ARTICLE (REFEREED)

Islamic Narratives in Ukraine: Analyzing Communicative Dynamics

Olena Klymentova

Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Ukraine

Corresponding author: Olena Klymentova, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Volodymyrska St, 60, Kyiv, Ukraine, 01033. klymentovaov@ukr.net

Abstract

The significance of Islamic marketing for Ukrainians is determined by its influence on consumers of informational and industrial products in a non-Muslim country. The objects of our research are semantic components of the Islamic narrative in Ukraine. The subject of the study is Islamic marketing of communications. The research objective is to analyze the communicative dynamics of Islamic narrative found in the popular Ukrainian media. The research methodology is based on the current scholarly approaches to religion narratives. The results show that the Islamic narrative has consisted of two different narratives, the first related to Ukrainian Muslims, and the second related to Muslims of other countries. The analysis of the narratives revealed that since the beginning of the military confrontation with Russia, a battle of ideologies has emerged in which the successful business narrative was first rooted in soft power strategy, then turned into a strategic narrative, and has eventually become a weaponized narrative.

Keywords

Islamic Narrative; Religious Marketing; Strategic Narrative; Weaponized Narrative

Introduction

At least since the beginning of the 21ˢᵗ century, sociologists have argued that religion would continue to penetrate the public sphere and that scholars can no longer ignore the implications this has for scholarship and policy (Davie 2006, p. 294). A special role in this process is given to Islam, which is showing the tendency to strengthen its position in many countries, including non-Muslim ones, like, for example, Ukraine. There are dynamic changes in religious communication in the many denominations operating in Ukraine, whose religious map is being transformed under the pressure of political, economic and cultural factors.

Ukraine is considered to be a country with a relatively small Muslim population: according to different estimates, followers of Islam make up from 600 thousand to 2 million people. And their number is growing rapidly due to a high birth rate. At the same time, Muslims have lived in predominantly Christian Ukraine for a long time and belong to indigenous peoples, such as the Tatars. The traditional territories of their settlement were the southern (Crimean Peninsula) and eastern regions of Ukraine (including the Donetsk and Luhansk regions). These territories have also become a new homeland for Chechens who disagree with the regime of incumbent Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov. Who will own the territories, where Ukrainian Muslims traditionally lived? This is one of the important questions and the war between Russia and Ukraine is likely to give an answer.

Media practice shows that extraordinary events in Muslims' lives have laid the basis for promoting Islamic content, something that was previously unimaginable in predominantly Christian Ukraine, where local Muslims were assimilated, often not expressing their religious beliefs and ethnically positioning themselves primarily as Ukrainians, with an emphasis on the tradition of exceptional tolerance for all faiths. In very recent times, these events include the annexation of Crimea that forced many Tatars to leave their homeland, the eviction of Muslims from places of their traditional residence in Donbas, the participation of Kadyrovites and other foreign Muslim mercenaries in the war between Russia and Ukraine and so on. Unexpectedly for Ukrainians, news from the Islamic world has the ability to determine ratings of Ukrainian media and encourage Ukrainians to discuss passionately this news, especially those news posts that arouse fear.

In almost all European countries, the Islamic narrative belongs to a strategic narrative, or 'compelling story lines which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn' (Freedman 2006, p. 22). These strategic narratives tie the local to global events and although they exist in a cognitive dimension, they have very real consequences' (Archetti 2017, p. 3). What does this mean for Ukraine? It may seem to be a rhetorical question, because Ukraine is located in the center of Europe and is currently applying for EU membership. Yet it is this question that is the focus of this paper.

Until recently, it was still possible to structure the Islamic narrative in Ukraine into two types: the first delivered the position of local Muslims, while the second represented the position of Muslims from other countries as a political marketing factor. In the pre-war period, the second was represented mainly by projects related to soft power strategies, business initiatives, cultural, educational and tourism activities. At the same time, the war with Russia has fundamentally changed the foreign Islamic narrative in Ukraine, and Islamism has become one of the strategic priorities, since the intra-Islamic conflict directly has begun to affect lives of Ukrainian Muslims, and indeed the lives of all Ukrainians.

Monitoring Ukrainian mass media enables us to identify at least three strategic epistemes that have fundamentally changed the concept of ALIEN in the Ukrainian Islamic narrative. These are the project of the global Islamic world, the confrontation between Islam and the West and Muslims' participation in the war waged by Russia on the Ukrainian territory. Researchers usually support the project's characterization with quotes from Qutb's books (1974), from Bin Laden's propaganda texts or the Al-Qaeda manifesto. The rhetoric of these texts literally is alien to Ukrainians who have been living in a multi-ethnic, multicultural

and multi-confessional society for centuries. In general, Ukrainians are not well versed in intra-Islamic conflict; after a long period of atheism and in the conditions of the politicization of scholarship, non-partisan Islamic studies in Ukraine are at an early stage of development.

The idea of confrontation between the values of Islam and the West is being developed by the Ukrainian mass media, without delving into the position of Muslims. Media framing of Islam in Ukraine is not balanced in terms of reproducing the complex and multi-level value paradigm of this religion. In Ukraine, the media offers a 'strange mixture of Islamophobia and Tatarophilia' (Yakubovych 2020), in which the causal contexts are regulated by today's security priorities, including relations with America and European countries. Ukrainian mass media is using the aggressive characteristics of Islam as markers for recognizing the concepts OWN and ALIEN, because at the current stage of development, Euro-Atlantic integration and the standard of living of Western countries determine priorities in many spheres of Ukraine's life. This can be construed as an attempt to replace an Islamic identity and culture with Western norms and values (Rane 2010, p. 11). Indeed, fear impedes the promotion of the values of Islam, and restricts opportunities for the development of business and economic ties. The Ukrainian experience confirms these considerations because here, in addition to the military confrontation in which Western countries provide huge assistance to Ukraine, the fight against Islamic terrorism unfolds in the field of communication and includes ideas, values and perceptions as well (Archetti 2017, p. 3).

This paper is written during the second six months of the war in Ukraine in 2022. It explores the discursive dynamics of the Islamic narrative in modern Ukraine, comparing the pre-war Islamic narrative the one developing as the war continues.

Religious narrative

Religious narratives are new subjects for linguistic inquiry. From the point of view of modern approaches, a religious narrative is a complex discursive phenomenon where political, religious and media features are fused to produce a hybrid construct (Farwell 2012). It is assumed that technologically efficient story-telling, frequent media representations and epistemic cohesion entail a suggestive effect of narratives. Owing to these factors, the efficiency of narrative suggestion does not necessarily depend on real-life events. For understandable reasons, this turns a narrative into a particularly convenient form of religious influence.

Much research has also focused on the compelling nature of Jihadist narratives, which succeed by drawing from stores of cultural and religious values, or by offering both material and spiritual incentives in which the material world is explained by religious ideas (Bindner 2018). Important for understanding the technology of creating a religious narrative is the contribution of Halverson et al., who in their book *The Main Narratives of Islamist Extremism* argue that despite differences in locally embedded narratives, there are master narratives that override these local narratives in importance. (Halverson, Goodall Jr. & Corman 2011) This finding pertains fundamentally to Islam and Muslims, where the master narrative is found to constitute elements derived from 'sacred texts' and history (Halverson, Goodall Jr. & Corman 2011, p. 396). It is also argued that master narratives are not static communicative phenomena, but are the result of constant reconsideration of individual and collective perception of religious experience.

Investigating the communicative dynamics of the Islamic narrative in Ukraine, it is important to emphasize that, despite the genre, thematic and content diversity of the texts involved in the creation of the narrative, these texts are rooted in a certain interpretive version of the Muslim sacred texts. Their language culture is based on the intention to form linear or non-linear orientations within the ethical paradigm of Islam. Therefore, even advertising or sales texts have a religious connotation.

The pragmatics behind the use of religious narratives lie in the fact that, along with political, cultural and other narratives, they help control public opinion, voters' behavior and people's emotional state. At the same time, religious narratives are specific because the intention of the doctrinal influence for all constructs

in religious communication is fundamental and its fusion with political components gives the influence a special power, which, in particular, can have very destructive consequences. This results in the strategic nature of religious narratives.

In the globalized world, these narratives become powerful weapons in hybrid wars. In general, the self-sufficiency of religious experience is destroyed, this experience becomes dependent on political views. In Ukraine, the high-speed modification of religious narratives carried out in propagandistic media flows has revealed new strategic aspects of their use. An example can be seen in the break between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and Russian Orthodoxy. This institutional self-determination became part of the political conflict between Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, each of the churches tries to 'appropriate' God and argues its strategy by referring to the sacred text and Christian commandments. The use of contemporary media amplifies the power and influence of the language used in religious narratives. The implications of this use of language are of particular relevance in this study

There are relatively few studies into the numerous modern forms of religious communication with their tendency to communicative dynamism. In the category of religious communication falls religious marketing and the related areas of religious advertising, religious naming, religious tourism, religious Internet-communication with its well-developed genre network and specific memes, tags, and so on. According to the global principle that organizes religious discourse, all these communicative constructs are marked for a certain religion and contribute, on the one hand, to renovating semiotic codes of religious communication and, on the other hand, to perpetuating epistemic elements of a religious narrative, which helps believers to recognize them easily and to decode them. Thus, religious banner advertisements in support of the idea of a national church displayed in the streets of large and small cities as part of Ukraine's 5th President Poroshenko election campaign produced real cognitive shock. On the one hand, these billboards destroyed the long-lasting tradition of separating church and state that had formed a language culture of intimacy of experience and embodiment of religious feelings. On the other hand, the high level of politicization of Ukrainians helped this idea take root in the worldview of Ukrainians as a manifestation of Ukrainian identity, where faith in God occupies an important place.

A religious narrative is a hypertext generated by a powerful set of communicative means used to objectify a religious picture of the world, a religious identity and a religious axiological paradigm. During the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the Islamic narrative has been drastically transformed in response to political changes and new formats of social solidarization; it has been objectified in understandable and simple messages sent by religious leaders to their communities.

Within the framework of this research into religious narrative, we also focus on religious advertising as a component of Islamic narrative, and, therefore, we also analyze its suggestive potential, in particular its capacity to present the acceptable and the unacceptable (Naseri & Tamam 2012, p. 69).

Methodology

The Islamic content used in this study drew on materials from institutional Islamic sites, Internet advertising, and popular Ukrainian periodicals. To explore the linguistic phenomenology of religious marketing, we chose Fairclough's methodological approach, the critical discourse model comprising three dimensions: 1) oral or written texts, 2) discursive practice, which extends to the production and interpretation of the text and 3) social practice (Fairclough 2003, pp. 454-456). The study also employs Van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach. Van Dijk regards narrative as a discourse of action, which is formed by intentions, goals (effects, results) and actors (Van Dijk 2008). Labov's model (Labov 1972, pp. 365-370) is based on the assumption that narrative is formed by the following constituent parts: Abstract, Orientation, Complicating action, Evaluation, Resolution, Coda. These approaches to narrative are used to present the analyses of the pre-war and the war-time narratives. The constituent parts offer a version of how an event

happened and what happened before; who participated in it, when and where; what actually happened and what was its result; what should be our assessment of this event and understanding of its meaning. Our analytical approach distinguishes between Islamic religious narratives used in times peace and those used recently, in the time of war in Ukraine.

Ontological Status of Islamic Narrative

Abstract The majority of Ukrainian Muslims are local people, whose ancestors have been living for centuries in the South and the East of Ukraine. As it is well-known, during the Soviet times, this identity, just like other religious identities, was almost completely blotted out with ideological dogmas that emphasized the atheist worldview. The collapse of the Soviet Union opened up certain opportunities for Islamic revival in Ukraine as an independent state. To that extent, the life of local Muslims reflected in the Islamic narrative, is always related to the concept of OWN, that is, of belonging.

Active institutional involvement of Ukrainian Muslims is objectified through the official recognition of their rights in independent Ukraine and, simultaneously, through the readiness for a dialog with other religious communities. The *Ukrainian Muslims' Charter* states: 'Ukrainian Muslims support and promote economic and cultural cooperation of Ukraine with countries of the Islamic world, and with Western countries, because they believe that European integration of Ukraine will improve protection of freedoms and rights of its religious minorities' ([Vlaskor 2016](#)). To some extent, Islamic identity was ensured by active economic and cultural cooperation with countries of moderate Islam, free access to religious services and goods, joint projects in religious education, and religious tourism. The narrative of foreign Muslims was presented fragmentarily, in accordance with the intentions mentioned above. These different narratives interacted without conflict. There was almost no information about another, militant, Islam in the Ukrainian mass media. Yet, this revival of the life of local Muslims, within the context of the nation of Ukraine was interrupted by the annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict in the Donbas region, its epicenter covering territories of Muslims' traditional residence. That is why Islam is being covered in Ukrainian media with an emphasis on political identity centered around the concept of Ukrainian independence.

The following two sections will present the analyses of the Islamic narrative during the peace period and during the time of war.

ISLAMIC NARRATIVE OF THE PEACE PERIOD

Orientation Islamic narrative was developed primarily by engaging new channels to spread religiously relevant information. These channels were mostly political and educational platforms including those targeted at children and young people, such as Islam.in.ua; Islam.ua; UMMA.in.ua; AMU.org.ua; channel Islamic Media Ukraine; channel Nashid Records; RAUM channel; Islamic Library; Children's development Center; Al-Irshad School; and Al-Maher School of Hafiz. The main marketing strategy was informational: it was employed by objectifying local intentions that were important in political, cultural and educational contexts. This adds persuasiveness to the texts since Ukrainians have little trust in their own institutions with responsibility for objective assessment. For example, a certification in standardization centers is a common procedure in the Halal industry, the text representation of their names, their location, and so on in advertisements aimed at Ukrainian mass media consumers may be perceived as an instance of the well-known suggestive technique of reference to authority.

Intentions of religious influence on the part of Ukrainian Muslims were objectified exclusively through messages that contain concepts of Moderate Islam and are in line with the Ukrainian interreligious dialog, freedom of religious beliefs and the Ukrainian spiritual tradition where Islamic motives play a prominent role. The identification function was actualized by the accentuated appeal to traditional Islamic values represented primarily in the Quranic text. Anti-Islamic messages were analyzed by providing examples

that do not match this principle. Thus, there were cases of inaccurate terminology, concept substitution, the phrase '*Ukrainians and Muslims*' that implies the division into *us* and o*thers* – as if Ukrainians cannot be Muslims or, vice versa, Muslims cannot be Ukrainians. The Islamic narrative was rooted in pacifist theology. Its semantic content had no epistemes of identity conflict.

Aims Compared to other religions, Islam in Ukraine, until recently, held a stronger position in the sphere of food products. It is necessary to mention that a religion, which makes its way through the use of commercial channels, daily food products and the beauty industry, is a brand new phenomenon for Ukraine. The focus of Christianity, and Orthodoxy in particular, on spirituality regard attention to the needs of the body and stomach as sinful. The market segment, religiously marked by Christian theology, of food, clothing, household items, hygiene, and so on traditionally remains vacant. This difference with Islam in the attitude to the needs of the body and the intersection of neoliberalism and capitalism in the economy of Ukraine make Islam more 'marketable' and consumer focused.

In addition, the separation of the church and the state in Ukraine did not create the conditions for a deep penetration of Christian ethics into the social activities of Ukrainians, and in particular into business activities, which are primarily regulated by laws. However, there is evidence that 'Islamic ethics is capable of coordinating and adjusting all social relations … the characteristics of ethics are education, self-discipline and ethical value-oriented coordination' (Liu 2011, p.19).

At the same time, this created good prospects for the latent strengthening of Islamic influence in Ukraine, the poorest country in Europe in terms of economic indicators, where control over hygienic quality of raw materials and food products exists in statements (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 2005). Unfortunately, eco-friendly manufacturing and ethical businesses are a desirable prospect rather than a Ukrainian reality. Besides, ordinary Ukrainians know almost nothing about the Islamic world. This situation obviously offers many benefits for cognitive marketing (See, for example, works by Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Edwards & von Winderfeldt 1986), which literally 'creates' its consumer through the transfer of knowledge about the product, teaches the consumer the 'correct' use of the product, forms standards and consumption culture.

Information taken for granted in a Muslim country is perceived differently in Ukraine. Market promotion of product offerings relevant to the values of Islam combines developmental information strategies with marketing objectives. Linguistic research into communicative features of Islamic marketing makes it possible to identify a large number of verbal suggestive means that ensure a high level of loyalty to the market offerings of this group, such as the identification of a product as *halal*, that is, lawful. In Ukraine, the market for *halal* food and products was flourishing. According to experts, 'special labelling is no longer just a sign of belonging to a specific religion, but a marker of a lifestyle, of a value system' (Negoda 2021). Minimalist advertising strategies usually emphasize verbalizers for the HALAL concept: *Halal*, translated from Arabic, means 'permissible', 'acceptable'. However, the term *halal* has long moved beyond the meat industry; it is not only about goods and services. *Halal* food is one of the incentives for Muslim identity and a counterbalance to the influence of Western culture and globalization (Armanios & Ergene 2018).

It can be assumed that the attractive media image of *halal* in Ukraine was partly formed as a reaction to the loss of the high quality of Ukrainian food. This is a kind of philosophy that regulates the idea of a healthy lifestyle and nutrition. Recently, *halal* has become an additional guarantee of quality. *Halal* products are being increasingly purchased not only by Muslims, but also by individuals who care about their health, as they begin to better understand this issue. Thus, the target audience is defined in a generalized manner: all people who care about their health. In cognitive terms, this philosophy expands the possibilities of a positive impact on human life.

Actors/consumers A study of the impact of *halal* labeling on consumer choice argues: 'The effects of religiosity on consumer behaviour seem to be even stronger in the case of Halal products', and 'another research demonstrates, however, that the issue of Halal products can potentially provoke ambiguous

attitudes among non-Muslims' ([Floren, Rasul, & Gani 2020](#)). But these results have not been confirmed in Ukraine. *Halal* products were presented in Ukraine as healthy, organic, useful without any reference to religion. There was even an emphasis on the lack of religious argumentation: '*There is no need to be a true believer to eat Halal meat*', '*not only for believers*' ([Negoda 2021](#)). At the same time, generalizations in favor of the perfect Islamic world were also expressed in mass media texts: 'if you see a package marked Halal, it means that the product at least does not contain chemicals, GMO, carcinogens, nitrates, harmful dyes that are strictly prohibited. This is an organic product since Islamic norms absolutely match modern environmental requirements' ([Negoda 2021](#)). At the explicit level, these text representations verbalize the semantic relation of a binary opposition *good* vs *evil*, which facilitates the secular identification of meanings on the emotive 'positive – negative' scale. In addition, at the implicit level this approach distinguishes the communicative tactic of sacral symbolization in the background of religious values peculiar to manufactured goods and their consumption typical of the Islamic world and its system of ethical values ([Adibah 2013](#)).

According to Naseri, the significant difference between marketing in Islamic countries and marketing in secular countries is the influence of Shari'a, the Islamic comprehensive code of conduct, that governs all Muslims, in all areas of life, including marketing and commerce ([Naseri & Tamam 2012](#), p. 69). Although it is recognized that there is a view that activities related to commercial purchases and economic behavior should be studied using theory derived from Islamic intellectual history and ethics, ([Al-Daghistani 2016](#), p. 402), these 'ethical principles' were popularized in a simplified cognitive version by the pre-war Ukrainian mass media. At the same time, the promotion strategy was provided by the tactics of positive presentation. These tactics activate implicit positivity in perception processes, which is realized here by using only such words and references to sources that encourage a positive interpretation of information, while in fact there is a lack of evaluative judgments about the objects of analysis. As an example, Paventko states: example: '*The organization and conduct of business is based on ethical principles that focus not on profitability and the amount of risk, but more on the reputation and moral image of companies and the moral qualities of their management*' ([Payentko 2022](#)).

This cognitive style has been used to demonstrate business principles, relationships between producers of products and services, product characteristics, Islamic financing of international projects, and so on ([Payentko 2022](#)). In this approach, the means of persuasion are based on suggestion, when the objects of media influence propose ideas as the only appropriate ones. Incidentally, we should note that in economic content, Ukrainian media tend to choose a 'downgrade' strategy from the tactics of 'minus' analysis, which implicitly activates negative assessments, calls for denunciation, accusations, and so on. Appeals to Christian morality within the framework of this rhetoric are not used in mass media, with the exception of cases when they represent the last emotional argument or hope for a miracle. As a result, the objective markers of belonging to one's own (Christian) and the others' (Islamic) world are reinforced by negative/positive connotations that promote tolerance of others.

Therefore, in marketing communication, there is no open coexistence of religious concepts in information space, and the discourse of tolerance to Islam in a non-Islamic country is ensured without conflict, by using cognitive phenomena that contribute to the process of changing perceptions. In the world of the non-Muslims to whom this marketing communication is addressed, positive evaluations of objects relevant for Islam are constructed. The culture of *halal* consumption occupies a special place here. As noted above, the significance of *halal* for Muslims cannot be overemphasized. However, for a Christian country, when daily consumption products are isomorphs of a religious concept, this is a promising innovation. Among such product offerings in Ukraine are the meat of birds and animals, their products, oils, sweets, hard rennet cheeses, as well as medicines, body care products, and so on. These are accompanied by the trademarks of certified manufacturers, presented on the website of the certification center. (Unfortunately, it is necessary to mention here that there are also cases of unauthorized use of *halal* markers.)

Communicative strategies to represent *halal* goods use tactics such as an emphasis on the benefits arising from certification and are implemented through reference to values such as recognition, cooperation and independence. Examples include for recognition: 'Our organization is accredited by JAKIM (Malaysia) and EIAC (UAE), so our certificate *is recognized worldwide*' (emphasis added); for cooperation: 'Our Halal certified manufacturers *successfully export* their products to countries *around the world*' (emphasis added); for independence: 'Assessments performed by the specialists of the Halal Certification Center are *always objective*' (emphasis added).

The high quality of *halal* products sold or even manufactured in Ukraine is always guaranteed by Islamic, rather than secular Ukrainian, institutions, as the following statement from the Halal Certification Center attests.

> 'Halal Certification Center is the only official certification body in Ukraine, which is supported and controlled by the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Ukraine (DUMU). Halal Certification Center is a recognized certification center of the global Halal industry, the high level of which has been confirmed by the world-renowned accreditation bodies JAKIM, EIAC and MUIS. The logo of the Halal Certification Center has become the business card of Ukrainian manufacturers on the world market, demonstrating not only the compliance of their products with "Halal" requirements, but also their high quality' (**Halal Certification Center, n.d.**).

Such 'laudatory verbal description' in the Ukrainian context aims at convincing, since Ukrainians have little faith in their own institutions authorized to make objective assessments. This adds persuasiveness to the texts. If certification in standardization centers is a common procedure in *halal* industry, the text representation of their names, their location, and so on. in advertisements created for Ukrainian mass media consumers may be viewed as the well-known suggestive technique of reference to authority.

Further, when advertising *halal* products, Ukrainian media also used the positive forecasting tactic: the Islamic narrative was disseminated by quoting the high rate of economic development, with reference to the considerable investments in economies of various countries, by the steady increase in export production of *halal* goods, including meat and poultry, honey, seafood, and so on. This cognitive style served the image strategies of the Islamic world and contributed implicitly to its attractiveness. Media emphasized that Ukrainian export of poultry to Muslim countries was on the rise, and that technologically innovative construction of factories to process and produce *halal* meat products in Ukraine was funded by Muslim countries.

Advertising texts that reported these processes in Ukrainian media contained a large number of axiological verbalizers that traditionally described the quality of *halal* goods: *the highest standards of sanitary norms, quality assurance, grown in non-polluted regions, does not contain harmful ingredients, antibiotics, hormones of growth and is safe and of high quality* (Negoda 2021). The news rhetoric of institutional sites is formed by phrases that confirm the conformity of the product to Muslim traditions: *slaughter of a special type*, *absence of any blood in meat*. The exclusivity of the goods proposal was objectified with the frequent use of verbal markers of novelty or 'foreignness': *newly built factory*, *modern workshop of boning, packing, cooling, a Turkish line of vacuuming and modern refrigerators*. The advertisements also employ slogans, for example, '*Consume Halal*'. Along with mouth-watering photos of their products, specialized Internet stores contain numerous favorable customer reviews (see for example Ukr Halal (Ukr-Halal) n.d.).

A prominent place in the Islamic narrative in Ukraine was taken by *halal* cosmetics whose marketing texts contain mainly stylistic properties mentioned above. Their informative intention is to objectify the most important features of *halal* beauty industry that distinguished it from other products offered in the market. The informing strategy correlates first of all with the media tactic of emphasizing advantages which is based on numerous verbalizers of norms peculiar to Islamic business ethic, as the following example shows: '*does not contain pork or its components, narcotic, hormonal, psychotropic substances, is made of mostly*

natural raw material, there are peculiar requirements to the personnel, processing, transporting, packing, Halal cosmetics is a combination of concern for nature, animals and humans, etc.' ([Nadobenko 2019](#)). The texts combine factual arguments with emotional ones. An attractive emotional correlation makes it possible to latently strengthen the objectification of Islamic values in the non-Muslim worldview.

One of the most promising branches of Ukraine's marketing development was tourism. The visa-free regime introduced for citizens of Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Kuwait, Oman and some other Muslim countries opened up Ukraine for many Muslim tourists. This made numerous Kyiv hoteliers and restaurateurs add new services and dishes, translate menus into Arabic, renovate interiors according to Muslim tourists' tastes. Good prospects for the development of religious tourism in the pre-war period provided Ukrainians with new jobs and legal, competitive salaries.

Thus, in the pre-war period, the Islamic narrative was formed primarily by these marketing messages. It did not belong to the strategic priorities. The influence of negative stereotypes such as 'Islam is an aggressive religion, the Qur'an calls Muslims to violence' and 'Christianity and Islam are irreconcilable religions' was neutralized in Ukraine with the help of media activity of Islamic institutions, openness of Ukrainian society to foreign Islamic business, religious tourism, a large number of Muslim students, business growth, international partnership with representatives of moderate Islamic countries. At the same time, on the level of communicative specificity, this process of strengthening positions was facilitated by the fact that a high level of loyalty to the Islamic segment was ensured by the active use of suggestive language in the information interaction with recipients.

The linguistic analysis reveals that the cognitive style of these mass media materials is rooted in the system of faith- and value-based reference points peculiar to the ideological code of the Islamic world. Its substitutes and first of all sensory perceptions are reinforced on the level of everyday needs and merge with psychologically comfortable emotions. This contributed to the fact that process of introducing Ukrainians to Islam took place not only at the mental level, but also at the everyday level, with the objectivation of various forms of sensory experience and was accompanied by positive emotions. Taking into account the time perspective, the combination of these factors created a solid basis for the conflict-free presence of the Islamic values in Ukraine, maintaining their high standards and forming an attractive image of Islam in a non-Islamic country.

Complications of the action The war with Russia has completely changed the format of meaningful principles of the Islamic narrative in Ukraine. To justify mobilization and the use of force abroad during the military invasion of Ukraine, Russia employs the narrative of fighting fascism. Mobilization of Muslims from Dagestan, Tatarstan, the North Caucasus and other Muslim regions of Russia, participation of Chechen armed groups in the violent confrontation ([Lelich 2022](#)), the aggressive media campaign with overt intimidation of Ukrainians by Kadyrov's soldiers ([Pislya povidomlennya pro zagybel 'kadyrivtsiv' na Hersonschyni Kadyrov zagovoryv pro dgyhad 2022](#)), the presence of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps in the captured territories ([Schmitt, Gibbons-Neff & Ismay 2022](#)) and propaganda of militant Islam have forced Ukrainian Muslims to set their priorities in the new circumstances.

ISLAMIC NARRATIVE DURING THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA

Resolution Military units of Ukrainian Muslims have become part of the Ukrainian army. According to the religious leader of Ukrainian Muslims, the ex-mufti of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Ukraine 'Umma' Sheikh Said Ismagilov, who had to leave his native Donetsk with his family after being included in the 'kill lists': 'for Muslims as believers, faith is, of course, more important, but love for their country, their people, and a happy future not only does not contradict faith, but is a derivative of faith. If you believe in God, if you believe in high moral values – you must wish prosperity to your country and your people, your

neighbors, your city, all your loved ones, your friends and all people in general! That is why in Islam our love for the Motherland is like a continuation of our religious faith' ([Sheikh Said Ismagilov 2022](#)).

All institutions of Ukrainian Muslims in the media have reaffirmed their solidarity with fighters against the large-scale Russian invasion on Ukraine and called for unity in order to give a consolidated rebuff to the Russian aggressor. As part of this approach, the leaders of Ukrainian Muslims and the leaders of the Muslim diaspora in Europe clearly start to distinguish between peace-loving and militant Islam. The events in Ukraine have shown that the doctrinal conflict within Islam allows politicians to play on the threat of Islamic extremism in multi-confessional or predominantly Christian countries. In modern political marketing, Islamic narrative is used as a convenient tool of influence in national contexts that are distant from the Islamic world.

So, to garner public support, Russia uses an old narrative proven in World War II: 'Russia is liberating the world from fascism'. The conflict escalating, the anti-fascist narrative is getting reinforced by the 'This war is a *jihad* for Muslims around the world' narrative. In Russian mass media, the anti-fascist narrative is used primarily for the general mobilization of the population to participate in the war. At the same time, the call for *jihad* is used in the countries of the Islamic world to seek political and financial partnerships, recruit mercenaries and support the international image of Russia as a country that respects religious feelings of Muslims. Unlike the Ukrainian media, Russian propaganda media are well embedded in the information space of the Islamic world. As a result, the political image of the war is formed as an event of systemic confrontation between the value paradigms of Islam and the collective West. This representation of the war turns the religious component into the priority, and the subjectivity of Ukraine in deciding the fate of its own state is generally weakened. The position of Ukrainian Muslims, who stand up to defend their territory, is shared by Ukrainians as representatives of Christian denominations and is sanctified by the text of the Qur'an as legitimate, since its purpose is defense. At the same time, its retransmission in the Islamic world is complicated by the asymmetry of efforts Russia and Ukraine make in their foreign policy image. Russian Muslims, whose hero in media representations is primarily R. Kadyrov, are portrayed as those who trust their religious leaders and are aware of the goals of the war. However, the leader of Ukrainian Muslims, Ismagilov, believes that Russian news reports on events at the frontline emphasize religiosity solely to mobilize foreign mercenaries who are hesitant about whether participation in this war is ethical from the point of view of Islam. ([Lelich 2022](#))

In particular, Muslims – Ukrainian Muslims and Russian Muslims – are currently fighting on opposite sides, and this feeds both political and religious narratives. The stance of local Muslims is a part of the national-patriotic narrative. Muslims of Ukraine are fighting to live in a tolerant country where they can safely practice their religion, publish Islamic literature, open Islamic centers and be a full-fledged part of a free society. This stance stems from the natural desire of people to protect their families and homes from the aggressor.

Evaluation During the war, the main influential actors in the information space are religious leaders. Sheikh Said Ismagilov has lent his voice to this worldview. He offered Ukrainian Muslims his understanding of the goals as well as the moral and ethical value of Muslim participation in military actions. For Russian and foreign Muslims, participation in military action is a way to give meaning to their own lives, for which no worthy goals have been found at home. The situation in Ukraine confirms that strategic narratives can mobilize and influence public support for military missions ([Freedman 2006](#); [Ringsmose & Børgesen 2011](#)). But as the conflict is continuing, the time for final conclusions has not yet come. In this study, we are trying to close this gap by analyzing strategic narratives presented in the Ukrainian mass media and paying special attention to the fact that the dominant narrative and balanced public support are relevant.

LOCAL MUSLIMS AND THE NATIONAL-PATRIOTIC NARRATIVE

It should be noted that the strength of Ismagilov's narrative stance and at the same time the lack of adaptation to the practice of Ukrainian media have been used by other active media actors for their image-building purposes in their struggle for influence over the electorate during the war with Russia. That is why its media distribution and influential functions have been strengthened by the rhetorical activities of Ukrainian radicals and ideologues of militant Orthodoxy. It is noteworthy that before the Russian invasion, Ukrainian society as a whole was tolerant of a wide range of opinions and radicalism did not have much support, although it was represented in diverse political standpoints.

The success of the radical narrative lies in its resonating with the idea of Ukraine's independence, which is seen primarily as a way out of Russia's political, economic and religious protectorate. Within this approach, Ukrainians and Russians oppose each other. The interests of national and religious minorities, and in general other factors of the war, are absorbed by the ethnic confrontation, which has a strong foothold in Ukrainian history. This provides the narrative with a high capacity for self-reproduction.

In communicative manifestations of the Islamic narrative, this convergence is often objectified as a practice of public humiliation of the enemy's religious feelings for propaganda purposes. For example, Ukrainian soldiers threatened Muslim opponents that they would wrap their corpses in pig skins so that their enemies would not enter paradise after death. For the same purpose, it was claimed that Ukrainian soldiers would also grease bullets with lard and use them in battles with Muslim invaders. Thus, Ukrainians have shown complete disrespect for those Muslims who support Russia's invasion on Ukraine. The interpretation frame is decoded by activating the recipient's background knowledge. The use of the word 'lard' [pig fat], which is one of the most famous ethno-markers of Ukrainian national cuisine, helps us to understand the implicit episteme of Ukrainian unity in this struggle. Another interpretive frame is deciphered as a curse from Ukrainians, which would block the soldiers' way to paradise even after death, because they would be defiled with pork.

It is clear that this display of anger is unacceptable to the civilized world and may seriously damage Ukraine's political image. For this reason, a presidential adviser has addressed Ukrainians on social networks and asked them to avoid insulting Muslims in this way, to refrain from viewing all Muslims as enemies and to distinguish between those who fight on the side of Russia (Kadyrovites) and other Muslims who help Ukrainians in every possible way. The response of Ukrainians to this call has been a propaganda expression that draws on the phraseological resource of the Ukrainian and Russian languages, deprived of any religious contexts: the image of a can with the inscription 'Kadyrovtsi in their own juice' appeared on social networks. The literal meaning of the phrase 'in their own juice' corresponds to the fact that this method of preserving the product does not involve the addition of spices or liquid. Conventionally speaking, 'juice' becomes a liquid for preservation; in this liquid, life processes stop. The use of the expression found as a label on canned food is a metaphor for the level of consciousness of enemies, a metaphor that implies narrow-mindedness of Kadyrov's soldiers, because the Ukrainian idiom 'in its own juice' means 'being stuck within one's own life/interests/work, working/living without communicating with others' (Bilonozhenko et al. 1993, pp. 51-52). It should be noted that the Ukrainian phrase[1] 'in its own juice' has a negative connotation, as it also means the loss of 'clear, vivid characteristics' (Matuzkova & Dibrova 2019, p. 203).

Muslims fighting on Ukraine's side say the Ukrainian war is a continuation of the Second Chechen War (2009). They point out that the Chechens are unable to continue the struggle in Ichkeria, so they will fight with Russia wherever possible, Ukraine being one of the locations. It is worth noting that Sheikh Mansour's battalion is manned not only by Chechens but also by fighters from other Caucasian nations.

---

1   The English expression, "to stew in one of own juice", which means "being left to suffer the consequences of one's own [misguided] actions alone" (Brewer's 1999); is certainly different from that of the Ukrainian idiom.

Other influential Muslin clerics, such as Abu Umar Sasitlinsky, believe that the participation of Muslims in the war on the side of Russia is a violation of the Islamic law because Islam protects the unjustly humiliated. Sheikh Umar Sasitlinsky emphasized that there is no Islamic interest in this war, it is a conflict between Christian countries (Sasitlinsky 2022a, 2022b).

Ukrainians believe that this is their liberation war against the Russian aggressor. This war has its own communicative parameters. The rhetoric of the euphemization strategy used by Russian media is opposed to Ukraine's strategy of controlling the interpretation of information. Ukrainian news messages do not report of *Russia's special operation in Ukraine*, they talk about *Russia's full-scale aggression, destruction, terrorism;* neither do media speak of *Russian warriors* but rather *Russian aggressors.* One can hardly find in Ukrainian media the words *dismissal, the overthrow of the ruling junta, Bandera regime.* Instead, there are the lexemes such as *attack, bloodshed*, *support of Ukraine.* In addition, *denazification* and *demilitarization* (as targets of Russian aggression) are concepts not used by the Ukrainian media.

Solidarity with the Ukrainian people is expressed with verbs that denote positive procedurality and empathic subjectivity: *to help, protect, provide, cooperate, unite, create (initiative groups), show the best human qualities, not stand aside.* This vocabulary lies at the core of the mobilizing potential in Ukrainian Muslim texts.

In addition, verbalizers of ideological concepts are represented by 'protection of Muslims' rights', '*freedom*', '*struggle*', '*volunteers*', '*interreligious dialog*'. These words help to objectify the seme 'Ukrainian Muslims' political loyalty' in numerous local media contexts. As a result, these media representations depict the religious identity of Ukrainian Muslims as secularized and partially absorbed by their political identity. Nevertheless, in order to stress initiatives put forward by Ukrainian Muslims, nouns such as *protection, evacuation, coordination, organization, solidarity, unity, integrity, peace* intensify positivity. Possessive pronouns are used primarily to differentiate like-minded people from others, to identify a group and to express solidarity: '*Our mosques and Islamic cultural centers are ready to become points of humanitarian aid*'.

THE NARRATIVE OF PRO-RUSSIAN MUSLIM PARTICIPANTS

Intentions The role and features of media support during military conflicts has been explored by Dimitriu who claims that, as the conflict deepens, perception of events by the local population and the international community gains significance. This explains the unique influence of dominant strategic narratives on the course of events and, ultimately, on a combatant's victory or defeat (Dimitriu 2012). Muslim participants' motivation in the war on the side of Russia (that is, Kadyrov's army and others) is rooted in Russia's strategic narrative. The active practice of using suggestion by the Russian media and the strong position of the concept of *victory over fascism* in the Russian picture of the world ensured support of the local population for the military invasion of Ukraine.

The narrative replicates itself through the mythology of unity among all peoples, including Muslims, in the struggle against fascism. Within this framework, the communicative specificity is manifested in the propaganda strategy of labeling, semantically relevant to the crimes against humanity attributed to the Ukrainian regime and the army. The influence of the Russian strategic narrative in international and domestic mass media is determined by the label 'fascists' used refer to Ukrainians. The concept of fascism is easily deciphered all over the world as a crime against humanity, it has a moral and mobilizing potential, it helps find sympathizers of various 'anti-fascist initiatives', without delving into the essence of the problem, except at the expense of emotional arguments. Therefore, in Russian propaganda news and other official reports, Ukrainian soldiers are depicted as neo-fascists, killers, 'Nazis' (from nationalists), radicals, who use civilians as human shields, and the Ukrainian government is called a 'fascist junta'.

At the same time, the concept Nationalism has been actively used in media to influence the Russian audience. Brought up within the Soviet system of values, people of the older generation are especially

sensitive to this kind of influence. Within the framework of the Soviet mythology, the movement of Ukrainian nationalists against the Soviet regime led by Stepan Bandera (1909-1959), an ideologist of Ukrainian radical nationalism, was fascist. Bandera's followers have entered the history of Ukrainian nationalism as 'Banderivtsy'. Even now, the attitude of Ukrainians to this historical character is ambiguous: from condemnation to cult. The critical discourse is based on the historical facts of massacres of Jews, Poles, Russians and Ukrainians by the participants in the movement in order to cleanse Ukraine of all kinds of enemies. From this perspective, Bandera is a tragic figure, he is a Ukrainian anti-hero.

The followers of the modern Bandera ideology, in their turn, define Bandera as the archetype of the father for the Ukrainian political nation that owes him its birth, with certain sacrifices and mistakes admitted. For them, Bandera is a national hero, a symbol of the liberation movement. 'Bandera is our father, and Ukraine is our mother' are the words from a Ukrainian popular song and the slogan of numerous flash mobs in support for political independence of Ukraine.

Although a scholarly biography of Bandera has not been written in Ukraine yet, since many historical materials related to the Ukrainian nationalist movement of the 1940s and 1950s still remain classified, this does not prevent Ukrainian politicians from creating Bandera's heroic mythology (Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security 2022). Russian politicians, on the other hand, use this character as a symbol of 'betrayal of their people, homeland, the idea of liberation from Bolshevism,' and so on (ARI 2014; Banderovtsy: fakty i mify n.d.; Banderovtsy. Mify i fakty 2014; Kiknadze 2022). Russian media attach the label 'Banderovtsy' to all contemporary Ukrainian defenders. Kadyrov's propaganda also features references to these concepts as a motivational argument in favor of Muslim participation in the war and the justification of the denazification of Ukraine.

At the same time, the motivational components of Russia's strategic narrative are manipulatively disguised with religious concepts. So, Mufti Talgat Tajuddin, who is the Supreme Mufti of Russia and the head of the Central Spiritual Administration of Russia (Verhovnyy Muftiy PF v Kurban-Bayran podderzhal voynu s Ukrainoy: u soseda parazity, polchischa neonatsistov, nam spokoyno zhit nevozmozhno 2022), Mufti of Chechnya Salah Mezhiev (Muftyi ChR obyasnil deystviya v Ukraine s tochki zrenya religii 2022), Mufti of Moscow Albir Krganov and others say that the war in Ukraine is a blessing for Muslims and for those who will die in this war because they will 'certainly become *shahids*' (those who die in the way of Allah). They have been supported by other Islamic leaders loyal to the government of the Russian Federation. Viewed from this perspective, the participation of local Ukrainian Muslims in the war against Russia, which aims to liberate Ukraine from the Nazis, is *haram*. The same position, embodied in the rhetoric of threats, intimidation and religious intolerance, is exhibited by Kadyrov (Pislya povidomlennya pro zagybel 'kadyrivtsiv' na Hersonschyni Kadyrov zagovoryv pro dgyhad 2022). For the Islamic world, then the war in Ukraine is primarily a war against the collective West. This is a trigger that is well understood in Muslim countries.

Thus, in the context of Ukrainian events and the associated narratives, the Islamic values have been radically transformed and the interpretative frames of the concepts of *shahid* and *haram*, and *jihad* have been revised, to the point where they can be seen as a brand (Archetti 2010). Their representation in the Russian mass media and support by foreign proponents of the war have transformed the Islamic narrative into a part of Ukraine's conflict discourse. The main features of this narrative fit the description of the general trend identified by Jackson (2014) where he argues that the central terms, assumptions, labels, narratives and genealogical roots of the language and knowledge of 'Islamic terrorism' are unhelpful, not least because they are highly politicized, intellectually contestable, damaging to community relations and practically counter-productive.

THE THIRD POSITION OR CONSENSUS FORMULA

Finally, there is a third approach which we believe is a part of the religious narrative. Here, the participation of Muslims in wars between Christians is *haram*, a religious sin, a source of shame, and a betrayal of Islam. For this reason, Muslims need to find various ways not to participate in the war in Ukraine. Muslims can sympathize with one of the parties to the conflict, be critical of its causes and goals, but should not take part because it is not a war for the Islamic world. Within this approach, almost all the questions that structure the narrative have the same answer: 'Who is the hero in this fight?' 'Christians'; 'Who opposes the hero?' 'Christians'; 'Who helps the hero, who are these ordinary observers of this confrontation?' 'Christians'; 'What does victory look like?' 'Like the victory of some Christians over others'. Hence, the third approach is built on referring to oneself and others by using religious labels.

Coda: What does it all mean?

Thus, the semantic components of the Islamic narrative in Ukraine, which are relevant to the Russian invasion, leave every Muslim the right to choose a certain worldview, emotional attitude and behavioral response to this event. In this case, all alternatives are based on emotional considerations: the first and the second options (Ukrainian Muslims and their allies against Russian Muslims and their followers) are antagonistic, whereas the third option is an attempt to choose the least of the evils.

It should also be noted that the Islamic narrative in Ukraine is heterogeneous. The ontological status of its main components is changing dynamically. Prior to the war with Russia, the Islamic narrative had not been considered a high-priority security threat in Ukraine, and now it is one of the most important strategic factors. The content specificity of the Ukrainian version of Islam lies in its vivid convergence with Ukrainian politics since the latter partially absorbs and secularizes religion. At the same time, the experience gained by Muslim communities in the critical conditions of contemporary Ukraine is vital in the global context because it lays the basis for the conscious worldview choice in favor of a secular multi-religious state where Muslim citizens enjoy all the rights granted to Ukrainian citizens and have all the legal opportunities for self-actualization, including religious values. Analysis of the communicative specificity of the Islamic narrative in Ukraine confirms this observation. In general, the communicative specificity of the Islamic narrative is now determined by military rhetoric and conflict strategies. These are able to completely destroy the positive image of Islam, which until recently ensured the successful implementation of Islamic values in a predominantly Christian country. At the same time, and just as importantly, the aggressive Islamic narrative and the conflicting Christian narrative complement each other.

Conclusions

Until recently, up to February 24, 2022, the day when the war broke out in Ukraine, Ukraine's Islamic narrative had been semantically monolithic, which resulted from the fact that almost all text representations resonated with the principles of Islamic ethics. Within this tendency, attention was paid to the cognitive mechanisms aimed at positioning Islamic values in a non-Islamic state. Most institutional resources made use of educational and commenting tactics to inform their communication strategy.

Regardless of what was being promoted (information products, goods), the notion of Islam was primarily represented with the concept *halal*. *Halal*, in its turn, was explained with the help of several synonymous notions: *natural, organic, healthy, safe*. In the Ukrainian picture of the world, they all contain a positive connotation and have no semantic relations with religious values. But in terms of persuasive power, this approach to presenting information was quite promising for the covert creation of the desired effects. Yet, this textual representation was grounded on the resonance between explicit and implicit aspects of a text where the explicated text is used as a container to promote stimuli, which are, in this case, Islamic values.

In order to build a positive image for Islam, informational and advertising representations were consistently filled with topics of ethical priorities, of high quality, safety, positivity, usefulness, and so on, and were disseminated through the tactic of emphasizing advantages. The main technique to secure their suggestive effect was the intense use of terms to counter any negative connotations, employed in positive self-presentations of Islam. The semantic code of these messages was interpreted with the help of the tactic that displays the advantages of Islamic values and evokes positive emotions. The rhetorical expression of image-making messages was carried out by using many means of verbal suggestion. This guaranteed a great impact on consumers of information and the corresponding attractive image effects.

The Islamic content in texts of institutional sites and Ukrainian media was marked for tolerance. It complied with the values of Moderate Islam and, simultaneously, was convergent with social priorities of Ukrainians. This correlated with Ukraine's policy of open interreligious dialog aimed at establishing close relations with Muslim countries.

However, the war has radically changed the Ukrainian media space, including the Islamic narrative. Under the new circumstances, this narrative has been absorbed by politics, losing its positive developmental and economic potential. The pro-Ukrainian Muslim narrative was objectified primarily by various forms of institutional solidarity with the struggle against the Russian aggressor. For security reasons, the heroically portrayed characters are absent from the media representations of this narrative. Instead, in the Russian media the antagonistic tendency is based on cognitive mechanisms aimed at intimidating Ukrainians and creating an image of a Muslim aggressor who is invincible, mentally alien and indifferent to the values of Ukrainian society, and who has his own religious goals in this war. This aggressor is mythologized in the person of Ramzan Kadyrov and his supporters who 'save the world from fascism and Ukrainian nationalism'.

Thus, instead of market competition, we have a battle of ideologies. A successful business narrative was first rooted in a soft power strategy, then turned into a strategic narrative, and has eventually become a weaponized narrative, which 'specifically attacks our identities, that define the differences between 'us' and 'them' worth fighting for. … History shows battles of fundamental narratives can lead to hundred-year wars' (Garreau 2017, p. 10-12).

References

Adibah Binti Abdul Rahim. 2013, 'Understanding Islamic ethics and its significance on the character building', *International Journal of Social Science and Humanity*, vol. 3, no. 6, pp. 508-513. https://doi.org/10.7763/IJSSH.2013.V3.293

Al-Daghistani, S. 2016, 'Semiotics of Islamic Law, Maṣlaḥa, and Islamic economic thought', *International Journal for the Semiotics of Law,* vol. 29, pp. 389-404. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-016-9457-x

Archetti, C. 2010, 'Terrorism, communication and the war of ideas: Al-Qaida's strategic narrative as a brand', Annual Meeting of the International Communication Association, Suntec Singapore International Convention & Exhibition Centre, Singapore. https://www.academia.edu/221753

Archetti, C. 2017, 'Narrative wars: Understanding terrorism in the era of global interconnectedness', In Miskimmon, A., O'Loughlin, B. & Roselle, L. (eds.), *Forging the World: Strategic Narratives and International Relations*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, pp. 218-245. https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.6504652

ARI (Russian Information Agency), 2014, Kto takie banderovtsy I za chto oni boryutsya. https://ari.ru/ari/2014/01/1328/kto-takie-banderovcy-i-za-chto-oni-boryutsya

Armanios, F. & Ergene, B. 2018, *Halal Food: A History*, Oxford University Press, New York.

Banderovtsy: fakty i mify n.d., *Network Journal Nauka. Obŝestvo. Oborona*. Retrieved 2022-11-29. https://www.noo-journal.ru/banderovcy/

Banderovtsy. Mify i fakty. 2014, *LiveJournal*. 11. 03. https://ev8e.livejournal.com/2286.html

Bilonozhenko, V. M., Hnatjuk, I. S., Djatchuk, V. V., Nerovnja, N. M. & Fedorenko, T. O. 1993, *Slovnyk frazeolohichnyi ukrainskoi movy*, Naukova Dumka, Kyiv, Ukraine. http://kropivnitsky.maup.com.ua/assets/files/slov557.pdf

Bindner, L. 2018, 'Jihadists' grievance narratives against France', ICCT Policy Brief, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 8, no. 7 (2018). https://doi.org/10.19165/2018.2.01

Brewer, E. C. & Room, A. 1999, Brewer's dictionary of phrase & fable, rev 16th edn, HarperCollins, New York.

Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security, 2022, 'Volodymyr Vjatrovych: Rosiya dyskredytue ne tilky Banderu, ale j ves ukrainskyj vyzvolnyj ruh', *Istorychna Pravda*. https://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2022/01/5/160744/

Davie, G. 2006, 'Religion in Europe in the 21st century: The factors to take into account', *European Journal of Sociology*, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 271-296. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975606000099

Dimitriu, G. R. 2012, 'Winning the story war: Strategic communication and the conflict in Afghanistan', *Public Relations Review,* vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 195–207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2011.11.011

Edwards, W. & von Winterfeldt, D. 1986, *Decision Analysis and Behavioral Research*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Fairclough, N. 2003, *Textual Analysis for Social Research*, Routledge, New York.

Farwell, J. P. 2012, *Persuasion and Power: The Art of Strategic Communication*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC.

Floren, J., Rasul, T. & Gani, A. 2020, 'Islamic marketing and consumer behaviour: A systematic literature review', *Journal of Islamic Marketing*, vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 1557-1578. https://doi.org/10.1108/JIMA-05-2019-0100

Freedman, L. 2006, *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*, Routledge, London.

Garreau, J. 2017, 'Attacking who we are as humans', In Allenby, B. & Garreau, J. (eds.), *Weaponized Narrative: The New Battlespace*, Center on the Future of War, Washington, DC. pp.10-13. https://weaponizednarrative.asu.edu/file/272/download?token=kV886rEe

Halal Certification Center n.d., *Benefits*. Retrieved 2022-11-20. https://halal.ua/#premium

Halverson, J. R., Goodall Jr., H. L. & Corman, S.R. 2011, *Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-11723-5

Jackson, R. 2014, 'Constructing enemies: "Islamic terrorism" in political and academic discourse', *Government and Opposition: An International Journal of Comparative Politics*, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 394-426. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x

Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. 1979, 'Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk', *Econometrica*, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 263-292. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185

Kiknadze, V. G. 2022, 'Ukrainskij natsyonalizm: ot istokov do denatsyfikatsii v hode spetsialnoj voennoj operatsii Rossijskoj armii', *Network Journal Nauka. Obŝestvo. Oborona*, vol. 10, no. 3, p. 17. https://www.noo-journal.ru/nauka-obsestvo-oborona/2022-3-32/article-0324/

Labov, W. 1972, 'The transformation of experience in narrative syntax', In *Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black English Vernacular*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA, pp. 354-396.

Lelic, M. 2022, 'Ismagilov v intervju RBK-Ukraine. U musulmanskomu sviti kadyrovtsiv nazyvayut "tik-tok batalyonamy"', *RBC-Ukraine*. 18.04.2022. https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/said-ismagilov-musulmanskom-mire-kadyrovtsev-1650222431.html

Liu, Y. 2011, 'The coordination function of Islamic ethics in transforming Islamic societies', *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)*, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 17-36. https://doi.org/10.1080/19370679.2011.12023183

Matuzkova, O. & Dibrova, I. 2019, 'Food code of culture in English, Ukrainian and Greek phraseology', *Zapysky z romano–hermans'koyi filolohiyi*, vol. 2, no. 43, pp. 189-208. https://doi.org/10.18524/2307-4604.2019.2(43).186245

Muftyi ChR obyasnil deystviya v Ukraine s tochki zreniya religii, 2022, *Chechnya Today*, https://chechnyatoday.com/news/353369

Nadobenko, K. 2019, *COSMOHIT*. 'Kosmetyka halal – etichnyj napryamok u biuti-industrii' (Halal Cosmetics is the ethical direction of beauty industry) / 9.11.2019 https://ua.cosmohit.ua/article/1171

Naseri, A. & Tamam, E. 2012, 'Impact of Islamic religious symbol in producing favorable attitude toward advertisement', *The Public Administration and Social Policies Review*, vol. 1, no. 8. https://revad.uvvg.ro/files/nr8/7.%20Naseri.pdf

Negoda, T. 2022, 'Znak zdorovya; pro scho govoryt markuvannya na produktah', *Ukr–Inform*, viewed 2022-12-21. https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-economy/3213713-znak-zdorova-pro-so-govorit-markuvanna-na-produktah.html?fbclid=IwAR1fK1X8x0zqcOA35JfF59zIrsXAuDaV50blWdLSGhMTvipoL7yUST8vY_M

Payentko, T. 2022, 'Orientatcya na shid', *Agrotimes*. https://agrotimes.ua/article/oriyentacziya-na-shid-na-yakyh-zasadah-slid-buduvaty-biznes-z-islamskymy-krayinamy/

Pislya povidomlennya pro zagybel 'kadyrivtsiv' na Hersonschyni Kadyrov zagovoryv pro dgyhad, 2022, *Ukrainian Pravda*, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/10/26/7373509/

Qutb, S. 1974, *Islam, the Religion of the Future*, Markazi Maktaba Islami, New Delhi, India.

Rane, H. 2010, Emerging trends in Islamist political thought: Implications for Islam-west relations, Australian Political Science Association Conference 2010, Melbourne, Australia. https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au/handle/10072/37477

Ringsmose, J. & Børgesen, B. K. 2011, 'Shaping public attitudes toward the deployment of military power: NATO, Afghanistan and the use of strategic narratives', *European Security*, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 505–528. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2011.617368

Sasitlinsky, A. U. 2022a, 'Dgyhad v Ukraine. | Vojna v Ukraine| Musulmanye', *YouTube*. https://youtu.be/-iEumnM_lks

Sasitlinskij, A.U. 2022b. 'Obrashchenie k narodu Ukrainy. | Putinskaya voyna v Ukraine.' *YouTube.* https://youtu.be/rGUKpHQVl_0

Schmitt, E., Gibbons-Neff, T. & Ismay, J. 2022, 'As Russia runs low on drones, Iran plans to step in, U.S. Officials say', *The New York Times*, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/17/us/politics/drones-ukraine-russia-iran.html

Sheikh Said Ismagilov: Zneviryayut'sya v mylosti Allaha til'ky neviruyuchi. Ukrayina vstoyit!, 2022, *UMMA*. https://umma.in.ua/ua/node/3176

Ukr Halal (Ukr-Halal): Vulytsya Zhmerynska 10-a, Kyiv n.d., *Ukr-halal*. Viewed 2022-20-11. https://ukr-halal.com.ua/index.php?route=product/category&path=59

van Dijk, T. A. 2008, *Discourse and Context. A Sociocognitive Approach*, Cambridge University Press, New York. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511481499

Verhovnyy Muftiy PF v Kurban-Bayran podderzhal voynu s Ukrainoy: u soseda parazity, polchischa neonatsistov, nam spokoyno zhit nevozmozhno, 2022, *Nastoyaschee vremya*, https://www.currenttime.tv/a/verhovnyy-muftiy-rf-v-kurban-bayram-podderzhal-voynu-s-ukrainoy-u-soseda-parazity-polchischa-neonatsistov-nam-spokoyno-zhit-nevozmozhno-/31935838.html

Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 2005, 'On quality and safety of food products and food raw materials', *Legislation of Ukraine*. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2809-15#Text

Vlaskor 2016, 'Hartiya musulman Ukraine', *Islam in Ukraine*. https://islam.in.ua/ua/suspilstvo/hartiya-musulman-ukrayiny

Yakubovych, M. 2020, '"Dergbezpekove" islamoznavstvo. Yak ukrainska nauka zalyshayetsya v poloni chuzhoyi mifotvorchosti', *Ukrainian Pravda*, viewed 2022-11-22. https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2020/09/10/7265985/