The Australian Journal of Construction Economicsand Building [Vol6, No 2) 55 011 u "··"'" u 7 The Effects of Occupational Licensing on Skills Needs in the Building Industry: Evidence from New Zealand Yadeed B Lobo (Department of Civli and Environmental gineerin. University of uck New zealand) and Suzanne Wilkinson (Department of C1v1l and Environmental Engmeenng, Umvers1ty of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand) ABSTRACT Occupational licensing for the building industry is being introduced in New Zealand. This research assesses whether the licensing regime being put into place in New Zealand would require new skills when voluntary licensing (2007) and compulsory licensing (by 2011) are introduced. The paper develops a deeper understanding of the effects of occupational licensing on an industry, above those of increased quality and training, to determine the effects of licensing on future skills needs in the New Zealand building industry. The results of the in-depth interviews of 35 leading practitioners in the New Zealand show how occupational licensing will affect skills in the industry in two main ways: increase professionalism and increased specializa ioin skills. The impact on the New Zealand bU1Id1ng industry will be to force a change in the working practices, increasing the move to offsite . prefabrication and change the types of sk1lls the industry requires. The paper serves as an . illustration to other countries on how changes 1n legislation, and the introduction of regulation for an industry, alter the working practices of that industry. Keywords:Skills, Building Industry, Occupational Licensing, New Zealand INTRODUCTION "r'"\,'.".,"..",uv.·."·,atiunvn•"•"ol•I:","..".A"n'e•"u"inn in "'3n in ••cfn1 '"'"' .,. common way for governments to exert control over professions, whilst promoting quality goods and services. The main objective of this research was to assess whether the licensing regime being put into place in New Zealand would require new skills when voluntary licensing (2007) and compulsory licensing (by 2011) were introduced. In this paper, an overhaul of the New Zealand building industry with respect to the introduction of occupationallicensing is discussed. The paper develops a deeper understanding of the effects of occupational licensing on an industry, above those of increased quality and training, to determine the effects of licensing on future skills needs in the New Zealand building industry. First the definition of the term occupationallicensing is presented. Then its effects on skills and skills shortages are analysed. New licensing regimes in the New Zealand building industry are reviewed and the potential impacts of these regimes are discussed from the perspective.of top industry players in government, compan1es and industry training organisations. The paper serves as an illustration of how central government control through licensing impacts on the lives of all building participants and consumers in both positive and negative ways. The paper also shows how the introduction of licensing can change the landscape of an industry. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN THE BUILDING INDUSTRY AND ITS EFFECTS Licensing is seen as state regulation that protects the public from the incompetent or unscrupulous practitioner, but it could also be understood to be used by occupational groups to restrict entry at the expense of public interest (Zhou, 1993). The definition of licensing ithe context of regulation of the labour market 1s defined in Arkani et al(Arkani et a,l 2003) as "...a set of rules embedded in a structured institutional framework, whether at local or state level that determine, orchestrate or bind reiationships between capiiai and iabour prevailing in a teffitoryn. Kleiner (Kleiner, 2000) and Arkani et al. (Arkaniet a,l 2003) both point out that occupational licensing is a set of rules by government which restricts entry to a profession through some demonstration of a minimum degree of competency. This is usually done through a licensing board who manage the licensing process, including fees and registration, and sets the entry requirements l6 I,.....,..,,.,....,f(_.....,._la.,''"" [\loi 6,No2l ----------------------- (Kleiner, 2000). Significantly, in a licensed occupation it is illegal to practice without a license. Studies indicate that licensing causes not only wages to increase but also restricts the current number of practitioners leading to skills shortages (Carrol and Gaston, 1983; Kleiner. 2000). Authors who have studied licensing agree that the main effect of licensing is improved quality of service provided for the consumer (Carrol and Gaston, 1983; Kleiner, 2000). The quality of the work or service will increase as less competent individuals are prevented from entering the occupation. In terms of quality, Carroll and Gaston (Carroll and Gaston, 1983) argue that more stringent restrictions deliver higher quality of service. In addition to improved quality, another advantage of licensing is better training as licensing imposes minimum competencies on a person in that occupation, which almost always need to be met by training. Better training also has an impact on quality as the trained person can provide a reasonable guarantee of the skill level of work undertaken (Kleiner. 2000). The main disadvantage of licensing is increasing wages (Perloff, 1980; Carroland Gaston 1983, Kleiner, 2000). Increased costs arise from the increase in the cost of labour as well as that of the associated services (Rottenberg, 1980). Licensing an occupation in terms of entry-level restrictions causes the supply of labour to the occupation to become restricted.It can reduce the number of new entrants to the occupation as individuals consider the cost of entering an occupation and passing/failing exams (Rottenberg,1980). Licensing can also restrict movement of labour between industries as different licensing regimes tend to preclude transfer or restrict movement between industries (Perloff, 1980). A recent example of builder licensing is found in Victoria, Australia.This system was introduced for licensing of building practitioners (Georgiou et al.. 1999). With the exception of architects. who had their own Registration Act,most practitioners were required to be registered (Georgiou et al.,1999). The system was created primarily for the housing section of the market. (Georgiou, 2000; Building Control Commission, 2003). Georgiou (Georgiou, 2000) outlines licenses for 3 classes of domestic building work: domestic building work (unlimited license). domestic building work (limited license) and domestic building work (managers' license). The system does not seek to impose licensing on all skills within the industry (Building Control Commission, 2003). The licensing system has in place a system of competencies to be satisfied for registration,which have to be assessed. Rather than describing the skills which the individual should possess the discussion papers (Building Control Commission, 2005) revealthat knowledge and the ability to do work are used. More specifically the competencies are defined in groups of work practice, professional practice, construction technology and legislation. Each of these groups has defined within itself the specific tasks, which a person who is licensed as a practitioner in that category is required to be able to accomplish. Building practitioners usually have to be trade or tertiary qualified with some exceptions of training through certificate courses (Georgiou, 2000). This system is markedly different from that proposed in New Zealand. THE NEW ZEALAND LICENSING REGIME In New Zealand the Built Environment Research Agenda of the Construction Industry Council's Construction Liaison Group estimates that the built environment is New Zealand's biggest physical asset with a value of $275 billion, and added to at the rate of $11 billion a year (CIC, 2005). There are currently few entry-level restrictions imposed by government in the New Zealand building industry. Engineering and architecture have restrictive entry provisions in the form of professional registration requirements and at the trades level, plumbing, gas fitting and electricians also have registration boards. The failure of the building industry in the recent past (Hunn et al., 2002) in part caused the government to overhaul the Building Act (Building Act, 2004) and introduce the licensing of building practitioners. Thus regulation of the industry in terms of licensing of skills is to be implemented; specifically, voluntary licensing in 2007 and compulsory licensing between 2009 and 2011 (DoBH, 2005). The New Zealand Department of Building and Housing estimates that a minimum of 25,000 people will seek licensing of which 22,000 will require to be assessed and nearly 11,000 will require some degree of upskilling (DoBH, 2005a). However, New Zealand is facing a current skills shortage, and concerns have been expressed about the introduction of such a licensing regime at times of employee shortages (NZIER, 2004). Staff shortages in building are higher than in the other sectors (NZIER, 2004a). In 2005, a shortage of staff was holding back expansion for over 70% of The Australian Journal of Construction E