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COOU Journal of Arts and Humanities (CJAH) Vol. 5 No. 3, 2020

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ABSTRACT
In his Political Liberalism (1993), John Rawls attempts to deal with the problem of political 
power in a modern democratic society with his idea of public reason, which provides a 
systematic answer to the question: What moral (not legal) limits does civility impose on public 
political debates and discussions by the citizens of a modern pluralist democracy? At the heart 
of the problem is that citizens in a modern democratic society, such as Nigeria, do not hold one 
but different and often conflicting comprehensive conceptions of the good (life) which they 
cherish and want to espouse. A central proposition of Rawls' thought in resolving the problem 
is that respect for others as free and equal citizens of a democracy entails that we accept a 
principle of equal liberty that allows each conception of the good life to thrive in the society. 
This paper exposed and interrogated Rawls' propositions and claims in order to see the 
relevance of this thought in today's modern democratic society. Through the use of historical 
and analytic methods, this paper found that, based on the fact of pluralism, it is reasonable for 
Rawls to suggest that to achieve social and political stability in a democratic society, there are 
certain types of reasons that citizens may and may not adduce to defend their points of view in 
public political debates, i.e., political discussions must be based on values that other citizens 
can reasonably be expected to accept and endorsed. The conclusion is that Rawls' idea of 
public reason is a commendable effort towards ensuring social justice, political stability and 
peaceful co-existence of citizens in a modern liberal constitutional democratic regime.

Keywords: Political liberalism, public reason, modern democracy, citizens, pluralism, 
society, public debates, free and equal.

Introduction
In his book, Political Liberalism (1993), as well as in a number of published articles that 
preceded its publication, John Rawls focuses on the problem which the make-up of modern 
societies possess for a liberal theory. Rawls' previous understanding of the problem was 
formulated based on the classical social contract theories and augmented by David Hume's 
account of the “circumstances of justice.” He now significantly understands this problem as 
compounded by what he calls “the fact of pluralism,” or “the fact of reasonable pluralism.” In 
the light of the fact of pluralism, the problem is no longer simply to articulate principles that 
might serve as a basis for equitable social cooperation among individuals in a society who 
otherwise share roughly the same moral standpoint. It is now, rather, to do so in a society 
whose members adhere to a plurality of different and sometimes incommensurable 

CHUKWUJEKWU STEPHEN CHIJIOKE (PhD) 
&

ANOWAI EUGENE CHUKWUELOKA (PROF.)
Department of Philosophy  

Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu University (COOU)
Anambra State, Nigeria.

AN EXPOSÉ OF THE “IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON”
 IN JOHN RAWLS' POLITICAL LIBERALISM



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“reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good.” Thus, in this new understanding of the 
problem (of modern society) given the fact of (reasonable) pluralism, Rawls' states the 
problem which “political liberalism,” both as a theory and a book, will tackle as follows: “How 
is it possible that there may exist over time a stable society for free and equal citizens 
profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical and moral 
doctrines?” (Rawls, 1993, p. xviii).  Rawls (1993) appreciates the traditional liberal response 
to the above question, but rejects it all the same in these words: “Sometimes one hears 
reference made to the so-called Enlightenment project of finding a philosophical secular 
doctrine, one founded on reason and yet comprehensive. It would then be suitable to the 
modern world, so it thought, now that the religious authority and the faith of ages were alleged 
no longer dominant” (p. xviii). 

Furthermore, the fact of (reasonable) pluralism which Rawls is insistent upon implies a 
rejection of the convergence hypothesis, such as the 'reflexive equilibrium' theory. For, Rawls 
as early as 1974 was already claiming in one of his articles that even should everyone attain 
wide reflective equilibrium, individuals in a society may still hold many contrary moral 
conceptions. Thus, fundamental moral disagreement is no longer seen as the manifestation of 
obstacles blocking the full, unfettered manifestation of reason.  Rather, according to Rawls 
(1993), it is seen as “the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the free 
institutions of a constitutional democratic regime” (p. xvi). In other word, there can no longer 
be any expectation that imposing the rigors of reflective equilibrium upon citizens, and 
particularly restricting them to their “considered convictions,” will yield convergence 
sufficient for the task of construction of a theory on the basis of shared premises. 

Put differently, observes Weinstock (1994), “practical reason, according to the fact of 
pluralism, speaks with many voices” (p. 174).  The search for shred convictions must start 
elsewhere. Rawls (1993) suggests strongly that we look to our shared public political culture as 
a repository of settled, specifically political values and judgments, such as “the belief in 
religious toleration and the rejection of slavery” (p. 8). From this perspective, Rawls (1993) 
pin-points and expatiates further the problem that political liberalism seeks to solve in these 
words: “The problem of political liberalism is to work out a conception of political justice for a 
constitutional democratic regime that the plurality of reasonable doctrines –always a feature of 
the culture of a free democratic regime –might endorse” (p. xviii). Of course, a liberal 
conception of justice is the one that includes a principle of equal liberty, that assigns protection 
of equal basic liberty priority over other social values, and that includes a principle requiring 
that each citizen has adequate material means to exercise his basic liberty. Thus, as de Marneffe 
(1994) rightly observes, a central proposition of Rawls' thought in his political liberalism is 
that “respect for others as free and equal citizens of a democracy entails that we accept a 
principle of equal basic liberty” (p. 232).

The principle of equal basic liberty that Rawls (1993) proposes is that each person has 
an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is 
compatible with the same scheme for all (p. 5). The basic liberties which Rawls (1971) has in 
mind are the same as those found in his earlier work, A Theory of Justice, and his other writings 
and the works of other political writers: freedom of political speech, assembly and 
participation; freedom of thought and conscience; freedom of association; freedom of the 
person; freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as associated with the rule of law (p. 66).  
However, these liberties are quite abstract, and so disagreement is bound to arise among 



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citizens about their precise scope –even among citizens who are fully committed to equal basic 
liberty in principle. Disagreement may inevitably arise, for instance, about whether hate 
speech and pornography are protected by freedom of speech and thought. Again, some people 
argue that religious reasons should be excluded from public debate; others yet argue for the 
exclusion of statements that degrade people on the basis of their religions, race or ethnicity. 
Other people still contend that in a public debate, an ideal of political morality should mirror 
the freedom of expression: all viewpoints should contend in a marketplace of ideas. Thus, it 
becomes necessary to identify principles to guide public debate over the scope of basic liberty. 
It is primarily to identify such principles that Rawls (1993) develops in Political Liberalism 
his idea of “Public Reason” (pp. 212-254).

Rawls' Central Proposition and Claim 
As Bruce Ackerman rightly observes, Political Liberalism is not merely the name of a book by 
John Rawls. It is rather a distinctive approach to the problem of political power. One can 
certainly find possible answers in Rawls' book. Following de Marneffe (1994), “a central 
proposition of Rawls' thought is that respect for others as free and equal citizens of a 
democracy entails that we accept a principle of equal liberty” (p. 232).  The principle of equal 
liberty that Rawls (1993) proposes is as follows: “Each person has an equal claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same 
scheme for all; and in this scheme, the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to 
be guaranteed their fair value” (p. 5). Now the central claim of Rawls' idea of public reason is 
that when the exercise of political power is in question, citizens should take only those 
positions on the scope of basic liberty (and other matters of basic justice) that are supported by 
some liberal political conception of justice, using modes of inquiry and methods of inference 
that are widely understood and endorsed. 

This is crucial since, according to Rawls, the content of public reason is formulated by 
a “political conception of justice” which he assumes to be “broadly liberal in character.” Rawls 
(1993) explains what he means that the content of public reason is formulated by a political 
conception of justice that is broadly liberal in character: “By this I mean three things: first, it 
specifies certain basic rights, liberties, and opportunities (of the kind familiar from 
constitutional regimes); second, it assigns a special priority to these rights, liberties, and 
opportunities, especially with respect to claims of the general good and perfectionist values; 
and third, it affirms measures assuring all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make 
effective use of their basic liberties and opportunities” (p. 223). Furthermore, says Rawls 
(1993): “In saying a conception of justice is political, I also mean … that it is framed to apply 
solely to the basic structure of society, its main political, social, and economic institutions as a 
unified scheme of social cooperation; that it is presented independently of any wider 
comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine; and that it is elaborated in terms of 
fundamental political ideas viewed as implicit in the public political culture of a democratic 
society” (p. 223).

One has to underline that Rawls' own two principles of justice constitute only one 
liberal conception of justice. There are equally others. Thus, the central claim of Rawls' idea of 
public reason is not that we should take only those positions that are supported by Rawls' own 
“justice as fairness” (JAF). Rather, the central claim is that we should take only those positions 
on the scope of basic liberty that are supported by some conceptions of justice that is both 
liberal and political. Based on this line of thought, Rawls (1993) expresses the point of his idea 
of public reason as follows: 



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The point of the ideal of public reason is that citizens are to conduct their 
fundamental discussions within the framework of what each regards as a 
political conception of justice based on values that others can reasonably be 
expected to endorse and each is, in good faith, prepared to defend that 
conception so understood. This means that each of us must have, and be ready 
to explain, a criterion of what principle and guidelines we think other citizens 
(who are free and equal) may reasonably be expected to endorse along with us” 
(p. 223).

Rawls' Arguments for the above Claim
In making the above claim, Rawls argues that a free and equal person who is reasonable and 
rational could not accept any position on the scope of basic liberty that is not fully compatible 
with his equal basic liberty. So, respect for others as free and equal citizens requires that we 
take only those positions on the scope of basic liberty that are supported by a liberal conception 
of justice.  Again, a free and equal person who is reasonable and rational could not accept any 
position on the scope of basic liberty that is defensible in terms of some comprehensive 
religious or philosophical doctrine that he rejects. So, respect for others as free and equal 
citizens requires that we take only those positions on the scope of basic liberty that are 
supported by a liberal conception of justice.   Also, a free and equal person who is reasonable 
and rational could not accept any position on the scope of basic liberty that is supported by 
modes of inquiry and methods of inference that he cannot understand or endorse. So then, 
respect for others as free and equal citizens requires that we take only those positions on the 
scope of basic liberty that are supported by modes of inquiry and methods of inference that are 
widely understood and endorsed.

Thus, an ideal of public reason provides a systematic answer to the question: What 
moral (not legal) limits does civility impose on public political debate and discussion by the 
citizens of a modern pluralist democracy? Solum asserts that in Political Liberalism, Rawls 
refines his idea of public reason and argues for an “inclusive public reason.” Based on his 
assertion, Solum (1994) lists out three main features of Rawlsian ideal of public reason as 
follows:

(1) Public reasons include (a) the general features of all reason, such as rules of 
inference and evidence; and

(2) The ideal applies (but not necessarily limited) to deliberations and discussion 
concerning the basic structure and the constitutional essentials.

(3) The ideal applies (a) to both citizens and public political debate, (b) to citizens 
when they vote, and (c) to public action –so long as the debate, vote or action 
concerns the subjects specifies in (2). (pp. 217-218)

As Peter de Marneffe explains, the general idea of Rawls' notion of public reason is that 
we should take only those positions on the scope of basic liberty that can be adequately 
defended solely in terms of values that every reasonable citizen could endorse. Rawls (1993) 
identifies those liberal political values as “the values of equal political and civil liberty; 
equality of opportunity; the values of social equality and economic reciprocity; and let us add 
also the values of the common good … the values of public reason –fall under the guidelines 
for public inquiry, which makes that inquiry free and public” (p. 224). However, this does not 
mean to imply that only these are the liberal political values there are.



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Major Aim of the Idea of Public Reason
Bruce Ackerman is one of those philosophers who find Rawls' treatment of the idea of public 
reason very enlightening. As he rightly observes, Rawls in his Political Liberalism makes one 
of his most important breaks with his earlier work, A Theory of Justice,  by renouncing his 
claim that 'the theory of justice is part of the theory of rational decision.' In his own words, 
Rawls (1993) says: “Here I correct a remark in theory, p. 16, where it is said that the theory of 
justice is part of the theory of rational decision. From what we have just said, this is simply 
incorrect ….” (p. 53). Ackerman (1994) underlines that Rawls' new aim now is “to express 
reasonable grounds for cooperation among parties who differ as to the meaning of the good 
life” (p. 366).  An important question suggests itself in the light of Rawls' idea of public reason, 
namely what is it to be reasonable when citizens differ or disagree on so much? Put differently, 
what is really the aim of public reason? Ackerman observes that Rawls' answer provides one of 
the high points of his Political Liberalism. In Rawls' (1993) words: “What public reason asks 
is that citizens be able to explain their votes to one another in terms of reasonable balance of 
public political values, it being understood by everyone that of course the plurality of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines held by citizens is thought by them to provide further and 
often transcendent backing for those values” (p. 243).  Rawls (1993) further insists that in the 
light of public reason and the idea of democratic citizenship, citizens must display as a matter 
of duty “a willingness to listen to others and a fair mindedness in deciding when 
accommodation to their views should reasonably be made” (p. 217). 

As Ackerman rightly observes, the overriding commitment to public dialogue leads 
Rawls in a direction beyond principles already established in Western political practice. Thus, 
as far as public dialogue is concerned, Rawls challenges the way Americans and others 
understand the electoral process.  This is because, in actual fact, when most people step into 
the voting booth, they believe that they have a right to cast their ballot any way they like 
–maybe I am voting for “A” because he is of African origin, or because he did my relation a 
favour, but this is nobody's business but mine. Rawls finds this attitude no more acceptable. 
Hence, Rawls (1993) affirms, “… the ideal of public reason not only governs the public 
discourse of elections …, but also how citizens are to cast their votes …. Otherwise, public 
discourse runs the risk of being hypocritical: citizens talk before one another one way and vote 
another” (p. 215). Rawls underlines that the ideal of public reason does not apply to ordinary 
citizens and various officers of the government in the same manner. According to him, it 
applies to government officers, the legislators, in their official capacities. As Rawls (1993) 
puts it: “It applies in official forums and so to legislators when they speak on the floor of 
parliament, and to the executive in its public acts and pronouncements” (p. 216).

Rawls (1993) also notes how the idea of public reason applies to the judiciary: “It 
applies also in a special way to the judiciary and above all to a supreme court in a constitutional 
democracy with judicial review” (p. 216).  This so, says Rawls, because the justices have to 
explain and justify their decisions as based on their understanding of the constitution and 
relevant statutes and precedents.  One must agree that Rawls has a point in urging us to have a 
second look at the act of voting, and the official conducts of legislators and judges in a liberal 
constitutional democracy. As Ackerman rightly observes, legitimate government is not based 
on the unfettered act of personal will, but the collective effort by each of us to justify our 
political power through public dialogue. For example, the secret ballot is valuable only 
because it shields us from coercive efforts by others to impose their will when they have failed 



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to convince us through argument. However, the salient point in the light of Rawls' notion of 
public reason is that this valuable shield should not be transformed into a sword that allows a 
majority of voters to impose their will on others in a way they are not prepared to justify in 
public.

Critical Evaluation
Rawls' formulation of the ideal of public reason has stirred both interest and criticism. Some 
critics argue particularly that Rawls' formulation is “exclusive.” By this, they mean to say that 
adherence to the Rawlsian idea of public reason would result in the exclusion of many groups 
in the society (especially religious groups) from full participation in public political life. In his 
essay entitled Rawls' Exclusively Secular Conception, Garry Leads criticises Rawls' view that 
the stability of an overlapping consensus depends on the exclusion of many doctrines from the 
public discourse. According to him then, for example, Rawls would not approve of politically 
active citizens asserting the truth of any precepts identified with their particular 
comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines. Thus, the exclusion of religious 
beliefs from public debate is argued to be both unrealistic and unfair. As quoted by Solum 
(1994), Leedes expresses the unrealistic nature of Rawls' view in these words: “This kind of 
discriminatory treatment is unlikely to end the culture wars between many Americans and their 
adversaries including Christian fundamentalists, Islamic fundamentalists, conservative 
Catholics, and Orthodox Jews. 

Rawls is in cloud-cucko land if he thinks that religious disagreements will be reduced 
in number by a political theory that stigmatizes devout persons whose political opinions are 
consistently aligned with their religious orientation” (p. 218). With reference to the charge that 
an exclusionary view is unfair, Leedes refers to Jürgen Habermas' conception of discourse 
ethics and observes that Americans (or citizens of any other modern society) conforming to 
Rawls' ideal of public reason must keep their religious beliefs in the closets when they enter the 
field of politics. He argues that this type of conformity is not in accordance with American 
traditions, customs and practices.  According to him, this restriction violets the principle of 
discourse ethics that assures adversely affected religious persons full and equal participation in 
political debates (Solum 1994, pp. 218-219).  Contrary to Leedes position, Solum believes that 
Rawls has an “inclusive view of public reason” –one that treats religious beliefs fairly and 
realistically. He argues that whatever position that Rawls himself may take, we should adhere 
to an ideal of public reason that is inclusive.  Then, for Solum (1994), an inclusive ideal of 
public reason is one that requires citizens to advance public reasons in public debate on 
political questions, but does not require them to exclude supporting non-public reasons from 
such debate (p. 219). The exclusionary principle requires “that only reasons accepted by the 
whole public be allowed as public reason.” Solum observes that this would constrict public 
reason to the vanishing point because there is likely at least one citizen who will deny the truth 
of almost every conceivable premise of political argument. 

Moreover, says Solum, this constriction seems unreasonable as some citizens are 
products of delusion. In the end, Solum thinks that the principle of excluding non-public 
reasons would be chosen over every other in a political debate. This is because, given the fact 
of pluralism, that principle does not ensure that reasons offered in public political debate can 
reasonably be accepted by the public at large. Secondly, the principle of excluding non-public 
reasons would also be chosen over that of excluding “all-contested-reasons” (or all-contested-
moral-reasons). For, as Solum observes, if all contested reasons were excluded, public debate 
would be severely restricted. Hence, allowing all public reasons (as defined here) would 



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facilitate a more robust and effective role for public debate.  Thirdly, the principle of 
“excluding non-public reason” would be chosen over that of “excluding religious reasons”. 
Whereas believers could not accept the principle of (of excluding religious reasons) as fair, 
they could accept the principle of excluding non-public reasons as fair. This is because the 
exclusion of all non-public reasons puts the deep belief of both theists and atheists on the same 
par. In the light of this, one might be inclined to agree with Solum that we have a prima facie 
reason to accept the principle of “exclusion of non-public reason” as the best interpretation of 
Rawls' idea of public reason.

However, Solum believes strongly that the ideal of public reason might be specified by 
“principle of inclusion.” According to him, the most promising inclusive principle is the one 
that requires the “inclusion of public reasons.”  This would allow for robust debate but would 
not be unfair to those with religious views. Unlike the principle of “excluding non-public 
reasons,” the principle of including public reasons would allow citizens to advance non-public 
reasons in public debates.  But non-public reasons would only be allowed if sufficient public 
reasons were also given. Both the exclusive and inclusive versions will result in the giving of 
sufficient public reasons, but the “inclusive version” will allow a specified role for non-public 
reason as well. Like the principle of excluding non-public reason, the principle of including 
public reasons would foster civility and the civic virtue of tolerance. According to Solum, it 
would do this in two ways. First, by requiring citizens to give a public reason, the principle of 
inclusion assures that no citizen will call for the coercion of another citizen without giving a 
reason the other citizen views as reasonable. Second, by requiring citizens to exclude non-
public reasons, the principle of inclusion assures that no citizen will call for the coercion of 
another citizen on the basis of grounds the other would view as wholly unreasonable. 

It seems, finally, that we have to believe that the principle of including public reason 
might do a better job of fostering civility and tolerance than would the exclusionary principle.  
In his Political Liberalism, Rawls recognizes the distinction between the “exclusive view” of 
public reason and the “inclusive view.” According to Rawls (1993), the exclusive view 
forbids, and the inclusive view allows, the presentation by citizens of “what they regard as the 
basis of political values rooted in their comprehensive doctrine” (p. 247).  Rawls (1993) 
prefers the “inclusive view” of public reason, as he sees it to be the correct one “which view 
best encourages citizens to honour the ideal of public reason and secures its social conditions 
in the longer run in a well-ordered society” (p. 248). For, surely, giving some circumstances, 
the giving of non-public reasons (which are not shared) that are the foundations of public 
reasons (which are shared) will foster a sense of political solidarity and tolerance.  This is so 
because, observes Rawls (1993), if I see that I agree about fundamental public values, despite 
our disagreement about the moral foundations of those values, I may come to see your 
fundamental views as reasonable – despite my unwillingness to accept them as true “(p. 249). 
Similarly, if I see that you treat my comprehensive view as reasonable, despite your 
disagreement with aspects of my view, then I may be more likely to treat your view with 
tolerance and respect”.

Conclusion
Rawls is right to assert that the fact of (reasonable) pluralism has compounded more of modern 
societies. The problem is no longer simply to articulate principles that might serve as a basis 
for equitable social cooperation among citizens who otherwise roughly share the same moral 
point of view as obtained in the medieval time. The problem is now rather to articulate such 



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principles in a society whose members adhere to a plurality of different and sometimes 
irreconcilable “reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good.” Thus, given the broad 
range of comprehensive conceptions of the good life that both do and that might come to 
coexist in a democratic society, and given the concomitant broad range of debates and 
disagreements that might emerge, it seems unwise, once fundamental constitutional principles 
and basic rights have been settled, to prejudge the type of issues about which people can 
legitimately debate and disagree in the political arena. It is rather more likely that what citizens 
will come to require is not a more fully marked out theory, but an agreed set of rules on the basis 
of which they might manage their political debates. It seems to many that Rawls comes close to 
providing us with just such a conception of public dialogue with the idea of public reason to 
which he devotes Lecture VI in his book, Political Liberalism. On the whole, Rawls' idea of 
public reason is a commendable effort towards ensuring stability and peaceful co-existence of 
individual citizens in a modern liberal constitutional democratic regime. 

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