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COOU Journal of Arts and Humanities (CJAH) Vol. 5 No. 3, 2020

Abstract
In retrospect, Diop narrates the Rwandan genocide which serves as a corpus for the study of 
extremist's hatred. This effort examined extremist hatred in Murambi, with the aim of 
understanding the triggers and process. Having understood that the task cannot be 
accomplished with a single theory, the study adopted J. M. Berger's « Linkages and bundles » 
(8-9) to demonstrate the process of incitation and Daniel Kahneman « Automatic and 
deliberative thinking » to interpret extremist hatred. The article has demonstrated extremist 
hatred as an ideology which may begin in different ways, including incitation which triggers 
the automatic thinking through the exploitation of conspiracy theories, and force. The actors 
of this instigation will then be radicalised from suspicion, to the formation of and belief in 
linkages and bundles, then the construction of ideologies that kill the conscience and 
legitimizes hatred, until it metamorphoses into violent extremism.

Key words: Extremist ideology, Hatred, Automatic thinking, Deliberate hinking, 
Radicalisation.

Introduction
African francophone writers have in modern times, adopted a narrative that is characterised by 
extreme conduct which are, according to Emmanuel Ahimana: “fiction surpolitisée, discours 
misérabilisé,  discours rebelle, forme monstrueuse, écritures de la violence” (6). Scholars and 
authors of African Francophone novels have demonstrated violence of different degrees and 
expression, which have been studied as “Des formes variées du discours rebelle” by Jacques 
Chevrier, “Langage et violence dans la littérature africaine écrite en francais” by Mwatha 
Musanji Ngalasso, « Les Violences extrêmes dans le roman négro-africain francophone, Le 
cas du Rwanda : Étude de langue et de style » by Emmanuel Ahimana  etc. who attest through 
their research, the presence and probably dominance of violence in the African francophone 
texts. There is no doubt that the different types of violence exhibited are driven by a force. The 
force that propels one into such violence is hatred. This study explains how hatred goes beyond 
limits to become an extremist ideology, demonstrating the strategy and process of building 
extremist hatred.

INTERPRETING EXTREMISTS' HATRED IN 

BOUBACAR BORIS DIOP'S MURAMBI: 

LE LIVRE DES OSSEMENTS

PATIENCE AJEIBI ODEH
Department of Foreign Languages

University of Jos

ajeibiodeh@outlook.com



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In Boubacar Boris Doip's Murambi Le livre des ossement, Cornelius returns to Rwanda for the 
first time after a long exile in Djibouti to reunite with his only surviving relative Simeon 
Hibaneza, four years after the genocide. He returns to unpleasant detail about the genocide: 
Jessica who adopts duty with seriousness and doubles as a spy for her people; Faustin Cabana 
an Interahamwe militant commander with a strong resolve  never to  live with the Tutsi again; 
his father Dr Joseph Karekazi, an elite Hutu, once moderate ends up organising the killing of 
thousands of Tutsi in Murambi; Colonel Perin, an officer of the French army and his 
engagements in the genocide; Gerald a Tutsi survivor who narrates disturbing events that 
characterized the war. Cornelius' reflection as one who discovers, serves as a revelation for the 
reader about the Rwandan genocide.

Exploiting the extremes of hatred
Hatred, as seen in Murambi, adopts the “extremists” vision. Following the reflections of one of 
the characters, Cornelius, he appears to be giving his judgments of the level of hatred 
displayed in Murambi : “Cette orgie de haine allait très loin au-delà de la lutte pour le pourvoir 
dans un petit pays” (214). Founding this argument on the duplex theory of hate will place the 
hate in question under burning hate, which Robert Sternberg itemise as need for annihilation, 
(disgust of negation of intimacy + anger/fear of passion + devaluation/diminution of 
decision/commitment.) However, Murambi's depiction of Anger/fear of passion is very 
minimal. The author tries in vain, to describe what could have informed that level of hatred but 
decided: “il ne voyait rien qui pût justifier une haine aussi féroce” (204). Pursuing hatred with 
such ferocity is an undertaking that requires a huge effort. This is obvious, given the fact that 
these killings were executed with machetes, requiring physical strength. It is therefore, 
important to reflect on what feuled the thoughts of the militants to return to their scene of 
carnage with renewed resolve to continue killing everyday. 

Haroro Ingram considers ideology as “a tool that is used selectively by violent 
extremists to construct their 'system of meaning' in response to psychosocial and strategic 
factors” (5). In the case of Murambi, the factors are more strategic than psychosocial. There 
seems to be a blatant display of disdain and resentment that appears to be too extreme to be 
considered reactional radicalism. According to J.M Berger, extremist ideology is “a set of 
justifications that legitimizes an in-group, which is primarily expressed through texts, 
including both written and spoken word” (7). Beyond the struggle for power as Cornelius 
suggests, there appears to be the search for legitimacy. The demonization of the Tutsi would 
have been a necessary evil for the taking of power. It is a strategy. However, exploiting the 
limits of hatred and pushing the boundaries in the manner Diop adopts leaves more questions 
to be answered.

In our corpus, the in-group can be seen as the Interahamwe militants and other Hutu 
fighters who found a set of justification to legitimize their existence but also their enemy and 
their aggression towards the enemy. Diop presents Gerald, a character that survived the 
carnage with a lot of memory, who brings us to reflect on the nature of hatred: “j'avais vu des 
choses absolument insupportable. Je ne pouvais plus croire à la bonté des hommes” (193).  To 
buttress Gerald's assertion, Diop paints a scene through the same character: Gerard in page 
210-211 recounting how an interahamwe was having sexual intercourse with one of the Tutsi 



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victims under a tree in broad day light. This display is outrageously humiliating for the woman 
in question, but that is hardly extreme. A high ranking militant then hails him in the act and 
encourages him to wrap up as quickly as possible: “Depeche-toi de finir tes pompes, on a 
promis à papa de bien faire le travail” (210), making it more inappropriate. Note also that “Le 
travail” here is the extermination of human lives. 

This symbolism alone makes the act ideological. This ideologisation becomes the 
basic indicator of the strategies adopted by the extremist for the legitimisation of their hostility. 
The high ranking militant then returns and smashes the woman's head with a stone while the 
militant pursue his pleasure undisturbed. According to Gerard, “ Cela n'a pas interrompu 
l'Interahamwe qui a continué à besogner le corps agité de légers soubresautes. Il avait les yeux 
hors de la tête, tournés vers le ciel, et je crois même qu'il était encore plus excité qu'avant” 
(210-211). This cruelty represents an illustration of extremist's hatred. How the victim's pain 
excites and satisfies the aggressors. Realities in our corpus show that extreme hatred occupied 
the minds of these extremists leading to what would be an invention of human pain. “De rue où 
errant des enfants- cadavres aux yeux vifs et afférés. Il ne suffit plus de tuer, Il faut aussi trapper 
les esprits. Alors, voici les rebelles qui savent si bien inventer de la douleur humaine” (213). 
Humans go to extremes to demonstrate through gruesome executions, their level of hatred 
towards defenceless victims including children. Where does extreme hatred emerge from? 
Why does man explore abominable means to express his lack of affection for a fellow human? 
Why the detailed and thorough strategy for evil? This question seems to be a response to Aloys 
Ndasingwa's account of how they invaded and killed people who went to seek refuge at the 
parish. These victims begged for their lives, begged for a moment of prayers before dying: 

Mes enfants, laissez-moi prier une dernière fois”. Une petite vieille toute 
ratatinée. C'est fou, le nombre de personnes qui demandent depuis hier à prier 
avant de mourir. Notre chef a répondu à la vieille, d'un air faussement étonné : « 
Ah ! Maman, ne le savais-tu donc pas ? Nous avons passé la nuit au ciel et là-bas 
nous nous sommes battus jusqu'à l'aube contre le Dieu des Tutsi ! Nous l'avons 
tué et maintenant c'est votre tour » d'un seul coup de machette, il lui a envoyé la 
tête au diable (100).

The number of people, the various forms of supplication and persuasion to be left alive did not 
deter the extremists. If it were to be a reaction to something they have done wrong, the victims 
would have persuaded long enough for a negotiation. The society was already polarized, but 
the instigation for the killings lies in their 'system of meaning which would have been defined 
during the preparation phase because according to Berger: “In addition to defining general 
practices, ideology usually defines acceptable tactics for maintaining or increasing the in-
group's legitimacy (such as isolation, proselytization, or violence against an out-group)” (7). 
Berger's assertion further confirms that the hatred that sustained the killings was an ideology. 
The author caps up this confirmation in what he considers an authentication of the death of the 
Tutsis by the Prefect who orders a meticulous verification: 

D'un geste, il a ordonné à deux de ses hommes de procéder à la vérification. 
Ceux-ci nous ont fait signe de nous éloigner puis ont jeté des grenades 
lacrymogènes sur les cadavres entassés sous nos yeux. Les Iyenzis qui s'étaient 



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dissimulés sous les corps avaient déjà bien du mal à respirer. Avec les 
lacrymos, ils éternuaient très fort et on n'avait qu'à leur mettre la main dessus. 
(101).

If one were to still be in doubt, the effort put into strategizing the massacre in page 34 will 
further serve as a convincing factor. But what offence merits such hatred. Cornelius recounts 
how hatred pushes people to kill even animals belonging to their object of hatred (52).  Stanley 
expresses the level of shock expressed by foreigners: “Alors pourquoi tant de cruauté?” (58). 
These suggest that the expression of hatred goes beyond logical limits. Cornelius recalls 
briefly the display of hatred in other countries. “Et sais-tu qu'en Sierra Leone, ils se contentent 
de mutiler leurs victimes? C'est pire que tout. Je ne sais pas ou ils trouvent la force de couper 
les jambes et les bras d'une fillette avant de la laisser repartir” (78-79).

To put this manifestation of extremist hatred in perspective, it is worthy of note that the 
author used the term extremist “les extremists du Hutu power” (83), on the same page he also 
recognises the word “Fanatique” (83) But what is responsible for the construction of these 
extremists and fanatics like Ndimbati whose love for Lucienne switch into hatred within a 
short time (84), or Extremists like Dr Karekezi who organized the massacre of millions of 
people including his wife and children (93)? Whereas once a moderate Hutu who spare headed 
a movement against impunity, he later became different “par la suite, il a changé. Le Docteur 
Joseph Karekezi n'était plus le même depuis longtemps, mais personne ne le savait. Lui seul 
peut dire ce qui s'est passé dans sa tête. Il ne supportait plus par exemple, d'être marié avec une 
Tutsi” (94). What really happened in his head ?

Suspicion
The author takes to 1959 when it all started with suspicion « Depuis 1959, chaque jeune 
Rwandais doit, a un moment ou a un autre de sa vie, répondre à la même question: faut-il 
attendre les tueurs les bras croisés ou tenter de faire quelque chose pour que notre pays 
redevienne normal? » (40). In reality, who is the killer? This expected killer was preached in 
both Hutu and Tutsi camps based on suspicion. In other words, suspicion prepared both camps 
for a war; a factless and baseless construction was on course. This suspicion created and 
fuelled hatred. Each member of the community looked behind his shoulder as he lived. The 
author demonstrates this in the innocence of the victims of the genocide: “Après ceux qu'ils 
appellent des Ibyitso, des complices, ce sera au tour des Tutsi. Eux, ils sont coupable d'être 
eux-mêmes, donc interdits d'innocence de toute éternité” (38). Considering a Tutsi guilty of 
whatever was considered the wrong doing just because they are Tutsi, comes from an ideology. 
The extremists system of meaning must have named the Tutsi as the out-group and thus 
considered the enemy. 

This is the only way one can explain the killing of men, women, children, and even old 
people. Suspicion created a polarized society. Manipulation or coincidence, the very event that 
was going to complicate the already tensed situation occurs: “Le Falcon 50 du président 
Juvénal Habyarimana avait été abattu… en pleine vol. Cyprien Ntaryamira, le chef de l'Etat 
burundais, se trouvait aussi dans l'avion. Il n'y avait aucun survivant et on accusait tout le 
monde d'avoir fait le coup : les Belges, les Français, le FPR et les extrémistes du Hutu Power » 
(83).  Suspicion made everything worse. The president is dead, everyone is being accused and 



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the tensions became even higher. Dr Joseph Karekezi predicted that “Les voyous et les 
fanatiques vont en profiter pour attaquer des innocents” (83). 

There lies the problem. Diop seems to point his readers in the direction of what will 
follow. First we deduced that the mind of everyone, Hutu and Tutsi was preconditioned to 
expect a war, it is not clear who declared the war. Just as everyone was suspicious of the other, 
Cornelius wonders “c'était peut-être absurde de la part des victimes de continuer à clamer si 
obstinément leur innocence. Et si ce châtiment radical -le génocide- était la réponse a un crime 
très ancien dont personne ne voulait entendre parler? (81). Diop deliberately or unconsciously 
leaves out the details of this suspicion. Probably because there were various conspiracy 
theories that hinged on suspicion. Cornelius acknowledges that he tried to verify from history, 
how and why the suspicion existed and declared “pourtant, je n'y ai trouvé aucune réponse. Les 
documents prouvent que les Hutu et les Twa ont été opprimés jadis par les Tutsi. Je suis Hutu 
mais je ne peux pas vivre avec cet héritage. Je refuse de demander au passé plus de sens qu'il 
n'en peut donner au présent » (81). Cornelius' analysis shows that the history books would have 
been exploited to form the high level constructs. One will also ask: if it was the Hutu and Twa 
that was oppressed, why is it only the Hutu that is executing the Tutsi? What is the crime? Who 
commits this crime? Against who was this crime committed? 

It is easy to deduce that Diop leaves this gap as resonance into the reader's mind that it is 
simple suspicion. What remains unclear however is the instigator of these suspicion, 
insecurities, victimism, or selfish inventions. The possibility of pure invention cannot be ruled 
out as shown in a previous study that extremist's ideologies can be born out of victimism. 
“Comme nous l'avons vu, la construction d'idéologies extrémistes telles que  le chauvinisme, 
le défaitisme, l'ethnocentrisme, la xénophobie, et la vengeance ; est issu du victimisme et de la 
radicalisation''(Odeh 188).  

Linkages, bundles and high level constructs
These come after suspicion is established. According to Berger, extremist ideologies begin 
with “linking concepts” (7). Extremist's ideologies thrive through these linkages to facts. For 
the Hutus, they linked this suspicion to history “Les documents prouvent que les Hutus et les 
Twa ont été opprimes jadis par les Tutsis” (81). 

Linking their suspicion to historical records 
According to Berger, these linked concepts are then “bundled into high-level constructs, in 
which several concepts are connected to one another and then conflated into a single idea” (8). 
The author shows a presumed level of tension between the Tutsi and the Hutu. This tension 
came from suspicion. It is however, not clear if the fears and apprehension have tangible links 
and sources.  We have shown in previous studies that “Il se peut qu'ils le présument réellement, 
en raison d'un décalage palpable, ou simplement un exercice d'invention (171). Invention of 
perceived enemies is the fourth stage in Borum's process of radicalization. Dr Karekezi raised 
the same concerns to his son that after the death of President Juvenal Habyarimana, fanatics 
were going leverage on his death to attack innocent people. (83) Diop validates our view by 
demonstrating clearly in the following declaration. “Pour certains d'entre eux, la situation est 
simple: ils ont tué les Tutsi que, pour une raison ou une autre, ils détestaient et, sans oser le dire  
ouvertement, ils aimeraient rentrer chez eux”(124). Through this illustration, it can be deduced 
that the genocide is based on linkages that differ for different individuals. 



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The theory of hate as a story applies in various categories based on the Hutu-Tutsi 
relationship. It proposes that hate emerges from different kinds of stories. In the case of 
Murambi, the stories vary according to the different linkages. We also find Cornelius 
reflections on Rwanda a clear pointer : “Au fond, le Rwanda est un pays imaginaire. S'il est si 
difficile d'en parler de manière rationnelle, C'est peut être parce qu'il n'existe pas pour de vrai. 
Chacun à son Rwanda dans la tête et ça n'a rien à voir avec celui des autres” (82). For 
Cornelius, on the one part, the different perceptions of Rwanda by the Rwandans must have 
created different expectations and of course diverse feelings of entitlement. There lies a 
problem. On the other part, by the contemplation of an imaginary Rwanda, he probably makes 
allusion to the assumption of enmity along tribal lines. 

The linkages that fanned the tension created by suspicion were diverse. It is thus right 
to conclude that the organisers of these heinous crimes like Kakerezi took hold of the people's 
automotive thinking. People made their linkages individually, to take positions in history : 
“dans cette histoire, beaucoup ont tue par avidité, par sottises, par crainte de l'autorité ou je ne 
sais quoi encore” (184). The tragic event of “mercredi 6 avril 1994” (13) already had suspects, 
due to linkages. The linkages are bundled up to more complex concepts, where people go to 
history to make a resolution. We find a very good example in Faustin Gasana who says: « J'ai 
étudié l'histoire de mon pays et je sais que les Tutsi et nous, nous ne pourrons jamais vivre 
ensemble. Jamais. Des tas de fumistes prétendent le contraire, mais moi je ne le crois pas » 
(26). 

This is a deadly resolution. It probably represents other perceptions such as potrayed in  
Colonel Musoni's conversation with Dr Karekezi: “Demain, il pourrait dire: au moment ou 
tout le monde ne pensait qu'a sauver sa peau, j'étais au coté du président Karekezi, nous étions 
au milieu de la tempête, nous avons fait face aux ennemis de la nation rwandaise, c'est nous 
deux et personne d'autre qui avons sauvé le pays » (128). Certainly, the Tutsi, old and young, 
were considered enemies of the nation. Let us not dwell on the lack of logic in that bundle and 
consider how extreme that is. This was a bundle that every Hutu needed to accept before 
extremist hatred is established. This bundle is an important part of the ideological construction 
that is going to ensure the extermination of every Tutsi alive. 

During the propaganda that reinforced this hatred, a story was told that demonstrates 
deliberative thinking on the part of the organizers to provoke automatic thinking and also 
thoroughness in execution: It is about the head of the FPR being a Tutsi child whose parents 
were executed in his presence during one of the previous conflicts. The narrator claimed that 
he was not killed because he was a child. The story sought to provoke regret on the actions of 
those who spared the boy, but to also ensure that no Tutsi is spared. This bundle is a propaganda 
that constructs an extremist ideology that defies any form of decency and human value. It is a 
bundle that would have encouraged the destruction of even a Tutsi fetus. 

High level Constructs -ideology
The conceptual linkages and bundles in Murambi were further bundled into high level 
constructs. These constructs served as a tool for brain-wash, and for incitation. The organizers 
of the genocide needed people to execute a well calculated (deliberately thought out) decision. 
Their aim is to usher themselves into the corridors of power as this was obvious to Michel 



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Serumundo who declares: “Il y a longtemps que ce pays est devenu complètement fou. De 
toute façon, cette fois-ci, les assassins avaient un prétexte en or: la mort du président. Je n'osais 
pas espérer qu'ils se contenteraient juste d'un peu de sang »   (18)

This high level constructs were ideological like in page 25 Gasana's father links the 
genocide they were preparing for, to the Hitler's genocide against the Jews “tu a surement 
entendu parler de ce français qui a voulu tuer tous les Iyenzi blancs pendant leur grande guerre 
là-bas”(25). Faustin Gasana's high level construct was based on history : « Jai étudié l'histoire 
de mon pays et je sais que les Tutsi et nous, nous ne pourrons jamais vivre ensemble. Jamais 
(26). This assertion is a product of many linkages leading to the consideration of the Tutsi 
enemies of the Rwandan state. Nous avons fait face aux ennemis de la nation Rwandaise' 
(128). This consideration legitimatizes the killing of the Tutsi.  

According to Berger, high level construct involves developed thinking such as 
“elements of in-group and out-group identity (perceived beliefs, practices, expectations, etc.) 
are linked to source knowledge (news, history, folklore, scripture, myth, conspiracy theories, 
etc.)” (8). Diop seems to adopt a predilection that does not only narrate the crimes; he went as 
far as adopting a narrative that makes the ideologies glaring of extremism. The taking of power 
did not seem to have been the only aim of the genocide. There appears to be a quest for 
legitimacy. This legitimacy is not unconnected with the power. It is possibly a means of 
retaining power after taking it. Berger asserts that “In-group demands more and more 
recognition of its claimed legitimacy and treats lack of adequate recognition as a threat” (4). 
The need for power would have started the spouts of killings as recognised by Simeon 
Habineza, but the demand for that recognition (legitimacy) seems to be the real framework for 
the extremist hatred. Peter Neuman puts this category of extremism this way: “In the context of 
liberal democracies, this could be applied to any ideology that advocates racial or religious 
supremacy and/or opposes the core principles of democracy and universal human rights” 
(citedbyBorum Radicalization 10)

For Dr Karekazi “C'est juste l'histoire qui veut du sang” (129). We find this aligning 
with the belief, whose real source is unknown to us, that “L'arbre de la liberte ne s'arrose que 
par le sang”. That is the high level construct that the Dr Karekazi adopts to legitimize the 
killing of his own family. It is only possible after achieving Borums's last step of ideological 
development: demonization of the victim. This is no doubt a manifestation of extremism, as 
the Macmillian Dictionary of Political Thought considers extremism methods through which 
political actors attempt to realise their interests and aims, “Adoption of means to political ends 
which disregard accepted standards of conduct, in particular which show disregard for life, 
liberty, and human rights of others”. The methods adopted by Karekezi and his likes are aimed 
at realizing their aims through undemocratic means. However, to sell the idea to the Hutu they 
needed a construct that will trigger anger and stimulate automatic thinking, as demonstrated by 
Borum: 

This ascription has three effects that facilitate violence. First, aggression 
becomes more justifiable when aimed against 'bad' people, particularly those 
who intentionally cause harm to others. Second, extremists describe the 
responsible party as 'evil'; dehumanizing a target in this regard, further 
facilitates aggression. Third, those suffering adverse conditions in the hands of 
others do not see themselves as 'bad' or 'evil'; this further identifies the 



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responsible person or group as different from those affected and, thus, makes 
justifying aggression even easier (“Understanding the terrorist mind-set” 8).

These legitimise extremist hatred. In the case of Rwanda, it was imperative for the organisers 
of the genocide to broadcast the image of the Tutsi as enemies of the state. We remark in 
Murambi, that Diop presents high level constructs as a product of deliberative thinking. He 
however, demonstrates through the Interahamwe militants, how the deliberative thinkers 
leveraged on automotive thinking to incite the Hutus.

Propaganda is a vital tool for initiation. Diop presents this assertion through Dr 
Karekezi. He considers the whole cruelty a duty. He presents the same ideology to the 
Interahamwe, this ideology considers his actions as duty “Quoi qu'il arrive, j'aurais fait mon 
devoir. Le devoir. Un mot simple et que j'aime bien. La journée n'a pas été facile. Pour réunir 
les hommes nécessaires au travail, il m'a fallu aller jusqu'à  Butare et de là remonter ver Muciro 
et Rusenge un peu plus au nord” (121). As if to confirm what  he  considers work, he says “Je 
suis toujours sur le terrain depuis le début de la guerre et ils savent aussi que je ne plaisante pas 
avec le travail. Et, naturellement, quand je suis dans les parages, Ils font du zèle” (123). “ils” as 
he employs here refers to the Interahamwe. Diop finds a subtle and interesting way to 
introduce the brains behind the genocide when he gives an account of Dr Karekezi reflections: 

Je n'ai jamais été aussi inquiet depuis le debut de ces événements. La vérité 
toute nue est celle-ci: nos hommes sont fatigués. Cela se lisait nettement sur les 
visages de ceux que j'ai vus. La fatigue et la lassitude. Nos Interahamwe ont 
certes reçu un bon entrainement mais nous avons peut-être sous-estimé l'effort 
physique que cela représente de tuer tante de gens avec des armes  blanches” 
(124).

Here Dr Karekezi appears to take responsibility for deliberately organizing the genocide, 
inciting the Interahamwe, equipping them with logistics for the genocide. What follows in 
page 125 will be Dr karekezi's admittance to deliberate thinking, manipulation, enforcing 
further our conclusion of exploiting automative thinking by these extremists: “ils savent que si 
toute cela se termine bien ils retourneront dans leurs taudis et que nous ne viendrons pas  boire 
la bière de banane avec eux.  Les tapes amicales, la fraternité entre les pauvres et les puissants, 
tout ça sera vite oublie. Un drôle de cercle vicieux”(125). These are clear indications that the 
organizers of this rare cruelty were manipulators. Colonel Etienne Perrin's description of Dr 
Karekazi shows a disguise “ rien ne laissait soupçonner chez lui un individu bassement 
haineux et fanatique” (140). He disguises his extreme hatred, trained and transmitted it into the 
Interahamwe militants who manifested his form of extremism. We acknowledge 
manipulation. 

According to Borum, “ideology and action are sometimes connected, but not always. 
Most people who harbor radical ideas and violent justifications do not engage in terrorism” 
(Radicalization into violent extremism 30). That describes Dr Karekazi. He propagates his 
extremism and camouflages himself into the elder states man everyone perceived him to be. 
While in reality he is : “bassement haineux et fanatique” (140). He indoctrinates this hatred 
into the militants and thus they resolved: “nous ne pouvons pas les éliminer tous, mais que les 
survivants soient au moins morts de douleur pendant le reste de leur vie” (136). The hatred 



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here is pushed to unimaginable extremes. They conceive a mutation and a long term effect on 
the survivors. Their only crime is going to be surviving the genocide. 

The extremist hatred is targeted to trigger both immediate pain and slow violence, 
described by Rob Nixon as: “the long dyings –the staggered and staggeringly discounted 
casualties, both human and ecological- …often not just incremental but exponential, operating 
as major threat multipliers” (www.chronicle.com/article/slow-Violence/127968). This kind of 
incitation was carefully calculated according to the Ingram's assertion that: “the potential 
appeal of extremist propaganda is largely dependent on how such messaging is strategically 
designed to leverage psychological forces and strategic factors that are pertinent to its targeted 
audiences”(4). The extreme hatred was spread through propaganda of high level constructs 
that triggered extreme hatred as an automated effect on the Hutu youth.

Conclusion
Murambi traces the way ambition and emotional disposition escalates into full extremist 
hatred. This we have followed from baseless suspicion to linkages and bundles into high level 
constructs which formed the fabric of propaganda by the real extremist: organizers of the 
genocide. We have also pointed to the fact that these organizers employed deliberative 
thinking to incite and manipulate a large number of people into extreme hatred while they 
themselves maintained their images as law abiding statesmen. The people's automatic thinking 
was exploited to commit some of the wildest display of cruelty while in reality, they stand to 
gain nothing. The study attests to the manipulation and disguise adopted by the propagandists 
of extremist hatred. It is also drawn from our corpus that the real extremists are calm and 
collected. They are strategic and tactful and leave no room for suspicion on their true nature 
such as Dr Karekezi, Faustin etc. While the mediocre incited members do the dirty job without 
any deliberate thinking. This category commits the crimes but in reality is made up of 
misinformed over-zealous peasants. The level of lunacy they exhibited in carrying out their 
duties attests to their emptiness and lack of ideology.

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