Cultural Logic: Marxist Theory & Practice  
Volume 27 (2023), pp. 95-132 

 

Being Valued by Birth: 
A Comparison of Castes and Feudal Classes in India, Tibet, China, and Korea1 

Timo Schmitz 
University of Trier 

 

Abstract: Karl Marx proposed that castes and feudal classes are both forms of the 
division of labor, with castes being hereditary in nature. In this paper, the author 
analyzes feudal class and caste through current and historical examples to 
investigate Marx’s theory and to detect challenges in drawing parallels between 
both. As examples, the author takes the Hindu society of India, as a persistent caste 
system which is de facto still practiced today, and the historical Yi caste system 
and its remnants in China and compares them to the historical feudal societies of 
the Tibetans in China and the pre-modern Korean society of the Josŏn dynasty.  
The author then contrasts these societies with the class systems practiced in the 
neo-feudal DPRK and the post-feudal ROK. 
 
Keywords: caste, class, feudalism, serfdom, labor division 

 

 

“Human beings are not born free, they are born to free themselves” 

– attributed to Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhism2 

 

Introduction 

Since time immemorial, there have been regions on this globe which brought forth caste 
systems as a special form of class society, the most prominent being the Hindu caste system of 
India and Nepal. Marx and Engels “observed that the crude form of the division of labour found 
among the Indians called forth the caste system in their state and religion. They criticised the 
idealist belief that the caste system produced the crude form of division of labour” (Bapuji 
2009, 340). Bapuji therefore explains correctly that for Marx, “the caste regime was also a 
particular division of labour […] However, that division of labour is ‘hereditary’ in nature” 
(Bapuji 2009, 340). Therefore, castes are an expression of socio-economic relationships if we 
follow Marx’s reading. And “Thus a revolt against caste is never simply a ‘cultural revolt’, can 
never be an attack purely at the cultural level, and requires the transformation of the relations 

 
1 I especially want to thank Norman Kenneth Swazo for giving me feedback on a previous draft which helped 
me to improve this paper. All citations from our communication are adopted with his permission. 
2 Quote taken from http://www.religionspourlapaix.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file= 
article&sid=445, retrieved on 29 June 2024. 



 

 

96   Cultural Logic 

of production” (Omvedt 1978, 70).3 However, due to the relatedness of castes and feudal 
classes,4 both can be compared with each other, since the major difference is, as we will see 
and as Marx already proposed, that castes are hereditary in nature while feudal classes are not. 
However, both are – as Marx already observed correctly – a division of labor. It will be 
interesting to investigate if there are other major differences between castes and classes in a 
feudalist context, which challenge the possibility of drawing an immediate parallelism. 
Concerning classes, it has to be clear from the beginning, though, that “Class as a concept 
cannot exist in and of itself. It is an abstraction, used to understand processes, with a view to 
taking action based upon it” (Collier 2022, 2). 

Concerning the Indian society, caste is not something common to every Indian per se, 
but specifically connected to Hinduism and its followers, and therefore not only a form of the 
division of labor, but Marx and Engels already criticized the Idealist belief which is inherited 
within the nature of the caste system. The spiritual notion therefore ought not to be 
underestimated, though Marx’s Historical Materialism focuses on the material aspect of labor 
as primary:   

Marxist Materialism has frequently been distinguished from previous 
materialist doctrines by its introduction of practice, and, with it, history, into the 
concept. Auguste Cornu, Marx’s biographer, sees this practical perspective as 
the key to Marx’s break with Feuerbach, and his subsequent elaboration of a 
distinctive theoretical outlook. Yet even before this break, Marx had developed, 
largely in the 1844 manuscripts, his own concept of labor, derived in part from 
his critique of Hegel, in part from his readings in political economy. (Miller 
1982, Part 1 Chapter 3)  

Given that Hindu castes are on a spiritual level, one could argue that labor is also staged on a 
spiritual level here: one is born into a certain caste which inherits certain occupations having a 
certain societal rank, because of the social hierarchical order – a kind of natural cosmic order 
taught through the religious doctrines of Hinduism. Thus, since the consciousness of a karmic-
based natural order comes before the aspect of labor, the Hindu society, therefore, one could 
argue, does not separate the activity of labor from spiritism. Or in other words: one could argue 

 
3 As Ranganayakamma (2004) explains: “If we observe castes – even though superficially – we find certain 
obvious distinctions among them: that some castes are high and some are low. In what respect do we find this 
‘high-low’ distinction? Generally speaking, all the upper castes are those which possess land, capital and money; 
those which have hegemony and engage in social organization and administration. Again, generally speaking, all 
the lower castes are those that do not have properties even as means of livelihood. They live as labourers and 
servants. They are subjected to the hegemony and ruling of the upper castes and live in dire poverty and social 
inferiority.” Thus, castes are rather drawn to a feudal organization and existed already in a pre-capitalist stage; 
however, unlike feudal classes in Europe, castes are hereditary in nature. The distinction that labor was not all 
the time in the same mode and thus the same form of division of labor (as Proudhon claimed) was brilliantly 
pointed out by Karl Marx in a reply on Annenkov’s letter about Proudhon’s Philosophy of Poverty: “But was not 
the caste regime also a particular division of labour? Was not the regime of the corporations another division of 
labour? And is not the division of labour under the system of manufacture, which in England begins about the 
middle of the seventeenth century and comes to an end in the last part of the eighteenth, also totally different 
from the division of labour in large-scale modern industry?” (cited after Ranganayakamma, 2004). On the 
division of labor in Marx’s Capital, see Marx 1918, 523-575. (Though it is usually assigned as Chapter 14 in 
most editions, the 1918 Yiddish edition (using the German Karl Kautsky edition as ground) places it as Chapter 
12. Kautsky’s Volksausgabe was published in Stuttgart in 1914 by the J. H. W. Dietz Nachfolger Publishing 
House.) Chapter 26 might be interesting in this context as well. Both, Chapter 14 and Chapter 26 are available in 
English in the Marxists Internet Archive. Kautsky focuses in his 1912 explanatory work on Capital concerning 
the division of labor on the mode of capitalism and manufacturing (see Kautsky 1912, 143-151). 
4 Feudal classes refer to the class relationships in a feudal society, while by using the term capitalist class, I refer 
to the class relationships in a capitalist society. 



 

 

Schmitz   97 

that the historical path of India is a deep-rooted Historical Idealism (due to the hereditary nature 
of the castes), an Idealism passed along from generation to generation.5 In contrast to that, 
Sikhs and Buddhists explicitly reject castes. For the Buddha Gautama, the Hindu society was 
the nucleus of suffering, and as every Hindu was assigned a rank which caused suffering, his 
being was already object to suffering from birth, or as Zeitlin puts it: “dos dazayn in dos layden 
zenen bay budda’n sinonimen” (Zeitlin 1910, 16; transliteration mine).6 However, this does not 
mean that religions other than Hinduism are necessarily completely free from influences of the 
caste system, even if they do not belong to any caste. For instance, as Singh (2015) explains: 
“The issue of caste in Sikhism is quite complex, always inviting a diversity of impassioned 
opinions. One thing we can be certain about is that Guru Gobind Singh had abolished all caste 
inequality with the inception of Khalsa on 13 April, 1699 and with the institution of Khanday-
Ki-Pahul or the Baptism of Sword. Faithful Sikhs do not practice caste discrimination but this 
is not to say that all Sikhs necessarily act in accordance to their faith. Consequently, the caste 
does exist in Sikhism, though in a diluted form than found in the rest of Indian society.” And 
in Sri Lanka, there are still Buddhist castes today. 

Concerning Hinduism, I could conduct a deep dive into Marxian religious critique, 
since it is a basic principle of  Historical Materialism. However, as Machovec (1974, 39-40) 
argues, Marx’s materialism ought not to be understood as a cult of materialism, and thus not a 
physicalism, but as a critical response bound to its historical time and setting and thus not as 
an eternal atheism.7 Furthermore, I argue with Kliemann (1989, 32) that Marx’s criticism was 
justified as the church did not side with the oppressed in the 19th century in Germany, but 
backed the oppression of the ruling class, thus Christians have to be thankful to Marx for 
pointing out this very unholy relationship. In a society where state and church are fully 
separated, the question of whether one adheres to a religion or not is a personal choice, and as 
such, no problem.8 I would argue, even, that religion can be helpful in overcoming oppression. 
The teaching of Jesus, for instance, aims at creating a classless society in which everyone is an 
equal brother or sister, independent of race, sex, status, etc. and the early Christians who 
followed Jesus shared everything with each other (Acts 4:32-35). Unlike many contemporaries, 
Jesus also reached out his hand to discriminated minorities, such as the Samaritans, as well as 
societal outcasts (cp. Luke 10:27-37, Mark 1:41-24). As such, I do not think that religious 
teaching is a problem; the problem is religious institutions that distance themselves from the 
humble teaching and enrich themselves for their own benefit. In this paper I would therefore 
like to focus on the social component in relation to Hinduism, namely the element of coercion 
and thus collective oppression, just as Karl Marx probably took the clerical influence on society 

 
5 Though Idealism itself is not problematic, as the dispute between Idealism and Materialism turns around the 
question whether consciousness or matter comes first, which is a legitimate question. If consciousness comes 
first, of course, this gives space for the possibility of the existence of a divine being, e.g. a God, and thus 
religion, which is also unproblematic in the first place and legitimate. 
6 English translation: “Being and suffering are synonyms for the [historical] Buddha.” 
7 See also Zademach’s (1974, 40-41) argument on why Marx’s religious critique is bound to its specific time and 
not eternally true, as well as Post’s (1974, 42-44) anti-critique of the Marxist religious critique. 
8 The question whether Idealism or Materialism is the true approach is as old as philosophy itself. In fact, I do 
not see Marx’s materialism as the final paradigm and argue that religion and Idealist philosophy in general are 
no obstacles for the Socialist cause. The only difference is that they explain the origin of the world in a different 
way, with the one side placing matter first and the other side placing consciousness first. But as Machovec has 
already observed, there are more urgent questions today than finding an ultimate answer to what was at the 
beginning. (I do not think that the question is uninteresting and irrelevant per se, as it helps us in understanding 
the world, but in a political context, and especially, in securing laborers’ rights, the question whether the 
universe is a created one or not does not have a priority. And as it is a question which helps us understand the 
world, but since there is not the one and only answer, it is important to respect different views and encourage 
pluralism, instead of a specific “final” dogma.) 



 

 

98   Cultural Logic 

as a whole and the collective coercion resulting from it as the starting point of his criticism. On 
the other hand, a religious life that is based on voluntariness does not harm any fellow human 
being; on the contrary, it can be seen as a source of inspiration in the class struggle.9 The aim 
of this paper thus is not to dive into the religious intermingling of castes in India, but rather to 
show the nature of feudal classes and castes. This shall be done through a comparative approach, 
taking the Hindu religion of India, the Yi and Tibetan societies of China, and the premodern 
Korean society as well as the modern societies of the DPRK and the ROK as examples. Finally, 
it should already be said in advance that while the Tibetans and Yi in China as well as the 
Koreans in the ROK overcame their feudal past, though there are still remnants of that time in 
the society of the Yi and in the ROK,10 the caste system is still overall present in Hindu societies, 
such as India and Nepal. As such, when I explain the situation in India, I will focus on the social 
dimension of castes and whether there is a chance for change in that particular country.    

 
Caste System in Hinduism 

Caste as a unifying element of Hindu religion 
 
Hinduism is generally regarded to be the main religion in India. Though this is not 

wrong, it is important to add that it is not one religion with several heterogeneous 
denominations, such as Catholicism and Protestantism within Christianity, but rather an 
umbrella term for many religious practices which originated in India and are native in local 
areas of the subcontinent but embracing the same canon and traditions.11 Thus, it should be no 
surprise that Hinduism is extremely manifold in its appearance (cp. Glasenapp 1922, 7-8). As 
Glasenapp points out: 
 

Trotz der Tatsache, daß die Hindus etwa ein Siebentel der Menschheit 
ausmachen, ist die Mehrzahl der Gebildeten über keine Religion so mangelhaft 
unterrichtet, wie gerade über ihn. Dies liegt einmal daran, daß er keine 
eigentliche Weltreligion ist, sondern sein Wirkungsfeld (wenn ich von den 
indischen Niederlassungen in Ost-Asien, Ost- und Süd-Afrika, Amerika und 
Australien absehe) auf Indien beschränkt, und hat sodann und vor allem seinen 
Grund darin, daß er sich von den genannten drei Religionen und den meisten 
anderen in eigenartiger Weise unterscheidet. […] Man kann von ihm in dieser 

 
9 I do not want to miss giving some historical examples of Christian Socialists, advocating a social gospel and 
the promotion of an authentic Christianity (as in the past, some Christian denominations in the West rather 
focused on their own benefit, instead of focusing fully on the community, the commoners, and making them 
their center of activity). These Christian Socialists included Ding Guangxun (1915-2012), Wu Yaozong (1893-
1979), Zhao Zizhen (1888-1979), Jiang Changchuan (1884-1958), Zhao Fusan (1926-2015), and Deng Yuzhi 
(1900-1996).  It is noteworthy that Deng Yuzhi took her Christian faith as main source of activity and at the 
same time supported the Communist Party of China in the anti-Imperialist struggle. The most famous signee of 
the Christian Manifesto known abroad is probably Ni Tuosheng, also known as Watchman Nee, who was 
martyred in 1972.  Concerning Buddhism, famous Buddhist Socialists include the 10th Panchen Lama Lobsang 
Chökyi Gyaltsen (1938-1989) who was a member of the Communist Party of China, the former Prime minister 
of Burma U Nu (1907-1995), former Indian Minister of Law and Justice B.R. Ambedkar (1891-1956), as well as 
Han Yong-un (1879-1944), Inoue Shuten (1880-1945) and Uchiyama Gudo (1874-1911). 
10 In contrast to the ROK, the DPRK is a neo-feudalist state today. 
11 The fact that Jainism and Buddhism originated in India might be one of the reasons that they are counted as 
Hinduism in the State of India. Buddhism, despite having its own canon, is often classified as nastika, i.e. 
nihilist tradition, within Hinduism in India.  Sikhism, however, successfully fought to be recognized as an own 
teaching. 



 

 

Schmitz   99 

Hinsicht nicht als von einer einheitlichen Religion reden, sondern muß geradezu 
von einer Enzyklopädie der gesamten Religionskunde sprechen. (1922, 6,7)12 13 

 
 One element ascribed to Hinduism, however, seems to be a unifying element: 

  
It is a curious fact, then, that there is a near-unanimous consensus that caste and 
Hinduism are inextricably linked. A statement cited in the opening pages of 
Lipner’s textbook on Hinduism might well have come from Weber or any of his 
intellectual descendants whose interpretations of caste have dominated 
intellectual discussion of the subject in the disciplines of sociology and social 
anthropology: “Caste is the Hindu form of social organization. No man can be 
a Hindu who is not in caste.” (Quigley 2003, 495)  

 
But Quigley (2003, 495) also informs us that Lipner “reminds us that there is a dissenting, 
minority view which states that one must be very careful” in doing such an equation. However, 
what was Weber’s position on castes? “Weber identified India’s caste structure to be 
‘fundamental,’ even ‘essential,’ to the Hindu religion and thus to the self-understanding of 
Indian society” (Swazo 2022, 23). Thus, I would argue that this is why castes cannot be “seen 
as an entrenched social crisis,” as proposed by Ayyathurai (5 July 2021), since “the ethos of a 
‘crisis’ suggests a temporary departure from the norm, not a permanent state of affairs” (Ugalde 
2024, 74). 
 
The origin of the caste system in India: Was Marx right? 
 

There have been various attempts to explain how the caste system came into being. The 
main question was whether the caste system was man-made or of divine nature. Now if the 
castes were developed by a law-giver, then they could be regarded as a human failure and might 
be corrected at any time. However, if they were propagated as a spiritual truth, then they would 
not be that easy to change, because humans are subjugated to the Divine. Concerning the first 
option, Ambedkar wrote:  
 

Every country has its law-giver, who arises as an incarnation (avatar) in times 
of emergency to set right a sinning humanity and give it the laws of justice and 
morality. Manu, the law-giver of India, if he did exist, was certainly an 
audacious person. If the story that he gave the law of caste be created, then 
Manu must have been a dare-devil fellow and the humanity that accepted his 
dispensation must be a humanity quite different from the one we are acquainted 
with. It is unimaginable that the law of caste was Given. It is hardly an 
exaggeration to say that Manu could not have outlived his law, for what is that 
class that can submit to be degraded to the status of brutes by the pen of a man, 
and suffer him to raise another class to the pinnacle? Unless he was a tyrant who 

 
12 English translation: “Despite the fact that Hindus make up at about a seventh of all people on Earth, the 
majority of educated people are not as poorly informed about any religion as they are about this one. It is due to 
the fact that Hinduism is not actually a world religion, but rather its field of activity (if I disregard the Indian 
branches in East Asia, East and South Africa, America and Australia) is limited to India, and above all, its reason 
is that it differs in a strange way from the three religions mentioned and most others. […] One cannot speak of it 
as a unified religion in this respect, but rather as an encyclopedia of the entire study of religion.” (translation 
mine) 
13 Cp. also Neubert, who writes on the assumption that “there is no such thing as ‘Hinduism’. This is why a 
number of scholars instead speak of Hindu religions (Stietencron 2000) or Hindu religious traditions” (2010, 
57). 



 

 

100   Cultural Logic 

held all the population in subjection it cannot be imagined that he could have 
been allowed to dispense his patronage in this grossly unjust manner, as may be 
easily seen by a mere glance at his “Institutes.” (n.d., 20-21)  

 
However, Ambedkar himself argues against this option that a law-giver would be the source of 
the caste system:  
 

One thing I want to impress upon you is that Manu did not Give the law of Caste 
and that he could not do so. Caste existed long before Manu. He was an upholder 
of it and therefore philosophised about it, but certainly he did not and could not 
ordain the present order of Hindu Society. His work ended with the codification 
of existing caste rules and the preaching of Caste dharma. The spread and 
growth of the Caste system is too gigantic, a task to be achieved by the power 
or cunning of an individual or of a class. Similar in argument is the theory that 
the Brahmans created the Caste. After what I have said regarding Manu, I need 
hardly say anything more, except to point out that it is incorrect in thought and 
malicious in intent. (n.d., 21)  

 
In the same way, Ambedkar rejects the shastras to be the main source of the caste system:  
 

There is a strong belief in the mind of orthodox Hindus that the Hindu Society 
was somehow moulded into the frame work of the Caste System and that it is 
an organization consciously created by the Shastras. Not only does this belief 
exist, but it being justified on the ground that it cannot but be good, because it 
is ordained by the Shastras and the Shastras cannot be wrong. I have urged so 
much on the adverse side of this attitude, not because the religious sanctity is 
grounded on scientific basis, nor to help those reformers who are preaching 
against it. Preaching did not make the caste system neither will it unmake it. 
(n.d., 21-22)  

 
With this notion, Ambedkar shows the very problem in a nutshell and I also argue that a plain 
criticism will not undo the caste system, as long as there is not a mass movement by the people. 
Nonetheless, as we will see later, there are many people who did not want to swallow the 
injustice imposed by the ruling class and higher classes. It is noteworthy that already Marx 
came to the conclusion that castes cannot be a result of a lawgiver, but must have been codified 
in another way: “According to Marx (1867: 321), the tendency of earlier societies was to make 
trades hereditary either to ‘petrify’ them into castes (as in India) or to ‘ossify’ them into 
exclusive guilds (as in Egypt). Marx (1846-47: 118) observes that the division of labour under 
the caste system was according to ‘fixed rules.’ These rules were not ‘established’ by a 
legislator. He further observes that these rules were originally born of the conditions of material 
production and were raised to the status of laws only much later” (Bapuji 2009, 341). We can 
clearly see that Marx was right that castes are the result of a division of labor, because the 
classification mirrors different occupations. As such, the four Vedic classifications of caste 
(varna) are: Brahmin (priest), Kshatriya (ruler), Vaishya (tradesmen, artisan, farmer), Shudra 
(laborer). The Dalit (untouchables) are outside of the caste system, and thus make up a caste 
class by not being part of a varna. The jati, then, are thousands of social classifications, which 
denote the rank by birth.  

 
This means that the caste system has a secular basis but was intertwined with religious 

conceptions which sealed its existence as a given matter of fact for the Hindu devotee.  



 

 

Schmitz   101 

The cultural dilemma  
 
But if the caste system is essentially a part of Hinduism as a god-given matter of fact 

and as such inseparable, then any deconstruction of the castes would lead to Hindu metaphysics 
falling apart. This presumes that Hinduism gives every human-being a value by birth and this 
value ranks the person’s rights and duties within the society, meaning that no individual efforts 
and no merits are able to transcend the human being’s position within the society as a whole. 
Any contestation of such a rank would then lead to societal discord, questioning the 
metaphysical worldview of the Hindu tradition. On the other hand, secular states have 
questioned the role of religion in a society, and state-church separation in Western societies, 
although it restricted the secular authority of church dignitaries, did not lead to a dismantling 
of religion itself. Of course, one might argue that the reason for that is simply that Western 
society did not reach the stage of Socialism, claiming that the existence of religion is a 
reactionary symptom of the bourgeois-capitalist society, but religion and religious believers 
also existed in Socialist states in the Eastern bloc.14 In other words, the constitutional equality 
of all members of society, including the equality of men and women, has not led to the collapse 
of a functioning society.15 In fact, the acknowledgement of the equality of every individual is 
also supported by church bodies: progressive religious institutions took up the reforms and 
backed them based on their respective scripture. For instance, the Fachstelle für Internationale 
Jugendarbeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland writes on Christianity:  
 

Frau und Mann sind nach der Heiligen Schrift gleichberechtigte Geschöpfe 
Gottes. In der Schöpfungsgeschichte (1. Mose 2,18 ff) ist beschrieben, dass 
Mann und Frau als Ebenbild Gottes geschaffen wurden. Die Geringerstellung 
der Frau, die in einigen biblischen Texten zum Ausdruck kommt, gehört zum 
patriarchalischen Kontext des Altertums. Jesus betont ausdrücklich die 
Gleichstellung von Mann und Frau (Matthäus 19, 4ff). […] Die 
Frauenbewegung des 20. Jahrhunderts hat vor allem die evangelische Kirche 
und ihre Theologie beeinflusst und dazu geführt, dass sich die Situation der Frau 
innerhalb der Kirchen langsam verändert hat.16  

 
As such, the social transformation in Europe in the 20th century and being member of a religion 
at the same time were both completely compatible. (And being a modern enlightened human 
being and adhering to a religion is compatible today as well.)  In contrast, Marx’s religious 
critique focusses on the practical religious situation in the 19th century, which was very different: 
“Marx ist in jedem Fall zuzugestehen, dass sein Vorwurf der Verschleierung und Stabilisierung 
der ungerechten gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse im Hinblick auf das Christentum des 19. 
Jahrhunderts weitgehend seine Berechtigung hatte. Ein selbstkritisches Christentum ist Marx 

 
14 For instance, the GDR built a Mormon church for its believers, and the theological seminar for Seventh Day 
Adventists in Friedensaue continued its service in Germany’s East and brought forth priests who were active in 
communities all over the GDR. For those who are interested in knowing more about Seventh Day Adventism in 
the GDR, the German-language branch of Hope Media made a documentary series about this topic quite 
recently, which was aired on Hope TV.   
15 The alleged possibility of a collapse was conjured up by reactionary anti-emancipatory forces in the 1950s 
and 1960s to avoid a modernization and implementation of equal rights. 
16 English translation: “According to the Holy Scripture, women and men are equal creatures of God. The story 
of creation (Genesis 2:18 ff.) describes that men and women were created in the image of God. The devaluation 
of women, which is expressed in some Biblical texts, must be explained in the patriarchal context of antiquity. 
Jesus, however, emphasizes the equality of men and women (Matthew 19:4 ff.). […] The women's emancipation 
movement of the 20th century primarily influenced the Protestant church and its theology and as a result, the 
situation of women within the churches slowly changed” (translation mine). 



 

 

102   Cultural Logic 

insofern auch zum Dank verpflichtet. Wie noch zu zeigen sein wird, stand insbesondere die 
offizielle evangelische Kirche in Deutschland damals in einem unglücklichen Bündnis von 
Thron und Altar weitgehend wirklich auf der Seite der Reaktion und Unterdrückung” 
(Kliemann 1989, 32).17 Thus, if we want to analyze the Hindu caste society we have two 
options: “One may consider the ethical issue of the caste structure (varna, jati) of Hindu society 
as a topic of contestation between Anglo-American cultural metaphysics (with its commitment 
to egalitarianism and contemporary human rights discourse) and that of South Asia (in the case 
of India, its historically sustained commitment to caste hierarchy)” (Swazo 2022, 21). 
 

Taking the Western angle might lead to the bias that the Indian history can hardly be 
classified in Western categories, as they have their own historical path and any Eurocentric 
view might cause the danger of taking a stance of Western superiority. Schluchter attests that 
this is not the case with Weber’s work, because even though Weber “adhered to a one-sided 
analysis of the history of religion from a European viewpoint and with European concepts, [he] 
never claimed that the West was superior to the East…” (cited after Swazo 2022, 24). In 
contrast to that, if we take the Indian angle, we are able to appreciate Indian society for itself 
without applying categories foreign to Indian thought to this unique society, but at the same 
time, it causes the danger that we develop a bias in taking the caste system for granted, even if 
we contest the basis for the caste system as such, leading to the danger that in the end of the 
discourse, we would rather defend castes and accept the hierarchization of human beings as a 
legitimate socio-cultural trait as cultural determinism, without realizing that the metaphysics 
of Indian religion is still nourishing this socio-cultural phenomenon.18 Thus, we would become 
blind to the injustice embedded through castes to explaining castes in a different way: We 
would argue that taking away the caste system is taking away India’s culture and its proper 

 
17 English translation: “In any case, we must admit that Marx’s accusation of concealing and stabilizing unjust 
social conditions with regard to 19th century Christianity was largely justified. In this respect, a self-critical 
Christianity is also indebted to Marx. As has to be shown, the official Protestant Church in Germany in 
particular was largely in an unfortunate alliance of throne and altar at that time, on the side of reaction and 
oppression” (translation mine). 
18 Obviously and for good reason, even after the secularization in Western societies, these societies kept many 
rules which go back to the Ten Commandments of the Old Testament, since these norms and laws were well 
established and are necessary for a harmonious society. The danger, however, is that even if India secularized, it 
would still maintain the caste system in areas in which it has never been questioned, as it is a normative social 
construct and is even seen by supporters as stabilizing. Nonetheless, I support the idea of a universal ethics 
through the absorption of universally shared values that connect all world religions, and, thus, it is legitimate, 
and even necessary, to derive the basic norms from religious laws, since law and guilt are metaphysical 
concepts. Norman K. Swazo rightfully asked me if this means that we have to adopt a “Eurocentric” position to 
counter the “Hindu” doctrinal teaching and then continued to argue with A. MacIntyre that we have to ask the 
salient questions: Whose justice? Which rationality?  Swazo explains: “Both questions are at the heart of this 
contention, since we cannot simply abandon our prejudices.” Indeed, I have to agree with Swazo that we do not 
get rid of our prejudices in so far as any attempt to objectify ethics leads to the problem that we cannot get over 
our own personal bias. In other words, we remain subjective, so when we search for an objective ethics, which I 
encourage to do, we do it through our own subjective approach. And this is why I think that pluralism is so 
important: since everyone has their own subjective view, everyone can abstract different aspects of this universal 
ethics and is able to contest a norm. Something can only be universally valid if it passes a contestation and turns 
out to be still upholdable. Concerning the cultural dilemma in my approach in this paper, I have to clearly reply 
to Swazo that, indeed, with my contestation in this paper I do not solve the cleavage, and, therefore, he is right 
when he states, “Even if one adopts a Marxist critique of Hindu doctrine and its social manifestations, this still 
amounts to adopting a ‘Western’ or ‘Eurocentric’ framework of practical rationality so as to evaluate whether 
justice is being done or not (including here critique of false consciousness and the modes of production and 
distribution established by the Hindu teachings).” Thus, my approach can hardly be a final answer, but I hope to 
make a contribution on uncovering norms which seem to be as universally as they are globally acceptable 
throughout different epochs and societies and which therefore seem to bear deeper truths which only can be 
found through a process of deliberation (Habermas!).  



 

 

Schmitz   103 

self-identity as a Hindu nation.19 A Hindu culture-state without a Hindu religion thus would be 
as unthinkable as a tree which has a crown but no roots. So the problem is that if we take a 
Eurocentric view and apply it to India, then there will be the danger that in the end we will not 
be able to understand India at all, and if we try to place ourselves into an Indian perspective (as 
far as this is even possible for an outsider), then we will be required to accept the caste system 
because it is not only regarded to be a stabilizing factor in Indian society in which everyone 
knows what role one has and which one can fulfill to the best of their knowledge and belief, 
but because it is an essential part of the construction of society as a whole, a kind of eternal 
truth which was always valid and which will always be valid, and thus, an unshakable pillar 
for an everyday orthodox Hindu. Anyways, accepting the caste system is no option, not only 
because it is psychologically discriminating, but also because we must ensure that physical 
caste-based violence cannot be justified or even legitimized in any way. There is therefore no 
way around abolishing the caste system in order to establish a more developed kind of society.  
 
The Maoist resistance as an answer to India’s socio-economic problems 

 
In fact, there has been resistance to Hinduism as a dominant factor of the state in the 

form of Marxist-influenced resistance movements, who are especially active in regions being 
feared as “Red Corridor” by the Indian state. These insurgency groups, often being called by 
the term Naxalites, are a heterogenous camp with many different groups, ideas, attitudes toward 
the use of violence, ethnic backgrounds, and goals. The main theme is a Maoist-inspired 
Cultural Revolution in which the given is questioned, and a renewal is demanded. Some of 
these groups also declared war against the state of India. The name “Naxalite” goes back to the 
village of Naxalbari in West Bengal in which peasants started a revolt in 1967, after basic rights 
have been declined to them by the state authority.20 I do not want to miss the opportunity to 
cite voices from India on the issue to go beyond my European view. However, I want to explain 
straight from the beginning that I am not a supporter of violence in whatever way and that I 
think that societal changes have to be negotiated through peaceful means in a democratic arena. 
Thus, I do not agree with those authors who try to legitimize violence.  
Bhambhri explains the roots of the Naxalites as follows:  
 

An armed guerilla struggle by a section of peasantry against the Indian state was 
launched from Naxalbari in West Bengal. It was led by Charu Majumdar who 

 
19 Unlike the term “Christian,” the term “Hindu,” though not being of an ethnic nature, also has an ethno-
cultural or more particularly ethno-religious notion, which is why some Hindus deny the possibility to convert 
into Hinduism and claim that one must be Hindu by birth, giving a possible lack of caste adherence of converts 
as a reason (cp. Neubert 2010, 57): “As a consequence of the [“non-conversion possible”] paradigm, ‘ethnic 
Hindus’ are usually considered as the only authentic Hindus. This is also to say that claims to authenticity by 
converted Hindus are considered as basically unfounded” (Neubert 2010, 58). For fairness’ sake, India is a very 
diverse country with very different ethnicities and identities. As such, the influences of the caste system today 
vary from region to region. Withnall (30 September 2020) explains it as following: “The caste system is less 
obvious today in urban India, where different sections of society live in close proximity and inter-caste marriage 
is more common. But in rural idea [sic], people of the same caste often still live together in clearly defined 
communities and news stories of neighbourly conflict can often be understood as clashes between members of 
different castes. […] And in southern India, it is commonplace to find people identifying themselves by only a 
single name in a rejection of the caste associations that so often come with surnames.” It seems that in Uttar 
Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh, castes are still extremely pervasive (cp. Withnall, 30 September 2020; 
Drishtiias, 28 July 2023), while in Kerala and urban areas such as Mumbai and Delhi, castes only play a reduced 
role today and a sense of equality is more common. Also note that Northeastern India is the home of tribal 
communities, where the tribal identity is more important and there is a significant number of Christians and 
indigenous religions.  
20 For a small historical overview of the Naxalites’ beginning, see Kaur (2010) and EFSAS (2019).  



 

 

104   Cultural Logic 

broke away from the CPI(M) because he considered that the Communist Party 
of India (Marxist), formed in 1964, wasn't militant enough and its parliamentary 
road to establish communist rule could never succeed and the oppressed, 
laboring classes cannot be, 'liberated from the oppressive rule of semi-feudal, 
comprador, collaborating capitalist classes’ The movement launched by 
Majumdar which survives in some parts of back-ward tribal areas even till today 
has declared itself as follower of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism. It has 
claimed to be the practitioner of the true and 'pure' ideology of communism as 
opposed to the ‘revisionary’ and ‘reactionary’ communist parties of India, 
including CPI (M). (2015, 15)  

 
Bhambhri claims further that the Indian state authorities have sought to delegitimize the 
guerrilla groups instead of tackling “the root causes of social discontent in parts of agrarian 
India and the tribal belt of Odisha, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and all the places where the 
movement has spread its influence especially among the most exploited and oppressed forest 
dwellers, tribals and Dalits” (2015, 16). He further emphasizes that the “so-called Maoist”21 
guerrilla warfare against the Indian state is entirely homegrown. It is well-documented that the 
unfinished agrarian land reforms have excluded lower peasantry, tribals, and Scheduled Castes, 
leaving them in poverty (Bhambri 2015, 16): “These ‘dispossessed’ strata of underprivileged 
society who are misguided provide a fertile ground for the State to crush the so-called 'Left 
Wing extremism' by employing its third largest professional army in the world and highly 
armed paramilitary organization” (2015, 16). And Dasgupta argues that “The Naxalite 
movement of the 1970s in West Bengal threatened to overhaul the existing political and 
ideological framework of Bengali ‘bhadrolok’ society. Front-ranking leaders of the movement 
such as Charu Mazumdar wrote extensively to exhort the public to participate in a violent 
rejection of the status quo modelled on the Chinese Cultural Revolution under Mao Zedong” 
(2006, 1920). 
 

Mohanty explained in 2006 that “the Naxalite movement has spread over some 165 
districts in 13 states of India and the prime minister has described it as the ‘single biggest 
internal security challenge’” (2006, 3163). Mohanty explains that he made the following three 
propositions in 1977: “(i) The Naxalite movement was a pre-organisational movement; (ii) it 
practised ideological parallelism to a large extent mechanically applying formulations of the 
Chinese revolution to contemporary India; and (iii) the strategy pursued by the Naxalites was 
a narrow construction of revolutionary strategy and was not always one of revolutionary 
violence. At the end of the four decades it seems that there have been significant changes in all 

 
21 Bhambri argues that the Naxalites have actually little to do with Maoism as it was understood in China: “It is 
not only simplistic, even erroneous, to maintain that the Naxal strategy of moving from ‘Liberated Area’ to 
another struggle for establishing ‘Liberated Area’ has anything to do with Mao’s strategy of Liberation followed 
during Long March in China” (Bhambri 2015, 16). Furthermore, there is a discussion in academia about how 
much Maoism itself is an original thought. See, e.g., Wittfogel (1960) and Wu (1975). Wu, for instance, argues 
that “The inevitable conclusion is that Maoism is a product of a historical situation rather than a product of a 
school of thought” (1975, 108), which does not mean that Mao’s ideas were weak in nature as “Those who 
accused him of being incapable of abstract thinking or incapable for philosophy were criticizing him only from a 
Western viewpoint. How many of his critics have realized that Mao’s way of communication (preferring the 
concrete and de-emphasizing conceptualization) is an artistic mode and is typically a Chinese preference?” 
(1975, 110). If we see Maoism not as a philosophy but as a historical situation, we must question whether 
Maoism can be successful in India at all. And if we agree that Maoism is an actual philosophy (whether original 
or not), then we still have to ask whether the Chinese mode of reasoning is appealing to the Indian working class 
at all, since they might have another mode of communication than in China. And if we say that Maoism is not 
really original, but only an imitation of Marx’s and Lenin’s thoughts then we still appreciate Maoism for 
converting the Marxist-Leninist ideals in a mode of communication which made it applicable on Chinese soil. 



 

 

Schmitz   105 

three respects, yet some elements of each dimension persist” (Mohanty 2006, 3163). As we can 
learn from the three authors, the Naxalites take the revolution in China as a role model. It 
appeared for the first time in parallel to the Cultural Revolution in China and was differently 
organized at different times. Though the ideals of the revolution are borrowed from China, the 
reason for the conflict in India, however, is not imported but home-made, as the land of peasants 
and tribal communities was dispossessed, making the starting point an agrarian uprising which 
questioned the legitimation of the ruling elite.22  

Bela Bhatia tried to identify the main roots of the Naxalites in the state of Bihar. I want 
to take Bhatia’s research as an exemplification of Naxalite activity: “Some broad features of 
the Naxalite movement are relatively easy to identify. The social base of the movement in 
central Bihar consists overwhelmingly of the landless, small peasants with marginal 
landholdings, and to a lesser extent middle peasants. In caste terms, the base of the movement 
consists of lower and intermediate castes. This applies to the Hindu as well as Muslim 
communities. The movement, however, also has some supporters among the higher castes and 
classes” (2005, 1537). This shows that the Naxalites are attractive for anti-bourgeois 
enlightened people from higher classes on the one hand, and poor peasants from lower castes 
on the other hand, and the working together of people from different castes shows that these 
supporters want to overcome the narrowness of caste determinism and other miseries. In Bihar, 
these include access to education, better access to food, proper wages, dignity for women – in 
general, basic human rights (cp. Bhatia 2005, 1538). Thus, we might argue that castes are just 
one out of many issues which Naxalites address. Despite that, due to the heterogeneity of the 
movement, it is impossible to make a generalization. 

What is to be done? 

Religion is always subject to change and while in the Middle Ages a secular sphere was 
practically nonexistent in most parts of Europe, a development to a state-church separation is 
rather the rule than the exception today. Thus, we can say that there are two possibilities for 
India, depending on India. The first scenario would be that the caste system is so deeply 
inherited in Hinduism that the Indian majority does not see a need for reform, and thus 
overcoming castes, and that those voices which want a secularization might be suppressed. 
This scenario might even be backed if we assumed that an authentic Hinduism without castes 
would be impossible, as the varnas are an essential part of Vedic Hinduism. The second 
scenario is that the caste system is dismantled but that Hinduism is not. Nonetheless, such a 
scenario would no less drive Hinduism into a crisis, because it would shake Hinduism in its 
core. The only difference with the first scenario is that in this case, this crisis can be overcome.23 
India has many local ethnicities, languages, and a rich and diverse history. As Hinduism is a 
decentralized religion or an umbrella of religions, the local traditions could transform into 
locally reformed teachings standing for themselves. To keep up the metaphor of the tree, it 
would be like the tree producing new seedlings, which then mature into independent, healthy 
trees. The maxim here is that one has to overcome the old so that the new can grow. For instance, 
outside of India, there are many Hindu communities which understand themselves as pragmatic 
and liberal without any devotion to castes, though this is dependent on the place and 

 
22 It should also be mentioned that India does not qualify as a democracy, but despite having elections it is an 
authoritarian state. It might be called an “electoral autocracy” according to a Swedish institute (cp. The Wire 
Staff, 11 March 2021). 
23 It can be compared to the Reformation in the Renaissance which questioned the papal authority of 
Catholicism, and thus something which was an unshakable truth for Christian self-understanding in Western and 
Central Europe for many centuries. As the caste system in India is even older, the cultural shock would be most 
likely even deeper and a caesura for the Indian society in general.  



 

 

106   Cultural Logic 

community.24 And there are also voices within India, which describe a peaceful Hinduism. For 
instance, as Tharoor (7 May 2024) argues: “Many Hindus like myself were brought up to 
venerate the sacred tenets, divinities, and sages of our faith without necessarily endorsing 
orthodox Hindu social practices like the iniquitous caste system. To discriminate against 
another, to attack another, to kill another, to destroy another’s place of worship, is not part of 
the Hindu ‘dharma’-code.” And Tharoor is right when he claims further that India’s Hinduism 
is quite rich in tradition. This is indeed a chance for reforms, but it must also be politically 
willed and a religious centralization must be avoided.25 The problem, however, is that the 
Hindu religion and the state are quite intermingled, and in such a constellation, centralization 
is always a danger, as usually there is a specific denomination favored over another. One of the 
main reasons for the Belgian Revolution in 1830/31 was that The Netherlands (even though 
formally claiming not to prefer one or the other denomination) was understood to prefer the 
Protestant denomination in the eyes of the Catholics in the southern part of the country. As 
Desure formulated, “The revolutionary movement was backed by a peculiar coalition between 
liberal and Catholic forces. Years of parliamentary opposition to the autocratic rule of William 
I had provided the revolutionaries with a clear political programme, summed up under the 
slogan ‘liberty in everything and for everyone.’ That is to say: personal liberty, to be obtained 
via constitutionally guaranteed individual liberties, and political liberty, in the form of a 
representative system based on popular sovereignty” (2019, 9-10). In the same way, it might 
be possible that certain Hindu traditions might be favored over others within a Hindu state, 
whether these traditions are given de jure or de facto preference, causing a cleavage not only 
between the different religions in India, such as Sikhism, Islam and Christianity, but also among 
Hindus themselves. As such, the situation is extremely complex and a change towards 
liberalism or self-criticism in the next years is rather unlikely in the central government (Union 
Government). On the level of the Indian states, a positive example for a State, where the role 
of castes has weakened, is Kerala, which is governed by a Leftist front. The strong presence of 
Social-democratic, Socialist and Communist ideas in this state and the presence of a single 
major language, i.e., Malayalam, which ties the inhabitants – independently of caste 
background – together to a single ethnic identity26 create an atmosphere of cooperation. In the 
same way, since the traditional occupations vanish in an industrialized environment, especially 
in urban settlements, there is also a break in the traditional caste understanding. Though we 

 
24 The fact that leaving India does not automatically mean leaving one’s caste is described for instance by 
Mogul (6 December 2017). She quotes an Indian student studying in London named Saunvedan Aparanti (“One 
is of the opinion that you leave behind all the trappings of the caste system once you leave India, but perhaps I 
was naive.”) and writes: “Having moved to Britain for university, Aparanti was surprised to find himself at the 
receiving end of ‘caste supremacy’ from his new flatmates. The caste system he speaks of – and its trappings –
is one that the world has, unfortunately, become familiar with. Stories relating to caste violence frequently 
emerge from some South Asian countries, particularly India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Headlines 
featuring the rape and murder of so-called ‘lower caste’ people, or Dalits, are no longer rare.” 
25 Actually, this is the crux of the whole issue: Without wholeheartedly-conducted political efforts, there cannot 
be any change in the long run and such a political will to overcome these structures does not really seem to 
exist.  In a conversation with Norman K. Swazo, he pointed out that he believes that it is a problem of religious 
teaching first and foremost which is then subsequently sustained by religious and (elite) political authorities and 
institutions.  Hence, he is not so confident that there is “a chance for change” in the social dimension, 
particularly because of BJP and the Hindutva movement being led by Modi. He underlines this with the fact that 
Ambedkar understood that the metaphysics expressed in the classical texts undermines any effort to establish a 
genuine democracy in India, even as he worked to draft a constitution that would put laws and institutions in 
place contributing to that objective. Thus, Swazo continues to agree with Ambedkar that one is unlikely to 
eradicate the caste structure of Indian society without removing the doctrinal authority of the classical scriptures 
that sustain this division of labor.  
26 In Kerala, everyone can understand each other, and there is no ethnic group considered to be inferior. Nor are 
different ethnic groups fighting to dominate the political culture of that state. 



 

 

Schmitz   107 

often find multiethnic environments here, there is a lack of class awareness. One of the reasons 
for this lack, I would argue by taking Bhatacharya into account, is “the multiple divisions in 
the working class and the difficult task of surmounting those divisions” (Gimenez, 4). Thus, 
overcoming castes alone does not lead to an abolition of oppression27:  

Paraphrasing Sparr, if sexism, racism and all forms of oppression and 
discrimination were eliminated, vast socioeconomic inequality would persist 
affecting everyone, men and women, white and non-white, citizens and 
immigrants, able and disabled, etc. The main difference would be that everyone 
would stand the same chance now of being at the bottom or at the lower layers 
of the stratification system. That would be desirable – for the burdens of 
oppression would have been lifted – but unattainable, except in the form of legal 
changes that outlaw discrimination and oppression while leaving their material 
conditions unchanged.” (Gimenez, 9)28  

Another reason for the lack of class awareness might lie in a certain ignorance of the universal 
truths of Marxism with regard to its economic critique:  

There are the people in India who oppose Marx’s theory (either knowingly or 
unknowingly or with half-baked knowledge) just like similar people elsewhere 
in the world. Such Indian opponents express two types of opinions on Marx’s 
theory - (1) Marx’s theory was relevant to the 19th century Europe but precisely 
it is not relevant to even those countries. (2) Marx’s theory may be relevant to 
other countries but it is not at all relevant to India because caste system exists 
here and this does not fall under the scope of Marx’s theory. These are the two 
views that are opposed to Marx’s theory. However, both these views are 
completely wrong. Since Marx’s theory talks about “labour relations,” it applies 
to each and every inch in human society. It applies to every relationship. […] 
Marx’s theory applies to all countries, including India, which are based on 
“exploitation of labour” and class distinctions, since it is the only and correct 
theory that discovered and explained exploitation of labour. (Ranganayakamma, 
2004)  

Thus, I personally believe that overcoming castes on a local basis striving towards peace and 
cooperation can only be applied in Indian States in which Socialists establish themselves as 
representatives of the people. The big problem, however, will be that the central government 
and its politics of Hindutva will be a major constraint, making it difficult – if not near 
impossible – to establish a democratic system in India. The orthodox values of Hinduism and 
the idea of liberal democracy, whether as a bourgeois or Proletarian state, seem to be totally 
incompatible, in my point of view. Thus, it must also be well-observed how an increase of 
Hinduism in Indian politics might be a factor in an increase of civic resistance against a 
dominant Hindu denomination. 

 
27 In fact, the same happened in Europe: after feudalism, the capitalist stage followed. We can observe the same 
in India. While the caste system is still in the feudalist stage, urban areas where castes vanish turn to capitalism 
if they lack class awareness. 
28 Though Gimenez wrote this in the context of the U.S., I would argue that this is also valid for India. Thus, the 
abolition of castes is not enough to establish a democratic India. Even further, the oligopolization of the means 
of production which would occur when India reached the state of capitalism would increase poverty, since 
people who are in a better situation due to their caste status could lose their wealth, while poor people would not 
automatically have a chance to become richer since they would no longer afford to own the means of 
production, which would be in the hands of a few then.  



 

 

108   Cultural Logic 

Final remarks 

Finally, it is noteworthy to emphasize that castes are the expression of an oppressor-
oppressed-relationship as the lower castes are deprived of basic rights and have to fulfill duties 
toward the higher castes. As such, it is not a system of social harmony but a well-integrated 
social mode of oppression, in which the benefactor always profits on the costs of those who 
are deprived of their legitimate right to self-expression. The fact that the system has been 
practiced for so long cannot be seen as a reason for its legitimacy, as people can still fall into a 
false belief over a long period of time. The caste system as a social institution can be seen as 
an expression of a pre-modern “traditional” society. As Sherer-Clarke points out: “Hegel sees 
a progression from traditional to modern to post-modern conceptions of Geist. The first, 
traditional conception ‘understands norms as objective.’ It emphasizes the status-dependence 
of normative attitudes, treating norms as objective facts which subjects are duty bound to 
acknowledge and respect through their attitudes. The modern conception of Geist, in contrast, 
treats normative statuses as purely subjective. Emphasising the attitude-dependence of statuses, 
it fails to recognize any authority of statuses over attitudes, seeing all normative statuses as 
‘man-made’ products of our attitudes” (2024, 64).29 It seems to be a consensus in Indian society 
that norms are an objective fixed set, and therefore, according to that logic, they cannot be 
changed. As such, the caste system backs the normative system, as the norms which one has to 
observe vary from caste to caste. At the same time, there is a social struggle in modern India 
which contests the castes (in the Hegelian sense the antithesis), either in the form of taking part 
of the government, such as in Kerala, or as an anti-state insurgency,  and which seeks reforms 
within Hinduism which go back to the founding phase of the modern Indian nation-state: “As 
it comes out, Gandhian approach was basically to undertake some reforms within Hinduism 
through what is called ‘constructive work’ to secure the support of untouchables behind the 
savarna leadership of Congress in the freedom struggle. Ambedkar, on the other hand, strove 
for a radical restructuring of Hinduism to do away with caste system itself and to provide a 
political platform to the rising dalit aspirations. These two contradictory approaches of Gandhi 
and Ambedkar defined their relationship with each other, with other communities like Muslims 
and with the British Government” (Mishra 1994). The question of whether an inter-ethnic, all-
Indian Hindu class awareness will arise (and as such the formation of a Hindu Socialist theory 
fit to represent the whole of India or as broader regionalist approaches of the Indian 
subcontinent30) or whether Hindu and secular forces are going to stand in a fierce opposition 
in the long run might be one of the major questions in the near future. To reconcile this tense 
situation, India – as the State of India – is in need of a synthesis.31 

 
 

 
29 Actually, I believe that objective values do exist, but that they are grasped by human beings in a subjective 
state, which means that we can never fully grasp the whole since we do not get into a condition of objectivity, as 
we cannot transcend ourselves but are subjective beings who are subjugated by limitations. This means that each 
of us has a different interpretation and through the exchange within the society, everyone can present one’s 
insights, which is why pluralism is essential in a democratic society. 
30 This means going beyond parliamentary participation in single states, and choosing an inter-state cooperation 
and partnership in order to become a strong voice and a powerful opposition against the bourgeois Union 
Government.  
31 Already Hegel therefore had a love-hate towards India: “Hegelian philosophy stood both with and against 
Indian philosophy. On the one hand, the conception of Brahman was very close to the absolute and on the other, 
was the caste system that Hegel detested as it defied his pivotal motif of freedom.” (Kriti 24 October 2022) 
Hegel stated in the Philosophy of World History that he believes that “Orientals have not attained the knowledge 
that Spirit – Man as such – is free; and because they do not know this, they are not free” (cited after Kriti 24 
October 2022). 



 

 

Schmitz   109 

Caste System among the Yi People 
 
The historical background 
 

The Yi people are one of China’s 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities. The Yi are 
very heterogenous with many different ethnic sub-groups, and even linguistically, though one 
can group the Yi language in six dialects, many regional speeches are not yet properly classified 
(Schmitz 2024b, 12-16) as some of them seemingly go seamlessly into one another as a 
continuum, and one cannot distinguish them sharply sometimes. The six dialects are Nuosu 
(Northern Yi), Nasu (Eastern Yi), Nisu (Southern Yi), Sani (Southeastern Yi), Lalo (Western 
Yi), and Lolo (Central Yi) (Schmitz 2024b, 12-15). Harrell explains that “Yi is a very broad, 
inclusive category. In this area it includes people whose autonyms are Nuosu, Lipuo, Nasu, 
Shuitian (or Laluo), Tazhi, Yala, and Bai” (2001, 68) and that “Nuosu are the least 
problematical: they are uniform in language, self-identification, membership in one of a series 
of linked clans, and strict ethnic and caste endogamy” (2001, 68). Furthermore, Harrell gives 
an impressive brief overview of the sub-categories and their relationship to the term “Yi”: 
“Lipuo living in Renhe and in areas of Yunnan immediately to the south also accept their 
identity as Yi, though they recognize cultural and linguistic differences from Nuosu and do not 
intermarry with them. Nasu, also called Abu in some of the literature, are descendants of the 
families of the tusi of Puwei and the marriage partners of his clan; some of them accept their 
identity as Yi and some do not. Tazhi, living in Puwei also, appear to have once been 
linguistically the same as the Nasu but members of lower-ranking clans who did not intermarry 
with the elite” (Harrell 2001, 68). In contrast to that, Harrell claims, the Yala and Shuitian do 
not consider themselves as Yi, the latter one “were eager to distinguish themselves from the 
Nuosu, whom they considered barbarians” when Harrell visited them in the 1980s; however, 
in 1994 they did not object to this classification anymore (Harrell 2001, 68). Concerning 
marriage and relationship, “Nuosu do not marry with other groups (even other groups classified 
as part of the Yi minzu) in the village context; they do not even intermarry among different 
castes of Nuosu” (Harrell 2001, 75). As such, the Nuosu always stay within their caste and 
cannot overcome their intra-ethnic division. Hattaway writes that: “Nosu history is of violence 
and interclan warfare. For centuries the Nosu raided villages and took slaves, forcing them to 
do manual labor. […] The Nosu region, in 1956, was the last part of China to come under 
Communist rule” (Hattaway 2000, 411). Thus, the feudal lords strongly tried to resist the 
abolishment of feudalism and to block the egalitarian spirit of Communism. Before the PRC 
was established, Chinese forces already tried to abolish feudalism; as a missionary noted: “In 
retaliation for the taking of slaves, it was not uncommon in the 1940s to see Chinese soldiers 
walking through city streets carrying on their back large baskets filled with Nosu heads, still 
dripping with blood” (cited after Hattaway 2000, 411). The former Bai Yi slaves mock the 
Nuosu today by calling them princes or princesses to remind them of their lost status (Hattaway 
2000, 411).32 So we can say that one ended up in a lower caste either through birth (and thus 

 
32 Hattaway mentions this in the people’s profile of the Shengzha-Nuosu. On the Xiaolangshan-Nuosu, he 
writes: “Prior to 1949 the Xiaolangshan Nosu practiced a system of slavery” (Hattaway 2000, 414). He further 
explains that in Northwest Yunnan, there were four classes among the Nuosu: Nuo, Tunuo, Gajia and Gaxi 
(Hattaway 2000, 414). The Nuo were the highest caste and thus the slaveowners, followed by the Tunuo as 
second highest caste, the latter ruling over the Gajia and Gaxi (Hattaway 2000, 414). The Shuixi-Nuosu were 
known for owning large estates, with the Black Nuosu being the masters and the White Nuosu being their slaves 
(Hattaway 2000, 412). The landowner married their children only among other landowners to enlarge their 
estates (cp. Hattaway 2000, 412). As Harrell clarified, the Nzymo are “the highest stratum of the Nuosu caste 
system,” which traditionally brings forth tusi (a kind of leadership) (2001, 335), the Nuoho are the aristocratic 
caste which are called Black Yi (Hei Yi) in Chinese (2001, 335), while the Quho (White Yi/ Bai Yi) were the 
 



 

 

110   Cultural Logic 

had no chance in life to get a higher status as people in higher castes were strongly prohibited 
from marrying into lower castes) or by being kidnapped during a village raid by another tribe. 

 
The societal self-understanding of the Nuosu 

Schoenhals argues that  

There are many fascinating attributes of Nuosu culture. I was intrigued by their 
caste system, since castes, like race, are usually associated with complex 
societies. The Nuosu, on the other hand, are subsistence agriculturalists. Related 
to caste is a Nuosu characteristic especially worthy of understanding for anyone 
studying mountain dwellers. The Han Chinese, who make up 94% of China’s 
population, view the mountains, and mountain peoples, as a locus of poverty 
and backwardness – the epitome of the uncivilized peoples so prominent in 
Chinese ways of thinking about the world – but the Nuosu, themselves, are 
clearly convinced that they are superior to the Han. In fact the Nuosu believe 
that they are superior to all other ethnic groups in the world. (2013, 341)  

As such, it should not be a surprise that castes were so persistent among the Yi, because they 
saw their society as being superior to others and therefore their societal order could not be 
contested easily. Even after the last Yi tribal lands came under Chinese Communist rule, though 
the caste system became weakened over the decades, it is still present to a certain degree, and 
I would argue that one reason for this might be found in the Yi’s self-understanding as a 
superior ethnicity in contrast to other ethnicities. But how did the Nuosu justify their caste 
system? The reason for being master or slave was seen in ancestral relations. As Harrell points 
out: “In fact, the sense of kinship relations determining ethnic status is so strong that it was the 
justification for the former practice of slavery and even for the caste system itself. Those of 
lower status, while still related to their social superiors, are less pure in their ancestry” (2001, 
81). For this reason, it was very important to keep one’s caste “pure,” avoiding any sexual 
contact with lower castes as this would cause the “noble” blood to become “impure.” Thus, the 
reason behind the continuation of caste for the Yi is not a spiritual codification, a religious duty, 
but rather regarded to be an ethnic responsibility: it is of a racial rather than a religious nature. 
As far as I understand the caste system of the Yi, those who are slaves are slaves because their 
blood is not as noble and pure according to the societal mindset. Practically, however, the Yi 
castes also have a notion of labor division, since villages were raided to take slaves because 
workers were needed: the slaves were taken to do manual labor. Therefore, it should not be a 
surprise that in some cases the “occupational or economic status carries over into the exogamic 
hierarchy, [which] is a feature that the Liangshan caste system holds in common with the jati 
manifestation of the Indian caste system” (Harrell 2001, 94).  

Though castes are distinguished through family relations and marriage, they are not 
socially confined to their own spheres, but a social interaction among members of different 
castes takes place: “It is important to point out at the same time, however, that caste 

 
commoner caste, with the Qunuo being the top position within the caste (2001, 336). As Harrell (2001, 96) 
points out: “As in many societies, someone who could command wealth (in land, livestock, and/or slaves) was 
automatically prominent, and someone who was wealthy enough could move, for example, from a status of 
mgajie to that of qunuo, or the top stratum of the quho caste, whereas someone of a quho station who was poor 
could descend into slavery, and even a nuoho who was poor was a no-account.” Thus one’s status could switch 
within one’s caste, so birth did not fully decide the social rank. In this context, it is also noteworthy that, 
according to Ma Erzi, “in the prerevolutionary society of old Liangshan, with no officially recognized political 
statuses or offices (except for the occasional tusi), people stood out for their accomplishments and abilities in 
different fields” (Harrell 2001, 96). 



 

 

Schmitz   111 

stratification in Liangshan has never, as far as I can tell, included notions of pollution or 
automatic deference, which are so important in the Indian caste system. In areas where there 
are both nuoho and quho, they socialize freely with one another, eating at each other’s houses 
and often becoming close friends. None of this, however, breaks down the marriage barrier; 
only among highly educated urbanites is intermarriage ever considered, and then it is usually 
decided against; most nuoho would rather have their daughters marry a Hxiemga than a quho” 
(Harrell 2001, 94).33 It is also understood that one does not inquire about caste when meeting 
someone for the first time, but only the clan affiliation, “and unless it is a clan unrepresented 
in the local area, or occasionally one with a name similar to that of another clan of a different 
caste, one knows immediately the caste of the interlocutor” (Harrell 2001, 95). This, I would 
argue, outlines once again that castes are not primary in social interaction, but only in marital 
affairs, and Harrel (2001, 95) also points out that the most important factor of class 
distinguishment is endogamy. Even after the abolition of feudalism, marriage is organized in 
terms of caste affiliation, something which seems to exist even today in some areas. 

Democratic reform and conclusion 

Thus, we can say that the caste institution among the Nuosu of the Yi ethnicity 
represents the pre-modern traditional society, as is the case in India, but the oppressor-
oppressed relationship is mostly nonexistent today: members of different castes can even be 
close friends and caste is limited to marriage today. One reason for this might be that, unlike 
in India, the Communist Party of China has actively pushed forward reforms in the 1950s to 
1970s to abolish the feudalist elements which persisted within the country:  

[T]he previously untouched minority areas underwent a process called 
Democratic Reform (Minzhu Gaige, or Mingai for short). In this process, rather 
than inducing local peasants to struggle against and overthrow their indigenous 
leaders, Party nationalities workers made an attempt to co-opt as many local 
leaders as possible into the new administration (in some areas, many of them 
had been co-opted already). Those who cooperated with the Communists were 
made into vice-heads of three of the four arms of the state – the People’s 
Government (Renmin Zhengfu), the People’s Congress (Renmin Daibiao Dahui, 
or Renda for short), or the People’s Consultative Conference (Renmin Zhengzhi 
Xietiao Weiyuanhui, or Zhengxie for short) – except in in most cases the leading 
arm, the Communist Party. (Harrell 2001, 50)  

For the future, we can take three possible views. One is the Eurocentric view in which 
we regard castes as being intrinsically unjustifiable and demand their deconstruction, based on 
our Western values. The second perspective is that of the Han-Chinese, in which the caste 
system of the rural mountain dwellers is a result of backwardness due to a lack of class 
awareness, which means that more education has to be done to overcome the remnants of class. 
The third one is the Yi-perspective, in which we take the stance that the castes are the result of 
a cultural determinism that is naturally present and that should be respected as part of the 
cultural heritage. Taking the third perspective, like in the case with India, could be seen as an 
attempt to justify injustice as a legitimate cultural trait, but at the same time it ignores the rich 
traditions and the self-understanding of the Yi. In fact, I prefer the Han-Chinese view insofar 
as China is a multiethnic country in which each ethnic minority ought to have its basic rights 

 
33 Hxiemga means a Han Chinese person. Nonetheless, while among Tibetans intermarriage is quite common 
today, in the Hindu society endogamy is practiced to keep the wealth in one’s caste and the Nuosu also usually 
rather marry among their caste peers than with other castes, but if they marry outside of their caste, then with 
someone of another ethnicity, such as Han-Chinese. 



 

 

112   Cultural Logic 

to preserve their identity, but on the other hand, it is an undeniable fact that everyone should 
be equal and treated equal, which is encouraged by the Communist Party.34  

 
Classes in Feudal Tibet 
 
Historical background 

 
Like the Yi, the Tibetans are one of the 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities in 

China. However, the geographical term Tibet is not easy to define, since Tibetans do not 
generally refer to their land as Tibet, but use regionally-based autonyms or tribal names. As I 
have previously written, “The rich ethnic diversity in Tibetan lands was well researched by 
Hattaway (2000), and Schmitz (2023: 21-30) proposed the following classification built upon 
Hattaway’s research: Central Tibetans, Kham Tibetans, Amdo Tibetans, West Tibetans, Gansu 
Tibetans, Golog Tibetans, and South Tibetans. The Kaqê, Pemako Tibetans, Shanyan Tibetans, 
Xiangcheng, Baima and Walang remain unclassified. The Qiangic-speaking Tibetans, i.e. 
Qiangic peoples which are classified as Tibetans by the Chinese government are not included 
in this classification […].” (2024a, 44)   Anyway, when one thinks of Tibet in the West, one 
often primarily has the Tibet Autonomous Region in China, also known by its Chinese name, 
Xizang, in mind. Under theocratic rule, Tibet was organized in a feudal class system, though 
its origins might go back much earlier than the Ganden Phodrang regime. To recall, in 1642, 
the last secular monarchic dynasty was overthrown with Oirat Mongolian help and the Gelug 
set up their respective theocratic reign under the protection of the Khoshuts, an Oirat 
Mongolian tribe (Schmitz 2024a, 15-16, 19-20). The Khoshut Khanate would eventually 
collapse with the death of Lhobsang Khan after the Dzungars started an attack (Schmitz 2024a, 
21-23). Qing China came to help to defeat the Dzungars and Tibet was integrated into China in 
the aftermath, and since then it has been part of China continuously until today, although the 
theocrats enjoyed a great autonomy during the republican era in the first half of the 20th century, 
which is often wrongly interpreted as a phase of independence (Schmitz 2024a, 24-43).35 I will 
mention that there are also voices which have a different view on that matter. For instance, 
Tsering Shakya points out that Tibet was de facto independent, and that the Han-Chinese had 
virtually no rule over Tibet after the fall of the Qing dynasty (1999, 2). Furthermore, some 
authors (such as Tsering Shakya and Dawa Norbu) have shown very well that the Tibetan 
population was initially very skeptical of the Chinese communists and that there was also an 
anti-Chinese image, while the theocrats particularly excelled in cooperating with the Chinese 
Communists. Shakya (1999, 37) points out: “The Chinese were skilfully exploiting the 
religious sentiments of the Tibetan people. They used prominent religious figures to 
communicate with the Tibetan government in Lhasa and selected Geta Rinpoche to proceed to 
Lhasa to establish contact and explain the party’s nationality policy to the government in Lhasa. 

 
34 Regarding academic publications on China’s commitment to rights, I recommend Wan (2001) to receive a 
multiperspective view, Zhang (2010) to receive an introduction into the Chinese legal framework and its 
characteristics, and Liebman (2009) on the rapid development of the Chinese legal system after Mao’s death and 
an assessment. Concerning public debate in general, I think that many factors are often left aside in the West and 
I strongly have to agree on Wan, who states, “What has been missing in the public debate in the West is the 
Chinese voice. Western attention has focused mainly on Beijing’s declared policies and Chinese dissidents’ 
opinions […] Decision-makers and observers should know and care about the views of ordinary Chinese since 
what is being debated in the West is not conventional diplomacy but rather a campaign to pressure the Chinese 
government according to the Western notion of how a ‘civilized’ member of the international community should 
behave.” (2001, 15).  
35 For differing positions and angles on who ruled the Tibetan territories in between 1912 and 1950 and how to 
understand their role, see Rubin (1968), Gelek (1982), Wang & Gyaincain (2000), Lin (2006), Tenpa (2012), 
Lawson (2013), Kobayashi (2014), Jagou (2019). 



 

 

Schmitz   113 

With the support of the Panchen Lama, Geta Rinpoche and other important religious figures, 
the Communists achieved a major propaganda victory.”36 And Dawa Norbu states:  
 

My home town, called Sakya, is located in Western Tibet. The news about the 
Chinese invasion of 1950 reached us sometime in 1952. A soldier whose family 
lived in a house next to ours brought the astounding news. He announced that 
the ‘enemies of our faith’ were advancing rapidly from the east and that there 
would be no peace and happiness in the land of snow. Despite the alarming news, 
no one in Sakya sharpened his sword or dusted his bow and arrows. […] The 
Chinese invasion was not perceived as a threat to the territorial integrity of Tibet 
– although Tibet had assumed a distinct geographical entity as an independent 
country in the seventh or eighth century – but more as a threat to our faith. The 
Chinese ‘liberators’ were called tendra – enemies of the faith. […] The first 
Chinese – a group of about ten – came to Sakya in about March, 1953. A funny 
incident took place on their arrival. Some laborers carrying manure to the fields 
met ten strange-looking khaki-clad horsemen on the way. Now the instinctive 
reaction of a religious Tibetan to ‘evil forces’ is a ritual called dogpa, meaning 
negation of the evil, which consists of simultaneously clapping hands and 
cursing. And that is exactly what the laborers did. The Chinese were visibly 
pleased, joining enthusiastically in the clapping. Later on we would be told that 
this was a new way of welcoming and congratulating.  

 
I think Norbu’s explanation gives quite an intriguing view. Tibetans feared that a religious 
persecution could take place, when they heard the news of PLA troops arriving in Tibet, but 
they did not see the Chinese as “a threat to the territorial integrity.” It is also noteworthy that 
the Tibet Mirror, a newspaper which was published in India from 1925 to 1963, tried to produce 
the stereotype of a Chinese aggression. Moskaleva (2022, 367) argues in her article that “after 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) declared the goal to ‘liberate’ Tibet in 1949, The Tibet 
Mirror started regularly reproducing the pro-nationalist version of Tibetan history and 
propagating the idea of a unified Tibetan nation. This editorial policy was adopted by Tharchin 
almost a decade before the flight of the 14th Dalai Lama to exile in India in March 1959 and 
the subsequent establishment of the so-called Tibetan government-in-exile there. The Tibet 
Mirror shaped a desired image of the Tibetan nation-state that was illegally attacked by the 
PRC and thus contributed to antagonizing of local population of Tibet and the PRC government 
officials there.” False historical representations about Tibet were already being spread in India 
while the Dalai Lama was still in China and China was falsely portrayed as an enemy, even 
though there were also many Tibetan supporters of a reintegration into China. In the following 
I would like to shed light on the social order during the theocratic period from 1642 to 1959.  
As Saklani states: “Tibetan society was organised upon the medieval feudalistic pattern, but 
the lines were blurred by the intricate interweaving of ecclesiastical and secular society along 
the hierarchy. The result was a confusing pattern of social hierarchies, which, though well 
defined and rigid at the same time, did not form any discrete strata. It was something which 
one existentially felt and lived with; a sense of hierarchy pervaded all aspects of Tibetan life 
including the ecclesiastical rank, but at the same time it was difficult for an outside observer to 
comprehend, enveloped as it was by a mystique which often defied analysis” (1978, 27). 
Saklani explains further that there has been a great puzzlement among scholars on how to 
interpret the Tibetan society and its social relation properly, as “There are some writers who 

 
36 The Tibetan National Assembly in Lhasa persuaded the Dalai Lama in 1951 to agree to the 17-Point 
Agreement, which was just signed by negotiators before, and not to repudiate it (see Shakya 1999, 89). 



 

 

114   Cultural Logic 

deny the existence of class or caste divisions in Tibetan society, while others highlight the 
extremely hierarchical ethos of the outer Tibetan social system” (1978, 27). Saklani suggests 
that “[i]n the Tibetan context, it would be relevant to take ‘property’ as the criterion for 
evaluating the stratification pattern” (1978, 27). Thus, unlike in Hinduism, where the caste 
system became a fact by birth through a spiritual codification, the Tibetan class system was 
primarily not spiritually motivated, but a question of property:  

All land was regarded, in the aggregate, as the overlord property, be it the state, 
the monastery and the nobleman or local prince. The entire land holdings were 
divided into these three domains, 38% of which, according to Chinese sources, 
belonged to the state, 37% to the monasteries and the remaining 25% to the 
aristocracy. It was assigned or lent to a temporary owner in exchange for 
services (state-labour, etc.). The higher overlord farmed out most of the area to 
a lesser lord, while keeping a small portion under his direct authority, which in 
turn was rented out to a member of the tax-payers. […] For noble families 
enjoying an estate exempt from taxes, the system compelled them to provide 
the government with officials and soldiers. The monastic estates also provided 
the government with officials.” (Saklani 1978, 28)  

This is also backed by Li who writes: “Feudal land tenure and serfs were attached to personal 
occupations of serfowners, which was the ruling foundation of feudal serf system in Tibet. 
Before the democratic reform in 1959, the three major seigniors in Tibet, namely, feudal 
officials, lords and temple monks, occupied all Tibetan land, including arable land, pasture, 
forests, wasteland, mountain ranges, and rivers, etc.” (2009, 46). 

Thus, the Marxian observation of labor division is also applicable to the Tibetan class 
system which is relatively easy to compare with medieval feudalism in Europe, something 
which Saklani also observes when mentioning the following five keys as being essential to 
feudalism in regard to Tibet: (1) lord-vassal relationships; (2) political actions based on 
personal agreements and private political authority, “where political authority was treated as a 
private possession”; (3) land granted by the lord for services; (4) few distinctions among 
officers; and (5) a pronounced aristocratic hierarchy (Saklani 1978, 28). Li explains the social 
relationship as following: “Those feudal seigniors, who accounted for only about 5% of the 
population, not only possessed all land, but controlled the political power, army and all reigning 
machines for maintaining their class interests, while those serfs and slaves who accounted for 
95% of the population had no land or personal freedom, and were attached to ‘the three major 
seigniors’” (Li 2009, 46). This means that almost all of the population of Tibet were practically 
serfs of a very tiny ruling minority. Within serfdom, there were three types of class, known as 
khral-pa, dui-chun, and lang-sein (Li 2009, 46).37 Around 80% of Tibetans were farmers or 
herders, and monks and nuns were mainly recruited from these groups, creating strong family 
connections with the lay population (Schuh 2020, 124-125). Monasteries, as centers of spiritual 
and scholarly elite, were particularly accessible to farmers. This made monasteries integral to 
both education and religion in the Tibetan plateau (Schuh 2020, 125). Dieter Schuh explains 
about the agricultural classes in Tibet: 

  

 
37  As Dhondup observed: “Traditional Tibetan society used to be class-based society – people were divided 
mainly into upper class, middle class and lower class. The class system was hierarchical, endogamous, 
hereditary and exclusionary in nature. On the top was the ruling class (mnga’ bdag), followed by peasants and 
nomads (mi ser or serfs), and then the lower class (rigs dma’ ba), which included butchers, smiths, undertakers, 
and so on” (2019, 79). 



 

 

Schmitz   115 

Grundsätzlich ist hier festzustellen, dass die Klasse der landwirtschaftlich 
Tätigen im tibetischen Hochland in zwei Gruppen geteilt war. Im 
Herrschaftsbereich der dGa´-ldan pho-brang-Regierung waren dies für die 
ausserhalb der Viehzucht Tätigen die Khral-pa (~ khral-´dzin) und die Dud-
chung. Für die Viehzüchter (´brog-pa) finden wir die Unterscheidung von She-
´dzin bzw. sBra-dud einerseits und Pho-hreng oder Mo-hreng andererseits. In 
Marpha bestand die Klasse der landwirtschaftlich Tätigen aus Grong-pa und 
Pho-rang mo-rang. In Ladakh und Spiti unterscheiden wir Khang-chen (in Spiti 
auch Grong-chen genannt) und Khang-chung (in Spiti auch Khang-bu genannt). 
(2020, 125)39 
 

Unlike slaves, khral-pa, “namely serfs, had some production materials” (Li 2009, 46). Dui-
chun had no land “and a large majority of them lived their lives as a helper or by selling some 
handmade articles with an extremely difficult life” (Li 2009, 46). Lang-sein were slaves 
without any capital goods who “worked for serfowners for nothing. They were private property 
of their owners because they were occupied by them all their life and were dominated by them 
at will. They might be resold, mortgaged, given as a present, and granted at will. If they fled 
and were caught, they would be beaten up, and some even were beaten to death. These ‘Lang-
seins’ accounted for approximately 5% of Tibetan population, and most of them were passed 
down from generation to generation” (Li 2009, 46). As these classes were not assigned by birth 
for once and for all, but attached to property, it must be noted that, unlike in Hinduism, one 
could change the class: some slaves managed to free themselves into a higher position, while 
others lost their status and became slaves. What all of these three categories have in common 
is that they have an overlord. Though castes might be seen as social classes, social classes in 
return must not by necessity be castes. Castes, as defined by Marx, are hereditary in nature. 
Indeed, serfdom was also hereditary in Tibet: the children of a slave were also slaves by birth 
until they managed to buy out themselves. Thus, one might agree that Tibet’s feudalism was 
renowned for its feudalist social classes, but we cannot talk of castes in a narrow sense, though 
we might talk of a semi-caste system, since Tibetans practiced a strict class endogamy and 
ranks were hereditary: “Because of strong class consciousness in Tibet, the Tibetan marriage 
system is class endogamous. Interclass marriage used to be a taboo, especially between the 
highest and the lowest class people. Hypergamy and hypogamy, although possible, were very 
rare” (Dhondup 2019, 79). Furthermore, both the castes in India and the social classes in Tibet 
served to divide labor and had primarily economical grounds. I would argue that the lack of a 
spiritual codification is the reason that it was easier to overcome classes in Tibet. Indeed, 
overlords who are hereditary spiritual figures and who take a rank as living-gods for their whole 
life are an unshakable element of Tibetan Buddhism which even survived the “Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” while the serfs were not naturally damned or condemned for 
life. This restricted the evolution of castes in the actual sense. Anyway, feudalism in Tibet can 
be compared with medieval feudalism in Europe very well; the only difference is that in Europe, 
the serfowner himself was not considered holy, but, rather, was given legitimation and thus 
approval by a religious institution and  his office was god-given. Therefore, unlike in Buddhism 
where a hereditary lama cannot be replaced through a revolution, no matter how unholy he 

 
39 English translation: “Basically, it can be stated here that the class of agricultural workers in the Tibetan 
plateau was divided into two groups. In the domain of the Ganden Phodrang government, these were the Khral-
pa (~ khral-'dzin) and the Dud-chung for those working outside of livestock farming. For the cattle breeders 
(‘brog-pa) we find the distinction between the She-‘dzin or the sBra-dud on the one hand and the Pho-hreng or 
Mo-hreng on the other. In Marpha, the agricultural class consisted of the Grong-pa and the Pho-rang mo-rang. In 
Ladakh and Spiti we are able to differentiate between Khang-chen (also called Grong-chen in Spiti) and Khang-
chung (also called Khang-bu in Spiti).” 



 

 

116   Cultural Logic 

behaves (as could be seen with the 6th Dalai Lama, see Schmitz 2024a, 21-22), the bearer of 
the office in absolutist Europe could be replaced in a revolution, if he did not fulfill his duties 
with sanctity. Finally, it is noteworthy that a common area called Tibet did not exist after the 
fall of the Yarlung dynasty in 842, which means that the areas which are inhabited by Tibetans 
were politically very diverse. This is important insofar as the class system among the Tibetans 
was not bound to a spiritual, but socio-political frame. This also means that different political 
entities in the Tibetan areas had most likely different practical forms of class society. This 
might also be a reason that so many researchers came to different conclusions on the intensity 
of class oppression.40  
 
The end of feudalism in Tibet and the democratic reform 
 

Feudalism came to an end with the establishment of Maoist-styled democratic reforms 
in 1959, a situation analogous to that of the Yi people: “In 1959, in compliance with will of all 
Tibetans, the Chinese government conducted a democratic reform in Tibet, and thoroughly 
abolished the inhuman feudal serf system which had reigned Tibet for several hundred years” 
(Li 2009, 45). 41  It is noteworthy, though, that within Tibet anti-feudal enlightenment 
movements and political interest groups existed already the before the establishment of the 
PRC in the Republican era, including the Tibet Improvement Party and the Tibetan Communist 
Party. Some Tibetans also joined the Guomindang in order to promote republican values and 
secularize Tibet. A prominent example for the latter is Kesang Tsering, a Khampa from Batang, 
Xikang Province (today part of Sichuan) (see Schmitz 2024a, 38).  

 
The impact of the Cultural Revolution 
 
  Only seven years later, the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” would follow. As 
the memory of feudalism was still deep in the people’s mind in Tibet and since feudalism and 
religion were connected to a certain degree (one has to remember once again that Tibet was a 
theocracy before), the Cultural Revolution also found a futile ground in the Tibetan areas, and 
most of the participants of the Cultural Revolution in Tibet were actually ethnic Tibetans (Gao 
2008, 24). Nonetheless, the violent attempt to overcome religion did not lead to progress, but 
instead the opposite was the case: the Cultural Revolution left chaos and destruction (Schmitz 
2024a, 54-56). In the aftermath Tibetans tried to distance themselves from the event42 and tried 
to put the blame on the Han, but blaming others is nothing more than historical revisionism: 
The Cultural Revolution in Tibet was conducted mostly by Tibetans, who even did revolution 
in the same way as the Han at that time, as Tsering Woeser noted (Gao 2008, 27). “Nonetheless, 
it cannot be ignored that the Cultural Revolution itself was a violent era which brought much 
pain: the Red Guards inflicted terror in the whole of China and these ten years which are known 
in China as ‘Ten Years of Chaos’ today took the life of many innocent people” (Schmitz 2024a, 

 
40 Another reason might be the wrong and romanticized image of Tibet in the West as a kind of shambhala, a 
blissful land; thus, the region, a terra incognita for many Westerners over the centuries, was mystified. 
41 On the one hand, Li (2009) explains the class system in short very brilliantly and brings in a sound Marxist 
perspective, but on the other hand, the author is very much based exclusively on the Chinese perspective. 
42 In fact, with the end of feudalism a social vacuum appeared which could not be filled by the Chinese 
revolutionaries immediately since many people in rural areas still lacked class consciousness. The majority of 
Tibetans attempted to fill this vacuum in the Cultural Revolution.  However, the Cultural Revolution only led to 
the very societal discord which we must fear will happen in India, when the old clashes with the new, especially 
if those who were extremely dissatisfied, such as former serfs in Tibet or their descendants, rebel in a radical 
way against what they consider to be remnants of feudalism. Only in the aftermath did the participants realize 
the full impact of their outrage and react with denial and silence about the Cultural Revolution that they once 
stood for and took part in. 



 

 

Schmitz   117 

56). Today, most Tibetans are still adhering to Tibetan Buddhism and accept the traditional 
religious hierarchies and lamas, but there are no more feudal classes, which shows that even in 
a society in which religious authorities were the lords, it is possible to overcome classes without 
the need to overcome religion. In fact, I would even go so far to claim that Tibetan Buddhism 
hardly reformed and that many Tibetans still strongly venerate their lamas and try to act 
meticulously according to the religious rule in order to accumulate good karma. While all 
Tibetans are equal today by law, the religious authorities are de facto still seen to be in a higher 
position by Tibetans, but these religious authorities are no more the overlords and, therefore, 
one does not have a duty toward them by law but only by belief. 

 
Class System in Korea 

Historical background 

According to Charles Barone, “Prior to Japanese annexation and occupation in 1905, 
‘feudal like’ structures predominated in Korea dating back to 935 A.D. These structures, 
although similar in some ways to European feudalism, are significantly different when 
considering superstructural elements. Therefore, forcing Korea into the feudal category is 
inappropriate.” (1983, 52).43 However, I disagree with Barone’s conclusion that it would be 
inappropriate to put pre-modern Korea in the feudal category. As Kim showed clearly, 
feudalism in Korea underwent three phases: “First, the genesis of Korea’s feudalism, which 
developed from the end of the ninth century to the late fourteenth century. Secondly, the 
continuum of feudalism in Korea, which the author believes stemmed from power conflicts 
among the elite and the ensuing decline of the Silla dynasty. It is noted, also, that Korean 
feudalism has been transformed gradually from a decentralized form to a centralized one. 
Thirdly, structural distinctions are noted between the above two sub-types of feudalism. The 
analysis indicates that centralized feudalism has been characterized by absolute monarchism 
and various social and political systems […] which were lacking in the decentralized feudalism” 
(1970, 53). But also Kim acknowledges that there is a major difference between Korean 
feudalism and European feudalism: “[A]ccording to Marxist usage, feudalism is a social and 
economic movement characterized by serfdom. In this view, feudalism generally succeeded 
the economic systems based on slavery and preceded that of capitalism. (Prawer and Eisenstadt, 
1968: 393-402). It should be noted, however, that in Korea feudalism was not followed directly 
by modern capitalism as was Western feudalism” (1970, 53). According to Kim (1970, 52), 
decentralized feudalism could be understood as a social order where landlords and vassals 
formed bonds through oaths, and not through legal contracts. Lords protected the vassals and 
granted them fiefs, while vassals provided military and social loyalty in return. After 935, Kim 
(1970, 54) argues, Koryŏ’s basic social structure was defined by centralized feudalism. This 
system was based on estate and prebendal systems under a highly centralized monarchy. The 
centralized authority influenced political, social, economic, religious, and educational reforms 
(Kim 1970, 54).44 

The Josŏn dynasty “became in many ways a model Confucian society. Confucian ideas 
shaped family and society in profound ways” (Seth 2010, 157). Korean Neo-Confucianism 
“emphasized rank and status; it was important for everyone to know his or her place and role 

 
43 Korea was formally annexed by Japan in 1910; however, the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1905 (known as Ŭlsa 
Treaty) had already deprived Korea of its diplomatic sovereignty, and the 1907 Japan-Korea Treaty finalized 
Korea becoming a Japanese protectorate. 
44 Kim uses Weber’s definition for a prebendal system: “According to Max Weber a prebendal system is a legal 
institution, pertaining to land tenure, which defines one’s right to use a certain portion of land in return for his 
public service” (1970, 54). 



 

 

118   Cultural Logic 

in society” (Seth 2010, 158). Korean society consisted of three basic classes: the ryangbang 
(upper class), the jungin (middle class), and the sangmin (lower class, commoners) (Kim, n.d.). 
We can even talk of a semi-caste system, since it was an endogamical society to protect one’s 
wealth and, therefore, interclass marriage was a taboo, and the rank or social class was usually 
defined through birth, i.e. it was hereditary (Kim, n.d.).45  The description of Kim (n.d.), 
however, also makes clear that economic factors played a role in class separation: the lower 
classes were the forces of production, the higher classes built the aristocracy.  
 

Lee (2012, 181-182) argues that while in the Josŏn dynasty, the monarch was in the 
highest position and the top authority, which was taken for granted by the Koreans, political 
authority became more embodied in individual political leaders during the Korean Imperial 
Period (1897-1910), and the monarchical concept gradually depersonalized. In addition, efforts 
to strengthen civil rights became even more important at this time (cp. Lee 2012, 182). One 
has to note that the Korean Empire was proclaimed as a result of breaking away from the 
dependence of the Qing Dynasty, as Korea was a tributary state to the latter. At the same time, 
despite the formal upgrade from a kingdom to an empire, Korea was extremely weakened and 
the Ri family’s power was on the verge of decline. Already in 1894, the quasi-caste system was 
abolished through the Kabo reforms of King Kojong (Suh 2015). “In case of leading capitalist 
countries in the west, the movement of nation building was led by bourgeoisie who represented 
the mode of production in capitalism. In underdeveloped countries, however, the traditional 
ruling class, which intended to achieve change with improvement, emerged to lead top-down 
modernization reform, and the Korean model belongs to this category” (Suh 2015, 30). 
However, I would nonetheless argue that civic movements forced the king to conduct reforms 
to avoid losing his power, and, as such, when he declared himself Emperor in 1897, the 
cleavage was already too obvious: a civil society with people’s sovereignty contradicts the 
mindset of Imperialism. The Confucian-styled Imperialism had the disadvantage that 
Confucianism intrinsically inherits a teaching on hierarchies. Thus, an equal society premised 
on hierarchies cannot be equal; it is literally the snake biting itself in its tail (cp. also Lee 2012, 
182, who highlights that the strengthening of monarchical power and the expansion of civil 

 
45 Kim (n.d.) notes: “우리 나라 전통사회에서 지배계급은 자기신분의 보호를 위한 신분내혼제와 
신분세습제를 형성하였으며, 이에 따라 지배계급과 피지배계급의 신분구조가 형성되었다. 이러한 
신분구조의 상층은 부족사회에서는 족장제가 전형적인 형태이고, 고대국가 형성기에 처음 등장한 
귀족제는 고려 중기까지 지속되었다. 고려 말기에 뚜렷하게 나타난 관료제는 조선 말기까지 강력히 
유지되었으며, 동시에 양반사회를 형성하였다. 양반사회 구조의 특징은 관료를 충원하는 양반과 중인, 
그리고 생산에 종사하는 양인과 노비로 구성되어 있다는 점이다. 전자가 전통사회의 소수의 지배신분을 
형성하였고, 후자는 다수의 피지배신분을 형성하였다. 그러나 조선 후기에 이르러 점차 신분의 
역계층화현상이 나타났다. 비록 구조적으로 역계층화현상이 일어나고 신분제도가 없어지지만, 전통적 
신분의식은 일제강점기까지 통혼과 행동양식에 강력히 잔존하였다.” [English translation: “In our 
country’s traditional society, the ruling class established a system of caste endogamy and hereditary caste 
inheritance to protect its status, and the status structure of the ruling class and the ruled class was formed 
accordingly. The upper class of this class structure is a typical form of the patriarchal system in tribal society, 
and the aristocratic system that first appeared during the formation of the ancient state lasted until the mid-
Koryŏ period. The bureaucracy which appeared in the late Koryŏ era was strongly maintained until the late 
Josŏn era, and at the same time formed a noble society. The characteristics of the noble society structure are that 
of nobles and middle-class recruit officials, and are also composed of laborers and slaves engaged in production. 
The former comprised the minority ruling class in the traditional society, while the latter formed the majority 
class, which was ruled. However, in the late Josŏn era, a reverse stratification phenomenon gradually appeared. 
Although structural reverse stratification occurred and the class system disappeared, traditional class 
consciousness remained strong in intermarriage and behavioral patterns until the Japanese colonial period.”] 



 

 

Schmitz   119 

rights is based on contradictory ideologies).46 The abolition of the quasi-caste system was even 
more the result of the Tonghak peasant uprising in 1894: “It was in the Southern provinces of 
Korea from where the revolts would start and soon spread further to the palaces. Already before 
the major Tonghak Uprising, Ri Pilje managed a revolt in 1871, mobilizing Tonghak 
sympathizers. Though we can hardly call Tonghak a Marxist teaching, it led to a class 
awareness and focusses de facto on a class struggle, which is why the peasantry could be 
mobilized this easily against the elite, and even further, it later inspired some groups of Korean 
Communists which were not to [sic] keen on historical materialism, but rather took the class 
struggle and independence struggle in the foreground” (Schmitz 2020, 232). As such, in the 
beginning, reforms were mainly designed by Confucian reformers who saw a need for societal 
changes. Later, Western ideals influenced more and more the reform discourse, and in 1905 
the Tonghak teaching formally embraced its Christian elements, calling itself Chondoism. 
Even further, we can point out clearly that the unrest in Korea was not fueled by secular forces, 
but spiritual movements, which saw the ruling class as being corrupted. The growing influence 
of foreign influences, especially from Japan and the West, were therefore seen as spiritual 
pollution. Thus, on the one hand, the people demanded reforms and civil rights, which can be 
seen as a resistance against the monarch; on the other hand, the Korean people remained 
skeptical concerning foreign influences, and opposed modernization in the form of 
westernization. The internal and external crises must therefore be clearly separated when 
considering the situation in Korea in the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of 
the 20th century. I think that Lee’s paper (2012) sheds quite an important light on it, focusing 
on the theory of sovereignty. Lee argues that “Previous studies generally adopted the analytical 
framework of the western ‘modernity’ model, which overemphasizes the conflicting features 
between the power of king and that of the people” (2012, 204). 

 
Cultural self-understanding of the Korean nation in the DPRK 

Like the Yi, the Koreans always regarded themselves to be superior to other peoples, 
an attitude that is apparent quite well today in the propaganda of the DPRK, which claims the 
Taedong River Culture to be one of the earliest civilizations, and which is also defended in 
DPRK academia:  

Our nation is resourceful with a long history and a brilliant culture. Our nation 
was developed independently from the earliest times with our characteristic 
language and culture in our country. It is a great pride of our nation that our 
nation has lived independently with a developed culture from the earliest times. 
A long history and a brilliant cultural tradition of our nation is based on the 
Taedong River Culture, one of five civilizations in the world. Five civilizations 
in the world mean the cultures of five zones in which created by first formation 
of slave states (ancient state), first class states, after end of the primitive ages in 
human history in the world. There are the Taedong River Culture in Korea, the 
Nile River Culture in Egypt, the Two Rivers Culture in Southwest Asia, the 
Indus River Culture in India and the Huanghei River Culture in China in five 

 
46 Suh therefore points out the problem in a brilliant way: “In particular, it is much more difficult to set up 
standards for the modern state in Korea, where modernization, which meant westernization, was begun by the 
shock of the encounter with the west, and was in deep conflict with the system of the traditional state. 
Furthermore, the concept of the modern state in Korea was re-imported from Japan, where it had been translated 
from the western model of the modern state” (2015, 30-31). 

 



 

 

120   Cultural Logic 

civilizations in the world. The Taedong River Culture is a culture of a first 
ancient state-Tangun Korea founded in the Taedong River basin around 
Pyongyang in the Korean Peninsula in the early part of the 30th century B.C. 
The Taedong River Culture in Korea is one of the world’s first ancient advanced 
civilizations. (Jong & Kang 2016)47  

Unfortunately, this claim is difficult to prove or refute independently as there is no real research 
on this outside of the DPRK. Therefore, I can only give my personal assessment on the matter: 
I think that there never was a Taedong River Culture. Rather, the proclamation of such a culture 
only serves to demystify and to personalize the mythological emperor Tangun, and at the same 
time it also grants a special sublimity to one’s own nation to suggest above all, of course, an 
independence (and an absence of interrelation) from other peoples; one does not want to be 
seen as a subculture or an offshoot of a great power such as China or Japan, but rather as an 
independent major culture. Thus, this myth rather serves to highlight the Korean distinctiveness 
and the alleged cultural superiority. As the Korean dynasties were seen to follow in the 
footsteps of Tangun (though this cult rather seems to have started in the Josŏn dynasty), 
legitimizing themselves to rule over the Korean people,48 it might be no surprise that the DPRK 
emphasizes Tangun as founder, in terms of self-legitimation, since the DPRK is a neo-feudalist 
state (on the latter see Schmitz, 2024c). At first glimpse, this might seem paradox, given the 
fact that the DPRK promotes an “anti-feudal democratic revolution” (cp. Juche Idea Lesson 1), 
but in fact this is not a contradiction for the DPRK as democracy is not understood in the sense 
of the modern meaning, but as being governed “independently.” For the DPRK, independence 
means to be free from foreign interference, which recalls a lot of the definition of the “Liberty 
of the Ancients” as outlined by Constant (1819): For the Ancient Greek people, being 
independent meant to be a sovereign polity, or in other words: if one was not enslaved or bound 
on the orders of another nation, then one was free, and thus rights were understood as collective 
rights, not individual rights:  

The [liberty of the ancients] consisted in exercising collectively, but directly, 
several parts of the complete sovereignty; in deliberating, in the public square, 
over war and peace; in forming alliances with foreign governments; in voting 
laws, in pronouncing judgments; in examining the accounts, the acts, the 
stewardship of the magistrates; in calling them to appear in front of the 
assembled people, in accusing, condemning or absolving them. But if this was 
what the ancients called liberty, they admitted as compatible with this collective 
freedom the complete subjection of the individual to the authority of the 

 
47 For another account from the DPRK on Tangun and his alleged historical life, see Kang (1994, 50-58).  
48 “Tan’gun was the symbol of a community connected by one bloodline perpetuating the image of unity and 
purity in Korean history. It played a major role in the development and settlement of a homogenous nationalism 
that claimed Koreans as the descendants of Tan’gun comprised a ‘single’ ethnic group. […] Historically, 
Tan’gun has been highlighted as the basis for national consciousness and national integration in the face of 
foreign invasions. The Samguk Yusa (三國遺事) and Chewang Un’gi (帝王韻紀) were written during the 
Koryô Dynasty on the brink of national crisis when the Mongols invaded in the 13th century. Also, since the 
establishment of the next dynasty, Chosôn, Tan’gun began to be emphasized, and the leaders of this new 
dynasty claimed to succeed Kojosôn by naming the dynasty Chosôn to inherit its power and establish legitimacy 
of the new regime” (Kim 2014, 214, 215). Thus, by claiming that Tangun is not just a mythological but 
historical person, the DPRK can claim to continue the historical path in which the Kims are the succeeding 
dynasty, while at the same time  promoting a new era which is allegedly free from feudalism and denouncing 
the westernization in certain aspects in the ROK and the model of Western-styled democracy as unKorean, as it 
does not follow the Tangunist tradition of a god-willed (or better: heavenly-willed) government through the 
bloodline of a chosen family.  



 

 

Schmitz   121 

community. You find among them almost none of the enjoyments which we 
have just seen form part of the liberty of the moderns. All private actions were 
submitted to a severe surveillance. No importance was given to individual 
independence, neither in relation to opinions, nor to labor, nor, above all, to 
religion. The right to choose one’s own religious affiliation, a right which we 
regard as one of the most precious, would have seemed to the ancients a crime 
and a sacrilege. In the domains which seem to us the most useful, the authority 
of the social body interposed itself and obstructed the will of individuals. 
Among the Spartans, Therpandrus could not add a string to his lyre without 
causing offense to the ephors. In the most domestic of relations the public 
authority again intervened. The young Lacedaemonian could not visit his new 
bride freely. In Rome, the censors cast a searching eye over family life. The 
laws regulated customs, and as customs touch on everything, there was hardly 
anything that the laws did not regulate. (Constant 1819)  

The DPRK still holds to this view on freedom, calling it independence. Now, why is the neo-
feudal DPRK calling itself anti-feudal? Since the Ri dynasty Josŏn was a tributary state to the 
Qing dynasty, the DPRK regards the Korea of the previous time period to be a vassal state and 
as such as non-independent (Kim 1994, 4, 17, 25). The peasants were exploited by the land-
owning aristocracy with the king paying tribute to the Qing. Thus, the higher class was seen to 
be the longer arm of the foreign power suppressing the common people on the common basis 
of exploitation of the poorest. In contrast to that, the neo-feudal Kim dynasty calls itself anti-
feudal and democratic, because the Kims isolate Korea from foreign influences, and in this way, 
the citizens can enjoy their “freedom” in the sense of the DPRK definition. And since they live 
in their own sovereign nation state and (ideally) work for the state, they are not exploited by 
working for an industrial bourgeois or landowning aristocrat, but for a revolutionary leader 
who in fact resumes the role of an aristocrat owning the whole state under the pretense of 
maintaining an anti-Imperialist “people’s democracy,” which is a weird word given the fact 
that δῆμος already means “people,” and calls the Supreme People’s Assembly to ratify his 
decisions. In exchange he keeps up the national independence and fends off any foreign 
interference (cp. Kim 1980, 307, 410). With the purge of the Kapsan faction by Kim Il-sung in 
1967, the last Marxist influence in the party was eliminated and Kim could establish Juche with 
his definitions of independence, democracy, feudalism, etc. As such, the DPRK continues “the 
ancient feudal reign that was interrupted by the Japanese occupation” (Schmitz 2024c, 47) and 
names its country after the name of the last kingdom, Josŏn, but unlike the Ri dynasty, the 
ruling dynasty is now the Kim dynasty.  

The new caste system of the DPRK 

The DPRK installed a new caste system under Kim Il-sung, called Songbun. On the 
origins of this caste system, Lankov (2011) explains: “In 1957, the authorities launched a large-
scale and ambitious investigation of the family backgrounds of virtually all North Korean 
citizens. As a result of this and subsequent investigations, by the mid-1960s the entire 
population was divided into a number of hereditary groups, somewhat akin to the estates of 
medieval Europe.” As far as we know, the DPRK caste system has three major castes with 
plenty of different classes within each of the castes. Collins explains:  
 

The core (haeksim) class is assessed by the regime to be loyal to the Kim regime 
and therefore receives significant privileges in all aspects of life. […] The 
wavering (dongyo) class is made up of those whose loyalty to the party is 



 

 

122   Cultural Logic 

deemed questionable but who can serve the regime well through proper 
economic and political performance, particularly if they demonstrate loyalty to 
the party and its leaders. […] The lowest level, the hostile (choktae) class, is 
prejudged as being disloyal to the socialist revolution, the party, and its 
leadership. The hostile class is commonly referred to as “impure elements” or 
“anti-party and anti-revolutionary forces.” (2012, 6, 7)  

 
As such, the classes are structured depending on the assumed loyalty toward the leader. Like 
in India, occupations or the ancestor’s occupation might play a role within the classification 
(cp. Collins 2012, 38-42). Lankov argued in the year 2011 that “In a nutshell, the past two 
decades were the time when the state was steadily retreating from the private life, and also was 
losing its ability (perhaps also its will) to control the daily activities of its subjects as well as 
how they made a living. One of many significant changes has been the steady decline in the 
significance attached to family background (known as songbun in North Korean parlance) –
once the single most important factor that determined the life of a North Korean.” As such, it 
seems that the North Korean caste system only plays a minor role today, though its historical 
role, especially under Kim Il-sung, should not be downplayed. As of 2011, the caste system 
rather served to determine key positions within the state: “Still, on the very top, songbun is 
important, since the key administrative positions are held by those with good songbun, and a 
mid- or high-level official can make a nice income by milking the private economy. Hence 
people with good songbun still often think about capitalizing on the real or alleged contribution 
of their ancestors to the establishment of the North Korean regime. However, for a majority the 
emergence of markets opened a new, faster and more attractive (but also more risky) avenue of 
social mobility” (Lankov 2011). In the DPRK’s private market, however, it plays no role: “The 
success in the emerging new economy is usually unrelated to one’s songbun” (Lankov 2011).  

The remnants of the old society in the ROK in times of their industrialization and bourgeois 
capitalism 

But remnants of the old feudal society also haunts the ROK until today, as we can learn 
from Kim Kyung-il’s book Confucius Must Die For The Nation To Live. As Kim Seong-kon 
(22 August 2017) commented on Kim Kyung-il’s book: “According to Kim [Kyung-il], both 
China and Japan abandoned Confucianism a long time ago, but Korea unwisely constructed its 
society upon Confucian morality, which has since degenerated into hollow formalism and a 
male-Chauvinist and patriarchal system. Kim wrote that Confucianism was, in fact, adopted to 
justify the Joseon Kingdom that was founded through a military coup that overthrew the 
Goryeo Kingdom, the religion of which was Buddhism. After reading the book, I came to 
realize why every time Korean politicians seize power, they take up the chant of weeding out 
corruption. Kim argues that such a cyclic repetition is inherent in Confucianism.” Kim Kyung-
il argues that Confucianism played a role in the three major 20th-century disasters in Korea. 
First, the 1910 Japanese annexation was due to incompetent leaders who were ignorant of 
international politics, which led to the loss of sovereignty (Kim Seong-kon 2017). Second, the 
Korean War in 1950 highlighted factional hatred and hostility, rooted in Confucianism, as North 
and South Korea, despite sharing language and culture, were intolerant of each other due to 
political ideologies and power struggles (Kim 2017). Third, the 1997 financial crisis resulted 
from national overconfidence, self-deception, and unrealistic ambitions (Kim 2017). As such, 
South Korean politics still understands itself to be in a special authoritarian position, even if 
democratically elected, rooted in the Confucian self-understanding of authority and 



 

 

Schmitz   123 

subjugation.49 However, it seems that after 1945, Kim restricts his point of view on the ROK, 
since the famine in the DPRK, which was definitely also one of the disasters of the 20th century 
on Korean soil, is not mentioned as such. Furthermore, “[T]he futurologist Herman Kahn first 
made a direct connection between the traditional values of so-called ‘neo-Confucian’ societies 
(Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) and economic success” (Jochim 
1992, 137). However, “[a]s the term ‘Neo-Confucian’ already had a standard use in the history 
of Chinese thought, the term ‘post-Confucian’ came to be used in connection with the 
hypothesis that certain Chinese cultural values rooted in the Confucian tradition have a positive 
effect on economic development in societies where Confucianism no longer exists as a political 
or religious institution” (1992, 137-138). I strongly agree with this theory: even though these 
societies do not have a spiritually fixed Confucian order anymore, the remnants of 
Confucianism have a positive effect on the development of capitalism and the economic growth 
under the capitalist system there. Of course, along with this, both the positive and negative 
effects of modern capitalism have also become established in these countries. From a Marxist 
perspective, industrialization and the formation of exploitative oligopolies among those who 
own the means of production have been fully established and thus a modern class society with 
the industrial bourgeois as the oppressor and the worker/employee proletarian as the oppressed. 
And since David Harvey argues “that capitalism does not solve its contradictions but rather 
redistributes them across space and time” (Ugalde 2024, 89, see also Ugalde 2024, 86), an 
industrialized capitalism in a post-Confucian society is still a capitalist class relationship, since 
the major problem of today’s society is the adoption of the industrial capitalist mode of 
production.50  
 
 
 
 

 
49 I argue that this is one of the main reasons that the ROK is an illiberal democracy today, and why it cannot 
proceed to become a liberal democratic state. 
50 Furthermore, one could argue that the ROK and Japan have also become victims of finance capitalism in the 
sense Collier defined it, as Japan is member of the G7 states and a strong military ally of the U.S., and the ROK 
was founded under U.S. guidance and is still a strong military ally of the U.S. Thus, neoliberal interests play a 
huge role in these countries. Note that one of the core themes of neoliberalism is the dominance of economic 
actors over governmental actors: Neoliberalism emphasizes the importance of free markets, privatization, and 
deregulation, thus acting in domains where states traditionally claimed a monopoly or at least claimed a 
dominating sphere of influence, such as the regulation of laws, civic norms and market norms, including the 
exclusion of critical infrastructure to exposure of the free-market economy and its interests. As the U.S. strongly 
promoted neoliberalism in the 20th century and Japan and the ROK were (and still are until today) close allies in 
critical domains, such as military, the enforcement of Cold War era U.S. interests in the region can be hardly 
overseen and have to be taken into consideration when analyzing the social transformation in the ROK and 
Japan. Of course, the partnership with the U.S. also brought benefits to Japan and the ROK, such as a security 
architecture in which Japan and the ROK would be able to defend themselves against their perceived “enemies” 
and as such security guarantees and defense stability played important roles. A final remark on the term 
monopoly finance capitalism: By using this term, I expressly do not agree with those who are trumpeting a 
global financial conspiracy or a New World Order. Rather, my usage and understanding of the term monpoloy 
finance capitalism echoes the fact that capitalism today no longer revolves around the production of goods in the 
first place, but rather around the shifting of resources and capital in a globalized world. As Collier describes it 
brilliantly: “Many of the divisions that had, in earlier eras, resulted in company-versus-union confrontations and 
other sorts of relations now got solved by merely dumping employees and moving production to another country 
and to a desperate and unorganized workforce” (2022, 3). Large financial institutions in particular are 
sometimes so important for a country’s economy that they are “too big to fail.” This means, conversely, that the 
state and thus also the society that the state represents can be blackmailed, and in case of doubt the state is 
forced to save the institution at all costs, even if this would not be in the interest of the state or the citizens, in 
order to avert greater damage. 



 

 

124   Cultural Logic 

 
The benefits of Confucianism and conclusion 

Thus, in the end, I want to emphasize that even if Confucianism contributed a large part 
to the fact that feudalism was able to be maintained in Korea for so long, Confucianism should 
not be demonized per se. Confucianism is a very fascinating religion that aims to create an all-
encompassing harmony. (This of course also included social harmony through established 
relationship structures.) Hou Jiaju “had listed the key features of traditional Chinese culture 
that encourage economic development, ‘all of which were advocated by Confucianism.’ They 
are diligence and thrift, tendency to save, respect for work, honesty, and harmony” (Jochim 
1992, 141). I would even argue that China, South Korea and Japan are economically so 
successful in terms of capitalism because of the Confucian attitude towards work and as well 
as awareness of obligations towards the employer. At the same time, one must be aware that 
Confucianism and Marxism are clearly mutually exclusive. Confucianism thrives on the 
assumption that not everyone can be in the same way equal, but rather has their own defined 
role in life. But that does not mean that one cannot advance within a Confucian society: the 
civil service examinations in the Chinese dynasties were meritocratic in nature. The fact that 
hard work and following clear structures lead to recognition and higher status shows that 
Confucianism presupposes a natural order. In Marxism, on the other hand, inequality is not 
natural but socially constructed, so that Marxism teaches that this inequality must be overcome 
because the bourgeois tries to maximize his own profit through exploitation or dispossession, 
while the proletariat lives in misery. Thus, Confucianism and classical Marxism are two 
completely contrary paradigms. As such, I want to argue that a society which is exclusively 
based on Confucian values and its hierarchies or whose values live on as remnants in a Western-
styled post-Confucian society might make a large contribution in establishing a neoliberal 
society, but cannot help us in building up a Socialist society, which is why it should not surprise 
us that the neo-feudal DPRK is actually capitalist in nature.51 On the other hand, I also want to 
argue that Confucianism and the Socialist cause are not contradictory: P. Chao, for instance, 
argues that “China has always been a class society where the upper classes are conscious of a 
natural obligation towards their social inferiors, and the inferiors look up to their superiors for 
exemplary conduct and right action. Thus by imitation and by a societal osmosis the high moral 
standards of Confucianism were transmitted down to China’s masses. Though China has been 
a class society socialism abounds in Confucian teachings. Again, though modem socialism 
originated in Europe, it also germinated in ancient China. We need not take pains in pointing 
out socialism in the teachings of Confucius and Mencius. These teachings inspired a great 
number of modern reformers with utopian thought” (1971, 328). And indeed there have been 
several thinkers who tried to combine Socialism with traditional Chinese thinking or 
personalities. One contemporary is Leo Koguan who advocates for a revival of Xuanyuanism/ 
Huangdiism (Xuan Yuan Thought) by claiming that the spirit of Xuan Yuan never vanished 
and could be seen in the ancient writers as well as in Mao Zedong, and as such, Leo claims, the 
CPC is upholding the Chinese heritage in continuing Xuan Yuan’s ideals (see Leo 2014).52 But 

 
51 I recommend reading Kim (2018), Wev (2020) and Schwekendiek & Xu (2020) for capitalist structures and 
the role of capitalism in the DPRK. Note that while classical feudalism is not a form of capitalism, neofeudal 
societies might be able to combine the feudal mode of production with the capitalist one: in the DPRK, this is 
done through shadowy markets, semi-official trade and parallel existing economies interceding the private and 
state economy. As such, songbun or rank in general is often a societal (prestige) factor, but not necessarily an 
economical one. In other words: One might have good prestige (such as soldiers, which are formally favored), 
but this does not spare one from living in misery (e.g., malnourishment among soldiers is not rare). 
52 In contrast, Wu (1975) already discussed the question whether it is adequate to see a continuity between 
Chinese philosophy and Maoism, and denied such a continuity. Instead, Maoism is a continuity of the ideas of 
Marx and Lenin and thus a transplantation of Marxism-Leninism on Chinese soil (Wu, 1975).  



 

 

Schmitz   125 

a Socialism with Confucian features, I argue, would not be built on Marxism, then. Instead we 
could say that Karl Marx and “Socialist” views in Confucianism go back to the same values.53 

 
Conclusion 

 
Castes and feudal classes have in common that they evolve out of economic principles, 

in which labor is divided. Once those who have gained a privileged status try to preserve it, 
while those who are in need for work to survive, but are unable to buy land, have to rent the 
land and work for a master or produce handmade goods for a master. Castes established 
themselves in the very interest of the higher-ranking lords (usually aristocrats or clergy) who 
want to protect their wealth and continue accumulation. As such, a caste protects the lords from 
interference by the populace into their state of affairs. In a non-caste feudal society, the feudal 
lords are masters by birth, but their societal status is not protected or codified in general and, 
therefore, their position can be subject to change. In contrast to that, castes are very pervasive, 
even if they are formally abolished, because the aristocratic castes regard themselves to be 
aristocratic by nature: they do not regard themselves as possessing a rank through a cultural 
appropriation, but they regard their rank to be a naturally given fact. This makes it difficult to 
contest castes and to break up their exclusive nature. Thus, castes are immune to revolutions 
and a socio-political change is very difficult to be adopted in practice, even if the castes are no 
longer inclusive in themselves, which means that befriending people from different castes 
becomes normal. Thus, the caste is a “mark” for life, in contrast to a feudal class society which 
can be subject to reforms. (Even if such reforms do not abolish classes but only bring forth 
another form of class society, such as the industrial revolution in which the bourgeoisie took 
over through owning the means of production, resulting in a distinction between the proletariat 
and the bourgeoisie in the modern sense.) 
 

What is noteworthy is the fact that it is often not easy to differentiate sharply between 
a caste and a feudal class, because every society is different and therefore more or less drawn 
toward the prototype of a caste. As such, the feudal Tibetan and pre-modern Korean societies 
can be grouped as semi-caste societies, because the socio-cultural framework made it difficult 
to shift one’s rank, though it was not impossible. The fact that the class was not an 
unchangeable lifelong brand makes it difficult to speak of a caste, but at the same time there 
were many social mechanisms and taboos that prevented one from changing one’s class easily, 
so that class membership was maintained through marriage and passed on to the next 
generation. Finally, while in a class society grievances can be overcome because one can draw 
attention to them and work to overcome them (i.e., through a peaceful class struggle), this is 
not possible in a caste society because the castes already limit what one can claim legitimately 
in a society (meaning that one’s rank is a limitation without a chance to go beyond this 
boundary). Consequently, a true social consensus can never really be achieved in a caste society 
because one cannot easily raise one’s voice if one is not in the position to do so due to the 
caste’s societal status. 
 

 
53 Though we could argue with Wu (1975) that these are only formal similarities, which are a result of 
abstraction or conceptual elaboration, but this does not mean that one has to do anything with the other, and 
thus, if we argued in this way, it would be anachronistic to call Confucian welfare ideals to be Socialist. On the 
other hand, two thinkers are able to have similar ideas independently of each other in two different places on the 
globe, which means that both abstracted the same particular value, even if both stand in different schools of 
thought. Thus, certain ideas of both schools, Marxism and Confucianism, might theoretically draw to the same 
values, even though there is no historical continuity or interception among them.  



 

 

126   Cultural Logic 

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Author 
 

Timo Schmitz received an MA in philosophy and political science from the University of 
Trier, where he is currently a PhD student in philosophy. Schmitz has two favorite interests 
that could not be more different: (1) philosophy of antiquity, especially ancient Greece, with a 
focus on Platonism, and (2) Juche ideology, the state doctrine of the DPRK, its principles and 
theoretical components as well as its practical outcome. Additionally, he has a great interest 
in China and its ethnic diversity.

https://ssrn.com/abstract=1839461


 

Since 1997 
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Rich Gibson  
San Diego State University 
 
Martha Gimenez  
University of Colorado (retired)  
 
Gregory Meyerson  
North Carolina A&T State University  

 
 
 
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University of Massachusetts Boston  
 
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University of British Columbia  
 
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Winston-Salem State University (retired) 

 

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