PLAYERS' EX POST PERCEPTIONS OF RISKS TAXING IN THE INVESTMENT GAME


Computer Simulation and Learning Theory, Volume 3, 1976 

 539 

PROPOSAL 

 

PLAYERS’ EX POST PERCEPTIONS OF RISKS TAXING IN THE INVESTMENT GAME 

 

Carl C. Nielsen 

 

Wichita State University 

 

The Investment Game has been played both by two-person teams of students and individuals. 

Earlier research into the performance of the players has indicated that there has been no difference of 

significance in rate of return between individuals and teams. However, in the administration of the game 

over several semesters, it has been found that disagreements on the question of risk do arise between team 

members. Two possible questions can be posed from these disagreements. 

 

First, is it possible that because of such disagreements the members of teams are able to reach 

decisions only after significant compromise and negotiation? Second, is it likely that teams in general 

accept different degrees of risk than individuals, at least after they have worked together for some time and 

negotiated with each other? This conceit of risk changes, called “risk syndication” or “risky shifts,” has 

been studied by others; the degree to which this phenomenon exists among players of The Investment 

Came should be of interest to most gamesters. 

 

The present study is an attempt to measure, ex post, the degree of risk aversion perceived by players 

of The Investment Game, both teams and individuals. If some evidence of difference can be found, or if it 

is determined that risk shifting occurs during the playing of the game, then the results may be relevant to 

gaming in general. 

 

It is recognized that evidence of risk shifting can only be measured through both ex ante and ex post 

measures. Hence, if this study indicates any evidence of such shifts, additional research will be necessary 

in an attempt to measure the degree to which risk shifts occur, particularly among the members of teams.