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Defense and Security Studies  Original Research 
Vol. 5, No. 2, 2024, pp. 65-73 
https://doi.org/10.37868/dss.v5.id268 

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 65 

 
 

The changing contours of insecurity in Katsina: A threat assessment 
 
Abdullahi Muhammad Maigari1* 
1Al-Qalam University Katsina, Department of Sociology, Nigeria  
 
 

*Corresponding author E-mail:  maigariabdullahi@auk.edu.ng   

Received: Jul. 9, 2024 
Revised: Aug. 15, 2024 
Accepted: Aug. 16, 2024 
Online: Aug. 20, 2024 

Abstract 
Threats from armed bandits and kidnappers in Northwestern Nigeria are in different 
forms. The landscape of security challenges has changed since 2016, with the intensive 
war against Islamic insurgents in Northeastern Nigeria called Boko Haram has changed 
the contours of security challenges in Nigeria. The manifestation of different security 
threats has been on the increase and the armed bandits have continued to wreak havoc on 
communities and highways in different parts of Nigeria. The security challenge is now a 
hydra-headed monster, which if one head is cut, another head will develop in Nigeria. 
This article has assessed the current security situation and challenges that beleaguered 
some States in the Northwest geopolitical zone of Nigeria with a particular interest in 
Katsina State. The researcher evaluated secondary data on the performance of security 
personnel deployed to the conflict-affected areas in Katsina, State.  The assessment 
covered January to June 2024. However, the data are classified information hence the 
identity of the personnel and persons who divulged the information cannot be revealed in 
line with the principles of anonymity in research ethics. The findings found that some of 
the armed groups in parts of Katsina State are kidnapping people to remove some vital 
organs from their bodies and sell them to those who traffic human organs. Based on the 
assessment, the affected Local Government Areas in Katsina State are categorized into 
four (4) based on the severity and magnitude of kidnapping, cattle rustling and ransacking 
of villages. Drawing from the findings, the researcher has developed policies and 
strategies to address the changing contours of security challenges in the affected areas and 
Nigeria.  

As a tradition in threat assessment, the researcher has provided policy recommendations 
to achieve or implement the policies and strategies. The activities of the armed bandits 
and organ traffickers portend a grave danger now and in the future as many people would 
be involved in the business of human organs due to their lucrative nature. The government 
should develop strategies that will enable the rural communities not to be vulnerable to 
attacks from armed bandits. Armed groups who kill and kidnap residents at will for 
ransom and organ trafficking if not tamed will recruit new foot soldiers hence aggravating 
the situation. Addressing security threats can be achieved by deploying enough security 
personnel at the border between the Niger Republic and Nigeria. Security personnel 
should deploy electronic scanners and long-range cameras to monitor and arrest the influx 
of foreign and domestic dealers in human organs and weapons for appropriate 
punishment.  

© The Author  2024. 
Published by ARDA. Keywords:  Armed banditry, Kidnapping, Security, Threats, Organ Trafficking 

1. Introduction  

Threats from armed bandits and kidnappers in Northwestern Nigeria are in different forms. The landscape of 
security challenges has changed since 2016, with the intensive war against Islamic insurgents in Northeastern 
Nigeria called Boko Haram has changed the contours of security challenges in Nigeria. The manifestation of 



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66 

different security threats has been on the increase and the armed bandits have continued to wreak havoc on 
communities and highways in different parts of Nigeria. The security challenge is now a hydra-headed 
monster, which if one head is cut, another head will develop in Nigeria. The threats posed by the marauding 
armed groups in Northwestern Nigeria are taking different shapes and colours. The landscape of insecurity is 
expanding, as some terrorist groups are aligning with the armed bandits in the Northwest and parts of Niger 
State. The alliance between the armed bandits and international terrorist organizations operating in the 
corridors of West Africa is a major security threat to the corporate existence of Nigeria. Amani Africa Report 
No. 13 [1] has succinctly summarized how all parts of Africa, have been affected by different forms of 
security threats. There is currently no longer a part of the continent where terrorist organizations are not 
active. As more and more regions run the potential of becoming the scene of terrorist operations, this global 
expansion keeps going. The threats from terrorist groups and organizations pose a great problem to humanity 
as terrorists and armed criminals resort to the use of sophisticated weapons against unarmed civilians. 
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism reported that there is a connection between the offenders' 
ideologies and the tools they employ in their attacks. While not all of these trends are as obvious, the majority 
of Jihadists use physical weapons (most often knives), the majority of right-wing extremist terrorists use 
firearms, and the majority of left-wing extremist terrorists commit arson or use fire bombs [7]. The annual 
threat assessment of the U.S. intelligence community [4] assessed the security threats in West Africa which 
Nigeria is included. The report stated that the stability of West Africa will be threatened by an explosive 
concoction of terrorism, inter-communal violence, and democratic regress. Recent illegitimate transfers of 
power in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali show the region's brittleness and, in some cases, the public's 
perception that their government is unable to manage rising insecurity or successfully provide services. Some 
of the still-powerful authorities are adopting autocratic, state-centric, and religious forms of government, 
concentrating security in important urban areas while handing over rural areas to jihadists [4]. 
In this assessment of security threats in Katsina State and its neighboring States in the Northwest geopolitical 
zone of Nigeria, the researcher evaluated the current situation in Local Government Areas that are under 
constant attacks. Incidence of kidnapping, cattle rustling, and ransacking of villages by armed bandits. This 
threat assessment attempts to explain why some areas than others, are more vulnerable to attacks by the armed 
groups operating in the affected areas and the consequences of such attacks, killings, and population 
displacement. Additionally, this article also explored an emerging type of crime by the armed groups 
operating in Northwestern Nigeria to source money to buy weapons and food.  This type of crime is unknown 
to many researchers and organizations interested in security studies and policy as well as border studies. The 
sales of captives by armed groups to human traffickers at the international frontiers between Nigeria and the 
Niger Republic as well as the Benin Republic is attracting the attention of security experts and social 
researchers in Nigeria and other parts of Africa. This is because reputable research organizations like The 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in their report on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks 
Arising from Migrant Smuggling [2] did not include the sales of kidnapped victims to those who are into the 
illegal transactions in organ harvesting. The FATF report [2] revealed that there have been instances of 
migrant smugglers using their opportunities to commit other crimes, some of which are directly related to but 
not necessarily implied by migrant smugglings, such as forgery, the corruption of border agencies and other 
public institutions to aid in travel, and even the administration of addictive drugs to control and exploit their 
victims. These additional crimes include the trafficking of illegal drugs, theft, harassment, sexual assault, 
blackmail, human trafficking, robbery, murder, and the exploitation of labour. Because this crime is 
transnational, migrant traffickers can also smuggle products, drugs, and weapons. 

However, Scheper-Hughes [6] documented how a terrorist group in Syria had engaged in the illicit business of 
selling the organs of human beings they captured during the war and along the US and Mexican border by 
drug cartels.  When police and government officials raided the Institute of Forensic Medicine in Yemen in 
2012, they found 8,200 body parts that had been stored there. The government acknowledged that the practice 
of harvesting body parts without permission had become the norm that it was illegal and unethical, that it 



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needed to be acknowledged, that families needed to be compensated, and that the bones, tissues, organs, and 
other body parts needed to be identified and returned to the families of the victims. 

To carry out this assessment, the researchers assessed secondary data from security operatives and residents of 
the villages affected by the insecurity in Katsina and the neighboring Zamfara States. Assessing the security 
threats and situation of Katsina State alone would be insufficient without including some parts of Zamfara 
State because of their proximity and similarity of their population composition. Military personnel, the 
Nigeria Police Force, the Nigeria Immigration Service, the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking 
Persons (NAPTIP), and residents of the affected communities provided valuable information for this 
assessment.  

2. Current security challenge in Katsina state 

Local Government Areas of the State are categorized based on their level of security threats or challenges 
(Fig. 1). The magnitude of the security challenge in Katsina varies from one Local Government Area to 
another. Based on the classification below, all the Local Government Areas located that are along the Kamuku 
forest which runs from Birnin-Gwarin Kaduna State to Jibiya LGA in Katsina are classified as areas with a 
severe and high threat of attacks of armed bandits or kidnappers. In this document, those LGAs are referred to 
as corridors of violence because the forest has become a haven for terrorists and armed groups.  

 

Figure 1. Level of security threats 

2.1 Causes of insecurity 

There are multiple causal factors of security challenges in different places in the world. Some of the causal 
factors are context-specific or unique to a particular place. In the context of Katsina State, some of the causes 
are as follows. 

2.1.1. Root causes 

The causal factors that triggered some people in Katsina and other parts of Northwestern Nigeria to take up 
arms against the citizens and security agencies are multi-dimensional. However, armed banditry, kidnapping 
and cattle rustling are not the same as other violent conflicts in Northeast (Boko Haram), farmer-herder 
conflict in Central Nigeria and secessionist movement under the Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) and 
Eastern Security Network (ESN) in Southeast Nigeria. In Katsina State, areas that are beleaguered by security 

SEVERE 
(Severe risk of armed criminal atttacks LGAs)

Bakori, Dandume, Faskari, Sabuwa, 
Kankara 

HIGH 

(High risk of armed criminals attacks)

Batsari, Safana, Danmusa, Jibiya

ELEVATED

(Significant risk of attacks)

Batagarawa, Katsina, Dutsin-Ma, 
Kurfi, Charanchi, Kankia, Kaita

LOW (Low risk of attacks): 

Baure, Ingawa, Mashi, Mani, 
Dutsi, Daura, Sandamu, Mai-

adua, Zango 



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challenges have a history of traditional cattle theft among the nomadic groups who are known for animal 
husbandry. The cattle rustling has continued unchecked for decades and the nomadic Fulani started running 
out of their livestock which is their major source of livelihood and an indicator of social status in the society. 
As time went by, the children of the herders grew up without livestock for herding and formal education that 
would enable them to have formal employment as a means of livelihood either in the villages or in the town 
apart from herding livestock.  In summary, the proximate causes of armed violence and kidnapping are: 

(a) Depletion of livestock in the possession of the nomadic groups. 
(b) Lack of formal education and vocational training in the rural areas to provide alternative livelihood 

options for the children of the nomads and farmers. Over the decades, all tiers of Government (Local, 
State, and Federal Government) in Nigeria have not anticipated the impeding danger of neglecting the 
nomadic population wit live in the forest and bush without livestock and formal education. 

2.1.2 Proximate causes 

One of the proximate causes of security challenges (Fig. 2) in some parts of Katsina State and some 
neighboring States of Kaduna and Zamfara is the existence of the forest which harbors criminal elements. 
From Kaduna State to Katsina and Zamfara, all the Local Government Areas that the forest passes through 
them, are the worst hit by the activities of the armed criminals, terrorizing the residents and the commuters. In 
this document, all the LGAs in Katsina State that Rugu Forest passes through are classified as "Severe Risk 
Areas".  The criminals find it easy to move from Niger State to Kaduna via Birnin Gwari to Katsina to 
Zamfara, Sokoto and Kebbi State without plying the highway. This has made it difficult for security agencies 
to track their movements, identify their location, and know their identity.  

Another proximate cause of the security challenges is the proliferation of lethal weapons in the West African 
Sub-region since the fall of Mu'ammar Gadhafi in 2011. Niger Republic which has a boundary with the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria is one of the destinations of weapons and fighters from Libya, Chad and Mali. 
Therefore, weapons and fighters from the neighbouring countries of Libya have citizens who participated in 
the war in Libya, Mali, or Chad and have been using the Niger Republic as a transit route to Nigeria. This is 
because a large segment of the border between Nigeria and the Niger Republic is unmanned and hence 
exacerbates or transforms the existing security challenge in Nigeria. The skills and techniques that armed 
criminals displayed in Northern Nigeria from 2009 to 2022 indicate that the majority of them had undergone 
some illegal forms of weapons training either inside or outside Nigeria. In this regard, the smuggling of 
weapons and ammunition to different criminal groups in Nigeria has led to the formation of an illegal cartel 
which in this document are referred to as conflict merchants or entrepreneurs, that is, those who are into the 
business of selling weapons and ammunition. Some of these merchants import their contraband goods from 
foreign countries by smuggling them to Nigeria and selling them to criminals. Some assist the kidnappers with 
information about people to be kidnapped or assist them in negotiating ransom with the relatives of the 
kidnapped persons. It has been observed that security challenges have provided an opportunity for the cartel of 
merchants or entrepreneurs to get money. 

3. Results 

The assessment of the threat posed by the security challenges in some parts of Katsina is discussed below. 

3.1. From kidnappers to human vendors: changing contours of insecurity 

Terrorist organizations worldwide devise different methods to raise funds to finance their activities (Fig. 3). 
From engaging in drug trafficking, money laundering, money courier, illegal mining and engaging in import 
and export of goods to donations from their sympathizers. However, kidnapping and rustling of livestock in 
Katsina State is taking a different path which is new in the area. Kidnappers in some parts of Katsina State are 



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69 

no longer demanding ransom from hostages and their relatives again. Some of the kidnappers or hostage 
takers are selling their victims to international syndicates who are in the illegal business of organ harvesting. 

 

Figure 2. Causes of insecurity in Katsina State 

The syndicates are operating between the Niger Republic and the Nigerian border, buying people who are 
kidnapped in Katsina, Sokoto, Zamfara, Kebbi and Niger States. This horrific situation is not known to the 
majority of the security operatives and political leaders in the affected places. This constitutes the most 
horrendous security threat as it changes the contours of security challenges in the entire Nigeria. The security 
challenge started as a traditional warfare of stealing livestock among the nomadic groups and metamorphosed 
into a conflict between pastoral groups (farmers) and herders. It has now moved beyond farmers-herders 
conflict to hostage-taking or kidnapping people for ransom to the senseless killing of people before they 
kidnap and steal food items and livestock. As most of the communities were running out of livestock, the 
armed bandits also changed their demands after taking a hostage to put levies on farmers before they were 
allowed to work in their farms in pre-, during and post-harvest periods. The majority of the farmers in the 
areas are subsistence farmers whose farm produce when sold, cannot settle the amount levied on them. In 
realization of the shattered economic life of the people in the affected areas, they had no means to pay the 
ransom, the terrorists resorted to the selling of human beings to willing buyers.  
 

  

Figure 3. Methods to raise funds for terrorist organizations 

ROOT CASUES 

PROXIMATE CASUES  

CAUSSES OF 
INSECURITY  

PROXIMATE CAUSES

1. Rugu Forest

2. Proliferation of weapons 

3. Existence of conflict entrepreneurs 
/merchants

ROOT CASUES

1, Historic livestock theft 

2. Depletion of livestock 

3. Lack of alternative livelihood 

HUMAN 
VENDORS 

RUSTLING OF 
LIVESTOCK

KIDNAPPING
RANSACKING 

COMMUNITIES 

LEVIES ON 
RESIDENTS 



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70 

Existing literature and research findings in areas where terrorist groups and other criminals operate in Nigeria 
and other parts of Africa have not documented the dramatic shift from kidnapping people for ransom to selling 
them to criminal cartels who are in the business of organ harvesting in Asia and Europe. For example, Idris [3] 
stated that Nigeria is a supplier and route of human traffickers. Nigerians from rural and conflict-affected 
areas are victims of trafficking, as are those from neighboring nations like Benin who are transported to Libya 
(and Europe) via Nigeria. Boko Haram has earned a bad reputation for kidnapping women and children for 
forced marriage, sexual enslavement, and domestic service. Examples include the kidnapping of 276 girls 
from a school in Borno State in May 2014 and 110 students from a school in Yobe State in 2018. In the work 
of Idris, selling human beings to human traffickers who are into the illegal business of organ harvesting is not 
mentioned because, at the time he conducted the research, such a problem had not started.   

This current situation in States in Nigeria such as Sokoto, Katsina, Niger, Zamfara, and Kebbi is fast turning 
to what happened in some countries like Syria, Yemen, Mexico, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The terrorists and 
other non-state actors fuelling insecurity in Northwestern Nigeria have now realized that community members 
can no longer meet their huge amount for ransom after they kidnapped their relatives hence exploring a more 
lucrative avenue for sourcing money to finance their illegal activities as well as feeding and procurement of 
weapons. Organ trafficking in conflict-ravaged areas had started in other countries before kidnapping for 
ransom and the sale of organs became a new trend of sourcing funds by the criminals operating in the areas 
assessed in this article. Scheper-Hughes [6] revealed that Boris Wolfman (also known as Volfman) was 
detained in Istanbul in December 2015. He had been recruiting Syrian refugees to sell their organs to foreign 
transplant tourists who would be treated in one of the many private transplant facilities in Turkish hospitals. 
Indicted for organizing illegal kidney transplant procedures in shady clinics in Kosovo, Azerbaijan, Sri Lanka, 
and other locations for foreign transplant patients willing to pay upwards of $100,000 for an illegal transplant 
with a kidney from an unnamed trafficked person, Wolfman was a wanted man in Israel. Wolfman was 
regarded as cruel by both transplant tourists and kidney buyers. He belonged to a global network of organized 
crime that operated on a global scale. Early on, it was quite simple to find new immigrants to Israel who were 
eager to live there but in need of assistance. These immigrants were mainly refugees from nations like 
Moldova, Ukraine, and Romania that had experienced economic collapse. Brokers visited new arrivals and 
assisted them in obtaining residency and even citizenship in Israel in exchange for their willingness to aid the 
country by selling a kidney in a foreign clinic for several thousand dollars.  

Furthermore, kidney trafficking in Syria has always been a problem for the poor and members of ethnic 
minorities. Selling kidneys to the destitute was a last resort before the wars that destroyed the nation; it was an 
unsightly but common practice. Today, kidney smugglers traffic Syrian migrants and accept them into prison 
facilities. Raad, a 19-year-old Syrian refugee, and his six siblings left Aleppo for Beirut, Lebanon. He was 
approached by Abu Hussain, a kidney hunter, there. Hussain, like Boris Wolfman, had kidney runners find 
recently arrived refugees and offer them money and assistance with immigration authorities in exchange for 
selling a kidney. What could be more advantageous than trading a kidney for a temporary visa? Similar to 
Turkey, Lebanon has long been a destination for thousands of transplant tourists, many of whom are from the 
Persian Gulf. The kidneys needed by transplant patients were previously supplied by Palestinian refugees in 
Jordan and Lebanon before Syrians started filling this void. Syrian refugees are today's new, cheaper, and 
more desperate bait [6]. 

Unlike slavery, servitude, prostitution-related exploitation, or sexual exploitation, "removal of organs" is 
different from the other prohibited types of exploitation in that it is not an activity that is necessarily 
exploitative. The 2000 Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, along with the 
2002 Additional Protocol thereto on the transplantation of organs, prohibits profiting from the sale of the 
human body and its parts as well as "organ and tissue trafficking." This prohibition is in addition to the 
Palermo Protocol [5]. 



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Based above discourse, engaging in trade in human organs by the terrorist groups in Nigeria indicates the 
existence of another means of getting funds to run their activities. This is corroborated by the -- Terrorist 
organizations may gain from human trafficking in a variety of ways, including the ability to continue their 
terrorist actions through human resources, tactical agility, and ideological reinforcement. Men, women, and 
children are trafficked to work for terrorist organizations in a variety of capacities. In addition, women and 
girls are trafficked to serve as combatants' sexual payoffs [5]. 

4. Way/means to address the current challenges 

This threat assessment covered January to June 2024.  It takes a team effort and contributions from numerous 
national and international organizations, including law enforcement agencies, the military, the intelligence 
services, the financial sector, the diplomatic service, and health organizations to effectively combat terrorism. 
Organization, cooperation, and coordination are essential to success. Therefore, kidnapping and other forms of 
armed violence in Northern Nigeria are not an exception. Table 1. Presents policy and strategy to address 
security challenges. 

Table 1. Policy and strategy to address security challenges 

Policy Strategy Short-term 
(1 year) 

Medium-term 
(2 years) 

Long-term 
(4 years) 

 Education (Formal 
& Informal) 

Establishment of 
schools for nomadic 
and farmer’s children  

Establishment of 
Primary Schools 

Construction of 
Houses for Head 
Teacher & Teachers in 
the respective villages  

Establishment of Junior 
& senior secondary 
schools. 

Deployment of 
Security operatives 

A holistic approach in 
the fight against the 
armed bandits. 
Combined operations 
across States facing 
security challenges in 
the Northwest & Niger 
State 

Prosecute the 
arrested 
criminals to 
serve as a 
deterrence to 
other criminals. 

For those who 
surrendered their 
weapons willingly, the 
Government Liaises 
with the National 
Directorate of 
Employment for 
vocational training. 

Establishment of Police 
Outpost and NSCDC 
Office in villages to 
ensure the presence of 
security in remote 
areas.  

Digitalize all inter-
state Roads in 
Katsina State 

Digital Roads  Digital roads 
with a camera-
powered solar 
system will 
enable security 
agencies to track 
& monitor 
vehicular 
movements in 
the entire state 
simultaneously. 

Availability of modern 
electronic gadgets for 
security surveillance 
and monitoring. 

The government should 
have a Mass 
Surveillance document 
for the State. This 
enables any time when 
new security personnel 
is deployed to Katsina 
State will have a 
working security 
document.  

Non-kinetic 
Approach  

Dialogue with the 
criminals 

Identify 
authentic leaders 
of the armed 
groups and their 
locations. 

Involvement of 
Miyetti Allah Kautel 
Hore, Miyetti Allah 
Cattle Breeders & JNI 
as the mediators 
between Government 
& armed groups. 

Resettlement of the 
displaced persons. 
Identify the victims & 
quantify the damage for 
compensation. 

Eradication of illiteracy among the nomadic groups was one of the rationales behind the establishment of the 
National Commission for Nomadic Education (NCNE) in Nigeria. However, for more than three decades, 



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72 

from 1989-2022, there has been no presence of the Commission's activity or projects in the rural areas of 
Katsina State where armed banditry has become the order of the day. The government needs to liaise with the 
NCNE in collaboration with the State Universal Basic Education (SUBEB) to ensure that the children of the 
nomadic groups are not out of school. This will enable the children to acquire skills and knowledge to survive 
in the ever-changing 21st century.  

5. Conclusions  

The security situation in the areas assessed showed that part of the survival imperatives by the armed bandits 
and kidnappers is the use of hybrid methods of raising funds for their activities. They collected ransom for 
hostage-taking and also, sold the victims to internationally organized syndicates of organ traffickers operating 
in West Africa. The destination of human organs from West Africa is mostly Asia, particularly India and 
China. The National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) in Nigeria has expressed 
concern over the number of people who were kidnapped and later disappeared at the hands of the kidnappers.  
Before 2022, different armed groups were operating in Northwestern Nigeria, stealing livestock that is known 
as cattle rustlers. The criminals were not eliminated by the authorities concerned and grew hydra-heeds hence 
the cattle rustlers developed or established a connection with existing criminals along the international 
boundaries between Nigeria, Niger Republic, Republic of Benin, Chad and Cameroon.  

Similarly, the existence of Islamic fundamentalist groups in Nigeria known as Boko Haram which later 
established a working alliance with ISIS has made it easier for the criminal groups to access weapons. The fall 
of Mu’ammar Gadhafi as the leader of Libya led to the spread of weapons and fighters who fought in support 
of the former Libyan leader.  Previous studies have shown that there are different cartels of international 
criminals who are in the business of migrant smuggling. The main purpose of migrant smuggling is to provide 
an illicit service, which the migrants pay for and thereby authorize. However, human trafficking makes use of 
compulsion, trickery, and other tactics to compel someone to be exploited against their will. The involvement 
of the armed bandits in the acts of organ trafficking and exchange of captives for weapons has added another 
dimension to the existing fragile situation. Human beings are not killed to remove their organs instead of 
ransom collection.   

The threats posed by the armed bandits in their connection with Islamic Jihadists and organ trafficking cartels 
portends a grave danger not in the Northwest alone but in other parts of Nigeria. The States which are located 
at the border between the Niger Republic and Nigeria are the most vulnerable and easy prey to these criminals 
because the Niger Republic serves as an easy exit posit and route to enter Libya on the road to Europe or Asia, 
where they sell such human organs for transplant. This assessment has opened a fresh perspective in dealing 
with the security threats in Katsina State and other affected States in Northwestern Nigeria. With this problem 
on the ground, the Government and security operatives will have to deal with a complex situation where 
armed bandits kill people sporadically, for ransom and organ trafficking.  

Policy recommendations are the following: 
1) Protect the communities: The government should develop strategies that will enable the rural 

communities not to be vulnerable to attacks from armed bandits and terrorist groups who kill and kidnap 
residents at will for ransom and organ trafficking. This can be achieved by deploying enough security 
personnel at the border between the Niger Republic and Nigeria. The security personnel will check and 
arrest the influx of foreign and domestic dealers in human organs for appropriate punishment. 

2) Policy of communication: The target beneficiaries of the government policy regarding security strategy 
should be well-communicated through community engagement with the affected persons and their 
stakeholders. This will enable the target persons to accept or embrace the policy initiated. The government 
should utilize the potential of Islamic preachers, traditional rulers and community leaders of both farmers 
and herders to deliver the gospel of peace and its benefits. 



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73 

3) Funding of security: Funds meant for security should be judiciously used to ensure that security agencies 
are properly remunerated. Both Federal and State Governments should support security agencies with 
modern operational gadgets, facilities, and equipment to enable them to protect the lives and property of 
the citizens. 

4) Performance evaluation unit: Tracking of results in line with the policy and strategies designed. This 
Unit would serve as a watchdog that will monitor and assess the performance of people charged with the 
responsibility of protecting the citizens doing their work. Through termly performance reviews, 
Government or security agencies can detect or identify any personnel who deserve commendation and 
otherwise. This unit will become a very important component in the implementation of the security policy 
and strategy of the Government. Hence it will also enable the Government not to deviate from its setup 
goals. 

Declaration of competing interest 

The author declares that they have no known financial or non-financial competing interests in any material 
discussed in this paper. 

Funding information  

No funding was received from any financial organization to conduct this research. 

References 

[1] A. Africa, "The growing threats of terrorism in Africa: A product of misdiagnosis and faulty policy 
response?", Special Research Report No. 13, 2022. 

[2] FATF, "ML/TF Risks Arising from Migrant Smuggling," FATF, Paris, France, 2022. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/migrant-smuggling.html. [Accessed: 
02-Aug-2024]. 

[3] I. Idris, "Responses to conflict, irregular migration, human trafficking, and illicit flows along transnational 
pathways in West Africa", XCEPT Evidence Synthesis, GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 
Birmingham, UK, 2022. 

[4] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Annual threat assessment of the U.S. intelligence 
community", Jan. 2022. 

[5] OSCE Office, "Where and How They Intersect: Analysis and recommendations for more effective policy 
responses", The Special Representative and Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings 
Trafficking in Human Beings and Terrorism, 2021. 

[6] N. Scheper-Hughes, "Organ trafficking during times of war and political conflict", Human Trafficking 
Search, 2016. 

[7] T. van Dongen, W. Wentworth, and H. R. Arkhis, "Terrorist threat assessment 2019-2021", International 
Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2022. 


