs, and streamlining standardized operations.� there are a number of examples where the merging of the rio conventions would lead to these results. looking again at clustering, the igm identify a number of possible benefits from functional clustering of meas including possible cost-savings, shared secretariat services via common structures, �enhanced coherence and coordination on cross-cutting issues,�27 and the possibility of attracting additional resources due to enhanced mobilization efforts. each of these benefits may be achievable in the case of merging the rio conventions into one convention on environmental management (cem). the potential cost-savings also correlate to saving time. el-ashry references a survey which found that the rio conventions meet on 230 days consilience author et al.: abbreviated title     out of the year. in addition to the high frequency of meetings, each rio convention typically meets in different cities, which complicates things further. for example, in the month of july 2009, the unccd secretariat held meetings in rome, bangkok and tunis in preparation for the ninth session of the conference of parties (cop).28 during that same month, the cbd secretariat held meetings in montreal, canada, and reading, u.k., and the unfccc held a meeting in st. george‘s, grenada.2930 this flurry of meeting activity places heavy burdens on smaller countries which lack the domestic staff and the budgetary resources to attend all of these events. other conventions have realized the folly in such disparate meeting schedules. for instance, the recommendations from the basel convention for functional clustering of chemicals and wastes found that back-to-back meetings would lead to �reduced conference servicing costs . . . savings on travel costs of interpreters� and �possible reduction in participation costs.�31 if the rio conventions were merged into a cem which utilized one secretariat, all meetings would be coordinated through one central office. this would allow for better planning so that meetings dealing with climate change, biodiversity or land desertification would either take place back-to-back in the same city (thereby reducing travel expenses and personnel needed for coverage) or consolidate meetings into one event. another benefit of a merger of the rio conventions would be the possibility of combining the secretariats and administrative functions of all three meas. although the unccd, unfccc and cbd are independent legal documents, their organizational structures are quite similar.32 each of the three conventions have their own executive secretary, deputy executive secretary, legal affairs department; sustainability department, science and technology departments, information services department, financial and human resources departments, and a conference planning department. that is, to some degree, a triple redundancy in that each convention undertakes separate conference planning, separate human resources management, separate legal affairs and so on. to merge the conventions into a cem wherein these overlaps would be consolidated would serve to minimize the redundancy. for example, one legal affairs department could cover the entire thematic area of environmental management and employ specialized lawyers (i.e., the current lawyers employed by the cbd, unccd and unfccc) to treat the specific legal issues around biodiversity, climate change and desertification. by serving in the same corporate office, these lawyers may in fact benefit from the proximity they would share, as this added collaboration may very well improve their performance. indeed, the concept of shared secretariat services has great appeal to many meas with similar concepts.33 at the 2005 world summit outcome, member states strongly supported enhanced coherence among meas and memorialized the fact in general assembly resolution 60/1: recognizing the need for more efficient environmental activities in the united nations system, with enhanced coordination, improved policy advice and guidance, 207 consilience     strengthened scientific knowledge, assessment and cooperation, better treaty compliance, while respecting the legal autonomy of the treaties, and better integration of environmental activities in the broader sustainable development framework at the operational level, including through capacity building, we agree to explore the possibility of a more coherent institutional framework to address this need, including a more integrated structure, building on existing institutions and internationally agreed instruments, as well as the treaty bodies and the specialized agencies.34 merging the secretariat services into one secretariat covering all aspects of environmental management for the rio conventions would certainly fulfill the needs of the member states by �building on existing institutions� as well as providing �a more integrated structure.� this would increase coordination among the rio sub-topics and thereby enhance the implementation of programming and activities.35 such a consolidation may even increase the effectiveness of overall operations for all departments (e.g., human resources, legal affairs, etc.). the necessary step for consolidating the organizational structure of the conventions would be moving all secretariat headquarters to the same city. this means those personnel from the cbd who would like to continue their work within the context of the newly formed cem would need to move from montreal, canada (the current cbd headquarters) to bonn, germany. bonn is the natural selection for the secretariat headquarters for the cem because the unfccc and unccd secretariats are currently located there. while the upfront cost may be substantial for such a move, the strategy would pay back dividends in the long term due to the added value of having all rio conventions in the same office complex, thereby eliminating future travel for secretariats to collaborate. there would likely also be cost savings in human resources, since with a consolidated administrative body, the new secretariat would potentially be able to lay off redundant staff and thus save on labor costs. one additional benefit of merging the rio conventions would be the stronger cem which would come out of the move. combining the separate scientific, political and civil networks which have been established via the rio conventions into one larger entity would endow the cem with a lot of powerful resources. the consolidated mea would be further strengthened as reporting requirements would become easier for member states to implement. rather than worrying about the reporting requirements of three rio conventions, the parties to the cem would have all requirements and obligations laid out in one single mea. consilience author et al.: abbreviated title       cem  secretariat                 legal  affairs   (cbd,  unccd,   unfccc)     administrative   affairs  (cbd,   unccd,  unfccc)     conference   planning  (cbd,   unccd,  unfccc)   figure 1: an example of the consolidated organizational structure of the cem, serving all rio conventions by capitalizing on the inherent interconnectedness of ecosystems, the merged cem would produce efficiencies which the rio conventions lack in their current standalone sovereignty. both operationally and administratively, the secretariats could expect greater utility and value by combining their efforts and resources into a single convention. 3. criticisms of the merger the idea of merging the rio conventions into one mea is subject to criticism in a number of areas. a potential barrier to merging which needs to be considered is the legal autonomy of each rio convention. the cbd, unccd and unfccc were each signed and ratified into law by member states on a separate basis. maria ivanova aptly summarizes the difficulty posed by this autonomy: while the institutional architecture for environmental governance in the early 1970s was obviously ill-suited for the scale and scope of the problems, a serious effort to reallocate environmental responsibilities among agencies or broader structural reform was deemed impossible given the legal autonomy of the agencies.36 the legal argument is a large barrier. the rio conventions, under advisory of the jlg, could not even agree upon joint reporting requirements due to the fact that each rio convention was legally signed and ratified under different particulars. for example, thailand ratified the cbd only in 2004 but ratified the unccd in 1991 and the unfccc in 1994.37 thus, thailand‘s obligations under each agreement only extend as far back as to the date ratified. if the rio conventions are merged into one mea, where does that leave thailand – or any country, for that matter – in terms of reporting requirements and historical acceptance of climate change, land desertification and biological diversity? this argument can be allayed by embracing pragmatic realism, in other words by acknowledging that what matters now is present and future efforts to address environmental issues, not the past. if the member states that have 209 consilience     ratified all three rio conventions were to agree to accept the most recent date (i.e., 2004 in the case of thailand‘s ratification of the cbd) as the ratification date of the cem, that agreement would provide a fair and concise way to unify the conventions. an even greater challenge to a potential merger is posed by member states that have not agreed to be party to all three rio conventions. given that a number of countries (i.e., the united states) have only signed and ratified one or two of the rio conventions but not all three, there would most definitely be disagreement about merging the meas into one entity. this consideration may be too large to surmount. legal considerations are the underpinning of national and international governance. each rio convention was signed into law with the explicit acknowledgement that the document was sovereign and not subject to alteration or modification. in order to merge the meas into a single format, the judicial courts might require that every single party to the conventions (e.g., each country which has signed and ratified any of the rio conventions) give consent to consolidate. getting 100 per cent consensus to consolidate is highly unlikely and bordering on the impossible given that some member states still refuse to become a party to certain rio conventions. even if member parties refuse to consent to a full-fledged merger to create the cem, there are ways to address the legal concerns. dealing with the most difficult international regulatory disputes is exactly what the united nations is meant to do, so there is precedent for imagining that a concerted effort at dialogue could lead to creative approaches. one possibility to consider is a modular approach where member parties only take part in the cem meetings or sessions, which are directly relevant to the rio conventions that they previously ratified. like students at a university, the member parties to the cem would meet to discuss specific subjects on the global agenda, including climate change, biodiversity and desertification. parties which have ratified the cbd but not the unfccc or unccd could choose to attend only the meetings or sessions which most closely relate to biodiversity or cbd-specific topics. the cem secretariat would facilitate this process by publishing in advance a �subject scorecard,‘ which would give a percentage rating to the most relevant subjects of the session. if a meeting rated as 80% focused on climate change, those countries not involved in the unfccc could choose not to attend. this �modular scorecard� concept could be challenged on the grounds that cross-cutting decisions would undoubtedly arise (i.e., sustainable forest management), wherein the scorecard might read �80% biodiversity� but the outcome of such a meeting might have a sizeable impact on the climate change agenda. in this example, a country that has not ratified the cbd might take issue that the decision reached under that biodiversity module has undue effect on the country‘s standing and rights under the climate change module. so how could the modular scorecard approach resolve such issues? the key is a democratic separation of powers, better known as �checks and balances,� as consilience author et al.: abbreviated title     is seen in the united states government with the senate and the house of representatives. before a major bill can become a national law, the bill must be passed with enough supporting votes cast in the senate and separately in the house of representatives. having two separate constituencies vote on the bill helps ensure that the majority are indeed in approval of the content. if a meeting which is 75% biodiversity, 20% climate change and 5% desertification passes new measures, then the climate change camp (those parties which only ratified the unfccc) would need to vote on the measures and approve them at a certain threshold. the solution is not perfect and not every party will feel satisfied, but democratic decisions (and multilateral decisions for that matter) rarely satisfy everyone. 4. conclusion considering both the advantages of merging the rio meas into a convention on environmental management as well as the difficulties in doing so, this topic is clearly in need of further debate by a wide group of stakeholders at the local, national and international level. as shown above, various groups and panels within the un organization have called for reform within the area of international environmental governance. while not advocating a specific approach to increasing cooperation and coherence, these reformist groups offer a number of valuable suggestions including consolidation of meas or mea functions. their inputs offer a starting point for a more comprehensive effort to improve environmental management through improved implementation of meas. the merging of existing meas may be viewed as a radical notion by some and far-fetched by many others. however, the important concept to take under consideration is not the feasibility of merging the rio conventions but whether the idea of doing so has merit. if the ideaas novel and radical as it may be makes some sense in terms of what it would accomplish, then it should ultimately open up new areas for discussion, stimulating further reform in the process. an outcome of increased dialogue, engaged debate on multilateral reforms, and increased visibility for improving environmental management is likely to be welcomed by all concerned member parties. 211 consilience     jlg   appendix: convention and secretariat organizational structures 1.1 – an overview of the secretariats and conference of parties initially, each of the three rio conventions sought to address a different environmental area of concern and add new understanding in terms of the interactions between humans with nature. each convention was endowed with a separate reporting structure. under the umbrella of the united nations, each convention has a governing body representative of all participant countries which is known as the conference of the parties (cop).38 further, the cop then establishes a unique secretariat for each convention with the goal of servicing and preparing for cop meetings and other subsidiary body meetings. the resulting framework looks like something similar to the framework shown in figure 2 below. figure 2: chart depicting the separate reporting structure of the secretariats to each cop; members of each secretariat and certain subsidiary bodies comprise the jlg and collaborate and share ideas in the jlg meeting sessions under the cbd alone, subsidiary bodies include the cop, the scientific body on scientific, technical and technological advice (sbstta), the working group on the review of implementation (wgri), the working group on access and benefit sharing (abs), the working group on article 8(j) and the working group on protected areas.39 the unccd has its cop, its secretariat as well as a committee for the review of the implementation of the convention (cric) and a committee on science and technology (cst), not to mention its outreach program groups like the global mechanism (gm).40 the unfccc has its cop as well as subsidiaries like the subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice (sbsta) and the subsidiary body for implementation (sbi).41 thus, the sum of all the sub-bodies under the rio conventions is at least twelve and possibly more if counting project groups and task forces. cbd  cop   unfccc   cop   cop   cbd   secretariat   unfccc   secretariat   unccd   secretariat   jlg   consilience author et al.: abbreviated title     appendix 1.2 – unfccc organizational structure4243 appendix 1.3 – unccd organizational structure44 appendix 1.4 – cbd organizational structure45 213 consilience     bibliography bar-yam, yaneer. �concepts in complex systems: reductionism.� necsi.org. new england complex systems institute, 2000. web. 3 june 2010. <http://necsi.org/guide/concepts/reductionism.html>. brundtland, gro harlem (ed.). �our common future: report of the world commission on environment and development.� center for a world in balance, 2010. web. 8 june 2010. <http://worldinbalance.net/intagreements/1987-brundtland.php>. dernbach, john c., et al. �progress toward sustainability: a report card and a recommended agenda.� widener law school research studies paper no. 09-12. spec. issue of environmental law reporter 39 (2009): 10275 – 10284. web. 21 april 2009. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1389878>. el-ashry, mohamed. 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"clustering of chemicals/wastes multilateral environmental agreements." 16 november 2001. basel convention. 25 april 2009. <www.basel.int/meetings/igm/unep_igm_4_inf_1_eng%20clustering %20of%20chemicals.pdf>. unfccc. calendar. 10 june 2010. 10 june 2010. <http://unfccc.int/meetings/unfccc_calendar/items/2655.php?year= 2009>. united nations. agenda 21. 15 december 2004. 21 february 2009. <http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/index.htm> . —. convention bodies. 22 february 2009. <http://www.unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/c onvention_bodies/items/2629.php>. united nations development group. system-wide coherence. 21 april 2009. <http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?p=32>. microsoft word bargout.docx   1   consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 95 – 122 ecological agriculture and sustainable adaptation to climate change: a practical and holistic strategy for indian smallholders remy n. bargout college of social and applied human sciences & ontario agricultural college university of guelph, ontario rbargout@uoguelph.ca abstract the largest demographic in india suffering from the adverse impacts of global climate change are small farmers. india’s rural population is approximately 800 million, with the majority being households dependent on small-scale agriculture. for these smallholders, facing a common rural reality of disempowerment and limited disposable household capital, the agro-ecological results of climate volatility will have catastrophic costs. in a single growing season, even moderate climate abnormalities in temperature regime or moisture regime have shown to disrupt farm agro-ecology and diminish harvests over time. using a precautionary principle to identify sustainable adaptation solutions, ecological farming offers the most practical and holistic traits of resilience, particularly in the areas of soil, water, and biodiversity. when acknowledging ecological agriculture as an empowering adaptation strategy for smallholders, the evident sustainability of this approach is also apparent alongside key structural dynamics limiting its adoption. author’s note remy is a fifth-year undergraduate candidate in international development studies, specializing in rural agricultural development, and plant science. for their guidance and hospitality throughout the research process, acknowledgements and gratitude are kindly given to dr. e. ann clark (retd.), dr. j. christopher hall, dr. vandana shiva, and the team members at navdanya’s bija vidyapeeth trial farm. keywords: agriculture, sustainability, smallholders, climate change adaptation, india 1.0 agro-ecological impact of global climate change 1.1 overview of impacts the most adverse agro-ecological impacts of global climate change are in the thermal regime (temperature) and moisture regime. in regards to tropical and subtropical agriculture, increases in temperature and decreases in available moisture are the fundamental changes limiting plant production. crop ecologists commonly acknowledge, based on a study from the u.s. national academy of sciences, that, for every degree celsius above the normal temperature range, a 10 percent yield reduction will likely occur in maize (zea mays consilience bargout: ecological agriculture and sustainable adaptation    2   l.), rice (oryza sativa), and wheat (triticum spp.) cropping systems (brown, 2009). figure 1: mean annual temperature anomalies in india from 1901 to 2005. an increasing trend begins near 1981. x-axis is in years from 1901 to 2005 and y-axis is in degrees celsius from -0.8 to 0.8 (indian institute of tropical meteorology, 2010). for plant species that have determinant traits – oilseeds, pulses, and cereals – higher temperatures hasten development in the plant lifecycle. this is characterized by a shorter growing period, premature adulthood, and smaller harvests (pankaj and rakshit, 2008). for tropical climates, temperature increases cause soil organic matter (som) to decompose at higher rates and, if not managed accordingly, expedite the leaching of nutrients, resulting in acidic soil (pankaj and rakshit, 2008). som is an integral component of healthy soil and leaching is only one of many agro-ecological catastrophes that can occur from its loss. temperature imbalance is a catalyst for biophysical disruption, and has the ripple effect of creating other negative feedbacks. in all aspects of agro-ecology, the most devastating feedbacks are those caused by disruption in the hydrological system. temperatures have an impact on moisture regimes by increasing evaporation and creating a soil moisture deficit (parry and swaminathan, 1992). additionally, insufficient rainfall results in dry spells and drought periods, which put stress on plants and lower plant productivity, especially during key growth periods in the plant life cycle (gadgil, 1995). 1.2 temperature changes in india the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc) has warned that india will continue to experience more extreme temperature variation with increases in mean annual temperature. temperature increases range from 3 to 5 degrees celsius when using a severe climate scenario and from 2.5 to 4 degrees under more modest predictions (sathaye et al, 2006). 97 consilience     97   figure 2: based on mean monthly rainfall in 2009, 19 out of the india’s 35 states and union territories experienced water deficiencies, and 1 state experienced a water surplus (india meteorological department, 2010b). consilience bargout: ecological agriculture and sustainable adaptation    98   figure 3: based on mean monthly rainfall for the monsoon season in 2009, 22 out 35 states and union territories experienced water deficiency, and 3 states experienced water surpluses (india meteorological department, 2010a). there is already evidence of such temperature increases. half of the years from 1990 to 2010 have been characterized climatically as abnormally hot periods, and seven of these hot years have occurred in the last decade [figure 1] (indian 99 consilience     99   institute of tropical meteorology, 2010). another study showed that deviations from india’s mean annual temperature have been increasing, both in their incidence and intensity by a mean of 0.4 degrees celsius (kothyari and singh, 1996). 1.3 3 hydrological changes in india a publication by the indian institute of tropical meteorology and the ministry of earth sciences shows variation in the millimeters of mean annual rainfall, seasonal rainfall, and monthly rainfall from 1901 to 2006. the data determined that annual rainfall has a decreasing trend for 68.1% of the country’s major 15 climate regions and 49 minor sub-regions, an increasing trend for 22.4%, with 9.5% showing no trend (sontakke et al, 2008). in 2009, the indian meteorological department documented some of the most severe moisture deficits characteristic of this trend [figure 2 & 3] (india meteorological department, 2010a; 2010b). although the majority of farms will receive less total rainfall throughout the year, summer precipitation during the monsoon season is also expected to increase in intensity and incidence (gadgil, 1995). in other words, not only do farms receive less total rainfall, the rain that is received increasingly comes from bouts of torrential downpour. the forceful impact of intense precipitation can damage or wash away a future crop during the period of germination or the initial phases of adolescence. a surplus of wet periods will facilitate the spread of pests and diseases during crucial growth periods. increased incidents of pathogens also pose a threat to post-harvest storage, a household source of calories, and seeds for the next crop. regularly waterlogged soil can act as an anaerobic host to soil-born diseases. it will also create more opportunity for soil compaction, reduce soil aeration, and place excessive stress on the root system of dry land plants (gadgil, 1995). more importantly, stronger monsoons bring larger volumes of water, which increase flooding and soil erosion (pankaj and rakshit, 2008). soil erosion creates complications through the combined losses of macro-nutrients, micro-nutrients, essential colloidal particles, residue sources (i.e. dead foliage, manure), and their resulting soil aggregates (i.e. clay, humus). 1.4 impact of climate change on indian smallholders a ‘smallholder’ can be defined by commonly used parameters of 1) a consolidated or dispersed area equal to or less than two hectares (approximately five acres), and 2) rain-fed plant production (dependent on precipitation for irrigation). approximately 800 million people make up india’s rural population, the majority of whom are smallholder households that rely on small-scale agriculture for their livelihoods and, often, their very subsistence (sathaye et al, 2006). consilience bargout: ecological agriculture and sustainable adaptation    100   figure 4: the lower function represents india’s estimated decline in net income of us$ 82m per every degree celsius increase in temperature (mendelsohn and dinar, 1999). for this demographic of indians, the agro-ecological impacts of climate change will be, undoubtedly, catastrophic. arguably, it is rural groups that are the most marginalized in india. indian smallholders suffer from a rural-urban divide that runs deep throughout the country, relatively little financial support from their governments, scarce amounts of disposable household capital, and limited access to new capital. these are some of the factors that have contributed to smallholders’ low adaptive capacity to climate change (sathaye et al, 2006). a study by kumar and parikh (1998) forecasts that a small increase of 2 degrees celsius in mean annual temperatures would be enough to lower net farmer income by approximately 8 percent [figure 4] (mendelsohn and dinar, 1999). higher temperatures have direct detrimental impacts on small farm productivity. however, it is the indirect impacts, expressed through hydrological volatility, that are the biggest cost to small farmers. the combination of smallholders’ low adaptive capacity and their reliance on rain-fed agriculture will result in lower productivity if rainfall decreases. many smallholder groups have already been deprived of their entitlements and confined to a cycle of rural poverty. the destructive hydrological volatility of climate change will only increase the magnitude of this groups’ suffering. although moisture regime deficits will negatively impact the plant species producing the final harvest, it is the smallholders who will suffer the in the end. 101 consilience     101   1.5 5 hydrological changes: impact on indian grasslands and livestock it is likely that moisture deficits will create destructive costs to grassland productivity. moisture deficits add ecological pressure on common resource pastures used for grazing. moisture stress lowers grassland carrying capacity and grazing at normal rates of consumption further exacerbates this strain (subramaniam, 1992). the drought prone state of rajasthan is a historical example of the positive correlation between moisture regimes and the capacity of grasslands to sustain livestock [figure 5]. in the event of statewide drought, forage production can fall short of minimum requirements in ten out of the eleven districts (subramaniam, 1992). figure 5: grassland productivity decreases drastically as drought intensifies (subramaniam, 1992). subsequently, as grassland resources diminish, farmers are left with the option of using grain feed to maintain their number of livestock. however, in reality, the regular expense of buying grain inputs is not financially feasible for many smallholder households. instead, they will be forced to have fewer heads of cattle. cows are the integral unit on many small farms, the absence of which can cause a serious collapse in the sustainability and viability of smallholder agriculture. despite the many cultural and household purposes that cows have in rural india, ruminants are the most sacred mechanism in the smallholder farming system. consilience bargout: ecological agriculture and sustainable adaptation    102   specifically, the zebu cow (bos primigenius indicus l.) plays a pivotal role in the farm system. because it is difficult for smallholders to access or afford mechanized farm implements, draught animals are a versatile source of labor (i.e. plowing fields, transporting goods). additionally, cow dung is an essential farm input because it acts as a synthesizing bridge in nutrient cycles and as a means for organic matter to be efficiently re-introduced into the soil. therefore, it would be fair to speculate that fewer cows will lead to a reduction in soil fertility on small farms (subramaniam, 1992). climate change threatens relationships between livestock pastures and soil fertility. these relationships are examples of the ecological interconnectedness in farming systems. as such, comparably holistic and sustainable agricultural solutions must be incorporated into adaptation strategies. 2.0 smallholder solutions for global climate change 2.1 adaptation vs. mitigation it could be argued that mitigation should be included in agricultural strategies that address global climate change. this is not a valid argument in the context of indian smallholders’ response to climate change. impoverished farmers cannot afford to mitigate a global phenomenon to which they have contributed very little. the benefits of mitigation are not immediately realized and are also dispersed globally. the benefits of adaptation are realized much sooner and directly benefit those affected by climate change (sathaye et al, 2006). indian smallholders have no reason to be interested in mitigation unless it comes as the bi-product of their preferred adaptation strategy. 2.2 agricultural approach for smallholder adaptation: transgenic, conventional, organic, and ecological the ipcc defines adaptation as “adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (ipcc, 2001). this is an adequate framework, but we must employ a precautionary principle to identify the most contextually viable means of agricultural adaptation. we should consider the various agricultural technologies for adaptation in relation to the capacity of smallholders to exploit beneficial opportunities, which will efficiently and sustainably moderate the harms of climate change. developing transgenic plant cultivars that exhibit climate resilience is a scientifically constructive pursuit. the exploration of these technologies is worthwhile for the advancement of genetic research. a strictly theoretical role is the extent of the involvement transgenic technologies should have in smallholder adaptation. precautionary principle dictates that the historical cases of transgenic use in india, the commercial demands of private agribusiness, and the fundamental ethics obliged of scientific theory should nullify any notion of broadly introducing 103 consilience     103   transgenic plants at this point. the volatile threats of climate change, placed upon an immense population of highly disenfranchised farmers, offer enough risk as it is. the scientific argument on climate resilient transgenic varieties is far beyond the scope of this report. however, one example of scientific error is the pleiotropic effect. this can materialize when one genetic alteration results in unforeseen physiological ripple effects throughout the entire plant (grains research and development corporation, 2008). when a plant is under stress from dynamic biophysical factors, there are many genes that can express themselves in unforeseeable ways (bhatnagar-mathur et al, 2007). there is no certainty in predicting what negative feedback may arise in 20 to 50 years if we introduce climate resilient varieties. there is too much at risk to afford error (bhatnagar-mathur et al, 2007). for india, inarguably, the achievement of modern agricultural technologies was the miraculous increase in national food production. this was accomplished without transgenic innovations, rather relying entirely upon conventional methods of plant breeding. now, in the face of climate change, smallholders must rely less on conventional plant technologies and high-yielding varieties (hyvs), many of which only function under ideal conditions (pandey, 1994). even renowned geneticist and plant scientist dr. m.s. swaminathan, celebrated as the ‘father of india’s green revolution,’ understands that global climate change is a game changer for conventional agriculture. indian farmers and scientists must reconsider the agro-ecological adaptability of these technologies being widely used. dr. swaminathan has initiated a research foundation and network of knowledge centers for smallholders. the organization focuses on ‘pro-nature and pro-sustainable eco-technologies.’ in the face of global climate change, perhaps dr. swaminathan has realized the adaptive shortcomings of many beneficial technologies he previously advocated for. for farmlands that must withstand adverse climate conditions, there should be a more conservative application of conventional technologies, such as hyvs, synthetic fertilizers, and pesticides. in some instances, the high-yielding variety of a particular cereal (i.e. rice, wheat) will demand up to eight times more water than the landrace of an indigenous coarse-grain cereal (i.e. millet, sorghum) (barker et al, 2008). conventional soils, cultivated with maize and soybean under dry conditions, respectively, have shown to yield up to 34% and 56% less than sustainably cultivated soils. this is due to lower levels of som, leading to a lower rate of water absorption and lower water-holding capacity (niggli et al, 2008). the preferential application of synthetic fertilizers as opposed to natural fertilizers (i.e. compost, mulch) is likely to increase soil ph over time (singh et al, 2004). balancing soil ph is important to prevent micronutrient problems (i.e. zinc deficiency, iron deficiency, molybdenum toxicity). stable ph is also important for the population of essential soil microbes, earthworms, and other beneficial arthropods that help regulate som and soil porosity. adequate porosity will prevent runoff, lower soil temperatures, improve water absorption rate, and increase water-holding capacity. there is also a tendency for herbicides to reduce the presence of beneficial soil organisms (shiva and tarafdar, 2009). consilience bargout: ecological agriculture and sustainable adaptation    104   to address the limitation of conventional farming practices, the science of organic farming will have to sustain an agro-ecological system that is resilient to the stress of moisture and thermal volatility. percent increase in organic soils agro-ecozones range mean arid 2 – 9 5.3 semi-arid 3 – 16 7.2 sub-humid 4 – 15 6.9 humid 3 – 17 6.8 table 1: water holding capacity of organically managed soils. (shiva and tarafdar, 2009) maeder et al (2002) found a positive correlation between microbial biomass and the aggregate stability of soil. these findings also indicated that, in an organic system, the presence of beneficial mycorrhizae microbes near the plant-root system were 40 percent higher, which benefited soil aggregate stability up to 60% (maeder et al, 2002). shiva and tarafdar (2009) analyzed water-holding capacity between 40 organic farms and 40 conventional farms, across four agro-ecozones in three different states (arid: w. rajasthan, semi-arid: se. rajasthan, sub-humid: mahrashtra, and humid: uttarakhand). ten organic farms and 10 conventional farms were studied from each agro-ecozone, focusing on organic soils that were adjacent to conventional ones and had been using organic practices for at least four years. the study found that water-holding capacity increased in every instance where soil was being organically managed [table 1] (shiva and tarafdar, 2009). the resilience of organic agriculture has been recognized by a number of key international bodies, including the ipcc and the united nations food and agriculture organization. however, there are discursive political reasons why ‘organic agriculture’ should not be the explicit term or school of thought to which we adhere in order to identify the sustainable adaptation strategy that is most practical. not only is the label of ‘organic agriculture’ highly stigmatized and admonished by many strong proponents of conventional agriculture, but there is also a north-south divide in the perception and understanding of what organic farming entails (scialabba, 2000). historically, india’s traditional farming practices were de facto organic, long before the international organic movement began. in this situation, small farms should not be restricted from the use of beneficial conventional technologies (i.e. synthetic fertilizers), as long as they are employed at a sustainable level. unlike many other organic producing regions in the global south, the relevant objective is not necessarily the sale and export of certified organic goods. the objective is to promote and implement a sustainable adaptation strategy centered on agricultural ecology. the term ‘ecological agriculture’ embodies what is most important for an adaptation strategy in india, and directly focuses on the ecological sustainability of farming systems. both systems, organic and ecological, have proven to be highly cost-effective and productive on small-farms in 105 consilience     105   developing countries (badgley and perfecto, 2007; badgley et al, 2007; pande and akermann, 2008; pimentel and berardi, 1983; pimentel et al, 2005; pretty and hine, 2001; singh et al, 2004). however, regardless of the mutual viability these two systems have on a small farm, it is the explicit resilience of holistic, practical, and efficient farming practice – not the pious prohibition of certain technologies – that is most relevant for indian smallholder adaptation. 2.3 adaptive benefits of ecological agriculture: key traits of resilience ecological agriculture exhibits traits of climate resilience in the three key areas of 1) soil, 2) biodiversity, and 3) water. ecological agriculture exhibits sustainable resilience because it is a holistic approach that addresses interconnected and interdependent relationships existing among all three of the key areas; the functions of soil, water, and biodiversity all impact one another. additionally, ecological agriculture is a holistic approach because it places broad emphasis on 1) context-specificity, 2) diversification, and 3) incorporation of traditional knowledge (niggli et al, 2008). it can be demonstrated, discursively, how such a holistic approach functions to incorporate the most climate resilient agro-ecological traits, into an overarching strategy that will sustainably benefit indian smallholder adaptation. 2.3.1 smallholder adaptation and soil resilience first and foremost, ecological agriculture prioritizes soil health. soil health is a fundamental determinant of farm resilience and productivity, and is strongly maintained by the presence of som. soil organic matter acts as the most vital mechanism for smallholder adaptation. primarily, som consists of dead carbon based organisms, at various stages of decomposition. a healthy supply of organic matter creates a natural reservoir of important macro-nutrients (ammonium nitrate, phosphate, potassium). even when synthetic fertilizers are being used, som is still needed to prevent leaching by storing the added nutrients within the upper soil horizons, close to the plant root zone. humus is a key form of som that will act as a storehouse of nutrients and, additionally, as a natural reservoir of moisture. humus functions like a sponge and a protective buffer during periods of drought. humus can hold 30 times its weight in water (jordan et al, 2009). under extreme hydrologic conditions, som is crucial for resilience because of its improved water-holding capacity and because it strengthens soil structure and prevents against erosion. protection against erosion will be extremely useful during the monsoon seasons when torrential downpours have the potential to devastate agricultural landscapes (fao, 2007) som can be maintained using practical and cost-effective ecological methods, including conservation tillage, mulching, green-manures, intercropping, mixed cropping, crop rotation, agro-forestry, permaculture, vermiculture, aquaculture, and composting (fao, 2007; fao, 2009; singh et al, 2004; venkateswarlu and shanker, 2009). composting livestock manure is an excellent consilience bargout: ecological agriculture and sustainable adaptation    106   source of som and, when done properly to eliminate the presence of any pathogens, human waste is also a safe and nutrient-rich source of som (kramer, 2011; kulkarni, 2009). there have been initiatives in agro-forestry with nitrogen fixing trees to improve soil fertility and reduce wind and water soil erosion (pande and akermann, 2008). on an indian rice paddy, a practical and cost-effective way to maintain som is with green-manure, using a non-invasive water fern called azolla (azolla filiculoides lam.) (arumugasamy et al, 2007). this unique intercropping method reintroduces organic matter to the soil when, after the rice is harvested, the azolla is ploughed into the soil, where it will naturally decompose. to further improve the resilience of wetland agricultural soils, fish and duck species can be domesticated within the cultivated area. certainly, one adaptive benefit of introducing plant and animal species together will be the provision of som from diversified sources. however, in most examples of ecological farming, the agricultural benefit of biological diversity is not based on the autonomous provision of one thing or another. within ecological agriculture, the functioning resilience of all organisms is interconnected through natural synergies with one another and with the surrounding physical environment. 2.3.2 smallholder adaptation and biodiversity resilience in the context of the surrounding physical environment, ecological agriculture studies synergistic relationships between domesticated and non domesticated plant and animal species. by understanding some of the internal mechanisms within these relationships, positive synergies can be safeguarded and their adaptive benefits can be sustainably exploited. according to the international crops research institute for the semi-arid tropics (icrisat), it is crucial to “collect, conserve, and characterize the interand intra-specific diversity of wild relatives in order to mitigate against the biotic and a biotic stresses caused by climate change” (lane and jarvis, 2007). in this regard, ecological agriculture fosters agro-ecosystem biodiversity that stabilizes small farm production systems against future events of biophysical chaos (niggli et al, 2008). there are positive synergies between the few cultivated species in a farm system and the genetic variety of the many uncultivated wild species (niggli et al, 2008). biodiversity conservation is reflective of an in situ breeding method because it allows domesticated species to co-evolve with changing adverse conditions. for example, a plant’s resilience can co-evolve in relation to the marginal presence of pests and diseases in their surrounding environment (ramprasad, 1994). a strong presence of biodiversity will buffer against catastrophic disease and pest outbreaks by limiting the variety of niche habitats in which harmful organisms thrive (niggli et al, 2008). ecological agriculture also recognizes the intrinsic value in traditional methods of biodiversity conservation. communities of indian smallholders have preserved traditional practices of biodiversity conservation. sacred groves are areas of untouched forest that are communally protected. these areas are hot zones of biodiversity and provide habitat for life forms that may not exist on farms. this wild environment interacts with the local agro-ecosystems, and they mutually benefit one 107 consilience     107   another’s resilience to abiotic and biotic stresses (boron, 2006). biodiversity does not exclusively enable current domesticated species to evolve against the indirect ecological adversities caused by climate change. it also facilitates the evolution of new species. undiscovered plant species can exhibit novel traits of resilience against indirect ecological adversity, in addition to resilience against direct thermal and moisture adversities. this has immense value for smallholder adaptation. benefits can be exploited in cases where undomesticated landraces – perhaps a rice landrace exhibiting extreme drought tolerance discovered in a community’s sacred grove – could be successfully cultivated for adaptive agricultural purposes. it is equally valuable that this ecological mechanism of innovation, naturally assisting in the breeding of potentially climate resilient species, continues to be safeguarded through ecology centered agricultural practices. more so, it is important that this mechanism continues to exist as a public agro-ecological resource (navdanya, 2009). biodiversity would be rendered useless to those most marginalized in society if it became proprietary. indian smallholders have scarce fiscal capital at their disposal but have comparably abundant natural capital that can be harnessed for their own empowerment (shiva and trafdar, 2009). basu (2000) suggested that a public network of seed banks across india’s many agro-ecozones would enable the equitable exchange of genetic common property resources among communities and regions. indeed, without needing to emphasize the preservation of wild species any further, indian smallholders should prioritize the agro-ecological vigor of biodiversity cultivated within their farm system. reasons for promoting biodiversity within the farm system are extensive. in regards to climate change adaptation, there are more specific explanations, which address indirect environmental adversities and direct thermal and moisture adversities. broadly speaking, ecological agriculture promotes a biologically diverse agro ecological system as a built-in system of insurance for smallholders. in the event that direct or indirect climatic adversities result in failure of a particular crop, the assumption is that other strategic crops will not be as adversely affected and guarantee a safety net on which small farmers can rely. this will enable smallholder gains under worst-case climate scenarios through a balance of precautionary measures and desired risks. in a basic example, this type of bio-diverse system might cultivate a diversity of marketable cash crop species (i.e. cotton, spices, horticultural vegetables), complimented by a diversity of crop species that could be used for emergency household subsistence (i.e. millet, cowpea, lentils, sesame, dry land rice). more specifically, if temperatures are abnormally high in a given season, wheat and cotton (gossypium arboretum) harvests may diminish or fail entirely from stress during juvenile and reproductive (grain producing) periods of the plant life cycle. however, in this event, sorghum (sorghum bicolor) and lentil (lens culinaris) yields would be less affected by heat stress, and provide an emergency source of household calories. of all the beneficial species that can be cultivated to increase biodiversity on a small indian farm, the most resilient physiological traits are found among indigenous coarse-grain landraces, such as sorghum and millet. traditionally, pearl millet (pennisetum glaucum (l.) r.br.) and finger millet (eleusine coracana gaertn.) have been cultivated in many regions of india. it is easy for them to thrive under rain fed consilience bargout: ecological agriculture and sustainable adaptation    108   conditions, and they are able to grow in some of the most forsaken soils imaginable (ghosal and krishnan, 1995). millet is a photosensitive plant with short growing periods. this means that farmers can have the opportunity of growing two crops in a single season. so, if a season’s cash crop fails, the consecutive harvest of more than one emergency crop will be an added safeguard for household food security (ghosal and krishnan, 1995). strictly speaking, however, a diverse selection of resilient food-producing species will not afford the full suite of adaptive benefits that ecological agriculture can offer through biodiversity. the strategic companionship of different crop species (intercropping), along with the spatial and temporal sequencing of species (crop rotation), will ensure that soil nutrients are being consumed efficiently and, therefore, more sustainably. pertaining to the species and breed of any given plant, there is a unique set of nutrient requirements. therefore, strategic crop companionship is favorable if plant species have disparate nutrient requirements that complement one another (niggli et al, 2008). using a random example, there would be more efficient use of soil nutrients in an intercrop of wheat and pigeon pea that respectively consume 120-70-70 npk (kg/ha) and 90-20-60 npk. pigeon pea and wheat might be in competition for the consumption of k (potassium) nutrients, but pigeon pea’s smaller demand for p (phosphorous) would compliment the higher p demand of wheat. more so, the general compliment between these two species is that wheat production will not be hindered since the minimum nutrient requirements of pigeon pea are downwardly elastic. for smallholders that cannot afford to buy fertilizer inputs, the most rewarding function of this synergy is that pigeon pea’s root system is a host for populations of nitrogen fixing microorganisms. once the pigeon pea has been harvested, fixed nitrogen can be reintroduced to the soil by composting or mulching plant fodder. this demonstrates the importance of temporally and spatially sequencing species through crop rotation. unless soil resources are simultaneously replaced by intercropping appropriate plant species, appropriate crops should be scheduled in the subsequent season to restore the nutrients expended. the implication is that the rotation of crops in the following season will have nutrient priorities different to that of the previous one (arumugasamy et al, 2007). it is still possible to cultivate the same plant species from season to season; however, the physical location of where they are cultivated should be strategically rotated as well. soil nutrients and other resources (i.e. som, microorganisms) will be exploited more efficiently and more sustainably by diversifying seasonal plant species with intercropping and by using crop rotation to diversify inter-seasonal plant species (temporal) over different areas of cultivated farmland (spatial). smallholders in uttarkhand have diversified their cropping systems through a traditional poly-culture called baranaaja (pande and akermann, 2008). this method of mixed cropping involves at least twelve food crops, grown in a matrix where agro ecological interactions are both spatial and temporal, and the end result is the efficient, synergistic, and sequential use of specific nutrients within the soil (pande and akermann, 2008). this sustainable method is useful for small farmers because it does not deplete the soil of nutrients, and land rarely needs to be left fallow (pande and akermann, 2008). financial benefits were compared between a paddy (rice) 109 consilience     109   monocrop and a mixed crop of finger millet, foxtail millet (setaria italica (l.) p. beauvois), beans (phaseolus vulgaris l.), and amaranth (amaranthus l.) (pande and akermann, 2008). the net profit of the mono-crop was rs. 6,720, and net profit for the mixed crop was rs. 15,800 (pande and akermann, 2008). figure 6: healthy rice harvest produced during season that experienced sufficient watering. (bargout, 2010a) ecological agriculture also prescribes that biodiversity will improve farmland adaptation through the cultivation of non-food plant species. even though the apparent investment in biodiversity produces true adaptive revenue within the agro ecological interconnectedness of all farm species, and the positive synergies they form with one another. for indian smallholders, once again, the cultivation of azolla is a prime example of non-food species providing adaptive benefits through positive synergies. azolla is a nitrogen-fixing plant that directly supplies nitrates (labile forms of nitrogen available for plant uptake) to the intermingled rice crop. this reduces the need for ammonium sulfate fertilizers. when the azolla crop is ploughed back into the soil, it will restore many of the lost macro-nutrients, along with adding organic matter. intercropping azolla in rice paddies means that competitive weeds will find fewer niche environments to thrive in, and the rice crop will not be threatened because azolla is a non-invasive species (arumugasamy et al, 2007). as previously mentioned, adding ducks and fish will contribute towards a more resilient agro-ecological system. in rice paddies, populations of aquatic and dry-land pests are a potential food source for these domesticated animal species. so far, we have emphasized the importance of natural and domesticated plant biodiversity, however, it should be self-evident that biodiversity in animal species is no less pivotal for agro-ecological resilience to climate adversity. particularly, it is the interconnected role of buffer-fauna, forminrsity and evolution of species. similarly, arboreal biodiversity (trees) is interconnected with the biodiversity of bird species. agricultural initiatives in the past have sought to create habitat for more bird species through agro-forestry (pande and akermann, 2008). tree biodiversity is also interconnected with insect biodiversity. agro-forestry depends heavily on insect pollination for the production of a healthy harvest, particularly for orchards and the respective production of fruit (fao, 2009). wild apiformes (bees) and apiculture (domestication of bee species) are consilience bargout: ecological agriculture and sustainable adaptation    110   absolutely vital for fruit production. what is more, apiculture is absolutely essential for the survival of our global agricultural system. a smallholder, along with other surrounding farms, would benefit exponentially from the pollination services of a single beehive; whether involved in tree crop farming or field crop production. a regional network of beehives would undoubtedly increase resilience. figure 7: inferior rice harvest produced during season that experienced insufficient watering. (bargout, 2010a) 2.3.3 smallholder adaptation and water biodiversity will also enhance moisture conservation by increasing water use efficiency, and reducing moisture loss from evapotranspiration (water evaporation off of soil and leaf surfaces). particularly, because there is more ground cover in crop poly-cultures, protection from sun radiation will lower soil temperature, and less water will evaporate (singh et al, 2004). water scarcity and hydrological volatility, caused by increasing temperatures, is the number one climate change adversity to which indian smallholders will have to adapt. moisture regime is easily the number one limiting factor in a small rain-fed agro-ecosystem. it cannot be emphasized enough that smallholders will need practical and affordable tools in order to sustainably increase their resilience to hydrological volatility and moisture scarcity. for indian smallholders, the utmost importance of water is symbolized by the acute impact that moisture scarcity has had on the rice harvests of one household. for this particular farming family, growing cereal crops in the state of uttarkhand, their rice harvest has been healthy during seasons when water supply was adequate [figure 6] (bargout, 2010a). however, when the supply of water has been scarce, their rice crop has suffered significantly. during a growing season in 2009, the insufficient supply of water desecrated the quality and the quantity of grain they were able to harvest [figure 7] (bargout, 2010b). smallholder households, such as this one, desperately require an alternative set of tools that can simultaneously empower their adaptive knowledge and their adaptive faculties. within ecological agriculture, there exist a variety of appropriate tools that will enhance adaptive capacity through the conservation of moisture. 111 consilience     111   when considering smallholder rice production, there are practical and cost effective strategies for strengthening paddy resilience to moisture stress. system of rice intensification (sri) is one of the most promising and practical water saving technologies being practiced in india (sinah and jayesh, 2006; venkateswarlu and shanker, 2009). as opposed to completely flooding the rice paddy, the soil can be kept moist or have an inch or two of water at most. the aim of this is to improve root growth through a higher level of soil aerobic activity and lower anaerobic activity. however, through this process, water conservation is one of the main achievements (venkateswarlu and shanker, 2009). smallholders in uttarkhand have successfully experimented with a traditional method of sri known as thakuli (pande and akermann, 2008). the use of sri in a mono-cropped system is still not a strategy that offers a holistic solution to the overarching problem. in order to fully benefit from the resilience of an ecological system, smallholders will still need to increase biodiversity, cultivate more poly-cultures, and consider cultivating more drought tolerant crop species. a participatory study by kelkar et al (2008) interviewed 62 households from two villages in a water stressed district in the state of uttarakhand (kelkar et al, 2008). when coping against climate change, the majority respondents attributed a quarter of their effort toward growing crops with lower water requirements (kelkar et al, 2008). millet is well suited for poly-culture farming systems because of its extremely low moisture demand. millet will deprive neighboring plant species of only a marginal quantity of water (ghosal and krishnan, 1995). millet has been known to withstand up to a seventy five percent absence of moisture in the soil (shiva and tarafdar, 2009). finger millets are the type most widely grown in india and have evolved into many unique drought resistant varieties that are indigenous to different bioregions (ghosal and krishnan, 1995). millets produce a large amount of fodder, which can be fed to livestock or used as mulch. similar to millet, sorghum is a crop that can be grown successfully under the most extreme drought scenarios. sorghum has a fascinating trait of resilience where it lies dormant during moisture deficient periods and then continues growth when minimal moisture requirements are met once again (ghosal and krishnan, 1995). recalling the agro-ecological interconnectedness in a farm system, most of the practices in ecological agriculture also buffer against hydrological volatility. the practice of agro-forestry creates windbreaks that reduce wind erosion of topsoil. tree cover will also reduce moisture evaporation from the soil surface (singh et al, 2004). vermiculture increases earthworm populations, resulting in large pores being carved into the soil, which increases the rate of water infiltration. a higher rate of water infiltration will protect soil from erosion and water-logging during periods of torrential downpour in the monsoon seasons (singh et al, 2004). internalized within the agro-ecology of a smallholder’s farm system, the ecological agriculture traits of resilience will provide vital adaptation services. because ecological agriculture is holistic and values the use of traditional knowledge, there are further steps smallholders can take to conserve moisture by altering the biophysical environment of their farm. smallholders should resurrect the traditional indian ‘water tank’ system of moisture conservation. the water tank method of water conservation is practical, readily accessible, and cost-effective. consilience bargout: ecological agriculture and sustainable adaptation    112   water tanks are essentially earthen dams, 1 to 10 hectares in size. this tool has been used in india for approximately 1,200 years (biksham et al, 2008). the majority of precipitation occurs during india’s monsoon seasons. it has been common for the majority of a year’s precipitation to occur within only 100 hours of rainfall (biksham et al, 2008). therefore, storing water from catchment areas becomes an essential activity and will guarantee agricultural access to water during the rest of the year. unfortunately, during the latter half of the twentieth century water tanks in india have sat dormant due to changes in government policy that focused on extracting ground water resources and using irrigated sources of water, theoretically afforded by the damming of rivers (biksham et al, 2008). more recently, due to a widely recognized need for pro-poor methods of water conservation in india, there have been highly successful initiatives to resurrect water tanks. a grassroots project in the godavari river basin, funded by the world wildlife foundation (wwf), was able to successfully restore traditional tank systems of water conservation (biksham et al, 2008). following which, the intended beneficiaries reported how, “crop yields increased significantly, by +1.1 t/ha [ton per hectare] for maize and +0.4 t/ha for turmeric, increasing total production by rs 5.8 million (us$ 69,600) per annum” (biksham et al, 2008). due to the abundant supply of water, farmers described how their plants became noticeably healthier. by collectively improving plant health, the entire region exhibited agro-ecological resilience to pests. this facilitated fewer outbreaks, and smallholders were able to spend less money on pesticides. there became a more frequently available supply of both water and crop residues for smallholders with which to feed their livestock. per-hectare, this increases farm carrying capacity to support cattle and allows farmers to be less dependent on common resource grasslands (biksham et al, 2008). smallholders also used the water tanks to support aquaculture, and net annual fish production was valued at us$ 3,700 (biksham et al, 2008). water tanks are also attractive habitats for different bird species, both wild and domesticated. the benefit of using water tank systems should not countermand the benefit of large-scale dam projects or detract indian authorities from investing in such projects. with specific regard to the agricultural needs of indian smallholders, large scale dam projects do not appear to directly address their concerns holistically. although dam projects can generate expansive sets of revenue, in both social capital and financial capital nationwide, small-scale farmers do not directly enjoy many of the benefits from these projects. smallholders will exponentially benefit from practical cost-effective strategies that are, first and foremost, aimed at developing their resilience to climate change by empowering them to actually regulate their farm moisture regime. smallholders directly benefit from the implementation of a water tank system. water tanks have a lower cost-benefit ratio, lower storage costs per cubic meter of water, and are relatively inexpensive to construct or restore. furthermore, they are locally manageable and will not result in unforeseen environmental or social disruptions (biksham et al, 2008). the success of the godavari river project demonstrated how, “applying technologies that are locally available, and undertaking small-scale measures could add up to effective and inexpensive large-scale and pro poor adaptation” (biksham et al, 2008). there is potentially immense value in 113 consilience     113   expanding projects like this one, since there are an estimated 208,000 water tanks across india. (biksham et al, 2008) locally managed, context specific water conservation is best for smallholder adaptation to climate change. this strategy will give farmers an empowering tool with which they can simulate the most ideal temporal distribution of potentially exploitable water resources provided by monsoon rains. 3.0 limitations: dynamic barriers for ecological agriculture despite the suitability of ecological agriculture to sustainably enhance agro ecological resilience on small indian farms, there remain dynamic political, economic, and social structures that inhibit widespread adoption of this adaptation strategy. presently, the indian government has little economic incentive to institute strong policies encouraging ecological agriculture (scialabba, 2000). agricultural policies are typically formed around the large-scale commercial imperatives of agricultural development, focusing on the revenue generated from export-oriented food production. it is not that indian public authority is unaware of the imperative need for climate change adaptation on its small farms (planning commission government of india, 2007; sharma et al, 2004). in this regard, neither is the government misinformed about the resilient traits of ecological agriculture. technocratic knowledge on the agricultural impacts of climate change and knowledge of the adaptation solutions, which are available, is demonstrated quite comprehensively in india’s initial national communication to the united nations framework convention on climate change (sharma et al, 2004). unfortunately, the historical reality is that the administrative bodies of public representatives have always marginalized indian smallholders, who are collectively disempowered and have few equitable civic mechanisms at their disposal through which to assert their interests. the government is an aggregate of highly compartmentalized bodies administered by the decisions of rationally performing bureaucratic agents, who are subject to the prescription of top-down agendas (burnell and randall, 2008). there are structures within india’s public authority that enjoy the luxury of embedded autonomy. it is only the interests of highly empowered groups that can be successfully articulated throughout the silos of government structure, and this is only to the point where there is a clear and impending consequence for the government itself, the implications of which are the only impetus for rational consideration and adoption of these articulations within the government narrative (burnell and randall, 2008). through many of its faculties, the indian government has maintained a strictly patron-client relationship with rural society (scialabba, 2000; burnell and randall, 2008). certainly, for all nations, dynamic malfunction within state establishments becomes an apparent obstruction to social innovation. within india, it is very possible that any political vehicle for promoting agricultural innovation will be halted or de-railed by the public authority, safely characterized by their weak bureaucracy, low transparency, divided political factions, and burdened by the pressure of extra national forces (i.e. foreign national agendas, multi-lateral lending bodies, trans national firms). having said this, there has been some government action in support consilience bargout: ecological agriculture and sustainable adaptation    114   of ecological agriculture for sustainable climate change adaptation. india’s government has been not been unsuccessful in occasionally enacting meaningful pieces of legislature. neither have they failed in making attempts to allocate federal budgetary resources towards sustainable agriculture and climate change adaptation. for india’s national 2012 union budget, the ministry of agriculture made formal grant requests of approximately usd 180 million and usd 180,000, respectively, for their planned ‘climate resilient agriculture initiative’ and ‘national mission on sustainable agriculture’ (department of agricultural cooperation, 2012; department of agricultural research and education, 2012). it is uncertain if the ministry of finance will allocate their budget to fund the full amounts requested. due to weakness in government transparency and the overhead costs of operating large agricultural programs, it is difficult to determine how much of this allocated capital will actually find its way on to the farmland of intended beneficiaries. these government efforts still reflect a patron-client relationship and will likely fail to facilitate expedient transition towards sustainable adaptation, particularly for india’s vulnerable multitude of disempowered smallholders. if adoption of a sustainable adaptation strategy is to be widely realized – one that resembles the resiliency and practicality of ecological agriculture – it will have to come from the ground up. veritably, a national mandate for adopting sustainable adaptation should not be contingent on the evident passiveness of federal government. the structural labyrinth of india’s public authority will need to be largely circumvented. the most legitimate ratification of a public demand for sustainable adaptation and a public demand for transition towards ecological agriculture will come from the autonomous social authority of indian smallholders and the popular grassroots organizations that strictly advocate on the behalf of marginalized rural communities. in accordance with this perspective – emphasizing smallholder agency and autonomy – preponderant social variables within india will also limit the open adoption of certain adaptive practices that ecological agriculture emphasizes. the social perspectives within smallholder communities will influence their decisions. the perspectives of smallholder households are contextually influenced by dynamic rural social realities. the rural social realities that will influence smallholder adaptation decisions include 1) access to power and knowledge (access to capital) and 2) cultural values. due to the fact that rural households already have a scarce supply of fiscal capital, many smallholders will face challenges affording the costs of adaptation. some of india’s small farmers are so marginalized in this regard that they have virtually zero capacity to implement a sustainable adaptation strategy. despite governmental and non-governmental efforts, smallholders continue to have limited access to financial credit. for a large proportion of india’s small-scale farmers, adaptive transitioning to ecological agriculture will not be feasible without external support. for acutely disempowered smallholders, transitional stimuli may need to come from non-governmental and grassroots organizations, since government bodies have continually failed to deliver significant adaptation assistance. perhaps what is more formidable than the linear distribution of any financial aid, is that adaptive assistance will need to include the provision of social capital distributed to an immense rural population and requiring a dynamic network of knowledge dissemination. 115 consilience     115   greatly contributing to the disempowerment and deprivation of indian smallholders is the lack of access to formal education. india’s rural poor are financially and socially excluded from many institutions of higher training, particularly institutions that offer agricultural training. additionally, the ministry of agriculture has a weak and underfunded network of farm extension agents tasked with providing useful knowledge and advice to farmers. for smallholders to even attempt the implementation of a sustainable adaptation strategy, they will need to, first and foremost, acquire relevant information about ecological practices. to begin with, smallholders will require awareness to the existing uses of ecological agriculture for climate change adaptation. second, smallholder perception of ecological agriculture and its relevancy to their realities must be addressed. in some scenarios, smallholders may not value adaptation using ecological agriculture perhaps until they are offered relevant evidence that demonstrates resilient traits. rural socio-economic dynamics have also led to the stigmatization of traditional indian farming systems as an anachronism. in the perception of many smallholders, their use of conventional technologies and practices – such as synthetic fertilizers, pesticides, transgenic and hybrid plant varieties, or mono-cropping – may serve as a social symbol of modernization, creating a higher perceived vocational status for them within society if farmers can openly demonstrate their capacity to afford the most advanced agricultural technologies available. the nature of this social dynamic, where embedded cultural perceptions are negatively influenced by the reality of deprivation in rural india, manifestly reduces the cultural relevancy of other practical adaptation tools recommended within ecological agriculture. modern dietary preference in india, both urban and rural, contravenes with some of the resilient traits in biodiversity, limiting the adaptive benefits that can be exploited through crop diversification. india has progressed from a developing to an emerging nation in the last fifty years, and indian diets have evolved to consume far less quantities of coarse-grain cereal. there has been increased demand for rice and wheat as staple grains throughout indian society and an increasingly stigmatized perception of millet and sorghum. coarse-grain foodstuffs are perceived as one of the only cereals that can be easily afforded by the extreme poor and, indeed, in many ways they are. even though millet and sorghum cereals are exceedingly nutritious, rice and wheat have become the most popular cereal for reasons of color, taste, and general palatability. understandably so, experiencing the vast textural difference of eating a flatbread cooked with wheat and a flatbread cooked with millet, it is clear that there is a literal significance to the term ‘coarse’ grain. rice and wheat are resource intensive crops with high nutrient demands, making them more expensive to produce. as a result, rice and wheat are more expensive household commodities. the high market price of luxury cereal is reflective of a social dynamic in india, which necessitates the superior demand for rice and grain. it is not solely the afforded luxury of staple foods that, despite their inferior nutritional value, are simply more enjoyable for people to eat. in fact, maintaining a food supply of high quality rice and wheat is one of the most basic household status symbols in indian society. cultural and religious dynamics embedded within the country’s social hierarchy have also contributed to this perception of status. even if it is more costly for farmers to produce, the high market bid for rice and wheat offers a desirable risk for any farmer who, so long as their yield is consilience bargout: ecological agriculture and sustainable adaptation    116   successful, can receive a far greater return on their investment in any given growing season (ghosal and krishnan, 1995; huang and david, 1993; popkin et al, 2001). since rice and wheat are preferred food sources to that of less appealing coarse grains, and because they are lucrative crops to grow, it is foreseeable that smallholders will be hesitant to corroborate millet and sorghum as welcomed constituents of an ecological agriculture adaptation strategy. 4.0 recommendations for the many attributes that identify ecological agriculture as a sustainable adaptation strategy, there should be a triage of priorities to emphasize areas where adaptation is needed most urgently and where it can be achieved most effectively. adaptation will be achieved most effectively through ecological practices that address the interconnected dependency of all three key areas: soil, biodiversity, and water. the restoration of india’s traditional water tank system should be prioritized to address the urgent issue of water shortage. this also addresses the issue of soil and the preservation of soil organic matter. improved water supply will increase the availability of valuable crop residues, which will sustain crucial livestock populations and can be used for mulch. smallholder training and education services should also remain a priority. this will address all areas of urgency but will most effectively address the urgent need for improved biodiversity. principle skills in plant breeding and seed saving are the most effective long-term adaptation tools for smallholders. this will require equitable collaboration between farmers and scientists. navdanya is a grassroots organization that focuses on the genetic conservation of india’s resilient landraces by training farmers and promoting locally managed seed banks (navdanya, 1995). the m.s. swaminathan foundation has initiated 26 professional research and training centers throughout the country. the highest mandate of each knowledge center is to address regional agro-ecological needs through knowledge-based empowerment among smallholder communities, offering practical information on sustainable adaptation methods such as system of rice intensification and azolla intercropping. these are encouraging examples of collaboration. crop diversification and poly-cultures should be prioritized in order to address the urgent area of soil. the biodiversity of domesticated plant species will address all areas of urgency and will most effectively address the urgency to maintain and improve levels of soil organic matter, which in turn serves to strengthen soil health and conserve precious nutrients. mono-crops of rice and wheat should be avoided. cultivation of grain-producing plants should, first, be intercropped with nitrogen fixing legumes and, second, subject to a crop rotation schedule. despite social barriers to the following recommendation, there is immense adaptation value to the intercropping of climate resilient coarse-grains. under the most destructive climatic conditions, there is no other grain-producing plant that has sustainably proven to exhibit resilience comparable to that of millet and sorghum. particular to india, the most interesting paradox is that of millet. arguably, the exploitable opportunity within millet cultivation makes it the most valuable crop for agricultural adaptation while, simultaneously, it remains one of the most de 117 consilience     117   valorized crops in indian society. considering this apparent dilemma, agricultural and social research on millet should be prioritized. in the holistic interest of ecological agriculture – that smallholders might incorporate millet as part of their adaptation strategy – it would be beneficial to further understand india’s social structures that work to exclude the cultivation of millet. for acutely marginalized farmers who have minimal insurance to protect their livelihood from unforeseen adversity, cultivating an emergency crop of millet will guarantee a backup harvest, even under the worst case scenarios of climate change. without exaggeration, this agro-ecological safety net will not only protect rural livelihoods from ruin, but also protect poor households from an impending food shortage. in 2011, canada’s international development research centre disbursed us$ 3.5 million in funding for a 42-month, multi-donor initiative on revalorizing minor millets in rainfed regions of south asia. india is one of three countries where the valorization of millet is being studied, particularly in the states of tamil nadu, orissa, and jharkhand. the study is being conducted through a north-south partnership, between researchers from canadian mennonite university (manitoba), university of guelph (ontario), and researchers from the rainfed farming development program of the development of humane action foundation (tamil nadu) (idrc, 2011). participatory multi-stakeholder research on the use of millets in india should be prioritized. we know that ecological agriculture is a relevant adaptation strategy for indian smallholders because it is a practical and holistic system of farming. however, even though ecological agriculture already exhibits a surplus of resilient traits that will support sustainable adaptation to climate change, smallholders’ limited cultivation of millet represents a forfeit of a crucial opportunity. consilience bargout: ecological agriculture and sustainable adaptation    118   bibliography arumugasamy, s., subramanian, k., & sridhar, s. 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(2009). climate change and agriculture: adaptation and mitigation strategies. indian journal of agronomy, 54[2], 226 230. microsoft word 5 typ 7100-article text-13887-1-6-20201122 consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 23, 2021, pp. 48-58.  abstract over the last few decades, the approach that the united kingdom has taken to climate policy has undergone a dramatic evolution, from a fierce opponent of climate policy at any level to a strong supporter of such policy at both the domestic and international level. that shift—which took place under both labour and conservative administrations—was driven primarily by two factors: increased public opinion in favor of climate regulation and a shifting judgment about the value of such policy to the british economy. this evolution holds four main lessons for advocates of sustainable development: 1.) durable cross-party support for climate change policies is possible, provided that politicians view supporting climate policy to be in their interest; 2.) public pressure after elections is as important as pressure during elections to ensure that politicians’ campaign promises match policies they enact in office; 3.) the business community can have a transformational effect on the policy debate when it recalculates the value of climate policies into its bottom line; and 4.) ambitious governmental action on climate change is easiest when accomplished in steps, rather than in an overnight, all-or-nothing period. author’s note hello! my name is eric scheuch, and i am a current senior undergraduate at columbia university in new york, new york (10027), affiliated with the earth institute’s sustainable development program and the department of political science. i have been an admirer of the cross-party british consensus on the need for climate policy since watching the 2015 uk general election in high school, and was alarmed for a long time about the impact that brexit might have on that policy, much of which was tied up closely in british participation in european union institutions. last © 2021 eric g. scheuch. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution license (ccby 4.0), which permits the user to copy, distribute, and transmit the work provided that the original author(s) and source are credited. eric g. scheuch is with the earth institute and the department of political science at columbia university, 116th st and broadway, new york, ny 10027 usa (email: eric.scheuch@columbia.edu). spring, while taking a class on the european union, i had the chance to write a paper on the impact of brexit on british climate policy, which forms the core of this paper. i hope that you have as much fun reading this as i did writing it! keywords united kingdom, environmental policy, climate change, public opinion, environmental politics, brexit i. introduction over the last five decades, there has been a steady progressive evolution in britain’s attitude toward climate policy, from complete hostility toward climate policy at all levels to strong participation at the national, international, and, until recently, supranational levels. that evolution has been almost consistently positive, and has taken place under governments of both parties. it has been driven by two main political trends that have transcended any one prime ministership: increasing domestic political pressure for governmental action on climate change, and a recalibration of the perceived impact of such regulation on the british economy. these trends persist today, and help to explain why brexit is unlikely to fundamentally change either the goals or form of british climate policy (pollitt and chyong, 2017). key lessons can be drawn from these trends about the possibility of cross-party consensus on climate policy, the need for constant public pressure, the role of the business community in the climate debate, and the gradual nature of the policy process. green evolution: lessons from british climate policy, 1973-2020 eric g. scheuch 49 consilience: the journal of sustainable development ii. historical evolution of british climate policy under margaret thatcher’s (1979-1990) conservative government, the uk actively opposed climate policy at the national, supranational, and international levels. such opposition was made easier by a lack of public demand for climate regulation; climate change had just begun to enter into the public consciousness during thatcher’s reign, and had not yet acquired a high level of public urgency (harris, 2017). britain came under intense pressure from its fellow eu member states as a result of its opposition, with one of its peers denouncing it as the “dirty man of europe” (harris, 2017). thatcher repeatedly refused to yield to such pressure, however, so long as she viewed climate regulation to be detrimental to the economy and public pressure on the issue remained lacking. one prominent instance of thatcherite opposition to climate regulation came in 1989 when france, the netherlands, and norway convened the hague summit on the atmosphere. this was one of the earliest international attempts to address climate change as a standalone environmental issue (harris, 2017). despite the participation of 17 governments, the uk’s refusal to join them forced the european communities to withdraw as a bloc. in justification of this decision, the uk emphasized that it could “not accept a body with supranational powers that could supersede national sovereignty on environmental issues” (harris, pg 70). while maintaining its resistance toward european climate policy, the thatcher government began to loosen its opposition to broader international climate policy after the hague summit (zito, 1999). this shift was due partly to public pressure; voters had expressed their dislike of thatcher’s opposition to climate regulation in the 1989 european elections by handing the uk green party a record 15% of the vote, up from just 0.5% in 1984 (zito, 1999). faced with these developments, thatcher began to shift her approach to climate policy at the international level, while remaining firmly opposed to it at the supranational level. in a speech at the un in 1990, thatcher leaned into international climate policy, acknowledging the danger of global warming and calling for the negotiation of an international framework treaty on which future international climate action could be based (d. fischer, 2013). the united kingdom would live up to thatcher’s promise of a un framework treaty, but it would not be under thatcher, who resigned just months after her un speech. under her successor and protégé, john major, the uk attended the 1992 un earth summit in rio de janeiro. the rio summit resulted in the signing of the united nations framework convention on climate change (unfccc), which committed signatories to working together to fight climate change and provided a framework which could be used to create future climate treaties. inspired by the unfccc, the european union searched for policy mechanisms it could employ to work toward the treaty’s climate goals. under the january-june 1993 danish presidency of the council of the european union, a major part of the council’s agenda was creating an eu-administered carbon tax (kluk, 2002). the uk government made their opposition to the tax clear (weale, 1999), and, despite strong efforts by the danes to change their minds (golub, 1996), the british effectively ended debate on the issue before it began. when german representatives took over the presidency of the council in 1994, they introduced a new carbon tax proposal designed to accommodate british concerns (golub, 1996). the uk once again rejected the tax, forcing germany to withdraw its proposal. while the major government continued thatcher’s opposition to climate action at the supranational level and support of it at the international level, it committed itself to domestic climate action by signing the unfccc. in 1993, the conservative government turned around and introduced a carbon tax of its own under chancellor of the exchequer kenneth clarke. however, in the face of firm opposition from the labour party and a rebellion from conservative backbenchers, the tax failed. major’s actions on climate change temporarily appeased the public pressure that thatcher had faced; the uk green party vote share, which can be used as a proxy factor for public opinion on climate change, went from 15% in the 1989 european elections to just 3% in 1994, the next election after major’s signing of the unfccc. in the 1997 general election, the labour party campaigned on making britain more involved with climate action at the european level, stating that “a labour government will strengthen cooperation in the european union on environmental issues, including climate change and ozone depletion.” labour also combined its environmental goals with its social and consilience: the journal of sustainable development scheuch: green evolution economic goals, making 1997 the first time a major british party had framed climate progress within the context of sustainable development (darkin, 2006). the conservatives, on the other hand, ran largely on a platform of business-as-usual. labour won, ending 18 years of conservative leadership and marking a new era in european climate policy. part of labour’s success may be attributed to the fact that, despite being temporarily sated by conservative moves on the environment in the early 1990s, by the end of that decade public pressure for action on climate change had continued to rise. between 1993, when the major administration blocked the danish carbon tax, and 2000, when blair rolled out his major domestic climate action item, the percentage of britons “very concerned” about air pollution rose from 54% to 63% (taylor, 2012). under the 10-year prime ministership of tony blair, the labour government would participate in three major pieces of carbon mitigation legislation: the international 1997 kyoto protocol, the domestic 2000 climate change programme, and the supranational 2006 european trading system. the blair government played a leadership role in the formation of the 1997 kyoto protocol just months after the election and the subsequent adoption of international emissions reduction targets, building the policy framework upon which all subsequent international climate agreements have been based (darkin, 2006). labour’s commitment to strong climate policy at the domestic level continued with the release of the 2000 climate change programme. kyoto and the programme together committed the uk to cutting its emissions to an ambitious 23% below 1990 levels by 2010 (house, 2005). part of the program involved implementing a domestic “climate change levy” in 2001, allowing the government to succeed where the conservatives had failed in 1993 (house, 2008). labour’s focus on climate action at the domestic and international levels was formed not only out of concern for the environment, but also out of a calculation that climate regulation could result in new business opportunities and economic benefits that outweigh the costs—the opposite calculation from the conservatives under thatcher (darkin, 2006). that calculation was shared by some in the business community; the climate change programme was based in part on recommendations from lord marshall, a former president of the confederation of british trade industries (darkin, 2006). while the confederation itself remained opposed to such regulation, marshall demonstrated that attitudes were changing among some influential members of the business community. this focus on climate action proved to be quite popular in the court of public opinion; in the 2001 election, the conservatives ran on rolling back labour’s climate regulations, only to lose to labour again in another landslide (carter, 2009). at the same time that labour was implementing the climate change programme and the climate change levy, the european commission was considering implementing a bloc-wide emissions trading system (ets) to help countries meet their obligations under kyoto (ellernman and buchner, 2007). as the new europe-wide ets took shape under another danish presidency of the council, britain participated in planning the proposal from the beginning (veenman and liefferink, 2012). this contrasted strongly with its blocking of the carbon tax, when the uk refused to take part in the drafting of the policy by the commission, and then conspired to block it without further attempts at participation once it had moved onto the council (veenman and liefferink, 2012). the uk’s change in approach could be attributed to the blair government’s view of the eu’s impact on the british economy. whereas thatcher and major viewed european carbon policy as a threat to british economic growth, blair saw a financial opportunity to make london the center of a new carbon trading industry (meckling, 2011). thus, the willingness of the uk to participate in the formation of the ets was due, in part, to a change in the calculation of how beneficial carbon reduction legislation would be to the uk economy. as a result, at least in part because of the uk’s leadership, europe finally got its ets, which debuted in 2005 (meckling, 2011). it was then, and is now, the largest carbon pricing system in the world. in 2007, tony blair resigned and gave way to gordon brown. rather than waiting for the eu to take the lead on climate policy and shaping uk policy to match it, as blair did with the ets, brown’s administration wrote an aggressive new climate law known as the climate change act of 2008 and pushed the eu to match it. this further evolution in british climate policy was due, once again, to the twin forces of 51 consilience: the journal of sustainable development public opinion and increased recognition of the benefits that climate regulation had for great britain. british public opinion began a strong push for increased climate regulation in 2005. although labour had already released its climate change programme and helped author the ets, there was an increasing demand for yet more action. these demands were driven by three trends: the release of al gore’s film, an inconvenient truth, which was highly influential among british viewers; a rise in scientific reports outlining just how devastating climate change would be for britain; and an increase in media coverage of the issue (carter and jacobs, 2013). within a year, the vast majority of the public was demanding increased action on the issue; by 2006, one poll by ipsos mori found that a whopping 94 percent of respondents believed that further action should be taken to combat climate change (ipsos mori, 2006). these changes in public opinion led to the rise of an organized “big ask” campaign, which demanded that mps commit to statutory emissions reductions that went beyond what was outlined in the ets (carter and jacobs, 2013). as public opinion shifted, there was an increased recognition by government and opponents alike that the benefits of stronger climate regulation outweighed the costs. by 2007, even the confederation of british industry—the same organization that had so vigorously supported thatcher’s opposition to environmental regulation of any type—was calling for carbon reduction targets (lockwood, 2013). in large part due to these changes in public opinion, there was a legislative push—from both the labour party and from the two major opposition parties, the liberal democrats and the conservatives—for increased climate regulation that went above and beyond the existing european policy. while support from the liberal democrats was unsurprising given the party’s long history of championing of environmental causes, the vocal support from the conservatives was more surprising, and was due largely to efforts of the new conservative leader, david cameron (carter, 2009). such widespread support for legislation across all sectors helped smooth the way for an ambitious new climate bill, and, in 2008, the climate change act passed with support from a majority of mps from all three parties. in an indication of how far members of the opposition had evolved on the issue, one of the main figures in rallying conservative support for the bill was john gummer, who had played a key role in stopping the german carbon tax in 1994. one of the essential components of the act was a commitment to reduce british emissions by 80% by 2050. after the passage of the act, the uk advocated for the eu to match that commitment, showing its progress from blocking eu climate goals in the 1990s to negotiating low goals in the mid-2000s to leading the creation of new goals in the late 2000s (bocse, 2020). the 2010 election brought an end to thirteen years of labour rule and restored the conservatives to power, but the cabinet that moved into whitehall was very different from the last conservative government to hold power. under david cameron, the conservatives ran on an ambitious climate platform that promised to create “the greenest government in history” and advocated that “european countries need to work together to [...] combat global climate change” (conservative party, 2010). the early work of cameron’s coalition government lived up to its promises by further advancing british climate policy, including the extension of carbon reduction targets to 2027, the creation of a “green bank,” new energy loan programs, and utility reforms (carter and jacobs, 2013). such climate action continued to be popular at the polls, and, in 2015, voters rewarded cameron’s conservatives with another term and an increased majority. in 2016, after losing the brexit referendum he himself authorized, cameron resigned, and gave way to theresa may. while brexit would, ipso facto, lead to a change in britain’s role in european climate policy—it is difficult to lead in the formulation of policy through an institution when you no longer belong to that institution—under may there was strong continuity in britain’s approach to climate policy at both the domestic and international levels. may led british ratification of the paris climate agreement in 2016, and publicly rebuked president donald trump when he pulled the united states out of the paris agreement the following year (merrick, 2017). on the domestic front, she led an amendment to the climate change act that committed the uk to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050—its most ambitious emissions target yet—making it the first g7 country to commit to this level of emissions (walker, mason, and carrington, 2019). just as the original climate change act was passed in part in response to media-driven shifts in public opinion, so was the net-zero amendment. in march of 2019, polling firm ipsos mori consilience: the journal of sustainable development scheuch: green evolution registered its highest level of concern about the environment since 2007, and several polls saw a further jump in voter concern after the extinction rebellion protests in april of that year, which were accompanied by significant media coverage (ipsos mori, 2019). may’s successor, boris johnson, has been in office barely a year, and with his tenure dominated by brexit and coronavirus, he has said little on the subject of climate policy. nevertheless, he seems primed to continue may’s policy of strong climate action at the domestic and international levels. in february, as britain hosted the cop-26 climate summit, he reaffirmed support for the net-zero goal and called on other countries to follow britain’s lead, indicating that he will maintain britain’s role as an international climate leader (farand, 2020). at the same conference, he announced that he would be moving up the deadline for britain to ban the sale of new diesel cars from 2040, where may had set it, to 2035, suggesting support for further domestic action on climate change (edie, 2020). the covid-19 crisis has not dampened the enthusiasm of the british public for climate action either; a july poll found that 67% of british voters support a coronavirus relief package that makes tackling climate change a priority, including a majority of voters among all three major parties (george, 2020). supporters of the net-zero goal include the confederation of british industry, which, in 2018, said that such a target, properly deployed, would have a “range of benefits across uk business sectors including power and industry” indicating, once again, a vast shift in the business calculus around climate change regulation (confederation, 2018). over the course of britain’s membership in the european union (1973-2020), the consensus of british elites on climate change underwent a dramatic shift, from opposing climate regulation at all costs in the name of business and sovereignty to a wide coalition supportive of a net-zero by 2050 goal. this evolution was primarily driven by the consistent application of public pressure and a recalculation of the value of climate policy to the british economy. iii. key lessons there are several key lessons that the uk’s experience holds for its peer nations, including fellow members of the eu, member nations of the commonwealth, and the united states. first, it illustrates that durable cross-party support for climate change policies is possible, provided that politicians view supporting climate policy as strategically beneficial; the conservative party started backing climate policy only after it became a salient election issue in the minds of the public. in economic terms, politicians are rational, selfinterested actors, and if the electorate demands action on climate change, they are likely to follow along. the mixed news for climate advocates is that there is some evidence of climate change increasing in salience as its costs—in terms of natural disasters such as hurricanes and wildfires—become more visible. in the 2020 u.s. presidential debates, for example, climate change earned a prominent place among the topics discussed in both head-to-head encounters of the two major presidential candidates, after receiving little mention in the debates four years earlier (harder, 2020). the debates took place during both a record fire season in the american west and a record hurricane season in the american southeast, both of which could have played a role in increasing the issue’s importance in voters’ minds. backing the concept of such a causal link, one study directly linked proximity to 2020 fires to individual support for climate action (hazlett and mildenberger, 2020), although the study also found evidence that the increase is more prominent among liberal voters than conservatives, potentially limiting its impact on the wider public. there is similar evidence from australia, with support for climate change mitigation reaching an alltime high after the devastating 2019 fire season (slezak, 2020). if the uk is any guide, however, while increased backing for climate policy in polls can help, it is itself not enough to move politicians; true results are seen when climate action is a winning issue in elections, as it was in the 1997 and 2001 british elections. recent elections in the united states have been somewhat encouraging on this front; president joe biden won industrial states such as michigan and pennsylvania despite promising to “phase out” the oil industry, while fossil fuel-backed incumbent senators lost reelection in colorado and arizona (ronayne and knickmeyer, 2020). a similar situation played out in the 2019 election north of the border in canada, with 63% of canadians backing parties whose platforms included support for major action on climate change (meyer, 2019). in a perfect example of 53 consilience: the journal of sustainable development how such electoral results can translate into policy consequences, the new government backed canada’s first-ever net-zero goal less than a month later, explicitly citing the election results as a justification for implementing the ambitious policy (meyer, 2019). in the uk, an early sign of the shifting consensus on climate was the change in the climate platforms of both major parties, with both backing climate action starting with the 2005 general election. in 2020, the u.s. democratic national climate platform was the most aggressive in history, while congressional republicans released their first-ever climate policy plan that, while modest in scope, was a marked shift from the party’s previous policy of denying the existence of climate change altogether (roberts, 2020). however, britain’s case study suggests that other factors are also important in creating a bipartisan consensus on climate. one of those factors is the application of continual public pressure between elections, in order to make sure that the policies underpinning campaigns match those enacted in office. climate mitigation, especially at the scale necessary to meet the 2˚c goal established under the paris agreement, is expensive and requires lifestyle changes among the population, and therefore can be popular in polls but difficult to implement in practice. one needs only to look to the carbon tax that inspired france’s yellow vest movement to witness a policy that was popular in polls but unpopular in implementation (douenne and fabre, 2020). in the face of such backlash, it is tempting for politicians to scale back the ambitions of their policies to be more popular among the public, but also require smaller reductions in emissions. as britain shows, one way to prevent that from happening is for activists to apply continual public pressure, rather than just pressuring politicians during election cycles. the british example of this was the “big ask” campaign, which leveraged celebrity endorsements and public lobbying to push the incumbent labour government to implement ever more ambitious forms of climate policies. the campaign did not happen overnight, but rather took years of organizing and building a wide coalition to successfully trigger change. the campaign is still ongoing; one of the drivers of the current british government’s continued action on climate is the ongoing work of extinction rebellion, more than a decade after the “big ask” campaign first began (ipsos mori, 2019). while organized, continual public pressure on the british government was important on its own, this effort was amplified by the amount of media coverage of the issue. this underscores the link between which of the issues are covered by the media and which make their way into the public consciousness. historically, since climate change is a somewhat abstract issue with costs that are sometimes hard to see in the moment, there has been a dearth of media coverage of the issue that reached a wide swathe of the public, with the exception of al gore’s film, an inconvenient truth. in britain, at least, this has changed somewhat, with coverage of climate change hitting an all-time high in recent years. spikes in media coverage are often, unsurprisingly, linked to extreme weather, and as these weather events become more frequent, so do such spikes (hope, 2019). the baseline level of coverage has also risen, however, suggesting that the media sees climate as a salient issue even when its costs are not immediately in the forefront of the public consciousness. a rise in media coverage of climate change can help drive increased public awareness of the issue, since it highlights the costs of climate change in voters’ minds even if they are not seeing them firsthand in their own communities. it can also drive further action by politicians, who often use media coverage as a proxy for what voters are thinking about at any particular moment. there are indications that increased media coverage of climate change is another ingredient for climate consensus present in many of the uk’s peer nations. in the united states, numerous mainstream media outlets such as the new york times and the washington post have stepped up both their regular and investigative coverage of climate change in recent years. that increase was driven in part by an administration hostile to climate action, but is unlikely to cease in a year of record droughts, hurricanes, and wildfires. increased coverage of climate change is not guaranteed, but rather can be subject to the viewpoints of those who control a nation’s media outlets. in australia, for example, major news organizations owned by newscorp have continued to give a voice to those who deny that humans play a role in climate change, even as the country burns (readfearn, 2020). one possible way to account for this is the influence of social media coverage of climate change, which, by the very nature of social media platforms, is a grassroots approach. 2019 consilience: the journal of sustainable development scheuch: green evolution was also a banner year for social media conversations about climate change, with over twice as many conversations occurring as those in the previous year. all of this combined presents significant evidence that the ingredients for increased consensus on climate change may be present in the united states and other peer nations. a third lesson from the united kingdom is the transformational effect that the business community can have when it recalculates the value of climate policies into its bottom line. from the united kingdom to the united states, right-wing parties have historically taken policy cues from business groups that are aligned with party views on economic policy. for decades, particularly under the thatcher and major administrations, incumbent conservative governments anchored their opposition to climate policies in the view that such policies would be bad for business. this position aligned with the views of industry trade groups such as the confederation of british industries. around the mid-2000s, however, the position of such groups toward climate legislation began to shift, driven by a view that certain policies, such as carbon trading, represented a potentially profitable opportunity, and that climate change was an increasingly large risk to future profits. while the conservative shift on climate policy was not solely caused by the evolution of such groups, the increased support for climate action by one of the party’s key constituencies was likely a major factor. this leads to a broader observation that political parties are most likely to back climate action when those they view as their important constituents demand such action. in american politics, one individual example might be former congressman carlos curbelo of florida. during his service, curbelo—who represented a congressional district in south florida, which is among the areas most vulnerable to climate change—regularly bucked his republican party to back climate legislation, since such legislation was in high demand among his constituents (harder, 2018). curbelo’s backing made little difference, since one vote only goes so far in a legislative body with 435 members. however, it still provides further evidence that politicians, whether as individuals or as parties, are willing to shift their position to back climate legislation if their constituents demand it. the fourth, and perhaps most important, lesson that climate advocates can draw from the united kingdom is that ambitious governmental action on climate change is easiest when accomplished in steps, rather than in an overnight, all-or-nothing period. bipartisan backing of britain’s net-zero policy didn’t happen overnight. rather, it was the culmination of two decades of progressive public policies that learned from and built upon each other. the success of this incremental approach can be explained with two concepts from political science: the policy cycle and the overton window. the policy cycle is a roughly six-step process that describes how public policy is created in an ideal environment. the exact steps of the policy vary between models, but the central tenet remains the same: public policies are most successful when they operate in a cyclical manner, with each building upon the lessons of the last (f. fischer et al., 2006). the policy cycle can account for the evolutionary nature of numerous successful governmental policies in the u.s., from the clean air act (passed in 1963, amended in 1970, 1977, and 1990) to medicare (passed in 1966, amended in 1997, 2003, and 2010). the policy cycle is predicated on the fact that creating successful public policy is, by nature, a difficult and expensive endeavor, and such endeavors can be more successful when done in stages. british climate policy can also be described through the policy cycle model, beginning with the 2000 climate change programme and uk participation in the eu ets, then evolving into the climate change act of 2008, and, finally, theresa may’s goal of net-zero by 2050. each of these policy structures has learned from the last, and each has enacted more aggressive climate policies than the last. a key to the success of this policy cycle has been a constant willingness among british policymakers, such as those employed by the committee on climate change—a permanent government body dedicated to tracking british progress toward its emissions goals—to reassess progress and to modify policies to ensure they work better going forward. 55 consilience: the journal of sustainable development figure 1: one version of the policy cycle (eu geosciences union) the overton window is a concept first invented by joseph p. overton of the university of michigan to describe the range of policies acceptable to the public at any given time. policies that are too radical to be implemented in a given moment due to their unpopularity with the public are said to fall outside of the window. the window is not a static entity, but rather a means of representing the policy views of the public at a given moment (lehman, 2014). the window matters a great deal to the field of climate policy because policies can vary widely in their ambition and cost, and discerning which policies are acceptable to the majority of the public at a given moment is vital to successfully implementing such policies. shifts in the overton window tend to be either gradual or sudden. britain’s engagement with climate policies is an example of a gradual shift. if labour had campaigned in 1997 on ending sales of gas-powered cars by 2035 and having a carbon neutral economy by 2050, they would have been laughed out of office, as such policies lay far outside the political mainstream. instead, they campaigned on more modest policies, whose success and public benefits allowed them to gradually shift the window to the left, so that policies, such as the former, that had once been unthinkable were eventually seen as sensible by the bulk of the british public. the trajectory of such a shift is shown in figure 2. figure 2: the overton window (vox eu) the overton window on a given issue can also shift suddenly, usually in response to a given stimulus or event (lehman, 2014). one example of this from the world of energy policy is the idea of phasing out nuclear power, a stance that became much more popular following the 2011 fukushima nuclear accident (kang, 2019). that case study also illustrates the policy potential of shifts in the window, with the shift after the fukushima accident leading germany to phase out all of its nuclear plants. the british example shows us how, over the course of several years and several governments, the policy cycle and a shifting overton window can help make once-radical concepts of climate policy become mainstream. the problem is that, if the united states and peer nations are to make the types of emissions cuts necessary to avoid the worst effects of climate change, the world cannot afford to wait for two decades of gradual emissions reduction policies. this is the limitation of the british model; we must make progress on climate policy at a far greater rate than the united kingdom did if we are to avoid the worst effects of climate change. in reality, however, we may not need to wait for smaller policies to shift the overton window and make ambitious climate policies mainstream—climate change may be doing that for us. there is some evidence that adverse environmental conditions caused by climate change, such as air pollution and natural disasters, can lead to greater support for climate policies. an area’s exposure to natural disasters has been associated with a more successful adoption of climate mitigation laws (kalafatis, 2018). local air pollution has also been shown to increase the likelihood of a successful adoption of climate policies, at least in urban areas (hess and gentry, 2019). this suggests that, as the number and severity of extreme climate events increases, the odds of a large shift in the overton window may also increase. consilience: the journal of sustainable development scheuch: green evolution iv. conclusion the last four decades have seen the evolution of a cross-party and cross-sectional consensus on the need for britain to fight climate change. this consensus supports climate action at the domestic and international levels, and has proved durable even amidst brexit, the largest change in british politics since its joining of the european communities in 1973. the rise in this consensus has paralleled a steady progressive evolution in climate policy under governments from both major parties, allowing the uk to move from being the “dirty man of europe” to having the most ambitious climate goals in the g7. an examination of the historical roots of this consensus demonstrates that it has been primarily driven by public pressure and a recalculation of the economic impact of climate regulation. britain’s case should give proponents of sustainable development hope that it is possible to build durable, effective, cross-party consensus on climate change. such consensus is most easily accomplished when politicians consider supporting climate policy to be in their interest, when public pressure is applied both during and after elections, when the business community recalculates the value of climate policies into its bottom line, and when progress is accomplished in steps rather than an overnight period. britain’s experience does not suggest, however, that doing so is easy—it is quite the opposite, as britain’s progress on the issue has been driven by decades of hard work by activists and politicians in both parties. future research on the issue should monitor if the actions of britain’s leaders continue to live up to their rhetoric, and, specifically, what impacts that the covid19 crisis has had on the uk’s carbon reduction goals. the adaptability of the uk model to its peer nations will also be vital, as organizations like 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(1999). creating environmental policy in the european union. berlin, germany: springer. consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 25 (2021-22) using spatial context and demographic analysis to assess surface permeability in philadelphia nicholas zhu urban studies program advised by: dr. elaine simon and dr. elizabeth greenspan university of pennsylvania abstract surface permeability significantly impacts the urban environment. specifically, impermeable surfaces result in runoff, which in turn causes flooding and pollution. left unchecked, impermeable surfaces can lead to hazardous conditions for unlucky city residents. these concerns are prominent in philadelphia, and in response the municipal government has launched an ambitious plan to increase permeability by installing green infrastructure. this paper explores how spatial and demographic research can be combined to provide a holistic assessment of surface permeability across one of america’s largest cities. first, 2020 satellite imagery, provided by the united states geological survey (usgs), was used to classify permeable and impermeable surfaces over the entire city. next, demographic data from the 2014-2018 american community survey (acs)– household income, rent, and home value, all by census block group – were individually merged with the surface permeability classification to generate three overlays. for example, surface permeability was correlated with household income . upon quantitative and qualitative examination of these overlays, it was found that impermeable surfaces are unevenly distributed and inequitably concentrated in philadelphia’s lessaffluent communities. overall, the methodology used in this research demonstrates a multi-disciplinary and reproducible procedure for joint environmental-demographic research. additionally, the conclusions reached offer location-specific insights that can help inform philadelphia’s future green infrastructure investments and runoff mitigation strategies. introduction surface permeability is often overlooked. truth be told, ground observation is usually for avoiding puddles, or worse, the trails of a dog owner without a plastic bag. even though surface permeability is easily forgotten, it is critical to the environmental health of cities. impermeable surfaces which include common materials such as concrete, asphalt, gravel, and tar–lead to flooding and stormwater runoff. runoff is particularly a problem in cities with combined waste-stormwater sewer systems: philadelphia is such a city. when it rains, these sewers cannot handle the sheer volume of liquid and subsequently release excess untreated waste into local waterways. this process–called 2 consilience combined sewer overflow (cso)–is severely detrimental to human health and the environment. flooding is also a major threat to cities, as demonstrated by the devastation wrought by hurricane katrina on new orleans. permeable surfaces protect against such environmental damage by absorbing stormwater and ensuring that sewers are not overwhelmed. as demonstrated by hurricane katrina, flood mitigation infrastructure is not equitably distributed across cities: poorer neighborhoods are often left more susceptible to stormwater hazards. this study examines the relationship between surface permeability and socioeconomic factors in order to assess stormwater runoff and environmental justice across philadelphia. in doing so, this paper asks the reader to consider this question: what would equitable surface permeability in philadelphia look like? while there is no concrete answer provided in the following pages, this research demonstrates that surface permeability is spatially and demographically unequal across philadelphia. while it is unrealistic to expect 100 percent permeable surfaces in any urban environment, the dominance of impermeable surfaces in philadelphia, especially within lower-income communities, is cause for concern. literature review many common elements of the environment can be considered green infrastructure (gi), including street trees, lawns, and public parks. thus, assessing gi requires a detailed survey of land characteristics (xu et al., 2018). in these surveys, remote sensing observation is more efficient than land-based techniques. remotely sensed imagery can be collected in many ways, the most common being satellites such as the nasa/usgs landsat missions. a wide variety of remote sensing techniques have been applied to surface permeability research in urban and suburban settings. many indices have been developed to identify permeable land characteristics, such as vegetation, in remotely sensed imagery (labib & harris, 2018; okujeni et al., 2018; padmanaban et al., 2019; taramelli et al., 2019). in environmental justice research, spatial context is essential. high resolution geographical analysis enables correlations to be made between environmental characteristics and demographic factors (weigand et al., 2019). spatial context is especially important in cities because metropolitan areas have dense and diverse landscapes. in highly populated regions, environmental data are often aggregated over too large of an area. these data then lose their resolution and specificity. detailed spatial context helps researchers to minimize the ecological fallacy of using group data to draw conclusions about an individual member of the group. throughout cities, surface permeability and environmental justice are unquestionably linked. comparatively impermeable neighborhoods experience more flooding and runoff–and suffer from more combined sewer overflows into local waterways. a recent storm that produced one-quarter inch of rain on the ground led to trash and raw sewage flowing down frankford creek, which lies in an impermeable semi-industrial region of philadelphia (kummer, 2019). recent studies have reported correlation between surface permeability, exposure to flooding-based contamination, and socioeconomic status (sansom et al., 2016). philadelphia happens to be a national leader in water management. notably, the city is taking a completely gi-based approach toward addressing their outdated, yet unfortunately typical, combined sewer system (dolowitz et al., 2018; fitzgerald & laufer, 2017). specifically, in 2011, the municipal government committed to a 25-year $2-billion plan called green city clean waters, which aims to create over 9,500 acres of new permeable surfaces (city of philadelphia, 2014). the city’s proactive decision to focus so heavily on gi implementation was atypical among its peers. in consilience zhu: using spatial context and demographic analysis contrast, washington d.c. proposed an unrealistically expensive gray infrastructure approach that would have separated the sewer system into waste and stormwater components (bauers, 2012). a new york-based study found that gi can be cheaper than gray infrastructure even without accounting for additional benefits of gi such as heat island mitigation (montalto et al., 2007). while green city clean waters is definitely a positive for philadelphia, stormwater management concerns are still pervasive in the city. for example, the 2019 incident in frankford creek left the waterway muddy brown and highly contaminated with hazards such as fecal bacteria (kummer, 2019). this incident shows that, despite philadelphia’s efforts, a clear need still exists for further gi implementation and surface permeability research. small storms continue to wreak havoc by introducing hazardous conditions in philadelphia’s communities. creating a supervised classification a supervised classification1 can efficiently identify permeable, impermeable, and water surfaces across philadelphia. a high-quality satellite image of philadelphia with minimal cloud cover is required for this process. i downloaded the selected image from the usgs earthexplorer. the image was taken on september 8, 2020, by the landsat 8 satellite.2 clouds covered 14 percent of the full image but none of philadelphia. i trimmed the downloaded image and converted it to a raster3 in which each pixel contained surface reflectance values for ten electromagnetic bands.4,5 figure 1 is an image constructed from the three electromagnetic bands in the visible light spectrum (blue, green, and red).6 this representation mimics what human eyes would see if looking upon philadelphia from above. 1 a supervised classification is a type of machine learning task that automatically partitions data based on pre-determined categories. 2 landsat 8 was launched in 2013, orbits the earth every 99 minutes, and collects imagery with 30 meter by 30 meter resolution. 3 a raster is a matrix of pixels in which each pixel contains specific information. 4 specifically, i used the following bands: coastal aerosol, blue, green, red, near infrared, shortwave infrared 1, shortwave infrared 2, cirrus, thermal infrared 1, and thermal infrared 2. 5 i performed the trimming and raster conversion in arcgis. 6 i performed the image construction in r. 4 consilience figure 1. true color composite of 2020 landsat 8 satellite imagery consilience zhu: using spatial context and demographic analysis next, i collected ground-truthed training data and placed them into a shapefile.7,8 i directly confirmed these individual training points as either permeable, impermeable9, or water. in total, i confirmed 418 permeable points, 342 impermeable points, and 212 water points for a total of 972 training data points. figure 2 is a map displaying the locations of all 972 training points. 7 i created the shapefile in arcgis. 8 while collecting training data for spatial analysis, accurate ground truthing is essential. if, for example, 50 impermeable training points were actually water bodies, the model’s ability to classify surfaces would be directly compromised. 9 in this instance of ground-truthing, impermeable surfaces consisted entirely of vegetation elements. therefore, permeable elements such as porous pavement were not classified as permeable. this is a limitation of a satellite-imagery based supervised classification. 6 consilience figure 2. training points confirmed through personal observation consilience zhu: using spatial context and demographic analysis after collecting the required imagery and training data, i wrote a supervised classification script (see appendix).10 using a decision tree structure, i computed predictions of surface permeability across philadelphia. figure 3 shows a generalized example of the decision tree.11 figure 4 maps the resulting classification of surface types. figure 3. example of decision tree structure 10 i wrote the supervised classification script in r. 11 in the generalized example, each condition represents a reflectance value. the model bases its prediction on the reflectance values of the training points. for example, in pixel q, if band 2’s reflectance is greater than x and band 2’s reflectance in permeable-surface training points is almost always greater than x, then pixel q is predicted to be a permeable surface. 8 consilience figure 4. supervised classification of surface permeability in philadelphia (2020) consilience zhu: using spatial context and demographic analysis as shown in figure 5, impermeable surfaces outnumber permeable surfaces in philadelphia by nearly 2:1. impermeable surfaces especially outnumber permeable surfaces in central and south philadelphia. in the northwest and northeast regions, permeable surfaces are relatively more common. these northern regions represent the sections of philadelphia that are beginning to blend with suburban landscapes. to confirm the accuracy of the classification, i compared the predicted permeability with the original training data. the following is an example of this comparison in question form: for a training point that was confirmed in-person as an impermeable surface, was an impermeable surface predicted by the machine learning model? for this criterion, the model was shown to be 99.59 percent accurate: of the 972 training points, 968 were predicted correctly. one water training point figure 5. surface area breakdown of 2020 supervised classification 19141200, 5.2% 216361800, 58.6% 133801200, 36.2% surface permeability supervised classification surface area in square meters water impermeable permeable 10 consilience and three permeable training points were incorrectly predicted as impermeable. as another validation method, i calculated the sensitivity12 and specificity13 for each category (see table 1). permeable impermeable water sensitivity 100.00% 98.84% 100.00% specificity 99.46% 100.00% 99.87% table 1. sensitivity and specificity of the supervised classification demographic analysis this study searches for connections between surface permeability and socioeconomic factors in order to consider issues of environmental justice and neighborhood affordability. specifically, this study examines a total of three community demographic indicators: household income, rent, and property values.14 i obtained the census block group for each indicator from the american community survey 2014-2018 5 year estimates. i then converted this data to raster outputs and separated the block groups into three categories: low, medium, and high (see figures 6, 7, and 8 12 sensitivity definition: (number of true positives) / (number of true positives + number of false negatives) 13 specificity definition: (number of true negatives) / (number of true negatives + number of false positives) 14 these indicators, while useful, are not a complete portrait of any community. a limitation of this demographic analysis is that it is impossible to create a complete depiction of an urban community using such indicators. consilience zhu: using spatial context and demographic analysis below). the break points were chosen to create roughly equal amounts of area in each category.15figure 6. median household income from the 2014-2018 american community survey 12 consilience figure 7. median rent from the 2014-2018 american community survey consilience zhu: using spatial context and demographic analysis figure 8. median home value from the 2014-2018 american community survey consilience zhu: using spatial context and demographic analysis correlating surface permeability with demographic data i combined the supervised classification with each of the demographic factors using the raster calculator feature in arcgis. for this process, i assigned numerical values to both the surface permeability and demographic indicator categorizations. then i multiplied the values together to create distinct product values. in order to perform this comparative analysis, both the surface permeability and demographic indicator raster datasets must have the same pixel size.16 an important issue was then revealed. the census bureau aggregates its demographic data by block group, each of which is much larger than 30 m by 30 m. the blockgroup-based data can easily be apportioned into a 30 m by 30 m raster, but the initial block-group aggregation lowers the overall spatial resolution of this comparative analysis. therefore, individual-building-level insights are unavailable. within the scope of this study, this problem could not be worked around. sufficiently recent single block or residence-based demographic data are not publicly available.17 once distinct categories were created for each correlation, the three maps shown in figures 9, 11, and 13 were created: surface permeability correlated with median household income, surface permeability correlated with median rent, and surface permeability correlated with median home value. for each map, i graphed surface areas for the distinct permeability/demographic categories (figures 10, 12, and 14). 16 in this case, the pixel size will be 30 meters (m) x 30 meters (m). 17 unaggregated census data becomes public 72 years after its collection. 15 consilience figure 9. spatial overlay combining surface permeability and household income data consilience zhu: using spatial context and demographic analysis figure 10. surface area breakdown of surface permeability correlated with median household income in the correlation between permeability and income, the two most common categories are impermeable, medium income and impermeable, low income. this result shows the disproportionately large presence of impermeable surfaces in the neighborhoods of less affluent residents. land falling in these two categories surrounds center city in a semicircular pattern that extends from south philadelphia, through west philadelphia, and up into lower north philadelphia. the circular pattern is cut off to the east by the delaware river. permeable, high income and impermeable, high income areas form certain distinct patches. the most notable impermeable, high income patch is center city. a clear patch of permeable, high income land can be seen in northwest philadelphia. another is observed in 82838700 77166900 60933600 56304000 36387900 36241200 18929700 impermeable, medium income impermeable, low income permeable, high income impermeable, high income permeable, low income permeable, medium income water surface permeability correlated with median household income surface area in square meters 17 consilience the northeast. while income cannot be called a predictor of permeability, a clear correlation exists. consilience zhu: using spatial context and demographic analysis figure 11. spatial overlay combining surface permeability and rent data 19 consilience figure 12. surface area breakdown of surface permeability correlated with median rent the correlation between surface permeability and median rent features numerous distinctly homogenous patches. impermeable, medium rent areas dominate in surface area, and clusters of this category can be seen most clearly throughout west and lower north philadelphia. patches of impermeable, low rent land feature heavily in philadelphia’s southernmost neighborhoods. center city is predominantly impermeable, high rent. additionally, both northwest and northeast philadelphia show large patches of permeable, high rent land. permeable, medium rent regions were by far the least represented but can be seen dispersed throughout the northernmost regions. as with the correlation between permeability and income, a semicircle of impermeable land that is occupied by less 90213300 63666900 62429400 53128800 49904100 30529800 18929700 impermeable, medium rent impermeable, high rent impermeable, low rent permeable, high rent permeable, low rent permeable, medium rent water surface permeability correlated with median rent surface area in square meters consilience zhu: using spatial context and demographic analysis affluent residents (signified by lower rent) is observed: a correlation between permeability and rent certainly exists. 21 consilience figure 13. spatial overlay combining surface permeability and home value data consilience zhu: using spatial context and demographic analysis figure 14. surface area breakdown of surface permeability correlated with median home value the correlation between surface permeability and median home value shows the largest homogenous patches of all three correlation maps. impermeable, medium value regions lead in surface area and are distributed expansively through northern philadelphia. another distinct patch can be seen in south philadelphia. impermeable, low value patches form a rough semicircle pattern surrounding central philadelphia similar to that described in the permeability/income and permeability/rent correlations. impermeable, high value patches can be easily distinguished in center city. permeable, high value patches are clearly present in northwest and northeast philadelphia. comparatively less surface area falls in the permeable, low value and permeable, medium value categories. 88369200 75894300 63435600 52046100 36172800 33954300 18929700 impermeable, medium value impermeable, low value permeable, high value impermeable, high value permeable, low value permeable, medium value water surface permeability correlated with median home value surface area in square meters 23 consilience having analyzed the correlation between permeability and three demographic factors, a general trend may be noted: impermeable surfaces in less-affluent neighborhoods surround an impermeable affluent central district. permeable affluent neighborhoods are concentrated in northwest and northeast philadelphia. figure 15 shows the sum of each correlation category over all three demographic factors. for example, the impermeable, medium category is calculated by adding together the impermeable, medium household income and impermeable, medium rent and impermeable, medium home value areas. as shown in figure 15 and table 2, high values for the demographic factors are closely split between permeable and impermeable surfaces: 51 percent of the highdemographic-factor areas are permeable. medium values of the demographic factors possess the largest difference between permeable and impermeable surfaces: 28 percent of medium-demographic-factor areas are permeable. 36 percent of lowdemographic-factor areas are permeable. table 2 shows for the summed surface area of all three demographic indicators, the difference between permeable and impermeable areas. the imbalance toward impermeable surfaces in the medium and low demographic factor categories is clear. consilience zhu: using spatial context and demographic analysis figure 15. surface area breakdown of surface permeability correlated with all three demographic indicators permeable, high minus impermeable, high 5,481,000 m2 permeable, medium minus impermeable, medium -160,695,500 m2 permeable, low minus impermeable, low -93,025,800 m2 table 2. difference between permeable and impermeable surface area over each demographic factor category 261421200 215490600 177498000 172017000 122464800 100725300 impermeable, medium impermeable, low permeable, high impermeable, high permeable, low permeable, medium surface permeability correlated with the sum of all three demographic indicators surface area in square meters 25 consilience discussion what does it mean for surface permeability to be equitably distributed across philadelphia? should there be a comparable ratio of permeable to impermeable surfaces for each demographic category? there is no “correct” answer to this query. however, the dominance of impermeable surfaces in low and medium demographic factor categories suggests a degree of urban environmental inequity. this spatial-demographic analysis does not provide a blanket answer as to how surface permeability correlates with the three selected demographic factors in philadelphia. at the finest level, neighborhood specific assessments are possible. for example, center city philadelphia can be characterized as both affluent—in this case defined as majority high income, high rent, and high home value—and covered with mostly impermeable surfaces. there are several broad themes that can be extracted from the three correlation maps and associated bar graphs and tables. more affluent neighborhoods are concentrated in the center of philadelphia and in the northwest and northeast corners. in the heart of philadelphia, land is almost completely impermeable: center city and the surrounding neighborhoods are densely developed, with only a scattering of public green spaces such as rittenhouse square park. this central region appeals to those who desire high-density living, seek minimal distance to philadelphia’s economic center, and can afford the associated costs of living. on the other hand, in philadelphia’s largely affluent northwest and northeast corners, land is largely permeable. this fact can perhaps be explained by identifying these outer neighborhoods as the transition point between the city and its less-developed suburbs. wealthy residents of these northern areas still need to be close to consilience zhu: using spatial context and demographic analysis philadelphia’s economic center, yet they also are looking to escape problems associated with high-density urban living. in between these two affluent sections is a semicircle that contains the bulk of lower-income, lower-rent, and lower-home-value communities. as shown in table 2, philadelphia’s wealthiest communities are about equally divided between permeable and impermeable surfaces. however, this division is not random within wealthy communities: the wealthy central neighborhoods are predominantly impermeable, while the wealthy outlying communities are generally permeable. on the other hand, in medium and low-demographic-factor communities, impermeable surfaces far outnumber permeable surfaces. generally, it is much likelier to encounter a permeable surface in an affluent community than in a lower income community. the overall increase in permeability with distance from the city center is reflective of philadelphia’s historical development. the older more central regions were developed in an era when surface permeability was not considered a priority. the variations of socioeconomic status with distance from the center are consistent with burgess’s concentric zone model (burgess, 1924). together, these patterns in permeability and demographics yield the correlations observed in this study, in which the relatively affluent choose between the impermeable city center or a permeable outlying zone. thus, wealthy residents have the option to live in the dense and impermeable center city or in the permeable neighborhoods bordering philadelphia’s northern suburbs. less wealthy residents have few alternatives besides living in the impermeable semicircle that envelops center city. 27 consilience is permeability an indicator of the cost of living and neighborhood affordability? what kind of value can be attributed to permeable surfaces? the answers vary from neighborhood to neighborhood. in regions bordering the suburbs, permeable land appears to be highly coveted. residents of these areas likely have more space and therefore value permeable open green space such as private lawns and backyards. in the more densely developed portions of philadelphia, permeability is not a clear distinguishing factor between affluent regions such as center city and the less-affluent southern neighborhoods. in summary, the most notable patterns that can be identified are as follows. 1) philadelphia’s center is largely impermeable and affluent. 2) moving away from the city’s center, the land is still largely impermeable but less affluent. 3) nearing the border between suburbs and city in philadelphia’s northwest and northeast corners, the proportion of permeable and affluent neighborhoods increases. conclusion this research has revealed a spatially and socially uneven distribution of permeable surfaces across philadelphia. specifically, permeable surfaces are concentrated in the relatively affluent northwest and northeast corners of the city. while the methods of this study were conducted successfully and the research questions were addressed, there is potential for further research on this topic. extensions of this work could begin by incorporating more demographic factors into the correlation analysis. as stated in the demographic analysis section, household income, rent, and home value do not paint a complete portrait of any community. demographic factors such as race, ethnicity, land value, and highest attained level of consilience zhu: using spatial context and demographic analysis education might be illuminating. additionally, non-demographic variables such as land use and proximity to center city could show illuminating correlations with surface permeability. in the future, the methods of this study can be used to assess surface permeability in other cities besides philadelphia. for example, as mentioned in the literature review, new york city and washington d.c. have concerns regarding surface permeability, runoff, and combined sewer systems. at present, this study can help planners and government officials in philadelphia to assess permeability with high spatial resolution and create narratives relating environmental and demographic data. supervised learning tasks and correlations with demographics can help identify ideal locations for investments in gi that equitably benefit both affluent and lower income communities. peering into the future, this study aligns with philadelphia’s goal to become a smarter city. in 2019, the municipal government released a document called the smartcityphl roadmap, which outlines the applications, objectives, and values of local urban technology solutions. this paper’s methodology can be extended to inform green-tech assessments of the environmental and health concerns associated with impermeable surfaces. if the reader is to come away from this paper with one takeaway, it would be that surface permeability in philadelphia cannot be described in one blanket statement. as explained in the literature review, permeable surfaces in the form of gi appear in many variations. surface permeability has a complicated correlation with household income, rent, and home values in philadelphia. in broadest terms, permeable surfaces are not proportionally distributed among affluent and lower 29 consilience income communities. despite the complex nature of these findings, the author –and hopefully the reader–have come away from this research with a more holistic and extensive understanding of surface permeability in philadelphia. consilience zhu: using spatial context and demographic analysis bibliography bauers, s. (2012, april 11). phila. embarks on green stormwater management. philadelphia inquirer. burgess, e. w. (1924). the growth of the city: an introduction to a research project. publications of the american sociological society 43, 85-97. dolowitz, d. p., bell, s., & keeley, m. (2018). retrofitting urban drainage infrastructure: green or grey? urban water journal 15, 83-91. fitzgerald, j., and laufer, j. (2017). governing green stormwater infrastructure: the philadelphia experience. local environment 22, 256-268. kummer, f. (2019, september 13). the secret scourge of climate change? more raw sewage in philadelphia's waterways. philadelphia: philadephia inquirer. labib, s. m., & harris, a. (2018). the potentials of sentinel-2 and landsat-8 data in green infrastructure extraction, using object based image analysis (obia) method. european journal of remote sensing 51, 231-240. montalto, f., behr, c., alfredo, k., wolf, m., arye, m., & walsh, m. (2007). rapid assessment of the cost-effectiveness of low impact development for cso control. landscape and urban planning 82, 117-131. okujeni, a., canters, f., cooper, s. d., degerickx, j., heiden, u., hostert, p., priem, f., roberts, d. a., somers, b., van der linden, s. (2018). generalizing machine learning regression models using multi-site spectral libraries for mapping vegetation-impervious-soil fractions across multiple cities. remote sensing of environment 216, 482-496. padmanaban, r., bhowmik, a. k., cabral, p. (2019). satellite image fusion to detect changing surface permeability and emerging urban heat islands in a fastgrowing city. plos one 14, e0208949. philadelphia, city of. (2014). green streets design manual. http://www.mapc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/gsdm_final_20140211.pdf philadelphia, city of. (2019). smartcityphl roadmap. https://www.phila.gov/media/20190204121858/smartcityphlroadmap.pdf 31 consilience sansom, g., berke, p., mcdonald, t., shipp, e., & horney, j. (2016). confirming the environmental concerns of community members utilizing participatorybased research in the houston neighborhood of manchester. international journal of environmental research and public health 13, 839. taramelli, a., lissoni, m., piedelobo, l., schiavon, e., valentini, e., nguyen xuan, a., & gonzález-aguilera, d. (2019). monitoring green infrastructure for natural water retention using copernicus global land products. remote sensing 11, 1583. weigand, m., wurm, m., dech, s., & taubenböck, h. (2019). remote sensing in environmental justice research – a review. geo-information 8, 20. xu, x., schreiber, d. s. p., lu, q., & zhang, q. (2018). a gis-based framework creating green stormwater infrastructure inventory relevant to surface transportation planning. sustainability 10, 4710. consilience zhu: using spatial context and demographic analysis appendix script for supervised classification of surface permeability programming language: r integrated development environment: rstudio __________________________________________________________________ ____________ # clear the global environment rm(list=ls()) # set the working directory setwd("c:/users/classification") ##### # load libraries library(raster) library(tidyverse) library(sf) library(rpart) library(caret) library(forcats) library(rpart.plot) library(rastervis) library(mapedit) library(mapview) library(magrittr) library(ggplot2) ##### # 2020 imagery preparation and processing # bring in 2020 satellite imagery as individual bands band1 <raster("2020_data/band1.tif") band2 <raster("2020_data/band2.tif") band3 <raster("2020_data/band3.tif") band4 <raster("2020_data/band4.tif") band5 <raster("2020_data/band5.tif") band6 <raster("2020_data/band6.tif") band7 <raster("2020_data/band7.tif") # band8 <raster("2020_data/band8.tif") # band 8 omitted because of an incompatible extent band9 <raster("2020_data/band9.tif") band10 <raster("2020_data/band10.tif") band11 <raster("2020_data/band11.tif") # stack the bands into a multi-band raster image <stack(band1, band2, band3, band4, band5, band6, band7, # band8,band9, band10, band11) # print image properties nlayers(image) crs(image) res(image) ##### 33 consilience # create initial plots of 2020 imagery # plot the true color composite par(col.axis="white",col.lab="white",tck=0) plotrgb(image, r = 4, g = 3, b = 2, stretch = "lin", main = "2020 true color composite") # export the true color composite to the working directory truecolor <stack(band2, band3, band4) path <"2020_truecolorcomposite.tif" writeraster(truecolor, filename=path) # plot the false color composite par(col.axis="white",col.lab="white",tck=0) plotrgb(image, r = 5, g = 4, b = 3, stretch = "lin", main = "2020 false color composite") ##### # preparation for predictive modeling # read-in training data training_points <st_read("2020_data/training_points.shp") # extract the spectral values for each training point training_points <as(training_points, 'spatial') df <raster::extract(image, training_points) %>% round() # create spectral profiles of each classification category (permeable, etc.) profiles <df %>% as.data.frame() %>% cbind(., training_points$id) %>% rename(id = "training_points$id") %>% na.omit() %>% group_by(id) %>% summarise(band1 = mean(band1), band2 = mean(band2), band3 = mean(band3), band4 = mean(band4), band5 = mean(band5), band6 = mean(band6), band7 = mean(band7), # band8 = mean(band8), band9 = mean(band9), band10 = mean(band10), band11 = mean(band11)) %>% mutate(id = case_when(id == 1 ~ "permeable", id == 2 ~ "impermeable", id == 3 ~ "water")) %>% as.data.frame() head(profiles) # plot the spectral profiles of each classification category across each band profiles %>% select(-id) %>% consilience zhu: using spatial context and demographic analysis gather() %>% mutate(class = rep(c("permeable", "impermeable", "water"), 10)) %>% ggplot(data = ., aes(x = fct_relevel(as.factor(key), levels = c("band1", "band2", "band3", "band4","band5", "band6", "band7", # "band8", "band9", "band10", "band11")), y = value, group=class, color = class)) + geom_point(size = 2.5) + geom_line(lwd = 1.2) + scale_color_manual(values=c("#e8cf7d", "#2a7332", "#0032a0")) + labs(title = "spectral profiles", x = "", y = "surface reflectance") + theme(panel.background = element_blank(), panel.grid.major = element_line(color = "gray", size = 0.5), panel.grid.minor = element_line(color = "gray", size = 0.5), axis.ticks = element_blank()) # create a histogram of spectral profiles profiles %>% select(-id) %>% gather() %>% mutate(class = rep(c("permeable", "impermeable", "water"), 10)) %>% ggplot(., aes(x=value, group=as.factor(class), fill=as.factor(class))) + geom_density(alpha = 0.75) + geom_vline(data = . %>% group_by(class) %>% summarise(grp.mean = mean(value)), aes(xintercept=grp.mean, color = class), linetype="dashed", size=1) + scale_fill_manual(values=c("#e8cf7d", "#2a7332", "#0032a0"), name = "class") + scale_color_manual(values=c("#e8cf7d", "#2a7332", "#0032a0")) + theme(panel.background = element_blank(), panel.grid.major = element_line(color = "gray", size = 0.5), panel.grid.minor = element_line(color = "gray", size = 0.5), axis.ticks = element_blank()) + labs(x = "reflectance value", y = "density", title = "density histograms of spectral profiles", subtitle = "vertical lines represent mean group reflectance values") ##### # predict surface permeability across philadelphia for 2020 # combine spectral values with their surface permeability class (permeable, etc.) df <data.frame(training_points$id, df) model.class <rpart(as.factor(training_points.id)~., data = df, method = 'class') 35 consilience # plot a decision tree rpart.plot(model.class, box.palette = 0, main = "classification decision tree", tweak = 1.1) # predict surface permeability across philadelphia pr <predict(image, model.class, type ='class', progress = 'text') %>% ratify() levels(pr) <levels(pr)[[1]] %>% mutate(legend = c("permeable", "impermeable", "water")) # plot it levelplot(pr, maxpixels = 1e6, col.regions = c("#2a7332", "#e8cf7d", "#0032a0"), scales=list(draw=false), main = "supervised classification of imagery") # export the classification raster path2 <"2020_classification.tif" writeraster(pr, filename=path2) ##### # model validation # compare the training data to the results of the model test <raster::extract(pr, training_points) %>% as.data.frame() %>% rename(id = ".") testprobs <data.frame( obs = as.factor(training_points$id), pred = as.factor(test$id) ) %>% mutate(correct = ifelse(obs == pred, 1, 0)) # plot a confusion matrix confmatrix <confusionmatrix(testprobs$obs, testprobs$pred) confmatrix introductionintroduction the 2014 nobel prize in physics went to three japanese researchers for their invention of the blue light diode (webb, 2014). this final piece completed the trifecta needed to create the clean, white lighting now present in many modern, industrialized cities. making white light requires wavelengths in the red, green, and blue visible light spectrum. red and green diodes have been around since the early 1900s, only changing in efficiency and shade throughout the years. the blue light emitting diode eluded scientists for decades until the nobel prize winning physicists perfected it. it is now 2020. the world is brighter than ever before. not only are we showered by the intense rays of a star, but we have created our own sources of light. photographs from outer space reveal bright whites and yellows splattered across an otherwise dark planet—an anthropogenic constellation that shares the locations of the most populous places on earth (figure 1). light often carries positive associations as a symbol of knowledge and growth. ‘having a lightbulb moment’ equates to sudden inspiration. ‘seeing the light’ means coming to an important understanding on an issue. it is concerning that society’s view is mostly positive when there are real, negative effects view journal | view issue light energy: our wasted resourcelight energy: our wasted resource kaitlyn tatro department of economics and environmental science, university of michigan, ann arbor, mi 48109, united states, email: ketatro@umich.edu keywords:keywords: alan, light pollution, led, blue-light, health abstract:abstract: artificial light at night (alan) is a form of visual pollution and energy waste that is often overlooked. the international dark sky association estimates that 30% of all lighting is strictly for the outdoors. furthermore, 30% of all outdoor lighting is wasted, used (1) when not needed, or (2) pointing directly upwards. in 2017, the us wasted approximately 60 billion kilowatt hours (kwh), translating to a loss of more than $6.3 billion and co2 emissions in excess of 23 billion pounds. alan has been linked to reduced production of melatonin, the body’s sleep-regulating hormone, which is associated with increased risk of hormonal cancers including breast and prostate cancer. in fact, the world health organization (who) now lists shift work as a type ii risk for cancer. light at night threatens migratory birds, a majority of which fly at night presumably using constellations as their guide. light pollution paints the sky black, pushing astronomers to ever-shrinking dark zones suitable for studying the universe. in the most severely affected cities, only a handful of stars can be seen where once thousands dazzled gazers. society’s overreliance on alan has resulted in energy waste, adverse health effects, and pervasive pollution contributing to climate change and concealing our starry night sky. 65 doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6731 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 65-72 figure 1: nasa earth observatory images by joshua stevens, using suomi npp viirs data from miguel roman, nasa’s goddard space flight center. reprinted from nasa (2017). author’s note:author’s note: the sky used to be filled with stars. i remember spending nights looking up and counting for hours. have you ever lost yourself in the expanse of space, realizing how small you are compared to the tiny speck one-hundred times the size of your own sun? did you know that on nights of a new moon, it’s possible to see the spiraling arms of the milky way galaxy? ironically, as the city grows ever brighter, my nights grow continually darker. the stars are disappearing behind curtains of scattered light from artificial sources. the night sky is fading out into a blank black canvas. i chose to research light pollution as part of an energy resources course at the university of michigan-dearborn because it’s an economic, environmental, and societal issue. humanity has always been inspired by the beauty in the night sky; i hope we find that beauty again. july 6, 2020 http://consiliencejournal.org https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/consilience/issue/view/651 consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6731 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 65-7266 associated with increased lighting. ironically, the more light we have the less we may actually see. this study examines energy consumption for lighting in the us, explains the associated pollution and health effects that arise from alan, and describes how society can fight back to regain natural, beautiful night skies without sacrificing visibility. energy and lighting in the usenergy and lighting in the us in 2017, us households consumed approximately 97.7 quadrillion british thermal units (≈2.86 x 1013 kwh) of energy (eia, 2018b). of this, 38.1% went to generating electricity. table 1 shows the 2017 market breakdown for electricity consumption in the us. the residential sector on average consumed less kwh than commercial and industrial customers but had the most consumers and higher rates. although the commercial and industrial sectors both consumed more kwh on average per month, the sheer volume of residential customers makes this the most energy demanding sector. an interesting pattern emerged from the data: the states consuming the most kwh also had the lowest cost/ kwh. using a simple linear regression model with spss, i tested the theory that consumption (dependent variable) is based on cost/kwh (independent variable) in the residential sector. the results are shown in table 2. the regression explains about 57% of the variation centered on the mean, with every additional penny resulting in an approximate decrease of 40 kwh consumed. the weak correlation implies factors beyond price influence electricity consumption, such as length of daylight, climate, state, availability of substitutes (wood logs, geothermal energy, etc.), and others. to further test the relationship between price and consumption, i ran a second regression by transforming the variables. by using the natural log of each variable, we can test the elasticity of the electricity market. these results are shown in table 2. the relationship here is stronger, with 69% of the variation centered on the mean explained. according to this model, for every 10% change in price, demand (consumption) decreases by 8%. since the change in demand is smaller in magnitude than the change in price, this is an inelastic market. inelastic markets typically result from insufficient alternative products for consumers. the limitation on alternatives or substitute goods means a change in price will not significantly impact consumption. for example, the gasoline industry is inelastic because even if prices increase dramatically tomorrow, demand will not change much in the short run since most americans own gas-powered vehicles. it would take time for consumers to find alternative modes of transportation like electric cars, bicycles, and public transportation. similarly, an inelastic electricity market means there are few alternative forms of energy available to consumers in the short run. this makes increasing the price of electricity a less effective solution for targeting light pollution than policy-making or education. table 1: electricity market breakdown by sector for 2017. created using data from the eia (2018a). see appendix for specific source information. table 2: linear regression results for consumption and cost in the u.s. electricity market. model 1 tests consumption (dependent variable) against cost/kwh (independent variable). model 2 tests for market elasticity by taking the natural log of the variables. consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6731 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 65-7267 the office of energy efficiency & renewable energy (2015) estimates that lighting accounts for 17% of electricity consumption in the us, with 30% of all lighting used explicitly outdoors (office of energy efficiency & renewable energy, 2015). the international dark sky association estimates that 30% of this outdoor lighting is wasted, meaning lights are installed in areas they are not needed, are left on when not in use, or are directed upwards such that light is scattered into the atmosphere. using these ratios, we can estimate the amount of wasted outdoor lighting in the us for 2017. this is done in table 3. more than 60 billion kilowatt hours were wasted for a relatively unnecessary use of electricity. lighting does not move people from point a to b. it does not power our tools. its purpose is to let us see, and the dominating perception is more light equals more sight. modern lightbulbs are more efficient and brighter than ever, and our persistence in installing more and more lights has nearly doubled the number of lumens cast into the night. the financial costs alone give sufficient reason to combat wasted outdoor lighting, but the incentive increases tenfold when considering its impact on greenhouse gases. the lawrence livermore national laboratory working under the u.s. department of energy created a flowchart breaking down us energy production. with the data from their estimated u.s. energy consumption in 2017: 97.7 quads, it is possible to calculate the estimated emissions from wasted outdoor lighting, shown in table 4. the volume of petroleum, natural gas, and coal used in the mix of electricity production for the wasted outdoor lighting of the entire us contributed over 23 billion pounds of co2 emissions into the atmosphere in 2017. this comprises 10% of emissions caused by lighting in the u.s. light pollutionlight pollution the international dark-sky association defines light pollution as “the inappropriate or excessive use of artificial light” that “can have serious environmental consequences for humans, wildlife, and our climate” (n.d.). light pollution crosses property lines and trespasses freely. images 1 & 2 illustrate how light pollution masks a star-filled night sky. night skies like the one on the right have become increasingly rare as more light is used in cities. one-third of humanity, including 80% of north americans, can no longer see the milky way. 99% of americans and europeans live under light-polluted skies (falchi et. al. 2016). in the us, roughly 38% of the population is exposed to significant light pollution, more than 41 times the natural background brightness (falchi table 3: breakdown of lighting in the u.s. for 2017 with a focus on outdoor lighting. see appendix for sources and explanations of values table 4: based on the percentage of each resource used to produce electricity, the estimated carbon footprint can be calculated for wasted outdoor lighting in 2017. consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6731 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 65-7268 2016). compared with the top 20 developed countries, the us has the sixth largest proportion of population exposed to significant light pollution. yet, 30% of the us’s land area is at or only slightly above the natural background brightness (falchi 2016), meaning there is still time for the u.s. to preserve large portions of natural sky. as stars fade into the background and the light of the galaxy is blocked by the glow of halogen and led lighting, we risk losing part of our identity. astronomer neil de grasse tyson said it best: “when you look at the night sky, you realize how small we are within the cosmos. it’s kind of resetting of your ego. to deny yourself of that state of mind, either willingly or unwittingly, is to not live to the full extent of what it is to be human” (department of physics, florida atlantic university (n.d.)). how are we to understand ourselves if we cannot see our place in the universe? many of earth’s species are being tested by similar difficulties. i. environmental disruptions north america holds four of the world’s largest migratory bird flight paths: the pacific, central, mississippi and atlantic flyways (flap canada, n.d.). many migratory bird species like the chestnut-sided warbler fly at night using the constellations as a guide. bright lights from cities pull them off course. once inside city limits, the lighting, noise, and tall structures disorient the birds. many cannot find their way out of the maze of buildings, wires, and lights. once day breaks, reflective surfaces add to the challenge and collisions are unavoidable. since 1993, volunteers from the fatal light awareness program (flap) have picked up hundreds of thousands of birds belonging to over 160 species in the toronto region (flap, n.d.). around 60% of these birds have been found dead. migratory birds are not the only species suffering from light at night. at least 30% of vertebrates and more than 60% of all invertebrates worldwide are nocturnal (bogard, 2013, pp. 131). many ecologists are concerned about sea turtles. female sea turtles time their egg-laying so hatchlings emerge from the sand near or on the night of a full moon. hatchlings use the moon’s reflection over the water as a giant beacon or guide to reach the safety of the water. however, the full moon is no longer the brightest light in the night sky. anthropogenic lighting along roads and houses confuse the newly hatched turtles. the natural instinct which served sea turtles so well for millions of years is no longer fool proof. instead of heading down the beach towards the water, they now crawl towards civilization where many are crushed by automobiles and passersby, fall into cracks and sewage drains, or become dinner to the predatory species taking advantage of their confusion. a lesser known case of these impacts occurs nightly at the luxor casino in las vegas (image 3). the top of this pyramid-shaped structure shoots off a beam so bright, it has acquired its own ecosystem. moths from the surrounding desert flock to the glowing point, which in turn attracts bats, which then attract owls (morris, 2017). what ensues is a feeding frenzy; the dense concentration of food attracts the surrounding fauna, but the energy bats and owls expend flying to the casino from the surrounding desert detracts from the gains. by the time they make the journey back, they have little to no food to give to their young. the intense beams themselves are a danger. the light can disorient birds, as ellen meloy notes in her essay, “the flora and fauna of las vegas.” her essay describes with vivid imagery the sight of a mallard duck losing its way in the intense lighting, and colliding with a powerline. the sight of a frying duck will no doubt linger in our minds, but it is what goes unseen that is most concerning. hardly a second thought is given before squashing a moth beneath a roll of newspaper. yet these organisms are credited with pollinating almost 80% of the world’s flora image 1 and 2: (left) photo of a house in canada taken during the night. (right) photo taken of the same house on august 14th, 2003, during a blackout. without light pollution, residents could see bands of light from the milky way galaxy with their naked eye. photo credit: todd carlson. source: department of physics, florida atlantic university (n.d.) image 3: the luxor casino in las vegas is the brightest location in the world due to its 39 lamps at the top, each of which reach 7,000 watts and cost $51 hourly to run (morris, 2017). photo credit: morris (2017) source: mcgraw 2017 consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6731 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 65-7269 (bogard, 2013, pp. 138). they emerge at night and because of their attraction to light, they suffer tremendously. as society continues to advance, more light follows. the night sky shrinks further out of sight, and where the night retreats, its creatures vanish too. ii. health effects melatonin is an incredibly important “sleep” hormone produced by the body. the time of day regulates its release in the brain with levels rising in the evening and falling in the morning (nih, 2015). richard stevens published the first article relating alan to cancer in 1987. his conclusion that “increasing use of electricity to light the night leads to circadian rhythm disruption which accounts for part of the breast cancer burden in the modern world and rising risk in developing countries” has had surprisingly little impact on the increasing brightness of our cities (bogard, 2013, pp. 104). david blask and colleagues (2005) further corroborated stevens’s claims when they ran experiments showing that human blood taken during the night prevented tumor growth in rats. when this experiment was replicated using the blood of individuals exposed to daylight and light at night, neither group’s blood samples had the aforementioned tumor-fighting impact. this means that the body might respond similarly to daylight and light at night. both scenarios cause reduced melatonin production in the body, which in turn has been linked to breast cancer. considering david berson and colleagues’ work from brown university, this comes as less of a surprise. in 2002, his team published research on a newly discovered photoreceptor cell in the retina previously thought not to be light-sensitive (bogard, 2013, pp. 105-106). these cells contribute to the external cues, or zeitgeber, that vertebrate use to reset their circadian rhythms to local times (department of physics, florida atlantic university, n.d.). isolated in a petri dish, the cells react strongest to blue light—wavelengths approximately between 420 and 480 (figure 2). the ramifications of this are huge, which is in part why the who now lists shift work as a type ii cancer risk (bogard, 2013, pp. 108). until recently, breathing diesel fumes and exposure to uv light were also type ii risks. they have since been moved to type i, meaning they are now known and proven causes of cancer (bogard, 2013, pp. 109). beyond cancer, reduced production of melatonin can also mean a harder time falling asleep. the majority of light scattered in earth’s atmosphere has a short wavelength, making the sky appear blue. since humans evolved to be predominantly active during the day, evolution geared our photoreceptive cells to be sensitive to blue light in order to attune us to the day-night cycle. when we are exposed to blue light at night, it tricks our bodies into thinking it is still daylight. this in turn prolongs the amount of time the body needs to wind down and ready for rest. 25% of adults in the u.s. already report insufficient sleep or rest every 15 out of 30 days (american sleep apnea association, 2017). this has consequences for the economy. tired workers are not as productive or attentive, which translates into lost revenue. hafner et. al. (2017) analyzed 5 countries and estimates that the u.s. economy loses $411 billion annually due to sleep deprivation. japan is second with a loss of $138 billion, germany third with $60 billion, then the uk at $50 billion and canada at $21.4 billion. sleep deprivation also takes a toll on health. the body is actively working to repair your heart and blood vessels, build new neural pathways, balance hormones, and strengthen your immune system while you are asleep (nih 2019). this partly explains why adults managing between 6 to 7 hours of sleep each night face a 7% higher mortality risk than those who obtain 7 to 9 hours of sleep. sleeping fewer than 6 hours per night results in a 13% higher mortality risk (hafner et. al. 2017). many aspects of modern life contribute to sleep deprivation, including alcohol consumption, smoking, lack of exercise, psychosocial stress, and electronic use (hafner et. al. 2017). many devices are now equipped with a night-mode or blue-light filter for night-time use, though scholars like hafner et. al. (2017) still recommend limiting screen-time before bed. low wattage, blue-filtered lights at night can also help the eyes rest and the body prepare figure 2: the peak sensitivity of these photoreceptor cells occurs in the blue light spectrum. reprinted from the department of physics florida atlantic university (n.d.). consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6731 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 65-7270 for vital sleep. the best solution is to simply leave lights off until truly needed. solutionssolutions the outlook for the future is not all doom and gloom (there are too many lights for that). educated communities around the globe are coming together to protect and bring back dark skies. organizations like flap in toronto, canada have good reason to. toronto lies directly in the atlantic flyway. hundreds of thousands of birds from over 160 different species fly near and over the city to wintering grounds in the south. this non-profit organization and roughly 100 volunteers dedicate themselves to rescue, research, protect, and educate the public on anthropogenic causes of bird collisions. since its founding in 1993, flap has created guidelines for architects, engineers, and building owners, required mandatory anti-collision measures for all new buildings, and promoted the development of tinted window-films (bogard, 2013). one measure to protect migrating species is simple: turn off extra lights at night. this is what cities like highland park, michigan; clintonville, wisconsin; and rockford, illinois have done (npr, 2011). while perhaps not entirely motivated out of concern for the environment, these cities have successfully cut back on energy consumption by turning off and even removing some of their streetlights. rockford, home to 150,000 residents, removed 2,300 streetlights––about 15% of their total stock––saving between $250,000 and $500,000 annually (npr, 2011). since shutting off lights is the best way to cut down on light pollution, it is necessary to address societal concerns surrounding light at night. the most significant is unsurprising: safety. with lighting comes a sense of security. however, the link between lighting and crime is weak to non-existent. dr. barry clark from the astronomical society of victoria in australia conducted a massive review of literature on the relationship between crime and lighting. in 1977, the national institute of law enforcement and criminal justice reviewed 60 street lighting projects and presented their findings to congress (clark, 2002). they admitted to “no statistically significant evidence that street lighting impacts the level of crime, especially if crime displacement is taken into account” (clark 2002), yet in the same paragraph they mentioned how increased lighting may decrease the fear of crime. it does not change the level of crime, but it does misguide people into feeling safer about it. twenty years later, the same department did a more in-depth review. “conclusions for open urban places” by eck (1997) [31] determined that lighting works in some places, has no impact in others, and proves counterproductive in still other circumstances. there is very little confidence that improved lighting will prevent crime since it has not been proven that offenders don’t benefit from increased lighting as well (clark, 2002). paul bogard, author of the end of night, cites a joke he heard while researching the topic in london: “criminals actually prefer to work in well-lit areas because they, too, feel safer” (bogard, 2013, pp. 76). he then cites a study asking criminals what deterred them from targeting a house. the top answers were “belief that house is occupied,” “presence of alarms or cctv/camera outside the property,” and, to a lesser extent, the “apparent strength of doors/window locks” (bogard, 2013, pp. 76). while lighting inside the home may lead criminals into believing someone is home, it does not explicitly deter criminal activity on its own. thus, extra lighting provides the illumination a criminal needs to the point that david crawford, founder of the international dark-sky association, terms this criminal-friendly lighting (bogard, 2013, pp. 76). bob mizon, coordinator for the campaign for dark skies in figure 3: examples of good (shielded) and bad (unshielded) forms of lighting. many roadsides and crosswalks are being retrofitted with small led diodes installed on the underside of the light fixtures. while this eliminates upward misdirection of light, these designs allow light to travel great distances horizontally. the exposed glare invades surrounding areas and can be blinding due to the way light scatters across the eye. illustration by bob crelin. used with permission. consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6731 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 65-7271 the united kingdom, stresses how people forget lighting goes both ways: the people who claim benefits from lighting, they never put themselves in the mind of the criminal–– what does he or she possibly need? what does a burglar need, what does a rapist or mugger need? they need to assess the victim; they need to see what they’re doing. i mean, who benefits most from a big security light at three o’clock in the morning? (bogard, 2013, pp. 76). the chicago alley lighting project is one such case where criminals seemed to benefit most. in 2000, the city installed higher-watt lighting to foster feelings of safety and decrease crime rates (morrow and hutton, 2000, pp. i). instead, they experienced a 21% increase in criminal activity (morrow and hutton, 2000, pp. iii). in 2008, california required the pacific gas and electric company to review more current research on the topic. the company found lighting had a mix of positive and negative effects on crime, the majority of which were not statistically significant. this suggests either no link between lighting and crime or a link so subtle or complex it didn’t appear in the data due to the limited study size (bogard, 2013, pp. 79). this does not mean lighting is unnecessary, but we can reduce the number of lumens without significant impact to society. in walking areas or traffic zones, a lower-watt light bulb not only reduces energy costs and pollution, but counters visual glares affecting passersby. parisian lighting designer roger narboni hopes that people will become more comfortable with shadows and darkness: in north africa, shadows are more important than light—the way that you play with the contrasts of shadows and light... we hide ourselves because the sun is so powerful. so for me in my everyday work this play between shadows and light is very important (bogard, 2013, pp. 232). narboni’s outlook is that lighting can be both functional and beautiful, and that darkness is a powerful medium. a new policy in paris seeks to renew all urban lighting while reducing energy consumption by 30% by 2020 (bogard, 2013, pp. 232), giving narboni a chance to put his beliefs into practice. however, not every city or household can afford a master light technician. in this case, there is a guide produced by the international dark-sky association on acceptable light fixtures that minimize glare and light trespass. these forms of lighting are shown in figure 3. other policies that cities can take to minimize light trespass are requiring fully-shielded light fixtures, reducing wattage of lights, and including a shut-off or dimming time for low volume parking lots and roads. conclusionconclusion “one of the penalties of an ecological education,” said leopold, is that one lives alone in a world of wounds. much of the damage inflicted on land is quite invisible to laymen. an ecologist must either harden his shell and make believe the consequences of science are none of his business, or he must be the doctor who sees the marks of death in a community that believes itself well and does not want to be told otherwise (bogard, 2013, pp. 178). if we want to put an end to light pollution, wasted energy costs, biological impacts, negative health effects, and children growing up thinking a starless black sky is normal, then the public needs to be educated on the harms of artificial light at night. the data supports that alan causes more harm than good. the problem is our current perception of light. in order to bring about effective change, educators and policy-makers must work together. once people learn what they are seeing (and what they are not) it will become increasingly apparent what light pollution is stealing from us. if there is anything at all positive to say about light pollution, it is that it can be solved with the flip of a switch. referencesreferences american sleep apnea association. 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(2015). the effect of reduced street lighting on road casualties and crime in england and wales: controlled interrupted time series analysis. j epidemiol community health, vol. 69:1118-1124. retrieved from https://jech.bmj.com/content/69/11/1118. webb, j., (2014). invention of blue leds wins physics nobel, bbc news. retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-29518521. appendixappendix a values calculated using information from table t5.a from eia’s 2017 average monthly billresidential b values calculated using information from table t5.b from 2017 average monthly billcommercial c values calculated using information from table t5.c from 2017 average monthly billindustrial d provided from 2015 u.s. lighting market characterization. e estimate taken from the international dark-sky association in tucson, arizona. defined as lights on where not needed, when not in use, or direct up lighting. does not include costs for maintenance and lamps (“light pollution”). f calculated by taking average residential, commercial, and industrial monthly kwh usage multiplied by number of customers in each sector, then multiplied by 12 months for yearly average kwh consumption. g conversions for petroleum: co2 emissions for petroleum calculated by taking the average co2 emissions of petroleum coke, residual heating fuel, and home heating and diesel fuel (distillate). averages to approximately 27 lbs. co2 per gallon. estimates from 2017 average 138,324 btu per gallon of petroleum. h conversions for natural gas: 117.10 lbs. of co2 are released per 1000ft 3 of natural gas. eia 2017 estimates an average of 1,034 btu per ft3. i conversions for coal: 4,631.5 lbs. of co2 are released per 1 short ton (2000 lbs.) [2016 estimates]. estimates from 2017 average 9,544 btu per lb. of coal. j taken from u.s. energy flow chart by lawrence livermore national laboratory (2017). microsoft word note from eic.docx dear readers, i am pleased to present the 14th issue of consilience: the journal of sustainable development. our editorial and managing boards have worked tirelessly in the face of numerous structural changes to the group to bring you this issue, which is composed of 15 articles comprised of a cumulative 259 pages. 2015 will be a turning point for sustainable development, with the rollout of the sustainable development goals and the convening of the 21st conference of parties at the end of the year. we hope that all of our readers will engage with our most current edition and follow the international discourse. issue 14 features myriad subjects that transcend discipline and geography, all with major implications on the future of sustainability with regards to the following questions: (1) how can we reconcile the gaps that exist between normative language and tangible action, contradictory policies and unspoken priorities, and slow-moving policies and rapid technological advances? (2) how can we embrace the promises of rapidly advancing technology and knowledge while abandoning outmoded and wasteful practices? (3) could some of these very frameworks and technologies that are lauded be harming the very marginalized populations they are supposed to be helping? with respect to the first question, gregg badichek discusses the conflict between renewable energy siting and endangered species conservation, before offering solutions under the existing framework. gregor beck, cora ditzel, sofia ganter, and olga perov examine the disparity between the growing literature on human rights and climate change and the extent to which the latter is truly articulated in the international climate negotiations. megan berry examines how “sustainability” is conceptualized linguistically and rhetorically within industry, utilizing the canadian oil sands industry as a case study. miranda bernard, alyssa menz, and laura booth analyze the magnet effect in central kenya, which has implications for the future of ecosystem management. joanna caytas considers the inadequacies of decisionmaking and legal frameworks vis-à-vis technology assessment and systems analysis, which are not conducive to sustainable development. nua deedam and anthony onoja analyze the impact of poverty alleviation programs on poverty reduction and the economic empowerment of nigerian women. liz moyer presents an impact assessment model for an innovative scheme that is known as time banking, before linking it to the wider discourse on social capital and sustainable development. cephas mutami analyzes smallholder production as a potential pathway for fighting poverty in rural zimbabwe. g. owusu-boateng and m.k. gadogbe evaluate rainwater quality in dzodze, ghana and how it fluctuates from precipitation to storage. simon oginni and joash moitui consider meaningful policy measures that could be taken to boost public engagement in the electrical process using social media. finally, oyinbo oyakhilomen, adah daniel, and rekwot zibah probe the technical efficiency of poultry egg production in kaduna state, nigeria with regard to sustainable food security. with regards to the third question, rebecca krisel investigates gowanus, brooklyn, a superfund site that is undergoing gentrification, with broad impacts on its residents. joshua mullenite chronicle the history of development in guyana and the mistakes that have been made multiple times in the name of progress, with large human costs. anthony onoja and anthonia achike investigate land grabbing in west africa by international investors, and consider the consequences for food security, property rights, and environmental sustainability. finally, jonathan park appraises weak sustainability and the predominant neoliberal approach to valuing nature and addressing climate change, providing a wider critique of capitalism as it currently exists. the breadth of these subjects, from the role of metaphors in framing discourse to the omnipresence of macroeconomics and policy, reveals the complex obstacles that remain before humanity can truly realize sustainable development. 2015 will be a crucial turning point for sustainable development and international governance, with meaningful policy solutions in the pipeline. however, the significance of discourse and interdisciplinary engagement will only continue to grow as solutions to our world’s most pressing issues continue to emerge, and we at consilience are excited to continue facilitating this discourse. we encourage you to continue engaging with the journal through your readership, submissions, and contributions to our briefings column. as always, we welcome constructive feedback and hope that our work inspires you to engage with the issues. if you have any questions, comments, or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact us at contact@consiliencejournal.org. we hope you enjoy issue 14. ryan elivo editor-in-chief consilience: the journal of sustainable development june 12, 2015 prime, blocking oil development in yasuní national park consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 27 (2024) blocking oil development in yasuní national park: ecuador’s unprecedented strides towards environmental justice lillian prime middlebury college middlebury, vermont 05753 lprime@middlebury.edu abstract this paper explores ecuador's proposal to protect block 43 of the yasuní national park from oil drilling through the yasuní-itt initiative proposed in 2007. the paper will examine why the initiative failed and how community activists responded. ultimately, it will argue that the yasuní-itt initiative upheld environmental justice through its assertion of a moral economy and its potential to help ecuador step away from oil dependency and protect the rights of indigenous communities, particularly the two tribes living in voluntary isolation in the yasuní region. when the initiative was terminated and indigenous communities were not consulted in the decision to begin drilling for heavy crude oil, citizen activism and mobilization of democracy through a referendum reasserted environmental justice and indigenous rights. author’s note lillian prime is a senior at middlebury college majoring in environmental justice and minoring in spanish. after being in ecuador in august of 2023 during the referendum vote and celebrating with local community members, she was interested in learning more about how and why ecuador voted to protect yasuní and the people who live there. keywords: environmental justice, indigenous rights, climate change, yasuní, oil mailto:lprime@middlebury.edu consilience prime: blocking oil development in yasuní national park i. introduction and relevant background on ecuador's relationship to oil with the impacts of climate change increasing and resource extraction continuing to rise, environmental leaders are seeking alternatives to meet economic needs while protecting the environment and those who live there. in ecuador, block 43 of yasuní national park, a space with significant heavy crude oil resources, offers a relevant case study on how natural resources and local communities may be protected. this paper seeks to address what allowed for the protection of yasuní block 43 and how this case of environmental justice supports climate change mitigation. by exhibiting the power of environmental justice, community rights, and local activism when international efforts fail, yasuní offers hope for local individuals defending their rights against transnational corporate interests. yasuní marks a space of highly valued biodiversity. yasuní national park, created in 1979, hosts an incredible array of biodiversity including 1,300 species of trees and 610 species of birds (barzallo, 2023). yasuní is also home to the waoraní, kichwa, and the shuar peoples as well as two tribes who live in voluntary isolation, the tagaeri and taromenane (chivers, 2023). nestled within the ecuadorian amazon, the park is renowned internationally for its biodiversity and ecosystem services. it is both the appeal of these resources as well as ecuador's recognition of their intrinsic value that allowed it to become the first country to grant nature constitutional rights in 2008 (“ecuador first,” 2008). in a world leaning towards neoliberalism and growing corporations, "[t]he measure is a part of an effort to level the legal playing field against multinational corporations that, armed with enormous financial resources and the force of international law written in their favor, scour the earth looking for cheap resources" (“ecuador first,” 2008, p. 131). the "rights for nature” chapter of ecuador's constitution reads, "nature or pachamama, where life is reproduced and exists, has the right to exist...every person, people, community or nationality, will be able to demand the recognition of the rights of nature before public bodies" (“ecuador first,” 2008, p. 131). by giving nature rights, ecuador established a legal avenue for environmental advocacy. ecuador has long been exploited for natural resources by corporations seeking bananas, natural gas, and crude oil (“ecuador first,” 2008). instead of wealth, this resource extraction has brought debt and poverty. the 1970s oil boom "enabled the ecuadorian government to take advantage of low-interest loans to subsidize national infrastructure building programs; but by the 1980s oil prices fell at the same time as interest rates rose. between 1974 and 1984, ecuador's external debt had increased from $324 million to $8.4 billion" (davidov, 2012, p. 13). not only has resource extraction brought debt, but it has also left behind pollution that impacts both ecosystems and residents. in response, activists in 1991 began a campaign against texaco (now chevron) due to its pollution of the amazon (rivera, 2017). their actions laid the groundwork for future activists to advocate for the cessation of oil drilling in block 43 of the yasuní national park. ii. relevant literature this paper will explore environmental justice and relevant terminology including recognition, capabilities theory, substantive and procedural rights, payment for ecosystem services, and cruel optimism. pellow’s (2009, p. 3) approach to environmental justice asserts that "[e]cological violence is first and foremost a form of social violence." oil development in block 43 of yasuní national park not only creates environmental pollution, but afflicts local communities with health issues, cultural erasure, and constructed economic dependency. environmental justice requires an understanding of the different needs, knowledge, and cultures of different actors (schlosberg, 2004). 3 consilience capabilities theory acknowledges the importance of recognizing cultural differences in order to ensure that actors can participate fully in decision-making processes (schlosberg & carruthers, 2010). thus, recognizing the unique capabilities of indigenous communities within yasuní is necessary for them to fully exercise their procedural decision-making rights (as opposed to tangible substantive rights) (fuentes-george, 2021). the combination of recognition, capabilities theory, substantive rights, and procedural rights creates the conditions necessary for environmental justice. when ecuador asked the international community for financial compensation for not drilling in block 43, they enacted a payment for ecosystems services model. kolinjivadi (2019, p. 6) critiques this model for its creation of a "neoliberal performance." landowners are incentivized to depend on others to conserve ecosystem services rather than being inherently motivated to do so (kolinjivadi, 2019). while this paper will critique the payment model's repetition of financial extraction for natural resources, it is also important to acknowledge ecuador's lack of conservation resources compared to wealthier countries. some local community members are likely to see oil development as a path out of poverty, but they are historically not likely to be the benefactors of this development. cruel optimism is "when something [one desires] is actually an obstacle to [their] flourishing" (berlant, 2011 p. 1), a sentiment that creates hope around the potential for oil development to create financial opportunities from ecuador when, in reality, development is unlikely to directly support marginalized communities. iii. imagining a new possibility: the yasuní-itt initiative ecuador garnered global attention and pioneered a new approach to climate change mitigation with its unprecedented yasuní-itt initiative. in 2007, president rafael correa rolled out his proposal to protect block 43 (also known as itt or ishpingo, tambococha, tiputini) of yasuní national park from oil drilling. for the yasuní-itt initiative, ecuador established a fund through the united nations program for development to receive payments from other countries (quang & breña, 2016). correa proposed that the global community provide ecuador with $3.6 billion usd, an estimation that accounts for half of the profits ecuador could earn from exploiting block 43, to support the choice not to drill for oil (einhorn & andreioni, 2023). the yasuní-itt initiative puts the burden of responsibility for ecuador's conservation and climate change mitigation efforts on wealthier countries that have more resources to devote to such projects. thus, the initiative is not only a way to protect block 43 but also "a way to mobilize a new moral economy as a critique of the established economies of debt and oil" (davidov, 2012, p. 13). this initiative serves ecuador's goal to "keep the oil in the ground" while still supporting its economy (davidov, 2012, p. 12). additionally, it acknowledges ecuador's smaller contribution to greenhouse gas emissions as compared to larger, wealthier countries, disputing the assumption that ecuador should have to suffer financial consequences by not exploiting its natural resources for profit the same way wealthier countries have. the initiative challenges the idea that economic growth and environmental conservation are mutually exclusive by promoting alternative payment avenues for the use (or lack of use) of oil. block 43 contains at least 850 million barrels of heavy crude oil (finer et al., 2010). thus, not drilling in block 43 would prevent an estimated 410 million metric tons of carbon from entering the atmosphere (fiske, 2017). as global temperature rises, the choice to not drill in block 43 would mitigate these emissions. funds produced by the initiative were to be invested in "renewable energy, protection of biodiversity, and conservation of 44 protected areas" (quang & breña, 2016). thus, the fund created a long-term plan for ecuador to maintain its sustainability efforts. this is consilience prime: blocking oil development in yasuní national park significant not only for environmental and climate reasons but also for the indigenous communities residing in block 43, which covers 200,000 hectares within the park's 982,000 hectares (quang & breña, 2016). for those tribes, legal protection, procedural rights, and consultation about decisions regarding the land is essential to their ability to maintain traditional cultural practices. iv. the failure of the yasuní-itt initiative despite its positive reception by ecuador and the global community, the yasuní-itt initiative failed to raise the economic funds correa proposed. the initiative received support from a range of local and global actors (rivera, 2017). however, the requested economic support did not materialize. correa announced that the initiative would be terminated in august 2013 after only $13.3 million usd of the proposed $3.6 billion usd had been raised by donors including spain, germany, and italy (fiske, 2017). terminating the initiative would allow for oil drilling to begin that same year. part of this oil as well as revenue from the oil would be necessary to repay china for the loans ecuador had taken out while waiting on the yasuní-itt initiative, loans which totaled $8 billion from the time correa was in office (einhorn & andreoni, 2023). on august 15, 2013, correa stated, "the world has failed us...it wasn't charity we asked for. it was co-responsibility against climate change" (fiske, 2017, p. 127). ecuador blamed the global community for its failure to support the yasuní-itt initiative, directing responsibility for its choice to begin drilling to actors who chose not to contribute to the initiative. as oil drilling began, correa made empty promises to ecuadorian citizens about the economic benefits they would receive from this endeavor. shortly after the yasuní-itt initiative was terminated, "[a] state owned company, now part of petroecuador, started knocking on doors in indigenous communities throughout block 43, offering money, housing and sanitation projects" (einhorn & andreoni, 2023). government and oil companies both pushed the idea of trickle-down economics, suggesting that drilling oil would have benefits for local communities in the area. correa shared this narrative, stating, "you don't like oil. i don't like it either, but we should all dislike poverty even more" (rivera, 2017, p. 232). correa's words show his belief that oil drilling is necessary to support local indigenous communities and avoid poverty. however, the decision to end the initiative and begin drilling was made without any consultation with the indigenous communities who would be affected (ceballos, 2019). the promise of trickle-down benefits from drilling also fell flat. "economic gains have barely trickled down to communities that have lived close to oil development for decades. more than half the people who live in the ecuadorian amazon, where the vast majority of the country's oil comes from, are poor" (einhorn & andreoni, 2023). correa promises that oil development will bring prosperity to the amazon, but history shows otherwise. oil development of block 43 is much more likely to continue the pattern of exploitation, poverty, and wealth inequality. v. collective power: the yasunídos in response to the government's failure to protect block 43, citizen activists stepped up. in 2022, ecuador's president guillermo lasso stated, "now that the global trend is to abandon fossil fuels, the time has come to extract every last drop of benefits from our oil, so that it can serve the poorest while respecting the environment" (einhorn & andreoni, 2023). after the termination of the yasuní-itt initiative, government leadership continued to promote the perceived benefits of oil development to local communities. some indigenous peoples agreed with this narrative. cristóbal 5 consilience kasent, a shuar indigenous leader, spoke to the importance of the 150,000 jobs that oil development in block 43 helped create (“with protection action,” 2023). however, many communities were disappointed by the government's choice to develop oil in block 43 and started organizing as collective activists after 2013. these activists called themselves yasunídos, a combination of the words yasuní and unidos, meaning united in spanish (barzallo, 2023). the yasunídos were made up of a diverse group of individuals, including youth and indigenous peoples (chivers, 2023). through community organizing, yasunídos used activism to assert their power against the state. yasunídos harnessed local community power through democracy to make their voices heard. yasunídos gathered 750,000 signatures, almost double the requirement, to put block 43 on the ballot as a referendum (watts, 2023). this allowed citizens to determine the future of oil development in the region rather than the government. on august 20, 2023, ecuador voted 58.95% to 41.05% to keep the oil in the ground (with protection action, 2023). according to donziger (2023), "the yasuní referendum proves that real democracy that respects the popular will can be a powerful tool for transitioning to a sustainable future." the referendum required oil companies to stop drilling immediately and gave them 18 months to dismantle their operations (chivers, 2023), successfully redistributing power from government leadership and corporations to local communities. vi. conclusion and recommendations the yasuní-itt initiative and ensuing citizen activism aimed to uphold justice for both the environment and the people who call that environment home. the initiative created a structure that can "enhance international intergenerational justice due to the fact that it combats climate change in different ways, preserves biodiversity, protects [indigenous] rights and implements the use of sustainable energy sources on [a] long term basis" (larrea & warnars, 2009, p. 223). its proponents sought a sustainable future that generated the economic resources ecuador needs without exploiting the land where vulnerable communities live. imagining the yasuní-itt initiative's possible termination, davidov (2012, p. 15) wrote, "[a]s an assertion of sovereignty it will have succeeded regardless of the outcome." despite its failure, the initiative impacted ideology and narratives about oil development, the assumed need to exploit land, and accountability for the economic costs of upholding environmental justice. the initiative reflected ecuador’s pursuit of environmental justice while citizen activism demonstrated the power of popular will. by introducing a referendum to the ballot, yasunídos framed block 43’s oil resources as a commons that the whole country should administer, not a commodity awaiting exploitation. ecuador's efforts to protect yasuní and the indigenous communities who live there serve as a blueprint for similar protections in other countries. in a speech, bolivian president evo morales (2008) called upon humanity to protect nature through "solidarity, complementarity and harmony with nature in contraposition to the reign of competition, profits and rampant consumption of natural resources." morales views ecuador’s stand against exploitative transnational corporations as part of a more widespread movement to prioritize environmental justice over profit. still, ecuador was uniquely situated to make this decision with its constitutional environmental protections and a democratic referendum. despite the referendum win, the failure of the yasuní-itt initiative means that ecuador bears the cost of conserving block 43 alone. thus, ecuador, a country with a comparatively small emissions footprint, must bear a disproportionate economic consequence. in an ideal world, the consilience prime: blocking oil development in yasuní national park economic costs of climate change might be distributed proportionally given a country's wealth and emissions. however, until there is an international agreement on this responsibility, the yasunídos stand as an example of an impressive democratic win in the face of transnational oil corporations. vii. acknowledgments thank you to professor kemi fuentes-george for his wisdom and support with this paper. 7 consilience references bakker, k. 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(2008, december 2). evo morales on climate change: save the planet from capitalism! climate & capitalism. https://climateandcapitalism.com/2008/12/01/ evo-morales-on-climate-change-save-the-planet-from-capitalism/ pellow, d. n. (2009). “we didn’t get the first 500 years right, so let’s work on the next 500 years”: a call for transformative analysis and action. environmental justice, 2(1), 3–6. https://doi.org/10.1089/env.2008.0549 quang, m. l., & breña, m. o. (2016). the yasuní-itt initiative: toward new imaginaries. latin american perspectives, 43(1), 187–199. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582x15579908 https://www.yesmagazine.org/environment/2023/07/31/ecuador-voting-oilhttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8322 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/aug/31/ https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/aug/31/ https://climateandcapitalism.com/2008/12/01/evo-morales-onhttps://climateandcapitalism.com/2008/12/01/evo-morales-onconsilience prime: blocking oil development in yasuní national park rivera, a. l. (2017). chronicle of a schism foretold: the state and transnational activism in ecuador’s yasuní-itt initiative. environmental sociology, 3(3), 226–236. https://doi.org/10.1080/23251042.2017.1295836 schlosberg, d. (2004). reconceiving environmental justice: global movements and political theories. environmental politics, 13(3), 517–540. https://doi.org/10.1080/0964401042000229025 schlosberg, d., & carruthers, d. (2010). indigenous struggles, environmental justice, and community capabilities. global environmental politics, 10(4), 12–35. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00029 watts, j. (2023, august 24). the message from ecuador is clear: people will vote to keep oil in the ground. the guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/aug/24/the-message-from-ecuador-isclear-people-will-vote-to-keep-oil-in-the-ground with protection action, some indigenous nationalities seek to annul the yasuní itt popular consultation. (2023). contentengine. https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=ifme&sw=w&issn=&v=2.1&it=r&id=gale%7ca7661 53911&sid=googlescholar&linkaccess=abs microsoft word 3 typ 6226-article text-13892-1-6-20201204 consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 23, 2021, pp. 22-29.  abstract as human civilization prepares to rise up to the increasingly serious challenges presented by climate change, environmentalist rhetoric has been incorporated into other movements for political change. the historic convergence of environmentalist and ecologist movements with civic and ethnic nationalist political movements has revealed a seemingly natural affinity between the two. from anti-nuclear environmentalist mobilization in post-soviet russia to the ecologist sentiments underpinning the rise of the nazis, i plan to investigate the efficacy of eco-nationalist praxis in local and national political mobilization. drawing on theories of social mobilization, i argue that the nationalist leaders often commodify environmental mobilization resources, and only serve to limit the prolonged effectiveness of the environmentalist movement. not only do i argue that nationalism erodes environmentalist resources, but also that the core values of nationalism are fundamentally inconsistent with environmentalism and ecologism. as the international community struggles to find solutions to global environmental threats such as climate change and biodiversity loss, it is essential to understand the historical role played by econationalist groups in advancing and hindering the goals of environmentalist and ecologist groups. keywords eco-nationalism, nationalism, civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism, environmentalism, ecologism, environmental history, climate change, eco-facism, far-right ecologism © 2021 morgan margulies. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution license (ccby 4.0), which permits the user to copy, distribute, and transmit the work provided that the original author(s) and source are credited. morgan margulies is with the political science department at columbia university, 116th st and broadway, new york, ny 10027 usa (email: m.margulies@columbia.edu). i. introduction in the summer of 2019, a white supremacist shooting at a walmart in el paso, texas left twenty-one people dead. preceding the attack, a post on the shooter’s social media featured racist and anti-immigrant ramblings, expressing his concerns about eventual “cultural and ethnic replacement” (beinart, 2019). diverging from traditional white supremacist rhetoric, the shooter vehemently expressed his concerns about the destruction of the environment. the environmental problems of the 21st century, the shooter asserted, had been the result of a so-called “invasion” by non-white ethnic groups in america and the overpopulation of noneuropeans. while this right-wing environmentalist sentiment seems uncharacteristic of modern nationalist dialogues, such a convergence of environmentalism and nationalism is nothing new. the ideological principle that has emerged from these two political movements has been referenced as eco-nationalism. the 21st century re-emergence of nationalism has occurred alongside urgent and transnational environmental concerns. as the global community seeks to address the problem of anthropogenic climate change, nationallyand globally-coordinated responses are necessary to reconcile the atmospheric damage caused by excessive greenhouse gas emissions. from ethnic econationalist movements in germany to civic econationalist movements in post-soviet russia, the frequency by which nationalism is supplemented by environmentalism begs the question of why? what are the underlying elements of ethnic and civic nationalism that make environmentalist sentiments so appealing? to what extent have nationalist and environmentalist eco-nationalism: a historical evaluation of nationalist praxes in environmentalist and ecologist movements morgan margulies 23 consilience: the journal of sustainable development movements throughout history successfully wielded econationalism to accomplish their respective goals? what can we learn from past eco-nationalist movements as the global community orients its response to the recent climate crisis? before i attempt to answer these questions, it is necessary to precisely define a few important terms. nationalism is a political principle predicated on a discrepancy between the state and a given national unit. the state is a distinctly political unit that is made up of a “set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of order” (gellner & breuilly, 2013, p. 4). order is enforced through a monopoly on violence as well as the provision of collective goods for those residing within “a bounded territory” (hechter, 2010, p. 27). a nationalist movement takes the legitimacy of the state to be normative, believing that “the political and the national unit should be congruent” (gellner & breuilly, 2013, p. 1). the existence of such a nation is historically and culturally constructed, relying on a system of ideas and signs that dictate association, behavior, and communication between two individuals bonded through recognition of mutual “rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership” (gellner & breuilly, 2013, p. 7). in this paper, i will use the term eco-nationalism to refer to the tendency of the goals of nationalist movements to coincide with the goals of ecologist and environmentalist movements. ecologism and environmentalism, however, are two distinct strands of green political thought. ecologism advocates for a sustainable existence through “radical changes in our relationship with the non-human world, and in our mode of social and political life” (dobson, 2010, p. 2). environmentalism, however, advocates for a managerial approach to environmental problems “without fundamental changes in present values or patterns of production and consumption” (dobson, 2010, p. 2). ii. origins of eco-nationalism the origins of eco-nationalism can be found within the very process by which nations were historically constructed. the potential processes by which these socio-political groups formed are of much academic speculation. while not the only elements, the roles of land, territory, and ecology were necessary in the development of different national cultures. nationality has become intertwined with the values of ecologism through cultural and spiritual means, whereas nationality has converged with environmentalism through territorybased economic niches. nationalism and ecologism are mutually reinforcing entities, both deriving their legitimacy from the cultural and spiritual essence of land for human populations. ethnic association with a specific territory constitutes the very existence of many ethnic groups. such a territory was foundational to the creation of an ethnicity-wide cultural consciousness formed through “myths, memories, values, and symbols” derived from the land (a. smith, 1988, p. 28). through the association between people and territory, the symbol of a homeland constructs and reinforces ethnic identity. the notion of common descent implied by the word “homeland” is given meaning through mythomoteurs, which define the collective essence of an ethnic community (a. smith, 1988, p. 24). the land, frequently the subject of these myths and stories, becomes the focus for pilgrimage, religious lore, and interpersonal commonality (a. smith, 1988, p. 29). the most obvious example is that of ethnic jews whose homeland lies in jerusalem. this historic homeland provides globally dispersed jewish populations with a symbolic land to coalesce, serving to solidify ethnic identity and solidarity. while land and ecology helped to construct ethnic identity, they also played a role in forming nations and nationalist movements. whereas the idea of a territorial attachment is sufficient to form an ethnic group, the distinct category of a “nation” emerges when the ethnic group is territorially concentrated within the given homeland (hechter, 2010, p. 14). these nations regard their existence within the territory to be natural, conceiving of their relationship with the land as symbiotic. this notion of symbiosis between territory and community gave rise to a rhetoric that draws ethnicityand location-based distinctions that establish ideas of national autonomy. nationalist policies are constructed upon the idea that other cultures and people are “incompetent for protecting the environment” and must be securitized against to preserve such a symbiotic relationship (lubarda, 2019, p. 7). for example, pollution in the hungarian portion of the tisza river has catalyzed nationalist resentment from members of the hungarian nationalist party mi hazánk (translated to mean “our homeland”), who accused their ukrainian and romanian consilience: the journal of sustainable development margulies: eco-nationalism neighbors of poisoning the hungarian people (lubarda, 2019b). here, eco-nationalism rose as an ecologist movement that emphasized an ethical relationship between community and environment within the framework of ethnic identity. while the spiritual and cultural components of nationalism intertwine eco-nationalism with ecologist demands, the economic features that construct the nation commodify environmental resources and give way to environmentalist sentiments. unique ecological territories both catalyze group formation and construct common, nationally-held values. thomas hobbes, whose writings in the leviathan provide the foundation for modern international relations theory, understands the initial process of national group formation to have occurred as individuals faced physical insecurity posed by external factors. a major threat that motivated group formation was food and water insecurity. groups grappling with resource scarcity formed national identities that were contingent on the territorial ecological limitations that created the conditions in the first place. for example, the nation of the !kung san formed in the kalahari desert when families cooperated to secure and distribute water within their water scarce biome (hechter, 2010, p. 21). as ecological distinctiveness and resource scarcity drove group formation, such limitations contributed to a nation’s unique consumption and production habits, two elements foundational to the cultivation of a nationally distinct value system. comparative advantages for production resulting from ecological qualities control the direction of economic specialization, contributing to a nation’s “production values” (hechter, 2010, p. 118). thus, a common system of valuation forms among those dependent on the national economy. michael hechter argues that values of consumption, a primary element of a nation’s culture, flow from this economic distinctiveness (hechter, 2010, p. 120). therefore, the makeup of a nation’s economic and cultural values is intrinsically tied to their unique ecology. nationalist demands for economic protectionism and even self-determination are intimately linked to these values derived from the local ecological makeup. for example, the 19th century agro-economy of the confederate south, a group that claimed to be culturally distinct from the yankee north, developed due to the distinct ecological qualities of the southern plains and grasslands, such as soil fertility and water supply (helms, 2000, p. 728). the economic values of the north and south, embedded in ecological difference, motivated differing political convictions, which translated to the southern nationalist movement for sovereignty and selfrule. from this perspective, nationalist demands predicated on economic preferences are tied to a system of values derived from the resources afforded by a distinct, preserved, and functioning ecosystem. the role of ecology in constructing national values furthers a model of eco-nationalism based in a more managerialist and environmentalist framework. iii. eco-nationalism and political movements the seemingly natural and historically-constituted coincidence of nationalism and green thought has been observed through various social movements in the last century. it is helpful to classify these movements as either a manifestation of ethnic or civic nationalism. ethnic nationalism refers to an ethnocentric conception of the nation as a community defined by common culture, language, and ethnicity (tamir, 2019, 425). civic nationalism, however, conceives of the nation as being defined by equal rights, a shared set of political values, and common citizenship regardless of ethnicity. while ethnic and civic nationalist movements have embraced environmentalism and ecologism as praxis to actualize their goals, it is necessary to investigate whether such instances of eco-nationalism actually served to further the objectives of such environmentalist and ecologist movements. a. ethnic eco-nationalism as explained above, the origins of ethnicity and nationalism were contingent on the biological limitations of a territory and the mythology derived from such natural features. such a genealogy of the nation considers the present relationship between nature and nation to be one defined by equilibrium and harmony. the assumed spiritual, organic, and naturalistic connection between community and nature has been continuously evoked in ethnic nationalist movements through history. the nazi phrase blut und boden (translated as blood and soil), coined by walther darré, the reich minister of food and agriculture, encapsulates the use of ethnic econationalism as praxis. the meaning of the phrase is best captured in darré’s writing, as he argues that “the 25 consilience: the journal of sustainable development german soul with its warmth is rooted in its agriculture and in a real sense always grew out of it” (lovin, 1967, p. 282). for darré, the nordic identity was inexplicably linked to the agrarian economy in which the german farmer became rooted through a history of symbiosis between the land and the community. facing external threats to such a conception of agriculture, german ethnic nationalists called for the sacrifice of blood (blut) to protect the soil (boden) (hamilton, 2002, p. 32). darré’s writings were part and parcel of the nazis’ broader ethic of conservation within the volkisch movement, which advocated for a return to the land in the face of industrial capitalism and environmental alienation (k. smith, 2019). such an emergence of ethnic eco-nationalism in germany led to the implementation of widespread renewable energy infrastructure and sustainable land use planning techniques (darwall, 2019). while the policy strategies for ecological sustainability implemented by the nazi party represent the success of environmentalism in germany, the racist overtones within nazi ideology and praxis represent the failures of ethnic eco-nationalism. the volkisch movement to return to the land was inherently antisemitic in that jews were used as a stand-in to represent the forces leading such environmental degradation such as rationalism, cosmopolitanism, and urban civilization (staudenmaier, 2012, p. 3). ethnic eco-nationalist movements such as the volkisch movement, thus, rely on a racialized narrative of environmental degradation to mobilize supporters. nazi anti-semitism was supplemented with the ecological discourse of charles darwin, which asserted nordic racial superiority as scientific fact. drawing on the notion that a species must compete for dominance within a world of finite natural resources, the nazis sought to optimize german access to nourishment (k. smith, 2019). to achieve this, the national party pursued a policy of lebensraum that sought to secure expanded living space for a unified nordic ethnic group (k. smith, 2019). everything the nazis did, from invading poland, creating nature preserves, exterminating jews, and implementing sustainable farming programs, was done in pursuit of lebensraum. in this case, ethnic eco-nationalism produced ecological programs that were pursued as a means of displacing and exterminating millions of human beings. the example of nazi germany reveals the problems inherent to ethnic eco-nationalism as praxis. core underlying elements such as spirituality and rootedness become complicated and dangerous when combined with racialized narratives of environmental degradation. when the belief in a symbiotic relationship between nation and land is supplemented with the identification of an ethnic group as a distinct environmental hazard, ethnic econationalism can result in dramatic forms of violence. b. civic eco-nationalism while an ethnic eco-nationalist praxis may lead to a violent and ill-informed implementation of ecological ideas, a civic eco-nationalist praxis might be a reasonable alternative in that it avoids the complicating element of ethnicity. in eco-nationalism, anti-nuclear activism and national identity in russia, lithuania, and ukraine, jane dawson analyzes civic eco-nationalism within the demands for self-determination and national sovereignty in the late soviet era that rose alongside anti-nuclear environmentalist movements (dawson, 1996). the convergence of these two social movements, dawson explains, was not a natural occurrence that can be explained through genealogy; rather, the nationalist embrace of environmental advocacy was a superficial one that used anti-nuclear demands as a surrogate to mobilize civic nationalist resistance. to explain this instance of eco-nationalism, dawson draws on social mobilization theory, the notion that social movements are rational actors that mobilize only with sufficient access to resources, organization and opportunity (dawson, 1996, p. 11). the political environment of the late soviet union was controlled by the state as they determined the dissemination of mobilizational resources through the distribution of resources such as money, meeting space, and communication technology. groups “deemed unthreatening to the party’s status and goals” were given such resources, while those seen as dangerous were suppressed by the soviet government (dawson, 1996, p. 18). this gave rise to a phenomenon referred to as “movement surrogacy,” in which more radical political intentions were masked behind a nonthreatening cause as a means of mobilizing support (dawson, 1996, p. 18). while perestroika-era civic nationalist movements for local sovereignty were suppressed because of their threat to the national political system, anti-nuclear consilience: the journal of sustainable development margulies: eco-nationalism environmental activists gained “privileged access to mobilizational resources” because local officials viewed them as apolitical and merely a sign of a growing environmental consciousness (dawson, 1996, p. 26). in many of the post-soviet states, ethnic and political elites capitalized on anti-nuclear mobilization resources to catalyze movements for achieving nationalist goals of self-determination. in the case of 1988 lithuania, scientists and political elites collaborated to manufacture a civic eco-nationalist movement. the dominant rhetoric within the anti-nuclear movement— mostly constructed by political elites—suddenly shifted from a genuine concern about nuclear technology to images of colonial control and local ethno-genocide, phrasing their concerns in terms of nation and territory. this fabricated and top-down combination of environmentalism and civic nationalism gave way to mass mobilization against the russian-built ignalina nuclear power station. mobilized by the rhetoric of antiimperialism, anti-nuclear environmentalist groups rallied with song and dance to resist the existential threat of nuclear radiation and territorial degradation imposed by moscow, dubbing their resistance the “rebirth of the lithuanian nation” (dawson, 1996, p. 52). when construction was halted at the ignalina power plant, nationalist organizers capitalized on the energy of local victory, shifting their advocacy toward overtly political issues “of much greater relevance to the question of republic sovereignty and independence,” which were eventually actualized in 1990 (dawson, 1996, p. 58). while some may argue that the anti-nuclear and nationalist movement arose together because of a shared opponent, the weakly contested decision to expand a lithuanian nuclear power station after independence proves otherwise (dawson, 1996, p. 60). as the new lithuanian government initiated nuclear construction, the anti-nuclear movement was left defenseless and disorganized. the eventual decline of anti-nuclear movements displays the result of such a civic econationalist strategy of mobilization. the use of antinuclearism as a surrogate to voice frustration with a colonial moscow left such environmental movements “extremely weak once opportunities for genuine political activism emerged” (dawson, 1996, p. 59). while the civic nationalist commodification of the environmentalist movement led to mass mobilization, the combination was nonetheless parasitic for environmentalists who became demobilized, under-resourced, and weakened as soon as the genuine political goals of the nationalists came to fruition. whereas civic eco-nationalism demobilized environmentalist movements in post-soviet russia, civic eco-nationalism as praxis actually serves to further entrench systems of consumption, exploitation, and pollution. a modern example by which civic econationalist praxis is applied reveals the disingenuous commodification of environmentalism that lies at the core of civic eco-nationalism. the scottish national party (snp), the leader of civic nationalist demands for scottish independence within the european union (eu), has sought to position itself alongside environmental activists within scotland. while the snp does not make emotive appeals to scottish ethnicity, scottish civic nationalism relies on the romantic narratives of nature to construct an image of the uk as a “negligent landlord” that deposits waste and pollution into a relatively underpolluted scottish territory (hamilton, 2002, p. 36). the snp embraces the demands of environmental activists as they fight alongside other green organizations against external environmental disruptions, such as the building of a site to import american waste and the eu initiative to privatize the water supply (hamilton, 2002, p. 37). a primary point of contention between the snp and britain, however, has been the use and storage of nuclear energy on scottish territory. the snp has continuously fought to shut down the nuclear waste site at dounreay, leading the charge against the expansion of nuclear energy throughout the eu (hamilton, 2002, p. 37). the corollary of snp’s civic nationalist narrative of a negligent landlord is the assumption that local government could more efficiently deliver material prosperity to the scottish people. the core promises made by the snp—such as more jobs, lower taxes, and decreased regulation via localized control—ensure the continuation of a growth-oriented society. this vision of localized and independent economic growth can occur, the snp submits, through the accumulation of revenue via oil extraction in the north sea oil field (hamilton, 2002, p. 40). increased oil extraction could not only raise revenue to expand a scottish welfare state, but also establish scotland as energy independent and, as a result, economically independent from the rest of the eu. such a strategy of independence would create an oil-dependent state of scotland whose existence relies on the 27 consilience: the journal of sustainable development exploitation of marine ecosystems and increased pollution via the burning of fossil fuels. this case accurately and precisely represents the shortcomings of civic eco-nationalism. such an environmentalist critique of british energy management, combined with civic nationalist goals for local prosperity, only serves to commodify environmentalist narratives while obviating and neglecting genuine ecologist concerns regarding a sustainable relationship to the land. whereas lithuanian eco-nationalist praxis ultimately served to demobilize environmental groups, the snp’s anti-nuclearism commodified environmentalist mobilization resources in order to expand and establish a system of further environmental exploitation through oil dependence. iv. the implications of eco-nationalism for international solutions to climate change as humanity is confronted with climate change—its largest environmental catastrophe yet—the goals of the environmentalist and ecologist movements are more important than ever. while nations scramble to develop strategies to draw down carbon emissions and protect vital ecosystems, it is necessary to keep in mind the problems within historic ethnic and civic eco-nationalist movements. while ethnic eco-nationalist movements successfully realized the goals of ecologism, the typical problems of ethnic nationalism prevailed when ecological narratives were interwoven with genocidal violence. civic eco-nationalism, while lacking problems associated with ethnic violence, proved ineffective in achieving ecologist and environmentalist goals, even resulting in the decline of a national environmental consciousness. these failures help contextualize the threat nationalism poses to the prolonged success of the environmental movement in resisting climate change. in political theory and the ecological challenge, avner de-shalit identifies several contradictions that render nationalism a threat that must be overcome in the fight against climate change (de-shalit, 2006). only by first understanding the limitations posed by eco-nationalism can states construct a new and ecologically sound framework for national sovereignty. first, nationalism confines a movement to act locally, whereas climate change necessitates a consideration of the global issue. the popular phrase “act locally, think globally” is the bedrock for environmental praxis as it urges individuals to consider the global impacts of environmental degradation while taking local. thinking globally is necessary for determining the direction of such activism; for example, local demands to halt carbon emissions are only valid when considering the global impacts of climate change. whereas nationalism may be conducive to local and national action, global thought becomes subordinated by “national interest” (de-shalit, 2006, p. 82). nationalist sentiments such as these evoke the realist image of a nation-state preserving its interests within an anarchic system where its interests are always at risk. therefore, international cooperation between states is limited in cases where the nation perceives cooperation as a threat to its national interests. two facts about climate change must be considered to understand the absolute necessity that global thought triumphs national interest. first, there is an unequal distribution of responsibility for climate change, which refers to the fact that developed nations such as the united states bear more responsibility because of their disproportionate level of carbon emissions (fussel, 2009, p. 1). second, there is an unequal distribution of impact; this refers to the notion that underdeveloped nations, less responsible for the crisis, will suffer disproportionately from the impacts of climate change (fussel, 2009, p. 1). given these facts, environmentalist praxis along the lines of global thought and international cooperation must be prioritized to ensure the most vulnerable individuals are not left behind. the second eco-nationalist inconsistency is the distinction between political and ecological borders. while nationalism as a political principle necessitates the existence of a system that is organized into sovereign and territorially distinct states, ecological problems have nothing to do with such “political definitions of geographical units” (de-shalit, 2006, p. 83). the core nationalist belief that the nation maintains the right to political autonomy is the basis for modern conceptions of sovereignty. the concept of sovereignty refers to the existence of a supreme authority whose powers cannot be restricted by other authorities. with reference to the legislature’s sovereignty within its own borders, international bodies such as the united nations are inherently threatening in their attempts to construct and enforce international agreements. for nationalists, to submit to an agreement is to sacrifice national consilience: the journal of sustainable development margulies: eco-nationalism sovereignty because a modification of domestic policy would be imposed by an outside power. this notion of sovereignty within a politically-defined territory places nationalism in opposition to environmentalist and ecologist praxis. de-shalit argues that every policy for environmental protection is similar in its goal of protecting ecosystems. whether this takes its form in the protection of humans from ecological instability or the protection of endangered species, environmental policy is dictated in terms of ecological boundaries (de-shalit, 2006, p. 84). the inconsistency between arbitrarily drawn national borders and more natural, ecological borders means that environmental policies that seek to protect ecosystems must cross political boundaries. only through the establishment of international agreements can such transnational action be coordinated to preserve vital ecosystems. nationalism’s fatalist attachment to notions of sovereignty and political autonomy has placed it in opposition to environmentalist efforts to mitigate threats to international ecosystems. as nationalist values of sovereignty limit the enforcement of international agreements, de-shalit urges nations to reconsider the importance of political autonomy as it relates to international environmental agreements and instead embrace policies of international intervention as a means of enforcement. as previously explained, the problem of greenhouse gas pollution necessitates global consideration, given that one country’s emissions will ultimately impact the health and well-being of the global community. because transnational environmental action is so urgent, compliance with, and enforcement of, international environmental agreements are essential. de-shalit proposes enforcement via international intervention, promoting an alternative view of the value of national sovereignty given the conditions of social and economic globalization (de-shalit, 2006, p. 85). intervention, he explains, does not necessarily imply militarism, but rather intervention should be through economic means such as sanctions and boycotts. however, many criticize the practice of international intervention due to its role in limiting sovereignty, as well as the amoral implications of transforming a state’s political structure. first, the claim that intervention impedes domestic sovereignty is false. the action of intervention in the form of economic sanctions merely operates on the international scale as a means of providing an incentive to adjust national policy. intervention does not involve the attempt to impede domestic sovereignty by manipulating a state’s formal structure, but rather it peacefully operates through moral persuasion or sanctions aimed at changing a particular policy. the inter-border impacts of non-compliance to international environmental agreements necessitate the subordination of nationality for higher considerations such as the health and wellbeing of the world’s inhabitants. v. conclusion the solution to the challenges presented by climate change involves a distinctly anti-nationalist praxis. in order to achieve ecological sustainability and preserve natural ecosystems, political responses must transcend the boundaries of national borders, and instead forge a system of international cooperation built on the collective enforcement of international environmental agreements. to achieve this, human society should disinvest in the values of nationalism. when this happens, the national interest will become subordinate to the global interest. the values of national sovereignty and autonomy become temporarily suspended and environmental action becomes compulsory. only once the global community disavows the values of nationalism from our response to the environmental crisis do we stand a chance of effectively mitigating and adapting to the impacts of climate change. references beinart, p. (2019, august 5). white nationalists discover the environment. the atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/whit e-nationalists-discover-the-environment/595489/. darwall, r. (2019, march 13). how the nazis embraced environmentalism. encounter books. https://www.encounterbooks.com/features/nazisembraced-environmentalism/. dawson, j. i. (1996). eco-nationalism: anti-nuclear activism and national identity in russia, lithuania, and ukraine. duke university press. de-shalit, a. (2006). nationalism. in a. dobson & r. eckersley (eds.), political theory and the ecological challenge (pp. 75-90). cambridge university press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511617805.006. dobson, a. (2008). green political thought. routledge. 29 consilience: the journal of sustainable development fussel, h-m. (2009). the ethical dilemma of climate change: how unequal is the global distribution of responsibility for and vulnerability to climate change? iop conference series: earth and environmental science, 6(11). https://doi.org/10.1088/17551307/6/1/112013. gellner, e., & breuilly, j. (2013). nations and nationalism. blackwell publishing. hamilton, p. (2002). the greening of nationalism: nationalising nature in europe. environmental politics, 11(2), 27-48. https://doi.org/10.1080/714000611. hechter, m. (2010). containing nationalism. oxford university press. helms, d. (2000). soil and southern history. agricultural history, 74(4), 723-758. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3745021. lovin, c. r. (1967). blut und boden: the ideological basis of the nazi agricultural program. journal of the history of ideas, 28(2), 279-288. https://doi.org/10.2307/2708423. lubarda, b. (2019a). beyond ecofascism? far right ecologism (fre) as a framework for future inquiries. central european university. lubarda, b. 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(2019, february 22). not so civic: is there a difference between ethnic and civic nationalism? annual review of political science, 22, 419-434. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-022018-024059.   1   consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 158–166 america’s other growth rate: what the u.s. obesity epidemic and healthcare cost crisis mean for the rest of the world ranu dhillon earth institute columbia university, new york email: rd2245@columbia.edu abstract increasing obesity rates in the united states have fueled soaring healthcare costs and exacerbated recent fiscal and economic challenges. this phenomena, however, is not unique to the u.s. and many countries, including low and middle income countries, are seeing increasing numbers of people who are obese or overweight. finding ways for societies to achieve the benefits of economic growth without suffering concurrent epidemics of obesity and related diseases represents a central challenge to sustainable development. for countries where this epidemic has already taken hold, new policy thinking is needed to mitigate this burden. meanwhile, emerging nations must define new pathways for development that bypass or minimize these pitfalls. proactive public policies, innovations in healthcare delivery, and refashioning the lifestyles adopted with growth represent potential avenues through which countries can navigate this issue. this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 06 jan 2021 20:06:57 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience dhillon: america’s other growth rate     159   while prospects for american economic growth appear thin, the u.s. obesity epidemic continues to grow. this trend has contributed to rapidly increasing healthcare costs that are undermining other aspects of u.s. social and fiscal health. significantly, other rich countries are also experiencing this simultaneous escalation of obesity and health care spending, while emerging nations are already seeing rises in the proportion of their populations that are obese or overweight in the early stages of development. finding ways for countries to attain higher levels of growth while preventing, mitigating, and managing concomitant increases in obesity is a central challenge to sustainable development in the 21st century. 1. obesity and healthcare costs in the united states one in three americans is obese and an additional 34% are considered overweight.1 2 the prevalence of obesity is increasing 3% each decade and a third of americans younger than 19 are already obese or overweight.3 4 consequently, conditions such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease now affect over 26 million people in the u.s.5 the american obesity epidemic has colluded with a host of factors – expensive new technologies,6 an aging population,7 costly end-of-life care,8 9 lack of competitive price pressures in the healthcare industry,10 and inefficient delivery systems11 12 – to fuel skyrocketing healthcare costs which now constitute 18% of gdp, up from 7% in 1970.13 14 15 the rise in obesity in particular is responsible for almost a third of this increase.16 u.s. healthcare spending is now nearly twice the 9% of gdp spent in other oecd countries and continues to increase 6% per year, outpacing 2 to 3% projected economic growth.17 18 1 obesity is defined as body mass index (bmi) greater than 30 kg/m2. overweight is bmi between 25 and 30 kg/m2. 2 flegal km, carroll md, ogden cl, curtin lr. 2010. prevalence and trends in obesity among us adults, 1998-2008. jama. 303(3): 235-241. 3 flegal et al. 2010. 4 ogden cl, carroll md, curtin lr, lamb mm, flegal km. 2010. prevalence of high body mass index in us children and adolescents, 2007-2008. jama. 303(3): 242-249. 5 national center for chronic disease prevention and health promotion. 2011 national diabetes fact sheet. atlanta: centers for disease control, 2011. 6 congress of the united states, congressional budget office. technological change and the growth of health care spending, january 2008. 7 mendelsohn dm and schwartz wb. 1993. the effects of aging and population growth on health care costs. health affairs. 12(1): 119-125. 8 http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/14/us-care-costs-idustre69c3ky20101014 9 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/23/health/23ucla.html?pagewanted=1 10 emmons dw, guardado jr, kane ck. competition in health insurance: a comprehensive study of u.s. markets, 2010 update. american medical association, 2010. 11 garber am and skinner j. 2008. is american health care uniquely inefficient? journal of economic perspectives. 22(4): 27-50. 12 altman, d. and l. levitt. february 23, 2003. the sad history of health care cost containment as told in one chart. health affairs web exclusive. 13 http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/cea/theeconomiccaseforhealthcarereform 14 truffer cj, keehan s, smith s, cylus j, sisko a, poisal ja, lizonitz j, clemens mk. 2010. health spending projections through 2019: the recession’s impact continues. health affairs. 29(3): 522-529. 15 centers for medicare and medicaid services. national health expenditure data. 16 thorpe ke, florence cs, howard dh, joski p. 2004. the impact of obesity on rising medical spending. health affairs. w(4): 480-486. 17 oecd health data 2011 18 truffer et al. 2010. this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 06 jan 2021 20:06:57 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 160 consilience    160   this has ominous fiscal implications at a time of growing concern over u.s. indebtedness. the healthcare cost crisis also undermines future growth and employment prospects by placing an ever-growing financial burden on companies to insure their workers and on average households to pay more in premiums and co pays.19 20 the crisis even hurts public education – another area of concern with far reaching effects for american competitiveness and job creation – as funds allocated for supporting schools are instead being diverted to cover the rising costs of teacher health benefits.21 1.1 roots of the epidemic what has brought on the american obesity epidemic? three overlapping factors have driven this phenomenon. first, rising u.s. incomes over the past 50 years have led to increased demand for meat-heavy, higher-calorie diets and resulted in a structural change in food supply from more balanced home-cooked meals to fattier sweetened foodstuffs. for example, in just 15 years between 1985 and 2000, americans consumed 12% more calories with about 90% of this increase coming in the form of added fats, sugars, and grains, all of which can contribute to obesity and related diseases.22 this trend in eating habits led to the ubiquitous availability of such less healthy foods, as epitomized by the fast food industry.23 thus, even as real incomes have dwindled in recent years, poorer households are increasingly dependent on less healthy foods because they tend to be cheaper and more accessible.24 25 a recent harvard study, for instance, calculated that eating healthy costs an additional $550 per person per year, or over $2,000 for a family of four, while another study showed that income neighborhoods have access to 30% fewer supermarkets than areas with the highest incomes.26 27 both the costliness and rarity of healthy foods thus encourage low-income families to adopt unhealthy, obesity risking diets. in addition to demanding heavier diets, americans in the last half of the century have adopted an increasingly sedentary lifestyle with greater time spent in front of the tv.28 as an example, about 40% of children walked or biked to school 19 thomson reuters. facts for healthcare: healthcare costs rise more than 7 percent for u.s. employers in 2009. ann arbor: thomson reuters, 2010. 20 kaiser family foundation and health research & educational trust. employer health benefits: 2010 annual survey. 2010. 21 moscovitch e. school funding reality: a bargain not kept. boston: boston foundation, december 2010. 22 putnam j, allshouse j, kantor ls. 2002. u.s. per capita food supply trends: more calories, refined carbohydrates, and fats. food review. 25(3):2-15. 23 piernas c and popkin bm. 2010. trends in snacking among u.s. children. health affairs. 29(3):398-404. 24 giang t, karpyn a, laurison hb, hillier a, perry rd. 2008. closing the grocery gap in underserved communities: the creation of the pennsylvania fresh food financing initiative. j public health manag pract.14(3):272–9. 25 usda. access to affordable and nutritious food: understanding food deserts and their consequences. 2009. 26 rao m, afshin a, singh g, mozaffarian d. 2013. do healthier foods and diet patterns cost more than less healthy options? a systematic review and meta-analysis. bmj open. 3: epub. 27 weinberg z. no place to shop: the lack of supermarkets in low-income neighborhoods. washington, dc: public voice for food and health policy, 1995. 28 prevalence of sedentery lifestyle – behavioral risk factor surveillance system, united states 1991. 1993. mmwr. 42(29):576-579. this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 06 jan 2021 20:06:57 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience dhillon: america’s other growth rate     161   in 1969; by 2001, this number was down to 13%.29 another study reported that only about a quarter of american adults reach the recommended levels of physical activity.30 third, the u.s. workplace has mirrored this shift to a less active way of life as the american economy has transitioned to more sedentary knowledge, service, and technology-based jobs with fewer people engaged in manufacturing, agriculture, and other physically active sectors.31 the proportion of people working in low-activity “office” jobs increased from 23% in 1950 to 41% by 2000, while those in high activity physical labor-oriented jobs declined from 30% to 22% over the same timeframe. 32 2. obesity around the world why does the u.s. obesity and healthcare cost crisis matter for the rest of the world? the fiscal implications and consequences for the competitiveness of the world’s largest economy have obvious repercussions for the evolving geopolitical landscape. more pointedly, the u.s. obesity epidemic is not wholly unique. the same factors kindling the u.s. crisis have, in part due to the globalization of american fast food culture, led to rising rates of obesity throughout the world. in half of oecd countries, 50% of people are overweight and roughly one in five is obese.33 in europe, 20% are obese and a quarter of children are already overweight or obese.34 35 japan and south korea are notable exceptions with obesity rates of only 4%; however, about 25% of people in these countries are overweight with rising levels of obesity particularly among middle-aged citizens.36 37 38 these developed countries have also seen healthcare spending simultaneously increase from an average of 7% of gdp in 1995 to 9.5% in 2009, though still far below u.s. levels.39 greater overall spending in u.s. is driven primarily by higher prices for similar services caused by its private, largely fee-for-service system. nonetheless, despite greater incentives and opportunities for cost control in the publicly-governed systems of other oecd countries, healthcare spending in these nations is also rising steeply at about 4% a year.40 29 mcdonald nc. active transportation to school: trends among u.s. schoolchildren, 1969-2001. 2007. am j prev med. 32:509-16. 30 brownsen rc, boehmer tk. trb special report 82: patterns and trends in physical activity, occupation, transportation, land use, and sedentary behaviors. transportation research board and institute of medicine. 31 church ts, thomas dm, tudor-locke c, katzmarzyk pt, earnest cp, rodarte rq, martin ck, blair sn, bouchard c. 2011. trends over 5 decades in u.s. occupation-related physical activity and their associations with obesity. plos one. 6(5): e19657. 32 brownson rc, boehmer tk, luke da. 2005. declining rates of physical activity in the united states: what are the contributors? annu rev public health. 26:421-43. 33 sassi f. obesity and the economics of prevention: fit not fat. oecd, 2010. 34 world health organization (who) europe 35 who european childhood obesity surveillance initiative 36 oecd health data 2011 37 lee mj, popkin bm, kim s. 2002. the unique aspects of the nutrition transition in south korea: the retention of healthful elements in their traditional diet. public health nutrition. 5(1a):197-203. 38 mccurry j. 2007. japan battles with obesity. the lancet. 369: 451-452. 39 oecd health data 2011 40 squires d. explaining high health care spending in the united states: an international comparison of supply, utilization, prices, and quality. the commonwealth fund, 2012. this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 06 jan 2021 20:06:57 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 162 consilience    162   even emerging societies like brazil, china, and the upper classes of poorer countries like nigeria are experiencing greater numbers of people who are overweight, as they contend with widespread malnutrition and poverty-related diseases.41 in brazil, rapid growth and the popularization of commercialized foods has led to a jump in the proportion of overweight people from 20% in 1990 to now almost 50%; approximately 15% are obese.42 this will only become worse as fast food companies plan for further expansion in the growing brazilian market.43 similarly, in 2010, yum brands, which operates several fast food chains including kfc and pizza hut, earned more profit in china, where 25% of people are overweight, than in the u.s.44 3. the policy challenge have we created a new stage in the developmental trajectory of human societies where growth eventually spurs fundamental transitions in food supply and lifestyle that, in turn, lead to epidemic obesity? with globalization positioning american culture as the desired ideal, is it inevitable that other countries evolving from agriculture-based subsistence to industrial, knowledge, or service-based economies will also fall into this pattern? can societies attain the benefits of modernity without facing the ills of these structural shifts in food supply, lifestyle, and labor? if the overweight society is a new stop on the development pathway, then the new policy frontier for developed countries is to craft strategies to tame obesity and the toll it takes on population and, in the american case, fiscal health. for emerging nations, the challenge will be to define a new vision of development where the fruits of growth can be garnered without these unintended side effects. if this is, indeed, a new frontier, then the u.s. stands closest to the brink, if not partially in the abyss. america’s ability to find a way to manage obesity will, in part, dictate its capacity to control healthcare costs and, by extension, influence its economic outlook. the affordable care act – known more commonly as ‘obamacare’ – includes several provisions to tackle obesity, such as access to preventive screening, controversial incentive-based ‘wellness’ programs, and grants for community-based innovations.45 their ability to actually curb obesity will be watched closely. if the u.s. cannot create a new cultural model that balances the upsides of development with healthier lifestyles, the hegemony american culture has enjoyed over the past half century may be put into question as up-and-coming societies will look elsewhere for healthier, more effective models to follow. emerging countries, including china, are uniquely positioned to fill this void. with rapid growth and nascent obesity that is neither entrenched nor full blown, these 41 who 42 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/6e0319c2-5fee-11e0-a718-00144feab49a.html#axzz1r5ss0bpl 43 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6a463c4a-977c-11e0-af13-00144feab49a.html#axzz1qlrzglyl 44 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7a28d7c0-2e28-11e0-8733-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1r5ss0bpl 45 http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/nejmp1008560 this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 06 jan 2021 20:06:57 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience dhillon: america’s other growth rate     163   nations have the resources and growing presence, especially in their regions, to define a new model of developed culture that can be a competitive alternative to the american way. furthermore, the leadership of these countries – and china’s autocracy in particular – are not mired in the type of partisan political gridlock that paralyzes the u.s.’s ability to take action, something that has hampered the american response to the healthcare crisis thus far. these advantages notwithstanding, emerging nations are already overwhelmed with the formidable task of navigating their societies through accelerating and dynamic change. countries like china, india, and brazil have the added challenge of creating healthcare systems that must meet the divergent needs of both rural and urban communities and, simultaneously, wealthy and poor populations. finding the space to step back and consider a path that avoids the downsides of overly industrialized food supplies and sedentary lifestyles is a distant priority in the face of such immediate needs. the worldwide trend towards obesity is taking place against a backdrop of rising global food prices, persistent hunger among the poorest sixth of the world, and concerns over the future sufficiency of the human food supply as climate change, population growth, and fuel demands threaten stores.46 ideally, an integrated framework for international food coordination could guide strategies to reduce obesity, ensure adequate global food production, and harmonize allocation so that imbalances of over/underconsumption are reduced and basic nutrition is guaranteed for all. of these complex, if not utopic propositions, reducing obesity is currently the most doable. at the national level, countries can address the obesity conundrum through three broad areas of strategic action: 3.1 behavior change policies ad campaigns, nutrition labels, and traditional public health messaging have not been enough to produce the behavior changes needed to rein in obesity. draconian measures to mandate exercise or restrict food choice would be anathema to personal liberty as well as wildly unpopular and likely ineffective (think u.s. prohibition of the 1930s or the drug war of the current day). however, policies that ‘nudge’ desired behaviors can play a crucial role and have worked in the instance of reducing cigarette use in new york city through a ban on outdoor smoking. the state of arizona previously considered a monthly ‘tax’ of $50 for all obese persons to compel lifestyle changes.47 while such measures may be ethically questionable, tax breaks for gym memberships or taxes on unhealthy foods to subsidize more nutritious alternatives could address some of the structural factors causing people to be overweight. indeed, several european countries including france, finland, and hungary have 46 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/05/science/earth/05harvest.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1 47 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/31/us/31questions.html?_r=3&scp=2&sq=arizona&st=cse this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 06 jan 2021 20:06:57 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 164 consilience    164   talked about or implemented taxes on salty and sugary foods.48 adjustments to public transportation systems can also promote more physical activity. local governments should create integrated strategies to address obesity in their community and development plans. in louisville, for example, where more than 60% of adults are obese or overweight, the city has redesigned public spaces to be more conducive to biking and walking while linking education campaigns for healthier eating to initiatives that make fresh produce more accessible.49 while it is still early to see the results of these efforts, similar approaches are being trialed in other parts of the country with evaluations forthcoming.50 3.2 reimagining health care delivery in the u.s. in particular, reforms to address the healthcare cost crisis (and, by extension, the obesity epidemic) are already being discussed. this includes paying healthcare providers for keeping their patients healthy, rather than simply reimbursing them for tests and procedures or managing certain conditions, so as to incentivize doctors to encourage healthier lifestyles. further health reforms in the u.s. should also rethink the traditional healthcare model in two important ways. first, the concept of healthcare coverage needs to expand to include lifestyle elements like food and exercise and not solely medications and procedures. for example, an elderly patient for whom i have cared for the last three years was just discharged from the hospital for the sixth time this year. if she eats too much salt, she retains extra fluid that then fills into her lungs making it hard for her to breathe. she does not always know what foods are high in salt and unknowingly eats the wrong things. alongside better education, she would probably benefit from having meals prepared for her, something that is not currently covered by health insurance although would save money compared to what is spent on her recurrent hospital stays (which are roughly $8,000 a pop).51 second, the current healthcare model in most developed countries is based on large centralized hospitals and isolated office practices with limited presence in the community. community-based models using outreach and community health workers have revolutionized care in poor countries where social and economic factors strongly influence vulnerability to disease and efficacy of treatment. many of the accomplishments in scaling up treatment for aids in these countries were facilitated by community health workers visiting patients at the household level to provide social support.52 similarly, the paradigm in developed countries needs to incorporate community-focused ‘wrap-around’ approaches that target the socioeconomic determinants that underlie behavior and the management of chronic 48 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/world/europe/hungary-experiments-with-food-tax-to-coax-healthier habits.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 49 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/health/14obese.html 50 ross rk, baxter rj, standish m, solomon ls, jhawar mk, schwartz pm, flores gr, nudelman j. 2010. community approaches to preventing obesity in california. american journal of public health. 100(11): 2023-2025. 51 center for medicare and medicaid services. other inpatient hospital drgs of high utilization 2005 data. may 31, 2006. 52 mukherjee js, eustache fe. 2007. community health workers as a cornerstone for integrating hiv and primary healthcare. aids care. 19(suppl 1): s73-82. this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 06 jan 2021 20:06:57 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience dhillon: america’s other growth rate     165   conditions like diabetes. more continuous engagement between healthcare providers and patients, as opposed to episodic visits, can help resolve issues before they become bigger problems and proactively address social needs that may undermine treatment. iora health, a start-up company modeling innovations in primary care, attaches ‘personal health coaches’ to each patient to coordinate on care and troubleshoot issues in between office visits.53 the general healthcare crisis in the u.s. urges more wholesale reconsideration of the strategies used to deliver care. many private sector innovations have been achieved not by novel technologies but rather in rethinking familiar systems and strategies.54 addressing obesity may benefit from scientific discoveries like diet pills, but we need innovations in how we deliver what already has proven impact. indeed, medical research has long confirmed that certain medications minimize future complications in people who have suffered heart attacks.55 however, one study suggests that only half of post-heart attack patients are actually on the appropriate regimen.56 3.3 redefining the lifestyles of developed societies most broadly, countries need to delineate a new way to develop without adopting such deleterious shifts in food supply and lifestyle. this will be easier for nations who continue to maintain lively manufacturing and agriculture sectors, but even these industries are taking on new technologies that limit physical activity. perhaps the greatest victories can be gained through a healthier food supply. south korea has achieved notable developmental success over the past three decades. while taking on many beneficial habits of industrialized societies, south korea has made a deliberate and concerted effort to maintain its traditional vegetable-centric diet. this has enabled it to have unexpectedly low consumption of fat and one of the lowest rates of obesity among developed nations. south korea has done this primarily through policies and public education emphasizing the importance of retaining traditional foods.57 while many countries can learn from the south korean experience, it will be important for nations, particularly those whose traditional diet is not as healthy as south korea’s, to consciously and strategically prevent a shift in food supply as they develop. for some countries, this may also include supply-side policies such as agriculture subsidies to incentivize production of more nutritious foods. 53 http://www.iorahealth.com/ 54 http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/category/innovation/ 55 ryan tj, anderson jl, antman em, et al. 1996. acc/ aha guidelines for the management of patients with acute myocardial infarction: a report of the american college of cardiology/american heart association task force on practice guidelines (committee on management of acute myocardial infarction). journal of the american college of cardiology. 28:1328-1428. 56 krumholz hm, radford mj, wang y, chen j, heiat a, marciniak ta. 1998. national use and effectiveness of beta blockers for the treatment of elderly patients after acute myocardial infarction. jama. 280(70):623-629. 57 lee mj et al. this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 06 jan 2021 20:06:57 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 166 consilience    166   the rest of the world may have some time before they must reckon with this crisis. for the u.s., however, the time for action is already here and, despite the buzz of declining american significance, the world is to take notes. this content downloaded from �������������24.184.95.106 on wed, 06 jan 2021 20:06:57 utc������������� all use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 24, 2021 effects of and potential interventions to combat climate change impacts on groundwater resources in long island and shelter island carolanne boughton1 1 columbia university in the city of new york abstract climate change is predicted to increase the temperature, precipitation, and sea level in the northeastern united states. for coastal communities, these impacts present challenges to maintaining the necessary quantity and quality of groundwater resources. on long island and shelter island, groundwater is the main source of freshwater for public supply, industrial uses and agriculture. this groundwater is recharged solely from precipitation that percolates into the unconfined aquifers below the ground. a growing population, increased development and urbanization, an expanding sewer system, and more intense storm events all pose threats to the regional groundwater recharge. data from the timescale decomposition tool, developed by the international research institute for climate and society (iri), substantiate a regional trend of warmer temperatures and increased precipitation. climate change will likely alter the behavior of climate modes, including the pacific decadal oscillation (pdo), east pacific/north pacific (ep/np) patterns, and pacific el niño that impact the long island sound region. data from the knmi climate explorer underscore a connection between pdo and land/sea global mean temperature, as well as el niño and sea surface temperature anomalies. new york state has developed a water conservation policy concerning wellpumping practices and groundwater effluent standards. long island counties have also set local water management goals to improve wastewater treatment, enhance aquifer protection, and increase the transparency and availability of pumping records. these goals must be enforced and actualized. this paper recommends that shelter island develop a groundwater management plan like those in place throughout long island. the islands are advised to consider innovative water storage strategies such as aquifer storage and recovery (asr), artificial recharge (ar), and rainwater harvesting. these practices, along with land use and urbanization planning, will help promote local resilience and groundwater resource sustainability. further modeling of local groundwater dynamics and enhanced knowledge of pumping practices are necessary to develop more accurate predictions of the groundwater system under future climate scenarios. introduction this paper seeks to explore the impact of climate change on the groundwater resources of long island and shelter island, new york, to better understand possible policy interventions and adaptation strategies to increase regional resilience. to achieve this goal, the islands are advised to utilize the latest observational data and climate modeling proposed in the scientific literature. both long and shelter islands have distinct groundwater dynamics and water needs that will be affected by anthropogenic climate change. climate change may be defined as significant changes in climate, including temperature and precipitation, that occur over an extended period of time and that coincide with natural climate variability (ipcc 2007). climate change may be caused by human activities that alter the composition of the atmosphere and characteristics of the land, or natural processes, including volcanic eruptions, solar irradiance fluxes, and earth’s orbital variations (ipcc 2007). climate variability describes the natural patterns of fluctuation in temperature and precipitation of a region over relatively shorter timescales (i.e., inter-annual or multi-decadal) that are not influenced by or related to human activities. long island and shelter island experience climate variability due to regional interactions with pacific decadal oscillation (pdo), east pacific/north pacific (ep/np) patterns, and pacific el niño. due to climate change, these islands are predicted to experience increased temperature, higher precipitation, and a sea-level rise. these impacts, compounded with the increased consumer water demand and pressure on local sewer systems, pose a significant threat to the quality and quantity of groundwater resources. groundwater resources are the only source of public water supply for these islands. the groundwater is recharged by precipitation that percolates to the water table. thus, sustainable management of these groundwater resources is vital to uphold the quality of life and industry development for long island and shelter island. description of problem increased development and population growth put stress on the groundwater systems and recharge dynamics in shelter island and long island. impervious surfaces resulting from urbanization across the islands have altered the percentage of recharge from precipitation. population growth leads to the rising demand for water and volume of sewage discharged to the groundwater system. this may result in intrusion of saline groundwater into the aquifers. a warmer climate may lead to more successful and longer agricultural growing seasons. as a result of the increased agricultural activity, groundwater depletion is expected to accelerate while more pesticides and other contaminants might leach into the groundwater. increased precipitation and storm events caused by climate change may lead to more water lost as runoff and less precipitation reaching the water table. as a result, the groundwater system will be recharged less effectively. below is a thorough exploration of the scientific literature concerning the impact of climate change on groundwater systems of regions with similar geology and climate dynamics to long island and shelter island. this will elucidate areas of vulnerability or change for the two islands’ groundwater systems as the effects of global climate change begin to alter the islands’ precipitation, surface temperature, and climate variability. this, in turn, will inform the type of adaptive strategies and policies the islands may implement to develop regional resilience and foster a sustainably-managed groundwater system. this exercise will also showcase areas in need of further research or modeling. existing knowledge long island extends nearly parallel to the connecticut coastline, south of mainland new york state. the average annual temperature in long island is 46.3°f (usgs 2000). the annual rainfall in long island is 44.8 inches (usgs 2000). long island’s only source of freshwater is precipitation that has infiltrated down into the water table, as the island’s groundwater system is bound below by an unconfined aquifer and on the sides by saline groundwater, bays, and the ocean (cohen et al. 1968). there are more than 2,000 recharge basins throughout long island (usgs, 2000). long island’s population was 2.8 million in 2019 and expected to grow annually by 0.1 percent (office of the new york state comptroller 2019). under pre-developed conditions, approximately one-half of the precipitation long island receives percolates to the water table (cohen et al., 1968). in unsewered areas of long island’s most populous counties, 85 percent of water pumped for public use infiltrates back into the groundwater system; however, in sewered areas, only 20 percent returns (buxton et al. 1999). large groundwater users include the power generation companies national grid, pinelawn power, covanta, and caithness (meyland 2017). other competing uses for groundwater are commercial water uses, agricultural needs, and recreational and golf course uses (meyland 2017). shelter island is a small island located at the eastern end of long island between the north and south forks. the average annual temperature in shelter island is 41.4°f (usgs 2000). the annual rainfall in shelter island is 45.7 inches (usgs 2000). shelter island’s thin upper glacial aquifer filled by precipitation is the island’s only source of freshwater and is permeable to saline groundwater intrusion in nearshore areas (usgs, 1984). freshwater supply is very limited in coastal areas, little ram island, and the west neck peninsula (usgs 1984). nearly all precipitation either is returned to the atmosphere through evapotranspiration or becomes recharge to the groundwater system (nemickas & koszalka 1982). precipitation variations affect water-table changes more than any other climatic trend (rozell & wong 2010). shelter island’s population was estimated to be 2,413 in 2016 and is expected to stay relatively steady (u.s. census bureau 2016). only groundwater pumped by the shelter island heights association and dering harbor water district is reported to new york state. the primary groundwater use is public supply and private well pumping, as there is limited agricultural and industrial presence on the island. water and temperature variability in the long island sound are strongly correlated with pacific decadal oscillation (pdo), east pacific/north pacific (ep/np) patterns, and the dipole index, particularly during winter (schulte et al. 2018). the winter ep/np behavior is also strongly correlated with spring and summer water temperature anomalies in the region (schulte et al. 2018). shifts in pdo and ep/np patterns have led to regional water temperature changes in recent decades, indicating that warming is not only caused by anthropogenic intervention to the natural system but rather an element of natural variability (schulte et al. 2018). the seasonal and decadal patterns of pdo and ep/np can be used to predict water temperature variability. central pacific el niño events are associated with regional cold events, while the end of cold events may coincide with el niño events that are a combination of eastern and central pacific el niño characteristics (schulte & lee 2019). water temperature variability does not appear to be related to the gulf stream position or changes in the north atlantic oscillation, despite long island’s border with the atlantic ocean (schulte & lee 2019). climate change is expected to alter the magnitude and timing of groundwater recharge by changing the distribution and seasonal timing of precipitation (liu 2011). climate modes, such as el niño and pdo are shown to influence groundwater levels and recharge (klove et al., 2014). changes to climate mode dynamics due to climate change will likely affect these island groundwater systems, as they are unconfined and shallow aquifers that are sensitive to climate variability (lee et al. 2006). evidence suggests that global groundwater fluxes correlate with recharge variations due to climate change (mohan et al. 2018). this means that river flows and groundwaterdependent ecosystems will also be impacted by climate change due to the hydraulic memory of groundwater systems (cuthbert et al. 2019). fluctuations in groundwater recharge are predicted to be larger than the corresponding changes in precipitation (ng et al. 2010). global median groundwater response times are estimated to be 6,000 years, however long island and shelter island most likely experience response times on human timescales due to shallow water tables and high permeability geology (cuthbert et al. 2019). this means that rapid groundwater flux may occur in the region in the near future. long island sound fluxes in groundwater over the next century have largely not been analyzed or predicted. the shallow water tables and encroaching saline groundwater of both long island and shelter island make the islands particularly vulnerable to impending climate change impacts on groundwater fluxes that are neglected from conventional global climate models. warmer winter temperatures due to global warming can increase the amount of precipitation falling as rain and increase snowmelt, allowing more water to percolate into the ground and increase wintertime groundwater recharge (klove et al. 2014). this also increases the risk of leaching of contaminants into the groundwater system during winter. however, humid regions, like the long island sound, are expected to receive an increase in strong rainfall events that may reduce groundwater recharge rates as most water is lost as runoff during these events (bates et al. 2008). a warmer winter may also mean longer growing seasons for agricultural producers on eastern long island. this may lead to increased groundwater pumping and leaching of contaminants and pesticides into groundwater resources (klove et al. 2014). rising sea levels caused by anthropogenic climate change are predicted to negatively affect freshwater resources of small island regions, as small islands have limited ability to store water in surface streams, lakes, or groundwater (rozell & wong, 2010). the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc) sea-level rise predictions through 2099 are between 0.18 to 0.59 m, including all future human activity scenarios (meehl et al. 2007). ipcc precipitation predictions over this time period are between -2 percent to 15 percent for eastern north america using the most likely human activity scenario (christensen et al. 2007). estimates illustrate actual precipitation to be higher than ipcc predictions, which will be offset by increased evapotranspiration due to higher temperatures (rozell & wong, 2010). the confining bottom layers to the aquifers below long island and shelter island may play a crucial role in the islands’ response to climate change, as only the sides of the aquifer are affected by hydrological conditions (rozell & wong 2010). because of this clay-confining layer, long island and shelter island may be less impacted by a sea-level rise as compared to the typical sandy islands (rozell & wong 2010). sea-level rise may increase freshwater resources on the islands if shoreline inundation remains minimal (rozell & wong 2010). given the elevation of the islands, even a sea-level rise greater than ipcc fourth assessment report estimates would result in limited island inundation and salt-water intrusion (rozell & wong 2010). this prediction means that unless demand significantly increases over the coming decades, groundwater-dependent ecosystems common throughout long island and shelter island, such as wetlands, will not be greatly impacted by reduced groundwater inflow or saltwater intrusion (drexler et al. 2013). wetlands facilitate natural water purification processes and protect against wave and storm surge. terrestrial ecosystems will also likely be largely unaffected by climate change, as shallow groundwater resources will allow species to access water consistently without salt-water intrusion (klove et al. 2014). however, studies indicate that groundwater pumping has more of an effect on seawater intrusion into coastal aquifers than climate change or sea-level rise (treidel et al. 2012). groundwater temperatures are expected to increase alongside surface temperature increases (taylor & stefan 2009). this warming may impact dissolved oxygen concentrations and ultimately affect temperature dependent reaction rates and reduction-oxidation reactions (klove et al., 2014). these reactions are important to biogeochemical processes, including the nitrogen and carbon cycles and the transport of contaminants. thus, global warming may negatively impact groundwater quality (klove et al. 2014). figure 1. annual temperature time scales of the eastern united states from 1900-2010. although no paleoclimate studies have been conducted specifically concerning long island or shelter island, studies analyzing the north atlantic basin through shell isotopic data elucidate past oceanic conditions and oceanic/atmospheric interactions (hudley 2012). fossil shells demonstrate fluctuations based on sea surface temperature and the north atlantic oscillation during the pliocene, offering insight into how coastal ecosystems and climate will vary in the future due to climate change (hudley 2012). data and method utilizing the timescale decomposition tool by the international research institute for climate and society (iri), the regional annual temperature contributions of the eastern united states were analyzed from 1900-2010 (figure 1). the temperature time scales illustrate a temperature increase, with approximately a 20 percent variance in the long island sound region. the explained variance of the annual temperature time scales over this time period expresses a trend contribution of 12 percent, decadal of 14 percent, and inter-annual of 62 percent. thus, interannual fluctuations appear to contribute significantly to regional climate variability (figure 2). this is consistent with past climate studies of the region, which highlight the role of inter-annual and decadal climate modes in driving climate variability. figure 2. inter-annual explained variance of temperature time scales of the eastern united states from 1900-2010. annual precipitation from 1900-2010 was then analyzed using the same tool. the precipitation time scales illustrate a slight precipitation increase, with a 0-5 percent variance in the long island sound region (figure 3). the explained variance of the annual precipitation time scales over this time period illustrates a trend contribution of 3 percent, decadal of 8 percent, and inter-annual of 81 percent. again, inter-annual fluctuations appear to be the main driver of regional climate variability (figure 4). the temperature and precipitation time scales support the prediction that the long island sound region will experience warmer temperatures and increased precipitation due to climate change. figure 3. annual precipitation time scales of the eastern united states from 1900-2010. figure 4: inter-annual explained variance of precipitation time scales of the eastern united states from 1900-2010. using the knmi climate explorer, the behavior of climate modes was analyzed. the correlation between pdo and smoothed land/sea global mean temperature was computed for 1900-2020 and indicates a connection between pdo and temperature (figure 5). the correlation between el niño and sea surface temperature anomalies was then computed from 1901-2017 and indicates a connection between el niño and cold sea surface temperature anomalies along with the eastern united states (figure 6). this supports the scientific literature that has proposed a relationship between el niño events and cold winter events along the eastern coastline; however, the climate explorer did not illustrate sea surface temperature anomalies near the long island sound. figure 5. correlation between pdo and smoothed land/sea global mean temperature for 19002020. figure 6. correlation between el niño and sea surface temperature anomalies from january to march for 1901-2017. potential solutions stakeholders interested in upholding the quality and quantity of long island and shelter island groundwater resources include the local populations, local policymakers and land use planning authorities, local wastewater management entities, watershed management, storm response and water management, local water utilities, industry actors, agricultural producers, educational establishments, tourism industry, conservationists interested in the health of groundwater-dependent ecosystems, and journalists and the media. these stakeholders should consider the recommendations put forth below. future groundwater resources of long island and shelter island will be particularly impacted by fluctuations in precipitation, pumping increases due to population growth, agricultural development, and/or economic activities, and an increase in heavy storm events. these islands’ groundwater recharge is dependent on precipitation that does not leach contaminants into the groundwater system and can percolate to the water table before it is lost as runoff. the various climate modes associated with this region will likely alter over the coming century due to warmer temperatures and increased atmospheric moisture. these islands’ governments may implement a sustainable groundwater management plan to ensure groundwater resources are secure despite future climate uncertainty. this entails developing a current regional water budget and a projected water budget that accounts for a growing population, more economic development, and increased agricultural activity. sources of significant groundwater pumping should report their use andensure overpumping of the aquifer is not occurring. if over-pumping is occurring, a mitigation plan should be developed and enforced. a managed and sustainable yield level should be created and regularly updated for each county in the region (meyland 2017). contaminated plume remediation must continue, and groundwater quality must be regularly analyzed. water demand should be reduced during the summer and times of drought. coastal areas throughout the united states have comprehensive groundwater conservation plans. for example, the coastal plains groundwater conservation district in texas estimates available groundwater, predicts how groundwater resources are expected to be used, and includes joint planning with other districts and relevant actors (cpgcd groundwater management plan 2014). the coastal plains district routinely monitors wells and aquifer conditions, in addition to analyzing precipitation and economic patterns to ensure groundwater sustainability (cpgcd groundwater management plan 2014). the coastal plains district concludes annual reports by conducting projected water supply and demand analyses, which may include impacts of climate change, population growth, and/or economic development (cpgcd groundwater management plan 2014). this proactive management plan prepares the coastal plains district for future groundwater variability. new york state’s groundwater effluent limitations detail water quality regulations per potential contaminating substance. new york state’s standards for water wells encourages wells to be constructed in locations where water levels do not greatly fluctuate, individuals to implement a minimum period of stabilized drawdown during the pumping process, and the water table to recover to at least 90 percent of the initial water level within 24 hours after pumping (public health law 206(18)). the new york state department of environmental conservation (nysdec) issues 10-year well permits that require individuals to disclose monthly pumpage (licap 2017). since 1988, new york state local governments must develop water conservation plans with measurable short-term conservation objectives (licap 2017). the nysdec’s pumpage caps, developed in 1987 to limit pumping in long island, have not been enforced since the early 2000s (licap 2017). long island and shelter island counties have developed and implemented water management plans for decades. for example, long island’s suffolk county created groundwater resource management goals in 2015 to be implemented over the next 20 years. these goals include upholding new york state ambient groundwater standards and maximum contaminant level goals, reducing nitrogen concentrations in groundwater, minimizing other contaminants, promoting land use patterns that protect groundwater resources, and maintaining and monitoring groundwater quality and quantity (bellone, 2015). suffolk county also developed a subwatersheds wastewater plan to manage sewer contamination and wastewater treatment. to further address and study groundwater issues, nassau county and suffolk county created the long island commission for aquifer protection (licap) in 2013. both the licap and suffolk county’s management plan call for increased or restored test well drilling, water use monitoring, and health department industrial waste inspections (licap 2017). in 2016, licap created an online database, watertraq, to map and monitor the water quality of public water supply. this tool emphasizes the importance of engaging the consumer, water supplier, and local governmental entities with transparent data so that coordinated sustainability efforts may be designed. only groundwater pumped for public supply is routinely tracked and published; however, any water withdrawal of more than 100,000 gallons per day must also be reported (meyland 2017). as of january 2017, all public water suppliers must construct a water use reduction strategy to decrease use by 15 percent in the peak season over three years(meyland 2017). an adaptation strategy that accommodates increased precipitation and storm events, as well as a growing population, is aquifer storage and recovery (asr), in which water is stored underground during off-peak periods so that it may be recovered during peak periods. an additional adaptation strategy is artificial recharge (ar). long island has implemented ar to replenish water in aquifers, and this practice should be expanded if aquifers become depleted due to increased pumping (licap 2017). if asr and ar are not sufficiently counteracting increased pumping due to a spike in future demand, long island and shelter island may consider alternative water sources (i.e. rainwater harvesting or re-use of reclaimed wastewater) to maintain sustainable groundwater levels (licap 2017). local governments may also encourage or discourage development and community growth based on the availability of quality drinking water. conclusions and recommendations challenges to the implementation of the above recommendations include a lack of public engagement, the low cost of water, old infrastructure, and increased demand for water resources (licap 2017). public awareness campaigns should target consumer knowledge of proper irrigation system use, leak repair, and updating aging infrastructure. these strategies will optimize water use and decrease contamination. active community development planning would help safeguard current groundwater resources. water on long island and shelter island is severely undervalued (licap 2017). when water is relatively underpriced for the consumer, individuals are not incentivized to conserve water resources. the region has historically benefitted from inexpensive water thanks to the high supply of high-quality groundwater. however, with the increased demand, contamination, and climate uncertainty, these circumstances may change soon. water should be priced appropriately to incentivize wise use and investment in water infrastructure replacement. there is still uncertainty as to how long island’s groundwater flow will be impacted by climate change. more research, including groundwater-flow modelling and hydro-geologic mapping, is required to substantiate current climate change predictions to the groundwater system. local governments should conduct regional groundwater models to assist policy developments and conservation strategies. reporting and monitoring of groundwater pumping must be enforced so that local governments have an accurate estimate of available resources. conservation policies have already been developed in long island, but until their routine enforcement takes place changes in consumer behavior are unlikely. shelter island does not have any water conservation measures that limit water use. its small population and lack of industry or agricultural activity will likely allow the island’s groundwater resources to remain relatively unchanged over the coming decades. however, shelter island should consider conservation measures during the summer months and in areas that have already experienced salt-water intrusion. population growth patterns and land use changes appear to be the most significant influence on the region’s groundwater recharge ability. although population growth has remained relatively steady for both long island and shelter island over the past few decades, there is still uncertainty in how population will change in the future. local governments should be proactive in land use planning to ensure groundwater recharge is still supported. local governments should also utilize new york state conservation measures to bolster local sustainability practices. long island and shelter island may turn to the water management procedures of similar coastal communities around the united states, such as the coastal plains district in texas, for examples of comprehensive monitoring, enforcement, and conservation management systems. maintaining groundwater sustainability is an active process that requires cooperation between consumers, local governments, industry, and agricultural actors. with thorough knowledge of the climate dynamics, projected population growth and development, and impacts of climate change, local entities should be proactive about groundwater conservation efforts and promote further research or modelling to understand potential scenarios with greater certainty. 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(2000). recharge basins across long island. retrieved august 11, 2020, from https://www.usgs.gov/media/images/recharge-basins-across-long-island. microsoft word 4 typ 6354-article text-13591-2-15-20201127 consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 23, 2021, pp. 30-47.  abstract in an era of rapid urbanization, a changing climate, and deepening political division, parks represent increasingly important places for urban residents to interact with, and feel connected to, the natural environment and the mental and physical health benefits it provides. unfortunately, in an age of austerity politics, parks and recreation departments in midwest rust belt cities often lack adequate funding to maintain such public spaces. recently, the business-minded rock island, illinois department of parks and recreation has implemented a creative cost-saving management solution: “naturalizing” sections of its city parks. using a mixed-methods approach, this interdisciplinary study aims to discover how the community members near two representative urban parks in rock island perceive this economically motivated “re-wilding” of long-manicured and domesticated urban nature. resident reactions reveal enduring conceptions of a nature-culture divide, as well as the upper class, white ideologies that have historically shaped park construction and use in the united states. author’s note my interest in this research topic stems from my studies in environmental science, human geography, and cultural anthropology. i grew up exploring rock island’s urban green spaces, and this project allowed me to reconsider these childhood destinations as complex and multidimensional social constructions, “naturecultures” worthy of study using ethnographic methods. during five months in the summer of 2019, i spent my days in the city’s parks, interviewing recreationists, distributing surveys, and conducting structured observations. what i discovered was a community of people © 2021 christian s. b. elliott. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution license (cc-by 4.0), which permits the user to copy, distribute, and transmit the work provided that the original author(s) and source are credited. christian s. b. elliott is with augustana college, 639 38th st, rock island, il 61201 usa (email: christianelliott16@augustana.edu). who cared about and valued their local green spaces, but also struggled with deeply entrenched and problematic views about what those spaces should look like, how they should be used, and to whom they “belong.” i hope rock island’s parks, as described in this article, can function as an informative case study for other parks and recreation departments across the united states that are struggling to manage such important public spaces in environmentally and socially sustainable ways during an age of austerity governance. keywords urban green space, naturalization, austerity, natureculture divide, ethnography, mixed methods figure 1: naturalization sign in lincoln park (author photo) when nature invades: resident perceptions of the austerity-driven “re-wilding” of an urban park in rock island, illinois christian s. b. elliott 31 consilience: the journal of sustainable development i. vignette: a park in flux it’s another hot afternoon in july, a few days after the fourth. the pothole-filled road through the middle of lincoln park in rock island, illinois is still strewn with firework and sparkler detritus. recorder in hand, i’m walking along the gently sloping road with two of my participants, a couple in their seventies that i’ll call don and dana. they have lived at the base of the hill at the foot of the park for six years now, and have walked its curving, oak-lined paths almost daily since they moved to rock island in 2014. they rave about the summer concert series that the rock island department of parks and recreation hosts in the old bandshell, and tell me how much they love watching sunsets from the top of the hill with the city and the mississippi river spread out for miles below them. they are the quintessential old couple—they hold each other’s hands as they lead me through the park, have matching eyeglasses, and constantly finish each other’s sentences in a way that i know will make transcribing this interview a particular challenge. birdsong fills the air, and children laugh in a nearby playground. as we walk, don starts to point out fallen tree limbs and overgrown grass, and the tone of our conversation quickly turns somber. don and dana want me to plead their case to the city—lincoln park is in trouble, they tell me, and it might be too late to save it. “in 2017 things changed,” don starts. he throws his hands into the air as we walk through one of the park’s new “naturalized areas” of unmowed grass. “it really went downhill,” he tells me, “i think there was a change in management, and now there’s no one taking care of this park! they don’t mow the slopes anymore. they say they want it to go back to prairie, but it just looks unkempt.” “the parks department doesn’t do anything,” dana agrees. “it’s only the money makers— the golf courses and soccer fields—that get attention.” don nods his head, frowning. “i’ve met a man who’s 91, and he’s walked the park since he was 65, and he, too, says that it’s totally unacceptable that they don’t mow anymore.” we’ve passed the playgrounds and basketball court by now and are walking down the overgrown concrete stairs at the back of the park. dana points to a wooden garden bed full of thistles and decorated with an empty mcdonald’s cup. “you see what i’m talking about? it just looks like an abandoned place. and ever since then, we’ve had more problems with graffiti, and there’ve been a few shootings at the basketball courts.” “crime-related things have really risen,” don agrees. “and the general feeling of safety is less since then, the last couple of years. dana always says…” “…i wouldn’t come by myself in the evening anymore.” dana finishes. “and it’s really related to the basketball courts…” i ask dana what she means. “well i don’t want to be a crabby old lady, but when the kids are shooting baskets there might be fifteen cars parked there and there’s trash all over. one time i came up by myself and it took a half-hour to pick up all their bottles and junk.” she looks me in the eye. “and i don’t want to be prejudiced, but they’re blacks.” ii. introduction parks are important features of cities. since the urban parks movement began in the mid-19th century, scholars and city dwellers alike have appreciated public urban green spaces as necessary for the creation of “communal life” and the city itself (halprin, 1979). in an era of rapid urbanization, changing climate, and political division, public health officials and urban planners are increasingly recognizing the potential of public parks to buffer negative climate effects through ecosystem services and ameliorate common urban social problems like obesity and social isolation (wolf, 2012; pickett et al., 2011; irvine et al., 2013; cartwright et al.,2018). yet, while urban parks are being asked to provide these increasingly important services for cities, parks departments across the country are facing significant cuts to funding and staffing—investment in public space tends to be “disproportionately subject to tight fiscal pressures” (dempsey & burton 2012). despite their benefits, public green spaces are often under-appreciated and targeted first for budget cuts when cities’ economic situations worsen (tyrvainen & vaananen, 1998; jim, 2004; chiesura, 2004). in attempts to reduce “green space deficits” and ensure park benefits are equitably distributed, cities often set minimum area targets for park provision. recent research, however, indicates that geographic proximity and access do not effectively predict the level of usage (wang et al., 2015). in response, scholars have begun to consilience: the journal of sustainable development elliott: when nature invades focus on intrapersonal (psychological) and interpersonal (social) factors in addition to objective structural ones like physical access. they find that perceived access is more significant than geographic access or proximity to parks for predicting park use (wang et al., 2014; rigolon, 2017; donaldson, et al. 2016). subjective perceptions of park cleanliness, attractiveness, safety, and the character of surrounding neighborhoods also significantly influence the level of usage (ho et al., 2005; madge, 2008). while studies comparing physical access using geographic information systems (gis) and attitude surveys have become common, less common is the use of qualitative ethnographic methods to investigate the cultural preferences of individuals to discover why different groups use parks differently and what perceptions and positionalities drive such disparate use patterns (byrne & wolch, 2009; cohen et al., 2009; chan et al., 2011). in one example, taplin and colleagues (2002) used ethnographic methods to conduct a “rapid ethnographic assessment” (reap) of an urban park in philadelphia to complement opinion survey data on park management projects. such methods of “action anthropology,” they argue, include local communities in the decision-making process and acknowledge cultural ties between those communities and parks, all in a quick assessment. to better serve the public and promote park use in an era of fiscal austerity (especially in rust belt cities already suffering decades of economic decline), managers need a complete understanding of who uses the parks and for what purposes. such an understanding, based on data from mixed-methods studies of park use— including ethnographic methods—can enable more informed budget and policy debates in city government and solidify the important role of urban parks in the pursuit of more sustainable cities. as former rock island senior manager of community development alan carmen told me, when you are dealing with specific park issues, if you don’t consider the intimate relationships between citizens and parks, if you don’t involve the public […] it will be a short-term decision with long-term implications. however, city officials argue that, since rock island lacks the resources, it cannot always follow best management practices that involve public participation, despite awareness of the benefit it brings to the parks long-term. the most accurate measurement of park use in rock island, according to parks department director john gripp, is from estimates of the amount of trash removed from receptacles. given the department’s lack of resources and the paucity of data on park use currently available, i offered to help. thus, the initial goal of my study was to conduct a mixed-methods pilot study as a model for gauging park use (see taplin et al., 2002) and to help the parks department make future management decisions. to better understand resident use and perceptions of parks in rock island, i conducted gis analyses of surrounding neighborhood geography and demographics using census bureau data; distributed an online attitude survey and analyzed the survey responses using software from the statistical package for the social sciences (spss); interviewed residents and city representatives; and conducted structured observations using the system of observing play and recreation in communities (soparc) methodology (mckenzie et al., 2006) by dividing the parks into sections based on use-type and counting and categorizing recreationists within each section at set times of the day. the analysis presented in this paper focuses specifically on data collected through the semi-structured in-person and phone interviews with survey respondents who live within a quarter-mile of lincoln park (n = 19) in rock island and with park and city government officials (n = 9). figure 2: the city of rock island in illinois (google maps) 33 consilience: the journal of sustainable development in this paper, i will use insights from anthropology, geography, and urban political ecology to show how the rock island park department’s recent economicallymotivated management intervention of “re-wilding” areas of lincoln park reveals urban residents’ underlying perception that the disordered, messy, “wild” nature is invading the park’s manicured, domesticated nature and that urban green spaces are potentially exclusive and distinctly white places. residents’ rejection of the “messy” naturalized areas reveals that neither alternate conceptions of urban nature nor the use of park spaces by minorities are necessarily welcome. iii. urban parks in america: green spaces, white places in his famous work, “the trouble with wilderness,” historian and geographer william cronon (1996) dismantles america’s great wilderness “myth.” by the mid-1800s, romantic christian valuations of the “sublime” and nostalgia for the disappearing american frontier created a powerful sense of the “wilderness ideal” in the hearts and minds of city dwellers in the united states. during the height of the industrial revolution, wilderness became the last “bastion of rugged individualism,” starkly contrasting the polluted cities of “civilization” (cronon, 1996). for example, at the 1893 world columbian exposition in soot-stained industrial chicago, historian frederick jackson turner gave an impassioned speech for expansion into the “wild” western frontier, which reflected a simpler, truer america. the socially constructed separation of human civilization and natural wilderness was born, even though no part of the natural world is truly “virgin,” having been altered by indigenous peoples for millennia before europeans arrived in north america (mann, 2005). soon, a rising middle class began using the remaining “pristine” countryside for recreation and consumption, and the government began creating “conservation refugees” by removing populations that did not belong from areas they deemed in need of protection (dowie, 2011). this human/nature duality and its effects persist today, not only in national parks and wilderness but also in local sections of conserved nature—urban parks and green spaces. historically, urban park design has been informed by this dichotomous understanding of culture and nature (chiesura, 2003; cronon, 1996; loughran, 2017; meeker, 1973; stormann, 2009). parks and protected areas are ways of “seeing, understanding, and producing nature and culture,” reinforcing western ideas of a division between the two (west et al., 2006; byrne & wolch, 2009; stormann, 2009). because parks are created and cultivated by people, their design necessarily reflects specific ideas about what nature should be and how it should be used. urban parks, like olmsted’s central park in new york city, began as “elitist culturenatures” to capture “wild” nature in cities for urban dwellers to consume (byrne & wolch, 2009; loughran, 2017). in such carefully cultivated pastoral landscapes (safer than the “true” wilderness of the west), the rich could participate in sports and race carriages on park roads—often some of the best maintained in the city— without encountering the urban poor. the idea of nature, not nature itself, forms parks, and these designs often reflect mostly white ideas of what nature should be and how parks should be used. therefore, parks are inherently racialized and exclusionary (loughran, 2017). as historically elitist places for recreation, urban parks excluded the urban poor and people of color. when parks were finally delivered to the poor, they were specifically designed to socially reform and assimilate immigrants. racial segregation of parks under jim crow laws continued into the 1950s (byrne & wolch, 2009). redlining, institutionalized racism, suburbanization, and white flight in the latter half of the 20th century left many black americans living in park-deprived city centers while new park construction followed whites to the suburbs (byrne & wolch, 2009). today, park creation is closely linked with gentrification and exclusion, often clearing certain communities to make way for parks that serve others (taplin et al. 2002). studies show people of color often report feeling underrepresented in parks’ histories and have more limited access to park space (taplin et al., 2002; west 1989). as a result, affluent white communities benefit disproportionately from public green space. some scholars have rightfully framed this inequity as an environmental justice issue (heynen, 2003; nicholls, 2001; wolch et al., 2005; byrne et al., 2009; boone et al., 2009). with this complex history of parks and urban green spaces—as constructed, racialized forms of nature—in mind, i turn to the site of my ethnographic study, lincoln park in the city of rock island, illinois. unsurprisingly, consilience: the journal of sustainable development elliott: when nature invades the same historical power structures that drove park development across the united states have not left this city’s green spaces unscathed. iv. urban parks in rock island, illinois rock island is a city of around 37,000 people on the mississippi river at the western edge of illinois. though well outside the region traditionally considered america’s rust belt, rock island’s history of industry and economic decline shares similarities with other more well-known rust belt cities such as pittsburgh, pennsylvania and youngstown, ohio. rock island is considered one of the “quad cities,” along with moline to the east and davenport and bettendorf on the iowa side of the river. among the quad cities, rock island is the least economically prosperous and one of the most racially diverse ($43,558 median household income, 22.5% non-white according to u.s. census bureau 2018 data). rock island has 850 acres of public green space in 28 parks of various sizes and designs, plus two golf courses, a water park, an outdoor sports complex, and a fitness center. park staff members are quick to state that rock island boasts more “parks per capita” than any of the other quad cities. my project focuses on lincoln park, located between 7th and 14th avenues in the city’s keystone neighborhood. lincoln park is a large, traditional city park close to a high school and augustana college (a 2,500-student residential liberal arts college) featuring a large bandshell and outdoor theatre, playgrounds, gazebos, and sports fields. established in 1909 to commemorate abraham lincoln’s centennial birthday, lincoln park is a particularly good example of an urban park as an “elitist culture nature” with settler-colonial origins. the park’s northern edge is delineated by the arbitrary indian boundary line, created by an 1816 treaty that forced illinois sauk and meskwaki tribes further north out of their ancestral lands. in 1920, augustana college attempted to purchase the (at the time) undeveloped green space for development, but a citizen protest, led by keystone neighborhood founder and wealthy lawyer e.h. guyer—who wanted to create a “utopian city” with luxurious houses and theatres and lincoln park at its center—successfully opposed the sale. as guyer wrote, “lincoln park […] in reality belongs to the people and any effort to deprive the people of it should be strenuously resisted” (city of rock island, 2020). in 1924, the wealthy davenport family donated funds to build a fountain and bandshell in the park (city of rock island, 2020). the park’s rolling hills and oak-lined paths were carefully sculpted by davenport landscape architect russell l. mckown in 1928 in the style of other early 20th-century american parks, which were originally modeled after european pleasure gardens for the upper class. in its early days, the park hosted basket picnics and athletic events for neighborhood residents. during the great depression in the 1930s, tennis courts, an italian renaissance revival-style arboretum, an elegant wading pool surrounded by greek columns, and a bedford stone dressing room building were added and funded by the wealthy denkmann family. they were constructed by otherwise jobless men employed by federal programs. today, the old pool building houses a greek theater guild. figure 3: lincoln park satellite image (google maps) the park sits in a liminal space between the historically segregated “above the hill/below the hill” divide—with poorer black and latinx neighborhoods “below the hill” closer to the river—in rock island. as rock island reverend melvin grimes reflected in 2016 on growing up “below the hill” in the 1960s, “if you lived below the hill, you were nothing. if you lived above the hill, that was the cream of the crop. and certainly no one at that time was going to allow blacks to buy any property […] up the hill.” that same geographic divide has historically played a role in park management; in an interview, a previous parks director described a long and protracted conflict between “above the hill” and “below 35 consilience: the journal of sustainable development the hill” residents about the location for the future water park. my participants, a self-selected group of keystone neighborhood residents—89% white and on average female (66%), 50 years old, and college-educated (62%)—who responded to my survey, certainly love the park. based on survey responses, participants visit parks in rock island on average 12 days per month, with some visiting as often as every day, especially on summer evenings. like their keystone neighborhood ancestors, they certainly possess a combination of race and wealth privilege that make such frequent visits possible. living near parks—and living in park-dense rock island in particular—was very important to them. many are longtime rock islanders, having lived, on average, 16 years (and as long as 69 years, in one case) in their current homes and at an average driving distance of three minutes from lincoln park. several, including a 70-yearold nurse, shared that their children had been married in the park. one of my respondents, a 68-year-old schoolteacher, told me lincoln park “feeds her soul.” comparing rock island to the nearby city of moline, she emphasized that, though “things were more expensive in moline,” she “really loved the park system in rock island.” as i sat on a park bench once with don and dana from the opening vignette, they reflected on a similar lengthy love affair with the park: it’s our neighborhood park—we live less than a block away, and we’ve known [lincoln park] all our lives. we love these old oak trees, it’s a jewel of a park. in the winter you can see for miles. another elderly woman told me about picnicking in the park as a child, and described how the wading pool was closed amidst a polio epidemic during which she was sick. however, despite their love of lincoln park, many residents—like don and dana—expressed concerns about what they saw as a decline in the quality of park maintenance over the past several years. they felt city staff had “given up” on the parks, although many also understood that “rock island isn’t financially in the best of shape.” to understand the recent history of park management and maintenance in the city, we turn next to data from my interviews with city officials. v. park management in an age of austerity urban geographers have studied the neoliberal restructuring of rust belt cities facing “downscaling” and disempowerment since the beginning of the “long downturn” of deindustrialization—the 1980s, in the case of rock island (davidson & ward, 2014; peck, 2012). more recently, scholarship has focused on a significant “deepening” of neoliberal urbanism following the 20072008 financial crisis, labeled “austerity urbanism” (pottie-sherman, 2017; davidson & ward, 2014). in many rust belt cities, acute deficit crises and declining property tax revenues have led to cuts in public sector funding, increased privatization, enforced reliance on grant seeking and precarious revenue sources, and “rightsizing” plans to green or demolish abandoned property and to rescale city infrastructure (hackworth, 2015). as in many rust belt cities of similar size, park management in rock island reflects this age of fiscal austerity. in face of a rapidly declining population, for example, the quad cities chamber of commerce has implemented a “development-oriented inclusionary” policy to welcome refugees and immigrants to the area, a common theme among rust belt cities (quad cities chamber, 2018; pottie-sherman, 2017). austerity urbanism has also significantly impacted public funding for urban green space in rock island, where the “more parks per capita” narrative is continually framed negatively in city government budget discussions, as several city officials said in my interviews. parks director gripp echoed a common sentiment when he told me, “we have a great community here and we are blessed to have our parks. sadly, we don’t have enough money to maintain them the way i would like to see them maintained.” for decades, rock island has been governed by a “directive of frugality”—as one city official put it, “don’t increase property taxes, find alternative revenue sources, contain budget creep, and do things more efficiently.” the parks department’s funding structure reflects a neoliberal approach to local government that emphasizes the problem-solving capacity of free markets and a reluctance to increase taxes—75 percent of all revenue comes from memberships and programming while only 25 percent is subsidized by property taxes, opposite that of nearly all others parks departments in consilience: the journal of sustainable development elliott: when nature invades cities rock island’s size and larger. as a result, the parks department gets a “drop in the bucket” compared to other city entities receiving property taxes and faces more cuts each year, according to several officials in the department. this unique operating structure has forced the department to take a “business-minded approach” to management. as a former parks director explained, “we are really running a business because of the weak tax structure. if we aren’t providing services people are willing to come and pay for, we’re out of luck.” in 2011, following the economic recession, major changes in city government driven by the austerity urbanism ideology—including the controversial electoral victory (in a coin toss) of a new mayor, appointment of a city manager, and replacement of the city council— further imperiled the parks department’s economic situation. the new city manager quickly replaced many longtime city officials. as a former senior urban planner told me, “we were made very uncomfortable and it was either jump off the centennial bridge or decide to go.” by 2013, a collective 200 years of senior management had been forced to retire. the rock island department of parks and recreation has a staff of 23 full-time employees and 190 seasonal and part-time employees managed by director john gripp. many of the staff members are lifelong rock island citizens deeply committed to the wellbeing of the community. park policy decisions are made by the park board (appointed by the mayor), and the city council sets the department’s budget each year. thus, parks department employees’ management priorities largely follow the political whims of the city. rock island’s lurch toward austerity urbanism also increased the city’s reliance on more precarious funding sources. with city government “cleaned up” but still facing a deficit crisis, the new city manager next spent $15 million on land clearance in rock island on an agreement with walmart to construct a new store on the site. this “handshake” agreement later fell through as walmart began losing revenue to online retailers like amazon, quadrupling the city’s per capita debt. the city manager’s response was to cut green space funding yet again and privatize many of the city’s historic parks. as parks director gripp (then newly appointed) told me, “[the city manager] came through our department and wanted me to sell half our parks—they were going to develop them.” luckily, like in the early 20th century when augustana college tried to buy lincoln park, public outcry again prevented the sale of any parks. however, privatization remains a looming threat; as studies of urban parks in other places have shown, the result of privatization is always a “population disposed of an essential urban amenity” (álvarez, 2012). of course, the socioeconomic and historic factors that determine which parks tend to get sold (those in low-income neighborhoods) reveal privatization is a “symptom of a structural political disorder that perpetuates social and environmental injustice” (álvarez, 2012). gripp’s department has had to operate in what he calls a “culture of scarcity” ever since the failed walmart deal. the planned minimum wage increases in illinois and more frequent flooding in parks adjacent to the mississippi river due to climate change promise to provide continual challenges to management going forward. these problems have led gripp to make significant staff cuts, merge the parks maintenance division with the public works department, contract out park mowing to private companies, and defer maintenance indefinitely on lesser-used parks. “flagship” parks and revenue-generating attractions like the golf courses are prioritized for maintenance over older, lessvisited, or less economically productive properties. the department has also inventoried all park features in disrepair to help justify their already-small budget when targeted for cuts. as one parks official told me, “[the inventory] gives us ammunition, so to speak, so we can articulate what we are doing and make the residents trust we are acting responsibly with their tax dollars.” vi. naturalization as an austerity measure the policies of fiscal austerity that drive park management in rock island have recently led to a creative cost-saving management intervention—the naturalization or “re-wilding” of selected areas of some of the city’s parks. 22 million acres of tallgrass prairie once covered illinois, of which only around 2,500 acres remain today. before the sauk and meskwaki were forced out of its rolling hills, the area that is now lincoln park likely contained prairie or oak savanna habitats. reintroduction of native prairie grasses and forbs (flowers) to urban parks is another one of those “industry-wide trends” (see cook county, dupage county) that fits well with the parks department’s business-minded approach to management. 37 consilience: the journal of sustainable development reintroducing prairie provides a number of environmental benefits and ecosystem services— preventing erosion, aiding carbon sequestration, providing wildlife habitat, etcetera—but the city’s primary motivation is to reduce mowing and maintenance costs and the risk of injury inherent in mowing hills, according to several parks officials (stephen & mutel, 2005; smith et al., 2010; borsari et al., 2014). currently, 11 acres of lincoln park are selected for naturalization—mostly hillsides and other “unused areas” that “don’t interfere” with park functions. current management of these naturalized areas involves “letting them go” and mowing twice a year. with each mow, the department chooses whether to add to, subtract from, or move the naturalizations. as parks chief horticulturist marcus demarlie told me, “[naturalization] is not an overnight process. the overnight process was us not mowing, and that’s what caught everyone’s attention.” the naturalized areas, marked only by simple signs reading “naturalization in progress,” have indeed caught the public’s attention, and aldermen and parks department employees have fielded a lot of calls from upset residents in the past year. of course, ceasing mowing is not a best management practice for prairie restoration, a process that typically involves regular controlled burns and native plant seeding on a continuous basis indefinitely. parks officials do intend to follow such best management practices in the future, but for now, the parks department is employing naturalization as purely a cost-saving measure. so far, demarlie told me, the parks department has partnered with the rock island county forest preserve to get burn certifications for maintenance employees and with augustana college to conduct ecological research on the naturalized areas. in order to commit to proper naturalization in lincoln park, the department will have to convince the public that conducting controlled burns in an urban area is safe, and that the city government that prairie restoration’s high price tag is worth the cited benefits. as of now, the parks department has no clear-cut, unified restoration plan in place that would implement best practices going forward. figure 4: naturalized hillside patches around the “bowl” area of lincoln park (author photo) prairie restoration in urban parks, done correctly, is an effective environmental conservation measure and promises positive environmental and economic benefits for the city. naturalization can be a win-win, resulting in biodiverse, aesthetically pleasing, and ecologically vibrant restored prairie areas that serve as attractions and save the austerity-minded parks department money on storm water management and mowing. prairie restoration can also function as an important element of “plant advocacy,” helping to “decolonize” settler-colonial landscapes (mastnak et al., 2014). however, while the parks department’s current noncommittal and partial approach has reduced mowing costs, it has caused a remarkable amount of public backlash. the approach has also produced “naturalized” areas shown by augustana college studies to consist of little more than overgrown kentucky bluegrass and invasive shrubs—providing only minimal environmental benefit. neoliberalism and austerity drove the city to attempt this management intervention, which led to an uncontrolled and chaotic rewilding effort in the parks. while parks department employees strive to follow best practices to restore native plants, high costs and adverse public opinion are still prominent hurdles. vii. culture/nature conflicts revealed by naturalization political ecologists have long considered not one wild nature but rather a multitude of “natures” that are socially produced continuously. urban political ecology (upe) understands that the (re)production of urban landscapes is contingent on a history of unequal power consilience: the journal of sustainable development elliott: when nature invades relations and a complex human-nature dialectic relationship (álvarez, 2012; roy, 2011). in one upe study (kitchen, 2012), interview respondents in an urban area largely perceived a nearby forest as a burden, not a benefit—the trees were seen not as providing environmental or social benefits but as aiding the accumulation of capital for future harvesters. similarly, participants in my study called out the parks department’s re-wilding initiative as economically motivated. one resident questioned the supposed environmental basis of the city’s decision, saying, “to me it’s stupid, because what are you doing except not mowing? it’s a sign that ‘we are not going to spend any money to have people mow’ […] it’s an excuse for laziness.” next, i will show the spectrum of residents’ reactions to the parks department’s naturalization initiative, which reveals the complexity of this humannature relationship and its effects on the urban landscape. in the many interviews i conducted with rock island residents, i was surprised to hear how many people were viscerally repulsed by the tall grasses and shrubs they felt had invaded their neighborhood park via the naturalization project. the sentiment, echoed by many, was clear: “when they used to mow it was beautiful and pristine, and now it just looks like, excuse my language, it looks like shit.” as one resident told me, “they’re not mowing the hills and it looks overgrown and nasty.” another expressed frustration that the parks no longer looked like his own lawn, accusing the city of hypocrisy: “if i stopped mowing my grass, i would get city ordinance tickets.” clearly, residents expect parks to behave and look like their own yards, not like “wild” nature. residents’ complaints about “wild,” un-mowed grass in the naturalized areas reveal deeply rooted upperclass notions regarding the proper behavior of domesticated nature bound by the “culture” of the city in an urban park. to them, lincoln park was no place for prairie: “they said they want it to go back to prairie, and in my opinion, it’s not the right setting for returning to prairie. it just looks trashy.” these participants expected lincoln park to be manicured, as it was historically. significantly, some residents also connected the changing aesthetic of the park’s domesticated nature with a diminishing sense of place and pleasant feelings of comfort. the naturalized areas looked “unkempt,” and in contrast to the manicured areas, made the park feel less welcoming: it looks unwelcoming […] it looks unkempt, like nobody takes care of [the park]. it just gives you an icky feeling instead of a pleasant feeling. in the ten plus years i’ve lived here this is the first time i’ve actually been disgusted by the park […]. it just doesn’t look aesthetically pleasing. it looks very, very not inviting. the aesthetics of public green space and parks are very important to urban residents, or at least to my participants in rock island. one resident pleaded with me to tell director gripp to stop the project: “just make it look beautiful again. the park can go back to the way it was […] have more compassion for the aesthetic nature of the park.” in a conversation i had with gripp, he acknowledged the un-mowed grass produced by rewilding is not aesthetically pleasing: “[the areas] look kind of ugly, i’m not going to lie. it looks like we forgot to mow.” the parks department’s chief horticulturalist told me the department plans to cater more to residents’ aesthetic senses in the future—he wants to plant the areas near roads with a wildflower mix so people driving by can see colors “at 30 miles per hour.” some residents with whom i spoke were in favor of naturalization efforts in general but disagreed with the parks department’s approach. as one man told me, “it looks like a hodgepodge. […] they could have planted certain things in certain places, like one area that was all prairie grass and that was it, and one area that was all prairie flowers and that was it. […] it just looks very patchy.” they pointed to examples of other re-wilding efforts they had experienced—like black hawk state park’s single-fenced prairie restoration—and preferred because the borders were clearly defined. one participant cited the unmanaged ravines on augustana college’s grounds as an example of good “wild” or “natural” nature separated from the main quad’s flowerbeds and close-cropped lawns: “there’s a time and a place for naturalization. […] i now walk through lincoln park to get to augustana, where i can experience wild nature’s true peace and beauty.” in lincoln park, where small sections of naturalization are spread throughout the park, the separation of “wild” nature from manicured lawns 39 consilience: the journal of sustainable development was not clearly delineated, ruining the “true” beauty of nature. while most residents opposed the invasion of “wild” nature into the park outright or on the grounds that it was too “patchy,” some believed the opposite: the naturalized areas in lincoln park were not “natural” enough to be truly “re-wilded.” one participant told me, “it’s not truly naturalized anyway because they still mow it in the fall. so, it’s not a real natural area.” another told me while petting one of her bloodhounds, “[the naturalized areas] are not cultivated enough to be a natural habitat anyway. i’ve got three hunting dogs, and i let them run through there and they don’t flush anything out of there.” to these residents, the naturalized areas, rather than being too “wild,” were merely a disappointing facsimile of “true” nature—the confusing result of the city trying to cut mowing costs. all of the residents with whom i spoke possess preconceived ideas about what defines nature and the role it should have in public parks, which color their perception of the parks department’s naturalization efforts. to some extent, the naturalized areas produce confusion and contradictory reactions among residents because the park department’s approach to naturalization has been perfunctory and superficial. the naturalized areas, as they are now—unmaintained—are liminal spaces to residents; they exist not quite within the domain of “wild” nature (like the tallgrass prairies in illinois’s history or typical contemporary restorations) nor within the domain of urban nearby nature (like the maintained monocultural green lawns found elsewhere throughout lincoln park). furthermore, while “letting it go” is an ineffective restoration strategy, it reveals that the parks department also possesses preconceived notions about nature. nature free from human intervention is a romanticized idea based on an invented human-nature dualism, so restoration “aimed at a return to pristine nature is not only unrealistic but contradictory” (mastnak et al., 2014). historically, prairie ecosystems were carefully managed by the indigenous peoples who called the quad cities area home (mann, 2005). this laissez-faire attitude toward rewilding—the assumption that without human attention, “wild” nature will return—coupled with the choice of sites for naturalization—hillsides—that aren’t “useful” and frequent changes in site location, reveal that the department shares residents’ simplistic and problematic perception of a human-nature and wild-domestic nature divide. i should point out that not all residents with whom i spoke viewed the naturalization efforts negatively. several told me that they had called the city and learned more about the parks department’s long-term plans and were now “on board” because they viewed environmentalism as important. still others told me they had changed their minds after i explained the long-term goals and benefits the city saw in prairie restoration. as one man told me, “i was one of the guys that contacted john gripp about what’s going on […] and now that i understand what they’re doing i think it makes sense, and i think it’s going to be good for the wildlife and the city.” clearly, a concerted education campaign by the parks department could potentially sway public opinion—but only if the department also commits to undertaking naturalization properly. to do so, the department needs to critically evaluate its conceptions of the role of nature in cities, and reorient away from its “cutting costs” narrative toward one about improving environmental health. furthermore, they must help rock island residents see lincoln park not as a publicly accessible extension of their own lawns, but instead as a “multitude of natures” critically important to the future sustainability of rock island that the residents all have a role in producing and maintaining. so far, i have shown how austerity-driven park management in rock island, an economically distressed rust belt outpost city on what was once the midwestern prairie, has led to what could be a viable environmental conservation intervention. while many residents were amenable to the parks department’s re-wilding plan after learning more, it is also significant that the residents’ initial reaction to experiencing the overgrown and “wild” naturalized areas firsthand was almost overwhelmingly a sense of disgust and discomfort. resident reactions to the invasion of “wild” nature in their neighborhood parks reveal deep notions of a culture-nature dichotomy that, while unequivocally rejected within upe, generally remains in urban residents in (and within the parks department of) rock island. next, i will connect this austerity-driven accidental re-wilding to social exclusion using lincoln park as a case study. as i’ll show, resident rejections of naturalized areas as messy, disordered, unwelcoming, and unwanted are crucial for explaining the long and deeply held racial prejudices in rock island. consilience: the journal of sustainable development elliott: when nature invades viii. racialized conceptions of park naturalization: disorder as a proxy for criminality while interviewing residents about their park use and perceptions of lincoln park, another striking theme emerged: some residents with whom i spoke seemed to connect the parks department’s naturalization or rewilding of the park—to them, representative of the department’s decreasing management attention in general (seen in the way that they leave downed trees, do not replace broken equipment, do not clean graffiti, etcetera)—with an increase in “undesirable” use of the parks. one of my participants, very concerned about safety and lincoln park’s recent “decline,” pointed to one of the “naturalization in progress” signs and suggested it be replaced with one that read “dirty grass, don’t touch.” to some, the “dirty” and “neglected” naturalizations were a gateway to something much worse. as i walked through lincoln park a few days after the fourth of july of 2019 with don and dana, they pointed out park problems they wanted me to note: downed limbs, dead bushes, and, of course, the naturalized areas. as we crossed the grassy oak-lined expanse at the top of the park and reached the basketball courts, one of them took their observations a step farther, gesturing at the courts: my biggest concern is if [the park] continues to look unkept there is going to be more crime. i can live with [the parks department] turning it into a prairie when i don’t like how it looks, but i’ve been told [naturalization] invites vandalism and crime. they went on to explain the “broken windows theory,” introduced by the couple’s friend within the rock island county sheriff’s department, which is the idea that the “vandalism and crime” occurring in lincoln park were the result of the parks department “not taking care of the property.” in the coming months, several additional participants independently invoked what they called “broken window syndrome” to explain changes they observed in lincoln park: it’s called broken window syndrome. when a neighborhood is neglected and ignored […] when stuff gets broken and no one addresses it, the criminal element starts to notice. i would say within the last three to four years, [lincoln park] went from being this peaceful well-groomed park to them not taking care of it as much and […] then the criminal activity and the defacement of stuff […] because [the parks department] are kind of neglecting the park. many of my participants indicated that they had requested an increased police presence in the parks. the parks department, responding to residents’ phone calls, has partnered with the rock island police department to increase the frequency of foot patrols in lincoln park. the “broken windows” policing to which several residents referred was infamously used in former mayor rudy giuliani’s approach to “cleaning up” new york by using “criminological theory to conflate ‘dirtiness’ with deviance.” in this view, decline in poor urban areas is due not to poverty or systemic institutional neglect, but to immorality—the black people giuliani targeted were “insufficiently respectful of the value of property” (solomon, 2019; sharkey, 2018). it’s significant that multiple rock islanders’ perspectives on urban nature— “wild” and “dirty” unmaintained nature in particular— were informed by this racist and baseless criminology theory. to the lincoln park residents, long unmaintained grass is dirty; dirtiness invites crime, so the overgrown naturalized areas were conflated with criminality. this problematic association requires further analysis. how do unkempt, messy, naturalized areas invite crime? to answer it, we must turn again to urban political ecology theory. upe studies have shown that, despite their many benefits, urban parks are not necessarily universally seen as a positive asset for some residents; they can be a source of “fear and insecurity,” especially when visitors’ subjective experiences of a given park are negative, such as when they perceive the park as “unclean” or unsafe (madge, 2008). in kitchen’s (2012) upe-framed study, the “not natural” urban forests that managers had created were perceived as generating “criminal” and “delinquent” behavior. similarly, in anthropologist vassos argyrou’s (1997) study of waste in cyprus, one housewife’s concern with an overgrown 41 consilience: the journal of sustainable development vacant lot was not that it was an “eyesore” but the “lurking dangers of the ‘wild’ symbolized by the tall, dry weeds.” in response to a general question about aspects of lincoln park perceived as problematic, one of my participants told me, with obvious concern, that the overgrown naturalized areas the parks department produced in lincoln park “give criminals cover.” the invasion of “wild” nature into their favorite park symbolized the loss of that park to “undesirable” individuals and behaviors associated with the unmanaged, unkempt, “wild.” to some residents, at least, the encroachment of the “wild” into urban parks—where only cultivated, manicured, domesticated nature belongs—undermines those spaces’ ability to regulate and support appropriate patterns of use. due to the recent lack of maintenance and the parks department’s somewhat haphazard naturalization management interventions, lincoln park has become disordered. it is no longer doing its job of providing a place for white people to recreate. the idea that the manicured nature of an urban park can be socially useful, “uplifting” lowly individuals from anarchy and crime, historically played a key role in the ideology of park construction, and that mindset clearly persists in rock island today (taylor, 1999; byrne & wolch, 2009; loughran, 2018). there is some scholarly evidence that “abandoned” places like vacant lots can attract criminal activity (and that investment in such places can reduce crime rates) (klinenberg, 2018), but this problem is only perceived—not actual—in rock island’s parks. the parks department is actively attempting to improve these public spaces, not abandon them, but common perceptions of cities, race, and crime, such as the broken windows theory, still hold a powerful influence over residents’ responses to the department’s efforts. naturalized areas, fallen trees, and increased litter generated a sense of unease and loss for the participants in this study, a sense that the park was no longer comfortable or “theirs.” when asked to describe the “undesirable use” that they observed, these residents and others pointed to lincoln park’s basketball courts to explain their reasoning in both racially coded and racially explicit terms: my wife and i have walked around [the lincoln park basketball courts] and […] there’s some very unruly behavior and large, dangerous groups of people, we’ve seen fights and the group is completely disrespecting [the park] and throwing garbage everywhere. if a group of people is there and they’re being wild and crazy […] we will change our plans and walk along the river instead […] and it’s frustrating, it’s angering, because i feel that’s our neighborhood park and it should be our neighborhood park, it shouldn’t be a police crime scene. the general feel of safety is less in the last couple of years. it’s related to the basketball courts. in the evening we walk [in lincoln park] and there’s 20 or 30 people in parked cars being real disruptive. they’re playing and having fun, but the place is trashed when they leave. and i hate to be prejudiced but they are blacks. i have heard there are shootings, and i often see the police hanging around the basketball court when there are teens there. the teens are always black. residents connected the groups of black teens littering in the basketball courts to messiness, garbage, and criminality—the black “undesirable groups” were “trashing” “their” beloved lincoln park. in doing so, these participants made an “ideological and aesthetic equation whereby dirtiness signals deviance” (mckee, 2015). like in giuliani’s broken windows policing of new york, these rock islanders believed black people— invited by the city’s reductions in mowing and maintenance—caused lincoln park to be dirty by defacing and misusing it, and thus needed to be “cleaned up” (solomon, 2019). anthropologists have deemed such discursive associations of disordered landscapes and the morality of socially undesirable groups “trash talk.” theory on trash talk began with anthropologist mary douglas’s influential work purity and danger, in which she explains how “dirt” or “matter out of place” is socially constructed as a system of classifying inappropriate and appropriate elements in a culture. theorists of trash talk draw on sociologist pierre bourdieu to explain the consilience: the journal of sustainable development elliott: when nature invades symbolic power of such language to naturalize social distinctions. geographer sundberg (2008), for example, found americans used trash talk to describe how their “national and intimate spaces” were “invaded and trashed” by undocumented immigrants from mexico. as anthropologist emily mckee (2015) similarly writes in a study of marginalized bedouin people, trash talk “naturalizes links between dirty places, disorderly people, and the need to remove (or reform) them.” as a result, designations of disordered landscapes are “inextricably enmeshed in relations of power and domination” (argyrou, 1997). darwish (2018) similarly invokes the concept of “moral geographies” and the “idiom of pollution” to explain how waste can “sully” both physically and morally “polluting people and places and defining or altering their position within social and spatial hierarchies.” trash talk has significant implications for parks. for one thing, trash talk’s naturalizing effect obscures the basic cultural assumptions and histories of power that urban political ecologists have shown to shape park construction, distribution, and access. trash talk also naturalizes ideological assumptions about who belongs. as geographers and political ecologists have long shown, since self and place are co-constitutive, defining who gets to use parks and how the said group uses that green space significantly influences how the parks are designed and vice versa, enabling those with power to use trash talk as a tactic of “land contestation” (winegar, 2016). similarly, moral geography shows the “moralizing binary” of clean/dirty can separate and confine people to particular places, creating “socio-spatial orders” (darwish, 2018). when these boundaries are transgressed, like when black people enter lincoln park and “trash” the basketball courts, the existing moral order is polluted and imperiled (darwish, 2018; bender, 1993; bender, 2002). since trash inspires “gut repugnance,” trash talk is an “evocation of the most visceral revulsion of cultural others” (mckee, 2015). the disgust with which residents described the naturalized areas and litter in the basketball courts reveals a functional, aesthetic notion of the environment. as the trash talk theory shows, the “aesthetics of landscape are not innocent”—power relations, maintained through trash talk, shape people’s “most intimate experiences of a place” (mckee, 2015). in a phenomenological sense, landscapes are thus inextricably tied with people’s emotional lives. in the case of parks, aesthetic evaluations are indeed not innocent or even individual; instead, they reveal and perpetuate social relations. as previously mentioned, rock island city official alan carmen said that, “when you are dealing with park issues, if you don’t consider the intimate relationships between citizens and parks […] it will be a short-term decision with long-term implications.” thus, we must consider what these intimate relationships reveal about the social relations of a community. argyrou (1997), in his ethnographic study of differing perceptions of litter in cyprus, describes how, beginning with the industrial revolution in the 19th century, “mastering” nature (an idea dependent on the dichotomous view of nature and culture) became an indicator of “higher civilization.” much more recently, with the wilderness and then environmental movements in the united states, nature became a “sacred domain” of aesthetic importance able to be studied by science and “comprehended in all its complexity.” indeed, the idea that waste threatens “the environment” is a recent conception (oldenziel & weber, 2013). this new valuation and conception of nature became possible with the emergence of mental labor and the middle class. argyrou (1997) argues that the middle class “vision of the world where litter has no place presupposes a mannature relation where people do not need to grapple with the world physically because there is no economic necessity to do so […] it is only when the world can be kept at arm’s length […] that one can begin to constitute the world as a spectacle.” since “different conditions of existence predispose people to view the world, and themselves, in different ways,” working class people in cyprus generally didn’t share middle class participants’ disdain for littering (argyrou, 1997). the older, white, self-identifying environmentalist participants in my study were highly concerned about litter. a number of participants took pride in reporting that they always picked up litter when they saw it. after an older man’s dog died, he purchased a mechanical “grabber” and replaced his daily morning dog walks with laps around the park collecting trash. many expressed concerns about groups of african americans, disproportionately working class in rock island, littering and “disrespecting” the park. as one man told me, 43 consilience: the journal of sustainable development the groups of undesirable people will go up and play basketball and then […] dump garbage and litter all over the ground […] it’s just like someone dumped a dumpster of garbage all over the park others explained they had picked up litter in the past, but felt like doing so had now become a futile task: when we see garbage, we pick it up, but it’s just overwhelming, the litter. last year i picked up tons of stuff and i just refuse to do it this year. i’d pick up three or four handfuls of garbage every time i went up there and i go up there twice a day. i can’t do it anymore. borrowing terms from the study of material culture in a study of waste in egypt, anthropologist jamie furniss (2017) writes that recent studies show litter has a “practical value in a system of agency” and characterizes certain people or populations as “litterers.” this seems to be the case in rock island, where white study participants describe black people as “trashing” the parks with litter while they, in contrast, volunteer their time to clean up and restore the park’s aesthetic order. as studies have shown, waste has an ability to “absorb ethical and aesthetic concerns…through notions of disorder, abjection, and disgust” (martínez, 2017). people and places, martínez (2017) writes, can become associated with waste and as a result, become waste themselves. many of my participants shared they felt lincoln park was not what it once was, that it had lost value: “it’s not a source of pride anymore, it’s more of a pain in the butt, like ‘this is a problem we have to deal with’ instead of ‘oh my gosh it’s a beautiful park,’ you know?” another told me that “overall, i dislike my park that i have lived next to for 56 years.” in a strange and seemingly contradictory way, litter and “wild” invasive nature had worked together to turn the park into waste itself for the residents. resident comments, in this case, reveal perceptions of lincoln park’s green space as an exclusionary place and, significantly, a white space. the residents’ claims of ownership over the park—invaded both by nature and by black people in their view—are shockingly exclusionary but important for understanding the greater culture of parks in rock island and of the city itself. since we shared the same skin color, it’s possible some participants saw me as an empathetic advocate—“one of them,” the rightful owners of the park. these responses are not representative of all the interviews i conducted, but the amount of coded language present is worth pointing out. although residents don’t always state it explicitly, this implicit bias is strongly suggestive of a larger and older pattern of racial inequality in rock island. ix. conclusion: lincoln park today and tomorrow in may and june of 2019, rock island police responded to two separate incidents of shots fired at the basketball court in lincoln park. in august of 2019, in response to pressure from nearby augustana college, longfellow elementary school, alleman high school, and mounting concerns from “just about every neighbor who lives within a five-house deep circle of lincoln park,” as parks director john gripp put it, the parks department removed the basketball hoops from the court (jenkins 2019). the police department dramatically increased foot patrols in the park and installed cameras at key entry and exit points to the city, as they believe those involved in the violence actually came from outside rock island. gripp plans to also install cameras at the basketball court, but money, as always, is an issue. in gripp’s opinion, removing the hoops is not the answer to what is clearly a deeper problem in the city, and their removal bothers him “on a few different levels,” but he says it was a necessary move. in the shortterm, it was considered to be a successful collaborative broken windows policing effort—effectively eliminating visible messiness (litter and graffiti in the courts) and visible black people. gripp told me he hopes to return the hoops to the park in the future. in the meantime, the parks department is working on gathering grant funding for a recreation manager position that would organize basketball games at the park and have “boots on the ground.” the addition of cameras and supervised activities, he said, could “get people feeling safe coming back there and […] a lot of [problems] kind of sort themselves out then, rather than just removing something because it attracts a certain element.” another alternative, he told me, would be to accept augustana college’s recent offer to replace the court with a tennis consilience: the journal of sustainable development elliott: when nature invades court to accommodate additional classes—the school’s latest attempt to influence lincoln park. it’s ironic, gripp told me: “80 percent of the problems i have in lincoln park after dark are from augustana students [during greek life “pledging” season] drinking too much, doing a little vandalism.” several of my participants also referred to problems augustana students have caused in the park. the former president of the keystone neighborhood association told me that members cleaning up lincoln park used to joke the neighborhood got its name from all the keystone beer cartons and cans students tossed into the park’s ravines during fraternity and sorority “rituals.” while white college students litter lincoln park, the park’s residents do not blame them. instead, they place the blame on black teenage basketball players. figure 5: lincoln park's basketball court, hoops removed (author photo) rock island residents with voices in the community, gripp included, seem to see the temporary ban on basketball as a sad but required step. grip told me that “basketball has been part of lincoln park for a long time,” and described playing there as a child. in an opinion piece for a local paper, rock islander john marx lauds gripp’s leadership but mourns the hoops’ loss (a “sad indictment on society”) and nostalgically reflects on his own youth playing basketball at the park, during a time when “guns weren’t used to settle disputes”: “most summer nights if you did not have an organized baseball game, you played [basketball] at lincoln […] africanamerican, white, hispanic—it didn’t matter […] it was a different era” (2019). what is to be done about lincoln park? clearly, despite problems with money and maintenance, a lot of people love the park, and a lot of people feel like it belongs to them. many of my participants voiced interest in starting a friends of lincoln park group to build a sense of community and improve maintenance. as dana told me, pointing at an overgrown flower plot during our walk through the park, if there was a group, a “friends of the park” kind of thing, that would be really nice. there are little things we could do, like maintain some plantings or split up flower beds between a group. friends groups can help sustain parks in cities where austerity-driven management has taken hold, but they can be difficult to start and maintain. the former keystone neighborhood association president told me interest in the organization has declined recently, especially since the city stopped supporting local organizations in 2011. the keystone neighborhood has transitioned to mainly rentals over the past decades—six houses on her block are home to augustana college students, she said. organizing is difficult in a neighborhood consisting of senior citizens and college students who don’t have time to “integrate” enough to volunteer. still, she hopes to start friends of lincoln park sometime soon. an alderman with whom i spoke similarly cited a “struggle to create a sense of community and civic engagement and participation […] and taking pride in the area that you live in,” with a mixed population of elderly residents and college-age renters. with parks, especially in a “more parks per capita than anywhere else” city that lacks the money to take care of all of them equally, he believes, “it should be all-hands-on-deck.” he’s afraid rock islanders have developed a culture of “expecting services” and have lost the sense that “we’re all in this together.” he cited the example of a church garden that had looked overgrown until he volunteered to regular mow there— “and you know what was really funny about that? not once has that garden been vandalized now.” the answer clearly is not as simple as “if you make something look nice, the neighborhood starts to pay attention,” however; as we’ve seen, aesthetics aren’t innocent. reactions to lincoln park’s messiness provide us insight into the complicated history of racial inequality 45 consilience: the journal of sustainable development and conflict in the city. as long as rock islanders continue to distinguish “above the hill” and “below the hill” neighborhoods and worry about “riffraff” and grass “giv[ing] criminals cover,” they can’t simultaneously call for a coming together as “friends of the park.” it is important to note that don and dana, the same elderly couple who expressed interest in volunteering in the park, also made the “i hate to be prejudiced but they are blacks” comment. a friends group might be an important step in supporting lincoln park, as in other rust belt cities, but first, white rock islanders (regardless of their life-long emotional ties to the park) must stop claiming complete ownership over green space and start accepting a more inclusive definition of what types of “nature” and, more significantly, what types of people, belong in “their” urban parks. references álvarez, r. f. 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(2012). the nature and health connection: social capital & urban greening ecosystems. proceedings of the 2012 international society of arboriculture conference. microsoft word deedam.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 14, iss. 2 (2015), pp. 90-105 impact of poverty alleviation programmes on indigenous women’s economic empowerment in nigeria: evidence from port harcourt metropolis nua j. deedam department of food science and technology river state university of science and technology, port harcourt, nigeria anthony o. onoja department of agricultural economics and extension university of port harcourt, nigeria tonyojonimi@gmail.com abstract this study was designed to assess the impact of participation of port harcourt indigenous women in poverty eradication programmes in rivers state, nigeria. the study used a questionnaire to elicit responses from 385 indigenous women who were randomly selected through a multi-stage technique from the study area. descriptive statistics and t-tests were used to analyse the data collected. results showed that majority (58.3 per cent) of the women were members of a cooperative society, 63.5 per cent were members of a community based organization (cbo), while 60.9 per cent were member of “esusu” (rotatory credit schemes). the result further showed that 66.3 per cent of the women had engaged in jobs aimed at poverty alleviation. only 6.0 per cent identified that they were not member of any poverty alleviation programmes (pap) by government. it was found that after joining the pap, 75.5 per cent of them experienced an increase in income of 36.6 per cent. the hypothesis test indicated that statistically significant differences existed in the income of the women from various sources of the economic undertakings after joining poverty alleviation programmes. it was therefore recommended that more programmes designed at alleviating poverty in rivers state should target indigenous women. in addition to this, the study also recommended the establishment of entrepreneurship capacity-building programmes to enable the women to bring out their optimal input while participating in the poverty eradication programmes. author’s note mrs. nua janet deedam is a lecturer at the department of food science and technology, river state university of science and technology, port harcourt, nigeria. dr. anthony ojonimi onoja is a senior lecturer at the department of agricultural economics and extension, university of port harcourt, nigeria. keywords: indigenous, nigeria, poverty, women. consilience deedam and onoja: impact of poverty alleviation programmes 1. introduction poverty is one of the most prevailing problems facing humanity, being a major obstacle to the realization of human rights and sustainable development . the human development report (2002) placed the number of people living on less than a dollar a day in sub-saharan africa (ssa) at 46.7 per cent. the poverty trend in nigeria, an ssa country, as shown by the federal office of statistics (fos, 2009), showed that the incidence of poverty increased from 28.1 per cent in 1995-2000 to 42.7 per cent in 2002, increased to 65.6 per cent in 2005, and to 70.2 per cent in 2009. according to the report, about 70 per cent of the nigerian population live below the poverty line. a report from the world bank’s (2010) human development report ranked nigeria at 142 in the human development index (hdi), thus grouped as one of the countries referred to, by the report, as having “low human development.” the report, which was based on 2000-2008, indicated that the proportion of the population living below the income poverty line (i.e. those with purchasing power parity, or ppp, of $1.25 a day) stood at 64.4%—a very high figure. global efforts to tackle poverty and gender discrimination appeared not to be yielding positive results. world bank (2001), indicated that about 70 per cent of the 1.3 billion people living on less than $1 a day are women. according to the african development bank (adb, 2010) world leaders agreed to a set of time bounds and measurable goals and targets for combating poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and discrimination against women at the united nations millennium summit. t h e world bank (2001) stated that poverty stems from a situation where gross inequality in the ownership of assets persists because of vested interests and entrenched power structures. economists like jeffrey sachs (work bank 2001) see improvements in property rights as being instrumental to poverty alleviation. this underscores the reason for increased attention to poverty eradication globally, namely the launching of several poverty alleviation programmes which were also aimed at actualizing the millennium development goals (mdgs) of reducing hunger and poverty by half globally by 2015. unfortunately, 2015 is now here yet poverty in the world and nigeria is far from being eradicated. women’s participation in development in africa and other developing economies (a situation that could have improved the poverty situation of women) has been rated low (the united nations development program, undp, 2003). this low participation has also been blamed for the less satisfactory impact of public investment in development. the women plan and act together for the satisfaction of their felt needs. this is a process where the women assist themselves through organized effort to acquire the attitudes, skills, and concepts required for their effective participation in programmes designed to promote their wellbeing. this low participation has also been blamed for the less than satisfactory impact of public investment in development (iheduru, 2002). according to maduagwu (2007) and ketepa-kalala (2001), the beijing conference declared that about 70 per cent of women live in unacceptable conditions of poverty, mostly in developing countries (which includes nigeria). in nigeria, there are several poverty alleviation programmes, some operating under the auspices of the government authorities such as the national poverty eradication programme (napep), while others consilience deedam and onoja: impact of poverty alleviation programmes operate under the tutelage of non-governmental organizations (ngos) and even cooperative bodies among rural and indigenous peoples whose livelihood activities have commonalities. to eradicate poverty in nigeria and achieve sustainable development, women must participate fully and equally in the formulation of developmental policies. the eradication of poverty cannot be accomplished through anti-poverty programmes alone but will require democratic participation and changes in economic structures that will allow indigenous women to resource opportunities and public services (garuba, 2004). unfortunately, research into how the orchestrated poverty alleviation programmes (pap) affect indigenous women in nigeria and even globally appear very scant, if available. there is a huge need for more research into this important area to provide current and reliable indices for informed policy making about ways of transforming the economic wellbeing of indigenous women in developing economies as nigeria, hence the need for this research. findings from such studies have the potential to promote useful policies and scalable models for eradicating poverty in other developing countries. 1.1 objectives of the study based on the aforementioned, this study was designed with the aim of assessing the impact of poverty eradication programmes on the economic wellbeing or livelihoods of indigenous women in port harcourt metropolis, nigeria. specifically, the study’s purpose was to : 1.) identify the level of participation of indigenous women in poverty alleviation programmes in the study area; and 2.) assess the impact of participation in poverty alleviation programmes on selected economic empowerment indices among port harcourt metropolis indigenous women. 1.2 literature review and theoretical issues the problem of poverty is intertwined with gender issues. the international fund for agricultural development, ifad (1997) noted that women represent the majority of the rural poor (up to 70%), especially where migration, marital instability, male mortality, and single parenthood have left them as heads of households. women carry most of the responsibilities for household food security; women have indigenous technical knowledge, skills and motivation, and tend to remain on the margin, without access to critical resources. ifad (1997) observed that rural poverty is associated with lack of access to productive resources, especially land. the poorest men and women in general have little or no land, yet socio-economic structures further reduce or inhibit access to land by women. cultural traditions also inhibit women’s access to other productive resources and services. lack of education, especially among women, is correlated with high birth rates; the resulting population pressure contributes to environmental degradation, increasingly in the form of marginal land coming under cultivation; environmental degradation is characterized by soil erosion, declining yields, and even declining agricultural productivity. this leads to further expansion and migration, which increases the burden on those family members remaining as survivors. at times, the consilience deedam and onoja: impact of poverty alleviation programmes poverty condition requires that even young children work in subsistence activities. this, alongside the lack of resources to pay school fees, prevents children, especially, from attending schools. illiteracy prevents poor people from learning new skills and accessing information and services. women in particular work long hours and have difficulty allotting time to rural development programmes. a human-centred approach to development would entail a process of social change in which the women themselves have an opportunity to take part in making decisions that affect their lives (etuk and okwudishu, 2002). it is the women themselves who bring about poverty reduction; there can be no change for the better without their informed participation, i.e. without mobilizing their capabilities and energies and without increasing their knowledge and skills. as a result, the degree of poverty reduction in the 21st century should not be measured in terms of economic growth alone but must be seen from the point of general welfare of human beings. etuk and okwudishu (2002), argued that poverty reduction is used today especially in political and economic discourses to mean a change from a less desirable to a more desirable condition characterized by economic productivity, a high standard of living, technological advancement, a stable political order, the presence of basic human needs such as food, water, clothing, shelter, and a high literacy and educational level. the eradication of poverty cannot be accomplished through anti-poverty programmes alone but will require democratic participation and changes in economic structures, which would allow indigenous women access to resource opportunities and public services (garuba, 2004). level of participation is a process of acting together with different interest, deciding together what is best, and forming a partnership to carry something out. supporting independent community initiatives, i.e. helping others do what they want and perhaps within a framework of grants, advice, and support provided by the resource holder, is intended to achieve more than otherwise. according to maduagwu (2007), the participation of women in poverty alleviation programmes has helped to grow increasingly competent for enacting co-operative solutions for their families. it helps them not only become more effective in their participation in solving the problems of their families, but also aids them in developing the skills for understanding the relative importance of problems and selecting appropriate options to address them. this enables women to take up the opportunity to identify their poverty levels, deal with them, and learn from their problems. indigenous people are persons, communities, and nations which claim a historical continuity and cultural affinity with societies endemic to their original territories that developed prior to exposure to western culture. the ikwerres are the indigenous communities whose home lands are in the niger delta region, and of which 60 per cent of their tribal lands have been acquired for public development, resulting in the destruction of several of their villages and desecration of many of their sacred sites and burial grounds. the ikwerres are the real inhabitants of port harcourt city, the capital of rivers state, and also the oil hub of nigeria. consilience deedam and onoja: impact of poverty alleviation programmes 2. research methods 2.1 area of study the study was carried out in port harcourt city local government area of rivers state nigeria. port harcourt is the capital city of rivers state and also the headquarters of the port harcourt local government area. it lies alongside the bonny river and the atlantic ocean, and is located within the niger delta. the population of the city as of 2006 was 2,660,435 (national population commission, npc, 2006). the ethnic groups are ikwerre, ijaw, and others. the population of the indigenous women was 11,970 (npc, 2006) in nine communities of the city. the ikwerres are the real inhabitants of port harcourt city, the capital of rivers state, nigeria. the present day location was inhabited only by the minority ikwerre ethnic group, but today port harcourt is a metropolitan city of over a million people made up of ikwerre indigenes and those from other parts of nigeria, as well as a significant number of foreign nations who work in the petroleum and allied industries (ihemere, 2003). the communities of port harcourt local government area (phalga) are nkpogu, rumuwoji, rumukalagbor, elakahia, rebisi, nkpolu-oroworokwo, orogbum, ohamini, and ogbunabali. 2.2 data collection procedure the study, a survey in design, was carried out in 2012. primary and secondary data were used for the study. secondary data sources were from journals, textbooks, institutional research reports, as well as online resources. primary data were obtained through a set of structured questionnaires and interview schedules administered to indigenous women in the study area. a multi-stage random sampling technique was applied to select a total of 385 indigenous women from the study area. first, 5 out of the 9 communities in port harcourt, lga were randomly chosen. then, a list of indigenous women operating in different poverty alleviation programmes was obtained from the ministry of women affairs in the state. from this list, 77 indigenous women were randomly chosen in equal proportion from the five communities sampled for the study. the women, however, cut across various entrepreneurial segments and poverty alleviation programmes. 2.3 data analysis technique the data collected on the first objective of the study were analysed using descriptive statistics, such as mean, percentages and frequencies. the second research objective was attained through the aid of paired samples t-test. there are two main types of t-test: an independent-measures t-test – when samples are not matched – and a matched-pair t-test when samples appear in pairs (gujarati and sangeetha, 2007). the value of t may be calculated using statistical packages such as spss or eviews. the t-test for the equality of means (t test algorithms) is given as follows: consilience deedam and onoja: impact of poverty alleviation programmes the ttest statistics is given as; …………………...……. where: is the mean for group 1.(economic empowerment index before joining poverty alleviation programme); is the mean for group 2 (economic empowerment index after joining poverty alleviation programme); n1 is the number of people in group 1 (economic empowerment index before joining poverty alleviation programme); n2 is the number of people in group 2. (economic empowerment index after joining poverty alleviation programme); s1 2 is the variance for group 1( economic empowerment index before joining poverty alleviation programme); s2 2 is the variance for group 2 (economic empowerment index after joining poverty alleviation programme). the symbol s2 stands for the variance. the variance is the standard deviation without the square root, i.e. nothing more than the sum of the deviations of all the scores from the mean divided by n-1. the formula above is for testing the significance of difference between two independent samples, i.e., groups of events. 3. results and discussion result in table 1 indicated that the majority (58.3 per cent) of the women were members of a cooperative society, 63.5 per cent were members of community based organization (cbo), and 60.9 per cent were members of the esusu. their reasons for joining such groups are related to forming a safety net for the members so as to shield themselves from the risks of poverty. the result further showed that 66.3 per cent of the women had engaged in jobs aimed at poverty alleviation. only 6.0 per cent identified that they were not member of any pap by government. among those that were identified as members, 32.6 per cent were members of tap, 30.8 per cent were members of esi while 20.5 per cent were members of wfsh. consilience deedam and onoja: impact of poverty alleviation programmes table 1: level of involvement in poverty alleviation programmes item frequency percentage member of a cooperative society “yes” “no” engagement in any job or employment for purpose of alleviating poverty “yes” “no” member of any community based organization (cbo) “yes” “no” member of any contributory credit society “yes” “no” member of any poverty alleviation programmes sponsored by government empowerment support initiative (esi) the adolescent programme (tap) women fish sellers association (wfsh ) widowhood centre (wc) 225 161 256 130 245 141 235 151 119 126 79 23 58.3 41.7 66.3 33.7 63.5 36.7 60.9 39.1 30.8 32.6 20.5 6.0 source: field data (2012). table 2 showed that majority of the women had benefited from government sponsored pap (75.4%) and from any other pap (90.7%). it is evident that more women benefited from other pap than government sponsored pap. the result further showed that almost half (50.3%) of the women were having an annual income below n100,000 before joining the pap but after joining the pap, 75,0 per cent had an annual income of more than n100,000. the implication of the findings in this section is that women who really desire to improve their wealth status need not rely on government-sponsored poverty alleviation programmes alone. the fact that 75 per cent of the women who joined poverty alleviation programmes had their income levels raised above their erstwhile n100000 (equivalent of us $632.91 in 2012 us dollars at an exchange rate of 158 to 1 us dollar) participation in and access to poverty alleviation programmes have the capacity of boosting income levels of women thus reducing income poverty. consilience deedam and onoja: impact of poverty alleviation programmes table 2: impact from poverty alleviation programmes item frequency percentage cumulative % benefited from any poverty alleviation programme sponsored by government. yes no benefited from any of the poverty alleviation programs yes no 292 94 350 32 75.6 24.4 90.7 8.3 75.6 100 90.7 100 source: field data (2012). it was not certain whether the income change after participating in poverty alleviation programmes by the women in this study was significant enough on statistical grounds to use for making policy statements. therefore a more cursory examination was done by the t-test, whose results are presented in table 3. results in table 3 shows a significant increase (p<0.05) in the mean income of the women before participating in pap (n22,2937.17, or approximately usd 1411.00) and after joining the pap (n304,590.67, or approximately usd1,927.79), an increase of about 36.6 per cent. the t-test result enables us to reject the hypothesis that there is no significant change in income of women who participated in poverty alleviation programmes before and after participating in the pap. this implies that pap have positive impacts on the welfare, in particular incomes, of women who participated in the programmes. it is, however, beyond the scope of this study to assess the effects of other variables on income change other than participation in pap. table 3: approximate income earned by the women before and after joining poverty alleviation programme item mean (in naira and kobo) income before participating in the poverty alleviation programme. income earned after joining any registered poverty alleviation programme. t – value p – value n 222937.17 (usd 1411.00) n304590.67 (usd1,927.79) 8.011 0.00 source: field data (2012). table 4 shows the income generated from different sources before and after joining the pap. the results in the table revealed that almost all livelihood activities consilience deedam and onoja: impact of poverty alleviation programmes studied except two, forestry and hunting, did not show a significant differential in income among the indigenous women who participated in pap activities before and after joining the paps. it was, however, difficult to explain why some activities indicated negative differentials (i.e. livestock/poultry/fisheries). it is possible that the women who invested their money in these livelihood activities were probably not experienced or trained in these businesses and lost all their investments they used in the activity after joining or benefitting from pap. this may also be attributed to the natives of the city and the environment. from these results, it could also be noted that the services of forestry and hunting were not available to the women in the area. among the activities that indicated positive income changes after participation by the indigenous women in the study (as shown in table 4), we found that crop farming and gardening had income differentials of us$ 486.55 equivalence after participation; wholesale and retail achieved a us$602.51 rise in income; manufacturing us$537.97; services us$7078.50; and communication, computer, and photocopying us$706.11. the transportation services sector had a mean appreciated income of us$2341.77; trading/merchandise us$481.71; while other activities such as banking and insurance witnessed mean income differentials of us$1,999.42 after participating in pap. the t-statistics estimated for all of these factors were significant at a one per cent level. on the whole, it is evident from the findings of this study that participation in pap activities benefitted the livelihoods of women who participated in the programmes. table 4: income realized per annum before and after participating in pap source of income income realized per annum before poverty alleviation programme participation in naira income realized per annum after poverty alleviation programme participation in naira differential income in naira change in income in usd t – value crop farming, gardening 112500 189375 76875 486.55 9.94*** livestock, poultry 220000 110239.6 -109760.36 -694.69 10.46*** fisheries 300000 483333.3 183333.33 1160.34 13.15*** forestry, hunting 148571.4 293571.4 145000 917.72 1.05 wholesale, retail 117385.3 212582 95196.72 602.51 11.89*** manufacturing 149302.3 234302.3 85000 537.97 6.04*** services 200848 1319252 1118403.55 7078.50 3.73*** communications, computer, and photocopying 118984.5 230550.4 111565.89 706.11 12.05*** consilience deedam and onoja: impact of poverty alleviation programmes services transport services 360000 730000 370000 2341.77 10.45*** other activities, i.e. banking, insurance (n = 22) 404545.5 720454.6 315909.1 1999.42 14.44*** trading 110697.4 186807 76109.65 481.71 25.31*** source: field data (2012). nb: “***” = figures significant at a 1% level of statistical significance; “**” implies figures are significant at a 5% level and; “*” implies figures are statistical significant at a 10% level. table 5 in the appendix indicates that the percentage of women who had no property before joining the pap decreased after joining the pap. therefore, the acquisition of property significantly increased after joining the pap. in most of the properties considered, none of the women possessed more than one before joining the pap. some of the properties that were acquired most (> 4 items) were gsm handsets at 47.2 per cent, radio sets at 42.2 per cent, televisions at 42.2 per cent, kerosene stoves at 40.9 per cent , computers at 29.0 per cent, wheel barrows at 32.9 per cent, and air conditioners at 29.5 per cent. the rent paid for accommodation also increased from n65,414.508 to n100, 505.18. this is a reflection of the change from a low to a high-quality house. 4. conclusion the study had been able to find that a majority of the indigenous women in port harcourt metropolis participate actively in various poverty alleviation activities (both government initiated and privately organized ones). there are benefits uncovered by this research which appear to encourage them to do so. one of such benefits is the increase in personal incomes which accrue to them after joining the programmes. it was found, for instance, that after joining the pap, 75.5 per cent of them experienced an increase in income of 36.6 per cent. this development is a salvo to poverty alleviation programmes and underlies the need to put women in the forefront of poverty alleviation programme designs. with this finding, it is evident that one of the ways to ensure sustainable development in nigeria is to encourage indigenous women to participate in poverty alleviation programmes. they appear to convert investment on them into more desirable results. the findings, which showed that statistically significant differences existed in the income of the women from various sources of livelihood or economic undertakings, corroborated the earlier finding. however, it is recommended that more rigorous studies be carried out using inferential statistics such as regression models based on time series data that include other variables to test whether income changes were attributed to any other factor other than participation in the pap. for sustainable development to be attained, the pillar of human development must not be neglected. efforts must be made to put poverty alleviation and gender inclusion in the forefront of sustainable development programmes. we recommend that more programmes designed at alleviating poverty consilience deedam and onoja: impact of poverty alleviation programmes in rivers state of nigeria where port harcourt is located target indigenous women. in addition, we also recommend the establishment of entrepreneurship capacity building programmes to enable the women achieve optimal input while participating in the poverty eradication programmes. consilience deedam and onoja: impact of poverty alleviation programmes bibliography african development bank (2010). gender, poverty and environmental indicators on african countries 2010: xi. tunisia: economic and social statistics division statistics department african development bank. economic commission for africa (1999). economic report on africa. the challenge of poverty reduction and sustainability. addis ababa e/eca/cm 24/3/99. etuk ,u and okwudishu, i.(1998). ethical condition of human development in 21st century africa. ibadan: hope publication:40. federal office of statistic, fos. (2009). rivers state nigeria. lagos: fos. food & agricultural organization (1982). role of women in agricultural production fao, rome:5. food and agricultural organization (1996-2001) plan of action for women in development fao, nigeria. gujarati, d. n. & sangeetha(2007). basic econometrics. 4th edition. new delhi and new york. human development report hdp (2002). poverty, inequality and development. platform for action. iheduru, n. (2002). women entrepreneurship and development: the gendering of microfinance in nigeria. paper presented at 8th international interdisciplinary congress on women 21-26 july 2002. makerere university kampala uganda. ihemere k. u. (2003). university of newcastle united kingdom. an integrated approach to the study of language attitudes and change in nigeria: the case of the ikwerre of port harcourt city. international fund for agricultural development, ifad (1997). rural women in ifad's projects: the key to poverty alleviation. katepa-kalala p. (1999). assessment report on women and poverty and the economic empowerment of women. india. maduagwu, a. (2007). taking it global-panorama-women and poverty. retrieved on 23rd august, 2011 from http://www.tigweb.org/express/panorama/article.html.11/23/2009. one world guide (2012). sustainable development guide. retrieved on 30th november, 2012 consilience deedam and onoja: impact of poverty alleviation programmes http://uk.oneworld.net/guides/sustainable_development?gclid=ckb3g_gy 9rmcfc6v3god7r8afa. payne, s. (1991). women, health & poverty. hempsteed: harvester weatsheaf :132-135. united nations development programme (1998). nigeria human development report lagos. undp. united nations (2005). the millennium development goals report. http://unstats un.or/unsd/mi/pedf/mdg% 20 book pdf 4/15/2009. united nations development programme (1998). undp poverty report 1998. overcoming human poverty. new york. un millennium project (2006) investing in development retrieved on 22nd july, 2011 from http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports 4/5/2009. world bank. (1997). development in practice: taking action to reduce poverty in subsaharan africa. washington, d.c. work bank (2001). engendering development through gender equality in rights, resources and voice. washington, dc., and new york: world bank and oxford university press. world bank (2010). human development report. washington, dc., and new york: world bank. consilience deedam and onoja: impact of poverty alleviation programmes appendix a table 5: number of household items acquired before and after participating in the poverty alleviation programme (n=386). properties before poverty alleviation programme after poverty alleviation programme television none one two three four cd player none one two three radio set none one two three four video set none one two three gsm handset none one electric generator none one two motorcycle none one two car 183 47.4 203 52.6 262 67.9 124 32.1 183 47.4 203 52.6 301 78.0 85 22.0 198 51.3 188 48.7 308 78 347 89.9 39 10.1 0.0 172 44.6 163 42.2 39 10.1 4 1.0 8 2.1 63 16.3 257 66.6 52 13.5 14 3.6 172 44.6 163 42.2 39 10.1 4 1.0 8 2.1 158 40.9 186 48.2 38 9.8 4 1.0 53 13.7 182 47.2 116 30.1 31 8.0 4 1.0 175 171 40 260 67.4 99 25.6 27 7.0 consilience deedam and onoja: impact of poverty alleviation programmes none one two three no response cable / satellite none one two no response fridge none one no response deep freezer none one two no response gas cooker none one two no response kerosene stove none one two no response computer none one two no response washing machine none one two 329 85.2 53 13.7 4 1.0 293 75.9 89 23.1 4 1.0 231 59.8 151 39.1 4 1.0 302 79.1 69 18.1 11 2.9 291 75.4 95 24.6 227 58.8 155 40.2 4 1.0 321 84.0 61 16.0 227 58.8 123 31.9 22 5.7 10 2.6 120 31.0 221 57.3 45 11.7 143 37.0 202 52.3 23 6.0 18 4.7 146 38.2 174 45.5 58 15.2 4 1.0 177 45.9 177 45.9 24 6.2 8 2.1 148 38.7 158 41.4 72 18.8 4 1.0 218 56.5 112 29.0 33 8.5 15 3.9 4 1.0 4 1.0 consilience deedam and onoja: impact of poverty alleviation programmes three no response electric fan none one two three four no response air conditioner none one two three four no response wheel barrow none one two three four no response plots of land acquire none one two no response building erected none one two no response accommodation rent before participation 4 1.0 249 65.2 133 34.8 232 60.1 142 37.2 8 2.1 300 78.5 70 18.3 12 3.1 300 79.4 70 18.5 8 2.1 344 89.1 38 9.8 4 1.0 317 83.0 65 17.0 170000.00 207 53.6 54 14.0 75 19.4 38 9.8 12 3.1 155 40.6 95 24.6 64 16.6 42 10.9 22 5.8 4 1.0 195 51.6 114 30.2 45 11.9 16 4.2 8 2.1 190 49.7 127 33.9 57 14.9 4 1.0 211 54.7 123 31.9 48 12.4 229 59.3 210000.00 source: field data (2012) consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 23, 2021. note from the editors dear readers, we are pleased to present issue xxiii of consilience: the journal of sustainable development. as the covid19 pandemic rages on, our attention has been focused primarily on the present; leaders and scientists around the world have sought to distribute a vaccine and stem the tide of the virus, employers have sought to redefine the workplace, and individuals have sought to protect themselves and their families from the disastrous effects of the virus. at the same time, political divisions in the united states have deepened, and racial inequality has been thrust to the forefront of american consciousness as a deeply rooted problem that remains characterized by violence and hatred and must be addressed. while it may seem as if these worries are more than sufficient to take up our time, it is more important than ever that we not lose sight of the future of our world. the climate crisis goes hand-in-hand with inequality and should be treated with the same sense of urgency. as such, the field of sustainable development, though not without its controversies, has emerged as a beacon of hope for the future, and can perhaps serve as a way for us to look beyond the fear and uncertainty of this time. we must all take responsibility for making the forthcoming year a year of change. consilience seeks to further contribute to the global effort toward sustainability by providing engaging academic works from scholars around the world. the focus of the articles in issue xxiii varies widely, from a global consideration of eco-nationalism to a local analysis of naturalization in an urban park in rock island, illinois. the articles also draw from a variety of disciplines, including a scientific study of marine renewable energy, a social examination of ecoracism, and political evaluations of uk climate policy and u.s. national enteric emissions standards. as always, we encourage you to take a look at our briefings column, which publishes shorter opinion pieces on hot-button topics. you can also subscribe to the consilience pages on facebook, instagram, and twitter to stay informed about new articles that are posted, author highlights, events, and other journal news. if you have any questions, comments, or concerns, please don’t hesitate to contact us at consiliencejournal@gmail.com. we thank you for your continued interest in, and support for, consilience. warmly, agnes thornberg olivia chioffi editor-in-chief academic journal director introductionintroduction urban areas are predicted to house 68% of the world’s population by 2050 (united nations 2019). for this reason, cities are of unique concern to government officials given the pressing need to accommodate both a growing population and adapt to the changing climate (bulkeley 2013). adding to the complexity of urban climate adaptation is the increasingly globalized nature of cities; this interdependence means that one city’s actions can have consequences for cities around the world (knox 1997). it is therefore critical that cities develop physical, social, and economic resilience to ensure stability and prosperity both locally and globally. culture, which is a system of beliefs, attitudes, and values (hofstede 2001), plays an important role in how societies respond to challenges. geert hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory is the predominant framework to perform cross-cultural analyses on national culture. according to hofstede, there are six cultural dimensions that guide how organizations operate: (1) power distance, (2) uncertainty avoidance, (3) individualism vs. collectivism, (4) masculinity vs. femininity, (5) long-term orientation, and (6) indulgence vs. restraint. hofstede demonstrates that national culture can influence the values of a nation’s citizens. while studies have extensively addressed the relationship between national culture and organizational behavior (smith, dugan and trompenaars, 1996; deephouse, newburry, and soleimani, 2016), a literature search revealed little research on the role of national culture in the context of urban resilience. the most relevant research pertains to the concept of equity in urban contexts, as equity is involved in hofstede’s notions of collectivity and femininity (frías-aceituno, rodríguez-aríza, and gonzález-bravo, 2013; northridge and freeman, 2011; grant, 2014; partners for livable communities, 2000). more recently, a few studies have addressed the role of equity in urban resilience contexts (meerow and newell, 2016; meerow, majouhesh, and miller, 2019; fitzgibbons and mitchell, 2019). although meerow, pajouhesh, and miller (2019) and fitzgibbons and mitchell (2019) reviewed the plans of a few cities participating in the initiative, neither study assessed the plans from a lens view journal | view issue national culture and urban resilience: national culture and urban resilience: a case study of resilient citiesa case study of resilient cities madison cilk department of political science, the university of vermont, burlington, vt 05405, united states, email: mcilk@uvm.edu keywords:keywords: climate change, national culture, sustainability, urban resilience, hofstede abstract:abstract: as climate change, population growth, and globalization create new challenges for cities around the world, it is imperative that urban areas take steps to increase their resilience. previous research has shown that national culture, or the beliefs and attitudes that guide behavior, can play a significant role in shaping the values of a nation’s citizens. with more and more cities designing urban resilience plans, it is highly relevant to assess the role that national culture plays in the creation of these plans. through a qualitative content analysis of 71 urban resilience plans from 27 countries around the world using geert hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory, this research assesses whether and how national culture influences urban resilience efforts. the results of the analysis show that, for many cities, urban resilience efforts are not strongly influenced by national culture, but instead share a common thread of being inclusive, future-oriented, and prioritizing quality of life over profits. 18 doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6740 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 18-30 author’s note:author’s note: my interest in urban resilience and national cultures stems from a year i spent studying urban planning in the netherlands. there, i first learned about geert hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory and became curious as to whether and how cultures influence the ways in which urban areas respond to climate change. this research provides some insight into this inquiry, and has inspired me to continue learning about different cultures and their roles in shaping urban systems. july 6, 2020 http://consiliencejournal.org https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/consilience/issue/view/651 consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6740 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 18-3019 of national culture. therefore, the scope of knowledge regarding how national culture is reflected in urban resilience plans is limited. this research aims to close that gap. literature reviewliterature review national culture culture is the thread by which a country is united. dutch sociologist geert hofstede defines culture as a “collective programming of the mind” which drives how a group responds to its surrounding environment (hofstede 1991, 5). between 1967 and 1973, hofstede pioneered a study of the influence of national culture in organizations by surveying thousands of international business machines (ibm) corporation employees in 50 countries and three regions during two different time periods. his research assessed how people behaved within large organizations. after reviewing the survey results, hofstede noticed considerable differences between the employees depending on the country in which they worked. he reduced these differences to four different dimensions which addressed how each society responded to issues such as power imbalances and individualism. the results led hofstede to propose his cultural dimensions theory. as shown in figure 1, the dimensions include (1) power distance (pdi), (2) uncertainty avoidance (uai), (3) individualism vs. collectivism (idv), and (4) masculinity vs. femininity (mas). these dimensions, according to hofstede, refer to how different national societies cope with inequality, ambiguity, individual identification with groups, and the distribution of gender roles. after further research, hofstede later added two more dimensions: (5) long-term orientation (lto) and (6) indulgence vs. restraint (ivr) (hofstede, hofstede, and minkov 2010). these two dimensions refer to societies’ affinities toward tradition and the gratification of human drives for enjoyment. hofstede (2001) defines power distance as the societal acceptance that power is unevenly distributed. low scores represent a cultural acceptance of hierarchy, whereas high scores mean a society has low tolerance for inequality of power. uncertainty avoidance is described as the extent to which societies dislike unpredictability. a high score in this dimension suggests that a society prefers tradition over innovation, whereas a low score means a society prefers practice over principles. individualism vs. collectivism refers to the extent to which societies expect the individuals to take care of themselves as opposed to integrating into groups. a high score corresponds with a highly individualistic society and a low score is demonstrative of a society that prefers collectivism. masculinity vs. femininity refers to how societies adhere to traditionally male values (such as economic growth, power, high achievement) and traditionally female values (care, cooperation, pleasant atmospheres). high scores represent a preference for masculine values and low scores represent a preference for feminine values. long-term orientation relates to a society’s ability to be pragmatic versus their tendency to focus on traditions. a high score means that a culture prefers pragmatic problem-solving as opposed to tradition and social norms. indulgence vs. restraint refers to a society’s ability to “accept delayed gratification of their material, social, and emotional needs” (pg. xx). a high score suggests that a society prefers a high quality of life over strict societal norms. despite its widespread use, hofstede’s approach is not immune from scholarly criticism. touburg (2016) argues that hofstede disregards the impact of non-cultural factors, assumes national homogeneity, and has an inherent western bias. other scholars argue that the national culture scores are inaccurate measures at the organizational level and therefore should not be used to describe sub-groups within countries (brewer and venaik 2013). but research on cultural diversity within countries has suggested that this claim has little empirical support because there is still an influence of national culture on many subcultures (hofstede et al. 2010; minkov and hofstede 2012; minkov and hofstede 2014). arguably, the most prominent criticism came from mcsweeney (2002) who claimed that a survey cannot measure the influence of national culture on behavior. he suggested that hofstede disregarded variability within cultures and questioned the theory’s measurability, causality, and bipolar nature (i.e. the dimension of individualism versus collectivism). another related criticism is that not all of hofstede’s cultural dimensions are figure 1: scale of dimensions consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6740 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 18-3020 “empirically useful” (minkov 2018, 250; sharma 2003). in the decades following hofstede’s pioneering research, both critics and those inspired by hofstede have expanded upon his research in an effort to better understand cross-cultural interactions. urban resilience climate change has made its way to the forefront of urban planning, as cities are increasingly challenged to mitigate and adapt to problems such as increased precipitation, heat waves, and decreased air quality. the term “urban resilience” developed in response to the threat of climate change, but is also a broader term that encompasses the nature of an urban system’s response to uncertainty. meerow, newell, and stults (2016, 39) define urban resilience as “the ability of an urban system — and all of its constituent socio-ecological and socio-technical networks across temporal and spatial scales — to maintain or rapidly return to desired functions in the face of a disturbance, to adapt to change, and to quickly transform systems that limit current or future adaptive capacity.” as the definition suggests, planning urban resilience is not a one-size-fits-all endeavor. different cities take different approaches to addressing climate change; some emphasize equity (meerow, pani and miller 2019) while others focus on structural measures (birkmann et al. 2010). one lens through which to analyze equity in urban resilience is to consider the ‘5 w’s’: resilience for whom, what, where, when, and why (meerow and newell 2019). this planning tool enables those involved in the planning process to assess the tradeoffs for different beneficiaries of proposed measures. for example, when considering where it is most equitable to create green spaces, urban planners can assess which areas are most vulnerable to flooding or heat waves in addition to which areas are the most socially vulnerable. biermann (2014, 178) goes further in arguing that equitable allocation of resources is not an option; it is a political necessity. he suggests that in some cities, areas of high social vulnerability and environmental risk tend to be one and the same (bolin et al. 2012). by contrast, other research has demonstrated that there may be little overlap (meerow and newell 2019; talen 1997). critics of urban resilience argue that the concept is vague and difficult to measure (vale 2013; cote and nightingale 2011). this definitional ambiguity suggests that urban resilience may be defined differently depending on the cultural context. urban systems function within the context of national cultures. as the impacts of climate change become more pressing, it is critical to recognize that urban resilience plans are not one-size-fits-all and evaluate whether national cultures play a role in their formation. assessing the impact of national culture on urban resilience plans in terms of hofstede’s cultural dimensions will contribute to both cultural and earth systems governance research. cultures and resilience having identified the role of national culture within organizations, it is of special interest to study the role of national culture in urban contexts with respect to urban resilience. although past research addresses concepts of equity, local culture, governance, and urban resilience, there are no comprehensive studies that assess the influence of national culture on urban resilience efforts, or how countries’ plans differ depending on their cultural context. one possible explanation for this lack of research is that the discipline of urban sociology focuses on the characteristics of and between cities, and has therefore traditionally focused on local rather than national culture. yet, the local-national division is becoming harder to parse. as the world becomes more urbanized (united nations 2019), it also becomes more interconnected (castells 2002; sassen 2002). this global shift, which is largely technologically-driven, has made it increasingly difficult to distinguish urban societies from societies at large (wu 2016). castells (2002) proposes the idea of the “network-state”. this network-state, in contrast to the citystate, takes into account the influence of supranational urban institutions. these institutions interact on interactive electronic networks and are thereby able to surpass spatial boundaries. since cities are increasingly becoming hubs for supranational institutions, they need to be able to adapt quickly to global dynamics. methodologymethodology to analyze the relationship between national culture and urban resilience, i reviewed the urban resilience plans of 71 cities representing 27 different countries and assessed how each demonstrates hofstede’s six cultural dimensions (see table 1). the plans include those of 61 cities taking part in the 100 resilient cities (100rc) initiative and, to control for the selection of the dependent variable, 10 cities not participating in the 100rc initiative. though there were 97 total cities participating in the 100rc initiative, i only analyzed plans which met the following criteria: 1. the plans were either (a) originally written in english, or (b) had an english translation available on 100resilientcities.org. consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6740 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 18-3021 2. the plans came from countries which have all six national cultural dimension scores listed in hofstede, hofstede, and minkov’s cultures and organizations (2010).* * south africa was excluded because data was sourced from white citizens only. the 10 cities not participating in the 100rc initiative were selected by location to proportionally match the regions of the cities participating in the initiative. argentina (buenos aires, santa fe) australia (adelaide*, melbourne, sydney) brazil (campinas*, rio de janeiro) canada (calgary, mississauga*, montreal, toronto, vancouver) chile (santiago metropolitan region) china (deyang, huangshi) colombia (cali, medellin) denmark (vejle) france (paris) germany (berlin*) greece (athens, thessaloniki) india (chennai, pune, medan*, surat) indonesia (makassar*, semarang) italy (rome) japan (kyoto, toyama) malaysia (melaka) mexico (colima, mexico city, juárez) new zealand (christchurch, wellington) singapore (singapore) south korea (seoul) thailand (bangkok) netherlands (rotterdam, the hague) united kingdom (bristol, glasgow) united states (atlanta, berkeley, boston, boulder, chicago, dallas, el paso, greater miami and the beaches, honolulu, los angeles, louisville, new orleans, new york city, oakland, pittsburgh, portland or*, portland me*, norfolk, san francisco, seattle, st. petersburg*, tulsa, washington d.c.) uruguay (montevideo) vietnam (can tho, da nang) *non-100rc initiative the 71 cities analyzed demonstrate geographic diversity, representing 27 countries on five continents. there is also economic diversity, with high, upper middle, and lower middle income countries represented (the world bank 2020). the countries also all exhibit different cultural dimension scores (hofstede, hofstede, and minkov 2010). i employed a qualitative coding scheme similar to that of meerow, pajouhesh, & miller (2019) to assess the presence of cultural dimensions in each resilience plan. the coding scheme, which originally focused on equity, was modified to analyze the six dimensions through an urban resilience lens (see table 2). the texts of the urban resilience plans were coded with values of 0, .5, or 1 depending on whether there was a high presence, moderate presence, or absence of the text from table 2 (see table 3). it is important to note that for all dimensions except long-term orientation (lto) and indulgence vs. restraint (ivr), a high presence of cultural-specific text corresponds with a low national cultural dimension score. for example, if there is a high presence of text describing the individualism vs. collectivism (idv), it would mean that the urban resilience plan reflects a collectivist culture and would subsequently correspond with a low cultural dimension score for the country. table 1: plans which met the above criteria table 2: coding scheme for resilience plan documents consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6740 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 18-3022 after reviewing the plans for texts describing cultural dimensions, i compared my findings to the cultural dimension scores from hofstede, hofstede, and minkov’s cultures and organizations (2010), shown in table 4. these scores, which range from 0 to 100, were categorized as either low (<45), moderate (45-55), or high (55+). by comparing the national scores (hofstede, hofstede, and minkov 2010) to the scores of each resilience plan, i qualitatively analyzed the relationship between cultural dimension scores and the presence of these dimensions in the plans. the analysis includes a determination of an overall strong, moderate, weak, mixed, or no relationship between the scores and the urban resilience plans. cities with no national cultural dimensions aligning with their urban resilience plans have no relationship, those with one or two aligning have a weak relationship, those with three or four have a moderate relationship, and those with five or six have a strong relationship. analysisanalysis when the plans of the 71 cities were analyzed based on the coding scheme from table 2 and the national cultural dimension scores in table 4, they all scored the same for each of the cultural dimensions (see table 5). they all demonstrated a low power distance, low uncertainty avoidance, low individualism, low masculinity, high long-term orientation, and high indulgence. in other words, urban resilience efforts were inclusive, future-oriented, and prioritized quality of life over profits. though each city’s plan had at least one cultural dimension aligned with their respective national scores, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that national culture influences the ways in which cities plan for resilience. power distance for the power distance (pdi) dimension, all urban resilience plans demonstrated low pdi scores by having a high presence of text describing how citizens will participate in the decision-making processes. low pdi scores, as demonstrated in map 1, are typically found in germanic and anglo countries. latin and asian countries, in contrast, tend to have higher pdi scores. this means that countries such as vietnam, malaysia, and mexico are more accepting of social hierarchy. low pdi countries like denmark, the netherlands, and the united states are less accepting of such power inequalities and have national values that align with the participatory nature of urban resilience efforts. table 3: urban resilience plan coding scores for national cultural dimensions table 4: national cultural dimension scores* from cultures and organizations (2010) *** scores range from 0-100 consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6740 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 18-3023 participation takes different forms in urban resilience plans. in denmark, vejle’s urban resilience plan describes citizen participation and specific initiatives to promote engagement such as discussion groups for refugees and migrants, online platforms to share resilience ideas, and participatory design processes for enhancing climate adaptation. boston’s resilience strategy, resilient boston, is entirely focused on citizen engagement with a focus on inclusion of historically disadvantaged groups. compared to the plans of the other 70 cities, boston’s plan includes more specific measures as to how it planned to include citizens in decision-making processes. for example, the city planned to launch several participatory budgeting processes to include low income residents and youth in financial resource distribution decisions. uncertainty avoidance urban resilience is centered around the idea that cities should be able to adapt and prepare for future risks. in the uncertainty avoidance (uai) dimension, all 71 plans had a high presence of text mentioning specific initiatives and projected timelines. since all of the plans included innovative solutions as well as shortand long-term timeframes for implementation, the uai dimension from an urban resilience perspective aligns with a low score. chinese, table 5: coding scores of urban resilience plans and alignment with national cultural scores* table 5, cont’d *scores which are bold and underlined differ from national cultural dimension scores consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6740 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 18-3024 nordic, and anglo countries tend to have low scores in this dimension. latin american countries tend to have higher scores in this dimension, meaning these cultures are less comfortable with planning for the unpredictable. individualism vs. collectivism for the individualism vs. collectivism (idv) dimension, all of the plans mentioned inclusive and community-oriented language. typically, there is a significant difference in idv scores, with higher income countries having a high score and lower income countries having a low score. for example, the united states has a high score of 91 while colombia has a low score of 13. however, according to my analysis, these preferences do not translate into significant differences in how much each map 1: national power distance scores on a global scale map 2: national uncertainty avoidance scores on a global scale map 3: national individualism vs. collectivism scores on a global scale map 4: national masculinity vs. femininity scores on a global scale map 5: national long-term orientation scores on a global scale map 6: national indulgence vs. restraint scores on a global scale consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6740 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 18-3025 country’s plan values individualism or collectivism; all plans demonstrated a low idv score. the rotterdam resilience strategy mentions specific plans to improve livability in the underprivileged rotterdam zuid district in the netherlands. its plans, which are supported vertically by the national government (young 2013), include improved access to education, work, and housing. the city of montevideo in uruguay has designated inclusivity as one of four foundational pillars in its resilience plan, while santiago in chile plans to engage with disadvantaged communities and enhance their access to public services and facilities. masculinity vs. femininity all urban resilience plans scored low in the masculinity vs. femininity (mas) dimension, suggesting that urban resilience embodies traditionally western feminine values such as care, cooperation, and equity over masculine values of competition and high achievement. the uniformity in scores differs from hofstede’s findings that most countries have moderate or high masculinity scores with the exception of nordic countries. for example, hofstede ranks sweden as a feminine country with a mas score of 5. low mas scores were demonstrated in different ways throughout the 71 plans, but each plan contained detailed text describing vulnerable populations and how equitable distribution of resources would be addressed. in thailand, bangkok has designated plans for how vulnerable groups such as the elderly can gain better access to transportation and healthcare. the plan for paris, france, involves adapting infrastructure to help vulnerable citizens cope with a warmer climate. long-term orientation the analysis of the 71 urban resilience plans demonstrated that the cities all have a long-term orientation (lto) towards urban resilience efforts, corresponding with a high lto score. these efforts include plans to improve the cities’ physical, social, and economic resilience. east asian countries ranked as having a high lto in hofstede’s study, meaning their national cultures tend to prefer more pragmatic, long-term problem-solving techniques. latin american countries generally rank low in this dimension and tend to adhere to traditions and prefer short-term solutions. though colombia has a low lto score of 13, the plans of both cali and medellin include future-oriented language and long-term sustainability goals. rotterdam’s strategy includes the creation of climate-proof districts, water sensitive infrastructure, and a transition from a fossil fuel-based port economy to a bio-based one. melaka, in malaysia, has long-term strategies including creating a centralized government operation center and raising public awareness about the threats of climate change. in boston, long-term initiatives include supporting local entrepreneurs, providing financial empowerment tools, and adapting to extreme heat. indulgence vs. restraint lastly, all 71 resilience plans contained a high presence of text describing steps to improve the quality of life for citizens and therefore scored high in the indulgence vs. restraint (ivr) dimension. hofstede found that most nordic european, anglo, and latin american countries have highly “indulgent” cultures, suggesting that these cultures prefer leisure, optimism, and a high quality of life over pessimism and strict social norms. east asian countries, in contrast, tended to score either low or moderate in this category. this means that these cultures place less value on leisure and more on a strong work ethic. as was the case in the other five dimensions, the plans of the cities did not all align with their national scores in the ivr dimension. despite china having a low ivr score of 24, the plans of both deyang and huangshi place emphasis on improving the quality of life of all residents. proposed measures include enhancing green spaces and reducing pollution. in bangkok’s plan, the city aims to improve the local quality of life through innovation and adaptation. specific plans include creating a more connected mass transport system and improving the living conditions for migrant workers. paris plans to increase green space, access to transportation, and affordable housing. discussiondiscussion the urban resilience plans all scored the same for each of the cultural dimensions, showing zero variance. the plans of each city demonstrated a low power distance, low uncertainty avoidance, low individualism, low masculinity, high long-term orientation, and high indulgence. in other words, the urban resilience plans were inclusive, future-oriented, and prioritized quality of life over profits. while the 71 urban resilience plans reflected their national cultures in at least one dimension, there were usually multiple dimensions in which the cities’ plans differed. there were no urban resilience plans which contained text reflecting all six of its national cultural dimensions. the strongest relationship between urban resilience plans and national cultures — which is a moderate relationship — was found in the plans of danish, dutch, swedish, and vietnamese cities. these plans had 4/6 dimensions consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6740 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 18-3026 aligning with their respective national cultures. the plans of chilean, chinese, malaysian, singaporean, south korean, and british cities showed the next strongest relationship, with 3/6 dimensions aligning with their respective national cultures. the urban resilience plans of the following countries had 2/6 dimensions aligning: australia, brazil, canada, colombia, france, germany, indonesia, mexico, new zealand, thailand, the united states, and uruguay. the urban resilience plans of argentinian, german, greek, indian, italian, and japanese cities had 1/6 dimensions aligning. national cultures that have low power distances, low uncertainty avoidance, low individualism, low masculinity, high long-term orientation, and high indulgence share values with urban resilience efforts. while there were no national cultures sharing all six values with urban resilience, the cultures of denmark, sweden, the netherlands, and vietnam appear to best mirror the values of urban resilience. denmark, sweden, and the netherlands share political, economic, and geographical similarities, but vietnam’s inclusion in this group suggests these similarities are not sole determinants of having urban resilience values. the groupings of the remaining 23 countries do not show any obvious relationships. since all plans scored the same in each dimension, this research suggests that urban resilience has its own set of values and is not significantly influenced by national cultures. the values of urban resilience include being equitable, embracing uncertainty, having a community focus, prioritizing equity, thinking long-term, and enhancing quality of life. a potential reason for this lack of correlation between national culture is the presence of universal cosmopolitan values inspired by the network society. as noted by sassen (2002), the increasingly globalized nature of the world is contributing to dynamic transnational networks. these networks facilitate the flow of goods and information while serving as a vehicle for cultural transmission (sassen 2000) it is important to note that while national cultural values are not reflected in urban resilience plans, they may influence the ways in which the plans are implemented (smith 2010). each country has its own planning culture, with some countries prioritizing devolution and others having a more centralized process (reimer, getimis, and blotevogel 2014). studies show that planning cultures, which are inspired by national cultural values, can impact how plans are implemented (allemendinger 2001). this suggests that despite all of the urban resilience plans sharing the same resilience values, these shared values might be overshadowed by national cultures when plans need to be put into action. limitations of this study include a lack of representation of low income countries, specifically those located in africa. while there were several african cities participating in the 100rc initiative, hofstede’s ibm data included few african countries and it was not possible to match the 100rc cities to hofstede’s national scores. the development of urban resilience strategies requires coordinated responses from social, financial, and governmental actors – most of which would be lacking in low income countries. this research serves as a foundation for future analyses of cross-cultural urban governance dynamics. future studies should include a more economically and geographically diverse selection of cities to enhance the validity of their conclusions. it would also be productive to replicate this study using a different framework for cultural analysis, such as the globe model or ingelhart-welzel cultural map. a follow-up study to assess the implementation of the plans may shed light on the translation of the plans’ values to reality. how impactful is national culture in cross-cultural communications and policy sharing efforts? what traits would cross-cultural liaisons need to possess to facilitate policy sharing efforts? how can urban governments best learn from other cities to implement change in their own cities? these are pressing questions that future research must answer. conclusionconclusion hofstede demonstrated that national culture is multidimensional and that there are regional and economic trends among cultural values. based on the content analysis, there was zero variance in the urban resilience plans with regards to cultural values (i.e. all plans scored the same in each dimension). this means that urban resilience has its own set of values focused on preparing for unforeseen circumstances with a long-term focus, all while also considering equity and justice within an urban system. based on the analysis of the 71 urban resilience plans, this research suggests that for most cities, plans prioritize values of urban resilience over those of national culture. this implies that there is a shared system of values within the urban resilience plans and that cities around the world can engage in policy learning. this may include sharing strategies with each other and developing international networks of resilient communities. though national cultures may not directly influence urban resilience strategies for many cities, hofstede’s ibm study showed that cultures can influence the ways in which people respond and interact with one another. though most studies focus on cross-cultural business communications, cross-cultural collaboration in the field of urban consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6740 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 18-3027 resilience should yield similar results. future research should expand this analysis to assess a more 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(2016) and rashidi et al. (2017) for a comprehensive review. compared to social media and aggregate mobility usage data, survey data provides more information about travel behavior of individual users, including travel frequency, travel distance and user demographics. a survey given to 12000 respondents in sweden (eliasson, 2022) showed that the pandemic had an significant effect on human mobility in march 2020, when aggregate travel time and travel distance decreased. survey data an online survey was administered by a group of faculty and students at columbia university from 2020-2021, primarily focused on understanding people’s travel behavior to improve traffic mobility and safety for future pandemics. the objective of this survey is to understand how people’s travel patterns have been affected the three stages: the pandemic, the stay-at-home order, and the reopening. the length of participation in the study was approximately 10-15 minutes. this lets us analyze how the pandemic has affected travel habits in new york and by extension the environmental impacts it has caused. a total of 671 respondents participated in the survey. a majority of respondents fall between the ages of 25 and 54 with the most common age category being ages 25 to 34 (24.4%). people from 35 to 44 years old are 21.8% of total respondents. the proportions of respondents aged 18-24, 45consilience chen: travel pattern analysis on switching behavior 54, 55-64 and above 65 are 6.9%, 20%, 15.9% and 11%, respectively. a majority of respondents to this survey identified themselves as female (66.6%). only around one third of respondents identified themselves as male (32.8%) and a small minority of respondents identified as some other gender. respondents were asked to report the highest level of education that they had completed. fig. 1 provides a full breakdown of responses. a large majority of respondents (83.2%) hold at least a bachelor's degree with a majority of respondents holding some type of graduate degree. this distribution of education levels may be reflective of the fact that sampling of the survey was done on or near columbia university. we also collect respondents’ household sizes in fig. 2. the most common household size is two people with around 40% of respondents followed by one person and three people, both with approximately 20% of respondents. household income among respondents was distributed fairly evenly across different income categories. the most common household income category was $60,000-$89,999 with 15.5% followed closely by “above $300,000” with 15.5% of respondents. around seven percent of respondents chose to not report their annual household income. we would like to highlight that this survey mainly targeted the columbia community, which reflects how the members from a high-educational institute responded to the pandemic in terms of commuting in the city. it represents the changes in travel patterns for other communities across the city with a similar structure and would offer insights into the emergency responses of the city. 4 consilience figure 1: education background figure 2: household income consilience chen: travel pattern analysis on switching behavior travel behavior analysis this study analyzed how respondents’ travel modes have changed over the course of the pandemic (fig. 3). the most popular travel modes before the pandemic were the subway, buses, and walking with most people using the subway as a mode of transportation. since the pandemic, most people have shifted to teleworking and are using less traditional modes of transportation. this effect has lingered even after the stay-at-home order was lifted, with telework remaining the most popular transportation mode even after the order was lifted. telework is included as a “transportation mode” because it represents the lack of commute for work. one notable trend is the decline in the number of people taking buses. before the stay-athome order around 250 respondents reported using the bus as one of their modes of transportation. this number fell to 25 respondents during the stay-at home order and has recovered little even after the order was lifted. the subway has seen a similar decline in usage although has seen a higher recovery after the stay-at-home order. interestingly, this trend does not seem to extend to shuttles although the number of people taking shuttles has slightly declined since the beginning of the pandemic. cars, bikes and ubers seem to be the transportation modes that have been the least affected by the pandemic. cars and bikes have even seen an increase in usage after the stay at home order was lifted. this is likely due to the fact that those two modes are seen as safer than public transportation since they carry a lower likelihood of disease transmission. it is important to note that respondents were allowed to record multiple modes of transportation. therefore the total number of transportation uses is higher than the total number of survey respondents. this may also help explain why a transportation mode like walking has declined despite the fact that it is one of the safer transportation modes with regard to disease transmission. many respondents are likely not using walking as their primary mode of transportation and are instead walking in conjunction with using public transportation and therefore are walking less frequently as a result of choosing to use less public transportation. the environmental implications due to these shifts in travel mode are two-fold. the shift towards telework implies a reduction in energy use and carbon emissions, given that most studies find that teleworking lowers overall energy consumption (hook, 2020). the increase in bike-related travel also suggests an overall reduction of energy use. however, the movement away from public transportation and the increase in car-based transportation modes implies an increase in greenhouse gas emissions (dirgahayani, 2013). given the much larger shift towards telework in the aftermath of the pandemic, our data suggests an overall reduction in energy use and carbon emissions due to changes in travel mode. however, the increase in car usage could suggest an overall increase in emissions in the long run should people eventually move away from teleworking. 6 consilience figure 3: travel mode choices consilience chen: travel pattern analysis on switching behavior respondents also noted changes in their number of daily trips as well as their trip purpose (figures 4 and 5). they were asked to report even short trips such as running errands or going out to exercise. prior to the pandemic, most respondents reported taking two trips per day with only a small minority saying that they did not make a daily trip. this flipped during the pandemic with the vast majority of respondents saying that they did not make a trip daily during the stay-at-home order. after the order was lifted a majority of respondents were still not making a daily trip. fewer respondents have taken two or more trips after the start of the pandemic including after the end of the stay at home order. however, more respondents reported taking one trip after the end of the stay at home order which may be a result of people choosing to do more things in a single trip as opposed to taking multiple trips. the reduced number of trips is likely having an overall reduction in emissions and energy use. although these gains may be offset to some degree by increased energy use within the home, studies related to the environmental impacts of telework still suggest an overall energy reduction from reduced travel (hook, 2020). prior to the pandemic, the most common trip purpose was for work with around 600 respondents reporting making a work-related trip. during the stay at home order this number fell to 160 respondents which was tied for the third most common trip purpose along with bulk shopping. instead exercising was the most common reason that respondents reported taking a trip during the stay-at-home order. after the order was lifted, work-related trips returned to being the most common trip purpose for respondents. exercising and bulk shopping appear to be the transportation modes that were the least affected by the pandemic. more respondents actually reported making trips for bulk shopping during the stay-at-home order versus before it was enacted and after it was lifted. trips for dining and social/recreational purposes have seen the largest decreases since the start of the pandemic. these two purposes are likely related and may be the reason that both purposes have seen similar declines. the survey also asked respondents to report their transportation costs to reach their workplace during the three timeframes. the average transportation cost before the pandemic was $12.26 compared to $3.06 during the stay-at-home order and $5.86 after the stay-at-home order. overall, the pandemic seems to have reduced transportation costs which is understandable given that respondents reported traveling to work less. most of the transportation savings are likely driven by an increase in telework which allows respondents to maintain their employment with no transportation costs. it is also possible that the lower costs are due to people losing their jobs and therefore are spending nothing on work travel, however this seems unlikely given that only 1.5% of respondents reported losing their job due to the pandemic. 8 consilience figure 4: travel frequency figure 5. trip purpose. consilience chen: travel pattern analysis on switching behavior switching behavior this section details our analysis of the switching behavior of respondents. switching behavior refers to the tendency of respondents to change their transportation mode after a disruption (di et al., 2017; danczyk et al., 2017), such as the stay-at-home order in new york city in this study. since respondents were allowed to record multiple modes of transportation, a respondent was labeled as a switcher if they changed one of their transportation modes from before the stay-athome order to after the stay-at-home order. for example, a respondent that noted both the subway and walking as a transportation mode before the stay-at-home order and just walking after the stay at home order would be labeled as a switcher. respondents that reported no change in their transportation modes are labeled as stayers. not all respondents recorded a transportation mode before and after the pandemic. therefore not all respondents could be categorized as switchers or stayers which means that the switching analysis contains fewer observations. the table below shows some general statistics for switchers versus stayers. of the 420 respondents that could be labeled, there were a total of 100 stayers and 320 switchers. given the large number of switchers, it is evident that the pandemic has had a large impact on travel behavior in new york which has persisted even after the stay-at-home order was lifted. in table 1, an analysis of the transportation cost savings of stayers versus switchers show that switchers seem to benefit financially from changing their transportation mode. stayers saw few savings in regard to their transportation cost with an average of $0.30 saved and a median of $0.00 saved. this is to be expected as many respondents reported using public transportation whose prices are relatively constant. therefore the only things that could influence stayer savings are gas prices or other minor factors. switchers on the other hand saved an average of $4.00 and a median of $2.05 on transportation costs per trip. much of these savings are likely due to an increase in teleworking which allows switchers to work without spending any money on transportation. we would also like to point out that savings of $0.30 for stayers and $4.00 for switchers represent 9.7% and 36.9% of savings, respectively, compared to the pre-pandemic cost. those are probably attributable to less frequent trips made and more telecommuting persisting even after the order was lifted. the savings by switchers due to increased telework may suggest that the trend of increased teleworking will persist beyond the time frame of this study. switchers to telework could be incentivized to continue teleworking in the long term due monetary and time savings. this suggests that there is potential for longerterm energy savings and carbon reductions with regards to transportation. given the relatively large number of switchers as shown in table 1, these impacts could be quite significant. 10 consilience statistics stayers switchers total distribution counts 100 320 420 percentage (%) 23.8 76.2 100 average tnc cost per trip before 3.08 10.83 13.9 after 2.77 6.83 9.6 cost savings average 0.30 4.00 — minimum -5.5 -797.25 — maximum 22.50 450.00 — median 0.00 2.05 — percentage (%) saved on average 9.7 36.9 table 1: travel cost figure 6: travel mode-stayer consilience chen: travel pattern analysis on switching behavior figure 7: travel mode-switcher 12 consilience figures 6 and 7 show the transportation modes used by stayers and switchers, respectively. most stayers take the subway which is likely a result of the large number of people who reported taking the subway before the stay-at-home order. even if a large number of people switched from using the subway in some fashion there would likely still be enough for the subway to be the most common mode of transportation among stayers. the next most common transportation modes for stayers are cars and walking which were also some of the more common modes before the pandemic and are also considered safer with regards to disease transmission. both of these factors are likely an influence on the number of stayers. the most popular transportation mode among switchers before the stay-at-home order was the subway. following the stay-at-home many respondents switched off of using the subway although it is still the second most popular transportation mode among switchers behind teleworking and just ahead of cars. buses and walking also saw similar declines in users after the stay at home order was enacted. aside from telework, cars saw the largest number of users switch to using the transportation mode. this is likely because cars allow users to travel long distances while avoiding close contact with other people. respondents also switched to using no transportation mode which may be the result of them losing their job or perhaps an alternate form of remote work aside from telework. the increasing usage of cars has already led to worse traffic congestion, compared to the pre-pandemic level (brachfeld, 2022). as a consequence, the more frequent encounters between cars and pedestrians and cyclists has led to surging traffic fatalities after the pandemic (julianne, 2020). with these travel behavioral changes, the policymakers and city planners need to rethink the city planning and traffic management post the pandemic for improved traffic safety and efficiency. next we examine the percent of switchers versus respondent income levels to see how income may influence switching behavior (figure 8). for the most part there does not appear to be a clear pattern between household income and switching behavior, as respondents with a household income of $40,000 and above seem to have similar numbers of switchers. the glaring exception is the bracket of respondents with an income of less than $40,000. this group has a far lower percent of switchers which suggests that income may play some role in switching behavior although the effect disproportionately impacts people in the lowest income bracket. this may be due to the fact that respondents in lower income jobs are less able to switch to telework and therefore must maintain the transportation mode they used before the pandemic. consilience chen: travel pattern analysis on switching behavior figure 8: percentage of switchers 14 consilience we also conduct a spatial analysis of switching behavior across new york (figure 9 and 10). survey respondents were asked to record their residential zip code which allows us to look at the areas of the city in which most switchers reside. the map below shows a more complete distribution of respondents by zip code. we use arcgis pro for spatial visualization. the bars marked in red represent travel mode choices. it is shown that the usage of bikes and buses increased significantly after the stay-at-home order. as with other variables in this survey, the spatial distribution of switchers is likely a byproduct of the fact that this survey was administered near columbia university which means that a large proportion of respondents are likely affiliated with columbia in some respect. specifically we can see that the zip codes with the lower proportions of switchers are centered around columbia. if respondents are affiliated with the university, those closer to it may be able to rely less on public transportation and therefore would be more likely to maintain the modes of transportation they used before the pandemic. while this spatial analysis is somewhat limited to individuals who work at columbia university, it may have implications for the behavior of workers in different settings. workers who reside closer to their workplace may be more likely to maintain their transportation modes after disruptions than workers who live farther away. a factor in this may be the fact that teleworking would not be as convenient for people who live close to their workplaces and they also may have chosen a residence close to their workplace specifically because it would allow them to use a more preferable transportation mode to navigate to their workplace. consilience chen: travel pattern analysis on switching behavior figure 9: travel mode choices and respondents in 11 zip codes figure 10: travel mode choices and median household income in 11 zip codes 16 consilience conclusion the biggest takeaway is that people are maintaining their telework despite the fact that the stay-at-home order has been lifted. people are moving away from public transportation with subways being especially hard hit, while cars and bikes are some of the few modes that have seen an increase in usage due to the pandemic. this shift provides important implications for new york city from both an economic and environmental perspective. the move towards telework has far reaching consequences for small and large businesses that previously relied on in-person work and frequent commuting. this shift could transform the city’s economy should these new attitudes towards transportation persist long term. the move to telework, as well as a reduction in overall trips taken, has likely helped the city reduce greenhouse gas emissions and energy use in the short term. this could transform into a longer term effect if people continue to telework and commute less. this seems plausible due to the monetary savings of people who switched off traditional modes of transportation. however when this trend reverses, the increased use of cars could result in higher emissions long term if telework subsides but people continue to prefer them over public transportation. the findings from this survey help us understand the transportation modal shifts and could assist policymakers, public transportation operators and planners, which will further help residents of the metro area get to work and school more quickly and more safely. in addition, these findings will help prepare the communities in emergency response for future pandemics and assist the public transportation planners to prepare a more resilient transit system. although the pandemic has been declared over by the federal government, this study would shed light on the redesign of public transportation post-pandemic or if the coronavirus has a resurgence. with the rising traffic congestion and public transit still struggling to restore the 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(2020). “an interactive data visualization and analytics tool to evaluate mobility and sociability trends during covid-19”. arxiv: 2006.14882. consilience chen: travel pattern analysis on switching behavior appendix survey url: https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1faipqlsekpbjoi1cu6gk1ute40b17yrrr7ah7c_hhi8e1 kmmgkpjjya/viewform) consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 26 (2022-2023) gender marketing and the consumption of family planning methods afobunor, a. n, project officer sdsn – youth, ph. d student, university of lagos oyatoye, e.o, professor, university of lagos, akoka j. n. mojekwu, professor, university of lagos, akoka adebiyi, s.o, senior lecturer, university of lagos, akoka aafobunor@live.unilag.edu.ng eoyatoye@live.unilag.edu.ng; jnmoje@yahoo.com; soadebiyi@unilag.edu.ng rm 1, faculty management sciences, university of lagos, university road lagos mainland akoka, yaba, lagos, nigeria 23401 abstract questions remain about how we can initiate use of vasectomy and other underutilized birth-control methods for men over contraception medication for women. this paper’s analysis of sex promotion in nigeria, utilizing the indicators continually featured in the extant literature, uncovers the result of the masculinization of contraception medication marketing and use. people are projected to change their conceptive activities to decelerate populace increase, but the converse is also true. how can we better comprehend the contradiction in the birth control market and the reasons behind birth control manufacturers’ decision to choose a particular business strategy in a time marked by sustainability champions? although companies hold divergent views on marketing approaches for successful and broad utilization of contraception medication, over the long run, most have zeroed in on mass promotion. researchers have identified the financial and segment conditions that rouse couples to oversee their fertility, but this study examines gender marketing and family planning methods. we hypothesize that masculinization of birth control marketing induces consumption in men. we adopted the likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) for the data collection on birth control consumption. data analysis relied on the use of graphs and anova. this study substantiates that masculinization of the marketing mix elements (combined stakeholder engagement, mass marketing, celebrity endorsement, & communications) will induce birth control consumption in males. this discovery is an invaluable contribution to knowledge in both theory and practice. author’s note ms. afobunor a. n is an advocate for the rights of women and girls. she has spent the last 15 years working with grassroot organizations to bridge the gender divide by providing expert advice and solutions on advancing the sustainable development goals. she currently serves on the strategy and operations team at sdsn youth in new york, new york. my experience has provided me the opportunity to witness the dynamics in organizational structures and the gender-power imbalance in households which underscores my commitment to the interdisciplinary field of social marketing and special interest in family consumption patterns. future studies will analyze social marketing efforts by above-the-line leadership in the birth control industry. un sustainable development solutions network–youth initiative, 475 riverside drive suite 530, new york ny 10115. keywords: gender marketing, birth control, masculinization, consumption mailto:aafobunor@live.unilag.edu.ng mailto:eoyatoye@live.unilag.edu.ng mailto:jnmoje@yahoo.com mailto:soadebiyi@unilag.edu.ng 1. introduction 1.1 background to the study sustainability remains at the forefront of the discussion of birth control despite the ongoing arguments made by academics that starting a business with the sole goal of social profit is "madness," as the fundamental purpose of business is financial profit or both financial profit and social profit (business in the community, 1997; varey, 2002; hastings & angus, 2011; peattie & peattie, 2003; jiatong et al., 2021). but how can we better comprehend the contradiction in the birth control market and the reasons behind contraception companies’ decision to choose a particular business strategy in a time marked by sustainability? (defourny & nyssens, 2017; mishra & singh, 2020; chakraborty et al., 2021; sachs et al., 2021). consequently, the family as a spending and policymaking unit is a crucial marvel in advertising and purchaser conduct (jah, et al., 2014; commuri & gentry, 2000; diana, 2020). while people are projected to change their conceptive activities to decelerate populace increment, unfortunately this is not always the case (ashford, 2020). in this paper, we re-evaluate the existent writing to demonstrate that several significant and surprising examination inquiries remain unaddressed. although companies hold divergent views on marketing approaches to execute successful and broad utilization of contraception medication, over the long run, most examinations have zeroed in on mass promotion to deal with conception prevention. researchers have given responses to questions encompassing the financial and segment conditions that rouse couples to oversee their fertility (dumond, 1975; cleland & wilson, 1987; coale, 1973; tone, 1996; steinfeld et al., 2018; winterton, 2021). edwards and stewart (2017) indicated, through their gender impact investigation of contraception medication utilization, that gender focal point is basic to delivering a gender equitable strategy on family arranging. gender focal point refers to greater consideration of gender equality issues in daily operations. bandura (2002) opined that a country’s foreign capital investment in the long term depends on how evenly it applies its female and male-directed family planning programs. will marketing mix components (combined stakeholder engagement, mass marketing, celebrity endorsement, & communications) in cause-driven organisations remain on the periphery, or will social entrepreneurs and social marketers accept the idea of a mixed marketing strategy to address its social impact agendas? so, it is important to comprehend the marketing-related characteristics and components that motivate social change behaviours. therefore, in this examination, we evaluate the result of the masculinization of contraception medication marketing and utilization. 1.2 statement of problem the best strategy to slow down population growth in the global south remains unknown. one question is whether a masculinized family planning marketing approach will induce consumption in men (tone, 1996; commuri & gentry, 2000; dixon-ogbechi, 2015). the imbalance in the consumption of effective birth control calls for grave concern (babugura, 2017; united nations, department of economic and social affairs, population division [undesa], 2019). in the wake of the global climate and economic crises (winterton, 2021), and in addition to appropriate nigeria’s attractiveness to investors in the extended length, pivots on how evenly it applies its feminization and masculinization programs on family planning. 1.3 objectives of the study this study identifies what gender marketing methods reinforce birth control consumption in men. it determines if men would consume birth control marketed for men specifically, or if endorsed by a male celebrity, and examines if men will consume birth control more than women if the male gender is predominant in the marketing of family planning. 1.4 research questions i. what gender reinforces birth control consumption in men? ii. should men consume birth control? iii. will men consume birth control marketed for men specifically? iv. will men consume birth control for men if a male celebrity endorses it? v. will men consume birth control more than women if the male gender is predominant in marketing of family planning? 1.5 research hypothesis h0: masculinization of birth control marketing induces consumption in men 1.6 significance of the study there has been little research done on how vasectomy and other more effective birth control techniques for men can be reinforced in nigeria to increase family planning. 1.7 scope of the study this study investigates gender marketing and family planning consumption in nigeria. it mainly focuses on specific marketing mix elements that are prominent in literature published in reputable online scholarly journals from the 1900s to 2021 (coale, 1973; cleland & wilson, 1987; tone, 1996; valente et al., 1996; soler et al., 2000; munthanje, 2001; bandura, 2002; seltzer, 2002; arsel et al., 2015; warde, 2015; steinfeld et al., 2018; undesa, 2019). the world bank group projects slow poverty reduction in western sub-saharan africa between 2021 and 2030, but a focus in health and training remains crucial (gates & gates, 2019; 2021). 2. review of literature 2.1 preamble in accordance with tifferet and herstein (2012), gender is the most well-known type of division utilized by marketers (duraisamy & malathy, 1990; tone, 1996; valente et al., 1996; arsel et al., 2015; katie, 2019; tami et al., 2019 (as referenced in diana, 2020)). 2.2 theoretical and conceptual framework given the multiple definitions of “gender marketing,” a unified underpinning theory is difficult to achieve (wedgewood, 2009). gender theory proposes looking at masculinity and femininity as sets of mutually created characteristics shaping the lives of men and women, marking a significant shift from the days when ‘gender’ was synonymous with women (human rights council [hrc], 2021; arsel et al., 2015; rachel et al., 2015). labelling theory provides an opportunity for identity-based labelling or “identity appeals” where invoking an identity can motivate individuals to conform to characteristics of that identity (kim et al., 2019). gender marketing for this study is shaped by the attributes of the customer and the birth control methods. (coale, 1973; cleland & wilson, 1987; kincaid et al., 1996; tone, 1996; soler et al., 2000; munthanje, 2001; bandura, 2002; seltzer, 2002; arsel et al., 2015; warde, 2015; steinfeld et al., 2018; undesa, 2019). therefore, we posit that masculinization of birth control marketing induces consumption in men. 2.3 empirical literature according to open pr (n.d.), gender marketing alludes to a marketing procedure that inspects the activities of designated sex and uses systems to engage the designated sex. despite global forums for consigned females, their privileges are routinely spurned. 63% of rural women in low-paid positions in families ignore the advantages of effective birth control (tone, 1996; babugura, 2017; undesa, 2019; winterton, 2021). financial experts have fought about the causes of this trend, which range from marginal changes in behavior to a shifting balance of the costs and benefits of having various numbers of children in low-income economies (cleland & wilson, 1987; coale, 1973). researchers more often use the term “conception prevention” to refer to the family organizing technique which combines modern and traditional approaches to regulate or end childbearing (united nations, department of economic and social affairs, population division [undesa], 2019). the typical contraception approaches in sub-saharan africa include, but are not limited to, male condoms, musicality, female sterilisation, vasectomy, iud, implant, injections, pills, and withdrawal (undesa, 2019). according to tone (1996), during the 1920s economic crisis, when consumers’ purchasing power was low, a mccall’s magazine lysol advertisement portrayed the typical fears of women about losing their youth due to childbearing and heightened their feelings of dread. this led to an increase in the use of contraceptives among women who watched it. although contraception has always been important for societies, birth control has consistently been portrayed as a necessity for women by manufacturers who understood the impact of the advertisement and missions in marketing (tone, 1996; undesa, 2019). despite the strict legal requirements and the economic depression, the conception prevention sector was profitable. due to the widespread hardship in the 1930s, u.s. entrepreneurs advised families to limit the number of children they bore. the success of contraception is reflected in annual sales which exceeded $250 million by 1938. fortune magazine described contraceptive drugs as possibly the most successful new industry of the decade (tone, 1996). since then, the contraception medicine market has continued to grow. however, a third worldview arose during the 1950s, as the number of inhabitants in the global south was snowballing and that for individuals in low-income nations to decrease their fertility; yet birth control methods were still largely dependent on women without much success (green & cunningham, 1975; tone, 1996; schultz, 1994; babugura, 2017; white et al., 2017; undesa, 2019; ashford, 2020; yining, 2020; un women, 2021). in sub-saharan africa, 76% of women report that modern methods have satisfied their need for family planning, leaving 24% of the population unaccounted for (undesa, 2019). the question of how to effectively market contraception methods remains unanswered despite the proliferation of contraception drugs. in comparison to men, women continue to face barriers to employment, including business access, employment choice, working conditions, wage equality, and balancing work and family responsibilities (un women, 2021). green and cunningham (1975), forerunners in gender roles direction, examined this variable in relation to advertising and consumer behaviour to determine the consistency of its relative impact. they investigated its effects on female career directions and discovered that “the wife’s” verbally stated position had a higher impact on behavior than a traditionally female job direction. they further examined differences in family dynamics among various types of families (green & cunningham, 1975) and identified higher-pay groups and younger couples as more sensitive to traditionally female work distinctions (or their lack) among spouses. they also discovered that husbands expressed fewer independent choices when their wives had unconventional attitudes towards traditionally female employment. according to schultz (1994), as the cost of conception prevention decreases, people are expected to have fewer undesired births. this method was previously disregarded but may now be worth considering due to changes in desired levels of fertility. according to reports, there is a decline in the use of sterilizing, iud, and conventional methods (white et al., 2017; undesa, 2019); sub-saharan africa is the only region where injectables are the predominate method, with a prevalence of 9.6% among women of fertile age and the fastest decline in the use of contraception medication methods (undesa, 2019). male sterilization has not been documented, even though female sterilization is the most often used method of contraception globally, according to undesa (2019). however, the organization also noted that only 2% of nigerian women employed this method. this could be a reminder of the events in 1933 when merchants distributed and marketed goods for “female cleanliness” in large quantities to women, preying on their eagerness to consume contraceptive methods (tone, 1996). by the 1940s, contraception drug commercialization had become a significant industry, changing the way commerce was conducted (tone, 1996). fertility control existed before the economic slump, but manufacturers had the option of feminizing the provision of a contraception drug technology and popularizing it. this was determined by the maker’s choice rather than the buyer’s requirements (tone, 1996; white et al., 2017). post-frontier ghana used a similar strategy. the national family planning program’s [nfpp] goal was to lower the birth-rate and bring population growth to a level suitable for the public turn of events (ashford, 2020). despite progress, there were only 46 clinics in may 1970, 63 in december 1970, and 80 in march 1971. in april 1971, 39,858 people had visited family planning centres across ghana, indicating that the number significantly expanded over the course of nearly a year. by november 1972, 139 organizations had signed up with the nfpp. nonetheless, more women than men travelled to korle bu medical clinic, the primary location for family planning, from where it was located outside of accra. despite limited transportation, the women marched out in large numbers (ashford, 2020). family arranging programs were officially launched in china in 1971 after the state council of china approved the report which laid out the family arranging strategy. these programs are most notable for the fourth five-year plan, which ran from 1971 to 1975 (yining, 2020). soon, offices for family planning were established at all levels of regulation, and work to prevent conception was carried out similarly to the nfpp (ashford, 2020). the objective populace of the nfpp is china’s largest ethnic group, the han, which represents 93% of the populace. women again were the objective of these family arranging efforts. the prevalent technique for contraception at that time was the iud (intrauterine device) (yining, 2020). other techniques used included tubal ligation, male sterilization (vasectomy), and early abortions under certain conditions. in march 1978, china adopted a stricter strategy known as the one child policy. then, in 1982, the family arranging strategy became flexible to participants and permitted families that fulfilled certain conditions to have a subsequent child. the critical interaction between population, reproductive health, gender roles, and climate change cannot be removed. these studies reveal that traditional functional gender roles are still observed in non-traditional couples, establishing that a gender focal point is critical to produce gender-equal policy for birth control consumption through critical interchange between policymakers and researchers (gentry et al., 2003; pullanikkatil et al., 2013; edwards & stewart, 2017). as elaborated in the findings of steinfield et al. (2018), they uncover a misalignment of social marketing attempts and gender injustices (dibb & carrigan, 2013; kotler & keller, 2013). 2.4 research conceptual model construct 1 construct 2 figure 1: conceptual model of gender marketing birth control male female x family planning consumption conceptual model of gender marketng (source: researchers) birth control stakeholder engagement mass marketing communications celebrity endorsement family planning consumption 2.5 gap in literature questions about how we can initiate utilization of vasectomy, and other underutilized conception prevention for men over contraception medication for women remains unanswered (kincaid et al., 1996; arsel et al., 2015; white et al., 2017; steinfield et al., 2018; lara, 2019; undesa, 2019; ashford, 2020; steinfield et al., 2021; open pr, n.d.). while studies have openly laid the foundation on gender outlooks in consumerism, there is still room for progress (arsel et al., 2015). 3. methodology 3.1 preamble the hypothesis formulated in section 1.5, h0: masculinization of birth control marketing induces consumption in men, will be addressed using the research questions in section 1.4. 3.2 research design this study employs a descriptive research design which uses both qualitative and quantitative approaches. 3.3 population and sample size the total consumer strength of family planning methods is approximately 922 million (undesa, 2019). contrasting approaches to determining the sample size exist (yamane, 1967; crouch, 1984; bryman & bell, 2003). the respondents were a readily accessible cluster of birth control consumers observed by the researchers, doctoral candidates within the department of business administration at the university of lagos. bryman and bell (2003) assert that there are various methods for calculating sample size. for this study, we used a purposive examining approach with a sample size of 36. 3.4 data collection and analysis a camouflaged inquiry form within section a consisted of closed-ended and multiple-choice response structures for gathering demographic data from the respondents. section b sought data about the possible masculinization of birth control marketing and consumption using the likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) (saunders et al., 2015). section a we analyzed using graphs and b using anova on ibm statistical package for social sciences (version 26). pilot study and assessment of reliability and validity the pilot study included drafting an initial questionnaire for distribution that contained multiple choice questions of twelve items using the likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and using a north american population (sdsn youth facebook workplace) within the researchers reach. this enabled the researchers to keep items that were relevant to the study, providing a greater sense of confidence (bryman & bell, 2003). the instrument was validated through content analysis consisting of relevant variables on gender marketing and consumption of birth control discussed in section 1.7 with an alpha value of 0.655 deemed acceptable (hair et al., 2010). 3.7 model specification the basic mathematical expression of the model as discussed in section 2.4 is as follows: model 1 y= b0 + b1m + b2fi + ɛi where y = should men consume birth control b0 = constant / intercept (x) b1m = male b2fi = female ɛi = error term (other factors that may affect the dependent variable or family planning consumption). model 2 y= b0mcbcmkts + b1mcbcmemc + b2mcbcmtw + ɛi where y = smcbci (should men consume birth control) b0mcbcmkts = constant / intercept (men will consume birth control marketed for men specifically) b1mcbcmemc = men will consume birth control for men if a male celebrity endorses it. b2mcbcmtw = men will consume birth control more than women if the male gender is predominant in marketing of family planning. ɛi = error term (other factors that may affect the dependent variable or family planning consumption). y is the outcome variable, x is the predictor variables, and e is the accidental error term. the b0, b1, b2…, bn are the regression coefficients that represent, on average, the amount the dependent variable y changes when the corresponding independent variable changes one unit (field, 2017). the standardized version of the beta coefficients are the beta weights, and the ratio of the beta coefficients is the ratio of the relative predictive power of the independent variables. according to field (2017), dummy table (table 3) applies when using analysis of variance to analyse data to reduce errors. therefore, a post-hoc analysis is not important once dummy coding surfaces in the test of hypothesis. regression coefficients were to evaluate the strength of the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable (field, 2017). 4. data presentation, analysis, and interpretations 4.1 response rate a total number of 36 instruments were returned revealing a response rate after data editing process of 83.33%. that is only 30 were properly filled and found valid for use in the data analysis. 4.2 demographic data this section presents the demographic analysis of respondents by gender, age, birth control consumption and gender marketing approaches using pie charts, histograms, and a simple error bar chart. figure 2: pie chart depicting the gender of respondents. figure 3: pie chart depicting the ages of respondents. figure 4: stacked histogram depicting if a physician recommended the type of birth control consumed by respondents. figure 5: error simple bar depicting that the male gender can reinforce birth control consumption in men. figure 1 reveals that there were 14 (47.2%) male respondents and 16 (52.8%) female respondents, which signifies that most respondents were females. figure 2 reveals there were 4 (13.9%) respondents between the ages of 20 but less than 30 years old, 12 (38.9%) respondents who were at least 30 but less than 40 years old, 10 (33.3%) respondents who were at least 40 but less than 50 years old, and were 4 (13.9%) respondents who were 50 and above years old. this implies that most consumers of birth control are between the age group of 30 – 39 years old. figure 3 reveals that 16 respondents used condoms (54%), and 14 (47%) were not recommended by a physician while 2 (7%) were recommended by a physician. only three respondents used iuds (9%) although all three did so based on a physician’s recommendation. additionally, none reported using vasectomy as a form of birth control. eight respondents were consumers of two or more combinations of either condoms, iuds & pills (28%) with 1 (4%) revealing that a physician did not recommend it, while the remaining 7 (24%) revealed that their consumption of two or more combinations of birth control was instructed by a physician. these data reveals that most consumers of birth control are compelled by gendered marketing approaches. figure 4 is a simple error bar chart that reveals a linear relationship between female and male genders at 95% confidence levels. it also reveals that the frequency of respondents who strongly agreed that using the male gender alone to target male birth control consumption is more effective. it was also more statistically significant with an error value from the mean that is smaller relative to the error value from the mean for female and x genders and their frequency all together. 4.3 analysis of data according to research objectives analysis of data according to research objectives i (model 1) table 1: analysis of variance consequently, from model 1 y= b0 + b1m + b2fi + ɛi, results reveal the following: ✓ there was a significant positive linear trend and effect of male gender used to target men on levels of birth control consumption, f (2, 29) = 7.7, p = 0.002, ω = 0.56. ✓ planned contrasts revealed that having a male in the marketing mix significantly increased consumption in men compared to having just control, t (3.92), p = 0.001, r = 0.32, but having d1 (contrast of control versus male & female combined did not significantly increase birth control consumption in men to having d2. the degrees of freedom have changed to reflect how f was calculated. analysis of data according to research objectives ii – v (model 2) model 1 sum of squares df mean square f sig regression 18.840 2 9.420 7.701 0.002b*** residual 33.027 27 1.223 total 51.867 29 source: survey research, 2021 adjusted r2 =0.316 *** significant at 5% level f= 7.701*** table 2a: analysis of variance table 2b: analysis of variance model 2 sum of squares df mean square f sig. more than women between groups (combined) 5.033 4 1.258 1.110 .374 linear term unweighted 4.237 1 4.237 3.738 .065 weighted 2.715 1 2.715 2.396 .134 deviation 2.318 3 .773 .682 .571 quadratic term unweighted 1.633 1 1.633 1.440 .241 weighted 2.269 1 2.269 2.002 .169 deviation .049 2 .025 .022 .978 within groups 28.333 25 1.133 total 33.367 29 model 2 sum of squares df mean square f sig. marketed for men between groups (combined) 13.158 4 3.290 2.678 0.055 linear term unweighted 6.982 1 6.982 5.684 0.025*** weighted 5.882 1 5.882 4.789 0.038*** deviation 7.276 3 2.425 1.975 0.144 quadratic term unweighted 1.577 1 1.577 1.284 0.268 weighted 0.039 1 0.039 0.032 0.860 deviation 7.237 2 3.619 2.946 0.071 within groups 30.708 25 1.228 total 43.867 29 endorsed by male between groups (combined) 11.943 4 2.986 2.924 0.041*** linear term unweighted 4.269 1 4.269 4.182 0.052 weighted 5.528 1 5.528 5.415 0.028*** deviation 6.414 3 2.138 2.094 0.126 quadratic term unweighted 0.868 1 0.868 0.850 0.365 weighted 0.007 1 0.007 0.006 0.937 deviation 6.408 2 3.204 3.138 0.061 within groups 25.524 25 1.021 total 37.467 29 *** significant at 5% level table 2a & b, y= b0mcbcmkts + b1mcbcmemc +b2mcbcmtw + ɛi, results reveal the following for the weighted values: ✓ there was a significant linear trend of birth control marketed for men between groups specifically determinant on levels of birth control consumption in men, f (1, 29) = 4.789, p = 0.038 ✓ there was a significant linear trend of birth control endorsed by a male celebrity determinant on levels of birth control consumption in men, f (1, 29) = 5.415, p = 0.028 ✓ there is no significant linear trend of birth control consumption more than women when male gender is predominant in marketing determinant on levels of birth control consumption in men, f (1, 29) = 2.396, p = 0.134 therefore, hypothesis h0 accepted under 5% level of significance that masculinization of birth control marketing induces consumption in men. 4.4 discussion of findings the demographic data reveals that vasectomy, a method of birth control for men, is not a family planning option nor consumed by any of the male respondents which further corroborates the report of undesa (2019) that in nigeria only women undergo sterilization. also men who participated in this research strongly believe that birth control should be consumed by men and that such consumption be reinforced by utilizing male marketers as can be seen in the analysis of variance for each predictor (b0mcbcmkts, b1mcbcmemc, b2mcbcmtw) with male birth control endorsed by a male celebrity showing a stronger significance, f (1, 29) = 5.415, p = 0.028. other academics have also proposed that decisions should be seen through the prism of a business sustainability model (defourny & nyssens, 2017; mishra & singh, 2020; chakraborty et al., 2021). despite the unending debates in the birth control market over optimizing a business strategy in the wake of the green and economic crises and a time characterized by sustainability promoters, our results suggest that a business sustainability model may produce better results. 5. summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations the challenges associated with depopulation, the conceptualization of gendered marketing strategies, and gender theory are major issues that are highlighted by this study. the literature reviewed reveals the importance of regulating population towards a greener economy (gentry et al., 2003; pullanikkatil et al., 2013). while gendered approaches to marketing of female birth control products were effective 88 years ago, the same cannot be said for today (tone, 1996). hence, masculinization of birth control marketing is feasible if marketers increased male pedagogies to reinforce consumption of birth control in men. therefore, we recommend that masculinization targeted at the marketing mix elements combined (stakeholder engagement, mass marketing, celebrity endorsement, & communications) will induce consumption of birth control in males. however, a stronger significant relationship exists between male celebrity endorsement and birth control consumption in men. in view of this, until a prevailing interchange happens between birth control manufacturers, social marketing attempts targeted at gender injustices of reproductive health rights is likely to remain futile (dibb & carrigan, 2013; kotler & keller, 2013; white et al., 2017). this finding corroborates, arsel et al. (2015) who posit sex roles to be manipulative and ethically questionable. according to this study, an invaluable contribution to knowledge towards a balanced gendered marketing approach for a sustainable population and planet is eminent. suggestion for further studies future studies to be conducted across social marketing efforts by above the line leadership in the birth control industry. this study is not exempt from its own limitations and that includes the fragmentation of gender marketing, operational cost, lack of cultural diversity. we conducted this research using personal funds. acknowledgement i express my sincere appreciation to my professors, prof. oyatoye, e.o, prof. j. n. mojekwu and dr. adebiyi, s.o for the time invested to bring out the best of this work, to mr. david adeeyo my course mate for always coming to my rescue in ensuring i analysed the data herein effectively and to all those who indirectly contributed to the successful output of this paper but too numerous to mention names but more importantly my project supervisor prof. bolajoko dixon-ogbechi. bibliography articles bandura, a. 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(2021). in merriam-webster’s online dictionary. retrieved from https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/masculinize https://doi.org/10.1080/09589230903260001 https://doi.org/10.1177/1557988317694296 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3179403 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/masculinize https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/masculinize appendix i table 3: planned contrast dummy coding (orthogonal contrast coding) group d1 d2 x (control) -2 0 male 1 1 female 1 -1 yoo, motivators and hindrances of consuming reusable water bottles consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 27 (2024) motivators and hindrances of consuming reusable water bottles: an exploratory case study at columbia university jung ha yoo earth institute columbia university jungha.yoo@columbia.edu abstract this pilot study explores the factors that motivate and hinder tap water consumption and reusable water bottle usage among students at columbia university. despite manhattan's tap water being among the highest quality globally, the prevalence of single-use plastic water bottles on campus remains significant. choosing reusable water bottles over single-use plastics is a pro-environmental behavior that can reduce plastic production and waste. this research investigates the underlying reasons behind students' choices regarding tap water consumption and reusable bottle usage. the data were collected from 58 students selected through convenience sampling utilizing questionnaires and participant observation. the questionnaire responses were thematically coded, and descriptive statistics, including percentages and frequencies, were used to analyze the data. findings indicate that, while a relatively high percentage of students consume tap water compared to other universities, hygiene concerns related to water quality are the main hindrances. in terms of bottle usage, the primary motivation for carrying a reusable water bottle was to increase water intake. the major barrier was the inconvenience and lack of portability of reusable bottles. notably, students overestimated the positive environmental impact of using reusable water bottles, which could potentially lead to greater environmental harm due to misconceptions. this pilot study underscores the need for further in-depth research to identify and address the misconceptions and barriers affecting students' pro-environmental behaviors. author’s note as someone who loves drinking water—i consume about a gallon of bottled water every day—i was taken aback one day when i noticed that my apartment's recycling bin was overflowing with plastic bottles. it struck me that this substantial amount of water had been bottled and transported all the way from france and belgium to korea. this realization prompted me to look into the carbon footprint associated with transporting bottled water and the challenges of recycling plastic bottles. through this exploration, i discovered that using reusable water bottles is a far more environmentally friendly way to stay hydrated. this insight inspired me to learn how others perceive reusable water bottles and what motivates people to use them. my hope is that this research will help mailto:jungha.yoo@columbia.edu consilience yoo: motivators and hindrances of consuming reusable water bottles future policymakers promote sustainable behavior and reduce the environmental impact of single-use plastics. keywords: reusable water bottles; single-use plastic; pro-environmental behavior; environmental sustainability; student perceptions; water consumption habits; plastic waste reduction. 3 consilience introduction water is an essential resource for human survival and development. the establishment of reliable water supply systems has been pivotal in supporting population growth and urbanization. in the mid-19th century, new york city developed its water supply system, leading to a dramatic increase in population due to the availability of clean water resources (nyc environmental protection, 2020). today, new york city is renowned for its high-quality tap water, sourced directly from the catskill/delaware watersheds and maintained to rigorous standards (nyc environmental protection, 2020). despite the superior quality of new york city's tap water, there is a prevalent use of disposable plastic water bottles among residents. interestingly, studies have found that the percentage of people consuming bottled water tends to be high even in areas where tap water quality is excellent (fedi et al., 2021). this paradox highlights a disconnect between the availability of clean tap water and the public's preference for bottled water. the environmental impact of bottled water consumption is significantly greater than that of tap water. (garfí et al., 2016; makov et al., 2019; nessi et al., 2012). gleick and cooley (2009) estimate that bottled water production requires up to 2,000 times more energy than tap water systems (as cited in chudwick et al., 2013). further, the widespread use of single-use plastic bottles contributes to environmental degradation through increased plastic waste and greenhouse gas emissions. to better understand this discrepancy and promote environmentally sustainable behaviors, this study examines the motivators and barriers influencing tap water consumption and reusable water bottle usage among students at columbia university. this population is particularly relevant for exploratory research due to their youth, high level of education, and urban setting, which may influence their environmental awareness and behaviors. by identifying the factors that encourage or discourage the use of tap water and reusable water bottles, this research aims to bridge the gap between the availability of clean water and consumer preferences. understanding these factors is crucial for developing strategies and policies that promote pro-environmental behaviors and reduce reliance on single-use plastics. i. reusable water bottles and bottled water. in this research, reusable water bottles refer to any stainless steel, aluminum, glass, or plastic bottles that can be used multiple times and are purchased as standalone items. this includes reusable tumblers with lids used for other beverages, such as coffee or tea, because they can also function as water containers. recently, some manufacturers have commodified water in aluminum containers designed for multiple uses. however, these are not considered reusable water bottles in this study due to their limited popularity and unclear environmental impact. conversely, bottled water refers to water packaged in relatively thin, single-use plastic bottles, where the commodity is the water itself rather than the container. in this paper, the terms "bottled water," "single-use bottles," and "disposable water bottles" are used interchangeably. additionally, when addressing the term "water source," it refers to the methods of drinking water—either tap water consumed with a reusable bottle or bottled water. consilience yoo: motivators and hindrances of consuming reusable water bottles ii. columbia morningside campus students.            columbia university in the city of new york has a few campuses around new york city, such as the manhattanville, irving medical center, and morningside campuses. this research solely focuses on the morningside campus and often refers to it generally as columbia university. it is the main area most undergraduate and graduate students live, commute, and study.  literature review several studies have been conducted to identify individual motivations for drinking either tap water or bottled water. factors such as water quality, hygiene concerns, economic benefits, convenience, and environmental concerns, among others, have been identified (doria, 2006, 2010; etale et al., 2018; gleick, 2010; kang et al., 2017; mukherji j. & mukherji a., 2020; o'donnell & rice, 2012; van der linden, 2015).  i. convenience as a motivator. people who drink tap water at home often consume bottled water due to the accessibility and convenience of bottled water (etale et al., 2018). studies at purdue university (saylor et al., 2011) and the university of birmingham (ward et al., 2009) found that convenience was the primary motivator for drinking bottled water. at the university of south florida, tampa campus, similar qualitative research identified "convenience" as one of the critical themes in responses (graydon et al., 2019). alternatively, 91% of students who consume bottled water at villanova university indicated they would either use a reusable water bottle (50%) or "consider" using one (41%) if there were more water stations on campus (chudwick, 2013). however, the inconvenience of using reusable water bottles comes from not only the location of water filling stations but also the necessity of carrying the bottle daily. in many cases, one of the main reasons for not using a reusable bottle, regardless of tap water quality, was the portability of the bottle and forgetting to bring it (bartolotta & hardy, 2018; chang, 2010; mukherji j. & mukherji a., 2020).  ii. the perception of water quality as a motivator. the significance of water quality concerns related to tap water, such as health concerns and taste preference, varies among studies. some have found it to be a less critical motivator (bartolotta & hardy, 2018; ward et al., 2009), while others consider it a significant factor hindering tap water consumption (espinosa-garcía et al., 2015; gleick, 2010; levêque & burns, 2018; saylor et al., 2011). in germany, researchers tested whether students could distinguish between tap water and bottled water, as many believed that the taste of tap water was inferior. they conducted a blind test and found that students were unable to distinguish between tap water and bottled water (debbeler et al., 2018).  iii. the environmental impact as a motivator. establishing a significant relationship between people's environmental values and their preference for reusable water bottles has been challenging. a study on hispanic groups in the u.s. southwest found no meaningful relationship between environmental views and the intention to buy bottled water or use reusable water bottles. however, the study revealed that "negative attitudes towards plastics" led to a decrease in bottled water consumption (mukherji j. & mukherji a., 2020). 5 consilience this suggests that enforcing negative views on plastic usage is more effective than general concern for the environment at encouraging reduced consumption. additionally, students' academic disciplines correlated with their attitudes and intentions. students studying humanities and social sciences tended to use reusable water bottles for external reasons, such as community and environmental concerns (fedi et al., 2021). stem students tended to use reusable bottles for personal convenience or individual beliefs (fedi et al., 2021). iv. ownership of reusable water bottles as a motivator. goucher-lanbert and cagan (2015) found that even when consumers are provided with environmental information, the importance of price remains constant, while the design of water bottles becomes less critical. in this context, to promote reusable water bottles and tap water, princeton university distributed reusable water bottles to incoming students as part of the "drink local" campaign. they found that the distribution campaign successfully decreased the percentage of students drinking bottled water on campus (santos et al., 2016). since columbia university has numerous water refilling stations on campus and distributes reusable water bottles to incoming students at the administrative and student organization levels, the proportion of students using reusable water bottles was expected to be high. a case study on columbia university morningside campus this research is a pilot study focusing on students at columbia university’s morningside campus. this population serves as a representative case for this subject matter since the students are young individuals living in an urban setting, expected to become a significant economic demographic in the near future. in addition to its location, this population represents highly educated individuals with college-level education and exposure to sustainability education, as columbia university offers climate-related courses. studying the motivating factors among columbia university students would be beneficial for policymakers encouraging pro-environmental behavior as using a reusable bottle can both harm and alleviate environmental impact, depending on usage patterns. however, the columbia university population is unique regarding socio-economic status and other factors, making it challenging to claim external validity, though data may be applicable to similarly elite college campuses. in this regard, the findings from this study may provide exploratory opportunities for future research.  methodology i. questionnaires this study employed a convenience sampling method to recruit participants from columbia university's morningside campus. the questionnaires were conducted entirely online and distributed through multiple channels, including online social networks and social media platforms exclusive to columbia university students. responses were collected anonymously via a google form without recording respondents' email addresses. the inclusion criteria were being a student at columbia university's morningside campus. participation was voluntary, and no incentives were provided. the questionnaire began with a section requesting free prior informed consent (fpic) and included questions about participants' degree program at columbia university, hometown type consilience yoo: motivators and hindrances of consuming reusable water bottles (urban, suburban, or rural), and age group, provided as categorical choices to justify the representation of sample responses. other demographic information was not collected. beyond the fpic and demographic questions, the questionnaire had 16 items designed to understand students' perceptions of reusable water bottles and tap water. the questions included checklist items, rating scales, knowledge checks, and multiple open-ended questions to allow participants to provide more detailed and natural responses, enhancing data saturation. the open-ended questions encouraged longer responses to capture original thoughts and insights. the questionnaire was conducted from november 11th to 20th, 2021. figure 1 the demographic information of samples note. all data is self-reported information, and they are collected as categorical options. a total of 58 students responded to the questionnaire (see fig 1). of these, 54 respondents identified themselves as undergraduates (93.1%), and the remaining 4 identified themselves as graduate students (6.9%). the age distribution was as follows: 24 respondents were between 16 and 25 years old (41.4%), another 24 respondents were between 26 and 35 years old (41.4%), 9 respondents were between 36 and 45 years old (15.5%), and one respondent was between 56 and 65 years old (1.7%). the hometown types of respondents were well distributed among urban (43.1%), suburban (43.1%), and rural areas (13.8%). there is no available data on the hometown types of students at columbia university for direct comparison. the sample included a higher proportion of undergraduate students compared to the actual demographic distribution of columbia university's morningside campus, where the graduate student population is about twice as large as the undergraduate population (columbia university, n.d.). therefore, the degree types of the sample do not accurately represent the actual population. additionally, the use of convenience sampling may have introduced sampling bias, limiting the generalizability of the findings. despite these limitations, the purpose of this research is to focus on relatively young and highly educated individuals. thus, having more undergraduate students in the sample aligns with the study's objectives. furthermore, the age distribution of the samples is generally consistent with the actual student population (college factual), although the sample includes slightly more students over 7 consilience the age of 35. in this regard, the sample data is considered valid for the aims of this research. ii. participant observation to complement the questionnaire data and gain a deeper understanding of students' behaviors with reusable water bottles, participant observation was conducted. this observational study took place covertly in butler library and watson library at columbia university on november 30th, from 9:40 am to 1:00 pm. the researcher assumed a non-participant role, observing students without interacting with them to avoid influencing their natural behaviors. the observation was entirely opportunistic, focusing on randomly encountered individuals who were unaware of being observed. this approach ensured that the participants' behaviors were authentic and not affected by the researcher's presence. the primary focus was on how students used reusable water bottles in public spaces, including: ● usage patterns: noting the frequency of reusable water bottle usage among students in the libraries. ● methods of use: observing how students accessed water (e.g., using water fountains and filling stations) and how they interacted with their bottles. ● design features: paying attention to the design of the water bottles, such as material (stainless steel, plastic, glass), size, color, presence of stickers or logos, and any ergonomic features that might affect portability and convenience. the data collected from this participant observation provided qualitative insights that enriched the quantitative findings from the questionnaires. by directly observing students in their natural environment, the study aimed to identify behaviors and contextual factors—such as convenience, social influences, and environmental awareness—that might not be fully captured through self-reported data alone. this method helped validate the questionnaire results and offered a more comprehensive understanding of the motivators and barriers influencing reusable water bottle usage among students. findings according to the self-reported questionnaire, 47 out of 58 students (81.0%) reported drinking tap water, with or without a filter, whereas 11 students (19.0%) reported drinking bottled water (see fig. 2). analysis of the data showed similar preferences between undergraduate and graduate students regarding tap water consumption, indicating consistent behaviors across degree programs, although the sample size is too small to make a conclusion. however, notable variations emerged when examining the students' hometown types. among students from urban settings (n = 25), 10 students (40.0%) reported drinking bottled water. in contrast, only 1 student (4.0%) from suburban areas (n = 25) reported drinking bottled water, and all respondents from rural areas (n = 8) reported drinking tap water with reusable water bottles (see fig. 2). moreover, the majority of students who preferred bottled water (10 out of 11 students, or 90.9%) were from urban backgrounds, suggesting that students' hometown environments may influence their water consumption preferences.  consilience yoo: motivators and hindrances of consuming reusable water bottles figure 2 sources of drinking water preference and the preference by hometown types note. tap water, water cooler, and tap water with a filter were given as separate options. figure 3 reasons for not drinking tap water note. since many students drink tap water, the sample size is 19 respondents. both the students who prefer bottled water (n=11) and a small fraction of those who drink tap water provided reasons for their reluctance to consume tap water (see fig. 3). analysis of their responses revealed that the primary reason for not drinking tap water was "hygiene," encompassing 9 consilience concerns about water quality and health. this reason was cited by the majority of these respondents. the second most frequently mentioned reason was "bad taste," which is also related to perceptions of water quality. due to the small sample size of this subgroup, other reasons were not statistically significant. these findings indicate that concerns about water quality are the main hindrance to tap water consumption among the participants.  figure 4 drinking water preference by the degrees of water note. the groups are divided based on the levels of self-reported water consumption: high demand (=>7), and low demand (=< 4). regarding the reasons for using a reusable water bottle, the most common response among students was to drink more water (hydration), cited by 79.3% of respondents. this was followed by environmental concerns (60.3%) and the design of water bottles (22.4%). through thematic coding of the open-ended responses, "design" was found to include factors such as the volume, brand, weight, insulation capability, and durability of the water bottles. for students not using a reusable water bottle, the primary reason was inconvenience (55.2%). other reasons included having lost a reusable water bottle in the past (24.1%) and forgetting to bring it (6.8%). although hydration was the most popular reason for using a reusable water bottle, the data did not show a significant difference in water bottle preference between students with high water consumption needs and those with lower needs (see fig. 4). due to the exploratory nature of the study and the sample size, formal statistical analyses were not conducted to assess this difference. the questionnaire also inquired about the number of reusable water bottles owned by respondents. on average, students reported owning 3.08 reusable bottles. breaking it down by age groups, students aged 16 to 25 owned an average of 2.66 bottles, while those aged 36 to 45 owned an average of 4.9 bottles (see fig. 5). this difference suggests that individuals tend to accumulate consilience yoo: motivators and hindrances of consuming reusable water bottles more reusable water bottles as they age. despite most students owning more than one reusable bottle, the majority indicated they would accept a new water bottle if offered for free. additionally, the questionnaire asked participants how many times a stainless steel reusable water bottle must be reused to be environmentally more beneficial than using single-use plastic water bottles (see fig. 6). over half of the respondents (58.9%) predicted it would require fewer than 10 uses, and approximately 20% estimated the number to be between 20 and 50 uses. a small fraction of participants believed it would take more than 500 uses. figure 5 the number of reusable water bottles owned by students and the willingness to get more reusable water bottles note. the question on the right side of the figure was framed with the condition that there is a “free” distribution station on campus 11 consilience figure 6 assumptions on the environmental impact of reusable water bottles (equivalent to disposable bottles) note. the unit is the number of single-use plastic bottles.   the responses to the open-ended questions were thematically coded. four main themes were identified: economic, environmental, pessimistic, and design. under the economic theme, students considered reusable water bottles as either "too expensive" or "a good investment." for the environmental theme, "waste" emerged as the major sub-theme, reflecting concerns about plastic waste and its impact on the environment. under the pessimistic theme, respondents often claimed that the leading cause of climate change is pollution by "corporations," suggesting that individuals have little to no responsibility for climate change. the design theme encompassed factors such as aesthetics, branding, and personalization that influence the appeal of reusable water bottles. some respondents mentioned that they use disposable cups and single-use plastic bottles for other beverages (e.g., juice or carbonated drinks) and then refill them with tap water for the rest of the day. this behavior was corroborated through participant observation; in the afternoons, many students were observed bringing their non-water beverage containers to water fountains and filling them with tap water. regarding the design theme, it was observed that more than half of the students using reusable water bottles had bottles featuring brand logos, such as columbia university sipa, columbia university g.s., youtube, bain & company, and google. a small fraction of students had water bottles adorned with multiple decorative stickers. these observations support the idea that non-functional factors, such as branding and personalization, contribute to the appeal and usage of reusable bottles.  discussion compared to studies conducted at other universities (saylor et al., 2011; ward et al., 2009; graydon et al., 2019; chudwick, 2013), columbia university showed a higher percentage of tap water consumption among students. this may be attributed to the large number of water stations on campus (uehara & ynacay-nye, 2018; willis et al., 2019), the free distribution of reusable water bottles by the university, and active promotional campaigns by both new york city and columbia university emphasizing the cleanliness of tap water and its environmental benefits. additionally, the consilience yoo: motivators and hindrances of consuming reusable water bottles progressive attitudes of students at columbia university, coupled with exposure to climate-related information and sustainability issues, may contribute to a preference for environmentally friendly options such as drinking tap water. for those who do not drink tap water, concerns about water quality are the primary issue, as many studies have found. however, focusing solely on the hindrances to tap water consumption may not be sufficient, because the use of reusable water bottles often influences consumer preferences. the consumption of tap water and the use of reusable bottles are interconnected, as the bottle serves as the means of consuming tap water. although this research was exploratory and did not test specific hypotheses regarding reusable bottle usage, it was initially assumed that environmental concerns would be the primary reason for using reusable water bottles. contrary to this assumption, the primary motivator identified was "to drink more water." while "environmental concerns" was the second most popular response, included by more than half of the respondents, this suggests that personal health and hydration are more immediate motivators. participants tended to hold strong opinions against the use of plastic materials and were concerned about plastic waste, as identified through thematic coding. interestingly, there was little mention of the production of plastic bottles and associated co₂ emissions; instead, concerns focused on waste management and the negative impact on oceans, specifically harm to "turtles." this indicates that specific environmental narratives may influence behavior more than general environmental concerns. to further understand the environmental aspect of using reusable water bottles, the questionnaire assessed participants' knowledge of the environmental impact of reusable bottles compared to bottled water. measuring the environmental effects in absolute terms is challenging due to variables such as the weight and size of bottles, transportation distances, and washing frequency of reusable bottles (dettore, 2009). technological advancements have also reduced the plastic content in single-use bottles; for example, the average weight of 500 ml polyethylene terephthalate (pet) bottles has decreased by 48% (as cited in graydon et al., 2019). previous studies have indicated that producing an aluminum reusable bottle results in carbon emissions equivalent to those from producing 50 disposable plastic bottles (goleman & norris, 2009). more recent research suggests that co₂ emissions from producing one aluminum water bottle are equivalent to about 88 single-use plastic bottles and that in terms of eutrophication—a process where excess nutrients lead to algal blooms and oxygen depletion in water bodies—an aluminum bottle must be reused more than 483 times to offset its impact compared to single-use plastic bottles (tamburini et al., 2021). in this context, participants' assumptions about the environmental impact of reusable water bottles were found to be lower than reality. students tended to overestimate the positive environmental impact of using reusable bottles and the pollution caused by disposable bottles. this knowledge gap may lead to behaviors that are counterproductive to environmental goals, such as owning multiple reusable bottles and being willing to acquire more when offered for free, which contradicts their environmental intentions. while providing accurate environmental information can encourage sustainable consumption, emphasizing the need to reuse a bottle more than 88 to 500 times to offset its environmental impact may discourage use due to the perceived difficulty in achieving such numbers. 13 consilience therefore, further research is needed to find effective ways to educate consumers about the importance of consistently using the same reusable bottle without causing discouragement. in practice, reusing a bottle more than 88 or even 500 times can be achieved within a few months by refilling it several times a day, and columbia university's numerous water refilling stations facilitate this behavior. however, inconvenience remains a major hindrance to using reusable bottles. through thematic coding, "inconvenience" was identified with issues such as carrying the bottle due to its weight, cleaning the bottle, and locating refilling stations. additionally, reasons such as "forgetting to bring [a reusable bottle]" and "having lost [a reusable bottle]" align with the theme of inconvenience. some participants intentionally avoided bringing their reusable bottles when they had evening plans to prevent losing them, as they had in the past. considering both the environmental impact and the inconvenience associated with reusable water bottles, policies and campaigns may need to shift focus. instead of solely promoting the use of reusable bottles, efforts should encourage individuals to consistently use the bottles they already own for extended periods. while distributing reusable bottles can reduce the consumption of bottled water and plastic waste (santos et al., 2016), it may inadvertently increase other environmental impacts, such as co2 emissions, eutrophication, photochemical oxidation (the formation of reactive compounds in the atmosphere due to sunlight), acidification, fossil fuel depletion, water depletion, human toxicity, and ecotoxicity (tamburini et al., 2021). a strong relationship was also observed between students' hometown environments—urban, suburban, and rural—and their preferred water source, whether tap water with a reusable bottle or bottled water. although this relationship was apparent, the research could not further investigate this variable within the scope of the study. this hometown variable could be associated with factors such as exposure to nature, access to markets, perceived cleanliness of tap water, and parental preferences regarding water sources. it is worth exploring these aspects in more depth in future research. limitations this study has several limitations that should be acknowledged. firstly, a significant portion of the research relies on self-reported data collected through questionnaires. although the survey was entirely anonymous and conducted online—which can reduce social desirability bias—there remains the possibility that respondents may have overreported pro-environmental behaviors or provided answers they perceived as socially desirable rather than reflecting their actual practices. this potential bias could affect the validity of the findings related to tap water consumption and reusable water bottle usage. secondly, the research was conducted in november, a period when water demand often decreases due to cooler temperatures. seasonal variations in water consumption behaviors may have influenced the results, as individuals might be less inclined to carry reusable water bottles during colder months and might opt for bottled water if needed. although the study did not find a significant relationship between water source preference and water demand, seasonality could still be a confounding variable that was not fully accounted for in this case study. furthermore, this study was conducted within a specific and unique setting—a population of young, highly educated students at columbia university's morningside campus, characterized by high socio-economic status and politically progressive attitudes. these factors may limit the consilience yoo: motivators and hindrances of consuming reusable water bottles generalizability of the findings to other populations with different demographic and socio-economic characteristics. the use of convenience sampling and the overrepresentation of undergraduate students compared to graduate students may also affect the external validity of the study. given these limitations, this research serves as a pilot study and provides exploratory insights into the factors influencing tap water consumption and reusable water bottle usage among university students. future research should include a more diverse and representative sample, consider longitudinal designs to account for seasonal variations, and employ methods that mitigate self-reporting biases. such efforts would enhance the external validity of the findings and contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of pro-environmental behaviors in different contexts.   15 consilience references bartolotta, j. f., & hardy, s. d. 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(2019). the success of water refill stations reducing single-use plastic bottle litter. sustainability, 11(19), 5232. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11195232  microsoft word dhakal-copyedited.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 11, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 167–182 glimpses of sustainability in perth, western australia: capturing and communicating the adaptive capacity of an activist group subas p. dhakal collaborative research network (crn) southern cross university, australia email: subasdhakal@gmail.com abstract community-based activism has proven to be one of the most effective ways of addressing social and environmental injustice, the root causes of unsustainability. today, millions of sustainability activist groups (sags) are actively engaged in various social and environmental initiatives around the world. to date, however, there have been few photographic narratives from sags depicting adaptive capacity—the ability to maintain various assets under changing circumstances in order to fulfill desired objectives. this paper responds to this gap and offers a glimpse of one of the longest running activist initiatives in perth, the state capital of western australia. keywords: adaptive capacity, digital photography, sustainability activism, wetlands 168 consilience 1. introduction five decades ago, the renowned ecologist garret j. hardin predicted that unlimited population growth and human exploitation of the environment would inevitably bring about “the tragedy of the commons,” and that such a tragedy could only be avoided either through government intervention or privatisation (hardin, 1968). unfortunately, the continuous escalation of unsustainable development can be understood as an unfolding of hardin’s prediction. however, what has also been made clear is that neither the state nor market actors have been fully able to, nor have the desire to, curtail environmental degradation. since the root causes of unsustainability—social and environmental injustice—are often associated with the failure of the government or the private sector, community-based activism has emerged as an alternative but profound way for societies to respond to issues of unsustainability. hawken (2007) estimates that there are millions of sustainability activist groups (sags) around the world. in australia, a conservative estimate indicates that there are more than five thousand sags in the country. around five hundred such groups exist in perth, the capital city of western australia (dhakal, 2010). sags are often formed when friends and neighbours who share a common interest decide to take on a local sustainability issue, ranging from managing local nature reserves to mounting public campaigns to save endangered flora and fauna. these groups generally operate in challenging circumstances where a lack of available resources limits what they can realistically achieve and how long they can continue. thus, adaptive capacity—the ability to respond to changing circumstances in order to accomplish group objectives—is of paramount significance for successful sustainability activism. adaptive capacity is concerned with ensuring the flow of necessary resources—built, cultural, financial, human, natural, political and social—in order to fulfil the sag’s objectives (brown et al., 2010). dhakal (2013) showed positive association between adaptive capacity and the diversity of various resources that are built, maintained, and utilised by sags. the descriptions and associated indicators of each of these resources are depicted in table 1. the particular utility of such a view in the context of sags is that the state of the indicators serves as a measure of the group’s accomplishments. consilience dhakal: glimpses of sustainability table 1: multiple forms of resources relevant to adaptive capacity resources descriptions sags specific indicators built manmade physical assets and infrastructure • fence, signpost cultural the worldview and the everyday practices of people in terms of social inclusion, equality and equity (or lack thereof) • gender inclusiveness • democratically elected leadership financial money or wealth that facilitates productivity • funding human skills and competencies of people • skilled volunteers natural air, land, water, and organisms that abide in a particular location • ecosystem protected or restored political access and connection with power brokers in order to voice concerns and be heard • policy influence via ties with local government and politicians social connections within and outside the group • frequency of group meetings • number of partner organisations the assessment of resources, however, is often complex. thus, meaningful visual representation of resources in action is one way to help bridge the theory-practice divide of adaptive capacity. while digital photography has been increasingly explored as a qualitative tool for enhancing sustainable initiatives (bousé, 2003; farnsworth, 2011; hoeberlein, 2012), photographic narratives from an activists perspective that depict adaptation to changing circumstances remain scarce. this paper responds to this gap, and offers a glimpse of one of the longest running activist initiatives in perth, the state capital of western australia. 2. perth, western australia the town of perth (figure 1) was inaugurated in 1829 by captain james stirling, who arrived in the vessel parmelia on the shores of australia (kennewell & shaw, 2008). perth is the state capital of western australia (wa), and is now the fourth largest city in australia. the perth metropolitan area covers an area of 5,423 square kilometres and has a population of about 1.7 million (abs, 2010). 170 consilience figure 1: location map of perth [url: http://go.grolier.com/map?id=mgoc015&pid=go] the state of wa has enjoyed more or less continuous economic growth after the world war ii due to unprecedented mining opportunities in the northwest. this has attracted thousands of migrants to wa from within australia and around the world. the growth of industry as well as the residential, transport and lifestyle needs of the increasing population pose serious threats to city’s sustainability (dec, 2007). at the same time, because of the globally significant floral diversity, the broader perth region is listed as one of 25 significant biodiversity hotspots of the world (scc, 2004). consequently, while the state and private sector have been fixated on the resource boom, the protection of environmentally significant natural habitats has become one of the main issues for sustainability activists. thus, the contributions of sags have been particularly imperative in western australia, as government priorities have mostly remained under the shadow of a growing appetite for mining development. for instance, the iconic kings park (figure 2)—one of the largest inner-city botanical gardens in the world—exists today only because of an enormous activist initiative opposing the conversion of the park area into a sporting events venue in the 1960s. consilience dhakal: glimpses of sustainability figure 2: perth skyline as seen from the kings park 3. hydropolis city perth can be considered a hydropolis—a city of wetlands. wetlands are transitional ecosystems between land and water that support organisms uniquely adapted to the wet environment. the natural functioning of the wetlands supports rich biodiversity as well as provides services such as groundwater recharge, flood protection, and detoxification that become a valuable benefit to the residents of perth. approximately one-quarter of the perth region is classified as wetlands. while twenty-nine have been deemed nationally important, three have been deemed globally significant and listed as ramsar sites (environment australia, 2001). however, two-thirds of the wetlands in and around perth have already been lost in the past one and a half centuries, and remaining wetlands are under continual threat from unsustainable development (dhakal, 2010). the north and bibra lakes in south perth, for example, are currently under threat because of proposed highway development. in 2000, a government agency announced plans to extend the roe highway right through the middle of these wetlands (fig 3). since then, an activist group has persisted in increasing community awareness about the values of wetlands, and organised street protests and online petitions to stop the unwanted development (dhakal, 2010). while the activism has certainly been able to delay the construction for more than a decade, the future of these wetlands remains uncertain. 172 consilience brixton street wetlands kings park north and bibra lakes figure 3: proposed highway development between the two lakes [url: http://www.savenorthlake.com.au] 4. a case of brixton street wetlands the brixton street wetlands (bsw) are located within a nature reserve about 14 kilometres southwest of perth’s central business district (figure 4). the bsw has been identified as one of the six high-priority conservation wetlands (payne, 1993). figure 4: location map of the bsw [url: http://www.staywa.net.au/img/maps/map_perth_suburbs.gif consilience dhakal: glimpses of sustainability the bsw (figure 5) is spread over 0.19 square kilometres and is of outstanding botanical significance. as a seasonal wetland, bsw has higher species richness compared to permanent wetlands in perth. it is home to more than 300 species of plants—equivalent to more than 20% of perth’s flora in only 0.005% of its total area (phillimore, 2003). figure 5: brixton street wetlands in winter 5. the friends of brixton street wetlands the friends of bsw is one of the hundreds of sags in perth that has been actively caring for the environment since 1989. the group initially lobbied for the appropriate assessment and recognition of the wetland’s significance by the state environmental agencies. at the time, the wetlands area was under the ownership of homeswest, a government-housing agency. homeswest considered the wetlands to be a wasteland and wanted to convert it into a medium-density residential complex. thus, the original purpose of the group was to stop the proposed land reclamation of bsw. because of the mounting pressure from the friends of bsw, the homeswest proposal was subjected to an environmental impact assessment (eia). recognising the values of the wetlands, the eia report recommended opposition towards the development, and supported the establishment of a nature reserve to include the bsw (keighery, 1995). 174 consilience figure 6: celebrating sustainability activism: brixton style the persistent activism of the group—enabled by the ability of its leaders to harness connections within the local community and with other sags— persuaded the government agency to recognise the bsw as one of the nationally significant ecosystems in perth. this achievement is often celebrated with annual community events (figure 6) where wetlands enthusiasts from all walks of life come together to learn about the wetlands and exchange ideas and information. figure 7: convenor of the group: mrs regina drummond since being incorporated in 1993, the group has maintained an executive committee comprising of convenor, vice convenor, treasurer, secretary, and three consilience dhakal: glimpses of sustainability other executive members. the group’s executive committee is democratically elected on an annual basis during the annual general meeting. the group is led by a dynamic and well-respected female convenor (figure 7), who has been actively involved with several other sags in the region. she firmly believes that even one determined person can make a big difference in the community, and remains driven by the feeling that perth residents need to rethink how they live every day to save the environment for the future. she received the western australian environment award 2011 for rivers, estuaries and wetlands for her outstanding contributions in the community for the protection, sustainable use or enhancement of wetland environments. figure 8: member of the state legislative assembly: mr. chris tallentire participating in the group activity nearly 25 years of continuous activism and presence in the community means the group’s activities and events are always in the radar of local politicians. for instance, the minister for the environment has acknowledged the group’s contributions at the state level. several members of parliament who are involved with environmental interests have visited the wetlands and interacted with the volunteers. the office of local politicians is also supportive of the group, and provides colour-photocopying services for free when needed. more importantly, local politicians are keen to be involved in the group’s activities and never want to miss a photo opportunity (figure 8). these collective political resources have wide policy implications for sustainability activism. for instance, a federal sitting member of parliament recently visited the bsw and made the announcement to fund the green army project in order to help ecological restoration activities in bsw and other ecologically significant sites (templeton, 2013). 176 consilience figure 9: the aftermath of the 2009 bushfire although the group is mainly focused on restoration activities, bushfires (natural or human lit) remain one of the prominent challenges for the group. since the bsw is a seasonal wetland, areas that are inundated in the winter (figure 5) dry out completely during the hot summer, which increases fire risk. there have been two major incidents in a past decade (figure 9) alone, despite collaboration with state agencies in implementing bushfire risk reduction measures. the group is heavily dependent on community members living adjacent to the wetlands to contact the local fire brigade during an emergency. figure 10: volunteers killing invasive weeds with organic pesticide and geotagging its location consilience dhakal: glimpses of sustainability figure 11: community event held in the local library the group has tried hard to maintain strong relationships with key stakeholders in relation to funding opportunities. it has received grants from a wide variety of sources in the past two decades, including local, state, and federal governments. non-governmental organisations and educational institutions have also continuously supported the group. regional environmental networks have been instrumental in helping the group to apply for grants, host a webpage, and organise community events. these events (figure 11) provide unique opportunities for the group to promote its cause and collect donations by selling informative materials like calendars and greeting cards. however, funding shortages have consistently hindered or delayed many large-scale projects. apart from community members who live next to the wetlands, the group also relies on wide a variety of volunteers who bring unique skills and capacities that benefit the overall goal of the group (figure 10). for instance, some volunteers help out in weeding and geo-tagging the weed’s location, while others help out in mending fences, documenting activities or producing newsletters. these volunteers have contributed in the management of wetlands through various activities—collecting seeds, planting trees, surveying flora and fauna, removing invasive weeds, and cleaning up rubbish. the group has had about a dozen regular volunteers at any given time since the 1990s. however, attracting and retaining younger dedicated people who turn up every morning has been particularly challenging for the group in recent years. 178 consilience since the bsw is no longer threatened from the future development, the group has embraced education, management and restoration of wetlands as its primary objectives. the group actively engages with local schools to raise awareness about value of the wetlands. it has also adopted many passive wetlands-oriented recreational activities, such as bush walking, bird watching, nature photography, and scientific studies as a way to educate the community about the wetlands. the guided bush-walk with a renowned botanist (figure 12) has been particularly popular with the community in recent years. figure 12: guided bush-walk with a renowned botanist greg keighery since the early 2000s, the group has lobbied hard to find funds to fence the bsw and safeguard management and restoration efforts from unauthorised quad bike riders. the entire wetland is now fenced (figure 13) and paths have been maintained to minimize the trampling of bush walkers. the wetland is now listed on the register of the national estate of the australian heritage commission and the directory of important wetlands in australia. and finally, bsw is one of the 287 bush forever sites, a classification designated for patches with regionally significant vegetation, within the perth region. consilience dhakal: glimpses of sustainability figure 13: new fence in the southwest corner of the bsw it is clear that the group has been able to acquire, maintain and utilise various forms of resources effectively for nearly a quarter of a century. in doing so, the group has developed the adaptive capacity required to become a successful advocate of sustainability, and preserve the bsw (figure 14) for current and future generations. figure 14: signpost, information hut & a lookout as seen from the main entrance 180 consilience 6. discussion and conclusion the intent of this paper was to capture and communicate the contributions of an activist group in perth towards sustainability goals. we have seen that the friends of brixton street wetlands has generally operated in challenging circumstances where the availability of essential financial and human resources has been scarce. this scarcity can be attributed to two broad causes. first, a policy shift towards regional rather than local environmental approach has substantially reduced the availability of funding opportunities and other support for locally operating ecos in recent years. it is hard to maintain enthusiasm and motivation within a volunteer-dependent organisation without adequate financial resources. a second related cause is that the voluntary contributions of community organisations are generally under-appreciated by state agencies. when volunteers feel that they are the only ones looking after the wetlands, with little appreciation from the government, it becomes difficult to recruit and retain volunteers (dhakal, 2013). while the exploratory nature of this paper was limited in scope, we hope it effectively used visualisation as a qualitative method for highlighting the importance of sags for urban sustainability, and more importantly, told an intimate story about how these groups adapt in challenging circumstances. this photo essay is also a reminder that while sags in perth have made significant contributions, they could still benefit from the institutionalised support of state, private and community sectors. acknowledgements the author is grateful to numerous volunteers of the bsw who have spent thousands of hours in protecting and caring for the wetlands for nearly a quarter of a century, especially, mrs regina drummond, mr trevor drummond and their family in kenwick, wa. this research was partially funded by the australasian crc for interaction design and murdoch university. consilience dhakal: glimpses of sustainability bibliography abs (2010). tight fit will perth feel the squeeze? stats talk wa. canberra, act: australian bureau of statistics [abs]. bousé, d. 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[url: http://www.kenwyatt.com.au/brixton-st-wetlands-forrestfield-and-wattlegrove-to-benefit-from-coalitions-green-army/] kersey, a user-centered account of urban energy transitions in kampala, uganda consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss.27 (2024) a user-centered account of urban energy transitions in kampala, uganda jessica kersey energy and resources group university of california berkeley jessica.kersey@berkeley.edu abstract the rapid and complex effects of urbanization are shifting energy production and consumption patterns on the african continent. energy poverty is manifesting to an increasing degree and in diverse forms in low-income, vulnerable urban populations like informal settlements and/or “slums.” this photo essay shows the lived realities of the urban energy transitions unfolding across kampala, uganda’s many informal communities. though residents are almost universally connected to the grid, 97% of households and businesses rely on expensive and polluting charcoal. electricity access is precarious and residents develop personalized fuel-stacking strategies to balance the competing demands of affordability, health, convenience, etcetera. redundancy, hybridity, and improvisation are key features of the strategies that low-income communities use to meet their daily energy needs in the face of an unreliable, unaffordable, or inaccessible grid. this essay contributes to a growing body of research that aims to center users within discussions of urban energy transitions and sustainable development broadly. keywords: energy access, informal settlements, electrification, energy transitions, urban poverty consilience kersey: a user-centered account introduction clean and affordable energy is an essential input to sustainable development in the rapidly urbanizing global south. urbanization on the african continent has produced dramatic shifts in the form and density of human settlement patterns and the distribution of (energy) poverty (mahumane & mulder, 2022). existing cities are growing and densifying, often sprawling far beyond their administrative borders. new cities and towns are emerging, often as a single node in a larger mega-agglomeration or conurbation (oecd et al., 2022). cutting across these is a tendency for settlements to emerge informally and for vulnerable populations to be concentrated in urban spaces (ravallion et al., 2007; united nations high commissioner for refugees, 2023). these trends pose new challenges for meeting the sustainable development goal (sdg 7) to “ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all” (united nations department of economic and social affairs, n.d.). the infrastructure needed to provide clean energy to urbanizing communities has not kept pace with demographic trends in many places in sub-saharan africa (ssa) and beyond (falchetta et al., 2020). the conventional model of urban energy transitions holds that people transition to cleaner fuel sources (especially electricity) over time as their incomes increase and as these sources become more available and affordable (price, 2021). however, in ssa, these transitions have proceeded unevenly and often inequitably (fall et al., 2008; karekezi & majoro, 2002; pandey et al., 2022; yaguma et al., 2024). this is clear in the case of the electricity grid, which researchers have shown provides services of often poorer quality and higher expense to disadvantaged users (degani, 2022; graham & marvin, 2001; jacome et al., 2019; kersey et al., 2023; silver, 2015). this insight is troubling for the future of sustainable urban development. the current model of urban energy transitions in ssa hinges on the densification and extension of the central electricity grid to deliver low-carbon and wide-scale access across an increasingly low-income user base (j. h. williams & ghanadan, 2006). however, electricity has only been partially adopted in many low-income urban communities and reliability and affordability continue to be significant barriers to its uptake beyond basic uses like lighting and phone charging (blimpo et al., 2020; blimpo & cosgrove-davies, 2019). smoky fuels like charcoal and firewood continue to be important fuel sources for urban families and entrepreneurs, to the detriment of community health and the local environment (clean cooking alliance, iclei, 2023; kansiime et al., 2022). by 2030, an estimated 60% of cooking needs in urban ssa will still be met with biomass or fossil fuel sources (stoner et al., 2021). a deeper understanding of how the electricity grid is (or is not) meeting the needs of low-income urban users, and the layered strategies and fuel sources that these populations use to cope, is important to chart a more equitable path for sustainable urban development. informal settlements and “slums,” which are the focus of this study, are home to some of society’s most vulnerable groups (dodman et al., 2018). they are also the urban majority. of the total urban population in ssa of 600 million, 62% live informally in overcrowded conditions, poverty, insecure housing tenure, and poor access to basic services (un-habitat, 2016). more critical pieces of literature have long recognized that these communities are “more than simply places of dwelling…these ‘cities within cities’ also accommodate commerce, cultural production, politics, education, and much more” (werthmann & bridger, 2015). they host strong informal economies built around providing small-scale goods and services and disproportionately employ women https://www.zotero.org/google-docs/?czqcoi 3 consilience (brown & roever, n.d.). barbershops, motorcycle taxi drivers, salons, kiosks, and other diverse businesses all depend on energy. among research that has contributed to the debate around the nature and trajectories of urban energy transitions, there has been a call to better center users and their experiences (castán-broto et al., 2017). this is part of a wider agenda of socially-inclusive research, much of it based in informal settlements, which has also animated activities around participatory data collection (lundine et al., 2012). this aims to give end users, particularly those from disadvantaged communities, a seat at the table in making decisions that will impact their communities. this aligns with procedural elements of energy justice frameworks which emphasize inclusive participation and more opportunities for communities to engage meaningfully in decisions of energy governance (sovacool & dworkin, 2015). it also includes approaching conversations around energy access and infrastructural adequacy from a perspective of user aspirations particularly based on education, health, and wellbeing (parikh et al., 2012). this photo essay seeks to contribute to these discussions by visually contextualizing the urban energy transition in 25 informal communities in kampala, uganda. the photos are intended to convey the infrastructural experiences of the residents of the communities. they show the heterogeneity of electricity service provision in terms of the physical infrastructure and the informal service arrangements that users negotiate with local supply intermediaries. some are snapshots of the mundane ways that energy intersects with everyday lives and livelihoods. others depict items or pieces of infrastructure that community members pointed out to the research team as representative of a certain issue or challenge. in these ways, this work aims to provide a grounded and human-centered perspective on energy access in kampala’s low-income communities. as a visual medium, the aim is to make these narratives more accessible to the diverse policy, social, planning, and technical communities of practice working at the various intersections of urban energy transitions in kampala and cities of the global south more broadly. materials and methods these photographs were taken by the author during fieldwork related to the spotlight kampala initiative in kampala, uganda, between october 2022 and january 2023. they were taken with an iphone x, which has a lens of 28 mm f/1.8 and 52 mm f/2.4. this camera type was practical for this setting and felt more comfortable for research participants. the images have not been processed or corrected. during the fieldwork period, the research team conducted 66 interviews and 500 surveys, and installed power quality sensors in 150 homes and businesses (kersey et al., 2023). all three activities took place across 25 informal communities. figure 1 shows the location of uganda in east africa and the locations of all informal settlements in kampala. the names and exact locations of participating communities are withheld for the sake of data privacy at the request of ngo partners. https://spotlightkampala.com/ https://spotlightkampala.com/ consilience kersey: a user-centered account figure 1. maps showing the location of uganda and kampala within the east african region (left), and the locations of roughly 60 informal settlements within kampala city. these photos were captured during these research activities and other informal interactions and movements with community members. the exact procedures varied by the method, but for all activities representatives from actogether uganda and the national slum dwellers federation of uganda facilitated introductions with the local council (lc) leadership in partner communities. lc leaders at the parish and/or zone level consented to collaborate in the research and many then designated a guide to accompany the research team. the photos are supplemented by quantitative and qualitative insights from surveys and interviews. the study protocol was approved by the institutional review board of the university of california, berkeley under protocol 2022-07-15500 and the aids support organization under reference number taso-2022-141. the project is registered with the uganda national council for science and technology under registration number ss1437es. all people who are recognizably featured in the photos consented to be photographed and for the photos to be used as part of research efforts. essay in kampala, a majority (62%) of residents live in informal settlements (richmond et al., 2018). of these roughly one million people, 73% are estimated to live below the national poverty line of $1.90 per person per day (wanyama et al., 2019). these communities face intersectional vulnerabilities related to land tenure, food security, and unpredictable earnings (dimanin, 2012). they also face disproportionate environmental hazards (d. s. williams et al., 2019). in kampala’s 5 consilience case, flooding is a recurring issue (kwiringira et al., 2016). informal communities occupy the low-lying valleys between the hills, which host commercial and wealthy residential zones (hemerijckx et al., 2020). photo 1 shows an informal community in kampala from the vantage point of a nearby footbridge that crosses a highway. it gives a sense of the scale of the community, which is one of over sixty in kampala city (actogether uganda, 2014). photo 1. an aerial view of an informal community in the rainy season following a storm. the spatial arrangement of the community pictured is common. a variety of small businesses, like mobile money agents and shops, usually operate along the larger roads. households are clustered in the middle ground behind the shops. utility poles carrying low-voltage distribution lines are visible along the road, as well as high-voltage transmission lines in the background. electricity grids are the main way of delivering electricity to these economically and socially dense neighborhoods. access rates are nearly universal at 95%. photo 2 shows a typical neighborhood and the electrical infrastructure that serves it. the white boxes on the electricity pole in the right background are part of the pre-paid yaka metering system which controls power supply to customers. the other piece of the pre-paid meter is a customer interface unit (see photo 3) located within the premises of each registered user. it shows the amount of electricity credits remaining and allows users to reload by entering numeric tokens that can be purchased locally or via mobile money. consilience kersey: a user-centered account photo 2. this cluster of households is representative of housing conditions for lower-income residents. homes are commonly arranged around a common area. these spaces fulfill different social and economic purposes throughout the day, such as a play space for children, laundry, household and commercial food preparation, socializing, and more. these structures are likely owned by a common landlord and rented to their occupants. however, most connections do not conform to the utility’s standard configuration. barriers to applying for a connection, mostly related to the cost and landlord permission, prevent many from registering for their own connection. users circumvent these barriers by sharing a common electrical circuit and meter among multiple users. this is particularly common as a way for landlords to provide electricity services to multiple rental units. local electricians, known as kamyufus, can also illegally provide a connection to the grid by bypassing metering systems or tapping nearby distribution lines. they operate a parallel infrastructure below the formal utility grid which serves around a quarter of users in informal settlements (kersey et al., 2023). photos 3-5 demonstrate this heterogeneity as it manifests in diverse metering systems. photo 6 shows a utility pole that supports multiple types of connections. 7 consilience photos 3-5. three different metering systems were observed among users. the top left shows the most common one, which is a pre-paid yaka meter customer interface. the top right shows a “ready board” system offered by the then-rural electrification agency as part of an initiative to connect low-income users. it provides a light and several outlets. in practice, it was common for users to plug in an extension cable and run it to other parts of the home or business. the bottom photo shows a landlord’s electrical set-up for her tenants. submeters meter the use of her individual units and the main supply comes from the prepaid metering system. this arrangement was somewhat rare because of the cost of the materials and wiring involved. consilience kersey: a user-centered account photo 6. an lc leader pointed out this utility pole, commenting that “the tree [pole] is tired.” he is referring to the damage to the pole from kamyufus and utility workers, who use spiked metal boots to climb them and access the meter boxes at the top. on the pole, it is noticeable that the number of service lines is much greater than the number of meter boxes. these could be abandoned lines, but are more likely to be unmetered connections. 9 consilience these non-standard connections increase the inclusivity of electricity supply by allowing disadvantaged users to access the grid. however, they can also be precarious, restricted, and unsafe in ways that impact all grid users. photo 7 shows a physical precarity in the form of an improvised grid extension. photo 8 shows the challenge of power quality, which manifests as appliances that prematurely break due to chronically low voltages or instantaneous voltage spikes. reliability is also poor, mostly because of overloaded distribution transformers. photo 9 shows a circuit breaker with damage from an electrical fire which was specifically pointed out by community guides. photos 10 and 11 depict the improvised nature of electric wiring, which community members pointed to as a significant safety hazard. photo 7. a household connection with a bare splice in the line. it is possible that this was done intentionally to make the line easy to disconnect. this might be done by a kamyufu, for example, so that the line can be concealed in the case of an enforcement raid by the utility and law enforcement. the ability to easily disconnect might also be desirable for landlords, who tend to use electricity as leverage and often cut the electricity supply if rent is not paid on time. consilience kersey: a user-centered account photo 8. a headmistress at a primary school holds up a grinder that had been used to prepare meals for the children. in her interview, she reported that it had recently broken and she suspected it was due to voltage spikes. this is one appliance that she chose from multiple others which were broken and collected in a corner of the room. these appliance graveyards exist in many homes and institutions in kampala (and in many other contexts, in the author’s experience). broken appliances are stored because they can later be sold, repaired, or used for parts. 11 consilience photo 9. a breaker box that is controlling the power supply from a distribution transformer. the black, melted hardware on the right is evidence of an electrical fire. community members narrated that this circuit breaker was constantly tripping from overcurrent because it was not designed for the load. they noted that after it burned, umeme personnel did not replace it or upgrade the transformer but simply bypassed the breaker. one interviewee estimated that this was a common occurrence because although one transformer should serve around 200 households in reality they served around 1,000. as one kamyufu interviewee put it, “each pole should have 10 connections, but each wire coming off can have 5-7 houses.” consilience kersey: a user-centered account photo 10. an example of improvised household wiring. this was the home of a family with two young children. the yaka meter is visible to the left of the doorway but may be shared with nearby households. a family of this size uses electricity primarily for lighting, tv, phone charging, and other consumer electronics. ironing and boiling water are other common household uses of electricity. the cables above the doorway show how wiring is extended ad hoc. though the utility performs a wiring inspection as part of the registration process, internal wiring is usually added as money is available to purchase additional cables and outlets. extension cables and power strips are often used as permanent wiring. the cost of internal wiring for a dwelling like this is around 30 usd. because of this expense, it is common for renters to provide their own electrical wiring, which they usually remove and bring from their previous residence. 13 consilience photo 11. an electricity cable emerging from the ground and entering the wooden home above. this is also a footpath, and the concrete block was likely placed over it to protect it from bypassers, and vice versa. undergrounding is the best way of disguising an illegal connection, but is dangerous. several interviewees noted that underground cables like this used to cause several fatalities per year, but this practice is now less common. as one kamyufu explained, “if a wire gets damaged and is exposed especially in this place that floods when it rains, we have to be careful and advise [people] to switch off electricity when it rains, because this water can even kill people so we strive hard to switch it all off when it rains, and connect back when it stops.” consilience kersey: a user-centered account despite these challenges, energy underpins many local economic activities. photos 12-14 show examples of small businesses that use energy to generate income. it was clear from conversations with community members that they desired to use electricity for more purposes. however, affordability was a day-to-day challenge. when asked how they would use electricity if it were more affordable, many community members mentioned uses related to cooking. but, as one woman summarized, “everyone wants to use it [electricity] for cooking but when they weigh its price they decide that using charcoal is the better [option].” photo 12. a local storefront where the research team installed a power quality monitor provided by nline (klugman et al., 2021). the proprietor’s earnings came from selling small electrical gadgets and charging customers to screen movies or play the gaming consoles shown on the shelf. this is a very modern example of a business based on the productive use of electricity. http://nline.io 15 consilience photo 13. another example of a small business based in part on the sales of refrigerated and frozen products. it is common for community members to purchase secondhand appliances. though more affordable, these appliances are also less energy efficient which can make them more costly to run. refrigerators were challenging for local businesses to power affordably. a small number (7%) of surveyed users thus had two connections: one metered and one unmetered. the unmetered line is used for higher-consuming appliances like refrigerators because the kamyufus who manage the connection usually charge a flat monthly rate, which is much cheaper than the per-kwh rate billed on a metered connection. consilience kersey: a user-centered account photo 14. an older mzee (gentleman) shows his charcoal iron. charcoal is placed and lit within the metallic body of the iron. the metal plate on the bottom transfers the heat into the clothing. ironing is a culturally important use of energy within uganda, where well-pressed clothes are a sign of respect. ironing is also an important livelihood strategy for some for many given that 26% of community members take clothing to a local “dobbi” for washing and pressing (yaguma et al., 2024). as this mzee explained, he had used the iron to provide for his family for over 40 years nearly all (97%) of surveyed households and businesses use charcoal as their primary source of cooking fuel. residents also spend over double on charcoal (12%) compared to electricity (5%) as a percentage of monthly expenditures. it is clear that charcoal meets a significant percentage of energy needs in these communities, and is deeply embedded in everyday practices and livelihoods. photo 15 shows cookstoves on display for purchase. photo 16 depicts charcoal being dried and shows how biomass fuels are quite visible in community spaces. photo 17 depicts a charcoal vendor at her place of business. 17 consilience photo 15. local cookstoves, known as sigiris, are on display for purchase by a local vendor. in the foreground are traditional models which are less energy efficient, compared with the blue improved smarthome cookstoves in the back (rojas, 2018). improved cookstoves (ics) like these offer a cooking efficiency gain of 20 to 40% over traditional models, which translates directly to fuel savings (memon et al., 2020). sigiris are used to cook many foods, particularly local staples like beans, matooke (banana), and posho (maize meal). the manufacturing and sales of improved cookstoves like the smarthome are a growing market in east africa (clough, 2012). the traditional models are manufactured locally by small businesses at a scale of less than 100 stoves per month (global alliance for clean cookstoves, n.d.). consilience kersey: a user-centered account photo 16. charcoal spread over plastic bags to dry in the street. damp or wet charcoal burns at a lower efficiency and produces more smoke (kansiime et al., 2022). this leads to higher levels of household and ambient air pollution, which are already chronic health challenges in these communities. keeping charcoal storage areas dry is difficult because most of these areas are low-lying, and flood quickly during storms. community members felt that the timing and predictability of the rainy seasons were becoming increasingly unpredictable. according to climate scientists, extreme rainfall events are part of a changing ugandan climate trending towards hotter and drier overall conditions (nsubuga & rautenbach, 2018). urban researchers are increasingly concerned that informal communities will disproportionately face climate burdens while being among the least prepared to adapt and respond (borg et al., 2021). 19 consilience photo 17. a charcoal vendor gives a tour of her storage shed. she stores the charcoal here but sells it in small quantities at the nearby market which is one of the largest in kampala. lower-income households pay more on average because they buy charcoal in much smaller quantities, often just enough to cook a meal. a coordinator from the national slum dwellers federation of uganda later commented that her 10-person household used one sack per month at a cost of 120,000 ugx (~30 usd). to put this in perspective, an average household in our survey reported earning 180 usd per month. consilience kersey: a user-centered account conclusion this visual exploration of energy in kampala’s informal communities shows that residents have various, complex ways of navigating and adapting existing energy systems to meet their needs. redundancy, hybridity, and improvisation are themes that emerge in the photographs. though most residents have a connection to the electricity grid, the high cost of electricity, poor quality and reliability, and threat of disconnection by intermediaries are daily realities that restrict, discourage, or prevent its use. electricity is used as it is available/affordable/allowed, and charcoal, firewood, and manual labor fill the substantial gap. the patterns of fuel stacking provide a window into users’ preferences, constraints, and needs. given the precarity of grid connections (to outages, disconnections/supply cuts, voltage spikes, etc.), it is necessary to have multiple redundant fuel sources. most households have access to electricity, charcoal, firewood, candles, and solar light kits. they make daily decisions about what fuel to use based on, for example, the amount of money they earn that day. biomass sources still dominate for end uses like cooking. electricity has only entered kitchens for basic uses like boiling water. finding ways to displace charcoal and firewood are important and urgent areas of policy action for the government of uganda and its partners (circodu, 2023). communities in kampala, as elsewhere, have developed hybrid models of electricity service provision over time (de bercegol & monstadt, 2018; silver, 2023; smith, 2019; yaguma et al., 2022). these are a response to the high cost and administrative requirements of the connection process, which preclude many people from applying for formal service from the utility (singh et al., 2015). strategies like tapping distribution lines, sharing meters, or installing submeters–which are normally mediated by a landlord, neighbor, or kamyufu–have emerged as ways to make formal systems more inclusive (buyana, 2022). however, the quality and safety of the electricity provided by these connections are typically worse (kersey et al., 2023). the photos also convey a sense of dynamism in access to electricity via the grid. in economically, physically, and socially dense urban spaces, people and their built environments are constantly changing. electricity poles are erected but others fall. a transformer’s circuit breaker is blown and it is bypassed. a tenant does not pay the rent and her landlord disconnects them. the precarity of grid connections, and resulting cycles of connection and disconnection, is not something that is recognized in the technical frameworks favored by practitioners and policymakers to track progress toward sdg 7 (bhatia & angelou, 2015; nussbaumer et al., 2012). it is, however, one of the many barriers that encourage the continued use of polluting fuel sources and must be reconciled if electricity is to drive clean energy transitions in kampala. the insights from informal communities in kampala surface important questions around equity within urban energy transitions. the current model of electrification is based on the extension and densification of the central utility grid (iea, 2023). however, even in cities where grid coverage is high, electricity provision is precarious, inaccessible, or unaffordable to many. residents have improvised a range of strategies to overcome these challenges which hybridize elements of “formal” electricity services with informal terms and agreements that better suit their needs. echoing other authors, a fruitful area of future work will be to experiment with new service provision paradigms that embrace this hybridity while still ensuring a minimum level of safety and service (silver, 2023). emerging decentralized solar technologies have not traditionally been marketed to this demographic, https://www.zotero.org/google-docs/?glwzjy 21 consilience but could create interesting opportunities for renewably-based and locally-governed clean energy integration (alstone et al., 2015). to conclude, existing modes of clean energy provision (i.e. the grid) in kampala do not meet the needs of the city’s lowest-income and most vulnerable users. user accounts underscore a desire to transition to cleaner fuel sources, but also a profound reliance on “traditional” sources of energy like charcoal. this must be acknowledged within policies aimed at improving energy access to avoid impacts like those seen with a recent “charcoal ban” which disrupted the livelihoods of many in northwestern uganda (abet, 2023; munro & bartlett, 2019). policies and interventions must be informed by a thorough understanding of the everyday energy practices, challenges, and aspirations of communities. this entails a commitment to participatory approaches to ensure that the voices of the most vulnerable are heard and prioritized within broader agendas of sustainable urban development. https://www.zotero.org/google-docs/?lva4fx https://www.zotero.org/google-docs/?oeavkg consilience kersey: a user-centered account references abet, t. 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(2022). electricity access in uganda’s slums: multi-stakeholder perspectives from kampala. environmental research communications, 4(12), 125008. https://doi.org/10.1088/2515-7620/aca9ad consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 26 (2022-2023) investigating environmental values and psychological barriers to sustainable behaviors among college students dr. najla mouchrek honors culture of sustainability lab | virginia tech honors college, associate teaching professor | college of arts, media and design, northeastern university n.mouchrek@northeastern.edu charlotte cullen, alyssa ganino, vera gliga, paige kramer, rohith mahesh, lauren maunder, sean murray, kiara scott, taha shaikh | undergraduate researchers virginia tech honors college abstract while college students acknowledge that climate change is a major threat in today’s world, a multitude of structural and psychological barriers exist which prevent these individuals from engaging in eco-friendly practices. the honors culture of sustainability lab is a campus living laboratory in which undergraduate students engage in interdisciplinary research exploring cultural and social aspects of sustainability. as part of a course-based undergraduate research experience in spring 2022, the team undertook a study investigating environmental values and psychological barriers to pro environmental behavior among their peers: the student population at virginia tech, a large university in the eastern united states. data were collected through a survey that received 765 responses and used the new ecological paradigm nep and the dragons of inaction psychological barriers dipb measurement scales. students widely expressed environmental values and concern about climate change. agreement or strong agreement with statements reflecting the new ecological paradigm ranged from 67% to 92%. the research found that virginia tech students do think that action should be taken to promote sustainability and do want to engage in more sustainable behaviors but face a number of barriers to transform their habits and need support to translate their beliefs into action and concrete behavior change. the most influential psychological barriers showed: resistance to transforming habits and lifestyles, need for more information on how to change, and a feeling of unfairness in face of industry-caused environmental degradation. identifying what prevents students from changing their habits and behaviors will help guide institutional efforts to promote a culture of sustainability on the university’s campus. by understanding how students view and practice sustainability on an individual level, measures can be implemented that effectively address and overcome psychological barriers to pro-environmental behaviors. the answers to these questions will provide more insight into the state of environmental awareness and behavior at virginia tech and perhaps hint at trends in american college campuses in general. keywords: sustainable actions, environmental values, psychological barriers to pro environmental behavior, dragons of inaction, college students 2 consilience introduction given the current condition of our climate and environment, it is important that people adopt pro-environmental mindsets and participate in behaviors that align with these mindsets. committing to more sustainable behaviors and actions is dependent on social, psychological, and structural factors. many understand that climate change is a major issue, they are aware that changes must be made to address this issue, and even have pro-environmental values – however, many are reluctant to change their behavior patterns so that their actions are more sustainable. identifying and understanding the psychological barriers that people struggle with is an important part of explaining and resolving the dissonance between sustainable values and sustainable action. to investigate values and attitudes regarding the environment and understand how this valueaction gap manifests itself among college students, the undergraduate research team in the virginia tech honors culture of sustainability lab undertook, under the coordination of a faculty advisor, a study investigating values and ideas about sustainability and psychological barriers to sustainable behavior among their university’s student population. virginia tech has recently started implementing its new climate action commitment through a set of fifteen goals. increased information on environmental values and attitudes and barriers to sustainable action among students is necessary to inform and contribute to goals 10 (integrate the climate action commitment into the university’s educational mission) and 12 (diminish barriers to sustainable behaviors through institutional change, education and social marketing). the study was then proposed, in partnership with the virginia tech office of sustainability and sponsored by a grant from the office of undergraduate research. the study aims to answer the following research questions: what are virginia tech students’ values and opinions regarding the environment? what are the most prominent psychological barriers to pro environmental behavior among these students? for each set of constructs, the study investigates: how they manifest in the overall sample, differences between demographic groups, and relationships among constructs. the answers to these questions will provide more insight into the state of environmental awareness and behavior among the student population. these insights will be used to inform the office of sustainability’s efforts on campus and will guide the implementation of measures that will more effectively assist students in addressing the psychological barriers that are most prominent at the college level. literature review environmental attitudes are defined as the care or concern that one has for the environment and can be affected by factors such as: personality and values, education and environmental knowledge, direct experience with nature, and demographic background. it is important to study the relationship between environmental values, attitudes, and behavior to understand how these dimensions affect people’s willingness to engage in sustainable action (gifford & sussman, 2012). several measurement scales have been developed to assess people’s values and attitudes regarding the environment. the new ecological paradigm scale (dunlap et al. 2000) is used to gauge consilience mouchrek: investigating environmental values whether a respondent supports the ideas of the prevailing anthropocentric worldview (dominant social paradigm), or alternatively the ideas of a pro-environmental worldview (new ecological paradigm). there are 15 statements in this scale and respondents are prompted to rate the agreement with each statement. seven items reflect the dominant social paradigm (dsp), which encompasses ideas related to humans having the right to take control over the land and modify their environment, support of existing structures and ways of life, general resistance to conservation or lack of concern for the environment. the eight remaining items reflect the new ecological paradigm (nep), which includes perceptions of environmental abuse, concern for consequences of unbalanced human interference in natural processes and states the need for environmental protection and action. the process of behavior change toward sustainability is complex and does not correspond to a linear model in which ecological knowledge would lead to awareness, then directly to action (roizman, 2001; blake, 1999). this discrepancy is described as the value-action gap in pro environmental behavior (kollmuss & agyeman, 2002). while authors discussed a variety of external and internal factors that contribute to the value-action gap, our research only focuses on the latter as we were exploring psychological barriers to environmental action. structural barriers are important as well -however, for “almost everyone who is not severely restricted by structural barriers, adopting more pro-environmental choices is possible, but this is not occurring to the extent necessary” (gifford, 2011, p.1). the purpose of our study was to investigate in our local setting why people expressing pro-environmental values and attitudes do not always engage in behaviors that match these values. people may care about the environment, but their lack of sustainable behaviors is due to other significant factors that must be considered. lack of pro-environmental action is not necessarily due to a lack of awareness, or a lack of ability to change. the piece of literature most central to our study is dragons of inactions: psychological barriers that limit climate change mitigation and adaptation (gifford, 2011), which categorizes, and labels psychological barriers faced by humans which limit their environmental behaviors, informally called ‘dragons of inaction’. there are seven categories of barriers, ‘dragon families’, labeled as limited cognition, ideologies, comparisons with others, sunk costs, discredence, perceived risks, and limited behaviors. while in this foundational work there are a total of 29 dragons distributed throughout the seven families, later work in psychometrics (lacroix et al, 2019) developed the dragons of inaction psychological barriers (dipb) scale, a measure to investigate psychological barriers to pro environmental behavior into five subscales: change unnecessary, conflicting goals and aspirations, interpersonal relations, lacking knowledge, and tokenism. the change unnecessary subscale is composed of barriers in the categories ideologies and discredence. ideologies consist of our worldviews, religious beliefs, ideas, and system justification where the status quo is upheld. the idea of ‘techno salvation’, for example, describes when humans believe they will mitigate all their negative environmental behaviors through technology. discredence can manifest in the form of mistrust between citizens and their governments or scientists, inadequacy of existing sustainability programs, and denial of climate change as a whole. overall, the subscale lines up various arguments to justify the idea that change motivated by environmental concern is not necessary. 4 consilience the conflicting goals and aspirations subscale consists of barriers related to sunk costs and perceived risks. the idea of sunk costs can weigh heavily on our consciences, and our lifestyles, financial investments, and behaviors may not match our pro-environmental attitudes. this is especially true if the process of changing our habits appears too difficult. there are many barriers which fall into the perceived risks family, including risks that are physical, temporal, social, psychological, financial, or functional. overall, the perceived risks family suggests that people are deterred from engaging in pro-environmental behaviors by the negative consequences they assume will happen. our goals to be successful and comfortable, and/or our long-settled habits, are often directly countered by our goals to have a positive environmental influence. the interpersonal relations subscale is composed of the ‘dragon families’ comparison with others and perceived risks. comparison with others tackles ideas of social comparison, social norms, and perceived inequities. in this case, perceived risks can manifest in different fashions, most importantly social, psychological, and temporal. our pro-environmental behaviors are often limited by our fears of being judged poorly by others, criticisms which affect our self-confidence, and the idea of investing non-trivial amounts of time in our behaviors only to reap little or no benefit. the lacking knowledge subscale is made up of barriers related to perceived risks and limited cognition. limited cognition manifests itself through our “ancient brain”, which has not evolved as quickly as our societal advancements. this presents complex issues, including our ignorance, uncertainty, perceived behavioral control, and self-efficacy. perceived risks are once more present, especially in the form of spatial, temporal, and functional risks. people might feel they do not fully understand the complexities of the situation, that they do not have enough information to enact change, and even that they do not know how or where to start the change. lastly, the tokenism subscale consists of the limited behavior dragon family. the limited behavior barriers include tokenism and rebound effect dragons. in regard to the environment, tokenism can be demonstrated when individuals are most inclined to adopt low-cost behaviors (in terms of time, money, and effort) as symbolic exercises in pro-environmental behavior. this is referred to as the “low-cost hypothesis”, which implies that humans are likely to avoid high-cost behaviors that are more effective in favor of less intense behaviors that align with their values. rebound effect describes when people undermine the minimal positive environmental impact of some of their actions with other, non-sustainable behaviors. the classic example is someone who buys an electric car for environmental reasons, but then drives more miles than they ever did with a traditional car. our survey utilizes the dragons of inaction to frame the obstacles that students at virginia tech face, contributing to the value-action gap. each of the five developed subscales are used to summarize the critical ideas presented by gifford’s dragons of inaction (gifford, 2011; lacroix et al, 2019). methods the study surveyed students at the virginia tech main campus (blacksburg, virginia, united states) in the spring of 2022. the team collected 765 responses through an online questionnaire over the course of a three-week-long data collection period. 90% of respondents were undergraduate students, 40% lived on campus. the colleges with the greatest representations were engineering (27%), science (18%), and liberal arts and human sciences (15%), matching approximately the student population distribution. 55% of students were in their first/second year and respondents’ consilience mouchrek: investigating environmental values average age was 20.8 years old. 38% identified as male and 58% as female. 65% are white, 16% are asian/asian american, 7% black/african american, 6% hispanic/latinx. 94% of students are from the us. when asked if they have ever participated in a sustainability-related class, 58%of respondents answered ‘yes’, while 46% informed that they have previously participated in a sustainability-related project. the research was designed as an exploratory, quantitative, cross-sectional study aimed to identify characteristics, patterns and correlations and test relationships between variables related to values and attitudes regarding environment and psychological barriers to pro environmental action. the survey questionnaire investigated the following constructs and measures: values and opinions regarding the environment assessed using the new ecological paradigm, a scale with 15 items proposed by dunlap et al. (2000), which is divided into two sub-scales: new ecological paradigm (nep) and dominant social paradigm (dsp). example items in the nep subscale would be “plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist” and “humans are seriously abusing the environment”. example items in the dsp subscale would be: “humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs” and “the so-called ecological crisis facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated”. the response choices were five-level likert items ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). psychological barriers to pro environmental behavior assessed with the dragons of inaction psychological barriers (dipb), a 22-item scale proposed by lacroix et al. (2019) and composed by five subscales. the measurement strategy starts with a question prompting respondents to select one of the major types of pro-environmental behavior that they could perform more/better than they already do (eating less meat, engaging in more sustainable forms of transportation, wearing a sweater in the winter instead of turning up the heat, reducing water use, making more eco-friendly purchases, or properly recycling everything you can). respondents were then invited to respond why they did not adequately engage in that behavior by rating their agreement to 22 sentences. the response choices were five-level likert items ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). reliability analyses confirmed the internal consistency of four out of the five original subscales (change unnecessary, conflicting goals and aspirations, interpersonal relations, lacking knowledge) for the data in the present study. a factor analysis confirmed that the tokenism subscale needed change since response trends to one item were significantly different from all other items. the last item in the subscale was then proposed as a separate ‘subscale’ named industry causing. example items for the dipb scale would be: · change unnecessary: “there's not much point in making this change because i feel confident that technological innovators will solve environmental problems”. · conflicting goals and aspirations: “i can't change because i'm invested in my current lifestyle”. · interpersonal relations: “if i made the necessary change, i probably would be embarrassed when others noticed what i was doing”. · lacking knowledge: “there's so much information out there that i'm confused about how to make this change”. 6 consilience · tokenism: “the pro-environmental efforts that i currently engage in make further changes unnecessary”. · industry causing: “it’s not fair for me to change when really it’s industry that’s causing the majority of environmental problems”. willingness to engage in sustainability-related campaigns. assessed with a measurement scale proposed for this study, based on three priorities to promote change towards sustainable action on campus: reducing waste, saving energy in campus buildings, and changing to more sustainable modes of transportation. data analysis was conducted using quantitative methods and non-parametric statistical tests. reliability analyses confirmed the internal consistency of all measurement scales and subscales for the data in the study. descriptive statistics and internal consistency for all measures in the study are presented in table 1. consilience mouchrek: investigating environmental values table 1 descriptive statistics and internal consistency for study measures scale # items mean sd median iqr internal consistency values & attitudes regarding the environment new ecological paradigm 8 4.10 0.52 4.13 0.71 .73 dominant social paradigm 7 2.67 0.62 2.57 1.00 .71 psychological barriers to pro environmental behavior change unnecessary 5 1.82 0.65 1.80 1.20 .82 conflicting goals and aspirations 5 2.79 0.81 2.80 1.00 .73 interpersonal relations 4 1.76 0.73 1.75 1.67 .86 lacking knowledge 3 2.86 1.00 3.00 1.00 .79 tokenism 4 2.03 0.68 2.00 2.00 .83 industry causing 1 3.00 1.01 3.00 2.00 one-item willingness to engage in sustainability campaign 1 3 3.44 1.08 3.67 0.66 .86 note. all measures have responses choices ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), except when noted. 1 response choices range from 1 (not at all engaged) to 5 (extremely engaged). 8 consilience results i. what are virginia tech students’ values and opinions regarding the environment? in general, respondents displayed pro-environmental values and opinions: high agreement with statements reflecting the new ecological paradigm (m = 4.10), and low agreement with the dominant social paradigm (m = 2.67). 92% of respondents agree/strongly agree that humans are seriously abusing the environment (m = 4.49), while 90% agree/strongly agree that humans are still subject to the laws of nature, despite special abilities (m = 4.32). “if things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe” had 89% in agreement (m = 4.42), while 85% agree / strongly agree that plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist (m = 4.30) (figure 1). reflecting similar trends, several statements in the dominant social paradigm subscale (dsp) had high levels of disagreement. when prompted with the statement “the so-called ecological crisis facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated”, 79% of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed (m = 1.85). 72% of participants disagree that the balance of nature is strong enough to cope with industrial impact (m = 2.21). the domination of humans over nature is not a widely held belief among virginia tech students: 69% of respondents disagree or strongly disagree with the statement "humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature” (m = 2.16). the higher levels of agreement with dsp items were 57% for “the earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them” (m = 3.57) and 47% for “human advancement and innovation will ensure that we do not make the earth unlivable” (m = 3.32). responses were widely balanced on the statement regarding human's right to modify the environment to suit their needs: 31% responded neutrally, while 34% agreed and 35% disagreed (m = 3.00). one of the strongest relationships found in this study reflects the contrast between the ideas of the new ecological paradigm and dominant social paradigm. a pearson correlation coefficient showed a negative relationship between students’ agreement with each paradigm (correlation of -.48, p ≤.001) (figure 2). consilience mouchrek: investigating environmental values figure 1: distribution of responses to the new ecological paradigm subscale nep (n = 765). figure 2: distribution of responses to the dominant social paradigm subscale dsp (n = 765). 10 consilience differences across demographic groups a kruskal-wallis test showed a significant difference was found in the level of agreement with the dominant social paradigm across the nine different colleges (h = 30.671, p ≤.001). members of some colleges align more closely with the dominant social paradigm than others: a pairwise wilcoxon rank sum comparison revealed that students in agriculture and life sciences and architecture and urban studies were less likely to follow the dominant social paradigm than were students in engineering. significant difference between gender groups regarding environmental values and attitudes was found for both subscales. for support to the new ecological paradigm, females ranked higher than males (mdn = 4.25 over 4.00, p ≤.001), while for support to the dominant social paradigm, males ranked higher than females (mdn = 2.86 over 2.43, p ≤.001). influence of participation in sustainability classes or projects participation in sustainability classes granted less support for the dominant social paradigm. a wilcoxon rank sum test showed that there was a statistically significant (w =63454, p ≤.001) between the participants who had taken a sustainability class before (mdn = 2.57) compared to participants who have not taken a sustainability class before (mdn = 2.71) regarding agreement with the dominant social paradigm. previous participation on a sustainability-related project affected students’ values and attitudes regarding the environment. students who participated in projects supported statistically significantly more the new ecological paradigm than students who did not participate in these projects (mdn = 4.12 over 4.12, w=85043, p ≤.001). conversely, students who did not participate on a project supported more the dominant social paradigm than those who participated on a project (mdn = 2.71 over 2.57, w=58280, p ≤.001). ii. what are the most prominent psychological barriers to pro environmental behavior among virginia tech students? data analysis showed that the three most prominent psychological barriers were conflicting goals & aspirations (m = 2.79), lacking knowledge (m = 2.86), and industry causing (m = 3.0). there was no significant difference among these three barriers. there was a clear contrast between responses to these scales and the responses to the least prominent psychological barriers: change unnecessary (m = 1.825), interpersonal relations (m = 1.76), and tokenism (m = 2.03). overall, the individual items with the highest rate of agreement were “these issues are important to me but it’s too hard to change my habits” and “i’d like to change but i’m not sure where to start” with 55% and 50% of respondents who agree, respectively. on the other side, several items in the three least prominent barriers had exceptionally high levels of disagreement, ranging from 73% to 89%. in addition to the prevalence of the three main psychological barriers, there are a number of significant positive correlations among the subscales: positive correlations between conflicting goals & aspirations and industry causing (r = .36, p ≤ .001), conflicting goals & aspirations and lacking knowledge (r = .23, p ≤ .001), change unnecessary and tokenism (r = .62, p ≤ .001, change unnecessary and interpersonal relations (r = .53, p ≤ .001), and interpersonal relations and tokenism (r = .47, p ≤ .001) (figure 3). consilience mouchrek: investigating environmental values figure 3: distribution of responses to the most prominent barriers: conflicting goals and aspirations (n=765) figure 4: distribution of responses to the most prominent barriers: lacking knowledge (n=765) figure 5: distribution of responses to the most prominent barriers: industry causing (n=765) 12 consilience differences across demographic groups after analyzing the data on how the psychological barriers were distributed across demographic groups, a few significant differences have been found. for instance, lacking knowledge as a psychological barrier to pro-environmental behavior was different when comparing first-year and fourth-year students (h =16.466, p ≤ .001): first-years were more likely to consider the lack of knowledge as a barrier (mdn = 3.00) than fourth years (mdn = 2.67). this key piece of data can help to guide the office of sustainability in their efforts of assisting younger students in knowing more about sustainable efforts. a significant difference in psychological barriers across the colleges was found only for the change unnecessary subscale (h = 28.729, p ≤ .001). students in architecture and urban studies (mdn =1.40) were less likely to agree that pro environmental change is not necessary than students in three other colleges: engineering (mdn = 1.80), science (mdn = 1.80), business (mdn = 2.00). males had higher agreement with the change unnecessary barrier than females. females were also less likely to agree with the interpersonal relations. for tokenism, tests also indicated a statistically significant difference between males and females. lastly, for industry causing, differences were found between males and females and between respondents who prefer to self-identify and those who prefer not to disclose their gender. influence of participation in sustainability classes or projects there was no statistically significant difference in any of the 6 psychological barriers found between respondents who had previously taken a sustainability-related class as opposed to those who hadn’t, as shown by a wilcoxon rank sum test conducted. on the other hand, the test showed that previous participation in a sustainability-related project can generate differences in score for two barriers: change unnecessary and interpersonal relations: those who had previously worked on a sustainability-related project (n = 353) were more likely to disagree with items in the change unnecessary subscale (w = 60,302, p < .001) than those who did not previously participate in a project (n = 412). students who participated in projects were also less likely to agree with interpersonal relations items as barriers than those who did not participate before (w =64,696, p < .001). iii. how much are students willing to engage in sustainability-related campaigns? participants demonstrated high levels of willingness to engage in case the virginia tech office of sustainability proposes a sustainability-related campaign (m = 3.44). the questionnaire investigated students’ perception of three possible campaigns, based on current strategic goals of the office. 51% of respondents would be very/extremely engaged in a campaign aimed at efforts to decrease waste generation on campus (m = 3.41), while 51% would be very/extremely engaged in efforts to save energy on campus buildings (m = 3.37). changing to more sustainable modes of transportation was the topic that would have the highest level of engagement: 57% of respondents would be very or extremely engaged in a campaign towards this goal (m = 3.52) (figure 6). consilience mouchrek: investigating environmental values figure 6: distribution of responses to items related to willingness to engage in a sustainability-related campaign on campus (n=765) 14 consilience differences across demographic groups comparison tests were completed to find statistical significance between respondents’ willingness to engage in sustainability-related campaigns and their demographic information. we found a difference across colleges (h = 35.303, p ≤ .001). students in architecture and urban studies (mdn = 4.00) were more likely to engage than students in agriculture and life sciences (mdn = 3.67), engineering (mdn = 3.33), liberal arts and human sciences (mdn = 3.33), business (mdn = 3.00). differences in gender groups regarding willingness to engage in a sustainability campaign were statistically significant (w= 15.264, p ≤ .001). females (mdn = 3.67) were more likely to engage than males (mdn = 3.33); and those who preferred to self-identify (mdn = 4.00) were also more engaged than males. influence of participation in sustainability classes or projects students who previously attended a sustainability class are more willing to engage in a sustainability campaign at the university than students who did not attend a class before. comparison tests show a significant difference (w = 80917, p ≤ .001). similarly, students who participated in a sustainability project before expressed higher levels of willingness to engage than those who had not participated in a project (mdn = 3.67 over 3.33). iv. how are the main constructs in the study correlated? correlation tests were conducted to identify relationships among the main constructs in the study. a moderate negative correlation was found between the new ecological paradigm and the change unnecessary subscale (r = -.44, p ≤.001). along the same lines, a moderate positive correlation between the dominant social paradigm subscale and the change unnecessary subscale was identified as well (r = 0.50, p ≤.001). this set of results indicate that participants who responded proenvironmentally did not think their decisions and actions were related to a lack of need for change, while respondents with more support for the dominant social paradigm are more likely to think that change is not necessary. another relationship was identified between students’ agreement with the new ecological paradigm and their willingness to engage in a sustainability campaign – a weak positive correlation (r = .29, p ≤.001). discussion strong support for pro-environmental values results showed wide support for pro-environmental values across respondents and suggest that students at virginia tech do recognize the danger of climate change and do think change is necessary. students, from undergraduate to graduate across different demographics, all expressed concern about current environmental actions. based on our data, there is a larger portion of students who adhere to the new ecological paradigm as opposed to the dominant social paradigm. consilience mouchrek: investigating environmental values translating values into action our survey aimed to understand the potential barriers as to why individuals do not take environmental action. the common assumption for this phenomenon is that people are not aware of the climate issue, do not care about it, or are perhaps unaware of the severity of it. our data did not confirm this assumption: on the contrary, students showed a high level of awareness and concern for the environment. however, concrete engagement with significant sustainable behaviors is not at the same level. it indicates that, if pro-environmental behaviors are not occurring, it is likely due to psychological barriers as opposed to a lack of pro-environmental values. there seems to be a disconnect between the values of the respondents and their associated action regarding the environment, confirming the existence of barriers and a value-action gap, as stated in the work of kollmuss and agyerman (2002), and that of robert gifford (2011): values do not always manifest into action, there are psychological barriers which prevent people from acting in total alignment with their values. psychological barriers to pro environmental action the most prominent barriers students at virginia tech face were that they lack knowledge about pro-environmental behavior, have conflicting goals and aspirations regarding their behavior, and believe that industry was at fault for propagating issues caused by climate change. although the need is recognized, change might seem difficult. several participants were hesitant to change their habits because they are confused about where to begin making changes in their lives. it might seem too hard to change their habits because committing to a more sustainable lifestyle would interfere with other goals or because they were too invested in their current lifestyle. several students viewed it as unfair that they would have to take the initiative towards sustainability when they believe industry to be the major cause of climate change. social pressures are not affecting people’s environmental attitudes and again there is something else affecting the behavior. most participants showed barriers related to limited cognition in different ways. differences across groups the demographic group that had the most differences in their responses was gender. women expressed higher support for the new ecological paradigm than men, while men supported the dominant social paradigm more than women. men were more likely to agree with statements reflecting psychological barriers as change unnecessary, interpersonal relations, tokenism, and industry causing), while women were more likely to engage in a sustainability campaign. engineering students were more in agreement with the dominant social paradigm, while students in architecture and urban studies were more likely to agree that pro environmental change is necessary. first-year students agreed more with the “lacking knowledge” barrier. engaging in a sustainability campaign between the initiatives suggested (decreasing waste generation, saving energy, adopting more sustainable modes of transportation), students showed almost equal willingness to engage, with 50% or more participants stating that they would be very/extremely engaged. the demographic factors that increased the likelihood of students engaging in a sustainability campaign were being female and 16 consilience having previously participated in a sustainability-related project. students in architecture and urban studies were more likely to engage. influence of previous participation in class and projects previous participation in sustainability classes and projects granted more support for environmental attitudes and more willingness to engage in a sustainability campaign. these findings might illuminate the importance of engaging students through class and projects. key factors would be increased environmental knowledge, lived experience and practical involvement with community organizing and alternative lifestyles, peer support for change, among others. one important factor we want to highlight is that, through their participation in classes and projects, students are likely be more protected against environmental numbness (gifford, 2011), as their main source of information about the ecological crisis would be other than the constant bombardment of information through social media and other news outlets. conclusion students at virginia tech widely express environmental values and concern about climate change. sustainability efforts at the university should operate from the understanding that students have concerns about the state of human activity affecting the environment, agree that action should be taken to promote sustainability, and might want to have more pro-environmental lifestyles; but they might need help translating those beliefs into action. future sustainability campaigns should acknowledge the barriers students face: lack of knowledge about how to change, difficulty to transform habits and lifestyles, and a feeling of unfairness in face of industry-caused environmental degradation. to address the lack of knowledge, more prominent in younger students, the university could integrate sustainability-related content to introductory courses for all majors. we recommend developing a foundational two-part module series to be added to courses in the university’s first-year experience program: (a) part one would teach basic knowledge on climate change, impact of human activities in the environment, and potential socio-ecological change in the individual and collective level; (b) part two would investigate the connections between sustainability efforts and the students’ specific majors and minors, introducing students to notions of professional responsibility on how social, cultural and environmental resources will be used in the future. additional courses on these subjects could also be integrated into existing curricula in pathways, the university’s general education curriculum. to address the difficulty of changing habits, we recommend that the university implements campaigns on campus that are easy to understand and adopt and build upon with students’ pre-existing habits. expanding experiential learning opportunities aimed to provide opportunities to develop sustainability-related skills and competencies is highly recommended as well. advancing partnerships between academic departments, the office of sustainability, and vt engage: the center for leadership & service learning might provide increased opportunities for hands-on experience in sustainability projects in direct involvement with the local community, besides offering a way toward collective engagement and citizen participation (which would also balance the feeling of unfairness of taking individual responsibility for a systemic crisis). consilience mouchrek: investigating environmental values our study investigated research questions about college students’ values, attitudes, and barriers to behavior change related to sustainability. the answers to these questions provide insight into the state of environmental awareness and behavior at virginia tech and perhaps hint at trends in american college campuses in general. education and citizen engagement for sustainable development remains a fundamental area for investment as universities strive to fulfill their role in fostering a culture of sustainability. acknowledgements this study is part of a course-based undergraduate project in the virginia tech honors culture of sustainability lab (uh 3504), developed in partnership with the vt office of sustainability and sponsored by a grant from the vt office of undergraduate research. 18 consilience bibliography blake, j. overcoming the ‘value–action gap’ in environmental policy: tensions between national policy and local experience, local environment, 4(3), pp. 257–278, 1999. doi:10.1080/13549839908725599. dunlap, riley e.; van liere, kent d.; mertig, angela g.; & jones, robert emmet. (2000). measuring endorsement of the new ecological paradigm: a revised nep scale. journal of social issues, 56(3), 425–442. gifford, r. (2011). the dragons of inaction: psychological barriers that limit climate change mitigation and adaptation. american psychologist, 66(4), 290–302. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023566 gifford, r., & r. sussman. (2012). “environmental attitudes.” in the oxford handbook of environmental and conservation psychology, edited by s. d. clayton. oxford: oxford university press. 65–80. kollmuss, a. (2002). mind the gap: why do people act environmentally and what are the barriers to pro-environmental behavior? in j. agyeman (ed.), environmental education research (3rd ed., vol. 8, pp. 239–260). essay, taylor & francis ltd. lacroix, k.; gifford, r.; chen, a. developing and validating the dragons of inaction psychological barriers (dipb) scale. j. environ. psychol. 2019, 63, 9–18. roizman, l. g. (2001). sustentabilidade e ética ecológica: valores, atitudes e a formação ambiental de educadores. tese de doutorado. universidade de são paulo. consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 26 (2022-2023) the world of coffee: 21st century solutions for a commodity facing climate change risks laura negre sustainability management columbia university abstract this paper examines the environmental impacts of climate change on the yields of arabica coffee and the economic impacts on smallholder coffee farmers. in order to address these challenges, environmental and socio-economic solutions are proposed alongside a gap analysis of key coffee-related certification programs. as temperatures increase, farmers are forced to move to higher elevations to grow coffee, where less land is available for farming. these climate change outcomes are visibly affecting central and south american countries, which are experiencing up to 2°c of warming above pre-industrial averages. environmental risks may lead to smallholder farmers abandoning coffee production altogether, resulting in a decrease of supply and expertise for the coffee industry. simultaneously, this industry is seeing increased demand from consumers for products with “green” certifications, but sustainability certifications do not offer a full-fledged solution for environmental and socioeconomic concerns. this gap analysis focuses on four main sustainability certifications and aims to provide an understanding of why certifications fail to address environmental and socio-economic challenges. this study seeks to identify the factors that certification models should incorporate in their supply chain assessments to examine climate change threats and improve outcomes for farmers. analyzing the different criteria for certifications shows: 1) integrating environmental criteria within certifications is a resilient solution to addressing immediate climate change risks, and 2) mechanisms for protecting farmers against price volatility are required. the research shows the rainforest alliance’s certification program is currently best positioned to serve the needs of an increasingly at-risk sector. keywords: agriculture, climate change, coffee, rainforest alliance, south america, smallholder farmers 2 consilience the economic and social backdrop of the coffee sector the global coffee industry is valued at $400 billion, and it continues to grow (stanley, 2022). according to the food and agriculture organization of the united nations (fao), coffee production is concentrated in countries with relatively low income levels and accounts for a sizeable portion of their respective export revenues (fao, 2022). further, approximately 125 million people worldwide depend on coffee for their livelihoods (bruce-lockhart & terazono, 2019). coffee as a commodity produces enormous economic value and yet, so little of that value is captured and returned to coffee farmers and their respective local ecosystems. for an average cup of premium specialty coffee, farmers only retrieve $0.04 of the final purchase price (bruce-lockhart & terazono, 2019). however, there are efforts to address this loss of value through sustainable coffee farming practices and the promotion of certification programs. this paper details how certification programs have evolved and the impact of adoption for producers, farmers, and consumers, beyond a simple “stamp of approval.” actors along the coffee supply chain have developed several systems over the years to preserve value for producers, especially smaller ones, in the absence of formal multilateral trade agreements. mirroring trades in other commodities, merchants dealing in coffee have had opportunities to accrue wealth over the years. since coffee farmers are mostly from very low-income countries, trading beans into global markets has exposed millions of small producers in developing countries to exploitation, initially from colonialists and eventually from multinational trading firms. this has led to financial instability for many in the industry, with 44 percent of the world’s smallholder coffee farmers living in poverty, even while their beans are sold for premium prices in american and european markets (sachs, 2019). initiatives for more financially equitable outcomes for farmers are rooted in history. activism on behalf of coffee producers began as early as the 19th century when campaigners publicly opposed the financial abuse of coffee farmers by dutch colonists in the east indies. however, the modern fairtrade movement only began to take shape in the 1960s, when industrialized countries and multinational corporations faced increased criticism for extracting wealth from developing countries (haight, 2011). although there have been improvements toward the sustainability of the coffee value chain, severe profit-sharing inequality remains between upstream and downstream actors. these inequalities are exacerbated by increased volatility in pricing and the imminent threat of climate change, particularly for smallholder farmers who comprise 60 percent of global coffee production (rapsomanikis, 2015). climate change threatens coffee production amongst all commodities, the coffee trade is especially vulnerable to climate change. coffee is notoriously sensitive to small changes in climate and weather, and farmers are already starting to see the effects of disease, reduced yields, and inferior bean quality. the annual average land temperature consilience negre: the world of coffee of the coffee belt1 is now approximately 1.5°c higher than its pre-industrial average, and models predict an acceleration in this rise over the next 30 years. by 2050, according to some models, almost 20 percent of the coffee belt will have warmed by more than 4°c, which represents a limit of warming that cannot be offset by cultivating beans in shadier areas—a practice that currently helps to mitigate the effects of global warming (sachs, 2019). furthermore, at 4°c of warming, yields will decrease on average by 10 percent by 2050, while some harder-hit areas, such as honduras, will incur losses upward of 25 percent (sachs, 2019) (figure 1). additionally, by 2050, 75 percent of the land used for arabicagrown coffee will be at risk of becoming economically unviable (sachs, 2019). as temperatures increase, farmers are forced to move to higher altitudes and attempt to grow coffee where less arable land is available for farming. in central america, the minimum viable altitude is expected to increase by approximately 400 meters as a direct result of temperature increases (sachs, 2019). most of this warming is happening in central and south america; models have shown that brazil and guatemala are already experiencing warming of 2°c above pre-industrial averages (sachs, 2019). if warming continues at its current rate, coffee production will need to shift at an average of 58 kilometers per decade toward the poles in order to maintain current supply levels (sachs, 2019). moreover, there are limits to the viability of high-altitude farming, which is often characterized by reduced land availability and a resulting decrease in production. this economic volatility can also lead to farmers transitioning out of coffee farming and a consequential loss of expertise for the industry. climate change considerations are paramount to establishing a sustainable coffee industry and particular attention should be given to efforts to increase foliage and canopy growth. beyond ecological benefits, researchers have now proven that intermediate shade levels (30-50 percent coverage) produce higher yields (jha et al., 2014). 1 between 25 degrees north of the equator and 20 degrees south (national coffee association) 4 consilience figure 1. projected loss in coffee harvest by 2050. source: sachs, 2019. consilience negre: the world of coffee a sustainable future for coffee within the food and beverage sector, coffee is one of the fastest growing consumer beverages, estimated to grow at a compounded annual growth rate (cagr) of 5.5 percent, between 2019 and 2024 (sachs, 2019). this is expected to occur as sustainable supply becomes increasingly hard to come by. the need for integrated sustainability frameworks with a focus on environmental and socioeconomic considerations in sourcing practices is crucial. 1. environmental integration a. preserving biodiversity: by promoting shade-grown cultivation, farmers increase local biodiversity, attracting a variety of plant species and allowing for better bird and pollinator habitats, which in turn provide ecosystem services for coffee plantations such as the reduction of plant diseases and pests. a study found that a single bird can help save between 10 kilograms and 29 kilograms of coffee per hectare from disease annually (turner, 2019). b. implementing regenerative practices: this approach looks to improve soil health on farms by using integrated pest management techniques and avoiding the use of pesticides. herbicide-free farms are an important pathway to regenerative agriculture in coffee farms. although challenging for farmers given increased labor requirements, over time the enriched soil and financial benefits from no longer purchasing herbicides benefits the coffee farms both environmentally and economically (nerger, 2022). c. conserving water: this is a crucial element of promoting sustainability on coffee farms. farmers can monitor the presence of wildlife, streamside vegetation, oxygen, and ph levels to ascertain water quality. environmental practices should aim to restrict the use of agrochemicals and implement wastewater treatment which will reduce leakage of chemicals and contamination of waterways (nerger, 2022). there is no silver bullet to address the looming threat of climate change on the coffee industry and individual climate adaptation and mitigation strategies are crucial for farmers looking to address their own set of challenges. however, the environmental approaches mentioned set a valuable baseline for farmers to consider. shade-grown cultivation, in particular, offers a unique adaptation and mitigation opportunity to reduce the detrimental effects of warming temperatures. 2. social & economic considerations economic instability for coffee farmers is a root-cause barrier to broader sustainability aims and a “just transition” for the sector. without stable incomes, the aforementioned environmental solutions are unlikely to be implemented or even considered by smallholder farmers. most of the current financial rewards for coffee production are not reaped by farmers. increased transparency and traceability are paramount in order to allocate more capital upstream. among smallholder coffee farmers, women are particularly vulnerable, making up 70 percent of the labor force but only 20 percent of decision-making positions (sachs, 2019). increasing access to capital and education for women can ensure better budget management outcomes, eventually leading to financial and health 6 consilience benefits for entire families. certifications must promote mechanisms that allow coffee farmers to capture more of the final retail price that downstream actors currently benefit from, with a particular lens on practices that promote gender equality. a gap analysis of major coffee related certifications the coffee industry is seeing increased consumer demand for more effective corporate social responsibility (csr) programs that guarantee compliance with certification requirements (vogt, 2019). the gap analysis evaluates four main sustainability-driven certifications: fairtrade international, starbucks’ c.a.f.e., bird friendly, and rainforest alliance. the analysis identifies the program with the highest potential to make a significant impact on smallholder coffee farms and makes recommendations for improvements. 1. fairtrade international (fairtrade) fairtrade international was founded in 1997 with the purpose of providing stable livelihoods for agricultural workers. fairtrade usa, an offshoot of fairtrade international, will not be tackled in this analysis as it is focused on larger farms and plantations. environmental alignment: there are generic environmental standards that promote environmental protection, but the certification’s binding criteria is limited to non-cultivation of virgin forests, genetically modified organisms, and references to a prohibitive chemical list. there are suggestive measures but no criteria requiring shade-grown cultivation, regenerative agriculture, nor water conservation. environmental alignment is limited for the fairtrade certification as it primarily focuses on alleviating poverty for upstream actors. social and economic alignment: one of the cornerstones of the fairtrade certification is its protection of smallholder farmers who are often vulnerable to exploitation due to market price volatility. by ensuring a minimum of $1.40 for 1 pound of washed arabica unroasted coffee or $1.68 for coffee that was certified as organic, farmers are given a more stable source of revenue. this means that if the market price for a pound of arabica falls below this amount, smallholder farmers are assured a set price, and if the market price is above $1.40, they benefit from the higher price (fairtrade, 2019). the certification also attempts to increase financial stability for farmers by facilitating relationships between producers, roasters, and retailers. in turn, this can promote pre-harvest financing and enable long-term contracts (vogt, 2019). fairtrade is currently the only certification that targets pricing in smallholder coffee farming. consilience negre: the world of coffee however, there are implementation issues. many economists believe that more than $1.40 per pound of coffee is needed to compensate farmers fairly (haight, 2011). additionally, certification costs can offset the added income from price security (vogt, 2019). hence, one of the main critiques of fairtrade is that the certification program is not living up to its goal of reducing poverty. further, fairtrade’s environmental requirements are much less stringent than other programs. another concern is that fairtrade coffee does not have a quality grade requirement (haight, 2011). farmers typically need to sell both fairtrade and non-fairtrade coffee due to insufficient demand for the certified variety. this can create an incentive for a farmer to sell the lowest quality coffee at a guaranteed fairtrade price and higher quality coffee at market price, illustrating further the complexity inherent in designing certifications (haight, 2011) (figure 2). figure 2. percentage of production sold under main sustainable standards source: haight, 2011. 8 consilience 2. starbucks' coffee and farmer equity (c.a.f.e) program starbucks partnered with conservation international in 1999 to promote sustainable sourcing practices in coffee farming which later developed into its internal sustainability initiative known as c.a.f.e., which focuses on environmental leadership, social impact, economic accountability, and bean quality (starbucks practices, 2016). the program is a point-based system which tracks 185 indicators for larger producers and slightly fewer for smaller farms (craves, 2015). environmental alignment: over 40 percent of the indicators relate to biodiversity efforts, the protection of water and soil resources, and environmental monitoring. in light of climate considerations, the plan rewards shadegrown coffee, but does not make this a mandatory requirement. points are provided for integrated pest management, but agrochemicals can be used as a last resort (craves, 2015). social and economic alignment: starbucks looks to increase transparency and traceability in its supply chain by requiring suppliers to submit proof of payments to farmers and indicate the value of each purchase. starbucks has created an incentive-based mechanism for farmers who meet its environmental indicators. for example, if a farm satisfies 60 percent of the stated indicators, they become “preferred” (i.e., priority) suppliers. if a farm satisfies 80 percent, they become “strategic” suppliers, earning a $0.05 premium per pound for one year (duda et al., 2007). once either of these statuses are achieved, they remain valid for three years without further audits. c.a.f.e.’s sustainability plan is a step in the right direction but does not allow for consistent or predictable incomes for smallholder farmers. further, the company is not required to buy from “preferred” or “strategic” suppliers, and there is no minimum pricing policy. 3. bird friendly coffee association the bird friendly coffee association is the most demanding certification from an environmental standpoint but lacks socio-economic protections. its primary goal is to protect vital bird habitats. smithsonian scientists developed the certification in the 1990s in response to steep declines in migratory bird populations due to industrialized farming (smithsonian's national zoo, 2018). environmental alignment: bird friendly has the highest agri-environmental standards among existing certifications, and farms must be certified as “organic”. the bird friendly criteria requires farms to maintain 40 percent canopy cover, 11 different tree species, and a canopy height of at least 12 meters, which has demonstrated a direct correlation with increased animal biodiversity (smithsonian's national zoo, 2018). research at the earth institute of columbia university has shown increased biodiversity consilience negre: the world of coffee benefits associated with shade-grown coffee, such as the protection of mammals (caudill & rice, 2016) and an increase in the number of bird species from 60 to 200, when compared with sun-grown coffee (smithsonian's national zoo, 2018). social and economic alignment: the certification lacks the necessary social and economic considerations that would enable smallholder coffee farmers to successfully implement the required environmental criteria. 4. the rainforest alliance the rainforest alliance (ra) was established with the protection of forests in mind. it successfully uses pre-competitive collaboration by leveraging relationships with governments, policymakers, and other non-profit organizations to improve environmental, economic, and social conditions across the supply chain. over time, ra has expanded its scope to include broader goals in terms of economic and social sustainability but still holds more of a focus on environmental issues. ra uses the sustainable agriculture network (san) to certify farms and promote beneficial agricultural practices. environmental alignment: within the certification's core requirements, new plants are selected on the basis of a climate risk assessment. crop diversification, intercropping, and the utilization of different rooting depths are all strict requirements to enhance soil health (rainforest alliance, 2021). ra works with farms to reduce the use of pesticides and promotes integrated pest management techniques. other requirements include enhancing natural vegetation, protecting wildlife and biodiversity, and reducing water usage and on-farm greenhouse gas emissions. while there is no obligation for shade-grown cultivation, the certification requires native vegetation cover after six years of participation (rainforest alliance, 2021). social and economic alignment: ra recently launched its new 2020 certification program, which aims to implement a more robust and innovative multi-stakeholder methodology (rainforest alliance, 2021). the new framework’s approach is one of shared responsibility, where every actor in the supply chain has a more significant role to play, which can relieve the burden on farmers. the new framework uses a data-driven approach where smart meters enable farmers to set their own environmental targets. producers can then demonstrate their efforts and be rewarded by selling their coffee at higher prices. this technology also means that audits can happen in real-time, and ra is able to target higher-risk regions. ra can leverage insightful data to follow cashflows throughout the supply chain and potentially close living income gaps (rainforest alliance, 2021). 10 consilience although ra’s framework addresses social concerns, fair treatment and good working conditions are not binding for audit purposes (vogt, 2019). while the criteria has no tolerance for the worst form of child labor, it still allows for “light work” from the age of 12 and “full work” from the age of 14 (rainforest alliance, 2021). furthermore, farmers are still susceptible to volatile coffee prices as ra has yet to offer a minimum price. recommendations & conclusion all of the assessed certification programs have strengths and weaknesses. however, of the four analyzed, ra is best-positioned to provide a complete set of solutions beyond solely environmental criteria through its systems-thinking approach. most importantly, the certification’s new framework takes a holistic approach to improve environmental, economic, and social outcomes. additional focus is recommended in the areas outlined below. environmental leadership there are coffee production yield gaps that can be closed, provided better agricultural practices are in place. ra should continue to engage in rehabilitative and restorative practices. the benefits of shade-grown coffee have been highlighted, and ra should mandate this practice as a priority. currently, the natural vegetation cover recommendation meets a much lower threshold. ra should also partner with research providers, such as universities and leading industry organizations, to include coffee varietals, in its environmental criteria, that show resistance to climate change without a detriment to bean quality. social responsibility ra should engage in on-the-ground conversations with upstream stakeholders to better understand their needs and concerns. in regions that have experienced child labor, ra should demand audits by third-party, independent bodies. additionally, ra imposes mandatory schooling for large farms only. this requirement should be extended to smaller farms as well (rainforest alliance, 2016). if schools are inaccessible due to the remote nature of certain geographical areas, ra should work with local government agencies to improve access to education. economic considerations coffee prices are unlikely to increase as brazil’s high coffee productivity levels maintain low prices (sachs, 2019). coffee laborers (often migratory) are particularly susceptible to changes in market demand and work in horrific conditions (sachs, 2019). as they are paid by the volume of coffee cherries harvested, they can make as little as $2 per day (zamora, 2013). fair pricing needs to be improved for farmers and farmworkers to ensure decent standards of living. ra should establish a minimum price that considers climate risk, and demand that farmers be guaranteed this threshold. ra should leverage its data-driven supply chain to enable transparency and ensure that money flows to both farmers and farmworkers. particular attention should be given to small acreage farms that are most at-risk from economic instability. as e-commerce technologies become increasingly available to farmers, the use of distributive ledgers may facilitate the efficient tracing of transactions throughout consilience negre: the world of coffee the supply chain and ensure farmers and farmworkers benefit financially. however, these types of initiatives require upskilling of the workforce and should not marginalize farms that do not have access to connectivity. in order for the coffee industry to move toward sustainable outcomes and address the looming threat of climate change and warmer weather patterns, smallholder farmers must be empowered to build environmental resilience without sacrificing economic gain. by understanding the needs of the local communities surrounding coffee production, only then can genuine sustainable practices within the coffee industry advance. to that end, close collaboration between smallholder farmers and organizations such as certification providers, ngos, large corporations, and local governments is crucial. with regard to certification providers, these entities are well-positioned to enable sustainable growth and assist in the implementation of “green” practices that account for the economic and social well-being of communities. the four certification programs assessed all incorporate key sustainability issues. however, the rainforest alliance’s certification program looks to work closely with local communities and is best positioned to ensure long-term environmental, social, and economic sustainability. while certifications can have a significant impact as outlined in this analysis, these programs alone will not be enough to tackle the fundamental problem of climate change and growing income inequality within the coffee sector. governments, international organizations, and key stakeholders will benefit from leveraging existing frameworks to advance equality and enable a “just transition” in the coffee sector alongside long-term sustainability. 12 consilience bibliography bruce-lockhart, c., & terazono, e. (2019, june 4). from bean to cup, what goes into the cost of your coffee? financial times. retrieved february 13, 2023, from https://www.ft.com/content/44bd6a8e83a5-11e9-9935-ad75bb96c849 caudill, s. a., & rice, r. a. (2016). do bird friendly® coffee criteria benefit mammals? assessment of mammal diversity in chiapas, mexico. plos one, 11(11). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0165662 c.a.f.e. practices scs global services. (n.d.). retrieved december 10, 2021, from https://cdn.scsglobalservices.com/files/program_documents/cafe_scr_genericv3.4_011516.pdf. craves, j (2015, may 15). starbucks claims 99% 'ethically sourced' coffee, but what does that even mean? daily coffee news by roast magazine. retrieved december 10, 2021, from https://dailycoffeenews.com/2015/05/15/starbucks-claims-99-ethically-sourced-coffee-butwhat-does-that-even-mean/. duda, s., james, l. s., mackwani, z., munoz, r., & volk, d. (2007, may). starbucks corporation: building a sustainable supply chain. retrieved december 11, 2021, from https://users.dcc.uchile.cl/~nbaloian/procesos/otros/teuteberg/casestudies/casestudies/ starbucks%20corporation_building%20a%20sustainable%20supply%20chain.pdf. fair trade certified. https://www.fairtradecertified.org/. (2019, september 16) haight, c., & colleen haight is an assistant professor at san jose state university. (n.d.). (2011) the problem with fair trade coffee (ssir). stanford social innovation review: https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_problem_with_fair_trade_coffee. international research institute for climate and society, & jacqueline turner. (2019, march 12). shade-grown coffee helps ecosystems and farmers. state of the planet. retrieved february 13, 2023, from https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2019/03/12/shade-grown-coffee-sustainable/ jha, s., bacon, c. m., philpott, s. m., ernesto méndez, v., läderach, p., & rice, r. a. (2014). shade coffee: update on a disappearing refuge for biodiversity. bioscience, 64(5), 416–428. https://doi.org/10.1093/biosci/biu038 markets and trade – food and agriculture organization of the united nations. fao. (n.d.). retrieved february 13, 2023, from https://www.fao.org/markets-and-trade/commodities/coffee/en/ nca. national coffee association. (n.d.). retrieved february 13, 2023, from https://www.ncausa.org/research-trends/economic-impact nerger, m. (2022, november 1). what is regenerative agriculture? rainforest alliance. retrieved february 13, 2023, from https://www.rainforest-alliance.org/insights/what-is-regenerativeagriculture/ https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_problem_with_fair_trade_coffee consilience negre: the world of coffee rainforest alliance. (2021, december 8). retrieved december 11, 2021, https://www.rainforestalliance.org/. rapsomanikis, g. (2015). fao.org. fao. http://www.fao.org/familyfarming/detail/en/c/385065/. sachs, j. d., cordes, k., rising, j., toledano, p., & maennling, n. (2019). ensuring economic viability and sustainability of coffee production. smithsonian's national zoo. (2018, january 17). bird friendly farm criteria. retrieved december 11, 2021, from https://nationalzoo.si.edu/migratory-birds/bird-friendly-farm-criteria stanley, m. (2022, april 12). trouble brewing along the supply chain. [audio podcast episode]. in at scale: a sustainability podcast. apple podcasts. starbucks claims 99% 'ethically sourced' coffee, but what does that even mean? daily coffee news by roast magazine. retrieved february 19, 2023, from https://dailycoffeenews.com/2015/05/15/starbucks-claims-99-ethically-sourced-coffee-butwhat-does-that-even-mean/ vogt, m. (2019). variance in approach toward a ‘sustainable’ coffee industry in costa rica. https://doi.org/10.5334/bce zamora, m (2016, march 14). farmworkers left behind: the human cost of coffee production. daily coffee news by roast magazine. retrieved december 11, 2021, from https://dailycoffeenews.com/2013/07/17/farmworkers-left-behind-the-human-cost-ofcoffee-production/. http://www.fao.org/family-farming/detail/en/c/385065/ http://www.fao.org/family-farming/detail/en/c/385065/ introductionintroduction climate change impacts defy conventional national boundaries by reaching across borders (dzebo and stripple, 2015; goldin and mariathasan, 2014. steel et al. 2014; wilder et al. 2010; rose,2018; ruth et al., 2007; cutter et al., 2014). while manifestations of climate impacts often remain localized, the larger impacts are global in reach and have compelled the global community to see climate change and associated impacts as a shared responsibility that requires collective and concerted actions (hoffmann, 2011). thanks to globalization, crossborder interactions, and a deeper understanding of climate science (benzie et al.2019; gualini, 2003; hewitson et al. 2014; ipcc 2014). thanks also to the paris agreement (2015), which acknowledged in no uncertain terms that climate “adaptation is a global challenge faced by all with local, subnational, national, regional and international dimensions...” (article 7, section 2). the forceful recognition of climate change as a global challenge and a collective responsibility at the international level has set in motion the creation of new view journal | view issue mindscapes and landscapes: learning to adapt in mindscapes and landscapes: learning to adapt in transnational climate adaptation collaborative in africa transnational climate adaptation collaborative in africa bob offei manteaw centre for climate change and sustainability studies, college of basic and applied sciences, university of ghana, legon, accra, ghana, email: rmanteaw@ug.edu.gh keywords:keywords: climate change, impacts, learning, adaptation, governance, transnational, collaborative abstract:abstract: this paper foregrounds notions of learning and how they are framed in transnational adaptive capacity building processes. while supporting emerging adaptation governance mechanisms that recognize the boundlessness of climate change impacts, the paper draws attention to learning and the role it plays in such processes. learning, for the most part, is framed as an event rather than a series of conscious, reflexive, adaptive and multi-layered processes. such framing, the paper argues, is limiting and is based on flawed understandings of adaptation to climate change. instead, learning should reflect the underlying complexity of both the climate change phenomenon and socio-ecological systems change processes. this paper argues that current conceptualization of climate change fails to present climate change as emerging, evolving and complex and, in the process, influences how learning in adaptation is perceived, framed and pursued. author’s note:author’s note: with a background in socio-ecological systems change and sustainable development thinking and practice, my research, teaching and practice have focused on issues of social cognition, environmental learning and resilience building in complex socio-ecological systems. i am particularly interested in learning partnerships, change network actions and collaborative processes for social and ecological change. these interests are as a result of my different, but complementary professional experiences in academia, the private sector, government policy and international development practice from both developed and developing country contexts. my different experiences have been insightful and they continue to shape my research, teaching and practice interests and approaches. my works in climate change adaptation emerged out of my research interest in the social dimensions of global environmental change which eventually saw me move from academia in the united states to lead the province of alberta’s climate adaptation program in canada. as adaptation strategy coordinator for the province, i initiated and successfully completed the development of the province’s first comprehensive climate change adaptation strategy which involved cross-government and cross-sector coordination and intense institutional learning processes which have been influential in my interest in climate adaptation governance and knowledge brokerage. i have since been particularly curious about emerging issues such as resilience learning, adaptive capacity building and learning innovations in environment and sustainable development processes. these are all premised on my firm conviction that climate adaptation, resilience building and sustainable development are ‘learned’ processes which require careful approaches to understand social and ecological systems interactions and how those interactions lead to systems changes or modifications. my works, therefore, seek to affirm my conviction in the role of intentional and anticipatory learning in both climate adaptation and sustainable development processes. 93 doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6737 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 93-103 july 6, 2020 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/s2212095518301147 http://consiliencejournal.org https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/consilience/issue/view/651 consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6737 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 93-10394 collaborations and partnerships that transcends national borders (gunderson and light 2006; hermwille, 2016; hoffman, 2011; scholtz and stiftel 2005; lockwood et al. 2010; mattoo and subramanian, 2013). shared governance, particularly in climate adaptation, across jurisdictions and between countries has since emerged as an innovative approach to coordinate effective and efficient response actions to facilitate the development of new adaptation knowledge and the convenient transfer and application of such knowledge to build adaptive capacity and resilience at scale (barnett 2010; benzie & person, 2019; daniell et al.2011; goldin and mariathasan 2014). learning, has in the process, become a central concern in contemporary climate adaptation governance arrangements and especially in those that thrive on transboundary or transnational partnerships and collaborations (bellinson and chu, 2019; gonzales-iwanciw et al., 2019). however, as the role of learning continues to be acknowledged and praised in such arrangements, notions and practices around learning in adaptation and resilience building have so far done little or nothing at all to bolster understandings of how learning should be framed and approached in planned adaptation processes (tschakert and dietrich, 2010; walker et al. 2002). in most recent adaptation planning programs, learning is largely framed as an event that should occur after certain actions or adaptive performances have taken place. such assumptions are widespread in contemporary adaptation thinking and practice and are largely influenced by flawed understandings of climate change which presents climate change adaptation as a linear process with an expected stable endpoint. these are misconceptions which have also emerged out of underlying flaws in the perception and understanding of climate change impacts manifestation (fisher and dodman, 2019). ultimately, such false characterizations of climate change impacts and adaptation processes strongly influence how learning in adaptation is framed and pursued. this paper foregrounds notions of learning in transnational adaptation governance initiatives in selected adaptation initiatives in west africa. while acknowledging that some transboundary and transnational governance approaches recognize the boundlessness of climate change impacts, this paper argues that most of current approaches to adaptation and resilience building processes are framed on assumptions of homogeneity and that generic adaptive solutions could be applied in a range of geographical and social contexts in spite of their unique particularities (eisenack, ludeke and kropp, 2006; folke et al., 2005). such assumptions have variously and albeit wrongly influenced understandings of climate change and adaptation processes; they have also shaped the framing of learning in that regard. focusing primarily on west africa, the paper employs specific examples of transnational adaptation planning to demonstrate limitations in the framing of learning in transnational adaptation thinking and practice. the terms, “transnational” and “transboundary” are used interchangeably throughout the paper to describe adaptation programs that transcend conventional national borders (busch et al., 2018; gulani, 2003). “transnational” and “transboundary” are not necessarily used to discuss adaptation programs planned and implemented among countries that share clearly defined socio-ecological and biophysical corridors of connectivity. instead, they are used to describe the emergent practice of regional collaborative efforts that bring entities from countries and regions with similar or different geographical attributes together in joined adaptation programing. the paper is structured as follows: a discussion on ‘mindscapes and landscapes’ will set the tone for an appreciation and understanding of human-nature interactions. this first section will deconstruct how a growing decline in people’s attachment to their local places, as well as disconnect from local ecologies, are impeding the development of the most appropriate adaptive responses. following the first section is a detailed description of the methodology used for this study, as well as a presentation of the cases of study. the paper will conclude with a general overview of the meaning and practice of learning in adaptation. mindscapes and landscapesmindscapes and landscapes africa, like many developing regions of the world, is faced with unprecedented challenges which are seemingly separate in appearance, but complexly interconnected in their manifestations and impacts (churie et al., 2017; sandler, 1997;). from food and water insecurity, biodiversity degradation, population growth, surge urbanization, health dilemmas, natural disasters to violent conflicts between and within nations (kilroy, 2015), these are interconnected socio-ecological challenges which act together in different ways to endanger the socio-ecological security and well-being of africa’s diverse populations. they are challenges which are also currently being exacerbated by the emergent reality of climate change. as these challenges persists in many local communities it is also a worrying concern that not many people living in their local places understand current realities. their mindscapes are disconnected from the local landscapes that support their existence. about:blank consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6737 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 93-10395 even more worrying, perhaps, is the fact that at a time of increased awareness of climate impact manifestations and increased clarity around climate science, most people remain either ignorant or apathetic to the reality of climate change and socio-ecological systems changes and what they mean to the individual and to the communities in which they live (ziervogel et al. 2017). while many people depend on available resources in their local communities for survival, most of these people remain cognitively disconnected from the natural systems that support their existence and this is mainly because they lack understanding and an appreciation of how social systems and natural systems interact and how such interactions, as led primarily by local people living in their diverse places, influence current changes (simon and leck, 2015). these are underlying knowledge gaps in current climate adaptation and resilience building efforts in local communities across africa and they are gaps that are proving counter-productive to adaptive capacity and resilience building processes (schipper, 2007; simon and leck, 2015). not many people have the natural dispositions to carefully observe local ecological realities and to appreciate on-going changes with ‘insight’. this, as kraker (2017) observed, is a matter of human cognition and a learning deficiency which i describe in this work as ‘socio-ecological cognitive deficiency’ and one that impedes the insightful merger of people’s mindscapes with the natural landscapes. socio-ecological cognitive deficiency socio-ecological systems change as is frequently implied in this work is rooted in ecology and describes the perpetuity of human-ecological interactions and how such interactions become both a function and cause of change in those systems (plummer, 2011) these changes, which are either sudden or slow onset, have become increasingly common in most communities and are also becoming negatively impactful to both social and natural systems (benzie, et. al., 2019). the impacts of these changes are also being exacerbated by the impacts of the emergent reality of climate change. as climate-induced changes become pervasively evident and more intense in local communities across africa, it has also become a matter of great concern that in spite of the fact that human-nature interactions play different roles in creating some of current socio-ecological changes, not many africans know or understand current ongoing changes and what to do in response (parnell and walawege, 2011). the growing inability, or perhaps failure, of local people to connect their inner mindscapes to outer landscapes is what i describe as ‘socio-ecological cognitive deficiency’. broadly, this description exemplifies the notion of a disconnect between mindscapes and landscapes as implied in this work and represents what seems to be a growing global challenge. orr (1992) sees this deficiency which is on the increase around the world as the inability of individuals and communities to consciously link their welfares and well-being to the ecosystems that surround them. they fail to relate to the place on earth in which they live. david orr observes that “people who do not know the ground on which they stand miss one of the elements of good thinking which is the capacity to distinguish between health and disease in natural systems and their relation to health and disease in human ones” (p.86). at the heart of this deficiency is the normalized tendency of humans to dominate nature’s resources (milfont and sibley, 2014). while science and education continue to equip humans with the necessary knowledge, skills and technology to take and transform nature to serve almost all our needs, our development-focused actions and inactions have also demonstrated our lack of awareness of the potential consequences that may exist (orr, 2016). from this perspective, some of the current flawed assumptions and understandings of climate change and the role of learning in climate change adaptation and socio-ecological systems change processes become understandable. in ‘mindscapes and landscapes’, therefore, i draw attention to a missing foundational piece in contemporary socio-ecological systems change processes that shapes people’s perceptions about climate change and how adaptation should be approached. with the disconnection of mindscapes from local landscapes, the underlying complexities of socio-ecological changes and the roles of individuals and communities in the process are lost to many (pinho et al.,2015). adapting to climate change is therefore approached as a well-organized linear process in which the identification of the problem—impacts and vulnerabilities—and the application of certain mechanistic and technological solutions is expected to logically lead to the building of adaptive capacity (brooks and grist 2008; tompkins and adger,2005). while such assumptions are flawed, they also highlight existing notions of linearity and expectations of a stable end point in adaptation and in ways that trivializes underlying complexities of climate change and socio-ecological systems change. the lack of understanding and appreciation of the underlying complexity of both climate change and socio-ecological systems change impedes effective adaptation processes. such wrong conceptualizations of the adaptation process also, invariably, influence the framing consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6737 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 93-10396 of learning in adaptation and by extension how learning is pursued. the consequence is the growing numbers of failed adaptation projects and rising incidences of maladaptation (bunce et al., 2010; conway and schipper, 2011). as the climate change reality becomes more intense in local communities and the need for more proactive and effective adaptation measures become even more urgent, the imperative for new approaches also become critical. if adaptation, planned or autonomous, is a response to climate change and socio-ecological changes in vulnerable communities, then failure to understand the dynamics of human-nature interactions and socio-ecological systems changes can act as a barrier to effective adaptation. people need to know and understand their roles in socio-ecological systems interactions; they also need to appreciate climate change as both a cause and a function of changes in this system. it is in this regard that both climate change adaptation and resilience building processes become learning issues (loff, 2011: fazey et al., 2007), which necessitates current adaptive capacity and resilience building efforts in local communities, particularly in africa, to purposefully re-conceptualize what constitutes learning as well as the approaches employed in pursuing the goals of learning. research research methodologymethodology in line with the stated aim of this study, a mix of methodological approaches were employed to advance efforts to establish what constitutes successful adaptation to climate change and the role of learning in that regard. to answer the principal organizing question of whose learning counts and how learning is framed in climate adaptation program processes, a case study approach was employed as a vehicle to intimately examine the conceptualization of learning in two transboundary adaptation projects that had brought different entities from different parts of africa and asia together. as a researcher and participant in some aspects of the programs, i was privileged to have had direct access to some of the programs and to observe at very class range how learning is framed and applied. the processes of observation and close study of some aspects of the two programs were complemented through what has been described as systematic analysis. this is a rigorous approach to document analysis and to investigate knowledge gaps, critical issues and novel approaches. while the case study approach focused on specific aspects of the project implementation and in this case the framing of learning in those programs, systematic analysis was employed to formulate questions to guide the review of how ‘learning’ has been framed and employed in adaptation practice. thus, the study primarily adopted a qualitative approach that systematically examined existing notions and practices of learning in adaptation processes, as represented in various literature and the two programs. using keyword searches such as ‘climate change,’ ‘adaptation,’ ‘knowledge,’ ‘learning,’ and ‘adaptation progress’ in over 105 relevant publications on climate change adaptation, i closely studied trends, gaps, framing and usage of ‘learning’ in adaptation processes across a range of contexts, such as institutional and community-based climate change adaptation programming. as in most instances of systematic analysis, this process was conducted in three different stages: document identification and selection, data examination using leximancer software, and manual coding of relevant data into identifiable themes. leximancer as a data analysis tool was used to extract different themes, concepts, and ideas in ways that teased out relational differences and similarities of contextual usage and application of learning in adaptation processes (leximancer, 2016). the tool also proved particularly helpful in helping to reduce human bias in data coding by analyzing learning in adaptation from a range of contexts. the software uses proximity in texts and word correlation to analyze large streams of qualitative data. the analysis also considered the time frame of publications to be possibly responsible for variations in framing of both adaptation success and the role of learning in the process. these analyses provided an initial context for the framing of learning in adaptation. the dominant framing of learning in adaptation, as an event, signaled a correlation between understanding of climate change impact manifestations and adaptation. this correlation provided a context for the observation and scrutiny of how these framings are demonstrated in aspects of the two regional adaptation programs described below. systematic analysis of literature thus provided a framework for the close observation of how learning in adaptation was framed and pursued in aspects of the two programs and in relation with stated or demonstrated understanding of the aims of an adaptation project. it needs to be pointed out, however, that there were some limitations in the systematic review process. a key limitation was the fact that adaptation to climate change is a broad topic that is applicable to different contexts. thus, though the research interest was to examine the framing of learning in adaptation processes through relevant keyword searches, it was evident that the use of keywords was not enough to produce a comprehensive list of relevant consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6737 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 93-10397 literature to depict the diversity of applications and implications of learning in adaptation processes. learning, or knowledge development and exchange, in adaptation processes could be implicit in different programs without being labelled as such. such instances became clearly evident in the process; however, the original methodology of keyword searching was maintained for consistency. transboundary adaptation planning in west transboundary adaptation planning in west africaafrica vulnerable communities and nations in sub-saharan africa have experienced and continue to face climate change impacts that impede sustainability efforts (brown, hammil & mcleman 2007; cook and vizy, 2012; hope, 2006; mutanga et al, 2013; twomlow et al. 2008). preoccupied by the need for innovative solutions, regions have seriously responded to climate change impacts by forming creative partnerships and collaborations as avenues to explore adaptive solutions at scale. central in most of these transnational and collaborative adaptation planning programs is the notion of learning—the desire to uncover new knowledge, to gain new understandings through comparative experiences and to exchange knowledge to build the requisite adaptive capacity to respond to current and potential future climate change impacts (barnet, 2010; danielle et al. 2011). learning to adapt has therefore become a driving force behind the creation of some of these transnational adaptation governance mechanisms in the west african region. they have seen a number of adaptation programs that have made learning a key aspect of their programs. the adaptation learning program (alp) and adaptation at scale in semi-arid regions (assar) are two of such programs which served as cases for the verification of the framing of learning as emerged from the systematic analysis. following the systematic analysis of relevant literature, the process of learning in adaptation generally became clearer and prompted verification in specific real-world adaptation programs. a systematic review of the literature on learning in climate change adaptation gave a picture of a correlation between the understanding of climate change as a phenomenon and the conceptualization of adaptation. most of the literature perceived adaptation as an event or an endpoint that logically follows the execution of certain activities such as such as workshops, forums, and meetings. adaptation is not seen necessary as a learned, experiential or evolving process. learning in adaptation seems to be generally framed as additional to climate adaptation program activities and requiring deliberate arrangements to make it happen. this study focused specifically on designated adaptation planning processes that had learning as either an objective or part of its activities. the interest was to explore the conceptualization of climate change in the different programs and to see how such conceptualizations influenced a certain understanding of adaptation and how to pursue it. by focusing primarily on transnational adaptation governance initiatives in the west africa region, the study aimed to gain a fuller understanding of how learning, which is increasingly becoming, mainstream issue in adaptation. the two programs are described below and with insights of how learning is depicted in them. adaptation learning program (alp) and adaptation at scale in semi-arid regions (assar) the adaptation learning program (alp) in africa and the adaptation at scale in semi-arid regions (assar) project are good examples of transnational adaptation governance programs that involve african and asian countries. both programs have concluded. the alp was wholly africa-focused and made up of countries from ghana, niger, kenya and mozambique. the assar program involved a combination of seven countries in asia and africa: india, mali, ghana, namibia, botswana, ethiopia, kenya. three west african countries—ghana, mali and niger were in both programs. ghana is the only englishspeaking country of the three. while the mode of selection of countries for the alp programs have not been explicitly indicated in both programs, it could be assumed that similarities in the variety and levels of vulnerability were taken into consideration to feed into the program’s purpose of developing the capacity to respond appropriately to climate change. the assar program was largely defined by geography and specific socio-ecological factors that characterized specific locations within the selected countries. in other words, within individual countries, there were underlying biophysical and socio-ecological similarities that informed the selection of the countries. in contrast, the adaptation learning alp was a fourcountry program initiated and implemented by care international in early 2010. the program aimed to increase the capacity of vulnerable households in sub-saharan africa to adapt to climate variability and change through the implementation of innovative approaches to community-based adaptation (cba). according to the program’s website: the multi-year program was originally scheduled consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6737 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 93-10398 to run between 2010 and 2015, but was extended by another two years through the magnanimity of another donor to build on the achievements of the first five years of implementation. the specific focus given to the alp extension was to take lessons from what the program website describes as a “comprehensive and learning oriented ‘final’ evaluation” done in 2015 and at a time when it was believed that the program was ending to add learning, rigor and credibility of cba and its contribution to increasing climate resilience in africa. cba was the principal organizing methodology for the alp. this included a range of approaches at multiple levels which aimed to support and empower vulnerable communities in the specific country communities to adapt to both current and future impacts of climate change. the eventual extension of the alp was therefore intended to build on earlier gains made in the program and had specific objective to “deepen learning and to scale up successful practical adaptation approaches across africa.” the adaptation at scale in semi-arid regions (assar) program, was five years long (2014-2018 international interdisciplinary research program that brought together a mix of research and practitioner organizations. it was a partnership program between five lead institutions and twelve partner organizations and was a part of the collaborative adaptation research initiative in africa and asia (cariaa) program which was funded by canada’s international development research centre (idrc) and the united kingdom’s department for international development (dfid). the assar program was therefore one of different carria initiatives that used what idrc describes as the ‘hotspot’ and ‘consortium’ approaches. hotspot refers to regions of dire vulnerabilities of similar nature; they are seen as areas that need urgent attention, but with deep insights. carria focused on three climate change hotspots: semi-arid regions, delta regions and glacierand snow-fed river basins. these are areas or regions with considerable vulnerabilities that require deeper understanding of the nature of vulnerabilities and the appropriate adaptation options. thus, using the different hot spots as lenses for research and comparability, the carria initiative formed a consortium to research common themes and challenges across different contexts, gaining deeper insights to uncover emerging opportunities. the consortium operated on the understanding that research on climate change adaptation demands collaboration across disciplines. they also take the view that changes and manifestations of impacts in these hotspot regions have comparable biophysical, social and ecological implications within each hotspot which will facilitate new knowledge development, learning, new capacities and better informed policy and practice at scale. each consortium supported by carria brought together five institutions with a range of regional, scientific and socio-economic development expertise to explore the physical, social, economic and political dimensions of vulnerability and adaptation options. such an approach brought fresh and diverse perspectives to the identified problems and enabled the different consortiums to reach out to different regions of the world and to facilitate learning and knowledge exchange especially in southsouth relationships. the assar project was one such consortia that specifically focused on climate change adaptation in semi-arid regions in asia and africa. assar described its purpose as research to understand the impact dynamics of climate change and to explore effective adaptation responses. the program took the view that as global impacts of climate change became more clearly understood, and so too is the need for people to acquire the capacity to effectively respond and adapt to these changes. this, the program believed, was even more urgent in semi-arid regions in the developing world where hundreds of millions of people face perennial vulnerability. although many people in these regions already display remarkable resilience, many interconnected stressors are expected to worsen in the coming decades because of climate change. therefore, the assar program saw an imperative to understand the complexity of these problems and facilitate the development of adaptation policy responses that could empower local people, organizations and governments to adapt to climate change both now and in the future. ultimately, both the assar program and the alp program were driven by the need to use research to enhance learning. research, practice and learning at different scales and in multiple regions defined the programs’ aims of turning research in action and through learning by doing to produce future-focused and socially-relevant knowledge of potential pathways to a climate resilient adaptation. learning, thus, was an underlying issue in both programs. while it may not have been highlighted as a priority focus, its relevance cannot be underestimated in any research process as research essentially aims at uncovering new knowledge to serve the purposes of knowledge development, learning, knowledge uptake and utilization. consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6737 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 93-10399 learning in transnational adaptation planning — alp and assar with increasing clarity, the public acknowledges that climate changes do not follow the conventional state boundaries. droughts, floods, and other extreme weather events transcend national and regional borders and, as a result, attract varying governmental responses. the emergence of cross-border adaptation planning has aimed at using novel governance mechanisms to achieve effective and equitable results across the territories under different jurisdiction (barnett, 2010; daniell et al., 2011). knowledge development and transfer have become a defining aspect of these processes. however, both the conceptualization and the pursuit of this knowledge lack clarity. processes and activities that are supposed to lead to knowledge development and learning are not well-structured and as a result make it difficult, for the most part, to effectively evaluate what kinds of knowledge are developed and the quality of learnings that come with it. there are instances also where learning and knowledge development are focused on program participants or leaders with very little or no attention given to the learning and knowledge development needs of people living in local communities and facing the direct impacts of ate impacts. these lapses are clearly reflected in the descriptions of both the alp and assar programs where their learning goals were not clearly defined. both programs failed to clearly determine their respective scopes and concepts of learning and to state what learning approaches are to guide the different processes or activities. the main challenge, as was evident in the two programs, laid in the need to clearly articulate what constitutes learning in the process and to frame learning approaches, as well as the expected goals and outcomes. both programs focused on adaptive capacity building processes that approached adaptation as a stable end point which could be reached through linear processes such as the identification of soil fertility problem and the application of fertilizer as an adaptive solution. thus, once specific actions are taken in the name of adaptation the general expectation is that the adaptive capacity of people, and in this case farmers, will be built. such approaches ignore the critical reality of climate change being a constantly evolving phenomenon with underlying uncertainties . thus then contradicts the widely-held wrong perceptions and assumptions which portray and treat climate change as a stagnant and uniform phenomenon. climate change is an evolving process which also makes it a requirement that adaptation processes should necessarily respond to such challenges with continuous and reflexive learning agenda (armitage, mischake and plummer, 2008; vare and scott, 2007). the two programs, instead, approach adaptation as a linear process with a stable end point. this, as indicated, is a flawed thinking which leads to wrong conclusions that specific short-term adaptive actions as solutions could facilitate a speedy arrival at this alleged endpoint. such perspectives, reduce adaptation and adaptive capacity building to performative actions which, with very little efforts, are expected to build adaptive capacities. klein et al (2017) have described this practice as “the urgency to do adaptation”, which affirms the idea of performative actions to create an obvious impression of doing something. this again is a reductionist approach; it does not only reduce the underlying complexities of climate change impacts, but also ignores what oshbahr’s (2007) observation that successful adaptation is a learned process. the reality, however, remains that “without learning, or unlearning, neither adaptation nor transformation is possible...” (lof, 2010, p.529), and as a matter of necessity it is important that programs such as these acknowledge the critical importance of developing cognitive competencies that would prepare individuals and communities to respond to both sudden and gradual, slow onset changes.. in addition to the lack of intentionality, many programs also reduce learning to vertical processes of identifying impacts and applying ready-made solutions. this simplistic approach contributes to the “climate-proofing” culture, which provides a false sense of hope in many adaptive capacity building processes. it also validates earlier notions of ‘doing adaptation’ which as clarified above highlights what i consider as adaptation learning deficit. thus, by overly relying on standard, ready-made adaptation solutions, a “climate-proofing” culture shifts adaptation thinking and practice towards the simplified and predictable linear processes. such approaches, as evident from the failures of alp and assar programs, are based primarily on flawed understandings of climate change and also on adaptation processes that fail to approach adaptation as a learned process (folke, 2012; lof, 2011; osbahr, 2007). as davidson-hunt and berkes (2003) have posited, to adapt well means to learn to adapt and to acquire the capacity and competency to function effectively amid complex socio-ecological changes (adger, 2003; fabricius et al., 2007). therefore, the understanding of adaptation and resilience building as an iterative and evolving process remains central to the adaptive capacity quest which then also makes the role of learning critical to any process (simon, and leck, 2015; lonsdale et al.,2010). the consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6737 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 93-103100 understanding and appreciation of the role of learning in adaptation is therefore the starting point for adaptive capacity building processes. learning helps individuals and communities develop the requisite capacity to understand the complexities and uncertainties associated with climate change impact manifestations and to develop the needed anticipatory skills to respond to them. the acquisition of this understanding also allows individuals and communities to challenge pre-existing flawed assumptions, such as the belief or perception that climate change impacts are constant and predictable. the processes of building adaptive capacity and promoting resilience through learning require certain intentionality, which requires that learning is given the requisite attention in program planning processes (ensor and harvey, 2015; grantham et al. 2010; lonsdale et al., 2010; sterling, 2010). thanks to the increased understanding of climate science and appreciation of climate change as emergence and evolving (ratter et al., 2012), there is a gradual increase in calls for adaptation programs to move from mechanistic and regimented applications of ready-made solutions and in generic approaches to longer-term solutions that recognize both climate change and sustainable development as learned processes. thus, the occasional workshop-type gatherings, where key program participants share and exchange knowledge such as those organized by alp and assar, provide a good example of the reductionist approach, where learning in adaptation is framed as a vertical process to serve program’s pre-conceived interests. it is from such a perspective that learning approaches in adaptation and resilience building processes must be reconsidered. mainly, the approaches used should reflect the critical importance of underlying uncertainties and evolving nature of both climate change and socio-ecological systems change processes. (davidson-hunt and berkes, 2003; folke, 2011; chapin iii et al. 2009; keen et al. 2005). both the alp and assar programs demonstrate a belief in learning as the foundations of the successful adaptation. however, despite all their efforts to make learning visible in the process, the two programs were still not able to clearly demonstrate what constitutes good, effective learning and how it should be pursued (tschakert and dietrich, 2010). hence, by not articulating the goals of learning and also providing well-structured approaches to pursue the goals of learning, the two programs confused the use and application of learning in their programs. learning in both programs was applied loosely as an event rather than as an iterative, reflexive and intentional process. towards a new learning agenda in towards a new learning agenda in adaptation planningadaptation planning in order to challenge current mindsets and practices about adaptation and resilience building, understanding and appreciating the nature of climate change adaptation and socio-ecological change processes are needed (blackmore, 2007; folke et al., 2002). the first step is processes that simplify understanding and appreciation of the complexity of climate change and socio-ecological systems change. it is also important that such efforts provide deeper insights into how these complexities inform learning approaches. in other words, adaptive learning processes should create opportunities for the critical appreciation of emergence, uncertainties and the logic of non-linearity in adaptation to climate change. it is from this perspective that current weaknesses in the framing of learning in adaptation becomes evident. it is also in such a context that the need for the reconceptualization of learning in adaptation becomes imperative. adaptive and resilience learning efforts could be improved by aiming to increase the capacity for anticipation. that is to say that processes of learning and action should strengthen people and communities to be able to anticipate and imagine plausible future scenarios, and respond from previous adaptive strategies and anticipatory actions. it is only through such processes and proactive adjustments that potential shocks and surprises could be averted (nelson, et al 2007). ability to perceive and anticipate risk, to imagine plausible future scenarios and to respond accordingly and promptly is in itself evidence of adaptive capacity and resilience and an indication of learning to respond to socio-ecological shocks and disruptions (inayatullah, 2006; sterman, 2000). the question then becomes what forms of learning could facilitate changes in current adaptation approaches that rely essentially on notions of linearity and the expectations of a stable outcome. one suggestion to disrupt existing flawed notions of and approaches to learning in adaptation is social anticipatory and action learning (saal). taking its roots from social learning and scenario planning processes (adger, 2010; collins and ison, 2009), saal’s philosophical underpinnings are grounded in the fact that adaptability and resilience building in complex socio-ecological systems changes are cognitive issues; they are learning issues which require individual and collective engagements at multi-levels (lof, 2009). saal, therefore, combines the essential attributes of transformational and experiential learning processes to develop individual and social consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6737 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 93-103101 cognitive competencies that facilitates the development of awareness and understanding of the underlying complexities of both climate change and adaptation processes. saal combines collaboration, participation, iteration and reflexivity to deepen understanding and appreciation of climate change adaptation and resilience building as evolving processes of shared learning and communal knowledge brokerage. the capacity to build new knowledge and the ability to utilize the different knowledge forms emerge out of the changing manifestations of climate change impacts. learning then emerges from collaborative and participatory processes that allow a shared sense of meaning to be arrived at by people whose existential realities are challenged by climate change impacts or other manifestations of socio-ecological systems changes (ensor and harvey, 2015). through experiences of self-observation and insightful awareness of local ecologies and realities, people living in their communities are able to self-organize through what chambers (1983) has long described as “self-critical epistemological awareness”. here people living in their places learn to see, literally, and are able to understand the nature of changes in their communities and to take appropriate actions as a response. referencesreferences adaptation at scale in semi-arid regions (2017, march 4). retrieved from http://www.assar.uct.ac.za/about/about-assar adger, w. n. 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(2017). inserting rights and justice into urban resilience: a focus on everyday risk. environment and urbanization, 29(1), 123-138. 30j0zll 1fob9te _goback _xx2giyhfb1d2 liu, homeownership and environmental attitudes consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 27 (2024) homeownership and environmental attitudes e jen liu barnard college, columbia university ejenliu815@gmail.com abstract homeownership is associated with financial stability, middle-class status, and the good life in the united states. on the national level, homeownership has been touted to improve social stability, generate wealth, and foster citizenship and solidarity. if true, expanding homeownership could help to solve the nation’s social, political, and thus environmental challenges. however, despite the popular currency of these ideas, existing research has mixed findings on the political consequences of homeownership. while previous research has linked homeownership to conservative political orientation, there is reason to believe that this may not apply to environmental attitudes. the conservatizing hypothesis is supported primarily by research on homeowners’ attitudes toward macroeconomic or local development policies, not environmental ones. the two mechanisms from the literature — social integration and locally dependent financial investment— can be expected to increase environmental concern among homeowners. through six semi-structured interviews and a multivariate regression analysis using the general social survey 2021 cross-section study, this paper finds that homeowners tend to be more concerned about the environment than renters, especially if their neighborhood is highly exposed to environmental risks. author’s note my research stems from a curiosity about the rhetoric and politics of homeownership in the u.s. as an urban studies and political science major who experiences profound climate anxiety, i wish to understand the socio-historical and spatial dynamics that underly public views on climate change. this project brings together my interest in political behavior, sustainability, and neighborhood politics to explore the relationship between homeownership and environmental attitudes. keywords: homeownership, environmental attitudes, risk exposure, regression analysis consilience liu: homeownership and environmental attitudes introduction when it comes to the american dream, nothing is more emblematic of it than the white picket fence and cookie-cutter home it encloses. in the united states, homeownership is associated with financial stability, middle-class status, and the good life. on the national level, homeownership has been touted to improve social stability, generate wealth, and foster citizenship and solidarity. in the words of franklin d. roosevelt, “a nation of homeowners, of people who own a real share in their land, is unconquerable.” if true, expanding homeownership can help to solve the nation’s social, political, and environmental challenges. however, despite the popular currency of these ideas, existing research has mixed findings on the political consequences of homeownership. purchasing a home is one of the biggest investments people make. after buying a home, people become emotionally and financially invested in a locality. this is thought to lead to changes in political values, attitudes, and behavior. two main expectations exist within the literature: (1) homeownership increases civic engagement and participation, and (2) homeownership has a conservatizing effect on political orientation. this homeownership effect has been spun as both positive and negative; while it encourages informed and consistent voting (mccabe, 2013), it is also responsible for not in my backyard (nimby) behaviors and attitudes (mable and nall, 2021). given the pressing nature of climate change and the collective-action problem it poses, the impact of homeownership on environmental attitudes needs to be studied. climate change impacts have been felt across the country: heatwaves and coastal flooding in the northeast, water shortage in the southeast and caribbean, changing growing seasons in the midwest, drought and wildfires in the southwest, thawing permafrost in alaska, and more (usgcrp, 2018). existing research has examined the impact of education, income, religiosity, ideology, and party affiliation on environmental attitudes (nine americas, 2015). however, more studies need to be done on the relationship between homeownership and environmental attitudes. as of 2022, the homeownership rate in the united states was 65.9%, representing more than half of those surveyed in the census (u.s. census bureau, 2022). homeownership was highest in the midwest, followed by the south, northeast and west at 70.1%, 66.7%, 63% and 62.6%, respectively (u.s. census bureau, 2022). seeing that a significant portion of the population are homeowners, it is critical to understand how homeownership impacts peoples’ views on environmental issues and policies. climate change poses a significant risk to the neighborhoods and properties homeowners wish to protect. according to a report by corelogic, natural catastrophes in 2021 affected 14,566,529 homes across the u.s. and resulted in a total of $56.92 billion in property damage (2021 climate change catastrophe report, 2022). this has had various consequences for homeowners. beyond reconstruction costs, mortgage delinquency rates have risen, and homeowners in at-risk areas now have to pay higher written premiums to insurers (2021 climate change catastrophe report, 2022) therefore, climate issues are of direct concern to homeowners. in this paper, i evaluate whether and how homeownership affects environmental attitudes. i begin by surveying existing literature on the politics of homeownership and factors that influence environmental attitudes, bringing the two together to form a theory on how they interact. then, using qualitative insights derived from six semi-structured interviews, i argue that homeowners are more knowledgeable and personally invested in the effectiveness of environmental policies than renters. finally, using data from the 2021 general social survey, i have created a multi-scale index to measure homeowners’ versus renters’ level of environmental concern. literature review theorizing on the political consequences of homeownership can be traced as far back as the mid and late 1800s. on a societal scale, homeownership was commonly thought to increase political 3 consilience stability and aversion to radical change. this idea was central to engel’s theory on the embourgeoisement of the working class and its implications for socialism (engels, 1935). engels argued that homeownership creates a separate investor class, undermining solidarity among the proletariat through encouraging the adoption of bourgeois values and aspirations (engels, 1935). recent research has produced two dominant theories on possible mechanisms driving the politics of homeownership: social integration and locally dependent financial investments (mccabe, 2013). both posit that investment in a community—either social or economic— gives homeowners a stake in actively protecting and maintaining the status quo. one theory is that homeownership enables the creation of social networks and place-based attachments conducive to active political participation (mccabe, 2013; hall and yoder, 2019). behaviors like participation in voluntary organizations and informal interaction with neighbors indicate the formation of social (blum and kingston, 1984). the increased residential, professional, and familial stability that homeownership brings improves people’s ability to navigate administrative procedures and is correlated with the formation of clear partisan preferences (plutzer, 2002). homeownership overcomes initial inertia around civic engagement, transitioning from habitual non-voters to voters (plutzer, 2002). in other words, homeownership lowers the associated costs of voting, encouraging greater political participation (mccabe, 2013, p. 941). hence, homeownership is thought to make better citizens who are invested in their communities, have well-formed political preferences, and vote consistently. another theory posits that homeowners’ political behaviors are guided by material incentives, specifically their interest in protecting local property value (mccabe, 2013; marble and nall, 2021; hall and yoder, 2019). in purchasing homes, people become investors who can be expected to favor a safe and stable investing environment. this is thought to translate into a preference for political arrangements that preserve the status quo. researchers have supported this hypothesis through findings that homeowners are more likely to be economically conservative (verberg, 2000), hold right-leaning political beliefs (davidsson, 2018), reward and punish the incumbent more based on changes in local housing prices (larsen et al., 2019), and support market-based solutions (ansell, 2014). furthermore, mortgage-related debt is thought to decrease people’s appetite for increased taxes, while also serving as private insurance that eliminates the need for welfare state insurance (ansell, 2014). therefore, primarily when it comes to economic policies, homeowners have been found to support right-wing policies that advocate for deregulation, tax cuts, limited welfare, etc. drawing from the literature on the wealth effect, researchers have also tried to measure whether homeowners’ political participation varies based on the value of their homes. this hypothesis has been tentatively verified through findings that homeowners with more expensive homes tend to participate more in neighborhood groups (mccabe, 2013) and local elections (hall and yoder, 2019). these findings further reinforce the theory that the economic incentives and self-interested attitudes that arise from homeownership influence political behavior. the two mechanisms— social integration and locally dependent financial investments —are not mutually exclusive and are likely related. however, literature on the impact of homeownership on political orientation tends to focus on financial investment and interests. as mentioned before, homeownership is suspected to have a conservatizing effect through increasing people’s support for policies that maintain the status quo and protect local property value. while kingston et al.’s influential multivariate analysis of the american national election study of 1976 found no significant correlation between homeownership and attitudes toward socioeconomic policy, others have since repeated and built on their work using updated data and refined indices (kingston et al., 1984). the original study used a four-item scale that assessed attitudes toward employment, crime, racial integration, and minority groups (kingston et al., 1984). more recent studies have broken down the scale to create detailed indices of attitudes toward specific policy issues such as racial integration and affordable housing (jelen, 1990; marble and nall, 2021). consilience liu: homeownership and environmental attitudes using scales that measure attitudes toward specific policy issues rather than general political conservatism has generated new insights. when it comes to high-stakes local policies, as opposed to federal policies where costs are diffused, self-interest tied to homeownership has been found to trump ideology. liberal homeowners tend to support redistributive housing policies but are barely more likely than their conservative counterparts to approve of dense housing development in their communities (marble and nall, 2021). survey experiments have shown that even when liberal homeowners were prompted to think about the benefits of additional housing to lowand middle-income families, respondents still overwhelmingly prioritized self-interest over ideology (marble and nall, 2021). the likelihood of liberal homeowners supporting the construction of new housing becomes even lower when deregulation is prominent (manville, 2021). these attitudes have had tangible impacts. for example, a study of the 2010 and 2016 elections in san francisco found that precincts with higher rates of homeownership had significantly higher levels of support for anti-homeless measures (amaral, 2021). a similar methodology should be used to measure the impact of homeownership on environmental attitudes. this paper is informed by literature from psychology on appropriate ways to define and measure environmentalism. firstly, attitudes are broadly defined as the “intensity of positive and negative affect”, in this case, towards environmental issues (cruz and manata, 2020). secondly, attitudes are connected to but distinct from beliefs, intentions, and behaviors (cruz and manata, 2020). specifically, attitudes are narrower in scope and more concrete than beliefs, and though attitudes can shape intentions and behaviors, they do not always do so (cruz and manata, 2020). a variety of measures have been developed to assess environmental attitudes, with most employing lickert-type scales that measure verbal commitment to pro-environment behaviors, feelings toward ecological issues, the degree to which people value the environment and believe climate change to be anthropogenic, opinions on preservation and utilization, and evaluations of a range of environmental topics (mcintyre and milfont, 2016). drawing on past literature, this paper defines an attitude as a specific, concrete value judgement about a policy and/or course of action.  few have directly studied the impact of homeownership on environmental attitudes. however, there is a significant body of literature on the relationship between environmentalism and other demographic and attitudinal variables. while environmentalism was previously considered a primarily white phenomenon, recent research has found growing concern among minority groups for climate issues proximate to their communities (whittaker et al., 2005). personal experiences with adverse environmental effects and post-material values tend to increase support for environmental protection (rohrschneider, 1988). additionally, environmental concern is positively correlated with spirituality but not religious fundamentalism (preston and shin, 2022), inversely related to faith in technology (kilbourne et al., 2002) and age (lorenzini et al., 2021), and directly related to education, income, and metropolitanism (arcury, 1990). studies have also found a strong partisan divide in attitudes toward climate change. left-leaning individuals are more likely than right-leaning individuals to prioritize environmental protection over economic growth, believe that the green movement is effective, and self-report pro-environmental behaviors (neumayer, 2004). the majority of adults in the united states agree that the environment should be protected. however, democrats and republicans tend to disagree on the causes of climate change and the types of policies that should be adopted (pew research center, 2019; holian and kahn, 2014). in terms of causes, democrats are more likely than republicans to believe that human activity contributes to climate change (pew research center, 2019). attitudes toward climate policies are similarly split, with liberal democrats believing that they produce net benefits for the environment and conservative republicans being more skeptical and concerned about the impacts of policies on the economy (pew research center, 2019). 5 consilience some research has been conducted on homeowners’ environmental behaviors. homeowners are more likely to adopt environmentally friendly practices across a variety of possible home improvements. a study of household energy consumption in germany found that homeowners demand and spend less on utilities and heating than renters (rehdanz, 2007). however, it is unclear whether this is due to concern for the environment or the fact that homeowners have an economic incentive to upgrade their heating systems and have more energy-efficient homes. research on rooftop solar has found that adoption rates are higher among homeowners and residents who have high scores on place attachment indicators (corbett et al., 2022). the importance of place attachment has similarly been found in a study on seattle homeowners. homeowners who manage their properties in environmentally conscious ways reported motivations such as the protection of in-group well-being, personal stability and security, and connection with nature (neverisky, 2017). however, these observed behaviors are hyper-local and do not reflect wider attitudes toward national climate policies and debates. furthermore, environmental behaviors should be considered distinct from attitudes and could be motivated by economic interest rather than environmental concern. therefore, research specific to environmental attitudes needs to be conducted. while previous research has linked homeownership to conservative political orientation, there is reason to believe that this may not apply to environmental attitudes. the conservatizing hypothesis is supported primarily by research on homeowners’ attitudes toward macroeconomic or local development policies, and not environmental ones. the two mechanisms from the literature—social integration and locally dependent financial investment—can be expected to increase environmental concern among homeowners. more specifically, individuals who are homeowners are expected to agree more strongly that human activity is the primary cause of climate change, value environmental protection over economic growth, and report greater support for existing climate policies. this is because natural catastrophes tied to climate change pose significant risks to homeowners and their properties. in 2021, wildfires, severe weather, hurricanes, and winter storms resulted in $1.46 billion, $7.46 billion, $33 billion, and $15 billion worth of property damage in the u.s., respectively (2021 climate change catastrophe report, 2022). therefore, given that homeowners’ political orientations are organized around feelings of place attachment and economic interests, they should be expected to evaluate aggressive climate strategies positively to align with their stake in protecting their neighborhoods and homes.  interview method semi-structured interviews were conducted to test whether homeowners and renters vary in terms of environmental attitudes. separate protocols were used for homeowners and renters. both groups were asked questions about their attitudes toward environmental policies, level of social and financial investment in their communities, and feelings of environmental concern. all questions were informed by existing literature and aimed at exploring not only the research hypothesis but also theorized mechanisms. between the two groups, most questions were kept the same and wording was only adjusted for particular questions. for example, homeowners were asked how closely they keep track of fluctuations in property value whereas renters were asked about fluctuations in rent. these discrepancies were necessary in order to ensure the relevancy of questions to interviewees. for each interview, the order of questions was adjusted and follow-ups were asked in response to answers provided by interviewees. interviews lasted between 10 to 20 minutes and covered between 8 and 10 questions. all interviews were conducted virtually over phone calls, recorded, and transcribed using free online ai audio transcription services. verbal consent was obtained at the start of every interview and can be found in the recordings. transcribed interviews were then manually coded to identify common themes and patterns. convenience sampling was used and all interviewees were recruited through reaching out to friends and acquaintances. demographic questions were asked at the beginning of every interview to gather the age, gender, race, education, and neighborhood income level of participants. three renters consilience liu: homeownership and environmental attitudes and three homeowners were selected to represent the perspectives of both groups of the independent variable. the table below shows the sample demographics for this study. table 1: sample demographics age gender race education neighborhood income level renter 1 51 female asian bachelor’s high renter 2 22 male hispanic/latino bachelor’s middle renter 3 23 male hispanic/latino associate’s lower middle homeowner 1 65 female white master’s upper middle homeowner 2 51 female asian master’s upper middle homeowner 3 53 male asian master’s upper middle as seen in table 1, the ages of participants cluster around the early 20s and 50s. an equal number of men and women were interviewed. asian, white, and hispanic/latino participants were included in the study. all participants have a post-secondary degree and all homeowners interviewed have a master’s degree. self-reported neighborhood income levels range from lower middle to high income. results responses were coded under four major themes: attitudes toward environmental policies, social integration, financial investment, and environmental concern. in line with the research hypothesis, homeowners were more knowledgeable about local environmental policies and held stronger opinions—both positive and negative—regarding their effectiveness than renters. in terms of community attachment, there was no consistent relationship between homeownership and feelings of emotional connection to neighbors. however, all homeowners reported being part of local social networks —either informal or formal— whereas renters did not. in relation to the financial investment mechanism, homeowners were significantly more concerned about changes in local property value and the financial costs associated with climate change. finally, the study found no obvious relationship between local vulnerability to climate risk and environmental concern. attitudes toward environmental policies overall, homeowners tended to be both more critical and specific in their evaluations of existing environmental policies than renters. while no interviewees mentioned specific federal policies, homeowners were more knowledgeable than renters regarding policies on the neighborhood scale. interestingly, while both renter 2 and 3 admitted to having little knowledge of local environmental policies, the former interpreted his lack of awareness as a positive indicator that “laws that are in place are, at least from my perspective, doing a fairly consistent job” while the latter spun it negatively as a sign that no effective change has been made. homeowners, on the other hand, talked about local and neighborhood-level policies related to solar energy, building regulations, water preservation, lawn management, and waste disposal. homeowners in the sample referenced the recycling, gardening, and energy usage behaviors of neighbors in their evaluations of the effectiveness of local policies. all three homeowners mentioned local waste disposal and the recycling habits of their neighbors. in the excerpt below, homeowner 1 critiques the amount of trash generated by neighboring homes: “oftentimes i see my neighbors, houses with 2-3 people, carrying out huge black trash bags and i truly don’t understand how they’re able to produce so 7 consilience much trash. in my house, me and my daughter, we don’t produce nearly as much trash.” similarly, homeowner 3 noted that it is “very hard to enforce whether every household is composting their bio waste or recycling their products [and] plastics…since it is all run by an association [in his neighborhood]” and called for stronger federal policies. homeowner 2 also reflected on trash disposal in her community, but unlike the others regards neighborhood regulations to be highly effective: “community is good because. . .they follow the rules and regulations…they want us to keep it in the recycling bin…they will take care of the environment. yeah. not throwing here and there.” these insights suggest that homeowners think about the ways their neighbors manage their properties when they evaluate the effectiveness of local and federal environmental policies. renter 3 also alludes to issues of waste disposal but contrastingly uses rat infestation—an issue less tied to individual behavior and property management—as his primary point of reference. homeowners were also more attentive to energy-related policies. all three homeowners mentioned the importance of renewable energy, whereas only one renter did. policies mentioned include solar enrollment, green roofs, and gas and electricity usage. homeowner 3 spoke extensively on the impact of energy policies from the perspective of a homeowner: buying a home definitely is a big responsibility. there are lots of hidden costs, for instance, energy. so if you see in the last 20 years that i've owned this home, the energy prices have at least gone up five, six times the monthly bills…so the cost of gas and electric used to be less than a hundred. now it is about $800 per month. so the kind of increase, what that really means is there is no proper audit of how the energy is consumed in every home, gas versus electric. …as a homeowner…[it’s not] enough maintaining the home, running the home efficiently, but at the same time, are looking at environment-friendly options [rather] than just burning natural gas and consuming a lot of electricity during peak hours. he stressed both the economic consequences he faces as a homeowner as a result of ineffective energy policies as well as the added responsibility homeowners have to run their homes in energy-efficient and environmentally friendly ways. these two beliefs inform his opinion that in order for policies to be effective, they “should be at the city and state level and not at the homeowner level”. this suggests that homeowners’ greater sense of economic and moral burden in relation to energy consumption may lead to greater support for stronger environmental policies. mechanism 1: social integration while there were mixed results on whether homeowners or renters tended to have closer informal relationships with their immediate neighbors, homeowners were consistently more involved in neighborhood affairs. when describing their current living situations, renters tended to emphasize perks like independence, flexibility, and convenience, whereas homeowners used terms such as discipline, responsibility, stability, and security. this speaks to the idea of residential, professional, and familial stability in the literature that enhances people’s ability to navigate political bureaucracies and procedures. as per existing literature, homeowners described having access to formalized forms of neighborhood participation that allow them to regularly exercise civic engagement. homeowners 2 and 3 are both part of local homeowners associations: it's called the karika association, where there is a president that is elected by the homeowners and there is a committee that decides that meets at least once a month discussing issues in the communities… i have not held a position in the association because of my job demands. because i was on travel a lot of time. i don't have a lot of time to spend on the community issues, but… through digital messaging and other mediums and email, i contribute a lot in terms of providing ideas and support from the outside….there was one issue where i was actively involved some years ago about a common gate between our community and the neighborhood community where i basically consilience liu: homeownership and environmental attitudes went to the city council to give a memo which got passed…to keep that gate closed for the safety of our community. despite having a busy work schedule and traveling often, homeowner 3 described being actively involved in his neighborhood’s homeowners association (hoa). he mentioned various forms of participation, ranging from providing suggestions through emails to presenting a memo to the city council. although he reported not having a “very close integrated community” because “people are busy”, the karika association appears to act as a formalized social network that has facilitated his ability to navigate procedures necessary for political participation. homeowner 2, however, described being frustrated with neighborhood politics, suggesting variation in the quality of hoas: because not all the people goes for the annual meetings… [those] who [participate in] the voting system they will get [what they want]. …one thing is [that] in our community…some people they can speak, some people they can't speak there, and some people they're not interested to go to the meetings, so that's why a mix of people are there. in the excerpt above, homeowner 2 talks about the ways in which local power dynamics affect the accessibility of hoas. this, in her opinion, has meant that only certain subgroups within the community —specifically retired homeowners— can participate fully and meaningfully, giving them disproportionate sway over neighborhood policies. homeowners were not found to consistently have stronger informal bonds with their neighbors than renters. those who did not feel connected to their communities listed reasons such as living in an area for a short time, busy jobs, lack of organized events, and demographic heterogeneity. renter 3 spoke about how a lack of community events in his neighborhood has prevented him from forming a strong social network: at the moment, would say i do not feel connected to my neighbors or the people around me. i feel like there hasn't been much opportunity or chance to really meet or connect with people around me. there's not a lot of events or things happening near me that like would allow me to grow that like sense of community with people around me. when asked whether he would consider initiating any events, he replied that “there's no reason for me to really talk to them”, indicating a lack of place-based attachment. in contrast, those who reported feeling strongly connected to their communities cited reasons such as living around like-minded people, regularly interacting with neighbors indoors and outdoors, and future plans to continue staying in the same place: well, i know all of my neighbors on a first and last-name basis. i also hosted yoga and zumba classes during covid. i really enjoy going on walks and talking to people in my community. i feel like i have created strong roots and i plan on staying here for the next 5-10 years. some of my neighbors have been here for longer than i have so i definitely think we have a strong community here. homeowner 2 described how living in her neighborhood for a long time has given her the chance to get to know her neighbors. she also mentioned personally hosting classes in her backyard during the pandemic, demonstrating strong emotional investment in her neighborhood. mechanism 2: financial investment in alignment with expectations from the literature, homeowners were much more attentive to changes in local property value than renters. all three renters expressed knowing little about rent fluctuations in their area, citing it as a “waste [of] time” and “ not…a priority”. in contrast, homeowners were able to report changes in property value in great detail and speculated on potential 9 consilience causes. the causes mentioned include changes in neighborhood demographics, establishment of nearby companies, quality of surrounding schools, advertisements, changing consumer preferences, and rising hoa dues. we see the property values grow in the neighborhood only because there are a lot of brand-name companies that established themselves around our neighborhood. …so i keep track of the macro trends going on, see what keeps the property values up, or whether who are the residents, are the residents giving away the property for rents and moving on, or are there enough children in the community that are dependent on good schools in the neighborhood…overall, when you look at a long period of time, the properties hold values primarily because of the quality of the schools…in the neighborhood. in the excerpt above, homeowner 3 mentions both locally-dependent factors and macroeconomic trends that affect the housing market. these findings support the theory that homeowners’ greater attentiveness to local and national policies stems, at least in part, from having a greater financial stake. furthermore, in contrast to the nonchalant attitudes of renters, homeowner 2 expressed reported deep anxiety around drops in property value. “after two years or three years…it came down drastically down. …we are very, very worried about the home…i mean psychologically…we bought [it at] this much…and it went down. …200,000 that time.” these affective indicators further reinforce the theory that for homeowners, their properties are regarded as financial investments that need to be protected. homeowners were also more attentive to costs associated with climate risk than renters. renters in the sample mentioned general concern about flooding, water, pollution, and increasing wind speeds. homeowners, however, were able to quantify the impact that environmental changes have had on them through listing associated costs. specifically, homeowners 2 and 3 spoke on how hoa dues and energy prices have increased over time. this suggests that homeowners—as a result of being more directly affected by environmental costs through their properties—are more concerned than renters about the economic impact of climate change. while the literature expects homeowners to favor political arrangements that protect their financial investments by preserving the status quo, there were mixed results regarding whether homeowners tended to prefer liberal or conservative policies as compared to renters. notably, both homeowner 1 and renter 3 spoke on recent housing development. while homeowner 1 framed developers’ interest in her neighborhood in a positive way, renter 3 positioned affordable housing projects in his area as antithetical to both environmental protection and true housing equity. homeowner 1 does not see the work of developers in her neighborhood as a threat to her property, but as a positive development that will help to increase property value in the area: i think there has been quicker resident turnover and new people are moving in. the developers, they keep coming out here with signs, 2-3 times a week, asking me if i want to sell my property. its flattering, you know, and i guess good in a way that the property is so in demand, but for now i’m good. i don’t want to sell and i do plan on continuing to live here. as the literature on the financial investment mechanism predicts, homeowner 1’s perspective is primarily informed by self-interest to see property value in the area increase. in contrast, renter 3 critiqued affordable housing projects in his neighborhood: it's good to have more affordable housing, of course, especially in california, but they end up destroying the natural environment…right now they're in the works of developing more affordable housing [air quote]… in my area. in order to do so they're taking a huge chunk of land that looks like a beautiful scenery and [the] hills area that separates the pittsburgh area from the concord and i feel like that's just taking the opportunity away from preserving that area…in the bay area, affordable housing doesn't necessarily mean affordable housing for everybody…[it] means affordable consilience liu: homeownership and environmental attitudes housing for people who are new to the area who maybe have a tech job who make like six figures, that's affordable housing to them, like million dollar homes. unlike homeowner 1, renter 3 was less excited about the prospect of increased resident turnover and skyrocketing housing prices. as a renter, he does not stand to benefit from increases in property value in the area and believes environmental preservation to be a worthier cause than the creation of “affordable” homes for young elite professionals. environmental concern and local vulnerability to climate risks respondents reported varying degrees of concern regarding the impact of climate change on their homes and local communities. given that previous research has found a positive correlation between personal experiences with adverse environmental impacts and environmental concern (rohrschneider, 1988), local vulnerability to climate risk is theorized to be an important moderating variable. table 2 shows renters and homeowners, estimated levels of climate risk, and interviewees’ evaluations of local environmental risks. during the interview process, zip codes were collected and later run through city-data.com to identify their associated counties. this information was used to identify climate risk by county for each interviewee using data from the american communities project (acp). measured risks include sea level rise, hurricanes and typhoons, extreme rainfall, water stress, and heat stress on a risk scale ranging from no risk, low, medium, high, to red flag (pinkus, 2021). the acp defines each of the risk categories as follows: sea level rise measures population-weighted exposure to coastal flooding; hurricanes and typhoons represent geographical exposure to high wind velocities and tropical cyclones; extreme rainfall combines historical and projected indicators to estimate the likelihood of floods and heavy rainfall; water stress tracks changes in water supply and demand; and heat stress records the frequency and severity of hot days (pinkus, 2021). an additional total risk index value was calculated by averaging scores across risk categories, with no risk, low, medium, high, and red flags quantified as 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. table 2: environmental concern and local vulnerability to climate risks climate risk by county evaluation of local environmental risks renter 1 sea level rise: medium hurricanes and typhoons: high extreme rainfall: medium water stress: high heat stress: low total risk index: 2.2/4 “i think the most vulnerable ones could be that because it's very close to the sea. the …wind speed is very high. so it's sometimes even hard to walk around in a normal condition…i’m not too worried about it.” renter 2 sea level rise: high hurricanes and typhoons: high extreme rainfall: low water stress: high heat stress: medium total risk index: 3/4 “changes to the environment… not particularly that i know of that would be on a disproportionate to perhaps other neighborhoods” renter 3 sea level rise: medium hurricanes and typhoons: no risk extreme rainfall: medium water stress: high heat stress: medium total risk index 1.8/4 “i would say probably flooding. i do live right next to the to the bay…there’s been a lot of flooding, especially near this area, or …one area code farther. there's definitely [an] increase… before it was forest fires now, all of a sudden, we're getting flooding.” 11 consilience homeowner 1 sea level rise: no risk hurricanes and typhoons: high extreme rainfall: low water stress: medium heat stress: medium total risk index: 1.6/4 “not particularly [worried]. we’ve had more flooding and that has affected our basement and we’ve had to do some repairs… [and] temperature changes have been affecting my garden. daffodils are coming and going quicker.” homeowner 2 sea level rise: medium hurricanes and typhoons: no risk extreme rainfall: high water stress: low heat stress: low total risk index: 1.4/4 “one thing we are concerned [about] is that the soil, not my house, but …the far left side homes,…is sliding…when [there are] heavy rains…because it's a gated community… so we have to pay the hoa, we have to pay together… couple payments we did on top of our due, so that's a big amount we paid” homeowner 3 sea level rise: low hurricanes and typhoons: no risk extreme rainfall: medium water stress: high heat stress: low total risk index: 1.4/4 “see, no one can say… we're not prone to environmental risk…california is known to have these random fires. in fact, the last time a major fire outbreak happened, it came as close as of 15, 20 miles from my home.” based on the interviews, neither renters’ nor homeowners’ levels of concern regarding local environmental risks appear to be correlated with the calculated total risk indices for their respective counties. renters in the interview sample live in counties that average higher risk indices than those of homeowners. the interviewees who live in areas with the highest total risk indices—namely renter 1 and 2—expressed low levels of concern. notably, renter 1 was the only interviewee who did not identify any local environmental risks despite living in the county with the highest total risk index. those who reported the highest level of concern—renter 3, homeowner 2, and homeowner 3—live in counties with relatively low total risk indices. what is perhaps more interesting is the way that renters and homeowners framed local environmental risks. renters tended to describe environmental risks on the scale of the neighborhood or general “area”, whereas homeowners cited impacts on their own and nearby properties. while renters mentioned experiences of high winds while walking and flooding in nearby areas, homeowners described instances of flooded basements, shifting growing seasons in their gardens, and fires and soil sliding that impacted neighboring homes. homeowner 3 stated that environmental risks have not directly affected his home, but still framed his concerns in a way that centered his own property. for example, he specified that a recent fire outbreak occurred “15, 20 miles from [his] home”, suggesting a tendency among homeowners to think about local environmental risks in relation to their homes. homeowners also listed specific incidents whereas renters stopped at identifying relevant environmental risks. homeowners were able to recall details such as when and where environmental incidents occurred, measures that have since been taken to mitigate them, as well the economic consequences they faced: the soil slides when there are heavy rains…one bad thing is because it's a gated community…we have to pay the hoa, we have to pay together. so even though it's affecting their home…they divided [the cost] among 56 homes. …it's a four, 5,000 we paid…towards taking care of that place, that area, they put big rocks and i mean they don't want more sliding. a potential reason for this discrepancy is that homeowners are disproportionately burdened by preventative and damage-related costs associated with environmental risks. furthermore, two out of the three homeowners interviewed mentioned being a part of homeowner associations. this explains why consilience liu: homeownership and environmental attitudes they were able to provide details about how environmental incidents have affected not only their own homes but their neighbors’ as well. limitations given that convenience sampling was used to select interviewees, the demographic makeup of the three renters and homeowners in this study is not representative of the general us population. overrepresented demographics include upper-middle-class residents on the west and east coast. perspectives missing from the picture include those of black and native american residents, people in their 30s and 40s, and those without postsecondary education. notably, no long-term tenants were interviewed, and all renters emphasized the temporariness of their current living situations. this is a significant blindspot because long-term tenants may be more socially and financially invested in their neighborhoods than short-term renters, causing them to act more like homeowners than renters. further research is needed to explore the perspectives of demographics underrepresented in this study. while no relationship was found in this study between local vulnerability to climate risk and environmental concern, it is possible that the county-level estimations of risk used were not the most appropriate scale or measurement for risk exposure. environmental conditions may vary too greatly within counties, making the indicators used unrepresentative of conditions on the ground. for future studies, a measure that accounts for both physical climate vulnerability and human/system vulnerability as well as adaptive capacity could be a more accurate measure of how climate change is affecting different neighborhoods. questions used for the interviews did not cover all types of environmental attitudes. the responses gathered focused mainly on evaluations of local environmental policies and few respondents commented on national and international environmental regulations. some interviewees asked for examples of environmental problems and policies to prompt their thinking. the examples provided could have skewed their responses, limiting them to only speaking on topics mentioned by the interviewer. future studies should ask more targeted questions about specific federal policies and who respondents believe to be responsible for causing and mitigating climate change. the interviews conducted support the hypothesis that homeowners are more knowledgeable and personally invested in the effectiveness of environmental policies than renters. the mechanisms investigated show that homeowners tend to frame environmental risks and associated costs in relation to their properties and be more actively involved in shaping neighborhood policies. on the flip side, renters expressed knowing little about local environmental policies and having no desire or direct means to affect local conditions beyond adjusting individual behavior. while no relationship was found in this study between local vulnerability to environmental risks and environmental concern among homeowners and renters, future studies should revisit this question using more refined measures of vulnerability and environmental concern. quantitative data and method data from the general social survey (gss) 2021 cross-section study were used to test whether homeowners and renters differ in terms of environmental attitudes. the gss is administered nationwide and collects information through interviews on the opinions, attitudes, and behaviors of the american public. it is important to note that the 2021 survey was conducted during the pandemic and that necessary methodological adjustments were made by the gss. a weighted t-test, weighted bivariate regression, and weighted multivariate regressions were applied to the data to test the hypothesis that homeowners are more concerned about the environment than renters. the variables that were used are dwelown, grntaxes, grnprice, grnsol, naturdev, clmtcaus, grecon, educ, race, sexnow1, rincom16, polviews, airpollu, wtrpollu, exweathr, and wtssnrps. 13 consilience homeownership status was determined using dwelown and recoded into a homeownership factor and homeownership dummy, with 1 representing homeowners and 0 being renters. an additive index was created for environmental attitudes that include grntaxes, grnprice, grnsol, grncon, naturdev, clmtcaus, and grnecon. grntaxes, grnprice, and grnsol assess how willing respondents are to pay much higher taxes, pay much higher prices, and accept cuts in standard of living to protect the environment on a 5-degree scale between very willing and very unwilling. the three variables were recoded so that those more willing to accept the tradeoffs have higher scores. the variables grncon, naturdev, clmtcaus, and grnecon were kept as is. grncon measures general environmental concern, ranging from 1-not at all concerned to 5-very concerned. naturdev asks how willing respondents are to accept a reduction of america’s protected nature areas to open them up to economic development, ranging from on a 1-very willing to 5-very unwilling. clmtcaus assesses what people believe to be the cause of climate change, ranging from 1the climate is not changing to 4the climate has been changing mostly due to human activity. grnecon asks for agreement with the statement: we worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about prices and jobs today, ranging from 1-strongly agree to 5-strongly disagree. the final environmental attitudes index ranges between 7 and 34, with higher values representing greater environmental concern. the remaining variables were included as controls that were used in the multivariate regressions. for nominal independent variables — gender, race, and political ideology —dummies were created to allow for interpretations consistent with real-world applications. using sexnow1, race, and polviews, dummy variables were coded for homeowners, female, black, other (race), liberal, and conservative respondents. the referent categories are renters, male, white, white, moderate, and moderate, respectively. educ and rincom16 were kept as discrete variables, representing education in years and personal income (2019/2020) on a scale ranging from 0-no income to 26-$170,000+. an additive index was created for neighborhood environmental risk exposure using the variables airpollu, wtrpollu, and exweathr. these variables represent the extent to which respondents’ neighborhoods have been affected in the last 12 months by air pollution, water pollution, and extreme weather, respectively. each of these variables is measured on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all ) to 5 (to a very great extent). the resulting neighborhood environmental risk exposure index ranges between 3 and 15, with higher values representing greater exposure. finally, wtssnrps is the survey’s non-response adjusted weights that account for known population totals. the table below contains summary statistics for each of the variables. table 3: summary statistics consilience liu: homeownership and environmental attitudes the count for all the variables is 1,372 except for dummy: female. this is because 7 respondents reported being transgender or other in the survey and were recorded as na. given the way that the dummies are coded, their means can be interpreted as the percentage of respondents that are in the 1 category. notably, 75% of respondents are homeowners as compared to renters, and only 9% and 9.6% of respondents in the sample are black and other (race), respectively. for the personal income variable, its mean of 12.02, median of 15, and max of 26 translate approximately to incomes of $17,500-$19,999, $25,000-$29,999, and $170,000+, respectively. importantly, due to the way the additive indices were coded, environmental concern ranges between 7-34 and neighborhood environmental risk exposure is between 3-15. a one-tailed weighted t-test was used to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference between the mean environmental concern of homeowners and renters. separate data frames were created for homeowners and renters, both of which include the additive index for environmental concern and non-response adjusted weights. in alignment with the hypothesis that homeowners are more concerned about the environment than renters, a code was set up to test whether the mean for homeowners (x) is greater than the mean for renters (y). h0 signifies that the mean environmental concern of homeowners is not statistically significantly greater than the mean environmental concern of renters. ha signifies that the mean environmental concern of homeowners is statistically significantly greater than the mean environmental concern of renters. the p-value was then used to determine whether the null hypothesis can be rejected. regression tests were used to examine the relationship between homeownership status and environmental concern. first, a weighted bivariate regression was conducted using the homeownership dummy, environmental concern index, and wtssnrps weights variable. second, a weighted multivariate regression was conducted using additional control variables. the dependent variables in the model are homeowner dummy, neighborhood environmental risk exposure, female dummy, black (race) dummy, other (race) dummy, liberal dummy, conservative dummy, age (years), personal income, and education (years). based on existing literature, those who have been directly impacted by adverse environmental impacts are expected to be more concerned about the environment (whittaker et al., 2005). while the interview section of this paper did not find a consistent relationship between climate risk by county and respondents’ evaluations of local environmental risks, the neighborhood environmental risk exposure index derived from the survey is likely a more accurate measure of direct risk exposure. women are expected to express greater concern for the environment as compared to men due to greater perceived vulnerability to risk (bord and o’connor, 1997). people of color–represented by those in the black and other (race) category in this survey–have been found to be more invested in environmental justice and are expected to express greater environmental concern as opposed to white respondents (lazri and konisky, 2019). liberal and conservative respondents are expected to be more and less concerned, respectively, about the environment as compared to moderates (neumayer, 2004; holian and kahn, 2014). finally, environmental concern is expected to increase with education and decrease with age and personal income. third, an interaction was added to the previous weighted multivariate regression model. neighborhood environmental risk exposure was selected as a moderating variable. it is hypothesized that the effect of homeownership on environmental concern depends on individuals’ neighborhood exposure to environmental risks. this is because social and financial consequences—such as property damage, preventative hikes in maintenance costs, and increased energy prices—that differentiate the perspectives of homeowners and renters only materialize if individuals’ neighborhoods are directly exposed to environmental risks. in other words, homeowners’ levels of environmental concern are hypothesized to be more sensitive to increased levels of neighborhood environmental risk exposure than those of renters. the test was conducted twice—once with a renter dummy and another with a homeowner dummy—to find the slopes, standard errors, and p-values for both homeowners and 15 consilience renters. the regression tabled below only shows the result from the test that used a homeowner dummy, with homeowners coded as 1 and renters as 0. results mixed results were found across the various tests performed. counter to the hypothesis, the weighted t-test and bivariate regression found that renters are more concerned about the environment than homeowners. however, the addition of control variables in the weighted multivariate models flipped the sign of the coefficient, meaning that homeowners are estimated to have higher environmental concern scores than renters. furthermore, a statistically significant interaction effect was found for neighborhood environmental risk exposure on the environmental attitudes of homeowners and renters. the results of the weighted t-test did not allow for the null hypothesis to be rejected. contrary to expectations, the mean environmental concern of homeowners is lower than that of renters, measuring 23.076 and 23.816, respectively. the calculated p-value is 0.991 and greater than 0.05, meaning that homeowners are not more concerned about the environment than renters in a statistically significant way. considering these results, the test was flipped to see whether renters express greater environmental concern than homeowners such that h0 signifies that the mean environmental concern of renters is not statistically significantly greater than the mean environmental concern of homeowners and ha signifies that the mean environmental concern of renters is statistically significantly greater than the mean environmental concern of homeowners. the resulting p-value is 0.009 and less than 0.05, meaning that the null hypothesis should be rejected. therefore, the mean environmental concern of renters is statistically significantly greater than that of homeowners. this suggests that not only are homeowners from the sample not more concerned about the environment than renters, but the opposite appears to be true. however, this may be due to other variables that are not controlled for in this test such as neighborhood environmental risk exposure, gender, race, political ideology, age, personal income, and education. the table below shows the results of three weighted regression tests (1) bivariate (2) multivariate (3) multivariate with an interaction effect. table 4: regression results dependent variable: environmental concern (1) (2) (3) dummy: homeowner -0.927*** 0.677** -0.776 (0.352) (0.299) (0.791) neighborhood environmental risk exposure 0.536*** 0.388*** (0.052) (0.092) dummy: female 0.340 0.352 (0.251) (0.251) dummy: black -0.665 -0.639 (0.421) (0.421) dummy: other (race) 0.992** 1.030*** (0.396) (0.396) consilience liu: homeownership and environmental attitudes dummy: liberal 3.384*** 3.363*** (0.304) (0.304) dummy: conservative -3.989*** -3.967*** (0.304) (0.304) age (years) -0.023*** -0.024*** (0.008) (0.008) personal income -0.055*** -0.056*** (0.015) (0.015) education (years) 0.300*** 0.296*** (0.044) (0.044) interaction (homeownership * neighborhood environmental risk exposure) 0.219** (0.110) constant 24.077*** 16.983*** 18.089*** (0.299) (0.829) (0.998) observations 1,372 1,365 1,365 r2 0.005 0.427 0.429 adjusted r2 0.004 0.423 0.424 residual std. error 5.672 4.320 4.316 f statistic 6.915*** 100.942*** 92.323*** note: *p**p***p<0.01 bivariate regression the weighted bivariate regression tests the correlation between homeownership status and environmental concern. contrary to the hypothesis and consistent with the results of the weighted t-test, the regression found that relative to renters, homeowners are estimated to score 0.927 points lower than renters on the environmental concern scale. furthermore, this relationship is statistically significant. 17 consilience figure 1: boxplot of environmental concern by homeownership status. figure 1 shows the mean level of environmental concern for homeowners and renters. the difference in means between the two groups is difficult to see visually because of how close they are. therefore, while the results are statistically significant, they may not hold substantive significance. multivariate regression the addition of control variables in the weighted multivariate model found a statistically significant relationship between homeownership and increased environmental concern. this runs counter to the results from the bivariate regression. relative to renters, homeowners are estimated to score 0.677 points higher on the environmental concern index, holding all other variables constant. furthermore, the p-value is less than 0.05, indicating a statistically significant relationship. this aligns with the hypothesis that homeowners are more concerned about the environment than renters. figure 2: marginal effects. the marginal effects graph visualizes the effect that being a homeowner has on one’s level of environmental concern. its upward positive slope shows that relative to renters (0), homeowners (1) are consilience liu: homeownership and environmental attitudes estimated to score slightly higher on the environmental concern index, holding all other variables constant. statistically significant independent effects were found between environmental concern and seven of the added control variables. the figure below shows the estimated impact of each of the independent variables on environmental concern. holding all other variables constant, a one-point increase in neighborhood environmental risk exposure is associated with a 0.536-point increase in environmental concern. relative to white respondents, those who reported being in the other (race) category are estimated to score 0.992 points higher on the environmental concern scale. relative to moderates, liberals and conservatives are estimated to score 3.384 points higher and 3.989 points lower on the environmental concern scale, respectively. every one-year increase in age is associated with a 0.023-point decrease in environmental concern. every one-unit increase in personal income is associated with a 0.055-point decrease in environmental concern. finally, every one-year increase in education is associated with a 0.300-point increase in environmental concern. for all the variables above, the p-value is smaller than 0.05, indicating statistically significant independent effects. all the control variables moved in ways consistent with the theory. the two variables that do not have an impact on environmental concern are the female dummy and the black dummy. this means that black respondents do not feel differently about the environment relative to whites, and female respondents are not more or less concerned about the environment relative to male respondents. the r2 value and adjusted r2 for the test are 0.427 and 0.423, respectively, indicating that the model accounts for approximately 42% of the variance in the dependent variable. figure 3: model coefficients. multivariate regression with an interaction effect homeowners’ levels of environmental concern were hypothesized to be more sensitive to changes in neighborhood environmental risk exposure than those of renters. for expositional purposes, the scatterplot below visualizes how environmental concern for all respondents—both renters and homeowners— is related to neighborhood environmental risk exposure. 19 consilience figure 4: relationship between environmental concern and neighborhood environmental risk exposure. the graph shows a positive correlation between environmental concern and neighborhood environmental risk exposure. as neighborhood environmental risk exposure increases, environmental concern scores increasingly cluster around higher values. the weighted multivariate regression test with an interaction effect found a statistically significant difference between how neighborhood environmental risk exposure affects renters' versus homeowners’ levels of environmental concern. the slope differential between the two groups is 0.219 with a p value less than 0.05. furthermore, risk exposure is a statistically significant indicator of environmental concern for both renters and homeowners. the slope for renters is 0.388 with a standard error of 0.092 and a p-value less than 0.05. therefore, for renters, every unit increase in risk exposure is associated with a 0.388 unit increase in environmental concern. the slope for homeowners is 0.606 with a standard error of 0.063 and a p-value less than 0.05. this indicates that for homeowners, every unit increase in risk exposure is associated with a 0.606 unit increase in environmental concern. the r2 value and adjusted r2 for the test are 0.429 and 0.424, respectively, indicating that the model accounts for between 42% and 43% of the variance in the dependent variable. consilience liu: homeownership and environmental attitudes figure 5: interaction effect. as can be seen from the graph below, the slope for homeowners is steeper than that of renters above an environmental risk exposure level of 4. this supports the hypothesis that homeowners’ level of environmental concern is more sensitive to risk exposure than that of renters. in summary, environmental risk exposure is a predictor of environmental concern for both renters and homeowners, and the effect that exposure has on the two groups is different in a statistically significant way. conclusion this paper tested the hypothesis that homeowners are more concerned about the environment and likely to support aggressive climate policies than renters. both interviews and quantitative tests found homeowners to be more concerned about the environment than renters. while interviews failed to identify direct environmental risk exposure as a moderating variable in the relationship between homeownership status and environmental concern, quantitative tests did find a statistically significant interaction effect. a limitation of the general approach was that short-term renters were not differentiated from long-term tenants. this is potentially significant because long-term tenants may think and behave more like homeowners than short-term renters. additionally, only a limited selection of indicators for environmental concern were tested. being more intentional with the variables chosen and the specific types of concerns assessed could yield additional insights. future studies should find ways to account for differences between the perspectives of short-term renters and long-term. furthermore, researchers might consider distinguishing between what is considered classical environmentalism and environmental human rights and testing homeowners’ and renters’ attitudes toward values associated with each (rajan 2011). it may also be productive to focus on environmental behaviors rather than attitudes. additionally, age is likely also a moderating variable and its relationship to homeownership and environmental concern should be further investigated. in summary, results from both qualitative and quantitative methods used in this study support the hypothesis that homeowners are more concerned about the environment than renters. tests performed on data from the 2021 general social survey found statistically significant differences between the environmental attitudes of homeowners and renters and interviews revealed distinct ways of framing 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(2005). racial/ethnic group attitudes toward environmental protection in california: is “environmentalism” still a white phenomenon? political research quarterly, 58(3), 435–447. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/106591290505800306 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/ https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119162124.ch6 https://doi.org/10.1016/ https://environment.yale.edu/news/article/study-ofhttps://environment.yale.edu/news/article/study-ofhttps://doi.org/10.1017/ https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2022.101772 https://doi.org/10.4337/jhre.2011.01.06 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2006.04.002 https://doi.org/ https://doi.org/10.2307/3341822 https://doi.org/ consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 25 (2021-22) redefining shareholder value maximization: identifying key sustainable investment strategies and their role in rehabilitating corporate purpose iris wan wan duong committee on global thought columbia university abstract the purpose of this essay is to situate investing in a commercial context where consideration of esg and impact factors at the least does not compromise investment returns, and hence excludes discussions on non-profits, private foundations and charitable organizations. instead, i look into pension funds, private equities and hedge funds whose primary fiduciary duty is to serve the economic interest of beneficiaries. grounded in case studies and real-life interviews, this essay explore ways in which investors can transcend their roles of merely financiers to become gatekeepers, value creators and reformers of corporate mission, steering companies towards the path of sustainability. ultimately, by examining the regulatory framework, valuation models and implementation tactics of various sustainable investment strategies, this essay seeks to illuminate a new understanding of ‘value maximization’ that ties positive externalities to long term portfolio performance. acknowledgement a special thanks to the people whom i interviewed as part of my research process: jimmy yan, special counsel to the deputy comptroller for asset management & chief jennifer grancio, executive at engine no. 1 john george, esg and product strategy at lord abbett asset management mia soerli, esg team at fsn capital partners keywords: corporate sustainability, sustainable investment strategies, esgs. 2 consilience table of contents 1. reimagining capitalism for a new corporate purpose 2. maximizing ‘value’ in sustainable investing 3. esg integration: the gatekeeper • 3.1 the mechanism of integrating esg factors in equity valuation • 3.2 fiduciary duty of pension funds: dissecting the employee retirement income security act of 1974 • 3.3 case study: pension investing with the office of new york city comptroller scott m. stringer 4. impact investing: the value creator • 4.1 acting in clients’ ‘best interest’: the investment advisors act of 1940 • 4.2 ‘impact’ mapping: the theory of change • 4.3 case study: volery capital private equity impact fund 5. ‘impact’ activist fund: the reformer • 5.1 impact activist fund versus traditional hedge fund activism • 5.2 activist tactics & impact reforms • 5.3 case study: reenergizing exxonmobil with engine 1 6. roadblocks to sustainable investing • 6.1 the lack of standardized framework for impact measurement • 6.2 when doing good is not profitable • 6.3 sustainable investing: a complex reality 7. a future towards market sustainability 8. bibliography consilience duong: redefining shareholder value maximization 1. reimagining capitalism for a new corporate purpose frederic jameson had a rather bleak outlook on capitalism. he noted, “someone once said that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism. we can now revise that and witness the attempt to imagine capitalism by way of imagining the end of the world.” but what if capitalism can be reimagined by way of saving the world? the vice and virtue of capitalism are economic incentive — the incentive that fuels hard work, competition, creation of wealth and unprecedented technological advancement, is the same incentive that drives exploitation, collusion, income disparity, and economic degradation. this beating heart of capitalism, though much critiqued, resonates with that of fundamental human character. our current incarnation of capitalism has put much emphasis on shareholder value maximization, a doctrine that legitimatizes the relentless pursuit of profit by corporate executives in order to accommodate solely the short-term interests of shareholders. yet the unilateral focus on shareholders has led to huge disengagement with other corporate actors, the campaign to reimagine capitalism marks a growing divergence in the perception of ‘value’. the rise of climate change as an existential threat coupled with the surge of populist reactions have pushed discourses on corporate social responsibility to transform drastically in recent years. in 2019, the business roundtable released a new statement on redefining corporate purpose from shareholder primacy to a commitment to all stakeholders, including customers, employees, suppliers and communities, and ultimately “promote an economy that serves all americans” (business roundtable, 2019). consequently, investors are urged to harness their financial power and catalyze this change in mission by integrating sustainability as part of their new investment ethos. big lenders such as jp morgan aims to commit $200 billion to clean energy financing by 2025 in support of the paris agreement. blackrock chairman larry fink in his 2021 letter to ceos reiterated that “climate risk is investment risk” (blackrock, 2021), thereby requiring all fifteen thousand portfolio companies to disclose sustainability reports according to the sustainability accounting standards board (sasb) guidelines and task force on climate-related financial disclosures (tcfd) metrics. ‘corporate sustainability’ has become the new buzzword, but how sustainable are the efforts in achieving that? philanthropic efforts have proven insufficient to curb climate crisis or to narrow widening inequality, which calls for a greater need to mobilize private capital and create an incentive-based solution to reform corporate purpose. in 2017, 80% of the large-cap s&p 500 index and 78% of the broad-market russell 3000 index were owned by institutional investors (pensions & investments, 2017). large asset owners with trillions of assets under management and significant stakes across companies large and small can be powerful agents of change, influencing governance and business strategies of portfolio entities. by incorporating sustainability issues in their capital allocation decisions, they are effectively encouraging and enforcing portfolio companies to integrate positive environmental, social and governance (esg) impacts as part of their corporate mission, thus accelerating the movement towards a fairer and more inclusive capitalism. the purpose of this essay is to situate investing in a commercial context where consideration of esg and impact factors at the least does not compromise investment returns, and hence excludes discussions on non-profits, 4 consilience private foundations and charitable organizations. instead, i look into pension funds, private equities and hedge funds whose primary fiduciary duty is to serve the economic interest of beneficiaries. grounded in case studies and real-life interviews, this essay explore ways in which investors can transcend their roles of merely financiers to become gatekeepers, value creators and reformers of corporate mission, steering companies towards the path of sustainability. ultimately, by examining the regulatory framework, valuation models and implementation tactics of various sustainable investment strategies, this essay seeks to illuminate a new understanding of ‘value maximization’ that ties positive externalities to long term portfolio performance. 2. maximizing ‘value’ in sustainable investing in her book value of everything: making and taking in the global economy, mariana mazzucato observes how the idea of “value” has evolved over the years, from being an “objective theory of value” “tied to the conditions in which those goods and services were produced” to a normative concept, in which “value” is determined by “by the dynamics of price, due to scarcity and [consumers’] preferences” (mazzucato, 2018). this subjective and reductive definition of ‘value’ as ‘market price’ explains why milton friedman attributes social responsibility of a business to pure profit maximization, whereby the success of an enterprise is ubiquitously measured by share price performance. however, this myopic approach only encourages managers to adopt short-term management practices such as share buybacks to financially engineer a share price boost, without actually considering the long-term fundamentals of a company. it also ignores the fact that the success of an enterprise relies on the collective effort and mutual trust between multiple constituencies. conversely, stakeholder theory seeks to broaden the definition of ‘value’. it does not clash with the profit-oriented engine of capitalism, but simply “emphasizes the social relationships between management and employees, between the company and the community, the quality of the products produced, and so on”, and recognizes how combining social relationships with financial goals helps companies create a more “sustainable ‘competitive advantage’” (mazzucato, 2018, p. 174). under stakeholder capitalism, investors seeking ‘value’ maximization do not merely look to price-to-earnings ratio and dividend yield as benchmarks. rather, investors are to adopt a ‘sustainable’ lens to screen their investments and evaluate them on the basis of financial and social returns. according to the united nations principles for responsible investment (un pri), there are three ways in which investors can source and filter through investment opportunities: norm-based screening to evaluate investments against minimum esg standards, positive screening to select outstanding esg performers or companies with positive intentionality such as social enterprises, and negative screening to exclude bad esg performers, which by default eliminate companies from certain sectors such as oil and gas, tobacco and firearms. all three screenings intend to divest from companies who do not conform to esg standards, but what is the opportunity cost of those exclusions? and how effective is divestment? common index funds such as the s&p 500 cover a broad consilience duong: redefining shareholder value maximization basket of securities that will inevitably include mega-cap fossil fuel owners such as exxonmobil, which creates a problem of ‘passive investing’ where index fund investors still indirectly finance these oil and gas giants. negative screening of individual companies is not enough to undo the pollution damage by large gas companies, thus i propose a new type ‘inclusive’ negative screening, where bad actors can still become desirable targets for certain asset owners, particularly activist investors whose goal is to engage with the management of the company and push for better internal reforms. correspondingly, three investment strategies are identified: esg integration, impact investing and impact activist fund. depending on its institutional type, different assets owners have their respective fiduciary duties, disclosure and funding requirements to adhere to, which determine their flexibility and selection of investment strategies: 3. esg integration: the gatekeeper sustainable investing ecosystem asset owners institutional/ retail investors, endowments, foundations, pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, insurance, private equity, venture capitals, hedge funds activist hedge funds screening norm-based positive inclusive-negative strategy esg integration impact investing impact activist fund definition the aggregate worth of a company is valued based on based on its esg standards, alongside traditional financial metrics investments made with the intention to generate positive, measurable social and environmental impact alongside a financial return.1 investors target companies that generate negative externalities, instigate reforms and force target firms to change investment target normal corporations abiding by esg standards businesses with an explicit intention to create positive impact underperforming companies that requires activist interventions fund examples neuberger berman, fsn capital partners bridges venture, elevar equity, volery capital engine 1, impactive capital, jana partners notable measurement frameworks sustainability accounting standards board (sasb), global reporting initiative (gri), msci rating impact reporting and investment standards (iris), global impact investing rating system (giirs) , social return on investment (sroi) internal auditing 6 consilience 3.1 the mechanism of integrating esg factors in equity valuation all three screenings intend to divest from companies who do not conform to esg standards, but what is the opportunity cost of those exclusions? and how effective is divestment esg investing focuses on pushing environmental, social, and governance standards to become the norm. in a discounted cash flow model, esg factors can impact the future cash flow (short term performance), terminal value (long term performance), discount rate (risk), and hence the overall valuation of a company. mathematically, the first step is to integrate esg factors into the financial forecast by adjusting the revenue and revenue growth rate on the income statement by the amount that reflects the level of esg risks or opportunities. for instance, an automobile manufacturer can expect a decrease in sales of diesel cars and increase in sales of electrical vehicles. mining companies that do not observe workplace safety standards may encounter lawsuits, union strikes, or fatal accidents, resulting in higher labor cost, litigation expenses and loss of productivity. on the balance sheet, one-off impairment charges and asset write-downs could decrease a company’s earnings for the year. regulatory changes also often have significant impacts on capital expenditures listed on the cash flow statement, such as forcing an electricity producer to upgrade its coal power plants to meet new environmental regulation. esg factors could materially impact specific line items on each financial statement, which influence a company’s free cash flow within the forecast period. secondly, the terminal value constitutes a majority (50-70%) of a company’s total value. it implies an accounting assumption whereby the company will continuously grow and operate at a certain growth rate beyond the forecast period, and is the strongest lever in driving a company’s enterprise value. as fossil fuel reserves diminish over time and energy consumption pattern shifts toward natural gas, a shrinking fossil fuel company with zero perpetual growth will have a minimal terminal value compared to a renewable energy company with expanding business opportunities. similarly, esg risks can heighten a company’s cost of capital through increased operational costs, cost of litigation, physical risk, reputational damage etc. companies that opt out of the esg lens could potentially face a risk of stranded assets, meaning obsolete assets that have exceeded their useful life and are prematurely forced into long term/ permanent closure. these assets either face impairment charges or are converted to liabilities on the balance sheet, and are recorded as a loss of profit on the income statement. devaluation of coal-fired plants are particularly prevalent nowadays as countries seek to transition to a low-carbon economy. according to a financial times report, there is an estimated “$900 billion cost of stranded energy assets” (livsey, 2020). capital-intensive coal companies are often highly leveraged, and a decrease in revenue streams could imply a greater default risk and incur a higher cost of debt. a higher discount rate translates to a lower net present value of an investment, thus a lower valuation. esg integration is not a new valuation method. it simply demands a more thorough due diligence, risk assessment and accurate growth projection when evaluating a company. to investors, it paints a more holistic picture of the intrinsic value of an investment opportunity that considers both its economic standing today consilience duong: redefining shareholder value maximization and its ability to general cash flow on an ongoing basis. to ground this in reality, fidelity international reported that stocks with higher esg rating have significantly outperformed their lower rated peers in the first nine months of 2020 during the covid pandemic (fidelity international, 2021). their resilient trading performance in the midst of economic downturn is testimony to the risk mitigating potential of esg integration, justifying pursuing sustainability as part of ‘shareholder value maximization’.? 3.2 fiduciary duty of pension funds: dissecting the employee retirement income security act of 1974 are returns compromised in esg investing? the case of pension investing offers an example of a balancing act that prioritizes investments return while driving efforts in sustainable investing. the employee retirement income security act of 1974 (erisa) is a federal law that governs the fiduciary duty of private-sector pension funds, which declares that plan fiduciary must "plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits” to them (“fiduciary responsibilities”, 2021). under erisa, fiduciary is not permitted to sacrifice economic returns to promote collateral social goals. it must diversify the plan’s investments to mitigate risk of large losses, avoid conflict of interest, and discharge its duties “with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing” ((“fiduciary responsibilities”, 2021). contentious debate surrounding the role of esg factors in investment analysis has led some to question whether putting in place non-financial metrics would compromise a fiduciary’s duty of loyalty. during the clinton administration, an ‘all things being equal’ test was introduced in accordance with the interpretive bulletin (ib) 94-01, which allows investors to consider esg factors only as tiebreakers if two investments share the same financial profile. during the bush administration, the department of labor released ib 2008-01 stating that “collateral, noneconomic factors should rarely be considered in selecting plan investments” and placed heavy documentation requirements should fiduciaries consider any collateral benefits, thus discouraging fiduciaries from considering esg factors even in situations where they have an economic link to investments (morgan lewis, 2015). the proper recognition of the material financial impact of esg factors only officially came about in obama’s introduction of the ib 2015-01. it acknowledged that “esg factors may have a direct relationship to the economic value of a plan’s investment”, and hence justified the consideration of esg factors to be “proper components of the fiduciary’s primary analysis of the economic merits of competing investment choices” (morgan lewis, 2015). the bulletin also lowered the reporting requirements and therefore encouraged economically targeted investments (etis), which are known as “socially responsible investments” that “produce benefits in addition to, and apart from, the financial return on the invested assets” (morgan lewis, 2015). i argue that basing investment decisions solely on pecuniary factors is not an act of prudence, but rather an act of negligence that exposes assets to stranded asset risk and systematic risk. as part of prudent decision making, fiduciaries should “inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material information 8 consilience reasonably available to them” (smith v. van gorkom, 1985) (cornell law school, 2021), a disregard of esg analysis which evidently has material links to financial statements is a blatant dismissal of a comprehensive economic analysis of investment opportunities, and thus a breach of fiduciary duty. furthermore, andreas hoepner pinpoints that “due to the sheer size” of pension funds, their financial performance is “largely dependent on the performance of financial markets as a whole instead of the returns to individual assets” (hoepnera, 2011). this acute observation provides extra incentive for pension funds to allocate resources on investments that have a positive impact on the economic stability of the community. this investment strategy, on one hand, works in favor of the financial interest of beneficiaries. on the other hand, it also improves the economic conditions of the area that the beneficiaries are located in, demonstrating an alignment between monetary and impact returns that ultimately benefits city workers. between 2016-2020, the trump administration rolled back some of obama’s efforts: the latest rule on ‘financial factors in selecting plan investments’ (2020) labels esg benefits as “non-pecuniary factors” and once again limits their role to merely “tiebreakers” (thompson hine, 2020). nonetheless, such regulatory changes have illustrated the government’s ability to forcibly align esg standards with financial factors. recognizing the value of esg factors and translating that across legal frameworks will beneficially shape the investment strategies of pension funds, and if done right, this will have a tremendous impact on reforming corporate purpose. 3.3 case study: pension investing with the office of new york city comptroller scott m. stringer many sections of erisa are applicable to public sector pension funds (cfa institute, 2021), such as the new york city pension funds. the nyc pension funds is the fourth largest pension plan in the u.s. and represents a system of five independent funds that encompasses the employees’ retirement system (nycers), the teachers’ retirement system (trs), the police pension fund (police), the fire pension fund (fire), and the board of education retirement system (bers), totaling $240 billion in assets under management (“pension/ investment management”, 2021). it is also a un pri signatory. as part of an interview with jimmy yan, who serves as the special counsel to the deputy comptroller for asset management & chief investment officer at the office of new york city comptroller scott m. stringer, we explored practical ways in which esg factors can be integrated in an economic-based investment process while achieving competitive risk-adjusted market rates of returns: i. company engagement through the boardroom accountability project: engage with the board & management teams of investee enterprise by voting on shareholder resolutions, filing shareholder proposals and nominating directors through ‘proxy access’ implement boardroom diversity by calling on companies to adopt a ‘rooney rule’ and consider women and people of color for every board seat and ceo appointments (“boardroom accountability project.”, 2020) consilience duong: redefining shareholder value maximization in april 2020, nyc pension funds launched a ‘vote no’ campaign against lee raymond who serves on the board of jp morgan and has deep ties to the fossil fuel industry (“boardroom accountability project.”, 2020) ii. esg integration in the due diligence process: by adhering to the five principles of good governance — accountability, investor rights, aligned interest, transparency and legal action (“corporate governance”, 2021), esg practices and policies of managers are factored into the decision-making process of all investments iii. esg-themed investing: set forth climate solutions goal to double investment in climate change solutions from $2 billion to $4 billion across all asset classes iv. economically targeted investments (etis): allocate 2% of the pension assets to etis that are focused on providing affordable housing through antipredatory lending strategy and construction of 42,907 affordable apartments (“economically targeted investments”, 2021). the latter rehabilitation program also indirectly created job opportunities within the construction industry, tying financial return to the stability of the community v. divestments in firearm manufacturers/ retailers, private prisons, tobacco and fossil fuel reserve owners as a way to de-risk its portfolio as part of its commitment to clean energy solutions, nyc pension funds announced in jan 2021 a $4 billion divestment from fossil fuels company securities to de-risk (kerber, 2021) in the words of assistant secretary of labor jeanne wilson, “plan fiduciaries must put the growth and security of workers’ retirement savings first” (“u.s. department of labor issues final rule”, 2021). through esg integration and eti investing, the new york city pension funds ensure their continual commitment to the financial interests of city workers while engendering positive ancillary effects such as job creation, whom city workers equally benefit from. here, the pursuit of shareholder value maximization takes on new meanings. for one, active ownership — the use of shareholder rights “to influence the activities or behavior of investee companies” — in the form of strategic engagement and proxy voting has become a popular tool for equity investors to improve long term value of companies (“a practical guide”, 2018). investor-corporate dialogue is a direct way to build mutual understanding between investors and investees. investors can participate in shaping corporate strategy, assist companies to achieve esg goals, and ultimately ensure sound governance. for instance, former exxonmobil ceo lee raymond stepped down from the board of jp morgan in december 2020 following a series of vote-out campaign (kellaher, 2020). secondly, divestment is a form of risk mitigation. modern portfolio theory states that the risk of one investment should not be viewed alone, but assessed based on how it will affect the overall risk and return of an entire portfolio. to secure long term viability of funds, large endowments such as the university of california has fully divested from fossil fuels since may 2020 (asmelash, 2020). by capitalizing on their large investor power, long time horizon and inherently diversified portfolio, pension funds are advantageously positioned to yield high margins through economies of scale and modify corporate behavior by putting in place esg metrics as the gatekeeper to their vast investment universe. 10 consilience 4. impact investing: the value creator another critical observation by mariana mazzucato is the distinction between ‘value creation’ and ‘value extraction. modern economics focus on the latter, describing activities that “[move] around existing resources and outputs, and gaining disproportionately from the ensuing trade”. on the contrary, ‘value creation’ refers to “ways in which different types of resources (human, physical and intangible) are established and interact to produce new goods and services” (mazzucato, 2018, p. 16). this is what impact investing is all about. like any other investment strategies ranging from value to growth investing, impact investing presents a differentiated creative approach to investing. the global impact investing network (giin) defines impact investment as “investments made with the intention to generate positive, measurable social and environmental impact alongside a financial return” (“what you need to know about impact investing”, 2021). it emphasizes two things: an intentionality to do good and the convergence between impact and financial returns. investment themes span from gender lens investing, sustainable agriculture, to renewable energy, and the objective is often related to advancing the united nations sustainable development goals. while esg investors aim to hold companies accountable to basic esg standards, impact investors actively pursue opportunities that generate positive externalities. 4.1 acting in clients’ ‘best interest’: the investment advisors act of 1940 similar to erisa for pension funds, the investment advisors act of 1940 (‘advisors act’) establishes the fiduciary duty of private equity fund managers, which comprises a duty of care and duty of loyalty. the securities and exchange commission (sec) released an interpretative guidance in 2019, which underscores investors’ duty of care to (i) “provide advice that is in the best interest of the client”, (ii) “seek best execution of a client’s transactions where the adviser has the responsibility to select broker to execute client trades”, and (iii) “provide advice and monitoring over the course of the relationship” (commission interpretation regarding standard of conduct, 2019). there remains no clear regulatory framework for esg/ impact investing, and what is classified as ‘best interest’ remains to be a point of contention. nonetheless, the guideline clarifies that fiduciary duty “follows the contours of the relationship between the adviser and its client, and the adviser and its client may shape that relationship by agreement, provided that there is full and fair disclosure and informed consent” (commission interpretation regarding standard of conduct, 2019). in other words, fiduciary duty should be examined on the basis of the agreed upon relationship between the investor and beneficiary set forth in the terms and conditions of offering materials and disclosure agreement. it does not assume that impact investing does or does not automatically conform with fiduciary duties, but asserts that “the burden of ensuring that an [impact] investment strategy is consistent with an adviser’s fiduciary duties largely falls to each consilience duong: redefining shareholder value maximization adviser when designing and offering such strategies to clients” (“esg investing: considerations for u.s. registered investment advisers”, 2020). despite its ambiguous nature, the term “best interest” actually provides a degree of flexibility for investors to design its own investment strategy. should investors wish to pursue impact investing as means to achieve clients’ investment objectives, it will be up to advisors to memorialize in the advisory agreement and offering documents “what advisors understand by [impact] strategy”, “the specific contours of how [impact] factors are utilized when making investment decisions” and disclose any material esg impacts in future reporting (“esg investing: considerations for u.s. registered investment advisers”, 2020). furthermore, a prevailing misconception of impact investing is that it only produces below market returns and therefore breaches the advisors act. however, giin’s annual impact investor survey 2020 found 67% of the respondents targeting risk-adjusted market rate of returns (“annual impact investor survey 2020”, 2020). in fact, a growing body of academic literature has shown that there is no apparent tradeoff between impact and financial return. cambridge associates collaborated with giin in 2015 to publish the ‘impact investing benchmark’ and found that impact investment funds that raised under $100 million had produced a 9.5% internal rate of return (“introducing the impact investing benchmark”, 2015, 14), not dissimilar to the annual average return of the s&p 500. adam schor presented a successful case on impact investing for endowments by integrating it as part of a fair-return strategy for a university (schor, 2020, pp. 24-43). elevar equity, founded by maya chorengel who is also the co-managing partner of tpg rise fund, adopts a “commercial approach to impact investing” in low-income communities while maintaining a “benchmark market performance”, and is one of the most successful private equity firms to establish a “direct correlation between high impact and returns” (about elevar”, 2020). bridges venture, founded by the father of impact investing ronald cohen, has raised over £1 billion external capital and likewise is a thematic investor that has consistently delivered “attractive returns” while “[generating] better social and environmental outcomes” (“annual report 2018-2019”, 2018, p. 8). as an example, despite sluggish activity in the property market in 2019, its sme workplace business ‘flexspace’ saw a 70% boost in net rental income in order to meet the demands of industrial property (“annual report 2018-2019”, 2018, p. 30). in other words, profit-maximizing investors can also be socially motivated. one reason why impact investment may be financially profitable is the thematic growth underlying impact industries. impact themes often focus on categories with expanding business opportunities and a guaranteed consumer demand, such as renewable energy, water resource and waste management systems. sustainable investment practice is by virtue forward looking and thus automatically eradicates the stranded asset risk. as one door closes, another door opens. for instance, while the coal pipeline has tumbled nearly 70% between 2015-2018 (shearer et al., 2019, p. 5), renewable energy has increased 100% between 2000-2018 to become the fastest-growing energy source in the u.s. (“renewable energy”, 2020). to put these growth rates into context, the market is forecasted to grow at a compound annual growth rate of over 6% in 2020-2015 (“united states renewable energy market report 2020”, 2020). by riding on the tailwinds of macro trends, such as the transition to renewable energy, this materially translates to increased 12 consilience revenue streams. as with esg integration in equity valuation, investors can safely augment the perpetual growth rate of sustainable assets when calculating terminal value as they are deemed to be “long lasting”. the discount rate effectively captures the risk factor of company, which can be used to reward impact investments with low volatility and penalize esg defectors with uncertain future. since renewable energy assets are not subject to the volatility of oil price, this gives them access to a lower cost of capital and thus a higher valuation. one of the most exhaustive studies was conducted by gunnar friede, in which he pooled together over 2200 individual studies to show that “esg investing is empirically very well founded”, for “90% of studies find a nonnegative esg–corporate-financial-performance relation”, meaning that esg/ impact investing has neutral to positive impact on financial returns (friede et al., 2015, pp. 210-233). there is plenty of potential for investors to monetize non-pecuniary utility, and impact investing is the space where impact and financial return intersect. 4.2 ‘impact’ mapping: the theory of change impact measurements can be broadly categorized into absolute versus relative methodologies. absolute measurements refer to examples such as the b impact measurement (b-corp questionnaire), un reporting guidelines and score cards, while relative measurements include buffet’s ‘impact rate of return’, social return on investment, iris/ giirs ratings, and the additionality concept. depending on the nature of impact outcome, it is up to investors’ discretion to determine which approach to adopt. nevertheless, as a general rule of thumb, every impact investor should be able to complete a ‘theory of change’ exercise so as to explicitly demonstrate how change is materialized through investments. the theory of change as issued by unicef (also known as the impact value chain/ logic model) outlines a step-by-step guide of tracking how inputs lead to intended outcomes. i have chosen this for several reasons: firstly, regardless of the project, participants or impact outcome, the theory is universally applicable to any investment at any stage of the development. secondly, the theory’s methodological approach to enacting change reinforces the clear intentionality of impact investments. thirdly, impact management should be an iterative process to ensure optimal impact. by documenting every step, the theory provides actionable insights for investors and managers to identify the data that needs to be collected, monitor and adjust their interventions (inputs/ activities), and ultimately form a feedback loop to certify that the intended results are achieved. fourthly, the meticulous breakdown also requires some degree of measurable data as ‘output’, which forms the basis of impact reporting and ensures that return is quantifiable. the theory is as follows: input → activities → output → outcome → impact (rogers, 2014). input refers to the capital, human resource and any assets needed for the investment. activities are the actions occurred to produce value, such as distributing solar panels, lowering healthcare for low-income communities or hiring teachers. activities produce output, which can be quantifiably and qualitatively assessed by using predetermined, industry-specific key performance indicators. outcome refers to the larger distributive effect made on the community. impact denotes the funds’ overall influence in the community, including both financial and impact return. from start consilience duong: redefining shareholder value maximization to finish, the theory of change articulates a coherent narrative that links investors’ contribution to impact creation, enforcing accountability and consistency throughout the process while evincing the ‘value-creating’ potential of impact investing. 4.3 case study: volery capital private equity impact fund the traditional business model of private equity (pe) involves acquiring a company through a leveraged buyout, performing operational enhancements, then assuming an exit after 3-5 years at a higher price to realize a return on investment. pe firms are often structured as a limited partnership agreement between limited partners (lps) who commit the capital and general partners (gps) who manage the portfolio and make investment decisions. the two-twenty fee structure, in which gps earn 2% of the investment capital as management fee and 20% carried interest should investment returns outperform a predefined hurdle, provides extra incentive for gps to optimize investment outcomes. in this light, how can investors optimize the pe fund structure to execute impact missions in such a way that is congruent with fiduciary duty? how can impact strategy operate within this judicial framework of the advisors act? recognized as one of the impactassets 50, volery capital provides an exemplary model of a growth-oriented private equity that simultaneously yields “superior economic and impact returns” (“strategy”, 2021). grounded in the belief that impact propositions are accretive to financial returns, its investments seek to address climate change and promote inclusive economic growth. volery’s investment strategy features an aligned interest between impact-oriented gps and mainstream lps in order to achieve a double bottom line impact, its success case can be extrapolated to a more general template for other pe investors to learn as follows: i. sourcing & due diligence: employ a rigorous due diligence process when underwriting cash flows to holistically evaluate company managers based on their orientation to impact, which is anchored in the in-house ‘alpha’ framework approach to impact: how does a company manager assess esg risks and opportunities? set goals and action plans around esg considerations? is the impact outcome measurable? leadership: what is the level of esg expertise on the team? how committed is the senior management team to esg considerations? how does the team engage with stakeholders? is there training at the junior level? presentation: how, and how often, does the firm measure and report impact and financial return to stakeholders? are reports standardized? how does the manager forecast expected outcomes around esg considerations? hypothesis to impact: is the manager articulating a relevant thesis for addressing a significant challenge? is the firm’s action plan accretive to investment thesis? does the manager consider both negative and positive externalities? application of values within the firm: does the firm “practice what it preaches”? are quality benefits and compensation provided to employees? inclusive work culture? does the firm engage with the broader community in which it is based in? 14 consilience another important aspect of the due diligence process is examining financial return, specifically to identify and underwrite the alignment between economic and impact ii. value-add strategies: as an example, volery provides capital and strategic support to scale and institutionalize portfolio companies (“strategy”, 2021) provide technical assistance and capacity building: for instance, help firm to recruit and retain talent, implement state-of-the-art approach to risk and compliance practices, scale and enhance financial profitability, strategize product development and supply chain efficiency assist in capital raising: deploy fundraising strategies and provide investee with networks to connect to lps and consultants strengthen esg reporting and integrate esg considerations in firm and product development marketing and investor relations: help investee articulate their differentiated strategy, tell impact stories effectively and connect to lps iii. optimize exit opportunities: despite a short holding period (3-5 years), this does not clash with the longterm orientation of sustainable investing due to the ability of pe investor to optimize value on exit. should value-add strategies be successful in materially increasing the valuation of portfolio company, pe investor could exit at a price higher than the buy-in cost and realize a return company managers that demonstrate impact stewardship and superior execution ability are attractive targets for pe impact investors, and having a robust due diligence framework to select high performing managers is crucial for investors to secure alpha returns and mainstream impact. pe firms are extremely well poised to achieve competitive returns. for one, through active engagement protocols and value add strategies, pe investors can directly shape portfolio companies’ strategies and work with companies to help them meet the intended impact (“a guide for impact investment fund managers”, 2021). secondly, the composition of revenue for the gp changes over the life of a fund and grows nonlinearly should the fund outperforms, therefore motivating gp to strive for attractive returns. during the early years of fund formation and deal sourcing, gps’ main source of income is the management fee (2% of the committed capital). as capital is deployed, the management fee decreases and gp’s performance fee becomes contingent upon the fund’s return. as fund matures, lps would first recover all of their invested capital. if it continues to perform above hurdle rates, a disproportionately large share of investment returns will then be allocated to gp according to a distribution waterfall schedule. the 20% of excess returns gives pe investors strong incentives to make profits and prove the economic case that financial returns are not sacrificed for the sake of impact. pe firms are thus one of the most influential actors to catalyze the development of the impact investment space. 5. impact activist funds: the reformer it is intuitive to see the ‘value’ of esg and impact investing, but what is the ‘value’ in investing in esg laggards? what are the value maximization opportunities consilience duong: redefining shareholder value maximization of targeting esg under-performers? and what lessons can we learn from traditional shareholder activism by hedge funds? 5.1 ‘impact’ activist fund versus traditional hedge fund activism the term ‘impact’ activist fund is a spin-off from ‘hedge fund activism’. traditionally, activist hedge funds would acquire a huge stake in a public company’s share and try to obtain seats on the company’s board in order to effect significant change within the company. activists may instigate a series of operational, financial and governance reforms, with the ultimate aim of maximizing shareholder value. as observed by alon brav, target firms are typically “cash-cows with low growth prospects” (brav et al., 2010, p. 4). they are not in financial distress, rather, they are small, undervalued firms with “sound operating cash flow but low sales growth rates, leverage and dividend payout ratios” (brav et al., 2010, p. 4). they present opportunities for hedge funds to cut cost, increase leverage, raise margins and earn a return on exit. depending on the target, activists would initiate clear, though not mutually exclusive, objectives for intervention. they can be broadly put into five categories: “general undervaluation/maximize shareholder value,” “capital structure,” “business strategy,” “sale of target company,” and “governance” (brav et al., 2010, p. 12). the concept of an ‘impact’ activist fund is to capture the ‘activist’ spirit and ‘profit’ incentive of hedge funds and make them corporate mission reformers. compared to shareholder advocacy by esg investors, impact activism represents a more aggressive form of intervention. for target selection, key emphasis is put on a firm’s esg standards (or its lack of). any firms scoring a low esg ranking are potential targets for impact activist funds. be it firms adopting bad labour practices, creating excessive pollution or simply lacking boardroom diversity, it is believed that firms that do not value externality will experience detrimental effects on their stock price over time. henceforth, value maximization opportunities come in the form of improved esg ratings, whereby sophisticated activist investors intercept corporate behavior and implement reforms to enhance companies’ esg standing, which would then translate to an increase in share price. yet there are few key differences. for one, while activist hedge funds often target financially underperforming companies and work towards improving profitability and operational efficiency, impact funds seek to rectify malpractices of ‘bad-behaving’ corrupted firms and reorient their business models to become sustainable and profitable, striving for a double bottom line. traditional targets are often small, which allows hedge funds to “accumulate a significant ownership with a given amount of capital” (brav et al., 2010, p. 4). conversely, impact activists have no fear of pursing mega-cap public companies as exhibited in the engine one case study below. in fact, some investors believe that targeting a leader in its field would be a great way to publicize the activist campaign and illustrate to other peers within the sector on how to drive long term positive results. secondly, there has been considerable debate about the long-term impact of hedge fund activism on target companies. while most investors share the view that activist targets experience an initial spike in share price, there is no general consensus 16 consilience on the long-term effects following adversarial interventions. mark desjardine argues that activist targets are victims of “pump and dump scheme”, whose value “drops in later years relative to similar non-targeted companies” and would hamper “socially responsible efforts of companies” (“activist hedge funds: good for some, bad for others?”, 2021). alon brav’s empirical research indicates that “hedge fund activism has been successful in improving operating performance, increasing payouts, and reducing agency costs”, and is “associated with an almost immediate increase in payout and heightened discipline of the ceo” (brav et al., 2010, p. 40). this controversy however is not applicable to impact activist funds. the purpose of an impact activist intervention is not a short-term flip on share price, but to tackle the fundamentals of a company that drives better value for shareholders and stakeholders. incorporating the ‘sustainability’ component inherently guarantees long term value, and activist protocols will closely monitor target ceo’s code of behavior. since hedge funds share the same two-twenty compensation structure as pe firms and often earn 20% of excess return, they have the financial incentive to reconcile impact outcomes with profit. as they exit their investments at a higher value, activist investors validate the economic case that there is a math-based positive correlation between greater impact and higher financial return. 5.2 activist tactics & impact reforms hedge funds are lightly regulated investment vehicles, and therefore uniquely positioned to act as corporate governance police officers than any other institutional investors. compared to mutual funds which need to maintain a diversified portfolio as mandated in the investment company act of 1940, the agile organizational structure of hedge funds allows them to “hold highly concentrated positions” in target firms, use leverage and derivative securities to “extend their reach”, and launch a successful campaign (brav, 2008, p. 1730). unlike pension funds whose fiduciary duty is bound by the erisa, hedge funds suffer from fewer conflicts of interest “because they are not beholden to the management of the firms whose shares they hold” (brav et al., 2008, p. 1730), and face less scrutiny when it comes to fulfilling investors obligations. moreover, hedge funds often have “lock-up provisions that restrict the investors from withdrawing their principal” for a minimum of two years or longer, thereby granting investors the flexibility to pursue “intermediate and longterm activist objectives” (brav et al., 2010, p. 3). these advantages give hedge funds significant influence over target firms’ management. consequently, activist hedge funds are known for their ability to reshape the boardroom through proxy fights, long slates (i.e. when the activist nominates directors to replace 50%+ of the incumbent board), or using litigation to challenge boardroom decisions. there are six main tactic categories, the level of aggression ranges from communicating with the management regularly to enhance shareholder value, to seeking board representation without conflict or a proxy content, making formal shareholders proposal or public criticism, waging a proxy war in order to gain board representation or sue existing management, launching a proxy war to replace the board, and ultimately suing a company in a take-over bid (brav et al., 2010, p. 15). depending on the target’s degree of openness, level of negative externality and susceptibility to change, impact activist funds can adopt similar methods of consilience duong: redefining shareholder value maximization approaching target firms. furthermore, impact reforms will be systematically implemented in the target firm to ensure minimum adherence to esg considerations, while capitalizing on opportunities for operational efficiency and financial improvement. by deploying a team of highly incentivized and experienced managers to enact changes within the target, activist investors ensure the target is meeting the threshold of the sustainable corporate purpose. during and postinvestment, the firm can be valued by its (i) short term profitability (ii) long term post-investment profitability and (iii) esg standards. 5.3 case study: reenergizing exxonmobil with engine 1 shareholder activism has met with a recent surge in popularity as investors seek to address their esg concerns in a more active manner. according to deloitte, the number of campaigns targeting large-cap companies (market capitalization of $10 billion or more) rose by a compound annual growth rate of 4% between 2014—2018 (“be your own activist: developing an activist mindset”, 2019). as hedge funds amass greater capital and share ownership, large corporations are increasingly vulnerable to a “knock out in proxy contest” (“be your own activist: developing an activist mindset”, 2019). in this light, we can turn to the case of engine no. 1, launched by hedge fund veteran chris james in december 2020 with the motto to “engage as active owners” and align the “interests of main street and wall street” (“a new way of seeing value”, 2021). it has $250 million internal capital, its first activist campaign is an acquisition of a $40 million stake in the us oil and gas giant exxonmobil. an interview with jennifer grancio, executive at engine no. 1 has shed light on the mechanism of activist investing. firstly, the firm sources its targets using two criteria (i) pursing the market leader to make the loudest voice (ii) valuing negative externality in the absolute dollar amount, which often means targeting bigger companies have a bigger total impact. in determining intervention objectives, engine no. 1 concentrates on addressing and quantifying the biggest impacts that most drive share price over time. exxonmobil is a classic example in which it is currently a cash cow oil giant, but its performance is lagging behind. the existing management teams believe that environmental damage does not have material impacts on the company’s bottom line, though its underperformance compared to the s&p 500 and its proxy peers in recent years has shown otherwise. in response, engine no. 1 proposed the following solutions (“the case for change”, 2021): i. refresh the board with highly qualified, climate focused directors: run a proxy fight seeking to overhaul business by installing four directors ii. improve capital allocation decision and cut unproductive capital expenditure such as lowering the required break-even oil and gas price iii. implement a strategic plan for sustainable term value creation, such as invest in clean energy, achieve emission reduce targets etc. iv. realign management compensation to ensure better shareholder value creation similar to impact investments, activist fund performance should be quantifiable, industry-specific and comparable. the firm hires an in-house data scientist team to substantiate, through data modelling, its investment thesis that there 18 consilience is a negative correlation between negative externality and future value of the company. in particular this is captured in the valuation methods, be it in dcf or trading multiples in public company comparables. i. similar to integrating esg factors when creating a dcf, unsustainable companies are given a higher discount factor which lead to a lower future value of such companies. exxonmobil have close to zero terminal value ii. engine no. 1 adopts the method of trading comparables to benchmark exxonmobil against its peers, but emphasis is put on expanding a traditionally narrow universe of comparable companies to highlight what the target is “missing”. this means comparing exxonmobil to its broad energy peers. instead of comparing exxonmobil to other oil and gas giants such as chevron or conocophillips, the universe should also include renewable energy companies such as nextera energy to illustrate a stark difference in the long-term performance in those two sets of companies. through the method of benchmarking and capturing market data, this shows that companies who invest in clean energy are earning a higher margin as opposed to forgoing a ‘commercial rate of return’. the singular focus on quarterly and annual returns has misled managers to undervalue the environmental damage. exxonmobil’s return on capital employed (roce) for upstream projects has plunged from an average of 35% in 2001-10 to 6% in recent years; it is currently experiencing its highest debt level in history, its debt being downgraded twice by s&p in 2016 (“the case for change”, 2021). evidently, bad corporate behavior has material impacts that can be captured in the valuation exercise — its high cost of debt means a higher discount rate, its decreasing roce leads to minimal terminal value, resulting in trading multiples lower than industry peers. in this case of significant undervaluation, impact activism is a productive force of good that improves shareholder value in the traditional economic sense as well as social return sense. 6. roadblocks to sustainable investing 6.1 the lack of standardized framework for impact measurement sustainable investing is not without its challenges. sec commissioner hester m. peirce expressed her skepticism towards esg investing in her 2019 remarks before the american enterprise institute, “e, s, and g tend to travel in a pack these days, which makes it hard to establish reliable metrics for affixing scarlet letters. governance at least offers some concrete markers, such as whether there are different share classes with different voting rights…in comparison to governance, the environmental and social categories tend to be much more nebulous… not only is it difficult to define what should be included in esg, but, once you do, it is difficult to figure out how to measure success or failure” (peirce, 2019). indeed, the lack of standardized framework for impact measurement is one of the biggest defenses against impact investing. but even in traditional investing, the discounted cash flow model (dcf) is not a onesize-fits-all valuation method. airlines, oil and gas companies, financial institutions, consilience duong: redefining shareholder value maximization real estate companies and start-ups all require industry-specific valuation methods to determine their free cash flow. the formula of enterprise value is as follow: enterprise value (ev) = equity value + debt + minority interest + preferred shares cash yet banks differ from normal companies in many ways. they have a huge cash reserve which diminishes the enterprise value. they do not reinvest debt into their business, but rather uses it to create products (loans) and earn revenue in the form of interests. instead, banks use a dividend discount model (ddm) to find their annual dividends payout and arrive at an equity value. similarly, a dcf may work well for a retail company with predictable cash flows, but not for an exploration & production company in the oil and gas sector, which is exposed to cyclical commodity prices and huge capital expenditures. as opposed to using a dcf, mining companies rely on energy reserves as value drivers to find their net asset value until natural resources run out. lastly, common trading multiples such as ev/ revenue, ev/ ebitda (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, amortization) may not be applicable to loss-making technology start-ups or pharmaceutical companies with massive research and development cost. it is standard practice for investment analysts to devise industry-specific multiples such as ev/ page views for internet companies, ev/ ebitdax (x for exploration cost) for energy companies, price/ ffo (funds from operations) for real estate investment trusts to truly gauge their profitability. by the same logic, industry specification represents the basic requirement to measure impact returns. ‘impact’ is a blanket term encompassing environmental and social outcomes, but just as one would not compare the revenue generated by a start-up with that of a mega-cap energy giant, impact data is more meaningful when it is measured relative to its peers and comparable within an industry rather than across. responding to investors who believe that ‘impact’ is inherently subjective (such as ‘lives improved’), that is only true to a certain extent. in cases such as carbon accounting, monitoring the number of jobs created or school enrollment rates, rigorous data collection protocols can be implemented to extract quantifiable data. the impact investing field has witnessed positive developments in recent years, with notable frameworks such as the impact reporting and investment standards (iris) and global impact investment rating system (giirs) being vastly adopted by impact investors. 6.2 when doing good is not profitable every investment entails a certain potential for loss, this essay does not pretend that all investments generating positive social return will automatically become profitable. the california public employees’ retirement system one way (calpers) started a clean energy fund in 2007 and has so far reported losses, with an annualized negative return of -9.7%. so how do we minimize risks in impact investments without deterring capital from the private sector? one mechanism to overcome commercial losses is through blended finance, which is defined as the “strategic use of development finance and philanthropic funds to mobilize private capital flows to emerging & frontier markets”. it refers to the commingling of philanthropic and commercial money, whereby social investors (e.g. private foundations, nonprofits) invest alongside private investors (e.g. 20 consilience commercial private equity, venture capital) to help de-risk commercial money while maximizing impact. blended finance can be structured in many ways to deliver tailored financing solutions. oftentimes, philanthropic investors act as a guarantee / risk cushion to insure the losses should a transaction go wrong. philanthropic investors may deploy concessionary capital to subsidize return of the investment fund, so that commercial investors are repaid first in the repayment structure and earn a market-rate return. public donors can also provide grant-funded technical assistance platforms to deliver strategic coordination in the investment process. as an example, the us development finance corporation engages with private investors to offer political and security insurance and encourage funding in developing countries. terra silva is a $90 million collaborative impact investing fund launched by the david and lucile packard foundation and macarthur foundation with a focus on climate change and sustainable forestry. it deemed itself as a form of “catalytic capital” that pools together “patient, risk tolerant, concessionary, flexible” capital with private financing “in order to unlock impact and additional investment that would not otherwise be possible”, and help “build market infrastructure for climate-smart forestry”. by combining grant and investment capital synergistically, this accelerates a greater flow of capital to address the sdg funding gap, creates more investment opportunities and provides higher risk protection for commercial investors entering the impact investing space. 6.3 sustainable investing: a complex reality sustainable investing presents a complex reality, and there is still a long way to go before this industry reaches consolidation. for one, the lack of sec regulatory guidelines on esg investing makes it hard for investors to overcome structural biases on their own. without a clear legal framework, how should investors adjudicate an investment that yields successful impact returns, but at the expense of financial loss? what is the newly defined fiduciary duty of esg investors? will it consist of a duty of care, duty of loyalty, and duty of mission? how do we avoid dating accounting pitfalls and manipulations in impact measurement? sustainable investing requires a long term orientation, yet the concept ‘time value of money’ espouses that money today worth more than money tomorrow, and locking up capital for a prolonged time frame would result in a lower internal rate of return (irr) of an investment. what are the opportunity costs that investors should consider when allocating capital? these are the areas that merit further research. as we look back at the history of how various investment vehicles were created and popularized in different eras: hedge funds in the 50s, venture capitals in the 70s, private equities in the 80s, what will be the new investment model for 2020 and onwards? financial innovation is a continuous journey of developing tools to meet the needs of the market. these investment vehicles have undergone major changes before reaching their level of sophistication today, so it is only normal for any emerging type of investment model to face the initial wave of market skepticism and regulatory hurdles. the key here is to turn theory into practice — it is more important to make something happen than designing the perfect investment strategy. a great push for sustainability has met with a great deal of empty slogans and ‘impact washing’. but as beate sjåfjell echoed, “we must avoid merely replacing the consilience duong: redefining shareholder value maximization ‘shareholder’ in shareholder primacy with ‘stakeholder’”, for “a mere canvassing of ‘stakeholder interests” without practical commitment is inadequate to address climate challenges and achieve un sustainable development goals (sjåfjell et al., 2020). we need to experience the problem before we can come up practical solutions, theorization must lead to execution in order to effect changes in the real world. 7. a future toward market sustainability shareholder value maximization is a systemically entrenched notion that requires the collective effort of corporations, investors, creditors and regulators to re-orient corporate purpose to be something more meaningful and sustainable. this paper chooses to focus on the investors’ perspective in implementing esg integration, impact investing, and impact activist funds for two reasons. firstly, depending on country, state and regime type, it may take months even years for regulators to pass legislative reforms, and sustainability is often not politicians’ first priority. sustainable investing is to some degree self-driven by investors themselves who, as long as they see an alignment between impact and financial return, can implement strategies the next day. the legitimacy and financial prowess of the investment community also mean it has a great, if not greatest, sway over investee companies. a divestment by an investor is a humiliating denouncement of the esg credentials of the target company and could seriously impair the target’s ability to secure financing in the future. investors can therefore assume the roles of gatekeeper, value creator and reformer to compel corporations to integrate esg into their corporate mission. secondly, as henry kissinger asserts, “order must be cultivated, it cannot be imposed”. the economic pulse of a reimagined capitalism plays to the heart of human incentive, the profit-oriented approach to sustainable investing represents a scalable solution to achieve a sustainable future. as demonstrated throughout the paper, esg integration works in favor of beneficiaries’ interest and could materially enhance the valuation and reduce risk of a portfolio, impact investing as a commercial activity can be performed without a necessary deployment of concessionary capital, and value maximization opportunities lie within investing in esg underperformers by impact activist funds. on a global level, what is the least that all investors, regardless of size and type, can do to align themselves with the new corporate mission? among the three strategies outlined above, which is the most effective way of investing sustainably while pursuing ‘stakeholder’ value maximization? let’s take a step back: the investment industry today is highly concentrated, with the top five asset managers holding 22.7% of externally managed assets, and the top 10 holding 34% (eccles & klimenko, 2019). these universal owners with a global stock portfolio can no longer diversify away system-level risks and hedge against the global economy, “they have become too big to let the planet fail” (eccles & klimenko, 2019). so what investors should focus on, in fact, is to improve the market as a whole and ensure system sustainability by means of securing financial return. in other words, all investors should adopt an esg lens in all investment decision-making across all asset class. hiromichi mizuno, the chief investment officer of the world’s largest pension fund japan’s government pension investment fund (gpif) with roughly $1.55 trillion in assets under management, epitomizes this approach. he noted, “we are a classic 22 consilience universal owner with intergenerational responsibilities and thus have an inherently long-term view” (eccles & klimenko, 2019). he therefore championed a new business model of gpif with an esg focus: it emphasizes stewardship responsibility by becoming highly selective in picking which asset managers to invest in, and actively engages with portfolio companies through proxy voting and shareholder resolutions. by enforcing “best practices among investors and companies”, mizuno aims to capitalize on the long term investment objective and huge asset pool of his pension fund to “affect the system, including system sustainability” (morrow, 2018). his approach is substantiated by a groundbreaking research by george serafeim from harvard business school, who provides concrete evidence that “firms with good performance on material sustainability issues significantly outperform firms with poor performance on these issues, suggesting that investments in sustainability issues are shareholder-value enhancing” (serafeim et al., 2015). the astonish growth in passive investing has surpassed that of actively managed funds in recent years (gittelsohn, 2019). with more passive investors pouring their money into market index funds (e.g. s&p 500, dow jones industrial average), they have great incentive to see the market do well and have their portfolio companies address any material esg concerns. corporate engagement is therefore a reliable tool for managers to invest sustainably and improve portfolio performance. ultimately, esg integration should be the collective responsibility of both institutional and retail investors to safeguard market sustainability. oscar wilde famously noted, a cynic is “a man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing”, denoting a decoupling between ‘price’ and ‘value’. indeed, shareholder ‘value’ should not be limited to the provincial definition of share ‘price’. stakeholder capitalism does not imply a redistribution of resources that forgo shareholder interests, but rather relies on a holistic understanding of what ‘value’ compromises in order to a win-win situation. sustainable investors are free to pursue ‘shareholder value maximization’ while keeping the interests of other stakeholders as heart. having demonstrated the economic case that corporate sustainability could materially maximize shareholder value, this fortifies the responsibility of investors to integrate esg standards in investment decisions as part of their basic fiduciary duty. institutionalization of impact investments will ultimately turbocharge capital flows towards important outcomes. finally, sustainable investment should not be a sleeve in a portfolio, but a lens on all asset classes that shapes acquisition target selections and capital allocation decisions. by tapping into the investors’ desire for profit, sustainable investing should simply be the new way of doing business. to summarize, with a renewed definition of ‘shareholder value maximization’, i have a listed a few indispensable components that all institutional investors should incorporate in their sustainable investment strategy: i. become a signatory of the un principles for responsible investment to demonstrate an official commitment to sustainability and keep investors accountable through annual pri transparency reporting ii. consider esg factors in the asset management selection, investment screening and due diligence process consilience duong: redefining shareholder value maximization iii. align impact performance with financial return. specifically, to acknowledge that esg risks and opportunities pose a material financial impact in equity/ fixed income valuation, and integrate them in the analyses iv. adopt impact measurements that are (i) quantifiable: how is the company’s bottom line impacted, (ii) comparable: how is the company performing relative to its peers, (iii) industry-specific v. establish an esg risk management team to publish transparent, standardized sustainability disclosure, which are then independently reviewed by the board or external agencies 24 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(2020, december 11). u.s. department of labor. retrieved march 14, 2021, from https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20201211-1. united states renewable energy market report 2020: growth, trends, and forecast to 2025. (2020, november 17). business wire. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20201117006059/en/unitedstates-renewable-energy-market-report-2020-growth-trends-andforecast-to-2025--researchandmarkets.com#:~:text=the%20renewable%20energy what you need to know about impact investing. (n.d.). the giin. retrieved march 4, 2021, from https://thegiin.org/impact-investing/need-to-know/#what-is-impactinvesting sachs, a looming crisis consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 27 (2024) a looming crisis: exploring the precarious legal status of ‘climate refugees’ under international and human rights law claudia sachs school of general studies columbia university cr3230@columbia.edu abstract as climate change worsens, millions of people around the world will be displaced, exacerbating conflicts and resource scarcity. in recent years, individuals displaced by climate change have sought legal recognition as 'climate refugees' under the convention relating to the status of refugees, adopted by the un general assembly in 1951. this paper argues that the convention, originally designed to address persecution-based displacement, lacks provisions for those fleeing environmental crises. this paper explores existing legal frameworks relating to the status of 'climate refugees' under international and human rights law, with a focus on recent judicial opinions. it also examines alternative frameworks for refugee claims, including human rights treaties, as well as regional agreements such as the 1984 cartagena declaration on refugees and the 2009 african union kampala convention. these mechanisms offer potential pathways for recognizing and protecting those displaced by climate change beyond the narrow definition of the 1951 refugee convention. the paper concludes that regional agreements, modeled after the kampala convention, provide the most practical and enforceable solutions for addressing the complex legal challenges posed by climate-induced displacement. keywords: international law, climate refugees, climate displacement, internally displaced persons, human rights consilience sachs: a looming crisis introduction in recent years, the effects of climate change have produced waves of migration around the world, raising challenging questions regarding international refugee law and human rights. although quantifying migration remains challenging, recent estimates found that between 2008 and 2014, sudden-onset disasters displaced over 184.4 million people. of these, an annual average of 22.5 million people were displaced by weather-and climate-related hazards (unhcr, n.d.). these weather and climate-related disasters will only increase in the coming decades, leaving hundreds of millions with the impossible choice of staying in a dangerous area or fleeing to an unknown place that may refuse or mistreat them. furthermore, climate change acts as a “risk multiplier” that intensifies existing issues including resource scarcity, economic instability, and violence. this exacerbation will compound the global refugee crisis, leaving migrants at greater risk and overwhelming inadequately equipped nations. in response to the present refugee crisis and the prospect of a global climate migration catastrophe, a large body of legal scholarship has grown around the issue of “climate refugees” and designations of “climate refugee status” under international law. under different legal standards and principles, scholars debate whether “climate refugees” deserve statehood in the countries responsible for climate change, whether displacement can be attributed to climate change, and whether existing legal frameworks can adequately respond to the challenges ahead (unhcr, n.d.). though many scholars, activists, and government agencies are pushing for the protection of populations vulnerable to climate change, the issue of climate refugee status under international law remains contested. this essay will argue that existing international law does not explicitly provide for the protection or designation of climate refugees, but innovative legal and political mechanisms, including human rights and regional frameworks, may give states avenues for addressing climate migration and internal displacement. ultimately, this essay will propose that the best course of action to protect victims of climate change will be creating more binding regional agreements that can respond to climate displacement on a local level. i: does the existing legal framework apply to climate refugees? a) the refugee convention of 1951 the primary document regarding refugees and refugee status is the 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees (“the refugee convention”). the refugee convention was developed in response to the mass displacement of citizens during and after world war ii. the convention was amended in 1967 to remove geographic and time-based limitations connected to wwii, extending protection to people in any country fleeing conflict, violence, or persecution (unhcr us, n.d.). despite this amendment, the convention has not evolved further, and it has proven difficult for legal advocates to categorize ‘climate refugees’ solely based on the convention’s definitions. the refugee convention primarily addresses issues of violence, persecution, and political targeting but currently does not encompass individuals displaced solely by environmental factors, including climate change. the refugee convention defines “refugee” narrowly. article 1(a2) of the convention states that the term “refugee” shall apply to anyone who is outside his country of nationality “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 3 consilience nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” or someone who does “not have a nationality and [is] outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such [fear-inducing] events” (unhcr us, n.d., p. 14). displacement due solely to climate change does not meet these specific criteria. though climate impacts may amplify threats of persecution or violence, they are “spatially and socially differentiated” (unhcr us, n.d., p. 9). since emissions in one country cannot be directly linked to violence in another, it is difficult for people to claim refugee status based on the consequences of climate change (unchr, 2020). under current interpretations of the refugee convention, individuals cannot easily attribute their “well-founded fear of being persecuted” to the broad and indirect impacts of climate change. however, recent judicial interpretations suggest that the convention’s applicability may evolve as the effects of climate change become increasingly severe and attributable to state action or inaction. b) ioane teitiota v. the chief executive of the ministry of business, innovation, and employment the case of ioane teitiota in new zealand from 2015 highlights the limited situations in which the refugee convention could address climate-induced displacement. in ioane teitiota v. the chief executive of the ministry of business, innovation, and employment, teitiota, a citizen of a small island called kiribati, appealed his denial of refugee status in the new zealand high court due to his island’s vulnerability to climate change. teitiota argued that the effects of climate change on kiribati, including rising sea levels, freshwater contamination due to rising seas, and environmental degradation were forcing citizens off the island. ultimately, the high court determined that teitiota does not qualify as an “environmental refugee” under the refugee convention because teitiota would not face “serious harm” if he returned, and “there is no evidence that the government of kiribati is failing to take steps to protect its citizens from the effects of environmental degradation.” this ruling underscores that the refugee convention’s application remains narrow and excludes the broader concept of ‘climate refugees.’ while the refugee convention does not currently apply to climate refugees, judicial interpretations in ioane hint that climate refugee status may become relevant as climate impacts escalate. in ioane tetiota, the court noted that their decision does “not mean that environmental degradation resulting from climate change or other natural disasters could never create a pathway into the refugee convention or protected person jurisdiction.” this suggests that if future litigants can demonstrate a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” as a direct result of their state’s failure to respond to climate change, their claims might eventually align with the convention’s requirements. climate change’s exacerbation of resource scarcity, land disputes, and state vulnerability could strengthen the link between persecution and climate impacts, potentially satisfying the convention’s criteria for refugee status. furthermore, if in the future, small island states physically cease to exist due to sea level rise, former citizens may be able to make legal arguments for refugee status under the refugee convention for “not having a nationality” and “being outside the country of his formal habitual residence as a result of such events.” if/when this issue of complete statelessness due to climate change arises, the refugee convention may be more applicable to those impacted by climate change. overall, this analysis of the refugee convention and relevant cases demonstrates that legal refugee status under the convention necessitates a direct connection to persecution, imminent threats, or violence. while climate change’s compounding effects may increase the number of cases consilience sachs: a looming crisis meeting the convention’s criteria, climate factors alone cannot currently determine refugee status within this legal framework. ii: what other approaches can states and vulnerable populations utilize to respond to climate migration and internal displacement? a) international law and rights-based approaches while ‘climate refugees’ may not meet the strict criteria of ‘refugee’ under the refugee convention, other international and regional frameworks may be better equipped to support those forced to leave their country of origin due to climate change. in recent years, the un has developed several international frameworks addressing climate-induced migration that go beyond the scope of the refugee convention. these frameworks, while serving as essential guidelines, are not legally binding. for example, in 2016, the un adopted the new york declaration for refugees, followed by the global compact for safe, orderly, and regular migration in 2018 (weerasinghe, 2018). both documents emphasize the urgency of displacement linked to climate change and acknowledge it as a “risk multiplier” likely to compound refugee movements. these frameworks set valuable standards for global solidarity and burden-sharing and serve as supplementary guidance to existing agreements. however, they fall short of addressing the immediate needs of migrants or providing the funding necessary for managing migration effectively on the ground. beyond the walls of the un, countries have developed collaborative mechanisms to respond to the issue of climate-induced migration. in 2012, the governments of norway and switzerland launched the nansen initiative, an intergovernmental process aimed at building consensus on the protection of people displaced by climate change and addressing gaps in existing international law (the nansen initiative, 2015). in 2016, this state-led consultative process established a non-binding “protection agenda” to provide a toolbox to better prevent, anticipate, and prepare for displacement before it strikes (european parliament, 2021). the protection agenda also intends to help states improve their protocols for situations where people are forced to find refuge in a new place, whether through internal or external migration (european parliament, 2021). the nansen initiative did not define the legal status of ‘climate refugees,’ yet it provided an important platform for international collaboration and demonstrated that many states are intent on responding to climate-induced movements through diplomatic, rights-based approaches. going forward, policymakers may find success in better incorporating the existing human rights framework into documents and cases in order to improve the legal standing of climate refugee status. policymakers could argue that extreme weather events threaten the “right to life” under the convention on the rights of the child (crc), article 6 of the international covenant on civil and political rights (iccpr), and article 2 of the european convention on human rights (echr) (mcadam, 2011). a right-to-life argument was successfully utilized in budayeva v. russia, a case in which the european court of human rights held that the state’s duty to protect life extends to protection from natural disasters (mcadam, 2011, p. 21). this case demonstrates how rights-based frameworks have the potential to protect climate migrants. furthermore, policymakers could argue that increased food insecurity and water stress constitute cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment under article 7 of the iccpr, along with violations of the right to adequate food and safe drinking water in the iccpr, icescr, and crc ((mcadam, 2011, p. 23). additionally, article 7 of the iccpr contains a non-refoulement 5 consilience obligation, so it could be argued that countries receiving climate refugees may not return migrants to their places of origin where climate change is threatening their lives (mcadam, 2011). finally, in july 2022, the un declared a right to a “clean, healthy, and sustainable environment” (un news, 2022). through this provision, future climate refugees could argue that the environmental disruptors in their home country required them to flee in violation of their human rights. many of these human rights arguments are non-binding ‘soft law,’ but they nevertheless have the potential to provide an international legal framework for future agreements and cases. un frameworks, national initiatives, and international human rights law lay important groundwork for addressing climate migration by stressing the principles with which a more binding law might be constructed. however, these solutions struggle with the issues of enforceability and practicality. the most effective methods for legally addressing climate-induced displacement and statelessness issues exist on a regional level. b) regional approaches regional conventions focused on the status and treatment of refugees displaced by climate change may offer the most effective response to the gaps in the refugee convention regarding climate-induced displacement. two key conventions, the 1984 cartagena declaration on refugees (“cartagena declaration”) and the 2009 african union convention for the protection and assistance of internally displaced persons in africa (“kampala convention”) demonstrate how regional instruments can be one of the most valuable and practical tools for addressing the plight of those displaced by climate change. the cartagena declaration is a non-binding regional instrument that broadened the concept of a refugee in latin america, and it has the potential to address the legal challenges of ‘climate refugee’ categorization. the creators of the cartagena declaration sought to address some of the fault lines of the 1951 convention and 1967 protocol and expand the definition of refugees to fit with modern times and the specific challenges facing latin america. cartagena takes a broader approach to refugee protection than the prior protocol, recognizing the potential for individuals to qualify as refugees due to “circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order” (organization of american states, 1984). although the declaration does not directly address migration caused by climate change, some scholars argue that natural hazards and climate change-related disasters could be considered “circumstances that have seriously disturbed the public order” (canepa & gutierrez, 2021). no country has utilized this broader interpretation to grant refugee status based on climate change-related disasters, but the declaration provides a foundation for future cases that seek to expand the qualifications of ‘climate refugees’ beyond the 1951 definition (canepa & gutierrez, 2021). although the cartagena declaration is not legally binding, the majority of latin american countries have incorporated its content within their domestic law. through domestic implementation, the declaration has more potential to legally include ‘climate refugees’ in its categorization of refugees in the future. the fact that the cartagena declaration was developed regionally rather than internationally helped garner strong domestic responses. it is therefore one of the strongest frameworks for responding to climate-induced migration. the african union’s (au) kampala convention also demonstrates how regional frameworks can be one of the best tools for addressing the gaps in the refugee convention that have failed to consilience sachs: a looming crisis protect people displaced by climate change. while the refugee convention focused on refugee movement across borders, it failed to address a key category of migrants: internally displaced persons (idps), people displaced within their own borders. experts predict that most people displaced by climate change will become idps, so defining the legal rights of idps is key to responding to climate-induced movement (the brookings institution, 2014). the kampala convention is the only binding, continent-wide convention that determines the rights and responsibilities of individual states with respect to idps, regardless of the cause of their displacement. the kampala convention defines idps as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee” due to “armed conflicts…violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters” (african union, 2009). through this broad definition, the kampala convention protects a wide array of people and demonstrates how disasters, whether caused by people, the weather, or the climate, have a significant impact on vulnerable populations. in article 5(4), article 2(a), and article 4(2), the kampala convention requires states to protect those displaced by disasters caused by climate change, prevent and mitigate the root causes of internal displacement, and create warning systems and emergency management measures for crises. through these provisions, the kampala convention underscores how regional solutions can provide more robust protections for climate-displaced populations within national borders than the refugee convention currently does for cross-border climate migrants. together, the kampala convention and the cartagena declaration show how regional, legally binding frameworks based on domestic law can provide a more effective legal solution to climate displacement. these regional approaches are especially relevant since climate migration often happens within local and regional contexts. iii: how regional agreements address challenges relating to refugee status regional agreements like the cartagena decalaration and the kampala convention can offer practical solutions to two major challenges in climate migration: transborder responsibility and state resistance. one of the key challenges in addressing the status of climate migrants is transborder responsibility. climate change is a uniquely vexing problem because co2 emissions travel far from their place of origin. it is therefore difficult to establish a “causal chain” of transborder responsibility between emissions in america or china, a drought in africa, and a flood in bangladesh, for example. in the context of climate-induced migration, this transborder responsibility issue raises difficult questions about whether countries that did not cause the climate crisis should be responsible for climate refugees. most climate-induced migration occurs internally or between neighboring countries in the global south, placing an undue burden on countries with little climate responsibility. some argue that instead of taking a “nearest neighbor” approach, the countries most responsible for climate change should take the most refugees (mcadam, 2011). a global, responsibility-based approach would be more ethical and equitable than a “nearest neighbor” approach. however, there is little political appetite among developed countries, most of which bear the brunt of climate change responsibility, to take accountability for the impact of their emissions, particularly by taking in more refugees. in the past, developed countries have failed to protect the refugees that clearly fit within 7 consilience the refugee convention’s refugee definition—like syrian and north african refugees fleeing conflict—so it is unlikely that they will take transboundary responsibility for a new category of ‘climate refugees.’ regional frameworks, however, help alleviate this challenge of transboundary responsibility by focusing on local cooperation among neighboring countries that are most directly affected by climate displacement. for instance, the kampala convention directly addresses the needs of internally displaced persons (idps), not ‘climate refugees’ around the world, and requires only state cooperation within africa. through regional approaches such as the kampala convention, countries can mitigate the challenges created by climate-induced migration without needing to wait for the cooperation of developed nations. secondly, regional agreements like the kampala convention may reduce the likelihood of state resistance or noncompliance, which is often a significant barrier in international climate migration frameworks. even if a framework is developed to define the status of ‘climate refugees’, grant them particular rights, and assign transborder responsibility, states will likely resist taking in their fair share of refugees and protecting their rights. this state resistance or noncompliance could lead to an increase in international conflict, with vulnerable populations caught helpless in the middle. regional agreements may be a strong mechanism for addressing state non-compliance because individual countries are often better equipped to develop strong local enforcement mechanisms that don’t depend on distant actors. with approaches that respond to the needs of each region, political will for compliance with climate migration agreements may increase. this paper determines that the best solution for policymakers going forward is the creation of more binding regional agreements regarding the status of climate migrants, modeled after the kampala convention and cartagena declaration. regional agreements like kampala often have better enforcement mechanisms and more political will than international agreements, decreasing the likelihood of state resistance or noncompliance. since most displacement occurs locally, it is in the interest of the countries that will manage refugees to help determine their status, even if those countries do not bear the brunt of responsibility for climate change. conclusion this paper has highlighted the challenges in recognizing 'climate refugees' under the 1951 refugee convention and proposes that emerging regional treaties and international frameworks may provide a promising avenue for addressing the status of individuals displaced by climate change. as the effects of climate change continue to intensify global crises, the plight of 'climate refugees' will only gain significance. robust regional legal frameworks that are implemented domestically and focused on idps will be essential for a comprehensive global response to the intertwined issues of climate change and migration. it is vital for both international and domestic policy makers to bridge the gaps in existing international law regarding 'climate refugees' by adopting regional, rights-based approaches that safeguard the rights and dignity of the world's most vulnerable populations. consilience sachs: a looming crisis references african 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(2018, december). in harm's way: international protection in the context of nexus dynamics between conflict or violence and disaster or climate change (research paper no. 39). un high commissioner for refugees (unhcr). retrieved january 5, 2025, from https://www.refworld.org/reference/lpprs/unhcr/2018/en/122598 https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/stories/refugees-and-displaced-people-climate-frontlines-call-greater-inclusion-cop28 https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/stories/refugees-and-displaced-people-climate-frontlines-call-greater-inclusion-cop28 https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/stories/refugees-and-displaced-people-climate-frontlines-call-greater-inclusion-cop28 https://www.refworld.org/reference/lpprs/unhcr/2018/en/122598 https://www.refworld.org/reference/lpprs/unhcr/2018/en/122598 microsoft word burgess final.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 138–146   supporting capabilities: using psychosocial concepts to guide a sennian approach to escaping urban poverty rochelle burgess hon. bsc (psychology) msc (health community and development) email: r.a.burgess@lse.ac.uk scholarly abstract currently, more than half of the human population resides in cities. over onethird of these cities are located in the global south, where many of the world‟s slum and squatter settlements are located. the unique experience of the urban poor has helped initiate a reconfiguration of poverty definitions, led by amartya sen‟s capabilities approach. countless poverty alleviation programs have since incorporated his ideals, but with limited success. this paper attempts to address these issues by examining the role of psychosocial phenomena such as identity, social representations and stigma in the escape from poverty. through unpacking the interactions between these phenomena against the background of poverty within brazilian favelas, the author attempts to help inform a more concrete framework for the application of sennian approaches to poverty alleviation in urban centers. author’s note rochelle burgess is a graduate from the health, community and development program at the london school of economics and political sciences (lse). at the time of this article’s writing, she was completing a research fellowship at the health economics and hiv/aids research division (heard) at university of kwazulu-natal, durban, south africa. following the completion of her fellowship rochelle will begin doctoral research on mental health and hiv/aids at the lse. keywords: urban poverty, capabilities approach, social identity, social representations, stigma, poverty alleviation, favelas. 1. introduction for the fifty percent of the developing world that exists on less than one us dollar a day, no climb is more perilous than that which leads out of poverty. many people living in poverty endure inadequate shelter, lack of access to health care, lack of clean water, and an inability to educate or provide for their children. while this description most readily aligns itself with images of rural communities in developing countries, globalization has transposed a similar reality upon urban landscapes. thus those who go to cities to seek economic opportunity often find the cities poorly lacking. this influx to urban areas has lead to exponential increases in slum populations around the world, presenting a challenge to those attempting to address poverty in the world‟s largest cities. while the importance of a stable income in mitigating poverty is indisputable, we must suspect the notion that economic opportunity alone will consilience burgess: supporting capabilities   translate to improved livelihoods. it is quite likely that this illusion has been propagated by the very manner in which states of poverty are defined. neo-liberal doctrine has long placed the roots of poverty within the individual and his inability to capitalize on life circumstances to achieve economic success.i,ii urban poverty is a unique experience, however, which ties in a host of social factors such as high levels of crime, substandard housing conditions, and violence.iii unsurprisingly, this changing face of poverty has prompted a reconfiguration of poverty philosophies, led by amartya sen‟s capabilities approach. sen rejects preoccupations with economic indicators; instead, he explores the barriers that prevent individuals from engaging in five basic freedoms: social opportunity, political freedom, economic facilities, transparency guarantees, and protective security. he suggests that the only way to truly achieve happiness is through addressing the deprivation of capabilities that prevent the individual from engaging in these freedoms.iv sen‟s definition of poverty incorporates social phenomena such as social inequity, cross cultural stigmatization, and power imbalances. this incorporation has opened the doorway to more encompassing strategies against poverty and has inspired countless program efforts in the field since 2000. however, results have been mixed,v with scholars citing the inability of programs to appropriately consider the influences of these issues on the choices made by, and lived experiences of, the poor. such outcomes also highlight the absence of a framework capable of outlining how these freedoms can be actualized on the ground. the ability of psychosocial phenomena to describe the way that individuals interact with their world could potentially contribute to the establishment of a concrete pathway for actualizing sen‟s freedoms. by highlighting the intricacies of the interface between society and the individual through the application of psychosocial theory, poverty reduction strategies incorporating sennian ideals could be better informed and stand a greater chance of success. this paper will examine mechanisms such as social identity, social representations, and stigma with respect to sen‟s capabilities approach, in order to illustrate the importance of psychosocial well being in sennian approaches to poverty. examples of these phenomena in the lives of the poor are presented in comparisons to one of the most famous sites of urban poverty: the brazilian favela. 1.1 the brazilian favela for decades, the favelas (portuguese for „shanty town‟) of brazil have provided a window into the changing face of urban poverty. their inhabitants reside in some of the most culturally rich environments in the world, albeit in one of the most unequal countries.vi although informal settlements have existed in brazil for over 100 years,vii the economic downturn of the 80s and 90s following the „golden era‟ of the 60s is accredited for moulding once largely afrobrazilian communities into the profile seen today: a mix of afro-brazilian and poor white inhabitants.viii over eighty percent of brazil‟s population lives in cities, with more than 12 million 140 consilience   households residing in informal settlements. access to services vary, with 26 million individuals unable to access water, and over 80 million without access to formal sewage systems.ix the conditions within brazil's informal settlements have not been static. attempts to regenerate the favelas have ranged from removal policies in the 1970s, to upgrading programs in the 90s, such as the favela barrio regeneration program, launched in 1994.x though living conditions in favelas have improved in recent years, favela life is still plagued by high levels of violence and crime. drug trade is of particular concern in this respect; wars waged between drug lords and police officials often result in the deaths of innocent community members. living in an environment with such complex social conditions has been proven to influence psychosocial well being;xi as such, social conditions warrant consideration in attempts to improve living conditions in the favelas. 2. considering the psychosocial: social identity, social representations, stigma, and the brazilian poverty experience social identity theory describes identity formation as the process by which individuals come to define themselves in relation to others in their world.xii the process is thus heavily shaped by the nature of interactions with other people.xiii in a similar vein, group identities are formed by comparisons of the self to a set of individuals who compose an „in‟ group (and thus share similarities in values and behaviours) and against those who are in the “out” group (and therefore representative of contradictory ideals and values). in the favela, social identities are created in an environment where it is often difficult to find sources for positive self-validation. brazilian culture is famous for its dominant masculinities. in such a culture, the ability to provide for one’s family becomes a top priority and is cited by residents as the impetus for a move to urban centers.xiv the ability to act as a provider is also cited multiple times by sen as a capability for individuals. in pearlman’s examination of poverty in the favelas, 70% of respondents said that finding a good job is the only real opportunity to escape chronic poverty. however, a lack of job opportunities in the urban marketplace makes unemployment a reality for many. in cases like these, when it is impossible to provide for the family, a huge blow can be inflicted upon the maintenance of a positive sense of self. as men attempt to maintain positive identities through other means, alcoholism and domestic violence are often infused into the home. as one favela community leader put it, “if a man is out of work, he doesn‟t help around the house, but he does get in the way more than ever. he’s drinking and squabbling, blaming things on his wife.”xv such statements also describe typical defensive behaviour in social psychology, through which individuals attempt to maintain a positive sense of identity through projection of fears and negative feelings and through placing blame on others.xvi subsequently, many families are plagued by domestic violence, which is known to entrench individuals in the poverty cycle.xvii consilience burgess: supporting capabilities   what’s more, in many families, economic opportunities that become available in the way of informal work for women or children may be rejected based on the dominant male’s decision, fuelled by his need to remain acting head of household.xviii closely connected to this concept of identity formation is the idea of social representations, which have been described as the mechanisms through which individuals see and construct their worlds.xix the nature of this process involves interactions with peers in public spaces that allow the opportunity to formulate ideals and definitions that are used to help navigate one’s social environment. once formed, these representations can be understood as images, categories, and phenomena that organize meanings and allow individuals to classify circumstances and other individuals.xx the theory of social representations has great value in unpacking the motivations behind responses to poverty alleviation programs in poor communities. howarth, foster, and dorrer describe some key aspects of social representations theory, which can be applied to the favela experience.xxi first, social representation theory provides perspectives on the competing systems of knowledge across lay and professional spheres. for many poverty alleviation programs, which are characterized by the introduction of new knowledge and skills, the ability or inability of individuals to incorporate new information will heavily influence levels of success. second, social representations have the ability to entrench and sustain stigmatizing activities and practices within a group.xxii urban dwellings are often permeated by social, economic, and political variables that influence the opinions formed about actors and groups within a community. for example, in a community that has experienced failed program attempts from outside agents, existing representations may leave residents prejudiced and dubious of future initiatives. sen places a high importance on the ability of individuals to engage in political freedoms in the process of escaping poverty. favela residents have developed representations to explain experiences of high crime and violence committed against them by government and public officials, and these representations deter them from involving themselves politically. there is instead a belief that government workers and officials serve the interests of the wealthy.xxiii even in communities that have reached the level of participation necessary to improve situations of poverty, political experiences have not been positive, leading to a sense of defeat among favela residents. as one favela resident describes: 142 consilience   we built a police station with our own hands and money to curb the violence. the police agreed to come here after lots of pressure. they abandoned the station... after criminals destroyed it in a shoot out... finally we got fed up and tore it down with sledgehammers.xxiv negative social representations like these also carry the potential to interfere with the few economic opportunities that may present themselves. for example, in the wealthy communities that typically border brazilian favelas, there is a representation of favela residents that dubs them as violent, active participants in the drug trade and other illegal activities, uneducated, and, of course, impoverished.xxv though only a small proportion of favela residents actually fit this precise image today,xxvi the power that such false representations have on the daily choices and lifestyles of millions of the urban poor is unmistakeable. as one favela resident reported, “if i say i am from [the favela] they’ll retract the job offer because they think we are all criminals here.” xxvii another said, “one day a company called me for a job, but when they realized i lived in [the favela] they changed their minds, thinking that i was one of those... they couldn’t trust.xxviii this externally imposed representation of favela residents can damage their emotional well being, which reduces their self esteem and subsequently reduces the likelihood of engaging in job seeking behaviours after repeated interactions of this nature. these negative social representations often create widespread stigmatization from one group to another. in discussions of favela life, stigma is best defined as any negative thoughts, feelings, or actions directed towards a particular group of individuals.xxix in this context, the urban poor are impacted by the negative thoughts, feelings, and actions directed at them by the stigmatizers: affluent members of society. external representations and stigma towards favela residents are beyond their immediate control. this, however, does little to alleviate the negative impact and the ability of these factors to dictate their lived experiences. repetition of the types of experiences explained above can substantially erode feelings of self worth. more importantly, they can damage the belief that one’s efforts can result in a significant change in one’s situation; this belief is a driving factor behind the uptake of poverty alleviation programming. in order to distance themselves from outwardly imposed negative representations, individuals respond with a range of behaviours. pearlman describes a typical example witnessed during her fieldwork in the favelas: consilience burgess: supporting capabilities   young women... spend virtually their entire earnings on clothing and accessories that to them symbolize “south zone chic”. i spoke with one young man who had a cell phone, a pager, and a palm pilot hanging off the waistband of his baggy shorts... he confessed that none of them worked. they were merely fashion accessories.xxx it can be safely assumed that this hyper consumption of material items is done with the intent to combat the stigma and negative representations associated with a life of poverty by projecting the image of affluence. from an economic standpoint, such testimonials point to a shift in priorities: incomes traditionally dedicated to helping a family escape from poverty are now being invested in maintaining a positive sense of self worth among the youth in the favela. debt levels may increase within a home, and the effectiveness of economic opportunity is once again lessened.xxxi the need to maintain positive self identities and self representations can also explain the high volume of gang related activities among youths in favela communities. creating a positive sense of self is an important aspect of psychological development. as howarth describes, in absence of other opportunities to assert positive identities and challenge stigmatizing sentiments, it is not uncommon for youths to join gangs.xxxii gangs provide an opportunity for validation from a member’s peers, though this often occurs through engaging in negative activities. if poverty alleviation programming seeks to tackle such issues, it would follow that alternative means must be put into place for youth to find similar self-validation. 3. discussion the cities of the world house considerable potential. the work of international development agencies and grassroots organizations has led to the expansion of social opportunity, access to health care and education, and improvements in basic infrastructure in centers of urban poverty like brazil‟s favelas. such efforts clearly encapsulate the freedoms that sen deems pertinent in the escape from poverty on a theoretical basis. on the ground, however, these efforts have not been adequate in reducing the number of people who live in dehumanizing conditions within urban centers, indicating the existence of a missing link. once the interlaced relationships between these three phenomena—social identity, social representations and stigma—are examined in light of sennian ideology, the role of the psychosocial in escaping 144 consilience   urban poverty begins to take shape. a strong sense of self, fostered in part by positive individual and group identities, self efficacy (defined as the belief in one‟s ability to succeed in various tasks and often influenced by stigma and negative representations), and positive social representations of one‟s group in a broader cultural context, are as important as any program initiative. ultimately, we have seen that psychosocial wellbeing can impact an individual‟s likelihood to engage in the facilities made available to him or her via public programming. the likelihood that an individual will take advantage of opportunities created by training programs, a social opportunity for sen, engage in job seeking behaviour (economic opportunities), or participate in civic programming and political processes (political freedoms) are influenced heavily by the psychosocial wellbeing. but what does this mean in a practical sense? how can this improved understanding of the poverty experience inform future poverty initiatives of the sennian variety? the importance of psychosocial wellbeing is no secret. research has long identified the role of social phenomena and psychological wellbeing in the lives of the poor,xxxiii yet the integration of these ideas into a single concerted approach was not attempted until quite recently. despite advances in rhetoric surrounding poverty alleviation practices, interventions continue to operate in a vertical manner. programming aimed at reducing poverty works within a vacuum, often separate from attempts to address social issues such as violence against women and gang related violence among youth. there are many examples of ngo-operated initiatives that seek to rectify this gap,xxxiv and could help to inform large scale programming which has yet to incorporate such practices, if given the real opportunity to do so. this discussion has highlighted the ability of psychosocial barriers such as negative social identity, negative social representations, and high levels of stigmatization to inhibit the degree to which individuals can experience and interact with sennian freedoms in their daily lives. it appears that for sen‟s freedoms to be capitalized on, development programs must create opportunities for the urban poor to foster positive self-identities, formulate new representations of their place in society, combat the negative representations held by those outside favela communities. if these concepts were incorporated into the planning of poverty alleviation strategies, sustainable success could be far more attainable. the time for truly a multidisciplinary approach is long overdue. once the field of sustainable development takes into account the role of the psychosocial, the opportunities that cities provide for escaping poverty can be developed to their full potential. consilience burgess: supporting capabilities   bibliography amato, paul, and jiping zuo. “rural poverty, urban poverty and 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the stigmatized as agents, not objects.” journal of community & applied social psychology 16 (2006): 442-51. ---. “a social representation is not a quiet thing: exploring the critical potential of social representations theory.” british journal of social psychology 45 (2006): 65-86. howarth, caroline et al. “exploring the potential of the theory of social representations in community-based health research and vice versa?” journal of health psychology 9 (2004): 229-43. huddy, leonie. “from social to political identity: a critical examination of social identity theory.” political psychology 22.1 (2001): 127-56. patel, vikram. “poverty, inequality, and mental health in developing countries.” poverty, inequality and health: an international perspective. eds. david a. leon and gill walt. oxford: oxford university press, 2001. 247-262. pearlman, janice. “the metamorphosis of marginality: four generations in the 146 consilience   favelas of rio de janeiro.” the annals of the american academy of political and social sciences 606 (2006): 154-77. riley, elizabeth, jorge fiori, and ronaldo ramirez. “favela barrio and a new generation of housing programs for the poor.” geoforum 32 (2001): 52131. sen, amartya. development as freedom. new york: random house, 1999. the world bank. cities alliance: cities without slums 2007 report. washington, d.c.: 2007. ---. voices of the poor: from many lands. new york: world bank publications, 2002.   microsoft word schipani final.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 76–81   the red zone: why beijing’s air pollution crisis is more complicated than you think samantha schipani columbia university email: ss4121@columbia.edu keywords: air pollution, china, urban development the air pollution crisis in beijing is an immediately pressing issue, as particulate concentrations have reached unprecedented levels and photographs of a smog-filled city with masked citizens fill international news. as the world's biggest source of carbon emissions, china is under domestic pressure from its populace to counter air pollution as it poses not only health risks to its citizens, but also grave long-term environmental threats. but the issue of air pollution in beijing is much more complicated than media often portrays. beijing is particularly susceptible to adverse atmospheric conditions both due to its rapid urbanization and the geography of the area. the national and municipal government have enacted policies in order to combat air pollution, including restrictions on vehicle and industrial emissions and carbon trading. but there are many challenges to address given the multi-faceted nature of the crisis. in light of the recent policies and scientific contributions, beijing could go one step further in attempting to decrease pollution through implementing driver taxes, expanding and diversifying urban forests, and investing in alternative energy, particularly wind power. however, even such advanced preventative measures are met with their own obstacles given the constraints of urban infrastructure. beijing’s air pollution poses a health risk to the people who live there. such particulate air pollution combines liquid droplets in the atmosphere with a number of components, including acids like nitrates and sulfates, organic chemicals, metals, and soil or dust particles, which can be harmful to those who inhale it. there is a significant exposure-response relationship between maternal exposures to sulfur dioxide and total suspended particles during the third trimester of pregnancy and infant birth weight. the data suggests that total suspended particles and sulfur dioxide, or a more complex pollution mixture associated with these pollutants, contribute to an excess risk of low birth weight in the beijing population (wang et al., 1997) there are also negative health effects regarding respiratory and cardiovascular issues, amongst others, as the annual numbers of mortality and morbidity increase significantly in the presence of pm10 pollution in the urban areas. moreover, the chronic effects of long-term exposure could take years to develop cannot be fully quantified in such studies (zhang, 2007). health complications are also accompanied by economic costs as well as productivity decreases and consilience schipani: the red zone   hospitalization increases; thus it is in the interest of the city to invest in finding solutions to air pollution problems. beijing’s rapid urbanization causes many of its air pollution problems. factories in neighboring provinces circle the city of more than 20 million, as the number of cars on beijing’s streets multiplies at an astounding rate. since 1990, the population in beijing has been growing at a rate of about 2% annually. in 2011, beijing had a population of about 20.7 million, and the number continues to grow (beijing statistical yearbook, 2011). the increase in the population has stimulated real-estate development and accelerated urbanization. in the last decade, many new high-rise buildings have been constructed, hindering the dispersion of air pollutants (liu h. et al., 2005). furthermore, the growth of the population and gdp has increased the demand for vehicular transport. the number of vehicles has increased from 1.39 million in 1999 to 2.65 million in 2005 alone. beijing’s geological conditions also make it highly susceptible to air pollution. beijing sits on a plain flanked by hills and escarpments that can trap pollution on days with little wind (wong, 2013). conversely, strong northwestern winds carry dust from the gobi desert to beijing in the spring and lead to low visibility and high concentrations of pm10, particulate matter with diameter of 10 micrometers that are considered highly harmful to human health (zhang r. et al., 2005). domestic heating in this heavily populated city usually starts in mid-november and ends in the following march, and it is the major source of pollutant sulfur dioxide in the winter season (he et al., 2001). high temperature and relative conditions in beijing summers favor the transformation of air pollutants, resulting in some episodes with high concentrations of secondary pollutants (he et al., 2001). the above-average rate of foggy conditions indicates atmospheric chemical reactions, as hydrophilic aerosols can serve cloud condensation nuclei, leading to the formation of the dramatic fogs in the photographs circulating around the worldwide web (seinfeld and pandis, 1998). the result of the vicious combination between rapid urbanization and unfavorable geological conditions has caused beijing to have air pollution dangerously above the international average. the density of fine particulate matter, pm2.5, used as an indicator of air quality, was well above 600 micrograms per cubic meter – safe level under who guidelines is 25 micrograms per cubic meter (watt, 2013). in 2011, an air quality-monitoring device atop the united states embassy in beijing recorded an air quality index of 755, over the limit of 500, which was supposed to be the top of the scale. by contrast, new york city rated 19 that day on the scale using the same standards (wong, 2013). in general, china’s new environmental strategy promises to grant markets a decisive role in allocating resources while more harshly penalizing polluters. the shift underscores top-level concerns that environmental problems are threatening economic prosperity and social stability, as environmental scholars and the government alike now claim the subsidized and inefficient use of resources has contributed to a severely degraded atmospheric conditions (spegele, 2013). the new policies intend to weaken the hand of government and boost competition in the state dominated economy as a way to build efficiency and cut waste. policy changes, if carried out, are expected to spell gradually rising prices for resources ranging from natural gas to water. in general, higher taxes and other tools are likely to be used to try to wean the economy off coal, which is abundant and makes up the majority of china's energy use. 78 consilience   beijing has made several automobile emissions policy changes to combat air pollution. the city is expected to upgrade its exhaust standard from euro ii to euro iii this year, and special petrol suitable for euro iii cars will be on sale in july. motor vehicles that meet emission standards usually have a yellow or green tag pasted on their front windows after annual inspection. however, cars without such tags are often seen on the roads – with the stricter policies, people driving tag-less cars will be fined. the city also plans to phase out 3,800 old buses and 20,000 taxis, both blamed as major pollution sources (yu, 2013). the local government says it will reduce the number of license plates it issues over the next four years by 40 percent, to 150,000 license plates total per year by 2017, operating on a lottery system for distribution. at the same time, it says it will slowly increase the share of plates that are reserved for electric cars and other hybrid vehicles to 40 percent of the total by the end of four years (lim, 2011). however, electric and hybrid vehicles need electricity, and most of the country’s power is fueled by coal, so the effectiveness of these vehicles in reducing overall pollution is suspect. apart from exhaust fumes, the city will also take tough measures to slash industrial emissions. the new measures include stricter controls on industrial smoke, automobile exhaust fumes and construction dust. about twenty-eight industrial plants surrounding the metropolitan area involved in electricity, heat, and steel smelting have adopted measures to reduce their emissions. the steel giant shougang group, which has long been blamed as the biggest industrial polluter in beijing, was shut down in order to reduce emissions (“steelmaker removed,” 2011). a second batch of heavy polluters is expected to clean up operations within the year. in september 2013, china's cabinet released an action plan that aims to make a small reduction in the country's heavy reliance on coal to below 65 percent of total energy usage by 2017. according to the chinese government’s statistics, coal consumption accounted for 68.4 percent of total energy use in 2011 (watt, 2013). beijing is even taking smaller measures to reduce coal on a municipal level. hundreds of coal-using barbecue grills had been confiscated and destroyed by the government in a threemonth campaign in order to reduce emissions (“beijing destroys barbecue grills,” 2013). beijing has also become involved with carbon trading in order to reduce its emissions. china plans to launch pilot carbon trading schemes in beijing and shanghai as it strives to cut soaring rates of greenhouse gas, reduce choking smog and determine the best system for a nationwide roll-out (stanway, 2013). carbon credits provide financial incentive to close down inefficient steel or cement plants in order to free up the carbon credits to sell on the market. the fines for noncompliance are minimal, but state-owned companies are likely to participate fully given political pressure to take part and the close relationship with local governments. in the first phase, credits will be distributed to member firms free of charge, meaning participants will face additional costs only if they exceed their quotas and have to purchase more carbon credits. the new platforms, which will force industrial firms to buy credits to cover any carbon dioxide they emit above allocated quotas, underscore beijing's commitment to "market mechanisms" to slow emissions growth. since vehicle emissions have increasingly exacerbated pollution, beijing could encourage alternate transportation by taxing drivers. external costs of road traffic can be internalized by road pricing, but current pricing schemas are insufficient for consilience schipani: the red zone   climate change in that they focus mainly on congestion. air pollution is not dependent on traffic density, but rather by every kilometer travelled (creutzig and he, 2009). in order to properly tax car users, beijing could implement a vehicle miles traveled tax. instead of using a tax on fuel consumption as a way of financing road infrastructure, a vmt tax charges motorists based on their road usage measured in mileage. a vmt charge is implemented using gps units on board a vehicle to record distance, assign it to the appropriate taxing jurisdiction, and calculate the amount owed. such taxes have been piloted in areas of the united states and have been deemed feasible (hanley & kuhl, 2011). beijing could employ a similar technique as they currently intend to do by tagging emissions-approved vehicle – cars with installed gps systems could receive a marker and those without would be fined. gps units, however, would be costly, and enacting these measures in its first phases would also require a certain level of cooperation on the part of the drivers. such a project could incite public outrage from the more heavily taxed populace. another option for beijing could be incorporating more urban forests into the city. tree planting has been proposed by the municipal government as a measure to alleviate air pollution in beijing, but the current measures enacted have been insufficient. analyses of satellite images show that there are 2.4 million trees in the central part of beijing. the diameter distribution of the trees is skewed toward small diameters and the urban forest is dominated by a few species. the condition of trees in the central part of beijing is not ideal; about 29% of trees were classified as being in poor condition. nevertheless, trees in the central part of beijing removed 1261.4 tons of pollutants from the air in 2002. the air pollutant that was most reduced was pm10 – the reduction amounted to 772 tons. the carbon dioxide stored in biomass form by the urban forest amounted to about 0.2 million tons (yang et al., 2005). urban forests have reduced the concentrations of carbon dioxide and have potentiality to reduce more in the future. from these observations, the government should invest in diversifying its urban forests and spreading them out over greater areas. but budgetary as well as spatial constraints in the urban infrastructure could pose an obstacle to such expansion. ultimately, beijing’s main goal should be finding an alternative to coal as its most plentiful energy source. beijing could implement more hydroelectric sources, but in the past such projects have yielded disastrous ecological results, such as with the three gorges dam and the serious disturbance it caused in local ecosystems, sedimentation, and drinking water availability (gong, 2006; yang, 2006; wines, 2011). the government could expand resource taxes, which expect would include shifting how china taxes coal, from a volume-based tax to a value-based one. this would boost revenues, which could then be used to subsidize cleaner energy sources (spegele, 2013). perhaps this way, markets will shift towards demanding more clean alternative energy sources, such as wind. beijing could take advantage of the strong northwestern winds that carry dust from the gobi desert to beijing in the spring. areas of the gobi desert, especially in the gansu province outside of beijing, are usually very windy and could thus be used as areas for wind power generation. costbenefit analyses conclude that wind power would be very effective and cost efficient when compared to coal for energy use (sims et. al., 2005). however, cost of execution and grid connectivity that could complicate wind power implementation. 80 consilience   china is an important leader in international development. the challenges faced by beijing in its development could be applied further to other countries in the developing world. at the warsaw climate discussions this year, china’s leaders displayed renewed interest environmentalism as it relates to their country’s rapid growth. there has been a marked shift in developing countries pursuing economic development in concordance with environmental sustainability, or at least demonstrating awareness of the detrimental effects their development has had on the environment. such measures should be encouraged as policy makers strive for sustainability in economic prosperity. bibliography “beijing destroys barbeque grills to cut pollution.” associated press, 27 november 2013. web. beijing statistical yearbook 2011. beijing municipal bureau of statistics. china statistics press, beijing. chan, chak k., and xiaohong yao. "air pollution in mega cities in china." atmospheric environment 42.1 (2008): 1-42. creutzig, felix, and dongquan he. "climate change mitigation and co-benefits of feasible transport demand policies in beijing." transportation research part d: transport and environment 14.2 (2009): 120-131. gong, gwo-ching, et al. "reduction of primary production and changing of nutrient ratio in the east china sea: effect of the three gorges dam?." geophysical research letters 33.7 (2006). hanley, paul & kuhl, jon. “national evaluation of mileage-based charges for drivers.” transportation research record, 2011. he, k., yang, f., ma, y., zhang, q., yao, x.h., chan, c.k., cadle, s.h., chan, t., mulawa, p.a., 2001. the characteristics of pm2.5 in beijing, china. atmospheric environment 35, 4959–4970. lim, louisa. “license plate lottery meant to curb beijing traffic.” national public radio, 26 january 2011. web. liu, x., zhu, j., van espan, p., adams, f., xiao, r., dong, s., li., y., 2005. single particle characterization of spring and summer aerosols in beijing: formation consilience schipani: the red zone   of composite sulfate of calcium and potassium. atmospheric environment 39, 6909–6918. sims, ralph eh, hans-holger rogner, and ken gregory. "carbon emission and mitigation cost comparisons between fossil fuel, nuclear and renewable energy resources for electricity generation." energy policy 31.13 (2003): 1315-1326. spegele, brian. “beijing looks to markets to fix pollution: leaders take aim at cheap use of resources that has led to environment problems.” wall street journal, 20 november 2013. web. stanway, david. “china to launch two new carbon trading exchanges.” reuters, 25 november 2013. web. “steelmaker removed from bj to cut pollution.” china daily, 13 january 2011. web. watt, louise. “super smog hits chinese city as air pollution soars to 40 times higher than international safety standard.” associated press, 21 october 2013. web. wang, xiaobin, et al. "association between air pollution and low birth weight: a community-based study." environmental health perspectives 105.5 (1997): 514-520. wines, michael. “china admits problems with three gorges dam.” the new york times, 19 may 2011. web. yang, jun, et al. "the urban forest in beijing and its role in air pollution reduction." urban forestry & urban greening 3.2 (2005): 65-78. yang, z-s., et al. "dam impacts on the changjiang (yangtze) river sediment discharge to the sea: the past 55 years and after the three gorges dam." water resources research 42.4 (2006). yu, rose. “battling pollution, beijing to cut new car quota by 90,000.” the wall street journal china, 5 november 2013. web. zhang, minsi, yu song, and xuhui cai. "a health-based assessment of particulate air pollution in urban areas of beijing in 2000–2004." science of the total environment 376.1 (2007): 100-108. zhang, r., arimoto, r., an, j., yabuki, s., sun, j., 2005. ground observation of a strong dust strom in beijing in march 2002. journal of geophysical research 110, d18s06. zulfiqar, beyond income and education consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss.27 (2024) beyond income and education: unveiling the true catalysts of green behavior in pakistan and south asia a demand-side analysis fasih zulfiqar masters, duke university bachelors, institute of business administration, karachi f.zulfiqar.22921@khi.iba.edu.pk abstract there is extensive literature on the progress of green alternatives in pakistan, but there is no evaluation of how the people of pakistan will respond to these proposed solutions. after conducting a literature review on green alternatives, this paper employs the theory of planned behavior (tpb) framework. it utilizes data from the world values survey (wvs) in conjunction with logistic regression to assess the viability of sustainable practices in pakistan and whether specific demographic groups, such as women, highly educated individuals, and high-income citizens, exhibit a greater inclination to adopt sustainable practices. our regression analysis indicates that people’s income, religiosity level, and age do not affect their likelihood of adopting sustainable practices. in contrast, their attitude towards free market ideology, self-provision, and cultural values such as power distance and global connectedness have a significant impact. the paper shows pakistan’s education system does not instill environmental values in people like other south asian systems. women in south asia are less likely to adopt sustainable practices than men. these findings offer valuable insights for policymakers and financial institutions, guiding a nuanced restructuring of green alternative approaches in pakistan and south asia. keywords: green alternatives pakistan, sustainable practices adoption, gender sustainability gap, south asian sustainability, sociodemographic factors, environmental values consilience zulfiqar: beyond income and education introduction the impact of climate change will vary across south asia, a vast region with diverse climates. northwestern india and some parts of pakistan are high and arid. the maldives are threatened by rising sea levels. the hindu kush himalaya region, which spans several south asian countries, is subject to melting glaciers. other areas are tropical zones vulnerable to recurring cyclones (hijioka et al., 2014). due to its high population density, significant poverty, and population centers in coastal areas, south asia is vulnerable to rising sea levels and harsh weather conditions (siddiqui & hossain, 2020). by 2050, under a carbon-intensive scenario in which there is no decarbonization of energy systems, per capita income is projected to decline by 6.7% in bangladesh, 2.8% in india, and 7% in sri lanka (mani et al., 2018). all south asian countries must curb emissions (tzung, 2022), though india stands out as a particularly significant contributor to carbon emissions in south asia due to its large population (menon, 2022). research shows pakistan faces an acute threat from climate change, with floods alone causing a national loss of $30 billion u.s. dollars (qamer et al., 2022). moreover, fluctuating weather patterns are bringing about privation of crop yields and 20-30% of livestock, aggravating communities’ food poverty, and making pakistan the 8th most vulnerable country to climate change despite being responsible for only 0.9% of global greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions (ishaque et al., 2022). against this backdrop, green alternatives and sustainable practices, such as adopting green products and implementing electric vehicles become paramount. green financing is another factor, defined as any practice that increases financial flows such as banking, investment, microcredit, and insurance from the private, not-for-profit, and public sectors towards sustainable development (unep, 2016, p. 5). since it is not thoroughly researched in the literature and requires a bigger commitment on the part of individuals than other green alternatives, the last instrument takes more of the spotlight in this paper than other green alternatives. green financing solutions (gfs) are instruments for channeling green finance. this includes promoting green loans and bonds through public-private partnerships and supporting the government in fostering an enabling environment. gfs, more so than other green alternatives, requires collaboration from both businesses and the government, but, ultimately, it is the citizens’ lifestyles, willingness to pay, and awareness will determine their success. when people are not sufficiently concerned about the environment, they are less likely to sacrifice higher pecuniary returns—via conventional, non-green financial instruments—for modest returns via gfs. the same argument can be applied to other green actions, such as using sustainable packaging, which also requires a financial sacrifice. south asia is taking momentous measures in the form of gfs. some notable examples include india’s national clean energy and environment fund, which invests in research aimed at clean energy technologies (pandey et al., 2014). the bangladesh bank also launched a $200 million green transformation fund to subsidize industries purchasing environment-friendly machinery (cdkn global, 2020). pakistan implemented measures to support the financing of renewable energy, including the adoption of feed-in tariffs and the establishment of power purchase agreements (cppa, 2022). farmers in pakistan have also moved toward more collective action to improve their capacity for climate change adaptation (jabbar et al., 2023). however, again, such solutions, like other developments towards green alternatives, are only viable if people are inclined to forgo some financial gains for the environment, and the climate 3 consilience literature on pakistan has not focused on whether the populace is willing and ready to adopt sustainable practices. this raises the question: what are the sociodemographic factors of pakistan’s populace that make it likely or unlikely to forgo economic gain for environmental sustainability? to answer this question, the paper considers question 111 in the wvs survey (haerpfer et al., 2020), which is stated as a choice between the following options: (1) protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs. (2) economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent. the premise of the paper, that people's preference for environmental sustainability over economic gain is an important indicator of their behavioral intentions to adopt the relatively costly green alternatives, is based on the theory of planned behavior (tpb) put forward by kamalanon et al. (2022). the paper is structured as follows: section 1 puts forth the research objective; section 2 offers a literature review; section 3 presents the methodology and data analysis; section 4 sets forth the study’s results; section 5 presents the results, discussion, and policy implications; and section 6 concludes. literature review i. supply-side and demand-side studies mumtaz and smith (2019) have performed a comparative supply-side analysis of pakistan's green finance mechanism and concluded that, although china and india are better at implementing green banking practices, pakistan is still only starting to formulate its strategy. kumar et al. (2022) foresee a future where pakistan can successfully reduce its carbon footprint through green alternatives, including green financing, but point to several hurdles: insufficient business advisory, policy uncertainties, financial short-termism, and inadequate government funding for green initiatives in businesses and banks. banks support green loans because they might be a less risky investment than non-green loans, but there is a financing gap preventing adequate provision of such loans (afridi et al., 2021). ayaz et al. (2022) point to another obstacle: a lack of clear objectives and a legal and institutional framework. the consensus is that limited private sector involvement, lack of awareness, lack of policies with a clear structure, and inadequate financial support impede the success of green alternatives in pakistan. none of the research heretofore has analyzed the demand for green alternatives in pakistan, especially from households. consumers are a lynchpin in the country because, firstly, the demand for green initiatives is derived demand. it depends on the aggregate demand for green products, which is determined by households. moreover, consumers might be willing to support struggling businesses that embody environmental practices. even more importantly, they may be more receptive to crucial awareness initiatives. secondly, consumers decide whether green programs, such as loans for purchasing solar panels and energy-efficient vehicles, are successful. the same goes for green mortgage programs introduced by bank alfalah in pakistan in 2022 (bank alfalah, 2022). finally, some green solutions are government-led carbon offset programs. these programs allow households to offset their carbon footprint by investing in projects that capture greenhouse gas emissions. another example is government rebates such as tax credits given for installing energy-efficient upgrades to homes. however, the success of all such green alternatives depends on consilience zulfiqar: beyond income and education the inclination of households to forgo temporary economic gain for environmental sustainability. green alternatives can also include community-based projects where households participate in local sustainability initiatives, such as the 10 billion tree tsunami (sabir et al., 2022). today, communities in pakistan are becoming aware of the environmental and social impacts of their investments. in short, households’ role in determining the success of green solutions cannot be overlooked. in evaluating renewable energy in pakistan, malik et al. (2018) focused on consumer preferences. she concedes that clean energy will be less financially attractive because of its higher costs. many developed countries, having embraced green services early on, have overcome the affordability issue and do not face this dilemma. demand in china, for instance, is less limiting since it has made certain green technologies almost as affordable as non-green technologies, and the country plans to make renewables cheaper than coal in the next two years (gordon, 2020). in pakistan, green alternatives are more expensive than conventional sources (malik et al., 2018), and since green alternatives are channels for investing in green finance, the demand side matters. ii. why do socioeconomic factors and purchasing intentions matter? could certain socioeconomic factors and values make the people of pakistan and south asia relatively more inclined to make such sacrifices? if so, policymakers can adopt a targeted approach to propagating green solutions. while there is adequate research examining the supply side of green solutions, especially finance, a limited segment looks at the demand side. studies have examined what sociodemographic factors are correlated with people's purchasing of green products in developed countries, but there is limited research in south asia, and none in pakistan, that looks at the probability of success for green finance from a consumer perspective and then provides tailored policy recommendations. why do green actions, such as green financing, matter if an individual prefers to forgo economic growth for environmental sustainability? we can think of this choice as a measure of people’s green purchasing intention. yue et al. (2020) show that environmental responsibility has a positive correlation with consumption intention, and environmental concern positively affects green consumption intention. du et al. (2022) demonstrate the same, and kamalanon et al. (2022) reinforce the association by showing that people's intentions to sacrifice personal benefit can have a significantly positive effect on green purchases, with the effect being higher in developing countries compared to developed ones. this makes the effect very relevant for pakistan. to establish a more theoretical basis, the theory of planned behavior posits that a person's behavioral intentions are influenced by their attitudes towards the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. it should therefore be expected that pro-environmental behaviors, such as a preference for sustainability over economic growth, can be shaped by underlying beliefs stemming from religious, environmental, and personal values. iii. what socioeconomic and demographic factors matter? research has provided a consensus that socioeconomic context and culture must be considered in these discussions (barr et al., 2011). čábelková et al. (2023) show social and environmental value orientations are strongly interdependent, implying that how environmental problems are posed can be the deciding factor between the problem triggering an individual's social values or not. the authors show, for instance, that religiosity has a positive effect on 5 consilience pro-environmental actions. leonidou et al. (2022), studying the population of china and the united states, show that religiosity is consistently related to environmental sustainability beliefs while materialism is not. witek and kuźniar (2020), however, surveying 650 polish consumers, included several control variables in their research on how sociodemographic variables explain green purchasing behavior. she identified that gender, age, personal financial situation, and education all have a significant association with awareness and green purchasing behavior. on a global scale, women, people with decent personal financial situations, and people of relatively old age tend to be more inclined to purchase green products. however, people who are relatively more educated tend to prioritize their needs, or personal gain, over environmental values. this suggests that there might be an inverse relationship between the pakistani people's decision to forgo economic growth for environmental sustainability and their level of education. gasper (2006) shows the same relationship between being a woman, in particular a young woman, and preferring green aspects to higher financial returns in investment decisions. however, the relationship between income and sustainable behavior is uncorrelated. this could be because income and environmental concerns are non-linearly linked (park et al., 2012). this broaches the following question: why is the relationship between other socioeconomic variables and environmental concern linear, and might such a linear relationship also exist between not just the income of the pakistani people but also their other characteristics and their preference for environmental sustainability over economic gain? methodology i. data the methodology is based on a quantitative analysis and the data for the regression analysis that follows was acquired from the world values survey (wvs) wave 7. two datasets are constructed, one for pakistan and one for south asia as a collective (bangladesh, maldives, myanmar, and pakistan). the 7th wave was conducted in 2018 in pakistan and is based on a random sample of more than 1900 people. this sample size is adequate for generalization to the population. the variables of interest were taken and coded as follows. the dependent variable was the responses to q111, which asked people if they prefer economic growth versus environmental sustainability. a dummy variable, environment preference, was formed from this binary variable which equals 1 if the person preferred environmental sustainability over economic growth. are the answers to q111 in the wvs survey biased because the respondents were unaware of the trade-offs between economic growth and environmental sustainability? while this is not an unfounded concern, the wvs survey is interview-based and rules out the chances of the respondents being oblivious to what they are asked. according to the methodology, the interview is free of any bias and if the interviewee is unable to understand a question or the context behind it then he/she can ask the interviewer on the spot, thus ruling out the possibility that people's responses to q111 are arbitrary. moreover, the data has been cleaned, and the responses of all the individuals who did not pick one of these choices (economic growth or environmental sustainability) or did not know what these terms meant have been omitted from the analysis. consilience zulfiqar: beyond income and education ii. specification & variables where individuals obtain their information can also impact how concerned they are about the environment and how willingly they might sacrifice economic gain for environmental sustainability. a study from bangladesh shows environmental journalism is a significant subfield in local newspapers and can sway people (rahmatullah et al., 2021). further, gooch (1996) mentions that regional newspapers play a crucial role in disseminating environmental concerns, especially at the local level, in both poor and rich nations. wakefield and elliot (2003) also show that newspapers can be a key source of environmental risk information, but their impact is often mitigated by resident distrust and access to other information sources. therefore, newspaper and internet use were included as explanatory variables in the model. people's cultural values can also impact how likely they are to sacrifice economic gain for environmental sustainability. people's autocratic tendencies, synonymous with the culture’s power distance (terzi, 2011), defined by hofstede (1985) as “the extent to which the members of a society accept that power in institutions and organizations is distributed unequally,” can impact how environmentally concerned the people are (schultz & stone, 1994). a negative correlation between power distance and preservation of the environment is shown by wiseman et al. (2012) who explain this by noting that people with acute autocratic tendencies might be relatively aggressive and self-serving, thus less sacrificial of their economic benefit. countries exhibiting high power distance, indulgence, and individualism are less likely to achieve environmental sustainability, which indicates that how individualistic people are can also decide their environmental preferences (zakari & toplak, 2021). another cultural factor could be people's global identity, or how connected they feel to the world. several authors identified a positive correlation between global identity and pro-environmental behavior, which can be explained by people's feelings of obligation, responsibility, and relevance to other humans (pong & tam, 2023). some feminist theories argue the rights of women and the environment are interlinked (norgaard & york, 2005). societies that empower women, especially their right to work, create an environment wherein thinking and acting pro-environmentally is embraced. these are societies that tend to prefer sustainability over personal benefit (miao & cagle, 2020). similarly, people's views of whether scientific progress is making society better can also impact how environmentally concerned they are. lyons and breakwell (1994) shows that attitudes towards science's progress are a good discriminating factor even after controlling for social class and knowledge, whereas age is weakly significant and sex and personal commitment to science are insignificant. thus, from the category of cultural values, the variables power distance, global citizen, gender bias, and scientific optimism were formed. lastly, people's economic values inevitably affect their choice in an economic trade-off. an individual who advocates for free-market ideology is less likely to act pro-environmentally than an individual who argues for government ownership (heath & gifford, 2006). there is a lot of research that examines whether free markets and the ‘invisible hand' can deal with climate change, but, in general, laissez-faire ideology dismisses the reality of climate change (rapsikevicius et al., 2021). 7 consilience hofstede (1985) defines individualism as the extent to which individuals are supposed to take care of themselves as opposed to relying on groups or institutions. people in countries with high levels of individualism tend to cause more environmental damage since they are more likely to care about personal benefits than the social good (komatsu et al., 2019). there is no explicit question in wvs on individualism but there is one that asks people if it is the government's responsibility to provide for people or people's responsibility. this reflects economic liberalism, of which individualism is a component (de vita, 2013). to account for economic values, the variables “free market” and “economic liberalism” were formed. to conclude, based on the literature and the theoretical framework above, the following control variables were taken and labeled for both models: age, female, income, education, religiosity, and rural (whether the respondent belongs to a rural area). all the variables and their definitions are given in table i in the appendix. iii. method of analysis the descriptive statistics of all the variables have been provided in table ii. since the dependent variable is binary, logistic regression is used in both models to capture the effects of the independent variables on people's choices between economic gain and environmental sustainability. a significance level of 5% has been used to determine whether a variable is significant or not. five specifications of the models have been run to test the results' robustness: full model, information sources specification, cultural factors specification, economic values specification, and sociodemographic specification. these are all displayed below, and their results are shown in tables iii and iv. the coefficients of logistic regression can be esoteric, so average marginal effects (ame) of full specifications are computed and shown in table iv which compares the results between pakistan and south asia’s models. lastly, a multicollinearity check through the variation inflation factor has been performed. sociodemographic specification: 𝑌 𝑖 = β 1 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖 + β 2 𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑖 + β 3 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑖 + β 4 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 + β 5 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 + β 6 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑖 + 𝑢 𝑖 economic values specification: 𝑌 𝑖 = β 1 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖 + β 2 𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑖 + β 3 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑖 + β 4 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 + β 5 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 + β 6 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑖 + β 7 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑖 + β 8  𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝑖 + 𝑢 𝑖 cultural values specification: 𝑌 𝑖 = β 1 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖 + β 2 𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑖 + β 3 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑖 + β 4 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 + β 5 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 + β 6 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑖 + β 7 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑛 𝑖 + β 8 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖 + β 9 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑖 + β 10 𝑆𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝑖 + 𝑢 𝑖 information sources specification: 𝑌 𝑖 = β 1 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖 + β 2 𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑖 + β 3 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑖 + β 4 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 + β 5 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 + β 6 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑖 + β 7 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑈𝑠𝑒 𝑖 + β 8 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑈𝑠𝑒 𝑖 + 𝑢 𝑖 consilience zulfiqar: beyond income and education full specification: 𝑌 𝑖 = β 1 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖 + β 2 𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑖 + β 3 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑖 + β 4 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 + β 5 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 + β 6 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑖 + β 7 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑖 + β 8 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝑖 + β 9 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑛 𝑖 + β 10 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖 + β 11 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑖 + β 12 𝑆𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝑖 + β 13 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑈𝑠𝑒 𝑖 + β 14 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑈𝑠𝑒 𝑖 + 𝑢 𝑖 results i. what sociodemographic factors matter? from specification 1, only gender (female) and education are statistically significant variables in pakistan. in specification 5, with all independent variables, education becomes marginally significant (at the 90% level) and gender, while losing its significance, is still quite significant and negative. all other sociodemographic factors have no impact, in the case of pakistan, on deciding whether an individual might be willing to sacrifice economic gain for the environment. this includes religiosity, which was shown to matter in the literature (čábelková et al., 2023). in the case of south asia, gender, though still significant, is less significant in both the baseline and full specifications, whereas, unlike in pakistan, income is now significant in the baseline model but not in the full model. education, however, is highly positively significant in both specifications. this proves that education increases people’s likelihood to sacrifice gain for sustainability. ii. robustness checks since we have three groups of constructs in our independent variables: cultural, economic, and information source, five different specifications have been constructed for both pakistan and south asia for the sake of testing robustness and analyzing the effects of each construct individually. the first specification has only the sociodemographic variables of age, gender, education, income, religiosity, and settlement (rural or urban), whereas the second has these as control variables and the economic value of privatization as the main explanatory variable. similarly, the third specification isolates the impact of the cultural factors, and the fourth isolates the impact of information sources factors. lastly, the fifth specification comprises all three constructs to analyze their impact, controlling for sociodemographic and socioeconomic factors. iii. what other variables matter? cultural values in pakistan, being a global citizen seems to be highly significant and positive, whereas scientific optimism is moderately significant in both specifications and power distance is only slightly significant and positive. the results will be thoroughly discussed in the subsequent section, but some intuition is warranted. the positive impact of global citizenship and scientific optimism on environmental preference evinces a growing awareness of global environmental challenges and their long-term consequences. this awareness is likely heightened by pakistan's vulnerability to climate 9 consilience change, urbanization, and its agriculture-based economy, which directly affronts climate threats. such factors encourage a shift towards prioritizing environmental concerns over short-term economic growth. conversely, in the broader south asian region, the negatively significant effect of power distance and gender bias suggests that as traditional social structures are questioned, there is an increasing awareness of the link between environmental issues and social equity. the lack of impact from global citizenship and scientific optimism across south asia may reflect a stronger persistence of traditional values, indicating that these global perspectives have not permeated deeply. the disparate results between pakistan and south asia can be ascribed to pakistan's unique geopolitical characteristics and its rapid socio-economic changes that have fostered environmental awareness. information sources there are contradictory results between pakistan and south asia. in pakistan, newspaper readership is a statistically significant and positive variable in both specifications, albeit less so in the full one. in the case of south asia, it is not significant at all. this could be because of the diverse media landscape across the south asian region, with other sources like television or social media playing a larger role in shaping environmental attitudes in other regions, whereas in pakistan there is a historical legacy of newspapers as trusted sources of information, particularly among educated and politically engaged segments of society. economic values lastly, for economic values, the results for south asia and pakistan are consistent. while the free market variable is negatively significant in pakistan, it is barely significant in south asia. pakistanis might have a preference for more state-guided economic models, possibly influenced by the country’s past autocratic systems and present-day hybrid regimes. liberalism is highly significant and negative in south asia but merely significant and negative in pakistan. this could be due to a stronger overall resistance to liberal economic policies across south asia, which might be engendered from concerns about their impact on traditional social structures and economic inequality. iv. marginal effects the marginal effects reveal subtle disparities in environmental preferences between pakistan and south asia, reflecting complex socio-cultural dynamics. in pakistan, the gender gap is more pronounced, with women 7.4% less likely to favor the environment over economic growth compared to 2.5% in south asia. this could be due to more entrenched gender roles in pakistan. education's meager impact in pakistan (1.3% increase per education level versus 2.2% in south asia) indicates environmental awareness might not be as integrated into the educational curriculum. the significant positive effect of global citizenship in pakistan (4.3% more likely to favor the environment per unit increase) suggests exposure to global perspectives has a robust effect on environmental attitudes. the negative impact of free market preferences on environmental concerns is more pronounced in pakistan (1% decrease versus 0.4% in south asia per unit increase), suggesting a consilience zulfiqar: beyond income and education stronger perceived trade-off between economic liberalization and environmental protection. interestingly, respect for authority correlates positively with environmental preference in pakistan (2.9% increase per category), indicating trust in institutional approaches for environmental management. in south asia, gender bias greatly reduces environmental preference (5.3% less likely), highlighting the interrelatedness between social equity and environmental attitudes. lastly, the positive effect of newspaper readership on environmental preference in pakistan (2.5% increase per frequency category) underscores the significance of traditional media in shaping public opinion on environmental issues, a factor insignificant in the broader south asian region. these findings highlight the need for customized approaches to environmental education and policy-making that account for specific national and regional socio-cultural contexts. discussion there are specific results and policy implications for both pakistan and south asia that can enable the entities to make green alternatives a success. to start with, there is a significant negative correlation between women and action-based support for green finance in pakistan and south asia. the literature, however, shows that women are more inclined to purchase green products than men. this cannot be due to the educational disparities between men and women since the model has controlled for education. societal expectations and economic constraints in south asia could make women less inclined to adopt green alternatives than men. women in developing countries are expected to emphasize exigent concerns such as family welfare and finances, making them less focused on issues such as environmental degradation that might seem abstract (duflo, 2012). moreover, women face more economic challenges than men and this could make them favor economic gain over environmental sustainability since the former can help them overcome these economic strictures (elborgh-woytek et al., 2013). after controlling for people’s scientific optimism and incomes, education in pakistan–unlike in south asia–barely makes people more inclined to adopt green alternatives, indicating that there is a gap in pakistan’s educational curriculum that is preventing the youth from learning about environmental issues (gul & mahmood, 2021). in south asia as a whole, however, where environmental education is more integrated into the educational curriculum on average, the effect of education aligns with the literature in making people exhibit pro-environmental attitudes (meyer, 2015). the pakistani single curriculum is inadequate. unless students choose to take courses explicitly on the environment or energy, they are left without sufficient knowledge of the importance of environmental sustainability. those with higher incomes and those living in urban areas are just as likely to adopt green alternatives as those with lower incomes and living in rural areas, respectively. this concurs with the literature in that the effects of income are mixed (park et al., 2012). income, after holding education constant, does not seem to make one more willing to sacrifice economic gain for the environment even though the person might have more than enough income to lead a comfortable lifestyle. similarly, age is not a discriminating factor. the old and the young are equally likely to adopt green alternatives in south asia, which does not match the case in developed regions where gen z is found to be more willing to pay for green options (gomes et al., 2023). coming to cultural values, in south asia a high power distance makes people less inclined to adopt green alternatives, which is in contradiction to the situation in pakistan but aligns with the 11 consilience literature showing that higher power distance cultures are less inclined to make sacrifices for the environment (wiseman et al., 2012). pakistan, however, due to martial law and a cultural context where authority is esteemed and inequality is not abhorrent, has a populace that might be more receptive to adopting green alternatives if an august authoritative figure in the country advocates for gfs. the government and marketers should therefore align their green alternatives promotion strategies accordingly. moreover, in accordance with the literature (pong & tam, 2023), being a global citizen and being scientifically optimistic seems to matter in pakistan only. thus, initiatives promoting people’s connectedness to the world and putting a positive light on technological progress can be effective in making people adopt green alternatives. for instance, while the current news coverage in pakistan tends to be pessimistic, news channels can give more coverage to positive news about how technologies abroad are making not just other countries but also pakistan better. the government can also emphasize the interconnected nature of environmental challenges and the role of individual citizens in addressing them. whether an individual obtains information from the internet seems to have no impact in pakistan, whereas newspaper readers seem to be much more inclined to adopt green alternatives. since the distributions of these variables in the samples of both south asia and pakistan are similar and balanced, the explanation that pakistanis lack access to the internet can be ruled out. newspapers having such an impact indicate local journalism in pakistan may play a more influential role in shaping public opinion compared to broader south asia. localized reporting might resonate more with individuals, so fostering partnerships with local journalists and reputable newspapers (e.g. dawn) in accurately reporting environmental issues can enhance the effectiveness of green alternatives campaigns. conclusion green alternatives can be considered a peripheral topic in pakistan and south asia where people are concerned about more immediate issues such as poverty, malnutrition, and illiteracy. while those issues are exigent, this is not a zero-sum game. the region can simultaneously work on reducing its carbon footprint and improving the different dimensions of economic conditions. having to choose between one or the other is not necessary if the governments in the region, including pakistan, take a tailored approach when formulating and implementing sustainable behavior policies. for pakistan, such an approach involves taking note of the factors found significant in determining people’s willingness to adopt green alternatives. for instance, the government should focus on incorporating environmental education into the national curriculum since the evidence shows that, despite obtaining degrees, pakistanis are unwilling to forgo economic gain for environmental sustainability. similarly, the government should work on empowering women and nudging societal expectations so that women can escape parochialism and encourage their families to focus on environmental issues. the government should be cognizant of the power of local journalism in persuading people and should partner with reputable newspapers. it should also persuade the populace by showing that authoritative figures in the country are adopting green alternatives. the nation should emphasize people's connectedness to the world and how rapidly the world is progressing because of science and technology which can make people more receptive to green alternatives. lastly, pakistan should consilience zulfiqar: beyond income and education also realize there is skepticism towards government-led initiatives, so most of the advocacy and advancement of green alternatives should be undertaken by the private sector. with tailored policies and initiatives like these, the governments in the south asian region can make huge strides in making green alternatives a success in not only their own countries but in the entire region. however, it is important to note that the paper was based on people’s stated preferences, not their revealed preferences. as economists know, stated preferences are not always the best indicator of actual preferences. this is a limitation since the methodology relied on secondary data and it was not feasible to undertake a primary survey. lastly, further research is needed to explore the specific societal and economic factors that influence gender differences in environmental attitudes in south asia following the results discussed in this paper. comparative studies of environmental education curricula across south asian countries could help identify effective approaches to fostering pro-environmental attitudes through education. additionally, in-depth qualitative research could provide insights into why traditional media (newspapers) have had a 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(2019). green finance for sustainable development in pakistan. ipri journal, 1–34. https://doi.org/10.31945/iprij.190201 17 consilience appendix table i: definitions and sources of all variables variable scale and type definition income ordinal variable question 288: income 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. we would like to know in what group your household is. please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. 1.lower step 2.second step 3.third step 4.fourth step 5.fifth step 6.sixth step 7.seventh step 8.eighth step 9.nineth step 10.tenth step age continuous question 262: negative values cleaned from the data. female binary variable (coded) question 260: sex equals to 1 if the respondent is female. religion ordinal variable on a scale of 1-10 question 164: how important is god in your life? 1.not at all important 10.very important education ordinal variable question 275: highest educational level: respondent [isced 2011] 0.early childhood education (isced 0) / no education 1.primary education (isced 1) 2.lower secondary education (isced 2) 3.upper secondary education (isced 3) 4.post-secondary non-tertiary education (isced 4) 5.short-cycle tertiary education (isced 5) 6.bachelor or equivalent (isced 6) 7.master or equivalent (isced 7) 8.doctoral or equivalent (isced 8) rural binary variable (coded) h_urbrural: urban-rural settlement type equals to 1 if the respondent is in a rural settlement. consilience zulfiqar: beyond income and education newspaper use ordinal variable on a scale of 1-5 question 201: information source: daily newspaper 1.daily 2.weekly 3.monthly 4.less than monthly 5.never internet use ordinal variable on a scale of 1-5 question 206: information source: internet 1.daily 2.weekly 3.monthly 4.less than monthly 5.never free market ordinal variable: coded to an inverted scale of 1-10. question 107: private vs state ownership of business 1.government ownership of business should be increased 10.private ownership of business should be increased economic liberalism ordinal variable: coded to an inverted scale of 1-10. question 108: government’s vs individual’s responsibility. 1.the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for 10.people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves gender bias binary variable question 33_3: men should have a greater right to a job than women. 1.agree (coded to 1) 2.disagree (coded to 0) 3.neither agree nor disagree (omitted) power distance binary variable question 45: future change: there should be greater respect for authority. 1.good thing (coded to 2, most agreed) 2.don ́t mind (coded to 1, neutral) 3.bad thing (coded to 0) global citizen ordinal variable: coded to an inverted scale of 1-4. question 249: feel close to the world. 1.not close at all 2.not very close 3.close 19 consilience 4.very close scientific optimism ordinal variable: coded to an inverted scale of 1-10. question 158: science and technology are making our lives healthier, easier, and more comfortable. 1.completely disagree 10.completely agree consilience zulfiqar: beyond income and education table ii: descriptive statistics of all variables (pakistan) n=1391 statistic mean st. dev. min max age 35.68 11.68 18 85 economic liberalism 5.07 3.60 1 10 education 2.26 2.00 0 8 environment preference (y) 0.45 0.50 0 1 female 0.46 0.50 0 1 free market 5.04 3.52 1 10 gender bias 0.93 0.26 0 1 global citizen 3.27 0.99 1 4 income 4.36 2.31 1 10 internet use 1.96 1.51 1 5 newspaper use 2.32 1.55 1 5 power distance 1.93 0.87 1 3 religion 9.57 1.33 1 10 rural 0.66 0.47 0 1 scientific optimism 7.75 2.81 1 10 21 consilience table iii: regression results of all specifications (pakistan) variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) income -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) female -0.417*** -0.414*** -0.460*** -0.275** -0.311** (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) religion -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) education 0.088*** 0.091*** 0.084*** 0.058* 0.056* (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) rural -0.08 -0.08 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) free market -0.036** 0.181*** (0.02) (0.06) economic liberalism -0.037** -0.037** (0.02) (0.02) global citizen 0.194*** -0.035** (0.06) (0.02) power distance 0.114* 0.122* (0.06) (0.07) gender bias -0.13 -0.10 (0.21) (0.22) consilience zulfiqar: beyond income and education scientific optimism 0.040** 0.04 (0.02) (0.04) internet use 0.04 0.105** (0.04) (0.04) newspaper use 0.108*** -0.041** (0.04) (0.02) constant 0.51 0.838* 0.08 0.12 0.01 (0.47) (0.49) (0.55) (0.49) (0.59) observations 1,391 1,391 1,391 1,391 1,391 log likelihood -943 -939 -934 -938 -92 akaike inf. crit. 1,900 1,895 1,890 1,895 1,881 n=1391, *** if p-value < 0.01, ** if p-value < 0.05, and * if p-value < 0.10 decision variable: environment preference (1 if prefer environment over economic growth). 23 consilience table iv: regression results of all specifications (south asia) variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) income -0.028** -0.025* -0.024* -0.028** -0.02 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) female -0.105* -0.108* -0.110* -0.09 -0.103* (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) religion -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) education 0.099*** 0.102*** 0.089*** 0.096*** 0.091*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) rural -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) free market -0.017* 0.04 (0.01) (0.03) economic liberalism -0.027*** -0.018* (0.01) (0.01) global citizen 0.04 -0.029*** (0.03) (0.01) power distance -0.111*** -0.112*** (0.04) (0.04) gender bias -0.192*** -0.209*** (0.07) (0.07) consilience zulfiqar: beyond income and education scientific optimism 0.00 -0.01 (0.01) (0.02) internet use -0.01 0.03 (0.02) (0.02) newspaper use 0.03 -0.01 (0.02) (0.01) constant 0.11 0.33 0.34 0.07 0.572* (0.28) (0.29) (0.31) (0.28) (0.32) observations 4,599 4,599 4,599 4,599 log likelihood -3,157 -3,151 -3,147 -3,156 4,599 akaike inf. crit. 6,327 6,321 6,316 6,329 -3,140 n=1391, *** if p-value < 0.01, ** if p-value < 0.05, and * if p-value < 0.10 decision variable: environment preference (1 if prefer environment over economic growth). 25 consilience table v: average marginal effects of all variables (full specification) statistic pakistan south asia age -0.0001 0.0001 economic liberalism -0.008 -0.007 education 0.013 0.022 female -0.074 -0.025 free market -0.009 -0.004 gender bias -0.023 -0.051 global citizen 0.043 0.010 income -0.001 -0.005 internet use 0.010 -0.003 newspaper use 0.025 0.006 power distance 0.029 -0.027 religion -0.013 -0.005 rural -0.011 -0.010 scientific optimism 0.010 0.001 n=1391 decision variable: environment preference (1 if prefer environment over economic growth). beyond income and education: unveiling the true catalysts of green behavior in pakistan and south asia introduction literature review i. supply-side and demand-side studies ii. why do socioeconomic factors and purchasing intentions matter? iii. what socioeconomic and demographic factors matter? methodology i. data ii. specification & variables iii. method of analysis results i. what sociodemographic factors matter? ii. robustness checks iii. what other variables matter? cultural values information sources economic values iv. marginal effects conclusion references appendix microsoft word consilience submissions checlist.docx 1 consilience author submission guidelines table of contents author checklist . . . . . . . . . . 2 note from the editors . . . . . . . . . 4 scope of the journal . . . . . . . . . 4 types of papers accepted . . . . . . . . 5 characteristics of past successful submissions . . . . . 6 formatting guidelines . . . . . . . . . 7 review, production, and publication notes . . . . . . 8 privacy statement . . . . . . . . . . 9 2 checklist as part of the submission process, authors are required confirm compliance with all of the following items. submissions may be returned to authors that do not adhere to these guidelines. before submitting your paper, please check the following: _____ i confirm that i have read this document in its entirety _____ i confirm that the text adheres to the stylistic and bibliographic requirements outlined in the "formatting guidelines" below. _____ i confirm that this is an original work, an update on a previous piece, or a reprint of an article that deserves wider discussion. _____ i confirm that this submission adheres to standard grammar conventions _____ i confirm that my uploaded file is in .docx file type and not .pdf _____ i confirm that i have read the author agreement – found on the consilience website under the submit to the academic journal tab (signage is not required until the paper has been accepted for publication) included with my submission is the following: _____ cover sheet: this should include the title of your article, your full name, institutional affiliation, and your email address. _____ scholarly abstract: this should include your thesis, methodology, and its relevance to other disciplines within the field of sustainable development. this should be no more than 250 words. _____ author’s note: the consilience editorial board has found that readers enjoy learning about the author’s personal motivations for their involvement in their field of study and how they wish to contribute to sustainable development. this is your personal note to readers, describing the rationale for your study, your thesis, its relevance of the field of sustainable development and future avenues for research. the author’s note should be no more than ten sentences. _____ keywords: please include 3 to 6 keywords describing the content of the article. _____ full text manuscript (upload a word document, not pdf) 3 _____ bibliography, as outlined in the "formatting guidelines" below _____ appendices or supplementary material: we strongly encourage you to include any relevant photographs, charts, or graphs within the body of the article itself, beside relevant passages. these should be cited appropriately. 4 note from the editors dear author, consilience: the journal of sustainable development is a journal dedicated to promoting dialogue on sustainable development by brining students, researchers, professors, and practitioners from a variety of disciplines and geographical regions in direct conversation with each other through an online, academically rigorous medium. the field of sustainable development is broad and can encompass a wide variety of topics, related to the science, economics, politics, and society. as an interdisciplinary journal, consilience encourages its contributors to submit articles of relevance to many fields related to the study and practice of sustainable development. consilience also encourages authors of all experience levels, sectors, and disciplines to submit. our process for screening submissions in very competitive, so please be sure to read this document in its entirety before submitting your paper. papers which do not follow our guidelines will be at a disadvantage during our screening process. the opinions expressed within consilience do not necessarily reflect those of the journal, its staff, its advisory boards, or affiliates, or those of columbia university. questions should be directed to consiliencejournal@gmail.com. for more information and to read the journal, please visit www.consiliencejournal.org. the editorial board is based at columbia university in new york city. thank you for considering consilience. we look forward to reading your work. the consilience editorial team scope of the journal consilience publishes scholarly articles, opinion pieces, field notes, editorial columns and photo essays. by providing a public platform for discussion, we hope to encourage a global community to think more broadly, thoroughly, and analytically about sustainable development. the journal is run by a team of undergraduate and graduate students, under the guidance of faculty from columbia university in the city of new york. consilience draws submissions from across five continents. we have published or are currently editing submissions from: 5 • europe – denmark, france, finland, germany, italy, the netherlands, norway, switzerland, united kingdom • asia – china, india, malaysia, palestine, philippines • africa – burkina faso, ghana, kenya, egypt, nigeria, south africa, uganda • oceania – australia, new zealand • latin america – brazil, colombia, venezuela • united states of america typically, more than 50% of our submissions are from outside the usa. in issue 6 (summer 2012), roughly 1/3rd of our authors were academics and researchers, 1/3rd were graduate students and 1/3rd were undergraduate students. types of papers accepted scholarly articles scholarly articles are original, research-based articles that contribute new understandings or approaches to topics in sustainable development. such articles are thoroughly substantiated by existing research in order to introduce innovative findings; thus, articles contain numerous citations from scholarly sources. some authors may wish to include a concise literature review, although a specific literature review section is not required. authors should also include discussions of recommendations and implications of their findings. implications should be global in nature and not confined to specific case studies discussed in the article. given the rigor of the research, scholarly articles contain technical language and use of appropriate terminology. accompanying graphs, charts, and statistical analysis are often appropriate to include. these types of articles typically run longer than opinion pieces, field notes, and photo essays. although consilience does not designate a particular word or page limit, scholarly articles typically run between 12 and 18 pages, excluding bibliography and appendices. opinion pieces opinion pieces are designed to offer compelling arguments regarding controversial topics in sustainable development, including attendant challenges, strengths and theories. the main difference between opinion pieces and scholarly articles is that opinion pieces are less technically constructed, hence catering to the educated lay reader. opinion pieces are also typically shorter than scholarly articles, rarely exceeding 15 pages. authors may wish to include photographs and figures to illustrate their claims. field notes 6 a field note is a narrative that describes primary research conducted by the author(s). research may consist of interviews, observations, data collection, or post-field work reflections. fieldwork should generally provide a broader commentary on a topic or trend in sustainable development. research should build on existing information and should contribute new or supportive findings in order to provide an argument that considers previous research as well as future steps for further research. the implications of the findings should be globalized so as to expand upon specific case studies. research should also be accompanied by appropriate statistical analysis. authors may find it helpful to illustrate their findings through figures, graphs, and photographs. photo essays a photo essay is primarily a narrative that illustrates a topic in sustainable development through the lens of photographs. the series of photos should introduce an issue then depict the problem, trend, or solution regarding that issue in sustainable development. photographs should be impactful and artfully convey information as well as emotions of affected communities. although all photo essays differ in structure, typical photo essays follow one of two progressions. one progression narrates a story by depicting a phenomenon, organization, or individual over time. another progression concentrates on a particular subject, such as climate change, in order to demonstrate the consequences or lessons that can be learned from that subject. authors may either choose or combine structures of photo essays to best articulate their topic. additional elements that should be incorporated into an essay include: context, captions, and conclusions. all photos should be taken by the author(s). the following is a description of different types of photos found in photo essays: • lead photo: captures the reader’s attention and introduces the central idea of the essay. • landscape photos: provide context for the narrative. • portraits: depict the subjects or figures featured in the essay. • detail photos: convey additional information or emotional aspects in order to enhance the understanding of the topic. • clincher photo: concludes the essay by implicating the reader. characteristics of past successful submissions the consilience editorial team has chosen to include the following information about past submissions selected for publication. the information in this section is solely for your convivence: they are guidelines—they are not requirements. it is not necessary that all pieces meet all conditions; however, it is necessary that all pieces meet all requirements outlined in section one (author checklist) accepted pieces generally conform to many of these criteria: 7 • contribute in a fruitful and valuable manner to the field of sustainable development. • demonstrate creative thinking about a particular issue and its attendant challenges. • move beyond a simple restating of facts. • be accessible to a broad population interested in sustainable development and attempt to make linkages between different disciplines and areas of research and/or practice. • be thought-provoking. • be well-written. all pieces should progressively develop an argument throughout the piece and should follow a comprehensible and logical structure. • reflect the particular voice, ideas, and work of the writer. • propose solutions and remedies where appropriate; suggest further research possibilities. • offer one or more perspectives on a particular issue. articles that are ideal for acceptance will be interdisciplinary by nature. formatting guidelines please include the following with your submission: 1. cover sheet: this should include the title of your article, your full name, institutional affiliation, and your email address. 2. scholarly abstract: this should include your thesis, methodology, and its relevance to other disciplines within the field of sustainable development. this should be no more than 250 words. 3. author’s note: the consilience editorial board has found that readers enjoy learning about the author’s personal motivations for their involvement in their field of study and how they wish to contribute to sustainable development. this is your personal note to readers, describing the rationale for your study, your thesis, its relevance of the field of sustainable development and future avenues for research. the author’s note should be no more than ten sentences. 4. keywords: please include 3 to 6 keywords describing the content of the article. 5. full text 6. citations (see below) 7. appendices or supplementary material: we strongly encourage you to include any relevant photographs, charts, or graphs within the body of the article itself, beside relevant passages. these should be cited appropriately. citations consilience requires in-text citations with an accompanying bibliography in apa format. for authors who want to include supplementary information, we prefer footnotes, not endnotes. for assistance with apa formatting, please refer to http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/560/01/. 8 formatting 1. section headings and article title: garamond, 16 pt, bold 2. author’s name and affiliations: center text, garamond, 12 pt 3. scholarly abstract and author’s note: justified, garamond, 10 pt 4. keywords: justified, garamond, 12 pt 5. article body text and bibliography: garamond, 12 pt 6. subheadings: garamond, 14 pt, bold 7. captions: garamond, 12 pt 8. figures: centered, top of page 9. footnote numbering: garamond, 12 pt, superscript review, production, and publication notes creative commons as of 2015, consilience: the journal of sustainable development is licensed under a creative commons attribution license. articles published prior to 2015 fall under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderiviates license. all authors should consult the creative commons website if they would like to specify a particular license for their articles. authors retain the rights to their articles, though consilience asks authors to contact the journal before republishing. editorial review process all papers selected for submission will undergo a rigorous review by the consilience editorial board, and if deemed necessary the consilience corresponding board (consisting of graduate students) or consilience advisory board (consisting of professors or advanced scholars of sustainable development). submissions will be edited for style and content. there are two main rounds of editing, the first focusing on structural and content issues, the second on stylistic and small-scale issues. authors should be aware that they will likely be expected to revise submitted articles prior to publication. please note that as this is a student-run journal, it is not technically peer reviewed. submission screening process while consilience will make every effort to respond to all submissions, it cannot guarantee that all submissions will receive a response. please contact consilience at consiliencejournal@gmail.com if you do not receive an email within two months of submitting. 9 while we consider every submission, our selection process is very competitive. as an interdisciplinary journal which strives to publish a diverse array of voices, there is no single theme or type of submission which is favored over the other. submissions which do not follow our formatting guidelines will be at a disadvantage in our screening process. submission details consilience cannot return submitted manuscripts or documents. consilience reserves the right to exclude any article from inclusion in final publication at any point in this process. consilience also maintains the right to edit, delete, or change any aspect of an article at its own discretion. any major changes will be communicated to the author prior to publication. in addition, consilience may reproduce, excerpt, or otherwise utilize published material in future consilience publications, on the consilience website, or at consilience events without the explicit consent of the author. consilience maintains a commitment to protecting the work of its authors and to ensuring that this work is not reproduced unlawfully or without the author’s permission by other parties. privacy statement the names and email addresses entered in this journal site will be used exclusively for the stated purposes of this journal and will not be made available for any other purpose or to any other party. consilience consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 25–45 improving sustainable development outcomes through best management practices byron ramirez division of politics and economics school of social science, policy and evaluation claremont graduate university email: byron.ramirez@cgu.edu abstract over the last several decades the world has undergone several economic, political, environmental, and cultural changes. society is faced with countless challenges that surround sustainable development. progress has been made with respect to world poverty, technological development, and environmental awareness. nonetheless, we have an opportunity to improve the leadership, planning, implementation, and monitoring of sustainable development projects. notwithstanding having better technology and increased access to more data and information, we are still not able to optimize sustainable development decisions. this paper addresses a few critical aspects of strategic management and some resulting challenges faced by policy makers, managers, and implementers of sustainable development projects who come from the private sector, public sector and ngos. the paper offers some managerial recommendations on how to enhance the leadership, planning, implementation, and monitoring of sustainable development projects. author’s note byron ramirez is a phd candidate in economics and political science at claremont graduate university. he holds a master’s degree in economics from claremont graduate university and a master’s degree in management from the peter f. drucker graduate school of management. his research interests include economic development, sustainable development, management, entrepreneurship, and innovation. keywords: sustainable development; strategic management challenges, leadership; planning; implementation; management best practices 1. sustainable development in a complex and dynamic world over the last several decades the world has undergone several changes. globalization has undoubtedly modified the international economic and political landscape. we live in a world that has become increasingly integrated and interdependent. technology has become fundamental to everything that we do. advances in technology enable us to increase production and efficiency. globalization, technology, and the availability of information have converged and yielded a much more complex and dynamic environment where knowledge remains 26 consilience paramount to effective decision making. managing and applying knowledge effectively have become even more critical in a hyper-competitive world. in the midst of all these dynamic forces we find people and the environment. society is faced with countless challenges that surround sustainability. we are well aware of the economic growth literature that suggests that even a relatively small growth rate over a long period of time can have large impact on a country. countries are thus incentivized to grow economically as an expanding economy provides job prospects, income opportunities, and wealth for citizens. contrariwise, economic growth can also lead to an increase in income inequality along with inadvertently yielding negative spillovers that hurt the environment as industries and firms in some cases may be more preoccupied with ramping up production rather than examining and managing the effects of their production on the physical environment. during the last 30 years, researchers, scholars, agencies, and governments have increasingly explored and exchanged ideas, and worked closely towards building sustainable development practices as they realize that addressing issues such as poverty, food and agriculture, and climate change requires using an integrative, multidisciplinary framework. in 1987, the united nations world commission on environment and development (the “brundtland commission”) released our common future1. this report placed environmental issues on the political agenda and attempted to discuss the environment and development as a single issue. the report also called for: “strengthen international cooperation on environment and development and to assess and propose new forms of cooperation that can break out of existing patterns and influence policies and events in the direction of needed change” (our common future, 1987). ultimately, the work of the world commission on environment and development would lead to the emergence of the rio declaration on environment and development2 (1992) and the united nations conference on environment and development (unced). the rio declaration’s 27 principles emphasize the role of man, capacity building for sustainable development, and public participation. many scholars, researchers, policy makers, and community leaders have ever since worked tirelessly to eradicate poverty, decrease the disparities in standards of living, build up development capacity, and protect the environment during the development process. in the years since the rio declaration, numerous sustainability standards and certification systems have been established. also, the earth charter 3 was formed. the earth charter is essentially “a global consensus statement on the meaning of sustainability and the principles by which sustainable development is to be achieved.” (earth charter, 2014). moreover, several international organizations and agencies have been working closely together to enhance sustainable development practices and procedures aimed at building a desirable future for society. 1 our common future. http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm 2 rio declaration. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm 3 earth charter. http://www.earthcharterinaction.org/content/ consilience ramirez: best management practices 2. the state of the world today in spite of increased international economic integration, amplified cooperative efforts amongst international agencies and governments, improved technological developments in transportation and communication, and greater access to more information, the world continues to endure poverty, inequality, political instability, and environmental degradation. exhibit 1 – global poverty between 1950 and 2012 source: 2013 united nations global sustainable development report4. the data shown in exhibit 1 indicates that between 1990 and 2012, the total number of people living in absolute poverty, less than us $(ppp) 1.25 per day, decreased from 1.95 billion to 1.17 billion. moreover, the number of people earning less than us (ppp) $1.25 has also decreased from approximately 830 million to 380 million between 1990 and 2012. geographic areas where poverty has decreased include east asia and pacific (mainly in countries such as china and thailand) and to a lesser extent the middle east and north africa. however, geographic regions such as sub-saharan africa, south asia, and latin america and caribbean continue to experience consistently high levels of poverty. 4 united nations (2013). global sustainable development report – executive summary: building the common future we want. new york: united nations department of economic and social affairs, division for sustainable development. http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/globalsdreport/ http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/globalsdreport/ 28 consilience exhibit 2 – number of people living on less than us$ (ppp) 1.25 per day source: author calculation exhibit 2 was created using data presented in the 2013 united nations global sustainable development report. this exhibit suggests that progress has been made in terms of reducing absolute poverty around the world. despite the overall poverty reduction reflected above, china’s stunning economic growth in recent decades must be factored into the analysis. had china’s economy not grown at such a high rate during the last several years, we would expect to have several more million people living on less than us$ (ppp) 1.25 per day. 1.95 1.78 1.17 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 1990 2000 2012 in absolute poverty on less us$(ppp)1.25 per day n u m b er o f p eo p le ( in b ill io n s) time consilience ramirez: best management practices exhibit 3 – percentage of people living in absolute poverty out of total world population source: author calculation exhibit 3 was created using data presented in the 2013 united nations global sustainable development report. the exhibit suggests that the percentage of people living in absolute poverty out of the total world population has steadily decreased during the last 25 years. the declining percentage proposes that there have been important achievements in the global fight against poverty. nonetheless, it is important to factor in china’s economic growth. if we were to remove china’s figures from the analysis, the resultant overall percentage of people living in absolute poverty would be substantially higher. it is also important to underscore that the world population has continuously grown in recent decades. hence, although the percentage of people living in absolute poverty has declined, china included, the world’s population has steadily increased during the same period of time. world poverty is without a doubt a pressing issue. yet, there are other issues of significant global concern. one of the most pressing matters affecting us today is climate change. exhibit 4 below taken from nasa5 shows the atmospheric levels on earth during the past 650,000 years. since 1950, atmospheric has increased exponentially. the heat-trapping nature of carbon dioxide has increased the levels of greenhouse gases and caused the earth to warm up significantly. the increased level of has led to the melting of glaciers and the shrinking of ice sheets which raise sea levels and increase ocean acidification. ultimately, rising global temperatures, warmer oceans, and declining artic sea ice will converge to represent dire consequences for millions of people around the world. 5 global climate change. http://climate.nasa.gov/evidence 37% 29% 16% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 1990 2000 2012 p er ce n ta ge o f p eo p le liv in g in a b so lu te p o v er ty o u t o f to ta l w o rl d p o p u la ti o n time 30 consilience exhibit 4 – levels of atmospheric on earth during the last 650,000 years sustainable development is faced with the ongoing challenge of balancing many domains (ecological, economic, political and cultural). the data tells us that there have been some improvements in poverty alleviation. nonetheless, there are still several million people who are poor. additionally, the environment and its sustainability are of great concern. will there be enough food for the entire world population to be sustained while ensuring that the planet’s resources are not eradicated? in order to answer questions such as this, the ecological, economic, political and cultural domains must be examined and reconciled. all of them are equally important. exhibit 5 below is a visual representation of the circles of sustainability6, a comprehensive method used for assessing sustainability from multiple perspectives – an approach also referred to as 'engaged theory'. it is certainly appropriate that policy makers employ an integrated, multi-domain perspective when assessing sustainability and managing projects directed towards socially sustainable outcomes. such an approach should help to enhance human society’s needs without undermining the sustainability of the environment. 6 un global compact cities programme. http://citiesprogramme.com/archives/resource/circlesof-sustainability-urban-profile-process consilience ramirez: best management practices exhibit 5 – circles of sustainability by un global compact cities programme source: un global compact cities programme 3. we have made progress but can still improve in the last 25 years, much progress has been made. several organizations and individuals have contributed towards building a more sustainable world while incorporating the environment, economics, politics, and people into a cohesive and integrated sustainable development approach. although much has been accomplished, there are certainly opportunities to improve our leadership, planning, implementation, and monitoring of sustainable development projects. notwithstanding having better technology and increased access to more data and information, we are still not able to optimize sustainable development decisions. although we utilize advanced technical analysis tools to aid us in sustainable development projects, often times project results turn out different from what we intended and expected. this begs the question what prevents us from achieving the results we envision? perhaps some of the answers lie in our ability to manage people, processes, and projects. the remainder of this paper addresses a few critical aspects of strategic management and some resulting challenges faced by policy makers, managers, and implementers of sustainable development projects who come from the private sector, public sector and ngos. the paper also offers some managerial recommendations and policy implications. 32 consilience 4. strategic management challenges the effective management of people, processes, and decisions is vital to the success of any venture regardless of its goals, scope, industry, or location. effective management is necessary for the project’s purpose to be realized and its goals to be met. in order to improve the prospect of achieving desired results, management must address strategic management challenges effectively. in 2004, the international institute for sustainable development published a report titled national strategies for sustainable development7. the report highlighted challenges, approaches and innovations in strategic and coordinated action for sustainable development at the national level. the report identified challenges related to the strategic management aspects of leadership, planning, implementation, and monitoring and learning. a special reference was made within the report about a continuous improvement approach to managing sustainable development strategies introduced by dalal-clayton and bass (2002) – see exhibit 6 below. all of these aspects of strategic management are vital and henceforth their respective ensuing challenges must be addressed in order for the sustainable development project to accomplish its intended goals. exhibit 6 – continuous improvement approach by dalal-clayton and bass, 2002 source: 2004 national strategies for sustainable development report 7 national strategies for sustainable development. http://www.iisd.org/measure/gov/sd_strategies/national.asp consilience ramirez: best management practices 4.1 leadership challenges individuals are critical to the success of the enterprise. people are the organization’s most valuable assets and thus when led effectively can help to drive the organization’s mission forward. conversely, if led poorly, people can inadvertently impede the organization from fulfilling its goals. peter drucker (2008) argued that “there are no more important decisions within the organization than people decisions.” (p.308). leading people effectively is a major challenge that must be addressed in sustainable development. according to robbins and judge (2013), “leadership is the ability to influence a group toward the achievement of a vision or set of goals.” (p.368). however, leading individuals effectively is not an easy endeavor as individuals are complex, dynamic, and ultimately different. in the face of the complexity of human beings, we must recognize that leading individuals is both a critical responsibility and a necessity. peter drucker (1999) explained that “one does not ‘manage’ people. the task is to lead people.” (p.21-22). organizations and sustainable development projects necessitate strong leadership for optimal effectiveness. and leading people requires adaptability, flexibility, and awareness. daniel goleman (2000) discussed six leadership styles (coercive, authoritative, affiliative, democratic, pacesetting, and coaching) that managers utilize. goleman (2000) also explained that the leadership approach that gets effective results is one where managers do not rely on only one leadership style, but rather an approach that allows them to switch between leadership styles as the circumstances dictate (p.2). hence, effective leadership, according to goleman, is situational and adaptive. emotional intelligence, the ability to manage ourselves and our relationships, is also indispensable to effective leadership (goleman, 2000, p.4). developing emotional intelligence will help us acquire greater organizational awareness and increase our ability to recognize and meet the needs of our constituents and stakeholders. today more than ever before, we depend on teams to deliver work and results. teams are also complex and challenging to manage. the ability to manage teams effectively has become paramount as organizations are comprised of experts, specialists, key stakeholders, et al, who must work together in order to deliver results. linda hill (2006) argued that in order to succeed as a manager, we must give up the myth of authority (p.5). this implies that managers must not assume that exerting authority and using a top-down approach will lead to compliance and commitment within the team. rather, what is essential is building relationships with people within the team and with others outside of the group. following this suggested approach will allow the manager to better negotiate interdependencies and build effective relationships with key people the sustainable development project depends upon. this will in turn help foster buy-in and support for the team’s mission. we must also build commitment and trust by empowering individuals and teams to achieve individual and team goals (hill, 2006). instead of seeking to control individuals and teams, we must allow them to have ownership of the process and take calculated risks that lead to change and improvement. hill suggested that it is important to use group-based forums for problem solving and diagnosis (hill, 2006). it is essential that we find ways to harness the collective power of the team to improve performance and results. furthermore, we should be cognizant of the importance of developing a strong culture that embodies the values and norms we 34 consilience aspire to and which conversely will help support us in our quest for building sustainable outcomes. a strong, cohesive culture can help to improve problemsolving and dramatically improve team performance. theories about leadership have evolved over time. for several years, management and organizational behavior scholars recognized “transactional leaders” as exchanging rewards for effort and promising rewards for good performance. during the late 1970s, james macgregor burns conceptualized a different leadership theory which instead focused on the leader’s ability to influence the motivation, morale, and performance of followers. according to burns (1978) a “transforming leader” is able to connect the follower's sense of identity to the project and to the collective identity of the organization (burns, 1978). moreover, burns argued that the transforming leader serves as a role model for followers and inspires and challenges them to take greater ownership for their work. the transforming leader is an inspiring figure who understands the needs of her people and allows them to meet those needs through tasks and responsibilities. building upon burns’ work, bass and avolio (1994) found that a “transformational leadership” style can indeed motivate and intellectually stimulate followers and be useful in aligning followers’ motivation with tasks that enhance the performance of the organization (bass and avolio, 1994). transformational leadership offers practical applications to sustainable development. managers would be more effective if they allow their people to grow and expand their roles within the organization. sustainable development needs people to be engaged, committed, and motivated. an example of this type of approach is exemplified by the world resources institute8. also known as wri, this organization works closely with leaders to turn ideas into action. wri measures its success through real change on the ground. moreover, wri works closely with governments, companies, and the community to develop partnerships where people become engaged and committed to the project’s mission. transformational leadership can help motivate our people to go beyond the expected and find greater meaning. some further recommendations related to building leadership capabilities include assembling a team with members who have different and complementary skill sets and leadership styles. an example of this approach is demonstrated by the world bank9. the world bank recognizes that growth must be holistic, inclusive and environmentally sound to reduce poverty and build shared prosperity. as a result, the world bank assembles teams of professionals and experts who hold different and complementary skill sets to work on sustainable development projects. with time these diverse teams develop high levels of leadership due to their recurrent internal interaction and the team’s principal functions to solve problems and find solutions that address challenges. it is also advisable to seek and try to understand your team’s emotional intelligence. realize that emotional intelligence can be learned through practice and commitment and that effective leadership relies on the ability to switch across different styles. finally, a leadership approach that embodies and combines the 8 world resources institute. http://www.wri.org/ 9 world bank sustainable development. http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/sustainabledevelopment consilience ramirez: best management practices essence of situational leadership and transformational leadership is highly encouraged as it may help to enhance overall effectiveness. 4.2 planning challenges change is inevitable. change is constant and we must learn to embrace change rather than fear it. some organizations perceive change as something that you do once you realize the process does not work. however, waiting until the proverbial dam is cracked and the water is flowing through is not the way to approach change. organizations simply cannot afford to wait to change at the last minute. rather, organizations should embrace change and be open to changing processes, procedures, and approaches regardless of whether or not there is an evident crisis. in fact, waiting until there is a crisis to make changes is perhaps a sign of having waited too long. organizations ought to become more proactive, rather than reactive. planning is a necessity. managing change requires planning. and the effectiveness of sustainable projects is contingent upon our ability to manage change. although we may not be able to predict the future with great exactitude, planning allows us to consider and anticipate possible outcomes and design alternative strategies for accomplishing our goals. planning also helps to reduce some uncertainty as the planning process should reveal plausible scenarios and their corresponding likelihood. an example of an organization that focuses on planning is the international fund for agricultural development (ifad)10. a specialized agency of the united nations, ifad uses a strategic framework for conducting projects and guiding its operations. for instance, ifad has developed carefully planned strategies for partnering with the private sector, for engaging with middle-income countries, and for working on environment and natural resource management projects. through its strategic framework and strong emphasis on the planning component, ifad is able to work more effectively on projects and develop relevant processes and policies that reconcile the complexity and dynamism found in sustainable development project management. effective planning also benefits our decision making capabilities as we consider what information we will need, why we will need, and how we will use it. enriching our decision making process also helps to improve the probability of achieving the outcomes we envision. in order to make better decisions, it is important to have objective evidence. drucker (1995) noted that “decisions are commitments to action.” (p.x). consequently, we must be disciplined in our search for and use of data, information, and evidence as they will affect our decisions and actions. drucker (1995) explained that there are some key questions we must ask ourselves pertaining data and information such as: “what information do i need to do my job? when do i need it? in what form? and from whom should i be getting it? what new tasks can i tackle now that i get all these data? which old tasks should i abandon? which tasks should i do differently?” (drucker, 1995, 109) as mentioned earlier, effective decision making depends greatly on the use of objective evidence. pfeffer and sutton (2006) described that people trust their own 10 international fund for agricultural development (ifad). http://www.ifad.org/ 36 consilience clinical experience more than they trust research (pfeffer and sutton, 2006, 64). even though they are presented with research evidence, a very small percentage of professionals use such evidence. instead, they rely on their “personal experience”, intuition, and personal observation. moreover, many decision makers rely on cherished beliefs and traditions to make decisions. pfeffer and sutton warned: “when people are overly influenced by ideology, they often fail to question whether a practice will work – it fits so well with what they “know” about what makes people and organizations tick.” (pfeffer and sutton, 2006, 65). some decision makers import ideas and concepts from other organizations believing that these will also work in their own organization, yet often times they do not understand the logic and context of some of these borrowed ideas. pfeffer and sutton (2006) offered a few suggestions for enhancing decision making. nurture an evidence-based approach within your organization. take time to evaluate the logic behind the evidence. encourage trial programs and experimentation within the organization and reward learning from these activities even when things do not turn out as you expected. finally, pfeffer and sutton (2006) provided six standards that will enhance decision making. these are: “(1) stop treating old ideas as if they were brand-new; (2) be suspicious of “breakthrough” ideas and studies; (3) celebrate and develop collective brilliance; (4) emphasize drawbacks as well as virtues; (5) use success (and failure) stories to illustrate sound practices, but not in place of a valid research method; and (6) adopt a neutral stance toward ideologies and theories” (pfeffer and sutton, 2006, 71). decision makers influence organizational outcomes. some decision makers unwittingly fail to see and seek important information, fail to use the information they do see, and fail to share the information they do have. bazerman and chugh (2005) explained that some decisions are made with “bounded awareness” – when cognitive blinders cause people to ignore critical information when making decisions (bazerman and chugh, 2005, 3). bounded awareness derives from perceptual blindness, personal motivation to favor a particular outcome, and ignoring what others are doing in your industry or practice. the authors warned that bounded awareness spawns blind spots which impair decision making. bazerman and chugh (2005) offered some recommendations to address bounded awareness. below are some of their principal suggestions. “learn to be more observant of changes in your environment. get multiple views on an issue and assign someone the responsibility of building awareness about changes in the environment. seek disconfirming information – that is information that contradicts your intuition and knowledge and use it for problem solving. assign a devil’s inquisitor role to a member of the team. this person will be charged with asking questions rather than arguing an alternate point of view. since everyone has unique information and different perspective, request individual reports.” (bazerman and chugh, 2005) asking individuals to express their views provides them with the opportunity to participate more and may even encourage individuals to try and develop solutions that will benefit the organization. decision makers will also benefit from having multiple perspectives to ponder and consider. consilience ramirez: best management practices in order to be more effective planners, decision makers must learn to see, seek, use, and share information. planning relies on our ability to be objective and thorough in our analysis of data, information and circumstances. also, planning requires that we are disciplined thinkers who are open to new ideas, yet aware of their virtues and drawbacks. an example of an organization which uses this planning and objective data gathering approach is the department for environment, food and rural affairs (defra) in the united kingdom11. defra realizes that the government needs access to expertise and evidence in order to achieve its sustainable development objectives. as a result, defra has instituted the use of evidence as an essential base for developing its sustainable development efforts. in fact, defra funds and manages the sustainable development research network (sdrn) which aims to facilitate and strengthen links between research providers and policymakers across government to improve evidence-based policymaking to support delivery of the government’s objectives for sustainable development (defra, 2014). 4.3 implementation challenges there are numerous cases where seemingly appropriate solutions were developed yet surprisingly failed. often times, a lack of implementation foresight and of an executional approach have impaired the success of many hypothetical effective solutions. some projects fail to produce their desired results because their implementation was not addressed adequately using relevant contextual factors. magnus boström (2012) discussed challenges faced by the forest stewardship council (fsc) in its sustainability efforts. amongst the challenges faced by fsc is a lack of capacity to work for effective implementation. boström explained: “the problem is rather how certification bodies and auditors interpret the standards and how forest companies operationalize them.” (boström, 2012). furthermore, boström remarked: “what is drafted in the standard and what is implemented on the field – there is a great gap. that is the problem.” (boström, 2012). another example of a project that encountered implementation challenges is introduced by yang (2000) in a paper that discusses the major problems of sustainable development along the bank area of the changjiang river. yang explained that building a developed economic zone along the bank area of the changjiang river was a strategic decision that fell under the national macroeconomic development plan. yang suggested that the decision to develop the zone encouraged fast development of the economy, but at the same time led to major problems such as scattered industrial structure, duplicated construction of projects, enlargement of the development gap of the regional economy, and the deterioration of the environment including soil erosion and environmental pollution. yang explained that the project had well intended goals. however, due to a combination of planning and implementation ineffectiveness, the project actually exacerbated spillover effects due to unreasonable over-development. details matter and sometimes teams inadvertently or unknowingly miss to see, seek, use, and share information that is relevant to the project. as a result, we have examples of projects that have failed to achieve the goals and objectives they were intended to achieve. an example of this is discussed by manjengwa (2007) in a paper about sustainable development in zimbabwe. manjengwa argued that many 11 department for environment, food and rural affairs (defra). http://sd.defra.gov.uk/ 38 consilience sustainable development initiatives in developing countries are characterized by weak implementation and low impact on the ground. in her paper, manjengwa discussed the district environmental action planning (deap) and summarized her findings as follows: “deap was not based at local level, environmental concerns were not integrated into development plans, and the projects that were implemented had negligible impact on either environmental or human well-being. deap was implemented within a strongly hierarchical framework and failed to bridge the gap between micro and macro levels. analysis of deap's implementation has shown that the programme was essentially top-down, only partially participatory, and depended on the usual technocratic solutions to environmental management.” (manjengwa, 2007). matta and ashkenas (2003) suggested that part of the reason why good projects have failed is that the traditional approach to project management shifts the project teams’ focus away from the end result toward developing recommendations and partial solutions (matta and ashkenas, 2003, 1). the authors argued that the traditional approach of focusing on developing recommendations is problematic especially when you have many people working together over a long period of time. when this occurs, it is difficult to plan and predict all of the activities and work streams that will be needed in the future. hence, attempting to develop recommendations during earlier stages of the project misses the complexity and dynamism that will occur over time. hence, even if recommendations are identified early in the project management process, many of them will be out-of context or outdated as things will have shifted during the duration of the project. additionally, many projects end up producing partial solutions as individuals often times work independently of one another and over time their efforts may inadvertently diverge resulting in “integration risk”. matta and ashkenas (2003) provided some insight for designing projects that guard against unnecessary failure. below are some of their recommendations: “within the organization, inject the overall plan with a series of rapid-results initiatives, mini-projects, each staffed with a team responsible for a version of the hoped-for overall result in miniature. each rapid-results initiative should be designed to deliver results quickly. each team will work to discover what will be needed to be successful. teams will be forced to find out what is missing from their plan and what will be needed to successfully implement a set of solutions. as each team advances and learns through trial and error, they share their issues, challenges, and knowledge with other teams within the organization. eventually, teams will attempt to become the model for the next teams. the organization benefits from all this as it learns quickly from separate experiments what works and what does not, which challenges seem to surface, how to best implement the project, etc.” (matta and ashkenas, 2003) matta and ashkenas provided a different approach for addressing project implementation challenges. sustainable development projects are susceptible to implementation risk. successful implementation requires not only great ideas, but thoughtful reflection on how to best implement the solutions. this requires time and patience. rushing to see results is not a recommendation. rather, employing consilience ramirez: best management practices multiple analytic approaches, experimenting with rapid-results initiatives, and comparing and contrasting multiple ways of implementing a project are highly suggested. 4.4 monitoring and learning challenges sustainable development projects encounter monitoring and learning challenges. the strategic management process requires that we monitor and measure objectively and frequently. moreover, it is important that we learn throughout the process. as a result, it is essential that project managers and project team members address the questions of how they will monitor ongoing developments effectively and how they will learn from them. the goals we set and eventually monitor and evaluate must be measurable, realistic, objective, and based on the element of time. consequently, the monitoring system we employ must account for these characteristics. during the 1960s, the concept of management by objectives (mbo) emerged. it was a monitoring and performance evaluation process approach that tried to objectively measure performance and provide individuals with opportunities to establish self-motivating goals and objectives. for several decades, many organizations employed the mbo process approach believing that it was fair, reasonable, and effective. researchers in psychology and organizational behavior more recently have suggested that the mbo process is inadequate for inspiring individuals as it does not take into account the deeper emotional mechanisms of motivation, it ignores individuals’ personal goals, and it focuses on quantification while subtle, critical elements of work are ignored. the mbo process focuses on what individuals can do for the organization and not on how the organization can enable individuals to reach their personal dreams and aspirations. in an attempt to address this issue, levinson (2003) argued that there are better ways to build an effective performance management and monitoring system. levinson (2003) offered the following recommendations: “appraise your appraisal system. does it foster a genuine partnership between individuals and the organization? include group goal setting and appraisal. since individuals’ work is interdependent, formalize group and individual, short-term and long-term goal setting. have people meet regularly to help each other and to assess their effectiveness on shared tasks. appraise the appraisers. have direct reports evaluate their manager’s performance. encourage selfexamination. hold regular conversations with individuals to help them clarify their needs and goals.” (levinson, 2003) some scholars have focused their research on understanding how to best encourage learning within the organization. they argue that learning is critical to the organization’s success and overall performance. without learning, the organization may not advance in the long run as it will not build upon its existing knowledge base. frederick herzberg has written extensively on the topics of motivation, job enrichment, and organizational development. herzberg (2003) offered some recommendations on how organizations may motivate individuals and enable them to reach their full potential, while the organization benefits from their learning. herzberg (2003) explained: 40 consilience “increase individuals’ accountability for their work by removing some controls. give people responsibility for a complete process or unit of work. make information available to individuals rather than sending it through their managers first. enable people to take on new, more difficult tasks they have not handled before. assign individuals specialized tasks that allow them to become experts and learn more.” (herzberg, 2003) herzberg’s recommendations require contextual analysis and consideration prior to implementation. nonetheless, research indicates that increasing a person’s responsibility while allowing her to make decisions and take on more difficult tasks, does indeed increase that person’s learning and growth. if we believe individual and collective learning can benefit our organization, we may wish to consider implementing some of herzberg’s suggestions. gretchen spreitzer and christine porath (2012) argued that if you give your employees the chance to learn and grow, they will thrive, and so will your organization (spreitzer and porath, 2012). they explained that engaged individuals are more productive and committed to the mission. moreover, spreitzer and porath suggested that it is possible to engage individuals so that they believe in working towards creating a future (spreitzer and porath, 2012). learning plays a large part in engaging and motivating individuals and teams as it gives them the opportunity to grow from gaining new knowledge and skills. spreitzer and porath (2012) provided some recommendations on how to create sustainable performance within the organization. they suggested the following: “provide people with a sense of direction. they need to have a sense of where they are and where the organization is headed. foster a culture that encourages individuals to thrive. use four mechanisms to create a culture of thriving individuals: (1) provide decision making discretion; (2) share information; (3) minimize incivility; and (4) offer performance feedback.” (spreitzer and porath, 2012) these recommendations are universal. organizations benefit from fostering a thriving culture that inspires people to make decisions, to work together, to learn from success and failure, to take chances, and to accelerate learning and growth. achieving sustainable performance relies on our ability to monitor effectively and continuously learn. the monitoring system that ultimately is used should be designed based upon the characteristics and nature of the work that is being evaluated and measured. nonetheless, it is suggested that decision makers appraise the appraisal system, appraise the appraisers, and encourage self-examination. entities such as undp12, oecd13, the australian agency for international development (ausaid)14, and the ministry of foreign affairs, trade and development of canada15 utilize learning and monitoring as part of their respective 12 undp. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/triplewins-for-sustainable-development/ 13 oecd. http://www.oecd.org/ 14 australian agency for international development (ausaid). http://aid.dfat.gov.au/pages/home.aspx 15 ministry of foreign affairs, trade and development of canada. http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdicida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/ema-218132347-pkz consilience ramirez: best management practices sustainability approaches which in turn enable them to constantly evaluate and measure as well as enhance and refine decision making. it is also recommended that individuals are given the opportunity to take on more responsibility and make decisions. they will learn more. monitoring and learning are critical for building organizational effectiveness and achieving sustainable performance. 5. policy implications our world has undergone several economic, political, environmental, and cultural changes and it continues to change. today, the total number of people living in absolute poverty (less than us $(ppp) 1.25 per day) is about 1.17 billion. atmospheric has increased exponentially over past decades and this has resulted in the melting of glaciers and the shrinking of ice sheets. rising global temperatures, warmer oceans, and declining artic sea ice will affect millions of people around the world. many geographic areas have witnessed severe droughts resulting in even greater food shortages. this in turn has increased incivility and heightened informal economy activities in many countries. despite some economic growth, many countries are experiencing increased income inequality. accordingly, sustainable development faces several ongoing challenges. this paper has focused on addressing the strategic management challenges introduced by the international institute for sustainable development in their report titled national strategies for sustainable development. the strategic management process yields expected leadership, planning, implementation, and monitoring challenges. the purpose of this paper is to introduce managerially-based recommendations that may be useful to sustainable development professionals as tools and approaches to address the inherent leadership, planning, implementation, and monitoring challenges of sustainable development projects. the paper has discussed some best management practices which are intended for a global, multi-disciplinary audience. policy makers, managers, and implementers of sustainable development projects may find some of the presented concepts and recommendations suitable to their specific projects. ultimately, the goal of this paper is to share management concepts and offer suggestions that may enhance the performance and success of sustainable projects. it is possible to improve organizational performance and project outcomes. often times what hinders our progress is simply the way we manage individuals, teams, and processes. by directly addressing the leadership, planning, implementation, and monitoring components of sustainable development projects, policy makers and other professionals may help position their projects for better performance. 6. conclusion the opinion and concepts offered above are intended to provide professionals across different disciplines with ideas and approaches that may help to improve sustainable development outcomes. our society requires that we share best practices to successfully balance the environment, economics, politics, and the health and well-being of people. sustainable development is an interdisciplinary endeavor and a global necessity. professionals from across the globe must continue to 42 consilience collaborate and share ideas, practices, and remedies that address people’s needs while building a better future for our children and their children. life presents us with constant challenges. sustainable development is faced with leadership, planning, implementation, monitoring and learning challenges, to name a few. fortunately, we possess knowledge and the ability to learn and build upon success and failure. we have come a long way. we have accomplished much. ultimately, however, we can still continue to improve and deliver better results as we move forward. consilience ramirez: best management practices bibliography australian agency for international development. 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(2000). major problems of sustainable development along the bank area of the changjiang river. chinese geographical science, 10(2), 97 104. http://www.earthcharterinaction.org/content/ http://www.oecd.org/ http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/triple-wins-for-sustainable-development/ http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/triple-wins-for-sustainable-development/ http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/globalsdreport/ http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/sustainabledevelopment http://www.wri.org/ consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 25 (2021-22) sharing the burden: climate responsibility beyond the nation-state oliver fryett department of geography, planning and spatial sciences university of tasmania omfryett@utas.edu.au abstract crafting an adequate and cohesive global response to climate change has presented a monumental challenge. fairly distributing climate responsibility has been a key obstacle. traditionally, climate responsibility has focused on the nationstate, yet these methods of responsibility allocation have failed in their key goal; to drive effective action to respond to the social and environmental consequences of climate change. this paper seeks to strengthen the link between the theoretical allocation of climate responsibility and the creation of genuine and effective action on climate change across societal sectors. building on currently accepted methods of responsibility allocation, particularly the ‘carbon majors’, i present a novel approach to climate responsibility that is relevant to nation-states and corporate entities. this is achieved by utilizing mapping technology to clearly demonstrate the active transfer of wealth during the production of greenhouse gases from oil extraction location to end recipient in company shareholders, an aspect that is largely missing from current discussions. two multinational oil companies, equinor and bp, are used as case studies, to provide an example of both a majority stateowned and a publicly owned company. the isolation of shareholders, who also have roles as citizens of nation-states, as the destination of wealth from greenhouse gas production illuminates a useful connection between nation-states and companies in the context of climate change action. author’s note my name is oliver fryett, and i am a final year bachelor of science student at the university of tasmania in hobart, working within the department of geography, planning and spatial sciences. having long been concerned with the lack of action to combat climate change, particularly within my home country of australia, i was lucky enough to receive a summer scholarship to work on this paper. given that climate change is a problem of the atmospheric commons, which is not bound by our current political boundaries of the nation-state, i was motivated to explore how climate change can be better politically represented. i hope this paper broadens your understanding of climate responsibility, as it did for me. mailto:omfryett@utas.edu.au 2 consilience keywords: climate change, climate responsibility, carbon majors, postnationalism, wealth transfer, shareholder activism introduction the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc) (2018) reports that altering of the earth’s atmosphere through anthropogenic action has already caused warming of approximately 1 degree celsius above pre-industrial temperatures and is likely to reach 1.5 degrees of warming by 2050. the impacts of these changes to the climate system already have been, and will continue to be, widely felt, reverberating through critical sectors including agriculture and food security (anderson et al., 2020; gomez-zavaglia et al., 2020), human health (linares et al, 2020; watts et al., 2018) and biodiversity and ecosystem function (nunez et al., 2019; hillebrand et al., 2018). although there is a clear and pressing need to reduce the impacts of climate change, decisive actions culminating in sufficient reduction of greenhouse gases (ghgs) or an increase in adaption measures have continually failed to gain traction, despite an intense international focus on climate change, particularly in the global north (beuret, 2017). this is not to deny that attempts have been made, nor wins achieved, in addressing a notoriously difficult and wicked problem on a global scale (incropera, 2016; sun & yang, 2016). however, between 1990 and 2019, despite several international agreements to limit ghg emissions, more carbon dioxide has been released into the atmosphere than in all of history before 1990 (stainforth, 2020). since 1992, when the rio earth summit was convened, total annual ghg emissions have increased by more than 40% to almost 50 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent in 2016 (ritchie & roser, 2020). clearly, this signals the inadequacy of the response to the climate change threat. the united nations framework convention on climate change (unfccc), signed at the 1992 earth summit, first formalized the concept of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ of nations to respond to climate change (united nations, 1992, article 3), enshrining two key points – the need to allocate climate responsibility and the primacy of the nation-state. a nation-state represents the joining of the political state to the cultural and/or ethnic nation and is the current dominate global entity and is generally referred to as a country. under this arrangement, the state becomes an instrument to unite, economically, socially and culturally, the nation. forming the cornerstones of subsequent agreements, the allocation of climate responsibility and the nation-state have been treated as inseparable. while the territorial boundaries of the nation-state inform how climate action is governed, methods of climate responsibility are used to allocate costs and burdens stemming from climate action to the various polities under this governance. the inability or unwillingness of some nation-states to ratify their paris agreement pledges in national policy undermines the strength of the climate response, as nation-states require the cooperation of other states to effectively fulfill their functions, such as significant climate action (biermann & dingwerth, 2004). in parallel to the challenges of a territorial governance system responding to a problem of the atmospheric commons, vanderheiden (2011, p. 65) describes determining climate responsibility as the ‘primary obstacle to the consilience fryett: sharing the burden development of an effective climate regime’. it is evident then, that both obstacles must be overcome before climate action efforts can be furthered. the importance of climate responsibility is linked to the concept of climate justice. framing climate change as an ethical issue, taking a climate justice approach seeks to protect human rights while undertaking climate action (robinson & shine, 2018). there is a need to consider just actions in the context of climate change for two key reasons. first, the underlying cause of climate change, anthropogenic ghg emissions, presents a vastly uneven geography. the early industrializing nations, of europe and north america in particular, have contributed significantly more ghgs than other regions of the world (hickel, 2020). as fossil fuel usage ‘forms the fabric of our economy’ (bradshaw, 2010, p. 276), economic wealth is closely coupled to ghg emissions. having grown wealthy through consumption of fossil fuels (robinson & shine, 2018), nation-states of the global north are better equipped to deal with the impacts of climate change. however, the costs of ghg emissions are felt globally. people that have contributed little to the problem must contend with increased climate vulnerability, illustrated by measures such as the composite climate change vulnerability index (edmond et al., 2020). this is particularly prevalent in the global south, a term which stems from the generally southern location of decolonized countries. the global south references regions that, due to the exploitative nature of the colonial experience and the continuing modern echoes of this relationship, are economically and political poorer than their counterparts in the global north. secondly, accumulation of wealth has allowed early industrializing nations to hold significant leads in development areas such as health and education, while regions of the global south struggle with issues of poverty. enabling the improvement of the human condition in these areas, while avoiding the devastating impacts of further fossil fueled development, is central to the need for a just distribution of climate responsibility (robinson & shine, 2018). this paper aims to develop a novel perspective of climate change responsibility, one which operates beyond the frame of the nation-state. the restrictions imposed on collective issues by the territorial geography of the nationstate and the current limitations of assigning climate responsibility form the rationale for the project. in particular, transfers of both wealth and power in the creation of ghg emissions are masked by the current systems of climate responsibility, and thus they provide a limited picture of the ability to respond to climate change. i begin by providing a critique of the current methods of allocating climate responsibility. then, using mapping software as a primary tool, i seek to illustrate the transfer of wealth embedded in ghg production. the motivation behind presenting this information with maps is their effectiveness in conveying geographic relationships (smelcer & carmel, 1997) and improved comprehension and appeal to the public (cao et al, 2016) over other mediums. climate change requires global collective action, in which everyone is an actor (jamieson, 2015). therefore, no matter how seemingly important or insignificant an actor’s role is, the script must be able to be understood for the performance to succeed. utilizing two case studies, equinor and bp, the mapping exercise served two purposes; first, to explicitly draw attention to wealth transfer as an integral part of climate responsibility and secondly, to produce a novel framework that adds an 4 consilience additional dimension to existing climate responsibility allocation. as two of the ‘carbon majors’, a climate responsibility method that assigns ghgs to companies, equinor and bp were chosen because transnational corporations best represent the unbound commons of the atmosphere. shareholders were made the focus of the project, because of their primacy within a company. conventionally, the purpose of a company is to maximize shareholder wealth (rhee, 2017), and so shareholders of fossil fuel corporations serve as the destination of wealth created from the ghg production process. it is important to distinguish shareholders from stakeholders, as shareholders hold a vested interest in a company. in comparison, stakeholders, a group which shareholders form one part of, ‘include internal, external, and environmental constituents’ (tse, 2011, p. 57). the two companies vary in their shareholder composition. equinor is partially privatized, as the norwegian government owns 67% with the remainder held on public share markets (equinor, 2020), whereas bp is a publicly listed company. this provides examples of the two main types of companies listed in the carbon majors. i build on the carbon majors approach, using the framework of wealth transfer, with the goal of more effectively empowering climate action through responsibility allocation. representing climate responsibility allocating climate responsibility then presents a moral and a practical challenge. the question that forms the core of the challenge remains relatively simple: how are responsible actors identified and what share of the responsibility do they hold? despite the simplicity of the question, answering has proven to be anything but. in particular, the question of how responsibility is identified is intrinsically linked to questions about how actors may be encouraged or coerced to accept this responsibility. thus, representation in systems of responsibility becomes important; an actor’s responsibility must be visible for it to be accepted. identification requires an assessment of the individual contributions to harm caused by a collective (vanderhieden, 2007), and many of the contributions are socially acceptable or even encouraged. consider commuting in a petrol-powered car. it is an act that undoubtably contributes to the human-induced greenhouse effect, as transport is the second largest contributor of ghgs in australia (climate council, 2016). however, determining moral responsibility is more imprecise. is the commuter held responsible for not choosing a greener method of travel; perhaps the car manufacturer or oil company for encouraging the consumption of goods harmful to the environment; or is the government at a state or federal level failing to promote alternative transport? to assist with the moral challenge of allocating climate responsibility to maximize efforts to mitigate, adapt to and compensate for climate change, tools such as quantitative data and mapping are widely used. as discussed earlier in this paper, mapping is an effective instrument for conveying geographical relationships. data takes a variety of forms, such as tons of carbon dioxide or more complex indicators like climate vulnerability indexes (calculated using several forms of other data). nevertheless, as ghg emissions are the underlying cause of anthropogenic climate change, the dominant structure informing climate responsibility has been the allocation of ghgs. consilience fryett: sharing the burden traditionally, ghgs have been assigned to the nation-state where they are emitted. under the current global order, territory is considered sacred and owned strictly by one nation-state, a characteristic which is applied in this form of ghg accounting. termed the territorial method, it has formed the basis of agreements under the unfccc (hickel, 2020) and thus formed a key part of climate action attempts. figure 1 illustrates annual carbon dioxide emissions, the most voluminous of the ghgs, in 2019. with large emitters marked by darker colors, ghg emission is concentrated in the global north, with china, india, indonesia, and the oil producing states of the middle east featuring. only a small quantity is produced in africa. significant emissions are embedded in international trade, which is not considered under territorial methods. between 20 and 25 percent of carbon emissions are moved internationally (afionis et al, 2017), creating a requirement for relationships between exporters and importers to be considered in climate responsibility. the development of the consumer-based accounting has addressed this restriction by assigning ghgs to the consumer of a product, rather than its producer. afionis et al (2017) describes the consumer method as the most prominent alternative to a territorial approach, supported by its inclusion in the united nations emissions gap report 2020. under the consumer method, china’s ghgs are reduced in comparison to the territorial method, due to its large export of goods, while the united states and europe’s emissions share increases (figure 2). this demonstrates that while goods consumption has remained high in europe and the united states, production of these goods, and therefore ghg production, has been shifted overseas. 6 consilience figure 1. annual territorial carbon dioxide emissions 2019. source: ritchie and roser, 2020. figure 2. comparison of territorial and consumption methods of allocating c02 emissions. top 6 emitters are shown. source: united nations environment program, 2020. consilience fryett: sharing the burden the limitations of territorial and consumer-based accounting have created a need for differing approaches to applying responsibility using ghgs. hickel (2020) argues that the stores of ghgs in the atmosphere, not merely annual contributions, are the critical factor in the severity of climate change. therefore, historical emissions demand greater consideration in assigning climate responsibility. to determine this responsibility, hickel uses the safe planetary boundary of 350 parts per million of atmospheric co2 as a reference point: 830 gigatons of co2 could be emitted globally before this limit was crossed, which occurred in 1990. each country was then allocated a ‘fair share’ of this budget, based on population. for example, because of their larger population, china would be allocated a larger share of the budget than australia or canada. based on culminative territorial and consumption emissions between 1850 and 2015, nations that overshot their fair share were said to be in climate debt and therefore responsible for climate breakdown. those remaining within their boundaries had a climate credit; able to continue producing ghgs without bearing responsibility. current large emitters such as india and china remain in climate credit as of 2015, while the united states, having overshot its share by 40 percent, carries the bulk of climate responsibility (figure 3). the vast majority of climate debtors are located in the global north, with just 8 percent of debt held by the global south (figure 4), displaying a disparity between historic emissions and the north’s fair share 8 consilience figure 4. climate creditors and debtors, based on national ‘fair share’ carbon budget. data source: hickel 2020 figure 3. responsibility allocation based on carbon budget overshoots by selected region. data source: hickel, 2020. 40% 29% 13% 10% 8% responsibility for climate breakdown usa eu-28 rest of europe rest of global north global south consilience fryett: sharing the burden while the above approaches differ, they share the common vessel of responsibility, the nation-state. heede (2014) advocates for a different path; analyse emissions in the context of corporate actors. ghg emissions were traced to the large fossil fuel and cement producers, known as the ‘carbon majors’. citing the considerable benefit that companies have gained from ghg production, as well as the financial and technical capability, heede argues the carbon majors hold ‘…an ethical obligation to help address climate destabilization’ (p. 236). applying this lens, 108 companies are responsible for almost 70% of ghg emissions since 1751 (heede, 2020). an important consideration in determining responsibility for the carbon majors is their ownership or leasing rights of remaining fossil fuel reserves. if burnt, the ghgs from these reserves would undoubtably make limiting warming to 2 degrees an impossibility (dale, 2015). despite the range of approaches to allocate climate responsibility, their effectiveness in progressing climate action has been limited. i attribute this to several factors. firstly, none of the methods of allocating responsibility adequately trace or show the transfer of wealth. this draws on robbins’s (2020) notion that environmental change cannot be completely explained without consideration of who benefits from changes in a resource, and who takes what from whom. because of the key role of fossil fuel consumption and ghg production in accumulating capital within the modern capitalist system, the copious resources moved, and the potential harm caused, this factor takes on critical importance. the consumer method gives some consideration to who benefits from producing ghgs, as does the carbon majors, however benefit is implied through the assumption that greater emission levels result in greater benefit. i argue that in these approaches transfers of wealth are not suitably explicit, and to fulfill robbins’s examination, the flow of benefits must be traced from original production location to end benefactor. this connects to the second factor; responsibility is allocated at high-level polities such as the nation-state, or large corporations in the carbon majors. the incompatibility of the territorial nation-state system with the collective climate problem presents a troublesome hurdle, although this is not the only weakness of using high-level polities as the end point for responsibility. doing so places blame on all members of a grouping, particularly if a per-capita metric is used, smoothing unevenness within that group. in the australian context, a sydney executive would contribute many times the ghgs of a remote community in arnhem land, yet their share of australian emissions is the same. additionally, it also largely leaves resolutions to institutions such as government or the united nations. feelings of disempowerment and lack of agency are key issues in the conceptualization of climate change, with young people in particular overwhelmed with a problem of such magnitude (jones & davison, 2021). by shaping questions of responsibility at high levels, pathways to meaningful action are placed out of reach of many, reinforcing disempowerment and forgoing potential climate action opportunities. responsibility, transfer of wealth and empowerment promoting pathways for constituents of large actors to take action within the framework of the nation-state or company are therefore essential to remedy the situation of disempowerment. similarly to formal education settings creating 10 consilience emotions of disempowerment because of an inability to transfer knowledge into action (jones & davison, 2021), allocating climate responsibility provides important information to citizens or shareholders, without providing pathways for these small actors to implement this knowledge. rectifying this issue could have massive implications for climate action. unlike institutions, which largely occupy one role in society, people fulfill multiple roles, whether it be as a consumer, a teacher or voter. adding dimensions to the carbon majors to better empower shareholders to act by changing their performance of that role not only creates a site of action within a company but serves to spread experimentation into other roles (connolly, 2013). an accumulation of these experiments across a variety of roles can make a difference, creating multiple avenues for social action (ford, 1996) whilst inspiriting others to do the same. it also bridges the gaps between the multiple methods of allocating climate responsibility, currently working independently of another, allowing them instead to exist in parallel and through each other. climate change requires the cooperation of all actors (biermann & dingwerth, 2004), necessitating the rejection of a binary approach to responsibility and an advocation for multiple integrated responsibilities, both horizontally and vertically. method to represent the transfer of wealth linked to ghg emissions, the locations of physical extraction of a ghg source and sites of wealth accumulation linked to this extraction had to be determined. the complexity of the issues involved, uneven public availability of secondary data, and the scale of this research project informed the decision to adopt a case study methodology with centered both on a specific ghg source, oil, and on specific organizations, equinor and bp, two of the corporate carbon major’s identified by heede. the decision was made to focus on annual oil production given oil’s preeminence in the global economy, and the difficultly in substituting it for cleaner alternatives due to its transportability and high energy, critical to the transport sector. oil makes up 52% of equinor’s revenue (equinor, 2020, p. 26) and although the contribution to bp revenue could not be determined, it is likely to be similar. annual reports of bp and equinor, both publicly available, were used for this purpose as they contain breakdowns of oil production by location. equinor’s data was more specific, providing an account of production by oil field, while bp’s analysis was by nation-state with the exception of the united states, which separated alaska, the lower 48 states and offshore drilling in the gulf of mexico. the flow of wealth was then to traced to shareholders of the case study organizations, determined for the purposes of this study as the end point for capital accumulation. the companies themselves do not make available, nor are likely aware, inventories of individual shareholders, as stocks are often held through a range of investment vehicles, including mutual funds, super funds and banks on behalf of investors. to overcome this, the top five large investors of each company, which are publicly available, where used as placeholders. in their investors section of their website, equinor publishes a list of their largest shareholders. under disclosure laws, bp does publish some shareholders in its annual report, however this was not exhaustive enough for the study’s purposes. instead, institution investor information consilience fryett: sharing the burden was obtained from nasdaq’s bp plc listing, judged to be sufficiently robust because of regulations governing stock market information. in order to show the spread of shareholders represented by these investors, office locations of each were gathered from their respective websites. this was based on the assumption that institution investors would have office locations where large numbers of clients were located. where office location could not be determined, the investor was replaced by the next largest (e.g., 6th largest). extraction locations, together with the respective 2019 production levels, were tabulated for each company, as was the list of shareholder locations. latitude and longitude co-ordinates were added to each of these locations to allow gis software arcgis to produce a point layer for each table using the x-y table to point tool. appropriate symbology was then applied to create maps. results the case studies reveal a sharp contrast between the global geographies of shareholders (or wealth accumulation) and oil production (wealth creation). both equinor and bp have a similar spread of shareholders who are concentrated in the global north with pockets in china, india, south america, and the middle east. bp has significant oil operations in the middle east, reflecting its colonial origin as the anglo-persian oil company, africa, north and south america and the north sea. the large russian contribution is due to bp’s approximately 20 percent stake in rosneft, the russian state-controlled oil company. comparatively to equinor, the spread of bp shareholders more closely resembles the geography of production, although discrepancies remain. africa is represented in cape town alone, and although angola, algeria and alaska form almost 20 percent of bp operated production, there is not a shareholder within thousands of kilometres of these countries (figure 5). in the case of alaska, wealth transferred away from the state to shareholders is compounded by almost 40 percent of oil and gas industry workers residing elsewhere (demarben, 2018). 12 consilience figure 5. bp shareholder and production locations. data sources: bp 2020, nasdaq 2021. consilience fryett: sharing the burden on the other hand, while state-owned equinor extracts the majority of its oil from norway’s domestic north sea reserves, a sizable contribution is produced by oil fields in north america and africa. while america and canada contain a multitude of shareholders, the entire african continent of some 1.3 billion people is represented by one office in cape town, south africa (figure 6). the wealth transferred to shareholder from oil production is significant: equinor delivered dividends of 3.3 billion usd in 2019 (equinor, 2020, p. 157), while bp paid 6.9 billion in the same period (bp, 2020, p. 156). 2019 ghg emission data was unavailable, but in 2018 the two companies were responsible for 288 and 549 million tons of co2 equivalent respectively (heede, 2020a, b) emitted during the wealth transfer process. for every ton of ghg emitted, shareholders of equinor profited $11 and bp $12. flows of wealth, as well as uneven environmental burden, also occur within nation-states. in addition to wealth transferred away from the extraction location, the uneven environmental and social harms caused by oil production are highly localised to the production area (o’rourke & connolly, 2003, p. 593). the bp deepwater horizon oil spill in 2010 is used as a discrete event to demonstrate this, shown in figure 7, and the potential costs of oil production are clear. by superimposing the oil spill extent on the bp shareholder data, it can be easily discerned the gulf states of louisiana, mississippi, alabama, and florida, some of the poorest in the united states, bear the monumental environmental and social cost of the disaster in addition to the impacts of climate change, while wealth generated from these operations is transferred to cities in the region, such as houston, and further afield. these burdens are long-lasting (eklund et al, 2019) and happen regularly: 137 oil spills occurred in the united states alone during 2018 (cassidy, 2019). 14 consilience figure 6. equinor domestic and international production and shareholder locations. data sources: equinor 2020, equinor 2021. consilience fryett: sharing the burden figure 7. bp shareholders in relation to deepwater horizon oil spill. data source: nasdaq 2021, wagner et al. 2015. 16 consilience discussion and a new framework it is well established that the development and current wealth of the global north has been largely due to fossil fuel exploitation (robinson & shine, 2018; ortiz, 2020). this process of development has often been presented as a passive one, reflecting the ‘natural’ advantages of countries that have grown wealthy (da costa & dias, 2015). however, this process has both been active and highly political, rather than natural, with the majority of the world’s oil reserves found in the territories of relatively poor countries for example (o’rourke & connolly, 2003). wealth is actively transported from oil extraction location, often in the global south, to an often distance shareholder, and the magnitude of the wealth moved intensifies the effects of this movement. the process of fossil fuel production, which has created the collective problem of climate change, has worked to increase the vulnerabilities of extraction points to this problem through this movement of wealth. the environmental and social costs of oil production act as a multiplier to these vulnerabilities in the global south, further burdening at risk communities. the deepwater horizion disaster demonstrated that the divide between north and south is fuzzier than groups of nation-states. the global south exists as pockets in the global north (trefzer, 2014), hidden by focus on nation-states. although these impacts do not directly cause climate change, they occur during the process of ghg production and benefit, and therefore must be considered when assigning burden in response to climate change. the process of wealth transfer is poorly reflected in current methods of representing and allocating responsibility, and the carbon majors shareholder extension as defined in this paper aims to help rectify this. in addition to current production of corporate ghg emissions, it can be argued that shareholders bear some responsibility for the historic emissions of a company. the ability of a company to generate benefit for a shareholder in the present rests on the foundation of past activities, similar to the unjust inheritance of states described by duusotterström (2014). for example, bp was built up over the past 100 years, and a key part of its success is the emitting of over 40 million tons of co2 equivalent (heede, 2020a). if a shareholder is willing to accept the benefits created by a company, they must also accept responsibility for the foundation which the benefits are derived from. beyond the scope of this paper, tracing the transfer of wealth through time presents an opportunity for further research. fused into the foundation is the knowledge of damages stemming from ghg production, which some oil companies were aware of as early the 1970s (hall, 2015). despite the ability to transition away from a harmful business model, in some cases for almost half a century, carbon majors continue to engage in ghg production. further, many, such as bp, have and continue to actively resist climate action (laville, 2019) and repeatedly protect their corporate image from poor environmental performance through ‘greenwashing’ (kassinis & panayiotou, 2018; furlow, 2010). as beneficiaries of these ‘do no harm’ violations, an additional layer of moral responsibility must be added to the shareholder’s climate responsibility that stems from pre-climate change warning ghg production. a considerable climate responsibility then rests with the shareholder of a fossil fuel company. to ensure the effectiveness of this framework, owners must be aware of consilience fryett: sharing the burden their ownership. shares are often held by institutional investors on behalf of banks and super funds, who invest customers’ money to secure a return. the length and complexity of this ownership chain not only separates shareholders from the consequences of production, it reduces the ability for them to take responsibility and experiment with the role of owner. by shortening this chain of responsibility, generating wealth, through a super fund for example, becomes viewed as political act with practical and moral consequences. actors can then be empowered to take control of their responsibility. although initiatives such as divestment and increased shareholder activity are potential actions under this framework, the primary purpose is to multiply the sites of action across multiple sectors. transparency is critical to shorting the chain. although initiatives such as the task force on climate-related financial disclosures have made advances in this space, i argue the focus on financial risk and decision making encourages a shift away from climate breakdown contributors, and a dismissal of climate responsibility, rather than an acceptance of responsibility then used to motivate acts in multiple theaters. these initiatives can remain a useful tool, however disclosures that highlight the consequences of fossil fuel production, and the financial pathway leading to those consequences, could prove more effective. for shareholder climate responsibility to work, accessible information allowing an actor to determine their wealth is generated by companies such as bp or equinor must be readily available and independently verified. this is not to suggest that large actors, such as nation-states or companies, are relinquished of climate responsibility. indeed, the proposed framework supports quite the opposite. it aims to increase avenues in which small actors can take action, place pressure on large actors to do the same, and help bridge the gaps between the multiple simultaneous methods of assigning climate responsibility required to tackle climate change. it thus works to multiply the sites of political action by encouraging experimentation in the roles that people occupy and to increase both collective and individual agency, with the goal of creating cracks in the systems which have either created or allowed anthropogenic climate change to evolve. rather than the performance an obedient role, complicit in the renewal of these systems (connolly, 2013), i seek to encourage active participation to propel climate action forward. conclusion responding to climate change presents the largest collective environmental and social challenge of the 21st century. however, current ways of representing and allocating responsibility for the causes of this challenge have failed to motivate and guide sufficient action. given the colossal impacts of 2 degrees of warming, which the ipcc (2018) reports will take place under current paris agreement pledges, increasing the effectiveness of social processes of representing and allocating climate responsibility to create bolder climate action is critical. in addition, a deeper understanding the responsibility for climate change helps to more fairly allocate burdens garnered in responding to it, essential in ensuring a just approach to tackling the problem. this paper contributes to this essential work by adding additional dimensions to an existing responsibly method, the carbon majors. the key finding of this paper is the disparity between shareholder locations and sites of production in 18 consilience both case studies, equinor and bp. the processes of wealth transfer and the uneven geographies of accumulation and production during ghg production, and consequential climate breakdown, are therefore highlighted through this conclusion. realizing the central role that creating action pathways occupies in effective climate responsibility, role experimentation is then used to multiply the sites of action that stem from the shareholder, allowing the different responsibility methods to work in tandem. consilience fryett: sharing the burden bibliography afionis, s., sakai, m., scott, k., barrett, j. and gouldson, a. 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(2015). in mapping the fallout from the deepwater horizon oil spill, developing one tool to bring unity to the response. office of response and restoration, national oceanic and atmospheric administration. https://response.restoration.noaa.gov/about/media/mapping-falloutdeepwater-horizon-oil-spill-developing-one-tool-bring-unity-response.htm watts, n., amann, m., ayeb-karlsson, s., belesova, k., bouley, t., boykoff, m., byass, p., cai, w., campbell-lendrum, d., chambers, j. and cox, p.m. (2018). the lancet countdown on health and climate change: from 25 years of inaction to a global transformation for public health. the lancet, 391(10120), 581-630. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(17)32464-9 introductionintroduction economic development has historically come at the expense of environmental wellbeing. more recently, however, governments have increasingly focused on ecologically responsible growth and the protection and restoration of natural resources. this shift has occurred alongside momentous increases in standard of living for people across the planet. nations and international organizations are placing a renewed importance on advancing global quality of life while also ensuring environmental viability. researchers are finding that environmental consciousness and improvements in quality of life are not mutually exclusive. dr. p.v. baiju, an indian researcher in social development, wrote that sustainable development occurs at the intersection of ecological conservation, economic growth, and improvement of social wellbeing (baiju, 2007, p. 184). the second two dimensions, economic growth and improvements in social well being, are tied together in the concept of human capital. human capital here refers to the contribution of the individual worker to the output of an economy. human capital is the sum of the educational, health, and societal outcomes an individual experiences and brings into the workplace. despite an increased focus on sustainability in recent years, past decades of economic growth have come at the costs of environmental degradation and excessive natural resource exploitation. this does not need to be the norm. the study at hand seeks to examine the relationships between environmentally sustainable practice and positive life outcomes for the individual, representative of overall quality of life. its ramifications can help advise sustainable policy, in both the developing world and more slowly growing economies. literature reviewliterature review there is an abundance of literature linking environmental health to the social well-being of a nation’s denizens. however, much of the literature relies on index scores to represent various factors of sustainability, rather than examining the underlying indicators that inform view journal | view issue environmental sustainability and environmental sustainability and human capital developmenthuman capital development zachary porreca department of economics, bloomsburg university of pennsylvania, bloomsburg, pa 17815, united states, email: zjp00003@mix.wvu.edu keywords:keywords: development, human capital, emissions, growth abstract:abstract: this study utilizes a multiple log regression model to examine how markers of environmental wellbeing are able to explain disparities in human capital globally. this paper utilizes data from the world bank to examine relationships between emissions, air pollution, land and water conservation, renewable energy reliance, development status, and human capital levels. the results find that carbon emissions and particulate matter air pollution are the largest environmental predictors of human capital index scores, and that the positive relationship between carbon emissions and human capital level all but disappears amongst developed nations. this study fills a gap in the literature, providing a non-geographically isolated examination of particularly relevant explanatory variables, as opposed to solely utilizing index scores. 48 doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6746 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 48-57 author’s note:author’s note: our planet and way of life are in dire straits. in the past several decades we have seen an explosion in awareness regarding the dangers posed by unchecked industrial development. this study at hand hopes to add to the body of dialogue regarding proactive approaches to dealing with our changing climate. my hope is to draw attention to the sort of strategies that can be successful in promoting the sort of economic development that much of our world still needs while also protecting and restoring our planet’s ecosystems. hopefully, future policy will take into consideration studies such as this. development and environmental stewardship do not need to exist separately. july 6, 2020 http://consiliencejournal.org https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/consilience/issue/view/651 consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6746 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 48-5749 these index scores. this approach is problematic in that it unnecessarily limits the scope of factors examined. the ecological footprint (ef) index, based upon the number of references in publication, is the most widely used ecological and environmental index (strezov, evans & evans, 2017, p. 247). this index is also the only major index that solely examines environmental factors. despite its benefits, the index fails to account for factors such as air pollution concentrations that humans are in constant interaction with (“data and methodology”, 2019). another commonly used index in economic literature is the sustainable society index, which assesses a nation’s sustainability. using this measure to represent environmental sustainability is problematic in that the ssi contains indicators of sustainability outside of environmental well-being. this index seeks to encapsulate the whole of sustainability, at its environmental, social, and economic levels (strezov, evans & evans, 2017, p. 245). while this approach has merit, ssi index scores consistently fail to mirror environmental markers. scores are excessively influenced by the other factors considered. as such, this index is not an adequate measure of the interaction between human capital development and environmental factors. there is no single index score that can account for the intersectionality between environmental, economic, and social factors that make up sustainability (rodriguez-rosa, gallego-alvarez, vincente-galindo & galindo-villardon, 2017, p. 547). some literature has linked environmental quality to human development and economic health. the most famous example of this is in the “kuznet curve” which hypothesizes that environmental degradation is essential to the early stages of a nation’s economic growth. this theory posits that the concentration of carbon emissions will increase in these early stages of development, only reducing once the nation finds stable economic footing (jain and nagpal, 2017, p. 126-127). the same paper by jain and nagpal (2017) found that across south asia, environmental protection is positively related to human development index scores (p. 130). economic losses that are a result of environmental degradation are inextricably linked to human capital depreciation (zhao, yu, wang & fan, 2016, p. 11716). the same study from zhao et al. (2016) hypothesized that between 1.2% and 2.0% of newly generated wealth globally is lost each year due to health deterioration from air pollution (p. 11718). this is demonstrative of the massive economic cost imposed by the market failure of negative environmental externalities (the unintended environmental cost inherent in industrial activity). the failure of an economy to develop in an environmentally sustainable manner imposes not only ecological and social costs, but also significant monetary loss. air pollution has possibly the largest environmental influence on human capital depreciation (schmidt, 2019, p. 1). particulate matter air pollution (pm) has been linked to a loss of productivity due to reduced mental functioning (schmidt, 2019, p. 4). this reduced productivity, when coupled with the increased mortality associated with other forms of air pollution is a leading contributor to the decline in human capital as the effects of industrialization take hold. zhao et al. (2016) found that 12.5% of annual global deaths are attributable to air pollution (p. 11717). they concluded that as concentrations of air pollution increase, mortality also increases (p. 11723). existing literature indicates a link between environmental and human well-being. environmental factors that are of primary interest are water usage, forest coverage, clean air, and renewable energy usage (baiju, 2007, p. 190-191). a similar list includes renewable water resources, air quality, renewable energy, and greenhouse gas emissions (rodriguez-rosa et al., 2017, p. 548). rodriguez-rosa et al. (2017) also made clear the relationship between national income level and commitment to sustainable development (p. 561). because the relevance of these factors is well established, they will be examined in the study at hand. the current body of literature is lacking in that it either fails to solely examine the environmental dimension of sustainability or the study in question is geographically isolated. this study seeks to remedy this by focusing solely on the environmental factors impacting human development, while looking at a broad swath of nations across the globe. as such, this paper will fill an important place in the current body of literature: providing a global perspective on the role environmental well being plays in human capital development. data descriptiondata description all data utilized in this study is drawn from the world bank databank’s world development indicators from the most recent year for which data is available. 2017 human capital index scores are used to represent each nation’s quality of life. this index score accounts for a child’s probability of survival to age 5, survival rate from age 15-60, expected years of schooling, and the percentage of children under age 5 whose growth has not been stunted. according to the world bank (2018), this index is meant to showcase the amount of human capital that a child can expect to attain by age 18. they state that this index was “designed to highlight how improvements in current consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6746 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 48-5750 health and education outcomes shape the productivity of the next generation of workers” (world bank, 2018). while this index score and the underlying factors that determine its value are not necessarily representative of the myriad definitions of what could constitute human capital, they do provide a useful base-level instrument for an even-keeled evaluation. predictor variables were selected to represent different indicators of a nation’s commitment to environmental sustainability. these variables, along with a brief description of each are listed in table 1. these variables were chosen because they represent a broad swath of the objectives of environmental sustainability. together these factors can reveal a nation’s performance on several metrics of eco-progress. it does bear stating that these are not the sole environmental factors that can be considered as part of the broader field of environmental sustainability. however, amongst those factors quantified and made accessible by the world bank these are the predictors that have the strongest relationship to environmental wellbeing. the human capital index score indicates a value between 0 and 1, with higher values being associated with higher levels of human capital. the dummy variable takes a value of 0 as default. a value of 0 represents a nation that is not yet considered to be developed. a value of 1 represents a nation that is considered fully developed. 157 nations were initially examined. this selection of countries had the most recent hci score available. together, they represented a broad swath of the globe, with every populated continent represented. 46 african countries, 40 asian countries, 40 european countries, 13 north american countries (including central america and caribbean islands), 9 countries from australia and oceania, and 9 south american countries were represented. however, some nations had incomplete data. those without complete data on all metrics considered were excluded from further analysis. following this elimination, outliers in observations were controlled for. any nation which held an outlier in any of its associated metrics was deleted from consideration. for the purposes of this study, any indicator variable outside of three standard deviations from its mean was considered an outlier. this control was implemented to prevent any outlier observations from exerting undue leverage on the regression. in all, 56 nations were removed from consideration, the vast majority of which were removed due to incomplete data. upon implementing this control, 101 nations were left for analysis. methodologymethodology the primary objective of this study is to test the theory that regardless of a nation’s development status, a nation’s focus on environmental wellbeing is positively related to a higher quality of life for its citizens. before taking an in-depth look at the statistical modeling underpinning this article, several basic ideas regarding regression analysis should be stated. the models at hand were fit using an ordinary least squares method (ols). this technique essentially plots all known data points onto a theoretical multi-dimensional space and seeks to fit a functional form as closely to those data points as possible. the objective is to mirror reality as closely as possible, minimizing the distance between known observations and the model’s predictions. these disparities are termed “errors” and the ols regression fits a model that minimizes the squares of these error terms. the model is algebraically represented in a functional form. the response variable “y” in this case is a human capital index score. the β coefficients represent the degree to which a change in the “x” variable they are attached to will bring a resultant change in the response variable “y”. the first β coefficient (the one without a variable attached) is a constant, and functions as the y-intercept in basic algebra. the γ coefficient has a similar meaning but is attached to a yes or no dummy variable “z”. α is used similarly for coefficients of the interaction between factors. for regression analysis, most of the calculations are computed using statistical software that will output values for these coefficients as well as diagnostic markers. the ε at the end of the function represents the error term. it is not used in making predictions, as its value differs with each observation. while explaining the function of the relevant diagnostic summary statistics is beyond the scope of this paper, a familiarity with a few would be valuable. r2 is a measurement between 0 and 1 of the degree of variability table 1: table of variables consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6746 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 48-5751 in “y” explained by changes in the predictor “x” and “z” variables. it is often considered a measure of “goodness of fit”. each variable considered has an accompanying “p-value”. this value indicates the degree to which the variable is statistically different from zero. this validates the relation between that particular predictor and the response variable. lower values mean an increased certainty that the predictor and response are related. typically, we are looking for a 90-99% certainty that the factors are related to maintain their presence for consideration. other summary statistics will be explained as they are encountered in the remainder of this paper’s methodology section. to begin, the following model was selected and fit to the available data: model 1: regression model with all predictors considered upon fitting the model to the data at hand using an ols regression, the following results shown in table 2 were obtained. an r2 value of 0.83 was obtained. this demonstrates a good degree of variability in human capital being explained by the environmental factors considered. also of note is the fact that not all of these predictors are statistically significant. of particular note: level of water stress, percentage of land dedicated to agriculture, percentage of forested land, and greenhouse gas emissions (excluding pm25 and co2) were found to be statistically insignificant in the model. the percentage of total area that is protected was found to only be significant at the 90% level. it was then important to determine if there was significant interaction between the dummy variable representing a nation’s development status and the other predictor variables. the below model was utilized to test for interaction. model 2: regression model with all predictors and interaction when fitted through ols regression, this model provided the output shown in table 3. to determine whether there is a statistically significant interaction in the data, an f test was conducted to compare the reduced model 1 with the full model 2. the initial model 1 did not consider that the yes or no (represented in binary fashion) value of a nation’s development status may interact with any of the other factors considered to negate or confound their impact on human capital. a f test in this case is essentially used to compare which model is superior, the model without any interaction or the model with every factor interacting. the idea that there is no interaction is taken as a default or “null hypothesis” and the full model’s supremacy is taken as the alternative hypothesis. a f value of 1.77517 was returned. this value, in the case of this comparison (based upon number of observations and number of predictor variables between the models), does not lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis. model 1 without any interaction is a better predictor than model 2 with all predictor variables interacting with the dummy variable. however, all but one of the interaction terms were, based on their p-values, statistically insignificant. this value (interaction 4), was highly significant. following this result, a new model was generated, removing all predictors that were statistically insignificant on the basis of p-values in model 1. this model, model 3, which does not include interaction between variables was compared to the new model 4. model 4 contains solely the predictors that were deemed statistically significant, along with the interaction that was deemed significant on the basis of its p-value in model 2’s analysis. this is the interaction between the dummy variable of a nation’s development status and its co2 emissions. these new models are: model 3: simplified regression model running an ols regression on this model yields table 4 and model 4. model 4: model with statistically significant interaction running an ols regression on model 4 yields the output in table 5: consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6746 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 48-5752 taking the reduced (sans interaction) model 3’s adequacy as the null hypothesis, and the new full model 4’s superiority as the alternative hypothesis, an f statistic of 11.541 was obtained. this value is enough to reject the null hypothesis at the 99% significance level, and to state that model 3 is inadequate when compared to model 4. model 4 is the best fit for representing the relationship. there is significant interaction between co2 emissions and a nation’s development status. from this point forth, all discussion and analysis will be based upon model 4 and its output in table 5. to verify the results obtained, several tests needed to be conducted. the theoretical explanations behind these tests are beyond this paper’s scope. they are included in the body of this paper so as to validate the model and give credence to the quantitative and qualitative conclusions table 2: output from regression model 1 fitting table 3: regression output from fitting model 2 consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6746 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 48-5753 derived from it. these tests ensure that the model posits the most realistic relationships possible.they are in essence the statistically derived “evidence” of this paper’s primary arguments. the simplest visual test to conduct is that of the verification of the linear relationships that exist between the response variable and the predictors in question. to do this, a scatter plot matrix was generated (figure 1). this matrix did not account for the dummy variable for development status or the interaction term. the matrix solely looked at the four examined quantitative predictors. while it is not necessary to examine these correlations in detail, it is worth noting that, at first glance, there appears to be more or less linear relations between the hci and three of the four predictors. the correlation between the hci and the percentage of protected area is questionable. this finding does go in line with the insignificant p-value that the regression output yielded. further, there is no cause for concern regarding the potential issue of collinearity (that predictor factors are themselves related to one another) as there does not appear to be significant correlation between predictor variables. these results, derived visually, were confirmed by checking variable inflation factor values between individual predictor values and the model as a whole. no vif values were close to the threshold levels that would indicate multicollinearity, the highest vif value between variables was below 1.5. subsequently, autocorrelation needed to be tested. first, an index plot of standardized residuals was generated (figure 2). a visual inspection of this diagnostic plot does not give cause for concern regarding autocorrelation. the standardized residuals are more or less evenly distributed around the zero line, as would be expected of observations with independent errors. to confirm this result, a durbinwatson test for autocorrelation was conducted using a statistical software package. this returned a durbinwatson statistic of 1.9107. this is above the upper limit in question of 1.693. as such the hypothesis of autocorrelation is rejected at the 99% significance level, and by proxy at the 95% significance level. there is no autocorrelation present amongst the data. following these promising results, testing for heteroskedasticity was conducted. to do this, a plot of residuals versus fitted values was generated (figure 3). it is unclear whether there is a pattern present in figure 3. a data set with homoscedastic variance amongst error terms would exhibit a straight line pattern amongst the residuals. the errors above potentially illustrate what is called “fanning”, where the variance amongst error values grows larger as the fitted value grows larger. this is suggestive of heteroskedasticity. to confirm the results of this visual inspection, a breusch-pagan/ cook-weisberg test for heteroskedasticity was administered using a statistical software package. this test takes homoscedasticity as the null hypothesis and heteroskedasticity as the alternative hypothesis. this test returned a chi squared value of 0.03 and a p value of 0.8684. this is not a high enough value to reject the null hypothesis. this data set does not exhibit heteroskedasticity. after confirming the validity and significance of the proposed model, to ease in the explanation of relevant trends, a log linear transformation was performed on the datal. this form is simply a transformation of the previously validated form, allowing for clearer interpretations of the data’s mathematical relationships. in this form, the percent change in the response variable as a result of a 1% change in the predictor variable can be deduced.. the coefficients of the linear log model tell us what the values of these percentage changes are. this model, once transformed, takes the form of model 5. model 5: log transformation of model 4 table 4: output from simplified model 3 table 5: regression output after fitting model 4 consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6746 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 48-5754 this model, when fitted using an ols regression provided the output shown in table 6. this output is in the easiest form for examination of trends. as such, it will be utilized in the remainder of this paper. discussiondiscussion the most striking trend evidenced by these results can be inferred logically: that developed nations have, on average, 28.2% higher human capital index scores. this is hardly surprising considering the increased quality of healthcare and education available in the developed world. this illustrates the disadvantage those born in developing countries immediately face from birth. following the tests of significance, the predictors left are emissions, particulate matter air pollution, and combustible reliance. these are the sole factors of environmental sustainability that have a statistically significant impact on quality of life as represented by human capital index scores. what is perhaps least surprising amongst the established relationships is the inverse relationship between particulate matter air pollutants and human capital. for every 1% increase in particulate matter air pollution, a corresponding decrease of 0.12% in human capital was observed. this relationship is significant when considering the high levels of particulate matter in nations such as brazil and china during early stages of their economic development (zhao et al., 2016). the correlation between air pollution and increasing mortality is well established. this poses a significant threat to sustainable human development across the heavily polluted industrialized urban cores of the developing world. in addition to the lost productivity per worker due to the mentally degenerative effects of particulate matter air pollution (see schmidt 2019), there is a systemic burden imposed by this contamination. individuals experience stunted mental development and suffer premature deaths due to respiratory complications. workers are therefore never able to reach full productive potential, and an excessive burden is placed onto healthcare resources. this has the knock-on effect of removing individuals from the workforce and slowing economic growth. there is a need in the current body of research for studies that directly quantify the magnitude of economic losses attributable to particulate matter air pollution. these economic losses may be demonstrably excessive when compared to the temporary advantage an economy gains from this type of environmentally irresponsible growth. this is to say nothing of the unquantifiable human cost. among developing nations, there is a strong positive relationship between co2 emissions and human capital. increases in carbon emissions are associated with increasing human capital. in these developing nations, figure 1: scatter plot matrix of response and quantitative predictors figure 2: an index plot of standardized residuals figure 3: residuals versus fitted values consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6746 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 48-5755 every 1% increase in carbon emissions translates into a nearly 0.11% increase in human capital. the increasing quality of life associated with higher carbon emissions is most likely a product of the industrialization these emissions are associated with. as a low-income nation’s industrial sector expands, both gdp growth and quality of life should rapidly improve. carbon emissions can be viewed as a proxy for industrial growth. for developed nations, however, the carbon emissions that result from increasing industrial output bear a diminished rate of return. for these economies, increases in carbon emissions have a nearly negligible effect on human capital. each 1% rise in carbon emissions is accompanied by a less than 0.02% increase in quality of life. this hardly incentivizes the sort of environmentally destructive growth that is exhibited early in a nation’s development, as hypothesized by the kuznet curve (qain & nagpal, 2017). the effect of carbon emissions on human capital development may have been better represented functionally by a parabolic form (visually taking the shape of the “kuznet curve”). this potentially could have better captured the diminishing rate of return that was evidenced and approximated by the interaction of the dummy variable development status with emissions. all in all, carbon emissions likely do not directly affect human health or capital. as such, future research would do well to capture this peculiarity by devoting study to the topic. strategies such as instrumental variable regression, where the effect of carbon emissions on human capital development by proxy can be examined and quantified, may be better suited for that endeavor. lastly, reliance on combustible renewals for energy has a nearly negligible, yet statistically significant, inverse relationship with quality of life. each percentage increase in combustible reliance is associated with a 0.01% reduction is human capital. combustibles, including biofuel, are the world’s most utilized renewable energy sources (“combustible renewables and waste”, 2014). although many posit the economic benefits of biofuel production in developing nations, increasing biofuel crop cultivation in these countries has presented issues of food insecurity. the cultivation of crops for biofuel production processes in nations with growing biofuel industries has caused significant swells in food and feedstock prices (kojima & klytchnikova, 2008, p. 14). this adverse effect on food security is the most likely explanation for the small but significant inverse relationship between human capital and combustible renewable reliance. as with carbon emissions, this does provide another potentially fruitful avenue for future research. an investigation into the quantification of the interplay between reliance on renewable combustible energies, human capital levels, and quality of life as gauged by food security levels seems ripe for a similar instrumental variable approach. also of interest are the relationships found to be statistically insignificant. from the initial pool of nine explanatory variables, only four had a statistically significant relationship with human capital levels. this tells us that the level of water stress, amount of national territory set aside for preservation, amount of land left forested, and the amount of land reserved for agriculture have no effect on the quality of life of an individual, as approximated by their human capital index score. while these factors are undoubtedly important, they do not have a significant effect on a worker’s wellbeing in terms of productivity, health, and educational attainment. the average citizen’s life outcomes are not impacted by their county’s commitment to forestry, land and water resource preservation, or domestic agricultural production. this lack of a relationship holds true across both developed and developing nations. the worker is largely unaffected by these outside factors. these factors are, however, intrinsically linked to the health of the nation and the environment in other ways. as such, despite having no effect on a worker’s lifetime productivity, they are of value for reasons beyond the scope of this paper. the fact that these factors were not found to be significantly linked to human capital levels does not divorce them from individual wellbeing. human capital, the metric by which this study approximated quality of life, is far from the only measure of individual well-being. human capital levels are based solely upon individual productivity and the factors that underpin and contribute to that productivity. while the factors that contributed to the human capital index scores (life expectancy, expected educational attainment, etc...) are all positive things associated with quality of life, they are not the only such factors. other table 6: regression output for log transformed model 5 consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6746 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 48-5756 indexes may well be better equipped to approximate mean quality of life, such as the united nations’ national happiness scores. this study, however, solely sought to examine individual well being within the context of economic development. as such, for this purpose, the human capital index is certainly appropriate. once again, this points towards other potential avenues for future research utilizing varying definitions and metrics for quality of life. likewise, greenhouse gas emissions other than co2 had no significant relationship to human capital levels. this could be due to these more varied emissions not being as apparent of a byproduct of industrial processes. as such, their presence does not serve as an approximation of a nation’s industrial output. as there is little adverse health impact attributed to greenhouse gas emissions, there is little reason to suspect a relationship between human capital levels and greenhouse gas emissions other than co2. policymakers would do well to heed some of the evidence posited above. air pollution’s danger is clear and present. efforts aimed at reducing particulate matter air pollution would likely pay for themselves rapidly in terms of increased production output. a nation that reduces its particulate matter air pollution by 10% can expect to see a 1.2% increase in human capital levels, and corresponding increases in gdp levels, the magnitude of said rise determined by a particular economy’s structure. it is likely that economies more heavily reliant on human capital would experience the greatest gdp gains. this is all in addition to the human benefits — health and mortality — that would be reaped. without further research in the directions described above, it is difficult to make policy recommendations regarding carbon emissions and renewable combustible forms of energy. however, the observed diminishing rate of returns to carbon emissions suggests that developing economies may do well to get ahead of the curve earlier. developed economies demonstrate that sustained growth does not rely on continuing increases in carbon emissions. as such, there is reason to believe that slower paced, less carbon intensive growth, cannot achieve the same levels of economic output that would otherwise have been achieved with the rapid growth of carbon emissions. this may eventually prove beneficial for policy makers, as there is significant cost inherent in the eventual carbon clean up that seems inevitable for today’s growing economies. conscious development may allow for economies to achieve the same eventual level of output while avoiding the excessive costs of rectifying the externalities imposed by emissions. conclusionconclusion this paper has examined the relationships present between quality of life, as approximated by human capital index scores, and markers of environmental sustainability. according to the study, a moderate relationship is present. three indicators of environmental sustainability were found to have no statistically significant relationship with human capital levels. the primary environmental factors that do have an influence on quality of life are emissions and particulate matter air pollution. while particulate matter air pollution has already been demonstrated in other literature to have a negative relationship to human capital, the study at hand is unique in that its findings are not limited in geographic scope. furthermore, this study was able to substantiate the argument that the positive relationship between carbon emissions and quality of life in developing nations all but disappears once a nation has reached a threshold in its economic development. future research would do well to introduce further layers of a country’s development status so as to quantify the actual diminishing relationship between carbon emissions, development level, and human capital. such research would be invaluable in identifying a nation’s optimum point of carbon intensive industrialization for human capital growth at a given level of development status. the paper’s findings point policymakers towards the essential reduction in particulate matter air pollution. clean air may not itself be a major driver of human development. however, its absence is certainly a quantifiable factor in suppressing potential economic output. a nation’s removal of heavy pollutants from its air will bring about significant increases in human capital, decreasing mortality and health care costs and increasing productivity. the effects of such a policy can be readily quantified, and found to be worthwhile. as such, policymakers and stakeholders need to push for industrial regulation aimed at observable reductions in air pollutants. it is ultimately in the best interests of the individual and the economy as a whole. otherwise, it may be advisable that those living in areas of excessive air pollution regularly utilize respirators of some variety to mitigate the human effects of this pollution. if the development of human capital is a priority, it is worth examining economic development strategies that have the growth of biofuel industries as a central component. the economic gains these industries bring about, however, need to be carefully weighed against the human capital losses brought about by the industry’s destabilization of agricultural markets. consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6746 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 48-5757 relationships clearly exist between the wellbeing of a nation’s citizens and the environmental health of that nation. policy makers would do well to tread slowly while progressing towards green industries as more research is done on the most effective directions to proceed while maintaining growth in human capital. for now, perhaps it is best to focus on cleaning up harmful externalities, such as air pollution, that are associated with current industrialization before proceeding towards new paths that have the potential to destabilize current food security, doing more harm than good. while environmental sustainability in development is certainly a necessary objective, growth must occur conscientiously to ensure that human social development does not fall to the wayside. referencesreferences angheluta, p. s., & badea, c. g. 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(2016). economic evaluation of health losses from air pollution in beijing, china. environmental science and pollution research, 23(12), 11716–11728. doi: 10.1007/s11356-016-6270-8 consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 24, 2021 living energy: a novel approach to using biofluorescent bacteria in solar concentrators smiti gandhi1 and andrew liu2 1 college of natural sciences and mathematics, university of houston, houston, tx 77004, united states. email: sgandhi6@uh.edu, 2 college of arts and sciences, university of pennsylvania, philadelphia, pa 19104 email: andy0713@sas.upenn.edu abstract to combat pollution, habitat degradation, and waste of limited resources, scientists and environmental activists advocate for renewable energy – cleaner, inexhaustible forms of power. while there are numerous positives to this energy type, it is more expensive, more intermittent, and less efficient than readily available fossil fuels. for example, solar panels are only 15-21% efficient on average. one solution, the solar concentrator, uses reflective properties of glass to concentrate light towards a solar cell. this project investigates the integration of biofluorescent bacteria into concentrator photovoltaics, using visible light produced by these bacteria as an additional source of photons for solar cells. the purpose was to test how much this biofluorescent bacteria-based solar concentrator can enhance the power output of photovoltaic cells. the experiment consisted of 10 trials containing control glass concentrators and concentrators with biofluorescent e. coli, for a total of 1.5 hours under simulated light conditions and 1.5 hours in the dark. the power (wattage) of each recording was calculated at 15-minute test intervals and used to compare the control and bacteria-applied solar cells. on average, application of biofluorescent bacteria resulted in a power output increase of 61.46% in the light simulation and 273.6% in the dark. these findings suggest that the enhancement of photovoltaic cell performance using biofluorescent bacteria on a solar concentrator can allow for greater amounts of energy to be output by real-world solar panels. author’s note one fall morning, i sat quietly in my eighth-grade homeroom, studying photosynthesis – the light and dark reactions of plants – for my upcoming biology test. i was fascinated by how plants generated energy from the sun during the day and continued to use that energy even after the sun bid us adieu. after reading through a few chapters of my biology textbook, i began to doodle, and my mind wandered. if plants can provide energy for themselves around the clock, why can’t solar panels provide constant energy for us? what started as a typical morning turned into the beginning of something spectacular, and after five years of intensive research and countless hours of testing, my partner andrew and i created the biofluorescent solar concentrator. this design, a (quite peculiar!) mix of about:blank about:blank biofluorescent bacteria, glass, and solar panels, surmounts a major hurdle of widespread solar panel use – their limited response ranges. keywords solar panels, pv cells, photovoltaics, biofluorescent bacteria, renewable energy, clean energy introduction currently, the earth is predicted to sustain life for another 1.75 billion years (university of east anglia, 2013), assuming unnatural factors do not cause its premature demise. unfortunately, the rapid depletion of natural resources, such as water, vegetation, and fossil fuels, is disconcerting to scientists even today. additionally, greenhouse gases from fossil fuel use and the potential for global climate change may make earth uninhabitable to humans sooner than anticipated (may, 2014). scientists are investigating ways of transitioning to renewable energy to help prolong the planet’s sustainability, recognizing that such a transition would decrease the emission of harmful gases, in turn lowering the rate of global climate change (union of concerned scientists, 2017). because they produce “significantly less carbon emissions compared to fossil fuels” (sources of energy: a comparison), renewable resources are cleaner. unfortunately, this energy type is complicated by high costs, unreliable hardware, and low efficiency rates. all renewable resources can produce more than 15 terawatts (tw) of energy and have high theoretical potentials. however, only solar and wind energy have extractable potentials, potentials that can convert to an easily transportable chemical form (tsao, lewis, & crabtree, 2006). solar power is one of the more common renewable resources, and its popularity has increased since its conception. in 2018, solar energy generated 2.2% of the united states’ electricity, compared to only 0.7% in 2014 (lawson, sherlock, platzer, clark, & cowan, 2020). unfortunately, solar energy heavily depends on the availability of sunlight and is only 15 to 21 percent efficient (johnson, 2013), a problem researchers hope to solve through technological development. while solar batteries that store generated energy for later use seem like a tempting solution, they are expensive, costing users $11,000 $18,000 (how much does solar storage cost? understanding solar battery prices, 2020). the amount of sunlight energy striking the earth in less than two hours (89,300 tw) is greater than “the worldwide energy consumption in the year 2001 from all sources combined” (tsao, lewis, & crabtree, 2006). a more affordable, efficient method of harnessing this energy would fulfill the world’s energy needs and requires a thorough assessment of the solar panel’s weaknesses. one such weakness is investigated in this study. because standard solar panels cannot absorb ultraviolet (uv) rays from the sun and instead rely solely on longer wavelengths of visible light, their productivity declines on overcast days and in low-light conditions (steffen, 2020). tackling this hurdle may increase solar panel efficiency. background i. solar cells solar energy is converted into usable energy though flat arrays of photovoltaic (pv) cells. these cells work using the photoelectric effect, in which “photons are absorbed and electrons are released and are captured as electrical energy” (photoelectric effect, encyclopedia britannica, 1998). in a pv cell, light strikes a thin wafer of semiconductor material, such as silicon, and electrons are knocked loose. the electrical conductor attached to the unit forms a circuit, and the electrons can be captured as an electric current (dhar, 2017). while laboratory testing suggests that solar cells are usually unaffected by extreme weather (maehlum, 2013), other factors such as light wavelength and light intensity may impact their efficiency. silicon solar cells operate on the photovoltaic or spectral response curve, which defines the minimum wavelength as 300 nanometers (nm), and the maximum as 1,100 nm (barett, n.d.). however, “at short wavelengths below 400 nm, the glass absorbs most of the [rays] and the [solar] cell response is very low” (honsberg & bowden, 2016). at intermediate wavelengths, solar cell response peaks (honsberg & bowden, 2016). the sun provides the earth with visible light (400-800 nm), uv rays (shorter than 400 nm), and infrared radiation (ir) (longer than 800 nm) (the editors of encyclopaedia britannica, 2019). only a small portion of sunlight reaching the earth’s surface consists of uv rays, specifically uva and uvb rays (u.s. federal food and drug administration, 2020). still, because solar panels operate best at intermediate wavelengths, uv rays and ir are largely wasted, contributing to solar panels’ low efficiency, especially in dimly lit conditions. in 2020, electrical engineering student carvey ehren maigue recognized this problem. to combat it, he created aurora renewable energy and uv sequestration (aureus), a system which uses a fluorescent dye created from food waste (berg, 2020). this dye converts uv rays to visible light, which solar panels can better convert to usable electrical energy (maigue, n.d.). at lawrence berkeley national laboratory, scientists created an externally fluorescent solar cell—a cell which emits its own light using the material gallium arsenide. this rare material is a byproduct of aluminum smelting. although gallium arsenide is expensive, only a small amount is needed to reach a “precise balance between the amount of light absorbed and the amount converted to electricity” (franzen, 2011), thus increasing the efficiency of solar cells to 28.4% (yarris, 2011). various institutes have investigated ideas like these, but all have failed to find a method that brings solar cell efficiency closer to 100%. due to the photoelectric effect, the current produced depends on how much light strikes the module. increasing visible light intensity can increase the effectiveness of a solar cell, a phenomenon demonstrated by concentrator systems. ii. luminescent solar concentrators current photovoltaic concentrator systems consist of curved mirrors and lenses which direct the sunlight onto the solar panel. while these systems are effective in concentrating light and thus slightly increasing the efficiency of solar panels, they require cooling systems to prevent the panel from overheating. they also require large spaces. therefore, although these concentrators may somewhat enhance solar panel efficiency, they may not be cost-effective (thomson, 2008). due to this issue, researchers at mit attempted to reconstruct and amplify the idea of concentrator photovoltaics. their efforts produced an amelioration of the solar concentrator, an idea developed in the 1970s to combat high silicon prices and decrease the dependence on large solar panels (rodarte, hirst, & ghosh, 2014). luminescent solar concentrators are waveguides, focusing light waves hitting a large area and combining them, directing them at a smaller, specific target (layton, 2008). dye particles, a large sheet of plastic or glass, and a small solar panel make up mit’s enhanced luminescent solar concentrators, the latter two components being characteristic of concentrators on the market today. light energy from the sun hits the dye particles, exciting the electrons of the dye. when the electrons reach a lower energy state, they become trapped in the glass layer. the glass is sanded on all sides except for the side with the solar panel (rodarte, hirst, & ghosh, 2014), so the trapped energy is directed toward the panel through total internal reflection. the solar panel captures this energy and converts it to electricity, but unfortunately only lasts three months (layton, 2008). while this system may increase the effectiveness of solar power, its infeasibility prevented it from being introduced into the market. many high efficiency, photo-bleaching resistant dyes are expensive and difficult to manufacture (franzen, 2011). further, they may have their own chemical byproducts. these dyes are not naturally occurring, and if replaced with a more organic product, would be more efficient in reducing production costs. this project investigates exchanging this synthetic dye with a more natural element – bacteria. iii. biofluorescent bacteria “bioluminescence is the production of light by a species” (radford, 2010). it is a type of chemiluminescence; the light is the byproduct of a chemical reaction within the organism. bioluminescence is a cold light – “less than 20% of the light generates thermal radiation” (evers, 2013). most bioluminescence occurs due to a reaction between the substrate luciferin and the enzyme luciferase. while all bioluminescence involves luciferin and luciferase, some reactions occur with a photoprotein instead, resulting in biofluorescence, the “absorption and reemission of light from living organisms” (creatures of light | how biofluorescence works, 2016). a common photoprotein is the green fluorescent protein (gfp). this photoprotein was discovered in crystal jellyfish (aequorea victoria). in this specie, the photoprotein aequorin reacts with oxygen and is activated by calcium c++. when activated, aequorin emits a blue light and activates the gfp, which emits green light (zimmer, 2015). through genetic engineering, biofluorescence can be exhibited by organisms which may not naturally possess the quality. researchers have extracted the gfp gene from bioluminescent crystal jellyfish and inserted it into bacterial dna, specifically nonhazardous, nonpathogenic strains of e. coli. these engineered bacteria are plated, and those which have accepted the gene survive the antibiotic selection process. this produces a population of genetically engineered biofluorescent bacteria – these bacteria effectively produce the photoprotein gfp and emit green light when exposed to uv rays. researchers have investigated bioluminescent and non-luminescent bacteria as forms of energy. the company glowee attempted to use bioluminescent bacteria in streetlamps but faced hurdles due to the lifetime of the bacteria (marcellin, 2016). in 2018, researcher vikramaditya yadav, along with his team at the university of british columbia, genetically engineered bacteria to produce copious amounts of lycopene, a photosynthetic (nonluminescent) dye (srivastava, et al., 2018). the bacteria were then coated with semiconductor material, and glass was used as an anode (cimons, 2018). yadav’s team combined solar panels, glass, and bacteria to produce energy, even in low-light conditions (cimons, 2018). although this project uses the same key components as yadav’s, it presents them in a different form. more specifically, this project aims to genetically engineer bacteria to express biofluorescence and use these modified bacteria as an additional source of photons for a solar concentrator system. the notion of integrating biofluorescent bacteria into concentrator photovoltaics for energy production is entirely novel. objectives, aims, and expected outcomes this project aims to enhance the efficiency of photovoltaic cells through biofluorescent bacteria integrated into the original concept of concentrator photovoltaics, specifically investigating: does biofluorescent bacteria impact solar cell power output when integrated into concentrator photovoltaics? the objective of this research is to: 1) propose an alternate method of harnessing energy from solar cells; 2) assess the power output and effectiveness of said method, especially in dark conditions; and 3) examine the plausibility of real-world applications of bacteria-applied solar panels. it was hypothesized that the application of biofluorescent e. coli to glass and a small solar panel in the form of a photovoltaic concentrator increases the power output of the cell during both well-lit “light” and dimly lit “dark” simulations. biofluorescent e. coli produce gfp and emit visible green light when exposed to uv rays. the application of these biofluorescent bacteria to glass ensures the visible light is concentrated, streamlining it towards the small solar panel. the solar panel can then convert this visible light into electrical energy (see figure 1). figure 1. biofluorescent bacteria-applied, or biofluorescent, solar concentrator model. methodology in this experiment, the independent variable was the application of biofluorescent bacteria. the control consisted of the solar concentrator units with no bacteria applied. the dependent variable, or the variable that was affected by the change in the independent variable, was the power output of the solar units. since power output is expressed in numerical form, this experiment naturally adopted quantitative data collection and analysis methods. i. materials overview prior to conducting the experiment, necessary materials were gathered and various parts of the experiment were assembled. the bio-rad pglo transformation kit was used to genetically engineer the e. coli hb101 k-12 strain using the biofluorescent pglo gene. the finalized bacteria were plated on agar in petri dishes. to make solar concentrators, adhesive thin-film amorphous silicon solar cells were used. each cell was adhered to a sheet of glass conducive to total internal reflection (with thickness equal to the width of the solar cell). positive and negative wires were attached to the solar cells using a soldering gun and solder flux. to measure the power output of the cells, a multimeter and alligator clips were used. ii. preparation of the biofluorescent bacteria the preparation of agar was the first step of biofluorescent bacteria development. the agar powder provided by the bio-rad transformation kit and the listed amount of distilled water were stirred in a beaker and kept on a hot plate until the mixture was clear. the agar was then poured into the plates until the bottoms of the plates were covered and the agar filled three-fourths of the entire plate. an assistant was necessary to keep the plates steady as they were poured. the plates were kept cold until they were used. after this, bacteria were prepared by following the instructions provided by the kit. unmodified e. coli were swabbed onto the prepared agar plates using the quadrant streaking technique and incubated to promote growth and multiplication of colonies. genetic transformation of bacteria was achieved through the insertion of engineered dna extracted from another organism, specifically crystal jelly, using the heat-shock method. in this method (figure 2), an extreme temperature change puts pressure on the bacteria to accept the gene. in this case, once the bacteria accept the gene, transcription and translation result in synthesis of gfp. the bacteria express bright green fluorescence. the pglo gene is in the form of a plasmid (shown in figure 2), which is a circular, self-replicating dna molecule. this plasmid can exist in e. coli host bacteria without disrupting chromosomal function. figure 2. pglo plasmid, lyophilized, inserted into the bacteria through the heat shock method. ampicillin and arabinose were implemented to artificially select for the correct fluorescent bacteria for testing. while arabinose was a sugar necessary for bacterial growth, ampicillin eradicated all bacteria except the bacteria which accepted the pglo gene. at the end of this process, biofluorescent bacteria were obtained. using a sterile adhesive to prevent direct contact with the glass, the biofluorescent bacteria were peeled from the agar and attached to the surface of the experimental concentrators. an attempt was made to ensure that each concentrator received an equal surface area of biofluorescent bacteria to maintain consistency between the separate units. this was done by measuring the coverage of one film and then peeling an equal amount for the other cells. multiple colonies from multiple plates were used for each concentrator to account for any differences present across colonies or plates, and to ensure sufficient visible light would be available for the solar panels. if one film had a greater surface area of biofluorescent bacteria, the excess bacteria was carefully removed using an alcohol wipe. iii. construction of the concentrator units solar concentrator units were constructed prior to conducting the experiment. the ends of adhesive cells were cut to expose metal on both the positive and negative ends (which were labeled on the cell itself). copper tape was applied over the exposed insides of the solar cells, serving as a conductor and as a bridge between the metal and the wires. using a solder gun and solder flux, positive and negative wires were attached to the copper tape on their respective ends. these units were left to cool fully before use. the adhesive solar cell was then applied on the side of the sheet of glass. the control units consisted of glass, a thin-film amorphous solar cell, and an adhesive wrap. iv. testing this experiment was done in a laboratory setting. there were no windows, so no outside light could penetrate the room and skew the results. for the well-lit “light” simulation, the lighting in the laboratory was adjusted to match the lighting outside on a typical cloudless day in a suburban area. the amount of light (including uv rays and visible light) outside was measured using a light meter. during cloudless days, there is a considerable amount of uv light and a greater amount of visible light. contrastingly, during the “dark” simulations, the effect of only uv light on the power output of the biofluorescent solar concentrator was tested for. using adjustable uv lights and white lights in the room, these conditions were replicated in the laboratory. during the light simulation, the both the uv lamps and the white light were on. during the dark trials, to isolate the impact of uv rays on an overcast day, the white light was turned off and the uv light was turned on at a lower setting. to test, the concentrator units were placed under the adjustable uv lamps. the control and bacteria-applied units were separated, so that the light produced by the bacteria did not reach the control units, as shown in figures 3 and 4. control units only had sterile adhesive material (without bacteria). the wires of the units were taped and labeled with the trial number. figure 3. experiment setup schematic. figure 4. preliminary setup for the dark simulation. clamps were used to position the units but were removed before testing. the middle plastic stand was replaced with a dark stand to ensure no visible light reached the control concentrators. note – in this photograph, both the uv lights and the biofluorescent bacteria appear brighter than they were. at 15-minute intervals, with a designated 15-second test time for each unit, the voltage and current were measured and recorded. values were measured in millivolts and milliamperes due to the small scale of the system. due to the brevity and speed of each testing time, an assistant was needed to record the values as they were measured. as watt’s law states, voltage and current were multiplied to calculate power, and power was reported in milliwatts. results during testing, data were compiled into tables for each trial. these tables included preliminary information, such as voltage and current for each unit, which were then averaged for each time interval. these averages were multiplied to calculate power with watt’s law as previously stated. the values across time intervals were averages for each trial, and the percent increases between the control units and the bacteria units were calculated during both light and dark simulations. watt’s law: p = iv where: p = power i = current v = voltage there was a clear difference between the light and dark trials. during the light trials, the power output was in thousands of microwatts. during the dark trials, however, the power output was in hundreds of microwatts. this was due to the excess external light accessible in the light trials; in the dark simulation, intended to isolate the impact of uv light on an overcast day, because only small amounts of uv rays and biofluorescent bacteria were available, the overall power output of all units was lower than it was in the light simulation. two trials, trials 1 and 4, were selected at random to showcase. during the light simulation test, trial 1 showed a 61.41 percent calculated increase in power output of the biofluorescent bacteria-applied cell compared to the control. during the dark simulation, there was a 281.4 percent increase in power output. similarly, in trial 4, there was a 66.36 percent increase in power output during the light simulation and a 273.6 percent increase in power output during the dark simulation. these values were similar for all trials. the graphs of trials 1 and 4 are shown in figure 5. figure 5. graphs of trials 1, 4, and overall. overall, during the light simulation, there was a 61.46 percent average increase in total power output of the biofluorescent bacteria-enhanced concentrator units versus the control units. during the dark simulation trials, there was a 275.8 percent increase in overall power output (wattage).   although this method shows the expected outcome and a large difference between the control units and the bacteria-applied units, these preliminary charts and graphs (figure 5) are insufficient in showing meaningful differences. a more formal, statistical system was necessary. power was deemed the most significant unit, since supplied electricity is usually measured in this unit. this information was extracted from the original charts. to compare all power values for the control units to those of the bacteria-applied units, a two-sample ttest was conducted for the values for each trial after the data satisfied the conditions and assumptions for this test. the twosample t-test conveys if there is a difference between two samples when the variances of the samples are not known. because the t-tests for both light and dark trials produced p-values much lower than the significance level of 0.01 (p = 0.000), the differences between the power output of the bacteria-applied concentrators and control concentrators are statistically significant. discussion the objectives of this research were fulfilled through the data collected. an alternate method of energy collection was proposed—while renowned institutions have previously attempted to improve the power output of solar cells, none have incorporated biofluorescent bacteria with solar cells in the form of a luminescent solar concentrator. the hypothesis of the experiment was supported. as shown through the t-tests, the addition of biofluorescent bacteria significantly impacted the power output of the tested solar concentrators. in fact, the biofluorescent bacteria increased the power output by 273.6 percent during the dark simulation, indicating that this method of energy production was effective at converting uv rays to visible light. according to the spectral response curve, silicon solar cells are effective at converting visible light, but not uv rays, to electricity (honsberg & bowden, 2016). with the introduction of biofluorescent bacteria, which served as the only source of visible light for the solar concentrators in the dark trials, power output increased. biofluorescent bacteria, when used in conjunction with the glass, enables solar panels to generate power independently from any other sources of light if there are uv rays in the atmosphere. on an overcast day, when visible light may not be ample, but “up to 80 percent of the sun’s rays pass through clouds” (sklar, 2012), biofluorescent bacteria-applied solar concentrators may be especially beneficial. the power output of the biofluorescent bacteria-applied solar concentrators was much greater during the light trials than during the dark trials, possibly because the biofluorescent bacteria only produced green light. green light falls towards the lower end of the spectral response curve (honsberg & bowden, 2016). white light, which was left on during light trials, consists of equal amounts of all wavelengths of visual light, including those silicon solar panels are most responsive to. during the light simulation trials, the presence of the biofluorescent e. coli increased the power output of the solar cells by 61.46 percent. this is likely because the bacteria served as a barrier, keeping light trapped in the glass layer. in future experiments, this system can be compared to a glass concentrator with a similar barrier to escaping light to isolate the impact of the biofluorescent bacteria. i. limitations and extensions to solidify the conclusions drawn from this research, further experimentation should be conducted. although this project proposes a method to improve solar panel power output, it has limitations: 1. the orientation of the uv lamps may have influenced the results due to variations in the intensity of the light emitted from the lamps, and the different position of each solar panel could have had slightly variable shade. however, the potential influence of this source of error was mitigated by the adjustment of the lamp location to allow balanced exposure to external light. 2. although the bacteria are a nonpathogenic and nonhazardous strain of e. coli, it is commonly preconceived that all e. coli are dangerous to human health due to the potential of outbreaks. this may hinder the marketing of any product resulting from this research. furthermore, the exact lifespan of the bacteria is unknown, which may also complicate the marketing process. 3. unfortunately, because air pollution and smog decreases the amount of uv radiation reaching the ground (climate prediction center internet team, 2019), this system may not be feasible in areas with high pollution levels. widespread, outdoor testing is necessary to evaluate the effect of pollution levels on the biofluorescent solar concentrator. 4. due to the small scale of this experiment, the units produced small amounts of power. it is hypothesized that the enlargement of the system would produce greater power and that the ratios of the differences between the bacteria-applied units and the control units would remain the same. 5. the differences stated above are between a bacteria-applied concentrator and a simple glass concentrator (with no fluorescent or luminescent material applied). considering these limitations, this experiment has numerous potential future expansions. for instance, one future experiment could test this project’s concept with full-scale, industrial-grade solar panels, utilizing a real outdoor environment during a full 24-hour period. for a more direct comparison, the biofluorescent solar concentrators can also be tested against concentrators using synthetic dyes or gallium arsenide solar cells, ideas which have recently come to fruition and are not yet popular. because the biofluorescent bacteria produced green light, which solar panels are only moderately responsive to, the effect of the color of biofluorescent bacteria on solar panel power output can be investigated. genetically engineered bioluminescent bacteria, which utilize luciferase mechanisms instead of uv rays to generate light, may be explored as a source of visible light for solar panels at night and in areas with high pollution levels. ii. installation ideas assuming the above limitations are addressed, and this technology develops with further research, there are many ways in which this product can be installed on infrastructure. like current solar panels, biofluorescent solar concentrators can be mounted on roofs. still, the glass would form much of the roof, and a small solar cell would be attached on one edge of the glass. larger biofluorescent solar concentrators may also function from fields. biofluorescent solar concentrators could also be integrated into windows. mit has previously discussed the adjustment of windows to incorporate luminescent solar concentrators (layton, 2008). the glass of the window would serve as the glass of the concentrator, and the solar cell would be embedded within the window frame. with this research, the only addition to this window would be a lightly colored film of bacteria. because the exact lifespan of the bacteria is unknown, an automated cartridge system could be developed to change an old film of bacteria with a new one. this method would not only increase the building’s surface area viable for energy production, but it would also potentially enhance the aesthetics of the building. iii. cost analysis in the real world, the cost of a product is just as important to consider as the power output of the energy source. a rudimentary cost analysis (table 1) was conducted between the current, most used photovoltaics systems, current concentrator photovoltaics, ideas for luminescent solar concentrators, and the biofluorescent solar concentrator developed through this project. because the bacteria can replicate infinitely on its own following its genetic engineering, the costs for production are the: space and development of bacteria farms, basic labor, and implementation. this system requires less money to be invested in the solar cell itself than other systems do, and crucially, generates power through a generally safe method. a more thorough cost analysis should be conducted in future investigations. table 1. factors affecting the cost of various solar panel systems. conclusions this project is an important step in the development and enhancement of new renewable energy technologies, specifically solar energy. the augmentation of photovoltaic cell performance through a bacteria-based biofluorescent concentrator allows for conversion of uv rays to visible light and greater power output, making them more feasible for use during both cloudless and overcast days. the application of luminescent bacteria in a sealed environment 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(2015, august 18). gfp: green fluorescent protein. retrieved april 20, 2021, from connecticut college: https://www.conncoll.edu/ccacad/zimmer/gfp-ww/gfp1.htm microsoft word rand final.docx   1   consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 180-196 the “necessity” of democracy for sustainable development: a comparison between the usa and cuba marcus rand development and international cooperation programme university of jyväskylä in finland marcus.f.rand@jyu.fi abstract democracy is associated with, and often stated as a condition for, sustainable development. a comparison of cuba and the united states shows that sustainable development can exist and grow in countries that do not possess a democratic form of governance. the results of the comparison indicate that, to promote sustainable development on a wider scale, it is necessary to focus on the values embedded in the dignity of humankind. to promote such values, it is imperative to present sustainable development as a set of values linked to the rights and dignity of humankind, not as the sole offspring of democratic ideology. keywords: sustainable development, democracy, united states, cuba. 1. introduction experts from both hemispheres have stated unequivocally that democracy is necessary for sustainable development1 and that, conceptually, democracy is an extension of justice (tage and lars, 2003, p. 768). the text of agenda 21, a un produced document that was developed at the united nations conference on environment and development in 1992, reinforced this notion. agenda 21 is a “comprehensive plan of action to be taken globally, nationally and locally by organizations of the united nations system, governments, and major groups in every area with human impacts on the environment” (united nations department of economic and social affairs [undesa], 2009). in other words, it is a detailed plan of how sustainable development should be pursued at the individual, business and institutional level. chapter two of agenda 21 forges a conceptual link between democracy and sustainable development, stating that a necessary condition for sustainable development is “progress towards democratic government” (undesa, 2009). the apparent unilateral acceptance and promotion of democracy as a necessary ingredient for sustainable development begs the question: can sustainable development exist under other forms of government? in the dialogue on democracy and sustainable development, democracy has a somewhat nebulous definition. it is agreed, however, in the publications of the un democracy fund that democracies have a constitutional design, a “legislative guarantee of human rights including freedom of expression and freedom of association, a legal system [that] ensures due process in the resolution of conflicts consilience rand: necessity of democracy     181   and the upholding of human rights, an accountable executive and public administration, and strong political parties” (united nations democracy fund [undf], 2010). in addition, democratic governments permit and promote civil society participation, conduct national and sub-national elections, and provide access to information and transparency in the governing process [undf, 2010]. this idea of democracy has been fused with the idea of sustainable development. experts argue that sustainable development is “conducive to democracy” since it emphasizes the role of civil society (dryzek, 1999, 37). a transparent democracy shares political power by informing the constituent and involving him or her in the decision making process. the general consensus among academics appears to be that countries espousing the democratic system facilitate and encourage sustainable development more than their non-democratic counterparts. peter söderbaum argues that the strengthening of democracy makes the decision process at all levels more visible which, consequently, will “improve the prospects for sustainable development” (2006, 189). similarly, andy spiess argues that good governance is difficult to achieve in an authoritarian government setting and that democratic structures of civil society are essential for sustainable development (2008, 244). furthermore, some academics, such as robert deacon, posit that developed democratic countries practice and encourage environmental sustainability more than their authoritarian counterparts. according to deacon, democratic countries pollute less because they have stricter environmental policies (deacon, 2009) deacon�s research suggests that democracies exceed non-democracy provision “by roughly 100% for environmental protection…and roughly 25-50% for safe water sanitation and education” (deacon, 2009, 260). it seems that most western academics and international institutions, such as the un, support the notion that sustainable development is most successful where participatory multiparty democracies exist. the seemingly inextricable link between democracy and sustainable development is flawed because it cannot account for the countries in which authoritarian governments have pursued and promoted sustainable development. for example, in a comparison of the top six democracies and the six strictest authoritarian states, ranked by the economist intelligence unit, the authoritarian regimes have a greater average ecological reserve (economist intelligence unit [eiu], 2010). this implies that authoritarian states do not necessarily live in a less ecologically sustainable manner. this finding inspired further investigation through the subsequent comparative study. cuba and the united states were chosen for the following study because each of these countries is a prime example of differing governing systems. though cuba is commonly referred to as an authoritarian state, it is officially a communist state where one party holds complete political power. conversely, the united states is a federal republic where power is divided between a federal authority and constituent regions known as states (index mundi, 2010). the economist intelligence unit conducted evaluations of each country�s electoral process, pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture and civil liberties. each country was then assigned a score and ranking. the united states ranked 18th in the list of 30 full democracies while cuba ranked 8th in the list of 50 authoritarian states (eiu, 2010), thus raising serious questions about the necessity of certain government structures for sustainable development. 182 consilience    182   this paper will endeavor to challenge the notion that democracy is necessary for sustainable development and establish through a qualitative case study that democracy is not inextricably linked to sustainable development nor is it the exclusive ideology or government structure necessary for sustainable development to be achieved. to illustrate this argument, systems of governance, “green” legislation, participation in international law, and sustainable practices in each country will be examined. 2. united states of america’s and cuba’s systems of governance the united states government clearly defines the purpose for democracy. according to united states government publications, democracies promote decentralized rule, protect basic human rights, “conduct free and fair elections open to all citizens, and protect minorities. democracy is believed to be a „government in which power and civic responsibility are exercised by all citizens either directly or through their freely elected representatives�” (infousa, 2009). in short, the simplest and perhaps most brazen statement, “democracy is the institutionalization of freedom” sums up the american notion of democracy (infousa, 2009). the american idea of democracy resonates with söderbaum�s statement that participatory democracy is founded upon a respect for human rights, the sharing of political power and respect for “different values or orientations as long as these opinions do not contradict democracy itself” (söderbaum, 183). this participation is deemed as necessary to facilitate sustainable development. cuba�s governmental system also contains mechanisms to promote sustainable development by allowing for public participation. the national assembly of peoples power, the only body that holds constituent and legislative authority, is composed of elected deputies for a term of five years. the napp elects a president, one first vicepresident, five vice presidents, and a secretary. in addition, 23 ministers are appointed by the president from among its deputies. this elected council of ministers forms the government of power (constitution of the republic of cuba 1992, 2009). the council of ministers is accountable to the napp and as article 84 of the constitution states, it is the responsibility of the napp to “exercise their duties [for] the benefit of the people.” the napp is also held accountable to their electors (articles 78, 79, 84 & 99, 1992). in this system of governance, which is designed with checks and balances of power, constituents get to choose their leaders as long as they are part of the communist party. in these regards, this system allows for power sharing and participation, elements that researchers such as brown and söderbaum deem necessary for sustainable development and associate with democratic systems of government. just as americans associate and espouse values for democracy that promote sustainable development, the communist state of cuba does the same. according to articles 8 and 9 of cuba�s constitution, cuba “recognizes, respects, and guarantees many freedoms and equal rights for all in the economic, political, social, cultural and familial spheres. it is the state�s responsibility to „organize and conduct the political, economic, cultural, scientific, social and defence activities�” (article 98a, 1992). in the centrally planned system, it is clearly acknowledged that it is the state�s responsibility consilience rand: necessity of democracy     183   to help the people and the preserve the environment by promoting sustainable development. 3. usa’s sustainable development and green legislation in the u.s. constitution there is very little content devoted to the environment or sustainable development. however, congress has created many acts to protect the environment and consequently to promote sustainable development. examples of this relatively large body of green legislation include the national environmental policy act (1970), the resource conservation and recovery act (1976) and the oil pollution act (1990). in section 101a of the national environmental policy act of 1970, congress declared: it is the continuing policy of the federal government, in cooperation with state and local governments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of americans (1970). this act, along with the creation of the environmental protection agency (epa) in the same year, illustrates president richard nixon�s response to public demand for cleaner air, purer water, and preservation of non-renewable resources. it is evident from this act that green legislation was formed to steward resources effectively and improve quality of life. subsequent acts reflect a similar spirit. the resource conservation and recovery act addresses the life span of hazardous waste. it was amended in 1984 and 1986 to include interventions for waste minimization and more stringent guidelines for underground, hazardous waste storage tanks such as petroleum (us environmental protection agency [epa], 2010). similarly, the oil pollution act was created in response to the public�s growing concerns about the marine ecosystems, especially after the exxon valdez spill off the alaskan coast in 1989 (epa, 2010). thus, the general pattern of sustainable development legislation seems to be that once a need is identified, appropriate legislation is created to address the concern. in this regard, the structure of the american government system facilitates sustainable development. more recently, in january 2007, president george bush signed executive order 13423 strengthening federal environmental, energy, and transportation management, which created “policy and specific goals for federal agencies” to conduct their respective missions in an environmentally, economically and fiscally sound, integrated, continuously improving, efficient, and sustainable manner” (epa, 2009). following his lead, in october of 2009, president obama signed an executive order on federal sustainability, which allows federal agencies 90 days to “set a 2020 greenhouse reduction goal… targets for efficient, sustainable buildings, reduced petroleum use in vehicles, water efficiency, waste reduction, purchasing green technologies and products, and supporting sustainable communities” (epa, 2009). 184 consilience    184   from these executive orders and congressional laws one can see that concerns for sustainable development continue to be addressed. 4. cuba’s sustainable development and green legislation compared to the u.s., cuba�s constitution addresses the concepts of sustainable development much more directly. since sustainable development has only recently become a significant political issue at the national and international level, the differences regarding references to sustainable development within the constitutions are likely due to the fact that the cuban constitution was drafted in 1976, while the american constitution was drafted in 1788. however, both constitutions have undergone several amendments since their respective inceptions. article 27 of cuba�s constitution clearly indicates a desire to pursue sustainable development: the state protects the environment and natural resources of the country. [it] recognizes the close links with the economic and social development to make human life more rational and ensure the survival, welfare and safety of current and future generations. the state relies on the appropriate corresponding bodies to implement this policy. it is the duty of citizens to contribute to the protection of water, air, soil conservation, flora, fauna and all the rich potential of nature.2 the cuban government acknowledges that the welfare of its citizens is linked to the environment and its natural resources. similar to u.s. environmental policy, the government, in cooperation with appropriate bodies, is responsible for policy execution. the cuban constitution carries this idea one step further and indicates that it is also the individual�s responsibility to be a wise steward of the “rich potential of nature.” in the late 1970s, cuba asserted itself as an international actor by becoming increasingly active in the united nations (gleijeses, 2002, 345). realizing a need to attend to its environmental problems, the government created the national commission for the protection of the environment and the conservation of natural resources (comarna) (houck, 2000, 15). comarna was similar to the american epa as its composition consisted of a consolidation of agencies dealing with the environment. further environmental legislation, known as law 33, was developed to promote sustainable development in 1981. this law addressed water, soils, mineral resources, marine resources, flora and fauna, the atmosphere, agricultural resources, human settlements and landscape and tourism resources (barba & avella, 2009). this law, by several accounts, was not effective enough; thus, in 1990 decree law 118 was introduced (barba & avella, 2009). the intent of this law was to create more environmental responsibility. decree law 118 distributed specific environmental responsibilities to eight ministries and created a ninth for enforcement (ministry of science technology and environment citma) (houck, 15). in the early 1990s, there was another period of economic scarcity due to the disintegration of the soviet union and the council for mutual economic assistance. cuban officials consilience rand: necessity of democracy     185   simultaneously addressed the economic problems with sustainable solutions. because there was environmental legislation enforced by citma, cuba was able to easily focus on localized centers of food production, which reduced transportation costs and encouraged urbanized farming (community gardens) (davis et al., 2009, 87-88). this conserved valuable fuel resources while promoting healthier diets. in a desire to improve what were still viewed as unacceptable environmental conditions, sustainable legislation was refreshed more recently with the introduction of law 81 of the environment in july 1997. despite difficult economic circumstances, cuba implemented law 81, which resulted in more rigorous enforcement of environmental standards (houck, 18-21). as a result, cuba is experiencing positive change; the marine ecosystem of the havana harbor is “coming back,” industrial pollution is decreasing and reforestation has brought the amount of tree covered land back up to 21 percent (houck, 5). it is evident that cuban environmental law is evolving regularly to meet the new challenges that sustainable development brings. 5. america and cuban participation in international law both the united states and cuba have participated in international conventions related to sustainable development. for example, both governments have joined, ratified and implemented the ramsar convention on wetlands (1971), the convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora (cites)(1973) and the basel convention on the control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes (1992). the mission of the ramsar convention is the “conservation and wise use of all wetlands through local and national actions and international cooperation, as a contribution towards achieving sustainable development throughout the world” (ramsar convention on wetlands, 1971). cuba and the u.s. both possess significant wetlands; thus, their willingness to pursue sustainable development by preserving most wetland areas illustrates both parties� commitment to sustainable development. in similar fashion, cites is an international agreement that seeks to “ensure that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival” (convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, 1975). states that agree to be bound by this convention are responsible to create or modify domestic legislation that guarantees the framework of this agreement will be implemented at the international level. implementation of this convention indicates that both the u.s. and cuba are making a concerted effort to maximize the benefits of wild flora and fauna, while simultaneously preserving them so that future generations can reap the benefits of these sustainable practices. during the 1980s, some industrialized countries began shipping toxic waste to developing countries because increasing domestic environmental restrictions was raising the cost of disposal and cutting into profits. the basel convention (1992) was created in response to this practice of toxic trading. this international convention created criteria for “environmentally sound management” of toxic waste and a framework for controlling “transboundary moving of hazardous waste” (basel convention on the control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal, 1992). cuba�s and the u.s.�s participation in this convention suggests 186 consilience    186   that they are concerned about preserving the environment and pursuing a path of sustainable development. it appears, however, that cuba is more willing to commit to international initiatives that are linked to sustainable development than the u.s. for example, cuba signed and ratified the convention on biological diversity (cbd) (1992) while the u.s. has signed but not ratified it. the convention�s primary objective is to “halt the loss of biodiversity so as to secure the continuity of its beneficial uses through the conservation and sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources” (convention on biological diversity, 1992). this important conference has been identified by some as the conference that “catapulted” environmental protection and sustainable development forward in cuba (houck, 8). it is difficult to establish why the u.s. has not ratified the cbd. the most common suggestion seems to be that the influence of, “businesses based upon extracting and synthesizing natural information” such as pharmaceutical companies, has made it a challenge for the u.s. to ratify the cbd (vogel, 1997, 4). in other words, it is suggested that lobby groups for industries, such as the pharmaceutical research and manufacturers of america (phrma), have influenced policy and politics in this regard by coupling advocacy with targeted donations to political parties (phrma, 2010). this accepted practice of industrial lobbying in the american democracy does not exist in cuba�s system of governance. however, the current status regarding the cbd is that “the senate foreign relations committee recommended ratification of the cbd in 1994, but the treaty remains before the us senate” (u.s. department of state, 2010). in other words, the cbd has been neglected for over 16 years. the kyoto protocol (1997), an amendment to the un framework convention on climate change remains in a similar status. cuba has signed, ratified and implemented the protocol while the u.s. has only signed it. the american failure to ratify is surprising because the united states, like cuba is a member of the un framework convention on climate change. the clinton-led government failed to ratify the protocol because “meaningful participation by developing countries in binding commitments limiting greenhouse gases had not been met” (fletcher, 2010). in 2001, the bush administration announced it was not interested in continuing the discussion of the kyoto protocol. instead, bush announced a new policy on climate change in 2002 that was based on voluntary domestic measures, not on the international protocol (fletcher, 9-10). it is ironic that that united states government continues to refuse to implement the kyoto protocol, yet maintains that the international community “must work collaboratively to slow, stop, and reverse greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions in a way that promotes sustainable economic growth” (us department of state, 2010). 6. sustainable practices in the usa and cuba despite the apparent recalcitrance of the u.s. in regards to environmentally oriented international treaties, there are several initiatives that are worth mentioning. these initiatives relate to biofuel and biomass energy. in an attempt to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases emitted and encourage alternative fuel development, the consilience rand: necessity of democracy     187   u.s. implemented the energy independence and security act (2007). this act, in an endeavour to push the use of biofuel forward and reduce the consumption of and reliance on fossil fuels, requires the use of 36 billion gallons of cellulosic biofuels by the year 2022. in addition, the u.s. department of energy promised to invest $1.2 billion into the construction of six “commercial scale biorefineries” (gutterson and zhang, 2009, 442-445). another initiative that has been pursued is the construction of biomass energy plants. the impetus for this action relates to the energy independence and security act as well as the energy policy act (2005), which encourages energy conservation and efficiency by promoting residential efficiency, increasing the efficiency of appliances and commercial products, reducing federal government energy usage, modernizing domestic energy infrastructure, diversifying the nation's energy supply with renewable sources and supporting a new generation of energy efficient vehicles (united states government, 2007). there are currently 170 biomass power-plants in over 17 states. these plants collectively create clean energy from a renewable resource and “reduce carbon emissions by 15.2 million tons each year” (renewable fuels association, growing innovationamerica�s energy future starts at home, 2009). of all the energy consumed (electricity and fuel) in the u.s. during 2008, 7% of it came from renewable resources. the renewable energy came from the following sources: solar (1%), hydroelectric (34%), geothermal (5%), biomass (53%) and wind (7%) (energy information administration [eia], 2009). although the renewable energy is a small percentage of the total energy that is consumed, it is obvious that the u.s. is making strides towards a more sustainable way of living. the diversity of the renewable energy resources also shows that many green technologies and sources of energy are being pursued simultaneously to try keep pace with the national legislation that has already been passed. as in the united states, cuba has been attempting to reduce greenhouse gases, preserve its environment, and increase its self sufficiency by developing sources of green energy. the impetus for these changes was twofold. first, in the early 1990�s with the collapse of the soviet union, cuba was no longer able to purchase subsidized oil from the former soviet union. secondly, cuba has committed to itself to interventions that promote sustainable development. it appears that cuba has done more to promote sustainable practices and interventions than the u.s. in 2004, cuba was operating 85 biogas plants, which on a per capita basis is almost 4 times as many as the united states (chemi and hill, 2009, 650). this trend is only growing as it was reported in 2009 and that cuba had built 700 biomass plants to protect the environment and reduce the consumption of nonrenewable fuel sources (cuba verdad, 2009). in addition to developing biomass power plants, cuba has tried to reduce its demand for energy. cuba powers 65% of its sugar mills with “bagasse, a byproduct of sugar production,” and uses the waste fiber for paper products (brodine, 1992). in addition, cuba has promoted the use of bicycles with havana now boasting over 800,000 bicycles. using today�s population, that amounts to more than 1 bicycle for every three people. ultimately the efforts of the cuban government have been rewarded. in 2009, cuba�s yearly per capita consumption of petroleum was one 1.0 liters, while the u.s. consumed approximately 3.75 liters of petroleum for every citizen (eia, 2010). 188 consilience    188   moreover, cuba has equipped approximately 1900 schools and 280 medical facilities with photovoltaic panels and micro hydro plants. in 2004, cuba boasted, “157 hydroelectric plants, 6687 windmills, 8597 solar panels, 1548 solar heaters, and 112 bio-digesters” (chemi & hill, 2009, 650). these initiatives, largely executed in rural, isolated areas away from the main power grid, facilitate sustainable local development by protecting the environment whilst simultaneously providing power for lighting and refrigeration (chemi & hill, 2009, 652-653). this is just a brief glimpse of the strides that are being made in the environmental facet of sustainable development. since the 1970�s, the u.s. environment has “improved dramatically,” especially in the area of air and water quality. likewise, cuba has shown remarkable progress in reducing pollution and promoting sustainable development (houck, 2009, 5). despite these improvements, overall u.s. consumption patterns remain unsustainable. after comparing the usa�s ecological footprint to its total biocapacity, we find that on a per person basis, there is an ecological deficit of 4.6 global hectares (gha) (global footprint network [gfn], 2009). this means that on average, it takes 4.6 more gha of land than the ecosystem can afford to support the lifestyle of each person in the u.s. when one compares cuba�s ecological foot print to its biocapacity, cuba functions at a 1.3 deficit (gfn, 2009). on average, it takes 1.3 more gha of land than the ecosystem can afford to support the lifestyle of each person in cuba. in essence, both countries are operating at a deficit; however, cuba�s deficit is considerably lower than the america�s, indicating that cuba is closer to the goal of living sustainably. according to the world wildlife federations 2006 living planet report, cuba was the only country to meet both criteria for sustainable development. the two criteria measured human development index value and global hectares per person consumption. four years later, the 2010 report indicates that cuba has moved slightly over the sustainable limit of gha per person; thus, the country is just shy of maintaining sustainable development (world wildlife federation, 2006, 19). critics may argue that quality of life is compromised when sustainable development is pursued. if this is true, one would expect the cuban quality of life indicators to be lower as cuba appears to be more involved with international environmental legislation and sustainable development interventions. to investigate this notion, basic education, demographic and economic indicators will be examined. these indicators are commonly used to determine how developed a country is. in the u.s., primary school enrolment is 92% with gender parity, while in cuba it is 97%. this suggests that education is very important to both countries. the american fertility rate in 2007 was 2.1, while population growth has remained at 1% from 1970-2007. in cuba, the total fertility rate is 1.5, while the annual population growth rate declined from 1% (1970-1990) to 0.4% (1990-2007). lower fertility rates are frequently associated with higher education, which also translates to lower child and maternal mortality (unicef, 2009). both enrollment rates and fertility rates suggest that cuba and the u.s. are on the same level of development. the american gdp per capita annual growth rate is 2% (1990-2007), while gross national income per capita is $46,040 usd. in cuba, the gdp per capita annual growth rate is 3.6% (1990-2007). cuban income is much lower; however, there are no visible negative implications in regards to the basic necessities of healthcare, shelter, food and education. for example, life expectancy of both the average american and the average cuban is 78. in terms of the central government consilience rand: necessity of democracy     189   expenditure, the u.s. spends 25 % of its budget on healthcare and 3% on education. in cuba�s central government, 23% of the budget is allocated to healthcare, while 10% of its budget is designated for education (unicef, 2009). both governments also appear to value healthcare similarly, but the cuban government emphasizes education little more than their american counterpart. these statistics indicate that the quality of life is not affected adversely by the pursuit of sustainable development. as previously mentioned, even though average cuban�s income is lower, cuba�s greater visible commitment to sustainable development has not compromised the quality of life for its citizens. 7. discussion this evidence alone should be enough to indicate that democracy is not the exclusive ideology or form of government for sustainable development to thrive. cuba�s constitution specifically addresses environmental protection and sustainability, while the u.s. constitution largely deals with the mechanics of governing a country. in the examination of the democratic and socialist governance structures, it was revealed that both countries have mechanisms for public participation, at least at the theoretical level. in other words, when promoting sustainable development, the existing mechanisms for individual expression and participation should be used. more specifically, countries and international organizations such as the un should be flexible and work with existing forms of government to promote sustainable development rather than insisting that only a democratic government can achieve sustainable development. the case studies above show that it is possible to promote sustainable development through differing governing systems and political ideologies. in evaluating the environmental aspects of sustainable development, it appears that environmental protection and green technologies are being developed in both countries. cuba and the u.s. want to reduce their dependency and increase their self-sufficiency, which simultaneously increases sustainable living and sovereignty. cuba�s smaller ecological footprint seems to further contradict the notion that democracy is necessary for sustainable development. critics may counter that much more of cuba�s population is engaged in subsistence farming and has a significantly lower income. while this is true, indicators within the social context seem to indicate that income is not necessarily positively correlated to quality of life indicators such as education, life expectancy and health. both cuba and the u.s. have made notable steps in pursuing sustainable development, but cuba has made more of a symbolic commitment internationally by signing, ratifying and implementing the biological diversity convention and the kyoto protocol. basic quality of life, according to unicef, is very similar between the u.s. and cuba except for the significant income difference. moreover, according to the respective countries� constitutions, both have a system of participatory government where the individual�s voice can be heard. given this evidence, it is clear that multiparty democracy is not necessary for sustainable development. since there is no global authority on sustainable development, a solution to the promotion of sustainable development must involve values and concrete incentives in a two-pronged approach. at the theoretical level, the values of 190 consilience    190   respecting human rights and of stewarding resources in a responsible manner must be promoted. these values must be embedded in the dignity of humankind and divorced from one political ideology. to maximize success, sustainable development must not promote one political system or country over another. rather, if the rights of humankind are integrated with the basic values of sustainable development and presented in a more neutral manner, states will be more willing to promote them. in practice, this means toning down the overt ideological proponents in international discussions. for example, in documents such as agenda 21, this would mean emphasizing the same human rights but not presupposing that democracy or “progress towards democratic government” (undesa) is the only way to fulfill the listed policy directives and objectives. if sustainable development is presented as a concept that is intrinsically linked with the dignity of mankind and not democracy, it will be more widely accepted in authoritarian, democratic, and „in-between� states. similarly, if leaders at all levels would emphasize the same human rights but not presuppose that democratic government or progress towards democratic government is the only way to pursue sustainable development, we can begin to move towards broader acceptance and greater promotion of sustainable development. it may be a lot to ask of leaders, but it is a step that must be taken if we are to truly pursue sustainable development at a global level. consilience rand: necessity of democracy     191   bibliography   almananc of policy issues. environment. <http://www.policyalmanac.org/environment/ index.shtml> (20.11.2009). america.gov, “checks and balances” <http://www.america.gov/st/usg english/2008/ 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(26.11.2010). united states of america environmental protection agency, sustainability (2009) <http://epa.gov/sustainability/> (20.11. 2009). united states of america, infousa, us department of state. principles of democracy washington d.c. 2005 <http://www.usinfo.org/enus/government/overview/ what.html> (24.11.2009). vogel, joseph henry. “white paper,” biopolicy journal, 2, no.5 (1997): 1-12. world energy council, “deciding the future: energy policy scenarios to 2050” (2007): 9. <http://www.worldenergy.org/documents/scenarios_study_online_1.pdf> (1.12.2010). microsoft word ho final.doc consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 63–76 unsustainable development in the mekong: the price of hydropower ezra ho national university of singapore email: ezra_ho@live.com 1. introduction what is sustainable development? since its inception at the 1992 earth summit, “sustainable development” has been woven into the language of development and global change. recognising that past development paradigms have been fixated on economic growth, marginalising social and environmental dimensions of progress, the concept of “sustainable development” has attempted to reconcile all three developmental dimensions (moldan et al, 2012). broadly understood, “sustainable development” not only integrates these societal goals, but also ensures that the health of human and natural systems are not compromised for the benefit of future generations. however, this concept has remained the holy grail for development, implementation falling short of theoretical ideals (unep, 2012). furthermore, its broad and open nature has resulted in many interpretations, each fiercely contested on multiple scales (zaccai, 2012). in the following sections, i illustrate some challenges for sustainable development through examining hydropower development in the mekong basin. using the successor framework to the millennium development goals (mdgs) – the sustainable development goals (sdgs), i highlight the unsustainable trajectory of hydropower development in the mekong river basin and lay down several policy imperatives for sustainability. over the past two decades, the world has witnessed tremendous progress in human development. under the mdg framework, countries have made significant improvements in poverty alleviation, gender equality, education and healthcare provision. however, there is still much room for improvement for people and planet. in the 21st century, many now speak of the anthropocene, where human activities are now rivalling the forces of nature, shaping the landscape and processes of the planet (steffen et al, 2007). widespread and destructive, this human footprint is threatening the stability of the natural and societal fabric sustaining human wellbeing (mea, 2005; rockström et al, 2009). responding to this challenge, griggs et al (2013) have proposed a successor framework to the mdg to represent the challenges of sustainable development, better manage trade-offs and maximise the synergies between developmental goals. 6 goals encapsulate the drive for human progress; thriving livelihoods, sustainable food security, sustainable water security, universal clean energy, healthy and productive ecosystems, and governance for sustainability. as will be argued, hydropower development in the mekong has 64 consilience prioritised energy security at the expense of the other dimensions of sustainable development. 2. overview the mekong river basin the mekong river is one of the world's largest and diverse river systems. beginning its life in the tibetan plateau from snowmelt and driven by the seasonal monsoons, it snakes 5,000km through china, myanmar, laos, thailand, cambodia and vietnam before meeting the south china sea (adamson et al, 2009). during its journey to the ocean, it breathes life into both human and other-than-human communities. indeed, the mekong basin is home to one of the planet's biodiversity hotspots, regions containing endemic and threatened species (myers, 2003). biological diversity is also accompanied by cultural diversity, with over 70 ethnic groups living along its course (middleton, 2011). from this assemblage, coupled human-natural systems emerge from the various complex interactions between ecosystem health, biodiversity, livelihoods and cultural-spiritual practices (liu et al, 2007). such systems, featuring non-linear thresholds, are poorly understood. as a result, irreversible tipping points are often crossed unknowingly, with adverse effects on all communities. such is the case with the mekong's flood pulse, the annual variation that introduces spatial and temporal complexity to the river basin, around which biological, agricultural, economic and cultural-spiritual systems revolve around. in disrupting material and energy flows along the mekong, hydropower dams, compromise the health and functioning of these coupled human-natural systems (grumbine et al, 2012). because of the transboundary nature of the mekong, there are many obstacles to sustainable river governance, notably competing national interests (campbell, 2009; dore et al, 2012). recognition of the need for cooperation and collaboration among the mekong countries began in the late 1950s to ostensibly manage and develop mekong water resources for hydropower and agriculture (sneddon and fox, 2006). under the auspices of the united nations development program (undp), the mekong committee was formed to provide the necessary hydrological data for development purposes. of course, it was also in the american interest to counter communist influence within the indochina region (sneddon and fox, 2006). however, cold war geopolitics and proxy conflicts destroyed all prospects for cooperation. with the end of the cold war and the cessation of the cambodian civil war in the early 1990s, mekong cooperation revived. in the wake of conflict, the mekong committee renewed impetus towards regional development with the 1995 mekong agreement, which created the mekong river commission (mrc) to coordinate transboundary development of the mekong's water resources. moreover, the asian development bank (adb) also spearheaded the greater mekong subregion (gms) programme in 1992 to promote economic development and technical cooperation within the region. engagement with regional neighbours has also resulted in several initiatives to further cooperation within the mekong, such as the mekong basin development cooperation (1996), the development triangle initiative (2000) and consilience ho: unsustainable development in the mekong the lancang-upper mekong river commercial navigation agreement (2001) (chang, 2013). notwithstanding, as will be demonstrated, mekong governance is still fragmented, driven by national interests, and detrimental to local communities and ecosystems. 3. energy security and development in the mekong regardless of criticism, expansion of hydropower on the mekong is admittedly a developmental imperative. for most of the people in the mekong countries, secure and clean energy supplies remain elusive. most households still depend on traditional sources of fuels, such as wood or charcoal (adb, 2008), which causes health and safety problems for users. almost a fifth of the people in the mekong live in poverty and lack basic water and sanitation infrastructure, a need that could be easier met with reliable energy supplies (grumbine et al, 2012). moreover, in the years to come, the electricity consumption in these countries is expected to grow. already, in the period 1990-2006, electricity consumption has tripled, slightly outpacing production (adb, 2008). by 2025, the urban population in mekong countries is expected to grow by 33 million, increasing energy demands. complicating matters is the fact that developmental stages, energy resources and electrification rates are highly uneven between the mekong countries. for instance, while thailand and vietnam possesses developed grid systems for cross-border power exchanges, cambodia, laos and myanmar have lower quality grid infrastructure (zhai, 2010). likewise, electrification rates vary from 95% in the relatively developed regions of yunnan, china and thailand, down to 18% in cambodia (adb, 2008). to meet this energy and human development challenge, it becomes necessary to tap the massive hydropower potential of the mekong river, of which only a small proportion has been exploited. laos, for example, is planning 60 potential hydropower projects and is expected to increase hydropower production from 1,000 mw to 30,000 mw by 2029. thailand, for which industry accounts for half of gdp, and which is expected to grow, is also promoting hydropower development in neighbouring cambodia, to access cheap and abundant electricity supplies (chang, 2013). to this end, various institutional arrangements have been initiated to promote cooperation in hydropower development, most notably a regional power market between the mekong countries (zhai, 2010). not only would hydropower development drive economic growth, but multilateral cooperation would result in lower investment, operation and energy costs (yu, 2003; watcharejyothin and shrestha, 2009; adb, 2013). indeed, a regional, interconnected grid is projected to produce savings of up to $145 billion and reduce carbon emissions by 11% (zhai, 2010). however, as much as developing hydropower on the mekong enhances the energy security of the mekong peoples, the trade-offs incurred in the health of other human and natural systems make it an unsustainable enterprise. 66 consilience 4. ecological impacts because hydropower dams modifies and obstructs material and energy flows along a river's course, the health of ecological systems which depend on such flows is compromised. this is especially pertinent to a large river system like the mekong, which is driven by spatial and temporal variations in flow regimes. on a fundamental level, hydrological flows on the river are altered by impounded reservoirs and regulating water flow (he et al, 2006). while the flow regime of the mekong is so large as to be unaffected by dam operations, continual hydropower development has caught up, and now flow rates are visibly affected. although such flow regulation can be positive, functioning as flood control, increasing irrigation, enhancing river navigation and combating saltwater intrusion on agricultural lands, disruption of the river flow has adverse effects on ecological systems (he et al, 2006). migrating fish are not able to reach their breeding or feeding grounds, enriching sediment is trapped behind reservoirs and soil erosion occurs downstream where flow rates are increased. furthermore, because of the altered flow rates, habitats are also modified. water levels in the tonle sap lake in cambodia are expected to rise during the dry season and fall during the wet season due to dam operations (arias et al, 2012). consequently, the extent of flooded area is expected to change by 1,000 square kilometres, with implications for sediment deposition, nutrient cycling and habitat provision. dam construction can have ecological impacts by introducing industrial chemicals and heavy metals, whose impacts are poorly understood, into the ecosystem. investigations around the manwan, dachaosheng and nuozhadu dams in the upper mekong basin have revealed significantly higher levels of arsenic, cadmium, chromium, copper, nickel and lead in reservoirs and downstream areas (chen et al, 2011). introduced into the ecosystem, such toxic substances enter the environment, accumulate in marine organisms, eventually posing health risks to organisms and communities higher up the food chain. in addition, riparian communities are destroyed when water levels rise, flooding vegetation that provide food and habitat to riparian fauna (li et al, 2012). moreover, the resulting soil erosion increases the risks of landslides. further up the trophic level, phytoplankton populations and distribution are also affected when dams block the flow of rivers, creating artificial reservoirs, causing changes in water temperature, ph, suspended solids or flow velocity (li et al, 2013a). because the river is fragmented, distinct conditions develop in habitat fragments which result in changes in phytoplankton composition and abundance. consequently, eutrophication can result, with economic and ecological impacts on the surrounding human and natural communities. likewise, fish communities are also affected by altered habitats (li et al, 2013b). loss of habitat and shifting hydrological conditions interfere with migratory patterns and changing the distribution and reducing abundance of fish species. ultimately, such disrupted trophic, hydrological and geomorphic processes may expose the ecosystem to risks of bioinvasions from exotic or invasive species (walder, 2008). as much as invasive species may not necessary result in negative impacts, contributing to ecosystem diversity and consilience ho: unsustainable development in the mekong functionality, ecosystem interactions are hard to predict and any human modifications should be approached with precaution (schlaepfer et al, 2011). although recent studies have made it clear that dam development come with a high ecological price, the hydropower impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity are still poorly understood and understudied (he et al, 2006; orra et al, 2012). moreover, current environmental assessments often do not meet international standards. the environmental impact assessment (eia) conducted for the xayaburi dam in cambodia was extremely limited (baran et al, 2011). not only did it exclude livelihood concerns, but biodiversity and ecosystem assessments were not comprehensive enough. proposed fish passage mechanisms did not consider the unique characteristics of the fish species of the mekong. without contextualised ecological knowledge to guide hydropower development, ecosystem health will be compromised, driving unsustainable development. hence, it is imperative that the knowledge gap be bridged, technical expertise and policy frameworks developed to ensure that hydropower development occurs in an ecologically-sensitive manner. 5. coupled human-natural impacts in addition, because of the close linkages and dependence between human and natural systems in the mekong basin, ecological impacts result in cascading implications for human communities. accordingly, the hydrological, ecological and geomorphic changes on the mekong have resulted in adverse impacts on the livelihoods and food security of human communities in the mekong basin (sneddon and fox, 2006; middleton, 2011). as the world's largest in-land fishery, the mekong river sustains the livelihoods of 40 million people, who depend on fishing for their livelihood and subsistence. in fact, the mekong river provides an estimated annual catch of 240,000-400,000 metric tons of fish worth at least usd$1.2 billion (sneddon and fox, 2006). more importantly, mekong fisheries provide an irreplaceable source of protein for the communities in the region, constituting between 47-80% of dietary requirements (dugan et al, 2010). as such, reductions in fish populations would have serious repercussions on the nutritional state of mekong communities. unfortunately, as a result of the aforementioned hydrological and ecological impacts from dam development, fish productions have already witnessed a decline of 10-26% over the last few years, threatening the livelihoods and well-being of mekong communities (orra et al, 2012). along the thai-lao border, fishing catches have declined 50% in the period of 2001-2003 (middleton, 2011). hydropower development has also contributed to the erosion of mekong culture and traditions as the collective spiritual beliefs, value systems, traditions and modes of life are compromised (matthews, 2012). for the people of the mekong, the physical landscape where they live and which sustains them is also a landscape where their cultural heritage and identities are embedded in (tengberg, 2012). hence, when the local ecology of a mekong community is altered, disturbed or destroyed because of hydropower development, all ties – physical, economic, cultural and spiritual – are severed (matthews, 2012). inundation of land where entire villages are resettled cause the literal uprooting of a community from the local ecology, around which their 68 consilience cultural beliefs, practices and ways of life have evolved. material cultures such as livelihood practices (fishing nets, practices, traps) and traditional ecological knowledge are rendered obsolete. for instance, because of the decline in fishing catches due to dam operations, indigenous fishing methods have vanished as fishing families turn to alternative means of livelihoods such as tourism. for instance, fishing using cormorant birds is an indigenous fishing method found in guilin village of the yunnan province in china. however, as fishing is unable to sustain families, fishing communities have turned to providing tour services (noll et al, 2010). 6. unsustainable governance underlying the social and environmental distortions around hydropower development in the mekong is flawed governance paradigms. governance for sustainability has to be transformational, inclusive and adaptive (griggs et al, 2013). for one, in order to be transformative, governance processes has to be comprehensively multi-scaled to address and correct structural flaws. however, the main governing mechanism in mekong hydropolitics has been the mekong river commission established in 1992 to prevent water shortages by governing flow regimes. thus, the ecological and human complexity of the mekong is reduced to a one-dimensional measure of hydrological regimes (sneddon and fox, 2006; middleton, 2011). naturally, social and environmental concerns outside hydrological flows will be neglected. eias were often poorly conducted. in the eia for the yali falls dam in vietnam, the project boundary was a mere 6km. moreover, neighbouring cambodian authorities were not notified (dore et al, 2012). in addition, a major impediment towards cooperative mekong governance is the overriding concern of national interests and sovereignty among the mekong countries (campbell, 2009). for instance, china is not a member of the mrc, not sharing hydrological data with other countries, limiting ecological understanding of changes in the mekong ecosystem. because the mrc is based on principles of consensus, non-binding decisionmaking and non-interference in intra-state affairs, it is ham-stringed by limited political commitment from the mekong countries. for example, words such as “rules” have been contested by thailand, because it infringes on thai sovereignty to govern resources within its national boundaries (campbell, 2009). notification and collaborative mechanisms are poorly developed. vietnamese efforts to construct levee banks to promote irrigated rice resulted in severe flooding in cambodia, causing tensions to flare between both parties. thus, the mrc is unable to craft a coherent vision for mekong development. consequently, without a collective front, it is not possible to effectively govern the transboundary nature of the mekong river. furthermore, agenda-setting and decision-making in matters concerning hydropower development have been made exclusive to state and private entities such as government agencies, banks and corporations (yong and grundy-warr, 2012). such an arrangement maintains existing power relations, limits local participation in discussion and marginalises local concerns over social and environmental abuses consilience ho: unsustainable development in the mekong (sneddon and fox, 2007). although the mrc has established dialogue with large international ngos, it has limited engagement with small local ngos and local communities (campbell, 2009). consequently, such exclusionary processes promotes a developmental bias to emerge within the discourse surrounding hydropower development, further marginalising alternative development perspectives (sneddon and fox, 2006). for instance, an uneven influence over policy discourse has apportioned blame for declining fishing stocks to poor fishers, overlooking the salient role of commercial fishing activities (friend and arthur, 2012). the end result is that mekong development has been appropriated by neoliberal forces that have succeeded in framing the river system for certain privileged groups of actors, at the expense of local communities. without an inclusive governance process, certain perspectives are empowered while others are marginalised and silenced, resulting in inadequate knowledge for governing complex coupled human-natural systems. 7. policy imperatives towards sustainability fundamentally, the aforementioned socio-ecological compromises can be attributed to under-scaled governance institutions and processes. participatory governance of the mekong has been poorly implemented, contributing to marginalisation of certain groups of people (sneddon and fox, 2007). therefore, mekong governance needs to evolve towards greater polycentricity, involving a comprehensive range of stakeholders. such polycentric governance would not only promote more robust river management by promoting diversity in problem-solving, but also contribute to a greater sense of accountability and legitimacy (sovacool, 2011). additionally, because local stakeholders are consulted and integrated into planning and decision-making, governance can be responsive to local needs and contexts. thus, mekong governance is resilient to dynamic shifts in the environment, being able to respond and adapt through local ecological knowledge. admittedly, such an approach will run up against many challenges, such as unequal power relations within and between communities, social classes, ethnic groups, between gender and across ages (sneddon and fox, 2007). moreover, such polycentric governance may encounter difficulties transforming the official discourse around development, which views ngos and local communities with distrust and suspicion. simultaneously, polycentric governance is not without drawbacks. engaging a wide range of stakeholders may result in fragmented networks, which may be difficult to coordinate. moreover, diversity of stakeholders can also lead to contestations over legitimacy and accountability if not conducted in an equitable and transparent fashion (sovacool, 2011). nonetheless, polycentric governance, if pursued, would also help to bridge the knowledge gap and build up capacity within mekong governance institutions. because of limited participation from all stakeholders, ecological knowledge about mekong processes is lacking. besides having little resources to develop a knowledge base about mekong ecology, there is also an under-developed research culture in universities within mekong countries, which has contributed to poor engagement 70 consilience with the mrc. moreover, data-sharing mechanisms are poorly developed, data not forthcoming from countries. (campbell, 2009). thus, with greater inclusivity in consultation and integration from polycentric governance, knowledge gaps can be bridged, building the knowledge foundation and forming the networks to build up river governance capacity. in addition to improving consultation processes, trade-offs have to be better managed. compensation processes also need to be multi-scaled. social and environmental impacts may take place across multiple scales. for example, compensation may improve material wealth at the cost of embodied (livelihood skills) or relationship (social capital) wealths (wang et al, 2013). while villages near the xiaowan dam enjoyed better access to education and healthcare due to developed road infrastructure, other communities suffered because they lacked roads. although government programmes helped diversify incomes in villages, benefits were often unevenly distributed (wang et al, 2013). the winners and losers of development policies have to be identified, treated and compensated fairly to avoid disenfranchising communities. thus, compensation policies need to expand their system boundaries to ensure a comprehensive and equitable settlement for displaced and affected communities. 8. concluding thoughts from the first applications of hydraulic manipulation in mesopotamia to modern dams, hydropower has acted as a significant instrument of change, improving lives by harnessing the kinetic energies of water (sternberg, 2010). and so, similarly for the developing countries of the mekong basin, this energy is necessary to drive economic growth. however, in the bid to secure a supply of clean and cheap electricity, social and environmental dimensions to mekong development have been neglected and compromised. consequently, hydropower expansion on the mekong is promoting unsustainable development where the health and interests of ecosystems and human communities are compromised. to ensure a sustainable environment, where human and natural systems can flourish over succeeding generations, governance has to be polycentric and equitable. with a transparency and legitimate decision-making process, coupled with equitable compensation policies, it will be possible to develop the water resources of the mekong in a sustainable way. in the final analysis, the six pillars of the sdgs are not of equal importance. as important are energy security and livelihoods, without the ecological substrate that sustains human activities, no development can take place. ultimately, we need to recognise that: “[for] sustainable to mean anything, we must embrace and then defend the bare truth: the planet is primary. the life-producing work of a million species is literally the earth, air, and water that we depend on. no human activitynot the vacuous, not the sublimeis worth more than that matrix. neither, in the end, is any human life. if we use the word “sustainable” and don't mean that, then we are liars of the worst sort: the kind who let atrocities happen while we consilience ho: unsustainable development in the mekong stand by and do nothing.” (mcbay et al, 2011) 72 consilience bibliography adamson, p.t., rutherfurd, i.d., peel, m.c. and conlan, i.a. 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(2010). energy sector integration for low carbon development in greater mekong sub-region: towards a model of south-south cooperation. world energy council. retrieved from http://89.206.150.89/documents/congresspapers/52.pdf backgroundbackground on april 21, 1960, brazil moved its capital from rio de janeiro to brasília. rio de janeiro had been the capital of brazil since 1572 and served as the capital of portugal from 1808 to 1821. in 1891, brazil’s first republican constitution was drafted and contained a clause stating that the capital should be moved away from southeastern brazil to the center of the country. the new capital would be more isolated from foreign influence and would economically stimulate the interior of the country, reducing the regional dominance of the old capital rio de janeiro and other southeastern cities such as são paulo, niterói, porto alegre, and curitiba. president juscelino kubitschek de oliveira took on the task to build brasília, which was completed in 41 months under his “fifty years of prosperity in five” plan to modernize the country (hochman 2009). brasília was to be a symbol of change representing brazil’s movement into a new era having transcended problems including classism, racism, poverty, inequitable housing, and corruption. from the surface, the story of brasília looks to be a success: during its short lifespan it has grown to become brazil’s third largest city, it has the highest human development index (hdi) in brazil ([0.911] pelinski et al. 2014), and it has become the wealthiest city in brazil based on gdp per capita ([$35,689 usd] igbe 2014). however, the building of brasília did not achieve president kubitsheck’s goals of egalitarianism and instead worsened issues plaguing other brazilian cities. the construction of the city relied on an extreme urban bias where a disproportionate amount of federal revenues went to the building and provision of services to the new city at the expense of the other brazilian cities, most notably the old capital, rio de janeiro. though brasília was supposed to be a capital of hope, its costly construction amplified many of brazil’s existing problems and led to the collapse of democracy. it took brazil decades to recover from a military dictatorship and reestablish democratic government. in the post-world war ii era from 1945-1964, the brazilian government underwent a growth strategy known as import substitution industrialization (isi). initially, the results were astonishing: brazil’s gdp averaged 7% annual growth rate, industry grew at 9%, and agriculture grew at 4.5% (peet, hartwick 2015. p.78). with these astounding rates of growth, president kubitschek believed it was view journal | view issue the city sprouted: the rise of brasíliathe city sprouted: the rise of brasília jared kelly department of geography, university of california, berkeley, ca 94720, united states email: jared.kelly@berkeley.edu keywords:keywords: brasilia, urban, networks, sustainability, brasil abstract:abstract: in 1891, brazil’s constitution decreed that at some point in the future the capital would be moved from rio de janeiro to a new location towards the interior of the country. in the 1960s, the capital was moved to brasília. while one of the wealthiest cities in brazil today, there were significant costs to building brasília. this article aims to survey the development of the new capital and the negative externalities which emerged following its development. 73 doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6738 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 73-85 author’s note:author’s note: in 2006, the new capital of naypyitaw replaced the old administrative capital of yangon in myanmar. naypyitaw was unique because there was a deficit of inhabitants; the city was largely vacant. as a result, i became interested in the history of purpose-built national capitals. i was particularly interested in brazil’s capitol as i had been performing research on urban changes in rio de janeiro, the site of brazil’s former capitol. there is a storied history behind developing purpose-built capitals; the first record being the city of akhetaten in ancient egypt established by pharaoh akhenaten in 1346 bc but later abandoned in 1332 bc. the most recent purpose developed national capital was completed in 2006 when palau moved its capital from koror city to ngerulmud. the trend of purpose-built national capitals continues with south korea, south sudan, equatorial guinea, egypt, and indonesia currently in the process of building new capitals. july 6, 2020 http://consiliencejournal.org https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/consilience/issue/view/651 consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6738 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 73-8574 feasible to build brasília in the brazilian highlands of luíz crul’s 1892 survey. this approach was shortsighted, as brazilian growth relied on large amounts of foreign capital, resulting in foreign debt and rampant inflation. between 1962 and 1967, the annual rate of gdp growth dropped to 4%, and industry dropped to 3.9% (shei ue 1997). brazil’s isi policies caused manufacturing labor shortages which resulted in a major rural exodus of an estimated 7 million people -21% of the rural population -who eventually moved into cities and towns in the early 1950s (martine & mcgranahan 2013). this rural exodus continued into the 1960s, and those unable to find traditional housing settled on the outskirts of the city in informal settlements known as favelas. brasília’s proponents believed they could solve the housing crisis by developing a new city that was designed with egalitarian principles in mind. this was to be achieved with a zoning plan, that prompted residents of all classes to live together in integrated neighborhoods (kroll 2008). the new city was to be geographically neutral and its construction was intended to stimulate the economies of brazil’s interior states. at the time, it made sense for brazil’s politicians to fulfill the constitutional promise of 1891; however, major inefficiencies began to emerge with brazil’s isi development strategy, including the lack of diverse exports and skyrocketing interest and amortization payments. shortly after the founding of brasília, the country felt the effects from the government’s use of deficit spending to finance construction of the new capital. brazil lost its economic dynamism and, in 1963, inflation increased to 80% per annum (shei ue 1997). brasília was completed, but at significant cost to the democratization process; playing a contributing role in brazil’s 1960s military overthrow. the rural divide and the construction of the rural divide and the construction of brasíliabrasília the building of brasília was expensive and relied on deficit spending to finance the construction of the city. according to eugênio gudin, the minister of finance under president café filho, a conservative estimate for the cost to build brasília was $1.5 billion usd in 1954 dollars (coutinho 2012). president kubitschek constantly defended the high expense of construction, stating that the cost to build the city was only a couple dollars to the average brazilian: “the sacrifice of only two cruzeiros in five years, for every brazilian.” (vaitsman 1968). the cost to build brasília was not frugal by any measure; it significantly exceeded both gudin and kubitschek’s estimates. today, nearly 60 years after the construction of brasília’s public archive, officials are unsure about the total cost of building the city, claiming they are unknown and impossible to calculate (da costa 2010). it is estimated that the real dollars spent on brasília’s construction have never been equaled by another major development, including the songdo international business district in incheon, south korea, which is often considered one of the world’s most expensive development projects ever, exceeding $40 billion usd (garfield 2018). one avenue of finance pursued by the federal government was diverting tax revenue from rural areas to finance the growth of brazil’s cities, including brasília (green 2012). in rural areas, a large portion of tax revenues was not reinvested, but instead was directed to finance the development of urban centres. this is a trend abundant in latin america and other ldcs. the trend is very extreme in brasília and the brazilian northeast, which is pervaded by inequitable extraction from and under allocation to rural activity (lipton 1984, p.142-143). this strategy was successful in helping develop brasília, as the federal district progressed decades ahead of its surrounding neighbors in terms of services and quality of life. this inequity was intentional on behalf of the brazilian government, which maintained a dual policy of central city development and rural resettlement (hud 1977). lack of tax reinvestment in rural areas served as an incentive for rural migrants to seek out employment in large cities to improve their livelihoods (bradshaw 1987). however, this has not been without its consequences. rural areas in brazil, and especially those surrounding brasília, lacked basic services such as running water, sewage, and electricity. these areas had consistently lower human development outcomes including lower rates of literacy, education, food security, access to healthcare, and sustained poorer health outcomes than those residing in the urban core (armitage et al. 2013). brazil adopted a development strategy called isi, a policy aimed at decreasing the reliance on foreign imports by increasing domestic production and the development of native industrialized products. brazil maintained this strategy from the 1930s to the end of the 1980s. during this time, brazil devalued its currency in order to boost exports and discourage imports, as well as to promote the consumption of locally manufactured goods. brazil supported and financed industries that produced goods such as refrigerators, consumer appliances, cars, air conditioning, materials for ship building, and a variety of non-durable goods for domestic consumption. these industries were centered in the urban areas of brazil, and government support of these industries did little to improve the economic situation of rural inhabitants. in many ways, the rural-urban divide was exacerbated by this consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6738 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 73-8575 policy. there was an exodus from the rural periphery to the urban core due to the lack of prospects in the region (lipton 2008, p.161). the inflation that plagued brazil as a result of deficit spending under kubitschek severely impacted those who remained in rural areas as simple consumer goods became unaffordable. in the 1970s, the country was plagued by double-digit annual inflation, which turned into triple-digit annual inflation by the 1980s and would reach 50% at a monthly rate by 1994 (ito 1994). to illustrate the depth of the urban-rural divide, consider that the average cost for a twin mattress in rio de janeiro was than the per capita income in the primarily rural province of piauí in 1968 (shoumatoff 1980 p.14). isi played a fundamental role in the long-term economic development of brazil’s urban centers, making it one of the world’s largest economies. however, in the process of developing the urban core, a course of rural development was not pursued. plans to finance brasília were unsustainable because they extracted from revenues devoted to rural areas, and the monetary policy was socially unsustainable as it resulted in extreme inflation which disproportionally hurt the urban poor and rural peasants of brazil. as a result, many of these regions did not see social or economic development, and lagged far behind their urban counterparts. individuals living in rural brazil had little to no ability to engage in collective action movements to address the problems facing them. according to robert bates in his research on former west africa isi countries, countries have little incentive to negotiate with rural groups unless they either produce or procure a scarce or valuable resource. this was seen as the primary deterrent for west african farmers who saw others in similar positions fail when demanding redress for their grievances. as a result, the farmers did not collectively contest the policies of the urban marketing boards and the urban bias policies that disproportionately hurt them (bates 1981). after the completion of the capital’s construction, the situation in rural areas declined. then, from 1964 to 1988, the brazilian government was unresponsive to forms of rural protest against land tenure law, local land conflicts, social banditry, and messianic movements that emerged. the country became responsive when the movements nationalized and formed groups such as the movement of the landless (movimento dos trabalhadores rurais sem terra [mst]) (houtzager 2001). however, this story was different in brazil’s neglected urban peripheries, as local groups could mobilize to prompt national change. this is seen in the case of são paulo in the 1980s and 1990s where members of the urban periphery collectively retaliated and received infrastructure updates and services the city had previously failed to provide (caldeira 1996). prior to the 1990s, the brazilian government pursued large scale agroindustry and monocultures in rural areas. this continued the trend from the portuguese empire which focused on the production of sugarcane, coffee, and the exploitation of resources, including gold and brazilwood. much of brazil’s productive farmland was controlled by wealthy oligarchs in large estates known as latifundias. in 1964, when the military seized power, they attempted to break the oligarchic control of the region. they used subsidies and policies such as agricultural marketing boards to set price floors and ceilings on commodities (helfand & castro de rezende, 2001). in this period, the government encouraged the transition of many latifundias to develop monocultures in corn, soy, chicken, and other meats for export and domestic consumption (bateman & brochardt 2013). additionally, the new government attempted to modernize rural areas and address the inequities in rural areas. this was seen in establishing the land statute of 1964, a system of rural health provision, and social security (houtzager 2001). however, the impacts to the region were minimal as the government was limited by the debt that had been incurred and the rampant inflation. the majority of rural inhabitants remained landless peasants. the government outreach did allow for rural networks such as the mst to develop into national networks to collectively demand change in the 1990s (houtzager 2001). rural development began to be a priority much later in brazil. this occurred initially from reforms in the late 1980s and continued into the 1990s, corresponding with the introduction of a new currency – the real – and the rise of civil societies to combat inequality (ito 1994). the introduction of the real currency corresponded to major economic restructuring. nominal tariff rates for the sixteen principal industrial sectors fell from an average of 105% in the late 1980s to 13% from 1994-97. this included the agricultural sector, and the state’s agricultural policy transitioned from interventionist to a free-market approach (helfand & castro de rezende, 2001). constitutional reforms in 1988 the brazilian statutorily guaranteed that women could receive land, an action that before was difficult or even impossible. the reforms allowed for women to receive full pensions and land from the national integration program (programa de integração nacional pin). following economic liberalization reforms in the 1990s, peasants had easier access to obtain title to land and begin small farming practices. additionally, international groups such as the world bank contributed to rural development with the brazil consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6738 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 73-8576 rural poverty alleviation program. this encouraged and eventually prompted a decentralization of fiscal policy and investment from a federal level down to a state level and eventually to a local level. this has allowed for greater stakeholder participation and local self-governance in the development of brazil’s rural areas (kuehnast 2001). an additional factoring of rural development and addressing the urban-rural divide was the rise of civil society groups. groups such as the movement citizen action against hunger, poverty, and for life (ação da cidadania contra a fome, a miséria e pela vida) began drives to collect food, clothing, and shelter materials to serve low-income populations in the state (houtzager 2001). this group and others similar to the movement citizen action forced the government to take issues of food insecurity and underdevelopment in rural areas more seriously. the brazilian government took a very active role in addressing rural development when president luiz inácio lula da silva was elected in 2003. president lula was a member of a civil society group the citizenship institute (instituto cidadania). he began a plan to eliminate hunger in the country and provide social services to rural areas where it was lacking. in his presidency, he established the national council of food and nutritional security (conselho nacional de segurança alimentar e nutricional, consea), a group tasked with making local agricultural policy recommendations. additionally, the safra plan of family agriculture (plano safra da agricultura familiar) was established as a policy which provided financing, credit, investment, and farm insurance for small producers and family farms in order to increase the biodiversity of crops, strengthen small-scale farmers, and increase local demand for produce (dagnino, 2004). this commitment to rural development and empowering small-scale farmers is seen in a comparison of brazil’s two major farm ministries. in 2013, the ministry of agriculture (ministério da agricultura, pecuária e abastecimento, [mapa]) had a budget of approximately $4.42 billion usd, where approximately $100 million went to small scale producers. additionally, in 2013, the ministry of agrarian development (ministério do desenvolvimento agrário, [mda]), which was developed in 2000, received about $2.28 billion usd to support family farming/ small-scale agricultural producers. although the mda is about half the size of mapa, it demonstrates a significant commitment toward small-scale producers. additionally, the budget for the ministry has increased over 300% from 2004 to 2013, while mapa’s budget has only increased 25% in the same time period (bateman & brochart, 2013). health and education outreach has remained a part of the federal government’s rural development plans. the government has engaged in vaccination campaigns and recognized educational institutions built upon unproductive agricultural land and has provided support to these institutions through the ministry of education. the development of brasília occurred with a significant economic and social costs to rural areas. these areas faced disparities in revenue extraction and reinvestment with their urban counterparts and did not receive the same levels of development and attention until the 1990s and 2000s. despite the significant strides in addressing the urban-rural divide, there are still major shortcomings that can be addressed to create more robust and socially sustainable communities. government loans for smallholder producers are very strict, often resulting in the loss of land if smallholders fail to pay back the remaining balance, while these individuals and families often return to landless wage labor. brazil still lacks in social development, with over 32 million people still in poverty and 16 million from indigence living on less than $35 a month. much of these results from prior inequities: a lack of land, education, and healthcare due to decades of neglect by the brazilian government. the majority of these residents reside either in rural areas or in the informal settlements on the peripheries of brazil’s major cities. additionally, land rights remain an issue. according to the pastoral land commission (cpt), a church-based rural organization, land raids have remained an issue in brazil, which have been accompanied by violence and intense political conflicts. there has been a trend of land raids where over 3 million individuals – over 660,000 families – have engaged in land invasions in brazil to secure land from 1988-2004. roughly 440,000 of the families received land from the government in this period ending their status as wageless laborers, but access to land remains a significant issue in brazil in rural areas (hildago and richardson 2017). the development of brasília and the corre-the development of brasília and the corresponding decline of rio de janeirosponding decline of rio de janeiro the high cost to build brasília and the economic opportunities offered by the new city played a role in both the political and economic decline of rio de janeiro. rio was hampered by factors that prevented sustainable development. the area was geographically constrained by the atlantic ocean to the east and the serra da mantiqueira mountains to the west. this led to the highest real estate prices in brazil, which made it difficult for small business owners to obtain real estate, leading them to operate in informal markets or to forgo business entirely. additionally, rio de janerio faced extreme political competition where the local economy was manipulated to serve political goals consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6738 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 73-8577 (to increase support for a candidate or party) by matter of hiring, firing, or lowering/raising wages and/or the production of goods (montero 2001). brasília did not have the same constraints: real estate was inexpensive, it did not have parties with established clientelist political networks, and geographically there was space to expand and accommodate new migrants. as a result of these attractive factors, the development of brasília led to both a capital drain and brain drain from the former capital. rio’s economy, once dynamic, started to lose many of the private and stateowned enterprises that once held headquarters in the city. brasília took all the federal political power and associated federal industries from rio de janeiro. this occurred because the establishment of a national capital is a zero-sum game: when a new capital is built, the old capital loses the federal power and industry it once retained. this was seen in the development of washington d.c. in the united states, when the political industry, influence, and power was taken away from the former capitals of new york and philadelphia. additionally, brasília attracted industries such as banks, public agencies, finance, information technology, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, television, consulting, and legal service firms, many of whom migrated from rio de janeiro. this was catastrophic for rio de janeiro, which was losing economic influence not only to brasília but also its southern neighbor and rival são paulo. são paulo, unconstrained by geography, had the space to accommodate more industry and more immigrants. in brazil, from 1968 to 1973, the “economic miracle” occurred as a result of a greater shift towards exports and major government industrial investment. during the miracle, brazil’s gdp was growing at a rate of 10% per annum (pattnayak 1996, p. 95) and são paulo’s economy was growing at a rate of 5% per annum (the economist 1998). industry exploded in são paulo and it became the largest industrial power in latin america. the growth from the miracle was short-lived, as it was financed by borrowing. the country had accumulated more debt in 1974 than it had in the previous 150 years combined. the miracle effectively ended in 1979, as brazil had the largest debt in the world at about $92 billion usd. hyperinflation began and a recession ensued (kilborn 1983). despite the economic crash, são paulo had supplanted rio de janeiro as brazil’s commercial, financial, cultural and industrial center in the 1970s, establishing a new power dynamic in brazil’s southern frontier. rio de janeiro, once the political, economic, and cultural capital of brazil, had lost most of its economic clout to the rise of são paulo and its political influence to brasilia. this resulted in a shift in foreign investment in brazil. in 1995, after processes of economic liberalization, brazil’s fdi was $115.5 billion, and quintupled in a period of five years (aguayo-tellez et al. 2010, p. 2). much of the fdi that went to brasília and são paulo would have formerly gone to rio de janeiro. são paulo attracts more foreign investment than any other latin american city, with $1.4 billion usd in 2013 and $847.2 million usd in table 1: the decline of rio de janeiro as the economic center of brazil can be seen in developmental disparities in relation to são paulo. this is seen in health outcomes, housing laws, distribution of city services, and the revenues collected by the government all monetary values in usd source: u.n. habitat. “the challenge of slums: global report on human settlements 2003.” london: earthscan (2004). u.n. habitat “cities and climate change: global report on human settlements 2011.” london: earthscan (2011). consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6738 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 73-8578 2014 (ammachchi 2015). são paulo’s economy is fundamental to brazil as it was home to 63% of brazil’s multinational corporations in 2016 (winetrout 2016). if the city were its own country, its gdp would rank 42nd among all countries, between chile and finland (fecomerciosp 2017). a symbol of rio’s decline can be seen in the fall of the rio de janeiro stock exchange, which was surpassed by são paulo stock exchange in the 1970s. eventually, in 2002, the são paulo stock exchange bovespa purchased the rio de janeiro stock exchange. additionally, brasília was considered a more attractive locale to invest, and in 2015, it was ranked the second highest city in terms of foreign direct investment (fdi) in latin america behind são paulo and ahead of mexico city (ammachchi 2015). in brazil, rio de janeiro no longer served as a premier destination for human capital. migrants followed the wealth and chose to settle in brasília and são paulo more often than rio de janeiro. additionally, the new capital was seen as a place of hope while rio de janeiro was seen as a place of decline. unskilled migrants known as “candangos” migrated to brasília in search of a better life, as they believed they would not be confined to informal housing and they would have the opportunity to be instrumental in shaping and developing a positive future for brazil. the migration rate from the rural periphery increased as the mechanization of farming became standard and the transition to intensive commercial cash crop cultivation for export led to more pressure on small scale farmers, pushing rural laborers into cities (saint & goldsmith 1980). this allowed brasília’s federal district to develop a vast employment sector for low skill laborers including a large food processing industry and a construction industry responsible for connecting brasília with other major metropolitan centers through immense public works projects. brasília’s initial migrants were notable, as they often had higher education levels than migrants settling in other brazilian cities. of the migrants coming into brasília, 11% had university degrees and 28% had completed high school, and many came from the more developed regions of southeastern of brazil including rio de janeiro (shoumatoff 1980). this was contrary to migration patterns in most brazilian cities where immigrants primarily came from the poor regions of the north or the interior of the country with little education and settled in the southeast in search of opportunity (yap 1976, p. 233). internal migration increased from 20% in 1980 to 40% in 1999, with brasília boasting the highest rates of educated migrants (aguayo-tellez et al. 2010, p. 840). moreover, brasília attracted many skilled female workers, boasting the highest rates of formal employment for women and providing opportunities in the formal sector which were often difficult to find in other brazilian cities. (shoumatoff 1980). rio de janeiro has attempted to remedy this by creating special industrial zones on the outskirts of the city to lease the land and allow new manufacturing firms to remain competitive in brazil. however, these practices did not stop the exodus of industry from the city; between 1989 and 1997, 22% of the industrial companies moved to other areas of the country (cesar de queiroz ribeiro 2011). the exodus of corporations to brasília and the disproportionate investment into são paulo during the brazilian miracle came at the expense of rio’s development. additionally, rio de janeiro has never fully recovered from this exodus and its hopes for an economic revival have continued to decline. the city was once the tourism capital of brazil, and despite hosting the 2014 world cup and 2016 olympics, the city has seen a steady decline in tourists since the 1990s (kiernan & jelmayer 2016). in 2007, newly discovered underwater oil reserves signaled a potential revival for rio, but this is no longer the case as oil prices have fallen to near-decade lows and brazil’s state-owned oil company petrobras has been embroiled in corruption allegations and hampered by fiscal mismanagement (connors & kiernan 2017). the most insidious aspect of the building of brasília was the neglect showed to the former capital of rio de janeiro. brazil was investing large amounts of money into the building of brasília when there was a social crisis occurring in rio de janeiro. in this period, there was a significant rise in the number of favelas being constructed on the periphery of the city. rather than address the problem of informal settlements the government chose to invest public funds in the building of an ostentatious capital. the legacy of this choice still lives in the city today. the government neglect of the 1950s and 1960s led to the establishment of organized criminal networks that rio de janeiro is still struggling to contest. in the 1970s, under the carlos lacerda military regime, a favela removal policy was implemented that displaced hundreds of thousands of residents. many were relocated to housing projects such as city of god (cidade de deus). however, these new developments were plagued by the same issues faced in the old favelas, including substandard living conditions, which led to the development of new favelas (simpson 2013, p. 8-9). rio de janeiro, also known as “the marvelous city,” has become a place of fear and uncertainty for its residents. the neglect of rio’s social crisis of the 1950s and 1960s led to a political vacuum in the favelas. these favelas often lacked services including healthcare, electricity, sanitation, education, banking, and social services. criminal syndicates often moved in and filled the void consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6738 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 73-8579 by providing these services and acting as an informal subnational authority, sometimes winning the hearts and minds of the residents of the favelas in the process. in the 1980s, these criminal syndicates, known as milícias, had their power severely expanded as brazil became a transit country for narcotics trafficking. the biggest drug was cocaine, primarily from colombia’s cali cartel, which left rio de janeiro’s port en route to wealthy countries such as australia, new zealand, canada, europe, and the united states. the milícias that trafficked narcotics were rewarded financially, allowing them to exert greater control in their favelas. politically, they were able to provision more goods and services, and militarily, they secured arms, allowing them to contest both civil and military police forces. there are three primary factions made of smaller gangs in rio’s favelas today that compete for dominance: terceiro comando, amigos dos amigos, and comando vermelho, all of whom have constantly shifting alliances reminiscent to the nations of orwell’s 1984 (glenny 2015). the rise of milícias with paramilitary capabilities is a major problem for rio, as it harms the legitimacy of the brazilian government. first, the milícias who traffic guns and drugs are able to secure the hearts and minds of residents more effectively than the government, guaranteeing the longevity of the milícias. second, these groups have the ability to effectively contest police forces, furthering the perception of the milícias’ power and the belief that the police are ineffective among the general public. third, these milícias have embedded networks into both the operations of the civil and military police leading to the corruption of police forces and making them ineffective in dealing with the milícias. fourth, the milícias influence elections through violence, intimidation, and the buying of votes through political favors, casting doubt on election results (penglase 2014, p. 54). lastly, the government’s most effective police units, batalhão de operações policiais especiais (bope), which target milícias, have been accused of extreme violence and numerous human rights abuses which are often ignored or sanctioned by the government, harming the perception of the government to the populace (huguet, szabó de carvalho 2008. p. 104). the increase in violence in the city is one of the motivating factors for the exodus of capital in brazil. in 1970, brazil’s nine largest banks were all headquartered in rio de janeiro, but by the 1980s, the corporate exodus had accelerated as many professionals moved out in fear of the rising extortions, kidnappings, and killings (zaluar 2007 p. 3-5). by 1991, only five of the largest banks had remained (cesar de queiroz ribeiro 2011). the favelas have become an increasingly difficult prospect to deal with, as they now house 22% of the population despite only consisting of 3.7% of the city land area (the economist 2016). as corporate divestment continued in rio de janeiro, the jobs began to dry up, but rural migrants continued to settle in the city. the new residents with dim economic prospects were settling in informal housing settlements known as favelas. from 1980 to 1990, when brazil was experiencing hyperinflation, the populations of the favelas grew 41% despite rio’s overall growth rate holding at 8% (paddison & hutton 2014, p. 144). in the time leading up to the 2014 world cup and 2016 olympics, the government began a process of pacification, or policing, of the favelas leading to a reduction in violence. so far, 38 police pacification units have been created, which put over 9,500 officers into the favelas. however, this solution is likely not viable in the long term, as the murder rate has returned to pre-pacification numbers while police murders against civilians have increased. in 2020, there are still police pacification units in the favelas, although their presence decreased significantly in 2016 following austerity measures that forced rio’s state security department to cut its budget by 30% (associated press 2016). additionally, in many of the “pacified” favelas where security forces have vacated, there has been a return to criminal syndicate control (richmond 2019). the legacy of neglect in rio de janeiro has been exacerbated by fiscal mismanagement in the city and state government. the structures built for the 2014 world cup and 2016 summer olympiad were expensive and are no longer in use. many are starting to experience decay. according to a report by oxford university’s saïd business school, the olympic games were 51% over budget, costing $1.6 billion usd more than what was expected (flyvbjerg et al. 2016, p.19). the most notable example of a consequence of the fiscal mismanagement is the 2017 shutdown of rio’s flagship university — universidade do estado do rio de janeiro (uerj). uerj was one of brazil’s largest and most prestigious universities, having the highest ranked law and medical schools in brazil (uerj 2017), but the university was shut down for the 2017-2018 academic year due to insufficient funding (sims 2017). additionally, in 2018, the national museum of brazil burned down, which housed fossils, graeco-roman and egyptian artifacts, and “luzia,” the oldest human skeleton found in the americas. the museum had fire prevention mandates cut due to austerity measures and had a diminished response to the fire due to the government’s austerity measures ((watts, phillips, and jones 2018). despite the lack of funds, rio de janeiro governor luiz fernando pezão established a contract for a new multimillion-dollar private jet for the governorship (jornal nacional 2017). consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6738 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 73-8580 the city is experiencing significant problems, including a zika pandemic plaguing the favelas (callaway 2016, p.18) and major issues associated with water pollution. the state of rio de janeiro has significant debt resulting from large infrastructure projects such as the olympics and world cup; it owes approximately $29.5 billion usd to the brazilian government, an amount that exceeds the 200% percent threshold over net revenue allowed under brazil’s fiscal responsibility law (lrf) (fonseca 2019). there have been significant concerns that rio de janeiro will default on its debt; according to state secretary for the treasury luiz claudio rodrigues de carvalho, it is unlikely that rio de janeiro will be able to pay off its debt unless there is a structural change in the economy of the state (mann 2019). the severe debt faced by rio de janeiro makes it difficult for the government to address the problems it faces. as a result of the violence, health hazards, lack of funds, and declining opportunities, a large number of rio’s residents want to leave. according to a poll conducted by the agency rio como vamos, 56% of rio’s inhabitants wanted to leave the city in 2016, up from a figure of 27% in 2011 (the economist 2016). the governments of both brazil and the state of rio de janeiro need to make a concerted effort to promote social development in the favelas. the high rate of violence in the favelas is a primary factor in both businesses and residents wanting to leave the city. the process of pacification has not seen much success, because as soon as the police leave, criminal syndicates return. rio de janeiro needs to develop a program that targets young men between the ages 10 and 29 to prevent them from going into organized crime. additionally, the program will need to target systematic causes that allow the criminal networks to have such a wide influence in the favelas. in the 1990s, rio de janeiro had extreme homicide rates (over 100 per 100,000 citizens), so a comprehensive security program called pronasci was put in place to build local institutions, increase citizen trust in the police, and develop a civil culture to reduce violence. this was able to drastically reduce the homicide rate seen in brazil. the program had mixed results but did make an impact in reducing the violence and influence of criminal syndicates in the favelas. however, the program failed primarily due to bureaucratic concerns (ruediger 2013). still, successful elements of the program have informed the design of the united nations public security programme. financial solvency will allow the governments of rio de janeiro to maneuver in developing programs to address the situation. 1964: the end of the democratization 1964: the end of the democratization experexperimentiment the construction of brasília in a period of 41 months was an unprecedented feat that came at an extreme cost. brazil returned to democracy in 1945 after a period of rule by dictator getúlio vargas, but the return to democracy would be short lived. brazil, despite facing unprecedented growth in the 1950s, showed markers of economic decay such as the decline of coffee exports (brazil’s primary commodity) and swift social changes occurring in brazilian cities including the rapid development of slums and rapid inflation. however, president kubitschek decided to continue with the capital’s construction. kubitschek’s “fifty years’ progress in five” slogan was reworded by his critics as “fifty years’ inflation in five” (green 2012). the government’s financing plan relied on borrowing and manipulating the monetary policy by inflating the money supply. the shortcomings of the financing plan were widely apparent, as noted by new yorker columnist tad szulc in 1957 who stated, “the government is spending more money in its headlong rush to build the capital in four years than brazil’s inflation and deficit-ridden economy can afford.” in 1959, brazil was in significant trouble. inflation was rapidly increasing and the overall cost of living in brazil was rising. brazil asked for assistance from the united states to balance a deficit of over $300 million. the united states would only oblige if brazil engaged in economic restructuring and would participate in the development of a stabilization program with the imf. however, kubitscheck disagreed with the requirement to reduce subsidies on imports of wheat and petroleum. the imf reforms were rejected and inflation continued to rise leading to political turmoil in the country. during this period of national uncertainty, there were significant fears of a left-wing uprising, leading to a military coup in 1964 by humberto de alencar castelo branco. castelo’s government renegotiated loan agreements with the us and the imf, and took aid from the alliance for progress program. austerity measures to curb inflation and repay debt hurt brazilians in the short term as reforms limited industrial expansion and allowed real wages amongst workers to drop (wood 1982). these reforms began to pay off during the ‘brazilian miracle,’ but the new wealth gained was unevenly distributed. about 22 million brazilians were enjoying a high per capita income, while the other 85 million brazilians lived at or below subsistence level (green 2012). this legacy of uneven development has stuck with brazil, as the country remains in the bottom quartile according to the world bank’s gini coefficient in 2017 (world bank 2017). kubitschek’s desire consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6738 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 73-8581 to construct a capital city without adequate financing contributed to economic turmoil in brazil. the astronomical cost to build brasília was a product of brazilian financial maladministration. the decision to build brasília amplified brazil’s economic crisis resulting in an even greater increase in inflation, the prompting of more mass migrations from the rural periphery, an amplification of isi inefficiencies, and the acceleration of rio de janeiro’s decline. kubitschek’s actions are not an isolated example in brazil’s history. the military dictatorship that seized power in 1964 invested heavily in public works but relied heavily on deficit spending to finance the ambitious public works projects. this ultimately led to a major recession and hyperinflation in the 1980s at levels higher than 1964 levels. major monetary mismanagement is still widespread in brazilian politics; this occurred in branco’s regime which developed large dams on the amazon river and began the trans-amazonian highway. recurring bouts of extreme inflation led to modifications and sometimes the cessation of major projects (cesar de queiroz ribeiro 2011). the cycle still continues; the latest example of this can be seen in the large public works projects of the 2014 world cup and the 2016 olympics. in the development of these projects, there was extensive mismanagement and corruption, including fraud and embezzlement. 49 days before the opening ceremony of the olympics, rio de janeiro’s governor francisco dornelles declared a state of financial emergency and asked the federal government for support to prevent a “total collapse in public security, health, education, transport and environmental management” (barbara 2016). the former governor of the state of rio de janeiro sérgio cabral is serving a 200-year sentence for laundering tens of millions of dollars from public construction contracts, the former mayor eduardo paes of the city of rio de janeiro has been accused of taking money in exchange for contracts to build olympic games facilities, and six of the twelve stadiums built for the world cup are now under investigation for fraud (chade 2017). this mismanagement has always resulted in significant changes, most notably the military dictatorship coming to power in 1964 and more recently extreme austerity measures for the state and city of rio de janeiro. in december 2016, the amendment pec 55 was passed to freeze government social spending for a period of 20 years, allowing it to only rise and fall only in line with the country’s current inflation trends (assis 2017). the current austerity measures that have taken place have eroded the brazilian people’s faith in democratic government, effectively harming long term democratization. this is seen in a poll by latinobarometrico where brazilians’ support for democracy fell by 22% in 2016, while 55% of brazilians said they would not mind a return to rule under a military regime as long as it was effective and solved problems. (corporación latinobarómetro 2016, p.25) brazil engages in significant public infrastructure projects and often sees consequences in the form of extreme debt. in 1952, brazil developed what has become the second largest development bank in the world: the banco nacional de desenvolvimento econômico e social (bndes). this allows the country to pursue development projects without abiding by the conditions set forth by other countries or agencies. however, this allows the government freer rein in spending toward projects which have little to no long-term economic development prospects for the region. this was seen in the development of sporting complexes for the olympics and world cup, which are in a state of disrepair and only provided economic benefit for a short period of time during its construction and short-lived ability to attract tourists. the government needs to maintain a more selective criterion on what projects it pursues and be stricter with delinquency. additionally, there has been alleged corruption in bndes contracts, with funds going primarily to a few major contracting firms and cases of contracts being awarded before public bids are accepted (goodman and cuadros 2013). the lack of diverse contracts was summarized in a statement by brazilian writer eliane brum: “the companies built brasília and have never left it.” there needs to be more oversight of the brazilian development apparatus to allow for greater discretion in what projects are approved, stricter methods in the event of delinquency, and to guarantee that equitable and proper bidding procedures are followed when awarding contracts. this way, there will be less nepotism in the awarding of contracts and massive public works projects will have a higher degree of scrutiny and a more stringent approval process. when national or subnational authorities’ trend toward insolvency, they can do little in addressing prospective problems which may arise in their jurisdiction. brasília failed in its goals to build a capital brasília failed in its goals to build a capital of hopeof hope brasília did not succeed in its aims to build a classless egalitarian society. rather, the demographics of brasília are more reflective of the country, showcasing the extreme income inequality. the plan in building brasília was to establish an egalitarian city devoid of class division with no informal employment, no informal settlements, and to redistribute the ballooning wealth of the southeast to the interior of the country. at this time in brazil’s history, consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6738 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 73-8582 informal housing such as favelas and cortiços were becoming common and individuals were limited with little room for social mobility. classicism defined the landscape of brazilian cities, notably são paulo where individuals of diverse classes lived in close proximity, but self-segregation occurred with the emergence of private schools, private police, and gated communities, preventing social integration (calderia 1996). brasília’s chief architect oscar niemeyer attempted to combat this by designing the city so that all classes would live side by side in an attempt to overcome classist principles. brasília came nowhere close to achieving its goal of an egalitarian society; the central housing that was planned to provide classless accommodation is today almost exclusively occupied by the uppermiddle class. most poor workers commute from one of the 27 satellite cities that emerged on brasília’s periphery. according to the united nations, it became one of the most unequal cities in the world today. in the un report bridging the urban divide, brasília is one of the world’s top 10 most unequal cities with a gini coefficient of 0.60 (un-habitat 2011, p.193). this rampant inequality emerged as the city was built and zoned for 500,000 residents (bertaud 2010, p.1), but the federal district currently houses about 3 million individuals (igbe 2016). brasília was flooded by candangos who built settlements on the outskirts of the city because they could not afford to live in the centre. the satellite towns established by candangos suffer from significant underdevelopment; arapoanga, for example, lacks many basic utilities such as paved roads and a sewage system just as a favela would in rio de janeiro. the satellite towns continue to expand at a rate that is difficult for brasília’s government to maintain; from 2010 to 2016, their populations grew at an estimated rate of 20.56% (igbe 2010, igbe 2016). brasília was not immune to the social crises that plagued other brazilian cities; the situation of 1990s brasília paralleled the situation of 1950s-1960s rio de janeiro. in august 1997, clashes between police and illegal occupants of public land left 20 injured and 49 arrested (lea et al. 2003). the city was designed to avoid the problems other brazilian cities faced such as violence, corruption, overpopulation, and inequality, but ended up succumbing to these same problems. this is seen in the issue of income inequality, as brazil’s wealthiest 1% of the population control the same amount of wealth as the bottom 50% of the population (about 80 million brazilians) (beghin 2008, p. 21). according to the united nations human development report, brazil is the 3rd most unequal country in latin america by gini index, behind only colombia and honduras. it also ranks 10th in the world for global inequality (un-habitat 2011). brasília is reflective of this: it was ranked one of the 10 most unequal cities in the world with a gini coefficient of 0.60 (the only other brazilian city making the list was belo horizonte with a gini coefficient of 0.61) (un-habitat 2011). despite the intention of eliminating class and transcending brazil’s chronic problems, brasília now stands as the symbol of brazil’s class inequality. conclusionconclusion the building of planned cities is not a new theme. peter the great built st. petersburg as a window to the west towards europe on the baltic sea. in 1800, washington d.c. was developed under major pierre charles l’enfant’s plan, and in australia, canberra was developed in 1913 following a long dispute over whether sydney or melbourne should be the national capital (davison, hirst, & macintyre 1998). in an equally ambitious plan to st. petersburg, washington d.c., and canberra, president kubitschek attempted to fulfill the constitutional promise of 1891 and build brasília in the brazilian highlands. the city is similar in nature to houston of the united states, where it is one of the fastest growing cities by wealth but lacking a true identity like new york or chicago. the city showcases both the extreme wealth and poverty that is representative of brazil. from this showcase, the city has earned the nickname by critics “ilha da fantasia,” or “fantasy island,” because of the dramatic contrast between the wealth in brasília and the overwhelming poverty in the province of goiás which surrounds the federal district. the building of brasília was too ambitious and shows the difficulties with large-scale central planning strategies attempting to achieve goals. the building of brasília had notable consequences, such as leading to a more rapid decline of rio de janeiro and bringing forth a military dictatorship to brazil. the cycles of heavy investment in large public infrastructure projects and the resulting economic booms and busts remain a theme throughout brazil. the fallout from the development of brasília may serve as a warning for other democratic governments to forgo the heavy and rapid development of a new capital. there have been new capital development projects since brasília; however, they have all been from non-democratic countries whose actions are sheltered from domestic public backlash. these autocratic planned capitals include: islamabad pakistan in 1966, 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emission outputs from electricity generation, multiple stakeholders seek to decarbonize and transform current energy grid technology and energy generators. in support of this transition, this paper analyzes the technological capabilities of current grid-scale level energy storage systems and provides a process of prioritizing electrode material qualities. in specific, this paper explores anode and cathode materials for sodium-ion batteries utilizing attributes oriented for energy grid usage. this paper proposes the weighted-ranking system considering factors of reversible capacity, energy density, cycling ability, and material abundance. this paper seeks to aid those researching future electrode materials for sibs in the context of future grid-scale level batteries through contextualizing various electrode materials in comparison. this paper also seeks to provide a valid method of comparing multiple electrode materials to recommend specific research and development areas. keywords: sodium-ion batteries, lithium-ion batteries, energy storage, grid systems, renewable energy. 2 consilience i. introduction 1.1 status quo and future of energy and the grid through the ipcc’s ar6 report, the panel states how warming of the earth to 1.5℃ would cause “unavoidable increases in multiple climate hazards and present multiple risks to ecosystems and humans” through climate change” (pörtner et al., 2022). due to the harmful effects of climate change, researchers, politicians, activists, and general citizens seek to decrease the cause for global warming: greenhouse gases, such as co2, which are able to retain heat energy within the atmosphere and warm the planet. reducing greenhouse gas emissions is key in order to prevent the catastrophic consequences of global warming. within the united states, the electricity sector emitted 1,482 million metric tons of co2 in 2020. fossil-fuel generation sources are largely to blame. natural gas, coal combustion, and petroleum account for 60% of u.s. electricity generation, with 54% of co2 emissions from this sector coming from coal combustion alone (sources of greenhouse gas emissions, 2021). in addition to this, energy demand is increasing. according to the international energy agency, energy demand is expected to increase by 4-5% in the coming years (global electricity demand is growing faster than renewables, 2021). thus, attention is drawn towards how to shift the current electrical grid, based on non-renewable energy generators, to a decarbonized and expanded future power grid utilizing alternative energy methods. 1.2 renewable energy and electrical grids as to be explored in later sections of this study, typical energy production systems do not depend on natural inputs, unlike most renewable energy sources. because of the manual control of fossil-fuel and coal-based electricity generators, current day electrical grids are adapted to a certain amount of navigability in terms of energy production and handling. due to the variable nature of certain energy sources, such as wind and solar which are dependent on natural circumstances, researchers and grid managers are growing in interest in utilizing energy storage systems–both to handle variations in electricity and energy demand, as well as providing for added energy security. various forms of energy storage approaches, such as “secondary battery technologies, flow batteries, supercapacitors, flywheels, compressed air energy storage, thermal energy storage, and pumped hydroelectric power” are both implemented and in investigation for implementation (fan et al., 2020). within the scope of electrical energy grids, battery technologies are highly considered as a preferable option, due to their “modularization, rapid response, flexible installation, and short construction cycles” (yabuuchi et al., 2014). as such, current research and development in battery systems consider handling specific needs of future energy grids. with such variation in current available technology, it can be difficult to assess current solutions given the next century’s environmental, economic, and political contexts. successful solutions to our current electrical grid and energy storage dilemma would allow for rapid growth and adoption of renewable energy consilience saha: comparing sodium-ion battery electrode materials systems, accelerating our pathway to carbon-neutrality. this study aims to explore those parameters within power grids, current electricity storage systems, and other components of electrical energy technology. 1.3 electricity management by power grids in the scope of advancing our current grid for decarbonization, the growth of renewable energy has led cause for concern within energy management. as typical energy distribution systems match energy demand with a complex matching of various energy generation sources, the onset of pv energy, wind turbines, and other nature-dependent energy sources decrease our control of managing the supply of energy. as described by kroposki et al, increasing variable renewable energy (vre) usage within the energy grid potentially leads to conflicting results, economically. their study revealed that at an 80% vre implementation scenario, restricting energy generation from vres demonstrated the most economically viable solution (kroposki et al., 2017). this demonstrates how the current energy grid is not optimized for vre implementation, as demonstrated by its economic inviability. figure 1: off-peak production for an 80% vre transmission-constrained scenario (kroposki et al., 2017) through the added variability of renewable energy sources, grids must change how they adapt to the variable supply. one such method includes demand response (dr) (uddin et al., 4 consilience 2019). within this process, grid system managers employ a series of schemes in order to decrease electrical energy demand. most schemes economically incentivize a load reduction from consumers: price-based dr and incentive-based dr. price-based dr includes time-of-use tariffs, critical peak pricing, and real-time pricing to reward customers’ load reduction. incentive-based dr includes direct load control, curtailable load, and demand side bidding programs to incentivize consumers to reduce load (paterakis et al., 2017). however, none of these schemes manage how the grid itself adapts to certain energy demand loads. grid managers may implement a scheme to increase energy capacity through increasing the energy generator usage. this scheme is known to not be “economically feasible and inefficient” (uddin et al., 2019). 1.4 energy storage systems for power grids with the projected increased demand for electrical energy, these dr systems will not suffice. as a solution, electrical-grid system managers seek to employ an alternative form of demand response: the “integration of energy storage systems” (uddin et al., 2019). energy storage systems (ess) allow grids to manage moments of stress, in addition to matching energy excess demand with excess supply. within the context of grid systems, energy storage systems remedy fluctuations of supply and demand through two processes: peak load shelving and load leveling. within the typical grid cycle, peaks refer to the lowest and highest points of energy demand. energy storage systems will charge from energy generators during moments of low-demand, whereas ess will discharge during moments of high-demand. this process of reducing peaks allows for typical on-demand energy generators to reduce the variability of energy production. in the context of variable energy sources (wind, solar), peak load shelving can reduce wasted energy potential, allowing grid-system managers to utilize vres despite the time of day. figure 2: (fan et al., 2020) as shown by figure 2, the ess will absorb energy from energy supply during low-demand (typically nighttime) as demonstrated by the red, and the ess will discharge energy to the grid during consilience saha: comparing sodium-ion battery electrode materials high-demand as demonstrated by the blue. load leveling refers to flattening the overall load “rather than simply [removing] the system’s peaks”. load leveling allows for economic benefit within the grid (kerestes et al., 2012). in addition to providing fast “frequency and voltage regulation,” battery energy storage systems are a clear possibility to aid the implementation of variable energy sources to our grid (fan et al., 2020). 1.5 lithium-ion batteries lithium-ion batteries are well-established as a strong, efficient, and dense energy storage system. lithium-ion batteries have a “relatively high energy density (up to 200 wh/kg, with wh/kg referring to the amount of energy transfer available per kilogram), high [energy efficiency (ee)] (more than 95%), and long cycle life (3000 cycles at deep discharge of 80%)” (chen et al., 2020). commercialized by sony in 1991, lithium-ion batteries have been at the forefront of battery research (manthiram, 2017). common lithium-ion batteries are based on “insertion-reaction electrodes and organic liquid electrolytes” (manthiram, 2017). as demonstrated by figure 3, lithium-ions are rocked back and from either electrode. the cathode consists of a metal oxide, typically of lithium manganese oxide or lithium cobalt oxide. the anode consists of a “graphitic carbon on a copper current collector”. the organic liquid electrolyte for lithium-ion batteries are either lithium salts, such as lipf6, lin[cf3o2]2, and libf4, or lithium bix-oxalato borate libob dissolved in carbohydrate mixtures (fan et al., 2020). figure 3: diagram of lithium-ion battery (kerestes et al., 2012) 6 consilience 1.6 battery materials grid-scale level energy storage systems require capable energy capacity, high energy efficiency, fast response time, and relatively long lifetime (chen et al., 2020). as previously noted, lithium-ion batteries store up to 200 wh/kg, they last around 3000 cycles at an 80% deep discharge and have a high energy efficiency of 95%. for these reasons, lithium-ion batteries have been implemented in 77% of all energy storage systems for grid-scale level batteries (chen et al., 2020). however, li-ion batteries have various drawbacks preventing them from becoming the sole savior for vre-powered grids. lithium exists in relatively low abundance within the earth, at around 20 ppm. with lithium only found in select countries like south africa, chile, and china, li-ion batteries may increase in price. according to chen et al. , the scarcity of lithium metal causes the high cost, causing doubt and concern for the applicability of grid-scale li-ion batteries (chen et al., 2020). in addition to material abundance, the geographical deposits of these materials have political implications. thus, researchers are looking into alternative electrical energy storage systems of matching response time, energy density, and of more abundant earth materials. figure 4: elements’ crustal abundance (yabuuchi et al., 2014) through the research of yabuuchi et al., they’ve compiled a list illustrating the relative abundance of certain elements within our planet. while lithium correlates more with scarcity, other elements, such as fe, na, ca, and mg, are far from the rarity of lithium. one common element in particular has strong similarities to lithium: sodium (nayak et al., 2017). in addition to being the “fifth most abundant element,” sodium fits just shy of lithium’s championing characteristics (gür, 2018). lithium reigns as the battery-element due to its high polarity and low radius (r = 0.59, cn = 4). within the periodic table, sodium is just one period away. sodium has less polarity and a larger radius (r = 1.02, cn = 6) (nayak et al., 2017). sodium also has a weaker standard reduction consilience saha: comparing sodium-ion battery electrode materials potential of -2.7 volts against lithium’s -3.04 volts (pan et al., 2013). as we’ll soon explore, many developments aim to decrease the delta between reduction potentials, causing sodium-ion and lithium-ion batteries to exist as complementary. 1.7 sodium-ion batteries sodium-ion batteries have been investigated and researched at the same rate as lithium-ion batteries from the 1970s to the 1980s (pan et al., 2013). with lithium-ion’s booming success, much research shifted over to lithium-ion battery technology. as previously explained, research is now accelerating in the sodium-ion area due to potential resource challenges in the future. yet, sodiumequipped batteries are not something of great promise and optimism, na-s and na-nicl2 batteries already exist in commercial form (pan et al., 2013). roughly 50 years ago, a “high-temperature solidstate sodium ion conduct sodium β”-alumina (naal11o7)” triggered interest in the area of sodium electrochemistry (ellis et al., 2013). since then, sodium-sulfur batteries have been engineered to operate at approximately 300 degrees celsius, causing both sodium and positive electrodes to become molten. this shift in state of matter allows for the decrease dendite formation, leading to little chance of an internal short circuit (ellis et al., 2013). however, safety-issues associated with cells operating at such high-temperatures diminish the battery-type’s potential for implementation in esss. figure 5: diagram of sodium-ion battery (gür, 2018) per figure 5, sodium-ion batteries work in a similar system as lithium-ion batteries. the key component of the shuffling-ion exists in both sodium-ion and lithium-ion batteries. when the battery discharges, sodium-ions leave the cathode and intercalate, the process of an ion inserting within vacant spaces in a crystal lattice structure, within the anode. when the battery charges, sodium-ions leave the anode and enter the cathode, thus creating energy potential. due to the 8 consilience similarity of lithium-ion and sodium-ion batteries, researchers have attempted to engineer sodiumions off the template of lithium-ion batteries. both the battery components and energy storage mechanism are similar, with only the “ion carriers” differing between batteries (hwang et al., 2017). as researchers are using the template of lithium-ion batteries, most areas of research involve adapting an electrode material, electrolyte, or current collector to better work with sodium-ions. ever since the 1980s, researchers have developed intercalation materials using non-aqueous electrolytes, just like lithium-ion batteries. despite the similarity of intercalation chemistry, the replacement of sodium with ion requires heavy research into “new electrode materials” and new “stable electrolytes” (ellis et al., 2013): the increased radius of sodium compared to lithium, along with other aspects, decreases its ability to intercalate at electrodes. much of cathode materials have been mimicked from lithium-ion batteries. sodium-ion intercalation materials were explored by whittingham and hagenmuller around the 1970s and 1980s; they proposed sodium intercalation into layers of “mos2, tas2, tis2 and naxmo2” for cathodes (pan et al., 2013). anodes, on the other hand, present more issues. within li-ion batteries, the anode consists of graphite to allow for lithium to intercalate. due to the energetic instability of na-gic (sodium intercalated in graphite), sodium-ions cannot intercalate with graphite (hwang et al., 2017). commonly used in laboratories, metallic sodium is not optimal as a production-level anode due to its dendrite-formation causing safety and cycling issues (li et al., 2017). hence, researchers prioritize discovering suitable materials, such as carbonaceous materials, to create cost-effective and high-voltage sodium-ion batteries. companies such as catl and fardion have already demonstrated exceptional prototypes of nonacqueous sodium-ion batteries. catl produces sodium-ion batteries, utilizing prussian white for the cathode and a porous hard carbon for the anode. through their research, they have achieved up to 160 wh/kg, nearing the energy density of lithium-ion batteries, and the ability to charge to 80% within 15 minutes (catl unveils, 2021). fardion has achieved 160 w h kg^-1 in 32 a h pouch cells at 4.2–1 v (rudola et al., 2021). 1.7.1 sodium-ion cathode materials: 1.7.1.1 layered oxides one of the most promising cathode materials for increased capacity, safety, and response for grid management includes layered oxides, noted as the “most extensively studied cathode” due to their research-conception in the 1980s (li et al., 2017). delmas et al. studied layered oxides of the structure axmo2, with a being an akali-metal ion and m being a transition element with two oxidations states (delmas et al., 2021). layered oxides are defined as the “crystal structure of layered compounds'' which depends “on the stacking sequence of alkali ions between layers”. within the context of sodium-ion batteries [sib], the two-dimensional layered-oxide empirical formula is na1xmo2 (hwang et al., 2017). these layered-oxides are, of course, modeled from common lithium-ion battery cathodes. what usually takes the shape of limo2 (m = co, mn, ni, etc.), takes the shape of namo2 (ellis et al., 2013). according to delmas et al. , sodiated transition metal oxides come in two key formations: o3 and p2. “o3 '' represents octrahedral (o) crystal structures containing three consilience saha: comparing sodium-ion battery electrode materials sodium-ions. “p2” represents trigonal prismatic (p) crystal structures containing two sodium-ions (li et al., 2017). these octrahedral or trigonal prismatic environments represent the structure of the layered oxide, as demonstrated through figure 6. figure 6: (left) p2 formation (right) o3 formation (li et al., 2017) as demonstrated by figure 6a, a p2 formation includes an alkali-ion in 2b or 2d. as demonstrated by figure 6b, an o3 formation includes an alkali-ion in three various areas. in addition to differing ion-storage quantities, these different structures alter multiple characteristics: capacity, cyclability, energy density, etc. within these cathodes, na will intercalate with the layered oxide materials in either an o3 or p2 formation. formations indicated such as o'3 or p’3 indicate a monoclinic distortion, simple alterations to the structure, to the original phase (hwang et al., 2017). according to hwang et al., o3 formations become stable with higher concentrations of lithium. for sodium-ions entering an o3 formation, such a crystal structure will enter phase changes of o3 ↔ o’3 ↔ p3 ↔ p’3. hwang et al. states how p2 crystal structures are most stable with “na content” in the “range of 0.3-0.7” (hwang et al., 2017). as researchers seek to discover layered metal oxides with a reversible capacity, the energy quantity that can be lost through discharging and later recovered through charging, of >200 ma h g-1 at an average potential greater than 3.0v, researchers are wary of the typically associated pitfalls of these cathode materials. such issues include “structural instability due to multiple phase transitions and structural variations during nainsertion/extraction,” a process which typically results in capacity decay (qian et al., 2021). notable sodiated transition metal oxides include nacoo2, nacro2, navo2, and namno2. nacoo2 10 consilience figure 7: source (chromium, 2022) nacoo2 was first analyzed by delmas et al. as they illustrated the sheet phases of the oxide. nacoo2 can extract up to “0.5 na with multiple plateaus in the electrochemical curve.” according to delmas et al., cathodes starting with p2-na0.77coo1.96 yield a 230 wh/kg theoretical energy density (delmas et al., 2021). cathodes starting with p2-na0.70coo1.96 yield a 260 wh/kg theoretical energy density (li et al., 2017). while the relatively high energy density portrays nacoo2 as a plausible choice for a sib cathode material, the usage of co is associated with availability issues. however, with abundance on par with lithium, at 26.6 ppm, utilizing a cobalt-based cathode would solve little resource issues (cobalt, 2022). nacro2 like other layered oxides, nacro2 compares against licro2. unlike other layered oxides which simply replace a successful cathode material with a layered sodium oxide, nacro2’s qualities are superior to its lithium alternative. due to the “movement of formed cr6+ to a td site,” layered licro2 cannot reinsert li after extraction and is therefore electrochemically inactive. within nacro2, cr-ions stay in layered oxides’ transition metal layer after na extraction (li et al., 2017). in addition, na-ions are thought to diffuse faster than li-ion in the oxide framework due to longer alkali-oxygen bonding in nacro2 than licro2(komba et al., 2021). nacro2 has a phase transition of o3 to p3-type structures. this transition metal oxide has an initial discharge capacity, the amount of energy dispelled by the battery in its first cycle, of 120 mah g-1 with a 3.0v operating potential (ellis et al., 2012). unlike cobalt, the key transition metal, chromium has an abundance of 126 ppm within the planet (chromium, 2022). although not comfortably abundant, chromium is less likely to cause resource issues as lithium or cobalt are. consilience saha: comparing sodium-ion battery electrode materials navo2 figure 8: naxvo2 voltage graph (berthelot et al., 2010) navo2 has a reversible capacity comparable to nacro2 of 126.4 mah g-1 within a range of 1.4-2.5 v (shiiba et al., 2013). however, navo2 can only be reversible for up to 0.5 mol na-ion per mole of navo2. as determined by dider et al., this electrode material faces “large voltage variation during cycling” and “oxygen senstivity2. although vanadium exists at 138 ppm, the low voltage and various issues demonstrate the low practicality of this material (vanadium, 2022). 1.7.1.2 prussian blue and analogs prussian blue [pb] and its analogs' open cubic framework and “favorable interstitial sites” allows for reversible insertion and deinsertion of alkali ions. prussian blue analogs [pbas] have the structure of axmm′(cn)6 (a = na, k; m and m’=fe, co, mn, ni) (li et al., 2017). these compounds are a large family of “transition-metal hexacyanoferrates” with plentiful redox-active sites, stable and strong structure, along with an open framework (cobalt, 2022). within the lattices, pbas have large ionic channels and interstices which allows na+, a large alkali cation, to have reversible and facile insertion reactions. the large and spacious structure of pb allows for a diffusion coefficient of 10-9 to 10-8 cm2 s-1, signifying high ionic conductivity relative to other insertion cathodes. each prussian blue molecular formula contains two redox centers: fe +2/+2 and m+2/+3. thus, each mol of pb can hold 2 na+. from the analysis of qian et al., “na2fefe-pb can release a considerably high capacity of ≈160 ma h g−1 at average high potential of 3.1 v and na2mnmnpba can reach a high reversible capacity of 209 ma h g−1 at high potential of 3.50 v (vs na/na+)” (qian et al., 2021). current research varies the structure and transition-metals of pbs and pbas, seeking to discover superior capacity, energy density, and cycle life. of the two redox metals, battery engineers can vary the transitional metals to ones with ample scarcity. such an example includes the na2mnmn-pba who’s transition-metal, mn, has a crutsal abundance of 774ppm (manganese, 2022). 12 consilience 1.7.1.3 phosphates in the scope of grid-scale level electrical energy storage systems, future sodium-based cathode materials must have comparable energy density, capacity, and structure to depict sib as a valid choice. prussian blue and prussian blue analogous have been described to have high potential for success in each of these qualities. the cubic framework of the material allows for expansive space for na-ions. current research has demonstrated possibilities for high reversible capacities. however, conventional synthesis “always exhibits large amounts of vacancies in the crystal framework because of a rapid precipitation process” (you et al., 2014). due to this, researchers have paid additional attention toward phosphate framework materials as promising cathode materials. as described by fang et al., strong p-o covalent bonds , found in po4 3 within phosphate framework materials, can stabilize the lattice oxygen even at a highly charged state. phosphate framework materials’ structural stability allows for safety and long-term cycling. the 3d framework allows for less volumetric expansion and phase transition during insertion and de/insertion of na-ion. despite these numerous advantages of phosphate framework materials, the large size and isolating nature of po4 3cause low electron conductivity and moderate capacity. within lithium-ion batteries, olivine lifepo4 is a common and “successfully commercialized” cathode material (you et al., 2014). its sodium analogue, nafepo4 is known to be more “thermodynamically stable” (li et al., 2017). as achieved by liu et al., their nafepo4@c electrode reached 89% capacity retention over 6300 cycles with a high reversible capacity of 145 mah g-1 at 0.2 c (liu et al., 2014). 1.7.2 sodium-ion anode materials: 1.7.2.1 carbonaceous materials within lithium-ion batteries, anode materials commonly consist of graphite. due to the smaller size of lithium-ions, they are “readily inserted into graphite with a final stoichiometry of lic6, which is equivalent to a capacity of 372 mah g-1”(li et al., 2014). as previously noted, sodiumions have differences from lithium-ions, quite notably the larger ionic radius. when na+ is inserted into graphite, the process is significantly impeded with electrolytes/electrodes undergoing degradation (hwang et al., 2017). in order to solve this issue, researchers take two approaches: expanding graphene layers and utilizing na+-solvent co-intercalation (li et al., 2017). through the work of wen et al., they expanded graphite layers from 0.34 nm to 0.43 nm, reaching promising results. 1.7.2.2 graphitic materials the expanded graphite (eg) had a 73.92% capacity retention rate after over 2,000 cycles. eg also provides reversible capacity of 284 ma g-1 at 20 ma g-1 density (wen et al., 2014). expanded graphite was produced through a two-step oxidation-reduction process. as noted by wen et al., the expanded graphite necessitated at least 0.37 nm of an interlayer distance in order for na+ insertion. corresponding to the second method of utilizing graphite, jache et al. demonstrate a process known as co-intercalation to create ternary gics (t-gics), producing graphite anodes consilience saha: comparing sodium-ion battery electrode materials which have high reversibility and cycle life. t-gics are produced through reducing graphite, allowing for the intercalation of solvated alkali ions, in this case sodium. equation (1) illustrates the reduction of graphite, with a+ being an alkali metal, solv being a solvent molecule, and cn being n carbon atoms within the graphite lattice (jache et al., 2014). 𝐶𝑛 + 𝑒− + 𝐴+ + 𝑦𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑣 ↔ 𝐴+(𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑣)𝑦𝐶𝑛 − equation 1: source (jache et al., 2014) through co-intercalating solvent molecules, the issue of sizing between na-ions and graphite lattices can be resolved. this process utilizes an ether-based or diglyme-based electrolyte to allow for co-intercalation. both electrolytes allowed for graphite to have an “excellent cycling ability” paired with a relatively high reversible capacity of 150 mah g-1 for ether-based and 100 mah g-1 for diglyme-based electrolytes (li et al., 2017). 1.7.2.3 non-graphitic materials hard carbon, also known as non-graphitic carbon, is the other carbonaceous anode material in heavy research for a promising cathode material. hard carbon and graphite differ in terms of how na+ intercalates with the material. within graphite, graphene layers are spaced to create a structure of which na-ions can intercalate. hard carbons consist of “randomly distributed turbostatic domains with graphene nanosheets and expanded interlayer spacing” (xiao et al., 2018). this creates molecular complexity in terms of how na+ intercalates with the material. a model known as the “card-house” model illustrates a method of how na-ion’s intercalate into hard carbon (luo et al., 2014). according to the analysis of xiao et al., hard carbon materials consist of three types of ionstorage sites within the “card-house”. the first includes intercalations between “graphene sheets in turbostratic graphitic structures''. the second type involves storing ions within micropores found in between hard carbon microstructures. the third being through surface and defect absorption (xiao et al., 2018). overall, hard carbons are noted to have high reversible capacity and low voltage. where they potentially bring disadvantages, is in the realm of materials costs. certain hard carbon material sources, such as biomass and resin, can require “high preparation cost and relatively low carbon yield”, thus driving the cost of hard carbon very high (li et al., 2017). stevens and dahn first demonstrated a glucose-derived hard carbon in 2000, reaching a reversible capacity of 300 mah g-1 (stevens et al., 2000). since then, numerous research efforts on hard carbon usage as an anode have occurred. as best reviewed by li et al., hierarchical porous carbon, hollow carbon nanospheres, ndoped porous carbon nanosheets, sulfur-doped carbon, and nanowires have been proposed as anode materials for sibs due to “poor cycling stability” and “low and initial subsequent coulombi efficiencies'' (li et al., 2017). while anodes utilizing hard carbons are heavy in research and vary in methodology, a commercial carbon molecular sieve, engineered through zhang et al., achieved a relatively successful construction of a hard carbon-based anode. through permitting na-ion insertion within “abundant ultra-small pores,” they achieved a high reversible capacity of 284 mah g-1 at a current density of 100 ma g-1 (zhang et al., 2016). 14 consilience ii. methodology within this paper, we will explore various types of electrode materials and evaluate the feasibility and efficacy of its implementation within the context of sodium-ion grid-scale energy storage systems. as mentioned by pan et al., it’s important to consider factors such as “energy density, specific capacity, discharge performance, power output, response time, cycle life, safety, and cost” (pan et al., 2013). however, certain factors are more important than others, due to the nature of grid-scale level batteries. factors such as energy density may be of less concern due to the sedentary usage of the technology. factors such as safety and response time may be more important due to the possible residential geography of these storage systems. in a perfect world, one would be able to analyze various electrode materials to determine the optimal sodium-ion battery for grid scale technologies. however, as certain processes and statistics are not known, this paper seeks to evaluate electrode materials best within the scope of grid-scale level energy storage systems, providing a helpful resource for energy system designers to understand promising materials for future systems. this paper will also implement a grading score to prioritize and deprioritize certain electrode materials, thus giving a quantitative estimation on how apt an electrode metal is for grid-scale level implementation. this paper will create a graded ranking set comparing a total of ten electrodes, consisting of seven cathode and three anodes. the seven cathodes include layered oxides {o3, o'3, p3 naxcoo2, p2 naxcoo2, nacro2, navo2}, prussian blue and analogues{r-na1.92fe[fe(cn)6], na2mnii[mnii(cn)6]}, and a phosphate {nafepo4} cathode. the three anodes include a graphitic {expanded graphite}, a non-graphitic {carbon molecular sieve [cms]}, and an alloy {snpolyacrylate [sn-paa]} anode. we will rank and organize ten total electrode materials based on their reversible capacity, limiting-material abundance, cycle life and stability, and energy density. within the larger scope of grid-scale level energy electrical systems, optimizing for safety and overall kwh/$ is key. factors such as reversible capacity, energy density, cycle life, and material abundance are the same factors used when computing overall kwh/$. due to the current-day development status of certain electrodes, full information regarding the manufacturing process, reactant costs, and other associated statistics are unavailable. therefore, this paper will regard these cost-associated factors instead, giving future researchers more specific analysis to base their work off. within grid-scale level batteries, safety is a key concern with battery technologies. molten sodium batteries, such as na-s or na-o2, operate at high temperatures (approximately 100℃+) causing safety concerns. as the state of electrode-research does not always include data or information related to safety, this paper will analyze cyclic trends of batteries in regards to safety. 2.1 weighted-ranking system due to the current nature of electrode research, much information concerning the economic and technological feasibility of certain materials comes within both quantitative and qualitative consilience saha: comparing sodium-ion battery electrode materials research. in order to best compare and contrast electrode materials, this paper will utilize a weightranking system to evaluate and present results. within each of the factors (reversible capacity, material abundance, cycle life/stability, energy density), this paper will rank each cathode from 1st to 7th and each anode from 1st to 3rd. then, each ranking will be multiplied by a weight and summed, resulting in a weighted-ranking score of which we can utilize to assess favorable electrode materials. lower values will indicate a material as more preferable. as demonstrated through table 1 and table 2, all categories are weighted close to evenly–with the exception of reversible capacity and energy density. within the scope of grid-scale level batteries, energy density is of less importance due to the lack of batteries’ movement. in addition, reversible capacity is noted with more importance as it is a base measurement best demonstrating the technological advancement of the electrode. thus, this weighted-ranking system will apply a 30% weight to reversible capacity and only a 20% weight to energy density. table 1 weights for cathode material ranking material reversible capacity energy density cycling ability material abundanc e total o3, o'3, p3 naxcoo2 30% 20% 25% 25% 100% p2 naxcoo2 30% 20% 25% 25% 100% nacro2 30% 20% 25% 25% 100% navo2 30% 20% 25% 25% 100% r-na1.92fe[fe(cn)6] 30% 20% 25% 25% 100% na2mnii[mnii(cn)6] 30% 20% 25% 25% 100% nafepo4 30% 20% 25% 25% 100% table 2 weights for anode material ranking material reversible capacity current density cycling ability material abundanc e total expanded graphite 30% 20% 25% 25% 100% cms 30% 20% 25% 25% 100% sn-paa 30% 20% 25% 25% 100% 16 consilience 2.1.1 reversible capacity ranking ranking electrodes by reversible capacity is fairly simple, as little calculations are needed. for o3, o'3, p3 naxcoo2 and p2 naxcoo2 cathodes from shacklette et al., the authors provide energy density only (shacklette et al., 1988). in order to determine reversible capacity for o3, o'3, p3 naxcoo2 cathodes, this paper takes the charged voltage value (v) and utilizes it within this equation: 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 ( 𝑚𝐴ℎ 𝑔 ) = 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 ( 𝑊ℎ 𝐾𝑔 ) 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 (𝑉) in this for all other electrodes, reversible capacity is given. thus, electrodes are ranked from highest reversible capacity to lowest reversible capacity. 2.1.2 energy density just as reversible capacity is ranked from highest to least, energy density is ranked from highest to least in wh/kg. for cathodes whose energy density is not given, this formula is used to compute energy density in wh/kg: 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 ( 𝑊ℎ 𝐾𝑔 ) = 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 ( 𝑚𝐴ℎ 𝑔 ) ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑉) within anode material literature, authors provide current density in the form of ma/g. for anodes, higher ranking anode materials will have a higher current density than lower ranking anode materials. 2.1.3 cycling ability as per judging cycling ability, ranking electrode materials becomes more complicated. due to the variation in terms of cycle numbers conducted by each study, ranking was optimized to ensure a higher-ranked electrode had higher capacity retention throughout all cycle numbers than a lower-ranked electrode material. 2.1.4 material abundance this category ranks the limiting element, the element of lowest crustal abundance, within an electrode material by the element’s crustal abundance within earth. higher ranking electrode materials will have higher crustal abundance of its limiting element than a lower ranking electrode. 2.2 data table 3 consilience saha: comparing sodium-ion battery electrode materials cathode material data table material reversible capacity (mah/g) energy density (wh/kg) cycling number cycle retention (%) material abundance (ppm) o3, o'3, p3 naxcoo2 (shacklette et al., 1988) 85.7 300 340 50 [co] 26.6(cobalt, 2022) p2 naxcoo2 (shacklette et al., 1988) 77.1 270 1000 50 [co] 26.6(cobalt, 2022) nacro2 (komba et al., 2021) 120 360 1000 90 [cr] 135(chromium, 2022) navo2 (shiiba et al., 2013) 173 n/a n/a n/a [v] 138(vanadium, 2022) r-na1.92fe[fe(cn)6] (wang et al., 2015) 160 490 750 80 [c] 200(carbon, 2022) na2mnii[mnii(cn)6] (lee et al., 2014) 209 554 100 75 [c] 200(carbon, 2022) nafepo4 (liu et al., 2014) 145 168.1 6399 89 [p] 567(phosphorus, 2022) table 4 weights for anode material ranking material reversible capacity (mah/g) current density (ma/g) cycling number cycle retention (%) material abundance (ppm) expanded graphite 184 100 2000 73.92 [c] 200(carbon, 2022) cms 284 100 180 93.3 [c] 200(carbon, 2022) sn-paa 500 50 20 100 [sn] 1.7(tin, 2022) iii. results table 5 18 consilience cathode material ranking material reversible capacity energy density cycling ability material abundance weighted ranking o3, o'3, p3 naxcoo2 6 4 5 7 5.6 p2 naxcoo2 7 5 4 7 5.85 nacro2 5 3 2 5 3.85 navo2 2 7 7 4 4.75 r-na1.92fe[fe(cn)6] 3 2 3 2 2.55 na2mnii[mnii(cn)6] 1 1 6 2 2.5 nafepo4 4 6 1 1 2.9 table 6 anode material ranking material reversible capacity current density cycling ability material abundance weighted ranking expanded graphite 3 1 1 1 1.6 cms 2 1 2 1 1.55 sn-paa 1 3 3 3 2.4 3.1 results of cathode material ranking ranked from most to least optimal cathode materials come na2mnii[mnii(cn)6], rna1.92fe[fe(cn)6], nafepo4, nacro2, navo2, o3/o'3/p3 naxcoo2, then p2 naxcoo2. although the specific values of each ranking have greater cause to be disputed, the overall ranking of these electrode materials appears justified. the two highest ranking electrode materials, na2mnii[mnii(cn)6] and r-na1.92fe[fe(cn)6], are both prussian blue analogue materials. both these materials have high energy density and reversible capacity, in addition to utilizing materials of high abundance. in fact, catl, one of china’s leading battery research organizations, utilizes pbas in their commercial sodium-ion batteries, potentially due to the same reasons as reviewed in this paper (catl unveils, 2021). the worst performing cathode materials include both layered oxides including cobalt. as noted by yabuuchi et al., cobalt is nearly as scarce as lithium, hence these electrode materials would never solve the material abundance issue which triggered additional interest in sodium-ion batteries. coming just before the two cobalt layered oxides is navo2. this consilience saha: comparing sodium-ion battery electrode materials layered oxide had promising reversible capacity, however it lacked cycling ability and stability due to the “large voltage variation during cycling and the oxygen sensitivity of the material” (shiiba et al., 2013). 3.2 results of anode material ranking ranked from most to least optimal anode materials come carbon molecular sieve (cms), expanded graphite (eg), then sn-paa. both cms and the eg are carbonaceous materials, with cms being a hard-carbon and eg being a graphitic material. as both materials are carbonaceous, the limiting material is carbon, which exists at 200 ppm, plentiful for battery production (carbon, 2022). cms is cited to perform so well due to the “abundant ultra-small (0.3-05 nm) pores that only allow the insertion of na ions while rejecting the electrolyte,” allowing for a high-performance anode (zhang et al., 2016). expanded graphite, on the other hand, provides a competitive reversible capacity in addition to a superior cycle life, with 73.92% retained after 2000 cycles. due to the large gap between cycle life, one can dispute whether eg or cms is a superior cathode. outside of these two, sn-paa well-deserved to be ranked worst out of all anodes. although this anode has nearly double the reversible capacity as cms, the scarcity of sn is less than that of li. iv. conclusion this study reviewed, considered, and compared various electrode materials concerning gridscale sodium-ion batteries. after reviewing the current and future state of the energy grid in respect to global emissions and climate change, this paper considered the necessities and requirements for successful and cost-effective grid-scale sodium-ion batteries. this study reviewed cathode materials, such as layered oxides, prussian blue and analogues, and phosphates in addition to anode materials consisting of carbonaceous materials and alloys. through a proposed weighted-ranking system on the basis of reversible capacity, energy density, cycling ability, and material abundance of various electrode materials, this paper recommends na2mnii[mnii(cn)6] and r-na1.92fe[fe(cn)6] cathode materials. through the same system, this paper recommends carbon molecular sieves as a preferable anode material based on the same attributes. this paper seeks to provide ample information for researchers in the space of future electrode materials for sibs in the context of future grid-scale level batteries. this paper also seeks to provide a valid process to compare and rank various electrode materials, in hopes of aiding in determining specific areas of research in electrode material development. successful usage of this study would hopefully result in rapid research and development of grid-scale batteries of alternative materials, leading to accelerated adoption of these systems. correlating with increased usage of these storage systems, renewable energy systems, including those that variably produce energy, could be adopted and used within the energy system, advancing our society to a sustainable and carbon-neutral system. 20 consilience bibliography carbon element information, properties and uses | periodic table. 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(2016). commercial carbon molecular sieves as a high performance anode for sodium-ion batteries. energy storage materials, 3, 18-23. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ensm.2015.12.004 microsoft word berry.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 14, iss. 2 (2015), pp. 46–70 “sustainability as:” an analysis of the alberta oil sands industry’s metaphorical discourse megan nicole berry institute of environmental sustainability mount royal university, calgary, alberta mberr683@mtroyal.ca abstract an analysis of alberta’s oil sands industry’s sustainability perspectives from a communication, and specifically metaphorical, standpoint is a valuable endeavour due to the importance of the oil sands (both in alberta and elsewhere) today with the world’s reliance on fossil fuels. learning how sustainability is used and conceptualized by the industry will reward us with a more comprehensive understanding of how to approach sustainable development in industry. moreover, analysing the industry’s sustainability metaphors in a systematic manner will allow a greater variety of metaphors to be introduced and investigated, allowing us to more succinctly articulate metaphorical conceptualizations of sustainability, sustainable and energy development, environmentalism, nature, and the oil sands themselves. author’s note sustainability has been an ongoing interest of mine and this, combined with my affection for picking apart language, made this research too good of an opportunity to pass up. this work was funded by a grant from the institute of environmental sustainability at mount royal university in calgary, alberta, canada. it is part of a larger project that looks at metaphors not only in industry documents, but also in non-profit, government, and mass media discussions. it is obvious to me that to get anywhere with sustainable development we need to first understand what it is, and as metaphors are constantly used to conceptualize sustainability, we must analyse such metaphors. we must investigate how we speak of sustainability and sustainable development to uncover what we are truly saying when we compare the earth to an “earth goddess” versus a “bank.” does the earth goddess or bank comparison place the responsibility of sustainable development on humanity, or does it suggest that it doesn’t matter whether we develop sustainably or not because the earth is all-powerful or there for the taking? can we place a value on the environment? are we simply seeing it as one of the many costs that industry has to balance? such questions must be asked, and metaphor analysis provides the tools for doing just that. keywords: sustainability, oil sands, metaphor, alberta, environmentalism, sustainable development. consilience consilience 1. introduction as this analysis will demonstrate, sustainability in reference to the alberta oil sands can be understood in a rich and diverse way through metaphor. this paper begins with a brief overview of the literature on sustainability metaphors, followed by an examination of what a systematic process for metaphor analysis should entail. the corpus in question will be briefly discussed, the precise methodology presented, and some key highlights of the research findings of sustainability metaphors in the oil sands industry dialogue put forth. finally, consideration will be given to how useful a more detailed and systematic process for metaphor analysis specific to sustainability metaphors would be, and recommendations for future research will be provided. sustainability is becoming a topic of increased interest. the united nation (un) meetings in copenhagen about climate change and the more informallycreated meetings of smaller groups have raised the issue of how to preserve the planet despite the damage that has already been done. efforts to protect our planet have been occurring for decades, through developments such as the kyoto protocol (united nations, 1998), the un’s world charter for nature, and the brundtland report (1982; 1987), plus the various environmentally-minded groups that have sprung up across the planet, such as the pembina institute or the canadian environmental network (goodwork.ca, 2015). as of 2014, the oxford dictionaries defines sustainable as being “maintained at a certain rate or level” and, related, “conserving an ecological balance by avoiding depletion of natural resources,” or “able to be upheld or defended” (pt. 1-2). there’s an abstract idea present in the definitions of sustainable but little that is concrete. we don’t know what this ecological balance, or this rate or level, are; they’re simply arbitrary abstract scales. metaphors, however, are used as a tool to facilitate the understanding of abstract concepts, including sustainability (lakoff & johnson, 1980, p. 3). understanding the metaphors used to clarify sustainability, such as whether it’s in reference to the environment or something else entirely, is one way to allow us to understand what most people mean when they talk about sustainability. this involves interrogating what their goals for sustainability are, what tools are required to achieve these goals, and what the duties involved in achieving such goals ought to be. a metaphor, according to lakoff and johnson (1980), is a conceptual tool used both verbally and in thought processes to help people make sense of the world around them, resulting in the term “metaphor” being used interchangeably with the term “metaphorical concept” (pp. 3-6). as of 2014, the oxford dictionaries states that a metaphor is “a figure of speech in which a word or phrase is applied to an object or action to which it is not literally applicable” (pt. 1). this can be expanded on to develop a definition of metaphor for this paper’s purposes as: a linguistic device used to facilitate the understanding of an abstract concept (in this case sustainability, environmentalism, or nature] without being literally applied to the abstract concept. following the practice of lakoff and johnson (1980), the metaphors analysed will be capitalized to distinguish them from more general discussion. consilience berry: alberta oil sands metaphorical discourse since sustainability is an incredibly broad topic in itself, analysing how a specific discourse community approaches the constructions of this concept metaphorically is a useful departure point. consequently, this discussion focuses on how industry players have “experienced“ and “understood” (lakoff & johnson, 1980) the oil sands located in alberta, canada. this industry is directly impacted by notions of sustainability due to the fact that it uses natural resources and directly impacts the land, water, and air in which it operates. additionally, the industry has often come under fire for apparent unsustainable practices in regards to oil, most recently involving the pipelines northern gateway and keystone xl (cryderman & jang, 2014; mccarthy, 2014; mccarthy & giovannetti, 2015). 2. literature review 2.1 sustainability metaphors there are many ways to understand the elusive notion of sustainability, one of the more prominent being through metaphor. after conducting a google scholar search of texts related to sustainability metaphors, 63 texts were found that, upon analysis, revealed a number of sustainability metaphors. the three most common in the articles reviewed were: (1) the idea of sustainability as a scale/balance either expressed through those words or through terms such as “equity”, “holism”, or “fairness”; (2) the idea of sustainability as a journey, expressed through models such as “journey”, “process” or “way of traveling”, and; (3) sustainability as an exchange/trade involving “natural capital”. in addition to sustainability metaphors, three pre-eminent nature metaphors were found in the literature, including: (1) the metaphor of nature as capital/stock, (2) nature as a person, and, (3) nature as an interconnected system/machine. these nature metaphors tended to be connected to the sustainability metaphors and assisted in facilitating understanding of the sustainability metaphors. each of these metaphors will be reviewed in greater detail below. the sustainability as a scale metaphor was often used as a tool by corporations to vaguely define their work towards and understanding of sustainability (ihlen & roper, 2011, conclusions, para. 3-4), however it is also understood by others as a way to demonstrate the value of humans nature (jabareen, 2004, pp. 629-630; livesey, 2002, pp. 336-338; milne, tregidga, & walton, n.d., p. 12, 19-20; oldfield & shaw, 2002, pp. 394-396). balance was argued to be key to sustainability alongside other metaphorical tools (espejo & stewart, 1998, p. 486, 494), and contributed to the understanding of sustainability referring to preserving the world for future generations and other species (clugston & calder, 1999, p. 3 & 7; reid & petocz, 2006, p. 117). it also included the expression of the concept of three or two sectors of sustainability – economic, environmental, and social – (clugston & calder, 1999; gough, 2002; jabareen, 2004; livesey, 2002; milne, tregidga, & walton, n.d.), the idea that there are limits to what nature or humans can do (carew & mitchell, 2006; milne, kearins, & walton, 2006), and the act of combining disparate elements together into a cohesive whole or symbiotic relationship (carew & mitchell, 2006; gough, 2002; romaine, 1996). consilience consilience the scale metaphor supports different nature metaphors as well, including the idea of nature as a machine (audebrand, 2010; haase, 2013; princen, 2010). this conception of nature tends to lean towards believing that nature can be improved upon, and can be made more efficient or uniform via rational actions, which will in turn increase production to an ideal amount (haase, 2013, p. 897-898; princen, 2010, p. 62). it operates on the belief that nature and humans are separate organisms and, furthermore, expects that nature can solve problems encountered by humans (haase, 2013, p. 898). nature, in such a metaphor, is truly a machine. the concept of nature as a lab suggests a similar degree of control possessed by humans over nature, with nothing being out of place and nothing in excess (princen, 2010). the metaphor of nature as an ecosystem or similar system leaves room for less human control than the metaphors of nature as a machine or lab, but still suggests that there is a degree of order to nature; it implies that there is a natural system with specific, pre-determined ways of accomplishing and knowing things (carew & mitchell, 2006; espejo & stewart, 1998; milne, kearins, & walton, 2006; romaine, 1996). the sustainability as a journey metaphor was referred to in the existing literature via such terms as “journey”, “process” or “way of traveling”, either via the authors’ examinations of other texts or by the authors themselves (audebrand, 2010; camino, 2014; gough, 2002; ihlen & roper, 2011; livesey, 2002; milne, kearins, & walton, 2006; milne, tregidga, & walton, n.d.). at multiple points, those examining the journey metaphor often build off the work of milne, kearins, and walton (2006) and point out that the journey metaphor is often used by organizations to accommodate small changes, to avoid making substantial transformations within the organization, and to avoid working towards fundamental industry changes contributing to sustainability – after all, they’re on a journey of sustainability, they’re working on it (audebrand, 2010, p. 415; ihlen & roper, 2011, communicating corporate environmentalism, para. 2, rationales, para. 1-3, & conclusions, para. 5-6; milne, tregidga, & walton, n.d., p. 16). milne, tregidga, and walton (n.d.) found that in corporate reporting, the journey metaphor is often used not only to depict sustainable development as a process, but also to “capture movement along this process” (p. 16). the journey metaphor was used as a vague measuring tool, a justification for small action without accompanying big action, and a tool to understand an abstract process of sustainable development or sustainability. or, in the case of the united nations, the journey metaphor was simply used by the oft-mentioned brundtland report to further define sustainability as a “process of change” (1987, pt. 30). it is this process that brings about the addition of a cycle metaphor, which is included under the umbrella of the journey metaphor because it involves a start and end point, phases of some sort, and can be used to facilitate travel. the cycle metaphor is also sometimes used to display a never-ending journey of sustainability (haase, 2013). this journey metaphor may also be connected to the idea of sustainability as endurance or growth. in some cases, sustainability may mean holding out through a process, or maturing – which is a process in and of itself (ihlen & roper, 2011; jones, 2013; princen, 2010; reid & pentocz, 2006). princen (2010) extends this understanding of sustainability as growth, or more specifically physical maturation, to embrace the metaphor of nature as a small child (pp. 64-65). princen (2010) argues this by pointing out that utilizing the idea of nature as a consilience berry: alberta oil sands metaphorical discourse small child is ideal for the maturation metaphor because the child has an established point where they will stop physically maturing, thus the dangers associated with extended maturation of something such as money, which may continue to grow until it becomes problematic, are prevented (pp. 64-65). sustainability as an exchange/trade generally applies a human economic system to the natural world, bringing forth the idea of capital or similar to facilitate completing transactions between nature and nature, nature and human, and human and human to ultimately achieve sustainability (carew & mitchell, 2006; haase, 2013; jabareen, 2004; livesey, 2002; milne, tregidga, & walton, n.d.; oldfield & shaw, 2002; tregidga, milne, & kearins, n.d.). this metaphor regularly emphasizes the importance of the financial state of an organization in achieving sustainability, arguing that before sustainability can be achieved, a profit must first be made (tregidga, milne, & kearins, n.d., p. 12). this exchange or trade metaphor is often used to promote economic rather than ecological interests in sustainability (livesey, 2002, pp. 331-334, 336). nature as capita that can be used in transactions to achieve sustainability is frequently used in tandem with the metaphor of sustainability as an exchange or trade. nature can be measured, exchanged, or paid, all in the name of sustainability (jabareen, 2004; jones, 2013; milne, tregidga, & walton, n.d.; oldfield & shaw, 2002; remillard, 2011; romaine, 1996). of course, for nature to be able to participate in transactions, sometimes that means it must take on a personified presence, such as that of the goddess gaia, of a mother, or of a friend; someone who is of equal standing to the suggested human part of the transaction (audebrand, 2010; camino, 2014; romaine, 1996). nature may also be personified as a patient, victim, small child, or another vulnerable individual, but personifying nature as such and utilizing the sustainability as exchange metaphor creates an unequal exchange that may not accurately display the relationship between humans and nature that someone wishes to communicate (audebrand, 2010; camino, 2014). nature can also be understood metaphorically as a store (princen, 2010), a spaceship (audebrand, 2010; princen, 2010; romaine, 1996), a neighbourhood (jabareen, 2004; princen, 2010), or even a home (audebrand, 2010). audebrand (2010) points out that such metaphors bring a wealth of accompanying ideas, such as the idea that if nature is a home, then humans are its caretakers and occupants, suggesting a responsibility towards nature by humans during, for, and beyond the sustainability transactions (p. 420-421). despite the aforementioned sources exploring metaphors and sustainability, very little of the literature actually specified what it envisioned metaphor to be. those that did define metaphor commonly used the various works of lakoff and johnson (1980) to either borrow or create a definition of metaphor, most revolving around the idea that metaphors are a tool to facilitate both the “understanding” and “experience” of the notions of sustainability (audebrand, 2010; carew & mitchell, 2006; haase, 2013; jabareen, 2004; milne, kearins, & walton, 2006; princen, 2010; romaine, 1996). other sources used different departure points, such as the observation of scientists at work, to come up with their own definition of metaphor, for example, camino’s (2014) understanding of metaphors is that they are devices that make sense of “alien” concepts (p. 2). the methodology used to analyse sustainability metaphors was overwhelmingly qualitative and utilized content analysis. there is a significant body consilience consilience of work discussing sustainability metaphors in academia, such as how higher education teachers or students view metaphors both in practice and through what they publish (audebrand, 2010; carew & mitchell, 2006; clugston & calder, 1999; gough, 2002; haase, 2013; jones, 2013; reid & petocz, 2006), and industry (ihlen & roper, 2011; livesey, 2012; milne, kearins, & walton, 2006; milne, tregidga, & walton, n.d.; tregidga, milne, & kearins, n.d.). a review of the existing literature shows little attention given to the metaphors used by the media, non-profits, and the government regarding sustainability. there also appears to be a significant dearth of quantitative analysis, or use of other qualitative methods such as interviews, participant observation, or case study analysis. moreover, existing studies of sustainability metaphors dominantly seem to focus on what is written by industry and academia, not what is said. based on the review of the existing conversation about sustainability, a few recommendations for future research have been identified: • conduct quantitative analysis on sustainability metaphors; • investigate the metaphors used by the government, non-profit, and media sectors, paying attention to what is written and said; • utilize a greater variety of analysis, including interviews, case studies, observation, and surveys for sustainability metaphor investigations; • be more precise about the methods and ways of analysing metaphors so a clearer understanding of how to identify and critique these metaphors is apparent. it is the last of these gaps that this paper hopes to fill. 2.2 metaphor analysis for lakoff and johnson (1980), metaphor is a verbal and internal conceptual tool used to help people make sense of the world around them (pp. 3-6). as star (1991) articulates, metaphor is used as a “bridge between different rules” (as cited in williams, 2010, p. 1); as such it can be used to a variety of effects, such as facilitating understanding, or evoking multiple voices or one voice (williams, 2010, pp. 1-2). skinnemoen (2009) and steen (2007, p. 10-11) support this conception of metaphor being used to facilitate understanding, with skinnemoen (2009) using this cognitive linguistic understanding of metaphor to guide her research (pp. 14-16). metaphor as “a figure of speech in which a word or phrase is applied to an object or action to which it is not literally applicable” is the definition the 2014 oxford dictionaries uses (pt. 1), which can be easily melded into the understanding of metaphor described above. by and large, the steps for metaphor analysis can be simplified to include three broad, overarching steps: i. create a corpus and read the corpus (pragglejaz group, 2007, as cited in steen, 2007, p. 12; skinnemoen, 2009, p. 69; williams, 2010, pp. 76-81); ii. identify the metaphors in use (charteris-black, 2004, as cited in skinnemoen, 2009, p. 66; pragglejaz group, 2007, as cited in steen, 2007, p. 12; skinnemoen, 2009, pp. 69-70; steen, 2007, pp. 16-17; williams, 2010, pp. 81-83), and; consilience berry: alberta oil sands metaphorical discourse iii. determine the meaning, or meanings, of the identified metaphors (charteris-black, 2004, as cited in skinnemoen, 2009, p. 66; pragglejaz group, 2007, as cited in steen, 2007, p. 12; skinnemoen, 2009, pp. 71-75; steen, 2007, pp. 16-18; williams, 2010, pp. 81-84). along with the abovementioned steps come some difficulties in metaphor analysis. there can be challenges in distinguishing between conventional metaphors and novel metaphors (charteris-black, 2004, as cited in skinnemoen, 2009, p. 66; williams, 2010, p. 83), along with alive metaphors – those that bring new insights when being used – and dead metaphors – those that are taken for granted (williams, 2010, p. 83). as with any qualitative analysis, there are also the usual challenges associated with analytical error and the researcher’s own limitations (skinnemoen, 2009, p. 126; steen, 2007, p. 14; williams, 2010, p. 76, 86, 96). for example, with multiple researchers there’s a higher likelihood of coming to different and arguably more varied conclusions about the texts being analysed, which may shift findings as a result. with a single researcher, such variance is less likely. 3. case study 3.1 background analysis on how the alberta oil sands are discussed is lacking. this is evidenced by the fact that only 22 articles were found that examined how oil sands and other environmental issues were tackled by different sectors, such as the industry, government, non-profit organizations and the mass media. overwhelmingly, the analysis that was present in such articles tended to be done through the qualitative content analysis of various non-academic texts and a splattering of discourse analysis of academic texts, with extremely few investigations involving both content and discourse analysis (difrancesco & young, 2010; way, 2011). discourse analysis occurred independent of other analysis only once (davidsen, 2013), as did a case study analysis (aronczyk, 2013), and a survey (paskey & steward, 2012). all interviews were conducted alongside content analysis (lê, 2013; pulver, 2006), and only once were interviews, content analysis, and the one occurrence of participant observation, used together (groom, 2011). future research should involve other methods in addition to or independent of content analysis so that this topic can be more thoroughly dissected. through the aforementioned dominant content analysis of oil sands discussion in different sectors, it was often found that there tended to be more focus on humans and less on nature, unless nature was displayed as helping humans as a resource or as a place of leisure (difrancesco & young, 2010, p. 523 & 526; groom, 2011; lê, 2013; remillard, 2011). oil sands tended to not be discussed independent of other environmental issues; instead they were connected to such things as climate change (aronczyk, 2013; difrancesco & young, 2010, p. 532; paskey & steward, 2012; pulver, 2006; soroka, et.al, 2009, p. 14), and were brought up in time with external events related to the environment, such as the kyoto protocol or odd weather (paskey, steward, & williams, 2013, pp. 52-53; soroka, et.al, 2009, pp. 14-15; wolbring & noga, 2013, p. 92, 100 & 102). oil sands discourse could be ignored if consilience consilience deemed not compelling enough of an issue to discuss (widener, 2013), tended to be simplified across all sectors (davidsen, 2013; paskey, steward, & williams, 2013, p. 59, 64 & 77), and was overwhelmingly presented from an industry perspective in the mass media (difrancesco & young, 2010, p. 526; paskey & steward, 2012; paskey, steward, & williams, 2013; way, 2011, pp. 83-87, 92; willard, 2011, pp. 40-45). with the industry perspective being so widely spread through the mass media, it will be valuable to investigate the industry’s perspective further so as to determine what precisely that perspective and its origins are. 4. methodology 4.1 metaphor analysis the sample for this study contains 26 texts. these documents were collected using the search terms “oil sands”, “oilsands”, “tar sands” or “tarsands” via selective internet searching. three texts were found through the cumulative environmental management association (cema, http://cemaonline.ca), which includes the oil sands environmental management bibliography and the dms library. to help further populate the corpus, website searches were performed of the various companies active in the oil sands, such as suncor, syncrude and industry associations. from these website searches, 26 industry documents became a part of the corpus, including 6 from suncor, 5 from shell, 4 from statoil, 4 from the oil sands leadership initiative, 3 from syncrude, 2 from the canadian association for petroleum production, and 1 each from devon energy, imperial oil, and the alberta chamber of resources. the corpus texts were organised by date to ensure that only those from 2008 and beyond were gathered, this is because that was when discussions of the oil sands began involving a wider scope of voices (paskey, steward, & williams, 2013). 4.2 research design to examine the sustainability metaphors used by the oil sands industry, a metaphor analysis approach was used. this approach involved three steps with organizational help from the dedoose software. the three steps were: (1) collecting texts to analyse, (2) reading the texts for understanding, and (3) coding the texts. following the organization of the texts as described in the previous section, content analysis was undertaken with the help of a previously determined definition of metaphor. as found in section 1, that definition of metaphor was: a linguistic device used to facilitate understanding of an abstract concept [in this case sustainability, environmentalism, or nature] without being literally applied to the abstract concept. with this understanding of metaphor in mind, the analysis followed the below seven steps for each text, taking inspiration from the pragglejaz group’s (2007) procedure (as cite din steen, 2007, p. 12). consilience berry: alberta oil sands metaphorical discourse i. read the entire text to gain a basic understanding of it. ii. using the metaphors identified by skinnemoen (2009) as a rough guide, determine the topmost levels of the coding trees. iii. find the basic concrete definition of the word or phrase in question using a dictionary, such as the oxford english dictionary. iv. decide if the basic definition is different enough from the contextual meaning to be classified as a metaphor. continue until having identified all metaphors in the text. v. review the identified metaphors and disregard those that do not directly offer metaphorical understandings of sustainability, the environment, the oil sands, or nature. vi. identify the topmost coding tree level the word or phrase in question falls under in the coding trees. vii. identify the word or phrase using a specific general metaphor under the previously identified topmost coding tree level. multiple metaphors within one phrase may be found. ultimately, the coding trees were created with two or three levels, and can be seen below. table 1.0: the codes used, in alphabetical order. excluded code: conscious metaphors.1 first-level second-level third-level climate change as art(s) acting sculpture business/metrics competition fair play team construction tools exchange/trading illumination machine tools military movement driving forward personal relationships family personification 5 senses growth conservation as art(s) acting business/metrics competition first place construction guard/protect journey walking 1 the conscious metaphors code is independent of the level system used by the other codes, being only applied to individual metaphors as necessary, and thus is not included in the table. consilience consilience machine tools personal relationships partnership personification 5 senses scale system energy as conflict light movement driving left behind owned personification health sustenance system chain energy efficiency as art(s) acting business/metrics cleaning competition construction gems/minerals/chemical elements journey road map machine military movement chase personal relationships commitment/promise steward personification 5 senses plan environmental impact as building/property environmentalism as art(s) acting drawing building/property business/metrics competition first place sports team construction destruction guard/protect journey quest (fantasy) railroad road map machine military consilience berry: alberta oil sands metaphorical discourse movement driving forward package personal relationships commitment/promise neighbourhood steward personification 5 senses footprint growth health scale three sustainability system chain fossil fuels (carbon etc.) as art(s) acting arts & crafts business/metrics construction tools draft animal exchange/trading gathering (objects) machine tools movement back driving personal relationships commitment/promise personification footprint growth health removal land as animal business/metrics conflict construction movement forward object personal relationships commitment/promise neighbourhood steward personification footprint growth health repair sustainable system self-sustaining oil sands as art(s) acting building/property consilience consilience business/metrics competition cards first place journey road machine movement driving package personification footprint growth power system chain sustainability as art(s) acting sculpture sewing tapestry building/property business/metrics competition fair play first place sports construction tools environmentalism exchange/trade guard/protect journey path railroad road map machine tools military movement driving forward nutrients personal relationships commitment/promise partnership steward personification 5 senses footprint growth health infant scale three system self-sustaining top sustainable living as art(s) mold construction consilience berry: alberta oil sands metaphorical discourse personification 5 senses sustainable/energy development as art(s) acting business/metrics clean competition first place team construction journey path quest road map lock movement driving forward package personal relationships commitment/promise neighbourhood partnership steward personification 5 senses growth health scale three system water as art(s) acting business/metrics machine personification footprint health initially, after reading a text and coding it individually as per the above steps, i then compared my findings with my supervisor’s until we felt confident that we understood the coding system identically. the coding process involved going back to the codes multiple times to ensure that the coding remained consistent. despite this, there were challenges when it came to coding vague metaphors such as “long-term” – it may go under the journey metaphor or another metaphor, – “chain” – it could refer to a chain as a machine or a chain as a system, – or even “first place” – it could belong under the journey or competition metaphors. when confronted by such challenges, i discussed it with my supervisor and we came to conclusions that then carried across the coding system. the last coding done (excluded from table) was for consciously used metaphors. these were identified as metaphors that were deliberately included by the text’s authors for a specific reason. these metaphors were recognized by, first, the amount of times they appeared within the same text section as multiple uses of the same metaphor suggests that it was a conscious use of the metaphor, and second, if they appeared in different forms that came down to the same root metaphor, which consilience consilience suggests that the root metaphor was known to the text’s author and used for a specific reason. like steen (2007, p. 15), i did not mark words such as “key” as a metaphorical expression when it was used as an adjective, such as through the phrase “key piece.” in such a phrase, any metaphor associated with key is not used; instead it is a conventional phrase and is understood as such (steen, 2007, p.15). using the dictionary definition of words to help determine metaphorical usage is a common method for analysing metaphors, and was used during this analysis (lakoff & johnson, 1980; skinnemoen, 2009; steen, 2007). during this analysis, the 2014 oxford dictionaries was used. the word “path”, according to the dictionary, is “a way or track laid down for walking or made by continual treading” (pt. 1). due to this definition, the use of “path” in the phrase “sustainability path” is clearly metaphorical and should be coded as such. 5. findings and analysis 5.1 coding overview a total of 262 metaphors applied a total of 2355 times was found in 26 texts via 1057 excerpts. this makes 10% of the 26 texts metaphorical in nature. while i stuck to the understanding of metaphor outlined in the previous sections, there were some challenges in identifying whether something was a metaphor pertaining to sustainability or not. for example, suncor energy often mentioned a “journey to zero” program that initially i thought was in reference to some sort of sustainability journey (suncor energy, 2009, p. 2, 12 & 16; suncor energy, 2010, p. 2, 6, 7 & 16; suncor energy, 2011, p. 2, 6, 7 & 16; suncor energy, 2012, p. 2, 8, 9 & 27; suncor energy, 2013, p. 2, 25, 28 & 29; suncor energy, 2014, p. 26, 30 & 31). further investigation in the texts that incorporate the journey to zero program, however, revealed that the program was a workplace safety program and largely irrelevant to the sustainability discourse of the company. a greater challenge was figuring out what to code some metaphors as. for example, the metaphor of sustainability as an engine could be coded as a driving metaphor, and therefore a movement metaphor, or as a machine metaphor. in the end, it was decided to code the sustainability as an engine metaphor as both a driving and a machine metaphor. the metaphor of sustainability as a chain, however, could have been coded as either a machine or a system metaphor, as seen above. largely, the sustainability as a chain metaphor was coded only as a system metaphor because the chain often referred to a value chain, therefore a part of an idea instead of a part of a machine. rare metaphors tended to be more challenging to code simply because i lacked a background in understanding them. thus, in one case, i considered the metaphor of environmentalism as a harness to be a restraint metaphor, but when looking into the dictionary definition of the word “harness” i found that it was more accurately referring to a draft animal instead of restraints. as a result, there is one occurrence of a draft animal metaphor. consilience berry: alberta oil sands metaphorical discourse challenges arose when creating the coding trees as well. one particularly irksome challenge revolved around the competition metaphor. i spent a lot of time trying to figure out if it was more valuable to have separate competition and sports metaphors or to keep them connected, with sports being sub-codes under competition. ultimately, due to the fact that most sports metaphors referenced competition in some way rather than a friendly non-competitive sports match, i decided to keep sports metaphors as sub-codes under the larger competition metaphor. however, i did decide to separate the competition and military metaphors, due to the fact that the military metaphors tended to invoke references not usually found in the competition metaphor, such as the word “frontline.” 5.2 metaphor trends 13 root (or top tier/first-level) metaphors were uncovered. the most common first-level metaphors were sustainability as and environmentalism as with 210 and 203 occurrences respectively. on the other end of the scale, the least common first-level metaphors were sustainable living as and environmental impact as, with two and one occurrences respectively. only two first-level metaphors were found related to nature: land as (53 occurrences) and water as (six occurrences). however, there were a number of first-level metaphors related to resources, including: oil sands metaphors (41 occurrences), fossil fuels (28 occurrences), and 15 excerpts related to energy. the most common secondand third-level metaphors of the aforementioned most prevalent root metaphors are described below. 5.2.1 sustainability metaphors sustainability as personification and sustainability as personal relationships were the most common ways to imagine sustainability metaphorically, occurring 42 and 41 times respectively. sustainability as personification was used as a code because of the third-level metaphors of 5 senses, footprint, growth, health and infant, which made up 38 of the 42 occurrences, with the remaining four occurrences coded as personification because of the use of language such as “social”, “issues facing” and “mindset”. the most common third-level metaphor was growth, used 15 times, when “grassroots” (which would of course grow as grass or anything with roots does), “evolution” and the word “growth” itself were used in reference to the environmental sustainability of the organization, which may grow, evolve, or rise from a grassroots beginning. this seems to be similar to the metaphor of nature as gaia (audebrand, 2010; camino, 2014; romaine, 1996), which has the problem of assuming that the environment can bounce back from most anything due to being an all-powerful goddess, which may or may not be true, and assumes that sustainability can be tracked in small changes or stages (evolution) and is ongoing with no apparent end (i.e. maturation vs. unlimited growth). however, the nature as gaia metaphor does, from my perspective, seem to facilitate greater understanding as to what nature and sustainability mean for the organization using the metaphor. nature and sustainability are thus characterized as important and powerful. consilience consilience with 28 occurrences, the next most common second-level metaphor was sustainability as journey, with the third-level metaphors of path, railroad, and road map making up 17 of the 28 occurrences. the third-level metaphors occurred whenever the words themselves (path, railroad/train tracks, road map) were used, specifying a particular type of journey. the only large difference between the three was that, unlike when “path” or “railroad” or “train tracks” was used, “road map” was generally used to highlight the fact that the organization had a plan of some sort pertaining to sustainability. there was a destination and it could be mapped out. this obviously harkens back to the general understanding of sustainability as journey, which tends to utilize the journey metaphor as a way to demonstrate that sustainability is a process of some sort through which small changes can be tracked. this of course also carries with it the problem of the journey metaphor, which is that it is often used by organizations to justify tiny, nearly completely insignificant changes to organizational practices because sustainability is a journey and the organization is on that journey (audebrand, 2010, p. 415; ihlen & roper, 2011, communicating corporate environmentalism, para. 2, rationales, para. 1-3, & conclusions, para. 5-6; milne, kearins, & walton, 2006; milne, tregidga, & walton, n.d., p. 16). as a result, critiques about how the organization is going about that journey is ineffective because of the idea that one cannot critique a journey without seeing its end (which has not been reached because the journey is still in process). thus, the journey metaphor could be used as a smokescreen blocking substantial change. 5.2.2 environmental metaphors environmentalism as arts – acting, environmentalism as business/metrics and environmentalism as machine were the most common secondand third-level metaphors, with 59, 56 (out of 59), 69, and 59 occurrences respectively. metaphorizing environmentalism as acting was overwhelmingly done through use of the word “performance”, which was cross-coded with environmentalism as business/metrics and environmentalism as machine, which accounts for the large occurrence of the business/metrics and machine metaphors. it accommodates not only theatre performance but also business performance (as in working on corporate financial or personnel goals) and machine performance (as in a machine working on the task set out for it). using a performance-oriented metaphor places the actor as the company or the environment, which are performing a play (in the acting version) or task (in the business/metrics or machine versions) in a way that can support environmentalism either through the act of performing the play or task, or from the outcome of the play or task. it can be assumed from the sheer prevalence of the use of the word “performance” that has resulted in this abundance of environmentalism as arts – acting, business/metrics, and machine – that such language is deeply imbedded in the industry’s culture and therefore may not be a conscious metaphor but an incidental one, a result of being educated and working in an industry that favours such language. accordingly, it may be the case that the use of the environmentalism as arts – acting, business/metrics, and machine – doesn’t so much demonstrate the inner sustainable workings of an organization than consilience berry: alberta oil sands metaphorical discourse demonstrate the external face of an organization, making the organization simply look sustainable rather than be sustainable. environmentalism as personal relationships – commitment/promise or steward – occurred 40, 18 (out of 40) and 18 (out of 40) times, respectively. environmentalism as personal relationships – commitment/promise – was overwhelmingly used in reference to the use of words such as “responsibility” and “accountability,” speaking of a commitment the company has to environmentalism. this commitment implies a sense of relationship between the company and the metaphor’s target, environmentalism, reinforcing the idea that it is the company’s responsibility to act as though there is a relationship and to treat environmentalism with some semblance of respect and dignity. occurring 44 and 31 (out of 44) times respectively was environmentalism as personification – footprint. this builds from the idea of an environmental footprint, which is “the productive area required to provide the renewable resources humanity is using and to absorb its waste” (global footprint network, 2014, para. 3), and gives the idea that not only does the company have a footprint, but that the company can step on environmentalism and harm it by creating said footprint. simply, the larger the footprint the larger the surface-area affected by the step and the more the harm. this is an easy metaphor to use due to the general understanding of the environmental or ecological footprint that readers are assumed, and likely do have, whether through learning in school repeatedly or through work. the use of such a footprint metaphor makes understanding the organization’s comprehension of sustainability easier than it may be with more obscure metaphors. 5.2.3 nature and oil sands metaphors land as personfication – health were the most common secondand third-level metaphors used, occurring 24 and 13 (out of 24) times, respectively. this is unsurprising as the general goal of environmental sustainability seems to be to ensure that the land is not damaged, and this can be easily translated to the personification of the land by saying that healthy land is the goal of environmental sustainability. this personification metaphor harkens back to the metaphor of nature as gaia, a patient, a small child, or a mother. in the analysed texts, save for where it is specifically stated that the land is sick and must be healed (i.e. nature as a patient) thus placing the organization in the role of caretaker, it’s largely unclear what type of person the land is presently or is meant to be, besides healthy. this makes it difficult to understand comprehensively the metaphor target or the position of the organization. is the organization a caretaker or healer? is the organization a maintenance worker? these are very different roles with quite divergent responsibilities. this difficulty is partially answered by the finding of the secondand thirdlevel metaphors land as personal relationships – steward, which occurred 16 and 15 (out of 16) times, respectively. a steward, according to the 2014 oxford dictionaries, is essentially someone responsible for managing or supervising something else. due to the common use of the phrase “land stewardship” for this metaphor, this places the organization squarely in the role of steward towards the land, therefore creating a relationship based on an inherent responsibility the consilience consilience organization has towards the land. once, this metaphor occurred in tandem with that of land as personification – health, clearly showing that the land is a responsibility roughly akin to an elderly relative, and the organization is responsible for that land/elderly relative. this does the exact opposite of the nature as gaia metaphor and instead of assuming the environment can bounce back from any harm done to it, it assumes that the environment must be maintained by humans and is often threatened. oil sands as personfication – growth were by far the most common secondand third-level metaphors, occurring 16 and 13 (out of 16) times, respectively. these metaphors occurred largely thanks to language referring to the oil sands’ explicit “growth”, “life cycle,” and “life span”. specifically, the language of “life cycle” and “life span” makes it seem as though the oil sands are living substances or beings with beginnings, middles, and ends. in short, they’re implied to be able to grow. 5.2.4 conscious metaphors out of the 262 total metaphors, 145 conscious metaphors, or 55%, were found. of those conscious metaphors, 75, or 52%, were sustainability as metaphors, with 10 (13% of the 75) occupying the sustainabiilty as journey metaphor sub-category. environmentalism as metaphors showed up 29 times out of 145, or 20%, with environmentalism as competition occurring 6 times (21% of the 29). for more nature-oriented metaphors, 13 of 145, or 9%, were oil sands as metaphors while 7 of 145, or 5%, were land as metaphors. the conscious metaphors, particularly those involving sustainability as, environmentalism as or sustainable development/energy development as driving assume that the reader will understand the metaphor based on their personal experiences. as such, they’ll be able to understand that when something is referred to as an economic engine it is the economy and therefore capital resources that will help to result in greater sustainability. similarly, when something is referred to as driving sustainability or towards sustainability, it is assumed that the reader will understand that the vehicle used to move towards sustainability is the company (syncrude, suncor, etc.), or, more specifically, the company’s official sustainability plan. the same assumption occurs when using the journey metaphor in all its incarnations (i.e. sustainability as a path, a road map, a quest). it is assumed that the reader understands what a journey is, that when they speak of a “path” or a “road map” they are referring to a plan with steps that may or may not be clearly defined but will, nevertheless, lead to sustainability. this assumption occurs again whenever construction metaphors are used. it is assumed that when a sustainability model is referred to the reader will understand that the model is a tool used to reach sustainability. when the term “concrete” is used in reference to sustainability it is assumed that the reader will understand that sustainability, or that which is used to reach sustainability, or the sustainability plan – whichever is referred to using the term “concrete” – is stable. the conscious metaphor of sustainability as, environmentalism as or sustainable development/energy development as scale – three, calling back to the idea of the three-legged stool seen in the literature review, is more consilience berry: alberta oil sands metaphorical discourse explicitly explained. at least once, whenever the three metaphor is used, the industry text will specify that the three parts to this scale – three metaphor are: environmental, social, and economic dynamics, or equivalents. it’s just enough specification for the reader to understand, assuming they understand what a scales does, that those three parts – environment, social, and economic – must be balanced to achieve the above sustainability, environmentalism or sustainable development/energy development. an obscure conscious metaphor, that of oil sands as playing cards, which did not appear in the preliminary research, is more clearly explained in text by explicitly referring to oil sands as “the ace” and “the trump card,” therefore apparently referring to the sustainability of the economy as a card game (syncrude canada ltd., 2009, p. 5). this metaphor is not expanded on elsewhere, and assumes a basic knowledge of card games that use a trump card. freeman refers to a card metaphor to explain an “interactionist model of social identity” wherein the cards in one’s hand can be equivalent to real world “social-structural processes,” thus having different cards will affect how you can and will play the game (2001, p. 293). this seems to be similar to how the oil sands as playing cards metaphor is used. 6. conclusion the sheer breadth and variety of metaphors found makes it clear that utilizing a systematic methodology to analysing texts for metaphor use is extremely valuable. metaphors are so engrained into our society that the use of a word such as “performance” can be used to refer to a theatre performance, business performance, or a machine’s performance (see section 5.2.2) and be understood. however, these performance metaphors are so engrained and common they become less and less meaningful for promoting a rich and varied discussion of oil sands sustainability. the personification of nature as gaia, mother, patient, or child permits a conceptual understanding of sustainability as being something fragile that one is responsible for (i.e. patient or child) or sustainability as something independent that is responsible for itself (i.e. gaia or mother). the metaphorization of sustainability as journey offers an opportunity to critique the actions of organizations that claim to be on a journey towards sustainability but do not place a limit on how long the journey must take. a journey can last anywhere from a second to two hundred years to a few thousand years to all of human existence, but generally when the metaphor of sustainability as journey is used there is no specification of a timeline and the destination is largely obscured by the journey smokescreen. sustainability as a scale or balance offers a slightly more defined understanding of sustainability and the organization’s part in sustainability. what creates a discussion is figuring out what the parts of the scale or the pieces being balanced are, exactly. as previously mentioned, generally they are divided into three parts – environment, social, and economic – but little is specified beyond that. what part of the environment, society, and the economy must be balanced? all of it or just a section? figuring out the answers to such questions will help promote a more sophisticated understanding of what sustainability can and should look like. perhaps this may come about through further creative use of the personification and balance metaphors. metaphorizing the environment to someone in their late teens rather consilience consilience than a small child or a parent would suggest that the environment was independent and self-sufficient to a degree, and will periodically object to involvement or guidance from others (i.e. humans), but often does nevertheless require some limited assistance or guidance from others. such a metaphor would provide a more balanced approach to sustainable development, without arbitrarily dividing the world into three sectors as the scale metaphor tends to. this is why metaphor analysis is important. it illustrates many components of sustainability that we have difficulties discussing in a consistent way, which can explain the problems we already have communicating with people about sustainability and other complex topics. the analysis of metaphors, however, has to occur with a systematic methodology otherwise the understanding of the metaphors used will be lacking. comparing the metaphors found during the literature review and those found through this analysis clearly displays the importance of a systematic methodology when analysing metaphors. it could be that the oil sands industry uses a greater variety of metaphors in its published texts than those texts analysed by others looking into metaphor, but this is unlikely as the analyses in the literature review may not have used the same texts but did focus on the same general topic – sustainability – which, judging by the similar metaphors found through the literature review and the industry text analysis, tends to be understood via similar metaphors across society sectors, texts, and individuals. in sum, it is a systematic analysis that permits an immense variety of metaphors to be found, analysed and understood in any metaphor analysis. thus, metaphor researchers should consider their methodology and its degree of systematic analysis thoroughly before beginning their research. consilience berry: alberta oil 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(hon) international development consultant superlemp@yahoo.com abstract this essay uses established united nations treaties and agreements on human “development” and progress, that were part of the post world war ii consensus, as a basis for rediscovering and reaffirming those “universal development goals” that were intended to be the measure of “development” success within all of the world’s countries and that can be recognized again as the u.n. sets its agenda and measures for post-2015 “development goals”. the author notes how the u.n.’s “millennium development goals (mdgs)” established for 2001 to 2015, abandoned the earlier global consensus to substitute a narrower vision duplicating the “civilizing mission” of european colonialism. this approach undermined global aspirations and substituted a vision of homogeneity and basic needs with no possibility for progress. current attempts to “fix” the failures of the mdgs with “sustainable development goals (sdgs)” continue to subvert the earlier agreements. the 13 principles for development that the international community outlined as the basis of humanity’s development vision after world war ii can serve as the basis for contemporary “universal development goals”. author’s note david lempert, ph.d., j.d., m.b.a., e.d. (hon.), social anthropologist and attorney, has pioneered approaches in comparative studies of development while also building the infrastructure for practical application and for interdisciplinary social science. he has worked in more than 30 countries and has founded ngos or projects in democratic experiential education, heritage protection, and sustainable development. this article is among a series of applied indicator and professional codes that he has published as part of an effort to protect professionalism and create accountability in the “development” sector/international interventions while promoting civilization and “progress”. acknowledgments thanks to professor paul kingston, head of the critical development studies department at the university of toronto, for challenging the author to outline a positive definition of “development” and to various editors at consilience who offered suggestions for making this piece more accessible to multiple audiences. keywords: united nations, millennium development goals (mdgs), sustainable development goals (sdgs); sustainable development, progress, development consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24 1. introduction imagine a world where the leaders from all of the most powerful and technologically advanced nations could not offer a single goal for their own progress. imagine if their only aspiration was increased productivity and consumption and that the only additional idea that they could add to that would be to assure that it might even be “sustainable” rather than destructive. imagine that the only other set of ideas they could suggest as part of their aspirations was to try to assure that those of different cultures, whose resources had been exploited for centuries, would be allowed some minimum support so as to partly live like those who had exploited them. such a world would be a dead world, with no imagination and no future. it would have no social progress. it would promote no creativity other than for technological efficiency. it would offer nothing for the human potential at the level of the individual, or cultures, or societies or the globe. we do not have to imagine it. that is, in fact, the world we live in today. yet, only three generations ago, at the end of world war ii, when the leaders of the world got together, the vision they had and signed in a number of basic treaties and agreements for humanity, was one that recognized a full spectrum of human possibilities in goals for “development”. as this article is being written, committees are being formed throughout the world under the auspices of the united nations and its member governments to propose a set of “development” goals for the future of humanity. non-governmental organizations and individuals are also seeking to draw up a list of the world’s development goals. these will replace the most recent set of goals that had been called the millennium development goals and that are scheduled to be revised in 2015 (u.n. millennium declaration, 2000). in fact, there already is a set of universal development goals that are recognized by the international community. it is visionary. it needs no political process to establish because it is already accepted and codified. the problem with it is simply that it is hidden under mounds of material and it has long been forgotten. this article demonstrates how established united nations treaties and agreements on human “development” and progress, that were part of the post world war ii consensus, can serve as a basis for outlining those “universal development goals”. this paper uses the tools of basic social science research and law to unearth and present again these hidden and forgotten “universal development goals” as a step in re-endorsing them for acceptance and implementation by the global community for our human future. in doing so, they may be re-affirmed as the measure of “development” success within all of the world’s countries as the u.n. sets its agenda and measures for post-2015 “development goals”. after unearthing these universal objectives, the author explains how the post-war treaties sought to change the cultural processes of colonialism and empire that led to the world wars of the 20th century and how that process has essentially failed. the u.n.’s “millennium development goals (mdgs)” established for 2001 to 2015, abandoned the global post-war consensus and its framework for global peace, security and rights protections, and reverted to the narrow “civilizing mission” (the phrase used by the french and implied by the british) of european colonialism in a way that undermined global aspirations and substituted a vision of homogeneity and basic needs with no possibility for progress. the piece further suggests how current attempts to “fix” the failures of the mdgs with “sustainable development goals (sdgs)” continue to subvert the earlier agreements consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24 and to potentially recreate the conditions that led to world war and the need for the original post-war consensus. finally, the piece helps crystallize the 13 areas development that the international community outlined as the basis of humanity’s development vision and points to a new set of actionable universal measures to fulfill the universal development goals. 2. methodology: unearthing the universal principles of development that are the international consensus the method for extracting key legal principles from laws and legal documents is relatively straightforward. the reason it hasn’t been done before in the area of “development” is also not hard to explain, since this is a relatively new area of international law. the methodology for extracting the basic principles from the body of treaties is one regularly used by lawyers and judges when trying to find the precepts underlying laws and is referred to as “statutory analysis”. though bodies drafting laws do not always fully define the theories and principles that they use when they reach a consensus and draft a law or a group of laws, legal scholars and judges routinely use laws and legal documents to reconstruct the underlying principles in order to apply them (cross, 1995; beninion, 2009; sutherland, 2010). although there is no formal body of “international development law” that is recognized as such, and there is certainly is no “case law” of judicial interpretations of the principles and elements of “international development” and its various aspects like “poverty reduction”, there already are several international laws and treaties that define the basic elements of rights and dignity that are part of the international consensus. some of these laws, for example, identify the essential elements for survival of communities and right to choice patterns of consumption for living sustainably (u.n. convention on the prevention and punishment of genocide (“genocide convention”), 1948). others define what is needed for children to “develop” to attain their full potential as human beings (the u.n. convention on the rights of the child (the “crc”), 1989. for development law to be recognized as a formal set of codified principles, it simply needs to be systematized through a process of statutory analysis and placed in a format equivalent to other legal “treatises” in other areas of law. identifying and systematizing laws in different areas is similar to what social scientists also do in “deconstructing” texts to find the guiding logic underlying them. the empirical “data” used to explore human behavior and draw conclusions comes from the written texts, themselves. not everything is explicit, but there are also some implied conditions and elements for the overall principles to work. that method can be applied here. the fact that international legal scholars and development practitioners have yet to produce a treatise or codification of laws on “development” is perfectly understandable. this area of international law is new. attention has focused more on international commercial law and on criminal law where specific parties had immediate needs for legal remedies and lawyers. moreover, the details of the principles of development have taken some time to elaborate. although some of the basic frameworks were established immediately on the founding of the united nations, in the united nations charter, (1946) and its initial declarations, some principles on rights of children and minority groups, that are fundamental to elaborating the concept of “development”, took more time before there was consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24 an international consensus on what was “universal”. the crc appeared forty years after world war ii and some of the fundamental rights of ethnic groups, that were codified into criminal law in the genocide convention were only now more recently spelled out in the united nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (2007). while the universal principles now underlying these laws are now available to be systematized and the process is relatively straightforward, there have still been questions on enforcement procedures. what is available is a set of overlapping, confusing legal documents, sometimes appearing contradictory and with unclear applicability, ranging from enforceable international criminal laws to declarations or as conventions without clear enforcement processes. but just because enforcement procedures may not be clearly specified, that does not mean that the principles of development that are recognized as international universals with the consensus of the international community cannot be spelled out for use in the form of universal development goals. they certainly can be. this author has now been completing codification process in the area of international “development”. the author has worked through the details of codifying the principles of international development in a recent peer review article (lempert, 2014) as one of a series of steps that are codifying international development law in a treatise. such works are subject to peer review to assure a consensus and use of appropriate professional methods and tools. the author has now completed 12 such articles with 8 of them now published or forthcoming. the one of specific interest here is the one that sets the framework; the principles of “development”. others work to codify sub-principles within the framework, codifying the universally recognized international legal principles for “sustainable development” (lempert and nguyen, 2008) as well as other principles like “poverty alleviation” and “sovereignty”. below is a quick summary of the international community’s principles for “development” in general, and their basis, taken from that recent article. they are presented here as a foundation for examining what has gone astray in establishing universal development goals and then for placing those “universal development goals” (“udgs”) before the international community so they may be reaffirmed. 3. what the international community and the u.n. charter established – summary the internationally accepted framework principles for “development” that are found in international laws fall into four categories, at the level of the individual (personal development), society, cultural group, and at the global level (for relations among peoples) with a total of 13 elements. they are found in some of the most basic international laws and treaties that specifically use the word “development”. the key international treaties that recognize universal principles of “development” are: the university declaration of human rights written at the founding of the united nations in 1948, that sets an overall framework; the convention on the rights of the child that introduces concepts of individual (personal) development and of communities (1989)) and the genocide convention that was also signed in 1948, as one of the basics of international law, establishing the elements of development for cultures and ethnic groups. though still relatively recent and not universally accepted given questions consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24 on enforcement, the declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (undrip) (2007) is an elaboration of the genocide convention in ways that suggest what it means to fully “develop” communities/cultures. the undrip is written to protect “indigenous peoples” but it embodies the principles of cultural and community vitality for all human groups. other treaties, including the basic “rights” treaties – the international covenants on civil and economic rights (1966), and on economic, social and cultural rights (1966) – as well as the rio declaration (the conference on environment and development) (1992), reiterate and flesh out the concepts of development that are mentioned in the basic documents above. in brief, the international community recognizes the following 13 universal elements of “development” in four categories. individual/personal development: 1. physical (body) development: the international community values developing individual physical abilities as part of health, confidence and awareness as well as cultural expressions and economic and social activities that rely on body expression. 2. mental development: the international community recognizes the importance of developing both intellectual/mental abilities and also mental health (“psychological treatment”/ “responsible life in a free society”/ “rest, leisure and recreational activities”). added separately, though certainly part of mental attributes, is science. the international community recognizes mental development as very different from basic education or just job training. it is an expression of unique abilities of each individual. 3. spiritual (appreciation of natural world) development: the international community recognizes the value of individuals development: “respect for the natural environment” (biophilia – the innate love of nature – and the human responsibility for stewardship of biodiversity of eco-systems), along with religious freedom and the value of peace and tolerance, that could be said to be spiritual. this appreciation is different than just protecting or living with the environment. it implies respect, responsibility, and understanding. 4. moral (appreciation of others as individuals) development: the international community recognizes “respect for rights and fundamental freedoms”; “respect for civilizations other than his own”; and ”understanding, peace, [and] tolerance”. this is different from obedience to laws or rules. it implies empathy and responsibility as well as long-term responsibility to future generations and the unborn and to humanity. 5. social (appreciation of community) development: in this category, international agreements recognize the development of individual “respect for parents, cultural identity, language and values”. the word “respect” implies understanding and appreciation of how social institutions were formed and chosen, how they are shaped and by what standards they are valued. they are neither to be obeyed nor replaced at the subject of any authority (governmental or international agent or outside influence). consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24 moreover, there is no mention here of respect for the state or political hierarchy or power, or to material wealth or consumption. identity and values are above these. 6. cultural (appreciation of one’s identity) development: cultural development can be seen as an extension of “social development” beyond family and social institutions and to include all attributes of culture and pride in one’s culture including “cultural and artistic life” and protection of “archaeological and historical sites, artifacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts and literature” as well as economic and political practices and skills that are beyond “social” and artistic or religious. pride and understanding include the ability to enrich culture and to promote its strengths and ability to be sustainable, without wishing to discard, abandon, neglect, debase or replace it. societal level development: the international community’s recognition of societal level development is both as a means to promote individual development and an ends at promoting a universally recognized ideal of a “good society”. there are three elements. 1. social equity/ “social progress”/equal opportunity: the international community recognizes this aspect of development as essential to the promotion of individual human development to the fullest. creating it requires not just finding short-term “income generation” strategies to raise current consumption levels for the poor or empowering them to increase their consumption relative to the wealthy but also convincing the haves of their long-term interests in solidarity with others as part of a common advancing humanitarian future to sustainably share existing resources and opportunities. 2. political equity/ “equal rights”: the international community recognizes the development of political equality as essential to full access to resources for the highest attainment of individual potential. it includes political rights such as free expression of views and “freedom of thought, conscience and religion” as well as “freedom from fear” along with attention to human “dignity”. like social equity, creating it requires changing the mindset of those with power and building institutions that protect and advance an understanding that diversity and empathy are part of linked survival concerns for societies and humanity. 3. peace/ tolerance/ de-militarization: the international community also recognizes that the pre-requisite for human development is “an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding”. “de-colonialization” of hegemonic structures of inequality, assimilation and oppression in formal colonial regimes and elimination of pressures by superpowers on smaller countries is envisioned as the key to this goal everywhere. the goal of the international community is not to simply reduce conflicts, through homogenization of cultures (assimilation) or the elimination of differences, nor acceptance by the weaker of their inferiority (the suppression of legitimate conflict in the name of “peace”), but to create mechanisms that protect diversity and negotiation of that diversity with recognition of the importance of such diversity to human survival. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24 cultural/community development: the international community does not specify what cultures (ethnic groups) require to develop, but the overall right of cultural development is recognized as based on a fundamental principle: sustainability of cultures in their environments. sustainability/(sovereignty): before a culture or community can consider developing, it must be assured that its basic existence as a sovereign culture is guaranteed. though the international system does not yet recognize the specific sovereignty of cultures that are not nation states, the international community does recognize the prerequisites of sustainability. global development: the international community establishes pre-requisites for cultural development that are also parallel to and in addition to those of individual personality development, but at the global level rather than the societal level. achievement of these objectives also requires understandings and change in powerful cultures as part of a recognition of what is required for long-term human progress and survival. there are three elements. 1. social equity/ “social progress”/equal opportunity: the international recognition of social equity amongst cultures is not a call for equal consumption and production patterns in a homogeneous world system that assimilates all cultures to a single global standard and way of life. it is the recognition of equal opportunity of peoples to their environments to live and function comfortably and sustainably within them, with their own choices of production and consumption, without pressures from others that would take away those economic bases and resources that are fundamental to their equal opportunity to survive as cultures. 2. political equity/ “equal rights”: if political rights are essential at the individual level for personality development, they are also essential at the level of cultures in order to protect their right to development. 3. peace/ tolerance/ de-militarization: it is also a universal principle that cultures also require demilitarization and an end to hegemonic pressures (e.g., military threats, manipulation of youth and their values through various psychological and social influences, corruption of leaders) if they are truly to be free to develop. how the international community failed to change the culture of colonialism and imperialism that led to the world wars of the 20th century: anyone reading the above list of development elements cannot fail to recognize them both as fundamental human aspirations and as a set of principles that has also somehow disappeared from discussions of “development”. the “universal development goals” that the international community began to establish after world war ii were visionary. the intent in establishing international commitment and consensus was to change the cultural processes of colonialism and empire that led to the world wars of the 20th century and to build a new vision for humanity. now, some 70 years after the end of the second world war, it is clear that the process has failed. the previous national mindsets that led to those wars seem to have reappeared. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24 what has happened is that the u.n.’s “millennium development goals (mdgs)” established for 2001 to 2015, abandoned the global post-war consensus and reverted to the narrow “civilizing mission” of european colonialism. they undermined global aspirations and substituted a vision of homogeneity and basic needs with no possibility for progress. now, current attempts to “fix” the failures of the mdgs with “sustainable development goals (sdgs)” appear to suffer from the same lack of memory and vision in ways that continue to subvert the earlier agreements and to potentially recreate the conditions that led to world war and the need for the original post-war consensus. 4. the millennium development goals and their failure: it is easy to see the difference between the universally established international principles for “development” and those that characterize both the millennium development goals as well as almost all discussions today of “development”. one simply needs to compare the two lists to see how little they have in common. it is also easy to recognize that the failure reflects a reassertion of the same ideologies that led the world to world war ii. with a little bit of research, it is easy to find an example of development policies in empires prior to world war ii and to see that their “development” policies, though under slightly different names (such as the “civilizing mission” of the french in its colonies), are essentially indistinguishable from the approaches in the millennium development goals today. comparing the universal development goals with the millennium development goals: in the year 2000, in choosing ways to measure “development” and progress for humanity, the world’s leaders created what they called the “millennium development goals”. they chose eight areas of “development” and established target groups as well as target outcomes. in doing so, they seemed to completely abandon the universal development goals that they had painstakingly established in laws and treaties and replaced them with the lowest common denominator for humanity; a focus simply on basic animal needs for human beings and their assimilation into a homogeneous urban vision of state schooling and equal treatment of males and females as employees. whichever way one runs the comparison, it is easy to see the disconnect. in a recent article, after detailing the principles of development that were established by the international community, this author examined the eight mdgs that the international community had selected for 2001 to 2015 and asked whether they were universally applicable to all countries and fulfilled the elements of development as established in the elements of international laws and treaties (lempert, 2014, table 1). for all eight, the answer was clearly “no”. (in brief, the eight mdgs are: end poverty and hunger by increasing resources of the lowest 25%, offer university primary education, promote gender equality, reduce infant mortality and promote child health, promote maternal health, combat hiv/aids, address environmental sustainability through species protection and lowering of ozone and co2 levels, and promote global partnerships in the area of trade, finance, technology transfer, debt relief and governance. details can be found on the undp website and in undp documents as well as in specific country documents (un millennium declaration, 2000; un 2013).) consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24 table 1. universally recognized aspirations for development and the international community’s recognition of them through the millennium development goals 1. indiv idual deve lopment objec t ives : elements response o f the internat ional community through the mdgs 1. physical (body) development: limited in recipients and in applications. current mdg 1 (on poverty and hunger) partly addresses basic animal needs as do mdgs 4, 5 and 6 that focus on basic health (infant and child health, maternal health, and hiv/aids) but the approach of the mdgs is just to support minimal physical development of “the poor” and then to stop. 2. mental development: dubious. current mdg 2 (primary education) promotes top-down universal primary state schooling (with curriculum set by national authorities and with international goals) for those not yet subject to it or excluded from it, but such schooling often destroys cultures and traditional education, skills, and respect for local environments, language, history and values. it is not responsive to individual desires and does not seek to improve mental development of the vast majority. 3. spiritual (appreciation of natural world) development: abandoned. current mdg 7 (on the environment) promotes green space (land devoted to forest and parks) and lowering of pollutants but does not change the attitudes or policies that have led to environmental damage because of the loss of spiritual appreciation for nature. 4. moral (appreciation of others as individuals) development: abandoned. 5. social (appreciation of community) development: abandoned. 6. cultural (appreciation of one’s identity) development: abandoned and contradicted by mdg 2 (primary schooling) that generally works to assimilate cultures and substitute traditional education with state directed classroom education promoting the history, language, culture and goals of the dominant national groups. 2. socie tal leve l deve lopment objec t ives : : elements response o f the internat ional community through the mdgs 7. social equity/ social progress/ equal opportunity for dubious. current mdg 1 (poverty and hunger) focuses on the lower 25% but tries to resolve inequity through productivity and cultural destruction to generate shortconsilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24 individuals term income increases for the “poor”, rather than through empowerment or distributional equity policies (e.g., higher taxation on the rich and legal protection of merit-based systems and choice) without any social solidarity and changes in distribution of opportunity; current mdg 3 (gender equality) tries to achieve equality in the area of gender, only, and in ways that do not protect traditional cultures and do not deal with any inequities to males or underlying causes of gender inequity (e.g., militarization and violence). 8. political equity/ equal rights for individuals: abandoned other than for women through mdg 3 (gender equality) and without addressing underlying causes of gender inequity or inequities faced by men. 9. peace/ tolerance/ de-militarization for individuals: abandoned. 3. cultural/ community leve l deve lopment objec t ives : elements response o f the internat ional community through the mdgs 10. sustainability/ (sovereignty) of cultures: abandoned and contradicted by mdg 8 (promoting global partnerships) that promotes trade and technology transfer to the detriment of resource protections and sustainability. 4. global deve lopment objec t ives : elements response o f the internat ional community through the mdgs 11. social equity/ social progress/ equal opportunity of cultures: abandoned and contradicted by mdg 8 (promoting global partnerships) and mdg 2 (primary education) that work to industrialize, urbanize and homogenize cultures in their production and consumption rather than to promote diversity and equity between them. 12. political equity/ equal rights for cultures: abandoned and contradicted by mdg 8 (promoting global partnerships) and mdg 2 (primary education) that work to urbanize and homogenize cultures rather than to promote diversity and equity between them. 13. peace/ tolerance/ de-militarization for protection of cultures: undermined. current mdg 8 (promoting global partnerships) tries to do this through homogenization and a single, top-down approach to globalization in ways that actually destabilize cultures and long term prospects for peace (lempert and nguyen, 2011). consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24 here, we can see the disconnect by running the comparison in reverse. table 1 lists the principles that form the udgs (in the left column) and analyzes how the eight mdgs do in furthering them (the right hand column). although one needs to be familiar with the eight mdgs and how they are actually interpreted and applied by the international community in order to fully follow this analysis, one does not have to know all of the details of the mdg applications to see the clear disconnect between the udgs and the mdgs. table 1 suggests that of the 13 udgs, the mdgs directly undermine prospects for one of them (global peace and tolerance), abandon and partly undermine four of them, fully abandon four and partly abandon another, and directly recognize only three with either dubious or limited impact and scope. the mdgs have essentially hijacked the u.n. system’s “development” agenda. instead of “development” as defined by universal international principles, the mdgs have substituted the goals of globalization; raising consumption on a certain number of indicators, through and including nation state schooling and trade. the goals seek to promote consumption and assimilation/homogenization in place of “development”. no development goals are applied to wealthy and powerful countries; they are deemed to stagnate. the international community’s original vision focused on human beings and their aspirations at all levels for their individual personal development, for improvement of their communities, for diversity and tolerance, and for a better world. in its place, the mdgs substituted a focus on production of things as the measure of humanity and the meeting of basic animal needs while losing site of alternatives (schumacher, 1973; brown, 1984 to 2001). comparing the millennium development goals with the pre-world war ii colonial approach to development that they were supposed to replace: while it is not easy to explain “why” the international community has collectively decided to close its eyes to humanity’s universal aspirations for development and its approach for avoiding a return to the kind of world that led to world war ii, it is easy to show that this is indeed the case by comparing the view of “development” during the colonial era before world war ii with the approach taken in the mdgs. though there are no specific studies of the origin of the mdg agenda, there is a way to test the anthropological axiom; that systems continue in their cultural patterns unless forced to change. there are excellent historical records of european colonialism in asia, africa and latin america in the period before world war ii, describing the work of religious missionaries, charities and governments in working with local peoples and native peoples. for the purposes of this article, the author chooses three of the 30 countries in which he has worked for this test: viet nam, laos and cambodia, where the author has worked for most of the past 10 years documenting colonial history and sites (lempert, unpublished). the french “civilizing mission” in its colonies was very clear in the form of church hospitals, state schools, health infrastructure, and foreign laws and concepts of “equality” (jameson, 1993; logan and askew, 1994). table 2 places the mdgs side by side with the french “civilizing mission” in a way that elicits the striking similarity between the two. in the left column are the mdgs. the right column describes the french equivalents. although we could also create a table with the udgs, such as table 1, and consider whether the french offered anything else beyond consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24 the mdgs that matched the udgs, the results would only show some minor differences. the french did pay some attention to documenting historical and cultural sites, building technical schools and higher education, and to landscape and art in ways that go beyond what the mdgs do today. if anything, the mdgs may be even more narrow than preworld war ii “development” under the french. the results would be similar for other preworld war ii colonial empires. what is also clear from the table is that the mdg approach replicated the fatal legacy of post-world war i european relief that led to world war ii; treatment of symptoms of poverty in ways that generated high population growth but with little or no focus on sustainability; thus assuring poverty and collapse as children reached adulthood. it is also striking that it is the governments of the former colonies that have signed onto the mdgs. the anthropological explanation is that the leaders of these former colonies were trained in the colonial mentality and their systems also often continued much like those under colonial rule but simply with local elites replacing the foreign powers (gunder frank, et. al., 1972;wallerstein, 1979). table 2. colonial origins of the millennium development goals: french colonial interventions millennium development goal and measures analys is o f french colonial “civi l izing miss ion” act iv i t i es on the basis o f whether they ref l e c t the mdgs and their implementat ion (using indochina, 1860 – 1945) 1. end poverty and hunger, including increasing the share of the lowest 25% yes, the french introduced the same productive ideology for reducing poverty that is found in undp projects based on the mdgs; promoting small business and export crops and building sanitation systems, irrigation systems and roads along with schools, and using community labor for investment to combat “poverty”. treatment of minorities imposed the same leveling effect as today, including abolition of slavery to protect the lowest 25%, without concern for sustainability or wealth protection. 2. offer universal education (at the primary school level) yes, the french introduced community schools (same as the state schools of today for nation building and symbol manipulating skills) to promote french literacy and to unify the areas under their control and replace local autonomy. 3. gender equality in a relative sense, yes. the french created schools for girls as well as for boys and the idea was to create the same gender relations as in europe, including protections of women through french legal codes, though the concepts of equality were different from today. 4. child health (reduce infant mortality) yes, this was a key goal of french missionary activities and associated hospitals as well as of specific health institutes like the pasteur institutes. they promoted vaccines and sanitation campaigns much like the mdgs. 5. maternal health yes, the mother and child hospitals were a key to the hospital and health systems introduced by the french. the french consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24 symbol was that of mary and baby jesus. 6. combat hiv/aids in a relative sense, yes. though there was no hiv/aids, there was venereal disease and the french established special clinics (e.g., hanoi) for soldiers and local prostitutes to receive treatment. 7. environmental sustainability: species protection, lowering of ozone and co2 levels. in a sense that the u.n. has subverted the goal of natural asset protection to that of clean water and particularized rather than holistic and integrated interventions that protect specific aspects of the environment but do not protect sustainability of peoples or assets, one can say that this was the french model for water sanitation and parks. the french environmental consciousness was limited to aesthetics (landscaping and gardens) in a way that is analogous to the mdg approach to symptoms rather than root causes. 8. global partnership: rule based trade and finance, sustainable debts; technology transfer, good governance, debt relief yes, the french idea of technology transfer (building technical schools and institutes, offering scholarship and work permits to france, to turn colonies into models of contemporary french production and consumption) and “civilizing” the locals was all based on a concept of globalization/ french civilization that promoted trade and solidarity. total 5 of the 8 mdgs appear to be taken directly from the french colonial model while the remaining three, that are more time specific, seem consistent with the french colonial ideology for “civilizing” the natives. 5. attempts to “fix” the mdgs with “sustainable development goals” and other schemes and where they fail: while the international community is now calling for new sets of development goals such as “sustainable development goals” (“sdgs”) and other goals and measures, there is still a disconnect with the international consensus on development as established in the universal development principles. as the period designated for the mdgs comes to a close in 2015, there is recognition that they have failed on perhaps the single most important element for global peace and security; sustainable development. but this is only one of 13 integrated elements of “development”. recent analyses of the mdgs have made it clear that they have failed in environmental protection and sustainability planning (un fact sheet, 2013) and this failure, alone, can undermine all of the purported achievements on the other mdgs (lempert and nguyen, 2008). at the time this article is being written, the focus of the international community is simply on sdgs; an initiative promoted by the rio +20 of june 2-12 with open working groups (u.n. “a new global partnership”, 2013). but it is easy to see that the thinking still does not incorporate the universal principles of development and simply continues the mdgs under the banner of “sustainable and equitable economic growth” in the belief that “eradicating poverty is the greatest global challenge facing the world today (p. 1). the problem is also visible in the key measure used in the international community of well-being that continues to be promoted. the major measure of development that is consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24 now used internationally is the “human development index” (hdi) constructed by amartya sen and mahbub ul haq in 1990 (sen and ul haq, u.n. human development report). the inclusive measures for generating the index are really those of productivity without cultural or individual diversity. they are: life expectancy (similar lifestyles and consumption leading to similar aging), formal state schooling/literacy, and average per capita incomes. moreover, the index ranks countries, in violation of the basic principles of nondiscrimination and support for diverse consumption choices that are established in international treaties. this index is not a development or poverty reduction index that fulfills the multiple objectives enumerated in international agreements. reaffirming the international community’s universal development goals and making them actionable after 2015: the international community already has a set of 13 universal development principles that have international legal status and that can apply to every country and independent and diverse paths for development. they simply need to be recognized as goals, called what they are – universal development goals (udgs) – and specified with targets that can be measured and provide the basis for actions and not just words on paper. this article does not establish what the specific targets should be. that is for the peoples of the world to decide in offering the full potential of their creativity and aspirations. it simply refocuses the debate within the established legal framework that has been forgotten and shows not only that such a framework exists but that the aspirations are indeed measurable. table 3 reaffirms the visionary model of development that is already enshrined in international law but has been forgotten. it presents the four categories of 13 universal international principles of development as udgs in the left column. the right column offers reference to the professional measures that already exist for establishing the targets that make these actionable. what is important to recognize is that the udgs are not simply something imposed or induced on the poor by the rich. they are measures of “progress” in which all countries and individuals can continually monitor their own improvement. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24 table 3. universally recognized aspirations for development (“universal development goals”) and their measures and targets 1. indiv idual development goals : overal l objec t ives spec i f i c measures 1. physical (body) development: measurement: longevity, growth, physical fitness, health indicators targets: to be negotiated actions: universal health care; sustainable livable cities – park space and recreational facilities and time in school, work, neighborhoods; bike lanes; reduction of environmental pollutants 2. mental development: measurement: skills and multiple intelligences development (gardner, 1993) as culturally appropriate and as based on individual cultural aspirations and talents as well as fitted to surrounding environment targets: based on bottom-up decisions by individuals for their needs and aspirations, not top-down by states (lempert, briggs, et. al., 1995) actions: equal right to education rather than economically stratified schooling; schools have the equivalent of laboratories, gardens, workshops; integrated teaching with community field work and integrated with different age groups and with environment; universal psychological care; lifelong learning vouchers; libraries, museums and arts development 3. spiritual (appreciation of natural world) development: measurement: not yet developed though under discussion by environmental educators and social studies educators (lempert, briggs, et. al. 1985) targets: to be negotiated actions: nature retreats and excursions in school curricula; rooftop and community garden spaces and green spaces; pets and plants; restoration and use of eco-systems (marine, riverine, forest, coast); study of basic technologies and crafts within the outdoor environment; study of ancestors’ technologies, cultures and ways of life as part of history and social science education beyond the classroom and as part of cultural education and tolerance education 4. moral (appreciation of others as individuals) development: measurement: moral awareness educational measures (piaget, 1965; higgins and kohlberg, 1989) targets: to be negotiated actions: consumption and environmental impact (“footprint”) targets for individuals; family planning, contraception and relationship training and guidance mechanisms; parenting, mentoring, role modeling and guidance systems in place; 5. social (appreciation of measurement: community affinity, participation, and attachment and amount of outmigration and “brain drain” (loss of the most capable people and their skills); local rituals and events and consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24 community) development: participation; percentage of tax contributions and donations of all kinds (scotland, 2004; mcconnell, 2002; packham, 2008) targets: to be negotiated actions: volunteer work activities for all levels of society and all ages; universal service but also de-militarization for those serving in militaries; sustainable government systems through taxation not resource sales or foreign subsidy; democratic experiential education (lempert, briggs et. al., 1995) 6. cultural (appreciation of one’s identity) development: measurement: bilingualism, cultural identification, cultural knowledge, historic preservation, museums targets: reverse current rates of cultural and language loss actions: bilingual schooling and cultural knowledge; promote traditional language restoration and use of customs and skills, museums and exhibits 2. socie tal leve l deve lopment goals overal l objec t ives development goals 7. social equity/ social progress/ equal opportunity for individuals measurement: “gini” coefficient for distribution (the standard sociological measure of income distribution) balanced by culture rights to protect differences/preferences in consumption and production as part of protecting cultural sustainability targets: lower the gini coefficient through reducing the upper 1% and 25%. qualify use of gini to assimilated urban or urbanizing groups. actions: through taxes on wealth, income, and transfers but do not create a leveling effect or homogenizing effect in consumption among cultures in different environments with different choices. 8. political equity/ equal rights for individuals: measurement: governance mechanisms that change the balance of power and their actual use: juries, class action lawsuits (where suits are maintained by large groups of citizens as a bloc), private attorneys general (where individual citizens can begin prosecutions on criminal laws to protect the public interest where government prosecutors do not prosecute, often due to conflicts of interest); electoral barriers (that make it difficult for additional parties or individuals to compete against elite interests including concentrations of private and corporate money and power); civilian control of military and police within cultural context (lempert, 2009b; 2011) targets: to be negotiated actions: model constitutions adapted (lempert, 1994); participatory civics skills education to certified levels 9. peace/ tolerance/ demilitarization measurement: national and local peace indices (institute for economics and peace/ iep) targets: to be negotiated actions: civilian re-immersion training for those serving in consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24 for individuals: military; swedish model of military resistance training (a 1970s approach to public non-compliance with authority in forms of effective civil disobedience against invasive centralized control through force); negotiation skills training and conflict resolution/mediation; gun control, elimination of death penalty; de-institutionalization and re-absorption of prison populations 3. cultural/ community leve l goals overal l objec t ives development goals 10. sustainability/ (sovereignty) of cultures: measurement: cultural “red-book” measures for cultural endangerment (following the model used for listing levels of species vulnerability used by environmentalists) (lempert, 2010); global sustainability measures (brown, 1991; center for the advancement of a steady state economy) targets: reverse current rate of cultural extinction actions: sustainable development plans at the cultural level for 50 to 100 years (lempert and nguyen, 2008); sustainability transitions (daly, 2011; dietz and o’neil, 2013; lempert, mccarty and mitchell, 1995, 1998) 4. global deve lopment goals overal l objec t ives development goals 11. social equity/ social progress/ equal opportunity of cultures: measurement: cultural red-book measures for cultural endangerment (lempert, 2010) targets: to be negotiated actions: natural resource/ wealth accounting on a national and cultural basis as well as per capita to assure maintenance; accession to cultural rights enforcement in international courts of justice 12. political equity/ equal rights for cultures: measurement: measures of federalism (effective balances of power among different cultural groups, large and small) assuring minority culture vetoes and control of national and international military and police forces; designations for minorities in legislatures; designations for minority blocks in selection of judges (lempert, 2009b) targets: to be negotiated actions: federalism objectives in legislatures, courts, and control of militaries as well as in un system, itself 13. peace/ tolerance/ demilitarization for measurement: global peace indices (institute for economics and peace/ iep; galtung, 1975); de-colonialization of institutions (lempert and nguyen, 2011) and of dependency (lempert, 2009) targets: to be negotiated actions: sustainable development plans for all countries; footprint consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24 protection of cultures: reduction for all countries; dependency reduction and lack of foreign dependency on outside for key areas for major cultures (e.g., energy) 6. conclusion – breaking the cycle and achieving human progress: since the industrial revolution, authors have been writing about how humans have became alienated from nature, alienated from each other, in communities that are failing and in ways in which they are “growing up absurd” (goodman, 1947, 1956; roszak, 1978). the international community already has a way to overcome the absurdity, to create meaning, to define “progress” and to promote human aspirations in the way of “development”. it needs to remember what they are, dream again, and face the reality of what is likely to happen if these principles, designed to stave off the next world war, are not followed. it is time to focus again on the earlier consensus reached by humanity. it is time to follow those agreements in an enlightened vision for humanity that offers measures of progress before choosing a dark vision of humans simply as animals satisfying basic consumption needs. we already have a blueprint for universal development goals. we need to agree on the measures and set targets. it is a process in which everyone can consider his or her own aspirations for individual development, for community protections and development and for real human “progress” for all countries and peoples, not just of meeting basic needs in the most exploited countries. the mdgs did not offer anything to measure for the u.s. or europe or japan but the udgs do. and it is easy to see if they are moving forward or backwards. (in many ways, it is clear that they are moving backwards; regressing and either stagnating or reversing development!) in political action, one can use the udgs as a standard for political leaders. are they promoting development and progress or are they actually limiting humanity and regressing? the same can be applied to the international system, itself, to see whether governments are protecting or failing humanity. the answers may explain why governments may fear to be held to these standards. for personal development, one can try to measure one’s status in a way that is separate just from material goods and comparative well being, but that considers the whole person and being human. for community development, one can consider personal and community. the results one finds on the individual and community level may also not be pleasant, but they do offer motivations to act. governments and the international community are currently using measures that seem to push human societies to their lowest common denominator, closer to the attributes of animal groups rather than to the realization of potentials that are those of humans. appeals are made to “security” or to animal needs but not to real peace or development or progress. the udgs are not only a way to direct action but a test of where we are, where we are going and whether we are being led or mis-led. the international community developed them for good reason. human reason suggests that we must reaffirm this legacy or face the consequences of another world war. consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24 bibliography beninion, francis alan roscoe (2009). understanding common law legislation: drafting and interpretation, oxford: oxford university press. brown, lester (1981), building a sustainable society, worldwatch institute, new york: w.w. norton. brown, lester (1984 to 2001), state of the world (annual series), worldwatch institute, new york: w. w. norton. center for the advancement of the steady state economy, www.steadystate.org cross, rupert (1995). statutory interpretation, oxford: oxford university press. daly, herman (2011), “moving from a failed growth economy to a steady state economy,” presentation to the aaas (unpublished). devries, r. & zan, b. 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"an historical perspective: the emergence of the new economic order." the capitalist world economy. new york: cambridge u. press. at the present moment, australian schools fail to administer meaningful sustainability education to empower young people in engaging with the united nations sustainable development goals (sdgs) owing to a lack of governmental and wider systematic support. an analysis of the australian ‘cross-curriculum priorities’ (cpps) illustrates the inherently tokenistic nature of australian policies towards sustainable development, presenting a barrier to the empowerment of young people within australian educational institutions. flaws evident among the ccps generates two-tiered social disempowerment regarding efforts towards sustainability in australia. the first tier of disempowerment is endured by school teachers and inevitably disperses into the second tier, which is the disempowerment of australian students. the absence of mandatory training and support for australian school teachers towards implementing the ‘sustainability’ ccp into school curriculums significantly disadvantages view journal | view issue do young people in australian educational systems receive do young people in australian educational systems receive adequate support to feel empowered in engaging with adequate support to feel empowered in engaging with sustainable development goals?sustainable development goals? sarah h. morley school of social sciences, monash university, melbourne, australia 3800, email: sarahmorleys@gmail.com keywords:keywords: policy, youth empowerment, sustainable development goals abstract:abstract: with the anticipated rise of over double the paris agreement’s 2°c goal, climate change is likely to jeopardize the prosperity of future generations. thus, it has become increasingly apparent that young demographics must be integrated into the process required to achieve the un’s sustainable development goals (sdgs) owing to their disproportionately threatened futures over that of adult demographics. a major barrier to children engaging with sdg progress is evident in australian educational policies, which fail to provide adequate opportunities for young people. moreover, a lack of individual autonomy in young people can lead to feelings of disempowerment regarding sustainability. hence, at the present moment, young people in australian educational institutions are deprived of adequate support systems that could help them feel empowered by contributing to sustainability progress. research methods undertaken for this paper include literature review, interviews with australian students and teachers, research into successful international frameworks for youth programs, policy review, and analysis of australian educational frameworks. opportunities for empowerment through education and intergenerational support are vital for children to be integrated into the work of sdgs. this fails to transpire within australian educational institutions. although there exist various independent organisations which promote tools for youth empowerment throughout australia, the lack of wider systematic support results in insufficient accessibility for teachers and students alike. whilst young people possess the capacity to play a role in politically securitising climate change and the achievement of sdgs, supportive systems are required through structural changes, including policy, to initiate progress. author’s note:author’s note: as a graduate of international relations, i am interested in analysing the potential for national policy to impact transnational concerns. sustainability is at the forefront of my research within the current context of escalating threats from climate change upon national security worldwide. i attribute the far-reaching lack of governmental support for sustainable progress to neoliberal reliance upon the commodification of nature, in addition to the challenge of changing behavioural patterns, as two primary barriers to sustainable social transformations. in 2019, i was fortunate to have the opportunity to present a research poster at the international conference on sustainable development. there, one of the presenting categories was ‘engaging across the generations: children and the sdgs’. this prompted me to investigate the australian school system regarding sustainable development in order to analyse whether australian educational policy provides adequate frameworks to support young people in achieving sustainable lifestyles and systems more broadly. i was especially interested given the current spotlight on young figures including greta thunberg and her symbol for youth empowerment, in addition to my past experience working as a violin teacher and mentor for french students wherein i learned the impact of education upon youth perspectives. the ability for educational institutions to positively or negatively impact the behaviour of young people is of great interest to me, particularly given the increasing international awareness amongst young people regarding sustainability through movements including the school climate strikes. by exploring the consequences of australian education policies upon youth disempowerment and presenting the classroom as opportunity for behavioural change, i hope to encourage conversation regarding solutions to the significant detriment evident in the australian education system surrounding sustainability. 86 doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6745 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 86-92july 6, 2020 http://consiliencejournal.org https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/consilience/issue/view/651 consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6745 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 86-9287 the empowerment of young people. this is demonstrated through the resigned attitude among students towards resolving climate change issues, which occurs in classroom contexts wherein social norms are learned and practiced. given that behaviour change is indispensable for creating sustainable societies, it is evident that the lack of systematic support within australian classrooms to encourage constructive practices concerning sustainability generates disempowerment among young populations in engaging with sdgs and, more broadly, sustainability. backgroundbackground prospects for meaningful sustainable development are threatened globally. this is of immediate concern across australia, with an economy so reliant on fossil fuel production that it is one of the highest producers of co2 emissions per capita internationally (world bank, 2019). australia has endured a multitude of harsh climate change ramifications, transpiring most obviously in the form of extreme bushfires which culminated following september 2019. over 11 million hectares of australian land was burned, vastly eclipsing the damage sustained in the california and amazon fires collectively (chapman, 2020). in addition to destroying thousands of homes and essential ecosystems, the bushfires have killed humans and wildlife directly through the flames, as well as indirectly through the resulting compromised air quality. the ramifications of extreme weather events mostly affect marginalised social groups, including indigenous communities, who have contributed the least towards harmful emissions. hence, whilst the harmful environmental effects of climate change are universal in nature, certain population groups are at higher risk than others (white, 2011). in addition to marginalised social groups, entire generations of young people are especially vulnerable to current climatic changes. with global figures anticipating a rise in temperature over double the paris agreement’s 2°c goal climate change will likely jeopardize the prosperity of future generations unless it is securitised as a national emergency and reflected as such through substantial policy change. it has become increasingly apparent that young demographics must be integrated into the process required to enact effective sustainable development, owing to the disproportionate threat to their futures over that of adult demographics. given the absence of comprehensive sustainable policies and frameworks tailored to the australian context, the sdgs will be utilised as an archetype framework to pursue within australia for the purpose of this paper. furthermore, despite the fact that climate change has been comprehensively proven by scientific research, domestic and international media continue to present the existence and severity of climate change as ‘political’ debate (white, 2011, p. 14). therefore, an analysis of australian education policies is beneficial in order to observe the degree to which young people’s education may be influenced by political agendas, and the entailing effects this has on young people’s empowerment. lack of individual autonomy in young people creates a reliance upon social contexts, including school systems, for support and engagement with sdgs. additionally, the challenge of producing necessary behaviour change and social norms within australian society is often regarded as a dominant barrier to implementing sustainable practices nationally (wicker & becken, 2013, p. 42). hence, the need to grant increased analysis and criticism of the australian education system is productive to strategising society-wide progress into sustainable social systems. as such, classroom contexts offer the opportunity for intervention of commonly learned behaviours which undermine sustainable practices, given that ‘norms, like other aspects of a social setting, are dynamic in nature’ (henry, 2010, p. 43). the remainder of this paper shall broadly investigate the australian primary and secondary education systems, with particular regard to the evidence of support in encouraging young people to reach sdgs and be effectively educated about sustainability. the australian context: cross-curriculum the australian context: cross-curriculum priorities priorities australian education policies present a major barrier to young australians accessing adequate support systems for engagement with sdgs. in particular, fundamental flaws are identifiable in the three ‘cross-curriculum priorities’ (ccps), which are applicable to every australian state under the 2008 melbourne declaration. ccps were introduced to the australian curriculum in order to ‘meet the needs of students by delivering a relevant, contemporary and engaging curriculum that builds on the educational goals of the melbourne declaration’ (australian curriculum, assessment and reporting authority, 2016). the three ccps consist of: ‘aboriginal and torres strait islander histories and cultures,’ ‘asia and australia’s engagement with asia,’ and ‘sustainability.’ whilst the inclusion of ‘sustainability’ amongst the ccps may imply governmental support for sustainability education and sdg-centred ideology more generally, evidence suggests that, in practice, the ccps do not result in positive empowerment of young people in achieving sdgs and consequently lead to youth disempowerment. consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6745 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 86-9288 the effectiveness of the ccps is largely undermined by their voluntary nature, wherein the explicit requirement for whether and how sustainability is taught ensures that sustainability is ‘neither a priority nor cross-curricular’ (almeida, barnes, & moore, 2018, p. 4). the optional nature of ccps has equally led to teacher disempowerment regarding teaching the cpps in classrooms, with teachers experiencing ‘confusion as to how to include them’ amongst an already dense school curriculum (donnelly & wiltshire, 2014, p. 135). henderson and tilbury note that in order to run a successful and wide-reaching school sustainability program, it must be: ‘relevant (to the school and community ie individually tailored program), resourced (supporting materials/facilitators/long-term financing), reflective, responsive (flexible structure), reformative (have capacity to change according to new ways of thinking and practice)’ (henderson & tilbury, 2004, p. 45). it is evident that all of these necessary measures are absent from the ccp framework. moreover, the lack of accountability in teaching the sustainability ccp within australian school curriculums reveals the weight of both policy and politics upon the capacity for australian youth to be disempowered in effectively engaging with sustainability at a crucial point in time. thus, political support of social welfare sectors, including those listed amongst the cpps, is crucial to the success of society-wide progress. whilst opportunities for sustainability education are available, particularly in contexts including extracurricular learning through independent organisations, varying socioeconomic factors mean that access to these opportunities is not guaranteed for all australian youth. hence, only through holistic measures enforced through nation-wide policy may the relevance, effectiveness and longevity of schoolwide programs for sustainability be achieved throughout australia (henderson & tilbury, 2004, p. 46). while the ccps should have been developed with genuine commitment to sustainability, the ineffective nature of the policies reveals the priorities to have been engineered to address the interests of australia’s most powerful, rather than those in subordinated social situations who rely on supportive systems (salter & maxwell, 2016, p. 309). this enables the neoliberal economic interests of the australian state government to continue to exploit fossil fuels through a business-as-usual plan, whilst simultaneously maintaining the façade of governmental dedication to a ‘green agenda’ to the advantage of their own sectional interests (white 2011, p. 14). hence, despite the inclusion of sustainability amongst the australian ccps, australian policies regarding sustainability education merely serve as tokenistic displays of concern for sustainability, rather than a genuine commitment to combating the effects of climate change through sdg guidance or similar frameworks. australian policy undermines sustainability education for young people, leading to their disempowerment. two-tiered social disempowermenttwo-tiered social disempowerment fundamental flaws within the ccps lead to two-tiered social disempowerment regarding sdg engagement, and sustainability more broadly. the first tier of social disempowerment is evident among school teachers within australian educational institutions, who find it difficult to implement the sustainability ccp. in addition to an overwhelming lack of awareness regarding vital sustainability frameworks (particularly including that of the sdgs), australian teachers report that they do not understand the concept of sustainability, demonstrating a key barrier to the implementation of the sustainability ccp (green & somerville, 2015, p. 832-833). nicholls and thorne note that findings from two queensland doctoral studies on teachers’ understanding of climate change education concluded that the sustainability ccp had ‘little to no impact on teaching and learning in the participant schools’, further noting that ‘school culture and principals do not support implementation of education for sustainability’ (nicholls & thorne, 2017, p. 197). hence, any hypothetical benefit of the ccps is diluted through personal biases and practiced social norms within the context of australian schools owing to lack of accountability. figure 1: potential for impact from youth participation in contributing to positive social change through engagement with activism and advocacy to promote sustainability through intergenerational support. image acquired from: plan international, aycc + oaktree report, ‘we stand as one: children, young people and climate change’. consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6745 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 86-9289 despite the reluctance of many australian schools to implement the sustainability ccp into formal education, opportunities for personally invested teachers do exist through the work and available resources of various ngos that provide sustainability tools for teachers to employ in class learning. for example, eco-schools is a ‘curriculum linked, democratic and participatory program’ that provides accessible resources for students to gain a better education on sustainability in the schooling context (eco-schools australia, 2019). however, despite the availability of resources for australian teachers to utilise, the lack of wider systematic support, including that of financial resources, regularly prevents teachers from effectively integrating such tools into classroom activities. additionally, proactive engagement with external resources requires personal interest in sustainability from teachers, which further highlights inconsistencies within the sustainability ccp. ferreira, ryan, davis, and cavanagh emphasise that education for sustainability must be mainstreamed into ‘pre-service teacher education so that it becomes part of its core focus and activity, embedded in practices and policies,’ in efforts to push ‘beyond the addition of sustainability into the curriculum, to the broad-scale adoption and re-orientation of the entire system’ (ferreira, ryan, davis, & cavanagh, 2009). it is evident that teachers require access to professional development, tools, and support when implementing the sustainability ccp, given that, ‘until teachers can identify and conceptualize what sustainability looks like in their own teaching context, policies, curriculum innovations, and accountability are voiceless in the classroom’ (almeida, barnes & moore 2018, p. 14-15). although some external sustainability organisations have generated a degree of success in select schools, external resources often lack credibility and efficacy due to the absence of system-wide support through mandatory policy. for example, whilst victoria and new south wales were involved with a successful trial of the australian sustainable schools initiative implemented by the federal government in 2005, broader systematic roll-out of the initiative was cut after the trial, owing to ‘budget’ concerns (garg, 2017). hence, although various programs exist to assist teachers in accessing resources and teaching support, such programs are largely undermined by the reluctance of governmental funding, reflecting the fundamentally flawed nature of the ccp policies and presents detrimental inconsistencies in australian sustainability education. inevitably, this evokes negative consequences for the empowerment of australian students in contributing towards sdgs. teacher disempowerment, evident in the largely ineffective delivery of sustainability education, triggers direct negative consequences upon australian students, who endure the second tier of social disempowerment. this is largely due to the significance of the school classroom as a social context that influences development, wherein the majority of australian students spend the predominance of their time (henry et al., 2000, p 61). as noted by white & wyn, the specificity of ‘self’ and identity is shaped not only by global features, ‘but also by the mundane experiences of family friends, neighbourhood, school and community,’ demonstrating the influence of contexts like the classroom in developing norms and behaviours (wyn & white, 2008). although young people ‘express reasonabl[y] high levels of concern for the environment,’ particularly in light of recent school climate strikes, studies equally indicate that many young people are resigned to feelings of disempowerment regarding the negative consequences of climate change (department of education, employment and workplace relations, 2010, p. 65). thus, the predominance of youth disempowerment ought to be considered as a practiced social norm which gains legitimacy within influential social contexts such as school systems, wherein resignation to the facts of climate change appears to be palpable. this is particularly concerning given that certain behavioural change is considered mandatory in order to live more sustainably (wicker & becken, 2013, p. 42). therefore, classroom settings that validate negative attitudes towards sustainability prevent successful youth figure 2: australian youth opinion on being taken seriously on the topic of climate change. data acquired from: millennium kids inc. report, ‘young people of australia climate change: perceptions and concerns’. consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6745 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 86-9290 engagement by inhibiting positive behavioural change and norms. in a similar capacity to that of teacher resources, students have limited access to external organisations which facilitate the encouragement of sustainable practices amongst youth, such as millennial kids, oaktree and the australian youth climate coalition. although formal education is an essential tool to achieve sustainability by shaping behaviours and attitudes, wilson states that ‘formal education is only one means to encourage sustainability, and cannot carry the sole responsibility for people’s learning of sustainability’ (wilson, 2012, p. 44). many school teachers have fostered pedagogical partnerships with such external organisations and communities to encourage engagement with sustainability initiatives, which have been strategically incorporated into the learning experiences of students (green & somerville, 2015, p. 839). thus, it is possible for young people to find empowerment within extracurricular involvement with sustainable organisations, should they acquire the support of their parents and communities. the recent school climate strikes alone demonstrate the capacity for australian students to be empowered through external communications. however, the fact resurfaces once again that this level of engagement relies upon the values and beliefs of individual teachers, students and parents rather than systematic support. another problem is that, as shown by a recent survey published by the journal ‘global environment change’, one in five australians do not believe in climate change, giving australia the highest percentage in the world of climate sceptics (tranter & booth, 2015). this is merely one example demonstrating the general context of apathy within australian society towards climate change. therefore, positive prospects for changes in behaviour through engagement with external organisations alone does not appear plausible in a systematic capacity. hence, it is apparent that, despite the efforts of individual teachers and parents with special interest in sustainability, education practices cannot be emancipated from australian political agendas and policies which undermine prospects for holistic sustainability education. this ensures that the cycle of environmental crime is normalised and sustained, as students lack awareness of, and access to, information detailing the structural and systemic roots of environmental problems (schild, 2016, p. 31). thus, because of students’ lack of individual autonomy, social norms encouraging apathy towards climate change are actively sustained through political influence to capitalise on the business-as-usual commodification of nature. recommendations and future workrecommendations and future work despite the overwhelmingly negative outlook in the australian context regarding sustainability education and youth engagement with sdgs, a list of three recommendations have been collated which details plausible actions that could be undertaken to improve this outlook. these recommendations are listed in order of scale (from the smallest scale at number 1 to the largest at number 3), with 2 being the most plausible option to encourage effective youth empowerment and engagement. i. increased awareness of sdgs in australian classrooms through basic means, including visual representation such as posters. particularly in australian primary schools, visual representations of knowledge, such as posters, would benefit students in learning the purpose and global requirements for sdgs. cognitive science supports the use of posters in the classroom, with a multitude of research finding that visualisation is an effective tool to foster student learning (yale poorvu centre for teaching and learning, 2016). sparking this initial conversation with the visual assistance of posters and encouraging student community participation through relevant coursework may then promote positive engagement with sdgs. this could be through educational projects in secondary education such as the sace research project, in which students are given opportunities to engage with external organisations, persons and communities that promote sustainability. whilst this recommendation may face the previously-addressed obstacle of the lack of sustainability training for teachers, the recommendation would prove effective in contexts wherein teachers do possess a minimal level of prior knowledge. additionally, it is a simplistic initiation to broader concepts which may be pursued by students in relevant coursework after introduction to the sdgs through visual aid. ii. increased sustainability-focused extracurricular activities, wherein broader scope for such opportunities is evident over that of regular classroom learning. this is a recommendation already being practiced by various australian schools throughout victoria and new south wales in particular. given that extracurricular staff are legally required to be compensated for preparation hours in the organisation of after-school activities, this recommendation is realistic and effective in working towards the normalisation of sustainability in schools. to note one successful example, school staff are able to gain consilience: the journal of sustainable developmentconsilience: the journal of sustainable development doi: 10.7916/consilience.vi22.6745 consilience j. sus. dev. 2020, 22, 86-9291 access to the resourcesmart schools program through online portals that help after school care workers introduce activities which promote and normalise sustainability (resourcesmart schools, 2019). moreover, successful frameworks within australia indicate an ability to strengthen community ties and encourage localised action efforts, thus promoting social sustainability. adopting a bottom-up approach through schools and increased community participation is vital for children to learn about the significance of sdgs and become empowered to shift business-as-usual norms. although policy change is ultimately required to initiate large-scale change, a bottom-up approach is a necessary avenue to pursue now. iii. increased pressure from staff and students to acquire meaning ful governmental support in the ‘sustainability’ ccp. increased pressure may be generated through continued school climate strikes, organised teaching strikes, petitions, interschool collaboration and formalised meetings to strategise means of plausible institutional transformation of the ccps. policy review of the ccps must be prioritised, and that the ‘voluntary’ nature of the ccps must be replaced with ‘compulsory’ requirements including greater support to teachers to effectively teach the sustainability ccp. collective action from activist groups has proven effective in changing policies previously, from large scale change including the women’s right to vote, to smaller scale environmental victories including the franklin river blockade success led by the wilderness society in the 1970s. furthermore, the recent school strikes for climate highlighted the strength in collective action, reflected by the participation of significant companies including amazon, etsy, and lush, among many others. there are certainly drawbacks to this recommendation, which are illustrated throughout the paper, including budgetary restrictions upon, and the lack of knowledge possessed by, australian teachers. however, as has also been acknowledged, there exists a number of australian school teachers who have identified flaws in the ccps and are eager to initiate change in order to make sustainability education more effective. although this recommendation is large in scale, past instances of successful collective action indicate promising prospects for increased funding to support sustainability education in the future. conclusion conclusion presently, young people in australian educational systems do not receive adequate support to feel empowered in engaging with sdgs, and sustainability more broadly. this is a result of the large-scale systematic barriers of policy and politics which are sustained to economically and socially empower those already powerful through the commodification of nature, whilst simultaneously jeopardising the future prosperity of young people. this is identifiable within the australian ccps, which offer nothing further than a tokenistic gesture regarding sustainability education, given its voluntary nature and therein lack of accountability. the ccps generates a two-tiered system of social disempowerment regarding sustainability education. the first tier is evident in the capacity that australian school teachers are deprived of adequate training and education regarding effective delivery of sustainability education in classrooms. consequently, the disempowerment of teachers triggers the disempowerment of young australian students, who are unable to access means of comprehensive sustainability education owing to lack of autonomy. this exacerbates the current trend of negativity concerning sustainability and climate change within australian schools and youth populations, with prospects for positive behaviour change into sustainable actions being undermined by the social norms produced by neoliberal political agendas evident in the ccps. thus, young australians are deprived of adequate frameworks for empowerment and support within their educational institutions, preventing youth engagement and inhibiting societal progress in sustainability. references references almeida, s., barnes, m., & moore, d. 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(2016). implementing posters in the classroom. retrieved from https://poorvucenter.yale.edu/implementingposters microsoft word garten.docx consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 16, iss. 1 (2016), pp. 1-13 the coastal zone management act: a mixed success lindsay garten school of international and public affairs, columbia university lgg2110@columbia.edu abstract coastal zones in the united states are becoming overpopulated and underlying ecosystems are being degraded. the ecosystem services that coastal zones provide will be compromised if we follow the current management path. as the population in these areas increases, so too does the amount of non-point source pollution. integrated coastal zone management programs are needed to address non-point source pollution. coastal zones are also in peril due to the current projections of sea level rise caused by climate change. a precautionary approach, such as that employed in australia and new zealand, must be used to protect coastal zones from the effects of global warming. the coastal zone management act (czma) of 1972 was created to preserve and protect coastal areas from pollution and overpopulation. the purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of the czma and the challenges it will face going forward. keywords: coastal zones, coastal zone management, non-point source pollution, water quality, wetlands consilience 2 introduction coastal zones are near-coastal waters and the adjacent land areas, including islands, transitional and intertidal areas, salt marshes, wetlands, and beaches. they provide a buffer from storms, filter pollution, provide habitats for marine life and offer areas for recreation and tourism.1 many coastal zones are in peril due to the harmful effects of increasing urban expansion, industrial pollution, runoff, and discharge of waste and sewage.2 the coastal zone management act (czma) of 1972 was created to preserve and protect coastal areas from pollution and overpopulation. prior to passage of the czma, local governments were unable to control pollution levels in waterways spanning multiple jurisdictions. without a centralized regulatory body, each municipality could pollute waterways as much as it wanted while downstream municipalities disproportionately bore the effects. the czma addressed this problem by creating a partnership between the federal government and state governments to manage land use in coastal zones. the act created three major programs: the national estuarine research reserve system (nerrs), the national coastal zone management program (nczmp), and the coastal and estuarine land conservation program (celcp) (established in 2002).3 the purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of the coastal zone management act of 1972. first, i will explain the context in which the act was enacted. i will then focus on the particulars of the act, discussing the three main programs it created. next, i will consider the successfulness of the act. the czma has had mixed success, but faces numerous difficulties going forward. i will conclude by discussing the challenges that the czma faces going forward. climate change in particular appears to be a forthcoming challenge to coastal zones that will require intense management to preserve the integrity of these areas. 1 coastal zone management act of 1972, pub. l. no. 92-583, 86 stat. 1280-89 (1972). 2 united states. congress. house. committee on public works. subcommittee on rivers and harbors. (19701971). coastal zone management: hearing, ninety-first congress, first session, on h.r. 14845 ... december 3, 1969. washington: u.s. govt. print. off. 3 about the office for coastal management. (n.d.). retrieved april 02, 2016, from https://coast.noaa.gov/about/; the coastal and estuarine land conservation program. (n.d.). retrieved april 02, 2016, from https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/landconservation/; coastal zone management act. (n.d.) retrieved april 02, 2016, from https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/act/. consilience garten: coastal zone management act the czma was necessary and part of a larger environmental movement the czma was formed during a time of increasing awareness of the environment. notably, the clean air act and the national environmental policy act, two ground-breaking environmental policies, were passed in 1970. the environmental protection agency (epa) was also formed in 1970, and brought further awareness to environmental issues. in 1969, the commission on marine science, engineering and resources recognized that the degradation of coastal zones was a serious problem.4 coastal zones were experiencing the effects of rapid industrialization. for example, between 1954-1964, filling, diking, draining and the construction of sea walls destroyed over 35% of salt marshes between maine and delaware.5 these problems were further exacerbated by the large number of people living in close proximity to coastal zones; 53% of the u.s. population lived in cities and counties within 50 miles of coastal zones.6 description of the coastal zone management act of 1972 the czma was established to preserve, protect, develop, and restore the coastal zones of the united states.7 as shown in appendix a, 34 out of 35 eligible states currently participate in the program. as of 2011, alaska is the only eligible state that does not participate.8 the czma established three main programs: nerrs, nczmp, and in 2002, the celcp. nerrs is a group of 28 coastal estuaries covering 1.3 million acres designated for protection and study through a partnership between noaa and coastal states.9 the nczmp is a voluntary partnership between the 4 klyza, c. m., & ford-martin, p. a. (2011). coastal zone management act (1972). in environmental encyclopedia (4th ed., vol. 1, pp. 336-339). detroit: gale. retrieved from http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/ps/i.do?id=gale%7ccx1918700318&v=2.1&u=columbiau&it =r&p=gvrl&sw=w&asid=cf5191b856a9b173c371e92dadeb74c9 5 united states. (1972). national coastal zone management act of 1972: report of the senate committee on commerce on s. 3507: (together with individual views). washington: u.s. govt. print. off. 6 united states. (1972). national coastal zone management act of 1972: report of the senate committee on commerce on s. 3507: (together with individual views). washington: u.s. govt. print. off. 7 coastal zone management act of 1972, pub. l. no. 92-583, 86 stat. 1280-89 (1972). 8 government accountability office. (photographer). (2014, july 18). figure 1: coastal states participating in the national coastal zone management program [digital image]. retrieved from https://www.flickr.com/photos/usgao/14497343859; coastal zone management programs. (n.d.). retrieved april 05, 2016, from https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/mystate. 9 national estuarine research reserve system. (2015, 29 may). retrieved from http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/ecosystems/nerrs/ consilience 4 federal government and u.s. coastal states that works to address issues such as climate change, ocean planning, and planning for energy facilities and development.10 it provides states with basic requirements for their coastal management plans; however, states still have flexibility to design unique programs within these parameters.11 the celcp program provides matching funds to state governments to purchase endangered coastal and estuarine lands that are ecologically important or have other conservation value.12 coastal zone management act’s mixed success the czma’s original goals were to protect natural resources, manage coastal development, improve coastal water quality, control non-point source (nps) pollution, and provide public recreational access to the coasts.13 noaa rates overall quality of coastal zones using the following indices: water quality, sediment quality, coastal habitat, benthic, and fish tissue contaminants. in 2001, the overall quality of coastal zones was rated at 2.0/5.0, which is considered fair to poor. in 2008 it improved to 2.8/5.0, which is considered fair.14 in 2011, noaa removed water quality from its overall focus areas. while this was done to streamline performance measurement systems, it also means that current performance indicators may not provide an overall picture of individual states’ performances in relation to all focus areas.15 however, the czma has also provided many opportunities for public access to coastal zones. it has created 470 new access sites, enhanced 730 sites, educated 37,000 people, trained 650 coastal decision makers, and invested $26 million dollars between 2008-2011 into providing public access; these numbers are not insignificant.16 10 about the national coastal zone management program. (n.d.). retrieved april 02, 2016, from https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/about/ 11 about the national coastal zone management program. (n.d.). retrieved april 02, 2016, from https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/about/ 12 the coastal and estuarine land conservation program. (n.d.). retrieved april 02, 2016, from https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/landconservation/ 13 coastal zone management act of 1972, pub. l. no. 92-583, 86 stat. 1280-89 (1972). 14 coastal zone management act performance measurement system 2010 report on contextual indicators (rep.). (2010, december). retrieved april 2, 2016, from noaa website: https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/media/contextualindicator2010.pdf 15 fennell, a. (2014, july 16). coastal zone management opportunities exist for noaa to enhance its use of performance information (rep. no. gao-14-592). retrieved april 2, 2016, from government accountability office website: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664806.pdf 16 the national coastal zone management program measuring performance: public access. (n.d.). retrieved april 2, 2016, from https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/media/czmperfaccess.pdf consilience garten: coastal zone management act the nerrs network of 28 coastal areas has cumulatively preserved 1.3 million acres of estuaries.17 a recent study comparing nerrs sites and non-nerrs sites found that water quality and biological condition indicators scored consistently higher for nerrs than for non-nerrs sites.18 the study concluded that setting aside nerrs areas to help preserve the integrity of natural-resource components is effective and can provide valuable reference sites for comparison with other estuarine areas.19 these areas however, are subject to environmental stress and biological impacts outside of their boundaries that illustrate the limitations of the nerrs program.20 the czma’s effectiveness in controlling non-point source pollution has been limited. nps pollution such as runoff, precipitation, atmospheric deposition, drainage, seepage or hydrologic modification,21 cannot be sourced to a particular polluter. nitrogen and phosphorous runs off into waterways causing large algal blooms and creating hypoxic zones.22 downstream states bear the brunt of the problem as they are unable to control upstream pollution, which hinders effective coastal zone management. we now know that employing the precautionary principle of preventing pollution before it enters waterways, is a more effective way to control nps pollution. when congress reauthorized the czma in 1990, it identified nps pollution as a major factor in the continued degradation of coastal zones, recognizing the challenges of managing this factor.23 the czma must also find ways to adapt and to mitigate the effects on coastal zones of sea level rise caused by climate change. many coastal states and communities have taken action to prepare for and adapt to climate change by restoring natural storm buffers and incorporating climate change into their restoration 17 national estuarine research reserve system. (2015, 29 may). retrieved from http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/ecosystems/nerrs/ 18 balthis, w. l. et al. (january 01, 2015). an integrated assessment of habitat quality of national estuarine research reserves in the southeastern united states. integrated environmental assessment and management, 11, 2, 266-275. 19 balthis, w. l. et al. (january 01, 2015). an integrated assessment of habitat quality of national estuarine research reserves in the southeastern united states. integrated environmental assessment and management, 11, 2, 266-275. 20 balthis, w. l. et al. (january 01, 2015). an integrated assessment of habitat quality of national estuarine research reserves in the southeastern united states. integrated environmental assessment and management, 11, 2, 266-275. 21 what is nonpoint source? (2016, january 5). retrieved april 02, 2016, from https://www.epa.gov/pollutedrunoff-nonpoint-source-pollution/what-nonpoint-source 22 nonpoint source pollution pollutants from nonpoint sources: nutrients. (2012, december 3). retrieved april 02, 2016, from http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/kits/pollution/010nutrients.html 23 guidance specifying management measures for sources of nonpoint pollution in coastal waters (rep.). (1993). retrieved april 2, 2016, from http://nepis.epa.gov/exe/zypurl.cgi?dockey=200139l3.txt consilience 6 plans.24 coastal cities have also built and repaired dikes, seawalls, and other structures to protect cities from erosion and storms.25 these communities have mapped coastal hazards and developed emergency response plans to take sea level rise into account.26 however, given the problems caused by recent natural disasters, there is still more that can be done. recall the effects of hurricane katrina on new orleans and much of the gulf coast in 2005. a recent study found that there was a lack of organization and large gaps in knowledge for decision making in local coastal zones in louisiana prior to the hurricane.27 this suggests that there was room for improvement in louisiana’s coastal zone management program (czmp).28 louisiana is not alone in facing such challenges, other coastal states could enhance their management plans by more comprehensively considering the effects of climate change. oregon is another state whose czmp could be improved. oregon officials were first notified in 2001 that they needed to create tighter non-point source pollution regulations.29 in 2009, the northwest environmental advocates sued noaa and the epa over their failure to enforce the czma.30 although the oregon board of forestry voted in november 2015 to further restrict logging near streams in the western part of the state, noaa and the epa noted that oregon still had management gaps in its forestry sector.31 in march 2016, the epa and noaa notified the state that it was being denied $1.2 million in federal funding for 24 adaptation examples: coastal areas. (2016, february 23). retrieved from https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts-adaptation-renamed/coasts-adaptation.html. 25 adaptation examples: coastal areas. (2016, february 23). retrieved from https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts-adaptation-renamed/coasts-adaptation.html. 26 adaptation examples: coastal areas. (2016, february 23). retrieved from https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts-adaptation-renamed/coasts-adaptation.html. 27 norris-raynbird, c. (2011, august). local czm capacity pre and post hurricanes katrina, rita, gustav and ike: a comparison study (rep.). retrieved april 2, 2016, from louisiana sea grant college program website: http://www.laseagrant.org/wp-content/uploads/local-czm-capacity-final-report.pdf 28 norris-raynbird, c. (2011, august). local czm capacity pre and post hurricanes katrina, rita, gustav and ike: a comparison study (rep.). retrieved april 2, 2016, from louisiana sea grant college program website: http://www.laseagrant.org/wp-content/uploads/local-czm-capacity-final-report.pdf 29 profita, c. (2016, march 11). feds cut oregon funds over failure to protect coastal waters from logging. retrieved april 04, 2016, from http://www.opb.org/news/article/feds-cut-oregon-funds-for-failing-to-protectcoastal-waters-from-logging/ 30 jaquiss, n. (2016, march 11). feds strip $1.2 million in grant funding from oregon, citing failure to protect forests from logging. retrieved april 04, 2016, from http://www.wweek.com/2016/03/11/feds-strip-1-2-millionin-grant-funding-from-oregon-citing-failure-to-protect-forests-from-logging/ 31 profita, c. (2016, march 11). feds cut oregon funds over failure to protect coastal waters from logging. retrieved april 04, 2016, from http://www.opb.org/news/article/feds-cut-oregon-funds-for-failing-to-protectcoastal-waters-from-logging/ consilience garten: coastal zone management act failing to protect coastal streams from logging under the czma.32 oregon’s department of forestry noted that its pollution regulations in forests could be improved and that by the end of 2016 new rules regarding logging in streams will be created.33 coastal zone management could be improved coastal zone management faces many challenges going forward. recent events have shown that the growing impacts of climate change will negatively affect coastal areas. rising populations will put further stress on coastal communities, which effective management will need to overcome. federal spending on coastal zone management should consider the effects of climate change on coastal zones and act proactively to ensure that coastal zones are protected from sea level rise. the united states could benefit from looking to foreign precedent to improve its coastal zone management policies. in new zealand, regional and territorial policymakers are responsible for avoiding and managing risks to coastal zones. this system is mandated by both the local government act of 2002 and the resource management act (rma) of 1991. the 2010 new zealand coastal policy statement, a policy under the rma, requires the government to conduct managed retreats, meaning that buildings in areas that are likely to be at risk of damage from sea level rise and other coastal hazards should be relocated or removed.34 while building coastal protections structures may be an appropriate alternative approach in some situations, it does not fit in with the sustainability values of managing the country’s coastal zones.35 the australian government also provides funding for coastal adaptation projects, including the abandonment of some coastal areas that will become too costly to maintain in the long 32 profita, c. (2016, march 11). feds cut oregon funds over failure to protect coastal waters from logging. retrieved april 04, 2016, from http://www.opb.org/news/article/feds-cut-oregon-funds-for-failing-to-protectcoastal-waters-from-logging/ 33 profita, c. (2016, march 11). feds cut oregon funds over failure to protect coastal waters from logging. retrieved april 04, 2016, from http://www.opb.org/news/article/feds-cut-oregon-funds-for-failing-to-protectcoastal-waters-from-logging/ 34 young, r. (2013, october 31). a year after sandy, the wrong policy on rebuilding the coast. retrieved april 02, 2016, from http://e360.yale.edu/feature/a_year_after_sandy_the_wrong_policy_on_rebuilding_the_coast/2705/ ; new zealand coastal policy statement 2010 (rep.). (2010, november). retrieved april 2, 2016, from new zealand department of conservation website: http://www.doc.govt.nz/documents/conservation/marine-andcoastal/coastal-management/nz-coastal-policy-statement-2010.pdf 35 new zealand coastal policy statement 2010 (rep.). (2010, november). retrieved april 2, 2016, from new zealand department of conservation website: http://www.doc.govt.nz/documents/conservation/marine-andcoastal/coastal-management/nz-coastal-policy-statement-2010.pdf consilience 8 run.36 this funding can come in the form of coastal adaptation and protection (cap) grants. cap grants are available to local governments, state government agencies, aboriginal land councils, and other corporate entities that are directly involved with coastal management. eligible projects include those that provide: coastal monitoring, adaptation planning, asset management, coastal adaptation, and coastal maintenance.37 when applying for these grants, applicants are instructed that the number one priority for adaptation strategies is to avoid development in areas that are affected by coastal hazards. the second priority is a planned or managed retreat similar to new zealand’s policy. the third and fourth priorities are accommodation and protection from coastal zone hazards.38 while australia is attempting to avoid new development in coastal zones, the united states continues to build along the coasts. after hurricane sandy, the u.s. army corps of engineers spent $5 billion on shore protection projects, mostly putting sand onto beaches. the army corps of engineers will have to put approximately 20 to 30 million cubic yards onto beaches, the equivalent of filling an 80,000-seat football stadium about 10 times.39 this is just a band-aid in the face of the real problems that coastal zones are facing. in order to more effectively manage coastal zones, the czma should require states to work to restore ecosystems rather than trying to engineer coastal zones.40 acting in a precautionary rather than an reactionary manner, would be much more effective. under this act, there has been limited funding towards coastal mitigation projects. in 2015, noaa’s national coastal zone management program allocated only 16%, or $11.4 million federal and $18.7 million matching funds to coastal states for projects aimed at mitigating coastal hazards (see appendix b for a full breakdown of the spending allocation).41 the spending bill that the republican-dominated house of representatives passed in june 2015, defunded many organizations and agencies conducting climate science research. under this bill, 36 young, r. (2013, october 31). a year after sandy, the wrong policy on rebuilding the coast. retrieved april 02, 2016, from http://e360.yale.edu/feature/a_year_after_sandy_the_wrong_policy_on_rebuilding_the_coast/2705/ 37 coastal adaptation and protection (cap) grants. (n.d.). retrieved april 04, 2016, from http://www.transport.wa.gov.au/imarine/coastal-adaption-and-protection-cap-grants.asp 38 coastal infrastructure coastal adaptation and protection grants 2015/2016 (rep.). (n.d.). retrieved april 4, 2016, from the government of australia department of transport website: http://www.transport.wa.gov.au/mediafiles/marine/mac_p_cap_2015_16_grant_brochure.pdf 39 young, r. (2013, october 31). a year after sandy, the wrong policy on rebuilding the coast. retrieved april 02, 2016, from http://e360.yale.edu/feature/a_year_after_sandy_the_wrong_policy_on_rebuilding_the_coast/2705/ 40 young, r. (2013, october 31). a year after sandy, the wrong policy on rebuilding the coast. retrieved april 02, 2016, from http://e360.yale.edu/feature/a_year_after_sandy_the_wrong_policy_on_rebuilding_the_coast/2705/ 41 noaa’s national coastal zone management program funding summary 2015 (rep.). (n.d.). retrieved april 5, 2016, from noaa office of coastal management website: https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/media/funding-summary. consilience garten: coastal zone management act noaa’s budget was cut to $5.2 billion, which is $270 million below its current spending level.42 with a decreased budget, it is more difficult to provide grants to states to fund their coastal zone management programs. additionally, the budget cuts will make it increasingly difficult for noaa to advise and oversee state management plans. coastal zones have affected both national and local economies in the united states. coastal zones counties account for 48% of total gdp and 42% of total employment.43 one study found that a 0.1 increase per meter in wetland continuity reduces property damages for an average affected area in southeast louisiana (including new orleans) by $99-$133.44 another study found that an increase in the percent of water or wetlands that surround a coastal property has a significant positive effect on price. it further noted that a change of 100 fecal coliform counts per 100 ml changes property prices by about 1.5%, illustrating the connection between the effect of water quality and local economies.45 the economic effects of the cmza also extend to public beaches. those who live near coastal zones are willing to pay more for high quality beaches with characteristics such as low tide beach width and dune width.46 with half of the u.s. population in coastal zones, it is important to address the issue of climate change in these areas through effective coastal zone management programs.47 the impacts of climate change will exacerbate the problems that coastal zones already face including: shoreline erosion, coastal flooding, and water pollution affecting both manmade infrastructure in these areas and coastal ecosystems.48 coastal areas are sensitive to sea level rise, increasing frequency and intensity of storms, and precipitation increases.49 the population 42 yehle, e. (2015, may 19). noaa: house bill would slash spending on climate research, coastal programs. retrieved april 02, 2016, from http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2015/05/19/stories/1060018807 43 kildow, j. t., colgan, c. s., johnston, p., scorse, j. d., & farnum, m. g. (2016). state of the u.s. ocean and coastal economies 2016 update (rep.). retrieved april 5, 2016, from middlebury institute of international studies at monterey national ocean economics program website: http://www.oceaneconomics.org/download/ 44 barbier, e. b., georgiou, i. y., enchelmeyer, b., & reed, d. j. (january 01, 2013). the value of wetlands in protecting southeast louisiana from hurricane storm surges. plos one, 8, 3. 45 leggett, c. g., & bockstael, n. e. (january 01, 2009). evidence of the effects of water quality on residential land prices. international library of critical writings in economics, 1, 234, 164-187. 46 landry, c. e., & hindsley, p. (december 08, 2010). valuing beach quality with hedonic property models. land economics, 87, 1, 92-108. 47 fennell, a. (2014, july 16). coastal zone management opportunities exist for noaa to enhance its use of performance information (rep. no. gao-14-592). retrieved april 2, 2016, from government accountability office website: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664806.pdf 48 climate impacts on coastal areas. (2015, february 23). retrieved from https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts/coasts.html. 49 climate impacts on coastal areas. (2015, february 23). retrieved from https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts/coasts.html. consilience 10 living along coastal zones it expected to increase by 11 million over the next seven years, which will further stress surrounding ecosystems.50 projections indicate that coastal zones will only face more stress in the coming years, which puts increased importance on coastal zone management. more effective management strategies could include facilitating state partnerships to reduce nps pollution. multi-state partnerships would enable more effective management of coastal zones. one example of this is the chesapeake clean water blueprint which in 2010, brought together six chesapeake bay states, washington, d.c., and the federal government to restore the health of the bay.51 a peer-reviewed study from the chesapeake bay foundation found that the chesapeake bay watershed is currently valued at $107 billion annually. when the blueprint is fully implemented, the region will realize $22 billion in additional annual benefits, the majority of them generated by upstream land uses.52 the results of this partnership have yet to be seen, but successful implementation could set an example for other coastal waterways.53 these partnerships would allow for coastal zone management programs to better control nps pollution. conclusion the coastal zone management act of 1972 was created for states to effectively manage the quality of their coastal zones. these zones provide valuable ecosystem services and are also economically productive, contributing to approximately 50 percent of the total annual gdp in the united states.54 as populations in these areas increase and the effects of climate change become more pronounced, coastal zone management needs to adapt to respond effectively to environmental stress factors. actions have been taken to consider the impacts of climate change on coastal zones. the white house announced in 2014, that $1.5 million would be available to states under the czma to assess how climate change 50 noaa, u.s. census report finds increases in coastal population growth by 2020 likely, putting more people at risk of extreme weather. (2013, march 25). retrieved april 05, 2016, from http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2013/20130325_coastalpopulation.html 51 2014 state of the bay (rep.). (2015, june). retrieved april 2, 2016, from chesapeake bay foundation website: http://www.cbf.org/document.doc?id=2289 52 phillips, s., & mcgee, b. (2014, october). the economic benefits of cleaning up the chesapeake (rep.). retrieved april 5, 2016, from the chesapeake bay foundation website: http://www.cbf.org/document.doc?id=2258 53 2014 state of the bay (rep.). (2015, june). retrieved april 2, 2016, from chesapeake bay foundation website: http://www.cbf.org/document.doc?id=2289 54 coastal zone management act performance measurement system 2010 report on contextual indicators (rep.). (2010, december). retrieved april 2, 2016, from noaa website: https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/media/contextualindicator2010.pdf consilience garten: coastal zone management act may exacerbate challenges to coastal zone management.55 but more can be done. the united states continues to build in coastal areas that will soon see their demise as sea levels rise. employing the precautionary principle to cease construction in areas prone to flooding would further coastal zone management goals. additionally, creating interstate partnerships to control non-point source pollution will enhance coastal zone management and will strengthen the coastal zone management act’s reach. 55 fact sheet: taking action to support state, local, and tribal leaders as they prepare communities for the impacts of climate change. (2014, july 16). retrieved april 02, 2016, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/07/16/fact-sheet-taking-action-support-state-local-and-tribal-leaders-they-pre consilience 12 appendix a figure 1: coastal states participating in the national coastal zone management program. alaska is the only coastal state that does not participate in the coastal zone management act of 1972. source: us government accountability office flickr consilience garten: coastal zone management act appendix b source: noaa’s national coastal zone management program funding summary 2015 microsoft word bernhardt.docx   1   consilience: the journal of sustainable development vol. 12, iss. 1 (2014), pp. 123–137 north-south imbalances in the international trade regime: why the wto does not benefit developing countries as much as it could thomas bernhardt department of economics the new school for social research, ny bernt495@newschool.edu abstract participation in international trade potentially brings huge benefits to developing countries. however, the design and setup of the international trade regime, most importantly the rules and regulations stipulated in the agreements of the world trade organization (wto), often make it difficult for developing countries to fully tap this potential. as will be argued in this paper using descriptive statistics, some of these agreements lead to imbalanced consequences for developing vs. developed countries. first, one of the key objectives of wto agreements, namely to enhance member states� access to other members� markets, has so far been realized in a rather imbalanced fashion, to the detriment of developing countries. second, various wto stipulations contribute to reducing the “policy space” of developing countries, thereby hampering their ability to pursue national policies aimed at fostering economic development. a lot of this can be related to asymmetries in the governance structure of the wto which help explain why international trade negotiations have preserved such imbalanced outcomes. against this backdrop, this paper advocates for a pro-development international trade regime that facilitates a more sustainable integration of developing countries into the world economy and that supports their efforts to fully reap the benefits that participating in the international division of labor offers to them. author’s note thomas bernhardt is a second-year ph.d. student in economics at the new school for social research, and a visiting student at columbia university�s school of international and public affairs (sipa). his areas of specialization are development economics and international economics. keywords: international trade regime, wto, imbalances, developing countries, market access, policy space. 1. introduction participation in international trade offers an enormous opportunity for low income countries to contribute to their economic and social development. however, this development potential is undermined by some of the rules and regulations of the international trade regime. the world trade organization (wto) is the most visible and influential pillar of this regime. it was established in 1995 as the institutionalized 124 consilience    124   successor of the general agreement on tariffs and trade (gatt) after the “uruguay round” of multilateral trade negotiations, often referred to as the “great bargain.” the developing-country perspective on the “great bargain” was that they gained access to developed countries� markets in exchange for agreeing to include services and miscellaneous “trade-related aspects” in the wto�s agenda. this great bargain, however, did little to remove existing north-south imbalances in the world trading system and even introduced some new ones. many of these imbalances reflect the reality of asymmetrical power relations in the global, political, and economic arena, which, in turn, lead to global economic governance outcomes that, in some cases, are to the detriment of developing countries. this paper intends to highlight and analyze the asymmetries that characterize the current international trade regime as reflected in wto agreements. it first argues that one of the key objectives of international trade negotiations (under the auspices of both gatt and wto), namely to create access to other countries� markets, has so far been realized in a rather imbalanced fashion. the second section then explores how different wto agreements contribute to reducing the “policy space” of developing countries, thereby limiting their ability to pursue national policies that would foster their economic development. the third section, spotlights on asymmetries in the governance structure of the wto to try to explain why international trade negotiations have preserved such imbalanced outcomes. the paper concludes with some final remarks. 2. imbalances in market access access to the markets of advanced economies is important for developing countries so they can expand their exports and thereby earn the foreign exchange they need to pay for their imports (e.g. capital goods). in the short run, therefore, they seek market access to sectors where they currently have a comparative advantage – such as agriculture or textiles.1 however, as developing countries had not participated very actively in earlier rounds of multilateral trade negotiations under the gatt, trade in sectors of interest to them was not greatly liberalized at the time the uruguay round started in 1986 – while trade barriers in sectors of interest to advanced economies had already been brought down considerably (stiglitz/charlton 2005: 42-45). yet the uruguay round agenda reflected, in large part, the priorities of developed countries, so that these asymmetries were addressed only half-heartedly. as a result, wto agreements perpetuate several of these imbalances. 2.1 northern protectionism in sectors of interest to the south developing countries had expected that the uruguay round would help facilitate access to northern markets, particularly in agriculture and textiles. these were sectors that had long been highly protected (through the multi-fiber arrangement, or mfa) and exempt from multilateral trade negotiations but in which developing countries had a comparative advantage. in fact, the very inclusion of 1 the longer-term perspective, which implies a move from static to dynamic comparative advantage, will be treated in the next section. consilience bernhardt: north-south trade imbalances     125   agriculture into the agenda of the wto was initially considered a success for the south, as was the agreement to dismantle the mfa, albeit with a long transition period of ten years. in reality, however, both agriculture and textiles & clothing remained among the sectors subject to the highest levels of protection in the north (khor/ocampo 2010: 8).2 in other words, the tariff structure of industrial countries is still significantly biased against imports that typically come from developing countries, with average applied “most favored nation” (mfn) duties on agricultural products, textiles and clothing far exceeding average duties on non-agricultural products in general (see table 1). table 1 also gives some indication of the tariff peaks that characterize the tariff profiles of advanced economies, especially the european union (eu) and japan, where only a tiny fraction of non-agricultural products but more than a fifth of agricultural imports are subject to duties exceeding 15%. another feature of rich countries� tariff structures that harms developing countries and that was not adequately addressed in the uruguay round is a phenomenon known as tariff escalation. for agricultural countries, processing the fruits and vegetables they grow would represent an almost natural comparative advantage and an opportunity to create higher earnings than from exporting merely the raw produce. but industrial countries often design their tariffs so that tariffs increase parallel to the degree of processing – i.e. the more manufacturing involved, the higher the import duty. canada, the eu, and japan, for example, charge tariffs of 42, 24, and 65%, respectively, on fully processed food items but only 3, 15, and 35%, respectively, on the least processed products in this sector (world bank 2002: 45).3 such tariff escalation discourages industrialization based on forward linkages of traditional raw material exports, thereby stifling industrial diversification in developing countries (stiglitz 2006: 87). in agriculture, trade is additionally distorted by the enormous financial support that northern economies continue to provide their farmers. the uruguay round brought little progress in this area, as the agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures (scm) allowed various exemptions to reduction commitments, thus permitting a considerable number of agricultural subsidies to be maintained, even on a permanent basis. these loopholes have allowed northern countries to re-structure (or simply re-label) their support for agriculture. whereas support for outlawing trade-distortion has shrunk, more acceptable subsidies have increased.4 consequently, in canada and the u.s., producer support as a share of total agricultural production value has remained basically the same since 1995, the 2 the uruguay round agreement on textiles and clothing set a long transition period that allowed affected (mainly developed) countries to progressively phase out their import quotas and other restrictions. yet few countries actually took a gradual approach but rather retained protection in most sensitive areas until the very end. several countries even introduced some additional protections after liberalization (khor/ocampo 2010: 8). 3 as an example, the u.s. harmonized tariff schedule specifies that the general tariff on imported oranges is 1.9 cents/kg, on citrus fruit preserved in sugar 6 cents/kg, and on frozen orange juice 7.85 cents/liter (u.s.itc 2010). 4 however, the distinction between subsidies that are trade-distorting and those that are not is questionable. by making farmers less risk-averse and/or increasing their creditworthiness and thus also their access to bank lending, even non-production-based support (like income support payments decoupled from production) can have an impact on output and prices and thereby generate trade distortions (world bank 2007: 97-98). 126 consilience    126   country/territory   simple  average  of  mfn  applied  duties  on   mfn  applied  duties  >  15%  *   agriculture   ssg  in  %  non-­‐ag.  products   agric.  products   textiles   clothing   non-­‐ag.  products   agric.  products                  canada   3.7   11.5   6.6   16.9   6.7   6.1   5.9   european  communities   4.0   16.0   6.6   11.5   1.1   27.8   23.8   japan   2.6   23.6   5.5   9.2   0.7   22.8   8.3   united  states   3.3   5.3   8.0   11.7   2.4   6.0   2.9   table 1: tariff profiles of selected advanced economies (in 2008) * share of hs 6-digit subheadings in % note: mfn = most favored nation, non-ag. = non-agricultural, agric. = agricultural, ssg = special safeguards duties > 15% = share of hs 6-digit subheadings subject to ad valorem duties greater than 15%. agriculture ssg in % = percent of hs 6-digit subheadings in the schedule of agricultural concessions with at least one tariff line subject to special safeguards (ssg). source: author’s compilation, data from wto/itc/unctad (2009)   1990   1995   2000   2005   2006   2007   2008   2009                        canada   37.6%   22.2%   22.1%   25.2%   24.2%   20.8%   13.9%   22.1%     eu-­‐27   35.8%   40.6%   39.1%   36.7%   35.5%   28.6%   26.7%   28.6%     japan   54.5%   65.9%   63.9%   57.5%   55.0%   49.8%   51.2%   51.7%     usa   18.4%   10.7%   27.6%   17.3%   12.4%   10.7%   8.6%   10.7%                        table 2: agricultural producer support estimate as share of total production value. source: author’s compilation, data from oecd pse database founding year of the wto, while in the eu and japan it went down quite a bit, though still remaining at very high level (see table 2). in 2009, oecd countries still spent about u.s.$253 billion (corresponding to 22% of aggregate gross farm receipts) in support of their agricultural producers. even worse, more than half of these subsidies belong to perhaps the most distorting forms of support, i.e. support based on output (including border protection) and support based on unconstrained use of variable inputs (oecd 2010: 5). the problem is that these subsidies make it hard for developing-country producers to compete with those of industrial countries. they not only displace agricultural exports from the south but also suppress world prices5, with both effects directly impairing farm incomes in poor countries6. to conclude, as long as producers in developed countries receive subsidies of such a magnitude, there is no real market access for farmers from the developing world. 2.2 services that trade in services was included in the wto framework (in the general agreement on trade in services, gats) was due to the pressure from developed countries and part of the “grand bargain”. the gats is one of the most flexible wto agreements as it is based on a “positive list” approach where nations only liberalize those sectors that they want. yet, strengths and interests differ a lot between the north and the south. developing countries typically have abundant 5 dimaranan, hertel, and keeney (2003) estimate that oecd domestic support causes a downward pressure on world prices for many agricultural commodities of between 3.5 and 5%. 6 according to some estimations, developing countries lose about u.s.$24 billion annually in agricultural and agro-industrial income due to protectionism and subsidies by the north (stiglitz/charlton 2005: 50). consilience bernhardt: north-south trade imbalances     127   unskilled labor and thus have a comparative advantage in less skill-intensive products while developed countries are rich in skilled labor. overall, actual outcomes of negotiations under gats have been biased in favor of the latter (stiglitz/charlton 2005: 111). more specifically, advanced economies have pressured for liberalization in service sectors of their interest – particularly financial, information and telecommunications services – while trying to keep unskilled-labor intensive services (such as shipping and construction) off the agenda (stiglitz 2006: 88). moreover, they have been reluctant to liberalize under mode 4 of gats7 (“movement of natural persons”), which would allow the international movement of service providers and probably benefit southern countries significantly. yet, liberalization under mode 4 has advanced by far the least in terms of volume of scheduled commitments. in fact, the limited progress in this area has mainly involved the intra-corporate movement of skilled personnel (marchetti 2004: 28) – an issue of interest to the north. increasing labor mobility in a fashion beneficial to developing countries, particularly through facilitating temporary migration for workers from the south, on the other hand, has seen very little progress. not allowing developing countries to use their comparative advantage in lowand medium-skill labor-intensive services comes at an immense cost in the form of foregone benefits especially to developing countries but also to global efficiency. indeed, empirical studies have estimated the potential annual benefits of liberalization under mode 4 to range between u.s.$150 and over u.s.$300 billion (hertel et al. 1999: 17, winters et al. 2003: 1159). 2.3 non-tariff trade barriers market access for developing countries is additionally constrained by the use of non-tariff trade barriers by industrial countries. although wto agreements also address these sorts of barriers, progress has been limited. as a consequence, southern countries making inroads into northern markets have repeatedly found themselves facing non-tariff trade barriers, particularly dumping duties and technical standards (khor/ocampo 2010: 8). non-tariff trade barriers can take different forms. anti-dumping rules are a particularly popular barrier designed to stop the trade practice of selling goods below cost. part of the problem with such schemes is how they are applied, as each country can set its own standard and have its own cost calculation method to determine whether imports are sold below costs. the current system thereby encourages the use of cost calculation formulas that make a finding of dumping very likely. in any case, the number of anti-dumping claims has grown significantly. in 1998, the u.s., the eu, canada, and australia together accounted for one third and thus an over proportional share of all anti-dumping cases (amsden 2003: 85). between 1995 and 2002, 2,063 dumping cases were initiated, with the u.s. (279) and the eu (255) among the largest initiators. “it does not seem sensible,” joseph stiglitz and andrew charlton argue, “that the countries with the largest capacity to absorb shocks and 7 the gats identifies four modes of service delivery, all potentially open to liberalization. however, liberalization has been uneven: modes 1 (“cross-border supply”) and 2 (“consumption abroad”) have seen more liberalization than modes 3 (“commercial presence”) and, particularly, 4 (marchetti, 2004: 28; world bank 2005: 136-138). 128 consilience    128   figure 1: world exports in selected sectors (1989-2009, index: 1995 = 100). source: author’s illustration, data from wto statistics database compensate import-competing interests should be the most common users of anti dumping laws.” (stiglitz/charlton 2005: 127) to put it another way, instead of protecting industries that suffer from intensified foreign competition by by resorting to anti-dumping laws, these countries would have other economic and social policies at their disposal to deal with the consequences of competitive imports that make inroads into their markets. yet, dumping duties have been the type of non-tariff trade barrier most utilized by industrial countries, the main reason being that they can provide longer term or even permanent protection. this distinguishes them from safeguards, another type of non-tariff trade barrier, which may be applied only temporarily to help a country or industry adjust to an unanticipated large increase (“surge”) of imports. still, the use of safeguards has risen dramatically, from two cases in 1995 to 132 in 2002 (stiglitz/charlton 2005: 128). there are indications that southern countries have made too little use of this option8 whereas some northern countries, most 8 the reasons for this differ between trade in manufacturing goods and trade in agricultural goods. as for manufacturing goods, the wto safeguards agreement requires that the member country that activates a safeguard measure (and thereby curtails trade) must give something in return, for example by lowering the tariffs in another sector. in fact, the exporting country (or countries) affected by the imposition of a safeguard measure can seek compensation through consultations. if these consultations do not lead to an agreement, the exporting country/countries may retaliate by taking equivalent action (e.g. raising tariffs on exports originating from the country that took safeguard action). this threat of retaliation (especially from richer countries) might discourage developing countries from considering the use of safeguards. by contrast, the special safeguards provisions (ssg) for agriculture (as defined in the agreement on agriculture) differ from normal safeguards. more precisely, ssg are only applicable to those products that were included in the uruguay round “tariffication process” (i.e. the effort to convert all agricultural non-tariff trade barriers into bound tariffs) and which were designated by a member country as eligible for the ssg in its schedule of commitments. most developing countries cannot use these ssg simply because they set their bound agricultural tariffs outside the tariffication mechanism. agricultural products textiles clothing world total merchandise trade 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 consilience bernhardt: north-south trade imbalances     129   notably the u.s., have repeatedly abused safeguard measures, often employing them to protect an industry in decline even when the underlying problem cannot be causally traced back to a surge of imports. for example, as the last column in table 1 shows, a non-negligible percentage of agricultural goods in the eu and japan is protected by special safeguard (ssg) provisions. other forms of non-tariff trade barriers are technical standards and quantitative restrictions (qrs). technical laws (e.g. sanitary and phytosanitary standards) can be complex and opaque and often constitute an important barrier to trade – in some cases deliberately so (stiglitz 2006: 95). qrs were actually prohibited during the uruguay round, except as emergency tools in the case of balance of payments crises the clause typically relevant for the south. yet, while their use as emergency measures was put under stricter disciplines, qrs were given greater room in textiles during the phasing out of the mfa, in the general safeguards agreement, and de facto also in agriculture, thereby creating another north-south asymmetry (khor/ocampo 2010: 6). so, as this section showed, facilitation of access to northern markets did not keep up with the expectations that southern countries had after the uruguay round. rather, different trade barriers and restrictions remained in place, perpetuating north-south imbalances in market access. consequently, after the implementation of uruguay round commitments, trade-weighted developed-country tariffs against imports from developing countries are on average more than four times higher than against goods produced by other developed countries (3.4% vs. 0.8%) (hertel/martin 2000: 464). this is reflected in figure 1 which shows that trade in agricultural products, textiles and clothing has developed much more slowly since 1995 than world merchandise trade in general.9 a closer look reveals that world trade in agricultural products (in value terms) accelerated from 2003 on – though largely due to a boom in commodity prices10 – while textiles and clothing exports somewhat picked up only around the same year, when the expiration date of the mfa became increasingly tangible. on the other hand, trade in services, where it is overwhelmingly rich countries that have a comparative advantage, grew impressively (and faster than world merchandise trade) over the last 20 years, and considerably so after the wto (including gats) was set up in 1995. 3. the reduction of policy space many sectors where developing countries currently have a static comparative advantage (like agricultural commodities) may prove to be, in a sense, dead ends with regardlonger-term economic development. loosely speaking, economic development requires southern countries to move into sectors with higher rates of potential productivity improvements, higher skill and/or technology content, and higher growth prospects. 9 this is not to deny that factors other than tariff and non-tariff trade barriers determine international trade flows. however, the fact that trade in sectors of importance to developing countries has continuously underperformed services and overall merchandise trade is striking. 10 on this issue, see unctad (2009) or world bank (2009), for example. 130 consilience    130   increased access to markets where they currently have a static comparative advantage is therefore not the only thing that the multilateral trading system should offer to developing countries in order to support development. it also has to grant developing countries sufficient room to maneuver (“policy space”) andpursue national development strategies that aim at promoting the development of dynamic comparative advantage in higher value-added economic activity. in other words, southern countries need a certain autonomy in policy-making to be able to manage their integration into the world economy in a way that promotes economic development (kumar/gallagher 2006).11 yet, various aspects of the new trade rules and domestic disciplines agreed upon in the uruguay round actually constrain this crucial policy space for developing countries. some of them prohibit the use of instruments that had been freely deployed by the east asian tigers as well as by today�s industrialized nations at comparable stages of their development, most notably – as will be shown below – in the areas of intellectual property rights, subsidies, and investment. 3.1 intellectual property rights (iprs) among the uruguay round agreements signed was the agreement on trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (trips). this happened on the initiative of the advanced economies who sought to force other countries to recognize their intellectual property.12 the trips agreement requires wto member states to set minimal standards for the protection of the full range of intellectual property. from a north-south perspectives, it features certain imbalances. first, it aims at a global uniformization of ipr regimes according to northern standards which burdens southern countries with adjustment costs. more precisely, trips requires the extension of ipr protection to typically 20 years in all fields of technology – whereas many developing countries previously had no or only very lax iprs. moreover, trips obliged many countries to broaden the scope of what is patentable. stricter iprs clearly entail economic costs for developing countries. in the short term, not only implementation and adjustment costs but also welfare costs have arisen in the south for firms using foreign patented or newly patentable knowledge and for consumers who subsequently have to pay higher prices for patented products. as figure 2 reveals, international payments for royalties and 11 the theoretical underpinning of the need for policy space, particularly in the presence of market imperfections (which, in fact, are quite common in developing countries), has been provided by the “theory of second-best” which states that government policy can offset market failures (lipsey/lancaster 1956; see also rodrik 2008). the empirical relevance of these theoretical insights, in turn, has been demonstrated vigorously by the development experience of the east asian “tiger economies” in the second half of the 20th century, almost all of which relied on a wide range of government interventions (including trade, technology, and industrial policies) to spur development (amsden 2001, 2003, chang 2002, 2007, rodrik 2001, wade 2004). that trade can play an important role in the industrialization (and diversification) process that characterizes a country�s structural transformation during the economic development process has been shown by structuralist development economists (see, for example, chenery 1960, 1980, but also gibbs 2008). these insights are highly relevant for the argument laid out here but treating them in detail would go beyond the scope of this paper. 12 yet, whether iprs belong in a trade agreement at all is a topic of intense debate (bhagwati 2008). consilience bernhardt: north-south trade imbalances     131   figure 2: low & middle income countries, flows of royalty and license fees in the bop (million u.s.$, 1985-2009). source: author’s illustration, data from the world bank’s world development indicators database licenses from lowand middle-income countries went up significantly since the inception of trips in 1995. northern countries hold 86% of all patents worldwide and receive 97% of all patent royalties. this makes it difficult for southern countries to access technology and to enter the innovation process – or at least very expensive in terms of licensing such patents (undp 2003: 207). from a longer-term perspective, the trips agreement has significant repercussions for southern countries� ability to deploy technology and industrial policy. before trips, developing countries could set their own ipr policies. with the aim of facilitating domestic firms� capabilities for responding to foreign innovations, many late industrializers relied maintained loose intellectual property rules, limited the duration of patents and often simply refused to grant patents for key products. moreover, their governments tried to push technological progress by encouraging learning from foreign firms (often through public r&d efforts) and allowing different methods of imitative innovation (such as reverse-engineering of foreign patented products or simply copying existing foreign knowledge and techniques) (gallagher 2008: 65; stiglitz/charlton 2005: 103). under the trips agreement, developing countries now are “constrained by having to adhere to ipr standards that are high compared not only to what they previously had, but also what the developed countries had when they were at their initial stages of industrialization” (khor/ocampo 2010: 13). that, in a sense, represents a historical asymmetry as many tools and policies commonly used by today�s advanced economies during their development process are no longer available to the south (chang 2001). 3.2 investment policies the agreement on trade-related investment measures (trims) was newly introduced along with trips to the global trade regime during the uruguay round. 35,000   30,000   25,000   20,000   15,000   10,000   5,000   0   1985     1987     1989     1991     1993     1995     1997     1999     2001     2003     2005     2007     2009   payments   receipts   132 consilience    132   like trips, it reduces wto member states� policy space by prohibiting the use of a number of investment-performance-related measures that allegedly distort trade but that have, however, been successfully deployed both by early northern and late east asian industrializers. for example, as part of targeted industrial policies, several east asian countries actively encouraged foreign investment in certain sectors but stipulated that the majority of the firm be owned by national citizens, that certain local content and sourcing requirements were met, that technology was transferred, and that some r&d was conducted in the host country, with a certain percentage of local staff being employed in such processes (gallagher 2008). moreover, they often imposed certain performance requirements such as export-import balancing requirements (which make foreign firms use domestic rather than imported inputs) which, together with domestic content requirements, played an important role in forging linkages to the local economy and thereby generating spillover effects. all these policies are now considerably restricted under trims, making it more difficult for developing countries to be selective about foreign investment (khor/ocampo 2010: 12, rodrik 2001). 3.3 subsidies further restrictions are imposed on a country�s policy space by the wto�s agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures (scm) which prohibits, for countries with a per capita gdp exceeding u.s.$1,000, all forms of export subsidies. yet, export subsidies are among the major subsidy instruments used by developing countries and were deployed successfully by south korea and taiwan, for example (amsden 2001). now, with all forms of export subsidies being forbidden under the scm, southern countries� ability to diversify their exports and to help their firms break into global markets is severely constrained (khor/ocampo 2010: 6). at the same time, as detailed above, rich countries continue to heavily subsidize their agricultural sectors. here, the scm agreement only had the effect of making northern countries re-structure their support from export to domestic subsidies.13 yet, the distinction between export and domestic subsidies is somewhat artificial, and the trade effects of domestic subsidies are often understated. apart from agricultural subsidies, three other types of subsidies are explicitly permitted in article 8 of the scm, namely for r&d, regional development, and environmental adaptation – all three being important instruments of intervention used by northern countries (aguayo/gallagher 2005). there is, therefore, a pronounced north-south imbalance in the treatment of subsidies. as a result, while a mere 4% of developed country exports are subsidized by another wto member, this share is much larger for middle-income countries (6.4%) and low-income countries (29.4%; not including china and india) (stiglitz/charlton 2005: 48). 13 for example, between 1990 and 1998-9, the u.s. and the eu reduced their annual export subsidies for cereals and beef by u.s.$4.1 billion. in the same period, annual domestic support for these goods, which is treated more permissively in the wto, grew by about u.s.$18.9 billion in the eu alone (abare 2001: 3). consilience bernhardt: north-south trade imbalances     133   3.4 erosion of “special and differential treatment” (sdt) in theory, the wto recognizes the particular needs of developing countries via the principle of “special and differential treatment” (sdt). prior to the uruguay round, the gatt provided developing countries with differential treatment and thus additional policy space. for instance, it allowed them to keep most tariffs unbound, make use of quantitative import restrictions, and maintain domestic content requirements on foreign firms. in the uruguay round, however, “[a]lthough not entirely eliminated, the sdt principle was significantly eroded, particularly for middle-income developing countries” (khor/ocampo 2010: 4). in fact, there are now three forms of sdt in the wto agreements that resulted from the uruguay round: trade preferences, modulation of commitments, and declarations of support. in its first form, sdt allows industrial countries to deviate from the principles of reciprocity and mfn by according differential and more favorable treatment to developing countries (e.g. by giving them preferential market access in the form of lower tariffs on their exports).14 the problem is that the current system makes preferential treatment entirely voluntary, i.e. the legal enforceability of these provisions is questionable (iisd 2003: 2).15 by contrast, sdt provisions that permit a modulation of commitments according to the member country�s level of development are legally enforceable and, hence, are currently the most substantial form of sdt.16 the third area of sdt, essentially the declarations of support for southern countries, is entirely unenforceable. against this backdrop, there are two principal problems with the status quo of sdt: first, those sdt provisions that are legally enforceable amount to eroding assets. the implementation delays granted by the trips, scm, and agriculture agreements, for instance, ceased to provide differential treatment once the extended transition period expired. second, large parts of the new “trade-related aspects” agenda are without any legally enforceable sdt. overall, many developing countries are unhappy about “the lack of „hard law� sdt provisions in the uruguay round results” (iisd 2003: 2). to conclude, it is of course true, as amsden (2003) and gallagher (2008) argue, that the policy space for developing countries has not vanished altogether as a result of wto agreements. however, the point here is that the expansion of the scope of the multilateral trading regime has clearly reduced the policy space for developing countries, especially as compared to the pre-wto era. 14 two examples of such preferential schemes are the eu�s “everything but arms” initiative and the u.s.�s “afri-can growth and opportunity act”, which non-reciprocally remove tariffs on a wide range of products imported from the poorest countries. however, the world bank (2004: 154) found that the overall impact of these schemes has been fairly limited, with complicated rules of origin provisions seeming to be at least partially responsible. 15 preferences are not binding on grantor countries and can be changed to exclude certain products or withdrawn entirely at the grantor nation�s discretion, creating uncertainty for grantee countries. (keck/low 2004, hoekman 2004: 3-4, wto 2004: 25). 16 examples include the agreement on agriculture (which required developed countries to cut their tariffs by 36% over six years whereas developing countries were given 10 years to lower their tariffs by only 24% while ldcs were exempted from tariff reductions altogether), the trips agreement (which gave industrial countries one year to implement its provisions, but developing countries five and ldcs eleven years), and the agreement on scm (which has implementation provisions similar to trips). 134 consilience    134   4. asymmetries in wto governance formally, the wto is a democratic institution with its governance structure based on the “one country, one vote” principle and its decision-making requiring consensus. in practice, how-ever, not all wto member countries have an equal say in the institution�s agenda-setting and decision-making, so “informal oligarchy” (evans 2003) seems to be a more accurate description. one core problem in governance is the way in which negotiations occur. in fact, in what is commonly referred to as the “green room” process, many initial trade negotiations (both under gatt and wto auspices) have taken place and still occur in informal meetings among a limited number of countries dominated by the northern wto members. typically, the major advanced economies negotiate among themselves to come up with a common position. they then select a few (influential) developing countries to negotiate within another round of informal meetings with the aim of winning them over, often by putting pressure on them to break ranks with other developing countries (stiglitz 2006: 98). most wto members are not informed about or even invited to these meetings and often do not know what is negotiated there. the purpose of such meetings is to shape the agenda of negotiations and to reach agreements within a relatively small group which are then easier to translate into the “consensus” required for the formal decision-making (dervis 2005: 170, twn et al. 2003). during the initial years of the wto, this informal system was led by the so called “quad” (u.s., eu, japan and canada) but became increasingly dysfunctional with the emergence of several dynamic developing countries. consequently, since 2004, a newly formed “group of 6” (u.s., eu, japan, australia, brazil, and india) has engaged in small-group, informal agriculture negotiations, at times also including china. the inclusion of brazil, india and china in this informal circle has, in a sense, enhanced the presence and role of developing countries in key decision-making forums. in reality, however it has done little to remove the north-south asymmetry in participation and decision-making, especially as these three countries explicitly represent only themselves in these meetings and not the developing countries as a group (for which they do not have a mandate anyway) (khor/ocampo 2010: 25). this lack of transparency in wto working methods and decision-making mechanisms is compounded by the fact that various low-income countries cannot afford to have a mission or a representative at the wto headquarters in geneva. this impinges on their ability to follow current discussions and participate in important meetings and negotiations (stiglitz/charlton 2005: 82). overall, in some contrast to its democratic setup, wto governance has in practice been riddled with north-south asymmetries in participation and voice. the economic power of the advanced industrial countries has often been felt in the process of setting the agenda (with the focus of envisaged negotiations often put on issues of interest to developed rather than developing countries) and negotiating the rules (evans 2003: 295). once rules are agreed upon by wto member states, states are held accountable for the commitments they made through the wto�s dispute settlement mechanism (dsm). the dsm can be used by any member state who alleges that another member country violates wto rules. interestingly, no wto body has the power to initiate litigation or implement sanctions in case violations of rules are found. rather, wto agreements delegate the authority to sanction – via trade consilience bernhardt: north-south trade imbalances     135   table 3: wto dispute settlement cases (1995-2008). source: khor/ocampo (2010: 22) retaliations – to the member states themselves. in practice, the dsm has proven to be effective17: it has been used quite actively and, importantly, it has been applied in all directions, i.e. by both developed and developing countries against both developed and developing countries. however, there has also been a certain asymmetry in the use of the dsm: while more than two thirds of wto members are developing countries, over 60% of all complaints have been filed by developed countries (see table 3). part of the explanation of this under-proportional use by developing countries lies in the relatively high costs of resorting to the mechanism and in an inherent asymmetry in retaliation between rich and poor countries (stiglitz/charlton 2005: 82).18 both factors make the use of the dsm less appealing to poorer wto members and might even defer them from even considering a complaint in the first place (srinivasan 2007: 1056). although there have been initiatives and proposals19, the inescapable reality of disparities in economic strength between different countries will make it difficult to overcome these asymmetries entirely. 5. concluding remarks as we have seen, the current international trade regime as defined by wto agreements is characterized by various imbalances from a north-south perspective. somewhat in recognition of these asymmetries, a new round of multilateral trade 17 for favorable reviews see, for example, ocampo (2010: 22), srinivasan (2007) and wto (2004: 50 51). 18 the prospect of developing countries imposing retaliatory measures of last resort is not very frightening for violators of wto rules from the north, given that such measures would most likely have only limited effects on the violator�s trade. 19 to remove the asymmetry in retaliation, it has been suggested that the wto introduce monetary compensation of damages or to allow the trading of the right to retaliate (wto 2004: 54-55). in an attempt to counter the asymmetry of the high costs of the legal procedure, in turn, an advisory centre on wto law was set up to offer subsidized legal assistance to developing countries (khor/ocampo 2010: 22). 136 consilience    136   negotiations under wto auspices was launched in 2001 in doha with the declared objective to make it a “development round.” however, the round is still ongoing and is in fact already the longest in the history of the gatt/wto – a clear indication of the round�s failure. one of the main reasons for this is that developing countries worry that the potential benefits of what is on the negotiation table are relatively small while the probable costs in terms of further loss of policy space are significant (gallagher 2008). the negotiations now narrowly focus on core market access issues, and the northern economies more or less insist on reciprocity, so the initial developmental focus is has essentially disappeared. in order for the doha round to achieve a development-friendly outcome, a certain degree of non-reciprocity in trade liberalization commitments will be necessary, especially in non-agricultural market access (nama) negotiations. for example, developing countries should be permitted to identify a limited list of key strategic industries to be exempted (at least for a certain, reasonably long period of time) from tariff reduction commitments in their “schedules of concessions.” this would provide them with valuable space to pursue targeted industrial policies. at the same time, to improve developing countries� access to their markets, industrial countries should agree to a tariff reduction formula that explicitly tackles tariff peaks and tariff escalation, for example by imposing a cap on their tariff rates. in recognition of their exceptional development needs, the least developed countries (ldcs) should actually be granted duty-free access to northern markets (at least for their manufactured goods). as an intermediate step, industrial countries could bring down their tariffs on products of interest to developing countries (e.g. textiles & clothing or agricultural products) to a level not exceeding their average level of tariffs on all other commodities. in terms of access to the agricultural markets of the north, the second key issue (besides tariff cuts) will be a reduction of subsidies in advanced economies. to this end, the somewhat artificial distinction between trade-distorting and non-distorting subsidies needs to be re-examined. this should lead to the adoption of more effective rules on the use of permitted subsidies (for example with regard to the eligibility criteria for recipients of subsidies) and the introduction of limits on the amounts receivable per agricultural producer (khor 2007). eventually, this would make it more difficult for developed countries to maintain their levels of public support to farmers by simply re-structuring or re-labeling their subsidies. as noted, many of these measures would require unilateral concessions by northern countries and thus a deviation from the principle of reciprocity that is at the core of wto agreements. this can be defended on the basis of the concept of “special and differential treatment” (sdt) for developing countries. in fact, one of the objectives of the doha round – if it is to be a true development round – should be to strengthen or even expand sdt provisions in wto agreements. one way to achieve this would be to adopt a framework agreement on sdt – as was indeed mentioned in the doha declaration. this would help to make sdt provisions more precise and effective and could serve to enhance their legal enforceability. on the whole, such a consolidation of the principle of sdt would positively impact developing countries� policy space and their access to northern markets. for these outcomes of the doha round to become more likely, substantive steps must be taken towards institutional and governance reforms of the wto. among other things, this should include the abandonment of the practice of negotiating in the “green room,” thereby enhancing the transparency of and consilience bernhardt: north-south trade imbalances     137   participation in decision-making and negotiation processes. at the same time, developing countries ought to try to increase their voice and weight in trade negotiations by coordinating their positions and forming coalitions.20 such efforts should be supported by institutional enhancement, for example by the establishment of a permanent advisory body (whose task would be to advise developing countries on how to improve the effectiveness of their bargaining) and the installation of an independent evaluation unit (which would conduct studies to objectively assess the impact of possible future liberalization commitments on developing countries and compare and evaluate alternative scenarios) (stiglitz/charlton 2004). overall, it is extremely important that the doha round is revived and turned into a real development round with substantial outcomes meeting the demands and needs of the poorer wto members. a successful conclusion of the doha round could, as an additional benefit, remove the perception among developing countries as well as civil society that the rich countries use the wto to further their interests and those of their corporate sectors. eliminating this view would thereby enhance the legitimacy of the wto as a forum for international trade negotiations. the alternative to a successful doha round is an increase in bilateral and regional free trade agreements (ftas). however, this is an even less appealing outcome from a development perspective, not only because they more often divert rather than create trade (bhagwati 2008: ch. 3) but also because developing countries have even less bargaining power in a bilateral setting than in a multilateral setting, where they can, at least in theory, form coalitions. in fact, this fear has already materialized in the inclusion of “wto plus” stipulations in such ftas (evans 2003: 296, khor/ocampo 2010: ch. ii). the potential of the international trade regime to support the development efforts of countries in the global south thus remains considerably unexploited. unfortunately, the way the current doha round of multilateral negotiations has developed so far does not hold great promise. 20 this is of course not an easy task in practice. the developing countries are not a homogeneous group and their interests and objectives can differ substantially, depending, inter alia, on their respective productive structures and trade patterns. however, currently even efforts of developing countries that have 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remote sensing; time series analysis; ecological restoration monitoring; coastal management consilience shaham: evaluating a decade of mangrove restoration 1. introduction the motivation for a remote sensing analysis of mumbai’s mangrove restorations is presented below. first, general background information about mangrove ecosystems, their environmental benefits, and global trends in mangrove deforestation are reviewed. this is followed by a summary of mangrove restoration programs in mumbai and the challenges they have faced worldwide. in addition, the characteristics of common rehabilitation methods, including sapling plantation and ecological mangrove restoration, are discussed. finally, the importance of monitoring restoration outcomes and the gap in a public outcomes evaluation for mumbai’s coastal restoration projects is examined. 1.1 background mangrove ecosystems grow in low coastal elevations and provide essential ecosystem benefits to coastal communities across the world. mumbai’s 150 km of coastline is banked with 65 km2 of mangroves (maharashtra mangrove cell, 2017). southeast asia is home to ⅓ of the world’s mangroves and 75% of all mangrove restorations since 1990 (gatt et. al., 2017). in mumbai, the outcomes of more than a decade of mangrove restoration have yet to be assessed. mangrove trees provide essential benefits to the residents of mumbai. mangrove trees guard against sea-level rise through wave attenuation and shore stabilization (s.v. et. al., 2019). they are widely credited with protecting mumbai neighborhoods from inundation during the devastating 2005 floods (gupta, 2007). the trees’ dense pneumatophoric root systems filter organic marine pollutants as well as sewage and anthropogenic effluents (heavy metals like chromium, lead, etc.) regularly discharged in the city’s municipal waterways (bayen et. al., 2005; tam and wong, 1995). mangrove forests foster nutrient-rich environments that act as incubators for endemic fish, prawn, and crab species that are vital to local economies (ellison et. al., 2020). indeed, mumbai’s migrant workers and indigenous koli community have long used mangroves for economic and subsidence activities. these include fishing, grass cutting, sand dredging, housing, medicinal treatments, shell collection, wood harvesting, and basket weaving (parthasarathy, 2011; kandasamy, 2017). moreover, mangroves’ capacity for carbon sequestration is critical in the global fight against climate change and a major impetus behind their mass restoration. mangrove forests are carbon sinks that can absorb up to 8 times the co2 of any other ecosystem (donato et. al., 2011). though mangroves represent less than 1% of tropical forest cover, they account for 10% of all carbon emissions due to deforestation (simard, 2019). therefore, the clearance of mangrove trees has a disproportionate impact on carbon emissions. this has created an urgent push for mangrove restoration among international organizations, states, and ngos. 1.2 global vs. mumbai mangrove cover losses mumbai proves an important global city case study for understanding the limitations of restoration initiatives in mitigating mangrove loss and the importance of rehabilitation monitoring. the number of people living in low coastal elevation cities (areas less than 10 m above sea level), ballooned from 360 million in 1990 to 900 million in 2020 (ipcc, 2023; macmanus et al., 2021). mumbai’s population grew by 65% in the same period (1990-2020), from 12.2 to 20.4 million people (un desa, 2018). urban population growth in coastal cities is linked to mangrove loss as demand for housing, commercial development, and aquaculture create pressures for mangrove clearance 3 consilience (goldberg et al., 2020). as a site of rapid population growth, mass infrastructure investment, and international environmental aid, mumbai is emblematic of the challenges that face growing global coastal cities and vulnerable mangrove forests in the developing world. global trends in mangrove deforestation and reforestation efforts track closely with mumbai’s own mangrove cover changes. anthropogenic activities caused a 1% annual reduction in worldwide mangrove coverage during the 20th century and 1.04 million ha in loss from 1990-2020 (fao, 2007; shono, 2023). a meta-analysis of 200 studies indicated that the majority of global mangrove clearance (3870 km2) was concentrated in south and southeast asia during this period (bhowmik et al., 2022). mumbai’s mangrove losses parallel global trends. remote sensing analyses indicate a dramatic decrease in the greater mumbai area’s total mangrove extent from 1972-2001, from 200 to 118 km2 (s. et al., 2022). from 1991-2001 alone, mumbai lost 40% of its mangrove cover (vijay et al., 2005). a 2017 analysis indicated 119 km2 of mangrove cover remains in the area (indian institute of space and technology, 2019). in light of significant losses, an increased awareness of mangroves’ environmental benefits has led to thousands of mangrove restoration programs globally over the past decade, including dozens in mumbai. from 1990-2020, the number of mangrove restorations across the world more than tripled (duarte et al., 2020). as mumbai’s population and urban development continue to increase exponentially, so do the pace of its mangrove clearance and restoration schemes. the maharashtra mangrove cell reported restoring more than 1500 hectares of mangroves in mumbai from 2015-2022 (table 1). table 1: mumbai mangrove restorations 2015-2022 (maharashtra mangrove cell, 2020; 2021; 2022) location area (ha) restoration start year saplings planted not listed 110 2015-2016 not listed 80 2016-2017 not listed 155 2017-2018 not listed 490 2018-2019 not listed 655 2019-2020 alimgar bharodi 13 2020-2021 57,772 surai 5 2020-2021 22,220 eksar 16 2020-2021 71,104 vikhroli 4 2020-2021 22,000 sarsole 3 2020-2021 13,332 ghansoli (survey) 3 2020-2021 13332 koparkhairane 2 2020-2021 8888 manori (survey) 1 2020-2021 4,444 gorai (survey) 1 2020-2021 4,444 vikhroli 5 2021-2022 22,220 alimghar 5 2021-2022 22,220 kharbav 13 2021-2022 57,772 totals 1561 319,748 consilience shaham: evaluating a decade of mangrove restoration yet the lack of publicly-available outcomes assessments of mumbai’s existing decade of mangrove restorations limits understanding of the soundness of mangrove restoration as municipal and conservation policy. newly restored forests can struggle to reach mature growth in the absence of long-term monitoring, community buy-in, and consistent financial support (brown et al., 2014; ellison et al., 2020). therefore, evaluating the methods and outcomes of mumbai’s decade-old mangrove restoration program is critical to its future success. 1.3 mumbai’s mangroves: tree clearance and restoration mumbai’s mangrove loss, and corresponding restoration program, is primarily driven by land-cover land-use (lclu) changes for national infrastructure projects, industrial pollution, and informal housing construction. hundreds of hectares of mumbai’s mangroves were cleared from 2007-2022 with the promise of reciprocal mangrove afforestation in other parts of the city (s. et al., 2022). large-scale infrastructure projects have been a major driver of mangrove clearance in the city. major schemes that involved clearance include the mumbai coastal road, bandra-worli sea-link, mumbai trans-harbour bridge, navi mumbai international airport, the mumbai metro, ahmedabad-mumbai bullet train, the jawaharlal nehru port, and the western dedicated freight corridor, among many others (bureau, 2022; deshpande, 2019). the city will lose 1% of its total mangrove cover to the coastal road alone (chatterjee, 2017). amid widespread reductions in mangrove cover, restoration has gained support from local civil society groups, businesses, municipal and state authorities, and international organizations. yet despite widespread investment in restorations, scholars have long noted the lack of a global monitoring repository of restored areas and varying outcomes (duarte et al., 2020). for instance, the un development programme (undp) and the global climate fund (gcf) allocated $9.32 million in 2019 for the maharashtra mangrove cell to carry out coastal resilience projects across the state, including ten mangrove restorations in mumbai (2021). yet to date, the maharashtra mangrove cell has not published a monitoring assessment of any of its extensive mangrove restoration programs in the mumbai region, including the undp sites. an independent, mid-term grant evaluation of the ten undp-funded restorations in mumbai found that despite the significant resources invested, local communities are uninvolved in mangrove restorations and that the restoration was unlikely to meet its targets by 2025 (paltsyn et al. 2022). the report is indicative of a broader need for monitoring assessments to flag errors and provide technical guidance for restoration efforts in the region. 1.4 history of protective regulations and restoration regime the history of mumbai’s mangrove restoration program confirms the importance of public and scientific scrutiny in sustainable ecosystem management. mumbai’s mangrove restoration program can be traced to active civil society advocacy for coastal protections and legal mandates for restoration. as a result of local environmental ngo campaigns, mangroves were notified as “protected forests” in 1991 under india’s federal coastal regulation zone, also known as the crz (krishnamurthy, 2014). the crz is india’s overarching coastal conservation law that regulates development on india’s shorelines and has been critiqued extensively. scholars have widely noted the gaps in enforcement, the deficiencies in a national, one-size-fits-all coastal conservation policy, and 5 consilience the lack of viable space for successful restoration programs after coastlines have been cleared (chouhan, 2017; dhiman, 2019). after long-promised government mangrove restorations in mumbai failed to materialize despite crz mandates, a lawsuit brought by bombay environmental action group in 2005 led the bombay high court to issue a landmark conservation ruling (bavadam, 2005). the court forbid construction within 50 m of mangrove trees irrespective of the landowner, and mandated the creation of a new government body, the maharashtra mangrove cell, to take charge of restorations (bombay high court, 2005). as a result of these lawsuits, the mangrove cell began operations in 2012. its mission is to carry out mangrove restoration, forest monitoring, and fund administration for marine science research. between 2015-2022, the cell’s annual reports indicate that 430,197,000 inr (~ us $5.2 million) were allocated toward 1561 hectares of mangrove restoration and 319,748 saplings were planted (table 1) (maharashtra mangrove cell 2020; 2021; 2022). de jure, mumbai’s mangroves are legally protected from clearance through the crz. de facto, regular exceptions for infrastructure projects deemed critical to the national interest often authorize mangrove tree clearance by the thousands. as development grows exponentially in mumbai, so does the task of the mangrove cell and state ministries to restore lost forests. yet global trends in mangrove rehabilitation suggest persistent challenges in restoration outcomes. a lack of long-term monitoring can hamper mangrove recovery efforts. without robust monitoring, good governance, and local involvement, well-intentioned mangrove restorations can quickly succumb to deforestation and negligence (lewis et al., 2016). 1.5 mangrove restoration overview and challenges despite widespread efforts to revive mangrove forests, the majority of mangrove restoration projects globally have failed (ellison et al., 2020; lovelock et al., 2022). this is primarily due to a preference for sapling plantation over ecological mangrove restoration and a lack of quality monitoring assessments. ecological restoration is defined by gann et al. (2019) as, “any activity with the goal of achieving substantial ecosystem recovery relative to an appropriate reference model, regardless of the time required to achieve recovery.” the two predominant techniques for mangrove restoration are sapling plantations and ecological mangrove restoration. in the plantation method, mangrove saplings and propagules are planted at discrete intervals in a coastal restoration site. the long-term survival rates of saplings in monoculture plantations are as low as 20% and scholars have critiqued the method for its inconsistent results (primavera and esteban, 2008; wodehouse and rayment, 2019). notwithstanding its documented shortcomings, the ease and relative affordability of sapling plantations have kept them popular as a restoration method. from 1972-2021, 74% of mangrove restorations in southeast asia were direct sapling plantations (gerona-daga and salmo, 2022). alternatively, researchers have long established that ecological mangrove restoration (emr) leads to successful mangrove rehabilitation given the proper depth, duration, and frequency of tidal flooding (lewis, 2009; lewis et al., 2019. emr involves the resumption of a restoration site’s normal hydrology and tidal flows by removing blockages and digging channels (lewis, 2001; pérez-ceballos et al., 2020). emr helps to spur secondary succession and natural mangrove regrowth (figure 2). consilience shaham: evaluating a decade of mangrove restoration the community-based ecological mangrove restoration method (cbmer), consciously involves local stakeholders in all aspects of emr from design through monitoring (brown et al., 2014). assessments of mangrove restoration failures in south and southeast asia point to an overreliance on monoculture plantation practices, improper site selection, and a lack of follow-through on restoration monitoring. an evaluation of sri lanka’s 23 mangrove restoration sites found that in five years, only 200 out of 1200 hectares of attempted restorations showed any growth, 54% of plantings failed, and nine sites showed no growth (kodikara et al., 2017). similar issues and high rates of failure hampered mass mangrove restoration projects across hundreds of thousands of hectares in the philippines, vietnam, and pakistan (primavera and esteban, 2008; lee et al., 2019; powell et al., 2011. the low success rate of sapling plantations in more than 30,000 hectares of attempted restoration in the gulf of kachchh in the bordering state of gujarat, further calls into question the viability of plantation as a compensatory afforestation method for maharashtra’s mangroves (thivakaran, 2017). 1.6 the restoration monitoring gap to date, there is no publicly available monitoring of mumbai’s mangrove restorations. despite consistent reporting on mumbai’s total mangrove coverage through remote sensing, there is no published long-term monitoring of mangrove restoration efforts in the greater mumbai region. gis satellite monitoring has enabled government bodies and scholars alike to regularly assess the total mangrove extent in mumbai (prasad et al, 2010; mallick et al., 2015; vijay et al., 2020; forest survey of india, 2020). yet this has not translated into public monitoring of mumbai’s 1500 ha of restored mangrove areas. available data from both academic and government sources do not disaggregate to differentiate between natural growth and mangrove areas nurtured through restoration. restoration monitoring is critical to successful outcomes. given the variable record of mangrove restorations globally, monitoring has been deemed an essential component of successful mangrove rehabilitation. early detection of mangrove degradation through remote sensing monitoring embedded in coastal management plans can help officials pre-empt mangrove loss and improve afforestation practices [37]. the design of appropriate restoration monitoring timelines with ecologically informed checkpoints is crucial to full ecosystem rehabilitation. though mangroves need 20-25 years to reach maturity, the vast majority of monitoring studies take place within three years of restoration (lewis, 2007; wodehouse et al., 2019). as bayraktarov et. al. notes, “the outcome of [marine coastal] restoration success or failure is directly related to the period of observation” (2016, p. 1068). reported success rates in the literature are biased towards published successes over failures (ibid). consequentially failed restorations rarely undergo published scrutiny, limiting lessons learned and alternative paths forward. the present study addresses this gap in the literature through a remote sensing analysis of mumbai’s mangrove restorations in the period from 2012-2022. the study indicates that most restorations in the city failed. through this investigation, the author identifies the locations of restoration and clearance sites in mumbai and measures how many hectares have been successfully restored. 7 consilience 2. materials and methods a remote sensing assessment of mumbai’s mangrove restorations was conducted utilizing gis, google earth engine, a random-forest machine learning algorithm, and satellite data from landsat and sentinel systems. the following section details how a sample of 25 restoration sites was identified and selected for analysis from government of india databases including parivesh and e-green watch. the optimization of landsat and sentinel satellite data for time-series analysis and cloud correction is discussed. subsequently, the parameters for a random-forest machine-learning algorithm and subsequent accuracy assessment are also reviewed. 2.1 remote sensing remote sensing has proven an efficient and accessible way for practitioners to monitor both mangrove extent and restoration outcomes. researchers have utilized a bevy of satellite systems, including landsat, sentinel, spot, alos, aster, and ikonos, among others, to track mangrove extent (heumann, 2011; valderrama-landeros, 2018). mangroves have spectral signatures that can be tracked in six hyperspectral channels: visible range, red edge, near-infrared, infrared slope, mid-infrared absorption pitch, and mid-infrared peak (vaiphasa, 2007). the availability of free, high-resolution satellite data has enabled scholars to establish a baseline of global mangrove extent called the global mangrove watch (bunting et al., 2022). platforms like google earth engine have allowed researchers to efficiently and autonomously provide mangrove extent analyses all across the globe (ghorbanian et al., 2021; mondal et al., 2019). 2.2 geographic inclusion criteria and site identification for this remote sensing analysis, the geographic inclusion criteria were mangrove restoration sites from 2012 onwards in the greater mumbai metropolitan area. these include the maharashtra districts of palghar, thane, raigarh, mumbai city, and mumbai suburban (figure 1). restoration sites were identified through a combination of federal and state government publications, environmental impact statements, and satellite imagery. these included the indian forest service’s e-green watch database, the ministry of forest, environment, and climate change (mofecc) environmental clearance database (parivesh), and available documents of the maharashtra mangrove cell. the e-green watch database is a federal repository of india’s forest service, national information center, and state forest departments that tracks compensatory afforestation and plantation projects across india (forest service of india, 2023). it includes geo-referenced information and metadata about afforestation projects (i.e. site area, rationale for diversion of protected environmental land, etc.). similarly, parivesh is a federal database hosted by mofecc that tracks environmental clearances for construction projects, environmental impact assessments, budget justifications, and geo-referenced data for sites at the state, district, and local levels (mofecc, 2023). consilience shaham: evaluating a decade of mangrove restoration figure 1: locations of mangrove clearance projects in mumbai corresponding to 25 restoration projects identified in the study analysis. utilizing the keyword search function in both databases, restoration sites that had “mangrove” in their title or project details were identified in the greater mumbai region. 71 files were identified in e-green watch as meeting the inclusion criteria from initial query results. using the same search criteria, another 13 restoration sites were identified on parivesh for a total of 84 candidate sites. the 84 restoration sites identified from e-green watch and parivesh were cross-referenced with corresponding environmental clearances as well as project details from the maharashtra mangrove cell’s annual reports. of these, 52 sites were deemed to have involved either mangrove clearance or restoration. 9 consilience figure 2: locations of mangrove restoration projects (n=25) across the greater mumbai region identified for remote sensing analysis. sites are designated by their respective restoration start years. 14 duplicate entries were identified and removed. an additional 13 construction sites where mangroves were cleared in the mumbai region but the corresponding compensatory afforestation projects did not involve mangrove restoration were also removed. the remaining 25 sites were confirmed as mangrove restoration areas by project documentation and visual assessment utilizing high-resolution satellite imagery (figure 2). for each of these 25 sites, the start date of restoration, restoration site area (ha), area of mangrove cleared for approved construction project (ha), restoration method (plantation, emr, mixed), restoration project timelines, and justification for mangrove clearance were recorded where data was available (table 2, table 4). consilience shaham: evaluating a decade of mangrove restoration table 2: mangrove restoration sites summary table. the table records the restoration start year, the amount of mangrove land cleared for each restoration site (ha), the number of mangrove trees cut, and the construction project justifications for mangrove clearance recorded from project documents (national informatics centre; forest service of india, 2023; national informatics centre & ministry of environment, forest and climate change, 2023). site start year site name mangroves cleared (ha) trees cut reason for mangrove clearance 1 2013 palghar 17.5356 construction of railway line from jawaharlal nehru port to dadri up. 2 2014 boisar 10 3 2014 ghivali 5 4 2014 aasangaon 15 5 2014 datiware 25 6 2014 dapoli 15 7 2014 dighi 1 8 2017 ghansoli (i) 0.279 57 construction of stormwater pumping station in santacruz, mumbai. 9 2018 ghansoli (ii) 0.274 60 construction of new creek bridge, thane to kalwa & rabodi. 10 2018 koparkhaira ne (i) 0.46 190 passenger water terminal project, nerul, alibag, and ferry warf. 11 2018 charkop 2.997 1585 versova-bandra sea link at versova, juhu and bandra, msrdc. 12 2018 gorai (i) 0.985 357 metro pier and bhakti park station, metro line 4 (mmrda). 13 2018 ulwe 0.4859 245 bridge construction, ulwe river for navi mumbai airport cidco. 14 2019 manori 0.983 63 construction of flyover (bridge), airoli to thane belapur road. 15 2019 borivali 0.194 3 widening and reconstruction of existing bridge across mithi river. 16 2019 gorai (ii) 0.048 14 interchange at kalanagar junction, bandra east (bkc), mmrda 17 2019 koparkhaira ne (ii) 0.91 construction of bkc metro railway station at bandra. 18 2019 gorai (iii) 0.226 mangrove conservation center and mangrove park, gorai mmcu. 19 2019 gorai (iv) 0.226 mangrove conservation center and mangrove park gorai, mmcu. 20 2019 gorai (v) 0.2 86 metro piers, vakola nalla, mumbai metro line 2-b, mmrda. 11 consilience 21 2020 nhava 31.7869 3728 coastal road, amra marg-mthl airport link at navi mumbai. 22 2020 jetty 0.005 construction of jetty and at gorai. 23 2020 sarang 0.6983 62 construction of the metro piers for mumbai metro line 5. 24 2021 saravali 4.0122 1454 construction of ghansoli to airoli creek bridge in navi mumbai. 25 2021 neral 0.061 21 construction of cycle track in nerul at sonkhar village, taluka. totals 133.3669 2.3 google earth engine and satellite systems google earth engine (gee) is a web-based platform for geospatial analysis (gorelick et al., 2017). the platform provides access to continually updated datasets for satellites (i.e., landsat, sentinel, modis, etc.) and land cover (global forest cover, fire, water, mangrove, etc.). users can efficiently leverage the petabytes of data that gee hosts in its repository through google’s cloud computing service. this eliminates the need for independently downloading large batches of imagery, stand-alone data processors, or time-intensive preprocessing involved for traditional remote sensing studies. gee has been reliably used for mangrove extent analysis in country-wide assessments, like in the gambia, and remote sensing analyses of restorations (mondal, 2019). in china, jia et. al., collated 42 years of mangrove extent data to track reforestation efforts in national mangrove reserves (jia et. al., 2018). for the present study, sentinel 2 and landsat 8 images were utilized for extent analysis based on the methodology outlined by barenblitt and fatoyimbo (2021). sentinel 2 is a satellite system operated by the european space agency’s copernicus program. launched in 2015, the satellite captures 13 spectral bands using a multi spectral instrument (msi) and has a 10 m per pixel resolution. the sentinel 2 level-1c dataset includes the derivation of toa (top of atmosphere) reflectance values after geometric and radiometric corrections (european space agency, 2015). landsat 8, launched in 2013 by the us geological survey, is a publicly available satellite data system that measures eight spectral bands at a 30 m per pixel resolution (usgs, 2023). a spectral index is an equation that reflects the combination of multiple pixel values from spectral bands in a multispectral image (lenhardt, 2023). spectral indices are used to identify vegetative cover, wetlands, coastal zones, and other distinct land use properties. in the present study, spectral indices were derived from both the sentinel-2 and landsat-8 bands and included the natural differentiated vegetative index (ndvi) and modified normalized difference water index (mndwi) (kriegler, 1969; xu, 2006). 2.4 image cloud correction cloud-free satellite images were generated for the restoration start year and 2022 at each restoration site. images were composed of pixels using a year’s worth of satellite data. a total of 774 sentinel images and 147 landsat images were used in the creation of the composites (table 3). consilience shaham: evaluating a decade of mangrove restoration table 3: number of satellite images used to generate composites for restoration sites. sentinel 2 data were used for mangrove restoration sites with start years from 2016-2022. landsat 8 data were used for start years 2013-2015. year sentinel 2 landsat 8 number of images number of images 2013 37 2014 55 20151 20161 2017 58 2018 138 2019 140 2020 144 2021 150 2022 144 55 total 774 147 1 year without restorations in the sample of 25 sites. mangroves grow in the tropics and subtropics, areas characterized by high annual precipitation. consequently, cloud cover frequently obscures remote sensing studies of mangrove extent (wang et al., 2019). to minimize cloud cover in restoration analysis, images from sentinel 2 were filtered with a cloud mask using the s2 cloud probability dataset where bands are upsampled through bilinear interpolation and missing values are eliminated (google earth engine, 2023). the median reducer function was also applied to eliminate outlying pixel values and to produce seasonally balanced data (zhang et al., 2021). with the landsat data, the reduction of cloud interference was achieved by utilizing the pixel_qa band (usgs, 2023). the resulting image was clipped to low coastal elevations (<40m). images were also clipped to documented appropriate values for mangroves in spectral indices, above .25 for ndvi to ensure the presence of vegetation and below -.5 for mndwi, to exclude water bodies from consideration in analysis (fatyoinbo and barenblitt, 2021) 2.5 random forest, training data, and mangrove extent analysis landcover values were classified using random forest, a decision-tree-based, and a supervised machine learning method. of various machine learning methods—random forest, cart, maximum likelihood classification (mlc), support vector machines (svm), artificial neural networks, etc.—random forest has been shown to be a robust classifier in mangrove extent analysis (toosi et al., 2019; nagarajan et al., 2022). the training data for the model was derived from intertidal regions along mumbai’s coast. mumbai’s mangrove community is largely dominated by single-species avicennia marina (kantharajan et al., 2018). the model was trained on 200 points to differentiate between mangrove cover (100) and non-mangrove cover (100 points) such as mudflats, coastal and intertidal water bodies, non-mangrove vegetative cover, and the built environment. 13 consilience the training group was randomly split so that 80% of the samples were used to train the model, and the remaining 20% were used to test its accuracy. random splitting reduces bias in the models’ endpoint classifications (diettrich and kong, 1995). the model was programmed to utilize 100 trees with five randomly selected predictors per split. pixels classified as mangroves with less than four other “mangrove” pixels appended were removed from the random forest output to reduce model noise. the model was further refined through comparison with the biannual global mangrove watch to exclude inaccurate mangrove identifications, and then retrained appropriately, resulting in an overall accuracy (oa) of 85.33% and kappa coefficient (kc) of 0.71. to establish a baseline, cloud-free composites were generated in google earth engine and analyzed for mangrove extent area (ha) for all sites in the restoration start year. this process was repeated for all sites in the year 2022. time series analysis helps to mitigate issues of tidal interference and disparities in mangrove extent that result from changes in high and low-tide measurements and strengthen the accuracy of model classification results. mangrove extent for restoration areas was calculated in hectares on gee utilizing the ‘image.calculatepixelarea’ function cover and recorded. 3. results in total, 25 mangrove restoration sites were identified in the mumbai metropolitan region. restoration start years ranged from 2013-2021 (table 4). of the selected sites, the year with the most restorations identified was 2019 (n=7). for the construction projects corresponding to these restorations, the total amount of mangrove forest cleared was 133.4 ha. across the 25 restoration sites, the total land allotted by authorities for mangrove restoration projects was 157.3 ha (table 4).  table 4: restoration analysis results by restoration site number. each site records the start year of restoration, the restoration method used, project timeline, site area (ha), mangrove extent at start (ha), and mangrove extent in 2022 (ha), change in mangrove extent, percent extent at start and 2022, and change in percentage of extent. site # site name year project method time (yrs) site area (ha) mangrov e extent at start (ha) mangrove extent in 2022 (ha) change in mangrove extent (ha) % extent before % extent after change in % extent 1 palghar 2013 plantation 8.5 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2 boisar 2014 mixed 11.4 3.0 9.08 6.12 26.0% 79.7% 53.7% 3 ghivali 2014 mixed 5.0 4.5 4.89 0.39 90.2% 97.9% 7.7% 4 aasangaon 2014 mixed 15.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5 datiware 2014 mixed 25.0 8.9 16.70 7.76 35.8% 66.8% 31.0% 6 dapoli 2014 mixed 15.0 8.1 14.85 6.72 54.2% 99.0% 44.8% 7 dighi 2014 mixed 7 23.4 3.6 11.46 7.82 15.6% 49.0% 33.4% 8 ghansoli (i) 2017 mixed 7 1.0 1.0 1.00 0.00 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 9 ghansoli (ii) 2018 mixed 7 1.0 1.0 1.00 0.00 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% consilience shaham: evaluating a decade of mangrove restoration 10 koparkhair ane (i) 2018 mixed 7 1.0 0.3 1.00 0.65 34.8% 100.0% 65.2% 11 charkop 2018 mixed 7 3.0 0.0 0.05 0.00 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 12 gorai (i) 2018 plantation 7 1.0 0.5 0.82 0.30 51.6% 81.5% 29.9% 13 ulwe 2018 mixed 7 1.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 14 manori 2019 mixed 7 1.0 0.0 0.01 0.01 1.5% 1.5% 0.0% 15 borivali 2019 mixed 7 1.0 0.7 0.90 0.24 66.3% 89.9% 23.6% 16 gorai (ii) 2019 mixed 1.0 0.8 0.80 0.00 80.3% 80.3% 0.0% 17 koparkhair ane (ii) 2019 plantation 7 1.0 1.0 1.00 0.00 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 18 gorai (iii) 2019 plantation 7 0.7 0.6 0.64 0.05 85.1% 91.8% 6.7% 19 gorai (iv) 2019 plantation 7 0.3 0.2 0.27 0.06 71.9% 90.4% 18.5% 20 gorai (v) 2019 mixed 7 1.0 0.4 0.39 0.00 38.6% 38.6% 0.0% 21 nhava 2020 plantation 10 34.0 32.4 32.41 0.00 95.3% 95.3% 0.0% 22 jetty 2020 plantation 10 1.0 0.0 0.09 0.09 0.0% 8.6% 8.6% 23 sarang 2020 mixed 10 1.0 0.0 0.27 0.27 0.0% 26.9% 26.9% 24 saravali 2021 plantation 10 4.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25 neral 2021 mixed 10 0.1 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% totals 157.3 67.2 97.63 30.44 average 6.3 2.7 3.91 1.22 41.9% 56.0% 14.0% 3.1 restoration timeseries analysis more than half of restoration sites, 13 of 25 (52%), saw no mangrove growth from the start year of their restoration until 2022. in the 12 restoration sites that showed mangrove growth, there was an average 29% increase in coverage from the time of restoration until 2022. the average coverage growth per restoration site was 2.5 hectares. the site that saw the greatest change in mangrove coverage is site #10 in koparkhairane, from 0.35 ha in 2018 to 1 ha of mangroves by 2022 (table 4). across all restoration sites, there was an average increase of 14% in mangrove coverage in sites from before restoration until 2022. across the 25 sites (157.34 ha), there was an increase of 30.44 ha of mangrove coverage, from 67.19 ha of cover prior to restoration, to 97.63 hectares by 2022. 3.2 prior growth ten of the 25 sites designated for restoration showed more than 50% mangrove cover before restoration works began. out of the total 157.3 hectares allocated by the forest service for restoration, 42.7% (67.2ha) of the land was already covered in mangroves prior to restoration. of these, three sites (sites 8, 9, and 17) were measured to have 100% mangrove coverage before being designated for mangrove restoration. these three sites saw no change in mangrove extent between their restoration start years and 2022 (table 4, figure 3). 15 consilience figure 3: mangrove extent at six coastal restoration sites in mumbai. (a, e) more than half of all sites in the sample, as at sites 1 and 14, showed no mangrove growth from the restoration start to 2022. (c) some areas allocated for compensatory restoration, such as site 8, already showed 100% cover prior to restoration activities. other sites varied more widely in restoration outcomes. (d) sited 10 achieved full restoration in mangrove extent. (b, f) in contrast, sites 6 and 23 only achieved partial coverage recovery. 4. discussion the present study is the first evaluation of a decade of mangrove restoration in the greater mumbai region. an analysis of 25 mangrove restoration sites across mumbai indicates a low increase (14%) in mangrove extent cover (table 4). moreover, half of the restoration sites in mumbai (52%) failed to show any mangrove growth. out of 157 hectares set aside for mangrove restoration, only 30 hectares were successfully restored from 2013-2022. this places mumbai in line with regional efforts at mass mangrove restoration in south asia which show a similarly low rate of success (kodikara et al., 2017; thivakaran, 2017). as a burgeoning megacity, mumbai is representative of the tension between urbanization, rapid population growth, and coastal conservation. the mixed results of the coastal regulation zone (crz) as a conservation law for mangrove trees in mumbai tracks with the efficacy of similar environmental protection laws globally. over 30 countries have designated more than 50% of their mangroves as protected areas (worthington et al., 2020, p. 436). these regulations have not fully stopped anthropogenic clearance, but instead only slow degradation. consilience shaham: evaluating a decade of mangrove restoration the present study revealed that while the majority of mangrove clearance projects in mumbai take place in its urban core, restorations are often located in the outlying suburban and periurban regions. for instance, none of the mangrove clearance projects identified in the analysis took place in the northern district of palghar. the area was host to nine different mangrove restoration projects over the last decade (figures 1, 2). the externalization of mangrove restoration to the outer regions of the city deprives densely-populated urban coastal regions of the flood protection and fishery support that mangroves provide. 4.1 study limitations certain limitations should be considered when interpreting the results of the present analysis. assessing mangrove extent with remote sensing for 1-year-old sapling plantations is prone to variability as satellites may not adequately capture spectral signatures for small trees with low canopy height and leaf coverage. furthermore, the results of remote sensing must be taken with circumspection without ground truthing as there could be changes in canopy cover that can go undetected by remote sensing instruments. this study represents only a partial sample of mangrove restoration sites across mumbai that were able to be publicly verified through environmental impact reports, compensatory afforestation documents, and geospatial confirmation (i.e. presence of fishbone channels). the author identified more restoration sites but was unable to incorporate them for study inclusion because of a lack of available public documentation. future studies should seek to evaluate all of the restoration efforts in the greater mumbai region. with these limitations in mind, the remote sensing methods utilized in this study have proven accurate in providing detailed assessments of mangrove coverage (ghorbanian et al., 2021; mondal et al., 2019). in the mumbai metropolitan region, mangrove restoration is part of an established policy regime for mangrove clearance. the assurance of restoration provides legal cover for developers to seek exemptions from mangrove protection laws. in reality, restoration rarely, if ever, manages to compensate for the number of trees that are lost. only one of the restoration sites (site 10) showed mangrove growth commensurate to the number of trees cut in a corresponding construction project. in the following section, recommendations at the local, national, and international levels are outlined to improve mangrove restoration outcomes in the greater mumbai region. 4.2 local recommendations at the municipal level, geo-referenced location data for mumbai’s restoration sites should be published regularly. this will promote transparency with the public and allow for external accountability on mangrove restoration by academic, ngo, and community stakeholders. the lack of a monitoring assessment of mumbai’s mangrove restorations until now likely stems from the lack of transparency about the location of restorations in mumbai. for the present study, the sample of 25 sites was identified through federal indian databases and resources. the maharashtra mangrove cell reported restoring more than 1500 hectares of mangroves from 2015-2021 (2020; 2021; 2022). despite the legal mandate for the publication of compensatory afforestation sites, only 25 sites that covered 157 hectares of restorations were able to be verified through available public records. municipal and maharashtra state authorities should regularly disclose the location and geographic data of restoration areas to improve monitoring. 17 consilience 4.3 national recommendations at the national level, conservation officials should prioritize ecological mangrove restoration and better enforce existing legal protections for mangrove clearance. the present study revealed that the majority of restorations in mumbai involved sapling plantations, with 319,748 saplings planted from 2012-2022 (table 1). plantations are a historically inconsistent rehabilitation method (primavera and esteban, 2008; wodehouse et al., 2019). policymakers should reform restoration programs to focus on proven ecological mangrove restoration methods for a higher chance of restoration success. furthermore, coastal oversight boards should not green-light mangrove clearance projects until restoration sites are selected and their locations and requisite public documentation publicly released. mangrove clearance decisions are controlled by the national and state coastal zone management authorities (nczma and mczma respectively). an auditor general of india evaluation of state and federal czmas found that the boards are irregularly staffed, meet infrequently, and unqualified private contractors often conduct the environmental impact assessments necessary for coastal clearance (jha, 2022). the report concluded that these chronic issues led to poor oversight in the coastal clearance process and inadequate enforcement of compensatory afforestation plans. the nczma and mcszma need to effectively enforce crz rules and staff in a full-time capacity, to effectively carry out their oversight mandate of mangrove clearance 4.4 international recommendations on the international front, mumbai’s struggles with restoration are symptomatic of gaps in global mangrove restoration standards (duarte, 2020). the un has declared 2021-2030 the decade of ecosystem restoration, with a particular focus on marine projects (waltham et al., 2020). as the number of funded restorations increases, there is a strong need for reform and standardization of restoration methodologies, rigorous guidance on site selections, and success benchmarks that exceed the current average three-year follow-up timeline in the region. this author echoes the call of gatt et. al. (2022), in the need for scholars, practitioners, and international organizations to consolidate a more unified monitoring assessment regime. many of mumbai’s largest infrastructure projects that involve mass mangrove clearance—the coastal road, mumbai metro, ahmedabad-mumbai bullet train, nmia, jnpt, etc.—have largely been financed through private-public partnerships with international financial institutions. these include hundreds of billions ($usd) in combined infrastructure investment from the world bank, asian development bank (adb), japan international cooperative agency (jica), and the european bank for reconstruction and development (ebrd). as international financial institutions transform the physical landscape of global cities, they have a responsibility to rigorously weigh the environmental impacts of clearance and financially support restoration structures at the multi-decadal scale. moving forward, international stakeholders and local officials should develop a targeted whole-of-city approach to conserving and monitoring mumbai’s mangrove restorations. consilience shaham: evaluating a decade of mangrove restoration supplementary materials the following supporting information on project clearances and restoration area shapefiles can be downloaded at: https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fo/rfk59n8pe8swkkqvw2qtl/h?rlkey=udr0ezkvw5ijaqk184of6pedu &dl=0 . funding this research was funded through the fulbright-nehru student research program, administered by the united states-india educational foundation – iie id: e0651579. data availability statement publicly available datasets were analyzed in this study. this data can be found here: https://parivesh.nic.in/, https://egreenwatch.nic.in/. acknowledgments i am grateful to dr. kamal kumar murari for his mentorship and feedback on drafts of the manuscript. thank you to dr. janki andharia and dr. ravinder dhiman for their contributions to the project conceptualization and sound advice as i pursued this research. i am indebted to dr. mark giordano for his considerate feedback on the final drafts of the paper and continuous support. thank you to the tiss office of international relations, kalden shringla, ryan pereira, and the many wonderful individuals at usief for their invaluable support during the duration of my affiliation in mumbai. a final note of gratitude to maya nashva taylor, laila durrani, and cate ralph for their thoughtful reflections and insights throughout. conflicts of interest the author declares no conflicts of interest. the funders had no role in the design of the study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript; or in the decision to publish the results. https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fo/rfk59n8pe8swkkqvw2qtl/h?rlkey=udr0ezkvw5ijaqk184of6pedu&dl=0 https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fo/rfk59n8pe8swkkqvw2qtl/h?rlkey=udr0ezkvw5ijaqk184of6pedu&dl=0 https://parivesh.nic.in/ https://egreenwatch.nic.in/ 19 consilience references bavadam, l. 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(2021). assessment of annual composite images obtained by google earth engine for urban areas mapping using random forest. remote sensing, 13(4), 748. https://doi.org/10.3390/rs13040748 references consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 26 (2022-2023) recording humidity, temperature, and moisture in a hydroponic greenhouse mckenna olsen, franklin farrel, german kuznetsov, donielle nolan, nathalia peixoto, & venkat kalyan reddy yasa george mason university molsen7@gmu.edu, ffarrel@gmu.edu, gkuznets@gmu.edu, dnolan6@gmu.edu, npeixoto@gmu.edu, vyasa@gmu.edu abstract george mason university’s hydroponic greenhouse and the patriot green fund requested an irrigation data logging system to track how weather conditions affect the frequency at which plants need to be watered. a prototype system was created and tested in the greenhouse. the initial prototype was found to have significant issues and was brought back to the lab for modification. upon testing in the lab, it was found that the sensors had multiple issues; further testing is required to find solutions. this project has wide implications in the field of sustainability, as it could be used in medium and small-scale hydroponics operations across the world. author’s note when our team was offered the opportunity to work with the president’s park hydroponic greenhouse to develop a more efficient and sustainable irrigation system, we knew we had to take it. our internship at george mason university allowed us to work with multiple departments, and the greenhouse (along with the accompanying patriot green fund) happened to be one of them. realizing that little data had been collected on weather conditions in the greenhouse, we decided to tackle this gap in knowledge. we believe that the data we helped collect could help the greenhouse water crops exactly how much they need to be watered, ultimately increasing yield and using water and other resources more efficiently. this would also create opportunities for students and faculty to further study how conditions change in the greenhouse due to different seasons and weather conditions. college of engineering and computer science, george mason university; fairfax, va 22030 thanks to sarah d’alexander and the patriot green fund. keywords: hydroponics, greenhouse, agriculture, humidity, irrigation. mailto:molsen7@gmu.edu mailto:ffarrel@gmu.edu mailto:gkuznets@gmu.edu mailto:dnolan6@gmu.edu mailto:npeixoto@gmu.edu mailto:vyasa@gmu.edu 2 consilience introduction the goal of this study was to create a data collection (and/or automatic irrigation) system for george mason university’s hydroponic greenhouse. initially, the desired goal was to create a fully automated watering system that would account for several factors including humidity, temperature, and sunlight levels, but it was quickly decided that this would not be feasible in the amount of time given. instead, the project switched focus to helping the greenhouse collect data on humidity and moisture levels both in the greenhouse as a whole and in the hydroponic trays where food is grown. the hydroponic greenhouse at gmu uses a timer-based irrigation system at present. this system works, but it has several flaws and requires frequent maintenance. as the seasons and weather change, so do the temperature and humidity in the greenhouse, causing water to evaporate at differing rates; this can result in overor under-watering of crops, creating problems such as wilting and root rot. the greenhouse staff’s primary goal was to find a way to record data on weather conditions and their correlation with moisture levels in the hydroponic trays where plants are grown. hydroponic systems are incredibly beneficial to the environment as a greener way to grow food. they use far less water than traditional, soil-based agriculture, take up less space, and allow many crops to be grown locally where that would not be feasible otherwise. the high degree of control afforded by hydroponic systems (over ph, nutrient content, water levels, etc.) can also produce an increased crop yield. this is not to say that hydroponics doesn’t have its own set of problems; first of all, hydroponic systems are expensive to construct. there are simply more components and more complex technology involved than there would be in a traditional garden. issues such as power outages and waterborne disease can quickly harm plants, and a high degree of monitoring is required to ensure that these and other problems (such as pests) do not affect crops. an institution like gmu, with plenty of resources and time to dedicate to sustainability seems an ideal place to streamline hydroponics and solve some of these problems. this would allow the rest of the world to more readily implement hydroponics, allowing for more efficient use of space and resources. humidity and temperature sensors were tested in the greenhouse and reported that temperature rises, and humidity falls significantly during the day. then, a prototype of an integrated data collection system was built and tested in the greenhouse; however, data collection stalled in the middle of the night and the system had to be brought back to the lab. finally, the project moved to fine-tuning this system and re-testing in the lab. it was found that the moisture sensors used in the prototype were malfunctioning in the lab (showing multiple fluctuations in moisture where there should be none) and corroding when placed in the greenhouse’s hydroponic trays. while our team did not have the opportunity to find solutions to these problems or test alternate sensors, we would propose this as a starting point for future investigators. consilience olsen: recording humidity, temperature, and moisture this paper is organized into several sections; first, a brief review of literature surrounding the project is provided. second, the methods and experimental process are described. third, results are relayed, and implications of those results both for this project and for future work in the field are discussed. finally, this paper concludes with suggestions for improvement on this project and an overview of the project’s effect on the hydroponic greenhouse and their future operations. literature review the project began by reviewing several papers on hydroponics and microgreen growth (as our project mainly collected data from trays growing microgreens). in this review, we found that there has been much research on automating hydroponic systems in greenhouses, primarily focused on controlling the flow of nutrient solutions (dhal et al., 2022) or on monitoring temperature and humidity (yanshori et al., 2022). additionally, attempts have been made to solve the problem of environmental factors inhibiting plant growth by controlling those environmental factors; that is, by proposing a fully light-controlled greenhouse (bhargava et al., 2022). this would not be feasible in gmu’s greenhouse, both due to cost and the greenhouse’s goal of being fully sustainable. other papers have shown that increased temperature during light periods can be beneficial to plant growth and crop yield (kumazaki, 2022). this means it is likely that increased temperature in the greenhouse in and of itself does not present a problem for plant growth; it is more likely to be beneficial than detrimental. therefore, a viable solution should not involve an attempt to change the temperature in the greenhouse. sensor-based irrigation systems have been implemented in hydroponic greenhouses before (tatas et al., 2022). tatas et al. created an irrigation system in which data transmitted about ambient conditions in the greenhouse informs the amount of water pumped through the system. additionally, arduino microcontrollers have been used to control the flow of nutrient solution in hydroponic systems (sihombing et al., 2018). this provides precedent for the work done in this project. materials in this project, an arduino microcontroller (essentially a small, easily-programmable computer) was used to read sensor values. moisture sensors were used to measure water content in the hydroponic trays, although the initial model began corroding and a different model was used in the final product. an sd card was used to record data, and components were connected by a circuit board. additionally, the smart hygrometer from sensor blue and an android phone were used to collect preliminary data. finally, burlap fabric was used to test the sensors in the lab and secure them in the greenhouse. methods 4 consilience first, initial data on temperature and humidity was collected from the greenhouse to provide a control dataset from which to calibrate sensors. to collect this data, sensor blue’s smart hygrometer was used. these sensors stream information to an android smartphone, from which data can be exported. one sensor was placed adjacent to the microgreen trays, and another was placed approximately 300 feet away in a different section of the greenhouse. the sensors were left to collect data for 48 hours and recorded the entire time without issue. after the data was exported, it was analyzed in excel, matlab, and codap. a detailed report of this analysis is given in the results section of this paper. next, a prototype data collection system (referred to in this paper as prototype 1) was tested in the greenhouse. data collected by 2 moisture sensors in the hydroponic trays was transmitted via wiring to an sd card for collection and analysis. the prototype was primarily powered by electricity in the greenhouse, although the timepiece was battery powered. additionally, the hygrometers were again placed in the greenhouse so that data from the 2 systems could be compared. prototype 1’s moisture sensors were both placed in the hydroponic tray under the burlap the plants are grown on. one of the hygrometers was placed adjacent to the tray, and the other was placed a few feet above the tray. all sensors were left to record data for approximately 21 hours. approximately 9 hours of data (discussed in the results section) were collected from prototype 1 in this trial; however, it stopped recording around midnight and did not resume. it is possible that it stopped recording due to power being cut off to the outlet it was plugged into, but it remains unsure why it did not resume recording once the outlet was turned back on. the hygrometers again recorded the entire time without issue. additionally, it was found that prototype 1’s moisture sensors had begun to corrode, potentially due to the ph of the nutrient solution in the hydroponic trays. consilience olsen: recording humidity, temperature, and moisture figure 1. prototype 1. an image of our first prototype en route to the greenhouse. the arduino microcontroller (white) is connected to a motherboard that integrates information from the sd card, timepiece, and sensors (connected to the blue & purple wires). 6 consilience figure 2. moisture sensor corrosion. the sensor on the left is unused, whereas the two on the right were used and show visible corrosion. consilience olsen: recording humidity, temperature, and moisture however, the sensors were re-tested in the lab (both in tap water and in the greenhouse’s nutrient-enriched water). the sensor was placed on wet burlap and allowed to dry and did not corrode or have any issue recording data. further testing is required to determine why the sensors worked in the lab but not at the greenhouse. data was analyzed in matlab and codap; plots were created to show the trends in temperature (figure 3) and humidity (figure 4) from our initial data, then a 3d plot was created to compare and contrast the 2 sets of data (figure 5). finally, a chart showing the discrepancies in data collection from moisture sensors in the lab was created to show the problems with these sensors (figure 6). results in analyzing the data from the control condition, it was found that temperature rises in the greenhouse during the day (particularly from the hours of 10:00 am to 4:00 pm), and that humidity falls dramatically during those same hours, as shown in figures 3, 4, and 5. the average temperature in the greenhouse was found to be approximately 76.2 degrees fahrenheit (with a standard deviation of 5.54), and the average humidity was found to be approximately 77.4% (with a standard deviation of 10.76). according to this data, humidity and temperature in the greenhouse are inversely related, but humidity varies more widely. this is reflected in the maximum and minimum values of each data set, with the maximum and minimum values for temperature being 91.06 degrees fahrenheit and 69.13 degrees fahrenheit respectively, and the maximum and minimum values for humidity being 90.4% and 50.3% respectively. in analyzing the data from the first experimental trial, the smart hygrometers reported similar data to the control trial, albeit with lower variability of both temperature and humidity (temperature had a maximum value of 87.2 degrees fahrenheit, and a minimum value of 74.4 degrees fahrenheit, while humidity had a maximum value of 83.3% and a minimum value of 65.9%). this may be because data collection was stopped before the hottest hours of the day (2pm-4pm) or because of variations in weather. the data from the prototype, although it collected data for approximately 9 hours, was largely inconclusive; statistical analysis found little to no pattern. when tested in the lab, the moisture sensors collected data properly for the duration of the trial; this data (figure 6), unlike that collected in the greenhouse, did have a pattern. however, the data did not perform exactly as expected; despite the sensor only being wetted once and then allowed to dry, data shows several fluctuations in moisture level (graph shown below). further testing is required to see why this is the case and if there is any way to make the sensors work properly. 8 consilience figure 3. humidity plot. plot of humidity vs. time of day; humidity increases at night and decreases during the day. figure 4. temperature plot. plot of temperature vs. time of day; temperature decreases at night and increases during the day. consilience olsen: recording humidity, temperature, and moisture figure 5. a 3d plot of humidity, temperature, and time of day. shows the inverse relationship of humidity and temperature throughout the day. figure 6. line graph of data collected from moisture sensors in the lab. high values indicate increasingly dry conditions, while low values indicate wet conditions; despite only being moistened once, the sensors report several fluctuations in moisture. 10 consilience discussion from the data discussed above, we make the preliminary conclusion that temperature and light levels strongly affect humidity and moisture in the greenhouse. temperature is clearly shown to be inversely proportional to humidity, and the temperature of the greenhouse is largely a function of the temperature outdoors and the sunlight coming into the greenhouse. since humidity is affected so strongly, moisture levels in the hydroponic trays are almost certainly affected as well, as the humidity should be inversely proportional to the rate of evaporation. prototype 1 had several problems, all of which can be explained. first, the prototype unexpectedly shut off around midnight; a potential reason for this is that some of the greenhouse outlets are on timers. still, it is unclear why the prototype would not resume recording once power was turned back on in the morning. second, only one of the 2 sensors recorded data at all; this may be due to improper sensor placement. third, the data that was recorded shows no clear pattern or trend. this is most likely because the sensors began corroding overnight, likely due to the ph and other chemical properties of the nutrient solution. it is also likely that the moisture sensors’ demonstrated tendency to display random fluctuations contributed to this. we concluded that the best solution to the problems with sensors was simply to obtain and test a different sensor; the ones used seem to be incompatible with the nutrient solution gmu’s greenhouse uses. these sensors were not chosen for any specific reason; they were simply what the lab had on hand. to fix the sensor positioning problem, a sensor thin enough to be woven into burlap could be used or a clip could be devised to secure the sensors. conclusion in this project, an automatic irrigation system for gmu’s hydroponic greenhouse was devised, tested, and revised. this work is important to the field of sustainability due to the environmental benefits of hydroponics; it proposes a partial solution to the problem of hydroponic crops needing constant monitoring to stay healthy. initial data was collected on weather conditions in the greenhouse, and then a prototype was tested both in lab and in the greenhouse. in both conditions, the moisture sensors used were found to have multiple problems in collecting data consistently and accurately. however, several trends in humidity and temperature were observed, which hopefully will be useful to the gmu greenhouse. additionally, prototype 1 provides an excellent framework for improvement with alternate sensors. this project has many potential implications in the field of hydroponics; other students or faculty could improve upon this design to provide the greenhouse with more accurate and detailed monitoring, or even control of irrigation based on the data gathered by this system. this design could also be altered for use in other smallto medium-scale hydroponics operations, allowing producers around the country and around the world to collect data on weather, moisture levels, and how the two interact. there are countless potential applications for this design, and we hope that our work will be useful to future contributors. consilience olsen: recording humidity, temperature, and moisture bibliography bersani, c., ruggiero, c., sacile, r., soussi, a., & zero, e. 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(2022). changes of soil water and heat transport and yield of tomato (solanum lycopersicum) in greenhouses with micro-sprinkler irrigation under plastic film. agronomy, 12(3), 664. https://doi.org/10.3390/agronomy12030664 https://doi.org/10.3390/agronomy12030664 https://doi.org/10.3390/agronomy12030664 consilience: the journal of sustainable development iss. 25 (2021-22) impact of world bank-assisted projects on poverty alleviation eti best herbert ll.b (uyo); b.l.; ll.m (ibadan). legal practitioner and research consultant; head of practice, olive branch attorneys, ibadan. etiherbert@gmail.com omolara olateju odeniyi ll.b (abuja); b.l.; ll.m (ibadan); phd (in view). barrister and solicitor of the supreme court of nigeria. odeniyiomolara6@gmail.com abstract the world bank is an international financial institution responsible for issuing loans, grants, aids, etcetera to states and multinational corporations for the purpose of carrying out reconstruction and development projects and investments, respectively. several criticisms have trailed the world bank’s project financing, especially with regards to the conditionality of economic restructuring usually imposed thereto. however, in 2013, the world bank realigned its goal toward reducing poverty to less than 3 percent by 2030. mechanisms such as the poverty reduction strategic paper (prsp), compliance advisor ombudsman (cao) were created toward this end. it is in view of the foregoing that this paper examined the impact of world bank assisted projects on poverty alleviation. this paper concluded that for the bank to achieve its goal at the set date, a purposive approach must be adopted to ensure the participation of the various stakeholders in the poverty alleviation process. introduction more than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. their food is inadequate. they are victims of disease. their economic life is primitive and stagnant. their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to themselves and to more prosperous areas. for the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people. (truman, 1949, as cited in chandy et al., 2016, p. 1). 2 consilience seventy-eight years after the above statement was made, the world is still grappling with the scourge of poverty. poverty is a matter of serious concern to the world, as its victims and effects transcend cultural, religious, national, racial, or even continental boundaries. it is a threat to its victims, including those who have escaped it and the world at large. the recognition of this fact warranted action plans by many governments and organizations, both at the local and international level, at various times.1 at the dawn of the 21st century, the united nations formulated seven millennium development goals (mdgs) for its member states. among these goals was the eradication of poverty.2 the target year for achieving these goals was 2015. unfortunately, little success was achieved in most parts of the world. in 2015, the united nations came up with 15 sustainable development goals (sdgs) to be attained by 2030. the first and 10th goals of the sdgs are targeted at poverty eradication. the world bank group is primarily concerned with providing aid, loans and grants to governments, corporate bodies, and not-for-profit organizations to execute infrastructural, social, and development-based projects (world bank, n.d.). the world bank had usually insisted on the borrowing countries to implement structural adjustment programs (saps) reforms as a condition for obtaining loans (ibrd article iii sect. 4, amended 2012). the claim had been that the sap conditions were aimed at economic revitalisation. however, the preponderance of countries that implemented sap experienced higher levels of poverty, mass unemployment, and increasing external debt levels. the world bank has, of recent, been more concerned with the outcome of the projects financed by the bank than in the past. in 2013, the world bank president announced to the international community, its new goal targeted at ending global poverty by 2030. this goal, in his estimation, will be achieved when there is a drastic reduction of the number of persons living below poverty line. thus, the aim of the world bank is to reduce global poverty to 3 percent or lower in 2030 (world bank, 2016a). this decision is to reflect the redefinition of its mission statement toward poverty eradication. in line with the foregoing statement, the burden of this scholarly sojourn is to examine or verify the impact of world bank-financed projects and how realistic they are to the attainment of the goals of a renascent world bank. this paper will reference specific world bank assisted projects in nigeria. the paper will demonstrate how the world bank’s investments in extractive industries have limited economic diversity and affected environmental sustainability in countries which borrow money from the bank. the social dimension of the study considers 1“i want to see a world free from poverty. poverty does not belong in a civilized human society. its proper place is in a museum… information and communications technology is changing the world more rapidly and more fundamentally than any other technology in human history. i would like to see all information available to all people everywhere (including the poorest, the most ignorant, and the most powerless) at all times, almost cost-free. why can’t we create a povertyfree world before the new century crosses the halfway mark?” muhammad yunus. 2000. economist and founder of the grameen bank, bangladesh. see, muhammad yunus, ‘the battle against poverty’, encyclopaedia britannica student and home edition (2010). 2technically, the seven millennium development goals are all aimed at the eradication of poverty because the various goals are means to which poverty eradication is an end. consilience herbert & odeniyi: impact of world bank-assisted projects the world bank’s engagement of stakeholders, particularly people under the scourge of poverty, in development projects. the findings from this analysis will reveal the extent of the negative or positive impacts of the world bank’s transactions with nigeria and other developing countries. consequently, appropriate recommendations shall be made on the possible course of action that may be taken to remedy the situation. world bank the world bank was founded in 1944 at the united nations monetary and financial conference, more commonly known as the breton woods conference (malanczuk, 1997). although the world bank is affiliated with the united nations, it is not accountable to the general assembly nor the security council. when one talks of the world bank, what is contemplated is a group that consists of five institutions: the international bank for reconstruction and development (ibrd), the international development association (ida), the international finance corporation (ifc), the multilateral investment guarantee agency (miga), and the international centre for settlement of investment disputes (icsid). they are collectively referred to as the world bank3 group. the individual institutions have different functions. the function of the ibrd is to offer loan facilities with interest rates at the subsisting market value to low and middle-income developing countries, provided they are creditworthy to satisfy their obligations thereto. on the part of the ida, it offers loan facilities with longer timeline, yet interest-free. other services which it renders to lowincome developing countries include technical support and counsel on policy matters relating to health, education and rural development. the world’s capital markets offers a platform through which ibrd generates funds, while in the case of ida, contributions made by developed countries forms the major source from which it carries out financing operations. the ifc is the arm of the world bank which forms alliance, offer loans, guarantees and equity financing for corporation with investment undertakings in developing countries. miga functions as insurer and guarantor to protect foreign investors from non-commercial eventualities occasioning losses to their investment in developing countries. icsid operates independently in providing alternative dispute resolution mechanism, particularly arbitration, in the settlement of international investment disputes arising between foreign investors and host states (chossudovsky, n.d.). the world bank is made up of 189 member countries. each of these countries is usually represented by its finance minister or central bank governor. ordinarily, membership of the international monetary fund (imf) is a precondition for membership of the world bank. however, the world bank has the discretion to continue regarding a state as its member notwithstanding that its membership with imf has ceased (schermers & blokker, 2011). the world bank’s decisions are usually reached on a weighted vote basis (ibrd, article v 3in most of the literature reviewed in the course of this work, most of the authors usually refer to ibrd as world bank and then specifically mention any of the other institutions among the world group where they intended to refer to any of them. however, for the purpose of this work, they shall be commonly referred to as world bank unless the otherwise is intended, in which case it shall be stated. ebcid:com.britannica.oec2.identifier.articleidentifier?articleid=42583&library=eb&query=null&title=international%20development%20association#9042583.toc ebcid:com.britannica.oec2.identifier.articleidentifier?articleid=42586&library=eb&query=null&title=international%20finance%20corporation#9042586.toc 4 consilience section 3, 2012). critical decisions require the consent of 70 percent to 85 percent of the votes (shaw, 2008). this system ensures that the largest stakeholders enjoy a privileged position as a result of their financial subscription. the united states, being the country with the highest input, has always dominated the bank and always produced its president. the plenary organ of these agencies is the board of governors, which exercises authority. out of the representatives of member countries, 25 resident executive directors are chosen to form the executive body. their duty is to conduct the general operations of the world bank under the powers delegated to them from the board of governors. the board of executive directors is responsible for approval of the annual budget (see generally ibrd article v, amended 2012). the board of governors of the world bank group, at its 2013 spring meetings, endorsed two goals in its new strategy of operation. these are “[1] to end extreme poverty: reduce the percentage of people living on less than $1.254 a day to 3 percent by 2030 and [2] to promote shared prosperity: foster income growth for the bottom 40 percent of the population in every developing country” (world bank group, 2014, p. 1). although the world bank always expressed its mission of fighting against poverty, these two goals reiterate its commitment to erasing poverty from the world and raising the standard of living at a rapid and sustainable rate (world bank group, 2014). by implication, the target is to reduce the poverty headcount ratio globally from 10.7 percent in 2013 to 3 percent or less by 2030 and enabling the growth in the income or the consumption expenditure of the poorest 40 percent of the population in each country (world bank, 2016a). in achieving this goal, the world bank developed a model consisting of three main elements, namely: systematic country diagnostic, country partnership framework and performance and learning review. the first variable entails a methodology that depend on data and analytical tool so as to identify the essential projections and weaknesses to poverty reduction while ensuring the sustainability element in the wealth creation strategy that takes into consideration the opinion of the poor persons and members of the private sector. the second variable entails locating the focal point for which the world bank would channel its funding, having already identified the prospects and shortcomings based on the systematic country diagnostic approach. this is supposed to be tailored along with the developmental pathway of individual states, in view of certain considerations, such as comparative advantage of the world bank group involved, the expectations of the country and interest of development partners. the last variable, which is the performance and learning reviews, attempts to ascertain and galvanise lessons culled from projects that were implemented. these lessons advises the bank on the kind of interventions that may be infused at mid-intervals or at the learning and accountability stage after a circle of the project has been completed. regional coordinating mechanism also has a role to play in aiding the world bank group perform its project at the regional level. (world bank group, 2014, p. 7-8). the world bank pursues an empowerment agenda as an integral aspect of poverty reduction. the bank’s comparative advantage lies in its relationship with 4 due to the corona virus pandemic, this figure has been adjusted to $1.90 per day. consilience herbert & odeniyi: impact of world bank-assisted projects over 100 countries. “the bank's comparative advantage is, obviously, not to work at the community level but to advise governments based on analytical and evaluative work, to facilitate links to financial investment, and to enable others directly or indirectly to work on the empowerment agenda. the bank is uniquely placed to provide support in four areas: (a) analysis, evaluation, and advice; (b) convening; (c) enabling; and (d) capacity building” (narayan, p. 9). poverty poverty is the inability to cope well with the economic, political, social, and psychological expectation of one’s community.5 poverty is said to exist when people lack the means to meet their basic needs.6 the world bank defines poverty with regards to income and consumption levels. “the world bank focuses on the inability of people to generate sufficient income to purchase the necessities of life, and poverty is said to be reduced or eliminated when people achieve a minimum standard of living” (mubangizi, 1). the world bank’s measurement indicator of poverty scaled it at $1 per day, per person, adjusted by the purchasing power parity (ppp) as the absolute poverty line. any individual whose income falls below this level is considered to be living in a condition of absolute poverty. this concept of poverty is criticised on the grounds that poverty is a multi-faceted phenomenon which cannot be reduced to income level only. the ability to get available basic amenities including, good educational system, sound health facilities, portable water supply etcetera, which enable healthy standard of living, where subject matter with the contemplation of the world bank’s income matrix (adejumobi, 2006). adejumobi advised caution in the assessment of poverty on a global scale. he identified three major points to consider about poverty. the first point is his identification of poverty as a structural occurrence which has multiple dimension displayed on either economic, social, or political grounds. second, poverty is neither seen as a natural occurrence nor a particular incident but borne as a result of combined factors which diminishes the people’s standard of living. the third perspective is that interpretation of what poverty is, depends on the perception of each society, as influenced by their unique social and cultural universe of experience (adejumobi, 2006). in his study, mubangizi is more concerned with making an enquiry as to the factors which cause or perpetrate poverty, in order to formulate preventive rather than curative solutions. according to mubangizi, it is the “absence of distributive justice that is largely responsible for poverty production,” (mubangizi, 2). the foregoing position agrees with the concept that poverty is a living condition wherein a person or group of people are unable to attain the majority of their basic and elementary needs for human survival in terms of good 5ao oriababor, and ado adesina, ‘the status of poverty alleviation programmes among the rural women in nigeria’ (2006) 1 (1&2) international journal of law and contemporary issues 158. 6what constitutes basic needs may be defined to mean “those necessary for survival” or broadly put, “those reflecting the prevailing standard of living in the community”. see, ‘poverty’, encyclopaedia britannica student and home edition (2010). 6 consilience nutrition, clothing, shelter, foot wear, energy, transport, health, education, and recreation. these criteria, as noted earlier, differ for different social groups depending on their geographic, political, and economic realities (ater et al, 2006).7 poverty alleviation8 the extent of absolute poverty in a country or a region can be measured by the number, or fraction, of people living below the poverty line. an individual whose income falls below the poverty line is regarded as “poor.” poverty may be relative when people at the bottom of the income distribution are compared those around the middle. the fraction of people with income less than half of the median income determines the relativity of poverty. in the course of attaining poverty alleviation, the direct or indirect method has been followed. based on the direct approach, pays attention to rendering aid to enable poor people meet their essential needs, including food, shelter, education, access to health care, etcetera. on the other hand, the indirect means consider putting macro-economic structure in place which would in turn stimulate enabling environment for poor people to earn income (gannon & liu, 1997). the direct approach takes cognizance of the fact that even through the dividends of the indirect approach there is an economic situation where some people are unable to utilize those opportunities. hence, this calls for a direct redistribution of wealth in the form of aid and assistance to meet the basic needs of the poor. there is a significant record of decline in extreme poverty globally. however, this result is credited to the improved standard of living in parts of asia, latin america, and the caribbean. this is hardly the case for sub-saharan african countries. this region is reputed for having a headcount ratio of 41%, the highest across the world. it is also infamous for its world record of accommodating a population of 389 million poor persons. poverty alleviation is the primary benchmark by which the essential contribution of the world bank is measured (world bank, 2016). beginning from 1970, successive nigerian governments have initiated developmental plans which placed focus on poverty eradication (nkemdilim, 2003). towards this end, several tantalizing programmes including, operation feed the nation (ofn), community based poverty reduction (cbpr), green revolution (gr), family economic advancement programme (feap), directorate for food roads and rural infrastructure (dfrri), better life for rural women 7pi ater, jc umeh and wl lawal, ‘comparative analysis of the impact of world bank root and tuber expansion programme on poverty alleviation of peri-urban and rural communities in benue state, nigeria’ (international association of agricultural economists conference, gold coast, australia, 2006) 2. <ageconsearch.umn.edu>bitstream.pp060218.pdf> accessed 9 august 2017. 8poverty alleviation is sometimes used coterminously with poverty reduction and poverty eradication. however, the former two implies minimising poverty to the barest point; while the later connotes complete termination of poverty. the choice of poverty alleviate in this work suggest our position that it is not possible to exterminate poverty; it can only be reduced to its barest minimal effect. consilience herbert & odeniyi: impact of world bank-assisted projects programme (blrwp), national poverty eradication programme (napep), nigerian agricultural corporative and rural development bank (napcrdb), amongst others, in a bid to eliminate poverty have been conceived and implemented. billions of naira and dollars have been invested in this regard by the nigerian government and donor agencies such as the world bank, imf, united nations children’s fund, ida, and others nkemdilim, 2003). world bank assisted projects as noted earlier, the world bank finances projects carried out by member states, corporate bodies (especially multinational companies), and even not-forprofit organizations. the world bank was initially formed to finance infrastructural development and the rehabilitation of europe after the vast devastation caused by world war ii and the economic recession that followed. subsequently, the scope of the bank’s functions expanded to granting assistance to developing countries in africa, asia, south america, eastern europe, and the caribbean. loans provided to these countries usually included the conditionality that the government of the borrowing country must implement the sap. this scheme requires the government to refrain from participating or controlling the economy but rather allow market forces to determine the outcome of the economy. hence, existing public utilities were to be liberalised, commercialised, and privatised. at first, loans were given to only governments of member states. subsequently, the formation of the other institutions of the world bank groups, such as ifc and miga, extended its financing pre-occupation to corporate bodies. their targets include multinational companies involved in the extractive industries. this is due to the expectation of quick financial returns on the loans offered to these companies. more so, their influence in these indebted countries, most of which are rich in natural resources, can be used to create an enabling environment for their client companies to smoothly operate. the bank approved $9.3 billion for the sub-saharan african region for 109 projects in the fiscal year of 2016. this includes $669 million in ibrd loans and $8.7 billion in ida commitments, $200 million of which was from the ida scale-up facility (world bank annual report, 2016). target areas for this fund included increasing agricultural productivity, raising access to affordable and reliable energy, building climate change resilience, strengthening fragile and conflict afflicted areas, and promoting good and quality education.9 the bank stated that the incidence of poverty in the region may be lower than current estimates. the high population growth was further credited as a reason for the number of africans living in extreme poverty. the 2020 population estimation of 1.341 billion people in sus-saharan africa (worldometers, 2019) is above 50 million greater than its population size in 1990 (world bank annual report, 2016). 9ibid. 8 consilience world bank assisted projects in nigeria nigeria became a signatory to the world bank articles of agreement in 1961, one year after the country’s independence and 17 years after the creation of the world bank.10 since then, nigeria has continued to enjoy over 120 world bank assisted projects and over 121 ibrd and ida credit facilities.11 below is the list of subsisting world bank projects in nigeria: 1. better education service delivery for all. june, 2017 to october, 2022. us$611 million. 2. nigeria-kaduna state economic transformation programme for results (improve enabling business environment, strengthen fiscal management and accountability in kaduna state). april, 2017 to march, 2021. us$350 million. 3. mineral sector support for economic diversification project (mindiver). april, 2017 to june, 2022. us$150 million. 4. agro processing productivity enhancement and livelihood improvement support project (enhance agric productivity, encourage small and medium scale farmers). march, 2017 to september, 2023. us$200 million. 5. national social nets projects. june, 2016 to june, 2022. us$183 million. 6. natural extractive industry transparency initiative (neiti) reporting compliance. december, 2016 to december, 2017. us$0.32 million. 7. community and society development (accessibility of social and natural infrastructural services). june, 2016. us$75 million. other projects at different levels of government include, but are not limited to, the following: development finance project; state and local governance reform project; ng-polio eradication support: additional financing; nigeria program to support saving one million lives; nigeria edo state fiscal improvement and service delivery operation; nigeria partnership for education project; 3rd lagos state development operation; 2nd additional financing toward national fadama development project; and, additional financing nigeria state health investment program.12 the role of the world bank group as corporate financier is well noted. its presence in the extractive industry is particularly felt. miga is reported to have guaranteed the sum of $200 million for the purpose of gas pipeline and processing plant construction in nigeria.13 10jonathan gandu joseph, ‘world bank and crises of development in nigeria (1999 to 2008)’ (msc thesis, department of political science department, faculty of social sciences university of nigeria, 2010) 12. 11<http://www. answers.com/economyofnigeria/2/5/2009> accessed 9 august 2018. 12‘source’ <www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/projects/all> accessed 9 august 2018. 13world bank group, ‘the world bank group in the extractive industries’, (2016) annual review. 4. <documents.worldbank.org.112709-ar-wbg-in-extractive-industries-annualreview-2016-public.pdf> accessed 16 december, 2020. consilience herbert & odeniyi: impact of world bank-assisted projects world bank and corporate funding the sankofa gas project, launched by the ghana national petroleum corporation, received a world bank financial boost in the range of $700 million.14 in 2016, the amount expended in support of the extractive industry by the world bank group grossed $3.1 billion.15 additionally, a world bank finance project is targeted at the establishment of an oil field in southern chad, with a 1,070 kilometer pipeline linkage to an off-shore facility in the coast of cameroon.16 the foregoing has provoked queries regarding whether the world bank’s involvement in extractive industries falls in line with its poverty alleviation and sustainable development objections. as nadia martinez writes, although, the bank is a taxpayer funded institution whose mission is to help the poorest people on the planet, it is putting the interest of oil companies based in rich countries ahead of the needs of the world’s poor…however, the institute for policy studies’ research suggests that 82% of the bank’s oil extraction projects wind up supplying consumers in the united states and europe. the institute has also calculated that the main beneficiaries of the bank’s fossil fuel extractive projects are halliburton, shell, chevron texaco, total, and exxon mobil. the bank’s own review of extractive industries was proof enough that oil companies’ profits do not trickle down to the people the institution is supposed to serve.17 concerns have been raised as to the overall effect the world bank’s partnership with private corporations may have. it has been suggested that it may undermine the role of the state as the primary provider of basic goods and services, thereby leading to a reduction of countries in need of their services.18 this may not necessary be as a result of the self-sufficiency of these countries but may be in form of people protest that world bank is giving more impetus to corporate entities whose activities are perceived to be of adverse effect to their interest. the world bank has justified its financing of extractive industries by suggesting natural resources are harnessed toward economic growth and sustainable development for all.19 hence, it is multinational companies that invest and operate in extractive industries that are direct beneficiaries of the world 14ibid. 15ibid. 8. 16extractive industries review, striking a balance: the world bank group and extractive industries. final report. (2003) vii. <www.extractiveshub.org-get-010+volume+l++the+world+bank+and+extractive+industries.pdf> accessed 16 december, 2020. 17n martinez, ‘world bank ignores own advice!’ (2004) 102 review of african political economy 703-5. 18‘what are the main concerns & criticism about the world bank and imf’, <www.brettonwoodproject.org/2005/08/art-320869/> accessed 9 august 2017. 19 holly wise and sokol shtylla, ‘the role of the extractive sector in expanding economic opportunity’, (2007) kennedy school of government, harvard university, corporate social responsibility initiative report no. 18. 7. <www.hks.harvard.edu_files_report_18_eo+extractive+final.pdf> accessed 9 august 2017. 10 consilience bank’s financing activities. as corporate bodies, the driving force for any of their undertakings is that such is regarded as a business venture. the end result of any of their ventures is profit-oriented. funds used for corporate social responsibilities and other charitable activities are a small component of their profits. even when they are executed, it usually has an undertone of direct or indirect benefit to the companies themselves. the mission of poverty eradication will not be well-served if everybody goes about their activities or businesses as usual. there has to be some altruistic extension of services by the rich to raise the poor above the standard of poverty. assuming the world bank is playing an altruistic role in that regard, it is submitted that the polling of the bank’s resources in favor of organizations that do not understand what it means to play such altruistic role runs afoul and is capable of making the bank’s mission of poverty alleviation head for an imminent failure. world bank projects and environmental impact the world bank promotes private investment in extractive industries in two different ways. first, it seeks to influence the investment environment using its macroeconomic adjustment programs and technical assistance loans to promote trade and investment liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation, legislative reforms, government institutional support, and capacity-building. second, it gives direct investment support to corporate multi-national companies in the extractive industries by financing or guaranteeing specific projects.20 the activities of corporate entities in the extractive industry are inherently environmentally unclean given their reliance on fossil fuel and production of fossil based products. world banks’ investment in these entities is a tacit impetus to their malfeasance and protection from the consequences of their wrong in view of the influence which they wield over the host country. thus, an enabling environment is created for the smooth operation of the multinational companies, s it is their primary interest to do so. similar to every other credit-facilitating institution, the world bank’s funded projects are determined on the basis of returns and security of financial investments and the ability of debtors to repay loans. environmental impact assessments were rarely carried out on the projects and minimal consideration was given to the potential social, human, and environmental costs. for example, a world bank-financed project executed in the gambella region of ethiopia resulted in the displacement of 1.5 million people from their homes.21 in another instance, the construction of the sardar sarovar dam in india continued to enjoy funding from the world bank for years despite its displacement of a million 20scot pegg, ‘poverty reduction or poverty exacerbation? world bank group support for extractive industries in africa’, (2003) 6. <https://www.oxfamamerica.org>files>povertyreduction-or-poverty-exacerbation.pdf> accessed 9 august 2017. 21osuntogun a jacob, global commerce and human rights: towards an african legal framework for corporate human rights responsibility and accountability. (phd thesis, university of the witwatersrand, 2015) 185. consilience herbert & odeniyi: impact of world bank-assisted projects people.22 it was called to order only after loud outcry by global civil society groups, after all assessment reports pointed out the environmental and financial unsustainability of the project.23 there are other world bank-funded projects which flout the principles of environmental and social sustainability, including the approval of oil pipeline projects in cameroon and chad and a resettlement project in china, which resulted in the displacement of ethnic tibetans and mongol nomadic herders. in 2000, the bank admitted that under its portfolio, 2.6 million people worldwide were adversely affected by forcible eviction, loss of land, or loss of livelihood. for the year 1999 fiscal, the ifc earmarked 19.1 percent of its investments for oil, gas, mining, timber, pulp, and paper operations. despite the obvious environmental impact of these projects, far lesser financing is granted for environmentally-sustainable projects. an informal us government white paper shows that spending on the environment has decreased from 3.6 percent of the bank’s overall portfolio in the 1994 fiscal year to 1.0 percent in the 1998 fiscal year.24 this position was confirmed by the world bank which stated that the funding committed to environmental projects decreased by 32.7 percent between 1998 and 1999.25 between 1992 to 2002 the world bank was noted to have deployed nearly us$25 billion into fossil fuel-based projects, which is responsible for releasing at least 46.7 billion tons of carbon dioxide emissions.26 the grave impact the emission of carbon dioxide has on the ozone layer and the resulting climate crisis is well-noted. the climate crisis will lead to unstable weather conditions, desertification, rising sea levels, and natural disasters such as flooding, tsunamis, erosion, etcetera. the agricultural sector would be heavily impacted by these consequences. it is well-known that the majority of poor people live in rural areas and their main source of income is farming. if their means of subsistence is under great threat as a result of the climate crisis, their poverty situation would likely continue or worsen. even the world bank noted that “warmer global temperatures and projected sea-level rise threaten both future poverty reduction and the sustainability of past gains that were achieved through decades of work. the adverse effects of climate change fall disproportionately on the poorest countries and the poorest groups within countries.”27 a report in a publication titled, shock waves: managing the impacts of climate change on poverty, released shortly before the 21st conference of the parties (cop 21) on climate change talks in paris, warned that without rapid action, climate change could push more than 100 million people into poverty by 2030.28 further projections suggest that by 2080 about 22vikas nath, ‘world bank: a step forward and a step backward do we need this institution?’ 4. <www.cddc.vt.edu>knownet>iseworld.pdf> 7 august 2017. 23ibid. 24ibid. 4-5. 25see, world bank, <http://www.foe.org/international/worldbank/wb.pdf> accessed 7 august 2018. 26sustainable energy and economy network/institute for policy studies, ‘the world bank and fossil fuels: a clear and present danger’, (2002). 27world bank. (n. 14) 3. 28world bank, (n. 38) 17. 12 consilience 600 million people worldwide will suffer from malnutrition as a result of climate change.29 based on these projections, the bank is far from achieving its goal. the adoption of the sdgs by the united nations in september 2015 and the signing of the paris agreement on climate change in april 2016 marked a strong recognition by the international community that economic growth, poverty reduction, and environmental sustainability are inextricably linked to achieving sustainable development.30 78 percent of the world’s poor people live in rural areas. most of them depend on agriculture as their source of livelihood. enabling the environment to increase farm productivity and resilience, strengthening farmers’ links to markets, and making food obtainable at affordable rates are viable means to end poverty and boost shared prosperity.31 environmental pollution is a common occurrence in communities where commercial entities are involved in extractive activities. this pollution could be due to the very nature of the industry, disregard for environmentally sustainable measures in exploitation of natural resources, or acts of sabotage from third parties. in nigeria, there have been various incidences of environmental pollution arising from oil spillage, pipeline explosion or vandalization. in ogoniland of the niger delta region of nigeria, the oil spillage by shell pipelines have rendered the affected land area useless to agricultural yield. the life of fauna in bodies of water where oil has been spilled is highly threatened. the anthropogenic activities of world bank-supported extractive industries have led to local communities losing their livelihoods of farming and fishing. in the jos area of plateau state, nigeria, there are large areas of arable land mass lost to gullies which were formerly tin mining sites. having ransacked the earth of its resources, the companies simply move to the next available site without filling up those gullies. a study demonstrated the large mass of arable farm land that is lost to tin mining endeavours in jos south. these activities has occasioned “soil erosion problems, swampy nature of neglected mined excavation, mine dump, pits and industrial use of the arable land”, thereby causing “low productivity in crop farming, land fragmentation, land disputes and conflicts, and unemployment in the area” (adegboye, 82). significantly more people could have been employed if those lands were available for farming purposes. this could have also increased the food production from the area. in the event a project creates a high rate of return but adversely affects the poor population, its politically-judged contribution to social welfare may warrant careful reconsideration and reconstruction. involvement of the poor in world bank projects it is usually said that he who wears the shoe knows where it pinches. another person cannot claim to know the part of the body in which a sick person feels pain. similarly, the poor know their respective needs better than any other person may claim to know. hence, the needs of the poor cannot be met without consulting the poor population and granting them participation in the 29sanni m adam, ‘law and policy on environmental protection and challenges of climate change’, (2012) 1 uniabuja liberal chambers silk 175. 30world bank, (n. 38) 15. 31ibid. consilience herbert & odeniyi: impact of world bank-assisted projects process. in the event the poor population boycotts the poverty alleviation process, there is no way the scourge will be effectively tackled. participation is “a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives, decisions, and resources which affect them.”32 participation can come in different means, ranging from information sharing and consultation methods, to mechanisms for collaboration and empowerment that give stakeholders more influence and control.33 in every endeavour, there are persons who are referred to as stakeholders. stakeholders in terms of world bank-financed operations are persons who are likely to gain or lose something as a result of a project or policy intervention, or those capable of affecting the outcome of an intervention. these categories include: i. the borrower: the world bank’s most direct clients and beneficiaries are the governments and agencies responsible for project or policy implementation.34 ii. the poor (key stakeholders): the ultimate goal of the world bank’s interventions is to help countries reduce poverty. thus, the poor become a key target and are stakeholders in this regard. however, the poor often lack information and power and are often left out of the development process. particular attention should be given to vulnerable groups such as the women, children, physically challenged persons, indigenous people, and minority groups.35 iii. other affected groups: this includes other individuals, families, communities, or organizations who may be positively or negatively affected by the world bank’s financed projects or policy interventions.36 iv. interest groups: this includes others who have vested interests in development initiatives including donors, civil society groups, opinion leaders, non-governmental organizations, religious and community organizations, local authorities, and private sector firms. the world bank, as well, is a stakeholder in its work with client countries.37 economic growth alone cannot guarantee a considerable reduction in poverty. research shows that nigeria did not experience commensurate poverty reduction even in periods of economic growth.38 this supports the point that economic growth must be deliberately accompanied with equity, promoted by 32the world bank, ‘the world bank and participation’, (1994) operations policy department. 33jennifer rietbergen-mccracken and deepa narayan, ‘participation and social assessment: tools and techniques’, (1998) the international bank for reconstruction and development/the world bank 4. <www.oikodomos.org>references>text>amartin_11_toolkit_participation.pdf> accessed 9 august, 2017. 34ibid. 35ibid. 36ibid. 37ibid. 66. 38ezeora j nkemdilim, 34. 14 consilience the participation of the poor themselves in the activities that would alleviate poverty, which is vital to sustainable poverty reduction.39 the pertinent question to ask at this point is whether the world bank appropriately consults and enables the participation of the poor in its projects and policies. in answering this question, it shall be considered from two perspectives. the first view is the interest of poor member countries in the organization, while the second view is the stake of poor citizens of the countries receiving aid from the bank. on the first perspective, it is contended that the world bank does little to serve the cause of the poor. this view may be hard to fault if one looks at the organizational structure of the bank. the structure lacks the principle of equality of states. elections into positions and the decision-making processes of the organization are determined by weighted votes according to the financial subscriptions of states.40 developing countries, the main beneficiaries of the loans and policy advice, have insignificant voices in the organization. the sap conditionality is nothing other than the ideals of capitalism, which the united states and other western countries with influential positions have used to foist on the organization and the developing countries who depend on such loans for their economic stability. the bank was used as an instrument in advancing the ideological cold war between the united states and former soviet union. poor countries, especially in africa, were torn between leaning toward the capitalist ideology of western europe or the socialist ideology of eastern europe. whereas a developing country typically maintains a socialist disposition, the united states used its dominant position, as the largest contributor with the highest percentage of voting power,41 to block the grant of such loans by the world bank. otherwise, lending countries are forced to adopt the sap conditionality and a capitalist model for their economy. on the second perspective, it is doubtful whether poor citizens are taken into consideration in the execution of world bank projects. the bank is not involved in the actual execution of the projects in the borrowing countries. they merely issue the funds to the government or corporate bodies to execute the projects. this approach is unsatisfactory. if the world bank has taken it upon itself to eradicate poverty, it must be concerned with the outcome of the project for which funds are issued. they must also ensure that poor people are engaged to certify that the project meets their needs. the various poverty alleviation schemes launched over the years in nigeria, beginning from operation feed the nation to the agricultural development projects, have not successfully addressed the issue of poverty. this failure has been attributed to their shortterm and top-down execution approach, which is unsustainable.42 39ibid. 40“at the beginning of the 21st century the united states exercised more than one-sixth of the votes, more than double that of japan, the second largest contributor… in the late 1990s approximately 2 percent of the votes were held by 25 african countries combined”. michel chossudovsky, ‘world bank’. 41elmira makova, ‘role of the world bank and imf in issuing loans to russia: responsibility, tricks, corruption, mafia, and important use of legal enforcement’, (llm thesis, university of georgia, 2005) 37. 42 the world bank, 2002. why poverty reduction strategies have failed nigeria: the guardian, 25 and 27. ebcid:com.britannica.oec2.identifier.authoridentifier?authorid=5534 consilience herbert & odeniyi: impact of world bank-assisted projects several barriers arise at different levels to prevent the poor from having a real stake in development activities. identified barriers include social stratification, peculiar experience, infrastructural functionality, illiteracy, limited economic prowess, institutional control, limited access to information, and the caliber of the project.43 special arrangements and efforts must be employed in reaching and engaging the poor by the sponsors. a needs assessment and the services of community-based organizations, which are closer to the grassroots, can be employed. these measures must go beyond those used to engage government officials and other relatively powerful stakeholders in the participatory processes.44 “they too must be enabled to influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them,”45 during the preparation, planning, and implementation stages of such projects. a study by the bank’s operations evaluation department (oed) found that the bank’s financed projects that were managed by local communities were slightly more successful than those managed by other entities. additionally, after a detailed analysis of village water and sanitation committees in two indian states, it was found that water system effectiveness, operation, and maintenance were strongly due to transparency of information, followed by ownership, participation, and inclusion.46 the four elements of empowerment are information, inclusion and participation, accountability, and local organizational capacity. the combination of these elements leads to more effective, responsive, inclusive, and accountable institutions. such institutions enable poor people to develop their own capabilities, increase their assets, and move out of poverty.47 world bank and economy diversification the world bank is partly responsible for the monochromic economy of nigeria and most african countries. this was achieved by the instrument of the sap in the resource-rich countries of africa. instead of promoting economic diversification and developing other sectors of the economy, the bank chose to provide support and encouragement for the increased production of primary commodities and the excessive reliance on the extractive sectors for export revenue. for instance, between 1992-2005 the bank issued $18.5 billion for the purpose of the execution of coal and petroleum ventures in 25 developing economies.48 their focus was on revenue generated from the oil, gas, and mining sectors in the hope that enough foreign exchange would be quickly generated to enable the rapid payment of debt to the world bank and other creditors.49 the 43od kolawole, and do torimiro, ‘nigerian poor majority: issues and challenges in the 21st century’, (2006) 1 (1) research journal of social sciences, 11, 11. 44world bank, the world bank participation sourcebook, (1996) 7. <documents.worldbank.org>multi-page.pdf> 9 august 2017. 45ibid. 8. 46deepa narayan, 6. 47ibid. 24. 48emeka duruigbo, ‘the world bank, multinational oil corporations, and the resource curse in africa’. (2014) 26 (1) university of pennsylvania journal of international law 1, 27. 49scot pegg. 16 consilience failure of the adjustment policies to foster long-term economic growth in africa has led to commodity dependence, unviable economies, balance of payment deficits and, ultimately, increases in poverty.50 the world bank’s adoption of similar developmental approaches for the reconstruction of europe came under severe criticism. in the late-1960s, pressure mounted from international civil societies against the bank’s role in manipulating development to suit their ideals. the world bank’s approaches were seen as hindering diversity and self-reliance of domestic economies of developing countries. this pressure caused the world bank’s then-president, robert mcnamara, to redefine the mission of the institution. thus, it focused on poverty alleviation throughout the world.51 however, the development approach of the bank remained the same. strong emphasis is still placed on mega-projects and resource exploitation-based projects for export to industrialized countries. studies have shown that these sorts of projects do not lead to poverty alleviation but rather environmental and human devastation.52 in 2004, the bank’s own extractive industries review (eir) found that “project funding in the extractive industries has not had poverty reduction as its main goal or outcome… increased investments have not necessarily helped the poor; in fact, often times the environment and the poor have been further threatened by the expansion of a country’s extractive industries sector.”53 the possible effect of over-dependence on natural resource wealth is a depressed long-term growth rate. this creates two possible effects that work in tandem to suppress domestic growth rates. first, resource booms tend to cause real exchange rates to rise due to the large inflow of foreign exchange generated by the increased resource exports. second, labor and capital are likely to migrate from other productive sectors to the booming resource sector. consequently, there are higher costs and reduced competitiveness for locally-produced goods and services, thereby reducing agricultural and manufacturing exports. 54 several african countries have been caught by this phenomenon. for instance, the oil boom in congo-brazzaville occasioned a corresponding decline in the production of coffee, cocoa, and sugar due to rural dwellers leaving the plantations for migration to the cities.55 cameroon had a similar experience during its oil boom in the early 1980s, as oil accounted for two-thirds of the country’s export revenue.56 in gabon, a country which already faced food insecurity, oil dependence exacerbated this situation to the point where only about 1 percent of the country’s total land area was utilized for cultivation 50ibid. 51janet redman, ‘dirty is the new clean: a critique of the world bank’s strategic framework for development and climate change’ (2008) 4. <priceofoil.org>dirtyisnewcleanfinal.pdf> accessed 9 august 2017. 52ibid. 53ibid. 54“this phenomenon has come to be known as “dutch disease” after the negative effects of the north sea oil boom on industrial production in the netherlands.” ibid. 9. 55ibid. 56janet redman. consilience herbert & odeniyi: impact of world bank-assisted projects purposes.57 consequently, gabon depends wholly on imported food to meet domestic needs. in nigeria, the situation is not any different from the situation of the various african countries captured above. this could be inferred from the disappearance of the groundnut pyramid in the north, the decline of cocoa production in the southwest, and the disintegration of rubber plantations in the former mid-western region. the rural-urban migration for “oil money” is largely responsible for the overpopulation of cities such as port harcourt, kano, and lagos.58 the resultant effect is still felt on the nigerian economy. the economic recession that the country currently faces is, to a great extent, attributable to over-dependence on the oil and gas sector as the main stay of the economy. the drop of the oil price in the global market is negatively impacting the economy. the low returns on foreign exchange due to the high capital flight from the importation of foreign goods leads to a balance of payments deficit and the inability to finance the country’s budget. if other sectors of the economy, especially the agricultural and manufacturing sector, were as developed as the oil industry, the situation would be different. changing role of world bank the meltzer commission set up in 1998 by the us government to proffer advisory opinion on us interactions with international financial organizations, gave a devastating verdict in 2000 that the world bank has outlived its relevance to the global mission of achieving poverty alleviation. the report found that 80 percent of the bank's resources are not devoted to the poorest of developing countries but rather to the countries with better creditworthiness with the ability to raise funds in international capital markets.59 it further stated that the failure rate of the bank’s projects is close to 70 percent in the poorest countries and up to 60 percent in all developing countries.60 in rising to the defence of the world bank, vikas nath argued that most of the criticisms against the world bank are for its past actions and not based on current knowledge and situations. the situation at that time may have warranted the world bank’s actions. he is quoted as saying: from the do-no-harm approach, which emphasized minimizing harmful effects of projects, it has moved to targeted environmental improvement that recognizes the linkages between poverty, development and environment (world bank website). environmental review procedures have gained importance in the 57ibid. 58paul oluwatomipe adekola, ‘migration, urbanization and environmental problems in nigeria’, in john lekan oyefara, (ed.) migration and urbanisation in contemporary nigeria: policy issues and challenges (2016) 1, 3. 59meltzer commission, report on international financial institutions, (2000) <http://csf.colorado.edu/roper/if/meltzer-commission-mar00> accessed 8 august 2017. 60ibid. 18 consilience bank's lending program and have become mandatory for certain kinds of lending. the bank now requires all projects to undergo environmental assessments (eas) at the project, regional and sectoral level. more specifically, the projects do get amended or downsized to comply with environmental regulations.61 arguing further, he said the bank is shifting away from the dominant image of providing structural adjustment loans to making poverty elimination its central mission. it has started funding new areas of operation, such as promoting good governance, better knowledge management, and fighting the hiv/aids pandemic. the world bank continues to be the single largest source of funding for primary education programs for the poorest countries of the world, he concludes.62 there appears to be some validity in nath’s assertion above. there are some reforms and restructurings in the bank’s operations. the world bank currently adopts the poverty reduction strategy paper (prsp) process which was first introduced for highly indebted poor countries (hipc) in 1999. this approach entails allowing leaders, administrators, analysts, and other stakeholders from within a country to take the lead in developing a locally-conceived process to set out a long-term strategy for fighting poverty based on the latest available data and analysis.63 this is as opposed to the previous world bank approach of externally-imposed conditions for development. the process usually begins with the measurement of poverty and an analysis of its dimensions and causes. based on the findings, extensive dialogue is conducted about which action plan should be put in place to reduce the number of poor people. once poverty is measured and the poor are identified, the next step is to choose the most viable public actions and programs that have the most effective impact on poverty. additionally, the approach identifies indicators of progress and monitors the resultant change in a systematic manner.64 the world bank typically insists on monitoring the process. on the participatory element of prsps, it is important to emphasise that what occurs in many countries is consultation rather than participation. the interim-prsps, which often forms the basic document for the framing of the final prsp, is usually not prepared through any process of participation. instead, it is prepared by the report of technocrats in collaboration with the imf officials and the world bank. consultation with civil organizations only takes place after the framework and the main elements of the prsps have been determined.65 both the ibrd and ifc have policies that require consultation with communities in order to safeguard against their projects harming the community and its environment. the world bank group has also formulated mechanisms for community members to channel their complaints directly to the inspection panel and the compliance advisor ombudsman (cao), which are independent offices of the group. the cao is tasked with investigating and reporting on 61vikas nath 8. 62ibid. 11. 63haughton and khandker, ‘what is poverty and why measure it?’ 6. <siteresources.worldbank.org>resources> accessed 9 august 2017. 64ibid. 65said adejumobi 19-20. consilience herbert & odeniyi: impact of world bank-assisted projects violations of the above-stated policies. report shows that, in practice, little or no pragmatic outcome is achieved when communities come under attack.66 a cao report found that the ifc’s culture of determining success in financial terms encouraged staff to “overlook, fail to articulate, or even conceal potential environmental, social, and conflict related risks.”67 it is not just enough to carry out projects in developing countries. it is also important for an assessment of the impact of the projects on the poor, who are the ultimate targets of the projects, to be conducted.68 particular interest must be taken of the extent to which project benefits reach the poor and the impact they have on their welfare. some of the questions that should be answered on impact evaluation include the following: how did the project affect the beneficiaries? were any improvements a direct result of the project? would they have improved without the project? could the program’s design be modified to improve impact? were the costs justified?69 this is the crux of monitoring and evaluation, which the world bank must take into consideration in order to achieve their goal of poverty eradication. this is most important in climes like africa and nigeria, in particular, where the scourge of corruption has eaten deep into the fabric of public service and there is a likelihood of diversion and misappropriation of funds meant for developmental projects by public office holders. as of 2019, the country ranked 146th out of 180 countries in transparency international’s corruption perception index.70 the nigerian government usually engages the services of foreign consortiums to execute procurement contracts after accessing funds from financial institutions such as the world bank. there are instances where some of these foreign consortiums bribe nigerian public office holders in order to enable them to inflate the contract price of goods and services to be supplied. a case in point is the halliburton71 scandal, where the company was found to have bribed some nigerian officials into forming an unholy alliance to inflate contract prices for the bonny island liquefied gas project.72 in other instances, siemens and willbros were found to have offered bribes amounting to $14.6 million and $6 66human right watch, ‘at your own risk: reprisals against critics of world bank group projects’, (2015) 2. <https://www.hrw.org>sites>files>rep.worldbank0615_4up.pdf> 9 august, 2017. 67ibid. 18-19. 68poverty impact assessment can be applied to a wide range of specific projects, such as: measuring the impact of microfinance programs on household income; the impact of a training program on labour and employment; the impact of a school feeding program on student attendance; or the impact of the construction of rural roads on household welfare. see, judy l baker, ‘evaluating the impact of development projects on poverty: a handbook for practitioners’, world bank (2000) vii <siteresources.worldbank.org>handbook.pdf> accessed 9 august, 2017. 69ibid. 1. 70 transparency international, ‘corruption perception index’, (2019) <https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/nigeria> accessed 16 december, 2020. 71 patrick ukase and ben audu, ‘the role of civil society in the fight against corruption in nigeria’s republic: problems, prospects and the way forward’, (2015) 11 (2) european scientific journal 171, 172. 72international consortium of investigative journalism, ‘files open new window on $182 million halliburton bribery scandal in nigeria’, <https://www.icij.org/invetigations/swissleaks/files-open-new-window-on-$182-million-halliburton-bribery-scandal-in-nigeria/> accessed 16 december, 2020. 20 consilience million to former ministers and government officials, respectively, in order to win lucrative telecommunications and petroleum contracts.73 such incidents have alerted the government to monitor procurement contract processes, which enabled the government to prevent $500 million in leakage due to the bloated contracts and subsequent blacklisting of foreign consortiums involved in the failed racket.74 there are rampant cases of public misuse of world bank funds in the form of disbursements to cronies and disbursements for political purposes other than the developmental projects for which those funds were provided. this is peculiar to developing countries in africa, including nigeria. despite this wellknown fact, the world bank had looked on helplessly for years. the bank seems to have been incapacitated by article iv section 10 of its article of agreement, which limits the bank’s decision-making consideration to economic factors, while it is to turn a blind eye to the political activities of the borrowing states. hence, public misappropriation of world bank funds was considered a political issue which it had to ignore. however, in the light of its new developmental objectives, the world bank established an independent sanction system to checkmate the issue of corrupt practices in the utilization of world bank funds for its intended purposes.75 despite its success in imposing sanctions in the cosnia consultancy case, dutchmed case, karl storz case, hifab international case, etcetera, it has been noted that this system has been affected by issues of transparency, legitimacy, due process shortcomings, and a lack of a legal framework for its operation.76 conclusion this work has evaluated world bank-sponsored projects and its impact on its mission of poverty eradication from the world. the bank has made an effort to reduce poverty in the world. it would be unfair to say that no impact has been made. in fact, studies carried out by researchers of two rural road development projects in bangladesh found an approximate 5-7 percent poverty reduction in the project villages within a period of 5 years.77 however, more impact may be realized if the issues identified in this work are resolved. if the status quo continues, the bank will be a far cry from achieving its mission of 73estelle shirbon, ‘nigeria to investigate siemens bribes scandal’, reuters 19 may, 2010 <https://jp.reuters.com/article/nigeria-siemens-idusl193502420071119> accessed 16 december, 2020. 74augustine nwabuzor, ‘corruption and development: new initiatives in economic openness and strengthened rule of law’, (2005) 59 journal of business ethics 121, 131; ‘nigeria bans siemens over bribery scandal’, voice of america news, 1 november, 2009. <https://www.voanews.com/archive/nigeria-bans-siemens-over-briberyscandal?amp> accessed 16 december, 2020. 75 constiantino grasso, ‘corruption in world bank-financed development projects: a phenomenon-focused examination’, in corruption in the global era: causes, sources and forms of manifestation, (routledge, 2019) 258, 259. 76 stefano manacorda and constiantino grasso, fighting fraud and corruption at the world bank: critical analysis of the sanction system, (springer, 2018) 35. 77shahidur r. khandker, zaid bakht and gayatri b. koolwal, ‘the poverty impact of rural roads: evidence from bangladesh’, (world bank) p. 18. <web.worldbank.org>web>wps38750.pdf> accessed 9 august, 2017. consilience herbert & odeniyi: impact of world bank-assisted projects poverty eradication by 2030. in view of the foregoing, the following recommendations are made. recommendations the world bank should move away from promoting massive infrastructural projects that only serve its interests and those of donor governments. funding of projects should be mainly based on full national participation and should take environmental factors into consideration in decision-making processes. objectivity and information transparency could help solve many challenges for the bank, as it will occasion the participation of the recipient government and other key stakeholders of the project. more attention should be paid to the funding of smalland medium-scale sustainable project models, which build upon the knowledge of local people, promote equitable development, and refrain from destroying the social fabric of the people.78 poverty reduction strategies are usually given a rural focus. this is especially true for africa, where urbanization levels are low. although the majority of poor people are resident in rural areas, there is a high rate of ruralurban migration of people in search of greater economic opportunity. thus, the attention of poverty reduction strategies should also be devoted to urban areas, taking into consideration the rate of rural-urban migration.79 the world bank should take serious concern for the consultation and participation of stakeholders in the developmental process. stakeholder engagement should be targeted at encouraging inclusiveness and partnership, which mirrors the views of the community in the decision-making and problem resolution strategy.80 special consideration should be taken of the following for the stakeholder participation strategy: a. stakeholders of high influence and high importance should be closely involved throughout the process to ensure their support for the success of the project; b. stakeholders of high influence but low importance, though not the target of the project, may oppose the intervention; hence, there is a need to keep them informed and their views acknowledged to avoid disruption or conflict; c. stakeholders of low influence and high importance deserve special efforts to meet their needs and ensure their meaningful participation; d. stakeholders of low influence and low importance do not need to be closely involved in the project and do not need special participation strategies other than (general public) information-sharing strategies.81 78vikas nath 12. 79deniz baharoglu and christine kessides, ‘urban poverty’ (world bank) p. 134. <siteresources.worldbank.org.4418_chap16> accessed 9 august, 2017. 80brackmann, s. m. community engagement in a neoliberal paradigm. 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