The Architect's Dilemma:  A Self Reflection in Understanding Prison 
Design  and Construction in Private  Prison Projects 

 
Giustina G S Consoli (School of Commerce, University of South Australia, City West Campus, North 
Terrace, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia) 

 
 
 
 

ABSTRACT   
 
 

Australia embarked upon a number of private 
prison projects during the 1990's.  These 
projects involved the competitive bidding for 
prison projects by consortia, which generally 
consisted of a correctional operator, contractor 
and architect. The architect's role in such 
projects was to satisfy the needs and desires of 
the operator, contractor and government 
assessors.As a result, the architect became a 
critical element in the successful delivery of 
the prison projects. 

 
 

Intensive interviews with such architects have 
shown that a number of issues were experienced 
as a result of their inclusion in the projects. 
These architects reported: (a) uncertainty in 
undertaking large specialist projects, (b) 
grappling with their own expectations and those 
of other participating parties as to the role of the 
prison architect, (c) a desire to acquire a working 
knowledge of the philosophies of incarceration 
and prison design and construction, and (d) 
difficulties in working within an environment 
where suspicions were raised in regards to 
conflicting and underlying objectives of the 
operators and contractors. 

 

Keywords:Prison Design and Construction; 
Design and Construct; Procurement; 
Privatisation, Architect. 

 
 

INTRODUCTION   
 
 

Only a few academic investigations have 
specificaiiy examined the roie of the 
contemporary prison architect and influences 
upon them. Some most notable accounts 
include Atlas 1982;Atlas & Dunham 1990; 
Derbyshire 2000; Johnston 1973, 2000 and 
Fairweather 1994, 2000a. There are also 
suggestions that the role of the prison architect is 
dictated by the forces created by differing 
delivery methods (Knape! 1993; Dixon 1993; 
Cunningham 1999). 

 
 
This paper presents architect views regarding 
their inclusion and role as prison architects within 
private prison projects in Australia, spanning 
between 1985- 2000.   A total of 22 architects 
that participated in private prison projects were 
interviewed via use of semi structured interview 
questionnaires (Consoli 2003, 2004). This paper 
reviews: 
 
 
a) Literature that exposes perceptions regarding 
the role of the prison architect and the potential 
impact of privatisation; 
 

b) Contractual relationships between parties in 
private prison projects; and 
 

c) Responses by architects in regards to 
participating in the prison projects. 
 
 
Interviews highlighted that the architect's 
inclusion in the prison projects, and their 
understanding of their role and of prison design 
and construction, were considered critical issues 
in the experiences of architects in the private 
prison projects.   As such, the principal themes 
to emerge are the role of the architect in design 
and construct teams, and the impacts this places 
upon the architect in the prison design process. 
In effect, the findings of the study highlight the 
erosion the architect's authority in prison design 
projects, and the effect of private prison projects 
in fast tracking this process. 
 
 
CONSIDERING THE PRISON ARCHITECT 
 
 
From Jeremy Bentham's Panopiicon prisoii fmm 
and theoretical stance, to the seminal works of 
Michel Foucault's Discipline  and Punish and 
Robert Evan's The Fabrication of Virtue: English 
Prison Architecture, 1750-1840, the emergence 
of the prison as a modern institution in the West 
has raised great debate. However, this has also 
meant that the role of the prison architect and 
the development of prison architecture as a 
specialist area has received scholarly attention. 
Literature regarding modern prison design and 



The AustralianJournalof ConstructionEconomics and Building[Vol6,No 2) I 

 

the role of the architect highlights a number of 
themes.  This section provides a snapshot of 
such views. 

 
 

Various commentators report that the role of the 
contemporary prison architect has altered from 
one who assumed a relatively central 
authoritative position in the past, to one who, in 
their attempts to satisfy the various forces and 
protagonists  in prison delivery, has been forced 
into a more submissive role (Atlas 1982;Atlas & 
Dunham 1990; Derbyshire 2000; Johnston 1960, 
1973, 2000; Fairweather  1989, 1992, 1994, 
2000a, 2000b). 

 
 

Another area of discussion has focussed upon 
the methods employed in the selection of 
architects for prison projects.  For instance, 
Farbstein (1986) reported that the architect 
should be assessed against selection criteria. 
She added that this would typically include 
correctional experience and a review of their 
previous work.  Other criteria include the size of 
their firm, ability to establish rapport with the 
clients, and assistance from their consultants  to 
undertake the prison projects.   Englar (1987) 
believed that it is the prison owner's 
responsibility to •...select the most qualified 
team, pay a fair fee, and reap the benefits of an 
adequate planning and design process' (Englar 
1987, p.33). 

 
 

Difficulties faced by architects have also been 
widely reported.  Although attempts to 
standardise correctional design has been a 
means to give architects guidance, architects in 
tum have reported being smothered by 
conflicting and stringent requirements (Atlas 
1983; Fillip 1985;Atlas & Dunham 1990; 
Summers et a/1996; Fairweather  1994, 1995, 
2000b).  This has left their role and resultant 
product a contentious issue.   This has been 
evident on a number of levels.  According  to 
Atlas & Dunham (1990): 

 
 

Architects often contribute to prison 
problems.  These planners often do not 
understand inmate characteristics and their 
needs and therefore design facilities on the 
basis of information from a third party, on 
some general impression of inmates (Atlas & 
Dunham 1990, p. 55). 

 
 

Likewise, Fairweather  (2000b) maintained: 

The perennial task of prison architects is to 
struggle to produce acceptable solutions in a 
very different and changing climate of 
opinion amid conflicting advice (Fairweather 
2000b,p.61). 

 
 
Fairweather  (2000) advocated the need for the 
specialist prison architect.  He also warned that 
alternative procurement would inevitably reduce 
the architect's role.  He maintained that it would 
be difficult for architects to question their 
'sponsors' within a competitive framework. 
Fairweather  (2000a) stated that the fact that 
'...managing design has never been treated  with 
the same seriousness  as other aspects of prison 
design (2000a, p.66}, and that •...architects are 
not encouraged  to enter into any sort of 
meaningful discussion about the wider purposes 
of imprisonment and attitudes of society' (2000a, 
p.66), meant they would be rendered an 
irrelevant inclusion with consortia led prison 
projects. 
 
 
This is closely related to the perception of prison 
architecture as a separate and distinct area of 
architecture, which has encouraged  the belief 
that greater focus and responsibility should be 
directed at prison design and construction 
processes  (Atlas 1990; Nadel 1996; Dietsch 
1997; Johnston 2000). McConville (2000) 
extended this point further and claimed that the 
combination of competition/privatisation and 
prison architecture is unhealthy  and fraught with 
limitations.  This trend  is considered a detriment 
to prison design processes, the role of the 
architect, and the built form. 
 
 
Whilst the role and experiences  of the architect 
and other design professionals has generally 
avoided mainstream attention, a most recent 
development is the Prison Design Boycott 
Campaign (ADPSR 2004) in the United States. 
This boycott has resulted in a wave of architects, 
designers and planners collectively refusing to 
undertake prison projects. The movement 
seeks to increase discussion of alternatives to 
prisons, and encourage public debate and legal 
reform (ADPSR 2004; Finoki 2005; Garofoli 
2005; Fuss 2006; Yoders 2006). 
 
 
PRIVATE PRISON PROJECT  CONTRACTUAL 
ARRANGEMENTS   
 
 
The contractual arrangements in the private 
projects saw the inclusion of alternative 

 

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- 



4    The Australian Journalof ConstructionE<onomic:s and Building [Vol6,No 2) 
 

procurement methods  (Russell & Abdel-Aziz 
1997) in Australian prison delivery.   In such 
projects the private sector was placed under a 
contractual obligation to finance, design, 
construct, operate and maintain the facility for a 
set time (Cunningham 1999). 

 
 

The delivery methods used in the Australian 
projects can be typified as Design and Construct, 
however  variants include BOT (Build Operate 
Transfer), BOOT (Build Own Operate Transfer) 
and DCFM (Design Construct Finance Manage). 
The resulting contractualrelationship between 
the parties typically saw the private correctional 
company (operator)  as owner. They contracted 
with a single building contractor  who, usually 
together with the operator, selected an architect. 
The architect contracted directly to the 
contractor.  It was the contractor's responsibility 
to provide all design and construction services. 
The contractor also led the consortia  in regards 
to the design and construction component of the 
bid, and throughout the design development and 
contract documentation (Knapel 1993; 
Cunningham 1999). 

 
 

Various studies have reviewed the successes 
and failures of using alternative delivery 
methods,primarily from a non-prison design and 
construction perspective.  Such research has 
shown variable impacts upon the role of 
designers/architects in relation to the choice of 
delivery method.  Some notable findings include 
that: 

 
 

• Project managers  would ultimately  steer 
and control new building delivery 
methods and pursue different criteria to 
architects (Lockley 1988; Hawk 1996; 
Emmitt 1999); 

 
• Cost imperatives, culturaland 

interdisciplinary differences  of project 
participants, and communication issues 
strained relationships between parties 
and caused friction and jeopardised 
project success (Akintoye & Skitmore 
i992; Latham i994; Loosemore, Haii & 
Dainty 1996; Jefferies & Chen 1999; 
Phua & Rowlinson 2003; Lam, Chan & 
Chan 2003); 

 
• Lack of knowledge regarding 

construction processes and expectations 
excited participants (Battersby  & Yates 
2003); 

 

• Possible scope for innovative 
improvements arising from alternative 
delivery methods (Kumaraswamy & 
Dulaimi 2002; Harding 1997); and 

 
• Adoption of new skills, roles, 

responsibilities and risks, so that all 
phases of a projects  lifecycle can be 
managed effectively  (Love et a/2000). 

 
 
In regards to prisons, Design and Construct has 
been considered an alternative delivery method, 
which has an impact upon the roles and 
responsibilities of the parties (Knapel 1993). 
Typically, the contractor is •...responsible for 
managing and coordinating all aspects of design 
and construction to complete the project within 
the specified time and cost limits (Knapel 1993, 
p. 9). Knapel (1993) added that: 
 
 

...because the architect in this method works 
for the design/build  contractor rather than for 
the owner approval milestones are 
minimised, the contractor has opportunities 
to overlap phases...because the architect in 
this method works for the design/build 
contractor rather than directly for the owner, 
contract provisions  for owner input and the 
opportunity to review the design may 
become very important....however as a 
subordinate  to the contractor, the architect 
may be inclined to be primarily faithful to the 
time and cost interests of the contractors 
team (Knapel 1993, p.10). 

 
 
Englar (1987), acknowledging the shortcomings 
of the design and construct  methods, also stated 
that: 
 
 

Architects believe that nothing should be 
done to compromise  the interactive process 
that should occur between the 
operator...and the designer.  Programming 
and design of a typical jail or prison requires 
professional expertise in all parts of the 
facility...therefore,it is important that the 
design be ihoughtfuiiy and refiectiveiy 
planned through the interaction of the 
architects  and the owners and operators 
(Englar 1987, p.32). 

 
 
Dixon (1993) found that private operators 
believed the use of alternative  procurement 
methods meant a '...different kind of architect 
(Dixon 1993, p.6) was required.  Such an 



The AustralianJournalof ConstructionEconomics andBuilding(Vol6,No  2)     3  

architect would not possess a traditional mindset 
but be open to new and innovative approaches. 
Dixon (1993) considered this as imperative  for 
those architects involved in the delivery of a 
private prison.  The role of the architect has 
continued to create some discussion.  In one 
instance, the government maintained that there 
was an unequivocal reliance upon architects, 
and that '...you take the advice of the 
architects...these people are skilled in 
designing prisons' (Owen 1998). However, it is 
the  architect's voice that remains to be heard 
regarding their role and expectations in prison 
design and construction. 

 
 

This paper is focussed upon the role and 
constraints faced by the consortia architect in 
Australian private prison projects.  This  is 
highlighted in two principal themes: Part 1 - The 
Architect in Design and Construct Tearns and 
Part 2 - Understanding Prison Design and 
Construction. 

 
 

PART 1: THE ARCHITECT IN DESIGN AND 
CONSTRUCT TEAMS   

 
 

SELECTION OF ARCHITECTS 
 
 

All architects expressed  that prison design was 
not an area they would normally have pursued, 
with most believing they had '...got into it by 
accident...'.  Experienced architects argued that 
a failure of many consortia teams was the fact 
that '...prisons don't attract the best architects in 
the world...'. The other failure was the method 
of selecting architectural firms by consortia.  
Architects expressed  that the selection of 
architectural firms by private prison consortia 
was neither predictable nor logical.  The 
predominant belief was that selection was based 
upon their previous affiliation with the public 
sector.  They likewise stated that such 
experiences  had forged them a reputation in 
prison design; hence their recruitment into 
private projects meant that the private consortia 
wished to draw upon this knowledge.  In other 
instances, architects  were unsure of why they 
were chosen.  Such architects had limited, if 
any, experience in correctional design.  They 
surmised that their inclusion in the prison 
projects was because they had worked with the 
consortia contractor  in other projects. Both 
experienced and inexperienced architects 
considered their selection as '...lucky...' and a 
sign of being '...well-liked...' by the contractor. 

For all architects, selection was considered an 
honour. 
 
 
All architects expressed  initial excitement at 
entering prison design and construction. 
However, they were equally concerned at their 
lack of knowledge and expressed uncertainty of 
what was expected in correctional design.   It was 
reported that limited pre-design research  had 
been independently conducted, which caused 
most inexperienced participants to be 
'...personally terrified...'.  In contrast, those 
deemed experienced and knowledgeable of 
State projects believed that their skills could be 
easily transferable with only a '...minor 
adjustment...' to meet private sector 
requirements. 
 
 
Architects also showed respect and admiration 
towards operators.  They found '...most private 
company people are above board and ethical...', 
and generally  supported the motivations  and 
outcomes pursued by the private prison 
operators.  Ultimately, all architects believed that 
the operator '...wouldn't get involved in 
something that wasn't straight up and down...'. 
 
 
ROLE OF THE ARCHITECT 
 
 
Architects considered that their role differed 
according to their experience in prison design 
and construction, the State and the consortia 
they worked with.  Architects also expressed that 
their role could fluctuate greatly from one project 
to another due to uncontrollable factors, such as 
changes of key personnel or differences in 
delivery methods. 
 
 
All architects expressed that their role was more 
than to '...just do one's bidding...'. They believed 
they assumed a greater responsibility, which 
included responding to community sentiment, 
producing appropriate buildings and 
environments, and to delve into the complex 
area of prison design and construction.  Their 
success at achieving such objectives was not 
measured  in terms of the outcome of a bid; it 
was based upon their own personal value 
judgements of the process. Hence, it was 
common to find successful bids were not always 
considered  a satisfactory  outcome of the 
process. This was prevalent when the architect 
believed that they had been denied valuable 
input, control, or the capacity to achieve a 
required level of understanding. 



6   The AustralianJournalof ConstructionEconomics andBuilding(Vol 6, No 21 
 

 
 

Reports also emphasised  the belief that the 
'...architects role is to try and understand the 
brief...'.  This meant a number of objectives had 
to be met.  Architects were to '...evolve...and 
develop the brief...' and to '...try to design for the 
clients' true needs, and not necessarily what 
they want...'. Furthermore, all consortia 
architects believed that their ultimate role was to 
help the government break from tradition or 
:...past moulds...'.  All affirmed that they were an 
Instrument for the development and 
incorporation of innovation.  Although the issue 
of innovation was of priority in assessing 
expectations and distinguishing  between teams 
and professions, it was also a point of 
contention, often dividing consortia architects. 

 
 

Although there were a number of issues that 
developed amongst parties within consortia, 
generally all architects reported an atmosphere 
of  maraderie 
relat1on to the early stages of the bidding 
process, architects reported that since 
'...everyone has the same objective...', it meant 
everyone would '...work together united...'.  This 
was manifested in a hands-on approach, in 
which architects would '...get into the clients' 
heads, and try to understand all the stakeholders 
needs...'. Most architects believed that the 
operator fully comprehended their role.  They 
maintained that the operator was dependant 
upon them, adding '...they (operator) ought to 
be, if they want to win...'. Since architects 
considered themselves  as the sole party with the 
abilities to give the operator ·...the edge based 
on their philosophy...', they considered 
themselves both indispensable  and an integral 
part in the bid process. 

 
 

Reg?rdless of their level of prison experience, 
arch1tects also demonstrated a desire to improve 
themselves with every project.  Hence, they 
undertook a constant review of prisons from 
every project and consortia. Although they were 
legally restricted from accessing  the schemes of 
competitors, this was rarely considered a barrier. 
.rno.eeo., tn' ose arcr'u•teets g.iven an opportunity to 
compare their schemes with others wanted '...to 
see if they (the opposition) have any 
advantage...'. This was predominately  the case 
with architects who had worked on a number of 
projects.  In contrast, architects of limited 
correctional experience were entirely reliant 
upon the operator and contractor, hence 
demonstrated little concern at comparing 
schemes.  As '...novices to the game...', they 
assumed the operator and contractor would have 

done such investigations, and would simply brief 
them of their requirements. 

 
 

RELATIONSHIPS RAISING SUSPICION 
 
 
Most architects believed contractors had become 
progressively nervous during design 
development and contract documentation.  They 
sensed contractors believed that the architect 
would be '...pushing the operators advantage to 
the disadvantage  of the construction company...'. 
Consequently, architects believed contractors 
had become excessively suspicious of their 
actions and motivations. 

 
 
Architects reportedly felt sandwiched between 
the requirements and orders of the contractor 
the need to achieve and maintain the best  ' 
interests of the operator, and their •...moral 
sense of the greater good of the facility...•. All 
ar hitects 
try1ng to support your client, not screw your client 
...'. This sentiment seemed to aggravate their 
rela ionship 
felt  ...left sort of cloak and dagger giving advice 
to both parties...'. As the projects developed, 
and relationships between parties evolved and 
deepened, the level of suspicion escalated. 

 
 
Responses demonstrated two reasons for the 
cause of such unrest.  Firstly was the affect of 
contractor experience in prison projects. 
Architects were suspicious of contractors who 
lacked prison-building experience.  In cases 
where experienced architects were teamed with 
first time prison contractors, architects believed 
they had greater knowledge of the key issues in 
prison design and construction; hence they 
should have had ultimate decision-making 
authority.  For instance: 
 
 

...There are not many prisons built in 
Australia, and there was no builder in 
Australia that could really put up his hand 
and say they are prison buildina exoerts...so 
it's a little frustrating that the architects in the 
whole design team are being frustrated by 
people that really didn't know what they were 
doing... 

 
 
All.architects expressed that a prison project is a 
un1que and specialised building, which requires 
greater levels of thought and consideration.  The 
majority of architects complained that contractors 



The AustralianJournalof ConstructionEconomics and Building(Vol6, No21      S  

did not possess the required level of theoretical 
understanding.  Architects believed that '... the 
builder can't understand what incarceration 
means, and what it means to be housed 
inside...'. They believed since contractors 
lacked such understanding, they would try to 
handle prison projects as any other construction 
project, which was considered a '...dangerous 
approach...'. For instance: 

 
 

...For the builder, it's a matter of putting a 
prison together and moving on...it might be a 
prison...it might be a hospital...horse 
stable...they couldn't care less ...it's like: 
'Give me a set of standards mate, and we 
will build you a prison'... 

 
 

An architect of an opposing consortium agreed, 
stating: 

 
 

...They (contractors) don't have the slightest 
idea of what constitutes a prison.  They 
wouldn't know a prisoner can tear 1.6 mil 
steel...they don't even think about a prisoner 
urinating on something untilit corrodes 
away...you really have to be skilful in 
anticipating  what they might do if they wish 
to create mischief... 

 
 

Architects expressed concern that early in 
projects, contractors began to •...change...', and 
take the schematic design and design 
development  '...hostage...'. They believed this 
was directly related to the second cause of 
unrest - the procurement method.  The 
restrictions imposed by the contractors  were, 
according to architects, primarily because 
contractors were at the helm of decision-making, 
yet were too inexperienced to satisfactorily 
assume such responsibility. Architects believed it 
was the contractor's obsession with financial 
issues, which caused problems to arise.  While 
some simply regarded this as '...financial naivety 
by contractors...', others found this a calculating 
ploy by contractors to maximise profits.  This 
architect explained further: 

 
 

...I think the reason for that is that regardless 
of their advertising materials, builders say 
whatever  they have to say to win a 
job...builders instruct their teams that: 'We 
have tendered for this price, but we must 
deliver the job for less than this...unless you 
can work the price up on variation...you 
must make a margin on this job'.  Despite all 

the rhetoric and the salesmanship in winning 
the contract, every contract has exactly the 
same problem... 

 
 
This resulted in parties within consortia 
possessing different objectives.  It became 
evident that while the contractor's  decision- 
making was based upon the minimum cost- 
spatial requirements, architects believed they 
had to pursue a balance between costing and 
theoretical responses, which they considered 
would be to the overall benefit of the facility and 
its users. 
 
 
Architects also agreed that Design and Construct 
procurement forced the government  to seek a 
'...packaged product...' and thus avoid 
addressing problems with the individual 
components of the package.  Architects 
considered this inappropriate because it meant 
assessors were judging consortia 
'...cosmetically...', and with an overemphasis 
upon consortia '...make-up...'.  Most architects 
believed that this was the catalyst for uncertainty 
and speculation, and that assessor's  reactions to 
personnel within consortia had a greater impact 
than the design and proposal itself. As a result, 
architects believed the design process had been 
undermined by the Design and Construct 
contractual arrangements. Hence, all architects 
concluded that consortium parties '...would 
probably be better off getting a design prepared 
by an architect with a team of consultants 
working for the operator...'.  This architect 
summarised this problem in the following extract: 
 
 

...The difficulty we have as designers in 
such a situation is that not only do we have 
to produce an efficient design when we join a 
consortium, we have to have the 'right' 
operator, and the most cost driven builder, 
and the most aggressive funder.  The 
designers are way down the food chain, 
unable to gain any entrepreneurial dividend, 
yet critical to the process.  BOOT schemes 
are high risk, high cost, and don't necessarily 
provide architects with a lead role in 
design...quite the opposite, as you are going 
to be compromised in reducing design 
concepts due to the cost, and less likely to 
innovate due to the committee perceptions of 
joint risk. Unfortunately, this type of bid is 
becoming more prevalent, and there appears 
to be no counter movement to invest in 
design solutions, and then to go to the 
market... 



8  The Australian Journal of Construction E<onomicsand Building [Vol6, No 21 
 

PART 2 UNDERSTANDING PRISON DESIGN 
AND CONSTRUCTION   

 
 

All architects believed it was important to 
comprehend the correctional philosophy of the 
State and the operator. Of equal importance did 
the need for a philosophical understand of 
incarceration, punishment, and of what 
alternatives were available.  In all projects, 
architects relied on a verbal articulation of 
consortia and the State correctional philosophy 
by the operators. This was reportedly because 
operators did not have a published philosophical 
stance, and hence preferred to rely on verbal 
discussions. Architects reasoned that the 
inability to document philosophical stances 
indicated that consortia preferred the flexibility of 
oral reporting.  They believed this enabled the 
operators to change their philosophy; perhaps as 
a response to a particular project or the State 
they were working within. Indeed, architects 
reported State or operator stances could differ 
markedly from one project to another.  Hence, 
architects were aware that regardless of how 
many projects they completed with an operator, 
it was critical that a philosophical briefing was 
given for every project. 

 
 

Attempts at understanding correctional 
philosophies frustrated architects. Although all 
architects recommended the need to engage in 
philosophical debate, and to '...thrash out 
philosophy...', all unanimously expressed 
disappointment with the detail and content of the 
philosophy.  Experienced architects elaborated 
that there is a need to be at '...ease with the 
philosophy that is driving the design decision- 
making, otherwise you don't feel good as an 
architect...'. 

 
 

A perceived lack of substantial philosophical 
direction was said to hamper a fluid approach to 
the design process.  A minority of architects 
believed the inability to discuss issues on a 
broader level was because operators were 
aware that it could have a dramatic affect on the 
physical form of the building. The remainder 
believed addressing the broader issues was 
hindered by a number of underlying forces, 
including individual personalities, unsaid 
objectives of the operator, and the dynamics 
created by the consortia environment. 

 
 

Perhaps as a result of such frustrations, it was 
common for architects to clash with operators 
later in the bidding process. Arguments arose 

when architects demanded additional 
explanation or suggested changes in approach. 
Most architects believed that the cause of such 
friction was the operator's failure to move outside 
their established comfort zone. Architects also 
believed failures at gaining a required level of 
information was due to forces including 
economic objectives, the design brief, and the 
contractor's professional and personal 
imperatives. 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION   
 
 
The private prison case study supports current 
literature that finds that the role of the modem 
prison architect has been diluted and creates 
frustration, uncertainty, and may adversely 
impact upon the product itself (McConville 2000; 
Fairweather 2000a, ADPSR 2004). 
 
 
The study showed that architects questioned 
what their role was in the prison projects.  They 
believed that their responsibilities as architect 
fluctuated subject to individual project 
requirements, the tum over of key personnel, 
and the specific requirements of the delivery 
method.  According to architects, the 
responsibilities within consortia included 
responding to community sentiments regarding 
appropriate prison facilitation, producing 
appropriate buildings and environments, and 
"understanding" prison design and construction. 
As highlighted by Fairweather (2000b), and 
supported in the study, the strain experienced by 
architects stemmed from their belief that they 
had a responsibility to understand and articulate 
the brief, so that they could evolve the brief to 
meet client needs, help the government break 
from tradition, outdated prison designs and 
construction methods, and develop and 
incorporate innovation in their schemes. 
However, as the delivery of projects have 
changed and the role and authority has likewise 
been diluted (as per Atlas 1990; Nadel1996; 
Dietsch 1997; and Johnston 2000), the ability to 
incorporate and achieve best practice as 
articulated by prison architectural commentators 
such as Farbstein (1986) is also evidently 
reduced. 
 
 
Whilst literature has hinted at the possibility that 
a move towards alternative delivery is a catalyst 
for the diminished role of prison architects 
(McConville 2000), this study indicates that it 
plays a fundamental role.   The study showed 
that at both the bidding stage and assessment of 



The Australian Journal of Construction Economicsand  Building [Vol6, No 2]  7 
 

bids architects felt an uncomfortable level of 
suspicion and distrust between parties which 
undermined some relationships.  Architects 
generally believed that they were sandwiched 
between the contractor's requirements and the 
interests of the operator.  They resolved that 
such tension arose primarily due to the use of 
alternative delivery methods.  This demonstrated 
that the delivery method created an unsuitable 
arms length approach between consortia and the 
government, enabled the inclusion of 
inexperienced contractors, and allowed 
contractors to take control and effectively 
manipulate the process for their own individual 
gains. 

 
 

Thus supporting Atlas & Dunham 1990, 
Derbyshire 2000, Johnston 2000 and 
Fairweather 2000a, 2000b, the architects were 
forced into a more submissive role.  In addition, 
as per general construction project literature 
(such as Akintoye & Skitmore 1992, Jefferies & 
Chen 1999 and Lam, Chan & Chan 2003), the 
study also showed that resulting tensions in 
prison projects were symptomatic of parties from 
different disciplines and educational/training 
backgrounds  forcing upon them values, which 
they.believed were inappropriate.  Consequently, 
arch1tects recommended that there is a need to 
fully understand consortia philosophy, and 
initiate and continually encourage philosophical 
debate amongst parties within consortia, 
between the private and public sector, and the 
community at large. 

 
 

Ultimately, the study shows that the architects 
believed that their role was to improve 
established prison design, and achieve better 
outcomes, yet had been prevented from doing 
so.  It is not surprising that such sentiments have 
now led to the movement in the United States for 
architects to boycott prison projects (ADPSR 
2004; Finoki 2005; Yoders 2006). Indeed, it may 
also be indicative of a more general diminishing 
role of the architect in modem times, in which the 
private prison experience  simply serves as a 
case study for a much wider developing issue. 

 
 

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