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ART, TECHNOLOGY, AND TRUTH
in the Thought of Martin Heidegger
FELIPE DANIEL MONTERO
In mythology, autochthones (from the Ancient Greek αὐτός "self," and χθών
"soil"; i.e. "people sprung from earth itself ") are those mortals who have sprung
from the soil, rocks and trees. They are rooted and belong to the land eternally.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In his “Deromanticizing Heidegger,” American philosopher Don Ihde attempts to
denounce some arbitrary stances in Martin Heidegger’s thought in order to propose
a philosophy of technology purged of what he deems the philosopher’s romantic,
and implicitly Nazi, preferences. Ihde begins in stating: “A century after his birth,
two very contrary statements can be made concerning Martin Heidegger: First, in a
significant sense, he is surely one of the most important founders of the philosophy
of technology […] Second, we all also know that he joined the National Socialist
German Workers' Party and remained with it through the war […] My question is
this: Is there something at the very heart of Heidegger's thought that makes both of
these contraries possible?”2 The aim of this present work attempts to answer Ihde’s
question following a close reading of Heidegger’s public speech “Memorial Address”
1 Josine H Blok. “Gentrifying Genealogy: On the Genesis of the Athenian Autochthony Myth.” In Ancient Myth.
Media, Transformations and Sense-Constructions, 251–75. Edited by Ueli Dill and Christine Walde. (Berlin: De
Gruyter, 2009), 261.
2 Don Ihde, Heidegger’s technologies: postphenomenological perspectives, (New York, Fordham University Press, 2010),
74.
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(Gelassenheit).3 If we assess the rest of Heidegger’s works in light of this speech, then it
is possible to reach a systematic understanding of the relationships that exist between
art, technology and truth in Heidegger’s thought. In turn, this analysis specifically
allows us to appreciate what aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy lead him to his so-
called romanticism and the consequent error of subscribing to Nazism. Finally, this
essay also explains how, in the words uttered ten years after the end of the war,
Heidegger himself managed to offer an alternative to fascism so as to confront the
threats of modern technology.
II. THE CONCEPT OF EARTH: PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON
HEIDEGGER’S ROMANTICISM
Many of Martin Heidegger’s works, such works as “The Origin of the Work of Art,” or
“The Question Concerning Technology,” are filled with a romanticization of German
country life that remains implicitly related (at least it is hard to argue otherwise)
to Heidegger’s involvement with Nazism. And yet, this supposed romanticization
does not result from a mere ideological preference, but rather, is grounded in the
very concept of a homeland (Heimat) or a home ground (heimatlicher Boden)
consequently employed in Heidegger’s “Gelassenheit” (n.b. both of these concepts
approximately correspond to what in “The Origin of the Work of Art” he refers to
as ‘the earth’).4 Heidegger concludes through his phenomenological explication of
the work of art that the essence of the work is the strife between earth and world,
and that “[w]hat thus happens in the strife […is] the inauguration of the open in
the struggle between the unconcealed and the concealed, the coming-out of hiding
and deception—this self-contained event is the happening of what we call truth.”5
The making of a work of art produces the earth, comparable to the sound in music,
the words in literature or color in the visual arts. Nonetheless, we cannot reduce the
earth to such isolated concepts as ‘matter’ or ‘the sensuous’ since Heidegger conceives
of it as the opaque aspect of beings, which resists being brought to the clearing of
intelligibility. In opposition to the earth, the world is that which is opened by the
work. Earth and world, then, describe two different dimensions of intelligibility:
the opaque, or that which resists interpretation (concealment), and the world as
“revealing,” or the transparent aspect of entities. Art as “the becoming and happening
of truth”6 manifests then when the earth—as that which closes upon itself—becomes
brought to the open of the world in the strife instigated by the work; that is, in the
tensional relationship established between what there already is and the elusive aspect
of the receding earth.
3 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on thinking.: a translation of Gelassenheit, (New York, Harper & Row, 1959)
4 Iain D. Thomson, Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 110
5 Martin Heidegger, “Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerks: Erste Ausarbeitung” Heidegger Studies Vol. 5 (1989): 5-22.
The original text reads: “Was so in der Bestreitung geschieht: die Eröffnung der Offenheit des Widerstreits von
Unverborgenem und Verborgenem, das Herauskommen von Verdeckung und Verstellung, — dieses in sich
gefügte Geschehen ist das Geschehen dessen, was wir Wahrheit nennen.”
6 Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought. (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 71.
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Despite the alleged ontological complexity of Heidegger’s concept of ‘earth,’ he still
can claim that, “[w]e notice that a work of art has flowered in the ground of our
homeland. As we hold this simple fact in mind, we cannot help [but remember
that] at once […] during the last two centuries great poets and thinkers have been
brought forth from the Swabian land. Thinking about it further makes clear at once
that Central Germany is likewise such a land, and so are East Prussia, Silesia, and
Bohemia.”7 Given these statements, it seems like we must concede to Ihde that
Heidegger’s romantic tastes are intrinsically linked to his nationalist ideology and
represent a great obstacle not only for the philosophy of technology, but also for
his aesthetics (including his concept of truth). Nonetheless, this pivot too hurriedly
dismisses Heidegger’s thought, which can be corrected if we approach his critique of
modern technology from the horizon of his remaining corpus.
As stated earlier, Heidegger claims that the essence of the work of art takes place
in strife, which itself hosts the occurrence of truth as unconcealment. In “The
Question Concerning Technology,” the essence of technology as enframing (Gestell)
is characterized as modernity’s hegemonic mode of unconcealing. In this way, art
and technology are revealed as diametrically opposed modes of unconcealment or
truth, and as Ihde points out—concerning the latter—Heidegger has the tendency to
oppose a ‘good’ technology to a ‘bad’ one. What characterizes the good technology is
its artistic dimension as a result from art not yet being distinguished in its particularity
from the rest of technology, as is the case in Greek philosophy—where the concept
of techné is understood as encompassing the poiesis of fine arts since the artist is not
distinguished from the artisan. Yet, Ihde understands that Heidegger’s distinction
has its grounds in subjective preferences; in particular, a nostalgia for traditional
modes of production and an ecological awareness that rejects those technologies that
“provoke” (herausfordern) nature. In “Gelassenheit”, Heidegger claims that in order
to face the threats that modern technology poses, “[w]e can use technical devices
as they ought to be used.”8 Phenomenology (methodologically speaking) precludes
this type of normative claims because it must be descriptive. Although we might
conclude that in this speech Heidegger betrays his arbitrariness by uttering explicitly
normative claims, there are still, nonetheless, many sufficient arguments to doubt this
deduction. In the next section, I initially expound Heidegger’s characterization of the
provocative mode of unconcealing as derived from a more original one, and secondly,
offer an interpretation of Heidegger’s project in “Gelassenheit” that emphasizes the
non-normative grounds of his statements. In both of these cases, the original/derived
distinction grounds Heidegger’s preferences. These must be understood as stemming
from a purely phenomenological basis that does not allow itself to be tainted by
subjective tastes or a normativity incompatible with the phenomenological method.
7 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on thinking.: a translation of Gelassenheit, (New York, Harper & Row, 1959), 47.
8 Ibid, 54.
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III. BEYOND ROMANTICISM: THE TRANSCENDENTAL
ARTWORK
In the “Question Concerning Technology,” after a brief detour through the traditional
conception of technology as a means to an end, and a reinterpretation of Aristotle’s
concept of causality, Heidegger formulates the essence of technology as the Gestell,
or “enframing”. The Gestell marks one of the epochs in Heidegger’s depiction of the
history of western metaphysics, which just as the Idea was for Plato, is the way in
which being announces itself to us in our times. What characterizes our epoch is that
the Gestell interpellates us to unconceal the totality of beings as “stock” (Bestand)
in the manner of a provocative order or solicitation (herausfondernde Bestellen).9
Discerning what exactly Heidegger considers to be the particular characteristics and
limits that enable us to distinguish the provocative mode of unconcealment from
non-provocative ones represents a tough exegetical challenge. Why exactly does the
hydroelectrical dam on the Rhine provoke Nature whereas the temple does not? In
this respect, Ihde opposes Heidegger’s description of the Greek temple in the “Origin
of the Work of Art” to that which J. Donald Hughes offers in his Ecology in ancient
civilizations. While Heidegger offers a highly romanticized depiction of the temple,
Hughes emphasizes the environmental impact that one can see around the Acropolis.
Hughes also mentions how even Plato witnessed these concerning ecological
transformations when he visited various temples devoted to the guardian spirits of
streams, which had already dried out by his time. Nonetheless, these counterexamples
suffer from two defects. First, the contrast between these examples results from
Heidegger’s stance that we must understand the work of art in the context of the
world that is opened up by it. It is then justified to offer a romanticized depiction of
the temple since only in this way can we offer an account of its original situation in
which the temple properly functions as a work of art. The two examples offered by
Hughes depict works whose worlds have already closed. Second, we must concede
to Ihde that Hughes’ examples demonstrate how the damage done to nature is not
something exclusive to modern technology. However, this does not mean that Greek
technology provoked nature in a Heideggerian sense. What concerns Heidegger is
the complete hegemony of a certain way of approaching beings that threatens to take
over all other possible modes of unconcealment. We must take into account that
even if the ancient Greeks could be said to have damaged nature just as much as the
English did in the times of Francis Bacon, the difference between the two of them—
and of unique interest to Heidegger—is how from a certain historical horizon nature
can be seen as something to be dominated, which is clearly incompatible with the
Greek conception of physis.10
9 Martin Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000), 17.
10 In more analytical terms, the distinction is not quantitative but qualitative. It does not refer to a measurable
difference in ecological damage but rather to a change in humanity’s relation to nature. The type of comparison
that Ihde makes rests in the type of thinking that Heidegger is criticizing, that is, the calculative mode of thought
that hopes to settle all questions by way of empirical obervations and measurements.
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The ultimate danger that the Gestell represents is that all modes of unconcealment
would be redirected to that of provocation. This would signify the end of meditative
thinking and the total hegemony of what Heidegger terms the calculative mode of
thought. Heidegger claims that the Gestell, which becomes pervasively evident in our
times with the advent of such technologies as the nuclear bomb, began operating
and developing itself long ago—being the root of modern science’s instrumental
character and understanding of nature in terms of measurable extension. In this way,
Heidegger worries that the only possibility that would remain for man would be “of
pursuing and pushing forward nothing but what is revealed in ordering (Bestellen),
and of deriving all his standards on this basis. Through this the other possibility is
blocked, that man might be admitted more and sooner and ever more primally to
the essence of that which is unconcealed and to its unconcealment, in order that he
might experience as his essence his needed belonging to revealing.”11 In the language
of Being and Time, man would fall into an improper mode of existence in which he
would no longer understand himself from himself, and, remain oblivious to his own
essence as a consequence of understanding both nature and himself in terms of stock
(Bestand). Ihde admits that “Heidegger does not simply outright condemn modern
technology—its essence, enframing, is simultaneously a revealing of the world and
an openness.” In spite of this, Ihde dismisses the danger that Heidegger warms us of
by introducing the following question: “In short, all of nature, including the human
being, will be seen as reduced to a vast resource well (Bestand) – but the question
then is: for who, or for what end?”12 However, if we properly understand Heidegger’s
stance that the Gestell grounds an epoch of our understanding of beings, then it does
not result from any human will or in favor of any human interests. In this respect,
Heidegger’s stance regarding the hegemony of the Gestell can be compared to Michel
Foucault’s description of power relations. Instead of the traditional models of power
vested in a source of authority, an individual figure or within a particular group, the
microphysics of power do not respond to any such central source; instead, oppressed
individuals reproduce within themselves these same structures biopolitically.13
The following quote from Heidegger’s “Gelassenheit,” thus, takes on the following
relevance: “these forces, since man has not made them, have moved long since beyond
his will and have outgrown his capacity for decision[s].”14
Another aspect of Heidegger’s romanticism remains in his nationalism as a form
of the concept of ‘home ground,’ which specifically protrudes in “Gelassenheit.” In
relation to art, Heidegger asks “does not the flourishing of any genuine work depend
upon its roots in a native soil? […] does man still dwell calmly between heaven and
earth? […] is there still a life-giving home-land in whose ground man may stand
11 Martin Heidegger, The question concerning technology, and other essays, (New York, Harper Perennial, 2013): 26.
12 Don Ihde, Heidegger’s technologies: postphenomenological perspectives. (New York, Fordham University Press, 2010),
81.
13 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 26.
14 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on thinking.: a translation of Gelassenheit, (New York, Harper & Row, 1959), 51.
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rooted, that is, be autochthonic?”15 These concepts lend themselves easily to an
interpretation that relates Heidegger’s thought immediately back to his involvement
with Nazism, but this issue is far more complex. The concept of earth is the result of
a phenomenology of the work of art and his phenomenology—as is the case for the
phenomenology of “equipment” towards the beginning of Being and Time, which
focuses exclusively on the artisanal mode of production—takes the thematic entity
under description from the perspective of a primitive experience. In this way, we can
say that Heidegger’s phenomenology of art, although seeking to arrive at the essence
of art as such, focuses on a model of art in which the production of beautiful objects
is not yet distinguished in its particularity from the rest of technological production.
In this manner, there seems to be a radical difference between the Greek temple as
studied in the “Origin of the Work of Art” and the example of Van Gogh’s painting
“A Pair of Shoes” offered in that very same text. While the essence of the work of
art as strife must be descriptive of all forms of art, it seems that the Greek temple
is limited to the world of the Greeks, whereas Van Gogh’s painting properly reveals
to Heidegger the essence of art as such. Iain Thomson claims that “in Van Gogh’s
painting—the strange space which surrounds these shoes like an underlying and yet
also enveloping atmosphere—one can notice that inchoate forms begin to emerge
from the background but never quite take a firm shape; in fact, these shapes tend to
disappear when one tries to pin them down.”16 In this manner, Van Gogh’s painting
can be said to reflect the structure of the type of strife that Heidegger deems the
essence of the work of art.
Meyer Schapiro famously objected to Heidegger’s interpretation of Van Gogh’s
painting as nothing but a subjective projection of his own romantic preferences,
since the shoes that the painting depicted were Van Gogh’s own—those of a city
man, and not, as he states, those of a countrywoman. Most Heideggerians would
claim that Schapiro misses the important aspects of Heidegger’s example; namely,
the ontological depth sought in the phenomenological description of the work.
While I partially agree with this rebuke, the fact that Van Gogh painted his own
shoes17 acquires utmost importance precisely because it means that we are facing an
ontological work that reflects on its own being—a transcendental art18 that reveals
15 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on thinking.: a translation of Gelassenheit, (New York, Harper & Row, 1959), 47-48.
16 Thomson, Iain D., "Heidegger’s Aesthetics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .
17 Van Gogh’s painting then doesn’t reveal the world of the country woman but the world of the artist. Here we
have an opposition between the two modes of reading the concept of earth. If we take the shoes to be those
of the German country woman, we read the earth as soil (in a way reminiscent of the Nazi slogan “blood and
soil”) whereas if we take them to be the artist’s, we are confronted with the concept of earth as that dimension
of inteligibility that resists totalitarian closure. I’d venture to claim that Van Gogh’s painting could only reveal
art’s essence to Heidegger in so far as it expresses the artist’s relationship to the earth which involves a constantly
renewed attempt to seize those fleeting instants that are worthy of being immortalized in the artwork. Derrida
seems to be pointing in this direction on Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question and also on The Truth in Painting.
18 There is much to develop and further enquire in regard to this concept since the reflexive character of modern
art is an extensive phenomenon. I recently came upon a book by literary critic Robert Alter named “Partial
Magic: The Novel as a Self-conscious Genre,” which sees in the Quixote not only the birth of the novel, but also
the archetype that contains all the self-reflexive exercises that later novelists will explore and exploit (with the
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the conditions of its own possibility. This kind of art differs altogether from what
one could deem pre-transcendental art, such as the Greek temple, or any other work
of art previous to Cervantes’ revolution in putting forth his highly reflective Don
Quixote—comparable to that started in philosophy twenty years later by Descartes
in his Rules for the Direction of the Mind.19 We can say, without departing too much
from Heidegger, that a work of pre-transcendental art is a sensible manifestation of
the spirit of a community or, in less Hegelian terms, that it consolidates its ethno-
political identity by providing a tangible foundation for its political organization.
Nonetheless, we can only claim that this is art’s function because of Heidegger’s
radical claim that the temple founds the Greek world in the sense of a cosmovision,
opening the historical horizon of intelligibility for their understanding of beings.
As Heidegger says, “Standing there, the temple first gives to things their look, and
to men their outlook on themselves.”20 While the temple’s essence is the strife in
which the earth is brought to the clearing of human intelligibility, Van Gogh’s
painting reflects the strife itself, as his broad brushstrokes abandon the defined lines
of realism and evoke the elusive and receding aspect of the earth. In this way, we can
appreciate the link between Heidegger’s aesthetics and nationalism, since as long as
an explicit distinction between transcendental and pre-transcendental art does not
arise, the concept of ‘earth’ remains tied to that of a ‘home ground’ and autochthony.
Heidegger’s “Gelassenheit” functions as an exhortation for thinking about a new
autochthony that would allow us to dwell properly in the midst of the irreversible
changes brought through modern technology.
Releasement (Gellasenheit) is the attitude that Heidegger proposes as that which
we need to assume in order to face the threats of modern technology. In “The
Experience of Technology: Human-Machine Relations,” Ihde states that “there
is a 'technosphere' within which we do a good deal of our living, surrounding
us in part the way technological artifacts do literally for astronauts and deep sea
investigators.”21 Despite his romanticism, Heidegger similarly observes that, “[f ]or
all of us, the arrangements, devices, and machinery of technology are to a greater or
lesser extent indispensable. It would be foolish to attack technology blindly. It would
be shortsighted to condemn it as the work of the devil. We depend on technical
devices.”22 Given that we depend on the world of technology or the technosphere,
releasement means saying “yes” to modern technology, remembering, however, that
exception of those who subscribe to literary realism). Furthermore, an interesting dialogue can be opened with
Danto’s philosophy of art since his periodization of the history of art responds to the degree of self-consciousness
evidenced by artists. Danto distinguishes between pre-art and Art, the latter corresponding to the epoch in which
artists as the makers of beautiful objects are distinguished from artisans. The infamous claim of the end of art
precisely refers to the epoch in history, the 20th century, where art itself becomes philosophical as it explicitly
poses the question, “What is art?"
19 We could also mention here another exponent of the Spanish renaissance: the painter Velazquez, known for his
self-portrait Las Meninas and his extensive depiction of mirrors.
20 Martin Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002), 21.
21 Ihde, D. Technics and praxis, (Dordrecht, D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1979), 14.
22 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on thinking.: a translation of Gelassenheit, (New York, Harper & Row, 1959), 53.
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the essence of modern technology insofar as it compels us to understand nature
merely as a quantitatively measurable reserve of resources (including what we deem
the “human resources”) threatens to redirect all modes of unconcealment to that of
provocation. Since this would signify a fall into an improper mode of existence as
we stop reflecting upon ourselves to understand humanity merely in terms of stock,
releasement simultaneously has to say “no” to the pervasiveness of the Gestell: “We
can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the right to
dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste our nature.”23 This saying yes
to the unavoidable character of technology acknowledges that “a profound change is
taking place in man's relation to nature and to the world. But the meaning that reigns
in this change remains obscure.”24 Given this opacity in modern technology’s essence,
the openness to mystery becomes the other part to Heidegger’s solution to face the
dangers of the Gestell. With this openness, Heidegger simultaneously recognizes the
imperative to accept the inevitable while humbly admitting that his limitations as a
man of a past generation preclude him from imagining how man can dwell properly
in the time of the Gestell. Insofar as “mystery” is defined by Heidegger as that which
shows itself at the same time as it conceals itself, the openness to mystery is the
way in which we keep meditative or self-reflexive thought alive by staying in the
realm of truth as unconcealment. It is worth noting how the mystery to which we
remain open evokes the concept of earth, for one of Heidegger’s main contributions
to philosophy is his stance that humans first and foremost understand the world
through the manipulation of tools and the production of works. Thus, thought as
openness to mystery and art are identified—as in Nietzsche’s stance that art is the
properly metaphysical activity of man or Danto’s claim that the defining trait of 20th
century art remains its philosophical character since it explicitly poses the question
“What is art?”
V. CONCLUSION
Releasement and openness to mystery “grant us the possibility of dwelling in the
world in a totally different way. They promise us a new ground and foundation
upon which we can stand and endure in the world of technology without being
imperiled by it. Releasement toward things and openness to the mystery grants us a
vision of a new autochthony, which someday even might be fit to recapture the old
and now rapidly disappearing autochthony in a changed form.”25 The lost rooting
that Heidegger denounces is not simply the subordination of meditative thinking
to calculative thought: the hegemony of modern technology brings about the
shortening of all distances in space and time, the erasure of all localisms as a result of
globalization. As Ihde claims, “[t]he dramatic space shots of Earth from the moon or
a satellite are very un-Heideggerian precisely because they place Earth at a distance
23 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on thinking: a translation of Gelassenheit, (New York, Harper & Row, 1959), 54..
24 Ibid, Pg. 55.
25 Ibid.
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from Earth-as-ground. But they are also irreversibly part of the postmodern view of
Earth-as-globe, with a very different sense of what constitutes our ‘home’.”26 As this
essay demonstrated, Heidegger recognizes this irreversible aspect of the profound
changes in humanity’s relation to nature and the world and exhorts us to think so that
we can build a “home” in the technical world. In this regard, Heidegger’s thought is
closer than ever to the spirit of Kant’s philosophy: not only does he offer a critique
of the illegitimate claims of the science of his time that threaten to warp and destroy
human freedom, but he also calls upon us to understand our dwelling within the
world in cosmopolitan terms. ◆
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Blok, Josine H. “Gentrifying Genealogy: On the Genesis of the Athenian
Autochthony Myth.” In Ancient Myth. Media, Transformations and Sense-
Constructions, 251–75. Edited by Ueli Dill and Christine Walde. Berlin: De
Gruyter, 2009.
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. New York: Vintage Books, 1995.
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University Press, 2010.
Ihde, D. Technics and praxis. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1979.
Heidegger, M. Discourse on thinking.: a translation of Gelassenheit. John M. Anderson
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Heidegger, M. Off the Beaten Track. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002
Heidegger, M. Poetry, Language, Thought. A. Hofstadter, trans. New York: Harper &
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Heidegger, M. “Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerks: Erste Ausarbeitung”. Heidegger
Studies Vol. 5 (1989); 5-22
Heidegger, M. Vorträge und Aufsätze. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann,
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Heidegger, M. The question concerning technology, and other essays. New York: Harper
Perennial, 2013.
Thomas, Iain D., “Heidegger’s Aesthetics,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Fall 2019 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (e.d.), URL=.
Thomson, Iain D. Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity. Cambridge: Cambridge
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26 Don Ihde. Heidegger’s technologies: postphenomenological perspectives, (New York, Fordham University Press, 2010):
85.