Appreciating Complexity: The Chief of Staff of the Army Game Page 160 - Developments in Business Simulation and Experiential Learning, volume 38, 2011 ABSTRACT When Army officers are promoted to the rank of Major, they become field grade officers with the responsibility of planning, organizing and leading large unit formations, working on high level staffs and running the Army day to day. The “Future Force” game is an experiential learning simulation designed to introduce them to the complexity of supporting the current force in its world-wide missions while simultaneously designing and shaping the force for all possible mission profiles for the next 20 years. Played early in their change management curriculum, the game provides a common frame of reference for further detailed technical lessons. This paper describes the game design process from conception to application. INTRODUCTION Each year, more than 1500 Majors from the United States Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, along with more than 100 specially selected international officers of equivalent rank, are assigned to attend the United States Army Command & General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth Kansas. In 2010, the vast majority of these officers are combat veterans with an average of 3 combat tours in the last 5 years, with more tours expected in the near future. This extraordinarily high rate of combat experi- ence has been true of the student officer population for sev- eral years and is projected to remain constant for the next 5 years. This collection of student officers is more experi- enced in combat operations characterized by uncertainty, complexity and non-doctrinal solutions as any cohort of officers in the history of CGSC (Long, 2009). These offi- cers attend the year-long Command & General Staff Col- lege at Ft Leavenworth, Kansas for education in Leader- ship, History Strategy, Tactics, and Logistics. The logistics curriculum includes an 18 hour course in Army Force Management in which they are intro- duced to the Army’s processes for designing, raising, man- ning, equipping, deploying and sustaining ready field forces. The Army’s complex Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES)is nested within an even more complex Department of the Defense system. All of which are designed to field the right Army at the right time in the right place to support the nation’s defense objectives. This collection of processes are performed by the Generating Force, which is led by the Army’s senior officer, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), who is charged with the leadership, management, design and readiness of all Army forces. In the 10 years following their graduation, CGSC students will have a variety of assign- ments that require them to become masters of organiza- tional planning and management on a vast scale. Nothing in their previous experience has prepared them for their future assignments as field grade officers, where they lead and manage large unit formations, work on high level staffs, and run the Army day to day. The com- plexity and uncertainty they will be asked to appreciate and manage will be of a different nature than the world of direct action combat. They will be asked to plan for multiple missions, manage budgets, design and equip new forms of organizations, assemble mixed task forces of new kinds of units and make them ready for combat in a wide variety of mission profiles in different parts of the world against newly emerging threats. Traditional technical education, which emphasizes lecture by subject matter experts with knowledge tested by formal examinations, has proven unsuitable and unsatisfy- ing in equipping students with the necessary cognitive skills to survive and thrive in the complex world of force management. Student and faculty surveys had repeatedly described problems with the complex material, citing diffi- culties in seeing the big picture, understanding the rele- vance to their future assignments, and seeing how individ- ual technical lessons fit into larger systems and processes. CGSC faculty in the logistics department devel- oped a pilot program to assess the usefulness of experien- tial learning, using a small worlds simulation to help stu- dents and faculty visualize the complexity of Army force generation and force management. This paper describes the process of developing the Future Force game from design through prototyping to implementation which in six months made significant improvements in all measured areas of education quality and in the satisfaction levels of students and faculty alike. INITIAL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS In the initial planning session, key faculty mem- bers and subject matter experts described the problem and opportunity space. Force management is hard to do and may even be harder to teach, especially to operations career APPRECIATING COMPLEXITY: THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY GAME Ken Long US Army Command & General Staff School long-kenneth@conus.army.mil mailto:long-kenneth@conus.army.mil Page 161 - Developments in Business Simulation and Experiential Learning, volume 38, 2011 field officers who have not directly experienced or been educated in the processes of the Generating Force. The design group focused on top-level educational outcomes that the students must appreciate. Any piece of curriculum must address these issues: 1. How is the Army SUPPOSED run? 2. How DOES it run? 3. How are its processes EVOLVING? 4. How COULD it run better? 5. How SHOULD it run? One of the most challenging aspects of teaching Force Management is finding the balance between technical terms and detailed processes and a high-level overview of the important professional questions officers must contend with in their career. Operations career field officers are rarely called upon to become experts in broad generating force processes, but their ability to define requirements, establish priorities, allocate resources, manage risk and provide guidance are essential elements of Army Force Management. The design group incorporated students in the design process from the beginning, to ensure any proposal would be teachable and meaningful from their perspective. In a classroom discussion one day, the team decided to construct on the white board a “systems dynamics” process map of what they imagined the Chief of Staff of the Army’s decision process looked like concerning how to design, equip, sustain and manage an Army. They consid- ered the constraints and conditions of time, money, politics, uncertainty, full spectrum operations, the global informa- tion environment, and multiple thinking, adaptive enemies competing with Army forces in the operational environ- ment. The white board diagramming led to experiential, collaborative learning that students and faculty rated very highly for effectiveness and shared understanding that day. They called it the “Chief of Staff of the Army game” and created a slide to capture the essence of our diagram and discussions. We often referred back to that experience and the slide in later lessons. This is a common experience for organizations that adopt a systems dynamics modeling ap- proach to understand their own processes. These models can often be profitably turned into management simulations Figure 1 Strategic Asset Allocation Model: Chief of Staff, Army National Interest Region: Payoff X = Value to US Payoff Y = Value to Competitor Attrition & Results 1 2 3 A B C Refit $ Produce Save Info Uncertainty X Y Z Competitors w/ strategies 1. CSA decides: Allocate $ between: Save, Invest, Produce, Refit, Info, Maintain Force Pool • Save: returns $ • Invest: improves tech level capability • Produce: Generates forces among type A,B,C; each has cost & time factor • Refit: Converts types of forces to other types more cheaply than generating new • Info: Provides more certainty about opponent strategy • Force Pool: maintains available forces 2. Type A,B,C forces have different times, costs and effectiveness against Opponent strategy 3. Lag time for converting forces in Refit & Production 4. Info yields probabilities and confidence intervals 5. National Interest regions have different payoffs for US and for Opponent; Opponents have different victory conditions 6. Each “turn” produces victory points in each Region which has payoff (+/-) for US $ 7. Next stretch: all functions are probability distributions, not linear functions Force Pool Budget guidance ARFORGEN Invest Maintain Refit Page 162 - Developments in Business Simulation and Experiential Learning, volume 38, 2011 that allow others to experience and explore the rich descrip- tion of the organization and its environment, and come to a better common understanding. The group published the slide and explanation on the college blog and shared it among select faculty who found it useful, as is, as an educational artifact. RAPID PROTOTYPING WITH A SIMPLE CARD GAME Using the systems dynamics diagram as a guide, the design group next modeled a card game that applied a sim- ple ruleset and a half deck of cards to create an interesting game that could be learned and played in a classroom in less than an hour that was very well received by students and faculty who tried it out. The development of the rule- set, much like the slide before it, became a powerful learn- ing artifact above and beyond the direct insights generated during the play of the game. The card game evolved into several variations of in- creasing complexity, which led to an increase in accuracy and realism, but which sacrificed playability and enthusi- asm for the experience. The insights from these variations of the card game prototype yielded important insights into the next phase of design. The design group refined several versions of the card game that produced positive educa- tional effects at an acceptable level of rigor and playability for some educational environments where access to com- puter networks and skilled instructors may not be available. They remained valuable contributions to the department’s teaching kitbag in their own right. DESIGNING & DEVELOPING THE COMPUTER SIMULATION To build on the momentum and insights of the previous phases, the group decided to proceed with the development of a computerized version of the Chief of Staff of the Army game. They developed a computer simu- lation that could be played: 1. Against a live opponent or in the classroom 2. In an hour 3. With enough complexity to challenge 4. With enough simplicity to allow focus and access to the learning insights 5. With enough fun and competition to make it en- joyable 6. With enough choices to represent complexity but not be overwhelming 7. On a network or a single computer 8. With limited instructions and setup time required 9. With immediate viewable results for feedback 10. With an editable scenario set to allow exploration of student ideas 11. In support of the force management learning ob- jectives 12. With enough realism to be satisfying to profes- sionals 13. With enough strategy choices to suggest themes for further discussion 14. To create a common, memorable experience to support collaborative learning. The department’s design team secured college resourc- ing for contracted support to develop the game. In a matter of 4 months, a small developmental team of programmers, designers, playtesters, quality assurance, network special- ists, faculty and students went from the initial systems dy- namics concept model and requirements list to a delivered commercial quality operational game that met all require- ments. Keys to the group’s success included: 1. Designers with a clear sense of the endstate, with decision authority 2. A small enough group that could remain focused on the deliverable 3. A broad enough group that included representa- tives from all stakeholders 4. Rapid prototype and development cycles that per- mitted frequent check-ins and clarifications 5. Distributed, asynchronous development through the network 6. Preventing mission creep and feature creep so that the end-product remained focused and integrated 7. Frequent project updates made available to broader groups of students and faculty through blogs, discussion boards and presentations to gather feedback and build momentum for accep- tance of the final product IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DESIGN MODEL The Future Force game represents and helps the payer/ student visualize the following big ideas: Page 163 - Developments in Business Simulation and Experiential Learning, volume 38, 2011 1. The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) is a designer and a resource allocator. He makes decisions about the types and mixes of forces the Army needs. He is not a warfighter, and the game reflects a much more techni- cal and administrative tone and feel than typical strat- egy and first person shooter games. 2. Congress provides budget guidance from the political process, which in many cases comes with constraints on how that money shall be spent, and the budget guid- ance is influenced directly by results, but also political processes beyond the scope of the military domain to control or predict. 3. The Army “competes” in various regions/areas of op- erations around the world against smart competitors who adapt, and whose “victory conditions” may vary from ours. They seek to learn about our strategies, while masking their own intentions, thus setting the conditions for an information war. 4. Our forces must be designed, raised, manned, equipped, deployed, sustained, refit, and retired as needed. Life cycle management across many budget and program years is crucial for future preparedness and flexibility. 5. Many processes make claims on the CSA’s budget: he must make tradeoff decisions concerning: strategic deployment, technological upgrades, strategic and tac- tical information systems, current operational tempo costs, refit & re-engineering of forces; stationing; re- sponding to opponents’ strategies. 6. Consistency with current and emerging Army war- fighting doctrine which describe full spectrum opera- tions (FSO) as a set of overlapping mission profiles ranging from Major Combat Operations (MCO) through Stability Operations (SO) to Peacetime Mili- tary Engagement (PME). 7. Mission profiles vary in different regions and in com- petition with multiple opponents. Not everyone fights us in the way we would want. Mission profiles in a region have patterns but are not completely predict- able; regional mission profiles can and do change. 8. Mission profiles vary by region: simultaneous full spectrum operations will be the norm. 9. Mission consequences are not linear: the costs, conse- quences and implications of winning or losing differ dramatically between major combat operations (MCO), stability operations, and peacetime military engagement. 10. Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) is a phased process of generating the operational forces needed for current and future operations. 11. Multiple feedback loops, time delays, uncertainty, in- complete information, mixtures of quantitative and qualitative judgments, adaptive strategies and oppo- nents, funding: these dynamic variables create a net- work of uncertainty and opportunity which must nev- ertheless be managed . The design team included these insights into the de- sign criteria for the Future Force simulation, so that “players”, in the role of the CSA had real choices to make, Page 164 - Developments in Business Simulation and Experiential Learning, volume 38, 2011 with as much reasonable realism in the underlying model as we could design in order to help gain insights into the chal- lenges and tradeoff decisions, while keeping the game play- able and meaningful for the time available in the class- room. TRADEOFFS AND SIMPLICATIONS To be useful in a time-constrained school environment, educational models must find simplifications that allow games to be learned and played for significant effect. Sim- plified models must not be mistaken for reality, and neither can they be shunned for their lack of perfect accuracy. Ex- pressing this idea in the classroom was part of a larger les- son on the nature of uncertainty and the use of models for understanding and managing it. The department elected to make this an explicit part of the faculty train-up, the teach- ing note, and the classroom discussions that followed the playing of the game. This allowed the faculty to connect the logistics and change management curriculum to the broader theme of critical thinking and management of un- certainty which ties the year-long curriculum together. These are things the design team simplified in order to have a playable game and just enough complexity to repre- sent the dynamics of the environment. Simplification is a tradeoff between realism and playability/usefulness. They made every effort to blend both to create a tool that stimu- lates thoughts about the nature of force management and strategic decision-making for officers coming from an op- erational force, tactical orientation. Mission profiles: The categories and sub-categories of mission profiles (types of missions) get more numerous every year, as the Army is called upon to undertake a wider set of operations. Army Field Manual 3.0 “Operations”, (FM 3.0 , 2008), figure 2-1 describes full spectrum opera- tions as a spectrum of conflict FM 3.0 (2008) then arrays operational themes across the spectrum of conflict to represent the complexity FM 3.0 (2008), Table 2-1 illustrates a representative sample of the many operational types defined under a sub- set of just some of the operational themes The design team made a playability and visualization deci- sion to simplify into 3 broad categories: 1. Major Combat Operations (MCO): conventional high intensity combat involving a significant num- ber of large formations of regular forces. 2. Stability Operations(SO): a catch-all category to contain missions as varied as COIN, peace- keeping, peace-making, insurgency and counterin- surgency 3. Peacetime military engagement(PME): everything less than a force-on-force direct engagement and including forward presence, foreign internal de- fense, partnership training, coalition and partner readiness exercises Army units are numerous and varied with an almost infinite set of capabilities and performance characteristics in different mission profiles. They vary by design and by proficiency of individual units. We made a playability and visualization decision to use 6 “type” brigades to represent the variety of choices available to the CSA. This is how we described them to reflect their use, play, costs and conse- quences within the game. Our intent was to remain as true Page 165 - Developments in Business Simulation and Experiential Learning, volume 38, 2011 to the professional understanding of what these units “really” are: 1. Heavy BCTs (HBCT): large, self-sufficient, conven- tional combined arms formations of tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, howitzers, optimized for MCO, and whose forward presence demonstrates national politi- cal resolve and pre-emptive force, with a high OP- TEMPO cost and high deployment costs 2. Stryker BCTs (SBCT): large, self-sufficient, conven- tional combined arms formations of Stryker medium weight vehicles, howitzers, proficient in MCO and SO, and whose forward presence demonstrates national political resolve and pre-emptive force, but with a me- dium OPTEMPO cost and medium deployment cost 3. Infantry BCTs (IBCT): large, self-sufficient, conven- tional, tailorable combined arms formations of light- weight vehicles, towed howitzers, proficient in MCO , and SO, adaptable in PME, and whose forward pres- ence demonstrates national political resolve and pre- emptive force, with a relatively low OPTEMPO cost and low deployment cost 4. Special Forces Groups(SOF): small, self-sufficient, unconventional, tailorable, special operations forma- tions of small, highly trained, specialized soldiers, pro- ficient in MCO , and SO, adaptable in PME, and whose forward presence demonstrates national politi- cal resolve, a commitment to developing partnership capacity and the ability to engage in direct action on short notice in SO and PME, with a relatively low OPTEMPO cost and low deployment cost 5. Aviation Brigades (AVN): large, self-sufficient, con- ventional combined arms formations of helicopters and support vehicles, optimized for MCO and profi- cient and adaptable for use in SO and PME; whose forward presence demonstrates national political re- solve and pre-emptive force, with a high OPTEMPO cost and high deployment costs 6. Maneuver Enhancement Brigades (MEB): medium size formations, reflecting multi-capable, highly adaptable general purpose forces that can be tailored for a variety of missions across MCO, SO and PME with medium OPTEMPO costs and medium deploy- ment costs. Army units have different capabilities in the different mission profiles. The design team used a Delphi technique to establish the relative effectiveness of the 6 “type bri- gades in each of the 3 mission profiles. This is necessarily a qualitative judgment, informed by professional expertise. The group normalized the relative effectiveness that emerged from the consensus of over 50 field grade officers and faculty, in order to create meaningful choices in the game. The group used a simple form to capture individual opinions and discovered that this form can be used as a great “concrete experience” to generate interest and “buy in” from students, because it gets them into discussing their own experiences, judgment, and decision criteria. The sce- nario editor lets the adventurous faculty member to use their consensus estimates for the basis for the game deci- sion-model. Playing and winning the game connected directly to the students’ competitive instincts. The group used the following concepts to connect to playability considerations: 1. Regions/Areas of operations: the game establishes 5 regions/areas of operations to represent areas around the world in which military forces (and the other ele- ments of national power as well) engage other “players. At times we thought of these as geographical combatant command areas of responsibility, and at other times as definable Joint Operational Areas of strategic interest to the nation 2. Victory points: represent the strategic value of the 5 regions/Areas of operations to the nation, determined by the political strategic process. 3. Variability and trends: the game described each re- gion/AO in terms of the relative stability of the current “state of nature” to represent how volatile, or subject to change each region is considered to be by competent experts. This represents a range of geo-political uncer- tainty with which the CSA must contend as he devel- ops his design and mixture of forces for future contin- gencies. We described a probability for each of the 3 mission profiles for each region, as a way to estimate the set of likely future missions. These fuzzy qualita- tive judgments approximate the strategic uncertainty, somewhere between random and deterministic, that the CSA is working with. INSIGHTS AND TRADEOFFS ENCOUN- TERED THROUGH GAMEPLAY The Future Force game helps officers consider the following strategies and tradeoffs, at a minimum. Here are 8 kinds of questions/dilemmas/tradeoffs that the players will encounter, and which they will continue to encounter as field grade officers throughout their career. 1. Stationing: forward deployment at increased opera- tional tempo (OPTEMPO) cost vs. continental United States (CONUS) stationing. Stationing in CONUS represents a requirement for more strategic movement capability, but less OPTEMPO costs. Forward deploy- ment requires the Army to be strong in many places; CONUS stationing allows the Army to be strategically strong but increases the transportation costs. Consider the costs of the assumption about how many regions can be covered simultaneously 2. Research & Development: what percentage of the op- erating budget? Should the Army remain focused on 1 program consistently or regularly rotated to improve all forces? Do R&D dollars always pay off? What’s the risk of going down the wrong path? Page 166 - Developments in Business Simulation and Experiential Learning, volume 38, 2011 3. Mixture of forces: here are a variety of force mix strategies that are feasible a. A balanced force mix of equal parts of each type brigade b. Mostly general purpose forces that are reason- able good at a lot of things in PME (the “normal” state of the regions), and a few spe- cialized forces (HBCT and SOF) to be ready for MCO and SO c. A split between HBCTs and SOF to be ready for seizing the opportunity to win the 2 kinds of shooting war, and a few general purpose forces d. Very effective but expensive general purpose forces (AVN) vs. moderately effective inex- pensive, general purpose forces (EGR) 4. Specialization of forces: What does it cost the Army to specialize? For how much value? What’s the conver- sion cost if the Army gets it wrong? How much spe- cialization is enough? Specializing for what? 5. Forecasting future mission sets: How adaptive to stra- tegic surprise is the Army? Should the Army maintain a budgetary reserve? How much money should be spent to improve the accuracy of the estimate of the future requirements? CAN the estimate accuracy be improved? 6. Information vs. force structure: If the Army spends more on information (strategic and/or tactical) can it reduce the cost of equipping and maintaining force structure? How reliable is the information? How well protected are the Army’s own plans? How much should it spend to mask friendly force intentions com- pared to buying armored forces? 7. Tactical vs. strategic information: Is it more important to see what the opponent has in the region where the Army is engaging him, in order to optimize the de- ployed force or to stay in touch with his longer term acquisition and force structure strategy (looking at his capabilities in the future across all regions) 8. Reset vs. re-engineer: is it better to reconstitute dam- aged forces or convert them to different types of units, since the Army must pay a refit cost anyway? Should the Army stand down unneeded units and build new or should the Army retrain existing units for new mis- sions? INTEGRATION INTO THE BROADER CURRICULUM The department implemented the use of the newly named Future Force game in a series of faculty develop- ment sessions that featured full documentation of the game and a robust teaching note, demonstrating not only how the game was played, but how it could support a variety of teaching styles and scenarios in the classroom. Student reports of their own learning insights in small focus groups became an important part of this teaching note, as they pro- vided actual evidence of learning in a positive acceptable and believable manner. Pilot programs using the game in one classroom while more traditional methods were taught by the same faculty were used to compare and contrast educational outcomes. Post-instructional exposure to the game by students who had received the traditional instruction confirmed the fac- ulty opinion that the game offered much more variety en- joyment and practicality in achieving lesson intended out- comes. The game was introduced into a force management elective course, where students interested in Army change management can go deeper into their studies of this techni- cal domain. They found the game very helpful in providing “scaffolding” for placing their deeper research inquiries into a broader theoretical context. The students and faculty in the elective found that con- ducting another round of “game design” allowed them to quickly and graphically describe additional insights into Army change management and force management in a lan- guage and with concepts that they already had in common. This is consistent with the systems dynamics models in general: they not only allow participants to try out ideas, they also become the basis of a shared mental model that facilitates communication and mutual understanding. This has broader applicability beyond the military gaming com- munity. Experiential games that allow for iterative develop- ment between domain experts and game designers can quickly generate new models for understanding and educa- tion. Some faculty reported observing their students playing the game before class, during lunch, and after classes were released for the day. Many students and faculty are avid gamers and their interest in playing a competitive level of the game against each other produced some memorable encounters and provided additional deep-level insights into the power of small worlds games to achieve a positive and energetic classroom environment. Here is a screenshot of the simple yet subtle screen where Future Force: The Chief of Staff of the Army Game” is played . . . . Insert Future Force Screen Shot about here . . . . A 15 minute movie/voice over that describes the play of 1 turn in the game, and which is used as a part of the class preparation phase and homework can be found at the following link: http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=W5fw8Ry3kvM RESULTS The faculty has been overwhelming in favor of using the game in the mainstream curriculum and after 2 cycles of use, their judgment has been supported by the measured feedback from the college’s quality assurance office, re- Page 167 - Developments in Business Simulation and Experiential Learning, volume 38, 2011 sponsible for rigorous quantitative and qualitative measure- ments of student learning outcomes. The year over year measured student satisfaction levels shown a significant increase in overall satisfaction with the difficult force man- agement materials when taught using the Future Force game. Students have chosen to highlight the game experi- ence in their open-ended narrative comments. Faculty after action reviews have been very positive in describing the use of the game in their classrooms. The game has embedded many technical considerations into the system, which many new faculty often find to be challeng- ing when preparing for their first delivery of the lessons. The game serves as a useful education tool for the faculty as well as students. The department has shared the game with other partner schools in the Army Education System and with high level operational field commands who are concerned with raising the proficiency of their staffs in appreciating the complex- ity of Army force management. The success of this strategic force management educa- tional game spawned the rapid development of 2 additional small worlds games, which have both been completed us- ing the same developmental model and strategy described in this paper. Both games are on schedule to be added to the curriculum using the same basic approach to implemen- tation described in this paper The second game is an operational level deployment model that simulates the flow of forces and supplies into a theater of war from a CONUS base against a determined and capable enemy whose aim is to disrupt the flow and create catastrophes at the initial ports of debarkation. The third game models the tactical distribution of bulk fuel throughout an area of operations against an elusive, deter- mined and capable enemy, in order to support offensive operations over a wide area. The look and feel of all 3 3 games are similar, by design, and collectively represent a suite of educational experiences that are well positioned to meet the college’s needs for experiential games into the future. CONCLUSIONS The Army Command & General Staff College’s (CGSC) mission to educate newly promoted field grade officers on the variety of complex management and leader- ship challenges their students will face in the future is sig- nificantly enhanced by the appropriate use of experiential learning in the form of small worlds management games. Using a design and implementation strategy that fea- tured a diverse development team of subject matter experts, faculty, students and programmers, the logistics department Page 168 - Developments in Business Simulation and Experiential Learning, volume 38, 2011 at CGSC was able to define, develop, test, field and apply a strategic level Army Force Management game. The Future Force game significantly enhanced the student and faculty ability to visualize, understand and manage the complexity inherent in the requirement to field an Army now and in the future that is ready to adapt to and win in a dynamic opera- tional environment against adversaries across the spectrum of conflict. Fully documenting the design and development proc- ess became an important part of the educational process contained within the lesson package for the game, since the project itself was directly concerned with managing and learning about uncertainty. Successful completion of this project points the way ahead for more ways to apply the techniques of experiential learning to other areas of the curriculum, and allows the CGSC to continue to develop partnerships with other schools and organizations working in this area of educating leaders for uncertainty. REFERENCES (Long, K. (2009). Participatory Action Research pilot study notes. Ft Leavenworth, KS: CGSC (unpublished). Long, K. (2008). A reflection on Army force structure deci- sion making from 1995-1996: Passing on the BCT based Army. [webpage, blog essay] URL http:// usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/dlro/archive/2008/11/24/a- reflection-on-army-force-structure-decision-making- from-1995-1996-passing-on-the-bct-based-army.aspx TRADOC Pam 525-5-500. (2008). Commander’s Appre- ciation and Campaign Design. TRADOC Pam 525-8-3 (2010). US Army Functional Learning Concept: 2016-2020. US Army Field Manual FM 3.0, Operations, (2008) Additional references which indirectly influenced the de- velopment of this paper, and may be of interest to the reader interested in scholarly treatments of appreciating complexity. Baron, J (2000) Thinking and deciding. New York: Cam- bridge University Press. Checkland, P. (1981). Systems thinking, systems practice. Avon, UK: John Wiley & Sons. Cumming, T. & Worley, C. (2009). Organizational devel- opment & change (9th edition). South-Western CEN- GAGE Learning. Mason, OH. Gigerenzer, G., (2005). I think, therefore I err. Social Re- search, 72(1), 195-218. Gosling, J., & Mintzberg, H. (2004). The Education of Practicing Managers. Sloan Management Review, 45 (4), 18-23. Grove, A. (1996). Only the paranoid survive: How to ex- ploit the crisis points that challenge every company. Doubleday. New York. Henrich, J., ALbers, W., Boyd, R., Gigerenzer, G., McCabe, K., Ockenfels, A., & Young, H. (2001). Group report: What is the role of culture in bounded rationality. In G.Gigerenzer, & R. Selten (Eds.), Bounded rationality: the adaptive toolbox. (pp. 343- 359) Boston: First MIT Press. Jones, G. (2010). Organizational theory, design and change (6th ed.). Prentice Hall. Upper Saddle River, NJ. Keeney, R. (1992). Value-focused thinking: A path to crea- tive decisionmaking. Harvard University Press, Cam- bridge, MA. Klein, G.,(2001). The fiction of optimization. In G. Giger- enzer, & R. Selten (Eds.), Bounded rationality: the adaptive toolbox. (pp. 103-121). 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Table of Contents Volume 38, 2011 Simulated Tabletop Exercise for Risk Management - Anti Bio-terrorism Scenario Simulated Tabletop Exercise From Business Games to Simulations - Simuworlds & Microworlds Demand Equation Redux: The Design and Functionality of the Gold/Pray Model in Computerized Business Simulations Managing Client-Based Learning: Insights from Successful Teaching Project Courses in Marketing Tracking Forecast Error Type, Frequency and Magnitude with the Forecast Error Package Responding to Facilitate Collaboration Simulating Sudden Change and the Value of Timely Information Managing Human Resources Simulation A Study on Collectivism and Group Decision-Making: An International Comparison of Japan, China, and Russia Using a Gaming Simulation The Use of Management Games in the Management Research Agenda Gaming On-Line: A Simulation Application Positioning and Performance in Simulated Networks Supply Chain Management: A Simulation Application Simulation as a Teaching Method in Strategic Management Distance Studies Entrepreneurship: A Game of Risk and Reward Phase II: The Start-Up Return to the Paradise Islands: From Confrontation to Cooperation Effect on Market Performance of Displaying Supply and Demand Curves in a Business Simulation Appreciating Complexity: The Chief of Staff of the Army Game Managing Organizations: Experiential MBA Course Teaches Alternatives to the Machine Model A Simulation Model for Analyzing the Night-Time Emergency Health Care System in Japan The Continuing Evoluation of Assessing Project Management as an Academic Learning Outcome (ALO) Should College Instructors Change Their Teaching Styles to Meet the Millenial Student? The Mouse Game and its Effects on Team Interdependence Learning from the Gulf Oil Spill to Prepare for a Brighter Future: A New Game Engaging Stake Holders in Triple Bottom Line Accounting & Strategic Planning Video Killed the Biblio Star: The Impact of Digital Media on Student Learning Outcomes Exploring Motivation: Using Emoticons to Map Student Motivation in a Business Game Exercise An Alternative to PC and Internet Based Simulations: The Internet Integrated Mode MiddleState University -- A Crisis in Education Complexity Avoidance, Narcissism and Experiential Learning Examining the Cognitive, Affective, and Psychomotor Dimensions in Management Skill Development Through Experiential Learning: Developing a Framework A Situational Leadership Exercise Based on the Biology of a Starfish JOGAI CEFET -- The Industrial Administration Undergraduate Game Would You Take a Marketing Man to a Quick Service Restaurant? Modeling Corporate Social Responsibility In A Food Service Menu-Management Simulation Use of a Simulation in a Large Class Environment for a Marketing Principles Class: A Qualitative Analysis of Whether Learning Objectives were Met A Team Based Information Literacy Exercise ABSEL Marketing Communications Plan An Interdisciplinary Study of the Impact of Playing a Marketing Simulation Game on Student Knowledge of Management Accounting/Finance Principles Analyzing Construction Planning of Interiro Finish Work of Apartment Building by Simulation Doing Murder One Again The Simple Business Game and Simulation Transfering the Knowledge of Middle Management to Novices Infectious Disease Simulation Model for Estimation of Spreading Understanding the Relative Influence of Several Factors in ERP Simulation Performance: An Exploration of Ecological Validity Tragedy of the Commons: An Exercise Using Clickers to Illustrate and Teach a Key Concept in Negotiations The Meaning of Firm Demand in Business Simulations If the Games Work, Why Aren't More Faculty Willing to Play? Those Who Do and Those That Don't: A Study of Engaged and Disengaged Business Game Players